Ukraine War

Mapping Ukraine’s counteroffensive

Timeline of the war

Six months after Ukraine launched its summer counteroffensive to take back Russian-occupied territory in the east of the country, Kyiv’s forces have made little progress in the face of entrenched Russian resistance.

Russia’s defensive line — the largest and most fortified in Europe since World War Two — ultimately held, and early prospects of a Ukrainian breakthrough that would sever the land bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea have faded.

With another winter stalemate approaching — if not a renewed Russian attack to take more of eastern Ukraine — these are some of the main factors that left Ukraine’s forces stuck at the front line.

1
Ukraine split its attack across the long front line

Western military advisors, especially from the United States, recommended Ukraine launch a concentrated offensive along the axis in Zaporizhzhia. Instead, Ukraine launched offensives across multiple axes.

At the heart of the Ukrainian counteroffensive was the Zaporizhzhia front, a battleground considered by military analysts the most direct path to split the Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine. Stretching 80 km (50 miles) from Orikhiv, winding through Tokmak, and meeting at Melitopol, this route aimed to cut off crucial Russian supply lines to Crimea.

Though Kyiv kept its ultimate goals for the counteroffensive close to its chest, in August, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy laid down a marker that Ukraine’s campaign would not stop until Crimea was freed from Russian occupation.

For many Western analysts, the key to that goal was breaking through to the supply lines that connected Crimea to Russia in Zaporizhzhia. But Ukraine’s forces were ultimately split between three axes of attack, including one as far north as Bakhmut in Donetsk, where Ukraine had to reinforce its own defences after Russia went on the attack in October.

2
Russia had time to prepare layered defences

The timing of Ukraine’s counteroffensive played a crucial role by allowing Russia time to fortify the front line, particularly in Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine waited months to begin its attack while training troops, shipping in Western arms and debating strategy. Throughout that crucial window, Russia had time to dig trenches and lay mines along strategic areas of the front.

Intelligence gathered from satellite imagery, analysed by Brady Africk of the American Enterprise Institute, uncovered a robust defence strategy. Speaking to Reuters, Africk described Russia's fortifications between the front line and Tokmak as dense and layered, featuring anti-vehicle ditches, obstacles, fighting positions, and strategically placed land mines within treelines and along key roads leading south into occupied Ukraine. Notably, the open, flat terrain in the region made it more difficult for Ukraine to move with any element of surprise.

The delay to Ukraine’s counteroffensive allowed Russia time to construct extensive fortifications and lay dense minefields, creating additional challenges for the counteroffensive, especially intense along the Zaporizhzhia axis.

3
Slow progress and insufficient manpower and arms

According to Africk, the Ukrainian army’s modest progress reflects the substantial density of fortifications in the region and the resources at their disposal. Despite six months of intense fighting, Ukraine managed just a 7.5-kilometer advance, reaching the village of Robotyne.

Russia’s defensive line consisted of layer upon layer of static barriers designed to impede tanks, intricate networks of trenches and tunnels, and strategically camouflaged batteries, tanks, and command posts. This multifaceted defence strategy created a formidable challenge for Ukrainian forces attempting to breach the front line. All of this was backed by a constant barrage of Russian artillery.

This graphic illustrates Russia's defensive line, consisting of layer upon layer of static barriers designed to impede tanks, intricate networks of trenches and tunnels, and strategically camouflaged batteries, tanks, and command posts.

The satellite images below vividly depict the aftermath of relentless shelling in the region. The landscape near Robotyne is pock-marked by craters.

While neither the Ukrainian nor the Russian armies have officially released casualty data, both sides have incurred significant losses in terms of manpower and resources. Russia pressed poorly trained convicts into “Storm-Z” punishment battalions to reinforce frontline troops, while Ukraine’s high-risk attacks against well-prepared defences with limited, battle-fatigued troops took a major toll on their forces and assets.

A satellite image over Robotyne reveals the territory gained during the Ukrainian counteroffensive, amounting to just 7.5 km over the course of six months.

4
Dense land mines under constant surveillance

Ahead of its troop positions along the front, Russian forces laid a formidable first line of defence: a dense layer of anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines.

Clearing paths through Russian mine fields became one of the costliest challenges of the counteroffensive, both in terms of time and men and machinery.

Ukraine employed Western mine-clearance vehicles and armoured columns of tanks and vehicles to traverse the hazardous terrain. But the army’s movements to clear paths through the mines unfolded under the watchful eye of surveillance drones operated by Russia’s new specialised drone units.

These drones meticulously observed the mine-clearance vehicles, feeding targeting information to artillery and attack helicopters. Evolving optical capabilities on the drones also meant they could see through traditional camouflage techniques such as smoke screens that would foil human observers.

As forward mine-clearing tanks and vehicles were targeted and destroyed, Ukrainian attack columns behind them got stuck in a kill zone for Russian artillery, unable to manoeuvre around destroyed vehicles without triggering yet more mines.

Ultimately, mine clearing was left to smaller, slow-moving units rather than larger attack groups to minimise their exposure to artillery.

