


EXCERPTED FROM

When Democracies
Choose War:
Politics, Public Opinion,
and the Marketplace of Ideas

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ISBN: 978-1-62637-646-5 hc



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

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Boulder, CO 80301 USA
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fax 303.444.0824

This excerpt was downloaded from the
Lynne Rienner Publishers website
www.rienner.com

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1

Democratic Wars of Choice and the Marketplace of Ideas

As the summer of 2002 wound to a close, speculation was rife across the country that Iraq would be the next target of the George W. Bush administration's war on terror. Prominent foreign policy experts from the president's own party, including former secretary of state James Baker and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, questioned the wisdom of going to war against Iraq in high-visibility venues.¹ Yet the White House remained mum on its plans, waiting until after Labor Day to launch a coordinated public relations campaign to build domestic support for a bellicose policy toward Saddam Hussein. Curiously, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card explained the delay in terms of marketing strategy, informing *New York Times* reporter Elisabeth Bumiller, "You don't introduce new products in August."² To even the most seasoned and sophisticated observers of US foreign policy, this must have seemed a rather crass remark, reflecting an attitude appropriate to marketing laundry detergent but not for national security affairs. In fact, Card's statement reveals a lot about how modern democracies justify and sustain so-called wars of choice and anticipates the central themes explored in this book. In short, the comment represents the culmination of efforts by leaders of democracies to persuade their citizens to embrace the decision to take up arms regardless of their reluctance, in the words of Immanuel Kant, to risk "all the calamities of war."

Card's reference intrigues because it strikes at the heart of theoretical and practical concerns regarding democracy and war. Inspired by Kant's argument that states in which citizens enjoy liberal rights would share a zone of peace, the proposition that democratic states do not wage war on fellow democracies has gathered significant empirical support and has become a regular feature of the rhetoric of political leaders.³ However, the degree to which democracy inhibits or promotes the use of force in the

more limited instance of democratic-democratic war, let alone in general, remains in dispute. Scholars searching for a satisfactory explanation for why democracies behave one way toward similarly constituted regimes while evincing no such restraint against other regime types have few untapped routes for empirical investigation. Wars between democracies, and even near misses, have been so rare that limited insight can be gained from further intensive consideration of such cases.⁴ To better understand the interaction of democracy and war, I propose examination of cases where the state does not face anything approaching an existential threat, making it incumbent on leaders to generate societal support for military action that for all intents and purposes is a choice.

In their study of the misapplication of the right-to-protect norm, Badeşcu and Weiss demonstrate how “backlash and contestation” can help “clarify the actual meaning and limits” of a norm, even in cases when the norm is not heeded.⁵ I use democratic wars of choice in a similar fashion to enlighten our understanding of the evolution of liberal constraints on the use of force. I ask whether these instances of democratic war provoke a domestic reaction that propels forward the adoption of norms restricting future democratic belligerent action.

Richard Haass has popularized the distinction between wars of necessity and wars of choice. A war of choice is one in which the survival of the state is not at risk, where decisionmakers opt for war as one of the possible means to achieve desirable but not core state goals.⁶ A war, according to Haass, “undertaken for reasons that do not involve obvious self-defense.”⁷ Democracies certainly engage in wars of choice; the question is whether and how democracy affects state behavior in these wars. Through close observation of democratic wars of choice, we may appreciate whether, as a consequence of the experience, democratic identity and liberal norms evolve to forestall such wars from the panoply of actions states identifying themselves as “liberal” do not commit.

Haass presents the decision to go to war as dichotomous—it’s either a choice or a necessity. Of course, there is some element of choice in almost all wars. Moreover, modern democracies seldom face existential threats. There may be instances when a democratic leader does not think the state faces a threat to its existence but nevertheless believes that he or she must go to war owing to political necessity, fearing that a failure to respond to the domestic political imperative of attacking the hated foe will put their political viability at risk. For example, although Spain posed no existential threat to the United States, domestic pressure arguably compelled President William McKinley to war in 1898. Were the leader to resist the siren calls to war in such circumstances, placing his or her own assessment of the national interest above political concerns, we would characterize their refusal as a profile in courage, reflecting a difficult choice, but a choice

nevertheless. Thus, even when war might seem a political necessity, there is an element of choice. Moreover, given the low levels of knowledge and awareness of foreign affairs among the public, it is extremely unlikely that pressure for war from ordinary citizens would emerge without elite encouragement and debate—precisely the mechanisms that regulate democratic involvement in war of interest in this study.

A concept used to describe the pressures faced by dictators in the developing world also may be applicable to leaders of democratic states. Steven David uses the term *omnibalancing* to refer to the need for dictators in what was then called the third world to placate potential domestic rivals even as they respond to the structural imperatives of the international system.⁸ No leader is immune from tending to their domestic flanks; the key point is that when the choice is war—no matter how narrow that choice may be—democratic systems afford many pathways for contrary voices to air their views. How actors in a democracy navigate these pathways when the subject is war forms the core focus of this research.

We therefore ought to think of wars as falling along a *choice continuum*, with a very narrow set of conflicts on one end of the spectrum being clearly of necessity, and at the other end would be those uses of force advocated by few other than those at the pinnacle of state power. Given the realities of democratic governance, the instruments of state power cannot be applied to any substantial degree or for very long without the acquiescence of society. Thus, in most cases, governing elites must expend effort bringing other institutions and the body politic to concur with their assessment that this perceived danger must be met with force. In those rare instances when political necessity may argue in favor of a use of force, hesitant leaders may endeavor to argue that in actuality war would be more of a choice than their constituents contend. In most cases, however, it is incumbent on a democratic leader to present the prospect of war as falling as close to the necessity side of this continuum as possible to secure the broad backing that makes battlefield success possible. To do so, the leader must *frame* the choice of war in terms that will resonate positively across society, reflecting the purposes for which the democratic audience believes wars should be fought. Or, in Card's language, sell the war to reluctant consumers hesitant to find war in the national interest or consonant with expected norms of liberal state behavior.

Theoretical Foundations

What is the connection between democratic war, democratic politics, and democratic norms? How do democratic officials reconcile their assessment of national security requirements with imperatives imposed by the political system? In short, what happens domestically when democracies choose

war? To address these questions, I integrate three areas of inquiry that for sake of scholarly convenience are normally kept separate.

First, I take my research question from democratic peace theory, which finds mixed evidence that liberal states are more peaceful than other regime types (the monadic proposition) and persuasive indications that they do not wage war against fellow democracies (the dyadic). Much democratic peace research over the past two decades or so seeks explanation for why democracies tend not to fight fellow democracies but engage in war against non-democratic opponents. By highlighting democratic wars against illiberal targets that do not pose an immediate threat, I aim to clarify why democracies fight some types of wars but not others. Can we explain why war between democracies has been rare, if not nonexistent, by examining the conditions that give rise to opposition to democratic wars of choice? In addressing this question, I seek a more nuanced understanding of the role of democracy and war than is currently provided by democratic peace research. I explain the variance in democratic behavior by highlighting normative debate about wars of choice in the democratic marketplace of ideas and exploring the role played by public opinion in rendering some forms of wars inappropriate for democracies to wage.

