(Electromagnetics and Radar) Robert B. McShea - Test and Evaluation of Aircraft Avionics and Weapon Systems (2014, SciTech Publishing) PDF

Test and Evaluation of Aircraft
Avionics and Weapon Systems

Test and Evaluation of Aircraft
Avionics and Weapon Systems
2nd Edition
Robert E. McShea
Edison, NJ
theiet.org
Published by SciTech Publishing, an imprint of the IET.
www.scitechpub.com
www.theiet.org
2010, 2014 by SciTech Publishing, Edison, NJ. All rights reserved.
First edition 2010

Second edition 2014
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except as permitted under Sections
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Publisher for permission should be addressed to The Institution of Engineering and Technology, Michael Faraday
House, Six Hills Way, Stevenage, Herts, SG1 2AY, United Kingdom.
While the author and publisher believe that the information and guidance given in this work are correct, all parties
must rely upon their own skill and judgement when making use of them. Neither the author nor publisher assumes
any liability to anyone for any loss or damage caused by any error or omission in the work, whether such an error or
omission is the result of negligence or any other cause. Any and all such liability is disclaimed.
Editor: Dudley R. Kay
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ISBN 978-1-61353-176-1 (hardback)
ISBN 978-1-61353-180-8 (PDF)
Typeset in India by MPS Limited

Printed in the USA by Sheridan Books Inc.
Printed in the UK by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon
This Book is Dedicated to
Marlenni Belinni
Friends till the end
Contents
Preface xv
Preface to First Edition xix
List of Acronyms xxi
1 What is Avionics Flight Test and Why Do We Need It 1

1.0 Avionics Flight Test 1
1.1 Historical Background 2
1.2 Flight Test Organization 4
1.3 Flight Test Objectives 5
1.4 The Need for Flight Test 6
1.5 Classifying the Program 8
1.6 Contractual Requirements 9
1.7 Test Team Composition 11
1.8 Team Member Responsibilities 13
1.9 Understanding Terms 15
1.10 Contractor and Subtier Specifications 20
1.11 Customer Expectations 21
1.12 Formulating the Program 22
1.13 Summary 25
1.14 Selected Questions for Chapter 1 26
2 Time, Space, Position Information 29

2.0 An Overview of Time, Space, Position Information 29
2.1 Sources of TSPI 30
2.2 Ground-Based Tracking Radar 30
2.3 Radar Characteristics 32
2.4 Radar Accuracies 35
2.5 Geometric Dilution of Precision 38
2.6 Earth Models 39
2.7 Theodolites 41
2.8 Theodolite Limitations 44
2.9 Global Positioning System 44
2.10 Stand-Alone GPS Receivers 44
vii
viii Contents
2.11 Inertial-Aided GPS Receivers 46

2.12 Differentially Corrected GPS 48
2.13 Sensor Fusion 48
2.14 Ranges 49
2.15 Range Assets 49
2.16 Unique Services 50
2.17 Interfacing with the Range 51
2.18 Time Alignment 53
2.19 Summary 55
2.20 Exercises 55
2.21 Answers to Exercises 55
3 MIL-STD-1553 and Digital Data Busses: Data Reduction

and Analysis 61
3.0 Overview 61
3.2 1553 System Architecture 62
3.3 A Bit About Bits 65
3.4 1553 Word Types 67
3.5 Data Encoding 67
3.6 Word Formats 68
3.7 Command Words 68
3.8 Anomalous Command Word Conditions 70
3.9 Command Word Summary 71
3.10 Status Words 71
3.11 Data Words 73
3.12 Message Contents 74
3.13 Bus Controller Design 75
3.14 Sample Bus Configurations 76
3.15 The Flight Tester’s Task 79
3.16 MIL-STD-1553 Summary 80
3.17 Other Data Busses 81
3.18 Potential Problems for the Analyst 122
3.19 Data Acquisition, Reduction, and Analysis 124
4 Communications Flight Test 139

4.0 Overview 139
4.1 Communications Basics 140
Contents ix
4.2 Aircraft Communications Equipment 142

4.3 Test Requirements 144
4.4 The Three Steps in Avionics Testing 144
4.5 Communications Test Plan Matrix 146
4.6 Executing the Matrix 148
4.7 Other Considerations in Communications Tests 149
4.8 Effects of Stores, Landing Gear, and Flaps 149
4.9 Effects of Weather 149
4.10 Logistics 150
4.11 Boredom 151
4.12 Speech Intelligibility 151
4.13 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility 154
4.14 EMI/EMC Testing 158
4.15 EMI/EMC Test Issues 161
4.16 EMI/EMC Elimination 161
5 Navigation Systems 167

5.0 Introduction 167
5.1 History 168
5.2 Basic Navigation 168
5.3 Radio Aids to Navigation 175
5.4 Radio Aids to Navigation Testing 184
5.5 Inertial Navigation Systems 191
5.6 Doppler Navigation Systems 207
5.7 Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) 213
5.8 Identification Friend or Foe 234
5.9 Data Links 238
6 Part 23/25/27/29 Avionics Civil Certifications 267

6.1 FAA Type Certification History 268
6.2 Federal Aviation Regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations 270
6.3 Other Rules and Guidance 273
6.4 FAA Type Certification Process 274
6.5 Avionics Software Considerations in the Technical Standard Order
Process 282
6.6 Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex
Systems 285
x Contents
6.7 Important Notes for Evaluators Concerning Documentation 298

6.8 Differences between EASA and FAA Documentation 300
6.9 Cockpit Controls and Displays Evaluations 301
6.10 Weather RADAR Certification 322
6.11 Airworthiness Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems 329
6.12 Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums 348
6.13 Proximity Warning Systems 356
6.14 Terrain Awareness and Warning System 382
6.15 Flight Guidance Systems 410
6.16 Landing Systems 459
6.17 Flight Management Systems 504
6.18 Enhanced Vision Systems (EVS) 520
6.19 Summary 527
7 Electro-optical and Infrared Systems 535

7.1 Infrared History 536
7.2 IR Radiation Fundamentals 547
7.3 IR Sources 552
7.4 The Thermal Process 554
7.5 Atmospheric Propagation of Radiation 556
7.6 Target Signatures 562
7.7 EO Components and Performance Requirements 567
7.8 Passive EO Devices 581
7.9 Laser Systems 588
7.10 Passive EO Flight Test Evaluations 594
7.11 Active EO Systems 614
8 Radio Detection and Ranging – Radar 625

8.1 Understanding Radar 626
8.2 Performance Considerations 629
8.3 Radar Utility 630
8.4 Radar Detections 636
8.5 Maximum Radar Detection 641
8.6 Radar Sample Applications 645
8.7 Pulse Delay Ranging Radar Modes of Operation and Testing 652
Contents xi
8.8 Doppler and Pulse Doppler Modes of Operation and Testing 668
8.9 Air-to-Ground Radar 694
8.10 Millimetric Wave Radar 710
8.11 Miscellaneous Modes of Radar 712
8.12 Some Final Considerations in Radar Testing 712
9 Electronic Warfare 719

9.1 Electronic Warfare Overview 720
9.2 The Threat 724
9.3 Air Defense Systems 728
9.4 Electronic Attack 729
9.5 Noise Jamming 734
9.6 Deception Jamming 738
9.7 Chaff Employment 742
9.8 Flare Employment 743
9.9 Electronic Protection Measures 745
9.10 Electronic Warfare Systems Test and Evaluation 748
9.11 Finally 760
10 Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground Weapons Integration 763

10.1 Weapons Overview 764
10.2 Stores Management System 767
10.3 Air-to-Air Missiles 785
10.4 Air-to-Ground Weapons 803
10.5 MIL-HDBK-1763 Test Requirements 812
10.6 AGARD Flight Test Techniques Series, Volume 10 Requirements 820
10.7 Weapons Delivery Considerations for Helicopters 824
11 A Typical Avionics Integration Flight Test Program 831

11.1 Vehicle Test Requirements 831
11.2 Avionics Test Requirements 833
11.3 Test Planning 835
xii Contents
11.4 Responsibilities of the Test Team 843

11.5 Analysis and Reporting 848
12 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 851

12.1 UAV Types 852
12.2 Interoperability 856
12.3 The Airworthiness Certificate 857
12.4 UAS Communications Architecture 860
12.5 Navigation 886
12.6 Autopilots 889
12.7 Sense and Avoid Systems 892
12.8 Payload 899
12.9 Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA) 901
12.10 Summary 902
13 Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS) and Helmet

Mounted Displays (HMD) 907
13.1 Overview 908
13.2 Image Intensification (I2) Technology 909
13.3 NVG Human Factors Issues 918
13.4 Lighting Specifications 920
13.5 Interior NVIS Lighting Methods 924
13.6 Exterior Lighting Methods 929
13.7 Test and Evaluation of NVIS Equipment 931
13.8 Some Final Considerations 938
13.9 Helmet Mounted Display Systems (HMD) 939
13.10 HMD Components 942
13.11 Test and Evaluation of HMD Equipment 949
14 Acquisition, Test Management, and Operational Test

and Evaluation 957
14.0 Overview 957
14.1 Applicable Documentation 958
Contents xiii
14.2 The Acquisition Process 958

14.3 The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 965
14.4 The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) 966
14.5 Operational Test and Evaluation 967
14.6 OT&E Test Plan Structure 970
14.7 Reliability, Maintainability, Logistics Supportability,
and Availability (RML&A) 978
14.8 Summary 981
Index 983
Preface
Overview and Goals

The original purpose of this text was to offer the test community, especially the Avionics
and Weapons Systems Test Community, a primer on the basics of Test and Evaluation.
The text is a compilation and refinement of experiences and methods gleaned from a
multitude of programs and test engineers over the past 30 years, and is designed to help
students and readers avoid common mistakes. The text is an invaluable companion to
evaluators of fighter or heavy aircraft systems, military or civilian programs both
manned and unmanned.
A question which is commonly asked is ‘‘Where is the Flight Test Cookbook?’’
Unfortunately, there is no such book, and readers may be disappointed that this text is not
a cookbook either. Each task undertaken in the real world is unique and requires some
rework to the established rules. Avionics Flight Test is no different, and in fact is prob-
ably more dynamic than any other area of test. An engineer, in order to be successful,
must be schooled in the fundamentals of avionics test, understand the ground-rules and
possess a knowledge of similar systems which have been previously tested. This
knowledge, with a little bit of common sense, engineering judgment and luck makes an
Avionics Flight Test Engineer. This text will identify the ground rules and provide
information on systems which were previously tested. Lessons learned (good and bad)
are addressed in each chapter. Exercises to reinforce the instructional material are also
included. Engineering judgment was issued to you when you graduated college (whether
you know it or not) and you must supply the common sense. Luck normally comes to
those who know what they’re doing and is only viewed as luck by those who don’t know
what they’re doing.
The best features of the book are its readability and usability. The author has
received numerous comments and feedback that the text is being used on a daily basis
throughout the industry. The text has been remarkably successful and the author is
honored that it is currently being used as course reference in many short courses and
schools around the world. The revision will keep the format, style and form of the
original text. The intent of this revision is not to change the flavor of the original text,
but rather expand and improve upon it.
Significant Changes to the Original Text

Comments received from readers indicated a desire to include additional material cov-
ering a multitude of systems. The system which generated the most interest was the
unmanned aircraft program as it has gained much attention in the past five years. A new
chapter (Chapter 12) is now devoted to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), con-
centrating on the systems aspects of these programs. The chapter builds on previous
sections of the text and then expounds on some of the difficulties encountered when
evaluating these systems. A second request was a natural extension of EO/IR
xv
xvi Preface
evaluations: Night Vision Systems and Helmet Mounted Displays found in Chapter 13.
An Operational Test and Evaluation chapter was added to discuss the differences
between development and operational testing in finer detail than previously covered.
Due to significant changes in civilian regulatory and advisory material, Chapter 6,
Civil Certification, has been entirely re-written. Comments from rotary wing readers
requested that helicopter unique certification issues be addressed and they are now
included in the chapter. Other sections throughout the text have been edited and updated
based on the latest advances in technologies. An example is the enhancement of Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS)
found in Chapter 5.
Rationale
The author has been working on this book for a number of years with the express
purpose of providing students a reference to fall back on when involved in a multitude of
programs. There are textbooks that describe Avionics Systems, but not how to evaluate
them for their usefulness. There are textbooks available that describe acceptable test
techniques for evaluating an aircraft’s handling and flying qualities but none devoted to
test techniques for evaluating avionics and weapons systems. Many of the modules, and
hence the Chapters, are unique, and to my knowledge, are not taught anywhere else but
at the National Test Pilot School. The text provides these modules to the Test and
Evaluation community in the hopes that it will make life a little simpler.
Audience
The audience for this book will encompass Flight Test Engineers, Program Managers,
military and civilian aerospace workers, Flight Test Range and Instrumentation support.
The book is appropriate for newly hired or assigned personnel at these locations as well
as seasoned veterans in the Test and Evaluation areas. The text is not limited to U.S.
locations as it will find practical applications in the international arena, particularly for
aerospace companies and flight test centers.
Organization of Content
This book is written to accompany a six month course of instruction in Avionics
and Weapons Systems Evaluation which was developed by the author and currently
presented at the National Test Pilot School in Mojave, CA. The book reflects the
culmination of the development of this course as accredited by ABET and approved by
the State of California as a requisite for a Master of Science Degree in Flight Test
Engineering. The chapters of the book are structured to each 40 hour course of curri-
culum taught during this six month period and are sequenced exactly as they are in the
syllabus. The preliminary chapters introduce the student to the fundamentals of Test and
Evaluation and their relationship to aircraft avionics and weapons systems, whereas
subsequent chapters discuss specific aircraft systems such as radar, IR Imaging devices,
navigation systems and weapons. Chapter 6 deals specifically with civil certification
procedures and airworthiness and will prove invaluable to those individuals seeking
to obtain airworthiness certification for avionic systems installed in civilian aircraft.
Preface xvii
Each chapter covers the basic theory of operation of the systems discussed but does not
attempt to re-write the many excellent textbooks available. References used in the
course are cited for the reader when additional information on theory or operation is
required. Formulas are not developed but are included when required to understand the
subject. Each chapter concludes with the methods to successfully evaluate a multitude of
aircraft avionics and weapons systems. Sample questions for each Chapter are used to
reinforce key ideas and concepts.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to first and foremost thank the hundreds of students who have
used draft copies of this text and provided comments, corrections and personal experi-
ences to make it a better reference. The author owes a special debt of gratitude to Chuck
Antonio, Aerospace Medicine/Night Vision Systems Pilot Instructor, National Test Pilot
School, Doctor of Medicine, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston SC,
Graduate, US Navy Flight Training and Flight Surgeon School, NAS Pensacola FL, and
Edward ‘‘Dick’’ L. Downs, Night Vision Systems Pilot Instructor, National Test Pilot
School, BSc Aeronautical Engineering, Imperial College London, without whose help
the chapter on Night Vision Systems would not have been possible. Also, a sincere thank
you should be given to the numerous community reviewers who gave of their time to
improve the draft manuscript. Finally, thanks to SciTech- IET Editor Dudley Kay and
his colleagues for their work in bringing this title to fruition.
Despite all the reviewing and editing, any errors that remain are my own responsi-
bility. I would very much appreciate being informed of errors found or suggestions for
improvement to subsequent printings and editions.
Bob McShea
Deputy Director for Systems Flight Test Instruction,
Flight Test Engineer Instructor
National Test Pilot School
Mojave, CA
bmcshea@ntps.edu
February 2014
Preface to First Edition
The purpose of this text is to offer the test community, especially the avionics and
weapons systems flight test community, insight into the differences in avionics testing
from our brethren in the vehicle test world. Whenever flight test is mentioned in
conversation, thoughts are immediately drawn to visions of those magnificent men
in their flying machines, breaking the sound barrier, performing max performance turns,
pressing the ‘‘q’’ limit, or some other glorious adventure. In reality, most of today’s
flight testing involves the upgrading of aircraft with state-of-the-art avionics equipment,
making bombs ‘‘smart,’’ and providing aircrew members with current, correct, and
understandable information. Strain gauges, pressure transducers, and temperature
probes that provide information in hundreds of samples per second have given way to
MIL-STD-1553, ARINC 429, and high-speed data busses that provide information in
megabits per second. Vehicle flight test has not been replaced with avionics flight test,
and the differences between the two are substantial. A newer type of flight test, with its
own set of rules, has evolved over the last 10 to 15 years; this text attempts to explain
those changes and identify what is expected of today’s avionics flight test engineer.
A question that is commonly asked is, ‘‘Where is the flight test cookbook?’’
Unfortunately, there is no such book, and readers may be disappointed that this text is
not a cookbook either. Each task undertaken in the real world is unique and requires
some rework to the established rules. Avionics flight test is no different and, in fact, is
probably more dynamic than any other area of testing. An engineer, in order to be
successful, must be schooled in the fundamentals of avionics testing, understand the
ground rules, and possess a knowledge of similar systems that have been previously
tested. This knowledge, with a little bit of common sense, engineering judgment, and
luck, makes an avionics flight test engineer. This text will identify the ground rules
and provide information on systems that have been tested previously. Lessons learned
(good and bad) are addressed in each chapter. Exercises to reinforce the instructional
material are also included. Engineering judgment was issued to you when you graduated
college (whether you know it or not) and you must supply the common sense. Luck
normally comes to those who know what they’re doing and is only viewed as luck by
those who don’t know what they’re doing.
This text is a compilation of experiences and methods gleaned from a multitude of
programs and test engineers solicited over the past 25 years, and hopefully will prevent
the reader from making some of the same mistakes that were made previously. Humor is
included in the discussions, and the ‘‘war stories’’ are true. The text will prove to be an
invaluable companion to fighter and heavy aircraft, U.S. and foreign national, and
military and contractor testers. Happy testing.
xix
List of Acronyms
A AEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering

A/A Air-to-Air Committee
A/C Aircraft AEG Aircraft Evaluation Group
A/D Analog to Digital AEIS Aircraft/Store Electrical
Interconnection System
A/G Air-to-Ground
AEWS Airborne Early Warning
A/RFM Airplane/Rotorcraft Flight
System
Manual
AFDX Avionics Full Duplex Switched
AAA Anti-aircraft Artillery
Ethernet
AAD Assigned Altitude Deviation
AFOTEC Air Force Operational Test
ABC Auto Brightness Control and Evaluation Center
ABF Annular Blast Fragmentation AGARD Advisory Group for Aerospace
ABL Airborne LASER Research and Development
ABS Advanced Brake System AGC Automatic Gain Control
ABSAA Airborne Sense-And-Avoid AGHME Aircraft Geometric Height
AC Alternating Current Measurement Element
AC Advisory Circular AGL Above Ground Level
ACAS Active Collision and Avoidance AH Absolute Humidity
Systems AHRS Attitude Heading Reference
ACC Air Combat Command System
ACK Acknowledgment AI Airborne Intercept
ACK Acknowledge AIAA American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics
ACLS Automatic Carrier Landing
System AIF Avionics Integration Facility
ACM Air Combat Maneuvering AIL Avionics Integration Lab
ACO Aircraft Certification Office AIM Aeronautical Information
Manual
AD Airworthiness Directives
ALARM Air Launched Anti-radiation
ADC Air Data Computer
Missiles
ADI Attitude Direction Indicator
ALI Aerospace Lighting Institute
ADL Armament Datum Line
AM Aeromechanical
ADL Avionics Development Lab
AM Amplitude Modulation
ADS Automatic Dependent
AMC Acceptable Method of
Surveillance
Compliance
ADS-B Automatic Dependent
AMLCD Active-matrix LCD
Surveillance Broadcast
xxi
xxii List of Acronyms
AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range ATC Air Traffic Control

Air-to-Air Missile ATCRBS Air Traffic Control RADAR
ANL Automatic Noise Leveling Beacon System
ANP Actual Navigation AT-FLIR Advanced Targeting FLIR
Performance ATG Auto-gating
ANSI American National Standards ATM Air Traffic Management
Institute
ATP Advanced Targeting Pod
ANVIS Aviator Night Vision Imaging
ATS Automatic Thrust System
Systems
AURT All-Up-Round Test
AO Aero-optical
AVHRR Advanced Very High
AOJ Angle-on-Jam
Resolution RADAR
AOR Angle Only Ranging
AVMUX Avionics Bus
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking System
Advisory Committee
ARC Automatic Radio Compass B
ARDP Airborne RADAR Display Baro Barometric Altitude
Processor BER Bit Error Rate
ARDS Advanced Range Data System BET Best Estimate Trajectory
ARINC American Radio Incorporated BFL Bomb Fall Line
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile BHMD Binocular Helmet Mounted
ARMUX Armament Bus Display
ARP Aerospace Recommended BIT Built-in-Test
Practices BR Break Rate
ARSP Airborne RADAR Signal B-RNAV Basic Area Navigation
Processor BRU Bomb Release Unit
ASA American Standards BSP Bright Source Protection
Association
BSR Blip-Scan Ratio
ASE Altimetry System Error
BVR Beyond Visual Range
ASG Aperiodic Synchronization Gap
ASI Aircraft Station Interface C
ASPJ Airborne Self-Protection C/A Coarse Acquisition Code
Jammer C2 Command and Control
ASR Airport Surveillance C2P Command and Control
RADARS Processor
ASTM American Society for Testing C3I Command, Control and
and Materials Communication Intelligence
AT Aperiodic Access Time-out C4I Command, Control and
ATARS Advanced Tactical Airborne Communication Intelligence
Reconnaissance System and Computers
List of Acronyms xxiii
C4ISR Command, Control, CFR Code of Federal Regulations

Communications, Computers, CG Center of Gravity
Intelligence, Surveillance
CGS Chirp Gate Stealer
and Reconnaissance
CLHQ Closed Loop Handling
CAA Civil Aeronautics Authority
Qualities
CAA Civil Aeronautics
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide
Administration
Semi-conductor
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
COA Certificate of Authorization
CADC Central Air Data Computer
COI Critical Operational Issues
CAN Controller Area Network
COMINT Communications Intelligence
CANCO Can’t Comply
COS Continued Operational Safety
CandD Controls and Displays
COSRO Conical Scan Receive Only
CANTPRO Can’t Process
CPA Closest Point of Approach
CAS Calibrated Airspeed
CPDLC Controller Pilot Data Link
CAW Cautions, Advisories and Communications
Warnings
CR Combat Rate
CBA Capability-Based Assessment
CRC Cyclical Redundancy Check
CBR chemical/biological/
CRM Crew Resource Management
radiological
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
CCA Common Cause Analysis
CRT CDD Requirements Correlation
CCD Charge-Coupled Device
Table
CCIP Continuous Computing
CS Conducted Susceptibility
Impact Point
CS Control Symbol
CCTV Closed-circuit TV
CSI Carriage Store Interface
CDD Capability Development
Document CSMA Carrier Sense Multiple Access
CDI Course Deviation Indicator CSMA/CR Carrier Sense, Multiple Access
with Collision Resolution
CDL Common Data Link
CTF Combined Test Force
CDRL Contract Data Requirement List
CTP Critical Technical Parameters
CDV Command Directed Vehicle
CTS Clear to Send
CE Conducted Emission
CV Carrier
CE Clutter Elimination
CW Continuous Wave
CE Concatenation Event
CWS Control Wheel Steering
CEA Circular Error Average
CEDP Compatibility Engineering D
Data Package D/A Digital to Analog
CEP Circular Error Probable DA Destination Address
CFAR Constant False-Alarm-Rate DAR Designated Avionics
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain Representative
xxiv List of Acronyms
DAS Detector Angular Subtense DP Decision Point

DAS Distributed Aperture System DRA Defense Research Associates
DAS IRST Distributed Aperture System DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition
Infra-red Search and Track Review Council
System DSL Digital Subscriber Line
DBS Doppler Beam Sharpening DSR Data Set Ready
DC Direct Current DT&E Development Test and
DCCIP Delayed Continuous Evaluation
Computed Impact Point DT/OT Development/Operational
DCD Data Carrier Detect Test
DCE Data Communications DTE Digital Terrain
Equipment DTE Data Transmission Equipment
DDU Digital Data Unit DTR Data Terminal Ready
DE Directed Energy
E
DEP Design Eye Position
E3 Electromagnetic
DER Designated Engineering
Environmental Effects
Representatives
EA Electronic Attack
DERA Defence Evaluation Research
Agency EADI Electronic Attitude Direction
Indicator
DF Direction Finding
EASA European Aviation Safety
DFCS Digital Flight Control System
Administration
DID Data Item Description
EBR Enhanced Bit Rate
DITS Digital Information Transfer
ECCM Electronic Counter-Counter
System
Measures
DME Distance Measuring
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
Equipment
ECP Engineering Change Proposal
DMIR Designated Manufacturing
Inspection Representative ED End Delimiter
DNS Doppler Navigation System EDR Expanded Data Request
DOA Direction of Arrival EEC Essential Elements of
Capability
DoD US Department of Defense
EFAbus Eurofighter bus
DoDD Department of Defense
Directive EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument
System
DoDI Department of Defense
Instruction EFVS Enhanced Flight Vision
System
DOE Design of Experiments
EGNOS European Geostationary
DOP Dilution of Precision
Navigation Overlay Service
DOT Department of Transportation
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization,
EIA Electronic Industries Alliance
Training, Materiel, Leadership
and Education, Personnel and EL Electroluminescence
Facilities ELINT Electrical Intelligence
List of Acronyms xxv
EM Electromagnetics FEATS Future European Air Traffic

EM Electro-Magnetic Management System
EMC Electro-magnetic FED Field Emission Display
Compatibility FGS Flight Guidance System
EMCON Emission Control FHA Functional Hazard
EMI Electro-magnetic Interference Assessment
EMS Emergency Medical Services FLIR Forward-Looking Infra-red
EO Electro-optics FLTA Forward-Looking Terrain
Avoidance
EO-DAS Electro-Optical Distributed
Aperture System FM Frequency Modulation
EOF End of Frame FMC Fully Mission Capable
EOTS Electro-Optical Targeting FMR Frequency Modulation
System Ranging
EP Electronic Protection FMS Flight Management
System
EPE Expected Positional Error
FOC Full Operational Capability
ERP Effective Radiated Power
FOG Fiber-optic Gyro
ES Electronic Warfare Support
FOM Figure of Merit
ESA European Space Agency
FOR Field of Regard
EU Engineering Unit
FOT&E Follow-on OT&E
EVS Enhanced Vision Systems
FOTD Fiber-optic Towed Decoy
EW Electronic Warfare
FOV Field-of-View
EWISTL Electronic Warfare Integrated
Systems Test Laboratory FPA Focal Plane Array
EWR Early Warning RADAR FRD Functional Requirements
Document
F FRL Fuselage Reference Line
FA False Alarm FRP Full Rate Production
FA Frequency Agility FRUIT False Replies Uncorrelated
FAA Federal Aviation in Time
Administration FRV Federal Republic of
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation Yugoslavia
FC Fibre Channel FSD Full Scale Development
FC Frame Control FSDO Flight Standards District
Office
FC-AE-ASM Fibre Channel-Avionics
Environment Anonymous FSPI Full Speed Peripheral
Subscriber Messaging protocol Interface
FCS Flight Control System FSS Flight Service Station
FCS Frame Check Sequence FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FD Flight Director FTE Flight Technical Error
FDE Force Development FTJU Fuel Tank Jettison Unit
Evaluation FTT Fixed Target Track
xxvi List of Acronyms
G HAT Height Above Terrain

GAGAN Indian GPS Aided Geo HAV Hybrid Air Vehicle
Augmented Navigation HAVCO Have Complied
GAI GPS Aided INS HDD Heads Down Display
GAMA General Aviation HDDR High Density Digital Recorder
Manufacturers Association
HDOP Horizontal Dilution of
GATM Global Air Traffic Precision
Management System
HEL High-energy LASER
GBAS Ground-based Augmentation
HFOV Horizontal Field-of-View
System
HFR Height Finder RADARS
GBS Global Broadcast Service
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Fields
GCE Ground Control Element
HMD Helmet Mounted Displays
GCI Ground Controlled Intercept
HMI Human Machine Interface
GCU Gun Control Unit
HMS Helmet Mounted Sight
GDOP Geometric Dilution of Precision
HOP Head Orientation and Position
GFE Government Furnished
Equipment HOTAS Hands on Stick and Throttles
GFI General Format Identifier HP High Precision
GLONASS Russian Federation Ministry HPRF High PRF
of Defense Global Navigation HSFLIR Head Steered Forward Looking
Satellite System Infra-red
GLS GNS Landing System HSI Heading Situation Indicator
GMR Ground Mobile Radio HSPI High Speed Peripheral Interface
GMTI Ground Moving Target HTS Helmet/Head Tracking
Indicator Systems
GMTT Ground Moving Targat Track HUD Heads-Up-Display
GMU GPS Monitoring Unit
I
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite
I/S Interference to Signal ratio
System
I2 Image Intensification
GPS Global Posining System
IADS Integrated Air Defense
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning
System
Systems
IAG Inertially Aided GPS
GRAS Australian Ground Based
Regional Augmentation System IAS Indicated Airspeed
GRI Group Repetition Interval IBIT Initiated BIT
GTRI Georgia Tech Research Institute ICAO International Civil Aviation
Organization
H ICD Initial Capabilities Document
HARM High Speed Anti-radiation ICD Interface Control Document
Missile ICS Intercommunications System
HAT Height Above Touchdown IDE Identifier Extension
List of Acronyms xxvii
IDS Interface Design Specification J

IFAST Integrated Facility for Avionic J/S Jamming to Signal Ratio
Systems Testing JAA Joint Aviation Administration
IFF Interrogate Friend or Foe JAUS Joint Architecture for
IFOV Instantaneous Field-of-View Unmanned Systems
IFR Instrument Flight Rules JDAM Joint Direct Attack
IGI Integrated GPS/INS Munition
IJMS Inadvertent Jettison Monitoring JEM Jet Engine Modulation
System JETDS Joint Electronics Type
ILS Instrument Landing Designation System
Systems JIC Joint Intelligence Center
ILS Integrated Logistics JPL Jet Propulsion Lab
Support JSF Joint Strike Fighter
INCITS International Committee for JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target
Information Technology Attack Radar System
Standards
JTA Joint Technical Architecture
iNET Integrated Network-Enhanced
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information
Telemetry
Distribution System
INFO Information
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
INS Inertial Navigation System
JTT Joint Test Team
IOFP Interim Operational Flight
JU JTIDS Unit
Program
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence
IOT&E Initial OT&E
Communications System
IPF Interference Protection
Feature K
IPT Integrated Product Teams KEAS Knots Equivalent Airspeed
IR Infrared KPP Key Performance Parameters
IRCCM Infrared Counter-Counter KSA Key System Attributes
Measures KTAS Knots True Airspeed
IRLS IR Line Scanner
L
IRNSS Indian Regional Navigation
LAAS Local Area Augmentation
Satellite System
System
IR-OTIS Infrared Optical Tracking and
LAN Local Area Network
Identification System
LANDSAT Land Remote Sensing
IRS Inertial Reference System
Satellite
IRST Infra-red Search and Track
LANTIRN Low Altitude Navigation and
ISAR Inverse SAR Targeting Infrared for Night
ISM Industrial, Scientific and LARS Launch Acceptability Regions
Medical
LASER Light Amplification by
ITV Inert Test Vehicles Stimulated Emission of
IU Interface Unit Radiation
xxviii List of Acronyms
LCD Liquid Crystal Display MDD Materiel Development Decision

LDU Link Data Unit MDT Mean Down Time
LED Light-emitting Diodes MDTCI MUX Data Transfer Complete
LEMV Long Endurance Interrupt
Multi-inteklligence Vehicle MEL Master Equipment List
LEO Low Earth Orbiting MEO Medium Earth Orbiting
LLC Logical Link Control MFA Multiple Filter Assemblies
LNAV Lateral Navigation MFD Multi-function Display
LOA Letter of Authorization MFL Maintenance Fault List
LORAN Long Range Navigation MFOV Medium Field-of-View
LORO Lobe-On Receive Only MFR Multiple Frequency Repeater
LOS Line-of-Sight MIAA Multiple Intruder Autonomous
LPI Low Probability of Intercept Avoidance
LPRF Low PRF MIDO Manufacturing Inspection
District Office
LPV Localizer Performance with
Vertical guidance MIDS Multifunctional Information
Distribution System
LRF LASER Range Finder
Mil-Std Military Standard
LRIP Low Rate Initial Production
MIP Mean Impact Point
LRR Long Range RADAR
MISB Motion Imagery Standards
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
Board
LSB Least Significant Bit
MIU High Speed Media Interface
LTE Launch to Eject Unit
LTM LASER Target Markers MLC Main Lobe Clutter
LWIR Long Wave Infra-red MLS Microwave Landing System
MMEL Master Minimum Equipment
M List
MAC Media Access Control MMR Multi-mode Receiver
MagVar Magnetic Variation MMSI Miniature Munitions/Stores
MAJCOM Major Command Interface
MAL Maximum Aperiodic Length MMW Millimetric Wave
MALD Miniature Air Launched Decoy MNPS Minimum Navigation
MASPS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards
Performance Standards MOA Measures of Assessment
MAU Medium Attachment Unit MOAT Missile-on-Aircraft-Test
MBIT Maintenance BIT MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MCP Micro Channel Plate MOP Measures of Performance
MDA Minimum Descent Altitude MOPS Minimum Operational
MDB Measurement Descriptor Performance Standards
Blocks MOS Measures of Suitability
List of Acronyms xxix
MPAD Man-Portable Air Defense NCS Net Control Station

MPEG Motion Pictures Experts NCTR Non-cooperative Target
Group Recognition
MPRU Missile Power Relay Unit NDB Non-directional Beacon
MRA Minimum Release Altitude NED North, East and Down
MRC Minimum Resolvable NETD Noise Equivalent Temperature
Contrast Difference
MRDT Minimum Resolvable NFOV Narrow Field-of-View
Temperature Difference NIMA National Imagery and
MSB Most Significant Bit Mapping Agency
MSI Mission Store Interface NMSU New Mexico State University
MSL Mean Sea Level NOTAM Notices to Airmen
MSOT&E Multi-service OT&E NPG Network Participation Groups
MSPS Minimum System NRZ Non Return to Zero
Performance Standards NRZI Non Return to Zero Invert
MTBCF Mean Time Between Critical NS No Statement
Failure
NTR Net Time Reference
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
NVD Night Vision Devices
MTF Modulation Transfer Function
NVG Night Vision Goggles
MTI Moving Target Indicator
NVG Night Vision Goggles
MTR Moving Target Rejection
NVIS Night Vision Imaging Systems
MTSAT Multi-function Transport
Satellite O
MTTR Mean Time to Repair OA Operational Assessment
MUH Minimum Use Height OBEWS On-board EW Simulator
MWIR Mid-wave Infra-red OBS Omni-bearing Selector
MWS Missile Warning System OCRD Operational Capability
Requirements Document
N OEM Original Equipment
NACK Non-Acknowledgments Manufacturer
NAD North American Datum OFP Operational Flight Program
NAGU Notice Advisories to OI Operational Instruction
GLONASS Users OLED Organic LED
NANU Notice Advisory to Ops Specs Operations Specifications
NAVSTAR Users OPSEC Operations Security
NAS National Airspace System OPTEVFOR United States Navy Operational
NAVAIRINST Naval Air Instruction Test and Evaluation Force
NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical ORD Operational Requirements
NBRN Narrow Band Repeater Noise Document
Jammer ORT Operational Readiness Test
xxx List of Acronyms
OT Other Traffic PR Pulse Repeater

OT&E Operational Test and PR Preamble
Evaluation PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency
OTH Over-the-Horizon PRI Pulse Repetition Interval
OUE Operational Utility Evaluation PRN Pseudo Random Noise
OUI Organizationally Unique Jammer
Identifiers P-RNAV Precision Area Navigation
P PSG Periodic Synchronization Gap
PA Physical Address PSSA Preliminary System Safety
PAL Pilot Assist Lock-on Assessment
PBIT Power-up BIT PSTT Pulse Single Target Track
PBIT Periodic BIT PUF Probability of Unsafe Flight
PC Personal Computer PVU Position Velocity Update
PCM Pulse Code Modulation PW Pulse Width
PD Pulse Doppler PWD Pulse Width Discriminator
PDA Premature Descent Alert Q
PDOP Positional Dilution of Positional QOT&E Qualification OT&E
PF Pilot Flying QZSS Quazi-zenith Satellite System
PFD Primary Flight Display
R
PFI Primary Flight Instruments
R&M Reliability and
PFL Pilot Fault List
Maintainability
PIC Pilot in Command
R/C Receipt/Compliance
PID Packet Identifier
RA Resolution Advisory
PIRATE Passive Infrared Airborne
RA Raid Assessment
Track Equipment
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging
PK Probability of Kill
RAIM Receiver Autonomous
PLD Program Load Device
Integrity Monitor
PMA Program Management Activity
RAM RADAR Absorption Material
PMC Partially Mission Capable
RAT Ram Air Turbine
PNF Pilot Not Flying
RCR Raid Count Request
PoC Proof of Concept
RCS RADAR Cross Section
POC Point of Contact
RD Random Doppler
POT Position and Orientation
RE Radiated Emission
Tracker
RelNav Relative Navigation
PPI Plan Position Indicator
RF Radio Frequency
PPLI Precise Participant Location
and Identification RFI Returned for Inventory
PPS Program Performance RGPO Range Gate Pull-Off
Specification RH Relative Humidity
List of Acronyms xxxi
RHAW RADAR Homing and S

Warning SA Source Address
RIM Range Interface Memorandum SAE Society of Automotive
RLG Ring Laser Gyro Engineers
RML&A Reliability, Maintainability, SAM Situation Awareness Mode
Logistics Supportability, SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
and Availability
SAR Search and Rescue
RMS Root Mean Square
SAR Synthetic Aperture RADAR
RNASP Routing Network Aircraft
SAS Stability Augmentation
System Port
Systems
RNAV Area Navigation
SATCOM Satellite Communications
RNP Required Navigation
SAW Selectively Aimable Warhead
Performance
SCATI Special Use Category I GPS
ROC Required Obstacle Clearance
Landing System
ROIC Readout Integrated Circuit
SCMP Software Configuration
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle Management Plan
RRN Recurrence Rate Number SCR Signal-to-Clutter Ratio
RS Radiated Susceptibility SD Start Delimiter
R-S Reed-Solomon Encoding SDI Source/Destination Identifier
RSAM Repeater Swept Amplitude SDU Secure Data Unit
Modulation
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air
RSS Root Sum Square Defenses
RTC Required Terrain Clearance SEAM Sidewinder Expanded
RTCA Radio Technical Commission Acquisition Mode
for Aeronautics SFAR Special Federal Aviation
RTO NATO Research and Regulation
Technology Organization SFD Start Frame Delimiter
RTO Responsible Test SG Synchronization Gap
Organization
SICP Subscriber Interface Control
RTP Real-time Transport Protocol Program
RTR Remote Transmission Request SID Standard Instrument
RTS Request to Send Departures
RTT Round-trip Timing SIGINT Signal Intelligence
RTZ Return to Zero SIL Software Integration Lab
RVR Runway Visibility Range SINPO Signal strength, Interference,
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Noise, Propagation disturbance,
Minima Overall rating
RWR RADAR Warning Receiver SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol
Router Network
RWS Range While Search
SLB Sidelobe Blanking
RXD Received Data
xxxii List of Acronyms
SLC Side Lobe Clutter STC Supplemental Type Certificate

SLC Sidelobe Cancellation STC Sensitivity Time Constant
SLS Side Lobe Suppression STI Speech Transmission Index
SMP Stores Management Processor STT Single Target Track
SMPD Single-carrier Modulation SUAV Surrogate UAV
Photo Detector SUT System Under Test
SMS Stores Management System SWAG Scientific Wild-ass Guess
SNAS Chinese Satellite Navigation SWIR Short Wave Infra-red
Augmentation System
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio T
SOA Service Oriented Architecture T&E Test and Evaluation
SOF Start of Frame T/R Transmit/Receive
SOJ Stand-off Jamming TA Traffic Advisory
SOT Start of Transmission TA Traffic Alert
SOW Statement of Work TA Terrain Avoidance
SP Standard Precision TACAN Tactical Air Navigation
SPADATS Space Debris and Tracking TAD Towed Air Decoy
Station TADIL Tactical Digital Information
SPIE International Society for Link
Optical Engineering TAE Track Angle Error
SPIE Society of Photographic TAMMAC Tactical Area Moving Map
Instrumentation Engineers Capability
SPJ Self Protection Jamming TAS True Airspeed
SQAP Software Quality Assurance TAS Traffic Advisory Systems
Plan TAWS Terrain Awareness Systems
SRB Safety Review Board TC Type Certificate
SRR Substitute Remote Request TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision
SSA System Safety Assessment Avoidance System
SSE Static Source Error TCP Transmission Control
SSEC Static Source Error Protocol
Correction TD&E Tactics Development and
SSI Software Support and Evaluation
Integration TD. Time Difference
SSM Signal/Sign Matrix TDI Time Delay Integration
SSV Standard Service Volume TDMA Time Division Multiple
STANAG Standing NATO Agreement Access
STANAG NATO Standardization TDS Technology Development
Agreement Strategy
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival TEC Total Electron Content
Routes TER Triple Ejector Rack
List of Acronyms xxxiii
TERPS U.S. Standard for Terminal TTPF Target Transfer Probability

Instrument Procedures Function
TF Terrain Following TVE Total Vertical Error
TFP Terrain Following Processor TWS Track While Scan
TFT Thin-film Transistor TXD Transmitted Data
TG Terminal Gap U
TI Thermal Imager UAS Unmanned Aerial System
TI Transmit Interval UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
TIA Type Inspection Authorization UCAS Unmanned Combat Air
TIM Terminal Input Message System
TIP Tetrahedral Inertial Platform UDP User Datagram Protocol
TIR Type Inspection Report UR Utilization Rate
TIS Traffic Information Service USAARL US Army Advanced Research
TIS Test Information Sheets Laboratory
TLAR That Looks About Right USAF United States Air Force
TM Telemetry USB Universal Serial Bus
TmNS Telemetry Network System USN United States Navy
TOA Time of Arrival UTC Universal Time Code
TOGA Takeoff and Go-around UV Ultraviolet
TOM Terminal Output Message V
TPIU Transmission Protocol V Voltage
Interface Unit
V/H Velocity to Height Ratio
TPWG Test Planning Working Group
VA Visual Acuity
TQ Time Quality
VandV Validation and Verification
TRB Test Review Board
VCS Visually Coupled System
TRSB Time Reference Scanning
VDOP Vertical Dilution of Precision
Beam
VFOV Vertical Field-of-View
TSB Time Slot Block
VFR Visual Flight Rules
TSDF Time Slot Duty Factor
VGPO Velocity Gate Pull-Off
TSE Total System Error
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network
TSEC Transmission Security
VNAV Vertical Navigation
TSO Technical Standard Order
VOR VHF Omni-Directional Range
TSOA Technical Standard Order
Authorization VORTAC VOR/TACAN
TSPI Time Space Position VOT VOR Test Facility
Information VS Velocity Search
TSS Test Summary Sheets VTAS Visual Target Acquisition
TTNT Tactical Targeting Network System
Technology VVI Vertical Velocity Indicator
xxxiv List of Acronyms
W WRA Weapons Replaceable

WAAS Wide Area Augmentation Assembly
System WSAR Weapons System Accuracy
WC Word Count Report
WCA Warning, Caution and WSEP Weapons System Evaluation
Advisory Program
WFOV Wide Field-of-View WWI World War I
WGS World Geodetic System WWII World War II
WILCO Will Comply X
WOW Weight on Wheels X-EYE Cross Eye
WOW Weight off Wheels X-POLE Cross Polarization
CHAPTER
What is Avionics Flight Test

and Why Do We Need It 1
Chapter Outline
1.0 Avionics Flight Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Flight Test Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Flight Test Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 The Need for Flight Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Classifying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6 Contractual Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.7 Test Team Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8 Team Member Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9 Understanding Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.10 Contractor and Subtier Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.11 Customer Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.12 Formulating the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.13 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.14 Selected Questions for Chapter 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.0 AVIONICS FLIGHT TEST

There is little written on the specific subject of avionics and weapons systems testing,
but there are articles and tutorials available that address the general subject of testing
and experiments. One source on testing is The Logic of Warfighting Experiments, by
Richard A. Kass (Washington, DC: CCRP Press, 2006), which is available online at the
time of this writing at http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Kass_Logic.pdf. The U.S. Air
Force, and in particular the 46th Test Wing at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, has been
promoting the use of ‘‘design of experiments’’ (DOE) as the preferred method of con-
structing and analyzing test programs. As a reference, the reader is encouraged to read
any of the numerous papers on this subject by Gregory T. Hutto and James M. Higdon.
The most recently published is American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA) paper 2009-1706, ‘‘Survey of Design of Experiments (DOE) Projects in
Development Test CY07-08,’’ which is also available online at http://pdf.aiaa.org/
preview/CDReadyMTE09_2104/PV2009_1706.pdf.
1
2 CHAPTER 1 What is Avionics Flight Test and Why Do We Need It
1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The flight test community as a whole has been driven to do more with less in recent years.
It has been forced to become more efficient with the available dollars for testing and
evaluation. In the past, flight testing was divided among three separate groups of testers:
● Contractor flight testing
● Development test and evaluation (DT&E)
● Operational test and evaluation (OT&E)
Each of these groups was assigned a charter and was responsible for the testing and
reporting of their respective tasks. There was a bit of overlap of tasks and, as a result,
some of the testing was repetitive; different results from similar tests sometimes led to
heated confrontations. In all fairness, the test communities from each of these groups
were seeking to evaluate similar tasks from different perspectives.
Contractor flight testing of avionics systems is first and foremost developmental in
nature. Perhaps as much as 90% of the test program is dedicated to development,
whereas the final 10% is the ultimate demonstration of the finished product. Even this
demonstration is a ‘‘test to spec program,’’ where the contractor is on the hook to show
specification compliance. Completion of the program, and therefore payment, is con-
tingent upon this successful demonstration. It should be obvious that the contractor
will be reluctant to perform any testing that is above and beyond specification com-
pliance (performance testing, for example), since this will reduce the time available for
specification compliance testing. The contractor is also not being paid to demonstrate
performance.
Development test and evaluation (DT&E) is chartered with ensuring that the system
under test is indeed ready for operational test and evaluation (OT&E). Since OT&E is
interested in the true performance and functionality of the system under real-world
scenarios, the DT&E community is saddled with a rather large burden. DT&E has to
validate the specification compliance testing previously done by the contractor and then
accomplish sufficient performance testing to ensure that OT&E will not dismiss the
system outright. Specification compliance verification is used as a baseline; additional
performance testing would be moot if the system cannot perform to specifications.
Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) has no interest in specification compliance
verification and is only interested in the system’s capability to perform the desired
mission. For example, OT&E was interested in the ability of the F-14D to perform fleet
defense, not in its ability to detect a nonmaneuvering target at high altitude at some
specified range. The latter is a specification compliance issue and not a performance or
operational utility issue. In many cases, OT&E would determine that the specifications
were so poorly worded that the system, although it met the specifications, could not
perform the mission. Of course, the opposite is also true; the system may fail to meet
specification compliance but is found to be acceptable in meeting mission requirements.
The existence of these three independent organizations necessitated three periods
within the master schedule for flight testing. In fact, most test programs included the
contractor test period interspersed with DT and OT periods. These DT and OT periods
were scheduled at major milestones within the schedule coinciding with incremental
capabilities of the system. These periods lasted for weeks, and sometimes months,
and severely impacted contractor development testing, because during these periods
software was frozen and further development work was halted. The rationale here was to
not allow the contractor to fritter away all of the test and evaluation (T&E) monies
without periodic progress checks. This rationale worked fine as long as the T&E sche-
dule was not shortened and development proceeded as expected. In reality, the test
schedule was always shortened and development was always lagging. These real-world
developments caused considerable consternation among the three groups, since none of
the test organizations had any inclination to giving up scheduled test time.
In the mid-1980s, an idea to combine some of the testing among the three groups
was floated to the test community. The idea was to incorporate some or all of the DT&E
testing with the contractor testing. This way the separate DT&E test periods could be
absorbed by the contractor test periods and thereby shorten the total T&E effort. The
contractor would simply have to include the DT&E test objectives in the contractor test
plan. Since the objectives would be combined, the next logical step would be to combine
the test teams. It was from this initial proposal that the Combined Test Force (CTF),
Joint Test Team (JTT), or any of many other names this union was called was born. Note
that these were not integrated product teams (IPTs); they will be addressed later.
The initial CTFs had some growing pains. The first attempts at participatory flight
testing simply deleted the DT&E test periods and shortened the T&E effort accordingly.
Unfortunately, the contractor test periods were not expanded, even though it was
expected that they would wholly incorporate the DT&E effort. In the ideal world, many
of the DT&E test objectives and test points would match one for one with the contractor
test plan (specification compliance). In the real world, the DT&E community structured
its testing to try and accomplish both specification compliance and performance with the
same test objective. This created quite a dilemma for the contractor test organization,
especially since, during this period of cooperation, no one changed the contracts. Con-
tractors were still bound to satisfy a contract that was rooted in specification com-
pliance; there were no stipulations for additional testing. Contractor test teams were
routinely caught in the middle of the ‘‘customer satisfaction’’ and program direction
battle. On the one hand, they tried to incorporate the customer’s testing; on the other,
they were accountable to program management to test only what was in the contract.
There were other ancillary problems which became evident during these phases of
joint testing. Since testing would be combined, the teams would be combined. This idea
would have been a good one if it had not been tinkered with. the premise of this idea was
that consolidation would save money. The most obvious savings were reaped by elim-
inating the DT&E periods. A second method of savings, courtesy of the accountants,
was the elimination of manpower due to consolidation. Contractor test teams were
reduced by the number of DT&E personnel which were assigned to the JTT and vice
versa. Once again, the charters of each of these organizations were never adjusted, so the
workload remained the same, but the manpower was reduced. Each organization was
still responsible for such things as data reduction, analysis, and generation of test
reports. The contractor organization was still responsible for the instrumentation of the
aircraft, formulation of the test plan, telemetry station setup, and engineering unit (EU)
conversion of data. Additional tasks of training new DT&E members and converting
data into a format usable by the DT group was added.
As time went on, it was determined that even more time and money could be saved
if the OT&E community was also brought into the fold and a true CTF could be formed.
Problems similar to those previously presented rose anew. One unique problem with this
setup involved the specific charter of the OT&E community. Any member of the OT&E
community will tell you that they are chartered by the U.S. Congress to ensure that the
taxpayers are getting what they pay for and the users are getting a system that is capable
of performing the designated mission. This is an integral part of the checks and balances
of the acquisition system, but it leads to serious problems when trying to consolidate the
test community. How can the OT&E testers be melded with the CTF and still retain their
autonomy? In reality, operational testers have everything to gain and nothing to lose in
this situation. They will not give up their dedicated periods of testing and are able to
interject special testing into the combined test plan. This special testing is over and
above the development/specification compliance test plan.
The greatest problem with consolidation is the failure of all team members to
understand that avionics testing programs, by nature, are developmental. That is, soft-
ware-dependent systems are incremental. There is no such thing as 100% software (full
system capability), especially with the initial deliveries. If this fact is understood, spe-
cification compliance and validation testing will never be performed early in a program.
In fact, this testing should occur at the end of the program. The differences between
development, demonstration, qualification, and performance are covered later in this
chapter. OT&E organization and testing is covered in chapter 14.
1.2 FLIGHT TEST ORGANIZATION

Ideally flight test should be an independent organization (i.e., not reporting to the
Engineering Department) tasked with impartially evaluating and reporting on a vehicle
or system. the discussion here will address avionics and weapons systems. The per-
sonnel within this organization should be knowledgeable of the system under test. They
should understand the basic operation of the system, the interfaces with other avionics
systems aboard the aircraft, and where and how the system will be employed. In addition
to basic knowledge of the system, the tester must also be knowledgeable of applicable
system specifications. Specifications may be defined as the minimum standard to which
the system must perform. Many of the MIL-STD specifications we have been familiar
with in the past have given way to minimum operating capabilities, desired objectives,
or essential elements of capability (EEC). It should be noted that the specifications for a
program were probably formulated many years earlier by individuals who may no longer
be involved with the program. The specifications may be poorly written or, worse yet, be
seemingly unattainable. These problems lead to a more difficult task of test plan pre-
paration for the flight test community. An example is the inputs to the cockpit design by
the Pilot’s Working Group. In many test programs, a Pilot’s Working Group is estab-
lished during the design phase to solicit input from operational users for the design of
controls, displays, and the human machine interface (HMI). These inputs are used by
design engineers and incorporated into the final product. Five years later, when the
pilots have all moved to different assignments and the system enters flight testing, no
one can fathom the reason for the display presentations.
It is with these specifications that we must formulate the foundation of our test plan.
Above all, this organization of testers must have the ability to ‘‘call somebody’s baby
ugly.’’ This is a whimsical way of stating that the organization has the ability to remain
independent of Development Engineering and maintain objectiveness and impartiality.
Some flight test organizations within corporations and defense agencies are organiza-
tionally within the Engineering Department. This is unfortunate because the Engineering
1.3 Flight Test Objectives 5
Department more often than not is responsible for designing and implementing the
system. It is pretty hard to call somebody’s baby ugly when you and the baby have the
same father.
In the ideal world once again, the flight test organization will be a composite test
team. This team will put aside all parochial interests and focus on the common goal.
Members of the team would include flight test engineers, aircrew, and analysts from the
contractor and customer development and operational test organizations. These mem-
bers will provide the core of the test structure. In addition to flight test engineers, the
team may include the design engineers, who act as consultants and provide the technical
expertise. There may be some vendor or subcontractor engineers for those unique sys-
tems not designed by the primary contractor—an inertial navigation system (INS) or
radar, for example. Instrumentation personnel also provide a key role on the team,
ensuring that data are available in a format that is usable. Site support personnel such as
maintenance, integrated logistics support (ILS), and range support provide an orderly
flow to test operations.
1.3 FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES

Perhaps the most important goal of the flight test team is to validate that the system
being tested meets the customer’s needs and requirements. We are not validating the fact
that the customer knows what they want, but rather that our system will fulfill their
requirements. This is accomplished by ensuring the top-level specifications are satisfied
and by performing some measure of system performance testing. In an avionics pro-
gram, the first step is to identify system problems and anomalies. Some readers may
know this portion of the program as ‘‘fly-fix-fly,’’ which indeed it is. Unfortunately,
once again, there are some acquisition experts who believe that fly-fix-fly is a product of
an age long since passed. With all of our investment in state-of-the-art simulators, some
believe that all problems can be worked out in the laboratory prior to the flight test,
hence there is no need for a fly-fix-fly or development program. This tenet is, of course,
ridiculous to those who have been involved in the testing and evaluation of avionics
systems.
Along with the identification of problems and anomalies comes providing trouble-
shooting assistance. The most helpful thing a flight test engineer can do in the area of
troubleshooting is to provide data. It cannot be emphasized enough that the identifica-
tion of problems is only half of the job. If a problem is presented to an engineer without
proof (a picture of the baby), it has a very small chance of being corrected in a timely
manner. Flight test engineers should live and die by data; it is the fruit of their labor. In
addition to providing data, the test engineer should be ready to assist with the problem
resolution. The test engineer should be the closest individual to the problem. It was the
engineer who should have designed the test, then collected, reduced, and analyzed the
data. Yet they are quite happy to report that a problem exists in a system without
assisting in finding a solution to the problem. As mentioned previously, engineering
judgment is issued to you at graduation. It is OK to act like an engineer and provide an
educated guess as to where the problem lies and how it can be fixed.
In many cases, problems can be as simple as a busy bit being set continuously. An
obvious solution might be to reset the bit. The flight test engineer should know this
by looking at the data. The design engineer, upon hearing of the problem, but without
supporting data and the flight test engineer’s insight, may spend as much time
researching the problem as the test engineer in order to come to the same conclusion.
This may seem a trivial matter, however, if multiplied by a large number of anomalies,
one can see how the system can easily be bogged down. This logjam can be broken up
with good flight test engineering.
The final goal of the test team should be fair and accurate reporting of all tests
conducted and the results obtained. These reports should document the system perfor-
mance versus specified requirements and must be supported by the data. Once again, the
independence of the organization is critical in providing an impartial report.
1.4 THE NEED FOR FLIGHT TEST

The previous section addressed the foolishness of eliminating the fly-fix-fly concept
from flight test planning. Some quarters feel that there is no need for flight testing at all,
and here is a good place to put that issue to rest. Simulation and laboratory development
are excellent tools in placing a system into service. In fact, experience has shown that
approximately two-thirds of all problems discovered in an avionics program are found in
development labs and simulators. This is an excellent method for reducing flight time,
and with the advent of more aircraft-representative development labs, the percentages
should increase, but to what degree? Avionics systems are becoming increasingly
complex, with hard-to-simulate dependencies on other avionics systems and environ-
mental conditions.
There are two major drawbacks to labs and simulators. The first hurdle is the lab’s
approximation of the aircraft; space constraints, lack of available flight-qualified hard-
ware and software, and line runs/losses between line replaceable units (LRUs) are a few
examples of laboratory limitations. Real-world variables such as acceleration, vibration,
acoustics, and loads cannot be adequately modeled without collecting flight data first.
The second hurdle is the simulation itself (i.e., simulation is not real; it is a simulation).
Simulations cannot account for all real-world dynamics. It would be impossible to
evaluate the human factor implications of a system’s operation in moderate turbulence
in a simulator; these are things normally discovered during actual operation in a flight
test environment. Attempts are made to make the simulations as real as possible, how-
ever, the number of variables can be astronomical. These considerations are responsible
for the number of ‘‘lab anomalies’’ that are seen in all flight test programs. Even more
interesting is the fact that some functions fail in lab testing and pass in flight testing, and
some which are successful in the lab may fail on the aircraft.
Simulations can be compared to software development. As a rule, most simulations
are not developed by the user, and the programmers attempt to keep as many variables as
possible constant in the algorithms. Man-in-the-loop simulators can reduce the problems
caused by nonusers developing the simulation. The second problem is a little trickier to
reduce. The number of variables that can affect an algorithm can be large. A simulation
attempting to replicate the real world would entail developing a program that would be
quite complex. The simple bombing problem which follows demonstrates how the
variables can multiply very rapidly if we attempt to replicate real-world situations.
If we attempt to drop a bomb from an aircraft with the intention of hitting an
object on the ground, the pilot must consider a number of variables which directly
affect the impact point. The first of these variables involves the ballistics of the bomb.
1.4 The Need for Flight Test 7
These ballistics determine the flight characteristics of the bomb. By knowing how the
bomb will fly, downrange can be computed by knowing where in space the bomb was
released (altitude, airspeed, g, and attitude). If the pilot deviates from any of these
desired conditions, the impact point of the bomb will change. Lead computing sights and
target tracking boxes on today’s fighter aircraft compute a constantly changing impact
point based on changes in the input variables.
If a programmer wants to simulate these conditions, he has to take into account the
four variables mentioned. But are there only four variables? Altitude can be above
ground level (AGL), mean sea level (MSL), or height above the ellipsoid (utilizing any
one of a number of earth models). Airspeed is measured in three axes, normally North,
East, and Down, or East, North, and Up (depending upon the aircraft convention).
Affecting velocity is wind and wind gusts, also measured in three axes. Acceleration (g)
is also measured in three axes. Attitude refers to the pitch, roll, and yaw of the platform;
the true attitude of the platform may differ from the reference the platform is using for
the computations (INS, global positioning system [GPS], attitude heading reference
system, etc.). By taking all of theses components into account, the number of variables
grows to 12 or more. If assumptions are made—the pilot will always be at the correct
altitude, 1g level flight—the computations for the simulation become much simpler.
Although the preceding example may be an oversimplification of how simulations
are developed, it does explain the principle. By eliminating variables, the simulation
becomes easier and the coding more manageable. On the flip side, the simulation becomes
further removed from the real-world aircraft. The infrared (IR) signature of an F-5 aircraft
at a given aspect in clear air on a standard day is probably well known, but that same F-5
flying in desert haze over mountainous terrain in August is probably not known. It is
probably not known because all of the variables have changed and cannot be accounted
for in a simulation. The only way a database can be built for a simulation would be to
collect a massive amount of data for varying terrain, haze, and temperature conditions.
This is performance data that can only be obtained in a flight test program.
One last example: radar detection and classification of rain. If the capability of a
radar to detect rain is a requirement, it may be advantageous to test this capability within
the confines of a lab. After all, the size of raindrops and reflectivity based on frequency
are known quantities. The problem with this task is that no attention has been given to
the terrain that the rain is falling over. The performance of the radar will change if the
terrain is a runway, forested, a sand dune, mountainous, or the ocean. A massive data-
base would have to be obtained for varying rain rates over various terrains in order to
quantify true radar performance or specification compliance. Once again, a flight test
program would probably be more efficient than creating an additional test program for
the purpose of collecting rain data.
In today’s test environment, labs, simulators, and flight tests coexist and work
together in order to meet program goals. Simulations and mathematical models
attempt to predict system performance to the extent of their own capabilities, and are
excellent tools for discovering gross anomalies in the system. Flight tests provide data
on functions that cannot be evaluated in the lab, and the data that are collected can help
to validate or improve the models used in the lab. A constant supply of real flight data
allows the models and simulations to mature and become better predictors of system
performance. It can be reasonably assumed that simulation will never supplant flight
testing. It is also readily apparent that flight testing should not be undertaken without
first undertaking extensive lab evaluation.
1.5 CLASSIFYING THE PROGRAM

Avionics test programs are of two types: subsystem/system development and system
integration. Subsystem/system development encompasses the development and laboratory
testing of a new or improved avionics system. An example of this classification would be
the development of a new airborne radar or the development of an upgraded radio system.
System integration is the type of program which most flight test engineers are familiar
with. These programs entail the installation and integration of a proven system into an
existing platform. A prime example would be the installation of GPS into an AV-8B. GPS
is a proven system, more than likely provided as government-furnished equipment (GFE).
A full-scale development (FSD) program may consolidate these two programs under one
umbrella where there is some new development as well as system integration. FSD pro-
grams are becoming increasingly rare, as military services and corporations are electing to
direct monies to upgrade programs rather than the development of new airframes.
Examples of recent FSD programs are the F-35, A-400 and the F-22.
Unlike vehicle programs (when the term ‘‘vehicle programs’’ is used it refers to
performance and flying qualities programs and analog-type systems such as hydraulics,
fuel, pneumatics, etc.), avionics programs deal extensively with software. This implies
that the program will be incremental in nature; software is never delivered to test with
full system capabilities. In fact, there may be many deliveries, or builds, sent to the test
organization. If we take the case of radar software in a subsystem/system development
program, the deliveries may be scheduled as
● Build A: raw sensor development

● Build B: system integration
● Build C: weapon support
● Build D: special modes
● Build E: reliability/maintainability/qualification/sell-off
In this scenario, the first delivered build to the test community (Build A) will con-
tain only basic capabilities for the radar. The system will not play with the other aircraft
systems and may be good only for a ‘‘smoke check’’ (turning the system on does not
cause a fire) in the aircraft. Build B allows for system integration, which may provide
the first opportunity for viewing radar information on the displays, employing basic
radar modes, and possibly establishing track files. The system will not support weapons
nor will it feature special modes such as frequency agility. Build C is the first oppor-
tunity for the radar to support weapons delivery and a missile in flight. Build D provides
all radar functions with the exception of final sell-off and qualification. Build E is the
sold-off version of the radar software and will have been subjected to all environmental,
mean time between failure (MTBF), and false alarm tests.
The schedule of these deliveries is normally determined at the start of the program
and will drive the conduct of the flight test program. In the previous example, the
deliveries may be scheduled at 6 month intervals for a 3 year test program (6 months of
tests per delivery). Figure 1.1 shows the relationship of radar development to the overall
schedule.
1.6 Contractual Requirements 9
Vendor Development Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ FIGURE 1.1 ¢

(Builds A Through E) Software Delivery as
Contractor Integration Δ Δ it Affects Flight
Testing
Contractor Software Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ
(Builds 1 Through 5)
Development Flight Test Δ Δ
Demonstration Flight Test Δ Δ
DT/OT ΔΔ
The figure also shows the interdependence of the flight test organization on the
contractor and vendor software deliveries. The integration contractor must await a new
radar software delivery prior to proceeding with its own integration work. This inte-
gration work will entail melding the radar software with the aircraft software. A soft-
ware release for testing by the contractor will include the last version of radar software
received. Should any of these milestones (D) slip, one of two things must happen:
1) Each successive integration or test period must move to the right; or 2) Each suc-
cessive integration period or test period must be shortened by the length of the slip. For
those individuals working integration, the news is not bad; the integration period merely
slips to the right. For those individuals performing flight testing, the news may not be so
good; the flight test period may be shortened by the length of the slip.
The rationale is not that hard to comprehend. The milestones after the flight test
period (in our case, DT/OT) are the final milestones on the master schedule. These
milestones indicate a few things. The first is that this is the end of the program and this is
where the customer will make a final decision on the product. The second implication is
that this is where the money typically runs out. Both of these scenarios are true and they
dictate that the final milestones after flight testing are generally prohibited from moving
to the right. It is OK to move to the left, and this is seen quite often when budgets seem
to be overrunning and costs need to be trimmed. Therefore the first rule of avionics
flight testing is that, for testers, the final milestone must never move to the right. As
flight testing is compressed to the right, certain testing may be deleted and some func-
tions may not be evaluated at all. This is a problem for flight testers if they do not
address the problem with program management. Program management must be advised
that with a reduction in testing comes a reduction in confidence level. Confidence level
is your belief in the accuracy of the data you provide in the final report. Most flight test
programs are estimated based on an 85% to 90% confidence level. A reduction in the
amount of data collected will cause a reduction in confidence, and this fact needs to be
included in the final report.
1.6 CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS

Whether you are a civilian contractor or a Department of Defense (DOD) tester, each
flight test program has contractual obligations that must be met. A contractual item that
your organization may be responsible for may be an interim or final report. In the
civilian world, responsibilities of the test organization may be found in the contract data
requirement list (CDRL) section of the contract. Each CDRL item has an associated
data item description (DID) which explains in detail what the contractor is required to
submit, in what format, to whom, when, and how many copies. DT&E and OT&E
organizations are typically required to submit interim and final reports on the system
being tested. Format and submittal of these CDRLs is governed by regulations or pro-
cedures. As each test program becomes more and more consolidated, the responsibility
for meeting the CDRL submittal will fall to the CTF. Some programs have moved away
from the formal specification compliance submittals common in past programs. These
programs have attempted to define system performance in terms such as a statement of
objectives or essential employment capability (EEC). Although the names and termi-
nology have changed, the responsibility for reporting progress and performance to the
customer is still a requirement.
Depending on the program, the first report that may be delivered to the customer is
an instrumentation list. As mentioned previously, compliance and performance can only
be proven when substantiated with data. The instrumentation list provides a list of all
parameters that will be collected, reduced, and analyzed during the program in order to
meet this goal. In addition to data parameters taken directly from the aircraft or system
under test, the list must also include data parameters that will be used for ‘‘truth.’’ This
list includes parameters that are obtained from pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding
systems, data busses, and other data collection systems, along with their respective data
rates or sample sizes, accuracy, and scaling factors.
In addition to identifying the parameters that will be used for compliance or per-
formance assessment, the customer is also interested in how you intend to manipulate
the data. You must provide signal conditioning information, data reduction routines,
filters, and processing algorithms in order to show that the data will not be over-
massaged. If data are to be obtained in real time, the customer will want to know merge
routines, sample rates, and if there is any data latency or senescence in the processing
system. The time alignment system you have chosen, system time (GPS, satellite,
manual), and clock drift should also be provided.
A newer report that has routinely been requested in recent programs is the weapons
system accuracy report (WSAR). This report is delivered in two sections, one at the
beginning of the program and the other at the completion of the program. The first
section deals with the accuracy of the time space position information (TSPI), or truth
data. As systems become more and more accurate, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to provide a truth system which is at least four times as accurate as the system under test.
Yes, four times as accurate (which is the second rule of avionics testing). In many cases
we are forced into using some form of sensor fusion in order to obtain the accuracy we
require. The customer may request that sensor fusion routines, accuracies, filters,
weather corrections, and earth models used for truth be provided in this report. The
second phase of this report is issued after the test program has been completed, and
addresses the overall system accuracy based on the results of testing. For example,
although the accuracy of a GPS is 15 m while on the bench, after being integrated into
our platform the accuracy may now be 17 m. The 2 m degradation can be a result of
many things: timing, latency, senescence, update rates, etc. Regardless, the total system
performance is 17 m, and that is what will be reported.
The submittals that most test engineers are already familiar with are flight test plans
and reports. Flight test plans are submitted prior to the start of the actual test program
1.7 Test Team Composition 11
and are normally subject to the approval of the customer. Depending on the organization
or affiliation, the formats of these reports will vary. Historically, contractors have been
able to submit their test plans in ‘‘contractor format.’’ As CTFs become more the norm,
test plans must fit the format required by the customer. The U.S. Air Force (USAF), as
well as the U.S. Navy (USN), require that the flight test plan conform to a format
specified by regulation. The USN, for example, uses Naval Air Instruction (NAVAIR-
INST) 3960.4B, ‘‘Project Test Plan Policy and Guide for Testing Air Vehicles, Air
Vehicle Weapons, and Air Vehicle Installed Systems.’’
Reports are divided into three categories: pilot reports, flight reports, and final
reports. Pilot reports are normally a requirement for all avionics programs and are
submitted on a per flight basis; these reports are sometimes called dailies in some test
organizations. Depending upon the program, flight reports may or may not be required.
These reports may be required only for the initial flights of the program, all flights of the
program, or may be in the form of status reports which are required after each block of
testing. Final reports are always required, and as with the test plan, may be in either a
‘‘contractor format’’ or customer format. The test community is usually responsible for
the latter two reports, while the test aircrew normally submits the pilot reports. The DID
addresses these requirements, as well as the currency and time period allotted for
submittal.
1.7 TEST TEAM COMPOSITION

Prior to the start of the test program, or even the test planning phase, a coherent test team
must be put into place. Although this sounds like common sense, in many programs it is
often overlooked. As mentioned in section 1.5, flight testing is the last operation in the
program master schedule. As such, funding for flight testing does not ramp up until the
flight test period is imminent. Prior to this funding, a skeleton crew is normally
authorized to perform planning, instrumentation development, data reduction routine
preparation, and scheduling, which is no small task. It is the responsibility of the flight
test manager to present the case to program management in order to obtain the required
funding and manpower early in the program. Failure to do so may cause the flight test
community to be behind schedule, which may eventually lead to failure.
Task teaming needs to be implemented as early as possible in the flight test cycle. It
has been proven on numerous occasions that early teaming is essential to the success of
the program. The first requirement of teaming is to identify all groups that are required
for success. Today’s jargon states that all members who either own or contribute to the
‘‘process’’ need to be included. Once individuals or groups are identified, the team must
identify the goals of the group and team member responsibilities, and assign account-
ability. Most importantly, the group must be colocated. Excessive travel and distance is
detrimental to a group’s progress, and in many cases, actually prevents a team from
carrying out its charter successfully. This situation is best demonstrated if we compare
test site colocation to the children’s game of telephone. In the game, a group of children
is placed in a line and a little ditty is told to the first child, who then whispers it to the
next child. When the last child receives the message, we ask that child to tell us what he
heard. Everyone gets a big chuckle as the child tells us something that does not sound
anything like what we told the first child. This is true when the test team is not colo-
cated; communication gets garbled in transit. This is the third rule of avionics testing.
Whether test facilities are located 2 miles apart or 20 miles apart, the results are always
the same. Communications become garbled when the test group is not colocated.
The task team should outline a new organizational structure at the outset. A team
leader should be appointed and given the responsibility and the authority to carry out the
goals of the team. All too often team leaders are given the responsibility for the team’s
actions, but they are not given the authority required to lead effectively. In this scenario,
we have a built-in scapegoat for anything that goes wrong in the program. This scenario
also weakens a leader’s ability to assign accountability to individuals within the group.
Within CTFs or JTTs, some unique problems may occur with the team leadership. A
CTF or JTT may combine contractor, DT&E, and OT&E testers under one umbrella. In
some cases, an individual from each of the groups may be assigned as a joint team
leader. As the charters of these groups are different, there will be some jockeying for
control of the direction of the team. In the end, it may be the strongest personality that
wins out.
The individuals and groups assigned to the flight test task team are those individuals
previously mentioned in section 1.2: development and software engineering, flight test
engineering, subcontractors and vendors, and DT&E and OT&E customer representa-
tives. Each of these groups have specific responsibilities to the task team and are con-
tributors to the overall goals of the team.
The goals are set by first establishing the priorities of the program. The team must
determine if the program is one of specification compliance, development, or system
performance evaluation, or some combination of the three. Once the priorities are set,
schedules can be developed in order to meet these goals. In formulating these schedules,
it is important for the team to exercise some judgment in realism. A careful review of
similar previous programs should give an indication of how long and how difficult the
program will be. The bottom line is to make schedules realistic rather than optimistic.
The foregoing description may be recognizable as an IPT, which is very much in
vogue today. The premise is the same as task teaming, and in fact, IPTs are an outgrowth
of the task team. The greatest difference is that IPTs are formed for all ‘‘processes,’’ and
have been used in many organizations to improve flow efficiency and, therefore, cut
costs. These teams have been highly effective in areas such as assembly lines and cus-
tomer assistance, but their effectiveness as a tool for the flight test effort is in doubt.
Under an IPT-based flight test program, changes must be coordinated through all
affected IPTs. If, for example, an anomaly is detected during test and a possible solution
is determined by data analysis, the fix and retest may take several months to accomplish.
The problem and fix must first be brought before the avionics IPT, who determine if the
problem and the associated correction are acceptable. Assuming they are acceptable, the
engineering change proposal (ECP) IPT is next to be briefed. This IPT will determine if
the fix is required (i.e., within scope), how much it will cost, the timeline involved, and
if it will fit in the available schedule. If approved, the fix is presented to the software
IPT, which determines if the fix can be done, how much it will cost, the timeline
involved, and if it will fit in the software build schedule. Should the fix make it past this
hurdle, it is then presented to the flight test IPT, who determines if the procedure
requires modification to the existing test program, if additional safety concerns materi-
alize, if additional testing is required, and whether or not the test can be accomplished
within the existing testing budget for that particular system. If it is agreed that the
test can be accomplished, it is forwarded to the execution IPT. This IPT determines
if the test can be accomplished with available resources and test assets and in the
1.8 Team Member Responsibilities 13
available schedule. If approved here, the final stop is the integrated test team IPT, who
determines if the test is in the best interest of the contractor, DT&E, and OT&E. If it is,
then the test is scheduled. Each of these processes is on the order of weeks if the IPTs
meet once a week; the entire iteration is a long and tedious one. When the schedule of
software builds is taken into account, the delivery of the fix may be several months away
if a build was missed while the fix was in the IPT loop. Thus, by establishing an IPT for
each process, we have impeded the progress of flight testing by an order of magnitude.
There are other problems associated with IPT-based flight test programs. Because
there are so many identifiable processes within the flight test community, there tend to
be a like number of IPTs. This phenomenon leads to two distinct problems. The first is
the sheer number of personnel required to staff these teams. The personnel problem can
be handled in one of two ways: either hire more staff or allow the same staff to become
team members of multiple IPTs. Most flight test organizations utilize a combination of
these solutions, and the results are equally disappointing. More personnel are hired to
create a process that is supposed to save money, or personnel are so busy attending to
IPT business that there is no time to perform the actual job of flight testing.
Because of the number of IPTs created, there exists an overlap of responsibilities.
This particular problem is amplified as individuals serve on many different teams. If
there is no one responsible person who can resolve problems between teams, warfare
between the fiefdoms will ensue. Unlike the autocratic flight test of a few years back,
where the program manager controlled the purse strings and had absolute authority,
today’s IPTs are generally independent, with their own budgets. As a result, IPTs tend to
become self-serving and an impediment to the process they were designed to assist.
1.8 TEAM MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES

Each member of the task team is assigned specific responsibilities that must be
accomplished in order to successfully complete the flight test program. Some liberty has
been taken here to identify each member’s (group) responsibilities to the team. Some
organizations may place these responsibilities in different organizations; nevertheless,
all of these tasks must be completed by someone.
Development and software engineering have the primary responsibility for provid-
ing the task team with all applicable documentation. They are tasked with preparing and
maintaining the design, performance, and integration specifications as well as mea-
surement descriptor blocks (MDBs). An MDB is the description of a parameter on the
data bus in relation to where the parameter comes from and where it is going to. It
identifies the 1553 (MIL-STD-1553 military data bus, covered extensively in chapter 3
of this text) message number, word, start bit, and stop bit for every parameter on the bus.
This information is the life blood of the test team, because this is how data are extracted
from the system. For example, if we are testing the radar altimeter, we would have to
know where the parameter ‘‘radar altitude’’ is on the data bus. The MDB provides us
with this information. MDB information is contained in the integration design specifi-
cation (IDS). This specification must be updated with each release, as the locations of
the parameters on the data bus are likely to change with each new release (parameters
are added, deleted, etc.).
The program performance specification (PPS) identifies the total system operation
and is similar to the system operations section of military technical orders (Dash 1 for
the USAF, NATOPS for the USN). When testing a navigation system, it is imperative
that we understand the hierarchy of the systems and what can be expected as navigation
systems gracefully degrade. This information is found in the PPS.
The functional requirements document (FRD) describes the operations that take
place within the system line replaceable unit. This information is important to the flight
tester because it determines what functions will need to be tested. In testing system
compliance, we must know what is happening to the data within the system in order to
determine its performance. An FRD is written for each avionics system in the aircraft
which also describes the hardware interfaces and data flow between modules.
It should be evident that this documentation is mandatory information for the test
team. Instrumentation tasking depends on up-to-date parameter information. In most
programs, the first iteration of these documents will be the last time that the information
is current. Unfortunately, documentation is probably the last priority for development
and software engineering. It is for this reason that a close liaison must be developed
between the flight test team lead engineer and the cognizant engineer. This liaison will
ensure that changes in parameter location and identification are transmitted to the test
team in a timely manner.
In addition to supplying the applicable documentation to the test team, the engi-
neering community is also responsible for a number of other tasks. They are the
responsible agency for accepting and testing government furnished equipment/contractor
furnished equipment (GFE/CFE). All upfront integration testing is conducted by the
engineering group. This task includes the integration of software and hardware on all
GFE/CFE systems, as well as vendor unique systems. They prepare a lab test plan and
conduct the actual lab tests. These tests are normally conducted in an avionics integration
facility (AIF); also known as an avionics integration lab (AIL), software integration lab
(SIL), avionics development lab (ADL), and software support and integration (SSI).
Results of lab testing are furnished in final and interim reports. Successful integration and
lab testing will result in a software release to test. This release will contain the func-
tionality of the software, affected systems, and limitations to test. A final task of the
engineering community is to provide a point of contact (POC) for each system under test.
The flight test engineer’s primary task is to ensure compliance with the top-level
specifications, statement of objectives, or EECs. In order to accomplish this task, they
must formulate a test plan, coordinate the plan through the task team, prepare schedules
to meet the plan, write test cards, brief, conduct and debrief the flight. The flight test
organization is responsible for collecting flight data, reducing it to a usable format, and
analyzing the data with respect to the task team goals. Data analysis provides the basis
for meeting the primary goal. An accurate representation of the results of the test are
provided in interim and final reports. Ancillary tasks are the documentation of anomalies
discovered during the testing phase and assisting in the troubleshooting of these
anomalies with the engineering group. Troubleshooting involves supplying data to the
cognizant engineer as well as attempting to pinpoint the cause of the anomaly. Planning
and retesting after problem resolution as part of the fly-fix-fly evolution, as well as the
formulation of a regression test plan, complete the flight test tasks.
The subcontractor and vendor test representatives provide onsite technical expertise
for their respective systems. These engineers are critical to the test effort, in that most of
the problems experienced during the integration of these vendor systems should have
been seen before in previous vendor applications. They have corporate knowledge for
their systems. Another important task of these representatives is the interpretation of
data collected by vendor-unique data collection systems. Many systems that are devel-
oped by subcontractors contain data collection routines, outputs, and recording instru-
ments that can only be interpreted by vendor-unique data reduction systems. These
systems are highly specialized, and purchasing one may be cost prohibitive. In these
situations, the vendor may also be contracted to reduce and analyze data from this
unique system. This flies in the face of the need for the flight test community to be an
independent organization. In this case, we have the contractor who developed the system
now providing analysis as to whether the system is performing to specifications.
Although this is similar to the fox guarding the chicken coop, safeguards can be
employed in order to ensure the integrity of the flight test process. The simplest way of
avoiding conflict is to assign an individual from the team as a data analyst to assist in the
vendor’s analysis. Personalities play a key role here, as the vendor is naturally going to
be somewhat protective of his system. This is human nature, as DT&E and OT&E
personnel assigned to a contractor test team can attest.
The customer representatives (DT&E and OT&E) should be fully integrated with the
task team. The ideal team will be comprised of analysts from all agencies, sharing the
workload of collection, reduction, and analysis in support of the common goal. In an FSD
program, where multiple systems are being tested, it is not uncommon to have a con-
tractor engineer leading the radar team, a DT&E engineer leading the navigation team, an
OT&E engineer leading the electronic warfare team, a vendor engineer leading the
missile integration team, and so on. In addition to performing analyst functions, customer
representatives normally provide operational aircrew to support the tests and may have
the authority to recommend approval for specification compliance demonstrations.
1.9 UNDERSTANDING TERMS

There is great confusion in the flight test community regarding the true meaning of
terms in relation to a flight test program. One of the first tasks of the task team is to
identify realistic goals. This can be a difficult endeavor if the type of program is not well
defined. Aside from system development or subsystem integration, a tester needs to
know if the program is either development or demonstration (sometimes identified as
‘‘qualification’’). There are major differences between the two, and a failure to realize
the correct type may cause an underbidding of the program by as much as an order of
magnitude. A development program is the type previously described as fly-fix-fly.
A demonstration program entails a proof of specification compliance, with no devel-
opment work involved. It is a straightforward test program whose satisfactory comple-
tion normally is approval for production.
A development program is heavily dependent on the software delivery schedule and
the maturity of each of the releases (that is not to say that hardware deliveries may also
impact program schedules). In this type of program, the primary task of the test team is
to identify problems in hardware and software as early as possible, isolate the cause, and
retest as necessary. Figure 1.2 shows the fly-fix-fly process and its relationship to the
test community. In order to successfully complete any avionics flight test program on
time and within budget, the cycle time of this process must be made as short as possible.
It is readily apparent from the figure that the tester could get into an infinite loop if a
discovered anomaly never gets resolved to 100%. This fact highlights the fourth and
fifth rules of avionics flight testing: 4) the duration of the flight test program is directly
FIGURE 1.2 ¢ Tape Release Flight Development Flight Demonstration

The Fly-Fix-Fly
Functional Does Yes Demo Flight
Process Evaluation It Work? Test
No
Development Issue Problem Analyze

Lab Duplicate Report Analyze Data
Data Submit
Report
Development Problem No Yes

Lab Fix Definition
Does It Work?
Lab Fix Evaluate Fix

Validation In Aircraft
proportional to the duration of the fly-fix-fly process, and 5) no software release is ever
100% mature. In other words, testers must do everything in their power to accelerate the
fly-fix-fly cycle, as well as know when to stop testing a particular function. The decision
to stop the evaluation process on a particular function is one of the most difficult tasks a
tester is presented with. More often than not, liaison with the customer will alleviate
some of these difficulties. The customer (end user) will know better than anyone if the
fleet/squadron will be able to perform its desired mission with less than optimum
performance of the particular function. The tester may also face pressure from the
engineering/software development community, who will be adamant that the function is
fixed in the next build.
I digress a moment here in order to explain what is meant by a software build. The
software build is called many things, and we frequently interchange these expressions in
flight test discussions. This text may also inadvertently use different terminology to
explain this concept. The software build may also be called a tactical release, operational
flight program (OFP), build release, interim operational flight program (IOFP), or
software release. Aside from the OFP, all of these terms relate to an incremental release
of software, with each subsequent release containing more mature functionality. The
OFP is normally released to the customer for operational use (i.e., the test program is
complete), and therefore this term will not be used in our discussions.
The term software build conjures up visions of a floppy disk or nine-track or some
other sort of electronic media used to program the aircraft mission computer. This is true
to the extent that the build normally arrives at the aircraft in some sort of media format,
but it contains much more than mission computer coding. In fact, a software build will
contain code for all processors aboard the aircraft. Figure 1.3 shows a typical example of
a hypothetical software build delivered to an aircraft for test. Avionics build 1.0 contains
all of the software programs for each processor aboard the aircraft. If any of these sub-
builds within Avionics build 1.0 are changed, then the overall build number must also be
changed.
In the case cited in Figure 1.3, the software in Display Processor 1 was changed,
perhaps to correct an anomaly found in testing, which necessitated a change to the
overall software build. Upon closer reflection, it should become painfully obvious why
AVIONICS BUILD 1.0 AVIONICS BUILD 1.1 FIGURE 1.3 ¢

Mission Computer 1 MC1.0 Mission Computer 1 MC1.0 Software Build
Mission Computer 2 MC2.1 Mission Computer 2 MC2.1 Contents
Display Processor 1 DP1.0 Display Processor 1 DP1.1
Display Processor 2 DP2.0 Display Processor 2 DP2.0
Radar Signal Processor R1.2 Radar Signal Processor R1.2
Radar Display Processor R D2.0 ANY CHANGE Radar Display Processor RD2.0
EW Processor E3.5 EW Processor E3.5
Stores Management Processor S1.0 Stores Management Processor S1.0
Navigation Processor N2.0 Navigation Processor N2.0
Command Launch Computer C5.1 Command Launch Computer C5.1
the fly-fix-fly cycle is normally a slow, tedious process. If any small change in the
subsystem software requires a major build release, it is more efficient for the software
community to collect a group of changes and incorporate all of these changes at once. In
this way, only one major release is required instead of the many it would take by
incorporating changes as they come in. Although good for the engineering software
community, this logic can be a killer for the test community. Testing often comes to a
grinding halt while testers await new software.
How then can we accelerate the development cycle in order to complete the test
program on time and within budget? One way is to allow the testing to continue with
software patches. A patch allows a specific portion of the software to be modified
without impacting the entire build. This method allows testing to continue with fixes that
ordinarily would not be seen until a new software release. A problem with this philo-
sophy is that eventually all of these patches must be incorporated into a major release.
This process is known as a software recompile, and it can create serious problems for the
software tester. After a recompile, serious regression testing must be accomplished on
the new build to ensure two things: 1) that all of the patches were incorporated correctly
in the new release, and 2) and most difficult, to determine if any other portion of the
code was affected by the incorporation of these patches. Remember that patches do not
affect the entire build because they are only written for a specific portion of the soft-
ware; they can be thought of as an addendum to the code. The recompile, however,
replaces code. Regression testing in the lab will determine the extent, if any, of the
impact of patch incorporation. Experience has shown that software recompiles that
incorporate large numbers of patches are functionally inferior to the software they
replace, and two or three iterations may be required in order to regain that functionality.
Historically the U.S. Navy has allowed patches on avionics integration programs,
whereas the U.S. Air Force is currently not allowing patches.
It should also be remembered from the previous discussions that data acquisition
software is also dependent on software releases. Each software release will entail
changes to the software used to collect data. The data acquisition routines that are used
for the current software release may only be good for that release. Subsequent releases
may require updates to these routines, and a new version number must be assigned with
each new release. The data acquisition routines are married with the software releases
and are cataloged for future reference. This is configuration management, which will be
addressed in a later chapter.
Now that software releases are understood, we can continue our discussion on the
differences between development and demonstration programs. In addition to the fly-
fix-fly concept of the development program, there are other objectives that the test
community must address. The flight test team will validate engineering test results. That
is to say, the team will determine if the systems in the aircraft work the same as in the
lab. Section 1.4 touched on this issue briefly while addressing the need for flight testing.
The development test program validates the lab simulations and mathematical models as
well as provides flight data to enhance these simulations. Since there will be many
conditions and functions that are not testable in the lab, the development test community
incorporates these functions in the flight test plan. The development team also has the
responsibility of uncovering any design discrepancies not found in the lab, providing
data, and supporting the troubleshooting of anomalies. The final task is to incorporate
the refly effort into the flight test plan and account for regression testing.
Diametrically opposed to the development test program is the demonstration, or
qualification, flight test program. In this type of program, the tester’s responsibility is to
ensure that the system is compliant with the applicable specifications. It is often
assumed, albeit wrongly, that there is no development work required for this type of
program. A program is usually deemed as demonstration when proven hardware/soft-
ware is to be installed in a proven aircraft or if a decision is made that all development
work will be accomplished in the lab. There are fallacies in each of these assumptions;
the latter was debunked in section 1.4. Although proven hardware/software is being
installed in the proven test bed, there is still the small matter of integration which must
be addressed. An installation of a MIL-STD-1553 compatible tactical air navigation
(TACAN) system into an aircraft today is much more involved than previous tasks of
ripping out an old system and widening the hole for a new system. Avionics systems of
today are not stand-alone. These systems must communicate on the bus with more than
one system and are required to interface with the host aircraft’s software design proto-
cols. If this task were as simple as it sounds, then GPS integration into any aircraft would
not take upwards of a year to complete. If a mistake is made, and a development pro-
gram is classified as demonstration only, it is likely the budget will run out a quarter of
the way through the program or some serious compromises will have to be made.
Historically the ratio of development to demonstration is 4:1, and this is the sixth basic
rule of avionics flight testing.
Even though there is no such thing as a demonstration-only avionics flight test
program, the tasks associated with a demonstration program must still be satisfied.
Normally the program will be set up for development and demonstration, with the
demonstration tasks being held back until development is complete. Demonstration is
extremely important, because 99% of the time, final payment is based on successful
completion of the qualification phase (the contractual obligations have been met). In this
phase, the test community is responsible for ensuring that the system can satisfy the top-
level specifications. These top-level specifications identify the minimum level of
acceptable performance. In the past, top-level specifications were the degree to which
the system had to be demonstrated and were used as the basis for formulating the flight
test plan. In today’s environment, many of the top-level specifications have been
replaced with design objectives or EECs. Although the names have changed, the
essential information and requirements remain the same for the test community. It is
imperative that testers understand the demonstration requirements, for without them the
program can not be intelligently planned.
Normally, top-level specifications are of the MIL-STD variety and are very specific
as to what the avionics systems are and how they should perform. An example of a top-
level specification is MIL-D-8708B(AS); the AS stands for ‘‘as supplemented.’’ This is
the specification for fighter aircraft and identifies all of the possible systems that may be
incorporated into an aircraft. MIL-D-8708 has many addenda, and each of the addendum
represents a particular aircraft. Addendum 100, for example, refers to the F-14D. The
addenda instruct the reader as to which of the paragraphs in MIL-D-8708 are applicable
to a particular type of aircraft. The addenda also refer the reader to a subsystem docu-
ment if there are further specifications to be met. For example, under Radar in Adden-
dum 100 to MIL-D-8708B(AS), the reader is referred to a radar specification, SD-4690.
SD-4690 contains the specifications to be met by the aircraft-specific radar; in this case,
the APG-66. SD-4690, in turn, refers the reader to another specification that contains
additional specifications for the APG-66 operating in special modes. This document is
classified SECRET and therefore cannot be included in SD-4690. This third document is
SD-4619. This flow of documentation is typical of specifications for military and federal
agency avionics systems. It is important for the tester to understand this flow and not be
deceived into thinking that specification compliance is meeting the objectives of
the basic specification (in this case MIL-D-8708B(AS)). The following is an example of
the level of detail a tester might expect to see in these specifications:
● MIL-D-8708B(AS), Addendum 100 might state:

‘‘the onboard radar shall be able to detect and track targets in the pulse Doppler
mode.’’
● Referring to the same paragraph in MIL-D-8708, SD-4690 may state:

‘‘the APG-XX radar shall detect and track a 2 square meter target at 35,000 ft
with a total closure of 1200 knots under maneuvers to 5g at a range of 95 nautical
miles in the pulse Doppler mode.’’
● SD-4690 may in turn refer the reader to SD-4619, which may state:
‘‘the APG-XX radar shall detect and track a 2 square meter target at 35,000 ft
with a total closure of 1200 knots exhibiting angle deception noise swept
amplitude modulation (NSAM) at a range of not less than 50 nautical miles with
elevation and angle accuracy of not less than 1.5 in the pulse Doppler mode.’’
Each of the cited paragraphs above are bona fide requirements that must be
demonstrated by the test team. If the tester elects to only demonstrate the basic speci-
fication (MIL-D-8708), the test plan is going to be very simple and very incomplete. The
plan would be so simple in fact that the total test program would not be much longer
than one flight, and that flight would basically be a ‘‘smoke’’ check of the radar. As long
as the radar did not burn up after it was turned on, it would probably meet the specifi-
cations. The second paragraph is more representative of what the test plan should be
built on, as it calls for some performance numbers that must be verified. The third
paragraph is even more specific and requires more test planning and effort in order to
meet the desired specifications. Each of these paragraphs is a mandatory criteria that
must be demonstrated. Satisfaction of the basic specification does not meet specification
compliance for the system.
The foregoing discussion should trigger some thinking; prior to initiating any test
planning activity, an in-depth review of the specifications must be accomplished. If this
review is not accomplished, and all of the test requirements are not known, serious
underestimation and underbidding of the program will occur. On a related note, consider
the effect of a poorly written specification on the quality of the product. If the basic
specification is the only specification issued, would we expect the same product as if we
had issued all three specifications? In some quarters, the answer is yes. Some agencies
honestly believe that if contractors are given only the minimum guidance, they will
produce the best possible product to meet the customer’s needs. It is believed that there
is no so such thing as a ‘‘lying, cheating contractor,’’ and given half a chance, the
contractor will work miracles. The thought process is to release the contractor of the
burden of specifications and let them build the best product possible in the shortest
possible time. Obviously it is the contractor who knows best how to build the best
system. The problem, of course, is what happens at the end of the flight test program
when the money and assets are gone and the system is not exactly what the customer
needs? All the contractor needs to do is point to the contract, and the lack of detail, and
say the contract has been satisfied. The customer really has no options for recourse
except to deny future contracts. This points out the fact that the customer ultimately
‘‘owns’’ the risk in a development program. The customer must ensure that the
requirements are accurate, complete, verifiable, and fully understood by the contractor.
On the other hand, requirements equate to cost, so the customer should not have more
requirements than is absolutely necessary.
This is not to say that this scenario will happen; however, the option is there and
customers may wind up paying twice for a system they desire. Contractors, as a rule,
will not offer this concept to their subcontractors, and this leads us into the next dis-
cussion on contractor and subcontractor specifications.
1.10 CONTRACTOR AND SUBTIER

SPECIFICATIONS
In addition to validation of the top-level specifications previously discussed, the test
community is also tasked with the responsibility of validating contractor and sub-
contractor specifications. These are sometimes called subtier or C-level specifications
and are used to guide the design of avionics systems and their interfaces with other
avionics systems aboard the aircraft. For the sake of completeness, A-, B-, and C-level
specifications can be defined as
● A-level: high-level customer requirements.
● B-level: requirements levied on the prime contractor (perhaps withholding some
margin, or removing some requirements the customer might choose to delay until
future variants).
● C-level: the specification documents the prime contractor levies on subcontractors.
The IDS, PPS, and FRD were addressed in section 1.8. The prime contractor is
responsible for these specifications. Should the prime contractor subcontract work to
other vendors, an interface specification must be written for each of the systems that
have been subcontracted. These documents describe the interfaces required between
subsystems and prime systems to allow functionality. A simpler way of describing these
documents would be to say that the interface specifications are memorandums of
agreement between the two companies.
1.11 Customer Expectations 21
Since one of the primary jobs of the avionics tester is to validate the travel of data from
the sensor through each of the related LRUs to the final output to the aircrew, they must in
fact validate the interface specifications. Testing may uncover discrepancies or incompat-
ibilities between the IDS and the subcontractor interface specifications. Any incompat-
ibilities will likely cause a failure of the system being tested. At first glance it may appear
as though the system under test is at fault; however, under closer scrutiny we may find that
the system is performing as designed. An example may clarify this point: In one particular
program, the entire avionics system was to perform to class A power specifications. An
electronic system can be designed to operate under three classes of power (A, B, or C).
These classes may be thought of as operation under differences in power quality, transients,
and recovery time. An LRU specified to operate to class A may be required to accept a
larger transient of power for a longer period of time without adverse operation than a
system designed to meet class B power. In our particular example, the specification given
to the subcontractor stated class A power requirements; however, the chart included with
the text was one for class B. The subcontractor designed the LRU to the weaker require-
ment (class B). Of course, the first time the aircraft transferred from external to internal
power, the system dropped offline. Who is at fault? Is the system unacceptable?
To the user, the system is definitely unsatisfactory, yet to the subcontractor, the
system was built as designed and performs to specifications. The prime contractor in this
case is stuck in the middle with ‘‘egg on their face’’ and is forced to fund an engineering
redesign (this particular venture cost the contractor well over a million dollars and a year
of lost time). An avionics flight tester identified the problem and cause, and pinpointed
the documentation error.
1.11 CUSTOMER EXPECTATIONS

The test community’s customer may be the final customer (the buyer) or it may be local
program management. Each of these customers has different expectations of the avio-
nics test program. The final customer will expect, at a minimum, that the top-level
specifications have been satisfied and that all CDRLs have been fulfilled. Since the test
team is more than likely a task team that includes DT&E and OT&E members who were
involved in the test plan preparation, the final customer will also expect some measure
of performance data.
Local program management is a completely different customer than the buyer. Local
program management is tasked with maintaining fiscal accountability and adherence to
the program master plan. Fiscal accountability is easy to understand; there is only x
amount of money allotted to the program and there must be somewhat of a profit margin.
Normally program management maintains a contract-oriented regimen that only permits
testing strictly called out in the contract. Program management is also concerned with
maintaining progress in the test program. Progress is measured against milestones, and
the final milestone is looming ever larger on the horizon. The test community is technical
by design, and communicating with an organization (i.e., program management) that is
not technical in nature can be a frustrating experience.
In order to maintain program discipline and fiscal accountability (and mental
sanity), a constant liaison between the program office and the technical test team
must be maintained. The first consideration in this liaison is maintaining a balance
between the program milestones and technical merit. This can best be illustrated by the
‘‘flight around the flagpole’’ (a flight accomplished for the sole purpose of demonstrating
to the world that your program is alive and well), of which all test programs have been
guilty. Unfortunately one of the methods used to gauge progress in a flight test program is
flight rate; the more you fly, the more progress you are making, and vice versa. One of
the worst things that can happen in a flight test program is for the test vehicle to be on the
ground, either intended or unintended. The unintended portions include weather, main-
tenance, or instrumentation problems, and are nonproductive periods of time that cannot
be avoided. But what happens if the test team suggests that flying be halted for a period
of time so data can be analyzed, or worse, the team needs new software and is devoid of
constructive tests. More often than not, this halt in flying indicates a halt in progress
which can be easily alleviated by a continuance of flying. Therefore the test team is
directed to resume flying (progress). This example may seem silly to some, but rest
assured, it does occur in today’s environment. It is the test engineer’s responsibility to
plead their case to management and present the rationale for standing down. The test
engineer must be prepared to justify every test. Conversely, the test engineer must also be
prepared to explain why a test is a waste of time/money, even while program manage-
ment is demanding that testing start/resume in order to ‘‘show progress.’’
It must also be remembered that flight testing is dependent on the configuration of
the hardware as well as software in the test bed. Asset requirements, hardware as well as
software capability, must be relayed to program management in a timely manner in order
to preclude flying with the wrong configurations. If the test plan calls for testing data link
at a certain period of time and the hardware is not available, the applicable milestones
showing these tests must be moved to the right on the program schedule. Failure to do so
sets up a conflict between the program and the test team when the tests are not complete.
Similarly, when the software does not support the test milestones, a similar scenario will
occur. Above all, it must be remembered that scheduling, briefing, and conducting a
nonproductive mission takes as much time, effort, and manpower as a productive flight.
1.12 FORMULATING THE PROGRAM

Understanding customer requirements, test team goals and responsibilities, and the nature
of the test program allows us to formulate, or estimate, the program. It is important to
realize that undertaking an estimate without first determining these aspects is a recipe for
failure. Each estimate should follow a tried and true methodology: determine the type of
program and the required outcome, determine the assets required to perform the task in
the time allotted, and estimate the task. We have discussed the factors that affect the type
of program and will now address the assets required for the time allowed.
By knowing the nature of the development, demonstration, or performance
requirements of a system, we can set out to identify each of the following:
● The number and type of test vehicles required
● Instrumentation
● Support facilities
● Size and composition of the test team
● Special hardware or software requirements
● Schedule of software releases
1.12 Formulating the Program 23
Normally the number and type of test vehicles are predetermined by program
management, the customer, fiscal constraints, or some combination of these factors.
In estimating a program where the final determination of assets has not been ascertained,
the tester may be asked to propose a number which he feels is necessary in order to
complete the program in the time allowed. The key factor here is time.
It is an excellent idea to first research past programs with similar requirements and
examine the total sortie (flight) count and total time for program completion. This
information is archived in many locations within test organizations and is just begging to
be read prior to a new test program. These past histories probably reside next to the
‘‘lessons learned’’ notes from the same program. Once again, it is unfortunate that many
testers would rather reinvent the wheel than learn from others’ experiences. Past history
and lessons learned from similar previous programs provide invaluable insight into what
can be expected in the program you are estimating if the lessons are applied appro-
priately to the test activity at hand. There are a series of reports available for reference
regarding the aforementioned discussion. The Rand Corporation has been involved with
Project AIR FORCE and has issued a number of reports documenting trends and lessons
learned on T&E projects. The first one that I would like to reference is Test and Eva-
luation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons which was published in 2004
and covers many of the topics previously addressed. The second Project AIR FORCE
report is entitled Lessons Learned from the F/A-22 and F/A-18E/F Development
Programs, Rand, 2005. Quite an interesting read.
Consider the case where a previous radar program spanned 3 years and 300 sorties
and the data time per flight would have been 1 hr. On closer examination, we see that
only one test bed was used for the program, and that the initial schedule called for the
test bed to fly 10 sorties per month. The actual flight rate was something less, about
8.33 sorties per month. This information tells us a great deal about a radar program. It
not only tells us the total number of sorties required, but it also tells us that there should
be some contingency factor of about 20% to account for loss of scheduled sorties from
the plan. This loss could be due to maintenance (scheduled or unscheduled), weather,
software, instrumentation, or personnel problems (sick, holidays, vacations, etc.). If we
used an historical program that was accomplished at Edwards Air Force Base, where
there are on average 330 days of flyable weather, and compare it to a current program
being conducted at Patuxent River, MD, where weather does pose a problem, some
adjustments would have to be made. A contingency of 20% is realistic and can be used
in estimating any avionics or weapons system test program. The numbers also show that
if flight time can be increased or if assets can be added, the total program time will
decrease. If our historical program used an F/A-18C as a test bed and our test bed is an
F-15E, the flight time will indeed be doubled and the program should be halved. Care
must be taken in the amount of time compression we anticipate in a test program. As we
compress time, we place a larger burden on the flight test analysts to turn data around
more rapidly and on software engineering to compress the fly-fix-fly cycle. Either of
these burdens may be eased by increasing manpower, but the incurred cost may out-
weigh the benefit of compressing the test program.
In order to show compliance, troubleshoot anomalies, and report performance,
we must provide data. Data can only be provided if the test bed is instrumented.
A second phase of formulating the program is determining what instrumentation is
required, in what format data should be presented, and whether these data need to be
transmitted to the ground in real time or be postflight processed. In addition, the type of
recording—video and data—needs to be determined, as well as time synchronization

and whether the development lab needs to be instrumented. The PCM format and
whether edited data bus or full data bus will be recorded also needs to be determined.
Each of the items in the instrumentation package directly impacts the length and
cost of the avionics program. Real-time data will shorten the program considerably;
however, the cost may be prohibitive. Actual labor to instrument the aircraft may take
longer than the program allows or equipment may not be available. Special instru-
mentation such as onboard simulators and stimulators have very long lead items and
need to be accounted for in the estimate if they are mandatory for success. As is the case
with test vehicles, the test engineer must be aware of the trade-offs between time,
money, and manpower affected by the type of instrumentation package chosen.
Often overlooked when trying to formulate a test program are the seemingly benign
support facilities. Test range support needs to be addressed, and the level of support that
is necessary for successful program completion needs to be accurately conveyed to the
range directorate. This is addressed in some detail in section 2.16 of this text.
In addition to consolidation of manpower within the test teams, the current policy in
the United States is to consolidate test sites as well. Flight testing of the future may be at
either an East Coast or West Coast range facility. Smaller government and contractor
facilities will be forced to unify under one of these two facilities. Work in this area is
already well under way, and it is yet to be seen who the big winners are.
Nothing is more distressing for a tester than to arrive at a test facility and find out
that there is no place to sit, or there’s no phone or computer access, or that the test article
has to brave the elements because there is no hangar space. All of these scenarios are
distinct possibilities if there was no upfront planning and coordination on the part of
the test team. Do not be lulled into a false sense of security and into believing that since
the test program has been directed to use a designated facility that all is in readiness. In
fact, there are additional costs that need to be accounted for. Other than workspace areas
and telephone and computer access, there are other areas that must be considered and
which are often overlooked.
Clearances and certifications may not be transferable from site to site; unless pre-
coordinated, program clearance at one site does not automatically grant access to
another. The ability to transmit radio frequencies requires a clearance and a deconflic-
tion. In the United States, this is obtained through the regional frequency council; radio
frequencies also cover telemetry frequencies. A clearance to transmit data will also be
required, and in many cases can only be done if the data is encrypted, which can lead to
a cascading list of additional requirements. Encryption requires additional hardware and
software, and in most cases raises the security classification. With enhanced security
comes enhanced security measures in terms of access, storage, and handling. Data must
be logged, controlled, and stored in special facilities and access to the data must be
controlled. Crypto keys are controlled, change from day to day, and require specialized
personnel to load the keys into aircraft and telemetry processors. All of these additional
requirements will have an impact on the cost of the program.
Certification in a particular field, such as hydrazine handling, may not be valid at
the test site, especially if you have a contractor certificate going to a government test
site. Military personnel are not exempt either, because in many cases the Navy does not
recognize Air Force certification, and vice versa.
Data reduction and processing facilities at the test location may not be able to
handle the installed instrumentation system, or the data rate, or support rapid turnaround
1.13 Summary 25
of data. In the worst-case scenario, a test team estimates the length of a program based
on a 24 hr turnaround of data, only to find out later that data will not be available for
analysis for 72 hr. In a similar vein, if data must shipped to the engineering group for
confirmation of results or for troubleshooting purposes and they are located many miles
away, the program will be delayed as well. This can be disastrous to the efficient flow of
the program. There are two options: maintain the schedule even though the data will be
delayed, or slip the schedule to accommodate the delay of data. From our previous
discussions, you know that you are not going to slip the program, because that costs
money. On the other hand, if you maintain the schedule, you will probably be flying
without the benefit of knowing the last flight’s performance. The end result of such a
miscalculation is wasted or lost flights and a program coming to an end without
obtaining all the necessary data. Knowing all of the limitations of a test program, not just
system limitations, is imperative if you intend to be successful.
The requirements for special hardware and software drive the program schedule and
cost. Special instrumentation, such as data bus editors or word grabbers, may cost some
additional funds, but more importantly, they require a long lead time. Times of one year
or more to design, fabricate, install, and test a special piece of instrumentation are not
uncommon. You cannot hinge the success of your program on the acquisition of key
pieces of data if you do not know how you are to capture that data. Never assume that all
data are always available with off-the-shelf, time-tested instrumentation. This is another
reason why instrumentation personnel need to be brought into the program early.
As previously mentioned, knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the
installed software is imperative to efficient testing. Similarly, you must know the
schedule of builds in order to put together a rational schedule. Remember, incremental
builds are the norm in avionics testing, and the length of the test program is directly
proportional to the functional capabilities available in each build. The schedule will also
stretch with the amount of time it takes to fix a problem in the software. How does
today’s tester understand the capabilities and limitations of software? They need to be in
the lab during validation and verification testing long before the software gets to the test
bed. This is the only way a tester can understand the maturity of a software system.
Armed with this knowledge, a realistic schedule can be formulated.
1.13 SUMMARY
Before putting pen to paper or scheduling your first test, it is important to realize that
there are many variables to be considered in the world of avionics systems flight testing.
The rules you may have learned in vehicle testing may not apply. The single largest
difference is that you are dealing with a nasty little item called software. Do not ever
believe the adage that software changes are ‘‘transparent to the user,’’ or that ‘‘we didn’t
change anything in that module.’’ Software has extremely long tentacles, and changes in
one module may affect other seemingly unrelated modules. Scheduling test programs
can be an interesting effort, as there are so many items that can affect them: software
maturity, fix cycle, delivery schedule of builds, data turnaround time, etc. It takes a
tester adequately versed in these parameters to make an avionics test program work
properly. The tester that recognizes these variables, reads the ‘‘lessons learned’’ file, and
applies them appropriately to the test activity under consideration is the one who
will succeed.
Remember the six basic rules when performing avionics and weapons systems
testing:
1. The final milestone (D) never moves to the right.

2. Truth data (TSPI) needs to be four times as accurate as the system under test.
3. Whether test facilities are located 2 miles apart or 20 miles apart, the results are
always the same: communications are garbled when the test group is not colocated.
4. The duration of the flight test program is directly proportional to the duration of the
fly-fix-fly process.
5. No software release is ever 100% mature.
6. Historically the ratio of development work to qualification testing is 4:1.
1.14 SELECTED QUESTIONS FOR CHAPTER 1
1. What are the major differences between vehicle testing and systems testing?
2. Name three major objectives of flight testing.
3. What is a measurement descriptor block?
4. What is the bulk of testing in today’s environment?
5. What is an avionics build (software release)?
6. How come it takes so long to receive new/updated software?
7. Software is incremental. How does this fact affect systems testing?
8. What is a CDRL?
9. What is a DID?
10. What is the difference, if any, between DT&E development, demonstration, and
performance testing?
11. Why are data important when identifying problems?
12. Who has the responsibility of ensuring that the system meets the specifications?
13. What is meant by the term ‘‘composite test team’’?
14. What are ‘‘lessons learned’’ and how do they apply to flight testing?
15. What is fly-fix-fly?
16. What factors affect the length of a system’s flight test program?
17. How would you describe avionics systems flight testing?
18. Name the advantages of using real-time data.
19. What is an IPT? What is its purpose?
20. Who are the key individuals that should be a part of the flight test team?
21. What is OT&E responsible for?
22. Why can simulation not be used in lieu of flight testing?

23. Give three examples of objectives that cannot be accomplished in the simulator.
24. Is combining DT&E and OT&E a good idea? Why or why not?
25. What is a top-level specification?
26. What is the program manager’s purpose?
27. Will there ever be a difference of opinion between flight test and program
management?
CHAPTER
Time, Space, Position

Information 2
Chapter Outline
2.0 An Overview of Time, Space, Position Information . . . ....... ........ ..... 29
2.1 Sources of TSPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 30
2.2 Ground-Based Tracking Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 30
2.3 Radar Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 32
2.4 Radar Accuracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 35
2.5 Geometric Dilution of Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 38
2.6 Earth Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 39
2.7 Theodolites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 41
2.8 Theodolite Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 44
2.9 Global Positioning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 44
2.10 Stand-Alone GPS Receivers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 44
2.11 Inertial-Aided GPS Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 46
2.12 Differentially Corrected GPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 48
2.13 Sensor Fusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 48
2.14 Ranges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 49
2.15 Range Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 49
2.16 Unique Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 50
2.17 Interfacing with the Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 51
2.18 Time Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 53
2.19 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 55
2.20 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 55
2.21 Answers to Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 55
2.22 Selected Questions for Chapter 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ ..... 58
2.0 AN OVERVIEW OF TIME, SPACE, POSITION

INFORMATION
All testing of avionics and weapons systems requires that the tester prove the perfor-
mance of the system under test by measuring its performance against some known
quantity. This known quantity falls under the heading ‘‘truth data,’’ or time, space,
position information, affectionately known as TSPI. The concept is slightly different
29
30 CHAPTER 2 Time, Space, Position Information
from the testing accomplished on the vehicle side of the house. In loads testing for
example, the tester relies on instrumented parameters to determine the ‘‘true’’ bending
and torsion on a member. The accuracy of the result depends entirely on the accuracy of
the instrumentation system. The tester in this case is measuring the truth and comparing
this answer to the predicted results. In avionics and weapons system testing, we still
collect instrumented parameters such as latitude, longitude, and altitude, but we com-
pare them to an outside reference, a truth. This truth is generated by calibrated reference
systems such as cinetheodolites or an on-board global positioning system (GPS). It is
important that our truth system be accurate enough to measure the expected performance
of the system under test. Unfortunately, all too often testers use whatever TSPI system is
available without considering the impact on the results of the test. In some cases, highly
accurate avionics systems are being measured by TSPI systems that are not as accurate
as the system under test! This chapter discusses what systems are available, how the
results can be improved upon, and defines a common-sense approach for identifying
required test assets.
2.1 SOURCES OF TSPI

The first place a tester needs to visit prior to any avionics test is the range directorate.
These are the people responsible for providing the user with truth data. In some orga-
nizations, the range directorate and data support and instrumentation may be the same
organization. You will find these organizations extremely helpful in determining what
sources are available, and more importantly, what accuracies to expect. The novice in
flight testing may want to spend some time with this organization in order to become
familiar with TSPI in general.
There are other sources of information available on the subject as well. Each test
range will be able to provide a range user’s handbook that describes the capabilities, and
sometimes the prices, of the range assets. There are some very good range websites,
unfortunately many of them require government access. One particularly good source
of information is the Defense Test and Evaluation Professional Institute, located at
Pt. Mugu, CA. They have put together a CD-ROM course on TSPI that is very beneficial
and may be available to your organization.
2.1.1 Summary of TSPI Sources

The sources that will be discussed in the following sections, as well as a summary of
their attributes, are contained in Table 2.1. Other subject areas that will be covered are
sensor fusion, ranges, and time alignment.
2.2 GROUND-BASED TRACKING RADAR

Until the proliferation of satellite based positioning systems, the most common form of
TSPI service was provided by ground-based tracking radars. These systems are most
common on U.S. military ranges and have been used for many years. The most common
form of the ground-based tracking radar can trace its origins back to the U.S. Army Nike
2.2 Ground-Based Tracking Radar 31
TABLE 2.1 ¢ TSPI Sources and Attributes
TSPI Source Positive Attributes Negative Attributes Relative Cost Availability

Ground-based 1) Long-range system 1) Accuracy degrades as Moderate Good, available at
tracking radar 2) High x, y, z accuracy range increases most ranges
at short ranges 2) Accuracy degrades as
elevation angle decreases
Film-read 1) Highly accurate in 1) Time-consuming Very high Low, specialized
cinetheodolite x, y, z position processing will cause
delays in receiving data
2) Weather dependent
Optical tracking 1) Highly accurate in 1) Weather dependent High Low, except for
cinetheodolite x, y, z position 2) Limited range specialized weapons
2) High data rates 3) Limited aircraft velocity delivery ranges
in real time
LASER trackers 1) Highly accurate in 1) Weather dependent High Low, except for
x, y, z position 2) Limited range specialized
2) High data rates in 3) Limited aircraft velocity weapons delivery
real time ranges
Stand-alone GPSs 1) Good x, y position 1) Low data rates Very low Plentiful
accuracy if 2) Limited maneuvering
nonmaneuvering 3) Susceptible to signal loss
2) Readily available
Inertial-aided GPSs 1) Extremely good 1) Susceptible to signal loss Low Medium, pods are
velocity and 2) May coast out available at most
acceleration accuracy military ranges
2) Good x, y position
accuracy
Differential GPSs 1) Extremely good x, z 1) Susceptible to signal loss Low Good, most test
positional accuracy facilities
2) If differentially
corrected and aided by
barometric altitude it
is the best TSPI
system available
Hercules Air Defense Systems (Figure 2.1). Many of these systems have been upgraded
to solid-state technology and provide fairly accurate position information to test orga-
nizations. An advantage of the ground-based tracker is its ability to track targets at long
ranges out to the limits of line of sight.
In order to understand the capabilities of this TSPI source, as well as its limitations,
it is important to note the key aspects of radar operation. For any TSPI source, we are
interested in determining true position. In order to determine the three-dimensional (3D)
position of an object in space, we need to determine that object’s latitude, longitude, and
altitude. Radars provide us with a 3D location of an object in space in relation to the
radar pedestal, or ownship location.
The tracking radars we will come in contact with are pulse radars. Radio energy is
directed (transmitted) out of the antenna dish in distinct pulses. The radar then listens
(receives) for the return of these pulses. Since we know that radio energy travels at the
speed of light, we merely multiply the speed of light by the amount of listening time it
FIGURE 2.1 ¢ U.S.

Army Version of the
Nike Hercules
Target Tracking
Radar
takes for the pulse to return and divide by 2 (since the energy travels a roundtrip and we
only want the one-way distance. This computation gives us the range to the target (note
that this is slant range, and not ground range). By knowing the pedestal orientation in
relation to true north, it is an easy task to measure the bearing to the target. This mea-
surement is known as the azimuth. Similarly, if we know the reference of level to the
earth, we can compute how many degrees of tilt are used to detect the signal. This
measurement is called the elevation. If the fixed position of the pedestal is known
(latitude, longitude, and altitude), the measured range, azimuth, and elevation can be put
into a coordinate conversion routine and the detected object’s latitude, longitude, and
altitude can be computed.
Converting range and bearing from a fixed point to a latitude, longitude, and altitude
is a relatively simple procedure. If math is not your forte, there are a number of software
programs available, many of them free on the World Wide Web. Just enter the keywords
‘‘coordinate conversion.’’ If you are receiving data from an established range, you may
request your data in the form of either range, azimuth, and elevation, or latitude, long-
itude, and altitude and the conversion is performed for you.
2.3 RADAR CHARACTERISTICS

There are some considerations the tester must address prior to using a radar as a TSPI
source. The first of these considerations is the ability of the radar to track the target.
In all quotes of accuracy of a ground-based tracking radar, it is assumed that the object
to be tracked is equipped with an onboard beacon. These beacons, which operate in
either the C or X band, allow the ground-based radar to track a point source of radiated
energy. The beacon acts as a transponder. The ground-based radar interrogates the
beacon and the beacon, in turn, responds back to the radar after a set delay. Since the
frequency of the response is the same frequency as the radar, very accurate tracking can
be accomplished. The azimuth and elevation are determined by a passive detection of
2.3 Radar Characteristics 33
FIGURE 2.2 ¢
Effects of RCS on
the Reflectivity of
Radio Waves
the beacon reply and range is measured by the time of the reply. If a beacon is not
available, or the beacon is ‘‘blanked’’ from being seen on the ground by aircraft man-
euvering, the radar must ‘‘skin’’ track, which causes drift and loss of signal return from
time to time, thus degrading the position trace. The problem will also occur if the test
aircraft dispenses chaff (chaff is an expendable described in chapter 9 of this text). This
problem is most severe when attempting to track dynamic targets whose aspect angle,
and hence radar cross-section (RCS), is ever changing. RCS is described in detail in
chapter 8 of this text.
As can be seen in Figure 2.2, the aspect of the target as seen by the radar has a
significant effect on the amount of energy returned to the radar. In some cases, a rela-
tively small change in the aspect may cause a strong return to suddenly disappear and the
radar will transfer tracking to a stronger return from the aircraft, affecting the reported
position. The effect on a TSPI solution is readily apparent—dropouts of the radar track,
that is, a loss of consistency causing an erratic trace. Military ranges in the United States
require aircraft on their ranges to have a beacon installed on the aircraft as a condition of
entry. A consideration for ‘‘stealth’’ aircraft may require that low observable testing be
accomplished on an aircraft not used for systems testing, since those aircraft will be dirty
with the existence of an external beacon.
Some readers may be confused with the terminology of X and C bands. Depending
on your background, these bands (which equate to a specific grouping of frequencies)
may look more familiar if they were called I and G bands, which is the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) standard. Back when radars were being developed, the
‘‘microwave’’ frequency band was broken up into specific groups and labeled with a
seemingly random nomenclature; these are the ‘‘old’’ radar frequency designations. In
reality, the lettering scheme used does have real meaning. L band represents long wave,
whereas S band represents short wave, and C band is a compromise between L and S
bands. Table 2.2 provides the nomenclature and frequency bands for both the ‘‘old’’ and
‘‘new’’ radar frequency designations. Test engineers working with electronic warfare do
not use the ‘‘old’’ designations, but rather use the NATO, or ‘‘new’’ standard: C band
through M band (lowest to highest frequency).
Since we are dealing with radar, it is important for us to understand some of the
properties of radio waves. First, radio waves cannot travel through rocks, buildings, or
other manmade structures. This is important for the tester in determining if there are any
blockage areas that may impede the radar’s ability to track the target. A second property
is that since these are radio waves, they are restricted to a line of sight (LOS) with the
target. Since the earth is curved, flying at a constant altitude away from the radar will
TABLE 2.2 ¢ Radar Band Designations
IEEE US (old Frequency NATO, US ECM

radar designation) Origin Range Wavelength (new radar designation)
W W follows V in 75–111 GHz 400–270 mm M (60–100 GHz)
the alphabet
V Very short 40–75 GHz 700–400 mm L (40–60 GHz)
KA Kurtz (above) 26–40 GHz 1.1–0.7 cm K (20–40 GHz)
K Kurtz (which is 18–26 GHz 1.6–1.1 cm J (10–20 GHz)
German for short)
KU Kurtz (under) 12.4–18 GHz 2.5–1.6 cm
X Used in World War II 8–12.4 GHz 3.7–2.5 cm I (8–10 GHz)
for fire control as an
‘‘þ’’ for crosshairs
C Compromise 4–8 GHz 7.5–3.7 cm H (6–8 GHz)
between S and X G (4–6 GHz)
S Short wave 2–4 GHz 15–7.5 cm F (3–4 GHz)
E (2–3 GHz)
L Long wave 1–2 GHz 30–15 cm D (1–2 GHz)
UHF 0.3–1 GHz <1 m–30 cm C (0.5–1 GHz)
FIGURE 2.3 ¢
Effects of Multipath
on Radar Reception
eventually lead you to be below the horizon; thus none of the radio energy will be
reflected by your aircraft, and hence there will be no target returns. Radio waves are also
refracted as they travel through the atmosphere. This bending is dependent on the fre-
quency employed as well as the atmospherics of the day. We, as users of the data, do not
have to worry about the inaccuracy of the radar pointing angle due to refraction because
an ‘‘index of refraction’’ is applied by the pedestal operators at the site.
A fourth property is the concept of multipath (Figure 2.3). Since radio waves cannot
penetrate solid objects, they are reflected by those objects. The earth happens to be a
very good reflector of radio energy. As a radar attempts to track a target low on the
horizon, it will receive a return from the target (direct reflection) and a second return
from the earth (radio energy reflected from the target which subsequently is rereflected
off of the ground). The tracking radar encounters two problems: first, the phase of the
multiple returns may cancel each other out, depending on how far out of phase they are;
and second, it cannot determine the true target reflection from the rereflected energy
from the earth, thus destroying the tracking solution (elevation accuracy is lost). In some
cases, the aircraft may appear to be below the ground elevation. For this reason, many
ranges will not guarantee radar tracking accuracy at elevation angles of less than 2 .
For the tester, it is important to calculate the minimum altitude allowable for the
aircraft during the flight which will ensure elevation angles to the aircraft of more than
2 . To allow for refraction, it is common for ranges to use a 4/3 earth model which
approximates the effect. If the 4/3 earth model is assumed, a good rule of thumb to
ensure a 2 elevation is that for every 4 nm the aircraft is away from the radar, altitude
must be increased by 1000 ft. For example, if the aircraft is 100 nm from the site, then
the aircraft would have to be at 25,000 ft:
100 4 ¼ 25 1000 ft ¼ 25,000 ft.
It can be seen that there will be a range where it will become impossible to maintain
the required altitude for LOS. It should also be apparent that if the test cards specify a
particular altitude to fly, that will dictate a maximum range allowable due to range asset
restrictions. The good news is that the radar may have a maximum range of 300 nm.
The bad news is that your crew will need pressure suits to maintain the 2 restriction.
2.4 RADAR ACCURACIES

Perhaps the greatest concern for the tester, however, is the actual accuracy one can
expect from the system. All radar vendors deliver the tracking systems with a stated
vendor accuracy. This accuracy is tempered with the caveat that accuracy is based on a
schedule of calibrations. That is, the accuracy can only be guaranteed if the specified
calibrations have taken place. There are some important issues related to calibration.
Pedestal level, surveyed location, radar center of radiation (with respect to the antenna),
and a host of instrumentation errors can all affect data, whether it be a TSPI radar or
testing of a radar system. Often they must be corrected postmission with simple or
complex bias removal. Contact with your range directorate can give you these answers.
There are many types of calibrations, ranging from star calibrations to beacon ran-
ging tests. Many ranges have calibration spots on the taxiways as a final sanity check
prior to takeoff. The accuracies that can be provided are normally found in the range
handbook. The book will state what can be provided to the test community for each
TSPI system available. Figure 2.4 is a sample page from one of these handbooks.
The meanings of each of the columns are pretty obvious. The first column indi-
cates that data being provided is TSPI. The next column provides the user with the
guaranteed accuracy that will be provided as long as the conditions in the remarks
column are met. Skipping over to the remarks column, we can see that a C-band
beacon is required on this range. The maximum range from the pedestal is 125 nm
(not really too good for a ground-based tracking radar). The next two items are really
excuse statements. As mentioned previously, there will be some propagation and
delay errors as well as multipath in all radar systems. Because of multipath, this range
cautions you to remain at elevation angles greater than 2 . In addition to the remarks
FIGURE 2.4 ¢ INSTRUMENTATION RADAR 1

Sample Range
Data Data Activity Output
Handbook Radar Data Products Remarks
Required Accuracy Area Rate
Accuracy
TSPI ⫾0.5 mrad Controlled 20 samples Printouts 1. C-band AN-TPQ-39V-0
azimuth and areas above per second Magnetic tape 2. Beacon-assisted track
elevation 5° elevation Plots 3. 125 nm max range
4. Exclusive of atmospheric
⫾5.0 yards delay and multipath
range 5. Exclusive of beacon delay
and propagation
variations
6. Data degrades
significantly at elevation
angles of less than 2°
section, the chart also tells you where you may operate and what data products and
sample rates are available. The data rate will also affect the accuracy. How far the
aircraft travels between samples and how much it can deviate from a straight-line path
directly dictate the required data rate. Later we will discuss data rates and the impor-
tance of time alignment, but for the time being, try to remember that we would like the
output rate of data to be as high as possible.
The units in the accuracy column may look a little strange to us, as they are not units
that we really deal with in the test community. This is because the radar community is a
little strange and likes to stand apart from the rest of the crowd. The range accuracy is
not too difficult to understand. The chart tells us that for any range out to 125 nm the
error we might expect is no greater than plus or minus 15 ft. This is pretty good accu-
racy, but as stated previously, with a pulse radar with or without beacon enhancement,
excellent range accuracy should be expected because it is a direct measurement.
Azimuth and elevation accuracies are a different bird completely.
The accuracies are given in milliradians, which pilots call mils. But just what is a
milliradian? A milliradian (1 mrad) is equal to 0.001 rad. A radian is an angular mea-
surement, and there are 2p radians in a circle (6.2832 rad ¼ 360 ). The error can be
thought of as an inclusive angle radiating outward from the radar. But as testers, we are
really interested in an error budget; or stated another way, for any point in time, how
accurate is our TSPI? We would really like to know what our total error is, in feet. If we
take an aircrew’s idea of what exactly a mil is, it may enlighten us. To an aircrew, this is
a mil (.). The dot inside the parenthesis, which they call a ‘‘pipper,’’ located at the center
of their aircraft’s target reticle.
To the aircrew, that angular measurement can be represented by a symbol of some
width relative to a fixed distance. To further explain:
● One mil subtends 1 ft at a range of 1000 ft, or as a practical example, a 20 ft
wingspan will be completely covered with a dot which is 20 mils wide at 1000 ft.
This is how pilots can tell the range of an object even without a sensor lock-on. It is
called reticle matching or stadiametric ranging. (It should be noted that in European
countries and in some ground test organizations, the relationship is given as 1 mil
subtends 1 m at 1 km.)
● If we use a radar mile of 6000 ft, 1 mil would subtend 6 ft.

