# American Exit Increases Optimism in Falluja

*by Timothy Williams*
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Falluja, Iraq—In Falluja, a town that rises abruptly out of the vast Syrian Desert an hour west of Baghdad, nearly every building left standing has some sort of hole in it.

Mosques are without their minarets. Apartment walls have been peeled away by artillery shells. A family's kitchen is full of tiny holes made by a fragmentary grenade.

Of all the places fighting has raged since the American invasion nearly six years ago, Falluja—the site of two major battles and the town where American security contractors were killed and their bodies hung from a local bridge—stands out as one of the bloodiest and most intractable.

This month, as the last American Marines prepare to leave Camp Falluja, the sprawling base a few miles outside of town where many of the American troops who fought the two battles were stationed, Falluja has come to represent something unexpected: the hope that an Iraqi town once at the heart of the insurgency can become a model for peace without the United States military.

As part of the reduction of United States troops from Iraq, by Thursday there will be few Marines left in or around this mostly Sunni city of about 300,000 people. The closing of Camp Falluja is one of the most prominent symbols yet that America's presence in the country, which at times had seemed all encompassing, is diminishing.

As recently as a year ago, the base closing was cause for alarm. The calm that seemed to have taken hold here was fragile enough that both Iraqi and American officials feared the potential consequences of the Marines' departure.

Today they look forward to it.

"That will make our job easier," said Colonel

Dowad Muhammad Suliyman, commander of the Falluja Police Department. "The existence of the American forces is an excuse for the insurgents to attack. They consider us spies for the Americans."

To be sure, the threat of violence has not vanished. But the police said they were proud that a place that suffered a major attack a week just a few years ago had had only two in the last six months.

The view that the town is better off taking care of itself was echoed by residents, even in the neighborhood hit by the most recent big attack, in early December, when suicide truck bombers linked to al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia killed 19 people, wounded dozens of others and leveled nine houses and two police stations.

"Our sons will take care of the security issue," said Khalil Abrahim, 50, a resident of the neighborhood, as he walked over the rubble of his house, wondering aloud how he could afford to rebuild. "They can do a better job."

Camp Falluja will be handed over to the Iraqi Army, with most of its Marines relocated to Al Asad Air Base, about 90 miles to the west. A smaller contingent will remain at nearby Camp Baharia.

The move reflects the confidence of the American command that major violence will not return here.

"It won't happen again because the Iraqis don't want it to happen again," said Colonel George H. Bristol, the bald, heavily muscled commanding officer of the I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group at Camp Falluja.

"We've certainly turned a page," he said. "The conditions are now there where we can close it and turn it over to the people who fought beside us. It's a great thing. If you look at the city, it has really come to life."

The city, which had been emptied of much of its population before the second Battle of Falluja in November 2004, now bustles with people, its streets filled with honking cars inching their way to the Old Bridge that spans the placid, green Euphrates River.

In a small building at the foot of the bridge, freshly painted green, not far from where the bodies of two Blackwater security guards were hung,

Falluja has established an Office of Citizen Complaints.

At the elementary school where in 2003 members of the 82d Airborne Division fired on protesters—some of whom may have been armed—killing 17 people, dozens of girls were at play during recess. A sign out front said the school was a voter registration center for the coming provincial elections.

Not far away, a restaurant named KFC—not affiliated with the American fast-food chain but adorned with unlicensed pictures of Colonel Sanders—sells a fried chicken lunch for about $3.50.

All around the city, people are rebuilding houses and clearing away rubble.

If a rocket-propelled grenade launcher symbolized Falluja during the height of the insurgency, its new symbol may well be the broom. They are sold in bunches at roadside markets and are in almost constant use by workers in bright orange jumpsuits trying to keep the town's narrow roads free of desert sand.

At Camp Falluja, Major James R. Gladden and Master Gunnery Sergeant Ray SiFuentes are overseeing the dismantling of a base that had once been home to 14,000 Marines and contractors.

The 2,000-acre post had its own fire department, water treatment plant, scrap yard, voter registration booth, ice-making factory, weather station, prison (for insurgents), beauty shop, power plant, Internet cafe, Turkish bazaar, and dog catcher.

Its chapel could fit 800 Marines for religious services, a Toby Keith concert, or a performance by the Philadelphia Eagles cheerleaders, all of which were held there.

"We had basically everything a small town had," said Major Gladden, 34, who is known by other Marines as the mayor of Camp Falluja. "Everything except fast-food outlets," he said, which were deemed too unhealthy.

There are only 200 Marines left now, and about 170 truckloads a day leave the base, most headed for other United States military installations.

Even the gaggle of geese from the camp's artificial pond, which some Marines had adopted as pets, has been taken away. One by one, they

were trapped and set loose at a larger pond at Camp Baharia.

A good deal of packing up involves making sure nothing is left behind that later could be used against American forces. Obsolete armor for trucks, ballistic glass plates for Humvees and concertina wire are cut to pieces. Thousands of mammoth concrete barriers are being trucked to other military bases.

Back in town, where residents have been required to be fingerprinted and to submit to iris scans, Hashim Harmoud, 69, a caretaker at a mosque that had been said to be a center for insurgent activity, said he was thankful for the city's newfound peace.

But as testament to the town's dual nature, he was hesitant to discuss an insurgency that could rise up again at a moment's notice. "Al-Qaeda?" he asked, a bit cagily. "I don't know anything about them. I go from the mosque to my house, and that's all."

## Notes

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# The Price of the Surge: How U.S. Strategy Is Hastening Iraq's Demise

*by Steven N. Simon*

In January 2007, President George W. Bush announced a new approach to the war in Iraq. At the time, sectarian and insurgent violence appeared to be spiraling out of control, and Democrats in Washington—newly in control of both houses of Congress—were demanding that the administration start winding down the war. Bush knew he needed to change course, but he refused to, as he put it, "give up the goal of winning." So rather than acquiesce to calls for withdrawal, he decided to ramp up U.S. efforts. With a "surge" in troops, a new emphasis on counterinsurgency strategy, and new commanders overseeing that strategy, Bush declared, the deteriorating situation could be turned around.

More than a year on, a growing conventional wisdom holds that the surge has paid off handsomely. U.S. casualties are down significantly from their peak in mid-2007, the level of violence in Iraq is lower than at any point since 2005, and Baghdad seems the safest it has been since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime five years ago. Some backers of the surge even argue that the Iraqi civil war is over and that victory on Washington's terms is in sight—so long as the United States has the will to see its current efforts through to their conclusion.

Unfortunately, such claims misconstrue the causes of the recent fall in violence and, more important, ignore a fatal flaw in the strategy. The surge has changed the situation not by itself but only in conjunction with several other developments: the grim successes of ethnic cleansing, the tactical quiescence of the Shiite militias, and a series of deals between U.S. forces and Sunni tribes that constitute a new bottom-up approach to pacifying Iraq. The problem is that this strategy to reduce violence is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.

Despite the current lull in violence, Washington needs to shift from a unilateral bottom-up surge strategy to a policy that promotes, rather than undermines, Iraq's cohesion. That means establishing an effective multilateral process to spur top-down political reconciliation among the major Iraqi factions. And that, in turn, means stating firmly and clearly that most U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Iraq within two or three years. Otherwise, a strategy adopted for near-term advantage by a frustrated administration will only increase the likelihood of long-term debacle.

## The Surge's False Start

After the February 2006 bombing of the Askariya shrine in Samarra, the White House started to become increasingly concerned that there were too few U.S. troops in Iraq. A network of retired army officers led by Jack Keane, a former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, had been pushing from the outside for an increase in forces, and Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) kept up a drumbeat of criticism of what they saw as a lackluster military effort. The November 2006 congressional elections, which handed the House and the Senate to the Democrats, added to the sense that a new strategy was needed. In a December 2006 memo, Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, somewhat gingerly noted that the United States might "need to fill the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad with Coalition forces if reliable Iraqi forces are not identified."

On December 13, 2006, Bush met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon to persuade them to allocate more troops to Iraq. It was not an easy sell. U.S. ground forces are not configured to fight such

a long war, and the repeated deployment of the same active-duty and Reserve units had taken a toll. The reenlistment rate of young captains, for example, had fallen to an unprecedented low; about half of the West Point classes of 2000 and 2001 had decided against an Army career. The pace of unit rotations and the tempo of operations had also taken their toll on equipment, which was wearing out at nine times the normal rate, faster than it could be replaced. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made clear his concern about the army being stretched too thin. A shortfall of 10,000 company-grade officers meant that the Reserve units would have to rob both people and materiel from other units. Meanwhile, the mounting expense of the war was crowding out the procurement of new combat systems for the Navy and the Air Force, and there was a growing risk that the military might find itself without the capacity to meet other strategic challenges, whether from Afghanistan, Iran, or elsewhere.

Bush tried to allay these worries, pledging to, among other things, increase the size of the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps and boost defense spending. But the Joint Chiefs also conditioned their reluctant support of the surge on a promise from the president to hold Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's feet to the fire on political reconciliation. So when Bush unveiled his surge strategy in January 2007 (the deployment of an additional 21,500 troops, through September, with the initial military objective of restoring order to Baghdad), the stated purpose was to ensure that "the [Iraqi] government will have the breathing space it needs to make progress in other critical areas. Most of Iraq's Sunni and Shi'a want to live together in peace—and reducing the violence in Baghdad will help make reconciliation possible." Bush quoted Maliki's promise that the Baghdad security plan would "not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation."

Even then, however, the administration was already starting to doubt Maliki's competence and willingness to pursue reconciliation, the principal determinant of long-term stability in Iraq. Two months earlier, Hadley had visited Iraq to assess the prospects for a cross-sectarian political rapprochement and come away unsure of Maliki's stance. "Do

we and Prime Minister Maliki," Hadley had wondered in his December 2006 memo, "share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shi'a hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq." Hadley proposed several ways to test Maliki's intentions and bolster his resolve, including initiatives to rejigger parliamentary support to free Maliki from his Shiite base linked to Muqtada al-Sadr and enable him to take conciliatory steps toward the Sunnis. The United States, however, lacked the influence necessary to put this approach into practice. Before long, events in Iraq revealed the answers to Hadley's questions: in both cases, a resounding no.

The deployment of the five new brigades proceeded more or less as planned, but from the start there was little headway made toward the broader goals of the surge, particularly reconciliation, as measured by the Iraqi government's inability to meet key benchmarks. The Constitutional Review Committee, which was charged with redressing Sunni grievances, made little progress, and there was no progress on de-Baathification reform, amnesty, provincial elections, or the implementation of oil legislation. The Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front had walked away from Maliki's cabinet, and Bush's reportedly regular calls to Maliki urging him to mobilize his government were ineffective. The Iraqi committees created to support the Baghdad security plan were left unfilled, and the three Iraqi brigades needed to help implement it arrived late and understrength. Diplomatic efforts to get Iraq's neighbors involved fizzled.

## From Top Down To Bottom Up

The president's hopes for the top-down political efforts that were supposed to accompany the surge quickly faded. As a substitute, however, a new bottom-up strategy was embraced. Bush had observed in his January surge speech that the Sunnis were challenging al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq, and a February 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recommended "deputizing, resourcing, and working more directly with neighborhood watch groups and establishing grievance committees—to

help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilized into communal warfare over the past three years." A few months later, the president signaled a formal shift in strategy in a speech at the Naval War College: "To evaluate how life is improving for the Iraqis, we cannot look at the country only from the top down. We need to go beyond the Green Zone and look at Iraq from bottom up. This is where political reconciliation matters the most, because it is where ordinary Iraqis are deciding whether to support new Iraq or to sit on the fence, uncertain about the country's future." What the president was proposing was a shift in the U.S. approach to counterinsurgency. Now, the United States would work to exploit a grass-roots anti-al-Qaeda movement already under way by taking the pressure off the insurgents who had begun to point their weapons at the jihadists and funneling money to tribal leaders. In theory, this would help dismantle the jihadist infrastructure and create islands of stability that would eventually join up like "oil spots."

After the U.S. invasion, the Sunni groups that would go on to make up the insurgency arrived at a marriage of convenience with the foreign and local jihadists who made up al-Qaeda in Iraq. The two shared a common goal: to reverse the triumph of the Shiites and restore the Sunnis to their lost position of power. For the Sunni insurgents, the presence of foreign jihadists also helped divert the attention of U.S. forces. Up to a point, therefore, al-Qaeda's excesses—such as its attempt to impose strict Wahhabi-style rule by banning music and satellite dishes and compelling women to cover themselves entirely—were to be tolerated.

But for al-Qaeda, the link with the insurgents was supposed to serve two additional purposes that went well beyond the shared goal of chipping away at Shiite predominance—and ultimately went against the interests of the Iraqi Sunnis themselves. The first was to establish an al-Qaeda-dominated ministate as a base for carrying out jihad against enemies outside of Iraq. (The November 2005 attack against three Western tourist hotels in Amman, Jordan, allegedly ordered by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, was a harbinger of this wider strategy.) The second was to seize a leading position within the insurgency

and thereby block a power-sharing arrangement between Baghdad and the Sunni nationalists, an arrangement that would entail the selling out of al-Qaeda by the Sunnis.

The Iraqi Sunnis' enthusiasm for the alliance waned as al-Qaeda increasingly attempted to assert its leadership. In October 2006, al-Qaeda declared the formation of an Islamic state in Iraq, demanding that Sunni insurgent leaders pledge allegiance to the new (and many believed fictional) jihadist commander Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, whose name was supposed to signify an authentically Iraqi origin. To the nationalist insurgents, accepting the declaration of a separate state and ceding leadership to al-Qaeda made little sense. Doing so would have fueled the process of decentralization, emboldened those Kurds and Shiites who sought their own fiefdoms, and, crucially, further distanced the Sunnis from eventual access to Iraq's potentially massive oil revenues. Moreover, despite the spectacular successes that had been attributed to al-Qaeda, it was the nationalist Sunnis who provided the backbone of the insurgency and had done most of the killing and dying.

Some tribes had also grown increasingly resentful of al-Qaeda's efforts to seize control of resources. The Albu Risha tribe, for example, had lost control over portions of the road from Baghdad to Amman, undermining its ability to raise revenue by taxing or extorting traders and travelers. When the Albu Rishas' leaders protested, the chieftain, Sheik Bazi al-Rishawi, was killed along with one of his sons, and two more of his sons were abducted. In response, Rishawi's fourth son, Sheik Abdul Sattar, assembled a small group of tribal figures (with the help of funds from the local U.S. military commander) under the banner of the Anbar Salvation Council to roll back al-Qaeda's influence. The bodies of al-Qaeda personnel soon began turning up in alleyways.

This strategic schism might have been papered over had the jihadists not overreacted to the opposition of other insurgent groups. In 2007, there was a wave of sensational killings of Sunni leaders by al-Qaeda, including Abdul Sattar (who had met with President Bush two weeks before his death). The assassinations of Sunni leaders warranted retaliation under the prevailing tribal code, opening the

door to more systematic cooperation between the tribes and U.S. forces. In the wake of Abdul Sattar's death, a Sunni leader complained that al-Qaeda's assassinations had "left resistance groups with two options: either to fight al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Americans or fight the Americans and join the Islamic State of Iraq, which divides Iraq. Both options are bitter." After their defeat in the battle of Baghdad—thanks to the entrenched power of Sadr's Shiite Mahdi Army and the arrival of additional U.S. troops—the Iraqi Sunnis went decisively with the first option, marking the start of the Sunni Awakening groups.

The United States, for its part, had its own incentive to cooperate with the insurgents: June 2007, with 126 troop deaths, was the second-worst month for the U.S. military in Iraq, and General David Petraeus, the U.S. ground commander, was facing pressure to reduce casualties quickly. The most efficient way to do so was to strike deals with the newly pliable insurgents.

The deals were mediated by tribal leaders and consisted of payments of $360 per month per combatant in exchange for allegiance and cooperation. Initially referred to by the United States as "concerned local citizens," the former insurgents are now known as the Sons of Iraq. The total number across Iraq is estimated at over 90,000. Although the insurgents turned allies generally come well armed, at least one unit leader, Abu al-Abd, commander of the Islamic Army in Iraq, who controls Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, has said that he receives weapons as well as logistical support from U.S. units. His arrangement is probably typical. In November 2007, he agreed to a three-month pact, open to extension.

This strategy has combined with other developments—especially the fact that so much ethnic cleansing has already occurred and that violence in civil wars tends to ebb and flow, as the contending sides work to consolidate gains and replenish losses—to bring about the current drop in violence. The Sunni sheiks, meanwhile, are getting rich from the surge. The United States has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribal groups this year, and the sheiks take as much as 20 percent of every payment to a former insurgent—which means that commanding 200 fighters can be worth well over a hun-

dred thousand dollars a year for a tribal chief. Although Washington hopes that Baghdad will eventually integrate most former insurgents into the Iraqi state security services, there are reasons to worry that the Sunni chiefs will not willingly give up what has become an extremely lucrative arrangement.

## Tribal Realities

The surge may have brought transitory successes—although if the spate of attacks in February is any indication, the decrease in violence may already be over—but it has done so by stoking the three forces that have traditionally threatened the stability of Middle Eastern states: tribalism, warlordism, and sectarianism. States that have failed to control these forces have ultimately become ungovernable, and this is the fate for which the surge is preparing Iraq. A strategy intended to reduce casualties in the short term will ineluctably weaken the prospects for Iraq's cohesion over the long run.

Since the mid-19th century, ruling powers in the Middle East have slowly and haltingly labored to bring tribal populations into the fold, with mixed success. Where tribes and tribalism have remained powerful, the state has remained weak. The Ottomans attempted forced sedentarization of the tribes, weakening tribal authorities by disrupting settlement patterns and replacing tribal sheiks with smaller cadres of favored leaders who became conduits for patronage. The colonial powers after World War I faced a different problem: the threat of nationalist urban elites opposed to foreign rule. In an effort to counter defiant urban leaders, they empowered rural tribes on the periphery. In Iraq, the British armed the tribes so that the sheiks could maintain order in the countryside and balance the capabilities of the nominal local governments operating under League of Nations mandates. Thus, the tribal system that Ottoman rule sought to dismantle was revitalized by British imperial policy, and the power of the nominal Iraqi government was systematically vitiated. In 1933, Iraq's King Faisal lamented, "In this kingdom, there are more than 100,000 rifles, whereas the government has only 15,000."

