

Docket Nos. 50-313  
and 50-368

November 1991

LICENSEE: Entergy Operations, Inc.

FACILITY: Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 and 2 (ANO-1&2)

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 31, 1991, MEETING TO DISCUSS LICENSING ACTIONS

On October 31, 1991, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) met with the NRC staff in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss proposed amendments to the ANO-1&2 technical specifications (TS). The staff gained a better understanding of the licensee's approach to developing TS amendment requests. The TS amendment process was discussed from both the licensee's and the NRC staff's perspective. The prioritization and scheduling process for license amendment reviews were also discussed utilizing specific TS amendment requests that ANO intends to pursue. The licensee plans to submit 15 to 20 TS amendment requests by the first quarter of 1992. The pending TS amendment requests include NRC-approved line item improvements, plant-specific items, clarifications, and potential generic changes. The staff discussed the need for industry to actively coordinate and propose generic TS line item improvements. Currently, there do not appear to be any conflicts between the licensee's needs and NRC schedules.

A list of meeting participants is provided in Enclosure 1. Enclosure 2 is the licensee's handout listing approximately 64 TS amendment requests that ANO intends to pursue.

In addition, Sheri Peterson, the NRC project manager assigned to ANO-2, met with the licensee to discuss the status of current licensing actions, focusing on whether NRC or the licensee had the next action.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
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Project Directorate IV-1  
Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, and V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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Enclosures:  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 13, 1991

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and 50-368

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*Sheri R. Peterson*

Sheri R. Peterson, Project Manager  
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Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, and V  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:  
As stated

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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Arkansas Nuclear One, Units 1 & 2

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MEETING BETWEEN ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. AND NRC STAFF  
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNITS 1 AND 2  
October 31, 1991

ATTENDANCE RECORD

<u>NAME</u>	<u>AFFILIATION</u>
Sheri Peterson	NRR/DRPW/PDIV-1
James J. Fisicaro	Entergy Operations, Inc - ANO
Calvin W. Moon	NRR/DOEA/OTSB
Martin J. Virgilio	NRR/DRPW
John T. Larkins	NRR/DRPW/PDIV-1
Dale E. James	Entergy Operations - ANO/Licensing
Larry A. Taylor	Entergy Operations - ANO/Licensing



ENTERGY

AND PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

Enclosure 2

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:

PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

---

1-91A-21	Removal of Cycle Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications
11/7/91	1

---

1-90A-07	ECP Level Requirement
2-90A-17	ECP Temperature Limits
12/1/91	2/3

---

2-87A-07	Resubmittal of Station Battery TS Change Request
12/1/91	1

---

2-90A-11	Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability
12/1/91	1

---

2-91A-29	Containment Cooler
12/1/91	2

---

2-91A-37	Reduced RCS Pressure
12/10/91	

---

1-89A-19	Auxiliary Electrical Systems
3/1/92	2



ENERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

1-90A-30	Main Steam Safety Valve Testing
3/1/92 2	
1-91A-10	Containment Temperature and Pressure Limit
3/1/92 2	
1-91A-20	Reactor Building Leakage Test
3/1/92	
1-91A-22	Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM
3/1/92 2	
1-91A-24 1-91A-27 2-91A-27 2-91A-32	Replace Shift Technical Advisor with Shift Engineer Replace Shift Supervisor with Shift Superintendent
3/1/92 1	
1-91A-25	Station Battery - Upgrade to STS
3/1/92 1	
1-91A-26	ESFAS Surveillance Test Interval and Allowed Outage Time Extension
3/1/92 2	



ENTERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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1-91A-30            Table 4.1-1 Typos

3/1/92    3

---

1-91A-32            Use of Breathing Air in Containment

3/1/92

---

1-91A-33            Delete Requirement for Operations Manager to Retain  
2-91A-36            Active License

3/1/92

---

2-88A-11            Safety Injection Tank 5% Sample Requirement  
2-90A-35            Safety Injection Tank Boron Concentration  
2-91A-10            Safety Injection Tank Pressure Discrepancy

3/1/92    2/1

---

2-89A-06            Unit Two Q CST

3/1/92    1

---

2-89A-26            Containment Purge Isolation Valve Surveillance  
2-90A-30            Containment Isolation Valve Table

3/1/92    2

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2-90A-01            CST Volume

3/1/92    1



ENTERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:

PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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2-90A-05	Indefinite Bypass of PPS Channel
3/1/92	1

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2-90A-09	120 Day RPS / ESFAS Testing
3/1/92	1

---

2-91A-05	Containment Air Lock Doors
3/1/92	1

---

2-91A-12	Containment Temperature and Pressure Limit
3/1/92	

---

2-91A-17	Revise Seismic Monitoring Table
3/1/92	

---

2-91A-21	Main Feedwater Isolation Valve, Inoperability Time
3/1/92	2

---

2-91A-25	Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM
3/1/92	2





ENTERGY

AND PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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2-91A-26	Removal of Component Lists from the Technical Specifications Delete Table 3.8-1
3/1/92	3