Second, I incorporate research on public opinion and foreign policy to provide guidance on the conditions under which public opinion becomes activated in foreign policy formulation. Basically, activation of public opinion occurs when debate among societal elites signals a challenge to the normative justification for a war of choice offered by leaders. I use newspaper coverage and other contemporaneous accounts as a representation of the marketplace of ideas and evaluate the degree of elite consensus through content analysis of the debate carried out in the national media.

Third, to evaluate how arguments over ideas affect the course of a war of choice and how this debate ultimately influences the evolution of democratic norms, I turn to constructivism, a mode of analysis that emphasizes the role of nonmaterial factors such as identity and norms on state behavior. In contrast to materialist approaches, such as realism and liberalism, that focus on power and wealth as the key motivating factors for state action, constructivism highlights how the determination of “appropriate” behavior constrains the policy choices available to officials. I evaluate how arguments presented by leaders in support of policy are challenged by elite and public debate, and I use constructivist analysis to interpret how this interaction constitutes the evolving position of society on the appropriateness of the use of force in a given context. In essence, when there is debate over a democratic war of choice in the marketplace of ideas, the conditions are ripe for the evolution of norms that define democratic identity and shape democratic behavior.

I bring these three strands of inquiry together to explore the debate in the democratic marketplace of ideas for five cases of democratic wars of

choice: the French effort to retain Indochina after World War II, Richard Nixon's effort to sustain US intervention in Vietnam from 1960 to 1973, Great Britain's war to retake the Falklands in 1982, Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and the decision to topple Saddam Hussein and its aftermath in Iraq in the early 2000s. To lay the foundation for my case studies, I use Card's metaphor as a segue to explore sequentially how the key themes relevant to this project from the literatures on democratic peace, public opinion and war, and the potency of norms come to a confluence when debate over war is engaged. I present my model of the relationship between wars of choice, democratic politics, and norms of liberal behavior. I complete this introductory chapter with a description of my research methodology and case format.

The Interaction of International Relations and Domestic Politics

By connecting the choice to go to war with the ensuing domestic debate over its wisdom, I follow in the footsteps of Robert Putnam, whose two-level diplomacy makes a start toward reconciling the security requirements of the external realm with the political constraints of the domestic. I advance Putnam's efforts at synthesis by focusing on how democracy shapes the interpretation and presentation of the security environment and consequently the resources available to leaders to pursue their security agendas. Putnam characterizes international diplomacy as a contest between chiefs of government (COGs) negotiating on the international plane, while these principals remain attentive to what their domestic counterparts are willing to ratify. The *win-set*, or range of acceptable negotiating outcomes, is forged by the interaction of the COG and his or her domestic audience, regardless of regime type.⁹ Scholarship on interstate rivalry offers another avenue of research that explores the link between domestic politics and international relations. Eric Cox examines how domestic politics may shape state action to ameliorate interstate rivalries. He finds that domestic or foreign policy failure may lead the public to turn to new leadership to seek an end to an ongoing conflict.¹⁰ Using a dynamic longitudinal approach, Diehl and Goertz confirm that joint democracies are very rarely rivals, and indicate that when former rivals become democracies, their hostility is likely to end.¹¹

Of course, for every democratic war of choice, the COG's job is to make the case that war is necessary. The opposition's task is to make the counterargument that the choice of war is unnecessary, imprudent, premature, or immoral. In a democracy, the clash among various individuals and institutions in the marketplace of ideas determines the size and characteristics of the win-set. Curiously, aside from Putnam and some others, this rela-

tionship, though not highlighted by scholars, is attended to assiduously by contemporary policymakers, as Card's remark made clear.¹²

By applying a marketing metaphor to a foreign policy issue, Card confessed to the realist-based conventional wisdom among academics and policymakers that the duty of leaders is to identify security threats, formulate a justification for resulting policy, and then expect domestic support to follow. Even so, his declaration resonates as an admission that the public must be coached to support the choice of war. Leaders of democracies are normally loath to admit considering public opinion when conducting foreign policy, since consulting polls on questions of national security violates the almost universally held realist value that officials act on the basis of the national interest, not domestic politics. This attitude was best expressed by a high-level State Department official who proclaimed in Bernard Cohen's 1973 classic, *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*: "To hell with public opinion. . . . We should lead, not follow."¹³ On this basis, Card's admission that the choice to go to war needed to be sold as does laundry detergent does not seem surprising. After all, being dismissive of the reasoning capacity of the public fits right in with the sentiment expressed by Cohen's respondent, as well as empirical evidence collected over the decades that reveals public opinion to be fairly uninformed about issues of international import.

While waiting until after Labor Day to ensure you have the attention of the domestic audience suggests a low regard for the public's ability to concentrate on issues of state, it is not an attitude that lacks basis in scholarly literature and standard practice. Nevertheless, Card's remark is striking because democratic officials tend to be sensitive about making comments that denigrate the reasoning capacity of constituents. But perhaps he wasn't being careless. Instead, his remark may be seen as a recognition of the need for leaders to respond, educate, and shape a public opinion that although not well informed, has structured attitudes that policymakers must skillfully tap into when legitimating the choice to go to war.

One also must wonder to what degree the Bush administration policy was shaped or constrained by the need to present "a new product" in the democratic marketplace of ideas. After all, Card's remark is an implicit acknowledgment that there are limits beyond which marketing techniques fail. Why else be concerned about the timing of the marketing campaign? Moreover, there must have been much consternation and debate in the White House over the content of the "new product" introduction. Supposedly, then, there are boundaries of democratic acceptance for wars of choice, and Card's metaphor refers to the Bush administration's efforts to find and test them. Is there a magic ingredient to a successful campaign to gain public support for a democratic war of choice?

The essence of democratic governance is that citizen preferences somehow flow to leaders and that policy, domestic or foreign, reflects the popu-

lar will. Yet the process through which public preferences and policy interact remains underexplored. If, as realists contend, the national security interest reflects an objective reality undifferentiated by regime type, the only contrast between democratic regimes and others will be found in the necessity to persuade a sometimes skeptical, usually gullible public of its importance, not in the leadership's decision to choose war. Thus, Card's reference to marketing strategy pays lip service to the need to build domestic support for foreign policy, while it nevertheless reinforces the realist notion that foreign policy flows from the top down. In trying to persuade the home audience to support a war of choice, are officials constrained by the liberal sensibilities of their constituents?

Persuading the home audience of the necessity for war may be an essential part of any state's road to belligerence. Surely democracies, unlike other political systems, are designed to provide a multiplicity of channels for domestic interests to influence policy. When the policy at issue is whether to go to war, the rationale offered by officials must be vetted in the marketplace of ideas. Importantly, in this arena the chief executive does not always win. Democratic leaders must be attentive to winning framing contests to assuage citizen reservations about risking blood, treasure, and their liberal identity. Democratic peace theory and other liberal approaches highlight the significance of internal politics to external policy but fall short of explaining the circumstances under which democracy constrains the use of force. I explore this theoretical and practical tension in the democratic marketplace of ideas, the crucible in which those in favor of a war of choice must make their appeal. I provide an overview of democratic peace research in the next section, focusing on the key theoretical gap left exposed in this literature.