● The example in Figure 2.4 states the azimuth and elevation accuracy of this particular
radar is 0.5 mrad. By using the preceding logic:
1 mil ¼ 1 ft @ 1000 ft
0.5 mil ¼ 0.5 ft @ 1000 ft
0.5 mil ¼ 0.5 ft 6 @ 6000 ft (1 mile) ¼ 3 ft
0.5 mil ¼ 3 ft 50 miles ¼ 150 ft
0.5 mil ¼ 3 ft 100 miles ¼ 300 ft
By using the previous example, a tester can determine the accuracy of this TSPI
system at any point in time. If you are running a particular test and you require 300 ft
accuracy, you must fly no further than 100 miles from the pedestal. This type of infor-
mation can prove to be invaluable in a test situation where the prebriefed setup has to be
moved due to weather, traffic, etc. Where can we go and maintain the accuracy that we
need? What are the ramifications if we conduct a test in an area where the truth data are
determined to be insufficient? We will need to refly the objective, which is sure to make
the program manager’s day. Of course, if you would really like to convert thousandths of
radians to radians to degrees and then complete the triangle to determine the error, you
can. The answer will be the same, just a little bit behind real time.
Unlike range accuracy, which is constant out to the maximum range of the radar,
azimuth and elevation accuracy are completely range dependent. This is because the
fixed angle of the pencil beam (assuming the azimuth error of the radar is equal to the
elevation error) subtends more area with increasing range. This can readily be seen in
Figure 2.5. The cross-sectional area of the radar beam can also be viewed as the max-
imum error the tester can expect. When producing an error budget for the test (maximum
error in the TSPI system), the test engineer must consider the errors in three dimensions.
Since a radar will produce range, azimuth, and elevation measurements, that is where we
will concentrate our analysis. We know the range error is constant and the azimuth and
elevation will vary based on the range from the pedestal. So the error budget can be
imagined as a giant coin in the sky with the depth of the coin equal to twice the error in
range and the diameter of the coin varying with respect to range.
FIGURE 2.5 ¢
Beam Cross-
Sectional Area in
Relation to Range
FIGURE 2.6 ¢ AZ
Radar Radar
Radar Error Budget EL measurement A measurement B
Worst case: Uncertainty is

Aircraft is on the equal to twice the
edge of the beam radius of the circle
Radar-
determined
position
Figure 2.6 illustrates that the error budget is the same for all points within the circle.
The worst case is when the target is anywhere on the edge of the error circle. Radar
measurement A determines and reports the aircraft’s position. In the next measurement,
it again reports the aircraft’s position, but to the right of the first measurement (radar
measurement B). The difference between these two measurements is the uncertainty,
which is equal to the distance subtended by the inclusive angle. As an example:
● What is the error for a radar tracking a target at 100 miles whose azimuth and ele-
vation accuracies are 0.15 mrad?
● 1 mil at 1000 ft ¼ 1 ft
● 1 mil at 6000 ft ¼ 6 ft
● 0.15 mrad at 6000 ft ¼ 0.9 ft
● 0.15 mrad at 100 miles ¼ 90 ft
● Total error budget is 90 ft in azimuth and 90 ft in elevation
In the previous example, it was determined that our radar had an error of 90 ft at a
range from the pedestal of 100 miles. If we were performing an inertial navigation
system (INS) navigation run, and our specification stated that positional accuracy in the
x-y plane must be accurate to within 300 ft, could we perform the test? The answer is not
at 100 miles. Why, you say? We just proved that the radar was accurate to within 90 ft at
100 miles. The answer lies in the realm of confidence. In systems testing, the truth data
must be four times as accurate as the system under test. So in our particular INS test, the
truth must be accurate to 300/4 ¼ 75 ft. This radar can be used as a truth source, but the
test must be performed within 83 miles of the pedestal (75 ft 0.9 ft ¼ 83.33 miles).
2.5 GEOMETRIC DILUTION OF PRECISION

One last concept with regards to accuracy is called the geometric dilution of precision
(GDOP). All TSPI sources have a GDOP, and as the name implies, it is a dilution of
precision based on your reference position to the TSPI source. Accuracy can degrade in
certain quadrants for many reasons. A radar may have accuracy degradation due to
blockage areas. The GPS suffers degradations due to jamming, galactic interference,
multipath, and constellation availability. These degradations can be plotted to give the
tester an idea of where the best coverage is available.
2.6 Earth Models 39
Theodolite Error Analysis (Error in Feet) FIGURE 2.7 ¢

30 4 Cinetheodolite
4 5
3
4 3 GDOP
3 3 4
20 3 2 2 35
2
2 2
1 345 5 5 5
11 44
2 12254354 5 3 3 44 5
10 2 1235432
1 121 1 2 22 3 4 5
2 1 A 1 2 3 4 5
y (Ten Thousands of Feet)
0 2 * B
1 1 2 3 4 5
3 2 Altitude 1000 ft
3 23 2 11 1 2 3 4 5 Error Total
3 3
−10 54 4 44 1 1
2 4 5 Cedar
5 5 3
5433 Pylon
5 2 2 2 3 4 5
4
−20 5 3 3 3 3 4 5 Contour
4 4
5 4 4 5 Identification
5 5
−30 1 5.0
2 10.0
3 15.0
−40
4 20.0
5 25.0
−50
−60
−20 −10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
x (Ten Thousands of Feet)
Figure 2.7 shows the GDOP for a cinetheodolite tracking system. There are a series
of contour lines that are numbered in the figure. These numbers indicate that if you are
within the contour, your accuracy will be the system’s best accuracy, multiplied by the
contour number. If you were flying at point A, you are within contour 1, so your accuracy
would be 1 the stated accuracy of the system. If you were flying at point B, you are
within contour 2, and your accuracy would degrade (or dilute) to 2 the stated accuracy.
Put another way, if your TSPI system can provide a 50 ft accuracy, it can only do so
within the area bounded by the contours for a GDOP equal to 1. As you fly into an area
outside of contour 1 (best accuracy), the accuracy will degrade to a number proportional
to the GDOP contour number. GDOPs for range TSPI systems are provided by the range
directorate. GDOPs for a GPS can be obtained online prior to flight from a number of
Websites, or real time from the GPS itself. NOTE: GDOP is a 3D value. Other dilutions
of precision (DOPs) may be given for a system. For example, a GPS may provide the user
with a horizontal (HDOP), vertical (VDOP), or positional (PDOP) dilution of precision.
If the user is only interested in the horizontal degradation of the GPS (as is the case with
barometric-aided systems), the user would reference the GPS HDOP.
The position of the DOP contours as depicted in Figure 2.7 is also dependent on the
earth model that is being used. We will look at what an earth model is in the next section.
2.6 EARTH MODELS

An earth model is a mathematical representation of the earth. The explanation pre-
sented here is simplistic, and my apologies to the geodesy gurus. For a more in-depth
explanation, I refer readers to any one of a number of texts on the subject. I would
FIGURE 2.8 ¢ Flat Earth Society

Earth Models
WGS-72
NAD-27
WGS-84/NAD-83
FIGURE 2.9 ¢
Earth Model
Differences
recommend Geodesy for the Layman, by Capt. R. K. Burkard (Washington, DC:

Defense Mapping Agency, 1984; available at http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/PUBS_LIB/
Geodesy4Layman/toc.htm).
If we were to draw a picture of the earth, we would have to know the equatorial and
polar radii, and we would have to know the function of the curvature (or flattening) of
the earth. The picture will be a function of the parameters we choose. Mathematicians
have always wanted to define the precise shape of the earth, and it has been an ongoing
quest. Figure 2.8 shows some of the common depictions of the earth.
We started out believing (and some still do) that the earth is flat, and eventually saw
the earth as a spheroid. The spheroid shape was the norm for quite a while, until
mathematicians decided that it was not really round at all, but really an ellipsoid. This
theory was also debunked, and now we believe that the earth is really an oblate spheroid,
or more commonly known as a geoid. The numbers under each of the shapes in the
figure refer to the datum, or mathematical description, of the earth. NAD refers to North
American Datum and WGS refers to World Geodetic System, or World Geodetic Survey
(depending on the document you read). The numbers refer to the year in which the
survey was completed; NAD-27 is the North American Datum, 1927; WGS-72 is the
World Geodetic System, 1972. These datums are by no means universal. Individual
nations and groups of nations use their own unique datum, causing some confusion.
Avionics systems and TSPI systems output position referenced to an earth model. In
addition, charts and maps are printed with reference to an earth model. The problem is
obvious if we superimpose competing earth models over one another.
You can see in Figure 2.9 that the shapes do not match up and there are some areas
where gross differences exist. Attack pilots notice these differences when using GPSs that
are outputting position in WGS-84 and comparing the GPS position to high-resolution
charts referenced to NAD-27. They do not match. There can be differences of up to 1500 ft
2.7 Theodolites 41
when comparing WGS-84 to NAD-27. The differences between WGS-72 and WGS-84
are much smaller, averaging anywhere from a few tens to 100 ft. There is a solution,
of course. Either use a chart that uses WGS-84 datum or output the GPS position in
NAD-27. The important thing to remember here is to not mix apples and oranges.
When testing any avionics or weapons system, ensure that the system under test and the
TSPI are in like earth models. Most countries and test organizations are converting to
WGS-84 as a universal standard, but many maps and charts used by aviators and mar-
iners are referenced to older earth models.
2.7 THEODOLITES
Another device that may be used as TSPI is called a theodolite. It may be either a
cinetheodolite or a laser theodolite. The position of your aircraft is determined by
aerotriangulation of lines of azimuth and elevation or arcs of range. Both systems
capitalize on optical systems that provide excellent attributes of azimuth, elevation, and
range.
2.7.1 Cinetheodolites
There are two types of cinetheodolites: the first is a film-read theodolite that corrects
radar position postflight by reading the film time history of the event; the second
computes the position of an aircraft by aerotriangulation of azimuth and elevation lines
from multiple trackers. In the first case, an aircraft is tracked by a ground-based radar. A
camera is bore-sighted to the radar and records the position of the radar cursor relative to
the tracked aircraft. Postflight, a technician reviews the recorded film and manually
corrects the radar position for each frame to the actual target position. Figure 2.10
depicts the correction process.
As can be seen in Figure 2.10, the radar shows an erroneous position of the aircraft
slightly right and high. The technician applies a delta azimuth (DAz) and delta elevation
(DEl) to the radar position to move the radar to the desired point on the aircraft. This
process is repeated frame by frame for the entire time of interest. Since this is a manual
RADAR POSITION FIGURE 2.10 ¢

Film-Read
Cinetheodolite
AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION CORRECTION
DESIRED POSITION
process, it is very time consuming. A 7- to 10-day data turnaround time is not unusual
for this type of TSPI. It does provide a high degree of accuracy, however, it will cost the
user more in terms of time and money. Figure 2.11 provides a range handbook sample
for a film-read cinetheodolite.
A second type of cinetheodolite uses optics only to track the airborne target. Since
optical systems (cameras) provide excellent azimuth and elevation, but not range (the
radar in the previous example provided the range), a different method must be employed
in order to determine the aircraft’s position. For these systems, multiple optical trackers
are placed on surveyed points and aerotriangulation is used to determine the aircraft’s
position. A minimum of three trackers are needed to obtain the position, and additional
trackers will provide enhanced accuracy. The aircraft flies between these trackers and a
coordinate conversion is performed by the tracking systems to obtain the latitude,
longitude, and altitude of the target. Figure 2.12 depicts the target setup. This system
may also employ postflight film reading (as described previously) to enhance system
accuracy.
FIGURE 2.11 ¢ Data Data

Activity Area Output Rate Data Products Remarks
Instrumentation Required Accuracy
Theodolites
⫾0.3 mrad Weather
azimuth and Within a 10 ⫻ 20 samples Printouts dependent
elevation in 15-mile area per second
real time to the east of Magnetic tape Obstruction to
the range plots the west of the
⫾0.1 mrad shoreline
TSPI
azimuth and
elevation
postflight film
read root
mean squared
(RMS) error
FIGURE 2.12 ¢
Aerotriangulation
Cinetheodolites
Lines of Azimuth and elevation provided by the trackers

2.7 Theodolites 43
Both types of cinetheodolites produce accuracies on the order of 0.1 mrad, about
twice the accuracy of a ground-based tracking radar. Unfortunately this increase in
accuracy is directly proportional to the price of the service. There are also limitations
with these systems not found with radar. These limitations are addressed in section 2.8.
2.7.2 Laser Trackers

Another type of theodolite is the laser tracking system. The laser system is very similar
to the second type of cinetheodolite in that it uses aerotriangulation methods from
known points on the ground. Since the laser is an excellent measure of range, this system
aerotriangulates with arcs of range rather than lines of azimuth and elevation. The
methodology is very similar to another system in everyday use, the GPS. Figure 2.13
shows the difference between the laser tracker and the cinetheodolite.
Lasers provide accuracies comparable to cinetheodolites, on the order of 0.1 mrad.
Figure 2.14 provides a range handbook excerpt for a laser tracking system. In order to
utilize this system, the range directorate must install laser reflectors on the sides of the
test aircraft. These are multifaceted mirrors that provide an orthogonal reflecting surface
at every look angle from the aircraft.
FIGURE 2.13 ¢
Aerotriangulation by
Arcs of Range
Lasers mounted on surveyed points
Lasers provide range
Data Data FIGURE 2.14 ¢

Activity Area Output Rate Data Products Remarks
Required Accuracy Laser Tracking
⫾0.1 mrad Runway Real time: 20 Printouts Weather System
TSPI azimuth and coverage and samples per dependent
elevation over the second Magnetic
station tape Mobile unit
⫾1–3 ft range Postflight: 100 can be
samples per Plots relocated with
second advance
notice and
funding
2.8 THEODOLITE LIMITATIONS

Theodolite systems operate in the optical spectrum and are limited in many ways. The
most obvious limitation is visibility. The target cannot be tracked if it cannot be seen.
The laser will be affected by the amount of moisture in the air, and may provide ranging
to droplets in a rain shower rather than the aircraft. Smoke, haze, fog, and smog all affect
optical systems. Obstructions such as buildings, mountains, and LOS to the target also
affect the visibility. Another obvious limitation is range. Laser trackers are limited in
power as to not injure the aircrew, hence their range is limited. Theodolites are operated
by human operators who must be able to see the target in order to track it. The target
becomes smaller with range and is therefore harder to track accurately. Aircraft speed is
also a limitation, as operator slew rates must be taken into account. Figures 2.11 and
2.14 identify relatively small areas of coverage, which is typical of most theodolite
systems. It is possible to combine a laser rangefinder with a cinetheodolite system that
can provide the user with range, azimuth, and elevation in real time.
2.9 GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

The GPS has proven to be a relatively inexpensive positioning device for the test
community. The basic GPS concept, accuracies, and limitations of the system are
described in detail in chapter 5 and will not be repeated here. It may be advisable for the
reader who is not familiar with the GPS to review the section in chapter 5 and then
return to see how it is used as a TSPI system. TSPI systems that utilize the GPS as a
positioning device may be stand-alone, inertial (INS) aided, differentially corrected, or a
combination of any of these. It is important that testers understand the limitations of the
GPS and have some method of validating the information provided is true and accurate.
Many range directorates have programs in place that validate the output of GPS-based
TSPI and notify the user when GPS accuracies degrade.
2.10 STAND-ALONE GPS RECEIVERS

A stand-alone GPS receiver is the most common and least expensive of all the GPS TSPI
systems. It also has the most problems. The GPS is a navigational system that has been
adopted for use as a TSPI system. In the four previous examples, the TSPI systems
directly measured some or all of the parameters of range, azimuth, and elevation. These
systems are positioning systems because they directly measure the position of an object.
What is the GPS? The only parameter that the GPS can directly measure is time. From
differences in the time a signal was sent to the time it was received, the GPS calculates
range. The computations for position are then accomplished the same way as with a laser
tracker. The GPS does not measure position, velocity, or acceleration. Is the GPS, then, a
positioning system? We really need to examine the outputs of the GPS and determine
where they come from. This can be accomplished by examining the nine-state vector.
All navigation systems output the nine-state vector shown in Figure 2.15.
As previously described, the GPS measures time, calculates range, and uses aero-
triangulation to determine an aircraft’s position. That position is defined as latitude, long-
itude, and altitude. Position in the horizontal plane will be good only if the DOP is good.
2.10 Stand-Alone GPS Receivers 45
Nine-State Vector Parameters FIGURE 2.15 ¢ The

Nine-State Vector
Latitude
Longitude
Altitude
North velocity
East velocity
Down velocity
North acceleration
East acceleration
Down acceleration
Most test organizations require a DOP of 4 or better for the GPS to be used as TSPI.
Assuming the DOP is good, latitude and longitude will be good as well. Due to the
coplanar nature of the GPS constellation (all satellites are in a plane above me), there is
nothing to help bound the error in the vertical (altitude). In fact, most systems, and all
military systems, opt to aid (or substitute) the GPS with barometric altitude. So the
answer to the original question would be ‘‘Yes, the GPS appears to be a positioning
device, but only in the horizontal plane.’’ This is a true statement with some limitations.
The first limitation applies to all GPS TSPI systems as well as all GPSs, and that is
the lack of system integrity within the GPS. No GPS can be trusted unless monitored by
an external integrity monitor. This monitor may be a receiver autonomous integrity
monitor (RAIM), an additional navigation system used to cross-check the GPS, a space
based augmentation system (SBAS) signal, or a differential GPS. A GPS may not be
used as a TSPI system unless one of these monitors is in place.
A second limitation unique to stand-alone receivers is the aircraft attitude. As an
aircraft banks, the visibility of the GPS antenna is impeded and may start to lose
satellites. If the bank angle is increased so the aircraft is now inverted, the system will
not have enough satellites for position determination. As the aircraft is rolled upright,
the GPS must now reacquire the satellites needed for position determination. This sce-
nario defines two problems. If the aircraft is highly dynamic, there are going to be
periods of time where position information is lost. The second problem involves the
number of channels in the GPS receiver. A single-channel GPS receiver will take longer
to reacquire satellites after a dynamic event than a multichannel receiver. An eight-
channel receiver will have an easier time than a four-channel receiver. Total loss, in
time, of positioning information is also a function of the equipment being used.
Another limitation of all GPSs is the iteration rate. The update rate of the GPS is
1 sample per second. Because of this limitation, the along-track error (or uncertainty)
increases with aircraft speed.
Because of these limitations, we can say that stand-alone GPS receivers are ade-
quate TSPI devices for nondynamic applications. Accuracies expected are 15 m x/y for
L1-only receivers and 1 m x/y for L2 receivers. These numbers assume that an external
integrity monitor is in place.
The previous discussions have only addressed the position determination of GPS
TSPI sources, but there are six other states to consider. These six states are the three for
velocity and the three for acceleration. If we had a Doppler GPS, we could directly
measure velocity due to the Doppler shift created by our own aircraft movement and the
GPS signal (the satellites are moving too). Since most organizations do not have this
capability, we will investigate how velocity and acceleration are obtained, and what sort
of accuracies we can expect from them.
Velocity can be obtained from the GPS by calculating the rate of change of position
with respect to time, or the first-order derivative of the position with respect to time. If
the aircraft is flying, the latitude and longitude are always changing. Changing altitude
at the same time complicates the matter. If the system provides outputs of position at a
high rate, such as an INS of about 60 to 90 Hz, our calculation of velocity would
probably be very good. The GPS has an iteration rate of once per second, and a device
using a different reference system aids in determining altitude. The velocity that is
obtained is really not that accurate, especially in any sort of dynamic environment.
Acceleration is the rate of change of velocity with respect to time, or the second-
order derivative of the position with respect to time. Since we have determined that the
velocity is really not that good, one can imagine how good the acceleration might be.
Not very. This makes perfect sense, as the GPS does not directly measure velocity or
acceleration, and measurement of the position has inherent errors. Out of the nine states,
only the horizontal position should be used for stand-alone receivers as a TSPI source,
and then only after considering the limitations mentioned previously.
2.11 INERTIAL-AIDED GPS RECEIVERS

As the name implies, inertial-aided GPS receivers obtain navigational aid from either an
external or internal inertial reference system (IRS) or inertial navigation system (INS).
There are many integrated GPS/INS (IGI), inertially aided GPS (IAG), and GPS-aided
INS (GAI) systems on the market today, and many have been adapted for TSPI use. The
benefits of these systems are obvious, having read the aforementioned discussions.
When GPS information is lost, or degrades to a point lower than the acceptable DOP, the
INS takes over as navigator until GPS integrity/accuracy is regained.
Inertial navigation system theory and flight testing are covered in chapter 5 and will
not be repeated here. Once again, for those readers not familiar with INSs, I recommend
a review of the INS section in chapter 5 prior to continuing on with this discussion.
An INS or IRS (combined in this discussion as just INS) is an acceleration and attitude
measurement system. That is, the INS directly measures acceleration and attitude
(of the aircraft, not the pilot). Note that three of the states in the nine-state vector are
acceleration. Similar to the GPS, the INS must calculate the other states.
The INS calculates the three states of velocity by integrating the acceleration over
time. Unlike the GPS update rate, the INS will sample accelerations at rates greater than
60 Hz. This high sampling rate, and the fact that accelerations are more or less instan-
taneous, allows the INS to calculate a very accurate velocity. The problem for the INS is
its drift rate. The drift rate is a function of several things—gyro bias, heading mis-
alignment, etc.—and all of these things equate to an inaccurate platform alignment. If
the platform is misaligned to true north by 1 mrad, after 100 nm of travel the aircraft
would report its position approximately 600 ft from its true position. The error of the
INS is time dependent, and that is why most specifications call out a drift error in
nautical miles per hour (nm/hr). The good news is that over the short term, the error in
the INS position is pretty small and comparable to the GPS.
An inertial-aided GPS may be implemented in one of two ways. The first imple-
mentation uses GPS as the primary navigator, and GPS position is used to update the INS
at 1-sec intervals. Should GPS information be lost, the INS will take over as navigator until
the GPS DOP improves. The second implementation involves the use of a Kalman filter.
2.11 Inertial-Aided GPS Receivers 47
In this implementation, all available navigation is used to compute a ‘‘system’’ nine-

state vector. The inputs to the Kalman filter are weighted and checked for integrity
prior to being used in the algorithm. Should the inputs fail the integrity check, such as a
high DOP for the GPS, that input is dropped and is not used in the calculations.
There are different schools of thought as to which system is best for the TSPI user.
By far the simplest is the first type, which incorporates GPS positions with INS accel-
erations and velocities. The second is a bit more complicated, and depending upon the
Kalman model implemented, may output degraded GPS positions or INS accelerations
as a result of sensor fusion. Check with instrumentation or the range directorate prior to
using any of these systems to identify the accuracies and limitations of these systems.
For those organizations that do not have dedicated TSPI assets that incorporate
GPS/INS merge, fear not. The implementation can be done on the ground in real time or
postflight and can provide the same accuracies. In order to generate this TSPI, you will
need access to the aircraft’s onboard GPS, INS, and barometric altitude data. You can
then write a TSPI program that may say something like
If the DOP of the GPS is 4 or less,
And the INS Q-factor is greater than 5,
Then output GPS latitude and longitude and INS accelerations and velocities with
barometric altitude.
If the DOP of the GPS is greater than 4,
And the INS Q-factor is greater than 5,
Then output INS latitude, longitude, accelerations, and velocities with barometric
altitude.
If the DOP of the GPS is 4 or less,
And the INS Q-factor is less than 6,
Then output GPS latitude, longitude, accelerations, and velocities with barometric
altitude.
If none of the previous conditions exist,
Then output a warning, ‘‘TSPI FAIL.’’
NOTE: The Q-factor is similar to the GPS DOP. The INS will output a status on
how healthy the system regards itself. This status is normally a Q-factor. The
numerical values run from 0 to 10, with 10 being the best.
Your TSPI program will read the inputs from either the data stream in real time or
from a tape playback postflight and output to the user a TSPI nine-state vector. This is
graphically illustrated in Figure 2.16.
Nine-State Vector Input Parameters FIGURE 2.16 ¢

TSPI Nine-State
Latitude GPS
Vector
Longitude GPS
Altitude Barometric
North velocity INS
East velocity INS
Down velocity INS
North acceleration INS
East acceleration INS
Down acceleration INS
2.12 DIFFERENTIALLY CORRECTED GPS

Differential GPS, which is covered in chapter 5, along with navigation systems and
basic theories of operation, will not be covered here. These systems benefit users
who require very accurate positioning (latitude and longitude) information. The base
station computes a matrix of time errors for all satellites in view. This information
may be data-linked to the aircraft for real-time corrections or applied postflight.
Most range directorates will differentially correct the information postflight.
Corrections can be applied to either stand-alone or aided GPSs. Some systems, such
as the Astec Z-12, have been certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
as truth sources for compliance tests. Accuracies of 1 cm have been demonstrated for
nondynamic applications. Users must be aware of the limitations of these systems.
The base station can only correct for the satellites that it can see, therefore, the
operating range from the base station is a concern. LOS limitations must be known
for users uplinking the correction matrix. When the WAAS is fully operational, TSPI
users will have access to differentially corrected GPS signals in real time without the
need for a base station.
2.13 SENSOR FUSION

Sensor fusion is a buzzword in and around the military communities. One is led to
believe that this is a new development on the cutting edge of technology. In truth, sensor
fusion has been around for many years in the range community. Sensor fusion is the
process of combining multiple sources of data, in our case truth data, and outputting a
result that is more accurate than any one input. The example given in section 2.12 for the
INS/GPS program is an example of sensor fusion in TSPI. Historically we have called
the output a best estimate trajectory (BET). In the case of a theodolite, it is apparent that
the addition of more trackers will provide a more accurate truth. Ground-based tracking
radars can also be improved with sensor fusion. There are some ground rules and
assumptions that must be made when applying sensor fusion.
For example, if ground-based tracking radar is used, we must first assume that a
second radar added to the track will not overlay incorrectly in the same direction at the
same time as the first radar. If it did, then there would not be any benefit to adding
another radar. Figure 2.17 illustrates the sensor fusion of two tracking radars.
Three radars, assuming that none of the three radars overlay wrong in the same
direction at the same time, yields even better results (Figure 2.18).
FIGURE 2.17 ¢
Two Tracking
Radars on the Same
Target
2.15 Range Assets 49
FIGURE 2.18 ¢
Three Tracking
Radars on One
Target
Almost all ranges can provide a BET with multiple TSPI sources. Users should
consult with their respective instrumentation and range directorates in order to ascertain
the accuracies and capabilities available. The next section addresses other concerns that
must be discussed prior to embarking on any avionics test program.
2.14 RANGES
The general topic of ranges is included here because there are many details that must be
addressed prior to prosecuting a test plan. In many cases, a test plan cannot be finalized
until TSPI, range assets, and range procedures have been analyzed. As test planning is
accomplished, the tester will need to periodically contact range personnel in order to
determine if a test can be performed with the assets that are available on the range. In
many cases, tests will have to be modified based on the available assets, or worse yet,
accomplished at another location. This will impact the fidelity of the test as well as the
schedule.
2.15 RANGE ASSETS

The TSPI requirements as well as other unique range services are identified during the
test planning process. Up to this point, we have identified TSPI assets and their expected
accuracies. By knowing the requirement for accuracy, we can easily determine if our
preferred test area can support our requirements. A secondary task that must be
addressed is the ease of scheduling and availability of the required assets. For the
expected time period of our test, are there any scheduled down periods for the assets
we require? What other programs are expected to compete for those assets? What is our
priority in the big-picture scheme of things? All too often, testers expect range assets to
be there whenever they need them and are shocked to learn that they are not available
when asked for at the last minute.
Other than TSPI, what other assets are we talking about? There are a number of
services that we do not normally think of until the day before the test. These services are
addressed here in order to assist in the test planning process.
2.16 UNIQUE SERVICES

Unique services that are available (or unavailable, as the case may be) range from the
obvious to the not so obvious. These services are listed here in no particular order of
importance:
● Bomb Drop and Scoring. In any weapons delivery program the test organization will
require an area to deliver ordnance and have that ordnance scored. In some cases, it
may be desirable to track the store from separation to impact, which will require
additional TSPI support.
● Fuel Lab. A funny thing about testers is their incessant desire to add things to an
airplane. It could be test equipment, instrumentation, or additional systems. The
funny thing about pilots is that they always want to know about weight and the center
of gravity (CG) of the airplane. Weight and balance tests are a common requirement.
● Cats and Traps. Most testers will not ever come into contact with catapult and
arrestment devices or the requirement to use them. For those that do, this is a spe-
cialized test, and equipment is only available at specialized locations.
● Targets and Target Availability. Targets come in all shapes and sizes. They can be
land-based targets, airborne targets, or enhanced ocean-going targets. The targets
may have to be instrumented or able to carry jamming pods. They will probably
require a beacon be installed. They may have to fly high and slow or low and
supersonic. They may range from a fraction of a meter RCS to many thousands of
meters RCS. They may be manned or unmanned. No range can provide all of the
permutations and combinations of targets that testers will require, so it is going to
take some logistical work.
● Chaff. It is a deception device that employs plastic (it used to be aluminum foil) cut
to the specific wavelengths of threat radars. The unfortunate thing about chaff is that
it does not stay airborne. Eventually it falls back to the earth. This creates an envir-
onmental hazard, especially for the little creatures that eat it. Chaff can only be
dropped in specific areas, which can cause problems for the test community.
● Decoy Deployment. As the name implies, this device is meant to deceive threat
radars by either launching or towing a decoy. There are many vendors of these
devices and they go by many names—miniature air-launched decoy (MALD), towed
air decoy (TAD), etc. These devices are all classified either by their shape or the
length of their tether. If these devices are released or cut from the towed aircraft, they
must be over a secure area for recovery. I remember one interesting program in New
York that wanted the test department to ensure that Sunrise Highway and the Long
Island Expressway were closed to traffic when recovering the aircraft. Anyone from
that part of New York knows what a nightmare that would create.
● Missile Firings. Missile firings require that the tester ensure safety over the entire
footprint of the missile. Missiles do not always go where you tell them, so the tester
must map out an area of coverage for any and all contingencies. This can become
quite a large area and exceed many range’s capabilities.
● Anechoic Chamber. Anechoic facilities are invaluable for antenna pattern testing,
electronic warfare integration and testing, and electromagnetic interference and
compatibility testing. The size of the facility, signal attenuation capability, and
2.17 Interfacing with the Range 51
near-field/far-field testing are a few of the requirements that the tester must con-
sider. Scheduling is a major concern, as most facilities are scheduled up to a year in
advance.
● Frequency Allocations. Testers do not have carte blanche to radiate signals as they
see fit. Radiation into free space will require a license (in the United States anyway)
and an available time slot. These are obtained from the Frequency Allocation Council
in your region. Your instrumentation group will probably be most familiar with this
requirement.
● Data Processing. Turnaround time, formats, and availability of real-time and post-
flight processing are major concerns for the flight tester. Any delays incurred in
receiving TSPI data are going to have a deleterious effect on the schedule. Remem-
ber, a good tester is not going to proceed with the test plan until he knows the results
of the current test.
● Control Room. Another area is the availability of a control room with appropriate
communication and telemetry capability to permit real-time execution of the mission.
2.17 INTERFACING WITH THE RANGE

The range is an equal partner in the test planning process. It is imperative that both
parties understand what is required of them in order to successfully complete the project.
This understanding must be more than an oral agreement made over the telephone. One
of the biggest problems that I have seen in the past is merely a lack of communication.
There are many examples of tests that had to be redone because of a lack of under-
standing of what was required for the original test. If the requirements are not specific
enough, the data you receive may be data that the provider thought you wanted, but data
you cannot use. A few common examples of data screw-ups follow.
Suppose that you required the bearing from target 1 to target 2 as depicted in
Figure 2.19.
If you do not tell me what bearing you want, I have to assume a bearing that you
want. In Figure 2.19, the relative bearing to target 2 from target 1’s cockpit is about
015 . The true bearing, however, is about 105 , and if we had about 15 of east variation,
the magnetic bearing would be about 120 . All of these bearings are correct, but they are
all different. Obviously, the wrong parameter will significantly impact your results.
Let’s try another one. In Figure 2.20, what is the aspect angle of the target as seen from
Target 1’s cockpit?
FIGURE 2.19 ¢
Bearing to Target 2
Target 1 N (true) Target 2

FIGURE 2.20 ¢
Target Aspect Angle
TARGET 2
TARGET 1
FIGURE 2.21 ¢
Altitude
Relationships
MSL AGL WGS-84
If you said that this was a 0 aspect angle, you would be right about 50% of the time.
In the United States, for example, the U.S. Air Force designates this as a 0 aspect angle.
The U.S. Navy, however, denotes this as a 180 aspect angle. Once again, the wrong
selection will impact your results.
What is a WOW switch? It could possibly be weight-on-wheels, but then again it
could be weight-off-wheels. Depending on the aircraft manufacturer, WOW can mean
different things. Once again, they are both correct and they are both different.
One last example is one of my favorites, and that is altitude. Altitude is one para-
meter that testers always have a hard time with. Figure 2.21 shows an aircraft in flight
with three different altitude references.
The aircraft in Figure 2.21 is at a constant altitude, yet we obtain three different
altitude readings depending on the parameter that we choose. The first reference is mean
sea level (MSL). The second is above ground level (AGL) and the third is WGS-84, or
height above the ellipsoid. All three of these altitude references are available to the pilot
and to the tester on the data stream. From the figure, it is apparent that if we expected
WGS-84 and were provided MSL, a significant error would be introduced.
There are many examples of these types of ‘‘gotcha’’ errors. The only way to avoid
introducing these errors into your data is to specify exactly the parameter you need.
2.18 Time Alignment 53
Test planning working groups (TPWGs) dedicated to tester, range, data acquisition, and
instrumentation interfaces accomplish this task. A desired outcome of the TPWG should
be a range interface memorandum (RIM) that details in writing the requirements for a
successful test program. A RIM is by no means a contractual document, but rather it sets
guidelines that all parties agree to. I have found this method of documenting require-
ments to be very useful, especially when original participants move on to different
programs and someone new shows up to take his place. At a minimum, the RIM should
address the following:
● Test plan general and specific objectives
● Applicable documents, specifically the test plan, interface design specification, and
interface control document
● Real-time and postflight requirements, including formats and data turnaround time
● Communication and encryption requirements
● Parameter list, TSPI, and avionics (I have found it advantageous to identify
the parameter, give its description, draw a cartoon of what it looks like. See
Figures 2.19–2.21, and in the case of calculated parameters, the equation).
2.18 TIME ALIGNMENT

Another consideration that must be addressed prior to actual testing is your method of
time alignment. Since there are multiple sources of data, you must assume that these
sources are asynchronous, that is, arriving at different times. Before you attempt to align
these times, you must first ensure that all data are time stamped the same. I have told my
students for years that it really does not make a difference if you use GPS time, UTC
time, wall clock time, or Mickey Mouse time, as long as all data have the same time. The
second consideration about time is when the data are actually time stamped. Time
should always be inserted as close as possible to the source. If it is not, then a time delay
study must be undertaken with the results applied as an offset to the data.
Aircraft clocks, telemetry station clocks, and TSPI clocks insert time into the data
streams. It is imperative that all of these clocks are synchronized to the same time. Most
systems now synchronize to GPS time. Some systems use a direct insert of the GPS time
into the data stream rather than employing a separate clock. If GPS information is lost,
so is time, and it only updates at a once per second rate. A common procedure is to
utilize a stand-alone clock that is synchronized to the reference time (such as GPS) and
then allowed to free run. Most of the clocks used in the instrumentation and test com-
munities are very accurate, with drift rates on the order of 3 msec/hr. Some common
brand names of clocks are Arbiter and Kinemetrics. These clocks are connected to time
code inserters that time tag the data.
Data that arrives at the collection point (either in a telemetry room or in a postflight
playback mode) must be time aligned prior to analysis. Time alignment does not mean
arranging data in chronological order. Time alignment ensures that for each time, data
from all sources are available. Figure 2.22 illustrates the typical problem of time
alignment.
At arrival time 1, there are TSPI data available, but no corresponding avionics
data for the same time. Similarly, at arrival time 2, avionics data are present, but no
FIGURE 2.22 ¢ Data Type

Arrival Time
Asynchronous TSPI Avionic
Arrival of Data 1 T1
2 A2
3 T3
4 A4
5 T5
6 A6
7 T7
8 A8
FIGURE 2.23 ¢
LATITUDE2 = LATITUDE1 + NORTH VELOCITY2 * DELTA TIME
Extrapolation LONGITUDE2 = LONGITUDE1 + EAST VELOCITY2 * DELTA TIME
Example ALTITUDE2 = ALTITUDE1 − DOWN VELOCITY2 * DELTA TIME
NORTH VELOCITY2 = NORTH VELOCITY1 + NORTH ACCELERATION * DELTA TIME
EAST VELOCITY2 = EAST VELOCITY1 + EAST ACCELERATION1 * DELTA TIME

DOWN VELOCITY2 = DOWN VELOCITY1 + DOWN ACCELERATION1 * DELTA TIME
FIGURE 2.24 ¢
Given: VALUE V1 AT TIME T1 and VALUE V3 AT TIME T3
Interpolation Estimate: VALUE V2 AT TIME T2 WHERE:
Example
V1 ≤ V2 ≤ V3V3 − V1 = V2 − V1
T3 − T1 T2 − T1
V2 = (V3 − V1) × T2 − T1 + V1
T3 − T1
corresponding TSPI data. We must find a way to obtain avionics data at arrival time 1
and TSPI data for arrival time 2. There are two ways of accomplishing this task: inter-
polation and extrapolation. Interpolation requires two pieces of data (end points) to find
the value for any time between them. From Figure 2.22, I can interpolate a value for T2
if I know the values T1 and T3. Extrapolation is predictive and requires a historical point
and the present point to predict a value in the future. By knowing the values of T1 and
T3, I can predict the value of T4. Which method is best?
The more accurate of the two methods is interpolation because you have data on
either side of the desired value. The drawback is that you must wait for more data before
you can obtain a value for the present time. This would be unacceptable for real-time
telemetry, as the system would have to buffer large amounts of data, thus causing the
system to slow down. Real-time telemetry systems use extrapolation in order to keep up
with real time, and suffer some degradation in accuracy. Postflight systems use inter-
polation in order to obtain the best accuracy. Figures 2.23 and 2.24 provide examples of
extrapolation and interpolation.
2.19 SUMMARY
Compliance with applicable specifications or operational requirements requires accurate
TSPI. The tester must identify the system accuracies needed to achieve compliance and
then choose the correct TSPI source. Part of identifying TSPI sources includes deter-
mining the cost to the program. As a general rule, more accuracy will require more
money. The truth systems must be at least four times as accurate as the system under
test. With today’s technology, this task is becoming more difficult, as many systems
provide accuracies better than most truth systems can measure. In these cases, the tester,
in concert with range and instrumentation personnel, must develop sensor fusion algo-
rithms to assist them.
2.20 EXERCISES
For each of the following examples, determine the TSPI source required to show
compliance.
A. A GPS whose required horizontal accuracy is 15 m in the x/y plane.
B. An AN/ASN-130 inertial navigation system whose stated system accuracy is a
2 nm circular error probable (CEP) positional error, velocity accuracy of 2 ft/sec,
and acceleration accuracy of 0.2 ft/sec/sec.
C. An ARN-118 tactical air navigation system (TACAN) which shall provide bearing
accuracy to a station within 2 at 300 nm and range information to within 0.2 nm
at 300 nm.
D. An ALR-67 radar warning receiver (RWR) must be capable of determining
direction of arrival (DOA) to within 2 azimuth and elevation at a range of 10 nm.
E. An APG-XX pulse Doppler (PD) radar with accuracies in the scan mode (mea-
surement accuracy) of 0.5 nm in range, 1 in azimuth and elevation, and 10 knots
in range rate. Additional accuracies in the track mode (track accuracy) are 0.2 nm
in range, 0.25 in azimuth and elevation, and 4 knots in range rate.
2.21 ANSWERS TO EXERCISES

The first step in identifying the required TSPI source entails the selection of the accu-
racy that must be proven. Once this is known, the accuracy can be divided by 4 (since
the TSPI system must be four times as accurate as the system under test) to determine
the TSPI accuracy. Each of the following explanations will determine system, as well as
TSPI, accuracy.
A. The first exercise asked you to prove the horizontal or positional accuracy of the
GPS. The desired accuracy is 15 m, which is divided by 4 to obtain the required
TSPI accuracy; roughly 13 ft. We then analyze which systems can meet this 13 ft
requirement. We know that the ground-based tracking radar’s accuracy depends
on the range to the target. For a 0.15 mrad radar system, you can obtain a 13 ft
accuracy out to about 14 nm. So if you did the entire test within 14 nm of the radar
FIGURE 2.25 ¢ Longitude

GPS Position Data Radar
with Radar Error
Coverage Budget
Xxxxxx Latitude
Xxxx
xx
GPS Data Points
site, you could verify the GPS accuracy. I do not believe that this would be a valid
test since the GPS will probably be used as a navigation system and you would
want to fly a navigation profile. A navigation profile will surely take you much
further than 14 nm distance from the site, which means the accuracy will degrade.
The same problem exists with a cinetheodolite system, whose range is very lim-
ited. You cannot use a stand-alone GPS receiver unless it is an L2 system. If you
do not have an L2 system, you could use an L1 system with differential. What
happens if you do not have either? This was surely a problem 15 years ago, when
GPS systems were first being installed. This particular problem will arise again as
newer, more accurate systems enter the market. You can do this test with older
TSPI systems; it just takes a little innovation. Suppose you flew a navigation
profile and tracked the aircraft with a 0.15 mrad radar system. If you plotted the
GPS position against the radar position and all of our GPS points fall within the
error budget of the radar (see Figure 2.25), what can we say about GPS accuracy?
We certainly could not say that the system meets specifications, since our
truth data is not accurate enough. We can say that the system is as good as the
radar, and, in fact, will probably give us a ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ about our GPS system. A
‘‘warm fuzzy’’ is one of the basic systems tests that are addressed later in the text.
The test allows us to see, at very little cost to the program, if the system under test
has a good chance of meeting compliance. Since the test was conducted on a
navigation profile, the next step would be to test for specification compliance close
in to the radar or against a theodolite system.
B. The second exercise asked us about an INS. The first accuracy required was its
positional accuracy. The required performance is stated as a 2 nm CEP horizontal.
Following our procedure, we divide 12,000 ft by 4, or a required TSPI accuracy of
3000 ft. Any one of the systems discussed can provide this accuracy, and therefore
is not a problem. The second and third accuracies of velocity and acceleration are a
bit more difficult. An INS directly measures acceleration, and is the only TSPI
system that we have discussed which measures acceleration. It is impossible to
prove compliance with a positioning TSPI system. Based on our previous discus-
sions, the same can be said for velocity measurement. Unless we had access to a
Doppler system, trying to prove velocity accuracy would be futile. We could run the
test described in exercise A and make the same conclusions, or we could perform a
ground test. If the INS is mounted on a maintenance tilt table, we can insert known
accelerations and ensure that the INS reports them correctly. Velocity accuracy is
FIGURE 2.26 ¢
Test aircraft TACAN Test Setup
300 nm slant range
TSPI site TACAN

Surveyed site
directly proportional to the accuracy of the acceleration measurement. This test is

the most accurate way to show specification compliance.
C. The third exercise involves accuracy testing of a radio aid to navigation called a
TACAN. The system provides range and bearing from the ground station to a
cooperative aircraft. At first glance it appears that our testing will be accomplished
at 300 nm away from our TSPI site. This is not true. The ground station must be
300 nm away from our aircraft. In fact, we could be flying directly over our TSPI
site while interrogating a station 300 nm away. The test setup is shown in
Figure 2.26.
There are two pieces of truth data required for this test. We first need to
identify the 3D position of our aircraft (latitude, longitude, and altitude). We need
the same information for the TACAN site. We then calculate a range and bearing
and compare that to the reported range and bearing. The total error budget includes
the uncertainty of our position and the uncertainty of the TACAN position. This
total error cannot exceed 1200 ft (0.2 nm) divided by 4, or 300 ft in range. The
azimuth accuracy is 2 , which must be converted to ft. At 300 nm, 2 subtends
10 nm, or 60,000 ft; divided by 4 yields a required TSPI accuracy of 15,000 ft.
These accuracies are easily accomplished by any of the TSPI systems discussed.
D. The radar warning receiver in the fourth exercise is a system on the aircraft that
scans all incoming emissions and attempts to identify their type based on a lookup
library. If a match is made, the type of threat is displayed to the aircrew along with
its associated bearing. The system is required to display this bearing to within 2
when the threat is at 10 nm. The setup and TSPI requirements are exactly the same
as in the previous exercise. The bearing accuracy of 2 at 10 nm equates to 2000 ft.
Required TSPI accuracy will be 2000 divided by 4, or 500 ft. This accuracy is
easily accomplished by any of the TSPI systems discussed.
E. Our last exercise is a fictitious radar, and we are asked to prove four parameters of
range, azimuth, elevation, and range rate. Our TSPI error budget in this exercise
involves two aircraft, and the total error budget will be the error for our aircraft
plus the error for the target. Figure 2.27 illustrates the setup for this test.
Assume that our aircraft are 100 nm apart and 100 nm from the TSPI site. The
specified range accuracy is 0.5 nm and 0.2 nm, respectively, for measurement and
track accuracy. Required TSPI accuracy is 750 ft for measurement accuracy and
300 ft for track accuracy. If we used our 0.15 mrad radar, our accuracy at 100 nm
would be 90 ft; but since there are two targets, the total error budget is 180 ft. A
radar or GPS is perfectly suited to perform this test. Azimuth and elevation call for
accuracies of 1 and 0.25 for measurement and track accuracy. These angular
measurements translate into 10,000 ft and 2500 ft for the two modes. TSPI accu-
racy requirements are 2500 ft and 650 ft, respectively. These specifications can
FIGURE 2.27 ¢ Error Budget

Radar Test Setup
also be proven with our radar or GPS. The final parameter is range rate, specified
at 10 knots and 4 knots for measurement and track accuracy. This equates to TSPI
accuracies of 2.5 knots and 1 knot for each. Range rate is the velocity of closure
between two aircraft. As previously discussed, GPS and radar are positioning
systems that do not measure velocity. This radar is a Doppler radar, which does
measure velocity directly. We could use INS velocities as truth, but even they are
not sufficient. If we assume that the INS tested in exercise B is installed in each
aircraft, and we use it as velocity truth, we can expect accuracies on the order of
2 ft/sec, or roughly 1 knot. The total error is the sum of the two aircraft, or 2 knots.
With this accuracy we can prove measurement accuracy, but we cannot prove
track accuracy. We can only state in a report that the system was tested to the
maximum TSPI accuracy, guaranteeing a system accuracy of 8 knots (4 times the
TSPI accuracy of 2 knots). This is the type of problem testers are encountering
today. It is important to realize that we can only show compliance to the level of
our truth sources.
1. What does TSPI stand for? What is TSPI?

2. Why do we need TSPI?
3. What is WGS-84?
4. What is the requirement for accuracy when testing avionics?
5. What is an error budget?
6. At what depression angle does a ground-based tracking radar start to become
unreliable?
7. Name two types of theodolite systems.
8. What is a GDOP? HDOP? VDOP?
9. Name two types of cinetheodolite systems.
10. What is the accuracy of a 0.2 mil radar system at 100 nm?
11. What is a mil?
12. Can a radar with the accuracy listed in question 10 be used to evaluate a GPS?
13. What is a coordinate conversion? Give one example.
14. What is better, interpolation or extrapolation?
15. What would be considered good accuracy for a ground-based radar?

16. What is a cinetheodolite? How do laser theodolites work?
17. How accurate is a ground-tracking radar (pulse) in velocity? How does it obtain
velocity?
18. What is a nine-state vector?
19. What is a DGPS?
20. Describe sensor fusion?
21. Who has access to the GPS L2 frequency?
22. Which is a more accurate measure of velocity, differentiation of GPS position or
integration of INS accelerations?
23. Why should you meet with the range directorate before the commencement of
testing?
24. Give an example of sensor fusion and explain why it might be a better system.
25. How important is time synchronization?
26. What is an earth model? When is it used?
27. GPS is said to operate in L band. Is that the old or new frequency designation?
28. What is multipath? How can it affect TSPI?
29. Does anyone really believe that the earth is flat?
30. What attributes of target position can a cinetheodolite provide?
31. What attributes of target position can a laser theodolite provide?
32. What are the advantages of using real-time data.
33. What is extrapolation? When is it used?
34. What is interpolation? When is it used?
35. Why do most military ranges require a beacon on the airplane for radar tracking?
CHAPTER
MIL-STD-1553 and Digital Data

Busses: Data Reduction and 3
Analysis
Chapter Outline
3.0 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.1 Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 1553 System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 A Bit About Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 1553 Word Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5 Data Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6 Word Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Command Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.8 Anomalous Command Word Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.9 Command Word Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.10 Status Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.11 Data Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.12 Message Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.13 Bus Controller Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.14 Sample Bus Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.15 The Flight Tester’s Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.16 MIL-STD-1553 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.17 Other Data Busses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.18 Potential Problems for the Analyst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.19 Data Acquisition, Reduction, and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.20 Selected Questions for Chapter 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.0 OVERVIEW
The transfer of data on today’s aircraft is accomplished by data bus architecture. Data
acquisition is the art of extracting data from these busses and converting them to some
meaningful units that can then be analyzed. This text is designed to give every engineer
a working knowledge of data bus technology that will allow you to speak intelligently
to software design engineers and instrumentation personnel. It will also help you
appreciate those personnel who provide data to you. Data acquisition today is a little
more complicated than calibrating voltages for strip chart pens.
61
62 CHAPTER 3 MIL-STD-1553 and Digital Data Busses
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Technology made great strides in the area of aircraft avionics during the Vietnam years.
Many of these strides were, of course, made by necessity. Unfortunately, many of the
cockpits were ill-suited to handle this increased technology. The amount of systems
technology added to the cockpits to aid aircrews in performing their missions was directly
proportional to human factor problematic issues. Each new system that was added to a
cockpit included the sensor, associated cabling, and its own separate controls and display
suite. As systems such as radar warning receivers (RWRs), instrument landing systems
(ILSs), laser designators, forward-looking infrared units (FLIRs), and television (TV)
were added, available real estate declined sharply. Systems were placed in the cockpit
where they would fit; many times in less than desirable locations. After all, there is only
so much space at the design eye of the aircrew. In addition, all of these systems and their
associated accouterments added a great deal of weight. The military set out to try and
streamline cockpit and initiated a study looking at these problems from a ‘‘systems’’
approach that was simpler, weighed less, had some sort of standardization, and at the
same time was flexible. The military’s answer was MIL-STD-1553.
The commercial sector was experiencing many of the same problems as the mili-
tary; however, their biggest driver was money. A simpler, streamlined system that
reduced weight would save money. The commercial study in the United States grew into
the ARINC (American Radio Inc.) standards. These standards have been modified and
updated and are still in use today. The military still uses MIL-STD-1553, although it is
now designated as an interface standard. The military also uses MIL-STD-1760 (Inter-
face Standard for Weapons Systems) and MIL-STD-1773 (Interface Standard for Fiber
Optics [vice copper cables]). Commercial industries use a plethora of standards in
addition to ARINC. The initial section of this chapter is dedicated to the MIL-STD-1553
protocol; users of 1760 and 1773 will note that these standards are nearly identical to
1553. The United Kingdom version of this standard is Def Stan 00-18 (Part 2) and the
NATO version is STANAG 3838 AVS. The latter part of this chapter deals with other
data busses and their use in the avionics world.
3.2 1553 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Avionics and weapons systems test engineers must become familiar with how the
military data bus operates. An excellent reference for testers is provided by ILC Data
Device Corp., Bohemia, NY. The title of the text is the MIL-STD-1553 Designer’s
Guide, which, at the time of this writing, was in its sixth edition. They have a convenient
website at www.ilc-web.com. If you register with them, you can download the guide in
Adobe Acrobat. As far as a reference goes, I think that this guide is all you will need.
Most technical libraries probably have a copy or two.
The full title of the interface standard is MIL-STD-1553, Aircraft Internal Time
Division Command/Response Multiplex Data Bus. To put this in laymen’s terms, there
is a bus controller (BC) that issues commands on the bus and remote terminals (RTs)
that respond on the bus. There is a timing requirement for gaps between messages
and response time of the RTs. In some cases where large data flows are needed, a
multiplexer is used (called a multiplex) to split the transmission into two or more
subchannels. The device accomplishes this by allotting a common channel to several
3.2 1553 System Architecture 63
different transmitting devices one at a time (time division). The speed at which the bus
can transfer data differs with each type of data bus. The 1553 data bus has a 1 MHz data
rate which allows it to transfer 1 megabit/sec. The 1773 data bus can increase the data
rate by a factor of 100. 1553 uses serial communication, which means that bits are sent
sequentially on a single data channel. The key elements of 1553 architecture are the
● BC
● Bus monitor
● RT
● Stand-alone remote terminal
● Twisted pair shielded cable
The BC provides data flow control for all transmissions on the bus. It has the ability
to send as well as receive data. It is the only unit on the bus that initiates a transmission.
You may think of the controller as the traffic cop on the bus. It is the controller’s
responsibility to ensure orderly operations on the bus. The BC uses a command/response
method of data transfer. No other device on the bus may talk on the bus unless so
ordered by the BC. It also initiates such operations as self-test, synchronization, trans-
mitter shutdown, and overrides for other bus devices. The BC is smart enough to
recognize changes in the environment as well as identify failed units. A simplified
example of a bus structure is shown in Figure 3.1.
A bus monitor is a passive unit on the bus. The standard defines a bus monitor as a
‘‘terminal assigned the task of receiving bus traffic and extracting selected information
to be used at a later time.’’ These systems are used for troubleshooting and aircraft
instrumentation. They are not active terminals and do not communicate with the bus
controller. These devices read all of the traffic on the bus and capture the time and value
of selected parameters. These parameters are preprogrammed into the bus monitor.
The first type of monitor is called a bus analyzer. These systems are used exten-
sively in software support facilities and integration labs and can be very helpful to the
flight tester. Older models only provided a hexadecimal dump of all messages resident
on the bus during a specified time. Newer models provide engineering unit (EU) con-
verted data. Examining a weapons release sequence shows an example of how this
device can be used.
A weapons release sequence involves many variables that are time and order
dependent. If either the timing is off or events are not in order, the weapon may not
release or not arm. A critical test would be to determine proper sequencing of the Stores
Management System. A proper sequence is shown in Table 3.1.
TACAN FIGURE 3.1 ¢

Stand-alone
Remote Remote RadAlt Simplified Bus
Remote
Terminal Terminal CADC Structure
Terminal
Fuel Quan
Bus Bus Shielded

Controller Analyzer Twisted Pair
Cable
TABLE 3.1 ¢ Weapons Release Sequence
Time Event
0 Trigger depress
10 msec Battery arm
35 msec Rocket motor arm
50 msec Ejector arm
150 msec Roll command sent
250 msec Frequency set
350 msec Ejector fire
500 msec Rocket motor fire
The eight events are completed in 0.5 sec. Normal aircraft instrumentation will
probably sample the bus about 25 samples/sec. This sampling rate is too slow to capture
the events of interest. The question now becomes, ‘‘Where can this test be accom-
plished?’’ It should be done in the lab with a bus analyzer. You can trigger the analyzer
to capture all data on the bus for 1 sec with the capture initiated at trigger squeeze. The
timing and sequencing can then be analyzed.
The second type of bus monitor is common to instrumentation. Most of these sys-
tems are called either word grabbers or bus editors. They are normally built by the
instrumentation group and are unique to one type of aircraft. The devices are pre-
programmed on the ground to look for certain messages (parameters) on the bus and
read these data to either a recording device or multiplex them into a telemetry stream.
The amount of data these systems can grab for real-time data analysis is limited by the
recording pace or the telemetry system.
The RT may be thought of as an avionic component or sensor connected to the bus.
An inertial navigation system (INS), global navigation satellite system (GNSS), radar
display processor, or electro-optical sensor can be used as RTs. These terminals do not
have controller authority unless they are designated as backup bus controllers. There
may be a maximum of 32 RTs on a bus (mathematically true, but not true in real life).
Interface circuitry inside the sensor is tied directly to the bus, which allows a transfer of
data into and out of the sensor.
The stand-alone remote terminal may be thought of as a big analog-to-digital (A/D)
converter. Depending on the age of the aircraft under test, there may be several systems on
board that are pre-1553 and are still analog. The only way these systems can talk to the rest
of the aircraft is to perform an A/D or D/A conversion. Depending on the number of older
systems, it may not be feasible to place a converter on each system. This method would
take an enormous amount of valuable space and add unwanted weight. Most military
designers opt for one converter unit to handle all of the nonstandard (non-1553) systems.
These systems are known by a variety of names; the most common are converter interface
unit, systems interface unit, digital converter unit, and signal interface unit. Figure 3.1
shows non-1553 systems such as the TACAN, radar altimeter, ILS, fuel quantity and
central air data computer (CADC) talking to the bus via this stand-alone remote terminal.
The last component of the bus is the twisted pair shielded cable that carries the data.
There are a pair of cables for redundancy purposes. All busses will have an ‘‘A’’ bus and
a ‘‘B’’ bus. Shielding is for electromagnetic interference (EMI) reduction. The standard
requires the cable shielding provide a minimum of 90% coverage and connectors must
have continuous 360 shielding with a minimum of 75% coverage.
3.3 A Bit About Bits 65
3.3 A BIT ABOUT BITS

We know that data busses transmit data by using bits. Do the systems that we deal with
use binary, octal, or hexadecimal? Do we know the difference between the three? If you
think back to grammar school math (unless you are a product of the California school
system), you may vaguely remember base 2, base 3, etc. If it is too vague, or just not
there, continue on. For those who may think that this is too basic, skip to the next section.
Computers use a binary system that is really base 2, as opposed to the base 10 that
21 20
we are familiar with. If we have two available slots, what numbers can we come up
0 0
with? Figure 3.2 shows the possibilities for two bits that are available.
The 1553 systems count from right to left, so we shall perform this exercise the 0 1
0 1 0
same way. Bit 0 is the first bit on the right and equates to 2 , which equals one. The
second bit equates to 21, which equals two. The first number we can obtain is zero ones 1 1
plus zero twos, which equals zero. The next number is one (ones) plus zero twos, which
equals one. The third number is equal to zero ones plus one two, which equals two. After FIGURE 3.2 ¢ Base 2
the number three in base 2 (11), we can go no farther unless we add another bit, which Maximum Number for
Two Bits
would equal 22, or four. The rationale continues out to the left for as many bits as we
15
have. 1553 uses 16 bits for data, so it could conceivably go as high as 2 .
That was fairly straightforward. What is octal? As the name implies, octal is base 8.
Figure 3.3 shows the maximum number you can attain in two bits for a base 8 system. 81 80
As with binary, you can start at 00, which equates to 0 times 80 (0 1) plus 0 times 81 0 0
0 1
(0 8) for a total of zero. The first bit can increment upward until 7. Two bits of 07 0 2
would equal 7 (0 eights plus 7 ones). You cannot place an 8 in the first bit because the 0 3
second bit place is 81, or eight. Therefore 8 in base 10 would be written as 10 in base 8. 0 4
0 5
The maximum number that you can identify with two bits in base 8 is 77, which is
0 6
equivalent to 63 in base 10 (7 8 þ 7 1). Are there any systems that you are familiar 0 7
with that use base 8? It may not be readily apparent unless we use four bits. Pilots will 1 0
see the obvious if we show a four-bit octal system: 1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
7 7 7 7 1 5
1 6
1 7
…
This is, of course, the Mode 3 Interrogate Friend or Foe (IFF) system. Some of you 7 7
will know this system by another term: the 4096 code. There are 4096 available squawk
codes available in the current Mode 3 IFF system. The code 7777 is octal and is FIGURE 3.3 Base 8
¢
Maximum Number for

equivalent to 4095 in base 10. The code 0000 is also available, which makes a total of Two Bits
4096 codes.
The last type of system use would be hexadecimal, or base 16. Since each slot
can only contain one character, some other method must be used to identify the units 10
through 15. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4, which shows the maximum number
in base 10 that we can obtain by using two bit slots in the hexadecimal system.
As with the two previous uses, we start at the top with 00, which equates to 0 in base
10 (0 160 þ 0 161). The first bit slot increments upward through 9. Since only one
character can occupy a slot, the units 10 through 15 are identified by the alpha characters
A through F, where F is the maximum that can be placed in any slot. This makes sense,
since the second slot is occupied by 161, or 16 in base 10. We can count upward to 15,
but then we must move over to the second bit position. The base 10 number 16 would be
161 160
written as 10 in hexadecimal, 17 would be 11, and so on. The maximum number that can
0 0 be written for two bit positions in hexadecimal is FF, or 255 in base 10.
0 1 Reading a binary bit string in hexadecimal can be advantageous for flight testers and
0 2
0 3
analysts. The 1553 systems utilize 20-bit words, 16 of which contain usable information.
0 4 The first three bits are the synchronization pattern and the last bit is a parity bit. Imagine
0 5 you are an analyst and it is your task to determine if a fault occurs in a system. You have
0 6
0 7
been told that a fault is present if bit 9 registers positive (a 1 is set). Either real-time or
0 8 postflight processing yields reams of data for this one 16-bit word.
0 9
0 A
0 B Bit 9
0 C
0 D
0 E 1101010001101111
0 F
1 0 This 16-bit word would scroll down the page and it would be your task to determine
1 1
1 2 when, if ever, bit 9 went to a 1. This is a difficult task, even for the seasoned analyst, but
1 3 not impossible. If we convert this binary string to a hexadecimal word, the task can be
1 4 easily accomplished. In order to read a binary string in hexadecimal, we need to break
1 5
1 6
up the 16-bit word into four equal parts:
1 7
1 8 1101 0100 0110 1111
1 9
…
F F We then read each segment in hexadecimal characters. This is done by adding, from
right to left, the binary string, and converting the resultant number to hexadecimal. This
FIGURE 3.4 ¢ Base
16 Maximum Number
can be demonstrated by
for Two Bits
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
where the top row is the bit number, the second row is the binary multiplier, and the
third row is the original 16-bit word. This binary string is then converted to hexadecimal
by multiplying row two by row three and then adding across right to left.
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
8 4 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 4 2 0 8 4 2 1
13 = D 4=4 6=6 15 = F
read in hexadecimal is D46F.

In this example, we were able to express a 16-bit binary word in a hexadecimal
format. The original problem was to identify a failure which would be indicated by bit 9
being set true. By reading in hexadecimal, if all other bit values remain constant, only
the 4 will change (to a 6), and the task becomes much easier. As one more example,
convert the following binary string to hexadecimal:
0011110011001101
First, break it up into sectors:

3.5 Data Encoding 67
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20 23 22 21 20
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
Multiply row two by row three:
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
0 0 2 1 8 4 0 0 8 4 0 0 8 4 0 1
Add right to left and convert:
15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
3=3 12 = B 12 = B 13 = D
Read in hexadecimal: 3BBD.

This concept will become more apparent when we address different types of 1553
words in the coming sections.
3.4 1553 WORD TYPES

There are three different types of words on a 1553 bus: command words, status words, and
data words. Each of the words contains 16 bits plus a synchronization pattern and a parity
bit, for a total of 20 bits. The parity is odd. Command words only come from the bus
controller, whereas status words are only sent by the remote terminal. Data words come
from either the bus controller or the remote terminal. The bit transmission rate on the
1553 bus is 1 megabit/sec. Fiber optics can increase this rate to 10 to 100 megabits/sec.
There are twenty 1 microsecond (msec) bit times allocated for each word, since each word
will contain 20 bits.
3.5 DATA ENCODING

The 1553 systems use Manchester II biphase encoding as opposed to the more well-
known non-return-to-zero (NRZ) encoding such as that used in instrumentation systems.
Manchester still uses 1s and 0s, but it is a little more complicated than 1 for high and 0
for low. In Manchester, a 1 is transmitted as a bipolar coded signal high/low (within 1 bit
time, the signal transitions from high to low). A 0 is transmitted as a bipolar coded signal
low/high (within 1 bit time, the signal transitions from low to high). The transition
through 0 occurs at the midpoint of each bit for either 1 or 0. Figure 3.5 illustrates NRZ
as compared to Manchester II for a 1 MHz clock.
The synchronization pattern (first three bits of the 20-bit word) uses an invalid
Manchester code to aid in identifying the start of a new word. The transition, either low
to high or high to low, takes 3 bit times (3 msec) to complete, with the transition through
0 occurring at 1½ bit times (1.5 msec). A logic of 1 (high to low) identifies a command or
status word, while a logic of 0 identifies the start of a data word. Command and status
FIGURE 3.5 ¢ Data One Bit Time

Encoding: NRZ 1 MHz (+)
Versus Manchester Clock (–)
II Bipolar
NRZ (+)
Data (–)
Manchester (+) 1 0 1 1 0 0
Code (–)
FIGURE 3.6 ¢ +Volt

Command and 1.5 Bits
Status Word
Synchronization
Pattern
0 Volt
–Volt 1.5 Bits
High to Low Transition, 3 Bits

Bits
words can use the same synchronization pattern, since command words can only come
from the bus controller and status words can only come from the remote terminal.
Figure 3.6 shows the synchronization pattern for the command and status words. The
data word synchronization pattern is simply reversed.
In fiber-optics systems (MIL-STD-1773), there is a slight difference in the encoding
method. Since light cannot have a negative value, the pulses are defined as transitions
between 0 (off) and 1 (on) rather than between þ and voltage transitions.
3.6 WORD FORMATS

The formats of the command, status, and data words are shown in Figure 3.7. A detailed
explanation of each of the words follows.
3.7 COMMAND WORDS

The command word is only sent by the BC. As illustrated in Figure 3.7, the command
word is comprised of a 3-bit time synchronization pattern, 5-bit RT address, 1-bit
3.7 Command Words 69
BIT Times 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 FIGURE 3.7 ¢

Word Formats
Command Word 5 1 5 5 1
SYNC Remote T/R Subaddress/ Data Word Count/ P
Terminal Address Mode Mode Code
Data Word 16 1
SYNC Data P
Status Word 5 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Remote Reserved
Message Error
Service Request
Instrumentation
Broadcast Command Received

Busy
Subsystem Flag
Dynamic Bus Control Acceptance
Terminal Flag
Parity
SYNC
Terminal Address
T/R Transmit/Receive
P Parity
transmit/receive, 5-bit subaddress/mode field, and 5-bit word count/mode code field
followed by a 1-bit parity check, for a total of 20 bits. The 1553 terminals add the syn-
chronization and parity before transmission and remove them during reception. Therefore
the nominal word size is 16 bits. By using Figure 3.7, we can construct a representative
command word. Suppose that the BC needs nine-state vector information from the INS. The
bus controller needs to initiate a command word and send it to the INS for action. Also
suppose that the INS happens to be identified as RT 12 on this particular bus. The first 5 bits
(after the 3-bit synchronization is removed) of the command word are used to identify the
RT address. In our example, this is 12. The address would look like this:
0 1 1 0 0
The 5 bits are read from right to left, with the first bit representing 20 and the fifth bit
representing 24. Here we have 1 (4) and 1 (8), for a total of 12. The total number of RT
addresses that we can have is 32. If all bits are set to 1, we have 31 (1 þ 2 þ 4 þ 8 þ 16).
We can also have an RT with an address of 0, which allows us to mathematically have
32 remote terminals on any one bus. In practice we are only allowed to have 31 remote
terminals on a bus. This anomaly is due to the broadcast mode, which will be explained
later. Let’s get back to our example. As this command word is sent out on the bus, the INS
reads it because it is addressed to it (RT 12). The other remote terminals will ignore the
command word.
The next bit in the command word is the transmit/receive bit. Transmit is set to 1,
and receive is set to 0. Since the bus controller is requesting the INS send nine-state
vector information, this bit will be set to 1. Had the controller been sending information
to the INS, then the bit would be set to 0.
0 1 1 0 0 1
The next 5-bit field is the subaddress/mode and the final 5 bits comprise the word
count/mode code field. It is easier to first explain the word count field. These final 5 bits
determine how many data words are to be sent or received. If each of the nine-state
vector parameters required one data word, then the word count would be nine:
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
It should be obvious that the maximum number of data words that can be sent is 31 (all
bits set to 1). This limitation on the amount of data that can be exchanged could be dele-
terious to system operation. Let’s examine the information an INS may possess which
might be of interest to other systems on the aircraft. The INS either measures or computes
latitude, longitude, altitude, velocities (north, east, and down [NED]), accelerations (NED),
heading, ground track, groundspeed, pitch, roll, yaw, time-to-go, distance-to-go, cross track
and along track errors, and many other parameters. It stands to reason that thirty-one 16-bit
data words would be inadequate to transfer all of this information. If this is the case, then
how do we expand our capability to transfer this important information? The answer is in
the use of the 5-bit subaddress field. This field allows subaddresses from 0 through 31, with
each subaddress having 32 associated data words. This now allows 32 32 data words for
information exchange, except that there are two reserved fields. Subaddress 0 (00000) and
subaddress 31 (11111) are reserved for mode commands, which will be addressed later. In
the example, subaddress 5 may contain the nine data words for the state vector:
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Our completed message shows the command word going to RT 12, transmit sub-
address 5, word count nine. Both the BC and the RT are programmed to know where
information resides.
3.8 ANOMALOUS COMMAND WORD

CONDITIONS
In section 3.7, I stated that there can be only 31 RTs on a bus even though there are
32 mathematical possibilities. The RT address of 31 (11111) is reserved for broadcast
mode. Suppose that there was a parameter on the aircraft that all systems used in their
computations. One that comes to mind is altitude. Sensor systems, electronic warfare
(EW) systems, weapons systems, and navigation systems all use altitude. Since all
systems use this parameter, it would seem to be efficient to broadcast this parameter to
all RTs rather than send the parameter individually. This is broadcast mode. When the
RT address is set to 31 (11111), all RTs read the message. Unfortunately, the RTs cannot
respond stating that they received the message because all of the replies would come
back at the same time, making identification of respondents impossible. In order to
determine if all RTs did in fact receive the transmission, the bus controller would have
to individually ask each RT if they received the transmission. This is a time-consuming
process, rendering the broadcast mode unusable. As a result, most aircraft that use
MIL-STD-1553 do not employ broadcast mode.
3.10 Status Words 71
The second anomalous condition is when 0 (00000) or 31 (11111) is found in the

subaddress. When this occurs, the command word is said to be a mode command. Earlier
in the chapter it was stated that in a 1553 system, RTs may not perform any operation
unless commanded to do so by the BC. If the RT needs to perform a self-test, or reset, or
synchronize, it must wait until commanded by the BC. These operations are called mode
commands. The subaddress of 0 (00000) or 31 (11111) tells the RT that the message is a
mode command, and the word count is replaced with the code of the specific operation.
There are assigned mode codes, and these codes can be found in the reference material.
For example, a mode code of 3 (00011) indicates that the RT is to perform a self-test. In
the previous example, if we wanted the INS to initiate a self-test, the command word
would look like this:
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
The reference material will also indicate whether the transmit/receive bit is set to
0 or 1. In the self-test example, the bit is set to 1.
3.9 COMMAND WORD SUMMARY

The command word is a 20-bit word sent by the BC to an RT. The 3-bit synchronization
and 1-bit parity are added before transmission and removed during reception. The
remaining 16 bits are comprised of
● A 5-bit field for the RT address; RT 31 (11111) is reserved for broadcast mode.
Broadcast is not efficient and therefore not widely used. A total of 31 RTs may
occupy a bus.
● A 1-bit field for transmit/receive: 1 ¼ transmit, 0 ¼ receive.
● A 5-bit field for the subaddress. The subaddress allows more data to be exchanged. A
0 (00000) or 31 (11111) in the subaddress field indicates a mode command. The
transmit/receive bit in a mode command is per the documentation.
● A 5-bit field for the data word count. If a 0 (00000) or 31 (11111) occupies the
subaddress field, the data word count becomes the mode code. Mode codes are
assigned per the documentation.
3.10 STATUS WORDS

Once again, the reader is referred back to Figure 3.7 to aid in the understanding of this
section.
After the RT has received a command word from the BC, it builds a status word that
informs the bus controller of the RT’s status as well as the result of the last transmission.
The first 5 bits are the responding RT’s address. This allows the bus controller to know
from which RT the status word is coming. The next 11 bits are a status field. The good
thing about status words is that this 11-bit field will be 0-filled if the message was received
without error and the RT’s health and welfare are good. Knowing this provides analysts
with an excellent tool for monitoring bus communications. This will be described later.
The first bit after the RT address is the message error identification. The receiving
RT validates each word and message using the following criteria:
● The word begins with a valid sync
● The bits are a valid Manchester II code
● The word parity is odd
● The message is contiguous
If the word/message does not meet these criteria, the message error is set to 1. The
status word, however, is not sent and the bus controller is alerted to a problem due to a
timeout. The bus controller can obtain the status word by subsequently issuing a mode
command to transmit the status word.
The remaining bits in the status word are called status bits. The instrumentation bit can
be used to discriminate the command word from the status word (remember they have the
same synchronization). The logic would be 0 in the status word and 1 in the command
word. If the instrumentation bit is used this way, then the number of subaddresses is
reduced from 30 to 15, and only subaddress 31 (11111) can be used for initiation of a mode
command. If the instrumentation bit is not used in this way, then it is always set to 0.
The service request bit is the next status in the field and is used to indicate to the bus
controller that the RT requires service. When the bit is set to 1, the bus controller may
command a predetermined action or request transmission of a vector word that will
identify the type of service requested.
The next three bits are reserved by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and prior
approval must be obtained to use them.
The next bit is the broadcast command received status. If the architecture incorpo-
rates broadcast mode, this bit will be set to 1 when a broadcast command is received. As
described earlier, the status word cannot be sent and is therefore suppressed. If the bus
controller wants to know the status of the broadcast command it will have to issue a
mode command requesting the status word.
The busy bit indicates to the bus controller that the RT cannot respond to commands
due to a busy condition. For example, the terminal may be performing periodic main-
tenance. Busy conditions are supposed to be the result of a previous command by the bus
controller and not due to periodic internal RT conditions. Busy conditions tend to add
overhead and disrupt bus communications.
A subsystem flag indicates that a fault exists in the RT’s subsystem and that the data
requested may not be reliable. This should not be confused with the last status bit, called
the terminal flag. The terminal flag indicates a failure within the RT as opposed to its
subsystem.
A dynamic bus control acceptance bit indicates to the bus controller that the RT is
ready to take control of the bus after receiving a take control mode command. In some
applications, this procedure is illegal and the bit will always be set to 0.
It should be apparent that if the message is received without error and the RT status
is healthy, the only information in the status word will be the RT address. If we examine
the status word, we may see a trend in good versus bad status words. If we assume that
the INS in our command word example received the message error free, and the INS is
healthy, the status word would look like this:
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.11 Data Words 73
The message error and status bits are all set to 0. If we read this message in hex-
adecimal, it looks like:
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0
If the message was received error free, and the RT is healthy, the status word, when
read in hexadecimal, will always end in (000) or (800) (when an RT address occupies
the 20 slot). An analysis program can be written that states: ‘‘print on event whenever the
status word does not end in 000 or 800.’’ As a result, a record for all failures in com-
munications will then be obtained for the entire test.
3.11 DATA WORDS

Data words can come from either the bus controller or the RT (Figure 3.7).
The 3-bit synchronization pattern is opposite of the command and status words, and
the parity once again is odd. The 16 bits may be packed in many ways and may contain
as little as one-half of a parameter or as many as 16 parameters. The tester must be
familiar with the latest versions of the interface design specification (IDS) and the
interface control document (ICD) in order to determine which parameters are contained
in the data words. Let’s look at an example of a typical data word (synchronization and
parity removed):
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
From the ICD, the data word radar altitude (parameter ID R_Alt) is contained in
8 bits: start bit ¼ 0, stop bit ¼ 7; scaling factor ¼ 3 ft. Reading right to left (the first bit
received), radar altitude is obtained:
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Radar altitude in this example is equal to (1 þ 2 þ 4 þ 64 þ 128) 3 ft, or 597 ft.

The parameter of radar altitude only uses the first 8 bits. What is contained in the other
8 bits? It could be another 8-bit parameter, or it could be something else. Imagine
looking down on the nose of an aircraft (see Figure 3.8):
A FIGURE 3.8 ¢
Pitot-Static System
Measured Clockwise
B From Top (A, B, C)
C
Many aircraft employ multiple pitot and static sensors on the aircraft. Figure 3.8 shows
a typical configuration of three sensors labeled clockwise from the top: A, B, and C. When
the aircraft and the free stream are aligned, the three sensors should agree with one another.
When the aircraft is yawed, one of the sensors will be slightly different than the other two.
In our example, if we apply right rudder, sensor C will be obscured from the free stream
and will give a slightly different reading than A and B. Sensor C will be voted out and
declared invalid by the air data computer (ADC). The analyst will know this when looking
at validity bits on the bus. Going back to our original example with the radar altimeter, the
ICD may identify the next three bits as validity bits. The logic is 1 ¼ true and 0 ¼ false.
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
TAS C TAS B TAS A
The validity bits in the example show that true airspeed (TAS) A and B are valid
and TAS C is invalid. What do the last 5 bits represent? It could be another 5-bit
parameter or five more validity bits. The important thing to note is that a data word may
contain more than one parameter. Some parameters are ‘‘long words.’’ These parameters
require two 16-bit data words to comprise the data. Some examples of ‘‘long words’’ are
latitude and longitude.
3.12 MESSAGE CONTENTS

Messages are packets made up of the three word types previously discussed: command
words, status words, and data words. There is a response time requirement of between
4 and 12 msec and a minimum intermessage gap time of 4 msec. There are three basic
types of messages or data transfer:
● BC to RT
● RT to BC
● RT to RT
There are variations in these messages which include mode commands with or
without a data word, and broadcast commands with or without a data word. Figure 3.9
shows the sequence of MIL-STD-1553 message formats.
FIGURE 3.9 ¢ Receive Data Data nth Data 4 – 12 Status

BC to RT
MIL-STD-1553 Transfer Command Word Word Word μsec Word
Message Formats
RT to BC Transmit 4 – 12 Data Data nth Data

Transfer Command μsec Word Word Word
RT to RT Receive Transmit 4 – 12 Status Data Data Status

Transfer * **
Command Command μsec Word Word Word Word
*to the nth ** 4 – 12 μsec

3.13 Bus Controller Design 75
It should be noted that for the three cases, the bus controller initiates the sequence.
After any of these three sequences is complete, the bus controller needs to wait a
minimum of 4 msec before initiating the next sequence.
In the first case (BC to RT), the bus controller identifies the receiving RT in the first
5 bits of the command word. The transmit/receive bit will be set to 0 since the RT is
expected to receive data. The type and number of data words are identified in the sub-
address and word count. The data words follow the command word without any gaps.
Figure 3.9 shows the command word followed by data word 1, data word 2, out to the
nth data word (identified in the word count). The RT will respond within 4 to 12 msec
with a status word as long as the message meets the criteria described in section 3.10.
For an RT to BC transfer, the bus controller initiates the sequence with a command
word to the appropriate RT with the transmit/receive bit set to 1, since the RT will be
transmitting data. The type of data and number of data words are once again identified in
the subaddress and word count fields. Within 4 to 12 msec, as long as the criteria for a
valid command are met, the RT will send a status word followed by the prescribed
number of data words. There are no gaps between the status and data words.
The RT to RT transfer requires the bus controller send two command words, one to
the receiving RT and one to the transmitting RT. It must be done in this order to pre-
clude an RT from transmitting data at the same time a receive message is being sent by
the bus controller. The transmitting RT responds in the same manner as the RT to BC
transfer described in the previous paragraph. The receiving RT has 4 to 12 msec to
respond with a status word after receipt of the last data word (once again assuming that
the message was received error free).
Mode commands, with or without a data word, behave like the RT to BC and BC to
RT transfers; the subaddress is replaced with a 0 (00000) or 31 (11111) and the word
count is replaced by the mode code. The transmit/receive bit is set according to the
documentation. Broadcast mode sets 31 (11111) in the RT address and all RTs read the
message. The RTs set the broadcast command received status bit in the status word but
do not send the status word.
3.13 BUS CONTROLLER DESIGN

Most test engineers are not going to be tasked with designing system processors, but it is
helpful to know a few things about their capabilities and limitations. If you are working
with military applications, you may often wonder why the aircraft mission computer has
less capability than your laptop. There are a few reasons for this disparity. The first
problem, of course, is military standardization. But wait, you say, there are no more
military specifications! This is true and it is not true. There is still a need for standards in
military applications. Would you allow someone to drop your laptop from 18 inches
onto a hardened concrete surface? That type of shock is what military equipment must
be able to sustain. It is sometimes called ruggedization of equipment. In the past, it has
taken up to 5 years to ruggedize a civilian system. For this reason, a legacy aircraft of the
1990s may have a 486 processor. Some legacy radar systems employ a 286 processor.
Things have improved a great deal since about 2005, and military capabilities do not lag
their civilian counterparts as much.
A larger problem for military applications is the language that the system uses.
Military systems are coded in many languages: machine code, COBAL, Ada, etc.
The language was not standardized until the late 1980s, when the military tried to stan-
dardize all programs with Ada. Of course, there were many waivers and this dictum really
did not solve the problem. I keep saying problem. It was not a problem in the 1980s
because the military accounted for the bulk of all computer software; somewhere on the
order of 85%. Today, the military accounts for 10% to 15% of all software. Now can you
see the problem? In the 1980s, people were falling all over themselves to work for the
military, because that is where the money was. Today, it is not as profitable. Suppose you
have an aircraft that is programmed in Ada and you need to modify or add a new function.
You must find a company that has expertise in your language that is willing to take on the
task. In order for the company to realize a profit from such a specialized task, the cost can
be astronomical. It is easier for the company to reprogram the entire processor with a
language that is current and for which plenty of expertise is readily available. Of course,
when this happens, the test community is in for a rather large regression program.
The last concern for testers is related to the first two. For any digital system, it is
desirable to have some redundancy in system operation. In fly-by-wire flight controls,
for safety of flight reasons, there is usually triple redundancy for the bus controllers. For
the same reasons, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Part 25 air carriers have the
same redundancy in flight controls as well as the avionics suite. In fighter and bomber
military applications, most initial designs call for dual-redundant mission computers
(avionics and weapons suite) and triple-redundant flight controls. In addition, most
contracts will specify a processor reserve requirement (25–50%) for future growth.
Unfortunately these requirements are rarely met. Due to the large number of functions
the system is required to perform (controls, displays, navigation, radar, weapons, EW,
electro-optical/infrared [EO/IR] sensors, reconnaissance, etc.), the functions wind up
being partitioned between the two processors. The only redundancy is in safety-of-flight
functions such as controls, displays, and navigation. In the event of a loss of one mission
computer in flight, the checklist will more often than not direct the aircrew to ‘‘land as
soon as practical,’’ since some mission capability has been lost. By the same token, these
many functions take up so much processor capacity that the future growth reserve
requirement rapidly evaporates. There are some military aircraft in service today that
have no growth capability. Legacy aircraft such the F-16, F-18, and F-15 are plagued by
this problem; if a new function is to be added to the aircraft, some other installed
function must be removed first.
3.14 SAMPLE BUS CONFIGURATIONS

Figure 3.10 shows the simplest bus configuration that a tester may encounter. It
describes dual bus architecture: mission bus 1 and mission bus 2. Mission computer 1 is
the bus controller for mission bus 1 and the backup bus controller for mission bus 2.
Mission computer 2 is the bus controller for mission bus 2 and the backup bus controller
for mission bus 1. It should be noted that as discussed earlier, each mission bus contains
an A bus and a B bus.
Figure 3.11 contains the basic elements of the simplified structure shown in
Figure 3.10 and adds in RTs. There may be 31 RTs on any bus: RT 0 through RT 30.
Address 31 is reserved for broadcast mode. The RTs can be connected to more than one
bus, and the addresses can be different for each bus. In addition, the mission computers can
be connected to each other by an intercomputer bus, which allows direct transfer of data
3.14 Sample Bus Configurations 77
Mission bus 1A FIGURE 3.10 ¢
Simple Bus
Configuration
Mission bus 1B
Mission Mission
Computer 1 Computer 2
BC bus 1 BC bus 2
BBC bus 2 BBC bus 1
Mission bus 2A
Mission bus 2B
RT 1 RT 2 RT 3 RTn RT <31 FIGURE 3.11 ¢

RT Arrangement
A/D
Mission Mission
BC Bus 1 BC Bus 2
BBC Bus 2 BBC Bus 1
RT 1 RT 2 RT <31
FIGURE 3.12 ¢
Converter Interface
Unit Arrangement
Converter
Interface
Unit
between the mission computers. Most of the RTs shown are connected directly to the bus.
RT 1 on mission bus 1 is connected to the bus via an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter.
Remember that some systems are not 1553 compatible and therefore must go through an
A/D converter. In military applications, most systems employ one large converter interface
unit which handles all of the A/D conversions required by nonstandard (non-1553) systems.
This can be seen in Figure 3.12. All A/D conversions are performed by the converter
interface unit. The converter interface unit acts as an RT on both mission busses.
FIGURE 3.13 ¢ RT 1 RT 2 RT 3 RT n RT <31

Typical Multibus A/D
Architecture
SMP
Mission Mission ARDP RT
Converter
Interface
RT BC Bus 1 BC Bus 2
Unit
BBC Bus 2 BBC Bus 1 RT RT
RT
RT 1 RT 2 RWR RT RT <31
RT RT
There are other busses on the aircraft and they have to be able to communicate with
the mission computers as well as each other. This is accomplished by allowing the bus
controllers of other subsystems to also be RTs on the mission busses. This can be seen in
Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.13 incorporates our previous architectures, and adds three additional busses:
radar, stores management, and EW. The ARDP, located on the right side of the diagram, is
the airborne radar data processor, which is the bus controller for the radar bus. The ARDP
is also an RT on mission bus 1 and mission bus 2. This allows radar information to be
passed along the mission busses for use by other sensors/systems. The ARDP manages its
own bus with up to 31 RTs on the bus. By the same token, the SMP (stores management
processor), located at the left side of the diagram, is the bus controller for the stores
management bus. It is also an RT on mission bus 1 and mission bus 2. The SMP manages
its own bus (with up to 31 RTs), and can share information with other sensors/systems via
the mission busses. The EW bus is controlled by the radar warning receiver (RWR), in the
lower portion of the diagram. Unlike the previous two cases, this bus acts as an RT only on
mission bus 2. Information is still shared as long as mission bus 2 remains healthy. Should
mission bus 2 go down, there will be no data transfer with the EW bus.
There are a total of six busses depicted in Figure 3.13: mission busses 1 and 2, an
intercomputer bus, radar bus, stores management bus, and EW bus. This is a typical
arrangement on a fighter-type aircraft. Each bus has the capacity of transferring data at
the rate of 1 Mbps, for a total of 6 Mbps.
Even with these data rates, it may become necessary to bypass bus operations in order
to increase efficiency. This can readily be seen by investigating data transfer between the
INS and radar. The radar must know its spatial relationship with the earth and true north at
all times. This is called platform information and is obtained from the aircraft INS. The
radar needs this information updated at the highest rate possible. If the INS provides data
updates at 90 Hz, then the radar will use a 90 Hz update rate. In our bus architecture, this
would require the bus controller to send out a receive and transmit command to the radar
and the INS 90 times/sec. Depending on the size of the data words and overhead, this
might be the only information on the bus because of the maximum bandwidth of the bus.
As a result, it may not be possible to have any other data transfer on the bus. This, of
course, is totally unreasonable. The way to fix the problem is to either reduce the INS to
the radar transfer rate, or find an alternate means of transferring the data. In this particular
application, a direct update (hard wire) from the INS to the radar would likely be
3.15 The Flight Tester’s Task 79
implemented, thereby bypassing the bus altogether. This may seem to defeat the purpose
of having a data bus at all, but sometimes the operational requirements dictate design.
3.15 THE FLIGHT TESTER’S TASK

When evaluating any avionics system that is integrated with a digital data bus, it is the
tester’s job to verify that data are not being corrupted along the way. The only way this
test can be carried out correctly is by first understanding the system design and dis-
cussing the bus architecture with the design engineer. Comparing an input to a system to
an output of the system does not necessarily yield the answer that we are looking for.
Remember, in systems integration, we are not evaluating the box, we are evaluating a
correct integration of that box.
In recent system design approaches, an engineer will assess each subsystem from an
input and output perspective (i.e., understand what information a subsystem produces and
what other systems/subsystems consume that information, as well as what information
the subsystem itself consumes). A good example of a parameter that is produced within
a system on an aircraft is altitude. A design engineer looks at this parameter, where it
is sensed (i.e., produced) and describes its transmission path through the aircraft to other
systems that may consume this information. Typically this description is defined in a
functional requirements document (FRD). As the name implies, this document describes all
of the functional requirements of a given system. There may be an overarching FRD for the
overall system (i.e., aircraft), which is then broken into several subsystem specifications
that provide details of each subsystem. Typically, a software engineer would then be
assigned the task of detailing the derived requirements of the subsystem into a very detailed
coding specification that will be used to code the software to meet the requirements.
Again, typically, an interface design specification (IDS) is produced that specifies the
data input and output requirements of the subsystem of interest. An ICD is produced
that takes the data input and output requirements of a specific subsystem and identifies the
types of interfaces required between the other subsystems that consume the data produced
by the subsystem of interest.
The job of the tester is to ascertain if the subsystem that has been developed meets
the performance of the system/subsystem FRD. To accomplish this, the tester must
understand what the FRD says, or, at a minimum, have a very good understanding of the
intent of the FRD.
Figure 3.14 shows the parameter altitude, where it is sensed, and where the infor-
mation flows. This is a simplified version of what a design engineer must do.
We know that altitude is corrected for local pressure in the Mission Computer. In our
diagram, altitude that is sensed by the pitot-static system, passed to the ADC, and then to the
A/D converter is noncorrected altitude. The mission computer to display processor to display
is corrected altitude. In any case, the competent test engineer will want to verify that 1) the
pitot-static sensed altitude parameter is accurate (verified by TSPI), 2) the altitude received
by the mission computer is not corrupted (verified by data analysis), 3) the conversion
completed by the mission computer is accurate and correct (verified by data analysis), 4) the
altitude received by the display system is uncorrupted (verified by data analysis), and 5) the
altitude displayed to the operator is correct and readable (verified by data analysis and
human–machine interface [HMI] assessment). This is just for one parameter and one com-
munication path. Now consider the same for all other data parameters and all other paths.
FIGURE 3.14 ¢ Pitot-Static A/D Mission Display

ADC Display
Altitude Flow Chart System Converter Computer Processor
IFF INS GNSS
Stores
Management Radar EW
System
Store A Store B Store C EO/IR
Consider another example, the vertical channel in the INS. In most cases it is not
very good, so in many applications INS altitude is aided by barometric altitude. This
‘‘corrected altitude’’ is sent by the mission computer to the INS, and the INS reports
back with an INS corrected altitude. INS corrected altitude does not equal corrected
altitude or noncorrected altitude; it is something different.
The inherent worst error for GPS is in altitude, so most applications also aid GPS
altitude with barometric altitude. In the case of GPS, however, noncorrected altitude is
sent to the GPS from the mission computer and the GPS reports back with a GPS
corrected altitude. Of course, GPS altitude is not really altitude at all, but a height above
ellipsoid. Height above ellipsoid does not equal corrected or noncorrected altitude, or
even INS corrected altitude.
Many weapons use an altitude that is more ‘‘accurate’’ than corrected or non-
corrected altitude. They may use density altitude, which corrects for temperature and
humidity variation from standard conditions. And, yes, you guessed it, it is not the same
as any of the other altitudes we have discussed. Other sensors, radar, EO, and EW may
also require altitude to aid in their functional performance. Depending upon the instal-
lation, the sensors may use any of the aforementioned altitudes. Some sensors, such as
radar, compute their own altitude, which is different still from those already mentioned.
So, which altitude is correct? Unfortunately they are all correct. It all depends on
where the data are collected (i.e., produced) and where they are used (i.e., consumed). It
is incumbent upon testers to have a thorough understanding of the system under test and
how data it produces and consumes are being manipulated while passing through the
system. Failure to do so will result in an inaccurate assessment of the system under test.
Remember one other thing: even though altitude is altitude (i.e., a data parameter is
a data parameter), the parameter must be considered at each stage of the transition from
one subsystem (or transport layer) to the next.
3.16 MIL-STD-1553 SUMMARY

Data bus architecture has made the sharing and presentation of information in today’s
cockpit easier than ever. One of the most important features of this technology is that
systems have moved from direct interaction with the crew (i.e., direct manipulation of
the system) to indirect control of the subsystem through a bus interface. This has allowed
the use of multifunction displays (MFDs) that collate information from many sensors
and subsystems onto one display while the subsystems themselves are located in various
places on the aircraft. Without the use of data bus technology, this would not be possible.
MIL-STD-1553, in particular, offers a standard for the transfer of this information in
military applications. Testers, however, must not be lulled into thinking that the testing
of such systems is easier than analog, nor should they believe that all tests will be
standardized. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of learning the system before
testing. Once the system is understood, the tests must evaluate the entire system, not just
the box. If these two points are considered with every test plan, the risk of missing a
potential problem is minimized.
3.17 OTHER DATA BUSSES

Up until now, I have only addressed MIL-STD-1553. I have spent a bit of time on this
system because it has been the backbone of military avionics and weapons systems for
the past 30 years. Modern systems need to move more data between devices and needs
have emerged to incorporate audio and video, pushing MIL-STD-1553 beyond the limits
of its bandwidth. The search for a bigger, faster bus has yielded some interesting and
innovative designs. In the following sections I will examine a number of other digital
interface standards testers may come in contact with.
When looking at other systems, it is important to compare them to the advantages of
MIL-STD-1553. The primary reason the military uses MIL-STD-1553 is that this system
is deterministic. Because of the command/response protocol of MIL-STD-1553, we can
always guarantee that the data arrived on time and uncorrupted in real time. There are
not that many other interface standards that can make this claim. For this reason alone,
we can probably expect to see some form of MIL-STD-1553 in all mission critical
systems of the future. Other advantages of MIL-STD-1553 are its local area network
(LAN) architecture, which reduces weight and conserves space; its capacity for redun-
dancy (dual-bus redundancy); support for non-1553 devices; a proven history; and
component availability. Any replacement for this system must be analyzed with respect
to these capabilities.
3.17.1 RS-232C
RS-232C (recommended standard number 232, version C) is one of the oldest standards
still in use; it was introduced in 1969 by the telephone industry. It is a standard for short-
distance, multiwire, single-ended communication. Bit rates are up to 19 kbps with a
16 m bus and up to 115 kbps over short links. It uses bipolar voltage signaling with
simple handshake signals and allows for synchronous and asynchronous operations.
The standard specifies pin assignments for a point-to-point topology. It was developed
by the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) and Bell Laboratories to connect computing
equipment, known as data transmission equipment (DTE), to a telephone modem,
known as data communications equipment (DCE), so that two computers could com-
municate over a telephone line. The standard implied that the communication was per-
formed over a short distance on discrete wires with a common return. There was no
mention of transmission line parameters such as impedance or attenuation.
Initially designed for communicating through modems, it migrated to communica-

tions between computers and peripherals. During the 1980s, RS-232C was the standard
of choice for linking computers to devices such as printers, plotters, or other computers.
This worked well as long as the data rates were kept to 20 kbps at a 1 m distance or
600 bps at 25 m.
RS-232C became EIA 232E, with the latest version introduced in 1991. Since the
standard limited the data rates and distances, newer standards were devised to increase
these parameters. EIA 423 allows 100 kbps at distances up to 1200 m and EIA 422
allows data rates of 10 Mbps at distances up to 1200 m.
RS-232 signals are represented by bipolar voltage levels with respect to a common
ground between the DTE and the DCE. On the data line, the active condition is repre-
sented by a positive voltage between 3 and 15 V and indicates a logic 0. The idle
condition is represented by a negative voltage between 3 and 15 V and indicates a
logic 1. Figure 3.15 shows the signal levels and character frame defined in RS-232.
Besides the basic transmit and receive data paths, RS-232 specifies handshake lines,
primarily for use by modems. The standard defines the function of these handshake lines
and the designated pins within a range of connectors. The basic configuration of the RS-
232 interface is shown in Figure 3.16. The interconnecting lead between the DTE and
DCE is simply wired pin 1 to pin 1, pin 2 to pin 2, etc.
A description of the main signals follows:
● Transmitted data (TXD): the serial-encoded data sent from a computer to a modem to
be transmitted over the telephone line.
● Received data (RXD): the serial-encoded data received by a computer from a modem
which has, in turn, received it over a telephone line.
● Data set ready (DSR): set true by a modem whenever it is powered on; it can be read
by the computer to determine that the modem is online.
● Data terminal ready (DTR): set true by a computer whenever it is powered on; it can
be read by the modem to determine that the computer is online.
FIGURE 3.15 ¢
+15 V
RS-232 Signal LSB MSB
Levels and 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
Character Frame Logic D
(Space)
+3 V
Indeterminate
0V
Region
–3 V
Logic 1
(Mark)
7 Data Bits Stop

–15 V
Start Bit Parity Bit Bits
PC FIGURE 3.16 ¢
Basic Configuration
of RS-232
DB25 DB25
Male Female Modem
Data Pin Pin Data Communication

Terminal 2 TxD TxD 2 Equipment (DCE)
Equipment (DTE) 3 RxD RxD 3
4 RTS RTS 4
5 CTS CTS 5
6 DSR DSR 6
7 GND GND 7
8 DCD DCD 8
20 DTR DTR 20
PC PC FIGURE 3.17 ¢
RS-232 Null Modem
Configuration
DB25 DB25
Male Male
Data Data
Terminal Pin Pin Terminal
Equipment (DTE) 2 TxD TxD 2 Equipment (DTE)
3 RxD RxD 3
4 RTS RTS 4
5 CTS CTS 5
6 DSR DSR 6
7 GND GND 7
8 DCD DCD 8
20 DTR DTR 20
● Request to send (RTS): set true by a computer when it wishes to transmit data.
● Clear to send (CTS): set true by a modem to allow the computer to transmit data.
● Data carrier detect (DCD): set true by a modem when it detects the data carrier signal
on the telephone line.
There are also clock signals defined for synchronous communications. The DCE
extracts a clock signal from the data stream and provides a steady clock signal to the
DTE. Computers may be connected to other computers (DTE to DTE) by changing the
cable (corresponding pins cannot simply be connected together). Along with the data
lines, various handshake lines need to be crossed over. This configuration, known as a
null modem, is shown in Figure 3.17.
The depiction in Figure 3.17 assumes that full handshaking capability is imple-
mented in both devices, which may not be true. Cables can be wired so that a device
provides its own handshake signals and tells itself to proceed with the transfer regardless
of the status of the handshaking signals (i.e., RTS connected to CTS or DSR, and DCD
TABLE 3.2 ¢ EIA (RS) 232C Signals
DB-25 Pin No. DB-9 Pin No. Symbol Description (with respect to DTE) Direction
1 FG Frame Groud –
2 3 TXD Transmitted Data From DTE
3 2 RXD Received Data To DTE
4 7 RTS Request To Send From DTE
5 8 CTS Clear To Send To DTE
6 6 DSR Data Set Ready To DTE
7 5 SG Signal Ground –
8 1 DCD Data Carrier Detect To DTE
9 – þ P test pin –
10 – P test pin –
11 – unassigned –
12 SDCD Secondary Data Carrier Detect To DTE
13 SCTS Secondary Clear To Send To DTE
14 STD Secondary Transmitted Data From DTE
15 TC Transmission Signal Element Timing To DTE
16 SRD Secondary Received Data To DTE
17 RC Receiver Signal Element Timing From DTE
19 SRTS Secondary Request To Send From DTE
20 4 DTR Data Terminal Ready From DTE
21 SQ Signal Quality Detector To DTE
22 9 RI Ring Indicator To DTE
23 – Data Signal Rate Selector From DTE
24 – Transmitter Signal Element Timing To DTE
connected to DTR). In general, DTR and DSR are used to detect if the other device is
present and powered up, while RTS and CTS are used to implement hardware flow
control. Table 3.2 lists all signals and pin numbers (for 25- and 9-pin connectors) and the
direction the signal travels between the equipment.
Other than slow data rates, the RS-232 standard has some other significant pro-
blems. These are, in no particular order,
● Only one conductor is used per circuit with a single return for both directions of
transmission.
● It can generate cross-talk among component signals.
● The absence or misuse of the handshaking signals can result in buffer overflow or
communication lockup.
Newer standards (RS-422, RS-423, and RS-485) attempt to correct some of these
problems as well as enhance data rates.
3.17.2 Controller Area Network Bus

The controller area network (CAN) bus uses message transmission based on prioritized bus
access with bounded throughput. It operates at 1 Mbps with a 40 m bus and up to 100 kbps
with a 500 m bus. The CAN bus uses an NRZ encoding with message lengths of 0 to
8 bytes. It is a serial communications bus developed in the mid-1980s by Robert Bosch
GmbH for the German automobile industry. The needs which drove the requirement are
similar to those in aircraft avionics: to provide real-time data communication with
reduced cabling size and weight and normalized input/output (I/O) specifications.
There are two versions of CAN: CAN 1.0 and CAN 2.0, with CAN 2.0 divided into
two parts known as CAN 2.0A and CAN 2.0B. CAN 2.0 has been formalized in two
standards: ISO 11898, for high-speed applications (125 kbps to 1 Mbps), and ISO 11519
Part 2, for low-speed applications. Amendment 1 to both standards covers CAN 2.0B.
Messages transmitted on the CAN bus contain a unique identifier indicating the data
content of the message, and the receiving terminals examine the identifier to determine
if the data are required by the terminal. The identifier also identifies the priority of the
message; the lower the numerical value, the higher the priority. Higher-priority mes-
sages are guaranteed bus access, whereas lower-priority messages may have to be
transmitted at a later time.
To determine the priority of messages, CAN uses carrier sense, multiple access
with collision resolution (CSMA/CR). Collision resolution is by nondestructive bitwise
arbitration, in which a dominant logic 0 state overwrites a recessive logic 1 state. A
higher-priority terminal having a lower-value identifier transmits a logic 0 before a
lower-priority terminal. Transmitting terminals monitor their own transmissions; a
competing lower-priority terminal finds one of its logic 1 bits overwritten to a logic 0.
The lower-priority terminal terminates its transmission and waits until the bus is free
again. There is automatic retransmission of frames that have lost arbitration or have been
destroyed by errors in transmission. Nondestructive bitwise allocation allows bus access
on the basis of need, which provides benefits not available in other types of architectures
such as fixed time schedule applications (1553) or destructive bus allocation (Ethernet).
In a CAN bus, outstanding transmission requests are dealt with in order of priority. It is
claimed that a CAN will not lock up (Ethernet) because no bandwidth is lost in colli-
sions. Unfortunately, low-priority messages could be permanently locked off the bus,
which would cause problems in military applications.
The standard CAN 2.0A message frame is depicted in Figure 3.18 and contains seven
different bit fields. The start of frame (SOF) field, consisting of a single dominant bit,
indicates the beginning of a message frame. The arbitration field contains the 11-bit
message identifier, providing the means for nondestructive bitwise arbitration plus a
remote transmission request (RTR) bit. The message identifier allows 2032 unique
identifiers to be used for unicast, multicast, or broadcast messages. The RTR bit is used to
discriminate between a transmitted data frame and a request for data from a remote node
(much like the transmit/receive bit in the 1553 command word). The control field con-
tains 6 bits comprising the format identifier extension (IDE), reserved bit r0, and a 4-bit
data length code (DLC). The IDE bit is used to distinguish between the CAN 2.0A format
Bus Idle Arbitration Control Data CRC ACK EOF Int Bus Idle FIGURE 3.18 ¢
CAN 2.0A Frame
Format
11-bit identifier DLC Data (0–8 Bytes) 15 bits
SOF
RTR
IDE
r0
Delimiter
Slot
Delimiter
FIGURE 3.19 ¢
Bus Idle Arbitration Control Data
CAN 2.0B Frame
Format
11-Bit Identifier 18-Bit Identifier DLC Data (0–8 Bytes)
SOF
SRR
IDE
RTR
r1
r0
and the CAN 2.0B extended format. The DLC indicates the number of bytes (0–8) in the
following data field (much like the data word count in the 1553 command word).
The cyclical redundancy check (CRC) field contains a 15-bit CRC code and a
recessive delimiter bit. (NOTE: The CRC and what it is used for are described more
completely in the MIL-STD-1760 section later in this chapter.) The acknowledge (ACK)
field consists of 2 bits: the first is the slot bit, which is transmitted as recessive and is
subsequently overwritten by dominant bits transmitted from any node that successfully
receives the transmitted message; the second bit is a recessive delimiter bit. The end of
frame (EOF) field consists of 7 recessive bits. The intermission (Int) field consists of 3
recessive bits; after the 3-bit intermission field, the bus is again considered free. The bus
idle time may be of any arbitrary length, including zero.
The CAN 2.0B format is shown in Figure 3.19. The only difference from CAN 2.0A
is found in the arbitration field, which contains two identifier bit fields. The first (base
ID) is 11 bits long, for compatibility with version 2.0A. The second field (ID extension)
is 18 bits long, to give a total length of 29 bits, allowing more than 5 million unique user
identifiers. The distinction between the two formats is made using the identifier exten-
sion (IDE) bit. A substitute remote request (SRR) bit is also included in the arbitration
field. The SRR bit is always transmitted as a recessive bit to ensure that, in the case of
arbitration between a standard data frame and an extended data frame, the standard data
frame will always have priority if both messages have the same base (11-bit) identifier.
The RTR bit is placed after the 18-bit identifier and followed by 2 reserved bits; all other
fields in the 2.0B format are the same as in 2.0A format.
A CAN implements five error detection methods, resulting in a residual (unde-
tected) error probability of 1011:
● Cyclical redundancy checks (CRCs)
● Frame checks
● Acknowledgment error checks
● Bit monitoring
● Bit stuffing
A CAN discriminates between temporary errors and permanent failures by using
error count registers within each terminal; a faulty device will cease to be active on
the bus, but communications between the other nodes on the bus can continue.
3.17.3 ARINC 429

The formal name of ARINC 429 is the ARINC 429 Mark 33 Digital Information
Transfer System (DITS) specification. This system is simplex (one-way) operating at
100 kbps (high speed) or 12–14.5 kbps (low speed). The message length is 32 bits with a
255 word data block in block transfer mode. ARINC 429 uses RTZ bipolar tristate
modulation and can be configured in either a star or bus-drop topology. The standard
was developed by the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee (AEEC) data bus
subcommittee, administered by American Radio Inc. (ARINC).
The ARINC 429 specification defines the requirements for a data transmission
system based on the use of a single data source and reception of that data by up to 20
sinks or receivers. In the context of MIL-STD-1553, the source can be viewed as the bus
controller, whereas the sinks are the RTs. The maximum number of sinks permitted for
connection to a source is limited by the specified minimum receiver input impedance.
Either a star (Figure 3.20) or a bus-drop (Figure 3.21) topology may be used. If a
full-duplex connection is required, a terminal/line replaceable unit (LRU) may have
multiple connectors and separate transmit and receive busses (Figure 3.22). A receiver/
sink is not permitted to respond on the bus when it receives a transmission, but as
indicated in Figure 3.22, it may respond on a separate bus. LRUs connected to ARINC
429 busses are not assigned addresses; instead, they listen for data words with labels
identifying data of interest to the LRU.
ARINC 429 utilizes a twisted pair shielded copper cable for redundancy. Although
the bus length is not specified, most systems are designed for less than 175 ft, with some
able to handle 20 sinks at distances of up to 300 ft. The signaling is by RTZ bipolar
FIGURE 3.20 ¢
Receiving Receiving ARINC 429 Star
LRU LRU
Topology
Transmitting
LRU
Receiving Receiving
LRU LRU
FIGURE 3.21 ¢
Transmitting ARINC 429 Bus-
LRU
Drop Topology
Receiving Receiving
LRU LRU
Receiving
LRU
Receiving
LRU
FIGURE 3.22 ¢
LRU
ARINC 429 Multiple
Bus Topology RX
RX RX
TX
LRU TX
RX
TX
RX
TX
RX RX RX
FIGURE 3.23 ¢ ‘1’ ‘0’

Return-to-Zero
Tristate Modulation Hi
Null
V
Lo
FIGURE 3.24 ¢ 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01
ARINC 429 Word P SSM Data Word SDI Label

MSB LSB LSB MSB
Format
tristate modulation and has three states—‘‘Hi,’’ ‘‘Null,’’ and ‘‘Lo’’—which are repre-
sented by the differential voltage between the two wires on the cable. A graphical
representation of RTZ is shown at Figure 3.23.
A logical 1 is signaled by transmission of a 10 1 V pulse followed by a 0 0.5 V
null period. A logical 0 is signaled by the transmission of a 10 1 V pulse followed by
a 0 0.5 V null period. Rise and fall times for the pulse are specified in the standard and
are a function of bit rate. A drawback associated with RTZ is that unequal numbers of
‘‘Hi’’ and ‘‘Lo’’ bits can result in a transfer of electrical energy into reactive elements of
the bus so that the bus may become charged, resulting in end-of-message distortion and
ringing. An advantage of tristate modulation is that a clock is not necessary, as the start
of new words can be identified by length of null time (words are separated by four bit
times of null voltage).
ARINC 429 uses 32-bit words divided into five application domains. The data
contained in the words of the message format depend on the application domain and the
specific data being transferred. Figure 3.24 represents a typical ARINC 429 word con-
taining five parts.
The source transmits the 32-bit word and each sink is required to inspect the label
field, which is encoded in octal to represent the type of information contained within the
32-bit word. The organization of the word is least significant bit (LSB) sent first, except
for the label, which is encoded most significant bit (MSB) read first. The label field can
have system instructions or data reporting functionality. When performing data block or
data file transfers, the label is replaced with the system address label (SAL). Each data
item is assigned a label listed in the ARINC 429 specification and each source may have
up to 255 labels assigned for its use.
The next two bits are used as a source/destination identifier (SDI). The SDI is
optional, and if it is not used, the two bits are added to the data word. The functions of
the SDI are any of the following:
● Indicate the intended destination of the data on a multisink bus.
● Identify the source of the data on a multisource bus.
● Add an extension to the label, in which case receiving systems decode the label/SDI
combination.
When the SDI is used as a destination indicator, receivers are given binary instal-
lation numbers (00,01,10,11), where 00 may be receiver number 4, or it may be used to
indicate a broadcast mode (similar to 11111 in MIL-STD-1553).
The data field contains 19 bits and, as previously mentioned, may contain 21 bits if
the SDI is not used. The signal/sign matrix (SSM) is also an optional field which is used
to indicate sign information: up/down, east/west, north/south, þ /, etc. The parity bit is
set to make the word parity odd.
Each ARINC 429 word has a predefined rate at which it must be transmitted, as
each label has an associated minimum and maximum transmit time defined in the
standard. As previously mentioned, the minimum interword gap is four bit times;
however, they may be longer.
ARINC 429 allows for block transfer of data between devices. Files are transferred
in blocks known as link data units (LDUs) and may contain from 3 to 255 words. The
file transfer is handled much the same way as discussed in RS-232. When a source
intends to transmit data to a unit, it sends an RTS word containing a destination code and
data word count. The receiving unit sends a CTS word containing the same destination
code and word count for verification. Upon receipt of the CTS, the source initiates a
transfer by sending a start of transmission (SOT) word. The SOT word contains a file
sequence number, a general format identifier (GFI), and an LDU sequence number. Up
to 253 data words are then sent, followed by an end of transmission (EOT) word that
terminates the block. The EOT word includes a CRC and identifies the position of the
LDU in the overall file transfer. With successful verification, the receiving unit sends an
acknowledgment (ACK) word; the source may then repeat the process. Later versions
of the standard allow up to seven LDUs to be transmitted without seeking separate
permission from the sink.
3.17.4 ARINC 629

ARINC 629 is a serial, multitransmitter data bus operating at 2 Mbps. It utilizes Man-
chester II biphase encoding and can transmit up to 31 word strings, each containing one
16-bit label and up to 256 16-bit data words. Access control is via carrier sense multiple
FIGURE 3.25 ¢
Message
ARINC 629 Message
Structure
Word String 1 Word String 2 Word String n
Label Data 1 Data 2 Data N
FIGURE 3.26 ¢ Source Destination Information Crc

System status Data
ARINC 629 Simple Address Address Identifier (Optional)
Word String
access/collision avoidance (CSMA/CA). Initial research was carried out by Boeing and
was implemented on the Boeing 777 in 1989 (ARINC 629). ARINC 629-2 was pub-
lished in 1991 and ARINC 629-3 in 1994. It was developed because of the need to
overcome limitations in ARINC 429.
An ARINC 629 message (Figure 3.25) has variable length up to 31 word strings. A
word string is also of variable length and is made up of one label with channel infor-
mation and data labels for addressing and up to 256 data words.
Figure 3.26 is an example of how a word string may be used. The label is used for
the source address. Subsequent words carry system status information, destination
address, information identifier, data, and an optional CRC. Each word is 20 bits long:
the first three are the synchronization pulse, the next 16 are data, and the last bit is for
parity.
In CSMA/CA, bus access control is distributed among all participating terminals,
each of which determines its transmission sequence. This is achieved by the use of bus
access timers:
● Transmit interval (TI): The TI is the longest timer and operates between 0.5 and
64 msec. It starts every time the terminal starts transmitting and is specified by a
7-bit value in the terminal controller. A message is sent by the terminal from every
1 to 31 TI periods depending on settings held in the terminal’s transmit personality.
The TI is the same for all terminals.
● Synchronization gap (SG): The SG ensures that the terminals are given access. The
SG is chosen to be greater than the maximum terminal gap and the values are 16, 32,
64, or 128 minimum terminal gap. The SG starts every time bus quiet is sensed; it
may be reset before it has elapsed if bus activity is sensed and restarted the next time
the terminal starts to transmit. The SG is the same for all terminals.
● Terminal gap (TG): The TG is used to differentiate between terminals and is unique
for each terminal. The values of the TG are from 3.6875 to 126.6875 in 1 msec steps.
The TG only starts after the SG has elapsed and the bus is quiet; it may be reset if bus
activity is sensed before it has elapsed.
Terminal 1 FIGURE 3.27 ¢

TI Basic Protocol
M SG TG M SG TG Periodic Mode
Terminal 2
TI
TG M SG TG TG M SG TG
Terminal 3
TI
TG M SG TG TG M SG TG
Minor Frame = TI
The standard supports two alternative protocols: basic and combined. The two can
not operate simultaneously due to fundamental differences in bus access. In both cases
the access is coordinated at two levels:
● The basic division of bus time into major and minor cycles may be of a fixed duration
and looks a lot like time division multiple access (TDMA) or may be variable
depending on the settings of the terminal.
● The access contention by terminals can be accomplished by carrier sensing and
observation of the preassigned waiting times, and common bus quiet periods look a
lot like carrier sense multiple access (CSMA), but with collision avoidance.
The basic and combined protocols support periodic and sporadic transmissions.
Periodic messages are scheduled automatically at the 629 terminal level according
to predefined message tables (message contents, destinations, etc.). The way that
sporadic transmissions are handled provides the main difference between the two
protocols. Figure 3.27 shows the basic protocol periodic mode timing for a simple
three-terminal bus.
The order in which the terminals achieve bus access remains the same for all minor
cycles and is determined by the initialization sequence and drift between terminal
clocks; it does not necessarily equate to the relative duration of the terminals’ TG timers.
If the sum of all the TGs, transmission times, and SG is less than TI, then the minor
cycle time remains fixed and equal to the TI. Periodic access for all terminals can only
be guaranteed if the message transmission times (represented by ‘‘M’’ in Figure 3.27)
are all equal and constant.
If the sum of all the TGs, message transmission times, and SG is greater than TI,
then the system must operate in the aperiodic mode, as shown in Figure 3.28.
For every minor cycle, the terminals transmit in order of their TG durations
(shortest first); in Figure 3.28, TG1 < TG3 < TG2. Each minor cycle consists of a
series of transmissions separated by the various TG delays, which are followed by an
SG delay that provides synchronization. The messages include periodic and sporadic
data transmissions that vary in length from minor cycle to minor cycle. The timing
stability of the periodic data transmission is dependent on the amount of sporadic data
that can cause jitter.
In order to solve the problems associated with aperiodic mode, British Aerospace
and Smiths Industries developed a combined protocol to provide a more effective
FIGURE 3.28 ¢ Minor Frame ⬎ TI

Basic Protocol Terminal 1
Aperiodic Mode TI TI
TG1 M SG TG1 M
Terminal 2
TI
TG2 M SG
Terminal 3
TI
TG3 M SG
FIGURE 3.29 ¢ New L3 New (continuation)

L3 Backlog
Combined Protocol Requests L3 Requests
Periodic Aperiodic Aperiodic Periodic

(L1) (L2) (L3) (L1)
ASG ASG
AT PSG
TI (constant)
MAL+PSG
approach to handling periodic and sporadic data. The combined protocol has three
levels:
● Level 1: Periodic transmissions
● Level 2: Short but frequent sporadic data
● Level 3: Long but infrequent sporadic data
A new set of timers are also defined for the combined protocol:
● Transmit interval (TI): The TI is the same as in the basic protocol, but is only
applicable for the first periodic transmission within each minor cycle.
● Concatenation event (CE): The CE overrides and cancels all subsequent nonelapsed
TI timers, effectively forcing all periodic transmissions into a burst separated only by
TG delays and the start of each minor frame.
● Terminal gap (TG): Same as in the basic protocol.
● Periodic synchronization gap (PSG): Ensures synchronization at the minor cycle level.
● Aperiodic synchronization gap (ASG): Synchronizes transmissions between trans-
missions of different levels within minor cycles.
● Aperiodic access time out (AT): Indicates the time to the next periodic (level 1)
transmission; any sporadic transmissions that would take longer than this time are
prohibited during the current minor frame, thus ensuring fixed-length minor frames.
The combined protocol timing is depicted in Figure 3.29. Level 1 periodic
messages are transmitted in a burst (separated by the TG) at the start of the minor
frame when the PSG of the previous minor frame elapses. Level 2 aperiodic messages
are transmitted (separated by TG delays and in the reverse order of TG duration) after
the burst of level 1 periodic data when timer ASG has elapsed, followed by level 3
aperiodic messages.
Each terminal is limited to one level 2 transmission, but may perform multiple level 3
transmissions if time is available within the minor frame. Level 2 sporadic data must be
transmitted within the current minor frame or be lost. Level 3 sporadic data may span
minor cycles, and backlog level 3 messages take priority. The ‘‘MAL’’ in Figure 3.29 is
the maximum aperiodic length, and is equal to 257 words.
Although this standard was once considered for use by Airbus, it is currently used
on only one platform (Boeing 777), where it forms part of the fly-by-wire system.
3.17.5 STANAG 3910

STANAG 3910 builds on the basic 1553 bus architecture by adding a 20 Mbps high-
speed data bus activated by commands on the low-speed 1553 bus. The standard allows
for variable message formats of up to 128 blocks of 32 words, or a total of 4096 16-bit
data words. The standard defines three optical (fiber optic) and one electrical high-speed
network topology options.
STANAG 3910 was born out of necessity because of the inadequate data transfer
capacity of MIL-STD-1553 for the Eurofighter and other future avionics systems where
the requirements could not be met by multiple 1553 busses. The designed system was
low risk and it relied heavily on existing 1553 designs and protocols.
The first draft standard was created in 1987 by a German standardization commit-
tee; the EFAbus (Eurofighter bus) was issued as a project-specific variant of 3910 type
A in 1989. An electrical high-speed network (type D) variant was adopted for the French
Rafale program in 1990. The standard defines the high-speed fiber-optic and electrical
transmission networks, the concept of operation and information flow on the high-speed
network, and the optical, electrical, and functional formats to be employed.
The standard defines a 20 Mbps fiber-optic or electrical network controlled by a
1553B or optical equivalent 1 Mbps data bus. Four types of systems are defined:
● Type A
– Low-speed channel: 1553 data bus
– High-speed channel: fiber-optic data bus
● Type B
– Low-speed channel: fiber-optic equivalent of 1553B
– High-speed channel: physically separate fiber-optic data bus
● Type C
– Low-speed channel: fiber-optic equivalent of 1553B
– High-speed channel: wavelength division multiplexed with the low-speed channel
onto a common fiber-optic medium
● Type D
– Low-speed channel: 1553B data bus
– High-speed data bus: physically separate wire data bus
FIGURE 3.30 ¢ MIL-STD-1553B Data Bus

3910 Type A
Network
1553 T/R 1553 T/R 1553 T/R 1553 T/R
Remote Remote Remote

Bus Controller
Terminal 1 Terminal 2 Terminal 3
20 Mbps T/R 20 Mbps T/R 20 Mbps T/R
Star Coupler 20 Mbps

Channel Fiber Optics
Figure 3.30 shows an example of a type A 3910 network using an optical star
coupler. STANAG 3910 defines requirements for the high-speed channel implemented
as an optical transmissive star coupler, reflective star coupler, or a linear T-coupled
optical bus. EFAbus uses a type A network with optical reflexive star couplers.
All transfers on the high-speed network are initiated via messages on the low-speed
bus, with the action required on the high-speed network defined in a 1553B data word and
described in 3910 as a high-speed action word. In the Eurofighter, the RT recognizes the
high-speed data transfer when a command word with a subaddress of 26 is sent. The high-
speed terminal’s status is conveyed in 1553B data words, described in 3910 as high-speed
status words. Figure 3.31 describes the message formats available in 3910. You will
recognize them as being similar to those described in the 1553 section of this chapter.
The ‘‘**’’ in the figure refers to the response time as described in 1553, which you will
remember is 4 to 12 msec; the ‘‘#’’ symbol in the figure refers to the intermessage gap,
which is 4 msec. The bus controller receives the status of the high-speed transfer by
sending a mode code to the transmit/receive requesting a high-speed status word.
In the Eurofighter implementation of 3910, the bus controller waits for the high-
speed message frame to complete before sending the next command word/message on
the low-speed 1553 bus.
The formats of the data words (high-speed action word and high-speed status word)
are shown in Figure 3.32. The bus controller sends the command word to the transmitting/
receiving RT with a subaddress of 26. The next word (first data word) will be the high-
speed action word shown in Figure 3.32. The action word is 20 bits long, with the first
3 bits used as the synchronization pattern. The A bus/B bus (A/B) bit indicates which
of the two (redundant busses) networks will be used for the transmission, while the
T/R bit indicates whether the RT is to transmit or receive the high-speed transfer.
The high-speed message identity/high-speed mode works like MIL-STD-1553 except the
subaddress uses 7 bits (128 subaddresses) instead of the 5 bits in 1553. The high-speed
word count/mode code is as in MIL-STD-1553, except there are 7 bits for the data word
count (128 data words). The parity bit is the same as in 1553 (odd parity). All zeroes
(0000000) in the message identity indicates a mode code command.
BC to RT or RT to BC Transfer (initiated by a 1553B BC to RT message) FIGURE 3.31 ¢

Command HS Action Status Next Command 3910 Message
Word Word ** Word # Word
Formats
(1553B
HS Message Frame
Data Word)
RT to RT Transfer (initiated by two successive 1553B BC to RT messages)

Command HS Action Status Command HS Action Status Next Command
Word Word ** Word # Word Word ** Word # Word
(1553B (1553B
Data Word) Data Word) HS Message Frame
BC to RTs Broadcast Transfer (initiated by a 1553B Broadcast message)

Command HS Action Next Command
Word Word # Word
(1553B
HS Message Frame
Data Word)
Transmit HS Status Word (no 20Mbit/s transaction)

Command Status HS Status Next Command
Word ** Word Word # Word
(1553B Data Word(s))
HS Mode Command
Command HS Action Status Next Command
Word Word ** Word # Word
HS Mode Command with additional Data Word (Receive)

Command HS Action Data Status Next Command
Word Word Word ** Word # Word
RT to RTs Broadcast Transfer (initiated by a 1553B Broadcast message)

Command HS Action Command HS Action Status Next Command
Word Word # Word Word ** Word # Word
HS Message Frame
HS Broadcast Mode Command

Command HS Action Next Command
Word Word # Word
HS Broadcast Mode Command with additional Data Words (Receive)

Command HS Action Data Next Command
Word Word Word # Word
HS Action A/ T/ HS Message Identify/ HS Word Count/ FIGURE 3.32 ¢

B R P
Word HS Mode HS Mode 3910 High-Speed
3 1 1 7 7 1 Action and Status
Words
HS Status
Word HS Transmitter HS Receiver
Reserved TF P
Status Status
3 3 6 6 1 1
The high-speed status word (also shown in Figure 3.32) is comprised of a 3-bit
synchronization followed by a 3-bit reserved field. The 6-bit transmitter status field
indicates the status of the transmitter section of the high-speed media interface unit
(MIU) and the transmission protocol interface unit (TPIU). Only two bits in this field are
used: bit 7 indicates that the transmitter is not ready for transmission, and bit 8 indicates
FIGURE 3.33 ¢ Word No. 1 2 3 4 3 + WC 4 + WC

High-Speed C
Message Frame Unit CS Protocol Data Units (PDU) S
Format P S FC
Field R PA DA WC Data FCS E
D D
4 4 8 8 16 16 16 16 16 4
(CS) Control Sequence (FC) Frame Control (WC) Word Count

(PR) Preamble (PA) Physical Address (FCS) Frame Check Sequence
(SD) Start Delimiter (DA) Destination Address (ED) End Delimiter
that the high-speed transmitter is active (transmitting). The 6-bit high-speed receiver
status indicates the status of the receiver section. Only three of these bits are used: bit 16
indicates that the high-speed receiver is not ready for reception, bit 17 indicates that the
high-speed receiver is active (receiving), and bit 18 indicates that an error was detected
on the most recently received high-speed transmission. Bit 19 is the terminal flag and bit 20
is the parity bit. The high-speed message format is shown at Figure 3.33.
Three control symbol (CS) fields define the boundary of a transmission: the preamble
(PR), start delimiter (SD), and the end delimiter (ED). The PR is used by the receiving unit
to acquire signal-level synchronization. The SD and ED delimit the start and end of a data
transmission sequence and are made up of invalid Manchester code patterns similar to the
synchronization pattern. The frame control (FC) field is required to be permanently set to
11000000. The physical address (PA) field is set to the 1553 RT address of the trans-
mitting unit. If the transmitting unit is a bus controller, then the PA is set to 00011111; in
all cases the three high-order bits are set to zero (since 1553 only uses a 5-bit RT address).
The first bit of the destination address (DA) specifies either logical or physical addressing
modes. If physical addressing is used, the first 8 bits are the receiving RT’s 1553 address
followed by the high-speed subaddress (which is identical to the content of the high-speed
message identity field transmitted on the low-speed bus). Logical addressing is used for
broadcast mode and is defined by the system designer. The high-speed word count (WC)
defines the number of 16-bit data words in the information (INFO) field. The INFO field
contains the number of data words defined in the WC field. The frame check sequence
(FCS) provides a check for errors in all preceding fields (similar to the CRC).
3.17.6 Universal Serial Bus

The universal serial bus (USB) is a tiered star peripheral interface network operating at
1.5 Mbps, 12 Mbps, or 480 Mbps. The system can transfer messages up to 1024 bytes in
length to as many as 127 nodes; it uses non-return-to-zero invert (NRZI) encoding and is
capable of isochronous and bulk data transfer. USB is intended to replace the older RS-
232 networks for peripherals such as mice, keyboards, scanners, cameras, and printers,
and mass storage devices such as CD-ROM, floppy, and DVD drives. There are two
versions of the standard: USB 1.1 (September 1998), allowing bit rates of 1.5 and
12 Mbps, and USB 2.0 (April 2000), allowing rates of 480 Mbps.
USB is dedicated to providing communications between a host and a number of
slaves; there is no direct communication among the slaves. The standard defines a tiered
star, or Christmas tree topology, with a hub at the center of each star. The maximum
number of allowable tiers is seven and the maximum number of hubs in a commu-
nication path between the host and any device is limited to five. A depiction of the USB
topology is shown in Figure 3.34.
FIGURE 3.34 ¢
USB Tiered Star
Host
Topology
Tier 1
Root Hub (Host Tier)
Hub
Tier 2
1
Hub
Function Function Tier 3
2
Function Function Hub Function Tier 4

3
Compound Hub
Hub
Device 4 Function Function Function Tier 5
5
Hub
Function Function Function 6 Function Function Tier 6
Function Function Tier 7
There may be up to 127 logical devices (hubs and peripherals) connected via the
tiered star topology, with control dedicated to one USB host (normally in the host com-
puter/PC). Plug and play of peripheral devices is managed by automatic reconfiguration
of software/firmware within the host. There are three basic units within the topology:
● Host controller—responsible for centralized command and control of the network. It
most typically resides within the host computer/PC.
● Hubs—router/repeater devices that provide connectivity to the peripheral devices.
Every hub contains a hub controller and a hub repeater; it has one upstream port and
one or more downstream ports. Messages arriving at an upstream port are broadcast
on all the downstream ports and messages arriving at any downstream port are
repeated on the upstream port. A hub with more than one downstream port is called a
compound device.
● Peripheral devices—also called functions in the standard, and can be mice, key-
boards, scanners, etc.
The data rates within USB are the low-speed peripheral interface (LSPI), at 1.5 Mbps;
the full-speed peripheral interface (FSPI), at 12 Mbps; and the high-speed peripheral
interface (HSPI), at 480 Mbps.
USB is a polled network in which the host controller initiates all data transfers.
USB establishes a 1 msec time base, called a frame, for LSPI and FSPI; it establishes a
125 msec time base, called a microframe, for HSPI. A frame or microframe may contain
several transactions; each transfer type defines the transactions allowed within a frame
or microframe for an endpoint. Data carried over the USB network is carried in a USB-
defined structure; however, the standard allows device-specific structured data to be
carried as well. Formatting and interpretation of the data transported during a bus
transaction are functions of the client software. USB defines four transfer types to suit
the various real-time requirements of the peripherals:
● Control transfers—provide configuration, command, and status communication
flows between client software and its function. They are typically used for command
and status information during configuration. They are composed of a setup bus
transaction: sending a request from host to device, sending information in the
direction indicated by the setup transaction, and waiting for status information from
the device.
● Isochronous transfers—a periodic, continuous communication between the host and
the device. They are typically used for time critical information that is associated
with telephones, speakers, or microphones which preserves the concept of time
encapsulated in the data. There are no handshakes or acknowledgments and they are
supported by unidirectional flows from the host or device.
● Interrupt transfers—provide low-frequency, bounded-latency communication used
by devices such as mice, keyboards, and joysticks.
● Bulk transfers—used with most common USB devices. The transmissions are large
nonperiodic packets of data typically used for non-time-critical data that can wait
until bandwidth becomes available.
The packet formats for USB are shown in Figure 3.35. All packets begin with a
synchronization field, which is not shown in Figure 3.35; this is used by the receivers to
align incoming signals with the receiving device’s clock. The field is 8 bits long for
LSPI and FSPI and 32 bits long for FSPI. Each packet has a packet identifier (PID)
specifying the packet type and other information. The start of frame packet contains an
11-bit frame number and a 5-bit CRC covering the preceding fields. The token packet
contains the PID identifying a token packet, followed by a device address field identi-
fying the peripheral that is to respond to the token. This is followed by an endpoint field
identifying the endpoint within the device that is to be the source or destination of the
data to follow. The data packet starts with the PID, followed by a data field that may be
from 0 to 1024 bytes long; a 16-bit CRC protects the preceding fields. The handshake
packet consists of a PID field identifying it as such, and returns values indicating suc-
cessful reception of data, flow, control, and stall conditions.
FIGURE 3.35 ¢
PID Frame Number CRC Start of Frame
USB Packet 8 bits 11 bits 5 bits
Formats
PID Address End CRC Token
8 bits 7 bits 4 bits 5 bits
PID Data CRC Data

8 bits 0 - 1024 bytes 16 bits
PID Handshake
8 bits
The USB host sends a start of frame packet for every frame (or microframe in the
case of HSPI). The available bus bandwidth is shared between devices within the frame
or microframe interval. A typical USB data transaction uses a token packet, data packet,
and handshake packet. The host controller broadcasts a token packet to a specific device
address. The device responds to its unique address and, depending on the contents of the
direction field in the PID, will broadcast or wait to receive data. After a data packet has
been transmitted or received, a handshake packet is sent by either the host or the device.
3.17.7 Enhanced Bit Rate 1553

Enhanced bit rate (EBR) 1553 is a higher-speed, 10 Mbps version of the 1553 protocol,
maintaining the determinism of the basic MIL-STD-1553B system. EBR-1553 is one
way to resolve the problem of newer applications requiring higher data rates on legacy
systems. It is a preferred method when integrating newer systems, as opposed to
rewiring (fiber optics). Another benefit is the ability to reuse software written for 1553
applications, which simplifies the integration task.
The initial topology for EBR-1553 was an active star configuration. In this con-
figuration, a logical hub provides the communications link between the bus controller
and the RTs. The active function limits responses from the RTs so the bus controller will
only receive data from one RT at a time. A depiction of the EBR-1553 topology is
shown in Figure 3.36.
The bus controller, through the logical hub function, is connected to a number of
terminals (up to 31; 5-bit address, 11111 reserved for broadcast) with point-to-point
physical connections utilizing RS-485 transceivers. These modems work much the same
way as the digital subscriber line (DSL) connection works with your home PC. Hub
topology is used to improve reliability, and RS-485 transceivers are robust and relatively
inexpensive. It can be seen from the figure that RT–RT data transfer rates can now be
increased significantly. The bus monitor ensures that the data transfer was completed
successfully and monitors for errors in the transmission.
EBR-1553 can extend the terminal address range from 31 to 255 by using a sup-
porting point-to-point CAN bus (see section 3.17.2). The CAN bus assigns RTs or stores
an address at power-up. It allows for an 8-bit address that consists of a 3-bit segment
address and the 5-bit RT address, effectively allowing eight segments, each containing
32 allowable RTs (32 terminals for seven segments, 31 terminals for the original avio-
nics bus, or 255 total addresses). Figure 3.37 illustrates this expansion (not shown is the
bus monitor, which resides on each segment).
FIGURE 3.36 ¢
BC X = RS-485 Transceiver EBR-1553 Topology
BM = Bus Monitor
Active Hub
X X X X X
X X X X X
RT 1 RT 2 RT 3 RTⱕ31 BM
FIGURE 3.37 ¢ Bus

EBR-1553 Remote Controller X = RS-485 Transceiver
Terminal Increase
Switch
to 255
Segment 1 Hub Segment 2 Hub Segment 3 Hub

X X X X X X
X X X X X X
RT RT RT RT RT RT
1 ⱕ31 1 32 1 32
Up to 31 RT/Segment 1 EBR-1553 Extension Up to 8 Segments

Up to 32 RT/Segment 2–8
One example where EBR-1553 data standards are used is the miniature munitions/
stores interface (MMSI). The MMSI standard uses EBR-1553 as the embedded data bus
standard and defines implementation requirements for the electrical interface between
the aircraft-carried dispensers (or other carrying devices) and miniature stores.
3.17.8 MIL-STD-1760D
Prior to the implementation of MIL-STD-1760, aircraft and stores were developed
independently. This, of course, resulted in unique aircraft/store electrical interconnec-
tion requirements which varied from aircraft to aircraft. Unique installations were costly
and each addition of a new store required external or internal modifications to the air-
craft. The goal of the standard was to develop aircraft that were compatible with a wide
variety of stores and stores that were compatible with a wide variety of aircraft.
MIL-STD-1760D defines a standard electrical (and optical) interconnection system
for aircraft and stores. The system is based on the use of a standard connector, a standard
signal set, and a standard serial digital data interface for control, monitoring, and release
of stores. The standard defines implementation requirements for the aircraft/store elec-
trical interconnection system (AEIS) in aircraft and stores. Requirements for mechan-
ical, aerodynamic, logistic, and operational compatibility are not covered. Factors such
as size, shape, loads, and clearances are not specified; therefore, full interoperability
cannot be assured. Signals for emergency jettison are not included; nor does the standard
attempt to establish the electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility
(EMI/EMC) requirements of the aircraft or the store. It does define an interface that is
generally capable of meeting the requirements.
The standard provides for a variety of stores interfaces:
● Aircraft station interface (ASI)
● Mission store interface (MSI)
● Carriage store interface (CSI)
● Routing network aircraft system port (RNASP)
These interfaces are shown in Figure 3.38.
FIGURE 3.38 ¢
Aircraft/Pylon Aircraft
Disconnect Wing
1760D Stores
Interfaces
Store Station
Pylon Equipment
Parent Rack ASI

Umbilical
MSI
Mission Store
Fixed Rack/Adaptor
Aircraft Aircraft Mission

Aircraft
Wing Station Store
Station
Pylon Store station
ASI MSI
Equipment
Parent Rack ASI
Umbilical
CSI Carriage store
Rack Equipment
Rack
CSSI CSSI
MSI
ASI – Aircraft Station Interface
Only these Interfaces
CSI – Carriage Store Interface
Are Controlled by
CSSI – Carriage Store Station Interface
This Standard
Mission Stores MSI – Mission Store Interface
Appendix B of MIL-STD-1760D specifies the requirements for message formatting,

data encoding, information transfer rules, and other characteristics for utilizing a digital
data bus. The data bus interface complies with the requirements of MIL-STD-1553B,
Notice 4, with additional requirements. WGS-84 is the specified earth model. SAE-
AS15531 may be used in lieu of MIL-STD-1553.
The protocols for MIL-STD-1760D follow the requirements contained in 1553;
command, data, and status words are formatted the same, although there are more
reserved fields and data dependencies. Messages are formatted the same, however, 1760
allows for mass data transfer. Mass data transfer refers to the transfer of data sets
between aircraft and stores (or between stores) where the data set consists of more data
words than can be transferred with only a few messages.
All command words are generated by an AEIS bus controller (normally the mission
computer or stores management processor). The RT address is the terminal address of
the store; broadcast command is authorized. There are 10 subaddress fields reserved in
MIL-STD-1760 and they can be found in Appendix B, Table B-1, of the standard; it is
reproduced here as Table 3.3. The aircraft may use 00000 or 11111 in the subaddress
field to identify a mode code.
Many of the mandatory mode codes are as defined in MIL-STD-1553: transmit
status word, transmitter shutdown, override transmitter shutdown, reset remote terminal,
transmit vector word, synchronize with data word, and transmit last command. The
aircraft shall not transmit dynamic bus control or any of the reserved mode codes. If a
store receives a prohibited mode code it shall not alter the state of the store subsystem.
The status word is as defined in MIL-STD-1553; however, status word bits at
bit times 10, 12, 13, 14, and 18 shall be set to logic 0. Bit time 10 may not be used to
TABLE 3.3 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Command Words Subaddress Fields
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-I. Subaddress/mode field application
MESSAGE FORMATS 1/ and 2/
SUBADDRESS FIELD RECEIVE TRANSMIT DESCRIPTION

00000 (00) B.4.1.1.3 B.4.1.1.3 MODE CODE INDICATOR
00001 (01) B.4.2.2.6 B.4.2.2.3 STORE DESCRIPTION,
AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION
00010 (02) USER DEFINED USER DEFINED
00111 (07) B.4.1.5.9 B.4.1.5.9 DATA PEELING
01000 (08) RESERVED RESERVED TEST ONLY 3/
01011 (11) B.4.2.2.1 B.4.2.2.2 STORE CONTROL/MONITOR
01110 (14) B.4.1.5.8 B.4.1.5.8 MASS DATA TRANSFER
10011 (19) B.4.2.2.4 B.4.2.2.5 NUCLEAR WEAPON
11011 (27) B.4.2.2.4 B.4.2.2.5 NUCLEAR WEAPON
11110 (30) USER DEFINED USER DEFINED DATA WRAPAROUND 4/
11111 (31) B.4.1.1.3 B.4.1.1.3 MODE CODE INDICATOR
distinguish a command from a status word. The message error and the broadcast com-
mand received are the same as 1553; service request bit, busy bit, subsystem, and
terminal flag are slightly different. The service request bit is only used for request
notification; once a store sets this bit to logic 1, it must ensure that a vector word is
immediately available. The vector word format is contained in Appendix B, Table B-II,
of the standard and is reproduced here as Table 3.4. The service request bit will be reset
to logic 0 when and only when the store has received a transmit vector word mode code
for the active service request and the vector word has been transmitted. If the service
request bit is still set to logic 1 in a second or subsequent service request, it will be
TABLE 3.4 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Vector Word Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-II. Vector word (asynchronous message demand) format
FIELD NAME BIT NO. DESCRIPTION

FORMAT FLAG -00- Shall be set to logic 0.
RESERVED 1/ -01- RESERVED. Shall be set to logic 0.
-02- RESERVED. Shall be set to logic 0.
T/R 1/ -05- Shall be set to a logic 1 to indicate that the requested message is a
transmit command. (Logic 0 indicates a receive command request.)
SUBADDRESS 1/ -06- MSB ¼ 16 #

-07-
-08- — Bits 6 through 10 contain the subaddress of the
-09- required message.
-10- LSB ¼ 1
WORD COUNT 1/ -11- MSB ¼ 16 #

-12-
-13- — Bits 11 through 15 contain the word count of the
-14- required message.
-15- LSB ¼ 1
1/ The designated field definitions apply only when bit number 00 is set to logic 0. See TABLE B-III for alternate vector word format.
2/ The vector word shall be set to 0000 hexadecimal, unless the service request notification protocol (B.4.1.5.4) is in progress.
disregarded by the aircraft. Acknowledgment of the receipt of a valid vector word is not
a requirement of the aircraft.
The busy bit will only be set to logic 1 when the store cannot move data to or from
the store subsystem in compliance with a command, and is only set temporarily in
accordance with the standard (50–500 msec). The busy bit is the only indication that a
message has been discarded, and no additional notification is implemented. The sub-
system flag is set by the store when there is a fault condition within the store or the store-
to-terminal interface, which destroys the credibility of the data at the data bus interface.
The controller will interpret this as a total loss of store function.
The data words follow the same formatting as with MIL-STD-1553, however, their
sequencing follows a more rigid format than previously seen with avionics data. Actual
message formatting will be discussed shortly.
There are three primary verifications performed with MIL-STD-1760D implementation:
● Verification of checksum
● Verification of message header
● In the store control message: verification of critical control 1, verification of critical
control 2, and critical authority
FIGURE 3.39 ¢
Command Word
Cyclical
Redundancy Check
Header Word
Shift 2 bits to
the right
Data Word 1
Data Word 2
Checksum Word
Add and sum should be

equal to zero
The use of a checksum is required in the store control, store monitor, store
description, transfer control, and transfer monitor messages. The checksum occupies the
last word position of both transmit and receive messages. Each data word is rotated right
cyclically by a number of bits equal to the number of preceding data words in the
message. The resultant rotated data words are summed to each bit with the checksum
and the sum shall be equal to zero (bits are not carried). If the checksum fails, the
message is discarded; this is also known as the CRC. A graphical representation of
the CRC is shown in Figure 3.39.
The first word of each message is the header word for message identification. The
format follows the requirements set forth in the standard and is reprinted as Table 3.5. If
the header word is missing or incorrectly formatted, the message will be discarded.
In MIL-STD-1760D, the validity of the data words is verified with each store
control/store monitor (subaddress 11) transmission. This is accomplished by the use
of an invalidity word. Each bit of the invalidity word corresponds to a data word; a
logic 1 set in any of the bits indicates that the corresponding data word is invalid.
Bits 0 through 15 represent data words 1 through 16. Invalidity word 2 corresponds to
data words 17 through 32. An example of invalidity word format is contained in
Appendix B, Table XXXI, of the standard, and is reproduced here as Table 3.6.
For a critical control 1 or critical control 2 word not marked invalid (in the invalidity
word), both the identifier and address control fields must be correct. For the critical
authority word, the coded check field must be correct. As with the header word and CRC
discussed earlier, any errors in the critical control or authority will result in the message
being discarded; all protocol failures are reported in the store monitor standard message.
Examples of the critical word and critical authority are reproduced in Tables 3.7 and 3.8,
respectively. These checks are all required to ensure that the correct store is selected and
the correct information is received by the store.
In addition to normal transfer of information as defined in MIL-STD-1553B, MIL-
STD-1760 allows for specialized transfer and associated messages:
● Store control
● Store monitor
● Store descriptions
● Nuclear weapons control
TABLE 3.5 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Header Word Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-X. Header word
HEADER
(HEXADECIMAL) APPLICATION
0000 #
THROUGH Used selected
03FF
0400 Store control message (B.4.2.2.1)

0401 #
THROUGH Reserved for store safety critical control and monitor
041F
0420 Store monitor message (B.4.2.2.2)
0421 Store description message (B.4.2.2.3)

0422 Transfer control message (B.4.2.3.2.1)
0423 Transfer control message (B.4.2.3.2.2)
0424 #
THROUGH Reserved for carriage store non-safety critical control and monitor
042D
042E #
THROUGH Reserved for future non-safety critical control and monitor
04FF
0500 #
THROUGH User selected
FFFF
● Nuclear weapons monitor

● Aircraft description
● Mass data transfer
Standard messages follow MIL-STD-1553 format but contain a header word as the first
data word; if checksum is used it will occupy the last data word position. The store
control message is used for controlling the state of the stores and specifically standar-
dizes the format for safety critical commands. The store control message is a 30 data
word receive command with a subaddress of 11 (01011). A description of the store
control message is found in Appendix B, Table B-XI, of the standard, and is reproduced
here as Table 3.9.
Note the two invalidity words (addressed earlier) that occupy the second and third
data words of the message.
The store monitor message is used as a status message to reflect the safety critical
condition of the store; the message also includes other nonsafety critical store infor-
mation. The store monitor message is a 30 word transmit message with subaddress
11 (01011). The format of the store monitor message in contained in Appendix B,
Table B-XII, and is reproduced here as Table 3.10.
TABLE 3.6 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Invalidity Word Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XXXI. Invalidity word
FIELD NAME BIT NUMBER DESCRIPTION

INVALIDITY -00- INVALIDITY OF WORD 1
-01- INVALIDITY OF WORD 2
1/ Invalidity bit set to logic 1 shall indicate that a word is invalid.
2/ For the standard message to/from subaddress 11, the invalidity bits associated with the reserved words and those
associated with words that are defined in the system specification or ICD as not used, shall be set to logic 0 (valid).
3/ For the standard message to/from subaddress 11, bits 00 through 15 in the invalidity word shall indicate invalidity of
words 1 through 16 in the message and bits 00 through 15 in a second invalidity word shall indicate the invalidity of
words 17 through 32 in the message. Bits 14 and 15 in the second word shall only be used during the routing of message
to/from a mission store carried on a carriage store and shall be set to logic 0 at all other times.
4/ For user defined messages, utilization and setting of the invalidity bits shall be as defined in the system specification
or ICD.
Receive messages with subaddresses 19 and 27 are only used for control of nuclear
weapons; transmit messages with subaddresses 19 or 27 are only used to monitor nuclear
weapons. The information regarding message content is contained in Aircraft Monitor
and Control Project Officers Group System 2 Specification (SYS 2001-01), and is not
reprinted here.
The aircraft description message transfers aircraft identity to the store via subad-
dress 1 (00001). The message includes a header word, invalidity words, country code,
aircraft identification words, station number, pylon/bay number, and checksum.
Mass data transfer is initiated by the use of three data message types:
● Transfer control message
● Transfer monitor message
● Transfer data message
The transfer control message is a standard receive message for controlling the
transfer of operating modes and the designation of files, records, and block numbers.
Each selected file is divided into 1 to 255 consecutive records, with each record further
divided into 1 to 255 consecutive blocks. Each block is transferred with one transfer data
TABLE 3.7 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Critical Control 2 Format
MIL-STD-01760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XXXIII. Critical control 2
FIELD NAME BIT DESCRIPTION

NUMBER
STORE CONTROL -00- D10 ¼ Erase command/authority
1/ -01- D9 ¼ RF jam command/authority
-02- D8 ¼ RF emission activate command/authority
-03- D7 ¼ RESERVED. Shall be set to logic 0.
#
IDENTIFIER -08- D2
-09- D1 — see 2/
ADDRESS CONFIRM
-10-
-11-
D0
A4 #
-12- A3
-13- A2 — Shall be set to match the logic state of the
-14- A1 corresponding interface address discrete lines
-15- A0 A4 through A0 as specified in 5.1.6 and 5.2.6
1/ Data bits set to a logic 0 shall indicate that the associated function is required to be inactive. Data bits set to a logic 1 shall
indicate that the associated function is required to be active. Data bits reset to a logic 0 shall indicate that the associated
function is required to be deactivated as applicable.
2/ The IDENTIFIER FIELD shall be set as indicated below.
D2 D1 D0
0 0 0 RESERVED
0 0 1 Mission Store
0 1 0 Carriage Store
0 1 1 RESERVED
thru
1 1 1 RESERVED
3/ Stores shall discard any message found to contain a critical control word that fails one or more of the protocol checks in
paragraph B.4.1.4. Stores shall only enable safety critical processes demanded by critical control words which pass the
protocol checks detailed in B.4.1.4.
message and contains 30 data words, with the first being the record/block number and
the remaining 29 representing file data. The transfer control message is sent as a receive
message, subaddress 14 (01110). The format is shown in Table 3.11.
Word 2 of the transfer control message is the instruction word, and it is very similar
to a mode code, as it tells the receiving RT what operation it is supposed to initiate. The
format of the instruction word is contained in Appendix B, Table XVII, of MIL-STD-
1760, and is reproduced here as Table 3.12.
The transfer monitor message is a standard format message for monitoring the status
of the mass data transfer operations in the store. The transfer monitor message is initiated
TABLE 3.8 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Critical Authority Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XXXIV. Critical authority
FIELD NAME BIT NUMBER DESCRIPTION

CODED CHECK -00- C14 ¼ D10 þ D9 þ D6 þ D1 þ D0
-01- C13 ¼ D9 þ D8 þ D5 þ D0
-02- C12 ¼ D8 þ D7 þ D4
-03- C11 ¼ D7 þ D6 þ D3
-04- C10 ¼ D10 þ D9 þ D5 þ D2 þ D1 þ D0
-05- C9 ¼ D10 þ D8 þ D6 þ D4
-06- C8 ¼ D10 þ D7 þ D6 þ D5 þ D3 þ D1 þ D0
-07- C7 ¼ D10 þ D5 þ D4 þ D2 þ D1
-08- C6 ¼ D10 þ D6 þ D4 þ D3
-09- C5 ¼ D9 þ D5 þ D3 þ D2
-10- C4 ¼ D10 þ D9 þ D8 þ D6 þ D4 þ D2 þ D0
-11- C3 ¼ D9 þ D8 þ D7 þ D5 þ D3 þ D1
-12- C2 ¼ D10 þ D9 þ D8 þ D7 þ D4 þ D2 þ D1
-13- C1 ¼ D10 þ D8 þ D7 þ D3
-14- C0 ¼ D10 þ D7 þ D2 þ D1 þ D0
RESERVED -15- RESERVED. Shall be set to logic 0
1/ Coded check bits shall be generated using modulo 2 arithmetic.
2/ D0 through D10 refer to bits D0 through D10 as defined in TABLE B-XXXII and TABLE-B-XXXIII, as applicable.
3/ The coded check bits are based on the BCH 31, 16, 3 polynomial:
X15 þ X11 þ X10 þ X9 þ X8 þ X7 þ X5 þ X3 þ X2 þ X þ 1
as a transmit command, subaddress 14 (01110). The format of the transfer monitor

message is found in Appendix B, Table B-XXII, of the standard, and is reproduced here
as Table 3.13. Word 3 of the reply from the receiving terminal contains the transfer mode
status of the mass data transfer. This indicates to the controller where the RT is in the
transfer operation. The format of the transfer mode status word is found in Appendix B,
Table B-XXIII, of the standard, and is reproduced here as Table 3.14.
The protocols in MIL-STD-1760 are predicated on MIL-STD-1553B with some
variations and enhanced integrity checks. The verification of the data is more stringent
in stores applications, as safety is a primary concern. As with MIL-STD-1553, the data
transmissions are deterministic, using a command/response method of data transfer.
3.17.9 Fiber Channel

The fiber channel (FC) is a serial, high-throughput, low-latency packet switched or con-
nection-oriented network technology that can operate at 1, 2, or 10 Gbps. It refers to a set
of standards developed by the International Committee for Information Technology
Standards (INCITS), who are accredited by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI). It was originally developed to handle data storage, providing a means for
high-speed data transfer over a serial link between computers and peripherals. Its original
use was for high-performance disk/tape interfaces. As development continued, it was
TABLE 3.9 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Store Control Message
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XI. Store control (BC-RT transfer) 1/
WORD NO. DESCRIPTION/COMMENT PARAGRAPH or TABLE

-CW- COMMAND WORD (Subaddress 01011 Binary) B.4.1.1
-01- HEADER (0400 hexadecimal) B.4.2.1.1
-02- Invalidity for words 01-16 TABLE B-XXVI line 2
-03- Invalidity for word 17-30 TABLE B-XXVI line 2
-04- Control of critical state of store - TABLE B-XXVI line 3
-05- Set 1 with critical authority TABLE B-XXVI line 5
-06- Control of critical state of store - TABLE B-XXVI line 4
-07- Set 2 with critical authority TABLE B-XXVI line 5
-08- Fuzing mode 1 TABLE B-XXVI line 8
-09- Arm delay from release TABLE B-XXVI line 12
-10- Fuze function delay from release TABLE B-XXVI line 13
-11- Fuze function delay from impact TABLE B-XXVI line 14
-12- Fuze function distance TABLE B-XXVI line 18
-13- Fire interval TABLE B-XXVI line 20
-14- Number to fire TABLE B-XXVI line 21
-15- High drag arm time TABLE B-XXVI line 16
-16- Function time from event TABLE B-XXVI line 17
-17- Void/layer number TABLE B-XXVI line 23
-18- Impact velocity TABLE B-XXVI line 24
-19- Fuzing mode 2 TABLE B-XXVI line 9
-20- Dispersion data TABLE B-XXVI line 165
-21- Duration of dispersion TABLE B-XXVI line 166
-22- Carriage Store S&RE Unit(s) Select 2/ TABLE B-XXVI line 167
-23- Separation elements TABLE B-XXVI line 168 or 169
-24- Surface delays TABLE B-XXVI line 170 or 171
-25- #
-26-
-27- — Reserved data words (0000 hexadecimal) TABLE B-XXVI line 1
-28-
-29-
-30- Checksum word B.4.1.5.2
-SW- STATUS WORD B.4.1.2
determined that FC could be used as a networking technology as well as a data channel.