The tribes lost some power over the subsequent decades. This was in part a result of increasing direct British involvement in activities such as law enforcement, land tenure, and water distribution and in part a result of urbanization: as Iraqis moved from the country to the city, their affiliations shifted from the tribe to urban institutions—principally the trade union and the mosque—even as they held on to tribal symbols. When the Baathists took power in 1968, they explicitly rejected "religious sectarianism, racism, and tribalism . . . the remnants of colonialism." The tribes, in their minds, were inevitable rivals of a centralizing state. But after taking control in a coup in 1979, Saddam leaned on his own Sunni tribal networks to staff his security services, army leadership, and bureaucracy, while suppressing other tribal life. He tried to rein in tribes by dispersing Baathist apparatchiks throughout the hinterland, but he nonetheless came to rely on the tribal system as a whole to make up for the shortcomings of the state as times became harder.

During the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam used Shiite tribes to defend regions near the Iranian border, and elsewhere tribal leaders regained some of their traditional authority as the war forced the redeployment of Baathist officials to the front. Amid the hardships created by the conflict, the flow of resources from the center shrank, leading to greater self-reliance in tribal areas and the renewed importance of tribal leaders. The Gulf War, and the grinding international sanctions that followed, accelerated these trends. In 1996, a high council of tribal chiefs was established and was granted political privilege, weapons, and land. Selected tribal leaders were allowed to enrich themselves by any means, fair or foul, and in return they were expected to defend the regime. Saddam, in effect, fostered a process of retribalization in Iraq.

Iraq's Arab neighbors, particularly Jordan and Saudi Arabia, provide a counterexample. They won enduring stability by corralling the tribes through a combination of reward and punishment. In Transjordan, King Abdullah I and the British— helped by famine and the effects of the Great Depression—confronted recalcitrant tribes militarily and then secured their allegiance with a steady flow of resources from the emerging state. More recently, Jordan's Hashemite monarchy has preserved the

tribes' loyalty by guaranteeing them prestigious positions in the government and the military and by playing them off against the Palestinians. In Saudi Arabia, the al Saud dynasty consolidated its state by subduing the tribal challenge of rebellious Ikhwan and then endowing them with status and a military role. Strategic marriages between the al Saud family and the tribes cemented these ties. Although such efforts occasionally faltered, the thrust of the policy was always clear: to subordinate the tribes to the state.

Now, U.S. strategy is violating this principle by fostering the retribalization of Iraq all over again. In other countries in the region, such as Yemen, the result of allowing tribes to contest state authority is clear: a dysfunctional country prone to bouts of serious internecine violence. Such violence can also cross borders, especially if neighboring states are willing to use the tribes as their own agents. Pakistan provides a particularly ominous example of this dysfunctionality: its failure to absorb its Pashtun population has threatened the viability of the Pakistani state. The continued nurturing of tribalism in Iraq, in a way that sustains tribes in opposition to the central government rather than folding them into it, will bring about an Iraqi state that suffers from the same instability and violence as Yemen and Pakistan.

U.S. officials in Iraq have taken note of how the current U.S. approach has exacerbated the dangers of tribalism. Last month, a senior U.S. military adviser conceded, "We're not thinking through the impact of abetting further corruption and perpetuating tribal power." In December, a U.S. diplomat warned, "The absence of government in a lot of areas has allowed others to move in, whether militias or others." The net effect has been a splintering of the country rather than the creation of a unified nationalist Sunni front that, having regained its confidence, would be prepared to deal constructively with Baghdad.

## The Crumbling Center

The growth of warlordism is another consequence of the surge. By empowering the tribes and other networks without regulating their relationship to the state, the United States has enabled them to

compete with one another for local control and what is mostly criminal revenue. It is worth noting that warlordism is not just a creeping Sunni phenomenon. Kurdish and Shiite criminals have been equally adept at exploiting the current security situation to their advantage. Indeed, warlordism appears even to be altering the sectarian divide. In Najaf, where gang warfare has erupted on more than one occasion, supporters of Sadr's Mahdi Army are engaged in street battles with members of the Badr Organization, even though both are Shiite groups.

Last December, a committee of British MPs charged with examining the security situation in Basra as British forces began to draw down concluded that warlords and criminal gangs had all but taken over the city. "Although the reduction in attacks on UK forces can only be welcome," the committee's report noted, "this alone cannot be a measure of success. The initial goal of UK forces in South Eastern Iraq was to establish the security necessary for the development of representative political institutions and for economic reconstruction. . . . This goal remains unfulfilled."

The United States' bottom-up strategy is also worsening sectarianism. For many Sunnis, reconciliation means restoration—not inclusion in power-sharing arrangements but regaining control of the state. Instead of discouraging this mindset, the evolution of the surge into a bottom-up operation has validated it, fostering the impression that Washington has at last recognized that its strategic interests lie with the Sunnis. As the Sunnis see it, the current U.S. strategy is a policy of organizing, arming, and training them to challenge Shiite supremacy.

The Shiites and the Kurds naturally have sharply different notions of what reconciliation means. For the Kurds, reconciliation means respect for their claims to autonomy as well as for their potential territorial gains. The Shiites have tended to emphasize the need for justice before reconciliation, which, as they see it, requires that they be compensated for their suffering under previous regimes (not only Saddam's). This, in their mind, necessitates the subordination of Iraq's Sunni population to the Shiite community. Some Shiite leaders have defied such thinking—Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani most prominently—but Sadr has made clear that he will use violence

to secure Shiite hegemony, and Maliki's government has shown no willingness to be pried away from Sadr and like-minded Shiites. Indeed, in postconflict situations, reconciliation often founders on the unwillingness of victims to surrender their claims to justice.

Some Sunnis have started to recognize that the United States has no intention of restoring their supremacy. The realization that civilian jobs and vocational training is all that is in store for the 80 percent of the former insurgents who are blocked from membership in the Iraqi Army (Shiite leaders want to dominate the army in order to use it as their own instrument of control) has eroded Sunni cooperation with U.S. forces. As one volunteer told a reporter, "The Sunnis were always the leaders of the country. Is it reasonable that they are turned into service workers and garbage collectors? . . . We had not anticipated this from the American forces. Of course we will not accept that." One response has been to head back to al-Qaeda. An Awakening commander in the Diyala provincial capital of Baqubah, which has never been fully pacified, said in February, "Now there is no cooperation with the Americans. . . . We have stopped fighting al-Qaeda." This was doubtless an exaggeration, but one that pointed to the hard truth that for many Sunnis, Shiite rule remains unacceptable. When former Sunni insurgents no longer believe that Washington will restore them to dominance, their current U.S. paymasters will once again be their targets.

Given the current trajectory, significant Sunni segments of the postsurge Iraqi state will continue to be funded by the United States, but they will remain beyond the control of either Baghdad or Washington. They will also be in a position to establish ties with neighboring countries. All of this may well accelerate the centrifugal forces unleashed by the bottom-up strategy. When it withdraws from Iraq, the United States will be leaving a country more divided than the one it invaded—thanks to a strategy that has systematically nourished domestic rivalries in order to maintain an illusory short-term stability.

This could mean that Iraq will remain essentially unreconstructed. The authority of the state would plummet, and the United States' ability to influence events, already limited, would become even weak-

er. Iraq would become a running sore, and successive crises within the country and on its borders would distract Washington from other priorities and sap its ability to normalize relations with Iran. For the Iraqis, safety, security, and economic advancement would remain uncertain. Those who could leave would. Stability would become an ever-receding prospect.

One plausible consequence of this turmoil would be the emergence of a U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped Iraqi Army, increasingly open to former officers of Saddam's military, as a powerful force in Iraqi politics. The professionalism and esprit de corps of the army is already on the rise. Officers who see themselves as having to navigate a maelstrom of unregulated militias, weak and irresponsible government officials, tribes emboldened and then embittered by their U.S. connections, and overbearing but uneven U.S. assertions of control could turn inward, as they did under the British and under Saddam. They might adopt a posture of superiority to politicians, impatience with upstart tribal leaders, and passive-aggressiveness toward their U.S. patrons and then sideline the civilian government and take control of the state. This result might be less disastrous than complete long-term breakdown: to the degree that Iraq needs a mediating military presence to sustain a fragile peace, this role might ultimately be better served by a military with its own corporate identity rather than by U.S. troops. But still, the United States would be confronted by a strong, centralized state ruled by a military junta that would resemble the Baathist regime Washington overthrew in 2003. Rather than an anarchic situation, the United States would face potentially aggressive nationalism and a regime unsympathetic to U.S. regional priorities.

## Responsible Retreat

At this stage, the United States has no good option in Iraq. But the drawbacks and dangers of the current bottom-up approach demand a change of course. The only alternative is a return to a top-down strategy. To be more effective this time around, Washington must return to the kind of diplomacy that the Bush administration has largely neglected. Even with 160,000 troops in Iraq,

Washington lacks the leverage on its own to push the Maliki government to take meaningful steps to accommodate Sunni concerns and thereby empower Sunni moderates. (The legislative package and the de-Baathification reform law passed earlier this year were seriously flawed and did more to spur the Sunnis' anxieties than redress their grievances.) What the United States could not do unilaterally, it must try to do with others, including neighboring countries, European allies, and the United Nations (UN).

In order to attain that kind of cooperation, Washington must make a public commitment to a phased withdrawal. Cooperation from surrounding countries and European partners is unlikely to be forthcoming without a corresponding U.S. readiness to cede a degree of the dubious control it now has over events in Iraq. Currently, the dominant U.S. presence in Iraq allows the rest of the world to avoid responsibility for stability in and around Iraq even as everyone realizes the stakes involved. A plan to draw down U.S. forces would therefore contribute to the success of a larger diplomatic strategy, prompting Middle Eastern states, European governments, and the UN to be more constructive and proactive in working to salvage stability in the Persian Gulf.

The point, therefore, is not to focus on the precise speed and choreography of a troop withdrawal. Rather, what is necessary is to make clear that the United States intends to withdraw. Should the Bush administration suspend the currently programmed withdrawals of the surge force, it would send precisely the opposite message. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and General Petraeus have all signaled their interest in halting any further drawdowns after the last surge brigade has come home this summer. Petraeus, who has already begun to lay out his case in interviews, argues that "the key is to hang on to what you've got." The president has suggested that he is unwilling to withdraw additional troops until after the Iraqi provincial elections—which, although originally scheduled for October, could very well be delayed. It is therefore possible that the next U.S. president will have to decide what to do with approximately 140,000 troops, a considerably larger number than most observers assumed would still be

on the ground in Iraq at the end of 2008. (Some consideration will also have to be given to the problem of removing 56,000 contractors and facilitating the departure of a segment of the 30,000-50,000 Iraqi and foreign workers supporting the U.S. presence.)

Given that the laws of physics are as relevant to troop redeployments as are the laws of strategy and politics, the higher baseline bequeathed by Bush would mean a longer timeline for withdrawal. As of last summer, there were 1,900 tanks and other armored vehicles, 43,000 trucks, and 700 aircraft in Iraq. Equipment is scattered over 70 bases throughout the country, along with 38 major supply depots, 18 fuel-storage centers, and 10 ammunition dumps. According to the conservative rule of thumb used by military logisticians, the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps could move a brigade per month from the Iraqi theater. Moving the 15 brigades likely to be in Iraq in January 2009 would require up to 10,000 truck trips through potentially hostile zones within Iraq.

Although fixating on an exact timetable for withdrawal might be unhelpful at this juncture, a new administration should begin to draw down deliberately and in phases as soon as its internal deliberations are complete and the process has been coordinated with Baghdad. These steps could take months, as the new team conducts its policy-review process; military planners plot safe and efficient withdrawal routes; congressional consultations are carried out; conclusions are reached about where the forces being drawn down should be redeployed; planners determine the size, roles, and missions of the residual force; and the numerous dependencies created by the occupation and the surge are gradually shed. Once under way, however, a drawdown of most of the troops now in Iraq could be completed within two years. The redeployment might proceed more quickly if U.S. public support for the war collapsed, the Iraqi government demanded a swifter withdrawal, or the political situation in Iraq settled down; alternatively, the process might take more time if U.S. forces were under attack, an atrocity claiming the lives of many Americans occurred, or a responsible, reconciliation-minded Iraqi government and a concerned international community sought a slower drawdown.

## Reconciliation From Above

Announcing a withdrawal will entail certain risks. Aware that U.S. forces will finally be departing, Iraqi factions might begin to prepare for a new round of fighting. The Sunnis, aware of their vulnerabilities to attack by militant Shiite forces without the United States to protect them, might resuscitate their alliance with al-Qaeda. The government in Baghdad might be concerned about its own exposure to attack in the absence of a U.S. shield and proceed to forge tighter links with Tehran or encourage greater activism by the Mahdi Army. It is all the more vital, therefore, that the drawdown take place as part of a comprehensive diplomatic strategy designed to limit these risks. The interval between a decision to withdraw and the removal of the bulk of U.S. forces should provide the space in which the UN can convene a multilateral organization to foster a reconciliation process in Iraq.

There is much that can be done to revitalize a top-down approach to reconciliation if it is under UN auspices and led by a credible special envoy. First, the international community should be energized to help Iraq move forward on provincial elections, which would test the popularity of the new Sunni leaders who have emerged during the surge and lash them up to Baghdad. This would have the added benefit of isolating the radical federalists from the majority of Shiites, who would prefer to live in a united Iraq. A UN envoy would have a better chance of brokering a deal on the distribution of provincial and federal powers, the issue that led to the veto of the provincial election law, than would Washington. In a multilateral setting that is not conspicuously stage-managed by the United States, regional states, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, could play a pivotal role in this process. Although Tehran's cooperation is inevitably hostage to its broader relations with Washington, UN sponsorship of this effort might provide the leaders of Iran with the cover they need to act in their own interest. The Saudis, for their part, would like to see the UN involved and are prepared to use their influence and money to impel the parties in Iraq toward reconciliation.

Second, an institutionalized multilateral group of concerned states should mobilize the broader inter-

national community to assist with the care, feeding, and permanent housing of the millions of refugees and internally displaced Iraqis who have not been able to get to the United States or Europe. This is essential, since refugee camps and squatter settlements are incubators of radicalism and radiate violence. The longer these populations remain unmoored and cut off from education, employment, and access to adequate social services and health care, the harder it will be to resettle them permanently, whether in Iraq or elsewhere.

Third, before a new and more intense phase of the civil war begins, there should be a multilateral process put in place to prod Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to finance investment projects that provide real employment in Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, should be pressing the Iraqi government to bring far more Sunni Awakening volunteers into the regular Iraqi Army and, crucially, into the provincial police forces funded by the central government. The latter step would reinforce the positive effects of the provincial elections and the emergence of politically legitimate local leaders. The current commitment to enlist 20 percent of the Awakening's members is far too small to have an impact.

Finally, the tribes feeding off the surge must be weaned from U.S. assistance and linked firmly to Baghdad as their source of support. Intertwining the tribes with Baghdad in this way, as the Iraq specialist Charles Tripp has noted, would yield something very much like the imperial protectorates in the Middle East of the first half of the 20th century. The "club of patrons" in the capital would dole out goods to tribes through favored conduits. At this juncture, the U.S. military is performing the role of the patrons—creating an unhealthy dependency and driving a dangerous wedge between the tribes and the state. Through coordinated action by the UN sponsors of the multilateral process, the government in Baghdad, and U.S. commanders on the ground, payment responsibilities will have to be transferred from the U.S. military to Iraqi government representatives.

There is no guarantee that the old way of giving tribes a taste of the lash followed by a dollop of state largess—the model that successfully integrated tribes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia in the 20th century—can be successfully applied to a divided Iraq today. Iraq is heterogeneous, unlike Jordan or Saudi Arabia, where the state and the tribes shared a religious heritage. Furthermore, overestimating Iranian or Saudi influence on Iraqi politics and the willingness of the UN Security Council to plunge into the existing morass is all too easy. In any event, it will be a slow and hazardous undertaking. Many things have to happen more or less simultaneously in a carefully coordinated chain of actions. Washington has to announce that it will begin withdrawing the bulk of its forces. The UN secretary-general, with the backing of the Security Council, must select a special envoy. A contact group of key states must be formed under UN sponsorship. Priorities and milestones will need to be set for the distribution of resources within Iraq, the recruitment of Sunnis to the army, provincial elections, foreign investment, dealing with refugees, and development assistance. Crucially, the phasing of the troop drawdown will have to mesh with this diplomatic process but not hinge on its ultimate success. This course is risky and possibly futile. Yet it is still a better bet than a fashionable, short-term fix divorced from any larger political vision for Iraq and the Middle East.

## Notes

**About the Author**
Steven N. Simon is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His publications include *After the Surge: The Case for U.S. Military Disengagement from Iraq* (2007), *The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and the Strategy for Getting It Right* (2005), and *The Age of Sacred Terror* (2002). He was also director for global issues and senior director for transnational threats at the National Security Council from 1994 to 1997.

# When to Leave Iraq: Today, Tomorrow, or Yesterday?

by Colin H. Kahl and William E. Odom

## *Walk Before Running*

by Colin H. Kahl

In "The Price of the Surge" (May-June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional U.S. troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward.

Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation-a very unlikely scenario—the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement—rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement—would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening.

The Awakening began in Anbar Province more than a year before the surge and took off in the summer and fall of 2006 in Ramadi and elsewhere, long before extra U.S. forces started flowing into Iraq in February and March of 2007. Throughout the war, enemy-of-my-enemy logic has driven Sunni decision making. The Sunnis have seen three "occupiers" as threats: the United States, the Shiites (and their presumed Iranian patrons), and the foreigners and extremists in AQI. Crucial to the Awakening was the reordering of these threats.

When U.S. forces first arrived in Anbar, upending the Sunni-dominated social order, they were viewed as the principal threat. Because AQI fought the United States, it was seen by the tribes as a convenient short-term ally, despite deep distrust. This ordering of threats changed in 2005 and 2006. For one thing, U.S. forces became more effective and discriminating in their counterinsurgency activities. AQI, meanwhile, became more brutal and indiscriminate, forcing the tribes to start defending themselves. In the fall of 2006, it also declared the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq, asserting political and economic hegemony over Anbar and other provinces with significant Sunni Arab populations. It started demanding brides, enforcing harsh fundamentalist social norms, and cutting into the tribes' smuggling revenues.

At the same time, U.S. forces had to convince the Sunnis that they were not occupiers—that is, that they did not intend to stay forever. Here, growing opposition to the war in the United States and the Democratic takeover of both houses of Congress in the November 2006 elections were critical. Major General John Allen, the Marine Corps officer responsible for tribal engagement in Anbar in 2007, recently told me that among Sunni leaders, the Democratic victory and the rising pro-withdrawal sentiment "did not go unnoticed. . . . They talked about it all the time." According to Allen, the Marines, from top to bottom, reinforced the message sent by the Democratic takeover by saying, "We are leaving. . . . We don't know when we are leaving, but we don't have much time, so you [the Anbaris] better get after this." As a result, U.S. forces came to be seen as less of a threat than either AQI or the Shiite militias—and the risk that U.S. forces would leave pushed the Sunnis to cut a deal to protect their interests while they still could. As Major Niel Smith, the operations officer at the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, the commander of U.S. forces in Ramadi during the pivotal period of the

Awakening, wrote recently in *Military Review*, "A growing concern that the U.S. would leave Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and Iranian-supported militias made these younger [tribal] leaders [who led the Awakening] open to our overtures." In short, contrary to the Bush administration's claims, the Awakening began before the surge and was driven in part by Democratic pressure to withdraw.

It was also critical, however, that U.S. forces did not leave immediately. According to Allen, the continued U.S. presence allowed U.S. commanders to argue that their troops would be the Sunnis' "shock absorbers" during the transition. In other words, the surge and the threat of withdrawal interacted synergistically: the threat of withdrawal made clear that the U.S. commitment was not open-ended, and the surge made clear that U.S. forces would be around for a while. Together they provided a strong incentive for the Anbaris to cooperate with the United States and turn on AQI.

This revised history of the Sunni Awakening has significant implications moving forward. Now, the principal impediment to long-term stability in Iraq is the reluctance of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's central government to engage in genuine political accommodation. That will require a hydrocarbon law designed to equitably share oil revenues, better budget execution and service provision, steps to resettle and compensate victims of sectarian violence, resolution of the disputed status of Kirkuk, and efforts to demobilize and co-opt the Shiite militias (principally Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army). It will also require that the Shiite government integrate or otherwise employ the 90,000 "Sons of Iraq," mostly Sunni tribal militia members and former insurgents. After considerable cajoling, Maliki has agreed to integrate about 20 percent of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi Army and police and provide the remainder with nonsecurity jobs. But his government has been very slow in carrying out this pledge, and the 20 percent figure is unlikely to be sufficient. Brigadier General Shija al-Adhami, the head of the Awakening force in Baghdad's Ghazaliya neighborhood, recently told the *Washington Post*, "This is a big failure-either they take us all in or this is not going to work."

Convincing the Iraqi government to make the tough decisions needed for accommodation requires following the same logic that drove the Awakening: using the risk of abandonment to generate a sense of urgency while committing to protecting groups that make tough choices. The Bush administration has thus far failed to generate the leverage such a strategy would produce because it has effectively given the Iraqi government a blank check. To the degree that minimal political progress has occurred, it can be attributed at least as much to the prospect that the Democrats in Congress might force a withdrawal as to overt threats from the Bush administration. secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted as much last April: "The debate in Congress . . . has been helpful in demonstrating to the Iraqis that American patience is limited. The strong feelings expressed in the Congress about the timetable probably has had a positive impact . . . in terms of communicating to the Iraqis that this is not an open-ended commitment."

As the United States moves forward in Iraq, more leverage is required, but the positions now being advanced by many Republicans and Democrats fail to offer the right mix of incentives to get the Iraqis to act. President George W. Bush has signaled his intent to "pause" the planned troop withdrawals when the surge ends, and Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) speaks of staying in Iraq for a hundred years, no strings attached. This policy of unconditional engagement will not work, because there are no consequences for Iraq's leaders if they fail to accommodate one another. Some Democrats, on the other hand, side with Simon and are calling for a unilateral timetable for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces, regardless of the conditions on the ground. This policy of unconditional disengagement also gives up too much leverage, because it provides no ability to the Iraqi government to affect the pace of redeployment or the nature of U.S. support in exchange for making tough choices. Unconditional engagement is all carrots, no sticks; unconditional disengagement, all sticks, no carrots.

A new policy of conditional engagement would take advantage of the ongoing talks aimed at shaping a long-term U.S.-Iraqi security framework to push the Iraqis toward political accommodation. U.S. negotiators should exploit the continuing dis-

content among Democrats in Congress and the impending presidential election to signal that a long-term U.S. commitment to Iraq is not politically sustainable unless there is tangible evidence of reconciliation. Because the Iraqi government has an interest in a long-term security relationship with the United States, especially continued U.S. support for the Iraqi security forces, this tactic could prove very effective.

The presidential candidates from both parties should reinforce this strategy by publicly endorsing the conditions the Iraqi government must meet in order to influence the pace of future U.S. withdrawals and gain their future administrations' support for the Iraqi security forces in the years ahead. This will require the Democratic nominee to clarify his or her stance on the disposition of residual forces in Iraq after a withdrawal of most of the combat troops (only Senator Barack Obama [D-Ill.] has proposed explicit conditions to be placed on continued support for the Iraqi security forces), and it will require McCain to abandon his unconditional pledge to stay in Iraq.

When the new administration takes office in January 2009, it must follow up on this approach by initiating a down payment on redeployment. Starting from the roughly 15 combat brigades (a total of 130,000-140,000 troops) it is likely to inherit, the new administration should signal its intention to transition to a "support," or "overwatch," role by announcing the near-term reduction of U.S. forces to perhaps 12 brigades. The new administration should also immediately sign a formal pledge with the Iraqi government stating unequivocally that it will not seek, accept, or under any conditions establish permanent or "enduring" military bases in Iraq. Taken together, these actions would signal to the Iraqi government that the U.S. commitment is no longer open-ended while still maintaining enough forces in the near term to prevent a major reversal of progress on security. These steps would also signal to groups inside the Iraqi parliament that strongly oppose the occupation (especially the Sadrists), as well as to the organizations representing the nationalist wing of the Sunni insurgency, that the United States does not intend to stay forever. This might open up additional avenues for bringing those Sunnis into formal and informal negotiations.

Simultaneous with these decisions, the United States should start negotiations to establish a broad time horizon for the transition of the remaining U.S. forces to an overwatch role and the conditions for continued U.S. support for the Iraqi government. Once U.S. forces have reached a sustainable overwatch level, the primary mission of the U.S. military in Iraq will switch to counterterrorism, training and advising of the Iraqi security forces, and force protection for U.S. civilians and advisers. U.S. negotiators should make clear, however, that continued economic and diplomatic support, as well as continued support for the Iraqi security forces (something the Iraqi government deeply desires and needs), will hinge on continued progress toward political accommodation. U.S. negotiators should emphasize that over the long run, the United States intends to normalize its relationship with the Iraqi government and redeploy all of its remaining forces as conditions permit. This policy of conditional engagement should be nested within a wider regional diplomatic initiative that seeks to leverage the U.S. drawdown in Iraq and the common interest among Iraq's neighbors in avoiding a failed Iraqi state.

In the end, this approach may not work. If the Iraqis prove unwilling to move toward accommodation, then no number of U.S. forces will be able to produce sustainable stability, and the strategic costs of maintaining a significant presence will outweigh the benefits. If so, the new administration should shift to Simon's unconditional disengagement as Plan B.

## Rush to the Exit

*by William E. Odom*

Simon provides a brilliant analysis of Iraq's political realities, past and present, exposing the effects of the U.S. occupation. Sadly, neither the administration nor all but a few outside analysts foresaw them. More recently, most media reporting has wholly ignored the political dynamics of the new "surge" tactic. And peripatetic experts in Washington regularly return from their brief visits to Iraq to assure the public that it is lowering violence but fail to explain why. They presume that progress toward political consolidation has

also been occurring, or soon will be. Instead, as Simon explains, political regression has resulted, a "retribalization" of the same nature as that which both the British colonial rulers and the Ba'athist Party tried to overcome in order to create a modern state in Iraq.

This should hardly come as a surprise. The history of tribalism in Iraq is well known. When the United States replaced the British in the Middle East after World War II, it set "stability" above all other interests there, maintaining it through a regional balance of power. President Bush's invasion of Iraq broke radically with this half-century-old strategy. The prospects of success, as Simon shows, were worse than poor.

Until recently, the wisdom of this new strategy has not been challenged. Instead, just as happened with regard to the war in Vietnam, the mainstream discussion has focused on tactics, "nation building" through elections, and diplomacy aimed at reconciling irreconcilable Iraqi elites. As a result, the domestic dialogue has not been serious, not even in this magazine, until the appearance of Simon's analysis.

Serious discussion today must be about how to deal with the repercussions of the tragic error of the invasion. The key to thinking clearly about it is to give regional stability higher priority than some fantasy victory in Iraq. The first step toward restoring that stability is the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Only then will promising next steps be possible. Simon moves in the direction of such an approach, although not far enough. He shows unambiguously why the United States must withdraw from Iraq, but his hesitant formula for withdrawal risks sustaining the paralysis U.S. strategy now suffers from and could make regional stability far more difficult to restore.

Fear of the chaos that a U.S. withdrawal would catalyze is the psychological block that prevents most observers from assessing the realities clearly. As such observers rightly claim, the United States will be blamed for this chaos, but they overlook the reality that the U.S. military presence now causes much of the chaos and has been doing so since 2003. The United States cannot prevent more chaos by remaining longer.

Preventing it is simply not an option. The United States can, however, remove the cause of disorder by withdrawing its forces sooner rather than later. That is the only responsible option.

I was convinced that Simon understood this until he began speaking of "a top-down approach to reconciliation" to be implemented "under UN auspices and led by a credible special envoy." Why should a UN special envoy move into the U.S.-guarded Green Zone as long as insurgents and militias occasionally fire mortar rounds and rockets into it? Some sort of UN-led effort may eventually become possible, but it is not likely as long as U.S. forces remain. And even a UN envoy could not "reconcile" Iraq's warring factions "from the top down."

Simon does understand that the United States' departure will force other countries, especially in Europe, to reconsider their hands-off policies toward Iraq. It will also lead Iraq's neighbors to rethink their hands-on policies. They all want stability there, but some are meddling in ways that exacerbate instability. Once U.S. forces leave, instability may be even less in their interests. Thus, the faster U.S. forces depart, the greater the shifts in other countries' policies will be. A two-year schedule for removing U.S. forces, as Simon proposes, would fail to achieve most of this shock effect.

After recognizing the breakout potential of withdrawal, Simon effectively reembraces strategic paralysis. Otherwise, he would not insist that Iraq's tribal fragmentation must be overcome by means other than civil war and violence. He recognizes that U.S. legitimacy for sponsoring such an effort has been lost—if it ever existed—and so he wants to try a multilateral substitute involving the UN. Its prospects for success, however, are dubious in the extreme. If it consists only of Western countries, it will never be seen as legitimate, only as a crusade in another form. If it includes countries from the region, they are unlikely to agree on fundamental issues about the kind of Iraq they will permit. Moreover, a UN entity's military component would prove far less effective in dealing with insurgents, militias, and the Ministry of Interior's death squads. Its weakness would invite violence, not reduce it. And

neighboring countries would support militant resistance for their own interests.

Tribalism will not be subdued in a couple of years, or even a couple of decades. Two well-known British officials in the 1920s, fluent in Arabic and deeply knowledgeable about the Arabs, T. E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell, slowly relinquished their hopes for such an outcome in Iraq. And the fragmentation there today is not just along tribal lines. The larger Sunni-Shiite sectarian divide, although often overemphasized, has been made far more serious as a result of the U.S. occupation and the holding of democratic elections before a political consolidation was achieved. Kurdish separatism is probably as strong as it has ever been. These divides are unlikely to be bridged by any means other than a civil war fought to a decisive conclusion. This reality indicates that Iraq's eventual rulers are not now in the Green Zone, and when they one day occupy the capital, all foreign elements will be gone. Association with U.S. forces contaminates any would-be Iraqi regime. A UN entity would not overcome that handicap; at best, it could only sustain political instability and abet conflict.

Simon also argues that logistical imperatives require at least two years for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. That is probably true if all U.S. weapons and materiel are to be removed, but much of it is not worth the costs of hauling it back to the United States. Vast numbers of trucks and other equipment withdrawn from Kuwait in 1991 have never been used again and have been left in costly storage to rust. At least a thousand five-ton trucks can be found stored in Italy today, unused yet costing money to retain. If the highest priority is given to the withdrawal of personnel, not materiel, the required time can be dramatically shortened.

Other factors favor speed. Retrograde movements in war are risky affairs. They must be made when one has lost the initiative or when one's own forces are poorly deployed, which means the opponent has the advantage. More time favors the opponent even more. More speed reduces his opportunities. Speed would also improve diplomacy abroad and boost pub-

lic morale at home. In the very best circumstances, uncertainties abound during strategic withdrawals.

Most critical in the long run is recognizing that the primary U.S. strategic interest in this part of the world was and still is regional stability. That means subordinating the outcome in Iraq to the larger aim. Getting out of the paralysis in Iraq, chaotic or not, is the sine qua non of any sensible strategy for restoring regional stability.

Finally, some kind of rapprochement with Iran is essential. Regional stability from the 1950s to the fall of the shah in 1979 rested on three pillars: cooperative relations with Iran, moderate Arab states, and Israel. That arrangement served the strategic interests, if not always the tactical interests, of all parties. When the United States lost its footing in Iran, U.S. military requirements for maintaining the balance rose dramatically. That explains the rapid buildup and eventual creation of the Central Command during the Carter administration. The only way to reduce U.S. military requirements in the region is to restore the United States' diplomatic straddle between the region's two major conflicts—the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian-Arab conflict. The invasion of Iraq not only destroyed the balance but is now imposing additional military requirements on the United States that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

## Notes

**About the Authors**

Colin H. Kahl is assistant professor in the security studies program in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His publications include *States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World* (2006).

William E. Odom was director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. A retired three-star general in the U.S. Army, he was a professor at Yale University and a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the time this article was published.

# Appendix A[1]
## Command List

## I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force West
### March 2004-February 2005

Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway (until September 2004)
       LtGen John F. Sattler
Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder (until May 2004)
BGen Dennis J. Hejlik
Chief of Staff: Col John C. Coleman
G-1: Col William J. Hartig (until May 2004)
  Col Eric D. Bartch
G-2: Col James R. Howcroft (until June 2004)
  Col Ronald S. Makuta
G-3: Col Larry K. Brown (until June 2004)
  Col Michael R. Regner
G-4: Col Bruce E. Bissett (until June, 2004)
  Col Andrew Reynosa III
G-5: Col Anthony L. Jackson (until June 2004)
  Col Richard O. Bartch
G-6: Col Marshall I. Considine III (until June 2004)
  LtCol Martin E. Lapierre Jr.

I MEF Headquarters Group:
Commanding Officer: Col John C. Cunnings (until June 2004)
      Col Joseph A. Bruder IV

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC):
Commanding Officer: Col Robert J. Johnson

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Walter L. Miller Jr.

3d Civil Affairs Group
Commanding Officer: Col Michael M. Walker

4th Civil Affairs Group
Commanding Officer: Col John R. Ballard

### Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis (until August 2004)
      MajGen Richard F. Natonski

Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly (until July 2004)
BGen Joseph F. Dunford Jr.

Chief of Staff: Col Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (until July 2004)
Col Robert J. Knapp

1st Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)
Commanding Officer: Col John A. Toolan (until September 2004)
Col Lawrence D. Nicholson (14 September, 2004)
Col Michael A. Shupp

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)
Commanding Officer: Col Craig A. Tucker

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Arthur W. Connor Jr., USA

2d Brigade, (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division "Black Jack" (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael D. Formica, USA

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division, "Strike Force Brigade" (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA

## Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: MajGen James F. Amos (until May 2004)
MajGen Keith J. Stalder

Assistant Wing Commander: Col Roy A. Arnold

Chief of Staff: Col Gerald A. Yingling Jr. (until July 2004)
Col Rex C. McMillian (until October 2004)
Col Rick W. Schmidt

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Stuart L. Knoll (until April 2004)
Col Guy M. Close

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland (until June 2004)
Col Jonathan G. Miclot

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Juan G. Ayala

## Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: BGen Richard S. Kramlich

Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney Jr.
Chief of Staff: Col Tracy L. Mork

Combat Service Support Group 11 (-)
Commanding Officer: Col David B. Reist

Combat Service Support Group 15 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael E. Kampsen

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group
Commanding Officer: RAdm Charles R. Kubic
                   RAdm Raymond K. Alexander

## II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West
## March 2005–February 2006

Commanding General: MajGen Stephen T. Johnson (until January 2006)
                    MajGen Richard A. Huck
Deputy: BGen Charles S. Patton
Chief of Staff: Col John L. Ledoux
G-1: LtCol John R. Armour (until September 2005)
     Maj Blair S. Miles
G-2: Col John T. Cunnings
G-3: Col Glenn T. Starnes (until October 2005)
     Col Thomas L. Cariker
G-4: Col John J. Fitzgerald Jr. (until July 2005)
     Col. Donald C. Hales
G-5: Col Kenneth D. Bonner
G-6: Col Sean T. Mulcahy

II MEF Headquarters Group: (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Daniel D. Leshchyshyn

13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-)
Commanding Officer: Col James K. LaVine

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas C. Greenwood

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit
Commanding Officer: Col Kenneth F. McKenzie

5th Civil Affairs Group (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Steven E. McKinley

6th Civil Affairs Group
Commanding Officer: Col Paul W. Brier

155th Brigade Combat Team (Reinforced) (Army National Guard)
Commanding Officer: Col Augustus L. Collins, USA (until April 2005)

### Marine Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen Richard A. Huck (until January 2006)

Assistant Division Commander: BGen Joseph J. McMenamin
Chief of Staff: Col Robert G. Sokoloski

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)
Commanding Officer: Col Stephen W. Davis

8th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 8)
Commanding Officer: Col Charles M. Gurganus (until August 2005)
                   Col David H. Berger

2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (Reinforced) (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Gary S. Patton, USA

2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Reinforced) (Army National Guard)
Commanding Officer: Col John L. Gronski, USA

### Marine Aviation Combat Element

2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)
Commanding General: BGen Robert E. Milstead
Chief of Staff Col John T. Rahm (until August, 2005)
                   Col Thomas M. Murray

Marine Aircraft Group 26 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas M. Murray (until February 2006)
                   Col David J. Mollahan

Marine Air Control Group 38
Commanding Officer: Col Jonathan G. Miclot

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Mark R. Cyr

Marine Wing Support Group 27 (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Scott M. Anderson

### Marine Combat Service Support Element

2d Force Service Support Group (Forward)
Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman (until June 2005)
                   BGen John E. Wissler

Chief of Staff: Col James E. McCown III

Combat Logistics Regiment 25
Commanding Officer: Col Robert W. Destafney (until September 2005
                   Col Dennis W. Ray

## I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West
## March 2006–February 2007

Commanding General: MajGen Richard C. Zilmer
Deputy Commanding General for Operations: BGen Robert B. Neller

Deputy Commanding General for Support: BGen David G. Reist
Chief of Staff: Col George F. Milburn
G-1: Col Eric D. Bartch
G-2: Col Peter H. Devlin
G-3: Col Michael P. Marletto
G-4: Col Scott A. Dalke
G-5: Col Chad W. Hocking
G-6: Col Kirk E. Bruno

I MEF Headquarters Group:
Commanding Officer: LtCol Thomas Ward

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit:
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas C. Greenwood (Until August 2006)
                    Col Brian D. Beaudreault

## Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward)
Commanding General: MajGen Richard F. Natonski (until August 2006)
                    MajGen John M. Paxton
Assistant Division Commander: Col Kevin A. Vietti
Chief of Staff: Col Kevin A. Vietti

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)
Commanding Officer: Col Lawrence D. Nicholson

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)
Commanding Officer: Col William B. Crowe

1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division (U.S. Army)
Commanding Officer: Col Sean B. MacFarland, USA

## Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Commanding General: MajGen Samuel T. Helland
Assistant Wing Commander: Col Jonathan G. Miclot (until June 2006)
                          Col Howard F. Baker
Chief of Staff: Col Rick W. Schmidt (until September 2006)
                Col Guy M. Close

Marine Aircraft Group 16
Commanding Officer: Col Guy M. Close (until May 2006)
                    Col John C. Kennedy

Marine Aircraft Group 31
Commanding Officer: Col Robert Walsh (until May 2006)

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Jonathan G. Miclot (until June 2006)
                    Col Mark G. Cianciolo

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Marine Logistics Group (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding General: BGen David G. Reist[2]
                    Col David M. Richtsmeier (CO Fwd)[3]
Deputy Commander: Col Elvis E. Blumenstock[4]
Chief of Staff: Col Michael D. Malone (until January 2007)
                    Col Juan G. Ayala

Combat Logistics Regiment 17
Commanding Officer: LtCol Todd A. Holmquist (until July 2006)
                    LtCol James C. Caley (July-August 2006)
                    LtCol Kirk C. Wille

Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Charles L. Hudson (until June 2006)
                    Col Brian J. Vincent III

## *Notes*

1. To present a comprehensive order of battle for the entire period covered by this anthology (2004-2008) would require a volume unto itself. The goal of this appendix is to give as comprehensive a list as possible within the space provided. Consequently, not all Marine Corps units deployed to Iraq between 2004 and 2008 are listed.