The Democratic Peace

It began with a nugget of a finding. As students of international politics began to accumulate data in pursuit of a scientific understanding of the causes of war, they stumbled on a finding so potent that it has been lauded as among the most significant empirical determinations in political science: democracies do not fight other democracies.¹⁴ Even though there is scant evidence of a democracy warring on another democracy, scholarly consensus on the value or meaning of this historical observation remains elusive. Some skeptics practically ridicule the so-called dyadic peace as sophistry.¹⁵ Miriam Elman bemoans "the cantankerous narrow-mindedness exhibited by some of the participants in the debate."¹⁶ Critiques of the democratic peace finding explain the apparent absence of war among democracies as the product of realpolitik assessment of power balances,¹⁷ of common interests,¹⁸ or

of shared preferences.¹⁹ An alternative explanation of the democratic peace focuses on audience costs, which make democratic threats credible, thus causing adversaries to back down short of war, and democratic leaders reluctant to embark on risky foreign policies.²⁰ Some consider the democratic peace overdetermined, with multiple factors combining to account for the apparent absence of wars among democracies.²¹

If democracies do not fight other democracies but engage in many other forms of aggression against a range of targets, why is this the case? Advocates of the liberal peace identify democratic norms and institutions as the causal factors that explain why democracies are inhibited from engaging fellow democracies in war yet allow for democratic war against other regime types. According to this view, the liberal norm of peaceful conflict resolution along with the institutional checks and balances of democratic systems work in some undetermined combination to stop conflicts among democracies from escalating to war. Democracies thus belong to a community sharing the norm of live-and-let-live, so just as disputes within these states are resolved short of violence, so is the expectation—and the empirical reality—that disputes between democracies will not escalate to war.²²

If we accept that democracies do not wage war against other democracies, they still fight nondemocracies and use violent means short of war against all types of targets. Indeed, acts of liberal aggression in the form of armed intervention, covert penetration, colonialism, and the like provide ready examples to discredit anyone's vision of pacifistic democracies.²³ Nevertheless, the monadic variant of the democratic peace that democracy constrains state behavior has its adherents. For example, R. J. Rummel has been a leading proponent of the monadic proposition, presenting evidence in a series of essays that democratic or (as he calls them) libertarian states are less violent.²⁴ Elaborations of the monadic thesis include studies finding that democracies are less likely to join wars,²⁵ and democracies are more likely to resolve disputes at a lower rung on the conflict escalation ladder.²⁶ Over the past century democracies have proven less prone to domestic collective violence than nondemocracies.²⁷ In addition, democracies experiencing relative decline have been shown to adopt strategies other than preventive war to maintain their position in the international hierarchy.²⁸ Democracies have been found to be less likely to initiate crises, and established democracies with proportional representation systems are least likely to be involved in war.²⁹ Looking at the role of democracy on international affairs from a different perspective, Reiter and Stam conclude that democracies are more likely than other states to avoid initiating risky wars and to win the wars in which they engage because their leaders are accountable to their constituents.³⁰ Collectively these findings suggest that the interaction of liberal norms and democratic institutions combine to restrain democratic behavior in a range of circumstances. However, the conditions under which norms

become a factor in the deliberations of democratic institutions and thereby constrain the conduct of democracies in world affairs remain a puzzle.

Democratic Wars of Choice and the Marketplace of Ideas

Skeptics of democratic peace theory point to the selective application of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution, which does not prevent democracies from using force when it suits them, as well as the complicity (if not encouragement) of democratic institutions in promoting war, to discredit the leading causal mechanisms of the democratic peace.³¹ If the question of why democracies come to reject certain types of wars yet embrace others lies at the crux of the democratic peace controversy, weighing the relative significance of norms and institutional structures in producing the phenomenon has been the essence of scholarship among the theory's advocates.³² Russett considers the two "not fully separable in theory or in practice."³³ Clearly, both are essential; how they interact and reinforce each other requires further investigation.

It would be fair to assume that political structures, particularly popularly elected legislatures, provide meaningful insight into a society's norms.³⁴ Important case studies demonstrate that these factors affect the democratic peace. For example, Barbara Farnham finds that Franklin D. Roosevelt's evaluation of the threat posed by Adolf Hitler changed as Roosevelt came to view him as dismissive of democratic norms at Munich.³⁵ Meanwhile, a case study analysis of war between four mixed pairs of states by Miriam Fendius Elman concludes that different democratic institutional structures have varying impacts on decisions to use force.³⁶ Such intensive examination of democratic decisions to begin, continue, or end involvement in war can clarify our understanding of how democratic norms and institutions interact and shed light on the evolutionary process that narrows the range of appropriate democratic uses of force.

Democratic wars of choice become possible when officials succeed in arguing for the prudential necessity and normative legitimacy for using force in the marketplace of ideas. Whether through persuasive power, stealth, inadequacy of the political opposition, or rapid military success, democratic leaders intent on using force secure domestic support by appealing to the voters' interests and normative beliefs about the state's role in international politics. Democratic wars of choice become unpopular not just because official goals are more difficult to achieve than anticipated but because contestation over the war's purpose provides a normative basis for opposition to the war that resonates among citizens. Potentially, through a process of norm diffusion, these arguments become the root of a normative prohibition embraced by democracies in general.³⁷

Doyle argues that “liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes.”³⁸ If so, we would expect that democratic leaders articulate a liberal justification for wars of choice to their publics. Moreover, we would anticipate that as the war endures, a domestic debate will be enjoined to evaluate the official rationale for war in terms of liberal norms. Democratic objection could be raised on a multitude of grounds: cost in lives or treasure, prudence (“the wrong war at the wrong time against the wrong enemy” syndrome), or a rising dissonance in society as the perception grows that resources are being used to achieve ends that are anathema to state identity (e.g., intentionally inflicting massive civilian deaths). Of course, democracies fight wars that violate liberal norms of peaceful conflict resolution and the live and let live principle; norms are not a barrier to behavior. Rather, as Risse-Kappen asserts, “norms guide behavior in a probabilistic sense,” reminding us, “we do run red lights from time to time.”³⁹ Although critics may find a democratic war of choice problematic for any number of reasons, an indictment of the official definition of the problem that ostensibly necessitated the war brings to the forefront the question of whether state action is compatible with democratic identity. Once this critique gains traction in the marketplace of ideas, public support for continued sacrifice is likely to ebb.