---

1-90A-02	Bases Change - Boron Dilution
4/1/92	3

---

1-90A-08	LRV Block Valve Reference (Table 4.1-1)
4/1/92	3

---

1-91A-07	Purge Valve Applicability
4/1/92	2

---

2-90A-28	RAS 2 Sets of 2 per Train
4/1/92	2

---

1-89A-29	Containment Net Free Volume Correction
6/1/92	2

---

2-90A-20	Special Test Exception - Center CEA
6/1/92	3



ENERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:

PROPOSED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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1-89A-25	Administrative Changes
1-90A-26	Radiological Environmental Typos
1-91A-13	Pressurizer Safety Valves Misnomer
8/1/92	3

---

1-90A-22	Fuel Pool Figure 3.8.1
8/1/92	3

---

1-90A-27	Reactor Building Design Features
8/1/92	3

---

1-90A-33	Boric Acid Figure 3.2-1
10/1/92	3

---

2-90A-21	Basis for Radioactive Liquid Effluent Instrumentation
10/1/92	3

---

2-90A-26	Boration Rate
2-91A-16	3.10.3 Special Test Exemption Typo
10/1/92	3

---

1-91A-04	Instrumentation Table 3.5.1-1
12/1/92	3



ENTERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:

PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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2-90A-34	ESFAS Response Times
12/1/92	3

---

2-91A-03 2-91A-07	Pressurizer and Steam Generator Variable Setpoints SG/PZR Variable Setpoint Values
12/1/92	2

---

1-91A-06	Peak Clad Temperature (Bases)
2/1/93	3

---

2-91A-01	Controlled Leakage Definition
2/1/93	3

---

1-89A-23	Heat Balance Calibration
1/1/94	2

---

1-90A-12	Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability
1/1/94	2

---

1-90A-29 2-90A-33	Snubbers - IST Program
1/1/94	



ENTERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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1-91A-05            Core Flood Tank Volume

1/1/94    2

---

1-91A-09            Gas Decay Tank Curie Content  
2-91A-11

1/1/94    3

---

1-91A-14            Reactor Building Integrity Timeclock  
1-91A-15            Reactor Building Integrity When RCS is Open

1/1/94    2

---

1-91A-23            Removal of Component Lists from the Technical  
Specifications

1/1/94    3

---

1-91A-28            Emergency Cooling Pond Level With Opposite Unit  
2-91A-34            Shutdown

1/1/94    3

---

1-91A-29            Delete F.O.L. Completed Conditions

1/1/94    3

---

1-91A-31            3.0.5 Bases (DG Outage Time)

1/1/94    3



ENTERGY

AND PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

---

2-86A-23            Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning

1/1/94    3

---

2-90A-08            Undervoltage Values for 4.16 kv Busses

1/1/94    2

---

2-90A-23            Leakage Detection Systems

1/1/94    2

---

2-90A-38            Fuel Handling Area Ventilation

1/1/94    2

---

2-91A-02            Emergency Chiller Starting Location

1/1/94    2

---

2-91A-23            Valve Position Verification - Containment Spray System

1/1/94    3

---

2-91A-30            Diesel Load Rejection

1/1/94    2



ENERGY

ANO PENDING  
TECH SPEC CHANGES

TRACKING NUMBER: TITLE:  
PROJECTED SRC DATE / PRIORITY

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2-91A-35

Delete F.O.L. Completed Conditions

1/1/94 3

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-21**

**TITLE:**

**Removal of Cycle Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 11/7/91**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Generic Letter 88-16 - Removal of Cycle Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications.

License amendments are generally required each fuel cycle to update the values of cycle-specific parameter limits in Technical Specifications. The processing of changes to Technical Specifications that are developed using an NRC-approved methodology is an unnecessary burden on licensee and NRC resources. Generic Letter 88-16 provides guidance for the preparation of a license amendment request to eliminate the need to update the cycle-specific parameter limits each fuel cycle. This change will incorporate the Generic Letter recommendations into the ANO-1 Technical Specifications.

ANO-2 TSCR is 2-91A-24

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-07

2-90A-17

### TITLE:

ECP Level Requirement  
ECP Temperature Limits

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2/3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/91

ASSIGNED TO: Bob Clark

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

1-90A-07 - This change is to show the revised ANO-1 ECP level and temperature requirements to reflect the present design calculations and to be similar to the ANO-2 specification.

2-90A-17 - This change modifies the ANO-2 Technical Specification 3/4.7.4.1 associated with the Emergency Cooling Pond (ECP), to be consistent with actual method of temperature recording. The current Technical Specification method of temperature recording is described as "average" water temperature. This change clarifies what is meant by average.



# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-87A-07

TITLE:

Resubmittal of Station Battery TS Change Request

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/91

ASSIGNED TO:

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Proposed change revises the Surveillance Requirements of TS 4.8.2.3 to allow battery operability determinations following service and performance discharge tests to use the measured battery charging current in lieu of specific gravity measurements. In addition, this change (1) clarifies the use of cell voltage correction factor used to compensate for battery electrolyte temperature variances and (2) revises the specific gravity and battery connector (terminals, connections, etc.) Surveillance Requirements.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-11**

**TITLE:**

**Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/91**

**ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

NRC Generic Letter 84-15 "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability" provided recommendations to reduce wear, extend the life and improve availability of the Emergency Diesels. In addition to certain programmatic changes such as prelubrication and warmup procedures, changes to the Technical Specifications were recommended to reduce engine stress and wear. Specifically these include reduction in cold fast starts and rapid loading. 2CAN109006 sent 10/10/90 for TSCR.