This graphic explains how dense minefields have in effect halted the counteroffensive. Mine-clearing vehicles were detected by drones and subsequently destroyed, leaving the armored columns and ground units vulnerable.

Despite few breakthroughs along the front, Ukraine’s counteroffensive can claim some modest success.

The counteroffensive in Crimea, employing sea drones and targeted long-range missile strikes, forced Russia’s navy on the backfoot in the Black Sea, and a declassified U.S. intelligence report pointed to a cost for Russia’s armed forces of nearly 315,000 dead and wounded troops, or nearly 90% of the personnel it had when the conflict began.

Still, the ultimate aim of retaking land in occupied Ukraine failed to materialise, and Kyiv is now scrambling to secure more arms supplies from Western nations as the war drags on.

A senior military commander told Reuters that frontline troops were facing shortages of artillery shells and had scaled back some military operations because of a shortfall of foreign assistance.

This map illustrates the advancements and setbacks of the Ukrainian counteroffensive across the entire front line.

This map shows the path taken by the Russian mercenary group Wagner to Moscow during its rebellion.

Russian mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner forces returned to base after a 36-hour mutiny that saw mercenaries heading toward Moscow and the prospect of bloody confrontations with regular military defending the Russian capital.

A last-minute deal averted the immediate crisis, but the mutiny raised questions about the state of the Russian leadership and the prospect that the long war in Ukraine may be taking its toll on their grip on power at home. The apparent ease with which Prigozhin’s Wagner mercenary forces barrelled hundreds of kilometres towards Moscow from Russia’s south, facing little resistance, indicated that Russian reserve forces were so thin they struggled to respond to the threat.

These were the major figures in the biggest challenge to Russia’s military and political leadership in a generation:

Yevgeny Prigozhin
Yevgeny Prigozhin
Founder of Wagner mercenary organisation

Since entering the spotlight when his Wagner mercenary troops occupied the frontlines in the months-long fight to take the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut, Yevgeny Prigozhin — a one-time caterer — has frequently criticised Russia’s military leadership.

On Friday, after claiming that Russian troops had bombed and killed large numbers of Wagner soldiers, Prigozhin released audio messages in which he challenged the rationale for the war and said his fighters would “punish” those responsible. Within hours, Wagner fighters were streaming back across the border with Russia, had captured the military command hub in Rostov-on-Don, and were seen heading towards Moscow.

After a deal was struck late Saturday, Prigozhin declared the whole thing off, commanding his troops to return to their bases, while he decamped for exile in Belarus.

Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Putin
President of Russia

While Prigozhin singled out Russian top military brass, he carefully avoided criticising President Vladimir Putin. But the president made a national address to the Russian people on Saturday condemning the mutiny as a “stab in the back” and vowing to crush it. Putin has not commented publicly since then.

Sergei Shoigu
Sergei Shoigu
Russian Defence Minister

Prigozhin had for months openly accused defence minister Sergei Shoigu of rank incompetence and of denying Wagner ammunition and support. Speculation quickly spread on Russian social media channels after the deal was struck to end the Wagner mutiny that Prigozhin might have secured concessions including changes in the military leadership. But on Monday, Shoigu was shown speaking to officers in an undated video released by his ministry. It was his first appearance since the crisis.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser who remains close to the authorities, said the video was “a signal to everyone that Shoigu is in office and will probably remain defence minister now”.

Valery Gerasimov
Valery Gerasimov
Chief of the General Staff of Russian Armed Forces

Valery Gerasimov — whom Prigozhin had also accused of incompetence — is in direct command of Russia’s campaign in Ukraine. He rarely appears in public and has not been seen since the mutiny.

Aleksandr Lukashenko
Aleksandr Lukashenko
President of Belarus

Lukashenko became a surprise mediator to bring the crisis to an end after he brokered a deal between Prigozhin and Putin. On Saturday, he announced the deal would stop Wagner fighters streaming toward Moscow. In exchange, all charges would be dropped against Prigozhin and he would move to Belarus.

The fighting around Bakhmut continues. A month after Russian forces claimed to have taken the city after the longest and bloodiest battle of the war in Ukraine so far, Ukrainian forces have reported modest gains along the nearby frontline.

New analysis by Masae Analytics, a technology & strategy consulting firm, using satellite images and algorithm-based analysis, has measured the severity of the destruction in Bakhmut. The analysis measures damage to buildings, ranked from low to high levels of destruction and shows how broadly devastated the city has been after months of constant shelling and building-to-building combat.

The video shows a 3D model of the building footprint in western Bakhmut overlaid with videos and photos showing the destruction of many of those buildings since the assault on Bakhmut began.

Once a city of 70,000 people, Bakhmut is now mostly depopulated and a landscape of ruins. The most intense destruction can be seen in the western parts of the city, the last to fall under Russian control. The Ukrainian army withdrew slowly, fighting on every street. Nearly every building in this sector is marked by intense Russian bombardment.

This video combines Ukrainian drone footage with a 3D reconstruction of the western part of the city to depict the desolation in this last area seized by the Russians, now a scene of charred walls and broken glass.