To unpack the purported normative causal mechanism of the democratic peace, I spotlight the degree to which norms are contested during debate in the marketplace of ideas. Nye and Welch call for detailed case studies to tease out the causes of democratic peace, an especially valuable means for exploring causal mechanisms and generating more highly differentiated variables for further study.⁴⁰ For example, Risse-Kappen and Elman differentiate among democratic regime types, concluding that public opinion and leader autonomy vary according to institutional structure.⁴¹ By contrast, investigation into normative restraints on democratic uses of force lacks a temporal dimension. Using multiple methods, Rousseau finds that democratic structures are a significant factor in restraining democratic escalation against all regime types, but concludes that norms largely do not play a moderating role.⁴² He focuses on norms as reflected in the socialization of leaders, primarily the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. Although Rousseau incorporates an evolutionary institutional mechanism that allows him to trace the ability of competing centers of power to inhibit the choice for war at different stages of a conflict, norms remain static. Critics of democratic peace theory overlook the fact that democratic norms are not fixed. Indeed, research by Diehl, Goertz, and Balas confirms that norms against conquest and secession that emerged after 1945, along with the norm in favor of decolonization that took hold in the 1960s, have contributed to the greater peacefulness of post–World War II interstate politics.⁴³ To tease out how contestation over norms govern the use of force and how evolving norms enter domestic political debate, we need to look intensively at cases

of democratic war when official justifications for the use of force are subject to normative challenge and ask whether the home audience has become engaged in determining the outcome of this contest.

Citizen sensitivity to the material sacrifices that warfare demands fluctuates according to the stakes at hand.⁴⁴ Moreover, as I develop in the next section, democratic norms that inhibit the contemplation of force in certain contexts develop over time, often in response to a significant event.⁴⁵ Therefore, officials' freedom of maneuver to act without the check of democratic institutions, or the inhibitions presented by normative constraints, vary. This explains how democratic leaders in the past were able to engage in wars that from today's perspective seem incongruous with the assumptions of the democratic peace.

Scholarship on the marketplace of ideas emphasizes the ability of elites to hijack the foreign policy agenda or of officials to use their control over information and the like to silence debate.⁴⁶ In essence, by controlling the marketplace of ideas, policymakers are able to use force irrespective of the interests of the median voter, thereby mitigating (at least temporarily) any constraints imposed by democracy. Wars of choice present an opportunity to evaluate how the interaction of elites and public opinion in the marketplace of ideas shape the course of democratic intervention. As Gil Merom writes, the marketplace of ideas provides society with a means to oppose state policies "over expedient and moral issues that concern human life and dignity."⁴⁷ I open the window into democratic norm evolution by testing whether elite debate over the normative justification for war activates oppositional public opinion and in turn influences the development of democratic norms regarding the legitimate use of force. To develop my model, I consider next the role of norms in democratic peace research.

Norms and the Democratic Peace

Rationalist approaches like realism, liberalism, neorealism, and neoliberalism explain state behavior through the *logic of consequences*, that is, policies are assumed to reflect an assessment of state capabilities and interests. Constructivists, on the other hand, look to the *logic of appropriateness* to make sense of state actions that seem to confound rationalist explanation.⁴⁸ Ann Florini argues that "the realm of *conceivable* behavior in a given social structure is normatively determined and it is not as wide as the realm of behavior that is physically possible."⁴⁹ In this gray area where norms are uncertain or ambiguous, capability permits democratic leaders to choose war, following the probabilistic calculus to which Risse-Kappen refers.⁵⁰ In reaction, democracy affords others in the political system the opportunity to question such a choice. Indeed, the political process essential to liberal

identity ensures, as Doyle writes, that “nonliberal principles and interests will not become the norm in the formation of liberal foreign policy.”⁵¹

Here is where the concept of policy legitimacy, first introduced by Alexander George, can be helpful in untangling the nexus of international behavior, norms, and domestic politics. Policy legitimacy is conferred when others in the political system agree that the leader’s intended goals can be achieved and that the proposed course of action reflects national values.⁵² How, then, can a democratic leader best convey to society the cognitive (achievability) and normative (right) components of policy legitimacy? Not surprisingly, justifications for war, as Freedman puts it, “draw on normative arguments, on expectations about how governments should behave towards their own people, and on how human beings and states should behave towards each other.”⁵³ Laura Roselle develops this idea further, arguing that “national identity clearly shapes and often constrains the ways by which leader will seek to legitimize policies.”⁵⁴ Thus, when it comes to democratic wars of choice, the justification for the resort to arms offered by the COG may be contested on normative grounds in the marketplace of ideas.

When the state is engaged in (or openly contemplating the prospect of) a war of choice, society is provided the opportunity to chime in on the fit between state action and ascriptive norms. Social identity theory indicates that group membership encourages the adoption of common markers of identity and behavior. Belonging to the community of liberal democracies thereby fosters adherence to the norms that denote the unique features of the group.⁵⁵ As Finnemore and Sikkink write, following liberal norms is part of liberal state identity, something liberals “take pride in or from which they gain self-esteem.”⁵⁶ Thus, one would expect citizens of democracies to promote behaviors commensurate with the expectations of group identity and reject actions that are inappropriate in the estimation of the wider community.

Jeffrey Legro defines norms as “collective understandings of the proper behavior of actors.”⁵⁷ Norms are significant to state behavior because they affect the ability of leaders to persuade others to sacrifice on behalf of their agenda.⁵⁸ Thus officials in a democracy may promote foreign policy actions that are outside the scope of normatively acceptable behavior at a given point in time. As Russett notes, even the “norm that democracies should not fight each other seems to have developed only toward the end of the nineteenth century.”⁵⁹ Democracies did not emerge on this Earth with a disinclination to fight other democracies.⁶⁰ Rather, the democratic injunction against using military force against fellow democracies developed experientially. For instance, Stephen Rock’s case analysis of US-British relations from 1845 to 1930 suggests an evolution in their “special relationship” from one based on a mix of interest, Anglo-Saxonism, and democracy to one more firmly rooted in “shared liberal values and democratic institutions.”⁶¹

He finds that increasingly, democracy served as an impediment to war between the two states, “with the deepening of democracy in Britain and the growing awareness of that country’s democratic character in the United States.”⁶² Generalizing from Rock’s treatment, not only does the extent of democracy evolve in a given state (i.e., the scope of liberal rights and the breadth of the voting franchise), so does what a democratic state considers “appropriate” in its external relations.

Democratic states formerly engaged in a range of behaviors that ultimately became anathema in the eyes of those who would identify themselves as liberal democrats. Slavery, dueling, and wars against fellow democracies are types of activities that democracies now eschew.⁶³ Moreover, the democratic definition of *citizen* has evolved, as the definition of *human being* has been broadened to expand the range of victims that states consider worthy of humanitarian intervention.⁶⁴ Similarly, self-determination did not become a goal of statecraft until Woodrow Wilson introduced it during World War I.⁶⁵ Finally, as Bruce Russett points out, colonization and the normative right to rule are examples of past justifications for expansionary state policies that were once of unquestioned legitimacy but now are thought unseemly types of engagement for democratic states.⁶⁶ Somehow democratic military actions formerly considered appropriate become the subject of domestic political contention. The interaction between this contention and the event in question provides the spark that tips norm evolution forward.

If democratic norms evolve, what factors influence their content? I suggest that an examination of public opinion can provide useful insights into the evolution of norms.⁶⁷ To do so, we need to review the extant literature on public opinion and foreign policy. Democratic use of force against a target state becomes possible when the threat it poses is socially constructed as an imminent danger.⁶⁸ The process through which such a construction occurs requires mobilization of elites and persuasion of public opinion in the marketplace of ideas. Recent research in the area of public opinion and foreign policy provides the tools to evaluate this process.

Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace

Across the democratic peace literature, public opinion is often mentioned but rarely investigated. Contributors to the democratic peace debate offer a bifurcated view of public opinion: either it is a force that provokes reluctant leaders to war or it is a factor that encourages otherwise bellicose leaders to moderate their positions. For example, in her edited volume of case studies on the democratic peace, Elman concludes that a “cumulative finding of this book is that public opinion often is not a force for peace.”⁶⁹ In fact, she singles out public opinion along with undemocratic leadership as the main

sources of democratic aggression.⁷⁰ On the other side of the ledger, Rummel suggests that democratic wars are “usually precluded by the restraint of public opinion,” while Russett asserts that “democracies are constrained in going to war by the need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government.”⁷¹ Students of public opinion and foreign policy offer a more nuanced view of the impact of public opinion on state policy, with important implications for our understanding of the democratic peace.

Public opinion on foreign policy issues is seen by most analysts as uninformed yet based on underlying values, largely latent on many specific, narrow issues, but stable on policy direction.⁷² During the early stages of a foreign policy crisis, the public almost intuitively approves government action via the rally-round-the-flag effect.⁷³ Over the years, a number of factors have been identified as potential causes of the inevitable decline in popular support for war. John Mueller made an initial contribution to our understanding that the public may react rationally to real-world events when he first confirmed the notion of casualty sensitivity with his finding that support for war declined in correlation with the logarithm of the casualty rate.⁷⁴

The next generation of research on public opinion and war began to differentiate among the purposes behind an intervention. It was found that the public was more likely to support the use of force to prevent a potential rival from gaining an advantage or to stop the abuse of human rights than to intervene to shape the internal affairs of a target state.⁷⁵ Similarly, the stakes at hand in a use of force have been found to be a crucial determinant of public support.⁷⁶

More recently, the likelihood of success for use of force, along with its “rightness or wrongness,” has been identified as the key variables explaining the variance in public support for war.⁷⁷ In contrast, Berinsky attributes the public’s stance on war to partisan identification, finding individuals more likely to support uses of force initiated or sustained by presidents of their political party.⁷⁸ Other analysts have isolated the stage of the foreign policy making process as an important consideration in determining the significance of public opinion to decisionmakers.⁷⁹ Certainly, public officials rarely admit that their policies are driven by public opinion, yet they clearly pay attention to reading and influencing poll results.⁸⁰ Though much of the scholarship on the public opinion–foreign policy link has a US focus, research on other democratic systems confirm similar characteristics.⁸¹ Therefore, although the public lacks specific knowledge of issues having international import, public opinion does matter in the foreign policy making process.

A key public opinion issue relevant to the democratic peace literature concerns the factors that cause public opinion to become activated. There is some consensus in the literature that elite debate carried out in the media is

crucial.⁸² That is, public opinion only becomes a factor when there is open elite disagreement over policy. For example, Klarevas writes that “dis-sensus among leadership elites or reports of unsuccessful operational outcomes” can contribute to the erosion of public support for the use of force.⁸³ Otherwise, the public either pays little attention to policy or supports the government’s actions.

Leaders of democracies wishing to evade liberal constraints would certainly try to prevent activation of public opinion. As William LeoGrande found in his examination of congressional support for Reagan’s Nicaragua policy, officials were concerned with what public opinion might become.⁸⁴ Interestingly, Sebastian Rosato considers evidence of initial public support for democratic uses of force where there was no immediate threat to the national interest to be an indictment of the democratic peace claim that public opinion is a restraining factor. But he limits his attention to “public opinion early in a war since it is presumably this initial reaction that concerns policymakers the most,” a choice that happens to suit his thesis but fails to reflect a complete understanding of the public opinion–foreign policy nexus.⁸⁵ Democratic leaders may safely assume initial public support for the use of force given the rally-round-the-flag effect. Moreover, during the early stages of military engagement, the chief executive has unique advantages of information to shape debate.⁸⁶ At the same time, democratic uses of force are framed by leaders as upholding, not violating, liberal norms. Rosato’s critique, and that of much of the democratic peace literature, pro and con, eliminates democratic politics from the mix and ignores the implications of potential public opinion activation.

In her book on intervention, Finnemore reminds us that state interests are rarely obvious and declares that “much of politics is a struggle to define them.”⁸⁷ Democratic engagement in war is the result of an assessment that belligerence is dictated by the national interest. For constructivists, that interest reflects state identity. Ruggie encourages constructivists to investigate “the identities and interests of states and to show how they have been socially constructed.”⁸⁸ Accordingly, I highlight efforts of leaders to persuade the public that a war of choice serves the national interest and reflects national identity. Finnemore and Sikkink consider persuasion “central” to an understanding of “normative influence and change,” asserting that “persuasion is the process by which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective.”⁸⁹ Building on this literature, Marijke Breuning examines the role of individuals, or gatekeepers, in the process of normative change. She finds that those gatekeepers best able to “craft their message in such a way as to gain broad public support” and “navigate the peculiarities of the political institutions within which they function” are more likely to succeed at promoting normative change.⁹⁰

We ought to consider how public opinion and the effort to shape it are part and parcel of the process of threat perception and identity formation in democracies.⁹¹ As Farrell suggests, the dyadic peace “is the absence of war between states that *perceive themselves and each other* to be liberal democracies” (emphasis in original). By highlighting how “identity shapes the application of norms,” constructivism can untangle why democracies are less ready to fight certain types of wars than others.⁹²

Democratic political systems are intended to reflect a broad conception of what state interest is. Democracies are also designed to allow widespread input into defining their identity. Enthusiasts for the democratic peace should embrace the idea that state behavior is a product of the interaction of societal actors, a concept best expressed in Andrew Moravcsik’s comprehensive liberal theory of preferences: “the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical ‘transmission belt’ by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.”⁹³ Public opinion is an understudied component of the “transmission belt” of the democratic peace. If we can tap into how public opinion influences democratic behavior in war, we may gain a fuller understanding of the promises and shortcomings of democratic peace research. The first step in doing so requires familiarity with a thorny concept from the political communication literature—framing, for this is how the purposes for war are presented by leaders, debated by elites in the marketplace of ideas, and processed by the public that the success or failure of a war of choice is determined.

