

Airfield Development and Activities Behind the Lines

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRFIELDS²

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from U. S. Pacific Fleet, Base Development Plan, Iwo Jima, *TF 51 AR*; *TF 52 AR*; *TF 56 AR*; *TF 56 TQM Rpt*; *TF 56 Air Rpt*; *TF 56 Med Rpt*, dtd 28Mar45; *VAC SAR*; *VAC C-1 PerRpts*; *VAC C-3 Rpt*; *VAC C-4 Jnl*; *VAC Logistics Rpt*; *VAC NGF and AirRpts*; *3d MarDiv G-1 PerRpts*; *3d MarDiv G-4 Per Rpts*, 27Feb-1Apr45; *3d MarDiv G-4 Jnl*, 23Feb-8Apr45, hereafter *3d MarDiv G-4 Jnl*; *4th MarDiv D-4 Rpts*; *5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts*; *5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv SerTrps UJnl*, 19Feb-8Mar45, hereafter *5th MarDiv SerTrps UJnl*; *5th SP Rgt AR*; *ComPhibGru 2 AR*; *Iwo Comments*; *Bartley, Iwo Monograph*; *Newcomb, Iwo Jima*; *Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*; *Craven and Cate, The Pacific*; *Gallant, The Friendly Dead*; *Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil*; *Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass*; *Brooks E. Kleber and Dale Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service: The Technical Services—U. S. Army in World War II—Chemicals in Combat* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1966), hereafter *Kleber and Birdsell, Chemicals in Combat*; *Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher, The Chemical Warfare Service: The Technical Services—U. S. Army in World War II—Organizing for War* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), hereafter *Brophy and Fisher, Organizing for War*; *David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, The Atomic Years, 1945-1950*, v. II (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), hereafter *Lilienthal, The Atomic Energy Years*; Department of the Navy, *Building the Navy's Bases in World War II*, v. II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947); *William*

While three Marine divisions were inching their way northward against tenacious resistance, an equally difficult battle was being fought to the rear of the combat troops. Aside from the Japanese who, particularly during the early days of the operation, were able to blanket any part of the island with artillery and mortar fire, the biggest enemy was the time factor. The basic premise on which the entire operation had been planned was to secure the two southernmost airfields on the island as quickly as possible, and it was for this purpose that Marines up front were hourly giving their lives. Unless the airfields could be quickly put into operation, the sacrifice of these Marines would serve little, if any, purpose.

On D plus 5, men of the 31st Naval Construction Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Dominick J. Ermilio, began work on the southern airfield. This job initially had been assigned to the 133d Naval Construction

Bradford Huie, *From Omaha to Okinawa* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1945).

² Additional material in this section is derived from: *31st NCB AR*: 1st JASCO OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Nov44-19Mar45, hereafter *1st JASCO OpRpt*; 2d Sep Eng Bn URpts, 25-Feb-26Mar45, hereafter *2d Sep EngBn URpts*; 3d JASCO AR, Iwo Jima, 7Nov44-16Mar45, hereafter *3d JASCO AR*; 2d Bomb Disposal Co. UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-22Mar45, hereafter *2d Bomb Disposal Co UJnl*.

Battalion under Lieutenant Commander Raymond P. Murphy, but the battalion had suffered such heavy casualties on D-Day that it was still undergoing reorganization four days later. While, to the north, the battle for Airfield No. 2 was in progress, the Seabees, with riflemen covering them, were crawling up the runway of No. 1 Airfield on hands and knees, probing for mines and picking up the most jagged shell fragments that could wreak havoc with the rubber tires of aircraft.

Throughout the day, the Seabees and elements of the VAC 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Clark, sifted the dirt on the runways, often under enemy sniper and artillery fire. By late afternoon of 25 February, the engineers had filled, bladed, and rolled 1,500 feet of the north-south runway of Airfield No. 1, which was then ready for use by small aircraft. This was the scene that took place at the airfield on the following day:

Down on Airfield No. 1 the first planes came in, two little OY-1s of the 4th Division (VMO-4), their wheels kicking up spurts of dust as they touched down. Dirty engineers and Seabees lined the runway and cheered as the little spotter planes rolled to a stop. The Grasshoppers (Stinson Sentinels), or "Maytag Messerschmitts," stayed only a few minutes and then took off again, to fly over Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater to spot targets for the 4th Division. As they left, the first of the 133d Seabees' rollers and scrapers climbed up onto the runway. After a week of fighting, and heavy casualties, and reorganization, the 133d was ready to start on the job it had come for.³

Once the first spotter aircraft had flown in from the escort carrier *Wake Island*, others followed in rapid succession. By 1 March, 16 planes of VMO-4 and -5 had reached the island. Since the airstrip was still under enemy artillery and mortar fire, many of the small planes sustained damage which had to be patched up in frantic efforts. Of the seven aircraft which VMO-4 brought ashore, six eventually were so badly damaged that they had to be surveyed after the end of the operation.

Completion of the first 1,500-foot strip of Airfield No. 1 was but the initial step in the restoration of the entire field. The 2d Separate Engineer Battalion was charged with the reconstruction of the north-south and northwest-southeast runways, while the 62d Naval Construction Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Frank B. Campbell, was responsible for rebuilding the northeast-southwest runway. Quarries available on the island yielded an excellent sand-clay fill that could be used for the construction of roads and was widely utilized in rehabilitating and extending Airfield No. 1. In fact, it was the use of this material that had made possible the early completion of the short strip for the land-based observation planes.

Good progress was made in restoring the airfield, except for the hours of darkness and those times when the enemy took the field under fire. On the last day of February, Airfield No. 1 invited emergency landings by carrier aircraft. This offer was promptly accepted by a damaged torpedo bomber. From this time on, the popularity of

³Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, pp. 193-194.



HOLY COMMUNION *during Mass atop Mt. Suribachi. (USMC 110322)*



FIRST MARINE OBSERVATION PLANE *lands on Motoyama Airfield No. 1 (USMC 110595)*

the airfield among carrier pilots rapidly increased. By 2 March, a 4,700-foot runway had been completed and the first air transport, a R4D of Air Evacuation Squadron 2, departed with 12 wounded Marines on board. Noting increased activity on the newly restored airfield, the enemy concentrated his artillery fire on the strip. For the remainder of the day, the field remained inoperative, but subsequent evacuation flights became an almost daily occurrence without any further serious enemy interference.

A new milestone was reached during the afternoon of 4 March, when a B-29 bomber, returning from an air attack against the Japanese homeland, made a forced landing, refueled, and continued on its return flight. This was only the first of hundreds of the giant B-29s which were to make emergency landings on the island for the remainder of the war.

As early as 28 February, planes of the Army Air Forces 9th Troop Carrier Squadron had dropped more than 9,000 pounds of supplies near the western beaches. Beginning 1 March, air-drops were made over the southern airfield. The cargo dropped consisted of badly needed 81mm mortar shells, medical supplies, radio gear, and mail. Work on the two short runways was completed on 4 March. On this date, the first Marine transport, a R5C, piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, commanding VMR-952, landed on the island. The aircraft, carrying 5,500 pounds of badly needed mortar shells and ammunition from Guam, had stopped at Saipan before continuing the flight to Iwo. Once Airfield No. 1 had

become operational, a variety of aircraft could be brought into the island. The value of Iwo Jima was further enhanced when, on 12 March, the 5,800-foot strip was completed. By this time, landings and takeoffs on Airfield No. 1 had become a daily occurrence.

In addition to the aircraft using the southern airfield for bringing in supplies and evacuating the wounded, fighter planes were needed to assist the ground forces fighting on Iwo. Their mission was both an offensive and a defensive one. On the one hand, the fighters had to give the closest support possible to Marines fighting on the ground. Their second mission, of no less importance, was to make continuous sweeps over Japanese islands in the vicinity of Iwo to preclude any reinforcement of the Iwo garrison, and at the same time to eliminate any Japanese air power still remaining in the Bonins. Above all, the enemy had to be prevented from interfering with the progress of the Iwo ground operation or with the numerous supply ships standing by offshore.

During the first two weeks of the Iwo Jima operation, Colonel Vernon E. Megee acted as the Commander, Landing Force Air Control Unit. In this capacity, he came ashore on 24 February but did not assume control of support aircraft until 1 March, at which time he also became Commander Air, Iwo Jima. The establishment of these functions ashore greatly facilitated coordination and control of fire support for VAC,⁴ particularly since Colonel Megee, using forward observers, developed a

⁴ *TF 51 AR*, Pt V, Sec E, p. 15.

system of close air support controlled from VAC Headquarters.⁵

This proved to be a very busy time for the representative of Marine aviation, who was to reminisce later:

You see, I had a dual status there really. In fact, I stayed Commander there even —let me see, we were supposed to have an Air Force Brigadier for that job but he never showed up until a couple of weeks after the landing and during the interim I was the Air Commander, Iwo Jima. . . . And I had air defense responsibility and the logistical responsibilities during that time so I was like the proverbial paper hanger with the itch.⁶

On 6 March, Brigadier General Ernest Moore, USA, arrived on Iwo to assume his duties as air commander. With him came an initial complement of 28 P-51 Mustang fighters and 12 P-61 Black Widow night fighters of the 15th Fighter Group. On 8 and 9 March, the forward echelon of VMTB-242 ar-

⁵ *Rogers ltr.*

⁶ Gen Vernon E. Megee interview with HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 17May67 (Oral History Collection, HistDiv, HQMC), p. 32. According to USAF historical sources, "On 10 January 1945 General Moore recommended that Colonel Megee (as Landing Force Commander, Air Support Control Unit) would continue to act as the Landing Force Aircraft Commander during the assault phase at Iwo until the arrival of the designated Landing Force Aircraft Commander, namely Moore. He stated that Colonel Magee concurred in the plan since it would provide unity and continuity of command. Moore also pointed out that he would be needed on Guam to get aircraft prepared to go forward as scheduled, and it would be more important for him to do this than to be on Iwo during the assault phase. . . . On 6 March, General Moore led the air echelon of the 15th Fighter Group to Iwo Jima, and upon arrival there promptly assumed the Air Commander duty. *Air Force Comment.*


rived from Tinian. This squadron, commanded by Major William W. Dean, began to fly air defense missions around Iwo Jima day and night. Based on the southern airfield, the bomber squadron also relieved carrier aircraft of anti-submarine patrol missions. After 23 days of well executed and strenuous operations, the Support Carrier Group departed from Iwo.⁷

On 11 March, 15 of the Iwo-based P-51 fighters launched their first attack against nearby Chichi Jima. This was only the first raid of many to follow. Throughout the assault and occupation phase, Army Air Forces bombers based in the Marianas conducted day and night raids against Haha and Chichi Jima with two raids being directed against enemy positions on Iwo Jima in general support of our forces. Aircraft from the Support Carrier Group, while it was still in the Iwo area, in addition to their numerous daily local commitments, also flew several strikes against Haha and Chichi Jima. Once the southern airfield became operational, an increasingly large number of B-29s sought refuge on the island while returning from raids over Japan, often in a precarious condition. By 14 March, D plus 23, 24 of the giant bombers had made emergency landings on the island,⁸ often under the very noses of the enemy still holding out in northern Iwo.

Even as Airfield No. 1 was becoming operational and the number of aircraft using its facilities increased, first steps were under way to restore the second

⁷ *TF 56 AR*, Encl F, p. 4.

⁸ *ComPhibGru 2 AR*, pp. 9-10.



B-29 SUPERFORTRESS, *the first of many, makes emergency landing on Iwo Jima.*
(USAF 57013 AC)



4TH MARINE DIVISION *observation post near wrecked enemy aircraft at northern end of Motoyama Airfield No. 1.* (USMC 110251)

airfield. Since the field, shortly to become known as the Central Airfield, was still under enemy fire during the latter part of February and early March, little could be done by way of actual reconstruction. As a first step, an abundance of mines and booby traps, which the enemy had left behind, had to be cleared, an unenviable task that was handled by the 2d Bomb Disposal Company, a Marine unit specializing in the removal of mines and duds. The company had already performed a similar job creditably at the southern airfield before restoration could get under way. By 16 March, the Central Airfield had been restored to a point where it also became operational. It featured one strip graded to 5,200 feet, another to 4,800 feet.⁹

As the assault phase on Iwo Jima came to a close, attention turned to the execution of plans for the development of the island as an important air base. To this end, once the objective was secured, a naval construction brigade was organized and additional construction units were employed. Original plans for the development of Iwo Jima had called for three airfields and installations to accommodate the garrison. The fields were to be designed to handle up to 90 B-29s daily, as well as five groups of escort fighters. The Central Airfield was to be utilized for staging Superfortresses en route from the Marianas to Japan. Airfields No. 1 and 3 were to serve fighters and smaller bombers. Alternate plans, however, were more ambitious than the earlier ones and eventually it was anticipated that the Cen-

tral Field would be turned into one huge complex featuring two B-29 strips, two fighter strips, and a combat service center. It was finally decided that once the island was secured, the North and Central Fields would be combined, covering more than four square miles, just about half of the surface of the island.¹⁰

In rebuilding the Iwo Jima airfields, the engineers ran into complex and exasperating problems. Because of the recent volcanic origin of Iwo, laying out the runways or putting in subsurface gasoline lines became a very difficult undertaking when steam pockets or sulphur laden crevasses were encountered. Construction of runways on the volcanic rock also posed a major problem and it became necessary to put the naval construction units on a schedule of two 10-hour shifts daily.¹¹

By mid-July, the first B-29 runway had been paved to its full length of 9,800 feet. The second strip had been graded to 9,400 feet by the end of the war but was never resurfaced. The old runway, running from west to east, became a 6,000-foot fueling strip. The fighter strip on Number 1 Airfield was eventually paved to 6,000 feet and was equipped with 7,940 feet of taxiways and 258 hardstands. The rough terrain in the area of the northern strip delayed construction, so that by the end of the war it had been paved to 5,500 feet for the use of fighters; in addition, some 10,000 feet of taxiway had been graded. Two large tank farms and facilities at each field took care of the supply of fuel.

⁹ Craven and Cate, *The Pacific*, p. 595.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 596.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

The utilization of Iwo Jima as a fighter base was to be greatly affected by the overall war situation. The reduction of enemy air strength in Japan proper proceeded so rapidly during the late spring and early summer of 1945 that in time fighter escorts from Iwo were no longer required for the B-29s. Nevertheless, some 1,191 escort sorties were to be flown from Iwo, as well as 3,081 strike sorties against enemy targets in Japan.¹² The primary use to which the airfields on the island were put was as an intermediate landing point, particularly for big B-29s in distress. By the time the war came to an end, about 2,400 of the giant bombers had made emergency landings on Iwo runways, involving a total of 25,000 airmen.

*LOGISTICS, REAR INSTALLATIONS, AND NEWS COVERAGE*¹³

A combination of enemy fire, deep volcanic ash, and heavy surf resulted in grave supply problems during the Iwo Jima operation. The early phase, in particular, became a nightmare for the Navy beach parties and the Marine shore parties. In the days following the

¹² *Air Force Comment.*

¹³ Additional material in this section is derived from: *3d EngBn AR*; *3d Pioneer Bn URpt*, 25Feb-26Mar45, hereafter *3d Pioneer Bn URpt*; *4th MedBn OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-Mar45, hereafter *4th MedBn OpRpt*; *4th Ser Bn OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-19Mar45, hereafter *4th SerBn OpRpt*; *5th Eng Bn UJnl*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-24Mar45, hereafter *5th EngBn UJnl*; *5th MedBn UJnl*, Iwo Jima, 27Feb-18Mar45, hereafter *5th MedBn UJnl*; *5th Pioneer Bn UJnl*, Iwo Jima, 7-23Jul45, hereafter *5th Pioneer Bn UJnl*.

initial landings, the main emphasis was on meeting the urgent requirements of the combat troops. The supplies brought ashore in LVTs and DUKWs often were sent directly inland without any rehandling on the beaches. For the first five days, until roads capable of supporting wheeled vehicles could be utilized, LVTs, DUKWs, and the versatile Weasels took care of transporting the bulk of supplies from the beaches to the inland dumps.

The landing of ammunition and supplies took place under extremely difficult conditions. Heavy swells caused extensive broaching of landing craft. With each wave, boats were picked up bodily and thrown broadside of the beach, where succeeding waves swamped and broached numerous landing craft. Other craft in succession hit the wrecks already beginning to pile up on the beaches until considerable wreckage had accumulated. The LSTs and LSMs sent to the beaches once the beachhead was secured also had great difficulty in keeping from broaching. Tugs were in constant attendance to tow them clear. Since unloading continued day and night, the beach parties had to work around the clock.

In order to facilitate getting supplies to the combat troops, Marston matting and armored bulldozers were utilized on the beaches. The matting was of tremendous value in overcoming the obstacle created by the soft volcanic ash on the landing beaches. The armored bulldozers, equipped with steel plates to protect both the driver and the machine, were employed on the beaches to level sand terraces and carve out

exits. When fighting shifted to the northern part of the island, several bulldozers were used to cut roads through the rocky gorges characteristic of northern Iwo, notably in the 5th Marine Division zone of advance.

In discussing the value of the Mars-ton matting and the armored bulldozers, the Commander of the Attack Force Beach Party Group, Captain Carl E. Anderson, USNR, pointed out that these two items of equipment:

. . . contributed materially to the success of the landing and the moving of heavy equipment off the beaches, which could not have otherwise been accomplished without almost insurmountable hardship.¹⁴

The pioneer battalions were the basic component of their respective division shore parties. The 133d and 31st Naval Construction Battalions provided equipment operators and cargo handlers for the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions. In addition, the Army's 442d and 592d Port Companies, assigned to the 4th and 5th Divisions respectively, and Marine service and supply units were given special tasks within the shore party organizations. Invaluable service was also rendered by the three Army DUKW companies which, like the port companies, were Negro units. Replacement drafts furnished the largest source of labor for ships platoons and shore details, though their subsequent integration into the depleted combat units left much to be desired. As of D plus 3, units of the 8th Field Depot went ashore and were assigned to assist the divisional shore parties, which were be-

coming depleted from casualties and fatigue.

There were slow but steady signs of progress. On D plus 6, the day that General Erskine launched his drive up the center of Iwo, engineers of the 5th Marine Division began the operation of the first water distillation plant on the West coast. Cognizant of the geological characteristics that were peculiar to the island, the engineers drove intake pipes into the natural springs. The water emerging from the ground was so hot that it had to be cooled with sea water. One of the first amenities of civilization, the hot shower, thus became a welcome arrival on the island.

On the same day, the VAC Shore Party assumed control of all shore party activities, a further indication that the situation on the beaches was stabilizing. The general unloading of cargo ships on the eastern beaches now got under way. As large quantities of supplies began to reach the shore, it soon became evident that additional beaches on the west coast of the island would have to be utilized. Preliminary surveys had indicated that conditions on the west coast were suitable for beaching LCTs and smaller craft. By D plus 8, beach exits and roads had been constructed on western Iwo. Simultaneously, a number of beaches, designated as Purple, Brown, White, and Orange, were established.

The Japanese, increasingly compelled to watch the beehive of activity along the eastern shore in helpless frustration, saw an opportunity to interfere with operations on the western beaches. On 1 March, an ammunition resupply ship, the *Columbia Victory*, was ap-

¹⁴ RAdm Carl E. Anderson ltr to CMC, dtd 26Nov52, in *Iwo Comments*.

proaching the west coast with a cargo of artillery ammunition when mortar fire from Kama and Kangoku Rocks, as well as northwestern Iwo, bracketed the vessel. One shell exploded so close to the ship that it wounded one man and caused light damage to the vessel. Anxious eyes were watching the Japanese artillery fire, including those of Generals Holland Smith and Schmidt, who viewed the action from VAC headquarters on the west beach. More than the loss of a ship was involved. If the *Columbia Victory's* cargo of ammunition blew up, the entire west coast of Iwo could go with it, along with thousands of Marines working on the beaches. Keenly aware of the danger, the cargo ship reversed course and, miraculously evading additional near misses, headed back out to the open sea.¹⁵

As a result of enemy interference, the western beaches could not be opened until D plus 11, when Purple 2 went into operation. By 3 March, all assault shipping had been unloaded and retired from Iwo Jima, and Garrison Force Zero began to discharge its cargo. This element consisted of troops of the garrison force, commanded by Major General James E. Chaney, USA. The Zero echelon had been embarked in additional shipping to arrive at the objective on call after the assault ships, but prior to the first echelon garrison ships.¹⁶ General Chaney, together with his staff and elements of the Army's 147th Infantry Regiment and men of the 7th Fighter Command, had already gone

ashore on D plus 8 as the advance echelon of Army ground and aviation troops that would play an important part in garrisoning the island. Meanwhile, the Army 506th Antiaircraft Battalion, having landed on D plus 6, was firing its 90mm guns at Kama and Kangoku Rocks off the west coast, from which the enemy had harassed the *Columbia Victory*. Men of the 5th Marine Division advancing up the west coast had already become the target of mortar and rocket fire from these islets.

While the Marines in the front lines were pitting their bodies against a cruel and remorseless enemy, the battle to save lives was being waged with equal devotion in the rear. American skill at improvisation, coupled with determination and medical know-how, were destined to save many lives. On Purple Beach on the west coast, a Navy evacuation hospital opened on the evening of D plus 6 with a capacity of 200 beds. At the 4th Marine Division hospital, located at the northern tip of the southern airfield, 17 doctors, operating in four surgical teams, worked around the clock. The Army's 38th Field Hospital, consisting of 22 officers and 182 enlisted men, came ashore on 25 February. Working together with the Navy medical facilities, it was to make a major contribution in providing medical care to the wounded in the days to come. Hospital facilities on Iwo were further supplemented when the 5th Marine Division Hospital went into operation at the southern tip of Airfield No. 1.

In order to provide the best possible care for the wounded, time was of the essence. This applied particularly to the

¹⁵ CominCh 1-9.

¹⁶ TF 56 TQM Rpt, p. 6.

availability of blood at the company medical aid stations. Blood plasma had been used in earlier operations, where its life-saving capabilities had already become legend. On Iwo Jima fresh whole blood, recently drawn on the west coast of the United States, packed in ice and airlifted directly to the scene of action was used with excellent effects. Initially, whole blood was flown in by seaplane to a base established near Mount Suribachi at the southeastern tip of Iwo. Use of the seaplane base continued until 8 March, at which time it was decommissioned and the seaplanes, which had also been used to conduct rescues at sea, were returned to Saipan.

Once the southern airfield became operational, whole blood was flown into Iwo by casualty evacuation planes. Up to D plus 25, a total of 960 pints had been flown in. Additional supplies of blood plasma were obtained from the hospital ships. Before the Iwo operation came to a close, the Landing Force had used up 5,406 pints of whole blood. The total used for the care of the Iwo casualties up to this date amounted to 12,600 pints.¹⁷

Before the Iwo Jima operation ended, Army and Marine air transports, consisting of C-46s and C-47s, airdropped 78 tons of supplies and delivered another 40 tons by air freight. The cargo planes involved were from the Army Air Forces 9th Troop Carrier Squadron and Marine VMR-253, -353, and -952.¹⁸

On D plus 9, the hospital LSTs, which thus far had provided emergency treatment for the wounded, were released and left the area, fully loaded with casualties. At this time, shore-based medical facilities took over the task of caring for the wounded. Serious cases were subsequently evacuated directly from the beach to hospital ships and transports. By D plus 14, more than 9,500 casualties had been evacuated to rear areas by transports and hospital ships, not counting another 125 evacuated by air.¹⁹ Plans called for the evacuation of the wounded to Saipan, where 1,500 beds were available and to Guam, which had beds for 3,500.²⁰ From the Marianas, the casualties were to be transported to Hawaii by such surface ships as were available and by air as the condition of the men permitted.

Part of the activities carried on in the rear involved the collection and burial of the dead. This task was performed by service troops, often under extremely hazardous conditions, since the dead were in close proximity to the front lines. Carrying parties often became the target of enemy small arms and mortar fire. The ever present specter of death on Iwo Jima was to give rise to this description by a veteran of the battle:

As the struggle in the dust of Iwo Jima, in the rocks and ravines, continued night and day, the act of war became a monotony of horror, a boredom of agony and death; it became a way of life, a task, a burden,

¹⁷ HQ FMFPac MedRpt, Iwo Jima, dtd 28-Mar45, p. 19, hereafter *FMFPac MedRpt*.

¹⁸ *VAC Logistics Rpt*. Encl A, pp. 16-23.

¹⁹ Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 113.

²⁰ *TF 56 MedRpt*, p. 3.

a work that was repetitious, galling to the body and mind.

Death was so commonplace as to be without interest to the living, for the living were resigned to it. They no longer expected to survive. Fear was not of death, but of mutilation. And there was no end to this; no end to mutilating wounds.²¹

Because of the heavy casualties during the Iwo operation, burial of the dead posed a special problem. Disposition of the dead was the responsibility of the 4th Marine Division burial officer, Captain Lewis Nutting, who occupied a dual position as VAC burial officer. Headquarters personnel, and especially members of the division band, performed this sad but necessary duty, which in time became a never-ending chore, as outlined here:

All day long, men carried litters to the field and placed them in neat rows. Two men passed along the rows, taking fingerprints, if the right index finger remained. Other men picked up one dog tag from each body, leaving the other for burial. If there were neither hands nor dog tags, and often there were not, the teams tried to establish identification by means of teeth, scars, tattoos, birthmarks, clothing stencils, jewelry, or uniform marks. Sometimes there was so little left that it was necessary to ascertain which section of the battlefield the body came from in order to determine to which unit the man had belonged.

When a row was ready, the bodies were wrapped in blankets or ponchos and placed in a trench. The bulldozer covered them with 6 feet of Iwo Jima sand, and a grader spread clay on top to keep it from blowing away. The sounds of battle off to the north were ignored. Since D plus 3, Captain Nutting's unit had suffered five

casualties of its own. Even in the cemetery there was no security.²²

The Japanese, on their part, appeared reluctant to abandon their dead on the field, presumably not for sentimental reasons but in order to keep the advancing American forces from becoming aware of the true extent of the enemy losses. As a result, frequently under cover of darkness, Japanese carrying parties sneaked into the battle area and removed the dead. Where the disposition of bodies proved impractical, the enemy burned his dead or buried them in pillboxes.

As the campaign progressed, the efficiency of the landing force organization increased. Improved coordination of air, naval gunfire, and artillery was achieved through the VAC artillery officer, Colonel John S. Letcher, who already had worked out detailed guidelines back in Hawaii with the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.²³ In close teamwork with members of the Landing Force Air Support Control Unit and the corps air and naval gunfire officers, Letcher screened requests for supporting fires with members of the three division artillery regiments. Some of the members of this coordinating group continued to function on board the *Auburn* even after corps headquarters had gone ashore on 24 February. On the other hand, Colonel Letcher left the

²² Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, pp. 254-255.

²³ For a detailed account of the procedure laid down for obtaining various types of artillery and air support, and the sequence in which such type of support was to be requested by the infantry, see *Letcher ltr.*

²¹ Gallant, *The Friendly Dead*, p. 164.



155MM GUN on *Iwo Jima* at moment of firing. (USMC 110636)



MARINE ROCKET TRUCKS furnishing fire support for advancing infantry. (USMC 111100)

Auburn at 1430 that date and half an hour later went ashore, where he remained until the operation had ended.

Along with the demands of the situation, there were changes in the organization of the shipping that stood by off Iwo Jima. A new type of logistic vessel, the small craft tender, was introduced here. This vessel was a self-propelled barracks ship, later designated as the APB. Two of these vessels were employed at Iwo Jima on an experimental basis. Actually, the vessels were LSTs converted to meet the needs of the numerous small craft employed around the island with insufficient endurance for long voyages and long periods at objectives. In order to effectively support the small craft, the converted LSTs each carried about 225 tons of frozen and dry provisions, 120,000 gallons of water, and about 235,000 gallons of fuel; they had berthing facilities for 40 transient officers and 300 men, a sick bay for 14 patients, and messing arrangements for 750 men on a round-the-clock basis. The ships serviced by these tenders at Iwo included destroyers, destroyer escorts, destroyer minesweepers, landing ships, minelayers, patrol and landing craft, minesweepers, submarine chasers, and rescue tugs. From 19 February through 7 March, the two APBs refueled and rewatered 54 vessels and reprovisioned 76.²⁴

The above does not by far represent the total accomplishment of the two

vessels, whose performance was to lead to the following observation:

Perhaps the best thing of all was the way the tenders mothered the landing boats and their crews. Many of these were caught at the beach when their own ships moved out of sight. Many were temporarily disabled, some lost. These tenders berthed a total of 2,500 officers and men, and fed 4,000 on the scale of one man, 1 day. It was a great help to a tired and hungry boat crew to have a place to eat and sleep. The tenders did not carry landing-craft spares or repair facilities. The principal part of the maintenance and repair work at Iwo was done by 3 landing ships (dock), 3 repair ships, 1 diesel repair ship, and 1 landing-craft repair ship. The job was no small one, totaling work on 30 landing ships (tank), 3 destroyers, 5 attack transports, 1 net ship, and numerous landing boats. It has been said that every small boat used in landing on beaches had sustained damage of some sort, many of them more than once. The LSDs worked 24 hours a day on repairs. The divers of the repair ships practically lived in diving suits from sunrise to 10 or 11 o'clock at night clearing propellers and doing underwater repair and salvage work.²⁵

An account of developments on and around Iwo Jima would not be complete without mention of the 3d Marines. This regiment, commanded by Colonel James A. Stuart, constituted the Expeditionary Troops Reserve. As early as D plus 9, 28 February, both Generals Schmidt and Erskine had requested commitment of this reserve to lend impetus to the lagging drive up the center of the island.²⁶ This request was made at a time when the landing

²⁴ Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil*, p. 290.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 290-291.

²⁶ CTG 56.1 Dispatch to CTF 56, 1732, 28-Feb45.

force already had sustained crippling casualties, and the loss of manpower, coupled with exhaustion of the men, was beginning to seriously impair the combat efficiency of all three Marine divisions committed on Iwo Jima. Despite the energetic efforts on the part of VAC to get the 3d Marines landed, General Holland Smith felt compelled to repeat the argument of Admiral Turner, Commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force, that the number of troops already ashore was sufficient to complete the capture of the island and that the employment of an additional regiment would only add to the congestion.²⁷ This contention was to be strongly disputed by the VAC operations officer who was to make this comment:

It was my considered opinion while on Iwo Jima, having visited all parts of the island in our hands, and keeping in close touch with the situation, that the 3d Marine Regiment could have been landed without in any way overcrowding the island. Commitment of this well trained and experienced regiment would have shortened the campaign and saved us casualties.²⁸

The pros and cons of committing the 3d Marines were to spark a controversy

²⁷ According to the VAC chief of staff: "I was present when General Smith discussed this with General Schmidt, and to the best of my recollection General Smith stated categorically that Admiral Turner would not release the 3d Marines unless General Schmidt stated that he could not capture the island without them. This, of course, General Schmidt could not do." *Rogers ltr.*

²⁸ LtGen Edward A. Craig ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., in *Iwo Comments*, hereafter *Craig ltr.*

that has remained unresolved more than two decades later. Members of the landing force still consider with bitterness that "commitment of a fresh regiment at that time would have cheered up the exhausted troops ashore and would have permitted the final capture of Iwo Jima in much less time and with far fewer casualties."²⁹ According to one analysis of the situation:

The consequences of using battle replacements rather than landing the infantrymen of the Third Regiment and shortening the fronts of the units in the line are, in retrospect, evident. Completing the assault was delayed. Key personnel in the front lines were unduly exposed, and casualties relative to the resistance encountered began to increase both among regular infantrymen and among the battle replacements.³⁰

In almost all respects, the conversion of Iwo Jima into an American military base was influenced by the small physical size of the island. There were no buildings, roads, wooded areas, fields, or streams. But above all, there was little room in the rear area, such as there was. Always close to the front lines and never more than two or three miles to the rear, the airfields, gun positions, supply dumps, and troops occupied virtually every inch of the island.

The lack of space in the rear had its effect as much on the location of medical facilities as it did on the headquarters of the three divisions operating on the island and VAC headquarters. The medical organizations dispersed their units into such areas

²⁹ *Rogers ltr.*

³⁰ Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 528.



AIR VIEW OF *Iwo Jima* beachhead on *D plus 11*. (USMC 112223)



SHORE PARTIES *prepare to haul supplies to the front line*. (USMC 109635)

as were allotted "and with the help of the ubiquitous bulldozer literally dug themselves a place on the island."³¹ Portable plywood operating rooms were set up in holes in the ground and covered with tarpaulins to keep out the dust and cold. The engineers built roofs over sunken water reservoirs which made good operating rooms. Ward tents were set up in airplane revetments or simply in long trenches bulldozed in the ground. The electric lights went in, the field surgical units were set up, the blood bank moved ashore, and by the time the transports left, a system of excellent surgical facilities was in operation.

In his memoirs, General Holland Smith recalled his impression of the command posts on Iwo Jima which he had occasion to inspect:

I went ashore every second day, calling on Harry Schmidt at V Corps Headquarters, or on Rockey, Cates, and Erskine at their Command Posts, and going forward to watch the progress of the fighting. None of these Command Posts was the Hotel Splendide the invading general seized for himself and his staff in fictional war. Cates' post, overlooking the sea near the fortified quarry, was a knocked-out Japanese pillbox, where the smell of decomposing enemy dead, buried in the ruins, grew more loathsome every day. Erskine, just south of Motoyama Airfield Two, occupied an abandoned Japanese gun emplacement, with a tarpaulin slung over a 4.7-inch dual purpose gun. Over on the left, Rockey had a ramshackle place up against a cliff, where the Japanese had been flushed out recently.³²

Supply of the landing force was a highly complex operation. Thus, the

average daily expenditure of artillery ammunition right up to the final phase of the campaign, exceeded 23,000 rounds daily. Enough ammunition of various types was unloaded across the beaches to fill 480 freight cars, plus enough food to feed the entire city of Columbus, Ohio, for an entire month.³³ Expressed in definite numbers, for the naval bombardment alone the total of ammunition actually expended came to a staggering 14,650 tons. This amount was divided into 2,400 rounds of 16-inch, weighing 2,280 tons; 5,700 rounds of 14-inch, 3,640 tons; 1,440 rounds of 12-inch, 520 tons; 11,700 rounds of 8-inch high capacity, 2,020 tons; 8,400 rounds of 6-inch high capacity, 440 tons; 152,000 rounds of 5-inch high capacity, 4,160 tons; 17,700 rounds of 5-inch star, 300 tons; 12,000 rounds of 5-inch, 270 tons; 10,000 rounds of 4-inch, 145 tons; and 70,000 rounds of 4.2 mortar, 875 tons.³⁴

In addition to ammunition, an amazing quantity of fuel and other items were to be required for the capture of the five-mile long island. These included: 4,100,000 barrels of black oil, 595,000 barrels of diesel oil, 33,775,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 6,703,000 gallons of motor gas; plus about 28,000 tons of various types of ammunition; 38 tons of clothing; more than 10,000 tons of fleet freight; more than 7,000 tons of ship supplies of rope, can-

³³ CG FMFPac, Arty Anx to Encl G, Iwo AR; *New York Times* Editorial, 25Feb45, p. 8E, columns 2-3, as cited in Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 517.

³⁴ Carter, *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil*, p. 289.

³¹ *FMFPac MedRpt*, p. 21.

³² Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*, p. 267.

vas, fenders, cleaning gear, and hardware; approximately, 1,000 tons of candy; toilet articles, stationary, and ship's service canteen items; and about 14,500 tons of fresh, frozen, and dry provisions.³⁵

General Holland Smith himself was to remark later "that the amount of effort that had gone into the capture of the barren island was staggering. The Navy had put more ammunition on Iwo Jima than anywhere else in the Pacific. Marine artillery expended 450,000 shells and we used huge quantities of mortar shells, grenades, and rockets."³⁶

Closely connected with the expenditure of ammunition by shore-based artillery and naval gunfire was the Air Support Control Unit, in charge of the combat air and antisubmarine patrol. The unit was composed of Marine and Navy officers and Marine enlisted technicians and operators. Here the cramped space available on Iwo Jima was an advantage. In this case, the unit was located only 75 feet from the Landing Force Command Post. As a result of this proximity, troop requests for air support could be handled much more expeditiously than before.

For the coordination of artillery fire and air strikes, a brief of each air strike was broadcast over the Corps Artillery Fire Direction Control Net. Each air strike was given a number and information obtained on number and type of aircraft, direction of approach and retirement, minimum altitude, and other pertinent data. Each artillery battalion thus was able to control its fire so that

it did not interfere with strikes. A complete cessation of artillery fire became necessary only once or twice when aircraft delivered a low-level napalm attack.³⁷

Progress in developing the island did not stop with the construction of new facilities. In some instances, the very shape of the island had to be changed to meet the requirements of the new occupants. Even Iwo's most outstanding landmark, Mount Suribachi, was to be affected by these changes. The Army garrison troops planned to get various trucks housing radar, weather, and navigational equipment for the coming assault against the Japanese home islands on top of the mountain. Before such plans could be realized, it became necessary to construct a road to the top, a project that had never been realized by the Japanese. On D plus 15, construction of a two-lane road, 35 feet wide, got under way, winding its way up and around the mountain for nearly a mile. Early the following morning, the first bulldozer drove into the crater at the top of Suribachi. The Japanese, a number of whom were still living inside the mountain after surviving the battle for Suribachi, were powerless to interfere with the road construction. They stole out of their caves only at night in search of food and water and were methodically eliminated when spotted.

In the midst of the multitude of supporting headquarters and units operating on the island, there was a special complement of men, neither wholly military or civilian, whose job it was

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

³⁶ Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*, p. 275.

³⁷ *ComPhibGru 2 AR*, Pt 5, pp. 1-2.

to photograph the action on the island or write about it. They were representatives of American and Allied news services, radio networks, and local newspapers. The news reporters were given the widest possible latitude in covering the operation and thus could be found among the invasion force, in the landing boats, and occasionally in the foxholes.

In addition to the accredited civilian correspondents, each of the military services had its own news writers and photographers, including a special Navy film crew which recorded the entire operation on color film. Radio teletype equipment was set up on the beaches for the benefit of the press, and a Navy floatplane was made available to carry copy, photographs, and newsreels directly to Guam, where this material was processed and flown back to the United States. Another precedent was established when, on D plus 7, Admiral Turner and General Holland M. Smith were interviewed on Iwo Jima in a live broadcast while the battle was still raging on the island.

The events on the battlefield received wide coverage and distribution in American newspapers and magazines. None of the ferocity of the fighting was withheld from the American public. As casualties mounted and the full impact of the cost in lives expended to secure the island began to hit home, plaintive voices arose to question the need for such a bloodletting. Then as now, sincere and serious-minded Americans, appalled witnesses to the savage fighting they could not stem, groped for a way out, at least a more inexpensive way to

subdue the enemy. Among the expedients suggested was the employment of toxic gas.

*THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST CHEMICAL WARFARE*³⁸

Unknown to the public at large, the employment of chemical warfare agents in the Pacific Theater had already undergone active consideration while the Iwo operation was still in the planning stage. Through collaboration with the Office of Strategic Services, forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, a special report had been compiled on the subject of gas warfare on Iwo Jima.³⁹ Its primary feature was the recommendation that Japanese transmitters on the island be jammed. Once the enemy's communications had been rendered inoperable and he was isolated, the entire island was to be inundated with gas. In late June 1944, the director of Research and Development, OSS, had made a special trip to Hawaii to discuss the project with Admiral Nimitz.

The difficulties of employing gas warfare were twofold, both technical and moral. During the early part of World War II, the United States had thought

³⁸ Additional material in this section is derived from: Frederic J. Brown III, *Chemical Warfare, A Study in Restraint* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), hereafter Brown, *Chemical Warfare*.

³⁹ A chapter dealing with this matter, known as the Lethbridge Report, appears in the recollections of Stanley P. Lovell, former Director of Research and Development, OSS, in his memoirs entitled: *Of Spies and Strategems* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 70-78.

of the use of toxic gases only as a retaliatory measure. In this connection, the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb was considered by chemical warfare officers as the most suitable munition for retaliation. The peak stock of this item attained in the Pacific Theater in July 1944 was 15,244 bombs with 541.2 tons of toxic filling. In the words of a chemical warfare service officer :

This supply was token only. If, for example, this entire supply had been used on Iwo Jima, which had an area of seven and one-half square miles, it would only have contaminated a little more than half, or four and one half square miles. Considering the vapor effect of mustard and the fact that the entire island would not have been regarded as a target, the stock would have been sufficient for one contamination. In the opinion of most chemical officers one contamination would have been enough to end all enemy resistance on the island. The question of resupply for other objectives would then arise.⁴⁰

The second difficulty in employing chemical warfare against the Japanese could be found in the attitude of most of the nation's civilian and military leaders. In fact, military reluctance to use this weapon had its origin in the experiences of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. In connection with the possible employment of toxic gas on Iwo Jima, General Holland Smith made this comment :

I am not prepared to argue this question. Certainly, gas shells smothering the island, or gas introduced into caves and tunnels would have simplified our task, but naturally the use of this prohibited weapon was not within the power of a field commander. The decision was on a

⁴⁰ Kleber and Birdsell, *Chemicals in Combat*, pp. 269-270.

higher level. It was in the hands of the Allied Powers, who alone could authorize its use in a war which would have assumed even more frightful proportions had gas been allowed.⁴¹

In the end, it was the Chief Executive of the United States who had a final voice in approving or disapproving the entire plan. Regardless of their divergent political views, both Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the years between the two world wars had been in favor of eliminating gas as a military weapon. In 1937, when vetoing a bill that would have changed the designation of the Army Chemical Warfare Service to that of Chemical Corps, the President had expressed his views on this subject in no uncertain terms :

It has been and is the policy of this Government to do everything in its power to outlaw the use of chemicals in warfare. Such use is inhuman and contrary to what modern civilization should stand for.⁴²

One of the official Army histories dealing with chemical warfare has pointed out in this connection that "gas warfare had no advocates in high places."⁴³ While this may have been true during the early years of World War II, there is some evidence that, as of early 1945, the atmosphere in Washington has begun to shift in favor of chemical warfare.⁴⁴ Another reason for increased

⁴¹ Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*, p. 276.

⁴² Veto msg of Bill S.1284, as cited in Brophy and Fisher, *Organizing for War*, pp. 21-22.

⁴³ Kleber and Birdsell, *Chemicals in Combat*, p. 653.

⁴⁴ In Brown, *Chemical Warfare*, the author attributes this change to three factors: Germany's imminent collapse, removing the last

American readiness to accept initiation of chemical warfare towards the final phase of the war may be found in the extremely heavy American casualties sustained in the Western Pacific. None other than General of the Army George C. Marshall was to testify after the war had ended that "following the terrible losses at Iwo Jima, he was prepared to use gas at Okinawa."⁴⁵

It is interesting to note that, at the same time that American views towards the employment of gas offensively became more aggressive, the Japanese policy shifted in the opposite direction. With the loss of the Marianas in the spring and summer of 1944, the home islands had suddenly become extremely vulnerable to American chemical attack. In the firm belief that the United States would not initiate gas warfare, and since Japanese ability to retaliate was in any case too low, Japan, in mid-1944:

. . . decided to discontinue production of toxic agents and to recall all stocks of gas munitions from the hands of troops in the field. Thus, in mid-1944, the Japanese started a policy of disarmament. Readiness spiraled downward until hostilities ended.⁴⁶

Thus we are faced with the strange spectacle of a hostile nation, pledged to fight to the death, and confronted by an immense military machine, dis-

mantling its limited chemical warfare apparatus as operations reached their climax. Stranger still, Japanese reasoning apparently was based on the declared policy of the United States not to initiate gas warfare. The Japanese failed to consider that, given different time and circumstances, such a policy might be subject to change.

With present knowledge, not available to Allied planners in 1944, it becomes clear that by the time the Iwo Jima operation got underway, Japan was no longer in a position to retaliate with chemical means in response to Allied action, with one minor exception.⁴⁷ All that prevented the employment of gas on Iwo Jima was the President's aversion to gas warfare. Even though the United States had not signed any international instrument outlawing such warfare, national policy clearly limited the conditions under which toxic gas might have been introduced. In consequence of this policy, heavy casualties to the contrary, Marines would continue to assault Iwo Jima with rifle, hand grenade, and flamethrowers until all resistance had been overcome.

In a matter of roughly three weeks from D-Day, Iwo Jima had been transformed from a strongpoint in the Japanese defense system to an important American air base of strategic and tac-

Axis possibility of retaliating with gas against an Allied population; President Roosevelt's death; and the over-riding importance of bringing the war against Japan to a speedy conclusion.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Lilienthal, *The Atomic Energy Years*, p. 199.

⁴⁶ Brown, *Chemical Warfare*, p. 260.

⁴⁷ "The Japanese troops on Iwo Jima had been supplied with glass containers—I suppose they could be called gas grenades—which was liquid hydrogen cyanide. These containers of clear glass were a little larger than a baseball. When the container was broke the liquid released cyanide gas. These could have been effective if they had been used inside pillboxes or caves or other closed spaces." *Letcher ltr*,

tical importance to the overall air offensive against Japan. The capture and development of the island denied its use to the enemy and at the same time it served as an emergency haven for aircraft returning from raids against Japan. In American hands, Iwo Jima represented an advance base for search and reconnaissance. It further provided a base within fighter range of Japan. Furthermore, the island could be utilized as a staging point for bombers, permitting greater bomb loads in lieu of gasoline, though the island was not much used for this purpose.⁴⁸ Iwo Jima could also become a refuelling stop for short-range aircraft en route to bases closer to Japan yet to be seized before the general assault against the

Japanese homeland got underway later in the year.

This, then, was the significance of the fiercely contested island. This is why General Kuribayashi had decided to adopt those tactics that would prove most costly to the invasion force and that would cause the most delay in the conversion of the stronghold to American use. After three weeks of bitter fighting, his intention has been partially realized as far as taking a toll in American lives was concerned. But, just behind the front lines, bulldozers were shifting earth, changing the very landscape of the island; communications were humming, and heedless of tenacious Japanese holed up in the northern part of the island, the task of reconstruction was proceeding at an ever-increasing pace.

⁴⁸ Craven and Cate, *The Pacific*, p. 597.

The 5th Marine Division Drive on the Left¹

ADVANCE UP THE WEST COAST²

As the battle for Iwo Jima neared its climax, the full force of three Marine divisions was employed to reduce the main enemy defenses near the Central Airfield. General Erskine's drive up the center of the island to the northern

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: ComPhibPac AR, Iwo Jima, 12Jan-26Mar45, dtd 19May45, hereafter *ComPhibPac AR*; *TF 51 AR*; *TF 56 AirRpt*; *TF 56 G-3 Rpt*; *VAC AR*; *VAC G-2 Rpts*; *VAC C-3 Jnl*; *VAC C-3 Rpt*; *VAC NGF and AirRpts*; *VAC Translations*; *5th MarDiv AR*; *5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv D-2 Jnl*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter *5th MarDiv D-2 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv D-2 Per Rpts*; *5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts*; *1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl*, 9Jan45-15Mar45, hereafter *1st ProvFldArtyGru G-1 Jnl*; *13th Mar UJnl*; *13th Mar AR*; *26th Mar UJnl*; *26th Mar AR*, Iwo Jima, 1Jan-26Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter *26th Mar AR*; *27th Mar UJnl*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-22Mar45, hereafter *27th Mar UJnl*; *27th Mar AR*, Iwo Jima, 19Oct44-23Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, hereafter *27th Mar AR*; *28th Mar UJnl*; *28th Mar AR*; *28th Mar R-2 Jnl*; *Horie Rpt*; *Iwo Comments*; *Bartley, Iwo Monograph*; *Newcomb Notes*; *Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign*; *Morison, Victory in the Pacific*; *Henry et al, U. S. Marines on Iwo Jima*; *Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*; *Conner, The Fifth Marine Division*; *Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass*; *Robert Leckie, Strong Men Armed*; *Newcomb, Iwo Jima*.

² Additional material in this section is derived from: *5th TkBn UJnl*; *5th TkBn*

shore has already been narrated. In addition to the men of the 3d Marine Division who fought and died at such landmarks as Hills OBOE and PETER, Motoyama Village, and Hill 362C, Marines of the adjacent 4th and 5th Divisions were making similar sacrifices to the east and west respectively. In the sectors of the latter two divisions the landmarks may have varied in some respects. They were to bear names like Hill 362A, 362B, Nishi Ridge, and Bloody Gorge. Men of the 4th Division would suffer at places appropriately named the Meat Grinder, the Amphitheater, and Turkey Knob. For all of them the enemy remained the same: fanatical, utterly devoted to his mission, bent on the destruction of the invaders who had dared violate sacred Japanese soil.

An attack by the 5th Marine Division on 24 February had resulted in sizable gains by the 26th Marines, which by the end of the day advanced 400 yards north of the 3d Division ele-

AR; *2/26 UJnl*; *2/26 Obs Rpt*, Iwo Jima 18Feb-23Mar45, hereafter *2/26 ObsRpt*; *2/26 AR*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, hereafter *2/26 AR*; *3/26 UJnl*; *3/26 AR*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, hereafter *3/26 AR*; *1/27 UJnl*; *1/27 AR*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-23Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter *1/27 AR*; *2/27 UJnl*; *2/27 AR*, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44-23Mar45, dtd 17Apr45, hereafter *2/27 AR*; *3/27 UJnl*; *3/27 AR*, Iwo Jima, 10Nov44-23Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter *3/27 AR*.

ments on its right. The gains were made at a heavy cost; 21 officers and 332 enlisted men became casualties on D plus 5.³ In order to give the 9th Marines a chance of straightening the lines, the 26th Marines was ordered to remain in place on 25 February.

On the morning of D plus 6, the 5th Marine Division held a line extending for 1,200 yards from west to east. From the left to right, 2/27 held the cliffs overlooking the western beaches; the center of the line, protruding into enemy territory, was held by 2/26; to the right of this battalion, the line slanted southward, held by 3/26 with one attached company of 1/26. (See Map V, Map Section). It had become evident by this time that the high ground in the zone of action of the adjacent 3d Marine Division exerted a paramount influence on the further advance of the 5th Division. No major progress could be expected until General Erskine's division had driven the enemy from this high ground in the center of the island.

While the 26th Marines consolidated its positions on 25 February, the adjacent 9th Marines of the 3d Division attacked northward along its joint boundary with the 5th Marine Division. On this day, the 9th Marines failed to make any noteworthy gains, and the situation along Colonel Graham's right flank remained substantially unchanged. Throughout the day, heavy enemy fire from the right front raked the positions occupied by the 26th Marines, greatly interfering with supply and evacuation. Nevertheless, the men of the 5th Division were to get one break

during the day. Around 1500, one of the spotter planes reported enemy artillery moving north along a road following the contour of the island on northern Iwo. Three batteries of the 13th Marines immediately adjusted on the target and fired nearly 600 rounds. At the end of this fire mission, the observer reported that three artillery pieces had been destroyed, several prime movers were burning, and an ammunition dump was ablaze.⁴ This was the only time during the Iwo Jima campaign that the enemy ever offered such a choice target. Hereafter, Japanese artillery deployed to new firing positions only at night.

On D plus 7 General Rockey's division resumed the attack. Following a 45-minute artillery and naval gunfire preparation, the 26th Marines jumped off in the main effort. Almost immediately, the attack ran into heavy resistance. The enemy poured fire from small arms, machine guns, and mortars into the ranks of the advancing Marines. At the same time, heavy artillery and mortar fire from the northern part of the island hit the assault troops. As the Marines closed with the enemy, hand grenade duels ensued.

During the advance, the nature of the terrain underwent a subtle change. Thus far, General Rockey's division had been operating in soft, sandy, and open terrain. As the 26th Marines moved northward, the level ground gave way to heavily fortified cliffs. Essentially, the 5th Marine Division now entered a difficult complex of ridges. In each case, the attack had to be carried up one

³ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 81.

⁴ *13th Mar AR*, p. 13.

slope, across the top, and then down into another ravine beyond. Above the ridges, there loomed a major enemy bastion, Hill 362A, just south of Nishi Village. This terrain feature impressed the advancing Marines because its sinister presence overshadowed all other obstacles in the area. The hill was rugged and rocky, devoid of all vegetation on its southern slopes. To the north, as yet unseen by the Americans advancing from the south, there was a sheer drop of about 80 feet. The Japanese had exploited this formidable obstacle to the utmost. The entire hill bristled with caves of varying sizes, many of them serving as mortar and machine gun emplacements. The elevation enabled the enemy to observe western Iwo all the way south to Mount Suribachi, and thus exposed to his view all American activity in the front lines, as well as on the western beaches.

Despite fierce enemy resistance, the 5th Marine Division attack on 26 February moved steadily towards Hill 362A, still about 800 yards away, whose very prominence made it a natural objective. The three battalions in the main effort were the 2d and 3d Battalions, 26th Marines, commanded respectively by Major Amedeo Rea and Major Richard Fagan, and 2/27 under Major John W. Antonelli. Because of heavy automatic weapons fire from an enemy strongpoint consisting of pillboxes and caves, the advance of 2/26 was so slowed that in two hours gains of only 50 yards were registered. Tanks of Company B, 5th Tank Battalion, took a hand in the fighting. At 1000, Company F of 2/26, thus far held in reserve, was committed. With the support of armor, the

infantry launched a spirited attack against the stubborn enemy position. The efforts of this company were quickly crowned with success. For the first time since 2/26 had come ashore, the battalion came face to face with the usually elusive and unseen enemy. In the resulting pitched battle, the Japanese came out second best. Those of the enemy who sought to flee were killed out in the open. Catching the ordinarily well entrenched enemy for once in such a vulnerable position greatly boosted the morale of the Marines engaged in this action, "for no man likes to fight something he cannot see, and the sight of running Japs was, if nothing else, reassuring."⁵

Advancing on the right and supported by tanks of Company A, 5th Tank Battalion, 3/26 gained about 100 yards, smashing fortifications as it went along and destroying numerous guns in the ravines that led down from the plateau perpendicular to the route of advance. Gains made by the adjacent 9th Marines helped 3/26 in its forward movement.

To the left of the 26th Marines, 2/27 initially made rapid progress, gaining 400 yards during the first two hours. For the remainder of the day, the battalion stayed in place in order to permit 2/26 to come abreast. The terrain in the zone of advance of 2/27 precluded the employment of tanks. Instead, 20 LVT(A)s of the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Reed M. Fawell, Jr., supported the battalion attack from the sea. The 75mm fire from the armored

⁵ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 85.



SOLIDLY EMPLACED tank of the Japanese 26th Tank Regiment after capture.
(USAF 70317 AC)



MARINE COMBAT PATROL moves through jagged terrain in northern Iwo Jima.
(USMC 142316)

amphibians knocked out several enemy caves, but in the choppy seas their fire began to endanger friendly troops and, as a result, they were ordered to cease fire.⁶

When action halted on the evening of 26 February, the lines of the 5th Marine Division still formed an arc whose apogee extended some 400 yards into enemy territory. Gains for the day amounted to roughly 300 yards. Most important of all, the day's advance had netted the 26th Marines two Japanese wells, the last ones believed to be under enemy control. Henceforth, the Japanese would have to rely on such water as they had been able to store or on rainfall.

Enemy reaction to the loss of this vital resource was not long delayed. Following a rainy afternoon, the skies cleared. In bright moonlight, a company-size force of Japanese assembled and started to move down the west coast, presumably with the intention of recapturing the two vital wells. Men of the 26th Marines spotted a sizable enemy force heading for one of the wells near the cliffs south of Hill 362A. The Japanese represented a splendid target in the moonlight. Both artillery and naval gunfire racked the enemy force and dispersed it before it reached any of the wells.

In another incident during this restless night, at the observation post of Company D, the company commander, Captain Thomas M. Fields, and a member of his staff observed three Japanese walking boldly within 25 feet of them

with picric acid satchel charges. The two officers routed the enemy with hand grenades, killing one of the intruders.⁷ This was only one example of the enemy's boldness in approaching or penetrating the American lines. Marines up front could never be sure of who or what was approaching them in the darkness. One of the early incidents which occurred on D plus 2, involved the compromise of the password "Chevrolet" in the area then occupied by Company F, 2/26. A sentry challenged a moving figure, who gave the correct password. Not satisfied with the pronunciation of "Chevrolet," the sentry repeated his challenge. Once again the password was mispronounced. The sentry fired and killed the intruder, who the next morning was identified as Japanese.⁸

Confrontations of this type tended to increase the vigilance of Marines on Iwo Jima. At times, such alertness was carried to the extreme and, a few nights later, resulted in a humorous incident involving the same company. During the night of 25-26 February, Company F, 2/26, seized a Navajo Indian, who was mistakenly identified as Japanese.⁹ His poor English, made worse by a bad case of fright, made his position pre-

⁷ 2/26 AR, p. 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁹ On Iwo Jima, as in other military operations in the Pacific Theater during World War II, the U. S. Marine Corps employed specially trained Navajo communicators or "talkers," whose language was not known to the Japanese and thus not open to enemy translation. In tactical situations where time was of the essence, precious minutes were gained since radio voice transmissions could be used without coding or decoding.

⁶ 5th MarDiv AR, Anx M, pp. 12, 15.

carious for a while. Fortunately, he escaped physical harm; his ordeal ended when he was finally identified by another Navajo Marine.

At 0630 on 27 February, the 27th Marines, with 1/26 attached, relieved the 26th Marines. Ninety minutes later, following a half-hour preparation by the 13th Marines, reinforced by corps artillery, Colonel Wornham's men jumped off with 2/27 on the left, 1/27 in the center, and 3/27 on the right. The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, remained in regimental reserve. Shortly before the jumpoff, truck-mounted launchers of the 3d Rocket Detachment showered the area directly in front of the lines with a heavy barrage of 4.5-inch rockets, then pulled back before the enemy could retaliate. At the same time, naval gunfire was brought to bear against Hill 362A, followed by carrier aircraft which bombed and rocketed the hill.

Moving forward in the center, 1/27 gained 200 yards before running straight into a heavily defended cluster of pillboxes. A half-track was able to knock out one of these strongpoints with its 75mm gun before its crew was hit by well-aimed small arms fire. A decision to move up 37mm guns for support could not be implemented because no suitable positions could be found. Consequently, the task of reducing the formidable obstacle once again fell to small flamethrower-demolition teams who would reduce one pillbox after another in the slow, dangerous, but time-proven method.

During the afternoon, when the company advancing on the left of the 1st Battalion encountered a heavily for-

tified area, the call went out for tanks. The arrival of a flamethrower tank, in particular, was eagerly awaited. When it finally reached the scene of action, accompanied by other armor, it received a mortar hit and was disabled before it had a chance to take part in the engagement. Nevertheless, the remaining Shermans lent effective support. They fired with everything they had and then moved forward in concert with the infantry. In the course of this advance, several more enemy pillboxes, as well as a dug-in tank, were put out of action. Once the momentum of the attack had been regained, the Marines moved forward for an additional 200 yards until they halted shortly after 1900.

Advancing on the left of the 27th Marines, the 2d Battalion faced not only a determined enemy, but extremely difficult terrain. The cliff on the high ground adjacent to the west coast beaches was honeycombed with caves and emplacements, most of them sheltering mortars and machine guns. In such terrain the employment of tanks was out of the question; furthermore, the few existing routes of approach were heavily mined. Once again, the full burden of the attack fell on small infantry and demolition teams, each one advancing more or less independently, taking its losses as it eliminated one enemy strongpoint after another. Of necessity, such a movement is slow and extremely exhausting, yet steady gains were made and by late afternoon, 2/27 had advanced 500 yards.

On the right of the division line, 3/27 moved against a ridge which guarded the approach to Hill 362A.

Company G launched a frontal assault against this ridge and was promptly thrown back. A group of 30 men attempting to outflank this position was initially repulsed; a second try appeared more promising. As the Marines advanced up the slope they were hit by a hail of hand grenades thrown by the enemy from the reverse slope. Ten Marines were killed on the spot, including Gunnery Sergeant William G. Walsh, who dived on a hand grenade which landed in a hole where he and several of the men had taken cover. As other elements of the company reached the scene, the enemy was driven from the reverse slope, and the ridge remained in friendly hands.

As D plus 8 came to a close, the 5th Marine Division had gained roughly 500 yards through the heart of the enemy main line of resistance in some of the heaviest fighting in which any Marine unit on Iwo Jima was to take part. Losses throughout the day had been heavy, some units being harder hit than others. In one instance, Company A, 1/27, occupied a ridge only to discover that it was exposed to heavy enemy rifle and machine gun fire. The company suffered additional casualties from enemy hand grenades, thrown from bypassed positions in the flanks and rear. For all practical purposes, the Marines of Company A on top of the ridge were cut off. The 1st Platoon, in particular, was hard hit. By the time the company was relieved by Company B, 8 men had been killed and 50 wounded.¹⁰ While the Company A losses were unusually heavy, they serve as an

¹⁰ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, pp. 86-87.

indication of the 5th Marine Division's losses since D-Day. By noon of D plus 8, the division had sustained 32 officers and 530 men killed, 134 officers and 2,360 men wounded, and 2 officers and 160 men missing in action, a total of 168 officers and 3,058 men.¹¹

The 5th Marine Division had now reached the 0-2 Line across its entire zone of advance, though the lines on the evening of D plus 8 were not perfectly straight. Not all of the action occurred in the front lines. Continuous vigilance was required to clear the enemy out of the previously captured ground. Japanese kept appearing seemingly out of nowhere. Only later was it determined that they could move at will through a carefully constructed system of tunnels. As a result, before a day's attack could get under way, some mopping up remained to be done in the rear area. Despite the gains made by the 27th Marines on 27 February, an even more difficult operation awaited 5th Marine Division units on the following day.

*THE ASSAULT ON HILL 362A*¹²

On the morning of D plus 9, the last day of February, the 5th Marine Divi-

¹¹ *5th MarDiv AR*, App 3, Sec VIII, p. 15.

¹² Additional material in this section is derived from: 5th Eng Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, dtd 13Apr45, hereafter *5th EngBn AR*; 1/26 AR, Iwo Jima, 15Nov44-26Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, hereafter *1/26 AR*; 1/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n.d., hereafter *1/28 AR*; 2/28 *OpRpt*; 2/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19 Feb-26Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter *2/28 AR*; 3/28 AR, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45, n.d., hereafter *3/28 AR*.

sion was squarely up against Hill 362A, the highest elevation on western Iwo. The hill loomed forbiddingly above the Marines huddled at its approaches. Around the base of this hill mass, rocky outcrops dominated every approach. The Japanese had fortified each one of these rocky spurs, which afforded excellent fields of fire. For the attack on 28 February, the 27th Marines had been ordered to seize an intermediate objective between the 0-2 and 0-3 Lines.

Initially, the mission of taking Hill 362A had been entrusted to 3/27, while 1/27 was to simultaneously attack an irregular line of ridges extending from the objective down to the western beaches. During the night, 1/26 had relieved 2/27 and was committed along the left flank of the regiment along the beaches. Following a 45-minute preparation by artillery, naval gunfire, and rockets, and supported by carrier-based aircraft, the 27th Marines jumped off at 0815 for what was to develop into one of the bloodiest encounters on the island.

From the outset, the enemy offered stubborn resistance all along the regimental front. Advancing in the center and on the right of the regimental line, 1/27 and 3/27 encountered some of the heaviest small arms fire yet directed against them. The 1st Battalion called for and received tank support as it had on the previous day, but the terrain in the zone of advance of 3/27 precluded the employment of armor, and the battalion had to rely strictly on its own fire power. Advancing gingerly across 200 yards of difficult terrain, the two assault battalions reached the foot of the hill around noon.

At this point, the attack began to bog down. In accordance with General Kuribayashi's orders, the Japanese remained in their positions and fought to the bitter end. Those who were bypassed continued to fire into the rear of the advancing Marines. At such close range, the enemy snipers were extremely effective and inflicted heavy casualties on the assault force. In the course of the afternoon, several patrols from 3/27 probed the defenses on the hill itself, seeking for a way to seize it. A patrol from Company I actually made it up the southwest slopes to the crest of the hill around 1630. However, since cohesion between 1/27 and 3/27 had been lost, the patrol had to be recalled in late afternoon and Company I pulled back about 100 yards, where it tied in with elements of the adjacent 21st Marines on the left of the 3d Marine Division.

Far from being content with halting the Marine advance, 50-100 enemy troops sallied forth from positions on Hill 362A during the late afternoon and counterattacked the 3/27 lines. The brunt of this blow fell upon Company H, which engaged in desperate hand-to-hand fighting with frenzied Japanese before the latter were driven off.

By nightfall, men of the 27th Marines were still stalled at the foot of Hill 362A, which towered above them, seemingly as impregnable as ever. After a day of extremely bitter action, which had cost numerous casualties, the overall regimental gain had been about 300 yards. To the left, 1/26 had sent out advance detachments along the beaches, but the northward movement of any large body of troops was seri-

ously impaired by the enemy's possession of the adjacent high ground.

The night from 28 February to 1 March turned out to be a very quiet one for the exhausted 5th Division Marines in the front lines. Four listening posts had been established by 2/26 along the beaches to frustrate any enemy intentions of landing reinforcements on the island. Each listening post had been augmented with one dog and its handler from the 6th War Dog Platoon. Eventually, things became so quiet that even the dogs found it difficult to remain awake.¹³

Elsewhere on Iwo Jima, it was a different matter. In the southern part of the island, in the vicinity of Mount Suribachi where they had been positioned ever since that elevation was captured, the 28th Marines was preparing to move north to join the 5th Division drive. At midnight, the enemy began shelling the positions of the corps artillery and those of the 13th Marines. This bombardment continued at some length. Shortly after 0200, the 5th Marine Division ammunition dump blew up with a tremendous roar, blazing fiercely for the remainder of the night. At least 20 percent of the division small arms ammunition supply was lost in the conflagration, along with large quantities of heavier ammunition. One of the exploding shells landed in the corps artillery fire direction center but caused no casualties, though it did wreak havoc with the telephone wire.¹⁴

In the course of the operation, VAC Headquarters itself came under fire a

number of times from mortars and artillery. This shelling resulted in several casualties. On at least two occasions, all work in the operations tents of the various staff sections came to a stop and officers and men piled together on the ground as shells landed nearby.¹⁵

In the midst of the commotion caused by the exploding ammunition dump, the island's air alert system went off. The nerves of personnel in the southern part of the island were further strained when exploding white phosphorus shells were mistaken for gas shells and someone gave the gas alarm at 0300. Within ten minutes, the gas alarm was cancelled; not so the air alert, which continued until 0430.¹⁶

As it turned out, there was some substance to the air alert. No enemy planes appeared over Iwo Jima during the night, but shortly before 0300 an enemy aircraft, skimming in low over the water, dropped a torpedo near the destroyer *Terry* a few miles north of Kitano Point. The destroyer took evasive action and barely avoided getting hit by the torpedo. However, a few hours later, while passing the northernmost point of Iwo Jima, the ship came under fire from enemy shore batteries, which scored hits on the main deck and forward engine room. Eleven destroyer crewmen were killed and 19 wounded before the *Terry*, assisted by the *Nevada* and *Pensacola*, made good her escape. In addition to the loss in lives, the ship had suffered substantial damage.¹⁷ Another vessel, the destroyer *Colhoun*, an-

¹³ *26th Mar AR*, App. 4, p. 9.

¹⁴ BGen John S. Letcher ltr to CMC, dtd 13Mar53, in *Iwo Comments*.

¹⁵ *Craig ltr*.

¹⁶ *VAC OpRpt*, p. 28.

¹⁷ Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*, p. 64.

chored off the northeastern coast of Iwo to repair damage sustained in a collision, took several hits from enemy shore batteries which wrecked a torpedo tube, exploded the air flask of a torpedo, and caused other extensive damage. One man was killed and 16 were wounded in the course of this action.¹⁸

At 0630 on 1 March, the 28th Marines, with the 5th Tank Battalion and 3/27 attached, moved forward through the 27th Marines in order to continue the attack on Hill 362A. Between 0745 and 0830, the objective and surrounding area received a heavy shelling from all four battalions of the 13th Marines and the corps' 155mm howitzers. Offshore, a battleship and two cruisers joined in the bombardment. The volume of fire was such that it was deemed best, in the interests of coordination, to exclude aircraft from the preparatory fires. They would have ample opportunity to support the attack later in the day.

Shortly before 0900 the 28th Marines jumped off with the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions from right to left. The attack moved ahead slowly under heavy enemy mortar and small arms fire. To Colonel Liversedge's men, the dogged defense of Hill 362A was reminiscent of the action at the base of Mount Suribachi. The scheme of maneuver called for 1/28 and 2/28 to attack around the right and left of Hill 362A respectively and link up on the north side of the hill. Meanwhile, 3/28 was to advance up the west coast to the left of 2/28.

By 1030, both the 1st and 2d Battalions had reached the top of the ridge and the ridgeline running east and west of Hill 362A. As they attempted to advance beyond the crest, they discovered that a steep drop of nearly 100 feet into a rocky draw confronted them. To make matters worse, heavy fire from small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars hit the advancing Marines from the adjacent ridge to the north, subsequently to become known as Nishi Ridge. The draw itself ran parallel to the ridge line and was bisected by an antitank ditch that ran perpendicular to the hill. Covering the ditch were cleverly constructed positions in the face of the steep cliff, inaccessible from the top. Beyond the antitank ditch and the draw, the ground leveled off for about 200 yards before again rising sharply to form Nishi Ridge.

In order to keep the attack moving, Lieutenant Colonel Jack B. Butterfield, commanding 1/28, sent his reserve, Company A, around the right of Hill 362A. This maneuver proved unsuccessful and the company came under such withering fire, accompanied by a shower of grenades, that it was stopped short in its tracks. During this assault the company commander was killed. A similar attempt by Company B to get into the draw proved equally unsuccessful, and the company commander was wounded. In this jumble of rock, both companies suffered heavy casualties. Among these was Corporal Tony Stein of Company A, who had already made a name for himself on D Day. He set out with 20 men to clear the ridge of snipers. Only seven men returned from

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

this mission. Among the men of Company B killed near the base of Hill 362A this day were three who had raised the American flag on Mount Suribachi; one of them had taken part in the first and the two others had participated in the second flag raising.

Throughout the day, 10 regular tanks and 2 flame tanks of Company C, 5th Tank Battalion, gave all possible support to 2/28 to the extent that the terrain permitted, with fire on the cliffs and the high ground to the front. Shortly after noon, two platoons of tanks spearheaded an attack along the left flank of the battalion; subsequently, one platoon was withdrawn and shifted to the right of the zone of action of 2/28, just north and west of Hill 362A. Even with the support of tanks, 2/28 proved unable to advance. The battle raged hot and heavy at close quarters; in one instance, one of the tanks bogged down, surrounded by 30-40 Japanese, some of them occupying a cave only 10 feet from the tank. Fighting as infantry, the tank crew was able to make a harrowing escape after disabling the gun and radio.

For the remainder of the afternoon of D plus 10, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 28th Marines, remained stalled along the crest of Hill 362A and at the base of the hill, where the enemy still held out in caves. In the course of the afternoon, the boundary of General Rockey's division was extended about 200 yards to the east to facilitate the advance of the adjacent 3d Marine Division. As a result, General Rockey committed 3/26 on the right of the 28th Marines.

Shortly before 1900, 3/26 relieved 1/21 and established contact with 3/9 on the right and 1/28 on the left. At the same time, 2/26 displaced forward as 28th Marines reserve.

While the 1st and 2d Battalions, 28th Marines, were making little progress in the extremely difficult and well defended terrain, 3/28 was making a steady advance with two companies abreast near the west coast. The battalion moved forward against moderate resistance until its assault elements on the left were ahead of those on the right, at which time they drew heavy fire from the right front. The battalion had gained about 350 yards and since the regimental attack to the right had stalled, 3/28 halted its advance.

By the end of 1 March, Hill 362A and a rocky ridgeline extending to the west coast had been seized. In all, elements of the 5th Division held a 1,000-yard front, which was exposed to heavy artillery and mortar fire from positions to the north. In order to obtain better observation over the northwestern coast of Iwo Jima, artillery observers were placed on board an LCI(G) which cruised up and down the northwest shore. This expedient was successful and several enemy positions were located and silenced.¹⁹

At the end of 1 March, the 5th Marine Division had taken a total of 12 prisoners; it was estimated that 3,252 of the enemy had been killed in the 5th Division area of responsibility.²⁰ Casualties sustained by the division to this

¹⁹ *5th MarDiv AR*, pp. 23-24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

date were 48 officers and 952 men killed, 161 officers and 3,083 men wounded in action, and 2 officers and 47 men missing.²¹ The capture of Hill 362A and the ridges on either side of it in a one-day operation had cost the 28th Marines alone 224 casualties.²²

While General Rockey's men were engaged in reducing Hill 362A, the adjacent 3d Marine Division had penetrated the enemy defense system in the center of the island and had pivoted to the northeast. This move threatened to open a widening gap between the 3d and 5th Marine Divisions. As a result, for 2 March, General Schmidt directed the 5th Marine Division to make the main effort on the right while maintaining contact with General Erskine's men. In order to carry out the newly assigned mission calling for an expansion of his boundaries, General Rockey committed the 26th Marines to the right of the 28th. For the continuation of the 5th Division attack on D plus 11, the fire of the 13th Marines was augmented by half of the corps artillery fires.²³

At 0800 on 2 March, the 26th Marines jumped off along the division boundary with 3/26 in the assault. As the battalion moved forward, a gap arose on the left, and Companies D and F of 2/26 were committed to regain contact with 1/28. In the zone of advance of the 26th Marines the Japanese made maximum use of cleverly concealed positions, whose approaches were mined. Progress was correspond-

ingly slow. Even though the terrain did not favor the use of armor and abounded in antitank obstacles, 3/26 requested tank support, and tanks from Company A, 5th Tank Battalion, spear-headed the attack.

Companies D and F of 2/26 were in the midst of blasting their way into and through the enemy defenses when the battalion had to shift to the right to close a new gap that had developed between the 3d and 5th Divisions. In executing the shift, the two companies had to disengage under heavy fire; they were further harassed by mortars and minefields. A solid line was finally formed in late afternoon just before nightfall. In order to fill the void created when the two companies of 2/26 were shifted to the northeast, it became necessary to commit 1/26.

When fighting came to an end on D plus 11, 3/26 had gained 500 yards. (See Map VI, Map Section). Responsible for these gains to a large measure were the division engineers, who moved alongside the assault units to clear minefields and open supply roads in the rear. In front of the 26th Marines, the enemy had mined the approaches to his pillboxes and permanent fortifications; without the help of the engineers, the advance of Colonel Graham's regiment on D plus 11 would have been doomed to failure.

In the left of the 5th Division zone of advance, the 28th Marines jumped off at 0800 with its three battalions employing the same scheme of maneuver as on the previous day. The 1st and 2d Battalions were to attack around both sides of Hill 362A and join on the north side for a coordinated assault against

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, p. 53.

²³ VAC OpO 10-45, dtd 1Mar45.

the next elevation 200 yards to the north. This obstacle, extending westward from the plateau almost to the water's edge, was squarely in the path of the 28th Marines. Beyond were the stark remains of what had once been a small hamlet called Nishi. From it, the elevation took its name: Nishi Ridge.

As the two battalions jumped off, they encountered undiminished resistance. Every time the Marines moved into the depression north of Hill 362A, they drew heavy fire from both the front and the rear. Tanks from Company B, 5th Tank Battalion, tried to give effective support, but were severely limited in their movements by the antitank ditch extending across their front.

As a result, the 28th Marines made only little progress. The 13th Marines gave all possible support to the infantry, concentrating its fire on enemy mortar positions identified from the air and through forward observers. Finally, elements of the regimental weapons company succeeded in setting up three .50 caliber machine guns to cover the caves that honeycombed the northern slopes of Hill 362A. Friendly mortar fire saturated the defile in front of the infantry.

Eventually, armored bulldozers of the 5th Engineer Battalion got close enough to the antitank ditch to fill in a portion of it. This permitted the tanks to move out and advance for 200 yards until the terrain narrowed and precluded any further forward movement. Caught in this type of cul de sac, the tank crews fought with the enemy at closest quarters. At 1400, tanks of Company C relieved those of Company B, which was beginning to run out of ammunition.

En route to the front lines, the tanks of Company C, including a flame tank, blasted and burned enemy positions in the steep northern face of Hill 362A, from which the enemy was still firing into the rear of the advancing infantry.

The enemy made numerous attempts to destroy the supporting armor with satchel charges. Apparently, the appearance of tanks in close support of the infantry in terrain that all but precluded the effective employment of armor confounded the Japanese. One of the officers on General Kuribayashi's staff was to make the following comment on this subject:

When American M-4 tanks appeared in front of Osaka Yama (Hill 362A), Lieutenant General Kuribayashi was very anxious to know how to dispose of this tank. Even our 47mm antitank gun could not destroy it, and at last came to the conclusion that bodily attacks with explosives was the only way to destroy it.²⁴

Actually, the Japanese island commander may have overestimated the structural strength of the M-4 tank, which was indeed vulnerable to 47mm antitank fire. Nevertheless, the Shermans were indispensable on Iwo, and without them the assault might have failed. Ideally, a tank with heavier armament and a lower silhouette, as well as improved traction, would have been more desirable, but at the time of the Iwo Jima operation only the Shermans were available to the Marines engaged in the assault.

While the tanks were keeping the enemy to the rear occupied, Company E, 2/28, charged across the exposed terrain north of Hill 362A to the foot

²⁴ *Horie Rpt*, p. 8.

of Nishi Ridge. Enemy reaction to this move was immediate and, in the words of the regimental report, "All Hell broke loose"²⁵ as the Japanese fought back from the cliff line to the north, from Hill 362A, and from a blockhouse in front of and to the east of Hill 362A. Combined with the heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire was a counterattack by a large group of Japanese against 1/28. This attack was repulsed with 129 Japanese killed.

Losses among the Marines of 2/28 also were beginning to mount. Shortly after 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler W. Johnson, commanding 2/28, was hit squarely by an artillery shell as he was inspecting the front lines. The battalion commander was killed instantly and the battalion executive officer, Major Thomas B. Pearce, Jr., assumed command. For the remainder of the afternoon, reserve units mopped up in the vicinity of Hill 362A, whose northern face was giving the advancing Marines infinitely more trouble than the southern slopes had.

While bitter fighting was raging along the center and eastern portion of the division line, 3/28 was advancing along a narrow front near the west coast. Movement in this area was seriously impeded by numerous caves and heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. The caves were attacked and slowly neutralized with 37mm guns, heavy mortars, and demolition charges; a total of 68 were blasted during the day. At 0900 and again around noon, shells falling within the battalion zone of advance gave off a green-yellowish gas

which induced vomiting and caused severe headaches to some of the men exposed to it. A brief gas scare resulted until it became apparent that only those men in the immediate proximity of a shell burst were affected; symptoms lasted only for a short time. In the end, the ill effects were ascribed to the presence of picric acid fumes.²⁶

At 1700, VAC ordered the lines to be consolidated for the day. In the 5th Division zone of advance, fighting continued until nightfall, some of it at very close quarters. For the night, 5th Division Marines were generally dug in at the base of Nishi Ridge; on the far right, the 2/26 lines extended to the northeast along the division boundary where they tied in with 3/9 near Hill 362B. The biggest advance for the day had been made by the 26th Marines, which had gained 500 yards. There were indications that the regiment was moving into a different type of defensive position than had been previously encountered. There were fewer concrete fortifications and more rock barriers and tank ditches. Even though the enemy was resisting as fiercely as ever, he was abandoning some of his equipment. Items captured on D plus 11 were a generator truck found behind one ridge and a large searchlight behind another.

As night fell, the enemy made several attempts to infiltrate the 5th Division lines. About 50 Japanese sallied forth near Hill 362A and some of this force succeeded in getting into the Marine positions. Once the Marines became aware of their presence, bitter

²⁵ *28th Mar AR*, p. 27.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in the course of which knives, sabers, pistols, and hand grenades were liberally used. The alertness of the Marines in dealing with the infiltrators led General Kuribayashi to report that "the look-out of American forces has become very strict and it is difficult to pass through their guarded line. Don't overestimate the value of cutting-in attacks."²⁷

On the evening D plus 11, the battle of Hill 362A was over, but an even bigger challenge was to confront General Rokey's men for the following day: the capture of Nishi Ridge and Hill 362B.

*NISHI RIDGE, HILL 362B AND BEYOND*²⁸

On the morning of D plus 12, the 5th Marine Division resumed the attack with basically the same formations it had employed on the previous day. From the very outset, both the terrain and enemy resistance combined to make it a difficult day. The 26th and 28th Marines were to make the main effort. In the path of the 28th Marines lay a series of gorges and ridges; in front of the 26th Marines the terrain was heavily mined; in addition, from strongly held Hill 362B, the enemy was able to sweep the area with fire. New roads

would have to be dozed out before tanks could move in to support the advance.

The attack jumped off at 0745. Supported by 75mm half-tracks, 37mm guns, and a reinforced tank platoon, 1/28 and 2/28 in the regimental center moved out and almost immediately ran into heavy mortar and small arms fire. As the two battalions inched forward, the men soon came to close grips with the enemy and numerous hand grenade duels were fought. Within two hours after the jumpoff, Nishi Ridge had been seized and the battalions prepared to move into the rugged terrain beyond. As the advance gained momentum, the 28th Marines swept down from Nishi Ridge into the remnants of Nishi Village, and by late afternoon had reached a point about 200 yards beyond, despite mounting casualties, for enemy resistance never slackened. At the close of the day, when the fury of the battle receded, 1/28 made further gains which brought it ahead of the other two battalions. Since morning, 1/28 had gained 500 yards, while 2/28 had scored gains of only 150 yards, as had 3/28 along the coast.