When used for aircraft, and specifically avionics, the FC standard that is used is the fiber
channel–avionics environment anonymous subscriber messaging protocol (FC-AE-ASM).
The FC standards define the topologies, services, and interface details that make up
the network. The basic topologies are:
● Point-to-point: used to provide a dedicated bandwidth between two processors, or
between a computer and a sensor/display.
● Arbitrated loop: a ring topology that can connect up to 126 nodes on a shared
bandwidth network. Each node can arbitrate to obtain control of the loop, establish a
TABLE 3.10 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Store Monitor Message
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XII. Store monitor (RT-BC transfer) 1/

-CW- COMMAND WORD (Subaddres 01011 Binary) B.4.1.1
-04- Critical monitor 1 TABLE B-XXVI line 6
-05- Critical monitor 2 TABLE B-XXVI line 7
-06- Fuzing/arming mode status 1 TABLE B-XXVI line 10
-07- Protocol status TABLE B-XXVI line 25
-08- Monitor of arm delay from release TABLE B-XXVI line 12
-09- Monitor of fuze function delay from release TABLE B-XXVI line 13
-10- Monitor of fuze function delay from impact TABLE B-XXVI line 14
-11- Monitor of fuze function distance TABLE B-XXVI line 18
-12- Monitor of fire interval TABLE B-XXVI line 20
-13- Monitor of number to fire TABLE B-XXVI line 21
-14- Monitor of high drag arm time TABLE B-XXVI line 16
-15- Monitor of function time from event TABLE B-XXVI line 17
-16- Monitor of void/layer number TABLE B-XXVI line 23
-17- Monitor of impact velocity TABLE B-XXVI line 24
-18- Fuzing/arming mode status 2 TABLE B-XXVI line 11
-19- Monitor of dispersion data TABLE B-XXVI line 165
-20- Monitor of dispersion duration TABLE B-XXVI line 166
-21- Monitor of carriage store S&RE Unit(s) select TABLE B-XXVI line 167
-22- Monitor of separation elements TABLE B-XXVI line 168 or 169
#
-23- Monitor of surface delays TABLE B-XXVI line 170 or 171
-24-
-25-
-26-
-27- — Reserved words (0000 hexadecimal) TABLE B-XXVI line 1
-28-
-29-
-30- Checksum word B.4.1.5.2
1/ The message format shown is for RT-BC transfers. The data entities and entity sequence for word numbers 01 through 30 may also be applied to RT-
RT transfers provided that the receiving RT is not an AEIS store.
logical connection with another node, and originate traffic. Arbitrated loops do not
include any fault tolerance features to handle node or media failure.
● Hubbed loop: a variation of the arbitrated loop in which the connections between
adjacent nodes on the loop are made by a central hub. This allows failed or unpow-
ered nodes to be bypassed and a centralized maintenance and management point to be
employed.
● Switched fabric: a network capable of supporting multiple, simultaneous full-
bandwidth transfers by utilizing a ‘‘fabric’’ of one or more interconnected switches;
TABLE 3.11 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Transfer Control Message Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XVII. Transfer Control (TC) message format

-CW- COMMAND WORD (Subaddress 01110 binary) B.4.1.1
-02- Instruction B.4.2.3.2.1.2
-03- Subaddress select B.4.2.3.2.1.3
-04- File number B.4.2.3.2.1.4
-05- Record number B.4.2.3.2.1.5
-06- Block number B.4.2.3.2.1.6
-07- Filerecord checksum B.4.2.3.2.1.7
-08- Checksum word B.4.2.3.2.1.8
TABLE 3.12 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Transfer Control Message Instruction Word
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XVIII. Instruction word
FIELD NAME BIT DESCRIPTION

NUMBER
INSTRUCTION -00- No operation - commands the store to update the TM message with current status of the
TYPE mass data transfer transactions
-01- Select download mode - commands the store to enter (or remain in) the download mass
data transfer mode.
-02- Select upload mode - commands the store to enter (or remain in) the upload mass data
transfer mode.
-03- Start new file/record - commands the store to prepare for receiving or transmitting, as
applicable. Transfer Data (TD) messages.
-04- Erase all files - commands the store to erase data in all store contained memory addresses
allocated to mass data transfer storage.
-05- Erase designated file - commands the store to erase the designated file.
-06- Erase designated record - commands the store to erase the designated record.
-07- Select echo mode - commands the store to enter (or remain in) the TD echo mode.
-08- Calculate file checksum - commands the store to run the file checksum test.
-09- Calculate record checksum - commands the store to run the record checksum test.
-10- System start - system start command to the store.
-11- Exit transfer mode - commands the store to exit the mass data transfer mode.
-12- Select block checksum mode - commands the store to interpret word 30 of the TD message
as a message checksum (See B.4.1.5.2.1) if in download mode, or to supply word 30 of
the TD message as a message checksum if in the upload mode.
RESERVED -13- Shall be set to a Logic 0.
-14- Shall be set to a Logic 0.
TABLE 3.13 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Transfer Monitor Message Format
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XXII. Transfer Monitor (TM) message format
WORD NO. DESCRIPTION/COMMENT PARAGRAPH

-CW- COMMAND WORD (Subaddress 01110 binary) B.4.1.1
-02- Last received instruction B.4.2.3.2.2.2
-03- Transfer mode status B.4.2.3.2.2.3
-04- Current selected subaddress B.4.2.3.2.2.4
-05- Current file number B.4.2.3.2.2.5
-06- Current record number B.4.2.3.2.2.6
-07- Current block number B.4.2.3.2.2.7
-08- Current file/record checksum B.4.2.3.2.2.8
-09- Checksum word position B.4.2.3.2.2.9
TABLE 3.14 ¢ MIL-STD-1760 Transfer Monitor Message Transfer Status Word
MIL-STD-1760D
APPENDIX B
TABLE B-XXIII. Transfer mode status
FIELD BIT DESCRIPTION

NAME NUMBER
MODE -00- In download mode - indicates the store is in download mode.
STATUS
-01- In upload mode - indicates the store is in upload mode.
-02- Transfer enabled - indicates the store is ready for transfer of TD messages
-04- Erase completed - indicates the store has completed the commanded erase operation.
-05- Echo mode selected - indicates echo mode is enabled in the store.
-06- Checksum calculation in progress - indicates the store is executing the commanded checksum
calculation.
-07- Checksum calculation completed - indicates the store has completed the commanded checksum
calculation.
-08- Checksum failed - indicates the commanded checksum calculation failed.
-09- Execution started - indicates the store has initiated execution at the commanded location or the
mission store has loaded the location in the TM message that the aircraft is to initiate
execution.
-10- Exit in progress - indicates the store is exiting the MDT mode.
-11- Retransmission request - indicates the store request for retransmission of limited TD data
RESERVED -12- Shall be set to a Logic 0.
this provides the highest level of performance. A hybrid topology can also be created
by attaching one or more arbitrated loops to the fabric, making it possible to achieve
wide connectivity among a group of low-bandwidth nodes.
To support these topologies, four basic port types are defined:
● Node port (N_Port): provides the mechanisms to transport data to and from another
port; used in point-to-point and switched topologies.
● Fabric port (F_Port): provides the access point for an N_Port to the switched fabric.
● Loop port (NL_Port): an N_Port with added functionality to provide arbitrary loop
functions and protocols.
● Expansion port (E_Port): a port on a switch used to interconnect multiple switches
within the fabric.
Figure 3.40 shows the relationship of port types to their respective topologies.
The fabric is responsible for the routing of data between two endpoints, with the
connected devices unaware of the routing mechanism or the internal structure of the
fabric. The fabric does not passively pass data; the F_Ports perform defined functions
and may restrict the communication models and classes of service provided. Before any
data transfer occurs, the N_Port must log in to the F_Port and other N_Ports to deter-
mine the topology and the relevant capabilities that may affect transfer parameters, as
well as to undertake node address assignment. In a loop, all NL_Ports must also initi-
alize before they can log in with each other.
A number of server-like functions are defined within the generic services standards that
are used to manage the network and provide functions such as a logic server, fabric con-
troller, and name and time server. Some of the services can reside within an N_Port,
although most would reside within a central switch or be distributed across the fabric to
reduce the complexity of each node. Each service is assigned a unique, well-known address.
N N Nl Nl FIGURE 3.40 ¢
Fiber Channel
Point-to-Point Arbitrated
Port/Topology
Loop
Relationships
Nl
N Nl
Nl Nl
Public
Loop
F Fl
Pb Pb Nl
Port Bypass N
F E
Pb
Circuit
Hub
E F
Nl N
Hubbed Loop N F F
Switched
N
FIGURE 3.41 ¢ Exchange Exchange Exchange

Frame, Sequence,
and Exchange
Structure
Sequence Sequence Sequence
Frame Frame Frame Frame
0-2112 bytes
Start of Frame Data Payload End of

Idles Crc Idles
Frame Header Optional Header Data Payload Frame
4 bytes 24 bytes 64 bytes 0-2048 bytes 4 bytes 4 bytes
An 8-bit/10-bit encoding scheme is used in FC, which defines 256 data (D) codes,
12 control (K) codes, and 11 reserved codes. Also defined are ordered sets of four words
used for low-level link functions such as frame delimiters and port event indications
(idle, receiver ready, arbitration request, etc.).
Fiber channel is optimized for large block transfers and includes segmentation and
reassembly activities in order to transfer large blocks within the restricted frame data
field. These transfers are defined in terms of frames, sequences, and exchanges, with the
lowest granularity of messages being frames. Individual frames may contain up to 2112
bytes, and larger data transfers are sent by means of sequences that consist of multiple
frames traveling in the same direction. An exchange is usually bidirectional and com-
prises one or more nonconcurrent sequences. The frame, sequence, and exchange
structure is shown in Figure 3.41.
In order to accommodate the requirements of different applications and data types,
five classes of connection for data transfers are defined to specify the delivery char-
acteristic for the sequence of frames:
● Class 1: a connection-oriented circuit-switched class of service that establishes a full
bandwidth path between two N_Ports through a fabric or across a point-to-point link.
● Class 2: a connectionless packet-oriented service that can be used on any of the basic
topologies; it provides confirmation of delivery.
● Class 3: a connectionless packet-oriented service that can be used on any of the basic
topologies; it provides unconfirmed delivery service.
● Class 4: a fractional bandwidth connection-oriented service that establishes a virtual
connection between pairs of nodes with bandwidth resources allocated to meet spe-
cified quality of service (QoS) parameters (delivery confirmation).
● Class 6: a connection-oriented service similar to class 1, but with a multicast facility
implemented with the fabric acting as a multicast server.
Fiber channel also provides three forms of multicast/broadcast:
● For an arbitrated loop, the open replicate function provides a broadcast service by
allowing the messages to be repeated and stored at all ports on the loop, while the
selective replicate function provides a multicast service by enabling a message to be

repeated to all nodes on the loop, but only stored by a selected subset of ports.
● For a switched fabric, a class 3 ‘‘unreliable’’ multicast can be used (class 3 does not
guarantee delivery).
● A switched fabric can use a class 6 multicast, which uses a multicast server hosted
within the fabric to provide confirmation of message delivery.
The performance of an FC network is dependent on network topology and the class
of service, as well as basic link rate. The performance may be further degraded by the
limitations in bandwidth or latency caused by the fabric switch elements.
Commercially FC is being used to connect servers and storage systems. In the
military world, FC has been used in avionics upgrades on the AWACS Extend Sentry,
B-1, F/A-18, and Joint Strike Fighter. In the U.S. Navy’s F/A-18 tactical area moving
map capability (TAMMAC), the connection between the program load device (PLD)
and the map generator is FC. For the B-1B mission computer upgrade, FC was used to
connect the mission computers and mass storage units, while on the AWACS, FC was
used to connect the operator workstations to the main radar distribution system. For the
F-35, FC provides the communications between the core processor and sensors; com-
munications, navigation, and identification (CNI), and displays.
3.17.10 Ethernet
Ethernet has evolved since 1980 and is encompassed by the IEEE 802 family of stan-
dards. Ethernet can operate at bit rates of 1, 10, 100, or 1000 Mbps or 10 Gbps and uses
carrier sense multiple access/collision detection (CSMA/CD) media access (not including
full-duplex or switched Ethernet, which is covered in a subsequent section). Several
media access control (MAC) standards are defined for a variety of physical media. A
logical link control (LLC) standard, a secure data exchange standard, and MAC bridging
standards are intended to be used in conjunction with the MAC standards.
All versions of Ethernet use a CSMA/CD media access mechanism with the
exception of those using a full-duplex mode of operation. A station connected to a
common medium with other stations and needing to transmit data listens until there are
no transmissions on the medium (carrier sense) and then starts to transmit in an Ethernet
frame; other stations also have the right to transmit (multiple access). While a station
transmits, it continuously monitors signals on the media, and if it detects that another
station is also transmitting (collision detection), it immediately ceases transmission and
waits for a random interval based on a back-off algorithm before it starts transmitting
again. On a heavily loaded network, multiple collisions may occur. If repeated collisions
occur, then the stations involved begin expanding the set of potential random back-off
times in a process known as ‘‘truncated binary exponential back-off.’’ In the extreme
event of 16 consecutive collisions, the station MAC discards the Ethernet packet it is
attempting to send. The higher-level protocols are responsible for ensuring that the data
are eventually delivered to the destination station by establishing a reliable data trans-
port service using acknowledgment mechanisms.
The CMSA/CD protocol is half-duplex, so that a station may transmit or receive
data, but not simultaneously. The standard defines a full-duplex system without CMSA/
CD which allows two stations to transmit and receive data simultaneously over inde-
pendent transmission paths, thus doubling the aggregate data rate of the link.
FIGURE 3.42 ¢ Preamble SFD DA SA L/T Data PAD FCS

Ethernet Frame: 7* 1 2 or 6 2 or 6 2 0–1500 4
Fields and Number *Bytes
of Bytes Per Field
The Ethernet frame used to deliver MAC entities is shown in Figure 3.42.
The preamble field consists of 56 bits with alternate ‘‘1’’ and ‘‘0’’ values and allows
the receiving station to detect and synchronize on the signal.
The start frame delimiter (SFD) contains a single byte value (10101011) indicating
the start of a frame.
The destination address (DA) identifies a unique station to receive the frame, or a
broadcast or multicast address (all 1s). The standard allows this field to contain 2 or
6 bytes (in most applications 6 bytes are used).
The source address (SA) identifies the station that originated the frame. As with the
DA field, the standard allows 2 or 6 bytes, with most applications using 6 bytes.
NOTE: The IEEE administers the assignment of addresses by assigning 24-bit
identifiers, known as organizationally unique identifiers (OUIs), to every organization
manufacturing Ethernet interfaces for use as the first half of the station address. A
unique 48-bit address is preassigned to each Ethernet interface when it is manufactured,
eliminating the need for user administration of addresses. The 48-bit address is variously
known as the hardware address, the physical address, or the MAC address.
The length type (L/T) field indicates the number of bytes in the data field or the
MAC client protocol type. If the value of the two bytes in this field is less than or equal
to 1500, it indicates the number of data bytes. If it is greater than or equal to 1536, it
indicates the MAC client protocol type.
The data field carries the data to be transferred between stations, and may contain up
to 1500 bytes.
The Ethernet frame, from destination MAC address field to the frame check
sequence (inclusive) has a minimum size of 64 bytes. If the size of the frame is less than
the minimum size, then a padded field (PAD) is added of sufficient size to make the
frame size equal to the 64-byte minimum.
The frame check sequence (FCS) contains a 4-byte CRC value for error checking.
The CRC covers all the fields from the destination address to the PAD.
There have been some adjustments to the Ethernet frame based on newer technol-
ogies. For virtual local area networks (VLANs) (a defined subset of a LAN), a 4-byte
identifier is added between the source address and the L/T fields. This identifier is used
to identify which VLAN the frame belongs to; it increases the maximum length of the
Ethernet frame to 1522 bytes.
Gigabit Ethernet added an extension field to the end of the frame to ensure that
frames are of sufficient duration for collisions to propagate to all stations in the network.
The extension field is added and made long enough to ensure that the frame contains at
least 512 bytes from the destination address field to the extension field.
Gigabit Ethernet also adds a burst mode of operation that allows a station to
transmit a series of frames without relinquishing control of the transmission medium
in order to improve performance when transmitting short frames. After successfully
transmitting its first frame, a station may transmit additional frames until 65,536 bit
times have been transmitted. Interframe gap periods are inserted between the frames and
the transmitting station fills these with nondata symbols to maintain an active carrier.
If required, the first frame of a burst will contain an extension field; the remaining
fields do not require them.
With the exception of the early standards that used a bus topology, all Ethernet
standards use a star topology with a repeater hub at the center. The repeater hub includes
a medium attachment unit (MAU), which is essentially a transceiver at the hub end of
each segment. The repeater normally does not include MAC or LLC, but retransmits
signals received on one segment bit by bit onto the other segments; a repeater may
implement a full Ethernet interface for network management purposes. If a collision
occurs, the repeater hub propagates the collision by transmitting a jam signal to all
segments. The Ethernet bus topology is shown in Figure 3.43.
The repeater hub shown in Figure 3.43 may be replaced with a device known as a
switch to implement a switched Ethernet LAN. The switched Ethernet LAN operates
without CSMA/CD. The switch examines the destination address in each incoming
Ethernet frame and routes it (switches) to the appropriate segment (unlike the repeater,
which simply repeats each frame to all segments). A switch may also provide a degree of
flow control by temporarily buffering frames. There are three types of switches: cut-
through, store-and-forward, and error-free cut-through. There is also a variation on the
store-and-forward switch known as a back-pressure switch.
The cut-through switch examines only the destination address in the frame, then con-
sults an address lookup table to determine the port/segment to which it should be forwarded.
FIGURE 3.43 ¢
Transceiver
Ethernet Star
(MAU)
Station
Topology
Segment
Repeater
Transceiver
Hub
(MAU)
Transceiver Transceiver Transceiver Transceiver

Repeater
(MAU) Segment (MAU) (MAU) Segment (MAU)
Transceiver
Station Station
(MAU)
Segment
Transceiver
(MAU)
Station
It then forwards the frame to the appropriate segment without reading the rest of the
frame content. This process results in a minimum delay of packet throughput. Since it
does not examine the frame check field, it may forward corrupted data without
knowing it. This may result in increased network traffic due to retransmission requests
from the destination node.
The store-and-forward switch reads the whole incoming frame into a buffer and
checks the frame check field. If the CRC is correct, it consults the address lookup
table to determine the port/segment to which the frame should be forwarded. This pro-
cess is slower than a cut-through switch, but it does not forward corrupted data.
The error-free cut-through switch forwards the frames immediately to the destina-
tion port/segment; however, these frames are also read into a buffer and CRC checked.
If errors are detected, the ports at which the bad frames arrive are reconfigured to store-
and-forward switching. If the errors diminish to preset thresholds, the ports are set back
to cut-through switching for higher-performance throughput.
The back-pressure switch is a variation of the store-and-forward switch. This switch
overcomes the problem of overflowing buffers in store-and-forward switches by sending
the overflow packets back to their source. This effectively slows the workstation
transmission rate and thus the arrival of new packets from the source.
3.17.11 IEEE 1394 (FireWire)

IEEE 1394 is a low-cost digital interface intended to integrate entertainment, commu-
nication, and computing electronics into consumer multimedia. The standard was con-
ceived in 1986 by Apple Computer Inc. under the trademark name of ‘‘FireWire.’’
FireWire was adopted as the IEEE 1394 standard in 1995.
FireWire allows bit rates of 100, 200, and 400 Mbps over cable medium and from
25 to 50 Mbps for backplane operations. The standard allows for asynchronous and
isochronous data transfer with message lengths of 512 bytes at 100 Mbps, 1024 bytes at
200 Mbps, and 20,148 bytes at 400 Mbps (asynchronous), or isochronous format data
payload of up to 9600 bytes. The standard uses a media access of request/response with
physical layer arbitration over a daisy-chained bus and tree topology.
Figure 3.44 shows an example of IEEE 1394 topology made up of point-to-point con-
nections between nodes with multiple ports. Signals received on one port of a node are
retransmitted on all other ports so that a transmission from one node is propagated to all
others. Node devices have multiple connectors (the standard allows from 1 to 27 per device),
FIGURE 3.44 ¢ Rx Rx Rx
IEEE 1394 Topology
Tx Rx Rx
allowing the daisy-chain and tree topologies. Each IEEE 1394 bus segment may
have up to 63 devices attached to it. In addition to the cable specification, FireWire
includes a backplane specification that can extend the serial bus internally to a device.
IEEE 1394 allows for the use of ‘‘plug-and-play’’ devices; this feature allows
devices to be added or removed from the bus with the bus in full operation. Upon
altering the bus configuration, topology changes are automatically recognized. This
feature eliminates the need for address switches or other user intervention to
reconfigure the network. The process of responding to the alteration of a network con-
figuration is known as cable configuration. Cable configuration is accomplished in three
phases: bus initialize, tree identify, and self-identity.
Bus initialize occurs when a device is added or removed from the bus or at power-
up. A bus reset forces all nodes into a state that clears all topology information and starts
the next phase of the process. At this point, the only information known by the node is
whether it is a leaf (only one node connected to it), a branch (more than one other node
connected to it), or unconnected. Figures 3.45 and 3.46, respectively, show an example
of a network after bus initialize and after cable configuration.
The tree identity phase translates the topology into a tree with one node designated
as the root and every other connected port in the network designated as either a
parent (connected to a parent node [closer to the root]) or a child (connected to a child
node [further from the root]). Any unconnected ports are labeled ‘‘off’’ and do not
participate further.
The self-identity phase gives each node an opportunity to select a unique physical ID
(node number) and identify itself to any management entity attached to the bus. Self-
identity uses a deterministic selection process in which the root node passes control of the
media to the node attached to its lowest numbered port and waits for that node to send an
‘‘identification done’’ which indicates that all of its children nodes have identified them-
selves. The root then passes control to its next highest port and repeats the process.
Media access is by means of physical layer arbitration. Referring to Figure 3.46, if
node E and node A both require network access, each seeks control of the network by
FIGURE 3.45 ¢
Node B Branch IEEE 1394 Network
After Bus Initialize
Port 1 Port 2
Ports 2 & 3
Port 1 Port 1
Node A Leaf Node D Branch
Port 2 Port 3
Port 1 Port 2 Port 1
Node C Leaf Node E Branch
Port 2
Port 1
Leaf Node F
FIGURE 3.46 ¢ Root

IEEE 1394 Cable Node B
Node No. 5
Configuration
Completion Port 1 (Child) Port 2 (Child)
Ports 2 & 3 (off)

Port 1 (Parent) Port 1 (Parent)
Branch Branch
Node A Child of Node B Node D Child of Node B
Node No. 0 Parent of Nodes C & E
Node No. 4
Port 2 (Child) Port 3 (Child)
Port 2 (Parent) Port 1 (Parent)

Port 1 (off)
Leaf Branch
Node C Child of Node D Child of Node D Node E
Node No. 3 Node No. 2
Port 2 (Child)
Port 1 (Parent)
Leaf
Child of Node E Node F
Node No. 1
FIGURE 3.47 ¢ Subaction 1: Request from Source Subaction 2: Response from Destination
IEEE 1394 Subaction Ack Subaction Ack Subaction
Packet Ack Packet Ack
Asynchronous Gap Gap Gap Gap Gap
Subaction
Arbitration
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal
Arbitration
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal

transmitting an arbitration request to its parent (node E to node D and node A to node B).
Each parent then forwards its request to its parent and denies access to all of its other
children (in this example node D denies access to node C) by transmitting a data prefix
signal, including a speed code. The request originating from node A propagates to the
root node before the signal originating at node E, since the signal from node E must also
propagate through node D. The root node grants access to node A and issues a denial
code to node D that will be passed on to node E. The procedure favors the node closest
to the root. This unfairness is overcome by the use of a ‘‘fair arbitration’’ protocol that
limits the frequency with which any one node may access the network and arranged so
that all nodes get an equal opportunity for access.
IEEE 1394 allows for asynchronous and isochronous data transfer, allowing both
non-real-time applications such as printers and scanners and real-time applications such
as audio and video to operate on the same network. The asynchronous format transfers
data and transaction layer information to or from an explicit address. Figure 3.47 shows
a single transaction known as an ‘‘asynchronous subaction.’’
To transmit data, the device first gains control of the physical layer, as described in
the previous paragraphs. The arbitration process ends with the transmission of a data
prefix signal, including a speed code if needed. The packet includes the addresses of
both the source and the destination nodes, CRC, and, if appropriate, a data payload.
1st Channel 2nd Channel 3rd Channel FIGURE 3.48 ¢
Isoc Isoc Isoc Isoc IEEE 1394

Packet Packet Packet
Gap Gap Gap Gap Isochronous
Subaction
Arbitration
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal
Arbitration
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal
Arbitration
Data Prefix Signal
Data End Signal

Packet Frame ⫽ 1.25us FIGURE 3.49 ¢
IEEE 1394 Packet
Isochronous Isochronous Isochronous Frame
Time Available for
Channel No 1 Channel No 2 Channel No 3
Asynchronous Transport
Time Slot Time Slot Time Slot
Timing
Gap
When the receiver accepts the packet, an acknowledgment packet (which may also
contain a data payload) is returned to the original sender. The standard defines 13 packet
formats, with and without data, for asynchronous transactions. If a negative acknowl-
edgment is returned, error recovery is initiated.
The isochronous format broadcasts data based on channel numbers rather than
specific addressing. The sender requests an isochronous channel with a specific band-
width; isochronous packets are issued on average every 125 msec. Figure 3.48 depicts an
isochronous subaction.
Isochronous channel IDs are transmitted followed by the packet data. The receiver
monitors the incoming data’s channel ID and accepts only data with a specified ID. User
applications are responsible for determining how many isochronous channels are needed
and their required bandwidth. Figure 3.49 shows a packet frame with just three channels,
although up to 64 isochronous channels may be defined.
The bus is configured to send a start of frame timing indicator in the form of a
timing gap. This is followed by the time slots for isochronous channels 1, 2, and 3. The
remaining time may be used for any pending asynchronous transmission. Since the slots
for each of the isochronous channels have been established, the bus can guarantee their
bandwidth, and thus their successful delivery.
IEEE 1394 has achieved wide acceptance in the consumer market, supporting such
devices as digital television, video cassette recorders (VCRs), digital video disk (DVD)
players, and other multimedia products. In the military avionics world, IEEE 1394 is
being used on the Joint Strike Fighter Vehicle Management System.
3.17.12 Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet

Avionics full-duplex switched Ethernet (AFDX) is essentially a subset of ARINC 644
under development by Rockwell Collins for Airbus. Airbus plans to use AFDX in the
new A380 civilian aircraft and in the A400M military transport program. AFDX is a
full-duplex, 100 Mbps, switched Ethernet (see section 3.17.10) dual-redundant network
with message sequencing numbering. Message frames are sent on both networks, with
receiving end systems employing a ‘‘first valid wins’’ policy. This can protect against
the complete loss of one network.
3.17.13 Additional Comments on Other Data Busses

This section is not by any means all inclusive of the types of data busses the test engi-
neer may come across. Individual organizations are continually modifying and devel-
oping new methods of data transfer in order to best suit their needs. I have tried to cover
those systems, or variations thereof, that have the highest probability of being encoun-
tered by the evaluator. Before attempting any project, it is imperative that the test
engineer perform his or her homework to understand the system as well as data acqui-
sition methods.
TCP/IP (Terminal Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) and video compression is
discussed in detail in chapter 12 of the text.
3.18 POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE ANALYST

One of the greatest problems the evaluator is going to encounter is the sheer amount of
data that will be available to the test community. How do we collect it, and then what do
we do with it once we have it? MIL-STD-1553 is a relatively easy system for accessing
and retrieving data, and the data rates are somewhat manageable. The newer systems
that have just been discussed (FC, Ethernet, etc.) have data rates that are extremely high
and the way they are used is completely different than what we have seen with 1553.
Figure 3.50 shows a partial MIL-STD-1553 bus configuration with a bus controller
and seven RTs.
In the example, the processing of navigation information is accomplished in the mis-
sion computer (bus controller). A Kalman-filtered solution may then be sent to either the
stores management system or the radar. The data rates on the bus are limited to 1 Mbps, so
not all of the information available from all navigation sensors is being used by the mission
computer. In modern system development, all of the information available is being used
by a core processor and the answer is sent to the mission computer when requested.
Figure 3.51 shows how Figure 3.50 would look like in a modern implementation.
In the revision, each navigational sensor forwards data to a navigation core pro-
cessor which produces a ‘‘system’’ navigational solution. The data transfer is over a
high-speed data bus with rates than can approximate 1 Gbps, although 80 to 100 Mbps is
FIGURE 3.50 ¢
Simple MIL-STD- GPS INS TACAN MIDS DNS
1553 Bus
Configuration
Bus
SMS RADAR
Controller
3.18 Potential Problems for the Analyst 123
FIGURE 3.51 ¢
Sensor High-Speed Data
GPS Core Bus Implementation
Proc
INS
NAV Mission High-Speed

TACAN Core Computer Data Bus
Proc
MIDS
Wpns
DNS Core
Proc
High-Speed
Data Bus 1553 Data Bus
probably more realistic. But even at the lower rate, we are still seeing an increase of 100-
fold over the basic MIL-STD-1553 system. The first problem for instrumentation and
the evaluator is how to capture, store, time tag, and time align these data. The high-speed
data busses would also be implemented for a sensor core processor (radar, electro-optics,
forward-looking infrared, electronic intelligence, off-board sensors, etc.) and weapons
core processor. Each of the core processors is an RT on the 1553 bus; basic command
and control is still resident with the mission computer, however, processing of data
becomes decentralized. Our original one data bus in 1553 carrying a maximum of
1 Mbps of data is now transformed into four busses, with our three high-speed data
busses moving up to 300 Mbps!
The second problem associated with this setup involves the analysis of any parti-
cular system. Under the basic MIL-STD-1553 system, an analyst can compare sensor
inputs to the system outputs (displayed data) and make an assessment of the perfor-
mance of the system. In the revised case, all sensor data are forwarded to the core
processor, where the decision is made for the best ‘‘system’’ navigation solution, or
target solution, or weapons solution, etc. The output of the core processor is a result of
artificial intelligence within the processor, and that is what is being reported on the 1553
data bus. The evaluator would have to replicate the core processor in analysis software
and provide the sensor inputs to this software. The output of the analysis software could
then be compared to the core processor output to the 1553 bus. Sensor errors would be
very hard to determine, as they would probably be minimized within the core processor.
A test would have to be developed to look at only the sensor of interest (which would
entail the shutting down of all other inputs to the core processor); this would be a very
laborious task. Of course, a lot of this testing would not have to be done if the output of
the core processor always matches the truth data (but how often can that be expected?).
The Joint Strike Fighter uses a mix of four standards: FC for avionics, IEEE 1394b
for vehicle systems, 1553 for legacy systems, and EBR-1553 for weapons systems; quite
an adventurous task for instrumentation and test and evaluation.
3.19 DATA ACQUISITION, REDUCTION,

AND ANALYSIS
In order to successfully execute a test program, data must be collected, analyzed, and
submitted to substantiate conclusions. In the chapters 1 and 2 of this text, the impor-
tance of valid avionics and TSPI data was stressed. This section will cover the
available means of acquiring test data and the tools available to the evaluator for
reduction and analysis.
3.19.1 Instrumentation
Data acquisition is accomplished with the use of instrumentation. Instrumentation
comes in many shapes and forms and runs the gamut from handheld to data bus
monitoring. Handheld instrumentation may be as simple as a stopwatch or writing
down GPS coordinates at the time of an event. Data bus monitoring may be in the
form of editing the data stream on the aircraft and recording parameters of interest or
telemetering an entire data bus to a ground receiver. Telemetry and recording may be
analog or digital and may include audio and video. Instrumentation will most certainly
be required on your test vehicle, but it may also be required on targets, bombs, or
missiles. The development lab and vendor test beds may also have an instrumentation
requirement. Current telemetry standards in the United States and used throughout
the world are contained in the Range Commanders Council Telemetry Group IRIG
Standard 106-04.
3.19.1.1 Pulse Code Modulation

The pulse code modulation (PCM) instrumentation system is the basic instrumentation
system on the aircraft and also provides a means of incorporating digital information.
A PCM system allows the test community to record parameters of interest and telemeter
these parameters to a ground station, where they may be read in real time. PCM allows
an analog signal to be converted to a binary field prior to transmission or recording.
The basic PCM process is shown in Figure 3.52.
FIGURE 3.52 ¢
PCM Process +45 8-Bit Binary

Number
10110101
Filter Sample Quantize Encode
Analog PAM
Signal Signals PCM
Signal
+45
0101101
Filter Decoder
PAM
Signals
The signal is sensed (voltage, temperature, etc.), amplified, and encoded into a
binary field which is sent to a receiving telemetry station. The ground station runs the
binary field through a decoder and it is transformed back to its original signal.
PCM is usually associated with analog parameters because the system was designed
prior to digitized aircraft. A basic PCM system is still used by the test community to
monitor and record analog parameters of interest:
● System health and welfare
● Switch positions/commands
● Instrumentation status
● Interlocks
System health and welfare might include the monitoring of cooling air or voltage to
an aircraft system to avoid overheating or undervoltage which may damage the sensor.
Instrumentation can be used to monitor correct pressurization of a backup hydraulic
system. Switch positions and commands allow the receiving station to monitor mode
selections by the aircraft operator. There could be a case where a mode is selected by an
operator but the command is not sent on the bus. Instrumentation status may be data time
remaining or the position of the data record switch. Interlocks such as weight-on-wheels
are normally monitored in most development programs, as they can control or deny
many things if not set properly: ground cooling fans, missile fire inhibit, etc. A block
diagram of a generic PCM system is shown in Figure 3.53.
The transducer in the block diagram could be a voltage sensor, strain gauge, mass
flow sensor, etc.; transducer is used as a generic term. The signal is conditioned and sent
to a remote unit that is located in the vicinity of the sensor. The remote unit amplifies the
signal and sends it to the PCM master unit, which builds the frame (an instrumentation
data set described later) to be sent to either a digital recorder (HDDR in this diagram) or a
digital data unit that multiplexes the data and sends it via telemetry to a ground receiver.
As an example, consider the situation depicted in Figure 3.54. An avionics sensor
on the aircraft is cooled by fins and forced-air cooling. By engineering analysis, it is
Transducer Signal Conditioner FIGURE 3.53 ¢

Remote
Generic PCM
Unit
Transducer Signal Conditioner System
Transducer Signal Conditioner

Remote
Unit
Transducer Signal Conditioner PCM HDDR

Remote
Master
Unit
Transducer Signal Conditioner Unit DDU

Remote
Unit
PCM – Pulse Code Modulation

Transducer Signal Conditioner DDU – Digital Data Unit
Remote
HDDR – High-Density Digital Recorder
Unit
Transducer Signal Conditioner TLM – Telemetry
FIGURE 3.54 ¢ Aircraft Sensor,

Instrumentation for Processor, etc.
Forced-Air Cooling
Aircraft Transducer
Cooling Air
FIGURE 3.55 ¢ +8 V
Calibration Curve for
a Thermocouple
Voltage
–8 V
0 300°C
Temperature
determined that the sensor will fail if the temperature of the sensor exceeds a certain
level. Further analysis relates exhaust temperature (cooling air leaving the sensor) to
core temperature; therefore, if we monitor the exhaust temperature, we can protect the
sensor. A temperature monitoring device (transducer) is placed at the exhaust port of
the sensor as part of the instrumentation package on the airplane. The transducer works
much like the thermostat on your car; it may consist of a bimetallic element that reacts to
temperature. With a current applied to the transducer, the voltage will change based on
the change in resistance due to the reaction of the bimetallic element. If we calibrate this
device, we can equate a voltage to a temperature.
Instrumentation personnel will try and match as closely as possible the desired range
and resolution required by the test engineer to the measurement device. Assume that
the thermocouple in this example has a range of 0–300 C for voltage changes
of 8 to þ 8 V. Instrumentation will provide the test engineer with calibration charts for
this device in terms of voltage versus temperature. A typical calibration curve for this
device is found in Figure 3.55.
After determining the calibration, it will be necessary to define the resolution of the
measurement. Instrumentation uses a term called ‘‘counts,’’ which is really the number
of bits available in the PCM frame for each parameter. The depiction of the PCM
process in Figure 3.52 shows 8 bits available for that example.
Suppose that instrumentation has 10 counts, or bits, available to measure the voltage
for our transducer. If every bit was signed (remembering back to section 3.3), it would
look like this:
29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
The sum would equal 1023 plus the added measurement of 0, or 1024. This means that
we could resolve the voltage down to 16/1024, or approximately 0.015 V. If the curve
were linear in Figure 3.55, the resolution of temperature would be 300/1024, or roughly
0.3 C. If this resolution were not good enough for our purposes, we would have to
narrow the range of interested temperatures. If we decreased the range to 100 C to
300 C, the new resolution would be 200/1024, or roughly 0.2 C.
Now that the parameter can be quantified, we need a mechanism to deliver the data
to the test and evaluation team. In telemetry operations, data are transmitted in a PCM
frame. An example of a PCM frame format is shown in Figure 3.56.
In this example, the frame is comprised of 16 subframes with 128 words in each
subframe; a word is 10 bits long. The frames are transmitted at a rate of 12.5 frames/sec.
The instrumentation system reads from left to right in subframe 1 and then drops down
and reads from left to right in subframe 2. The system continues until the entire frame
has been read and then transmits the entire frame of data. If we do the math, we will see
that 10 bits/word 128 words 16 subframes 12.5 frames/sec equals 256 kbps. This is
a low-rate PCM system; most modern systems run at data rates of between 2 and
5 Mbps. It can be readily seen that if the number of available bits per word or the frame
rate is increased there will be a corresponding increase in the data rate.
The evaluator also needs to specify the sample rate required of the parameter in
question. The sample rate of the parameter is determined by the number of times
the parameter appears in the frame. In Figure 3.56, the parameter AAA appears in
the first word of all 16 subframes; parameter AAA will be read 16 times in each
frame, and with a frame rate of 12.5 frames/sec, will be sampled 200 times
each second. Parameter BBB appears in the second word of every other subframe,
Words 1 Through 128 FIGURE 3.56 ¢

1 2 3 4 128 PCM Frame Format
1 AAA BBB CCC GGG
2 AAA DDD
3 AAA BBB EEE
4 AAA FFF
5 AAA BBB CCC
6 AAA DDD
7 AAA BBB EEE
8 AAA FFF
9 AAA BBB CCC GGG
10 AAA DDD
11 AAA BBB EEE
12 AAA FFF
13 AAA BBB CCC
14 AAA DDD
15 AAA BBB EEE
16 AAA FFF
128 Words × 16 Subframes = 1 Frame
Frame rate is 12.5 frames/sec.

Parameter AAA is sent at 200 samples/sec.
Parameter BBB is sent at 100 samples/sec.
Parameter CCC is sent at 50 samples/sec.
Parameter GGG is sent at 25 samples/sec.
which will produce a sample rate of 100 each second (8 12.5). Parameter CCC
will be sampled at 50 samples/sec, whereas parameter GGG will be sampled at
25 samples/sec. If a parameter only appeared once in each frame, it would be sampled
at the frame rate, or 12.5 samples/sec. This process is known in the instrumentation
world as subcommutation.
If a requirement exists for a higher sampling rate than is possible with sub-
commutation, then instrumentation may elect to use supercommutation. An example of
supercommutation is shown in Figure 3.57.
Notice that in Figure 3.57, parameter AAA is read twice in each subframe (as
opposed to once) in the subcommutation example. This effectively doubles the sample
rate to 400 samples/sec. Parameter BBB is read four times in zach subframe, which
yields a sample rate of 800 samples/sec. The parameters must be spaced correctly in the
frame. Parameter AAA is repeated twice, so the placement of the second word must be
at 128/2, or 64 places, from the original position (word position 65). Parameter BBB is
repeated four times, so the placement of the additional words must be at 128/4, or
32 places, from the original position (word positions 34, 66, and 98). Supercommutation
is normally used when it is desired to see a certain parameter in real time at a higher rate
than normal, usually for troubleshooting purposes. Supercommutation reduces the total
number of parameters that you will be able to see in real time.
Test engineers have the responsibility to sit down with the instrumentation group
and determine which parameters and what rates are required for each phase of the test
program. It can be seen that in the frame provided in the examples, a maximum of 2048
parameters can be sent at a rate of 12.5 samples/sec (assuming all of the parameters use
the 10 bits available in each word). Increasing the sample rate on any of the parameters
will decrease the total number of parameters that can be seen in real time.
The pilot’s voice can also be sent via a PCM frame; in many test organizations this
is known as ‘‘Hot Mike.’’ Hot Mike will send all audio that is heard by the pilot (UHF,
VHF, ICS, etc.). In order to put voice into the PCM frame the audio must first be
digitized; the digital information is then sequentially inserted into the PCM frame as it is
FIGURE 3.57 ¢ 1 2 3 4 34 65 66 98 128

Supercommutation 1 AAA BBB CCC GGG BBB AAA BBB BBB
2 AAA BBB DDD BBB AAA BBB BBB
3 AAA BBB EEE BBB AAA BBB BBB
4 AAA BBB FFF BBB AAA BBB BBB
5 AAA BBB CCC BBB AAA BBB BBB
9 AAA BBB CCC GGG BBB AAA BBB BBB
13 AAA BBB CCC BBB AAA BBB BBB
Frame rate is 12.5 frames/sec.

Parameter AAA is sent at 400 samples/sec.
Parameter BBB is sent at 800 samples/sec.
received from the A/D converter. It should be noted here that in most development
programs in the United States, the pilot’s voice must be encrypted if it is sent via a
telemetry stream. This is accomplished with an encryption unit, most likely a KY-58,
which is fitted between the A/D converter and the instrumentation system. Commu-
nications encryption is covered in section 4.2 of this text.
Up to this point we have only discussed analog measurements and how they are sent
in the telemetry stream. Digital data from any of the avionics busses on the aircraft can
also be sent using the same PCM frame. The PCM process described earlier showed the
analog signal converted into a binary format. Digital data busses need no conversion, as
they are already in the correct format. All that is needed is a way to extract the desired
parameters from the bus. A device which accomplishes this task was identified in
section 3.2 and is called a bus monitor.
A bus monitor is a passive unit on the bus. The standard defines a bus monitor as a
‘‘terminal assigned the task of receiving bus traffic and extracting selected information
to be used at a later time.’’ These systems are used for troubleshooting and aircraft
instrumentation. They are not active terminals and do not communicate with the bus
controller. These devices read all of the traffic on the bus and capture the time and value
of selected parameters. These parameters are preprogrammed into the bus monitor.
A depiction of the relationship of the bus monitor to the 1553 data bus is shown in
Figure 3.1, repeated on this page for clarity.
Most of these systems are called either word grabbers or bus editors. They are
normally built by the instrumentation group and are unique to one type of aircraft. The
devices are preprogrammed on the ground to look for certain messages (parameters) on
the bus and read these data to either a tape system or multiplex them into a telemetry
stream. The amount of data these systems can grab for real-time data transmission is
limited by the telemetry system.
The evaluator will also need to determine which digital parameters are required
for real-time analysis, but now the ICD will need to be consulted in order to determine
the location of those parameters in the data stream. The instrumentation group will
program the bus editor on the aircraft to extract the correct parameters. If it is desired to
obtain data from multiple busses on the aircraft, then a separate bus editor will be
required for each bus.
The biggest limitation on real-time data is the amount of data that can be transmitted
in the telemetry stream. Historically avionics telemetry systems have operated in L band
and many of the missile telemetry systems have operated in S band. Some video
downlink systems operate in C band. L band is restricted, due to bandwidth limitations,
in the amount of data that can be sent. Some attempts at video downlink in L band have
TACAN FIGURE 3.1 ¢

Stand-alone
Remote Remote RadAlt Simplified Bus
Remote
Terminal Terminal CADC Structure (Previously
Terminal
Fuel Quan Presented)
Bus Bus Shielded

Controller Analyzer Twisted Pair
Cable
resulted in unsatisfactory resolution because of these limitations. The typical telemetry

system of today transmits between 2 and 5 Mbps of data on the telemetry stream. With
modern aircraft utilizing data busses that can transfer data at up to 8 Gbps, this has
become a severe limitation.
3.19.1.2 Advances in Real-Time Telemetry

There are drawbacks in the way data is sent to a receiving station. The greatest problem
has been addressed already—the limited amount of data that may be telemetered based
on bandwidth limitations. A second problem involves the geometry of the aircraft and,
in particular, its telemetry antennas relative to the receiving station. As an aircraft
maneuvers, it may block the telemetry signal and the receiving station will experience
dropouts. The telemetry signal as well as the bus data are directly recorded on the
aircraft and are available for postflight review so the data are not lost. The problem
occurs when data are required in order to proceed to the next test; that is, step 2 cannot
be attempted unless step 1 is validated as successful. In the past, if a data dropout
occurred during step 1, the test would have to be repeated to validate success in real
time. This is time consuming and wasteful of your limited budget. A good example
would be an envelope expansion test for an aircraft with a new store installed. Safety
concerns dictate the need to be absolutely sure that it is safe to proceed to the next step
up in airspeed or altitude. If we could retrieve the old data from the recording and resend
it to the station, a repeat of the test would not be necessary.
The U.S. Department of Defense has been developing a network architecture that
will give the test community new radio-spectrum-enhancing capabilities. The telemetry
network system (TmNS) will provide test range computer networks with a wideband
wireless capability that can cover hundreds of miles. This is one step in the total upgrade
which is known as integrated network-enhanced telemetry (iNET). The goal of iNET is
to find a feasible upgrade for the basic architecture of the test ranges’ telemetry systems.
Under an iNET configuration, time-sensitive data are transmitted immediately using
point-to-point telemetry, while less urgent data are collected and sent when bandwidth
becomes available. All data are still recorded onboard the aircraft for postflight reduc-
tion. This eliminates the problem of lost data during maneuvers, as the data can now be
retransmitted. It will also help with near real-time troubleshooting of problems, as
additional data (data not normally available to the test community during real-time
operations) can be sent while setting up for the next test card. Data received at the test
site can then be shared between multiple users, such as other ranges, engineering groups,
and contractors, via the iNET network.
It is envisioned that iNET will use L, S, and C band and allocate bandwidth in real
time to multiple users. This would be accomplished by an uplink to the aircraft which
would be able to change the transmitter and the transceiver in real time, thereby
adjusting the spectrum allocation. This would be ideal for multiple test platforms,
allocating the spectrum based on need.
The initial architecture of iNET was defined by the Boeing Phantom Works and
the proposed standards are near completion and should then be incorporated into the
Range Commanders Council Telemetry Group IRIG Standard 106-04. This program is
a joint improvement and modernization project managed by the Central Test and
Evaluation Investment Program. A limited operational prototype of the system is
expected to be in service sometime in 2011. The proposed iNET system interfaces are
Ground RF
FIGURE 3.58 ¢
Networks Environment iNET System

Interfaces
Spectrum Test article

Network TmNS
Assignment Peripherals
Manager
Manager
Peripheral Peripheral
Configuration HMI
Applications Applications iNET
The iNET system is comprised of six contributing elements:

● Test article peripherals
● Peripheral configuration applications
● Peripheral human machine interface (HMI) applications
● Telemetry network system (TmNS)
● Network manager
● Spectrum assignment manager
Test article peripherals are all of the instrumentation devices that reside in
the test article: PCM systems, data and video recorders, TCP/IP networks, etc.
Peripheral configuration applications allow an instrumentation engineer to remotely
configure instrumentation on the test article. Peripheral HMI applications allow test
engineers to remotely monitor and control instrumentation on the test article. The
TmNS is the communications link between the test article and the ground networks
and will transmit data via PCM streams and IP packets. The network management
application is an application that allows the monitoring of the health and welfare of
the TmNS. The spectrum assignment management application allows a spectrum
manager to remotely monitor and control radio frequency (RF) attributes of the
TmNS. The system will exchange data much like the tactical targeting network
technology (TTNT), which is an improvement on existing data link technology. This
system is described in section 5.9.5 of this text. Progress on the iNET system can be
followed on their homepage: www.inetprogram.org.
3.19.1.3 Other Instrumentation

The bulk of data used for troubleshooting and analysis does not come from real-time but
rather from onboard recording systems. In the early 1980s these systems were multitrack
analog recorders and limited in the amount of data that could be captured. Video
recorders were VHS and some Beta, which were also limited. Analog data recorders
gave way to high-density digital recorders (HDDR) developed to capture MIL-STD-
1553 bus data at data rates of 1 Mbps. About the same time, specialized recorders to
capture internal radar processing were also developed, and these recorders attained data
rates of about 4 Mbps. VHS was replaced by Hi8, which was smaller and produced
better quality, and some early work was done on downlinking video along with the
telemetry stream. In today’s programs, it is not unusual to see data rates in excess of
1 Gbps, which exceed the capabilities of the standard recorder. Data today (avionics as
well as video) are written to flash memory, much like the memory sticks that you can
carry on your key chain.
The workload for the evaluator has increased significantly with the amount of data
that is being collected from the test article. This problem was previously identified and
discussed in section 3.18 of this text. The types and sources of data recorded for post-
flight analysis are many:
● Avionics data busses (can include 1553, 1760, EBR-1553, Ethernet, etc.)
● Pilot’s voice
● Time
● Telemetry stream
● HUD/HMD video
● Display video
● Missile data (avionics and video)
● Stores data (avionics and video)
● TSPI data (onboard and off-board)
● TSPI data differentially corrected
● Satellite data
3.19.2 Real-Time Data Reduction and Analysis

A definition of real-time (or near-real-time) data could be the processing of aircraft
telemetry and range data during a flight to provide answers that allow flight profiles to
be completed or repeated as necessary to optimize flight test efficiency. The closest you
can get to real time is about 0.5 sec, and this is for data that are throughput directly to
monitors without any processing or smoothing. These data are used for parameter
monitoring or limit checks and are most often used as flight safety checks (altitude,
airspeed, temperatures, etc.). Latency for near-real-time parameter comparison used for
top-level system performance determination runs about 2 sec.
The importance of real-time data can be seen in five broad categories:
● Multistream merge comparisons
● Test control
● Quick look and specification compliance
● Top-level performance
● Debrief support
Real-time data are merged and time aligned for viewing by the analyst. This
operation must be accomplished for the benefits of real time to be realized. This is
one of the reasons why data will be near real time, as there is processing required to
perform the time alignment; time alignment was discussed in section 2.18 of this text.
Depending on the test being conducted, there may be as little as one telemetry stream
and one TSPI stream to be merged, or in the case of complex testing, such as live missile
firing, there may be more than five data streams that must be merged and time aligned.
Some of the sources of data that may be seen in real-time operations are
● Multiple aircraft avionics telemetry streams
● Multiple missile telemetry streams
● Video downlink
● TSPI ground trackers
● Target video and telemetry
When performing a real-time merge of these data, the control room (an operations
center where test control and analysis is performed) will assume that all data are asyn-
chronous; that is, all of the varied data streams arrive at different times. The center will
read imbedded time to accomplish the time alignment. Imbedded time is the time stamp
on the data which is inserted at the point of collection. For example, a PCM frame will
contain a header word that contains time. It is that time that is read, not the time that data
arrives at the control room. Figure 3.59 shows this relationship.
The test aircraft in Figure 3.59 inserts time in the PCM header before it is sent to
the control room. The control room receives the PCM frame at some time later and
marks the time that it was received. Similarly, the TSPI site will determine the test
aircraft coordinates and insert the time that the position was sensed. It will send this
(via microwave, data link, land line, etc.) to the control room, which will again mark
the time it was received. When merging these two streams, the time stamp inserted at
the source (test aircraft and TSPI site) will be used, not the time it was received at the
control room. This eliminates the need to determine the time lag due to transmission
from the two sites.
The responsibility for conducting the test lies with the test conductor. This indivi-
dual determines flight safety—if testing can proceed, if the systems are functioning as
expected—and direct the general flow of testing. For proper control, data need to be
provided to the test conductor as expeditiously as possible. For this reason, data provided
Time Stamp FIGURE 3.59 ¢

Time Stamping of
Test Aircraft
Data
Telemetry
Time Stamp
TSPI Site Control Room

to the test conductor are normally nonfiltered or processed. The test conductor receives
inputs from the
● Test conductor screen
● Mission display or range control
● Voice communications
● Station analysts
A test conductor screen normally displays critical flight safety parameters such as
airspeed, altitude, acceleration, fuel remaining, etc. It may also display parameters
identifying test requirements. Sensor status, the selected mode of the system under test,
built-in test (BIT) results, and store station selected are possible parameters that may be
of concern. In addition, time and instrumentation status should be displayed.
A mission display or range control console provides real-time support by
displaying the TSPI-determined position of all of the test participants. In some
organizations, this display is used to control the geometry of the test setups. In
other organizations, test geometries are controlled by qualified range control officers
(much like FAA controllers). This display provides airborne tracks with persistence
trails of all test aircraft, the relationship between tracks (range, bearing, and closure),
event markers, and the ability to make a hard copy of the display. The display may
have an overlay of the restricted area boundaries or even visibility profiles of the
TSPI coverage. A replay mode is normally available to assist in flight debriefs and
postflight analysis.
Communications also may come from a multitude of sources:
● Hot Mike
● UHF/VHF/HF
● Satellite communications (SATCOM)
● Data link
As described previously, Hot Mike will relay, via telemetry, all voice communica-
tions heard by the pilot; this includes the intercommunications system (ICS). This pro-
vides situational awareness for the test conductor, allowing him to hear when the pilot is
busy with other communications. Voice communications and direction to the aircraft are
accomplished over the UHF/VHF/HF frequencies. Over-the-horizon communications
can be accomplished with HF/SATCOM/data link when required.
Station analysts can provide the test conductor with detailed information on test
results and status based on real-time information. Analysts may have access to infor-
mation that is not readily available to the aircrew by accessing the aircraft data busses.
Armed with the data described, the test conductor has all the necessary information
to vector the aircraft, change test profiles, call an abort, or proceed to a different set
of test cards.
Real-time data allow the test team to identify problems early as well as data that
need further analysis in postflight, provide for an early look at specification compliance,
and allow for an orderly flow to the next objective. Quick look is the term that some test
organizations use for this process, as it allows a snapshot of how the test is progressing.
Testers have become quite inventive when displaying data in a format that provides
status at a glance. Color-coded screens using green for within specification, red for out
of tolerance limit, and yellow for a transitional status are extremely helpful for quickly
identifying problem areas. By using analog representations of the data, trends can
readily be seen. Comparing truth data and system data on the same screen can determine
specification compliance. By comparing real-time parameters to expected values, a
sense of system performance can be attained.
It should be noted that data viewed in real time is normally at a lower data rate than
what is available in the data stream. Whenever indepth analysis is required, data should
be taken from the aircraft recording, which has all of the data at the highest data rates.
Data collected in real time provides an excellent tool for flight debrief support. Hard
copies of the data screens taken at critical times during the flight, video, and mission
display recordings can assist the test team in accurately deconstructing the flight.
3.19.3 Postflight Data Reduction

There are two types of postflight data reduction: batch processing and interactive batch
processing. Batch processing involves a request to the data group (personnel tasked with
providing data reduction and support) for time slices of data from the aircraft recordings.
These may be requests for parameter sets required by the analyst, raw data extraction in
hexadecimal, or requests for data files. Interactive batch is a process that allows the user
to access aircraft-recorded data which has been engineering unit (EU) converted and
resides on a server or workstation. A depiction of these processes is shown at Figure 3.60.
Data obtained is used for troubleshooting of anomalies and determination of spe-
cification compliance and system performance. In real time, decisions on whether to
continue to the next profile or defer the test to the next flight will be based on the
availability of data. During the debrief, data will determine the work schedule: Is new
aircraft software required? Can a productive flight be accomplished as planned? Does
maintenance need to be scheduled? Postflight processing provides the analyst with all of
the data at the highest data rates, and it is these data that will be used to determine
specification compliance and true system performance.
Batch Request FIGURE 3.60 ¢

Batch and
Tape or Interactive Batch
EU-
Flash Processing
Converted
Drive
Data
Aircraft Playback
Data Server
Recoding
Dictionaries from ICD for

EU Conversion
Workstations
1. How many different types of words can be sent over a MIL-STD-1553 bus? What
are they?
2. Name two additional error checks added to the MIL-STD-1553 protocol in MIL-
STD-1760.
3. What is a BC? How many sensors can be a BC?
4. Is ARINC 429 a simplex or duplex link?
5. What does FireWire allow a system to do?
6. How does the military routinely handle non-1553-compatible equipment on the
1553 bus?
7. What is an RT? Give five examples of a sensor that might be an RT.
8. What does Manchester code mean? What does NRZ code mean?
9. How come a clock is not used on ARINC 429?
10. What is a message? What types of messages can be sent over the MIL-STD-1553
bus?
11. What does command/response mean to you?
12. What is MIL-STD-1760 used for?
13. What is an interface design specification? What is it used for?
14. How does MIL-STD-1760 differ from MIL-STD-1553?
15. What is asynchronous data? Give one example.
16. What is broadcast mode in MIL-STD-1553?
17. What is a bus analyzer? Why would you need one?
18. Why are header words used with some MIL-STD-1760 messages?
19. What is a return-to-zero tristate modulation?
20. What is isochronous data? Provide two examples.
21. What is meant by deterministic? Which data bus is optimally suited if determinism
is required?
22. How is the high-speed data bus activated on the Eurofighter?
23. What is decimal, binary, octal, and hexadecimal?
24. What are weapons A/D converters known as?
25. What is a functional requirements document?
26. Will Ethernet ever achieve a safety assurance level of A?
27. How many RTs can occupy a MIL-STD-1553 bus, mathematically and in reality?
28. What are some problems associated with high-speed data busses that can cause
concern for instrumentation and data analysts?
29. What is meant by an action word?
30. Are the status word bits the same in MIL-STD-1760 as in MIL-STD-1553?
31. How many busses can be on an aircraft? What are the limitations?
32. What does contention access mean in the data bus world?
33. What is the data rate on most MIL-STD-1553 busses?
34. Must the ARINC 429 use the source destination identifier as an address?
35. What does a hexadecimal dump of raw data mean to you?
36. What are the three major advantages of employing EBR-1553 on legacy aircraft?
37. What is MIL-STD-1760? Are the protocols different than MIL-STD-1553?
38. What is an intermessage gap? How long is it?
39. What is the instrumentation bit in the MIL-STD-1553 status word used for?
40. What is a mode code in MIL-STD-1553? How is it initiated?
41. If two devices need to share information on an ARINC 429 bus, what needs to be
added?
42. What is the most common problem with RS-232?
43. Briefly describe the decentralized processing routines on the next-generation
aircraft.
44. What is a cyclical redundancy check? What is it used for?
45. Is there a response time requirement in MIL-STD-553? What is it?
46. What is a bus monitor used for?
47. What is a parity bit? What is it used for?
48. What is a vector word?
49. What is mass data transfer? On which bus would you find this?
50. What is ‘‘plug and play’’?
51. What is ‘‘peer to peer’’?
52. What is FC-AE-ASM? Is this a common standard?
53. Is Ethernet deterministic? Why or why not?
54. Can an RT reside on more than one bus?
55. Can a device be an RT on one bus and a bus controller on another?
CHAPTER
Communications Flight Test

4
Chapter Outline
4.0 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 139
4.1 Communications Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 140
4.2 Aircraft Communications Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 142
4.3 Test Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 144
4.4 The Three Steps in Avionics Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 144
4.5 Communications Test Plan Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 146
4.6 Executing the Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 148
4.7 Other Considerations in Communications Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 149
4.8 Effects of Stores, Landing Gear, and Flaps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 149
4.9 Effects of Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 149
4.10 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 150
4.11 Boredom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 151
4.12 Speech Intelligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 151
4.13 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility . . ........ .... 154
4.14 EMI/EMC Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 158
4.15 EMI/EMC Test Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 161
4.16 EMI/EMC Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 161
4.17 Selected Questions for Chapter 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 164
4.0 OVERVIEW
The flight testing of communications systems is avionics flight testing in its most basic
form, but it does illustrate many of the common factors seen in the more complex
systems. The testing of communication systems occurs more often than one would
expect. Radios are often upgraded, which requires a flight test program, but these
upgrades may be many years apart. What occurs on a more frequent basis is the relo-
cation of antennas or the installation of stores or other obstructions that may affect
communications. Some flight testing may be required to ensure that no degradation of
communications due to these modifications has occurred. Radios, because they transmit
as well as receive radio frequency (RF) energy, are also key players in electromagnetic
interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) testing. This testing will be
139
140 CHAPTER 4 Communications Flight Test
addressed later in this chapter. Data link systems, which transfer digital information,
voice, or data, are tested in a similar way to radios, and are addressed in chapter 5.
4.1 COMMUNICATIONS BASICS

It is not the intent of this text to cover the theoretical concepts of any of the avionics
systems under test. Rather, a practical usage of the systems will be addressed. There are
many texts available to the flight test engineer assigned to a particular system. The
engineer should become familiar with any system he is assigned. As mentioned pre-
viously, a good flight test engineer knows the system as well as the designer. The text
assumes that some basic knowledge is possessed by the tester. Wherever possible, sug-
gested reading which has proven beneficial to the author in the past will be recommended.
A good overview of communications theory, for example, can be found in Modern
Electronic Communication, by Gary M. Miller (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).
Our first concern will be the ability to propagate the radio wave; propagation in free
space is much different than that seen in wires, cables, or, in the case of radar, wave-
guides. In wires, the wave does not lose energy as it travels (except for scattering and
absorption). In free space propagation, the beam spreads as it travels away from the
transmitter; the surface area it occupies increases as the square of the distance traveled.
For example, if you were to double the distance from the transmitter, the area occupied
by the wave would increase to 22, or 4 times the original area. Since energy must be
conserved, the energy per unit surface area must also decrease by the square of the
distance traveled; this is called the inverse square law, which we will also see when
discussing electro-optical (EO) and radar systems. For each doubling of the distance,
a 6 dB (power ratio of ¼) loss is experienced. For all of the waves up to millimeter
wavelengths, this free space loss is going to be the most detrimental.
The second concern is the interaction of waves with obstructions. When waves
become obstructed in free space, new waves will result from the interaction. There are
four types of interactions:
● Reflection
● Refraction
● Diffraction
● Scattering
Reflection occurs when a wave encounters a plane object and the wave is reflected
back without distortion. Refraction occurs when the wave encounters a change in
medium and the direction and speed of the wave is altered. This can be seen when you
put your arm into a swimming pool and your arm appears to be broken. Diffraction
occurs when the wave encounters an edge; the wave has the ability to turn the corner.
Diffraction is dependant on the frequency of the wave; the higher the frequency, the less
diffraction. Scattering is the reradiation of waves in multiple directions as the wave
impacts an object. Scattering is also frequency dependent, with higher scattering at
higher frequencies.
The propagation of waves is also influenced by the atmosphere, and in particular the
troposphere and the ionosphere. The troposphere extends from the surface of the earth to
about 30 miles in altitude; the ionosphere begins at the edge of the troposphere and
4.1 Communications Basics 141
TABLE 4.1 ¢ Radio Frequency Designations
Band Designation Label Frequency Spread

Extremely Low Frequency ELF 3–30 Hz
Super Low Frequency SLF 30–300 Hz
Ultra Low (Voice) Frequency ULF or VF 300 Hz–3 kHz
Very Low Frequency VLF 3–30 kHz
Low Frequency LF 30–300 kHz
Medium Frequency MF 300 kHz–3 MHz
High Frequency HF 3–30 MHz
Very High Frequency VHF 30–300 MHz
Ultra High Frequency UHF 300 MHz–3 GHz
Super High Frequency SHF 3–30 GHz
Extremely High Frequency EHF 30–300 GHz
continues to outer space. The troposphere contains the earth’s weather and liquid water,
as well as most of the earth’s water vapor, gaseous atmosphere, and pollutants. The
ionosphere contains oxygen molecules which are ionized during the day by ultraviolet
(UV) and x-ray radiation from the sun. At night, the ions recombine to form uncharged
oxygen molecules. This ionization converts the ionosphere into an electrically neutral
gas of positive and negative charges; this gas is known as a plasma. With low fre-
quencies the plasma behaves much like a mirror and reflects radio waves. As the earth is
also a strong reflector of radio waves these frequencies will hop back and forth between
the ionosphere and the earth and the wave will propagate very long distances. As the
frequency increases to about 50 MHz, the ionospheric effect decreases, and at higher
frequencies appears invisible.
The frequencies of interest to us will be the high-frequency (HF) through the extra-
high-frequency (EHF) bands (see Table 4.1). The propagation of HF frequencies is
accomplished with two waves: a sky wave, which bounces from the ionosphere, and
a ground wave, which propagates along the ground. Because of the long wavelengths,
HF is not affected by the troposphere and can usually bend around most obstructions.
These properties allow HF communications over long distances, including beyond line-
of-sight (LOS).
Very-high-frequency (VHF) and ultra-high-frequency (UHF) bands are also not
affected by the troposphere, but their frequencies are too high to exploit the ionosphere.
Since the wavelengths are relatively small, they are unable to diffract around obstacles,
which adversely affects communications. These frequencies are subject to multipath or
fading. Multipath was discussed in chapter 2 and occurs when multiple signals (direct
transmission from the transmitter and reflected signals from the earth or obstructions on
the earth) arrive at the receiver simultaneously. Depending on the phase difference of the
signals, they may be constructive (amplifying) or destructive. Thus a listener experi-
ences changes in amplitude and clarity of the received signal.
Microwave and millimetric wave frequencies are affected by the troposphere,
require LOS geometries, and are affected above 10 GHz. Above 25 GHz, water vapor
and oxygen molecules will severely attenuate a signal due to absorption.
When we use the atmosphere as a transmission medium, we cannot control the noise
environment. Electrical noise is defined as any undesired voltages or currents that
appear in the receiver and are presented to the listener as static. Static can be annoying,
and in severe cases can distort the reception so much that intelligible communications
are impossible. Noise can be described in two broad categories: external and internal.
External noise includes man-made noise, atmospheric noise, and space noise. Internal
noise is noise introduced by the receiver, and can be broken down into thermal noise and
shot noise.
Man-made noise is caused by spark-producing systems such as engine ignitions,
fluorescent lighting, and electric motor commutators. The noise is radiated from the
source and propagated through the atmosphere. If the frequency of the noise is close in
frequency to the transmitted signal they will combine. Man-made noise is random and
occurs in frequencies up to 500 MHz; man-made noise is dominant in urban environ-
ments. In HF and VHF, this noise is usually caused by other signals in the same band.
Some early warning radars generate enough noise to be of concern in these frequencies.
Atmospheric noise is caused by naturally occurring disturbances in the earth’s
atmosphere, such as lightning. Atmospheric noise is evident throughout the entire RF
spectrum, however, intensity is inversely proportional to frequency, so lower fre-
quencies will suffer most, with a limited effect on frequencies above 20 MHz.
Space noise is a combination of two sources: the first originates from the sun and is
called solar noise; the second is radio noise from outside the solar system, called galactic
noise. Solar noise is cyclical, with peaks every 11 years. The next solar peak is expected
in 2012. The noise from individual stars from outside the solar system is small, but their
cumulative effects are large because there are so many of them. Space noise occurs at
frequencies between 8 MHz and 10 GHz and depends a great deal on solar activity.
The directivity or the ability to focus energy is also directly related to frequency. At
higher frequencies it is easier to focus a beam of RF energy. For example, a uniformly
illuminated circular aperture antenna can generate a beamwidth:
Beamwidth ¼ 1:02 wavelength=diameter of the aperture
As the frequency decreases, the wavelength increases, which will cause the beam to
become larger, or less directed. The only way to improve our ability to focus energy is to
either increase the frequency or increase the size of the antenna. As it turns out, for
communications testing we are normally interested in omnidirectional coverage; that is,
we should be able to transmit and receive normal communications 360 horizontally
about the aircraft.
4.2 AIRCRAFT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

There are many variables to consider when attempting to adequately test an aircraft
communications system. The first consideration is the frequencies used by the system. In
today’s aircraft, it is not unusual for a communications suite to incorporate HF, VHF,
UHF, SATCOM, and data link. Each of these frequency bands has its own requirements
for range, coverage, modulation, etc. Each of these systems has unique mission
requirements which will have to be investigated. A list of the RF bands and their des-
ignations are shown in Table 4.1.
When testing RFs it is also common practice to test groups of frequencies within the
band. For example, if a VHF radio is installed in an aircraft, you would test low, med-
ium, and high frequencies within the VHF spectrum.
4.2 Aircraft Communications Equipment 143
Antennas are also a consideration when testing communications systems. Most air-
craft are equipped with an upper and a lower antenna for communications frequencies.
This allows communication with a ground station or another aircraft regardless of the
orientation of the aircraft. Some radio systems automatically switch antennas based on
the received signal strength at a particular antenna. This is true for military tactical air
navigation (TACAN) systems. Most communications systems allow selection of the
antenna by the aircrew. The selections are upper, lower, and both. In some systems,
the antennas are tied and the signal is split when ‘‘both’’ is selected. This fact should be
taken into consideration when performing maximum range and intelligibility tests.
The radios may also be capable of operating in different modes or different mod-
ulations. It is common for military radios to be able to operate in clear and encrypted
modes. The classic case of scrambling requires that the analog voice first be digitized.
The analog signal is run through an analog-to-digital (A/D) converter, and the digitized
signal is then sent to an encryption unit. The most common encryption units are KY-28s
and KY-58s, the latter being the most current. The ‘‘program’’ for the encryption is set
with an encryption key, which is classified SECRET. A couple of things that bite testers
here should be obvious. All radios involved in the test where encryption is used must have
the same, current key and must be functionally checked before the aircraft leaves the
ground. Encryption keys are normally good for 24 hours based on Zulu (Greenwich Mean
Time [GMT]) time, therefore two keys are normally loaded, one for the current day and
one for the next day. The keys should automatically roll to the next day as time passes
2400Z. When an encrypted radio is transmitting, the encrypted signal (called a preamble)
is transmitted first and received by another receiver. The receiving system sends the
preamble through the encryption unit, where it is decrypted using the encryption key. If
the encryption keys for the two radios match, the communications can be achieved. If the
keys do not match, receipt of the transmission is impossible. If the keys match, the
decrypted signal is run through a digital-to-analog (D/A) converter and is then heard in
the headset. The original analog signal is processed quite often before being received by
the cooperating system. This process time may result in a degradation of the intelligibility
of the signal due to time delay, clipping, etc., and should be noted during testing.
Radios may also operate in a frequency-hopping or antijam mode. The system is
known in the United States as Have Quick or Have Quick II. The purpose of the system
is to deny access to your conversations by denying an enemy the ability to pinpoint the
frequency on which you are communicating. The system utilizes many frequencies
within a particular band (UHF, VHF, etc.) and randomly hops among these frequencies
at very short intervals. The key to this system is time. All participants must be syn-
chronized to the same time in order to communicate on the proper frequency at any
given time. The system establishes a ‘‘net’’ that must be entered and then aligned in time
with the other participants. Time can be obtained by either a synchronization pulse from
the ‘‘net’’ owner or via an external source such as the GPS. Other than the previously
mentioned concerns of intelligibility when using this mode of operation, testers should
also pay particular attention to the robustness of the system, and the ease of entering or
reentering the ‘‘net.’’
A second radio mode of operation is the ability to modulate the frequency. Most
modern radios have the ability to modulate frequencies in either amplitude or frequency
(i.e., amplitude modulation [AM] and frequency modulation [FM]). Modulation may be
employed based on the operational need. For example, AM provides longer range, while
FM provides a clearer signal. Testers need to take note of specification changes based on
the modulation that is employed and the inherent characteristics of the modulation used
for a given radio.
An additional mode of operation within many communications systems is a direction
finding (DF) mode. This mode allows an aircraft to obtain a bearing to any source ema-
nating a selected frequency. The system incorporates a methodology to first locate the
frequency and then discern the direction from which it is being transmitted. Some of
the more modern systems incorporate a coherent detection feature. This feature allows the
system to internally generate the same frequency it is searching for, allowing for detection
of the signal in higher noise levels than was previously possible. The aircrew is then given a
bearing to or from the selected signal when detected. Depending on the sophistication of the
system, it may be able to determine whether the receiver is moving away from or toward
the transmitter. The accuracies are not exceptional, but it can help establish situational
awareness or even locate a lost wingman. DF is possible with any frequency band available
to the aircrew (UHF, VHF, HF, etc.) depending on the DF system being used.
4.3 TEST REQUIREMENTS

The specification requirements for a communications system are usually defined as clear
and effective communication in all directions out to a specified range. A typical speci-
fication may read:
The ARC-XXX will be capable of air-to-air and air-to-ground communications in
the UHF mode of not less than 300 nm throughout the omnidirectional range with
elevation angles of þ30 to 45 , clear and encrypted in AM and FM modes.
The military uses a unique letter/number scheme to identify avionics and weapons
equipment installed on an aircraft. ‘‘ARC’’ is decomposed as follows: the ‘‘A’’ refers to
piloted aircraft, the ‘‘R’’ refers to radio, and the ‘‘C’’ refers to communications. This is
based on the Joint Electronics Type Designation System (JETDS). By knowing the
nomenclature, it is possible to get a rough idea of what type of system is being discussed.
For example, we might be looking at an ASN-130 and an ARN-118. Both of these
systems are used on piloted aircraft (‘‘A’’). The ‘‘S’’ refers to special or combination and
the ‘‘R’’ refers to radio. The ‘‘N’’ in both cases refers to navigation aid. The first is an
inertial navigation system (INS), while the second is a TACAN system.
At first glance, it appears that this communications suite will be a relatively simple
test. Just fly out to maximum range and perform the required operations. However, this
is not a particularly good way to plan this test. In reality, we must plan a logical pro-
gression of test points leading to the ultimate goal of maximum range performance. This
will require the construction of a test matrix in order to identify all test conditions.
4.4 THE THREE STEPS IN AVIONICS TESTING

There are three basic steps to take when preparing to evaluate any avionics or weapons
system. If these three steps are applied in all test cases, many of the unforeseen pitfalls
will be avoided. These unforeseen pitfalls have been called many things; some test
programs identify them as ‘‘known unknowns.’’ It is the job of the tester to flush out
4.4 The Three Steps in Avionics Testing 145
problems, and this can only be accomplished with a complete and logical test plan. The
three steps in any test plan are
1. The static test
2. The ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ (or functional evaluation) test
3. Compliance
The static test is just what the name implies, a ground test designed to see if the
system works to any degree of confidence while sitting on the ground. It is not a lab test
and cannot be replaced by a lab test. There is no guarantee that the way the software/
hardware/firmware worked in the lab is going to be the same when integrated with the
aircraft. In the case of our communications test, we would exercise all test conditions on
the ground with a cooperating aircraft and ground station. You need to be careful as to
where the aircraft is located: ensure a clear LOS to the receiver and ensure that the aircraft
is far enough away from items that may cause multipath, blockage areas, or electro-
magnetic interference (EMI) (covered in section 4.13 of this text). If the modes of the
radio do not work on the ground, it is a pretty safe bet that they will not work when you
are flying 300 miles from home. If some of the functions do not work, fix them and
perform another static test. Some testers may argue that if some functions do not work on
the ground, then just evaluate the functions that do work in the air and test the nonworking
functions at a later date when they are working. Does the term regression test come to
mind? What guarantee do we have that fixes to a system have not impacted previously
tested functions? The worst-case scenario will have the system completely retested.
Thinking back to the first chapter, we must learn to test smarter and more efficiently.
The ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ test is a term used by the author and entails an evaluation that
will not cost an inordinate amount of money, will not collect data for statistical analysis,
but will give you a nice warm feeling that the system, when evaluated, will produce
good results. In technical terms, this test is a true functional evaluation of the system and
its capabilities. In our communications test, for example, the specification calls for
a maximum range of 300 nm. We may want to test at intermediate ranges of 75 and
150 nm. If volume and clarity are not very good at 150 nm, we probably would not have
a ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ about 300 nm. If, on the other hand, our test plan called for us to fly to
300 nm and evaluate the communications system in all modes of operation, what
statement could we make about the system if nothing worked at the test conditions? The
only statement we could possibly make is that the system does not meet specifications.
Why? We have no baseline of past performance and therefore cannot determine the
cause of the problem.
Compliance is the easiest of all the tests, and that is why testers tend to gravitate
toward these tests when building a test plan. The compliance test places the system at
the required specification conditions and gathers enough data to prove to some con-
fidence level that the system is or is not compliant. But here is the problem. Suppose that
we put together a test plan which shows compliance only. What happens the first time a
system does not work at the test conditions? After the system is reworked, we refly the
test conditions. But wait a minute. You have already used up the time and resources that
you needed to complete the test. Now you have to refly, which means adding more time
and schedule to the evaluation period. The bottom line is that it is easier to remove tests
from a test plan than to add tests to a test plan. Build a comprehensive test plan in the
beginning and save yourself a lot of aggravation later.
4.5 COMMUNICATIONS TEST PLAN MATRIX

Revisiting our specification paragraph for our communications system, we are now
ready to devise a test matrix that will cover all of the test conditions necessary to
evaluate this system. After the matrix is complete, we can incorporate it into our test
plan. All avionics and weapons systems will require the use of a condition matrix.
The matrix in Table 4.2 merely identifies the system specifications. The tester must
identify how many test conditions (not test points) are required in order to adequately
evaluate this system. Some of the areas are quite easy, while some require additional
thinking.
● Direction: There are only two directions, air-to-air and air-to-ground, and each must
be tested, so the total test conditions are two.
● Frequency: In our example, there is only one frequency band—UHF—but as men-
tioned earlier, each band is further subdivided into low, medium, and high. The total
test conditions here are three.
● Range: The maximum range is 300 nm, a zero range really equates to the static test.
The tester has a few options. One could test at zero and 300 nm, but as addressed
earlier, this is not a good option. Suppose a test is completed at every 75 nm. This
would equate to five test conditions.
● Azimuth: The system should maintain communications throughout the omnidirec-
tional range, which is a fancy way of saying 360 about the aircraft. We could test
at the cardinal headings, but that would probably not be enough. We could test at
every degree, but that would be overkill. Each 30 would seem a good compro-
mise, but this will be at the discretion of the testing agency; potential blockage
areas from perturbations on the aircraft (propellers, other antennas, or external
stores) may call for smaller increments of testing. A test at every 30 would
yield 12 test conditions.
● Elevation: The elevation requirement allows the aircraft to bank without losing
communications. As with the azimuth parameter, the tester needs to choose a
representative number of elevation parameters. Each 15 would seem logical, and
this would provide us with six test conditions.
● Encryption: There is either encrypted mode or nonencrypted mode, which provides
us with two test conditions.
● Modulation: The operator may select AM or FM, which provides us with two test
conditions. NOTE: Many terms are used to convey encryption, and confusion may
arise when using them. For example, terms used include clear, plain, red, green,
black, etc., all of which may mean different things to different communities.
By inserting our test conditions, Table 4.2 now becomes Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.2 ¢ Communications Matrix
ARC-XXX Direction Frequency Range Azimuth Elevation Encryption Modulation Total

Specification AA/AG UHF 0–300 nm 0–360 þ30 to 45 Not encrypted/ AM/FM
Encrypted
4.5 Communications Test Plan Matrix 147
TABLE 4.3 ¢ Communications Test Conditions
ARC-XXX Direction Frequency Range Azimuth Elevation Encryption Modulation Total

Specification AA/AG UHF 0–300 nm 0–360 þ30 to 45 Not encrypted/ AM/FM
Encrypted
Conditions 2 3 5 12 6 2 2 8640
The funny thing about these test matrices is that they are multiplicative. That is, in
order to calculate the total number of test conditions, you must multiply across the
matrix. Table 4.3 shows the total to be 8640 test conditions. It is also important to note
that these are test conditions not test points. You may require six test points, or data
points, at each test condition in order to achieve a desired confidence level. In our
example, the total of 8640 test conditions would grow to 51,840 test points. To the
layman, this would appear to be an unrealistic number of data points to prove a rela-
tively simple system is compliant. However, it is likely not unrealistic, and this is the
nemesis of communications system testing. The matrix is a logical test condition buildup
and is technically the best way to approach the compliance issue.
The problem that most program or project managers have is equating test points to
test flights. If their background is in vehicle flight testing, the problem is more severe.
Management may address flight testing with the premise that, historically, test programs
accomplish about 10 test points per flight. Using this logic, your communications test
will take in excess of 5000 flights. While 10 test points per flight may be valid for
envelope expansion or stores separation, it is certainly not valid for avionics testing.
Average data rates recorded by instrumentation are approximately 25 samples/sec. If
time, space, position information (TSPI) data can be recorded at the same rate, 25 data
points are recorded every second at the test condition. This is an important concept that
must be understood by all players in the test program. A misunderstanding of what is
being collected, and how long it will take, always creates trouble for the avionics tester.
This is because metrics are formulated to show progress, and the metrics have no
bearing on reality. One of the favorite measures of progress is total test points versus
time, or the test point burn-down.
Assume that we are going to show compliance for a navigation system as well as the
communications program we just addressed. Assume that for the navigation program we
need to accomplish six navigation runs for accuracy. In order to account for the Schuler
cycle (the Schuler cycle is discussed in section 5.1 of this text), each navigation run
needs to last approximately 84 min. In short, each flight will produce one navigation
point, or six flights will be required to complete the navigation portion of the program.
Also assume that we can complete our communication matrix in two flights. How will
this look on our progress metrics? Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the two possible metrics,
and neither of them provide any worthwhile information. For the example, the naviga-
tion flights are flown first, followed by communication flights.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that there was no progress on the test program for the first
six flights. In reality, in terms of flights required, each flight accomplished 12.5% of the
test program. Unless the program is fully understood, management would expect a burn-
down of approximately 8000 test points per flight. By the time the second flight is
FIGURE 4.1 ¢ Test

Point Progress
Test Points Accomplished

50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Flights
FIGURE 4.2 ¢ Test 60,000

Point Burn-Down
50,000
Test Points Remaining
40,000
30,000
20,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Flights
complete, hundreds of hours will have been spent on meaningless discussions of why
you are behind schedule.
4.6 EXECUTING THE MATRIX

Some thought must also go into executing the test matrix. The first setup is our static
test. Examination of the matrix reveals that 20% of our test conditions can be accom-
plished here without ever leaving the ground. Having satisfied ourselves that the system
works well enough to fly, we can plan our first flight condition. Our first planned range
is 75 nm, but what do we plan to do once we are there? If we set up an orbit, we can
accomplish most of the required conditions. The one condition that we cannot satisfy is
the elevation change. A constant bank turn will provide a fixed elevation, positive on
one side of the circle and negative on the other side of the circle. We would like to
obtain the full range of elevation change throughout the full range of azimuth change. In
order to accomplish this task we must change the geometry. Depending on aircraft
capabilities, the tester should investigate cloverleaf turns, rolling out on different
headings, or some kind of modified Cuban-8 turns. These geometries will offer ever-
changing elevations with azimuth, thus maximizing the data collection per unit time.
According to our test plan, the next range to be attempted would be 150 nm,
but suppose our communications suite performed flawlessly at the 75 nm condition?
4.9 Effects of Weather 149
Perhaps we would defer the 150 nm condition and proceed to the 225 nm condition. In
this instance, 20% of our required test points would be deferred. That looks good for us,
and it is much easier to delete test points from the plan than to add them to a test plan
that was not thought out completely. We would progress along this way until the matrix
is complete.
4.7 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN

COMMUNICATIONS TESTS
There are other considerations that were not specifically addressed in the test matrix.
These considerations include
● Effects of stores, landing gear, and flaps
● Effects of weather
● Logistics
● Boredom
● Speech intelligibility
● EMI/EMC
4.8 EFFECTS OF STORES, LANDING GEAR,

AND FLAPS
Because of the location of the antennas on the aircraft, it is entirely possible that certain
perturbations such as stores, landing gear, and flaps can have a deleterious effect on
radio performance. Aircraft that carry stores externally can be troublesome to the tester
due to the many configurations that are possible. In-flight communications tests are
normally conducted in the configuration in which the aircraft would normally operate.
These tests are rarely conducted in a clean configuration unless there are specific rea-
sons for doing so. Multiple configurations or new configurations (after compliance has
been shown) can be accomplished on the ground in some anechoic facilities by per-
forming antenna pattern tests. These tests are described in section 4.10. Communications
tests in the landing configuration (gear and flaps down) are normally tested at the nearest
range (i.e., in the matrix we discussed at the 75 nm test condition). Testing at the longer
ranges is done in the cruise configuration (gear and flaps up).
4.9 EFFECTS OF WEATHER

As described in section 4.1, weather may have an effect on aircraft communications.
Since this is a known phenomenon, most test plans do not identify communications in
weather as a separate test condition. What needs to be done is to note the atmospheric
conditions for each test. Temperature, pressure, absolute humidity, precipitation, and
cloud cover should be addressed for all testing involving RF energy. These conditions
also need to be noted for radio aids, radar, EO, and infrared (IR) testing, as atmospherics
will affect performance. When analyzing test results, these data can explain differences
in day-to-day observations of the same system.
4.10 LOGISTICS
Some of the logistics areas that need to be addressed for communications testing are
crypto keys (similar equipment for cooperative systems) and antenna pattern facilities.
Crypto keys will be necessary during military testing when exercising encryption systems
such as KY-28, KY-58, and KG-84. The important thing to remember here is that these
keys are classified SECRET and will require a communications security (COMSEC)
custodian. Military organizations normally do not have too many problems obtaining these
keys, but I have seen contractor organizations take as long as 6 months to acquire keys.
Many testers make the mistake of attempting to test new radios with cooperative
systems that do not have the same capabilities as the test aircraft. Ground stations,
telemetry centers, and cooperating aircraft need to have the same capabilities as the
system under test in order to accurately test the communications suite. In addition, the
aircrew equipment (helmets, microphones, connectors, etc.) must also be compatible
with the system under test.
Antenna pattern testing is a maligned and neglected test in the test community, and
is often not scheduled unless there is an actual problem. An antenna pattern is used to
describe the relative strength of a radiated field 360 about the antenna at a fixed dis-
tance from the receive site. The radiation pattern is a reception pattern as well, since it
describes the receiving properties of the antenna. Antenna patterns may be accomplished
in an anechoic chamber, with the aircraft mounted on a rotating pedestal, or flight tested
against an antenna farm. All three tests will provide the tester with the desired infor-
mation; which test is used is a matter of availability and cost. The anechoic chamber
may be the least available at a lower cost, while flight testing may be available, but it is
the most costly. In all of the tests, a transmitted signal of known strength is sent through
the aircraft antenna and received by antennas in the test facility. The receivers measure
and plot the signal strength as the aircraft changes aspect in space. The radiation pattern
is measured in three dimensions; however, since it is difficult to display, most depictions
are a slice of the three-dimensional (3D) measurement portrayed in two dimensions.
Figure 4.3 is a typical presentation of an antenna pattern. The nose of the aircraft is at the
top of the plot, right wing to the right side of the plot, etc.
It can be seen that if Figure 4.3 represented our UHF radio in the previous exercise,
we would have some serious problems with reception in the aft quadrant of the aircraft.
It would be nice to know that we had these problems before we expended valuable flight
test resources. Many programs fail to recognize the need for antenna pattern testing,
thinking that it is an additional test that ties up the aircraft. Sometimes they are lucky
and no serious problems surface. But other times they are not, and engineering rework
must be done and antenna patterns must be flown to validate the rework, all at a serious
cost to the schedule. As a rule of thumb, anytime you add, modify, or relocate antennas
on an aircraft you need to perform antenna pattern testing. The addition of new stores
may require pattern work based on engineering analysis.
There is some good news. As of this date, many anechoic facilities can now perform
antenna pattern testing, which will reduce flights and testing offsite.
Theta = 120 Cut FIGURE 4.3 ¢

= 120 Antenna Pattern
=0
= 120 = 120
= 270 = 90
Radial Scale:
Decibels/Circle = 2
Full Scale (dBi) = 10
Component (Dashed) = LHCP Component (Solid) = RHCP
MAX = –0.7 dBi at 14.1 DEG MAX = 1.7 dBi at 16.1 DEG
MIN = –41.0 dBi at 194.1 DEG MIN = –39.5 dBi at 200.2 DEG
4.11 BOREDOM
I mention boredom because these flights are some of the least liked flights by pilots. If
you want to ingratiate yourself to the pilot community, try to add communications
testing with other testing so that the entire flight is not dedicated to boring holes in the
sky talking on the radio. A bored pilot is not the best candidate to conduct a test. Instead
of completing the communications matrix on one flight, try to spread it over three or
four flights.
4.12 SPEECH INTELLIGIBILITY

Have you ever heard pilots or aircrew members speaking over the headsets saying things
like ‘‘I have you 5 by 5,’’ or ‘‘I’ve got you 3 by 3’’? Have you ever wondered what they
are talking about? These statements are the listener’s perception of the quality of the
radios. They use a 5-point scale for loudness and clarity. A 5-by-5 system would be loud
and clear, whereas a 3-by-3 system would be weak but readable. I have never heard a
2-by-2 system. But these are only the listener’s perceptions and are not quantitative
TABLE 4.4 ¢ SINPO Rating Scale
(S)ignal (I)nterference (N)oise (P)ropagation (O)verall

5 Excellent 5 None 5 None 5 None 5 Excellent
4 Good 4 Slight 4 Slight 4 Slight 4 Good
3 Fair 3 Moderate 3 Moderate 3 Moderate 3 Fair
2 Poor 2 Severe 2 Severe 2 Severe 2 Poor
1 Barely Audible 1 Extreme 1 Extreme 1 Extreme 1 Unusable
enough to judge a system’s intelligibility. Testers may come in contact with the SINPO
rating, which is used when making reception reports to broadcasters. The code addresses
signal strength, interference (from other stations), noise (from atmospheric conditions),
propagation disturbance (or fading), and an overall rating. A numerical description of
the SINPO code is shown in Table 4.4.
There are a couple of ways of quantifying the intelligibility of a communications
system. The first is a rhyme or talker test; the second is the speech transmission
index (STI).
Speech intelligibility is measured directly as a percentage of words, rhymes, or
sentences that are heard correctly by a number of listeners. A number of talkers will
speak words or sentences and a number of listeners will indicate what they hear.
The percentage of right answers is used to quantify the intelligibility of the system.
A modified rhyme list (Table 4.5) is used for the speech intelligibility test during
testing. There are 50 six-word rhyme groups on the rhyme list. The speaker selects
one word from each of the 50 groups and the listeners write down the word that
they hear. A percentage of right and wrong answers is compiled to determine the
speech intelligibility of the system. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
recognizes the American Standards Association (ASA) Paper S3.2-1960 as an
acceptable rhyme list. A minimum of 75% correct responses is needed for acceptable
speech intelligibility.
Another method of determining speech intelligibility is the STI. When determining
intelligibility in an auditorium, a specially modulated noise test signal is sent from a
loudspeaker at the speaker’s location. STI expresses the ability of the channel to carry
across the characteristics of a speech signal. STI test signals are based on modulated,
speech-shaped noise. A receiver with a microphone gives a direct readout of the STI
value at the receiver’s location.
The influence that a transmission channel has on speech intelligibility is dependent on
● The speech level
● Frequency response of the channel
● Nonlinear distortions
● Background noise level
● Quality of the sound reproduction equipment
● Echos (reflections with delay >100 ms)
● The reverberation time
● Psychoacoustic effects (masking effects)
TABLE 4.5 ¢ Modified Rhyme List
1. sun nun gun run bun fun

2. kit kick kin kid kill king
3. bust just rust dust gust must
4. pill pick pip pit pin pig
5. ban back bat bad bass bath
6. rent went tent bent dent sent
7. pad pass path pack pan pat
8. bill fill till will hill kill
9. gang hang fang bang rang sang
10. sun sud sup sub sung sum
11. pave pale pay page pane pace
12. safe save sake sale sane same
13. tang tab tack tam tap tan
14. gale male tale pale sale bale
15. test nest best west rest vest
16. pub pus puck pun puff pup
17. pop shop hop cop top mop
18. name fame tame came game same
19. sin sill sit sip sing sick
20. sip rip tip lip hip dip
21. may gay pay day say way
22. sin win fin din tin pin
23. soil toil oil foil coil boil
24. cuff cuss cub cup cut cud
25. wig rig fig pig big dig
26. sap sag sad sass sack sat
27. tick wick pick kick lick sick
28. lot not hot got pot tot
29. park mark hark dark lark bark
30. seen seed seek seem seethe seep
31. dun dug dub duck dud dung
32. beach beam beak bead beat bean
33. did din dip dim dig dill
34. led shed red wed fed bed
35. peas peal peach peat peak peace
36. tease teak tear teal teach team
37. map mat match mad mass man
38. came cape cane case cave care
39. keel feel peel reel heel eel
40. gold hold sold told fold cold
41. paw jaw saw thaw law raw
42. race ray rake rate rave raze
43. bit sit hit wit fit kit
44. fizz fill fib fin fit kit
45. lame lane lace late lake lay
46. bus buff bug buck but bun
47. cook book hook shook look took
48. hen ten then den men pen
49. meat feat heat neat beat seat
50. heal heap heath heave hear heat
STI is a numeric representation measure of communication channel characteristics

whose value varies from 0 ¼ bad to 1 ¼ excellent.
¢ 0 STI 0.3 0.45 0.6 0.75 1.0
BAD POOR FAIR GOOD EXCELLENT
In aircraft testing, a digitized signal is broadcast through the aircraft’s commu-

nication antenna. A receiver on the ground receives and records the transmitted signal.
This signal is then sent through a processor where a bit error rate (BER) is determined,
and hence the intelligibility of the signal. An application used with some success at
NTPS is iSTI, which is an iOS compatible application for measuring the Speech
Transmission Index using STIPA test signals. The application complies with IEC-
60268-12 4th edition (2011), and features a STIPA (Speech Transmission Index for
Public Address Systems) signal generator and a Speech Transmission Index analyzer.
There are two schools of thought aligning themselves with each of the described
methods. The STI group will tell you that the STI method is superior to the talking
rhyme method because the human element is removed and there is no ambiguity in the
assessment. The rhyme school insists that the human element must be considered when
assessing communications systems and that STI is better left to evaluate data transfer
systems such as automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) or the military data link sys-
tem. Either method is acceptable in performing speech intelligibility testing on aircraft
communications systems.
4.13 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE/

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY
Equipment and systems on modern aircraft need to be able to perform the functions for
which they were intended, free from interference from other aircraft systems and
equipment. At the same time, their operation should not adversely affect the function or
performance of other aircraft systems. This simple concept is the explanation of EMI/
EMC. The interference portion (EMI) is undesirable. The ability to coexist peacefully
with other equipment is the desired compatibility (EMC). This section is devoted to the
test requirements necessary to ensure EMC.
Prior to addressing the testing required to eliminate EMI and ensure EMC, a small
review of electromagnetics must be undertaken. As mentioned in section 4.1, anytime we
are tasked with formulating a plan for any system we should first review the system theory
and operation. The same is true for EMI/EMC test planning. There are a number of good
texts on electromagnetics, electrostatics, flux, etc. There is one text that I find myself
referencing constantly which should be a required reference for all flight test engineers. It
is called The Engineer’s Manual, by Ralph G. Hudson (London: John Wiley & Sons).
Remember from your basic electronics courses that current is the electron flow in a
circuit. As electrons move in the circuits, wires, and antennas, they produce mutually
perpendicular electric and magnetic lines of force, or electromagnetics. These lines
of force are known as fields. Electromagnetic (EM) fields radiate outward like wheel
spokes and are continuous about the charge. These fields are steady when the current is
steady and expand and contract as the current is changed. Alternating current (AC)
defines the electron flow as rapidly changing, anywhere from 1 to 1 billion Hz. AC
power can be created by alternators or transmitters, or by transforming direct current
(DC) to AC. DC is created by batteries, generators, or transformer rectifiers and pro-
duces a constant EM field unless switched. High-speed switching (such as computers
and data busses) causes the EM field to behave much like the field created by AC.
Electromagnetics are created whenever current is flowing. Electromagnetics can be
created internally, by any aircraft-powered equipment (e.g., a sensor, radar, radio, gen-
erators, data busses, etc.). Electromagnetics can also be created externally to the aircraft
by numerous sources, other aircraft, microwave relays, transmission lines, lightning, and
ground-based emitters. When dealing with EMI/EMC, the test community is concerned
with two types of designations: emission and susceptibility. Conducted emission (CE) is
the noise inducted in a system through connected conductors via connectors and cables.
Radiated emission (RE) is the noise added to a system through radiated power. Con-
ducted susceptibility (CS) is improper operation of a system due to conducted noise.
Radiated susceptibility (RS) is improper operation of a system due to radiated noise. The
task of the test community is to track down sources of electromagnetics and protect the
aircraft and its associated systems from them.
Almost all RF transmissions create base frequencies and harmonics. This implies
that an RF transmission out of the band of interest can still create interference within the
band of interest. An example of this type of interference was found during KC-10
operations. It was determined that HF transmissions caused the digitally controlled
refueling boom to move randomly. Aircraft tend to be susceptible to interference due to
the aircraft construction and the wealth of good conductors within the aircraft. Another
problem unique to aircraft is the close proximity of equipment, especially on smaller
fighter-type aircraft where real estate is at a premium. Larger commercial carriers are
noticing an increase in EMI as their systems become digitized and the riding public is
carrying more and more electronic devices onto aircraft. Cell phones, laser pointers,
personal computers with CD-ROMs, and personal video games are a few of the offen-
ders. These systems can interfere with autopilots, nose wheel steering, communications,
navigation, and even fire detection systems. Aftermarket installations, such as in-seat
personal entertainment systems, must be thoroughly checked for possible interference
problems.
The problems can be internally generated by systems on the aircraft. Testers are
often amazed that the first time the telemetry is turned on the GPS signal is lost. Tele-
metry systems for aircraft data normally operate in the L band, which is where GPS
resides. Unfortunately there are many other systems that also operate in the L band, so
much so that there is very little available bandwidth within this frequency band.
Simultaneous operation of these many systems (GPS, TACAN, multifunction informa-
tion distribution system [MIDS], traffic alert and collision avoidance system [TCAS], air
traffic control mode S, etc.) can be a very difficult prospect. Other examples of intern-
ally generated interference is the 400 Hz noise (from aircraft generators) on the tele-
metry signal, static or warble over the headset, or a VHF transmission that causes an
instrument landing system (ILS) deviation. Particular attention must be paid to data bus
operation in the presence of interference. Pilots can be given erroneous readings on their
display suites, or worse yet, noise may enter the digital flight control system (DFCS),
causing loss of the aircraft or loss of life.
High-intensity RF fields (HIRFs) can be generated by transmitters either on or off

the aircraft. Transmitted energy from microwave stations, radars, electronic warfare
jammers, or self-protection pods can be injurious to aircrew and aircraft. For this reason,
testers must examine certain tactics and operating doctrines to determine operations that
may place the aircraft in the presence of EM fields that are of greater strength than what
may normally be seen. An example is a fighter being escorted by an EA-6B employing
jamming operations from its ALQ-99 system. A more typical problem may be mutual
radar interference between two fighters flying in formation. These fields need to be
calculated and added to the test matrix.
Specific examples of EMI in the aviation community are numerous; some with
disastrous results. Five crashes of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters (which killed or injured
all on board) shortly after their introduction into service in the late 1980s were found to
be due to EMI from very strong radar and radio transmitters affecting the electronic
flight control system (in particular, the stabilator system). A U.S. Army UH-60, while
flying past a radio broadcast tower in West Germany in 1987, experienced uncom-
manded stabilator movement, spurious warning light indications, and false cockpit
warnings. Investigation and testing showed that the stabilator system was affected
by EMI from HIRFs. Apparently when the Blackhawk was initially tested, it was not
routinely flown near large RF emitters. The U.S. Navy version of the Blackhawk,
the Seahawk, has not experienced similar EMI problems because it is hardened against
the severe EM environment found on ships.
An F-16 crashed in the vicinity of a Voice of America radio transmitter because the
DFCS was susceptible to the HIRFs transmitted. Since the F-16 cannot fly without
the aid of the DFCS, any interruption can be fatal. Many F-16s were modified to prevent
this type of EMI, which was caused largely by inadequate military specifications for
their avionics systems. The F-16 case history was one of the reasons for the formulation
of the FAA’s HIRF certification program. A German Tornado also crashed near a Voice
of America transmitter in 1984 near Munich.
Weapons systems are not exempt either. During the 1986 U.S. air strike on Libya,
several missiles failed to hit their designated targets and one F-111 crashed. The U.S.
Air Force concluded that the cause was due to mutual interference within the strike
package. The initial development of the F-117 revealed serious problems with the tar-
geting lock-on system. The problem was linked to poor shielding techniques and old
hardware designs. In Australia, two warships nearly collided when the radar beams of
one disabled the steering of another. The mine hunter HMAS Huon (a state-of-the-art
coastal mine hunter) went out of control and veered across the bow of the frigate HMAS
Anzac. The Australian National Audit Office reported the shortcomings in the testing
and evaluation of new defense equipment, especially in the areas of EMI and EMC.
During a B-52 missile interface unit test, an uncommanded missile launch signal was
given. One of the contributing factors was cross-talk in the system wiring; a second
factor was not adhering to the EMC control plan requirements. The program only
recommenced after a year-long redesign and test effort. During the Falklands War, the
British ship HMS Sheffield sank with heavy casualties after being hit with an Exocet
missile. Despite the Sheffield having the most sophisticated antimissile defense system
available, the system created EMI that affected radio communications with the Harriers
assigned to the ship. When the Harriers took off or landed, the defense system was
disabled to allow communications, which also allowed an opportunity for the Exocet to
target the ship.
The civilian side of the house is not exempt either. A National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite experienced phantom commands when
flying over Europe. Controllers determined that the commands were due to suscept-
ibility to the heavy VHF environment over Europe. A blimp flying near the Voice of
America transmitter in Greenville, NC, experienced a sudden double engine failure. An
investigation revealed ignition failure due to extreme EMI; the blimp was flying with a
new ignition system. Operational frequencies of cellular phones, computers, radios, and
electronic games are often EMI sources on air carriers. A DC-10 autopilot was disrupted
during final approach by a passenger operating a CD player.
Modern medical equipment has also experienced EMI problems. FAA data show
that cell phones appear to be the main culprit, but there are others. An ambulance was
transporting a heart attack victim to the hospital. The patient was attached to a defi-
brillator, unfortunately, every time the technician keyed the radio to request medical
advice the defibrillator shut down. The patient died. The cause was traced to the
installation of a new fiberglass roof with a long-range radio antenna. Reduced shielding,
combined with the strong radiated signal, resulted in EMI affecting the machine. Elec-
tric wheelchairs have come under scrutiny due to reports of uncommanded movements
and erratic behavior due to EMI.
Car owners have been locked out of their cars by EMI affecting their electronic
entry keypads, garage door openers have been activated by overflight of airplanes, and
advanced brake systems (ABSs) have failed due to outside transmissions. In all cases,
the threat of EMI was not fully understood or envisioned by the evaluator.
The U.S. military uses military standards for the measurement and control of
emissions. MIL-STD-461D is the military standard governing the requirements for the
control of electromagnetic interference emissions and susceptibility. MIL-STD-462D is
the military standard for the measurement of electromagnetic interference character-
istics. These two standards have been combined into MIL-STD-461F, which is an
interface standard, ‘‘Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference
Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment.’’ This standard describes the required
tests and test setups for conducted and radiated emissions.
MIL-STD-464A is the interface standard for the electromagnetic environmental
effects requirements for systems. It is concerned primarily with protection from external
electrical sources operating from about 10 kHz to about 40 GHz and also includes
effects of lightning. MIL-STD-1605 (SHIPS) describes the procedures for conducting a
shipboard EMI survey for surface ships.
Another military publication that will be useful is MIL-HDBK-237D, ‘‘Electro-
magnetic Environmental Effects and Spectrum Certification Guidance for the Acquisi-
tion Process.’’ This handbook is especially beneficial for test planners, as it identifies all
of the electromagnetic environmental effects (E3) considerations throughout the testing
process. Each of the military documents also provides the reader with other applicable
and relevant documents, including standing NATO agreements (STANAGs).
On the civilian side, HIRF requirements are described in SAE Aerospace Recom-
mended Practice ARP 5583, ‘‘Guide to Certification of Aircraft in a High Intensity
Radiated Field (HIRF) Environment,’’ and airworthiness requirements are called out in
AC 20-158, ‘‘The Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for Operation
in the High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF) Environment.’’ An additional advisory
circular, AC 25.899-1, ‘‘Electrical Bonding and Protection Against Static Electricity,’’
pertains to Part 25 compliance with CFR 14, §25.899.
4.14 EMI/EMC TESTING

As described in the previous paragraphs, the test procedures for conducting EMI/EMC
evaluations are delineated in the appropriate documentation. A generic description of
the required testing is provided here for general considerations.
There are four phases of EMI/EMC testing:
● Bonding
● Victim/source
● Field testing (baseline)
● Field testing (HIRF/near field)
The first test that must be accomplished is a bonding test, which is merely a
grounding test of the aircraft and equipment. Systems that are not grounded properly
will give erroneous results during the tests. Victim/source testing identifies compat-
ibility problems on the aircraft and is a test that most flight test engineers will be
involved with at one time or another. It involves the formulation of a matrix (what else?)
pitting the system under test against the other aircraft systems.
Assume that we have installed the new UHF radio system that was discussed earlier.
We need to set up a matrix that allows a test of this radio’s performance in the presence
of other system operations. We set up the UHF radio as our victim and identify all
sources of possible EMI from other systems on the aircraft. Table 4.6 shows a possible
victim/source matrix for the UHF installation.
This matrix is rather simplistic, as it does not identify all sources of potential EMI
that may emanate from the aircraft systems. The final matrix will be slightly larger and
may include other submodes of operation. Table 4.6 is a good starting point for under-
standing the basic concept of victim/source. The left column of Table 4.6 identifies our
victim, the UHF radio that was installed. As noted previously, we should consider low,
medium, and high portions of the bands during our evaluations. The first test will, of
TABLE 4.6 ¢ Victim/Source Matrix
Radar
Source Engines Radar Radios Altimeter Telemetry IFF TACAN EW TCAS Data Link
Off PS VHF On On Identify A/A T/R RGS On TACAN
On WX -Low Off Off Off A/G T/R VGS Off RelNav
STT -Medium Noise PPLI
TF -High Off
TA HF
RWS -Low
TWS -Medium
ACM -High
Off Off
Victim
UHF
-Low
-Medium
-High
4.14 EMI/EMC Testing 159
course, be a static test to obtain the baseline performance of the radio and to ensure that
there is no interference from either external power or battery operations.
The method of test would be as follows:
1. Engines off, tune in a low-frequency UHF channel and listen for voice.
2. No other systems in the aircraft shall be turned on.
3. Turn on the radar (if possible with external power only).
4. Select pulse search on the radar.
5. Listen for any change on the headset (static, warble, etc.).
6. Select weather mode (WX).
7. Listen for any change on the headset (static, warble, etc.).
8. Repeat the procedure for the next six modes of the radar.
9. Turn off the radar.
10. Select a low VHF channel and key the mike (transmit).
11. Monitoring UHF, listen for any change on the headset.
12. Select a medium VHF channel and repeat the procedure.
13. Step through the remaining modes of VHF and HF.
14. Turn off the radio (not the UHF radio).
15. Turn on the radar altimeter and note any changes on the headset.
16. Turn off the radar altimeter.
17. Continue the same sequence until exhausting the sources (data link).
18. Still on external power, select a medium UHF channel and listen for voice.
19. Repeat the entire procedure through data link.
20. Still on external power, select a high UHF channel and listen for voice.
21. Repeat the procedure again through data link.
22. Return to the low UHF.
23. Engines on and note any changes in the headset.
24. Repeat the entire matrix of testing for low, medium, and high UHF.
But we are not finished yet. Since combinations of system operations can produce
harmonics which are more severe than individual operation, a new matrix of combined
operation of sources must be formulated. Unless you are an electrical engineer, you will
probably need some help in identifying the worst combinations of systems. The matrix
will be relatively small and not nearly as time consuming, but it still must be repeated
for low, medium, and high UHF. And we are still not finished.
Since the UHF radio that we installed can generate an RF transmission, there is a
possibility that the transmit side of the radio may adversely impact operations of other
systems on the aircraft. Remember, compatibility is a two-way street. Compatibility is the
ability of a system to perform its intended function without interference from other systems
and not have an adverse impact on other systems while performing its function. In this
case, we must construct another matrix where the UHF radio that was installed is now the
source while other aircraft systems become the victims. Table 4.7 shows this new matrix.
TABLE 4.7 ¢ Source/Victim Matrix
Flight
Radar Control Data
Victim GPS Radar Radios Altimeter Telemetry IFF TACAN System TCAS Link
On PS VHF On On Identify A/A T/R L Wing On TACAN
Off WX -Low Off Off Off A/G T/R R Wing Off RelNav
STT -Medium Stab PPLI
TF -High Rudder Off
TA HF
RWS -Low
TWS -Medium
ACM -High
Off Off
Source
UHF
-Low
-Medium
-High
For this second series of tests the engines have been removed from the matrix as a
possible victim. It has been replaced by GPS, which is a passive receiver that may be
affected by radio transmissions. In a similar fashion, the EW jammer has been replaced
in the matrix by the flight control system (FCS). As was the case with Table 4.5, this
matrix is also not complete, as things such as the display subsystem should also be
included. The final test matrix will be somewhat larger, including all systems that may
be affected by the radio transmissions. The execution of this matrix is slightly different
than what was described for Table 4.6. In this iteration, engines will be running and the
source radio as well as the victim systems will be turned off. The individual victim
systems will be turned on, verified for proper operation, and then the radio will be
keyed. The method of test would be as follows:
1. Start engines.
2. All victim and source systems off.
3. Turn on GPS, acquire satellites, and verify a valid position and groundspeed.
4. Select a low UHF channel and key the radio.
5. Note any deviations in the GPS latitude, longitude, and groundspeed.
6. Stop the radio transmission.
7. Verify GPS.
8. Select a medium UHF channel and key the radio.
11. Verify GPS.
12. Select a high UHF channel and key the radio.

15. All potential victims in the matrix will be tested in the same manner.
16. For the case of the FCS, observers should be posted at the control surfaces.
17. For each radio transmission, the observers are to look for any movement.
It may be necessary to repeat some of the matrix with combinations of the UHF radio
and other systems on if the combined harmonics are of concern.
The field testing requirement is performed in accordance with MIL-STD-461E and
involves
● Conducted emissions tests
● Conducted susceptibility tests
● Radiated emissions tests
● Radiated susceptibility tests
The applicability of these tests depends on many things, such as the branch of
service (Air Force, Navy, or Army) and the intended use of the system and location of
use (air, sea, space, ground support, etc.). The strength of the field is also dictated by the
interface standard, but tends to a nominal 200 V/m. Operational requirements may
dictate that these tests be conducted under more severe field strengths. These procedures
then become the near-field tests.
4.15 EMI/EMC TEST ISSUES

The interface standard also addresses some miscellaneous issues that need to be men-
tioned here. The field tests must be conducted in an anechoic facility, since clear air will
not meet the minimum requirements for noise. I have seen some test organizations
perform victim/source testing in a clear-air (outside) environment. I recommend against
this procedure. If a potential problem is detected during victim/source testing in a clear-
air environment, there is no guarantee that this problem was caused by a controlled
emission. External RF sources, not under control of the test team, may be responsible for
the anomaly.
Anechoic facilities, like any other test asset, must be scheduled. There are programs
that use the facility for months at a time, so entire blocks of a year may be unavailable.
Scheduling a chamber block of tests a year or more in advance is not unusual and is
something to be considered in the planning phase. Depending on the field requirements,
the chamber configuration may have to be changed (larger cones for attenuation, for
example). The interface standard provides equations for determining the adequacy of the
facility.
4.16 EMI/EMC ELIMINATION

The simple part of the EMI/EMC puzzle may be finding that you have a problem. It
may be more difficult to eliminate the problem. Historically the easiest way to eliminate
the problem was by isolation. Equipment can be isolated in two ways: physically and
electrically. Physical isolation requires the separation of operating equipment on an

aircraft. While this may be a possibility on a large cargo-type aircraft, it is virtually
impossible on today’s fighter and bomber aircraft. Electrical isolation involves good
grounding and electrical shielding. Components can be installed in metal boxes that are
well grounded; cables can have grounded shields around the primary conductor.
As more and more technology and equipment is added to the aircraft, more inven-
tive ways have to be devised to eliminate interference. Some of the additional ways to
eliminate interference are
● Directional antennas
● Multiple filter assemblies (MFAs)
● Time-sequenced operation or blanking techniques
● Procedural changes
As the name implies, directional antennas allow the antenna to limit its reception to
a certain area. This feature reduces noise and can aid in detecting signals that may be at
the noise level. The drawback, of course, is that the system is limited in its ability to
either direct energy or receive energy from certain areas around the aircraft. In highly
dynamic aircraft, this can be a severe handicap. The aircrew may lose the ability to track
targets or jam enemy threats based on the aircraft orientation and target aspect.
Another method of reducing interference is to filter out select signals. This method is
similar to a Doppler notch on an airborne radar, which notches out certain Doppler returns
in order to reduce clutter. An example of this concept is the simultaneous operation of an
airborne radar and a radar warning receiver (RWR). Without a filter, the RWR will detect
its own radar and display the signal to the aircrew. The display may take the form of video
where a ‘‘U’’ (for unknown) may be displayed, or worse, an audio alert may be sounded in
the headset. Neither of these indications is desired, as it directs the aircrew away from
other tasks to investigate the indication. It also may mask a real threat. We can notch out
our onboard radar’s signal and eliminate the problem. But what happens when a bona fide
threat with very similar characteristics as our own radar paints the aircraft? What happens
when our own radar starts to employ frequency agility? Both are examples of where a fix
to a problem can cause more problems than the original architecture.
Time-sequenced operation and the employment of blanking techniques are methods
of allowing systems to transmit while potential victim systems are rendered unable to
receive signals. In the previous example, we could elect to blank the RWR while the
radar is transmitting. We would then listen with the RWR between radar pulses. As with
the previous example, this method can produce some additional problems.
Figure 4.4 is a simplified bus architecture depicting the mission computer and
associated radar, stores, and EW busses. Information between the busses is accom-
plished by commands from the mission computer. If there is going to be any type of time
sequencing or blanking, it must be controlled by the mission computer. As we step
through the operations, we will see that the integration that is required is enormous.
1. Radar and RWR operation: Since the radar antenna is not perfect at directing energy,
there are some losses through the side and back lobes of the antenna. This energy will
be detected by the RWR and a corresponding signal will be displayed to the aircrew.
The mission computer can sequence this operation by blanking the RWR when the
radar is transmitting and release the blanking signal between radar transmissions.
FIGURE 4.4 ¢
Mission Radar Simplified Bus
Radar
Computer Processor
Structure
Stores
EW Bus
Management
Controller
System
Radar Warning Self-Protect

HARM AMRAAM
Receiver Jammer
2. Radar, RWR, and self-protect jammer operations: The self-protect jammer receives
incoming RF and compares the signal characteristics to known signals in its threat
library (just like the RWR). In the event that a signal is matched to a known threat,
the jammer will either automatically attempt to jam the threat or ask the aircrew if
they would like to jam the threat. Like the radar, RF from the jammer will be sensed
by the RWR, and if in a close enough frequency, by the radar. There are a couple of
problems here. First, in order to protect these systems from damage, it is inadvisable
to allow high-power RF from a radar or a jammer to enter the receiving antenna of
another system. That being known, if the radar is transmitting, the RWR and self-
protect system must be off. If the self-protect system is transmitting, the radar and
RWR must be off. If the RWR receiver is listening, the radar must be off and the self-
protect system must not be transmitting. This sequencing can be accomplished, but
certain modes of the radar and jamming effectiveness may suffer.
3. Radar, RWR, self-protect jammer, and high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM)
operations: The HARM seeker is a very sensitive receiver that works much like the
RWR and jammer receiver. All of the discussion in case 2 holds true here, only now
we have added another passive receiver that has the same cautions as the RWR. Since
they are both passive, they can listen at the same time and the integration method in
case 2 will work here.
4. Radar, RWR, self-protect jammer, HARM, and advanced medium-range air-to-air
missile (AMRAAM) operations: The AMRAAM is an improvement over the AIM-7
Sparrow, which was the primary radar-guided missile for many years. During a
launch to eject (LTE) cycle, the missile relies on the aircraft radar to update target
position. The missile does not expend any power looking for the target during the
initial phase of the intercept, which is beneficial for range and battery life. If the
missile does not receive updates from the aircraft radar at the specified time interval,
it assumes that the radar is gone and the missile goes active. If the missile goes active
early, the potential for a target miss is increased. Referring back to case 2, we see that
the radar is off whenever the jammer, RWR, or HARM is on. If the radar must
remain on to support the launch of the AMRAAM, what can be said about the self-
protection of the aircraft? There is none. In a way, the aircrew is lucky that they are
carrying an AMRAAM and not an AIM-54C Phoenix, which has a much greater
range and hence a longer period of self-protection loss. Even older missiles such as
the AIM-7 can create these same types of problems. The preferred launch method of
the AIM-7 is a continuous wave (CW) launch because the AIM-7 needs Doppler
shift. CW will provide a continuous shift since the power is continuous. What hap-
pens to our self-protection coverage during this launch? It is gone, just like the
AMRAAM. An AIM-7 can be launched in a pulse Doppler mode such as track while
scan (TWS) or range while search (RWS), but the probability of kill (PK) is reduced
because the Doppler shift in this mode is not as good as in CW.
This leads us to our final method of EMI avoidance.
Procedural changes are a way of eliminating a problem by not placing the operator
or the aircraft in a situation where the problem manifests itself. Suppose a problem exists
with an aircraft flying at low level. A problem may cause the aircraft to impact the
ground. A procedural fix would be to restrict the aircraft from flying at low levels. If the
situation is avoided, then the problem goes away. This type of problem avoidance is
exhibited in our AIM-7 problem above. We have two options. We can limit AIM-7
launches to pulse Doppler mode only, or we can launch in CW and lose self-protection.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both. Pulse Doppler launches will assure us
self-protection; however, we may have to launch two AIM-7s at each target to ensure the
likelihood of a kill. We will increase the PK if we launch in CW, but we run the risk of
not seeing other potential threats. Engineers involved in this sort of testing are integral to
the decision-making process of choosing an option. The decision is a critical one and
should not be based on cost or expediency, but rather on total mission requirements and
capability.
EMI/EMC testing reaches far beyond testing for interference on radios. Integration
of avionics and weapons systems, especially when considering EMI/EMC is a long,
involved process and may pose some difficult questions when considering the opera-
tional task. We must also consider regression testing after modifications or updates to
the aircraft systems. Anytime we add, modify, or relocate equipment or antennas, EMI/
EMC tests will be required in order to prove that we have not caused additional pro-
blems within the aircraft.
1. Name three range limiting factors of radio waves.

2. What is meant by the term HIRF?
3. Man-made noise dominates at what frequency?
4. What is the relationship between frequency and wavelength?
5. Galactic noise dominates what frequency?
6. What are the three simplified steps in any system test?
7. When building a test matrix, how are test conditions computed?
8. Explain a possible geometry when conducting communications range testing.
9. Briefly describe voice encryption.
10. What is speech intelligibility? What does it determine?
11. Why use amplitude modulation? Frequency modulation?