Framing Effects

According to Robert Entman, framing is the process of “*selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution*” (emphasis in original).⁹⁴ Entman emphasizes that when there is “cultural congruence” between how an administration characterizes its policies and society’s cognitive map of how the world works, public approval will be more likely. Finnemore and Sikkink’s observations are consistent with Entman’s, noting that those seeking to establish norms succeed when “the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”⁹⁵ Similarly, Crawford links frames to arguments over identity, explaining that one representation of a matter at hand dominates by “claiming that specific behaviors are associated with certain identities.” She cites the

claim of a French legislator during parliamentary debate in 1930 as an example of an “identity argument”: “France will be a great colonizing power, or it will cease to be France.”⁹⁶ How does this relate to the democratic peace debate? Advocates of using force in a democracy must win a domestic contest in the marketplace of ideas over the legitimacy and efficacy of going to war. As Entman argues: “Democratic politics is all about convincing others to see things as you do, so that they will support your goals. That means conveying ideas and framing choices in ways that make your side of the story seem the most persuasive.”⁹⁷

Entman brings together various strands in the public opinion and foreign policy literature that can help explain why citizens in a democracy may turn against certain types of war aims. He goes beyond the role of elite debate in activating public opinion against a use of force to incorporate the way government officials and elites frame the particular policy. For example, he contrasts official statements and media coverage of the downing of KAL 007 by the Soviet Union in 1982 and the 1988 destruction of an Iranian civilian Airbus by the USS *Vincennes*, strikingly similar events that received starkly different media coverage and consequently public reaction. The former was portrayed by US officials as a knowing, deliberate act of barbarism, whereas the latter was attributed to technological failure and human error. Because this official story line meshed with the experience of US news consumers, no widely accessible counterframe could penetrate the media. If an alternative news narrative were offered, it would not resonate with the pre-existing schemas of the public that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire” and the United States a benevolent force for good in the world.

As Entman proposes, there is a set of beliefs and experiences that make up an individual’s schema, or the “networks of linked ideas and feelings that provide people their major templates for interpreting foreign policy.”⁹⁸ Citizens in a democracy have a sense of what types of state behavior are proper given their country’s history and the values inculcated by society. This is not to say that any foreign policy action taken by a democratic state passes through an evaluative rubric for each citizen. Rather, foreign policy decisions of sufficient moment to generate treatment in the marketplace of ideas have the potential to trigger responses in citizens ratifying or questioning the appropriateness of state action.

Therefore, wars of choice conducted by democracies must reflect more than just the national interest as conceived by leaders; the official framing of the rationale for using force must resonate in the collective schemas of the public. To minimize the likelihood of public opinion activation, the government’s aim is to present the war as being as close to the necessity end of the choice continuum as possible. If this is accomplished, any resulting debate will be conducted on security grounds, where officials can use claims of unique expertise to dominate the marketplace of ideas, rather than

on prudence or values, where the bar to effective participation is lower. Successful framing of a choice of war as a security necessity tends to quiet opposition as vulnerability and threat are habitual, ready schemas to be tapped by authorities. There are other reasons for justifying a war of choice, however, and though farther from the pole of necessity, in such instances it becomes imperative for leaders to frame the use of force in terms resonant with citizens' experience and expectations of what is appropriate. Of course, in presenting a justification for war, there is what Baum and Potter call "the elasticity of reality," demarcating "the range within which events can be spun, or framed" before provoking a hostile public reaction.⁹⁹ When the official framing of an intervention is incongruent with the schemas held by the public, other elites may offer an alternative definition of the problem at hand and the remedy chosen. When democratic military interventions evoke such a counterframe, or a presentation and/or organization of events that is plausible and runs contrary to the official frame, the legitimacy of the war of choice is undermined and the underlying normative basis for such democratic wars becomes suspect.


An Integrated Model of Democratic Politics and Wars of Choice

The degree to which a war is more of a choice than a necessity is a normative question rather than an empirical one. A democratic COG presents their justification for going to war, often in the form of a major address to the nation marking a change in policy, which, as Hallin notes, is usually accompanied by a "public relations blitz."¹⁰⁰ When elites respond with a counterframe of the war's rationale that is culturally congruent with societal expectations and gets covered in the nation's news media, the goals or win-set of the COG become constrained by the resulting domestic political pressure.¹⁰¹ Such an alternate description of the nature of the problem faced and/or the best solution to it—what, borrowing from Entman,¹⁰² I refer to as the "problem definition"—imperils a democratic leader's effort as domestic politics renders the range of objectives set by the COG unobtainable. Moreover, to advance his or her objectives in the face of mounting opposition at home, the COG may approve high-risk military moves to salvage these goals before democratic institutions impose limitations on the scope of the war. In this sense, two-level diplomacy is *reversed* as the COG gambles that a bold move on the foreign battlefield can forestall the success of their adversaries in the domestic political arena.¹⁰³

In Figure 1.1 I present my model of democratic politics and war. Crucial is the media coverage of elite debate, which may follow from the COG's intention to choose war. What matters most here is the extent to

which frame contestation appears in the coverage. If opponents articulate a counterframe to that proffered by the COG that is congruent with national experience and liberal norms, I expect activation of oppositional public opinion, which in turn will threaten the ability of leaders to continue the war. Using news coverage and other indicators of elite debate, I determine whether opposition to official policy is offered on normative or policy grounds. In essence, the official problem definition provides a rationale for why the threat faced must be met by force, with this remedy justified as being consistent with prevailing norms and national identity. Critiques may also be framed in terms of policy (i.e., are the tactics suited to the task at hand?), or if expected procedures have been used by leadership to reach and implement the choice of war (e.g., has the legislature been properly consulted, or have the appropriate multilateral institutions been brought on board?). I catalog the extent and sources of opposition to state policy in terms of these frames and chart the reaction of public opinion. Finally, I assess whether policy changes as a result and/or if the justification for policy comes to reflect the normative arguments of dissenters.

Figure 1.1 A Model of Public Opinion Activation and Normative Change



Case Selection

According to some commentators on the US legal system, a district attorney could easily persuade a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich. While it might be tempting to consider this an apt metaphor for the relationship between democratic COGs and war, leaders advocating the use of force in democracies face varying constraints on their ability to choose and prosecute successfully such military actions. Unlike the grand jury with the apocryphal lunch order-turned-defendant, I hypothesize that leaders of democracies sometimes lose the contest in the marketplace of ideas over a war of choice because society does not accept its placement as being as “necessary” as leaders claim or find the use of force in the circumstances at hand inconsistent with the state’s liberal identity.

My examination of democratic wars of choice begins with the French effort to reclaim Indochina. This case provides foundational material essential for understanding how norms of democratic appropriateness emerged in the post-World War II period. In several respects France was itself a nascent democracy at the time, with women having just won the vote and the media becoming more open during the period under scrutiny.