By far the most spectacular fighting and resultant gains were made in the zone of advance of the 26th Marines. The mission assigned to the 26th Marines for D plus 12 had been to advance northeastward to relieve elements of the 3d Marine Division near Hill 362B. The line of departure for 2/26 and 3/26 formed an inverted horseshoe with 3/26 on the left and 2/26 on the right. The two battalions moved out rapidly, even though both began taking casualties almost at once. Company B

²⁷ *Horie Rpt.*, p. 9.

²⁸ Additional material in this section is derived from: *133d NCB AR*; 2/13 UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-27Mar45, hereafter *2/13 UJnl*; 2/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 27Oct44-21Mar45, n.d., hereafter *2/13 AR*; 3/13 UJnl, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-17Mar45, hereafter *3/13 UJnl*; 3/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 27Oct44-21Mar45, n.d. hereafter *3/13 AR*; 4/13 AR, Iwo Jima, 27Oct44-21Mar45, dtd 7Apr45, hereafter *4/13 AR*.

of the 5th Tank Battalion supported the 2d Battalion by covering the left flank of Company F. Just as it had done on D plus 7 when first committed in the assault, this company smashed into the enemy defenses with great force and aggressiveness. Since, at the outset, the terrain was comparatively level and thus favored the employment of armor, the company commander was able to radio instructions to the armor through a tank liaison man assigned to the command post of 2/26. The assault swept on for about 300 yards before the open terrain changed into the deep gorges and rock formations characteristic of northern Iwo Jima. In these rocky badlands the battle continued, frequently man against man. The Japanese fiercely contested the advance behind every rock and boulder but could not stop it. In some of the most bitter fighting of the entire operation, every weapon at hand was brought into play.

By the time the forceful advance came to a halt, Company F had advanced more than 600 yards to the high ground to its front. Even then, the Japanese grimly contested every foot of the freshly seized ground, and numerous hand grenades continued to harass the Marines from cleverly hidden caves and gullies whose presence had hitherto been unsuspected. But the enemy was mortal, and bazooka shells accurately fired into such defensive positions usually eliminated this resistance in short order.

The 600-yard advance of 2/26 eliminated the horseshoe and for all practical purposes, straightened the line. With the severe threat to its left flank

gone, 3/26 was able to launch an advance of its own, which resulted in a 200-yard gain. While Company F was tackling the enemy at close quarters, Companies D and E launched an attack northeastward along the division boundary in order to seize Hill 362B and relieve 3/9. The relief was completed by 1430 and the two companies, from positions just southwest of the hill, prepared for the assault.

When it came, at 1600, the battle for the hill proved to be a bloody one. Using rocket launchers, flamethrowers, demolitions, plus a goodly amount of sheer courage and will, the two companies forced their way to the top. The southern and western slopes of the hill were honeycombed with caves and pillboxes, each of which required an individual assault. By the time the crest of the hill was reached, both company commanders and many of their men had become casualties.

The advance made by the 5th Marine Division on 3 March was almost spectacular under the conditions in which the battle was fought. The cost of seizing this ground was correspondingly high. On D plus 12, the 26th Marines alone had 281 casualties.²⁹ Total losses for the 5th Marine Division on 3 March were 9 officers and 127 men killed or dead of wounds, and 15 officers and 357 men wounded.³⁰ As of D plus 12, total casualties for the division since D-Day numbered 4,960 officers and men.³¹

²⁹ *26th Mar WarD*, Mar45.

³⁰ *5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts*, dtd 25Jun45.

³¹ *Ibid.*

As the fury of the battle receded on the evening of D plus 12, the 5th Division lines extended from the west coast at a point roughly 200 yards north of Nishi Village along the northern edge of Motoyama Plateau to the crest of Hill 362B. All along the front, the casualty rate had reached alarming proportions and it became necessary to send men from headquarters and weapons companies into the line as riflemen to bolster the tired and depleted units. Not all of the 5th Marine Division men were able to get much rest that night. In the sector of the 28th Marines, there were relatively few attempts at infiltration. It was another story in the 26th Marines area, where the enemy infiltrators appeared more aggressive and crowded the 26th Marines throughout the night. Almost all of the nearly 100 would-be infiltrators were killed.

Following an artillery preparation and rocket barrage, the 5th Marine Division resumed the attack on the morning of D plus 13. As the men jumped off in the same formation they had employed on the previous day, they were hit by intensive fire from small arms and mortars. Once again, the Marines advanced into terrain dotted with interconnected caves. The lines were now so close to each other that artillery support could be used only on special occasions. Because of a low cloud ceiling, the air support which had been scheduled for the day had to be cancelled.

The low clouds soon gave way to intermittent showers, which did little to lift the morale of the men who were still exhausted in spirit and body from

the rigors of the preceding days' combat and lack of sleep caused by the continuous Japanese infiltration attempts of the previous night. The rugged terrain seriously limited the use of 75mm half-tracks and 37mm guns. With Japanese lurking all around them, the crews of these vehicles felt progressively more exposed to enemy fire. Beyond that, the enemy was beginning to take a toll in vehicles with mines, skillfully emplaced in the few avenues of approach available to the supporting armor.

Perhaps the biggest difference between the success attained on D plus 12 and the fighting on the following day was the fact that the attacks were not closely coordinated. Once again, the brunt of the battle was borne by small detachments, moving more or less haphazardly against those enemy caves and pillboxes that were unmasked. As a result, only small gains were made, even though in this jungle of rocks the bravery of the individual Marine continued undiminished. As on the previous day, losses were heavy and many of the combat units were operating at half strength or less. The enemy was noticeably more aggressive in the daytime than he had been before, and the 26th Marines beat back several counterattacks executed in company strength. Nowhere did the Japanese succeed in breaking through the 5th Division lines, but the counterattacks served to take additional steam out of the drive of the fatigued Marines, and net gains for the day remained practically nil. As one account of the day's operations put it, "The only successful move, in fact, was made by Division headquarters which

moved from its original location near the eastern beaches to a position north of Airfield No. 1 on the west side of the island.³² At about this time, General Kuribayashi shifted his headquarters from the center of Iwo Jima to a large cave in the northwestern section of the island, between Hiraiwa Bay and the ruins of Kita Village, where he prepared to make his final stand.

General Schmidt's order to his three divisions that 5 March was to be utilized for reorganization, resupply, and preparations for the resumption of the attack on the following day reached 5th Division units during the afternoon of 4 March. At a time when physical strength and fighting spirit were beginning to flag, this order was more than welcome. Logically, the day of rest would be used, above all, to funnel replacements into the depleted ranks of the frontline units. The exigencies of combat had already necessitated sending some men with specific and critical skills, such as demolition personnel and bazooka or flamethrower operators into the lines prior to 5 March. On the whole, except for small emergency details, replacements were sent forward when the combat battalions were out of the lines. Replacements, no matter how willing and well trained, always tended to present something of a problem before they were wholly integrated. The reasons for this were outlined in the following report:

Reports from infantry units indicate that the average replacement, upon being assigned to a rifle unit and immediately subjected to the type of fierce fighting en-

countered, was initially bewildered and terrified resulting from a mental attitude of his being "alone," and not knowing his leaders and companions on the battlefield. This lack of a sense of security, even when among battle-experienced troops, was brought about by his separation from contact with those with whom he had previously trained and not yet having become assimilated into a fighting team. Those who did not readjust themselves quickly had a high percentage of casualties since in their bewilderment they usually carelessly exposed themselves.³³

For the resumption of the attack on 6 March, General Rockey directed 1/26 to relieve 1/27 and ordered the 27th Marines into reserve. At the same time, the 28th Marines was to reorganize so that 3/28 would take over the sector of 2/28. This would leave all three battalions of the 26th Marines in the line, the 28th Marines holding a front with 3/28 on the left and 3/27 on the right, and the 27th Marines, less the 3d Battalion, in reserve.

In accordance with VAC orders, combat activity by 5th Division units was limited to local attempts to straighten the lines during the morning. Throughout the day, artillery and naval gunfire were brought to bear on suspected enemy positions, and carrier aircraft flew 18 missions. Within the 26th Marines sector, a few tanks engaged in reducing caves and other strong-points that were directly menacing the front lines. Those tanks not actually engaged with the enemy received badly needed maintenance in the bivouac areas.

Despite general inactivity on the part of the Japanese infantry, the 5th

³² Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 95.

³³ *5th MarDiv AR*, Anx A, p. 14.

Division suffered casualties through enemy action even on this day of rest. One of the tanks operating near the 26th Marines lines ran over a mine and was disabled, another was hit by enemy antitank fire. Japanese mortars continued to harass the Marines throughout the day, particularly when the enemy observed troop movements near Road Junction 338 northwest of Motoyama Village. Even though this junction was situated in the 3d Marine Division area, it constituted a supply road for the 26th Marines and other 5th Division units.

A particularly unfortunate incident occurred shortly after the relief of 1/27 by 1/26. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, was in the process of moving to an assembly area in the vicinity of Road Junction 338 when an enemy shell hit the jeep carrying the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Butler, who had been observing the relief. The battalion commander was killed, and two other men in the vehicle were wounded. Later that afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Justin G. Duryea, the operations officer of the 27th Marines, took over command of 1/27.

While all three Marine divisions on Iwo remained in place and prepared to continue the assault, several important changes occurred to the rear, indicative of what had been accomplished and how much remained to be done. At the foot of Mount Suribachi, the 133d Naval Construction Battalion put into operation six portable water distillation units. The processed water was sent to the front and there was enough to furnish three canteens per day per man,

a vast improvement over what had been previously available. As early as 3 March, the situation from a naval viewpoint had become relatively quiet. Unloading and evacuation progressed favorably over both the eastern and western beaches. It thus became possible for all of the assault shipping including the Defense Group and the Joint Expeditionary Force Reserve to retire to rear areas.

On the morning of D plus 15, it was business as usual for all three assault divisions on Iwo. The only change from the norm was that the heaviest artillery barrage thus far fired preceded the attack. Shortly before 0700, 11 artillery battalions, a total of 132 guns ranging from 75mm to 155mm in caliber, unleashed a tremendous bombardment of enemy positions in northern Iwo, followed by a rolling barrage. Offshore, a battleship, two cruisers, three destroyers, and two landing craft added their fire to that of the land-based artillery, which in little more than an hour expended 22,500 shells, some of them falling within 100 yards of the Marines waiting to jump off. At pre-timed intervals, carrier planes strafed, rocketed, and bombed the enemy positions. The portion of the island still in Japanese hands literally rocked under the punishment being meted out, and it appeared that little could withstand such an extensive pounding.

As soon as they jumped off at 0800, the Marines of the 5th Division, as well as those of the two remaining divisions, discovered to their dismay that the barrage had done little to soften up enemy resistance. When the artillery fire lifted,

the Japanese, little the worse for wear, contested the advance of General Rockey's men from prepared bunkers, pillboxes, and caves. Marines attempting to advance north from Hill 362B immediately drew heavy rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire interspersed with white phosphorus shells. It was almost as if the heavy bombardment had never happened. The broken terrain all but precluded close tank support and, instead of a big push, the advance could be measured in yards. The vigorous drive to the 0-3 Line that had been envisaged could not materialize under such conditions and the attack soon bogged down. By the end of the day, the 26th and 27th Marines had gained between 50 and 100 yards; the 28th Marines' advance bogged down altogether.

The only progress made could be measured, not in yards, but in the number of enemy caves and emplacements destroyed. Engineers operating with the 28th Marines were able to seal off numerous caves. As in preceding days, the Japanese harassed the advance from the front, flanks, and rear. Casualties were correspondingly heavy. The type of vicious close in fighting the Marines were engaged in during this period was reflected in the nature of the casualties evacuated to the rear. In the words of one observer:

At the Fifth Division hospital, Lieutenant Evans was noticing a change in the type of wounds coming in. They were bad ones, from close range sniper or machine gun fire. The earlier wounds, mostly from mortar bursts, had been numerous and ragged, but not so penetrating. The whole blood was being used as little as twelve

days after it was given on the West Coast, but often it could not help.³⁴

After the heavy volume of artillery fire on 6 March, expended with such little effect, VAC limited the use of ammunition, particularly for harassing missions. In his orders for 7 March,³⁵ General Schmidt directed the 5th Marine Division to seize the high ground overlooking the sea with the main effort to be made in the northeastern portion of the division zone of action. Within this zone, the main effort was to be carried out by the 27th Marines, while the 26th and 28th Marines were to execute limited objective attacks.³⁶

*THE DRIVE TO THE SEA*³⁷

Just as General Erskine's division on the right jumped off for a surprise attack without an artillery preparation early on 7 March, so the 26th Marines, less 2/26 in VAC reserve, duplicated the maneuver on a minor scale. Jumping off 40 minutes prior to H-Hour without an artillery preparation, 1/26 and Company H, 3/26, set about to reduce the stubborn enemy defenses that had thwarted the regiment's advance on the previous day. After overcoming moderate resistance, the battalion reached a 30-foot knoll just north of Nishi Village. As Marines wearily surrounded this hill, enemy fire all but ceased. The sudden stillness was broken only when

³⁴ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 247.

³⁵ VAC OpO 14-15, dtd 6Mar45.

³⁶ 5th MarDiv OpO 13-45, dtd 6Mar45.

³⁷ Additional material in this section is derived from *1/13 UJnl*; *1/13 AR*, Iwo Jima, 27Oct44-21Mar45, dtd 5Apr45, hereafter *1/13 AR*.

demolitions men blasted and closed one cave entrance, while machine gunners made short work of several of the enemy who rushed out of a rear entrance. Marines of Company H ran towards the top of the hill in a suspicious silence that was most unnatural for Iwo, until about 40 had gathered on the crest. Then the unbelievable occurred:

... The whole hill shuddered and the top blew out with a roar heard all over the island. Men were thrown into the air, and those nearby were stunned by the concussion. Dozens of Marines disappeared in the blast crater, and their comrades ran to dig for them. Strong men vomited at the sight of charred bodies, and others walked from the area crying. The enemy had blown up his own command post, inflicting forty-three Marine casualties at the same time.³⁸

All that remained of the ridge was a mass of torn, twisted, and burning rock and sand. Smoke emerged from a ragged hole so large that it might well have harbored a good sized apartment building. Many of the men, not directly injured by the blast but stunned by the concussion, were staggering around in a daze. It remained for the commander of Company H, Captain Donald E. Castle, to gather the remnants of his men and lead them in a renewed attack.³⁹

³⁸ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 252.

³⁹ This was the first time that men of the 5th Marine Division had become involved in a disaster of this type. A similar incident, on a somewhat smaller scale, involved 2/24 of the 4th Division on Roi-Namur in November 1943. Then, a large blockhouse used to store aerial bombs and torpedo warheads blew up as the Marines surrounded it. At the time, in an

Meanwhile, 3/26 had also jumped off and almost at once ran into such heavy resistance that continuous fighting at close range, which lasted until night-fall, produced a gain of only 150 yards. Once again, even this meager advance had to be paid for with heavy casualties.

The 5th Marine Division main effort on D plus 16 was made by 2/27, supported by a company of 1/27. Following a 15-minute preparation by a battery of the 13th Marines, the battalion jumped off for an attack that was coordinated with elements of the 21st Marines operating beyond the division boundary. The objective was a stretch of high ground squarely astride the regimental zone of advance. Initially, good progress was made until the forward elements entered a draw directly in front of the first of a series of ridges. At this point, enemy machine gun fire, coming from two directions, raked the exposed men, who sought in vain to pinpoint the well-camouflaged positions. Casualties mounted as a 37mm gun was arduously manhandled to a forward position, from where it engaged the hidden machine guns with undetermined results.

Throughout the day, fighting raged at close quarters, each side making generous use of hand grenades. In the end, the overall gain for the 27th Marines on D plus 16 was 150 yards, similar to the ground seized by the 26th. Even such a limited advance, executed against a firmly entrenched enemy force

instant, the battalion suffered more than half of its total battle casualties for the operation. Proehl, *The Fourth Marine Division*, p. 29.

that contested every foot of ground with knee mortars, grenades, and deadly accurate sniper fire, was a major accomplishment. The task of the Marine infantrymen might have been greatly eased had tank support been available. As it was, the broken terrain was altogether impassable for armor. During the afternoon, platoon-sized elements of 2/27 attempted to outflank some of the enemy positions, only to be caught by heavy flanking fire that all but isolated them from the main body. A withdrawal became possible only with the help of a smoke screen. Fighting continued throughout the afternoon and individual enemy caves were assaulted and taken. But there was no way of telling how many hidden tunnels led into these caves, or how long it would take the enemy to restock them with new men and weapons after the Marine assault squads had moved on.

The only sign of progress of the 5th Marine Division on 7 March occurred on the division's left wing. There, in the zone of advance of the 28th Marines near the west coast, 3/28 and 3/27 dispatched combat patrols before the main body launched a general attack. These patrols moved out at 0900, met with little resistance, and reported this fact back to the regiment. One hour later, without any special artillery preparation, the main body moved out. There was scattered resistance, but not enough to delay the forward movement as 3/28 and 3/27 struck out in a northeasterly direction. In this instance, the extremely difficult terrain proved to be much more of an obstacle than the sporadic resistance encountered. In

order to maintain the momentum of the attack, numerous caves were bypassed, to be mopped up later by 1/28 and 2/28. Mortar and rocket fire was directed well ahead of the advancing Marines; additional fire support came from a destroyer offshore.

By 1530, the two battalions had advanced about 500 yards over and through rocky gorges in terrain that was passable only for men on foot. Included in the ground taken this day was Hill 215, located about 500 yards north-east of Nishi Village, only 750 yards from the northern shore. The relative absence of enemy resistance in this sector was to be the most surprising development of the day's operations. In addition to making the longest advance yet in the 5th Division zone, the attacking units killed nine of the enemy in this area and captured one.⁴⁰ According to the battalion action report, "a little further advance might have been made, but the positions for the night would have been weak, so the defenses were laid out in the area indicated."⁴¹

From the time the advance halted for the day until dusk, all three battalions of the regiment dug in for the night in the vicinity of Hill 215, while some of the Marines were engaged in mopping up in the immediate vicinity of the hill. In the midst of this activity, few Marines paid much attention to the fact that a stiff breeze had begun to blow from the north towards the American lines. This nonchalance changed to

⁴⁰ 3/28 AR, 7Mar45.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

near-panic when this ill wind was found to be:

. . . bringing with it eye-smarting sulphur fumes and smoke from a burning enemy ammunition dump. Unit commanders, always alert to the possibility of the enemy's employing poison gas, sounded an alert which brought hundreds of gas masks into use. The alarm soon passed, however, and CT 28 went on with its reorganizing.⁴²

The 5th Division advance on D plus 16 had moved the lines forward from 500 yards in the west to 150 yards along the boundary with the 3d Marine Division, where resistance had been the stiffest. In support of the day's operations, naval gunfire had played a significant part. Following the tremendous expenditure of ammunition by the shore-based artillery on 6 March, VAC had restricted the use of the corps 155mm howitzers to "deliberate destructive fires against known enemy targets."⁴³ The resulting gap in artillery support had been taken up by naval gunfire. All naval gunfire control parties received instructions to expend 500 rounds per ship. On the basis of data furnished by the corps intelligence section, the 5th Division intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Roll, assigned target priorities.⁴⁴ Additional support was obtained through air strikes, even though the shrinking enemy perimeter and the proximity of the lines made such support a rather risky undertaking. Altogether, 119 carrier aircraft flew 147 sorties. The employment of napalm bombs was some-

what less than successful: of 40 carried, 7 failed to release; of the 33 released, 7 failed to ignite.⁴⁵ An additional 67 500-pound bombs, 170 100-pound bombs, and 426 rockets were not subject to technical failures, but no estimate as to their effectiveness against a well dug-in enemy could be obtained.

The night of 7-8 March was characterized by relatively light enemy activity, though it was far from quiet. In the zone of action of the 5th Marine Division, the Japanese kept things lively with small arms and knee mortar fire and hand grenades. Enemy patrols probed the Marine lines at various points. The only determined attempt at infiltration occurred in front of 1/26, where approximately 25 Japanese tried their luck. The attempt ended in dismal failure when the enemy, tripping flares in his stealthy approach, became a good target and was mowed down by the alert Marines.

The operations order issued by General Schmidt for D plus 17 was simple and to the point. Instead of naming phase lines to be reached in the coming day's assault, the VAC commander directed all three divisions "to capture the remainder of the island."⁴⁶ For General Rockey's division, these orders meant that the main effort would continue to be made on the right by the 27th Marines, advancing to the northeast coast along the division boundary parallel to the movements of the adjacent 3d Marine Division.

The terrain over which the 27th Marines was to advance featured a series

⁴² Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 101.

⁴³ VAC OpO 14-45, dtd 6Mar45.

⁴⁴ 5th MarDiv D/3 PerRpt No. 17, dtd 7Mar45.

⁴⁵ VAC AirRpt, Encl A, p. 5.

⁴⁶ VAC OpO 15-45, dtd 7Mar45.

of interconnected caves and tunnels. All approaches to these defenses were heavily defended. Colonel Wornham planned to meet this challenge by having trails bulldozed into enemy terrain, over which the infantry could advance into close proximity of the enemy. Once there, Marines could reduce the Japanese fortifications at close range with time proven methods. As added insurance, tanks would support the infantry advance over the newly bulldozed trails.

At the first glint of dawn, prior to the jumpoff of 2/27 scheduled for 0750, Shermans of the 5th Tank Battalion slowly crawled forward from their bivouac area over a previously reconnoitered route. In the rough, unfamiliar terrain, the tanks moved slowly and did not reach the front until 0930. Meanwhile, 2/27 had launched its assault on schedule, but little progress was made until the tanks arrived. The armor immediately commenced cleaning out pillboxes and emplacements, permitting the infantry to move in close to caves in order to seal them. The enemy opposed the Marines with accurate small arms fire, grenades, and mortar fire. Despite this opposition and the heavily mined terrain, elements of 2/27 by 1030 had gained 100 yards. Company E, 2/27, reported killing 75 Japanese during the first two hours.⁴⁷

On the battalion left, Companies D and F attempted an advance without tank support and were soon halted by heavy machine gun and mortar fire. A 15-man crew from Battery B, 13th Marines, manhandled a 75mm pack how-

itzer and 200 rounds of ammunition close to the lines to provide badly needed fire support. This unorthodox employment of artillery raised the eyebrows of the 1/13 intelligence officer, impelling him to leave this statement for posterity:

We thought this morning that this battalion had done everything it was possible for an artillery unit to do. We had landed under machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire; gone into position at night; repelled Jap pre-dawn counterattack on D plus 1; fired countless counterbattery missions; had snipers in our position area; participated in regimental missions; fired T.O.T. missions; had our observers on land, on sea, and in the air, and we hauled ammo all night. But today we detached No. 4 Baker and sent it forward to knock off some Jap pillboxes. A report came back that their fire on pillbox was very effective. This was a new twist but the same result—Japs destroyed.⁴⁸

The infantry received additional support from rocket launcher crews who blasted the Japanese in their holes and buried them alive. Despite the punishment doled out to the enemy, neither company made much progress, and gains were limited to less than 100 yards.

In the center of the division line, the 26th Marines failed to make even that much progress. With 1/26 and 3/26 still in the assault, Colonel Graham's men found themselves facing a complex system of pillboxes and interconnected caves among the debris that was all that had remained of Kita Village. In the midst of such forbidding defenses, the regimental attack barely got off the ground and, at the end of another exhausting day, the regiment was still in

⁴⁷ 2/27 AR, p. 12.

⁴⁸ 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 8Mar45, in 1/13 UJnl.

substantially the same position it had occupied prior to the jumpoff. A gain of 400 yards laboriously carved out by 1/26 during the day had to be relinquished at dusk because it was untenable.

The 28th Marines on the division left nearly equalled the previous day's advance. Moving along the coast against initially weak enemy resistance, 2/28 actually advanced another 500 yards. Once again, opposition became more stubborn on the regiment's right where 1/28 gained a respectable 300 yards. Both battalions covered the initial 100 yards before serious resistance developed, both from the front and the rear. Within the limitations imposed by the terrain, the attached 75s and 37mm guns of the weapons company supported the regiment, as did the 81mm mortars. Ahead of the advance, naval gunfire attempted to neutralize enemy positions near the coast, while carrier planes struck twice at Hill 165, one of the last significant obstacles separating the 5th Division Marines from the northern shore. For these carrier aircraft, 8 March was the last day of support for the ground forces. Effective 9 March, such close support would become the responsibility of the Army Air Forces.

The violent battle of attrition raging in the craggy terrain of northern Iwo on D plus 17 was to have more than its share of personal drama in the informal setting of war. Tragedy struck within the setting of Company E, 2/27, which in the course of the morning had already scored an advance of 150 yards through engineer-tank-infantry teamwork. Only a jumble of rocks separated the Marines of Company E from the

sea, but hidden behind every crag and in every crevice was an enemy determined to block any and all egress by the advancing Marines to the sea just east of Kitano Point.

As bitter close fighting raged in this inaccessible area, one man began to stand out among the rest of Company E. He was 1st Lieutenant Jack Lummus, a former gridiron star at Baylor University, now determined to overcome the final obstacle barring his men from the sea. Rushing forward at the head of his platoon, the lieutenant was knocked down by an exploding grenade. He got to his feet, shook off some of the dust, and rushed an enemy gun emplacement. A second grenade exploded, knocking him down again and shattering his shoulder. Undaunted, the platoon leader got up, rushed a second enemy position and killed all of its occupants. As his men watched, Lummus continued his rush. When he called to his platoon, the men responded, now moving forward with a deadly purpose. As the attack gained momentum, the entire company began to move, hesitantly at first, then with growing speed and assurance.

Lummus was still at the head of his men, viciously slashing at the enemy in his path, when the incredible happened:

Suddenly he was in the center of a powerful explosion obscured by flying rock and dirt. As it cleared, his men saw him, rising as if in a hole. A land mine had blown off both his legs, the legs that had carried him to All-American football honors at Baylor University. They watched in horror as he stood on the bloody stumps, calling them on. Several men, crying now, ran to him and, for a moment, talked of shooting him to stop his agony.

But he was still shouting for them to move out and the platoon scrambled forward. Their tears turned to rage, they swept an incredible 300 yards over impossible ground, and at nightfall they were on a ridge overlooking the sea. There was no question that the dirty, tired men, cursing and crying and fighting, had done it for Jack Lummus.⁴⁹

Lieutenant Lummus died later that day and was subsequently awarded his country's highest decoration. Even in death his triumph over the enemy and the slaughter that was Iwo Jima was complete. His devotion to duty and personal sacrifice had supplied the impetus for the wild charge.⁵⁰ A mixture of love and compassion for their leader, mixed with anger and frustration, had supplied the spark to an explosive mixture which set off a reaction that, for all practical purposes, was the American equivalent of the traditional enemy *banzai* charge.

Throughout D plus 17, tanks of the 5th Tank Battalion supported the infantry assault units as best they could. Tanks of Company B, backing up 2/27, advanced into an important enemy bivouac area replete with ammunition dumps, motor vehicles, and trailers. In the course of this advance, tankers observed at least 100 of the enemy killed, many of them wearing U. S. Marine uniforms.⁵¹ Eleven regular tanks and two flame tanks of Company C, 5th Tank Battalion, moved out in support of 2/28 but soon were unable to keep up with the infantry advance when the engineers, who were checking the road for mines, were pinned down by sniper

fire. As a result, tank support was limited to four rounds of 75mm and half a load of flame fuel in this area for the entire day. At about 1300, one platoon with a flame tank was dispatched to the center of the division zone of advance to support 1/26. Even though the area allegedly had been checked by the engineers, two of the tanks hit mines causing considerable damage to both. These tanks had to be abandoned after the guns and radio had been disabled.⁵²

As fighting came to a close on the evening of 8 March, the 5th Marine Division had slashed deeply through the enemy lines and was within reach of the northern shore. It had rained intermittently throughout the day and the men were utterly exhausted. However, the enemy was in little better shape, as indicated by the following report submitted by General Kuribayashi on the day's action:

Troops at "Tamanayama" and Northern Districts are still holding their position thoroughly and continue giving damages to the enemy. Their fighting situation believing their country's victory looks god-like.⁵³

Two hours later, the Japanese commander conceded:

I am very sorry that I have let the enemy occupy one part of the Japanese territory, but am taking comfort in giving heavy damages to the enemy.⁵⁴

On the evening of D plus 17, the 5th Marine Division stood within reach of victory, but more than two weeks of bitter fighting over the island's most

⁴⁹ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 256.

⁵⁰ *27th Mar AR*, p. 13.

⁵¹ Co B, *5th Tk Bn AR*, p. 7.

⁵² Co C, *5th Tk Bn AR*, p. 7.

⁵³ *Horie Rpt*, 1800, 8Mar45.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

treacherous terrain in northwestern Iwo would be required before Japanese resistance within the division zone of action was broken. During 9 and 10 March, there was no forward movement, and General Rockey's men, with extreme exertion, were able to extend the division left flank about 40 yards. At this point, the 28th Marines came under intensive fire from the high ground that extended southeast from Kitano Point. This fire brought the drive to the northeast to an abrupt halt in front of a long, low ridgeline overlooking a deep gorge. This canyon was to become the final enemy pocket of resistance on Iwo Jima, where General Kuribayashi and the remnants of his garrison would fight to the bitter end. In the northeastern portion of the island, between Tachiiwa Point and Minami, in the 4th Marine Division sector, a second pocket occupied mostly by naval personnel, would soon become depleted following a reckless *banzai* charge.

By noon of D plus 18, within sight of the sea to the north, General Rockey's Marines still faced an uphill battle in some of the worst ground on Iwo. There, the ridges and gorges were so steep as to be almost impassable even for men on foot. As in more accessible areas, caves and dugouts abounded. This phase of the fighting, in the face of undiminished enemy opposition, is referred to in the official records as "a battle of attrition".⁵⁵ For a number of days to come, the advance could be measured in feet instead of yards.

⁵⁵ 5th MarDiv AR, p. 26.

As on the previous day, another human drama, again involving the 27th Marines, was to be enacted in the front lines on 9 March. During the early afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel Duryea, commanding 1/27, and Major Antonelli, commanding the adjacent 2d Battalion, went forward to check their lines. They were headed back to the rear when:

. . . Duryea called to his runner, who was sitting on a rock, and the youngster replied "I'm coming Colonel." He took one step and was blown to bits. He had set off the detonator of a 6-inch naval shell buried in the ground to catch a tank.

A huge fragment of the shell tore off Duryea's left arm at the elbow and another smashed his left knee. Antonelli fell, blinded by sand. Duryea, still conscious, could not see his left leg, doubled under him and thought he had lost it. Thinking an attack was under way he shouted to the others, "Come here, come here. Don't go away." He tried to roll over to get the pistol under his right hip, but could not.

A captain ran to get corpsmen, and they bundled Duryea and Tony Antonelli into stretchers. Duryea's left leg dangled off the side, and a bullet pierced it, breaking it.⁵⁶

With the two battalion commanders out of commission, the executive officers of the two battalions, Major William H. Tumbelston and Major Gerald F. Russell, assumed command. The detonation had also wounded the company commander and another officer of Company E, as well as the intelligence officer of 2/27. Major Antonelli, despite his eye injuries and a broken eardrum, refused evacuation until he had issued orders for the resumption of the attack. Subsequently, the indomitable battalion

⁵⁶ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, pp. 262-263.

commander walked out of the division hospital and returned to his unit until Colonel Wornham personally ordered him to return to the hospital. The following day, Antonelli was back at the battalion command post, where he remained during the daylight hours for another week until Colonel Wornham requested his evacuation from the island to prevent further injuries.⁵⁷

Aside from routine operations on 9 March, two developments occurred. One was indicative of progress made in developing Iwo Jima as an air base. The other showed to what extent the combat units had been depleted. During the difficult fighting along the north coast, Army Air Forces P-51s went into action for the first time, strafing and bombing the enemy-held gorges in precision attacks that drew admiration from the Marines on the ground.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, this impressive air support failed to break enemy resistance or morale, and the results remained inconclusive.

At noon of 9 March, General Rockey decided to bolster the dwindling combat strength of his infantry units by sending personnel from the supporting arms to the front. On the morning of 10 March, 100 men of the 13th Marines joined 3/28 as riflemen. About the same number reinforced 3/26. The 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion furnished 55 men for 3/27 and slightly more than

100 men from the 5th Motor Transport Battalion joined 1/28.

While the Marines were still able to reinforce their frontline units, such expedient was denied to General Kuriyayashi. In the narrow strip of coast separating the 5th Division from the sea, the northern pocket had been compressed into an area less than one square mile in size. Caught in this pocket were General Kuribayashi and his division headquarters, elements of the 2d Battalion of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Infantry Regiment, remnants of the Cd Battalion, 17th Independent Mixed Regiment and a conglomeration of stragglers from other units. Altogether, Japanese Army and Navy strength in northern Iwo came to approximately 1,500 men.⁵⁹

At 0800 on 10 March, the 5th Marine Division continued its attack against enemy opposition that was undiminished in ferocity. On the division left, the 28th Marines made an advance of 200 yards before it was stopped by fire from a ridge running generally southeastward from Kitano Point. The 26th Marines gained roughly 100 yards in almost impossible terrain. The 27th Marines destroyed numerous enemy caves and pillboxes in close-in fighting, but progress was minimal. By the end of D plus 19, after another day of heavy and costly fighting, the lines of the 27th Marines were substantially the same as they had been that morning.

Throughout the day, the 5th Marine Division attack was supported by shore-based and naval gunfire, as well as air

⁵⁷ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 108.

⁵⁸ On 10 March, the VAC air officer reported: "The precision low altitude work of the P-51s was particularly pleasing to the ground troops." *VAC Air Rpt*, Encl A, p. 6.

⁵⁹ *Horie Rpt*, p. 10.

strikes. Once again, the effectiveness of this support could not be accurately gauged by the exhausted Marines on the ground. It was obvious by this time that it was becoming increasingly difficult to make effective use of these supporting arms because of the rapidly diminishing area held by the enemy. At the same time, the bombs and heavy gunfire directed in heavy concentrations against a shrinking pocket were bound to hurt the enemy. This is best confirmed by the messages emanating from General Kuribayashi's headquarters on the evening of 10 March. Beginning on a fairly confident note, the Japanese commander reported that, "even though American attacks against our northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly."⁶⁰ Changing to a more plaintive note, General Kuribayashi continued:

. . . 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" (northern Iwo in the 5th Division sector) all day. The enemy's bombardments from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine gun firing against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.

Before American forces landed on Iwo Jima, there were many trees around my Headquarters, but now there are not even a grasp of grass remaining. The sur-

face of the earth has changed completely and we can see numerous holes of bombardments.⁶¹

In its two-week drive up the coast of western Iwo Jima between 25 February and 10 March, General Rockey's division had covered about 3,000 yards from the vicinity of the Central Airfield to a line that ran from west to east across the base of the northern tip of the island. In the course of this advance the division had sustained more than 4,000 casualties.⁶²

Indicative of the severity of enemy opposition is the minute number of prisoners taken by D plus 19. Altogether VAC had seized 111 prisoners since D-Day. Of this figure, only 67 were Japanese, the remainder consisting of Korean labor troops.⁶³ At the same time, 8,073 enemy dead had been counted in the 5th Marine Division sector.⁶⁴ On the evening of 10 March, no one could guess how much more blood would be shed before the battle for Iwo Jima was over.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² These losses consisted of 830 killed in action, 2,974 wounded, 263 died of wounds, 5 missing in action, and 220 cases of combat fatigue, a total of 4,292 casualties.

⁶³ A breakdown of this total by divisions is as follows: the 3d Marine Division had captured 49; the 4th Marine Division 28, and the 5th Marine Division, 34. Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 148.

⁶⁴ 1/13 G-2 memo, dtd 11Mar45, in 1/13 *UJnl.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1930, 10Mar45.

The 4th Marine Division Drive on the Right ¹

ADVANCE INTO THE MEAT GRINDER²

The first six days of the Iwo Jima operation had taken the 4th Marine Division to the eastern portion of the Central Airfield and Charlie-Dog Ridge, which had been secured at heavy cost on 24 February. As of D plus 6, it be-

came the division's mission to seize and hold that part of Iwo that lay east of the Central Airfield and to the south of Hill 362C. The ruggedness of the terrain over which General Cates' Marines would have to advance equalled or outdid that encountered by the 3d and 5th Marine Divisions.

As might be expected, the enemy had made maximum use of the natural terrain features by digging caves, constructing blockhouses, and tunnelling between ridges until the entire area was honeycombed with defense installations rivaling every other sector on the island. Among a large number of non-descript ridges and canyon-like depressions, the following stood out and formed cornerstones of the main line of defense in the northeastern part of the

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: *TF 51 AR*; *VAC AR*; *VAC G-2 Rpts*; *VAC C-3 Jnl*; *VAC C-3 Rpts*; *VAC NGF and Air Rpts*; *VAC Translations*; *4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts*; *4th MarDiv OpRpt*; *4th MarDiv D-3 Jnl*; *4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpts*; *4th MarDiv D-4 PerRpts*; *4th MarDiv OpOs*, Iwo Jima, 24Feb-9Mar45; *4th MarDiv Translations*; *4th MarDiv Dispatch Summaries*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-15Mar45; *4th MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 28Dec44-17Mar45, dtd 4Apr45, hereafter *4th MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt*; *1st ProvFldArtyGp G-1 Jnl*; *23d Mar OpRpt*; *24th Mar OpRpt*; *25th Mar UJnl*; *25th Mar OpRpt*; *25th Mar Strength and Casualty Rpt*, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-26Mar45; *25th Mar R-2 PerRpts*, Iwo Jima, 22Feb-16Mar45, hereafter *25th Mar R-2 PerRpts*; *14th Mar WarD*, 28Dec44-5Apr45; *14th Mar OpRpt*; *14th Mar R-3 Rpts*, 22Feb-14Mar45, hereafter *14th Mar R-3 Rpts*; *Iwo Comments*; *Bartley, Iwo Monograph*; *Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign*; *Horie Rpt*; *Morison, Victory in the Pacific*; *Isely and Crowl, U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*; *Newcomb, Iwo Jima*; *Newcomb Notes*; *Hayashi and Coox, Kogun*; *Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima*; *Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division*; *Leckie, Strong Men Armed*.

² Additional material in this section is derived from: *2/14 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 15Jan-13Mar45, n.d., hereafter *2/14 Op Rpt*; *4th*

TkBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-18Mar45, dtd 18Apr45, hereafter *4th TkBn OpRpt*; *1/23 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 31Dec44-16Mar45, n.d., hereafter *1/23 OpRpt*; *2/23 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 31Oct44-16Mar45, n.d., hereafter *2/23 OpRpt*; *3/23 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 18Jan45-16Mar45, dtd 12Apr45, hereafter *3/23 OpRpt*; *1/24 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 11Feb-18Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter *1/24 OpRpt*; *2/24 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 27Oct44-18Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter *2/24 OpRpt*; *3/24 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 1Jan45-17Mar45, dtd 20Apr45, hereafter *3/24 OpRpt*; *2/25 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-17Mar45, dtd 16Apr45, hereafter *2/25 OpRpt*; *3/25 OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 22Nov44-17Mar45, n.d., hereafter *3/25 OpRpt*; *2d ArmdPhibBn*, Iwo Jima, 10Feb-13Mar45, n.d., hereafter *2d PhibBn OpRpt*.

island: Hill 382, just east of the Central Airfield (*Nidan Iwa* to the enemy), situated about 250 yards northeast of the east-west runway. About 600 yards south of Hill 382, just west of the remains of Minami Village, was an unsightly elevation which was to become known as "Turkey Knob." Even though its height was not impressive, it sheltered a large communications center made of reinforced concrete. The top of this hill afforded an unobstructed view of the entire southern portion of the island. To the southwest, the high ground gave way to a depression soon to become infamous as the "Amphitheater."

On the evening of D plus 5, units of the 4th Marine Division held a line, facing east, extending from the Central Airfield southward to the coast to the vicinity of the East Boat Basin. From their lines, the men could see Hill 382, the highest point in northern Iwo, second in size only to Mount Suribachi. The hill was readily identifiable from the remnants of a radar station, where the skeleton of a radio tower pointed starkly skyward. The Japanese had hollowed out a sizable portion of the hill, which was bristling with field pieces and antitank guns. The guns themselves were housed in concrete emplacements, often protected by as many as 10 supporting machine guns. Some of Colonel Nishi's tanks, mounting 47mm and 57mm guns, backed up these formidable defenses.

The concrete blockhouse on Turkey Knob was so soundly constructed as to make it virtually immune to bombing and naval gunfire. The Knob dominated a broad, rocky area of a deceptively

innocent appearance, the Amphitheater. Prior to the naval bombardment, this area had been covered by heavy vegetation and resembled a slight depression in rolling terrain. The true extent and cohesiveness of this major enemy defensive area had not as yet revealed itself to the 4th Division Marines. To them, it looked just like a slight hollow in rolling terrain, though in reality "the Amphitheater was a veritable large scale booby trap, containing three tiers of deep prepared positions facing their advance."³

The failure of the advancing 4th Division units to be aware of what awaited them on the rocky, cave-studded terrain of northeastern Iwo Jima was not due entirely to a lack of intelligence. Observers had studied the terrain in the zone of advance of the division from battalion observation posts, from a vessel close to the shoreline, and from one of the reconnaissance planes of VMO-4. A detailed intelligence report compiled on the basis of such observation noted:

The volcanic, crevice lined area is a tangled conglomeration of torn trees and blasted rocks. Ground observation is restricted to small areas. While there are sundry ridges, depressions, and irregularities, most of the crevices of any moment radiate from the direction of Hill 382 to fan out like spokes generally in a southeasterly direction providing a series of cross corridors to our advance and eminently suitable for the enemy's employment of mortars. The general debris caused by our supporting fires provides perfect concealment for snipers and mortar positions. From the air, caves and

³ Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, p. 61.

tracks are observed everywhere, but the enemy's camouflage discipline is flawless and it is the rarest occasion that an Aerial Observer can locate troops.⁴

The enemy force charged with the defense of the Meat Grinder, which consisted of Hill 382, Turkey Knob, and the Amphitheater combined, was the *2d Mixed Brigade* under Major General Sadasue Senda. This force consisted of five infantry battalions,⁵ an artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, and a field hospital. Prior to D-Day, the *2d Mixed Brigade Engineers* had consolidated the three terrain features into a closely integrated defense system, complete with extensive communications and electric lights. Marines of the 4th Division, preparing to move into northeastern Iwo, faced the most extensive and powerful defenses on the island.

In the course of 25 February, General Cates' men prepared to advance into the eastern bulge of Iwo Jima. Early on D plus 6, the 21st Marines which had been attached to the 4th Division, reverted to General Erskine and the boundary between the 21st and 24th Marines became the left boundary of the 4th Division. At the same time, the 23d Marines reverted from VAC reserve to the 4th Division and prepared to attack after passing through the left of the 24th Marines. Plans for the assault on D plus 6 called for 3/23 to move out with 1/23 following 600 yards behind. The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, was to

remain in reserve. In the adjacent sector, the 24th Marines, with 2/25 attached, was to continue the advance with 3/24 on the left and 1/24 on the right. The 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, was to become regimental reserve as soon as it had been relieved by 3/23. The 25th Marines, less 2/25, was to remain in division reserve. The division main effort was to be made on the left, where the 23d Marines was to maintain contact with the adjacent 3d Marine Division.

The attack jumped off at 0930. (See Map VII, Map Section). Almost immediately, Colonel Wensinger's 23d Marines, advancing in a column of battalions, encountered heavy mortar and machine gun fire from pillboxes, bunkers, and caves. Progress was accordingly slow. Enemy antitank guns and mines, as well as unfavorable terrain, made it impossible to move armor to the front in the 4th Division zone of advance. The adjacent 3d Division was requested to permit tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion the use of an approach route leading through 3d Division terrain to the Central Airfield. Permission was granted shortly before 1300. Once the Shermans had taken up firing positions along the left boundary of the 23d Marines, they were able to lend effective support to the infantry, destroying antitank weapons, pillboxes, and enemy machine gun emplacements. Once these defenses had been eliminated, an armored bulldozer of the 4th Engineer Battalion was able to clear a route of advance for the tanks in the zone of action of the 23d Marines. Throughout the day, 3/23 continued to meet heavy resistance as it gained a

⁴ *4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt* No. 62, dtd 5-Mar45.

⁵ *309th, 310th, 311th, 312th, and 314th Independent Infantry Battalions.*

foothold on the high ground at the northeastern edge of the Central Airfield and pushed eastward along Charlie-Dog Ridge. Heavy and accurate enemy mortar fire that blanketed the runways of the airfield made it extremely difficult for Colonel Wensinger's Marines to maintain contact with the adjacent 9th Marines.

The 24th Marines, with 2/25 attached, made only little progress on 25 February, slowed by difficult terrain, mortar fire, and interlocking bands of fire from automatic weapons in pillboxes, bunkers, and caves. Prior to the jumpoff, artillery, naval gunfire, and carrier aircraft attempted to soften up the Amphitheater and Minami Village. While the air strike was in progress, 81mm mortars fired 200 rounds into this area. Offshore, LVT(A)s of the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion attempted to support 1/24, but rough seas soon made their withdrawal necessary.

Enemy resistance in front of 3/24 came from the Amphitheater, while 1/24 found its advance contested by strong enemy defenses to its front. Five tanks of Lieutenant Colonel Richard K. Schmidt's 4th Tank Battalion eventually got into position to support the attack, but the rough terrain severely limited the movement of armor. Having gained roughly 100 yards, the two battalions were halted by heavy enemy fire that took a steady toll among officers and men. Among those mortally wounded in the course of the morning was the commander of Company A, 1/24. The battalion intelligence officer was wounded and evacuated.

For the remainder of the afternoon, neither regiment made any significant

gains. An air strike against the high ground facing 3/24 in the early afternoon temporarily reduced the volume of the enemy mortar fire and enabled Major Stout's men to move forward a few additional yards. In midafternoon, 2/24, which had spent most of the day in regimental reserve, was ordered to relieve 1/24 on the regiment's right. This relief, ordered at short notice, was executed without casualties.

On the evening of D plus 6, the 4th Marine Division was poised for the attack into the enemy's strongest line of defenses in the division's zone of advance. At this stage, even before the division had launched a direct assault into what came to be called the Meat Grinder, its combat efficiency had already been reduced to an estimated 55 percent by casualties and battle fatigue.⁶ Yet General Cates and the men under his command were unflagging in their determination to see the difficult job through. In commenting on the limited gains of 25 February, the division sized up the situation as follows:

The combination of terrain skillfully employed to the best advantage by the enemy, terrain unsuited for tank employment, the locations of installations in areas which were defiladed from our artillery, and the stubborn fight to-the-death attitude of the defenders had temporarily limited the advance of this Division; but the Division prepared to continue the attack.⁷

At 2200 on D plus 6, the rear command post of the 4th Marine Division closed on the USS *Bayfield*. In the course of the evening, support ships fired night

⁶ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, 25Feb45.

⁷ *Ibid.*

missions. During the night, there was little activity in the 4th Marine Division sector. A small enemy patrol attempted to infiltrate into the 3/24 area, but all of the Japanese were either killed or dispersed. The enemy fired sporadically into the division sector with rockets, mortars, and artillery.

The 4th Division attack on the morning of 26 February was preceded by a coordinated preparation fired by the corps and division artillery and naval gunfire support ships. Following the shelling, the 4th Marine Division resumed the attack at 0800 with five battalions abreast. Once again, on the division left, Colonel Wensinger's 23d Marines attacked with 1/23 on the left and 3/23 on the right. On the division right, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines, which had relieved the 24th Marines earlier that morning, advanced at 0830 with all three battalions. The half hour delay in the jumpoff of the 25th Marines was caused by the necessity of returning 2/25 from 24th Marines' control and moving the battalion to the line of departure.

The division attack encountered the same difficulties that had stymied its progress on 25 February. Enemy resistance from well organized and mutually supporting positions continued undiminished. In front of the 23d Marines, the enemy occupied a maze of pillboxes, bunkers, and caves. All avenues of approach were protected by successive minefields, which made it almost impossible to commit armor in support of the infantry. On the other hand, enemy tanks dug in on the slopes of Hill 382 had a clear field of fire into the advancing Marines. One of the ene-

my medium tanks, armed with a 57mm gun, occupied a stationary position in a crevice, from where it could fire at will along the entire length of the main runway of the Central Airfield. Three 47mm antitank guns were emplaced in the northern portion of Charlie-Dog Ridge, which also afforded an unimpeded field of fire at the same runway.

Despite bitter opposition, Colonel Wensinger's Marines continued to push the attack throughout the day. Elements of 1/23, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Louis B. Blissard, drew heavy and accurate fire not only from Hill 382, but also from the adjacent 3d Division zone, where the enemy still occupied strong positions to the north of the Central Airfield. To the right of 1/23, the 3d Battalion, commanded by Major James S. Scales, met equally heavy fire, but managed to fight its way forward, eliminating well-emplaced and dug-in pillboxes and blockhouses through the use of flamethrowers, rockets, and demolition teams.

By late afternoon, the 23d Marines had gained about 300 yards and seized the southwest slopes of Hill 382. This advance partially denied the use of this vital hill to the enemy. At 1700, the regiment was ordered to consolidate, but one hour later Major Scales' men were still engaged in close combat with the enemy and vicious fighting at close quarters continued until well into the evening. In addition to receiving fire from the front and flanks, the Marines occupying precarious positions on the slopes of Hill 382 also drew scattered sniper fire from the rear, which did little to ease the minds of the exposed Marines. When heavy enemy mortar

and rocket fire began to hit the southwestern slopes in the afternoon, it became necessary to withdraw all units to the foot of Hill 382.

The 25th Marines was to find the going equally rough on D plus 7. Following a rolling artillery barrage, Colonel Lanigan's regiment, with 3/24 attached, jumped off with 1/25, under Major Fenton J. Mee on the left, 2/25 under Lieutenant Colonel James Taul in the center, and 3/25 commanded by Captain James C. Headley, on the right.

Initially, the advance of 1/25 and 3/24 into the Amphitheater proceeded slowly but steadily against enemy small arms fire. After an advance of about 150 yards, the terrain became extremely difficult. At the same time, Japanese machine guns and mortars unleashed such a deluge of fire from well prepared and camouflaged positions near Minami Village that the men were effectively pinned down. Tanks of Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, attempted to reduce enemy pressure on the infantry but succeeded only in drawing additional artillery and mortar fire which resulted in the destruction of two Shermans just east of the airfield. In the jumbled terrain, artillery forward observers were unable to direct effective counterbattery fire against the enemy. Two spotter aircraft from VMO-4, which had just reached the island, made an attempt to spot the bothersome enemy mortar and artillery positions from the air, but this effort was also unsuccessful due to skillful enemy camouflage.

With the left and center of the 25th Marines pinned down, Company C of 1/25 made an attempt at 1400 to send a platoon, supported by three Shermans,

around the right flank to envelop enemy defenses on Turkey Knob. This attempt ended in dismal failure when the Japanese became aware of the maneuver and shifted their mortar fire. The barrage caught the men out in the open and killed several, including the platoon leader. The survivors of this ill-fated platoon were able to withdraw only under cover of a smoke screen.

Along the division right flank, 3/25 made a slow but steady advance against heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the high ground on the left and caves and pillboxes to the front. As Company L slowly moved forward, Company I, supported by two medium tanks and by LVT(A)s offshore, was systematically mopping up near the East Boat Basin. In the wake of Company L's advance followed Company K, using demolition charges and flamethrowers on every position that might possibly shelter enemy troops that had been bypassed.

As D plus 7, 26 February, came to a close, the 4th Marine Division held a very irregular line somewhat resembling the wings of a seagull. On the left, the 23d Marines had gained roughly 200 yards. In the center of the division line, where 1/25 was directly in front of Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater, gains were at best 75 yards. The most progress for the day had been made by 3/25 on the right which by late afternoon had seized a line of cliffs east of the East Boat Basin for an overall gain of nearly 500 yards. One more accomplishment accrued to 3/25: in mopping up the area near the East Boat Basin, the battalion wiped out the last nest of snipers that had interfered with shore party activities on the beaches

below. Even though the unloading was still carried on under the muzzles of the enemy artillery and rockets from northern Iwo still were capable of hitting any point on the island, at least the bothersome sniper fire had been eliminated.

The 4th Marine Division intelligence report for D plus 7 outlined the severity of the resistance that the division had encountered, particularly in front of Hill 382 and Turkey Knob, and noted "that the enemy is now fighting to the death in pillboxes, foxholes, and trenches . . . and is not retreating as he apparently formerly had done."⁸

The enemy unit to which this report referred was the *309th Independent Infantry Battalion*. On D-Day, this battalion had been stationed near the Southern Airfield and since then it had fought a delaying action, gradually withdrawing northeastward under superior pressure. On D plus 7, the attack by the 23d Marines had severely mauled the battalion and pushed it southeastward, where it found itself in the path of the 25th Marines' advance. As a result, when the day ended, the battalion had been for all practical purposes annihilated.

After a day of exhausting action, 4th Division Marines were in for a restless night. Enemy mortars and artillery kept both the division's front and rear areas under steady fire, paying special attention to the division artillery positions. Beyond any doubt, the accuracy of the enemy fire was aided by bright moonlight which emerged after an afternoon of intermittent rain. Less accurate, but equally disturbing to the

peace of mind of 4th Division Marines, were the huge rockets wobbling over their positions and exploding far to their rear. In the midst of this bedlam, there was small arms fire from the enemy side.

Small groups of Japanese attempted to infiltrate all along the division perimeter. Around 0530, the sound of tank engines was heard in front of the 23d Marines and there were indications that the enemy was preparing to counter-attack. An artillery preparation into the presumed enemy assembly area restored silence. Offshore, support ships furnished harassing fires and illumination. Aside from the enemy probes, no major attack developed and it was assumed that the artillery barrage had dispersed the possible counterattack. Indicative of the bitterness of the action that continued through the long night is the fact that in the area in front of 1/25 alone, 103 enemy dead were counted after daybreak.⁹

Dawn on 27 February, D plus 8, marked the beginning of the second day of the concerted 4th Division assault into the Meat Grinder. The lineup of units for the attack was substantially the same as on the previous day. From left to right, the five battalions committed were 1/23 and 3/23, and all three battalions of the 25th Marines. The 24th Marines, except for the 3d Battalion which was still attached to the 25th Marines, continued in regimental reserve.

The assault was preceded by a 45-minute preparation of the corps and division artillery. Even though, at this

⁸ *4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt*, 26Feb45.

⁹ *25th Mar OpRpt*, p. 8.

particular time, the corps artillery was giving priority to supporting General Erskine's 3d Division, Colonel Letcher, commanding the 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, ordered his 155mm howitzers to expend 300 rounds as part of the preparation. For the remainder of the day, the corps artillery was authorized to fire up to 25 percent of the general support missions for General Cates' division. The 4th Division objective for D plus 8 was capture of Hill 382 and advance to the 0-2 Line.

Following a thunderous artillery preparation, the 4th Division attacked at 0800. On the division left, the two battalions of the 23d Marines resumed the assault on Hill 382. While 1/23 attacked northeastward in order to envelop the hill from the north, the 3d Battalion resumed the assault up the southwestern slopes. Since the Japanese atop the hill enjoyed a perfect view of the American lines, smoke was employed to screen the reorganization and movement of frontline companies in the 3d Battalion area. The enemy was not deceived, however, and almost immediately, the advancing Marines came under such severe fire that forward movement was all but impossible. Nevertheless, throughout the morning, 3/23 launched repeated assaults up the southwestern slopes of the hill without making any substantial headway. Strong and determined enemy resistance from the high ground effectively pinned Major Scales' men down. Two of Colonel Nishi's tanks, emplaced in the recesses of Hill 382, further added to the volume of the enemy fire. A new technique resorted to by the Japanese at this time was firing

rifle grenades in volleys, which took a further toll of casualties among the exposed Marines.

By noon, the Japanese were still fully in control of the hill. The 1st Battalion, 23d Marines, was slowly gaining ground to the northwest of Hill 382. Once he had bypassed the objective from the north, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard, the battalion commander, planned to attack up the reverse slope. Both battalions, but especially 3/23, had sustained losses that had reduced them to little more than company strength; some of the companies had shrunk to platoon size. Nevertheless, the assault continued. In order to assist 3/23 in its frontal assault, 2/14 fired a 30-minute preparation beginning at noon, against Hill 382. Following this barrage, the exhausted men of 3/23 jumped off. This time, some progress was made, as Marines threw grenades and satchel charges into the caves and other strong-points still held by the obstinate defenders. Once the Marines had advanced within striking distance of the two tanks, they were able to finish them off with bazooka fire. Slowly and painfully, the assault force fought its way up the hill.

Additional support for Major Scales' men arrived in two forms. First, shortly after 1400, Lieutenant Colonel Blissard's battalion, having bypassed the hill, commenced an attack up the reverse slope. Secondly, almost at the same time, engineers with a tank dozer began to carve out a path over which some of the Shermans could come within striking distance. Once they had gone into position, the supporting tanks took the

Japanese on the higher reaches of Hill 382 under effective fire. This badly needed support, arriving at a crucial time, reversed the situation. The Japanese on the hill found themselves virtually cut off. The deadly fire of the Shermans forced them to stay under cover. As Major Scales' men approached the top of the hill, they discovered that the top had been hollowed out and that it contained a solid wall of artillery and antitank gun positions.

Here, among the ruins of the radar station, the men of 3/23 came to grips with the Japanese in vicious close combat in which no quarter was asked or given. Just when it appeared that the Japanese would be driven off, a heavy artillery and mortar barrage hit the advancing Marines. With darkness approaching, 3/23 still had not gained a solid foothold on top of Hill 382, and rather than risk an envelopment during the night, 3/23 was ordered to consolidate on ground that would permit solid contact with adjacent units to the left and the right. As a result, Major Scales' men withdrew from the hill and spent the night in practically the same positions from which they had launched their attack on the morning of D plus 8.

Progress on 27 February was little better to the right of the 23d Marines, where the 25th Marines, with 3/24 attached, jumped off at 0800. On the regimental left, the advance of 1/25 hinged on the progress made by 3/23. If the latter succeeded in seizing the crest of Hill 382, 1/25 was to advance north through part of the 3/23 zone of attack, then pivot southeastward to envelop Turkey Knob while 2/25 was to

attempt an envelopment from the south. When it became evident by 1500 that the advance of 3/23 was progressing much more slowly than anticipated, Major Fenton J. Mee, commanding 1/25, ordered the battalion forward, even though Hill 382 still had not been taken. The attack, supported by tanks and preceded by a rocket barrage, initially gained 150 yards across open terrain but came to a halt before cover on the far side could be reached when heavy mortar and antitank fire, as well as intense machine gun fire, hit the assault force. In addition to inflicting heavy casualties on the infantrymen, the Japanese also succeeded in putting two of the three tanks supporting the attack out of action and damaging the third. Shortly after 1700, it had to be conceded that the commanding ground which formed the day's objective could not be reached before nightfall, and the battalion pulled back to its jumpoff positions.

In the regimental center and on the right, 2/25 and 3/25, attacking due east gained between 200 and 300 yards. After having reached ground that was favorable for night defense, both battalions were ordered at 1600 to halt for the day. Since it was still considered possible that the enemy might attempt a flanking attack from the sea, elements of 3/25 were held in reserve near the East Boat Basin with the specific mission of defending that area against any further attack from the ocean.

As D plus 8 ended, an analysis of the progress made that day showed clearly that the gains made were minimal. Summing up the situation at Hill 382, the 4th Division noted with some dis-

gust that "it was envisaged that the capture of this terrain freak would be a costly and a time-consuming job."¹⁰

THE BATTLE OF ATTRITION¹¹

For 4th Division Marines, the night from 27-28 February proved to be a restless one. Throughout the darkness, both the front and rear areas came under heavy mortar fire. For a while it appeared that the enemy had singled out the division command post for special punishment, and no less than 15 heavy shells hit the CP prior to 2200.¹² At the same time, the enemy fired on the beach area with either 20mm or 40mm automatic weapons. Offshore, ships of Task Force 54 furnished normal harassing and illumination fires. The enemy probed various sectors in the 4th Marine Division lines, but no counterattack developed.

Shortly before 0100, the 23d Marines reported that enemy cargo parachutes were dropping into the enemy lines about 400 to 600 yards ahead of them. Strangely enough, none of the enemy planes had been picked up by the American radar on and around Iwo Jima. Nevertheless, the visual sightings were sufficient to spur American artillery into vigorous action. Concentrated artillery and naval gunfire into the drop zone,

though unobserved, was expected to have resulted in the destruction of most of the supplies that had been airlifted to General Senda's *2d Mixed Brigade*, elements of which were still holding the crest of Hill 382. The cargo received by the Japanese that night consisted of medical supplies and ammunition, dropped with paper parachutes from planes based elsewhere in the Bonins. Some of these supplies, still attached to the flimsy parachutes, were recovered several days later when Marines entered the drop zone.

Objectives for the continuation of the attack on the last day of February, D plus 9, remained unchanged though some of the regimental boundaries within the 4th Division underwent a slight change. On the left, the 23d Marines was to continue the assault on Hill 382; in the center, 1/25 and 2/25 were to continue their envelopment of Turkey Knob, while 3/25 along the coast was to advance to the 0-2 Line.

At 0815, following a 45-minute artillery preparation, the assault battalions of the 4th Marine Division jumped off. On the left, the 23d Marines, reinforced with one company of the 24th Marines, resumed the attack with 1/23 on the left and 2/23 on the right after the latter battalion had relieved 3/23. The 2d Battalion, under Major Robert H. Davidson, attempted an advance into the area between Hill 382 and Turkey Knob, while 1/23 again assaulted the hill from the east. Following the jumpoff, 2/23 advanced about 200 yards before it came under increasingly heavy mortar and automatic weapons fire from concealed bunkers and pillboxes. The 1st Battalion likewise drew fire

¹⁰ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 25.

¹¹ Additional material in this section is derived from: 1/14 *OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 27Jan-15Mar45, dtd 27Mar45, hereafter *1/14 OpRpt*; 3/14 *OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 13Jan-13Mar45, dtd 27Mar45, hereafter *3/14 OpRpt*; 1/25 *OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-17Mar45, dtd 19Apr45, hereafter *1/25 OpRpt*; 1st JASCO *OpRpt*, Iwo Jima, 24Aug44-18Mar45, hereafter *1st JASCO OpRpt*.

¹² *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 26.

from automatic weapons and mortars, which brought its advance to a virtual standstill. The 3d Battalion spent most of the morning reorganizing and did not start its push up the southwestern slopes of Hill 382 until later in the afternoon.

As a result, the only battalion of the 23d Marines to make any appreciable gains in the course of the morning was 2/23. At 1300, following a 10-minute preparation, 1/23 launched a coordinated attack with the 21st Marines of the adjacent 3d Marine Division. This joint venture resulted in a 300-yard advance of 1/23 near the division boundary. Other elements of 1/23, attacking Hill 382 from the east, destroyed two of Colonel Nishi's dug-in tanks and continued the ascent to a point where they could take the enemy on top of the hill under fire. By midafternoon, Hill 382 was virtually surrounded; the noose around the Japanese was further tightened when two companies of 3/23 were committed to reinforce the lines of the two assault battalions.

Despite the punishment he was taking, the enemy atop Hill 382 continued to fight as if nothing out of the ordinary were happening around him. In addition to resistance coming from the hill itself, the Marines of the encircling force drew heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire from enemy positions hidden in the jumbled rocks to the east of the hill. Behind the American lines, the supporting weapons did all they could to support the attack of the infantry against Hill 382. In addition to firing preparations before the jumpoff, the 14th Marines shelled the area ahead of the infantry in an attempt to silence

enemy small arms and automatic weapons. Corps and division observers teamed up in an effort to pinpoint as many as possible of the cleverly hidden enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket positions, a slow and time-consuming process that did not always produce immediate results.

The difficult terrain, combined with Japanese expertise in mining the approaches to the front lines and the excellent marksmanship of the enemy antitank gun crews, severely curtailed the use of tanks in close support of the infantry. Nevertheless, individual tanks were able to move forward to deliver overhead fire, which was helpful but still lacked the volume necessary to be really effective. Finally, it was decided that the 4.5-inch rockets of the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment might provide the massed firepower needed. Initially, whenever the rocket trucks went into action, they invariably attracted immediate counterbattery fire from the enemy entrenched on the dominating heights blessed with the advantage of unlimited observation. In order to compete effectively at such a disadvantage, the rocket launcher crews employed hit-and-run tactics. Rocket trucks would whip into position, fire their launchers, and take off to pre-designated assembly points in the rear with all possible speed. If a particularly intensive barrage was desired, six trucks and launchers would fire once, reload with rockets carried on the vehicles, fire a second salvo, and then head for the rear. In this way, a double ripple of 432 rounds could be delivered in somewhat less than five minutes.¹³

¹³ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, Anx C, p. 27.

By late afternoon of 28 February, it became evident that despite the deteriorating situation of enemy troops on the crest of Hill 382, capture of this objective would not be completed in the remaining hours of daylight. As a result, the 23d Marines remained active well into the night in an attempt to consolidate its lines for night defense. The 1st Battalion, in particular, found it extremely difficult to close the gap on the left with the 21st Marines. This was finally accomplished under sniper fire from enemy pockets that has been bypassed in the adjacent 21st Marines' zone of advance during the day. Gains made by the 23d Marines on D plus 9 totalled about 300 yards on the left and 200 yards on the right.

As Colonel Wensinger's regiment vainly struggled to complete the capture of Hill 382 on D plus 9, the adjacent 25th Marines faced its own ordeal in its drive to seize Turkey Knob, the Amphitheater, and the area separating the Knob from the east coast. At 0815, the regiment, with 3/24 attached, jumped off in the same formation it had maintained on the previous day. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, plus one company of 3/24, were to attempt an envelopment of Turkey Knob from the north, while another company was to advance along the low ground southwest of the Knob and attack eastward around the Amphitheater until it could link up with the northern pincers.

Following the usual preparation, elements of the 1st Battalion moved into the wooded area just north of Turkey Knob and advanced some 50 yards. At this point, the enemy unleashed a tre-

mendous mortar and artillery barrage; heavy machine gun fire from the front and the left flank began to rake the Marines. Prompt counterbattery fire called for by observers with the 1st Battalion failed to silence the enemy batteries. By noon, the situation of 1/25 in the woods had become critical and the battalion was suffering heavy casualties. Nevertheless, Major Mee, the battalion commander, ordered his men to hold the woods in order to enable the southern pincers to complete the envelopment of Turkey Knob. As Company B, which was to make the envelopment, started its encircling movement, supported by two Shermans, the enemy on the high ground east of the objective started to shower the force with hand grenades, at the same time raking them with accurate machine gun fire. One of the tanks soon hit a mine and was disabled; the other managed to pull back.

At the fury of the enemy fire increased and casualties mounted, the attack of Company B stalled. By 1645 it was readily apparent that continuation of the attack in the face of such heavy enemy resistance during the limited daylight remaining would serve no useful purpose, and both pincers of 1/25 pulled back to their respective starting positions. In the fading daylight, two tanks made their way forward to a point northwest of Turkey Knob and from this vantage point opened fire against the enemy communications center atop the hill. The 75mm shells, to all appearances, did little damage to the concrete structure and the shelling was ineffective.

To the right of 1/25, the 2d Battalion attempted to extend its left flank

to support the advance of the southern pincers of 1/25. To this end, it had to seize the high ground directly to its front. Enemy fire, most of it coming from pillboxes to the left of the battalion zone of advance, pinned down the infantry. The difficult terrain made it impossible for the Shermans and half-tracks to give close support to the infantry. The attack soon stalled. At noon, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Taul, decided to improvise in order to get the attack moving again. He requested and received permission to have a 75mm pack howitzer rushed forward, to be used as a direct assault weapon. A DUKW was used to transport the howitzer to a position just behind the front lines. There, the gun was dismantled and the various pieces were gingerly hand-carried into the zone of advance of 2/25, where the piece was carefully reassembled. Once this feat had been accomplished, the pack howitzer pumped 40 rounds at the concrete structure atop Turkey Knob. Most of the shells bounced harmlessly off the thick concrete walls and did little, if any, damage to the communications center. However, it was not altogether a wasted effort for the battalion reported that while "the direct result to the enemy was not readily apparent, the morale effect on the men of this battalion was of considerable value because after the howitzer was fired our lines advanced approximately 75 yards by 1900."¹⁴ Two hours later, under cover of darkness, the pack howitzer was again disassembled and returned to its parent organization.

On the right of the 25th Marines' zone of advance, 3/25 jumped off on the morning of D plus 9 at the same time as the other battalions of the division. Moving eastward roughly parallel to the east coast, the battalion had gained about 100 yards by 1000. At that time, the advance of the adjacent 2d Battalion began to bog down, and 3/25, which was pacing itself by the progress of the unit on its left, also halted the attack. Since 2/25 on the left failed to make any further progress for the day, neither did 3/25. At 1800, units of the 25th Marines were ordered to consolidate for the night.

In summing up the results of the day's operations, the 4th Marine Division felt that, even though the enemy was still clinging to the crest of Hill 382 and Turkey Knob, the day's limited advance had outflanked these enemy strongpoints. The feeling was that 4th Division Marines could henceforth bypass the Amphitheater and continue the drive along the east coast of Iwo Jima. Despite the small gains made on D plus 9, the division intelligence officer felt that the central defensive core of resistance had been cracked. He affirmed the possibility of an enemy counterattack, but assumed that the Japanese would be least likely to mount any major counterattack in the zone of action of the 4th Division because of the difficult terrain.¹⁵ Events were to prove this forecast only 50 percent correct.

Throughout 28 February, the assault battalions had received a variety of assistance from the supporting arms. Off-

¹⁴ 2/25 OpRpt, p. 8.

¹⁵ 4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 57, dtd 28-Feb45.

shore, gunfire support ships furnished call-fire missions, while smaller craft fired mortars in support of 2/25 and 3/25. During the afternoon a destroyer approached the east shore and began shelling enemy positions on the high ground in front of the 2/25 zone of advance. Air support extended to the entire 4th Division sector, though half of the napalm bombs dropped in front of the 25th Marines in the course of the morning failed to ignite. A second strike, this time in support of the 23d Marines, took unduly long to be executed. When the aircraft did arrive, they went into action against the wrong target area.¹⁶

The night from D plus 9 to D plus 10 turned out to be another restless one for Marines of the 4th Division. The enemy concentrated his artillery fire against rear installations of the 5th Marine Division and scored several lucky hits on the ammunition dumps of that division. The resulting explosions coming from the rear did little to reassure the men of any of the three divisions. Some enemy mortar and artillery fire also fell in the 4th Division area, causing further disruption of sleep. Alert Marines of 3/23 frustrated several enemy attempts to infiltrate their lines, and 29 enemy dead were found in front of the lines on the following morning. Around 2200, the 25th Marines noticed that the enemy in company strength was massing for a counter attack near the coast in the 3/25 area. Naval gunfire and shore-based artillery promptly fired on and dispersed this assembly.

¹⁶ 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 55, dtd 28-Feb45.

Division orders for 1 March called for continuation of the attack against Hill 382 and Turkey Knob. Beginning at 0530, the 24th Marines was to relieve the depleted units of the 23d, with 2/24 relieving 1/23 and 1/24 taking over the 2/23 sector.¹⁷ The relief was completed by 0630 without major incident and, following a 45-minute naval gunfire and corps artillery preparation, the attack against the key enemy defenses resumed. For 10 minutes prior to H-Hour, set for 0830, the division artillery blasted enemy positions in the division zone of advance.

On the division left, the 24th Marines jumped off, with the 2d Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Rothwell on the left and 1/24, under Major Paul S. Treitel, on the right. Almost immediately, 2/24 was hit by heavy artillery and mortar fire. In order to keep his battalion from getting bogged down, Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell requested supporting fire. Shortly after 0930, carrier aircraft dropped napalm about 600 yards in front of 2/24. The aerial assault was followed within the hour by a fire concentration against the same area by the corps artillery; this fire was followed by naval gunfire. This counterfire had a salutary effect and enemy opposition diminished to the extent that elements of the battalion, in the course of the afternoon, were able to make gains of 150 yards.

While part of 2/24, notably Company F, was engaged in attacking northeastward along the boundary with the 3d Marine Division, at times even cross-

¹⁷ 4th MarDiv OpO 10-45, dtd 28Feb45.

ing the boundary, the gains made by General Erskine's men on 1 March exceeded those of the 4th Division and, in consequence, a gap developed along the boundary. Colonel Walter I. Jordan, commanding the 24th Marines, at 1430 had to commit two companies of 3/24 into the gap in order to regain contact with the 3d Division along the left flank.

Somewhat farther to the south, the battle for Hill 382 continued with undiminished fury. The reduction of the battered strongpoint fell to Company G, 2/24, which assaulted the hill with flamethrowers, bazookas, grenades, and whatever else was at hand. Just as elements of the 23d Marines had previously fought their way to the top to engage in close combat with the defenders, only to be driven off, so it was with the determined Marines of Company G, 2/24. The viciousness of the fighting that ensued has been depicted in these words:

At one time, Company G of 2/24 was astride the top, but still there was no quarter. The attackers fought with rifles and grenades, with flamethrowers and satchel charges. Still the defenders would not give up, even though their own fire fell on them from the ridges further east. These were the men from Kumamoto in Kyushu, a historic battlefield of the 1877 Civil War, and they would not give up. Not even when Major Kenro Anso died, burned from head to foot by a flamethrower. He led the 3d Battalion, 145th Regiment, in defense of the hill. So great was his inspiration that at his death he was promoted two full ranks to colonel.²⁸

As the afternoon wore on, the battle for control of the hill continued

without letup. While hand grenades flew back and forth, assault squads were blowing cave entrances, and flamethrowers were incinerating such Japanese as showed themselves. Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell, escorted by his company commanders, appeared on the scene in order to conduct a personal reconnaissance, select positions for the coming night, and make plans for the attack on D plus 11. Despite heavy fire that was coming from nearly every direction, the reconnaissance party completed its inspection and the battalion commander left the hill unscathed. As the day ended, the remnants of Major Anso's battalion clung to the crest of Hill 382, still full of fighting spirit despite the loss of their commander.

Along the southern slopes of the hill and near its base to the southeast, the fighting on D plus 10 waxed just as bitterly as it did at the top. Here, 1/24 was attempting an envelopment of Hill 382 from the south against heavy fire coming not only from the top of the hill but also from a patch of woods directly in front and the high ground beyond. As men of the 1st Battalion inched ahead, two tanks attached to Company C provided covering fire. Just before noon, the company commander was wounded and casualties mounted to a point where smoke had to be employed to screen evacuation of the wounded.

Following a heavy artillery and mortar concentration, and led by a new commander, Company C resumed the attack at 1300. Within minutes, the new commander was wounded and had to be replaced. Despite all enemy opposition, the company continued its dogged advance and by 1700, when it began to

²⁸ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 212.

consolidate its positions, it had seized some of the high ground to the south-east of Hill 382.

The biggest gains for the 24th Marines on D plus 10 were to accrue along the 4th Division boundary, where 2/24 made an advance of 400 yards to the east. To the right, the dogged attack of 1/24 to the high ground southeast of Hill 382 culminated in a gain of 200 yards. This forward movement, flanking Hill 382 from two sides, all but surrounded the enemy atop the hill, though this made little, if any, difference to Japanese determined to die there. Of added importance to the further advance of the 24th Marines was the fact that from the high ground southeast of Hill 382, Company C was able to look down on the ruins of Minami Village. Thus it appeared that the day's advance had served not only to outflank most of Hill 382, but a portion of Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater as well.

To the south, the 25th Marines, attacking in the same formation employed in previous days, also was in for a hard day's work. The regiment's plan was ambitious: to execute a double envelopment of Turkey Knob, supported by two companies of 3/23 which relieved elements of 3/24 that had been attached to 1/25 for the past two days. As the 1st Battalion moved out, supported by the companies of 3/23, it crossed an open area prior to entering the woods to its front. Upon reaching the edge of the woods around 1000, 1/25 encountered the same conditions that had halted the advance on the previous day. Once again, Major Mee's men were

hit by heavy mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire, which caused the advance to bog down. Despite counter-battery fire and aerial spotting, it proved impossible to put the enemy mortars out of action, nor were the aerial observers able to spot to the cleverly concealed enemy artillery positions.

Fighting for the woods raged throughout 1 March, as Marines of 1/25 pressed the attack. It was an unequal contest with the enemy possessing the advantage of cover, concealment, commanding terrain, and superior fire power. In the end, the assault units of 1/25 had to pull back to their jump-off positions. As the tired men began their withdrawal the enemy, in a final gesture of defiance, subjected them to a heavy mortar and rocket barrage, which caused additional casualties. The withdrawal was accomplished with the help of a smoke screen, which also made it possible to evacuate the casualties. Shortly after 1600, the Japanese added insult to injury by subjecting Colonel Lanigan's command post to a severe shelling.

Since the remaining two battalions of the 25th Marines were pacing themselves in relation to gains to be made by the 1st Battalion, they remained more or less in place when it became apparent that the attack of 1/25 had bogged down. Nevertheless, 2/25 did succeed in gaining 100 yards along its left. For the most of the day, the division reconnaissance company was attached to 2/25 in order to mop up the rear area. From the 3/25 area, a tank was able to destroy two enemy machine guns, but no additional ground

was taken. Indicative of the artillery support furnished to the 25th Marines by 1/14 on D plus 10 are the following figures. The battalion fired 4,640 rounds for 135 missions, of which 94 were harassing, 31 were aimed at targets of opportunity, 6 were for preparation, and 4 were fired at miscellaneous targets.¹⁹ The figures listed above do not include the defensive fires, which 1/14 started at 1640, and harassing fires which continued throughout the night.

As D plus 10 came to a close, the 4th Marine Division could book only very limited gains for itself. After five days of continuous assault into the Meat Grinder, all three of the mutually supporting cornerstones of the enemy defense system, Hill 382, Turkey Knob, and the Amphitheater were still in enemy hands, and, with the exception of Hill 382, firmly so. With the heaviest assaults still ahead, the combat efficiency of the 4th Division on the evening of 1 March remained at 55 percent.²⁰

The night from 1-2 March passed with few untoward incidents, except in front of 2/24, where small groups of the enemy made various attempts at infiltration, keeping the battalion in a general state of unrest. All of the 4th Division units came under sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire that hit the lines and rear area in a seemingly haphazard fashion. By way of response, the corps and division artillery replied to each enemy salvo with immediate counterbattery fire, the results of which could not be readily determined.

Early on 2 March, General Cates' division again resumed the battle of attrition in the Meat Grinder. Though none of the weary 4th Division Marines was aware of it that morning, the final battle for the Meat Grinder was about to begin. The main effort was to be made by the 24th Marines against Hill 382, while farther south the 23d and 25th Marines were to assault the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob from the north and south. If the heavy enemy fire against Hill 382 from these two staunch bastions of the enemy defense system could be eliminated, the hill itself could be taken.

Following a 25-minute artillery preparation fired by the corps artillery from H-Hour minus 30 to minus 15, and again from minus 10 to H-Hour, the assault resumed. On the morning of D plus 11, there was one change in the preparatory fires. Precisely at H-Hour, 0800, the division artillery unleashed an intensive preparation, followed by a rolling barrage.

On the division left, the 24th Marines with 3/24 on the right, 2/24 in the center, and 1/24 on the left moved out for the attack. The 3d Battalion, commanded by Major Doyle A. Stout, advanced eastward along the division boundary northeast of Hill 382 and, while keeping contact with 3d Division elements on its left, advanced about 300 yards. As the battalion fought its way forward, enemy opposition stiffened until all further movement became impossible.

It was in the regiment's center and on its right that the most desperate fighting for the day was to occur. It

¹⁹ 1/14 *OpRpt*, p. 16, dtd 1Mar45.

²⁰ 4th *MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 30.

fell to 2/24 to launch an assault against Hill 382 from the northeast, while 1/24 enveloped the hill from the south. At the time they jumped off, the men of 2/24 had spent an even more restless night than had other units in the division. The front lines on Hill 382 had been active throughout the night. Hand grenade duels and hand-to-hand fighting frequently erupted with small groups of the enemy that filtered out of recesses in the hill in front of the Marine positions, between them, and even to the rear. In fact, two Marines had received saber cuts during the nocturnal fighting.²¹ Nevertheless, the battalion attacked Hill 382 with vigor, even though it was immediately subjected to heavy machine gun, rifle, mortar, and artillery fire. Since Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell's men constituted the main effort, four Shermans and a section of the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment furnished support, in addition to the division artillery. As the tanks and rocket launchers blasted the area ahead of 2/24 with shells and flame, they were spotted by the enemy and taken under such heavy fire that the armor had to pull back. The rocket launchers were able to fire three missions before they, too, had to be withdrawn.

By 1100, the frontal assault on Hill 382 was beginning to bog down in the face of interlocking enemy machine gun fire, as well as heavy mortar fire. The importance that the Japanese attached to the defense of the hill was underscored not only by the severity of the mortar fire but also by the unusual-

ly large caliber of mortar shells employed. As elsewhere on Iwo Jima, the artillery and naval gunfire furnished in support of the attack was of little benefit to the infantrymen slowly inching their way up the reverse slope of Hill 382, exposed to everything the enemy was capable of throwing at them with little else but their own organic weapons to answer.

As the attack was on the verge of bogging down, Lieutenant Colonel Rothwell assembled his company commanders a short distance behind the lines and decided that one platoon of Company E, accompanied by two tanks, was to make an attempt to outflank the stubborn enemy defenders from the right. At this time, a platoon of Company E, commanded by 2d Lieutenant Richard Reich, had already reached the top of the hill and was locked in close combat with the enemy underneath the radar antenna at the same spot which already had seen vicious close fighting when the 23d Marines was attempting to seize the hill. As Major Roland Carey, commanding Company E, attempted to relay the orders for the flanking movement to his men, he was hit by machine gun fire and had to be evacuated. The executive officer, Captain Pat Donlan, took over and prepared to see that his predecessor's orders were carried out.