The majority of Marines deployed to Iraq during this time period were under the command of Multi National Force-West (MNF-West), which was coterminious with either I MEF (2004-2005), II MEF (2005-2006) or I MEF (2006-2007). The appendix is divided by MEF deployment, and lists commanders down to the regimental level and units down to the battalion level that were at one time under the command of MNF-West during each MEF deployment.

The information is drawn from the following sources: I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2005), II Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2006), I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Recommendation (2007), LtCol Kenneth W. Estes, "U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Iraq, 2003-2006" (Quantico, VA: History Division: United States Marine Corps, 2009), USMC History Division Reference Branch, "Chronology of U.S. Marines and Global War on Terror," at http://www.tecom .usmc.mil/HD/Chronologies/Campaign/GWOT_2001-2005.htm (accessed 3 June, 2009), and Institute for the Study of War, "Order of Battle, Coalition Combat Forces" at http://www.understandingwar.org /IraqOrderofBattle (accessed 3 June, 2009).

2. BGen Reist served as 1st MLG commanding general and as Deputy Commanding General for Supply. See 1st Marine Logistics Group (MLG), Command Chronology (CC), July-December 2006, p.2.

3. Col David M. Richtsmeier was Commanding Officer, 1st MLG (Fwd). See Cpl Daniel J. Redding, "Combat zone ingenuity protects Marines," Operation Iraqi Freedom—Official Website of Multi National Force-Iraq, 10 August, 2006, at http://dr15.ahp.dr1.us.army.mil/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2005&Itemid=225. accessed 25 August, 2009.

4. Col Blumenstock served as Acting Commander, 1st MLG, while BGen Reist was deployed to Iraq as Deputy Commanding General for Supply, I MEF (FWD). See 1st MLG Command Chronology, July-January, 2006, p.3.

# Appendix B:
# Unit List

U.S. Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom
March 2004-February 2007

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) [I MEF]/Multi National Force-West [MNF-W]
March 2004-February 2005

Command Element

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [11th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 4th Marines [BLT 1/4]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 166 (Reinforced) [HMM-166]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 11 [MSSG-11]
Task Force, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 5th CavReg]
1st Battalion, 227th Aviation (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 227th AvReg]
153d Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [153d EngrBn]
1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (U.S. Army) [1st Bn 5th SFG]

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 1/2]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMM-263]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-24]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 24th Marines [TF 2d Bn 24th Mar]
Task Force "Blackwatch" (United Kingdom) [TF "Blackwatch"]

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) (Reinforced) [31st MEU]

1st Battalion, 23d Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn 23d Mar]
Task Force Naha [TF Naha]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (Reinforced) [HMM-265]
1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn 7th Mar]
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines [BLT 1/3]
3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn 5th Mar]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 31 [MSSG-31]
2d Force Reconnaissance Company (-) [2d ForReconCo]
2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) (Provisional MP Battalion) [2d Bn 11th Mar]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]

2d Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d IntelBn]
2d Radio Battalion (-) [2d RadBn]
9th Communications Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [9th CommBn]
Battery E, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry E, 2d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 10th Mar]
Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [Det, 1st ANGLICO]

3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]
4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]

## Marine Ground Combat Element

**1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]**

Headquarters Battalion (Reinforced) [HqBn]
Small Craft Co (-) [Small Crft Co]
2d Battalion (-) 11th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 11th Mar]
3d Battalion, 24th Marines [2d Bn, 24th Mar]
3d Battalion (-) 11th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]
2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

**1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1]**

2d Platoon (-), 1st Force Reconnaissance Company [2d Plt, 1st ForReconCo]
Fire Control Team, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [FCT, 1st ANGLICO]
2d Battalion, 1st Marines [2d Bn, 1st Mar]
3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]
3d Battalion 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
Task Force 2d Battalion 7th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 7th Cav]
Task Force Light Armored Reconnaissance [TF LAR]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st ReconBn]
2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d ReconBn]
Company B, 1st Battalion 4th Marines (-) (Reinforced), [Co B, 1st Bn, 4th Mar]
Company D, 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (Reinforced) [2d AABn]
Company C, 2d Tank Battalion (Reinforced) [2d CmbtEngBn]
Company B, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [2d CEB]
Battery M, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines (Reinforced) [Btry M, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]

**7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]**

1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]
2d Battalion, 7th Marines [2d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
1st Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 23d Marines [1st Bn, 23d Mar]
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (Reinforced) [BLT 1/3]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company [1st ForReconCo]
2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCo]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [3d LAR Bn]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry (-),(U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 2d Inf]
Company C, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [Co C, 3d Bn, 82d FldArty]
Company A, 2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d Tank Bn]
Detachment, Company C (-), 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Det, Co C, 2d CmbtEngrBn]

Detachment, Company A (-), 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
[Det, Co A, 3d LAR]
Marine Expeditionary Force Service Support Group 31 [MSSG-31]

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 1st Cavalry Division "Black Jack" (U.S. Army) [2d Bde, 1st CavDiv]

15th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [15 FwdSptBn]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry "Stryker" (U.S. Army) [TF "Stryker"]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 5th Cav]
Battery A, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [A Btry, 82d FldArty]
Attack Helicopter (U.S. Army) [Atk Helo]
Company B, 312th Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 312th MilIntelBn]
Company B (-), 13th Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [B Co, 13th SigBn]
759th Composite MP Battalion (U.S. Army) [759th Comp MPBn]
2d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d ReconBn]
Company A (Reinforced), 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion,
[Co A, 2d LAR Bn]
Detachment, Explosive Ordinance Disposal Platoon (-), 63d Ordnance Battalion
[Det, EOD Plt, 63d OrdBn]

1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (U.S. Army) [1st Bde, 1st InfDiv]

2d Battalion, 4th Marines [2d Bn, 4th Mar]

2d Brigade (-) (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division "Strike Force Brigade" (U.S. Army)
[2d Bde, 2d Inf]

2d Battalion, 2d Force Support Battalion (Reinforced) (U.S. Army),
[2d Bn, 2dForSuppBn]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (-), (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 503d IR]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (-) (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 506th Inf]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (U.S. Army) [TF 1st Bn, 9th Inf]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 17th FldArty]
44th Engineering Battalion (-) (U.S. Army) [44th EngrBn]
Company A, 102d Military Intelligence Battalion (U.S. Army) [Co A, 102d MilIntel Bn]
Company B(-), 122d Signal Battalion (U.S. Army) [Co B, 122d SigBn]
Company B, 5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery (U.S. Army) [Co B, 5th Bn,
5th AirDefArty]
2d Battalion 5th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 5th Mar]

## Marine Aviation Combat Element

**3d Marine Aircraft Wing (-) (Reinforced) [3d MAW]**

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 (-) (Reinforced) [MWHS-3]

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-16]

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367, MAG-39 [HMLA-367]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 (-), MAG-39 [HMLA-169]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268, MAG-39 [HMM-268]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365, MAG-29, 2d MAW [HMM-365]

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774, MAG-42, 4th MAW [HMM-774]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron [HMH-361]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (All-Weather) 242, MAG-11 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-542]
Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MALS-16]

Marine Air Control Group 38(-) (Reinforced) [MACG-38]

Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron (-) (Reinforced) [MTACS-38]
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (-) (Reinforced) [MASS-3]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MWCS-38]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (-) (Reinforced) [MACS-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]
4th Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion (Reinforced), 4th MAW (Prov Sec
    Battalion, Al Asad) [4th LAAD Bn]
Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines (Tactical Control from 1st FSSG) [Btry F,
    2d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery K, 4th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry K, 4th Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery P, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry P, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [Det, MACS-1]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 [MWSS-472]
Detachment, 9th Communication Battalion [Det, 9th CommBn]
326th Area Support Group (U.S. Army) [326th AreaSptGru]
1439th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [1439th EngrTm]
767th Engineer Team (U.S. Army) [767th EngrTm]

## Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group (-) (Reinforced) [1st FSSG]

Headquarters and Service Battalion [HqSBn]
2d Battalion, 10th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 10th Mar]

Combat Service Support Group 11 (-) [CSSG-11]

Combat Service Support Battalion 1 [CSSB-1]
Combat Service Support Battalion 7 [CSSB-7]

Combat Service Support Group 15 (-) (Reinforced) [CSSG-15]

### I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]

Task Force Charlie [TF Charlie]
Task Force Echo [TF Echo]
Task Force Sierra [TF Sierra]

Task Force Tango [TF Tango]

With Participating Members From

1st Naval Construction Battalion [1st NCB]
7th Naval Construction Regiment [7th NCR]
22d Naval Construction Regiment [22 NCR]
20th Seabee Readiness Group [20th CRG]
31st Seabee Readiness Group [21s CRG]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 3 [NMCB 3]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 [NMCB 4]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 14 [NMCB 14]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [NMCB 15]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 17 [NMCB 17]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 23 [NMCB 23]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 74]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB 133]
120th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) (U.S. Army) [120th EngrBn]

## II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West [II MEF (FWD)/MNF-W]
### March 2005-February 2006

Command Element

## 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [13th MEU]

Command Element
Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/1]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 13 [MSSG-13]

## 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (-) [22d MEU]

Command Element
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 1st Bn, 2d MarDiv]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 [HMM-261]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 [MSSG-22]

## II MEF Headquarters Group (-) (Reinforced) [II MEF HqGru]

Headquarters and Service Company [HqSCo]
Headquarters and Service Company, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division
(Provisional MP) (Reinforced) [HqSCo 4th Tank Bn, 4th MarDiv]
Company A, 4th Tank Battalion [A Co, 4th Tank Bn]
Company B, 4th Tank Battalion [B Co, 4th Tank Bn]
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]
Headquarters Battery, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [HqBtry, 5th Bn 14th Mar]
Battery N, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry N, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery O, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry O, 5th Bn, 14th Mar]
Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines [Co E, 2d Bn, 25th Mar]

Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry D, 2d Bn, 14th Mar]
Battery C, 1st Battalion, 14th Marines [Btry C, 1st Bn, 14th Mar]
Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 23d Marines [Wpns Co, 1st Bn, 23d Mar]
1st Platoon, 2d Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company [1st Plt, 2d FAST]
Antiterrorism Battalion, Combined Antiarmor Team [AT Bn, CAAT 3]
1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced), I MEF [1st IntelBn]
2d Radio Battalion (-) [2d RadBn]
8th Communications Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th CommBn]
5th Civil Affairs Group
6th Civil Affairs Group

155th Brigade Combat Team, Army National Guard (Reinforced) [155th MissANG]

Task Force 2d Battalion, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) [TF 2d Bn, 11th
    ArmCavReg]
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-1]
Marine Aircraft Group 14 [MAG-14]
Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [MACS-2]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-271]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 [MWCS-38]
30th Naval Construction Brigade (U.S. Navy) [30th NCBde]
Task Force 2d Battalion, 198th Armor Regiment [TF 2d Bn, 198th AR]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 198th Armor Regiment [TF 1st Bn, 198th AR]
Task Force 1st Battalion, 155th Infantry Regiment [TF 1st Reg, 155th BCT]
106th Service Battalion [106th ServBn]
150th Engineer Battalion (-) [150th EngrBn]
Task Force, 2d Battalion, 114th Field Artillery Regiment [TF 2Bn, 114th FldArtyReg]
5th Battalion, 14th Marines [5th Bn, 14th Mar]

## Marine Ground Combat Element

### 2d Marine Division (-) (Reinforced) [2d MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [HqBn]
2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [2d ANGLICO]
1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ANGLICO]
Detachment, 3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) [Det, 3d ANGLICO]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced), I MEF [1st ForReconCo]
2d Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [2d ForReconCo]
74th Multi-Role Bridge Company, 130th Engineering Brigade (U.S. Army) [74th
    MRB Co, 130th EngrBde]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

### 2d Marines/Regimental Combat Team 2 (-) (Reinforced) [2d Mar, RCT-2]

3d Battalion, 1st Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
3d Battalion, 2d Marines (-) (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 2d Mar]
3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 6th Mar]
3d Battalion, 25th Marines [3d Bn, 25th Mar]
3d Battalion, 504th Infantry [3d Bn, 504th Inf]

1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st LAR Bn]
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d LAR Bn]
Detachment, 2d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [Det 2d ANGLICO]
4th Battalion, 14th Cavalry Regiment, (U.S. Army) [4th Bn, 14th CavReg]
Fleet Antit-Terrorism Security Team, 172d Brigade Support Battalion [FAST, 172d BSB]
Battery A, 2d Battalion, 20th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [A Btry, 2d Bn, 20th FldArtyReg]
Battery A, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines [A Btry, 1st Bn, 11th Mar]
Battery K (Reinforced), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry K, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]
Company A (Reinforced), 1st Tank Battalion [Co A, 1st TkBn]
Company A (Reinforced), 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co A, 4th AABn]
Information Company, Azerbaijani [InfCo, Azj]

8th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 8 [8th Mar, RCT-8]

Company B (Reinforced), 2d Tank Battalion [Co B, 2d TBn]
Company B (Reinforced), 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co B, 2d AABn]
Battery A (Reinforced), 1st Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry A, 1st Bn, 10th Mar]
3d Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced), 3d Marine Division [3d ReconBn]
3d Battalion 1st Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
2d Battalion, 2d Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 2d Mar]
1st Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) [1st Bn, 4th Mar]
3d Battalion, 4th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]
2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]
Company D (Reinforced), 2d Tank Battalion [Co D, 2d TkBn]
Company A (Reinforced), 2d Assault Amphibian Battalion [Co A, 2d AABn]

2d Brigade (Reinforced), 2d Infantry Division) (U.S. Army) [2d BCT 2d Inf]

1st Battalion, 503d Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 503d Inf]
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th Inf]
Air Defense Artillery, Battery B, 5th Battalion, 5th Field Artillery (-) [ADA, Btry B, 5th Bn, 5th FldArty]
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 9th InfReg]
2d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 17th FldArty]
44th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [44th EngrBn]
3d Battalion, 82d CSE (U.S. Army)
Battery B, 1st Battalion, 4th Artillery, 2d Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [Btry B, 1st Bn, 4th Arty, 2d ForSptBn]
1st Battalion (Reinforced), 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]

2d Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (Reinforced) (Army National Guard) [2d Bde, 28th InfDiv]

228th Forward Support Battalion (U.S. Army) [228th FwdSptBn]

1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th Inf]
1st Battalion, 110th Infantry (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 110th Inf]
1st Battalion, 172d Artillery (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 172d Arty]
2d Battalion, 222d Field Artillery (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 222d FldArty]
2d Battalion, 116th Field Artillery Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 116th FldArty]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Reinforced) [3d Bn, 7th Mar]

224th Engineer Battalion (C) (M) (Reinforced) [224th EngrBn]

Company C, 4th Tank Battalion [Co C, 4th TkBn]

54th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [5th EngrBn]

Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines (Provisional MP) [Btry E, 2d Bn, 11th Mar]

## Marine Aviation Combat Element

**2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Fwd) [2d MAW]**

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 (-) [MWHS-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 26 (-) [MAG-26]

Marine Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 26 [MHHS-26]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224 [VMFA-224]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 332 [VMFA-332]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 142 [VMFA(AW)-142]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 224, MAG-31 [VMFA(AW)-224]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 142, MAG 42 4th MAW [VMFA-142]
Marine Attack Squadron 223 [VMA-223]
Marine Attack Squadron 311 (-) MAG- 13, 3d MAW [VMA)-311]
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-2]
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 4 [VMAQ-4]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 [HMLA-167]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 (-), MAG-26 [HMLA-269]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 775, MAG-46, 4th MAW [HMLA-775]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 [HMM-161]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264, MAG-26 [HMM-264]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364, MAG-16, 3d MAW [HMM]-364
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764, MAG-46, 4th MAW [HMM-764]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 [HMM-774]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 (-) (Reinforced), MAG-16, 3d MAW [HMM-465]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMM-466]
Marine Transport Squadron 1 [VMR-1]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [MALS-26]

Marine Air Control Group 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-28]

Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MTACS-28]
Marine Air Control Group Headquarters [MACG-28 Hq]
Marine Air Control Squadron 2 (-) (Reinforced), MACG-28 [MACS-2]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) (Reinforced) [MWCS-28]
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 (-) (Reinforced), MACG-28, [MASS-1]

Marine Air Control Group 38 Headquarters [MACG-38 Hq]

Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [MACS-1]

Marine Wing Support Group 27 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-27]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS)-271]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS)-371]
2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [2d LAAD Bn]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-372]

## Marine Combat Service Support Element

**2d Force Service Support Group/2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) [2d FSSG]**

Headquarters Service Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [HqSBn]
Communications Company (Reinforced) [CommCo]
8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSBn]
Combat Logistics Battalion 2 [ComLogBn 2]
Combat Logistics Battalion 8 [ComLogBn 8]

Combat Logistics Regiment 25 [ComLogReg 25]

Headquarter Service Company (-), 2d Transportation Support Battalion [HqSCo, 2d TransSptBn]

30th Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced), 1st Naval Construction Division (U.S. Navy) [30th NCR, 1st NCD]

Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 24 [NMCB-24]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 1 [NMCB-1]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 3 [NMCB-3]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 5 [NMCB-5]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 22 [NMCB-22]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 23 [(NMCB-23]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 24 [NMCB-24]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (-) 133 [NMCB-133]
983d Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), (U.S. Army) [983d EngrCbtBn]
46th Engineer Combat Battalion (Heavy), (U.S. Army) [46th EngrCbtBn]

**I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward)/Multi National Force-West [I MEF (FWD)/MNF-W]**
**March 2006–February 2007**

Command Element

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit [15th MEU]

        Battalion Landing Team 2/4 [BLT 2/4]
        Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 [HMM-165]
        Combat Logistics Battalion 15 [CLB-15]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group (-)(Reinforced) [I MEF Hq Gru]

        1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBn]
        2d Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d IntelBn]
        1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]
        2d Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d RadBn]
        9th Communication Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [9th CommBn]
        1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ANGLICO]
        1st Force Reconnaissance Co (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForRecon Co]
        3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]
        4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]
        6th Civil Affairs Group [6th CAG]

# Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Forward) [1st MarDiv]

        Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]
        1st Battalion, 14th Marines [1st Bn, 14th Mar]
        3d Battalion, 14th Marines [3d Bn, 14th Mar]
        5th Battalion, 14th Marines [5th Bn, 14th Mar]

5th Marines/Regimental Combat Team 5 (-) (Reinforced) [5th Mar/RCT-5]

        1st Battalion, 1st Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]
        2d Battalion, 2d Marines [2d Bn, 2d Mar]
        3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]
        3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]
        2d Battalion, 6th Marines [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
        2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]
        1st Battalion, 24th Marines [1st Bn, 24th Mar]
        1st Battalion, 25th Marines [1st Bn, 25th Mar]
        1st Reconnaissance Battalion [1st ReconBn]
        2d Reconnaissance Battalion [2d ReconBn]
        3d Reconnaissance Battalion [3d ReconBn]

7th Marines/Regimental Combat Team 7 (-) (Reinforced) [7th Mar/RCT-7]

        1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCo]
        4th Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [4th ForReconCo]
        2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th AR]
        1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LAR Bn]
        2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LAR Bn]
        3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [3d LAR Bn]
        1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]
        3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]

3d Battalion, 3d Marines [3d Bn, 3d Mar]
3d Battalion, 6th Marines [3d Bn, 6th Mar]
3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]
1st Battalion, 36th Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 36th Inf]
4th Battalion, 14th Stryker Cavalry Regiment (U.S. Army) [4th Bn, 14th Stryker CavReg]

1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division "Ready First" (U.S. Army)
[1st BCT, 1st ArmDiv]

1st Battalion, 6th Marines [1st Bn, 6th Mar]
3d Battalion, 8th Marines [3d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 506th InfReg]
1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 9th InfReg]
1st Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 37th ArmReg]
2d Battalion, 37th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [2d Bn, 37th ArmReg]
1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 77th ArmReg]
1st Battalion, 35th Armor Regiment (U.S. Army) [1st Bn, 35th ArmReg]

## Marine Aviation Combat Element

### 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (Reinforced) [3d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 1 (-) [MWHS 1]

### Marine Aircraft Group 16 [MAG-16]

Marine Aircraft Logistics Squadron 16 (-)(Reinforced) [MALS-16]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-533]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 242 [VMFA(AW)-242]
Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-223]
Marine Attack Squadron 513 (-) [VMA-513]
Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-211]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367 [HMLA-367]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167 (-) [HMLA-167]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 [HMM-268]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 [HMM-364]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 774 [HMM-774]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 [HMM-266]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 [HMH-463]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363 [HMH-363]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466 [HMH-466]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 [HMH-361]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-465]
Det, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 252 [VMGR-252]
Det, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 [VMGR-352]

Marine Aircraft Group 31 [MAG-31]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG 38]

   Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]
   Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]
   Marine Tactical Air Command Squadron 38 [MTACS-38]
   Marine Air Support Squadron 3 [MASS-3]
   Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 [MWCS-38]
   Marine Air Control Squadron 1 [MACS-1]
   Marine Wing Support Squadron 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]
   Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 [MWSS-273]
   Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]
   Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 [MWSS-274]
   Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 [MWSS-374]
   3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]

## Marine Combat Service Support Element

**1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) (-) (Reinforced) [1st MLG]**

Combat Logistics Regiment 17 [CLR-17]

   Headquarters Company (-) (Reinforced), 7th Engineer Support Battalion
    [HqCo, 7th ESB]
   Combat Logistics Battalion 5 [CLB-5]
   Headquarters and Service Co, Combat Logistics Battalion 7 [H&SCo, CLB-7]
   Combat Logistics Battalion 1 [CLB-1]

Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (-) (Reinforced) [CLR-15]

   9th Engineer Support Battalion [9th EngrSptBn]

30th Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced) [30th NCR]

   46th Engineer Battalion (U.S. Army) [46th EngrBn]
   Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB-133]
   84th Engineer Construction Battalion (U.S. Army) [84th EngrConBn]
   Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 22 [NMCB-22]

3d Naval Construction Regiment (-) (Reinforced) [3d NCR]

   Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 18 [NMCB-18]
   Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB-74]

# Appendix C
## Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AIF–Anti-Iraqi Forces
ACR–Armored Reconnaissance Regiment
AFDD–Air Force Doctrine Document
AQI/AQIZ–al-Qaeda in Iraq/al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia
AOR–Area of Responsibility
ASC–Anbar Salvation Council
BATS–Biometric Automated Tool Set
BBC–British Broadcasting Company
BCT–Brigade Combat Team
BIAP–Baghdad International Airport
BLT–Battalion Landing Team
BPC–Building Partnership Capacity
CAP–Combined Action Program
CAV–Cavalry
CEB–Combat Engineering Battalion
CERP–Commander's Emergency Reconstruction Program
CENTCOM–U.S. Central Command
CF–Coalition Forces
CG–Commanding General
CGS–Common Ground Station
CIA–Central Intelligence Agency
CJTF–Combined Joint Task Force
CLB–Combat Logistics Battalion
CLR–Combat Logistics Regiment
CMO–Civil-Military Operations
CMOC–Civil-Military Operations Center
CP–Command Post
CPA/CPA–Coalition Provisional Authority
CSS–Combat Service Support
CSSB–Combat Service Support Battalion
DIA–Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD–Department of Defense
ECP–Entry Control Points
EFDC–Expeditionary Force Development Center
EFIC–East Fallujah Iraqi Camp
EKMS–Electronic Key Management System

EOD–Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FLT–Fallujah Liaison Team
FOB–Forward Operating Base
FSS–Fast Sealift Ships
FSSG–Force Service Support Group
GIC–Gulf Investment Company
GCE–Ground Combat Element
HIDACZ–High Density Airspace Control Zone
HQMC–Headquarters Marine Corps
IA–Iraqi Army
IDF–Israeli Defense Force
IECI–Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
IED–Improvised Explosive Device
IED WG–Improvised Explosive Device Working Group
IIF–Iraqi Intervention Force
IIG–Interim Iraqi Government
IMO–Information Management Officer
ING–Iraqi National Guard
IO–Information Operations
IPT–Integrated Process Team
IPSA–Intermediate Pumping Stations
IRMO–Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
ISF–Iraqi Security Forces
ISR–Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
IW–Irregular Warfare
JCC–Joint Coordination Center
JDAM–Joint Direct Attack Munition
JIDI–Joint IED Defeat IPT
KIA–Killed in Action
LAR–Light Armored Reconnaissance
MA–Mortuary Affairs
MACCS–Marine Air Command and Control Squadron
MAG–Marine Air Group
MAGTF–Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARCORSYSCOM–Marine Corps Systems Command
MarDiv–Marine Division
MAW–Marine Aircraft Wing
MCCDC–Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCIA–Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCWL–Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
MCWP–Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MEB–Marine Expeditionary Brigade

MEF–Marine Expeditionary Force

MEG–MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group

MEU–Marine Expeditionary Unity

MHG–Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Headquarters Group

MLG–Marine Logistics Group

MNC-I–Multi National Corps-Iraq

MNF-I–Multi National Force-Iraq

MNF-W–Multi National Force-West

MNSTC-I–Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq

MNSTC-I–Multi National Support and Training Command-Iraq

MOD–Ministry of Defense (Iraq)

MOI–Ministry of the Interior (Iraq)

MSR–Main Supply Route

MWSG–Marine Wing Support Group

MWSS–Marine Wing Support Squadron

NCO–Noncommissioned Officer

NCR–Naval Construction Regiment

NGO–Nongovernment Organization

OEF–Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF–Operation Iraqi Freedom

OIF II–Operation Iraqi Freedom II

PA–Public Affairs

PL–Phase Line

POE–Points of Entry

POW–Prisoner of War

PRDC–Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee

PRT–Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PSYOP–Psychological Operations

RCT–Regimental Combat Team

RLT–Reconstruction Liaison Team

RPG–Rocket-Propelled Grenade

RROC–Regional Reconstruction Operations Center

SAM–Surface-to-Air-Missile

SVBIED–Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

SERT–Seabee Engineer Reconnaissance Teams

SOF–Special Operations Forces

TACON–Tactical Control

TAL–Transition Administrative Law

TF–Task Force

TOC–Tactical Operations Center

TTP–Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

UAV–Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USAF–United States Air Force
USA–United States Army
USMC–United States Marine Corps
USN–United States Navy
VBID/VIED–Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
VCP–Vehicle Checkpoints
WIA–Wounded in Action

# Appendix D
# Chronology of Events, 2004–2008

## 2004

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|---|---|
| March 20 | The 82d Airborne Division transfers command of Multi National Force-West to I Marine Expeditionary Force takes responsibility for al-Anbar Province. |
| March 31 | Four civilian Blackwater USA contractors are ambushed and their bodies mutilated by insurgents in Fallujah. |
| April 5 | Units from I Marine Expeditionary Force launch Operation Vigilant Resolve in Fallujah. |
| April 9 | Gen John P. Abizaid, USA, Commanding General of U.S. Forces Central Command, orders Marines to suspend offensive operations against the insurgency in Fallujah. |
| April 9-April 30 | Units from I Marine Expeditionary Force engage in skirmishes and firefights throughout Fallujah. |
| May 1 | I Marine Expeditionary Force withdraws from Fallujah and hands authority over to the Fallujah Brigade. |
| June 28 | The official transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government. Two days later, Marines raise the American flag over the new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. |
| July 16 | First units of the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrive in an-Najaf. |
| July 23 | Six Marines from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, complete the first combat, high-altitude parachutedrop in the history of the Marine Corps. |
| July 31 | 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit assumes operational control of an-Najaf and al-Qadisiyah Provinces. |
| August 2 | Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Force begin battling units of the Mahdi Militia insurgency in Najaf and Kufa. |
| August 9 | Multi-National Force-West assumes tactical control of 11th Marine Expeditionary Force with the arrival of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) Command Element. |

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| August 11 | 11th Marine Expeditionary Force forces engage insurgents southwest, northwest, and northeast of Najaf. |
| August 21 | 1st Battalion, 4th Marines raid Kufa. |
| August 26 | In Najaf, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, surround the Imam Ali Mosque. Shrine. Multi National Corps-Iraq orders Marines to cease offensive activities and allow Iraqi officials to peaceably resolve the removal of Mahdi Militia forces. |
| August 27 | Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani negotiates a truce in Najaf. Iraq government declares that hostilities will officially end at 1000. |
| September 10 | The Fallujah Brigade disbands, having failed in its efforts to secure the city. |
| September 12 | LtGen John F. Sattler becomes commanding general, I Marine Expeditionary Force, relieving LtGen James T. Conway. |
| September 26 | Two suicide car bombers try to drive into a base used by U.S. Marines and Iraqi National Guardsmen in Karma, near Fallujah. When challenged, they detonate the cars. No injuries are reported. |
| October 5 | More than 3,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops, including the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force, launch an offensive operation in the southern approaches to Baghdad and take control of a bridge across the Euphrates River. |
| October 14 | Marines launch air and ground attacks against an insurgent stronghold in Fallujah after peace talks are suspended. The peace talks fizzle over the demand that the insurgent mastermind Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other foreign fighters be handed over to the authorities. |
| November 7 | Marines from I Marine Expeditionary Force conduct operations in preparation for a second battle to clear Fallujah of insurgents. These include securing key bridges, surgical air strikes, and seizing insurgent nodes outside the city. |
| November 2 | George W. Bush reelected as U.S. President. |
| November 8 | I Marine Expeditionary Force launches Operation Phantom Fury (Operation al-Fajr) against insurgents in Fallujah. The second battle of Fallujah begins. |
| November 11 | Northern area of Fallujah falls to U.S. Marine forces. |
| November 13 | The initial attack on Fallujah is completed. Search and attack operations commence. |

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| November 14 | 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, takes the Jolan district in Fallujah. Marines successfully occupy the city. |
| November 23-27 | Elements of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Force, along with U.S. Army soldiers and Iraqi forces, launch Operation Plymouth Rock against insurgents in North Babil Province. |
| December 21 | The 11th Marine Expeditionary Force assumes operational control of Karbala Province from the Polish-led Multi National Division Central-South. |
| December 23 | Operation Phantom Fury concludes. Fallujah secured and cleared of insurgents. Repopulation of the city commences. |

## 2005

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| January 14 | All districts of Fallujah are opened for resettlement. |
| January 26 | CH-53 helicopter crashes in western Iraq, claiming the lives of 30 Marines and one sailor. Currently the single deadliest event for U.S. forces during the war. |
| January 30 | Iraqi national elections held for a Transitional National Assembly. Sunnis largely boycott the vote. |
| February 20-March 5 | Marines and Iraqi security forces launch Operation River Blitz throughout al-Anbar Province. The operation targets insurgents in cities along the Euphrates River including Hit, Ramadi, and Baghdadi. |
| March 10-25 | Regimental Combat Team 7 and its relieving unit, Regimental Combat Team 2, conduct Operation River Bridge. |
| March 27 | II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) relieves I Marine Expeditionary Force as Multi National Force-West. |
| March | II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) builds 1,700-man police department in the city of Fallujah. |
| April 1-May 4 | Marines from the 2d Marine Division conduct Operation Outer Banks and Operation Patriot Shield to clear the Haditha-Hit corridor of insurgent operations. |
| April 11 | Insurgents attack Camp Gannon at Husaybah. Three Marines are wounded. |
| March-June | II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) disbands the 60th Iraqi National Guard and integrates 2,000 former ING soldiers into the regular Iraqi Army. |

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| May 2 | Two FA-18 Hornet fighters from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 collide over Iraq, killing both pilots. |
| May 7-14 | Regional Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Matador against insurgents operating along the Syrian border. |
| May 25-29 | Marines conduct Operation New Market in Haditha to battle entrenched insurgents. |
| June 6-July 31 | Operation Guardian Sword: 2d Marine Division conducts operations against insurgents to support Iraqi Constitutional Referendum. |
| June 17-22 | Operation Spear: Marines focus on the rebel stronghold of Karabilah near the Syrian border. |
| June 18 | Regional Combat Team 8 launches Operation Dagger against insurgent networks in al-Anbar Province. |
| June 23 | Iraqi insurgents carry out the deadliest attack involving U.S. female service members to date when a suicide car bomber rams a convoy in Fallujah. Five Marines and one female sailor (three males and three females) are killed in the attack and 13 others are wounded, 11 female. |
| June 28-July 6 | Regional Combat Team 2 conducts Operation Sword in Hit and Haditha. |
| July | Marine, Army, and Iraqi Army units conduct Operation Sayaid (Hunter) to continue efforts to secure Anbar Province. |
| July 7 | Operation Scimitar begins with raids in the village of Zaidan, approximately 20 miles southeast of Fallujah, and at least 22 suspected insurgents are detained. |
| August 3 | Fourteen Marine reservists and a civilian interpreter are killed in Haditha when the amphibious assault vehicle they are traveling in is struck by a roadside bomb. Two days earlier, six other Marines are killed near the same city by enemy gunfire. |
| August 3-10 | Marines participate in Operation Quick Strike, an offensive operation aimed at disrupting insurgent activities in Haditha, Haqliniyah, and Barwanah. Marines net nine car bombs, 28 other explosive devices, and capture 36 suspected insurgents. |
| October 1 | Marines from Regional Combat Team 2 conduct Operation Iron Fist to disrupt insurgents filtering into the country from Syria. |
| October 4-October 19 | Marines conduct Operation River Gate in Haditha, Haqlaniyah, and Barwanah to disrupt insurgent activities and secure the triad region. |

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| October 15 | The referendum on Iraqi Constitution, and the first phase of Operation Liberty Express. |
| October 18 | The deputy governor of Anbar Province, Talib al-Dulaimi, is assassinated in Ramadi. |
| November 5-November 17 | Regional Combat Team 2 participates in Operation Steel Curtain against insurgents in al-Qa'im along the Iraq-Syria border. |
| November 19 | Haditha Incident: Marines from the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, are attacked by an insurgent land mine. In the aftermath, several civilians are killed or wounded over questionable circumstances. |
| November 19 | Roughly 150 Iraqi Army soldiers and 300 U.S. Marines and soldiers launch Operation Dhibbah (Bruins) in Ramadi. |
| November 26 | Approximately 400 U.S. Marines and 150 Iraqi Army troops launch a new offensive in the Ma-Laab district of eastern Ramadi, Operation Tigers (Nimur). |
| November 30 | Operation Iron Hammer conducted by Marine and Iraqi armed forces to rid the Hai al-Becker region of insurgents traveling from Syria into Iraq. |
| December 2 | Three hundred Marines from the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, and 200 Iraqi Army soldiers from the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, conduct Operation Harba (Shank) in Ramadi to secure the Anbari capital for elections on 15 December. |
| December 15 | The election for the Iraqi National Assembly. Operation Liberty Express provides security for polling. |
| December 17 | Iraqi soldiers begin Operation Moonlight to disrupt insurgent activity along the Euphrates River near the border with Syria. |