NRC recommended revision. LIRs sent for comments.

## SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-29

TITLE:

Containment Cooler

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/91

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change bases the specification for the containment cooling units on heat removal capacity rather than components. A similar change was approved for ANO-1 in Amendment 145. This is addressed in CR 2-91-0330 action G5.

The current ANO-2 Technical Specifications base containment cooler operability on service water flow rate. The heat removal characteristics of these coolers have changed due to fouling and the current Technical Specification limit no longer assures the heat removal assumptions of the Safety Analysis. The proposed change will base cooler operability on heat removal capacity rather than service water flow rate.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-37

TITLE:

Reduced RCS Pressure

MANAGER'S PRIORITY:

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/10/91

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

As a part of ANO's continued efforts to reduce Primary Safety Value Leakage. A Technical Specification change is proposed to allow a reduction of primary system pressure by 200 psi with a corresponding ~ 10% reduction in reactor power. This flexibility will allow the reduction of RCS pressure for short periods of time in an attempt to seat a "simmering" safety valve. If successful, this will preclude steam cutting of the seats which ultimately leads to unacceptable safety valve leakage.

STATUS

## SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-89A-19

TITLE:

Auxiliary Electrical Systems

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change will revise the existing TS for offsite power sources including:

- (1) clarification of operability requirements
- (2) addition of appropriate action statement to address 2 inoperable offsite power sources
- (3) revision of requirement for switchyard DC control power sources.
- (4) clarification of requirements for S/U 2 transformer load shedding circuitry.

### STATUS

Draft to Dale/Larry 5/30/91.

Meeting needed for input on justification. Rewrote per meeting on 9/6/91. Out for review again on 9/23/91.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-30

TITLE:

Main Steam Safety Valve Testing

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The current Technical Specifications for ANO-1 Main Steam Safety Valves does not allow for performance of corrective maintenance on more than two of the sixteen valves during any one outage without removing the additional valves and sending them offsite for post maintenance testing. Section 3.4.1.2 requires 14 of the 16 valves to be operable prior to exceeding 280° F RCS temperature. The current footnote to section 3.4.1.2 allows all but one valve on each header to be gagged for the purpose of hydrostatic testing while the plant is in hot shutdown. This change will expand the footnote to include post maintenance setpoint testing with only two valves (one on each header) operable. This will allow the rebuilding of several valves (making them technically inoperable) during an outage and then performing the setpoint test and operability verification in place as the plant is coming out of the outage. This will result in a cost savings of ~ \$20,000 per valve.  
1R10 related.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-10**

**TITLE:**

**Containment Temperature and Pressure Limit**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

ANO-1 Tech Spec 3.6.4 lower limit of 5.5 in Hg is inconsistent with the ECCS analysis basis assumption of 1 psig vacuum. Subject of CR-2-91-0064 Actions 02 (ANO-2) and 05 (ANO-1) due 10-30-91.  
ANO-2 TSCR 2-91A-12.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-20**

**TITLE:**

**Reactor Building Leakage Test**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY:**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This proposed change deletes the reduced pressure test, changes Type A, B, and C test pressure from design pressure (59 psig) to peak accident pressure (53.1 psig), changes airlock door seal test to a reduced pressure test (2.5 psig), clarifies acceptance criteria to specify maximum pathway leakage, and other editorial changes.



**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-22**

**TITLE:**

**Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and  
Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Generic Letter 89-01 - Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and  
Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM  
ANO-2 TSCR is 2-91A-25

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-24

1-91A-27

2-91A-27

2-91A-32

### TITLE:

Replace Shift Technical Advisor with Shift Engineer

Replace Shift Supervisor with Shift Superintendent

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

### ASSIGNED TO:

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The functions of the Shift Technical Advisor are being met by the Shift Engineer. This change is a title change for this position. ANO-2 change is 2-91A-27.

Operations has reorganized their on shift organization to include Shift Superintendent and Control Room Supervisor. The title of Shift Supervisor is no longer applicable. If possible, the change should be as generic as possible, such as "Shift Supervision", to allow flexibility. ANO-2 change is 2-91A-32.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-25**

**TITLE:**

**Station Battery - Upgrade to STS**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Revise ANO-1 battery surveillance to be consistent with standardized technical specifications. Ensure changes described in 2-87A-07 are incorporated.

## SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-26

TITLE:

ESFAS Surveillance Test Interval and  
Allowed Outage Time Extension

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This Tech Spec change is based on a B&W Owners Group Task 1427. Draft report "Justification for Increasing the Engineered Safeguard Features Actuation System (ESFAS) On-Line Test Intervals", BAW-10182, July, 1991. Issued in draft July 12, 1991 for BWOOG comment. Final version will be submitted to the NRC as a generic document. Upon approval, a Tech Spec change may be made. Maintenance, Jack Waxenfelter, will sponsor change.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-30**

**TITLE:**

**Table 4.1-1 Typos**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Correct typos in table 4.1-1. Table 4.1-1 Item 42.b.1 list the Triaxial Peak Accelerograph Instrument numbers. as 2XR-8437, the correct number is 2XR-8347. Item 53.c lists for EFW initiation Low Pressure SGS or B and should be SGA or B.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-32

TITLE:

Use of Breathing Air in Containment

MANAGER'S PRIORITY:

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This request is to use breathing air in containment above cold shutdown. This condition is currently prohibited by Tech Spec requirements which prevent opening the manual isolation valve for the breathing air system above cold shutdown.

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-33

2-91A-36

### TITLE:

Delete Requirement for Operations Manager to Retain Active License

### MANAGER'S PRIORITY:

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: P. Bemis

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change is proposed to reduce the training burden associated with maintaining an active License as is currently required of the Operations Manager. The Operations Manager will be required to have had an active License on the respective Unit. The Operations Manager remains cognizant of changes in the facility and procedures simply due to the nature of the position. Also to successfully fulfill the position will require the periodic review of the Operator Training Program. The reduced training burden will allow additional time for management participation in issues affecting the Operation Organization.

STATUS

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

2-88A-11

2-90A-35

2-91A-10

### TITLE:

Safety Injection Tank 5% Sample Requirement  
Safety Injection Tank Boron Concentration  
Safety Injection Tank Pressure Discrepancy

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2/1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Periodic makeup to the Safety Injection Tanks is required due to inventory loss from sampling, component leakage, and internal system leakage. The current Tech Spec requires sampling after a 1% level change (cumulative since last sample). This sample requirement is unnecessarily restrictive. SIT makeup is from the Refueling Water Tank, which has the same Boric Acid concentration as the SITs. Normal makeup, therefore, cannot result in an out of specification boron concentration. Allowing additions totaling 5% would reduce sampling to almost monthly and simplify SIT inventory control.

SIT boron concentrations are not easily adjusted due to the limited volume of the tank. Presently, to increase SIT boron concentration requires numerous small "drain and fills" or one large "drain and fill" which results in the SIT being out of spec. on pressure and level. The 2500 ppm limit was chosen because it is the same low limit as the RWT for convenience as discussed in the basis for this spec. Accident analysis assumes 2000 ppm. A low limit of 2000 ppm would reduce the number of drain and fill operations to achieve a concentration in spec.

Quality Assurance Tech Spec Audit QAP-18F-90 provided the following recommendation (R01) in regard the ANO-1 Tech Spec 3.5.1:

"Review the SAR, Tech Specs and Test Procedure; determine which pressure (700 psia or 700 psig) is warranted; and revise the appropriate documents to provide consistency."

The applicability of Tech Spec 3.5.1 is listed as being when RCS pressure is > 700 psia (equivalent to 685 psig), however the Surveillance Requirement is to verify the safety injection tank isolation valve open when RCS pressure exceeds 700 psig.



**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**  
2-89A-06

**TITLE:**  
Unit Two Q CST

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY:** 1  
**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE:** 3/1/92

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This change will make available the new Q CST as a water source to the Emergency Feedwater Pumps in addition to the currently credited Unit Two CST. Additionally if the Q CST is selected as an option for EFW for both Units One and Two simultaneously, a higher specified water volume must be maintained.

# SUMMARY SHEET

## TRACKING NUMBER:

2-89A-26

2-90A-30

## TITLE:

Containment Purge Isolation Valve Surveillance  
Containment Isolation Valve Table

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

## ASSIGNED TO:

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change deletes the containment isolation value Table from Tech Spec per Generic Letter 91-08.

Additionally, the change will discuss deletion of isolation time surveillance requirements for containment purge inlet and outlet isolation valves. The change also will discuss the allowance of preliminary adjustments of the containment purge isolation values when performing Appendix J, Type C leak tests. Based on CR-2-89-0012 Item 3 due 4/30/91 and CR-2-89-334 and CR-2-89-0046 Item 4 due 11/12/91.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-01

TITLE:

CST Volume

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

ANO-2 Technical Specification Section 3.7.1.3 requires a minimum CST Volume of 160,000 gallons. The corresponding Basis states that this volume is adequate for 1 hour at HOT STANDBY concurrent with a LOOP. However the Basis also states that each EFW pump will supply 485 gallons at 1100 psig. Two trains of EFW for 1 hour consumes about 1/3 of the CST volume. Therefore an inconsistency exists in the BASIS for this specification.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-05

TITLE:

Indefinite Bypass of PPS Channel

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/'92

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This proposed change to the ANO-2 Technical Specifications changes the amount of time that a channel may be left in the bypass condition from 48 hours to until the next Cold Shutdown. Currently the Technical Specification Action for an inoperable channel allows the channel to be bypassed for up to 48 hours, after which the channel must be placed in the tripped condition. This change will permit the inoperable channel to be bypassed until the next Cold Shutdown, when the channel must be repaired. A 2 out of 3 trip logic will be in effect when the channel is in bypass. This change will serve to reduce the potential for RPS or ESFAS trips on spurious trip signals on a second channel with one failed channel in the trip condition.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-09**