12. What is the minimum passing grade of a rhyme test?
13. What is EMI? What is EMC?
14. If you wanted to know the requirements for lightning protection, which document
would you consult?
15. Identify the unique problems of EMI/EMC in a fighter-type aircraft.
16. What are harmonics and why should we be concerned with them?
17. Is aircraft construction a problem in EMI/EMC?
18. Which type of data bus would be most resistant to EMI? Why?
19. Name two types of EMI avoidance in aircraft? How about two more.
20. What is the problem with employment of MFAs or notch filters?
21. What is the difference between conducted emission and radiated emission?
22. What are some problems with implementing procedural changes to eliminate EMI?
23. Which military specification governs the requirements for EMI/EMC testing? What
is the method of test?
24. Name the four steps of EMI/EMC testing.
25. Briefly describe victim/source.
26. Why are antenna patterns important? When should these tests be accomplished?
27. What is near-field testing?
28. What is the difference between electromagnetic interference and electromagnetic
compatibility?
29. Blackhawks initially had EMI problems yet Seahawks did not. Why?
30. What are aircraft configuration concerns in communication testing?
31. What are two methods of determining speech intelligibility?
CHAPTER
Navigation Systems
5
Chapter Outline
5.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.2 Basic Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.3 Radio Aids to Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.4 Radio Aids to Navigation Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
5.5 Inertial Navigation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.6 Doppler Navigation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
5.7 Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
5.8 Identification Friend or Foe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
5.9 Data Links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
5.0 INTRODUCTION
Navigation systems span a rather large subject area. This chapter discusses basic radio
aids to navigation such as very high frequency (VHF) omnidirectional range (VOR),
tactical air navigation (TACAN), nondirectional beacon (NDB), and distance measuring
equipment (DME) as well as self-contained navigation systems such as inertial navi-
gation system (INSs), Doppler navigation systems (DNS), and the global positioning
system (GPS). Identification friend or foe (IFF), mode S, and data link are also
addressed. Integrated navigation systems and future air navigation systems such as wide
area augmentation systems (WAAS) and the U.S. military’s global air traffic manage-
ment system (GATM) will be covered in chapter 6. The reference textbook that I use in
my courses is Avionics Navigation Systems, 2nd ed., by Myron Kayton and Walter R.
Fried (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997). It does a very good job of explaining the
theory and operation of navigation systems. Another text worth reading is Integrated
Navigation and Guidance Systems, by Daniel J. Biezad (Reston, VA: American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics). Flight testers should consult the NATO Research and
Technology Organization’s Flight Testing of Radio Navigation Systems (RTO-AG-300,
vol. 18, April 2000).
167
168 CHAPTER 5 Navigation Systems
5.1 HISTORY
Kayton and Fried define navigation as ‘‘the determination of the position and velocity of
a moving vehicle.’’ As we saw in the TSPI chapter, however, the position of an object in
space is really a nine-state vector composed of latitude, longitude, altitude, north-east-
down velocity, and north-east-down acceleration. The methods of obtaining this infor-
mation have steadily progressed through the years with ever-increasing accuracy. Dead
reckoning, the original navigation method that uses time, speed, and heading, is still a
backup mode on all current airborne navigation systems. As we also saw in the TSPI
chapter, no single navigation system is capable of directly measuring all nine states.
Modern navigation systems may use sensor fusion of multiple navigation systems or
employ a navigation computer to calculate the remaining states not directly measured. It
is the tester’s responsibility to understand not only the accuracy of the system but also
the inherent inaccuracies of the measured states. This concept is critical in evaluating
modern systems designed for use in congested airspace where the required navigation
performance to operate in this airspace is extremely restrictive.
5.2 BASIC NAVIGATION

I have found that many times testers are at a loss to effectively plan test missions
because they do not speak ‘‘pilotese.’’ This is not a slight against testers: they have never
been exposed to aircraft flight operations, and most schools do not teach basic earth
coordinates anymore. When a pilot asks for latitude, he is not asking for room. Many
testers are intimidated by pilots because they cannot effectively communicate with
them. The following tutorial is meant to explain some of the basics of navigation. You
will not be a navigator after this section, but you will know the difference between a
magnetic heading and a true heading. Those readers who are pilots, navigators, or flight
literate may want to jump to the next section.
5.2.1 Position
The first concept is that of latitude and longitude. The earth is divided into grids by
imaginary lines of latitude and longitude. Latitude lines are horizontal bands around the
earth. The equator is 0 latitude, and the North and South Poles are at 90 north and
south latitude, respectively. Longitude lines are vertical bands around the earth and start
at the Prime Meridian, which runs through Greenwich, England, at 0 longitude. The
lines continue east and west and meet at the International Date Line, which is at 180
west and east longitude. Any position on the earth can be identified with a unique
latitude and longitude. Figure 5.1 shows these key points.
The distances between any two points may also be determined. Each degree of
latitude traverses 60 nm as you move from pole to pole. Degrees are further broken
down into minutes. There are 60 minutes in a degree, so each minute will traverse 1 nm
(6080 ft). Minutes are then broken down into seconds, and there are 60 seconds in each
minute. More commonly, minutes are resolved by tenths, hundredths, and thousandths
of minutes. For example, 0.001 min equals 6.08 ft. Each degree of longitude traverses
60 nm, but only at the equator. This is because lines of longitude converge at the poles
(Figure 5.1). As we get away from the equator, the distance between each degree
of longitude is a function of the cosine of the latitude: 1 of longitude ¼ 60 nm cosine
of the latitude. You can see that at the equator the latitude is 0 and the cosine of zero is
one. At the poles, the latitude is 90 , and the cosine of 90 is zero (lines of longitude
converge). So if you ever measure distances on a chart, use the tick marks between the
lines of latitude, not the lines of longitude (Figure 5.2).
Prime FIGURE 5.1 ¢

90° N Latitude Meridian Spherical
Coordinates
International
Date Line
Equator
90° S Latitude
FIGURE 5.2 ¢
Latitude/Longitude
Differences
Measure here
Not here
5.2.2 Heading
The next item of interest is the heading between two points. To perform this
measurement we will need a chart (map) and a plotter (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4).
It is important to note here that maps come in all types of resolutions (scales).
The amount of resolution, or detail, that we require will determine the required scale.
Typical maps for general aviation are called sectional aeronautical charts and have a
scale of 1:500,000. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) offers 1:100,000 scale
topographic maps. The military uses charts ranging from 1:50,000 to 1:1,000,000,
depending on mission requirements. Plotters are fairly standard and can provide
scales matching the charts in use. Mileage measurements can be read in either statute
or nautical miles. There is also a wealth of software programs that will automatically
compute headings and distances in preflight planning. Flight management systems
deliver real-time measurements and corrections to aircrews using onboard avionics
and operator inputs.
All of the charts that we use for flight and flight planning will be referenced to true
north. Unfortunately, all of the ground-based radio aids to navigation are referenced to
magnetic north. Since the radio aids are in magnetic, pilots fly magnetic. During flight
FIGURE 5.3 ¢
Measuring the 3 Degrees East
Heading 4 Degrees East
Line of
Latitude Airport B
Line of
Longitude
Airport A
FIGURE 5.4 ¢
Reading the
Heading Scale
planning, we measure a heading from the chart in true north, but we convert it to
magnetic north for the pilots. To accomplish this task, we must understand the concept
of magnetic variation and how it affects our measurements.
The plotter is placed with the bottom edge on the line drawn between airport A and
airport B (Figure 5.3). The plotter is then positioned until the longitude line intersects
the center hole of the plotter. The heading is read on the outside scale of the plotter
(Figure 5.4). If a line of latitude is used, as in the case of headings very nearly north or
south, the inside scale of the plotter will be used. In our example, the heading read on the
plotter scale is 250 or 070 . There are two answers because we can be going from A to B
or vice versa (180 out). Since we are traveling ENE from A to B, we know that the
correct answer is 070 . This measurement is referenced to true north (since it is read
from the chart) and pilots will note the heading as 070 true. We must convert this true
heading to a magnetic heading that the pilot will fly.
To convert true heading to magnetic heading, we must apply magnetic variation.
Magnetic fields vary around the earth and are constantly changing: we can determine
these magnetic fields by consulting a sectional chart, enroute flight information
publication, or airport/facility directory (more on these publications later). On the
sectional chart depicted in Figure 5.5, lines of magnetic variation are shown via
dashed magenta lines and an associated east–west value. The magnetic variation at
Salt Lake City is 16 east. In our original example (Figure 5.3), I show a 3 east
variation at airport A and a 4 east variation at airport B. The only thing a tester
needs to know to correctly apply magnetic variation is East is least, and West is best.
That is, to convert true heading to magnetic heading we subtract east variation and
add west variation.
If our true heading from airport A to airport B was measured as 070 true, the
magnetic heading at airport A would be 067 magnetic (070 3 east variation).
As we approach airport B, maintaining the same true heading, our magnetic heading
FIGURE 5.5 ¢
Typical Sectional
Controlled Chart
Airspace
VOR Salt Lake
City
Salt Lake
City Airport VOR
Information
VOR Compass
Rose
Lines of
Magnetic
Variation
will change to 066 magnetic. Why? Because the magnetic variation has changed as
we progressed along our route. We continue to fly a straight line, yet our magnetic
heading changes.
The difference between true and magnetic heading can be quite significant. The true
heading from the center runway at Salt Lake City to the Salt Lake City VOR (Figure 5.5)
is roughly 360 true. But if we apply the 16 east variation, the magnetic heading
becomes 344 . Providing the pilot with the correct heading will determine if he ever gets
to the point in space where we would like him to be.
5.2.3 Airspeed
The next variable we need to consider is velocity or, as pilots like to call it, speed. We
tend to think of speed much like an automobile. If we travel at 70 mph, in 1 hr we would
have traveled 70 statute miles. Aircraft travel is measured in nautical miles per hour, or
knots. You would suppose that an aircraft traveling at 300 knots would have traversed
300 nm in 1 hr (1 nm ¼ 6076.12 ft ¼ 1.15078 statute miles). This would be true if the
pilot were flying true airspeed (TAS) in a no-wind condition. Unfortunately, pilots
usually fly an indicated airspeed (IAS).
The pilot’s airspeed indicator is read in knots of IAS. The airspeed is computed by
the aircraft’s pitot-static and central air data computer system. The system measures
impact pressure and compares it to a static pressure: the greater the difference between
the two, the larger the IAS. At sea level, IAS and TAS are about the same. As an
aircraft climbs, the pressure decreases and so does the impact pressure on the pitot
system. The IAS will decrease for a constantly held TAS. As the aircraft configuration
changes (angle of attack due to changes in speed, altitude, weight, and flap or gear
configurations) the flow across the pitot system will change, thus giving an erroneous
reading of pressure. To correct this error, a lookup chart is used to calculate a cali-
brated airspeed (CAS). If the aircraft is flying at speeds greater than about 200 knots
(CAS), the air ahead of the aircraft will become compressed, giving a high reading on
impact pressure. An airspeed compressibility lookup chart corrects for this error and
produces a knots equivalent airspeed (KEAS). Higher speeds at higher altitudes will
create larger differences between CAS and KEAS. For system evaluators, we need
only to remember the 2% rule for converting IAS to TAS: For each 1000 ft of mean sea
level altitude, TAS will increase by 2% of the IAS. For example, an aircraft flying at
200 KIAS at 20,000 ft will produce a TAS of 280 KTAS (2% of 200 ¼ 4; 4 20 ¼ 80;
200 þ 80 ¼ 280 KTAS).
All would be fine for us to use true heading and TAS if it were not for that small
inconvenience called wind. Systems evaluators are concerned only with our true posi-
tion over the earth and the speed at which we traverse it. Wind affects our line over the
ground and the speed we pass over the ground. These two new terms are called track and
groundspeed, and they are the only heading and speed we will ever use. Figure 5.6
shows the effects of wind on our track and groundspeed.
In the first case in Figure 5.6, a wind from the north will drive our aircraft south of
the desired point on the nose of the aircraft. You may think of the track as the resultant
velocity vector from our own-ship forward velocity and the cross-track component of
the wind. The second case demonstrates the effect of wind in the along-track condition.
The along-track component of the wind will cause the groundspeed to either increase or
decrease, depending on whether it is a tailwind or a headwind.
Wind True Heading FIGURE 5.6 ¢

Wind Effects on True
Heading and True
Airspeed
True Heading + Crosswind Component = Track
Track
Wind
True Airspeed – Headwind Component = Groundspeed
FIGURE 5.7 ¢
Altitude
Measurement
The Earth Above Ground Level (AGL)

Pressure Altitude, Mean Sea Level (MSL)
Height Above Ellipsoid, GPS Height
5.2.4 Altitude
The last variable we need to address is altitude. In test and evaluation, we use three
different altitudes, or two altitudes and one height, but more on that in a moment.
Figure 5.7 shows an aircraft flying over the earth. We can measure its altitude in the
three ways that are depicted.
The first measurement of altitude is above ground level (AGL) and is a direct mea-
surement of your altitude in feet. This measurement is accomplished with a radar alti-
meter that utilizes a frequency modulated (FM) waveform. It can provide readouts to the
nearest foot, and its accuracy ranges from 1 ft to 1% of altitude. Figure 5.8 shows a typical
aircraft radar altimeter. The second measurement of altitude is the height above mean
sea level (MSL). This measurement is obtained with a barometric pressure altimeter
(Figure 5.9). Aircraft use the MSL measurement almost exclusively when navigating
around the globe. Heights of airports, towers, mountains, and navigation aids are all
reported as MSL altitudes. MSL is simply a comparison of the pressure where the aircraft
is to the standard-day pressure at sea level. A standard day is defined by the air properties
FIGURE 5.8 ¢
Allied Signal Bendix/
King KRA-10A
Radar Altimeter
FIGURE 5.9 ¢
Barometric Altimeter
of density, specific volume, pressure, temperature, and viscosity. A standard day would
exhibit a temperature of 59 F (15 C) and a pressure of 14.7 psi (101.3 kN/m2). This
pressure would also correspond to 29.92 in of mercury (inHg; barometric pressure).
The pilot’s barometric altimeter has the capability of setting a pressure for the air
mass the aircraft is flying in. Suppose that an aircraft is sitting on the ground at an airport
whose field elevation is 0 ft (sea level). If it were a standard day, the pilot would insert
29.92 as a setting for pressure, and the aircraft altimeter would read 0 ft. Since standard
days are few and far between, this is rarely the case. Suppose that a high pressure system
is sitting over the airfield and the pressure is 30.45 in Hg. If the pilot had 29.92 set in his
altimeter, he would be reading a negative 530 ft on his instrument. As he increases the
setting to 30.45, the altitude will increase and read 0 ft with the correct setting. You can
calculate how far off you will be by merely subtracting the two settings; the hundredths
place is worth 10 ft, and the tenths place is worth 100 ft:
30.45
− 29.92
0.53
30 ft
500 ft
The knob at the bottom right of the altimeter in Figure 5.9 is where the pilot sets the
pressure setting of the day. The window just to the left of the knob displays the setting.
The final altitude is not really an altitude but a height above an ellipsoid. This
ellipsoid is the earth model in use, which was discussed in chapter 2.
5.3 RADIO AIDS TO NAVIGATION

When aircraft fly from point A to point B, they rarely fly a straight line (visual flight
rules [VFR] traffic excluded). Aircraft, and their pilots, are directed to highways in the
sky called airways. These airways are defined by radio aids to navigation and the radials
that emanate from them. When pilots are given directions, they are expected to stay
on the line, or as close as inaccuracies in the system will allow. It is fairly important that
these radio aids to navigation be checked for accuracy before allowing a pilot to put his
life on the line.
Figure 5.10 is a section of the U.S. instrument flight rules (IFR) Enroute High-
Altitude Flight Information publication. It defines the allowable highways in the sky for
the western United States for aircraft flying under IFR. Using Figure 5.10, let’s fly from
Los Angeles International Airport to Bakersfield. You can see that we would fly the line
identified as J5 to a point called LANDO and then proceed on J5 again to the Shafter
VORTAC, which is just to the north of Bakersfield Municipal Airport. This is
straightforward enough, but how do pilots get the information to tell them that they are
on J5? These lines are not drawn on the ground, so there must be some sort of directional
information provided to the pilot’s instruments. This directional information is provided
by radio aids to navigation. If we take a closer look at Figure 5.10, where J5 starts at Los
FIGURE 5.10 ¢
IFR Enroute High-
Altitude Flight
Information, Los
Angeles Area
Angeles, there is a compass rose around Los Angeles. By following J5, we next see the
number 337 superimposed on the airway. The magnetic heading outbound from Los
Angeles to LANDO is 337 . But how far is LANDO from Shafter? If we look at the
intersection of J5 and Shafter we see another compass rose and a heading of 126 .
Further along the route from Shafter there is a little box above J5 with the number 25 in
it. This is the distance in nautical miles from Shafter to LANDO. If I departed Shafter on
a magnetic heading of 126 and flew for 25 nm, I should be over LANDO, right? This
would be true only if there was no wind.
At the center of each compass rose is a six-sided symbol identifying the radio aids to
navigation that we will talk about next. Figure 5.11 shows the types of navigation aids
FIGURE 5.11 ¢ IFR LEGEND

High-Altitude Chart AIRPORTS
Legend Airports shown have a minimum of 5000´ hard surfaced runway. Airports in BLUE and GREEN have an approved Instrument Approach
Procedure published. Airports in BROWN do not have a published Instrument Approach Procedure. The DOD FLIP Terminal High
Altitude contains only those shown in BLUE.
Associated city names for public airports
Civil preceeds the airport name. City names for Associated City
military and private airports are not shown. CITY
Civil-Military If city name and airport name are the same, Airport Name
only the airport name is shown. The airport (APT)
identifier in parentheses follows the airport Airport Identifier
Military
name.
NAVAIDS AND COMMUNICATION BOXES
NAVAIDS COMMUNICATION BOXES
VHF/UHF Data is depicted in BLACK CHECK NOTAMS 000.0
LF/MF Data is depicted in BROWN T
NAME NAME
COMPASS ROSES 000.0 IDT 000 (Y) 000.0 IDT 000
Oriented to N00º00.00´
Magnetic North VOR with TACAN compatible DME W000º00.00´
FSS
of NAVAID which NAME
Underline indicates No Voice transmitted Name
may not be
on this frequency. TACAN Channels are
adjusted to the Freq(s) positioned above thin line NAVAID
without voice but not underlined.
charted isogonic box is remoted to the NAVAID site
values. Overprint of affected data
indicates Abnormal Status, 000.0 000.0
i.e. CHECK NOTAMS/
DIRECTORY NAME
(Y) TACAN must be placed in “Y” mode 000.0 IDT (L) 00
to receive distance information N00º00.00´
VOR VOR/DME TACAN VORTAC W000º00.00´
Automated Weather Broadcast Systems:
Shadow NAVAID box indicates NAVAID
A ASOS/AWOS - Automated Surface and Flight Service Station (FSS) have
Observing Station/Automated same name
LF/MF Nondirectional Weather Observing Station
Radiobeacon or Marine FSS Name and
Radiobeacon H HIWAS - Hazardous Inflight identifier not associated
NAME IDT
Weather Advisory Service with NAVAID
T TWEB - Transcribed Weather
Broadcast Remote Communications
Outlet (RCO). FSS name
LF/MF Nondirectional Automated weather, when available, is NAME 000.0
and remoted frequency(s)
Radiobeacon/DME broadcast on the associated NAVAID are shown
frequency.
Flight Service Station (FSS) or FSS freq(s) 122.2, 255.4 and emergency
Remote Communications Outlet (RCO) LF/MF Radio Aid 121.5, 243.0 are normally available and
NAME are not shown. All high altitude discrete
not associated with a charted identification and
000 IDT freq(s) are shown above the box.
NAVAID or airport frequency
In Canada a shadow box indicates
Part-Time or standard group freq 243.0, 126.7
On-Request NAME and 121.5
* 000 IDT 00(000.0) (L) Frequency Protection usable range at
18,000´ AGL - 40NM
LF/MF Nondirectional Radiobeacon/DME (T) Frequency Protection usable range at
VHF Freq paired with TACAN Channel 12,000´ AGL - 25NM
“L” and “T” category NAVAIDS located off
Jet Routes are depicted in screen black.
NAVAIDS without classification are “H”
category.
identified by symbols on the high-altitude chart. We will concern ourselves with VHF
omnidirectional range (VOR), distance measuring equipment (DME), tactical air navi-
gation (TACAN), and nondirectional beacon (NDB).
5.3.1 VHF Omnidirectional Range

The VOR is a ground-based, short-distance radio aid providing continuous azimuth
information in the form of 360 radials emanating from the station. The VOR provides
the backbone of the civil airways structure throughout most of the world. Figure 5.12
provides a representation of the concept of radials from a VOR. The triangle represents
an aircraft traveling north and east of the VOR. The aircraft is currently on the 045
radial of this VOR station. As the aircraft continues its flight north, it will intercept the
044 , 043 , 042 radials, etc. It will approximate but never intercept the 360 radial
unless it turns toward the west.
To determine the radial that the aircraft is on, the aircraft equipment measures and
displays the phase difference between two signals that simultaneously originate from the
ground station. The reference phase signal is radiated in an omnidirectional circular
pattern at a phase that is constant throughout the 360 . The variable phase signal is
radiated at 1800 rpm with a phase that varies at a constant rate. As can be seen in
Figure 5.12, both signals are in phase at magnetic north, but a phase difference equal to
the radial is evident at all other points around the station.
The pilot may have any one of a number of displays for VOR information. Radial
information can be displayed on the heads-up display (HUD), multifunction display, or
any of the older analog displays. The information is the same, and most digital displays
merely replicate the analog displays that they replaced. Figure 5.13 shows two types of
displays that are used to display VOR bearing information. The display on the left is a
radio magnetic indicator (RMI). It has the ability to display bearings from two radio
aids. The compass card will always indicate the aircraft’s magnetic heading at the top of
the card. The needles will point to the VOR station selected; that is, the pointy end is
where the station is. The tail of the needle is the radial that the aircraft is on.
FIGURE 5.12 ¢
Radials Emanating
Variable Phase Signal
from a VOR Station
045° Radial
N
Reference Phase Signal
FIGURE 5.13 ¢
Radio Magnetic
Indicator (Left) and
VOR Display (Right)
The display on the right is a VOR display commonly found on civil aircraft. The
compass card on this display is not slaved to the aircraft compass but is controlled with
the omnibearing selector (OBS) knob at the bottom left of the display. The pilot selects
the VOR bearing chosen as the reference to fly to or from the station; the compass card
rotates to that selection. In the figure, the pilot has rotated the OBS to a desired course of
345 . The vertical white needle on the display is the course deviation indicator (CDI).
The needle swings left or right, indicating the direction to turn to return to course. When
the needle is left you turn left, and when the needle is right you turn right. When
centered, the aircraft is on course. Each dot in the arc under the needle represents a 2
deviation from the desired course. The white arrow in the right center portion of the
display is the to–from indicator. In this example, we are going away, or from, the station.
As the name implies, the VOR operates in the VHF radio spectrum. Specifically, the
VOR operates within the 108 to 117.95 MHz band. If we refer again to Figure 5.10 and
look at the bottom center of the chart, locate the VORTAC of Santa Catalina. Within the
box labeled Santa Catalina, there are three other pieces of information. The first is the
VHF frequency of 111.4, which is the VOR frequency for Santa Catalina. The pilot
would enter this frequency to receive information from Santa Catalina. Once entered, as
long as the VOR volume is turned up, the pilot will receive SXC (the three-letter
identifier for Santa Catalina) in Morse code. This is how the pilot knows that his system
is receiving the correct station. Do all pilots know Morse code? Probably not, but to help
them out the high-altitude IFR legend contains Morse code. Sectional charts have the
Morse code in the station identifier box on the chart. Within the Santa Catalina box
(Figure 5.10), immediately after the SXC identifier is the letter L in parentheses, which
identifies the standard service volume (SSV) of the radio aid. The SSV is the volume of
space where this station can be utilized. There are three SSVs: terminal (T), low
altitude (L), and high altitude (H). In our case, Santa Catalina is a low-altitude service
volume. Table 5.1 shows the serviceable areas of the three SSVs. This is an important
piece of information, especially in flight testing, because it will determine how far away
you will be able to receive the radio aid.
There are two types of VOR systems in use: the older Standard VOR and the newer
Doppler VOR (DVOR). In the DVOR system, the carrier is amplitude modulated by the
TABLE 5.1 ¢ VOR, DME, and TACAN Standard Service Volume Classifications
SSV Class Altitude (ft) Distance (nm)

(T) Terminal 1000 to 12,000 25
(L) Low Altitude 1000 to 18,000 40
(H) High Altitude 1000 to 14,500 40
14,500 to 18,000 100
18,000 to 45,000 130
45,000 to 60,000 100
reference signal and frequency modulated by the variable signal (the reverse of the
standard or conventional VOR [CVOR]). The Doppler principle states that there is a
change in frequency of a signal received when the closure between the source and
receiver changes. When the closure increases, the frequency increases; the opposite is
true when the closure decreases. The rotation of the antenna is reversed in the two
systems, and because the variable signal is FM there is less of a chance of destructive
multipath.
5.3.2 Distance Measuring Equipment

The VOR will provide the pilot with bearing information to a ground reference but will
not provide a range. It is possible to get a positional fix with the intersection of two VOR
bearings (called a theta-theta solution in Kayton), but if both VORs are in the same
hemisphere with relation to the aircraft ambiguities will exist. Range information will
greatly enhance the positional fix. DME is used to establish an aircraft’s range from
either a ground or airborne beacon. DME is a transponder system requiring that the
aircraft and cooperating station possess a transmitter and a receiver. In general opera-
tion, the aircraft will generate a pair of interrogation pulses that are received by the
cooperating station. After a delay of 50 msec, the cooperating station sends back a reply.
By using pulse-delay ranging, the aircraft computes the slant range to the station.
The DME system works in the UHF band between 962 and 1213 MHz and
is capable of replying to 100 airborne interrogations simultaneously. This means that
each airborne receiver will have to discriminate its reply from any other aircraft inter-
rogations. The discrimination is accomplished by integrating replies following each
interrogation pulse with respect to time. The time between transmission and reception of
the receiver’s reply will be relatively constant over a small number of sweeps, while all
other replies will occur at random time intervals. To assist in discrimination, the air-
borne equipment has two modes. The first is the search mode, where pulse discrimina-
tion is achieved. During this period, the transmitter generates 150 pulse pairs/sec to
reduce acquisition time. Once the system is locked onto the range, it enters a tracking
mode and generates between 5 and 25 pulse pairs/sec to prevent early saturation of the
transponder.
The DME uses 126 channels (frequencies), and to ensure that there is no interaction
between the transmitter and receiver, transmit and receive frequencies are separated by
63 MHz. In most civil applications, the pilot need to tune the navigation radios only to
the VOR frequency and the equipment will autotune the DME.
In its simplest form, the DME display is simply a digital readout of slant range to
the selected station, usually displayed to the nearest 0.01 nm. The displays may be
electromechanical or electronic and may be combined with other cockpit displays such
as the RMI or heading situation indicator (HSI). In some applications, VOR/DME
constant positional fix is used to update the aircraft’s navigation system.
5.3.3 Tactical Air Navigation

The TACAN system is an omnidirectional radio aid to navigation developed by the
military operating in the UHF band that provides continuous azimuth information in
degrees from the station and slant range distance via the DME system. The TACAN
system has 126 two-way channels (in reality 126 ‘‘X’’ TACAN and 126 ‘‘Y’’ TACAN)
operating in the frequency range of 1025 to 1150 MHz air to ground. Ground to air
frequencies are in the ranges of 962 to 1024 MHz and 1151 to 1213 MHz. Our original
case of Santa Catalina (Figure 5.10) shows in the information box after the three-letter
identifier the number 51. This is the TACAN channel number.
Similar to VOR, the TACAN system measures the time interval between the arrivals
of two signals. Two basic signals are produced by the rotation of the inner and outer
reflectors of the central antenna. Figure 5.14 shows the antenna array for the TACAN
ground station.
A 15 Hz signal is produced once during each rotation of the inner reflector.
A 135 Hz signal is produced nine times with each rotation of the outer reflector. When
the radio wave lobe of the 15 Hz signal passes through magnetic east, a separate
omnidirectional signal is transmitted; this is the main reference signal. When each of
the nine lobes of the 135 Hz signal passes through magnetic east, nine additional
omnidirectional signals are transmitted and designated as auxiliary reference signals.
Figure 5.15 illustrates the main and auxiliary reference signals of the ground station.
To determine the aircraft position in bearing from the station, a phase angle must be
electronically measured. This is done between the main reference signal and the 15 Hz
signal. This time interval is converted to an angle that isolates one of the 40 segments.
The time interval between the reception of the auxiliary reference signal and the maxima
of the 135 Hz signal is measured within that segment. The angular difference is con-
verted into degrees magnetic and presented to the pilot. The range is determined from
the DME system, which is incorporated into the TACAN system.
Because of the basic construction of the TACAN system (eight auxiliary and one
main reference pulse), it is possible to have 40 lock-on errors in azimuth. When the
FIGURE 5.14 ¢ Top View Perspective

TACAN Ground
Station Outer Reflectors
Inner Reflector
Central
Stationary
Antenna
Magnetic North FIGURE 5.15 ¢

0° TACAN Signal
15 Rev Pattern
Per Sec
270° East
40°
180°
15 Hz MID Amplitude
15 Hz Modulation
135 Hz Modulation
Strength
Signal
0° 100° 140° 180° 220° 300° 0°

Bearing Representation
Time
airborne receiver is working correctly, these pulses lock on to the airborne equipment
with the main reference at 90 (magnetic east). When the airborne receiver is weak, the
main reference pulse may slide over, miss magnetic east, and lock on at one of the
auxiliary positions. When this occurs, azimuth indications will be 40 , or some multiple
of 40 , in error.
The TACAN within the aircraft also has an air-to-air mode that provides range to a
cooperating aircraft. In this mode, the first aircraft will select any TACAN channel
(1–126) and direct the cooperating aircraft to select a TACAN channel 63 units away
from aircraft 1’s selection. For example, if aircraft 1 selected TACAN channel 29,
aircraft 2 would select TACAN channel 92. In this scenario, the DME readout will be
the distance between the two aircraft. This should obvious if we recall that the DME
system separates the transmit and receive frequencies by 63 MHz (section 5.3.3).
Table 5.2 provides the transmit and receive frequencies for the 126 channels of X
TACAN systems. In newer TACAN systems, the air-to-air mode will provide bearing to
a cooperative target in addition to range.
5.3.4 Nondirectional Beacons and Automatic Direction Finders

An NDB installation combines a low-frequency transmitter with an antenna system
providing a nondirectional radiation pattern. NDBs are a useful radio aid, as they are
relatively low cost and low maintenance. As with VOR, dual receivers can provide a
TABLE 5.2 ¢ TACAN Frequency Pairings
182
A/A A/A A/A
Channel Transmit REC REC Channel Transmit REC REC Channel Transmit REC REC
1X 1025 962 1088 43X 1067 1004 1130 85X 1109 1172 1046
2X 1026 963 1089 44X 1068 1005 1131 86X 1110 1173 1047
3X 1027 964 1090 45X 1069 1006 1132 87X 1111 1174 1048
4X 1028 965 1091 46X 1070 1007 1133 88X 1112 1175 1049
5X 1029 966 1092 47X 1071 1008 1134 89X 1113 1176 1050
6X 1030 967 1093 48X 1072 1009 1135 90X 1114 1177 1051
7X 1031 968 1094 49X 1073 1010 1136 91X 1115 1178 1052
8X 1032 969 1095 50X 1074 1011 1137 92X 1116 1179 1053
9X 1033 970 1096 51X 1075 1012 1138 93X 1117 1180 1054
10X 1034 971 1097 52X 1076 1013 1139 94X 1118 1181 1055
CHAPTER
11X 1035 972 1098 53X 1077 1014 1140 95X 1119 1182 1056
5
12X 1036 973 1099 54X 1078 1015 1141 96X 1120 1183 1057
13X 1037 974 1100 55X 1079 1016 1142 97X 1121 1184 1058
14X 1038 975 1101 56X 1080 1017 1143 98X 1122 1185 1059
15X 1039 976 1102 57X 1081 1018 1144 99X 1123 1186 1060
16X 1040 977 1103 58X 1082 1019 1145 100X 1124 1187 1061
17X 1041 978 1104 59X 1083 1020 1146 101X 1125 1188 1062
18X 1042 979 1105 60X 1084 1021 1147 102X 1126 1189 1063
19X 1043 980 1106 61X 1085 1022 1148 103X 1127 1190 1064
20X 1044 981 1107 62X 1086 1023 1149 104X 1128 1191 1065
21X 1045 982 1108 63X 1087 1024 1150 105X 1129 1192 1066
Navigation Systems
22X 1046 983 1109 64X 1088 1151 1025 106X 1130 1193 1067
23X 1047 984 1110 65X 1089 1152 1026 107X 1131 1194 1068
24X 1048 985 1111 66X 1090 1153 1027 108X 1132 1195 1069
25X 1049 986 1112 67X 1091 1154 1028 109X 1133 1196 1070
26X 1050 987 1113 68X 1092 1155 1029 110X 1134 1197 1071
27X 1051 988 1114 69X 1093 1156 1030 111X 1135 1198 1072
28X 1052 989 1115 70X 1094 1157 1031 112X 1136 1199 1073
29X 1053 990 1116 71X 1095 1158 1032 113X 1137 1200 1074
30X 1054 991 1117 72X 1096 1159 1033 114X 1138 1201 1075
31X 1055 992 1118 73X 1097 1160 1034 115X 1139 1202 1076
32X 1056 993 1119 74X 1098 1161 1035 116X 1140 1203 1077
33X 1057 994 1120 75X 1099 1162 1036 117X 1141 1204 1078
34X 1058 995 1121 76X 1100 1163 1037 118X 1142 1205 1079
35X 1059 996 1122 77X 1101 1164 1038 119X 1143 1206 1080
36X 1060 997 1123 78X 1102 1165 1039 120X 1144 1207 1081
37X 1061 998 1124 79X 1103 1166 1040 121X 1145 1208 1082
38X 1062 999 1125 80X 1104 1167 1041 122X 1146 1209 1083
39X 1063 1000 1126 81X 1105 1168 1042 123X 1147 1210 1084
40X 1064 1001 1127 82X 1106 1169 1043 124X 1148 1211 1085
41X 1065 1002 1128 83X 1107 1170 1044 125X 1149 1212 1086
42X 1066 1003 1129 84X 1108 1171 1045 126X 1150 1213 1087
TABLE 5.3 ¢ NDB Classifications
Code Power Range and Altitude

H 50 W to less than 2000 W 50 nm at all altitudes
HH 2000 W or more 75 nm at all altitudes
MH Less than 50 W 25 nm at all altitudes
positional fix for the aircraft using the intersection of two NDB bearings. NDB beacons
are assigned in the 190 to 535 kHz range and vary in power output. As with the VOR,
NDBs are assigned a letter to denote the output power of the beacon and an SSV
denoting range and altitude coverage associated with the designations. Table 5.3 shows
the NDB power output classification codes.
A 1020 Hz amplitude modulated (AM) audio tone is normally present and transmits
Morse code identifications at least once every 30 sec. The more powerful NDBs usually
have two-letter identifications, while a single letter identifies those that serve as the
marker facility for instrument landing system (ILS) installations. Some NDBs also have
voice capability for the transmission of control data and information.
Since the radio signal is nondirectional, a system must be installed in the aircraft to
determine bearing to the station; range information is not available. The automatic
direction finder (ADF), sometimes called the automatic radio compass (ARC), is an
aircraft-installed system provides a bearing to the NDB. The ADF is a low-frequency
receiver that operates in the 100 to 1750 kHz range. Since commercial AM radio
broadcasts in the 540 to 1650 kHz range, it is possible to use an AM radio station as an
NDB. It is also possible to listen to the radio station, which is one very good reason that
ADF will probably never be removed from modern aircraft.
The operation of the ADF is dependent on the characteristics of the loop antenna:
there is a maximum reception when the loop is parallel to the direction of the wave
emanating from the transmitting station. When the loop is rotated, the signal strength
gradually decreases until it is at its minimum when the plane of the loop is perpendicular
to the direction of the wave; this point is called the null. Further rotation causes the
signal strength to increase until it again reaches its maximum when the loop is again
parallel to the transmitted wave.
The null property of the loop can be used to find the direction of the transmitting
station, provided there is a nondirectional antenna to solve the ambiguity of the loop. The
loop alone can be used to locate a transmitting station, but the operator has no way of
knowing whether the station is on a specific bearing or its reciprocal; this is known as the
180 ambiguity of the loop. When a signal from a nondirectional antenna is superimposed
on the signal from a loop antenna, only one null is received, thus solving the ambiguity.
On most military aircraft, the ADF antenna is fixed, so two crossed loop antennas are used
and the null position is sensed inductively or capacitively with a goniometer, which is an
instrument that measures angles or allows an object to be slaved to a given angle.
Modern aircraft employ synchronous or coherent detection in order to discern the
NDB signal from noise. Coherent detection systems internally generate a signal on
the same frequency as the tuned station. The receiver then searches through the noise
entering the receiver, attempting to match the internally generated signal with the
received signal. Once this is accomplished, the system is said to be locked on. Military
aircraft also use direction finding in the UHF and VHF frequencies to locate missing
wingman, downed pilot’s emergency beacons, or friendly forces. The same principles
previously covered apply to these systems as well.
Because of the frequency employed and the method in which bearings are obtained,
the NDB system has errors not found with VOR and TACAN that can contribute sig-
nificantly to bearing inaccuracies. Some of the major contributing errors are
● Bank error. Bank error is most predominant at altitude when the aircraft is close to
the station. While the aircraft is banking, the bearing pointer points downward toward
the station, thus giving an inaccurate reading. The error is greatest on nose and tail
bearings when bank is applied.
● Thunderstorm effect. Normally radio waves are distorted by electrical disturbances
caused by thunderstorms. There may be erratic fluctuations of the bearing pointer in
the direction of the disturbance. It is possible for the bearing pointer to home in on
the thunderstorm.
● Night effect. Night effect is caused by the reflection of sky waves from the iono-
sphere; it is most noticeable at sunrise and sunset, when the height of the ionosphere
is changing. The reflected sky waves interfere with the reception of the ground waves
and cause the bearing pointer to fluctuate.
● Shoreline effect. Shoreline effect or coastal refraction occurs when radio waves
change direction on crossing a shoreline. It is possible to have errors of up to 40 in
bearing. The area of maximum error is reached when the bearing from the aircraft to
the station is less than 30 to the shoreline.
● Mountain effect. Multipath effects due to mountain reflections will cause fluctuations
in the bearing pointer.
● Glinting or quadrantal effect. A quadrantal error is due to the glinting of radio waves
off the surfaces of the aircraft. This error is primarily due to the location of the
antenna on the aircraft. True effects can be calculated during antenna pattern testing.
5.4 RADIO AIDS TO NAVIGATION TESTING

5.4.1 Radio Aids to Navigation Ground Testing
The first test in any systems evaluation is the static test. It is a good idea to ensure that the
system is functioning properly on the ground prior to expending valuable flight resources.
There are many facilities and much test equipment available to the evaluator to make our
lives a little easier. We should evaluate the need for testing in the first place. Remember
that if we have added, modified, or moved antennas or equipment on the aircraft we will
need to perform EMI/EMC testing (previously described in section 4.13). If we have
added, modified, or moved antennas, we need to perform antenna pattern testing
(addressed in section 4.10).
If we are testing a VOR, it would be advantageous to check the system against a VOR
check radial or VOR test facility (VOT). A check radial is a surveyed point on the airfield
that informs the pilot that with the correct VOR tuned and identified, the cockpit reading
should be as posted. A VOT is a low-power (2 W) VHF omnitest transmitter that permits
the ground checking of aircraft VOR equipment without reference to a check radial.
The VOT emits an omnidirectional magnetic north radial plus aural identification con-
sisting of a series of dots. It is monitored to a tolerance of 1 . With the VOR properly
tuned to the VOT (108.0 MHz in the United States), the display should indicate a 360
radial indication on the bearing pointer. With 360 set into the track selector window, the
track bar should be centered with a ‘‘from’’ indication. The allowable error is 4 .
If we are evaluating a TACAN, a TACAN test set is available. The test set requires
entries of channel number, range, and bearing. With the aircraft TACAN turned on, enter
the same channel number that has been entered into the test set. Once tuned, the cockpit
indications of range and bearing should be the same as those entered into the test set.
As with all avionics systems, controls, and displays, built-in testing (BIT) and self-
testing should also be accomplished. Controls and displays testing are covered in chapter 6
and will not be addressed here. A self-test checks the electrical continuity of the system
out to the antennas. A BIT, if available, checks the software of the system. Indications,
results, and possible logging of errors will be available in the systems’ manuals.
5.4.2 Radio Aids to Navigation Flight Testing

Since all of the systems we have discussed provide us with azimuth or range, one would
assume that there must be some sort of accuracy requirements associated with these
systems, and you would be right. VOR bearing accuracy is on the order of 4 , TACAN
accuracy is on the order of 2 , and NDB bearing accuracy is on the order of 5 . DME
range accuracy is on the order of 0.2 nm. To evaluate the accuracy of the system, we will
need the following information:
● Aircraft’s present position (latitude, longitude)
● Altitude (MSL)
● Heading (magnetic)
● VOR/TACAN/NDB position (latitude, longitude)
● VOR/TACAN/NDB altitude (MSL)
● Magnetic variation
● Cockpit reading of bearing and range
Our aircraft’s position at the time of the bearing/range reading is provided by TSPI
data. The telemetry stream or a recording of the information in the cockpit provides our
altitude and magnetic heading. The VOR/TACAN/NDB and magnetic variation are
known because the sight does not move. I will discuss where this information can be found
in a moment. The cockpit reading is taken from the aircraft’s instruments. The geometry
should be set up as shown in Figure 5.16. In any avionics test, we try to keep the mea-
surand (the parameter we are evaluating) as constant as possible to reduce measurement
errors. For bearing accuracy, we would fly either inbound or outbound on a radial and the
bearing will stay constant. For range accuracy, we would fly an arc around the site to keep
the DME constant. When we are ready to collect data, we would call a mark and note the
required measurements. A sample data card for this test is shown in Table 5.4.
The items in the top portion of the data card can be filled out before the flight. The
items in the bottom left must be collected during the flight. The items in the bottom right
are calculated postflight. The calculation is performed using a coordinate conversion
routine, converting delta (D) latitude, longitude, and altitude to bearing and slant range.
The error that is calculated should be put into absolute value terms. Remember that your
initial answer will be a true bearing, which must be converted to a magnetic bearing
(since the cockpit reading is in magnetic)—hence the need for magnetic variation.
FIGURE 5.16 ¢
Range and Bearing
Bearing Accuracy, Constant Radial
Accuracy Geometry
DME Accuracy, Constant Arc
TABLE 5.4 ¢ Radio Aids Range/Bearing Accuracy Data Card
Test Station Identifier Frequency Station Station Station Magnetic

# Name Latitude Longitude Altitude Variation
1
2
3
4
Aircraft Aircraft Aircraft Aircraft Bearing/ Bearing / Range Error
Latitude Longitude Altitude Heading Range Read Calculated
1
2
3
4
The magnetic variation that is applied is always the magnetic variation at the radio aid.
The test appears straightforward enough; the only missing information is the radio aid
data. This information is most easily obtained from an airport facility directory or
enroute supplement. A facility directory is shown in Figure 5.17. These publications are
distributed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or by state authorities
in other nations. Before using these publications, ensure that you have a current one.
The expiration date is located on the front cover.
A sample of the information contained in the facility directory is shown in
Figure 5.18. I have chosen a combination VOR/TACAN station (called a VORTAC)
named Hector, which is located in Southern California about 80 mi east of Palmdale or
75 mi northeast of greater Los Angeles. I will explain all of the entries for Hector
starting at the upper left and working to the right and then down. The first entry is the
station name, and immediately to the right is the latitude and longitude (in WGS-84
coordinates) of the radio aid. This is the information that we would enter on our data
card for station latitude and longitude. To the right of the positional information is the
statement NOTAM FILE RAL. NOTAM, which means Notices to Airmen. This is a
system that informs pilots of changes within the airspace structure and supporting ele-
ments. If a runway is closed for construction, if an approach is not authorized, if the GPS
signal is unserviceable, or if a radio aid is down for maintenance, these items will be
noted in the NOTAM file. It is the pilot’s responsibility to check the NOTAM file for all
FIGURE 5.17 ¢
Airport Facility
Directory
FIGURE 5.18 ¢
Sample Entry from
the Facility Directory
facilities along his route prior to flight so there will not be any surprises. Of course,
testers also need to consult the NOTAMs prior to a test if we plan on using a radio aid
during the evaluation. It would not be very bright to brief the pilot that we are going to
use Hector VORTAC for our test if Hector is down for scheduled maintenance.
The far right corner tells us that we can find Hector on a Los Angeles sectional
chart, Enroute High-Altitude Chart 4H, or Enroute Low-Altitude Chart 3C. The second
line starts out with an (H), which means that this radio aid is a high-altitude SSV. The
next entry tells us that it is a VORTAC, the VOR frequency is 112.7, three-letter iden-
tifier of HEC, and TACAN channel 74. The next item informs us that there is no airport
at Hector, and the nearest airport is Barstow-Daggett, which is on the Hector 266 radial
for 16.5 nm. The last entry on the line is the station altitude of 1850 ft MSL and a
magnetic variation of 15 east.
The next section deals with blockage areas around Hector. Since Hector is situated
in a valley bordered by mountains to the north and south, line of sight (LOS) to the
station will be a consideration. If you are north of the station you must be at or above
10,000 ft (within 15–28 nm) or at or above 14,000 ft (beyond 28 nm) to have radio LOS.
This is another concern for flight testers: Make sure you can see the station during the
test. The final entry on the page tells you who to contact for flight following (mon-
itoring). In this case it is the Riverside flight service station and their associated VHF
frequencies. This information allows the tester to fill out the data card as well as plan the
geometry. Remember the SSV. It will be very difficult to obtain range and bearing
accuracies at 80 nm against a terminal SSV radio aid.
In addition to range and bearing accuracies, the radio aid installed on the aircraft must
be capable of putting the aircraft in a position to land when the weather is not so good. VOR,
TACAN, and NDB systems are authorized for nonprecision approaches. A nonprecision
approach allows a pilot to perform the approach while in clouds as long as the ceiling and
visibility at the intended airfield is above some weather minimums. In the United States,
most nonprecision approaches have weather minimums of 500 ft cloud ceiling and a visi-
bility over the runway of 1 nm. The approach may not be flown if the observations are lower
than the minimums. Other countries allow pilots to perform the approach down to the
minimums even if the observations are lower than the approach minimums. Figure 5.19
shows a typical nonprecision approach to AF Plant 42, Palmdale, CA. This particular
approach is valid for aircraft that have VOR with DME, TACAN, or GPS.
It is not the tester’s job to guide the pilot through the approach, but it would be
helpful if the tester at least understood what the pilot was doing. The objective of this
evaluation is to determine if the radio aid, as installed in the aircraft, can safely place the
aircraft in a position to land at the missed approach point. The pilot will make this
determination; there are no data to be collected. It is a qualitative evaluation. However,
the test needs to be accomplished.
The basic approach plate (Figure 5.19) provides the pilot with information defined in
terms of range and bearing from the radio aid (which is not always located at the airfield).
The large picture in the center of the page is the bird’s-eye view of the approach; the
smaller picture at the bottom right is the vertical profile. Below the vertical profile are the
weather minima: straight-in approach (400 ft and 1¼ nm) and circling approach (500 ft
and 1¼ nm). An airfield diagram is pictured at the bottom left. The approach is as follows:
overfly the Palmdale VORTAC at or above 5000 ft; intercept the 070 radial outbound,
maintaining altitude at or above 5000 ft; outside of 12 DME, but within 15 DME, execute
a right turn to intercept the 085 radial inbound (heading 265 , no wind); once established
inbound you are cleared to descend to 4400 ft at 12 DME; at 5.2 DME you are cleared to
descend to your minimums and if you cannot safely land out of this approach your missed
approach point is at 0.5 DME (1 nm from the airfield). Once again, it is the pilot’s call as
to whether the system is satisfactory or not.
5.4.3 Other Considerations in Radio Aids Testing

Some other considerations in evaluating radio aids integrations are as follows, in no
particular order:
● Aircraft configuration. Aircraft configurations, especially on military fighters, can
change on a day-to-day basis, and these configurations can cause different blockage
FIGURE 5.19 ¢
Nonprecision
Approach
SW–3, 12 MAY 2005 to 07 JUL 2005
SW–3, 12 MAY 2005 to 07 JUL 2005
051
areas for reception. If antenna pattern testing is accomplished, many of these concerns
will be alleviated. In flight testing, radio aids to navigation testing as well as commu-
nications testing will be accomplished with the most common aircraft configuration.
● Antenna switching. VOR and TACAN systems normally are implemented with an
upper and lower antenna that automatically switches due to perceived signal strength
at the antenna. This function should be tested by to make certain that there are no
dropouts during turning maneuvers.
● Statistical accuracy. I am not going to delve into the black world of statistics, but in
everything we do in avionics testing we are concerned with the confidence level of
the data. Ideally we would test range and bearing accuracy against three different
ground stations. We do this in case one of the stations is out of calibration and gives
us erroneous readings. We would only know this if two stations closely agree and the
third is out to lunch.
● Atmospheric effects. As previously discussed, NDB/ADF testing will provide varied
results based on atmospheric conditions. The tester is responsible for collecting
atmospheric data during the test so some sense of the data may be made later.
● Propeller modulation. Care must be taken when evaluating antenna locations on
propeller-driven and rotary wing aircraft, as the radio wave will be modulated when
passing through these rotating devices.
● Magnetic variation. Magnetic variation is always applied at the ground station; that is,
we use the lines of magnetic variation closest to the ground station during our analysis.
● Cone of confusion. Above the ground station there is a cone of confusion within
which the equipment receives only DME information. The cone can vary from 60 to
110 , depending on the type of ground installation. The most common is the 90
cone, and bearing information will be lost when the DME reading is equal to the
aircraft altitude in DME. For example, an aircraft flying at 18,000 ft will lose bearing
information when the DME is equal to 3 nm and will not regain bearing information
until the DME exceeds 3 nm.
5.4.4 Civil Certification of Radio Aids

All of the previous tests will be valid toward a civil certification; however, civil autho-
rities require some additional testing as well as variations in methodology. These tests,
which may be found in the appropriate advisory circulars (ACs), are noted as follows:
● VOR Testing
– Test ranges from the station for bearing accuracy are either 160 nm or 80 nm
(depends on the aircraft certification altitude).
– Long-range reception should be accurate during 10 bank turns.
– VOR nonprecision approaches are initiated with the station 13–15 nm behind the
aircraft.
● DME Testing
– Test ranges, bearing accuracy, and long-range reception are the same as for the
VOR.
– Orbits at 2000 ft, 35 nm from the station should be accomplished; DME should
continue to track with no more than one unlock and not to exceed more than one
search cycle.
– A penetration (high-altitude enroute descent) should be accomplished from
35,000 ft down to 5000 ft, 5 to 10 nm short of the facility.
● ADF Testing
– Pointer reversal should be tested to prove that range equals the altitude flown
(cone of confusion validation).
– Bearing accuracy is shown by flying a minimum of six headings over a known
ground point. Accuracy will be shown to be within 5 .
– Indicator response is a 180 change within 10 sec and accurate to within 3 .
– Ground reference points must be at least one-half of the service range of the station
(Table 5.3).
5.5 INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

The basic measurement instrument of the inertial navigation system is the accel-
erometer. There are three accelerometers mounted in the system: one to measure north–
south accelerations, one to measure east–west accelerations, and one to measure vertical
acceleration. There are two basic types of accelerometers: a moving mass or a pendulum
device. The moving mass accelerometer is just a mass on a spring with a ruler attached.
The ruler may be an electromagnetic sensor that senses distance. When the vehicle
accelerates, the mass moves and the ruler measures the movement. A basic accel-
erometer is shown at Figure 5.20. The system requires calibrated springs, and these are
nearly impossible to make consistent. In a pendulum device, due to inertia, the pendu-
lum will swing off the null position when the aircraft accelerates. A signal pickoff
device tells how far the pendulum is off the null position. The signal from this pickoff
device is sent to an amplifier and current from the amplifier is sent back into a torquer
located in the accelerometer. A torque is generated which restores the pendulum to the
null position. The amount of current that is goes into the torquer is a function of the
acceleration the device is experiencing.
The acceleration signal from the amplifier is also sent to an integrator, which is a
time multiplication device. The integrator starts out with acceleration (which is in feet
per second per second) and multiplies it (integrates) by time; the result is a velocity in
feet per second. The velocity data are sent to a second integrator, which again multiplies
Potentiometer FIGURE 5.20 ¢

Basic Moving Mass
Accelerometer
= –
Battery
+
Integrating Mass
DC motor
(integrates) by time, with a resultant in feet (distance). Since there are three accel-
erometers aligned to three axes in the system, there will be three outputs of velocity and
three outputs of distance. This is known as the nine-state vector previously addressed in
chapter 2: latitude, longitude, altitude, north/east/down (NED) velocity, and NED
acceleration. It should be noted that any inaccuracy in the measurement of the accel-
eration will be magnified as a large error in position.
5.5.1 Gyro-Stabilized Platforms

To accurately measure the acceleration in a given axis, the accelerometer must be
constantly aligned to this axis. This is accomplished mechanically or computationally.
In the mechanical solution, the accelerometer is mounted on a gimbal assembly,
commonly called a platform. The platform, via the use of gyroscopes (gyros), allows the
aircraft to go through any attitude change yet maintain the accelerometers level.
Figure 5.21 shows a simple platform structure. Figure 5.22 shows how a gyro is used to
control the level of the platform.
FIGURE 5.21 ¢ INS E-W

N-S
Platform Structure Accelerometer
Accelerometer
Pit
ch
West North
Gyro
Gyros
Z E
Azimuth
Ro East
South ll
Z Accelerometer
FIGURE 5.22 ¢ Single-Axis Platform

Gyro Leveling Amplifier
Gyroscope
Accelerometer
Pickoff
Gimbal
Gimbal
Drive
Motor
The gyros and the accelerometers are mounted on a common gimbal. When the
gimbal is moved off of the level position, the spin axis of the gyro remains fixed; the
case of the gyro is moved off level and the amount that the case is tipped will be detected
by the signal pickup in the gyro. The signal is amplified and sent to the gimbal drive
motor, which restores the gimbal to the level position. Since the accelerometer is always
kept level, it does not sense a component of gravity and is able to sense only the hor-
izontal accelerations of the aircraft as it travels across the earth.
This scenario works only for a platform that is fixed in space. Aircraft fly close to
the earth, the earth is round, and the earth is rotating. To keep the accelerometers level
with respect to the earth so that they sense only horizontal accelerations, these facts must
be accounted for. Earth rotation rate compensation is depicted in Figure 5.23. The left
side of the figure shows what would happen to the platform if it did not account for the
earth’s rotation. In this bird’s-eye view, the platform maintains its same orientation in
space, but from the earth’s vantage point would appear to tip over every 24 hours. To
compensate for this tipping, the platform is forced to tilt in proportion to the earth’s
rotational rate. Conversely, with compensation, the bird’s-eye view shows the platform
tipping over every 24 hours, but with respect to the earth the platform remains level.
The required rate compensation is a function of the latitude of the aircraft because
the horizontal component of the earth rotation rate sensed by the gyros is a function of
latitude. The maximum earth rotation rate is at the equator and is 15.04 /hr. This value
decreases as we move north or south, until it becomes zero at the poles.
Movement of the aircraft around the earth has the same effect on the platform that
was caused by the earth’s rotation because the earth is round and the aircraft flies an arc
as it follows the contour of the earth. The rate of compensation is determined by using
the aircraft’s velocity. Earth rotation rate and aircraft movement rate compensations are
implemented in the system by torquing the gyro. The aircraft movement rate and the
earth rotation rate terms are summed and sent to a gyro torquer, which will always keep
the platform level with respect to the earth.
A few other compensations are required for correct operation of the INS. The
descriptions of these corrections follow; however, the mathematics are left to those
industrious engineers. Chapter 7 of Kayton and Fried’s text or chapters 3 and 4 of
Without compensation With compensation FIGURE 5.23 ¢

Earth Rotation Rate
Compensation
Time 0 Time 0
Noon Noon
4 Hours North 20 Hours 4 Hours North 20 Hours

• •
Pole Pole
Midnight Midnight
8 Hours 16 Hours 8 Hours 16 Hours
12 Hours 12 Hours
Biezad’s text can satisfy this particular urge. The first of these additional compensations
is a correction for pendulum effect known as Schuler tuning. A pendulum is a suspended
mass, free to rotate about at least one axis in a horizontal plane and whose center of
gravity is not on the rotational axis. Any pivoted mass that is not perfectly balanced is,
by definition, a pendulum. Pendulums align themselves to dynamic vertical when at rest.
The pivot axis and the center of gravity are aligned to the gravity vector. Pendulums will
tend to break into their natural period of oscillation when they are accelerated. This
oscillation is periodic angular motion that has the gravity vector as its midpoint.
A pendulum is said to be at static rest only when its center of gravity and its pivot axis
are resting in the same local vertical vector. When a vehicle carrying a pendulum accel-
erates, the acceleration is introduced to the pendulum via the pivot axis, which moves out of
the gravity vector; the center of gravity lags behind. The longitudinal axis of the pendulum
now forms some angle other than zero with the local gravity vector, which in turn produces
an angular acceleration of the pendulum. During constant velocity, the pendulum seeks to
return to the vertical directly under the pivot axis but continually overshoots, manifesting
itself as a periodic oscillation. For a given mass, the closer the pivot axis is brought to the
center of gravity the lower the period of oscillation and the further the center of rotation.
If the pivot axis and the center of gravity are brought close enough together, the
center of turning can be made to coincide with the center of the earth. Once this pen-
dulum is brought to static rest, accelerations of the pivot axis cannot cause the pendu-
lum’s longitudinal axis to form any other angle with the gravity vector other than zero.
All horizontal velocities will be accompanied by the proper angular velocities to
maintain constant alignment of the pendulum to the rotating gravity vector. The pen-
dulum will not oscillate because of horizontal accelerations. To prevent vehicular
accelerations from causing an oscillation of the stable element in the INS, the platform is
mechanized to have an equivalent length of a pendulum extended to the center of
the earth. Any acceleration of the platform is about the earth’s center of mass and that
of the mechanized pendulum’s center of mass. Any errors that introduce an offset in the
platform cause the effective mass of the mechanized pendulum to be displaced and
introduce an oscillation with a period of 84.4 min. This oscillation causes the platform
error to be averaged out over a period of 84.4 min. This is called a Schuler period or
cycle. INS platforms that are Schuler tuned are used to bound any errors in the system to
acceptable limits so that they do not continue to build.
Two other forces that must be considered are Coriolis and centripetal effects. These
are considered external or phantom accelerations. Coriolis forces are apparent because
the aircraft is referenced to a rotating earth and appear whenever the aircraft is flying.
Due to Coriolis forces, an aircraft moving to the north has an east acceleration, an
aircraft moving east has an upward and south acceleration, and an aircraft moving
initially upward has a west acceleration. This means that an aircraft flying from the
equator to the North Pole will be observed as flying a curved path in space, even though
it is flying a straight line. Figure 5.24 shows this phenomenon. For the aircraft to
maintain its northerly heading, the accelerometer signals must be corrected according to
aircraft velocity and present position.
The oblateness of the earth causes certain centripetal accelerations in certain positions
on the earth where the plumb line to the center of the earth does not exactly match the true
vertical. The resulting element imbalance causes spurious centripetal accelerations.
Compensations for this spurious acceleration must be made before the acceleration is
integrated to compute velocity. The oblate earth effect is shown in Figure 5.25.
1° Per Hour FIGURE 5.24 ¢

5.04
g1 Coriolis Effect
tin
R ota
th
ar
E
Earth
North
Pole
4th
Hour
Eq
ato
u
r 3rd
Hour
2nd
1st Hour
Start Hour
Local Vertical FIGURE 5.25 ¢

Oblate Oblate Earth Effect
Earth
Plumb Line
to Center
of Earth
True
Circle
Since we are going to navigate with the INS, it is extremely important that we know
our origin and the orientation of true north and the center of the earth. The first step is to
determine the gravity vector, which is a relatively simple task. The pilot inserts the
present position of the aircraft and enters the first stage of alignment.
In this stage, the gimbal drive motor moves the gimbals until the pendulum of the
accelerometer (z axis) is aligned with the gravity vector. At this point there is zero
output from the accelerometer, the computer sets the velocity to zero, and attitude
information is available. A gyro system used for stabilization (radar, forward-looking
infrared [FLIR], backup attitude system) or an attitude, heading, reference system
(AHRS) will cease at this point.
FIGURE 5.26 ¢ Platform Relevels

Platform Level and When Pointed to
Gyrocompass But Misaligned North, Platform Stays
Alignment
Level
Y Y X
Earth Rate Earth Rate
Compensation Compensation
X X
Earth Rate
Compensation
Misalignement Causes Platform to Tilt as Earth Rotates

Tilt is Detected by Accelerometers Causing Platform to
Reorient to North
Figure 5.26 depicts how the platform orients itself to true north during the alignment
process; this operation is called gyrocompassing. In the far left position, the platform is
level and the computer assumes that it is pointing to true north. It only applies earth
rotation rate compensation to the east–west (x) gyro. Since the platform is misaligned,
the platform will tilt off level as the earth rotates. The tilt is detected by the accel-
erometers, and a torquing signal is sent to the gyro that controls the platform in the
heading axis. The gyro control loop physically reorients the platform toward true north.
Eventually the platform is oriented toward true north (far right), the north–south (y)
gyro requires no compensation, and the platform remains level. As the aircraft is flown
in the navigation mode, the computer maintains platform alignment using torquing the
azimuth gyro via a combination of earth rotation rate and aircraft movement rate.
The gyrocompass system just described has one serious disadvantage: it cannot fly
in the polar regions. If the platform were to be flown directly over the poles, the platform
would have to rotate 180 at the instant it crossed the pole. This is physically impossible,
and in reality, these systems cannot be operated within a few hundred miles of the poles
because of the high torquing rates that are required to keep the platform level to north.
This problem can be solved with a wander angle inertial system.
The basic fundamentals of a wander angle system are the same as described for the
gyrocompass system. To allow the system to fly in the polar regions, the platform takes an
arbitrary angle with respect to true north during gyrocompassing. This arbitrary angle is
called the wander angle. Figure 5.27 shows the chronology of events for inclusion of the
wander angle. In the far left of the figure, the platform is leveled. As with the gyro-
compass alignment, the platform is level and all compensation is sent to the east–west (x)
axis. Because this assumption is not correct, the platform will tilt off level as the earth
rotates, in the same manner as in the gyrocompass example. The tip is detected by the
accelerometers as before, but rather than sending all torquing to align to north, the signal
is split between the x and y gyros. Eventually the right combination of earth rotation rate
compensation to the two gyros is determined for the particular wander angle. The ratio of
earth rotation rate compensation is used to compute the initial wander angle.
As this system is flown in the navigate mode, the wander angle will change
(hence wander) as a function of the longitude due to the convergence at the poles.
Platform Level Platform Relevels and FIGURE 5.27 ¢

all Earth Rate When Correct Earth Rate Wander Angle
Compensation Combination is Determined
Alignment
to X Gyro Platform Stays Level
Earth Rate Y
Y Earth Rate
Compensation Y X
Earth Rate
X Compensation Compensation
X
Wrong Earth Rate Tilt is Detected by

Compensation Causes Accelerometers Causing
Platform to Tilt Earth Rate Compensation to be
as Earth Rotates Split Between the Two Gyros
The accelerometers are not mounted along true north–south/east–west axes but are
offset by the wander angle. This is not a problem for the navigation computer, as it
knows the wander angle and can easily compute the true accelerations.
5.5.2 Strap-Down Systems

Lightweight digital computers permit the system to eliminate the gimbals, which create
strap-down systems. These sensors are strapped down to the vehicle and computers are
used to compute lateral and vertical velocities. A few sensors may be used in strap-down
inertial systems, the most common of which in aviation use is the ring laser gyro (RLG).
The laser gyro works on a physical principle discovered by French physicist G.
Sagnac in the 1900s. Sagnac found that the difference in time that two beams, each
traveling in opposite directions, take to travel around a closed path mounted on a
rotating platform is directly proportional to the speed at which the platform is rotating.
Although Sagnac and others demonstrated the concept in the laboratory, it was not until
the 1960s, with the advent of the laser beam and its unique properties, that the principle
could be used in a gyro. The key properties of the laser that make the laser gyro possible
are the laser’s coherent light beam, its single frequency, its small amount of diffusion,
and its ability to be easily focused, split, and deflected.
The RLG is composed of segments of transmission paths configured as either a
square or a triangle and connected with mirrors. Figure 5.28 shows a diagram of a
triangular RLG. The mirrors in the diagram are located at 5, 6, and 7. One of the mirrors
(6) is partially silvered, allowing light through to the detector (9). A laser (8) is launched
into the transmission path (4) in both directions, establishing a standing wave resonant
with the length of the path. The beams are recombined and sent to the output detector
(9). In the absence of rotation, the path lengths will be the same and the output will be
the total constructive interference of the two beams. If the apparatus rotates, there will
be a difference in the path lengths traveled by the two beams resulting in a net phase
difference and destructive interference. The net signal will vary in amplitude depending
on the phase shift; the resulting amplitude is a measurement of the phase shift, and
consequently, the rotation rate about the body’s axis (3).
FIGURE 5.28 ¢ 5
Ring Laser Gyro
1 2
4 6
9
3 8
FIGURE 5.29 ¢ x
Ring Laser Gyro INS
Y axis Accelerometers
Laser Z axis
Gyroscope Z
X
Y
Laser
Gyroscope
z X axis
Laser
Gyroscope
To provide a practical north-seeking gyrocompass, three RLGs are combined with

three accelerometers to form a complete navigation, guidance, and control system.
Figure 5.29 depicts a common RLG INS system.
One of the significant attributes of the laser gyro is its use of very few moving parts.
It is theoretically possible to build laser gyros without any moving components. The
spinning mass gyros use gimbals, bearings, and torque motors, whereas the RLG uses a
ring of laser light, rigid mirrors, and electronic devices. These differences make the RLG
more rugged than the spinning mass gyros, with greater reliability and a longer mean
time between failures (MTBF), which translates to lower life-cycle costs. Because the
laser gyro uses solid-state components and massless light, it is insensitive to variations
in the earth’s magnetic and gravitational fields. Shock and vibration have little impact.
Unlike a conventional gyro that requires some time to warm up and bring the gyro up to
speed, the laser gyro is essentially ready as soon as it is turned on. This is an advantage
for military aircraft with alert requirements.
There are some problems with the RLG. When the laser gyro is rotated very slowly,
the frequencies of the counterrotating lasers become very close to each other. At this low
rotation, the nulls in the standing wave get stuck on the mirrors, locking the frequency of
each beam to the same value, and the interference fringes no longer move relative to the
detector, which causes the device to no longer track angular position. This phenomenon
is known as lock-in. This effect is compensated for by adding dithering. With dithering,
the entire apparatus is twisted and untwisted about its axis at a rate convenient to the
mechanical resonance of the system, thus ensuring that the angular velocity of the sys-
tem is usually far from the lock-in threshold.
Other gyros may be used in strap-down systems. A device related to the RLG is the
fiber-optic gyro (FOG). The FOG works exactly as the RLG, but it utilizes transmission
paths with a coiled fiber-optic cable rather than a laser. A vibrating gyro takes Coriolis
effects into account; that is, a vibrating element (resonator), when rotated will cause a
secondary vibration that is orthogonal to the original vibrating direction. By sensing the
secondary vibration, the rate of turn can be detected. For vibration excitation and
detection, the piezo-electric effect is often used; therefore vibrating gyros are often
called piezo, ceramic, or quartz gyros, even though vibration and detection do not
necessarily use the piezo effect. This type of gyro is suitable for mass production and is
almost maintenance free. This device has a drawback in that when it is used under
external vibration it cannot distinguish between secondary vibration and external
vibration. In most applications the system has two mass-balanced tuning forks integrated
on a silicon chip arranged handle to handle so that forces cancel. As the forks are twisted
about the axis of the handle, the vibration of the tines tends to continue in the same plane
of motion. This motion has to be resisted by electrostatic forces from the electrodes
under the tines. By measuring the difference in capacitance between two tines of a fork
the system can determine the rate of angular motion.
In addition, accelerometer-only systems use four pendular accelerometers to mea-
sure all the possible movements and rotations. Usually these are mounted with the
weights in the corners of a tetrahedron and therefore are called tetrahedral inertial
platforms (TIPs). When the vehicle rolls, the masses at opposite ends will be accelerated
in opposite directions. When the vehicle has linear acceleration, the masses are accel-
erated in the same direction. These devices are inexpensive, but at the current time they
suffer from inaccuracy.
5.5.3 Flight Testing of Inertial Navigation Systems

Flight test items of particular interest to the evaluator include the following:
● Time to align
● Align quality
● Alignment types
● Navigation circular error probable (CEP), or drift rate
● Velocity accuracy
● Acceleration accuracy
● Navigation updates
● Navigation hierarchy
5.5.3.1 Time to Align
Time to align is the minimum amount of time that the INS should take to provide an
operable navigation system. These times are called out either in the manufacturer’s spe-
cifications or by the user in the system requirements. It is important to note that the time to
TABLE 5.5 ¢ Time to Align Data Card
Time to Align
Test Type Start Ready Navigate Latitude at Longitude Groundspeed

No. Alignment Latitude Longitude Time Light Selected Navigate at Navigate at Navigate
1
2
3
4
5
6
align is associated with a navigation performance number. In general, the longer the
system is left in the alignment mode the greater the performance, or accuracy, of a system.
For example, the specification may state that ‘‘the AN/ASN-XXX shall provide a drift rate
of 1 nm/hr after a normal alignment; normal alignment shall be accomplished in 4 min.’’
The statement ties the accuracy of 1 nm/hr to an alignment time of 4 min. If the system is
aligned for, say, 10 min, the accuracy should be even better than 1 nm/hr. Tactical bombers
may leave their INS in the align mode for up to 30 min. This is to gain maximum accuracy
from the system. I mention this here because if you intend to evaluate the drift error rate of
this system and you allow the system to align for 30 min, the data you collect to prove a
drift rate will be invalid. I have reviewed test reports of INS evaluations where the eva-
luator touted a drift rate of 0.5 nm/hr, ‘‘far superior to the specification.’’ Upon investi-
gation we find that the aircraft was left in the align mode for a time longer than the 4 min
called out in the specification. This constitutes a no test as far as specification validation is
concerned. A typical data card for this test is shown in Table 5.5. Note the information that
is important to this test. The type of alignment is normal, stored heading, carrier, interrupt,
or in-flight. These types of alignments will be addressed in more detail shortly. The latitude
and longitude are data entered by the pilot or operator. The start time is the time the system
is placed into the align mode. The ready light is the time that the operator is apprised of an
operable navigator (which must meet the applicable specifications). Navigate selected is
the time that the operator places the system into navigate (this time may not exceed the
specification time for navigation accuracy flights). The latitude and longitude are again
noted after the operator places the system to navigate (it should be the same as entered by
the operator). The groundspeed is also noted at the selection of navigate and needs to be
equal to zero or the INS will start to drift away rapidly.
The INS will also provide a quality (Q) factor during operation, which is the INS’s
best guess at how healthy it is. The Q factor is very similar to the figure of merit (FOM)
produced in the GPS. The Q factor normally provides a numerical value of 1 through 9,
with 9 being the best. In many integrated GPS/INS systems, the Q factor is used to
determine whether INS information is good enough to be used in the navigation solution.
5.5.3.2 Alignment Types
There are five general alignment types for the INS. It is important for the tester to note
that navigation accuracy is also dependent on the type of alignment used:
● Normal alignment
● Stored heading alignment
● Carrier (CV) alignment

● In-flight alignment
● Interrupted alignment
As the name implies, the normal alignment is the most common INS alignment type
and is used most often operationally. The operator moves the INS control from off to
standby, thus powering up the system. Depending on the type of installation, the
operator may go directly to the align mode or pause in standby until the required entries
are made. The operator will be required to enter own-ship latitude and longitude; this
allows the INS to perform its transport calculations. If the INS is a spinning mass sys-
tem, it will require a warm-up period, which is dependent on temperature. The specifi-
cation will call out how much time is allowed for the warm-up period. During this time
the gyros will come up to speed and the operator will be given an indication when the
warm-up period has elapsed and the system has entered the first phase of the alignment.
An RLG system does not have a warm-up time and will enter the alignment phase
immediately. The next indication the operator will receive is completion of the attitude
phase. Remember that this is the point where the system has leveled the platform and the
z accelerometer is aligned with the gravity vector. We could go to navigate at this point,
but we would have platform reference data only (horizon line); the INS will not be able
to navigate. The last phase is gyrocompassing, which allows the INS to properly align
the north–south/east–west axes. Once accomplished, the operator will receive a ready
indication and the system may be placed to navigate.
A stored heading alignment is most often used in alert situations where an aircraft
needs to scramble (i.e., take off as soon as possible). A normal alignment is performed as
previously described. At the completion of the alignment, the operator requests that the
heading be stored in the INS and then shuts down the system. When the operator returns
to the aircraft in a rapid reaction scenario, he will power up the INS as normal and the
system will advise him that a stored heading is available. The operator has the option of
accepting the stored heading or entering into a normal alignment sequence. Since the
present position and true heading (and hence true north) are already known by the
system, only platform leveling is required. Once the platform is leveled, an operable
navigator is available. The advantage is time, since platform lateral referencing does not
need to be accomplished. A stored heading alignment usually takes about half the time
to perform as a normal alignment. There are some disadvantages to this alignment,
however: the accuracy is not as good as a normal alignment and the aircraft cannot be
moved in the interim time between the first alignment and the second alignment. The
reason for the movement restriction should be obvious; the aircraft applies its earth
rotation rate compensation to the gyros based on a known true heading. Moving the
platform will cause the gyros to tumble as soon as navigate is selected by the operator.
Aircraft carriers provide some unique problems for INS alignments. As the aircraft
sits on the deck of the carrier it is subjected to the forward motion of the ship as well as
the pitching and rolling movements of the ocean. A normal alignment would be
impossible to perform in such situations. The carrier alignment mode (sometimes called
the CV align mode) allows the INS to perform an alignment in these conditions. In pre-
GPS days, the ship’s INS information was fed to the aircraft either by a hardwire or
microwave link. The aircraft INS was said to be aligned when it was in sync with the
ship’s INS. This method is still used today, but GPS makes it possible for the aircraft to
perform an in-flight alignment very quickly, providing similar accuracies.
An in-flight alignment is performed when the INS information is lost or becomes

unusable. This can occur when the gyros tumble due to a power failure or precession
(an off-axis wobbling of the gyros) or the present position/drift rate becomes unacceptable.
In pre-GPS days, an in-flight alignment would only provide the operator with a platform
reference (horizon line) and would not provide accurate navigation data. As the aircraft
was maintained straight and level, the operator would enter the align mode. The operator
would enter present position and heading as well as air data system airspeed. Much like the
carrier align, the aircraft would attempt to align the platform using these external inputs.
In reality, this alignment could take as long as 20 min to complete before a platform
reference was available, and even that was suspect, as it depended on the pilot’s ability to
fly straight and level during the entire alignment period. Today, GPS can provide the INS
with present position, groundspeed, and track at updates once per second. The alignment
can take as little as 30 sec and provides accuracies comparable to the normal alignment.
There are two types of interrupted alignments: power interrupt and taxi interrupt.
The INS should be able to withstand power interruptions on the ground during the
alignment sequence. The INS has a battery that should provide emergency power during
transient operations. This alone is a good reason for flight testers to check the battery for
proper operation before performing any INS test. This evaluation is easily accomplished
by starting the alignment on external power and transferring to internal power midway
through the sequence. The transient should be transparent to the INS. The second type of
interruption is the taxi interrupt, which is controlled by the position of the handbrake.
If the handbrake is released during an alignment, the alignment will be suspended until
the handbrake is reset. The INS uses all the information gathered before the suspension
to continue the alignment after the handbrake is reset. This works well for a short taxi in
the forward direction only. If the aircraft is moved in heading or for any distance, the
alignment must be reinitiated. The mode is designed to allow the aircraft to be moved
slightly without losing the initial alignment.
Each of these alignment types has a specified accuracy and time limitation. The tester
must perform a representative sample of each of these alignments per the data card
(in Table 5.5) and then perform a navigation accuracy test following each of these alignment
types. The navigation test may be the calculation of a circular error probable (CEP) or the
calculation of a drift rate per unit time. The specifications will dictate the accuracy required.
5.5.3.3 Circular Error Probable and Drift Rate

To determine either a CEP or drift rate we need to first construct a navigation route.
Most navigation test routes are constructed as right triangles with one leg as a line of
longitude and a second leg as a line of latitude. This construction allows us to easily see
if the system has a bias in either latitude or longitude. These routes are also constructed
to take at least 84.4 min to traverse, or one Schuler cycle. To calculate the accuracy of
the system, we will have to know where we really are (TSPI data) and compare that to
where the system thinks it is. The calculations for CEP and drift rate will be different,
but they will use the same data. Table 5.6 shows a typical data card for navigation
accuracy flights. Data card 1 identifies all of the data that must be collected during the
flight. Data should be collected at regular intervals along the route with enough fre-
quency to adequately determine accuracies, errors (systemic and bias), and trends of the
system. If the data are collected manually, this can be a very busy flight; the minimum
sequencing should be about 30 sec. If telemetry or batch processing is used, the timing
will depend on the data rate and be limited by the rate of avionics or TSPI, whichever is
lower. The heading of the aircraft and the magnetic variation are required to compute
TABLE 5.6 ¢ Navigation Accuracy
Navigation Accuracy (Input Data Card 1 of 2)
Alignment Type Time to Align
Time Magnetic Magnetic True Airspeed Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude

Heading Variation Heading (g) Truth Truth System System
Navigation Accuracy (Input Data Card 2 of 2)

Computed Errors
Time Radial Bearing N/S E/W Cross Along Sx Sy
Track Track
cross-track and along-track errors. If using telemetry, track may be provided from the
aircraft and these two data columns will not be required. As we fly along the route, the
aircraft should vary the airspeed and acceleration to note any anomalies that may present
themselves. As was discussed previously, I recommend that the first navigation accuracy
flight be flown at a constant airspeed and altitude in order to determine a baseline
performance. The latitude and longitude of the truth is the TSPI data time aligned with
the avionics (system) data. Remember that the truth data must be four times as accurate
as the system under test. Prior to the flight we need to work out our error budget for the
TSPI data (e.g., dilution of precision, timing, latency, resolution of the data).
Data card 2 shows the computations to be done on the data. The first two calculated
errors are the radial error and the direction of the error (bearing). These data can be used
to show the drift rate or calculate a CEP (if we assume that east/west and north/south
errors are equal). I will explain the CEP in a moment. The radial error is merely the
square root of the sum of the squares of the latitude and longitude errors:
LatitudeTruth LatitudeSystem ¼ DLatitude
LongitudeTruth LongitudeSystem ¼ DLongitude (5.1)
ErrorRadial ¼ ðDLatitude2 þ DLongitude2 Þ =
1
2
FIGURE 5.30 ¢
True Error Versus
Schuler Effect
Error Schuler Effect

(nm)
Drift Rate
0 42.2 84.4
Time
The DLatitude and DLongitude in equation 5.1 must be converted into feet before
we can compute the radial error; a simple conversion if we remember our basic
navigation. We can plot this error versus time to determine the drift rate of the sys-
tem. We can also plot either latitude or longitude error versus time if we are trying to
determine a bias in either of the two axes. For Schuler-tuned platforms, it is
imperative that we remove the Schuler effect from the radial error that we calculated
previously. If we remember that Schuler-tuned platforms are bounded by a period of
84.4 min, then the easiest way to remove the Schuler effect is to fly for one Schuler
cycle to determine the true error. Figure 5.30 shows data collected for a Schuler-tuned
platform plotting radial error versus time. The Schuler effect (red line) will give an
erroneous indication of the error throughout the period except for the times that it
crosses through the real system error line (blue line). Notice that these times are at the
half-Schuler and full-Schuler period times. A good operator on an aircraft without
GPS will only update the aircraft’s INS at these times. Updates at other times will
actually be detrimental to the accuracy of the INS. The calculated radial errors will
produce the red line; testers will add in the blue line using their best engineering
judgment. The area above the blue line enclosed by the red line should equal the area
below the blue line enclosed by the red line.
If we assume that the east–west and north–south errors are equal, the computation of
a CEP for this INS would be relatively easy. Since the CEP in all navigation systems is
50%—that is, half of all data points will be within the stated CEP and the other half will
be outside—the midpoint of all the calculated radial errors will be the CEP for the
system. If there is an even number of data points in the set, then the CEP will be the
average of the two midpoints in the set. If we consider the errors in the two lateral axes
to be unique, or bivariant, then we cannot use this approach and must try something a
little more cosmic.
One of the approaches used in computing a two-dimensional (2D) CEP of a
data set is an approximation that weighs the CEP in favor of the higher standard
deviation. This approximation, which may be found in most basic statistics books,
is as follows:
If Sx < Sy and Sx =Sy 0:28; then the CEP ¼ 0:562Sx þ 0:615Sy :
If Sx > Sy and Sy =Sx 0:28; then the CEP ¼ 0:615Sx þ 0:562Sy : (5.2)
If neither of the above are true; then the CEP ¼ 0:5887ðSx þ Sy Þ:
FIGURE 5.31 ¢
CEP About the
Target and the MIP
Case 1 Case 2
In equation 5.2, Sx is the standard deviation of the data set in the x axis, and Sy is the
standard deviation of the data set in the y axis. To put this mathematically:
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
SX ¼ Sðxi xÞ2
n1
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (5.3)
1
SY ¼ Sðyi yÞ2
n1
The previous equations will give the standard deviations in x and y, but in relation to
a mean impact point (MIP), that is, the center of all the data points. The MIP is simply
the mean of the data points in x and the mean of the data points in y. From basic
statistics, remember that the mean is defined as
1X
N
x¼ xi
N
i¼1
and
1 X
N
y¼ yi (5.4)
N
i¼1
These are the x and y coordinates for the MIP. Should we desire to calculate Sx and
Sy for the target as opposed to the MIP (as we would in determining our navigation
CEP), the MIP (in equation 5.3) is set to zero. It is always advisable to plot the CEP
against the target as well as the MIP because the visualization can help us determine
dispersion and whether errors appear to be systemic or a bias. Consider the diagram in
Figure 5.31. In each of the two cases, the CEP about the target is the same. However, the
CEP about the target in the second case clearly shows that the system is behaving well,
but there appears to be a biasing. Case 1 shows the CEP about the target (origin on the
x-y axis). Case 2 shows the same CEP about the target but depicts a CEP about the MIP
as the smaller circle. The MIP is the center of the smaller circle. This is due to the large
dispersion of data in case 1 and the tightness or grouping of data in case 2.
5.5.3.4 Acceleration and Velocity Accuracy

Many flight testers will fall into the trap of flight testing INS velocity and acceleration
accuracy. Remember from chapter 2 that (1) the truth must be four times as accurate as
the system under test, and (2) the best measure of truth is to use a system that measures
the parameter directly. The INS measures acceleration directly and then uses integrators
to solve for velocity and position. To prove the accuracy of the INS acceleration, it
would be impossible to find a truth source that measures acceleration four times as
accurately as the INS. If we had such an accelerometer, it would most likely be in the
INS! Acceleration accuracy is a bench test where the INS is placed on a tilt table and
known accelerations are input to the INS. The output of the INS is compared to these
known inputs to calculate accuracy. We can also look at the output of velocity and
compare it to our own calculated velocity with known acceleration inputs. We could
compare the INS velocity to a Doppler device (since Doppler measures velocity
directly), but these devices in the TSPI world are rare. The bottom line is that you can
perform these two tests in the lab. The actual parameters of interest will be positional
error and drift, which can, and should, be measured in flight.
5.5.3.5 Navigation Updates

The INS has the capability of being updated (i.e., make its nine-state vector more
accurate). The INS may be updated in position or velocity. It is the flight tester’s job to
ensure that the update functions are implemented and that they work correctly. Velocity
updates are normally accomplished with either the Doppler navigation system (DNS)
(discussed in the next section) or from the onboard radar. The DNS can accurately
calculate north–south and east–west velocities, which are really groundspeeds. This
information is fed directly to the INS as a direct substitution for the velocities. These
updates will remove any velocity ambiguities it has built up prior to the update. In some
aircraft implementations, the INS velocity is constantly updated by the DNS as long as
the DNS outputs are valid. The second possibility for updating the INS velocity is via the
radar. In the Doppler mode, the radar will identify the closing velocity of terrain on
the nose as the ship’s groundspeed. By knowing the aircraft’s heading (track) the INS can
compute the north–south, east–west components of the groundspeed and incorporate
them as with the DNS. In many implementations, this update is called the radar’s position
velocity update (PVU). In some cases, the PVU mode is interleaved (allowed to run
intermittently) with another radar mode to allow for continuous INS velocity updates.
Positional (latitude and longitude) updates to the INS include
● Radar/laser
● Radio aids (VOR/DME/TACAN)
● Visual
● GPS
● Off-board (data link)
Some of these updates require computations by the navigation computer, whereas
others are a direct substitution of position. A radar or laser update uses the onboard
sensors to determine the range and bearing to a known target. Using this information,
along with own-ship altitude, the navigation computer can determine (via coordinate
conversion) the own-ship position and feed this information to the INS (Figure 5.32).
A similar update capability exists with VOR/DME and TACAN. The station’s true
position is known from a lookup table in the aircraft’s mission computers. The radio aid
system provides a range and bearing to the ground station, and this information, along
with own-aircraft altitude, can be fed to the navigation computer to determine own-ship
present position. In some implementations, civil as well as military, a constant INS update
is performed as long as a valid signal is received from the radio aid. A visual update is
FIGURE 5.32 ¢ INS

Update via Onboard
Sensor
Range and Bearing from Sensor
Altitude from Aircraft
Latitude, Longitude, and

of a Known Point
performed by flying over a known point and then inserting the latitude and longitude of
the point into the INS when the aircraft is directly over the point. The accuracy of this
update is directly proportional to the altitude of the aircraft when over the point. For
example, if an aircraft performed a visual update over a point while flying at 500 ft AGL,
the pilot could expect to be accurate to within 500 ft. If he were flying at 18,000 ft
and performed this update, the accuracy of the update could be expected to be only 3 nm.
This implies that visual updates should be performed at the lowest altitude possible.
The easiest of the updates is the direct substitution updates from either the GPS or
an off-board sensor through a data link system. Implementation of the GPS update can
be either manual or automatic. With a manual update, the pilot forces the GPS position
into the INS. With an automatic update, as is the case with an integrated GPS/INS (IGI)
or an enhanced GPS/INS (EGI), whenever the GPS position is valid and the FOM is
better than a set threshold, the GPS position is sent to the INS at an update rate of once
per second. Some systems, such as Link-16, retain a capability to update the aircraft’s
INS from another platform. A terminal input message (TIM) is received by the aircraft
directing a navigation update. The mission computer then forwards the new present
position to the navigation computer as an update.
A Note of Caution: Some testers, and indeed operators, may notice that when a
navigation update is performed the system does not accept the full update. For example,
the pilot may notice that the navigation system places him 1 nm east of his real position.
After a valid update, he notices that the navigation system places him ½ nm east of his
real position; only half of the update was accepted. The reason is the Kalman filtering
techniques and weighting used in modern navigation systems. The system will not
accept large changes to any of the states when they exceed allowable predictions. You
may find that multiple updates will be required to put the navigation system at the
correct position in space.
5.6 DOPPLER NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

The DNS utilizes the Doppler effect to calculate an aircraft’s velocity in the east–west,
north–south, and up–down directions. This information, along with a known heading
and a starting origin, allows the system to perform dead reckoning navigation. The
Doppler effect is covered in detail in chapter 8 of this text. In general, the Doppler effect
is the apparent frequency shift whenever relative motion is present between bodies
emitting electromagnetic waves. A positive rate of closure (two bodies approaching each
other) will compress the wave, shortening the wavelength and thereby increasing the
frequency. The opposite is true for opening, or negative rate of closure. The apparent
frequency shift is larger at higher operating frequencies than lower frequencies and thus
is more able to measure small changes in closure.
If we first take the case of a stationary transmitter radiating toward a moving target, we
can describe the relationship of velocity to Doppler shift. If we let f equal the frequency of
the transmitter in hertz, V be the velocity of the target in feet per second, and c equal the
speed of light in feet per second, the frequency of the reflected energy (freflected) becomes
freflected ¼ f þ Vf=c: (5.5)
For a moving transmitter, there is an additional change of Vf/c caused by movement

of the transmitter during the trip time of the wave. The reflected frequency then becomes
freflected ¼ f þ 2Vf=c: (5.6)
Since we know the frequency and the speed of light, and we remember the rela-
tionship of wavelength and frequency (l ¼ c/f ), then the Doppler shift can be written as
Doppler shift ¼ 2V=l: (5.7)
Consider the case of an aircraft transmitting a narrow beam of radio energy toward
the ground. If the beam depression angle is s (Figure 5.33), then the difference between
the transmitted wave and the ground echo is

2Vf
cos s: (5.8)
c
The choice of the depression angle is a matter of compromise. If the depression

angle is too small, then little of the transmitted energy will be reflected back, especially
when flying over smooth surfaces such as sand, ice, and water. If the depression angle is
too large, its cosine is too small to make an accurate measurement. Typical DNS sys-
tems will have depression angles somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 . When
Doppler navigation is combined with onboard radar, the depression angle often cannot
be greater than 45 .
Two frequency bands have been allocated to DNSs under international agreement;
they are centered about 8.8 GHz and 13.3 GHz. At these frequencies, Doppler shifts of
around 10 kHz are experienced and can be measured quite accurately.
Since the aircraft needs to know the velocities in three axes, an ideal system would
radiate four beams: two in the forward quadrant and two in the aft quadrant. Left–right
and forward–aft velocities can be converted to a groundspeed along a track if the heading
is known. Many DNS beam arrangements are used, but most common are Janus Systems
(Janus, named for the Roman god who looks ahead as well as behind). Figure 5.34 shows
some typical DNS beam arrangements; three of them are Janus-type systems. It is
important to note that if the antennas on these systems were fixed, then serious errors
would be introduced into the systems during aircraft pitch and roll maneuvers. For this
FIGURE 5.33 ¢
DNS Depression
Angle
s
FIGURE 5.34 ¢
Typical DNS Beam
Arrangements
(a) Two-Beam Non-Janus (b) Three-Beam Janus Lambda
(c) Three-Beam Janus T (d) Four-Beam Janus X
reason, the antennas must be earth stabilized either mechanically or mathematically.

Mechanically stabilized antennas employ a gimbal package, much like the INS, to
maintain DNS stabilization during aircraft maneuvers. The gimbals are limited in the
amount of tilt and roll they can produce, and there will come a point in time during a
maneuver where the system can no longer compensate for the aircraft’s attitude. A typical
system can be stabilized to 10 in pitch and 45 in roll. Mathematically stabilized systems
compute a correction to the measured velocity by knowing the aircraft’s pitch and roll
attitudes. This system is more restrictive in pitch and roll, as the returned energy decreases
and finally disappears on the up-wing antenna during a maneuver.
Figure 5.35 shows the aircraft velocity vectors as a function of x (forward), y (left/
right), and z (up/down). The three-beam Janus Lambda system that is depicted directly
measures the three velocities of Fp (forward port), Fs (forward starboard), and Rs
(rearward starboard). Given this geometry and the three measured Doppler velocities,
the three components of aircraft velocity can be calculated. The equations for these
calculations are shown in equation 5.9.
lðf FP fRS Þ
VX ¼
4 sin b cos f
lðf FP fFS Þ
VY ¼ (5.9)
4 sin b cos f
lðf RS f FS Þ
VZ ¼
4 cos b
FIGURE 5.35 ¢ Fp
Aircraft Velocity Rp
Components
f Vy
d
Vx
f
Fs
Vz
s s
b b
In addition to stabilization in the vertical (earth stabilization), some Doppler navi-

gation antennas are also stabilized with respect to ground track. This can be accom-
plished by rotating the antennas about the vertical until the cross-track Doppler is
nullified. By nullifying the cross-track error, the aircraft drift angle is equal to the
antenna offset and the groundspeed is equal to Vx. In systems that are not ground track
stabilized, the drift angle and the groundspeed must be computed:
Groundspeed ¼ ðVx 2 þ Vy 2 Þ1=2
(5.10)
Drift angle ¼ tan1 ðVy =Vx Þ
The DNS transmissions may be either continuous wave (CW) or pulsed. There are
advantages and disadvantages to both types. CW systems employ a transmit and a
receive antenna. These systems suffer from leakage (energy from the transmitting
antenna seen by the receiving antenna) and, as a consequence, require more power and
therefore larger components. The major benefit of CW systems is that they do not
experience eclipsing. With single-antenna systems, the antenna must be given a listening
time in order to receive echoes from reflective targets. Some echoes will arrive at the
antenna at the same time as the antenna is transmitting. Since the antenna cannot process
this return, no return for that returned echo (range) can be displayed. These blind zones
are a function of the pulse repetition frequency (PRF) of the radar and the range to the
target. The disadvantages of the CW system can be avoided by frequency modulating
the transmitted signal; the ground return will be delayed by a time equal to the distance
traveled, whereas the leakage will be undelayed.
The pulsed system avoids the CW leakage problem since there is only one antenna.
Signals are generated at a specific length (pulse width) and PRF. As previously men-
tioned, pulsed systems with a high PRF will experience eclipsing. Some of the eclipsing
problems can be solved by varying the PRF, which avoids a constant range being
eclipsed, or by making the PRF altitude (and thus range) dependent. Some pulsed sys-
tems use coherent detection, which achieves a higher signal-to-noise ratio. The trans-
mitted signal is replicated in the receiver, allowing the receiver to search through the
noise to match the returned energy to the internally generated signal.
5.6.1 Doppler Navigation System Errors

As we have seen, an accurate heading and an accurate measurement of x, y, and z
velocities are required to maintain an accurate navigator. It should come as no surprise
that the errors involved are related to heading and Doppler measurement. If the heading
is inaccurate, then the measured drift will be added to that error to obtain the aircraft
track, which will also be in error. Groundspeed will, in turn, be applied to a wrong track,
which will drive the aircraft position away from true position.
The first cause of error in the measurement of velocity is antenna misalignment.
Velocity along the radial axis of the aircraft is proportional to the cosine of the
depression angle (equation 5.8). Any error in the depression angle will translate into an
error in the velocity measurement. These errors may be caused in boresighting of the
system or in the manufacturing process; occasionally variations in waveguide dimen-
sions can affect beam depression angle. If the stabilization of the system is accomplished
mathematically, any errors in the attitude measurement of the aircraft will translate into
depression angle errors.
The second cause of velocity inaccuracies is due to the type of terrain the aircraft is
overflying. Since the radar requires a return from the surface in order to determine
velocity, flight over smooth surfaces can create problems, especially for systems
employing small depression angles. Flight over sand, snow, lakes, and paved surfaces
will tend to reflect the beam away from the transmitter. Flight over the ocean creates
unique problems, because unlike the ground the ocean is always moving. The Doppler
shift is a combination of aircraft movement as well as ocean movement. Wind across the
waves creates additional problems as water droplets are carried by the wind and appear
as an additional Doppler shift. Most DNSs provide the operator with a land and sea
mode of operation. The land mode may be considered the normal operation of the DNS.
The sea mode employs special processing to account for the ocean’s movement and thus
velocity errors. The simplest method of correction could be the entry of the system into a
memory, or coast, mode. In this mode, the last known drift and groundspeed are used
until the operator selects land. This correction is undesirable for long transit times over
the ocean. A second correction may be the addition of an average velocity bias applied
to the measured Doppler velocity when the sea mode is entered. The bias is a fixed value
incorporated into the system and may not be realistic based on changing sea conditions.
A third way to account for errors over the ocean is to use beam shaping or beam
switching. Both of these solutions add cost and complexity to a relatively simple system,
with the latter being the most effective as well as the most costly. Beam shaping utilizes fan
and pencil beams on an alternating basis to seek an average velocity. Beam switching
requires a change in depression angles on a scan-to-scan basis. Larger depression angles
will give a truer picture of aircraft velocity but are more difficult to measure due to the
small cosine of the larger angles. Smaller depression angles provide easier calculations but
are more subject to water movement and deflection. A summation of measurements taken
at different depression angles can provide a realistic determination of own-ship speed.
5.6.2 Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Doppler

Navigation Systems
The advantages of the DNS system are similar to the INS in that it is entirely self-contained
and, as such, can operate anywhere. Similarly, it is not restricted to LOS operations with
any ground station. Unlike the INS, there is no alignment required for the DNS, and the
DNS measures groundspeed directly as opposed to integrating acceleration.
On the flip side, the DNS requires an independent heading source that must be
accurate, as well as an independent attitude reference system. The aircraft will be
maneuver restricted due to gimbal limitations of the system. Similar to the INS,
the position error of the DNS is unbounded as a result of the time integration of velocity.
There will be degraded operation of the system over smooth surfaces like the ocean, and
external radiation makes the aircraft vulnerable to enemy detection in wartime.
A DNS-aided INS provides a better navigation system than either system alone,
but a GPS/DNS-aided INS provides an even better system. GPS will be addressed in the
next section.
5.6.3 Flight Testing of Doppler Navigation Systems

Flight testing of the DNS will be similar in nature to testing of the INS, except the
performance of the system will also include flight over different types of terrain. A CEP
or drift rate should be calculated for each type of terrain, and in the case of flight over
the ocean, different sea states; sea states are covered in section 8.8.5 ‘‘Detection of
Targets at Sea.’’ As a preview, Table 5.7 provides a description of sea state and the
associated wave heights. Velocity accuracy is not normally tested but is evaluated when
troubleshooting poor positional accuracies.
The first test of the system will be a mechanical evaluation of the boresight. Perfor-
mance evaluations should not be attempted prior to this evaluation. Victim/source EMI/
EMC and field tests should be conducted prior to flight testing, as described in section 4.13.
Prior to departure, the groundspeed should be checked that zero groundspeed is indicated
while the aircraft is at rest. Double-check the input of latitude and longitude prior to takeoff.
Cross-check the heading input when the aircraft is aligned with the runway. If installed on a
helicopter, these checks can be accomplished during the transition to hover.
The navigation route should be designed to fly legs of the route over similar terrain,
going from the most benign to the worst case. Legs should also be flown initially at
constant speed and altitude to obtain the baseline performance of the system. It does not
do any good to fly the first navigation route at varying speeds with large bank angles
over varying terrain because you will not know the cause of the inaccuracies. If each leg
TABLE 5.7 ¢ World Meteorological Organization Sea States
Wave Height
Sea State Feet Meters Descriptive Term

0 0 0 Calm, Glassy
1 0–⅓ 0–0.1 Calm, Rippled
2 ⅓–1⅔ 0.1–0.5 Smooth, Wavelets
3 2–4 0.6–1.2 Slight
4 4–8 1.2–2.4 Moderate
5 8–13 2.4–4.0 Rough
6 13–20 4.0–6.0 Very Rough
7 20–30 6.0–9.0 High
8 30–45 9.0–14 Very High
9 >45 >14 Phenomenal
TABLE 5.8 ¢ DNS Test Scenario
Doppler Navigation Flight Sequence
Flight No. Type Terrain Airspeed Altitude Maneuvers

1 Diffuse, Good Reflecting Cruise Constant Benign
2 Diffuse, Good Reflecting Vary, Low to High Constant Benign
3 Diffuse, Good Reflecting Cruise Vary, Low to High Benign
4 Diffuse, Good Reflecting Cruise Constant 10 , 20 , 30 to
Max Bank S Turns
5 Smooth, Sand, Snow, Calm Lakes Cruise Constant Benign
6 Smooth, Sand, Snow, Calm Lakes Cruise Constant 10 , 20 , 30 to
Max Bank S Turns
7 Ocean Up to Sea State 3 Cruise Constant Benign
8 Ocean Up to Sea State 3 Cruise Constant 10 , 20 , 30 to
Max Bank S Turns
9 Ocean, Greater than Sea State 3 Cruise Constant Benign
10 Ocean, Greater than Sea State 3 Cruise Constant 10 , 20 , 30 to
Max Bank S Turns
11 Land–Sea Contrast Cruise Constant 10 , 20 , 30 to
Max Bank S Turns
of the route features a different type of terrain, then a navigation update should be
performed at the start of each leg. The easiest way to do this is to use a GPS or fly over a
known point on the ground. The data that need to be collected are identical to that
needed for the INS (Table 5.6); you will have to add type terrain to one of the data
fields. A proposed test scenario can be found in Table 5.8.
The general idea is to collect baseline performance data for the system and progress
logically to the next level of difficulty. The table is not meant to imply that 11 flights are
required for the evaluation. Aircraft with longer flight durations may combine multiple
scenarios in one flight. If this is done, remember to update the present position prior to
initiating the next scenario. Land–sea contrast is included as a test condition because
some systems may incorporate an automatic gain control (AGC) to prevent saturation.
If this is the case, strong echoes from land returns may trigger an AGC response in the
DNS, which may cause a loss of return from the weaker water echoes. Once again,
homework is necessary on the part of the evaluator to understand how the system works
prior to embarking on an evaluation.
5.7 GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE

SYSTEMS (GNSS)
GNSS is the generic term for all satellite-based navigation systems. Systems currently in
use or planned are as follows:
– Global positioning system (GPS) (US)
– Global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) (Russian Federation)
– Galileo (European Union)
– COMPASS BeiDou (North Star) (China)
– Quasi-zenith satellite system (QZSS) (Japan)

– Indian regional navigation satellite system (IRNSS) (India)
An introduction to GPS was given in section 2.12 when addressing TSPI systems.
As previously mentioned, GPS can provide an excellent source of present position, but
operators and evaluators must be aware of some of its limitations. This first section will
deal with the basic theory and operation of the GPS.
The GPS baseline constellation is composed of 24 earth-orbiting satellites, with 2
spares, at an altitude of 10,900 nm. There are four satellites in each of six planes that are
at 55 inclinations; the orbit time for each satellite is 11 hr, 57 min. For the past several
years, the Air Force has been flying 31 operational GPS satellites, plus 3 to 4 decom-
missioned satellites (residuals) that can be reactivated if needed. The optimized coverage
is for the mid-latitudes for the simple reason that the United States built it. With this basic
knowledge, some things about GPS should become obvious. The first is that you are
going to get different constellations on a day-to-day basis even if you fly at the same time
each day. Do not make the mistake of thinking that the GPS was great today at 1300 so we
will schedule our next flight at the same time next Tuesday to get the same results.
The second is that coverage may be lost or not as many satellites may be in view as you
get closer to the poles. Parts of Canada, Alaska, and Australia encounter this problem.
The satellites broadcast coded messages to the receivers on the GPS frequencies.
Each message contains almanac and ephemeris data, which are the health and position
data for all of the satellites. Each message contains five subframes, each of which is
6 sec long, for a total of 30 sec. The almanac is downloaded on the Nav message every
12.5 min. If a GPS receiver does not have the current almanac and ephemeris it must
collect it before it can attempt to acquire satellites. A single-channel receiver takes
12 min (for 24 satellites) to initialize. A 12-channel receiver with 12 satellites in view
takes about 1 min. It is possible for the GPS to be fooled on its initial position. Most GPS
receivers maintain their last known position and continue to maintain time when turned
off through battery power. If the GPS is moved without being turned on, when it is
reinitialized it will think that it is still in its last known position. It will search the sky for
the satellites it thinks should be in view. When it does not find them (because it was
moved), it will start to listen for satellites and calculate where it must be with the
satellites in view; this may take a bit of time. All GPS units allow the user to enter into a
menu to identify present position (or geographic location) to make the GPS search much
quicker. Each subframe has a telemetry and handover word that contains a 17-bit time of
the week. Table 5.9 provides an illustration of the satellite content.
The GPS operates on two frequencies in the L-band spectrum. The L1 frequency,
which contains the coarse acquisition (C/A) code and the precision (P) code is at
1575.42 MHz. The L2 frequency, which contains the P code only, is at 1227.6 MHz.
Both frequencies can be acquired by dual-channel frequency receivers (both military
and civilian) as long as the P code is not encrypted. Should it become necessary to
encrypt the P code, as in time of war, it is renamed the Y code. Access to the Y code can
be accomplished only by users with a crypto key, that is, the military.
Three new civil signals will eventually be added to the GPS system via new satel-
lites. L2C (L2 civilian) is designed to meet commercial needs by offering higher accu-
racy through an ionospheric correction and higher effective power and it will never be
encrypted. L5 is designed to meet safety of life civilian requirements and the L1C which
is designed for other GNSS systems (Galileo, IRNSS, QZSS) interoperability.
TABLE 5.9 ¢ Satellite Message Content
Subframe One Subframe 300 Bits, 6 Seconds

#
1 TLM How SV Clock Correction Data
2 TLM How SV Ephemeris Data (I) One
Data
3 TLM How SV Ephemeris Data (II) Frame
25 Pages of Subframe 4 and 5 12.5 minutes
1500 Bits,
4 TLM How Other Data (IONO, UTC, ETC) 30 Seconds
5 TLM How Almanac Data for all SVS
One Word 30 Bits, 24 Data, 6 Parity

TLM
8-Bit Preamble Data Parity
Telemetry Word
How
17-Bit Time of Week Data Parity
Handover Word
GPS NAVIGATION DATA FORMAT

PHDANA 10/92
The L2C signal will be available with the Block IIR(M) constellation. The launch of
the first Block IIR-M was on 25 September 2005, and the last launch occurred in August
2009. As of December 24, 2013, there were 7 healthy IIR(M) satellites in the GPS
constellation, plus one more (SVN-49) designated unusable. The Block IIR(M)
constellation will comprise 24 satellites with an estimated completion time of 2015.
It provides benefits of a second civilian GPS signal (L2C) for improved performance in
commercial applications, two new military signals providing enhanced military jam-
resistance, and flexible power levels for military signals.
The IIF series expand on the capabilities of the IIR(M) series with the addition of a
third civil signal (L5) in a frequency protected for safety-of-life transportation. The F in
IIF stands for follow-on. Compared with previous generations, GPS IIF satellites have a
longer life expectancy and a higher accuracy requirement. Each spacecraft uses a mix of
rubidium and cesium atomic clocks to keep time within 8 billionths of a second per day.
The IIF series will improve the accuracy, signal strength, and quality of GPS. The first
IIF satellite was launched in May 2010. As of December 24, 2013, there were four
healthy IIF satellites in the GPS constellation, with a fifth scheduled for launch in 2014.
The GPS Block III is currently under development by Lockheed Martin. GPS III will
provide more powerful signals in addition to enhanced signal reliability, accuracy, and
integrity, all of which will support precision, navigation, and timing services. As of April
2013, GPS III Satellite Vehicles (SVs) 03-08 are in the production and deployment phase.
Future versions will feature increased capabilities to meet demands of military and civi-
lian users alike. The key improvements are a fourth civilian GPS signal (L1C) for inter-
national interoperability and a 15-year design lifespan. Future enhancements include the
distress alerting satellite system (DASS) for search and rescue and satellite laser retro-
reflectors. Updates and status of the GPS system may be found at http://www.gps.gov.
The L2 frequency is normally obtained by first tracking the P code on the L1 fre-
quency using the handoff word. Some military receivers can directly acquire the L2
frequency, but this is outside the norm.
The GPS provides users with a nine-state vector, just as with all other navigation
systems. But as we have seen with the other systems, the GPS provides a direct mea-
surement of only one parameter. INS measures acceleration, DNS measures velocity,
and GPS measures time. The GPS obtains position by aerotriangulation using spheres of
range from three satellites. The range is obtained by using the time difference from when
a signal was sent by a satellite to when it was received by the user and multiplying the
time difference by the speed of light. The position of the user is defined by the inter-
section of three spheres around the satellites whose radius is equal to the range just
described. The position is three-dimensional (3D) consisting of latitude, longitude, and
altitude. Since three parameters are unknown, three equations (satellites) are required for
the solution. Time is also unknown, and therefore a fourth satellite is required for the 3D
position. In some military applications, barometric altitude is directly substituted into
the solution, and only three satellites are required for the 3D position. The biggest
problem for the receiver is to calculate the correct time.
If a wrong time is used, there will be an accompanying error in the measured
range and therefore position. Pseudoranging is the manipulation of the calculated
ranges from each received satellite to minimize errors, primarily the time bias of
the receiver. Figure 5.36 provides a graphical representation of this process,
and Table 5.10 provides a mathematical example of the pseudoranging process.
An important aside is the fact that all measurements are relative to the antenna, not
the receiver.
FIGURE 5.36 ¢
Pseudoranging
Measured
Range
Receiver
Clock Bias
Position and Time
The GPS Navigation Solution

The estimated ranges to each satellite intersect within a small region when the receiver
clock bias is correctly estimated and added to each measured relative range.
TABLE 5.10 ¢ Pseudoranging Calculation Example
GPS Pseudorange Navigation Example - Peter H. Dana - 4/24/96

Satellite (SV) coordinates in ECEF XYZ from Ephemeris Parameters and SV Time
SVx0 :¼ 15524471:175 SVy0 :¼ 16649826:222 SVz0 :¼ 13512272:387 SV 15
SVx1 :¼ 2304058:534 SVy1 :¼ 23287906:465 SVz1 :¼ 11917038:105 SV 27
SVx2 :¼ 16680243:357 SVy2 :¼ 3069625:561 SVz2 :¼ 20378551:047 SV 31
SVx3 :¼ 14799931:395 SVy3 :¼ 21425358:24 SVz3 :¼ 6069947:224 SV 7
Satellite Pseudoranges in meters (from C/A code epocs in milliseconds)
P0 :¼ 89491:971 P1 :¼ 133930:500 P2 :¼ 283098:754 P3 :¼ 205961:742 Range þ Receiver Clock Bias
Receiver Position Estimate in ECEF XYZ
Rx :¼ 730000 Ry :¼ 5440000 Rz :¼ 32300000
For Each of 4 SVs i :¼ 0..3
Ranges from Receiver Position Estimate to SVs (R) and Array of Observed - Predicted Ranges
qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Ri :¼ ðSVxi RxÞ2 þ ðSVyi RyÞ2 þ ðSVzi RzÞ2 Li :¼ mod½ðRi Þ:299792:458 Pi
Compute Directional Derivatives for XYZ and Time
SVxi Rx SVyi Ry SVzi Rz
Dxi :¼ Dyi :¼ Dzi :¼ Dti :¼ 1
Ri Ri Ri
Solve for Correction to Receiver Position Estimate
2 3 2 3
Dx0 Dy0 Dz0 Dt0 3186:496
6 Dx1 Dy1 Dz1 Dt1 7 6 3791:932 7
A :¼ 64 Dx2 Dy2 Dz2 Dt2 5
7 dR :¼ ðAT AÞ1 AT L dR ¼ 6
4 1193:286 5
7
Dx3 Dy3 Dz3 Dt3 12345:997

Apply Corrections to Receiver XYZ and Compute Receiver Clock Bias Estimate
Rx :¼ Rx þ dR0 Ry :¼ Ry þ dR1 Rz :¼ Rz þ dR2 Time :¼ dR3
Rx ¼ 733186:496 Ry ¼ 5443791:932 Rz ¼ 3231193:286 Time ¼ 12345:997
5.7.1 GPS Errors

Since the GPS can measure only time, it stands to reason that the only errors in the GPS are
due to errors in the measurement of time. Errors can occur in three areas: the satellites
themselves, the propagation of the signal, and the receiver. Each satellite has three atomic
clocks to ensure the accuracy of time. U.S. Space Command is responsible for the control
segment of the GPS, which includes monitoring the health and welfare of the satellites,
positioning spares, correcting ephemeris data, and ensuring the satellites provide accurate
time. The master control station is at Schriever Air Force Base, in Colorado, and monitoring
stations are situated close to the equator around the world. Even with this control, sometimes
errors are missed and are allowed to enter the receiver and hence the navigation solution.
As an example, I offer the following. A significant GPS anomaly occurred on
January 1, 2004, beginning at approximately 1833 Z. The anomaly affected precise
timing and navigation for users over large portions of Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia,
and portions of North America. The anomaly was due to a failed atomic frequency
standard (AFS) on satellite 23. The lack of a hard failure indication on the satellite
telemetry and satellite visibility limitations caused the satellite to provide hazardously
misleading information to GPS users. Figure 5.37 shows the affected area of the
anomaly, and Figure 5.38 shows the ranging errors caused in this satellite.
FIGURE 5.37 ¢ SVN 23 Timing Anomaly, Satellite Footprint - 1830 to 2120Z

Affected Coverage
Due to AFS Anomaly
FIGURE 5.38 ¢ Ranging Errors

Ranging Error Due IGS Rapid Ephemeris & MCS Kalman Filter
to AFS Anomaly 0
–27,400
–100,000 –93,700
–155,805
–200,000
–218,953
Ranging Error (m)
–300,000 –282,103
*SVN/PRN23 set
–400,000 Unhealthy@2118Z
–464,684
–500,000
–531,000
–600,000 –595,000
MCS Kalman Filter –658,000
–700,000 IGS Rapid Ephemeris –722,000
–800,000
16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 00:00
Plot Courtesy of Boeing
Many of satellite errors will be known ahead of time. The control segment may
move a satellite within its orbit or take the satellite out of service for a period of time.
It is incumbent upon the user to check the notice advisory to NAVSTAR users (NANU)
prior to GPS use. The NANU system is much like the notices to airmen (NOTAM)
system, which identifies restrictions in the use of navigation aids, airfields, etc. As with
the NOTAM system, the NANU system should be checked prior to any flight or
test operation scheduled to use GPS. NANU may be accessed in many ways, the
most popular being the Internet. One example is the U.S. Coast Guard site at http://
www.navcen.uscg.gov. Restrictions on the use of GPS may also be found on the
NOTAM system when specified areas may be unavailable to GPS users. This can hap-
pen around military installations testing antijam GPS capabilities or radiating energy in
the GPS frequencies.
01/13/14 Ionospheric TEC Map FIGURE 5.39 ¢

18:50 UT 80 Total Electron
80 Content Map
60
70
40
Geographic Latitude (deg)
60
20
50
TECU
0 40
30
–20
20
–40
10
–60
0
–80
–180 –150 –120 –90 –60 –30 0 30 60 90 120 150 180
Geographic Longitude (deg)
• GPS Receiver
Since GPS operates in L band, the earth’s atmosphere is almost transparent to the
transmission. The largest contributor to time errors in propagation is galactic noise,
or solar activity. Programs are available that show possible degradation of the GPS
due to solar activity. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory website (http://iono.jpl.nasa.gov/
latest_rti_global.html) provides users with global maps of ionospheric total electron
content (TEC) in real time. These maps are used to monitor atmospheric weather and
predict ionospheric storms that adversely affect GPS accuracy. Figure 5.39 shows an
example of an ionospheric TEC map.
By using a little ingenuity, the user sets a threshold for TEC that will identify the
maximum degradation of the signal that may be allowable for a particular operation.
Other websites and programs are available to the user to assist in determining whether
ionospheric scintillation might be a potential problem for their application. Northwest
Research Associates produces a product that indicates, by satellite, scintillation levels
that exceed certain user-specified thresholds as a function of time. Figure 5.40 provides
an example of their product: red indicates levels exceeding user-defined outage levels
60% of the time, yellow more than 30%, green less than 30%, and black indicates that
the satellite is below a user-defined elevation angle. These products allow users and
evaluators to schedule testing at the optimum times.
Other errors in propagation involve jamming—intentional as well as unintentional.
The GPS signal at the antenna is below earth noise; the L1 signal can be measured
at 160 dBW. The signal is pulled out of the noise with coherent detection preamp-
powered antennas and high-gain receivers, but it does not take much additional noise to
obliterate the GPS signal. A 1 W noise jammer centered at L1 can blank the GPS signal
for 30 nm. This may be a problem for military applications in hostile areas, but the
biggest jamming threat to most users is unintentional jamming; everybody and his
brother broadcasts in L band. Systems such as TACAN, JTIDS, MIDS, IFF, and mode S
all broadcast in L band. I do not know how many programs lost GPS on the first
development flight of a new program because no one considered the adverse effects
of telemetry transmissions on the GPS signal (most pulse code modulation [PCM]
FIGURE 5.40 ¢ GPS Scintillation Impacts - 31 January 2002 (L2, S4>0.3)

User-Defined 32
Outage Levels 31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
(Copyright 2002, Northwest Research Associates, Inc)

23
22
21
20
19
18
GPS PRN
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
09
08
07
06
05
04
03
02
01
00
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
UTC
Location: Oslo, Norway
Solar/Geophysical Conditions: SSN = 150.0 | Activity Level: High (7)
telemetry systems operate in L band). Multipath effects in mountainous areas may also
be considered as unintentional jamming, as the results are the same.
In October 2011 a series of upgrades were begun to increase the availability of the
WAAS LPV service during times of high solar activity; the last peak (11 years) was in
February 2013. To ensure safety for users, the WAAS provides information about the
ionosphere. This is done via a parameter called the grid ionospheric vertical error (GIVE);
the parameter is low for small solar activity and high for greater solar activity. The GIVE
parameter ensures WAAS receivers account for delay due to ionospheric activity. The
real-time GIVE parameter can be found at http://www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/24Hr_WaasLPV.
htm. An example of a daily WAAS GIVE plot may be found at Figure 5.41.
The receiver itself can also have errors in the clock or in the calculation of time.
A combination of these errors (satellites, propagation, and receiver) sum to the total
WAAS LPV Coverage Contours FIGURE 5.41 ¢

01/12/14 WAAS LPV
Week 1775 Day 0
1 Accounting for GIVE
70
60
0.95
50
Latitude
40
Percent CONUS Alaska Canada
Avail. Coverage Coverage Coverage
95 100.00% 98.99% 93.46% 0.9
30 98 100.00% 97.66% 88.58%
99 100.00% 97.34% 86.24%
99.9 100.00% 97.01% 82.88%
100 100.00% 97.01% 82.63%
20
W+J+H+ FAA technical center

WAAS test team
10 0.85
–160 –140 –120 –100 –80 –60
Longitude
error in time. This, of course, translates to an error in range from the satellites that
carries through to a positional error determined by the receiver. Unless some external
monitor is employed, the integrity of the GPS cannot be assured. We will investigate
receiver autonomous integrity monitors (RAIMs) and differential systems (which can
perform integrity checks) in a later section.
5.7.2 Other Contributors to GPS Inaccuracy

The GPS receiver employs an internal optimum constellation algorithm that selects the
four satellites providing the best dilution of precision (DOP). The concept of the geo-
metric dilution of precision (GDOP) was addressed in section 2.5. Briefly, the DOP is a
multiplier of accuracy. For example, the GPS provides an accuracy of 15 m in x and y
for a DOP of 1. If the DOP increases to 3, the accuracy of the GPS is 3 15 m, or 45 m.
It is important to know the DOP for each test of the GPS. The constellation that will
provide the best accuracy (GDOP ¼ 1) is three satellites 120 apart at 5 above the
horizon and one satellite directly overhead. Since this constellation is not always
available, GPS accuracy will degrade as a function of satellite geometry.
The GPS can output a vertical (VDOP), horizontal (HDOP), or positional (PDOP)
dilution of precision. The GDOP is the PDOP for a specific user’s location. It is important
to remember that the GDOP will change based on the user’s location, the time of day,
and the availability of satellites. Some GPSs output an expected positional error (EPE).
The EPE is merely the product of the DOP and the manufacturer’s stated accuracy.
FIGURE 5.42 ¢ Baja DOP Spike

Effect of Satellite 18° 43' N ⴛ 118° 31.7'W, 29 Jun 2004, SVN32 removed, all in view, 5-Degree mask
10000
Removal on the
DOP
1000
PDOP (Log)
100
10
1
22:00
22:10
22:20
22:30
22:40
22:50
23:00
Time of Day (UTC)
AFSPC GPS Support Center
Evaluators should not use EPE as TSPI accuracy or as a measure of GPS performance.
The error budget should use 15 m multiplied by the user’s GDOP. When satellites are taken
offline for a period of time, the user may see a large increase in the GDOP and therefore a
large increase in the inaccuracy. Figure 5.42 shows the effect of removing a satellite where
only five satellites are in view. This is actual data from the Baja Peninsula on June 29, 2004.
There is also an inaccuracy due to the update rate. The GPS update rate is once per
second, and this will contribute to the along-track error; cross-track error will not be
affected. Because of the slow update rate, the along-track uncertainty, or error budget,
will increase with increasing aircraft speed.
Many of the problems associated with timing accuracy can be eliminated with dif-
ferential GPS. A ground receiver at a known location compares the computed GPS
position to its known location. The error of the GPS location can be eliminated by
calculating the clock bias, or Dt, for each of the satellites. As the Dt for each satellite is
applied, the GPS position is moved toward the true position. A Dt for all satellites in
view is computed to make the GPS position equal to the true position. A matrix of these
time corrections can be sent to an aircraft to adjust its GPS position, or it can be cor-
rected in postflight, as in the TSPI case. There are some concerns with this arrangement:
relativity effects, LOS considerations, and satellites not in view to the ground receiver.
The error in time will change based on the relative position of the receiver to the
satellite. The aircraft may be closer to the satellite than the ground station and may see
less of an error. The general consensus is that relativity effects are not a concern as long
as the receiver and the ground station are within 300 nm of each other. Since the earth is
round, there will come a point where the aircraft is below the horizon and corrections
cannot be received from the ground station. The range at which this occurs is a function
of the aircraft’s altitude and can be calculated using equation 5.11.
pffiffiffiffiffi
Range to the radar horizon ðnmÞ: R :86 2h; (5.11)
where h is the altitude of the aircraft.

As the aircraft travels away from the ground station it will begin to receive satellite
signals that cannot be seen by the ground station because of the same LOS considera-
tions. The ground station cannot offer corrections for these satellites if the aircraft uses
them in its calculations.
5.7.3 GPS Accuracies

Historical data have shown that the accuracies of the GPS are better than specified.
Figures 5.43 and 5.44 present actual performance data for the GPS for the 2003 calendar
Actual Horizontal Position Errors FIGURE 5.43 ¢

All in View VS Best 4 - 2003 2003 Positional
10.00
Accuracies Best 4
Global Best 4 95% Horizontal Error Global AIV 95% Position Error
9.00 Linear (Global Best 4 95% Linear (Global AIV 95%
and All Satellites
8.00 Horizontal Error) Position Error)
7.00
Meters of Error
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
1-Jan-03 20-Feb-03 11-Apr-03 31-May-03 20-Jul-03 8-Sep-03 28-Oct-03 17-Dec-03
Date
Actual 3-D Position Errors FIGURE 5.44 ¢

All in View VS Best 4-2003 2003 Geometric
10.00 Accuracies Best 4
Global Best 4 95% Position Error Global AIV 95% Position Error and All Satellites
9.00 Linear (Global best 4 95% Linear (Global AIV 95%
8.00 Position Error) Position Error)
7.00
Meters of Error
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
1-Jan-03 20-Feb-03 11-Apr-03 31-May-03 20-Jul-03 8-Sep-03 28-Oct-03 17-Dec-03
Date
year. Although the figures show performance near 1 m, the specified accuracy for L1
(C/A code) is 15 m in the x–y plane (latitude and longitude). Differentially corrected
L1 will provide 1 m x–y accuracy. Dual-frequency receivers (L1 and L2) can expect
accuracies of 1 m (uncorrected) and 1 cm (differentially corrected), respectively. The
accuracies stated are for a nonmaneuvering aircraft. TSPI systems such as the advanced
range data system (ARDS) claim accuracies of 1 to 7 m, depending on the maneuver,
and velocity accuracies on the order of 1 to 8 knots.
5.7.4 GPS as a Navigation Aid

Since the accuracies appear to be quite good, why is GPS not approved as a sole means
of navigation? The answer lies in the requirements for a system to be certified as an
approved navigation aid. For any system to be accepted as an onboard navigation sys-
tem, four criteria must be met:
● Accuracy
● Integrity
● Continuity
● Availability
The performance requirements for sole-means system accuracy are found in
Table 5.11. The accuracy required depends on the segment of flight and the type of
approach desired. The GPS—on its own without differential corrections—can satisfy
most of the basic accuracies (e.g., enroute, terminal, landing). It cannot satisfy the ver-
tical accuracy requirements for more restrictive precision approaches without differ-
ential corrections.
Integrity can be defined as the minimum time to alert the operator that the naviga-
tion system being used can no longer provide the accuracy required for the task at hand
(e.g., enroute, terminal, landing). It can be thought of as similar to the off flag on the
VOR or TACAN system. Since there is no off flag in the GPS, there is no integrity in the
GPS unless a monitoring system is employed.
Three different types of integrity monitors may be employed in the GPS: RAIM,
equivalent RAIM, and differential GPS. A RAIM is employed in most civilian and
military applications. It must have five satellites in view for integrity monitoring and at
least six in view for RAIM with fault detection and exclusion (FDE). The numbers drop
TABLE 5.11 ¢ Performance Requirements for Sole-Means Accuracy
Performance Requirements for Sole Means Accuracy
Enroute and Nonprecision Approach Precision Approach Cat 1 Landing

Horizontal Accuracy 100 m 7.6 m
Integrity (Time to Alarm) 8 sec 5.2 sec
Availability 99.999% (5 min/yr of degraded service when 99.9% (9 hr/yr of degraded service when
continuity cannot be met) continuity cannot be met)
Continuity 99.999999% (1 in 100 million flights loses 99.945% (1 in 18,182 flights loses navigation
service during a 1 hr navigation period) service during a 150 sec precision approach)
Vertical Accuracy N/A 7.6 m
by one in military systems that directly substitute barometric altitude into the GPS. The
basic tenet is that RAIM uses additional satellites (other than the optimum constellation
of four satellites) to check the integrity of the navigation solution. By using all of the
permutations and combinations of all satellites in view (using a different four in each
iteration to calculate a navigation solution), the program is able to identify any satellite
that is providing misleading information. The bad satellite will be the common thread in
all solutions that differ from the others. Once detected, the bad satellite is excluded from
any future calculations. If only five satellites were initially available, then after any
exclusion RAIM is not available.
An equivalent RAIM system uses another navigation system to check the output of
the GPS. A typical equivalent RAIM system might be a triply redundant INS, which is
available on many air carriers. The equivalent RAIM system continuously monitors the
output of the GPS solution and issues an alert when the difference between the two
systems exceeds a certain threshold.
A differential GPS ground station may also be used as an integrity monitor where
unacceptable satellites are identified by the ground station and the information is
uplinked to users. The WAAS, European geostationary navigation overlay service
(EGNOS), and the multifunction transport satellite (MTSAT) satellite-based augmen-
tation system (MSAS) all satisfy the requirements for integrity monitoring. These
systems will be discussed in greater detail later. Current systems can provide a time-to-
alert of about 6 sec.
Continuity guarantees a user coverage for a particular phase of flight. The prob-
ability of a loss of coverage is more restrictive in the critical phases of flight, such as
approach and landing. Due to possible solar activity, multipath effects, or jamming
(intentional or unintentional), continuity cannot be assured with the current system.
Enhancements have to be made to the current system to allow for replacement of current
ILS and microwave landing system (MLS) systems.
Availability simply means that the system is available to the user when the user
needs it. Due to the problems already addressed with continuity, availability cannot be
assured. Future systems such as the ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) will
greatly improve continuity and availability.
5.7.5 Other Satellite Systems

There are five other satellite navigation systems either in service or soon to be in service:
GLONASS, Galileo, Beidou/Compass Beidou, Quasi-zenith satellite system, and Indian
regional satellite system.
GLONASS is the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense global navigation satellite
system initiated in 1982. The GLONASS operational system consists of 21 satellites in
three orbital planes with three in-orbit spares. The planes have a separation of 120 , and
the satellites within the same orbit plane are separated by 45 . Each satellite operates in
circular 19,100 km orbits at an inclination angle of 64.8 . The orbit time is 11 hr, 15 min.
Each GLONASS satellite transmits two types of signals continuously: standard
precision (SP) and high precision (HP). The satellites transmit the same code, but on
different frequencies within the L band. The SP operates on L1, where L1 is equal to
1602 MHz þ n (0.5625 MHz); n is equal to the satellite number (e.g., n ¼ 1, 2, 3). Some
satellites have the same frequency; however, they are never in the same field of view
to the user. The receiver requires four satellites to compute the 3D position and time.
The GLONASS system accounts for leap seconds; however, there is a constant 3 hr bias
between GLONASS and the universal time code (UTC) because GLONASS is aligned
with Moscow Standard Time.
GLONASS guarantees (99.7% probability) horizontal positioning accuracy of
57–70 m and vertical positioning accuracy of 70 m. In 2001, GLONASS was operating
in a degraded mode, with fewer than eight satellites in orbit. With 24 launches in the last
10 years, GLONASS now has 24 operational satellites (full operational status), 3 spares
and 1 in testing status. As with GPS, notice advisories to GLONASS users (NAGU) are
issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Russian geodetic datum PZ-90
is used by the GLONASS system. The status of GLONASS can be followed at
http://glonass-iac.ru/en/GLONASS/. Discussions are under way with the United States
to modify the GLONASS signal to make it compatible with GPS and Galileo. As a bit
of trivia, Vladimir Putin has a GLONASS locater on his dog, Koni (Figures 5.45).
Galileo is the first positioning and navigation system specifically developed for
civilian users. It is being developed by the European Space Agency (ESA). Galileo is
composed of a constellation of 30 satellites inclined at 56 in three circular orbits of
24.000 km. It is supported by a network of ground monitoring stations. Galileo was been
initiated because of concerns regarding GPS integrity, continuity, and availability. The
system is touted as providing positioning accuracy of 1 m. Due to constellation geometry,
optimum coverage is in the extreme northern and southern hemispheres. The single
biggest advantage of Galileo over GPS is the incorporation of an integrity message.
Two Galileo control centers in Europe will control the constellation, time
synchronization, integrity signal processing, and data handling. Data transfer to and
from the satellites will be performed through a global network of Galileo uplink stations.
Each uplink station will have telemetry, communications, and tracking. Galileo sensor
FIGURE 5.45 ¢
Koni (Courtesy
REUTERS/RIA
Novosti/Pool)
stations around the globe will be responsible for monitoring signal quality. Regional
components will independently provide integrity for the Galileo services.
Galileo will transmit 10 signals on four L-band carriers: 6 for open service, 2 for
commercial service, and 2 for public regulated service. The Galileo message includes
ranging codes as well as data. Data messages will be uplinked to the satellites, stored
onboard, and broadcast continually. In addition to time, almanac, and ephemeris data,
the satellites will also broadcast an accuracy signal giving users a prediction of satellite
clock and ephemeris accuracy over time.
Galileo will offer five levels of service: two open and three restricted (Table 5.12).
On January 1, 2007, the Global Navigation Satellite System Supervisory Authority
(government) replaced the Galileo Joint Undertaking (private) and the program schedule
has slid to the right. Two test satellites, GIOVE A and GIOVE B, were launched and
have since been decommissioned; 4 operational satellites (In-Orbit Validation, IOV 1-4)
were launched in 2011 and 2012 are being used to validate the Galileo system. Full
Operational Capability with 30 satellites (27 þ 3 spares) is expected in 2019. Initial cost
was expected to be Euro 3.2–3.4 billion; logical estimates are double or triple that now
(last estimate was Euro 10 billion). In November 2011 the EU commission pledged Euro
7.0 billion to complete and maintain Galileo and EGNOS through 2020.
The Chinese Space Program or Dragon in Space began with the BeiDou Navigation
System; BeiDou is loosely translated as North Star. Unlike GPS, GLONASS, and
Galileo, the BeiDou-1 system uses geostationary satellites as opposed to orbiting
satellites and covers only China. Since the satellites are geostationary, not as many are
needed to provide a viable navigation constellation; the BeiDou-1 system contains four
satellites and became operational in mid-2007. The compass navigation satellite system
(CNSS, or BeiDou-2 or Compass Beidou) will be a true GPS much like the others. The
full BeiDou-2 constellation will ultimately include 35 space vehicles: 27 in middle Earth
orbit (MEO), 5 geostationary orbits (GSO), and 3 inclined geostationary orbits (IGSO).
The free service will provide 10 m accuracy, and fee for service will provide enhanced
service and error messages (8 m in 3D). The program was approved by the Chinese
government in 2004; the system was activated on a trial basis on December 27, 2011, and
will initially offer high-precision positioning and navigation services to the Asia-Pacific
region by late 2014. This will be then expanded into a global coverage by 2020.
The Compass/BeiDou-2 navigation satellite system is currently composed of a total
of 15 satellites. The first satellite, Compass-M1, was launched in 2007, followed by
Compass-G2 in 2009. Five more satellites were launched in 2010, and four and five
satellites were launched in 2011 and 2012, respectively. Compass-IGSO3, launched in
April 2011, allowed the system to start providing regional positioning service covering
China and neighboring countries, and the network will become fully functional with the
launch of the last satellite in 2015.
TABLE 5.12 ¢ Galileo Levels of Service
Open Service Free to air, mass market, simple positioning

Commercial Service Encrypted, high accuracy, guaranteed service
Safety of Life Service Open Service þ Integrity and Authentication of Signal
Public Regulated Service Encrypted, Integrity, Continuous Availability
Search and Rescue Service Near real-time, precise, return link feasible
The Quasi-zenith satellite system (QZSS) system is really an enhancement for the
GPS system receivable only in Japan. Three satellites will be launched in a highly
elliptical orbit, which will mean that the satellite will be very high on the horizon
(almost overhead) and each satellite would be in view for approximately 12 hours.
Adding to the GPS constellation, this position will enhance the GDOP. The first satel-
lite, MICHIBIKI, started to provide L1 and L2C signals in June 2011. MICHIBIKI
carries out technical and application verification of the satellite as the first phase; then
the verification results will be evaluated for moving to the second phase in which the QZ
system verification will be performed with three QZ satellites. The system even has a
mascot looking down over Japan (Figures 5.46).
The Indian Space Research Organization (IRSO) is in development of its own
GNSS called the Indian regional navigation satellite system (IRNSS). The IRNSS sys-
tem is composed of four geostationary and three orbiting satellites and will cover an
area of about 1500 km around India. Coverage will extend from þ /40 Latitude and
40–140 E longitude. The system was designed to minimize the maximum DOP using
the smallest number of satellites in orbital slots already approved for India. The system
will broadcast navigation signals in the L1, L5, and also in S band; correction signals are
uplinked in C band.
There will be two kinds of services: special positioning service (SPS) and precision
Service (PS). Both services will be carried on L5 (1176.45 MHz) and S band (2492.08
MHz). The navigation signals would be transmitted in the S-band frequency (2–4 GHz)
and broadcast through a phased array antenna to keep required coverage and signal
strength. The IRNSS is expected to provide navigation accuracies similar to GPS: 10 m
over the Indian landmass and 20 m over the Indian Ocean. The system can be augmented
with local area augmentation for better accuracy. The first launch of an IRNSS satellite
was on July 1, 2013, and the next six will be launched at six-month intervals. By the
schedule the system should be operational by 2016. The expected cost of the system is
approximately US$230 million.
FIGURE 5.46 ¢
QZSS Mascot
5.7.6 Satellite Augmentation Systems

To improve on the basic satellite accuracy, integrity, and availability, a number of
augmentation systems have been developed:
● Wide area augmentation system (WAAS) (United States)
● Ground-based augmentation system (GBAS) (Joint Development)
● European geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS) (ESA)
● MTSAT satellite-based augmentation system (MSAS) (Japan)
● Indian GPS-aided geo augmented navigation (GAGAN) (India)
● Australian ground-based regional augmentation system (GRAS) (Australia)
● Chinese satellite navigation augmentation system (SNAS) (China)
All of these systems employ the benefits of uplinking differential satellite corrections to
users. A simplified depiction of the U.S. WAAS is shown in Figure 5.47.
A series of reference stations located around the United States compute the clock
bias for all satellites in view and multiplex this information to master stations which in
turn uplink this information to geostationary satellites. The satellites rebroadcast this
information on the GPS L1 frequency to all WAAS-compatible receivers. Basic GPS
receivers that are not WAAS compatible will need software modifications (if possible)
or replacement to take advantage of the WAAS. Phase 1 of WAAS utilized commercial
Inmarsat satellites as the geostationary portion of the system. These satellites have since
been replaced by three new geostationary satellites: Intelsat Galaxy XV (CRW), Anik
F1R (CRE), and Inmarsat I4F3 (AMR). The fourth satellite, GEO-5, to complete full
operational capability was contracted in 2012. The current architecture of reference and
master stations is shown in Figure 5.48.
Simplified WAAS Architecture FIGURE 5.47 ¢

Simplified WAAS
Inmarsat III
Provides aircraft with precise position of satellite (as if it were Architecture
part of GPS constellation) and provides differential correction.
GPS Satellite
Reference Stations
Compare GPS derived position to known
location and transmit data to master stations.
Master Stations
Send differential correction and
precise position of satellite to Inmarsat III.
FIGURE 5.48 ¢
WAAS Reference
and Master Stations
WAAS (Phase 1, initial operating capability [IOC]) was commissioned by the FAA
into the NAS in July 2003. WAAS Phase 2 included full localizer performance with
vertical guidance capability (LPV) and was achieved in 2008. WAAS Phase 3 is called
Full LPV-200 performance (FLP), which calls for WAAS upgrades to enhance coverage
and availability; it is scheduled for completion in 2014. WAAS Phase 4, dual frequency
operations, began earlier in 2014 and will focus on two major areas:
– Dual Frequency with the addition of L5
– WAAS life-cycle maintenance
This phase is contingent upon the upgrades to the GPS constellation; development will
continue through 2018. At the time of this writing, the earliest planned retirement of
WAAS is 2028.
With the availability of the WAAS comes a new category of airport approaches
called LPV, which allows WAAS-equipped aircraft to fly enhanced approaches down to
ILS Cat 1 minima without the need for an ILS. Instead of guiding the aircraft with an RF
beam, LPV provides landing guidance with a series of approach waypoints. The course
deviation indicator provides localizer and glideslope information in terms of distance
away (left/right, above/below) from the approach waypoint. A depiction of an LPV
approach is shown in Figure 5.49.
As of January 9, 2014, there are 3,364 WAAS LPV approach procedures serving
1,661 airports; the FAA projects that there will be about 6,000 LPV approaches avail-
able by the end of 2018.
Currently, only special procedures are available for helicopters (created for indivi-
dual users and not available to the general public). Procedures are typically in metro-
politan areas for approaches to places like hospitals and police stations. The FAA has
been working with Bell (429), Air Methods Corporation, and Mercy Medical Center in
FIGURE 5.49 ¢
WAAS LPV
Approach
Approach
Waypoints
Des Moines, Iowa, and has approved a WAAS-based IFR low-level helicopter structure.
The FAA has also been working with Bell, the University of Oklahoma, and CareFlite in
Dallas to develop WAAS LPV approaches to medical centers. With WAAS-equipped
aircraft, helicopters can fly approved LPV approaches to medical centers and helicopter
emergency medical service (HEMS) landing zones to minimums of 300 ft and ¾ nm
visibility. Additionally, departures may be performed at minimums of 500 ft and ¾ nm
visibility (previous non-WAAS-equipped aircraft were limited to takeoffs with mini-
mums of 700 ft and 2 nm visibility).
NAV Canada is a private sector concern with operations throughout Canada.
It provides Air Traffic Control, Flight Information, Weather Briefings, Aeronautical
Information Services, Airport Advisory Services and electronic aids to navigation. NAV
Canada currently provides LPV service at 36 airports with a total of 57 approaches
published. Over the next 12–18 months, NAV Canada has 180 approaches pending
design and publication at 92 airports.
Enhancements are also being made to allow users to fly GNSS approaches down to
Cat II/III minima. Originally called the Local Area Augmentation System, or LAAS, the
system is now designated as the GBAS, which is demonstrated to be 1 m accurate in
the horizontal and vertical planes and will support ILS Cat II/III landing requirements.
GBAS is in codevelopment with the FAA, Honeywell, and Airservices Australia
with assistance and prototypes by DECEA in Brazil, DFS in Germany, and AENA in
Spain. The GBAS system will provide services in the airport terminal area to a radius of
20–30 nm by uplinking local differential corrections via data link from the airport
(eliminating relativity effects).
Currently, two U.S. locations have obtained operational approval for GBAS use and
support revenue airline traffic. These stations are located at Newark Liberty Interna-
tional Airport (EWR) and Houston George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH). Inter-
nationally, Bremen Airport (BRE) in Germany has also been approved and is being used
by airlines for revenue traffic.
Several GBAS stations currently installed outside the United States are expected to
receive operational approval shortly. These stations are located in Malaga, Spain, and
Sydney, Australia. Additional airports, both foreign and domestic, are considering the
installation and approval of GBAS.
EGNOS complements the GPS and GLONASS systems. EGNOS disseminates, on
the L1 frequency, integrity signals giving real-time information on the health of GPS
and GLONASS in the European theater. EGNOS has been broadcasting a preoperational
signal since 2000 and is now operational. EGNOS will be integrated with Galileo when
that system becomes fully capable.
EGNOS attempts to correct some of the problems with DGPS: relativity effects,
common-view satellites, and receiver algorithms. A total of 34 reference integrity
monitor (RIM) stations around Europe monitor GPS and GLONASS and relay their data
to four master control centers (MCCs). The MCCs generate a single set of integrity data
and wide area differential (WAD) GPS corrections for Europe. The corrections account
for clock and ephemeris errors as well as ionospheric effects.
EGNOS operates on the same frequency (L1) and uses the same ranging codes as
GPS but uses a different data format. The message cycle follows a 6 sec duty cycle in
order to provide a 6 sec time to alert; it also informs users when to exclude a particular
satellite. The accuracy is stated as 2 m and is interoperable with all other augmentation
systems. EGNOS currently has 34 RIMs and has tested the signal on all three geosta-
tionary satellites. EGNOS uses two Inmarsat-3 satellites (eastern Atlantic and Indian
Ocean) and the ESA Artemis satellite over Africa.
The first EGNOS LPV approach was accomplished (certified by DFS) (Deutsche
Flugsicherung) at Bremen airport on February 12, 2012, by Air Berlin. France, Swit-
zerland, Germany, Italy, and the Channel Islands have approved LPV approach proce-
dures. The publication of these procedures has been possible after the signature of an
EGNOS Working Agreement (EWA) between the air navigation service provider and
the company ESSP, the EGNOS service provider, which officially declared the start of
the EGNOS safety-of-life service intended for Aviation on March 2, 2011. Seven EWAs
have been signed in Europe as of 2013.
MSAS is the Japanese MTSAT Satellite-Based Augmentation System. It works on
the same principle as the WAAS and EGNOS, utilizing a network of ground monitoring
stations in Japan, monitoring and ranging stations outside of Japan, master control sta-
tions, and the MTSAT. MSAS has two geostationary satellites (MTSAT-1R and
MTSAT-2) and entered operational service on September 27, 2007.
GAGAN (which translates to sky in Hindi) is a planned space-based augmentation
system developed by the Indian government that uses the geostationary satellite GSAT-4
and 18 total electronic content (TEC) monitoring stations throughout India. Differential
corrections are sent to users similar to other satellite-based augmentation systems
(SBAS); GAGAN claims 3 m accuracy. The director general of civil aviation (DGCA)
of India certified the GAGAN system to RNP 0.1 (Required Navigation Performance 0.1
Nautical Mile) on December 30, 2013. Aircraft equipped with SBAS receivers will be
able to use GAGAN signals in Indian airspace for enroute navigation and nonprecision
approaches without vertical guidance.
GRAS works a little differently than the other SBASs. The system employs ground-
based monitoring stations that calculate differential corrections, which in turn are pro-
vided to two master control stations. The master control stations relay the information to
a network of VHF transmitters, which broadcast the information to suitably equipped
users. The primary reason for this system is the ability to provide LPV approach cap-
ability. The system is very similar to the jointly developed GBAS discussed earlier and
will use the same equipment developed for GBAS.
The availability of satellite-based augmentation system coverage throughout the
world continues to grow. WAAS, EGNOS, and MSAS are operational and allow users
required navigation performance (RNP) 0.3 coverage from the central Pacific Ocean
eastward through Europe and then again in the Japanese Flight Information Region.
Additional SBASs will allow users RNP 0.3 and LPV coverage potentially worldwide.
Additional information on these systems, as well as test issues, can be found in chapter 6
of this text. Coverage is graphically depicted in Figure 5.50.
Availability as a Function of User Location FIGURE 5.50 ¢

80 RNP 0.3 SBAS
Coverage
60
40
20
Latitude (deg)
–20
–40
–60
–80
–150 –100 –50 0 50 100 150

Longitude (deg)
<50% >50% >75% >85% >90% >95% >99% >99.5% >99.9%

Availability with VAL = 35. HAL = 40. Coverage(99%) = 7.54%
5.7.7 GPS Recap

The GPS can provide excellent positional (x, y) data to users. Position will be affected
by velocity, update rate, and maneuvers. The altitude data of the GPS are normally aided
by the barometric altimeter. Integrity, continuity, and availability prevent the GPS from
replacing older radio aids to navigation. GPS augmentation systems enhance GPS
position determination and make the system more robust. Without a stronger signal or
directional antennas, GPS is susceptible to jamming and interference.
5.7.8 GPS Flight Test Objectives

Since the GPS can provide the user with positional accuracy, one would think that this may
be a required evaluation. In addition to positional accuracy, the evaluator will be required
to test the navigation integration functions (since GPS is rarely a stand-alone system),
weapons integration, controls and displays, operational testing, and mission suitability.
It is important to understand that, like every other avionics system, we are not
testing the accuracy of the box (since we already know the answer to that question) and
are really testing to make sure that we did not degrade the system with our integration/
installation. The type and method of testing will be the same as the methodology
explained in section 5.5.3.3. The T&E of a GNSS for use as a positioning system is
covered in great detail in section 6.11 of the text.
5.7.8.1 GPS Weapons Integration Testing

Many of the same tests that were accomplished with navigation integration must also be
performed for weapons integration. The accuracy and timing of the navigation infor-
mation sent to the stores management system must be known, as this directly impacts the
accuracy of the weapon. Any inaccuracies in the navigation system will add to the error
budget of the weapons system. As previously mentioned, the mechanics and integration
of the weapon must be known prior to executing a test plan. Some questions that will
need to be addressed in the test plan are
● Are GPS positions fed to the weapon?
● Can the weapon acquire and track GPS signals?
● Are there any blockage areas?
● Is there communication with the store after release?
● Can position be updated after release?
● Can the system be retargeted after release?
In-depth weapons testing evaluations are covered in chapter 9 of this text.
5.7.8.2 GPS Operational Testing

The first objective in formulating an operational test plan for the GPS is to determine
exactly how the GPS will be employed in a particular aircraft. A transport aircraft may
use GPS as a supplemental navigation system to assist in flying from point A to point B
and to perform nonprecision approaches. A search and rescue (SAR) helicopter may use
the GPS to mark a point and then use GPS steering to return to that point. A fighter may
use GPS information to program a smart weapon from the stores inventory. Although
each of these systems uses the GPS, the accuracy requirements are not the same. The
transport aircraft will require the same accuracy as a TACAN system, whereas the SAR
helicopter may require accuracy of a few meters. The fighter may hope to attain a weapon
CEP on the order of a few feet. Spending an inordinate amount of test time and assets on
the transport program to prove GPS accuracy of 1 m just does not make any sense. On the
other hand, it is critical that the fighter obtain such accuracy. The test plans will be
increasingly more difficult as the intended accuracy for each system increases.
The evaluator needs to set up a simulated task in the test plan that closely resembles
how the system will be used in the real world. The plan should start with the most benign
conditions and then logically progress to the most stressful evaluation. Some key
questions that may be imbedded in the plan are
● Are the controls and displays useful under realistic conditions?
● Is the system usable at all times of day and night, weather or combat conditions?
● Is the basic accuracy of the system good enough to meet operational requirements?
● What alternate displays or displayed information may enhance the probability of success?
● Are update rates satisfactory?
● What problems are associated with loading crypto keys?
● Can the mission be accomplished successfully given the limitations of the system?
5.8 IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE

The IFF system as we know it is part of the FAA Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon
System (ATCRBS). The forerunner of this system was developed during World War II
FIGURE 5.51 ¢
Typical Surveillance
RADAR
to enable military radar operators to identify aircraft as friendly or enemy. The system’s
equipment sent a signal to the aircraft transceiver, which in turn replied with a set code
depending on how a pilot tuned his selector. Only a few codes were used at that time,
and codes were changed daily or more often. When adapted for civilian use, the first
transponders had a capability of 64 different codes. There are now 4,096 codes available
for monitoring general aviation (four-position octal setting). In addition to responding
with a coded reply, the capability exists for encoding own-ship altitude. A mode
3C-equipped aircraft will report altitude and be measured in azimuth and range by the
ground facility. By performing a coordinate conversion, the latitude, longitude, and
altitude of the aircraft can be determined. A typical airport surveillance radar is shown in
Figure 5.51. By looking at the shape of the dish, it should become apparent why altitude
must be encoded in the reply.
Four modes are used in the IFF system; three are used by the military and one is
used by both civilian and military aircraft. Mode 1 is used by military controllers to
determine the type or mission of the aircraft it is interrogating; there are 64 reply codes
for mode 1. Mode 2 is also used by military controllers, and, for example, this mode may
request the tail number of the interrogated aircraft; there are 4,096 reply codes for this
mode. The final military mode is mode 4, which is an encrypted mode and is used to
determine friendly aircraft in wartime. Mode 3/A is the standard air traffic control
(ATC) mode and provides controllers with the aircraft’s unique code. It is used in
conjunction with mode 3/C, which provides controllers with the aircraft’s uncorrected
barometric altitude. The mode 3/A codes are given to the aircraft by ATC and may be
changed many times over the aircraft’s route of flight. General aviation, flying under
visual flight rules, uses a universal code of 1200.
The interrogation signal sent by the ground station consists of two pulses 0.8 msec in
duration, spaced at a precisely defined interval. These pulses are referred to as P1 and
P3. Figure 5.52 depicts the spacing of these pulses for each of the IFF modes. In mode 1,
the interval between the first and last pulse is 3 msec, in mode 2 it is 5 msec, in mode 3/A
it is 8 msec, and in mode 3/C it is 21 msec. The frequency of the interrogation signal is
FIGURE 5.52 ¢ IFF IFF Modes

Interrogation Timing Mode Purpose Interrogation
1
Military 3 μsec
Aircraft
Mission Pulse 1 Pulse 2
2
Military 5 μsec
Personal
Identification Pulse 1 Pulse 2
3/A
Military 8 μsec
Civilian ATC
Pulse 1 Pulse 2
3/C
Altitude 21 μsec
Reporting Pulse 1 Pulse 2
Secure
Military IFF
Sync Encrypted
1030 MHz. The airborne equipment contains circuitry that discriminates between the
various timings and automatically sends back the desired reply. The frequency of
the replied transmission is 1090 MHz. The transponder replies with a pulse containing
12 bits of data. For civilian systems, the interrogator receives the reply and converts the
12-bit data word to aircraft code and barometric altitude. The resolution of aircraft
altitude is limited to 100 ft. Mode 1 replies back with a 6-bit data word and mode
2 replies with a data word of 12 bits.
Since the ground antenna is not perfect, it will emit sidelobes that can trigger a
response from an aircraft that is not in the main beam. This can cause ghosting on the
ATC display, where an aircraft may appear in more than one position. In extreme cases,
an effect known as ring around occurs, where the transponder replies in such excess that
the target is distorted into an arc or circle centered on the radar site. To combat these
effects, sidelobe suppression (SLS) is used. SLS employs a third pulse, P2, which is
spaced 2 msec after P1. This pulse is transmitted from an omnidirectional antenna at the
ground station rather than from the directional antenna. The power output from the
omnidirectional antenna is calibrated so that, when received from an aircraft, the P2
pulse is stronger than either P1 or P3 except when the directional antenna is pointed
directly at the aircraft. By comparing the relative strengths of P1 and P2, it can be
determined if the antenna was pointed at the aircraft when the reply was received.
Mode 4 is a secure mode of the IFF and is used only by the military. The mode is
encrypted because it is essential that enemy forces not be able to identify themselves as
friendly. Mode 4 uses a challenge word containing a preamble that tells the transponder
it is about to receive a secure message. The challenge is encrypted by a device that uses
mathematical algorithms to put it in a secure form. The aircraft transponder receives the
message and decodes it using the same mathematical algorithms to determine its
validity. A transponder that cannot decipher the challenge cannot respond as a friend,
and similarly a transponder will not respond to an enemy challenge.
To prevent unauthorized use of the equipment, a crypto key is used. These keys can
be 12 or 24 hr keys based on Zulu time. To eliminate the chance of a random guess by a
hostile target corresponding with a correct response, each identification consists of a
rapid series of challenges each requiring a different response that must be correct before
the target is confirmed as a friend.
5.8.1 Mode S
Mode S, or mode select, is an enhanced data link and reporting system that was designed
to replace the current ATCRBS. Mode S is designed to fully interoperate with the
ATCRBS; mode S surveillance radars can interrogate IFF transponders, and mode S
transponders will reply to IFF interrogations. Mode S was originally developed as a
solution to the congestion on 1090 MHz and the minimal number of available trans-
ponder codes. The high coverage of radar services available today means some radar
sites are interrogating transponders that are within reception range of an adjacent site.
This results in a situation called false replies uncorrelated in time (FRUIT), which is the
reception of replies at a ground station that do not correspond with an interrogation.
With the addition of traffic alert and collision avoidance systems (TCAS) (covered in
chapter 6), congestion and reply problems have worsened.
Mode S attempts to reduce these problems by assigning aircraft a permanent mode S
address that is derived from the aircraft’s tail number. It then provides a mechanism by
which an aircraft can be selected, or interrogated, so that no other aircraft reply.
Mode S is really a data link because it is not as limited as the IFF system in the amount
of data that it can send. Current transponders are limited to send only 56-bit standard-
length messages. Mode S has provisions to allow for the transmission and reception of up to
16-segment ‘‘extended length’’ 112-bit messages. As a result, the system can transmit
messages faster as well as send messages that could not be sent before. Unfortunately, the
capabilities of mode S are not being fully utilized, primarily due to the cost of upgrading all
aircraft from the current IFF system. Mode S can be used for enhanced TCAS (TCAS II),
which allows for conflict resolution, weather services, and wind shear alerts, differential
GPS correction uplinks, traffic information service (TIS), and automatic dependent sur-
veillance broadcast (ADS-B). All of these systems allow for greater situational awareness
in the cockpit by providing the operators with large amounts of data relating to the airspace
around them. These specialized systems are covered in chapter 6.
5.8.2 IFF Interrogators

Many military aircraft are equipped with airborne IFF interrogators to determine if
targets that are detected by onboard or offboard sensors are either hostile or friendly.
They are also an excellent device for locating a missing wingman. Military interrogator
units have the designation AN/APX, with the most common interrogator being the AN/
APX-100, which is employed on many U.S. and foreign military fighters and bombers.
Newer systems combine the aircraft’s IFF and interrogator units within one LRU.
Advances in antenna design (electronically scanned, multiarrayed) and processing
(monopulse) have increased the accuracy of the IFF return significantly. While older
systems provided the operator with range and azimuth (with varying degrees of accu-
racy), newer systems such as the AN/APX-109, can provide the operator with range,
azimuth, and elevation, with azimuth and elevation accuracies of 2 and range resolution
of about 500 ft.
The system searches a predefined scan volume for modes or codes selected by the
operator. For example, an operator can select mode 3 and enter a code of interest (say,
his wingman). All targets within the scan volume that can reply to a mode 3 inter-
rogation will be displayed to the operator out to the maximum range of the system. Any
targets who reply with the correct code will be identified separately. The advantage of
such a system that can interrogate mode 4 codes in a hostile environment should be
readily apparent. Of course, this system will not display targets that do not have a
transponder or whose transponder is in the off or standby position. Targets with bad
altitude encoders will reply with an erroneous altitude just as they would to ATC.
5.8.3 Flight Testing of IFF Systems

Since the IFF or mode S transponders are required systems for flight in controlled
airspace, these systems must be certified as meeting the minimum operational perfor-
mance standards (MOPS) for ATCRBS reporting systems. A good place to start is the
applicable technical standard order (TSO) that identifies the MOPS for IFF and mode S
systems. The TSO for airborne ATC transponder equipment is TSO-C47c, while the
TSO for mode S is TSO C-112. The advisory circular for either the IFF or mode S
system is the next source of reference to the evaluator. An advisory circular is one
means, but not the only means of demonstrating to the FAA or state authority that the
installed system meets the requirements of the applicable federal aviation regulations. It
may be considered a demonstration test plan, and for civil systems this is more than
sufficient. The advisory circular for mode S, for example, is AC 20-131A; civil certi-
fications are covered in depth in chapter 6.
Ground and flight tests will be required for any new installation of an IFF or mode S
system. If antenna placement on the new installation is much different than the previous
installation, a full series of antenna pattern tests will be required in order to determine
possible blockage areas. Victim/source tests will determine the compatibility of the new
system with other installed aircraft systems. Other ground tests include pulse spacing
and duration of P1, P2, and P3; modes of operation; proper reply and frequency; SLC
logic and operation; power; and sensitivity. Flight tests called out in the advisory cir-
cular include performance at maximum range and altitude, performance during turns,
self-jamming, proper altitude encoding, and performance during approaches.
5.9 DATA LINKS

The discussions on communications flight testing and mode S are precursors to the
evaluation of data links. This section will deal exclusively with military systems: Link 4a,
5.9 Data Links 239
Link 11/11b, and Link 16. Controller pilot data link communications (CPDLC), SAT-
COM and Mode S are civilian versions of data link and are covered in chapter 6.
5.9.1 Tactical Data Link Background

Fighter aircraft, ground forces, sea forces, and antiaircraft weapons all operate within the
same battle area. To be effective, all must know their location and their geographic
relationship with friendly and hostile forces. It is imperative that accurate information be
shared in a timely manner. To meet the command and control needs of fast-moving
forces, huge amounts of data must be exchanged between automated systems.
This transfer of information is used to enhance the situational awareness of commanders
and participants.
The method of obtaining this situational awareness is the tactical digital information
link (TADIL). The TADIL is a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)—approved, stan-
dardized communications link suitable for transmission of digital information. The
current practice is to characterize a TADIL by its standard message formats and trans-
mission characteristics. TADILs interface two or more command and control or weap-
ons systems via a single or multiple network architecture and multiple communications
media for exchange of tactical information.
TADIL-A is a secure, half-duplex, netted digital data link utilizing parallel
transmission frame characteristics and standard message formats at either 1364 or 2250
bits/sec. It is normally operated in a roll-call mode under the control of a net control
station to exchange digital information among airborne, land-based, and shipboard
systems. The NATO equivalent of TADIL-A is called Link 11. In most flight test
communities, these data link systems are identified by their NATO designation and not
their TADIL number.
TADIL-B is a secure, full-duplex, point-to-point digital data link system utilizing
serial frame characteristics and standard message formats at either 2400, 1200, or
600 bits/sec. TADIL-B interconnects tactical air defense and air control units. The
NATO equivalent of TADIL-B is called Link 11B. Link 11 (A/B) data communications
must be capable of operation in either the HF or UHF bands. Link 11 is used by a
number of intelligence-gathering platforms such as RIVET JOINT.
TADIL-C is an unsecure, time-division data link utilizing serial transmission char-
acteristics and standard message formatting at 5000 bits/sec from a controlling unit to a
controlled aircraft. Information can be one way (controlling unit to a controlled aircraft)
or two way (fighter to fighter). The NATO equivalent of TADIL-C is Link 4. There are
two versions of Link 4: Link 4A and Link 4C.
Link 4A plays an important role by providing digital surface-to-air, air-to-surface,
and air-to-air tactical communications. Link 4A was designed to replace voice com-
munications for the control of tactical aircraft. Link 4A has been around since the 1950s
and has been expanded from its original role to include communication between surface
and airborne platforms. The U.S. Navy’s automatic carrier landing system (ACLS)
operates on the Link 4A system. Link 4A is reliable but is susceptible to jamming.
Link 4C is a fighter-to-fighter data link that was designed to complement Link 4A,
however, the two links do not communicate directly with each other. Link 4C offers
some electronic protection, as opposed to Link 4A. A typical net includes four fighters
as participants. Link 16 was to replace Link 4, however, Link 16 does not support the
U.S. Navy’s ACLS.
TADIL-J is a secure, high-capacity, jam-resistant, nodeless data link that uses the
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) transmission characteristics and
protocols. The NATO equivalent of the TADIL-J is Link 16. An innovation on the
JTIDS terminal utilizing advances in technology that allow for lighter systems is the
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS). Link 16 provides improve-
ments over the older Link 4/11 systems in the areas of jam resistance, improved security,
increased data rate, larger packets of information, reduced terminal size (MIDS), secure
voice, relative navigation, and precise participant location and identification.
5.9.2 Link 16 Operation

Since Link 16 can perform all of the operations of Link 4/11 (with the exception of
ACLS) it is reasonable to concentrate on Link 16, as Link 4/11 will merely be subsets of
the Link 16 system. For this reason, I have elected to look at the operation of the Link 16
system and then its test and evaluation. I will address the major differences between
each of the three systems later.
Link 16 is the DOD’s primary tactical data link for command, control, and intelli-
gence, providing critical joint interpretability and situation awareness information. Link
16 uses time demand multiple access (TDMA) architecture and the ‘‘J’’ series message
format (TADIL-J). The JTIDS terminal is one of two terminals that provide Link 16
capability to users; the other terminal is the MIDS. JTIDS and MIDS are the commu-
nications component of Link 16. JTIDS is an advanced radio system that provides
information distribution, position location, and identification capabilities in an inte-
grated form. JTIDS distributes information at high rates, in an encrypted and jam-
resistant format.
5.9.2.1 Link 16 J Series Messages

Like other tactical data links, Link 16 conveys its information in specially formatted
messages. These message formats are composed of fixed fields similar in nature to the
data word structure in MIL-STD-1553. A requesting terminal will ask for specific data
and the transmitting terminal will provide the data requested by comparing the request
number to a specific action. Remember that in MIL-STD-1553, an RT knows which data
to send based on the subaddress in the command word. It works the same with Link 16.
The messages exchanged over Link 16 between participating TADIL J units are the
J series messages. Each J series message format is identified by a label and a sublabel.
Its 5-bit label defines 32 specific formats, while its 3-bit sublabel permits up to eight
subcategories for each defined format. Together, they comprise 256 possible message
definitions. The TADIL J message catalog is depicted in Table 5.13. In airborne sys-
tems, the J series messages are processed by the mission computer.
Since the aircraft mission computer is the bus controller on the 1553 bus, there must
be some mechanism to transfer information between the JTIDS terminal and the con-
troller. This is accomplished by the use of terminal input messages (TIMs) and terminal
output messages (TOMs). Massive amounts of data are transferred between JTIDS
terminals on a timed schedule, and there is no command/response or determinism as
defined by the MIL-STD-1553 protocol. The JTIDS terminal will provide data to the
mission computer only when directed by a command word; the JTIDS terminal is an RT
5.9 Data Links 241
TABLE 5.13 ¢ TADIL-J Message Catalog
TADIL-J Message Catalog

Network Management J7.6 Filter Management
J0.0 Initial Entry J7.7 Association
J0.1 Test J8.0 Unit Designator
J0.2 Network Time Update J8.1 Mission Correlator Change
J0.3 Time Slot Assignment
J0.4 Radio Relay Control Weapons Coordination and Management
J0.5 Repromulgation Relay J9.0 Command
J0.6 Communication Control J10.2 Engagement Status
J0.7 Time Slot Reallocation J10.3 Handover
J1.0 Connectivity Interrogation J10.5 Controlling Unit Report
J1.1 Connectivity Status J10.6 Pairing
J1.2 Route Establishment
J1.3 Acknowledgment Control
J1.4 Communicant Status J12.0 Mission Assignment
J1.5 Net Control Initialization J12.1 Vector
J1.6 Needline Participation Group Assignment J12.2 Precision Aircraft Direction
J12.3 Flight Path
Precise Participant Location and Identification J12.4 Controlling Unit Change
J2.0 Indirect Interface Unit PPLI J12.5 Targe/Track Correlation
J2.2 Air PPLI J12.6 Target Sorting
J2.3 Surface PPLI J12.7 Target Bearing
J2.4 Subsurface PPLI
J2.5 Land Point PPLI Platform and System Status
J2.6 Land Track PPLI J13.0 Airfield Status Message
J13.2 Air Platform and System Status
Surveillance J13.3 Surface Platform and System Status
J3.0 Reference Point J13.4 Subsurface Platform and System Status
J3.1 Emergency Point J13.5 Land Platform and System Status
J3.2 Air Track
J3.3 Surface Track Electronic Warfare
J3.4 Subsurface Track J14.0 Parametric Information
J3.5 Land Point or Track J14.2 Electronic Warfare Control/Coordination
J3.7 Electronic Warfare Product Information
Threat Warning
Antisubmarine Warfare J15.0 Threat Warning
J5.4 Acoustic Bearing and Range
National Use
Intelligence J28.0 U.S. National 1 (Army)
J6.0 Intelligence Information J28.1 U.S. National 2 (Navy)
J28.2 U.S. National 3 (Air Force)
Information Management J28.3 U.S. National 4 (Marine Corps)
J7.0 Track Management J29 National Use (reserved)
J7.1 Data Update Request J30 National Use (reserved)
J7.2 Correlation
J7.3 Pointer Miscellaneous
J7.4 Track Identifier J31.0 Over-the-air Rekeying Management
J7.5 IFF/SIF Management J31.1 Over-the-air Rekeying
J31.7 No Statement
FIGURE 5.53 ¢ Data link

JTIDS Installation Interface
Host Unit
Computer
1553 Data bus
Antenna A
External
Time
Voice Data
Blanker JTIDS Link
INS MIDS R/T
Heading TDS
IFF Computers
TACAN
D/L Control
Crypto
Antenna B
on the avionics bus. A simplified diagram of the JTIDS installation is shown in

Figure 5.53.
Terminal input messages are sent from the host computer to the terminal’s interface
unit (IU) over the 1553 bus. On airborne platforms, the mission computer is the host,
whereas on shipboard platforms the command and control processor (C2P) is the host. The
host, as bus controller, issues command words to control the transfer of data. A total of
30 TIMs have been identified for transferring data from the host to the subscriber inter-
face control program (SICP) that executes in the IU. Besides data words, TIMs also
contain command and status words; command words from the host and status words from
the IU. The host can send TIMs at any time. The host restricts its transfer of TIMs so that
no given TIM type is updated more frequently than every 20 msec. In addition, the host
restricts its transfer of common carrier messages which are sent in TIMs 2 through 11 at a
rate of 10 per 50 msec. Table 5.14 lists the TIMs and their respective functions.
Terminal output messages are used to transfer data from the terminal SICP to the
host computer over the 1553 bus. Like TIMs, 30 TOMs have been identified. In addition
to the J series messages received from the JTIDS network, TOMs contain terminal status
information, performance statistics, and confirmation of control setting changes made
by the operator. The SICP has 10 msec to write its TOMs to the buffer, signaling the
SICP when it is finished by writing a TIM 29. Table 5.15 lists the TOMs and their
respective functions.
The exchange of TIMs and TOMs takes place cyclically during the multiplex cycle.
TIMs may be sent to the SICP in the IU any time during this cycle, but access to the TOM
buffers is controlled to avoid collisions by the host and SICP. Which system has access
is governed by an interrupt called the MUX data transfer complete interrupt (MDTCI).
5.9 Data Links 243
TABLE 5.14 ¢ TIMs and Their Respective Functions
Terminal Input
Message No. Function
TIM 1 Conveys a block of initialization data to the SICP
TIM 2–11 Common carrier messages (data words)
TIM 12 Not used
TIM 13–14 Offers an alternative method for conveying to the SICP for transmission sensor target data and an
intent to engage a surveillance track
TIM 15 Conveys the air platform and system status to the SICP for transmission
TIM 16 Used to request information from the SICP
TIM 17 Transfers navigation data and geodetic position to the SICP
TIM 18 Transfers external time reference measurements from the host to the SICP
TIM 19–28 Not used
TIM 29 Controls the process of accessing the MUX port by signaling that the host has completed its
request for TOMs for the current cycle
TIM 30 Transfers clock synchronization from the host to the SICP; it is only used when time tags in the
navigation data are invalid
TABLE 5.15 ¢ TOMs and Their Respective Functions
Terminal Output
Message No. Function
TOM 1 Conveys the system status each MUX cycle
TOM 2–20 Used to transfer messages received from the network to the host
TOM 21–27 Supports the tape recording function; the SICP contains a 700 word buffer that can hold
recorded data
TOM 28 Provides the information requested by the host in TIM 16
TOM 29 Provides the status of the net selection request
TOM 30 Provides the terminal’s navigation data to the host for use by the host’s navigation system
For the 10 msec immediately following this interrupt, the SICP has authorization
to update the TOM buffers. The TOM 1 buffer is updated every time; others are updated
as required.
Link 16 includes two secure voice channels, called ports. These ports operate at
16 kbps; port 1 is also capable of interfacing with an external voice encoder (vocoder)
that can operate at either 2.4 kbps or 4.8 kbps. This allows the system to support
encrypted voice. The voice audio is digitized in the IU of the terminal. Control of each
voice channel is controlled by the push-to-talk protocol. The digitized voice is not
encoded for error correction, yet it is still encrypted, which makes it secure.
When the operator pushes the push-to-talk button, two audio buffers are alternately
filled with digitized voice data. As one buffer is transmitted, the other is filled, and vice
versa. During the receive portion of the transmission, data are alternately filled in the
two buffers and then converted back to audio by the IU. Practical experience indicates
that JTIDS secure voice degrades more quickly than encoded JTIDS data; JTIDS voice
remains understandable with up to 10% of the transmission in error compared to 50% in
error for encoded data.
Link 16 operational frequencies interfere with TACAN and IFF operation. IFF
frequencies are notched so as not to interfere with normal IFF operation. With TACAN,
however, the physical system is removed from the aircraft and the function is taken over
by the JTIDS terminal. The TACAN channel and mode are included in the TIM sent to
the SICP and outputs of DME, bearing, and audio are sent via a TOM.
5.9.2.2 JTIDS Architecture

The JTIDS network is a communications architecture known as TDMA. This archi-
tecture uses time interlacing to provide multiple and apparently simultaneous commu-
nications circuits. Each circuit and each participant on the circuit are assigned specific
time periods to transmit and receive.
Every 24 hr day is divided by the JTIDS terminal into 112.5 epochs. An epoch is
12.8 min in duration. An epoch is divided into 98,304 time slots, each with a duration of
7.8125 msec. The time slot is the basic unit of access to the JTIDS network. The time
slots are assigned to each participating JTIDS unit (JU) for a particular function; a JU is
assigned to transmit or receive during each time slot.
The time slots of an epoch are grouped into three sets: A, B, and C. Each contains
32,768 time slots numbered from 0 to 32,767, and is called the slot index. The time slots
belonging to set A are identified as A-0 through A-32767. By convention, the time slots
of an epoch are named in an alternating pattern. The time slots of each set are inter-
leaved with those of the other sets in the following sequence:
A- 0; B- 0; C- 0
A- 1; B- 1; C- 1
A- 2; B- 2; C- 2

A- 32767; B- 32767; C- 32767
This sequence, ending in C-32767, is repeated for each epoch. Figure 5.54 shows the
JTIDS TDMA.
The number of slots in each epoch (32,768) is a power of 2 (215), and remembering
back to middle school math, we know that the logarithm (base 2) of 32,768 is 15. This fact
is used in JTIDS TDMA to determine the recurrence rate number (RRN). The recurrence
rate indicates how many time slots are in the block and how often they occur. The entire
set of time slots in A is 32,768, or 215. It is distributed every third slot and is identified by
the notation A-0-15. Half of the slots in A would be 16,384, and would occur at every
sixth slot. The recurrence rate for half of the slots would be 14. Similarly, if we halved the
number again, every 12th slot would be used, for a recurrence rate of 13.
The relationship between RRN and the interval between slots is shown in
Table 5.16. As a consequence of the three-set interleaved structure, three is the mini-
mum spacing between slots in the same set. The time between slots can be calculated by
multiplying the number of slots in the interval by 7.8125 msec.
The 12.8 min epoch is too large to be manageable in describing the rapid commu-
nication requirements of Link 16, so a smaller, more manageable time interval is
required. This basic recurring unit of time is called a frame. There are 64 frames per
epoch; each frame is 12 sec in duration and is composed of 1536 time slots. There are
5.9 Data Links 245
FIGURE 5.54 ¢
JTIDS TDMA
Each day is divided into 112.5 epochs
........................
0 Each epoch is divided into 98,304 time slots.
A- B- C- A- B- C- A- B- C- A- B- C- A- B- C-
0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4
seconds
TABLE 5.16 ¢ Recurrence Rate (Logarithm Base 2 of the Number of Slots)
RRN No. of Slots Per Epoch Slot Interval Slots Slot Interval Time
15 32,768 3 23.4375 msec
14 16,384 6 46.8750 msec
13 8192 12 93.7500 msec
12 4096 24 187.5000 msec
11 2048 48 375.0000 msec
10 1024 96 750.0000 msec
9 512 192 1.50 sec
8 256 384 3.00 sec
7 128 768 6.00 sec
6 64 1536 12.00 sec
5 32 3072 24.00 sec
4 16 6144 48.00 sec
3 8 12,288 1.6 min
2 4 24,576 3.3 min
1 2 49,152 6.4 min
0 1 98,304 12.8 min
TABLE 5.17 ¢ Frame Recurrence Rate
Slot Interval
No. of Slots
RRN Per Frame Within the Set Within Interleaved Sets Time
15 512 1 3 23.4375 msec
14 256 2 6 46.8750 msec
13 128 4 12 93.7500 msec
12 64 8 24 187.5000 msec
11 32 16 48 375.0000 msec
10 16 32 96 750.0000 msec
9 8 64 192 1.50 sec
8 4 128 384 3.00 sec
7 2 256 768 6.00 sec
6 1 512 1536 12.00 sec
512 slots dedicated to A, B, and C, respectively. The time slots of the frame are num-
bered and interleaved as the epoch:
A- 0; B- 0; C- 0
A- 1; B- 1; C- 1
A- 3; B- 3; C- 3

A- 511; B- 511; C- 511
Since 64 frames comprise an epoch, the number of slots per frame is found by
dividing the number of slots per epoch by 64. An RRN of 15 represents every slot in a
set; 32,768 slots in an epoch and 512 per frame. Because the three sets are interleaved,
the interval between slots in any one set is three and not one. Table 5.17 shows the slot
layout per frame and is merely Table 5.16 divided by 64.
Time slots are assigned to each terminal in the network as a block of slots.
This block of slots, known as a time slot block (TSB), is defined by three variables: a set
(A, B, or C); a starting number, or index (0 to 32,767); and the recurrence rate. Up to
64 TSBs may be assigned. RRNs of 6, 7, and 8, which correspond to reporting intervals
of 12, 6, and 3 sec, are most often used. For example, the TSB A-2-11 represents the
block of time slots belonging to set A that occur every 16th slot within the set beginning
at slot 2. The value of the slot interval (16) for the RRN of 11 can be found in
Table 5.15. TSB B-2-11 would represent the block of slots belonging to set B that occur
every 16th slot within the slot beginning at slot 2. Although both examples have iden-
tical starting slot indices and RRNs, they have no slots in common. These TSBs are said
to be mutually exclusive. It is important to remember this fact when making terminal
assignments, since only one terminal may transmit at any specific slot. Four rules govern
the mutual exclusiveness of TSBs:
● TSBs specifying different sets are mutually exclusive.
● TSBs having the same RRN but different indices are mutually exclusive.
5.9 Data Links 247
● If one index is even and one index is odd, the TSBs are mutually exclusive regardless
of their RRNs.
● TSBs having the same set and index but different RRNs are not mutually exclusive;
the one with the smaller RRN is a subset of the one with the larger RRN.
The network structure described so far represents a single net. This is the architecture
of the network when the JTIDS terminal is set to either communications mode 1 with the
normal interference protection feature (IPF) setting, or to mode 2. Only one frequency is
used (969 MHz) and all messages are assigned to time slots in the single net.
Multiple nets can be constructed by stacking several single nets. The time slots of
these nets are synchronized so that a time slot of one net coincides with the time slots of
every other net. The multinet architecture allows several groups of participants to
exchange messages independent of the other groups during the same time slot. There is a
7-bit net number within JTIDS, which allows a network of up to 128 nets to be estab-
lished. Net number 127 is reserved to indicate a stacked net configuration; the remaining
nets are numbered from 0 to 126. In a stacked net configuration, the operator selects
which net to use during operations, with each net assigned a unique frequency-hopping
pattern. Although it is theoretically possible to construct a stacked network of 127
individual nets, more than 20 can cause degradation in communications.
In order to establish a synchronized network, a single terminal must be designated to
provide a net time reference (NTR). The time maintained by this terminal becomes the
JTIDS system time. As the reference, this time defines the beginning and end of time slots
and ensures time alignment in multiple net architectures. Periodically the NTR transmits a
net entry message to assist other terminals in synchronizing with the network.
Synchronization is accomplished in two steps: coarse synchronization is achieved
when a net entry message is successfully received, and fine synchronization occurs when
the terminal successfully exchanges round-trip timing messages with the NTR. Each
terminal maintains a measure of how accurately it knows system time, called its time
quality (TQ). It continuously refines its knowledge of system time by periodically trans-
mitting round-trip timing messages and by measuring the time of arrival (TOA) of all
received messages. This has become a much simpler task with GPS installations. Unlike
other data link systems, JTIDS can continue to operate when the NTR fails or leaves the net.
A platform is assigned either to transmit or receive in each time slot. Several
components comprise each time slot:
● Jitter
● Synchronization
● Time refinement
● Message header and data
● Propagation
The slot starts with a delay, or dead time, in which no pulses are transmitted. This is
called jitter, and the amount of dead time (jitter) varies with each time slot in a pseu-
dorandom way that is determined by the transmission security (TSEC) crypto variable.
Jitter is part of the antijam waveform of JTIDS. Jitter is followed by two sets of pre-
determined pulse packets called synchronization and time refinement. These patterns are
used by the receiver to recognize and synchronize with the signal. The message section
is next, which contains header and data information. The end of the slot is marked by a
guard period, which allows for the propagation of the signal. The propagation guard
time allows for a propagation of 300 nm in the normal range setting or 500 nm in the
extended range setting.
5.9.2.3 Link 16 Message Types

Link 16 messages are exchanged during the TDMA time slots of the JTIDS network.
Each message consists of a message header and message data. The message header
specifies the type of data being sent and identifies the source track number of the
transmitting terminal. There are four basic types of messages:
● Fixed format
● Variable format
● Free text
● Round-trip timing
Fixed-format messages are used to exchange the J series messages described in
section 5.9.2.1. Variable-format messages provide a general way to exchange any type
of user-defined messages. Free-text messages are used for digitized voice, and round-
trip timing messages are used for synchronization.
The fixed-format messages consist of one or more words to a maximum of eight.
Each word consists of 75 bits: 70 are data, 4 are for parity, and 1 is used as a spare. Three
types of words are defined: an initial word, an extension word, and a continuation word.
Fixed-format messages consist of an initial word, one or more extension words, and one
or more continuation words. If there are an insufficient number of 75-bit words to fill a
transmit block, the terminal fills the block with no statement (NS) words. Metering
within the host attempts to keep the NS words to a minimum. The word formats of the
fixed-format messages are shown in Figure 5.55.
Fixed-format messages are always encoded for parity checking. Bits 4 through 18 of
the message header, which contain the source track number, are used in conjunction with
the 210 data bits of the 3 data words to calculate a 12-bit parity value. These parity bits are
distributed at bit positions 71–74 of each 75-bit word. Bit 70 is reserved as a spare.
Fixed-format messages are also encoded for error detection and correction. The
encoding scheme is an algorithm called Reed-Solomon (R-S) encoding. Sixteen error
detection and correction bits are added for every 15 bits of data, so that 15 bits of data
become 31 bits in the message. R-S encoding can detect and correct up to 8 bits in error.
FIGURE 5.55 ¢ Initial Word (Word Format 00)

Word Formats Message Sub- Word
Parity Information Fields Label
(Fixed-Format Length Label Format
Messages) 74 70 13 10 7 2 1 0
Extension Word (Word Format 10)
Word
Parity Information Fields
Format
74 70 1 0
Continuation Word (Word Format 01)
Continuation Word
Parity Information Fields
label Format
74 70 7 21 0
5.9 Data Links 249
TABLE 5.18 ¢ Assignment of Slots to Match Standard Serial Line Baud Rates
RRN Slots/Frame Slots/Sec Bits/Slot Bits/Sec

13 128 10-2/3 225 (R-S encoded) 2400
450 (unencoded) 4800
R-S encoding will transform the 75-bit sequence into a 155-bit sequence. These bits are
taken in groups of five to create 31 symbols, transforming each 75-bit Link 16 word into
a 31-symbol codeword.
Variable-format messages consist of 75-bit words, similar to the fixed-format
messages, and are structured the same as the extension word. Variable-format
messages, however, may vary both in content and length, and fields within the message
can cross word boundaries. Information within the message itself identifies the fields
and their length.
Free-text messages are independent of any message standard; they are unformatted
and utilize all 75 bits in the data word and all 225 bits in the three-word block. No parity
is associated with free-text messages. They may or may not be R-S encoded for error
correction. When R-S encoding is used, the 225 bits of data are mapped onto 465 bits for
transmission. When R-S is not used, all 465 bits are available for data, but only 450 are
used in order to match standard line rates (Table 5.18). The free-text message format is
used for Link 16 voice.
Message words may be taken in groups of 3 words, 6 words, or 12 words to form
transmissions. If there are an insufficient number of words to complete a group, the
terminal once again fills with NS words. The processing of a group of three words is
called standard (STD) format, 6 words is called packed-2 (P2) format, and 12 words is
called packed-4 (P4) format.
The message header is used to specify whether the message that follows is
fixed format, variable format, or free text. It identifies whether the message
is encoded or not and which packing structure has been used. It also identifies
the serial number of the secure data unit (SDU) and the track number of the
source terminal.
The message header contains 35 bits that are R-S encoded, so the 35 bits become
80 bits. The 80 bits are taken five at a time to form an R-S header codeword containing
16 symbols.
The last of the Link 16 message types is the round-trip timing (RTT) message. The
JTIDS time alignment is maintained by the JTIDS NTR. In order to receive and transmit
in the net, the terminal must be synchronized with the net. A special set of messages is
defined to support synchronization. The RTT message represents the only exception to
the rule that a terminal can transmit or receive, but not both, in a single time slot. With
the RTT message, a terminal can transmit an interrogation and receive a reply within the
same time slot.
The initial exchanges of RTT messages enable the terminal to synchronize with the
network. Subsequent exchanges allow the terminal to refine its measurement of system
time, or TQ. Each terminal reports its TQ over the network. Each terminal also main-
tains an internal catalog of terminals within LOS that have the highest value of TQ.
These entries assist the terminal in choosing which address to interrogate for the next
RTT message.
FIGURE 5.56 ¢ RTT Interrogation

RTT Interrogation Type A
and Reply SDU Serial No. Source Track No. 0 010
Messages
34 19 430
Type B
SDU Serial No. TQ Spare 1 010
34 19 14 4 30
RTT Reply
Interrogator’s SDU Serial No. Time of Arrival (12.5 nsec)
34 19 0
An RTT interrogation may be either addressed (RTT-A) or broadcast (RTT-B).

The RTT-A consists of a header message addressed to the unit that reports the highest
TQ. It is transmitted in a dedicated time slot, and only the addressed terminal will
reply. The RTT-B is not specifically addressed to any terminal but rather to the broad-
cast. The RTT-B contains the terminal’s TQ, and any terminal with a higher TQ
can reply.
The RTT interrogation is similar to the message header; it contains 35 bits of
R-S encoded data. The interrogation is not followed by any data, and it is transmitted
without jitter.
The reply to an RTT interrogation is transmitted 4.275 msec after the beginning
of the time slot as measured by the receiving terminal. The reply contains the
time that the last symbol of the interrogation was received; this TOA is measured at
the antenna and is reported in units of 12.5 nsec. The interrogating terminal uses
the reported TOA along with its own measurement of the TOA of the reply to
calculate a correction to its system clock. The RTT interrogation and reply formats
are shown in Figure 5.56.
5.9.2.4 The JTIDS RF Signal

JTIDS operates in the L-band portion of the UHF spectrum between 960 and 1215 MHz.
As mentioned numerous times in this text, this is the frequency where many other
navigation and telemetry systems operate. TACAN, DME, GPS, IFF, and telemetry
frequencies are but a few of the systems that JTIDS must compete with. Expected ranges
for JTIDS are 300 nm air-to-air, 150 nm ship-to-air, and 25 nm ship-to-ship. In order to
increase its operational range, JTIDS makes use of relays.
There are three communications modes within the JTIDS terminals: mode 1, mode 2,
and mode 4. Mode 1 is the normal JTIDS mode of operation; it uses frequency hop-
ping with full message security and transmission security processing. Mode 2 does
not employ frequency hopping, and all pulses are transmitted on a single frequency.
Mode 4 also does not employ frequency hopping, and it also eliminates much of the
security processing to allow JTIDS to operate as a conventional data link. Mode 1 is
the normal operational mode. Modes 2 and 4 represent a reduction in capacity and
capability.
There are 51 frequencies assigned to the JTIDS system between 969 and 1206 MHz,
3 MHz apart. Two subbands centered at 1030 MHz and 1090 MHz are excluded because
they are used by IFF. In mode 1, each pulse is transmitted on a different frequency in a
5.9 Data Links 251
pseudorandom pattern determined by the crypto variable of the day. Since the frequency
is changed on a pulse-to-pulse basis, the nominal frequency-hopping rate is 33,000
frequencies/sec.
In order to prevent interference with other systems, JTIDS employs many protection
features. The TACAN system is removed from JTIDS-equipped aircraft and the function
is taken over by the JTIDS terminal. Notch filters on the JTIDS terminal transmitter
prevent the JTIDS signal from encroaching on the ATCRBS IFF system. To prevent the
terminal’s RF transmissions from interfering with the normal operations of other sys-
tems, the pulse power spectrum and out-of-band transmission characteristics are strictly
specified. The pulse power spectrum is unrestricted within 3 MHz of the center fre-
quency, but it must be down 10 dB at 3 MHz, 25 dB at 6 MHz, and 60 dB beyond
15 MHz. The out-of-band emission characteristics, including broadband noise, sideband
splatter, harmonics, and other spurious emissions, must be kept below 65 dBm/kHz.
In order to adhere to these restrictions, the JTIDS terminals are equipped with an IPF to
monitor all terminal transmissions.
The JTIDS IPF monitors the transmitter for out-of-band transmissions, transmis-
sions in the IFF notches, improper frequency-hopping distribution, incorrect pulse
lengths, high receive/transmit thermal levels, improper amplifier operation, and time
slot duty factor. If the authorized levels are exceeded, the IPF function will auto-
matically disable the terminal’s transmissions.
The terminal implements two sets of protection features: peacetime constraints on
the terminal operation in mode 1, and the monitoring of transmissions to ensure that they
do not interfere with navigation systems. The operator has three IPF settings:
● Normal
● Exercise override
● Combat override
The normal setting is normally required when within 12 nm of land and enforces
peacetime constraints on the terminal’s transmissions. TDMA is authorized, but the
capability and capacity of the system is reduced to prevent interference with civilian and
military navigation systems. When the normal IPF setting is in effect, the transmission
packing is limited to standard or packed-2 single pulse; high-power output is forbidden.
Multinetting and contention access (where simultaneous transmissions may occur) are
also not allowed. Time slot usage is minimized to a system level of 40% capacity and a
terminal level of 20% capacity. The limitations apply to all time slots, free-text and
fixed-format messages, and relays. The permitted time slots are A-0-14, B-1-14, C-0-12,
and C-4-11. This restriction on time slot usage, which limits the number of pulses per
unit time, is called a time slot duty factor (TSDF) of 40/20. The terminal monitors its
performance for compliance with these restrictions. It also measures pulse width,
monitors the distribution of pulses to ensure a uniform distribution of pulses across the
spectrum, and monitors for out-of-band transmissions. Any violation of the restrictions
will cause the terminal to disable all transmissions.
The exercise override setting provides partial interference protection. The peace-
time constraints are overridden to allow contention access, multinetting, a time slot duty
factor of 100/50, and high power output. Shipboard and AWACS terminals have a high-
power amplifier that can boost outgoing transmissions to 1000 W, which is primarily
used to overcome jamming. In this setting, the terminal continues to monitor the signal
characteristics of the terminal transmissions, including pulse spread, invalid frequencies,

and nonuniform frequency distribution.
With the IPF set to combat override, all protection features are overridden. It should
only be used when operation is essential to mission success (even with a known IPF
failure). It should also be understood by the operator that navigation systems will
probably be jammed.
5.9.2.5 Link 16 Participants

This section deals with how the Link 16 network is populated. The assignment of par-
ticipants in the Link 16 structure is based entirely on operational requirements and the
numbers and types of agencies and services involved in executing a mission plan. Many
structures are possible and they are designed by agencies specifically organized to make
these plans work. The network is broken up into operating groups that have a com-
monality in mission. The participants are then assigned based on the mission they sup-
port. There are also functional groups that lend support to the operation of the network.
All of these functional groups are known as network participation groups (NPGs). The
transmissions on each NPG consist of messages that support its particular function.
This functional structuring allows JTIDS units (JUs) to participate on only the NPGs
necessary for the functions they perform. A maximum of 512 participation groups is
possible. NPGs 1 through 29 are associated with the exchange of J series messages; each
NPG is associated with a particular set of J series messages. Each NPG and its asso-
ciated function are described in Table 5.19.
Messages for up to three NPGs can be buffered in the JTIDS terminal by the SICP.
Buffering decreases the chance that a message will be lost or dropped when message
traffic is heavy. The operator selects which NPGs to buffer.
TABLE 5.19 ¢ NPG Assignments and Functions
NPG Function
1 Initial Entry
2 RTT-A
3 RTT-B
4 Network Management, Redistribution of Network Capacity
5 Location Information, Weapons and Store Status
6 Identification, Location Information, Relative Navigation and Synchronization
7 Air, Surface, and Subsurface Tracks, Land-point SAM Sites, Reference Points, ASW
Points, Acoustic Bearings, EW Bearings and Fixes
8 Mission Management, Command Designated Unit to Coordinate Battle Group Weapons
and Order Weapons Engagements
9 Air Control, Mission Assignments, Vectors and Target Reports
10 Electronic Warfare
12 Voice Group A
13 Voice Group B
14 Indirect PPLI for Link-11 Participants
18 Weapons Coordination, Similar to NPG 8
19 Fighter to Fighter, Shared Sensor Information
27 Joint Operations PPLI
28 Distributed Network Management
29 Residual Message, Transmission Opportunity for Messages not Assigned to any other NPG
5.9 Data Links 253
The amount of network capacity given to a particular NPG depends on the com-
munications priorities. These priorities are
● Number and type of participants
● Access requirements to the NPG by the participant
● Expected volume of data
● Update rate of the data
The number of time slots that must be allocated within the NPG to each participant
depends on the type of unit and the method of accessing the time slot. Two types of units
are participants within Link 16: command and control (C2) and non–command and
control (non-C2). The two types of units have different missions and different require-
ments in terms of which NPGs they participate in and how often their data must be
updated. The primary C2 functions are surveillance, electronic warfare, weapons coor-
dination, air control, and net management. The primary non-C2 functions are target
sorting and engagement.
Within each NPG, the time slots assigned to each unit are evenly distributed over
time and generally occur every 3 sec, every 6 sec, etc. These sets are assigned using time
slot blocks that specify a set, index, and RRN, as previously discussed, and a net num-
ber. Time slot blocks are numbered from 1 through 64, so the terminal is limited to a
maximum of 64 assignments.
The two major access modes for each time slot are dedicated access and contention
access. Dedicated access is the assignment of time slots to a uniquely identified unit for
transmission purposes. Only the assigned JU can transmit during that time slot. If there
are no data to transmit, then the slot goes empty. The obvious advantage of dedicated
access is that it provides each JU on the NPG with a predetermined portion of the
network’s capacity and a guarantee that there will be no transmission conflicts. One of
the disadvantages of dedicated access is that assets are not interchangeable. One aircraft
cannot simply replace another in the NPG. If this were a requirement, its terminal would
first have to be reinitialized to transmit and receive during time slots matching those of
the unit it was replacing.
The assignment of time slots to a group of units as a pool for transmission purposes
is known as contention access. In contention access, each unit randomly selects a time
slot from the pool during which to transmit. The frequency of the terminal’s transmis-
sion depends on the access rate assigned to that terminal.
The advantage of contention access is that each terminal is given the same initi-
alization parameters for the corresponding time slot block. This simplifies the network
design and reduces the network management burden, since specific assignments for each
JU are unnecessary. Since the JUs are now interchangeable, it facilitates the inclusion of
new participants and allows units to be easily replaced. The disadvantage of contention
access is that there is no guarantee that a transmission will be received.
Because a time slot is not dedicated to one user, simultaneous transmissions are
possible with contention access. The likelihood of simultaneous transmissions depends
on the number of time slots in the pool, the number of units in a group, and the
frequency with which they must transmit. If two units do transmit simultaneously
during the same time slot on the same net, whether in dedicated or contention access, it
is called time slot reuse. Whenever this occurs, receivers will always hear the unit
closest to them.
TABLE 5.20 ¢ Network Roles and Associated Functions
Network Role Function

Network Time The time established by this unit is, by definition, the network system time. This system time is
Reference propagated to all other units by the initial net entry message.
Position Reference The positional reference must have a positional accuracy of better than 50 ft and should be on a
surveyed point. The positional reference is assigned a position quality of 15 and is used as a
stable geodetic reference for RelNav.
Initial Entry JU Assists in the propagation of system time to units that are beyond LOS of the NTR.
Navigation Controller Used only when a relative grid is desired; establishes a relative grid origin.
Secondary Navigation Provides stability to the relative grid by working with the navigation controller.
Controller
Primary User All JUs, with the exception of the NTR are primary users. Networks can support upwards of
200 primary users.
Secondary User A JU operating passively is said to be a secondary user. Units can enter the network passively, or
an operator can select passive operations after entering the network actively.
Forwarding JU A JU designated to forward data between links, such as Link 16 to Link 11.
Network Manager Unit assigned the responsibility for administering the minute-by-minute operation of the Link 16
network. The network manager monitors force composition, geometry, network configuration,
relay, and multilink requirements.
In addition to being C2 or non-C2 units, terminals are also identified as having a role
in the network. Network roles are functions assigned to a JU, either by initialization or
operator entry. Roles are assigned to C2 units and are based on platform capabilities and
expected platform position. With the exception of network manager, all roles are
terminal functions that may be changed during operations. The network roles and their
associated responsibilities are found in Table 5.20.
5.9.2.6 PPLI and RelNav

Two of the capabilities of the JTIDS terminals which have only been minimally touched
upon until now are precise participant location and identification (PPLI) and relative
navigation (RelNav). JTIDS terminals employ relative navigation techniques to con-
stantly fix their platform’s position. This information is transmitted periodically, along
with other identification and status information in the PPLI message.
The PPLI is the friendly unit reporting message and can be used to determine link
participants and data forwarding requirements, as well as initiate air control. PPLIs are
transmitted by all active JUs on NPG 5/6. PPLIs generated by Link 11 participants are
forwarded by the forwarding JU on NPG 14. Location is reported as latitude, longitude,
and altitude, as well as the participant’s present course and speed. This information is
used by the receiving terminal’s RelNav function, along with other information such as
the quality reports, RTTs, and local navigation inputs, to refine its calculations of its
own position.
Each participant in Link 16 is assigned a unique JU number between 00001 and
77777 (octal). In addition, the JTIDS terminals require a source track number of five
octal digits. These two numbers must be the same to ensure positive identification.
In addition to the JU number, the PPLI message also contains IFF codes and platform
types. Periodically the host provides inventory and equipment and ordnance status that
is included in the PPLI. The specific numeric inventory of shipboard defense missiles
5.9 Data Links 255
TABLE 5.21 ¢ TQ Assignments
Time Standard Time Time Standard Time

Quality Deviation (nsec) Quality Deviation (nsec)
15 <50 7 <800
14 <71 6 <1130
13 <100 5 <1600
12 <141 4 <2260
11 <200 3 <4520
10 <282 2 <9040
9 <400 1 <18,080
8 <565 0 >18,080
TABLE 5.22 ¢ Position Quality Assignments
Position Position Position Position

Quality Uncertainty (ft) Quality Uncertainty (ft)
15 <50 7 <800
14 <71 6 <1130
13 <100 5 <1600
12 <141 4 <2260
11 <200 3 <4520
10 <282 2 <9040
9 <400 1 <18,080
8 <565 0 >18,080
and aircraft weapons, as well operational, degraded, or nonoperational status of all

relevant shipboard and aircraft systems is reported. Status information also includes the
air control and JTIDS voice net numbers or other UHF voice frequencies that each
platform is using.
Two other pieces of information are provided by the JUs in the PPLI message:
time and position quality. Each terminal estimates how well it knows system time.
The estimate is based on clock drift, accuracy of the RTT interrogations, and the
time since the last RTT reply. This estimate is used to provide the TQ. Values of TQ
range from 0 to 15; only the NTR has a TQ of 15. Each terminal provides the TQ in
every PPLI message that it transmits. Table 5.21 shows the assignment of the TQ with
respect to the time deviation in nanoseconds.
Position quality is also a value of 0 through 15, which indicates the accuracy with
which a unit knows its geodetic or relative position. Position is provided by navigation
sources, and the value entered should be consistent with the platform’s navigation
equipment. A geodetic position quality of 15 is assigned to stationary position references
and indicates an accuracy of position within 50 ft. When relative grid is used, all posi-
tions are measured relative to the navigation controller, and the navigation controller is
assigned a position quality of 15. Table 5.22 shows the assignment of position quality
with respect to positional errors.
Relative navigation (RelNav) is an automatic function of the JTIDS terminal. It is
used to determine the distance between platforms by measuring the arrival times of
transmissions and correlating them with reported positions. This information is required
by the terminals in the network to remain synchronized. Automatic RelNav is in con-
stant operation in all JTIDS terminals and may be used to improve a terminal’s posi-
tional accuracy. If two or more terminals have accurate, independent knowledge of their
geodetic position, RelNav can provide accurate geodetic information for all participants
in the network (aerotriangulation). As a result, the precise geodetic position of every unit
can be maintained constantly by every other unit in the network.
5.9.2.7 Determinism
There has been no discussion until now about the determinism of transmissions on Link
16. If we remember back to MIL-STD-1553, we know that one of the biggest advantages
of the command/response system is that it is deterministic. We know that the sent data
are the received data. What is the mechanism employed in Link 16? In fact, certain
messages require acknowledgment to indicate that the message is received. Two levels
of acknowledgment, called receipt/compliance (R/C), are performed. The first level of
acknowledgment, called machine receipt, is performed automatically by the system. The
second level of acknowledgment is a response from the operator and indicates an intention
to comply (HAVCO, have complied, or WILCO, will comply) or to not comply (CANCO,
cannot comply). In Link 11, the machine portion of the R/C is performed by the tactical
data system computers. In Link 16, it is an automatic function performed by the JTIDS
terminals. Other responses, such as cannot process (CANTPRO) are possible as well. In
Link 11 as well as Link 16, the message is automatically retransmitted if the machine
receipt is not received; this process can occur several times. The appropriate operators are
informed if a machine receipt has not been sent after several transmissions.
5.9.3 Data Link Comparisons

Protocol. Link 11 uses a polling protocol and a netted architecture. The net operates
under a controller that permits access and maintains discipline. Link 4A uses a com-
mand/response time division multiplexing (TDM) system. One controller can control
multiple aircraft on the same frequency independently. Link 16 uses the principle of
TDMA. All JTIDS terminals, or pools of terminals, are assigned specific time slots to
transmit or receive data.
Nodelessness. A node is a unit that is necessary to maintain communications. The node
in Link 11 is the net control station (NCS); if the NCS goes down, the entire net goes down.
Link 16 is nodeless with the exception of the requirement for a net time reference at startup.
Once the net is established, it can run for hours with the loss of the NTR.
Participants. Each participant, or JTIDS unit, is assigned a unique five-digit octal
address from 00000 to 77777. Link 11 is limited to a three-digit octal address, allowing
for addresses up to 177.
Track Numbers and Quality. Link 16 employs a five-character alphanumeric track
number, allowing up to 524,284 tracks. Link 11 employs a four-digit octal track number,
0000–7777, allowing 4095 tracks. Link 16 uses track quality, with values ranging from
0 to 15. Each track quality value is defined by a specific positional accuracy, the best of
which is 50 ft. Link 11 has track qualities (0–7) that are defined by update rate. A track
quality of 7 can have an accuracy worse than 3 nm.
Track Identification. Link 16 track identification is detailed enough to identify the
type of platform, activity, and nationality. Link 11 is limited to three fields. Link 16
5.9 Data Links 257
PPLI messages can report detailed information on friendly forces: equipment status,
ordnance inventory, radar and missile channels, fuel available for transfer, gun cap-
ability, ETA/ETD to/from station, and surface missile inventory. Link 16 can provide
information on land points and tracks, a category that is not available with Link 11.
Granularity. Granularity is the measure of how precisely a data item can be
reported in messages. Link 16 is an order of magnitude better than Link 11.
Graphics and Mapping. Link 16 can report lines, segments, geometric shapes,
and maps of any size. Link 11 can report only four basic shapes. Link 16 utilizes a
3D geodetic coordinate system and can report anywhere in the world. Link 11 uses a
Cartesian coordinate system and is map limited.
5.9.4 Flight Testing of Data Link Systems

The first thing that will awe flight testers of data link systems is the sheer amount of data
that is being transferred among platforms and the mechanisms that programmers have
used to maximize the volume and rate of this transfer. As mentioned in every chapter of
this text, the first step is to understand how the system is supposed to operate. Testers
must understand that there are two operations that are occurring: the transfer of infor-
mation over the link itself, and the exchange of that information between the host
(mission computer) and the data link terminal (JTIDS, MIDS, or tactical data system
computers). If it is assumed that the data link is a known entity, then our greatest tasks
will be to ensure that a) we have not screwed up the installation, and b) we integrated the
terminal successfully into our system architecture. Are the data being presented to the
operator correctly, efficiently, and without delay? A typical interface of an airborne data
link system was shown in Figure 5.53.
In the following discussion I assume (just as we did in the previous operations
section) that we are attempting to integrate a JTIDS/MIDS terminal onto the bus. The
data transfer between the mission computer and the SICP is accomplished via TIMS and
TOMS (section 5.9.2.1). These messages can be captured on aircraft instrumentation and
either telemetered to the ground or captured on aircraft tape. The data rates will be the
same as all other MIL-STD-1553/1773 systems. The JTIDS terminal will either receive
information from the mission computer (TIMs) or transmit information (TOMs) when
directed by a command word. The truth data, however, must be the data that are received
by the receive/transmit on the JTIDS side of the diagram. Recall that the SICP can buffer
up to three NPGs. What was not mentioned is that there is an optional recorder that is
written to by the SICP for all Link 16 data. These data are our truth data. It is the tester’s
job to ensure that the requested data are in fact the truth data that arrived over the link.
Unfortunately, these data are not in the format of the familiar 1553 but in the format
described in the previous sections.
In addition to verifying the TIMs and TOMs, the tester will also need to evaluate
three other functions associated with the JTIDS/MIDS terminals: PPLI, RelNav, and the
determinism of the JTIDS system (HAVCO, CANCO, and CANTPRO). The tester must
ensure that the host is providing the correct information to be inserted into the PPLI
message: IFF codes, platform type, inventory, ordnance and equipment status, opera-
tional or degraded status, JTIDS voice net numbers and other UHF frequencies in use,
and time and position quality. In this case, the truth data are resident in the host and can
be accessed on the 1553 data bus. RelNav is an automatic function of the JTIDS/MIDS
terminal and is in constant operation. RelNav accuracy is obtained by comparing the true
position of all participants (TSPI) to the JTIDS-derived position. The determinism of the
data link system is accomplished by the machine-generated receipt of messages (much
like the status word in the 1553 system). Evaluation of the receipt/compliance function
needs to validate that the appropriate operators are informed if a machine receipt has not
been sent after several transmissions.
The left side of Figure 5.53 depicts the direct inputs to the data link interface. Each
of these systems must be evaluated to ensure that the proper information is being
delivered to the interface correctly, in proper format, and in a timely manner. The
external clock is the aircraft time, and in most cases will be a GPS time. The voice
channels were described in section 5.9.2.1. Evaluation includes support of encrypted
voice and push-to-talk protocols. Voice may be encrypted at the host or accomplished in
the interface unit, depending on the implemented architecture. The blanker unit allows
simultaneous operation of the JTIDS/MIDS and the ATCRBS IFF and TACAN systems.
Since these systems all operate on the same frequencies, a series of notch filters and
blanking pulses must be employed in order to prevent inadvertent jamming of these
systems. The JTIDS system notches out IFF frequencies and prohibits radiation in those
frequencies. The TACAN function is assumed by the JTIDS/MIDS terminal, and system
transmissions are interleaved to prevent jamming of either system. The tester will be
required to ensure that normal operation of the IFF and TACAN is not adversely
affected by the JTIDS equipment; this test must be done with the JTIDS equipment on
and off. INS and heading information are required by the JTIDS system and this infor-
mation is directly routed from the systems to the JTIDS interface. This architecture
prevents bogging down the 1553 bus with high data rates. A simple test to ensure that
the correct information is delivered in the correct format needs to be devised to validate
this interface. The JTIDS system uses two crypto keys: one for voice and the other for
data. Testing should include the proper loading of these keys as well as the capability to
roll over to a new ZULU date. The keys are good for 24 hr, and the time is based on
GMT. When flying, there is a probability that you will fly into the next day (2400Z). For
this reason, 2 days of keys are loaded into the system and will automatically roll over to
the next day when needed. A controls and displays test plan as well as a human factors
test plan should also be incorporated.
5.9.5 Advances in C4I

Command, control, and communications intelligence (C3I) has been updated to include
computers (C4I). Current systems, including MIDS, are limited by today’s standards,
especially in the areas of streaming audio and video. The next-generation planned sys-
tem is the joint tactical radio system (JTRS).
JTRS radios provide additional communications capability: access maps and other
visual data, communicate via voice and video, and obtain information directly from
battlefield sensors. JTRS provides Internet protocol–based capability and will eventually
replace all tactical radios with interoperable LOS and beyond LOS radios. It will allow
all forces (ground, sea, and air) to freely exchange tactical information.
There are several versions of JTRS being built for the services. The ViaSat/Data
Link Solutions team is responsible for implementing JTRS into the MIDS LVT terminal
while maintaining Link 16 and TACAN functions. Boeing is developing the ground
mobile radio (GMR), which will support helicopter requirements, U.S. Army and
Marine Corps ground vehicles and U.S. Air Force tactical control. General Dynamics is
developing the handheld/manpack version of the JTRS.
The implementation of JTRS will allow the integration of the Tactical Targeting
Network Technology (TTNT). TTNT is an advanced, low-latency, high-bandwidth
Internet protocol waveform that meets time-sensitive targeting network technology
requirements. Because of the TCP/IP architecture plug-and-play protocols are allowed,
this eliminates the need for complex net structures (which is one of the biggest problems
with Link 16). TTNT has distinct advantages over all current military data link systems:
● Internet-based protocol
● Ad hoc joining to the net (<5 sec)
● Extremely low latency (2 Mbps at 100 nm with a 2 msec delay)
● Low observable compatible
● Antijam capabilities comparable to Link 16
● High data throughput
● Multiple levels of security
● No loss of Link 16 and TACAN functionality
JTRS and TTNT are currently in the development stage; testing will be roughly
equivalent to the tests described in the Link 16 section, with the added burden of much
more data to capture and analyze.
1. What is the difference between magnetic and true heading?

2. What is the Q factor and FOM used for?
3. Name three spinning mass INS error sources.
4. What is total electronic content and what does it affect?
5. What are the four requirements that need to be satisfied for a navigation system to
be certified as a short-range navigation system?
6. What does gain mean to you? How can you increase gain?
7. How do you convert true to magnetic?
8. 1 of latitude equals how many miles?
9. What is a space-based augmentation system?
10. 1 of longitude equals how many miles? At 30 N?
11. What is an earth model?
12. What earth model is most commonly associated with GPS? GLONASS?
13. What does NAD-27 mean? Is it used worldwide?
14. What airspeed do we use in a system test?
15. What is meant by the term omnidirectional range?
16. What is an NPG in the MIDS network?
17. What is meant by the term side-lobe cancellation?

18. What measures acceleration in a RLG INS?
19. What is the purpose of the JTIDS/MIDS interface unit?
20. What is the major detriment to accuracy in hyperbolic systems?
21. What problems could you expect when using CW in a DNS system?
22. Which altitude is encoded in mode 3C?
23. What heading do we use in a system test?
24. What is the advantage of the Galileo system over the GPS?
25. What is the difference between MSL AGL and WGS-84?
26. What is a transition altitude?
27. What is a coordinate conversion?
28. Name three types of Link 16 formats.
29. What is a loop antenna? What is the basic principle?
30. A warning flag appears on your TACAN during an approach. What does it mean?
Would you expect the same on your GPS system?
31. What is a NOTAM? What is a NAGU?
32. What does a land/sea switch do in a DNS system?
33. How accurate do you think your installed TACAN is?
34. What is frequency hopping? How is it used in Link 16 systems?
35. Are there civil requirements that military aircraft must meet when installing new
radio aids equipment?
36. Why do you input a present position prior to aligning the INS?
37. Where would you start if you were to write a test plan for mode S installation?
38. What is ADS-B?
39. NDBs are popular in remote environments. Why?
40. What is meant by the term accuracy in navigation systems? Does it ever change?
41. Who was responsible for cancellation of the OMEGA system?
42. Identify the unique problems of EMI/EMC in a fighter-type aircraft.
43. Can the GPS on its own provide enough accuracy for a Cat II approach?
44. What is the difference between true heading and track?
45. What error does KEAS account for? At what speeds?
46. What is the drawback of Galileo’s precision service?
47. How easy is it to replace participants on the Link 16 system?
48. What heading does the INS calculate? How about the GPS?
49. What is an advisory circular? What is it used for?
50. What happens to IAS in a climb with a constantly held TAS?
51. Are GPS weapons really flown with GPS?
52. What is the purpose of employing a data link?

53. Who has access to the GPS L2 frequency? What if the P code becomes the Y code?
54. What is the communications system within Link 16?
55. Briefly explain the differences between Link 16 and other link systems.
56. What does nodeless link mean? Give an example of a nodeless link.
57. What is an NTR? Is one always required?
58. What does a ring laser gyro measure? How is the platform realigned to level?
59. The accuracy of the INS is 1 nm. Which TSPI system would you use?
60. What does granularity mean?
61. What is the difference between FOM and GDOP?
62. If you wanted the latitude, longitude, and altitude of a Link 16 participant, what
would you request of the MIDS terminal?
63. What is RelNav?
64. What is an advantage of a directional antenna?
65. How would you convert N 35 09.11 to degrees, minutes, and seconds?
66. What does integrity mean in navigation systems?
67. Which frequency band does Link 16 operate in?
68. Why is TACAN included within Link 16?
69. How easy is it to jam a GPS signal? How can it be prevented?
70. What is the major difference between IFF and mode S?
71. Name two methods of controlling synchronization in Link 16.
72. Briefly describe IFF operation.
73. What is an altitude encoder and why is it used? Which IFF mode is it employed in?
74. What is the optimum GPS constellation?
75. Briefly explain the potential of mode S.
76. How many satellites are required for a 3D position? Are there any exceptions?
77. Magnetic variation for a radio aid is applied where?
78. What is a VORTAC?
79. What information is provided by a VOR? TACAN? NDB?
80. What is an ADF steer?
81. Explain the rho-rho and rho-theta systems.
82. What does high, low, and terminal mean when applied to radio aids?
83. Briefly explain a bearing accuracy test for radio aids.
84. Briefly explain a maximum range test for radio aids.
85. What would you expect for typical INS accuracy? Military or civilian systems?
86. What is the effect of a speed increase on GPS accuracy?
87. What does continuity mean in navigation systems?
88. Briefly explain the operation of an air-to-air TACAN.

89. What is the basic premise of operation of a hyperbolic system?
90. What is the integrity monitor for a radio aid? For GPS?
91. 1 of longitude at the equator equals how many nautical miles? At the poles?
92. Which Doppler system would you prefer, one operating in the L band or one
operating in the X band?
93. An aircraft is 2.5 off course at 32 nm. How many miles off course is it?
94. Name the two types of INSs.
95. What is a hyperbolic system? How does it compute a position?
96. What is the relationship between error rate and time-in-align for an INS system?
97. What is a nine-state vector?
98. Can you think of any advantages Link 16 has over Link 4 or Link 11?
99. How would you test acceleration accuracies of an INS?
100. Draw a picture of a BDHI or RMI as the aircraft is heading 020 and is on the
360 radial.
101. An ADF low-frequency receiver operates in the 200 to 1600 kHz range. Why is
this important to a pilot?
102. Why are ring laser–type INSs used if they are less accurate than spinning mass gyros?
103. What is a stored heading alignment? Why is it used?
104. Why is the INS selected to NAV at the specification time requirement?
105. How can nets be stacked in a Link 16 system?
106. Are Link 16 messages sent in MIL-STD-1553 format?
107. Why are 1030 and 1090 MHz notched out in Link 16?
108. How is the civilian world protected against MIDS/JTIDS?
109. How does the INS navigate (i.e., compute position)?
110. How are accelerometers employed in an INS?
111. What is a torquer? How is it employed?
112. What does availability mean in navigation systems?
113. Briefly explain how possible alignment errors affect INS performance.
114. What does a ring laser measure? How?
115. Briefly describe a possible navigation route profile and why it is built that way.
116. What is the minimum amount of time required for a true measure of a spinning
mass INS performance? Why?
117. Can knowledge of navigation hierarchy become a problem? Why?
118. Describe three types of INS alignments.
119. Describe three types of INS updates.
120. Will the entire update always be accepted by the Kalman-state vector? Why or
why not?
121. What is a taxi interrupt in an INS alignment? How does it work?

122. What is the maximum range you would expect between VORs on a jet route if the
VOR accuracy was stated as 4 ?
123. What is the Doppler effect?
124. What is the primary use of a DNS?
125. What is the importance of depression angle in a DNS?
126. Why is a space-stabilized antenna important in a DNS?
127. What is a PPLI? Give some examples.
128. How can a directional antenna aid GPS operation?
129. Name three advantages of the DNS.
130. Name three disadvantages of the DNS.
131. How does the DNS compute drift?
132. Name the three errors in time in the GPS.
133. What is meant by unintentional jamming?
134. What is continuity in a navigation system?
135. The IFF mode 3 has 4096 codes. Why?
136. Is the DNS bank limited? Why?
137. Give three examples of a global navigation satellite system.
138. What are P1, P2, and P3 in an IFF system?
139. What is a Janus DNS?
140. What does an interrogator do?
141. What is the biggest drawback of the current IFF system?
142. What does the GPS measure?
143. What are the major contributing errors to the GPS?
144. What integrity monitor is employed in the GPS?
145. Why are four satellites required for the GPS?
146. Name four types of tests common to a DNS evaluation.
147. What is a GDOP? What determines the GPS GDOP?
148. Why does the GPS employ two separate frequencies?
149. Are there any advantages of an INS over GPS?
150. What is GPS almanac data? Why is it important?
151. What are the typical errors associated with GPS? CA, P, differential?
152. What does differential GPS correct?
153. Which error of the GPS position is related to aircraft velocity?
154. What is the update rate of the GPS?
155. How long will it take for a brand new GPS to acquire and produce a position?
156. How would you test an installation of a new GPS?
157. You turn on Link 16 and you lose telemetry. Why?

158. Describe the best navigation system you could design having access to all of the
systems discussed.
159. Name three accelerations, phantom or otherwise, accounted for in INSs.
160. Name three types of gyros used in INSs.
161. What is a TADIL?
162. What determinism is there in Link 16?
163. How is a DNS platform stabilized?
164. You are flying at 12,000 ft and 160 KIAS. What is the TAS?
165. How does the VOR obtain bearing?
166. How long is a Shuler period?
167. Where would you find the datum used for a map?
168. Name three functions of the interference protection feature on Link 16.
169. How does the TACAN operate in Link 16 systems?
170. What is the difference between track and true heading?
171. How is Link 16 secure?
172. How many VOR stations would you use in a radio aids test?
173. How is DME obtained in a TACAN?
174. Your wingman is missing, you have set TACAN channel 37, what does he need to
set?
175. What is pseudoranging in the GPS?
176. What are TIMs and TOMs?
177. What is the most difficult thing about data link testing?
178. What is the basic unit of time in Link 16?
179. What advantages does Galileo have over GPS?
180. Name three SBASs.
181. What is a NANU? Where would you find it?
182. Is an INS a good navigation system to install in a helicopter?
183. Why will ADF/NDB never be removed from aircraft?
184. Other than RAIM, name two other GPS integrity monitors.
185. What is meant by a radial error in an INS test?
186. You notice that the GPS DOP is 3. What is your error budget?
187. You only have a GPS in your aircraft. Can you legally fly IFR?
188. What is coherent detection?
189. What is the difference between a stable platform and a strap-down platform?
190. What is a cone of confusion? When do you encounter it? When do pilots
encounter it?
191. Why do we not use a depression angle of 80 or 90 in a DNS?
192. What is a VOT? What does it test?

193. What is an internal optimum constellation algorithm?
194. What effect does flying over snow have on a DNS? Sand?
195. When is the combat setting used on Link 16?
196. Does your aircraft have an atomic clock to measure GPS time? How does it do it?
197. What is the difference between dedicated and contention access?
CHAPTER
Part 23/25/27/29 Avionics

Civil Certifications 6
Chapter Outline
6.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
6.1 FAA Type Certification History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
6.2 Federal Aviation Regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.3 Other Rules and Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
6.4 FAA Type Certification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
6.5 Avionics Software Considerations in the Technical Standard Order Process . . 282
6.6 Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Systems . . . . . . 284
6.7 Important Notes for Evaluators Concerning Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
6.8 Differences between EASA and FAA Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
6.9 Cockpit Controls and Displays Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
6.10 Weather RADAR Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
6.11 Airworthiness Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
6.12 Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
6.13 Proximity Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
6.14 Terrain Awareness and Warning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
6.15 Flight Guidance Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
6.16 Landing Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
6.17 Flight Management Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
6.18 Enhanced Vision Systems (EVS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 520
6.19 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527
6.20 Selected Questions for Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528
6.0 INTRODUCTION
The Part 23/25/27/29 in the title of this section refers to the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA) (formerly
Joint Aviation Administration) definitions of aircraft types. Part 23 aircraft are defined
as normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes; Part 25 defines transport
category airplanes. The discussions in this section are applicable to Part 27 (utility
helicopters) and Part 29 (transport helicopters) as well as military installations. The
systems in this section have, for the most part, been developed for the general and
commercial aviation market or mandated for use by the state authorities.
267
268 CHAPTER 6 Part 23/25/27/29 Avionics Civil Certifications
Since the emphasis will be on compliance with the applicable certification

requirements, some time will be spent on the civil certification process, its history, and a
review of the types of documents that you will need to reference. The discussion will
continue with hardware, software, and safety considerations and the requirements for
each. Controls and displays and human factors, which are considerations for all test
plans, will be discussed in detail and documents to assist in the test planning process will
be identified. The systems that will be covered include weather RADAR, global satellite
based navigation civil certifications, reduced vertical separation minima (RVSM), ter-
rain awareness warning systems (TAWS), traffic alert and collision avoidance systems
(TCAS), flight management systems (FMS), landing systems, autopilots, and integrated
navigation systems. Suggested reading and reference material are numerous and will be
called out in each of the sections.
6.1 FAA TYPE CERTIFICATION HISTORY

Each country around the world has created a state authority responsible for managing
aircraft, pilots, and air traffic management. This authority in the United States is called
the FAA. In Europe, it is now known as the EASA for members of the European Union
(although each country maintains its own state authority). These organizations have a
list of recognized priorities. The first concern is safety and the continued operational
safety (COS) of aviation. The second priority is regulatory, where the authorities set
safety standards and establish policies and procedures. The final priority is the certifi-
cation process, which is further broken down into type, production, and airworthiness
certifications and will be explained later.
Commercial air transport originated in the United States in 1918 after a demon-
stration of the capability in 1911. Originally tasked to the U.S. Army, service was
transferred to the U.S. Post Office and was transcontinental by 1921. The Airmail Act of
1925 authorized the Post Office to contract with air carriers for mail service. Federal
regulations seemed to be a foregone conclusion after the industry suffered 2,000 injuries
in two months of service. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 set up the Aeronautics Branch
of the Department of Commerce. This branch was responsible for fostering the growth
of air commerce, establishing airways and navigation aids, licensing pilots, issuing
airworthiness certificates, and investigating accidents. Four original bulletins governing
aircraft were issued by the Aeronautics Branch:
● Bulletin 7 (basic handbook, 1926)
● Bulletin 7A (airframes, 1928)
● Bulletin 7G (engines and propellers, 1931)
● Bulletin 7F (aircraft components and accessories, 1933)
The requirements in these initial bulletins were not very severe. If an aircraft could
demonstrate a takeoff and landing ground roll of less than or equal to 1,000 feet and a
sea level rate of climb of greater than or equal to 250 ft/min it met the requirements for
aircraft performance. If it could fly figure-eight patterns around fixed pylons, it
demonstrated satisfactory compliance for flying qualities. The first type certificate for
an aircraft was granted to the Buhl Airster C-3A on March 29, 1927 (Figure 6.1).
6.1 FAA Type Certification History 269
FIGURE 6.1 ¢
Buhl Airster
From a Company Brochure
Its engine developed 200 hp, weighed in at 1686 lb, and took 7.5 min to climb to
2000 feet (266 ft/min, which exceeded the 250 ft/min requirement).
The Black-McKeller Act of 1934 required mail contracts by bid. This caused airlines
to turn to passengers for revenue. On May 6, 1935, Senator Cutting from New Mexico
was killed in the crash of a DC-2 traveling from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Kansas
City, Missouri. The scheduled TWA flight ran into unforecast weather, ran low on fuel,
and crashed while attempting an approach in poor weather conditions. The Accident
Board faulted TWA for not carrying reserve fuel, employing unqualified pilots, engaging
in instrument flying without effective radios, and trying to land with a low ceiling. TWA
countered by faulting the Department of Commerce for poorly maintained navigation
beacons and failing to inform pilots of deteriorating weather conditions.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 was passed as a result of Senator Bronson
Cutting’s death. This act transferred the civil aviation role from the Commerce
Department to a new independent agency called the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The
first regulation issued by the authority was Civil Aeronautics Regulation (CAR) 4
‘‘Airworthiness Requirements for Aircraft.’’ This regulation applied to all aircraft, but
conflicting requirements for transport and light aircraft caused a separation into two sets
of rules in 1948. In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt split the Civil Aeronautics
Authority into two agencies: the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration (CAA).
The CAB was responsible for rulemaking, accident investigation, and the economic
regulation of airlines. The CAA was given the responsibility for air traffic control
(ATC), airmen and aircraft certification, safety enforcement, and airway development.
In 1948, two regulations and two manuals were available for guidance:
● Civil Aeronautics Regulation 3 (CAR 3)—Airworthiness Requirements for Normal,
Utility, and Acrobatic Aircraft
● Civil Aeronautics Regulation 4 (CAR 4)—Airworthiness Requirements for Transport

Aircraft
● Civil Aeronautics Manuals 3 and 4 (CAM 3, CAM 4)—Flight Test Guidance
In 1956, two regulations were added:
● Civil Aeronautics Regulation 6 (CAR 6) Airworthiness Requirements for Normal
Category Helicopters
● Civil Aeronautics Regulation 7 (CAR 7)—Airworthiness Requirements for Transport
Category Helicopters
In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was passed, which transferred the role of the CAA
as well as CAB safety rulemaking to the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA). The act added
a new role of developing common military and civilian air navigation and air traffic
control systems to the new agency. In 1965, the Civil Aeronautics Regulations were
recodified into Federal Aviation Regulations.
The recodification of the CARs into the new Federal Aviation Regulations included
the following:
● CAR 1 became FAR 21—Certification Procedures
● CAR 3 became FAR 23—Normal, Utility, and Acrobatic Aircraft
● CAR 4b became FAR 25—Transport Aircraft
● CAR 6 became FAR 27—Normal Helicopters
● CAR 7 became FAR 29—Transport Helicopters
● CAR 13 became FAR 33—Engines
● CAR 14 became FAR 35—Propellers
On April 1, 1967, after passage of the Department of Transportation Act the pre-
vious year, the Federal Aviation Agency was renamed the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration and was placed under the newly formed Department of Transportation (DOT).
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 phased out the CAB’s economic regulation
of airlines. The CAB ceased to be an entity in 1984. In 1994, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 was repealed and the Federal Aviation Regulations were rewritten into the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR). The regulations are meant to ‘‘promote safe flight of civil
aircraft . . . by prescribing minimum standards.’’ This is where we are today.
6.2 FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS IN THE

CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The FAR are presented in the CFR. The CFR is a codification of general and permanent
rules based on the acts of Congress. They are divided into titles that represent broad
subject areas, and a few examples are as follows:
● Title 1—General Provisions
● Title 3—President
6.2 Federal Aviation Regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations 271
● Title 7—Agriculture
● Title 14—Aeronautics and Space
● Title 19—Custom Duties
Within Title 14 there are subchapters and FAR parts:
Title 14, Chapter 1

Federal Aviation Administration
Department of Transportation
Subchapter FAR Part
A. Definitions 1
B. Procedural Rules 11 and 13
C. Aircraft 21 through 49
D. Airmen 60 through 67
E. Airspace 71 through 77
F. Air Traffic and General Operating Rules 91 through 100
G. Air Carriers 121 through 139
H. Schools and Other Certified Agencies 141 through 149
I. Airports 150 through 169
J. Navigation Facilities 170 through 182
K. Administrative Regulations 183 through 191
N. Risk Insurance 198
O. Aircraft Loan Guarantee Program 199
The regulations that govern certification and continued airworthiness can be found
in subchapters C, F, G, and K:
Subchapter C—Aircraft
FAR Part 21 Certification Procedures for Products and Parts

FAR Part 23 Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility, Aerobatic, and Commuter
Category Airplanes
FAR Part 25 Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes
FAR Part 27 Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft
FAR Part 29 Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Rotorcraft
FAR Part 31 Airworthiness Standards: Manned Free Balloons
FAR Part 33 Airworthiness Standards: Aircraft Engines
FAR Part 34 Fuel Venting and Exhaust Emission Requirements for Turbine Engine
Powered Airplanes
FAR Part 35 Airworthiness Standards: Propellers
FAR Part 36 Noise Standards: Aircraft Type and Airworthiness Certification
FAR Part 39 Airworthiness Directives
FAR Part 43 Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alterations
Subchapter F—Air Traffic and General Operating Rules
FAR Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules

Subchapter G—Air Carriers, Air Travel Clubs, and Operators for Compensation or Hire:
Certification and Operation
FAR Part 121 Certification and Operation: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Air
Carriers and Commercial Operators of Large Aircraft
FAR Part 125 Certification and Operation: Airplanes Having a Seating Capacity of
20 or More Passengers or a Maximum Payload of 6,000 Pounds or
More
FAR Part 127 Certification and Operation: Scheduled Air Carriers With Helicopters
FAR Part 129 Operations: Foreign Air Carriers and Foreign Operators of U.S.
Registered Aircraft Engaged in Common Carriage
FAR Part 133 Rotorcraft External Load Operations
FAR Part 135 Air Taxi Operators and Commercial Operators
FAR Part 137 Agricultural Aircraft Operators
FAR Part 139 Certification and Operation: Land Airports Serving Certain Air
Carriers
Subchapter K—Administrative Regulations
FAR Part 183 Representatives of the Administrator

How does a proposed rule become a requirement (FAR)? This is accomplished
through the rulemaking procedures. The documentation for this process may be found in
three guidelines provided by the FAA:
● FAR Part 11—General Rulemaking Procedures
● FAA Order 2100.13—FAA Rulemaking Policies
● Advisory Circular (AC) 11-2—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System
The rulemaking process is shown in Figure 6.2.
Any interested person may petition the administrator to issue or amend a rule issued
by the FAA. The petition or summary is published in the Federal Register with a 60-day
comment period. Status reports are provided to the petitioner 10 days after the close of
the comment period and every 120 days. If the petition is granted, then a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking is published in the Federal Register. If the petition is denied, the
petitioner receives a denial of petition signed by the administrator.
Any interested person may also petition the administrator for temporary or perma-
nent exemption from any rule issued by the FAA. A summary is published in the
Federal Register with a 20-day comment period. Within 120 days a grant or denial of
exemption is issued to the petitioner; the notice of this disposition is published in the
Federal Register.
The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) is composed of members
of the aviation community, including air carriers, manufacturers, general aviation
representatives, passenger groups, the general public, other government agencies, and
other groups or associations. Their purpose is to advise the administrator on rulemaking
activities. The ARAC provides a forum to obtain additional input from outside the
government on major regulatory issues; all meetings are open to the public.
6.3 Other Rules and Guidance 273
Rulemaking Process FIGURE 6.2 ¢ FAA

Rulemaking Process
Trigger Event
Petition or
FAA Initiated Investigate and decide appropriate action
Intra-agency coordination
Advanced Notice
of Proposed
Rulemaking
Public comment and consider comments
Prepublication coordination (Intra-agency, OST, OMB)
Notice of
Proposed
Rulemaking
Public comment (hearing) and consider comments
Decide final action. Intra-agency coordination
Final Rule
Effective Date Possible judicial review
6.3 OTHER RULES AND GUIDANCE
● In addition to the FAR contained in the CFR, the evaluator must also be aware of
other rules and guidance. The first of these is the Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR), which is issued for a specific trial period and is used to gain knowledge and
experience during that period. The SFAR goes through the same rulemaking process
as the FAR. The SFAR may eventually be canceled, revised, or incorporated as a
FAR. AC 00-44 lists the FARs and SFARs and information on how to obtain them.
Interim airworthiness criteria are issued for a new category for which airworthiness
standards do not exist. The tilt rotor is an example where interim criteria had to be
issued. The administrator will hold public meetings to solicit comments and work with
the manufacturer to establish certification criteria.
Airworthiness directives (ADs) possess the same authority as the FAR; they are
issued to correct an unsafe condition in a product. They can be issued only if there is an
unsafe condition and the condition is likely to develop in other products of the same
design. The AD describes the conditions and limitations under which the product may
continue to operate (corrective action). The AD is considered as part of the FAR
(by FAR Part 39) and the process is documented in FAA Order 8040.1. An AD can be
issued in one of three ways:
● Emergency rule: issued by telegram or priority letter, then published in the Federal
Register; comments are not solicited.
● Immediate rule with request for comments: published in the Federal Register with an
effective date 30 days later. The AD may be changed based on the comments received.
● Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, followed by a final rule.
FAA orders and notices are directives for FAA employees and their designees; they
do not carry the force of law (e.g., a FAR). The public and certification applicants may
find these documents very useful. Orders are permanent directives governing internal
operations and provide guidance on a specific subject. Notices are temporary directives
that remain in effect for 12 months or less. If they are not replaced, they become inde-
finite; they are often used to update FAA procedures. The FAA may also issue policy
memoranda, which contain statements on policy interpretation. These are also internal to
the FAA and provide guidance to a limited audience.
Advisory circulars do not carry the force of law, but provide a means of showing
compliance with a FAR requirement. This is an excellent starting point for flight testers,
since the AC is basically a ground/flight test plan for specification compliance. The AC
is not the only means of showing compliance with a FAR requirement, and an applicant
may elect to demonstrate this compliance via the use of another method. The AC is
focused on a particular subject and specifically aimed at those regulated by the FAA.
The AC, although not required to be used, does encourage standardization.
6.4 FAA TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

The reference for the certification process is FAA Order 8110.4, ‘‘Type Certification
Handbook.’’ In a nutshell, an applicant must show compliance with the applicable FARs
and the authority will find compliance based on the applicant’s submittal. The applicant
will show compliance by test, inspection, and analysis. The FAA will find compliance
by witnessing tests, inspecting the design, reviewing the analysis, and conducting tests.
The applicant is entitled to a type certificate if he shows the type design meets the
applicable regulations and any other special considerations and if the authority finds that
the type design meets the applicable noise requirements and airworthiness requirements.
Certification is granted via one of three methods:
● Type certificate (TC): for a new aircraft or an aircraft with significant changes.
● Supplemental type certificate (STC): certification of modifications to an aircraft that
require substantial engineering and/or flight testing per the FARs; the STC will apply
on all similar types of aircraft. (If the applicant held the TC, she would then apply for
an amended TC vice an STC.)
● FAA Form 337: certification of a modification that would not affect flight safety for a
single aircraft; this is done via an FAA field approval.
The requirement for obtaining certification is found in FAR Part 21, Certification
Procedures for Products and Parts. Type certificate requirements are found in subpart B,
Provisional Type Certificates; in subpart C, Changes to TCs; in subpart D; and supple-
mental TCs I, in subpart E. The TC is the basis for all other approvals, and has two major
components: production and airworthiness. The TC flight test project will be the most
complex and the lengthiest. A TC is required (FAR 21.19) for new aircraft or for aircraft
where there are
● Changes in design, configuration, power, speed, or weight that are extensive enough
to require a complete investigation of compliance
● Changes in the number of engines or rotors
● Engines or rotors using different principles of propulsion

● Engines or rotors using different principles of operation
● Changes in the number of propeller blades or principle of pitch change operation
In the first line of the previous excerpt, the term extensive enough is used, but how
big of a change is extensive enough? FAR 21.93 is a good place to start, as this para-
graph defines the differences in major and minor changes. According to this paragraph, a
major change is any change that has an appreciable effect on weight and balance,
structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or characteristics affecting
airworthiness. A minor change is indicated when none of the previous is true. But what
is appreciable?
A change is appreciable if the change requires revisions to published data or pro-
cedures related to the flight characteristics. This may be a change to the flight manual,
weight and balance data, or engine data. A change is also appreciable if tests are
required to reestablish compliance with the FARs or to show that hazardous or unreli-
able conditions have not been introduced as a result of the change. A change may also be
appreciable if the change has some effect on characteristics and cannot be classified as
minor. If this sounds a bit convoluted, it is, because most of the time a classification of a
change will be a judgment call.
In general, anyone can apply for a TC. Normally the TC process is conducted (for
the FAA) within the United States, but it may be conducted outside of the United States
if no undue burden is involved. The FAA allows five years for transport aircraft appli-
cants and three years for all others (including engines) for the completion of the TC
process. There is no expiration date on the TC, and the owner has the right to transfer the
TC to another individual. A TC is invaluable since it allows its holder production
approval, approval to install certified engines or propellers, or airworthiness approval.
Technically the process for obtaining an STC is the same as obtaining a TC,
although the degree of review and involvement is generally less for the STC.
The first step in the TC process is the application submittal. The applicant completes
Form 8110-12 and submits it to the Aircraft Certification Office (ACO). Within the
United States there are four division chiefs and an international program officer in the
FAA certification service organization; they all report to the administration director:
● AIR 100—Aircraft Engineering
● AIR 200—Production and Airworthiness
● AIR 500—Planning and Program Management
● AIR 400—International Airworthiness Program Officer
● Brussels Aircraft Certification—Liaison with Europe, Africa, and Middle East
governments
There are four accountable directorates within the certification service organization
established in areas of the country where the expertise of particular aircraft resides:
● ANM-100—Transport Airplane, Seattle, Part 25

● ACE-100—Small Airplane, Kansas City, Parts 23 and 31
● ANE-100—Engine and Propeller, Burlington, Parts 33 and 35
● ASW-100—Rotorcraft, Ft. Worth, Parts 27 and 29
They are responsible for policy under a FAR part covering a particular category of
aircraft or aeronautical parts and oversee major certification projects wherever they
occur involving the category of aircraft they specialize in. Their involvement increases
as a certification program becomes significant, and their responsibility is delineated in
FAA Order 8100.5, Directorate Procedures. The accountable directorates have final
authority on policy for their respective FARs. They also serve as geographical directo-
rates, which are responsible for all the field offices within a geographical area:
● Seattle—Seattle, Long Beach, Denver
● Burlington (Boston)—New York
● Kansas City—Wichita, Atlanta, Chicago, Anchorage
● Fort Worth
The four accountable directorates also handle certification projects for specified
countries. For example, the Seattle office is also responsible for projects from
● Brazil ● Denmark
● Finland ● France
● Israel ● the Netherlands
● Norway ● Russia
● Spain ● Sweden
Of course, this can be a bit confusing for the uninitiated. Suppose an applicant in
San Diego applies for a helicopter TC. In this case, his field office would be Long Beach
(ACO), the accountable directorate would be Ft. Worth (rotorcraft), and the geo-
graphical directorate would be Seattle.
Along with Form 8110-12, the applicant must also submit three view drawings
along with any preliminary data, engine description and design features, engine
operating characteristics, and proposed engine operating limitations. As previously
mentioned, the applicant has a specified period to obtain the TC from the date of the
application: five years for transport aircraft and three years for all others. If the
program slips, the applicant may get an extension, but this will impact the certifica-
tion basis. Suppose an applicant submits a certification request for a Part 23 airplane
on November 1, 2015. By the regulations, she has until November 1, 2018, to com-
plete the process. If the program slips three months, to February 1, 2008, a new
application date of February 1, 2016, will be imposed. The applicant is then respon-
sible for meeting any new rules that became effective between November 1, 2015,
and February 1, 2016.
The FAA will establish a project team for the new application. The typical makeup
will include members of the ACO, which is the local field office, the accountable
directorate, the Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO) (which is located at
the field office), and the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) (which is also located
at the field office).
The ACO will provide a project manager/lead engineer as well as engineers from
different branches (e.g., structures, systems). The ACO will also assign an ACO man-
ager and support staff. The accountable directorate is responsible for assigning a project
officer and may be called upon to supply a national resource specialist.
The MIDO conducts conformity inspections throughout the program and reviews
the manufacturing process used to build the prototype, which lays the groundwork for
production certificate approval. The MIDO is responsible for releasing the aircraft to
flight test after verifying conformity with the approved design; airworthiness is certifi-
cated by the issuance of an experimental airworthiness certificate. The MIDO will
prepare part I of the type inspection report (TIR); flight test prepares part II.
Flight standards will support the project with an Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG),
which is composed of operations and maintenance specialists. This group reviews the
flight manual, maintenance instructions, and instructions for continued airworthiness. It
is also responsible for evaluating pilot workloads to determine training requirements and
for preparing the master equipment list (MEL) for the aircraft.
Within flight test, the pilot and engineer have designated responsibilities. Jointly
they are responsible for determining whether performance, flight characteristics, and
operations meet FAA requirements. They determine the operational limitations and
procedures, review the applicant’s flight test results, and help write the type inspection
authorization (TIA).
The test pilot has the additional jobs of concurring with the necessary flight tests,
conducting the flights, and analyzing the results. He prepares part II of the TIR and
briefs the Type Certification Board at the preflight meeting. The engineer coordinates
with the applicant, supervises the designees, and reviews data as necessary. She
approves the design data, drawings, and test plans and identifies issues for the Type
Certification Board. The engineer also coordinates with MIDO and approves air-
worthiness limitations and reviews instructions for continued airworthiness
(FAR 21.50).
6.4.1 Type Certification Board

The function of the Type Certification Board is to provide senior management oversight
in the following primary ways:
● Introduction and description of the project
● Discussion of design details and possible problem areas with FAA specialists
● Start the evaluation process
● Establish the basis and need for type certification
● Formulation of special compliance teams to define special conditions
● Establish project schedules
● Resolve problems of major significance and provide for unconventional design
solutions
There are three mandatory meetings for the applicant: preliminary, preflight, and
final. There may be a familiarization meeting prior to the preliminary meeting for
applicants who are not ‘‘known’’ to the authority or do not have a track record of
previous applications.
The preliminary meeting is held to collect technical data about the project, deter-
mine the proposed certification basis, and establish what information is required to
develop a certification program plan. It is at this meeting that any issues will be iden-
tified, milestones and schedules will be mapped out, and points of contact for both sides
will be identified. The certification program plan, as a minimum, will contain the fol-
lowing information:
● General information
● Certification basis
● Method of compliance
● Compliance checklists (this is not a requirement, but can be of great assistance during
the certification effort; this will be addressed later)
● Project schedule
● Delegation
NOTE: The plan is a living document and does get updated during the program.
The general information section contains the name of the applicant, the date of the
application, model and project description, and the location of the ACO. The certifica-
tion basis determines the applicable FARs as well as noise and emissions standards. The
certification basis may identify unique situations relevant to the proposed program.
These situations could include equivalent levels of safety, issue papers, special condi-
tions, or exemptions. A unique situation could involve programs for which airworthiness
regulations do not contain an adequate safety standard due to novel or unusual design
features. For example:
● Vertical/short takeoff and landing aircraft—Should airplane or rotorcraft standards
be used?
● Two engines driving one propeller
● Canards—What are the icing test requirements?
● Composites
The issue paper process is covered in AC 20-166, Issue Paper Process, June 15,
2010. Issue papers provide a structured means for describing and tracking the resolution
of significant technical, regulatory and administrative issues that occur during a project.
The issue paper process establishes a formal communication for significant issues
between the applicant and the Authority. Issue papers form a valuable reference for
future TC programs and for development of regulatory changes; by describing sig-
nificant or precedent-setting technical decisions and rationales employed, they are ideal
source documents. The types of issue papers are as follows:
– Method of compliance
– Equivalent level of safety
– Proposed special conditions
– Certification basis
– Determination of compliance
– Environmental considerations
– Export (import) requirements
– New information
– Type validation
– Other types of FAA approvals

– Unsafe features or characteristics
– All other issues
The method of compliance is the most common issue paper, and it defines a par-
ticular method of compliance that requires directorate or policy office coordination as a
result of peculiarities in the type design or the need to define specific conditions to
show compliance. Equivalent level of safety (ELOS) findings are granted when literal
compliance with a certification regulation cannot be shown and compensating factors
exist which can provide an ELOS (21.21). Compensating factors are normally any
design changes, limitations or equipment imposed that will facilitate granting the
equivalency. An equivalent level of safety is a determination by the FAA that the
applicant’s design, while not meeting all FAA requirements, provides for an ELOS.
This is usually used for very specific requirements and is a judgment call by the
accountable directorate. A request for an equivalent level of safety is discussed in the
following example.
The request for an equivalent level of safety ruling was requested by Boeing for its
B-777 with respect to auxiliary power unit (APU) monitoring. The issue paper identified
FAR 25.1305 as requiring the flight deck instruments to monitor critical APU functions
to ensure safe operation within specified limitations as required by FAR 25.1501(b).
Continuous APU monitoring with a two-man crew results in too high a workload.
The FAA stipulated that instrumentation must either conform to FAR 25.1305 and
FAR 25.1501(b) requirements or accept an equivalent level of safety under FAR 21.21.
The applicant’s position stated that automatic APU shutdown provided for fire,
rotor speed droop, loss of rotor speed signal, or rotor overspeed. In addition, an APU
limit caution message was generated for the crew whenever the APU exceeded exhaust
gas temperature (EGT), oil pressure, or oil temperature limits. The FAA concluded that
this architecture did provide an equivalent level of safety.
The basis for issuing and amending special conditions is found in 21.16. A special
condition is issued only if the existing applicable airworthiness standards do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for an aircraft, engine or propeller because of
novel or unusual design features of the product to be certificated. Novel or unusual
applies to features of the product to be certificated when compared to the applicable
airworthiness standards. Special conditions are not used to upgrade the applicable air-
worthiness standards when novel or unusual design features are not involved. Once
again, the accountable directorate is responsible for their issuance and they are listed on
the type certification data sheet. An example of the mechanism of special conditions is
provided below.
Innovative Solutions and Support (IS&S) applied for an STC for the DC-10-30 on
July 15, 1997. The STC called for the installation of a digital electronic altimeter. Since
altitude is a critical parameter, concern was high due to the possible disruption of the
signal by high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). Interference by HIRF could cause a loss
of displayed information or provide hazardously misleading information. The new sys-
tem was required to meet the standards that were in effect at the time of the original
certification (February 1, 1965). Since there were no specific regulations addressing
HIRF in 1965, the digital altimeter was considered novel or unusual in terms of type
certification basis.
The concern was adverse effects due to external radiation and uncertainty about the
adequacy of aircraft shielding. To allay fears, the system’s immunity to HIRF had to be
established. IS&S was able to prove this immunity via HIRF ground tests. The original
TC was amended to include the special conditions provided by the modifications to the
airplane by IS&S and that the system met the shielding requirements as demonstrated by
testing.
Certification basis issue papers designate the applicable airworthiness and envir-
onmental regulations, including special conditions, which must be met for certification
per Part 21. The issue paper must provide the definitive justification for selecting the
certification basis, including specific amendment levels. An exemption is a temporary or
permanent allowable noncompliance with a particular regulation for a specific product.
As previously discussed in section 6.2 of this text, any interested party may petition
for a temporary/permanent exemption from any rule issued by the FAA. This is allowed
by FAR Part 11 and must follow the rulemaking process. The key for an exemption
petition is that it must be in the public interest and not adversely affect safety. The
petition may be granted or denied by the accountable directorate or the administrator.
An example of a petition for exemption is provided in the following paragraphs.
TRI Phantom, Inc., sought to modify a single-engine Explorer model 552C by
increasing the seating from 9 to 13 passengers. The company sought an exemption from
FAR 23.3(a), which limits the normal category airplane to nine passengers. In addition,
they sought an exemption from FAR Part 135, Appendix A, delineating one engine
inoperative requirements for FAR 135 operations in aircraft with 10 or more seats.
The company claimed that the public interest would be served by these exemptions
because they could operate the aircraft at a significantly lower cost per passenger, which
would equate to lower airfares. Because of the additional seats, fewer flights would have
to be flown to serve the same number of passengers, which would translate into lower
fuel consumption, conservation of the environment, and smaller workloads for air traffic
controllers.
The company argued that safety was not adversely affected since the center of
gravity (CG) range and maximum certified gross weight did not change, the propulsion
and propeller system were not modified, and no airframe modifications were required.
The company also stated that the airplane would not be approved for flight into instru-
ment flight rules (IFR) conditions and this configuration was already in use in foreign
countries.
Unfortunately for the company, the FAA stated that the data submitted did not
support any of the claims that the applicant made. They (the company) did not show the
equivalent level of safety for aircraft certified for more than nine seats in terms of crash
worthiness and the number of exits and exit markings. The request for exemption from
one engine inoperative requirements failed to offer any reason or argument why the
petitioner is unique from the same general class of operators who are also subject to the
regulation. In addition, the petitioner failed to provide any logic as to why an equivalent
level of safety was provided for aircraft carrying more than nine passengers with one
engine versus two. The petition was denied.
Determination of compliance issue papers provide a statement of procedural
requirements, including the applicant’s responsibilities for showing compliance. They
are designed to capture the compliance checklist, which shows the regulatory require-
ment and the method of compliance proposed by the applicant for each regulation
identified in the certification basis. A compliance checklist documents the means of
compliance to the applicable airworthiness standards. There is no regulatory require-

ment for a compliance checklist, so it cannot be required of the applicant. FAR 21.21
requires that the applicant show that his design meets the applicable FAR requirements.
Since the applicant is required to show how the plans on showing compliance, a
checklist is probably the easiest way of monitoring progress against the plan.
Environmental considerations issue papers are similar in nature but define the
applicable environmental regulations required by the applicant to show compliance.
Export/import issue papers are written by either the FAA or the CAA, which cites
compliance with the airworthiness requirements. A new information issue paper is
written by the FAA to examine issues that arise from a better understanding of envir-
onmental or other hazards that were not well understood in the past or did not exist
previously (e.g., microbursts, cabin ozone hazards). When the FAA is the validating
authority, an FAA validation team writes an issue paper for each validation item: a
certification item or airworthiness standard of peculiar interest to the validating authority.
For other FAA approvals such as parts manufacturer approvals (PMA) the FAA may
use issue papers to document and resolve compliance issues where Directorate or policy
office guidance is required. Unsafe features or characteristics issue papers are written for
items that could preclude certification. All other issues during the TC project that
become controversial or may otherwise require type certification board action to resolve
may require an issue paper (e.g., a nonstandard method/means of compliance proposed
by the applicant).
FAR 21.33 allows the FAA to make any inspection and test necessary to determine
compliance. Conformity inspections were discussed under the MIDO responsibilities in
section 6.4. The inspections are accomplished to ensure that the product being certified
conforms to design data. The inspections are accomplished by the MIDO or the FAA
designee. Designees are engineers, inspectors, and test pilots who do not work directly
for the FAA, but are approved to act as their designees. For conformity inspections, the
FAA may approve a designated manufacturing inspection representative (DMIR) or a
designated avionics representative (DAR). Most common among the designees are the
designated engineering representatives (DERs), who specialize in different aeronautical
roles. The schedule of events for product inspection is as follows:
● The applicant submits FAA Form 8130-9, Statement of Conformity.
● DER or FAA reviews the data.
● FAA engineering requests conformity inspections via FAA Form 8120-10 or the type
inspection authorization.
● ACO sends the request to the appropriate MIDO.
● MIDO conducts inspections (deviations are recorded and dispositioned).
● FAA Form 8130-3, Airworthiness Tag, is issued.
● Completed conformity inspection records are sent back to FAA engineering.
● Results are included in the TIR.
Certification tests are official tests by the FAA or a DER on conformed aircraft to
show compliance with certification criteria. The FAA tests are accomplished to verify
the applicant’s data and are not used for flight test data. Any changes to the aircraft must
be documented and conformed, and those tests affected by the modification must be
repeated.
The final certification board reviews all data, identifies outstanding issues, and
decides on whether to issue a TC. The TIR is issued 90 days after the issuance of the TC.
The TIR is an official record of inspections and tests conducted to show compliance
with applicable regulations and provide a record of other information pertinent to each
TC/STC project.
And you thought that you had it bad with flight test readiness reviews, test review
boards, and safety review boards for military products. A good reference for the FAA
avionics certification process is an FAA document titled ‘‘Description of the FAA
Avionics Certification Process,’’ prepared by James H. Williams on April 23, 1997, and
available on the FAA website (http://www.faa.gov).
6.5 AVIONICS SOFTWARE CONSIDERATIONS

IN THE TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER PROCESS
The technical standard order (TSO) system provides test specifications and evaluation
considerations that should be employed to evaluate the performance of various types of
appliances. Appliances in this case are not toasters and microwaves but avionic systems
installed on aircraft. These criteria are called minimum operating performance standards
(MOPS). The MOPS may be generated by the government or any of a number of other
organizations:
● Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
● Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA, and now just called RTCA)
● Manufacturers
● Any other technically oriented body
The MOPS provide reasonable assurance that a TSO-authorized appliance will
function reliably and as intended. The MOPS typically consist of
● Test procedures that address operating characteristics
● Test procedures that address environmental conditions
● Test procedures that address software
The TSO system within the U.S. permits almost total delegation of compliance
determination to the industry; this is not true under EASA where the European TSO
(ETSO) is treated the same as a TC or STC under AMC 21. The exceptions, where FAA
approval is required, are found in the approval required for the software validation and
verification plan, and sanctioning and monitoring of the manufacturer’s quality control
procedures.
A finding of compliance is synonymous with approval. What this means in plain
English is that when a manufacturer declares that its data and submittal comply with all
of the TSO requirements, it renders approval for the submitted data. The FAA responds
to the manufacturer with a TSO authorization, not a TSO approval. The manufacturer
has already granted itself that approval. Similar principles and procedures are used in the
authorization of modified appliances. It is important to note that this is not the case
within EASA regulations that consider the TSO as a formal approval and must go
through the certification process, similar to the TC, ATC, and STC certificates.
6.5 Avionics Software Considerations in the Technical Standard Order Process 283
The authorization process for modified appliances depends on the magnitude of the
change involved. Two types of modifications apply to hardware: a major change and a
minor change. A major hardware change is defined as a change requiring a nontrivial
reevaluation to show compliance with the TSO criteria. It may also be a change that,
because of new features or functions (or the potential effect on features and functions),
requires a nontrivial reevaluation to show compliance with the TSO criteria. A minor
change is any hardware change that is not a major change.
A minor change to a TSO appliance is approved in-house by the manufacturer
without FAA participation. The required TSO data that have been changed should be
submitted to the FAA within a reasonable period of time (usually 30 days). A major
change in a TSO appliance requires the manufacturer to reapply for the TSO author-
ization. The reapplication involves the following:
● Relabeling the article with a new identification description
● Reestablishing compliance with the TSO criteria
● Resubmitting the required TSO documentation
● Redeclaring compliance with the TSO criteria
Major changes may not be implemented until a new TSO authorization is received
from the FAA; the FAA has 30 days to respond. The references for the TSO process are
FAR 21, subpart O; FAA Order 8150.1A; AC 20-115A; and AC 20-110E.
Changes in software are defined as significant and nonsignificant. The wording is
much the same as that found with hardware changes. A significant change is one that
requires a nontrivial reevaluation to show compliance with the TSO criteria or a change
that, because of new functions or features (or the potential effects on existing functions
and features), requires a nontrivial reevaluation to show compliance with the TSO criteria.
A nonsignificant change is any software change that is not a significant change. The
process for obtaining the new authorization is the same as described for hardware changes.
As previously mentioned, the authority does have the responsibility for approving
the manufacturer’s software practices as well as monitoring the manufacturer’s quality
control procedures. The software audit is a means to examine a manufacturer’s software
practices. The intent is to determine whether the manufacturer is capable of producing
software to a stated criticality level. The process addresses software quality as well as a
subjective measure to minimize nondetected software errors. The software audit is
usually divided into three phases:
● Preaudit activities
● Audit activities
● Postaudit activities
The frequency and intensity of the audits is based on manufacturer’s performance,
past software record, and FAA experience with the particular manufacturer. The goal of
the audit is to ensure that the manufacturer is maintaining its software process as
accepted by the FAA.
The preaudit activities involve the formulation and presentation to the authority of
required documentation:
● Software management development plan, or software development methodology
● Software quality assurance plan (SQAP)
● Software configuration management plan (SCMP)

● Structural organization of the corporation showing by whom and how the individual
software tasks are undertaken, controlled, monitored, and approved for a sample project
The audit activities are geared toward monitoring the manufacturer’s response to
changes and the effectiveness of its software process. The audit requires that the product
be developed through the corporate product development policies, that is, that the plan
must be in place and followed. The audit activities include the following:
● A review of problem reports and implementation of changes
● Response resolution of preaudit reviews
● Determining the adequacy and standards for compliance with the validation and
verification plan (V&V)
● Evaluating the effectiveness of quality assurance
● Evaluating the effectiveness of the configuration management plan
● Evaluating the effectiveness of any other self-policing functions
● Audit summary and action items
The postaudit activity is a review of all required action items to ensure that the
manufacturer has complied with the recommended changes. The postaudit activities
include the following:
● Assessment of audit activities
● Resolution of audit action items
● Reporting of changes to software standards, software development methodologies, or
policing (control) procedures (SQA, SCM)
6.5.1 Other Considerations in the TSO Process

Three other considerations in the TSO process must be addressed by the manufacturer:
interchangeability, the mixing of TSO and nonTSO functions, and component identifi-
cation. When changes are made to a TSO appliance, the applicant must provide inter-
changeability methodology. For example, it is the responsibility of the TSO
manufacturer to demonstrate functional conformance (one-way or two-way inter-
changeability) has been substantiated. What this means is that hardware or software
changes shall be form, fit, and functional with the previous equipment. Installation
factors may need to be taken into account. Repairs and enhancements that do not
adversely affect operation and safety should be acceptable for interchangeability.
Software of appliances that provide TSO and nonTSO functions needs to be eval-
uated as one entity as part of the TSO process, irrespective of whether the software
serves TSO or nonTSO functions.
The following items need to be discernible through the manufacturer’s component
identification scheme:
● Hardware changes (major or minor)
● Software changes (significant or nonsignificant)
● Criticality level (level 1, 2, 3, or multiple)
● Interchangeability (one-way or two-way)
6.6 Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or Complex Systems 285
6.6 CERTIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR

HIGHLY INTEGRATED OR COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Today’s avionics systems are digital and, by their very nature, are integrated with other
aircraft systems. The term highly integrated refers to systems that perform or contribute
to multilevel functions. Complex refers to systems whose safety cannot be shown solely
by test and whose logic is difficult to understand without the aid of analytical tools. The
reference material for this section can be found in Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) ARP4754, ‘‘Certification Con-
siderations for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems,’’ and ARP4761,
‘‘Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment on Civil Airborne
Systems and Equipment.’’ The reference material was developed in the context of Part 25
(civilian transport) but can easily be applied to other categories as well as military
applications. The software requirements are referred back to RTCA documents (MOPS)
such as RTCA DO-178B and its European counterpart ED-12B. The U.S. military has
adopted RTCA DO-178B in lieu of a military standard (DOD-STD-2167A was can-
celled). The practices are primarily directed toward systems that integrate multiple
functions and have failure modes with the potential to result in unsafe aircraft operating
conditions. The goal is safety.
The references are recommended practices and hence do not carry the mandate of
law. They are not mutually exclusive and must be taken together when approaching any
complex avionics system. The references were developed in response to a request from
the FAA to the SAE to define the appropriate nature and scope of system-level infor-
mation for demonstrating regulatory compliance for highly integrated or complex sys-
tems. The documents are designed to provide a common basis for certification and
concentrate on meeting the intent of FAR 25.1309 and FAR 25.1301, which is not a
particularly easy task.
Specifically, the FARs state:
The airplane equipment and systems must be installed so that:
– Those required for type certification or by operating rules or whose improper func-
tioning would reduce safety, perform as intended under the airplane operating and
environmental conditions CFR 14/CS 25.1309 (a)(1)
– Other equipment and systems are not a source of danger in themselves and
do not adversely affect the proper functioning of those covered by (a)(1);
25.1309 (a)(2)
– Catastrophic failures are extremely improbable and do not result from a single failure,
a hazardous failure condition is extremely remote, and a major failure is remote
25.1309 (b)(1,2,3)
– Information concerning unsafe system operating conditions must be provided to the
crew to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. A warning indication must
be provided if immediate corrective action is required
– Systems and controls, including indications and annunciations must be designed to
minimize crew errors, which could create additional hazards 25.1309 (c)
CFR 14 25.1301 for the associated aircraft types is really a catch-all; each item
must be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function and must be labeled as
to its identification, function, or operating limitations, or any combination of these

factors. Each item must also be installed according to limitations specified for that
equipment. The statement, ‘‘Each item must function properly when installed,’’ is
shown only in US documentation. There are four major categories to consider when
showing compliance with subparagraph (a) to 25.1301. The operating and environ-
mental conditions that installed systems must be evaluated against include the entire
operating envelope of the airplane normal and abnormal conditions. These conditions
should include external environmental conditions of turbulence, HIRF, lightning and
precipitation; the severity of these conditions is dependent on the limitations set by
certification standards. In addition to the external environmental conditions previously
mentioned, the systems must also be evaluated against the environment within the
airplane. These tests include vibration and acceleration loads, variations in fluid
pressure and electrical power, fluid or vapor contamination in the normal operating
environment as well as accidental leaks or spillage or handling by personnel. RTCA/
DO-160G/ED-14G, ‘‘Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne
Equipment,’’ defines the standard series of tests that may be used to support compliance
with this subparagraph.
The substantiation of these tests may be shown by test or analysis or reference to
comparable service on other aircraft. It must be shown that comparable service experi-
ence is valid for the proposed installation. The compliance demonstrations must also
show that the normal functioning of such equipment, systems or installations does not
interfere with the proper functioning of other systems, equipment, or installations. The
other equipment mentioned in subparagraph (a)(2) of 1301 refers to systems that are
usually amenities for passengers (e.g., phones, in-flight entertainment). Failure or
improper operation of these systems should not affect the safety of the airplane. Tests
are necessary to show that their normal or abnormal functioning does not adversely
affect proper functioning of aircraft systems and does not adversely influence the safety
of the airplane or its occupants (e.g., fire, explosion, high voltage).
Failure conditions need to be identified and their effects assessed to show com-
pliance with subparagraph (b) to 25.1309: catastrophic failures are extremely improb-
able and do not result from a single failure, a hazardous failure condition is extremely
remote, and a major failure is remote. Compliance can be shown by analysis or appro-
priate simulator, ground or flight testing. When performing the analysis, all possible
failure conditions and their causes, modes of failure, and damages from sources external
to the system need be considered. These include the possibility of multiple failures and
undetected failures or the possibility of requirement, design and implementation errors.
The analysis should also note the effect of reasonably anticipated crew errors after the
occurrence of a failure or failure condition or the effect of reasonably anticipated errors
when performing maintenance actions. From the human factors perspective, the crew
alerting cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults should be
examined. Finally, it should be determined what the resulting effects are on the airplane
and occupants when considering the stage of flight and operating and environmental
conditions.
The maximum allowable probability of the occurrence of each failure condition is
determined from the failure condition’s effects. But how do we measure probability?
Probability can be quantitative or qualitative; safety assessments that cannot be
calculated must be assessed qualitatively. A logical and acceptable relationship exists
between the average probability per flight hour and the severity of the failure condition
effects. The probability and severity descriptions are taken from FAA and EASA doc-
umentation. EASA uses a more detailed description of these terms:
– Failure conditions with no safety effect have no probability requirement
– Minor failure conditions may be probable
– Major failure conditions must be no more frequent than remote
– Hazardous failure conditions must be no more frequent than extremely remote
– Catastrophic failure conditions must be extremely improbable
When using quantitative analyses to determine compliance with the rule the fol-
lowing descriptions have been accepted in terms of average probability per flight hour:
– Probable failure conditions are those having an average probability per flight hour
greater than of the order 1 105
– Remote failure conditions are those of the order of 1 105 or less, but greater than
of the order 1 107
– Extremely remote failure conditions are those of the order 1 107 or less but greater
than of the order 1 109
– Extremely improbable failure conditions are those of the order of 1 109 or less
Where did these numbers come from? Historical evidence indicated that the prob-
ability of a serious accident due to operational and airframe related causes was approxi-
mately one in one million hours of flight; about 10% of the total were attributed to failure
conditions caused by the aircraft systems. It seemed logical that serious accidents caused
by aircraft systems should not be allowed a higher probability than this in new aircraft
designs. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the probability of a serious
accident from all such failure conditions should not exceed one in ten million flight hours
or 1 107. But how many failure conditions in an aircraft could be catastrophic?
It was assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that there could be approximately 100 failure
conditions in an aircraft that could be catastrophic. If the target allowable probability of
1 107 was apportioned equally among these 100 conditions, each failure condition
could not exceed a probability of 1 109. The upper limit for the average probability
per flight hour for catastrophic failure conditions would be 1 109, which establishes
an approximate probability value for the term extremely improbable. Failure conditions
having less severe effects could be relatively more likely to occur.
When using qualitative analyses to determine compliance with the rule, the fol-
lowing descriptions have been accepted as aids to engineering judgment:
– Probable failure conditions are those anticipated to occur one or more times during
the entire operational life of each airplane
– Remote failure conditions are those unlikely to occur to each airplane during its
service life, but may occur several times when considering the total operational life of
a number of airplanes of the type
– Extremely remote failure conditions are those not anticipated to occur to each air-
plane during its service life, but may occur a few times when considering the total
operational life of a number of airplanes of the type
– Extremely improbable failure conditions are those so unlikely that they are not
anticipated to occur during the entire operational life of all airplanes of one type
The associated severity terms must be described as well:

– No safety effect—failure conditions that would have no effect on safety or failure
conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane or increase
crew workload
– Minor—failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane safety and
would involve aircrew actions that are well within their capabilities and may include a
slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a slight increase in crew
workload such as flight plan changes, or some physical discomfort to passengers or
cabin crew
– Major—failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there
would be a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, a sig-
nificant increase in crew workload, or conditions impairing crew efficiency, or dis-
comfort to the flight crew, or physical distress to passengers or cabin crew possibly
including injuries
– Hazardous—failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the
ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there
would be:
– A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
– Physical distress or excessive workload such that the flight crew cannot be relied
upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely
– Serious or fatal injury to relatively small number of the occupants other than the
flight crew
– Catastrophic—Failure conditions that would result in multiple fatalities usually with
the loss of the airplane. (The acceptable method of compliance within the EASA
documentation notes that a catastrophic failure condition was defined in previous
versions of the rule and the advisory material as a failure condition that would prevent
continued safe flight and landing.)
The combination of probability and severity, along with the associated verbiage, is
depicted in Table 6.1.
6.6.1 The Safety Assessment Process

The Part 25 Airworthiness Standards are based on the objectives and principles or
techniques of the fail-safe design concept, which considers the effects of failures and
combinations of failures in defining a safe design. The following objectives pertaining to
failures apply:
– In any system or subsystem, the failure of any single element, component or con-
nection during any one flight should be assumed regardless of its probability; they
should not be catastrophic.
– Subsequent failures during the same flight, whether detected or latent, and combi-
nations thereof, should also be assumed, unless the joint probability with the first
failure is shown to be extremely improbable.
TABLE 6.1 ¢ Severity versus Probability
Effect on the No Effect on Slight Significant Large Normally with

Aircraft Operational Reduction in Reduction in Reduction in Hull Loss
Capabilities Functional Functional Functional
or Safety Capabilities or Capabilities or Capabilities or
Safety Margins Safety Margins Safety Margins
Effect on the Inconvenience Physical Physical Distress, Serious or Fatal Injury Multiple
Occupants Discomfort Possibly Including to a Small Number Fatalities
Excluding the Injuries of Passengers or
Flight Crew Cabin Crew
Effect on the No Effect on Slight Increase in Physical Discomfort Physical Distress or Fatalities or
Flight Crew Flight Crew Workload or a Significant Excessive Workload Incapacitation
Increase in Impairs Ability to
Workload Perform Tasks
Allowable No Probability Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely
Qualitative Requirement Improbable
Probability
Allowable No Probability <103 Note 1 <105 <107 <109
Quantitative Requirement
Probability;
Probability
per Flight
Hour on the
Order of:
Classification of No Safety Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Failure Effect
Condition
Note 1: A numerical probability range is provided here as a reference. The applicant is not required to perform a quantitative analysis, nor substantiate by
such an analysis, that this numerical criteria has been met for Minor Failure conditions. Current Transport category aircraft products are regarded as
meeting this standard simply by using current commonly accepted Industry practice.
The fail-safe concept uses multiple design principles and techniques to ensure a safe
design. The use of one principle or technique is seldom adequate, and normally two or
more are required to meet a fail-safe design. The basic fail-safe design will ensure that
major failure conditions are remote, that hazardous failure conditions are extremely
remote, and that catastrophic failure conditions are extremely improbable.
The following identifies the techniques used in development to ensure a fail-safe
design:
– Design integrity and quality (including life limits)—to ensure intended function and
prevent failures
– Redundancy or backup systems—to enable continued function after any single (or
other defined number of failures such as engines, hydraulics, and flight controls)
– Isolation or segregation of systems, components or elements—so that failure of one
does not cause failure of another
– Proven reliability—so that multiple, independent failures are unlikely to occur during
the same flight
– Failure warning or indication—to provide detection
– Flight crew procedures—specifying corrective action for use after failure detection
– Checkability—the ability to check a component’s condition

– Designed failure effect limits—including the capability to sustain damage and limit
the safety impact or effects of the failure
– Designed failure path—to control and direct the effects of a failure in a way that
limits the safety impact
– Margins or factors of safety—to allow for any undefined or unforeseeable adverse
conditions (known unknowns)
– Error tolerance—considers adverse effects of foreseeable errors during the airplane’s
design, test, manufacture, operations, and maintenance
Because newer systems are more highly integrated, there is a concern that design
and analysis techniques traditionally applied to noncomplex systems may not provide
adequate safety coverage. Other assurance techniques such as development assurance,
utilizing a combination of process assurance and verification coverage criteria, or
structured analysis and assessment techniques applied to the airplane or systems level
are applied to more complex systems. Their systematic use increases confidence that
errors in requirements or design and integration or interaction effects have been ade-
quately identified and corrected.
Compliance with these two paragraphs can be very subjective unless some specific
guidance is offered. The aerospace recommended practices attempt to provide such
guidance. The documents provide assistance in the areas of safety assessment, risk
analysis, certification planning, requirements determination, and validation.
The safety assessment process includes requirements generation and verification
that support development activities. The process provides a methodology to evaluate
aircraft functions and the design of systems performing these functions to determine that
the appropriate hazards have been addressed; the process can be quantitative as well as
quantitative. The guidance states that the process should be managed to provide assur-
ance that all relevant failure modes have been identified, and that significant combina-
tions of failures that may cause those conditions have been considered.
The safety assessment process for integrated systems should account for any addi-
tional complexities and interdependencies that arise during the integration effort. The
process is required to establish safety objectives for the system and to ensure that
the implementation satisfies those objectives. In highly integrated or complex systems,
the evaluator will need to use development assurance methods to support system safety
assessments. Careful attention must be paid to system architecture: the relationship and
interdependency of avionics systems, the flow and sharing of information, latency of
data, and software interactions. Limiting the inclusion of systems will obviously sim-
plify the development process; however, there is some risk in eliminating systems that
may have a causal effect on safety.
Safety assessments are based on assigned assurance levels that account for the cri-
ticality of a potential failure as well as the probability of the failure occurring. More on
this later. The safety assessment process provides analytic evidence showing compliance
with airworthiness requirements and may include:
● Functional hazard assessment (FHA)
● Preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA)
● Common cause analysis (CCA)
● System safety assessment (SSA)
Typical development cycle FIGURE 6.3 ¢ ARP

Safety Assessment
Level of Activity
Requirements Design Test Process
Time
Concept Preliminary Detailed Design Validation

Development Design Design & Verification
Aircraft Functions System Functions Detailed Functions Tests
Aircraft Architectures System Architectures Detailed Architectures Analyses
Aircraft Requirements System Requirements Detailed Requirements
Aircraft FHA System FHA

• Functions • Functions
• Hazards • Hazards
• Effects • Effects
• Classifications • Classifications
PSSAs SSAs
Aircraft FTAs System FTAs System FMEAs/ System FTAs

• Qualitative • Qualitative FMES • Quantitative
• System Budgets • Subsystem • Failure Rates
• Intersystem Budgets
• Dependencies
CCAs
Particular Risk Analyses
Common Mode Analyses
Zonal Safety Analyses
Safety Assessment Processes
The safety assessment process and how safety assessment methods relate to the
process are shown in Figure 6.3.
An FHA is conducted at the beginning of the aircraft/system development cycle. It
should identify and classify the failure conditions associated with the aircraft functions
and combinations of functions. The failure conditions are then assigned a classification;
these are in terms of severity and effect. These classifications were shown in Table 6.1.
The goal of the FHA is to identify each failure condition and the rationale for its clas-
sification. These failure conditions will be used to identify the safety objectives. The
output of the FHA is used as a starting point for the PSSA.
Two levels of FHA use the same process: aircraft level and system level. Generation
of the FHA at the highest appropriate level is dependent on overall knowledge and
experience and will probably require consultation with numerous specialists. Table 6.2
provides an example of the high-level functions and their associated failure conditions that
may be considered. The failure conditions identified in Table 6.2 can be further broken
down through the use of fault trees. This is commonly called fault tree analysis (FTA)
and attempts to identify all causal factors that may result in the failure condition. It is not
TABLE 6.2 ¢ High-Level Functions and Associated Failures
Function Failure Condition

Control flight path Inability to control flight path
Control touchdown and roll out Inability to control touchdown and rollout
Control thrust Inability to control thrust
Cabin control environment Inability to control cabin environment
Provide spatial orientation Inability to provide spatial orientation
Fire protection Loss of fire protection
unusual for the FTA to identify other failure conditions that may result due to initial or
subsequent failures.
If we take the first failure condition (inability to control flight path) identified in
Table 6.2 and apply fault tree logic, we can come up with various failures that will
produce the same condition. Inability to control flight path may be caused by:
● Loss of trim
● Inadvertent trim
● Loss of hydraulics
● Loss of flight control
● Flight control malfunction (hardware or software)
● Loss of the flight control computers
This is obviously not an all-inclusive list but gives the reader an idea of the types of
causes that we are looking for. We would then look at what could cause these primary
failures. A loss of flight control computers could be caused by a loss of electrical power.
In looking to mitigate this failure, it may be decided to install a battery backup for the
flight control computers. In the end, the matrix will be quite large and attempts to link
individual failures with multiple consequences should be accomplished (common cause
analysis, which will be discussed later). It should also be noted that it is desirable to
generate an aircraft general hazard list to be used on future projects so that known
hazards are not overlooked. As new systems are integrated, the FHA process must be
revisited.
The PSSA is an iterative analysis imbedded with the overall aircraft/system devel-
opment. The PSSA is used to complete the failure conditions list and corresponding
safety requirements. It is also used to show how the system will meet the qualitative and
quantitative requirements for the hazards that have been identified. The PSSA should
identify failures that contribute to conditions identified in the FHA. It then identifies and
captures all derived system safety requirements and protection strategies.
Six major categories of protective strategies may be used and identified in the
PSSA:
● Partitioning: The practice of isolating software processes; the activation of one pro-
cess is not dependent on another. This is quite often the case with flight controls, and
in the military, with weapons systems. Flight control software will be a criticality
level A and it would not be advisable to interleave this software with less critical
systems. Many weapons run their software routines independently from the aircraft,
thus lessening the probability of noncompatible software.
● Built-in test (BIT): A process that evaluates the functionality of the system software.
BIT is one of the most difficult processes to perfect; if the tolerances are too tight, the
false alarm rate will increase, and if they are too loose, the probability that an
undetected failure will occur increases. Maintenance costs are also a strong driver in
BIT development, as false alarms tend to drive maintenance costs higher.
● Dissimilarity: A check and balance provided by a system that operates on dissimilar
software. The probability that two independent software routines will arrive at the
same wrong answer is remote. With two systems, the operator can only be warned
that there is a disparity; with three, the incorrect system can be voted out.
● Monitoring: A system (either hardware or software) that monitors a process for
prescribed tolerance levels. Monitoring systems reduce cockpit workload, as the
monitoring function is performed by the system, not the operator. The example of the
APU monitor discussed previously is an example of monitoring, which as you may
remember, was able to provide an equivalent level of safety.
● Redundancy: Two systems performing the same operation. Flight control and mis-
sion computers are truly redundant in civil aircraft; FCCs are redundant in military
aircraft but the mission computers usually are not.
● Backup: A system (hardware or software) that assumes the operation in the event of a
primary system failure. These systems are very common in aircraft hydraulic and
electrical systems, and it is not uncommon to have secondary and tertiary backup
systems.
The Boeing 777 uses a combination of these processes within its flight control system to
meet the required hardware assurance level (of course this can become very expensive)
(Figure 6.4).
Possible contributing factors leading to failure conditions may be identified using
methods such as fault tree analysis, which was discussed previously. There are other
methods as well, such as dependence diagrams and Markov analysis. These methods are
not going to be discussed here; however, the reader is referred to SAE ARP4761 for a
discussion and examples of these analyses. Hardware failures and possible hardware/
software errors as well as faults arising from common causes should be included in the
PSSA. Care must be taken to account for potential latent failures and their associated
exposure times. Exposure time is defined as the time between when an item was last
known to be operating properly and when it was known to be properly operating again.
Common cause analysis is performed to ensure independence between functions.
Independence between functions, systems, or items may be required to satisfy safety
FCC1 FCC2 FCC3 FIGURE 6.4 ¢

Boeing 777 FCS
Intel Microprocessor Intel Microprocessor Intel Microprocessor Protective
Motorola Motorola Motorola Strategies
AMD AMD AMD
Vote
Vote Force Voting

Vote
Actuator
requirements. It is necessary to ensure that this independence exists, or that the risk
associated with dependence is deemed acceptable; CCA provides the tools to verify this
independence. CCA identifies failure modes or external events that can lead to a cata-
strophic or hazardous/severe/major failure condition. Such common causes must be
eliminated for catastrophic failure conditions and be within the assigned probability
budget for hazardous/severe/major failure conditions.
Common cause analysis is subdivided into three types:
● Zonal safety analysis
● Particular risks analysis
● Common mode analysis
The purpose of zonal safety analysis is to ensure that the equipment installation
meets safety requirements. The first step is to verify the basic installation. The instal-
lation should be checked against the appropriate design and installation requirements.
The next step should be to check for interference between systems. The effects of
equipment failures should be considered with respect to their impact on other systems
and structures within their physical sphere of influence. The final analysis is in regard to
maintenance errors and their effect on the system or aircraft.
Particular risks are defined as those events or influences that are outside the system
but may violate independence concerns. Most of these outside influences are common-
sense items and can be thought of as the world according to Murphy. Some of the
obvious bad things that can happen are:
● Fire
● High-energy devices
● Leaking fluids
● Hail, ice, and snow
● Bird strikes
● Lightning
● High-intensity radiation fields
● Separated parts from the aircraft
A common mode analysis verifies that independent faults identified in the fault-free
analysis are independent in the actual installation. The common mode faults that should
be analyzed are:
● Hardware or software error
● Hardware failure
● Production or repair flaw
● Installation error
● Requirements error
● Environmental effects
● Cascading faults
● Common external source faults
System FHA Failure FIGURE 6.5 ¢

Conditions Guidance in
Determining a
Verification Plan
Yes Is Condition No No
Is Condition
Hazardous or
Major?
Catastrophic?
Yes
Yes Is System
Complexity
High?
Is Service No
No
Experience
Relevant?
Yes
*
Qualitative and
Qualitative Analyses FHA Summary
Quantitative Analyses
*Major failure conditions may be satisfactorily analysed with methods that are less rigorous and complete than
those for Catastrophic or Hazardous Failure Conditions (e.g. FMEA containing failure rates)
The SSA is a systematic, comprehensive evaluation of the implemented system to

show that relevant safety requirements are met; the analysis process is similar to the
PSSA. A PSSA is a method to evaluate proposed architectures and derive system/safety
requirements. An SSA is verification that the implemented design meets both the
quantitative and qualitative safety requirements as defined in the FHA and PSSA. The
SSA process flow is generally represented through succeeding levels of verification.
RTCA DO-178 procedures should be used to verify that the software implementation
meets the required development assurance levels. The hardware development assurance
level is verified via procedures that are defined by RTCA DO-254. For each failure
condition, it should be determined how the aircraft/system will satisfy the safety
objective. The flowchart in Figure 6.5 provides generalized guidance in defining a
verification plan for the failure conditions in a given system.
Military designers consider the probability not only of an event occurring but also of
being in a flight regime that could have catastrophic consequences if the event occurred.
Determination of failures and when they may occur contributes to a probability of
unsafe flight (PUF). A PUF is generated for operational flight conditions that are
inherently dangerous. For example, if a failure mode in a system is determined in the
FHA and the failure is deemed to produce catastrophic results if it occurs when the
aircraft is flying at low level, then the percentage of time that the aircraft is flying in
those conditions (low level) is taken into account during the safety assessment. The
failure mode may not be completely mitigated, but the probability lessens it to an
assurance level B or C.
6.6.2 Safety Assessment Certification Plan

SAE ARP4754 defines a process for compliance with FAA/EASA requirements.
Although the process is designed for civilian certifications, it is nevertheless a good
place to start for military evaluators as well. The certification plan for complex or highly
integrated systems includes:
● Defining the product and installation
● Outlining the product development services
● Identifying the proposed means of compliance
Since many of the development assurance activities occur in the development cycle,
early action on the certification plan is highly desirable.
The certification plan should address the system and the aircraft environment. The
amount of detail in the plan varies with the classification of the associated hazards. At a
minimum, the plan should include:
● A functional description of the system to be installed, including hardware and soft-
ware and an outline of the functional, physical, and informational relationship with
other aircraft systems
● A summary of the functional hazard assessment (hazards, failure conditions, and
classifications)
● A summary of the preliminary system safety assessment (system safety objectives
and classification)
● A description of any novel or design features planned to be used in meeting the safety
objectives
● A description of any new technology applications
● A configuration index
The only new subject in the certification plan requirements is the configuration
index, which identifies all of the physical elements comprising the system as well as
procedures and limitations that are integral to system safety. Any design features or
capabilities that enhance safety should also be identified. The index contains the iden-
tification of each item, associated software, interconnection of items, required inter-
faces, and safety-related operational and maintenance practices.
In plain English, the safety assessment certification plan addresses all of the hazards
that were identified and the methods to determine that the failures have either been
mitigated or reduced to an acceptable level of occurrence probability. The plan should
also address the method for declaring that a system is susceptible to a hazard (i.e., what
requirement causes the aircraft to be put into a particular situation where hazards may
occur?). For example, an airliner may lose all oil pressure in inverted flight, which may
have catastrophic consequences, but what requirement exists for an airliner to fly upside
down? This is called the validation and verification (V&V) process of system
TABLE 6.3 ¢ Development Assurance Levels
System Development Software Development Hardware Development

Failure Condition Assurance Level Assurance Level Assurance Level
Catastrophic A A A
Hazardous/Severe B B B
Major C C C
Minor D D D
No Safety Effect E E E
The development assurance level is assigned based on the most severe failure condition associated with the applicable aircraft function. It is determined
from the FHA.
requirements. This is done to ensure that the requirements are indeed real. It is a tre-
mendous waste of time and resources to mitigate hazards that will never be encountered.
V&V is reserved for the most serious assurance levels. Validation of requirements and
specific assumptions is the process of ensuring that specific requirements are sufficiently
correct and complete. The verification process ensures that the system implementation
satisfies the validated requirements.
Requirements, with their related hazards, provide the basis for the supporting pro-
cesses. Because hazards have different levels of importance, the allocation of require-
ments has a significant impact. The requirements associated with a given function define
the way the function acts in its environment and, in turn, will determine system devel-
opment assurance levels (Table 6.3). System development assurance levels are based on
the degree of hazard and are generated for software (IAW RTCA DO-178 B/C) and for
hardware (IAW RTCA DO-254).
System requirements are generated from many sources:
● Safety requirements
● Functional requirements
● Customer requirements
● Operational requirements
● Performance requirements
● Physical and installation requirements
● Maintainability requirements
● Interface requirements
● Additional certification requirements
● Derived requirements
Validation and verification methods are called out and described in the referenced
documents and will not be reproduced here. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the V&V methods
and their relationship with assurance level. It can be easily seen that the more severe the
assurance level, the more intense the V&V process will be. Assurance level A (cata-
strophic) requires almost all methods be applied and discussed in the certification plan.
Levels B and C (hazardous and major) require only slightly less of an examination,
whereas levels D and E (minor and no safety effect) are basically negligible for
requirements verification.
TABLE 6.4 ¢ Validation Methods
Assurance Assurance Assurance Assurance

Methods Level A/B Level C Level D Level E
PSSA R R A A
Validation Plan R R A N
Validation Matrix R R A N
Traceability R A A N
Analysis/Modeling R 1 Recommended A N
Similarity A 1 Recommended A N
Engineering Judgment A 1 Recommended A N
Implementation Effects R A A N
Validation Summary R R A N
R, recommended; A, as negotiated; N, not required.
TABLE 6.5 ¢ Verification Methods
Assurance Assurance Assurance Assurance

Methods Level A/B Level C Level D Level E
Verification Matrix R R A N
Verification Plan R R A N
Verification Procedures R A A N
Verification Summary R R A N
SSA R R N N
Inspection/Review R R A N
Test Unintended Function R A A N
Experience A A A A
R, recommended; A, as negotiated; N, not required.
The certification plan is good for the as-designed aircraft. Changes to the system,
adding new systems, or changing interfaces may require the applicant to revisit the
entire safety assessment process.
6.7 IMPORTANT NOTES FOR EVALUATORS

CONCERNING DOCUMENTATION
Problems arise for the uninitiated concerning the requirement flow—that is, where do I
go to find the requirements for my test? The rule of law is found in the FARs and the
applicant must show compliance with these paragraphs. Without exception, in Avionics
Systems certifications, the applicant must show compliance with paragraphs 1301 and
1309: the system must perform its intended function and it must be safe. Compliance
with 1309 will require a system safety assessment as just described. To comply with 1301
and demonstrate airworthiness requires knowledge of the document trail (Table 6.6).
Table 6.6 shows the flow of requirements; it starts at the top with the FAR
requirements and ends with airworthiness approval by following the AC. An example
using the TAWS system is shown in the far right column. In order to determine its
6.7 Important Notes for Evaluators Concerning Documentation 299
TABLE 6.6 ¢ Requirements Flow
Example Terrain Awareness

Requirement Document Warning System (TAWS)
Rule of Law FAR Part Paragraph CFR 14 25.1301, 1309
Must show Compliance EASA Certification Codes CFR 14, Parts 91,121,135
July 2, 2013
Minimum Performance MOPS RTCA/DO-161A
of the System Minimum Performance
Standards-Airborne Ground
Proximity Warning Equipment
May 27, 1976
How Manufacturers TSO (FAA) (TSOA is granted) TSO-C151c Terrain Awareness and
Show Compliance Acceptable Method of Warning System June 27, 2012
with the MOPS Compliance AMC-21 in
EASA ETSOA is granted
Airworthiness Advisory Circular (FAA) AC 25-23 Airworthiness Criteria
Certification Specification for the Installation Approval of a
Book 2, EASA, AMC Terrain Awareness and Warning
System (TAWS) for Part 25
Airplanes May 22, 2000
intended function, a MOPS is written; the TSO describes the testing a manufacturer
must accomplish to show compliance and receive a TSOA. The AC describes the testing
that the installer must perform to receive airworthiness certification. A manufacturer is
not required to meet the requirements of a TSO (as it is not mandatory), but failure to do
so will result in a failure to obtain a TSOA. Likewise, the installer is not required to
follow an AC in his quest to obtain airworthiness certification, as an AC provides ‘‘a
means, but not the only means to show compliance.’’ In almost all cases, the AC will
state that the applicant needs to install a TSO appliance when complying with an AC.
One would think that since the top-level requirements are written first and the AC is
written last (as the requirements are serial), the dates of publication would follow
accordingly. In most cases this is true, as more information is learned about a new
system the more detailed the requirements become. This can be frustrating to an eva-
luator or installer because in many cases the requirements for airworthiness are more
stringent than the TSO and functions may not have been evaluated in the TSOA process
but are required in the airworthiness process.
In some cases, some documents are revised and others are not, creating even more
confusion. If we look at the example of the TAWS system, the reader will note that the
least current of the documents is the MOPS and the second least current is the AC. In
this case, the AC references the applicant to the TSO for the functionality of the TAWS.
In fact, the TSO adds a new installation (Class C), which is not mentioned in the AC.
When seeking airworthiness certification for a new TAWS installation, the applicant
must follow the guidance in the TSO as well as any unique tests called out in the AC. It
is heartily recommended that prior to writing any test plan, the applicant carefully
review the entire train of documentation to understand exactly what will be required for
demonstration. The requirements will then be written to the certification plan.
6.8 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EASA AND FAA

DOCUMENTATION
In the United States, the requirements for aircraft are found in the Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 14, Aeronautics and Space; for transport category aircraft you would
find the regulations for compliance in 14 CFR, Part 25 (paragraphs 1-1587 plus
Appendices A–J; commonly referred to as FAR Part 25 requirements). Until the tran-
sition to EASA, European member states had to show compliance with JAA regulations;
these regulations (JAR) matched the FAR numbering system so transport category
requirements would be found in JAR Part 25.
The European Aviation Safety Agency has incorporated the JAR Part 25 require-
ments into the Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes (CS-25). Book 1 of
CS-25 contains the JARs, as amended (called the certification codes), and Book 2
contains the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) for the certification codes in
Book 1. In general, CS-25 Book 1 certification codes are aligned with FAA and former
JAA paragraphs. The AMC is similar to the US Advisory Circulars (AC) and the JAA
Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ), which will be addressed later.
Part 21 can be described as the requirements and procedures for the certification
of aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, as well as production organi-
zation approval; Part M is the applicable continuing airworthiness requirements. In
Europe, the Part 21 requirements have been incorporated into commission regulation
(EC) No. 1702/2003; the Part M requirements are incorporated into EC No. 2042/
2003. The Acceptable Means of Compliance for the Part 21 Implementation Rules is
found at Decision No 2003/1/RM, which provides guidance material for air-
worthiness and environmental certification as well as for the certification of design
and product organizations. Part 21 Implementing Rules are contained in two sections:
A contains the Requirements for Applicants, and B contains the Procedures for
Competent Authorities. Section B of the Part 21 Implementing Rules is also divided
into subparts, with the category titles matching section A. Similar to the Imple-
mentation Rules, the Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material is also
divided into two sections: A covers the Applicant, and B covers the Procedures for
Competent Authorities. This is a novel approach since one document contains the
requirements for certification as well as an acceptable method of compliance
(no more searching!).
Three basic types of certificates may be issued as a result of a certification
project: the type certificate (TC), the supplemental type certificate (STC), and the
European technical standard order (ETSO) for parts and appliances. The ETSO is
infinitely more rigorous than the TSO. For aircraft that do not meet all of the
requirements for a production TC, a restricted TC may be issued if the applicant shows
compliance with the applicable TC basis established by the agency to ensure adequate
safety with regard to intended use of the aircraft and with applicable environmental
protection.
EASA provides more structure in determining major and minor changes. Decision
No2003/1/RM provides guidance on what determines a major change. The document
provides a decision flow chart as well as specific instances of types of changes to large
and small airplanes and a discussion of the rationale for the change classification.
The current cross-referencing of EASA and U.S. documentation is shown in
Table 6.7.
TABLE 6.7 ¢ EASA and FAA Documents Cross Reference
Former JAR Definition

Publication EASA Publication US FAR Reference
JAR 21 Implementing Rule Certification Certification Procedures for A/C, Products and Parts
EC 1702/2003 FAR Part 21
JAR 145 Implementing Rule Continuing Airworthiness Approved Maintenance Organizations
EC 2042/2003 FAR Part 145
Annex II
JAR 147 Implementing Rule Continuing Airworthiness Maintenance Training Organizations
EC 2042/2003 FAR Part 147
Annex IV
JAR 66 Implementing Rule Continuing Airworthiness Certifying Staff
EC 2042/2003 N/A
Annex III
JAR 22 CS 22 Sailplanes and Powered
Sailplanes
N/A
JAR 23 CS 23 Normal, Utility, Aerobatic and Commuter Airplanes
FAR Part 23
JAR 25 CS 25 Large Airplanes
FAR Part 25
JAR 27 CS 27 Small Rotorcraft
FAR Part 27
JAR 29 CS 29 Large Rotorcraft
FAR Part 29
JAR 34 CS 34 Aircraft Engine Emissions
FAR Part 34
JAR 36 CS 36 Aircraft Noise
FAR Part 36
JAR 39 Incorporated into Implementing Rule Certification Airworthiness Directives
EC 1702/2003 FAR Part 39
JAR E CS E Engines
FAR Part 33
JAR P CS P Propellers
Within the A/C Category
i.e., Part 23 Subpart E
JAR TSO CS ETSO Joint Technical Standard Orders
TSO FAR Part 21 Subpart O
JAR VLA CS VLA Very Light Aeroplanes
No US
JAR VLR CS VLR Very Light Helicopters
No US
GAI 20 AMC 20 Joint Advisory Material
Advisory Circular Joint
6.9 COCKPIT CONTROLS AND DISPLAYS

EVALUATIONS
There is a marked difference between modern cockpits and those of about 20 years ago.
Information is now shared among many systems, and information can be retrieved by the
operator and presented on flat-panel displays. Displays are no longer directly driven (steam
gauges) by independent sensors. As we saw in the previous section, however, the
probability of providing hazardous or misleading information that can lead to catastrophic

results must be extremely improbable. We must be very careful, then, to evaluate displays
not only in how well the information is presented but also with respect to the correctness
and timeliness of the displayed information. Similar to displays, controls in modern
cockpits have become more automated, a fact that has its benefits as well as disadvantages.
It cannot be doubted that a machine is more efficient than a human and in the long run will
probably save the operator some money in terms of fuel burn, for example. Many pilots in
transport aircraft have become more of a system manager than the guy in charge of the bus.
The pros of modern cockpits are many and carry some major benefits. Safety is
enhanced because automation allows more monitoring time on the part of the pilot,
produces a less stressful work environment, and is less fatiguing. The crew workload is
decreased and human error is reduced. Of course, some would say that human error can
be eliminated entirely if the pilot is completely removed from the operation. The bottom
line is that it (automation) allows accurate and efficient airline operations.
There is a flip side to all of these good things. Automation may lead to a false sense
of security or even a higher sense of insecurity if the automation fails. There is a
general temptation to ignore raw data and stick with the directed task (e.g., following
the magenta line). Since the pilot becomes peripheral to what is going on, he may feel
that he is not involved, which contributes to isolation of the crew. Automation can
increase boredom and heads-down time in the cockpit (managing systems), which
indirectly decreases safety. In critical situations, the information presented to the pilot
may be confusing (multiple modes and automatic mode transitioning). In some archi-
tectures, there is a tendency for the computers to take the control authority out of the
pilot’s hands in critical situations. Clumsy or poorly designed automation can create
high workloads at critical times; the workload may be changed but not necessarily
reduced. Finally, automation is intended to reduce risks but may encourage aircrews to
take greater risks.
6.9.1 Controls and Displays Airworthiness Documentation

FAA airworthiness guidance for controls and displays are found at:
– AC 20-175—Controls for Flight Deck Systems
– AC 23.1311-1C—Electronic Displays in Part 23 Airplanes
– AC 25-11A—Electronic Flight Deck Displays
– AC 25.1322-1—Flightcrew Alerting
– AC 25.1302-1—Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew
– AC 27.1321—Arrangement and Visibility
– AC 27.1322—Warning, Caution and Advisory Lights
– AC 29.1321—Arrangement and Visibility
– AC 29.1322—Warning, Caution and Advisory Lights
Additional Guidance when considering the Human Factors impact may be found at:
– AMN-99-2 Reviewing certification plans (Part 25)
– ANM-01-03 Methods of compliance (Part 25)
– PS-ACE100-2001-00 Reviewing certification plans (Part 23)
– GAMA Publication #10 Practices and guidelines for cockpit design (Part 23)
– GAMA Publication #12 Recommended Practices and Guidelines for an Integrated

Cockpit/Flightdeck in Part 23 A/C
Human Factors has become a high interest item in the Certification process.
ANM-99-2 provides guidance to FAA Certification Teams to conduct effective reviews of
the applicant plans with respect to Human Factors (Part 25) and provides assistance to the
applicant in developing these plans. ANM-99-2 is to be used by all members of the cer-
tification team including Test Pilots and Flight Test Engineers and encourages the devel-
opment of a Human Factors Certification Plan (AC 21-40). The Authority cannot require
the applicant to submit a Human Factors Certification Plan, but like an Advisory Circular,
is recommended. AC 25.1302-1 is the newest guidance on the evaluation of controls and
displays with respect to human factors considerations. It was published in May of 2013.
Other Guidance is available is available:
– Mil-Std-1472G DoD Standard for Human Engineering
– SAE/AIR 1093, Numeral, Letter and Symbol Dimensions for Aircraft Instrument
Displays (mimics much of Mil-Std-1472D)
– SAE/ARP 571C, Flight Deck Controls and Displays for Communication and Navigation
Equipment for Transport Aircraft (similar to 1093, but specific to Navigation systems)
– SAE/ARP 1874, Design Objectives for CRT Displays for Part 25 (Transport) Aircraft
(specifically lighting, readability, etc.)
6.9.2 Human Factors Concerns

The FAA has recognized that there are problems associated with modern cockpits and
automation. The key issue appears to be overreliance on the system. Additional pro-
blems identified by the FAA are
● Mode awareness. Aircrews are not always aware of the system mode status.
● Mode behavior. Aircrews are not always aware of mode operations, altitude capture
for example.
● Speed and altitude protection. Some modes may not limit altitude or speed.
● Disengagement behavior. Aircrews are not knowledgeable of what happens when
automation is disengaged.
● Crew interface. The man–machine interface is sometimes ill conceived.
These problems manifest themselves in aircraft accidents. Since the introduction of
glass cockpits, there have been hundreds of accidents and incidents where the man–
machine interface has been a contributing factor; fatalities have occurred. The accidents
fit into a definite pattern: pilots did not understand what the automation was doing or the
aircrew did not receive adequate feedback from the automated system. Some examples
are given in the subsequent paragraphs.
The first example is one of an aircrew’s temptation to ignore data, or ignorance of what
the system was telling them. A ‘‘REV ISLN’’ (reverser isolation-reverser may be unsafe)
advisory message illuminated immediately after takeoff to a Boeing 767 aircrew. The mes-
sage was ignored and the aircrew climbed to FL310 where the thrust reverser deployed and
the aircraft broke apart. In another case where the information to the aircrew was confusing
there were 47 fatalities. A British Midland Boeing B737-400 experienced a failed engine fan
blade and the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) provided confusing information on
which engine failed. The aircrew shut down the wrong engine and the aircraft crashed.
Another case of confusion, but this time mode confusion, was experienced by an
Airbus A320 crew making an approach to Strasbourg, France. The aircrew received a
change in the approach clearance to a nonprecision approach. The aircrew calculated that
a 3.2 flight path would keep them compliant with the step-down fixes. The aircrew input
what they thought was 3.2 commanded glideslope; instead, they got a 3200 ft/min des-
cent rate, and the aircraft was lost. A similar event occurred with an Airbus A320 landing
in San Diego. The crew credits the ground proximity warning system for the save.
In an instance where disengagement behavior did not act as expected, an Airbus
A300 first officer accidentally hit the takeoff and go-around (TOGA) while established
on an ILS approach. The aircrew attempted to control the situation by disconnecting the
autothrottles and to control the airspeed manually. Since the TOGA commands the
aircraft to pitch up during a go-around, the aircrew pushed forward on the yoke.
Unfortunately, the autopilot tried to compensate and trimmed the aircraft nose up. The
aircraft stalled, and 271 lives were lost.
The automated aircraft sometimes allows the aircrew to enter incorrect information
and then uses that information in its computations. An Airbus A320 aircrew entered an
incorrect aircraft weight into the FMS. As a result, the approach was flown at 136 knots
instead of the correct approach speed of 151 knots. At this speed, the aircraft pitch angle
was 8 instead of the standard 3–4 , which substantially reduced tail clearance. The
airframe hit the runway surface.
These are but a few of the many instances where the system and the aircrew were on
different pages of the script. They are provided as an illustration of what can go wrong if
the system and its automation are not completely understood.
6.9.3 Controls Design Principles

With respect to cockpit controls, AC 20-175 provides generalized guidance on flight
deck control system design, installation, integration, and approval. Appendix B of the
AC provides a template for a control/function matrix, and Appendix C in the same
document provides a quick reference to regulations (part, paragraph) for controls related
to human factors and applies to all avionics systems being evaluated:
Each control must operate with the ease, smoothness, and positiveness appropriate
to its function. 23.671(a), 25.671(a), 27.671(a), 29.671(a)
Controls must be located {part 23 only: arranged, and identified} to provide for
convenience in operation. 23.671(b), 23.777(a), 25.777(a), 27.777(a), 29.777(a)
Controls must be located {part 23 only: arranged, and identified} to prevent the
possibility of confusion and subsequent inadvertent operation {part 29 only: from
either pilot seat}. 23.671(b), 29.771(b), 23.777(a), 25.777(a), 27.777(a), 29.777(a)
The pilot compartment must allow the pilot to perform his duties without unrea-
sonable concentration or fatigue. 23.771(a), 25.771(a), 27.771(a), 29.771(a)
The aircraft must be controllable with equal safety from either pilot seat. 25.771(c),
27.771(b), 29.771(b)
Vibration and noise characteristics of cockpit equipment may not interfere with safe
operation of the aircraft. 25.771(e), 27.771(c), 29.771(c)
Controls must be identified (except where the function is obvious). 23.777(a)
Controls must be located and arranged, with respect to the pilot seat, to provide full
and unrestricted movement of each control without interference. 23.777(b),
25.777(c), 27.777(b), 29.777(b)
A control must be of a kind and design appropriate to its intended function. 23.1301
(a), 25.1301(a)(1), 27.1301(a), 29.1301(a)
Controls must function properly when installed. 23.1301(d), 25.1301(a)(4), 27.1301
(d), 29.1301(d)
For alerting lights, installed in the cockpit, the color red must be used for warnings
and the color amber for cautions. 23.1322, 27.1322, 29.1322
Use of the colors red, amber, and yellow on the flight deck for functions other than
flightcrew alerting must be limited and must not adversely affect flightcrew
alerting. 25.1322(e)(1), (f)
Instrument lights must make each instrument and control easily readable and dis-
cernible. 23.1381(a)
Instrument lights must make each instrument, switch, and other device, easily
readable. 25.1381(a)(1), 27.1381(a), 29.1381(a)
Instrument lights must be installed so that no objectionable reflections are visible to
the pilot. 25.1381(a)(2)(ii), 27.1381(b)2, 29.1381(b)2
The minimum flightcrew must be able to access and easily operate controls required
for safe operation. 23.1523, 25.1523, 27.1523, 29.1523
A cockpit control must be plainly marked as to its function and method of operation.
23.1555(a), 25.1555(a), 27.1555(a), 29.1555(a)
A typical Part 25 Human Factors compliance matrix is shown in Table 6.8.
AC 20-175 shows a means of compliance with the previously referenced regulatory

paragraphs. The guidance in the document applies to the approval of:
– Controls for avionics systems in the flight deck
– Dedicated controls (e.g., switches, knobs)
– Multifunction controls (cursor controls, touchscreens)
The human factors general topics associated with controls are:
– Minimum crew
– Accessibility
– Concentration and fatigue
– Convenience and ease of operation
– Identification and marking
– Confusion and inadvertent operation
– Unrestricted movement
– Intended function
To meet these requirements, the AC addresses a philosophy that should be considered
for all designs. It states that a variety of environments should be addressed during the
evaluation:
– Appropriate representation of the pilot population
– Lighting conditions
– Use of gloves
TABLE 6.8 ¢ Part 25 Human Factors Compliance Matrix
Method(s) of
Compliance
Part 25 AC 20-175
Paragraph General Human Factors Requirements ANM 99-2 Deliverable
25.771(a) Each pilot compartment and its equipment must allow Analysis, Simulator Workload Certification
the minimum flight crew to perform their duties Test, Flight Test Report
without unreasonable concentration or fatigue
25.771(e) Vibration and noise characteristics of cockpit equipment Bench Test Test Report
may not interfere with safe operation of the airplane
25.773(a)(1) Each pilot compartment must be arranged to give pilots Similarity Vision Certification
a sufficiently extensive, clear, and undistorted view to Report
enable them to safely perform any maneuvers within
the operating limitations of the airplane, including
takeoff, approach, and landing
25.773(a)(2) Each pilot compartment must be free of glare and Ground Test Lighting Certification
reflections that could interfere with the normal duties Report
of the minimum flight crew
25.777(a) Each cockpit control must be located to provide Simulator Test, Flight Flight Deck
convenient operation and to prevent confusion and Test Anthropometry
inadvertent operation Certification Report
25.777(c) The controls must be located and arranged, with respect Ground Test Flight Deck
to the pilot’s seats, so that there is full and unrestricted Anthropometry
movement of each control without interference Certification Report
from the cockpit structure or the clothing of the
minimum flight crew when any member of the flight
crew, from 50 200 to 60 300 in height, is seated with the
seat belt and shoulder harness fastened
25.1301(a) Each item of installed equipment must be of a kind System Description, System Description
and design appropriate to its intended function Simulator Document,
Demonstration, Demonstration
Flight Test Report, Flight Test
Report
25.1309(b)(3) Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and Hazard Assessment, Fault Tree Analysis
warning means must be designed to minimize crew Simulator Demonstration Report
errors that could create additional hazards Demonstration
25.1321(a) Each flight, navigation, and power plant instrument for System Description Installation Drawings,
use by any pilot must be plainly visible to him from Analysis, Flight Test Vision Certification
his station with the minimum practicable deviation Report, Flight Test
from his normal position and line of vision when he is Report
looking forward along the flight path
25.1321(e) If a visual indicator is provided to indicate malfunction Similarity Test, System Description and
of an instrument, it must be effective under all Ground Test Statement of
probable cockpit lighting conditions Similarity, Flight Test
Report
25.1523 The minimum flight crew must be established so Simulator Test, Demonstration Report,
that it is sufficient for safe operation, considering Flight Test Flight Test Report
a. the workload on all individual crew members;
b. the accessibility and ease of operation of necessary
controls by the appropriate crew member;
c. the kind of operation authorized under § 25.1525.
The criteria used in making the determination required
by this section are set forth in Appendix D.
(Continues)
TABLE 6.8 ¢ (Continued)
Method(s) of
Compliance
Part 25 AC 20-175
Paragraph General Human Factors Requirements ANM 99-2 Deliverable
25.1543(b) Each instrument marking must be clearly visible to Analysis, Simulator Vision Certification
the appropriate crew member Test Report,
Demonstration Report
System Specific Human Factors Requirements
25.1381(a)(2) The instrument lights must be installed so that no Ground Test Flight Test Report
objectionable reflections are visible to the pilot
Specific Crew Interface Requirements
25.773(b)(2)(i) The first pilot must have a window that is openable . . . Ground Test (to verify Flight Test Report
and gives sufficient protection against the elements no interference with
against impairment of the pilot’s vision window opening)
25.1322 If warning, caution, or advisory lights are installed in Similarity System Description
the cockpit, they must, unless otherwise approved Document
by the administrator, be
a. red, for warning lights (lights indicating a hazard that
may require immediate corrective action);
b. amber, for caution lights (lights indicating the
possible need for future corrective action);
c. green for safe operation lights; and
d. any other color, including white, for lights not
described in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this sec-
tion, provided the color differs sufficiently from the
colors prescribed in paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section to avoid possible confusion
– Turbulence and vibrations

– Interruptions and delays in tasks
– Interference with the motion of a control
– Incapacitation of one pilot
– Use of the nondominant hand
– Excessive ambient noise
With respect to the pilot population, the evaluator should be compared to the anthro-
pometric population. The test should use evaluators from throughout the range of
operational users or supplement the study with mock-ups or anthropometric models.
Keys to look for are unrestricted motion as well as inadvertent movement. Other con-
tributors could be pilot strength, visual acuity, color perception or pilot cultural char-
acteristics; look at experience with other, similar types of controls.
Controls should be evaluated under all foreseeable lighting conditions that include
direct sunlight, indirect sunlight and reflection, sun above the forward horizon and night
and/or dark environments. Tactile compensation can be taken into account when eval-
uating lighting conditions. Gloves will impact tactile feel and sensing and may be a
discriminating factor with button spacing.
The test should ensure that the controls are operable during vibration. The evaluator
must look at inadvertent actuation as well as the ability to actuate a control in the
environment. Vibration and noise should not interfere with the safe operation of the
aircraft. These tests should be accomplished inflight as the conditions are difficult, if not
impossible, to replicate on the ground. Excessive noise may prohibit the aircrew from
receiving aural feedback important to control functions, and can sometimes impact
nonaural sensory modes. It may be necessary to incorporate another sensory feedback
mechanism in conditions of excessive noise (visual, tactile).
Some control operations involve multiple steps and an interruption or delay may
negate a successful result. In environment and use conditions, the evaluator should
include interruptions and delays to understand if the controls’ behavior results in safety-
critical consequences. Aside from the obvious, movement may also be restricted by
items brought onto the flight deck by the crew. The evaluator should consider objects
that might reasonably be in the flight deck for physical interference, state the objects
considered, and show the control is acceptable in the presence of these objects.
Incapacitation of one pilot must be considered in determining the minimum flight
crew. Any control required for operation by the pilot in the event of incapacitation of
other crewmembers must be viewable, selectable and operable. Controls should be
usable by left-handed and right-handed pilots; the evaluator should give special con-
sideration to controls that require speed or precision of force or motion. Gain affects the
tradeoff between task speed and error; high gain values tend to favor pilot comfort and
rapid inputs, but can contribute to error (overshoot, inadvertent activation). Low gain
values tend to favor tasks that require precision, but can be too slow for the task. Special
consideration should be given to variable gain controls. In the final analysis, gain and
sensitivity should be acceptable for the intended function.
Controls should be designed to provide feedback when actuated. Possible feedback
results are:
– Physical state of the control device (force, position)

– State of data construction (text string)
– State of activation or data entry (‘‘enter’’)
– State of system processing
– State of system acceptance (‘‘error’’)
– State of system response (page change, zoom, disconnect)
Feedback can be visual, aural, or tactile. If feedback or awareness is required for

safety, then the aircrew should be informed of the state of activation or data entry, the
state of system processing (downloading . . . . . . . .), and the state of system response.
Controls must be identifiable and predictable; they are the action part of the aircraft/
pilot interface. Controls should be easily identifiable to be operated quickly and
instinctively by a ‘‘pilot under stress’’ (AC verbiage). Pilots should be able to find
controls without looking at them and as such should be distinguishable in some manner,
for example, a gear handle in shape of a wheel or flap handles with an airfoil shape. For
controls with visible markings that are intended for use in low-light conditions, the
markings must be lighted in some way that allows them to be easily read. The lighting of
controls needs to consistent with flight crew alerting and need to be dimmable but not so
low as to appear inactive. External lighting should not produce bright spots or glare, and
automatic adjustment may be used. Night Vision System (NVIS) requirements are
covered in Miscellaneous Guidance of AC 27-1 and 29-2.
Controls for data entry must support its intended function; they need to be
acceptable for data entry speed, accuracy, error rates, and workload. If data entry
involves multiple steps, each step must be discernible and automatic data strings should
be discernible from constructed strings (pilot entered). Pilots should be able to easily
recover from typical error inputs; this may be envisioned as a ‘‘go-back’’ button. His-
torically, when pilots found themselves on an unfamiliar display or simply lost, they
would power down the display and restart from scratch on a familiar display. Keyboards
and cursors should follow standard physical configurations, and cursors should auto-
matically be placed in the first data field. There should be no more than two knobs per
knob assembly.
Designers can ask some basic questions prior to implementing any new or improved
controls and displays suite:
● Are the controls suitable for the task or the mission?
● Is there adequate control feedback (e.g., moving or nonmoving autothrottles or stick)?
● Are the displays clear, concise, and unambiguous?
● Does the symbology clearly describe the function?
● Is sufficient information provided to allow the operator to know what the aircraft is
doing?
● How is automation implemented?
● How much automation is implemented?
● Has complexity been minimized?
● Is there standardization within the cockpit?
Answering these questions will hopefully negate some of the pitfalls that are
inherent in today’s systems. In attempting to design controls and displays systems some
basic tenets must be observed.
6.9.4 Display Design Principles

The basic function of the display suite is to supply information not discernable to an
operator’s unaided senses. Displays fall into three categories: visual, audio (e.g., warn-
ings), and tactile (e.g., stick shakers). In older display suites, information was simple and
standardized. The familiar T layout was developed after World War II and is still in use
today. All analog cockpits utilize this arrangement, and almost all digital cockpits
replicate the analog displays that they replaced. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 illustrate this concept.
If you look at the figures, you can see the primary flight information displayed from
left to right: airspeed, attitude, and altitude. Heading is the fourth parameter and com-
pletes the T at the bottom center of the suite. Pilots are taught to develop a scan pattern
using the T to rapidly gather information and continuously update their situational
awareness. It should also be noted that if pilots are taught this technique and we change
the location of these parameters (as in a new digital cockpit) we will actually increase
workload and therefore reduce situational awareness. This is one reason why many
modern cockpits seem to be just color replicas of the analog suites that are 60 years old.
FIGURE 6.6 ¢
Analog Cockpit with
T Arrangement
FIGURE 6.7 ¢
Familiar T in a Digital
Design
Although it appears from the previous example that displays have only become
prettier, modern display complexity has increased. The previous example only illu-
strated the pilot’s primary flight instruments. Other displays, developed by a multitude
of vendors, may have no commonality in the way that information is presented. This
information, which does not carry the criticality level that primary flight instruments
possess, may be displayed in any fashion the designer desires. This leads to issues
affecting the readability of the displays and the aircrew’s understanding of what is being
presented:
● Continuous versus discrete displays. Some displays will continuously update infor-
mation while others will only change when a parameter, mode, or condition changes.
● Color displays. The use of colors is dictated by FAR 23/25.1322, but not for all
displays and all colors. In some instances, engaged modes and warning annunciators
may be the same color. The combinations of colors, such as background and data,
may be hard on the eyes or be unreadable in certain lighting conditions.
● Crowded displays. Many times there is just too much information being presented on
a single display. This problem is compounded when the display size is too small.
● Symbology. The representation of data by symbols (e.g., next waypoint depicted as a
triangle) is not uniform among designers and may change with changes in mode
within the same display.
● Information overload. Because the capability exists to depict everything that is going
on around the cockpit, some designers have seen fit to display everything that is
available. It sometimes becomes difficult to determine which data are important and
which are just informational.
● Eye fatigue. As anyone who works with computers already knows, staring at a screen
for many hours creates eye strain.
● Memory. Most of the ACs relating to aircraft systems make a point of stating that the
operation of a particular system should not rely on pilot’s memory, or that operation
should be intuitive. With so much information and so many possible modes of
operation, this statement becomes meaningless. Take a look at the four F-15 heads-up
display (HUD) modes depicted in Figure 6.8 and ask yourself if any memorization by
the operator might be required.
Figure 6.8 provides a sample of a fighter implementation and shows how memory
plays an important part in understanding information that is provided. There are exam-
ples in the civil area as well. Figure 6.9 illustrates the rate of descent versus angle of
descent controls discussed in section 6.9.2. In the upper right portion of the display, the
selector knob controls either track and flight path angle or heading and vertical speed
indicator, depending on the mode indication selected. Not paying attention to the mode
select or uncertainty of the inputs could lead to some bad consequences.
6.9.5 Flightcrew Alerting

AC 25-1322-1, Flightcrew Alerting, 12/13/2010 was developed to provide guidance in
developing a consistent philosophy for alerting conditions, urgency, and prioritization
and presentation. (Part 23 has no guidance within this paragraph, AC 23-8 reserves this
paragraph, and Parts 27 and 29 are covered in their respective ACs). The following
design concepts have been developed:
– Only nonnormal conditions and operational events that require aircrew awareness
should generate an alert.
– All alerts provided to the aircrew must provide the information needed to identify the
nonnormal condition and the corrective action required.
– The alerting philosophy should be consistent.
Gun (air-air) Mode Medium Range Missile (air-air) Mode
Heading scale Master arm “on” Heading scale

Master arm “on” (reading 120)
(gun boresight line) (reading 120) (gun boresight line)
Aircraft waterline Altitude scale Steering circle Target designator
(reading 355 ft) 40 mile radar
Indicated airspeed Steering dot
10 mile radar ranging scale
scale (F-15 at 45 kt) Indicated
ranging scale airspeed scale Altitude scale
Aiming reticle (reading 335 ft)
(50 mil radius, range Target designator (F-15 at 445 kt)
1,000 ft per tick mark) on acquired target Target closing at
Velocity vector
Target at 2,000 ft 980 kt at 22 miles
Gun armed, 999 Closing at 150 kt. Missiles armed,
rounds remaining Target in
4 MRMs ready missile range
Discretes
Flight path Flight path ladder 60 sec. to missile
ladder Velocity vector impact
Automatic (air-ground) Mode CDIP (air-ground) Mode
Master arm/gun Heading scale
cross “on” Heading scale Master air/gun
(reading 360) cross “on” (reading 360)
Release cue Altitude scale Velocity vector
Indicated airspeed Indicated
(reading 5,000 ft)
scale (reading 450 kt) airspeed scale Altitude scale
Air-to-ground (reading 450 kt) (reading 5,000 ft)
Azimuth reticle (reading
steering 10,000 ft range) Target designator
Target Pull-up cue
designator Displayed
impact line
Time-to-go Pitch scale Air-to-ground
Pull-up cue reticle (reading
Pitch scale 6,900 ft range)
FIGURE 6.8 ¢ F-15 HUD Modes of Operation
FIGURE 6.9 ¢ Rate

of Descent versus
Angle of Descent
Controls
The AC further states that cockpit design should include the appropriate combina-
tion of alerting elements. These elements may be:
– Master visual alerts
– Visual alert information
– Master aural alerts
– Voice information
– Unique tones (unique sounds)
– Tactile or haptic information (stick/rudder pedal shaker)
The general rules for alerting design state that the designer should ensure the Alert
System is synchronized and prioritized. The colors should conform to 25.1322, and if
using aural alerts with multiple meanings a corresponding visual, tactile or haptic alert
should also be provided. The designer must determine the conditions that will generate
the alert and establish how the urgencies and priorities will be generated. Above all, the
presentation scheme must be consistent.
Alerts for warnings and cautions must provide cues through at least two senses;
advisories are provided through a single sense. Several alert combinations are used to
meet this requirement:
– Master visual alert, visual alert and master aural alert
– Master visual alert, visual alert and voice-alert information or unique alert tone
– Voice alert information may be preceded by a master aural alert
– A tactile alert may be combined with a visual or aural alert to meet the two sense
requirement
6.9.6 Color Usage

Color usage is dictated by the FARs, as noted previously. The pertinent FAR is
23/25.1322. There are ACs available to assist the applicant in meeting the intent of this
paragraph. AC 25-11 and AC 23-1311-1A provide an acceptable means of showing
compliance with the FAR. In the subsequent paragraphs I will discuss how designers of
one aircraft (MD-11) designed their display color usage and how they are in compliance
with the applicable FAR.
FAR 25/23.1322(a) states that warning lights shall be in red and may require
immediate action. AC 25-11 and AC 23-1311-1A state that red will be used for
warning lights and flight envelope or system limits. The MD-11 procedures state that a
red warning light requires immediate crew action. Red is used on the aircraft for
autopilot and auto throttle disconnects; high and low airspeed alerts; exceeding pitch,
bank, or engine limits; unsafe landing gear; and weather radar precipitation rates of
12 to 50 mm/hr.
According to FAR 25/23.1322(b), caution lights should be in amber and advise the
crew that there is a possible need for future crew action. AC 25-11 and AC 23-1311-1A
state that cautions, abnormal sources, and weather radar precipitations of 4 to 12 mm/hr
shall be in amber. The MD-11 procedures state that the presence of an amber light
requires immediate crew awareness and possible subsequent action. Amber is used for
level 1 and level 2 alerts, failures and cautions, abnormal sources (such as the captain’s
static sources on backup), weather radar precipitation rates of 4 to 12 mm/hr, the ILS
middle marker, and configuration speed limits.
The color green, according to FAR 25/23.1322(c), is used to indicate safe operation.
The AC further stipulates that green should be used for engaged modes, flight director
bars, selected data, and weather radar precipitation of 1 to 4 mm/hr. In the MD-11, green
is used for data validity, the #2 navigation needle, track diamond, autopilot and auto-
throttle modes, configuration limits, landing gear safe indication, takeoff and landing
checklists complete, and weather radar precipitation of less than 4 mm/hr.
The FAR states that cyan can be used as long as it is not related to red/amber/green
light functions and that the color does not cause confusion. The AC calls for cyan to be
used for the sky, armed modes, selected data, and selected heading. The MD-11 uses cyan
for engine start hydraulic fluid levels, autopilot engage status, the captain’s #1 navigation
bearing and range display, pitch limit, and systems available for use but not selected.
There is no specified reference in the FAR to magenta; the AC states that magenta
should be used for the ILS deviation pointer, flight director bar (also green, see above),
crew station #1 selected heading, and active route in the flight plan. It also states that
magenta should be used for weather radar precipitation rates greater than 50 mm/hr or
turbulence. The MD-11 reserves magenta for electronically generated or derived data
such as FMS selected values, flight director commands, radio navigation data, localizer
and glideslope deviations, weather radar precipitation greater than 50 mm/hr, and tur-
bulence. Other colors, such as grey, are used for scale shading; white is used for scales
and manual entries.
6.9.7 Test and Evaluation of Controls and Displays

There are two types of evaluations associated with controls and displays: functional and
evaluation. One of these is done well, while the other is not really done well at all. If you
review the previous section regarding colors, you might be led to the erroneous con-
clusion that the evaluation would be very simple. All we need to do is go down the
checklist and make sure that we comply with the FAR/AC. This is only part of the
evaluation. I tend to call these evaluations TLAR testing: that looks about right. This is
the evaluation of the controls and displays suite. The testing is based on human factors
and the man–machine interface, but it has nothing to do with evaluating whether or not
the displayed information is correct. A functional evaluation evaluates the system’s
ability to provide accurate, timely, and no misleading information to the aircrew. We do
not do functional evaluations very well.
In a functional evaluation, the displayed information and the command/response
functions of the controls are measured against the truth data (more on this later). Human
factors techniques and validation of the FAR items are components of the evaluation.
For both types of tests, video recording of the displays should be accomplished as well
as pilot’s voice and time code insertion. The pilot’s voice will give us insight into how
well the suite is designed and will alert the evaluator to potential problems. The time
code will allow us to select pertinent time slices for data analysis. When performing the
controls and displays evaluations, it is important that more than one operator/pilot be
used for the tests. Select a full range of users from low experience levels to senior pilots;
if in the military, select users other than all test pilots. Test pilots and senior pilots have
many hours of flight time and have developed inherent workarounds to problems. A
system that they deem acceptable may be unwieldy for a less experienced pilot.
Much of the testing can be accomplished in the simulator, as long as the simulator
emulates the aircraft as closely as possible. Attempt to exercise all failure modes and
emergency situations during the evaluations. These scenarios will increase workload and
provide a true picture of whether the displayed information is suitable or not.
The first portion of the test should be to evaluate system usability. The displays may
be cathode ray tubes (CRTs), liquid crystal diodes (LCDs), flat panel, or a combination
of these. Inputs may be made via soft keys, touch screens, keypads, or other controls.
The first item to be checked is the feedback mechanism. If an operator selects MENU on
a soft key, does the display immediately display the menu, or is there a mechanism that
says, ‘‘You have selected MENU; is that what you really wanted?’’ For this type of
feedback mechanism, the soft key would have to be depressed again to go to the MENU
page. The initial depression may highlight MENU or turn it bold to inform the operator
that this mode has been selected. This was a common mechanization on early digital
military aircraft. Unfortunately, it took about 20 sec for the pilot to figure out that if he
hit the button twice he would get the page right away, thus negating the positive feed-
back implementation.
Probably the most intelligent design enhancement for modern controls and displays
is the ‘‘go back’’ button, which is just like the one you use while surfing the Web. In
order to go back to a previous page you simply hit this button and you are there. Imagine
that you have just entered a 20-waypoint flight plan into the FMS and just prior to hitting
the enter button you notice that some of the entries are incorrect, but your brain does not
stop your finger in time. Now what do you do? Without a ‘‘go back’’ button, you might
have to go to an edit page, or worse yet, redo the flight plan. With a ‘‘go back’’ button,
you merely retrieve the last page and make the corrections. With this type of mechan-
ization, there is no need to have the positive feedback, two-depression system, because
you can always recover if you screw something up.
Touch screen displays are much like ATM displays, where you touch the item on
the screen rather than using a soft key. These displays may be pressure sensitive or heat
sensitive. You would not expect someone to install a heat-sensitive touch screen in a
military aircraft because the aircrews wear gloves, but it has been done. Keypad entry or
entry via some other control (e.g., lever, knob) should also be evaluated for ease of use
and the potential for errors. In many military cockpits, control entry is made via the
Mark I, Mod A #2 pencil because the buttons are too small or too close together, so the
probability of hitting the wrong button (once again with gloved hands) is high. This is
also a good time to evaluate consistency in the controls (is clockwise up and counter-
clockwise down, etc.?).
As an evaluator, we must also be cognizant of the operational requirements of the
operator. In military aircraft, it is possible that the operator may be wearing an outfit that
is slightly more constraining than a flight suit. Cold weather gear or antiexposure suits
are bad, but the worst is nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) flight gear. With this
equipment, movement, tactile feel, and blood flow are severely restricted. Controls that
were acceptable with normal flight gear may no longer be usable. Other operational
requirements may be flight with night vision systems. Displays need to be visible in all
types of lighting conditions.
The problems with designing displays (wrong information, too much information,
etc.) were described in the previous section. During the evaluation you must determine if
the designers eliminated these problems or inadvertently contributed to or compounded
them. If there is too much information presented on the display, is there a way to
FIGURE 6.10 ¢
Controls and DATA DATA HUD DATA DATA
Displays Suite
MFD 1 MFD 2 MFD 3 MFD 4 MFD 5
FIGURE 6.11 ¢
Allowable Methods
of Showing
Unreliable Data
declutter the mess? Many displays have submodes (declutter modes) that allow the
operator to remove certain types of information to make the display more readable. Next
the color, font, and character size should be evaluated for compliance with the applic-
able FAR. The ACs are a good place to formulate these tests.
After we are happy with the displays (TLAR) we can set about determining if the
data are correct and delivered in a timely manner. In order to proceed with this test, we
first need to know how the system is architected. How does the information flow from
where it was sensed to the display? What manipulation is done to the data along the
way? How long does it take from the time the parameter is sensed to when it is presented
to the operator? If these questions are not answered, it does not really make any dif-
ference how pretty a display looks because the data cannot be trusted.
We saw in the complex systems section that any safety assessment starts with a
failure hazard analysis (FHA). This FHA is normally initiated with a fault tree analysis.
We must accomplish the same type of test when functionally evaluating controls and
displays. Figure 6.10 depicts a controls and displays suite that consists of five displays,
one of which is a HUD.
Multifunction display (MFD) 3 is the HUD and contains the primary flight instru-
ments for the pilot (airspeed, attitude, altitude, and heading). Since the probability of
failure or providing hazardously misleading information is extremely improbable, the
loss of the MFD 3 hardware due to failure would require that the HUD information be
moved to another MFD. In addition, the pilot must be made aware that the information
on MFD 3 is no longer valid. This can be accomplished in one of two ways: the display
can be blanked or a red ‘‘X’’ can be placed across the display (Figure 6.11).
Assume that the logic in the system states that with a loss of MFD 3, the HUD
information is moved to MFD 2. What happens if MFD 2 fails with a subsequent failure
of MFD 3? Obviously there must be additional logic that states that if these failures
occur in this sequence, then the HUD information will be moved to MFD 4. The logic
that is incorporated is a result of the safety assessment discussed previously. It is our job
as evaluators to ensure that the logic is coded correctly in the software. But this example
is a simple test. What system feeds information to the displays?
In most digital display systems, the displays are controlled by display processors.
We need at least two display processors, because if we only had one and it failed we
would not have any displays. Figure 6.12 shows a typical architecture with the same five
MFDs supported by two display processors. Display processor 1 supports MFD 1, 2, and
3, while display processor 2 supports MFD 3 and 4.
What happens if the aircraft experiences a loss of display processor 1? Since display
processor 1 drives MFD 3 (HUD), it stands to reason that display processor 2 must then
drive MFD 3 after the loss of display processor 1. What happens if MFD 3 fails with a
subsequent loss of display processor 1? Our original logic stated that with the loss of
MFD 3 the HUD information would be moved to MFD 2. If display processor 1 then
fails, our original logic said that display processor 2 would drive MFD 3, but that display
has failed. We must have additional logic that says if display processor 1 fails and MFD
3 fails, then display processor 2 must drive MFD 2. You can see that the testing is
starting to get a little more involved.
We are not finished yet, since the mission computers/mission processors drive the
display processors. Usually we have at least two mission computers (for the same reason
we have two display processors), and either mission computer can drive both display
processors. The problem (especially in military applications) is that the mission com-
puters are not truly redundant, and the loss of a mission computer will result in a loss of
capability. Figure 6.12 adds the mission computers to the schematic. Mission computer 1
contains the functions of controls and displays, navigation, radar, and weapons.
Mission computer 2 contains the functions of controls and displays, navigation, electro-
optics, and electronic warfare, so the mission computers are not totally redundant. They
are only redundant in the areas of controls and displays and navigation. With the loss of
a mission computer, the associated functions will also be lost on the displays. The data
are not allowed to freeze, and the correct indications must be given to the pilot.
Figure 6.13 shows the loss of mission computer 1 and the associated loss of the radar and
weapons information on the displays.
FIGURE 6.12 ¢
DATA DATA HUD DATA DATA Display Processor
Support
Display Display
Processor 1 Processor 2
FIGURE 6.13 ¢
RADAR WPNS HUD EO EW Display Effect with a
Loss of Mission
Computer 1
Display Display
Processor 1 Processor 2
Mission Computer 2
Mission Computer 1
Controls and Displays
Controls and Displays
Navigation Electro-optical
Navigation Radar Weapons
Electronic Warfare
The final input to the displayed data is the aircraft sensors (e.g., inertial navigation
system [INS], GPS, angle of attack [AOA], air data). These sensors feed into the mission
computers; the mission computers determine the validity, perform calculations, and
forward the information. This is the ‘‘truth data’’ for the display subsystem. If a sensor is
bad, its information will not be allowed on the display and the pilot will receive the same
bad data indications. The evaluator will have to devise a test matrix where individual
sensor information is failed and validate that the parameter is either removed or X’d out
on the display. This will be a rather large matrix and will take some time to accomplish,
but it is an extremely important test. We would not like to find out on final approach in
marginal weather that the AOA freezes on the display rather than being taken down
when the sensor fails.
In addition to validating that the data are correct and not displayed when invalid, the
evaluator also needs to determine if there is any latency in the system. The latency is
defined as the time between when a parameter is sensed and when it is displayed. The
GPS can provide horizontal accuracy of 15 m 90% of the time, but if it takes 2 sec to
reach the display, the accuracy could degrade by hundreds of meters, depending on the
aircraft speed. This test must be done with all systems to ensure accuracy has not been
degraded and that safety has not been compromised. Again, this will be a rather large
test matrix and involve quite a bit of time.
A third test involves the ability of the system to accurately display cautions, advi-
sories, and warnings (CAWs) in a timely fashion. In analog aircraft, these advisories are
displayed on an annunciator panel in the cockpit with color-coded lights: red for
warnings and amber for cautions and advisories. The panel is normally combined with a
master caution or master warning light that illuminates when a light appeared on the
annunciator panel. This keys the pilot to look at the panel and determine which system is
at fault. An annunciator panel is depicted in Figure 6.14. The annunciator panel is analog
and analog is passé. With digital systems, faults are now presented on displays. Not all
faults will be displayed, and all faults will not appear on all displays. For example, loss
FIGURE 6.14 ¢
Caution, Advisory,
and Warning Display
of hydraulic pressure is fairly serious, and the fault may appear on all displays, including
the HUD. Loss of a radar transmitter is not a warning and may only appear on the radar
display; other displays, such as the FMS scratchpad, may inform the pilot to check the
radar display. What happens if a failure is supposed to appear on the HUD but a previous
failure has caused the HUD information to be moved to a different display? The logic
must be present in the system to accommodate this change and properly display the
cautions, advisories, and warnings. Another test and another large matrix.
These tests must be run to ensure the integrity of the system and before allowing
IFR flight. How long does this testing take? Well, it could take as long as six months,
and that is assuming that there are no software changes. What happens when the testing
is complete and then you receive a change to the display processor software? It is
probably a good idea to run these tests again. Think back a couple of sections to the
discussion of software in the TSO process and the concepts of significant and insignif-
icant changes. These tests must be accomplished if there is a significant change, but how
confident are you with insignificant changes?
There is another series of tests that also need to be verified and these involve a
mechanism called the display override feature. Suppose you are flying and your airspeed
is 60 KIAS, AOA is 50 , and your yaw rate is 60 /sec. What can you say is happening to
your aircraft? If you said spinning, you are correct. For the pilot of this airplane, the first
order of business is to determine in which direction the aircraft is spinning and then
apply the appropriate antispin controls. Applying the controls in the wrong fashion may
really ruin your day. In some aircraft, help is provided by overlaying the HUD and in
some cases all other displays, with spin information. The display will remain until the
situation is corrected and then the displays will revert back to their prespin settings. An
example of the spin display is shown in Figure 6.15.
The display is telling the pilot that the aircraft spin is to the right and that the stick
should be placed in the right forward quadrant. In the civilian world, similar logic is
applied on some aircraft for TAWS, which is discussed later in this chapter. If the
system detects terrain and issues a pull-up command and the pilot does not have a
TAWS display selected, the TAWS display will automatically override one or more of
the cockpit displays to provide immediate situational awareness. The logic and imple-
mentation of these overrides must also be included in the test plan.
The last portion of the evaluation is the determination that a particular display or
suite of displays is suitable to accomplish the mission. We accomplish this test by using
tests that are very similar to closed loop handling qualities (CLHQ). The performance
and flying qualities testers use a system called the Cooper-Harper chart. A copy of this
chart is provided in Figure 6.16. By using a slight modification, we can adapt this same
system for determining the utility and usability of a display.
SPIN FIGURE 6.15 ¢
Spin Display
Override
FIGURE 6.16 ¢ Aircraft Demands on the Pilot in Pilot

Characteristics Selected task or operation* Rating
Cooper-Harper
Good Pilot compensation not a factor for
CLHQ Rating Scale Negligible deficiencies desired performance
1
Adequacy for selected
task or required operation* Excellent Pilot compensation not a factor for
2
Highly desirable desired performance
Fair - Some mildly Minimal pilot compensation required for
Yes 3
unpleasant deficiencies desired performance
Minor but annoying Desired performance requires moderate

4
deficiencies pilot compensation
Is it No Deficiencies
Moderately objectionable Adequate performance requires
satisfactory without require 5
deficiencies considerable pilot compensation
improvement? improvement
Very objectionable but Adequate performance requires
6
tolerable deficiencies extensive pilot compensation
Yes
Major deficiencies Adequate performance not attainable with
maximum tolerable pilot compensation 7
Is adequate Controllability not in question
No Deficiencies
performance attainable
warrant Major deficiencies Considerable pilot compensation required
with a tolerable pilot 8
improvement to maintain control
workload?
Major deficiencies Intense pilot compensation is required
9
for control
Yes
Is it No Improvement Major deficiencies Control will be lost during some portion

10
controllable? mandatory of required operation
*
Cooper-Harper ref. NASA TND-5153 Definition of required operation involves designation of flight phase
Pilot Decisions
and/or subphases with accompanying conditions
With CLHQ, the pilot is given a task to perform and is then asked to quantify the
task by using to Cooper-Harper scale. Assume that we have changed the control laws in
the flight control computers. We then task the pilot with accomplishing an objective that
employs these new control laws. We assign the pilot the task of landing the airplane. He
attempts to land the aircraft and discovers that stick forces are nonexistent and he has to
summon up all of his piloting skills just to get the airplane on the ground without killing
himself. The pilot enters the Cooper-Harper scale with the task ‘‘land the airplane.’’ The
first milestone that he encounters is ‘‘Is it controllable?’’ and the answer is no. We move
to the right and pick the most appropriate statement. We have only one choice here and
that is a Cooper-Harper rating of 10, major deficiencies, improvement mandatory.
After going back to the lab, the software is reworked and the pilot is tasked again
with the new and improved software. Although the control is much more attainable, he
finds that he tends to overshoot the nose with corrections to the runway. He enters the
chart again and this time passes the first milestone (because it is controllable) but stops
at the second milestone, because the workload is still too high, and gives the system a
Cooper-Harper rating of a 7. These iterations continue until the task is rated at a Cooper-
Harper of 1 to 3.
With a slight modification to the Cooper-Harper CLHQ scale, we can devise a
display rating tree that can be used for evaluating the usability of any display. The
method is exactly the same as previously described for handling qualities, except in this
case we are going to see if the required parameters for accomplishing a task are con-
trollable (as opposed to the aircraft). The display rating tree is depicted in Figure 6.17.
Difficulty Pilot Demand level Pilot FIGURE 6.17 ¢

Rating
Display Rating Tree
Excellent Pilot compensation not a factor for
1
Adequacy for selected desired performance
task or required operation* Good Pilot compensation not a factor for
2
Negligible difficulty desired performance
Fair Minimal pilot compensation required for
Yes 3
Mild deficiencies desired performance
Minor but annoying Desired performance requires moderate

4
deficiencies pilot compensation
No Workload
Is Pilot Workload Moderately objectionable Adequate performance requires
Should be 5
Satisfactory? deficiencies considerable pilot compensation
Reduced
Very objectionable but Adequate performance requires extensive
6
tolerable deficiencies pilot compensation
Yes
Major deficiencies, Adequate performance not attainable with
Display Redesign maximum tolerable pilot compensation 7
Controllability not in question
No Deficiencies
Is Performance
warrant Major deficiencies, Considerable pilot compensation required
Adequate? 8
improvement Display Redesign to maintain control
Major deficiencies, Intense pilot compensation is required for
9
Display Redesign control
Yes
Is Parameter No Improvement Major deficiencies, Uncontrollable, Pilot can not complete

10
Controllable? mandatory Display System Redesign task
Pilot Decisions
Assume that we are going to evaluate a HUD and the ability to fly certain man-
euvers using only the HUD as reference. We would set up a task and establish certain
thresholds for the pilot to meet. The first task may be:
● Fly straight and level 300 KIAS and the thresholds are airspeed 5 knots, altitude
25 ft, heading 1 .
The pilot would then attempt to complete the assigned task using the HUD as the
only reference. If the altitude was graduated every 50 ft, this task could not be accom-
plished, since the assigned threshold was 25 ft. Entering Figure 6.16, we would be
stopped at the first milestone, ‘‘Is the parameter controllable?’’ The assigned level would
be a 10, much like our original CLHQ example. A software change would be required to
the HUD display software to successfully accomplish this objective. The level of com-
plexity would be ever increased until the true usability of the HUD could be established.
The same type of test can be devised for any system display, including weapons deliv-
ery, radar, and navigation.
6.9.8 Standardization and References for Controls and Displays

Standardization is really a misnomer when it comes to the design of aircraft controls and
displays. It would reduce transition time for pilots introduced to new cockpits, and safety
levels would be increased if all cockpits were designed the same. However, it would
reduce creativity and perhaps stifle the development of better controls and displays. In
the civilian world, there are a multitude of documents that are available to assist in the
development of these systems. None of these documents carry the force of law and are
advisory only. The FARs must be satisfied, and these documents can assist in com-
pliance. The FAR 23/25/27/29 paragraphs that relate to controls and displays are
● 1303—Flight and Navigation Instruments
● 1305—Powerplant Instruments
● 1309—Equipment, Systems, and Installations
● 1311—Electronic Display Instruments
● 1321—Arrangement and Visibility
● 1323—Airspeed Indicating System
● 1335—Flight Director System
● 1337—Powerplant Instruments Installation
● 1541—Markings and Placards
In addition to the ACs, other guidance is available to the applicant:
● ESD-TR-86-278, ‘‘Guidelines for Designing User Interface Software’’
(acceptable standards for digital entry and feedback, acceptable error messages and
nomenclatures)
● NASA FTB 3000 (Rev A), ‘‘Man Systems Integration Standards’’ (gives guidance
for aural warnings, types of intelligibility, and noise levels)
● SAE AIR 1093, ‘‘Numerical, Letter, and Symbol Dimensions for Aircraft Instrument
Displays’’ (mimics much of the work in MIL-STD-1472, see below)
● SAE ARP 571C, ‘‘Flight Deck Controls and Displays for Communication and
Navigation Equipment for Transport Aircraft’’ (specific to navigation systems)
● SAE ARP 1874, ‘‘Design Objectives for CRT Displays for Part 25 Transport Air-
craft’’ (specifically lighting and readability)
● SAE ARP 4102, ‘‘Flight Deck Panels, Controls, and Displays’’ (how to get the most
out of the displays by employing various techniques and standardization)
● SAE ARP 4107, ‘‘Electronic Displays’’ (describes the information that must be
available for each particular group of systems, such as primary flight instruments)
● SAE AS 8034, ‘‘Minimum Performance Standard for Airborne Multipurpose Electronic
Displays’’ (describes the measurable criteria for, for example, lighting, alignment,
width, height)
The U.S. military currently uses one standard:
● MIL-STD-1472D, ‘‘Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems,
Equipment, and Facilities’’ (first attempt at military standardization of controls and
displays suites)
6.10 WEATHER RADAR CERTIFICATION

RADAR (radio detection and ranging) is covered in detail in chapter 8 of this text, so the
theory of operation will not be discussed here. In this section, we are merely concerned
with the evaluations that must occur to show compliance with the applicable regulations.
For most avionics installations on the aircraft, the first document the evaluator should
investigate is the flight test guide for the applicable aircraft. For transport category aircraft,
AC 25-7C, ‘‘Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Airplanes’’ (October 16,
2012), is the document to use. For small airplanes we would consult AC 23-8C, ‘‘Flight
Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes’’ (November 16, 2011). Not all avionics
systems are covered by the respective ACs, but they are, nevertheless, the best place to
start. In some instances, the AC will refer the reader to another AC or reference document.
A new Advisory Circular, AC 20-182, June 17, 2014, Airworthiness Approval for Aircraft
Weather Radar Systems consolidates the airworthiness requirements for all aircraft when
installing Weather Radar, and forward looking Windshear and Turbulence Detection.
Both ACs cite paragraph 1301 as the fundamental requirement for equipment
function and installation; the paragraph should sound familiar, as is has been discussed
in previous sections. AC 25-7C summarizes the certification requirements of modern
avionics and electrical systems on aircraft by stating that the systems/equipment must
● Perform their intended function (25.1301)
● Be adequately protected for failure conditions (25.1309)
● Be arranged to provide proper pilot visibility and utilization (as appropriate)
(25.1321)
● Be protected by circuit breakers to preclude failure propagation and minimize dis-
tress to the airplane’s electrical system (25.1357)
● Be installed in a manner such that operation of the system will not adversely affect
the simultaneous operation of any other system (25.1431)
The AC also makes the case for the test of all installed equipment on aircraft
whether or not it is characterized as ‘‘optional.’’ Optional equipment would imply that
the equipment is not necessary to safely fly the aircraft. The AC makes the point that all
equipment installed will obviously be used by the crew; therefore, the statutorily
required tests must be applied. Public law requires that the administrator find that no
feature or characteristic of the airplane makes it unsafe for the category in which cer-
tification is requested. The extent to which that equipment must be tested or evaluated,
that the administrator may make the necessary finding with respect to the whole air-
plane, is a technical determination based on the engineering and operational expertise of
the administrator. This logic is more clearly defined in AC 20-168, ‘‘Certification
Guidance for Installation of NonEssential, NonRequired Aircraft Cabin Systems &
Equipment (CS&E)’’, July 22, 2010.
In light of the preceding paragraph, there are some general guidelines to be followed
for all equipment installations (optional or not):
● The criteria and requirements are a function of the applicant’s engineering analysis
and laboratory (simulator) test program. The combination of analysis, laboratory, and
flight evaluation form the whole of the certification requirement.
● The requirement for demonstrating safe operation should normally include induced
failures during flight. The types of failures and the conditions under which they occur
should be a result of the analysis and laboratory studies.
● The amount of flight testing should be determined through the cooperative efforts of
the assigned project personnel. As a rule, flight testing will be required for an initial
certification, while derivative, follow-on items may require less testing. When
ground or flight test data are available from similar, previously approved installations
and are sufficient to properly evaluate a system’s performance, additional testing
may not be required.
● Particular attention should be given to those installations where an external piece of
gear, such as an antenna, could affect the flight characteristics.
● Installations that can or may change the established limitations, flight characteristics,
performance, operating procedures, or any required systems require approval by an
FAA ACO flight test branch.
● New installations of equipment should be evaluated as a cooperative effort by the
authority and the applicant.
● Throughout the systems/equipment evaluation, the operation of annunciators should
be assessed to determine that proper conspicuity and display are provided to the
appropriate flight crew member. Any mode of action selected by a manual action, or
automatically, should be positively identified. Any submode should be evaluated to
determine the need for annunciation.
AC 23-8C is not nearly as verbose as the AC for Part 25 aircraft. The document says
that it provides requirements for specific types of equipment (such as weather RADAR).
The document only provides the applicant with the additional guidance that particular
attention should be given to those installations where an external piece of equipment
could affect the flight characteristics. It also states that all installations of this nature
should be evaluated by the flight test pilot to verify that the equipment functions prop-
erly when installed.
For utility and transport helicopters, AC 27-1B, September 30, 2008, and AC 29-2C,
September 30, 2008, address Weather RADAR in the Miscellaneous Guidance (MG)
section 1 in chapter 3.
6.10.1 Specific Weather RADAR Tests

AC 25-7C defines 10 specific weather radar tests that need to be completed to
demonstrate compliance with FAR 25.1301. Once again, an AC does not carry the force
of law; it is a means, but not the only means, of demonstrating compliance. The specific
tests are
● Warm-up period
● Display
● Range capabilities
● Beam tilting and structural clearance
● Stability
● Contour display (iso echo)
● Antenna stability, when installed
● Ground mapping
● Mutual interference
● Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
Tests described in AC 23-8C, AC 27-1B and 29-2C are inclusive with the exception of
warm-up period and display.
Warm-up Period. If a warm-up period is defined by the manufacturer, then all
tests will be completed after this time has elapsed. Usually the manufacturer will state
in the operator’s manual what this time (if any) is. Wording will be something like ‘‘a
usable display will be available to the operator 2 minutes after selecting standby/
operate.’’
Display. The evaluator should check that the scope trace and sweep display move
smoothly and are without gaps or objectionable variations in intensity. As the sweep
moves from left to right, there should be no ratcheting across the display. The persis-
tence should be set so that there is always a full display picture rather than returns only
under the beam. For color displays, the evaluator should verify that the colors are correct
with the proper contrast. This test will be accomplished again when verifying the con-
tour mode. In many systems, BIT, initiated at either start-up or manually by the operator,
will run through a color and contrast test.
Range Capabilities. This test verifies the maximum range capabilities of the radar
as specified by the manufacturer. The tests should be completed by looking at large
radar returns with good contrast from the surrounding area. Excellent choices for this
test are land–water contrasts such as coastlines or lakes. As long as the water is not
extremely rough, the water will be displayed as a no-show target (no radar energy will
be returned from the water). The display will show the water as black, while the sur-
rounding areas of landmass will be bright. The AC states that while maintaining level
flight at 90% of maximum approved height for the airplane, set the radar controls so that
large radar-identifiable objects such as mountains, lakes, rivers, coastlines, storm fronts,
turbulence, etc., are displayed on the radar scope. A little caution about using storm
fronts or turbulence: this is supposed to be a test of maximum range, which implies that
you know where you are and you know where the object is (truth data). If you do not
know the exact location of the weather, then how do you know the radar is displaying
the correct range? The paragraph further states that the evaluator should maneuver the
airplane and adjust the radar controls so that the tests can be conducted for the range
requirements. The radar should be capable of displaying prominent line-of-sight (LOS)
targets. What this means is that the tilt will have to be adjusted upward to show targets at
the maximum range. On some aircraft installations it is possible to not meet the manu-
facturer’s requirement for maximum range detection. This may be due to the fact that at
90% of the maximum certificated altitude the LOS is less than the stated maximum
range. The equation for computing the range to the radar horizon (LOS) in nautical miles
is given by Equation 6.1.
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
R ¼ :87 2hR (6.1)
where R is the LOS and hR is the aircraft’s altitude in feet.

If an airplane is certificated to 12,500 ft and the evaluation is conducted at 12,000 ft,
the LOS for the radar will be approximately 135 nm. If the manufacturer’s stated
maximum range is 200 nm, this test cannot be successfully completed. This does not
mean that the radar is not acceptable, as it provided returns at the maximum LOS for this
airplane.
Beam Tilting and Structural Clearance. There are two tests within this section:
the first is to determine that there is no structural interference between the radar antenna
and the radome; the second is to check for bearing accuracy. With the aircraft in level
flight, the operator should attempt to find a large radar return with the antenna tilt set at
0 . Once found, maneuver the airplane so that the target is at 0 elevation and 0 azimuth
(on the nose). Slowly change the tilt control through an appropriate range and observe
that the radar scope presentation does not change erratically, which might indicate
structural interference with the antenna. This interference should not occur throughout
the entire speed envelope of the airplane. A couple of notes here: If there is any physical
interference present, the operator is going to hear it and it will, in all probability, cause a
massive failure in the radar. If the structure interferes with the antenna’s ability to see
the returned energy, then the display will change based on the loss of signal.
In order to check the bearing accuracy, fly under conditions that allow visual identi-
fication of a target, such as an island, river, or lake, at a distance within radar range. When
flying toward the target, select a course from the reference point to the target and deter-
mine the error in displayed bearing to the target at all range settings. Change the heading
of the airplane in increments of 10 to 30 maximum and verify that the error does not
exceed 5 in the displayed bearing to the target. This method is more qualitative than
quantitative because it relies on the pilot’s initial reference of zero, which could be off by
some amount. As discussed in the maximum range test, if we use truth data (aircraft
position and target position), a real measure of accuracy can be obtained for the radar.
Stability. The AC directs that while observing a target return on the radar indicator,
turn off the stabilizing function and put the airplane through a series of pitch and roll
movements, observing the blurring of the display. Turn the stabilizing mechanism on
and repeat the pitch and roll movements. Evaluate the effectiveness of the stabilizing
function in maintaining a sharp display. This is an evaluation of a system that does not
have antenna stabilization, that is, a gyro stabilization package that will maintain the
antenna level with respect to the earth regardless of what the aircraft does (to some
limit). Gyro or space-stabilized radar tests are covered after the contour tests in this
section. The stabilization in this section is more of a point-ahead mode, where the radar
will attempt to keep pointing at the position the operator commands and smooth out
elevation changes due to aircraft altitude transients in level flight. With the stabilization
function turned off, the radar pitch and roll axis is slaved to the aircraft fuselage (or
water mark) and the wings. Any change in aircraft space position or attitude will
translate to a change in the radar picture, and hence smearing. Figure 6.18 shows the
difference between stabilized and nonstabilized radar.
Contour Display (Iso Echo). This is the function of the radar that allows the
determination of weather intensity. The AC states that if heavy cloud formations or
rainstorms are reported within a reasonable distance from the test base, select the
contour display mode. The radar should differentiate between heavy and light pre-
cipitation. Of course, you have to know the intensity of the storm to determine if the
FIGURE 6.18 ¢
Stabilized versus No Stability
Nonstabilized
Platforms
Stability Stability
No Stability
radar displays it correctly. There is that truth data again. Also remember from our
discussions of displays that, according to AC 25-11, the color presentations for display
of precipitation are
● Green, weather radar precipitation rates of 1 to 4 mm/hr
● Amber, weather radar precipitation rates of 4 to 12 mm/hr
● Red, weather radar precipitation rates of 12 to 50 mm/hr
● Magenta, weather radar precipitation rates of greater than 50 mm/hr or turbulence
Antenna Stability, When Installed. This is the test for gyro-stabilized platforms that
was alluded to earlier. Most manufacturers will guarantee stabilization of their platform up
to about 10 of pitch and 20 to 30 of bank. When flying within these restrictions, the
radar will always provide a clear, undistorted picture of the area of interest selected by the
operator. As these limits are exceeded, the gimbal limits of the radar will be exceeded and
portions of the display will be lost. For example, if the stabilization limit is specified as 10
of pitch and you start to pitch the airplane up to 10 , picture will not be affected. As you hit
11 , you start to lose information from the bottom of the display (near range) because the
stabilization is overcome by the excessive pitch. Similarly, if the aircraft is banked to the
right and the bank limit is 20 , the picture will be unaffected up to 20 of bank. At 21 of
right bank, you start to lose information on the left side of the display (up wing side)
because the stabilization is overcome by excessive bank angle. Stabilization limits are thus
determined by noting the pitch and bank angles where display information is lost.
The AC states that while in level flight at 10,000 ft or higher, adjust the tilt 2 to 3
above the point where the ground return was eliminated. Put the airplane through down
pitch and then roll movements. No ground return should be present. A note is added that
the aircraft should be rolled right and left approximately 15 and pitched nose down
approximately 10 .
Ground Mapping. This test is accomplished to see if the weather radar can assist in
navigating the aircraft by presenting the operator with a picture of the ground in front of
the aircraft. High-resolution radars are able to provide a presentation that looks exactly
like a map. Most weather radars suffer from large beam widths and long pulses that can
not provide high-resolution ground returns. Large objects should be able to be identified,
and therefore aid in the aircrew’s situational awareness.
The AC directs that the aircraft fly over areas containing large, easily identifiable
landmarks such as rivers, towns, islands, coastlines, etc. The evaluator would then
compare the form of these objects on the indicator with their actual shape as visually
observed from the cockpit.
Mutual Interference. This test is used to verify that no objectionable interference is
present on the radar indicator from any electrical, radio, or navigation equipment, when
operating, and that the radar installation does not interfere with the operation of any other
equipment. Particular attention should be devoted to radar effect on electronic display
systems and on localizer, glideslope, and ADF signals during landing approaches.
Electromagnetic Compatibility. The AC states that with all systems operating in
flight, verify by observation that no adverse effects are present in the required flight
systems. Both the previous paragraph (mutual interference) and this one (EMC) are
really inadequate when considering EMI and EMC testing. We discussed EMI/EMC in
sections 4.13 and 4.14 of this text, and I recommend that these procedures always be
followed whenever you add, modify, or relocate antennas or equipment.
TABLE 6.9 ¢ Weather RADAR Compliance Matrix
No. Requirement Subject Description

1 8(a) Warm-up All tests should be conducted after the manufacturer’s spe-
Period cified warm-up period.
2 8(b) Display Check the scope trace and sweep display move smoothly
and without gaps or objectionable variations in intensity.
Verify appropriate colors and color contrast.
3 8(c) Range At 90% of maximum approved altitude, objects should be
Capabilities displayed at maximum range specified by the manu-
facturer; maneuvers should be conducted. The radar should
be capable of displaying line-of-sight known prominent
targets.
4 AC 25-7C.1301c 8(d-1) Beam Tilting The structural interference (caused by beam tilting) between
and Structural the radome and antenna should not occur throughout the
Clearance operational speed envelope of the airplane.
5 8(d-2) Bearing Change the heading of the airplane in increments of 10 to
Accuracy 30 maximum and verify the error does not exceed 5
degrees maximum in the displayed bearing to the target.
6 8(e) Stability While observing a target return on the radar indicator, turn
off the stabilizing function and put the airplane through
pitch and roll movements. Observe the blurring of the
display. Turn the stabilizing mechanism on and repeat the
roll and pitch movements. Evaluate the effectiveness of the
stabilizing function in maintaining a sharp display.
7 8(f-1) Contour If heavy cloud formations or rainstorms are reported within a
Display reasonable distance from the test base, select the contour
(Iso echo) display mode. The radar should differentiate between
heavy and light precipitation.
8 AC 25-7C.1301c 8(f-2) Contour Determine the effectiveness of the contour display function
Display by switching from normal to contour display while obser-
(Iso echo) ving large objects of varying brightness on the indicator.
The brightest object should become the darkest when
switching from normal to contour mode.
9 8(g) Antenna While in level flight at 10,000 feet or higher, adjust the tilt
Stability approximately 2-3 degrees above the point where ground
When Installed return was eliminated. Put the airplane through pitch
(down 10 ), then roll (15 ) movements. No ground return
should be present.
10 8(h) Ground Fly over areas containing large, easily identifiable landmarks
Mapping such as rivers, towns, islands, coastlines, etc. Compare the
form of these objects on the indicator with their actual
shape as visually observed from the cockpit.
11 AC 25-7C.1301c 8(i) Mutual Determine that no objectionable interference is present on the
Interference radar indicator from any electrical or radio/navigation
equipment, when operating, and that the radar installation
does not interfere with the operation of any other equip-
ment. Particular attention should be devoted to radar effect
on electronic display systems and on localizer, glideslope,
and ADF signals during approach to landing.
12 8(j) EMC EMC should be evaluated with all systems operating in flight
to verify by observation that no adverse effects are present
in the required flight systems.
AC 23-8C offers the same type of testing for the installation of weather radar in
small airplanes, with some small differences. There are no specific tests called out for
warm-up period or display in the AC. The maximum displayed target range for Part 23
installations is 80% of the maximum stated range. Bearing accuracy is 10 in small
aircraft, as opposed to the 5 for transport aircraft. Under beam tilting, the Part 23 AC
merely states that the antenna should have an elevation travel of 10 . There is one
addition to AC 23-8B under specific tests and that is that the display must be evaluated
under all lighting conditions, including night and direct sunlight. This test is mentioned
in AC 25-7C as required for all equipment covered in the section. All other verbiage is
the same in Part 23 as it is in Part 25.
An example of a Weather RADAR Compliance Matrix is shown in Table 6.9.
6.11 AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL OF

POSITIONING AND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS
6.11.1 Background
Conventional aircraft navigation is based on the use of ground-based navigation aids
(VOR, DME, NDB, TACAN). This has resulted in a route structure anchored to these
navigation aids and dependent on the locations of these aids. The current system is
inefficient and does not lend itself to expansion to handle the predicted increase in air
traffic. Because of the inability of the current system to expand easily, it became evident
that exploitation of emerging technologies was needed. This strategy would, of course,
need to maintain the quality and safety of air traffic. One of the concepts that has been
pursued is area navigation, or RNAV. RNAV is a method of navigation that allow aircraft
to operate on tracks joining any two points within prescribed accuracy tolerances; aircraft
would no longer be required to overfly specific ground facilities (radio aids).
In 1990, RNAV was identified by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) Future European Air Traffic Management System (FEATS) as the future
navigation system in the European region. FAA regulations have started to identify
minimum navigation performance standards (MNPS) and minimum system performance
standards (MSPS) as a condition for certification, as is the case with reduced vertical
separation minimums (RVSM). Most importantly, aircraft without RVSM authorization
or MNPS will not be allowed in RVSM or RNAV airspace.
RNAV is a method of navigation that permits aircraft operations on any desired
flight path within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or the limits of self-
contained aids. Airborne RNAV equipment automatically determines aircraft position
from one or more sensors. Most RNAV equipment can provide lateral displacement
from a desired track and provide inputs to the autopilot. B-RNAV is basic area navi-
gation, and satisfies a track-keeping ability of 5 nm for 95% of the time. This level of
accuracy is comparable to what can be obtained with conventional navigation aids when
the navigation aids are less than 100 nm apart. B-RNAV can be equated to required
navigation performance 5 nm (RNP 5). This method of track keeping may be expected
to be in use until 2018 (phase out period for ground-based navigation aids).
P-RNAV or Precision Area Navigation is being incrementally implemented
worldwide; P-RNAV is equivalent to RNP 1 or a Required Navigational Performance
of þ/1 nm 95% of the time. All of these implementations are required to implement
Free Flight, Free Flight 2000, Random Navigation, Capstone, etc. Air Traffic Control
will be replaced with Air Traffic Management (ATM); The U.S. Air Force has deter-
mined a need to comply with new FAA directives and has established GATM (Global
Air Traffic Management).
6.11.2 AC 20-138D
The backbone of the aforementioned enhancements is borne by the Global Positioning
System, GLONASS, Galileo and other GNSS systems. Improvements such as the Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS), Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS),
EGNOS and SBAS will build upon the basic satellite installations. Aircraft desiring to
participate in restricted airspace must comply with the Minimum Performance Standards
in the applicable TSOs and the Airworthiness requirements in AC 20-138D, Air-
worthiness Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems, March 28, 2014.
AC 20-138 is an effort to consolidate all positioning systems within one document
and provides the applicant with a means, but not the only means, of obtaining Air-
worthiness Approval for the following systems:
– Global Positioning equipment including those using GPS augmentations

– Area Navigation (RNAV) equipment integrating data from multiple navigation
sensors
– RNAV equipment intended for Required Navigation Performance (RNP) operations
– Barometric Vertical Navigation (baro-VNAV) equipment
This AC replaces AC 20-138A, which only addressed stand-alone (TSO C-129

(AR)) and WAAS enabled TSO C-145c and TSO C-146c equipment; it also clarifies
some details from earlier versions of AC 20-138.
The AC does not address satellite systems planned or in development; all posi-
tioning and navigation equipment and RNP Airworthiness guidance will be eventually
be included in one AC. AC 20-138 incorporates Airworthiness guidance contained in
AC 90-101A (RNP procedures with special aircraft and aircrew authorization required
[SAAAR]) and AC 90-105 (RNP Operations and baro-VNAV in the NAS); the AC does
not supersede the operational guidance of the RNP 90 series ACs. Authors note:
SAAAR has since been replaced with the term AR (approval required) to make life
simpler. This AC states that deviation from this AC by an alternate means must be found
acceptable by the FAA (which is also a new development).
The following documents are cancelled by AC 20-138B:
– AC 20-129 (Airworthiness approval of VNAV systems)

– AC 20-130A (FMS using multiple sensors)
– AC 20-138A (GNSS equipment)
– AC 25-4 (INS Systems)
The AC supersedes the requirements contained in AC 90-45A, Approval of Area

Navigation Systems for use in the U.S. NAS; a new section titled Frequently Asked
Questions has been added to the version C update.
6.11.3 Positioning Systems TSOA

The applicant may apply for VFR or IFR operations; the normal basis for equipment
approval is the TSOA. The AC makes note of the fact that while the TSO process
operates on the basis of self-certification by the applicant, it is beneficial to involve the
ACO because, as was noted previously:
– Obtaining a TSOA does not ensure that the equipment will satisfy all of the applicable
requirements when installed.
– Equipment has become more complex and workload intensive with no standard inter-
face with the pilot; that is, the human factors evaluation of the equipment is subjective.
The AC even goes as far as to recommend that manufacturers elect to obtain an STC
for their equipment concurrent with the TSO process. This will ensure that the authority
is involved with the process from the beginning. It should be noted that this is also a
marked departure from the previous ways of doing business.
The TSOAs will come in many variations with respect to global navigation satellite
systems (GNSS). TSO C-129 (AS) and TSO C-196a refer to stand-alone GPS receivers
without SBAS and receivers that incorporate many of the processing improvements
found in GPS/SBAS systems but without the GPS/SBAS requirements. TSO C-129a has
been canceled and TSO C-196a incorporates the improvements of enhanced EMI/EMC
protection in the presence of other GNSS systems and a selective availability aware
wherein the receiver properly accounts for satellite range error if it is reflected in the
user range accuracy index.
The original airworthiness certifications for GPS and GNSS systems came with
limitations as the integrity, accuracy, availability, and continuity were not robust enough
to offer a primary means of navigation, so other navigation systems were required to be
on board. Flight over the ocean and in remote areas was authorized but required the
applicant to install redundant systems and install a predeparture RAIM program. SBAS
systems automatically meet most of the requirements levied on the earlier certifications,
so in a sense, some of the compliance issues are easier for an applicant.
Three equipment classes could be approved under TSO C-129. The classes were
based on capabilities (enroute and terminal navigation, nonprecision approach cap-
ability), whether or not they included an integrity monitor (RAIM or RAIM equivalent),
and level of integration (GPS data to an FMS, or from an FMS to an autopilot). The
equipment classes and their capabilities are summarized in Table 6.10.
As opposed to the TSO C-129 approvals, TSO C-145c and 146c equipment do not
require other positioning and navigation systems to be on board. RTCA/DO-229D is the
source for single-frequency GPS/SBAS MOPS; new MOPS and TSOs will be written
for multifrequency/multisystem equipment. TSO C-145c and 146c equipment may be
one of four classes within two groupings: functional and operational.
Functional classes are based on the TSOA:
– Class Beta is a TSO C-145c GPS/SBAS sensor and Class Gamma (complete sensor/
navigation system and Class Delta (ILS Look-alike) falls under TSO C-146c
– Class Beta-1 equipment consists of a sensor that determines position (with integrity)
and provides this data to an integrated Navigation System (FMS). The equipment
also provides integrity in the absence of other navigation sensor inputs such as
GPS/WAAS through the use of FDE
TABLE 6.10 ¢ GPS TSO C-129(AR) Equipment Classes
Provides Data to
Enroute and Nonprecision an Integrated Provides Enhanced
Equipment Terminal Approach Equivalent Navigation Guidance to an
Class Navigation Capability RAIM RAIM System Autopilot
A1 Yes Yes Yes No No No

A2 Yes No Yes No No No
B1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No

B2 Yes No Yes No Yes No
B3 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
B4 Yes No No Yes Yes No
C1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes

C2 Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
C3 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
C4 Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
– Class Beta-2 equipment will provide deviations relative to a selected path; in this
class of equipment, database capability, display outputs and pilot controls are
necessary
– Class Beta-3 equipment includes the above plus VNAV when used with another
sensor
– Class 4 Gamma and Delta equipment provides the above and has the capability of
performing a precision approach
The operational classes of TSO C-145c/146c equipment may be summarized as
follows:
– Class Beta-1 equipment supports oceanic and domestic enroute, terminal, non preci-
sion approach and departure operations.
– Class Beta-2 equipment provides a stand-alone navigation system.
– Class Beta-3 equipment performs the stand-alone navigation system when combined
with another system.
– Class 4 equipment supports precision approach capability (ILS replacement). and will
more than likely satisfy the equipment requirement for Class Beta-1, 2, or 3.
TSO C-161a/TSO C-162a equipment covers systems that use a ground-based aug-
mentation system (GBAS) or systems that uplink GPS/GNSS corrections via a VHF data
link. A comparable system would be the Australian ground-based regional augmentation
system (GRAS). Some equipment may carry multiple TSOs as they satisfy multiple
functions; the AC addresses that multiples are authorized.
TSO-C115c defines an acceptable certification standard for obtaining approval for
multisensor navigation systems or FMS that integrate data from multiple navigation sys-
tems; TSO-C115b only addressed TSO-C129 GPS systems. If the applicant is integrating
LP/LPV capability as in Class Gamma-3 or Class Delta-4, the equipment will require a
TSOA IAW TSO-C115c. An upgrade to TSO C-115c is considered a major change.
6.11.4 Positioning Systems Airworthiness

AC 20-138 breaks down the airworthiness approval into three categories:
– Equipment performance
– Installation considerations
– Installed performance—test
It then addresses each functionality with respect to performance:
– Advisory vertical guidance
– GNSS
– RNAV multisensor equipment
– RNP (general)
– RNP approach
– RNP terminal
– Baro-VNAV
6.11.4.1 Equipment Performance

Advisory Vertical Guidance Positioning and navigation equipment may provide
vertical path deviation guidance as an aid to pilots to meet barometric altitude require-
ments. The equipment typically uses GNSS or baro-VNAV but may use any other
method to generate the flight path information. Advisory systems do not provide
operational credit (i.e., cannot be used) for LNAV/VNAV or LPV approaches. When
implemented, a limitation stating that the information is advisory only and that the
barometric altimeter must be used to comply with altitude restrictions must be included
in the flight manual. The AC states that manufacturers should consider a method to
differentiate between vertical guidance and advisory vertical guidance to prevent con-
fusion in the cockpit. There is no TSO guidance or MOPS standards for vertical advisory
guidance or how this guidance is generated.
GNSS One of the largest concerns for GNSS equipment is the performance of such
systems in the external noise environment. The broadband external interference noise is
defined in RTCA/DO-235B. Earlier equipment (TSO-C129, TSO-C145c, TSO-C146c)
may experience degradation as more GNSS satellites are launched. Any equipment
intended for use beyond 2020 needs to meet the effective noise density requirements
contained in RTCA/DO-235B. TSO-C129 and TSO-C196 GPS equipment may be used
on RNAV T and Q routes and for RNAV approaches to LNAV minima within the
United States (except Alaska) (see AC 90-100a and SFAR 97 for requirements).
T routes (low) are available for use by RNAV equipped aircraft from 1200’ above
the surface (in some instances higher) up to but not including 18,000’ MSL. T routes are
depicted on Enroute Low Altitude Charts (Figure 6.19).
Q routes (high) are available for use by RNAV equipped aircraft between 18,000’
MSL and FL450 inclusive. Q routes are depicted on Enroute High Altitude Charts
(Figure 6.20).
TSO C-129 and 196 sensors are positioning and navigation systems with equipment
limitations for the aircraft to have other navigation equipment available (supplemental).
These systems have limitations in oceanic and remote areas (FDE), and pre-departure
FIGURE 6.19 ¢
T Routes
FIGURE 6.20 ¢
Q Routes
RAIM and FDE checks need to be performed. TSO C-129 equipment may have an FDE
program with RAIM; TSO C-196 equipment must have an FDE program. RAIM pre-
dictions are available on-line such as the site at http://www.raimprediction.net.
For this equipment, the prediction program must:
– Have the capability of designating satellites that are off-line
– Allow the user to select a route, time and duration
– Identify the maximum RAIM or FDE outage time and any navigation capability
outages
– For approaches, the maximum outage can not exceed 5 min
– For RNAV 1 and 2, 5 minutes (using GNSS only)
– For RNP-4, 25 minutes, 34 minutes for RNP-10 and 51 minutes for MNPS operations
– Provide RAIM or FDE availability over an interval of þ/15 minutes computed in
intervals of 5 minutes or less about the ETA
The basis for GPS antenna certification was contained in TSO C-129a for GPS
systems certified under AC 20-138. A newer TSO, TSO C-144, Airborne Global Posi-
tioning Antenna, was used with original TSO C-145/146 GNSS SBAS required antennas
to be matched to receivers for older approvals. An even newer TSO (TSO-C190) is used
for all new SBAS antennas under AC 20-138; manufacturers are also encouraged to use
this new TSO when replacements are necessary. The basic functions and performance of
the GPS antenna and the sensor must meet the requirements for compliance as outlined
in the AC. This guidance is typically for the manufacturer as the equipment does not
need to be installed on the aircraft for the evaluation. These tests deal with determining
the signal loss along antenna cables, effects of lightning, and antenna minimum radia-
tion pattern gain. A list of acceptable pairings of receiver type and antenna type (by
TSO) is contained in Table 2 of AC 20-138.
GNSS/SBAS equipment has two different TSOs depending on whether the equip-
ment is designed as a position sensor only (TSO-C145c, Class Beta) or a sensor/
navigation computer combination (TSO-C146c, Gamma Class); TSO-C146c may also
offer ILS look-alike approaches (Delta Class). When outside of SBAS coverage, the
system may revert to FDE; there are no limits in oceanic and remote areas as long as the
operator has a prediction program. Although GNSS/SBAS does not have a requirement
for additional navigation systems on board the applicant’s operating instructions should
encourage the implementation of back-up navigation systems.
GNSS/SBAS equipment that complies with revision a, b, or c of the TSO has the
capability of performing LP approaches. LP approaches use the horizontal accuracy and
integrity values of the LPV approach but do not provide vertical guidance; the intent is
to provide LP approaches only at airports where issues prevent issuing the LPV vertical
guidance. LP and LPV approaches are mutually exclusive and will have separate
approach plates as opposed to a localizer-only approach on an ILS plate.
For LNAV/VNAV approaches collocated with an LPV approach, the GNSS/SBAS
equipment must use the final approach segment data block to define the final approach
segment (i.e., uses WGS-84 height above ellipsoid). The vertical flight path for LNAV/
VNAV approaches is defined by the threshold location, threshold crossing height and the
glidepath angle (values in MSL); DA is always expressed in MSL. This database con-
version can be done in the GNSS/SBAS equipment or by the use of lookup tables based
on the approach selected. These GNSS/GBAS receivers support Cat 1 precision approa-
ches and some a differentially corrected positioning service (DCPS). All GNSS/GBAS
ground stations provide precision approach service; not all stations are expected to pro-
vide DCPS. TSO-C190, which references RTCA/DO-301 defines an acceptable antenna
(VHF); antennas used for ILS localizer or VOR may be used, but require 360 omni-
directional coverage. For Cat I approaches, the equipment outputs lateral and vertical
deviations mimicking an ILS; these parameters may only be output when the aircraft is
within the precision approach envelope defined as DMAX. When outside of DMAX, the
equipment may not use the broadcast differential corrections. GPS/GBAS approaches will
not have LNAV/VNAV minimums published with the GLS procedure; there is no fail-
down option if guidance is lost during the GBAS final approach.
RNAV Multisensor In general, the RNAV multisensor system may be thought of as an
FMS. Each individual sensor must meet the applicable navigation performance and
operational criteria contained in the respective TSO and ACs. For a DME/DME RNAV
system to support RNAV1 and RNAV2 operations it must:
– Provide a position update within 30 sec of tuning a station

– Auto-tune multiple DME facilities
– Provide continuous DME/DME position updating
– When switching to a 3rd or second DME pair, there must be no interruption in
positioning information
The DME/DME system may only use facilities listed in the Airport Facility
Directory; facilities not listed should be excluded. DME facilities to be used should be at
a relative angle of between 30 and 150 , expanded to 20 /60 for DME pairs. The
limitations for use are:
– Greater than or equal to 3 nm from the facility

– Less than 40 look-up angle from the facility
– If an ARINC FOM is used, the DME usable ranges are provided in Table 3 of
– the AC
– Additional facilities such as a localizer/DME may be used
– Only facilities that meet validity checks may be used
A valid DME facility is defined as one that broadcasts an accurate identifier signal,
satisfies the minimum field strength requirement, and is protected from other interfering
DME signals. There is no requirement to use another navigation system during normal
operation of a DME/DME system. Two DME systems meeting the validity requirements
plus one other facility not meeting the criteria must provide a position accuracy of
1.75 nm; FTE is assumed to be 1 nm for RNAV 2 operations and the DME signal in
space position error is assumed to be 0.1 nm. The RNAV system must ensure that co-
channel DME facilities do not cause erroneous guidance. This may be accomplished by
reasonableness checks that are most often accomplished by the FMS; it may also be
accomplished by excluding a DME facility when there is a co-channel DME within LOS.
The RNAV system must use operational DME facilities; if a system is flagged by
NOTAM there must be a method of eliminating that facility from the navigation solution.
Multisensor equipment may also incorporate VOR/DME updating and if used, must
meet the performance for the route being flown. Terminal and enroute RNAV imple-
mentation in the US does not require using VOR, so any use of the VOR must include
reasonableness checks such as cross-checking with a DME/DME system. Positional
accuracy for the VOR is 1.75 nm for RNAV 2 and 0.87 nm for RNAV 1. For the special
case of using information from a single co-located VOR/DME, the total maximum
position fixing error can not exceed the values published in Table 4 of the AC.
An INS/IRU is an acceptable lateral positioning source during a significant portion
of flight as long as it meets the requirements described in 14 CFR Part 121, Appendix G,
while in the inertial mode; an AHRS does not qualify as an acceptable positioning
source. A more commonly implemented use today is an INS/IRU/GNSS integration. As
of this time there is a limitation on IGI data output to support enroute through LNAV
approach only; higher precision operations would require the integration of an SBAS or
GBAS receiver or baro-VNAV installation. Position errors in the GNSS solution should
not be able to corrupt the inertial states. All heading and attitude data must comply with
the relevant regulations under all foreseeable operating conditions; these conditions
should include those addressed in the aircraft FHA. If coasting is employed by the
system, the manufacturer must document the coasting performance and limitations.
RNAV equipment may also employ an INS/IRU/DME/DME integration and this
integration supports RNAV 1 and RNAV 2 operations. In addition to the DME/DME
requirements previously mentioned, the FMS must be able to:
– Provide automatic position updating from the DME/DME
– Accept a position update immediately prior to takeoff
– Exclude VORs greater than 40 nm from the aircraft
The Total System Error (TSE) must be less than or equal to 1 nm throughout the
route (95%) and the FTE for the integration on terminal procedures should be limited to
0.5 nm.
RNP General The AC consolidates the Airworthiness criteria from AC 90-101A
(Approval Guidance for RNP Procedures (IAP) with Special Aircraft and Aircrew
Authorization Required (SAAAR)) and AC 90-105 (Approval Guidance for RNP
Operations and Barometric Vertical Navigation in the U.S. NAS); RNP SAAAR has
since been renamed RNP AR (authorization required). SBAS and GBAS equipped FMS
systems can provide vertical path guidance for RNP 0.3 operations and RNP AR
operations as low as RNP 0.1. Stand-alone GNSS sensors, with FMS, can provide the
same operations if these systems are equipped with baro-VNAV. Augmented systems
are superior to baro-VNAV systems in that they provide an accurate and repeatable
vertical flight path and give a consistent alignment of the glide path angle and visual
landing cues. Augmented systems do not need to be temperature corrected, meet
RNP 0.1 vertical performance without independent system monitoring, and flight path is
not affected by altimeter setting errors.
RNP Approach GNSS is the primary navigation system to support RNP approach
procedures; RNP approaches normally include two lines of minima: LNAV and LNAV/
VNAV. Unless the pilot has the visual references in sight to continue the approach, it
must be discontinued if:
– The navigation display is flagged invalid
– A loss of integrity function is presented
– The integrity alerting function is flagged before passing the FAF
For systems to be used for RNP Approach there must be a statement of compliance
in the AFM, and sensors should be approved IAW their respective TSOs. The accuracy
requirements for RNP Approach systems are as follows:
– During operations on the initial and intermediate segments of the approach as well as
the missed approach, the TSE and the along track error must be within þ/1 nm
(95%)
– During the final segment of the approach, the TSE and along track error must be
within þ/0.3 nm (95%)
– The FTE should not exceed 0.5 nm on the initial, intermediate and missed approach
segments of an RNP approach procedure; 0.25 nm on the final approach segment
A malfunction of the aircraft navigation equipment that causes the TSE to exceed 2x
the RNP value without an annunciation is considered a Major failure condition. The loss
of function is considered a Minor failure condition if the operator can revert to an
alternate navigation system and safely proceed to a suitable airport. If the lateral error
exceeds 2.0 nm/0.6 nm (initial/final) an alert must be given.
An analog deviation display (CDI, EHSI) with TO/FROM indications, failure
annunciation, and used as a primary flight instrument should have the following attributes:
– Visible to the pilot in the primary FOV
– Lateral deviation display scaling should agree with alerting and annunciation limits
– Lateral deviation full-scale deflection should match the phase of flight
– The lateral deviation display must be slaved to the RNP path

– As an alternate means, a navigation map may be used if it provides equivalent
functionality and is the primary FOV
For systems providing RNP approach, the following capabilities are required:
– Each pilot must be provided the RNP desired path and the aircraft position relative to
the path on the primary navigation display
– A navigation database, and the expiry date must be displayed
– A means to retrieve and display data from the database
– A capability to load, by name, the entire RNP approach
– A means to display the distance between waypoints, the distance to a waypoint, along
track distances, active navigation sensor type, identification of the active waypoint,
groundspeed or time to waypoint and the distance and bearing to the active waypoint
Additional capabilities should include the following:
– A direct-to function
– Automatic leg sequencing with display to pilots
– Capability to execute fly-over and fly-by waypoints
– Fly-over points: Initial fix, track-to-fix, and direct fix
– Display an indication of failure to the pilot
– Indicate the navigation system error alert limit
The AC states that it is recommended that the autopilot or flight director be coupled
for RNP approaches; if the lateral TSE can not be demonstrated without these systems
then they must be used.
An important question to ask is, ‘‘Which minima may I use for the approach?’’ The
answer lies in the installed equipment and which TSOA is assigned. The following
TSOA/TSOA combinations allow the operator to use the LNAV minima:
– Stand-alone TSO C-129(AR) (Class A1) and TSO C-146(AR) (Class 1, 2, or 3)
– Multisensor TSO C-129(AR) (Class B1, B3, C1, C3), TSO C-196 sensors, TSO
C-145 (AR) (Class 1, 2, or 3) or TSO C-161a sensors using GBAS positioning service
To use the LNAV/VNAV minima, the following TSOA/TSOA combinations are
required:
– TSO C-146(AR) Class 2 or 3, TSO C-129(AR) (Class 1) with baro-VNAV
– Multisensor systems using TSO C-145(AR) (Class 2 or 3)
– Multisensor systems using TSO C-129(AR) (Class B1, B3, C1, or C3) with
baro-VNAV or TSO C161a sensors with GBAS and baro-VNAV
An example of an RNAV Approach Plate is shown in Figure 6.21. The reader will
note the difference in the minima between the GLS approach (lowest minima) to the
LNAV approach (highest, not including circling).
RNP Terminal RNP Terminal deals with RNP 1 operations in the terminal area
(obstacle departure procedures, or ODP; standard instrument departures, or SID; and
FIGURE 6.21 ¢
RNAV Approach
SC-1, 24 JUL 2014 to 21 AUG 2014

SC-1, 24 JUL 2014 to 21 AUG 2014
TABLE 6.11 ¢ RNAV FTE Requirements
RNP FTE FTE Basis

0.3 0.25 FD and Autopilot
1.0 0.5 FD and Autopilot
0.8 Manual CDI Operation
2.0 1.0 Manual CDI Operation
4.0 2.0 Manual CDI Operation
Note: Navigation systems providing RNP performance monitoring and alerting (such as
GNSS) can satisfy this FTE requirement. These systems must ensure the TSE for each
segment is not exceeded; the integration of operational modes and configuration accounts
for accuracy and FTE.
standard arrival routes, or STAR). All sensors need to be approved with respect to their
applicable TSO; RNP aircraft with P-RNAV approval automatically meet the air-
worthiness requirements of the AC. The lateral and along-track TSE must be within
þ/1 nm (95%); the FTE should not exceed 0.5 nm. A malfunction which is not
announced and causes the TSE to exceed twice the RNP value is considered a major
failure. The loss of function is considered a Minor failure if the operator can revert to a
different navigation system and proceed to a suitable airport. The functional require-
ments for the displays and the system capabilities are the same as noted for RNP
Approach operations. The system eligibility to perform RNP 1 and RNP 2 Terminal
operations are the same as noted for RNP approach operations.
A summary of the FTE requirements for RNAV equipment is shown in Table 6.11.
Baro-VNAV A Baro-VNAV system may be approved for use within the entire NAS;
however, unless it is compensated for temperature, this equipment can only be used
within the limitations for temperature published on the approach plates (a sample of an
Approach Plate limitation is shown in Figure 6.22). Systems with temperature com-
pensation must meet the requirements of RTCA/DO-236B Appendix H.2; limitations
must be incorporated into the AFM. Baro-VNAV performance has shown to be inade-
quate for vertical guidance required for LPV or GLS approaches. Baro-VNAV may be
used for vertical guidance during flight operations; the primary barometric altimeter will
be used as the primary altitude reference.
The initial certification of a Baro-VNAV system requires an engineering evaluation
to verify performance, failure indications and environmental qualifications. For enroute,
terminal and approach IFR operations, the Baro-VNAV system must have TSE com-
ponents in the vertical direction that are less than that shown in Table 6.12.
The altitude associated with the active waypoint should be to the nearest 100’
(enroute and terminal) and 10’ for the approach phase; if implemented, waypoint hor-
izontal position should be to the nearest 0.1 nm. For VNAV, the ascent or descent
gradient angles should be to the nearest 0.1 . Station elevation should be to nearest
1000’ for enroute and terminal and to 100’ for approach. The capability must exist to
enter altitude for up to eight successive waypoints (TO-FROM equipment) or nine
waypoints for TO-TO equipment. A means must be available to confirm that input data
is correct prior to its use. The system should not give operationally misleading infor-
mation, and the vertical guidance information should be compatible with the aircraft’s
flight instrumentation. There should be a continuous display of vertical path deviation
with the performance identified in Table 6.13.
FIGURE 6.22 ¢
Baro-VNAV
Temperature
Limitations
EC-3, 24 JUL 2014 to 21 AUG 2014

EC-3, 24 JUL 2014 to 21 AUG 2014
TABLE 6.12 ¢ Baro-VNAV TSE Requirements
Level Flight Segments and

Climb/Descent Intercept of Flight Along Specified
Altitude Region (MSL) Clearance Altitudes Vertical Profile
At or Below 5000’ 150’ 160’
5000’ to 10000’ 200’ 210’
10000’ to 29000’ 200’ 210’
Above 29000’ to 41000’ 200’* 260’
* For aircraft type designs prior to January 1, 1997, the value is 200’ in the cruise region and is not to exceed 250’ over the
full aircraft operating envelope, re RVSM
TABLE 6.13 ¢ Vertical Path Deviation Requirements
Enroute/Terminal (feet) Approach (feet)

Minimum Full Scale Deflection 500 150 *
Readability 100 30
Minimum Discernable Movement 10 5
Note: Smaller values of minimum full scale deflection for approach may be acceptable provided the pro-
posed value is found satisfactory by an Engineering evaluation
Alert indications for the system should be located on or near the vertical path
indicator and should provide a discernable annunciation for any of the following:
– Inadequate or invalid navigation signals
– Absence of primary power
– Inadequate or invalid displays or sources
– Equipment failures
The Baro-VNAV system should be able to provide navigation guidance within
20 seconds after input of desired vertical track, and navigation guidance should be
available within 5 seconds of waypoint data input. The equipment should be demon-
strated to function properly throughout the range of environmental conditions (RTCA/
DO-160G contains acceptable tests). The crew shall have a means of determining the
system status prior to flight, and the equipment shall have a means of annunciating a
waypoint alert thus anticipating vertical maneuvering; systems connected to an autopilot
or FD should not allow the aircraft to depart an assigned altitude until acknowledged by
the crew. If parallel offset track capability is provided, a waypoint alert and vertical
maneuver anticipation should be provided prior to arrival at the point where the offset
track intersects the angle bi-sector of the parent track. The equipment should operate
properly when interfaced with LNAV equipment providing turn anticipation and the
software should be validated and verified to at least Level C.
6.11.4.2 General Installation Considerations

As with all avionics systems installations, a safety assessment is required. The failure
level classifications for each of the navigation modes are shown in Table 6.14.
The system must comply with paragraph 1301: any probable failure must not
degrade or adversely affect the normal operation or performance of other required
TABLE 6.14 ¢ Failure Level Classifications
Mode Enroute, Terminal

Advisory Area Non Precision Non Precision Approach
Vertical Approach LNAV or with Vertical Guidance LP/LPV GNSS Precision
Hazard Guidance RNP 0.3 LNAV/VNAV Approach Approach Cat I
Loss of No Effect Major Major Major Major
Navigation
Misleading Minor Major Major Hazardous Hazardous
Information
Note: For RNP values less than 0.3, losing RNP capability constitutes a loss of navigation
equipment or create a hazard. Software is IAW RTCA/DO-178B (AC encourages the

applicant to submit a Plan for Software Aspects of Consideration [PSAC]); RTCA/
DO-178C has been issued but no current AC or TSO recognizes this revision. Hardware
is IAW RTCA/DO-254 (AC encourages the applicant to submit a Plan for Hardware
Aspects of Certification [HSAC]). Positioning and navigation manufacturers installation
instructions should define compatibility with aircraft systems; manufacturers are
encouraged to develop compatibility equipment lists.
Human factors considerations are covered in detail in the AC and the items of
interest mimic the compliance matrix presented in section 6.9.3, Table 6.8. As men-
tioned previously, the applicant can use this compliance matrix with all avionic systems
airworthiness certifications.
Antennas are covered in the general installation instructions. Typically, a GNSS
antenna is located forward or aft of the wings on top of the fuselage; location should
provide the largest, unobstructed view of the satellites. Shadowing by the aircraft
structure and/or rotor blades can adversely affect the operation of the GNSS sensor.
Location should be optimized to ensure the receiver can take full advantage of the 5
mask angle. The antenna should be separated as much as possible from other transmit-
ting antennas and in the case of small aircraft as far away as possible from the wind-
screen to prevent case to antenna coupling.
The VDB antenna should be located so that the maximum received power from any
on-board transmitter does not exceed the desensitization levels of the VDB receiver. For
rotary wing aircraft, rotor modulation and multipath considerations may drive the
location of the antenna. For multisensor installation, the installer should reduce the
likelihood that a single lightning strike would affect all of the sensors (do not place all of
the antennas in a straight line). If the aircraft is approved for flight in icing conditions,
then the antenna may not be susceptible to ice build-up. Double-shielded cables should
be used to prevent interference coupling into the cable.
In regard to the navigation sensors, for positioning and navigation inputs that drive a
display, the pilot must be able to select the sensor and be apprised of which sensor is
being used as well as what capabilities are being provided. Autopilot navigation modes
related to the navigation source should be inhibited if the displayed source is not the
same source driving the autopilot. If the displayed navigation source is displayed in the
primary FOV, it need not also be displayed on the HUD (if installed). Dual installations
should be synchronized whenever possible to reduce crew workload and to prevent
confusion as to which system is driving the navigation data.
If the navigation equipment is not synchronized then:

– Either crew member should be able to enter and view data in the offside equipment.
– Workload to manually update both equipment sets should not be too burdensome.
– There should be no possible confusion as to which equipment is driving the displays
– Controls and displays should not lead to confusion or misleading information due to
possible inconsistencies.
When integrating navigation sensors with the FGS, a compatibility list of approved
FGS/positioning systems should be provided by the manufacturer. A clear indication of
which FGS modes are engaged and which modes are armed must be provided to the
pilot. The equipment must be compatible with the FGS modes of operation and cannot
be limited by a positioning and navigation reduced bank selector during an approach. If
buffet protection is not provided by the navigation system, or FGS, limitations must be
noted in the AFM. The positioning and navigation should meet the performance
requirements of the EFVS if installed.
If a Magnetic/True switch is installed in the aircraft, the navigation system should
be driven by the same switch to maintain consistency. If there is an Air Data source
switch, a de-selected source may not be used by the navigation equipment. If there is an
inertial source switch, a de-selected inertial may not be used by the navigation equip-
ment. If the equipment requires a barometric corrected altitude, the air data system is
required to provide that information without additional pilot actions; if the corrected
altitude is not available an alert to the pilot must be provided.
The AC addresses the importance of Electromagnetic Compatibility; grounding is
essential, and when possible, don’t install positioning sensors near a VHF radio. VHF
communications and harmonics can cause interference, but can be mitigated by instal-
ling filters at the output of the VHF transmitter or isolation (by distance) of the navi-
gation sensors. ELTs can also cause interference and can be mitigated by the use of
notch filters on the ELT antenna cable. DME can cause interference, and sometimes a
replacement can alleviate the problem. DF equipment may cause interference; relocating
the DF antenna on top of the fuselage to the belly of the aircraft may help the problem.
6.11.4.3 Installed Performance-Test
Required Airworthiness tests include ground and flight tests. Since the equipment per-
formance section of the AC is primarily the responsibility of the manufacturer, the
applicant’s airworthiness certification plan will be focused on the installation con-
siderations and installed performance sections of the AC. If the applicant is installing
RNAV multisensor equipment, he will also have to consult AC 25-15, ‘‘Approval of
Flight Management Systems in Transport Category Airplanes,’’ November 20, 1989.
The sample compliance checklist for positioning systems uses multisensor RNAV
equipment as an example and may be found in the flight management system section.
Ground Test—GPS, GPS/SBAS, GPS/GBAS Freedom from interference due to VHF
transmissions must be demonstrated; frequencies should be transmitted for 35 seconds
while observing its effect on the GNSS system. The AC specifies the transmitting
frequencies:
For 25 kHz channels:
121.150 MHz, 121.175 MHz, 121.200 MHz, 131.250 MHz, 131.275 MHz,
131.300 MHz
For 8.33 kHz channels:

121.185 MHz, 121.190 MHz, 130.285 MHz, 131.290 MHz
For installations on rotorcraft, the applicant should ensure that the rotor blades do
not interfere with the received signals (will vary with the rotation rate). For equipment
that supports LPV or a GLS approach, the MOPS requires an offset compensation for the
navigation center to antenna offset (parallax correction). For stand-alone navigation
equipment, the ground tests consist of ensuring the displayed parameters (e.g., HSI,
CDI) are correct and conducting a failure modes and associated alerts and warnings
evaluation.
Flight Test—GPS, GPS/SBAS, GPS/GBAS Flight test will verify that navigation data
is continuous during maneuvering with bank angles up to 30 and an FTE of 1.0 nm for
enroute, approach, and transition and 0.25 nm for a nonprecision approach with and
without autopilot can be maintained. Additionally, the overall GNSS functionality needs
to be evaluated:
– Hold at a designated waypoint
– Intercept and track from a waypoint to a selected course
– Turn anticipation
– Waypoint sequencing
– Selection of an approach
– General presentation of navigation data
– Overall operation of all types of procedures
If the GNSS is integrated with the FGS, then the following must be evaluated:
– Steering response with the FGS engaged through a series of track and mode changes
to include enroute, approach and missed approach
– Proper execution of fly-by turns with varying wind conditions
– Verify that the lateral maneuver anticipation is appropriate for the type aircraft and
that an annunciation is given
– Verify a Direct-To execution does not result in an overshoot or hunting
– Evaluate the FGS response to a GNSS fault by pulling the circuit breaker for the
GNSS equipment (enroute and approach)
If the equipment is approved for LPV and Precision Approaches, several approaches
using raw data, FD and autopilot as applicable need to flown to ascertain compatibility
with the integrated systems. If the autopilot has been modified it needs to be re-tested
IAW the applicable autopilot/FD AC. For manual control to the approach flight path, the
appropriate display must provide sufficient information to maintain approach path and
alignment with the runway. The pilot should verify full-scale deflection while on the
approach. The applicant shall evaluate the FGS approach functionality to ensure com-
patibility with the gain scheduling employed during an LPV approach.
If the equipment uses barometric altitude input, verify that the equipment properly
interprets the barometric reading; if manually input, verify the workload involved.
Verify/assess all transfer and switching functions: electrical, alternate navigation sour-
ces, air data and inertial. A review of all failure modes and their associated
TABLE 6.15 ¢ INS Error with Loss of Update
Time Since INS/IRU 95%

Last Update (T) (hr) Error (nm)
0.0 to 0.5 hr 8*T
0.5 to 1.5 hr 4
annunciations should be verified as operating correctly. A workload analysis when

operating GNSS equipment should be conducted during all phases of flight.
If the equipment has GBAS capability, verify in-flight EMC compatibility between
VHF communications equipment and the VDB; the test should be accomplished at the
highest VDB frequency and transmitting VHF at 100 kHz above the VDB channel. The
AC states that the applicant should use 118.0 MHz for VHF equipment that can not
transmit below 118.0 MHz; VDB omnidirectional coverage should be demonstrated in-
flight.
Flight Test—RNAV Multisensor Flight tests are accomplished to verify proper
operation and accuracy of the multisensor equipment. EMI/EMC tests are required,
some of which may be accomplished as a ground test. The applicant must validate
multisensor equipment navigation accuracy in each operating mode; the performance of
each navigation sensor should be evaluated separately and in combination with other
sensors as applicable. Initial certification of VOR/DME or a multiple (scanning) DME
sensor requires a demonstration of accuracy by collecting the sensor position at
15 minute intervals and comparing this position to the true aircraft (TSPI) position.
The system should demonstrate its ability to detect, for example, poor signal con-
ditions, inadequate navigation capability, and recovery from in-flight power failure. The
auto-tune logic should be reviewed and tested to verify the ground stations are identified
and tuned correctly. The growth in position error when reverting to INS/IRU can be
expected to be less than 2 nm per 15 minutes; if an applicant desires certification credit
for better performance it must be coordinated with the ACO. INS accuracy after a loss of
updating is shown in Table 6.15.
Data continuity during normal aircraft maneuvering for the navigation modes must
be validated (bank angles up to 30 and pitch angles associated with approaches,
departures and missed approaches). The applicant must verify the FTE: 1.0 nm enroute,
0.5 nm approach transition and missed approach and 0.25 nm for a nonprecision
approach (with and without FGS). Additionally, verification of all modes of operation,
barometric input and switching functions and the operation and annunciation of failure
modes must be accomplished.
The interface with the FGS requires an evaluation. The applicant shall evaluate the
steering response and display sensitivities with the FGS engaged during a variety of
track and mode changes. The test should include several fly-by turns with varying wind
conditions to verify the equipment accomplishes the turn as a fly-by waypoint and dis-
courages an overshoot. Lateral maneuver anticipation should be appropriate and the
correct annunciation should be provided. Direct-to-steering should not cause an over-
shoot or hunting. The response to a multisensor fault by pulling a circuit breaker for the
equipment should be done for all sensor modes.
For equipment that provides precision approach capability, or for nonstandard dis-
plays, conduct several approaches using raw data, FD only and fully coupled to evaluate
compatibility. For manual control to the approach path, the appropriate display must
provide sufficient information for the approach and runway alignment without reliance
on other displays.
Ground Test—Baro-VNAV The following ground tests should be accomplished with
the installation of a Baro-VNAV system:
– Analysis of the manufacturer’s procedures for V/V of S/W and associated documentation
– Verification of compliance with RTCA/DO-160F
– Examination of the display capabilities with an emphasis on CAW
– Analysis of failure modes
– Review of reliability data to establish that all probable failures are detected
– Evaluation of the controls, displays, annunciations and system behavior from a
Human Factors perspective (see section 6.9.3)
– Evaluation of the pilot’s guide
– Review of the installation drawings, wiring diagram and descriptive wire routing
– Analyze data flow diagram to review how data are passed from device to device
– Review the structural analysis report
– Evaluate the integration with the associated lateral navigation equipment
Flight Test—Baro-VNAV Flight Test of the Baro-VNAV system will include func-
tional checks and a navigation accuracy test. Functional flight tests include the
following:
– Evaluation of all Baro-VNAV equipment operating modes
– Examination of the interface function of other equipment connected to the baro-
VNAV system
– Review of the failure modes and proper annunciations
– Evaluation of the steering response of the FGS during a series of lateral and vertical
track changes
– Evaluation of the displayed baro-VNAV navigation parameters on interfaced Flight
Deck instruments (e.g., HSI, CDI)
– Assessment of all switching functions
– Verification of EMC
– Verification of the accessibility of controls and display visibility
– Analysis of aircrew workload when using baro-VNAV equipment
Navigation error is computed by comparing Baro-VNAV position to an accurate
TSPI source; tests should be accomplished using a variety of descent rates, angles and
lateral navigation source inputs. The accuracy requirement is on a 99.7% probability
basis. Flights should verify proper operation of caution indications and lateral navi-
gation interface and normal flight maneuvers should not cause a loss of system sensor
inputs. The system dynamic response should be confirmed, and the applicant should
note any unusual FTE or errors from using the autopilot and FD with the baro-VNAV
system.
Aircraft Flight Manual The operations manual must address the operation of the
equipment and should also cover the operation of related equipment. If there is a lim-
itation associated with the operation of the equipment, a sample airplane/rotorcraft flight
manual supplement should be provided. Sample quick reference guides and flight
manual supplements can be found in Appendix 5 of the AC.
VFR Installation of GNSS Equipment GNSS equipment may be installed on a
no-hazard basis as a supplement to VFR navigation; such installations need only to
verify that the GNSS installation does not introduce a hazard to the aircraft. Loss or
misleading VFR navigation information is considered a minor failure; therefore, Soft-
ware Development Assurance Level D is acceptable. A readable placard stating ‘‘GPS
limited to VFR use only’’ must be installed in clear view of the pilot. A change to the
flight manual is not required since the placard conveys the limitations. Guidance for
VFR use only is contained in Appendix 6 of the AC.
6.12 REDUCED VERTICAL SEPARATION

MINIMUMS
Almost universally, there exists restricted airspace between FL 290 and FL 410 inclu-
sive. Within this airspace, aircraft separation is reduced to 1000 ft vertically; aircraft and
operators can only operate in this airspace via RVSM approval. Within the United
States, this airspace is known as domestic RVSM (DRVSM) and has been active since
January 20, 2005. The guidance material on the authorization of operators and aircraft
for RVSM operations is found in AC 91-85, Authorization of Aircraft and Operators for
Flight in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum Airspace, August 21, 2009. The rules
for operating in RVSM airspace are found in Part 91, sections 91.180, 91.706 and
appendix G (RVSM Operations). It should be noted that aircraft approved per Appendix
G are eligible for RVSM operations worldwide. The airspace where RVSM is applied is
considered special qualification airspace. In this respect, both the specific operator and
the specific type of aircraft the operator intends to use needs to be authorized by the
appropriate FAA office before conducting RVSM operations. The reader will note that
the operator and aircraft are granted authorization vice an approval; the applicant shows
that the aircraft can meet the requirements for operating in this special airspace.
In general, the operator must be able to prove that the aircraft is capable of maintaining
altitude to within certain tolerances. These tolerances vary based on where the aircraft
operates and whether the aircraft is part of an aircraft group or unique in its configuration.
An aircraft group is defined as a group of aircraft that are of nominally the same design and
build with respect to all details that could influence the accuracy of height-keeping per-
formance. A nongroup aircraft is an aircraft for which the operator applies for authorization
on the characteristics of the unique airframe rather than on a group basis.
For an aircraft to be considered a member of a group for the purpose of RVSM
approval, they must meet the following conditions:
● Aircraft should have been manufactured to a nominally identical design and be
approved by the same TC, TC amendment, or supplemental TC.
● The static system of each aircraft should be installed in a nominally identical manner
and position; the same static source error (SSE) corrections should be incorporated in
all aircraft of the group.
● The avionics units installed on each aircraft must meet the minimum RVSM equipment
requirements (detailed shortly) and should be manufactured to the manufacturer’s same
specification and have the same part number (different avionics units may be used if
the applicant can demonstrate that the replacement provides equivalent performance).
● The RVSM data package is produced or provided by the airframe manufacturer or
design organization.
If an airframe does not meet the four conditions, it must be considered a nongroup
aircraft.
In addition to the classification of type of aircraft, the applicant must also state
whether the authorization is for the full RVSM envelope or for a basic RVSM envelope.
The full RVSM envelope encompasses the entire range of operational Mach numbers,
W/d, and altitude values over which the aircraft can be operated within RVSM airspace.
It would be difficult to show all of the gross weight, altitude, and speed conditions that
constitute the RVSM envelope on a single chart; a separate chart of altitude versus Mach
would be required for each aircraft gross weight. For most jet transports, the required
flight envelope can be collapsed to a single chart by the use of the parameter W/d
(weight divided by atmospheric pressure ratio). This is due to the relationship between
W/d and the aerodynamic variables of Mach and lift coefficient. The mathematical
explanation of W/d is shown in Equation (6.2).
W =d ¼ 1481:4CL M 2 SREF ; (6.2)
where
d ¼ ambient pressure at flight altitude divided by sea level standard pressure,
W ¼ weight,
CL ¼ lift coefficient,
M ¼ Mach number, and
SREF ¼ reference wing area.
The basic RVSM envelope encompasses the range of Mach numbers and gross weights
within the altitude ranges FL 290 to FL 410 (or maximum available altitude), where an
aircraft can reasonably be expected to operate most frequently. The RVSM operational
flight envelope for any aircraft may be divided into two zones, as shown in Table 6.16.
TABLE 6.16 ¢ Full RVSM Envelope Boundaries
Lower boundary is defined by Upper boundary is defined by

Altitude FL 290 The lower of the following:
1. FL 410
2. Airplane maximum certified altitude
3. Altitude limited by cruise, thrust,
buffet, or other aircraft limitations
Mach or Speed The lower of the following: The lower of the following:
1. Maximum endurance (holding) 1. MMO/VMO
speed 2. Speed limited by cruise, thrust,
2. Maneuver speed buffet, or other aircraft limitations
Gross Weight The lowest gross weight compatible The highest gross weight compatible
with operation in RVSM airspace with operation in RVSM airspace
The boundaries for the basic RVSM envelope are the same as those for the full
RVSM envelope except in regard to the upper Mach boundary, which may be limited to
a range of airspeeds over which the aircraft group can reasonably be expected to operate
most frequently.
6.12.1 RVSM Minimum Equipment Requirements

The minimum equipment requirements for RVSM operations are
● Two independent altitude measurement systems, each of which must have the fol-
lowing elements:
– Cross-coupled static source/system provided with ice protection if located in areas
subject to icing
– Equipment for measuring static pressure sensed by the static source, converting it
to pressure altitude and displaying the pressure altitude to the aircrew
– Equipment for providing a digitally coded signal corresponding to the displayed
pressure altitude for automatic altitude reporting
– Static source error correction, if needed
– Reference signals for automatic control and alerting at selected altitude
● One altitude reporting transponder. If only one is fitted, it must have the capability of
operating from either of the altitude measurement systems.
● An altitude alert system.
● An automatic altitude control system.
In addition to the minimum required equipment, the aircraft must satisfy RNP 5.
6.12.2 RVSM System Performance

The requirements for group aircraft are as follows:
● At the point in the basic RVSM envelope where the mean altimetry system error (ASE)
reaches its largest absolute value, the absolute value should not exceed 80 ft (25 m).
● At the point in the basic RVSM envelope where the mean ASE plus 3 standard
deviations reaches its largest absolute value, the absolute value should not exceed
200 ft (60 m).
● At the point in the full RVSM envelope where the mean ASE reaches its largest
value, the absolute value should not exceed 120 ft (37 m).
● At the point in the full RVSM envelope where the mean ASE plus 3 standard
deviations reaches its largest absolute value, the absolute value should not exceed
245 ft (75 m).
The requirements for nongroup aircraft are as follows:
● For all conditions in the basic RVSM envelope, | residual SSE þ worst case avionics |
160 ft (50 m).
● For all conditions in the full RVSM envelope, | residual SSE þ worst case avionics |
200 ft (60 m).
The term ASE is defined as the difference between the pressure altitude displayed to
the flight crew when referenced to ISA standard ground pressure setting and the free
stream pressure altitude. In order to determine the mean and three sigma values of the
ASE it is necessary to take into account the different ways in which variations in ASE
can arise. The factors that affect ASE are
● Unit-to-unit variability of avionics
● Effect of environmental operating conditions on avionics
● Airframe-to-airframe variability of SSE
● Effect of flight operating condition on the SSE
The assessment of the ASE may be measured or predicted, but must address all
factors. The effect of flight operating condition as a variable can be eliminated by
evaluating ASE at the most adverse flight condition in an RVSM flight envelope. It is
possible for an aircraft group to obtain RVSM authorization when the ASE or three
sigma ASE does not meet the requirement in certain flight regimes of RVSM airspace.
In this case, the restriction must be identified in the data package and annotated in the
appropriate aircraft flight manuals; a visual or aural warning system noting this
restriction is not required to be installed on the aircraft.
For nongroup aircraft, there is no mean or three sigma value of the ASE because
there can be no group data to identify airframe-to-airframe variability. A single ASE
value is established for nongroup aircraft, which is the simple sum of the altimetry
system errors. In order to control the overall population distribution, the limit is set less
than that for group aircraft.
The residual SSE is the amount by which SSE remains uncorrected or overcorrected
after the application of static source error correction (SSEC). Worst case avionics is the
combination of tolerance values, specified by the manufacturer for the altimetry fit into
the aircraft, which gives the largest combined absolute value for residual SSE plus
avionics errors.
There are additional tolerances that must be demonstrated to obtain RVSM
authorization. An automatic altitude control system is required and should be capable of
controlling altitude within 65 ft (20 m) about the acquired altitude when operated in
straight and level flight under nonturbulent, nongust conditions. This requirement is
relaxed to 130 ft (40 m) for aircraft types with certification or major changes in type
design on or before April 9, 1997, which are equipped with an automatic altitude control
system or FMS that allow variations of up to 130 ft. Where an altitude select/acquire
function is provided, the altitude select/acquire control pane must be configured such
that an error of no more than 25 ft (8 m) exists between the display selected by the
flight crew and the corresponding output to the control system.
The altitude deviation warning system should signal an alert when the altitude dis-
played to the flight crew deviates from the selected altitude by more than a nominal value.
For aircraft for which application for type certification or major change in type design is
on or before April 9, 1997, the nominal value shall not be more than 300 ft (90 m). For
aircraft with an application for type certification or major change in type design after this
date, the nominal value shall not be more than 200 ft (60 m). The overall equipment
tolerance in implementing these nominal threshold values shall not exceed 50 ft (15 m).
During the RVSM approval process it must be verified analytically that the pro-
jected rate of occurrence of undetected altimetry system failure does not exceed
1 105 per flight hour. All failures and failure combinations whose occurrences would
not be evident from cross-cockpit checks and which would lead to altitude measure-
ment/display errors outside the specified limits need to be assessed against this budget.
6.12.3 RVSM Airworthiness Authorization

The RVSM airworthiness authorization occurs in two steps: the manufacturer or design
organization develops the data package that is sent to the ACO; once approved, the
operator applies the procedures defined in the package to obtain approval from the CMO
or FSDO to conduct RVSM operations.
As previously discussed, the initial work is to define the group and type envelope
under which the applicant is seeking approval. The data package will specify the group
and envelope and contain the data needed to show compliance. It will also contain the
compliance procedures to be used to ensure that all aircraft submitted for airworthiness
approval meet RVSM requirements and the engineering data to be used to ensure con-
tinued in-service RVSM approval integrity.
Since the ASE will vary with flight condition, the data package should provide
coverage of the RVSM envelope sufficient to define the largest errors in the basic and full
RVSM envelopes. Where precision flight calibrations are used to quantify or verify alti-
metry system performance, they may be accomplished by any of the following methods:
● Precision tracking radar in conjunction with pressure calibration of the atmosphere at
test altitude
● Trailing cone
● Pacer aircraft (the pacer aircraft must be calibrated to a known standard; it is not
acceptable to calibrate a pacer aircraft with another pacer aircraft)
● Any other method acceptable to the FAA or approving authority
NOTE: If you recall the TSPI section, you will realize that the first method has an
inherent error in the radar. The error budget will grow as the distance from the tracking
radar increases. Care should be taken when using this method, as the error budget of the
radar may, in fact, exceed the maximum allowable error for the ASE.
When authorization is sought for group aircraft, the data package must be sufficient
to show that RVSM requirements have been met. Because of the statistical nature of the
requirements, data packages will vary from group to group. Other considerations for
aircraft group approval include:
● The mean and airframe-to-airframe variability of ASE should be established based on
precision flight test calibration of a number of aircraft. Where analytical methods are
available, it may be possible to enhance the flight test database and to track sub-
sequent change in the mean and variability based on geometric inspections and bench
tests or any other method acceptable to the approving authority.
● An assessment of the aircraft-to-aircraft variability of each error source should be
made. For some error sources (especially small ones) it may be acceptable to use
specification values to represent the three sigma values; for other error sources
(especially larger ones), a more comprehensive assessment may be required.
● In many cases, one or more of the ASE sources may be aerodynamic in nature (such
as variations in the surface contour in the vicinity of the static pressure source).
If evaluation of these errors is based on geometric measurements, substantiation

should be provided that the methodology used is adequate to ensure compliance.
● In calculating the ASE, all error sources should be summed and an algebraic solution
of the mean should be used to show compliance.
When authorization is sought for nongroup aircraft, the following guidelines should
be followed:
● The data package should specify how the ASE budget has been allocated between
residual SSE and worst case avionics. The applicant and approval authority agree on
what data is needed to satisfy the approval requirements.
● Precision flight test calibration of the aircraft to establish its ASE or SSE over the
RVSM envelope should be required. Flight calibration should be performed at points
in the flight envelope(s) as agreed by the certifying authority.
● Calibration of the avionics used in the flight test should be accomplished as required
to establish the residual SSE; the number of test points should be agreed by the
certifying authority.
● Specifications for the installed altimetry avionics equipment indicating the largest
allowable errors will be included in the data package.
● If subsequent to aircraft approval for RVSM operations avionics units that are from a
different manufacturer are fitted, it should be demonstrated that the standard of
avionic equipment provide equivalent altimetry system performance.
In all cases, the data package must contain a definition of the procedures, inspec-
tions/tests, and limits that will be used to ensure that all aircraft approved against the
data package ‘‘conform to type,’’ guaranteeing that future builds continue to meet the
budget allowances stated in the data package.
For continued airworthiness, the following items should be reviewed and updated as
appropriate to include the effects of RVSM implementation:
● The structural repair manual, with special attention to the areas around the static source,
angle of attack sensors, and doors if their rigging can affect airflow around these sensors.
● Master minimum equipment list (MMEL).
● For nongroup aircraft where airworthiness approval has been based on flight test, the
continuing integrity and accuracy of the altimetry system shall be demonstrated by
periodic ground and flight tests of the aircraft at intervals agreed on with the
approving authority. (Exception to this requirement may be given if it can be ade-
quately demonstrated that the relationship between any subsequent airframe/system
degradation and its effects on altimetry system accuracy are understood and ade-
quately compensated/corrected for.)
● In-flight defect reporting procedures should be defined to facilitate identification of
altimetry system error sources.
● For group aircraft where approval is based on geometric inspection, there may be a
need for periodic reinspection, and that interval needs to be defined.
● Any variation/modification from the initial installation that affects RVSM approval
should require clearance by the airframe manufacturer or design organization and be
cleared by the FAA to show that RVSM compliance has not been compromised.
Each operator requesting RVSM operational approval should submit a maintenance

and inspection program that includes any maintenance requirements necessary for
continuous airworthiness. At a minimum, the following items need to be reviewed as
appropriate for RVSM maintenance approval:
● Maintenance manuals
● Structural repair manual
● Standard practices manuals
● Illustrated parts catalog
● Maintenance schedules
● MMEL/MEL
The purpose of the maintenance and inspection program is to ensure the integrity of
the approved RVSM altimetry system. The maintenance plan addresses the need for
inspections and tests anytime the system is repaired or modified. The AC calls out the
particulars that must be addressed in the plan.
Those aircraft positively identified as exhibiting height-keeping performance errors
that require investigation should not be operated where RVSM is applied until the fol-
lowing actions have been taken:
● The failure or malfunction is confirmed and isolated by maintenance.
● Corrective action is carried out as required to comply with the ASE requirements and
verified to ensure RVSM approval integrity.
6.12.4 RVSM Operational Approval

As previously mentioned, operational approval is granted to each individual operator as
well as the aircraft. This entails operator knowledge of operational programs, practices,
and procedures when operating in RVSM airspace. There is an RVSM homepage (http://
www.faa.gov/ats/ato/rvsm1.htm) that provides current guidance and information on the
aircraft and operator approval process as well as the RVSM monitoring program. Before
an operational approval is granted, the FAA should be satisfied that operational pro-
grams, flight crew training and knowledge, and operations manuals are adequate. RVSM
approval is an approval for RVSM operations worldwide.
Operations training programs and operating practices and procedures should be
standardized for the following:
● Flight planning
● Preflight procedures at the aircraft for each flight
● Procedures prior to RVSM airspace entry
● In-flight procedures
● Flight crew training procedures
● Wake turbulence procedures
● TCAS/ACAS operations in RVSM airspace
● Oceanic contingency procedures
● Postflight
These procedures are discussed in detail in Appendices 4 and 5 of AC 91-85 and are
also available on the RVSM homepage. The training of operators must be reviewed by
the approval authority. 14 CFR Part 121, 125, and 135 operators should submit training
syllabi and other appropriate training items related to RVSM operations to show that the
practices and procedures are included in initial and recurrent training programs. 14 CFR
Part 91 operators should show the FAA that pilot knowledge of RVSM operating
practices and procedures is adequate to warrant approval for RVSM operations.
Acceptable proof is described in the AC.
Operations manuals and checklists must also be submitted as part of the operational
approval process. They are checked to ensure that the standardized practices and pro-
cedures previously identified are included. An operating history should also be included
in the application, including any events or incidents related to poor height-keeping
performance that may indicate weaknesses in training, procedures, maintenance, or the
aircraft group intended to be used. The applicant should also provide a plan for parti-
cipation in the RVSM monitoring program. In some cases, the FAA may request a
validation flight as the final step in the approval process. The FAA may accompany the
operator on a flight through airspace where RVSM is applied to verify that operations
and maintenance procedures and practices are applied effectively.
Authorization is issued to operators by one of two means: for 14 CFR Part 121, 125,
and 135 operators, approval to operate in RVSM airspace is granted by a change in the
flight manual, operations specification paragraph Part B (enroute) and Part D (aircraft
maintenance); 14 CFR Part 91 operators are granted approval to operate in RVSM
airspace via a letter of authorization (LOA), which is valid for 24 months.
The operator should provide a plan for participation in the RVSM monitoring pro-
gram. This program should normally entail at least a portion of the operator’s aircraft in
an independent height-monitoring program. This independent system may be either a
Height Monitoring Unit (HMU), aircraft geometric height measurement element
(AGHME) or a GPS monitoring unit (GMU). HMUs are located at Linz in Austria,
Nattenheim in Germany, and Geneva in Switzerland. The HMU radius of operation is
30 nm for Linz, 45 nm for Nattenheim, and 45 nm for Geneva. The HMU is an auto-
mated height measuring device and is scheduled by coordination through the flight plan
and London Control.
AGHMEs are ground-based radar tracking units that compare reported IFF altitude
to the radar-based derived altitude. There are six sites located in North America:
Atlantic City, New Jersey, Wichita, Kansas, Cleveland, Ohio, Phoenix, Arizona,
Ottawa, Ontario, and Lethbridge, Alberta. An AGHME application needs to be for-
warded to the appropriate constellation site (available on the AGHME website); no
coordination with ATC is necessary.
The GMU is a portable GPS system that is carried on board the monitored aircraft.
The unit records GPS position, which is compared postflight to IFF received altitude
enroute. In the United States, the GMU program is overseen by ARINC. The aircraft
must have an operable mode S transponder to take advantage of the AGHME.
6.12.5 Error Reporting and Loss of RVSM Authorization

Since the incidence of altimetry errors that can be tolerated in the RVSM environment is
very small, it is incumbent upon operators to immediately take corrective action to
rectify the conditions that caused the error. The operator must report the event to the
FAA within 72 hr of the occurrence with initial analysis of causal factors and measures
to prevent further events; the requirement for follow-up reports is at the discretion of the
FAA. Errors that should be reported are total vertical error (TVE) equal to or greater
than 300 ft (90 m), ASE equal to or greater than 245 ft (75 m), and assigned altitude
deviation (AAD) equal to or greater than 300 ft (90 m).
Height-keeping errors fall into two categories: equipment malfunction and opera-
tional errors. An operator who consistently commits errors of either variety may be
required to forfeit approval for RVSM operations. If a problem is identified that is
related to one specific aircraft type, then RVSM approval may be removed for that one
specific aircraft type.
The FAA may consider removing RVSM operational approval if the operator’s
response to a height-keeping error is not effective or timely. The operator’s past per-
formance may be a factor in deciding to remove operational approval. Authorization
may be removed until the root causes of the errors are shown to be eliminated and
RVSM programs and procedures are shown to be effective.
6.13 PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEMS

This section will cover the evaluation and approval of aircraft proximity warning sys-
tems, either with the earth or other aircraft. We will look at the traffic alert and collision
avoidance system (TCAS), traffic advisory system (TAS), automatic dependent sur-
veillance broadcast (ADS-B), ground proximity warning system (GPWS), and terrain
awareness warning system (TAWS).
6.13.1 Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System

The TCAS is designed to alert aircrew to the potential for conflicts with other aircraft
within the area. The system uses the existing ATCRBS system and the capabilities of
mode S transponders to coordinate with other TCAS-equipped aircraft. The TCAS
provides two types of advisories to the aircrew:
● Traffic advisory (TA): informs the crew that there is traffic in the area.
● Resolution advisory (RA): advises the aircrew that corrective action is necessary to
avoid a collision with an intruder aircraft.
Efforts to establish a collision avoidance system started in 1955 within the air
transport industry. The basic TCAS concept was implemented by the FAA in 1981, and
TCAS was evaluated aboard Piedmont and United Airlines aircraft through the mid-
1980s. The operational evaluation lasted until 1988. In 1991, the FAA mandated use of
TCASII (Version 6.0) in all aircraft with 30 or more seats as a result of a DC-9/private
aircraft midair over CA; the deadline was extended to 1993. An Operational Evaluation
of 6.0 was conducted and suggested improvements were incorporated into Version 6.04a
(1993). The principal changes included the reduction of nuisance alerts and altitude
crossing logic.
The results of the 6.04a evaluation indicated that the actual vertical displacement of an
RA response was much greater than 300 feet, which was having an adverse effect on
controllers and the ATC system. The required changes resulted in the release of Version 7.0
in 1999. Version 7.0 incorporated numerous changes and enhancements to the collision
avoidance algorithms, aural annunciations, RA displays and pilot training programs. The
main purpose of these changes was to reduce the number of RAs issued and to minimize
the altitude displacement when responding to an RA.
TCAS Version 7.0 performance has been analyzed since 2000 and has resulted in
Version 7.1; the MOPS was released in 2008. This release attempts to improve the RA
logic that was causal in the near mid-air over Japan in 2001 and the fatal mid-air on the
German-Swiss border in 2002. In these cases, the pilots maneuvered opposite to the
displayed RA; studies showed that pilots occasionally maneuvered in the opposite
direction from the Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust RA. To mitigate this problem all Adjust
Vertical Speed RAs have been replaced with Level Off, Level Off. Versions 6.04a and 7.0
are expected to remain in operation for the foreseeable future.
All US aircraft with more than 30 seats must have TCASII, and all installations of
TCASII in the United States after 1995 must be with Version 7.0. Since 1995, all Eur-
opean civil fixed-wing aircraft of 5700 kg or maximum seating of 19 or more must have
TCASII Version 7.0. Other countries including Argentina, Australia, Chile, Egypt,
India, and Japan have also mandated TCASII within their respective airspace. US
military, under GATM, have also installed TCASII on their transport aircraft. TCASII
Version 7.0 or higher must be installed if used in RVSM airspace.
TCAS equipment works the same way as the ground-based IFF system described in
section 5.8.2 of this text. A TCAS I system sends out an omnidirectional interrogation
pulse and waits for replies from other aircraft within the range of the signal (on the order
of 50 nm). We know from previous discussions that the range to an aircraft can be
determined from the time it takes to receive a reply. The bearing of the return is mea-
sured much like the ADF systems mentioned previously. By successive interrogations,
the system can determine range rate (by computing the rate of change of range with
respect to time). Similarly, the system knows the altitude of the replying aircraft by
examining the altitude-encoded reply. By successive interrogations, the aircraft can also
compute the vertical velocity (by computing the rate of change of altitude with respect to
time).
The TCAS II system has the added benefit of communicating with other aircraft via
the mode S system. The communication between two TCAS II receivers allows man-
euvering commands to be issued to the aircrew in the case of a conflict (‘‘you climb and
I will descend’’). The relationship between the TCAS II processors and the mode S
interrogators for two cooperating TCAS II aircraft is shown in Figure 6.23.
The warnings are given to the aircrew based on a minimum reaction time, which is
called the tau (t) concept in some documentation. Simply put, there is a minimum
Interrogation, Air-to-Air FIGURE 6.23 ¢

Mode S Interrogation/Reply
TCAS II Reply, Aircraft Transponder
between TCAS II
Systems
Reply, Aircraft
Mode S
Interrogation, Air-to-Air TCAS II
Transponder
reaction time that an aircrew would need to avoid a potential collision with another
aircraft. The time that it would take for an intruder on a collision course to hit my
aircraft (assuming we are at the same altitude) is a function of the distance to the aircraft
and the total velocity of closure between our aircraft. The time that this event would
occur is given by Equation (6.3):
Tcollision ¼ R=VC ; (6.3)
where
Tcollision ¼ time to a collision with an intruder aircraft,
R ¼ range to the intruder aircraft, and
VC ¼ total velocity of closure between the two aircraft.
For example, suppose an aircraft is on my nose on a reciprocal heading at 30 nm
traveling at 300 KTAS and I am traveling at 300 KTAS as well (no wind). The distance
is 30 nm and the VC is 600 knots. Substituting into Equation (6.3):
Tcollision ¼ 30/600 ¼ 0.05 hr ¼ 180 sec.
If we then wanted to receive an advisory based on reaction time, we could calculate
a distance to issue an alert based on velocity of closure. For example, if we assume for
our altitude, with an intruder in the forward quadrant we need a 48 sec reaction time,
how far away must the intruder be to issue the alert? Once again, using Equation (6.3)
and substituting the reaction time for the collision time:
48 sec ¼ :013 hr ¼ R=600
0:013ð600Þ ¼ 8 nm ¼ R:
The alert would be issued at 8 nm from the intruder aircraft. This is the way TCAS
computes when advisories should be issued. A depiction of the TCAS traffic and reso-
lution advisory zones is shown in Figure 6.24.
The right side of the figure shows the altitude clearances that will trigger the traffic
and resolution advisories. The traffic advisories are given if the intruder aircraft is within
850 to 1200 ft of own-ship altitude (depending on altitude and version of the software).
The resolution advisories are given when the intruder aircraft is within 600 to 800 ft
of own-ship altitude (once again, depending on altitude and version of the software).
FIGURE 6.24 ¢
TCAS II Traffic and
Resolution Advisory
Zones
Warning Area
Collision
Caution Area Area
Traffic Resolution
Traffic Advisory Advisory Advisory
Resolution
20–48 Seconds Advisory
15–35 Seconds
TABLE 6.17 ¢ Revised TA and RA Alert Thresholds
● The following are the existing and revised alert thresholds that apply to operations at high altitude. The only changes in the
thresholds are reductions in the altitude threshold for the issuance of TAs and RAs. The values that change between FL 300
and FL 420 are highlighted here.
Fixed Range
Range Threshold Altitude Threshold Threshold Used With
(sec) (ft) Slow Closure Rates (nmi)
TCAS Advisory V6.04a V7 V6.04a V7 V6.04a V7

Traffic Advisory FL 200–FL 300 48 48 850 850 1.3 1.3
FL 300–FL 420 48 48 1200 850 1.3 1.3
Corrective RA FL 200–FL 300 35 35 600 600 1.1 1.1
FL 300–FL 420 35 35 700 600 1.1 1.1
Preventive RA FL 200–FL 300 35 35 700 700 1.1 1.1
FL 300–FL 420 35 35 800 700 1.1 1.1
1 2
FIGURE 6.25 ¢
Traffic Advisory - Solid (Amber) Circle Stand-Alone TCAS
- Intruder aircraft entering caution area. Display
.5 (20–48 seconds from entering collision area)
–06 Resolution Advisory - Solid (Red) Square
- Intruder aircraft entering warning area
4
(15–35 seconds from entering collision area)
+12 Proximate Traffic - Solid Diamond (Blue or White)
0 +08 - Traffic within 6 nautical miles and +/–1,200 feet
6 Other Traffic - Hollow Diamond (Blue or White)
- Shown to enhance situational awareness
–02 Data Tag. Two digit number with plus or minus sign
4
.5 represents the intruders altitude difference above or
below the TCAS aircraft in hundreds of feet. The
arrow appears if the intruder is climbing or
1 2 descending at a rate greater than 500 fpm.
The vertical t is defined as the relative altitude divided by the rate of change of altitude;
the system calculates if the intruder will pass through the altitude thresholds. The high-
altitude advisory thresholds were revised in the software due to the implementation of
RVSM. These changes are shown in Table 6.17.
Figure 6.25 illustrates the stand-alone TCAS display. Four types of traffic can be
displayed for TCAS, and they are illustrated to the right side of the display. The rounded
dial bordering the TCAS information is a VVI display; the aircraft in the picture is
currently climbing at a rate of approximately 750 ft/min. If a resolution advisory is
issued requiring a climb or descent, a bar will appear on the outside of the scale indi-
cating a commanded climb or descent rate.
In many aircraft installations, the TCAS information is superimposed on existing
cockpit displays. Figure 6.26 shows a TCAS implementation on an MD-11 navigation
display. There is a 5 nm range ring around the aircraft in the picture and there are three
FIGURE 6.26 ¢
Navigation Display
with TCAS
1
other aircraft within the display field of view. Number 1 is other traffic, number 2 is
proximate traffic, and a traffic advisory has been issued for number 3, who is overtaking
us from the rear.
Figure 6.27 is from the MD-11 as well; however, we now have the navigation
display set to the TCAS mode. The addition of the starred ring (6) around the aircraft is
the aircraft’s nonintrusion zone. If any intruder’s closest point of approach will take the
aircraft inside the starred ring and its altitude is within the threshold, the TCAS will
issue traffic and resolution advisories at the threshold times. The traffic information
displayed is other traffic (1), proximate traffic (2), traffic advisory (3), and two resolu-
tion advisories (4 and 5). Figure 6.28 shows TCAS information superimposed on a
25 nm weather radar display.
The aural alerts that are available within the TCAS for software versions 6.04a, 7.0,
and 7.1 are shown in Table 6.18.
The TCAS resolution advisories are treated just as an emergency procedure; that is,
upon receiving a resolution advisory the pilot initiates the maneuver and then advises
ATC of what he has done as opposed to the other way around.
To reduce false alarms and to prevent aircraft from entering unsafe regimes, a number
of inhibits may be applied to the TCAS depending on its installation. A summary of the
inhibits that have been programmed into the TCAS computer is shown in Table 6.19.
Additional inhibits are addressed in Table I of AC 20-131A, ‘‘Airworthiness
Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS II) and Mode S
Transponders,’’ March 29, 1993. These inhibits are based on individual aircraft perfor-
mance and are applied when a maneuver will cause an unsafe reduction in airspeed.
Evaluators will have to consult this table to see if additional inhibits need to be imple-
mented in their installation.
FIGURE 6.27 ¢
Navigation Display
in the TCAS Mode
4
FIGURE 6.28 ¢
TCAS Information
Superimposed on
the Weather Radar
6.13.2 Certification of the TCAS II System

The five documents that dictate the performance and airworthiness of the TCAS in
regards to certification are
● RTCA DO-185A, ‘‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Traffic Alert and
Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS II) Airborne Equipment,’’ December 16, 1997
TABLE 6.18 ¢ TCAS Advisories
TCAS Advisory Version 7.1 Annunciation Version 7.0 Annunciation Version 6.04a Annunciation
Traffic Advisory Traffic, Traffic
Climb RA Climb, Climb Climb, Climb, Climb
Descend, Descend,
Descend RA Descend, Descend
Descend
Altitude Crossing
Climb, Crossing Climb, Climb, Crossing Climb
Climb RA
Altitude Crossing
Descend, Crossing Descend, Descend, Crossing Descend
Descend RA
Reduce Climb, Reduce
Reduce Climb RA Level Off, Level Off Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust
Climb
Reduce Descent, Reduce
Reduce Descent RA Level Off, Level Off Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust
Descent
RA Reversal to Climb RA Climb, Climb, NOW, Climb, Climb, NOW
RA Reversal to
Descend, Descend, NOW, Descend, Descend, NOW
Descend RA
Increase Climb RA Increase Climb, Increase Climb
Increase Descent RA Increase Descent, Increase Descent
Maintain Rate RA Maintain Vertical Speed, Maintain Monitor Vertical Speed
Altitude Crossing,
Maintain Rate RA Climb Maintain Vertical Speed, Crossing Maintain Monitor Veritcal Speed
and Descent
Weakening of RA Level Off, Level Off Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust Monitor Vertical Speed
Monitor Vertical Speed,
Preventative RA Monitor Vertical Speed
Monitor Vertical Speed
RA Removal Clear of Conflict
TABLE 6.19 ¢ TCAS System Inhibits
INHIBIT PARAMETERS
Increase Descent RA Inhibited below 1450 ft AGL
Descend RA Inhibited below 1200 ft AGL while climbing and inhibited
below 1000 ft AGL while descending
RA and TA Voice Messages Inhibited below 400 ft AGL while descending and below
600 ft AGL while climbing (TCAS automatically reverts to
TA only)
Close Range Surveillance May not function at separations of less than approximately
900 ft
Self-Test Can be inhibited when airborne
Advisory Priority Can revert to TA only when higher priority advisories
(GPWS, wind shear, etc., occur)
Climb RA 1500 ft/min can be inhibited based on aircraft performance
capability
Increase Climb RA 2500 ft/min can be inhibited based on aircraft performance
capability
Altitude Limit for Climb RA Can be inhibited based on aircraft performance capability
● TSO-C119c, ‘‘Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Airborne

Equipment, TCAS II with Optional Hybrid Surveillance,’’ April 14, 2009
● AC 20-131A, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
Systems (TCAS II) and Mode S Transponders,’’ March 29, 1993
● AC 20-151A, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
Systems (TCAS II) Version 7.0 and 7.1 and Associated Mode S Transponders,’’
September 25, 2009
● AC 120-55C, ‘‘Air Carrier Operational Approval and Use of TCAS II,’’ February 23,
2011
NOTE: AC 20-131A provides guidance for TCAS II installations with version 6.04.
AC 20-151A provides guidance for TCAS II installations with versions 7.0 and 7.1.
There are three major differences between the two: aural alerts, inhibits, and revised
TA and RA thresholds. The basic ground and flight tests are the same, although AC 20-
151A does not address flight tests required when changes are made to the surveillance
function of the TCAS II system. The revised TA and RA alerts have been previously
discussed and are shown in Table 6.18. The inhibits listed in Table 6.19 change
slightly with version 7.0 and 7.1. If your installation is for these versions, you must
consult AC 20-151A for the changes. If your aircraft is equipped with TCAS and flies
in RVSM airspace it must be with version 7.0 or higher. As AC 20-131A and AC 20-
151A deal with airworthiness approval, AC 120-55C deals with operational approval
for TCAS use in Part 121 operations. Operational approval pertains to training and
maintenance programs, manuals, operational procedures, minimum equipment lists
(MELs), and other areas necessary for safe and effective TCAS use and the qualifi-
cation of aircrews through the approved training programs. The following discussion
covers the airworthiness approval for version 6.04 systems and does not address the
operational approval.
This is a good place to note that TCAS II will only provide resolution advisories in
the vertical axis. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had originally
planned that aircraft meet the requirements of air collision and avoidance system III
(ACAS III), which calls for advisories in both the horizontal and vertical axes. At
the time of this writing, there was no work being performed on the development of a
TCAS III system, and it is unknown if this requirement will ever be met.
The TCAS installation requires the applicant to apply through the type certification
or supplemental type certification process. For airworthiness, the applicant may follow
the requirements of AC 20-131A or AC 20-151A, although these documents are only
one means of obtaining certification; a certification plan is required.
As TCAS II is an integrated system, certain types of equipment installations are
required. TCAS II must have mode S installed to handle the communication require-
ments necessary for coordinating resolution advisories. In addition, the pilot must be
able to control mode S and the TCAS II independently or simultaneously:
● Operation of mode S only
● Operation of mode S and TCAS II in the RA/TA mode simultaneously
● Operation of the ATCRBS transponder only if installed
● Operation of mode S and TCAS II in the TA mode simultaneously
● Operation of TCAS II in the standby mode
● A means to select the ATCRBS code

● A means to ‘‘IDENT’’
● A means to initiate TCAS II self-test
● A means to indicate that TCAS II is in self-test
● A means to suppress altitude reporting
There are also optional controls that may be provided:
● Selection of weather radar only
● Selection of weather radar and traffic display simultaneously
● Selection of actual, flight level, or relative altitude of traffic
The active mode S transponder shall have a top and bottom omnidirectional
antenna. The TCAS II shall have a top directional antenna and either an omnidirectional
or directional bottom antenna. The pressure altitude information must come from the
most accurate source and correspond to that being transmitted by mode S. Information
should be provided to indicate an invalid pressure altitude.
Radar altitude information is provided to the TCAS II to trigger the inhibits listed in
Table 6.19. Discrete inputs from aircraft configuration sensors (e.g., gear, flaps) are also
sent to the TCAS II to trigger inhibits. Discrete information shall be provided to the
mode S transponder pertaining to the aircraft’s unique identification code and maximum
airspeed capability. Heading information may be provided for use as a surveillance
reference, but must be flagged when the heading is invalid. An indication shall also be
provided to indicate that resolution advisories are not possible due to failure of the
TCAS II equipment or any of its sensors or displays.
6.13.3 TCAS Test and Evaluation

The testing and evaluation of TCAS II is dependent on whether it is a first-time instal-
lation or a follow-on (same TCAS II has been installed previously on other types of
aircraft). The test for the latter is a subset of the first-time installation (this discussion
will address the first-time installation). It should also be noted that in many cases, a new
TCAS installation may require a first-time installation of a mode S system; the AC
addresses this fact and calls out the requirements for mode S testing.
6.13.3.1 TCAS Ground Test, Version 6.04a

The first test called out in the AC is a bearing accuracy test. The AC addresses two
methods: rotating the aircraft to a fixed transponder site or testing on an antenna range
capable of radiating the aircraft from 360 . I have found that a good way of performing
this evaluation is to use a cooperating aircraft either taxiing around the airfield or in the
overhead pattern; the GPS position of the cooperating target, when compared to the test
aircraft position, will yield a true bearing. This can be compared to what is displayed on
the TCAS II display. Basic accuracy requirements are 15 , however, larger errors are
allowed in the area 45 from the tail (blockage areas). This test will also allow the
evaluator a quick look at the display performance (smoothness of the aircraft track,
possible TA/RA, inhibits, etc.).
Simulated failures of the aircraft sensors integrated with TCAS II should be eval-
uated to see if the resulting system failure states agree with the predicted results.
The EMI test called out in the AC advises the tester to determine that there is no
objectionable conducted or radiated interference to previously installed equipment. It
also advises to pay particular attention to interference to TCAS equipment from the
weather radar, particularly if the radar is operating in C band. This is hardly a description
of a good EMI/EMC evaluation, and I recommend that the evaluator revisit chapter 3
of this text to conduct a complete investigation. TCAS operates in L band, and as I
have said before, everyone and his brother operates in L band; particular attention
should be given to, for example, GPS, TACAN, JTIDS, and harmonics from VHF
transmissions.
The general arrangement and operation of the controls and displays, placards,
warning lights, self-test, and aural tones should be evaluated for functionality and visi-
bility (lighting conditions) and against human factors principles. Interfaces that should
be evaluated are pressure and radar altitude, mode S identification codes, and maximum
airspeed. The evaluator needs to verify that wind shear, TAWS, and TCAS II voice
alerts are compatible. The wind shear alert must be clearly understood with simulta-
neous wind shear and TCAS II alerts; if aural warnings are prioritized, the alert priorities
should be wind shear, TAWS, then TCAS II.
6.13.3.2 TCAS Basic Flight Tests, Version 6.04a

As with the ground tests, the evaluator is directed to observe the aircraft systems to
determine that there is no objectionable mutual interference with the installation of
TCAS II. The aural alerts should have sufficient loudness and clarity during low and
high cockpit noise levels (e.g., idle descent versus high power at VMO) with and without
headsets. If the TCAS II test function is used to simulate voice announcements, ensure
that the audio level is not changed by use of the test function.
The traffic information should remain valid and usable during aircraft maneuvers
(15 pitch and up to 30 of bank). For accuracy, this test can be performed with the
planned encounter flight tests explained in the next section. The effective surveillance
range of the system must also be evaluated; this can be done against targets of oppor-
tunity. The easiest way to accomplish this test is to fly to a point that equates to the
maximum surveillance range away from an airport or airway where known traffic is
evident and verify the traffic is displayed on the TCAS II display.
Unless previously demonstrated during ground tests, configuration discretes asso-
ciated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits, must be validated as functioning
correctly. The TCAS must also be evaluated for noninterference during coupled
autopilot and flight director approaches down to aircraft minimums. All selectable
modes of the TCAS II should be selected to ensure that they perform their intended
function.
6.13.3.3 Planned Encounter Flight Tests, Version 6.04a

These tests are done with a cooperative aircraft with compatible equipment (e.g., simi-
larly equipped TCAS II for TCAS–TCAS coordination, mode C only replies) to
demonstrate adequate surveillance and to verify smooth, predictable performance.
Before any of these tests are attempted, safety rules of engagement and ‘‘knock it off’’
criteria must be briefed and understood by all participants. A simple method is to declare
that all aircraft will have a 500 ft safety bubble around the aircraft. The test aircraft will
own all even altitudes and the intruder aircraft will own all odd altitudes. Neither aircraft
will leave their owned altitude without a visual contact on the other aircraft. On the
transition to the working area, the test aircraft and the intruder aircraft will fly in close
formation at the same altitude to verify altitude readouts; a nominal difference of 100 ft
may be acceptable, any error greater than 100 ft will cause an abort of the test. The
aircraft will also verify the mode S reporting altitudes are the same by coordinating with
ATC and confirming the readout on the ground. Errors greater than 100 ft as reported by
ATC will also cause an abort of the mission.
Knock it off is simply an expression that means that all testing must cease and all
aircraft must immediately return to their assigned altitudes. Some examples of a knock it
off call includes the following:
● Loss of situational awareness by either aircraft
● Violation of an aircraft’s 500 ft safety bubble
● Any aircraft enters the weather
● Another aircraft enters the area
● Test objective is accomplished
● Further testing is pointless
● Any emergency in either aircraft
These are a few of the common criterion; it will be up to the individual test orga-
nizations to determine an inclusive list. The following flight geometries are called out in
the AC:
● Intruder overtaking TCAS aircraft from the aft quadrant
● Head-on, low and high closure speeds
● Head-on, above climb limit, TCAS II to TCAS II
● Head-on, TCAS II against mode C with TCAS II aircraft above the intruder and
above the climb limit (force TCAS aircraft to descend)
● Head-on, at 300 ft above calm water (multipath protection)
● Converging flight
● Crossing, intruder above TCAS II aircraft and descending, or vice versa
● Evaluate similar setups in TA-only mode
● A mix of intruder transponder modes (A, C, S) should be evaluated, but primary
emphasis should be on TCAS II to TCAS II coordination and mode C replies
● Flights should be set up with TCAS II both above and below the intruder
TCAS II performance in flight should also be demonstrated in the presence of
electrical transients. The TCAS system should not see any adverse affects, generation of
false targets, or false alerts. Normal TCAS II functions and displays should be restored
within 3 sec.
6.13.3.4 Surveillance Flight Tests, Version 6.04a

The MOPS dictates the surveillance performance of TCAS II, and the bench tests that
are performed are done in controlled conditions. A surveillance flight test is done to
completely validate a TCAS II surveillance design. A flight test should be performed for
each new TCAS surveillance design and whenever major modifications are made to the
surveillance function of a previously certified system. The intent of the flight is to
evaluate the system under environmentally stressful conditions (e.g., multipath, high-
density traffic, multiple ground interrogations). The AC recommends an area of the
United States where this test should be accomplished, as well as the time of day and day
of the week. It is unusual to see such specific test information. However, the chosen area
has all the elements for producing stress on any TCAS II, a key being a traffic density of
0.1 transponder-equipped aircraft per square mile.
The test should be accomplished in the Los Angeles basin area in the vicinity of the
Long Beach and Santa Ana airports, on weekends between 10:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M.,
when the ground visibility is greater than 5 nm with a ceiling of at least 10,000 ft to
ensure the highest traffic densities. The flight paths should include a representative
mixture of the following conditions:
● Overland flights at an altitude of 3000 to 6000 ft
● Over water flights between altitudes of 3000 and 6000 ft for a duration that is at least
20% of the required flight duration
● Approach and departure flights to the Long Beach and Santa Ana airports
The AC allows the applicant to choose another area to perform this evaluation, but it
is up to the applicant to demonstrate that the area is similar in traffic density to Los
Angeles. In addition, the area must also have a minimum of three FAA or military
secondary surveillance radars located within 30 nm of the TCAS II aircraft to provide an
interference environment similar to Los Angeles.
The objective of this test is to collect TCAS II reporting data and compare it to the
actual traffic in the area. The applicant is responsible for collecting the data (at least
10,000 sec of tracking data, or about 1 hour of recording in the Los Angeles basin) and
forwarding these data to the FAA for an independent analysis. The AC contains the type
of information required and the analyses that must be performed to verify the integrity of
the TCAS II surveillance function. This test is only required for a new TCAS II or an
existing system with a major change to the surveillance function. The test is normally
accomplished by the vendor on a test aircraft and is only mentioned here for com-
pleteness. Descriptions of TCAS II displays and the required verbiage for the aircraft
flight manual are included as attachments in the AC.
6.13.3.5 TCAS Airworthiness Versions 7.0 and 7.1

As noted, the guidance for obtaining Airworthiness for the installation of a version 7.0 or
7.1 TCAS may be found in AC 20-151A. The AC adds requirements for equipment and
deletes some of the tests required of earlier installations. The document states that a pilot
control of TCAS equipment shall be provided and shall allow the selection of TCAS in
TA/RA mode with Mode S simultaneously, TCAS in TA mode with Mode S simulta-
neously, or TCAS in standby mode.
Features that should be provided are the ability to select an assigned 4096 code, the
ability to initiate TCAS self-test and a means to suppress altitude reporting. Features that
may be provided include the selection of Weather RADAR only or Weather and TCAS,
the display of traffic within selected altitude bands, the selection of altitude or relative
altitude of traffic, and the selection of TCAS information on MFDs.
With respect to antennas, the AC states that the Mode S transponder shall have a top
and bottom omnidirectional antenna and the TCAS shall have a top directional antenna
and a bottom omnidirectional or directional antenna. The antennas should be mounted as
close to the centerline as possible and should have at least 20 dB isolation from other
L band frequency antennas. The processor must have a TSOA IAW TSO-C119b or 119c
and may include hybrid surveillance as an optional capability.
Traffic and resolution advisory displays should conform to the standard symbology
provided in RTCA/DO-185A or B, section 2.2.6. Optional Caution/Warning lights may
be installed that are separate from the display; two types of annunciators have been used
in acceptable installations are a discrete amber annunciator for a TA (optional) located
in the pilot’s primary FOV and inhibited below 400’ AGL, a discrete red warning
annunciator for an RA, in the pilot’s primary FOV, inhibited below 900’ AGL. A VSI
with a lighted red arc or alphanumeric message is also acceptable.
Each TCAS aural alert should be annunciated by a dedicated message over the
cockpit speaker system at a volume adequate for clear understanding at high cockpit
noise levels. The AC mentions that the evaluation should include the case where the
flight crew member is wearing a headset covering the outboard ear when appropriate.
The appropriate alerts are listed in Table 6.18.
Certification is via the TC or STC process; any change in system equipment requires
either an initial or follow-on approval. A Certification Plan is required, and a ground test
showing TCAS to TCAS communication and TCAS to Mode S interoperability is
required.
In some cases, TCAS may command maneuvers that may significantly reduce stall
margins or result in stall warnings. Conditions where this may occur include bank angles
greater than 15 degrees, weight/altitude/temperature considerations, initial speeds, one
engine inoperative, etc. The AC provides a table of maneuvering conditions that can be
encountered with TCAS; the applicant should verify safe operation of the aircraft during
these maneuvers with an associated RA. If unsafe conditions exist, the applicant should
consider adding a discrete inhibit during these conditions (AC 20-151A, Table 1). These
are in addition to the required inhibits listed in Table 6.19.
The ground tests and planned encounter tests described for 6.04a are the same for
Versions 7.0 and 7.1. A typical TCAS version 7.1 compliance matrix is shown in
Table 6.20.
6.13.4 Traffic Advisory System

This section covers any active traffic advisory equipment that may be installed in air-
craft to provide situational awareness. These systems are very similar to TCAS I, which
provide an alert (TA) on potential conflicting aircraft and display of other traffic (OT)
within the surveillance area. It does not have the capability of providing resolution
advisories, and there is no aircraft-to-aircraft communication via mode S.
The system must meet the MOPS set forth in RTCA DO-197A, ‘‘Minimum Opera-
tional Performance Standards for an Active Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
(Active TCAS I), section 2,’’ September 12, 1994. Manufacturers must meet the mini-
mum performance standards called out in TSO-C147, ‘‘Traffic Advisory System (TAS)
Airborne Equipment,’’ April 6, 1998. AC 20-131A and 20-151A do not address these
types of systems since they are used for situational awareness, but the TSO states that
It is the responsibility of those installing this article either on or within a specific
type or class of aircraft to determine that the aircraft installation conditions are
within the TSO standards.
TABLE 6.20 ¢ TCAS version 7.1 Compliance Matrix

1 AC 20-151A 3-3a Bearing accuracy Demonstrate the bearing estimation accuracy of the TCAS II
system as installed in the aircraft. A maximum error of
15 degrees in azimuth is acceptable; however, larger
errors are acceptable in the area of the tail (e.g., within
45 degrees of the tail) when that area is not visible from
the cockpit.
2 AC 20-151A 3-3b Sensor failures Evaluate simulated failures of the aircraft sensors integrated
with TCAS II to determine that the resulting system failure
state agrees with the predicted results. These tests should
be part of the ground test plan.
3 AC 20-151A 3-3c EMI Survey the flight deck EMI to determine that the TCAS II
equipment is not a source of objectionable conducted or
radiated interference to previously installed systems or
equipment, and that operation of the TCAS II equipment is
not adversely affected by conducted or radiated inter-
ference from previously installed systems and equipment.
Pay attention for possible interference with TCAS II
equipment from weather radar, particularly if operating in
the C-band.
4 AC 25-151A 3-3d Human Factors Determine that they are designed and located to prevent
inadvertent actuation. Evaluate TCAS displays and
annunciations to determine that they support flight crew
awareness of TCAS status changes that could result from
TCAS mode selections, intentional pilot actuation of other
installed systems, or inadvertent pilot actions with TCAS
or other installed systems. Evaluate TCAS displays to
ensure all information is, at a minimum, legible, unam-
biguous, and attention-getting (as applicable). In particular,
where transponder functions are integrated with other
system controls, ensure that unintended transponder mode
switching, especially switching to STANDBY or OFF, is
not possible. Pay close attention to line select keys, touch
screens or cursor controlled trackballs as these can be
susceptible to unintended mode selection resulting from
their location in the flight deck (e.g., proximity to a foot
rest or adjacent to a temporary stowage area)
5 AC 20-151A 3-3e self-test Evaluate the TCAS II self-test features and failure mode
displays and annunciators
6 AC 20-151A 3-3f interface Verify that the pressure altitude source and radio altimeter are
properly interfaced with the TCAS II equipment
7 AC 20-151A 3-3g alerts compatibility Wind shear TAWS warning and TCAS voice alerts are
compatible
8 AC 20-151A 3-3h performance Observing any available area traffic.
9 AC 20-151A 3-3i visibility Evaluate the TCAS II system installation for satisfactory
identification, accessibility, and visibility during both day
and night conditions
10 AC 20-151A 3-3j logic with config- Determine that any configuration of discretes associated with
uration change the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb RAs, operate
properly. (Changes in logic or function with aircraft con-
figuration, altitude, or speed.)
(Continues)

11 AC 20-151A 3-3k maximum airspeed Verify that the ICAO 24-bit aircraft address and maximum
airspeed are correct. Additionally, verify that other fea-
tures, which may be optional, such as extended squitter,
aircraft identification reporting, hybrid surveillance or
other data link uses also function correctly. Verify that the
transponder and data sources meet the requirements of the
failure condition classifications associated with the fea-
tures. For example, an un-annunciated failure of the
transponder extended squitter resulting in erroneous infor-
mation being transmitted is at least a major failure
condition.
12 AC 20-151A 3-3l altitude Averter If connected, verify that the altitude alert is providing
correct data to TCAS and that the TCAS II version 7.0 or
7.1 logic, as applicable, correctly weakens or strengthens
the displayed RA using the altitude alert input.
13 AC 20-151A 3-3m air/ground Verify that the air/ground inputs are connected properly.
14 AC 20-151A 3-4a Interference During all phases of flight, determine if there is any mutual
interference with any other aircraft system.
15 AC 20-151A 3-4b aural message Evaluate TCAS II aural messages for acceptable volume and
intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise levels
(idle descent at low speed and high power at maximum
operating limit speed V) with headset covering outboard
ear only (when appropriate) and without headsets. In the
case of turbo-prop aircraft where the aircrew utilizes
headsets via the aircraft audio distribution panel, the aural
messages should hold the same acceptable volume and
intelligibility during both low and high cockpit noise
levels. If the TCAS II TEST is used to simulate voice
announcements, ensure that the audio level is not changed
by use of the TEST function.
16 AC 20-151A 3-4c traffic information Demonstrate that traffic information remains valid and
usable when the aircraft is pitched 15 degrees and
rolled approximately 30 degrees during normal
maneuvers by observing area traffic in the traffic advisory
display
17 AC 20-151A 3-4d surveillance range Evaluate the effective surveillance range of the traffic dis-
play, including target azimuth reasonableness and track
stability. Use of targets of opportunity or a nontransport
category (low speed) aircraft as a target for these tests is
permissible
18 AC 20-151A 3-4e logic/inhibit Determine that any configuration discretes (changes in logic
or function with configuration, altitude, or speed) asso-
ciated with the TCAS II logic, including inhibits of climb
RAs, operate properly unless previously demonstrated
during ground tests
19 AC 20-151A 3-4f Perform the additional flight tests in RTCA/DO-185A or
RTCA/DO-185B, paragraph 3.4.4 as applicable, unless
previously accomplished under TSO-C119b or TSO-
C119c, respectively
(Continues)

20 AC 20-151A 3-4g interference Evaluate TCAS II for noninterference during coupled auto-
pilot and flight director approaches to the lowest minimums
approved for the aircraft
21 AC 20-151A 3-4h altimetry check Before any cooperative flight tests at any altitude involving
the TCAS II-equipped aircraft and another aircraft, fly both
aircraft in close formation to ensure matched altimetry
readouts. These checks should be flown at the speeds and
altitudes to be used for the tests
22 AC 20-151A 3-4i modes Evaluate all selectable modes of the TCAS II to determine
that they perform their intended function and that the
operating mode is clearly and uniquely annunciated
23 AC 20-151A 3-4j regression Reevaluate any previously installed aircraft systems that
required changes as a result of the TCAS II installation.
(e.g., electronic flight instrument system (EFIS), flight
director (FD), PFD, navigation displays (ND), IVSI,
interface etc.)
24 AC 20-151A 3-4k Hybird surveillance If hybrid surveillance functionality is included, perform the
flight tests in RTCA/DO-300, MOPS for TCAS II Hybrid
surveillance, dated December 13, 2006, paragraph 3,
unless previously accomplished under TSO-C119c
25 AC 20-151A 3-5a intruder Intruder overtaking TCAS II aircraft (from the aft quadrants)
26 AC 20-151A 3-5b intruder Head-on
27 AC 20-151A 3-5c Converging Converging
1. Crossing (intruder above TCAS II, descending or vice
versa.)
2. Evaluate the TA-only mode during planned encounters.
3. Evaluate a mix of intruder transponder modes (A, C, S and
S with extended squitter) but primary emphasis should be
on TCAS II-to-TCAS II coordination, and on Mode C
replies from the intruder aircraft.
4. Evaluate a mix of encounters with TCAS II both above and
below the intruder.
5. If a flight test is necessary to ensure compatibility with
other designs, verify correct air-to-air coordination between
the test TCAS II and another manufacturer’s previously
approved equipment (refer to paragraph 2-15).
6. Evaluate the effect of electrical transients (bus transfer)
during encounters. The TCAS II should not experience
adverse effects. No false TAs or RAs should be generated
as a result of electrical transients. Normal TCAS II func-
tions and displays should be restored within approximately
three seconds.
28 AC 20-151A 3-6b Antenna Verify the installed antenna(s) are compatible with the
Mode S transponder and provide an adequate response to
ground radar interrogations during normal aircraft
maneuvers.
(Continues)

29 AC 20-151A 3-6c Mode S Demonstrate that the Mode S transponder functions properly
as installed and does not interfere with other aircraft
electronic equipment
30 AC 20-151A 3-6d Mode S If the Mode S transponder uses a top mounted antenna in
addition to a bottom mounted antenna installed at, or near,
the same location used by a previously approved ATCRBS
transponder antenna. Conduct a comprehensive ground test
and evaluation in accordance with Appendix B and
perform a functional flight test
31 AC 20-151A 3-6e Mode S If a Mode S transponder is installed in an aircraft that does
not have a previously approved ATCRBS transponder
installation, or that uses a bottom mounted antenna loca-
tion that differs significantly from that used by a pre-
viously approved ATCRBS transponder antenna, conduct
the following ground and flight tests: (1) Conduct ground
tests and evaluations per Appendix B. (2) Climb and
Distance Coverage (3) Long Range Reception (4) High
Angle Reception (5) High Altitude Cruise (6) Surveillance
Approach (7) Holding and Orbiting Patterns (8) Altitude
Reporting
This implies that there must be some type of verification (ground/flight tests) to ensure
that the system performs its intended function.
There are two classes of TAS equipment defined in the TSO:
● Class A equipment incorporates a horizontal situation display that indicates the
presence and relative location of intruder aircraft, and an aural alert informing the
crew of a traffic advisory.
● Class B equipment incorporates an aural alert and a visual annunciation informing
the crew of a traffic alert.
The TAS is only required to have one directional antenna, which may be mounted
on either the top or bottom of the aircraft. There are only two advisories that are given to
the pilot: traffic advisories and other traffic. The system may be designed with the same
color coding as previously discussed with TCAS, but may also use shapes only, so the
system may be implemented with monochrome displays.
6.13.4.1 TAS Class A Equipment

As a minimum, the TAS display, which must be readable under all lighting conditions,
must provide the following information to the pilot:
● A differentiation between other traffic and traffic advisories
● Bearing
● Relative altitude (above or below [] and a numerical value)
● Vertical trend of intruder aircraft (up/down arrow when the intruder’s vertical speed
is 500 ft/min)
● Range (selected range will be depicted)

● An own-aircraft symbol, with aircraft heading at the 12:00 position
● A range ring of 2 nm around the aircraft when a range of less than 10 nm is selected
● The traffic advisory will be a filled rectangle and other traffic will be an open
rectangle
● Overlapping traffic symbols should be displayed with the appropriate information
overlapped. The highest-priority traffic should appear on the top of other traffic
symbols
● The display should be capable of depicting a minimum of three intruder aircraft
simultaneously. As a minimum, the display shall be capable of displaying aircraft
that are within 5 nm of own-ship position; the display may provide multiple crew-
selected ranges.
● If the intruder range of a TA target is greater than the selected range display, no less
than one-quarter of the TA symbol shall be placed at the edge of the display at the
proper bearing.
● The traffic symbol size shall be no less than 0.2 in. high and the height of the relative
altitude characters shall be no less than 0.15 in.
● No bearing advisories shall be presented for an intruder generating a TA when the
intruder’s bearing cannot be derived. The advisory shall be in tabular form and
centered on the display below the own-aircraft symbol; the display will have provi-
sions for displaying at least two no-bearing TAs.
As with TCAS II, the TA aural alert is ‘‘Traffic, Traffic,’’ spoken once. The TA will
be inhibited below 400 100 ft AGL when TAS is installed on an aircraft equipped
with a radar altimeter. For aircraft without a radar altimeter, the TA will be inhibited
when the landing gear is extended. For aircraft with fixed gear and no radar altimeter,
the TA is never inhibited.
The TA is issued based on t, which was discussed in section 6.12.1.
6.13.4.2 TAS Class B Equipment

Since a display is not required equipment for the class B TAS, there are some unique
requirements not found in the class A equipment. A visual ‘‘Traffic’’ annunciation
should be provided for the duration of the TA. All TAS aural alerts should be inhibited
below 400 100 ft for aircraft fitted with a radar altimeter. As with class A, for aircraft
without a radar altimeter, the aural annunciations shall be inhibited when the landing
gear is extended. When installed on fixed-gear aircraft without a radar altimeter, the
aural annunciations are never inhibited. Aural annunciations may be inhibited on the
ground when the aircraft is fitted with a weight-on-wheels system.
The aural alert messages shall be announced in threat priority sequence, greatest
threat first. The initial aural traffic advisories shall be spontaneous and unsolicited. The
unsolicited annunciation should be as follows: ‘‘Traffic, x o’clock,’’ spoken once (where
x is the clock position of the intruder). If surveillance bearing information is not avail-
able on the intruder, ‘‘Traffic, No Bearing’’ shall be annunciated. The current relative
bearing to the intruder shall be annunciated as a traffic update upon aircrew command.
Additional information such as relative altitude, range of intruder, and vertical trend
may also be annunciated.
The acceptability of the annunciations must be reviewed during flight testing. The
following factors, at a minimum, must be evaluated for acceptability:
● Quantity of unsolicited annunciations
● Duration of annunciations
● Annunciation clarity
● Volume of the annunciations
The evaluation should occur under normal cockpit workload conditions during
departure, cruise, approach, and landing phases of flight and should include evaluation
of suitability in a normal ATC voice communication environment. There shall be a
means to request a traffic advisory update, mute a current aural advisory, and cancel or
restore aural advisories (turning the system off is an acceptable means of cancellation,
where the default condition of the equipment in the on position is aural advisories
active).
The criteria for issuing the traffic alert is the same as mentioned for class A TAS
and TCAS II. The active TAS equipment shall provide logic to inhibit traffic alerts of
altitude reporting intruders that are on the ground. This logic shall be used when the
TAS-equipped aircraft is below 1700 ft AGL with a hysteresis of þ50 ft. Of course, if
the aircraft does not have a radar altimeter, this requirement goes away. If the aural
memory storage capacity is exceeded, the system will delete the least threatening
intruders first.
6.13.5 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)

To improve the safety, efficiency, and capacity of the Nation Airspace System (NAS),
the FAA is transforming the current ground-based radar air traffic control system to a
satellite-based system called ADS-B. As the cornerstone of the next generation air
transportation system (NextGen), ADS-B supports these improvements and enables the
NAS to accommodate growth expected from future demand.
An ADS-B-equipped aircraft determines its own position and periodically broad-
casts this position and other relevant information to potential ground stations and other
aircraft with ADS-B-In equipment. Position data is usually derived from GNSS or from
an aircraft’s inertial reference system. ADS-B can be used over several different data link
technologies, including mode-S extended squitter (1090 ES) operating at 1090 MHz,
universal access transceiver (978 MHz UAT), and VHF data link (VDL Mode 4); the
FAA has chosen 1090 ES and UAT. With ADS-B, an A/C periodically broadcasts its own
state vector and other information without knowing what other vehicles or entities might
be receiving it; there is no acknowledgment or reply. ADS-B is automatic in the sense
that no pilot or controller action is required for the information to be issued. It is
dependent surveillance in the sense that the surveillance-type information obtained
depends on the suitable navigation and broadcast capability in the A/C.
ADS-B consists of three components:
– A transmitting system that includes message generation in the A/C

– A signal protocol: 1090 ES, UAT, VHF data link
– A receiving system that includes message reception and report assembly functions
There are two commonly recognized types of ADS for aircraft applications:
– ADS-addressed (ADS-A), also known as ADS-contract (ADS-C)
– ADS-broadcast (ADS-B)
ADS-B differs from ADS-A in that ADS-A is based on a negotiated one-to-one peer
relationship between an aircraft providing ADS information and a ground facility
requiring receipt of ADS messages. ADS-A reports are employed in the Future Air
Navigation System (FANS) using the Aircraft Communication Addressing and
Reporting System (ACARS) as the communication protocol. During flight over areas
without radar coverage (e.g., oceanic and polar), reports are periodically sent by an
aircraft to the controlling air traffic region.
The ADS-B link can be used to provide other broadcast services, such as TIS-B and
FIS-B. Traffic Information Services-Broadcast (TIS-B) supplements ADS-B air-to-air ser-
vices to provide complete situational awareness in the cockpit of all traffic known to the
ATC system. The ground TIS-B station transmits surveillance target information on the
ADS-B data link for unequipped targets or targets transmitting only on another ADS-B link.
TIS-B uplinks are derived from the best available ground surveillance sources: Primary and
secondary surveillance RADAR, ADS-B reports, and airport surface traffic reports.
Flight Information Services-Broadcast (FIS-B) provides weather text, weather gra-
phics, NOTAMs, ATIS, and similar information over the data link. FIS-B is inherently
different from ADS-B in that it requires sources of data external to the aircraft or
broadcasting unit, and has different performance requirements such as broadcast rate. In
the US, FIS-B services will be provided over the UAT link in areas that have a ground
surveillance infrastructure.
The ADS-B data link supports a number of airborne and ground applications; each
application has its own operational concepts, algorithms, procedures, standards, and user
training. A Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) is a generic display that
provides the flight crew with surveillance information about other aircraft, including
their position. A CDTI function might also display current weather conditions, terrain,
airspace structure, obstructions, detailed airport maps, and other information relevant to
the particular phase of flight.
ADS-B has the enhancing feature of providing airborne collision avoidance. ADS-B
is seen as a valuable technology to enhance ACAS/TCAS operation, which has been
previously addressed. Incorporation of ADS-B can mitigate the deficiencies of TCAS
and provide benefits such as the following:
– Decreasing the number of active interrogations required by TCAS, thus increasing
effective range in high density airspace
– Reducing unnecessary alarm rate by incorporating the ADS-B state vector, aircraft
intent, and other information
– Use of the ACAS display as a CDTI, providing positive identification of traffic
– Extending collision avoidance below 1000 feet above ground level, and detecting
runway incursions
Eventually, the ACAS function may be provided based solely on ADS-B. Other
applications that benefit from ADS-B are as follows:
– Air Traffic Management
– Improved search and rescue
– Enhanced flight following

– Lighting control and operation
– Airport ground vehicle and aircraft rescue and firefighting vehicle operational needs
– Altitude height keeping performance measurements
– General aviation operations control
There are two signals for ADS-B: ADS-B out and ADS-B in. ADS-B out is the
ability to transmit a properly formatted ADS-B message from the aircraft to ground
stations and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. ADS-B in is the ability of the aircraft to
receive information transmitted from ADS-B ground stations and other aircraft. On
January 1, 2020, when operating in the airspace designated in 14 CFR §91.225, you
must be equipped with ADS-B out avionics that meet the performance requirements of
14 CFR §91.227. ADS-B in is not mandated by the new rule; if an operator chooses to
voluntarily equip their aircraft, ADS-B In will also require the installation of a compa-
tible display. The new rule applies to much of the designated airspace classes.
Class A airspace extends from FL180 to FL600. Class B airspace is defined around
key airport traffic areas and has the shape of an inverted wedding cake, Class B airspace
normally begins at the surface with an upper limit of 10,000 ft. Class C space is struc-
tured in much the same way as Class B airspace, but on a smaller scale. Class C airspace
is defined around airports of moderate importance that have an operational control tower
and is in effect only during the hours of tower operation at the primary airport; the
vertical boundary is usually 4,000 ft. Class D airspace is generally cylindrical in form
and normally extends from the surface to 2,500 ft. AGL. The outer radius of the airspace
is generally 4 nautical miles; Class D airspace reverts to Class E or G during hours when
the tower is closed. Controlled airspace that is not classified as A, B, C or D is desig-
nated as Class E. In most areas of the United States, Class E airspace extends from
1,200 ft. AGL up to, but not including, 18,000 ft. Class F is not used in the United States
and Class G airspace includes all airspace below flight level 600 not otherwise classified
as controlled. Class G airspace is typically the airspace very near the ground (1200 ft or
less). A diagram of these classes is shown in Figure 6.29.
FIGURE 6.29 ¢
Airspace Classes FL 600 CLASS A
18,000 MSL
14,500 MSL CLASS E
CLASS B
CLASS C
CLASS D
Nontowered 700 AGL 1,200 AGL
Airport
CLASS G CLASS G CLASS G
MSL - mean sea level

AGL - above ground level
FL - flight level
The rule covers operation in all Class A, B, and C airspace. It also covers operation
in Class E airspace within the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia at and
above 10,000 ft MSL, excluding the airspace at and below 2,500 ft above the surface,
and Class E airspace at and above 3,000 ft MSL over the Gulf of Mexico from the
coastline of the United States out to 12 nautical miles. It is also mandated around those
airports identified in 14 CFR part 91, Appendix D.
6.13.5.1 ADS-B Certification
The rule specifies ADS-B out equipment be certified to either TSO-C154C (universal
access transceiver) or TSO-C166b (1090ES). Equipment certified to TSO-C166b will be
required to operate in Class A airspace and equipment certified to either TSO can be
used while operating in the designated airspace outside Class A.
The applicable documentation for ADS-B airworthiness includes:
– RTCA/DO-260B, ‘‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for 1090 MHz
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),’’ December 13, 2011
– RTCA/DO-282B, ‘‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B),’’
December 13, 2011
– TSO C-154c and TSO C-166b, previously identified, December 2, 2009
– TSO C-195b, ‘‘Avionics Supporting Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) Aircraft Surveillance Applications,’’ Draft June 2014
– Advisory Circular AC 20-165, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast ADS-B Out,’’ May 21, 2010
– Advisory Circular AC 20-172A, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval for ADS-B In Systems and
Applications,’’ March 23, 2012
AC 20-165 covers the airworthiness approval for ADS-B out systems. The AC
covers two link options: 1090 extended squitter (1090 ES) and universal access trans-
ceiver (UAT) (978 MHz); 14 CFR 91.225 requires 1090 ES in Class A airspace, and
FIS-B is available only on the UAT link. The body of the AC provides specific infor-
mation on installation and test and evaluation guidance. The appendices of the AC
provide information on the message elements, ADS-B position sources and a latency
analysis.
AC 20-172A covers the airworthiness approval for ADS-B In Systems and Appli-
cations. This AC provides guidance material for the reception of ADS-B, traffic infor-
mation services-broadcast (TIS-B) and automatic dependent surveillance-rebroadcast
(ADS-R) messages. This AC does not cover flight information services-broadcast (FIS-B)
messages; this application will be covered in a future AC. The AC states that it is not
mandatory, but if it is used, it must be used in its entirety. All installations of ADS-B in
should also provide ADS-B out.
6.13.5.2 ADS-B Out Airworthiness
ADS-B equipment broadcasts a system design assurance (SDA) parameter within its
message; this parameter indicates the probability of a system malfunction that would
provide false or misleading information of the aircraft’s position. Aircraft that are not
complex (for all intents and purposes, not applicable for the majority of newer aircraft)
would have a preset SDA; aircraft that are complex or highly integrated would require a
System Safety Assessment (SSA). The applicant must calculate the position and velocity
latency of the installed system: total latency and uncompensated latency. This is because
this information will be used by ATC and other aircraft to ensure safe separation.
Total latency is defined as the difference between the time the position is measured
(sensed) to the time the position is transmitted from the aircraft; the total latency must be
less than or equal to 2.0 seconds. Uncompensated latency is the difference between the
time of applicability for the transmitted position and the actual time the position is
transmitted from the ADS-B system (senescence); the uncompensated latency must be
less than or equal to 0.6 seconds.
AC 20-165 describes the ADS-B out message and the correct location of the mes-
sage parameters. The parameters encoded in the ADS-B out message are as follows:
– Latitude and Longitude
– Horizontal velocity; N/S E/W velocity while airborne and a combination of ground
speed and ground track or heading while on the surface
– System integrity level (SIL); described previously
– System integrity level supplement (SILSUPP); identifies the SIL as being calculated
on a per hour or per sample basis
– Navigation integrity category (NIC); integrity of the position source
– Call sign/flight ID
– IDENT/emergency status
– Mode 3/A
– Navigation accuracy category for position (NACP); HDOP
– Navigation accuracy category for velocity (NACV); 1 ¼ < 10 m/s, 2 ¼ < 3 m/s, 3 or
4 ¼ GNSS velocity accuracy
– Geometric altitude; WGS-84 height above ellipsoid
– Geometric vertical accuracy; VDOP
– Ground track angle (or heading)
– Barometric altitude
– Barometric altitude integrity code (NICBARO)
– TCAS status source
With respect to pilot interface and human factors, the system must display the
operational status to the crew (Mode 3A code, IDENT, emergency codes). If unable to
transmit, or in the event of a loss of function, the ADS-B must provide an appropriate
annunciation to the crew. Regulations require that aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out
operate with the equipment on at all times; if equipped with an on/off control it must be
located to prevent inadvertent actuation. An anonymous function is available but may be
used only if not requesting ATC services (Mode 3/A 1200). A single point of entry
should be used for Mode 3/A, IDENT and emergency codes, and the design should
minimize errors by the crew. The design should also enable the crew to detect and
correct errors. Transmission of a false position is considered a major failure and should
not occur at a rate of greater than 1 105 per hour; the safety analysis should consider
the potential of all pilot errors.
During flight test, EMI/EMC is to be evaluated during all phases of flight. Other
systems that may have been modified due to ADS-B installation should be verified to
operate properly. A flight profile to show the ADS-B equipment performs properly with
the FAA ground system needs to be accomplished; the AC provides the test area and
flight profile to be flown for this evaluation.
6.13.5.3 ADS-B In Airworthiness

There are three sources currently available for ADS-B in:
– ADS-B direct (1090 MHz) direct from other aircraft
– ADS-R (rebroadcast over 1090 MHz from ATC; original report sent to ATC via
UAT)
– TIS-B (1090 and UAT format sent from ATC on non–ADS-B targets, that is trans-
ponder replies)
Flight information services-broadcast (FIS-B) provides weather text, weather gra-
phics, NOTAMs, ATIS, and similar information. FIS-B is currently not available, but
will be a future fourth source for ADS-B In. The AC provides guidance for the display of
traffic information while on the airport surface and while airborne. TSO C-195a defines
the MOPS that provide the basis for installation; the TSO defines 3 classes of
equipment:
– Class A—cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) (surface only)
– Class B—CDTI (no restriction)
– Class C—airborne surveillance and separation assurance processing (ASSAP)
Class A equipment displays ADS-B traffic while ownship is on the surface and
moving slower than 80 kts; it must deactivate the CDTI when in the air or at speeds
greater than 80 kts. Class B equipment supports the display of ADS-B traffic without
restriction. Class C equipment processes ADS-B messages to generate traffic for a
CDTI. A summary of ADS-B in equipment classes and their allowable functions is
shown in Table 6.21.
The ADS-B in criticality for a loss of function or in the case of providing hazardous
or misleading information is shown in Table 6.22.
The airborne application displays traffic from a bird’s-eye view relative to ownship.
Each aircraft symbol displayed conveys position, direction and altitude information;
optional information, such as identity may also be displayed. The enhanced visual
TABLE 6.21 ¢ ADS-B In Equipment Classes
Avionics
CDTI
Surface Only CDTI ASSAP
Applications A B C
Enhanced Visual Acquisition Not Permitted Class B1 Class C1
Surface (Runways Only) Class A2 Class B2 Class C2
Surface (Runways and Taxiways Class A3 Class B3 Class C3
Visual Separation on Approach Not Permitted Class B4 Class C4
Airborne Not Permitted Class B5 Class C5
In-Trail Procedures Not Permitted Class B6 Class C6
TABLE 6.22 ¢ ADS-B In Equipment Criticality
Avionics Hazardous Misleading

Applications Loss of Function Information
Enhanced Visual Acquisition Minor Major
Surface (Runways Only) Minor Major (>80 kts)
Minor (< 80 kts)
Surface (Runways and Taxiways Minor Major (>80 kts)
Minor (< 80 kts)
Visual Separation on Approach Minor Major
Airborne Minor Major
In-Trail Procedures Minor Major
approach application allows the pilot to select an aircraft to follow on the approach;
additional information about the selected aircraft, including range and groundspeed, is
displayed to enhance the pilot’s situational awareness. The surface application with
runways and taxiways displays ADS-B traffic superimposed on a map of the airport
surface; different symbols indicate aircraft on the ground and airborne traffic. The sur-
face application for runways does not include taxiway traffic. The In-Trail Procedure
(ITP) application enables aircraft that desire FL changes in procedural airspace to
achieve these changes more efficiently. The ITP permits a climb through, or descent
through, or maneuver between, properly equipped aircraft using a new distance based
longitudinal separation minimum. The ITP requires specific application unique proces-
sing and display parameters; ITP requires operational approval (aircraft and crew, AR).
The CDTI may be presented on a dedicated display or integrated with the aircraft’s
EFIS, MFD or electronic flight bag. CDTI equipment should be compliant with the Class A
or Class B equipment requirements of TSO-C195. The display should be mounted in the
forward FOV for best situational awareness; side mounted displays may be used but may
be limited in more advanced applications. The crew must have an unobstructed view of the
display. ITP applications must have a CDTI and it is recommended to have a vertical
profile displayed during the maneuver; the required traffic symbology is contained in
Appendix 2 of the AC (AC 20-172A). The CDTI may use a dedicated control panel or be
integrated with existing aircraft systems. A means must be available to adjust the display
range between the minimum and maximum values, adjust the altitude bands between the
minimum and maximum values, and adjust the brightness of the display.
Optional controls may also be provided:
– Relative and actual altitude
– Selection of at least one traffic element
– Selection of alternate display criteria
– Declutter and return with a single action
– A means to indicate if auto-declutter is on
– Pan/zoom
– A means to designate traffic for an application (such as enhanced visual approach)
The ASSAP system accepts inputs from ADS-B reports, ADS-R reports, and TCAS
tracks; it correlates sources, creates tracks, and performs application-specific processing.
The tracks and alerts are then sent to the CDTI; ASSAP equipment must be compliant
with TSO-C195a Class C requirements.
Electrical bonding and load analysis are required. The total latency to receive,
process and display traffic must be less than 3 seconds (time from receipt of ADS-B
message). The total latency of ownship position at the display must be less than
3.5 seconds; ownship time of applicability must be within 1 second of the time of the
display. A latency analysis must be performed (appendix 1 of the AC provides metho-
dology). The same position source used for ADS-B out should be used to provide
position information to the ASSAP equipment. Equipment should be installed IAW
manufacturers’ instructions; parallax corrections to the GNSS antennas should be
known. The applicant needs to verify the equipment’s environmental qualifications
(RTCA/DO-160G) are compatible with the aircraft. Any limitations must be noted in the
AFM. As with all avionics systems in complex aircraft, a safety assessment is required:
unannunciated failures or hazardous misleading information is improbable for Class B,
remote for Class C and Probable for Class A.
Ground tests and flight tests are required to show airworthiness; the ground tests
entail the following:
– Verification of proper receipt and processing of messages
– Verification of proper integration with TCAS
– Verification of proper integration with the position sensor
– Verification of accuracy of CDTI displayed information
– Simulated messages from test equipment and targets of opportunity should be used
for the ground evaluation
During ground tests, the following traffic information should be validated as
received correctly:
– Relative horizontal position
– Ground speed/differential ground speed
– Directionality
– Pressure altitude and relative pressure altitude
– Vertical trend
– Air/ground status
– Flight ID
– TIS-B/ADS-R service status
– TCAS inputs
Ground tests will additionally verify:
– EMI/EMC
– Correct detection and annunciation of failures
– General arrangement of controls and displays
– Human factors emphasizing FAA key areas of concern
– Display symbology IAW appendix 2 of the AC
– ADS-B self-test
The reader will note that the required ground tests are nearly identical to those found
in the TCAS airworthiness testing.
Flight tests need to be conducted with cooperative ADS-B aircraft and conducted
within the TIS-B and ADS-R coverage areas. The flight tests should verify:
– Aircraft flight ID
– Ability to select a desired target aircraft
– Ability to display ground speed
– Bearing/distance to aircraft
– Altitude and relative altitude
– Direction
– Appropriate display of targets during maneuvers
During maneuvers, the displayed targets should not exhibit jitter or ratcheting and
should not blur or shimmer. Filtering (of track data) should not induce positioning errors
and false or redundant tracks should not occur regularly. If installed, surface target
information on the CDTI should match the real world. If ITP is installed, the function-
ality should be evaluated in accordance with the maneuver criteria described in Table 2
of AC 20-172A.
6.14 TERRAIN AWARENESS AND

WARNING SYSTEM
The terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) really encompasses a family of
terrain avoidance/awareness equipment. The basic system is known as a ground proxi-
mity warning system (GPWS), which depends on own-ship parameters and a radar
altimeter. The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) adds a digital
terrain database to the basic system so the aircraft can look ahead, much like an onboard
sensor such as radar or forward-looking infrared (FLIR). Helicopter TAWS (HTAWS) is
a specialized version, and only applies to Part 27 and 29 rotorcraft. The primary reason
for the installation of any TAWS is to prevent controlled flight into terrain (CFIT),
which is an accident or incident in which the airplane, under the flight crew’s control, is
inadvertently flown into terrain, obstacles, or water without either sufficient or timely
flight crew awareness to prevent the event. Since March 2005, the FAA has required the
installation of TAWS for all turbine-powered airplanes with six passenger seats or more
operating under Parts 91, 121, and 135. Larger aircraft have required TAWS equipment
since 1992. Although not required, the FAA also provides guidance for general aviation
aircraft with fewer than six passenger seats desiring TAWS installation.
The documentation that is relevant to the TAWS in relation to aircraft certification
includes
● RTCA/DO-161A, ‘‘Minimum Performance Standards—Airborne Ground Proximity
Warning Equipment,’’ May 27, 1976
● TSO-C151c, June 27, 2012 ‘‘Terrain Awareness and Warning System,’’ June 27, 2012
● AC 23-18, ‘‘Installation of Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS)
Approved for Part 23 Airplanes,’’ June 14, 2000
● AC 25-23, ‘‘Airworthiness Criteria for the Installation Approval of a Terrain

Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) for Part 25 Airplanes,’’ May 22, 2000
– RTCA/DO-309, Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for Heli-
copter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS), March 13, 2008 contains
the MOPS for HTAWS
– TSO-C194, Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS),
December 17, 2008, defines the standards manufacturers must meet for obtaining a
TSOA for their product
– AC 27-1B and AC 29-2C, Miscellaneous Guidance (MG 18) contains a means of
showing Airworthiness compliance
The basic GPWS provides the following functions:
● Excessive rates of descent
● Excessive closure to terrain
● Negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff
● Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration
● Excessive downward deviation from an ILS glideslope
● Descent of the airplane to 500 ft above the terrain or nearest runway elevation (voice
call out, ‘‘Five Hundred’’)
The enhanced portion of TAWS (EGPWS) adds the following functions:
● Forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA), which includes reduced required terrain
clearance (RTC) and imminent terrain impact. The FLTA function looks ahead of the
airplane along and below the airplane’s lateral and vertical flight path and provides
suitable alerts if a potential CFIT threat exists.
● Premature descent alert (PDA). The PDA function of the TAWS uses the airplane’s
current position and flight path information as determined from a suitable navigation
source and airport database to determine if the airplane is hazardously below the
normal (typically 3 ) approach path for the nearest runway as defined by the alerting
algorithm.
The TAWS must provide an appropriate aural and visual signal for FLTA and PDA
caution and warning alerts.
There are three classes of TAWS equipment. Class A equipment contains all of the
basic GPWS functions, FLTA, and PDA. Class B equipment must provide alerts for
excessive rate of descent, negative climb rate, or altitude loss during takeoff, a 500 ft
voice callout when the airplane descends to 500 ft above the nearest runway elevation,
FLTA, and PDA. Class C equipment is designed for general aviation aircraft that are not
required to have TAWS installed. Class C TAWS equipment must meet all the
requirements for class B TAWS with the small exceptions noted in TSO-C-151b. A
summary of Class A and Class B requirements is shown in Table 6.23.
Class A equipment must provide terrain information to be presented on a display
system. The following information must be provided on the display:
● The terrain must be depicted relative to the airplane’s position such that the pilot may
estimate the relative bearing to the terrain of interest.
TABLE 6.23 ¢ Summary of TAWS Requirements
Class A and Class B TAWS Requirements
TAWS Operating Passenger Seats FMS/RNAV Terrain

Class Rule (minimum) FLTA PDA GPWS or GPS Display Database
A 121 —* Yes Yes 1–6 FMS or GPS Yes Yes
A 135 >9 Yes Yes 1–6 GPS Yes Yes
B 135 6–9 Yes Yes 1, 3, 6 GPS No Yes
B 91 6 Yes Yes 1, 3, 6 GPS No Yes
*There is no seat threshold for 14 CFR Part 121. All 14 CFR Part 121 airplanes affected by the TAWS rules must install TAWS regardless of the number of
seats.
The GPWS equipage requirements in 14 CFR 121.360 and 123.153 expired and are superseded by the TAWS requirements in 14 CFR 121.354 and
135.154. TSO C-151c Class A equipment must meet the TSO C-92c requirements, but a separate TSO authorization for TSO-C92c is not required.
TABLE 6.24 ¢ TAWS RTC by Phase of Flight
TAWS RTC TAWS RTC

Phase of Flight TERPS (ROC) Level Flight Descending
Enroute 1000 ft 700 ft 500 ft
Terminal Intermediate Segment 500 ft 350 ft 300 ft
Approach 250 ft 150 ft 100 ft
Departure 48 ft/nm 100 ft 100 ft
● The terrain must be depicted relative to the airplane’s position such that the pilot may
estimate the distance to the terrain of interest.
● The terrain must be oriented to either the heading or the track of the airplane; a north-up
orientation may be added as a selectable format.
● Variations in terrain elevation depicted relative to the airplane’s elevation (above and
below) must be visually distinct. Terrain that is more than 2000 ft below the air-
plane’s elevation need not be depicted.
Operators required to install Class B equipment are not required to include a terrain
display; however, the equipment must be capable of driving a terrain display function in
the event that the installer wants to include a terrain display.
Class A and B equipment must provide suitable alerts when the airplane is currently
above the terrain in the airplane’s projected flight path but the projected amount of
terrain clearance is considered unsafe for the particular phase of flight. The required
obstacle (terrain) clearance (ROC) as specified in the U.S. Standard for Terminal
Instrument Procedures (TERPS) and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) have
been used to define the minimum requirements for obstacle/terrain clearance (RTC)
appropriate to the FLTA function. The TAWS RTC as a function of the phase of flight is
Class A and B equipment must provide suitable alerts when the airplane is currently
below the elevation of a terrain cell along the airplane’s lateral projected flight path and
based on the vertical projected flight path the equipment predicts that the clearance will
be less than that depicted in Table 6.20. The equipment must provide the alerts for
reduced RTC and imminent terrain impact in straight and level and turning flight.
Class A and B equipment must also provide an alert when it determines that the
airplane is significantly below the normal approach flight path to a runway. Alerting
criteria may be based on height above runway elevation and distance to the runway; it
may also be based on height above the terrain and distance to the runway. The doc-
umentation allows the manufacturer to determine the means for mechanizing premature
descent. The PDA should be available for all types of instrument approaches: straight-in,
circling, and approaches not aligned within 30 of the runway heading. The TAWS
equipment should not generate PDAs for normal operations around the airport: for
example, traffic patterns, circling minimums, VFR enroute to the airport.
A standard set of visual and aural alerts has been defined for the TAWS, and these
are repeated in Table 6.25.
In addition to providing the aural and visual alerts listed in Table 6.21, the TAWS
must perform the following functions:
● The required aural and visual alerts must initiate from the TAWS simultaneously,
except when suppression of aural alerts are necessary to protect pilots from nuisance
aural alerting.
● Each aural alert must identify the reason for the alert, such as ‘‘Too Low Terrain’’
and ‘‘Glideslope’’ or other acceptable annunciation.
● The system must remove the visual and aural alert once the situation has been
resolved.
● The system must be capable of accepting and processing airplane performance-
related data or airplane dynamic data and providing the capability to update aural and
visual alerts at least once per second.
● The visual display of alerting information must be immediately and continuously
displayed until the situation is no longer valid.
Class A equipment must have an interactive capability with other external alerting
systems so an alerting priority can be automatically executed for the purpose of not
causing confusion on the flight deck from different alerting systems. Class B equipment
does not require prioritization with external systems; if prioritization with those func-
tions is provided, the prioritization scheme must be the same as for Class A equipment.
An approved prioritization scheme is depicted in Table 6.26.
Class B equipment must establish an internal priority system for each of the func-
tions. The priority scheme must ensure that more critical alerts override the presentation
of any alert of lesser priority. Class B equipment need only consider the TAWS func-
tions required for Class B equipment. Table 6.27 provides a TAWS internal priority
scheme.
Since the TAWS is based on a digital terrain database, two things have to be correct
for the system to work properly. The first is the onboard navigation system; the navi-
gator places the aircraft on the map. The second is the map itself. Both of these systems
must be accurate to issue timely alerts and reduce the number of false alarms. Horizontal
position for TAWS must come from a GNSS source meeting TSO C-129(AR) or any
revision of TSO C-145, TSO C-146 or TSO C-196. The TSO (C-151c) notes that
Part 121 operators may operate on a nonGNSS source. Vertical position may come from
a barometric or GNSS source; Class A requires a RADAR altimeter.
Class A and B equipment that use a GPS internal to the TAWS for horizontal
position information and are capable of detecting a positional error that exceeds the
TABLE 6.25 ¢ Standard Set of TAWS Visual and Aural Alerts
Standard Set of Visual and Aural Alerts
Alert Condition Caution Warning

FLTA Functions Visual Alert Visual Alert
Reduced Required Amber text message that is obvious, Red text message that is obvious, concise,
Terrain Clearance and concise, and must be consistent and must be consistent with the aural
Imminent Impact with with the aural message. message.
Terrain
Class A & Class B Aural Alerts Aural Alerts
Minimum selectable voice alerts: Minimum selectable voice alerts:
‘‘Caution, Terrain; Caution, Terrain’’ ‘‘Terrain, Terrain; Pull-Up, Pull-Up’’
and ‘‘Terrain Ahead; Terrain Ahead’’ and ‘‘Terrain Ahead, Pull-Up; Terrain
Ahead, Pull-Up’’
Premature Descent Alert (PDA) Visual Alert Visual Alert
Class A & Class B Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
concise, and must be consistent
with the aural message.
Aural Alert Aural Alert

‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ None Required
Ground Proximity Visual Alert Visual Alert
Envelope 1, 2, or 3 Amber text message that is obvious, Red text message that is obvious, concise,
Excessive Descent Rate concise, and must be consistent and must be consistent with the Aural
Mode 1 with the aural message. message.
Class A & Class B
‘‘Sink Rate’’ ‘‘Pull-Up’’
Excessive Closure Rate Amber text message that is obvious, Red text message that is obvious, concise,
(Flaps not in Landing concise, and must be consistent and must be consistent with the aural
Configuration) with the aural message. message.
Mode 2A
Class A Aural Alert Aural Alert
‘‘Terrain, Terrain’’ ‘‘Pull-Up’’
Excessive Closure Rate Amber text message that is obvious, Red text message that is obvious, concise,
(Landing Configuration) concise, and must be consistent and must be consistent with the aural
Mode 2B with the aural message. message for gear up.
Class A
‘‘Terrain, Terrain’’ ‘‘Pull-Up’’—for gear up
None Required—for gear down
Altitude Loss after Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
Takeoff concise, and must be consistent
Mode 3 with the aural message.
Class A & Class B
Aural Alerts Aural Alert
‘‘Don’t Sink’’ and ‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ None Required
(Continues)
Standard Set of Visual and Aural Alerts

Envelope 1 (Gear and/or Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
flaps other than landing concise, and must be consistent
configuration) with the aural message.
Mode 4
Class A Aural Alerts Aural Alert
‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ and ‘‘Too Low None Required
Gear’’
Envelope 2 Insufficient Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
Terrain Clearance (Gear and/or concise, and must be consistent
flaps other than landing with the aural message.
configuration)
Mode 4
Class A Aural Alerts Aural Alert
‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ and ‘‘Too Low None Required
Flaps’’
Envelope 3 Insufficient Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
Terrain Clearance (Gear and/or concise, and must be consistent
flaps other than landing with the aural message.
configuration)
Mode 4
Class A Aural Alert Aural Alert
‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ None Required
Excessive Glideslope or Amber text message that is obvious, None Required
Glidepath Deviation concise, and must be consistent
Mode 5 with the aural message.
Class A
‘‘Glideslope’’ or ‘‘Glidepath’’ None Required
Altitude Callout (See Note 1) None Required None Required
Class A & Class B (See Note 3)
‘‘Five Hundred’’ None Required
Note 1: The call out for ground proximity altitude is considered advisory.
Note 2: Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if doing so fits with the overall Human Factors alerting scheme for the flight
deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent,
colored annunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements.
Note 3: Additional callouts can be made by the system, but the system is required to make the 500 ft voice callout.
appropriate alarm limit for the existing phase of flight are considered acceptable. When
the alarm limit is activated, the GPS computed position is considered unsuitable for the
TAWS function and an indication must be given to the aircrew indicating that TAWS is
no longer available due to navigation error.
TABLE 6.26 ¢ Alert Prioritization Scheme
ALERT PRIORITIZATION SCHEME
Priority Description Alert Levelb Comments

1 Reactive Windshear Warning W
2 Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning W continuous
3 Excessive Closure Pull-Up Warning W continuous
4 RTC Terrain Warning W
5 V1 Callout I
6 Engine Fail Callout W
7 FLTA Pull-Up warning W continuous
8 PWS Warning W
9 RTC Terrain Caution C continuous
10 Minimums I
11 FLTA Caution C 7 s period
12 Too Low Terrain C
13 PDA (‘‘Too Low Terrain’’) Caution C
14 Altitude Callouts I
15 Too Low Gear C
16 Too Low Flaps C
17 Sink Rate C
18 Don’t Sink C
19 Glideslope C 3 s period
20 PWS Caution C
21 Approaching Minimums I
22 Bank Angle C
23 Reactive Windshear Caution C
Mode 6a TCAS RA (‘‘Climb’’, ‘‘Descend’’, etc.) W continuous
Mode 6a TCAS TA (‘‘Traffic, Traffic’’) C continuous
a
These alerts can occur simultaneously with TAWS voice callout alerts.
W ¼ Warning, C ¼ Caution, A ¼ Advisory, I ¼ Informational.
b
TABLE 6.27 ¢ TAWS Internal Alert Prioritization Scheme
TAWS Internal Alert Priority Scheme
Priority Description
1 Sink Rate Pull-up Warning
2 Terrain Awareness Pull-up Warning
3 Terrain Awareness Caution
4 PDA (‘‘Too Low Terrain’’) Caution
5 Altitude Callout (500 ft)
6 Sink Rate
7 Don’t Sink (GPWS Mode 3)
As a minimum, terrain and airport information must be provided for the expected
areas of operation, airports, and routes to be flown. The terrain and airport information
must be of an accuracy and resolution suitable for the system to perform its intended
function. Terrain data should be gridded at 30 arc seconds with 100 ft resolution within
30 nm of all airports with runway lengths of 3500 ft or greater, or whenever necessary
(this is true in mountainous areas). It should be gridded at 15 arc seconds (or even 6 arc
seconds) with 100 ft resolution within 6 nm of the closest runway. Terrain may be
gridded in larger segments over oceanic and remote areas.
NOTE: There are 60 arc seconds in an arc minute, and an arc minute is 1/60 of 1 . One
degree of latitude equals 60 nm. One arc second is 1/3600 60 ¼ 1/60 nm ¼ 100 ft;
30 arc seconds ¼ 3000 ft; 15 arc seconds ¼ 1500 ft; and 6 arc seconds ¼ 600 ft
(in latitude); for longitude, 1 ¼ cos latitude (60) nm.
Class A and B equipment must include a failure monitor function that provides
reliable indications of equipment condition during operation. It must monitor the
equipment itself, input power, input signals, and aural and visual outputs. A means must
be provided to inform the flight crew whenever the system has failed or can no longer
provide the intended function. The equipment must also have a self-test function to
verify system operation and integrity. Failure of the system self-test must be
annunciated.
Class A equipment must have the capability, via a control switch to the flight crew,
to inhibit only the FLTA function, the PDA function, and the terrain display. This is
required in the event of a navigation failure or other failures that would adversely affect
the system. The basic TAWS (GPWS) required functions should remain active when the
inhibit function is used. Automatic inhibit is acceptable, but must be annunciated to the
crew.
TAWS search volume and alerting logic is based on the aircraft’s phase of flight. The
TSO defines four phases of flight for TAWS: enroute, terminal, approach, and departure.
The phases are defined by distances from and height above the nearest airport.
● Enroute. The enroute phase exists anytime the aircraft is more than 15 nm from the
nearest airport or whenever the conditions for terminal, approach, or departure are
not met.
● Terminal. The terminal phase exists when the airplane is 15 nm or less from the
nearest runway while the range to the nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the
airplane is at or below a straight line drawn between the two points specified in
Table 6.28 relative to the nearest runway.
● Approach. The approach phase exists when the distance to the nearest runway
threshold is equal to or less than 5 nm and the height above the nearest runway
threshold is equal to or less than 1900 ft and the distance to the threshold is decreasing.
● Departure. The departure phase needs to be determined by some reliable parameter
indicating that the aircraft is on the ground. This could be a weight-on-wheels sensor
or logic, which states that if airspeed is less than 35 knots and altitude is 75 ft, then
the airplane must be on the ground. Similarly, logic may state that if airspeed is
greater than 50 knots and altitude is greater than 100 ft above field elevation, then the
airplane must be flying. At any rate, once the airplane has reached 1500 ft above the
departure runway, the departure phase is terminated.
TABLE 6.28 ¢ Height Above Versus Distance to the Runway
Distance to Runway Height Above Runway

15 nm 3500 ft
5 nm 1900 ft
6.14.1 TAWS Evaluations

Each of the pertinent ACs (AC 25-23, AC 23-18) is similar in the proposed method of
airworthiness certification. The number of seats and the operating rules of the applicant
will determine the class of TAWS equipment required (see Table 6.23). This section
addresses the evaluations necessary for Class A and Class B TAWS installation. TAWS
Class C installation will be addressed in the next section.
As noted in earlier sections of this chapter, the proposed certification plan will be
multifaceted. Since this is an integrated and highly complex system, a systems safety
assessment will be required. The probability of an unannounced failure, hazardously
misleading information (HMI), or false alerts at the box level is 105. In order to
accomplish this, the TAWS needs to meet the following criteria:
● The probability of a failure that would lead to the loss of all TAWS functions shall be
103 per flight hour.
● The probability of a false caution or warning alert due to undetected or latent failures
shall be 104 per flight hour.
● The probability of an unannounced failure of the system to provide the required
alerting functions due to undetected or latent failures shall be 104 per flight hour.
● The probability of the system providing HMI to the TAWS display due to undetected
or latent failures shall be 104 per flight hour.
● Failure of the installed TAWS shall not degrade the integrity of any essential or
critical system installed in the airplane with which the TAWS interfaces.
In addition to the safety assessment, the applicant will be expected to submit a
human factors plan, testing plan, conformity and continued airworthiness plans, and
compliance documentation. Simulators are mentioned in the ACs as viable tools as an
aid to certification. Some of the characteristics of a TAWS installation and flight deck
integration that may be evaluated via simulation are
● Displays
● Alert prioritization
● Mode transitions
● Pop-up displays
● Autoranging
● Self-test
● Operational workload issues
● Accessibility and usability of the TAWS controls
● System failure modes
Two subjects that have not been mentioned previously have been brought up in this
list. Autoranging is not required, but may be installed. A TAWS alert at a range greater
than the selected display range will automatically provide the aircrew with a new display
range so the threat can be seen. If implemented, it must be obvious to the crew that the
range scale has changed; switching back to a manually selected range should require
minimal effort. A pop-up feature is similar to display override, which was previously
discussed. When a TAWS display is not being presented to the crew, a TAWS alert pop-up
feature automatically displays TAWS-related information.
6.14.2 TAWS Ground Test

The ACs state that a ground evaluation should be conducted for each TAWS installation.
Once again, simulators may be used to enhance/reduce the amount of on-aircraft ground
testing. In addition, computer-generated test equipment accepted by the TAWS manu-
facturer may be used in place of flight testing for basic TAWS Class B equipment and
minimize the extent of flight testing required for Class A TAWS equipment. Some of the
items that should be considered for the ground test are as follows:
● Acceptable location of the TAWS controls, displays, and annunciators
● Exercise self-test functions
● Evaluation of identified failure modes
● Evaluation of all discretes and TAWS interfaces
● Electromagnetic interference (EMI) and EMC
● Electrical transient testing
● Visibility and characteristics of any provided display under all lighting conditions
6.14.3 TAWS Flight Test

AC 25-23 and AC 23-18 provide identical flight test requirements for the installation of
TAWS Class A and B equipment. The level of flight testing is determined by the type of
aircraft, the level of integration and system architecture, and whether or not the system
has been certified in another aircraft. The requirements for flight testing are determined
for each installation. Any first-time installation or new sensor inputs require flight
testing. The ACs provide flight test guidelines by examining six examples of certifica-
tion and which modes of the TAWS must be evaluated in flight. Table 6.29 relates the
type of installation to the required flight test.
● Example 1 is a first-time installation of the vendor’s equipment under the TC/STC
process; thorough ground and flight testing must be conducted.
● Example 2 is a follow-on installation of a previously approved TAWS where a
required sensor input has not been previously approved—a new barometric altitude
input (or equivalent) that was not previously approved.
● Example 3 is a follow-on installation of a previously approved TAWS system where
the terrain display has not been previously approved.
● Example 4 is a follow-on installation of a previously approved TAWS system where
the sensor that provides the horizontal position input has not been previously
approved (e.g., perhaps upgrading the GPS to a GPS with WAAS capabilities).
TABLE 6.29 ¢ Flight Test Matrix for TAWS Examples
TAWS Functions Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4 Example 5 Example 6

FLTA X X X X X
PDA X X X X
Basic GPWS X X
Terrain Display (Class A) X X X X
Horizontal Position Source X X X
Example 5 does not apply to Class B equipment.
Class B equipment are not required to provide a display.
● Example 5 is a follow-on installation of a previously approved TAWS where the

sensor that provides radar altitude has not been previously approved.
● Example 6 involves the installation of a vendor’s TAWS into an airplane previously
fitted with basic GPWS from the same vendor and the algorithms and sensors for the
basic GPWS functions of TAWS remain the same.
The ACs are quite nebulous in discussing the flight test considerations for the
TAWS airworthiness evaluations. For the FLTA function, the ACs only state that
● All alerts (cautions and warnings) are given at an appropriate point in the test run.
● All pop-up, autorange, and other display features are working correctly.
● The display depicts the terrain accurately.
The ACs advise that test runs be made at 500 ft above the terrain or obstacle of
interest and at least 15 nm from the nearest airport (enroute phase of flight), and if this is
not possible, lower the fly-over altitude to 300 ft (terminal/intermediate phase of flight).
The clearance numbers (500 and 300 ft) are only good for an aircraft that is descending.
The clearances numbers for level flight in the same phases of flight are 700 and 350 ft
respectively (see Table 6.24). For an accurate determination of whether your TAWS
system is installed correctly or not you would have to revisit TSO-C-151c. An accurate
evaluation of the FLTA function requires test points for level and descending flight
during the four phases of flight previously discussed: enroute, terminal, approach, and
departure. The warnings that are provided to the aircrew will ensure that the RTC alti-
tudes in Table 6.24 can be met. (The TSO assumes a 1 sec pilot response time and 0.25 g
constant g pull-up at various descent rates.) Table 6.30 shows the test criteria for
TAWS cautions and warnings for FLTA during a descent in the enroute phase of flight.
Figure 6.30 depicts the 100 ft/min case.
It should be fairly obvious that this can only work correctly if the altitude of the
obstruction, its horizontal position, and the aircraft’s position and altitude are known.
We must also compare apples to apples. If the database is in WGS-84, then our TAWS
must measure altitude (height) in WGS-84. If we try and compare barometric altitude
with a WGS-84 database we will run into some severe problems, especially at higher
altitudes or in extremely cold climates.
During enroute level flight (500 ft/min), a terrain alert should be posted when the
airplane is within 700 ft of the terrain and is predicted to be equal to or less than 700 ft
within the prescribed alerting time or distance.
TABLE 6.30 ¢ TAWS Enroute Descent Alerting Criteria
Enroute Descent Alerting Criteria
Minimum TAWS Warning

Maximum TAWS Alert Height Above
Total Alt Caution Alert Height Terrain: ‘‘Terrain, Terrain,
Descent Alt lost with Alt Required Lost Due to Above Terrain: Pull-up, Pull-up,’’ ‘‘Terrain
Rate 3 sec Pilot to L/O with Recovery ‘‘Caution Terrain,’’ Ahead, Pull-up, Terrain
(ft/min) Delay 0.25g Maneuver ‘‘Terrain Ahead’’ Ahead, Pull-up’’
1000 50 17 67 1200 ft 567 ft
2000 100 69 169 1400 ft 669 ft
3000 200 278 478 1800 ft 978 ft
Aircraft Altitude 5000 ft FIGURE 6.30 ¢

1000 ft/min Descent Enroute Descent
Alert at 1000 ft/min
“Caution Terrain”
at 4200 ft
“Terrain, Terrain, Pull-up,

Pull-up” at 3567 ft
Obstruction Altitude
3000 ft
TABLE 6.31 ¢ TAWS Terminal Descent Alerting Criteria
Terminal Descent Alerting Criteria

Maximum TAWS Alert Height Above
Total Alt Lost Caution Alert Height Terrain: ‘‘Terrain, Terrain,
Descent Alt Lost Alt Required Due to Above Terrain: Pull-up, Pull-up,’’ ‘‘Terrain
Rate with 1 sec to L/O with recovery ‘‘Caution Terrain,’’ Ahead, Pull-up, Terrain
(ft/min) Pilot Delay 0.25g Maneuver ‘‘Terrain Ahead’’ Ahead, Pull-up’’
1000 17 17 34 700 ft 334 ft
2000 33 69 102 900 ft 402 ft
3000 50 156 206 1100 ft 506 ft
For the terminal phase of flight (descent), a terrain alert must be provided in time as
to ensure that the airplane can level off with a minimum of 300 ft altitude clearance over
the terrain/obstacle. The pilot reaction time, pull-up maneuver, and descent rates are the
same as previously described for the enroute test. Table 6.31 shows the terminal descent
alerting criteria for TAWS.
The test is run the same way as depicted in Figure 6.30 with the aircraft within
15 nm of an airport. For level flight during the terminal phase, a terrain alert should be
posted when the airplane is less than 350 ft above the terrain and is predicted to be
within 350 ft or less for the prescribed alerting time or distance.
During the approach phase (distance to nearest runway threshold is 5 nm, height
above threshold is 1900 ft, and distance to runway is decreasing), a terrain alert must be
provided in time to ensure that the airplane can level off with a minimum of 100 ft altitude
clearance over the terrain/obstacle. The assumed pilot response is the same as for enroute
and terminal conditions; the vertical velocity cases are somewhat lower. Table 6.32 pro-
vides the conditions for the TAWS alerts for descent in the approach phase.
During level flight operations at the minimum descent altitude (MDA), a terrain
alert should be posted when the airplane is within 150 ft (it is allowable to issue an alert
as much as 200 ft) of the terrain and is predicted to be 150 ft within the prescribed
alerting time or distance.
The final function of FLTA is imminent terrain impact. Class A and B TAWS
equipment must alert the aircrew when the aircraft is currently below a terrain cell along
TABLE 6.32 ¢ TAWS Approach Descent Alerting Criteria
Approach Descent Alerting Criteria

Total Alt Maximum TAWS Alert Height Above
Lost Due Caution Alert Height Terrain: ‘‘Terrain, Terrain,
Descent Alt Lost Alt required to Above Terrain: ‘‘Caution Pull-up, Pull-up,’’ ‘‘Terrain
Rate with 1 sec to L/O with Recovery Terrain,’’ ‘‘Terrain Ahead, Pull-up, Terrain
(ft/min) Pilot Delay 0.25g Maneuver Ahead’’ Ahead, Pull-up’’
500 8 4 12 350 ft 112 ft
750 12 10 22 400 ft 122 ft
1000 17 18 35 450 ft 135 ft
1500 25 39 64 550 ft 164 ft
TABLE 6.33 ¢ FLTA Imminent Terrain Impact Alerts
Imminent Terrain Impact Alerting Criteria
Groundspeed Height of Terrain Distance from Test Altitude Alert

(knots) Cell (MSL) Runway (NM) Run-in (MSL) Criteria
200–300 10,000 30 9000 Must Alert
400–500 10,000 30 8000 Must Alert
150–250 2000 10 1500 Must Alert
100–140 600 5 500 Must Alert
100–160 600 4 200 Must Alert
160 600 5 500 Must Alert
the aircraft’s lateral flight path and based on the vertical projected flight path the
equipment predicts that the RTC (Table 6.24) cannot be met. The assumed pilot
response is as previously described. Table 6.33 contains the TSO recommended test
conditions for FLTA imminent terrain impact.
So, as a recap of the flight tests required for FLTA:
● Enroute descent alert
● Enroute level alert
● Terminal descent alert
● Terminal level alert
● Approach descent alert
● Approach level alert
● Imminent terrain impact
The second mode of TAWS is the Premature Descent Alert (PDA). The purpose of the
evaluation is to verify that the pilot will be alerted to a low altitude condition at an altitude
that is defined by the specific design PDA alert surface. In other words, the TSO does not
specify unique ‘‘pass/fail’’ criteria for this mode. When applying for a TSO, the applicant
defines these criteria along with the proposed recovery procedures. When performing the
flight test of this function, the evaluator must first determine the PDA alert surface used by
the vendor and perform the recovery procedures used in the vendor’s assumptions.
TABLE 6.34 ¢ PDA Test Conditions
Premature Descent Alert Criteria
Groundspeed Vertical Speed Distance from Runway PDA Alert Height Recovery Altitude
(knots) (ft/min) Threshold (nm) (MSL) (MSL)
80 750 15 Determined Determined
100 1500 15
120 750 15
140 1500 15
160 750 15 By By
200 1500 15
250 2000 15
80 750 12
100 1500 12
120 750 12 Vendor Vendor
140 1500 12
160 750 12
80 750 4
100 1500 4
120 750 4
140 1500 4
80 750 2
100 1500 2
120 750 2
140 1500 2
Flight testing of the PDA function can be conducted in any airport area within
10 nm of the nearest runway. The airplane should be configured for landing at
approximately 1500 ft AGL along the final approach segment of the runway at
approximately 10 nm from the runway. At the 10 nm point, a nominal 3 glide path
descent should be initiated and maintained until the PDA occurs.
AC 25-23 and AC 23-18 both note that the runway that is selected should be rela-
tively flat along the extended centerline, as terrain/obstacles will trigger the FLTA
function. The PDA caution will sound ‘‘Too Low Terrain,’’ as opposed to the ‘‘Caution
Terrain’’ or ‘‘Terrain Ahead’’ for the FLTA function. The AC also notes that if it is not
possible to find a runway that is free of terrain/obstacles, then the evaluator may increase
the barometric altitude by 1 inHg to allow radar altimeter inputs to trigger the PDA.
Since the recovery altitude is based on groundspeed and vertical velocity, the TSO
recommends that this evaluation be conducted with multiple combinations of these two
parameters. Table 6.34 defines these conditions.
In addition to evaluating the FLTA and PDA functions, the TAWS should be
demonstrated as free from nuisance alerts. In general, the aircraft should be able to
conduct normal flight operations without nuisance TAWS alerts. The TSO specifies that
that for each phase of flight
● It must be possible to descend at 4000 ft/min in the enroute phase and level-off
1000 ft above the terrain using a normal level-off procedure without a TAWS caution
or warning.
● It must be possible to descend at 2000 ft/min in the terminal phase and level-off 500 ft
above the terrain using normal level-off procedures without a TAWS caution or warning.
FIGURE 6.31 ¢
Mode 1, Excessive “Sink Rate”
Rate of Descent
“Pull Up”
2500
”
ate
2000
Radio Altitude (feet)
kR
in
“S
1500
p”
lU
ul
1000
“P
500
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Descent Rate (feet/minute)
● It must be possible to descend at 1000 ft/min in the approach phase and level-off at
the MDA using normal level-off procedures without a TAWS caution or warning.
The TSO calls out specific instrument approaches that should be flown with lateral
and vertical errors to ensure adequate protection by the TAWS. In addition, the TAWS
should be evaluated against known accident cases to ensure integrity. These tests are
performed in simulation by the vendor and will not be addressed here.
TAWS class A equipment must contain the basic GPWS functions: excessive rate of
descent, excessive closure to terrain, negative climb rate or loss of altitude after takeoff,
flight into terrain when not in landing configuration, excessive downward deviation
from an ILS glideslope, and voice callouts ‘‘500 feet.’’ Class B TAWS equipment is
only required to have three of the basic GPWS functions: excessive rate of descent,
negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff, and voice callouts.
The minimum operational performance standards for the basic GPWS is contained in
RTCA DO-161A and the governing TSO is TSO-C92c. Airworthiness guidance is the
same as for TAWS (AC 25-23 and AC 23-18). There are some slight differences between
the Class A and Class B functions of the basic GPWS and they will be addressed shortly.
Excessive rate of descent (mode 1) should be tested over level terrain while ver-
ifying the system correlates to the RTCA DO-161A envelopes. The mode 1 envelope for
the caution ‘‘Sink Rate’’ and the warning ‘‘Pull Up’’ are shown in Figure 6.31.
For Class A TAWS equipment, the aircraft should initiate the test above the AGL
altitude selected for the test and ‘‘fly’’ into the envelope noting the altitude (AGL) and
vertical velocity at the callouts. For example, establish the aircraft at 2500 ft AGL and
initiate a descent rate of 3000 ft/min. The TAWS should signal ‘‘Sink Rate’’ at 1250 ft AGL
and ‘‘Pull Up’’ at 100 ft AGL. This test verifies the proper installation of barometric altitude
(and the corresponding calculation of barometric altitude rate) and the radar altitude.
For Class B TAWS equipment, the TSO presents a slightly different chart for mode 1
and is shown at Figure 6.32. The y-axis of the chart in the TSO is labeled ‘‘Height Above
Terrain’’ as opposed to radar altitude in Figure 6.31. This is because (in Class B instal-
lations) the height is determined by subtracting terrain elevation (from the terrain data-
base) from the current QNH barometric altitude (or equivalent). Remember apples to
apples! In both cases, only one test run is required to verify the installation.
The test of excessive closure rate to terrain (mode 2) verifies the installation/
integration of the radar altimeter. The envelopes for the caution ‘‘Terrain, Terrain’’ and
6000 FIGURE 6.32 ¢

Class B Excessive
Descent Rate
5000
Height above Terrain (ft)
4000
3000
2000 Sink Rate Area
1000
Pull Up Area
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
Altitude Rate (fpm descent)
2500 FIGURE 6.33 ¢

“Terrain
“Pull Up” Mode 2A Excessive
Terrain”
2000 Terrain Closure,
Flaps Up
1500
”
errain
1000
“Pull Up”
ain T
500
“Terr
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Terrain Closure Rate (feet/min)
the warning ‘‘Pull Up’’ vary when the flaps are in a landing configuration or not. This
difference is called out as mode 2A (flaps not in a landing configuration) and mode 2B
(flaps in a landing configuration). These modes are for class A equipment only. The
evaluation should be flown over an area of known rising terrain where the slope and
airspeed combination will trigger the aural alerts. Mode 2A and code 2B envelopes are
depicted in Figures 6.33 and 6.34, respectively.
Mode 3, negative climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff, is the same for TAWS
class A and class B equipment, however, like mode 2, class B equipment determines a
height above the runway using barometric altitude (or equivalent) and runway elevation
in lieu of radar altitude. This test is conducted immediately after takeoff before climbing
above 700 ft AGL. If a descent is initiated following a takeoff or go-around, the TAWS
stores the altitude value at which the descent began and compares successive altitude
data to the stored value. Activation of the ‘‘Don’t Sink’’ or ‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ is
induced when a minimum terrain clearance as a function of altitude loss is exceeded.
This warning area is depicted in Figure 6.35. The flight test would entail performing a
FIGURE 6.34 ¢ 2500

Mode 2B Excessive “Terrain
Terrain Closure, Terrain” “Pull Up”
2000

Flaps for Landing
1500
1000 “Terr
ain T
errai
n”
500
“Pull Up”
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
Terrain Closure Rate (feet/min)
FIGURE 6.35 ¢
Mode 3 Altitude “Don’t Sink”
1000
Loss After Takeoff

5 Ft/Sec
750
500
250 “Don’t
“Don’t sink”
Sink”
0
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175
Altitude Loss (feet)
normal takeoff and, at 500 ft AGL, initiating a descent rate of 5 ft/sec and noting the
altitude lost and current altitude when the alert is given.
Mode 4, flight into terrain when not in landing configuration, is only required for
class A equipment and provides alerts and warnings for insufficient terrain clearance
based on phase of flight and airspeed. This mode is broken down into three submodes:
mode 4A, mode 4B, and mode 4C. Mode 4A is active during the enroute and approach
phase of flight, with gear not in landing configuration, and has two warning areas
initiating a ‘‘Too Low Terrain’’ or ‘‘Too Low Gear.’’ Figure 6.36 shows these warning
regions.
Mode 4B is also active in the enroute and approach phase of flight with gear in a
landing position, but flaps not in a landing configuration. Similar to mode 4A, there are
two warning regions described by the TSO that will issue the alerts ‘‘Too Low Terrain’’
or ‘‘Too Low Flaps.’’ Figure 6.37 shows the warning areas for mode 4B.
Mode 4C is active during the takeoff phase of flight with either gear or flaps not in
landing configuration. It is designed to prevent CFIT on takeoff climb into terrain that
produces an insufficient closure rate for a mode 2 warning. Mode 4C is based on a
minimum terrain clearance that increases with radar altitude during takeoff
(Figure 6.38). Modes 4A and 4B should be tested while conducting a visual approach to
a runway, planning to enter the warning areas as depicted. Mode 4C should be con-
ducted from a runway with rising terrain on the extended departure centerline.
Mode 5 provides alerts when the airplane descends below the glideslope on an ILS
approach. The alerts are issued in two distinct tones depending on the aircraft’s position
on the glideslope. Figure 6.39 depicts the alert areas for mode 5. When the airplane is at
1500 FIGURE 6.36 ¢

1400 Unsafe Terrain Clearance
Min Terrain Clearance (feet)

1300 Mode 4A Unsafe
1200 Gear Up
1100
Terrain Clearance,
1000 Too Low Terrain Gear Up
900
800 Warning Area
700
600
500
400 Too Low
“Too Low 300 Gear Warning
Terrain” Aircraft Slowed to 200
100 Area
Less than 190 Knots 0
0 70 100 150 200 250
Computed Airspeed (knots)
“Too Low Terrain”
“Too Low Gear”
Runway
1500 FIGURE 6.37 ¢

1300 Gear Down, Flaps <30 Mode 4B Unsafe
1200 Terrain Clearance,
1100
1000 Too Low Terrain Gear Down, Flaps
900 Warning Area Not In Landing
800
700 Too Low Configuration
600
500 Flaps Warning
400 Area
“Too Low 300
Terrain” Aircraft Slowed to 200
Less than 159 knots 100
Gear Down 0
0 100 200 300 400
Computed Airspeed (knots)
“Too Low Terrain”
“Too Low Flaps”
Runway
3000
FIGURE 6.38 ¢
2600 Gear Down, Flaps not in Landing Mode 4C Unsafe
“Too Low 2400 Configuration 1500 FPM Climb Rate

Terrain” 2200 Terrain Clearance,
2000 Takeoff Over Flat Terrain or water Minimum Terrain
1800
1600 Warning Area Clearance
1400 (>250 knots)
1200 Warning Area
1000
(<190 knots)
800
600
“Too Low Terrain” 400
200
0
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
least 1.3 dots (but not more than 2 dots) below the glideslope, a soft ‘‘Glideslope’’ is
issued. If the aircraft continues the descent and deviates more than 2 dots below the
glideslope, a hard ‘‘Glideslope’’ is issued. The evaluation is performed on an ILS
approach first setting the aircraft 1.5 dots below the glideslope and then increasing the
deviation to just over 2 dots.
FIGURE 6.39 ¢

Mode 5 below Glideslope Alert
Excessive 1000 Gear Down
Downward Deviation 900
800
from an ILS 700 Soft Alert Area
Glideslope Glideslope 600
Beam Centre 500
Soft 400
300
Glideslope Hard 200 Hard Alert Area
Glideslope 100
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
Soft Alert Area Glideslope Deviation
(dots fly up)
Hard Alert Area
Runway
FIGURE 6.40 ¢ “Approaching

Mode 6 Advisory Minimums”
Callouts “Minimums”
“Fifty”
Runway
2500
“Bank Angle
Bank Angle”
Bank Angle
Curve
150 Feet
30 Feet
200
0
0 +/−10 +/−30 +/−40 +/−50
Roll Angle (+/− Degrees)
Mode 6 is the advisory callout. Only one callout is mandatory for class A and class B
equipment and that is the ‘‘500’’ that will be seen and heard during all of the tests that have
been previously discussed whenever the aircraft passes through 500 ft. Unlike class A,
which uses a radar altimeter, class B equipment determines the 500 ft height by sub-
tracting runway elevation (from the airport database) from the current barometric altitude
(or equivalent). When the height above terrain first reaches 500 ft, a single voice alert
‘‘500’’ or equivalent must be provided.
Many aircraft have elected to incorporate other advisory callouts into the TAWS.
They may be, but are not limited to, ‘‘Approaching Minimums,’’ ‘‘Minimums,’’ ‘‘50’’ (ft),
or ‘‘Bank Angle.’’ Although not required, if they are incorporated they must be proven as
correctly performing their intended function. Figure 6.40 presents examples of the mode 6
advisory callouts.
TABLE 6.35 ¢ TAWS Required Terrain Clearance
Small Aircraft TAWS Required TAWS Required

Required Obstacle Terrain Clearance, Terrain Clearance,
Phase of Flight Clearance Level Flight Descending
Cruise 500 ft 250 ft 200 ft
Takeoff 48 ft/nm 100 ft 100 ft
Landing 250 ft 150 ft 100 ft
The TAWS may also be used to issue wind shear warnings. This is accomplished by
looking at increasing and decreasing headwinds, and increasing and decreasing updrafts
and downdrafts. In some aircraft, this is called TAWS mode 7, wind shear warnings. An
evaluation of this mode would be performed in a simulator or by using vendor-approved
computerized test equipment. Mode 7 is not required by the TSO, but if installed, it must
be able to perform its intended function.
6.14.4 TAWS Class C Evaluations

There are some modifications to the TSO regarding TAWS class C equipment. Class C
equipment is intended for small general aviation airplanes that are not required to install
class B equipment.
The first change to class B requirements involves a change in the description of
phase of flight. Class C defines phases of flight as
● Takeoff: positive rate of climb, inside the airport traffic control area, distance to the
nearest runway threshold is increasing, and the airplane is below 1000 ft.
● Cruise: anytime the airplane is outside of the airport traffic control area.
● Landing: the airplane is inside the airport traffic control area, the distance to the
nearest runway threshold is decreasing, and the airplane is below 1000 ft.
NOTE: The vendor is the determining factor of the airport control area, which is usually
out to 10 nm from the nearest airport.
For the TAWS to work properly, a means must be provided to compute an actual
aircraft MSL altitude that is immune to temperature errors and manual correction errors
that would otherwise prevent the TAWS from performing its intended function. If the
TAWS includes a terrain display output. This reference altitude value used for TAWS
alerts should also be output for display. Since the altitude value is necessarily based on
GPS-derived MSL altitude, which is required for horizontal position in all class B and C
TAWS, the displayed value must be labeled MSL/G or MSL-G, or another obvious
acronym that relates to the pilot that altitude is GPS-derived MSL altitude.
The RTC also differs from the TAWS class A and B equipment. Table 6.24 is
revised for class C and is shown in Table 6.35.
The aural and visual alerts are also slightly modified from Table 6.25. Table 6.36
shows the TAWS class C standard set of visual and aural alerts. The test conditions
specified in the TSO are appropriate to small aircraft.
A terrain alert during cruise descent must be issued in time as to ensure that the
airplane can level off with a minimum of 200 ft clearance over the obstacle when
descending toward terrain within the operational flight envelope of the airplane. The test
TABLE 6.36 ¢ TAWS Class C Visual and Aural Alerts
STANDARD SET OF VISUAL AND AURAL ALERTS

Terrain Awareness Visual Alert Visual Alert
Reduced Required Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and Red text message that is obvious, concise and
Terrain Clearance must be consistent with the Aural message. must be consistent with the Aural message.
Minimum Selectable Voice Alert: ‘‘Caution, Minimum Selectable Voice Alert: ‘‘Terrain;
Terrain; Caution, Terrain’’ Terrain’’

Imminent Impact Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and Red text message that is obvious, concise and
with Terrain must be consistent with the Aural message. must be consistent with the Aural message.
Minimum Selectable Voice Alert: ‘‘Caution, Minimum Selectable Voice Alert: ‘‘Terrain;
Terrain; Caution, Terrain’’ Terrain’’
Premature Descent Amber text message that is obvious, concise and None Required
Alert (PDA) must be consistent with the Aural message.
‘‘Too Low; Too Low’’ None Required
Excessive Descent Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and Red text message that is obvious, concise and
Rate must be consistent with the Aural message. must be consistent with the Aural message.
‘‘Sink Rate’’ ‘‘Pull-Up’’
Altitude Loss after Amber text message that is obvious, concise, and None Required.
Take-off must be consistent with the Aural message.
‘‘Don’t Sink’’ None Required.
Voice Call Out None Required None Required.
(See Note 1)
‘‘Five Hundred’’ or selected altitude None Required
Note 1: The call out for ground proximity altitude is considered advisory.
Note 2: Visual alerts may be put on the terrain situational awareness display, if doing so fits with the overall Human Factors alerting scheme for the flight
deck. This does not eliminate the visual alert color requirements, even in the case of a monochromatic display. Typically in such a scenario, adjacent,
colored annunciator lamps meet the alerting color requirements.
conditions assume a descent along a flight path that has terrain that is 500 ft below the
expected level-off altitude. If the pilot initiates the level-off at the proper altitude, no
TAWS alert should be expected. If he delays the level-off, a TAWS alert is required to
recover to level flight in a safe manner. The assumed pilot reaction time is 3 sec with a
1 g incremental pull-up at descent rates of 500, 1000, and 200 ft/min. Table 6.37 depicts
the cruise descent class C alerting criteria.
TABLE 6.37 ¢ Cruise Descent Class C Alerting Criteria
Cruise Descent Alerting Criteria
Total Alt Maximum TAWS Caution Minimum TAWS

Descent Alt Lost with Alt Required Lost Due to Alert Height Above Warning Alert Height
Rate 3 sec Pilot to L/O with Recovery Terrain: ‘‘Caution Terrain, Above Terrain:
(ft/min) Delay 1g Pullup Maneuver Caution, Terrain’’ ‘‘Terrain, Terrain’’
500 25 1 26 550 ft 226 ft
1000 50 4 54 600 ft 254 ft
2000 100 17 117 800 ft 317 ft
TABLE 6.38 ¢ Approach Descent Class C Alerting Criteria
Approach Descent Alerting Criteria
Total Alt Maximum TAWS Caution Minimum TAWS

Descent Alt Lost with Alt Required Lost Due to Alert Height Above Terrain: Warning Alert Height
Rate 1 sec Pilot to L/O with Recovery ‘‘Caution Terrain, Caution, Above Terrain:
(ft/min) Delay 1g Pullup Maneuver Terrain’’ ‘‘Terrain, Terrain’’
500 8 1 9 300 ft 109 ft
750 12 2 14 325 ft 114 ft
1000 17 4 21 350 ft 121 ft
During cruise level flight conditions (vertical speed is 200 ft/min), a terrain alert
should be posted when the airplane is within 250 ft of the terrain and is predicted to be
200 ft above the terrain.
A terrain alert during approach descent must be given in time to ensure that the
airplane can level off with a minimum of 100 ft clearance above the terrain/obstacle.
Table 6.38 provides the alerting conditions for TAWS class C approach descent. The
pilot conditions are the same as for cruise descent with the exception of descent rates of
500, 750, and 1000 ft/min.
The approach level flight requirements for alerting are the same as for class B
equipment. During level flight operations at the MDA, a terrain alert should be posted
when the airplane is within 150 ft of the terrain.
The criteria for FLTA imminent terrain impact is the same as for class B equipment
(Table 6.33) except only speeds of 100 to 250 knots should be used and pilot recovery is
an incremental 1 g. The PDA conditions are the same as for class B TAWS equipment
(Table 6.34).
It must be possible to descend at 2000 ft/min and level off 500 ft above the terrain
using a normal level-off procedure without a caution or warning alert. Further, it must be
possible to descend at 1000 ft/min in the final approach segment and level off at 250 ft
using normal level-off procedures without a caution or warning alert.
The basic GPWS functions of excessive descent rate, negative climb rate or altitude
loss after takeoff, and altitude callouts are the same as written for class B equipment.
A compliance matrix for a TAWS Class A installation is shown in Table 6.39.
TABLE 6.39 ¢ Sample TAWS Class A Compliance Matrix
404
Requirements AC
No. Paragraph Subject Description
1 AC 25-23 13 Display Presentation a. Terrain Display.
b. Terrain Display Presentation.
c. Pop-Up Mode-Switching Functionality.
d. Auto-Range Switching Mode.
2 AC 25-23 14 Alerts a. In addition to being complaint with the requirements of § 25.1322, the TAWS alerts should
be clear, concise, and unambiguous.
CHAPTER
b. The visual and aural alerts are consistent with the alerting philosophy of the airplane flight
deck in which the TAWS equipment is installed
6
3 AC 25-23 16 System Inhibit a. A means for one of the flight crew to inhibit the following TAWS functions must be
provided:
● FLTA
● PDA
● Basic GPWS—Flight into terrain when not in the landing configuration
● Basic GPWS—Excessive downward deviation from the ILS glideslope
b. Care should be taken to ensure that instinctive, inadvertent, or habitual reflexive action by the
flight crew does not inhibit these functions.
4 AC 25-23 18 System evaluation Simulators may be used as a tool to evaluate specific installations of TAWS. The level of
with simulators simulation fidelity required will depend on the type of credit being sought. Some of the
characteristics of a TAWS installation and flight deck integration that may be evaluated via
simulation are:
● displays,
● alert prioritization,
Part 23/25/27/29 Avionics Civil Certifications
● mode transitions,
● pop-up displays,
● auto-ranging,
● self-test,
● operational workload issues,
● accessibility and usability of the TAWS controls,
● and systems failure modes.
5 AC 25-23 19 a Ground Test A ground test should be conducted for each TAWS installation. Some items to consider for
Considerations ground test should include:
● an acceptable location of TAWS controls, displays, and annunciators;

● exercise of self-test functions;
● evaluation of identified failure modes;
● evaluation of all discrete and TAWS interfaces;
● Electro-magnetic interference (EMI)/electro-magnetic compatibility (EMC) testing; and
electrical transient testing.
6 AC 25-23 19b Ground Test Considerations can also be made for evaluating display characteristics if it can be shown that all
Considerations of the performance aspects of the display that are available during flight can be evaluated on
the ground.
7 AC 25-23 20b(1) FLTA Flight testing to verify the proper operation of the FLTA function can be conducted in an area
6.14
where the terrain or obstacle elevation for the test runs is known to be within approximately
300 feet.
8 AC 25-23 20b(2) FLTA Test runs are recommended to be level flight at approximately 500 feet above the terrain/
obstacle of interest.
9 AC 25-23 20c(1) PDA Flight testing to verify the proper operation of the PDA function can be conducted in any airport
area within 10 NM of the nearest runway.
10 AC 25-23 20c(2) PDA The airplane should be configured for landing at approximately 1500 feet AGL along the final
approach segment of the runway at approximately 10 NM from the runway.
11 AC 25-23 20c(3) PDA At the 10 NM point, a normal three degree flight path angle descent can be initiated and
maintained until the PDA alert occurs.
12 AC 25-23 20(d)(1) GPWS Excessive Rates of Descent.
13 AC 25-23 20(d)(2) GPWS Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain. This test must be conducted in an area of known rising
Terrain Awareness and Warning System
terrain.
14 AC 25-23 20(d)(3) GPWS Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss after Takeoff. This test is conducted immediately after
takeoff before climbing above 700 AGL or above runway elevation.
15 AC 25-23 20(d)(4) GPWS Flight into Terrain when Not in Landing Configuration. This test should be conducted while on a
visual approach to a runway.
(Continues)
405
TABLE 6.39 ¢ (Continued) 406
Requirements AC
16 AC 25-23 20(d)(5) GPWS Excessive Downward Deviation from an ILS Glideslope. This test should be conducted during
an ILS approach.
17 AC 25-23 20(d)(6) GPWS Voice Callout ‘‘Five Hundred Feet.’’ This test is conducted during an approach to a runway.
18 AC 25-23 20e(1) Terrain Display The terrain must be depicted relative to the airplane’s position such that the pilot may estimate
the relative bearing to the terrain of interest.
CHAPTER
19 AC 25-23 20e(1) Terrain Display Flight testing to verify the proper operation of the terrain Display should be conducted while
6
verifying all the other required TAWS functions.
20 AC 25-23 20e(2) Terrain Display Emphasis should be placed on verifying compliance with the provisions specified in paragraph
13.a. (Terrain Display) of this AC during normal airplane maneuvering during all phases of
flight. Pop-up and auto-ranging features should be evaluated, if applicable.
21 AC 25-23 20e(3) Terrain Display The FAA recommends that the applicant perform sustained turns to evaluate:
– symbol stability,
– flicker,
– jitter,
– display update rate,
– color cohesiveness,
– readability,
– the use of color to depict relative elevation data,
– caution and warning alert area depictions,
– map masking, and
– overall suitability of the display.
22 AC 25-23 20f Added Features Flight Flight testing may be required to verify the proper operation of added features such as:
Test Considerations
– windshear detection,
– bank angle,
– altitude call outs ‘‘Approaching Minimums,’’ or
– Other features not required by TSO-C151a.
23 AC 25-23 20g Pressure Altitude The TAWS may be designed to account for the effects of cold weather on barometric altitude,
Variations in Cold while determining vertical position. Flight testing may be required, unless a
Weather suitable verification procedure can be conducted. This will depend on the design of the cold
weather compensation.
GS (kts) Height of Terrain Test Altitude Alert

Cell (MSL)
200 5000 6000 No
250 5000 5800 No
Enroute Level Flight 300 5000 5800 No
24 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.3 200 5000 5700(0/-100) Must
Requirement
250 5000 5700(0/-100) Must
300 5000 5700(0/-100) Must
6.14
400 5000 5700(0/-100) Must

500 5000 5700(0/-100) Must
25 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.2 Enroute Descent TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 1.2, TABLE A, ENROUTE DESCENT ALERTING CRITERIA
Requirement
26 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.4 Terminal Area (Inter- Refer to TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 1.4, TABLE C Terminal Descent Area Alerting Criteria.
mediate Segment)
Descent
Requirement
27 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.5 Terminal Area (Inter- Refer to TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 1.5, TABLE D Terminal Area Level Flight Alerting Criteria.
mediate Segment)
Level Flight
Requirement
28 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.6 Final Approach Des- Refer to TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 1.6 TABLE E Final Approach Descent Alerting Criteria.
cent Requirement
Terrain Awareness and Warning System
(Continues)
407
408
Requirements AC
CHAPTER
29 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 1.7 Final Approach Level Refer to TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 1.7 TABLE F Final Approach Level Flight Alerting Criteria.
6
Flight Requirement
30 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 2.0 FORWARD Refer to TSO-C151c, Appendix 3 2.0 TABLE G Imminent Terrain Impact Alerting Criteria.
LOOKING
TERRAIN
AVOIDANCE
IMMINENT
TERRAIN IMPACT
TEST
CONDITIONS
31 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 4.0 NUISANCE ALERT The test conditions mentioned in the TSO-C151c Appendix 3 4.0 must be conducted to evaluate
TEST TAWS performance during all phases of flight.
32 TSO-C151c Appendix 3 3.1 PREMATURE DES- Refer to TABLE H Premature Descent Alerting Criteria
CENT ALERT
6.14.5 HTAWS
HTAWS equipment, which is specific to Parts 27 and 29 helicopters, is divided into two
classes: A and B. HTAWS provides two TAWS functions and five GPWS functions:
– FLTA, reduced required terrain clearance and imminent terrain or obstacle impact
– Excessive rates of descent (optional) (1)
– Excessive closure rate to terrain (2)
– Excessive altitude loss after takeoff (3)
– Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration (4)
– Excessive downward deviation from ILS glide slope (5)
Although HTAWS is not required by operational rules for helicopters, installation is
consistent with TSO-C151c. Class A equipment must have a display, and may be either
a WX RADAR, EFIS or other compatible MFD; orientation of the display is Track Up.
Similar to TAWS, a GNSS provides the position source. Class A may provide automatic
autorotation detection when excessive descent rate warning functions are included. The
implementation should make provisions for a low altitude mode to allow VFR opera-
tions at less than enroute altitudes with minimal nuisance alerts.
Class B equipment provides only two principal alerts: imminent terrain or obstacle
impact, and excessive altitude loss after takeoff. Class B does not require a display; if it
does it must meet the requirements of Class A installations. Class B is required to
interface with an approved GPS for horizontal position, does not require an interface to a
RADAR altimeter, and should include a low altitude mode as described for Class A
equipment.
Certification is accomplished through the TC, ATC, or STC process. The significant
difference between TAWS and HTAWS is the lack of specific TSO requirements that will
necessitate greater engineering and flight test efforts in the Airworthiness certification. In
this light, much of the required testing is consistent with TSO-C151b, AC 23-18 and AC
25-23, adjusted for helicopter operations. Human factors, displays, alerts, auto pop-ups
and priorities are as with the fixed wing requirements.
The Miscellaneous Guidance Section 18 (MG-18) of AC 27-1B and AC 29-2C
provides an alternate table for Required Obstacle Clearance and Required Terrain
Clearance for Helicopters (Table 6.40).
MG-18 offers flight test considerations and requirements for HTAWS evaluations.
Excessive rate of descent (1) is tested over level terrain or water to validate correct
interface of the Barometric and RADAR altimeters; only one test run is required to verify
proper installation. Excessive closure rate to terrain (2) should be conducted in an area of
known rising terrain; it is recommended that one level test run at 200’ above the terrain
peak elevation be conducted. For Class A this will validate proper installation of the
RADAR Altimeter. Excessive altitude loss after takeoff (3) is conducted after a normal
takeoff profile has been established but before reaching pattern altitude. This test verifies
proper installation of barometric altitude, barometric altitude rate and RADAR altitude.
Flight into terrain when not in landing configuration (4) is conducted on a visual approach
over level terrain or water. For Class A equipment, this test verifies proper integration of
airspeed, radar altitude, and gear sensor inputs. Excessive downward deviation from an
ILS glide slope is conducted during an ILS approach. This test verifies proper integration
of the GS to HTAWS; the test must be repeated for dual ILS installations.
TABLE 6.40 ¢ Helicopter RTC
TAWS (RTC) TAWS (RTC)

Phase of Flight TERPS (ROC) Level Flight Descending
Enroute 1000 ft 150 ft 100 ft
Terminal Intermediate 500 ft 150 ft 100 ft
Approach 250 ft 150 ft 100 ft
Departure See note 48 ft/nm 100 ft 100 ft
During the departure phase of flight, the FLTA function of Class A and B equipment should alert if the aircraft is projected
to be within 100 ft vertically of terrain. Class A and B equipment should not alert if the aircraft is projected to be more than
150 ft above the terrain.
MG-18 provides the applicant with a list of applicable paragraphs from TSO-
C151b (TAWS) and RTCA/DO-161A (GPWS) that will satisfy the airworthiness
regulations.
6.15 FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS

The basic autopilot has been around in one form or another since 1910 when Lawrence
Sperry developed a two-axis (roll and pitch) autopilot based on work done on torpedoes
and ships. His son provided an airborne demonstration of the autopilot to the French in
1914 and marketed the autopilot for commercial use in 1932. Today’s autopilots com-
prise many modes and now include flight director and autothrust systems, as well as
interfaces with stability augmentation systems (SAS). Typical modes of operation in
each of the three axes may include the following:
Pitch Channel Roll Channel Yaw Channel

Attitude Hold Attitude Hold SAS
– Turbulence – Turbulence Turn Coordination
– Wind Shear – Wind Shear Engine Out
VNAV (FMS) LNAV (FMS)
Control Wheel Steering Control Wheel Steering
Altitude Hold/Capture Heading Hold/Select
Vertical Speed Hold Bank Limiting
Glideslope VOR/GPS/INS Nav
Flight Path Angle Localizer
Airspeed/Mach Hold Auto Land
– Speed/Pitch Holding
Go-Around Back-Course
Auto Land
Take-Off
Flight Level Change
Airspeed Protection
Auto Pitch Trim
SAS
The purpose of incorporating these modes is many: workload and fatigue for the
pilot is reduced; an autopilot is more precise than a human, which in turn makes it more
efficient (i.e., saves money); the autopilot can multitask; and it has built-in redundancy
and enhances safety.
As previously discussed, the autopilot is a highly integrated, complex system. It can
interface with the radar altimeter, CADC, flight control computers, FMS, INS, flight
director, autothrottles, elevator feed and flap limit sensors, flight control position sen-
sors, and SAS. These interfaces, along with the controls and displays and human factors
issues, can be a challenging task for even the most experienced evaluator.
Because of the dramatic changes in technology and system design, there has been a
marked increase in automation, complexity, and level of integration. The FAA has
recognized this fact and has recently revamped the FAR paragraph covering the FGSs
for Part 25 aircraft. Autopilot has been renamed flight guidance systems and includes the
functions of autopilots, flight directors, and automatic thrust control, as well as any
interactions with stability augmentation and trim functions.
The applicable documentation for the FGSs includes the following:
● The minimum performance standards, contained in SAE Aeronautical Standard
AS-402A, ‘‘Automatic Pilots,’’ February 1, 1959
● The TSO for autopilots, contained in TSO-C9c, ‘‘Automatic Pilots,’’ September 15,
1960
● The AC for Part 23 aircraft, contained in AC 23-17C, ‘‘Systems and Equipment
Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes and Airships;’’ paragraph 23.1329,
‘‘Automatic Pilot System;’’ and paragraph 23.1335, ‘‘Flight Director Systems,’’
November 17, 2011
● The AC for Part 25 aircraft, AC 25.1329-1B Change 1, ‘‘Approval of Flight
Guidance Systems,’’ October 16, 2012
– The AC for Part 27 aircraft, AC 27-1B, ‘‘Certification of Normal Category
Rotorcraft (Changes 1–3 incorporated),’’ paragraph 1329, September 30, 2008
– The AC for Part 29 aircraft, AC 29-2C, ‘‘Certification of Transport Category
Rotorcraft’’ (Changes 1–3 incorporated), paragraph 1329, September 30, 2008
In addition, other requirements are called out in the following:
● AC 23-8C, ‘‘Flight Test Guide for Certification of Part 23 Airplanes,’’ November 16,
2011
● AC 25-7C, ‘‘Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Aircraft,’’
October 16, 2012
The flight director requirements are incorporated into the autopilot section of AC
25-7C; the flight director section is AC 23-8C is marked ‘‘reserved,’’ and the reader is
referred to AC 23-17C for autopilots.
AC 23-17C is an attempt to consolidate compliance material within one document;
it contains policy guidance through 2011. As with all ACs, it does not contain the force
of law but shows a means of compliance for TC and STC applicants. AC 25.1329-1B
provides the reader with a cross-reference of the CFR 14 Part 25.1329 subparagraphs to
a compliance paragraph in the AC. For example, Part 25.1329(a) calls out the require-
ment for quick disengagement for the autopilot and autothrust systems. The matrix in the
AC points the reader to chapter 3, paragraphs 27 and 29 of the AC for the means of
compliance, which is very handy.
6.15.1 Components of the Flight Guidance System

For the purposes of AC 25.1329-1B, the term FGS includes all the equipment necessary
to accomplish the FGS function. This includes the sensors, computers, power supplies,
servo motors/actuators, and associated wiring as well as any indications and controllers
necessary for the pilot to manage and supervise the system.
The individual elements of the system are as follows:
● Flight guidance and control (autopilot or flight director displayed heads up or heads
down)
● The autothrottle/autothrust systems (autothrust is a generic term and includes power
control systems for propeller-driven airplanes)
● Interactions with stability augmentation and trim systems
● Alerting status, mode annunciations, and situation information associated with flight
guidance and control functions
● The functions necessary to provide guidance and control in conjunction with an
approach and landing system
– Instrument landing system
– Microwave landing system
– Global navigation satellite system
– GNS landing system
● The FGS also includes those functions necessary to provide guidance and control in
conjunction with an FMS; it includes the interface between the FMS and the FGS
necessary for the execution of flight path and speed commands.
● The design philosophy should support the intended operational use regarding FGS
behavior, modes of operation, pilot interface with controls, indications, alerts, and
mode functionality.
6.15.2 Part 23 Airworthiness Certification of the Autopilot

An acceptable means of compliance is found in AC 23-17, paragraph 23.1329.
AC 23-8B defers autopilot testing to AC 23-17C. The AC separates the testing into five
major areas:
● Cockpit controls
● Malfunction evaluations
● Recovery of flight control
● Performance flights
● Single-engine approach
The AC also provides some ground rules and considerations for all autopilot
testing:
● A single malfunction may not result in a hard-over signal in more than one axis.
When the result of this single malfunction is shown to be nonhazardous (from the
safety assessment) (defined as no hard-over signals, slow-over is acceptable if it is
demonstrated that they are easily controllable without exceptional skill) then multiple
axes being affected is acceptable if
– The malfunction evaluations are acceptable even with the maximum drive signal
due to the limited rate of change authority of the powered controlling element and
flight control surfaces.
– The monitor/limiting device is independent of the autopilot element.
– The signal is less than the hard-over signal due to the monitor/limiting device.
– An acceptable fault analysis shows the functional hazard of a combined monitor
failure and automatic pilot malfunction is not catastrophic.
– The functional hazard of a failure of a lock-out device/system to inhibit autopilot
engagement until the pre-engagement check is successfully completed is hazar-
dous or less.
– Pre-engagement check of the monitor system is mandatory with either a manual or
automatic activation.
– Automatic pilot authority is not greater than necessary to control the airplane.
● Alterations of increased engine horsepower or major changes in exterior cowlings and
surfaces should consider the effect/compatibility with the autopilot. An increase in
engine horsepower beyond 10% may adversely affect the autopilot system malfunctions,
performance, controllability, and longitudinal stability characteristics. Flight testing may
be required to verify the original approval of the autopilot system is still valid.
● Malfunction testing should be accomplished at aft CG (most critical).
● Performance and controllability evaluations should be accomplished at the most
forward CG.
● The force required to overcome the autopilot as called out in 14 CFR Part 23.143 are
maximums.
– The maximum temporary force to overpower the autopilot has not been allowed to
exceed 30 pounds in roll, 50 pounds in pitch, and 150 pounds in yaw. These forces
are applicable only to initially overpowering the autopilot system.
– The maximum prolonged force to overpower the autopilot should not exceed
5 pounds in roll, 10 pounds in pitch, and 20 pounds in yaw.
● A reasonable period of time has been established for pilot recognition from the time a
failure is induced in the autopilot system and the beginning of pilot corrective action
following hands-off or unrestrained operation:
– A 3 sec delay following pilot recognition of an autopilot system malfunction
through a deviation of the airplane from the intended flight path, abnormal control
movements, or by a reliable failure warning system in the climb, cruise, and des-
cent flight regimes.
– A 1 sec delay is assumed in approach and maneuvering flight regimes.
6.15.2.1 Cockpit Controls
In order to show compliance, the evaluation of the cockpit controls should include the
following:
● The location of the autopilot system controls should be readily accessible to the pilot,
or both pilots, if a minimum of two pilots are required.
● Annunciators must conform to the proper colors (Part 23.1322).

● Controls must be usable under bright sunlight to night lighting conditions (Part 23.1381).
● Either a quick disconnect or interrupt switch for the autopilot system are located on
the side of the control wheel opposite the throttle(s) and are red in color. A dis-
connect switch stops all movement of the autopilot system; an interrupt switch
momentarily interrupts all movement of the autopilot system.
NOTE: A quick release control must also be included on each aircraft control stick (for
those Part 23 aircraft that do not use a control wheel) that can be operated from either
pilot seat.
● Any automatic disconnects of the autopilot system must be aurally annunciated. If
warning lights are used to supplement the aural warning, they should meet the
requirements of Part 23.1322. Use of a visual warning as the sole means of annun-
ciating automatic disconnects is not acceptable.
● Motion and effect of autopilot cockpit controls should conform to the requirements of
Parts 23.1329 and 23.779.
6.15.2.2 Malfunction Evaluations

There are some basic ground rules that need to be abided by when performing mal-
function evaluations. Malfunction evaluations should be conducted with the airplane
loaded at the most critical weight or the most critical weight/CG combination. Max-
imum untrimmed fuel imbalance should be considered during the evaluation. If auto-
throttles are installed, they should be operating and autopilot servo torque should be set
to the upper tolerance limit. The simulated malfunctions should be induced at various
airspeeds and altitudes throughout the airplanes operating envelope. The envelope
should include the maximum operating altitude for turbocharged or high-altitude air-
planes or be within 10% of the service ceiling for normally aspirated engines. Vertical
gyro failures should not be considered.
The simulated failures and resulting corrective actions are not acceptable if they
result in any of the following:
● Loads that exceed the substantiated structural design limit loads
● Acceleration outside of 0 to 2 g (the positive g limit may be increased up to the
positive design limit maneuvering load factor if it has previously been determined
analytically that neither the simulated failure nor resulting corrective action would
result in loads beyond the design limit loads of the airplane)
● Speeds in excess of VNE (never exceed speed) or for airplanes with an established
VMO/MMO (maximum operating limit speed), a speed midway between VMO/MMO and
the lesser of VD/MD (design diving speed), or a speed demonstrated under Part 23.253
(high-speed characteristics)
● Deviations from the flight path including bank angle in excess of 60 or a pitch attitude
in excess of 30 deviation from the attitude at which the malfunction was introduced
● A hazardous dynamic condition
NOTE: Since I have introduced some abbreviations for different speeds, I have included
all the abbreviations you may come across during civil certifications in the following
table for completeness (Table 6.41).
TABLE 6.41 ¢ Civil Certification Speed Definitions
Abbr Meaning Abbr Meaning

VA Design Maneuvering Speed VMO/MMO Maximum Operating Limit Speed
VB Design Speed for Maximum Gust Intensity VMU Minimum Unstick Speed
VC Design Cruise Speed VNE Never Exceed Speed
VD Design Diving Speed VNEI Helicopter Instrument Flight Never Exceed
Speed
VDF/MDF Demonstrated Flight Diving Speed VNO Maximum Structural Cruising Speed
VF Design Flap Speed VO Maximum Operating Maneuver Speed
VFC/MFC Maximum Speed for Stability Characteristics VR Rotation Speed
VFE Maximum Flap Extended Speed VS Stalling Speed or the Minimum Steady Flight
Speed at which the Airplane is controllable
VH Maximum Speed I Level Flight with Max VSO Stalling Speed or Minimum Steady Flight Speed
Continuous Power in Landing Configuration
VLE Maximum Landing Gear Extended Speed VSI Stalling Speed or the Minimum Steady Flight
Speed Obtained in a Specific Configuration
VLO Maximum Landing Gear Operating Speed VSSE Safe, Intentional, One Engine Inoperative Speed
VLOF Lift-Off Speed VTOSS Takeoff Safety Speed for category A Rotorcraft
VMC Minimum Control Speed with Critical Engine VX Speed for Best Angle of Climb
Inoperative
VMCA Airborne Minimum Control Speed with VY Speed for Best Rate of Climb
Critical Engine Inoperative
VMCG Minimum Control Speed During TO Ground VYI Helicopter Instrument Flight Climb Speed
Run when Critical Engine is Suddenly
Made Inoperative
VMCL Minimum Control Speed During Landing V1 Takeoff Decision Speed
Approach when the Critical Engine is
Suddenly Made Inoperative
VMCL-2 For A/C with 3 Engines, the Minimum V2 Takeoff Safety Speed
Control Speed During Landing Approach
with One Critical Engine Inoperative and a
Second is Suddenly Made Inoperative
VMIMI Helicopter Instrument Flight Minimum Speed V2min Minimum Takeoff Safety Speed
6.15.2.3 Normal Flight Malfunctions

The airplane’s performance should be evaluated when the effect caused by the most
critical single failure condition that can be expected to occur to the system and can be
detected by the pilot is induced into the autopilot system. Hidden or latent failures, in
combination with detectable failures should be considered when determining the most
critical failure condition. Normal flight includes climb, cruise, and descent flight
regimes with the airplane properly trimmed in all axes. Airplane configurations (com-
binations of gear and flaps), speeds, and altitudes should be evaluated for unsafe con-
ditions. Reaction time for normal flight malfunctions is 3 sec. The more critical of the
simulated malfunctions are
● A simulated malfunction about any axis equivalent to the cumulative effect of any
failure or combination of hidden failures, including manual or electric automatic
trim, if installed
● The combined signals about all affected axes, if multiple axis failures can result from
the malfunction of any single component
6.15.2.4 Maneuvering and Approach Malfunction

Maneuvering flight tests should include turns with the malfunction induced at the
maximum bank angle for normal operations up to the autopilot authority limits. Airplane
configurations (combination of gear and flaps), airspeeds, and altitudes should be
evaluated to determine if unsafe conditions exist. The simulated malfunctions described
under section 6.13.2.3 are applicable here as well. The resultant accelerations, loads, and
speeds should be within the limits described for normal flight malfunctions. The reaction
time for maneuvering and approach malfunctions is 1 sec. Malfunctions induced during
coupled approaches should not place the airplane in a hazardous attitude that would
prevent the pilot from conducting a missed approach or safe landing. Recovery from
malfunctions should be shown either by overpowering or by manual use of a quick
disconnect device after the 1 sec delay. Altitude losses resulting from simulated mal-
functions are to be measured accurately and presented in the limitations section of the
AFM or approved manual material.
Accurate measurement of altitude loss because of an autopilot malfunction during
an instrument landing approach is essential. This altitude loss during a critical phase of
flight provides the basis for establishing the minimum approach altitude during auto-
pilot-coupled approaches. The loss should be determined by measuring from the altitude
at which the malfunction is induced to the lowest altitude observed during the recovery
maneuver, unless instrumentation is available to measure the vertical deviation from the
intended glide path to the lowest point in the recovery maneuver.
Figure 6.41 graphically illustrates an acceptable means of compliance for deter-
mining altitude loss during approach. In performing this test, the airplane should be
established on the ILS glideslope and localizer with the configurations and approach
speed(s) specified by the applicant for the approach. Simulated automatic flight control
system malfunctions should be induced at critical points along the ILS, taking into
consideration all design variations and their limits in sensitivity and authority; the
malfunctions should be induced in each axis. A 3 glideslope should be used for these
tests to determine the malfunction effects to be expected in service.
For use during a coupled ILS approach, the automatic control system should not fail
in such a way that it causes the airplane wheels to descend below a limit line lying below
FIGURE 6.41 ¢ 3° 1. Malfunction inducement point.