Then I highlight the Nixon phase of the Vietnam War, when two conditions important for this analysis obtained. First, the marriage of public opinion polling and public relations strategy came to the fore during this time, making it the first “modern” media-managed war.¹⁰⁴ Second, when Nixon shifted the goal of US participation to the achievement of honor, Vietnam arguably became a war of choice. Previously, though the survival of the United States was not at stake, the rhetoric of containment had created a situation where the collapse of South Vietnam to communism was portrayed widely as an existential threat to the anticommunist coalition. At the same time, the marketplace of ideas became enlivened with opposition to state policy from Congress and other elites as the media presented the war throughout this phase as an issue of legitimate controversy.¹⁰⁵

I turn next to the British endeavor to retake the Falkland Islands following Argentina’s 1982 invasion. This case provides an interesting contrast to the French effort in Indochina, insofar as the British did not invoke a colonial claim at all but accused the Argentines of violating the self-determination of the Falklanders. Israel’s 1982 war in Lebanon, ostensibly to address the threat posed by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) rocket and artillery fire, comes next. Prime Minister Menachem Begin framed the war in terms of security but also emphasized the opportunities presented by unfolding developments on the battlefield that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) could not but exploit. Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon brought an expansive vision of what the IDF could achieve for the state’s security interests by routing the PLO from Lebanon. What began as a rela-

tively modest effort to clear out the PLO from a forty-kilometer strip north of the Israeli border became a wider conflict involving Syria, the siege of Beirut, and profound moral questioning in Israeli society about the purposes for which state power should be used.

The Falklands and Lebanon cases were examined as separate chapters in an edited volume on the democratic peace.¹⁰⁶ However, these treatments were not comparative. Although these two states differ in terms of democratic regime type, these are surely two closely matched democracies in terms of capability facing nonexistential threats. In the British case, support for the government's war aims never wavered, whereas in the other, intense domestic contention compelled the curtailment of the Israeli government's ambition. Thus, we have two cases with different outcomes, with domestic opposition emerging in one and not the other.

For my final case I consider the US war in Iraq beginning in March 2003. The persistence of US involvement in Iraq despite public opposition, a change in party control in Congress, and a blue-ribbon commission advocating disengagement makes this case an important test of any theory purporting democratic influence over wars of choice.

There are clear limitations regarding which cases of democratic war are available for research. First, with a total of only thirty-eight interstate wars listed in the latest iteration of the Correlates of War (COW) database for the 1945–2003 interval, there are few mixed dyads including a democracy.¹⁰⁷ Second, because my analysis centers on the independent variables of elite debate and media coverage, the need for language fluency limits the purview of potential cases. Third, the war of choice under study has to generate sustained media coverage, otherwise there would be nothing to analyze. While not the only post–World War II cases that fit these criteria, the five I examine will help unpack the causal processes where threat perception, liberal norms, and democratic politics interact to constrain wars of choice. By selecting democratic wars of choice with some variation in the result, we can best see the degree to which my independent variables of institutional structure, the framing of elite debate, and media coverage factored in producing each outcome.¹⁰⁸ In doing so, I respond to George and Bennett's call for more "research on the interactions between leaders and publics" in what they refer to as the "interdemocratic peace."¹⁰⁹

The five cases break down into two categorical types: Type 1 are wars of relatively short duration where the initial, declared strategic objective remains unchanged, although the tactics are altered to fit domestically imposed constraints. The Falklands and Lebanon wars fit this category. Type 2 wars are of enduring intensity, where the strategic objective is altered in response to domestically imposed limits. Furthermore, tactics are adjusted in an attempt to mitigate the impact of domestic constraints. The two Vietnam cases and Iraq fit this category.

Owing to the relatively sparse debate conducted in French media outlets during most of its war in Indochina, newspaper articles are not subject to systematic content analysis. Instead, I characterize the marketplace of ideas by examining elite debate reflected in party and parliamentary politics. Otherwise, I use coverage of the wars of choice in the leading national newspapers as a surrogate for the marketplace of ideas. Newspaper articles for Type 1 cases were coded at regular intervals, beginning just before the start of the wars and ending near the conclusion of hostilities in the Falklands, and when a truce brokered by the United States allowing for the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon was reached (August 19, 1982).¹¹⁰ For Type 2 cases I reviewed a week's coverage during periods of significant political developments in the wars. For both of these wars, I examine news coverage during times when more intensive treatment in the marketplace of ideas is expected.

Each case begins with my description of the official explanation for the war of choice. Next I evaluate how each fits the criteria for a war of choice, consider the unique features of each political structure, and discuss how the case relates to the study of democracy and war. I then examine the evidence from the content analysis. These data inform my presentation of public opinion polling regarding each war. Finally I examine the debate over the war and how that affects state behavior as the war continues and in its aftermath. Although my findings regarding the implication of these developments on democratic norms must remain speculative, I suggest we can tease out the emergence or refinement of democratic norms of international behavior from these examples and make a contribution to our understanding of the evolution of democratic peace.

Notes

1. For example, Scowcroft argued against an invasion of Iraq in an appearance on *Face the Nation* (CBS News, August 4, 2002) and penned an opinion piece, "Don't Attack Saddam," *Wall Street Journal*, August 15, 2002; James Baker, "The Right Way to Change a Regime," *New York Times*, August 25, 2002.

2. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Traces of Terror: The Strategy; Bush Aides Set Strategy to Sell Policy on Iraq," *New York Times*, September 7, 2002.

3. I use *democratic* and *liberal* interchangeably throughout this book.

4. Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security*, 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994): 5–49.

5. Cristina G. Badescu and Thomas G. Weiss, "Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?," *International Studies Perspectives*, 11, no. 4 (November 2010): 354–374; 369.

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7. Richard N. Haass, "Wars of Choice," *Washington Post*, November 23, 2003, p. B07.

8. Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
9. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427–460.
10. Eric W. Cox, *Why Enduring Rivalries Do—or Don't—End* (Boulder, CO: First-Forum Press, 2010).
11. Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
12. See the discussion of the lack of exploration of internal-external interaction in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
13. Bernard Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), 62.
14. Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 662; Steve Chan, "In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise," *Security Studies*, 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/1999–Spring 1999): 60; Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing A Separate Peace: Constructivism, Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," *Security Studies*, 8, no. 2/3 (Winter 1998/1999–Spring 1999): 94–144, 143; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1, no. 4 (1995): 491–517, 494.
15. Christopher Layne, "Lord Palmerston and the Triumph of Realism: Anglo-French Relations, 1830–48," in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 61–100.
16. Miriam Fendius Elman, "The Never-Ending Story: Democracy and Peace," *International Studies Review*, 1, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 87–103, 103.
17. Layne, "Kant or Cant."
18. Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Politics and Peace," *International Security*, 20, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 123–146; Joanne Gowa, "Democratic States and International Disputes," *International Organization*, 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 511–522. Also, Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger, "Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 171–185.
19. Erik Gartzke, "Preferences and the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 191–212; Erik Gartzke, "Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace," *American Journal of Political Science*, 42, no. 1 (January 1998): 1–27. Alternatively, Michael Mousseau, "The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It's the Economy," *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 186–197, attributes the absence of war not to democracy but to shared "contract-intensive" economies.
20. Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For an application of the audience cost hypothesis to democracies with varying institutional structures, see Philip B. K. Potter and Matthew A. Baum, "Looking for Audience Costs in All the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access and Democratic Constraint," *Journal of Politics*, 76, no. 1 (January 2014): 167–181.
21. For example, Farber and Gowa, "Politics and Peace."
22. Stalwart defense of the theory is offered by Allan Dafoe, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace: Weighing the Evidence and Cautious Inferences," *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 201–214, and James

Lee Ray, "War on the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 198–200.