Just as Captain Donlan was in the process of orienting his platoon leaders and issuing orders for the flanking movement at the battalion command post, he was hit by a fragment of a mortar shell exploding nearby. As one of the platoon leaders, 1st Lieutenant Stanley Osborne, prepared to relieve

²¹ 2/24 AR, p. 16.

him, another large mortar shell scored a square hit on the command post with devastating results:

Osborne was killed instantly, Donlan's right leg was blown off below the knee, and two other officers were wounded, one mortally. Reich, still holding under the radar screen, was in command. He was the only officer left in Company E.²²

Despite the loss of five of its officers, Company E continued the assault on Hill 382. When elements of Company F, commanded by Captain Walter Ridlon, joined forces on the hill with Company E, the doom of the defenders was sealed. By 1530, 2/24 reported the objective secured.²³ Colonel Jordan, the regimental commander, had by this time apparently grown somewhat leery of optimistic reports concerning the capture of this particular objective, and in consequence, in describing the action of 2 March, the 24th Marines reported only "that small gains were made throughout the day all along the line except in the vicinity of Hill 382 where the bitter opposition continued."²⁴ The regiment did not officially record the capture of Hill 382 until the following day.

There was some truth to the comment that enemy opposition at Hill 382 continued, even though the Marines were now in possession of the crest. In the words of one account of the action on 2 March, "the hill was overrun, but it was not subdued."²⁵ A clue to this seeming contradiction may be found in a 4th Division report for D plus 11, which

introduces a new element in assessing the progress made by 2/24 on 2 March by pointing out:

It appears that there are underground passageways leading into the defenses on Hill 382 and when one occupant of a pillbox is killed another one comes up to take his place. This is rather a lengthy process.²⁶

And that is precisely the way it turned out. For the remainder of D plus 11, 2/24 mopped up the objective and consolidated its positions atop the hill. Because of the underground tunnels linking various pillboxes and strongpoints on the slopes of Hill 382, "the mopup proved to be an almost interminable process."²⁷ In fact, sealing the caves around Hill 382 and the elimination of isolated enemy holdouts would require several additional days. But for all practical purposes, one of the three strongpoints of the enemy defense system in the 4th Division zone of advance had been eliminated, which left the remaining two, Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater, somewhat more vulnerable to attack.

Operations on D plus 11 to the south of Hill 382 also differed from those of preceding days. While the enemy atop Hill 382 was treated to an exceptionally heavy preparation on that day, precisely the opposite was the case in the 25th Marines zone of advance. There, Colonel Lanigan decided to employ the element of surprise and launch an attack at 0630 without the benefit of any artillery preparation. During the early stages of the action, while the

²² Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 215.

²³ 2/24 OpRpt, p. 188.

²⁴ 24th Mar OpRpt, p. 15.

²⁵ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 216.

²⁶ 4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt No. 57 dtd 2Mar45.

²⁷ Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, p. 66.

enemy was still off guard, 1/25 was to infiltrate and seize the high ground north of Turkey Knob. Elements of 1/25 and 3/23, the latter having been attached to the 25th Marines, were to execute an envelopment from the northwest and the south.

The infiltration got under way at 0630 and proceeded on schedule for about 20 minutes. However, the Japanese soon recognized the multiple threat facing them and at 0650 unleashed a devastating rocket and mortar barrage against the assault forces. As Marines hit the ground to escape the lethal shell fragments, enemy machine guns opened up at close range and raked the area in which the assault force was pinned down. All need for further secrecy having disappeared, Marine artillery and mortars retaliated, and eight Shermans moved forward in support of the attack. Once again, the large blockhouse atop Turkey Knob drew most of the supporting fire. A large number of 75mm shells and no less than 1,000 gallons of flame-thrower fuel were hurled against this impressive obstacle, but no immediate effects of this fire became apparent. The blockhouse appeared to be unoccupied after the tank attack, but it was assumed that the enemy would feed replacements into it through tunnels as soon as the fury of the American assault diminished.

Under cover of the heavy supporting fire, the envelopment of Turkey Knob continued, though progress was slow. By 1430, the two pincers of the double envelopment were only 65 yards from each other, and for a while it appeared that the movement might still

succeed. However, as soon as the enemy became aware of this latest development, he threw a tremendous barrage against Company B, 1/25, which had been inching its way north to the high ground from positions south of the Amphitheater. This murderous rocket and mortar fire, interlaced with a heavy volume of small arms fire, inflicted over 30 casualties on the company and forced its withdrawal.²⁸

In the center of the 25th Marines line, 2/25 was to extend its left flank to assist 1/25, and for this purpose one company of 3/23 was attached to the battalion. Since no appreciable gains were made by 1/25 during the day, the 2d Battalion remained in place and spent the day in mopping up enemy stragglers and reducing such fortifications in its zone as the enemy still occupied or had reoccupied. Similarly, 3/25, nearest the coast, remained in position during the early part of the day. Enemy mortar fire into these positions caused several casualties, leading Captain James C. Headley, the battalion commander, to make this comment:

Throughout this period of time we were suffering casualties from enemy mortar fire and our failure to advance while suffering casualties had a depressing effect upon the morale of the troops.²⁹

During the late afternoon of 2 March, elements on the right of 2/25 and the 3d Battalion finally were given permission to advance to the high ground directly to their front. Surprisingly enough, the enemy did not contest this advance, and the 25th Marines gained

²⁸ *25th Mar OpRpt*, p. 12.

²⁹ *3/24 OpRpt*, p. 11.

300 yards, enabling the regiment to consolidate on the freshly taken high ground.

By evening of D plus 11, the 4th Division line protruded both in the north and in the south, hanging back only in the center where the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob remained to be taken. Overall, important progress had been made during the day with the seizure of Hill 382 and the unexpectedly easy advance near the coast during the latter part of the day. The fighting for Hill 382 had been costly for 2/24, in particular, which summed up the day's fighting as follows:

Today's fighting more intense than any other day up until now. Enemy resistance very heavy. Many pillboxes and strong emplacements to the direct front. Many officers, NCO's and experienced personnel were casualties. Leadership now an acute problem. Enemy installations knocked out during the day's advance: 8 machine guns; 15 cave entrances, from which fire was being received, were sealed; one 47mm gun in bunker knocked out. No count of enemy dead, estimated to be over 100.³⁰

Throughout 2 March, Marines on the ground had received excellent support from the sea as well as from the air. Two battleships and one cruiser furnished general support, while destroyers and gunboats deployed near the eastern bulge of the island to shell the rocky draws leading down to the sea. Carrier-based aircraft carried out six strikes against enemy positions in front of the 4th Division. The pilots and observers of VMO-4 flew five missions, including a rather unorthodox one in which

a division public relations photographer took pictures from an altitude of 1,000 feet. This improvisation became necessary because "the sustained bombardment of Iwo Jima had so torn the face of the land that pre-D-Day maps were by now of little use in terrain appreciation."³¹

The night from 2-3 March passed without major incidents. It almost appeared as if the Japanese were beginning to feel the results of the prolonged battle of attrition. Along the 4th Marine Division lines, the only action occurred in front of 2/24, where the enemy attempted an infiltration. Once the presence of the intruders had been discovered, a lively firefight ensued. It ended when the enemy withdrew, leaving behind 20 dead. Four Marines of 2/24 were killed in this action.³²

For the continuation of the assault on 3 March, General Cates made certain changes in the disposition of his forces. At 0500, the 23d Marines relieved the 25th and just before H-Hour, set for 0630, 1/23 passed through 1/25. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 25th Marines, were attached to the 23d and retained their positions in the center and on the right. There were no changes in the 24th Marines' sector, where Colonel Jordan's men were preparing to continue the attack, except that Company L, 3/24, suffered 22 casualties while relieving elements of the 9th Marines near the division boundary.³³

In an attempt to use the element of surprise, the 4th Marine Division attack

³¹ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, Sec IV, p. 32.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *24th Mar OpRpt*, p. 16.

³⁰ *2/24 OpRpt*, p. 189.

was not preceded by any preparatory fire. On the division left, the 24th Marines jumped off against formidable new defenses in its zone of advance, the bulk of which appeared to be concentrated on the high ground to the northeast of Hill 382, and in the vicinity of Minami Village. Initial resistance was heavy, and mortar, artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire hit the assault companies as soon as they began to move out. Directly in front of 2/24 were pillboxes and reinforced concrete emplacements, including one emplacement containing a high velocity gun.

Immediately following the jump-off, corps and division artillery began to pound these defenses with some effect. The regiment, with 3/24, 2/24, and 1/24 from left to right, slowly advanced against the enemy positions to its front. Some progress was made until the lines advanced to a point close enough to work on enemy emplacements with demolitions and flamethrowers. Once this close-in fighting got under way, fierce action ensued and the assault slowed to a crawl. The terrain consisted of numerous hillocks, mounds, and shallow cross-corridors with vertical sides. Covered reinforced concrete and sand-covered log machine gun and rifle emplacements with firing ports covering the front and both flanks blocked the advance. It soon became apparent that the line of defense to the north and east of Hill 382 had a depth of over 300 yards.

The difficulties accompanying an advance into prepared positions of this type were only too apparent. Due to the character of the terrain, these defenses

were well protected from the supporting artillery fire. Tanks and flame-thrower tanks, in particular, encountered major problems in getting into position. Once there, their fields of fire were limited so that they could effectively concentrate only on a few emplacements. As the infantry approached the enemy positions, the very close support needed could be furnished only by 60mm and 81mm mortars emplaced within 50 yards of the front lines. A shortage of ammunition limited the employment of the 81mm mortars, so that these weapons were fired only periodically and when dire necessity made their close supporting fires indispensable.

As usual, the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting. Marines, equipped with demolitions, portable flamethrowers, a variety of small arms, bazookas, and smoke and fragmentation grenades, maneuvered into position in small groups and attempted to neutralize the enemy positions one by one. It was a slow, tedious, and costly process calling for able leadership on the part of squad and fire team leaders, a number of whom were killed or wounded and had to be evacuated.

By late afternoon, the center of the 24th Marines had advanced 350 yards, with smaller gains along the northern and southern flanks. Throughout the day, the Shermans of Company B, 4th Tank Battalion, gave as much support to the regiment as the difficult terrain allowed. Rocket launchers employed their now customary hit and run tactics to escape counterbattery fire from the enemy mortars and artillery.

When Colonel Jordan's regiment consolidated on D plus 12, the 3d Battalion on the left had tied in with elements of the 9th Marines, while 1/24 on the right held a narrow front with only Company B in the line. After another day of fatiguing combat, the men were even more exhausted than on the previous day. Their condition was graphically outlined in a 2/24 report for the day:

Men very tired and listless, lack leaders. Close support by effective close support weapons, such as tanks and 37mm weapons not possible except in rare instances, due to terrain limiting fields of fire. Tank support is seldom sufficient to warrant the casualties resulting from the counter-mortar fire.³⁴

Bitter fighting also marked the day's operations to the south of the 24th Marines, where the enemy still retained a strong hold both on the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. There, 1/23 was to make the main attack southeastward above the Amphitheater and link up with units on the left of 2/25. If completed, this envelopment would result in reduction of Turkey Knob and encirclement of the well-dug-in enemy troops in the Amphitheater. In order to support the attack, Company C, 4th Tank Battalion and a platoon of the 4th Engineer Battalion were attached to 1/23.

Following the artillery preparation which came after the jump-off, the enemy initially appeared stunned and, in the words of the regimental report, "the initial phase of the attack progressed favorably."³⁵ However, progress on the

regiment's right soon lagged when Marines drew fire from the concrete blockhouse atop Turkey Knob. In addition, the enemy had mined the routes of approach. Any attempt to remove these antipersonnel mines was frustrated by deadly accurate sniper fire. Nevertheless, by 1400 the attached engineer platoon had cleared a path over which flame tanks and infantry demolition teams were able to get within effective range of the blockhouse. As a result of the combined teamwork of these arms, the blockhouse atop Turkey Knob was partially reduced in a slow and costly assault that continued during the latter part of the afternoon. By evening of 3 March, however, when units consolidated for the night, the Japanese were still firmly in control of Turkey Knob.

While 1/23 was battling for possession of the Knob, the remaining two battalions of the 23d Marines remained in position, except for Company K, 3/23, which, supported by tanks and 75mm halftracks, assaulted stubborn enemy defenses along the southwestern portion of the Amphitheater. Towards the end of the day, Company I was moved into a gap south of the Amphitheater between 1/23 and 2/25. The 2d Battalion of the 23d Marines remained in corps reserve for the day; it occupied an assembly area between the Southern and Central Airfields and could be moved anywhere within the Corps zone of action as required. For the remainder of D plus 12, 2/25 and 3/25 remained in their respective positions on the division's right, while 1/25 in division reserve underwent reorganization and

³⁴ 2/24 *OpRpt*, p. 191.

³⁵ 23d *Mar OpRpt*, p. 14.

rehabilitation, and got some badly needed rest.

Throughout the day, the slight but nevertheless important gains made by the 4th Marine Division had been achieved with the help of the supporting arms. Within the division, 2/14 had furnished direct support to the 23d Marines, while 1/14 had reinforced the fires of 2/14. The 24th Marines had been directly supported by 3/14, while 4/14 was in general support. The 4th Tank Battalion had furnished such assistance as the difficult terrain permitted. By the end of 3 March, 36 tanks were operational, 12 had been destroyed, and 8 had been damaged.³⁶ Ships of TF 54 continued to provide supporting fire, but the use of such support was restricted because of safety factors dictated by the location of the front lines.

At the end of D plus 12, the combat efficiency of the 4th Marine Division was estimated to be 50 percent. All units were ordered to consolidate at 1700, prepared to continue the attack on the following day. With the capture of Hill 382, one of the main props of the enemy's defensive system in the 4th Division sector had been knocked out, and despite heavy losses, it could be assumed "that the Division was now fighting in the rear of the highly prepared defensive area in which the operations for the past three days had been conducted."³⁷

The night from 3-4 March passed without major incident in the 4th Marine Division zone of operations, except for the sector occupied by the 24th Ma-

rines. There, small groups of the enemy attempted unsuccessfully to infiltrate the lines of 3/24. The enemy placed heavy artillery and mortar fire into the 24th Marines area throughout the night, causing moderate casualties. Four destroyers provided illumination during the night.

At 0730, 4 March, the 4th Marine Division continued its attack with no change in its formation or direction of advance. Prior to the jumpoff, the corps and division artillery fired a half-hour preparation, which was further supplemented by naval gunfire. In contrast to the preceding days, the weather on D plus 13 was overcast and showers began to fall in the morning. Because of the leaden skies and the limited visibility, all air strikes had to be cancelled. It also was a very poor day for aerial observation.

On the ground, the battle of attrition continued. On the division left, the 24th Marines attacked in a generally southeasterly direction. The direction of advance was to be parallel to the corridors. Once again, the assault turned into a step-by-step affair, as usual combined with heavy casualties and little gain. Such progress as could be made was achieved with the assistance of the Shermans, which were employed with good effect against the numerous pillboxes and caves. Good results were also obtained from the flamethrower tank which scorched the enemy defenses. Even though the regiment advanced only about 100 yards, the steady destruction of the formidable enemy defenses sooner or later was bound to have a concrete effect. Indicative of the regiment's effort is the fact that 2,200

³⁶ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 34.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

pounds of explosives were employed on D plus 13 to blow cave entrances and exits.³⁸

On the division right, the 23d Marines, with 2/25 and 3/25 still attached, 1/23 in line, and 2/23 in corps and 3/23 in division reserve, made small gains in the 1/23 zone of advance. The two attached battalions of the 25th Marines on the regiment's right had to sit it out in their positions, much against their will. As the division was to report the day's activities:

BLT's 2/25 and 3/25 could have advanced within their zones, but such an advance was not deemed advisable because it would have overextended the lines. The terrain in front of this RCT was the most difficult yet encountered; observation was limited to only a few feet, and it was impossible to support the attack with anything heavier than normal infantry weapons.³⁹

By evening of 4 March, the combat efficiency of the 4th Marine Division had dropped to 45 percent, the lowest yet since the Marines had gone ashore on Iwo Jima. The enemy was still offering stubborn resistance from closely integrated positions, and General Cates' men were more exhausted than ever. This circumstance, combined with the murky skies, the discomfort created by the rain, and the ever present enemy snipers in front of, behind, and between the lines should, by all normal yardsticks, have reduced the morale of the wet and tired Marines to a new low.

Yet, strangely enough, this was not the case. There was no definite indication that the enemy's morale was sag-

ging, and in his battered positions in the Amphitheater, he was clinging to every foot of ground as resolutely as ever. Nevertheless, there was a quiet feeling of optimism that perhaps, after all, the enemy might be beginning to crack. Perhaps it was brought about by the decrease in the accuracy of the enemy artillery and mortar fire resulting from the accurate counterbattery fire furnished by the corps artillery. It was also possible that the loss of Hill 382 and the severe mauling that Turkey Knob had taken by this time had deprived the enemy's artillery observers of their choice observation sites.

The battle of attrition being waged all over northern Iwo Jima was beginning to affect the enemy's power to resist, even though his spirit was as high as ever. In recognition of the bitter struggle waged by General Kuribayashi against overwhelmingly superior American forces, his superiors in Tokyo sent a message addressed both to him and Admiral Ichimaru, expressing Japan's admiration for the battle they were waging. Ichimaru replied: "The enemy is hitting us hard, but we will hit back."⁴⁰ For his part, General Kuribayashi had earlier stated defiantly "I am not afraid of the fighting power of only three American divisions, if only there were no bombardments from aircraft and warships. This is the only reason why we have to see such miserable situations."⁴¹

Looking at the overall situation on Iwo and the decimated remnants of his garrison, consisting of only 3,500 ef-

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁴¹ *Horie Rpt.*, p. 9.

fectives, General Kuribayashi saw clearly that his time was running short. In desperation, he signalled Tokyo for help on the evening of 4 March, calling for air and naval support. "Send me these things, and I will hold this island", he said. "Without them I cannot hold."⁴² But there was no response from the Japanese mainland, which itself was reeling underneath the intensified American bombing attacks. In view of total American air superiority in the Bonins and a mighty American fleet patrolling the surrounding waters, Iwo Jima was, indeed, isolated. The defenders of Iwo Jima had the full sympathy of almost the entire population of Japan, whose attention was riveted on the fierce battle in progress there. On its part:

... the Army High Command had meanwhile been conducting earnest investigations into the possibility of mounting an effective attack against the U. S. naval forces which were swarming around Iwo Jima. Air power on hand was small, however, while overwater flight training was inadequate; hence a massive effort could not be staged.⁴³

As for the Japanese Navy contingent on Iwo Jima, Admiral Ichimaru did not even bother to radio for help. Admiral Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Imperial Navy, had sent word that the Navy would be ready for the next expected American thrust by the end of April, but that all plans depended on the outcome at Iwo. The message ended with these words: "I regret that except for full submarine support and some air support, we cannot send reinforce-

ments to Iwo. However, in view of overall requirements, I earnestly hope you will maintain calm and fight staunchly by any means."⁴⁴

The meaning of this was clear and Admiral Ichimaru, who had never expected reinforcements in the first place, accepted the inevitable. Clearly, the Iwo garrison was on its own, and its prolonged death throes would, in any case, be a lonely business.

REORGANIZATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE ATTACK⁴⁵

In accordance with General Schmidt's order that 5 March was to be a day of rest and rehabilitation for all VAC units, no offensive action was planned in the 4th Division sector on D plus 14. Instead, the division was to reorganize so that by noon it would have one regiment, less one battalion, available to continue the attack on a limited front on the following day. The general direction of the attack on 6 March was to be eastward. (See Map VIII, Map Section).

The regiment which General Cates selected for the main effort was Colonel Wensinger's 23d Marines. In order to relieve this regiment from its other duties, the area on the division's right reverted to the 25th Marines. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 25th Marines, hitherto attached to the 23d, reverted to

⁴² Quoted in Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 207.

⁴³ Quoted in Leckie, *Strong Men Armed*, p. 456.

⁴⁴ Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*, p. 138.

⁴⁵ Additional material in this section is derived from: 4th SerBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 27Dec44-19Mar45, dtd 2Apr45, hereafter *4th SerBn OpRpt*; 4th MedBn OpRpt, Iwo Jima, 19Feb-15Mar45, n. d., hereafter *4th MedBn OpRpt*.

the parent regiment. The 1st Battalion, 25th Marines, relieved 1/23 in almost identical positions held by 1/25 on 2 March. Since 3/23 was still heavily committed along the southern fringes of the Amphitheater, where it was mopping up previously bypassed enemy defenses and overcoming other stubborn pockets of resistance, Colonel Lanigan combined the division reconnaissance company, which had been attached to his regiment as of 0700 on 5 March, with Company L, 3/25, into a provisional battalion, commanded by Major Edward L. Asbill, executive officer of 1/25. In the northern portion of the division sector, three companies of the 24th Marines were pulled out of the line and stationed in the regimental rear area, where they were to form a strong regimental reserve. In order to further bolster the 25th Marines, Company B of the 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion was attached to the regiment. This company was to patrol the beach areas north of the 3/25 sector and fire on targets along the beach.

The reorganization within the 4th Division area of responsibility was completed by noon of 5 March, as scheduled. During the entire period of reorganization, beginning on the evening of 4 March, the enemy did not initiate any offensive action, though his supporting arms remained active. During the night from 4-5 March, only sporadic fire hit the 4th Division zone, with the exception of the 24th Marines' area. There, heavy mortar and artillery fire was received almost incessantly during the hours of darkness. Throughout D plus 14, the 14th Marines continued to fire

on targets of opportunity and executed harassing fires. A total of 17 missions employed air observation. VMO-4 flew 10 tactical observation missions. One pilot was wounded and evacuated. By late afternoon of 5 March, the squadron had four aircraft that were still operational. In addition to the artillery fire provided by the 14th Marines on D plus 14, elements of TF 54 fired call fire missions throughout the day.⁴⁶

It had, for all practical purposes, been a quiet day on Iwo Jima. There had been no gains since there had been no offensive action. Yet, as this day of rest ended, "there had been more than 400 casualties on the line where there was no fighting. The men got ready for the next big push."⁴⁷

Following the day of rest, the VAC offensive resumed on the morning of 6 March. In order to obtain the maximum results from extensive massed preparations, General Schmidt had ordered his divisions to attack in echelon. Each attack was to be preceded by an intensive artillery and naval gunfire preparation, in which the corps and division artillery, as well as the medium and heavy guns of the fire support ships, were to join.⁴⁸ Altogether, not including the naval gunfire, 12 artillery battalions would unleash a devastating curtain of fire against the enemy garrison that still blocked the path of the VAC advance. They would first fire for approximately 30 minutes at the western portion of the front, then shift the preparation for a little over half an

⁴⁶ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 39.

⁴⁷ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 244.

⁴⁸ VAC OpO 13-45, dtd 5Mar45.

hour to the eastern half. Within the overall assault, the 4th Marine Division was to jump off at 0900, H plus 60 minutes, with the main effort on its left in conjunction with the adjacent 9th Marines of the 3d Marine Division.

At 0845, the coordinated fire of the 132 guns and the naval gunfire shifted to support the second phase of the VAC attack along the eastern portion of the front. The shore-based artillery alone had expended 22,500 shells ranging from 75mm to 155mm in a little over an hour. In the zone of action of General Cates' division, the full force of the barrage was brought to bear on the left in the zone of action of the 23d Marines. There, prior to 0600, the 23d Marines, less 1/23, had moved into position. In preparation for the assault, 2/23 had relieved 3/24 without enemy interference. The weather promised to be fair with good visibility; only a slight haze obscured observation in the early dawn.

Following the earth-shaking artillery preparation, which gave way to a rolling barrage, 2/23 jumped off at H-Hour, followed by the 3d Battalion at a 400-yard interval. As the assault battalion advanced eastward towards the high ground to its front, it became apparent that the heavy volume of artillery fire had not incapacitated the Japanese who emerged from their dugouts little the worse for wear and, in the extremely rugged terrain, put up a spirited fight for every yard of the way and defended each cave, pillbox, and emplacement with the greatest tenacity.

As the advance gained momentum, in the face of accurate fire from rifles and automatic weapons to the front, the as-

sault companies moved forward about 50 yards. On the left, where the terrain favored the employment of armor, Company G, 2/23, supported by four tanks, gained 300 yards. As the company prepared to move into a gap that had arisen between it and Company F, the enemy caught Company G in a murderous mortar barrage that caused numerous casualties and wounded the company commander. Fierce fighting continued throughout the day. At 1800, when 2/23 dug in for the night, Company G on the left still was 350 yards in front of the line of departure; the remainder of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 23d Marines, had gained approximately 100 yards during the day.

To the right of the 23d Marines, 2/24 and 1/24 jumped off abreast at H-Hour. Almost immediately, Colonel Jordan's Marines found themselves in the same type of terrain that had impeded the movements of the 23d Marines to the north. The ground was characterized by a series of jagged ridges and heavy undergrowth, both favoring the defending force. Despite support from gunfire ships and three heavy air strikes, enemy resistance continued undiminished. After a day of exhausting and costly fighting, the regiment gained 150 yards on the left and even less on the right.

Since the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob had, for all practical purposes, already been bypassed prior to D plus 15, no frontal assault was launched against these positions, which still formed a deep salient in the 4th Division lines. Because of these protruding enemy positions, the 23d and 24th Marines north of this salient attacked in an east-south-

easterly direction, while the 25th Marines to the south were attacking generally to the northeast. As a result, it appeared that all the 4th Division thrusts on 6 March were directed generally towards the remnants of Higashi Village.

For the three battalions of the 25th Marines, it was another day of waiting for the left wing of the division to move forward. Since no decisive gains were made by the 24th Marines, 2/25 and 3/25 stayed in position and conducted mop-up operations within their respective areas. The only forward movement took place in the 1/25 sector, where Marines continued chipping away at enemy fortifications to the east of Turkey Knob near Minami Village, supported by flame and medium tanks and 75mm half-tracks. Once the armor had completed its mission, the tanks were pulled back in order to prevent their exposure to the expected enemy counterbattery fire.

By evening of 6 March, it was evident that the momentous artillery preparation which had so promisingly ushered in the resumed offensive had failed utterly in crushing the enemy's will or capacity to resist. At the time it consolidated for the night, the 4th Marine Division held a line extending for roughly 2,470 yards. A gap of 400 yards still separated the division's left flank from the right of the adjacent 3d Division.

Once again, despite meager gains, the division's losses on D plus 15 had been heavy. The division D-3 report for the day estimated combat efficiency at 40 percent and added that "the result of

fatigue and lack of experienced leaders is very evident in the manner in which the units fight."⁴⁹ Conversely, the enemy seemed to adapt himself readily to the changing conditions on Iwo Jima by making widespread use of American equipment. Thus it was discovered during the day that five enemy bodies in front of the 4th Division lines were fully dressed in Marine uniforms. One Japanese who decided to give American food a try was to record in his diary: "I tasted Roosevelt's rations for the first time, and they were very good." No doubt, the frequently maligned originator of the American combat rations would have been pleased with this compliment.

The night of 6-7 March turned into a veritable hell for many 4th Division Marines. The continuous and exhausting action in preceding days had been enough to wear down many of them, both physically and mentally. Instead of the rest which they so badly needed and desired, the men were kept in a state of upheaval all night by Japanese activity which, according to the official report, was "sporadic but costly".⁵⁰

At 2130, several enemy mortar shells fell in the lines of 2/23, wounding approximately 30 men. While confusion engulfed this hard-hit battalion, the action shifted to the right flank of the 4th Division. There, shortly after 2200, enemy were reported moving in front of 3/25. Immediate artillery fire was brought to bear on the enemy assembly, which was dispersed. Up to this time,

⁴⁹ *4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpt* No. 61, dtd 6Mar45.

⁵⁰ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 40.

all had remained quiet in front of 1/25, but as the night continued, an estimated 40-50 Japanese infiltrated the battalion sector and sneaked into the foxholes occupied by Major Mee's men. An occasional bursting hand grenade punctured the quietness of the night—a solitary rifle shot, a deep grunt or groan, and then stillness again. It was not until morning that an accurate tally of the 1st Battalion's losses was possible. Then it became evident that 1/25 had lost one officer and 12 men killed; the enemy had lost an estimated 50 men.⁵¹ Conversely, 1/24 reported that this had been the quietest night in its sector.

Just as it appeared that this long night was nearing its end, disaster struck once more, this time in the 2/23 area. Shortly after 0500, one of the big, inaccurate enemy rockets wobbled its way into the 2/23 command post with devastating results. The battalion commander, Major Robert H. Davidson, was badly shaken up by the blast and suffered a severe concussion; the communications chief was killed, and the battalion executive officer, the operations officer, the adjutant, and two clerks were wounded. With practically all the headquarters staff officers out of action, a skeleton staff was quickly formed at regimental headquarters under Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Dillon, the regimental executive officer, who proceeded to 2/23 around dawn and took over the battalion.

H-Hour for D plus 16 had been set for 0730. The 4th Division was to continue

the assault in the same direction and with the same lineup of units as on the preceding day. There was to be no preliminary artillery or naval gunfire preparation, though neutralization fire against known enemy mortar and artillery positions was scheduled between 0800 and 0830. Because of the disruption caused by the enemy rocket hit on the command post of 2/23, H-Hour was postponed for an additional half hour.

Promptly at 0800 the 4th Division attack resumed, with the battered 23d Marines, less 1/23, in the main effort. The supporting neutralization fire appeared to be having a salutary effect, since there was little response from the enemy supporting arms. As a result, 2/23, attacking along the 4th Division boundary, was able to make slow gains in the course of the morning, particularly along the regimental left. In the center and on the right, on the other hand, enemy resistance was as bitter as ever, and there the advance quickly ground to a halt. By shifting the focal point of the assault quickly between companies, comparable to a boxer who hits his opponent with a low blow and then follows with a haymaker to the uncovered chin, the 2d Battalion was able to catch the Japanese off balance long enough to make a gain of 150 yards within an hour after jumpoff. Following this limited success, strong enemy positions were encountered all along the battalion front and for the remainder of the day progress was minimal. Enemy resistance on 7 March consisted primarily of heavy machine gun fire and extremely accurate rifle fire from concealed positions in the rocky ridge for-

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

mations and draws along the front. The virtual absence of enemy artillery fire at the 23d Marines' front was noticeable, though the regiment still drew intermittent fire from enemy mortars.

The 24th Marines resumed the attack with 2/24 and 1/24 on the line and almost immediately encountered heavy opposition, particularly on the right where intense machine gun and mortar fire halted the advance of the 1st Battalion before it really got moving. For the remainder of the morning, the regimental advance could be measured in yards as small demolition teams blasted and burned the enemy out of his well concealed and strongly-held positions. At 1245, the 14th Marines fired a five-minute preparation which signalled a renewal of the attack. Employing the same tactics used during the morning, and with considerable air support, the regiment scored a gain of 50 yards before 1700, when the lines were consolidated for the day.

On the division right, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines continued mopping up the numerous stragglers in its rear area. On the regiment's left, the 1st Battalion, supported by regular and flame tanks, destroyed enemy emplacements to its front, while the Provisional Battalion continued the systematic reduction of stubborn enemy defenses in the bypassed Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. Even though the 25th Marines did not seize any new ground on D plus 16, its strategic location along the division right would shortly change its mission into a defensive one. As the 23d and 24th Marines very slowly and inexorably continued their east-south-

eastward advance towards Tachiiwa Point on the east coast, they threatened to envelop Captain Inouye's forces, which would be compressed in an area bounded by the sea in the east and the 25th Marines to the south. For all practical purposes, the northern wing of the 4th Division formed a hammer while the stationary 25th Marines would serve as the anvil. In all respects, this type of maneuver closely resembled the large-scale German antipartisan operations in Russia where precisely such tactics often led to success.⁵²

In anticipation of increased pressure once this pocket was compressed, Colonel Lanigan took preparatory measures to enable his regiment to cope with any threat posed by the Japanese whose encirclement was imminent. Engineers attached to the regiment laid antipersonnel mines across the front. Barbed wire was strung out along the line. The men sited machine guns, 37mm cannon, and 60mm mortars, waiting for the Japanese to be driven against the regimental line. For the time being, the mission of the 25th Marines would be a defensive one.

Activity during the night from 7-8 March was not comparable to that of the preceding night and along the 4th Division lines consisted mainly of mortar and small arms fire. Some of the enemy mortar shells fell into the positions of 1/24 and in front of the 25th

⁵² For further information on this subject, see Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-244, Edgar M. Howell, *The Soviet Partisan Movement* (Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Aug 1956).

Marines. At 0300, 3/24 returned to the parent regiment and two hours later relieved 2/24 in the line.

On D plus 17, the division main effort changed from the left to the center, and the direction of the attack shifted to the southeast. Within the shrinking area left to the Japanese on Iwo Jima, the designation of phase or objective lines had become superfluous, and General Schmidt's operations order for 8 March was essentially "to capture the remainder of the island."⁵³ No one familiar with the yard-by-yard struggle expected enemy resistance to cease on this day, or for a number of days to come, but the tenor of the order gave a vague assurance that there was to be an end to the bloodletting. Facing the Marines of all three divisions were only the jumbles of rock and the sea, and a dwindling number of highly motivated Japanese determined to sell their lives as dearly as possible.

H-Hour on 8 March had been set for 0750. However, in accordance with corps orders, the 4th Marine Division jumped off at 0620, 90 minutes ahead of the 3d and 5th Divisions. The jump-off was carried out without any artillery preparation, though for half an hour following it the 14th Marines and the corps artillery fired successive concentrations in support of the attack. In the zone of advance of the 23d Marines, there was initially only light resistance, the enemy apparently being confused by the early morning attack. Even though opposition stiffened in time, gains were made in the center of the regimental zone of advance, as 2/23 drove southeastward

in the general direction of Tachiiwa Point.

The 24th Marines, with 3/24 on the left and 1/24 on the right, jumped off on schedule, but encountered far stronger resistance than the 23d Marines to the north, mostly from enemy units concealed in perfectly fortified positions. Enemy opposition was characterized by extremely heavy fire from small arms, knee mortars, and mortars of larger calibers. Gains made during the day were negligible, though at the end of the day the regiment was tied in with the 23d Marines on the left and the 25th Marines on the right. Throughout the day, 2/24 remained in division reserve.

On the right flank of the division, the three battalions of the 25th Marines remained in position and continued to strengthen the regimental lines in the event that the enemy decided to counter-attack as he was driven into a corner. Behind the lines, various elements of the regiment and the division reconnaissance company continued to mop up; enemy stragglers were also rounded up in the vicinity of Minami Village.

In the course of D plus 17, Shermans of the 4th Tank Battalion gave such support as was feasible to the regiments of the 4th Division, though the movement of armor was restricted largely to the few existing trails, most of them in the 23d Marines' area. There, several tanks ran into a minefield and three were destroyed. During the time required to clear the minefield, the remaining tanks remained in place. In the course of an air strike, an auxiliary gas tank filled with napalm was dropped erroneously into the friendly lines. It

⁵³ VAC OpO No. 15-45, dtd 7Mar45.

landed directly behind one of the Sher-
mans, and napalm splashed all over the
tank. Even though the outer surfaces
of the Sherman caught fire, the crew
was able to evacuate the vehicle and
put out the blaze with a portable fire
extinguisher. There were no casualties
and the mishap failed to put the Sher-
man, at this point somewhat the worse
for wear, out of action.⁵⁴

When the regiments of the 4th Di-
vision secured for the night around dusk
of 8 March, the combat efficiency of the
division was still clinging to a pre-
carious 40 percent, but even this figure
fails to convey the excessive number of
key personnel, the driving force of any
unit, that had been sent out of the lines
suffering from wounds or battle fatigue.
The weather had turned cloudy and
cold, and the men of General Cates'
division shivered in their foxholes while
attempting to rest their weary bodies
for the continuation of the struggle that
would await them in the morning.

*THE ENEMY STRIKES BACK*⁵⁵

In the gathering dusk and during the
early evening of 8 March, something
was beginning to stir in front of the
23d and 24th Marines. At first, there
was only the blur of muted voices and
movement, nothing definite that would
indicate anything out of the ordinary
was brewing. But then the intensity of
the enemy mortar, artillery, and rock-
et fire against the two Marine regiments
increased, followed at 2300 by large-

scale infiltration of the 2/23 and 3/24
sectors.

Had the Marines compressing the
Japanese naval force into the pocket
near Tachiiwa Point been able to look
into the enemy lines, and had they been
able to gauge the background and vola-
tile temperament of the Japanese Navy
captain commanding the 1,000-odd men
about to be trapped, certain inevitable
conclusions would have become appar-
ent almost at once. Captain Samaji In-
ouye, commanding the *Naval Guard
Force* on Iwo Jima, was a *Samurai*, a
noisy, swashbuckling extrovert, a cham-
pion swordsman, who was prone to
boast of his prowess as a fighter, lover,
and drinker in front of his subordi-
nates.⁵⁶

It was totally incompatible with
Inouye's character that he would sit
back in his dugout and idly watch his
force being encircled. Also, he had felt
deeply emotional about the loss of Mount
Suribachi and, in his grief at the Amer-
ican capture of this landmark, he had
nearly decapitated the hapless survivors
of the force that had straggled into his
lines following the fall of the mountain.
For the Japanese, ever since the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the eighth day of each
month had a special significance, and
Inouye was only too well aware that 8
March would be his last. He planned to
make it a memorable one for all con-
cerned.

Late in the evening, at 2200, he
gathered the remainder of his troops,
a mixture of survivors from many Navy

⁵⁴ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 43.

⁵⁵ Additional material in this section is de-
rived from: *4th EngBn OpRpt*, Iwo Jima,
18Feb-19Mar45, n.d., hereafter *4th EngBn
OpRpt*.

⁵⁶ A fascinating account of Inouye's back-
ground and mentality is contained in a letter
from Fred Saito to Richard F. Newcomb, dtd
5Feb64, in *Newcomb Notes*.

units on Iwo Jima. It was anything but a uniformly equipped force:

. . . many men had only bamboo spears, but some had hand grenades and rifles. There were a few machine guns, and some men strapped land mines across their chests, determined to blow up some Marines with themselves.⁵⁷

What Captain Inouye had in mind was, of course, an all-out charge against the American lines. But, short of killing Americans, there had to be a definite purpose to the assault. Still preoccupied with the loss of Mount Suribachi, where the Stars and Stripes fluttering on the summit had kindled his anger anew every day, the Captain announced to his assembled force the objective of the imminent assault was Suribachi itself. En route, after breaking through the American lines, the men were to blow up as many American planes as they could on the airfields.

Judged by the standards employed earlier in the war on islands like Guadalcanal, and particularly when compared to the desperate Japanese all-out charge on the Garapan Plain at Saipan, what Inouye had planned could best be described as a mini-*banzai*. His objective was unrealistic, the Marines to his front were too alert, and above all, he lacked the approval of his superiors for the action he was about to take. As the attack got under way, the following situation developed:

The band started south, not in a wild charge, but crawling slowly and quietly. One group got within 10 yards of 2/23's command post, where Lieutenant Colonel Dillon was still in command, before the alarm was given. Then the sailors lobbed grenades and charged, shrieking "Banzai!"

In a moment there was chaos. The Marines threw up flares and star shells lighted the sky. Machinegun fire, rifles, and mortars began to cut into them, but still the Japanese came on. Some of them carried stretchers and shouted "Corpsman, corpsman" in fair English. Finally the hordes faltered and broke, and no one knew where Captain Inouye was. He had last been seen running and shouting, his sword waving in the air.⁵⁸

According to an account of Inouye's orderly, who became separated from the captain in the melee, Inouye charged ahead with loud shouts, followed by his men. As accurate Marine fire raked the ranks of the charging Japanese, Inouye shouted "*Banzai, Banzai,*" at the top of his voice, and that was the last heard of him. As one of the Japanese was to comment regretfully later: "It's a pity he could not reach the American position for a full display of his final swordsmanship."⁵⁹

As the Japanese charged the boundary between the 23d and 24th Marines, it was inevitable that some of them would get through the Marine lines. There was vicious fighting throughout the hours of darkness. Some of the action eventually extended to the 24th Marines and, on a smaller scale, to the 25th. Company E, 2/23, continued to bear the brunt of the counterattack, expending 20 cases of hand grenades, 200 rounds of 60mm illumination shells, and an unknown quantity of machine gun, BAR, and rifle ammunition.⁶⁰ Company E faced a critical situation around 0100, when ammunition began to run out. Finally, additional loads

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

⁵⁸ Saito ltr to Newcomb, 5Feb64, in *Newcomb Notes*.

⁶⁰ 2/23 *OpRpt*, p. 33.

⁵⁷ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, pp. 257-258.

were sent forward in a jeep and trailer, which brought the badly needed supplies forward over an enemy infested road, with the aid of 60mm illumination. The jeep drew several rounds of enemy small arms fire but was able to deliver its badly needed cargo. Fire support ships expended 193 star shells during the night, thus lessening some of the confusion that accompanied the action. In the flickering light the chewed-up volcanic ground became visible, filled with wriggling forms. Artillery fire soon blanketed the area and many of the would-be infiltrators halted in their tracks.

But many of the attackers did get into the Marine lines and, in the words of one account:

The night became alive with the noise and lights of a determined fire fight. Red tracer bullets shot across the flats. Jap rockets hurtled through the air, leaving a quarter-mile trail of golden sparks. Star shells of yellow and green hung in the sky.

The battle kept up all night. Individual men in foxholes didn't know what was happening. They waited for Japs to appear and killed them as fast as they came. Men with telephones whispered into their instruments and tried to discover how strong the enemy attack actually was. Machine guns chattered incessantly. Grenades popped.⁸¹

As day dawned over Iwo Jima on 9 March, the area in and around the 2/23 positions, and to a lesser extent in front of the 24th Marines, showed the signs of horrible carnage. Mopping up continued until noon. A body count of enemy dead revealed approximately 650 at the focal point of the attack, while another 150 were discovered in the ad-

jacent sectors. Among those who perished in the counterattack was Captain Inouye, who died as he had wished to die. The counterattack cost the Marines 90 men killed and 257 wounded, a large number of men to lose in one night's bitter fighting; yet beyond any doubt the cost would have been higher had it been necessary to ferret the enemy out of his dugouts one by one.

To the Japanese survivors of the slaughter, the arrival of daylight brought little comfort. Stripped both of the protective cover of darkness and leadership on which all of them so much depended, the 200 sailors that had survived the abortive *banzai* huddled in small groups, wondering what to do next. It was apparent to all that getting to Mount Suribachi or any of the airfields was far beyond their capabilities. A lieutenant finally gathered them together and those who could crawled away from the place of carnage, constantly harassed by the Marines hunting for them. As to their further operations:

Their fighting was over. Each night the lieutenant sent out patrols of three to five men. They never returned. Others went into caves, and some died of wounds, of sickness, or of thirst. Some drank urine and died.

The lieutenant lasted until April 29, the Emperor's birthday, when he told the others, "We will steal a B-29 and fly to the homeland. You others do as you please after we're gone." He left, accompanied by the chief Navy medical officer, an ensign, and a petty officer.⁸²

There was to be one more sequel to Captain Inouye's counterattack: Obviously aware of General Kuribayashi's

⁸¹ Henri *et al*, *Marines on Iwo Jima*, p. 291.

⁸² Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 259.

orders to stay in place and fight as long as possible, he had neglected to inform his superior, Admiral Ichimaru, of his intentions. As a result:

. . . on the night of Inouye's last charge, Admiral Toyoda again messaged Admiral Ichimaru, praising the brave acts of the Navy men and again begging them to hold out as long as possible. Ichimaru did not know that Inouye had already sacrificed the last of the Japanese Navy force on Iwo Jima.⁶³

For the men of the 4th Marine Division, Captain Inouye's abortive counter-attack at one stroke eliminated a large segment of the enemy force holding the eastern part of the island. With just about all of this force out of the way, there no longer was any central direction of Japanese forces in the east. Major General Senda, with a force of undetermined strength, was still assumed to be blocking the 4th Division's path between Higashi Village and the coast. Enemy remnants were still in control of Turkey Knob, and a few other pockets of resistance still existed, but by this time the enemy's capability to resist was drastically reduced.

Even though the mopup of survivors of the counterattack continued throughout the morning of 9 March, the 4th Division continued its attack in accordance with previously laid plans. At 0700, following a 10-minute preparation, the 4th Division jumped off. Once again, the division employed the same scheme of maneuver it had used in previous days, with the 23d Marines on the left, the 24th Marines in the center, and the 25th Marines on the right. The 23d Marines, with 2/23 in the assault,

was able to advance in the center and to its right against resistance that lacked the bite of the preceding days. However, the left of the regiment drew heavy fire from a ridge near the division boundary about 500 yards north of Higashi. By 0900, the ridge had been seized in direct assault, and the battalion slowly but persistently forced its way forward. At 1500, 1/23 reverted to the regiment. Ordered to consolidate at 1700, Colonel Wensinger's men continued the attack to improve their positions and did not halt until half an hour later. Gains for the day were a respectable 300 yards. As the regiment dug in, it maintained contact with the 3d Marine Division on the left and the 24th Marines on the right.

In the remaining division sectors, enemy opposition was as strong as ever, and, in consequence, no additional ground was seized in the center and on the right of the division. To some extent, lack of progress in the center was due to depletion of manpower, which made it necessary to shuffle companies from one battalion to another in order to bring the assault battalion up to effective strength. As part of the reorganization of 1/24, Lieutenant Colonel Austin R. Brunelli, the regimental executive officer, assumed command of 1/24, relieving Major Treitel. Because of the heavy resistance on its left flank, the 25th Marines, less 3/25 but with 2/24 attached, remained in position.

During the night from 9-10 March, there was a relative lack of enemy activity. A small amount of light and medium mortar fire at infrequent intervals harassed the 4th Division lines during the night, and infiltration at-

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260.

tempts remained on a large scale. In order to counter the threat still posed by groups of the enemy operating in the division rear, the Provisional Battalion, which had been mopping up in the Amphitheater and around Turkey Knob, was disbanded and its mission taken over by 2/25. At the same time, a 4th Provisional Battalion, consisting of 37 officers and 498 enlisted men, was organized from units of the Division Support Group. This unit, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Krulewitch, had special responsibility for mopping up behind the division lines and retained this mission until 12 March, when it was disbanded.⁶⁴

At 0800 on D plus 19, the 4th Marine Division continued its attack after a coordinated corps and division artillery preparation, which changed into a rolling barrage as the men moved out. On this day, which was to be full of significant developments for General Cates' men, the assault was made essentially by the 23d and 25th Marines. The 24th Marines reverted to division reserve. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, was pulled out of the line and replaced by 3/25. The 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, remained in its previous zone of action but was attached to the 23d Marines, while 2/24 remained attached to the 25th Marines.

The 23d Marines, with 2/23 on the left and 3/24 on the right launched a vigorous attack that encountered only light opposition on the right. The enemy, entrenched in the rocky ridges along the left boundary of the division, replied with accurate and effective mor-

tar and small arms fire which reduced gains of 2/23 in this sector. Throughout the regimental zone of advance, small but determined groups of the enemy tried to impede the advance. Since the Japanese no longer held a solid line on commanding ground, the Marine assault elements were able to bypass such nests of resistance, leaving their annihilation to teams of engineers, tanks, and infantry, which blasted and scorched such obstacles with demolitions and flamethrowers.

As the regimental attack gained momentum, an enormous amount of ground was taken by Iwo standards. By 1500, Colonel Wensinger's men had advanced no less than 700 yards and were within 500 yards of the east coast. Having reached commanding ground in this area, the regiment halted in mid-afternoon. Patrols from 2/23, dispatched during the remainder of the afternoon, reached the coast near Tachiiwa Point without encountering any enemy opposition. A short distance to the south, elements of 3/24 reconnoitered to within 100 yards of the coast without making contact with the enemy.

On the division right, the 25th Marines, with 2/24 and the Reconnaissance Company attached, completed the relief of 1/24 by 0600. Following this relief, 3/25 took over the sector of 1/24. In order to complete the encirclement of those enemy remnants still holding out in the Amphitheater and on Turkey Knob, 3/25 was shifted to the north of the enemy salient, where, together with 1/25, it would attack to the southeast parallel to the axis of advance of the 23d Marines. Along the southern per-

⁶⁴ *4th MarDiv Support Gp OpRpt*, pp. 17-18.

imeter of the salient, 2/25 and 2/24 were to advance generally to the north-east or east respectively, which would enable 2/25 to effect a linkup with those units of the regiment attacking towards the coast from the northwest.

Jumping off at H-Hour on 10 March, 3/25 and 1/25 attacked towards the high ground to their front from where the enemy still offered moderate to heavy opposition. It soon became apparent that the 3d Battalion would be able to move faster than 1/25 and, in consequence, 3/25 was ordered to continue regardless of its flanks. As the attacks of 3/25 and 2/25 converged, the distance separating the two units dwindled until, shortly after noon, the two battalions linked up. Overall gains for the 25th Marines on D plus 19 were 600 yards. More important than the yardage gained was the fact that Turkey Knob was at last completely surrounded and all resistance remaining could now be eliminated. As the 25th Marines consolidated for the night, its left flank was tied to the 23d Marines about 800 yards from the coast while the stationary right flank was still anchored on the beach to the south.

The significance of the 4th Division's movements and gains on 10 March was summed up in one historical narrative in these words:

It was now evident that the Japanese counterattack had marked the turning point in the battle. Although bitter and costly fighting continued for six more days, particularly in the 25th Regiment's zone, organized resistance was now dying out in the 4th Division area.

During the 14-day period covered in this chapter, the 4th Division, in constant

head-on assault, fought its bloody way from Charlie-Dog Ridge past Hill 382, the Amphitheater, Turkey Knob, through Minami and formidable defenses northeast of 382, almost to the coast. The slow but relentless movement of this division front can be compared to the closing of a giant door. The right flank, which advanced less than 1,000 yards, acted as a hinge while the rest of the division (the door) turned upon it and attacked northeast, east, and southeast to close and sweep trapped enemy toward the sea.⁶⁵

The 4th Division assault on eastern Iwo Jima thus had broken the back of enemy resistance by 10 March. In the wake of the division's advance, there remained a staggering number of casualties, whose bodies and minds bore ample witness to the ferocity of the fighting. Between 25 February, when General Cates' men first attacked the Meat Grinder and 10 March, when they were within a stone's throw of the coast, the division had sustained 4,075 casualties. A total of 847 Marines had been killed or were dead of wounds; 2,836 had been wounded; 1 was missing, and 391 were suffering from combat fatigue.⁶⁶

As the three Marine divisions slowly approached the coastline in their respective zones of advance, it became apparent to all on the island that time for General Kuribayashi and his garrison was running out. In Japan, anxious eyes were watching the contest of wills being waged for possession of Iwo Jima. To the military observers, the outcome was a foregone conclusion. But the nation's morale was precariously

⁶⁵ Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 176.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

perched on the faint hope that General Kuribayashi's masterful defense of the island would give the business-minded Americans food for thought about the cost of a full-scale invasion of the home islands. Thus, in Japanese eyes, the prolonged defense of Iwo Jima pursued not only the immediate tactical objective, but a vastly more far-reaching strategic one.

Few of the surviving members of that garrison had any illusions left about the outcome of the war. One Japanese captured in the 4th Division area late on 9 March was better qualified than most others to comment on the overall situation. A peacetime editor and publisher of one of the large metropolitan newspapers of Japan, he remarked that "this is not a winning war for Japan—she cannot win, but she

is trying her darndest to lessen her defeat."⁶⁷

That time was running out on the mainland as well was strongly re-emphasized on the evening of 9 March, when more than 300 B-29s mounted one of the biggest air raids of the war against Tokyo. This attack severely devastated the enemy capital, serving notice to all Japanese that they were now open to American attack both from sea and air; that henceforth the citizens of Tokyo were as exposed to American explosives as General Kuribayashi's diminishing garrison on Iwo Jima.

⁶⁷ Interrogation of Leading Private Yutaka Oyanagi, 10Mar45, by 1stLt G. A. Hoeck, 4th MarDiv Preliminary POW Interrogation Rpt #15, 10Mar45, in *4th MarDiv Translations*.

Final Operations on Iwo Jima¹

ELIMINATION OF THE POCKETS— 3D MARINE DIVISION AREA²

On 11 March 1945, operations on Iwo Jima entered their final phase. No longer under any central direction, three more or less clearly defined enemy pockets fought a battle to the death in the zone of advance of each of the

three Marine divisions. As the pockets became more constricted, the nature of the fighting changed, mostly because the terrain no longer permitted the employment of naval gunfire, air support, and in the end even artillery. Eventually, as Japanese resistance neared the end, tanks and half-tracks furnished the heavy supporting fire needed to root out the last of the obstinate enemy defenders.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: *TF 51 AR*; *VAC SAR*; *VAC G-2 Rpts*; *VAC C-3 Jnl*; *VAC Translations*; *3d MarDiv AR*; *3d MarDiv D-2 Jnl*; *3d MarDiv G-2 PerRpts*; *3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpts*; *4th MarDiv OpRpt*; *4th MarDiv D-3 Jnl*; *4th MarDiv D-3 PerRpts*; *4th MarDiv Translations*; *5th MarDiv AR*; *5th MarDiv D-1 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv D-2 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpts*; *5th MarDiv D-3 Jnl*; *5th MarDiv Casualty Rpts*; *Horie Rpt*; *Bartley, Iwo Monograph*; *Iwo Comments*; *Morehouse, Iwo Jima Campaign*; *Newcomb, Iwo Jima*; *Newcomb Notes*; *Morison, Victory in the Pacific*; *Henri et al, Marines on Iwo Jima*; *Isely and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*; *Leckie, Strong Men Armed*; *Smith and Finch, Coral and Brass*; *Aurthur and Cohlma, The Third Marine Division*; *Proehl, The Fourth Marine Division*; *Conner, The Fifth Marine Division*; *Hayashi and Coox, Kogun*.

² Additional material in this section is derived from: *9th Mar URpts*; *9th Mar UJnl*; *9th Mar AR*; *21st Mar AR, Iwo Jima, 23Jan-16Mar45, dtd 10Apr45, hereafter 21st Mar AR*; *21st Mar UJnl*; *21st Mar URpts*; *1/9 AR*; *2/9 AR*; *3/9 AR*; *1/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 29Jan-26Mar45, dtd 6Apr45, hereafter 1/21 AR*; *2/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 30Jan-24Mar45, dtd 12Apr45, hereafter 2/21 AR*; *3/21 AR, Iwo Jima, 15Jan-16Mar45, dtd 11Apr45, hereafter 3/21 AR*; *1/23 OpRpt*; *3d TkbN AR*.

On D plus 20, the only major opposition in the zone of advance of the 3d Marine Division extended along the division's rough boundary, where enemy remnants still occupied a ridgeline paralleling the coast to the east of Kitano Point. (See Map IX, Map Section). A second center of resistance farther south, to the east of Motoyama Village, southeast of the Northern Airfield, and southwest of Hill 362C was a pocket which had already been under attack for several days prior to 11 March. Named after the commander of 2/9, Lieutenant Colonel Cushman, this pocket was honeycombed with caves and emplacements cut into sandstone. The pocket itself was ringed by antitank guns and Colonel Nishi's dug-in light and medium tanks, equipped with 37mm and 47mm guns. The most prominent occupant of the pocket was Colonel Nishi, who had thus far survived the ferocious fighting on the island.

On 11 March, 1/9 and 3/9 were to execute a converging attack from the high ground near the east coast into the northeastern fringes of the pocket. Once the two battalions had linked up, they were to launch a concerted drive into the pocket from the east. In the course of the morning, the 1st Battalion assaulted a ridge overlooking the pocket and blasted its way to the top, demolishing caves and other positions as it went along. The advance was supported by Shermans from the 3d Tank Battalion, whose fire either destroyed such enemy defenses as could be spotted or at least kept the occupants of strong-points underground to permit the approach of demolition teams. The 3d Battalion was forced to assault similar terrain during the morning without tank support, which did not arrive until an armored bulldozer had carved out a road for the Shermans during the early afternoon. In mid-afternoon, shortly after 1500, the two battalions linked up. For the remainder of the day, elements of both battalions mopped up along the east coast, outposted the beach, and established defensive positions on the high ground east of Hill 362C.

Even though no solid line of containment surrounded the pocket from the west or southwest, there was no activity on the part of the Japanese trapped within, aimed at either evading the encirclement or launching a direct assault against the Marines approaching them. Instead, the enemy followed the orders issued by General Kuribayashi to the letter. Remaining within their relatively secure pillboxes, dug-

outs, caves, and stationary tanks, the Japanese contested every foot of ground, continuing to make the Marines pay an exorbitant price for every yard gained.

In order to support the advance of 3/21, a 7.2-inch rocket launcher, mounted on a sled, was attached to the battalion. This improvisation was the idea of the VAC ordnance officer, who had four of the rocket launchers mounted on sleds when it was found that these weapons did not fit the M4A3 tank with which VAC was then equipped. The sled mount appeared to be the answer to the problem of getting this powerful supporting weapon into terrain which was impassable for tanks. Each rocket launcher, equipped with 20 tubes, was capable of delivering 640 pounds of TNT in a salvo. Effective range of the launcher was 250 yards. A volley of rockets, exploding within a narrow area, could be expected to have a gruesome and highly demoralizing effect upon the enemy.

As 3/21 approached the confines of the pocket, meeting very heavy resistance all the way, a rocket launcher was towed into action by a tank of Company C, 3d Tank Battalion. Altogether, 10 volleys were fired into the pocket with undetermined results. Only too soon did it become apparent that the efficiency of the launchers did not match the visual effect created by the exploding rockets. When the dust settled, the enemy still sat securely in his defenses, little the worse for wear. An official report of this action was to note with discouragement: "Nearly 200 of the 7.2-inch rockets were thrown into this pocket and

still our infantry was unable to go in and occupy the ground.”³

Elsewhere in the 3d Division zone of advance, General Erskine was able to pull 2/21 out of the line for a much needed rest after elements of the 27th Marines of the 5th Division had moved behind the left flank of that battalion. To fill the gap thus created, 1/21 extended its lines northward and tied in with the adjacent 5th Division. At the same time that 1/9 and 3/9 were converging on Cushman's Pocket from the northeast, 3/21, then attached to the 9th Marines, was approaching the pocket from the southwest.

For the remainder of 11 March, 3d Division engineers and riflemen blasted caves and dugouts. Because of the proximity of the battle lines, General Erskine's division did not receive any artillery support that day, though 1/12 stood by for call fires if needed. Similarly, there was no air support for the same reasons, except that aerial observation was used to report the movements of 3d Division units. After nightfall the Japanese, employing hit-and-run tactics, emerged from their hideouts and stealthily approaching the Marine positions, hurled a few hand grenades, and then attempted to disappear as quietly as they had come. Such tactics succeeded only infrequently, and many of the infiltrators did not survive to tell of their exploits.

On the evening of 11 March, 3/21 was facing eastward with a frontage of 200-300 yards, while 1/9 and 3/9 were facing westward with a frontage of about 600 yards. A distance of 500-600

yards separated 3/21 from the two battalions of the 9th Marines. The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, was in division reserve just east of Motoyama Village, where it was engaged in mopping up the enemy units on the southern fringe of the pocket. At the same time, the battalion formed a line some 400 yards long which acted as a stop-gap for any enemy troops seeking to escape westward from the encirclement.

Early on 12 March, compression of Cushman's Pocket continued, with 1/9 and 3/9 again hammering from the east while 3/21 formed the anvil along the western fringes. Lieutenant Colonel Boehm's 3d Battalion, advancing westward, apparently hit one of the developing weak spots in the enemy lines and made fair progress. The 1st Battalion to the south, on the other hand, ran into heavy resistance and was unable to keep pace with 3/9. Finally, an armored bulldozer carved out a path over which the Shermans could move to the front lines. Once the tanks had arrived there, eager infantrymen accurately pinpointed the enemy position for the tankers, and, in the words of the official report, “successful work in eliminating these positions was done by the tanks.”⁴

In the zone of advance of the 1st and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines, extreme difficulty was encountered with the terrain which alternately featured steep banks and gulches filled with soft volcanic ash. The tankers constantly had to be on the alert for Japanese in the vicinity who were only too eager to seek death if there was a chance of

³ *3d TkbN, AR, 11Mar45.*

⁴ *Ibid., 12Mar45.*

blowing up an American tank along with themselves. Tanks bogged down in the difficult terrain proved irresistible objectives for suicidal Japanese, not to mention their attractiveness as stationary targets of opportunity for the remaining enemy antitank guns. In addition to the above, the tankers found it very difficult to maintain direction since their movements were directed over the radio through remote control. Many of the enemy positions were so carefully camouflaged that as often as not Marines were almost on top of them before they were spotted. Once again, flamethrowers and demolitions proved their worth in this type of fighting. Progress was made on D plus 21, but in the rear of Cushman's Pocket, specifically along the crest of the ridge overlooking the east coast of Iwo Jima, resistance remained stubborn.

On the following day, 13 March, the pocket was further compressed when 1/9 and 3/9 continued their drive. Once again, the progress of the attack was impeded by caves, pillboxes, emplaced tanks, stone walls, and trenches. So masterfully had these defenses been camouflaged that "only those immediately in front of the troops could be located. . . . Out of about 150 of these positions (by later count), we knew roughly twenty or thirty of them."⁵ Nevertheless, despite the initial advantage accruing to the defenders, the Marine incursion into the pocket could not be stopped. Sherman tanks, particularly those equipped with flamethrowers, lent the necessary emphasis to the ad-

vance of the two battalions. The flame tanks proved most effective in reducing a number of troublesome concrete emplacements. Still operating in very rough terrain, the Shermans moved only short distances at a time, and then only with the aid of an armored bulldozer.

As far as the 9th Marines was concerned, the performance of the Shermans was of crucial importance. The regimental commander, Colonel Kenyon, considered them "to be the most formidable supporting weapon at our disposal . . . tank support was the deciding factor in this action."⁶

By the end of D plus 22, Cushman's Pocket had shrunk to a mere 250 yards. The diminishing size of the pocket enabled the withdrawal of two units from the encircling force. On the morning of 13 March, 1/21 relieved those elements of 3/21 that were engaged on the line, and the latter battalion reverted to its parent regiment. Having cleared its zone of action by evening of the same day, 3/9 was pulled out of this area early on 14 March and shifted to the vicinity of Hill 362, where it commenced a systematic mop-up.

The morning of 14 March marked the beginning of the final drive aimed at eliminating Cushman's Pocket. The main burden of the attack now rested on 1/9, which pressed forward throughout the morning and by midafternoon had gained about 100 yards. Once again, the use of armor proved decisive in eliminating the stubborn enemy defenses. A flame tank belonging to Company B, 3d Tank Battalion, was hit

⁵ Aurthur and Cohlma, *The Third Marine Division*, pp. 246-247.

⁶ *9th Mar AR*, p. 6.

by a rifle grenade which caused a small explosion inside the vehicle, wounding the driver and assistant driver.

At 1530, 2/9 reverted from division reserve to regimental control. Shortly before 1800, the battalion passed through 1/9 and launched an attack into the enemy position which by this time had already shrunk to about 150 square yards. Shermans of the 3d Tank Battalion played a dominant role in reducing whatever stubborn resistance remained, but a flame tank borrowed from the 5th Marine Division outdid all others. This tank was able to shoot a flame about 125 yards and, according to the official report, it "proved to be the weapon that worked when all others failed. Its long flame range and the area covered by one burst were the contributing factors to its remarkable success."⁷ By the time the Shermans and flame tanks had roamed through the pocket, blasting and burning everything in their path, enemy resistance became sporadic and gradually began to flicker out. The stage was now set for the infantry to move in and finish the job.

What might have turned into a routine chore of mopping up turned instead into a rather protracted operation requiring all the skill the attacking force could muster. The action that 2/9 saw for the remainder of 14 March was subsequently described with the statement: "Inconclusive hand to hand fighting ensued until dark."⁸ Hidden within this sentence, however, was a factor which was to be brought out

elsewhere, namely the combination of physical and mental exhaustion that was taking its toll among Marines on Iwo Jima at this phase of operations as surely as had shells and bullets of the enemy. Few Marines who had made the initial landing were left during the final phase of the fighting. Their places had been taken by willing though inexperienced replacements, whose performance in combat left much to be desired. As one Marine historian was to put it:

By this stage in the operation a large percentage of infantry troops were replacements who lacked the combat training and experience that prepared and conditioned men for closing with the enemy. Therefore, the skill and efficiency of assault Marines showed marked deterioration after three weeks of personnel attrition of original D-Day troop strength. During the final days of 3d Division efforts to smash remaining pockets, armor support made success possible. Gun tanks, armored bulldozers, and flame-throwing Shermans combined their operations to give the exhausted infantry a very effective and much needed assist.⁹

In dealing with the same subject matter, the battalion report was to state succinctly: "Almost all of the infantry were replacements. They lacked entirely the will to close with the enemy."¹⁰ Needless to say, this statement was not intended as an indictment of the men involved, but of the replacement system which forced men to join strange squads and platoons whose teamwork was dissipated by heavy casualties. For the individual Japanese, who fought to the end among friends,

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁸ 2/9 AR, p. 3.

⁹ Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 181.

¹⁰ 2/9 AR, p. 3.

death was an infinitely less lonely and impersonal affair than for the average Marine replacement.

While bitter fighting continued in Cushman's Pocket, where one enemy position after the other was eliminated, a different type of action took place just to the east of the pocket on one of the ridges overlooking the east coast. Initially, this ridge had been seized on D plus 16 in the conventional manner—direct attack with flamethrowers, small arms, and demolitions—by 3d Division Marines, who blasted this objective like hundreds of others and then moved on, leaving behind blackened and battlescarred cave entrances that looked sinister even in broad daylight. Several days passed and the front lines had moved on to the north when this desolate ridge came to life again.

The first indication that something was going awry in this so-called rear area came when a heavy Japanese machine gun, hidden somewhere in the previously cleared ridge, opened up on an unsuspecting Marine carrying ammunition and killed him. Other Marines near the ridge soon became startled victims of the enemy fire from the ridge which grew in intensity as small arms joined the machine gun. The next victims were stretcher bearers and their wounded burden. Eventually, tanks and demolitions men arrived and the dangerous, time-consuming job of clearing the ridge had to be repeated. To quote one report:

Despite their preponderance of weapons the Marines found that there were too many holes. They would attack one only to be shot at from another one half a dozen feet away. Moreover, the ridge was not a straight wall but, in many places,

curved like an S. Entranceways protected each other, so that Marines would be hit in the back from holes guarding the one they were assaulting. The inter-connecting tunnels inside the ridge also allowed the Japs to play deadly tag with the Marines. They would shoot out of one hole. By the time Marines got close enough to that hole, the Japs had left it and were shooting from another one twenty yards away and higher up in the wall. The Marines had to post guards at every hole they could see in order to attack any one of them. The tunnels also curved and twisted inside the ridge. The Japs could escape the straight trajectory weapons and grenades thrown into the cave entrances, merely by running back into the interior.¹¹

Finally, flamethrowers squirted their lethal liquid into the caves, which became boiling infernos. A number of the Japanese who had reoccupied the ridge were incinerated. Others, their clothing and bodies aflame, tried to escape, only to fall prey to accurate Marine bullets. In desperation, some of the enemy trapped inside the ridge blew themselves up with hand grenades. Before long:

. . . the scene became wild and terrible. More Japs rushed screaming from the caves. They tumbled over the rocks, their clothes and bodies burning fiercely. Soon the flamethrowers paused. A Marine lifted himself cautiously into view. There were no shots from the caves. A Jap with his clothes in rags hunched himself out of one hole, his arms upraised. The Marines stood up behind the rocks and waved to him to come out. The Jap indicated that there were more who would like to surrender. The Marines motioned him to tell them to come out.¹²

In all, 40 men emerged from the ridge, many of them Koreans. Marines

¹¹ Henri *et al*, *Marines on Iwo Jima*, p. 231.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 232.

shouldered their weapons as the prisoners were marched to the rear. The tanks left the erstwhile battlefield and quiet descended over the area. Yet this peaceful interlude was soon to be shattered again a few hours later when the Japanese, moving through underground tunnels, reoccupied the ridge. One of the first victims proved to be Sergeant Reid Chamberlain, a Marine with an unusual background. As a member of the U.S. Army, he had witnessed the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, but instead of surrendering to the enemy, he had turned his activities towards the organization and training of Filipino guerrillas. He received a commission in the U.S. Army and returned to the United States, where he promptly resigned his commission and enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps.

En route to the forward positions of the 21st Marines, Sergeant Chamberlain was walking past the long, rocky ridge, unaware that there were any enemy in the vicinity. Suddenly, there were several shots, one of which hit the sergeant in the head. This incident took place in front of several Marine news correspondents, some of whom also drew enemy fire. When help arrived for the sergeant, it was too late. As one of the correspondents present was to put it later, speaking of the enemy:

In an instant they had claimed one of our best men. Chamberlain's wonderful war record had ended abruptly. After so many heroic deeds, it seemed an added tragedy that he was killed while doing nothing but walking. There was nothing anybody could do about it.¹³

Efforts to employ flamethrowers against the ridge during the fading hours of daylight proved unavailing, since all of these weapons were committed in the front lines. At dusk, elements of the 9th Marines bivouacked on the ridge, which had become dormant again. Apprised of the situation, the commanding officer posted sentries behind the rocks facing the ridge, ready to fire on anything that moved.

Hardly had dusk settled over the area, when there was stealthy movement on the slopes of the ridge as individual Japanese emerged from previously undetected cracks and holes. Marines opened fire on these blurred silhouettes. The results of this fire became quickly evident as some of the Japanese who had been hit groaned with pain, others jerked spasmodically and then lay silent while the remainder, realizing that they were trapped, attempted to burrow their way back into the ground. A few who managed to get back under cover committed suicide.

Shortly before midnight there was a tremendous blast which hurled huge pieces of rock through the air and shook the entire area. Some of the Marines were buried in volcanic ash and debris up to their necks and had to be dug out. Others were hit by chunks of concrete that rained down throughout the area. The ridge itself became a mass of fire and disintegrating matter. While the Marines were still engaged in assessing what had happened and trying to aid each other as best they could, Japanese began to emerge from their holes on the ridge, some of them dazed, others carrying antipersonnel mines tied around their waists. A group

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

of five Japanese, running along the wall of the ridge, was spotted by the light of the flames and all were instantly killed.

At dawn it became apparent that, despite the explosion and subsequent bitter fighting, the Marines had suffered only one serious casualty. There might have been more if men, who found themselves buried in debris and volcanic ash, had not been rescued by fellow Marines before they were smothered. It was subsequently discovered that the enemy had used land mines and aerial bombs to blow up the ridge.

On 15 March organized resistance in the 3d Division sector had just about ended. General Erskine's division was ordered to relieve elements of the 5th Marine Division on the right of that division and attack to the northwest.¹⁴ Early on 16 March, D plus 25, the 21st Marines took over an 800-yard sector on the right of General Rokey's division. The boundary between the two divisions now extended from a point 400 yards east of Hill 362B to the northern tip of Iwo Jima near Kitano Point.

Following the relief of 3/27 and 2/26 by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 21st Marines, that regiment prepared to attack to the north in conjunction with elements of the 5th Marine Division. A 20-minute preparation by the 3d and 5th Division artillery, as well as the 155s of the corps artillery, preceded the jumpoff, which was scheduled for 0815, and continued for 10 minutes following H-Hour. The rolling barrage, which

marked the final phase of the preparatory fire moved only 50 yards ahead of the assault units and then moved forward at 100-yard intervals in conjunction with the advance. In addition to the shore-based artillery, a destroyer offshore shelled northern Iwo for nearly an hour and then stood by to deliver call fires. Fighters stationed on the Southern Airfield were available for air support, but the restricted area in which the final operations on Iwo Jima took place precluded their employment.

The attack of 1/21 made good headway against only light resistance. On the other hand, 2/21 encountered heavy small arms fire and extremely difficult terrain, both of which combined to retard its advance. Japanese, fighting from caves and spider trap positions, offered their customary obstinate resistance. Some of them, obviously bent on suicide, charged tanks or groups of Marines with grenades and demolition charges. For the most part, such sorties were marked more by fierce fanaticism than cool logic, and most of them failed before the human bomb could inflict much damage on the Marines or their armor. During the early afternoon both battalions reached the coast near Kitano Point. From that point, it became a matter of mopping up such enemy as remained in caves and other shelters.

By the end of 16 March, General Erskine's men had completed the elimination of Cushman's Pocket and, at the same time, had completed their mission in helping out the 5th Marine Division. This action, for all practical purposes, ended combat operations of the 3d Marine Division on Iwo Jima. Late on D plus 25, General Erskine announced

¹⁴ VAC OpO No. 23-45 with changes, dtd 15Mar45.

that all enemy resistance in the zone of action of his division had ceased.¹⁵

In fact, even though Cushman's Pocket had been overrun, Colonel Nishi, commanding the *26th Tank Regiment*, was still inside with about 450 men, all that had remained of his command. Of these, 300 were wounded and few of them were able to move on their own. From their underground hideout, the Japanese could hear their erstwhile comrades, now prisoners of war and working for the Americans, calling on Colonel Nishi to surrender. But such appeals fell on deaf ears. Early on 19 March, with only two days' food supply remaining, Colonel Nishi ordered his men to make a final charge against the Americans. Only 60 were able to heed his call. Sometime between 19 and 22 March, Colonel Nishi died. Whether he was felled by an American bullet or by his own hand has never been clearly determined though his widow finds solace in the thought "that he died at the foot of the northern cliffs, and that ocean waves have scattered his remains."¹⁶

4TH MARINE DIVISION MOPUP¹⁷

Following its impressive gains on 10 March, which had taken some of its assault units to the vicinity of the east coast, the 4th Marine Division con-

tinued the attack on the following morning. Jumping off with the 23d and 25th Marines at 0730, the division continued its advance to the coast. (See Map X, Map Section). On the left the 23d Marines reached its objective rapidly, overrunning such enemy resistance as flared up in its path. In the wake of the regiment's advance, engineers sealed caves and constructed a road. In late afternoon, 1/23 relieved 2/23 and pulled back to the same positions held during the preceding night. Combat patrols were dispatched into the beach areas to search out enemy stragglers or hold-outs.

The advance of the 25th Marines did not progress as smoothly as that of the 23d. Almost immediately after the jumpoff, Colonel Lanigan's regiment ran into heavy fire from rockets, mortars, and small arms. As a result, little ground was gained. An explanation of the stubborn resistance came during the afternoon when the interrogation of a captured Japanese revealed that about 300 of the enemy were holed up in caves and tunnels directly in front of the regiment. The prisoner further volunteered that a Japanese brigadier general was trapped inside the pocket.¹⁸

In describing the area of the pocket, 4th Division records had this to say:

It was at once apparent that this area was the final defensive position of the enemy in this zone. The terrain in this area was not normal in any respect; it could be classified only as a terrain freak of nature. However, it was well suited for the construction of cave positions, and the Japanese had utilized this advantage to

¹⁵ *3d MarDiv G-3 PerRpt* No. 31, dtd 16-Mar45.

¹⁶ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 267.

¹⁷ Additional material in this section is derived from: *23d Mar OpRpt*; *24th Mar OpRpt*; *25th Mar UJnl*; *25th Mar OpRpt*; *14th Mar OpRpt*; *1/23 OpRpt*; *2/23 OpRpt*; *2/24 OpRpt*; *1/25 OpRpt*; *2/25 OpRpt*; *3/25 OpRpt*.

¹⁸ *4th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt* No. 68, dtd 11-Mar45.

the fullest extent. Their scheme of maneuver was to hold up the advance as long as it was possible, and to inflict as many casualties as they could before they were forced to adopt their usual suicidal tactics.¹⁹

The terrain itself consisted of a series of deep crevices and steep ridges that extended generally to the south-east towards the coast. Smaller gullies cutting through the area created a maze of compartments and cross compartments. The rough rocky outcroppings and scrubby vegetation that had survived the extensive shelling provided the Japanese with excellent cover and concealment.

That the elimination of this small but tough pocket of resistance would be a difficult and time-consuming operation had already become apparent to 4th Division Marines by the end of 11 March. The presence of one of the big fish in the pocket, General Senda, commander of the *2d Mixed Brigade*, made it virtually certain that the remnants of that unit would fight to the bitter end with undiminished fanaticism.²⁰

Even though there was only a marginal possibility that General Senda might be persuaded to surrender, intelligence personnel of the 4th Marine Division decided on 12 March that such an attempt was worth the effort. A prisoner of war volunteered to lead a detail of Marines to the vicinity of General Senda's presumed hideout during the early morning of D plus 21. Under

sniper fire, which eventually caused a casualty, Marines set up an amplifier-speaker system over which an appeal to surrender was to be broadcast. For more than two hours the psychological warfare team failed in its efforts to start a power generator which would have provided the electricity needed to drive the amplifier. A second motor-driven power plant failed to start and due to this technical breakdown the entire operation had to be called off. Whether General Senda might have heeded the appeal promising and guaranteeing him and his men the best of treatment, remains doubtful. Certainly none of the other Japanese commanders approached in this fashion on Iwo Jima proved responsive.

Following the two-hour delay engendered by the abortive surrender appeal, Marines of the 4th Division launched their attack into the pocket at 0900 with 2/25, 3/25, and 2/24. The scheme of maneuver called for 2/25 to attack down the draws toward the coast while 3/25 and 2/24 were to support the attack with heavy weapons fire. This fire, furnished by bazookas, antitank grenades, and 60mm mortars, had to substitute for artillery support. As of 12 March, the limited area occupied by the enemy in the 4th Division zone no longer constituted a practicable target area, and orders had been issued to secure all 4th Division artillery.

The Japanese, firmly entrenched in ravines, caves, and pillboxes, resisted in their customary tenacious fashion, with the result that only minimal progress was made. The character of the terrain precluded the employment of tanks,

¹⁹ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 50.

²⁰ For a detailed breakdown of General Senda's military career, see *Japanese Defense Agency Comment*.

forcing Marines to flush the enemy out of his emplacements one or two at a time. In addition to the slow progress, this type of fighting was, as usual, expensive for the attacking force. By evening of 12 March, the combat efficiency of General Cates' division had dropped to a new low of 36 percent.²¹

The drive to eliminate General Senda's pocket continued on 13 and 14 March along the same lines as on the 12th. Progress throughout remained agonizingly slow, due to the depletion of personnel as much as enemy resistance. While the pocket was being reduced, the 23d Marines began a systematic mopping up of its area from the beach towards the regimental rear. At the same time, the regiment took care of other urgent business, notably the evacuation of the friendly dead, the burial of enemy dead, and the general policing of the area.

By 15 March, the slow and deliberate advance of the 25th Marines was beginning to bear dividends. Even though the enemy continued to offer desperate resistance, there were signs that his power to resist had been considerably reduced. Since 2/25 had become so depleted in strength that it required relief, 2/24 was ordered into the line. A provisional company composed of headquarters personnel and members of the 81mm mortar platoon of 1/25 was organized to take over the area previously held by 2/24. Colonel Lanigan ordered his men to press the attack into the pocket regardless of contact. At the same time, flame tanks stationed on the road paralleling the east coast of Iwo

fired northwestward into the inaccessible draws with good effect.

This drive on D plus 24 resulted in a net gain of 200 yards. More important, it scored a deep penetration of the left flank of the pocket, where General Senda had established his strongest positions. In the midst of this bitter fighting, repeated attempts were made to induce the surrender of the Japanese, but none of them fell on fertile soil. The destruction of one cave after another, together with their occupants, continued.

Increased evidence that the pocket could not hold out much longer was received during the night of 15-16 March, when a group of 50-60 Japanese attempted to break out of the encirclement. Six of the enemy were killed and the remainder were driven back into the caves from which they had emerged. When the 25th Marines resumed the attack at 0630 on 16 March, the Marines drew rifle and machine gun fire, and hand grenades exploded all around them. Nevertheless, the Japanese now fought without any real organization and such resistance as was offered came from small, isolated groups. By mid-morning, the assault battalions had fought their way through to the beach road and Colonel Lanigan declared all organized resistance in his zone of action ended as of 1030.²²

General Senda's body was never found; prisoners volunteered that he had committed suicide on 15 March. As the din of battle receded, all that remained in the hotly contested area were the torn and battered terrain, large

²¹ *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, p. 53.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

numbers of enemy dead, and the scarred and blackened cave entrances. In six days of bitter fighting, General Senda's pocket had finally been reduced. The Japanese had fought practically to extinction. The 4th Marine Division had paid for the ground with 833 casualties.

*5TH MARINE DIVISION DRIVE TO KITANO POINT*²³

Elimination of the enemy centers of resistance in eastern Iwo Jima left only one area in the hands of the Japanese. This was to be the final enemy pocket of resistance in the very northern part of the island, where General Kuribayashi with about 1,500 men was preparing to make his final stand. The Japanese pocket, squarely in the path of the 5th Marine Division's advance, occupied approximately one square mile between Kita Village and Kitano Point on the northwest coast. Not by coincidence, it also comprised the worst ground on the island.

The badlands of northern Iwo, as this area may well be called, consisted of thousands of soft sandstone outcroppings. Here, the Japanese had dug in with their customary efficiency. Each underground position had been provided with multiple entrances and exits to protect the defenders against fire and to permit their escape if one or more of the entrances were sealed. These defenses had been dug to such a depth that flamethrowers could neither burn out their occupants nor exhaust the supply

of oxygen available within this defensive system.

In addition to the excellent cover, the Japanese also had the advantage of effective concealment. Their uniforms blended closely with the color of the sandstone. They were familiar with the maze of tunnels that criss-crossed the entire area and could find their way around in the darkness as well as in the daytime. Fighting this type of defensive action, General Kuribayashi could continue to hang on with the austere means at hand. He had no logistics problem, for anything that had to be moved, be it men or supplies, travelled underground. Such vital supplies as ammunition, food, water and medicine all had been stockpiled underground long before the first Marines began to approach the northern portion of the island. In addition to his extensive preparations for combat, General Kuribayashi had seen to it that the knowledge of the entire defense layout was limited to very few of his men, most of whom were told only enough to be familiar with the immediate defenses in their vicinity. As a result, few of the enemy knew anything about the command setup of their own forces and most of them did not know the precise location of Kuribayashi's command post.

For General Rockey's men, the battle for northwestern Iwo meant a continuation of previous difficulties aggravated by worsening terrain. Once again, they would have to seize the forward face of a ridge, fight their way across the crest, then continue to fight their way down the reverse slope, all the while drawing fire from the front, the flanks, from the

²³ Additional material in this section is derived from: *TF 56 OpRpt*; *26th Mar AR*; *27th Mar UJnl*; *27th Mar AR*; *28th Mar R-2 Jnl*; *28th Mar AR*; *13th Mar AR*; *1/26 AR*; *2/26 AR*; *3/26 UJnl*; *3/26 AR*; *3/27 UJnl*; *3/27 AR*.



ENEMY POSITIONS near Nishi Village under fire. Note burning M-4 tank at left. (USMC 142316)



PRISONER captured by 5th Marine Division near Hill 165 is escorted to the rear for interrogation. (USMC 114881)

rear, and, in some instances, even from below. The latter circumstance was perhaps the most demoralizing, as pointed out by one participant in the fighting:

Perhaps worst of all, every Marine commander fighting through this sandstone jungle knew that underneath him were healthy Japanese who would be out that night to harass his rear, steal his supplies, either recover or booby-trap their own dead, and booby-trap his dead if he couldn't get them out first.

And so the battle for Iwo Jima was ending as it had begun, at close quarters with Marine forces stripped of the advantages of their fire power, fighting an enemy who had been indoctrinated since childhood that the greatest honor he would ever know was to die for his Emperor. He could not be threatened out of his position by encirclement or by superior force; he could not be induced to surrender because of his hopeless position—tactically or strategically, he had to be killed.²⁴

The 5th Marine Division drive into the biggest enemy pocket remaining on the island got under way on 11 March. The attack was preceded by a 10-minute preparation, which continued until 20 minutes after the jumpoff. The half-hour barrage, fired by the 12th, 13th, and 14th Marines, as well as the corps artillery, provided an impressive spectacle but once again, in accordance with previous experience, was generally ineffective against enemy personnel who huddled in well-protected cave positions.

As the division attacked, with the 27th Marines on the right and the 28th on the left, the men faced a double foe: the Japanese and the terrain, each being equally formidable. The 27th Marines, with 1/26 attached, was able to carve out limited gains of 200 yards

and to continue the systematic destruction of enemy cave positions. This was the job of small infantry-demolition teams, which operated more or less on their own, blasting their way forward as they went along. Operating on the division left, the 28th Marines encountered similar difficulties as Marines assaulted individual strongpoints guarding a rocky gorge to the front. The significance of this gorge, which was approximately 200 yards wide and 700 yards long, was not yet apparent to Colonel Liversedge's Marines. However, it was clear that the Japanese had taken great precautions to effectively cover all approaches leading into the gorge with rifle and machine gun fire.

While the enemy generally remained underground and invisible throughout the day, the entire division front erupted into action shortly after nightfall and remained that way throughout the night. Small groups of Japanese continuously attempted to infiltrate the Marine lines. A few were successful in reaching the 81mm mortar positions of 3/27. Seven of the infiltrators were killed in this attempt, one of them wearing a Marine uniform and equipped with an M-1 rifle.²⁵ Around 2100, an enemy concentration opposite the 28th Marines was broken up by an artillery and mortar barrage which killed 26 of the enemy. Sporadic rifle fire and grenade duels continued for the remainder of the night.

The arrival of daylight on D plus 21 returned the initiative to the Marines, who, once again, carried the battle to the enemy. On this occasion, the day

²⁴ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 107.

²⁵ *5th MarDiv AR*, p. 26.

started off with several air strikes against enemy positions just south of Kitano Point. One of the 500-pound bombs aimed at a blockhouse missed its target, only to fall into the mouth of a cave, where a tremendous explosion caused not only this entrance, but various others connected to this cave system, to belch fire and smoke. A similar incident occurred during the early afternoon, when a 500-pound bomb hit a cave entrance and created a violent explosion with smoke observed coming out of caves 200-300 yards away.

For the remainder of the day, the course of the fighting mirrored that of D plus 20. The enemy continued to resist from caves, emplacements, and spider foxholes, frequently holding his fire until Marines had approached to within a few feet of his positions. With the support tanks, the 27th Marines made slow progress against a network of pillboxes and prepared positions. In the course of this advance, between 15 and 18 pillboxes were destroyed, but overall progress still had to be measured in a few yards. The Japanese also had learned a few tricks in recent operations and, in order to escape American air strikes and artillery fire, attempted to hug the Marine lines. Backbone of the Japanese defense were his machine guns, rifles, and knee mortars, all of which continued to exact a continuous toll in Marine lives for each foot of the advance.

During the afternoon of 12 March, Company B of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion scouted Kama and Kangoku Rocks, situated close to the northwestern shore of Iwo Jima. Intermittently throughout the campaign,

Marines advancing up the west coast had been harassed from suspected Japanese positions on these two islands. There was no doubt that even if the enemy had not permanently stationed artillery there, they harbored keen-eyed observers who had helped to harass shipping approaching the western beaches during the early phase of the operation. As the Marines neared the two islands on 12 vehicles furnished by the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, they were greeted by silence. It was decided that a landing on the island would be made at 0900 on the following morning.

These landings, carried out by 6 officers and 94 men, proceeded without incident. The Marines went ashore first on Kama Rock and subsequently on Kangoku, the larger island. On the latter, there was evidence of previous enemy occupancy in the form of several caves and stone emplacements, but no Japanese were present to offer any resistance. Having completed its mission, the reconnaissance company withdrew from the islands.

In a report issued on 12 March, the 5th Marine Division intelligence officer estimated that at least 1,000 Japanese were still defending the northern end of Iwo Jima and concluded: ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend."²⁶ Actually, the battle was beginning to reach General Kuribayashi's very doorstep. As one account was to relate it:

On March 13, a patrol from the 26th Regiment came very near to Kuribayashi, peering into the cave in which he sat, near

²⁶ 5th MarDiv D-2 PerRpt No. 22, dtd 12-Mar45.

the eastern end of the Gorge. The General's orderly quickly blew out the candles and wrapped the General in a blanket. "Thank you," Kuribayashi said, and walked deeper into the cave. The Marines, one carrying a flamethrower walked a little way into the cave then turned and went out. The orderly sighed.²⁷

While the Japanese on northern Iwo Jima had been suffering badly in the battle of attrition that was now reaching its climax, the Marines of all three divisions had hardly fared any better. As assault troops of General Rockey's division were beginning to close in on the final enemy pocket, the men wearily attacking the ridges above the gorge were tired to the point of exhaustion and many of them found it difficult to remain on their feet. Few veterans of the early battles were left, and death had reaped a grim harvest among the men who had gone ashore on the island 22 days before. Companies were now reduced to platoon size. Most of the aggressive and experienced small unit leaders had long since become casualties. Gaps in the decimated ranks had been filled with replacements who lacked combat experience that would enable them to fight and survive.

On 14 March it became apparent that the slow, step-by-step advance of the 27th Marines finally had cracked the strong enemy positions along the northeastern coast of Iwo Jima. Since the main ridge lines in this area ran from the center of the island to the sea on the west coast, General Rockey decided that the most practical direction of attack henceforth would be from east to west. As a result, the 28th Marines was ordered to hold its present line while

the 27th Marines was to shift its direction of attack westward. In the center of the division line the 26th Marines took over a two-battalion front and was ordered to attack northward with 3/26 on the left and 2/26 on the right.

Enemy resistance was less obstinate on D plus 23 than it had been during the preceding days and the 27th Marines, with 2/26 attached, gained up to 600 yards. The attack was supported by tanks which were able to assist the infantry after armored tankdozers had carved routes of approach to the front lines for them. The official report, speaking of the flame tanks, pointed out:

. . . this was the one weapon that caused the Japs to leave their caves and rock crevices and run. On many occasions the Japs attempted to charge our flame tanks with shaped charges and other explosives. Few of these attempts were successful.²⁸

Other developments on Iwo Jima on 14 March gave clear evidence that the end of the long battle was approaching. In mid-morning, five Army Air Forces planes bombed and strafed Japanese positions in front of 3/27 for what proved to be the last air support mission over Iwo Jima. The diminishing size of General Kuribayashi's pocket rendered all further air support impractical. Limited support until the end of the operation would continue to be furnished by artillery and destroyers, and even these supporting arms soon found it difficult to furnish fire in the small area still remaining under enemy control.

While compression of the northern pocket was under way, a ceremony was

²⁷ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, pp. 270-271.

²⁸ *5th MarDiv AR*, p. 27.

taking place at 0930 on 14 March at General Schmidt's headquarters. It was not an elaborate proceeding; in fact, its stark simplicity underscored the significance of the long awaited event. In the presence of flag and general officers of the fleet and landing force, assembled around a flagpole erected in these stark surroundings, the official flag raising on Iwo Jima was held. Among those present were General Holland Smith, Admirals Turner and Hill, and Generals Schmidt, Erskine, Cates, Rockey, and Major General Chaney, representing the Army Garrison Force.²⁹ After the reading of an official proclamation in which the United States officially suspended the powers of government of the Japanese Empire and took over the occupation of the island, the flag was raised at the same time that the one on top of Mount Suribachi was taken down. Upon completion of the ceremony, General Holland Smith and his staff departed from the island by air.³⁰

The night from 14-15 March was marked by continuous enemy activity directed against the 5th Division lines. Around 0200, close to 100 Japanese attempted to infiltrate the positions of 3/27. In the ensuing firefight, 15 of the enemy were killed, most of them by mortar fire.³¹ Around the same time, a

²⁹ The VAC chief of staff recalled that "while the ceremony of raising the flag was in progress near VAC headquarters, the ground was shaking around us from the bombardment of the unsecured area by nearby Corps artillery." *Rogers ltr.*

³⁰ *TF 56 OpRpt*, pp. 10-11.

³¹ *5th MarDiv AR*, p. 27.

small number of Japanese approached the lines of 2/26 and started tossing hand grenades. At dawn, the action shifted to 3/26, where 30 of the enemy were discovered attempting to enter caves southwest of Kitano Point. Half of this group were killed, the remainder committed suicide.³²

The 5th Division attack continued on 15 March. On the right, the 27th Marines advanced 400 yards and reduced enemy resistance in this sector to sporadic small arms fire. In the center, the 26th Marines made smaller but equally significant gains, carving out an advance of 200 yards. On the division left, in front of the 28th Marines, enemy reaction remained determined and formidable. At this time, enemy resistance was still centered in two areas: the steep draw that extended northwest to the sea across the front of the 28th Marines and the strong core of resistance in front of the 26th Marines, just east of the draw.

Within the diminishing pocket, General Kuribayashi and the surviving members of his staff were still in radio contact with the Japanese on Chichi Jima. They were also able to listen to the "Song of Iwo Jima," especially broadcast from Tokyo for the Iwo Jima garrison. Already on the morning of 15 March, General Kuribayashi had announced that the situation was very dangerous and that his strength was down to 900 men.³³ By the evening of the following day, his strength had been reduced to 500. Clearly, the end was

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Horie Rpt*, p. 10.

drawing near. General Kuribayashi summoned the commander of the *145th Infantry Regiment*, Colonel Ikeda, to see how much longer resistance could continue. When the regimental commander informed him that it would all be over in another day or so, General Kuribayashi admonished him to be certain that the regimental colors were burned lest they fall into American hands.

Behind the Marine lines, additional signs of progress were becoming evident as the naval construction engineers put the final touches on the restoration of the Central Airfield. Even though the runways remained unpaved, they were usable and the field was about to become operational. Additional gasoline storage facilities had been completed, and the carpenters of the 5th Division were already busily engaged in building crates in which the division's equipment would be shipped. At the southern end of Iwo Jima, a dirt road leading to the top of Mount Suribachi had been completed and it was now possible to make the trip up by jeep or bulldozer.

Reduction of the northern pocket continued on 16 March. During this final phase of the operation, General Rockey's division was supported by elements of the 3d Marine Division, which passed through the 27th Marines and took over a sector on the right of the 5th Division. Attacking to the north, General Erskine's men reached the north coast shortly before 1400.

The 26th Marines, with 3/28 attached, attacked with three battalions abreast. The advance progressed slowly

against heavy rifle fire, as it proceeded over rugged and rocky ground, where all movement was extremely difficult. However, it was a sign of the progress that had already been made that the volume of enemy machine gun fire had greatly diminished, as had the number of caves that were encountered. Nevertheless, there was still an abundance of spider foxholes and positions in the rocky outcrops which permitted the enemy to inflict a deadly fire from close range. In the course of the day, the 26th Marines advanced 200 yards. The 28th Marines remained in position along the southern rim of the rocky gorge and continued the reduction of enemy defenses to its immediate front and flanks. Losses of the 5th Marine Division at this time consisted of 89 officers and 1,993 men killed, 249 officers and 5,710 enlisted men wounded, and 3 officers and 128 men missing. Combat efficiency was estimated at 30 percent.³⁴ The division had sustained a total of 8,162 casualties in 25 days of fighting.

At 1800 on 16 March, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured. Three hours earlier, the 13th Marines had fired its last rounds, since the regiment's guns could no longer furnish supporting fires in the limited area comprising the remaining pockets of resistance. It now became incumbent on the mixed 3d and 5th Division assault forces to complete the occupation of the island with all possible dispatch, a task easier contemplated than accomplished.

Following its relief by the 21st Marines on 16 March, the 27th Marines re-

³⁴ *5th MarDiv AR*, p. 28.

organized its badly depleted units into three battalions, each consisting of two rifle companies and a headquarters company. A composite battalion, consisting of a headquarters company and four rifle companies, was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Donn J. Robertson. A small remainder of the 27th Marines stayed in division reserve until the end of the operation. The unit mopped up in the rear area and prepared to leave the island. The composite battalion, numbering 460 men, subsequently was to be attached to the 26th Marines, where it would participate in eliminating the final enemy positions on northern Iwo Jima.

All of the records dealing with this final phase of the operation emphasize the state of exhaustion in which the men found themselves. According to one account:

That the Division still moved forward at all was a credit to the men and their leaders, but the fearful strain of days in the line was showing up in every unit. Men were getting careless, exposing themselves to fire when they were tired. Too, many of the men now were replacements, men who fought gallantly and brought credit to themselves and the Division, but who were not, nevertheless, as highly trained as the Division's original men had been and for that reason probably took slightly heavier losses.³⁵

A sustained effort was made on the part of General Rockey's division to keep up morale. Baked goods and fruit juice were sent to the units in the line; the wounded were evacuated and the dead buried with all possible dispatch. A division newspaper was circulated among the frontline units, and such

articles of clothing and toilet articles as were available were sent up to the lines. Some of the more lucky Marines even enjoyed the luxury of hot showers. But, despite such amenities, the report concludes "Iwo Jima remained an unclean, evil little island, an island that these men would never forget, however much they would have liked to."³⁶

Despite their ebbing strength and often only through the application of sheer will power, those men of the 3d and 5th Marine Divisions still able to move on their feet and carry a weapon now entered the final phase of the battle for Iwo Jima. Fought in a narrow corner of the island, the final struggle would prove every bit as difficult as the early phase of the operation: death came no easier now than in the beginning.

With the end clearly approaching and under steadily increasing pressure from the advancing Marines, General Kuribayashi on 16 or 17 March left his headquarters, housed in a large dome-shaped concrete structure, and moved to a cave occupied by Colonel Ikeda and Admiral Ichimaru, the remaining senior officers of the Iwo Jima garrison following the death of Major General Senda and Captain Inouye in the 4th Division sector. From this cave, situated near the southeastern end of the gorge, the Japanese officers could do little but exhort their men to continue resistance to the last. This cave was still linked to Chichi Jima by radio, and thus the final days of Japanese resistance on Iwo Jima have become a matter of record.

³⁵ Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 113.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

*BATTLE FOR THE GORGE AND
FINAL OPERATIONS*³⁷

The final battle for Iwo Jima began on 17 March, D plus 26, when 1/26 reached the north coast and pivoted to the southwest towards the gorge which had already been blocked by the 28th Marines for the past few days. (See Map XI, Map Section), It was here that General Kuribayashi had determined to make his final stand, and he had chosen his final position with great care. The gorge, 700 yards long and 200-500 yards wide, would have been difficult to approach even under normal conditions. Outcrops of rocks subdivided the ravine into minor draws that greatly impeded all movement. The Japanese commander had taken care to insure that all routes of approach leading into the gorge were covered by machine gun and rifle fire from positions that were all but invisible to the approaching Marines.

Units of the 5th Marine Division preparing to offer the coup de grace to the final enemy position on the island would have to use their last strength in attaining this objective. A brief breakdown of casualties in this connection speaks for itself:

Our own losses at this time had been extremely heavy. The average battalion which landed with 36 officers and 885 enlisted, now had about 16 officers and 300 enlisted from the original battalion. Most

³⁷ Additional material in this section is derived from: 1/28 AR; 2/28 AR; 3/28 AR; 5th Pioneer Bn UJnl, 7-23Mar45; U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas Rpt, Iwo Jima, Feb-Mar45, dtd 4Feb46; VAC Shore Party AR; Clive Howard and Joe Whitley, *One Damned Island After Another* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press), 1946.

of the company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders had become casualties and many platoons were commanded by Corporals or PFC's. Assault squads were depleted.³⁸

Plans for reducing the final pocket called for the 28th Marines, with elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and the division reconnaissance company attached, to occupy a blocking position along the southern rim of the pocket while the 26th Marines, in conjunction with 3/28 and 3/27, was to advance into the gorge from the north and east. Because of the depleted strength of the units and the condition of the men, assigned zones of action were relatively narrow. In their drive against the pocket on 17 March, 3/26 and 3/28 made slight gains in the northeastern perimeter of the pocket, but once again their progress could be measured in yards.

A drama of a different sort was enacted on the island on D plus 26. On the preceding day, prisoners captured by General Erskine's men had conveyed to their captors the whereabouts of General Kuribayashi and his staff, and, acting upon this information, General Erskine decided to make an attempt to induce these officers to surrender. Realizing that a direct appeal to General Kuribayashi would be fruitless, General Erskine instead dispatched a message to Colonel Ikeda, commanding the *145th Infantry Regiment*. The message was handed to two prisoners of war who, carrying cigarettes and rations, proceeded into the gorge, fully aware of the importance of their mission. As they trudged off on this unusual errand, the pair was handed a walkie-talkie over

³⁸ *5th MarDiv AR*, p. 29.

which they were to maintain contact with the 3d Division Language Section.

As they slowly continued on their journey, the two emissaries crossed lines and soon made contact with groups of Japanese, apparently without arousing anyone's suspicion. Several radio messages were received by 3d Division personnel indicating that the prisoners were getting close to their objective. At this point, the couriers stopped all further transmissions. One of them, who had incurred a leg wound, dropped out, but the other continued and six hours after embarking on his bizarre mission, reached the headquarters cave. There, he turned the message over to one of the sentries who passed it on to the regimental commander. Upon learning that Ikeda had taken the message in to General Kuribayashi, the prisoner lost his nerve and beat a hasty retreat.

As soon as he had rejoined his fellow courier, the radio transmissions to the 3d Division resumed and the Marines were informed that the two were on their way back. Upon reaching the Marine lines at the rim of the gorge, the prisoners thought themselves safe and were more than slightly disturbed at the rude reception accorded to them by 5th Division Marines, who were unaware of General Erskine's psychological warfare effort. The situation was finally straightened out before the two messengers came to any harm, though it took some convincing of the skeptical 5th Division Marines that the two Japanese were indeed working for General Erskine.

The practical results of this surrender attempt, as in previous instances, were

nil. None of the high-ranking Japanese officers on Iwo Jima surrendered, and the battle of attrition continued to take its slow and agonizing course. Even though nearly all of the Japanese on Iwo Jima, under General Kuribayashi's dynamic leadership, would fight to the end, there were some who heeded the repeated appeals to surrender. American planes dropped propaganda leaflets, and the artillery fired shells filled with surrender leaflets and passes. For the Japanese soldier on Iwo Jima, surrender was not an easy matter. He could count on being executed by his own people if caught with American propaganda on his person. Surrender might mean that he could never again return to his homeland and face his compatriots. And, last but not least, he had no guarantee that the Marines would honor their promise of fair treatment once he turned himself in to them. No wonder that the Japanese were hesitant to take the final and irreversible step in view of the uncertainty surrounding it. A sampling of 65 prisoners of war showed that 53 had been influenced in their decision to give up by some contact with American propaganda. The remaining 12 had been deterred by fear of their officers and distrust of the Marines and were captured under different circumstances.³⁹

Meanwhile, the Marines continued to close in on General Kuribayashi's pocket. With the end in sight, the Japanese garrison commander addressed this order to his men on 17 March:

1. The battle situation came to the last moment.

³⁹ VAC G-2 Rpts, pp. 19, 20.

2. I want my surviving officers and men to go out and attack the enemy tonight.

3. Each troop! Go out simultaneously at midnight and attack the enemy until the last. You all have devoted yourself to His Majesty, the Emperor. Don't think of yourself.

4. I am always at the head of you all.⁴⁰

Strangely enough, there was no unusual activity during the night from 17-18 March, and nothing even resembling a *banzai* charge occurred. From this point onward, the information concerning the last days of the enemy's battle for Iwo Jima becomes increasingly hazy. Most of what has remained passed through the hands of the Chichi Jima garrison, which continued to receive radio messages from Iwo that were filed and subsequently turned over to the Americans. Thus, early on 17 March, Chichi Jima was notified that "the *145th Infantry Regiment* fought bravely near 'Hyoriuboku' holding their regimental flag in the center." Later in the day, Colonel Ikeda sent this cryptic message: "Here we burnt our brilliant Regimental Flag completely. Good bye."⁴¹

Iwo Jima became the scene of a wild celebration on the evening of 18 March. It had nothing to do with the fact that the enemy was finally cornered in the northwestern portion of the island and his elimination now was but a matter of days. Instead, someone had leaked word that Germany had surrendered, and this item of news, entirely unfounded and nearly two months premature, spread all over Iwo Jima like wildfire. As a result:

... for about an hour the island was the happiest spot on earth. Antiaircraft and

other units in rear areas opened up a jubilant barrage with machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, carbines, rifles, and pistols.⁴²

Before it was over, units all over the island and the ships offshore had the news. An end to the celebration came only when Condition Red was declared, a warning that enemy planes were in the area. As one account has it, "The Fifth Division hospital treated three casualties from 'the German war' and there were certainly others."⁴³ Following the excitement, Marines on Iwo Jima returned to the more normal routine of routing individual Japanese and thwarting the enemy's infiltration attempts.

As the advance continued on 19 March, enemy resistance became centered around General Kuribayashi's erstwhile headquarters. The structure proved completely impervious to the 75mm tank shells and likewise defied all attempts to demolish it with 40-pound shaped charges. It would take the assaulting Marines two days to destroy the surrounding positions and then commence a direct assault on the command center. Engineers with bulldozers sealed an entrance on the north side of the structure and several air vents. Finally, four tons of explosives, divided into five charges, proved sufficient to destroy this stubborn center of resistance. Just who and how many among the Japanese perished within has never become known. However, the garrison commander and the high-ranking officers were safely tucked away in Colonel Ikeda's cave, and reports continued to reach Chichi Jima, though

⁴⁰ *Horie Rpt*, p. 11.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Conner, *The Fifth Marine Division*, p. 117.

⁴³ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 281.

communications daily became more sporadic.

Around 17-18 March, General Kuribayashi sent his final message to Imperial General Headquarters, in which he apologized to the Emperor for his failure to hold the island. The message was accompanied by a poem in which the garrison commander promised:

My body shall not decay in the field
Unless we are avenged;
I will be born seven more times again
To take up arms against the foe.
My only concern is
Our country in the future
When weeds cover here.⁴⁴

About the same time, but in a less poetic and more down-to-earth fashion, Admiral Ichimaru penned a rather vituperative letter to none other than President Roosevelt, charging the latter with a lack of understanding for Japan's problems and accusing the white race, and the Anglo-Saxons in particular, "of monopolizing the fruits of the world, at the sacrifice of the colored races."⁴⁵

Meanwhile, reduction of the pocket continued unabated. Tanks moved up to the front lines over paths cleared by the tank dozers which themselves frequently came under attack by individuals or small groups of Japanese bent on suicide. The slow but steady Marine advance into the gorge was carried out under the command of the assistant division commander, General Hermle, whom General Rockey had entrusted

with operational control of all units engaged in the final mop-up at the gorge. From an observation post affording a clear view of the gorge, General Hermle directed the operation that would bring organized enemy resistance in this sector to an end.

On Chichi Jima, Major Horie learned with astonishment on 21 March that General Kuribayashi and his men were still fighting. The durable garrison commander reported that his cave was under direct attack by tanks and demolition teams. Of American attempts to induce his surrender he mentioned disdainfully that "they advised us to surrender by a loud-speaker, but we only laughed at this childish trick and did not set ourselves against them."⁴⁶ Major Horie radioed to Iwo Jima the information that, effective 17 March, the Imperial government had promoted Kuribayashi to the rank of full general, Ichimaru to vice admiral, Inouye to rear admiral, and Nishi to full colonel. The two latter promotions were made posthumously, though most likely all of them were intended that way.

On D plus 30, 21 March, the 26th Marines, with 3/27 and 3/28 attached, continued the assault as 1/26 and 3/27 advanced into the gorge. At the rim, 3/28 held its positions. Fighting on this day, as on the preceding ones, was exceedingly bitter. The Japanese refused to yield; in fact, there no longer was any place for them to go but stand their ground and die. Thus, the Marines had to eliminate them one by one. As on an earlier occasion, it was noticed that many of the enemy were wearing Ma-

⁴⁴ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 272.

⁴⁵ Admiral Ichimaru ltr to President Roosevelt, n.d., in Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, pp. 172-173. This letter was found by Marines in a cave in the northern part of Iwo Jima; the original reposes in the museum of the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.

⁴⁶ *Horie Rpt*, p. 11.

rine uniforms and firing M-1 rifles. In the course of the day's advance, elements of 1/26 made gains of 200 yards down the gorge, but beyond that point required the support of flame tanks. It developed that the terrain did not permit their employment, so that portable flamethrowers were used until the Japanese shot the liquid out of the tanks. When his equipment was hit, one of the operators became a human torch and burned to death; another was just barely saved from suffering the same fate.

As D plus 30 ended, 1/28 had gained 400 yards at the edge of the cliff, while 2/28, after one of its patrols had eliminated 20 of the enemy, moved forward 100 yards to the very edge of the cliff. On this day, Major Horie received a message from Iwo Jima, informing him: "We have not eaten nor drunk for five days. But our fighting spirit is still running high."⁴⁷ The end was now very near, yet the battle for Death Valley, a name Marines had given to the gorge, continued. In a situation where the orthodox arms and tactics of warfare proved unavailing, other means had to be improvised. In the words of one account:

The Marines tried everything in the book, and a good many things that weren't, to clean the Japs out of the gorge. Explosives were lowered over cliffs by rope to blast the Japs from their caves. Drums of gasoline were emptied into canyons and set afire. Over-sized rockets were hauled up to the front on bulldozers and used to blow the Japs off hillsides. Aerial observers dropped grenades on enemy positions from their low-flying grasshoppers.

For four days men of the 5th Division tried to take Death Valley by direct assault. They failed, because any man who set foot in the gorge was dead.⁴⁸

Still, some progress was apparent as one enemy defensive position after another was whittled away. On 22 March, 3/27, supported by tanks, tank dozers, and flame tanks, gained another 300 yards. On the following day, D plus 32, Major Horie received one final message from Iwo Jima which said: "All officers and men of Chichi Jima, good-bye."⁴⁹ For three more days, Horie tried to communicate with Iwo Jima, but there was no answer and it was assumed that all resistance on the island had ended. This fact had already been mournfully announced over Tokyo Radio by the Japanese Prime Minister, who bemoaned the fall of the island as "the most unfortunate thing in the whole war situation."⁵⁰

By 24 March, the backbone of enemy resistance in Death Valley had been broken, and the size of the pocket was down to a square of 50 by 50 yards. On the following day, D plus 32, exhausted Marines of 3/26 and 3/28 moved down into Death Valley and completed the task of mopping up, sealing caves and squeezing the enemy into an area that was no longer defensible. Still, individual Japanese held out until 25 March, when death-tired remnants of the 26th, 27th, and 28th Marines staggered into the gorge and silenced what remained of enemy resistance. At

⁴⁸ Henri *et al*, *Marines on Iwo Jima*, p. 303.

⁴⁹ *Horie Rpt*, p. 12.

⁵⁰ Radio address by Premier Kuniaki Koiso, 17Mar45, as cited in Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 274.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

1045 on D plus 34, the gorge was declared secured and fighting on northern Iwo officially came to an end.

Withdrawal of Marine units from Iwo Jima got under way on 17 March, when the VAC artillery completed embarkation. Artillery of the three divisions reembarked on subsequent days, except for 4/12, which stood by for several days, prepared to deliver fire on request. On 18 March, the 3d Marine Division relieved the 4th and General Cates closed his CP on Iwo Jima. On the same day, men of this division embarked. Two days later, the ships carrying the division departed from the island en route to their rehabilitation area in Hawaii. The arrival of the 147th Infantry Regiment on 20 March brought Army troops into the picture. The regiment was attached to General Erskine's division for operational control. As early as 7 March, General Chaney had assumed responsibility for base development and antiaircraft defense of all Iwo ground installations. He had delegated the air defense of Iwo Jima to General Moore effective that date. At 0800 on 26 March, General Chaney took over as Iwo Jima garrison commander, in effect assuming operational control of all units stationed on the island. General Moore continued as Air Defense Commander.

Just as it appeared that Iwo Jima was about to become a garrison, rather than a fiercely contested battlefield, the Japanese decided to strike a last blow against the invaders who by this time had victory all but within their grasp. Mopping up operations up to this time had continued daily in northern and central Iwo, and day and night individual Japanese had either been killed or

captured. As a precautionary measure, a LCI(G) patrolled off the northwest beaches to prevent the escape of any of the enemy by water during the hours of darkness.

Early on 26 March, a force of between 200 and 300 Japanese moved down from the area near the Northern Airfield over a trail skirting the western coast of the island and launched a full-scale attack against Marine and Army units encamped near the western beaches. Far from executing a howling *banzai* charge, the Japanese launched a well-organized attack which was carried out in echelon from three directions. Carefully calculated to achieve the maximum confusion and destruction, the Japanese set about to do their deadly work in silence. Beginning at 0515, and for more than three hours, the enemy ranged through the Marine and Army bivouacs, slashing tents, knifing sleeping airmen, and throwing grenades at random.

The units engaged and partly overrun were the 5th Pioneer Battalion, elements of the 8th Field Depot, comprising the VAC Shore Party, the 98th Naval Construction Battalion, elements of the 21st Fighter Group, the 465th Aviation Squadron, and the 506th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. In the darkness, the fighting was confused and terrible. The chief difficulty, that of distinguishing between friend and enemy, was compounded by the fact that many of the attackers were armed with BARs, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols, and one even with a bazooka. Other Japanese charged with their swords, a sure indication that a sizable part of the assault force consisted of officers.



OFFICER BIVOUAC AREA of the 21st Fighter Group following the Japanese attack of March 1945. Note bullet-marked tents. (USAF 47590 AC)



GENERAL VIEW of parking area on Motoyama Airfield No. 1 after its restoration. (USAF 57620 AC)

At the height of the attack, the Japanese penetrated to the Army 38th Field Hospital, where they tore out the telephone lines, slashed tents, and machine-gunned ambulances. In the midst of the prevailing turmoil, officers of the 5th Pioneer Battalion organized the first resistance, and there were instances of great personal heroism and sacrifice. Initially, a firing line was established in some foxholes. Subsequently, as the din of battle increased, other Marines arrived on the scene and Army flame tanks began to go into action. The 5th Pioneers organized a skirmish line and, for the first time, the enemy was forced to give ground. Joining in the action was anyone who had a weapon, including airmen, Seabees, Army medical personnel, and members of the Corps Shore Party. In fact, the performance of the latter Marines earned them a special commendation from their commanding officer who stated:

The Corps Shore Party Commander is highly gratified with the performance of these colored troops, whose normal function is that of labor troops, while in direct action against the enemy for the first time. Proper security prevented their being taken unawares, and they conducted themselves with marked coolness and courage. Careful investigation shows that they displayed modesty in reporting their own part in the action.⁵¹

When it was all over, 196 Japanese littered the area of the 5th Pioneer Battalion alone; 66 of the raiders were killed in the adjacent areas and a total of 18 were captured. Rumor had it that General Kuribayashi had led the attack,

and the efficiency with which it was carried out would lend some substance to the report. The 40 swords gathered up on the field of battle after the action gave evidence of the high percentage of officers and senior noncommissioned officers that participated. Years after the war, a Japanese who had been taken prisoner during this final attack and who had been subsequently repatriated, was to claim that one-legged Admiral Ichimaru had taken part in the charge. But a body count following the battle and examination of the bodies failed to identify either Kuribayashi, Ichimaru, or Ikeda, and their exact fate has never been determined.

The final Japanese attack also proved costly to the Americans in terms of casualties. The 5th Pioneers lost 9 killed and 31 wounded in this action; units of the VII Fighter Command had 44 killed and 88 wounded.⁵² At just about the time that the last of the enemy raiders were being killed off on western Iwo, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was announced completed. As of 0800, 26 March, the Commander Forward Area, Central Pacific, Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, assumed responsibility for the defense and development of the island. General Schmidt closed his CP and departed from Iwo Jima by air shortly after noon. The remainder of his headquarters embarked on the USS *President Monroe*.

Embarkation of the remaining Marine units followed a schedule long

⁵¹ Shore Party AR, dtd 30Apr45, in VAC AR, App 10, Anx C, p. 13.

⁵²VAC G-3 PerRpt No. 35 dtd 26Mar45; 5th Pioneer Bn AR, Iwo Jima, 27Mar45, p. 2.

worked out in advance. Thus, elements of the 3d Marine Division began to embark on 27 March, when the 21st Marines and the division CP went aboard ship. The remainder of General Erskine's men departed on the return run of ships carrying garrison forces to Iwo. On 4 April, the Army's 147th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Robert F. Johnson, assumed full responsibility for the ground defense of the island and the 9th Marines prepared to embark. The last unit of General Erskine's division left Iwo on 12 April and arrived on Guam six days later. During the final phase of the operation between 11 and 26 March, the Marines had sustained a total of 3,835 casualties.⁵³ Total Marine casualties for the Iwo Jima operation came to 25,851.⁵⁴

The total number of Japanese who died in the defense of Iwo Jima has never been definitely established, but nearly the entire garrison went down fighting. As of 26 March, the Marines had taken only 216 prisoners,⁵⁵ a large number of whom were Korean laborers. Nor did the fighting and dying on the island end with the departure of the VAC Landing Force. Aggressive patrols and ambushes by the 147th Infantry

⁵³ Broken down by divisions, these casualties were as follows: 3d Marine Division: 147 killed, 60 died of wounds, 505 wounded, and 53 combat fatigue; 4th Marine Division: 139 killed, 87 dead of wounds, 442 wounded, and 52 combat fatigue; 5th Marine Division: 467 killed, 168 died of wounds, 1,640 wounded, 3 missing, and 122 combat fatigue. Above figures derived from HQMC postwar statistics.

⁵⁴ A detailed breakdown of Marine casualties by unit is shown in Appendix H.

⁵⁵ VAC G-2 *PerRpt* No. 35, dtd 9Apr45.

Regiment continued throughout April and into May, resulting in additional Japanese killed and captured. Isolated enemy strongpoints continued to hold out and had to be reduced, some of them more than once.

During the first week of April, in an incident reminiscent of the unexpected enemy attack of 26 March, about 200 Japanese materialized just above the East Boat Basin, where they attempted to rush an infantry command post. This battle continued all night and all of the attackers were killed, but not before they had succeeded in exploding 6,000 cases of dynamite, which rocked the island and caused a number of casualties.⁵⁶ Nor was this the end. Also during the month of April, Army troops stumbled upon the field hospital of the *2d Mixed Brigade*, located 100 feet underground on eastern Iwo Jima. The surrender of the hospital proved to be somewhat complex, as outlined by this account:

A language officer appealed to the Japanese to come out. After a long discussion, the senior medical officer, Major Masaru Inoaka, called for a vote. The ballot turned out sixty-nine for surrender, 3 opposed. Of the three nays, Corporal Kyutaro Kojima immediately committed suicide. The others came out, including two more medical officers, Captain Iwao Noguchi and Lieutenant Hideo Ota. Captain Noguchi, beset by remorse that he had lived while so many died, later emigrated to Brazil, unable to accept life in Japan.⁵⁷

For the remainder of April and May, members of the 147th Infantry Regi-

⁵⁶ Headquarters, Army Garrison Force G-2 Weekly Rpt No. 2, dtd 8Apr45, as cited in Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*, pp. 69-70.

⁵⁷ Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, p. 287.

ment accounted for 1,602 Japanese killed and 867 captured.⁵⁸ As the fighting and dying gradually subsided, the utilization of the island as a forward base went into high gear. But even as bulldozers tore across ground that had previously been so bitterly contested and aviation gas was beginning to reach Iwo in large quantities, three large Marine Corps cemeteries remained to offer a mute eulogy to the men who had fought and died there. Arriving on Iwo Jima on 20 April 1945, one eminent Navy historian counted 5,330 graves in the Marine Corps cemeteries, but, in his own words :

. . . there were about 31,000 soldiers, Air Force ground crews and Seabees on the island, very much alive, healthy and in high spirits. Army officers said they wouldn't trade Iwo for any South Pacific island.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Headquarters, 147th Infantry Regiment, Report of Operations Against the Enemy, Iwo Jima, dtd 11Jun45, as cited in Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 193.

⁵⁹ Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*, p. 70.

There were many who would pay tribute to the heroism of the Marines who captured this key bastion of the Japanese inner defense ring, bristling with the most powerful defenses a clever and crafty enemy could devise. None of them put it better than Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, who made this comment :

The battle of Iwo Island has been won. The United States Marines by their individual and collective courage have conquered a base which is as necessary to us in our continuing forward movement toward final victory as it was vital to the enemy in staving off ultimate defeat.

By their victory the Third, Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions and other units of the Fifth Amphibious Corps have made an accounting to their country which only history will be able to value fully. Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island uncommon valor was a common virtue.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Pacific Fleet Communique No. 300, dtd 17Mar45.

Summary¹

The battle of Iwo Jima requires a detailed analysis because it was unique in certain respects. First, it featured the employment of three Marine divisions (less one regiment) under a single tactical Marine command, the largest body of Marines committed to combat in one operation during World War II. Secondly, enemy resistance under General Kuribayashi was such that American casualties sustained in this operation exceeded those of the Japanese. Out of the savage struggle for eight square miles of inhospitable island emerged convincing re-affirmation of the fact that once air and naval superiority had been gained over and around an objective, Marines could make a landing, gain a foothold, and extend it until the enemy was driven into a severely restricted area. There, he could be annihilated, regardless of the size and number of his guns or the quality of his defense. The

then Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, gave voice to his "tremendous admiration and reverence for the guy who walks up beaches and takes enemy positions with a rifle and grenades or his bare hands."² Yet it would be folly to assume that sheer courage alone, even when coupled with material superiority, was the decisive factor that led to certain, if bloody, victory. Even Admiral Spruance's statement, that "in view of the character of the defenses and the stubborn resistance encountered, it is fortunate that less seasoned or less resolute troops were not committed,"³ only touches on one important facet within the overall picture.

The reason Marines were able to prevail against a firmly entrenched enemy, who knew in advance of the impending attack, can be found in detailed and meticulous planning. The plans for the Iwo Jima operation possibly were the most far-reaching for any operation in the Pacific area up to this time in World War II. Preparations extended not only to American bases in the Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Hawaiian Islands but all the way back to the mainland of the United States, "from whence came hundreds of new ships to transport the troops to the

¹ Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: *Fifth Fleet OpRpt*; *TF 51 AR*; *TF 52 AR*; *TF 53 OpRpt*; *TG 53.2 AR*; *TF 56 AR*; *VAC AR*; *VAC NGF Rpt*; *3d MarDiv AR*; *4th MarDiv OpRpt*; *5th MarDiv AR*; *1st Prov FdArty Gp AR*; Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*; Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*; *Iwo Comments*; Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*; Craven and Cate, *The Pacific*; Forrestal, *Admiral Spruance*; Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*; Isely and Crowl, *U S. Marines and Amphibious War*; Sherrod, *Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*; Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*.

² Quoted in *The New York Times*, dtd 26-Feb45, p. 1, col 6, as cited in Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 210.

³ *Fifth Flt OpRpt*, p. 3.

objective. Most of these ships were under construction less than six months before the target day, and some of the smaller ones existed at that time only in blueprint form."⁴ In fact, with one exception, the transports carrying the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions to the objective were either under construction or being commissioned as late as 31 October 1944.⁵ It is typical of the long-range planning preceding Operation DETACHMENT that many of the participating vessels had to be transferred from the European Theater to the Pacific prior to the invasion.

At Iwo Jima, as in similar operations, two command ships were employed so that, in the event one command ship became a casualty, the commander aboard the other could take over. In this case Admiral Turner, as Expeditionary Force Commander, was embarked in a command ship with General Holland Smith as Expeditionary Troops Commander, while Admiral Harry Hill, as Attack Force Commander and General Schmidt, as Landing Force Commander, were embarked in the other command ship. The VAC chief of staff was to comment on the command relationships at Iwo Jima in these terms:

The Navy was of course in command afloat. The Landing Force Commander assumed command ashore after setting up a command post there. General Holland Smith could have assumed command ashore by setting up a headquarters ashore. He did not do so, nor to the best of my knowledge did he ever issue any command to the troops ashore. In fact, he had only a skeleton staff, and as he remarked to General Schmidt the only

reason he went on the expedition was in case something happened to General Schmidt.⁶

When Admiral Nimitz coined his phrase about the uncommon valor displayed by Americans who served on Iwo Jima, he was referring not only to the Marines who did the lion's share of the fighting, but also to personnel of the U. S. Army and Navy, on the ground, at sea, and in the air, who supported them. According to one historical evaluation:

Without supplies and medical care the assault would have ground to a halt, and without close air, naval gunfire, and artillery support, there would have been no neutralization to permit the tank-infantry demolition teams to advance.⁷

Based on sound doctrine, training, and experience, the participating services and arms developed excellent teamwork that could not have been surpassed. In view of the depth and extent of the Japanese defenses, naval gunfire had only a limited effect. Long and medium range bombardment accomplished little, and even area fire failed to do much damage to underground enemy defenses. Following the operation, Admiral Blandy was to make this comment in dealing with the preliminary bombardment:

It was not until fire support ships, their spotting planes, and the support aircraft had worked at the objective for two days, had become familiar with the location and appearance of the defenses, and had accurately attacked them with close-range gunfire and low-altitude air strikes, that substantial results were achieved.⁸

⁴ *Rogers ltr.*

⁷ Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 501.

⁸ *TF 52 AR*, p. 10.

⁴ Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, p. 93.

⁶ *TG 53.2 AR*, p. 2.

This statement leads directly into the only deep-seated controversy to develop from the Iwo Jima operation, that of the duration of the naval gunfire support.⁹ This dispute still simmers more than 25 years after the event, and it appears doubtful that it will ever be completely resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. The issues in this case are clear:

Previous amphibious assaults had amply demonstrated that against such defenses only deliberate, short-range destructive fire would be effective. And both Marine and Navy commanders knew that even under the most favorable conditions this method of bombardment was extremely time consuming.¹⁰

Then, as now, the lines in the naval gunfire controversy were clearly drawn, and little room remained for compromise. Most of the Marines who fought on Iwo Jima give credit to the high degree of precision which naval gunfire had reached since the early operations of World War II, but at the same time firmly agree with one former Marine participant who commented that "undoubtedly, longer bombardment before

D-Day would have materially shortened the battle and saved many lives."¹¹

It would serve no useful purpose at this time to rekindle the barely submerged passions that have occasionally popped to the surface regarding this subject. Even minute inspection of all available data does not lead to concrete and infallible conclusions that would stand up to prolonged investigation. Thus the controversy simply becomes one of the vantage point occupied by each of the participants at the time of the operation. To a Marine who went ashore on D-Day or later and saw the carnage wrought by the Japanese shore guns among his comrades, it becomes inconceivable that, regardless of time limits and restrictions on ammunition expenditure, more was not done to assure that enemy shore defenses were knocked out prior to the landings. This feeling is born of a mixture of anger and frustration, known only to those who have been exposed to superior enemy firepower for any length of time, bereft of the possibility to reply at once and in kind. Little has yet been devised to relieve the initial feeling of helplessness experienced by the rifleman who hits a hostile beach under the muzzle of still functioning enemy guns.

From the Navy's vantage point, the situation was slightly different. In the first place, the Iwo Jima operation had been tightly wedged in a time frame between the invasion of Luzon and the coming assault on Okinawa. Under such pressure, perhaps the best that could be achieved was neutralization, not destruction of the enemy artillery as

⁹ In his version of the Iwo operation, Samuel Eliot Morison mentions an attack on Navy strategy and Marine Corps tactics launched by a segment of the American press, accusing both of being wasteful of American lives in paying an exorbitant price for the seizure of heavily defended objectives of limited usefulness. Deplorable as was the loss of lives at Iwo Jima, the American public then, as now, came to realize that the cost of victory is high. Despite expressions of public anguish at the losses sustained at Iwo Jima, the value of the objective for continued operations never was in doubt, nor did the issue, for lack of an alternate solution, ever assume the dimensions of a public controversy.

¹⁰ Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 202.

¹¹ Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*, p. 484.

desired by the Marines. The naval viewpoint is summed up in this statement:

There is no reason to believe that ten or even thirty days of naval and air pounding would have had much more effect on the defenses than the bombardment that was delivered. The defenses were such, by and large, that the only way they could be taken out was the way they were taken out, by Marine Corps infantry and demolitions. . . . Aerial bombardment and naval gunfire simply could not reach underground into the maze of caves and tunnels, yet these had to be cleared or sealed shut before the island could be secured as an air base on the Bonins' road to Tokyo.¹²

This line of reasoning carries little weight with Marines who faced the maze of virtually untouched pillboxes and covered emplacements between the Southern and Central Airfields and those to the east and west of the latter. These defenses were situated in more or less open terrain that was largely accessible to direct fire at relatively short ranges from vessels standing offshore. It required the herculean efforts of men in eight days of costly fighting to reduce these fortifications. In the words of General Harry Schmidt: "With additional time available for pre-D-Day firing naval guns might have accomplished much in this area to facilitate its capture."¹³ The Navy has contended that:

. . . heavy ammunition replenishment at sea had not been service tested and the bombarding ships were far from a supply base and could not carry enough ammunition for the prolonged bombardment desired by the Marines.¹⁴

Neither the validity of this contention nor the flow of time itself have

done much to cool the passions of Marines who underwent the trial by "fire and steel" on Iwo Jima. There simply appears to be no way to equate the feelings of men who have watched their comrades and friends torn apart by enemy weapons with the cold realities of logistics, statistics, and strategy. Thus, for the purposes of this history, the controversy must remain unsolved.

Let it be said for the record that, once the Marines had gone ashore, naval gunfire was furnished to the satisfaction of the landing force. In this connection, the positive must be accentuated. One account summed up the quality of naval gunfire support in these words:

The cooperation of these vessels, from the largest battleship to the small, specialized gunboats, was excellent. The nature of the terrain continued to limit their effectiveness, however, and in most instances only neutralization was obtained. Supporting ships and craft were quick to observe enemy activity and take it under fire after first checking with units ashore to determine that the shelling would not endanger friendly troops.¹⁵

General Kuribayashi himself unwittingly paid tribute to the accuracy of American naval gunfire support when he passed word to his superiors that the power of bombardment from ships required reevaluation:

The beach positions we made on this island by using many materials, days and great efforts, were destroyed within three days so that they were nearly unable to be used again. . . .

Power of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing operation possible to whatever beachhead they like,

¹² Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*, p. 73.

¹³ *VAC NGF Rpt*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁴ Forrestel, *Admiral Spruance*, p. 168.

¹⁵ Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 203.

and preventing them from landing means nothing but great damages.¹⁰

The same factors that limited the success of naval gunfire also proved a hindrance to the effectiveness of the preinvasion air bombardment. The bombing of Iwo Jima and adjacent islands over a period of several months by high-altitude B-24 bombers based in the Marianas had prevented the Japanese from enjoying the unrestricted use of the two airfields on Iwo Jima. On the other hand, the increasingly heavy air raids did much to drive the enemy underground. In evaluating the results of this extensive bombing, Air Force historians themselves conclude that, despite "the heavy going over the island had received, weather conditions and the topography of Iwo Jima had rendered the results much less decisive than had been expected."¹⁷

While bombers of the Seventh Air Force had concentrated mostly on the destruction or neutralization of the operational airfields in the Bonins, Admiral Durgin's carrier pilots assaulted those defenses that would interfere with the amphibious assault and the subsequent push inland. Deficiencies in the armament of the support aircraft and the small size of the bombs they carried severely limited the effectiveness of these attacks. Even when a target had been pinpointed, the bombs proved too small to smash buried blockhouses. The use of napalm, which was badly needed to strip enemy positions on Iwo Jima of their natural cover, also proved disappointing when, in numerous instances, the liquid failed to ignite.

On D minus 1, as the weather cleared and the carrier pilots had become familiar with the terrain and the targets on the island, more was accomplished than during the two preceding days. Japanese defenses on the slopes of Mount Suribachi and emplacements above the East Boat Basin proved to be particularly attractive targets for the Navy flyers, who not only bombed these targets but also strafed them with 5-inch rockets. The latter were effective due to their accuracy but lacked the destructive power required against the formidable enemy fortifications. In evaluating the effectiveness of these air strikes, the advance commander of the air support control units only allowed that they "conceivably weakened the areas commanding the landing beaches."¹⁸

Greatly contrasting with the inconclusive results obtained from the above air strikes was the support furnished by the pilots of Task Force 58 on D-Day. The Marine and Navy flyers, whose heroic efforts were clearly visible to Navy personnel and Marines about to hit the Iwo Jima beaches, drew vociferous praise. As long as Vice Admiral Mitscher's carriers remained at Iwo, the carrier squadrons were able to furnish all the ground support requested, but on D plus 4, when the large carriers departed, a shortage of aircraft quickly developed. Planes needed for ground support had to be diverted to such other duties as antisubmarine patrols, strikes against other islands in the Bonins, and sea rescue operations.

As a rule, response of aviation to requests from ground units was quick,

¹⁰ *Horie Rpt*, p. 13.

¹⁷ Craven and Cate, *The Pacific*, p. 584.

¹⁸ *TF 52 AR*, Encl D, p. 4.

though on many occasions more than an hour elapsed before the supporting aircraft appeared on the scene. Even then, the normally overcrowded Support Air Request Net proved to be the weak link in obtaining air strikes without undue loss of time. It is ironic that Iwo Jima Marines were denied the close support that was to become the trademark of Marine aviation, while Army troops in the Philippines at this time were reaping the benefits from exactly that type of support furnished by Marine dive bombers.¹⁹ As in other campaigns, each echelon intervening between the ground unit requesting air strikes and the pilots furnishing the support resulted in loss of time and attendant confusion. Once again, the crux of the matter was control of support aircraft by the ground units, something that higher headquarters were still most reluctant to grant. At the conclusion of operations in the Marshalls and the Marianas:

Marine commanders pressed hard for increased use of Marine air in close support. They wanted pilots, planes, and a control system oriented to ground needs and quickly responsive to strike requests. The winds of change were in the air in the summer of 1944 and refinements in close support techniques were coming. Operations later in the year saw planes bombing and strafing closer to frontline positions and evidenced a steady increase in the employment of Marine squadrons in this task as well as in air-to-air operations.²⁰

In the case of Iwo Jima, it is significant that all three participating Marine

divisions unanimously recommended that in future operations, the air liaison parties be given more direct control over aircraft during close support missions.²¹ The start made in this direction during 1944 proved to be only the first step in an uphill and time-consuming struggle, some of which still had not been resolved at the time of the Korean War.

Throughout the Iwo operation, air observers played an important role. Fighter-type aircraft, flown by especially trained pilots of VOC-1, augmented the float planes normally used to spot naval gunfire. On an improvised basis, Marine artillery and tactical observers operated from carrier-based torpedo bombers until the small observation planes of the VMO squadrons had gone ashore. In spite of the difficulties, the latter held their own. One historical account was to sum up their performance this way:

Like other Marines on Iwo, the VMO squadrons had to prove they could take it. The little planes and their pilots and ground crews were subjected to everything from *kamikazes* to artillery fire to faulty launching gear, and all of these took their toll.²²

Aside from difficulties encountered with the overcrowded Support Air Request Net, communications on and around Iwo Jima functioned exceedingly well. The multiplicity of wire and radio nets complicated the situation, and there were instances of enemy jamming and interference between sets. The performance of communications personnel

¹⁹ For the role played by Marine aviation during operations in the Philippines, see Part IV of this volume.

²⁰ Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*, p. 584.

²¹ *3d MarDiv AR*, Anx G, App. 1, p. 3; *4th MarDiv OpRpt*, Anx C, pp. 6-7; *5th MarDiv AR*, Anx G, App. 1, p. 3.

²² Sherrod, *Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*, p. 348.

was rated as excellent. Wire was widely used and with good effect. Radio bridged the gap where wire could not be employed. It was a far cry from the unsatisfactory radio equipment that had been employed in the early operations in the Pacific, notably at Tarawa. The short distances involved at Iwo Jima, as well as the very slow rate of advance, eased the burden of maintaining and expanding communications: there never was any serious breakdown. As in previous operations, the Navajo talkers performed an outstanding service, and their employment contributed materially to the effective and speedy transmittal of urgent classified radio traffic without danger of enemy interception.²³

Contributing to the overall success of the Iwo Jima operation was close coordination between the supporting arms. The systems of coordination used at the headquarters of the three divisions were similar, though General Erskine's division maintained an installation known as the "supporting arms tent," whose organization and functions have been described in these words:

The basic method of coordination between supporting arms was to achieve close personal liaison on all levels. Targets were freely interchanged according to the method of attack best suited, and, whenever operations were in progress or prospect, the artillery, naval gunfire, and air officers were together or readily accessible to each other by wire. Plans for scheduled fires or pre-King-Hour preparations were habitually prepared jointly, and so presented to the G-3, Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General. Much of the success achieved may be traced to the separate maintenance of a "supporting arms tent,"

so-called, adjacent to the G-3 Section. In this center, wire communications converged from the division switchboard, from the similar 5th Amphibious Corps establishment, from the division artillery fire direction center, and from the naval gunfire and air radio centrals. It was thus possible to establish any sort of communications necessary, and to plan without interruption, while being within a few steps of the G-3 Section.²⁴

Throughout the operation, close liaison was maintained between the corps artillery, air, and naval gunfire officers and the Commander, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, in the Joint Operations Rooms on board the USS *Auburn* and subsequently through facilities of the supporting arms tent at VAC headquarters ashore.²⁵

The performance of the shore based artillery at Iwo Jima deserves special mention. Standard tactics, vindicated in previous operations, were employed. It quickly became evident, though, that the 75mm and the 105mm howitzers of the division artillery battalions were far from adequate for the destruction of the type of emplacements encountered on the island. In fact, the 155mm guns and howitzers of the corps artillery frequently had to score up to a dozen hits in one place before they caused major damage to some of the strongest enemy installations.²⁶ In performing its mission, artillery was further handicapped by limited observation, which often prevented forward observers from seeing more than 200 yards ahead. As a result, great dependence was placed on aerial spotting, particularly for counter-bat-

²⁴ *3d MarDiv AR*, p. 53.

²⁵ *VAC NGF Rpt*, p. 38.

²⁶ *VAC Arty Rpt*, p. 29.

²³ *VAC Sig Bn Rpt*, p. 5.

tery and destruction fire. Despite such limitations, officers and men of the corps and division artillery carried out their mission in an exemplary fashion.

From 23 February to 1 March, the VAC artillery fired its maximum number of missions, most of them counter-battery. During the first four days in March, normal missions were fired, but the amount of ammunition expended had to be reduced since expenditure exceeded the inflow. After a breather on 5 March, when no preparations were fired, both the corps and division artillery made a maximum effort on the following day. On 6 March, a heavy time-on-target preparation was fired in which 11 division and corps artillery battalions participated. Despite the higher expenditure of ammunition, amounting to 2,500 rounds for the corps and 20,000 rounds of 75mm and 105mm for the division artillery, this massive concentration had no decisive effect.

In discussing the performance of the artillery during the Iwo Jima operation, General Schmidt underscored another aspect:

A feature of the employment of artillery in the Iwo Jima operation not noted in the report was that the bulk of the artillery ashore was sited around Airfield No. 1. During the greater portion of the time artillery was firing continuously (approximately 450,000 rounds fired during operation) at the same time Airfield No. 1 was being used for aircraft operation to capacity. This was also true even after Airfield No. 2 began operating. It is considered remarkable that no friendly planes were hit and that aircraft operations were not impeded by our artillery or vice versa. The method of control employed for the protection of planes taking off or landing was simply to have an individual

of the firing unit placed to observe whether any aircraft were in the line of fire and to give warning if that were the case.²⁷

Engineer support to VAC during Operation DETACHMENT was generally excellent. The task of constructing and maintaining roads in the VAC area was assigned to the 2d Separate Engineer Battalion, which also accomplished the preliminary work in restoring the Southern Airfield. It was the work carried out by this unit that enabled small observation aircraft to operate from this airfield by D plus 7. The further completion of additional strips on this airfield was the shared accomplishment of these Marine engineers and the 62d Naval Construction Battalion.

In addition to executing their important task of constructing roads, operating water points, and erecting various buildings and supply dumps, Marine engineers also had a combat mission to perform. The latter was the responsibility of the division engineers who cleared mines, dozed trails that enabled tanks to approach the front lines, and performed such other jobs as were designed to help the infantry advance over treacherous terrain. Much of this work was carried out under direct enemy observation and fire. Engineers, individually or in small groups, joined the infantry in demolishing the numerous enemy caves and strongpoints. For the hard-toiling engineers, there were only two bright sides to the operation: the sand-clay fill obtained from quarries on the island made excellent road

²⁷ *1st Prov Fd Arty Gp AR*, 1st Endorsement.

construction material; and "engineer operations were further facilitated in that no bridges were required."²⁸

The employment of amphibious vehicles on Iwo Jima featured a greater variety than had been previously used, including armored amphibian tractors, amphibian trucks, and sea-going jeeps. First to hit the beach were the LVT(A)s of the 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, equipped with one 75mm howitzer, one .50 caliber machine gun mounted in the turret ring, one .30 caliber machine gun mounted in front of the assistant driver, and one .30 caliber machine gun mounted in front of the howitzer loader. Once within effective range of the beaches, the LVT(A)s were to open fire with all weapons. After going ashore, these vehicles were to move about 50 yards inland and protect the following assault waves by firing on targets to their front and flanks.

Almost immediately, the steep terraces and the composition of the beaches caused the vehicles to bog down. A few made it across the first terrace only to become stalled on the second. While neither the LVT(A)s nor the following LVTs containing the assault troops drew voluminous enemy fire, progress of the LVTs upon reaching the beaches also was stymied by the loose volcanic ash and the steep terraces. Since in many instances the beach was very narrow and the surf broke very close to the steep ledge, many LVTs swamped. Some of the vehicles were thrown broadside on the beach where sand and salt water filled them.

It soon became apparent that the volcanic cinders and sand would not support wheeled vehicles. Only the LVTs, caterpillar tractors, and other tracked vehicles had a chance of making it inland across this treacherous ground. As emphasized in one report: "Supplies and equipment were hauled from ships directly to the front lines, and had it not been for LVTs the troops ashore could not have been supplied during the early stages of the landing."²⁹ Because of their importance to the logistics effort, it became necessary to use these vehicles around the clock during the early phase of the operation.

One of the new types of equipment to be used by all three Marine divisions during the Iwo operation was the 3½-ton Clever-Brooks trailer, employed to haul cargo and medical supplies. Major difficulty was encountered in launching these amphibious trailers in the rough seas and getting them across the steep terraces. LVTs were generally able to bring the trailers ashore, but attempts to have the DUKWs perform this service resulted in the loss of both the trailer and DUKW. While comments on both the LVT and DUKWs were generally favorable, VAC concluded: "The amphibian trailers did not prove to be of any particular or specific help during the operation."³⁰

The amphibian truck, the DUKW, had the primary mission of bringing the division artillery ashore on D-Day. Personnel to operate these vehicles was furnished both by the Marine Corps and the U.S. Army. The difficulty in land-

²⁸ Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, p. 144.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 133.

³⁰ VAC AR, Anx B, App. 4, G-4 Rpt.

ing the artillery resulted from the high surf and the tactical situation ashore. While some of the DUKWs landed without difficulty, others were swamped after exhausting their limited fuel supply or developing mechanical problems. Others that were overloaded, sank almost immediately after disembarking from the LSTs. Many of the DUKWs ran afoul of the steep beaches and broached when the front wheels dug down into the sand or volcanic ash and could not get sufficient traction to pull the vehicles forward. Following the initial landings, DUKWs hauled supplies, especially ammunition, evacuated the wounded, and performed mail and messenger runs.

Another amphibious vehicle that proved its worth during the Iwo operation was a light cargo carrier, dubbed the "Weasel." This tracked carrier had been issued to the three Marine divisions participating in DETACHMENT in November 1944. At Iwo Jima, the Weasels hauled light supplies, evacuated the wounded, and were used to string telephone lines. Their versatility in overcoming loose sand and the steep terrain made them the ideal all-purpose vehicle, and they were soon pressed into service as messenger or command cars or for the purpose of hauling trailers and small artillery pieces over terrain that wheeled vehicles could not negotiate. In addition to their versatility, the Weasels offered a poor target for the enemy because of their speed and low silhouette. The only difficulty encountered with these vehicles was at sea, where the high swells occasionally proved more than they could handle. It is interesting to note that a total of 133

DUKWs were destroyed during the Iwo Jima operation, amounting to 53 percent of those employed; only 9 Weasels were lost in combat, accounting for 13 percent of the number that were disembarked. The remaining 61 vehicles remained in operating condition until the Marines left Iwo Jima.³¹

One of the most successfully handled, yet difficult aspects of the Iwo Jima operation pertained to the treatment and evacuation of the wounded. The bitterness of the fighting, from the first to the last day of battle, coupled with the large number of men simultaneously locked in combat, placed an extremely heavy burden on the medical units, both ashore and afloat. During the initial days of the operation, doctors and corpsmen alike occupied a precarious foothold on beaches that were exposed to enemy fire of all calibers. As often as not, the medical personnel ashore became casualties themselves, especially the corpsmen attached to the combat units or the beach evacuation stations. It was not a rare occurrence for corpsmen to be hit as they carried litters with wounded to the rear or cared for the wounded at the evacuation stations. Casualties among medical officers and corpsmen were correspondingly high: 738, among them 197 killed.³²

In order to take care of the Iwo Jima casualties, medical plans had been drawn up well in advance of the operation. As a result, during the first nine days of the battle, once a casualty had arrived

³¹ VAC AR, Anx B.

³² U. S. Navy Bureau of Medicine, Statistics Division, World War II Casualties, dtd 1Aug-52, as cited in Bartley, *Iwo Monograph*, p. 195.

at one of the evacuation stations, he could expect prompt evacuation to one of the hospital LSTs that were lying 2,000 yards offshore. These LSTs acted as collection centers from which the casualties were forwarded to APAs and hospital ships. Initially, the transport of casualties from the beaches to the hospital LSTs was handled by landing craft, LVTs, and DUKWs. However, increasingly rough surf eventually prevented the use of small landing craft, and amphibious vehicles were employed exclusively. The DUKWs, in particular, proved useful because they handled well in the surf and alongside the big ships, and patients were more comfortable inside the DUKWs than inside the wet, bouncing LVTs.³³

In addition to the hospital ships *Bountiful*, *Samaritan*, and *Solace*, and the hospital transport *Pinkney*, the LSV *Ozark* was pressed into service as an auxiliary hospital ship. Together with transports that were leaving the combat area, these ships evacuated 13,737 casualties.³⁴ An additional 2,449 men were airlifted to the Marianas.

Because of the small size of Iwo Jima, distances from the front lines to battalion aid stations were invariably short. Nevertheless, the difficult terrain and constant exposure to enemy fire made even such short distances extremely hazardous both for corpsmen and patients alike. At first, LVTs and Weasels were widely used in order to bring casualties to the beaches; during the latter phase of the operation when roads had been constructed that were

passable for wheeled vehicles, jeeps oftentimes carried casualties to the rear.

The availability of whole blood to treat the victims of extensive loss of blood and shock undoubtedly saved many lives. Such transfusions of whole blood had not been used in any previous Central Pacific campaigns. Landing force medical facilities alone used more than 5,000 pints. By D plus 25, 12,600 pints had been used, nearly one pint for every patient evacuated.³⁵ Once the situation on the beaches had stabilized, hospital tents went up wherever a place for them could be found, and as electric power became available, the shore based hospitals were able to operate around the clock. In evaluating the efficiency of the medical care provided at Iwo Jima, VAC was to report:

The medical service for the Iwo Jima operation approached nearer the ideal than during any previous operations in the Central Pacific Area, and it is firmly believed that the casualties received the maximum medical care possible commensurate with the military situation.³⁶

One of the most difficult problems that had to be overcome during Operation DETACHMENT was that of supplying the landing force. Heavy surf, the deep volcanic ash, the enemy's complete coverage of the beaches with artillery, mortars, and small arms fire, and congestion at the beaches all combined to increase the complexity of logistics. Only the abandonment of carefully laid plans and timely improvisation saved the day, making possible an uninterrupted flow of supplies to the frontline units that kept the operation going.

³³ *TF 56 MedRpt*, pp. 8-9.

³⁴ *TF 53 OpRpt*, Part VI, pp. 5, 12.

³⁵ *VAC MedRpt*, p. 12; *TF 56 MedRpt*, p. 19.

³⁶ *VAC AR*, Anx B.

Iwo Jima provided a testing ground for the vehicles that shuttled back and forth through the heavy surf in an attempt to land badly needed cargo when and where required. Beyond that, it became a proving ground for men of the beach and shore parties, the frequently unpublicized and unsung heroes of the battle of logistics. Previously, little had been done to provide these parties with proper training, experience, and continuity of function. The force that went ashore on Iwo Jima included beefed-up pioneer battalions, which were further reinforced with men from the replacement drafts and division headquarters personnel, as well as U. S. Army port troops.

Taken as a whole, this conglomeration of units performed well in a situation which was considerably more complex than had been envisioned in the planning for the invasion. It had not been intended to bring any of these men, except for advance elements, ashore until the beaches were reasonably secure. Yet circumstances dictated a departure from previous plans and more than 10,000 of these service troops were landed on D-Day. Once ashore, under the most difficult circumstances, these men performed splendidly, though their presence added to the congestion and increased the number of casualties.

As it turned out, between 60 and 70 percent of the supplies unceremoniously dumped on the beaches were salvaged and either moved inland or incorporated into the hastily established beach dumps set up by forward elements of the division shore parties which went ashore with the fifth and sixth assault waves. These advance elements carried out

their mission in an exemplary fashion despite the most adverse conditions imposed by the terrain and the heavy enemy fire. The casualties among these units were correspondingly heavy, some of them being reduced to half strength.

In order to keep the logistics effort from foundering in the deep volcanic ash, Marston matting and armored bulldozers had to be pressed into service. Once again, the American penchant for improvisation proved to be a decisive factor in getting troops and supplies off the crowded beaches. Marston matting was of tremendous value in serving as the only usable roadways over which vehicles could move inland during the initial phase of the assault. The armored bulldozer was employed on the beaches to level sand terraces and cut routes inland. Their steel plates protected both driver and engine from enemy fire. On northern Iwo, these machines and their drivers performed an equally important service in clearing roads into previously impassable terrain under fire.

The movement of supplies across the beaches was in no small way facilitated by the presence of Navy cranes, as well as other equipment designed to expedite the unloading of the cargo vessels. In this connection, the expertise of TF 53 and its commander proved invaluable. In line with his extensive logistical experience, Admiral Hill was keenly aware of the requirements that had to be met and had at an early time recommended that ample cargo handling equipment be available for Operation DETACHMENT.³⁷ Despite all preparations, the

³⁷ BGen Leland S. Swindler ltr to CMC, dtd 14May53, in *Iwo Comments*.

tactical situation prevailing on Iwo Jima on D-Day caused the beaches to become so congested that on the following day underwater demolition teams had to be employed to assist in clearing lanes through the wreckage for incoming vessels.

It needs to be emphasized that, all difficulties to the contrary, no acute supply shortages developed for the assault troops, though in the days following the landings units were living from hand to mouth. Such shortages as did develop involved 60mm mortar illumination shells, grenades, cylinders for charging flamethrowers, and ordnance spare parts. As an expedient, these items were flown to Iwo Jima from Saipan, the first extensive use of air supply by the Marines.³⁸

The timing of the logistics support at Iwo Jima, an extremely important factor in an amphibious operation, proved to be well conceived and executed. Liaison teams from the 8th Field Depot, which constituted the VAC shore party, accompanied the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions ashore. As of 22 February, units of the field depot came ashore and rendered valuable service in assisting the divisional shore parties. Two days later, when VAC assumed control ashore, the field depot took over and the unloading continued without interruption. At this time, the beaches were still under enemy fire, which caused temporary work stoppages but proved unable to interfere seriously with the unloading. On D plus 6, 25 February, general unloading got under way. The opening of the western beaches

to small landing craft on 2 March removed the entire unloading operation from the threat posed by variable weather conditions. Henceforth, the menace of heavy surf pounding the eastern side of the island could be overcome by switching shipping to the western beaches.

In evaluating the overall success of the logistics effort at Iwo Jima, it appears appropriate to comment:

. . . the wonder is not that things were confused but that the vast quantities of supplies actually crossed the beaches so quickly. Expertly handled ship-to-shore communications and a high degree of coordination between Navy and Marine logistical control personnel afloat and ashore did much to overcome the difficulties inherent in the situation.³⁹

The official VAC report dealing with Operation DETACHMENT echoes this sentiment and, speaking of the adversities facing the Marines that went ashore on Iwo Jima, concludes:

The fact that these factors failed to impose any limitations on the conduct of operations reflects the highest credit on all concerned. Without the tireless support through unprecedented difficulties rendered by the expeditionary force and the supply agencies of the landing force, the sustained assault of the Corps would have been impossible.⁴⁰

Finally, a word about the tactics employed on Iwo Jima both by the assault force and the defending Japanese. The small size of the island permitted little or no maneuverability to either force, and once the first Marines had

³⁸ Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, pp. 519-520.

⁴⁰ *TF 56 AR*, Encl B, Comments and Recommendations, p. 4.

³⁸ *VAC Logistics Rpt*, pp. 12, 16.

gone ashore, the fighting that was to typify the entire operation was dictated by General Kuribayashi, whose defensive organization "was the most intelligent and complete one yet encountered."⁴¹ Basically, the Japanese conducted a position defense which was effective, intense, and notable for its economy of forces. There was no employment of mobile reserves, nor was there a withdrawal through a series of defensive lines. All precautions had been taken to assure that enemy troops were not exposed to the American supporting arms. General Kuribayashi's defense was simple; it was this very simplicity that made it so effective.

The enemy plan was based on the concept that a maximum number of weapons of all calibers were to fire more or less continuously from well-concealed and -protected positions until they were destroyed. Almost from the beginning of the operation the American supporting arms were handicapped by the geographical limitations of the island, the character of the terrain, and the strength of the enemy defenses. The heavier Japanese installations, in particular, often proved impervious to field artillery of light and medium calibers and required the destructive power of main battery naval gunfire. During the latter phase of the fighting, the proximity of the Marines to enemy positions frequently denied them the benefit of adequate heavy fires or bombardment.

Even though few underwater obstacles interfered with the Iwo Jima landings, the minefields ashore were the

strongest yet encountered in the Pacific Theater, indicative of the progress made by the Japanese in this sphere of defensive warfare. The operation also saw the first use of antipersonnel mines by the Japanese in the Central Pacific.⁴²

The Japanese made more widespread use of rockets than in earlier operations, though on Iwo Jima their effect was limited. Some of the rocket launchers were installed in locations from where they could be fired at certain areas. Movable rocket launchers were kept in caves, moved outside and fired, then pulled back into the caves. During the early phase of the Iwo Jima operation, the Japanese fired large rockets towards the northern slope of Mount Suribachi. However, due to the inaccuracy of this fire, the missiles went beyond the mountain and finally fell into the sea. If anything, these large weapons were well adapted for harassing fire, but their accuracy was doubtful.

In contrast to the relative inefficiency of the enemy rockets, the Japanese artillery performed better than had been anticipated by the invasion force. Coordination, volume, and accuracy of the enemy artillery fire, especially during the days immediately following the invasion, initially made it appear as if the Japanese were massing their fire, thus taking a page out of the book dealing with American artillery doctrine. It was subsequently determined that prior to the American landings, the enemy had

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁴² Detailed information on this subject can be found in Military Intelligence, War Department, *Minefield Patterns in the Defense of Iwo Jima*, Intelligence Bulletin (Washington, D.C., June 1945), pp. 15-19.

registered his artillery on critical terrain features against which he massed his fire, rather than relying on current observation.

General Kuribayashi's use of mortars was exceptionally skillful and very effective. In fact, it was this weapon, and the large number used, that inflicted more casualties on the Marines than any other support weapon. During the latter part of the campaign, the Japanese apparently suffered a shortage of mortar ammunition which restricted their choice of targets to Marine weapons, vehicles, and large groups of personnel. As with rocket launchers, the Japanese skillfully hid their mortars, either emplacing them on reverse slopes or moving them out of caves to fire, and quickly moving them back under cover.

Among the weapons Marines encountered on Iwo Jima for the first time were the 320mm spigot type mortar, new types of mobile rocket launchers and rockets, and 90mm and 120mm howitzers.

The landing force also made use of several innovations, sometimes on an experimental basis. Thus the rolling barrage, dating back to World War I, found renewed use during the operation. Generally, this type of artillery support proved successful, though the troops often did not advance as rapidly as expected. This required continuous modification of the barrage schedule resulting in repeating fires in certain blocks and delaying the lifting of fires from others.⁴³ With respect to the utilization of mortars, in accordance with

recommendations following operations in the Marianas, an effort was made to develop a craft mounting the 4.2-inch chemical mortar. As a result, three 4.2s were mounted on an LCI and successfully employed on D-Day and thereafter.

The effectiveness of the enemy mortar fire gave rise to the recommendation that a larger mortar be adopted, and that possibly a 120mm mortar battalion be added to each division. Marines who had been on the receiving end of enemy 47mm gunfire felt that a 57mm gun should be substituted for their own 37mm piece. Similarly, a tank with thicker armor and heavier armament than the Sherman would have facilitated operations on Iwo Jima. A great majority of the Shermans were equipped with small flamethrowers that proved their worth by squirting fire through one or two of their machine gun ports, but a tank capable of shooting a flame for about 100 yards from a turret-mounted tube proved the most efficient. In order to deceive the Japanese, who tended to concentrate their fire against any type of flamethrower, these tubes outwardly were exact replicas of the 75mm gun.

In his letter to President Roosevelt, Rear Admiral Ichimaru somewhat contemptuously referred to American material superiority as opposed to Japanese fighting spirit.⁴⁴ While there can be no doubt that such material superiority did in fact exist, it is equally

⁴⁴ RAdm Ichimaru ltr to President Roosevelt, n.d., as cited in Morehouse, *Iwo Jima Campaign*, App. E, p. 172E.

⁴³ *TF 51 AR*, Pt V, Sec C, p. 3.

clear that other important factors were at work which the Japanese admiral pointedly ignored. Not least among these were the outstanding leadership and discipline of the men who came to take Iwo Jima or die in the attempt; the physical stamina and mental power of endurance of these men, both tempered in months or years of thorough training; and the intangible, indefinable something known as esprit de corps or morale, that induces men to give their last in a common cause.

Without all of the above qualities, the individual Marine could not have gone on to victory on Iwo Jima, a battle that has been linked to "throwing human flesh against reinforced con-

crete."⁴⁵ For the men of the landing force that assaulted and captured one of the strongest enemy bastions in the Pacific, the operation was the supreme test. Judging by the performance of these men and the results attained, the inevitable conclusion can be drawn that a heavily defended objective can be seized by such a force regardless of its size, the difficulty of its terrain, and the degree of man-made defensive perfection. An amphibious assault against such an objective will be successful if it can be isolated by surface and air superiority and prepared by naval bombardment and bombing.

⁴⁵ Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 475.

Conclusions

The ground operations discussed in this volume, notably Peleliu and Iwo Jima, span the period of seven months from September 1944 to the end of March 1945. Within the overall context of World War II, this time span was most significant. In Europe, this period saw the advance of Soviet forces into Germany proper, the collapse of the German allies in Scandinavia and the Balkans, and the slow but steadily accelerating drive of the Western Allies into western Germany.

An ingenious offensive in the Ardennes and the introduction of new types of rockets failed to halt the steamroller that was beginning to engulf the *Reich* from the west, east, and the south. Dissent within the ranks of the Germans themselves had been all but snuffed out following the abortive attempt on Hitler's life in late July. The harsh measures that followed in the wake of the Generals' Plot all but silenced those who might have raised their voices against the continuation of a war that the overwhelming majority of the military, as well as the civilian population, already had to consider lost. The heavy Allied air raids, carried out in such force that entire cities were literally obliterated from the face of the earth only underscored the fact that time was on the side of the Allies. Despite reports of the miraculous effect of those wonder

weapons already existing and those yet to come, both pessimism and fear were dominant: pessimism as to what would happen to the country and its people once the Allies had won; fear of death from the air for the civilian populace; fear of death or capture on the part of the military, particularly those facing a merciless enemy on the Eastern front; fear of the numerous foreign workers who, in many cases forcibly conscripted and not always well-treated, posed an increasing threat to internal security as the ring closed around Germany.

Finally, there was fear of the ruling police and semi-military organizations whose measures against military personnel and civilians alike became ever more menacing as the strategic situation deteriorated. During the late fall and throughout the winter of 1944-1945, the German war machine still functioned efficiently despite heavy losses in personnel and materiel, devastation from the air, increasing shortages in raw materials, and covert popular discontent. The German offensive in the Ardennes, the last of the great German offensives of World War II, represented but the final gasp of a machine that had waged almost unlimited *blitzkrieg* during the initial years of the war. When this offensive fell short of its goals and could not be sustained, the end of the war in Europe became a visible goal,

at the most only months away. As one history of that war was to sum it up:

. . . the roads back over the Eifel led straight to the decimation and collapse of the German armies on the banks of the Oder River, along the Danube, in the Ruhr pocket, and, at last, to the bunkers of Berlin.¹

In comparison with operations in Europe, the war in the Pacific Theater during the latter part of 1944 and through the early months of 1945 showed certain similarities as well as marked differences. The vital gains in territory and raw materials made by the Japanese during the early months of the war had realized for them most of the tactical and strategic objectives they had embarked on. Beginning with the American landings in the Solomons, prolonged operations in New Guinea, and the American recapture of islands in the Aleutians, the Japanese situation had very gradually deteriorated, though such setbacks were in no way overly worrisome to the Japanese leaders who continued to maintain an optimistic outlook as to the eventual outcome of the war. They hoped that, in time, a negotiated peace would permit Japan to retain at least some of the vital areas from which she drew her raw materials.

The heavy American losses at Tarawa only strengthened the Japanese belief that the United States would not be willing to continue paying such a heavy price for each island that would have to be seized before the war was

carried into the Home Islands. Meanwhile, despite increasingly heavy interference by American submarines with Japanese shipping, raw materials continued to flow to Japan from the conquered territories: urgently needed rubber arrived from Burma, Malaya, and Indochina; vital food products and petroleum made their way north from the Philippines and from the former Dutch East Indies; and war plants in Manchuria and Korea were producing at full capacity. The vast pool of Japanese manpower had been barely touched by combat losses, though the caliber of the aviators was diminishing.

Both the Japanese military and the civilian population stood solidly behind the government, at whose apex was the Emperor against whom no voice of dissent could be raised. The entire population was in some way involved in the war effort. There was absolute confidence in the leadership and the foreign policy pursued by the country. The borders of Japan were secure. There were still the numerous island outposts to the south and west; much of the Chinese mainland, especially the vital coastal areas, was under Japanese control and the possibility of Russia's entry into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies appeared remote. Within the Home Islands, the entire nation was functioning as a military-civilian team under quasi-military rule. There were few foreigners in the Home Islands, aside from closely guarded Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, including missionaries, all of whom represented an infinitesimally small number that posed no threat to the Japanese war effort. Their presence

¹ Hugh M. Cole, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge—The U. S. Army in World War II* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), p. 673.

in the country was not a factor in maintaining the agriculture or industry of Japan.

The spring and summer of 1944 saw a rapid acceleration of Allied operations in the Central Pacific, primarily an American effort. Based on the bitter lessons of Tarawa, U. S. Marines had perfected their planning and refined their techniques until their drive into the Marianas "saw the flowering of a vital skill, logistics planning, whose incredible complexity met the need to sustain massive assaults and at the same time provide a continuous flow of men, supplies, and equipment for a host of existing and future requirements."²

Noting the change in the strategic situation in the Pacific brought about by American seizure of the Gilberts and Marshals, one postwar survey has noted that:

The United States position was firm indeed in early March 1944. The initiative had been won, adequate forces were in sight, and it was possible to plan in orderly fashion for future operations. Japan, on the other hand, was faced with the most urgent need for devising means to counter the unpredictable but obviously intended blows at her inner perimeter, with forces so limited that opposition with the slightest chance of a favorable outcome could only be offered under ideal conditions.³

The stage was now set for an American advance into the inner perimeter of Japan's defense. The possibility of an American invasion of the Marianas in the spring and summer of 1944 hardly came as a surprise for the Japanese, who nearly a year earlier had already

designated these islands as an "absolute strategic area within the absolute zone of national defense."⁴ What did cause great surprise and consternation were the might of the American naval bombardment, notably at Saipan, the great speed of the landing operations, and the overwhelming superiority of the Americans in the air, which underscored the loss of the well-trained and seasoned aviators that Japan had possessed at the beginning of the war.

The success of the American landings on Saipan only nine days after the Normandy invasion, coupled with the subsequent operations against Tinian and Guam, struck the Japanese with the same impact that the Allied invasion of Europe had on the Germans. In either case it was less the initial success of the landings that confounded the defenders than the fact that the invasion force could not be confined to the beaches or driven back into the sea. There were several fringe benefits for the Americans inherent in the Saipan operation. First, the fact that "it lured the Japanese carriers to defeat might alone be enough to call it the decisive operation of the Central Pacific Campaign."⁵ The capture of Saipan provided the Americans with a base from which giant B-29s would soon be able to launch a devastating air offensive against the Home Islands. The sea battle in the Marianas resulted in the loss of most of the carriers and air strength of the *Combined Fleet*, which gave American aircraft full control of the air while the U. S. Navy dominated the Central

² Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*, p. 583.

³ USSBS, *Pacific Campaigns*, p. 204.

⁴ Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*, p. 109.

⁵ Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*, p. 583.

Pacific. Without support from sea or air, Tinian and Guam were for all practical purposes isolated plums ripe for the picking. Since the loss of 300 naval aircraft had all but wiped out naval strength in the Marianas and the Japanese Army had only few planes with sufficient range to fly from bases on Iwo Jima to Saipan, there was no hope that Japan would regain command of the air over the Marianas. With this realization went any Japanese hopes of recapturing either Saipan, Guam, or Tinian.

Beyond this, from the Japanese point of view:

. . . there appeared a wide gap in the absolute zone of national defense in the Central Pacific region. The advance of the U. S. Navy toward Japanese waters was facilitated by this breach, which threatened the very security of the homeland. Even more painful for Japan, the American Air Force began to bomb the main islands from bases on Saipan and Guam—raids which began on September 24.⁶

Following the successful Allied invasion of Normandy, and in the weeks that followed, it is interesting to note that a group of German general officers, many of them members of the General Staff, concluded that the war could no longer be won and set about to remove Hitler before attempting to reach a negotiated peace with the Allies. In Japan, at approximately the same time, the situation was directly reversed. It was recognized that, with the loss of Saipan, the war situation had reached a critical phase. However, while the Emperor and the senior statesman "grew anxious and perturbed,"⁷ the military radiated an air of optimism, which went

so far as highly placed officers making profuse assurances "that our fleet had emerged victorious from the engagement (in the Philippine Sea). They even drank hilariously to the spectacular victory."⁸

In Germany the question of continuing the war or finding a way to the peace-table resulted in an ever widening chasm between the Armed Forces and the Nazi Party, with the former favoring an end to the war. In Japan, the military closed ranks in favor of fighting to the last man, woman, and child, if necessary, though major differences as to the further prosecution of the war remained between the Army and Navy. The dismissal of Tojo as Premier on 18 July preceded the assassination attempt against Hitler by two days. Whereas the abortive General's Plot resulted in a major upheaval in the German ranks with numerous courts martials and summary executions in its wake, the transition from the Tojo Government to a new cabinet took place in an orderly fashion, though it was far from routine. Never having been questioned, the stature and authority of the Emperor remained unchanged. In order to put an end to Army-Navy antagonism, both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff made efforts aimed at resolving the long-standing rivalries between the two Services, though the time was late.

While the drive across the Central Pacific was aimed directly at the Japanese Home Islands, General Douglas MacArthur was embarked on the road to Tokyo over a more circuitous south-

⁶ Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*, p. 109.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

erly route which would take him from New Guinea to the Philippines. As compared to the European Theater, this drive might be likened to the Allied invasion of North Africa and the subsequent moves to Sicily and Italy. Where the seizure of North Africa and Italy had been intended to open a door into Europe through the supposedly "soft belly" in the south, MacArthur's strategy of isolating Japan from her sources of supply in the Philippines and freeing the inhabitants of these islands from Japanese oppression, as he had promised, was to serve as a stepping stone towards the invasion of the Home Islands. Both in southern Europe, as in the southern Pacific, the respective campaigns proved costly, arduous, and time-consuming. Neither the recapture of the Philippines nor the plodding advance up the Appenine Peninsula yielded quick results that would have brought the war to a rapid end in either theater; nor was there any clear agreement in early 1944 where MacArthur would go once the liberation of the Philippines had been accomplished.

It is in the light of this overall situation that the seizure of the southern Palaus, Operation STALEMATE, must be viewed. During the early part of 1944, the Palaus represented one of the key strongholds in Japan's second line of defense. Once New Guinea and the Marshall Islands had been seized by the Americans, the Central Carolines had been bypassed, and the Marianas had fallen, the Palaus moved into the first line of defense for Japan. They became the most powerful and strategic enemy outposts halfway between the Central Pacific drive in the northeast and Mac-

Arthur's drive from the south. Since the Palaus were situated only 500 miles east of the Philippine island of Mindanao, their permanent neutralization from sea or air was impractical; as result, the southernmost of these islands became the target of invasion.

At the time Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were in general agreement as to the necessity of securing the southern Palaus, notably Peleliu and Angaur, as well as islands closest to Guam, notably Yap and Ulithi in the Northern Carolines. Possession of the smaller islands to the northeast and south of Babelthuap, the largest and most heavily-defended island in the Palaus, would permit the neutralization of that stronghold. At the same time that a joint force of Marines and Army troops assaulted Peleliu and Angaur respectively, MacArthur's forces prepared to assault Morotai, located about halfway between the western tip of New Guinea and Celebes, 480 miles southwest of Peleliu. Seizure of Peleliu and Angaur to the north (with Morotai as a stepping stone in the south) would effectively screen General MacArthur's drive into the Philippines, at the same time providing vital airstrips to the Americans from which aircraft could neutralize enemy forces and such air power as remained to the Japanese on adjacent islands.

The overall situation that had developed by mid-summer made it possible to scrap the planned operation against Yap Island in the northern Carolines. The invasions of Peleliu and Morotai took place on 15 September, followed two days later by the assault on Angaur. Fighting on Peleliu, in particular,

proved long, bitter, and costly, so much so that at the conclusion of the operation doubts arose as to whether results had been worth the effort, particularly in view of the fact that last-minute changes in plans for subsequent operations, specifically the invasion of the Philippines, "made it all but impossible to fit the Palaus into the operational role originally planned for them."⁹ The capture of Angaur also failed to provide immediate support to MacArthur's forces. Terrain difficulties and inadequate gasoline storage facilities prevented the operation of bombers from Angaur until 21 October, the day after American forces had landed on Leyte in the central Philippines.¹⁰ Even then, it was not until 17 November that the first bomber mission was flown against the Philippines from a field in the Palau. In time, Angaur became an important base for heavy bombers and an aircraft staging point, from which operations on Luzon could be supported. Aircraft based on Morotai did not fly sorties against Leyte, but flew many missions over Mindanao and other islands in the southern Philippines. After 7 October, fighters based on Morotai flew cover for Allied bombers en route to Mindanao and the Visayan Islands.

An unexpected dividend accruing to American forces from the seizure of the Palaus was the capture of Ulithi Atoll by Army troops. Seized in an unopposed operation from 22-24 September, this atoll became an extremely valuable base for the U. S. Pacific Fleet. As the war progressed, it became an im-

portant staging area for the fleet and amphibious forces taking part in the invasion of Okinawa. Generally speaking, seizure of some islands in the western Carolines, including Peleliu, gained for the Allies valuable bases, though the accelerating drive towards Japan made it necessary to convert these newly seized bases to uses other than those originally anticipated.

For the men of the 1st Marine Division who assaulted Peleliu, the seizure of the island meant a hard and bloody campaign. Of particular interest is the ratio of forces employed by both opponents. At Attu in the Aleutians, the American forces had enjoyed a numerical superiority of 5:1. The ratio was 2.5:1 in favor of the attacking force at Saipan, and at Guam it amounted to 2:1.¹¹ In the Palaus, the defending Japanese were considerably superior in number to the invasion force. Yet the latter was able to bring its full striking power to bear against the objective, while the main Japanese garrison on adjacent Babelthup was effectively blocked by the U. S. Navy from giving any relief to its hard-pressed comrades in arms on Peleliu.

Completion of the operation in the Western Carolines placed the United States in a favorable position for carrying the war to the enemy at an accelerated pace. Since early summer of 1944, the Japanese situation had deteriorated alarmingly. Even while Japan attempted to bolster her sagging line of defense, the Japanese air garrison in the Philippines had suffered staggering losses, as had Japanese ship-

⁹ Smith, *Approach to the Philippines*, p. 572.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 573.

¹¹ Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*, pp. 110-111.

ping, both through U.S. submarine action and later through carrier and shore-based air strikes.

The arrival of 1945 saw an almost complete reversal of the still fairly stable position of Japan just one year earlier. The final months of 1944 had faced the Japanese with almost unimaginable reverses that the nation could no longer compensate for. Loss of the Philippines to General MacArthur's forces was not only a very sore blow to Japanese pride, but more practically:

The Southern Resources Area, the prize for which the war had been fought, was gone and American fleets sailed with impunity to the shores of eastern Asia. All hope of future resistance had depended upon oil and now the tankers were sunk and the oil cut off. The surface fleet was gone, and so were 7,000 aircraft, expended in four months defense of the last supply line. Suicide attack, bleeding tactics, were now the last hope of this shrunken empire, and even these economical methods of defense suffered from the blockade.¹²

From the Marine Corps point of view, the tactical development of close air support had been one of the most distinguishing features of the Peleliu operation. The remarkable performance of Marine aviators during the capture of Ngesebus Island had been but a forerunner of what Marine air was shortly to accomplish in the Philippines in support of Army troops. This development had been slow in coming, the inevitable result of the early wartime naval training of Marine pilots, which devoted little serious attention to closely coordinated air attacks in support of ground units. By late 1944 the winds of change

had begun to blow at a stiffer pace, and the employment of Marine air for close support missions became a distinct possibility. In anticipation of such a development, MAG-24, then stationed at Bougainville, began the crash training of Marine pilots for close support. A radical departure from orthodox methods was the adoption of direct communications between pilots and ground-based air liaison parties. The performance of Marine aviators on Luzon Island and in the Southern Philippines was to become an outstanding chapter in a long history of excellent achievements, combining raw courage with skill and flexibility. The activities of Marine air in the Philippines constituted one of the few opportunities that Marine air groups had to show their skill in close air support. Except for a brief period of employment during the early days of the Iwo Jima operation, there would be little occasion for the Marine flyers to give any further demonstration of their close support prowess. Only later, on Okinawa, would Marine pilots have a final opportunity to perfect their close support tactics.¹³

The early days of 1945 were bleak ones for Germans and Japanese alike. In the case of the former, the Ardennes offensive had failed and only further weakened the depleted divisions of the *Reich*, which was now under aerial attack around the clock, while invading armies were striking at her interior from three directions. For the Japanese, the fortunes of war had come full

¹³ For a detailed account of Marine Corps operations on Okinawa, see Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, Pt. II.

¹² USSBS, *Pacific Campaigns*, p. 289.

circle. The spirit of optimism that had still filled the people of Japan with hope during the summer of 1944 had now vanished. The news from the battlefronts was all bad, and it could no longer be kept from the populace. The thought of rebellion against the Emperor was still unacceptable to the Japanese, but there were some effects, notably to morale: "At home the bad news began to be known and mutterings of negotiated conditional peace arose even in the armed forces. Japan was defeated: it remained only necessary to persuade her of the fact."¹⁴

As the war situation deteriorated for the Axis, the peoples of Germany and Japan realized that nothing short of a miracle could still save their situation. In Germany, the die-hard optimists looked for a reversal of imminent defeat through the V-Weapons, whose development assumed ever grander proportions, though reality lagged far behind wishful thinking. As early as 1943, the Japanese received word that Germany was working on atomic weapons, but nuclear physicists maintained that such weapons were not far enough advanced for use in World War II. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to employ science in a bid to solve the numerous military problems.

During 1944, an increasing number of scientists and technical experts were pressed into service in order to test a number of unorthodox devices that were to be employed in the decisive battle. Thus, the Japanese Army experimented with a thermal ray and bombs that would be guided to their targets by

sources of heat, notably American troopships. Actual experiments had been carried out during the summer of 1944, but the onrush of events overtook the slow experimentation before a multitude of technical problems could be eliminated. In the end, the "weapons of science" could not be put to any practical use, and "weapons for decisive combat thus came to mean suicidal expedients," such as the *kamikaze*.¹⁵ The only practical Japanese secret weapon ever to be used against the United States was a balloon bomb, which for about six months after 1 November 1944, was released daily from Japan. Purpose of the bomb was a psychological one: "Americans were to be made to feel uneasy because of surprise explosions scattered throughout the United States." While a number of these balloons actually reached the Continental United States, their effectiveness was practically nil; only a few grass fires resulted from 9,000 incendiary balloons launched.

The invasion of Iwo Jima must be viewed in the light of what the loss of the island would do to Japanese civilian morale, coupled with the benefits the use of the island's three airfields would provide to the Allied air effort against Japan. Because of the serious losses incurred in the Philippines and other campaigns, together with a breakdown in the pilot replacement program and a critical shortage of fuel, the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces were no longer effective deterrents to American incursions at sea or in the air. On the other hand, the American potential for waging war was at its height. The Amer-

¹⁴ USSBS, *Pacific Campaigns*, p. 290.

¹⁵ Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*, p. 118.

icans were stronger in numbers, better trained, and moving forward with an overwhelming offensive power. "United States domination of the Pacific Ocean Area was complete and the time was at hand to strike in earnest toward the heart of the Japanese Empire."¹⁶

The Iwo Jima operation was wedged in time into a very narrow period, barely preceded by the American landings on Luzon and shortly followed by the invasion of Okinawa. The ambitious plans for this decisive period almost exceeded the capabilities of a fully mobilized United States, particularly when the Tokyo carrier strikes were included. As a result, the landings at Iwo Jima took place under the shadow of the major invasion of Luzon in the south, the imminent assault against the Ryukyus, and a carrier-based aerial assault against the Home Islands. This accelerated schedule of events contributed to the reduction in the number of days available for the prelanding bombardment of Iwo Jima. That the island could be taken at all in view of the strength of its defenses and the casualties incurred by the attacking Marines is proof of the latter's courage, highly advanced state of training, and the soundness of amphibious doctrine that had become an integral part of Marine Corps tactics.

Control of Iwo Jima provided the Americans with airfields 600 miles closer to the Home Islands, opening the doors wide to a full-scale aerial assault on Japan. The early months of 1945 thus saw a further extension of American power towards the inner defenses

of Japan. Even as bitter fighting raged on Iwo Jima, a huge American invasion armada was already en route to Okinawa, which was ultimately to turn into "the most difficult operation undertaken in the Pacific by United States forces,"¹⁷ though from the point of view of the Marine Corps, the Iwo Jima campaign remains aptly designated as "The Supreme Test."¹⁸ A comparison of the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations does not fall within the purview of this volume; the latter operation has been most aptly described elsewhere in this series.¹⁹

The seizure of Iwo Jima eliminated a strong Japanese bastion of defense near the Home Islands; it provided the Americans with forward airfields; and the U. S. presence on Iwo Jima was decisive in neutralizing other fortified enemy islands in the Bonins. As the war in Europe thundered to its conclusion, the inevitability of defeat following the fall of Iwo Jima was impressed on all Japanese. As the shadow of American airpower and the specter of an all-out assault against the Home Islands themselves became a distinct possibility, Japanese diplomats began delicate maneuvers behind the scenes to save what could be salvaged from a misguided and misconceived war. Japanese defeats in the Pacific also were beginning to have international repercussions, notably with regard to the Soviet Union, which was beginning to waver in its neutrality towards Japan. The horror of atomic warfare was yet unheard of dur-

¹⁷ USSBS, *Pacific Campaigns*, p. 324.

¹⁸ Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, ch 10.

¹⁹ See Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, Pt II.

²⁰ USSBS, *Pacific Campaigns*, p. 320.

ing these early months of 1945. But each succeeding American assault across the Central Pacific had driven the nails of defeat deeper into the coffin that bore the remains of Japanese dreams, and it was on islands such as Peleliu and Iwo Jima that these dreams were finally laid to rest.

Bibliographical Notes

This history is predominantly based on official Marine Corps records comprising the diaries, reports, plans, journals, and orders of the commands and units that participated in the operations covered by this volume. Such records of the other Services as were pertinent to the subject matter have been consulted and used. Activities on high strategic levels have been reconstructed with the help of the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or official publications that derived a considerable portion of their basic data from JCS records.

Since this volume deals with a number of seemingly unrelated topics, ranging from an administrative history of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to major operations in the Western Pacific, not to mention aviation activities in widely separated areas, a large number of sources had to be consulted. Some of these were pertinent to only one area or period of time while others offered detailed information on a scope encompassing the entire volume. Unless otherwise noted, all of the official records cited are on file with or obtainable through the Library and Documentation Sections, Reference Branch, Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

A number of published works of general interest have been consulted frequently during the preparation of this volume. The more important of these are listed below.

In order to bridge the inevitable gaps and inadequacies that occur in the sources consulted, extensive use was made of the knowledge of key participants in the actions described. These men, representing all Services, generously offered time and effort in replying to specific questions, making themselves available for interviews, and furnishing critical comments on draft manuscripts of this volume and preliminary monographs. The historical offices of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have conducted a detailed review of draft chapters

and furnished much material of value to this history. The War History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan has read and commented on the passages dealing with Japanese operations on Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and in the Philippines, providing valuable information that has been incorporated into the narrative.

Books

Wesley Frank Craven and James Lee Cate, eds. *The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945—The Army Air Forces in World War II*, v. 5. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. The Air Force official history covering the final year of World War II with particular emphasis on the development and employment of the B-29 bomber and operations in the Western and Southwestern Pacific. This well documented book is a reliable source for the operations of Army Air Forces units in the Pacific and their vital part in the defeat of Japan.

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. *The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. An outstanding source of information dealing with the adoption, development, and perfection of amphibious warfare and application of these techniques during various phases of World War II. The authors' critical comments on each major operation and their conclusions are invaluable for a clear perspective of warfare in the Pacific Theater.

VAdm E. P. Forrestel. *Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN—A Study in Command*. Washington: Department of the Navy, 1966. Record of a naval leader's service to his country in war and peace. This well documented and illustrated biography not only tells the story of a man and his brilliant career in the Pacific during World War II but also outlines some of the major naval operations of World War II.

FAdm William F. Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan

III. *Admiral Halsey's Story*. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc., 1947. The life and service of one of the most prominent American naval commanders in World War II. In addition to gaining a close look at the human side of this great naval leader, the reader is also presented with the background and development of some of the great naval actions in the Western Pacific during World War II.

FAdm Ernest H. King and Cdr Walter M. Whitehill. *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1952. An autobiography covering the entire span of service of this great naval leader, highlighting his part in the formulation of American strategy within the high-level command structure employed in World War II.

FAdm William D. Leahy. *I Was There*. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1950. The autobiography of another high-ranking naval officer who served as Chief of Staff under Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. In addition to highly relevant comments on top-level Allied conferences which the author attended, a sizable portion of the book deals with his most delicate prewar appointment as American Minister to the Vichy Government and his official and personal relations with prominent Vichy persons.

Samuel Eliot Morison. *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. XII, XIII, XIV. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958, 1959, 1960. These three volumes by Rear Admiral Morison, *Leyte, June 1944-January 1945*, *The Liberation of the Philippines, 1944-1945*, and *Victory in the Pacific, 1945* give an excellent account of Navy operations in the Southwestern and Western Pacific. Though prepared with Navy collaboration and support, these volumes nevertheless bear the personal imprint of the author, whose masterful description of the naval operations of this period is without equal.

Robert Sherrod. *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. An unofficial history, but prepared with substantial research support from the Marine Corps, this work contains information on Marine aviation units not to be found elsewhere. It represents the most

comprehensive source in its field published to date.

Robert Ross Smith. *The Approach to the Philippines—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. An excellent account of the strategy and tactics that were employed in laying the basis for the recapture of the Philippines, specifically during amphibious and ground operations in New Guinea and the southern Palau Islands.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division. *The Campaigns of the Pacific War*, 1 vol. and *Interrogations of Japanese Officials*, 2 vols. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. The three volumes give an interesting account of World War II as seen through Japanese eyes. Prepared shortly after the end of hostilities, this series is deficient in accuracy and perspective. Yet the information and viewpoints provide an insight into Japanese military thinking, both through translation of pertinent documents and through interviews.

The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. Collection of the official reports of the chiefs of the armed services, issued during World War II and the immediate postwar period. Excellent material for reviewing the big picture of World War II operations.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

Official Documents

The operational span of ground operations in this volume covers the invasion of the southern Palaus as a preliminary step in the reconquest of the Philippines and the subsequent decision to seize Iwo Jima in the Volcano-Bonins as an advanced base in the direction of the Home Islands. For the strategy and tactics employed by the United States during this crucial period of the war in the South-

western and Western Pacific during the latter part of 1944 and early 1945, a variety of sources were required. These ranged from records of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff as cited in previously published official histories to the minutes of CominCh-CinCPac Conferences conducted during the summer of 1944. In some instances, copies of reports and minutes portraying the evolution of Anglo-American strategy can be found in the files of the World War II Division, Federal Records Center, The National Archives which has recently relocated to Suitland, Maryland.

Information on the status of Marine Corps units and personnel during the period covered has been derived from such tables of organization station lists and status sheets for air and ground units as were readily available in the archives of the Historical Division. Additional sources of information were the monthly FMF air and ground status reports prepared within the Division of Plans and Policies and the Division of Aviation, HQMC, and the Annual Reports of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy.

Japanese Sources

In appraising the strategic and tactical situation from the Japanese side, our view is necessarily limited by the factors of time, distance, availability of enemy persons and records, and linguistics. A full exploitation of official Japanese wartime records on a scale even remotely resembling that of captured German military records by the Allies proved impossible. On the tactical level, few of the Japanese garrison commanders and their staffs survived the fighting; as a result, such information as was obtainable had to be gleaned from American intelligence surveys prepared by higher headquarters, mostly based on the interrogation of the few prisoners that were taken or such Japanese military records, mostly of a tactical nature, that fell into American hands.

Fortunately for the historian and researcher, during the immediate postwar period while the occupation of Japan was in full swing, General MacArthur's headquarters utilized its available resources to initiate a study program with the help of former Japanese officials.

This program culminated in the preparation of a series of monographs detailing Japanese activities in widespread areas of the Pacific and Asia. These early studies which varied greatly in scope, quality, and accuracy underwent a further process of refinement in the mid-1950s, at which time they were published in the form of monographs under the auspices of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. A complete listing of these monographs is contained in *Guide to Japanese Monographs and Japanese Studies on Manchuria 1945-1960* (Washington, 1961) prepared by OCMH, which also exercises custody over this collection.

Of primary interest for the purposes of this volume were those monographs dealing with Japanese preparations for the defense of the Philippines during the summer of 1944. Monograph No. 45 comprising the *History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters*, gives an insight into the prosecution of the war as seen through eyes of Japanese on the elevated level of command in an exhaustive study of 382 pages. Monograph No. 48, *Central Pacific Operations Record*, Volume I, (December 1941-August 1945) furnished considerable information on the defense of Iwo Jima, while No. 49, Volume II of the same title, was useful in providing a general outline of the Japanese situation in the Pacific for most of 1944.

Books and Periodicals

The first three volumes of this series, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, *Isolation of Rabaul*, and *Central Pacific Drive*, as well as the last, *Victory and Occupation*, have served as a useful basis for the background information that had to be incorporated into the fourth, particularly with respect to the development and employment of amphibious doctrine. An appropriate setting was arrived at with the help of the following:

Ray S. Cline. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division—The War Department—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951. An official Army history outlining high-level planning in the Operations Division of the War Department during World War II. An

excellent source based on important primary data.

John Miller, Jr. "The Casablanca Conference and Pacific Strategy," *Military Affairs*, v. 13, no. 4 (Winter 49). A concise account of this high-level conference and its results.

Walter Millis, ed. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: The Viking Press, 1951. The personal files and papers of the former Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense dealing with top level planning, decisions, and conferences during the later phase of World War II. An important source for evaluating the Administration's plans in the realm of international affairs, the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, and the formulation of plans for the postwar period.

Louis Morton. "American and Allied Strategy in the Far East," *Military Review*, v. 29, no. 9 (Dec49). This article deals with planning for the eventual drive across the Pacific towards the Japanese Home Islands.

Adm Raymond A. Spruance. "The Victory in the Pacific," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, v. 91, no. 564 (Nov46). A brief but well prepared look at World War II operations in the Pacific Theater stressing planning and strategy.

United States Army, War Department. *Handbook on Japanese Military Forces*. TM-E 30-480. Washington, 1Oct44. A basic source on the organization and equipment of Japanese land forces with useful detail on weapons characteristics and textbook tactics.

PART II

FLEET MARINE FORCE, PACIFIC

Official Documents

The evolution of amphibious doctrine from the mid-1930s to the end of World War II directly reflects on the size and shape of the organization employed to implement this doctrine. In tracing the origin and development of the Fleet Marine Force, pertinent information was obtained from the official files at Headquarters, Marine Corps. The material found fruitful for this purpose included the Annual Reports of the Commandant of the

Marine Corps which, for the years under consideration, faithfully mirrored the increasing size and complexity of the organization. The evolution of amphibious doctrine is further reflected in Marine Corps and Navy manuals dealing with landing operations, issued between the two world wars, again notably during the 1930s. Information on the development of landing craft and amphibious vehicles was obtained from Headquarters Marine Corps files and those of the Department of the Navy Bureau of Ships. For a look at Fleet Marine Force organization and plans shortly before the United States entered the war, the "Report of the General Board on Expansion of the U. S. Marine Corps," of 7 May 1941, in the custody of the Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division, proved of great value.

Additional information was obtained from Volume I in this series, Part I, "Introduction to the Marine Corps," which thoroughly discusses this subject matter and the resulting Marine Corps posture on the eve of World War II.

In connection with the parallel growth of Marine aviation several sources proved important. Among these, the Marine Corps Aviation Status Sheets, prepared by the Division of Aviation; an *Administrative History of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific*; the *War Diary, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific*, and the *War Diary of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force Pacific* made a major contribution in following the expansion of Marine Corps aviation in World War II.

Unofficial Sources

The official material enumerated above was further supplemented with letters of comment on draft manuscripts obtained mostly from retired officers connected with the Fleet Marine Force following its establishment and those who played a part in it during the succeeding phases of its evolution. Many of the men who occupied leading positions during the two decades covered are no longer among the living. Nevertheless, their views, as expressed in statements, directives, and other correspondence have trickled down to us and have been carefully considered in the development of conclusions. An unpublished

draft entitled "FMFPac Administrative History—The Development of FMFPac" in the custody of the Documentation Section, Reference Branch of the Historical Division served as a valuable guide in the reconstruction of the organizational development.

Books and Periodicals

Robert D. Heinl, Jr. *Soldiers of the Sea—The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962*. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1962. An outstanding labor of love by an author who combines great writing skill with his intricate knowledge of the Marine Corps scene both in peace and war. Not always with the greatest objectivity, the narrative provides comprehensive coverage of the organization and operations of the Marine Corps including its struggles afar and at home.

Once again, Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War* provided valuable information on early amphibious doctrine and the evolution of the Fleet Marine Force.

Clyde H. Metcalf. *A History of the United States Marine Corps*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939. A valuable historical work showing the triumphs and tribulations of the Marine Corps in time of war and peace. Of special interest in this context for its coverage of the lean years following World War I to the beginning buildup in the late 1930s that foreshadowed World War II.

John H. Russell, Jr., "Birth of the Fleet Marine Force," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 72, no. 515 (Jan/46). An authoritative contribution by a former Assistant Commandant and later Commandant who was closely involved with the Fleet Marine Force in its early years.

General Holland M. Smith, "Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 38, nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (Jun-Oct48). A five-part article written by the man who made a major contribution to implementation of amphibious doctrine and the development of the Fleet Marine Force.

Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, *Coral and Brass*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. An autobiography in which the author discusses his noteworthy military career with valuable comments on the military

operations of World War II and his part in the development of the FMFPac.

PART III

THE PALAUS: GATEWAY TO THE PHILIPPINES

Official Documents

The seizure of the southern Palau as finally executed in Operation STALEMATE II resulted in the neutralization of the entire island group. The high level planning that preceded this operation, one of the most vicious and costly to be fought in the Pacific, spanned the period of nearly six months, during which time the progress of the war in the Pacific forced several revisions in the basic operation plan. The planning and execution of STALEMATE II resulted in a wealth of documentation ranging from minutes of the CCS and JCS to detailed plans on the corps and division level. On the tactical level, considerable information was available in the form of war diaries, appendices, and annexes including reports of general and special staff officers and sections, unit journals, and after action reports. While these vary greatly in scope and content, they nevertheless provide a comprehensive basis for an operational narrative, since all fields ranging from personnel, intelligence, and operations to logistics have been covered. If anything, the sheer quantity of material available from official sources, extending from the corps down to battalion level often made the selection of pertinent data a difficult undertaking. In those instances where a conflict existed between accounts on different reporting levels, the version of the unit most closely concerned with the action described has been utilized.

Unofficial Documents

In addition to the voluminous official sources, a number of unofficial documents were available in the form of letters that passed between various high-level participants in Operation STALEMATE II, particularly in the correspondence between Generals Geiger and Rupertus, and General Vandegrift, then Commandant of the Marine Corps. These letters are part of a personal correspondence file which the Commandant maintained with general and

flag officers, and which ultimately came to be placed in the custody of the Archives of the Historical Division.

During the preparation of the historical monograph, *The Assault on Peleliu*, the author, Major Frank O. Hough, prepared numerous notes in the form of a card file. These cards, though no longer complete, contain substantial information on all phases of STALEMATE II and may be examined through the Documentation Section, Reference Branch, of the Historical Division.

MajGen Oliver P. Smith. "Personal Narrative." The personal journal of the Assistant Division Commander of the 1st Marine Division covering the period from 28 January-1 November 1944, including very perceptive comments on the Peleliu campaign.

After the draft chapters of the above monograph had been completed, they were circulated among the higher ranking participants in the operation for critique and comment. The replies received brought to light much additional information of varying quality, ranging from outstanding to average, which were assembled in a folder designated as the Peleliu Comment File. To these comments, dating back to the early 1950s, must be added a similar critique of the chapters in this volume. Both comment files are in the custody of the Historical Division, which will make them available to the serious researcher.

Japanese Sources

Compared to the wealth of official records available from American sources, those from the Japanese side are at best sparse. Among a large cache of documents captured on Saipan a number dealt with Japanese defensive preparations in the Palaus. These were exploited, translated in the rough, and made available to the assault units prior to the invasion. The interrogations of the relatively few prisoners of war taken on Peleliu also provide a source of information, though intelligence obtained in this way is of a conflicting nature, since prisoners frequently made their disclosures with a view towards pleasing their captors, so that material thus obtained must be viewed with a grain of salt.

On a more professional level, the U.S. Army monograph series prepared in Japan in

the postwar period offers a wide range of material not to be found elsewhere, particularly Monograph No. 48, *Central Pacific Operations Record*, v. II. A recently published official Japanese History of World War II numbering several volumes undoubtedly contains much information that could fill existing gaps in the narrative of this volume. Unfortunately, publishing deadlines and lack of resources for the translation and exploitation of this material prevented its utilization.

In the years since the end of World War II, a number of books dealing with operations in the Central and Western Pacific have been published in Japan. Some of these, of varying degrees of quality, have been translated into English and are listed below.

Books and Periodicals

Once again Craven and Cate, *Matterhorn to Nagasaki*; Isely and Crowl, *U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*; Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation*, and Smith, *Approach to the Philippines* constitute invaluable sources. Other works which shed considerable light on the Peleliu operation are:

LtCol Kimber H. Boyer. "The 3d Armored Amphibian Battalion—Palau Operation, 15 September-20 October 1944." Quantico: Marine Corps Schools, Amphibious Warfare School, Senior Course, 1948-49. A brief historical tactical study of the Peleliu operation on the battalion level.

RAdm Worrall R. Carter. *Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Official history of Navy logistics in the Pacific during World War II.

Burke Davis. *Marine!*—*The Life of Lieutenant General Lewis B. (Chester) Puller*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1962. The story of one of the great fighting men of the Corps and the experiences of the 1st Marines, which he commanded, in the Peleliu assault.

Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. Coox. *Kogun*. Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1959. Translated from the Japanese, this account of the plans and activities of the Japanese Army High Command during World War II was prepared by a former staff officer in the *Imperial General Headquarters*.

Maj Frank O. Hough. *The Assault on Peleliu*. Washington: Historical Division,

HQMC, 1950. This official monograph contains a detailed account of Operation STALEMATE including interesting appendices on Japanese cave positions and the role of Marine Corps aviation on Peleliu.

George P. Hunt. *Coral Comes High*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. An account of Pacific operations including Peleliu from the company commander's point of view. More human interest than history, but nevertheless important in portraying the feelings of men in battle.

George McMillan. *The Old Breed: A History of the First Marine Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949. A unit history describing the performance of the units and men of the 1st Division, without which the complete story of the Peleliu operation could not be told.

MajGen Paul J. Mueller (USA), Chairman, 81st Wildcat Division Historical Committee, et al. *The 81st Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. A detailed account of the 81st Division's operation on Angaur Island and the subsequent employment of its regiments on Peleliu.

Jeremiah A. O'Leary. "Hell in the Umurbrogol," *True Magazine*, v. 17, no. 101 (Oct45). Human interest story of the ferocious fighting that took place on Peleliu.

PART IV

MARINES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Official Documents

Beyond the employment of the V Amphibious Corps Artillery on Leyte, the story of Marines in the Philippines is primarily one of Marine aviation in support of U.S. Army units. A variety of sources were consulted in order to obtain a balanced product. On the strategic level, heavy reliance was placed on minutes and records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, reports, plans, and official correspondence on the CinCPac level. On the tactical level, records of the U. S. Sixth Army proved valuable for the Leyte and Luzon Campaigns, while Eighth Army records were consulted for a reconstruction of operations in the Southern Philippines. The bulk of this material, including war diaries and journals

and after action reports of the U. S. Army corps and divisions involved are in the custody of the World War II Records Division, NARS, Suitland, Maryland.

Records of the Marine Corps consulted are predominantly those of aviation units on the aircraft group and squadron level. There is great variance in the coverage of events as to depth and scope between units, which resulted in gaps that had to be bridged through the use of both official and unofficial published works.

Unofficial Documents

Upon completion of a historical monograph on Marine Aviation in the Philippines, the draft manuscript was circulated for comment and critique to interested parties who had taken part in the operation. Many of these individuals responded and their comments have been cited throughout this section. Similarly, the draft chapters of this volume were sent to key participants and to the historical agencies of the other services, and the replies received have been used as applicable in revising the narrative. All such comments are retained in the files of the Documentation Section, Reference Branch of the Historical Division.

By no means all of the material uncovered by draft comments has been used in this book or in the historical monograph that preceded it. The files contain much unpublished information that may be of value to the future researcher or student of this phase of Marine aviation activities, particularly with regard to the doctrine of Marine close air support that evolved from childhood to adolescence during this phase of the war.

Japanese Sources

Once again, the number of official Japanese sources is quite limited when compared to the U. S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps records available dealing with this subject matter. Nevertheless, the OCMH monograph series does provide information in its *Philippines Operations Record*, Phases II and III, that bridges the gap to some extent. Additional information is available from *35th Army Operations, 1944-45* and the interrogation of senior Japanese commanders in the postwar

era. On the higher level of command, Monograph No. 45, *History of the Army Section, Imperial General Staff, 1941-45* provides valuable clues in portraying the strategy employed by the Japanese High Command during this period of the war.

Books and Periodicals

In addition to the overall sources, particularly the previously cited Morison volumes on *Leyte* and *The Liberation of the Philippines*, Craven and Cate, *The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki*, and Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*, the following were extensively consulted:

Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. *Marine Aviation in the Philippines*. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1951. An official monograph depicting Marine close support of Army units in the Philippines, outlining in detail the development of the Marine doctrine of close air support. The narrative covers the entire period of liberation of the Philippines from the Leyte landings to the end of the war.

John A. DeChant. *Devilbirds: The Story of United States Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Relatively brief but good description of Marine dive bomber operations on Luzon.

M. Hamlin Cannon. *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. Excellent account and official Army history of the recapture of Leyte, the first island to be liberated in the Philippines. Useful as a background for the movements and operations of the VAC artillery on Leyte.

General Robert L. Eichelberger and Milton Mackaye. *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*. New York: The Viking Press, 1950. The march across the Southwest Pacific as seen through the eyes of the Commanding General of I Corps and subsequently of the Eighth Army. Based on an earlier series in the *Saturday Evening Post*, the volume furnishes interesting details on Eighth Army operations in the Philippines.

Frank O. Hough. *The Island War: The United States Marine Corps in the Pacific*.

Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. Relatively brief description of Marine aviation activities in the Philippines is of primary importance in this context.

General George C. Kenney. *General Kenney Reports*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949. The personal history of the Commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific. A sizable portion of this book deals with the Philippines and thus serves as valuable background material for this section.

Capt Samuel H. McAloney, "Is Air Support Effective?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, No. 11 (Nov45). One of the members of an air liaison party discusses his experiences in obtaining close air support for Army troops on Luzon.

Robert Ross Smith. *Triumph in the Philippines—The War in the Pacific—United States Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963. The official Army history dealing with the liberation of the Central and Southern Philippines was of great value for providing the setting in which Marine aviation operated during the final phase of World War II.

Maj Bertram C. Wright, USA. *The First Cavalry Division In World War II*. Tokyo: Toppan Printing Company, Ltd., 1947. This division history furnishes an excellent account of the drive that culminated in the liberation of Manila and the support given to the division by Marine aviators.

PART V

MARINE AVIATION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

Official Documents

The discussion of Marine aviation activities in the Western Pacific is largely based on the records of the units concerned. Included in the documents are special action reports, war diaries, and informal combat reports on the wing, aircraft group, and squadron level. It should be remembered that the type of information contained in the official documents is but a reflection of the mission entrusted

to Marine aviation in the Central and Western Pacific, which in 1944 and almost to the end of the war consisted primarily of neutralizing Japanese bases and involved little of the close air support envisioned by Marine planners and subsequently used in the Philippines in support of Army units. There is also a wide variance in quality and detail of coverage, depending on the skill of the personnel assigned to the task and the value placed by the command on the importance of maintaining official records. Nevertheless, despite occasional gaps, the overall coverage is adequate to permit a comprehensive view of the part played by Marine aviation in the trek of the American forces across the Pacific. All of the official records used are in the custody of the World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland and may be obtained from that agency, or through the Historical Division, HQMC.

Unofficial Documents

There is no body of letters and interviews in the Marine Corps Historical Division archives relating to air operations against the bypassed islands in the Central and Western Pacific as there is in the case of other campaigns which have been covered in historical monographs. A few pertinent letters among the papers acquired from the Sherrod aviation history project are of limited value to a history of a wide scope.

During the preparation of this volume, the two chapters comprising this section were sent out to a number of individuals who had participated in the operations covered therein. In response, numerous written comments were received to round out the strategical and tactical picture. Certain key individuals in their comments helped to clarify command problems that were encountered during this phase of the war in the area involved. Generally, as seen from the vantage point of time and experience, the comments received proved an invaluable source of information to supplement the material found in official sources.

Japanese Sources

Japanese records used in this account consisted primarily of monographs touching upon

enemy air operations and defensive preparations in the Marshalls, Marianas, and Palau. Once again, an English translation of the official Japanese Army history of World War II would have been invaluable, since official World War II records dealing with this subject matter were not available. Much of the information from the Japanese side was obtained from postwar interrogations of Japanese officials contained in the USSBS *Interrogations*, and the postwar writings of Japanese who had participated in these operations.

Books and Periodicals

Valuable background material for this section was obtained from the previously cited Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*; King and Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King*; Sherrod, *Marine Corps Aviation in World War II*; Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*; and Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*. In addition to these, the following proved valuable in the preparation of this section:

Major Carl W. Hoffman. *Saipan—The Beginning of the End*. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1950. A detailed historical monograph dealing with the Saipan operation, of value as background material for the establishment of an airfield that was to become of vital importance in the conduct of air operations in the Pacific.

Major Carl W. Hoffman. *The Seizure of Tinian*. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1951. Excellent account of the Tinian operation, which furnishes valuable background material for the subsequent use of the island as a base from which the major attacks against the Home Islands were launched that brought an end to the war.

Major Orlan R. Lodge. *The Recapture of Guam*. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954. The official Marine Corps monograph concerning the Guam operation, furnishing valuable background material for an appreciation of the air situation in the Central Pacific during the final phase of World War II.

Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Horikoshi, and Martin Caidin. *Zero!* New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1956. The title of this

well-researched and written work is misleading, in that its scope goes far beyond a discussion of the well known Mitsubishi fighter, its development, and its employment. The book dwells on Japanese air operations in the Pacific throughout the war and provides a valuable insight into Japanese internal and foreign policy during the war years.

PART VI

IWO JIMA

Official Documents

Operation DETACHMENT probably received closer study in its inception and planning, more detailed analysis by the numerous staff sections of headquarters of varying levels for historical purposes, and extensive coverage by the news and information media than any of the Pacific amphibious assaults previously executed in World War II. Since this was an all-Marine operation involving three divisions at the very threshold of Japan, in fact against a target administratively a part of the Home Islands, the importance attached to DETACHMENT is reflected both in the volume and quality of the available material. Where gaps are readily apparent in other operations, none appear in this instance; to the contrary, the data available for research on Iwo Jima tends to be overwhelming. Instead of being compelled to bridge gaps, the researcher is nearly overwhelmed with a profusion of action reports, unit diaries and journals, operation plans and orders, dispatches, letters, and preoperation studies by units that took part in the campaign. Mindful of criticism voiced as to excessive casualties after Tarawa, every precaution was taken at Iwo Jima to avoid any gap in the planning of the operation. This care is reflected in every facet of the planning phase, from the amount of intelligence collected to the evacuation of the wounded and burial of the dead.

In order to avoid repetition and to obtain a balanced account of the operation, the reports of the higher echelons were used to reconstruct the "big picture," while on the lower level the records of the unit most directly involved in the action were utilized.

In addition to the voluminous records dealing with Operation DETACHMENT, the very length and difficulty of the campaign gave rise to much soul-searching on the division and corps level, which is reflected in very detailed reports on the performance of men and equipment under the conditions peculiar to the operation, as well as on organizational problems encountered. All of the official documents pertaining to Operation DETACHMENT are in the custody of the World War II Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland.

Unofficial Documents

The vast lode of official material is supplemented by a large quantity of information from unofficial sources. Thus, in the course of preparing the official monograph *Iwo Jima—Amphibious Epic*, its author, Lieutenant Colonel Whitman S. Bartley, requested comments from individuals who had taken part in the campaign. In response, approximately 175 participants in the operation contributed to the finished product through written comments or personal interviews. The information thus obtained was used to supplement or corroborate the hundreds of documents consulted during the preparation of the monograph. In the same way, valuable information was received that had never found its way into the official records, though time and space did not permit all of the personal recollections and anecdotes to be incorporated into the narrative.

Similarly, comments from participants in the operation were solicited upon completion of the draft chapters of this work. The passage of time had taken its toll among the survivors of the operation, but nevertheless much additional information was obtained in this fashion which otherwise might never have found its way into these pages. All of the comments, both for the historical monograph and for this volume repose in the files of the Documentation Section, Reference Branch of the Historical Division.

Japanese Sources

There is some variety in the Japanese sources available for Operation DETACHMENT. First, a number of enemy documents,

diaries, and letters were seized in the course of the campaign, which were translated, for the most part on the division level, and either filed with VAC or forwarded to higher headquarters. Additional information on the defense of Iwo Jima was obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war. For the most part, little information beyond that of a limited tactical nature could be thus obtained with the exception that one of the publishers of one of Japan's major dailies was, for reasons unknown, serving on Iwo Jima in an enlisted status. He was well versed in the realm of the big picture of the Japanese war effort and civilian morale in the Home Islands, and from this vantage point was able to contribute much to an overall appraisal of conditions in Japan during this phase of the war.

Time and resources did not permit the translation and use of the recently published official Japanese History of World War II, which, beyond doubt, would have contributed much to balancing the narrative from the enemy side of the hill. Comments by the War History Office of the Defense Agency of Japan also provided worthwhile information that was incorporated into the narrative.

Help in bringing to life the major Japanese participants in the Iwo Jima campaign arrived from a totally unexpected source, and it is in this respect that the Iwo Jima chapters differ from others in this volume. In writing an excellent book on the Iwo operation, which will be cited below, Richard F. Newcomb had numerous interviews conducted in Japan with members of the families of the long-deceased Japanese commanders, veterans of the campaign in Japan, and others who in some way were either connected with these individuals or the planning for the defense of the island. In making this voluminous file available to the Historical Division for use in this volume, Mr. Newcomb made a major contribution to removing the shadow of anonymity that cloaks these men who fought hard and gave all for their country. This material has been alternately referred to in the narrative as the *Newcomb File* or *Newcomb Notes*; a photostatic copy of it reposes in the archives of the Historical Division.

Books and Periodicals

The scope, size, and public awareness of the Iwo Jima operation have resulted in much published material on this campaign. As a result, only those sources consulted on a large scale are listed below. Valuable background material was contained in the previously cited Craven and Cate, *The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki*; Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*; Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*; Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea*; Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*; Mills, *The Forrestal Diaries*; and Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*.

Robert A. Aurthur and Kenneth Cohlmia. *The Third Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. One of the division histories published in the wake of World War II. Of primary interest in this context because of coverage of the Iwo Jima operation and the division's part in it.

Howard M. Conner. *The Spearhead—The World War II History of the 5th Marine Division*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950. An excellent account of the first major operation in which the division took part. Since this was the only campaign for the division, the author was able to devote more detail to this narrative than is the case with the histories of the other two divisions on Iwo. He has put this advantage to good use.

T. Grady Gallant. *The Friendly Dead*. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964. A participant's account of the horrors of the battle that saw heroism, gallantry, and brutal death on an unprecedented scale.

Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr. "Target Iwo," *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 89, no. 7 (Jul 1963). Well written account of the factors affecting the preliminary bombardment of the objective, prepared by one who was intimately involved in this aspect of the operation.

Capt Raymond Henri. *Iwo Jima—Springboard to Final Victory*. New York: U. S. Camera Publishing Corporation, 1945. Pictorial account with brief narrative of the Iwo campaign, outstanding for its pictorial coverage.

Capt Raymond Henri *et al.* *The U. S. Marines on Iwo Jima*. Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945. The operation as seen through the eyes of five official Marine combat corre-

spondents. An interesting human drama account of one of history's large, impersonal battles. Also contains numerous interesting photographs of the action.

Clive Howard and Joe Whitley. *One Damned Island After Another*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946. The history of the U. S. Army Seventh Air Force, written mostly from a public relations point of view. Nevertheless of value to this narrative because of its account of pre-invasion bombings of Iwo Jima.

Robert Leckie. *Strong Men Armed*. New York: Random House, 1962. Well illustrated human interest account of the Marines in World War II; its coverage of Iwo Jima added considerable flavor to the narrative.

Capt Clifford P. Morehouse. *The Iwo Jima Operation*. Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1946. Detailed historical monograph on the Iwo Jima operation containing some information on units and casualties not covered elsewhere.

Richard F. Newcomb. *Iwo Jima*. New York, Chicago, and San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965. An outstanding reconstruction of the battle as seen from both sides, covering both the operational aspects and the human side. This book and the author's notes made a major contribution to the writing of this volume.

Carl W. Proehl. *The Fourth Marine Division in World War II*. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. Well written and illustrated account of the division's exploits in World War II, with good coverage of the Iwo Jima campaign. The color photography is outstanding and the map work superior.

Saburo Sakai, Martin Caidin, and Fred Saito. *Samurai!* New York: Ballantine Books, 1957. An account by one of Japan's air aces of his experiences on Iwo prior to the invasion. A much needed bit of writing that helped to balance the account of the action.

Col Donald M. Weller. "Salvo—Splash!—The Development of NGF Support in World War II." *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, pt 1, v. 80, no. 8 (Aug/54). Valuable account of the experiences of a Marine officer who played a leading part in this aspect of Operation DETACHMENT.

CONCLUSIONS

Official Documents

The period covered by the ground operations in this volume extends from mid-September 1944 to the end of March 1945. The Peleliu and Iwo Jima campaigns which fall within this time frame were not isolated operations; momentous events were under way in other theaters of operations that eventually paved the way for final victory. The road to Peleliu and Iwo Jima had begun as a tortuous path that led from Guadalcanal to Tarawa. The lessons learned on each island and paid for with the blood of countless Americans paved the way for the seizure of the Marshalls and Marianas, which in turn served as springboards for the continued advance into the western Pacific.

In itself, this volume shows neither the beginning of the war nor its conclusion. The bloody battles fought in two major operations were but signposts pointing the way to the heart of the enemy's defenses. With the introduction of new defensive tactics by the Japanese and progress made in the art and science of amphibious warfare by the Marines, Peleliu was to become a struggle of endurance, Iwo Jima a contest of the will. Beyond the immediate tactical results of these operations, there were political overtones, both in Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Progress of the war in the Pacific influenced Allied operations in Europe, where events, in turn, had a measurable effect on Allied resources in the Pacific.

Since the concluding part of this volume was designed to bring the two major operations described into balance with the big picture of the war, the sources, of necessity, had to be obtained from the policy-making level. These include the records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff as cited in previously published official histories, as well as the minutes of such high-level and far-reaching conferences as those held at Teheran in November 1943 and Quebec in September 1944, not to mention the important Roosevelt-Nimitz-MacArthur meeting in Hawaii in late July of the same year. The Iwo Jima campaign nearly coincided with the Yalta Conference, which

set the tone for the overall strategic concept of the war, including that phase beyond the unconditional surrender of Germany to the ultimate surrender of Japan to be brought about in cooperation with other Pacific powers and the Soviet Union.

Unofficial Documents

The brevity of this part of the volume did not permit the discussion of foreign policy and the political overtones dictating strategy during the phase of the war to be covered in more than very general terms. The unofficial documents pertinent in this context are the numerous comments received on the draft chapters of this volume, as well as some of those submitted on Volume III of this series, *Central Pacific Drive* and Volume V, *Victory and Occupation*. All of these comments are filed in the archives of the Historical Division.

Books and Periodicals

Among the books most widely used in the preparation of this section were the previously cited Cline, *Washington Command Post*; Craven and Cate, *The Pacific—Matterhorn to Nagasaki*; Halsey and Bryan, *Admiral Halsey's Story*; Isely and Crowl, *U. S. Marines and*

Amphibious War; Hayashi and Coox, *Kogun*; Leahy, *I Was There*, and Morison, *Victory in the Pacific*. In addition, the following contributed substantially to this section.

Hugh M. Cole. *The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge—The U. S. Army in World War II*. Washington: Office of the Chief of the Military History, Department of the Army, 1965. An excellent account of the last major German counteroffensive of the war with resulting implications for the defeat of Germany.

Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. *Victory and Occupation—History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, v. V. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1968. The official Marine Corps history of the Okinawa campaign and the occupation of Japan and North China.

Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Bernard C. Nalty, and Edwin T. Turnbladh. *Central Pacific Drive—History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*, v. III. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1966. The official Marine Corps history of the campaigns in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Mariannas, which formed the basis for continued operations in the Western Pacific.

Guide to Abbreviations

A-1 (etc)	Corps Artillery Staff Officer, Personnel (See G-1)	AT	Antitank
A-20	Army twin-engine attack plane, the Douglas Havoc	ATC	Air Transport Command (Army)
AA	Antiaircraft	Avn	Aviation
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery	AWS	Air Warning Squadron
AAF	Army Air Forces	B-17	Army four-engine bomber, the Boeing Flying Fortress
AAR	After Action Report	B-24	Army four-engine bomber, the Consolidated Liberator
AcftCarrs	Aircraft Carriers	B-25	Army twin-engine bomber, the North American Mitchell
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff	B-26	Army twin-engine bomber, the Martin Marauder
ADC	Air Defense Command; Assistant Division Commander	B-29	Army four-engine bomber, the Boeing Super-Fortress
Adm	Admiral	BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
Admin	Administrative	Btry	Battery
Adv	Advance	BB	Battleship
AF	Air Force	"Betty"	Japanese two-engine Mitsubishi bomber
AFB	Air Force Base	BGen	Brigadier General
AFPOA	Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas	BLT	Battalion Landing Team
AirDel	Air Delivery	Bn	Battalion
AirFMFPac ...	Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific	Bomb	Bombardment
AK	Cargo vessel	Br	Branch
AKA	Cargo ship, attack	Brig	Brigade
Alex	Alexandria	Bu	Bureau
ALP	Air Liaison Party	Bul	Bulletin
Ammo	Ammunition	BuMed	Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Amphib	Amphibian; Amphibious	BuPers	Bureau of Naval Personnel
Amtrac	Amphibian tractor	C-1 (etc)	Corps Staff Officer, Personnel (See G-1)
AN/VRC	Army-Navy Vehicle, Radio Communication	C-47	Army twin-engine transport, the Douglas Skytrain
Anx	Annex	C-54	Army four-engine transport, the Douglas Skymaster
AP	Armor-piercing	Cal	Caliber
APA	Attack transport	CAP	Combat Air Patrol
APD	High-speed transport	Capt	Captain
App	Appendix	CAS	Close Air Support
Ar	Army		
AR	Action Report		
ArmdAmph ...	Armored Amphibian		
Arty	Artillery		
Asslt	Assault		
Asst	Assistant		

CASCU	Commander, Air Support Control Unit	DDT	Insecticide made of dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane
"Catalina"	PBY patrol bomber made by Consolidated-Vultee	DE	Destroyer Escort
Cav	Cavalry	Def	Defense
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff	Dep	Depot
Cdr	Commander	Det	Detachment
CEC	Civil Engineer Corps	DETACHMENT	Iwo Jima Operation
CenPac	Central Pacific	"Devastator" ..	TBD, torpedo-bomber made by Douglas
CG	Commanding General	Dir	Director
Chap	Chapter	Disp	Dispatch
CinCAFPac ...	Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific	Div	Division
CinCPac	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet	DOW	Died of Wounds
CinCPOA	Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas	Dtd	Dated
CinCUS	Commander in Chief, United States Fleet	DUKW	Amphibian truck
Cm	centimeter	Ech	Echelon
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps	Ed	Editor; edited
CMCS	Commandant, Marine Corps Schools	Encl	Enclosure
Cmt	Comment	Engr	Engineer
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations	Enl	Enlisted
CO	Commanding Officer	Evac	Evacuation
Co	Company	Ex	Executive
CofS	Chief of Staff	ExO	Executive Officer
Col	Colonel	ExTrps	Expeditionary Troops
Com	Commander (Units)	F-1	Force staff officer, Personnel (See G-1)
ComCenPacFor	Commander, Central Pacific Forces	F2A	Marine single-engine fighter, the Brewster "Buffalo"
Comd	Command	F4F	Navy-Marine single-engine fighter, the Grumman Wildcat
CominCh	Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet	F4U	Navy-Marine single-engine fighter, the Chance-Vought Corsair
Conf	Confidential	F5A	Army photo plane version of the P-38
Const	Construction	F6F	Navy-Marine single-engine fighter, the Grumman Hellcat
CP	Command Post	FAdm	Fleet Admiral
Cpl	Corporal	FAirWest	Fleet Air, West Coast
CT	Combat Team	FAirWing	Fleet Air Wing
CTF	Commander Task Force	FDC	Fire direction center
CTG	Commander Task Group	FEAF	Far East Air Forces
CV	Aircraft carrier	FEC	Far East Command
CVE	Escort carrier	Fld	Field
CWO	Chief Warrant Officer	FLINTLOCK ..	Marshall Islands Operation
D	Diary	Flot	Flotilla
D-1 (etc)	Division staff officer, Personnel (See G-1)	Flt	Fleet
DA	Department of the Army	FMF	Fleet Marine Force
"Dauntless" ...	SBD, scout-bomber made by Douglas	FO	Field order; forward observer

FRC	Federal Records Center	Inf	Infantry
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center	Info	Information
Fwd	Forward	Intel	Intelligence
G-1	Division (or larger unit) Personnel Office(r)	Inter	Interrogation
G-2	Division (or larger unit) Intelligence Office(r)	Intvw	Interview
G-3	Division (or larger unit) Operations and Training Office(r)	IsCom	Island Command
G-4	Division (or larger unit) Logistics Office(r)	J2F	Navy-Marine Corps single-engine amphibian, the Grumman Duck
GarFor	Garrison Forces	JANAC	Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee
G.B.	General Board	JANIS	Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study
Gd	Guard	JASCO	Joint Assault Signal Company
Gen	General	JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
GHQ	General Headquarters	JICPOA	Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas
GO	General Order	Jnl	Journal
GPO	Government Printing Office	"Judy"	Japanese single-engine Aichi bomber
Gnd	Ground	JWPC	Joint War Plans Committee
GroPac	Group Pacific	"Kate"	Japanese single-engine attack aircraft
Gru	Group	KIA	Killed in Action
GSA	General Services Administration	Lb.	pound
"Hamp"	Japanese Mitsubishi fighter, identical to "Zero"	LCC	Landing Craft, Control
Hd	Head	LCI	Landing Craft, Infantry
HE	High Explosive	LCI(G)	Landing Craft, Infantry (Gunboat)
HF	High Frequency	LCM	Landing Craft, Mechanized or Medium
H&I	Harassing and Interdiction	LCS	Landing Craft, Support
Hist	History; historical	LCT	Landing Craft, Tank
HistDiv	Historical Division	LCVP	Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
HMS	His Majesty's Ship	LD	Line of Departure
Hosp	Hospital	LFASCU	Landing Force Air Support Control Unit
How	Howitzer	LMG	Light Machine Gun
Hq	Headquarters	Loc	Located; location
HQMC	Headquarters, United States Marine Corps	Log	Logistics; logistical
HRS	Historical Reference Section	LSD	Landing Ship, Dock
H&S	Headquarters and Service	LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
IGHQ	Imperial General Headquarters	LST	Landing Ship, Tank
IIIAC	III Amphibious Corps	LST(H)	Landing Ship, Tank (Hospital)
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army	LSV	Landing Ship, Vehicle
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy	Lt	Lieutenant
IMAC	I Marine Amphibious Corps	LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel
IMB	Independent Mixed Brigade	LtGen	Lieutenant General
IMR	Independent Mixed Regiment		
In	Inch(es)		
Incl	Including; Inclosure (Army)		

Ltr	Letter	NCB	Naval Construction Battalion
LVT	Landing Vehicle, Tracked	NCO	Noncommissioned officer
LVT(A)	Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored)	N.d.	No date
M-1	Standard issue rifle, U. S., World War II	ND	Navy Department
M-4	Medium Tank, U. S.	NGF	Naval Gunfire
M-5	Light Tank, U. S.	NHD	Naval History Division
MAG	Marine Aircraft Group	No.	Number
MAGsZam	Marine Aircraft Groups, Zamboanga	NorSols	Northern Solomons
MAHA	Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Area	O	Officer; order
Maj	Major	O-1	Phase line designation
MajGen	Major General	OB	Order of Battle
Mar	Marine(s)	Obj	Objective
MarFAirWest..	Marine Fleet Air, West Coast	OCMH	Office of the Chief of Military History
MASG	Marine Air Support Group	Ofc	Office
MAW	Marine Aircraft Wing	OIC	Officer in Charge
MAWG	Marine Air Warning Group	Op	Operation
MAWPac	Marine Aircraft Wings, Paci- fic	OP	Observation Post
MBDAG	Marine Base Defense Air- craft Group	OPlan	Operation Plan
MBDAW	Marine Base Defense Air- craft Wing	Ord	Ordnance
MC	Medical Corps (Navy)	Org	Organization(al)
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station	OS2U	Navy single-engine float plane, the Chance-Vought Kingfisher
Med	Medical	OY	Navy-Marine single-engine observation plane, the Con- solidated-Vultee Sentinel
Memo	Memorandum	P., pp.	Page; pages
MGCIS	Marine Ground Control In- tercept Squadron	P-38	Army twin-engine fighter, the Lockheed Lightning
MIA	Missing in Action	P-39	Army single-engine fighter, the Bell Aircobra
MIAPD	Missing in Action, Presumed Dead	P-40	Army single-engine fighter, the Curtiss Warhawk
MID	Military Intelligence Divi- sion	P-47	Army single-engine fighter, the Republic Thunderbolt
MIS	Military Intelligence Sec- tion	P-51	Army single-engine fighter, the North American Mus- tang
Misc	Miscellaneous	P-61	Army twin-engine night fighter, the Northrop Black Widow
MLR	Main Line of Resistance	Pac	Pacific
Mm	Millimeter	PackHow	Pack Howitzer
Mov	Movement	PB	Patrol Boat
MP	Military Police	PBJ	Navy-Marine twin-engine bomber, the North Amer- ican Mitchell
Mph	Miles per hour	PBM	Navy twin-engine seaplane, the Martin Mariner
MS	Manuscript	PBO	Navy twin-engine bomber, the Lockheed Hudson
Msg	Message		
MT	Motor Transport		
NARS	National Archives and Records Service		
Nav	Navy; naval		

PB2Y	Navy twin-engine seaplane, the Consolidated Coronado	SB-24	Army night bombing version of the B-24
PB4Y	Navy-Marine four-engine bomber, the Consolidated Liberator	SB2C	Navy-Marine single-engine dive bomber, the Curtiss-Wright Helldiver
PBY-5A	Navy-Marine two-engine patrol bomber with amphibian boat hull, the Consolidated Catalina	SB2U	Navy-Marine single engine dive bomber, the Vought-Sikorsky Vindicator
Per	Personnel; Periodic	SCAP	Supreme Commander Allied Powers
PFC	Private First Class	SCAT	South Pacific Combat Air Transport Command
Phib	Amphibious; Amphibious Forces	SCR	Signal Corps Radio
PhibsPac	Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet	Sct	Scout
Pion	Pioneer	Sec	Section
Plt	Platoon	SecNav	Secretary of the Navy
POA	Pacific Ocean Areas	Sep	Separate
POW	Prisoner of War	Ser	Serial
Prelim	Preliminary	Serv	Service
Prov	Provisional	Sgt	Sergeant
Pt	Parts(s)	SgtMaj	Sergeant Major
Pub	Public	Sig	Signal
Pvt	Private	Sit	Situation
R-1 (etc)	Regimental Staff Officer (See G-1)	SMS	Marine Service Squadron
R4D	Navy-Marine twin-engine transport, the Douglas Skytrain	SNLF	Special Naval Landing Force
R5D	Navy-Marine four-engine transport, the Douglas Skymaster	SoPac	South Pacific
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force	Spec	Special
RB	Reference Branch	Spt	Support
Rec	Reception	Sqd	Squad
Recon	Reconnaissance	Sqdn	Squadron
Recs	Records	S.S.	U. S. Merchant Ship
Regt	Regiment	STALEMATE..	Palau Operation
Reinf	Reinforced	Strat	Strategic
Rev	Revised	Subj	Subject
RJ	Road Junction	Sum	Summary
RLT	Regimental Landing Team	Sup	Support; Supply
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force	Suppl	Supplement
Rpt	Report	Svc	Service
S-1 (etc)	Battalion (or regimental) Staff Officer, Personnel (See G-1)	SWPA	Southwest Pacific Area
SAR	Special Action Report	T/A	Table of Allowances
SBD	Navy-Marine single-engine dive bomber, the Douglas Dauntless	Tac	Tactical
		TAF	Tactical Air Force
		TAGO	The Adjutant General's Office
		TBF	Navy-Marine single-engine torpedo bomber, the Grumman Avenger
		TBM	Navy-Marine single-engine torpedo bomber, the General Motors Avenger
		TBS	Talk Between Ships Radio
		TBX	Medium-powered field radio

TBY	Portable low-power field radio	VAdm	Vice Admiral
TCS	Vehicle mounted, high frequency radio	VB	Navy Dive Bomber Squadron
T/E	Table of Equipment	Veh	Vehicle
TF	Task Force	VF	Navy Fighter Squadron
TG	Task Group	VHF	Very High Frequency
T.H.	Territory of Hawaii	Vic	Vicinity
TIO	Target Information Officer	"Vindicator" ..	Scout bomber, the Vought-Sikorsky SB2U
Tk	Tank	VLR	Very Long Range
TM	Technical Manual	VMB	Marine Bomber Squadron
TNT	Trinitro-toluol, a high explosive	VMD	Marine Photographic Squadron
T/O	Table of Organization	VMF	Marine Fighter Squadron
TO	Theater of Operations	VMF(N)	Marine Night Fighter Squadron
TOT	Time on Target	VMJ	Marine Utility Squadron
TQM	Transport Quartermaster	VMO	Marine Observation Squadron
Trac	Tractor	VMR	Marine Transport Squadron
Trans	Transport	VMSB	Marine Scout Bomber Squadron
TransDiv	Transport Division	VMTB	Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron
Trk	Truck	VP	Navy Patrol Squadron
Trng	Training	VS	Navy Scouting Squadron
Trps	Troops	W-1 (etc)	Wing Staff Officer, Personnel (See G-1)
U	Unit	WarD	War Diary
UDT	Underwater Demolitions Team	WD	War Department
USA	United States Army	Wes	West
USAF	United States Air Force	WesLandFor ..	Western Landing Force
USAFCP	United States Army Forces, Central Pacific Area	WIA	Wounded in Action
USAFPOA	United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas	"Wildcat"	Navy-Marine single-engine fighter made by Grumman
USMC	United States Marine Corps	WO	Warrant Officer
USN	United States Navy	WP	White Phosphorus
USNI	United States Naval Institute	Wpns	Weapons
USNR	United States Naval Reserve	WW	World War
USS	United States Ship	"Zeke"	Japanese single-engine Mitsubishi fighter, also known as Zero.
USSBS	United States Strategic Bombing Survey	"Zero"	Same as above
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	ZofA	Zone of Action
V	Volume		
VAC	V Amphibious Corps		

Military Map Symbols

UNIT SIZE		UNIT SYMBOLS	
I	Company		LVT
II	Battalion		RCN Reconnaissance
III	Regiment		Service
X	Brigade		Tank
XX	Division		
XXX	Corps		

UNIT SYMBOLS		EXAMPLES	
	Basic Unit	WPN	7 Weapons Company, 7th Marines
	USMC Unit (When units of other services shown)	3	26 3d Company, 26th Tank Regiment (Japanese)
	Enemy Unit	B	1 PION(+) B Company, 1st Pioneer Battalion (Reinforced)
	Cavalry	3	321 3d Battalion, 321st Infantry Regiment
	Artillery		1 1st Cavalry Division
	Engineer / Pioneer		1 1st Marine Division
	Infantry		
	Enemy Tank		

Chronology

The following listing of events is limited to those coming within the scope of this book, and those forecasting events to be treated in the volume to follow.

1935

5 Jun Aviation Section of the Headquarters staff is taken from the Division of Operations and Training and established as an independent section in the Office of the Commandant.

9 Jul Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, Virginia, publishes the Tentative Landing Operations Manual.

1 Sep Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, is transferred from Quantico, Virginia, to San Diego, California.

1936

1 Apr Division of Aviation established at Headquarters Marine Corps.

1937

27 Jan The 1st and 2d Marine Brigades, the U. S. Army 1st Expeditionary Brigade, and the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Groups conduct Fleet Exercise No. 3 near San Diego, California.

1938

1 Jul Marine Corps Reserve reconstituted to consist of a Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, an Organized Marine Corps Reserve, and a Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve.

1939

1 Sep World War II breaks out in Europe.

8 Sep The President proclaims a "limited national emergency". Marine Corps strength increased to 25,000 men.

1940

Jun Congress authorizes the Navy to begin a 10,000-plane construction program, with 1,167 aircraft allocated for Marine aviation. Marine Corps plans to organize 4 groups of 11 squadrons each.

5Oct Secretary of the Navy puts all organized Marine reserve ground units and aviation squadrons on short notice for call to active duty.

1941

15Mar The Fleet Marine Force is divided, with the 1st Marine Division at Quantico, Virginia, becoming part of the Atlantic Fleet and the 2d Marine Division at San Diego, California, becoming part of the Pacific Fleet.

Jun First Joint Training Force (JTF-1), consisting of the 1st Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Group, and the U. S. Army 1st Infantry Division organized at Quantico, Virginia, under the command of Major General Holland M. Smith.

1Nov Second Joint Training Force (JTF-2), composed of the 2d Marine Division, the U.S. Army 3d Infantry Di-

- vision, and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing organized at Camp Elliott, San Diego, California, to become a part of the Pacific Fleet.
- 7Dec Japanese attack Pearl Harbor.
- 1942*
- 9Apr End of American resistance on Bataan.
- 6May Japanese capture Corregidor.
- 23May Training Center, Fleet Marine Force, organized at Marine Barracks, New River, North Carolina, to include all Fleet Marine Force units and replacements except the 1st Marine Division.
- 7Aug 1st Marine Division lands on Guadalcanal.
- 15Aug Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, established at San Diego, California, under Major General Ross E. Rowell.
- 1943*
- 14-23Jan Casablanca Conference. Agreement reached to advance toward Philippines through Central and Southwest Pacific, and to terminate hostilities only upon unconditional surrender of Japan.
- 21Jan Marine Fleet Air, West Coast (MarFAirWest) organized under Colonel Lewie G. Merritt at San Diego, California.
- 26Jan Headquarters of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing established at Efate, New Hebrides.
- 9Feb End of organized Japanese resistance on Guadalcanal.
- 12-25May Trident Conference in Washington gives general approval to plan for a drive on Japan through the Central Pacific.
- 14-24Aug Quadrant Conference at Que-
- bec. CCS decide to attack Japan along both Central and Southwest Pacific routes.
- 4Sep V Amphibious Corps organized under Maj-Gen Holland M. Smith to train and control troops for amphibious landings in the Central Pacific.
- 20Nov Marines land on Betio Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands.
- 21Dec Dive bombers of the 4th Base Defense Aircraft Wing carry out an attack against Jaluit Atoll, the first such target in the Marshall Islands.
- 30Dec Advance Headquarters of the 4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing established on Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands.
- 1944*
- 31Jan-7Feb U. S. forces invade and capture Majuro and Kwajalein Atolls in the Marshall Islands.
- 4Feb Marine aircraft carry out first photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese base at Truk in the Carolines.
- 17Feb Combined Marine-Army force lands on Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshalls.
- 12Mar JCS direct seizure of Southern Marianas, target date 15 Jun 1944.
- 28Apr The 1st Marine Division (Rein), commanded by Major General William H. Rupertus, is relieved on New Britain and prepares to move to Pavuvu in the Russell Islands.
- 15Jun The Marine V Amphibious Corps under Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith lands on Saipan in the Ma-

	riana Islands. U. S. Navy carrier task force strikes Volcano-Bonin Islands in first raid on these groups. First B-29 strikes launched from China bases against mainland of Japan. FEAF established under Lieutenant General George C. Kenney. AirNorSols formed under Major General Ralph J. Mitchell.		Leyte from 20 December to 20 October 1944.
		17Sep	81st Infantry Division, as part of III Amphibious Corps, lands on Angaur.
		23Sep	U. S. Army troops seize Uli-thi as advance naval base.
		28Sep	The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Rein), under Major John H. Gustafson, lands on Ngesebus and Kongauru Islands in the Palaus, supported by VMF-114.
19-20Jun	Battle of the Philippine Sea. Carrier aircraft of TF 58 engage planes from enemy carriers and inflict crippling losses.	30Sep	Peleliu, Angaur, Ngesebus, and Kongauru declared occupied.
		30Oct	JCS directive orders occupation of one or more islands in the Volcano-Bonins.
24Jun	U. S. Navy carrier task force again hits Volcano-Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima.	90Oct	Admiral Nimitz informs General Smith that Iwo Jima is to be the objective in the Volcano-Bonins.
4Jul	Renewed carrier attacks against Volcano-Bonins.	12Oct	Peleliu becomes a Marine island command similar to Guam and Tinian.
14Jul	Joint Staff Study for Operation STALEMATE (invasion of the Palaus) issued.	14Oct	V Amphibious Corps directed to prepare plans for the Iwo Jima operation.
21Jul	III Amphibious Corps lands on Guam in the Marianas.	18Oct	Landing on Homonhon Island.
24Jul	4th Marine Division lands on Tinian in the Marianas.	20Oct	U. S. Army troops invade Leyte. The 1st Marine Division (Rein) on Peleliu is relieved by the U. S. Army 81st Infantry Division.
1Aug	End of organized enemy resistance on Tinian.	21Oct	Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, established at Santa Barbara, California, under Colonel Albert D. Cooley. Marine 5th and 11th 155mm Artillery Battalions as part of XXIV Corps Artillery in general support of the U. S. Army 7th Infantry Division on Leyte.
10Aug	End of organized Japanese resistance on Guam.		
15Aug	III Amphibious Corps, upon completing its operation in the Mariannas, is committed to invasion of the Palaus.	23-26Oct	Battle of Leyte Gulf which ends in U. S. naval victory.
15Sep	The 1st Marine Division, under Major General Rupertus, lands on the southwestern shore of Peleliu Island. U. S. Army troops land on Morotai, Netherlands East Indies, and capture airfield on that island. JCS decide to invade Central rather than Southern Philippines and advance target date for invasion of		

4Nov	VMF-122, commanded by Major Joseph H. Reinburg, supports U. S. Army landing on Pulo Anna Island south of the Palaus.	5Jan	U. S. Navy vessels shell Iwo Jima.
5Nov	Marine Corsair fighter-bombers based in the Marshalls hit Nauru Island in the Gilberts, setting a distance record for Corsairs with full bomb loads.	9Jan	U. S. Sixth Army invades Luzon.
11-12Nov	U. S. Navy surface forces rock Iwo Jima with heavy bombardment.	24Jan	U. S. naval surface force shells Iwo Jima.
16Nov	Marine Corsairs from Peleliu and Avengers from Ulithi launch a coordinated attack against Yap Island, west of Ulithi.	25Jan	First Marine dive bombers arrive on Luzon.
25Nov	CinCPOA issues operation plan for invasion of Iwo Jima. Tentative date 3 February 1945.	27Jan	Marine dive bombers fly their first mission in the Philippines.
3Dec	VMF(N)-541 and VMF-115, -211, -218, and -313 of MAG-12 arrive at Tacloban, Leyte, to provide air defense.	1Feb	Aircraft of Saipan-based Marine Bombing Squadron 612 begin nightly rocket attacks against enemy shipping and installations in the Volcano Islands.
7Dec	MAG-12 aircraft, under Colonel William A. Willis, support U. S. Army landings at Ormoc, Leyte.	1-4Feb	Marine dive bombers of MAG-24 and MAG-32 protect the left flank of the 1st Cavalry Division during its drive to Manila.
8Dec	U. S. Navy surface units shell Iwo Jima.	13Feb	Final rehearsals for Iwo Jima operation concluded off coast of Tinian.
11Dec	Major Marine air attack on Japanese convoy, Ormoc Bay.	15-16Feb	V Amphibious Corps Land Force departs Marianas after final rehearsals for assault on Iwo Jima.
15Dec	MAG-12 aircraft support landing of U. S. Army on Mindoro in the Philippines.	16Feb	TF 58 under Admiral Mitscher launches two day air strike against the Japanese mainland to divert attention from the imminent Iwo Jima operation.
24-27Dec	U. S. Navy surface units bombard Volcano-Bonin Islands including Iwo Jima.	16-18Feb	Amphibious Support Force (TF 52) bombs and shells Iwo Jima in the course of the preparatory bombardment.
25Dec	Leyte declared secured. Eighth Army relieves Sixth Army.	19Feb	The 4th and 5th Marine Division seize foothold on Iwo Jima.
1945		21Feb	21st Marines of the 3d Marine Division committed in zone of action of the 4th Division. Enemy executes <i>kamikaze</i> attack on support ships off Iwo Jima.
2-12Jan	MAG-14 with VMO-251 and VMF-212, -222, and -223 land at Guian, Samar.	23Feb	Combat patrol of the 28th Marines raises Old Glory

- on Mount Suribachi.
Manila falls to U. S. Army troops.
- 25Feb 3d Marine Division committed on Iwo Jima. General unloading of cargo gets under way. Elements of MAG-32 arrive on Mindoro, Philippines, to support U. S. Army troops.
- 26Feb Two Marine artillery spotter planes from the USS *Wake Island* land on Iwo Jima and become the first American planes to land on the island.
- 1945
- 27Feb 3d Marine Division captures the Central Airfield on Iwo Jima and seizes Hills Peter and Oboe.
- 28Feb U. S. Army troops invade Palawan in the Philippines.
- 2Mar 5th Marine Division captures Hill 362A on Iwo Jima.
- 3Mar Elements of MAG-12, MAG-24, and MAG-32 support U.S. Army landings on Masbate, Burias, and Ticao Islands in the Philippines.
- 3d Marine Division clears Northern Airfield on Iwo Jima.
- 4Mar First B-29 bomber lands on Iwo Jima after being damaged over Japan.
- 6Mar U. S. Army Air Forces 15th Fighter Group arrives on Iwo Jima with P-51s and P-61s.
- 7Mar Major General James E. Chaney (USA), Island Commander, assumes responsibility for Iwo Jima base development, air defense, and airfield operation.
- 3d Marine Division launches predawn attack against Hill 362C and captures this objective later in the day.
- 8Mar 4th Marine Division repels counterattack during the night 8-9 March.
- 9Mar General Holland M. Smith transfers his command post from the *Eldorado* to the *Auburn*. Admiral Turner and his staff on board *Eldorado* depart for Guam. Real Admiral Harry W. Hill assumes duties of Senior Officer Present Afloat, Iwo Jima.
- 10Mar MAG-12 and MAG-32 aircraft support U. S. Army landings on Zamboanga in the Philippines. American troops land on Mindanao in the Philippines.
- 11Mar Iwo-based Army Air Forces fighters assume responsibility for providing air defense and ground support missions when last Navy escort carriers leave.
- 14Mar Official flag raising ceremony marks proclamation of U. S. Naval Military Government in the Volcano Islands. Commander, Expeditionary Troops, departs for Guam.
- 15Mar Corsairs of MAG-12 arrive on Zamboanga. Close support of the U. S. Army 41st Infantry Division gets under way.
- 16Mar Cushman's Pocket on Iwo Jima eliminated. End of organized resistance in zone of action of the 3d Marine Division.
- Last enemy pocket in 4th Division zone wiped out. Iwo Jima declared secured at 1800.
- 18Mar U. S. Army troops invade Panay in the Philippines.

20Mar	U. S. Army 147th Infantry Regiment arrives on Iwo Jima for garrison duty.	1Apr	Invasion of Okinawa gets under way.
23Mar	Dive bombers of MAG-32 move from Luzon to Zamboanga.		U. S. Army troops land in the Sulu Archipelago and on Jolo Island in the Philippines.
25Mar	5th Marine Division eliminates final enemy pocket of resistance on Iwo Jima.	14Apr	MAG-24 dive bombers fly last Marine aviation mission on Luzon.
26Mar	Japanese launch early morning attack against Marine and U. S. Army bivouac areas on Iwo Jima. Capture and occupation phase announced completed as of 0800.	17Apr	MAG-12, MAG-14, and MAG-32 support U. S. Army landings on Mindanao in the Philippines.
	Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific, assumes responsibility for defense and development of Iwo Jima.	18Apr	Last Marines depart from Iwo Jima.
	Major General Chaney assumes operational control of all units on Iwo Jima.	20Apr	Dive bombers of MAG-24 move from Luzon to Malabang.
	V Amphibious Corps command post on Iwo Jima closed. Major General Schmidt departs Iwo Jima by air.	22Apr	MAG-24 dive bombers begin operations from Malabang.
	U. S. Army troops invade Cebu in the Philippines, supported by aircraft of MAG-12.	7May	End of war in European Theater.
		25May	JCS direct invasion of Japan, scheduled for 1 November 1945.
		21Jun	End of organized resistance on Okinawa.
		6Aug	Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
		9Aug	Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
			Russia invades Manchuria.
		2Sep	Japanese sign instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay.