## 2006

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| January 15-27 | Marines with Battalion Landing Team 1/2, and Iraqi Army soldiers conduct Operation Koa Canyon along the western Euphrates River Valley. |
| February 22 | The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra sparks an outbreak of sectarian violence. |
| February 28 | I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) assumes control of the Multi National Force-West area of operations from II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). |

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| March 9 | U.S. Army LtGen Peter W. Chiarelli, commander of Multi National Corps-Iraq, directs further investigation into events surrounding the 19 November 2005 attack in Haditha. |
| April 7 | The battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, as well as two company commanders, are relieved of command amid the investigation into the Haditha shootings. |
| April 17 | Marines repel an attack by Sunni Arab insurgents in Ramadi, when the insurgents launch a coordinated assault against the city's main government building and two U.S. observation posts. No U.S. casualties result from the 90-minute attack. |
| May 26 | Gen Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, announces Marines will face criminal charges for the November 2005 shootings in Haditha. |
| June 7 | Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Masab al- Zarqawi killed in an air strike. |
| June 14-July 20 | Operation Together Forward: U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces establish curfews, security checkpoints, and more patrols in cities across Iraq. |
| June 17 | 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division launches operations to prevent Ramadi from become a center of al-Qaeda in Iraq. |
| August 8-October 24 | Operation Together Forward II: 15,000 U.S. soldiers clear disputed areas and cede security responsibilities to Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi troops ultimately fail to secure the cleared cities. |
| Summer-Fall | U.S. Army LtCol Sean B. MacFarland of the 1st Brigade Combat Team begins forging anti-al-Qaeda alliances with Iraqi tribal Awakening Councils. |
| September | Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi of the Dulaimi confederation's Albu Risha tribe launches a campaign against al-Qaeda in Iraq. |
| October | Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, commanded by LtCol William M. Jurney fight to secure Ramadi in support of Awakening operations. |
| November 6 | Saddam Hussein found guilty by Iraqi tribunal for the 1982 murder of 148 Shiites in Dujail and sentenced to death. |
| November 7 | U.S. midterm elections end Republican control of both houses of Congress. |
| November 8 | Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld resigns. His successor, Robert M. Gates, is confirmed by the Senate on 8 December 2006. |

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| December 21 | Eight Marines are charged for the killings of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in November 2005. Four of the Marines, all enlisted, are charged with unpremeditated murder while four officers are accused of dereliction of duty for failures in investigating and reporting the deaths. |
| December 30 | Saddam Hussein executed. |

## 2007

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| January 10 | President Bush announces implementation of "the surge" and appoints Gen David H. Petreaus, USA, commander of Multi National Force-Iraq. |
| January 15 | The Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, complete an 18-day battalion-level operation in al-Anbar Province in an effort to disrupt insurgent activity along the Euphrates River Valley. |
| February 7 | Five Marines and two sailors are killed when their Marine CH-46 helicopter is shot down by insurgents about 20 miles northwest of Baghdad. It is the fifth U.S. helicopter to be shot down in a three-week period. |
| February 9 | I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) is relieved as Multi National Force-West by II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). |
| May 8 | Article 32 hearing for the first of four officers facing charges for failing to properly investigate the 19 November 2005 killings of Iraqi citizens in Haditha. |
| June 12 | The second bombing of the Gold Dome Mosque in Samarra. |
| July 5-8 | Marines with Battalion Landing Team 3/1 conduct Operation China Shop II in al-Anbar Province. The Marines conduct census surveys and carry out weapon sweeps. |
| July 11 | Col Christopher C. Conlin, who presided over a preliminary hearing for LtCol Jeffrey R. Chessani, recommends that the former battalion commander be court-martialed on charges of dereliction of duty and violating general orders for failing to investigate allegations against his men that they killed Iraqi civilians in Haditha. |
| July 14 | Regimental Combat Team 2 begins Operation Mawtini in towns along the Euphrates River long used as insurgent sanctuaries. The operation involves more than 9,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops and is aimed at establishing control in remote areas of western al-Anbar Province. |
| August 9 | LtGen James N. Mattis dismisses all charges against LCpl Justin L. |

Sharratt, one of four enlisted Marines who originally faced murder and other charges in the deaths of Iraqi citizens in Haditha. Charges are also dismissed against military lawyer Capt Randy W. Stone.

September 5 — The Marine Corps announces that three officers received administrative sanctions in connection with the killing of Iraqi civilians in Haditha because their actions in the aftermath of the incident did not meet the high standards expected of senior leadership. MajGen Richard A. Huck, former commanding general of 2d Marine Division; Col Stephen W. Davis, former commanding officer of Regimental Combat Team 2; and Col Robert G. Sokoloski, former chief of staff of 2d Marine Division, receive letters of censure from the Secretary of the Navy that are filed in their official military records.

September 10 — Gen David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker issue report to Congress on progress in Iraq.

1stLt Andrew A. Grayson, one of four officers to face charges for failing to properly investigate the Haditha incident, rejects a plea deal that would dismiss the charges in exchange for an admission that he covered up the killings of Iraqi civilians. Two days later, another of the four officers, Capt Lucas M. McConnell, is fully exonerated.

September 13 — Al-Qaeda in Iraq assassins murder Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi.

October 19 — LtGen James N. Mattis dismisses murder and negligent homicide charges against LCpl Stephen B. Tatum but orders him to general court-martial on lesser charges of involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault stemming from the Haditha incident. LtGen Mattis also orders criminal charges to proceed against the former battalion commander of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, LtCol Jeffrey R. Chessani, for failing to accurately report and investigate the same incident.

## 2008

February 9 — I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) relieves II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as Multi National Force-West.

September 1 — U.S. officially transfers authority for al-Anbar Province to the Iraqis.

November 4 — Barak H. Obama elected as U.S. President.

December — Last Marines withdraw from Camp Fallujah.

# Appendix E
## Annotated Bibliography
*(Selections in bold type appear in this anthology.)*

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### Primary Material

Abu-Tariq. "Daily Diary of al-Qaeda Sector Leader Called Abu-Tariq." Translation by Multi National Force-Iraq, posted on 10 February 2008 (http://www.usf-iraq.com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=16935&Itemid=128).

> Diary of a member of al-Qaeda in Iraq, detailing the reversals suffered by AQI as a consequence of the alliance between the al-Anbar tribes and U.S. military forces.

*Al-Anbar Awakening*, vol. 1, *American Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*. Edited by CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams and LtCol Kurtis P. Wheeler. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

*Al-Anbar Awakening, vol. 2, Iraqi Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009*. Edited by Col Gary W. Montgomery and CWO-4 Timothy S. McWilliams. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

> A two-volume collection of interviews with both Americans (mostly Marine Corps commanders, but also Army as well as State Department and USAID representatives) and local Iraqi leaders that traces the rise of the insurgency and the origins and development of the al-Anbar Awakening.

Baker, James A., III, and Lee H. Hamilton. *The Iraq Study Group Report*. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

> The report presents the results of a study assessing conditions in Iraq and offering proposals for bringing stability to the country. The authors focus on two courses: an external approach that calls for engagement with Syria and Iran, and an internal approach that focuses on strengthening Iraq's security apparatus and places the onus for maintain stability on the Iraqis themselves.

Bremer, L. Paul, III, with Malcolm McConnell. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.

> Memoirs of Coalition Provisional Authority leader L. Paul Bremer III. Provides information on the inner-workings of the CPA during the critical year following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime.

Campbell, Donovan. *Joker One: A Marine Platoon's Story of Courage, Leadership, and Brotherhood*. New York: Random House, 2009.

> Memoir of Donovan Campbell, commander of a Marine Corps platoon in the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, in 2004. Recounts his experience as a platoon leader and provides details on fighting the insurgency in Iraq and the battle for Ramadi in 2004.

I Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action, 2 August 2004-1 February 2005 (Unit Award Recommendation).

I Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action, February 2006-February 2007 (Unit Award Recommendation).

II Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action, 1 March 2005-28 February 2006 (Unit Award Recommendation).

> Unit award recommendations. Provide detailed information and chronologies of operations of I MEF and II MEF during their deployments to Iraq between 2004 and 2007.

Sanchez, LtGen Ricardo S., with Donald T. Philips. *Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story*. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.

> Memoirs of the chief U.S. commander in Iraq, 2003-2004. Provides information on the emerging insurgency, the capture of Saddam Hussein, the first battle of Fallujah, and the Abu Ghraib scandal.

U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. *Counterinsurgency*. Army Field Manual 3-24; Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army and Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006.

> A comprehensive analysis and doctrine for conducting modern counterinsurgency operations developed by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps.

## Secondary Material

Alford, LtCol Julian D., and Edwin O. Rueda. "Winning in Iraq." *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 2006, 29-30.

> Discusses the need for Marine Corps units to transform themselves into sizeable forces capable of maintaining order and security in the civil sphere at the termination of kinetic warfare. According to the authors, the Corps must also take great care in the recruitment and deployment of military advisers.

Anderson, Col Gary W. "Fallujah and the Future of Urban Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 2004, 52-58.

> Examines the first battle of Fallujah and notes that the battle confirmed what Marines had predicted about the nature of modern urban warfare. The author argues that the Corps must focus on selecting and training the best urban fighters and squad leaders.

Angell, Maj Aaron A. "The Marine Wing Support Squadron." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2008, 29-34.

> Overview of the functions and responsibilities of the Marine wing support squadron. Describes how the MWSS both supports of the air combat element of a Marine air-ground task force and provides logistical support to other elements of the MAGTF.

Armstrong, LtCol Charles L. "Fresh Counterinsurgency Doctrine." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2007, 49-50.

>Examination of the new Army and Marine counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, discussing its merits and contributions while also considering some of its drawbacks.

Axe, David. "Wild West: Marine Corps Aviators Support the Ground Troops in Iraq's Explosive Al Anbar Province." *Leatherneck*, August 2006, 20-24.

>Discusses the use of close air support in al-Anbar Province, focusing on the pilots of Marine Fighter Attack All-Weather Squadron 332.

Ayers, Cynthia E. "Iraqi Resistance to Freedom: A Frommian Perspective." *Parameters*, March 2003, 68-70.

>Using the psychological and sociological theories of German philosopher Erich Fromm, who argued that societies progress from a sense of insecurity to security as they develop, the author explores the causes of instability in Iraq.

Barno, LtGen David W. "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency." *Parameters*, February 2006, 15-29.

>Examines the nature of counterinsurgency and argues that the U.S. military has yet to adequately grasp the nature and character of irregular warfare. Asserts that the U.S. needs to improve its understanding of intelligence and perception in counterinsurgency warfare.

Belanger, Capt Tyson. "The Cooperative Will of War." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2006, 62-64.

>Chronicles the development and training of the Iraqi security forces, touching on the challenges of training soldiers in an environment where potential enlistees and their families are under the threat of intimidation and terror from insurgents.

Benhoff, LtCol David A. "Among the People: 5th Civil Affairs Group in Iraq." *Leatherneck*, July 2008, 36-40.

>Documents the operations of the Team 3, Detachment 2, 5th Civil Affairs Group (CAG), as it helps to rebuild the civil infrastructure in al-Anbar Province.

Bergman, LtGen John W. "Marine Forces Reserve in Transition." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2006, 26-28.

>Provides a broad overview of the activities of Marine Corps Reserve, focusing on civil and combat operations in Iraq and humanitarian relief operations in South Asia and New Orleans.

Biddle, Stephen, Michael E. O'Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollack. "How to Leave a Stable Iraq: Building on Progress." *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2008, 40-57.

Considers the successes of the surge and argues that the stability created by the U.S. change in strategy has paved the way for drawing down troops in the near future. The authors believe that stability and security can still be maintained while reducing troop numbers in the country, citing events in al-Anbar Province as an example.

Biddle, Stephen. "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon." *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2006, 2-14.

Contends that comparing Vietnam to Iraq is the incorrect approach. Argues that while the war in Vietnam was a Maoist peoples' war, the conflict in Iraq is a communal civil war. Consequently, efforts at Iraqization are only strengthening ethnic divides and fanning the flames of civil conflict.

Bilas, Maj John E. "Developing the Iraqi Army: The Long Fight in the Long War." In *Applications in Operational Culture: Perspectives from the Field*, edited by Paula Holmes-Eber, Patrice M. Scanlon, and Andrea L. Hamlen, 49-78. Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

Detailed case study of the development of an Iraqi Army brigade across 2006 and 2007. Analyzes the metrics used to measure progress.

Bingham, Col Raymond L. "Bridging the Religious Divide." *Parameters*, March 2006, 50-66.

Asserts that the war on terror can only be won if American planners have an understanding of Islam and Islamic culture. Appreciating what the Quran and Islam mean to Muslims and non-Muslims alike will help to strengthen U.S. understanding of the social factors influencing developments in the Middle East.

Birtle, Andrew. "Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare." *Military Review*, July-August 2008, 45-53.

Examines three major U.S. counterinsurgencies: the Civil War, Philippine Insurrection, and the Vietnam War. Argues that success in these conflicts was achieved by balancing coercive military operations with political operations that embraced moderation and reconciliation. While the U.S. achieved this balance in the Civil War and Philippine Insurrection, it failed to do so in Vietnam.

Bray, Sgt Jerry E. "A Letter to My Replacement." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2007, 31-33.

The author, a former adviser in Iraq, provides a comprehensive view of how his successor should approach his mission and treat his Iraqi colleagues. He stresses cultural understanding as well as being prepared to engage in unanticipated operations.

Broekhuizen, Capt Mark J. "Snipers." *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2007, 41-45.

Highlights the dangers of snipers in Iraq and provides analysis and proposals for how Marine units should respond to sniper threats.

Byman, Daniel. "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism." *International Security* 31 (Fall 2006): 79-115.

Examines the role allies play in counterinsurgency operations. Outlines the challenges and problems caused by the fact that the U.S. has often had to rely on weak, corrupt, and often inept allies in its counterinsurgency operations.

Calvin, 1stLt Carin. "The Assaultman in an Urban Environment." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 2005, 30-31.

Discusses the nature of the fighting during the second battle of Fallujah and presents a series of lessons learned from the battle. Argues that "assaultmen" proved decisive. Recommendations include increasing the number and effectiveness of shoulder launched multipurpose assault weapons (SMAW) and issuing the M4A1 close quarter battle weapon.

Cancian, Col Mark F. "Capitalizing on al Qaeda's Mistakes." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 2008, 43-48.

Examines the origins of the Anbar Awakening, noting that al-Qaeda's drive to create a unitary caliphate led it to target the Iraqi tribal system and its leading Sheikhs. In response to these attacks, sheikhs such as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha formed a coalition of tribes to confront al-Qaeda in Iraq.

———. "A Counterinsurgency Dilemma in Al Anbar." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 71-75.

Provides a general overview of the challenges and dilemmas faced by U.S. forces in Iraq. Although Marines have a history of developing counterinsurgency doctrine, they nevertheless continue to utilize heavy firepower. This impacts the Iraqi population, and many Iraqis fear American troops more than and the insurgency.

Carroll, Maj Patrick J. "Stealth Victory." *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2004, 41-43.

A former adviser to L. Paul Bremer III lays out a number of proposals for creating stability and security in Iraq. They include building effective, indigenous security forces, recognizing that the U.S. and its allies will never have complete clarity on who it is fighting, and acknowledging that the Iraqis need to take the lead in rebuilding the country.

Cavagnol, Richard M., LtCol Richard L. Hayes, and Maj Daniel C. Turner. "From Vietnam to Iraq," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2008, 10-16.

Presents recommendations for U.S. Marines going to Iraq to act as military advisers to Iraqi forces. The authors draw on the experience in Vietnam as a means of providing a point of comparison and as an example.

Chiarelli, MajGen Peter W., and Maj Patrick R. Michaelis. "The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations." *Military Review*, July-August 2005, 4-17.

Synthesizes lessons learned by MajGen Chiarelli during his tour as commander of the 1st Cavalry Division in Baghdad. He advocates for a full spectrum approach to

operations in Iraq, in which military, civil affairs, information, and reconstruction operations are concurrently deployed. Anticipates many of the principles that would shape later counterinsurgency doctrine.

Claessen, Maj Erik A. "S.W.E.T. and Blood: Essential Services in the Battle Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents." *Military Review*, November-December 2007, 91-98.

Belgian officer examines the use of economic support to combat insurgency. Notes that many Middle Eastern insurgency movements, such as Sadr's militia and Hezbollah, also use economic support measures to strengthen their movements. Consequently, counterinsurgent operations cannot assume they are acting unopposed in this arena.

Cloud, David, and Greg Jaffe. *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army*. New York: Crown, 2009.

Comparative biography of Generals David H. Petraeus, George W. Casey Jr., John P. Abizaid, and Peter W. Chiarelli. Examines their careers and explores how their training in the Army during the 1980s influenced the decisions they made as commanders during the Iraq War.

Cobb, Adam. "Iraq: A False Choice." *Small Wars Journal*, 5 November 2007 (http://smallwarsjournal. com/blog/2007/11/iraq-a-false-choice/).

Written as Gen David H. Petraeus delivered his first progress report to Congress in 2007, the article argues that focus on incremental progress in Iraq has masked the reality that a decades-long commitment is needed if the situation in Iraq is to be stabilized.

Coffey, Maj Ross. "Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq." *Military Review*, March-April 2006, 24-34.

Looks at the use of the civil operations and revolutionary development support system, which combined civil and military operations in South Vietnam. Considers the applicability of a similar model in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Cohen, Eliot, LtCol Conrad Crane, LtCol Jan Horvath, and LtCol John A. Nagl. "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency." *Military Review*, March-April 2006, 49-53.

Broad overview of basic principles and apparent contradictions of modern insurgency warfare. Authors argue that the U.S. military's extraordinary conventional capabilities mean that its opponents will more frequently adopt irregular tactics in the future.

Connable, Maj Alfred B. "Ben." "The Massacre That Wasn't." In *Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare*, edited by G. J. David and T. R. McKeldin, 341-50. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009.

An analysis of how the story that U.S. Marines destroyed a mosque during the first battle of Fallujah emerged and eventually spread across the world's media outlets.