23. Michael Poznansky advances an argument that covert operations may be consistent with democratic peace theory in "Stasis or Decay? Reconciling Covert War and the Democratic Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 59, no. 4 (2015): 815–826.

24. R. J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 27–71. James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 13–18, offers an extensive discussion of the corpus of Rummel's work.

25. Stuart A. Bremer, "Are Democracies Less Likely to Join Wars?," paper presented at the 1992 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3–6, 1992; Stuart A. Bremer, "'Dangerous Dyads' Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 36, no. 2 (June 1992): 309–341.

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30. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

31. For example, see Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 97, no. 4 (November 2003): 585–602.

32. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 40–42; Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 124. John M. Owen IV, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 90–91, notes that empirical tests yield no clear winner in this debate; see also, Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War*, 17–19.

33. Russett, *Grasping*, 119; Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, 30 and 37; and Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 90.

34. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 209.

35. Barbara Farnham, "The Theory of Democratic Peace and Threat Perception," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, no. 3 (September 2003): 395–415.

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38. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151–1169, 1160.

39. Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies?," 504.

40. Joseph S. Nye Jr. and David A. Welch, *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation*, 8th ed. (Boston: Longman, 2011), 62; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 21.

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50. Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies?," 504. Also, Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 294, notes that norm violation may occur when there is room for interpretation.

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55. Rose McDermott, “Psychological Approaches to Identity: Experimentation and Application,” in Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, eds., *Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 345–367, 347–349. Also, Jodie Anstee, “Norms and the Management of Identities: The Case for Engagement Between Constructivism and the Social Identity Approach,” in Vaughn Shannon and Paul Kowert, eds., *Psychology and Constructivism in International Relations: An Ideational Alliance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 76–91.

56. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 904.

57. Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” *International Organization*, 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 31–63, 33.

58. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 136.

59. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 5.

60. Charles Lipson, *How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 43. Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies?,” 508.

61. Stephen R. Rock, “Anglo-US Relations, 1845–1930: Did Shared Liberal Values and Democratic Institutions Keep the Peace?,” in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 101–149, 147.

62. Rock, “Anglo-US Relations, 1845–1930,” 147. Also see Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War* on elite perceptions.

63. John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Robert H. Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 111–138; James Lee Ray, “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War,” *International Organization*, 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 405–440. Chaim D. Kaufman and Robert A. Pape, “Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade,” *International Organization*, 53, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 631–668 argue that the vagaries of domestic coalition politics permitted a “saintly logroll” of “a parochial religious movement that held particular beliefs and identified slavery as one of a set of interconnected evils for which England would face divine punishment if left uncorrected” (643).

64. See Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153–185; and Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*.

65. See Neta C. Crawford, “Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices, Arguments, and Beliefs,” in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., *Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention* (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993), 37–61.

66. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 35. Also see Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 111–138; Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

67. Finnemore suggests exploring public opinion and media as possible mechanisms by which "norms are created, changed, and exercise their influence," in Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," 185.

68. Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies?," 503 and 507.

69. Miriam Fendius Elman, "Testing the Democratic Peace Theory," in Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 473–506, 487.

70. Elman, "Testing the Democratic Peace Theory," 486.

71. Rummel, quoted in Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, p. 15; Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, 38.

72. For reviews of this rather substantial literature, see Ole R. Holsti, *American Public Opinion on the Iraq War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011); Holsti, *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004); Richard Sobel, *The Impact of Public Opinion on US Foreign Policy Since Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus," *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, Supplement 1 (May 1998): 29–62; Louis Klarevas, "The 'Essential Domino' of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of Force," *International Studies Perspectives*, 3, no. 4 (November 2002): 417–437. Three prominent recent examinations of the public opinion–foreign policy link include Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Adam J. Berinsky, *In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).

73. Matthew A. Baum, "The Constituent Foundations of the 'Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon,'" *International Studies Quarterly*, 46, no. 2 (June 2002): 263–298.

74. John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973); John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); John Mueller, "The Iraq Syndrome," *Foreign Affairs*, 84, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 44–54; Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, no. 3 (June 1998): 278–300.

75. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, no. 3 (August 1998): 395–417; Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Force," *International Studies Quarterly*, 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 49–74; Klarevas, "The 'Essential Domino' of Military Operations."

76. Larson and Savych, *American Public Support for US Military Operations*.

77. Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, "Success Matters"; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War*.

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80. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, "Who Leads and Who Follows? US Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy," in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia, eds., *Decisionmaking in a Glass House* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 223–245; Andrew Z. Katz, "Public Opinion and the Contradictions of Jimmy Carter's Foreign Policy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 30, no. 4 (December 2000): 662–687; Andrew Z. Katz, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Administration and the Pursuit of Peace with Honor In Vietnam," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 27, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 496–513; Shoon Kathleen Murray and Peter Howard, "Variation in White House Polling Operations Carter to Clinton," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 527–558. On misreading opinion, Steven Kull and I. M. Destler, *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

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93. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization*, 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513–553, 518.
94. Entman, *Projections of Power*, 5.
95. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 897.
96. Crawford, *Argument and Change*, 25; Léon Archimbaud quoted in Rudolf von Albertini, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919–1960* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 265.
97. Entman, *Projections of Power*, 147.
98. Entman, *Projections of Power*, 147–148.
99. Matthew A. Baum, and Philip B. K. Potter, "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11 (2008): 39–65, 56.
100. Daniel C. Hallin, *The "Uncensored War": The Media and the Vietnam War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 184. Research on the efforts of recent US presidents shows the limits of this tactic; Jeffrey S. Peake and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, "The Agenda-Setting Impact of Major Presidential Addresses," *Political Communication*, 25, no. 2 (April 2008): 113–137.
101. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."
102. Entman, *Projections of Power*, 6, *passim*. Indeed, my analytic framework closely follows Entman's work.
103. In Putnam's formulation, negotiators on the international plane can only agree to terms that will be accepted at home, so domestic politics circumscribes international diplomacy. Here, the COG seeks to use coercion abroad to preempt a narrowing of options from being imposed on the home front.
104. Katz, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy"; Diane J. Heith, "Staffing the White House Public Opinion Apparatus: 1969–1988," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 62, no. 2 (August 1998): 165–189; Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "The Rise of Presidential Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 59, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 163–195.
105. This is not to say that opposition did not surface until Nixon's inauguration. However, as Hallin, *The "Uncensored War,"* 162 writes: "by 1968, the establishment itself—and the nation as a whole—was so divided over the war that the media naturally took a far more skeptical stance toward administration policy than in the early years: Vietnam, in other words, entered the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy."
106. Lawrence Freedman, "How Did the Democratic Process Affect Britain's Decision to Reoccupy the Falklands?," 235–266, and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Israel's Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Regime Change and War Decisions," 301–334, both in

Miriam Fendius Elman, ed., *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

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108. Laura Roselle and Sharon Spray, *Research and Writing in International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Longman, 2012), 36; George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 80.

109. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development*, 58.

110. See the Appendix for coding protocol.