Fleet Marine Force Status—31 August 1944¹

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Outside U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Hawaiian Area</i>				
<i>Oahu</i>				
Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac.....	228	1,378	14	12
Transient Center, FMFPac.....	334	5,599	43	313
3d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac.....	23	205	38	9
13th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	40	1,125	3	30
Headquarters Company, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	74	257	1	5
6th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	169	4,211	8	41
8th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	24	424	1	13
Headquarters and Service Battalion, VAC.....	82	601	8	22
Signal Battalion, VAC.....	42	534	9	8
Corps Transport Company, VAC.....	4	115	0	0
Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, VAC.....	20	288	0	12
Air Delivery Section, VAC.....	3	91	0	0
Headquarters, 2d Laundry Company VAC.....	1	24	0	0
4th Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC.....	1	61	0	0
Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific...	46	110	2	0
Marine Bomber Squadron 611, 2d MAW	69	467	1	8
Marine Bomber Squadron 612, 2d MAW	68	477	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 3, 3d MAW	68	519	11	18
Marine Observation Squadron 5, 3d MAW	9	28	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 4, 3d MAW	14	233	0	5
Marine Airborne Aircraft Warning Squadron 5, 3d MAW	13	168	0	4
Service Squadron 15, 3d MAW	8	229	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadon 321, 3d MAW	48	248	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 343, 3d MAW	48	292	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 953, 3d MAW	86	369	0	0
Headquarters Squadron, MAG-32.....	47	350	9	13
Service Squadron 32, MAG-32	11	242	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142, MAG-32	49	296	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 313, MAG-13	47	245	1	8

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 322, MAG-13	47	247	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 323, MAG-13	50	249	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 332, MAG-13	48	294	1	8
Area Sub-Total	1,821	19,976	156	577
<i>Hawaii</i>				
2d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac.....	13	296	1	7
1st Service and Supply Battalion, FMFPac.....	22	477	0	4
Headquarters Battery, VAC Artillery.....	27	155	3	9
2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	34	591	1	9
5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	35	711	1	12
10th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	33	724	1	12
11th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	54	847	4	21
12th 155mm Gun Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	1	150	0	0
26th Marines (Reinforced).....	188	4,188	18	224
27th Marines (Reinforced).....	199	4,461	19	219
Special and Service Troops, 5th Marine Division.....	137	1,213	8	24
Area Sub-Total	743	13,813	56	541
<i>Kauai</i>				
1st Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac.....	18	288	2	0
8th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, FMFPac.....	51	1,029	4	27
3d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac	11	278	0	2
3d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC.....	1	61	0	0
2d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	49	1,227	4	32
5th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery	63	1,230	3	32
7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery	63	1,214	4	32
16th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	56	1,219	4	29
Area Sub-Total	312	6,546	21	154
<i>Maui</i>				
3d Provisional Marine Detachment, FMFPac.....	16	347	1	3
2d Service and Supply Battalion, Supply Service, FMFPac	6	268	0	0
Medical Battalion, VAC.....	1	90	28	218
1st Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC.....	1	61	0	0

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (less Company A), VAC	20	319	1	9
11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (plus Companies D and E, less Companies A and C), VAC.....	21	523	2	9
Company C, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC.....	6	133	0	0
1st Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC.....	32	252	14	0
4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion.....	28	568	1	11
4th Marine Division	757	13,133	123	969
Area Sub-Total	888	15,694	170	1,219
<i>Midway</i>				
6th Defense Battalion.....	69	1,492	5	22
Headquarters Squadron 23, MAG-23	25	337	6	16
Service Squadron 23, MAG-23	11	255	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 314, MAG-23	61	249	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 333, MAG-23	50	298	1	8
Area Sub-Total	216	2,631	13	54
<i>Southwest Pacific</i>				
<i>Auckland, New Zealand</i>				
3d Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	15	106	2	8
<i>Russell Islands</i>				
4th Base Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	94	2,613	7	26
30th, 31st and 32d Depot Companies, Supply Service, FMFPac	12	479	0	0
2d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, IIIAC	1	61	0	0
3d Armored Amphibian Battalion (Prov), IIIAC	32	767	1	9
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, IIIAC	29	473	1	10
6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, IIIAC	24	462	1	9
4th and 5th Marine War Dog Platoons, IIIAC	3	191	0	0
5th Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC	1	43	0	0
6th Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC	1	44	0	0
12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion,, IIIAC Artillery ...	60	1,321	4	31
1st Marine Division.....	897	16,822	130	968
Marine Observation Squadron 3, MAWPac	9	28	0	0
Area Sub-Total	1,163	23,304	144	1,053

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Emirau</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	39	311	6	27
Service Squadron 12, MAG-12.....	17	265	1	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 115, MAG-12.....	47	238	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 215, MAG-12.....	45	222	1	1
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243, MAG-12	46	273	1	9
Headquarters Squadron 61, MAG-61.....	36	386	7	16
Service Squadron 61, MAG-61.....	10	249	0	0
Marine Photographic Squadron 254, MAG-61.....	53	470	2	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 433, MAG-61.....	67	411	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 443, MAG-61.....	69	410	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 952, 2d MAW.....	66	375	1	8
Area Sub-Total	495	3,610	21	85
<i>Green Island</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 14, MAG-14	39	364	7	22
Service Squadron 14, MAG-14.....	14	266	1	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 218, MAG-14.....	45	227	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 235, MAG-14.....	57	280	2	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341, MAG-14	46	263	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 423, MAG-14.....	62	398	1	8
Area Sub-Total	263	1,798	12	46
<i>Guadalcanal</i>				
16th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	43	1,204	3	16
29th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac	4	148	0	0
9th Ammunition Company, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	7	248	0	0
1st Battalion, 29th Marines (Reinf).....	34	817	2	39
Headquarters, 1st Laundry Company, IIIAC	1	24	0	0
1st Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, IIIAC	1	61	0	0
3d Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, IIIAC	1	61	0	0
4th Platoon, 1st Laundry Company, IIIAC	1	61	0	0
8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, IIIAC	26	499	1	9
4th Joint Assault Signal Company, IIIAC	35	343	9	115
3d Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC	1	32	0	0
3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	34	678	3	9
8th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	39	730	2	12
9th 155mm Gun Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	34	642	2	12
3d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	60	1,279	5	31

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
4th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	61	1,243	5	34
11th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, IIIAC	57	1,283	4	30
29th Marines (Reinf)	198	3,886	18	205
54th Replacement Battalion.....	9	612	1	9
Marine Observation Squadron 1, MAWPac.....	9	28	0	0
Area Sub-Total	655	13,879	55	521
<i>Ellice Islands</i>				
51st Defense Battalion.....	54	1,326	6	32
<i>Munda, New Georgia</i>				
Marine Air Base Squadron 1, 1st MAW.....	15	380	4	10
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241, 1st MAW.....	26	255	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 413, 1st MAW.....	57	401	2	9
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244, MAG-14.....	29	262	1	8
Area Sub-Total	127	1,298	8	35
<i>Torokina, Bougainville</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 1, 1st MAW.....	67	531	8	11
Marine Fighter Squadron 222, 1st MAW.....	32	221	1	6
Headquarters Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	30	365	7	23
Service Squadron 24, MAG-24.....	13	304	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133, MAG-24.....	47	286	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 212, MAG-24.....	14	235	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 223, MAG-24.....	44	238	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236, MAG-24.....	31	258	1	9
Marine Observation Squadron 251, MAG-24.....	50	239	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 152, MAG-25.....	68	385	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 153, MAG-25.....	62	353	1	8
Area Sub-Total	458	3,415	22	89
<i>Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides</i>				
Marine Air Defense Squadron 1, 1st MAW..	21	358	4	7
Headquarters Squadron 2, 2d MAW.....	66	422	7	28
Air Warning Squadron 3, 2d MAW.....	18	248	0	6
Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232, 2d MAW.....	41	295	1	15

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Marine Fighter Squadron 312, 2d MAW.....	47	249	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	23	59	8	15
Service Squadron 11, MAG-11.....	36	578	0	6
Marine Fighter Squadron 114, MAG-11.....	48	250	0	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 121, MAG-11.....	47	249	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 122, MAG-11.....	47	249	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 134, MAG-11.....	47	312	1	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541, MAG-11.....	29	308	1	8
Area Sub-Total	470	3,577	25	125
<i>Noumea and Tontouta, New Caledonia</i>				
Transient Center, Forward Echelon, FMFPac	17	408	3	5
Headquarters (SoPac-Admin), Supply Service, FMFPac	3	10	0	0
1st Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac	38	664	3	13
Headquarters Squadron 25, MAG-25	33	334	9	231
Service Squadron 25, MAG-25	15	348	0	0
Area Sub-Total	106	1,764	15	249
<i>Central Pacific</i>				
<i>Engebi</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 22, MAG-22	39	365	7	22
Service Squadron 22, MAG-22	12	248	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 1, MAG-22	12	201	2	6
Marine Fighter Squadron 113, MAG-22	48	238	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151, MAG-22	51	311	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 422, MAG-22	49	229	1	8
Area Sub-Total	211	1,592	12	52
<i>Eniwetok</i>				
10th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery	65	1,403	4	29
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 533, MAG-22	36	308	1	8
Area Sub-Total	101	1,711	5	37

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Guam</i>				
1st Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac	52	379	33	123
5th Field Depot	64	1,447	4	16
Company A, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC	3	138	0	0
Company A, 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC	5	130	0	0
Headquarters and Service Battalion, IIIAC	171	1,261	17	81
Signal Battalion, IIIAC	60	1,109	2	11
Motor Transport Battalion, IIIAC	32	609	2	11
Medical Battalion, IIIAC	1	151	35	312
Air Delivery Section, IIIAC	3	164	0	2
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, IIIAC.....	35	644	2	10
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, IIIAC.....	36	777	2	12
4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, IIIAC.....	27	541	2	8
2d Separate Engineer Battalion, IIIAC.....	35	721	3	20
1st Marine War Dog Platoon, IIIAC.....	0	32	0	0
2d and 3d Marine War Dog Platoons, IIIAC.....	2	98	0	0
3d Joint Assault Signal Company, IIIAC	35	340	9	0
1st Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC.....	1	41	0	0
Headquarters Battery, Corps Artillery, IIIAC.....	26	159	0	0
1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion, IIIAC Artillery.....	34	631	2	16
7th 155mm Gun Battalion, IIIAC Artillery.....	37	664	2	12
9th Defense Battalion, IIIAC Artillery.....	67	1,388	4	31
14th Defense Battalion, IIIAC Artillery.....	71	1,488	4	25
3d Marine Division.....	872	16,057	139	988
1st Provisional Marine Brigade.....	445	9,012	46	433
1st Replacement Draft.....	86	1,462	60	415
Marine Fighter Squadron 211, MAG-12.....	48	235	1	8
Marine Transport Squadron 253, MAG-15.....	67	333	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	38	322	8	19
Service Squadron 21, MAG-21.....	14	277	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 2, MAG-21.....	10	161	0	3
Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 131, MAG-21.....	47	328	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 216, MAG-21.....	46	234	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 217, MAG-21.....	47	229	1	7
Marine Fighter Squadron 225, MAG-21.....	45	239	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 242, MAG-21.....	47	328	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 321, MAG-21.....	48	230	1	7
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534, MAG-21.....	37	310	1	8
Area Sub-Total	2,694	42,669	384	2,610

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Kwajalein</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 15, MAG-15.....	42	351	6	21
Marine Transport Squadron 252, MAG-15.....	59	322	1	10
Marine Transport Squadron 353, MAG-15.....	93	413	1	8
Area Sub-Total	194	1,086	8	39
<i>Majuro</i>				
1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery.....	28	573	3	14
Headquarters Squadron 4, 4th MBDAW	90	635	11	20
Headquarters Squadron 13, MAG-13.....	31	351	7	22
Service Squadron 13, MAG-13.....	15	288	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231, MAG-13.....	51	299	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331, MAG-13.....	49	295	1	8
Marine Observation Squadron 155, MAG-31.....	44	248	1	8
Area Sub-Total	308	2,689	24	80
<i>Makin</i>				
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245, MAG-13.....	51	285	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 111, MAG-31.....	53	347	1	8
Area Sub-Total	104	632	2	16
<i>Roi-Namur</i>				
15th Depot Company, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	5	197	0	0
15th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (Reinf), VAC Artillery	48	1,164	4	21
Headquarters Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	34	407	8	18
Service Squadron 31, MAG-31.....	12	308	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 224, MAG-31.....	84	283	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 311, MAG-31.....	48	258	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 441, MAG-31.....	49	309	1	8
Area Sub-Total	280	2,926	15	63
<i>Saipan</i>				
7th Field Depot, Supply Service, FMFPac.....	90	1,780	5	34
2d Platoon, 2d Laundry Company, VAC.....	1	61	0	0
2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, VAC.....	33	771	2	14

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC.....	27	584	1	13
5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, VAC.....	23	562	1	9
1st Amphibian Truck Company, VAC.....	6	174	0	0
2d Amphibian Truck Company, VAC.....	9	185	0	0
2d Joint Assault Signal Company, VAC.....	35	391	10	0
1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC.....	3	54	0	0
2d Provisional Rocket Detachment, VAC.....	3	54	0	0
17th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	49	1,215	4	23
18th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, VAC Artillery.....	66	1,412	4	22
2d Marine Division	924	17,412	131	965
3d Replacement Draft.....	130	2,629	15	30
4th Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC.....	1	43	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron 2, 3d MAW.....	9	28	0	0
Marine Observation Squadron 4, 3d MAW	9	29	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532, MAG-31.....	33	249	1	8
Area Sub-Total	1,451	27,633	174	1,118
<i>Tinian</i>				
2d Base Headquarters Battalion, FMFPac.....	46	359	45	105
1st Separate Engineer Battalion, IIIAC	33	727	4	17
2d Separate Wire Platoon, IIIAC.....	1	41	0	0
Area Sub-Total	80	1,127	49	122
<i>Miscellaneous</i>				
Aviation personnel attached to Marine divisions, amphibious corps, and JASCOs.....	78	227	0	0
<i>West Coast, U.S.A.</i>				
<i>San Diego</i>				
Headquarters Company, Marine Training and Replacement Command, San Diego Area.....	41	145	2	5
Headquarters Squadron, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast	56	332	3	1
Area Sub-Total	97	477	5	6
<i>Camp Elliott</i>				
Base Depot, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego	91	760	2	20

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Camp Gillespie</i>				
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 141, MBDAG-41.....	48	302	1	8
<i>Camp Pendleton</i>				
Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training				
Command, SDA	172	1,847	45	256
Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command, SDA.....	178	2,573	9	0
Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training				
Command, SDA	170	2,162	46	866
Infantry Training Regiment (10 battalions),				
Marine Training Command, SDA.....	129	9,868	1	0
9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion.....	26	510	0	0
5th Marine Division (less RCT 26 and RCT 27).....	374	7,000	73	525
5th Joint Assault Signal Company.....	35	365	0	0
7th Replacement Draft	14	536	12	100
8th Replacement Draft	44	1,107	1	0
9th Replacement Draft	64	1,251	10	5
10th Replacement Draft	63	4,685	1	170
52d Defense Battalion.....	55	1,278	7	32
8th Field Depot (Rear Echelon).....	46	770	0	0
Sound Ranging Sections (3-4-5).....	3	66	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 471, MBDAG-43.....	49	277	1	8
Area Sub-Total	1,422	34,295	206	1,962
<i>Corvallis</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 35, MAG-35	185	857	8	30
Service Squadron 35, MAG-35.....	22	302	0	0
Area Sub-Total	207	1,159	8	30
<i>Camp Kearney</i>				
Marine Photographic Squadron 154, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast	59	427	2	8
<i>El Centro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 43, MBDAG-43.....	64	804	7	27
Service Squadron 43, MBDAG-43.....	8	319	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 461, MBDAG-43.....	47	252	1	3
Marine Fighter Squadron 462, MBDAG-43.....	52	257	1	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 472, MBDAG-43.....	48	254	1	0
Area Sub-Total	219	1,886	10	32

See footnote at end of table.

	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>El Toro</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 41, MBDAG-41.....	42	378	7	30
Service Squadron 41, MBDAG-41.....	16	277	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 132, MBDAG-41.....	47	307	1	5
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 144, MBDAG-41.....	48	313	1	2
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 234, MBDAG-41.....	46	307	1	2
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 454, MBDAG-41.....	46	324	1	3
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 464, MBDAG-41.....	31	316	1	2
Headquarters Squadron 46, MBDAG-46.....	72	341	6	17
Service Squadron 46, MBDAG-46.....	15	324	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 474, MBDAG-46.....	30	348	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 481, MBDAG-46.....	151	328	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 482, MBDAG-46.....	155	350	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 484, MBDAG-46.....	30	364	1	8
Area Sub-Total	729	4,277	22	98
<i>Miramar</i>				
Supply Squadron 5, Marine Fleet Air, West Coast.....	16	299	0	0
Headquarters and Service Squadron 2, 2d AWG.....	12	105	0	0
Air Warning Squadron 6, 2d AWG.....	14	259	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 7, 2d AWG.....	13	251	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 8, 2d AWG.....	15	258	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 9, 2d AWG.....	16	255	0	6
Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 10, 2d AWG.....	14	166	0	4
Air Warning Squadron 11, 2d AWG.....	16	255	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 12, 2d AWG.....	18	261	0	6
Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 15, 2d AWG.....	13	167	0	4
Marine Airborne Air Warning Squadron 20, 2d AWG.....	14	167	0	4
Headquarters Squadron, Personnel Group.....	270	215	28	0
Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, Personnel Group.....	12	1,124	0	6
Marine Wing Service Squadron 2, Personnel Group.....	5	1,167	0	160
Marine Wing Service Squadron 3, Personnel Group.....	6	958	0	10
Marine Wing Service Squadron 4, Personnel Group.....	4	1,716	0	0
Headquarters Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	30	362	7	16
Service Squadron 33, MAG-33.....	11	258	7	16
Area Sub-Total	499	8,243	42	256
<i>Oxnard</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 214, MBDAG-42.....	48	274	1	8

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Mojave</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 44, MBDAG-44.....	32	458	8	16
Service Squadron 44, MBDAG-44.....	10	396	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 124, MBDAG-44.....	49	246	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 213, MBDAG-44.....	49	252	1	7
Marine Fighter Squadron 451, MBDAG-44.....	47	243	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 452, MBDAG-44.....	48	252	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 51, MAG-51.....	38	309	9	19
Marine Observation Squadron 351, MAG-51	47	249	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 511, MAG-51.....	46	242	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 512, MAG-51.....	45	233	1	8
Area Sub-Total	411	2,880	24	90
<i>Santa Barbara</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 42, MBDAG-42.....	44	478	5	18
Service Squadron 42, MBDAG-42.....	17	338	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 112, MBDAG-42.....	47	241	2	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 123, MBDAG-42.....	49	249	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 221, MBDAG-42.....	45	242	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 45, MBDAG-45.....	43	392	7	18
Service Squadron 45, MBDAG-45.....	17	248	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 542, MBDAG-45.....	31	303	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44).....	0	0	0	0
Service Squadron 48, MBDAG-48 (Org 3Aug44).....	0	0	0	0
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 143, MBDAG-48.....	46	239	1	8
Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 233, MBDAG-48.....	45	303	2	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 943, MBDAG-48.....	33	223	0	0
Area Sub-Total	417	3,256	20	84
<i>East Coast, U.S.A.</i>				
<i>Camp Lejeune</i>				
Headquarters Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	28	811	0	0
Range Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	9	242	0	0
Coast Guard Detachment, Marine Training Command.....	0	0	39	1,409
Quartermaster Battalion, Marine Training Command.....	57	750	0	0
Schools Regiment, Marine Training Command.....	153	1,250	0	0
Specialist Training Regiment, Marine Training Command	397	6,870	0	0
Infantry Training Regiment (7 battalions), Marine				

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Training Command	157	7,402	0	11
Corps Evacuation Hospitals (I, II, III).....	0	0	79	604
10th Ammunition Company.....	7	279	0	0
11th Ammunition Company	3	294	0	0
7th Separate Infantry Battalion.....	18	677	2	21
Area Sub-Total	829	18,575	120	2,045
<i>Norfolk</i>				
Marine Base Depot, FMF.....	20	426	0	8
<i>Quantico</i>				
Infantry Training Battalion, MCS.....	36	993	2	38
Field Artillery Training Battalion, MCS.....	22	582	0	0
Area Sub-Total	58	1,575	2	38
<i>Bogue</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 16, 1st AWG.....	15	260	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 93, MAG-93.....	25	330	6	18
Service Squadron 93, MAG-93.....	10	190	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 934, MAG-93.....	34	188	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 941, MAG-93.....	35	188	1	7
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 942, MAG-93.....	6	81	0	0
Area Sub-Total	125	1,237	8	39
<i>Cherry Point</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 9, 9th MAW.....	63	429	7	13
Marine Wing Service Squadron 9, 9th MAW.....	15	183	0	0
Marine Transport Squadron 352, 9th MAW.....	127	434	1	8
Marine Photographic Squadron 354, 9th MAW.....	59	449	1	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 531, 9th MAW.....	17	166	1	4
Headquarters and Service Squadron 1, 1st AWG.....	91	900	3	8
Air Warning Squadron 17, 1st AWG.....	11	245	0	6
Air Warning Squadron 18, 1st AWG.....	10	164	0	6
Headquarters Squadron 53, MAG-53.....	45	290	5	19
Service Squadron 53, MAG-53.....	7	264	0	0
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 543, MAG-53.....	29	307	1	8
Marine Night Fighter Squadron 544, MAG-53.....	32	279	0	6

See footnote at end of table.

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Headquarters Squadron 62, MAG-62.....	58	686	6	6
Service Squadron 62, MAG-62.....	19	424	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 453, MAG-62.....	15	157	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 463, MAG-62.....	11	73	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 473, MAG-62.....	10	45	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 483, MAG-62.....	4	3	0	0
Marine Bombing Squadron 621, MAG-62.....	78	402	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 622, MAG-62.....	60	325	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 623, MAG-62.....	46	314	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 624, MAG-62.....	30	236	0	8
Headquarters Squadron 92, MAG-92.....	18	154	1	4
Marine Fighter Squadron 921, MAG-92.....	40	61	0	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 922, MAG-92.....	38	60	0	2
Marine Fighter Squadron 924, MAG-92.....	106	351	1	8
Headquarters Squadron 94, MAG-94.....	15	107	2	15
Service Squadron 94, MAG-94.....	3	43	0	0
Area Sub-Total	1,057	7,551	32	155
<i>Congaree</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 52, MAG-52.....	17	45	7	19
Service Squadron 52, MAG-52.....	13	669	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 521, MAG-52.....	48	158	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 522, MAG-52.....	45	156	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 523, MAG-52.....	48	161	0	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 524, MAG-52.....	50	155	0	8
Area Sub-Total	221	1,344	9	51
<i>Eagle Mountain Lake</i>				
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 931, MAG-93.....	47	268	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 932, MAG-93.....	50	274	1	6
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 933, MAG-93.....	30	268	1	5
Area Sub-Total	127	810	3	19
<i>Greenville</i>				
Marine Fighter Squadron 913, MAG-91.....	42	177	1	8

Units and Locations	Strength			
	USMC		USN	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
<i>Kinston</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 91, MAG-91.....	16	190	5	19
Service Squadron 91, MAG-91.....	8	169	0	0
Marine Fighter Squadron 911, MAG-91.....	44	183	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 912, MAG-91.....	44	180	0	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 914, MAG-91.....	39	145	0	0
Area Sub-Total	151	867	6	35
<i>Newport</i>				
Headquarters Squadron 34, MAG-34.....	26	487	6	22
Service Squadron 34, MAG-34.....	10	265	0	0
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 334, MAG-34.....	49	279	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 342, MAG-34.....	49	295	1	8
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 344, MAG-34.....	49	295	2	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 613, MAG-62.....	65	418	1	8
Marine Bombing Squadron 614, MAG-62.....	66	423	1	8
Area Sub-Total	314	2,462	12	62
<i>New River</i>				
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 944, MAG-94.....	61	393	1	8
<i>Oak Grove</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 14, 1st AWG.....	16	248	0	6
Service Squadron 51, MAG-92.....	11	271	0	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 513, MAG-92.....	47	229	1	8
Marine Fighter Squadron 514, MAG-92.....	48	218	1	8
Area Sub-Total	122	966	2	30
<i>Vero Beach</i>				
Air Warning Squadron 13, 1st AWG.....	18	256	0	6
Total FMF (Ground) Overseas.....	8,810	163,333	1,191	7,855
Total FMF (Air) Overseas	4,477	31,696	208	1,070
Total FMF (Ground) in U.S.A.	2,412	55,499	331	4,070
Total FMF (Air) in U.S.A.	4,980	39,376	208	1,031
Total FMF Overseas	13,287	195,029	1,399	8,925
Total FMF in U.S.A.	7,392	94,875	539	5,101
Total FMF	20,679	289,904	1,938	14,026

¹ Strength figures and unit designations were abstracted from the FMF Status Reports, Ground and Air, for August 1944 held in the Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units en route or ordered to the indicated area are listed under those areas regardless of their temporary locations.

Table of Organization F-100—Marine Division

5 May 1944¹

Unit	USMC		USN		Totals	
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	Off	Enl
Division Headquarters	(66)	(186)	(4)	(1)	(70)	(187)
Headquarters Battalion.....	101	883	7	13	108	896
Headquarters Company.....	(73)	(394)	(7)	(9)	(80)	(403)
Signal Company.....	(17)	(275)			(17)	(275)
Military Police Company.....	(6)	(96)			(6)	(96)
Reconnaissance Company.....	(5)	(118)		(4)	(5)	(122)
Tank Battalion	35	585	1	9	36	594
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(14)	(99)	(1)	(9)	(15)	(108)
3 Tank Companies (each).....	(7)	(162)			(7)	(162)
Service Troops	58	1,343	66	422	124	1,765
Service Battalion	(29)	(702)	(2)	(18)	(31)	(720)
Headquarters Company	(9)	(48)	(2)	(9)	(11)	(57)
Service & Supply Company.....	(13)	(483)		(9)	(13)	(492)
Ordnance Company.....	(7)	(171)			(7)	(171)
Motor Transport Battalion.....	(28)	(501)	(1)	(9)	(29)	(510)
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(13)	(171)	(1)	(9)	(14)	(180)
3 Transport Companies (each).....	(5)	(110)			(5)	(110)
Medical Battalion.....	(1)	(140)	(63)	(395)	(64)	(535)
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(1)	(15)	(28)	(45)	(29)	(60)
5 Medical Companies (each).....		(25)	(7)	(70)	(7)	(95)
Engineer Battalion.....	41	842	1	20	42	862
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(23)	(263)	(1)	(20)	(24)	(283)
3 Engineer Companies (each).....	(6)	(193)			(6)	(193)
Pioneer Battalion.....	38	672	3	32	41	704
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(11)	(81)	(3)	(32)	(14)	(113)
3 Pioneer Companies (each).....	(9)	(197)			(9)	(197)
Artillery Regiment.....	159	2,415	8	57	167	2,472
Headquarters & Service Battery.....	(23)	(193)	(4)	(9)	(27)	(202)
2 105mm Howitzer Battalions (each).....	(33)	(556)	(1)	(12)	(34)	(568)
Headquarters & Service Battery.....	(15)	(133)	(1)	(12)	(16)	(145)
3 Howitzer Batteries (each).....	(6)	(141)			(6)	(141)
2 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions (each).....	(35)	(555)	(1)	(12)	(36)	(567)
Headquarters & Service Battery.....	(14)	(132)	(1)	(12)	(15)	(144)
3 Pack Howitzer Batteries (each).....	(7)	(141)			(7)	(141)
3 Infantry Regiments (each).....	137	2,936	11	134	148	3,070
Headquarters & Service Company.....	(24)	(218)	(5)	(14)	(29)	(232)
Weapons Company.....	(8)	(195)			(8)	(195)
3 Infantry Battalions (each).....	(35)	(841)	(2)	(40)	(37)	(881)
Headquarters Company	(14)	(157)	(2)	(40)	(16)	(197)
3 Rifle Companies (each).....	(7)	(228)			(7)	(228)
Division Totals	843	15,548	119	955	962	16,503

¹ All unit strength figures enclosed in parentheses are included in strength totals of parent units.

MAJOR WEAPONS AND TRANSPORTATION—MARINE DIVISION

Weapons	Number	Transportation	Number
Carbine, .30 cal., M-1.....	10,953	Ambulance:	
Flamethrower, portable, M2-2.....	243	¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	52
Flamethrower, mechanized, E4-5.....	24	½-ton, 4 x 4.....	12
Gun:		Car, 5-passenger.....	3
37mm, M3, antitank.....	36	Station wagon, 4 x 4.....	3
75mm, motor carriage, M-3, w/armament, radio-equipped (TCS).....	12	Tractor:	
Gun, Machine:		miscellaneous.....	71
.30 cal., M1919A4.....	302	Trailer:	
.30 cal., M1917A1.....	162	¼-ton, cargo.....	135
.50 cal., M2.....	161	½-ton, dump.....	19
Gun, submachine, .45 cal.....	49	1-ton, cargo.....	155
Howitzer:		1-ton, water.....	74
75mm pack.....	24	miscellaneous.....	110
105mm.....	24	Truck:	
Launcher, rocket, antitank, M1A1.....	172	¼-ton, 4 x 4.....	323
Mortar:		¼-ton, 4 x 4, with radio.....	85
60mm.....	117	1-ton, 4 x 4, cargo.....	224
81mm.....	36	1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance.....	11
Pistol, .45 cal.....	399	2½-ton, 6 x 6, cargo.....	150
Rifle, .30 cal., M-1.....	5,436	2½-ton, 6 x 6, dump.....	53
Rifle, Browning, automatic.....	853	miscellaneous.....	68
Shotgun, 12 gauge.....	306		
Tank, Army medium, with armament..	46		
Vehicle, recovery, M32B2.....	3		

Marine Task Organization and Command List¹

MARINE GROUND UNITS

A. PELELIU (6 September–14 October 1944)

Expeditionary Troops

CG MajGen Julian C. Smith
 CofS Col Dudley S. Brown
 F-1 Col Harry E. Dunkelberger
 F-2 LtCol Edmund J. Buckley
 F-3 Col Robert O. Bare
 F-4 LtCol Jesse S. Cook, Jr.

III Amphibious Corps

(15Sep–14Oct)

CG MajGen Roy S. Geiger
 CofS Col Merwin H. Silverthorn
 C-1 LtCol Peter A. McDonald
 C-2 Col William F. Coleman
 C-3 Col Walter A. Wachtler
 C-4 Col Francis B. Loomis, Jr.

III Amphibious Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion

(15Sept–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson

¹ Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organization titles, and periods of service were taken from the muster rolls of the units concerned, held in the Diary Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, Headquarters Marine Corps. Units are listed only for those periods, indicated by the dates below parent unit designation, for which they are entitled to campaign participation credit. This information is derived from muster rolls and the U. S. Bureau of Naval Personnel, *Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual*—NAVPERS 15,790 (Rev. 1953) with changes (Washington, 1953–1958). The muster rolls have been the final authority when there is a conflict of unit entitlement within the overall campaign period as cited by the *Awards Manual*. In the case of Marine air units, many of which participated in the campaigns as flight or advance echelons only, the unit commander who was actually in the combat area is shown where muster rolls reveal this information. In order to conserve space, only units of battalion and squadron size, or larger, and sizable separate detachments are listed for each operation, although smaller organizations may have participated also.

III Amphibious Corps Troops

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO Col Max D. Smith

3d Base Headquarters Battalion

(22Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol William O. Smith

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO Maj Albert F. Reutlinger (to 21-Sep44)

Capt Arthur J. Noonan (from 22Sep44 to 10Oct44)

LtCol Maynard M. Nohrden (from 11Oct44)

3d Armored Amphibian Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Kimber H. Boyer

3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Richard A. Evans

6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO Capt John I. Fitzgerald, Jr.

7th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(6Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Henry R. Paige

8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Charles B. Nerren

8th 155mm Howitzer Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO Maj George V. Hanna, Jr.

12th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Merlyn D. Holmes

16th Field Depot

(15Sep–14Oct44)

CO LtCol Harlan C. Cooper

<i>Headquarters, 1st Marine Division</i>		<i>3d Battalion, 1st Marines</i>	
	(15Sep-14Oct44)	CO	LtCol Stephen V. Sabol
CG	MajGen William H. Rupertus		<i>5th Marines</i>
ADC	BGen Oliver P. Smith		(15Sep-14Oct44)
CofS	Col John T. Selden	CO	Col Harold D. Harris
D-1	Maj William E. Benedict (to 23-Sep44)	ExO	LtCol Lewis W. Walt
	LtCol Harold O. Deakin (from 24Sep44)	R-3	Maj Walter S. McIlhenny (to 16-Sep44)
D-2	LtCol John W. Scott, Jr.		Capt Donald A. Peppard (from 17Sep44)
D-3	LtCol Lewis J. Fields		<i>1st Battalion, 5th Marines</i>
D-4	LtCol Harvey C. Tschirgi	CO	LtCol Robert W. Boyd
	<i>Division Headquarters and Service Battalion</i>		<i>2d Battalion, 5th Marines</i>
	(15Sep-14Oct44)	CO	Maj Gordon D. Gayle
CO	Col Joseph F. Hankins (KIA 3-Oct44)		<i>3d Battalion, 5th Marines</i>
	LtCol Austin C. Shofner (from 3Oct44)	CO	LtCol Austin C. Shofner (WIA 15Sep44)
	<i>1st Engineer Battalion</i>		LtCol Lewis W. Walt (night 15-16Sep44)
	(15Sep-14Oct44)		Maj John H. Gustafson (from 16-Sep44)
CO	LtCol Levi W. Smith, Jr.		<i>7th Marines</i>
	<i>1st Medical Battalion</i>		(15Sep-14Oct44)
	(15Sep-2Oct44)	CO	Col Herman H. Hanneken
CO	Cdr Emil E. Napp, MC, USN	ExO	LtCol Norman Husa
	<i>1st Motor Transport Battalion</i>	R-3	Maj Walter Holomon
	(14Sep-2Oct44)		<i>1st Battalion, 7th Marines</i>
CO	Capt Robert B. McBroom	CO	LtCol John J. Gormley
	<i>1st Pioneer Battalion</i>		<i>2d Battalion, 7th Marines</i>
	(15Sep-14Oct44)	CO	LtCol Spencer S. Berger
CO	LtCol Robert G. Ballance		<i>3d Battalion, 7th Marines</i>
	<i>1st Service Battalion</i>	CO	Maj E. Hunter Hurst
	(15Sep-2Oct44)		<i>11th Marines</i>
CO	Col John Kaluf		(15Sep-14Oct44)
	<i>1st Tank Battalion</i>	CO	Col William H. Harrison
	(15Sep-14Oct44)	ExO	LtCol Edson L. Lyman
CO	LtCol Arthur J. Stuart	R-3	LtCol Leonard F. Chapman, Jr.
	<i>1st Marines</i>		<i>1st Battalion, 11th Marines</i>
	(15Sep-2Oct44)	CO	LtCol Richard W. Wallace
CO	Col Lewis B. Puller		<i>2d Battalion, 11th Marines</i>
ExO	LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr.	CO	LtCol Noah P. Wood, Jr.
R-3	Maj Bernard T. Kelly		<i>3d Battalion, 11th Marines</i>
	<i>1st Battalion, 1st Marines</i>	CO	LtCol Charles M. Nees
CO	Maj Raymond G. Davis		
	<i>2d Battalion, 1st Marines</i>		
CO	LtCol Russell E. Honsowetz		

4th Battalion, 11th Marines
CO LtCol Louis C. Reinberg

Island Command, Peleliu (1st Echelon)
(15Sep-14Oct44)
CO BGen Harold D. Campbell

B. PHILIPPINES
(20October-11December 1944)

Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps Artillery
(20Oct-29Nov44)

CG BGen Thomas E. Bourke
ExO Col Bert A. Bone
CofS Col Harold C. Roberts
A-1 Capt George K. Acker
A-2 Maj Leo S. Unger
A-3 LtCol Floyd R. Moore
A-4 LtCol Richard H. Crockett

5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion
(21Oct-11Dec44)
CO LtCol James E. Mills

11th 155mm Gun Battalion
(21Oct-11Dec44)
CO LtCol Thomas S. Ivey

C. IWO JIMA (19February-26March 1945)

Expeditionary Troops
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CG LtGen Holland M. Smith
CofS Col Dudley S. Brown
G-1 Col Russell N. Jordahl
G-2 Col Edmond J. Buckley
G-3 Col Kenneth H. Weir
G-4 Col George R. Rowan

Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion,
FMFPac
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Maj James L. Jones

V Amphibious Corps
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CG MajGen Harry Schmidt
CofS BGen William W. Rogers
C-1 Col David A. Stafford
C-2 Col Thomas R. Yancey, USA
C-3 Col Edward A. Craig
C-4 Col William F. Brown

V Corps Headquarters and Service Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt Cyril M. Milbrath

V Corps Troops
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col Alton A. Gladden

V Corps Signal Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Alfred F. Robertshaw

V Corps Medical Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LCrd William B. Clapp, MC, USN

2d Separate Engineer Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Charles O. Clark

8th Field Depot
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col Leland S. Swindler

1st Provisional Field Artillery Group
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col John S. Letcher

ExO LtCol Marin H. Floom

G-3 Maj William D. Winters, Jr.

2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Earl J. Rowse

4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Douglas E. Reeve

V Corps Provisional LVT Group
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Harry W. G. Vadnais

2d Armored Amphibian Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Reed M. Fawell, Jr.

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Sylvester L. Stephan

5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj George L. Shead

10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Victor J. Croizat

24th Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Ralph E. Boulton

V Corps Evac Hosp No. 1

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt H. G. Young, MC, USN

11th Amtrac Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Albert J. Roose

27th Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt Charles R. Puckett

28th Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Michael V. DiVita

30th Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt Donald J. Kendall, Jr.

31st Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt Thomas B. Tighe

34th Replacement Draft

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Capt Neil A. Weathers, Jr.

Island Commander, Iwo Jima

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO MajGen James E. Chaney, USA

Headquarters, 3d Marine Division

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CG MajGen Graves B. Erskine

ADC Col John B. Wilson

CofS Col Robert E. Hogaboom

D-1 Maj Irving R. Kriendler

D-2 LtCol Howard J. Turton

D-3 Col Arthur H. Butler

D-4 LtCol James D. Hittle

Division Headquarters and Service Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Jack F. Warner (to 14-Mar 45)

LtCol Carey A. Randall (from 14Mar45)

3d Engineer Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Walter S. Campbell

3d Medical Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Cdr Anthony E. Reymont, MC, USN

3d Motor Transport Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Ernest W. Fry, Jr.

3d Pioneer Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Edmund M. Williams

3d Service Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Paul G. Chandler

3d Tank Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Holly H. Evans

3d Marines

(19Feb-5Mar45)

CO Col James A. Stuart

ExO LtCol Newton B. Barkley

R-3 Capt Paul H. Groth

1st Battalion, 3d Marines

CO LtCol Ronald R. Van Stockum

2d Battalion, 3d Marines

CO LtCol Thomas R. Stokes

3d Battalion, 3d Marines

CO LtCol Ralph L. Houser

9th Marines

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col Howard N. Kenyon

ExO LtCol Paul W. Russell

R-3 Maj Calvin W. Kunz

1st Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Carey A. Randall (to 6-Mar45)

Maj William T. Glass (from 6-14Mar45)

LtCol Jack F. Warner (from 14-Mar45)

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol Harold C. Boehm

	<i>21st Marines</i>		<i>Division Headquarters and Service Battalion</i>
	(19Feb-16Mar45)		(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO	Col Hartnoll J. Withers	CO	Col Bertrand T. Fay
ExO	LtCol Eustace R. Smoak		<i>4th Engineer Battalion</i>
R-3	Capt Andrew Hedesh		(19Feb-16Mar45)
	<i>1st Battalion, 21st Marines</i>	CO	LtCol Nelson K. Brown
CO	LtCol Marlowe C. Williams (WIA 22Feb45)		<i>4th Medical Battalion</i>
	Maj Clay M. Murray (from 22- Feb45, WIA 22Feb45)	CO	Cdr Reuben L. Sharp, MC, USN
	Maj Robert H. Houser (from 22- Feb45)		<i>4th Motor Transport Battalion</i>
	<i>2d Battalion, 21st Marines</i>	CO	LtCol Ralph L. Schiesswohl
CO	LtCol Lowell E. English (WIA 2Mar45)		<i>4th Pioneer Battalion</i>
	Maj George A. Percy (from 2- Mar45)	CO	LtCol Richard G. Ruby
	<i>3d Battalion, 21st Marines</i>	CO	LtCol John E. Fondahl
CO	LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis	CO	LtCol Richard K. Schmidt
	<i>12th Marines</i>		<i>23d Marines</i>
	(19Feb-16Mar45)		(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO	LtCol Raymond F. Crist, Jr.	CO	Col Walter W. Wensinger
ExO	LtCol Bernard H. Kirk	ExO	LtCol Edward J. Dillon
R-3	LtCol Thomas R. Belzer	R-3	Maj Henry S. Campbell
	<i>1st Battalion, 12th Marines</i>		<i>1st Battalion, 23d Marines</i>
CO	Maj George B. Thomas	CO	LtCol Ralph Haas (KIA 20Feb- 45)
	<i>2d Battalion, 12th Marines</i>		LtCol Louis B. Blissard (from 20Feb45)
CO	LtCol William T. Fairbourn		<i>2d Battalion, 23d Marines</i>
	<i>3d Battalion, 12th Marines</i>	CO	Maj Robert H. Davidson (WIA 7Mar45)
CO	LtCol Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.		LtCol Edward J. Dillon (from 7-11Mar45)
	<i>4th Battalion, 12th Marines</i>		Maj Robert H. Davidson (from 11Mar45)
CO	Maj Joe B. Wallen		<i>3d Battalion, 23d Marines</i>
	<i>Headquarters, 4th Marine Division</i>	CO	Maj James S. Scales
	(19Feb-16Mar45)		<i>24th Marines</i>
CG	MajGen Clifton B. Cates		(19Feb-16Mar45)
ADC	BGen Franklin A. Hart	CO	Col Walter I. Jordan
CofS	Col Merton J. Batchelder	ExO	LtCol Austin R. Brunelli (to 8- Mar45)
D-1	Col Orin H. Wheeler		None shown (8-16Mar 45)
D-2	LtCol Gooderham L. McCormick	R-3	Maj Webb D. Sawyer
D-3	Col Edwin A. Pollock		
D-4	Col Matthew C. Horner		

1st Battalion, 24th Marines

CO Maj Paul S. Treitel (to 8Mar45)
 LtCol Austin R. Brunelli (from
 8Mar45)

2d Battalion, 24th Marines

CO LtCol Richard Rothwell

3d Battalion, 24th Marines

CO LtCol Alexander A. Vandegrift,
 Jr. (WIA 23Feb45)
 Maj Doyle A. Stout (from 23-
 Feb45)

25th Marines

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col John R. Lanigan
 ExO LtCol Clarence J. O'Donnell
 R-3 Maj John H. Jones

1st Battalion, 25th Marines

CO LtCol Hollis U. Mustain (KIA
 21Feb45)
 Maj Fenton J. Mee (from 21Feb-
 45)

2d Battalion, 25th Marines

CO LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr. (WIA
 20Feb45)
 LtCol James Taul (from 20Feb-
 45)

3d Battalion, 25th Marines

CO LtCol Justice M. Chambers (WIA
 22Feb45)
 Capt James C. Headley (from 22-
 Feb45)

14th Marines

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Col Louis G. DeHaven
 ExO LtCol Randall M. Victory
 R-3 Maj Frederick J. Karch

1st Battalion, 14th Marines

CO Maj John B. Edgar, Jr.

2d Battalion, 14th Marines

CO Maj Clifford B. Drake

3d Battalion, 14th Marines

CO LtCol Robert E. MacFarlane
 (WIA 19Feb45)
 Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 19-
 23Feb45)
 LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (from
 23Feb-10Mar 45)
 Maj Harvey A. Feehan (from 10-
 Mar45)

4th Battalion, 14th Marines

CO LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 23-
 Feb45)
 Maj Roland J. Spritzen (from 23-
 Feb-10Mar45)
 LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (from
 10Mar45)

Headquarters, 5th Marine Division

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CG MajGen Keller E. Rockey
 ADC BGen Leo D. Hermle
 CofS Col Ray A. Robinson
 D-1 Col John W. Beckett
 D-2 LtCol George A. Roll
 D-3 Col James F. Shaw, Jr.
 D-4 Col Earl S. Piper

Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj John Ayrault, Jr.

5th Engineer Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LtCol Clifford H. Shuey

5th Medical Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO LCdr William W. Ayres, MC,
 USN

5th Motor Transport Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Arthur F. Torgler, Jr.

5th Pioneer Battalion

(19Feb-16Mar45)

CO Maj Robert S. Riddell

- 5th Service Battalion*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Maj Francis P. Daly (KIA 22-Feb45)
None shown (from 22-27Feb45)
Maj Gardelle Lewis (from 27Feb-45)
- 5th Tank Battalion*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO LtCol William R. Collins
- 26th Marines*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Col Chester B. Graham
ExO Col Lester S. Hamel
R-3 LtCol William K. Davenport, Jr.
- 1st Battalion, 26th Marines*
CO LtCol Daniel C. Pollock (WIA 19Mar45)
Maj Albert V. K. Gary (from 19-Mar45)
- 2d Battalion, 26th Marines*
CO LtCol Joseph P. Sayers (WIA 23Feb45)
Maj Amedeo Rea (from 23Feb45)
- 3d Battalion, 26th Marines*
CO LtCol Tom M. Trotti (KIA 22-Feb45)
Capt Richard M. Cook (22Feb45 only)
Maj Richard Fagan (from 23-Feb45)
- 27th Marines*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Col Thomas A. Wornham
ExO Col Louis C. Plain (WIA 19Feb-45)
LtCol James P. Berkeley (from 15Mar45)
R-3 LtCol Justin G. Duryea (to 5Mar-45)
Capt Franklin L. Smith (from 5Mar45)
- 1st Battalion, 27th Marines*
CO LtCol John A. Butler (KIA 5-Mar45)
LtCol Justin G. Duryea (from 5-Mar45, WIA 9Mar45)
- Maj William H. Tumbelston
(from 9Mar45, WIA 14Mar45)
Maj William H. Kennedy, Jr.
(from 14Mar45)
- 2d Battalion, 27th Marines*
CO Maj John W. Antonelli (WIA 9-Mar45)
Maj Gerald F. Russell (from 9-Mar45)
- 3d Battalion, 27th Marines*
CO LtCol Donn J. Robertson
- 28th Marines*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Col Harry B. Liversedge
ExO LtCol Robert H. Williams
R-3 Maj Oscar F. Peatross (to 14-Mar45)
LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr.
(from 15Mar45)
- 1st Battalion, 28th Marines*
CO LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield
- 2d Battalion, 28th Marines*
CO LtCol Chandler W. Johnson (KIA 2Mar45)
Maj Thomas B. Pearce, Jr. (from 2Mar45)
- 3d Battalion, 28th Marines*
CO LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr. (to 14Mar45)
Maj Tolson A. Smoak (from 14-Mar 45)
- 13th Marines*
(19Feb-16Mar45)
CO Col James D. Waller
ExO LtCol Kenyth A. Damke
R-3 LtCol Jack Tabor
- 1st Battalion, 13th Marines*
CO LtCol John S. Oldfield
- 2d Battalion, 13th Marines*
CO Maj Carl W. Hjerpe
- 3d Battalion, 13th Marines*
CO LtCol Henry T. Waller
- 4th Battalion, 13th Marines*
CO Maj James F. Coady

MARINE AIR UNITS

*Headquarters Squadron Detachment,
1st Marine Aircraft Wing²..
(C—10Mar—4Jul45)³*

CO, HQ		W-2	Capt Charles J. Greene, Jr. (to 10Oct44)
Sqn-1	Capt Robert W. Baile		Capt Thomas C. Andrews (from 11Oct44)
	<i>Advance Echelon, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (B—24Sep—14Oct44)</i>	W-3	Col Lawrence T. Burke (to 2 Feb-44)
CG	MajGen James T. Moore		Col Carson A. Roberts (from 3-Feb—12Apr44)
AWC	BGen Harold D. Campbell		Col Lawrence T. Burke (from 13-Apr—16Jun44)
CofS	Col John Wehle		LtCol Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (from 16Jun—15Sep44)
W-1	Maj William K. Latians		Col Calvin R. Freeman (from 16-Sep44—1Feb45)
W-2	(None shown)		Maj Elmer G. Glidden, Jr. (from 2Feb—14Mar45)
W-3	Col Ronald D. Salmon		LtCol Martin A. Severson (from 15Mar45)
W-4	LtCol Walter T. Brownell	W-4	Maj Melville M. Nenefee (to 30-Sep44)
CO, Hq			Maj Granville Mitchell (from 1-Oct44)
Sqn-2	Maj Charles C. Campbell	CO, Hq-	
	<i>4th Marine Base Defense Aircraft Wing (Redesignated 4th Marine Aircraft Wing effective 10Nov44) (A—25Dec43—26Mar45)</i>	Sqn-4	Maj Melchior B. Trelfall (to 15-Oct44)
CG	BGen Lewie G. Merritt (to 15-May44)		Maj Charles C. Boyer (from 16-Oct—14Dec44)
	BGen Thomas J. Cushman (from 15May—20Aug44)		LtCol Alfred C. Cramp (from 15-Dec44—24Jan45)
	MajGen Louis E. Woods (from 21Aug44)		2dLt Robert J. Brown, Jr. (from 25Jan—3Feb45)
AWC	(None shown to 20Aug44)		Maj George F. Webster (from 4-Feb45)
	BGen Thomas J. Cushman (from 21Aug—31Oct44)		
	(None shown from 1Nov44)		
CofS	Col Frank H. Lamson-Scribner		
W-1	Maj Maurice L. McDermond (to 15Mar44)		
	Maj Lloyd E. Pike (from 16 Mar-5Sep44)		
	Col Lawrence T. Burke (from 6-Sep—17Nov44)		
	LtCol Corey C. Brayton (from 18-Nov44)		

³ Under each unit listed below there will appear a letter designation for each major area in which the unit operated, and dates of major involvement. Following are the campaigns and dates of entitlements, though individual units may have continued operations beyond the cutoff dates, particularly during the final months of the war.

A. Marshalls-Marianas-Bypassed
Islands25Dec43—26Mar45
B. Peleliu6Sep—14Oct44
C. Philippines10Oct44—20Jul45
D. Iwo Jima15Feb—16Mar45
² Headquarters, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing did not move to the Philippines until August 1945, shortly before the end of World War II.

Marine Aircraft Group 11

Advance Echelon (B—15Sep—14Oct44)

Rear Echelon (B—25Sep—14Oct44)

CO	Col Caleb T. Bailey
ExO	Col John S. Holmberg
GruOpsO....	LtCol Jeslyn R. Bailey
CO, Hq-	
Sqn-11 ..	Capt Cornelius Cole II
CO,	
SMS-11 ..	Maj Leslie T. Bryan, Jr.

Marine Aircraft Group 12

Advance Echelon (C—3Dec44—4July45)

Rear Echelon (C—17Mar—4Jul45)

CO	Col William A. Willis (to 26Feb-45)
	Col Verne J. McCaul (from 27-Feb45)

- ExO LtCol John L. Winston
 GruOpsO.... LtCol Frederick E. Leek
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-12 .. Capt Francis L. O'Melia
 CO,
 SMS-12 .. Capt William B. Freeman
Marine Aircraft Group 13
 (A—31Jan44-26Mar45)
 CO Col Lawrence Norman (to 16Dec-44)
 LtCol Chauncey V. Burnett (from 17Dec44)
 ExO Col Athur F. Binney (to 15Jul-44)
 LtCol Avery R. Kier (from 16-Jul-4Sep44)
 LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. from 5Sep-8Oct44)
 LtCol Chauncey V. Burnett (from 9Oct-16Dec44)
 LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from 17Dec44-3Feb45)
 LtCol Edward J. Moore (from 4-Feb-11Mar45)
 LtCol John V. Kipp (from 12-Mar45)
 GruOpsO.... LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (to 9-May44)
 LtCol Avery R. Kier (from 10 May-15Jul44)
 LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from 16Jul-4Sep44)
 LtCol Paul R. Byrum, Jr. (from 5Sep-8Oct44)
 LtCol Zane Thompson, Jr. (from 9Oct-16Dec44)
 Maj James C. Otis (from 17Dec-44-10Mar45)
 LtCol Edward J. Moore (from 11-Mar45)
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-13 .. Maj Harlan Rogers (to 22Apr44)
 Maj Stanley W. Burke (from 23-Apr-3Dec44)
 Capt Clement F. Hahn, Jr. (from 4Dec44)
 CO,
 SMS-13 .. Maj David Ahee (to 9Jun44)
 LtCol Corey C. Brayton, Jr. (from 10Jun-7Nov44)
 Maj Joseph A. Gray (from 8 Nov-44)
- Marine Aircraft Group 14*
 Advance Echelon (C—11Jan-15May45)
 Rear Echelon (C—23Feb-28May45)
 CO Col Zebulon C. Hopkins (to 17-May-45)
 Col Edward A. Montgomery (from 18May45)
 ExO LtCol Curtis W. Smith, Jr.
 GruOpsO.... Maj William C. Humberd
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-14 .. Capt Robert M. Crooks
 CO,
 SMS-14 .. Capt Droel H. Looney
Marine Aircraft Group 15
 (A—1Apr44-25Mar45)
 CO LtCol Ben Z. Redfield (to 31May-44)
 Col Thomas J. McQuade (from 1-Jun-30Sep44)
 LtCol Ben Z. Redfield (from 10-Oct44)
 ExO Maj Neil R. MacIntyre (to 31May-44)
 LtCol Ben Z. Redfield (from 1Jun-30Sep44)
 LtCol George D. Omer (from 1-31Oct44)
 LtCol Stanley W. Trachta (from 1Nov44-28Feb45)
 LtCol Edward F. Knight (from 1Mar45)
 GruOpsO Maj Ridgway Baker (to 1Oct44)
 Maj Clifford R. Banks, Jr. (from 1-31Oct44)
 LtCol Edward F. Knight (from 1-Nov44-21Jan45)
 Maj Charles W. Sommers, Jr. (from 22Jan-5Mar45)
 LtCol Desmond E. Canavan (from 6Mar45)
 CO, Hq-
 Sqn-15 .. Capt Louis F. Ferguson (to 15-Oct44)
 Maj Melchior B. Trelfall (from 16-Oct44-6Mar45)
 Maj Peter Ficker (from 7Mar45)
 CO,
 SMS-15 .. Maj Thomas H. Ray (to 8Sep44)
 1st Lt Thomas F. Wade, Acting (from 9Sep-5Nov44)
 Maj Thomas H. Ray (from 6Nov-44)

Marine Aircraft Group 21

(A—27Jul44–26Mar45)

CO Col Peter P. Schrider (to 6Sep44)
 Col Edward B. Carney (from 7-Sep44)

ExO LtCol James A. Booth, Jr. (to 2-Oct44)
 (None shown 3Oct–28Nov44)
 LtCol George D. Omer (from 29-Nov44–7Jan45)
 LtCol Wilfred J. Huffman (from 8Jan45)

GruOpsO LtCol Robert W. Clark (to 3Sep-44)
 LtCol James A. Embrey, Jr. (from 4Sep44–6Mar45)
 LtCol John S. Carter (from 7Mar-45)

CO, Hq-

Sqn-21 .. Maj Robert F. Higley

CO,

SMS-21 .. Maj Charlton B. Ivey (to 22Aug-44)
 Capt Albert I. Haas (from 23Aug-44–30Jan45)
 LtCol George E. Congdon (from 31Jan45)

Marine Aircraft Group 22

(A—19Feb44–26Mar45)

CO Col James M. Daly (to 9Oct44)
 Col Daniel W. Torrey, Jr. (from 10Oct44)

ExO LtCol Richard D. Hughes (to 14-Aug44)
 (None shown from 15–19Aug44)
 Col Edward B. Carney (from 20-Aug–17Sep44)
 LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr. (from 18Sep44–7Jan45)
 LtCol Elmer A. Wrenn (from 8-Jan45)

GruOpsO LtCol Julian F. Walters (to 24Jul-44)
 LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 25-Jul–3Aug44)
 LtCol Harrison Brent, Jr. (from 4Aug–17Sep44)
 LtCol Charles R. Luers (from 18-Sep–9Nov44)
 Maj Thomas C. Colt, Jr. (from 10Nov44)

CO, Hq-

Sqn-22 .. 1stLt John W. Hackner, Jr. (to 20-Nov44)
 Maj Alfred C. Cramp (from 21-Nov–18Dec44)
 Capt Lindsay K. Dickey (from 19-Dec44)

CO,

SMS-22 .. Capt John A. Hood (to 15Aug44)
 Capt Arthur Blakeney (from 16-Aug44–25Jan45)
 Maj Bruce Prosser (from 26Jan-45)

Marine Aircraft Group 24

Advance Echelon (C—11Jan–8Apr45)

Rear Echelon (C—22Jan–8Apr45)

(C—22Jan–4Jul45)

CO LtCol Lyle H. Meyer (to 31May-45)

Col Warren E. Sweetser, Jr. (from 1Jun45)

ExO LtCol John H. Earle, Jr.

GruOpsO LtCol Keith B. McCutcheon

CO, Hq-

Sqn-24 .. Capt J. Devereaux Wrather, Jr.

CO,

SMS-24 .. Capt Horace C. Baum, Jr. (to 21-Jan45)
 Maj William K. Snyder (from 22-Jan45)

Marine Aircraft Group 25

(C—30Oct44–1Apr45)

CO Col Allen C. Koonce (to 13Feb45)
 Col Harold C. Major (from 14Feb-45)

ExO LtCol John P. Coursey (to 13Nov-44)

LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from 25Nov44–8Feb45)

Col Warren E. Sweetser, Jr. (from 9Feb45)

GruOpsO LtCol Theodore W. Sanford, Jr. (to 4Mar45)

LtCol William H. Klenke, Jr. (from 5Mar45)

- CO, Hq-
Sqn-25 .. Capt LeRoy M. James (to 21Oct-44)
Maj Theodore E. Beal (from 22-Oct-9Nov44)
Maj Charles J. Prall (from 10-Nov44)
- CO,
SMS-25 .. LtCol Hillard T. Shepard (to 14-Nov44)
LtCol Albert S. Munsch (from 15-Nov44)
- Marine Aircraft Group 31*
(A-7Feb44-26Mar45)
- CO Col Calvin R. Freeman (to 12Sep-44)
LtCol Ralph K. Rottet (from 13-Sep-13Dec44)
LtCol Martin A. Severson (from 13Dec44-5Mar45)
Col John C. Munn (from 6Mar45)
- ExO Col Edward B. Carney (to 16Aug-44)
LtCol Ralph K. Rottet (from 17-Aug-13Dec44)
LtCol Richard D. Hughes (from 13Dec44-15Jan45)
LtCol Gordon E. Hendricks (from 16Jan45)
- GruOpsO LtCol Ralph K. Rottet (to 16 Aug-44)
LtCol Richard D. Hughes (from 17Aug-12Sep44)
LtCol Kenneth D. Kerby (from 13-30Sep44)
LtCol Lee C. Merrell, Jr. (from 10Oct-21Dec44)
LtCol Kirk Armistead (from 22-Dec44)
- CO, Hq-
Sqn-31 .. Capt Warren S. Adams II (to 9-Apr44)
Capt James C. Woodhull, Jr. (from 10Apr-31Dec44)
Capt William L. Thompson (from 1Jan-4Feb45)
Maj Leon A. Danco (from 5Feb45)
- CO,
SMS-31 .. Capt Neil A. Vestal (to 14Mar44)
Capt John Zouck (from 15Mar44-18Feb45)
Maj Archibald M. Smith, Jr. (from 19Feb45)
- Marine Aircraft Group 32*
Group Echelon (C-27Jan-22Feb45)
Flight Echelon (C-31Jan-22Feb45)
Advance Echelon (C-10Mar-4Jul45)
Rear Echelon (C-17Mar-4Jul45)
- CO Col Clayton C. Jerome
ExO LtCol John L. Smith
GruOpsO LtCol Wallace T. Scott
- CO, Hq-
Sqn-32 .. Capt Harold L. Maryott (to 17-Mar45)
1stLt Robert W. Mazur (from 18-Mar45)
- CO,
SMS-32 .. Maj Jack D. Kane
- Air Warning Squadron 1*
(A-20Feb44-26Mar45)
- CO Capt William D. Felder (to 20-Dec44)
Capt Edward R. Stainback (from 21Dec44)
- Advance Echelon, Marine Observation Squadron 1*
(D-19Feb-8Mar45)
- CO Lt Anthony E. Barrett, Jr.
- Air Warning Squadron 3*
(C-17Apr-4Jul45)
- CO Capt Harold W. Swope (to 1Jul45)
Capt Freeman R. Cass (from 2-Jul45)
- Advance Echelon, Marine Observation Squadron 3*
(B-15Sep-14Oct44)
- CO Capt Wallace J. Slappey, Jr.
- Air Warning Squadron 4*
(C-10Mar-4Jul45)
- CO Capt Charles T. Porter
- Marine Observation Squadron 4*
(D-19Feb-16Mar45)
- CO 1stLt Thomas Rozga
- Marine Observation Squadron 5*
(D-19Feb-16Mar45)
- CO 1stLt Roy G. Miller

Marine Fighter Squadron 111

(A—7Mar44—26Mar45)

- CO Maj J. Frank Cole (to 6Apr44)
 Maj William E. Clasen (7Apr-
 27Oct44)
 Maj William T. Herring (28Oct44-
 1Mar45)
 Maj Robert D. Kelly (from 2Mar-
 45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 112(USS *Bennington*)

(D—15Feb—4Mar45)

- CO Maj Herman Hansen, Jr.

Marine Fighter Squadron 113

(A—15Jan44—26Mar45)

- CO Capt Loren D. Everton (to 7Sep-
 44)
 Maj Charles Kimak (from 8Sep-
 18Dec44)
 Maj Philip R. White (from 19Dec-
 44—20Feb45)
 Maj Hensley Williams (from 21-
 Feb45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 114

Ground Echelon (B—15Sep—14Oct44)

Flight Echelon (B—26Sep—14Oct44)

- CO Capt Robert F. Stout

Marine Fighter Squadron 115

(C—17Dec44—4Jul45)

- CO Maj John H. King, Jr. (to 29May-
 45)
 Maj John S. Payne (from 30May-
 45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 121

Ground Echelon (B—15Sep—14Oct44)

- CO Maj Walter J. Meyer

Marine Fighter Squadron 122

Ground Echelon (B—15Sep—14Oct44)

Flight Echelon (B—1—14Oct44)

- CO Maj Joseph H. Reinburg

Advance Echelon Marine Fighter Squadron 123(USS *Bennington*)

(D—15Feb—4Mar45)

- CO Maj Everett V. Alward (to 25-
 Feb45)
 Maj Thomas E. Mobley (from 25-
 Feb45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 124(USS *Essex*)

(C—3—22Jan45)

(D—15Feb—4Mar45)

- CO Maj William A. Millington

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 133

(C—22Jan—4Jul45)

- CO Maj Lee A. Christoffersen (to 8-
 Mar45)
 Maj Floyd Cummings (from 9-
 Mar45)

Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 134

Ground Echelon (B—30Sep—14Oct44)

Flight Echelon (B—6—14Oct44)

- CO Maj Russell R. Riley

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 142

Ground Echelon (C—22Jan—4Jul45)

Flight Echelon (C—27Jan—4Jul45)

- CO Capt Hoyle R. Barr (to 8Jun45)
 Maj James L. Fritsche (from 9-
 Jun45)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 151

(A—29Feb44—26Mar45)

- CO LtCol Gordon H. Knott (to 30Oct-
 44)
 Maj Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr.
 (from 31Oct—4Dec44)
 Maj Bruce Prosser (from 5Dec44-
 25Jan45)
 Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from
 25Jan45)

Marine Observation Squadron 155(redesignated Marine Fighter Squadron 155,
 effective 31Jan45)

(A—1Nov44—26Mar45)

- CO Capt John P. Haines, Jr. (to 13-
 Jan45)
 Maj John E. Reynolds (from 14-
 Jan—14Feb45)
 Maj Wayne M. Cargill (from 15-
 Feb45)

Marine Fighter Squadron 211

(C—5Dec44—4Jul45)

- CO Maj Stanislaus J. Witomski (to 30Jan45)
 Maj Philip B. May (from 31Jan-20Mar45)
 Maj Angus F. Davis (from 21Mar-45)
Marine Fighter Squadron 212
 (C—19Jan—14May45)
- CO Maj Quinton R. Johns (to 27Apr-45)
 Maj John P. McMahon (from 28-Apr45)
Marine Fighter Squadron 213
 (USS *Essex*)
 (C—3—22Jan45)
 (D—15Feb—4Mar45)
- CO Maj Donald P. Frame (to 28Jan-45)
 Maj Louis R. Smunk (from 29Jan-4Feb45)
 Maj David E. Marshall (from 5-Feb45)
Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 216
 (USS *Wasp*)
 (D—15Feb—4Mar45)
- CO Maj George E. Dooley
Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 217
 (USS *Wasp*)
 (D—15Feb—4Mar45)
- CO Maj Jack R. Amende, Jr. (to 16-Feb45)
 Maj George E. Buck (from 17Feb-45)
Marine Fighter Squadron 218
 (C—10Mar—4Jul45)
- CO Maj John M. Massey
Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 221
 (USS *Bunker Hill*)
 (D—15Feb—4Mar45)
- CO Maj Edwin S. Roberts, Jr.
Marine Fighter Squadron 222
 (C—11Jan—14May45)
- CO Maj Roy T. Spurlock (to 27Apr45)
 Maj Harold A. Harwood (from 28Apr45)
- Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 223*
 (C—19Jan—15May45)
- CO Maj Robert F. Flaherty (to 24Mar-45)
 Maj Robert W. Teller (from 25-Mar—16Apr45)
 Maj Howard E. King (from 17-Apr45)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 224*
 (A—1Jan44—26Mar45)
- CO Maj Darrell D. Irwin (to 24Aug-44)
 Maj Howard A. York (from 24-Aug—31Dec44)
 Maj James W. Poindexter (from 31Dec44)
- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231*
 (A—4Feb44—1Aug45)
- CO Maj Elmer G. Glidden, Jr. (to 4-Sep44)
 Maj William E. Ablitt (from 5-Sep44—3Feb45)
 Maj Joseph W. White, Jr. (from 3Feb45)
- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 233*
 (C—26Jun—6Jul45)
- CO Capt Edmund W. Berry
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 236
 Advance Echelon (C—11Jan—4Jul45)
 Rear Echelon (C—28Jan—4Jul45)
- CO Maj Fred J. Frazer
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 241
 Advance Echelon (C—22Jan—4Jul45)
 Rear Echelon (C—25Jan—4Jul45)
- CO Maj Benjamin B. Manchester, III (to 19Feb45)
 Maj Jack L. Brushert (from 20-Feb45)
- Advance Echelon, Marine Torpedo-Bomber Squadron 242*
 (C—8—16Mar45)
- CO Maj William W. Dean
Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 243
 Ground Echelon (C—22Jan—4Jul45)
 Flight Echelon (C—31Jan—4Jul45)
- CO Maj Joseph W. Kean, Jr.

- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 244*
 Ground Echelon (C—22Jan—4Jul45)
 Flight Echelon (C—31Jan—4Jul45)
 CO Maj Vance H. Hudgins
- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 245*
 (A—1Jun44—15Aug45)
 CO Maj Julian F. Acers (to 23Sep44)
 Maj Robert F. Halladay (from 24-Sep44—30Jun45)
 Maj John E. Bell (from 1Jul45)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 251*
 (C—2Jan—12May45)
 CO Maj William C. Humberd (to 9-Feb45)
 Maj William L. Bacheler (from 10Feb—14Apr45)
 Maj Thomas W. Furlow (from 15-Apr45)
- Marine Transport Squadron 252*
 (D—3—9Mar45)
 CO LtCol Russell A. Bowen
- Marine Transport Squadron 253*
 (D—3—16Mar45)
 CO LtCol John V. Kipp (to 9Mar45)
 Maj Jack F. McCollum (from 10-Mar45)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 311*
 (A—15May44—20Jan45)
 CO Maj Harry B. Hooper, Jr. (to 23-Oct44)
 Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 24-Oct44)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 313*
 Ground Echelon (C—3Dec44—1Jun45)
 Flight Echelon (C—18Dec44—1Jun45)
 CO Maj Joe J. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 26-Apr45)
 Capt Jay E. McDonald (from 27—29Apr45)
 1stLt John M. Lomac (from 30-Apr45)
- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 331*
 Flight Echelon (A—25Feb44—1Aug45)
 Ground Echelon (A—2Mar44—1Aug45)
 CO Capt James L. Secrest
- CO Maj Paul R. Byrum, Jr. (to 9May-44)
 Maj James C. Otis (from 10May-15Dec44)
 Maj John H. McEniry (16Dec44—2Feb45)
 Maj Winston E. Jewson (from 3-Feb45)
- Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 341*
 Ground Echelon (C—22Jan—4Jul45)
 Flight Echelon (C—28Jan—4Jul45)
 CO Maj Christopher F. Irwin (to 3-May45)
 Maj Robert J. Bear (from 4May-45)
- Marine Transport Squadron 353*
 (B—6—14Oct44)
 (D—8—16Mar45)
 CO Maj John R. Walcott
- Marine Fighter Squadron 441*
 (A—1Jan44—6Apr45)
 CO Maj James B. Moore (to 4Apr44)
 Maj Grant W. Metzger (from 5-Apr44—20Jan45)
 Maj Robert O. White (from 21-Jan45)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 422*
 (A—24Jan44—25Apr45)
 CO Maj John S. MacLaughlin, Jr. MIA 24Jan44)
 Maj Edwin C. Fry (from 25Jan-1Feb44)
 Maj Elmer A. Wrenn (from 2Feb-31Dec44)
 Maj Elkin S. Dew (from 1Jan45)
- Advance Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 451*
 (USS *Bunker Hill*)
 (D—15Feb—4Mar45)
 CO Maj Henry A. Ellis, Jr.
- Marine Fighter Squadron 511*
 (USS *Block Island*)
 (C—26Jun—6Jul45)
 CO Capt James L. Secrest

	<i>Marine Fighter Squadron 512</i>		
	(USS Gilbert Islands)		
	(C—26Jun—6Jul45)		
CO	Maj Blaine H. Baesler	CO	LtCol Peter D. Lambrecht (to 20-Jun45)
			Maj Norman L. Mitchell (from 21Jun—7Jul45)
			Maj Reynolds A. Moody (from 8Jul45)
	<i>Marine Night Fighter Squadron 532</i>		
	(A—27Feb—23Oct44)		
CO	Maj Everett H. Vaughan (to 23-Sep44)		<i>Marine Bombing Squadron 611</i>
	Capt Warren S. Adams II (from 24Sep44)		Ground Echelon (C—17Mar—4Jul45)
			Flight Echelon (C—30Mar—4Jul45)
		CO	LtCol George A. Sarles (KIA 30-May45)
			Maj Robert R. Davis (from 1—19-Jun45)
			Maj David Horne (from 20Jun45)
	<i>Marine Night Fighter Squadron 534</i>		
	(A—4Aug44—15Aug45)		
CO	Maj Ross S. Mickey (to 23May45)		<i>Marine Bombing Squadron 612</i>
	Maj James B. Maguire, Jr. (from 24May—15Jun45)		(D—15Feb—16Mar45)
	Maj Clair C. Chamberlain (from 21Jun45)	CO	Maj Lawrence F. Fox
			<i>Marine Bombing Squadron 613</i>
			(A—23Dec44—26Mar45)
		CO	Maj George W. Nevils
			<i>Marine Transport Squadron 952</i>
			(B—1—14Oct44)
			(D—1—16Mar45)
		CO	Maj Malcolm S. Mackay
	<i>Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541</i>		
	Ground Echelon (A—15Sep44—28Aug45)		
	Flight Echelon (A—24Sep—3Dec44)		
	Flight Echelon (C—4Dec44—10Jan45)		
	Flight Echelon (A—11Jan—28Aug45)		

Marine Casualties¹

Location and Date	KIA		DOW		WIA		MIAPD		TOTAL	
	Officer	En-listed	Officer	En-listed	Officer	En-listed	Officer	En-listed	Officer	En-listed
Marines										
Peleliu ² (6Sep-14Oct44)	66	984	18	232	301	5,149	0	36	385	6,401
Iwo Jima (19Feb-26Mar45)	215	4,339	60	1,271	826	16,446	3	43	1,104	22,099
Aviation ³	66	49	3	6	91	212	44	32	204	299
Sea-duty	4	61	0	9	8	142	0	63	12	275
Total Marines	351	5,433	81	1,518	1,226	21,949	47	174	1,705	29,074
Naval Medical Personnel Organic to Marine Units ⁴										
Peleliu	1	49	0	11	11	238	0	0	12	298
Iwo Jima	4	183	0	22	19	622	0	0	23	827
Marine Aviation ⁵	0	2	0	0	2	10	0	0	4	10
Total Navy	5	234	0	33	32	870	0	0	39	1,135
Grand Total	356	667	0	1,551	1,258	22,817	47	174	1,744	30,209

¹ These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, Personnel Accounting Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, HQMC. Figures for the Peleliu Operation were certified and released on 1 June 1950; those for Iwo Jima in August 1952. Naval casualties were taken from NavMed P-5021, *The History of the Medical Department of the Navy in World War II* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953). The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows: KIA, Killed in Action; DOW, Died of Wounds; WIA, Wounded in Action; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed Dead. Because of the casualty reporting method used during World War II, a substantial number of DOW figures are also included in the WIA column.

² Includes Ngesebus.

³ Includes bypassed Marshalls, Carolines, Palau, Philippines, and Volcano Bonin Islands, overall period covering February 1944 - June 1945.

⁴ See Footnote (1) above.

⁵ Time frame identical to (3) above.

Unit Commendations

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to the

FIRST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

consisting of

FIRST Marine Division; First Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF; U.S. Navy Flame Thrower Unit Attached; Sixth Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Provisional), FMF; Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (Provisional), FMF; Detachment Eighth Amphibian Tractor Battalion, FMF; 454th Amphibian Truck Company, U.S. Army; 456th Amphibian Truck Company, U.S. Army; Fourth Joint Assault Signal Company, FMF; Fifth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF; Sixth Separate Wire Platoon, FMF,

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at Peleliu and Ngesebus from September 15 to 29, 1944. Landing over a treacherous coral reef against hostile mortar and artillery fire, the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, seized a narrow, heavily mined beachhead and advanced foot by foot in the face of relentless enfilade fire through rain-forests and mangrove swamps toward the air strip, the key to the enemy defenses of the southern Palaus. Opposed all the way by thoroughly disciplined, veteran Japanese troops heavily entrenched in caves and in reinforced concrete pillboxes which honeycombed the high ground throughout the island, the officers and men of the Division fought with undiminished spirit and courage despite heavy losses, exhausting heat and difficult terrain, seizing and holding a highly strategic air and land base for future operations in the Western Pacific. By their individual acts of heroism, their aggressiveness and their fortitude, the men of the FIRST Marine Division, Reinforced, upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

JOHN L. SULLIVAN,
Secretary of the Navy

E X T R A C T

GENERAL ORDERS)
No. 22)

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, D. C., 14 February 1947
Section
XV

BATTLE HONORS — Citation of Unit
XV — BATTLE HONORS.

The Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541 is cited for extraordinary performance of duty in action against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 3 to 15 December 1944. During a critical period in the fight for the control of the Philippine Islands, the pilots and ground crews of this unit signally distinguished themselves by the intrepidity and unyielding determination with which they overcame exceptionally adverse weather conditions and operational difficulties engendered by lack of ground facilities and incomplete radar directional coverage. Their superb airmanship and daring resourcefulness displayed in outstanding night patrol and interception work, which forestalled destruction of airfield facilities, and in the completeness of cover provided for numerous vital convoys and Patrol Torpedo boat patrols, effectively thwarted enemy attempts to prevent consolidation and further expansion of the foothold gained by United States forces in the Philippines. Achieving a record unparalleled at that time, the unit, composed of but 15 aircraft and 22 pilots, flew 136 sorties totaling 298.6 combat hours, destroyed 18 enemy aircraft in aerial combat without unit loss or damage, and on numerous occasions pitted consummate skill and accuracy against overwhelming numerically superior enemy strength. The extraordinary performance of the air and ground personnel of the Marine Fighter Squadron 541 in overcoming the greatest of aerial hazards and maintenance difficulties reflects the highest credit on themselves and the military service of the United States.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Chief of Staff

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the **PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION** to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces in the Philippine Islands from December 3, 1944, to March 9, 1945. Operating from the captured airfield at Tacloban, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE employed Corsairs as bombing planes to strike destructive blows at escorted enemy convoys and to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing their beleaguered garrisons by landing troops and supplies on western Leyte. Undeterred by intense aerial opposition and accurate antiaircraft fire, these pilots provided effective cover for ground troops, shore installations and Fleet units and, on several occasions, when ground troops were held up by heavy enemy fire, bombed and strafed Japanese positions, thereby enabling our land forces to advance unopposed. As hostile resistance lessened on Leyte, Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE expanded its sphere of operations to strike at enemy garrisons on the Visayan Islands and southern Luzon and to support the Lingayen beachheads, neutralizing the enemy's lines of communication, his harbors, airfields and escape routes, and ranging far from base to provide aerial cover for ships of the SEVENTH Fleet and merchant-ship convoys operating in the area. During February and the early part of March, this courageous Group gave direct support to Guerrilla units fighting on Cebu Island and aided in their rapid advance and the ultimate neutralization of the island. Well supported by skilled and dependable ground personnel, the gallant pilots of Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE caused the Japanese severe losses in airplanes, installations and surface craft, contributing to the achievement of air superiority so essential to the success of the campaign and thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS,
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

ASSAULT TROOPS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS, REINFORCED
UNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action during the seizure of enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945. Landing against resistance which rapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beaches with artillery, rocket and mortar fire, the Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps inched ahead through shifting black volcanic sands, over heavily mined terrain, toward a garrison of jagged cliffs barricaded by an interlocking system of caves, pillboxes and blockhouses commanding all approaches. Often driven back with terrific losses in fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Assault Troops repeatedly hurled back the enemy's counterattacks to regain and hold lost positions, and continued the unrelenting drive to high ground and Motoyama Airfield No. 1, captured by the end of the second day. By their individual acts of heroism and their unflinching teamwork, these gallant officers and men fought against their own battle-fatigue and shock to advance in the face of the enemy's fanatical resistance; they charged each strongpoint, one by one, blasting out the hidden Japanese troops or sealing them in; within four days they had occupied the southern part of Motoyama Airfield No. 2; simultaneously they stormed the steep slopes of Mount Suribachi to raise the United States Flag; and they seized the strongly defended hills to silence guns commanding the beaches and insure the conquest of Iwo Jima, a vital inner defense of the Japanese Empire."

The following Assault Troops of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps, United States Fleet Marine Force, participated in the Iwo Jima Operation from February 19 to 28, 1945:

9th Marines; 21st Marines; 3rd Engineer Battalion (less detachment); 3rd Tank Battalion; 3rd Joint Assault Signal Company (less detachment); Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, THIRD Marine Division; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 12th Marines; Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 1; 23rd Marines; 24th Marines; 25th Marines; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Tank Battalion; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Engineer Battalion; 1st Joint Assault Signal Company; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division; Companies A, B, and C, 4th Pioneer Battalion; 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division; Companies A and B and Detachment,

Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion; 7th Marine War Dog Platoon; Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 4; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 14th Marines; 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment; 26th Marines; 27th Marines; 28th Marines; 5th Engineer Battalion; 5th Tank Battalion; 6th War Dog Platoon; 5th Joint Assault Signal Company; 3rd Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 11th Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Companies A, B, and C, 5th Pioneer Battalion; Reconnaissance Company, Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company, Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division; 3rd Provisional Rocket Detachment; Pilots and Air Observers, Marine Observation Squadron 5; Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 13th Marines; Companies C, D, and Detachment, Headquarters Company, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion.