The destruction of the mosque ultimately convinced Coalition authorities to suspend Marine activities in Fallujah. The author examines how the story developed and how many elements of it ultimately proved to be false.

Connally, Col Thomas J. "Leaving the Tubes at Home." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2005, 31-34.

Account of the transition of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment from being an artillery unit to becoming a security unit in al-Anbar Province.

Cooper, Capt David E. "An Organizational Model for Marines Fighting an Insurgency." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 49-52.

Argues that the current Marine expeditionary force is not adequately equipped for counterinsurgency operations. Recommends greater emphasis on acquiring local intelligence, civil engagement, and waging more effective information and media campaigns.

Cordesman, Anthony H., with Emma R. Davies. *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict*. 2 vols. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008.

A close examination of the insurgency in Iraq, focusing on its emergence in 2003 and its general development from 2003 through 2007. Provides detailed information about the specific insurgent groups, their goals, and their tactics.

Covert, LtCol Craig H. "Marines on the Borders of Iraq." *Leatherneck*, October 2006, 22-25.

Account of the operations of the border transition team and its work training the Iraqi Department of Border Transition. Discusses U.S. Marine efforts to stem the flow of insurgents across the Iraqi-Syrian border.

———. "Navy Chaplains at War: A Test of Faith." *Leatherneck*, August 2007, 28-31.

Story about Navy chaplains serving in Iraq with Marine Regimental Combat Team 8. Provides an insightful, personal account of their duties and experiences in the field.

Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups." *International Security* 31 (Summer 2006): 7-48.

Considers al-Qaida's relationship to the broader Islamist terrorist movement, stressing that the U.S. needs to see the organization as a part of the broader terrorist threat. Argues against seeing jihadism as an unprecedented threat, warning that doing so only romanticizes jihadism and makes it all the more attractive.

Cuomo, Capt Scott A. "Embedded Training Teams." *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 2006, 62-67.

Presents an account of his experience as a captain of an embedded training team (ETT). Notes some successes but also criticizes the deployment of inexperienced ETTs and their lack of engagement with the local population in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Daily, Col Michael N. "Media Analysis in the Expeditionary Environment." *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2004, 54-60.

> Recommends that commanders use media analysis to ensure that they can anticipate negative reporting, emphasize positive accomplishments, and anticipate the impact of Marine Corps actions on populations.

Dalzell, LtCol Stephen. "Where the Streets Have No Names: Looking Past Operation Iraqi Freedom to Future Urban Operations." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2006, 40-42.

> Considers the evolution of urban warfare in Iraq and anticipates how the U.S. experience and lessons learned will impact future urban operations.

David, Maj John G., and Capt E. Lawson Quinn. "A Tactical Staff Structure for an Ideological War." *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2006, 30-32.

> Recommends creating a staff section tasked with conducting information warfare and gauging and managing public affairs.

DeAtkine, Norvell. "It's An Information War." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 2004, 64.

> Argues that U.S. forces cannot win the Iraq War with massive sweeps of the enemy, but need to better grasp the psychological and civil elements of the struggle.

——. "Reconciliation in Iraq: Don't Hold Your Breath." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 2008, 44-47.

> Examines the historical and customary obstacles to reconciliation in Iraq among its Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'a groups. Compares the situation in Iraq to Reconstruction in the American South. In light of the Shi'a's complete lack of political experience, cautions observers against being too critical.

DeCarvalho, LtCol Frank B. "Reaching Out: Partnering with Iraqi Media." *Military Review*, July-August 2008, 87-95.

> An examination of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi media organs. The article sees this effort as part of the broader process of building security and civil relations in Iraq.

Desch, Michael C. "Bush and the Generals." *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2007, 97-108.
> Considers the relationship between George W. Bush's administration and senior U.S. commanders. Examines the history of civil-military relations since the Vietnam War and investigates why tensions existed between the senior military leadership and Bush administration.

Diamond, Larry. "What Went Wrong in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2004, 34-56.

> Former adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority considers the miscalculations and missteps of the Bush administration during the early months of the Iraq occupation.

Dillow, Gordon. "Building Karmah: Fighting Terrorism with Handshakes and Smiles." *Leatherneck*, August 2004, 14-17.

> Account of how Marines have changed tactics from the U.S. Army and begun patrolling openly, on foot, among the Iraqi population as a means of building a closer relationship between the U.S. forces and local Iraqis.

Dobbins, James. "Who Lost Iraq? Lessons from the Debacle." *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2007, 61-74.

> Examines the sources of failure in Iraq, arguing that reversals and setbacks were the consequence of individual and institutional failures. Contends that future leaders need to surround themselves with competent, experiences advisers, encourage disciplined dissent, and redefine the nature and character of the war on terror to prevent repeating the mistakes of the past.

Dunlap, MajGen Charles J., Jr. "Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today." *Parameters*, February 2008, 52-66.

> Discusses the impact of FM3-24 on air power and its implications for the Air Force. The author believes that both FM3-24 and the Air Force's AFDD2-3 still do not adequately confront the challenges of modern counterinsurgency warfare.

Dunne, Maj Jonathan P. "Twenty-Seven Articles of Lawrence of Arabia." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2007, 10-13.

> Adapts T. E. Lawrence's central articles for the current situation in Iraq, tailored specifically for Marine Corps readers.

Dunn, Scott. "Corporal Becomes First Marine Awarded Medal of Honor in the War on Terror." *Leatherneck*, December 2006, 16-19.

> Story about Cpl Jason L. Dunham, the first Marine to earn the Medal of Honor in the war on terror for sacrificing his life to save two fellow Marines from an insurgent bomb.

Edelstein, David M. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail." *International Security* 29 (Summer 2004): 49-91.

> Surveys a range of military occupations throughout history and discerns a number of common factors and challenges that contributed to their success or failure. Observes that successful occupations were often characterized by the presence of an external threat that made the local population amenable to the presence of a foreign military power.

Eisenstadt, LtCol Michael. "Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned." *Military Review*, September-October 2007, 16-31.

> Provides a summary of Iraq's tribes, describing different tribal groups and characteristics and giving readers an overview of the tribal system in Iraq. Argues that civilian

and tribal engagement represent the best and most effective means of providing stability to Iraq.

―――― , and Jeffrey White. "Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency." *Military Review*, May-June 2006, 33-51.

> An examination of the Sunni insurgency. The authors focus on the amorphous character of the insurgency, consider motivations, and provide a warning against encouraging non-Sunni groups from joining the ranks of the insurgency.

Ellah, Elaine. "Winning Over the Al Anbar Province." *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2007, 31-32.

> Short account of U.S. military, State Department, and USAID projects for rebuilding and securing al-Anbar Province. Tactics used by U.S. forces include construction projects, aid programs, and forging tribal alliances.

Emery, LtCol Norman. "Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, Capabilities, and Effects." *Military Review*, November-December 2008, 27-38.

> Examines the utility of information operations. While the author stresses its importance in counterinsurgency operations, he also cautions planners from seeing information operations as a silver bullet capable of completely overturning enemy propaganda.

Fearon, James D. "Iraq's Civil War." *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 2007, 2-16.

> Examines the nature and character of the civil war in Iraq. Compares the conflict with other civil wars since World War II, especially to Turkey's civil war (1977-80) and the Lebanese civil war (1975-90).

Felicetti, Capt Gary. "The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development." *Parameters*, Winter 2006-2007, 71-83.

> Argues that an overwhelming focus on training local Iraqis is an inadequate means for building an efficient and reliable security force. Intensive training fails to build the experience and loyalty needed for a dependable force.

Filkins, Dexter. *The Forever War*. New York: Vintage Books, 2009.

> Journalist's account of the war on terror, beginning with the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the 11 September 2001 attacks, and the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fore, Henriette Holsman. "Aligning 'Soft' with 'Hard' Power." *Parameters*, Summer 2008, 14-24.

> Drawing on Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates's own contention that military success alone will not bring victory, this article argues that the Department of Defense must combine its efforts with those of the U.S. Agency for International Development to help rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gelpi, Christopher, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler. "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq." *International Security* 30 (Winter 2005-2006): 7-46.

Authors examine the role that casualty reports have on public support for American military operations in Iraq. They conclude that, under the right circumstances, mounting casualties will not deter or hinder public support for war.

Gibson, LtCol Chris. "Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path." *Military Review*, September-October 2006, 47-59.

Account by the commander of 2d Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division describing the success of counterinsurgency operations in northern Iraq during his tour of duty.

Goodale, 1stLt Jason R., and 1stLt Jonathan F. Webre. "The Combined Action Platoon in Iraq." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005, 40-42.

Discusses the development and experience of the first newly implemented combined action platoon since 1971 in South Vietnam, the 3d Platoon, Company G, Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. Considers the history of the CAP and its effectiveness as a means of building local security forces in Iraq.

Gray, Colin S. "Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View." *Parameters*, Summer 2006, 4-14.

Argues that the United States is inherently an ideological power and that it pursues war in a distinctly "American" way. The author contends that this so-called "American Way of War" is hindering its efforts against terrorism and toward building civil societies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gray, Wesley. *Embedded: A Marine Corps Adviser Inside the Iraqi Army*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Author recounts his experience as a Marine adviser in the Iraqi Army operating in al-Anbar Province in 2006. Includes valuable details on the advising program and the process of training and building a new Iraqi Army.

Grayson, Capt Bryan K. "Holding the Cordon." *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 2005, 39-40.

Detailed analysis and description of cordon and search tactics for urban combat and counterinsurgency operations.

Grice, Maj Michael D. "The Command Elements for the Long War." *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2007, 21-24.

Examines the impact of needing to ready and deploy a Marine expeditionary force command element every year. The author criticizes the process, noting that the annual tasking creates a constant cycle of preparation, deployment, and recovery that weakens the in-theater fighting capabilities of the MEFs.

———. "Going After Gunshot 66." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2008, 23-29.

>Description of the loss of Gunshot 66, a Cobra attack helicopter, and the problems and challenges that ensued during attempts to rescue it.

Groen, LtCol Michael S. "The Tactical Fusion Center." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005, 59-63.

>Account and description of the tactical fusion center, a means of acquiring intelligence at the tactical level specifically in service for the ground element of the MAGTF task force.

Gunter, Col Frank R. "Marine Reserve Gets the Job Done." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2004, 56-59.

>Discussion of the positive transformation of the Marine Corps Reserve and its better integration into the regular Marine force. Article discusses both the Marine Corps Reserve's positive contribution to Corps operations and new methods designed to better integrate the Reserves.

Halloran, Richard. "Strategic Communication." *Parameters*, Autumn 2007, 4-14.

>A critical assessment of communications warfare. The author examines how information and actions can both be deployed to send strategic messages. Ultimately, the author is critical of U.S. communications efforts and calls for a renewed emphasis on U.S. information operations.

Hamel, James. "Operation Iraqi Freedom Moves Forward with Herculean Effort from VMGR-252." *Leatherneck*, May 2006, 44-46.

>Story about a Marine aerial refueler and transport squadron, VMGR-252. The account describes the unit's day-to-day operations and its efforts to supply Marines in the field and thus reduce the need for convoys vulnerable to land-mine attacks in Iraq.

Hammes, Col Thomas X. "Countering Evolved Insurgency Networks." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 86-93.

>Examines the nature and development of insurgencies. Notes that insurgencies all share a political character, a remarkable endurance, and a link to the will and resolve of the counterinsurgent's home population. The author argues that a common mistake of counterinsurgencies is to use the same tactics as the insurgents.

———. "The Message is the Insurgency." *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 2007, 18-30.

>Contends that the current insurgency is primarily a strategic communications campaign supported by a military element rather than a military operation with strategic communications support. Notes that insurgents have drawn upon the lessons of past insurgencies and realize that they won by defeating the political will of their opponents.

Hashim, Ahmed S. *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006.

> Analyzes the origins and nature of the Iraqi insurgency. Focuses on the U.S.-backed marginalization of Iraq's Sunni population as a critical factor breeding insurgent networks and bringing together religious and secular resistance groups against the U.S. occupation.

———. "Iraq's Civil War." *Current History* 106 (January 2007): 3-10.

> Outlines the eruption of civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shi'a in 2005. The author criticizes individuals who use terms such as "sectarian violence" and argues that such terms merely cover up the true nature of the conflict.

Hassner, Ron E. "Islamic Just War Theory and the Challenge of Sacred Space in Iraq." *Journal of International Affairs* 61 (Fall/Winter 2007): 131-52.

> Discussion of Islamic rules concerning using mosques and other sacred sites in warfare. Author argues that when planning to search mosques for insurgents and weapons, American soldiers need to be respectful of local values and ensure the complete cooperation of local religious authorities.

Hayden, LtCol H. Thomas. "Counterinsurgency in Iraq Started with Fallujah." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 82-84.

> Article criticizes the U.S. decision to cease operations in Fallujah in April 2004, claiming that the action helped encourage the insurgency. Author lays out a number of proposals and ideas for waging effective counterinsurgency operations against the Iraq insurgency.

———. "Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency." *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 2005, 50-51.

> Discusses the history of how U.S. policy makers and military planners developed means for assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. Considers the U.S. experience in Vietnam and Iraq and the British experience in Malaya.

Higgens, LtCol James B. "Culture Shock: Overhauling the Mentality of the Military." *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2006, 48-51.

> Argues that soldiers and Marines need to better understand Iraqi culture when planning and implementing operations. This needs to go beyond just expressing cultural sensitivity, and instead understanding how cultural norms and ideas inform Iraqi perceptions and actions.

Hilgartner, Col Peter L., Maj R. James Caswell, and Capt Richard Zell. "Leading From the Front?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2006, 38-40.

> Authors criticize Marine junior officers for putting themselves in unnecessary danger to prove their valor and leadership abilities. They argue that this approach only

exposes officers to needless risk and that many Marine officers can lead more prudently and not "from the front."

Hoffman, Frank G. "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" *Parameters*, Summer 2007, 71-87.

Assesses the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 and general counterinsurgency practices and argues that U.S. planners must go beyond drawing lessons from the past, treat all insurgencies as unique, and avoid only looking at similarities and patterns among insurgent movements.

Holt, 2dLt Tyler J. "Shoot, Move, and Communicate." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 2006, 16-17.

Author recounts his experience leading a platoon in Ramadi. He notes the various tactics employed by Marines in Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, describing the nature of urban combat in al-Anbar Province.

Houlgate, Maj Kelly P. "Urban Warfare Transforms the Corps." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 2004, 34-37.

Argues that the U.S. Marines must transform themselves into a combat force capable of waging urban warfare and counterinsurgency operations. The author further argues that less emphasis must be placed on the Marine Corps experience in World War II and more attention paid to operations in the Caribbean and Vietnam.

Housenick, Christopher E. "Winning Battles but Losing Wars: Three Ways Success in Combat Promote Failures in Peace." *Military Review*, September-October 2008, 91-98.

Considers the link between phase III and phase IV war planning, noting that often the success achieved during phase III planning can lay the seeds for difficulty during phase IV operations.

Hutson, CWO-3 William E. "Small Unit Action: In the City of Al Turbah." *Leatherneck*, June 2007, 30-35.

Account of the urban warfare experience of 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 23d Marine Regiment, in the city of al-Turbah in al-Anbar Province.

Ieva, Maj Christopher S. "Significance in Semantics." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 28-33.

The author argues that successful counterinsurgencies in areas such as Malaya lead U.S. military planners to assume that combating the insurgency in Iraq could be done in the same way. He contends that the uprising in Iraq must be seen by planners as something more than an insurgency and argues against a single doctrine solution for counterinsurgency.

Kahl, Colin H. "How We Fight." *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2006, 83-101.

Examination of U.S. rules of engagement and adherence to the principle of noncombatant immunity in Iraq. Author argues that protecting civilians is not only necessary

based on ethical and moral grounds, but also a critical part of building trust with the Iraqi population and defeating the insurgency.

———. "In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq." *International Security* 32 (Summer 2007): 7-46.

Analyzes the question of whether or not U.S. military actions excessively harm civilians. Argues that the U.S. adherence to noncombatant immunity is actually greater than critics contend.

———, and William E. Odom. "When to Leave Iraq: Today, Tomorrow, or Yesterday?" *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2008, 151-57.

Response to "The Price of the Surge," written by Steven N. Simon, that focuses on the benefits, accomplishments, and drawbacks of the surge and Anbar Awakening.

Karcher, Mary D. "Female Marines Put Training to the Test." *Leatherneck*, February 2005, 44-47.

Story marking the 62d anniversary of the Women's Marine Reserve, discussing the various missions and services provided by women Marines in Iraq.

Keiler, Jonathan F. "Make the Military Justice System Fairer."*U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 2007, 80-81.

Considering events such as the shootings at Haditha, the author contends that the unfairness of the military justice system encourages many officers to avoid reporting potential war crimes committed in the field for fear of an unjust response on the part of the system.

——— "Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, January 2005, 57-61.

Examines the consequences of the battle of Fallujah and argues that it was a costly victory that U.S. forces can ill afford to repeat. Despite ultimate victory over the insurgency in December 2004, the withdrawal of April 2004 and the high casualty cost means that the insurgency was able to claim a partial victory.

Kilcullen, David. *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Examination of the nature and character of 21st-century insurgencies. Author analyzes modern small wars in relation to the wars of decolonization and the Cold War and considers new means and approaches to defeating the insurgent threat today.

——— "Twenty-Eight Articles." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 53-60.

Brief summary of Australian officer and counterinsurgency adviser's 28 articles for waging effective anti-insurgent operations. Examples of these include knowing the territory, focusing on platoon and squads as opposed to larger units, avoiding knee-jerk reactions, and keeping the initiative.

Kimmage, Daniel. *The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message.* Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2008.

> A comprehensive and detailed analysis of how the al-Qaeda and jihadist media networks operate. Among its conclusions are that Osama bin Laden's media operations account for only a fraction of jihadist media operations, that text products are the dominant form of media, and that jihadist media outlets are using established forms to gain legitimacy.

———, and Kathleen Ridolfo. *Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas: How Sunni Insurgents in Iraq and their Supporters Worldwide Are Using the Media.* Washington, D.C.: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2007.

> Radio Free Europe/Liberty report examines the media techniques of the Iraqi Sunni insurgency, analyzing text, audio visual products, and the internet. Provides specific case studies from April 2007 of insurgent media activities.

Kozlowski, Francis X. *U.S. Marines in Battle: An-Najaf.* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps History Division, 2009.

> Battle study of the battle of an-Najaf in August 2004, during which the Marines of the 11th MEU fought the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr.

Laird, Melvin R. "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam." *Foreign Affairs*, November-December 2005, 22-43.

> Nixon administration Secretary of Defense considers the relevance of his experience as Pentagon chief and his Vietnamization strategy to how the Bush administration conducts the war in Iraq.

Langewiesche, William. "Rules of Engagement." *Vanity Fair,* November 2006, 312-28, 350-55.

> Account of the Haditha incident, in which Marines killed Iraqi civilians following an insurgent attack. The author examines the event from the perspective of both the Marines and Iraqis.

Litaker, Col Eric T. "Efforts to Counter the IED Threat." *Marine Corps Gazette,* January 2005, 29-31.

> Story about the operations of improvised explosive device working groups, initially assembled to confront the challenge of IEDs to I MEF during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Discusses the contributions of IED WGs to OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Long, Austin G. *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006.* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2008.

> In the wake of the publication of FM 3-24, considers the influence of written counterinsurgency doctrine on U.S. military planning. Argues that doctrine alone does not

define U.S. tactics and strategy. Instead, U.S. forces need to be adaptive and responsive to changing situations.

———. "The Anbar Awakening." *Survival*, April-May 2008, 67-93.

Scholarly account of the al-Anbar Awakening in western Iraq. The author considers the history of tribes in Iraq and their relationship to the Iraqi state under the monarchy, Saddam Hussein, and the United States.

Lubin, Andrew. "Ramadi: From the Caliphate to Capitalism." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 2008, 54-61.

Recounts the dramatic and sudden development of the Anbar Awakening Councils. Focuses primarily efforts on the efforts of U.S. Army Col Sean B. MacFarland of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jurney of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and Sheikh Sattar Abdul Abu Risha to build a broad coalition arrayed against al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Malkasian, Carter A. "Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003-January 2007." In *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter A. Malkasian, 241-59. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Overview of the Iraqi insurgency from its origins following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, through the eruption of civil war in 2005, to the appointment of Gen David H. Petraeus as commander of Multi National Force-Iraq in 2007.

———. "The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004-2005." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 17 (September 2006): 367-94.

Argues that the perception that the United States would withdraw from Iraq and that the insurgency would achieve victory helped fuel the Sunni insurgency. The author believes that inadequate attention has been paid to the role perception plays in insurgencies and the inclination of moderates to engage in the political process.

———. "Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 3d Quarter 2007, 120-26.
Examines the question of troop levels and their relationship to violence in Iraq. In looking at the case of I MEF in Fallujah, he concludes that deficient troops levels weakened the ability of Coalition forces to provide adequate security and helped to increase the strength and virulence of the insurgency.

———. "Signaling Resolve, Democratization, and the First Battle of Fallujah." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29 (June 2006): 423-52.

Analyzes how the decision to cease military operations against insurgents in Fallujah indicates a lack of decisive resolve on the part of the U.S. military that helped fuel the insurgency and severely weakened counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. However, the author notes the refusal of the Iraqi Governing Council to support the U.S. effort

demonstrates that military force alone is an inadequate means for signaling resolve in a counterinsurgency.

———. "A Thin Blue Line in the Sand." *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, Summer 2007, 48-58.

Describes the challenges of Iraqization. Recommends that, despite the threat it poses to weakening the centralized character of the Iraqi state, U.S. authorities entrust security operations to local Sunni groups rather than the Iraqi army. Focuses on U.S. operations in al-Anbar Province.

———. "Will Iraqization Work?" Working paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., February 2007.

Paper examines the challenges of building a national army in Iraq, arguing that it will always be seen by Sunnis as an instrument for establishing Shi'a hegemony. The author posits that more efforts should be made to build local police forces based around communities to confront the security problems in Iraq.

Mann, Maj Morgan. "Steps to Winning." *Marine Corps Gazette*, March 2006, 43-45.

Brief summary of the experiences of Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, and its operations in Iraq's North Babil Province. Provides detailed descriptions of counterinsurgency operations.

———. "The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in Counterinsurgency." *Military Review*, May-June 2007, 104-8.

Discusses the importance of cultivating relationships with local tribes to provide security and stability. Focuses on the experiences of the 2d Battalion, 24th Marines.

Marshall, Maj David H. "Training Iraqi Forces." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2006, 58-60.

Provides a case study for training local Iraqi forces, focusing on the efforts of the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company to train members of the 504th Iraqi National Guard.

Marston, Daniel, and Carter A. Malkasian. *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007.

Anthology of essays describing the changing nature and character of insurgencies and counterinsurgency style warfare. Includes chapters on the Philippines, Malaya, and Iraq.

Martin, Capt Zachary D. "By Other Means." *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2005, 68-71.

Argues that Marines must alter their approach from fighting large-scale formations to focusing on counterinsurgencies. Makes a case for resurrecting the Vietnam-era combined action platoon as a means of forging closer relations between Marines and Iraqi security forces.

McCary, John. A. "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives." *Washington Quarterly* 32 (January 2009): 43-59.

> Provides a good analysis of the Anbar Awakening, exploring the motivations behind the tribal leaders and the pragmatic rationale for building relationships with tribal leaders.

McFate, Montgomery. "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 3d Quarter 2005, 42-48.

> Examines the renewed emphasis on the part of the U.S. military to understand the local customs and culture of Iraq. The author argues that this is a critical component for successfully combating the insurgency in Iraq and bringing about stability and security.

Millen, LtCol Raymond. "The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior during an Insurgency." *Parameters*, Winter 2006-2007, 4-13.

> Uses Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* to explain the role populations play in accepting either an insurgent or counterinsurgent's regime. The author contends that a population's desire for security means that the people will gravitate toward the force best able to provide it, rather than return to a Hobbesian state of nature.

Morris, LtCol Michael F. "Al Qaeda as Insurgency." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2005, 40-50.

> Considers whether al-Qaeda is a terrorist group or an insurgency. Argues that it is a global, fascist, ideologically driven insurgency. Consequently, U.S. strategy needs to focus on the practices of counterinsurgency.

Moyar, Mark A. *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009.

> Book explores the role that individual leadership has played in the success or failure of counterinsurgency campaigns. Beginning with the American Civil War, the study examines leadership and insurrections in the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Muckian, LtCdr Martin J. "Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary." *Parameters*, Winter 2006-2007, 14-25.

> Notes how planners are looking to past insurgencies as a means of determining the best strategies to use against the current insurgency in Iraq. However, the author believes that the older Maoist/Marxist insurgencies are not necessarily the best models and recommends that planners better grasp the current insurgency in Iraq before drawing on lessons from the past.

Mulrine, Anna. "Emphasizing Ethics Even as Bullets Fly; The Haditha Case Undermines U.S. Credibility," *U.S. News and World Report*, 19 June 2006.

Examines the Haditha shootings and notes that the event and the subsequent U.S. reaction have harmed U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and efforts to win the support of the population.

Murphy, Col Dennis M., and LtCol James F. White. "Propaganda: Can a Word Decide a War?" *Parameters*, Autumn 2007, 15-27.

Since the center of gravity in the war on terror is extremist ideology, the authors argue that the U.S. must use all means necessary to wage information war. The article also provides a detailed account of the history of U.S. wartime communications strategies and operations since World War I.

Nagl, John A. *How to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Analysis of counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Vietnam. Author explores and compares the British and American approaches to warfare and considers the influence of both on how they battle insurgencies and fight irregular wars. Author subsequently was on the writing team that produced the FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* manual.

Nasr, Vali. "The Shia Revival." *Military Review*, May-June 2007, 9-13.

Examines the emergence of Shi'a Islam and its revival in Iraq. The author sees it as part of a broader phenomenon impacting the Middle East. The article also provides contextual information on the history and character of Shi'a Islam.

——. "When the Shiites Rise." *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2006, 58-74.

Analyzes how the empowerment of Iraq's Shiites has sparked a Shiite revival and altered the religious and political face of the Middle East. The article considers the implications of the Shiite revival and the possibility of sectarian strife throughout the region.

Nieland, Capt Matthew A., and Capt Michael A. Dubrule. "Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence." *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 2005, 18-20.

Story about Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams and their acquisition of intelligence in the battlefield to help Marine Expeditionary Force operations.

Odierno, LtGen Raymond T., LtCol Nichoel E. Brooks, and LtCol Francesco P. Mastracchio. "ISR Evolution in the Iraqi Theater." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 3d Quarter 2008, 51-55.

Examines the importance of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in helping to build the conditions in which the Iraq surge could succeed.

O'Hara, SSgt Rory D. "ASCOPE." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2007, 46-47.

Recommends that Marines waging counterinsurgency operations use area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) as a means for assessing the effectiveness of COIN activities.

Ortiz, Col Paul R. "Unit Operations Center Getting High Marks in Iraq." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2005, 34-40.

Examines the development of the united operations center, a mobile command and control center designed for Marine forces.

Packer, George. *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005.

Account of the rise of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent rise of the Iraq insurgency in 2003, written by a *New Yorker* staff writer.

Palazzo, Maj Louis J. "To Build a Nation's Army." *Marine Corps Gazette*, December 2005, 35-36.

Story about the development of the Iraqi security forces, an umbrella term that encompasses the Iraqi National Guard, the Iraq border patrol, Iraqi police, Iraqi regular army, and facility protection service. Describes U.S. Marine efforts to build up the force.

Patriquin, Capt Travis. "Using Occam's Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba'ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar." *Military Review*, January-February 2007, 16-25.

Argues that the U.S. needs to reassess its policy in Iraq by acknowledging that a sizeable portion of Iraq's population does not desire democracy. The author believes that the simplest and most effective means of bringing stability to Iraq is to engage the tribes and clans of that country, rather than attempt to bring about a fully functional democracy.

Payne, Kenneth. "The Media as an Instrument of War." *Parameters*, Spring 2005, 81-92.

Contends that the media stands as a critical element of warfare. However, the author also argues that international agreements designed to govern the use of media on the battlefield need to be reassessed and updated to come to terms with the Internet and 24-hour news networks.

Petraeus, LtGen David H. "Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq." *Military Review*, January-February 2006, 2-12.

Author presents an overview of lessons and observations learned during his tour of duty in Iraq, stressing the benefits and needs for adaptability and initiative taking on the part of commanders.

Reider, Col Bruce J. "Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq." *Parameters*, Winter 2007-2008, 46-57.

Argues that the U.S. must rethink its approach to the Iraq War and see that it has developed from an insurgency into a mixture of civil war, insurgency, and terrorism.

Recommends that the U.S. focus its efforts on resolving the sectarian divide and reducing civil strife.

Reist, BGen David G. "Twelve Things I Wish I had Known." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2007, 76-78.

The former deputy commanding general for support with Multi National Force-West recounts his experience in Iraq, focusing on the interconnectedness between economics and security, the dynamics of the Iraqi tribal system, and the use of strategic communications systems.

Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.

Examination of the U.S. involvement in Iraq in 2003-2004. Focuses on the lead up to the war and the unpreparedness of U.S. forces for both occupation and counterinsurgency operations.

————. *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.

Account of the surge, Anbar Awakening, and transformation of overall U.S. policy in Iraq beginning in 2006, with a focus on the contributions of Gen David H. Petraeus, USA.

Rueda, Edwin. "Tribalism in the Al Anbar Province." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2006, 11-14.

Concise history of the emergence of Iraq's tribal system and its influence on politics during the Ottoman, British, and Ba'athist regimes.

Sattler, LtGen John F, and LtCol Daniel H.Wilson."Operation Al Fajr:The Battle of Fallujah—Part II." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 2005, 12-24.

Account of the second battle of Fallujah, related by the commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force, LtGen John F. Sattler. Article provides a commander's perspective to the operations.

Scales, MajGen Robert H. "Urban Warfare: A Soldier's View." *Military Review*, January-February 2005, 9-18.

Description of the nature and character of urban warfare operations in Iraq.

Schwarz, Lt Anthony J. "Iraq's Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq." *Parameters*, Spring 2007, 55-71.

Considers the role militias have played in fomenting sectarian and sectional strife in Iraq. Argues that the U.S. must focus on defeating the militias in order to bring civil order back to the country.

Searle, LtCol Thomas R. "Tribal Engagement in Anbar Province: The Critical Role of Special Operations Forces." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 3d Quarter 2008, 62-66.

Examines the development of tribal engagement in al-Anbar Province, initiated by special operations forces and carried out by Marines and soldiers.

Seifert, Maj Robert J. "Iraq and the AC-130: Gunships Unleashed." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 2d Quarter 2007, 78-83.

Discusses the deployment of AC-130 gunships in Iraq and their use in counterinsurgency combat.

Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." *Military Review*, May-June 2005, 8-12.

Presents an overview of counterinsurgency tactics throughout history, including a number of charts and graphics listing and describing important insurgencies.

Simon, Steven N. "The Price of the Surge: How U.S. Strategy Is Hastening Iraq's Demise." *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2008, 57-76.

Considers the successes of the surge and acknowledges that it has helped bring order to Iraq. However, the author argues that the policy is not sustainable and will not lay the foundations for a long term reconstruction of Iraq.

Simpson, Ross W. "Fallujah: A Four Letter Word." *Leatherneck*, February 2005, 16-21; March 2005, 14-19.

A two-part article describing the experiences of a single platoon of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, during the battle of Fallujah. Detailed and comprehensive examination of the nature and character of the battle.

———. "In the Crosshairs: USMC Snipers in Iraq." *Leatherneck*, June 2004, 24-28.

Presents an overview of sniper activities in the Corps during the battle of Fallujah.

Skiles, SgtMaj William. "Urban Combat Casualty Evacuation." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2008, 46-50.

Details the duties and operations of a casualty evacuation team in Iraq.

Skuta, LtCol Philip C. "Partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces." *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2005, 36-39.

Story about the activities of Task Force 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Iraq. The article discusses how 2/7 has worked to help build Iraqi forces and provides advice and recommendations to commanders for building relations with the local Iraqi soldiers.

Smith, Maj Niel, and Col Sean B. MacFarland. "Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point." *Military Review*, March-April 2008, 41-52.

The authors, both veterans of stabilization efforts in al-Anbar Province, recount how members of the "Ready First" Brigade Combat Team engaged the local tribes and encouraged them to join anti-al-Qaeda awakening councils.

Snead, Cpl Micah. "Marine Air In Iraq: 2d MAW Concludes Successful OIF Deployment." *Leatherneck*, May 2006, 16-20.

> Describes 2d Marine Air Wing's tour of duty. Provides a good general overview of air combat operations in Iraq.

Stubbs, Capt Paul D. "No Man's Water." *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2005, 20-21.

> Story about Marine riverboat patrols of the small craft company (SCC). Article examines the Marines' activities and stresses their qualifications and capabilities, noting that the unit is the only one in Iraq equipped for river patrols.

Swabb, 1stLt Eric F. "Restrictive Rules of Engagement and Force Protection." *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2006, 36-38.

> Examines the rules of engagement and argues that Marines must be educated to see them as a critical part of effective counterinsurgency operations, not as a restrictive device that places Marines in danger.

Tomes, Robert R. "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare." *Parameters*, Spring 2004, 16-28.

> Review article of major scholarly works on counterinsurgency. Considers works by Roger Trinquier, David Galula, and Frank Kitson. The author warns U.S. planners not to look to the U.S. experience in Vietnam as a source for lessons on the current struggle in Iraq.

Vasquez, Capt Michael. "Tribalism Under Fire." *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 2008, 62-68.

> Examines the Anbar Awakening, focusing specifically on how U.S. Marine counterinsurgency doctrine and activities helped to build tribal alliances arrayed against al-Qaeda in Iraq throughout al-Anbar Province.

Visconage, Col Michael D. "Turning the Tide in the West." *Marine Corps Gazette*, February 2008, 8-13.

> Summary of the emerging Anbar Awakening, focusing on the participation of U.S. Marines in forging tribal alliances in western Iraq.

Vlahos, Michael. "Fighting Identity: Why We Are Losing Our Wars." *Military Review*, November-December 2007, 2-12.

> Provides historical background and context to insurgency and counterinsurgency. Author examines the failure of U.S. troops to learn the lessons of tribal engagement.

Walker, Martin. "The Revenge of the Shia." *Wilson Quarterly* 30 (Autumn 2006): 16-20.

> Speculative article in which the author considers the possibility of a general war between Sunni and Shi'a groups erupting throughout the Middle East. He considers a range of possibilities and notes the apprehensions of Sunni Arab leaders such as King Abdullah of Jordan and Hosni Mubarek of Egypt about the rising power of Shi'a Iran.

Wallace, Col David A. "Battling Terrorism under the Law of War." *Military Review*, September-October 2007, 101-3.

> Asserts that U.S. forces must adhere to the laws of war when fighting the war on terror. The author argues that doing so supports the Geneva Convention, encourages enemies to surrender, promotes unit discipline, and maintains international support of the U.S. military effort.

West, Maj Owen. "Catch and Release." *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 2007, 26-31.

> Argues that the U.S. military's obsession with Western-style rule of law comes at the expense of understanding the necessities of war. By focusing on detention, the U.S. military has committed itself to a counterinsurgency strategy that lacks funds and facilities.

West, F. J. "Bing." "The Fall of Fallujah." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 2005, 52-58.

> Story about Operation Phantom Fury, the U.S. Marine Corps operation launched in the winter of 2004 to clear Fallujah of terrorists. Provides firsthand description of the events.

——. *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle of Fallujah*. New York: Bantam Books, 2005.

> Firsthand accounts of the battles of Fallujah. While it focuses on the accomplishments of Marines in the fights, it also explores reasons for the failures of the first battle of Fallujah, focusing on political-military tensions and a confused chain of command.

——. *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*. New York: Random House, 2008.

> Explores more recent developments in Iraq, focusing on the new strategy implemented by Gen David H. Petraeus, USA. The author concentrates on the experiences of the Marines in the al-Anbar Province, continuing his account from where he left off in *No True Glory*.

Wheeler, LtCol Kurtis P. "Good News in Al Anbar?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, April 2007, 36-41.

> An overview of I MEF's accomplishments in al-Anbar Province during its deployment of 2007-2008. Focuses on the Awakening and the role of Marines and local tribes in building a local Iraqi police force.

Williams, Timothy. "American Exit Increases Optimism in Falluja," New York Times, 30 December 2008.

> Report on the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Camp Fallujah, commenting on the symbolic nature of both the withdrawal and the new security and stability that has come to define the region.

Woodward, Bob. *Bush at War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

———. *Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.

———. *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.

———. *The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008.

> Series of books recounting the Bush administration's prosecution of the war on terror, the war in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. Provides inside accounts of the innerworkings of the administration and its decision-making process.

**Back Cover:** The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.