**TITLE:**

**120 Day RPS / ESFAS Testing**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO: IMS**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This change will extend the RPS / ESFAS testing frequency from 30 days to a 120 day staggered testing interval. This change is based on a Combustion Engineering Owners Group task, which has been completed.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-05

TITLE:

Containment Air Lock Doors

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 1

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The Technical Specifications require that if one air lock door is inoperable, the other door be closed. If the inner door is the inoperable door, access to that door to make repairs would have to be through the escape hatch through the reactor building to the door. Additionally, the current Tech Spec do not provide an appropriate action for an inoperable door interlock. Also Surveillance Requirement "a" is no longer an exemption to Appendix J, the note should be deleted.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-12

TITLE:

Containment Temperature and Pressure Limit

MANAGER'S PRIORITY:

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Figure 3.6-1 in the ANO-2 Tech Specs does not bound the present analysis for both the LOCA analysis and the peak containment calculations (DBA). The Bases for this TS may also need to be updated to reflect the effects of the LOCA analysis.

This change revises Figure 3.6-1 to limit the lower bounds of containment pressure to be consistent with the LOCA analysis.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-17**

**TITLE:**

**Revise Seismic Monitoring Table**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY:**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

The measurement range specified for the Triaxial Peak Accelerograph 2XR-8347 listed in table 3.3-7 is incorrect. The specified range should be .05-1.0g consistent with that of the other monitors in the table. Additionally, ANO-1 Technical Specifications are being revised to clarify the required ranges of seismic monitoring instrumentation. Reference CR-0-105-01.



**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-21**

**TITLE:**

**Main Feedwater Isolation Valve, Inoperability Time**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This proposed change adds a Tech Spec to limit the time a Main Feedwater Isolation Valve is inoperable.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-25

TITLE:

Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and  
Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Generic Letter 89-01 - Implementation of Programmatic Controls for RETS and  
Relocation of Procedural Details to ODCM  
ANO-1 TSCR is 1-91A-22

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-26**

**TITLE:**

**Removal of Component Lists from the Technical Specifications  
Delete Table 3.8-1**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 3/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Generic Letter 91-08 - Removal of Component Lists from the Technical Specifications. Delete Table 3.8-1  
ANO-1 TSCR is 1-91A-23

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-30A-C?**

**TITLE:**

**Bases Change - Boron Dilution**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 4/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This change is to correct a reference to the FSAR in the TS Bases discussion of boron dilution.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-08

TITLE:

ERV Block Valve Reference (Table 4.1-1)

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 4/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: IMS

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change is to clarify that a test of the ERV Block Valve indicator, rather than a calibration, is more appropriate for the surveillance required by Table 4.1-1 Item 49.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-07**

**TITLE:**

**Purge Valve Applicability**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 4/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

ANO-1 Tech Spec 3.23 Reactor Building Purge Valves requires the valves to be closed and the handswitch keys removed when TS 3.6.1 (Containment Integrity) is required. The prerequisites are temp. > 200°F, pressure > 300 psi and fuel in the core. Our NRC commitment is to maintain the valves closed and keys removed when > 200°. Our TS is inconsistent with our commitment. CR-1-89-577 Action 3 due 12/30/91 and QAP xxx tracking this change.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-28**

**TITLE:**

**RAS 2 Sets of 2 per Train**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 4/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Page 3/4 3-12 Section 6 requires "2 sets of 2 per train" under the Minimum Channels Operable and Total Number of Channels columns. This is incorrect as there is 1 set of manual trip pushbuttons.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-89A-29

TITLE:

Containment Net Free Volume Correction

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 6/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change corrects the value for "net free volume" given in ANO - 1 Technical Specification 5.2.1 to reflect the appropriate value.

The error was discovered during NDS review of some Reactor Building peak pressure calculations. This change was submitted to the SRC, and after further review was requested, an additional error was found. Final submittal is planned within the next few months.

CR-1-89-0322 Item 6 due 6/30/91



# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-20

TITLE:

Special Test Exception - Center CEA

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 6/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: IMS

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Quality Assurance Tech Spec Audit QAP-18D-90 contained the following finding:

"Surveillance Requirements 4.10.4.2 specifies monitoring linear heat rate (LHR) pursuant (to) the limits of T.S. 3.2.1 using the Incore Detector System (COLSS) during physics testing above 5% rated thermal power. Applicability of T.S. 3.2.1 is Mode 1 above 20% power. Also, the Incore Detector System is not considered operable below 20% power. (Reference ANO-89-2-00320 dated 4/28/89 "Response to AFR-769")"

Reactor Engineering provided the following response to AFR-917 (also applicable to AFR-769):

"Reactor Engineering recognizes that an apparent discrepancy exists in Surveillance Requirement 4.10.4.2 due to the unavailability of the incore detector system for monitoring linear heat rate below 20% power. However Reactor Engineering believes that further action on this tech spec. would provide no improvement in plant safety, performance or quality because tech spec. 3/4.10.4 is obsolete due to a change in startup testing methodology and has not been invoked in approximately seven years...."