For the President,

JOHN L. SULLIVAN
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS SIGNAL BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For extremely meritorious service in support of military operations, while attached to the I Marine Amphibious Corps during the amphibious assault on Bougainville, and attached to the III Amphibious Corps during operations at Guam, Palau and Okinawa, during the period from November 1, 1943 to June 21, 1945. The first American Signal Battalion to engage in amphibious landings in the Pacific Ocean Areas; the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion pioneered and developed techniques and procedures without benefit of established precedent, operating with limited and inadequate equipment, particularly in the earlier phase of these offensive actions, and providing its own security while participating in jungle fighting, atoll invasions and occupation of large island masses. Becoming rapidly experienced in guerrilla warfare and the handling of swiftly changing situations, this valiant group of men successfully surmounted the most difficult conditions of terrain and weather as well as unfamiliar technical problems and, working tirelessly without consideration for safety, comfort or convenience, provided the Corps with uninterrupted ship-shore and bivouac communication service continuously throughout this period. This splendid record of achievement, made possible only by the combined efforts, loyalty and courageous devotion to duty of each individual, was a decisive factor in the success of the hazardous Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa Campaigns and reflects the highest credit upon the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the III Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion who actually participated in one or more of the Bougainville, Guam, Palau and Okinawa operations are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

THIRD 155-mm. HOWITZER BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Japanese forces on Peleliu, Palau Islands, from 15 to 29 September 1944. Landing on an unestablished beachhead between 300 and 400 yards deep despite rugged terrain and fanatic opposition, the Third 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion established a position across a 200-yard front and emplaced its weapons precariously on top of solid rock within 300 yards of heavily entrenched, well concealed Japanese fortifications on commanding ground. The Battalion effectively utilized its 155-mm. howitzers in the same method of operation as demolitions to pound hostile pillboxes, machine-gun positions and troop concentrations with heavy fire and succeeded in annihilating the enemy, breaking down the hillsides and closing the caves in the sheer coral cliffs with rubble. Ordered later to hold a defensive sector on the front lines, the men and officers of the Battalion functioned effectively as an infantry unit despite the lack of specific training, and resolutely held the line until relieved. Resourceful and daring in the unorthodox employment of howitzers, the Third 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion provided unfailing support vital to the conquest of this strategic enemy stronghold, thereby upholding the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Third 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion during this period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS
Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP ELEVEN

for service as follows:

“For outstanding heroism in support of military operations against enemy Japanese forces during the Peleliu Campaign and the consolidation of the Western Carolines from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945. Performing valuable service during the early stages of the Peleliu Campaign by coordinating with ground units in unloading, establishing the air base and furnishing riflemen and stretcher bearers, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN commenced air operations on September 24 while the airfield was still under direct enemy fire. Assigned the mission of providing close support for ground troops which necessitated utmost precision because of close in-fighting between the opposing forces, the officers and men evolved new and unique tactics as exemplified in the development of steep-angle glide-bombing with varied fuse settings for diversified targets; low-level precision skip-bombing of almost impregnable caves in precipitous cliffs; and the employment of napalm bombs without fuses to be fired simultaneously by phosphorus shells from infantry weapons. By their resourcefulness, courage and skill, the flight personnel and ground crewmen of Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN achieved an illustrious combat record in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN, consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN; Marine Service Squadron, Marine Aircraft Group ELEVEN; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE; Marine Fighting Squadron ONE HUNDRED TWENTY TWO; Marine Night Fighting Squadron FIVE HUNDRED FORTY ONE; and Marine Torpedo Bombing Squadron ONE HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR, from September 15, 1944, to January 31, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

EIGHTH 155-mm. GUN BATTALION

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces on Peleliu, Palau Islands, from 17 to 29 September 1944. Landing heavy material over treacherous coral reefs in the face of fanatic opposition, the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion pushed forward to the southern edge of the airfield where the enemy was concentrating the fire of heavy mortars and anti-boat and anti-tank guns. Undeterred by infiltrating Japanese troops and intense mortar barrages, this Battalion went into firing position and rendered effective support to the Eighty-First Army Division. Moving around the outlying islands in LVT'S equipped with radar, this gallant Battalion prevented the reinforcement of hostile defenses on Peleliu and, in the later stages, denied routes of escape to the remnants of the defending garrison. When the infantry was confronted by an almost impenetrable barrier of man-made and natural defenses which withstood the onslaughts of tank and demolition squads and the fire of mortars, machine guns and small arms, elements of the Battalion moved forward and boldly emplaced a 155-mm. gun in an unprotected position close to the enemy. Braving intense hostile fire which caused several casualties, this indomitable group courageously fired its weapon at point-blank range and succeeded in exploding concealed ammunition dumps, annihilating the enemy and completely eliminating the strong point, thus permitting the infantry to clear the area. By their valor, determination and fighting spirit, the officers and men of the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion rendered invaluable service in breaking down the enemy's resistance and in hastening the conquest of this strategic Japanese stronghold, achieving a gallant combat record in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the Eighth 155-mm. Gun Battalion during this period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE BOMBING SQUADRON SIX HUNDRED TWELVE

for service as follows:

“For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces during numerous offensive missions in the Central Pacific Area from November 1, 1944, to May 31, 1945. Aggressive and courageous in the execution of their manifold assignments, the pilots and aircrewmembers of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE served heroically despite severe weather and relentless opposition in a series of air-sea rescues, special experimental operations and highly successful night, low-level rocket attacks against strongly defended shipping and shore installations. By their expert airmanship and superb skill, they saved the lives of several B-29 crews, developed and tested valuable new technical equipment and destroyed or extensively damaged 29 Japanese ships. This outstanding record of service and combat achievement, made possible only by the teamwork and steadfast devotion to duty of the pilots, flight crews and maintenance men of Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE, is in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

The pilots, aircrewmembers and ground crews attached to Marine Bombing Squadron SIX HUNDRED TWELVE during the above mentioned period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP THIRTY-TWO

for service as follows:

“For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTH Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands, Areas, from January 23 to March 15, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO operated continuously against Japanese forces, flying a series of more than 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relentless air and ground force opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetrated numerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammunition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to our ground forces' sweeping victory in this area. The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of these courageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.”

All personnel of the United States Armed forces serving with Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY-TWO during the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-FOUR

for service as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United States SIXTH Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands Area, from January 23 to April 10, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with the assault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR operated continuously against Japanese forces, flying a series of more than 8,000 daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relentless air and ground force opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetrated numerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroying vital ammunition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troop concentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and contributed materially to the sweeping victory of our ground forces in this area. The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR reflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of these courageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel of the United States Armed Forces serving with Aircraft Group TWENTY-FOUR during the above period are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

SUPPORT UNITS OF THE FIFTH AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
UNITED STATES FLEET MARINE FORCE

for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in support of Military Operations during the seizure of enemy Japanese-held Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, February 19 to 28, 1945. Landing against resistance which rapidly increased in fury as the Japanese pounded the beaches with artillery, rocket and mortar fire, the Support Units of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps surmounted the obstacles of chaotic disorganization, loss of equipment, supplies and key personnel to develop and maintain a continuous link between thousands of assault troops and supply ships. Resourceful and daring whether fighting in the front line of combat, or serving in rear areas or on the wreck-obstructed beaches, they were responsible for the administration of operations and personnel; they rendered effective fire support where Japanese pressure was greatest; they constructed roads and facilities and maintained communications under the most difficult and discouraging conditions of weather and rugged terrain; they salvaged vital supplies from craft lying crippled in the surf or broached on the beaches; and they ministered to the wounded under fire and provided prompt evacuation to hospital ships. By their individual initiative and heroism and their ingenious teamwork, they provided the unfailing support vital to the conquest of Iwo Jima, a powerful defense of the Japanese Empire."

All personnel attached to and serving with the following Support Units of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps, United States Fleet Marine Force, during the Iwo Jima Operation from February 19 to 28, 1945, are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

Headquarters & Service Battalion; Medical Battalion; Signal Battalion; Motor Transport Company; Detachment, 1st Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon; Detachment, Signal, Headquarters, Air Warning Squadron 7 - Army Fighter Command; Detachment, 568th Signal Air Warning Battalion - Army; Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army; Detachment, 49th Signal Construction Battalion - Army; Detachment 44 - 70th Army Airways Communications Service - Army; Detachment, Communication Unit 434 (Group Pacific 11); Landing Force Air Support Control Unit No. 1; 2nd Separate Engineer Battalion; 62nd Naval Construction Battalion; 2nd Separate Topographical Company; Detachment, 23rd Naval Construction Battalion (Special); 8th Field Depot (plus Headquarters Shore Party); 33rd Marine Depot Company; 34th Marine Depot Company; 36th Marine Depot Company; 8th Marine Ammunition Company; Detachment, 8th Naval Construction Regiment; Corps Evacuation Hospital No. 1; 2nd Bomb Disposal Company; 156th Bomb Disposal Squad - Army; Company B, Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, Fleet Marine Force; A and C Platoons, 38th Field Hospital - Army; Joint Intelligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Intelligence Teams No. 22, 23, 24, and 25; Detachment,

Joint Intelligence Corps, Pacific Ocean Area, Enemy Materiel and Salvage Platoon; Detachment, 1st Platoon, 239th Quartermaster Salvage and Collection Company - Army; Detachment, Headquarters, Army Garrison Forces, APO 86; Detachment Headquarters, 147th Infantry - Army; Detachment, Headquarters, 7th Fighter Command - Army; Detachment, 47th Fighter Squadron - Army; Detachment, 548th Night Fighter Squadron - Army; Detachment, 386th Air Service Group (Special) - Army; Detachment, Group Pacific 11; Detachment, Port Director; Detachment, Garrison Beach Party; Headquarters & Service Battery, 1st Provisional Artillery Group; 2nd 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion; 4th 155-mm. Howitzer Battalion; 473rd Amphibian Truck Company - Army; Detachment, Headquarters & Headquarters Battery, 138th Antiaircraft Artillery Group - Army; Detachment, 506th Antiaircraft Gun Battalion - Army; Detachment, 483rd Antiaircraft Air Warning Battalion - Army; 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units); Headquarters Battalion, THIRD Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company); 3rd Marine War Dog Platoon; 3rd Service Battalion (less detachment); 3rd Pioneer Battalion (less 2nd Platoon, Company C), 3rd Medical Battalion (less Company C); 3rd Motor Transport Battalion (less Company C); 12th Marines (less detachment); Marine Observation Squadron 1 (less detachment); Headquarters Battalion, FOURTH Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company); 4th Motor Transport Battalion; 4th Medical Battalion; 133rd Naval Construction Battalion; 4th Tank Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C); 4th Engineer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C); 4th Service Battalion; 4th Pioneer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C); 442nd Port Company - Army; 14th Marines (less detachment); 4th Marine Amphibian Truck Company; 476th Amphibian Truck Company - Army; Marine Observation Squadron 4 (less detachment); Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army (FOURTH Marine Division-Reinf.); 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units); Headquarters Battalion, FIFTH Marine Division, (less Reconnaissance Company and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Military Police Company); 5th Medical Battalion; 13th Marines (less detachment); 5th Marine Amphibian Truck Company; 471st Amphibian Truck Company - Army; Marine Observation Squadron 5 (less detachment); Detachment, 726th Signal Air Warning Company - Army (FIFTH Marine Division-Reinf.); 5th Pioneer Battalion (less Companies A, B, and C); 31st Naval Construction Battalion; 592nd Port Company - Army; 5th Motor Transport Battalion; 5th Service Battalion; 27th and 31st Replacement Drafts (less Advance Groups and those assigned assault units).

JOHN L. SULLIVAN
Secretary of the Navy

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS, ZAMBOANGA

consisting of the following Marine Aircraft Groups:

Marine Aircraft Group TWELVE	March 10 - June 30, 1945
Marine Aircraft Group THIRTY TWO	March 16 - June 30, 1945
Marine Aircraft Group TWENTY FOUR	April 11 - June 30, 1945

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service and outstanding heroism in support of elements of the EIGHTH Army during operations against enemy Japanese forces on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, and in the Sulu Archipelago. After landing with the assault forces, Marine Air Groups, ZAMBOANGA, effected wide coverage of battle areas in flights made extremely hazardous by dense jungles, precipitous cloud-obscured mountains and adverse weather conditions. The gallant officers and men of these Groups penetrated hostile defenses to press relentless attacks and reduce vital enemy targets, disrupt communications and troop concentrations, and destroy ammunition and fuel dumps despite intense antiaircraft fire over Japanese objectives. The vital service rendered during these campaigns in providing convoy cover, fighter defense and close aerial support of ground forces is evidence of the courage, skill and devotion to duty of the pilots, aircrewmembers and ground personnel operating as a well coordinated team, and reflects the highest credit upon Marine Aircraft Groups, ZAMBOANGA, and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with Marine Aircraft Group 12, 32 or 24 during their respective periods of service as designated are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS
Secretary of the Navy

Index

- Abuyog, 310, 321-322
ACETYLENE Island, 181*n*, 183-184
Acker, Capt George K., 314
Adams, Maj Hank, 248
Admiralty Islands, 67, 83, 292, 315, 363, 407
Advance Base Force, 14, 16
Advance base warfare, 14
AGGRAVATE, 181*n*, 183
 Aineman Island, 414
Ainsworth, RAdm Walden L., 278
Air activities
 American, 43, 95, 99, 227, 236, 340, 363, 368, 373, 381, 388, 718, 735
 air alerts, 624
 air attacks, 172, 450, 455-456, 735
 air combat, 278, 378, 385, 434, 561
 air coordination, 305-306, 354, 377, 385
 air cover, 328
 air defense, 319, 326, 598, 708
 air drops, 597
 air escort, 601
 air freight, 604
 air gunfire, 280, 605, 719
 air liaison officers, 171, 352-353, 390
 air liaison parties, 106*n*, 277, 283, 306-308, 342-344, 349, 351, 353, 356, 368, 370, 378, 718, 735
 airlift, 723
 air neutralization, 184
 air preparation, 210
 air observation, 281, 317, 320, 373, 600, 668, 671, 686, 719
 air observers, 660, 707, 718
 air offensive, 492
 air photography, 163, 368, 472, 474, 486
 air raids, 717, 729
 air reconnaissance, 382, 486
 air-sea rescue, 103, 717
 air strikes, 135-137, 141-142, 157, 172, 177, 224, 226, 241-242, 249, 260, 282-283, 306, 314, 327, 332, 335, 342, 346, 350-354, 366-367, 370, 372, 381, 383, 386, 399, 412, 415, 423, 430, 435, 453, 472-473, 485-486, 490, 500, 504, 534, 551, 558, 562-563, 586, 591-592, 601, 611, 638, 643-644, 648, 665, 668, 672, 676, 698, 714-715, 717-718, 735
 air superiority, 670, 728
 air supply, 725
 air support, 63, 97, 101, 153, 180, 211, 256, 283-284, 303, 306, 309, 350, 354, 356, 373, 384, 531, 538, 547, 555, 558, 611, 636, 643, 684, 686, 691, 699, 717
 bombing support, 190, 221, 728
 carrier-based support, 76-77, 106*n*, 283, 292, 306, 340, 424, 436, 489, 491, 737
 close air support, 17, 83, 99, 216, 283-284, 291, 304-307, 328, 332, 339-340, 343, 347, 349, 352-353, 368, 370, 378, 384-385, 387-388, 390, 393, 397, 423, 435, 440, 495, 512, 598, 640, 655, 699, 714, 718, 735
 dive bombing, 305, 374, 388
 emergency landings, 325, 438, 464, 597-598, 601
 fighter missions, 291
 ground controllers, 328, 385
 rocket strikes, 141, 506
 strafing, 190, 211, 221, 283
Japanese
 air attacks, 71, 190, 318-319, 325, 328, 330, 335, 400, 413, 451, 570
 air defense, 298
 air efforts, 337, 375, 396
 air garrisons, 340, 734
 air neutralization, 309
 air power, 309, 331, 405, 432, 597
 air strength, 298, 331, 336, 379, 393, 405, 450, 466, 539, 601, 731
 air support, 70, 670
Aircraft
 American, 81, 184, 199, 210-211, 224, 262, 264, 329, 350, 361-362, 376, 381, 393, 412, 417, 422-423, 493*n*, 548, 554, 644, 716, 720
Types
 B-24s (Liberators), 101-102, 193, 218, 399, 459, 473, 485 485*n*, 487, 495-496, 499, 504, 717
 B-25s (Mitchells), 353, 412
 B-29s (Super Fortresses), 429, 429*n*, 438, 462-464, 476, 479, 487, 597-598, 600-601, 679, 683, 731
 bombers, 43, 58, 325, 400, 407, 413, 430,

- 462, 487, 500, 503-504, 598, 717, 734
 C-46s (Commandos), 199, 604
 C-47s (Skytrains), 199, 326, 604
 C-54s (Skymasters), 427
 carrier-based, 5, 40, 64, 77, 82, 102-103,
 108, 141-142, 152-153, 165, 232, 298,
 301, 422, 436, 495-496, 500, 530, 574,
 587, 595, 610, 621, 623, 633, 638-640,
 718
 dive bombers, 43, 143, 340, 342-344, 346-
 347, 350, 352, 359, 370, 378-379, 382-
 383, 385, 393, 407, 412, 422, 718
 escort fighters 439, 600-601
 F4Us (Corsairs), 99, 143, 211, 228, 256,
 284, 326-332, 335, 339, 365, 368, 371-
 372, 375, 378, 383, 399, 401-402, 404,
 408, 412-414, 416, 428-429, 432-433,
 436, 503
 F6Fs (Hellcats), 100, 199, 326-327, 333,
 371, 399, 412, 427, 429, 436, 451-452
 F6F-Ns, 429, 432
 FMs, 371
 fighter-bombers, 108, 386, 412, 416, 429
 fighters, 58, 172, 328, 350, 362, 379, 382-
 383, 399, 404, 407, 413, 422, 429, 435,
 452, 495, 499, 503, 576, 597, 600, 691,
 718
 floatplanes, 101
 flying boats, 367, 439
 J2F-6s, 429
 L-4s, 317, 370
 L-5s, 212
 medium bombers, 43, 325, 382-383, 429
 night fighters, 193, 199, 326-328, 330,
 333, 371, 400, 411, 413, 422, 425, 429,
 526, 560
 OS2Us, 495
 OYs, 429, 432, 595
 observation planes, 101, 426, 429, 436-
 437, 495, 595, 617, 658, 718, 720
 P-40s, 329
 P-47s, 423
 P-51s, 436, 464, 598, 643, 643*n*
 P-61s, 326, 328, 371, 526, 598
 PBJs (Mitchells), 371, 373-374, 380,
 387, 429, 436, 485
 PBYs, 199, 371
 R4Ds (Skytrains), 371, 408, 437-438,
 597
 R5Cs (Commandos), 437, 597
 reconnaissance planes, 415, 417
 SB2Cs (Helldivers), 371, 389, 418
 SBDs (Dauntlesses), 339, 342-344, 346,
 353-354, 356-357, 370-371, 378, 383-
 386, 388, 399, 414
 spotting planes, 317-318, 386, 436, 714
 TBFs (Avengers), 193, 318, 371, 426,
 429,, 433-434
 TBMs (Avengers), 429
 torpedo bombers, 43, 422, 424, 426-427,
 429, 432, 576, 595
 transports, 325, 356, 632-363, 401, 412,
 422, 438, 480, 597, 604
 utility planes, 429
 Japanese, 71, 259, 276, 278, 300, 312, 324,
 328, 366-367, 382, 429, 450, 484, 732
 Types
 Bettys (medium bombers), 276, 356
 bombers, 407, 411, 413, 452
 carrier-based, 300
 dive bombers, 330
 fighters, 101, 327-330, 375, 400, 412, 451-
 452
 float planes, 71, 228, 259
 heavy bombers, 300
 Lilys (light bombers), 374
 medium bombers, 276
 night bombers, 326
 night fighters, 326, 330
 torpedo bombers, 330, 451-452
 transports, 321-322
 Zeros (fighters), 399, 404, 412, 451-452,
 495
 Airfield No. 1 (Iwo Jima), 449*n*, 459, 471, 479,
 495, 504, 514-516, 518-519, 525, 528, 547,
 549, 551, 557, 560, 563-565, 571, 595, 597-
 598, 600, 603-604, 633, 651, 716, 720
 Airfield No. 2 (Iwo Jima), 447, 449*n*, 459, 471,
 479, 509, 525, 548, 555-558, 561-563, 565-
 567, 569, 574-576, 586, 595, 597, 600, 616,
 644-647, 649, 701, 716, 720
 Airfield No. 3 (Iwo Jima), 459, 574, 578, 581-
 586, 600, 684, 708
 Airfields
 American, 58, 118, 152-153, 162, 173, 177,
 179, 181, 187, 189, 192-193, 199, 204,
 212, 214, 217, 222-224, 227-228, 237,
 241, 259, 268, 273-274, 277-281, 287,
 298, 314-315, 319, 323, 325, 339, 361, 363,
 365, 463, 485*n*, 600-601, 608
 Japanese, 58, 117, 120-124, 126, 131, 134,
 139, 141, 144, 156, 161, 180, 324, 336,
 393, 395-396, 405
 AK-98, 316

- Akalokul, 58
 Akarakoro Point, 190
 Aleutian Islands, 6, 21, 23, 467, 730, 734
 Allender, LCdr Byron E., 151*n*
 Allied
 air effort, 736
 invasion fleet, 340
 invasion, North Africa, 733
 news service, 612
 planners, 614
 powers, 613
 prisoners of war, 730
 ships, 336
 Allied Forces, 5, 54, 179, 301, 382, 440, 448, 729, 730, 732, 734
 Allies, Western, 729
 AMAZEMENT Island, 181, 181*n*, 183
 AMELIORATE, 181*n*, 183–184. *See also* Fala-
 lop Island.
 Amiangai, 208
 Ammunition
 American, 87–88, 128, 152, 240, 269, 279, 318, 476–477, 492, 523, 553, 601, 611, 678, 689, 720, 722
 artillery, 88, 127, 603, 610
 bombs, 108, 227, 408, 530, 534, 548, 551, 565, 613, 644, 691
 8-inch, 363, 587, 610
 81mm mortar, 152, 209, 523, 526, 563, 597
 15-inch, 587
 .50 caliber, 414, 551
 5-inch, 610
 14-inch, 145, 563, 565, 610
 40mm, 261, 315, 497, 505
 gas shells, 613
 high-explosive shells, 145, 156
 machine gun, 87, 127, 173
 mortar shells, 597, 611
 napalm bombs, 224–225, 249, 254, 256, 271, 283–284, 370, 378–379, 385–386, 416, 432, 436, 487, 499, 503, 506, 523, 530, 536, 611, 638, 658, 677, 717
 155mm howitzer, 587
 105mm, 152, 587, 672
 pyrotechnics, 258
 rockets, 241, 387, 418, 436, 481, 495, 497, 503, 505, 530, 534, 551, 565, 590, 611, 623, 631, 638, 649, 674, 685, 707, 727, 729
 75mm, 155, 587, 615, 644, 650, 672, 705
 16-inch, 610
 smoke, 154, 160, 206, 209, 230, 262, 352, 497, 501, 568, 589, 635
 star shells, 152, 270, 281, 526, 589, 610, 678–679, 725
 .30 caliber, 173
 tracer, 408
 12-inch, 610
 20mm, 261, 315, 578
 Japanese, 226, 249, 530, 654, 695
 aerial bombs, 72, 193, 258, 375, 636*n*
 aerial torpedos, 565–566
 antipersonnel bombs, 424
 armor-piercing shells, 123, 513
 artillery, 231, 367, 527, 545
 .50 caliber, 415, 420
 gas shells, 624
 illuminating, 258
 mortar, 526, 662, 673, 675, 727
 Amoy, 293, 465
 Amphibious assault operations, 10, 13–17, 33–34, 43, 71, 84, 168, 211, 278–279, 281, 286, 304, 359, 448, 463, 478, 487, 505, 715
 Amphibious doctrine, tactics, 10, 268, 737
 Amphibious exercises, 14, 162, 483
 Amphibious Training Command, 304
 Amphitheater, 568, 572, 595, 616, 646–648, 650, 656–657, 661, 663–665, 667, 671–672, 681–682
 Anderson, Capt Carl E., 602; RAdm, 602 *n*
 Angat River, 346
 Angaur, 52, 55, 57, 59, 62–63, 68–69, 79–80, 88, 134, 161–163, 165–166, 168–169, 171–175, 177–179, 181, 183–184, 187, 223, 279, 284–287, 430–431, 433, 733–734
 operation, 166, 173, 177–178, 180
 Annapolis, Maryland, 14
 Anso, Maj Kenro, 659
 Antonelli, Maj. John W. A., 508, 514, 618, 642–643
 Apamama Island, 398–399, 413
 Apennine Peninsula, 733
 Apra Harbor, 426
 Arakabesan, 57
 Ardennes, 729
 offensive, 735
 Arkansas, 493, 503
 Armor. *See also* Army Units; Marine Units; Weapons.
 American, 153–154, 158, 172, 212, 235, 272–273, 512, 514–515, 517, 519, 534, 549, 554, 565–567, 584, 592, 618, 621, 623, 628, 631–632, 637, 639, 647–649, 662, 672–673, 676, 687, 691, 727
 Japanese, 123

- Armstrong, PFC P. E., 344*n*
- Army Air Forces, 102, 307, 309, 325, 332, 359, 361, 366, 377, 386, 393, 396, 407, 436, 462, 464, 486-487, 496, 500, 640, 699, 712
- Units
- Far East Air Forces, 301, 303, 324-325, 359, 365, 388
 - Strategic Air Forces, 417
 - Fifth Air Force, 78, 101, 301, 307, 312, 326, 328, 332-334, 339, 353, 382, 389
 - Seventh Air Force, 396, 412, 473, 485, 717
 - Thirteenth Air Force, 301, 309, 334, 359, 362, 366, 368, 377, 382, 384, 390
 - Fourteenth Air Force, 334
 - Twentieth Air Force, 334
 - VII Bomber Command, 485, 485*n*
 - XX Bomber Command, 463-464
 - V Fighter Command, 333
 - VII Fighter Command, 603, 710
 - XIII Fighter Command, 388
 - 308th Bombardment Wing, 339, 342-344, 346, 349, 354
 - 310th Bombardment Wing, 331
 - 313th Bombardment Wing, 487
 - 15th Fighter Group, 598, 598*n*
 - 21st Fighter Group, 708
 - 48th Bombardment Squadron, 412
 - 419th Night Fighter Squadron, 368
 - 28th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 473
 - 9th Troop Carrier Squadron, 438, 597, 604
 - 973d Aviation Engineer Battalion, 367
 - 465th Aviation Squadron, 708
 - 76th Fighter Control Center, 368
 - 77th Fighter Control Center, 371, 383
- Army-Navy joint communications procedure, 35
- Army Units
- Chemical Warfare Service, 477, 613
 - Field Service Command, 30
 - Pacific Ocean Areas, 476
 - Southwest Pacific Area, 291, 293, 293*n*
 - Garrison Force Zero, 603
 - Sixth Army, 309-310, 315-316, 320-321, 325, 334, 337, 339-340, 342, 348-349, 357-359
 - Eighth Army, 332, 358-359, 365, 367, 374, 382
 - Tenth Army, 38, 465
 - I Corps, 20, 352
 - X Corps, 310, 315, 319, 321, 337, 359, 381-384, 386-387
 - XIV Corps, 303, 337, 342, 352
 - XXIV Corps, 63, 65, 301, 314-321, 323
 - XXIV Corps Artillery, 314, 319, 323
 - Americal Division, 375-377
 - 1st Cavalry Division, 301, 310, 334, 342-344, 346-348, 351-352, 354
 - 1st Infantry Division, 20, 34, 353
 - 3d Infantry Division, 34
 - 6th Infantry Division, 352-354
 - 7th Infantry Division, 34, 310, 315-318, 321, 400
 - 9th Infantry Division, 34, 36, 315
 - 11th Airborne Division, 322, 354
 - 24th Infantry Division, 310, 365, 384, 387, 390
 - 25th Infantry Division, 354
 - 31st Infantry Division, 381, 384-386, 390
 - 32d Infantry Division, 310
 - 37th Infantry Division, 307, 346, 354
 - 38th Infantry Division, 354
 - 40th Infantry Division, 354, 375-376
 - 41st Infantry Division, 359, 362, 366-368, 370-371, 373-374, 378-379, 390
 - 43d Infantry Division, 354
 - 77th Infantry Division, 63, 181, 310, 328, 332, 427
 - 81st Infantry Division, 63, 79, 96, 153, 162-163, 165, 170, 175, 177-180, 186-187, 250, 252, 254, 258, 260, 262, 264, 274, 282, 284-286. *See also* Wildcats.
 - 96th Infantry Division, 180-181, 310, 315-316, 318, 321
 - 1st Cavalry Brigade, 354
 - Infantry Regiments
 - 20th, 315
 - 33d, 315
 - 124th, 385
 - 147th, 608, 708, 711
 - 162d, 374
 - 163d, 374
 - 321st, 166, 168-171, 173-176, 178, 180, 186-187, 190, 192-193, 197, 201-202, 204, 209, 217-218, 221-224, 237, 242, 246, 249, 251, 254, 261
 - 322d, 166, 168-173, 176, 178-180
 - 323d, 163, 168, 180-181, 183-184, 251, 257-259, 264
 - 726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 254
 - 287th Artillery Observation Battalion, 314, 316-318, 322
 - 506th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, 603, 708
 - 154th Engineer Battalion, 254

- Field Artillery Battalions
 198th, 314, 316–317, 319
 226th, 314, 316–320
- Infantry Battalions
 1/162, 371
 1/321, 170–171, 173–176, 189, 192, 210, 254, 256–257
 1/322, 171–174
 1/323, 250, 254, 256–257, 262
 2/15, 190, 226
 2/162, 371
 2/321, 173–174, 176, 178, 189, 192, 195, 197, 199, 201, 206–207, 214, 223, 250, 254, 256–257
 2/322, 171–174, 176, 187, 193
 2/323, 257, 260–262
 3/124, 385
 3/321, 173–176, 187, 189, 192, 195, 198, 200, 206–207, 250, 254, 257
 3/322, 171–174, 197, 199
- 6th Ranger Battalion, 310
- 710th Tank Battalion, 174, 187, 224, 228–229, 240, 254
- 471st Amphibian Truck Company, 475, 516
- 295th Joint Assault Signal Company, 384
- 442d Port Company, 602
- 592d Port Company, 602
- 38th Field Hospital, 603, 710
- Arnold, MajGen William H., 377, 463–464
- Artillery
 American, 80–81, 84, 103, 129, 132, 135, 137, 142, 151–153, 157, 161, 173, 175, 187, 190, 195, 205, 208, 210, 224, 242, 244, 246, 254, 269, 272, 274, 281, 291, 300–301, 314, 316–320, 322–323, 379–380, 416, 423, 484, 504, 508, 516, 521, 530–531, 534, 538, 549–550, 552, 554–556, 560, 563, 565–567, 573, 576–585, 587, 589, 591, 605, 611, 617, 623–624, 626–627, 632–635, 638–639, 648–652, 654, 658, 661–663, 666–669, 671–674, 676, 679, 681, 684, 686, 691, 697–699, 704, 708, 714, 717, 719–722, 726–727
- Filipino, 348
- Japanese, 109, 115, 122, 127–128, 134, 141–142, 156, 177, 278, 350, 407, 453–454, 454*n*, 456–457, 474, 493*n*, 497–498, 519–520, 525–526, 531, 533–534, 538, 545, 549–551, 553–554, 557–558, 561, 564, 566, 568, 570, 575, 582, 584, 586–587, 595, 597, 603, 617, 624, 626, 629, 647, 651, 653, 655–656, 658, 662, 666, 669, 671, 674, 677, 718, 723, 726
- Asbill, Maj Edward L., 671
- Asia, 294
 Eastern, 735
 Southeast, 51, 294, 463
- Asias (village), 58–59, 148
- Aslito Airfield, 423–424
- Atlantic Ocean, 21, 444
- Atomic warfare, 737. *See also* Weapons.
- Atsuchi, Capt Kanehiko, 533*n*; Col, 533, 533*n*, 536, 537*n*, 538, 542
- Attu, 467, 734
- Auburn, 605, 607, 619
- Auckland, New Zealand, 431
- Aur Atoll, 418
- Auriga, 314, 316
- Australia, 291, 444
- Aviators. *See* Pilots.
- Axis, 736
- Aycrigg, Lt William A., 403
- Azores, 43
- Babelthuap Island, 57, 60–62, 68–69, 79, 162–163, 166, 175, 190, 193, 222, 225, 232, 241–242, 262, 264–265, 281, 432–433, 733–734
- Baker, Maj Harry F., 437
- Baker, Col R. M., 15
- Baldy Ridge, 224, 226, 228, 234, 237–238, 241–242, 244–245
- Balete Pass, 357
- Baliuag, 346
- Balkans, 443, 729
- Ballance, LtCol Robert G., 84, 86
- Baltic Sea, 443
- Bangkal, 379
- Bangkok, 463
- Banika Island, 89–90, 95, 393, 400
- Bard, Capt Elliott E., 42
- Basilan Island, 374
- Basilan Strait, 363, 366, 374
- Basilone, GySgt John, 514
- Bataan Peninsula, 348, 690
- Batangas Peninsula, 342
- Bates, Lt Wesley C., 512
- Battle for Leyte Gulf, 312, 321, 323, 443
- Battle of Midway, 430
- Battle of the Philippine Sea, 443
- Baybay, 310, 321
- Bayfield*, 648
- Bayug Airfield, 325
- Beach, Capt C. C., 415*n*
- Beaches, 58, 72, 77, 79, 86–87, 94, 118, 121, 128,

- 131, 259-260, 274, 472, 482, 527, 603, 617, 623, 717, 722, 724
 Blue, 163, 165-166, 168-169, 508, 519, 525, 557
 Blue 1, 316, 471, 471*n*, 508, 519-521, 548
 Blue 2, 471, 471*n*, 519-521, 525
 Brown, 602
 Green, 165, 169, 471, 513, 516, 526
 Green 1, 471, 508, 510
 Green 2, 173
 Orange, 79, 81-82, 106, 108, 119*n*, 137, 187, 232, 268, 602
 Orange 1, 80, 115
 Orange 2, 80, 115-117, 121, 129
 Orange 3, 80, 116, 119, 119*n*, 120, 131, 152, 233
 Purple, 187, 201, 228, 236, 251, 258, 268, 274, 602-603
 Purple 2, 603
 Red, 163, 165-166, 168, 176, 472, 508, 514
 Red 1, 471, 508, 512-513, 515, 552
 Red 2, 471, 508, 513, 515
 Scarlet, 193
 White, 79-82, 106, 108, 110, 144, 264, 268, 274, 602
 White 1, 108-110, 112
 White 2, 110
 Yellow, 424, 508-509, 517, 525, 555
 Yellow 1, 471, 508, 517-518, 522, 526, 548, 552, 560
 Yellow 2, 471, 508, 516-517, 519
 Beachheads, 73, 85, 430. *See also* Beaches.
 Beachmasters, 85, 87
 Beach parties, 282, 601. *See also* Shore party activities.
 Belgium, 6
 Bell, BGen Marcus B., 187, 211, 264*n*
 Benedict, LtCol William E., 97*n*, 109*n*,
 Berger, LtCol Spencer S., 92*n*, 147, 229, 253, 275
 Berlin, 730
 Betio Island, 396-397, 401
 Biak, 71, 457
 Bismarck Archipelago, 438
Bismarck Sea, 537
 Bivouac areas, 151
 Blackburn, Capt Donald D., 348
 Blaha, Capt Nathan D. 424
 Blanchard, Capt Rolfe T., 329*n*, 372
 Blandy, RAdm William H. P., 63, 165-166, 181, 278, 483, 492-493, 493*n*, 495-496, 498-502, 714
Blessman, 500
 Blissard, LtCol Louis B., 649, 652
Block Island, 435
 Bloody Gorge, 616
 Bloody Nose Ridge, 157, 223-225, 228, 279
 Blow, Maj Rex, 382
 Boats. *See* Landing Craft; Ships.
 Boehm, Col Harold C., 575, 575*n*, 582*n*, 588-590, 591*n*, 686
 Bohemia, 9
 Bohol Island, 327, 359, 361, 375, 377
 Bollman, Capt Howard W., 413
 Bombardments, 71, 102-104, 108, 112, 132, 145, 153, 165, 211, 221, 227, 278-281, 335, 386, 409, 452-453, 455, 486-487, 489, 491-493, 493*n*, 495-496, 498, 501-506, 509, 517, 526, 531, 533, 547, 565, 574, 576, 610, 646, 714, 726, 728, 731, 737. *See also* Naval gunfire.
 Bongao Island, 378
 Bonins, 64, 68, 102, 436, 444-445, 448, 450-451, 459, 461-462, 462*n*, 463-464, 466, 472, 475, 484-485, 505, 537, 597, 654, 716-717, 737
 Borneo, 6, 294, 309, 358, 366, 374, 378
 Bougainville, 284, 305-307, 335, 342, 346, 362-363, 388-389, 393, 467, 735
Bountiful, 723
 Bourke, BGen Thomas E., 291, 300-301, 314, 316-318, 323; LtGen, 319*n*
 Bowdoin, Maj George E., 248*n*
 Boyd Ridge, 221, 229, 231-237, 241-242, 250, 254, 257, 260
 Boyd, LtCol Robert W., 115, 123
 Boyer, LtCol Kimber H., 93
 Bozarth, Capt Clyde L., 276*n*
 Brant, Capt Robert E., 123
 Brayton, LtCol Corey C., 415*n*
 Brisbane, 291-292, 301
 British whaling captains, 445
 Brodie gear, 436-437
 Brown, Col Dudley S., 61
 Brunelli, LtCol Austin R., 680
 Buckley, Col Edmond J., 474
 Buckley, LtCol Joseph E., 93*n*
 Buckner, LtGen Simon B., Jr., 465
 Burauen, 310, 316-317, 319-320, 322
 Buri Airfield, 322-323, 325
 Burma, 730
 Burnette, Maj Robert W., 91
Burrfish, 78
Bushido, 69
 Butler, LtCol John A., 305, 508, 634

- Butterfield, LtGen Jackson B., 508, 513, 625, 627
- Byers, SSgt A. A., 344*n*
- Bypassed islands, 412, 415, 418
- Byrum, Maj Paul R., Jr., 399
- Cabanatuan, 343, 346
- Cagayan, 381
- Caldera Point, 366
- California, 17, 437, 468, 500
- Campbell, LtCol Harold D., 42; BGen, 46, 98, 265, 398, 430, 595
- Camp Dunlap, 23
- Camp Elliott, 20–21
- Camp Holcomb, 20
- Camp Kearney Field, 437
- Camp Lejeune, 20, 39
- Camp Pendleton, 23, 468
- Camp Tarawa, 482
- Cape Esperance, 94, 165
- Cape Gallatin, 169
- Cape Gloucester, 89, 94, 268, 275
- Cape Isabel*, 409
- Cape Ngaramudel, 173
- Cape Ngatpokul, 168
- Cape Pkulangelul, 172
- Capisan, 370
- Carey, Maj Roland, 662
- Cargill, Maj Wayne M., 417
- Caribbean, 15–17, 21, 36
- Carleson, Maj Roger T., 42
- Carney, Col Edward B., 429
- Caroline Islands, 3, 6, 16, 54, 67–68, 101, 395, 412, 733–734. *See also* Western Caroline Islands.
- Castle, Capt Donald E., 636
- Catskill*, 314
- Casualties
- American, 113–114, 120, 124, 128, 130–132, 136, 138, 141, 144, 147–148, 150, 154, 161, 166, 179, 185, 189, 198–199, 208–209, 212, 216, 218, 225, 227, 231, 236, 242–243, 253, 257, 273–274, 281–282, 284–285, 322, 336, 356, 375, 386, 390, 408, 412, 438, 451, 471, 479, 504, 513, 517, 520–521, 525, 525*n*, 531, 536–537, 545, 551, 560, 574–575, 597, 602, 604–605, 608, 612, 614–615, 617, 624, 630–631, 633–636, 636*n*, 644, 648, 659–660, 665, 689, 695, 699, 701, 703, 705, 710–711, 715*n*, 722–723
 - Japanese, 109, 113, 121, 126, 136, 138, 177, 177*n*, 179, 185, 208–209, 218, 226–227, 232, 253, 261, 265, 276, 300, 333, 350, 352, 376, 385, 396, 409, 415, 426, 453, 531, 533, 536, 538, 545, 562, 605, 626, 629, 639, 665, 679, 689
- Catabato, 381–382
- Cates, MajGen Clifton B., 467, 505, 517, 519, 521, 554, 557, 563, 579, 610, 645, 647, 652, 661, 665, 669–670, 672, 677, 681–682, 694, 700, 708
- Catmon Hill, 319*n*
- Caves. *See* Terrain.
- Cebu, 294, 358–359, 361, 363, 374–375, 388
- Cebu City, 375
- Celebes, 102, 294, 733
- Celebes Sea, 309
- Cemeteries, 712
- Central America, 8, 15
- Central Intelligence Agency, 612
- Central Pacific, 3, 23–24, 51–52, 54, 266, 293, 309, 318, 393, 395–398, 400–401, 405, 407, 414, 416, 432, 437–438, 440, 462–463, 466, 478, 491, 723, 726, 731–733, 738
- Chamberlain, Sgt Reid, 690
- Chambers, LtCol Justice M., 519–520, 559
- Chaney, MajGen James E., 603, 708
- Chapman, LtCol Leonard F., Jr., 92*n*
- Chappell, Maj C. J., Jr., 42
- Charan Kanoa, 424–425
- Charlie Dog Ridge, 568, 645, 648, 682
- Chase, BGen William C., 343–344, 347
- Chateau-Thierry, 468
- Centaurus*, 101
- Chemical officers, 613
- Chemical warfare, 91, 612–614
- Chenango*, 426
- Chesapeake Bay, 36, 304
- Chester*, 493, 500
- Chichi Jima, 64, 445, 448–449, 451, 455, 462*n*, 496, 543, 561, 598, 700, 702, 705–707
- Chidori Airfield, 449*n*, 453, 457
- Chilton, Cdr W. P., 499
- China, 3, 6, 9, 16, 51, 62, 69, 293–294, 298, 309, 334, 458, 463–464, 467
- China-Burma-India Theater, 334
- China Wall, 221, 241, 248, 250, 256, 260–264
- Chinese, 54, 276, 730
- Christianity, 294
- Christmas Day, 438
- Clark Field, 342, 357
- Clark, RAdm Joseph J., 451–453, 595
- Clausewitz, 330

- Coady, Maj James F., 515
Cobia, 455
 Cole, Col J. Frank, 395*n*, 400
 Coleman, Col William F., 186*n*, 210*n*, 211*n*;
 BGen, 221*n*
Colhoun, 624
 Collins, LtCol William R., 564–565
 Colorado, 409
Columbia Victory, 602–603
 Columbus, Ohio, 610
 Combat efficiency, 185, 227, 592, 608, 661, 694
 Combat information center, 497
 Combat loading, 17, 83*n*
 Commandant of the Marine Corps, 15, 24, 27,
 29, 36, 46, 253 *n*, 428
 Commander, Air, Iwo Jima, 597–598
 Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 362
 Commander, Aircraft, Solomons, 46
 Commander, Air Forces, Pacific Fleet, 29, 38,
 47, 99, 477
 Commander, Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet,
 48, 466, 473, 490, 490*n*, 491*n*, 492*n*
 Commander, Beach Party Group, 602
 Commander, Fifth Fleet, 491, 492*n*
 Commander, Forward Area, Central Pacific,
 64, 710
 Commander, Forward Areas, Western Pacific,
 184
 Commander, Garrison Air Force, Western Car-
 olines, 99
 Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 26, 28–30,
 36, 293, 421
 Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 26,
 38–39, 60–61, 77–78, 83, 98, 101, 134, 301,
 417, 421, 464, 469
 Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, 24
 Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force, 486,
 608
 Commander, Landing Force Air Support Con-
 trol Unit, 503
 Commander, Marianas Area, 36
 Commander, Marshall-Gilberts Area, 36
 Commander, Service Forces, Pacific Fleet, 477–
 478
 Commander, South Pacific, 99, 301
 Commander, Support Aircraft, 103, 108, 283
 Commander, Ulithi Fire Support Group, 183
 Commander, Western Pacific Task Forces, 62
 Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine
 Force, Pacific, 47
 Commanding General, Army Forces, Western
 Pacific, 39
 Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops,
 Third Fleet, 64
 Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pa-
 cific, 28–29, 31, 47, 477, 482, 491*n*, 492, 492*n*
 Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps,
 24, 490*n*, 491*n*
 Commanding General, Marine Garrison Forces,
 14th Naval District, 38
 Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas,
 477–478
 Commanding General, Samoan Force, 46
 Communications
 American, 14, 17, 35, 151, 178, 204, 222, 241,
 274, 277, 350, 368, 370, 377, 383–384,
 402*n*, 411, 612, 615, 620*n*, 693, 703, 722–
 723, 725
 Equipment, 94, 130, 139, 368
 Radios, 207, 259, 277, 384, 390, 402, 404,
 486*n*, 589, 612, 620*n*, 626, 719
 SCR–193, 308
 SCR–300, 277
 SCR–542, 308
 SCR–610, 277
 tank, 154
 Japanese, 278, 455, 586, 612, 646, 656–657,
 Radios, 120, 202, 377, 449, 451, 456, 461,
 487, 702
 Communism, 8–9
 Congress, 445
 Connolly, RAdm Richard L., 25
 Cook, Capt Richard M., 558
 Cooley, Maj Albert D., 42; Col, 47, 423
 Coolidge, President Calvin, 6–7
 Corregidor, 291, 296, 354, 690
 Court of International Justice, 4
 Craig, LtGen Edward A., 608*n*, 624*n*
 Cram, LtCol Jack R., 436
 Crist, LtCol Raymond F., Jr., 573
 Crowl, Philip A., 52, 279*n*
 Crown, Maj John A., 119, 204
 Cuba, 14, 19
 Culebra, 19
 Cunningham, Maj Alfred A., 41
 Cushman's Pocket, 686–687, 689, 691–692
 Cushman, LtCol Robert E., 414, 416, 574, 577,
 584, 591
 D-Day, 86, 273, 280–284
 Dagami, 316–317, 319–321
 Dagupan, 337, 339, 372
 Daly, LtCol James M., 401, 411
 Danube River, 730

- Dardanelles, 33
 Dardanelles-Gallipoli operation, 14
 Dark, Col Robert F., 187, 192, 199, 250-251, 257
 Dato, 379
 Davao, 366, 381, 384-385
 Davis, Maj Raymond G., 145
 Davidson, Maj Robert, 508, 517, 654, 674
 Day, Maj William R., 558
 Dead Man's Curve, 232-233
 Deakin, Col Harold O., 95*n*, 150*n*, 274*n*
 Dean, Maj William W., 598
 Death Valley, 160, 221, 226, 232, 254, 261-263, 707
 DeBell, Maj George J., 233*n*
 Deep Passage, 409
 Defenses
 American, 549
 antiaircraft, 101, 328, 330, 486*n*, 499, 708
 barbed wire, 675
 emplacements, 666
 fire, 661
 field fortifications, 14
 land mines, 14
 sandbags, 246, 248, 256-257, 260, 508
 Japanese, 66, 71-73, 101-103, 112, 134, 137, 144, 152, 161, 168, 177, 185, 189, 192, 199, 207, 217, 221, 227, 234, 237-238, 240, 242, 244-246, 249, 256-257, 262-264, 268, 276, 279, 284, 316, 346, 352, 366, 379-381, 385-386, 407, 436, 453-454, 457, 474, 484, 491, 496, 499, 528, 531-538, 546, 549, 564, 570, 573, 627, 645, 684-686, 695, 697-698, 700-701, 714, 717, 766, 731
 antiaircraft, 102, 329, 400, 412, 415-417, 424, 428-429, 433-434, 495, 499, 506, 568
 antiboat, 110, 116, 119, 121, 474-475, 497-498, 506
 antiinvasion mines, 72
 antitank, 72-73, 116, 120, 139, 141, 156, 171, 176, 205, 208, 268, 273, 346, 376, 459, 474, 513-514, 566, 572, 584, 625, 627-629, 655
 barbed wire, 72, 120, 163, 454
 beach, 71-72, 81, 108, 176, 267
 blockhouses, 104, 120, 134-135, 208, 211, 456, 459, 473-474, 485*n*, 486, 493*n*, 500, 508, 510, 513, 517, 528, 530, 539, 545, 548, 550, 562, 572, 629, 636*n*, 644, 649, 698, 717
 booby traps, 156, 178, 199, 257, 407, 426, 562, 600, 697
 bunkers, 135, 156, 171, 173, 273, 459, 528, 536, 545, 548, 558, 562, 572, 580, 590, 635, 647-649, 654, 665
 buried aerial torpedoes, 565
 camouflage, 548, 550
 coastal, 321, 407, 493*n*, 496, 624-625
 concrete fortifications, 73, 120, 135, 145, 376, 454-455, 629, 646, 666
 dugouts, 171, 192, 201, 212, 242, 379, 550, 555, 642, 685-686
 emplacements, 75, 156, 160, 200, 280, 473, 486, 495, 523, 542, 550, 554, 567, 584, 591, 618, 621, 635, 639-640, 665-666, 672, 675, 694, 698, 716
 fortifications, 75, 134-135, 138, 145, 154-156, 165, 169, 171, 173, 185, 208, 216, 274, 278, 448, 454-455, 458-459, 487, 531, 545, 627, 639, 673, 717
 foxholes, 651
 machine gun positions, 119, 127, 134, 136, 172, 242, 261, 636, 647
 mine fields, 251, 276, 375-376, 407, 479, 498, 513, 517, 520, 550, 554-555, 572, 600, 627, 640, 649, 676, 726
 observation posts, 75, 550
 obstacles, 72, 268, 271
 pillboxes, 73, 75, 79, 92, 112, 116, 118, 120-121, 134, 136, 138, 145, 152, 154-157, 163, 169, 171, 173, 176, 198, 200, 208, 212, 268, 271, 273, 350-351, 371, 379, 407, 453, 455, 458-459, 473-474, 482, 485*n*, 486, 493*n*, 500, 508, 510, 513-514, 517-518, 520, 528, 530-531, 536, 538-539, 545, 548-550, 554-555, 558, 560, 562, 566-567, 572, 577, 590-591, 605, 610, 614*n*, 618, 621, 627, 631-632, 635, 639, 643, 647-651, 654, 663, 665-666, 668, 672, 685, 687, 693, 698, 716
 pockets, 693-694, 706
 rifle pits, 73, 136, 160, 171
 rocket positions, 655
 spider foxholes, 698
 spider-traps, 517, 528, 691, 701
 tetrahedrons, 72, 79, 138, 163
 trenches, 117, 120, 171, 376, 379, 566, 651, 687
 trip wires, 473
 tunnels, 75, 205, 221, 453, 456, 530, 538, 540, 566, 572, 586, 613, 622, 637, 639, 645, 663-664, 689-690, 692

- underground fortifications, 75, 154, 279, 453, 455-456
- DeHaven, Col Louis G., 472, 521-522
- Deho, 379
- del alle, BGen Pedro A., 428
- Demolitions. *See* Weapons.
- Denmark, 19
- Deputy Commander, Aircraft, Landing Force, 503
- Deputy Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 30-31
- DETACHMENT Operation, 435, 465, 467-469, 482, 487, 489-491, 714, 720, 722-725
- de Villalobos, Ruy Lopez, 54
- Digos, 395
- Dillon, LtCol Edward J., 674, 678
- Dipolog, 365-367, 371-372
- Director of Marine Corps Aviation, 41
- Disarmament conferences, 5-6
- Disarmament treaty, 6
- Doe, MajGen Jens A., 366, 373, 378
- Doherty, Capt. Albert J., 204
- Dominican Republic, 467
- Donlan, Capt Pat, 662-663
- Doswell, Maj Menard, III, 433
- Downs, 1stLt Willis A., 374*n*
- Drake, Maj Clifford B., 521-522
- Drydocks, 83, 184
- Dulag, 310, 312, 314-317, 320, 325
- Dunn, Col Ray A., 179
- DuPage*, 108, 278*n*
- Duplantier, LtCol Wendell H., 558
- Durgin, RAdm Calvin T., 492, 495, 500, 560, 717
- Duryea, LtCol Justin G., 634, 642
- Dutch East Indies, 358, 730
- East Boat Basin, 220, 353, 459, 469, 471, 474, 500, 509, 547, 553, 555, 569, 646, 650, 711
- East Indies, 287, 294
- East Prussia, 443
- East Road, 145-146, 157-159, 189, 198-202, 206, 221, 224, 226, 228-233, 236-238, 240, 251
- Eberhardt, Capt Fred C., 526
- Edgar, Maj John B., Jr., 521
- Edmondson, Maj Robert W., 424
- Efate Island, 98, 430-431, 730
- Eichelberger, LtGen Robert L., 332, 359; Gen, 377, 386, 390
- El Centro, California, 45
- Eldorado*, 484
- Eleventh Naval District, 21
- Eli Malk, 57
- Eller, RAdm Ernest M., 80*n*, 283, 437*n*
- Ellice Islands, 396, 398-401, 404
- Ellis, Maj Donald K., 548
- Ellis, Maj Earl H., 16; LtCol, 66*n*
- Elmore*, 278*n*
- Emirau Island, 363, 373, 416, 432, 435, 438
- Emperor Meiji, 459
- Engebi Island, 408-413
- England, 6
- English, 54
- English, LtCol Lowell E., 558, 582
- Engineers. *See also* Army units; Marine units.
 American, 135-136, 156, 193, 204, 209, 224, 226, 231, 234, 258, 263, 271, 282, 325, 337, 376, 383, 398, 484, 514, 520, 531, 554, 595, 600, 602, 610, 627, 640-641, 652, 765, 681, 705, 720-721
 Japanese, 453, 647
- Eniwetok Atoll, 64, 83, 278, 314-315, 405, 408-409, 412-413, 420, 438, 526
- Enterprise*, 560
- Equipment. *See* Supplies and equipment.
- Ermilio, LCdr Dominick J., 594
- Erskine, MajGen Graves B., 467, 565, 573-574, 577-581, 583-585, 588-590, 592-593, 602, 607, 610, 616-617, 627, 635, 647, 652, 659, 686, 691-692, 700-701, 703-704, 708, 711, 719
- Espiritu Santo Island, 98-101, 430-431, 433, 438
- Essex*, 335, 435, 503
- Estes*, 493, 499
- Ethiopia, 9
- Europe, 5, 440, 729-731, 733, 737
- Europeans, 444-445
- European Theater, 714, 733
- Evans, Lt E. Graham, 635
- Evans, Maj Holly H., 574
- Everglades, 35
- Everton, Maj Loren D., 400, 412, 416
- Ewa, 21, 41-42, 45-47
- Fagan, Maj Richard, 558, 618
- Fais, 434
- Falalop Island, 433-434
- Fanshaw Bay*, 424
- Far East, 6
- Farrell, BGen Walter G., 46
- Fascism, 8
- Fascist dictatorships, 4
- Fawell, LtCol Reed M., Jr., 505, 618

- Feehan, Maj Harvey A., 522
 Ferguson, Capt, 197
 Fertig, Col Wendell W., 359, 381–382
 Fields, Capt Thomas M., 620
 Filipinos, 296, 347, 350, 381, 387
 Forces, 348, 381, 407
 Guerrillas, 348–352, 359, 361, 363, 365, 370–371, 375–377, 379–384, 386, 690
 Fire direction centers, 153, 319, 611. *See also* Artillery.
 Fitzgerald, Captain John I., Jr., 93
 Five Brothers Ridge, 221, 224–226, 229–231, 233, 240, 244, 246, 254, 256–257, 260–261, 441
 Five Sisters Hill, 157–158, 160, 221, 231, 237, 248, 250, 256–257
 Flag raising (Iwo Jima), 542–543, 543*n*, 545, 593
 Fleet Anchorage, 181
 Fleet War Plans Division, 465
 FLINTLOCK Operation, 401
 Flock, Lt Charles F., 370
 Florida, 35
 Flyers. *See* Pilots.
 FORAGER Operation, 61, 301, 422
 Formosa, 6, 51, 62, 276, 293, 297–299, 321, 324, 335–337, 435, 450, 464–465, 476
 Forrestal, Mr. James V., 442, 484, 564
 Fort Bragg, N. C., 35–36
 Fort, RAdm George H., 63, 83, 95, 104*n*, 165, 186, 211, 278–280, 286; VAdm, 78*n*
 Fort Stotsenburg, 342
 Forward observers, 153, 597, 628, 719. *See also* Artillery.
 Fourteen Points, 7
 Frame, Maj Donald P., 435
 France, 4–7, 19, 443, 467
 Frank, Mr. Benis M., 90*n*
 Freeman, Col Calvin B., 398, 401, 407–408
Fremont, 165, 278
 French Samoa, 398
 Frogmen, 495, 497–498, 500
 Fukudome, VAdm Shigeru, 298
 Funafuti, 396, 398, 401–404
 Futrell, Dr. Robert F., 486*n*

 Gabbert, LtCol John T. L. D., 389
Gambier Bay, 405
 Garakayo Islands, 242, 250
 Garangoai Cove, 173–174
 Garapan Plain, 678
 Garekoru, 59, 160, 190, 192–193, 195, 197–201

 Gayle, Maj Gordon D., 208, 242
 Geiger, BGen Roy S., 42, 45–46; MajGen, 25, 61, 63–64, 79, 89, 104, 131, 165, 175, 185–187, 211, 246, 252, 278–279, 286, 428, 433; LtGen, 31–32
 Gela, 281
 Geneva, Switzerland, 6
 Geneva Conference, 7
 Geneva Conventions, 377, 420
 German colonies, 3, 6, 55
 German General's Plot, 729, 732
 Germans, 395, 458, 675, 729–732, 735–736
 German Siegfried Line, 443
 German Sixth Army, 430
 Germany, 4, 8–9, 67, 408, 430, 443, 729, 732, 736
 Gilbert Islands, 6, 23, 288, 395–396, 399–401, 404, 407, 415, 422, 443, 462, 731
 Gilberts-Marshalls Operations, 407
 Gilberts operation, 395–396, 399
 Glidden, Maj Elmer G., Jr., 405
 Godolphin, Capt Francis B., 343*n*, 344*n*
 Gormley, LtCol John J., 119*n*, 121, 137
 Gorokottan Island, 262
 Goto, Major Ushio, 69, 163, 168–171, 176–177, 177*n*, 179–180,
 Graham, Col Chester B., 471, 515, 557–558, 567, 569, 617, 627, 639
 Great Britain, 4–6, 19
 Great Depression, 9
 Green Island, 363
 Green, Maj Thomas C., 42
 Griffin, Maj David R., 202*n*
 Grinlinton Pond, 257–258, 261
 Griswold, MajGen Oscar W., 352
 Guadalcanal, 44–45, 52, 61, 77, 89–90, 94–97, 99, 101, 165, 237, 253, 266, 268, 284, 291–293, 305, 327, 389, 393, 410, 422, 428, 430–431, 438–439, 457, 466, 514, 678
 Guam, 6, 25, 30–32, 36, 60–61, 63–64, 79, 184, 277, 279–280, 282, 310, 323, 388, 425–429, 429*n*, 438, 444, 466–469, 473, 477, 480, 483–484, 489, 505, 538, 564, 578, 597, 598*n*, 604, 612, 711, 731–734
 Guimba, 342, 347
 Guiuan, 335
 Guiuan strip, 339
 Gustafson, Maj John H., 141, 212

H. L. Edwards, 190
 Haas, LtCol Ralph, 508, 517, 526
 Hague Conventions, 377

- Haha Jima, 496, 598
 Haiti, 467
 Hale, MajGen Willis H., 414
 Halsey, Adm William F., 62–63, 65, 66*n*, 82,
 102, 181, 245, 278, 286, 291, 293, 293*n*, 301,
 303, 309, 325–326, 335, 420, 430, 435, 465
 Hanneken, Col Herman H., 119, 130, 135, 137
 Hankins, Col Joseph F., 233
 Hanlon, Capt B. Hall, 492
 Hansen, Lt John E., 402, 404, 536
 Harding, President Warren G., 5, 7
 Harmon, LtGen Millard F., 417, 464, 483
 Harris, SSgt Charles E., 536
 Harris, Col Harold D., 115, 122, 139, 141–143,
 208, 237–238, 240, 240*n*, 241, 245, 254, 303;
BGen, 115*n*
 Harrison, Col William H., 104–105
 Hart, BGen Franklin A., 505, 556
 Hawaiian Islands, 6, 16–17, 23–24, 30–32, 45,
 96, 162, 301, 314, 363, 400–401, 408–409, 436,
 438, 445, 462, 468, 477–478, 482–483, 604–
 605, 612, 708, 713
 Hawkins Field, 401, 404
 Headley, Capt James C., 559, 650, 664
 Headquarters, Marine Corps, 23, 27, 38, 221
 Heintz, Maj Robert D., Jr., 589*n*
 Hellzapoppin Ridge, 305, 346, 389
 Henderson, Col Frederick P., 426*n*
 Henderson Field, 45, 393, 428
 Heritage, Maj Gordon W., 426–427
 Hermle, BGen Leo D., 505, 516, 706
 Higashi, 445, 673, 680
 Higashi Rock, 495
 Higashiyama, 159, 260. *See also* Walt's Ridge.
 Hall, RAdm Harry W., 466, 502, 524, 700, 714
 Hill B, 222
 Hill Oboe, 576–577, 616
 Hill Peter, 574, 576–577, 616
 Hill Row, 205
 Hill 3, 214
 Hill 80, 202, 204
 Hill 100, 157, 199, 206–207
 Hill 120, 234, 244
 Hill 140, 244–246, 249, 254
 Hill 165, 640
 Hill 200, 146–147, 157
 Hill 205, 147
 Hill 210, 146–147
 Hill 215, 637
 Hill 260, 157
 Hill 300, 224, 260. *See also* Kansokuyama.
 Hill 331, 589–590
 Hill 357, 583–584
 Hill 362, 590, 687
 Hill 362A, 220, 581*n*, 616, 618, 621–623, 625–
 630
 Hill 362B, 581, 582*n*, 583–584, 616, 629–632,
 635, 691
 Hill 362C, 445, 582*n*, 583, 585–586, 588, 591,
 616, 684–685
 Hill 382, 447, 455, 568, 572, 646–647, 649–663,
 665, 668–669, 682
 Hilo, Hawaii, 477, 482
 Hiraiwa Bay, 474, 633
 Hirohito, Emperor, 732, 736
 Hitler, Adolph, 9, 729, 732
 Hjerpe, Maj Carl W., 515
Hobby, 402, 404
 Hodge, MajGen John R., 63, 318
 Hoeck, 1stLt G. A., 638*n*
 Hoffman, BGen Hugh, 344*n*
 Holcomb, Gen Thomas, 19, 44
 Holland, TSgt R. B., 344*n*
 Hollandia, 292, 310, 327
 Home Islands, 39–40, 57, 428, 443–445, 448–
 450, 463, 466, 484, 493, 496, 597, 611, 618,
 730–732. *See also* Japan.
 Hong Kong, 6, 294, 435, 451
 Honolulu, Hawaii, 476
Honolulu, 132
 Honshu, 490
 Honsowetz, LtCol Russell E., 147, 157
 Hoover, President Herbert, 7, 246, 401, 414,
 613, 710
 Hoover, VAdm John H., 184; Adm, 64
 Hope, Bob, 90*n*
 Hopkins, Col Zebulon C., 304*n*, 334
 Hori, Col Shizuichi, 457–458, 533*n*, 539*n*, 706,
 706*n*, 707, 717*n*
 Hough, Maj Frank O., 52, 150*n*
 Houser, Maj Robert H., 559*n*, 562, 588
 Hudson, LtCol Lewis C., 520, 548
 Hungary, 8
 Hunt, Capt George P., 110, 112–113, 144
 Hurst, Maj E. Hunter, 119–120, 137, 226, 229,
 234; LtCol, 197*n*
 ICEBERG Operation, 465, 572
 Ichimaru, RAdm Toshinosuka, 454, 461, 499,
 499*n*, 564, 586, 669–670, 680, 702, 706, 706*n*
Idaho, 493, 496, 498, 500, 563, 565
 IDENTICAL Island, 181*n*, 183–184
 Ikeda, Col Masuo, 453, 562, 566, 643, 701–705,
 710

- Iloilo River, 375
 Inaoka, Maj Masauru, 711
Independence, 396
Indianapolis, 281, 560
 Indochina, 453, 730
 Indonesia, 294, 358
 Infantry
 American, 87, 211, 240, 251, 273, 305, 307, 317, 352, 366-368, 371, 374-375, 379, 385-386, 423, 521, 531, 565, 567, 574, 576, 581-582, 584, 592, 608, 618, 621, 628, 633, 639, 647, 649-650, 657, 681, 686, 716, 720. *See also* Army units and Marine units.
 Inoue, LtGen Sadae, 68-72, 76, 156, 159, 163, 169-170, 179, 180*n*, 190, 222, 232, 259, 263, 265, 285-286
 Inouye, Capt Samaji, 457, 543, 586, 675, 677-680, 702, 706
 Intelligence
 American, 163, 173, 177, 183, 209, 271, 280, 284, 335-336, 340, 343, 349, 352, 359, 366, 368, 469, 472, 475-476, 489, 499, 523, 570, 638-639, 646, 651, 693, 698
 Irwin, Maj Darrell D., 400
 Islamic religion, 294
Island Mail, 409
 Isolationism, 5, 8, 15
 Italy, 4-9, 530, 733
 Ivey, LtCol Thomas S., 314
 Iwahig, 362
 Iwo Jima Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476, 435-438, 444-445, 447-449, 449*n*, 450-454, 454*n*, 455-459, 461, 462*n*, 463-469, 471-485, 485*n*, 486-487, 490-497, 500-504, 506, 510, 512, 514-519, 521-523, 525-528, 530-533, 535-543, 545-548, 550, 552-556, 559-565, 568-573, 577, 579-581, 586, 588, 592-593, 597-598, 598*n*, 600-605, 607-608, 610-614, 614*n*, 615-618, 620, 620*n*, 622-626, 628-631, 633-634, 636, 640-644, 646-647, 657, 669, 688, 691, 693-695, 697-715, 715*n*, 716-719, 721-729, 732, 736-738
 Operation, 397, 465, 468, 472, 476, 482, 564, 482, 564, 579, 597, 601, 604, 617, 645, 710-711, 713, 715, 715*n*, 720, 722-723, 726, 735, 737
 Izu Shoto, 444
 Jack, Maj Samuel S., 42
 Jaluit Airfield, 396
 Jaluit Atoll, 412-414, 416, 420
 Jaluit Island, 399, 405, 412, 415
 Jaluit lagoon, 399
 Japan 4-6, 8-10, 16, 23, 30, 32, 51, 54-55, 62, 67, 76, 241, 265, 276, 293-294, 296-297, 300, 326, 377, 405, 421, 430, 435-436, 348, 444-445, 448, 451, 453-454, 462-465, 476, 484, 489-491, 495, 598, 600-601, 614-615, 669, 683, 706, 711, 730-737.
 invasion of, 387-388
 Japanese, 57-58, 66, 117, 119, 121, 136, 138, 144-145, 147, 158, 160, 177, 190, 201-202, 207, 209, 212, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 227-228, 230-232, 234-235, 237-238, 240-242, 246, 249-251, 253, 256-258, 261-264, 267-268, 270, 276-277, 279, 285, 287, 296-297, 300, 306, 310, 312, 314-315, 317-318, 320-325, 328-329, 332, 335-336, 340, 346, 348-352, 356-357, 359, 361, 366-367, 370, 372, 374, 376-377, 379, 382, 386-387, 389, 393, 395, 399-400, 407, 409-11, 413, 415-418, 420, 426, 430, 436, 445, 449*n*, 451, 474, 484, 490, 526, 543, 558, 602, 613, 624, 670, 688, 697-698, 700, 710-711, 735-737
 Army-Navy relations, 732
 bases, 52, 400, 417
 civilians, 55, 265, 381, 445, 450, 453
 diplomats, 737
 Emperor, 8, 485, 730
 Empire, 451, 700, 737
 food, 530, 695
 Imperial Government, 706
 installations, 101, 108, 143, 279, 383, 414, 417, 490, 498-500, 514, 550, 719, 726
 leaders, 443, 449, 730
 mandated territory, 57
 Military Academy, 457
 military doctrine, 457
 Minister of War, 324, 451, 732
 morale, 332, 414, 682, 736
 policy, 445, 614
 phosphate plant, 172-174, 208, 216
 Prime Minister, 707
 repatriation, 265
 Samurai family, 450
 secret weapon, 736
 strength, 163, 175, 180, 189, 258, 276, 285, 336, 340, 381, 458*n*, 472-473
 surrender, 178, 222, 265, 421, 693, 704-705
 thermal ray, 736
 Tokyo Prefecture, 445
 transportation system, 335
 war effort, 730

- war production, 450
- weather station, 449, 456
- Japanese Units
 - Imperial General Headquarters, 67–68, 70–71, 76, 297–298, 706
 - Army, 208, 221, 276, 297, 332, 361, 371, 383, 407, 448, 457, 614*n*, 620, 726, 732, 736
 - Kwantung Army, 67
 - Southern Area Army, 76
 - First Combined Air Force, 298. *See also*
 - First Air Fleet, Fourth Air Army
 - Fourth Air Army, 298, 337
 - Fourteenth Area Army, 298, 300, 340, 348, 358
 - Twenty-Third Army, 451
 - Thirty-First Army, 68, 76, 78, 449, 453
 - Thirty-Fifth Army, 298, 361
 - 1st Infantry Division, 321
 - 14th Infantry Division, 68
 - 16th Infantry Division, 315
 - 30th Infantry Division, 359
 - 35th Infantry Division, 67–68
 - 100th Infantry Division, 359
 - 102d Infantry Division, 361
 - 109th Infantry Division, 433, 455, 475, 533*n*
 - 1st Amphibious Brigade, 68
 - 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, 453, 457–458, 569, 572, 647, 647*n*, 654, 693, 711
 - 53d Independent Mixed Brigade, 68–69
 - 54th Independent Mixed Brigade, 359, 361
 - Infantry Regiments
 - 2nd, 264
 - 15th, 68–69
 - 26th, 698
 - 41st, 321
 - 59th, 68–69
 - 145th, 453, 562, 643, 701, 703, 705
 - 26th Tank Regiment, 454–455, 590, 692
 - 10th Independent Antitank Battalion, 553*n*
 - Independent Infantry Battalions
 - 309th, 569, 647*n*, 651
 - 310th, 572, 647
 - 311th, 572, 647*n*
 - 312th, 647*n*
 - 314th, 572, 647*n*
 - 346th, 69
 - Infantry Battalions
 - 1/59, 163, 175
 - 2/15, 69, 193, 195
 - 3/15, 69, 135
 - 3/17, 643
- 3/145, 659
- Antiaircraft units
 - 126th, 69
 - 144th, 69
- Miscellaneous
 - 45th Guard Force Detachment, 69
- Navy, 178, 208, 265, 276, 298, 300, 312, 319, 329, 439–440, 443, 449–450, 454*n*, 670, 677, 680, 732
- Air Fleets
 - First, 298
 - Second, 298
- Combined Fleet, 67, 76, 297–298, 407, 499, 701
- Imperial Fleet, 64, 68, 297, 312, 319, 325, 407, 461, 493
- First Mobile Fleet, 298
- Second Fleet, 298
- Third Fleet, 298
- Fifth Fleet, 298
- Sixth Fleet, 298
- Chichi Jima Naval Base, 449
- 204th Naval Construction Battalion, 454
- 214th Naval Construction Battalion, 75, 208
- Naval Guard Force, 457, 475, 677
- Special Naval Landing Force, 379
- Striking Force, 298
- Special Attack Unit, 537. *See also* Kamikazes.
- Miscellaneous
 - Angaur Sector Unit, 69, 166, 169
 - Antitank Battalion, 454
 - Cavalry, 451
 - Chichi Jima Branch, Army Fortification Department, 448
 - Demolition detachment, 592
 - Field Hospital, 647
 - Garrison units, 138, 163, 169–170, 178, 222, 237, 278, 358–359, 361–362, 377, 381, 387, 415, 448, 453, 493, 704
 - Anguar, 163, 165, 175, 179–180, 184
 - Chichi Jima, 449, 705
 - Iwo Jima, 458*n*, 537, 670, 700, 702
 - Leyte, 329
 - Peleliu, 76, 134, 189–190, 214, 232, 265
- Imperial Guards, 451
- Korean labor force, 69
- Naval engineers, 221
- Palau Sector Group, 68–71, 76
- Parachute units, 450
- Peleliu Area Unit, 222

- Shimbu Group, 352
 Special Counterattack units, 267
 Special Counterlanding Force, 134
 Stragglers, 376, 426, 664, 675, 692
 Suicide Squads, 156
 Suicide Swimmers, 561
 Suribachi Sector Unit, 533
 Volcano-Bonin Defense Sector, 475
- Java, 297
 Jeans, Capt Cloyd R., 402–403
 Jerome, Col Clayton C., 219, 304, 336–337, 339, 352, 356, 363, 366–368, 372–373, 382, 390; BGen, 280*n*
 Jeru, Capt George E., 85*n*
 Johnson, LtCol Chandler W., 508, 539–540, 629
 Johnson, Capt Robert C., 560
 Johnson, Col Robert F., 711
 Johnston Island, 21, 438
 Joint Army-Navy Board, 16
 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24, 38, 51, 60, 62, 65, 151, 286, 292–293, 303, 462, 465, 733
 Joint Expeditionary Forces, 62
 Joint Intelligence Center (Pacific Ocean Areas), 30, 60
 Joint Marine-Army training, 21
 Joint Navy-Marine planning, 83
 Joint Planning, 468
 Joint Staff Planners, 464
 Joint Staff Study, 50
 Joint Training Forces
 1st, 20
 2d, 21
 Joint War Plans Committee, 462, 464
 Jolo Island, 361, 378–380
 Jordan, Col Walter I., 471, 519, 563, 567, 569, 659, 663, 665, 667, 672
 June, Col Frank M., 433
 Jungle Warfare. *See* Tactics.
- Kabacan, 381
 Kaempfer, Maj William P., 548
 Kaido, Col Chosaku, 456
Kalinin Bay, 401, 407
 Kaluf, Col John, 86*n*, 282*n*
 Kama Rock, 603, 698
 Kamikazes, 323–325, 328, 331, 336, 340, 459, 537, 718, 736
 Kamilianlul Mountain, 210
 Kamilianlul ridges, 202
 Kaneohe, Hawaii, 393
 Kangoku Rock, 472, 603, 698
 Kansokuyama, 159, 235, 260. *See also* Hill 300.
- Kauffman, Cdr D. L., 498*n*
 Kavieng, 303, 444
 Kazan Retto, 444
 KEENSET, 181*n*, 183–184
 Kellum, Maj William C., 433
 Kenney, LtGen George C., 291–292, 301, 303, 326, 334, 362; Gen, 65*n*
 Kenyon, Col Howard N., 564, 573, 582, 584, 687
Keokuk, 537
 Kessing, Como Oliver O., 434
 Kibawe Trail, 387
 Kibbe, Cdr R. L., 102*n*
 Kimes, Maj Ira L., 42
 KING II Operation, 310, 315
 King, Adm Ernest J., 35, 293, 395, 397, 462–463, 465
 King, Maj John H., 329
 Kingman, RAdm Howard F., 278
 Kingsbury, Maj Robert T., III, 326*n*
 Kinkaiç, VAdm Thomas C., 303, 309, 326, 334
 Kiska Operation, 467
 Kita village, 445, 455–456, 633, 639, 695
 Kitano Point, 447, 455, 459, 577, 593, 624, 640, 642–643, 684, 698, 691, 695, 698, 700
 Knott, Maj Gordon H., 411
 Koiso, Premier Kuniaki, 707*n*
 Kojima, Cpl Kyutaro, 711
 Kolombangara Island, 393
 Kongauru Island, 211–212, 223, 250
 Korea, 730
 Korean civilians and laborers, 206, 209, 216, 222, 265, 276, 418, 420, 639, 711
 Korean War, 718
 Koror Island, 57, 62, 68, 71, 134, 166, 190, 232, 281, 433
 Koror Town, 101
 Kossol Passage, 57, 103, 232
 Kossol Roads, 152, 287
 Koyatau, Riichi, 543*n*
 Krueger, LtGen Walter, 309, 321, 339, 348, 351, 357
 Krulewitch, LtCol Melvin L., 681
 Kumamoto, 659
 Kuribayashi, Capt Tadamichi, 451; LtCol, 451; Col, 451; BGen, 451; MajGen, 451; LtGen, 450–451, 451*n*, 453–459, 475, 484, 493, 523, 525–528, 533, 537, 539, 546–547, 551, 556, 561, 568, 572, 584–586, 593, 615, 623, 628, 630, 633, 641–644, 669–670, 679, 682–683, 685, 695
 Kuribayashi, Yoshii, 451*n*
 Kurihama, 484

- Kurihara, SgtMaj Masao, 237*n*
 Kurile Islands, 415, 443
 Kuroda, LtGen Shigenori, 298, 300
 Kurpoat, Sgt Henry S., 516
 Kwajalein, 400, 405, 407, 409, 411, 417, 438, 467
 Kyushu, 39, 659
- Lae, 451
 Lake Aztec, 176
 Lake Pinalay, 385
 Lake Salome, 174
 Lambrecht, LtCol Peter D., 326
 Lanboyan Point, 365
 Landing barges, 195
 Landing craft. *See also* Ships.
 American, 19, 35, 181, 184, 195, 241, 267, 503, 508, 522, 548, 601, 607, 634, 725
 Types
 LCIs (Landing Craft, Infantry), 108, 135, 166, 171, 497-498, 503, 554, 727
 LCI(G)s Landing Craft, Infantry (Gunboat), 132, 166, 496-497, 503, 626, 708
 LCI(M)s (Landing Craft, Infantry, (Mortar), 166, 504, 523, 555
 LCI(R)s (Landing Craft, Infantry, (Rocket), 315, 504, 530
 LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized), 88, 166, 516
 LCPs (Landing Craft, Personnel), 85
 LCTs (Landing Craft, Tank), 35, 84, 272, 459, 602
 LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel), 19, 34-35, 85, 88, 127, 166, 516, 518, 522, 542
 Japanese, 195, 258, 278
 Landing exercises and techniques, 17, 19
 Landing forces, 269, 731
 Tang, Lt Frank C., 413
 Lanigan, Col John R., 471, 509, 519-520, 549-551, 555, 649-650, 660, 663, 671, 692, 694
 Larkin, LtCol Claude A., 42; Col, 45; BGen, 46; MajGen, 303, 388
 Larsen, MajGen Henry L., 428
 Lauesen, Lt Christian F., 402
 LCI-392, 418, 420
 LCI-394, 420
 LCI-438, 497
 LCI-449, 497
 LCI-450, 498
 LCI-457, 498
 LCI-466, 498
 LCI-469, 498
 LCI-474, 497
 LCI-479, 420
 LCI-484, 420
 LCI-491, 420
- League of Nations, 4-5, 7, 9, 55, 66
 Leek, LtCol Frederick E., 372-373, 373*n*
 Lehnert, Lt Robert E., 402
 Lejeune, MajGen John A., 16
 Letcher, Col John S., 652; BGen, 480*n*, 605*n*, 614*n*, 624*n*
 Lethbridge Report, 612*n*
 Leutze, 497
 Lexington, 40-42
 Leyte, 54, 181, 287, 291, 294, 301, 303, 309-310, 312, 315-327, 330-335, 339, 342, 358-359, 361, 363, 366-367, 377-378, 381, 443, 443, 461, 734
 Leyte Gulf, 300, 310, 312, 318, 330, 335-337, 366
 Leyte Operation, 314, 318, 320, 323, 328, 332-334, 345, 358
 Lighthouse Hill. *See* Palomas Hill.
 Line of departure, 84, 505-506, 517, 522, 615, 649
 Lingayen, 337, 339, 342, 348
 Lingayen Airfield, 339
 Lingayen Gulf, 334-335, 337, 342
 Liscome Bay, 396
 LITHARGE, 181*n*, 183-184
 Little Slot, 221
 Liversedge, Col Harry B., 471, 509, 512, 528, 530, 539, 545, 625
 Logistics, 82, 476, 716, 725
 London Naval Treaty, 7
 Los Angeles, Calif., 454
 Los Negros, 363
 LOSSAU, 183
 Loud, Cdr Wayne R., 63
 Louisville, 106, 190, 278, 281
 Lovell, Stanley P., 612*n*
 Low Countries, 19
 Lowery, Sgt Louis R., 542
 LSM 216, 517-518
 LST 776, 436-437
 LST 477, 537
 LST 779, 543, 552
 LST 807, 560
 LST 929, 479
 LST 930, 479
 LST 931, 479
 LST 1032, 552
 LST 1033, 479

- Lummus, 1stLt Jack, 640-641
Lunga Point, 537
- Luzon, 21, 62, 287, 291, 293-294, 296-298, 303, 312, 324, 327, 331-332, 334-337, 339-343, 348-349, 351-352, 356-358, 361, 366, 368, 370, 377, 382-383, 433, 435, 443, 457, 465, 734-735, 737
- Luzon Operation, 332, 334, 348, 353, 357, 715
- Lyman, Col E. L., 248*n*
- MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 9, 24, 51-52, 54, 62, 65, 181, 286, 296, 301, 303, 309, 326, 333, 336-337, 342-343, 358, 386, 390, 465, 732-735
- MacFarlane, LtCol Robert E., 521
- Mackay, Maj Malcolm S., 437; LtCol, 438, 597
- Magai Channel, 183
- Main Valley, 221
- Major, Col Harold C., 388
- Majuro Atoll, 400, 400*n*, 405, 407, 438
- Makin Island, 396, 398-399, 400*n*, 408, 412
- Malabang Field, 383
- Malabang landing, 373*n*
- Malacanan Palace, 343
- Malakal, 57, 281
- Malanaphy, Cdr Michael J., 492
- Malaya, 730
- Malayan, 55, 294
- Malaybalei, 385
- Maloelap Airfield, 396, 405
- Maloelap Atoll, 412-413, 415
- Manchuria, 9, 67-68, 454, 458, 463, 730
- Mangaldan, 337, 339-340, 342, 352, 356-357, 370, 373, 381-383
- Mangaldan Field, 339, 354
- Manila, 294, 296, 303, 334, 342-344, 346-347, 349, 351-354
 Liberation of, 348
- Manila Bay, 296, 354
Manila Bay, 423
- Manila, John, 514. *See also* Basilone, GySgt John.
- Manus Island, 83, 315
- Maps and charts, Japanese, 472
- Marakina Watershed, 354
- Marcus Island, 283*n*, 444
- Marianas, 3, 6, 25-26, 30, 51, 54, 60, 67-68, 70, 292-293, 301, 395, 397, 416, 422, 428-429, 436, 443-444, 449, 453, 462-464, 466-468, 477-478, 483, 485, 495, 500, 504, 527, 559, 592, 598, 600, 604, 614, 713, 717-718, 723, 731-733
- Marianas Operation, 26, 60, 62, 64, 84, 86, 153, 424, 465
- Marianas Turkey Shoot, 423
- Marine units
- Air
- Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 27-30, 40, 47, 433
- Marine Aircraft, Hawaiian Area, 46
- Marine Aircraft, Northern Solomons, 301, 303, 387, 388
- Marine Aircraft, South Pacific, 46
- Marine Aircraft, Defense Force, Samoan Area, 46
- Marine Fleet Air, West Coast, 27, 30, 45-46
- Marine Garrison Air Force, Western Carolines, 431
- Marine Air Support Control Units, Amphibious Forces, Pacific, 48
- Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 28, 44-47, 99
- 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-47, 301, 303-304, 312, 347, 362, 387-389
- 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 41-42, 44-47, 98, 98*n*, 99, 212, 377, 388, 425, 430-431
- 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 46-47
- 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 27, 44-47, 398-399, 401, 404*n*, 412, 414, 416, 420, 422, 425
- Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, Service Group, 44-45
- Marine Carrier Groups, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 47, 423, 434-435
- Marine Aircraft Groups, 340, 342
- Marine Aircraft Group 11, 42, 98, 100-101, 127, 282, 430
- Marine Aircraft Group 12, 326-333, 335, 339, 342, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 372-373, 378, 390
- Marine Aircraft Group 13, 398, 400, 407
- Marine Aircraft Group 14, 334-335, 339, 359, 362-363, 375-376, 390
- Marine Aircraft Group 15, 413, 437
- Marine Aircraft Group 21, 42, 393, 426-429
- Marine Aircraft Group 22, 401, 411
- Marine Aircraft Group 23, 45
- Marine Aircraft Group 24, 303-304, 306-308, 335, 337, 339, 342-344, 347-349, 354, 356-357, 362-363, 368, 373, 382, 384, 387-389, 735

- Marine Aircraft Group 25, 98, 430
 Marine Aircraft Group 31, 398, 400, 407-408
 Marine Aircraft Group 32, 303-304, 335, 339, 342-344, 347-349, 352, 354, 356-357, 359, 362-363, 366-368, 371, 373, 378, 388, 390
 Marine Aircraft Group 41, 45
 Marine Aircraft Group 42, 45
 Marine Aircraft Group 43, 45
 Marine Aircraft Group 44, 45
 Marine Aircraft Group 45, 433-434
 Marine Aircraft Group 51, 47, 423
 Marine Aircraft Group 61, 327, 363, 388
 Second Marine Aircraft Group (Oahu), 20
 Marine Aircraft Group (Dagupan), 339, 350, 354, 356, 368
 Marine Aircraft Groups (Mindanao), 363
 Marine Aircraft Groups (Zamboanga), 370-374, 382, 384, 388
 Marine Aircraft Service Group 48, 435
 Marine Aircraft Support Groups, 47
 Provisional Air Support Command, 47
 Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, 503, 605, 611, 719
 Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 45, 98*n*, 433
 Marine Base Defense Aircraft Group 48 47, 423
 Base Air Detachment 3, 42
 AWS-1, 411
 AWS-2, 429
 AWS-3, 363, 383
 AWS-4, 363, 366, 368
 AWS-5, 425
 Headquarters Squadron, Marine Aircraft Wings, Pacific, 44-46
 HqSqn-11, 101
 HqSqn-12, 45
 VMB-413, 363, 388
 VMB-423, 388
 VMB-433, 363, 388
 VMB-611, 363, 373-374, 380, 386
 VMB-612, 429, 436, 485
 VMF-111, 42, 398, 400, 400*n*, 412
 VMF-113, 400, 411-412, 416
 VMF-114, 99, 101, 210-211, 226, 232, 241-242, 256, 259, 283-284, 430, 432-433
 VMF-115, 326, 329, 363, 368, 378
 VMF-121, 42, 99, 101, 430
 VMF-122, 99, 101, 228, 430
 VMF-124, 335, 435-436, 503
 VMF-151, 398
 VMF-155, 417
 VMF-211, 42, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 378, 383
 VMF-212, 334, 340, 363
 VMF-213, 335, 435
 VMF-216, 427, 429
 VMF-217, 427, 429
 VMF-218, 326, 328-329, 363, 368, 383
 VMF-221, 42
 VMF-222, 334, 340, 363, 375-376
 VMF-223, 334, 363, 375-376
 VMF-224, 398, 400, 408, 416
 VMF-225, 427, 429
 VMF-241, 398
 VMF-251, 363, 375-376
 VMF-252, 42
 VMF-311, 398
 VMF-312, 433
 VMF-313, 326, 328-330, 363, 368, 378
 VMF-321, 429
 VMF-422, 398, 401, 403-404, 409-411
 VMF-441, 398, 400, 416
 VMF(N)-531, 400
 VMF(N)-532, 400, 408, 411, 413, 425
 VMF(N)-534, 427, 429
 VMF(N)-541, 99, 259, 326-328, 330, 333, 430, 432
 VMF(N)-542, 433-434
 VMJ-152, 42
 VMJ-252, 413
 VMJ-353, 397-398, 413
 VMO squadrons, 718
 VMO-1, 426-427, 429
 VMO-2, 424-425, 429
 VMO-3, 153, 432
 VMO-4, 424-425, 436-437, 595, 646, 650, 665, 671
 VMO-5, 436-437, 595
 VMO-151, 42
 VMO-251, 42, 334-335
 VMR-253, 429, 438-439, 604
 VMR-353, 438, 604
 VMR-952, 437-438, 597, 604
 VMS-3, 42
 VMSB-131, 42
 VMSB-132, 42
 VMSB-133, 339, 346, 383, 385, 388
 VMSB-142, 339, 346, 353, 370, 380, 383
 VMSB-151, 398, 411
 VMSB-231, 42, 405, 412
 VMSB-232, 42

- VMSB-236, 339, 370, 378, 380, 388
 VMSB-241, 339, 346, 353, 383-385, 388
 VMSB-243, 339, 353, 363, 380
 VMSB-244, 339, 353, 383, 388
 VMSB-331, 398-399, 407, 412*n*, 418
 VMSB-341, 339, 353, 380, 383
 VMSB-354, 420
 VMTB-131, 367, 429
 VMTB-134, 100-101
 VMTB-232, 433-434
 VMTB-242, 429, 598
- Ground
- Fleet Marine Force, 10, 17, 19, 21, 23-29, 32-33, 36, 38-40, 44, 47-48, 464, 466-467, 476, 489
- Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, 17, 26-27, 30-31, 36, 38-39, 46
- Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, 20, 467
- Department of the Pacific, 38
- Administrative Command, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 26-27, 30
- Marine Garrison Force, 246, 475
- Amphibious Training Staff, FMFPac, 21
- Headquarters and Service Battalion, FMFPac, 27
- Marine Supply Service, FMFPac, 477
- Service Command, FMFPac, 30
- Supply Service, FMFPac, 27-28, 30, 477
- Transient Center (Marianas Area), FMFPac, 31
- Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, 16-17
- Marine Service of Supply, Amphibious Troops, Pacific, 24
- Expeditionary Troops, 83, 162, 181, 469, 471, 474, 484, 607, 714
- Force Amphibian Tractor Group, 27
- Force Antiaircraft Artillery, 27
- Force Artillery, 27
- Force Reserve, 27
- Force Service Troops, 27
- Fleet Base Defense Force, 17
- FMF Transient Center, 27
- I Marine Amphibious Corps, 3, 21, 23-25
- II Marine Amphibious Corps, 24
- X-Ray Provisional Amphibious Corps, 61, 64, 78-79
- Redesignated III Amphibious Corps, 66
- III Amphibious Corps, 25-27, 30, 61, 63-64, 79, 88, 96, 162-163, 165, 168, 177, 181, 186-187, 246, 252, 278*n*, 430
- V Amphibious Corps, 23-27, 30, 38-39, 61, 162, 300-301, 425, 436, 466-469, 471, 471*n*, 472-473, 476-480, 482-483, 489, 491-492, 504, 522, 522*n*, 523, 525-526, 528, 547-549, 554-557, 560-561, 563-565, 565*n*, 567-569, 571-573, 577-579, 579*n*, 580, 583, 585-588, 593, 597-598, 603, 605, 608, 608*n*, 610, 624, 629, 633, 635, 638, 643*n*, 644, 647, 670-672, 685, 700*n*, 711-712, 714, 719-721, 723, 725
- Administrative Command, 24-25
- Supply Service, 25
- V Corps Artillery, 301, 314, 316-319, 323, 565, 574, 580, 605, 708, 720
- I Corps Supply Service, 25
- III Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27
- V Corps Headquarters and Troops, 27
- 1st Marine Division, 19-20, 27, 34, 36, 63, 77-79, 83, 86, 89, 94, 96, 100, 106, 127, 130, 138, 158-159, 161-162, 165, 185, 187, 200, 209, 216, 218, 223, 225, 227, 232, 236, 240, 245, 249-251, 253-254, 266, 269, 271, 274-275, 277, 281-283, 283*n*, 284, 286, 430, 433, 734
- 2d Marine Division, 19, 27, 34, 97, 266, 395-396, 425, 464
- 3d Marine Division, 27, 389, 437, 464, 467-469, 471, 473, 478*n*, 483-484, 515, 525, 537, 553-555, 558, 563-565, 565*n*, 572-579, 579*n*, 580-582, 582*n*, 583-587, 589-593, 616-617, 623, 626-627, 630, 634, 638, 644*n*, 645, 647, 649, 652, 655, 659, 672-673, 676, 680, 684, 686, 688-689, 691, 701-702, 704, 708, 711, 711*n*, 712
- 4th Marine Division, 27, 400, 407-408, 423, 425, 437, 466-469, 471, 471*n*, 472-473, 478*n*, 479*n*, 482-483, 498, 502, 505-506, 508-509, 517-518, 521, 523, 525-526, 528, 549, 551-552, 554-558, 560-561, 563-564, 565*n*, 569-571, 595, 602-603, 605, 616, 636*n*, 642, 644*n*, 645-647, 649-652, 654, 657-661, 665, 668-677, 680-683, 692-693, 695, 702, 708, 711*n*, 712, 714, 725
- 5th Marine Division, 25, 27, 64, 437, 467-469, 471-473, 478*n*, 479*n*, 480, 482-484, 498, 502, 505-506, 508-509, 512, 516-517, 521, 525, 528, 549, 551-552, 554-558, 560-561, 563-565, 565*n*, 567, 569, 571, 573, 575-579, 579*n*, 580-581, 581*n*, 582*n*, 583-587, 591-592, 602-603, 605, 616-618, 620, 622, 624, 626-627, 629-636, 636*n*, 637-638, 640-641, 643-644, 644*n*, 645, 658, 676, 686, 688, 691, 695,

- 697-698, 700-705, 707, 711*n*, 712, 714, 725
- 6th Marine Division, 27
- 1st Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344*n*
- 2d Marine Brigade, 17, 19, 344*n*
- 1st Marines, 80-86, 91, 110, 116, 122, 126, 130, 134, 141, 143-146, 148, 155-159, 161, 186-187, 189, 192, 201, 223-224, 228, 237, 280, 467
- 3d Marines, 564, 565*n*, 573, 607-608, 608*n*
- 5th Marines, 80, 91, 96, 115-116, 118, 122, 126, 128-129, 134, 139, 141-143, 146, 148, 152, 155, 185, 201, 204-205, 207, 210, 214, 218, 223, 236-238, 240, 242, 249-250, 252, 254, 593
- 6th Marines, 467
- 7th Marines, 19, 80-81, 96, 118, 121, 126-127, 129-130, 134, 138, 146, 148, 153, 155, 185, 192, 200, 207, 216, 222-228, 233-234, 236-238, 252, 269, 276
- 9th Marines, 564, 573-578, 581-585, 587-588, 590-592, 617-618, 648, 665, 667, 672, 686-687, 690, 711
- 11th Marines, 80, 91, 94, 105, 129, 153, 202, 207, 233, 250
- 12th Marines, 573, 579, 579*n*, 580, 587, 589, 697
- 13th Marines, 472, 482, 515-516, 521, 548, 554, 579*n*, 617, 621, 624-625, 627-628, 636, 643, 697, 701
- 14th Marines, 472, 545, 552, 560, 568, 579*n*, 587, 655, 671, 675-676, 697
- 20th Marines, 408
- 21st Marines, 305-306, 484, 515, 551, 554-559, 561-563, 565-567, 573-575, 578, 580-588, 590-591, 593, 623, 636, 647, 655-656, 690-691, 701, 711
- 22d Marines, 408
- 23d Marines, 471, 509, 517-519, 521, 549-551, 554-558, 647, 649-652, 654-656, 658-659, 661-662, 665, 667-670, 672, 674-678, 680-681, 692, 694
- 24th Marines, 471-472, 519, 521, 557, 563, 565, 567-569, 647-648, 659-661, 663, 666-668, 671, 673, 675-681
- 25th Marines, 471, 471*n*, 509, 519-521, 548-551, 554-557, 560, 647, 649-651, 656, 658, 660-661, 664-665, 669-670, 673, 675-676, 678, 680-682, 692, 694
- 26th Marines, 469-471, 484, 515, 549, 557-558, 561, 565-567, 569, 575, 616-618, 620-621, 627, 629-636, 639, 643, 699-703, 706-707
- 27th Marines, 471-472, 509, 513-515, 548-550, 554-557, 621-623, 625, 633-636, 638, 642-643, 686, 697-702, 707
- 28th Marines, 471, 482, 509-510, 512-513, 516, 528, 530-531, 533-534, 536, 538-539, 542, 545, 547, 553, 624-628, 630, 632-633, 635, 637, 640, 642-643, 697, 699-701, 703, 707
- 29th Marines, 39
- Field Depots
- 1st, 28
- 3d, 28
- 5th, 28, 477
- 7th, 28
- 8th, 28, 478, 602, 708, 725
- 16th, 28, 86, 99, 150, 225, 246, 282
- Base Depots
- 4th, 28
- 6th, 28, 477
- 1st Provisional Field Artillery Group, 652
- Amphibian Tractor Battalions
- 1st, 28, 92, 229, 252, 271
- 2d, 28
- 3d, 28
- 4th, 28
- 5th, 28
- 6th, 28, 93
- 8th, 28
- 10th, 28
- 11th, 28, 643
- Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, 698
- Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions
- 1st, 27
- 2d, 27
- 3d, 27
- 4th, 27
- 5th, 27
- 7th, 27, 175, 179
- 8th, 27
- 9th, 27
- 10th, 27
- 11th, 27
- 12th, 27, 265
- 14th, 27
- 15th, 28
- 16th, 28
- 17th, 28
- 18th, 28
- Armored Amphibian Battalions
- 1st, 28
- 2d, 28, 472, 505, 618, 648, 671, 698, 721

- 3d, 28, 93, 242, 252
- Artillery Battalions**
 1/11, 80
 1/12, 575, 686
 1/13, 515, 639
 1/14, 521-522, 555, 573, 575, 661, 668
 2/11, 80, 116, 123, 195, 228
 2/13, 515
 2/14, 521-522, 652, 668
 3/11, 80, 129, 153, 269
 3/13, 515-516, 531
 3/14, 521-522, 552, 668
 4/11, 86, 248, 252, 254
 4/12, 708
 4/13, 515, 574, 578
 4/14, 472, 522, 552, 668
- Base Headquarters Battalions**
 1st, 28
 3d, 28
- Defense Battalions, 19, 21, 43**
 52d, 28
- Engineer Battalions**
 1st Separate, 28, 114, 204
 2d Separate, 28, 595, 720
 1st, 152, 156, 204, 240
 3d, 573
 4th, 647
 5th, 545, 628
- Infantry Battalions**
 1/1, 114, 144-147, 157-159, 161, 189
 1/5, 115-117, 122-124, 126, 139, 141, 143,
 201-202, 204-205, 209, 214, 216-217,
 236-237, 240, 250
 1/7, 119, 119*n*, 121, 129*n*, 135-138, 159-
 160, 190, 200, 210, 212, 223-229, 231,
 236, 250-252
 1/9, 574-577, 581-582, 586, 590-591,
 685-688
 1/21, 306, 558-559, 559*n*, 562, 578, 580,
 582-586, 588-589, 591-592, 626, 686,
 691
 1/23, 508, 517-519, 526, 548, 550, 554,
 558, 647, 649, 652, 654-656, 658, 660,
 665, 667, 671-672, 674, 680, 687, 692,
 779
 1/24, 519-521, 547-548, 550-551, 555,
 557, 559-560, 568-569, 647-648, 658,
 660-662, 666-667, 672, 674-676, 680-
 681
 1/25, 508, 519-520, 526, 547, 550-551,
 554-555, 559, 650-651, 654, 656-657,
 660, 664-665, 667, 671, 673-675, 681-
 682, 694
 1/26, 515, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567, 617,
 621, 623, 633-635, 638-641, 697, 703,
 706-707
 1/27, 508, 513-514, 549, 554-555, 621-
 623, 633-634, 636, 642
 1/28, 508-510, 512-514, 525*n*, 526, 530,
 534, 536, 538, 543, 545, 625-626, 629-
 630, 637, 640, 643, 707
 2/1, 110, 113-115, 123, 126, 134, 144-
 147, 157-159, 229
 2/5, 117-118, 123, 126, 139, 141-143,
 201, 205-206, 208-209, 216-217, 232-
 233, 237-238, 241-242, 244-246
 2/7, 80, 119, 130-131, 138, 144, 146-147,
 157, 159-160, 190, 207, 224-231, 234,
 236, 251-252
 2/9, 574-575, 575*n*, 576-577, 581-582,
 585-586, 590-592, 684, 686, 688
 2/21, 558-559, 562, 566-567, 578, 580,
 582-587, 591, 686, 691
 2/23, 508, 517-519, 550, 554, 558, 647,
 654-655, 658, 667, 672-674, 676-681,
 692
 2/24, 519, 547, 549, 554, 557, 567-568,
 636*n*, 647-648, 658-663, 665-668, 672,
 675-676, 680-682, 693-694
 2/25, 520, 547-548, 550-551, 555, 559,
 561, 567, 647-650, 654, 656-658, 664-
 665, 667, 669-670, 673, 681-682, 693-
 694
 2/26, 561, 567, 617-618, 620, 624, 626-
 627, 629-631, 635, 699-700
 2/27, 508, 513-515, 549, 557, 561, 617-
 618, 621, 623, 636-637, 639-642
 2/28, 508-510, 512-514, 530-531, 535-
 536, 538-540, 543, 625-630, 633, 637,
 640-641, 707
 3/1, 110, 113, 144-145, 147, 156-157,
 159-160, 187, 189, 192, 197
 3/4, 522
 3/5, 116-117, 119-120, 126, 128, 139,
 141-143, 148, 201-202, 205, 210-212,
 214, 228-229, 231-232, 237, 240, 246,
 249-251, 433
 3/7, 116-119, 119*n*, 120-121, 134-138,
 141, 159-160, 192-193, 195, 197-200,
 224-225, 227-229, 231, 234, 236-238,
 252, 697
 3/9, 575, 575*n*, 576, 578, 580-583, 585-
 593, 626, 629-631, 685-687
 3/21, 566-567, 576, 578, 580-581, 585-

- 587, 591-592, 685-687
 3/23, 518-519, 547, 556, 558, 647, 649,
 651-655, 658, 660, 664, 667, 671-672
 3/24, 520-521, 567-568, 647-650, 656,
 659-661, 665-667, 672, 676-677, 681
 3/25, 508, 519-521, 547-548, 550, 555,
 559, 561, 650-651, 654, 657-658, 664,
 667, 669-671, 673, 680-682, 693
 3/26, 558, 567, 617-618, 626-627, 630-
 631, 635-636, 639, 643, 699-700, 703,
 707
 3/27, 515, 547, 549, 554, 621, 623, 625,
 633, 637, 643, 691, 703, 706-707
 3/28, 512-513, 530-531, 534-536, 538-
 540, 625-626, 629-630, 633, 637, 643,
 701, 703, 706-707
 1st Medical Battalion, 148, 251
 Motor Transport Battalions
 1st, 88, 252
 5th, 643
 155m Howitzer Battalions
 1st, 27
 2d, 27, 552
 3d, 27, 80, 153, 254
 4th, 27
 5th, 27, 314-319, 320*n*, 322
 155mm Gun Battalions
 7th, 27
 8th, 27, 80, 153, 254
 9th, 27
 10th, 27
 11th, 27, 314, 316-317, 319*n*
 12th, 27
 Pioneer Battalions
 1st, 84, 86, 147, 152, 225, 282
 3d, 573, 602
 5th, 703, 708, 710, 724
 1st Seacoast Artillery Battalion, 28
 1st Service Battalion, 86, 282
 Service and Supply Battalions
 1st, 28
 2d, 28
 3d, 28
 4th, 28
 Tank Battalions
 1st, 88, 115, 124, 155, 228, 272
 3d, 484, 573-574, 578, 581, 591, 685, 687-
 688
 4th, 472, 509, 517, 519, 548-550, 555,
 560, 647-648, 650, 666-668, 676
 5th, 472, 512-515, 531, 538, 549, 554,
 560, 565, 618, 625-628, 631, 639, 641
 Provisional Battalion, 675, 681
 4th Provisional Battalion, 681
 Amphibian Truck Companies
 4th, 521
 5th, 516
 2d Bomb Disposal Company, 600
 Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO),
 103, 282, 332, 384
 4th Joint Assault Signal Company, 277
 War Dog Platoons,
 4th, 158
 6th, 624
 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, 662,
 655
 3d Rocket Detachment, 621
 Demolition teams, 135-137, 156, 169, 209,
 214, 216, 226, 262, 271, 531, 621, 633,
 636, 649, 667, 685, 689, 697, 706
 Marine Detachment (Provisional), U. S.
 Army Forces, Western Pacific, 39
 Marine Detachment, Sixth Army, 39
 Marine Detachment, Tenth Army, 38
 Marine Detachment (Provisional), Mari-
 anas Area, 31
 1st Division Military Police Company, 233
 7th Marines Weapons Company, 224, 227
 Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, N.C.,
 20, 100
 Marine Corps Air Station, Mojave, Calif., 45,
 47, 423
 Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif. 17
 Marine Corps Equipment Board, 17, 35
 Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va., 17, 60
 Marshall, General of the Army George C., 614
 Marshalls, 3, 16, 48, 54, 60, 67, 85*n*, 110, 279,
 288, 292, 315, 392, 395-396, 399-400, 400*n*,
 401, 405, 407-409, 411-414, 416-417, 420-
 422, 428, 449, 462, 466-467, 478, 713, 718,
 731, 733
 Masilay, 371
 Mason, Col Arthur T., 172*n*
 Matsunaga, RAdm Teiichi, 451
 Matsushita, Maj Nagahiko, 533*n*
 Maui, 468, 482-483
 McAloney, Capt Samuel H., 344*n*, 351*n*, 368,
 378-379
 McBroom, Maj Robert B., 89
 McCarthy, LCdr Daniel J., 538
 McCaul, Maj Vernon J., 42; Col, 304, 363, 388;
 LtGen, 304*n*
 McConaughy, Capt James L., Jr., 351-352, 379
 McCutcheon, LtCol Keith B., 304, 306-307, 337,

- 343, 372, 382, 389; MajGen, 343*n*, 373*n*
 McGlothlin, Maj Joe H., 329, 401-402
 McQuade, Maj Thomas J., 42
 Mears, Capt Dwayne E., 510
 Meat Grinder, 616, 645, 647-648, 651, 661, 682
 Medical Activities, 55, 83, 139, 142-143, 148, 150-151, 185, 225, 227, 234-235, 238, 266, 274-275, 398-399, 427, 431, 438, 477, 517, 525, 536, 545, 551, 557, 567, 569, 597, 602-604, 610, 613, 629, 635, 642, 648, 668, 677-678, 682, 689, 699, 721-723, 761
 Mee, Maj Fenton, 5; LtCol, 525*n*, 555, 650, 653, 656, 660, 674
 Megee, Col Vernon E., 47-48, 503-504, 504*n*, 597; Gen, 598*n*
 Melanesian, 55
 Merritt, Col Lewie G., 45; BGen, 388, 398, 401, 414, 416
 Meyer, Col Lyle H., 303, 307, 339, 356, 387
 Micronesia, 16, 54-55
 Middle Village, 174
 Midway, 17, 21, 342, 401, 438-439
 Mille Airstrip, 396
 Mille Atoll, 400*n*, 405, 412-413, 415, 418, 421
 Miller, Sgt P. J., 344*n*, 479
 Miller, Lt Roy G., 320, 436
 Millington, LtCol William A., 435-436, 503-504, 506
 Mills, LtCol James E., 314; Col, 319*n*
 Minami village, 445, 447, 459, 568, 642, 646, 648, 650, 660, 666, 673, 676, 682
 Mindanao, 52, 64-65, 291-293, 303, 309, 321, 332, 356-359, 361-363, 365-366, 374, 380-388, 390, 733-734
 Mindoro Island, 331, 334, 336, 358, 363, 381
Mississineua, 434
Missoula, 540
 Mitchell, Maj Norman L., 259
 Mitchell, MajGen Ralph J., 46, 301, 303*n*, 312, 314, 326, 334-335, 362-363, 387
 Mitscher, RAdm Marc A., 405, 493, 495-496, 717; VAdm, 64, 102
 Moluccas, 52
 Monte Cassino, 530
Monitor, 314
 Montgomery, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L., 307-308
 Moore, BGen Ernest, 598, 708
 Moore, Maj James B., 400
 Moore, MajGen James T., 47, 98-99, 430-431, 433, 593*n*
 Moran, Lt Robert P., 402-403
 Moret Field, 367-368, 370-374, 379-384, 388
 Moret, Capt Paul, 42; LtCol, 367
 Morison, Samuel Eliot, 715*n*
Mormacport, 101
 Moro guerrillas, 379
 Morotai Island, 52, 62, 65, 293, 309-310, 381, 733-734
 Mortimer Valley, 260
 Moses, Col Martain, 318
 Motoyama Plateau, 471, 571-574, 577, 579, 632
 Motoyama tableland, 580, 593
 Motoyama village, 445, 447, 449*n*, 459, 539, 574, 577-578, 581, 584-586, 634, 684, 686
 Mt. Bangkal, 379
 Mt. Daho, 379-380
 Mt. Dato, 379
 Mt. Mataba, 353-254
Mt. McKinley, 106, 187
Mt. Olympus, 106, 108, 278, 314
 Mt. Oyama, 262
 Mt. Patikul, 379
 Mt. Suribachi, 453, 455-459, 469, 471, 473, 483, 487, 495-498, 500, 502-503, 508-510, 512-513, 516, 525-526, 528, 530-531, 533, 533*n*, 534-540, 542-543, 545, 547, 553, 564-565, 593, 604, 611, 618, 624-626, 634, 646, 677-679, 700, 726
 Mudge, MajGen Verne D., 343*n*, 344*n*, 347, 352
 Mueller, MajGen Paul J., 63, 165, 168-169, 171-173, 175, 177, 179, 181, 186, 211, 232*n*, 237*n*, 252, 254, 259*n*, 260-262, 263*n*, 264, 278
 Mugai Channel, 181
 Mulcahy, Col Francis P., 46; MajGen, 47, 388
 Munda Airstrip, 428
 Munday, Maj Jack R., 123*n*, 129*n*
 Munich Settlement, 9
 Murahori, 1stLt, 190
 Murai, MajGen Kenjiro, 70, 259, 263; LtGen, 264
 Murphy, LCdr Raymond P., 595
 Murray, Maj Clay, 559*n*, 562
Murray, 420
 Mussolini, Benito, 9
 Mustain, LtCol Hollis U., 508, 519, 550, 555
 Nakagawa, Col Kunio, 68-70, 72, 146-148, 156-157, 159, 161, 169, 179, 217, 219, 222, 225, 229-230, 233, 235, 245, 248-249, 253, 260-264; LtGen, 267
 Nakayama, 146. *See also* Hill 200.
 Namur Island, 407. *See also* Roi-Namur.
 Nanomea, 396, 401-402, 404

- Nanpo Shoto, 444–445, 464
 Nansei Shoto, 465
 Napalm, 92, 92*n*, 136, 153, 169
 Napp, Cdr Emil E., 90*n*
Nashville, 311
 Natives, 265, 317, 365, 398, 402, 404, 418, 420
Natoma Bay, 423
 Nauru, 396, 399, 415
 Navajo Marine Code Talkers, 620, 620*n*, 621, 719
 Naval gunfire, 17, 34, 36, 63, 78, 83, 94, 103–105, 108, 112, 119*n*, 135, 137, 146, 153, 162, 166, 168–169, 177, 190, 208, 210, 221, 278–279, 280–282, 288, 314, 368, 404, 475, 483, 486–487, 489–493, 495, 501, 504–505, 512, 534, 536, 547–550, 555–556, 558, 562–563, 567, 573, 576, 579*n*, 582, 584, 587, 589, 605, 611, 617, 620–621, 623, 633, 638, 640, 643, 646, 648, 654, 658, 661–662, 668, 671–672, 674, 684, 714–719, 726
 Naval liaison officers, 282
 Naval liaison parties, 308
 Naval losses, 312
 Naval Treaty of 1922, 4, 6
 Naval War College, 15
 Navy, 13, 24, 41, 63–64, 278, 307, 325, 334, 342, 388, 430, 436, 452, 670, 714, 732, 734
 Bureau of Aeronautics, 41
 Bureau of Naval Personnel, 279
 General Board of the Navy, 14, 20, 40, 43
 Navy Units. *See also* Task Organizations.
 U. S. Fleet, 17, 395, 735
 Atlantic Fleet, 19–20
 Pacific Fleet, 19, 23, 184, 734
 Third Fleet, 63–64, 102, 245, 278, 293, 300, 303, 309, 334–336, 430, 435
 Fifth Fleet, 23, 68, 70, 77, 101, 422, 435, 466, 491, 502
 Seventh Fleet, 300–301, 307, 309, 326, 335
 Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, 20
 Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet, 21, 23, 467
 Amphibious Support Force, 483, 492, 502
 Attack Forces
 Eastern, 63
 Luzon, 336
 Northern, 25, 502
 Southern, 25
 Ulithi, 183
 Western, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283
 Covering Force, 63–64, 483, 492, 498, 500, 503
 Fast Carrier Forces, 64, 101, 435, 495
 Fleet Naval Landing Forces, 25, 63–64, 425
 Joint Expeditionary Force, 483
 Joint Expeditionary Force, 466, 483
 Pacific Forces
 Central, 23
 Southwest, 62
 Service Force, Pacific, 477
 Fleet Air Wing 2, 398
 Transport Division, 28, 316
 Transport Division 32, 484
 Amphibious Group 2, 476
 Attack Groups
 Angaur, 63, 165
 Peleliu, 63
 Ulithi, 181
 Defense Group, 634
 Escort Carrier Group, 96
 Fast Carrier Groups, 102
 Fire Support Group, 64, 102–103, 278
 Mine Group, 492
 Submarine Offensive Reconnaissance Group, 102
 Support Carrier Group, 492, 495, 500, 598
 Transport Groups, 95
 Transport Group 3, 83
 Underwater Demolition Group, 492
 Air Evacuation Squadron 2, 597
 Destroyer Squadron, 54
 Interpretation Squadron 2, 473
 Naval Construction Battalions (Seabees), 89, 204, 274, 335, 398, 408, 484, 517, 526, 564, 595, 600, 701, 710, 712
 9th, 560
 15th, 89
 31st, 479, 479*n*, 564, 594, 602
 33d, 152, 204, 272
 51st, 433
 62d, 479, 595, 720
 73d, 152, 204
 93d, 335
 98th, 708
 133d, 479, 479*n*. 594–595, 602, 634
 1054th, 152
 Photographic Squadrons
 4th, 472
 5th, 472
 Service Squadron 10, 478
 Transport Squadrons
 11, 484
 15, 584
 16, 484
 Underwater Demolition teams (UDT), 78–79, 83, 103, 110, 165, 183, 207, 268, 490,

- 493*n*, 496–499, 725
 UDT 13, 495
 UDT 15, 500
 VC-21, 283*n*
 VOC-1, 718
 Air Support Unit, 492
 Fire Support Unit One, 498
 Fire Support Unit Two, 498
 Gunboat Support Unit One, 492
 Gunboat Support Unit Two, 492
 Peleliu Fire Support Unit, 96
 Kossol Passage Detachment, 63, 103
 Shore-Based Aircraft, Forward Area, 414
 Navy Yard, 270
 Nazi Party, 732
 Negro Marines, 150, 516, 602
 Negros Island, 294, 331, 358–359, 361, 374–378
 Nemoto, Captain, 264
 Netherlands, 6
 Netherlands Indies, 51, 55
Nevada, 493, 496, 498, 500, 503, 624
 New Bern, N. C., 41
 New Britain, 77, 89, 237, 266, 303, 363, 444
 New Caledonia, 367, 438
 Newcomb, Richard F., 458*n*, 533*n*, 543*n*, 677*n*,
 678*n*
 New Georgia, 305, 389, 393, 428, 430
 New Guinea, 51–52, 67–68, 97, 287, 291–292,
 309, 432, 439, 444, 730, 733
 New Hebrides, 95, 98, 100, 430, 433
 New Ireland, 303, 363
 New London, Conn., 14
New Mexico, 336
 Newport, R.I., 14–15
 New River Base, N.C., 20
 Newton, VAdm John H., 293
New York, 493, 500, 503
 Ngardololok, 59, 142–143, 201, 217
 Ngarekeukl, 189–190
 Ngarmoked Island, 57, 135–138
 Ngercheu Island, 265
 Ngeregong, 261–262
 Ngesebus Airfield, 73, 211
 Ngesebus Island, 58, 61, 73, 80, 148, 189, 202,
 205–212, 214, 219, 222–223, 242, 250, 276, 281,
 84, 306, 735
 Nicaragua, 16–17, 305, 467
 Nichols Field, 354
 Nimitz, Adm Chester W., 24, 26, 29–30, 38, 44–
 47, 51–52, 52*n*, 60–62, 65, 98, 278, 286, 292–
 293, 326, 388, 395–396, 420, 427, 430, 462–
 466, 491*n*, 612, 712, 714, 733
 Nine-Power Treaty, 6
 Nishi, LtCol Baron Takeichi, 454–455, 459,
 590–591, 628, 646, 652, 655, 684, 692; Col,
 706
 Nishi Ridge, 616, 625, 628–630
 Nishi Village, 618, 630, 632, 635, 637
Nisshu Maru, 455
 Noble, RAdm Albert G., 381
 Noguchi, Capt Iwao, 711
 Norfolk, Va., 35
 Norman, Col Lawrence, 398
 Normandy, 731–732
 North Africa, 733
 North Carolina, 20
North Carolina, 493, 503
 Northern Solomons, 303
 Northrop Aviation, 326
 Norway, 19
 Noumea, 431
 Novaliches, 346
 Nui Island, 402–403
 Nukufetau, 399
 Nutting, Capt Lewis, 605
 Oahu, 21, 183, 417, 477, 483
 Obata, Gen Hideyoshi, 449, 453
 Observers, Japanese, 128, 141
 Ocean Island, 415
 OCTAGON Conference, 65
 Oder River, 730
 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 612
 Ofstie, RAdm Ralph, 278, 281
 Ogasawara Gunto, 444
 Okinawa, 30, 32, 39, 47, 184, 266, 277, 309, 377,
 387–388, 465, 490, 572, 614, 715, 734–735,
 737
 Old Baldy, 260
 Oldendorf, RAdm Jesse B., 103–104, 106, 287*n*,
 279–280
 Oldfield, LtCol John S., 515
 Old Glory, 445
 O'Leary, TSgt Jeremiah A., Jr., 235*n*
Ommaney Bay, 336
 O'Neill, Capt Donald D., 425
 Ormoc, 321, 325, 327–328, 330
 Orote Field, 426–428
 Orote Peninsula, 425–426
 Osaka Yama, 628. *See also* Hill 362A.
 Osborne, 1stLt Stanley, 662–663
 Osuka, MajGen Kotau, 453, 457–458, 475
 Ota, Lt Hideo, 711
 Owi Island, 335, 432

- Oyama, 260
 Oyanagi, Leading Private Yutaka, 683*n*
 Ozark, 723
- Pacific Islands, 55
 Pacific Ocean, 54, 439-440, 444, 713-714, 731, 737, 764
 Pacific Ocean Areas, 24, 29, 38, 41, 54, 60
 Pacific Theater, 21, 292, 504, 522, 588, 612-613, 620*n*, 726, 730
 Pacific War, 54
 Pagan Island, 429
 Palampon, 332
 Palau, 16, 47, 52, 54-55, 57-62, 64-68, 71, 76-78, 82, 96-98, 101-102, 105, 134, 162, 165, 180, 183, 189, 193, 223, 227, 232, 245, 253, 259, 265, 279, 286-287, 293, 326, 407, 430, 433, 457, 733-734
 Palawan Island, 358-359, 361-362, 365
 Palmyra Island, 21, 438
 Palo, 310
 Palomas Hill, 174, 176. *See also* Lighthouse Hill.
 Palompon, 331
 Panaon Straits, 310
 Panay, 294, 358-359, 361, 363, 370, 374-376, 378
 Panay Islands, 328, 331
 Parang, 381-383
 Parangon, 381
 Parker, Capt Elton C., 492
 Parris Island, S.C., 35-36
 Parry Islands, 408-409
 Password CHEVROLET, 620
 Patikul, 379
 Patrick, MajGen Edwin D., 352-354
 Patrols, 269, 611, 637, 692
 antisubmarine, 100, 278, 433, 561, 598, 611, 717
 Pearce, Maj Thomas B., Jr., 629
 Pearl Harbor, 20, 26, 30, 32, 41, 44-45, 60-61, 67, 94, 98-99, 220, 303, 315, 409, 423, 429, 431, 449, 451, 465, 467-468, 476-477, 501, 537, 677
 Japanese attack, 29, 40, 42, 44
 Peatross, LtCol Oscar F., 513*n*
 Peleliu, 3, 36, 57-59, 62-63, 66, 70-73, 75-81, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 92-94, 97, 100-106, 116, 118, 120, 122*n*, 124, 127-129, 131, 135-136, 138-139, 141-143, 150-51, 153, 155-156, 162, 165, 169, 175, 177, 179-181, 184-197, 189-190, 192-193, 195, 198-202, 204-205, 207, 209-211, 214, 216-219, 221-223, 225, 227-228, 232-233, 236-237, 241-242, 244-246, 249-250, 253-254, 258-263, 265, 267-269, 271-273, 275-286, 288, 300, 306, 309, 326-327, 333, 335, 430-431, 431*n*, 432, 438, 443, 445, 489, 505, 729, 733-734, 738
 Peleliu Airfield, 66, 95, 98-99, 115, 152, 165, 185, 236, 263, 276, 430, 432, 438
 Peleliu Island Command, 86, 89, 98, 134, 152, 156, 264-265, 282
 Peleliu Operation, 94, 96, 100, 153-154, 161, 185, 190, 207, 214, 266, 270-271, 273-274, 278, 280-281, 284, 285*n*, 287, 324, 433, 735
 Pennsylvania, 145
 Pensacola, 493, 495-497, 563, 565, 624
 Peppard, Maj Donald A., 237*n*
 Peralta, Col, 375
 Percy, Maj George A., 562, 582
 Perry, Commo Matthew, 445, 484
 Philadelphia, Pa., 14
 Philippines, 3, 6, 14, 51-52, 54, 65, 67, 70-71, 76, 102, 179, 181, 184, 279, 287, 291-294, 296-298, 303-304, 306-307, 309, 312, 324, 327, 332-333, 335-337, 340, 342, 348, 354, 356, 358-359, 361-363, 366, 375-377, 380-382, 384, 387-390, 423, 433, 440, 443-444, 447, 457, 461, 463, 465, 469, 718, 718*n*, 730, 732-736
 Philippines Operation, 286, 291, 300, 307, 334, 351, 358, 374, 377, 387, 389-390, 416
 Photographs, 221, 275, 318, 382
 Pilots
 American, 40-42, 48, 153, 225, 241, 274, 283, 291, 301, 312, 314, 327-328, 330-335, 342, 346, 348-349, 351-352, 354, 356, 359, 362, 365, 367, 370, 374-376, 380, 383-390, 393, 396-397, 400-401, 407, 411-413, 415-417, 420, 422-424, 427-428, 433-437, 440, 472, 485, 490, 493, 499-500, 523, 597, 717-718, 718*n*, 735
 Japanese, 399-400, 439, 452, 454
 Pinckney, 479, 723
 Pipes, Sgt Joe L., 516
 Plain, Col Louis C., 514
 Planning
 American, 51-52, 57-58, 60, 98, 346, 483, 485, 590, 542, 559*n*, 590, 593, 612, 721
 Japanese, 300, 340, 450
 Plaridel, 346
 Poland, 8-9, 19
 Pollock, LtCol Daniel C., 515, 549
 Polynesian, 55

- Ponape Island, 407, 412, 415-416
 Pontoon causeways, 152
 Pope, Capt Everett P., 157-158, 234
Portland, 281
 Portugal, 6, 8
 Pratt & Whitney radial engine, 399
President Monroe, 409-410, 710
 Price, RAdm John D., 398
 Prisoners of War
 Japanese, 134, 138, 175, 195, 199, 207-209,
 218, 222, 225, 236, 253, 258, 276-277,
 285, 361-362, 370, 418, 522, 551, 626,
 644, 690, 692-694, 703-704, 710-711
 Korean, 209, 216, 276, 644
 Psychological warfare, 276, 417, 693, 704
 Puerta Princesa, 362
 Puller, Col Lewis B., 110, 112, 114, 129-130,
 134, 144, 147-148, 157, 187
 Pusan, Korea, 454
 Putnam, Maj Paul A., 42
- Quantico, Va., 14, 16-17, 19, 21, 35-36, 39, 41-
 42, 304, 388
 Quarry, Iwo Jima, 525
 Quebec, Canada, 65
 Quebec (QUADRANT) Conference, 60
 Quezon City, 354
 Quezon, Manuel L., 296
- Rabaul, 303, 393
 Radar, 100, 259, 323-324, 326, 328, 330, 373,
 404, 408, 411, 425, 486*n*, 487, 572, 611, 646,
 653, 662
 Radar Hill, 205, 214, 216-217
 Radio Tokyo, 499, 707
 Railroads, 171, 171*n*, 172, 176
 Ramsey, LtCol Frederick A., Jr., 130*n*
 Randall, LtCol Carey A., 574
 Rea, Maj Amedeo, 561, 618
 Reconnaissance activities, 318, 474
 Redfield, LtCol Ben Z., 413
 Rees, Col James E., 353
 Reeves, RAdm John W., Jr., 151
 Reich, 2dLt Richard, 662-663
 Reinberg, LtCol Louis, 248
 Reinforcements
 American, 155
 Japanese, 190, 201, 281, 321-322, 324-325,
 328, 382, 453, 664, 670
- RENO V Operation, 293*n*
 Rentz, Maj John N., 445*n*
 Replacements, 86, 139, 147-148, 480, 483, 546,
 586, 592-593, 602, 608, 633, 688-689, 699,
 702, 724
 Rescue Activities, 401, 440
 Research and Development, OSS. *See* Office of
 Strategic Services.
 Reservoir Hill, 350-351
 Reutlinger, Maj Albert F., 93
 Reynolds, Maj John E., 417
 Rhineland, 9
 Richardson, LtGen Robert K., Jr., 464
 Ridderhof, Col Stanley E., 388
 Ridge 3, 242, 245
 Ridge 120, 244
 Ridlon, Capt Walter, 663
 Roach, Capt Phil E., 510
 Roads, 202, 210, 325, 479, 634
 Roane, Capt Eugene S., Jr., 322
 Robertson, Capt Armand, 95-96
 Robertson, LtCol Donn J., 515, 549, 702
 Robinson, Col Ralph R., 60
 Rockey, MajGen Keller E., 468, 512, 549, 554-
 555, 557, 579, 581, 598, 610, 617, 626-627,
 630, 633, 635, 638, 642-644, 691, 695, 699-
 702, 706
 Rocky Point, 168-169, 171
 Rodgers, RAdm Bertram J., 483, 492, 498, 500,
 502
 Rogers, BGen Ford O., 265
 Rogers, Capt John F., 402
 Rogers, Col William W., 466; MajGen, 466*n*,
 522*n*, 565*n*, 579*n*, 608*n*, 700*n*, 714*n*,
 Roi-Namur, 400, 400*n*, 401, 405, 407-408, 411,
 466-467, 477, 636*n*
 Roll, LtCol George A., 638
 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 9, 19, 65,
 613, 614*n*, 673, 706, 706*n*, 727
 Rosenthal, Joe, 543
 Ross, Col Richard P., Jr., 150*n*
 Rota Island, 428-429
 Rothwell, LtCol Richard, 519, 558, 562
 Rowell, Col Ross E., 41; BGen, 42; MajGen
 44, 44*n*, 45, 45*n*, 46
 Rowse, Maj Earl J., 552
 Royal Air Force, 408
 Royal Australian Air Force Command, 301,
 309, 382
 Royal, RAdm Forrest B., 366
 Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 39-40
 Royal New Zealand Air Forces, 301, 362
 Rozga, Lt Thomas, 425, 436
 Rue, Lt Charles C., 370
 Ruhl, PFC Donald J., 535

- Ruhr Pocket, 730
- Rupertus, MajGen William H., 63, 77, 79, 83, 94, 97, 129–132, 151, 165, 185–186, 189–190, 193, 199, 200–201, 204, 206, 210–211, 223–224, 228, 236, 242, 251, 253*n*, 266, 278, 278*n*, 279, 284, 286, 433
- Russell, Maj Gerald F., 642
- Russell Islands, 77, 88, 100, 115, 186, 393, 400
- Russell, MajGen John H., 17
- Russia. *See* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- Ryukyus, 297, 335, 444, 464, 737
- Sabol, LtCol Stephen V., 110, 113, 145
- Saipan, 25, 32, 51, 59–61, 71, 76, 78, 105, 168, 173–174, 176, 184, 263, 267, 275–277, 323, 421, 423–425, 428–430, 438, 443–444, 450, 453, 457, 461, 464, 467–468, 472, 474, 476, 478, 480, 484, 487, 489, 491, 498, 504, 573, 597, 725, 731–732, 734
- Saipan Operation, 26, 225, 423–424, 462, 466
- Saito, Fred, 533*n*, 543*n*, 677*n*, 678*n*
- Salt Lake City*, 493, 498
- Samar, 65, 294, 310, 312, 317, 330, 334–335, 339, 358–359, 365, 377–378
- Samaritan*, 479, 537, 723
- Samoa, American, 21, 46, 398
- Sample, RAdm William D., 278
- Samurai*, 677
- San Bernardino Straits, 312
- Sanderson, BGen Lawson H. M., 420
- San Diego, Calif., 17, 21, 23, 41–42, 44–45, 328, 431
- San Diego Union* (newspaper), 400
- San Fabian, 339, 356
- San Fernando, 342, 350
- San Francisco, Calif., 286, 465
- Sangamon*, 426
- Sanga Sanga, 378
- San Ildefonso, 346
- San Isidro, 331
- San Jose, Calif., 316–317, 353
- San Jose del Monte, 346
- San Pablo, 325
- San Roque Airfield, 367
- Santa Barbara, Calif., 45, 47, 423
- Santa Cruz, 439
- Santa Maria, 346, 367
- Santee*, 427
- Santo Tomas, 343
- Santo Tomas University, 347
- Sarangani Bay, 382, 384, 387
- Saratoga*, 40–42, 537
- Sarles, LtCol George H., 373, 386
- Saufley*, 378
- Savory, Nathaniel, 445
- Sayers, LtCol Joseph C., 561
- Sayre Highway, 385–386
- Scales, Maj James S., 518, 649, 652–653
- Scandinavia, 729
- Schmidt, MajGen Harry, 466–468, 476, 482, 490–491, 491*n*, 492, 505, 515, 517, 547, 551–553, 563–564, 569, 576–577, 593, 603, 607, 608*n*, 610, 627, 633, 635, 638, 670–671, 676, 700, 710, 714, 716, 720
- Schmidt, LtCol Richard K., 509, 648
- Schrider, Maj Peter P., 304, 425, 429
- Schrier, 1st Lt Harold G., 540, 542
- Scott, LtCol Wallace T., 356, 373
- Sea Runner*, 253
- Sea Sturgeon*, 251, 253
- Seawolf*, 78
- Secretary of the Navy, 484, 542, 713
- Selden, Col John T., 131; BGen, 131*n*
- Senda, MajGen Sadasue, 458, 569, 572, 586, 647, 654, 680, 693, 693*n*, 694–695, 702
- Sengebau, Kulas, 265*n*
- Service and Supply Activities. *See* Army units; Logistics; Marine Units; Supply and equipment.
- Sevik, Lt Edward A., 413
- Shanghai, 321
- Shanley, Capt James V., 235, 244
- Sharp, RAdm Alexander, 492
- Sharpe, 1stLt Winfield S., 372
- Shepard, LtCol Charles E., Jr., 513
- Sherman, Capt Forrest P., 465
- Shimbu Line*, 351, 353. *See also* Japanese Defenses.
- Ships. *See also* Landing craft.
- American, 86, 169, 323, 445, 493*n*, 499, 548, 603, 714, 716
- amphibious command ships, 475, 523, 714
- battleships, 82, 103, 165–166, 210, 278, 475, 493, 498–499, 574, 587, 625, 634, 644, 665
- barges, 87, 127, 184, 232, 269, 314, 367, 375
- cargo vessels, 82, 87, 478, 573, 603, 722
- carriers, 97, 102, 278, 281, 283, 293, 312, 317, 323–325, 336, 395, 397, 405, 407, 423–424, 426, 429, 435, 437, 451–452, 459, 475, 523, 537, 560, 565, 717
- cruisers, 82, 103, 160, 165–166, 181, 210, 278–279, 336–337, 400, 407, 459, 475, 484, 489, 498, 504, 551, 554–555, 574, 587, 625, 634–644, 665

- destroyer escorts, 312–313, 420, 607
 destroyer minesweepers, 607
 destroyers, 103, 108, 132, 162, 165–166, 181, 190, 195, 210, 261, 278–279, 312, 329–330, 336, 378, 383, 400, 402, 404, 407, 420, 475, 484, 493, 496–498, 504, 530, 554–555, 591–592, 607, 634, 637, 644, 658, 665, 668, 691, 699
 escort carriers, 424, 432
 gunfire support ships, 81, 211, 493, 495–498, 501, 503–504, 523, 554, 649, 658, 671–672, 679, 714
 liberty ships, 431
 LSDs (Landing Ships, Dock), 84, 88, 96, 607
 LSMs (Landing Ships, Medium), 379, 475, 482, 509, 517, 520, 601
 LSTs (Landing Ships, Tank), 84, 95–97, 103, 129, 153, 162, 166, 187, 232–233, 270, 329, 356, 366, 436, 475, 477, 479–480, 480*n*, 482, 484, 503, 522–523, 560–561, 601, 607, 722
 LST(H)s (Landing Ships, Hospital), 83, 479, 480*n*, 517, 522–523, 560, 604, 723
 LSVs (Landing Ships, Vehicle), 314, 732
 minelayers, 400, 530, 607
 minesweepers, 103, 165, 183, 335, 420, 491, 495–496, 607
 motor torpedo boats, 327, 361
 patrol craft, 84, 181, 261, 315, 497, 505, 607, 665, 716
 repair ships, 607
 submarines, 381, 444, 453–455, 473
 supply and support ships, 233, 253, 502, 531, 597, 648, 651,
 tankers, 82
 tenders, 607
 transports, 19, 85, 87, 96–97, 162, 168, 181, 212, 251, 274, 328–329, 335, 367, 429, 475, 498, 502–503, 522–523, 525, 540, 552, 573, 597, 604, 607, 610, 714, 723, 736
 tugs, 601, 607
 Japanese, 278, 281, 324, 327–330, 333, 399, 730
 barges, 166, 190, 259, 278, 420, 432, 526
 battleships, 312
 cargo vessels, 328–329, 399
 carriers, 300, 312, 731
 coast defense vessels, 321
 cruisers, 312
 destroyers, 312, 321, 328
 escorts, 329
 submarines, 259, 312, 366, 396, 415, 417, 434, 450, 484
 tankers, 447, 735
 tenders, 399
 torpedo boats, 366, 407
 transports, 321, 328, 453
 hip-to-shore movement, 119*n*, 269
 Shofner, LtCol Austin C., 116–118
Sho-Go Operations, 297, 312, 321
 Shore fire control parties, 35, 277. *See also* Air activities; Naval gunfire.
 Shore party activities, 17, 34, 84, 86, 88, 94, 127, 143, 148, 152, 204, 282, 478, 480, 483, 523, 553, 592–593, 601–602, 708, 710, 724–725
 Siari, 365
 Siberia, 67
 Sibert, MajGen Franklin C., 381, 383
 Sicily, 281, 733
 Silverthorn, LtGen Merwin H., 32*n*, 27*n*
 Sindangan, 365
 Singapore, 294, 337, 382
 Siskin, Chaplain Edgar E., 109*n*
 Slappey, Capt Wallace J., 432
 Smith, Sgt E. Payson, Jr., 373*n*
 Smith, LtCol John, 379
 Smith, Maj Holland M., 15, 19; Maj Gen, 20–21, 23, 434*n*; LtGen, 24–26, 29–31, 33–36, 304, 423, 428, 433, 464, 466, 487, 489–492, 492*n*, 501, 523, 542, 603, 608, 608*n*, 610–613, 700, 714
 Smith, MajGen Julian C., 61, 63–64, 76, 79, 186, 211, 278; LtGen 80, 80*n*, 89, 162–163, 181, 181*n*
 Smith, BGen Oliver P., 77, 129–131, 211, 253; MajGen, 60*n*
 Smith, Maj Perry K., 142; Col, 363
 Smoak, Col Eustace, 588
 Smoke screen
 American, 135, 231, 279, 322, 357, 385, 497–498, 637, 650, 652, 660, 666
 Japanese, 227, 592, 698
 Smyth, PFC George, 562
Solace, 479, 542, 723
 Solomons, 6, 67, 83, 87, 97, 291–293, 301, 326–327, 334, 342–343, 362–363, 393, 428, 466–467, 730
 Song of Iwo Jima, 700
 Sorol, 434
 South America, 8
 South China Sea, 334, 435
 South Pacific, 21, 23, 45–46, 398, 431, 733

- Southwest Pacific Area, 24, 51–52, 101–102, 291–292, 301, 303, 334–335, 358, 416, 438, 457
- Spain, 8, 9, 54, 294
- Spanish American War, 14, 54
- Spatz, Lt Donald, 413
- Spearfish*, 473
- Spritzen, LtCol Roland J., 553*n*
- Spruance, VAdm Raymond A., 23, 422, 435, 465–466, 469, 489–491, 492*n*, 501, 560, 713; Adm, 465*n*
- Spurlock, Maj Roy T., 327
- STALEMATE Operation, 52, 59–62, 162, 266, 278, 430, 733
- STALEMATE II Operation, 59, 62–65, 82, 84, 89, 97–98, 100–101, 180, 287, 315
- Stalingrad, 430
- Stark, Adm H. R., 40, 42–43
- Stars and Stripes, 207, 542, 564, 626, 678. *See also* Flag raising and Old Glory.
- Steele*, 413
- Stein, Cpl Tony, 625
- Stephenson, Capt Edward V., 578
- Stiles, Maj Wilfrid H., 431
- St. Matthias Group, 373
- Stout, Maj Doyle A., 568, 648, 661
- Stout, Maj Robert F., 225, 432–433
- Strategy, 395, 715*n*, 716
- Streit, Maj Victor H., 226
- Stuart, LtCol Arthur J., 88*n*, 122*n*, 124*n*, 154*n*, 210*n*, 272*n*
- Stuart, Col James A., 607
- Subic Bay, 21, 342
- Sudentenland, 9
- Suifuzan Hill, 235, 260
- Sulphur, 444, 455–456, 572, 579, 600, 638
- Sulphur Island, 444
- Sulu Archipelago, 358–359, 361, 363, 371, 374, 378, 389, 385
- Sulu Sea, 335, 368
- Sumatra, 297
- Supplies and equipment. *See also* Ammunition; Logistics.
- American, 85, 87, 128, 152, 273, 478, 478*n*, 522, 551, 553, 597, 601–602, 610, 612–613, 627, 722–725
- aviation, 477–478
- cargo, 721, 724
- clothing, 610
- communications, 308, 368, 370, 379, 383, 389, 413, 515, 597, 719
- dumps and storage, 86–87, 122, 126–128, 151–152, 264, 269, 282, 318, 526, 551, 553, 600, 608, 658, 701, 720, 724
- equipment, 92, 152, 184, 208, 266, 269, 272, 277, 325, 523, 611, 651
- explosives, 514, 531, 669, 711, 716
- food and rations, 83, 87, 128, 282, 398, 410, 477, 523, 553, 557
- fuel and lubricants, 87–88, 241, 476–477, 526, 536, 607, 610, 612–614, 641, 664, 712, 722
- gas masks, 638
- matting, 333, 478, 601–602, 724
- smoke pots, 256
- spare parts, 155, 266, 277
- water, 87–88, 128, 129*n*, 135–136, 150, 190, 241, 257, 271, 275, 352, 398, 447, 477, 480, 523, 553, 557, 602, 607, 634
- Japanese, 382, 415, 457, 473, 654, 659
- dumps and storage, 150, 200, 275, 278, 281, 331, 353, 383, 493*n*, 562, 617, 638, 641
- gas munitions, 614
- signal, 259
- smokeless powder, 177, 584
- water, 258, 262, 530, 611, 620, 695
- Support Air Request Net, 718
- Surigao City, 382
- Surigao Straits, 312, 327, 330
- Sutherland, LtGen R. K., 293*n*
- Suwanee*, 426
- Suzuki, LtGen Sosaku, 361
- Sweetser, Col Warren E., Jr., 387–388
- Swift, MajGen Innis P., 352
- Swindler, Col Leland S., 478; BGen, 724*n*
- Tachiiwa Point, 447, 459, 578, 642, 675–677, 681
- Tacloban, 310, 312, 314, 316, 325–328, 330–331
- Tacloban Airfield, 310, 330, 333
- Tactics
- American, 715*n*, 725, 737
- amphibious patrols, 260
- armed support, 209, 518, 550, 564, 566, 635
- counterbattery fire, 202, 320, 554–555, 639, 656, 660, 666, 669, 673, 719–720
- gas warfare, 612–614
- harassing and interdiction fire, 153, 281, 414, 651, 654, 661, 671
- infiltration, 705
- jungle warfare, 305
- night attacks, 91, 588, 590
- sabotage, 349
- search and kill missions, 318, 401

- supporting arms coordination, 134, 282, 308, 320, 331, 333, 482, 555, 657-658, 666, 684, 716, 719
- tank-infantry assault, 110, 174, 177, 234, 281, 514, 519, 536, 567, 580, 592, 623, 627, 687, 714
- Japanese, 278, 315, 322
- Banzai* attacks, 71, 122, 156, 169-170, 175, 261, 263, 457-458, 522*n*, 525-527, 533, 538, 556, 641-642, 678-679, 705, 708
- chemical warfare, 614
- counterattacks, 72, 115, 121, 126, 132, 147, 158, 170-171, 176, 198, 202, 205, 245, 257, 267, 350, 556, 559, 679, 682
- counterbattery fire, 279, 655, 661
- counterlandings, 242, 261
- guerrillas, 461
- harassing and interdiction fire, 73, 320, 726
- incendiary balloons, 736
- infiltration, 170, 174, 207, 220, 225, 249, 261, 319-320, 322, 525-526, 539, 545, 556, 558, 585-586, 630, 632, 638, 661, 665, 677, 686, 697
- rocket barrages, 660-664
- sniping, 135, 141, 168, 172, 187, 201, 208, 232-233, 246, 248, 251, 263, 320*n*, 351, 426, 543, 560, 564, 578, 595, 623, 625, 635, 637, 639, 641, 646, 649-651, 656, 667, 669
- suicide attacks, 156, 323, 330-331, 335-336, 435, 735
- tank attacks, 123
- withdrawal, 180
- Tada, Col Tokechi, 232*n*, 263, 458, 508, 548, 550, 559, 650, 657
- Takasago Maru*, 420
- Talevera, 342
- Tanauan, 315, 320
- Tanauan Airfield, 325, 331, 333, 339
- Tarawa, 32, 52, 78, 105, 287-288, 395-401, 408, 438, 466-467, 487, 489, 505, 719, 730-731
- Taroa, 400
- Taroa Airfield, 405. *See also* Maloelap Airfield.
- Task Organizations
- Central Pacific, 469
- TF 18, 20
- TF 30, 63-64
- TF 31, 63
- TF 32, 63, 83, 102, 165, 186, 283
- TF 33, 63
- TF 38, 64-65
- TF 50, 466
- TF 51, 466
- TF 52, 523
- TF 53, 25, 502, 724
- TF 54, 483, 493, 498, 500, 503, 654, 668, 671,
- TF 55, 25
- TF 56, 466
- TF 57, 399
- TF 58, 405, 408, 435-436, 475-476, 489, 493, 495-496, 501, 503, 523, 560, 564, 717
- TF 59, 11, 46
- TG 32.1, 63
- TG 32.2, 63, 165, 181
- TG 32.9, 63, 103
- TG 51.5, 634
- TG 52.2, 492, 495
- TG 52.3, 492
- TG 52.4, 492
- TG 56.1, 466
- TG 58.1, 451
- TG 58.4, 451
- TG 58.5, 560
- TG 59.6, 431
- TG 78.1, 366
- TG 78.2, 381
- TU 52.2.2, 492
- Tawi Tawi Group, 378
- Tennessee*, 409, 493, 496, 498, 500
- Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, 17
- Tenzan, 260, 644
- Terrain, 77, 723, 726
- caves, 57, 70, 73, 75, 92, 104, 112, 134, 138, 145-146, 154, 156, 160-161, 177, 192, 198, 201-202, 205, 208-209, 212, 214, 216-271, 221-223, 225-226, 230, 234, 236, 240-242, 245-246, 248, 251, 256, 258, 261-265, 270-271, 276, 279, 351, 426, 432, 453, 455, 459, 473, 493*n*, 508, 528, 530-531, 539-540, 542-543, 545, 548, 554, 560, 569, 572, 577, 580, 586, 589-592, 611, 613, 614*n*, 618, 620-621, 626, 628-629, 631-633, 635, 639, 642-643, 645-646, 468-650, 652, 663, 668, 672, 684-687, 689, 691-692, 695, 697-701, 704, 706-707, 716, 720, 726-727
- escarpments, 721-722
- hydrographic conditions, 165
- jungles, 192
- promontories, 73, 119, 134-136, 136*n*, 137-138, 146, 153

- ravines, 693
 reefs, 58-59, 78-79, 81, 84-88, 94, 103, 108-110, 113, 119, 127, 129, 131, 148, 152, 163, 183, 216-217, 241, 266, 268-270, 272, 41, 478, 496
 ridges, 134, 141-142, 146-147, 153, 185, 189-190, 193, 195, 198, 200-201, 204-205, 214, 216-217, 219
 sand, 721-722, 724
 swamps, 141-142
 terraces, 721, 724
 tunnels, 695, 716
 volcanic ash and rock, 452, 455, 478, 483, 506, 509, 516-517, 519, 538, 557, 600-601, 686, 690-691, 721-724
 Terrar, Lt Edward F., 426
 Terry, 624
 Texas, 493, 503
 Thompson, Lt Earl C., 402
 Thurnau, Lt Theodore, 403-404
 Timor, 297
 Tinian, 25, 32, 36, 60, 184, 424, 429, 429*n*, 467-468, 484, 598, 731-732
 Titcomb Field, 383-384, 388
 Titcomb, Capt Jack, 344*n*, 351, 383
 Tobiishi Point, 539, 545
 Tojo, Gen Hideki, 430, 450; Premier, 732
 Tokyo, 67, 288, 294, 296, 377, 428, 435, 451, 458-459, 463-464, 487, 491, 493, 495, 537, 560, 669-670, 683, 700, 716, 732, 737
 Tokyo Bay, 421, 444
 Torokina, 301
 Totsuke, LtCol Ryoichi, 375
 Toyota, Adm Soemu, 297-298, 300, 499, 499*n*, 564, 670, 680
 Treitel, Maj Paul S., 550, 560, 569, 680
 Trotti, LtCol Tom M., 558
 Truk, 60, 67, 101, 292, 407-408, 449
 Tryon, 101
 Tulagi, 95
 Tulagi-Purvis Bay, 83
 Tumatangas, 379
 Tumbelston, Maj William H., 642
 Turkey Hill, 572
 Turkey Knob, 353, 568, 595, 616, 646-647, 650-651, 654, 656-658, 660-661, 663-665, 667, 669, 672-673, 675, 680-682
 Turner, RAdm Richmond K., 23; VAdm, 25, 466, 475-476, 484, 489-491, 501, 608, 608*n*, 612, 700, 714
 Tuscaloosa, 493
 Twining, MajGen Nathan, 46
 Tutuila, 398
 Ujelang Atoll, 416
 Ulithi Atoll, 52, 59, 62, 66, 162-163, 180-181, 184, 250, 254, 257, 286-287, 430-435, 443, 478, 733-734
 Umayam River Valley, 386
 Umurbrogol, 58, 73, 75, 108, 147-148, 156, 161, 190, 192, 200, 210, 219, 228, 237, 240, 248, 258
 Umurbrogol Mountain, 57, 145, 177
 Umurbrogol Pocket, 192, 206, 216, 218, 221, 224, 227, 231, 236, 240-242, 244-246, 249-251, 254, 257, 259-262, 270, 284
 Umurbrogol Ridges, 58, 146, 189, 199, 219, 222-223, 236-237, 265
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 4-5, 8, 443, 675, 729-730, 737
 United Press, 400
 United States, 4-8, 171*n*, 294, 296, 400, 429, 444, 451, 467, 480, 483, 604, 612-614, 700, 734, 736-737
 aid programs, 274
 Armed Forces, 9, 348, 351, 462, 644
 Army, 17, 23, 161, 187, 200, 248, 291, 303, 307, 332, 342-343, 361, 384, 393, 409, 484, 708, 710-711, 714, 718, 721, 724
 Marine Corps, 9-10, 13, 15, 19, 39, 52, 397, 620*n*, 712, 721, 735
 doctrine, 333, 714
 history, 396
 morale, 664
 replacements, 688
 strength, 15, 19-20, 39, 44, 688
 training, 688, 714
 shipping losses, 324, 556
 units of fire, 83*n*
 Urukthapel, 57
 Valencia, 385
 Vandegrift, LtGen Alexander A., 186*n*, 252*n*, 247; Gen, 24-25, 29, 253, 288*n*, 423
 Vandegrift, LtCol Alexander A., Jr., 521, 568
 Vandegrift Letters, 158*n*
 Vaughan, Maj Everette H., 400; Col, 401*n*
 Vegetation, 192
 Vehicles
 American, 722
 Alligators, Roebing, 35
 ambulances, 274


- amphibians, 87-88, 94, 127-128, 130-131, 139, 148, 156, 269, 273, 312, 721-723
 amphibian tractors, 13, 17, 35, 78, 84, 92-94, 106, 108-109, 148, 187, 224, 266-267, 274, 282, 315, 321, 432, 473, 483, 503, 505, 508, 516, 548, 553, 573
 amphibian trailers, 88, 127-128, 269, 477-478, 482, 721
 amphibian trucks, 85, 87-88, 92-94, 103, 109, 115, 127, 129, 131-132, 148, 228, 269-270, 274, 277, 282, 344, 477, 479, 482-483, 515-516, 521-522, 552-553, 573, 601-602, 657, 721-723
 armored tankdozers, 699
 bulldozers, 127, 138, 152, 168, 238, 242, 262, 480, 516, 521, 523, 459, 601-602, 605, 610-611, 615, 628, 647, 685-688, 701, 705, 707, 712, 724
 cargo carriers (Weasels), 478, 482, 523, 536, 601, 722-723
 cranes, 724
 jeeps, 308, 344, 350, 368, 378-379, 384, 701
 LVTs (Landing Vehicle, tracked), 35, 85, 87, 92, 94, 104, 106, 108-110, 115-117, 127-128, 130-132, 136, 139, 144, 148, 151, 155, 166, 206, 210-211, 216-217, 233, 240, 257, 262, 269, 271-273, 280, 375, 447, 472-473, 478, 503, 506, 508, 516, 518-519, 523, 551, 601, 721-723
 LVT(A)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored)), 35, 84-85, 92-93, 106, 108-109, 114, 116, 129, 137, 146, 158, 195, 209-210, 212, 242, 266, 277, 472, 505, 508, 569, 618, 620, 648, 650, 721
 LVT(F)s (Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Flamethrower)), 155, 157, 201, 206, 208, 226, 229-230, 241, 263-264
 tank retriever, 156, 273, 518
 tractors, 109, 127, 506, 552-553, 721
 trailers, 722
 trucks, 151, 274, 350, 379, 513, 517, 522, 534, 655,
 wheeled vehicles, 447, 473, 478, 516-517, 721-723
- Japanese**
 armor, supporting, 177
 bulldozers, 459
 motor vehicles, 641
 prime movers, 617
 tanks, 687
 trailers, 641
 Vella Lavella Island, 393
 Venable, Col Benjamin W., 176
 Versailles Peace Conference, 7
 Versailles, Treaty of, 16
Vicksburg, 493, 498
 VICTOR Operations, 358, 362
 VICTOR I, 358, 375, 377
 VICTOR II, 358, 375, 377
 VICTOR III, 359
 VICTOR IV, 359, 365, 378
 VICTOR V, 359, 380-382
 Virgin Islands, 42
 Visayan Islands, 309, 734
 Visayan Sea, 327, 332, 358, 374
 Visayas, 65, 294, 298, 309-310, 321, 374, 377-378
 Vogel, MajGen Clayton B., 21
 Vogelkop Peninsula, 292
 Volcano Islands, 436, 443-444, 484, 462*n*
 Volckmann, Maj Russell W., 348; Col, 349, 351; BGen, 348*n*

 Wachi, Capt Tsunezo, 458*n*
 Wachtler, BGen Walter A., 82*n*, 240*n*
 Wake Island, 6, 21, 42, 415, 420-421, 444
Wake Island, 437, 493, 595
 Walker, Maj Thomas J., Jr., 42
 Waller, Col James D., 472, 515
 Wallis Island, 398-399, 411
 Walsh, Senator Joseph, 288*n*
 Walsh, GySgt William G., 622
 Walt, LtCol Lewis W., 118, 123, 141, 210
 Walt's Ridge, 157-158, 160, 221, 224, 229-234, 237, 240, 244, 246, 248, 250, 254, 256-257, 260
Walter Colton, 431
 War Dogs, 91, 143. *See also* Marine units.
Washington, 493, 503
 Washington Conference, 6, 15
 Washington, D. C., 5, 279, 462, 613
 Washington, President George, 5, 445
Wasp, 436
 Watson, Col Arthur P., 257, 264
 Watson, Sgt Sherman B., 539
 Wattie Ridge, 224, 233, 246
 Wattie, Lt. Robert T., 238
Weapons
 American, 195, 655, 689
 antiaircraft guns, 356, 477, 501
 antitank guns, 91, 116, 687

- atomic weapons, 204
- automatic weapons, 91-92, 126, 132, 144, 589
- bayonets, 223, 566
- bazookas, 91-92, 115, 124, 135, 152, 214, 216, 266, 271, 566, 578, 633, 652, 659, 666, 693, 708
- BARs, 266, 708
- demolitions, 91-92, 114, 134, 138, 216, 266, 590, 629, 631, 650, 666, 681, 687, 689, 699, 705
- 8-inch howitzers, 500, 504
- 81mm mortars, 230, 270, 518, 568, 575, 582, 640, 648, 697
- .50 caliber machine guns, 272, 463, 628, 721
- 5-inch guns, 500, 504
- 5-inch rockets, 503, 717
- flamethrowers, 91-92, 134-36, 138, 152, 155, 169, 176, 200, 204, 209, 216, 223, 256-257, 262, 264, 266, 270-271, 273, 514, 531, 536, 567, 569, 576, 578, 589-590, 614, 621, 631, 633, 666, 681, 687, 689-690, 695, 699, 707, 725, 727
- flamethrower tanks, 238, 273, 512, 531, 621, 626, 628, 641, 666-668, 673, 675, 687-688, 694, 699, 707, 710
- 4.2-inch mortars, 108, 270, 503, 554, 610, 727
- 4.5-inch rockets, 108, 503, 621, 655
- 14-inch guns, 500
- 40mm guns, 166, 503, 654
- .45 caliber pistols, 708
- grenade launchers, 115, 124
- grenades, 144, 262, 514, 531, 569, 611, 614, 620, 636, 652, 659, 666, 678, 686, 689, 693-694, 713, 725
- guns, 156, 477
- half-tracks, 136-138, 200, 230-231, 531, 534, 548, 630, 632, 657, 673, 684
- howitzers, 94, 116, 124, 246, 248, 482, 521-522, 552, 554-555, 565, 721
- M-1 rifles, 697, 707-708
- machine guns, 91, 108-109, 123, 272, 472, 566, 635, 698, 701
- medium tanks, 208, 233, 649-650, 673
- mines, 109, 134, 632, 656, 675, 691, 720
- mortars, 87, 92, 109, 121, 142, 144, 157, 166, 171, 173, 187, 230, 270, 272, 477, 508, 523, 566, 575, 629, 635, 637, 698, 727
- naval guns, 209, 376, 423, 540, 716
- 90mm guns, 603
- 155mm guns (Long Toms), 154, 209, 228, 230, 248, 301, 719
- 155mm howitzers, 301, 477, 625, 638, 652, 719
- 105mm guns, 240, 242, 516, 634, 691
- 105mm howitzers, 83-84, 129, 129*n*, 269-270, 472, 515, 521, 552, 568, 719-720
- 120mm mortars, 727
- rifles, 91, 109, 566, 613-614, 659, 689, 698
- rocket launchers, 627, 631, 639, 655, 662, 666, 676, 685
- rockets, 108, 166, 534, 637
- satchel charges, 652, 659
- 7.2-inch rockets, 685
- 75mm guns, 108, 209, 214, 217, 269, 516, 520, 534, 621, 634, 640-641, 727
- 75 mm guns (self-propelled), 135, 176
- 75mm howitzers (pack), 84, 93, 116, 129*n*, 246, 261, 272, 521, 639, 657, 719-721
- 16-inch guns, 504
- 60mm mortars, 92, 126, 241, 270, 510, 568, 582, 666, 693
- tank dozers, 156, 273, 512, 520, 652, 706-707
- tanks, 81, 85, 88, 91, 110, 115-117, 120, 123-124, 134-139, 141, 143, 145-146, 153-161, 166, 168, 171, 173-74, 200-201, 205-206, 209-212, 214, 217, 226, 229-232, 235-236, 238, 241, 251, 256-257, 262-264, 272-274, 277, 281, 353, 472-473, 483, 509, 512-515, 517-520, 531, 534, 536, 538, 550, 553, 555, 558, 560, 563-567, 569, 574, 576-578, 582, 584, 590-591, 618, 621, 626-628, 630, 633-634, 639, 641, 644, 646-647, 649-653, 655-657, 659, 662, 664, 666-668, 672, 676-677, 681, 684-690, 693, 698-699, 706-707, 727
- .30 caliber machine guns, 272, 771
- 37mm guns, 108, 115, 123-124, 136-137, 158, 251, 269, 531, 534, 568, 575, 621, 629-630, 632, 636, 640, 667, 684, 727
- toxic gases, 613-614
- 20mm guns, 166, 463, 654
- white phosphorus grenades, 235, 567
- Filipino, 348
- Japanese, 73, 109, 137, 156, 193, 221, 231, 240, 256, 267, 449, 454, 498, 518, 531, 538, 553, 585, 587, 604, 617, 639, 655, 666, 668, 675, 681, 689, 723, 726
- antiaircraft guns, 135, 415, 449, 493*n*, 549

- antipersonnel land mines, 667, 690, 726
antitank guns, 177, 209, 249, 316, 353,
474, 493*n*, 513, 519–520, 536, 565–568,
572, 574, 582, 587, 591, 634, 646–647,
684
automatic weapons, 75, 117, 136, 205–206,
209, 240, 256, 273, 320, 453, 456, 458,
575, 618, 625, 648, 655
bamboo spears, 678
bangalore torpedoes, 154
chemicals, 142, 614, 614*n*, 620, 638
coastal guns, 458, 474–475, 498, 500, 531
demolitions, 154, 200, 320, 367, 526, 592, 691
dual-purpose guns, 146, 474, 572
80mm (naval) guns, 454
81mm mortars, 267, 454
5-inch guns, 135, 500
57mm guns, 83, 646, 649, 727
flares, 533
4.7-inch gun, 610
40mm guns, 144, 415
47mm antitank guns, 73, 109, 112, 454,
562, 591, 628, 646, 649, 665, 684, 727
grenades, 134, 249, 259, 320, 514, 526, 535,
542, 545, 614*n*, 622, 630–631, 637–639,
656, 659, 678, 688, 691, 708
guns, 473
knee mortars, 637–638, 676
knives, 630
light tanks, 684
machine guns, 73, 112, 142, 160, 168, 177,
226, 249, 449, 474, 493*n*, 518–519, 535,
539, 549–550, 554, 563, 568, 574, 584,
589, 617, 621–622, 650, 656, 660, 662,
664–665, 675, 678, 689, 697, 703
medium tanks, 316, 684
mines, 72, 79, 115, 119, 135–136, 152, 156,
160, 163, 193, 199, 249, 258, 267, 269,
320, 426, 473–474, 482, 486, 508–509,
512, 519–520, 528, 536, 545, 548–549,
564–566, 584, 641, 647, 726
Molotov cocktails, 592
mortars, 118–119, 122, 127–128, 134, 141,
154, 156, 160, 168, 177, 205–206, 231,
353, 367, 453, 459, 513–514, 519–520,
523, 525, 527, 531, 533–535, 538, 549–
550, 553–554, 557–561, 566–568, 573–
575, 585, 587, 595, 603–604, 617–618,
621, 624–629, 634, 639, 648–651, 653–
656, 685, 660–662, 664, 668–669, 671–
672, 674–677, 681–682, 692, 723, 727
mountain guns, 146
naval mines, 367
90mm howitzers, 727
150mm guns, 497
150mm mortar, 221, 267, 454
140mm guns, 533
120mm howitzers, 449, 727
pistols, 630
rifles, 142, 177, 249, 449, 535, 568, 575,
662, 697, 703
rocket launchers, 407, 454, 459, 726–727
rockets, 142, 267, 453–454, 519, 527, 550,
592, 649–651, 655, 677, 692, 726
sabers, 630
satchel charges, 628
70mm guns, 202, 249
75mm guns, 73, 205, 268, 316, 454
6-inch guns, 530
60mm mortars, 510, 675
small arms, 206, 209, 617, 623, 625, 692
tanks, 122–124, 126, 267, 281, 316, 454–
455, 523, 586, 591, 652, 655
37mm antitank guns, 73, 202, 205, 209,
268, 454, 591, 675
320mm mortars, 454, 727
torpedoes, 396, 452, 624–625, 636*n*
20mm rockets, 267
20mm cannon, 139, 249, 379, 415, 454
25mm anti-aircraft guns, 268, 449, 454
200mm (naval) guns, 267
Weather, 233
humidity, 55
rain, 55
temperature, 141
Weller, LtCol Donald M., 489, 493, 499; Col,
279*n*
Welles, 403
Wells, 1stLt George G., 540
Wensing, Col Walter W., 471, 509, 517–519,
549–550, 647–649, 656, 670, 680–681
West Coast, 400, 411
Western Caroline Islands, 52, 55, 62, 97, 99,
151, 184, 429, 431–434, 455, 734. *See also*
Caroline Islands.
Western Pacific, 3, 59, 397, 465, 614
West Field, 429*n*
West Indies, 19
West Road, 189, 192, 195, 198, 200–202, 204,
206, 209, 222, 224, 226, 228, 232–233, 236–
238, 240, 242, 246, 249, 254,
White, Maj Philip R., 326*n*
Whitehead, MajGen Ennis C., 382
White Plains, 424–425

- Wickel, 2dLt James J., 232*n*, 259*n*, 263*n*
 Wildcat Bowl, 221, 256, 260-263
 Wildcats, 263-264, 399. *See also* 81st Infantry
 Division under Army units.
 Wildcat Trail, 210
 Wilkinson, VAdm Theodore S., 63-64, 103-
 104, 181, 278
 Williams, LtCol Marlowe C., 558-559; Col,
 559*n*
 Williams, BGen Robert H., 543*n*
 Willis, 2dLt William A., 112
 Willis, Col William A., 326, 363
 Wills, Maj Donald H., 372
 Wilson, Lt Walter A., 402, 404
 Wilson, President Woodrow, 3-5, 7
Wintle, 420
 Withers, Col Hartnoll J., 551, 555, 558
 Witomski, Maj Stanislaus J., 326*n*
 Woleai, 101
 Woods, MajGen Louis E., 388, 416, 420; LtGen,
 404*n*
 Worden, LtCol Waite W., 66*n*, 70*n*, 129*n*, 132*n*,
 153*n*, 180*n*, 190*n*, 248*n*, 285*n*
 World Disarmament Conference, 7
 World War I, 3-5, 7-8, 14, 54, 448, 467, 504,
 613, 727
 World War II, 3, 55, 448, 467-468, 522, 543,
 588, 612, 620*n*, 713, 715, 729, 736
 Wornham, Col Thomas A., 471, 509, 513, 549,
 556, 621, 639, 643
 Wotje Atoll, 400, 405, 412-415, 417-418
 Wright engines, 463
 Wright, Lt Frank J., 512
 Wurtsmith, BGen Paul D., 333*n*
 Yamashita, Gen Tomoyuki, 300, 377
 Yap, 54, 59, 62, 64, 68-69, 101-102, 180-181,
 184, 286, 430, 432-434, 444, 783
 Yap Air Base, 52
 Yap Operation, 63, 65, 181, 301
 Yokohama, 484
 Yokosuka, 449
Yorktown, 399
 Youngdale, LtCol Carl A., 552
 Zambales Mountains, 342
 Zamboanga, 356, 359, 362-363, 365-368, 371-
 373, 378-379, 382, 388, 390
 Zamboanga Peninsula, 361, 363, 365-366, 370-
 371, 374, 381
 Zeros. *See* Aircraft, Japanese.
 Zonne, Maj Edmund L., 397



**SCENE OF BATTLE
1944 - 1945**

MERCATOR PROJECTION

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

60° 50° 40° 20° E 20° 40° 50° 60°

STATUTE MILES AT THE EQUATOR

MAP I