Video journey through the devastated city of Bakhmut.

Moscow paid for its occupation of Bakhmut with close to 100,000 casualties. Some military analysts regard this battle as the bloodiest of the 21st century, often referring to it as a "meat grinder" and also say the city has no clear strategic value. Now, Ukraine is fighting to regain control over this ruined city, one of the key fronts in its counteroffensive.

Add a description of the graphic for screen readers. This is invisible on the page.

Last week, Ukraine began its long awaited counteroffensive against the Russian occupation in the east. While Ukraine’s army reported some initial victories and liberated a handful of occupied towns, the hardened Russian lines are still ahead of them.

About 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the frontline of the counteroffensive stands one of the largest defensive systems constructed in Europe since World War Two, according to analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Visible by satellite, the Russians’ fortified line stretches roughly 2,000 km, running from Russia’s border with Belarus to the Dnipro Delta. About 1,000 km of dense and layered lines are located in Ukrainian territory.

"Map of Ukraine showcasing the latest territorial situation under Russian occupation. Russia has built a 2,000-kilometre-long line of fortifications, of which 1,000 km lies within Ukraine."

Ukraine’s initial focus of the counteroffensive has been to cut through the centre of the Russian lines. The Ukrainians have broken through initial fighting positions along a broad part of the front but remain some distance from Russia’s main defensive line.

The counterattack has been focused in at least three areas so far:

Ukrainian soldiers have regained some territory along a broad part of the front, but they are still 15-20 km away from the main Russian defense line.

1

Ukrainian troops have made progress on the southern and northern flanks of Bakhmut, advancing about 300 metres each day, according to reports.

2

The biggest territorial gains for Ukraine have been near Velyka Novosilka. Ukrainian forces liberated a cluster of four villages, including two visited by Reuters: Velika Novosilka, Storozheve, Neskuchne and Makarivka.

3

Despite constant ground attacks, there have been limited territorial gains since the counteroffensive began in various cities located 20 km south of Orikhiv.

Russian defences are strategically designed to stymie any Ukrainian breakthrough into the Russian occupied territories and channel Ukrainian forces into areas where defenders have the advantage.

The defensive lines consist of layered networks of trenches, anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines, razor wire, earthen berms and dragon's teeth — concrete pyramids designed to obstruct the movement of main battle tanks and mechanised infantry.

One example of the layers of fortifications the Russians have constructed is on the outskirts of the occupied town of Mykhailivka, situated 25 km south of the frontline at Zaporizhzhia. Three distinct defensive lines and a three-sided position encircling the town await Ukraine’s forces here.

Ukrainian soldiers have regained some territory along a broad part of the front, but they are still 15-20 km away from the main Russian defence line.

In the more than 475 days since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, Ukrainians have endured near constant assault from devastating shelling along the front and missile and drone attacks striking cities far away from the battlefield. Despite an onslaught bigger than any in Europe since World War Two, Ukraine has survived. Kyiv hopes its next counterattack, supported by western weapons and training, can definitively turn the tide.

This is a brief history of what’s led to this moment where Ukraine hopes to decisively strike back:

Feb. — March 2022
Russia invades Ukraine

After months of Russian military buildup along Ukraine’s border and failed international efforts to defuse the growing threat, Moscow orders troops to invade Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022. The Russians stream in on three fronts, with a massive mechanised column in the north that threatens to overwhelm Kyiv.

April — Aug. 2022
Russia stalls outside Kyiv, withdraws to the east

Moscow’s forces stall on the outskirts of Kyiv and it abandons its northern assault, leaving behind evidence of atrocities against civilians in the capital’s surrounding towns. Ukrainians score a stinging victory after the Russian warship Moskva is sunk in the Black Sea. Russia consolidates its forces in the east.

Sept. — Nov. 2022
Ukraine’s lightning break-through

In early September, Ukrainian forces begin a “lightning counteroffensive” in the north and south. Russia acknowledges a section of its frontline has crumbled outside Kharkiv and retreats further east. In the south, Ukrainian forces push Moscow’s troops back across the Dnipro river, liberating the major southern city of Kherson.

Dec. ‘22 — May 2023
Russia resumes the offensive, gains little

After months on the back foot and much blame shifting in Moscow, Russia responds with an intense bombardment campaign, which Kyiv says targets energy infrastructure during the cold winter months. On the ground, the conflict settles into slow-grinding trench warfare. The city of Bakhmut becomes the site of the fiercest and bloodiest battles between Ukrainian defenders and waves of Russian mercenary fighters. Finally the city falls, but at a cost in lives that seems to far outweigh what little has been gained.

June 2023
Ukraine counterattacks

During the long winter, Russia has dug in, creating some of the longest and densest defensive lines seen in Europe since World War Two. But Ukraine has used the time, as well, to train new brigades on Western weapons, including advanced tanks and artillery. Kyiv is coy about goals for its much-anticipated counteroffensive, but analysts suggest the likeliest aim may be to cut the land bridge connecting Crimea to Russia and the occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk.