Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and other party elders decided to use troops to crack down. On June 3-4, PLA
soldiers fought their way into the square, attacked the students, and killed an
unknown number of them as well as other Beijing residents. 42 The tragedy of
Tiananmen stunned the entire world.
the rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow ensured that
the tragedy of Tiananmen would be widely covered by the international
media. Gorbachev's official visit to Beijing had attracted extensive media
attention. In addition to reporting on the Sino-Soviet summit, however,
several hundred reporters covered the standoff between the students and
the government, as well as the bloody crackdown on June 3-4. When millions
of viewers in different parts of the world saw on television a young Chinese
man standing in front ofa moving tank to stop its advance, they were shocked.
This was a defining moment for the fall of international Communism.
In China, the Tiananmen tragedy did not put an end to the reform and
opening process. After a short period of stagnation, the refornl process
regained momentum in 1992, when Deng used a dramatic tour of southern
China to revive his refonn ideas and practices. But the Soviet Union and the
Soviet bloc did not survive. In December 1989, the Berlin Wall, which had
existed as the real and symbolic dividing line between East and West for
almost three decades, was destroyed. The same month, Romania's
Communist dictator Ceau~escu and his wife were executed after they tried
but failed to use military force to suppress mass protests in Bucharest. Two
years later, on August 19, 1991, a military coup staged by a group of hard line
Communist leaders occurred in Moscow. However, the coup was quickly
defeated. The coup leaders hesitated to repress the resistance because the
"jarring effect" ofthe Tiananmen tragedy lingered in their minds. 41
then,
became another defining moment in twentieth-century hiStory, a moment
that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the entire Communist bloc in
Eastern Europe in a few short months. As a consequence, the global Cold War
ended. Although the conflict started and finished in Europe, the great trans
formations that China experienced from the late [960s to the early 1990S
formed a unique and integral part of the Cold War's final denouement.
42 The Chinese government announced that thirty-six
200
IO
The
stalemate that prevented a direct military conflict between
the United States and the Soviet Union displaced violent superpower com
petition to areas of the Third World where the two blocs could invest in
local and regional wars without risking direct confrontation. The Soviet Union
tended to approach such conflicts cautiously even when they involved other
Communist states. I The United States, by contrast, adapted its security policies
to a containment doctrine that defined the political complexion of every non
Communist government in the world as a matter ofpotential strategic interest.
Local Oppo1>1tion to foreign rule in the US and European colonial empires, and
social movements aiming to displace traditional elites elsewhere, confronted
a strong US preference for reliably anti-Communist (and thus conservative
to right-wing) regimes. Even moderate to conservative regimes that sought
to advance national interests by constraining US influence came under assault
from Washington. Governments that collaborated closely with the United
States often had to ignore or suppress local interests opposed to US policies.
In its prosecution of the Cold War in the Third World, the United States
enjoyed formidable advantages over its Soviet rival. Economic strength
gave US leaders a decided financial and material advantage over the Soviets.
Military bases projected US power into regions bordering on Communist
states throughout the world. US ideological and cultural assets also helped.
Alliances with local elites eager to reduce domestic challenges proved espe
helpful. The United States deployed all of these resources in response
to perceived affronts to its regime and policy preferences wherever they
occurred. The Soviet Union and its allies worked assiduously to overcome
for allies and "proxies" in the Third World to avoid
costly and unproductive commitments, In Latin America, for
the Soviets
declined to support gucn-illa movements in the I9608 and
Cubans fc)r
doing so. Sec Jorge Dominguez, To Make a World SaJeJor Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch . .1.
201
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
provided military and economic aid to Cuba from T96T, the USSR opposed
Cuba's support of guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s. In the I970s, the Soviets
pushed the Cubans to abandon support for such movements in Latin America,
offered only modest assistance to the elected socialist government of Chile
and sought normal diplomatic and trade relations with the some of
region's most repressive military regimes. 6 The Soviet Union and some East
lEuropean Communist states provided aid to Nicaragua after the victory of
the Sandinista insurgency, but in small amounts reflectine: Soviet economic
decline and political uncertainty.
Latin American governments, political movements, and interest groups
often challenged US predominance from within the region. Though circum
stances and capacities varied, nearly every Latin American government
attempted at one time or another to mitigate or evade compliance with US
interests by turning to other great powers, such as Britain, France, and both
imperial and Nazi Germany. The Cuban appeal to the Soviet Union in the
1960s thus followed a long tradition. At various times, Latin American govern
ments, unsuccessfully for the most part, requested regional or international
support through the Pan American Union or its successor, the Organization
of American States (OAS) , or the United Nations. Some sought to deflect
or resist US pressure by mobilizing popular support, but such mobilizations
raised popular expectations, alienated elites, and often drove the United States
to intervene.
Had the United States limited its Cold War objectives to defense against
threats to its security, it would have had little reason to exert itself in Latin
America. In addition to its unchallenged economic and political predomi
nance, the United States emerged from World War TI with nuclear weapons
and a military establishment immensely superior to any regional power, indeed
more than sufficient to deter any potential threat from Latin America without
compromising other strategic missions. US political leaders, however, tended
to accord great symbolic importance to deviations from US policy preferences
in Latin America, especially in the Caribbean basin. They worried about
the demonstration or domino" effect of any defections from the US camp
on neighboring and even distant countries, but their greatest concern focused
See Human
(New York:
3 On the Good
Center, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21St Century
Press, 2005), Part I.
Policy, the classic work is Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good
Neighbor
York: Norton, 1967).
4
chapter in volume II.
On
bloc rejection of Guatemalan aid requests, see Piero Gleijesis, Shattered Hope:
The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton, Nl: Princeton
University Press, 1991). ch. 9.
2
202
6 On Soviet policy in Latin America in the 19605 and 1970S, see Dominguez, To Make
a World Safr for Revolution, chs. 3-4; Cole Biasier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and
Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1983); and Nicola Miller,
Soviet Relations with Latin Amerie.a, 1959-1'187 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989)
203
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
8 Despite Cuba's repeated expressions of interest, tbe USSR never entered into a formal
alliance with Cuba nor did it
agree to defend Cuba militarily. Cuba
was not a member of the Warsaw Pact.
204
205
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
and denounced the Carter policy as intrusive meddling in their internal affairs.
The US government continued economic aid to avoid punishing innocent
beneficiaries, and sought quietly to develop contacts and leverage within the
two military establishments. This backdoor military diplomacy succeeded
in EI Salvador in 1979, but failed in Guatemala.
Carter focused most of his attention on Nicaragua, in part because the
regime of Anastasio Somoza seemed most likely to bend to US pressure. In
1978, Somoza's rivals began to pose a threat to the government, making
it potentially more dependent on US help. When the country exploded in
mass protests and insurrection in September, Carter was already pressuring
President Somoza to cede power to a new government that would organize
elections. Ifmanaged adroitly, Somoza's government could then be replaced
by one dominated by one or another of the country's traditionally moderate
political parties, grateful to the United States for having paved its way to
power. The alternative, which Carter and his advisers sought to avoid, was a
polarization ofNicaragua into warring camps, with the initiative passing to the
armed guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. Somoza, on the
other hand, was determined to retain power and convinced that, if the United
States were forced to choose between him and the FSLN "Communists," it
1O
would have to choose him and back off from its efforts to push him out.
Events moved more rapidly than either Carter or Somoza anticipated.
Somoza maneuvered to elude demands for "free elections" and began elim
inating plausible alternatives. On january 10, 1978, the assassination of Pedro
joaquin Chamorro, the wealthy publisher of the opposition newspaper La
Pren.sa and a possible successor, touched off a general strike. FSLN guerrillas
gained adherents throughout the country. Urban attacks and even large-scale
uprisings against the National Guard multiplied. The FSLN managed to seize
the national Congress building in Managua in August. The following month,
the FSLN briefly seized the northern town of Esteli, buoyed by a mass
insurrection against the regime. In December, Somoza rejected a last effort
by the Carter team to negotiate a peaceful departure.
Between january and June r979 , the Carter administration watched as the
FSLN and Somoza's National Guard fought one another. US military
economic aid to the Somoza government was formally cut off in February.
10 Robert A. Pastor. Not Condemned to Repetition: The United States and
,2nd ed.
(Boulder, co: Westview, 2002), chs. 4-<>; Thomas Walker, Nicaragua,
Land
Sanditlo (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981); William LeoGrande, OUf Own Backyard:
United States and Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carc>lina, 1998), 10-32.
206
and Carter officials hoped Somoza would step down. In late june, after the
OAS rejected a US plan to send "peacekeepers" to Nicaragua because their
main effect would have been to save the National Guard from defeat, US
officials opened negotiations with the FSLN, insisting that the Sandinista
leaders agree to appoint "moderates" to a majority of Cabinet posts in the
new government and promise to hold free elections. The FSI,N agreed after
some hard bargaining, Somoza then fled Nicaragua onjuIYI7; two days
11
the Sandinistas entered Managua amid tumultuous celebrations.
As the Carter administration worked to salvage the wreckage of its anti
Sandinista policies in Nicaragua, it moved simultaneously to avert "another
Nicaragua" in neighboring EI Salvador. It did so by inspiring key officers in
the Salvadoran armed forces to overthrow the highly repressive government
of General Humberto Romero on October 15, 1979. The new government
created a five-person junta or council to exercise presidential powers until
reforms could be implemented and elections called. Two members of the
junta represented the armed forces; three were civilians. The government
Not Condemned, chs. 4-6; Lawrence Pezzullo and Ralph Pezzullo, At the Fall of
Somoza (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
II Pastor.
207
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
alIDounced an end to repression, full restoration of civic and human rights, and
a commitment to agrarian reform and other progressive social policies. For
the next three months, El Salvador exploded into renewed political activity
and social activism. Political parties, labor unions, community and civic
organizations, church groups, and publications of all kinds suddenly emerged
from hiding or developed spontaneously. Tragically, the junta never managed
to exert control over the Salvadoran military and its repressive appararus
and was not supported by the United States when it sought to do so. The
Salvadoran military and police units remained intact and crushed their foes.
On January 3 and 4, 1980, the three civilian members of the Salvadoran junta
and all the civilian members of the Cabinet resigned in protest. In the months
that followed, the Salvadoran civil war began in earnest. The Carter admin
istration wanted democracy in EI Salvador, but it gave priority to preserving
the integrity of the Salvadoran military and its command structure to avoid
repeating a collapse similar to that of Somoza's National Guard.
The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980 hastened the collapse
of Carter's efforts. In El Salvador, Reagan's campaign speeches criticizing
Carter's human rights policies had helped persuade the Salvadoran military
to launch an orgy of repression. In December I980, after the rape and murder
of four US nuns, Carter briefly suspended military aid, but this decision had
no impact on the Salvadoran military because its leaders correctly expected
Reagan to reverse it.
In Nicaragua, Reagan's campaign rhetoric, which portrayed the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua as "Communists" and included pledges to remove them from
power, convinced the movement's leaders that there was little point in
placating the United States any longer. US-backed politicians in the Sandinista
Cabinet lost what leverage they had earlier acquired. More significantly,
FSLN leaders decided to extend military and financial aid to the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) fighting against the Salvadoran
The FMLN had the support of nearly all the opposition parties
and organizations in El Salvador, except for a minority faction of the
Christian Democrats, whose leaders had agreed to form a new government
with US support. The Sandinistas hoped that the FMLN would be able to
take power in a "final offensive" scheduled for January 198r, just prior to
Reagan's inauguration. They hoped that two revolutionary governments in
1975-1'i91
12
13. Funeral of Archbishop 6scar Romero orEl Salvador. who was killed by right-'WinO'C'r<
in March 1980 as he was saying mass. A bombing at the fi.meralleft thirty-eight
12 LeoGrande. Our Own Backyard, 33-51; Pastor, Not Condemned. ch. n; James Dunkerley.
Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o{ Modern Central America (New York: Verso.
T988), ch. 8.
208
See LeoGrande, Our Own Backyar.1; Americas Watch and the American Civil Liberties
Union, Report on Human Rights in El Salvador, January 1982 (Washington, DC: American
Civil Liberties Union. 1082): Cynthia Amson. E! Salvador: A RITo/ulion Confronts the
United States !Washington. DC: Institute for Policy Smdies. 1982).
209
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
and human rights. They did adopt a new constitution that called
for open and competitive elections in 1985, which they moved to 1984 in
response to US demands. Nor did the Sandinista regime pose the slightest
military or strategic threat to the United States. The Sandinistas announced
that their country would remain in the OAS and continue to fulfill its obligations
under the Rio Treaty. They stated repeatedly that they would never permit
foreign (i.e., Cuban or Soviet) military bases on their territory and offered to
sign a treaty, with stringent inspection provisions, to that effea, though they did
accept substantial economic and military aid from both.
Throughout the 1980s, both Cuba and the Soviet Union pressured the
Sandinistas to seek an accommodation with the United States and made it
clear that they were not in a position to offer either military proteaion or
sufficient economic aid to subsidize the Nicaraguan economy in the event
that the Sandinistas wished to impose a socialist model. Soviet military aid
totaled a mere $12 million from 1979 through 1980, rising to $45 million in 1981
after the United States began funding exile groups, eventually called the
Contras, that were seeking to create a military force to carry out attacks against
the Sandinista armed forces from bases in neighboring Honduras. Military aid
from all the Soviet bloc countries peaked at approximately $2,50 million in 1984.
Economic aid from the Soviet bloc rose to a high of $253 million in T982 and
declined thereafter. T5 The Sandinista government received more aid
from Western Europe and other Latin American countries than from the
Communist bloc, virtually all of it conditional on respea for private property
and civil liberties. 16
To President Reagan, however, the Sandinistas were implacable enemies
of the United States and had to be overthrown. In March 1981, after less than
two months in office, he authorized the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
to support the Contras. By December, the president had authorized the CIA
to provide them with funds, training, equipment, and logistical support. The
aV1C
Sandinista revolution
In its first weeks in office, the new administration made clear that it intended
to reverse a "dangerous decline" in US power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and
its allies. The Reagan team charged that timid policies had caused the '10ss"
of Mghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, Iran, Mozambique, and Nicaragua
to hostile regimes. They wanted to support allies and punish foes. Central
America's proximity and weakness made it an ideal test case for their bold
plans. Democracy and human rights would continue to be important goals
in the rhetoric of US officials, but quickly became secondary concerns in
practice. The new administration set about repairing relations with abusive
but pro-US regimes throughout the hemisphere, including the Argentine
military junta whose members were later prosecuted, and the military govern
ment of Guatemala, then in the process of razing hundreds of indigenous
villages and exterminating their inhabitants. T4
The administration's chief policy goals in Central America included the
destruction of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and viaory over insurgents
in EI Salvador and Guatemala. It expected Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama
to help achieve these objectives and exerted unremitting pressure on their
governments whenever their enthusiasm for US efforts flagged.
President Reagan made Nicaragua a key symbol of his administration's
aggressively anti-Communist foreign policy. Nicaragua under the Sandinistas,
the president stated, had become a "Communist," "totalitarian" state similar
to Cuba. BetweenJanuary 1981 and December 1983, the administration orches
trated a step-by-step escalation of tensions with Nicaragua, seeking to build
public support for an eventual US military intervention. The 1984 US presi
dential campaign forced the administration to reverse course to avoid political
setbacks, but after the president's reelection in November, Reagan and his
advisers expected to resume and consummate its campaign to rid the hemi
sphere of the Sandinista regime.
The Reagan administration's hostility toward the Nicaraguan government
stemmed from inaccurate premises. The Sandinistas were not turning Nicaragua
into a "totalitarian dungeon," as Reagan described it. They did not impose
a one-party state, nationalize the country's productive property, or suspend
I4 Comisi6n para
210
15 On Soviet aid, see "Latin Focus: Despite Fears of US, Soviet Aid to Nicaragua Appears
to Be Limited - While House Will Push To Aid Contras to Lessen Risk of Region
Revolution Managua Shuos Puppet Role," Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1985, 1; Stephen
Kinzer, "For Nicaragua, Soviet Frugality Starts to Pinch," New Yark Times, August 20, 1987;
W. Raymond Duncan, "Soviet Interests in Latin America: New Opportunities and Old
Constraints, 'Journal of Inter-American Studies and Warld Affairs, 26,2 (May 1984), 163--98.
16 On the Sandinista regime, see Thomas Walker, Revolution and Counterrevolution in
Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview, 199I), and Stephen Kinzer, Blood of Brothers: Life
and War in Nicaragua (New York: G. p, Putnam, 1991). On Soviet policies and attitudes,
see Kiva Maidanik, "On Real Soviet Policy Toward Central America," in Wayne
S. Smith (cd.), The Russians Aren't Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America (Boulder.
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 89-96.
211
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
I7 Christopher Dickey, With the Contras (New York: Simon & Schuster. T987):
BaMM Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 198H9X,
Simon & Schuster. N8S): LeoGrande. Our Own fiackvard eh. TJ.
2T2
Gutman.
York:
213
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
the hawks in the Reagan administration - North, CIA deputy director Roben
Gates, and others - maneuvered to get Honduras to reject the treaty and to
persuade the Costa Rican and Salvadoran governments to express reservations. 21
After the reelection of President Reagan, the campaign to overturn the
Sandinista regime resumed immediately.22 Momentarily cowed by the mag
nitude of the Reagan electoral triumph, CongTess appropriated $27 million in
"non-lethal" aid for the Contras in 1985-86 and then appropriated $mo million
million for weapons) for 1986--87. Despite their new weapons, however,
the Contras did not become an effective military force. More at home in their
well-stocked Honduran base camps than in combat, they suffered a series of
defeats in engagements with the Sandinista army in 1984-85 and subsequently
reverted to terrorist attacks on civilian targets, such as sugar mills, farm
cooperatives, rural schools, and health clinics, most of which were defended,
if at all, by lightly armed civilian militias.
The Reagan administration's illegal activities in supplying arms to the
Contras came to light in a series of incidents that culminated in October and
November 1986. In October, the Nicaraguans shot down a CIA resupply plane
and captured a surviving crewmember, who confessed fully; the Sandinistas
released him. In November, news began leaking from the Middle
East of a secret deal with Iran, in which, among other things, the adminis
tration agTeed to sell arms to Iran and use the "profits" to acquire black-market
arms for the Contras. 23
In addition to breaking domestic laws, the Reagan administration found
itself accused of violating international law by the Nicaraguan government
before the International Court ofJustice in The Hague. Since the violations,
which included the CIA mining of Nicaraguan harbors, could not be denied,
the US government asserted that for reasons of national security it would
no longer accept the jurisdiction of the International Court in matters
relating to Central America. When the court rejected this argument and
rendered a verdict requiring the United States to pay reparations to
Nicaragua for the damages it had inflicted, the United States ignored the
court's ruling. 24
21 LcoGrandc, Our Own Backyard, chs. 15-16; for a contrary view. see Susan Kaufinan
Purcell, "Demystifying Contadora," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1985), 74-95.
22 See, for example. Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 200-01.
23 On the lrangate or Iran-Contra scandal, see Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne (cds.),
TIle lran--Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New Press,
24 Smith, The Last Years, 197-99.
214
2.5 On negotiating with the crippled Reagan team, see Jim Wright, Worth ItA!l: My War for
Peace (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993). On the peace agreement, for which Oscar
Arias was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in J987, sec Martha Honey, Hostile Acts: US
Policy in. Costa Rica in the 1980 (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida. 1994), ch. 14;
LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, ch. 21; John M. Barry, The Ambition and the Power (New
York: Viking, 1989).
215
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
27 See Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatema!a: A History ~fRace and Nation (Durham, NC:
28 Gabriel AlrUilcra
2I6
217
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
218
219
JOHN H. COATSWORTH
220
197)-1991
The human cost of this effort was immense. Between 1960, by which time
the Soviets had dismantled Stalin's gulags, and the Soviet collapse in 1990, the
numbers of political prisoners, tOrture victims, and executions of nonviolent
political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union
and its East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the Soviet
bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than
many individual Latin American countries.38
The hot Cold War in Central America produced an unprecedented human
itarian catastrophe. Between I975 and 1991, the death toll alone stood at nearly
300,000 in a population of less than 30 million. More than I million refugees
fled from the region - most to the United States. The economic costs have
never been calculated, but were huge, In the 1980s, these costs did not affect
US policy because the burden on the United States was negligible. Indeed,
there were benefits. Calling attention to threats emanating from a region so
close to the United States helped the Reagan administration gain credibility
and build support for its other priorities, including major increases in defense
spending. Decades of confrontation with the Soviet Union had created a
domestic political culture that rewarded aggressive behavior when the costs
could be passed on to others.
Since many of the concerns the Reagan administration expressed about
Central America were empirically false or historically implausible, many
historians and political scientists have tended to conclude that US policy in
Central America during the Cold War cannot be explained as the result of
rational calculation. Policymakers, they claim, suffered from a kind of anti
Communist cultural malaise or imperial hubris.:19 Jorge Dominguez has
argued, for example, that the Cuban revolution so traumatized US
makers that, at crucial moments in the succeeding decades, US policy became
"illOgical."40 But for Central Americans, it made little difference whether
Cold War policies of the United States arose from rationally calculated
malevolence or merely undisciplined atavism. Many question whether this
sad history came to a definitive end when the Cold War ended.
38 This observation is based on the author's examination of published CIA and State
Department reports and on the reports of Freedom House, a private nonprofit organ
ization hostile to Communist regimes.
39 See, lor example, Richard Immerman. The CIA. in Guatemal.a: The Foreign Policy of
Intervention (Garden
NJ: Doubleclay, 1982); Gleijeses. Shattered Hare, 361, 366.
40 Jorge Dominguez,
American Relations During the Cold War and Its
Aftermath," in Victor Bulmer-Thomas and James Dunkerley (cds.), The United States
and Latin America: The New Agenda (Cambriclgc, MA: Ilarvard Unlversity Press. 1999),33.
22I