The coefficient is now calculated using a predicted fuel temperature coefficient. ANO has not invoked this exception since 1983 and has no plans to return to this methodology.

Planned resolution will be to delete specification 3.10.4 and its associated surveillance requirements.

# SUMMARY SHEET

## TRACKING NUMBER:

1-89A-25

1-90A-26

1-91A-13

## TITLE:

Administrative Changes  
Radiological Environmental Typos  
Pressurizer Safety Valves Misnomer

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 5

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 8/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Shirley Bell / Julie Jacks

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

This change is to correct typographical and grammatical errors, and to provide consistency within the TS. A similar change was recently submitted for ANO-2.

Section 4.30.1.2.b - "plan effluents" should be "plant effluents."

Section 4.30.1.2.c - "required by table 4.29-1" should be "...Table 4.30-1". Table 4.30-1 contains sample locations required for milk or fresh leafy vegetable samples.

Quality Assurance Audit QAP-17B-91 provided the following as Recommendation R01 for Technical Specification 3.1.1.3:

"The LCO states 'With one pressurizer code safety **operable**, either restore the valve to operable status within 15 minutes or be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours.'  
The LCO should be revised to read 'With one pressurizer code safety **inoperable**, either restore the valve to operable status within 15 minutes or be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours.'

QA recommends revising the Technical Specification to reflect the intended meaning of the above LCO."

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-90A-22**

**TITLE:**

**Fuel Pool Figure 3.8.1**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 8/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Figure 3.8.1 (Spent Fuel Pool Arrangement) does not agree with the Safety Analysis Report Section 9.6.1.3 as to configuration. Correct the Tech Spec Figure to reflect the as-built configuration.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-27

TITLE:

Reactor Building Design Features

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 8/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: Shirley Bell

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

In the references section of Reactor Building Design Features, FSAR Section 5.2.5 is incorrectly listed as 5.1.5.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-33

TITLE:

Boric Acid Figure 3.2-1

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 10/1/92

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Quality Assurance Technical Specification audit QAP-17C-90 Recommendation R02 stated that a sentence in TS 3.2.1.2 states "this tank shall contain at least the equivalent of boric acid volume and concentration requirements of Figure 3.2-1 as boric acid solution with a temperature of at least 10° F above the crystallization temperature". TS Figure 3.2-1 does not specify ppm boron or ppm boric acid. QA recommends revising TS Figure 3.2-1 to specify ppm boron.

QAP-17C-90-R04

Recommendation

QA recommends an evaluation of Tech Spec LCO 3.2.1.3 be performed to determine if it is adequate to meet the objective of Tech Spec 3.2 or the letter of Tech Spec 3.2.1.

Response

A review of Tech Spec 3.2.1 has been conducted. Specification 3.2.1 requires that sources of boric acid and the ability to inject it into the RCS be established prior to exceeding 200° F and that they be maintained operable above cold shutdown. Specification 3.2.1.3 provides an action if the requirements are not met. The action requires placing the plant in hot shutdown if the required systems are not operable. To be consistent with other Specifications and the Babcock and Wilcox Standard Tech Specs, a further action should be added to place the plant in cold shutdown after a specified period of time.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-21

TITLE:

Basis for Radioactive Liquid Effluent Instrumentation

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 10/1/92

ASSIGNED TO: IMS

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Quality Assurance Tech Spec Audit QAP-18D-90 contained the following recommendation:

"QA recommends that the basis for tech spec. 3.4.3.3.10 be revised to delete the statement that alarm annunciation occurs if the instrument controls are not set in the operate mode. Also noted was a typographical error in the numerical labeling of bases 3.4.3.3.10. This label is not consistent with the other basis in that it does not have a slash after the first number (i.e. 3.4.3.10 instead of 3/4.3.3.10)."

# SUMMARY SHEET

## TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-26

2-91A-16

## TITLE:

Boration Rate

3.10.3 Special Test Exemption Typo

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 10/1/92

## ASSIGNED TO:

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

In the action statement of Technical Specification 3.9.1 The statement "continue boration at > 40 gpm of Keff ..." should read "continue boration at > 40 gpm of 2500 ppm boric acid solution or equivalent until Keff is reduced..."

The Special Test Exemption for Reactor Coolant Loops states the limitations of Specification 3.4.1 ... may be suspended under certain conditions. The correct reference is "3.4.1.1" vice "3.4.1".

Page 3/4 3-40a Typo Table 3.10-10

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-04**

**TITLE:**

**Instrumentation Table 3.5.1-1**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

QA Finding QAP-17D-90-F02 provides the following: Tech Spec Definition for degree of redundancy is the difference between the number of operable channels and the number of channels, when tripped, will cause an automatic system trip. There is an inconsistency between the definition and Table 3.5.1-1.



**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-34**

**TITLE:**

**ESFAS Response Times**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/92**

**ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Several ESFAS response times changes as listed in Table 3.3-5 have been recommended as a result of the work conducted in response to CR-2-88-0293. These response time changes have been evaluated in calculation 89E-0040-02.

# SUMMARY SHEET

## TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-03

2-91A-07

## TITLE:

Pressurizer and Steam Generator Variable Setpoints  
SG/PZR Variable Setpoint Values

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 12/1/92

## ASSIGNED TO:

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Provide a Technical Specification change to revise the variable setpoint increments for Pressurizer Pressure and Steam Generator Pressure. The desired increment is  $\leq 400$  psi. If this is not feasible, pursue a  $\leq 200$  psi plus tolerance. Variable setpoint are referred to in Tech Spec Table 3.3-4 Items (1) and (2), and Table 2.2-1 notes (2) and (3).

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-06**

**TITLE:**

**Peak Clad Temperature (Bases)**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 2/1/93**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

ANO-1 TS Bases for section 3.3 lists the peak clad temperature for accident conditions as 2300°F. The current standard is 2200°F. This is a Bases change. 50.59 for this change requested of Jay Miller.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-91A-01

TITLE:

Controlled Leakage Definition

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 2/1/93

ASSIGNED TO:

SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

In section 1.14a, Definitions, the term "CONTROLLED LEAKAGE" is written in capitol letters, suggesting that the term is a definition, however, the term is not defined in the Specifications. Recommend that this definition include RCP controlled bleedoff, letdown and reactor vessel head leakage.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-89A-23

TITLE:

Heat Balance Calibration

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The Power Range Channel Amplifiers are adjusted to agree with the core thermal power from 15 to 100% power with the primary and secondary heat balance weighted linearly. This change will cause the heat balance to be weighted linearly to 50% with only the secondary heat balance to be considered above 50% full power.

This change is to modify TS 1.5.6, the TS definition of heat balance calibration, to allow use of secondary calorimetric power calculation only above 50% power (instead of a combination of secondary and primary calculations) to increase the heat balance accuracy.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-12

TITLE:

Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

NRC Generic Letter 84-15 "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability" provided recommendations to reduce wear, extend the life and improve availability of the Emergency Diesels. In addition to certain programmatic changes such as prelubrication and warmup procedures, changes to the Technical Specifications were recommended to reduce engine stress and wear. Specifically these include reduction in cold fast starts and rapid loading.

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-90A-29

2-90A-33

### TITLE:

Snubbers - IST Program

### MANAGER'S PRIORITY:

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

### ASSIGNED TO:

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The Tech Spec program for Snubbers accomplishes the intent of ASME Code Section XI. The current Specification references Specification 4.0.5. There is an element of confusion if the Tech Spec surveillance is relied upon to accomplish Section XI requirements from an administrative viewpoint. Management of snubber testing is preferred to be the Snubber Engineer rather than the IST Engineer. This change clarifies that snubber surveillances are performed in accordance with TS in lieu of ASME Section XI requirements. Similar Unit 2 change is 2-90A-33.

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-05

TITLE:

Core Flood Tank Volume

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

A proposed Tech Spec change has been developed based on Engineering Calculation 90E-0018-01 through 03. This change will increase the present Tech Spec limit of an indicated variance of  $\pm 0.4$  feet to an absolute variance of  $+ -1$  feet. It should be noted that the upper bound is limited both by the analysis and by the actual level tap span of 14 feet.



## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-09

2-91A-11

### TITLE:

Gas Decay Tank Curie Content

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

### ASSIGNED TO:

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

In the process of resolving the issue of component classification for the Gaseous Radwaste Management System, the noble gas activity limit for the contents of one Gas Decay Tank of 300,000 Curies, as specified in the ANO-1 and ANO-2 Tech Spec Sections 3.25.2.5 and 3/4.11.2.6, respectively, was found to be excessive. Based on more recent calculations, a more appropriate value should be 78,782 ci for ANO-1 and 82,400 ci for ANO-2.

## SUMMARY SHEET

### TRACKING NUMBER:

1-91A-14

1-91A-15

### TITLE:

Reactor Building Integrity Timeclock  
Reactor Building Integrity When RCS is Open

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor

### SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

Quality Assurance Audit QAP-17G-91 provided the following as Recommendation R05 for Technical Specifications 3.6.1 and 3.6.6:

Specification 3.6.1 defines under what conditions reactor building integrity is required and has the following ACTION: "Without reactor building integrity, restore the integrity within one hour or be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours."

Specification 3.6.6 timeclock allows more time (48 hours) for component repair. QA recommends adding to the 3.6.1 ACTION the following words "except as allowed by 3.6.6 below."

Quality Assurance Audit QAP-17G-91 provided the following as Recommendation R01 for Technical Specification 3.6.2:

Tech Spec 3.6.2 requires reactor building integrity to be maintained when the reactor coolant system is open to the reactor building atmosphere and the requirements for a refueling shutdown are not met. Tech Spec Interpretation states that "reactor coolant system open to reactor building atmosphere" means "when the reactor vessel head is being removed or has been removed with fuel in the vessel."

It is not intended to impose refueling condition requirements (RCS boron and temperature) and integrity requirements whenever the RCS is in Cold Shutdown and open in some manner (steam generator or pressurizer manway removed). QA recommends revising the Tech Spec for clarity to remove the need for an interpretation.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-23**

**TITLE:**

**Removal of Component Lists from the Technical Specifications**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Generic Letter 91-08 - Removal of Component Lists from the Technical Specifications

ANO-2 12CR is 2-91A-26

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-28**

**2-91A-34**

**TITLE:**

**Emergency Cooling Pond Level With Opposite Unit Shutdown**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This change will add additional level and temperature requirements for the Emergency Cooling Pond when the Unit is operating and the opposite Unit is shutdown. Level and temperature will be less restrictive.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-29**

**TITLE:**

**Delete F.O.L. Completed Conditions**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Certain conditions for our operating license have been completed and are no longer required to be retained in the specifications. As a cleanup item these can be deleted.

Similar ANO-2 request is 2-91A-35.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-35**

**TITLE:**

**Delete F.O.L. Completed Conditions**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Certain conditions for our operating license have been completed and are no longer required to be retained in the specifications. As a cleanup item these can be deleted.

Similar ANO-1 request is 1-91A-29.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**1-91A-31**

**TITLE:**

**3.0.5 Bases (DG Outage Time)**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

The third paragraph of the Bases for TS 3.0.5 states "For example, Specification 3.7.2.c provides for a 2 day outage time ...". TS 3.7.2.c actually provides for a 7 day outage time.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-86A-23**

**TITLE:**

**Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO: IMS**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

The proposed change would revise the Surveillance Requirement for the temperature requirement for Control Room temperature. The current limit during surveillances is 84° F. The propose change would be consistent with design basis requirements.

See also 2-91A-02.



**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-08**

**TITLE:**

**Undervoltage Values for 4.16 kv Busses**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO: Curt Taylor**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

This change would revise the specification for 4.16 kv Busse undervoltage trip to provide a tolerance rather than a specified value.

CR-2-90-0150 Item 4 due

CR-2-89-0563 Item 3 due

# SUMMARY SHEET

TRACKING NUMBER:

2-90A-23

TITLE:

Leakage Detection Systems

MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2

PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94

ASSIGNED TO: Tom Scott

## SUMMARY OF CHANGE:

The proposed change removes ambiguity from the action requirements, clarifies the requirement that operation can continue with either the gaseous or particulate monitor in service, and allows operation for up to 30 days provided grab samples or an RCS inventory balance is performed once per 24 hours.

## STATUS

Draft to Dale 5/15. Discussed with BWOG RSTS Representative. Our approach is correct. Discussed with Dale. Need for conference with Tom and Dale.  
To Larry 6/20/91

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-90A-38**

**TITLE:**

**Fuel Handling Area Ventilation**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

The wording as it exists for the surveillance requirements of the fuel handling area ventilation system indicates that all the surveillances must be performed when irradiated fuel is in the storage pool, not "whenever irradiated fuel is being moved in the storage pool and during crane operation with loads over the storage pool" as stated in the applicability section of TS 3.9.11. The deletion of the requirement in TS 4.9.11.2.a.3 to flow rate test in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 is because in this standard the air flow capacity and distribution, test is for acceptance testing after completion of initial installation or after completion of initial installation or after major modification or major repairs, not for surveillance testing. This change is in response to CR-2-90-466 Item 4, responded to by Stan Sheffield and Cliff Eubanks.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-02**

**TITLE:**

**Emergency Chiller Starting Location**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 2**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Surveillance requirement 3.7.6.1 requires Unit 2 to be able to start the Control Room Emergency Chillers from the control room. When the chillers are aligned with services (service water and power) from ANO-1, they must be started locally from B64. It is desirable to change the Technical Specifications to allow the chillers to be operable and surveillance requirements satisfied in this configuration. See also 2-86A-23.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**

**2-91A-23**

**TITLE:**

**Valve Position Verification - Containment Spray System**

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY: 3**

**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE: 1/1/94**

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

The Containment Spray System Tech Spec (4.6.2.1.a.1) requires that each valve in the flow path is positioned to take suction from the RWT on a Containment Pressure High-high signal. Other similar required valve position verifications exclude the valves that are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position. The intent of this requirement is to verify each valve is correctly positioned so that in the event of a containment spray actuation, the system is properly aligned to the RWT.

**SUMMARY SHEET**

**TRACKING NUMBER:**  
2-91A-30

**TITLE:**  
Diesel Load Rejection

**MANAGER'S PRIORITY:** 2  
**PROJECTED SRC MEETING DATE:** 1/1/94

**ASSIGNED TO:**

**SUMMARY OF CHANGE:**

Based on calculation 85S-00002-01 Revision 3, the largest load tied to the diesel generator is 636.9 kW. Testing of the load rejection capability should be based on the largest load capable of being supplied by the diesel generator. This change is a result of a change in methodology used to calculate loading in which the service water pump efficiency was lowered from 100% to 92.5%. Current Tech Specs specify a value for load rejection of 596 kw.