ILS
Acceptable Method No 2. Malfunction recognition pilot.
mi 3. Initiation of manual recovery pilot.
for Determining nal
Gl 4. Altitude loss with no instrumentation.
Path of ide
Altitude Loss on 1 Slo
Airplane pe 5. Altitude loss with instrumentation
Approach showing deviation between G/S and
Wheels
wheels.
2 4
1 sec. delay
3
Malfunction
5
Inducement
Point
1:29
slope 15 ft
Threshold Level
Runway ILS Glide

Threshold Path Origin
the glideslope, sloping upward at 29:1 from a point 15 ft above the runway threshold.
With the airplane established on the glideslope in approach configuration, at the
approach speed, the most critical malfunction is induced at a test altitude referenced to
the runway threshold. Measure the altitude loss between the test altitude and the lowest
point of the manual recovery unless instrumentation is available to measure the vertical
deviation from the intended glide path to the lowest point in the recovery maneuver. The
altitude loss and the known distance to the threshold from the lowest recovery altitude
are compared to the limit line. The lowest test altitude from which malfunction and
manual recovery can be completed without the airplane wheels descending below the
limit line is considered the minimum height for use of the automatic flight control
system. Normal and emergency operating procedures must be included in the AFM for
the automatic flight control system to include minimum altitude for use.
6.15.2.5 Alternate Means of Compliance
An alternate means of compliance is available to those systems that employ limiters or
monitors when the function of these devices is necessary to prevent the airplane from
exceeding the malfunction limits defined in section 6.13.2.2. There are three alternate
means of compliance, and the major difference is the criticality level as the result of a
failure: (1) addresses failure effects less than major; (2) addresses failure effects less
than hazardous; and (3) addresses failure effects less than catastrophic.
Alternate Means 1 With the monitor/limiter inhibited, autopilot malfunction flight
testing may not cause any of the following:
● Roll to exceed 80
● Pitch to exceed þ45 , 35
● Accelerations outside of the 0 g to 2.5 g envelope
● Airspeed exceeding VNE for an airplane having an established VMO/MMO, a speed not
greater than a speed midway between VMO/MMO, and the lesser of VD/MD or the
speed demonstrated under CFR 23.253.
In addition, a fault analysis should show the failure effect of a monitor failure
combined with an autopilot malfunction is less than major. A pre-engagement check of
the monitor is mandatory. No credit is allowed for a pilot-activated pre-engagement
check unless there is a lockout device or system.
Alternate Means 2 The limits in alternate means 2 are the same as for means 1 with a
slight exception in acceleration. With the monitor/limiter inhibited, autopilot malfunc-
tion flight testing may not cause accelerations outside of the 2 g to 2.5 g envelope. An
acceptable fault analysis showing the failure effect of a combined monitor failure and an
autopilot malfunction must be less than hazardous. In addition, the failure effect of the
failure of a lockout device to inhibit autopilot engagement must be less than major. Pre-
engagement check of the monitor is mandatory with either manual or automatic means
and the autopilot engagement must be inhibited until the pre-engagement check is suc-
cessful completed.
Alternate Means 3 For this method, flight tests with monitors inhibited are not
required. An acceptable fault analysis must show that the failure effect of a combined
monitor failure and autopilot is less than catastrophic. The failure of a lockout device or
system to inhibit autopilot engagement must be less than hazardous. A pre-engagement
check of the monitor is mandatory with either automatic or manual means. Autopilot
engagement must be inhibited until the pre-engagement check is successfully completed
and autopilot authority cannot be greater than that needed to satisfactorily control the
airplane.
6.15.2.6 Recovery of Flight Control

This section states that the ability to recover flight control from the engaged autopilot
system either by manual use of a quick disconnect or by physically overpowering the
system must be evaluated.
6.15.2.7 Performance Flights

Performance evaluation tests should be conducted with the airplane loaded to its most
adverse CG and weight conditions. Autopilot performance with the servo torque values at
the lowest production torque tolerance limit should be used to demonstrate safe con-
trollability and stability. Flight tests are necessary to ensure the autopilot system performs
its intended function, including all modes presented for approval (Part 23.1301).
6.15.2.8 Single-Engine Approach

For multiengine airplanes, an engine failure during a normal ILS approach should not
cause a lateral deviation of the airplane from the flight path at a rate greater than 3 /sec
or produce hazardous attitudes. The rate should be measured and averaged over a 5 sec
period. If approval is sought for ILS approaches initiated with one engine inoperative,
the autopilot should be capable of conducting the approach.
6.15.3 Airworthiness Certification of Part 25 Flight

Guidance Systems
An acceptable means of compliance is found in AC 25.1329-1B, ‘‘Approval of Flight
Guidance Systems,’’ October 16, 2012, and further guidance in AC 25-7C, ‘‘Flight Test
Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes,’’ October 16, 2012.
AC 25.1329-1B did an excellent job of cross-referencing the subparagraphs of
25.1329 to the related means of compliance in the AC; however, in the latest iteration,
Appendix 2 ‘‘Flight Test Procedures’’ was removed and incorporated into AC 25-7C! I
will follow the same scenario addressing 25.1329 subparagraphs (a) through (n).
6.15.3.1 Quick Disengagements

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 1329 states that quick disengagement controls for the
autopilot and the autothrust must be available to each pilot. A means of compliance is
contained in paragraphs 27 and 29 of chapter 3 in the AC. The purpose of the quick
disengagement control is to ensure the capability for each pilot to manually disengage
the autopilot quickly with a minimum of pilot hand/limb movement. The quick disen-
gagement control must be located on each control wheel or equivalent. It should be
within easy reach of one or more fingers/thumb of the pilot’s hand when the hand is in a
position for normal use on the control wheel or equivalent. The criteria for the quick
disconnect control are that it
● Must be operable with one hand on the control wheel or equivalent and the other
hand on the thrust levers
● Should be accessible and operable from a normal hands-on position without requiring
a shift in hand position or grip on the control wheel or equivalent
● Should be easily locatable by the pilot without having to locate the control visually
● Should be designed so that any action to operate the quick disengagement control
should not cause an unintended input to the control wheel or equivalent
● Should be designed to minimize inadvertent operation and interference from other
nearby control wheel (or equivalent) switches/devices such as radio control or trim
● A note in the AC adds that when establishing the location of the quick disconnect
control, consideration should be given to its accessibility with large displacements or
forces on the control wheel and the possible need to operate the quick disconnect
with the other hand
If the safety assessment dictates a need for an alternate means of disengagement, the
following needs to be addressed:
● Independence from the primary quick disconnect control
● Whether alternative means are accessible to the pilot
● Reliability and the possibility of latent failures of those alternative means
The following means of providing an alternate means of disengagement have been
found to be acceptable:
● Selecting the engagement control to the off position
● Disengaging the bar on the mode select panel
● Activating the trim switch on the yoke
● The AC notes that the use of circuit breakers as an alternate means of disengagement
is not acceptable
Autothrust quick disconnect controls must be provided for each pilot on the
respective thrust control (thrust lever or equivalent). A single-action, quick disconnect
switch must be incorporated on the thrust control so that switch activation can be exe-
cuted when the pilot’s other hand is on the control wheel (or equivalent). The disen-
gagement control should be positioned so that inadvertent disengagement of the
autothrust function is unlikely. Positioning the control on the outboard side has been
shown to be acceptable for multiengine aircraft. Thrust lever knob, end-mounted dis-
engagement controls available on both sides to facilitate use by either pilot have shown
to be preferable to those positioned to be accessible by the pilot’s palm.
6.15.3.2 Failure of the FGS to Disengage

The effects of the failure of the system to disengage the autopilot or autothrust system
when manually commanded by the pilot are to be assessed (in accordance with Part
25.1309). The AC points the applicant to paragraphs 27, 29, and 30 in chapter 3 of the
AC as well as chapter 8. Chapter 8 is the safety assessment chapter of the AC. The safety
assessment process has already been covered in section 6.6 of the text and will not be
repeated here, but the AC does specifically mention failure to disengage the FGS in
paragraph 89 of chapter 8. It states that the implication of failures that preclude the quick
disengagement from functioning should be assessed. The assessment should consider the
effects of failure to disengage the autopilot or autothrust functions during the approach
using the quick disconnect controls; the feasibility of using an alternative means if
disengagement should also be assessed. If the assessment indicates that the aircraft can
be landed manually with the autopilot/autothrust engaged it should be demonstrated in
flight testing.
6.15.3.3 Transients Caused by Engagement

Subparagraph (c) of 1329 states that engagement or switching of the flight guidance
system, a mode or a sensor may not cause a transient response of the airplane’s flight
path any greater than a minor transient. A minor transient is defined as one that would
not significantly reduce safety margins and would involve aircrew actions that are well
within their capabilities. A minor transient may involve a slight increase in aircrew
workload or some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew.
With an automatic engagement of the autothrust system, it should be clear to the
aircrew that the engagement has occurred. The automatic engagement may not cause a
transient larger than a minor transient. The transition to the engaged state should be
smooth and should not cause large unexpected changes in pitch attitudes or pitching
moments. The reason for automatic engagement (such as ‘‘wake up’’ mode to protect for
unsafe speeds) should be clear and obvious to the aircrew.
A note in the AC states that the design should consider the possibility that the pilot
may attempt to engage the autothrust function outside of the normal flight envelope or at
excessive or too low engine thrust. It is not expected that the autothrust feature should
compensate for situations outside the normal engine operation range unless that is part
of the intended function of the autothrust system.
For the autopilot, engagements should be free of perceptible transients. Under
dynamic conditions, including maneuvering flight, minor transients are acceptable;
under normal operating conditions, significant transients may not occur.
6.15.3.4 Transients Caused by Disengagements

Similar to the engagement scenario, paragraph 25.1329(d) states that under normal
conditions the disengagement of any automatic control function of a flight guidance
system may not cause a transient response of the airplane’s flight path any greater than a
minor transient. The AC contains the same words when referencing manual or automatic
disengagement of the autopilot. It also states that the disengagement should be free of
out-of-trim forces that are not consistent with the maneuvers being conducted by the
airplane at the time of the disengagement. If multiple autopilots are engaged, any dis-
engagement of an individual autopilot may not adversely affect the operation of the
remaining engaged autopilots.
For autothrust systems, the disengagement should not preclude, inhibit, or interfere
with timely thrust changes for go-around, landing, or other maneuvers requiring manual
thrust changes.
6.15.3.5 Disengagements under Rare and Nonnormal Conditions

The FAR allows for greater than minor transients for disengagements under rare and
nonnormal conditions. For these conditions, a transient no greater than a significant
transient may occur. A significant transient may lead to a significant reduction in safety
margins, an increase in flight crew workload, discomfort of the flight crew or physical
distress to the passengers or cabin crew, including nonfatal injuries. Significant
transients do not require, to remain within or recover to the normal flight envelope, any
of the following:
● Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength

● Forces applied by the pilot greater than those specified in 25.143(c) (controllability
and maneuverability)
● Accelerations or attitudes in the airplane that might result in further hazard to secured
or nonsecured occupants
The flight crew should be made aware (via a suitable alerting or other indication) of
conditions or situations (e.g., continued out-of-trim) that could result in a significant
transient at disengagement. The number and type of alerts required should be deter-
mined by the unique situations that are being detected and by the crew procedures
required to address those situations. Alerts should be clear and unambiguous and should
be consistent and compatible with other flight deck alerts. Care should be taken with
thresholds of these alerts so that they do not become a nuisance to the aircrew. The three
conditions to be considered for alerts are sustained lateral control command, sustained
pitch command, and bank and pitch angles.
If the autopilot is holding a sustained lateral control command, it could be indicative
of an unusual operating condition for which the autopilot is compensating. Examples of
such unusual operating conditions are asymmetric lift or drag due to asymmetric icing,
fuel imbalance, or asymmetric thrust. In the worst case, the autopilot may be operating
at or near its full authority in one direction. If the autopilot were to disengage while
holding this lateral trim, the aircraft could undergo a rolling moment that could take the
pilot by surprise. A timely alert should be considered to permit the crew to manually
disengage the autopilot and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that
might result from the condition.
If the autopilot is holding a sustained pitch command, it could be indicative of an
unusual operating condition such as inoperative automatic horizontal trim. If the pilot
were to disengage while holding this pitch command, the aircraft could undergo an
abrupt change in pitch that could possibly surprise the pilot. A timely alert should be
considered to permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior
to any automatic disengagement that might result from the condition.
Most autopilots are designed with operational limits in both the pitch and roll axes
such that those predetermined limits will not be purposely exceeded. If the airplane
exceeds those limits, it could be indicative of a situation where the pilot is required to
intervene. A timely alert should bring this situation to the attention of the aircrew and
permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior to any
automatic disengagement.
It is preferable that the autopilot remain engaged during out-of-trim conditions. If
there is an automatic disengagement feature due to excessive out-of-trim, an alert should
be generated and precede any automatic disengagement with sufficient margin to permit
timely crew recognition and manual disengagement.
These alerts are not meant for all automatic disengagements, but only for those
which if not addressed would lead to a significant transient (or greater) for which the
pilot would be unprepared. There are also cases where the FGS will provide intentional
out-of-trim conditions (parallel rudder operations in engine failure compensation modes,
pitch trim operation during approach/landing, or certain types of speed/Mach trim
systems). Alerts are not required for these modes. Other indications, such as mode and
status annunciations, should be provided.
6.15.3.6 Controls, Indications, and Alerts

The man–machine (or human–machine if you prefer) interface with the FGS is essential
in ensuring safe, effective, and consistent FGS operation. The manner in which infor-
mation is presented to the aircrew is vital to aircrew awareness as to which automation is
being utilized. The features and controls must be optimized to minimize flight crew
errors and confusion. Indications and alerts should be presented in a manner compatible
with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flight crew and provide the necessary
information to perform those tasks. Indications must be grouped and presented in a
logical fashion and should be visible from each pilot’s station under all lighting condi-
tions. Colors, fonts, font size, location orientation, and movement should all contribute
to the effectiveness of the system.
The function and direction of motion of each control must be readily apparent or
plainly indicated on or adjacent to each control to prevent inappropriate use or opera-
tion. In general, the design of the FGS should consider the following:
● Differentiation of knob shape and position
● Design to support correct selection of target values
● Commonality across aircraft types
● Positioning of controls and related indications
● Inadvertent operation
Engagement of the FGS functions must be suitably announced to each pilot; the
operator should be provided with appropriate descriptions of the FGS modes and their
behaviors. Mode annunciators must indicate the state of the system and be presented in a
manner compatible with flight crew procedures and tasks and be consistent with the
mode annunciation design for the specific aircraft type. The mode selector switch
position or status is not acceptable as the sole means of mode annunciation. Modes and
mode changes should be depicted in a manner that achieves flight crew attention and
awareness.
The FGS mode annunciations must effectively and unambiguously indicate the
active and armed modes of operation. The annunciation should convey, in explicit and
simple terms, what the FGS is doing (active modes) and what it will be doing (armed
modes) as well as target information such as selected speed, heading, and altitude. Mode
annunciations should be located in the forward field of view, such as on the primary
flight display. Engaged modes should be annunciated at different locations than armed
modes to assist in mode recognition.
Color, font type, font size, location, highlighting, and symbol flashing have histor-
ical precedent as good discriminators when implemented appropriately. The fonts and
font sizes should be chosen so that the annunciation of FGS mode and status information
is readable and understandable without eye strain when viewed by the pilot seated at the
design eye position; the use of graphical or symbolic indications is acceptable. Imple-
mentation of discriminators should follow accepted guidelines (see AC 25-11). Color
should be used in a consistent manner and ensure overall compatibility with the use of
color on the flight deck. FGS color should be similar and consistent with other aircraft
systems such as the FMS. The use of monochrome displays is not precluded, provided
that the aspects of flight crew attention and awareness are satisfied. Engaged modes should
be annunciated with different colors than armed modes to assist in mode recognition.
Mode changes that are operationally relevant, especially mode reversions and sus-
tained speed protection, should be clearly and positively annunciated to ensure flight crew
awareness. Altitude capture is an example of an operationally relevant mode because pilot
actions during that brief time the mode is operational may have different effects on the
airplane. The FGS submodes that are not operationally relevant, such as transition from
ILS capture to ILS track, need not be annunciated. The transition from an armed mode to
an engaged mode should provide an additional attention-getting feature, such as boxing
and flashing on an electronic display for a brief period (about 10 sec) to assist in flight crew
awareness. Aural notification of mode changes should be limited to special considerations.
In-service experience has shown the mode annunciation alone may be insufficient
(either unclear or not compelling) to communicate mode changes to the aircrew. The
safety consequences of the aircrew not recognizing the change should be considered
and, if necessary, an alert should be issued.
Mode information provided to the pilot should be sufficiently detailed so that the
consequences of the interaction between the FGS and the flight crew can be determined
unambiguously. The FGS should provide timely and positive indication when the FGS
deviates from the pilot’s direct commands (target altitude, speed commands) or from the
pilot’s preprogrammed set of commands (waypoint crossing). The interface should pro-
vide a clear indication when there is a difference or conflict with pilot-initiated commands.
The failure of a mode to engage or arm when selected by the pilot should be apparent.
6.15.3.7 Protection from Hazardous Loads and Deviations

Subparagraph (g) of 25.1329 states that under any condition of flight appropriate to its
use the FGS may not produce hazardous loads on the airplane, nor create hazardous
deviations in flight path. This applies to both fault-free operation and in the event of a
malfunction, and assumes that the pilot begins corrective action within a reasonable
period of time. The AC calls out three conditions to be evaluated in FGS operation:
● Normal conditions
● Rare normal conditions
● Nonnormal conditions
For each of the conditions (which are generic in nature and do not represent all
conditions that an aircraft may experience over its lifetime), an expected level of per-
formance is described. For normal conditions, the expected levels of performance are
● Any performance characteristics that are operationally significant or operationally
limiting must be identified with an appropriate statement or limitation in the AFM.
● The FGS should perform its intended function during routine airplane configuration
or power changes, including operation of secondary flight controls and landing gear.
● Evaluation of the FGS performance for compliance should be based on the minimum
level of performance needed for the intended functions.
● There are certain operations that dictate a prescribed level of performance. When the
FGS is intended for operations that require specific levels of performance, the use of
the FGS should be shown to meet those specific levels of performance (low visibility
operations, Cat II and III operations, RVSM operations, RNP, etc.).
● The FGS performance should be at least equivalent to that expected of a pilot per-
forming a similar task. When integrated with navigation sensors or the FMS, the FGS
should satisfy the FTE tolerances expected for use of those systems in performing
their intended functions.
● The autopilot should provide smooth and accurate control without divergent or per-
ceptible sustained nuisance oscillation.
● The flight director in each available display presentation should provide smooth and
accurate guidance and be appropriately damped to achieve satisfactory control task
performance without pilot compensation or excessive workload.
● The autothrust function should provide smooth and accurate control of thrust without
significant or sustained oscillatory power changes or excessive overshoot of the
required power setting.
● The automatic pitch trim function should operate at a rate sufficient to mitigate
excessive control surface deflections or limitations of control authority without
adverse interactions with automatic control of the aircraft. Automatic roll and yaw
trim functions, if installed, have similar requirements.
Table 6.42 provides examples of normal conditions for FGS operations.
TABLE 6.42 ¢ Examples of Normal Conditions
Examples of Normal Conditions
Terms Descriptions
No Failure Conditions All airplane systems that are associated with airplane performance are
fully operational. Failure of those systems could impair the FGS’s
ability to perform its functions
Light to Moderate Constant wind in a specific direction that may cause a slight deviation
Winds in intended flight path or a small difference between airspeed and
groundspeed
Light to Moderate Variations in wind velocity that may cause slight erratic or
Wind Gradients unpredictable changes in flight path
Light to Moderate Gusts Nonrepetitive momentary changes in wind velocity that can cause
changes in altitude or attitude but the aircraft remains in positive
control at all times
Light Turbulence Turbulence that momentarily causes slight, erratic changes in altitude
or attitude
Moderate Turbulence Similar to light turbulence, but of greater intensity. Changes in altitude
or attitude occur but the aircraft remains in positive control at all
times
Light Chop Turbulence that causes slight, rapid, and somewhat rhythmic bumpi-
ness without appreciable changes in altitude or attitude
Moderate Chop Similar to light chop, but of greater intensity. It causes rapid bumps or
jolts without appreciable changes in altitude or attitude
Icing All icing conditions covered by 14 CFR Part 14, Appendix C, except
asymmetric icing, which is a rare normal condition
The AC notes that representative levels of the environmental effects should be established consistent with the airplane’s
intended operation.
For rare normal conditions (Table 6.43), the expected levels of performance are
● The FGS should be designed to provide guidance or control for the intended function
of the active modes in a safe and predictable manner within the flight envelope and
for momentary excursions outside of the normal flight envelope.
● Operations may result in automatic or pilot-initiated autopilot disengagement close to
the limit of the autopilot authority.
● It is not necessary that the FGS always be disengaged when rare normal conditions
that may degrade its performance or capability are encountered; the FGS may sig-
nificantly help the flight crew during such conditions. The design should address the
potential for the FGS to mask a condition from the flight crew or otherwise delay
appropriate flight crew action.
● Operating an airplane in icing conditions can have significant implications on the
aerodynamic characteristics of the airplane. During autopilot operation, the flight
crew may not be aware of the gradual onset of icing conditions. A means should be
provided to the aircrew when icing conditions begin to have an effect on FGS
performance.
● The implication of icing on speed protection should also be assessed. If the threshold
of the stall warning system is adjusted due to icing conditions, appropriate adjust-
ments should also be made to low speed protection.
TABLE 6.43 ¢ Examples of Rare Normal Conditions
Examples of Rare Normal Conditions
Terms Descriptions
Significant Winds Constant wind in a specific direction that may cause a large
change in intended flight path or groundspeed or cause a large
difference between airspeed and groundspeed
Significant Wind Gradients Variation in wind velocity that may cause large changes in the
intended flight path
Wind Shear/Microburst A wind gradient of such magnitude that it may cause damage to
the aircraft
Large Gusts Nonrepetitive momentary changes in wind velocity that can
cause large changes in altitude or attitude; aircraft may be
momentarily out of control
Severe Turbulence Turbulence that causes large, abrupt changes in altitude or atti-
tude. It usually causes large variations in indicated airspeed;
aircraft may be momentarily out of control
Asymmetric Icing Icing conditions that result in ice accumulations that cause the
FGS, if engaged, to counter the aerodynamic effect of the
icing conditions with a sustained pitch, roll, or yaw command
that approaches the maximum authority
The AC notes that airplanes intended to meet paragraph 121.358 for wind shear warning and guidance need FD wind shear
guidance. The FGS may also provide suitable autopilot control during wind shear. It refers the reader to AC 25-12 and
AC 120-41.
TABLE 6.44 ¢ Examples of Nonnormal Conditions
Examples of Nonnormal Conditions
Terms Descriptions
Significant Fuel Imbalance Large variation in the amount of fuel between the two
wing tanks (and/or center and tail tanks if so equipped)
that causes the FGS, if engaged, to counter the aero-
dynamic effect with a pitch, roll, or yaw command that
is approaching maximum system authority
Nonstandard Ferry Flight Possible aerodynamic drag (symmetrical and unsymme-
Configurations trical) caused by nonstandard ferry flight conditions
such as locked high-lift devices, landing gear locked in
the deployed position, or an extra engine carried
underneath one wing in an inoperative position
Inoperative Engine(s) Loss of one or more engines that causes the FGS, if
engaged, to counter the aerodynamic effect of the
difference in thrust with a pitch, roll, or yaw command
that is approaching maximum system authority
Loss of One or More Hydraulic Loss of one or more hydraulic systems down to the
Systems minimum number of operational systems with which
the FGS is certified to operate
Inoperative Ice Detection/Protection Loss of the ice detection/protection system on an airplane
System so equipped, where the FGS is certified for operation in
icing conditions with that failure present
For nonnormal conditions (Table 6.44), the expected levels of performance are as
follows:
● The FGS should be designed to provide guidance or control for the intended function
of the active modes in a safe and predictable manner, both within the normal flight
envelope and for momentary excursions outside the normal flight envelope. If a
determination is made that there are nonnormal conditions in which the FGS cannot
be operated safely, appropriate limitations should be placed in the AFM.
● Operations in nonnormal conditions may result in automatic or pilot-initiated
autopilot disengagement close to the limit of the autopilot authority.
● It is not necessary that the FGS always be disengaged when nonnormal conditions
that may degrade its performance or capability are encountered; the FGS may sig-
nificantly help the flight crew during such conditions. The design should address the
potential for the FGS to mask a condition from the flight crew or otherwise delay
appropriate flight crew action.
6.15.3.8 Speed Protection

Paragraph 25.1329(h) states that when an FGS is in use, a means must be provided to
avoid excursions beyond an acceptable margin from the speed range of the normal
flight envelope. If the airplane experiences an excursion outside of this range, a means
must be provided to prevent the FGS from providing guidance or control to an unsafe
speed. The intent of the paragraph is that the FGS should provide a speed protection
function for all operating modes so that the airspeed can be safely maintained within an
acceptable margin of speed range of the normal flight envelope. The FGS may use any
of the following ways, or a combination of ways, to provide acceptable speed

protection:
● The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and provide
speed protection control or guidance.
● The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and then
disengage the FGS.
● The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and remain
in the active mode without providing speed protection, control, or guidance.
● Other systems such as the primary flight control system or the FMS (when in a
VNAV mode) may be used to provide equivalent speed protection.
● If compliance is shown by the use of alerts alone, then the alerts should be shown to be
appropriate and timely, ensure aircrew awareness, and enable the pilot to keep the
airplane within an acceptable margin of the speed range of the normal flight envelope.
The design of the speed protection function should consider how and when the
speed protection is provided for combinations of autopilot, flight director, and autothrust
operation. Care should be taken to set appropriate values for transitioning into and out of
speed protection such that the flight crew does not consider the transitions a nuisance.
The speed protection should integrate pitch and thrust control, and consideration should
be given to automatically activating the autothrust function when speed protection is
invoked. If an autothrust is either not provided or unavailable, speed protection should
be provide by pitch control alone.
The role and interaction of autothrust with elements of the FMS, primary flight
control system, and the propulsion system should also be accounted for in the design of
speed protection. For example, consideration should be given to the effects of an engine
inoperative condition on the performance of the speed protection function.
Speed protection covers both the low-speed and high-speed flight regimes. When
the FGS is engaged in any mode (approach mode will be addressed shortly) for which
the available thrust is insufficient to maintain a safe operating speed, the low-speed
protection function should be invoked to avoid unsafe speed excursions. VMO/MMO
mark the upper speed/Mach limit of the normal flight envelope, however, high-speed
protection may also come into play based on aircraft configuration (gear or flaps
extended).
Activation of speed protection should take into account such factors as the phase of
flight, turbulence and gusty wind conditions, and compatibility with speed schedules.
The low-speed protection should activate at a suitable margin to stall warning that will
not result in an unacceptable level of nuisance alerts. The applicant needs to consider the
operational speeds for all-engine and engine-inoperative cases during the following
phases of flight:
● Takeoff
● Departure, climb, cruise, descent, and terminal area operations (during these phases,
airplanes are normally operated at or above the minimum maneuvering speed for the
given flap configuration)
● During high-altitude operations it may be desirable to incorporate low-speed pro-
tection at the appropriate engine-out drift-down speed schedule, if the FGS or other
sensors can determine that thrust deficiency is due to engine failure
● Approach
● Transition from approach to go-around and go-around climb
● The AC notes that a low-speed alert and a transition to the speed protection mode at
approximately 1.13VSR (stall reference speed) for the landing flap configuration has
been found to be acceptable
Low-speed protection during approach operations and recovery from wind shear are
two special cases of this function. Speed protection should not interfere with the approach
and landing phase of flight. It is assumed that with autothrust operating normally, the
combination of thrust and pitch control during the approach will be sufficient to maintain
speed and the desired vertical flight path. In the cases where it is insufficient, an alert
should be provided in time for the flight crew to take appropriate corrective action.
For approach operations with a defined vertical flight path (ILS, MLS, GLS, LNAV,
and VNAV), if the thrust is insufficient to maintain the desired approach path and
approach speed, the intent of low-speed protection may be satisfied by the following:
● The FGS may maintain the defined vertical path as the airplane decelerates below the
desired approach speed until the airspeed reaches the low-speed protection value.
The FGS would then maintain the low-speed protection value as the airplane departs
the defined vertical flight path. The FGS mode reversion and low-speed alert should
be activated to ensure pilot awareness. (The AC notes that the pilot is expected to
take corrective action and add thrust and return the airplane to the desired vertical
path or go-around, as necessary.)
● The FGS may maintain the defined vertical path as the airplane decelerates below the
desired approach speed to the low-speed protection value. The FGS will then provide
a low-speed alert while remaining in the existing FGS approach mode. (The AC notes
again that the pilot is expected to take corrective action to add thrust to cause the
airplane to accelerate back to the desired approach speed while maintaining the
defined vertical path or go-around, as necessary.)
● The FGS may maintain the defined vertical path as the airplane decelerates below
the desired approach speed until the airspeed reaches the low-speed protection
value. The FGS will then provide a low-speed alert and disengage. (The pilot is
expected to take corrective action when alerted to the low-speed condition and dis-
engagement of the autopilot, and add thrust and manually return the airplane to the
desired vertical path or go-around.)
If the speed protection is invoked during approach such that the vertical path is not
protected, the subsequent behavior of the FGS after speed protection must be con-
sidered. Activating low-speed protection during the approach, resuming the approach
mode, and reacquiring the defined vertical path may be an acceptable response if the
activation is sufficiently brief and does not cause large speed or flight path deviations.
The interaction between low-speed protection and wind shear recovery guidance is
the second special case of low-speed protection. If the wind shear recovery guidance
meets the criteria of AC 25-12 and AC 120-41, then it also meets the requirements of
subparagraph (h) of 1329. The autopilot should be disengaged when the wind shear
recovery guidance activates unless autopilot operation has been shown to be safe in
these conditions and provides effective automatic wind shear recovery as noted in the
mentioned ACs.
Some of the factors to consider for high-speed protection are
● Operations at or near VMO/MMO in routine atmospheric conditions are safe; small,

brief excursions above VMO/MMO by themselves are not unsafe.
● The FGS design should strive to strike a balance between providing adequate speed
protection margin and avoiding nuisance activation of high-speed protection.
● Climbing to control airspeed is not desirable, as departing an assigned altitude can be
disruptive to ATC and potentially hazardous (RVSM airspace). As long as the speed
does not exceed a certain margin beyond VMO/MMO (about 6 knots), it is better that
the FGS remain in the altitude hold mode.
● The autothrust function, if operating normally, should effect high-speed protection
by limiting its speed reference to the normal speed envelope (i.e., at or below
VMO/MMO).
● The basic airplane high-speed alert should be sufficient for the pilot to recognize the
overspeed condition and take corrective action to reduce thrust. If the airspeed
exceeds a margin beyond VMO/MMO (about 6 knots), the FGS may transition from
altitude hold to overspeed protection mode and depart (climb) the selected altitude.
● When the elevator channel of the FGS is not controlling airspeed, the autothrust
function, if engaged, should reduce thrust as needed to prevent sustained airspeed
incursions beyond VMO/MMO down to the minimum appropriate value.
● When thrust is already the minimum appropriate value or the autothrust function is
not operating, the FGS should begin using pitch control as needed for high-speed
protection.
● If conditions are encountered that result in airspeed excursions above VMO/MMO, it is
preferable for the FGS to smoothly and positively guide or control the airplane back
to within the speed range of the normal flight envelope.
6.15.3.9 FGS Considerations for the HUD

If the HUD is designed as a supplemental system, it will not replace the requirement for
a standard heads-down display (HDD). If the HUD is used as the primary flight
instrument, it needs to be shown that the HUD is satisfactory for controlling the air-
plane and for monitoring the performance of the FGS. The following characteristics
apply:
● It should be shown that if the HUD guidance cues are followed regardless of the
appearance of external visual references, they do not cause the pilot to take unsafe
actions.
● It should be shown that there is no interference between the indications of primary
flight information and the flight guidance cues. In takeoff, approach, and landing
FGS modes, the flight guidance symbology should have occlusion priority (not
obscured by primary flight information).
● The HUD guidance symbology should not excessively interfere with the pilot’s for-
ward view, ability to maneuver the airplane, ability to acquire opposing traffic, or
ability to see the runway environment.
● The mechanization of guidance on the HUD should be no different with the HDD.
● It should be shown that the guidance remains visible and that there is a positive
indication that it is no longer conformal to the outside view (high crosswind and
yawing conditions).
● The location and presentation of the HUD information cannot distract the pilot or
obscure the outside view.
● The HUD display should present flight guidance information in a clear and
unambiguous manner; clutter should be minimized. Some flight guidance data
elements are essential or critical and should not be removed by any declutter
function.
The HUD FGS symbology should be compatible and consistent with the symbology
on other FGS displays, such as the HDD; they need not be identical, but should not be
prone to misinterpretation. The heads-up and heads-down primary flight display (PFD)
formats and data sources need to be compatible to ensure that the FGS-related infor-
mation presented on both displays has the same intended meaning:
● Symbols should be in the same format.

● Information (symbols) should appear in the same general location relative to other
information.
● Alphanumeric readouts should have the same resolution, units, and labeling.
● Analog scales and dials should have the same range and dynamic operation
● The FGS modes and status state transitions should be displayed on the HUD using
consistent methods (except for the use of color).
● Information sources should be consistent between the HUD and HDD used by the
same pilot.
● When FGS command information (like a flight director command) is displayed on
the HUD in addition to the HDD, the HUD depiction and guidance cue deviation
scaling needs to be consistent with the HDD.
● The same information concerning current HUD system mode, reference data, status
state transitions, and alert information that is displayed to the flying pilot on the HUD
should also be displayed to the nonflying pilot on the HDD.
Although HUDs are typically not intended to be classified as integrated caution

and warning systems, they may display cautions, warnings, and advisories as part of
their FGS function. In this regard, HUDs should provide the equivalent alerting
functionality as the heads-down PFDs. Warnings that require continued flight crew
attention on the PFD also should be presented on the HUD (e.g., TCAS, TAWS, wind
shear). If master alerting indications are not provided within the peripheral view of the
pilot while using the HUD, the HUD should provide annunciations that inform the pilot
of a caution or warning condition. Some additional considerations for HUD alerts are
as follows:
● For monochrome HUDs, appropriate use of attention-getting properties such as

flashing, outline boxes, brightness, size, or location are necessary to compensate for
the lack of color normally associated with cautions and warnings.
● For multicolor HUDs, the use of red, amber, and yellow for symbols not related to
caution and warning functions should be avoided.
● Single HUD installations rely on the fact that the pilot not flying will monitor the
heads-down instruments and alerting systems for failures of systems, modes, and
functions not associated with the PFDs.
● If master alerting indications are not provided within the peripheral field of view of
each pilot for a dual HUD installation, then each HUD should provide annunciations
that direct the pilot’s attention to heads-down alerting displays. The types of infor-
mation that should trigger the HUD master alerting display are any cautions or
warnings not duplicated on the HUD, as well as any engine or system cautions and
warnings. The intention is to avoid redirecting the attention of the flying pilot to other
displays when an immediate maneuver is required (e.g., TCAS, wind shear).
● If TAWS, wind shear detection, or guidance or TCAS is installed, then the guidance,
warnings, and annunciations required to be a part of these systems and normally
required to be in the pilot’s primary field of view should be displayed on the HUD.
Upsets due to wake turbulence or other environmental conditions may result in near
instantaneous excursions in pitch and bank angles and a subsequent unusual attitude. If
the HUD is designed to provide guidance for recovery from upsets or unusual attitudes,
recovery steering guidance commands should be distinct from and not confused with
orientation symbology such as horizon pointers. If the HUD is designed to provide only
orientation during upsets or unusual attitudes, those orientation cues should be designed
to prevent them from being mistaken for flight control input commands.
6.15.3.10 Characteristics of Specific Modes
There have been many types of implementations of specific FGS modes on aircraft in
the past. The AC provides guidance and interpretive material that clarifies the opera-
tional intent of the modes and criteria shown to be acceptable in current operations.
These specific modes are repeated here.
Lateral Modes
● In the heading or track mode, the FGS should maintain the aircraft heading or track.
When the airplane is in a bank when the mode is engaged, the FGS should roll the
airplane to a wings level position and maintain the heading or track when the wings
are level (typically less than 5 of bank angle).
● In the heading or track select mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain the selected
value; when initially engaged, the aircraft should turn in the shortest direction to the
selected heading or track. Once in the mode, any changes will result in changes of
heading or track; the FGS will turn the airplane in the direction selected by the pilot
(i.e., clockwise selection will turn the aircraft to the right, regardless of shortest
distance). The target heading or track value should be presented to the crew.
● In the LNAV mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain the lateral flight path
commanded by the FMS (or equivalent).
● If the airplane is not on the desired lateral flight path or within the capture criteria the
FGS, the LNAV mode should enter an armed state; it will transition to the engaged
state at a point where the lateral flight path can be smoothly acquired and tracked.
● For FGS incorporating LNAV during TOGA, the design should specify maneuvering
capability immediately after TO and any limits that may exist. After TOGA, man-
euvering should be based on airplane performance, preventing excessive roll (wingtip
impact with runway), and satisfying operational requirements where terrain or thrust
limitations exist.
Vertical Modes
● To avoid unconstrained climbs or descents for altitude transitions, the altitude select
controller should be set to a new target altitude before the vertical mode can be
selected. If it is allowed, the applicant should consider the consequences of uncon-
strained climb or descent (CFIT or ATC altitude restrictions). Consideration should
also be given to appropriate annunciation of deviation from a selected altitude and
pilot action to reset the selected altitude.
● In the vertical speed mode, the FGS should smoothly acquire and maintain a selected
vertical speed. Considerations should be given to selecting a value outside of the
performance capability of the airplane as well as the use of the vertical speed mode
without autothrust (these situations could lead to potential high- or low-speed pro-
tection conditions).
● In the flight path angle mode, the FGS should smoothly acquire and maintain the
selected flight path angle. The same considerations previously mentioned for the ver-
tical speed mode apply here as well. Acceptable means of compliance have included a
reversion to an envelope protection mode or a timely annunciation of the situation.
● In the airspeed/Mach hold mode, the FGS should maintain the airspeed or Mach at
the time of the engagement.
● In the airspeed/Mach select mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain a selected
airspeed or Mach; it may be either preselected or synchronized to the airspeed or
Mach at the time of the engagement.
● In the flight level change mode, the FGS should change altitude in a coordinated way
with thrust control on the airplane. The autopilot/FD will typically maintain speed
control through the elevator; the autothrust function, if engaged, should control the
thrust to the appropriate value for climb or descent.
Vertical Modes/Altitude Capture

● The altitude capture mode should command the FGS to transition from a vertical
mode to smoothly capture and maintain the selected target altitude with consideration
of the rates of climb and descent experienced in service.
● The altitude capture mode should be automatically armed to ensure capture of the
selected altitude. Annunciation of the armed status is not required if the mode is armed
at all times; if the FGS is in the altitude capture mode, it should be annunciated.
● The altitude capture mode should engage from any vertical mode if the computed flight
path will intercept the selected altitude and the altitude capture criteria are satisfied
(except as specified during an approach; glide path for approach mode active).
● Changes in the climb/descent command references (vertical speed command), with
the exception of those made by the flight crew using the altitude select controller,
should not prevent capture of the target altitude.
● The altitude capture mode should smoothly capture the selected altitude, using an
acceptable acceleration and pitch attitude with consideration for occupant comfort.
● The acceleration may result in an overshoot. To minimize the overshoot, the normal
acceleration limit may be increased consistent with occupant safety.
● Pilot selection of other vertical modes at the time of altitude capture should not
prevent or adversely affect the level-off at the target altitude. One means of
compliance is to inhibit other vertical modes during altitude capture unless the
target altitude is changed; if glide path criteria are satisfied during altitude capture,
then the FGS should transition to glide path capture.
● The FGS must be designed to minimize flight crew confusion concerning the FGS
operation when the target altitude is changed during altitude capture. It should be
suitably annunciated and appropriate for the phase of flight.
● Adjusting the datum pressure at any time during altitude capture should not result in
the loss of the capture mode; the transition to the pressure altitude should be
accomplished smoothly.
● If the autothrust function is active during the altitude capture, the autopilot and
autothrust functions should be designed so that the FGS maintains the reference
airspeed during the level-off maneuver.
Vertical Modes/Altitude Hold

● The altitude hold mode may be entered either by aircrew selection or by transition
from another vertical mode.
● When initiated in level flight, the altitude hold mode should provide guidance or
control to maintain altitude at the time the mode is selected.
● When initiated by pilot action when climbing or descending, the FGS should
immediately initiate a pitch change to arrest the climb or descent and maintain the
altitude when level flight is reached. The intensity of the leveling maneuver should
be consistent with occupant comfort and safety.
● When initiated by an automatic transition from altitude capture, the altitude hold
should provide guidance or control to the selected altitude.
● Any airplane response to a change in pressure datum should be smooth.
Vertical Modes/VNAV
● In the VNAV mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain the vertical flight path
commanded by the flight management function (i.e., FMS). If the airplane is not on
the desired FMS path when VNAV is selected, the FGS should enter an armed mode
or smoothly provide guidance to acquire the FMS path. The FGS should transition
from arm to engaged at a point where the FGS can smoothly acquire the desired
FMS path.
● The deviation from the VNAV flight path should be displayed in the primary field of
view, such as the PFD, navigation, or other acceptable display.
● When VNAV is selected for climb or descent, the autothrust function (if installed and
engaged) should maintain the appropriate thrust setting and maintain target speed
when leveling.
● The FGS should preclude a VNAV climb unless the mode select panel altitude
window is set to an altitude above the current altitude.
● The FGS should preclude a VNAV descent unless the mode select panel altitude
window is set to an altitude below the current altitude.
● The FGS should not allow the VNAV climb or descent to pass through a mode select
panel altitude except when on final approach to a runway.
Multiaxis Modes
● In the takeoff mode, the vertical element of the FGS should provide vertical guidance
to acquire and maintain a safe climb-out speed after initial rotation for takeoff.
● In the takeoff mode, the lateral element of the FGS, if implemented should maintain
runway heading/track to wings level after liftoff; a separate lateral mode annuncia-
tion should be provided.
● If rotation guidance is provided, the use of this guidance should not result in a tail strike.
It should be consistent with takeoff performance methods necessary to meet takeoff
performance up to 35 ft AGL. If no rotation guidance is provided, pitch command bars
may be displayed during takeoff roll, but not considered as providing guidance.
● The autothrust function should increase and maintain engine thrust to selected thrust
limits.
● The FGS design should consider all engine and engine-inoperative requirements
consistent with system performance characteristics after takeoff.
● Takeoff system operation should be smooth and continuous through transition from
the runway portion of the takeoff to the airborne portion and the reconfiguration for
enroute climb. The pilot should be able to use the same display for the operation;
changes in guidance modes and display formats should be automatic.
● The vertical axis guidance of the takeoff system during normal operation should
result in the appropriate pitch attitude and climb speed for the airplane.
● Normal-rate rotation of the airplane to the commanded pitch attitude at VR 10 knots
for all engines operative and VR 5 knots for engine out should not result in a tail strike.
● The system should provide pitch commands that lead the airplane to smoothly
acquire a pitch attitude that results in capture and tracking of the all-engine takeoff
climb speed: V2 (takeoff safety speed) þ x. x is the all-engine speed additive from the
AFM (normally 10 knots or higher). If pitch-limited conditions are encountered, a
higher climb airspeed may be used to achieve the required takeoff path without
exceeding the pitch limit.
● For engine-out operation, the system should provide commands that lead the airplane
to smoothly acquire a pitch attitude that results in capture and tracking of the fol-
lowing reference speeds:
– V2, for engine failure at or below V2; this speed should be attained by the time the
airplane has reached 35 ft AGL.
– Airspeed at engine failure for failures between V2 and V2 þ x.
– V2 þ x for failures at or above V2 þ x. (The airspeed at engine failure may be used
if it has been shown that the minimum takeoff climb gradient can be achieved.)
● If implemented, the lateral element of the takeoff mode should maintain runway
heading/track or wings level after liftoff and a separate lateral mode annunciation
should be provided.
● Characteristics of the go-around mode and resulting flight path should be consistent
with a manually flown go-around.
● The vertical element of the FGS go-around mode should initially rotate the airplane
or provide guidance to rotate the airplane to arrest the rate of descent.
● The FGS should acquire and maintain a safe speed during climb-out and aircraft con-
figuration changes (typically V2, but a different speed may be found safe for wind shear).
● The autothrust function, if installed, should increase thrust and either maintain thrust
to specific thrust limits or maintain thrust for an adequate, safe climb; the autothrust
should not exceed thrust limits. The autothrust should not reduce thrust for wind
below the minimum value required for an adequate, safe climb, nor reduce the thrust
lever position below a point that would cause a warning to activate.
● The initial go-around maneuver may require a significant change in pitch attitude; it
is acceptable to reduce thrust or lower pitch attitude for the comfort of the occupants
after a safe climb gradient has been established. It should be possible for the pilot to
reselect the full thrust value if needed.
● The go-around mode should engage when selected by the pilot, even if the mode
select panel altitude is at or below the go-around initiation point. The airplane should
climb until another vertical mode is selected or an altitude is set above the current
aircraft altitude.
● The FGS design should consider an engine failure resulting in a go-around and an
engine failure occurring during the go-around.
● In the approach mode, the FGS should capture and track a final approach lateral and
vertical path, if applicable, from a navigation (FMS) or landing system (e.g., ILS,
MLS, GLS).
● The FGS should annunciate all operationally relevant approach modes; modes that
are armed and waiting for capture criteria to be satisfied should be indicated in
addition to the active precapture mode. A positive indication of the capture of a
previously armed mode should be provided.
● If the FGS contains submodes that arm without further action (flare) and are sig-
nificant, they should be annunciated.
● Glideslope capture may occur prior to localizer capture. In this case, it is the flight
crew’s responsibility to ensure proper terrain clearance in a descent without lateral
guidance.
Autothrust Modes
● In the thrust mode, the FGS should command the autothrust function to achieve a
selected target thrust value.
● In the speed mode, the FGS should command the autothrust to acquire and maintain
the selected speed target value (assuming the selected speed is within the speed range
of the normal envelope). The autothrust may fly a higher airspeed than the selected
target speed during an approach in winds or turbulence.
● In the retard mode, the FGS should work in the same manner for automatic and
manual landings when the autothrust function is engaged.
Selected Target Altitudes in Approach Conditions

● The FGS vertical modes should allow the pilot to set the target altitude to a missed
approach value prior to capturing the final approach segment. This should be possible
for capturing from both above and below the final approach segment.
● It should be possible to define a descent path to the final approach fix and another
path from the final approach fix to the runway with the target altitude set for the
missed approach altitude. Appropriate targets and descent points should be identified
by the FMS.
Control Wheel Steering

● In the control wheel steering (CWS) mode, the FGS allows the flight crew to man-
euver the airplane manually through the autopilot control path. During CWS, the
pilot, rather than the FGS, is in control of the airplane.
● It should be possible for the pilot to maneuver the airplane using normal flight con-
trols with the CWS engaged and to achieve the maximum available control surface
deflection without using forces so high that controllability requirements are not met.
● The maximum bank and pitch attitudes that can be achieved without physically
overpowering the autopilot should be limited to those necessary for the normal
operation of the airplane.
● The AC notes that normal operational limits are typically 35 in roll and þ20
to 10 in pitch.
● It should be possible to perform all normal maneuvers smoothly and accurately
without nuisance oscillation; it should also be possible to counter all normal changes
in trim due to a change in configuration or power.
● The stall and recovery characteristics of the airplane should remain acceptable; it is
assumed that recovery from a stall is with CWS in use unless automatic disengage-
ment of the autopilot is provided.
● Consideration should be given to adjustments to trim that may be made by the
autopilot in the course of maneuvers that can be reasonably expected.
● If CWS is used for takeoffs and landings, it must be shown that sufficient control
(amplitude and rate) is available, reasonable mishandling is not hazardous, runaway
rates and control forces are such that the pilot can overpower the autopilot without a
significant deviation in flight path, and that any lag in the CWS response is acceptable.
● The autopilot, when engaged should not automatically revert to the CWS mode by
applying a control input to the column or wheel unless the autopilot is in a capture
mode (altitude or localizer capture).
● CWS is different from touch control steering, which is a temporary disengagement of
the FGS via a button or paddle switch, allowing the pilot to hand-fly the aircraft.
When the switch is released, the FGS is reengaged. A supervisory override works the
same way, only the disengagement is caused by a force on the flight deck controls; as
the force is released, the FGS reengages.
FGS and Fly-by-Wire Systems

● If speed protection is implemented in both the FGS and fly-by-wire flight control sys-
tem they need to be compatible; the FGS speed protection (normal flight envelope)
should operate to or within the limits of the flight control system (limit flight envelope).
● Information should be provided to the crew about the impact on the FGS following
degradation of the fly-by-wire system.
6.15.3.11 Compliance Demonstration by Simulation and Flight Test

As a reminder, the criteria that govern successful compliance are shown in three para-
graphs of CFR 14: 25.1301, 25.1309, and 25.1329. Compliance with paragraphs 1301 and
1309 includes specifics in AC 25-7C and AC 25.1309 (remember, you will be required to
perform a safety assessment and design a human factors test plan for these systems). The
FGS criteria are found in AC 25.1329-1B and have been addressed in this section.
The certification plan encompasses the evaluation of all modes of the FGS in all
anticipated flight conditions and for all phases of flight. The human factors aspects must
address the integration, man–machine interface, controls and displays, and visual and
aural alerts and indications. The safety assessment is as discussed earlier in this chapter;
AC 25.1329-1B devotes an entire chapter (chapter 8) to safety assessment considera-
tions for the FGS.
Other ACs that may have to be consulted for completion of the certification plan
include AC 120-29A, ‘‘Criteria for Approval of Category I and II Weather Minima for
Approach,’’ and AC 120-28D, ‘‘Criteria for Approval of Category III Weather Minima
for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout.’’
A simple way of looking at the plan is to take the characteristics of the specific
modes (identified in AC 25.1329-1B, chapter 6) and exercise them against the condi-
tions described in section 6.15.3.7 of this text. During the evaluations, human factors,
controls and displays, and alerts and warnings will be embedded in your results. Addi-
tional testing, such as HUD considerations (if installed), precision landings (ILS, MLS,
and GLS), and determination of the minimum use height (MUH) for the autopilot will
also be included in the plan. Not all of the testing will be accomplished in flight;
representative simulators can be used to demonstrate compliance for controls and dis-
plays and the man–machine interface portions of the certification plan. The level and
fidelity of the simulator used should be commensurate with the certification credit being
sought, and its use should be agreed upon with the certification authority.
AC 25.1329-1B does an excellent job of providing the required tests to show
compliance. Chapter 9 describes the compliance demonstration using flight test and
simulation. The actual flight test procedures have been moved to AC 25-7C, and flight
cards can be developed directly from the procedures given. It is not the author’s intent to
replicate those procedures here, as they are already provided for you. At a minimum, the
following test objectives need to be incorporated into the plan:
● Under normal and other than normal conditions (rare normal and nonnormal) the
FGS should be evaluated to determine the acceptability of
– Stability and tracking of automatic control elements
– Controllability and tracking of guidance elements
– Acquisition of flight paths for capture modes
– Consistency of integration of modes
– If the FGS provides wind shear escape guidance, perform demonstration require-
ments consistent with AC 25-12, ‘‘Airworthiness Criteria for the Approval of
Airborne Windshear Warning Systems in Transport Category Aircraft’’
● Specific performance conditions that require evaluation by flight test or simulation
include
– FGS performance and safety in icing conditions
– Low speed protection at high altitude with simulated engine failure, climb to
altitude capture with simulated engine failure, vertical speed with insufficient
climb power, and approach with speed abuse
– High speed protection at high-altitude level flight with autothrust function, high-
altitude level flight without autothrust function, and high-altitude descending
flight with autothrust function
– Evaluation of the go-around mode to assess the rotation characteristics of the
airplane and the performance of the airplane in acquiring and maintaining a safe
flight path. The go-around mode needs to consider the following factors:
– Airplane weight and CG
– Various landing configurations
– Manual thrust or autothrust
– Consequences of thrust rates with selection of go-around
– Engine failure at initiation of go-around
– Engine failure after go-around power is reached
– Initiation altitude (e.g., ground effect, flare)
– In addition, during go-around, the following characteristics need to be evaluated:
– Pitch response of the airplane during the initial transition
– Speed performance during airplane reconfiguration and climb-out
– Integrated autopilot and autothrust operation
– Transition to missed approach altitude
– Lateral performance during an engine failure
– Where height loss during a go-around maneuver is significant or is required to
support specific operational approval, demonstrated values for various initiated
heights should be include in the AFM
● The flight test or simulator program should demonstrate that the FD or HUD guidance
elements provide smooth, accurate, and damped guidance in all applicable modes to
achieve satisfactory control task performance without pilot compensation or excessive
workload. The FD guidance should be evaluated under the following conditions:
– Stability augmentation off
– Alternate fly-by-wire control modes (direct law), if any
– Engine inoperative
● The FGS considerations for the HUD, delineated in section 6.15.3.9, need to be
incorporated into the test plan.
● A flight evaluation needs to be conducted to demonstrate compliance with the FGS
override and disengagement functions (sections 6.15.3.1 through 6.13.3.6).
● The safety assessment process will identify any failure condition that would require
pilot evaluation to assess the severity of the effect and the validity of any assumptions
used for pilot recognition and mitigation. The classification of a failure condition can
vary according to flight condition and may need to be confirmed by simulator or
flight testing. Assessment of failure conditions contains four elements to be used in

the evaluation:
– Failure condition insertion
– Pilot recognition of the effects of the failure condition
– Pilot reaction time (time between pilot recognition of the failure condition and the
initiation of the recovery)
– Pilot recovery
● Failures should include
– Failures of the autopilot, including multiaxis and autotrim failures
– Failures of the FD if the conditions are relevant to the safety assessment
– The most critical flight condition (CG, weight, flap setting, speed, power, altitude,
and thrust)
– Failures on takeoff. The worst case will be defined by the safety assessment with
regards to the net effect on the flight path of the airplane at takeoff and the air-
craft’s attitude and speed during climb-out. Failures that cause the airplane to pitch
up or pitch down or bank should be evaluated. If the FGS provides on-runway
guidance for takeoff, then the effect of any failures on that guidance should be
evaluated.
– Failures in climb, cruise, descent, and holding should be evaluated for height loss.
– Maneuvering failures as introduced at the bank angle used for normal operation.
The bank angle should not exceed 60 at the recovery.
– The MUH must be determined for the type of approach performed (ILS, MLS,
GLS, RNAV, nonprecision, etc.)
● Pilot recognition cues have been identified as
– Hardover (recognition time of about 1 sec)
– Slowover (usually seen in a deviation; may take some time)
– Oscillatory
● Pilot reaction time is dependent on many variables, but the following times are shown
to be acceptable:
– Climb, cruise, descent and holding—recovery action should not be initiated until
3 sec after the recognition point
– Maneuvering flight—recovery action should not be initiated until 1 sec after the
recognition point
– Approach—recovery action should not be initiated until 1 sec after the recognition
point
– For the final phase of landing (below 80 ft), the pilot can be assumed to react with
no delay.
– For phases of flight where the pilot is exercising manual control using CWS, if
implemented, it can be assumed that the pilot will recover at the recognition
point.
● An incremental normal acceleration on the order of 0.5 g is considered the maximum

pilot recovery technique. During the pilot recovery maneuver, the pilot may over-
power the autopilot or disengage it.
● The MUH for the autopilot must be determined from flight testing and therefore
needs to be incorporated as a test objective.
6.15.3.12 Determination of the Autopilot MUH

There are two methods used for determination of the MUH for the autopilot. The first
method is used for approaches with a vertical path reference; the second is used for those
approaches that do not incorporate a vertical path reference.
Figure 6.42 provides an illustration of the deviation profile method, which is used
for assessment of the MUH for approaches with a vertical path reference. The first step
is to identify the worst-case malfunction. The approach should be flown in representa-
tive conditions (e.g., coupled ILS) with the malfunction initiated at a safe height. The
pilot should not initiate recovery from the malfunction until 1 sec after the recognition
point. The delay is intended to simulate the variability in response to effectively a hands-
off condition. It is expected that the pilot will follow through on the controls until the
recovery is initiated.
A deviation profile can be drawn from the results of the flight test. The deviation
profile is slid down the glide path until it is tangential to the 1:29 line or the runway. The
failure condition contribution to the MUH approach may be determined from the geo-
metry of the aircraft wheel height determined by the deviation profile relative to the 1:29
line intersecting a point 15 ft above the runway threshold. The method of determination
may be solved graphically or analytically.
The MUH approach is based on the recovery point for the following reasons:
● It is assumed that, in service, the pilot will be hands-off until the autopilot is disen-
gaged at the MUH in normal operation.
FIGURE 6.42 ¢ 1. Failure initiation

Deviation Profile Path of airplane 2. Failure recognition by pilot
1
Wheels as a result 3. Initiation of manual recovery action pilot
Method for
of failure 4. Point on normal/fault free wheel path at
Determining the 2 which autopilot is disengaged
MUH 1 sec
3
3° Nominal ILS Glideslope
Normal/Fault
1 Path of airplane Wheel path,
Free Wheel Path
Wheels as a result Tangent
of failure
2
1:29
1 sec
3 4
Minimum Use Height (MUH)
15.2 m
Threshold Height
4.6 m ILS
Threshold GP
FIGURE 6.43 ¢
1 Path of airplane wheels Height Loss Method
as a result of failure for Determining the
1. Failure initiation MUH
2 2. Failure recognition by pilot
1 sec 3. Initiation of manual recovery action by pilot
Height loss
Normal/Fault
Free Wheel Path
Tangential Wheel
Height
● The test technique assumes a worst case based on the pilot being hands-off from the
point of malfunction initiation to the point of recovery.
● A failure occurring later in the approach than the point of initiation of the worst-case
malfunction is assumed to be recovered earlier and, consequently, less severe.
Figure 6.43 depicts the height loss method for determining the MUH of the autopilot
for an approach without a vertical path reference. A descent path of 3 with a nominal
approach speed should be used unless the autopilot is to be approved for significantly
steeper descents. The vertical height loss is determined by the deviation of the aircraft
wheel height relative to the nominal wheel flight path.
A sample Part 25 FGS compliance matrix is shown in Table 6.45.
6.15.4 Part 27 and Part 29 FGS

The advisory circulars for helicopters have not incorporated paragraph 1335 (Flight
Directors) into paragraph 1329; the guidance for airworthiness in AC 27-1B and 29-2C
are the same. Stability augmentation systems (SAS) are covered in Appendix B of the
respective ACs. In accordance with paragraph 1301, the autopilot should be evaluated to
show that it meets its intended function. If the autopilot uses the same servos and servo
amplifiers as the SAS, the autopilot cannot produce a more severe hardover than the
SAS. If this is the case, then no other testing than that of the SAS in Appendix B is
required.
The evaluation requirements are similar to those addressed for Parts 23 and 25. If
monitors are used to meet the hardover malfunction requirements, then the Certification
Plan is a collaborative effort with the authority. There must be some method to indicate
the alignment of the actuating devices to the pilot. Depending on complexity, the
autopilot may be interlocked without the completion of a pre-flight test. Controls should
be labelled and easily accessed by the pilot, and the annunciator colors must conform to
AC 27/29.1322. Controls and displays should be readable in all lighting conditions, and
movement of controls should be correct in design and sense. Any disconnect should be
annunciated to the crew.
442
TABLE 6.45 ¢ Part 25 FGS Compliance Matrix
No. Requirement AC Paragraph Subject Description

1 27.a(1) Single Switch Action Each pilot should be able to select the autopilot function of the FGS with a single
switch action. The single switch action should engage both the pitch and roll
axes.
2 27.a(2) Engagement Status of The autopilot system should provide positive indication to the flight crew that the
Autopilot system has been engaged. [See § 25.1329(i)]
3 27.a(3) Multiple Autopilots If a single autopilot within a multiple autopilot installation can be individually
selected by the flight crew, the engagement annunciation should reflect the
CHAPTER
flight crew selection. It should not be possible for multiple autopilots to be

6
engaged in different modes. For modes that use multiple autopilots, the addi-
tional autopilots may engage automatically at selection of the mode or after
arming the mode. A means should be provided to determine that adequate
autopilot capability exists to support the intended operation.
4 27.a(4) Acceptable Transients With normal operating conditions, significant transients may not occur.
AC 25.1329-1B [See § 25.1329(d)]
5 27.a(5) Flight Director Not Without a FD engaged, the initial lateral and vertical modes should be consistent
Engaged with minimal disturbance from the flight path.
6 27.a(6) FD Engaged With a FD engaged, the autopilot should engage in a mode consistent with (i.e.,
the same as, or if that is not possible, then compatible with) the active FD mode
of operation. Consideration should be given to the mode in which the autopilot
will engage when large commands are present on either or both FDs.
7 27.b(1)(a) Normal Conditions Under normal conditions, automatic or manual disengagement of the autopilot
should be free of perceptible transients or out-of-trim forces that are not con-
sistent with the maneuvers being conducted by the airplane at the time of
disengagement. Disengagement in normal conditions may not result in a tran-
sient any greater than a minor transient. If multiple autopilots are engaged, any
disengagement of an individual autopilot may not result in a transient any
greater than a minor transient. [See § 25.1329(d)]
8 27.b(1)(b) Other Than Normal Under other than normal conditions (i.e., nonnormal or rare normal conditions),
Conditions disengagement of the autopilot may not result in a transient any greater than a
significant transient. [See § 25.1329(e)]
The flight crew should be able to respond to a significant transient without using
any of the following: 1. Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength;
2. Forces greater than those given in § 25.143(c), or; 3. Accelerations or atti-
tudes in the airplane that might result in a hazard to secured or non-secured
occupants.
9 27.b(1)(c) Potential for Significant The flight crew should be made aware (via a suitable alerting or other indication)
Transient of conditions or situations (e.g., continued out-of-trim) that could result in a
significant transient at disengagement.
10 27.b(2)(a) Alert Type Since it is necessary for a pilot to immediately assume manual control following
disengagement (manual or automatic) of the autopilot, a warning (both visual
AC 25.1329-1B
and aural) must be given. [See § 25.1329(j)]
11 27.b(2)(b) Aural Warning A timely aural warning must be provided and must be distinct from all other
Specifications cockpit warnings. [See § 25.1329(j)]
The aural warning should continue until silenced by one of the following means:
1. Activation of the autopilot quick disengagement control; 2. Reengagement
of the autopilot; 3. Another acceptable means.
12 27.b(2)(c) Multiple Autopilot 1. Disengagement of an autopilot channel within a multiple-channel autopilot
System system, downgraded system capability, or a reduction in the level of system
redundancy that requires immediate flight crew awareness and possible timely
action should cause a caution level alert to be issued to the flight crew.
2. Disengagement of an autopilot channel within a multiple-channel autopilot
system that requires only flight crew awareness should cause a suitable advisory
level alert to be issued to the flight crew.
13 27.b(3)(b) Quick Disengagement The quick disengagement control must be located on each control wheel or
Control Location equivalent. [See § 25.1329(a)]
6.15
It should be within easy reach of one or more fingers/thumb of the pilot’s hand
when the hand is in a position for normal use on the control wheel or
equivalent.
14 27.b(3)(c) Criteria 1. Must be operable with one hand on the control wheel or equivalent and the
other hand on the thrust levers. [See § 25.1329(a)]
2. Should be accessible and operable from a normal hands-on position without
requiring a shift in hand position or grip on the control wheel or equivalent.
AC 25.1329-1B
3. Should be easily locatable by the pilot without having to first locate the control
visually.
4. Should be designed so that any action to operate the quick disengagement
control should not cause an unintended input to the control wheel (or
Flight Guidance Systems
equivalent).
5. Should be designed to minimize inadvertent operation and interference from
other nearby control wheel (or equivalent) switches/devices, such as radio
control or trim.
(Continues)
443
444
15 27.b(4)(b) Alternative Means The following means of providing an alternative disengagement have been found
of Autopilot to be acceptable:
Disengagement
1. Selecting the engagement control to the ‘‘off’’ position.
2. Disengaging the bar on mode select panel (MSP).
3. Activating the trim switch on the yoke.
CHAPTER
16 27.b(5) Flight Crew Pitch Trim If the autopilot is engaged and the pilot applies manual pitch trim input, and the
Input autopilot is designed to disengage because of that flight crew action, the autopilot
6
must disengage with no more than a minor transient. [See § 25.1329(c)]

17 28.a(1)(a) FD Selection A means may be provided for each pilot to select (i.e., turn on) and de-select
(i.e., turn off) the FD for display on his or her primary flight display (PFD).
18 28.a(1)(b) FD Engagement An FD is considered ‘‘engaged’’ if it is selected and displaying guidance cues.

19 28.a(1)(c) Engagement Status of FD The selection status of the FD and the source of FD guidance should be clear and
unambiguous. Failure of a selected FD should be clearly annunciated.
20 28.a(1)(e) Autopilot Engaged An FD should engage into the current modes and targets of an already engaged
autopilot or FD, if any. With no autopilot engaged, the basic modes at
engagement of the FD functions should be established consistent with typical
flight operations.
21 28.a(2)(a) Display The FD command guidance cue(s) will typically be displayed under the following
conditions: 1. When the FD is selected and valid command guidance is avail-
able, or; 2. When the FD is automatically providing guidance
22 28.a(2)(b) Engagement Indication The display of guidance cue(s) (e.g., FD bars) is sufficient indication that the FD
is engaged.
23 AC 25.1329-1B 28.a(2)(b) Invalid Guidance The FD guidance cue(s) should be removed when guidance is determined to be
invalid.
24 28.b FD Disengagement There may be a means for each pilot to readily de-select his or her on-side
FD function. Flight crew awareness of disengagement and de-selection is
important. Removal of guidance cue(s) alone is not sufficient indication of

de-selection because the guidance cue(s) may be removed from view for a
number of reasons, including invalid guidance or autopilot engagement.
Therefore, the FD function should provide clear and unambiguous indication to
the flightcrew that the function has been deselected.
25 29.a(1) Autothrust Engagement The autothrust function should provide the flight crew positive indication that the
Indication system has been engaged.
26 29.a(2) Accessibility of Controls The autothrust engagement controls should be accessible to each pilot.
27 29.a(3) Inadvertent Engagement/ The autothrust function should normally be designed to prevent inadvertent
Disengagement engagement and inadvertent application of thrust for both on–ground and in–air
operations. For example, separate arm and engage functions may be provided.
28 29.a(4) Automatic Engagement Intended automatic engagement, such as a ‘‘wake up’’ mode to protect for unsafe
speeds, may be acceptable. If such automatic engagement occurs, it should be
clear to the flight crew that automatic ngagement has occurred. The automatic
engagement may not cause a transient larger than a minor transient. [See
§ 25.1329(c)]
29 29.b(1) Autothrust Disengage- Positive indication of disengagement of the autothrust function must result in a
ment Indication caution level alert to the flightcrew. [See § 25.1329(k)] The autothrust
‘‘engage’’ status annunciations should be deleted.
30 29.b(1)(a) Visual Indication 1. Following automatic disengagement: Visual indication of disengagement
should persist until canceled by flightcrew action.
AC 25.1329-1B
2. Following manual disengagement: If an aural alert is provided, visual indication
of disengagement should persist for some minimum period. If an aural alert is
not provided, visual indication of disengagement should persist until canceled
by flight crew action.
31 29.b(1)(b) Aural alert If provided, the aural disengagement alert should be of sufficient duration and
volume to assure that the flight crew has been alerted that disengagement has
occurred. However, an extended cycle of an aural alert is not
acceptable following disengagement, if such an alert can significantly interfere
6.15
with flight crew coordination or radio communication.

32 29.b(2) Inadvertent The autothrust normally should be designed to preclude inadvertent disengage-
Disengagement ment during activation of autothrust modes of operation.
33 29.b(3) Consequence of Under normal conditions, autothrust disengagement may not cause a transient any
Disengagement greater than a minor transient. [See § 25.1329(d)]
34 29.b(4) Autothrust Quick Autothrust quick disengagement controls must be provided for each pilot on the
Disengagement respective thrust control (thrust lever or equivalent). A single–action, quick
disengagement switch must be incorporated on the thrust control, so that
switch activation can be executed when the pilot’s other hand is on the control
wheel (or equivalent). [See § 25.1329(a)]
35 AC 25.1329-1B 30.b(1)(a) Autopilot Override The autopilot should disengage when the flight crew applies a significant override
Override Force force to the controls. The applicant should interpret ‘‘significant’’ as a force
that is consistent with an intention to overpower the autopilot by either or both
pilots. The autopilot should not disengage by minor application of force to the
controls, such as a pilot gently bumping the control column while entering or
exiting a pilot seat during cruise.
(Continues)
445
¢
446
TABLE 6.45 (Continued)
36 30.b(1)(b) Transients Resulting from In normal operating conditions, a transient larger than a minor transient may not
Override result from autopilot disengagement when the flight crew applies an override
force to the controls. [See § 25.1329(d)]
37 30.b(1)(c) Sustained Override Force Sustained application of force below the disengagement threshold may not result
Below level Required in a potential hazard. [See § 25.1329(l)]
for Automatic
Disconnect
CHAPTER
38 30.b(2)(a) Potential Hazard If the FGS is not designed to disengage in response to any override force, then the
response to an override may not result in a potential hazard. Sustained appli-
6
cation of an override force may not result in a potential hazard, such as when
the flight crew abruptly releases the force on the controls. [See § 25.1329(l)]
39 30.b(2)(b) Transients Resulting from In normal operating conditions, a transient larger than a minor transient may not
Override result from manual autopilot disengagement after the flight crew has applied an
override force to the controls. [See § 25.1329(d)]
40 30.c(1) Autothrust Override Force It should be possible for the pilot to readily override the autothrust function and
set thrust by moving the thrust levers (or equivalent) with one hand.
41 30.c(2) Response to Override The autothrust response to a flightcrew override may not create a potential
hazard. [See § 25.1329(m)]
42 30.c(3) Engagement Status with Autothrust functions may be designed to safely remain engaged during pilot
Override override. Alternatively, autothrust functions may disengage as a result of pilot
override, provided that the design prevents unintentional autothrust disen-
gagement and adequately alerts the flight crew to ensure pilot awareness.
43 31.a FGS Mode Engagement A description of the philosophy used for the mode at engagement of the autopilot,
Philosophy FD, and autothrust functions should be provided in light crew training material.
44 31.a Engagement Mode It should not be possible to select incompatible FGS command or guidance
AC 25.1329-1B Compatibility functions, such as commanding speed through elevator and autothrust at the
same time.
45 42.a HMI The human-machine interface with the FGS is crucial to ensuring safe, effective,
and consistent FGS operation. The manner in which FGS information is
depicted to the flightcrew is vital to flightcrew awareness and, therefore, to safe

operation of the FGS.
46 42.b Control, Indication and These features must be designed to minimize flight crew errors and confusion.
Alert [See § 25.1329(i)]
47 42.c Information Provided by It is recommended that the applicant evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of
FGS the information provided by the FGS interface, that is the controls, indications,
alerts, and displays, to ensure flight crew awareness of FGS behavior and
operation.
48 43.a FGS Controls The FGS controls must be designed and located to prevent crew errors, confusion,
and inadvertent operation. [See § 25.1329(i)] They should be designed to
provide convenience of operation to each crewmember. The function and
direction of motion of each control must be readily apparent or plainly indi-
cated on or adjacent to each control, if needed to prevent inappropriate use or
confusion. [See § 25.1329(f)] Sections 25.777(b) and 25.779(a) provide
requirements regarding direction of motion of flight deck controls. These
requirements apply for FGS command reference controls that select target
values, such as heading select or vertical speed. Section 25.781 also provides
requirements for the shapes of the knobs.
49 43.b(1) Differentiation of Knob Errors by the flight crew have included confusing speed and heading knobs on the
Shape and Position MSP.
50 AC 25.1329-1B 43.b(2) Design to support correct Use of a single control, such as concentric controls, for selecting multiple
of target value command reference targets has resulted in erroneous target value selection.
51 43.b(4) Positioning of controls Individual FGS controls, flight mode annunciator (FMA), and related PFD
and related indications information should be positioned so that, as much as reasonably practical,
items of related function have similarly related positions. Misinterpretation and
confusion have occurred due to the inconsistent arrangement of FGS controls
with the annunciations on the FMA.
52 43.b(5) Inadvertent operation The FGS controls must be located to discourage or avoid inadvertent operation,
such as inadvertent engagement or disengagement. [See § 25.777(a)]
6.15
53 44.a Annunciation of engage- Engagement of the FGS functions must be suitably annunciated to each pilot.
ment of FGS [See § 25.1329(i)]
54 44.b Description of FGS modes The operator should be provided with appropriate descriptions of the FGS modes
and their behaviors.
55 44.c FGS mode annunciations Mode annunciation must indicate the state of the system. [See § 25.1329(i)]
56 44.c(1) Active and armed modes The FGS mode annunciations must effectively and unambiguously indicate the
active and armed modes of operation. [See § 25.1329(i)]
57 44.c(2) Location Mode annunciations should be located in the forward field of view.
58 44.c(3) Discriminator Color, font type, font size, location, highlighting, and symbol flashing have his-
AC 25.1329-1B torical precedent as good discriminators, when implemented appropriately.
59 44.c(4) Color Color should be used in a consistent manner and assure compatibility with the
overall use of color on the flight deck.

60 44.d(1) Operationally relevant Mode changes that are operationally relevant—especially mode reversions and
mode changes sustained speed protection—should be clearly and positively annunciated to
ensure flightcrew awareness.
(Continues)
447
448
61 44.d(2) Attention-getting features The transition from an armed mode to an engaged mode should provide an
additional attention–getting feature, such as boxing and flashing on an
electronic display (see AC 25-11) for a suitable, but brief, period
62 44.d(3) Use of alert The safety consequences of the flight crew not recognizing mode changes should
be considered. If necessary, an appropriate alert should be used.
63 44.e Failure to engage or arm The failure of a mode to engage or arm when selected by the pilot should be
CHAPTER
apparent.
64 44.f FGS mode display and Mode information provided to the flight crew should be sufficiently detailed, so
6
indications that the consequences of the interaction between the FGS and the flight crew
can be determined unambiguously.
65 45.b(1) Speed protection alerts To assure crew awareness, an alert should be provided when a sustained speed
protection condition is detected.
66 45.b(2)(a) Low speed protection Low speed protection alerts should include both an aural and a visual component.
67 45.b(2)(b) High speed protection High-speed protection alerts need include only a visual alert component because
of existing high-speed aural alert requirements.
68 45.b(3) Consistency Alerts for speed protection should be consistent with the protection provided and
with the other alerts in the flight deck.
69 45.b(4) Nuisance alert Care should be taken to set appropriate values for indicating speed protection that
would not be considered a nuisance for the flight crew.
70 45.c Loss of autopilot approach The loss of the Approach mode requires immediate flight crew awareness. This
mode may be accomplished through autopilot disengagement
71 45.d(2) Flight crew alerts To help ensure flight crew awareness and timely action, appropriate alert(s)—
normally a caution or warning—should be provided to the flight crew for
conditions that could require exceptional piloting skill or alertness for manual
AC 25.1329-1B control following autopilot disengagement (e.g., significantly out of trim con-
ditions). The number and type of alerts required should be determined by the
unique situations that are being detected and by the crew procedures required
to address those situations. Any alert should be clear and unambiguous and
should be consistent and compatible with other flight deck alerts. Care should
be taken to set appropriate thresholds for these alerts so that they are not
considered a nuisance for the flight crew.
72 45.d(3)(a) Sustained lateral control If the autopilot is holding a sustained lateral control command, a timely alert
command should be considered to permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot
and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that might result from
the condition.
73 45.d(3)(b) Sustained pitch command If the autopilot is holding a sustained pitch control command, a timely alert
should be considered to permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot
and take control prior to any automatic disengagement that might result from
the condition.
74 45.d(3)(c) Bank and pitch angle A timely alert should bring this condition to the attention of the flight crew and
permit the crew to manually disengage the autopilot and take control prior to
any automatic disengagement that might result.
75 45.d(4) Automatic disengagement If there is an automatic disengagement feature due to excessive out-of-trim, an
alert should be generated and should precede any automatic disengagement
with sufficient margin to permit timely flight crew recognition and manual
disengagement.
76 52.a Intended function The FGS should provide guidance or control, as appropriate, for the intended
function of the active mode(s) in a safe and predictable manner within the
airplane’s normal flight envelope.
77 52.b Effect of system Where system tolerances have a significant effect on autopilot authority limits,
tolerances consideration should be given to the effect on autopilot performance.
78 53.c(2) Performance: configura- The FGS should perform its intended function during routine airplane config-
tion changes uration or power changes, including the operation of secondary flight controls
AC 25.1329-1B and landing gear.
79 53.c(6) Autopilot The autopilot should provide smooth and accurate control without divergent or
6.15
perceptible sustained nuisance oscillation.

80 53.c(7) Flight Director The FD, in each available display presentation (e.g., single cue, cross–pointer,
flight path director) should provide smooth and accurate guidance and be
appropriately damped, to achieve satisfactory control task performance without
pilot compensation or excessive workload.
81 53.c(8) Autothrust The autothrust function should provide smooth and accurate control of thrust
without significant or sustained oscillatory power changes or excessive over-
shoot of the required power setting.
82 53.c(9) Automatic trim Automatic roll and yaw trim functions, if installed, should operate without
introducing adverse interactions with automatic control of the aircraft.
83 57.a(2) Speed protection 1. The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and
provide speed protection control or guidance.

2. The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and
then disengage the FGS.
3. The FGS may detect the speed protection condition, alert the flight crew, and
remain engaged in the active mode without providing speed protection control
or guidance.
(Continues)
449
No. Requirement AC Paragraph Subject Description 450
84 57.b(3)(a) Low speed protection Speed protection should not interfere with the approach and landing phases of
during approach flight.
85 57.b(3)(b) Autothrust operation It is assumed that with autothrust operating normally, the combination of thrust
AC 25.1329-1B
control and pitch control during the approach will be sufficient to maintain
speed and desired vertical flight path. In cases where it is not sufficient, an alert
should be provided in time for the flight crew to take appropriate corrective
action.
86 57.b(3)(c) Defined vertical path For approach operations with a defined vertical path if the thrust is insufficient to
maintain both the desired flight path and the desired approach speed:
CHAPTER
1. The FGS mode reversion and low speed alert should be activated to ensure pilot
6
awareness.
2. The FGS will then provide a low speed alert while remaining in the existing
FGS approach mode.
3. The FGS will then provide a low speed alert and disengage.
87 57.c(2)(a) High speed protection: Operations at or near V MO/M MO in routine atmospheric conditions (e.g., light
Speed excursion turbulence) are safe. Small, brief excursions above V MO/M MO by them-
selves are not unsafe.
The FGS design should strive to strike a balance between providing adequate
speed protection margin and avoiding nuisance activation of high-speed
protection.
88 57.c(2)(b) High speed protection Climbing to control airspeed is not desirable, because departing an assigned
while in altitude hold altitude can be disruptive to air traffic control (ATC) and potentially hazardous
mode (e.g., in RVSM airspace). As long as the speed does not exceed a certain
margin beyond V MO/M MO (e.g., six knots), it is better that the FGS remain
in Altitude Hold mode.
The autothrust function, if operating normally, should effect high-speed protec-
tion by limiting its speed reference to the normal speed envelope (i.e., at or
below V MO/M MO).
AC 25.1329-1B The basic airplane high-speed alert should be sufficient for the pilot to recognize
the overspeed condition and take corrective action to reduce thrust. However, if
the airspeed exceeds a margin beyond V MO/M MO (e.g., six knots), the FGS
may transition from Altitude Hold to the Overspeed Protection mode and
depart (i.e. climb above) the selected altitude.
89 57.c(2)(c) High speed protection When the elevator channel of the FGS is not controlling airspeed, the autothrust
during climbs and function, if engaged, should reduce thrust, as needed to prevent sustained air-
descents speed excursions beyond V MO/M MO (e.g., six knots) down to the minimum
appropriate value.
When thrust is already the minimum appropriate value or the autothrust function
is not operating, the FGS should begin using pitch control, as needed, for high-
speed protection.
If conditions are encountered that result in airspeed excursions above V MO/M
MO, it is preferable for the FGS to smoothly and positively guide or control the
airplane back to within the speed range of the normal flight envelope.
90 63.a Heading or track hold In the Heading or Track Hold mode, the FGS should maintain the airplane
heading or track.
91 63.b Heading or track select In the Heading or Track Select mode, the FGS should expeditiously acquire and
maintain a ‘‘selected’’ heading or track value consistent with occupant comfort.
92 63.c(1) Lateral flight path In the LNAV mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain the lateral flight path
commanded by a flight management function.
93 63.c(2) Automatic mode If the airplane is not on the desired lateral path or within the designed path cap-
transitions ture criteria when LNAV is selected, the FGS LNAV mode should enter an
armed state. The FGS should transition from the armed state to an engaged
state at a point where the lateral flight path can be smoothly acquired and
tracked.
94 63.c(3) Takeoff or go-around For an FGS incorporating the LNAV mode during the TOGA phase, the design
(TOGA) should specify maneuvering capability immediately after takeoff and any
limits that may exist. After TOGA, maneuvering should be based upon aircraft
6.15
performance with the objective to prevent excessive roll attitudes where

AC 25.1329-1B
wingtip impact with the runway becomes probable, yet satisfy operational
requirements where terrain and/or thrust limitations exist.
95 64.a Target altitude selection To avoid unconstrained climbs or descents for any altitude transitions when using
applicable vertical modes, the altitude select controller should be set to a new
target altitude before the vertical mode can be selected.
96 64.b Vertical In the Vertical Speed mode, the FGS should smoothly acquire and maintain a
selected vertical speed.
97 64.c Flight path angle In the Flight Path Angle mode, the FGS should smoothly acquire and maintain
the selected flight path angle.
98 64.d Indicated airspeed In the Airspeed/Mach Hold mode, the FGS should maintain the airspeed or Mach
IAS/Mach hold at the time of engagement.
99 64.e IAS/Mach select In the Airspeed/Mach Select mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain a
selected airspeed or Mach.
100 64.f Flight level change In the FL Change mode, the FGS should change altitude in a coordinated way
with thrust control on the airplane.
(Continues)
451
¢
452
TABLE 6.45 (Continued)
101 64.g(1) Altitude capture: mode The Altitude Capture mode should command the FGS to transition from a vertical
transition mode to smoothly capture and maintain the selected target altitude with con-
sideration of the rates of climb and descent experienced in service.
102 64.g(2)(a) ALT capture: automatic The Altitude Capture mode should be automatically armed to ensure capture of
arming of mode the selected altitude. Annunciation of the armed status is not required if the
Altitude Capture mode is armed at all times. If the FGS is in the Altitude
AC 25.1329-1B
Capture mode, it should be annunciated.
CHAPTER
103 64.g(2)(b) Engagement from any The Altitude Capture mode should engage from any vertical mode if the com-
vertical mode puted flight path will intercept the selected altitude and the altitude capture
6
criteria are satisfied, except as specified during an approach.

104 64.g(2)(c) Changing climb/descent Changes in the climb/descent command references with the exception of those
command references made by the flight crew using the altitude select controller, should not prevent
capture of the target altitude.
105 64.g(2)(d) Capturing selected The Altitude Capture mode should smoothly capture the selected altitude, using
altitude an acceptable acceleration limit and pitch attitude with consideration for
occupant comfort.
106 64.g(2)(e) Minimizing acceleration The acceleration limit may, under certain conditions, result in an overshoot.
overshoot
107 64.g(2)(f) Selecting other vertical Pilot selection of other vertical modes at the time of altitude capture should not
mode prevent or adversely affect the level off at the target altitude.
108 64.g(2)(g) Changing target altitude The FGS must be designed to minimize flight crew confusion concerning the
FGS operation when the target altitude is changed during altitude capture.
109 64.g(2)(h) Barometric pressure Adjusting the datum pressure at any time during altitude capture should not result
adjustment in loss of the capture mode. The transition to the pressure altitude should be
accomplished smoothly.
110 64.g(2)(i) Maintaining reference If the autothrust function is active during altitude capture, the autopilot and
airspeed autothrust functions should be designed such that the FGS maintains the
reference airspeed during the level-off maneuver.
111 64.h(1)(a) ALT hold: pilot selection 1. Level flight. When initiated by pilot action in level flight, the Altitude Hold
AC 25.1329-1B entering mode mode should provide guidance or control to maintain altitude at the time the
mode is selected.
2. Climbing or descending. When initiated by pilot action when the airplane is
either climbing or descending, the FGS should immediately initiate a pitch
change to arrest the climb or descent and maintain the altitude when level flight
(e.g., less than 200 ft per minute) is reached. The intensity of the leveling
maneuver should be consistent with occupant comfort and safety.
112 64.h(1)(b) Automatic transition When initiated by an automatic transition from Altitude Capture, the Altitude
Hold mode should provide guidance or control to the selected altitude.
113 64.h(2) Mode transition Automatic transition into the Altitude Hold mode from another vertical mode
annunciation should be clearly annunciated for flight crew awareness.
114 64.h(3) Barometric pressure Any airplane response due to an adjustment of the datum pressure should be
adjustment smooth.
115 64.i(1)(a) FMS acquire vertical path In the VNAV mode, the FGS should acquire and maintain the vertical flight path
commanded by a flight management function (i.e., FMS or equivalent).
116 64.i(1)(b) Deviation from vertical If the aircraft is flying a vertical path (e.g., VNAV path), then the deviation from
path that path should be displayed in the primary field of view, such as the PFD,
navigation display (ND), or other acceptable display.
117 64.i(2)(a) Climb/Descent: autothrust When VNAV is selected for climb or descent, the autothrust function (if installed
function and engaged) should maintain the appropriate thrust setting.
118 64.i(2)(b) Preclude VNAV climb The FGS should preclude a VNAV climb, unless the mode select panel (MSP)
altitude window is set to an altitude above the current altitude.
119 64.i(2)(c) Preclude VNAV descent The FGS should preclude a VNAV descent, unless the MSP altitude window is
set to an altitude below the current altitude, except when on a final approach to
a runway.
121 64.a(1) Takeoff mode: vertical In the Takeoff mode, the vertical element of the FGS should provide vertical
guidance guidance to acquire and maintain a safe climb out speed after initial rotation for
6.15
takeoff.
122 AC 25.1329-1B 64.a(2) Lateral guidance In the Takeoff mode, the lateral element of the FGS, if implemented, should
maintain runway heading/track or wings level after liftoff. A separate lateral
mode annunciation should be provided.
123 64.a(3) Rotation guidance If rotation guidance is provided, the use of the guidance should not result in a tail
strike. It should be consistent with takeoff methods necessary to meet takeoff
performance requirements up to 35 ft above ground level (AGL). If no rotation
guidance is provided, the pitch command bars may be displayed during takeoff
roll but should not be considered as providing rotation guidance, unless it is
part of the intended function.
124 64.a(4) Autothrust The autothrust function should increase and maintain engine thrust to the selected
thrust limits (e.g., full takeoff thrust, de-rate).
125 64.a(5)(a) Transitions between flight Takeoff system operation should be continuous and smooth through transition
phases from the runway portion of the takeoff to the airborne portion and reconfi-
guration for enroute climb. The pilot should be able to continue the use of the
same primary display(s) for the airborne portion as for the runway portion.
Changes in guidance modes and display formats should be automatic.
(Continues)
453
126 64.a(5)(b) Pitch attitude and climb 1. Normal rate rotation of the airplane to the commanded pitch attitude at V R
speed/normal operation (takeoff rotation speed)—10 knots for all engines operative and V R—5 knots
for engine out should not result in a tail-strike.
2. The system should provide commands that lead the airplane to smoothly
AC 25.1329-1B acquire a pitch attitude that results in capture and tracking of the all–engine
takeoff climb speed, V 2 (takeoff safety speed) þ X. X is the all-engine speed
additive from the AFM (normally 10 knots or higher).
127 64.a(5)(c) Engine-out operation For engine-out operation, the system should provide commands that lead the
airplane to smoothly acquire a pitch attitude that results in capture and tracking
CHAPTER
of the following reference speeds:

6
1. V 2, for engine failure at or below V 2. This speed should be attained by the

time the airplane has reached 35 feet altitude.
2. Airspeed at engine failure for failures between V 2 and V 2 þ X.
3. V 2 þ X, for failures at or above V 2 þ X. Alternatively, the airspeed at engine
failure may be used, provided it has been shown that the minimum takeoff
climb gradient can still be achieved at that speed.
128 64.a(5)(d) Lateral commands during If implemented, the lateral element of the Takeoff mode should maintain runway
takeoff mode heading/track or wings level after liftoff and a separate lateral mode annun-
ciation should be provided.
129 64.b(1) Go-around mode: vertical The vertical element of the FGS Go-Around mode should initially rotate the
elements airplane or provide guidance to rotate the airplane to arrest the rate of descent.
130 64.b(2) Speed The FGS should acquire and maintain a safe speed during climb out and airplane
configuration changes. Typically, a safe speed for go-around climb is V 2, but
a different speed may be found safe for windshear recoveries (See AC 25-12).
131 64.b(3)(a) Autothrust during climb The autothrust function, if installed, should increase thrust and either maintain
thrust to specific thrust limits or maintain thrust for an adequate, safe climb.
132 64.b(3)(b) Pitch attitude during The initial go-around maneuver may require a significant change in pitch attitude.
go-around
133 64.b(4) Engagement The Go-Around mode should engage when go-around is selected by the pilot,
even if the MSP selected altitude is at or below the go-around initiation point.
134 AC 25.1329-1B 64.b(5) All engine and engine out The FGS design of the Go-Around mode should address all engine and engine–
capability out operation. The design should consider an engine failure resulting in a go-
around and the engine failure occurring during an all engine go-around.
135 64.c(1) Final approach path In the Approach mode, the FGS should capture and track a final approach lateral
and vertical path, if applicable, from a navigation (NAV) or landing system, for
example, ILS, MLS, GLS, RNP, area navigation (RNAV).
136 64.c(2) Mode annunciations The FGS should annunciate all operationally relevant approach modes.
137 64.c(3) Submodes The FGS may have submodes that become active without additional crew
selection.
138 64.c(4) Mode engagement Glideslope capture mode engagement may occur prior to localizer capture.
sequence
139 66.a Autothrust mode In the Thrust mode, the FGS should command the autothrust function to achieve a
selected target thrust value.
140 66.b Speed mode In the Speed mode, the FGS should command the autothrust function to acquire
and maintain the selected target speed value, assuming that the selected speed
is within the speed range of the normal flight envelope.
141 66.c Restart mode If a Retard mode is implemented in the FGS, it should work in the same manner for
both automatic and manual landings when the autothrust function is engaged.
142 67.a Approach operations The FGS vertical modes should allow the pilot to set the target altitude to a missed
AC 25.1329-1B approach value prior to capturing the final approach segment. This should be
possible for capturing from both above and below the final approach segment.
143 67.b VNAV path operations It should be possible to define a descent path to the final approach fix and another
path from the final approach fix to the runway with the target altitude set for
the missed approach altitude. Appropriate targets and descent points should be
identified by the FMS.
144 AC 25-7C.1329 b(2)(b-1) High altitude cruise low Low speed protection is intended to prevent loss of speed leading to an unsafe
speed protection condition.
evaluation
(aa) At high altitude at normal cruise speed, engage the FGS into an Altitude Hold
mode and a heading or lateral navigation (LNAV) mode.
6.15
(bb) Engage the autothrust into a speed mode.

(cc) Manually reduce one engine to idle power or thrust.
(dd) As the airspeed decreases, observe the FGS behavior in maintaining altitude
and heading/course.
(ee) When the low speed protection feature becomes active, note the airspeed and
the associated aural and visual alerts including possible mode change annun-
ciations for acceptable operation.
145 AC 25-7C.1329 b(2)(b-2) Altitude capture evalua- Low speed protection is intended to prevent loss of speed leading to an unsafe
tion at low altitude condition.
(aa) At a reasonably low altitude (e.g., approximately 3000 ft above MSL where
terrain permits) and at 250 knots, engage the FGS into Altitude Hold and a
heading or LNAV mode.
(bb) Engage the autothrust into a speed mode.
(cc) Set the altitude pre-selector to 5000 ft above the current altitude.
(dd) Make a flight level change to the selected altitude feet with a 250 knots climb
at maximum climb power or thrust.
(Continues)
455

(ee) When the FGS first enters the Altitude Capture mode, reduce thrust/power on
one engine to idle.
(ff) As the airspeed decreases, observe the airplane trajectory and behavior.
(gg) When the low speed protection condition becomes active, note the airspeed
and the associated aural and visual alerts including possible mode change
annunciations for acceptable operation.
146 AC 25-7C.1329 b(2)(b-3) High vertical speed Low speed protection is intended to prevent loss of speed leading to an unsafe
evaluation condition.
CHAPTER
(aa) Engage the FGS in the Vertical Speed mode with a very high rate of climb.
6
(bb) Set the thrust/power to a value that will cause the airplane to decelerate at
approximately 1 knot per second.
(cc) As the airspeed decreases, observe the airplane trajectory and behavior.
(dd) When the low speed protection condition becomes active, note the airspeed
and the associated aural and visual alerts including possible mode change
annunciations for acceptable operation.
147 AC 25-7C.1329 b(2)(b-4) Approach evaluation Low speed protection is intended to prevent loss of speed leading to an unsafe
condition.
(aa) Conduct an instrument approach with vertical path reference.
(bb) Couple the FGS to the localizer and glideslope (or LNAV/VNAV, etc.).
(cc) Cross the final approach fix/outer marker at a reasonably high speed at idle
thrust/power until low speed protection activates.
(dd) As the airspeed decreases, observe the airplane trajectory and behavior.
(ee) When the low speed protection becomes active, note the airspeed and the
associated aural and visual alerts including possible mode change
annunciation for acceptable operation.
(ff) Note the pilot response to the alert and the recovery actions taken to recover to
the desired vertical path and the re-capture to that path and the acceleration
back to the desired approach speed.
148 b(4)(b) FGS Climb, Cruise, Examination of the following modes are considered appropriate for inclusion in
Descent, and Holding this section:
Modes
AC 25-7C.1329 1. Altitude Hold/Select
2. Area Navigation
3. Backcourse
4. Heading Hold/Select
5. IAS Hold/Select
6. Lateral Navigation
7. Level Change
8. Localizer (only)
9. Mach Hold/Select
10. NonPrecision Approach
11. Pitch Attitude Hold
12. Roll Attitude Hold
13. Turbulence
14. Vertical Navigation
15. Vertical Speed Hold/Select
16. VOR
17. VOR Navigation
149 b(4)(c) Special characteristics Operation of the system should not result in performance for which the pilot
would be cited during a check ride (i.e., exceeding a speed target of 250 knots
by more than 5 knots, if appropriate, during operations below 10,000
6.15
feet altitude, or overshooting a target altitude by more than 100 feet during
capture of the pre-selected altitude). Resetting the datum pressure or the
selected altitude at any time during altitude capture should not result in
hazardous maneuvers.
150 b(6)(b) Airworthiness approval to 1. Conduct a series of approaches (usually 4 or more) on Type I rated ILS beams
CAT1 minimums to a radio altitude of 160 ft. (20% below the CAT I decision height of
200 ft).
2. Conduct the approaches with and without automatic throttles, with and without
yaw damper, alternate flap setting and so forth, for all configurations and
combinations of equipment for which the applicant seeks approval.
AC 25-7C.1329 3. At least three Type I beams should be included in the evaluation, one of which
should exhibit very noisy localizer and glideslope characteristics.

4. Failure modes/conditions described in paragraph 181b(7)(f) of this AC, appro-
priate to ILS approach modes, should be conducted.
5. The definition of a successful approach is one that positions the airplane at the
decision height (DH) such that the airplane can be safely landed without
exceptional piloting skill or strength.
(Continues)
457
151 b(6)(d) ILS with one engine If approval is sought for ILS approaches initiated with one engine inoperative,
inoperative and with the airplane trimmed at the point of glide path intercept, the automatic
flight control system should be capable of conducting the approach without
further manual trimming.
152 b(7)(a) Control wheel steering It should be possible for the pilot to overpower the automatic pilot system, and
achieve the maximum available control surface deflection, without using for-
ces that exceed the pilot control force limits specified in § 25.143(d).
153 b(7)(b) CWS Maximum bank and The maximum bank and pitch attitudes that could be achieved without over-
pitch attitude powering the automatic pilot system should be limited to those necessary for
CHAPTER
the normal operation of the airplane. Typically, these attitudes are 35 in roll
and þ20 to 10 in pitch.
6
154 b(7)(d) Stall The stall and stall recovery characteristics of the airplane should remain
acceptable with control wheel steering in use.
155 b(9)(a) Failure and malfunction Investigations should include the effects of any failure conditions identified for
validation by a system safety assessment conducted to show compliance with
§ 25.1309(d).
After the recognition point, action by the test pilot should be delayed to simulate
the time it would take for a line pilot to take control after recognizing the need
for action. Satisfactory airplane response to autopilot hardovers should be
AC 25-7C.1329 shown throughout the entire certificated airspeed/altitude flight envelope. If an
autothrottle is installed, the malfunctions should be examined with and without
the autothrottle operating.
156 b(9)(c) Failure and malfunction: Corrective action should not be initiated until three-seconds after the pilot has
different flight phase become aware, either through the behavior of the airplane or a reliable failure
warning system, that a malfunction has occurred.
The altitude loss for the cruise condition is the difference between the observed
altitude at the time the malfunction is introduced, and the lowest altitude
observed in the recovery maneuver.
157 AC 25-7C.1329 b(9)(d) Maneuvering flight Maneuvering flight tests should include turns with the malfunctions introduced
when maximum bank angles for normal operation of the system have been
established, and in the critical airplane configuration and stages of flight likely
to be encountered when using the automatic pilot. A one second delay time
following pilot recognition of the malfunction, through the behavior of the
airplane or a reliable failure warning system, should be used for maneuvering
flight malfunction testing. The altitude loss, for maneuvering flight testing, is
the difference between the observed altitude at the time the malfunction is
introduced, and the lowest altitude observed in the recovery maneuver.
For malfunction evaluations, the ACs state that the more critical of the following
should be inserted into the autopilot:
– A signal in any axis that is equivalent to any single failure (including autotrim)
– The combined signals about all affected axes if multiple axes failures can occur from
the malfunction of a single component
The reaction times are given in appendix B of the ACs:
– Hover, takeoff and landing—normal reaction time
– Maneuvering and approach—1 sec
– Climb, cruise, descent—3 sec
Simulated failure and corrective action should not exceed the aircraft structural
loads. Reasonable flight path deviation is explained in appendix B (normally 0–2 g, no
unacceptable workload or strength), and the MUH (same as previously discussed) must
be computed and added to the RWFM.
A sample Part 29 autopilot/SAS compliance matrix is shown in Table 6.46.
6.16 LANDING SYSTEMS

This section addresses the XLS-type landing systems: ILS, MLS, and GNSS Landing
System (GLS). Each of these systems are different from the nonprecision approaches
that were discussed in chapter 5 in that they provide vertical as well as horizontal
guidance for landing.
6.16.1 Instrument Landing System

The ILS is a precision approach system that allows safe landing of the aircraft from
200 ft ceiling and 2400 ft runway visibility range (RVR) down to autoland and rollout
with taxi guidance. Ceiling is the bottom of the cloud deck at the runway. If you were
standing on the runway and looked up at a cloud deck, the vertical distance between you
and the clouds would be the ceiling. The RVR is the distance that you can see down the
runway from the approach end down to the departure end. If it is foggy, you will not be
able to see as far as on a clear day. Pilots use the ceiling and RVR to see if they have
conditions that allow them to make the approach. The ceiling and RVR are the minimum
atmospheric conditions under which you are allowed to perform the approach. A non-
precision approach in the United States has, on average, minimums of 500 ft and 0.5 nm
(ceiling and RVR, respectively). If the airport called the weather conditions as 400 ft
broken (ceiling) and 0.5 nm, you cannot legally attempt a nonprecision approach, as the
ceiling is below the minimum. You would have to select an approach that provides more
guidance/accuracy and allows the approach to be performed with lower minima than the
nonprecision approach. The ILS provides this accuracy.
There are five categories of ILS:
● Category I (Cat I) allows manual approaches down to a 200 ft decision height (DH;
continue the landing or go-around), weather minima are 0.5 miles visibility or 2400 ft
460
TABLE 6.46 ¢ Part 29 AP/SAS Compliance Matrix
AC 29-2C Subject Sub Topic Description

§ 29.1329 B1 (i) AP Hardover test In demonstrating malfunctions of the autopilot system, generally servo actuator
hardovers are the most critical malfunction. If this is the case and the autopilot
system utilizes the same servos and servo amplifiers as the stability augmen-
tation system (SAS) and the autopilot function cannot produce a more severe
hardover than the SAS, then no additional consideration is required for this
CHAPTER
malfunction. An evaluation using the guidance in paragraph AC Appendix B

6
would be sufficient.
§ 29.1329 B 1 (i) AP Altitude Hold The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
perform its intended function of flying the rotorcraft
§ 29.1329 B 1 (i) AP BC The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
§ 29.1329 B 1 (i) AP Heading Hold The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
§ 29.1329 B 1 (i) AP VRT The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
§ 29.1329 B 1 (i) AP NAV The automatic pilot system should be evaluated to demonstrate that it can
§ 29.1329 B 1 (iii) AP Servo alignment The rule specifies that unless there is automatic synchronization, there should be
monitoring/indication some method to indicate the alignment of the actuating device to the pilot. The
intent of this requirement is to provide a means such that the pilot does not
inadvertently engage the system into a hardover condition. One method of
achieving this has been the use of servo force meters. These meters monitor the
current into the servo motor and indicate to the pilot if a signal is being sent to
the servo prior to system engagement.
§ 29.1329 B 2 (i) AP controls AP control location Location of the automatic pilot system controls are such that their operation is
properly labeled and is readily accessible to the pilot(s).
§ 29.1329 B 2 (ii) AP Annunciation Annunciator colors conform to the colors specified in § 29.1322 (Reference
paragraph AC 29.1322).
§ 29.1329 B 2 (iii) AP Displays Labeling A determination is made that the controls, control labels, and placards are read-
able and discernible under all expected cockpit lighting conditions.
§ 29.1329 B 2 (iv) AP Trim direction Motion and effect of the autopilot cockpit controls should conform with the
requirements of § 29.779.
§ 29.1329 B 2 (v) AP annunciations Annunciation Any disconnect of the autopilot should be annunciated.
§ 29.1329 C 1 AP AP/SAS dropout To preclude hazardous conditions that may result from any failure or mal-
functioning of the autopilot the following failures should be evaluated. This
evaluation should also account for any hazards that also might be caused by
inadvertent pilot action. The guidance in paragraph AC 29 Appendix B should
be used to determine the appropriate reaction times of the human pilot to an
autopilot malfunction.
Climb, cruise, and descent flight regimes. The more critical of the following
should be induced into the automatic pilot system.
(i) A signal about any axis equivalent to the cumulative effect of any single
failure, including autotrim (if installed).
(ii) The combined signals about all affected axes, if multiple axes failures can
result from the malfunction of any single component.
§ 29.1329 C 2 AP Loads The simulated failure and the subsequent corrective action should not create loads
in excess of structural limits or result in dangerous dynamic conditions or
deviations from the flight path. Additional guidance regarding the method of
determining pilot recognition times and reasonable flight path deviation due to
these simulated failures is contained in paragraph AC 29 appendix B b(6).
Resultant flight loads outside the envelope of zero to 2 g will be
acceptable provided adequate analysis and flight test measurements are con-
ducted to establish that no resultant aircraft load is beyond limit loads for the
structure, including a critical assessment and consideration of the effects of
structural loading parameter variations (e.g., center of gravity, load distribu-
tion, control system variations, maneuvering gradients).
§ 29.1329 C 5 AP Recovery To aid in recovery of the rotorcraft, after a malfunction occurs, one pilot should
6.16
be able to physically overpower the autopilot and then disengage it with ease,
and it should remain disengaged until further pilot action to reengage.
The pilot should be able to return the rotorcraft to its normal flight attitude under
full manual control without exceeding the loads or speed limits defined in
paragraph c(2) and without engaging in any dangerous maneuvers during
recovery. The maximum servo authority used for these tests should not exceed
those values shown to be within the structural limits for which the rotorcraft
was designed.
§ 29.1329 C 5 AP controls AP Disconnect The control to disconnect the autopilot should be easily available to the pilot who
Landing Systems
is now resisting the malfunctioning force of the autopilot. It is recommended

that the disconnect button be placed on the cyclic control. It should be red and
conspicuously marked ‘‘Autopilot Disconnect.’’
(Continues)
461
462
§ 29.1329 C 6 AP interlocks AP Interlocks The autopilot system should have appropriate interlocks to its engagement to
ensure it does not operate improperly as a result of information furnished by an
external device or system. An example of this is the navigation receivers and
the compass system. If for a particular mode of operation the autopilot uses
signals from these systems, the autopilot should be interlocked from operating
in those modes if invalid information is being received from that system.
§ 29.1329 D 1 AP AP ILS Malfunctions Throughout an approach, no signal or combination of signals simulating the
cumulative effect of any single failure or malfunction in the automatic pilot
CHAPTER
system, except vertical gyro mechanical failures, should provide hazardous

deviations from flight path or any degree of loss of control.
6
§ 29.1329 D 2 AP AP ILS malfunctions The aircraft should be flown down the instrument landing system (ILS) in the
configuration and at the approach speed specified by the applicant for
approach. Simulated autopilot malfunctions should be induced at critical points
along the ILS, taking into consideration all possible variations in autopilot
sensitivity and authority. The malfunctions should be induced in each axis.
While the pilot may know the purpose of the flight, the pilot should not be
informed when a malfunction is about to be or has been applied except through
aircraft action, control movement, or other acceptable warning devices.
§ 29.1329 D 3 AP Engine failure on An engine failure during an automatic ILS approach should not cause a lateral
approach deviation of the aircraft from the flight path at a rate greater than 3 per second
or produce hazardous attitudes.
§ 29.1329 D 4 AP Engine failure on If approval is sought for ILS approaches initiated with one engine inoperative, the
approach automatic pilot should be capable of conducting the approach.
§ 29.1329 D 5 AP Engine failure on Deviations from the ILS flight profile should be evaluated as follows:
approach (i) The rotorcraft should be instrumented so the following information is recorded:
(A) The path of the rotorcraft with respect to the normal glide path
(B) The point along the glide path when the simulated malfunction is induced
(C) The point where the pilot indicates recognition of the malfunction
(D) The point along the path of the rotorcraft where recovery action is
initiated.
§ 29.1329 G AP AP interlocks There should be a means of sequencing actions or interlocking engagement with
sensor inputs to prevent autopilot initiated maneuvers that could result in
hazardous operations due to:
1. Engagement of the autopilot;
2. Malfunctions of autopilot input or feedback signals that could result in
unbounded output commands.
Appendix B (6) (i) SAS Fly Through If a SAS installation stabilizes the rotorcraft by allowing the pilot to ‘‘Fly
through’’ and perceive a stable, well-behaved vehicle, it qualifies as a SAS, and
if reliable, receives credit under Sections III through IV of Appendix B for use
in complying will all-handling qualities requirements.
Appendix B (6) (ii) SAS Single Failures Reasonable single failures of the SAS must be evaluated and the resultant hand-
ling qualities must be evaluated to assure that in this degraded configuration,
(1) handling qualities have not been degraded below ‘‘VFR’’levels defined in
FAR Part 29, Subpart B,
Appendix B (6) (ii) SAS Single Failure Reasonable single failures of the SAS must be evaluated and the resultant hand-
the rotorcraft is free from any tendency to diverge rapidly from stabilized flight
conditions
Appendix B (6) (ii) SAS Single Failure Reasonable single failures of the SAS must be evaluated and the resultant hand-
the rotorcraft can be flown IFR throughout its endurance capability without
undue difficulty by the minimum flight crew.
Appendix B (6) (iii) SAS Reliability If no restriction on the SAS is applied, and if credit is to be given for system
reliability and the applicant exempted from consideration of malfunction,
hardover and oscillatory functions (AP excluded), a thorough system evalua-
tion is needed. Malfunctions should be tested in all fases of flight including
takeoff, climb, cruising, landing, maneuvering and hovering. Appropriate time
delay should be applied.
Appendix B (6) (v-vi) for consideration for test and limits.
Appendix B (6) (iii) SAS Reaction Time A good method to accurately determine pilot recognition and reaction time is to
establish typical climb, cruise, descent, and approach conditions and instruct a
6.16
subject pilot to react as soon as he recognizes individual hardover conditions in

pitch, roll.
Appendix B (6) (v) SAS Controls SAS Disconnect All cockpit emergency controls including emergency quick disconnect should be
‘‘red’’
Appendix B (6) (vii) SAS Multiple failures Following a single failure, subsequent failures and probable combinations of
failures must be considered. Probability analysis of combinations of failures
must be conducted by systems experts to determine the need for testing of
advanced failure scenarios.
Landing Systems
(Continues)
463
464

CHAPTER
Appendix B (6) (viii) SAS Beep trim Other areas for investigation include beep trim and auto trim failures. The delay
6
times of paragraph b(6)(iii) are appropriate for all such failures. System mal-
functions may also include component failures that result in oscillatory outputs
of the actuator(s). These should be sustainable at least as long as the specified
hardover delays, should be manageable thereafter with hands on the controls,
and should allow disconnect of the malfunctioning system.
§ 29.6721 SAS Failure identification This rule requires that the pilot be made aware of stability augmentation, auto-
matic or power-operated system failures that could lead to an unsafe condition.
Examples of clearly distinguishable warnings include, but are not limited to, an
obvious aircraft attitude change following the failure or an audio warning tone.
A visual indication itself may not be adequate since detection of a visual
warning would normally require special pilot attention. The use of devices
such as stick pushers or shakers is not acceptable as a warning means since the
automatic flight control systems (AFCS) may provide a hands-off capability or
normal helicopter vibrations could mask a control shaker.
§ 29.6722 SAS Direction of corrective The corrective flight control input following a system failure should be in the
action logical direction. For example, a malfunction resulting in a nosedown pitch of
the aircraft should require a corrective cyclic control input in the aft direction.
§ 29.6722 SAS Location of SAS release The system deactivating means does not have to be located on the primary flight
controls control grips; however, it should be easily accessible to the pilot.
§ 29.6722 SAS Inadvertent release of Consideration should be given to the consequences of inadvertent de-selection of
SAS the automatic stabilization system, especially if the deactivation control is

mounted on a primary control grip.
2 Dot FIGURE 6.44 ¢
2 Dot envelope (course width) (150 mV) ILS Localizer

is 700 ft wide at threshold
1,000 ft nominal
1 Dot
LOC
Transmitter
(1,000 W)
4° on Long runway
maybe 5° on short runway
Localizer
Function: Provides horizontal guidance.
Antenna: Optimum (a) 1,000 ft from end of runway and on centerline. Horizontal polarization.
Building: Transmitter building (B) is offset 2,000 ft minimum for the center of the antenna array
and within 90° to 120° for the approach end.
Frequency: 108.1 to 111.9 add. tenths only.
Modulation: Navigation modulation depth on course 20% for 90 Hz and for 150 Hz. Code identification.
1020 Hz at 5%.
RVR, which can be decreased to 1800 ft RVR with touchdown zone and centerline
lighting at the runway.
● Cat 2, coupled simplex autopilot, 100 ft DH, 1200 ft RVR
● Cat 3A, autoland with rollout control, 100 ft DH and 700 ft RVR
● Cat 3B, autoland with taxi visibility, 50 ft DH and 150 ft RVR
● Cat 3C, autoland with taxi guidance, 0 ft DH and 0 ft RVR with redundant systems
The ILS provides the aircrew with course (localizer) and altitude deviations. The
localizer and glideslope information is determined by measuring received signal
strength from two beams operating at different modulations. The aircrew is apprised of
the deviations by deflections on a course deviation indicator (CDI). It is critical that
there are no obstructions to beam reception (blockage/multipath) or the indications will
be erroneous. Figure 6.44 describes the localizer installation and geometry, and
Figure 6.45 provides the cockpit indications.
The glideslope portion of the ILS works in much the same way as the localizer. The
installation and the geometry of the ILS glideslope are shown in Figure 6.46, and the
cockpit indications are found at Figure 6.47. It should be noted that the deviations that
are calculated by the aircraft equipment are angular; the further away from the trans-
mitter you go the larger the distance subtended by the angle.
The ILS system also provides range to the runway threshold. This is accomplished
by the use of marker beacons. There are three possible beacons on the ILS approach:
● Outer marker: 400 Hz signal at 4 to 7 miles from the touchdown point; illuminates a
blue light on the cockpit display.
● Middle marker (which is not on all systems): 1300 Hz signal at 200 ft on the gli-
deslope (approximately 3500 ft from touchdown); illuminates an amber light on the
cockpit display.
● Inner marker: 3000 Hz signal at 100 ft on the glideslope; illuminates a white light on
the cockpit display.
Figure 6.48 details the installation and geometry of the ILS marker system.
FIGURE 6.45 ¢
Localizer CDI 00.0

Indications COURSE N
G 33 3
L
I
30
6
D
E
S
E
L
O
P
24
12
E
15
21
S
150 wide runway
100 above runway

70
210
420
200 above runway
82
246
492
FIGURE 6.46 ¢ 90 Hz
2 Dots Predominates
Glideslope
Installation and
1.4°
Geometry
2.5°–3°
2 Dots
150 Hz 1000
Predominates
Glideslope
Function: Provides vertical guidance.
Antenna: Sited (D) to provide 50 ft(+10/−3 ft) runway
threshold crossing height. Horizontal polarization.
Building: Transmitter building (E) is located 250 to 600 ft
from centerline of the runway.
Frequency: 329.3 to 335.0 MHz.
Modulation: Navigation modulation on path 40% (each) for 90 Hz and for 150 Hz.
Path: Established at an angle between 2° and 3° (3° optimum).
Path Width: Path width (F) approximately 1.4° (full scale limits).
FIGURE 6.47 ¢
28 2D
ots Cockpit Glideslope
1D
ot 00.0 Indications
56 COURSE N
1 Do G 33 3
t L
2 Do 14 I
30
6
ts D
E
S
W
200 High
E
L
O
P
24
12
28 E
100 High 21 S
15
2.5°–3°
Blue light FIGURE 6.48 ¢ ILS

Marker Beacons
Amber 3000
400 Light Hertz
Hertz 1300
Hertz 200 White light
100
Outer Marker Middle Marker Inner Marker
3,500 approx.
4–7 miles
Middle Marker
Function: Indicates vicinity of cat I decision height point.
Location: At decision height point (G) ± 500 ft longitudinal ± 300 ft lateral.
Frequency: 75 MHz.
Modulation: 1300 Hz.
Keying: Alternate dot and dash.
Inner Marker
Function: Indicates decision height for cat II approach (normally 100 ft
above TZE). Marks progress reference point for cat III approach.
Location: Between middle marker and end of the runway.
Frequency: 75 MHz.
Modulation: 3000 Hz.
Keying: 6 dots/sec.
Outer Marker
Function: Provides a fix and altitude of glideslope at that fix.
Location: At or past (H) the glideslope intercept point.
Frequency: 75 MHz.
Modulation: 400 Hz at 95%.
Keying: 2 dashes/sec.
6.16.2 Microwave Landing System

There are definite drawbacks to the current ILS. ILSs are good for only one runway and
have only one ideal flight path. Parallel runways require two separate installations, and
even then run into the potential of interference. In order to remove the potential of
multipath, large amounts of money may have to be spent on construction and earth
moving. One system that was examined for possible use in the United States and is used
FIGURE 6.49 ¢ Elevation beam 1 above

MLS Geometry the horizon to 20 (max)
Runway
Glide Path (ELI)

Azimuth Beam
Azimuth/Range Flare (EL2) 60 (max)
(DME) 7½° (max)
operationally in other parts of the world is the time reference scanning beam (TRSB)
MLS, or just MLS.
The MLS uses three scanning beams to provide azimuth and elevation, and a
transponder to provide range. The aircraft computer determines deviation from course
and glideslope by relating the timing of the received pulses from horizontally and ver-
tically scanned beams. The MLS setup is shown in Figure 6.49.
In the figure, EL1 is the glideslope reference and EL2 is a second lower-power
beam used for the flare prior to touchdown. The MLS uses the same CDI as the ILS to
provide the aircrew with lateral and vertical deviations. Since the beams are not fixed
and can span a relatively large volume, an infinite number of approaches can be
designed for the single ground station. The accuracies for the MLS are stated as 100 ft in
range, 0.1 in elevation, and 0.2 in azimuth. A depiction of the MLS coverage volume
is shown in Figure 6.50.
6.16.3 GNS Landing System

The last of the XLSs is the GNSS landing system (GLS). The GLS is composed of a
satellite-based navigation constellation (e.g., GPS, Galileo, GLONASS), a ground-based
augmentation system such as GBAS and a means of sending information (differential
corrections and approach waypoints) to the aircraft (e.g., a data link). Originally called
the local area augmentation system (LAAS), it is now designated as the ground-based
augmentation system (GBAS). GBAS is demonstrated to be 1 m accurate in the hor-
izontal and vertical planes and will support ILS Cat II/III landing requirements. GBAS is
in co-development with the FAA, Honeywell and Airservices Australia with assistance
and prototypes by DECEA in Brazil, DFS in Germany and AENA in Spain. The GBAS
system will provide services in the airport terminal area to a radius of 20–30 nm. The
components of this system are shown in Figure 6.51.
GBAS advantages include high accuracy, availability and integrity, and will support
departure procedures, guided missed approaches and terminal area operations with
Maximum Limit FIGURE 6.50 ¢

20,000’ MLS Coverage
60
Elevation
Volume
Azimuth 15 Normal

40 30 Glide Pa
th
3
20 NM
40
*Back
Approach Azimuth
Azimuth
40 7 NM
40
*when installed
60
1 THE GLS FIGURE 6.51 ¢

FIGURE
GLS Components
Multi-Mode
Ground-Based
Receiver VDB Data Link
Augmentation
System
Corrections and
Final approach
Segment data
Boeing commercial airplanes GNS landing system
flexible curved approaches. GBAS increases the efficiency of arrival and departure
procedures, and eliminates capacity constraint due to ILS bottlenecks. The system
supports offset landing thresholds and provides a navigation solution that supports the
most demanding RNP requirements.
The original US GBAS development site was in Memphis, Tennessee, which was
canceled, and two sites are now in development: one in Newark, New Jersey, and the
other in Houston, Texas. The initial testing at Newark encountered EMI from passing
truckers on the NJ Turnpike, which required siting and software modifications be per-
formed to mitigate the problems. Six GBAS landing systems approaches were approved
for Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport on May 31, 2012. Internationally,
Bremen Airport in Germany has also been approved and is being used by airlines for
revenue traffic. Several GBAS stations are currently installed outside the United States
and are expected to receive operational approval shortly. These stations are located in
Malaga, Spain, Agana, Guam, Frankfurt, Germany, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Sydney,
Australia. Additional airports, both foreign and domestic, are considering the installation
and approval of GBAS.
The original plan for the GPS was to replace all of the ground-based navigation
systems, including the ILS. Because of the problems with vertical accuracy, integrity,
continuity, and availability, it was not feasible. The first attempt at using GPS for a
precision landing system was the special use category I (SCATI) GPS landing system,
which was developed by a consortium of manufacturers and air carriers. The config-
uration used a differential GPS receiver at the airfield that uplinked differential GPS
corrections and approach glideslope waypoints to a cooperative and suitably equipped
aircraft. The aircraft was configured with a VHF data link and a receiver capable of
processing the differential corrections to aid the navigation solution. The CDI in the
airplane was driven by a position in space rather than the angular measurements used in
ILS and MLS. The aircraft processor determines its position in space (latitude, long-
itude, and altitude) and compares it to where it is supposed to be on the localizer and
glide path (approach glideslope waypoints). The deviation then drives the pitch, bank,
and steering bars on the CDI.
With the advent of the WAAS, EGNOS, MTSAS, and other SBAS systems, dif-
ferential corrections can now be delivered to the user from geostationary relay satellites.
Because of this accuracy, a new family of approaches has been approved for use called
localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV). WAAS is now approved to provide
guidance down to 200 ft above the airport’s surface for these vertically guided instru-
ment approaches.
As of the end of 2013 more than 3000 LPV approaches were approved in the
United States The basic premise of this type of approach is similar to the SCATI just
described; only for the LPV approaches there is no additional equipment at the airfield.
The differential corrections for the GPS are received from the WAAS system. The
waypoints for flying the approach are contained in the aircraft’s GPS/WAAS receiver
and have been preapproved (TERPS) by the authority. TERPS guarantee the accuracy of
the waypoints for the approach as well as clearance from obstructions.
When the pilot chooses to perform an LPV approach, the airplane treats the infor-
mation just as if it were receiving ILS information; pitch, bank, and steering on the CDI
are displayed as explained previously.
6.16.4 Other Category I Landing Systems

There are two other ‘‘landing systems’’ identified in the AC: RNP and area navigation
systems. RNP is the statement of the navigation performance necessary for operations
within a designed airspace. RNP is specified in terms of accuracy, integrity, and avail-
ability of navigation signals and equipment for a particular airspace, route, procedure, or
operation. Area navigation systems employ an FMS with VNAV and multiple naviga-
tion sensors to output a position. The accuracy of these systems is covered by other
AC 20-138C, which is addressed in section 6.11 of the text.
6.16.5 Airworthiness Certification of Landing Systems

The guidance for the ILS (Cat I/II), MLS, and GLS is found in AC 120-29A, ‘‘Criteria
for Approval of Category I and Category II Weather Minima for Approach,’’ August 12,
2002. The criteria for Cat III ILS is found in AC 120-28D, ‘‘Criteria for Approval of
Category III Weather Minima for Takeoff, Landing, and Rollout,’’ July 13, 1999. These
ACs contain operational approval to operate at the minimums and airworthiness
approval for the systems and equipment installed in the airplane. The following dis-
cussion concentrates on the latter of the two. Appendix 2 of AC 120-29A contains the
airworthiness criteria for category I systems and appendix 3 covers the airworthiness
criteria for category II systems. Appendix 2 of AC 120-28D covers the airworthiness
criteria for category III systems.
AC 27-1B only addresses guidance for localizer and glide slope systems; it does not
refer to AC 120-29. AC 29-2C addresses guidance for ILS Cat II in chapter 3, Mis-
cellaneous Guidance; it does reference AC 120-29, especially performance criteria in
appendix 1.
6.16.5.1 Airworthiness of Category I Systems

In general, the applicant will submit a certification plan that describes how any non-
aircraft elements of the approach system relate to the aircraft system from a perfor-
mance, integrity, and availability perspective. Standard landing aids (ILS, MLS) can be
addressed by reference to ICAO standards and recommended practices. In addition, the
plan should address
● The system concepts and operational philosophy to allow the regulatory authority to
determine whether criteria and elements other than those contained in the AC are
necessary.
● Approach system performance should be established considering the environmental
and deterministic effects that may reasonably be experienced for the type of opera-
tion for which certification and operational approval are being sought.
● Where reliance is placed on the pilot to detect a failure of engagement of a mode
when it is selected, an appropriate indication or warning must be provided.
● The effect of failures of the navigation facilities must be considered, taking into
account ICAO and other pertinent state criteria.
● The effect of the aircraft navigation reference point on the airplane flight path and
wheel-to-threshold crossing height shall be assessed.
Approach System Accuracy Requirements The following are general system accu-
racy requirements that pertain to all of the category I landing systems:
● The performance of the system should be validated in flight testing using at least
three different representative facilities for a minimum of nine approaches, with a
representative range of environmental and system variables that have an effect on

overall performance.
● Performance assessments should take into account the following variables applied
according to their expected distribution in service:
– Configuration (flaps)
– CG
– Landing weight
– Conditions of wind, turbulence, and wind shear
– Characteristics of ground- and space-based systems and aids
– Any other parameter that could affect system performance (e.g., airport altitude,
approach path slope, variations in approach speed)
● The criteria for acceptable approach performance are based on acquiring and tracking
the required flight path to the appropriate minimum altitude for the procedure. The
acquisition should be accomplished in a manner compatible with instrument proce-
dure requirements and flight crew requirements for the type of approach being
conducted.
● An approach guidance system shall not generate command information (FD, HUD)
that results in flight path control that is oscillatory or requires unusual effort by the
pilot to satisfy the performance requirements.
● An approach control system shall not generate flight path control (autopilot) with
sustained oscillation.
● The approach system must not cause sustained nuisance oscillations or undue attitude
changes or control activity as a result of configuration or power changes or any other
disturbances to be expected in normal operation.
Specific performance for the ILS includes
● The performance standards for signal alignment and quality are contained in ICAO
annex 10 (an equivalent state standard may be used).
● Lateral tracking performance from 1000 ft height above touchdown (HAT) to 200 ft
HAT should be stable without large deviations (within 50 mamp deviation) from
the indicated path.
● Vertical tracking performance from 700 ft HAT to 200 ft HAT should be
stable without large deviations (within 75 mamp deviation) from the indicated path.
Specific performance for the MLS includes the following:
● The performance standards for signal alignment and quality are contained in ICAO
annex 10 (an equivalent state standard may be used).
● Lateral tracking performance from 1000 ft HAT to 200 ft HAT should be
Specific performance for the GLS is the same as for the ILS/MLS.
FIGURE 6.52 ¢
Desired Path
Defined Path Navigation Lateral
Total system Error Components
Estimated Flight technical Path definition of the TSE
Error
Navigation System Error Position Error Error
Actual
Position
The accuracy criteria for RNP are designed to enable a seamless transition from an
enroute RNP to an approach RNP. RNP operations are based on the accuracy of the
airplane flight path in absolute terms with respect to the defined flight path over the
ground. The total system error (TSE) is characterized by the combined performance of
the airplane systems and any navigation aids. The certification plan should identify any
navigation aids on which the RNP performance will be established and how the airplane
performance interacts with the navigation aids to meet the TSE performance require-
ments. The certification plan should identify the assumed relationship between airplane
performance and any navigation aid performance. The relationship of all errors summed
into the TSE is shown in Figure 6.52.
The components of Figure 6.52 are
● The desired path: the path that the pilot, or pilot and ATC, is expected to fly.
● In order for an aircraft to follow the desired path it is necessary that the navigation
system (airborne or on the ground) generate a defined path.
● The difference between the desired path and the defined path is called the path
definition error.
● The difference between the estimated aircraft position (from the aircraft navigation
system) and the desired flight path is the path steering error. This error includes
display errors and the flight technical error (FTE, the accuracy with which the aircraft
is controlled either by the pilot or the autopilot).
● The error in the estimation of the aircraft’s position s called the navigation system error.
● The sum of the path deviation error, navigation system error and the path steering
error (FTE plus any display error) is the TSE, which is the difference between the
desired flight path and the actual flight path.
Particular levels of RNP can be satisfied using various navigation aids such as ILS/
MLS, or by using combinations of navigation sensors (i.e., GPS/INS), or in concert with
an FMS. When a computerized path (series of waypoints) is used as the basis for an
approach operation, the desired flight path must typically be defined by a series of 3D
earth-based coordinates for the applicable waypoints or path definition points. Approach
or missed approach operations can be approved by demonstration of the capability to
meet the required navigation performance for a specific approach procedure, for a set of
particular procedural types, or for a set of RNP levels.
Associated with an RNP level is a containment limit that is specified as ‘‘two times
the level of RNP’’ (2 RNP). The system performance integrity provided by this RNP
containment limit is intended to support its application as a basic element for either
aircraft separation or obstacle or terrain clearance assessment.
TABLE 6.47 ¢ Required RNP Levels for Approaches
Applicability/Operation Normal
RNP Level (Approach Segment) Performance (95%) Containment Limit
RNP 1 Initial/Intermediate Approach 1 nm 2 nm
RNP 0.5 Initial/intermediate/final approach: supports 0.5 nm 1 nm
limited Cat I minima
RNP 0.3 Initial/intermediate/final approach: supports 0.3 nm 0.6 nm
limited Cat I minima
RNP 0.3/125 ft* Initial/intermediate/final approach with specified 0.3 nm 0.6 nm
barometric vertical guidance: supports limited 125 ft 250 ft
Cat I minima
RNP 0.03/45 ft Final approach with specified vertical guidance: 0.03 nm 0.06 nm
supports Cat I minima 45 ft 90 ft
supports Cat I/II minima 15 ft 30 ft
supports Cat I/II/III minima 15 ft 30 ft
*A second value for the RNP indicates a required altitude accuracy as well as the lateral accuracy.
The expression RNP level is used to describe a specific value or level of navigation
performance. Table 6.47 provides RNP levels that can support initial, intermediate,
final, and missed approach segments. These values are recommended in the AC but are
not yet approved as international standards.
Specific performance requirements for area navigation systems are specified in AC
25-15, ‘‘Approval of Flight Management Systems in Transport Category Airplanes,’’ and
AC 20-138C, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems,’’ May 8,
2012.
Approach System Integrity Requirements The applicant shall provide the certifi-
cation authority with an overall operational safety assessment plan for the use of
systems other than ILS or MLS for ‘‘path in space’’ guidance. This plan shall identify
the assumptions and considerations for the nonaircraft elements of the system and
how they relate to the airplane system certification plan. The onboard components of
the landing system need to comply with 14 CFR Part 25.1309 (hence the safety
assessment plan). The following are published in the AC as guidance criteria with
respect to 1309:
● The aircraft system response to the loss of ILS guidance signals (localizer and gli-
deslope) shall be established.
● The aircraft system response to the loss of MLS guidance signals (azimuth and ele-
vation) shall be established.
● The aircraft system response to the loss of GLS guidance signals shall be established.
● The aircraft system response to the loss of navigation services used to conduct RNP
operation shall be established. In particular,
– The aircraft system response to any switchover to alternate navigation services
shall be established.
– It shall be demonstrated that the airplane will maintain the required flight path
within the containment limits when unannunciated failures not shown to be
extremely remote are experienced.
● The integrity requirements for area navigation systems are as specified in AC 20-138C.
Approach System Availability Requirements Below 500 ft on approach, the
demonstrated probability of a successful landing should be at least 95% (no more than
5% of the approaches result in a go-around due to a combination of failures in the
landing system and the incidence of unsatisfactory performance). A dual or single area
navigation approach system installation should meet the availability requirements con-
sistent with the operational objective of 14 CFR Part 121, section 121.349 (as applicable
to standard operations specifications [ops specs]).
Go-Around Requirements A go-around may be required following a failure in the
approach system as required by the flight crew or air traffic service at any time prior to
touchdown.
● It should be possible to initiate a missed approach at any point during the approach
until touchdown on the runway. It should be safe to initiate a missed approach that
results in a momentary touchdown on the runway.
● A go-around should not require unusual pilot skill, alertness, or strength.
● The proportion of approaches terminating in a go-around below 500 ft due to a
combination of failures in the landing system and the incidence of unsatisfactory
system performance may not be greater than 5%.
● Information should be available to the operator to ensure that a safe go-around flight
path can be determined.
Flight Deck Information, Annunciation, and Alerting Requirements The controls,
indicators, and warnings must be designed to minimize crew errors that could create a
hazard. Mode and system malfunction information must be presented in a manner
compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the aircrew. The indications must
be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible under all expected normal
lighting conditions.
For manual control of approach flight path, the appropriate flight displays, whether
heads-down or heads-up, must provide sufficient information without excessive refer-
ence to other cockpit displays to enable a suitably trained pilot to do the following:
● Maintain the approach path
● Make the alignment with the runway, and if applicable safely flare and roll out
● Go around
Sufficient information should be provided to the air crew to monitor the progress
and safety of the approach operation. The required flight performance monitoring cap-
ability should include at least
● Unambiguous identification of the intended path for the approach and, if applicable,
safety flare and roll out ILS/MLS approach identifier/frequency, and selected navi-
gation source
● Indication of the position of the aircraft with respect to the intended path (raw data
localizer and glideslope, or equivalent)
A positive, continuous, and unambiguous indication should be provided for the

modes actually in operation as well as those armed for engagement. Where the
engagement of a mode is automatic (localizer, glideslope acquisition), clear indication
must be given when the mode has been armed by either action of a member of the flight
crew or automatically by the system.
Alerting requirements are intended to address the need for warning, caution, and
advisory information for the flight crew. CFR 14 section 25.1309 requires that infor-
mation must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions and to
enable the crew to take appropriate corrective action. A warning indication must be
provided if immediate corrective action is required. The design should account for crew
alerting cues, corrective action required, and the capability of detecting faults. A caution
is required whenever immediate crew awareness is required and timely subsequent crew
action may be required. A means shall be provided to advise the flight crew of failed
airplane system elements that affect the decision to continue or discontinue the
approach. For RNP systems, the guidance or control system shall indicate to the flight
crew when the actual navigation performance (ANP) exceeds the RNP.
Appropriate system status and failure annunciations suited to the guidance system
and navigation sensors used and any related aircraft systems (autopilot, flight director)
should be provided to the operator prior to departure to determine system capability to
perform the approach. While enroute, the failure of each airplane component affecting
the approach capability should be indicated via an advisory (unless a warning is war-
ranted) without flight crew action. A means should be provided to advise the aircrew of
failed airplane system elements that affect the decision to continue to the destination or
divert to an alternate. System status indications should be identified by names that are
different than operational authorization categories (e.g., do not use a status of ‘‘Cat I’’).
Multiple Landing Systems and Multimode Receivers Many aircraft have the cap-
ability of conducting approach and landing operations using multiple landing systems;
for some, this capability is established by using a multimode receiver (MMR). Where
practicable, the flight deck approach procedure should be the same irrespective of the
navigation system selected. For these systems:
● A means should be provided to confirm that the intended approach aid has been
correctly selected.
● During the approach, an indication of a failure in each nonselected airplane system
element must be provided to the aircrew as an indication of system status.
● The loss of acceptable deviation data shall be indicated on the display; it is
acceptable to have a single failure indication for each axis common to all navigation
sources.
● The navigation source selected for the approach shall be positively indicated in the
primary field of view at each pilot station.
● The data designating the approach (e.g., ILS frequency, MLS channel, GLS approach
identifier) shall be unambiguously indicated in a position readily accessible and
visible to each pilot.
● A common set of mode ‘‘arm’’ and ‘‘active’’ indications (e.g., LOC, GS) is preferred
for ILS, MLS, and GLS operations.
● A means should be provided for the crew to determine a failure of a nonselected
navigation receiver function in addition to the selected navigation receiver function.
● The capability of each element of a multimode approach and landing system shall be
available to the aircrew to support dispatch of the airplane.
● An enroute failure of a multimode approach system element shall be annunciated to
the aircrew as an advisory.
● A failure during an approach of a multimode approach system element may be
annunciated to the aircrew as a warning, caution, or advisory.
If installed, the MMR has some unique certification requirements. These systems
are normally ‘‘ILS look-alike’’ and are replacement units for aircraft that have had a
single ILS or MLS receiver. When these systems are installed, the following general
certification guidance is used:
● An impact assessment should identify any new functionality (differences between
current and new systems, functionality being added).
● Credit can be taken for the existing approval.
● TSO/MOPS compliance should be demonstrated.
● An impact on airplane system safety assessments should be accomplished.
● EMI/EMC testing is required.
● Electrical loading needs to be accomplished.
● Flight data requirements need to be assessed.
● AFM changes are to be incorporated.
● The certification plan needs to address the functional integration aspects of the
receiver with respect to other systems, controls, warnings, and displays.
Airborne System Requirements In order to safely conduct approach and landing
operations, there are aircraft systems that need to operate correctly and in concert with
the approach and landing system.
● All aircraft systems must comply with the basic performance, integrity, and avail-
ability requirements stated in the previous section.
● Autopilot criteria is specified in AC 25.1329-1C and detailed in section 6.15 of this
text.
● The following criteria are applicable to HUD systems:
– Workload associated with the use of the HUD should be considered in showing
compliance with section 25.1523 (minimum crew)
– The HUD must not significantly obscure the pilot’s view through the cockpit
window.
– The HUD must provide sufficient guidance information, without excessive refer-
ence to other cockpit displays, to enable a suitably trained pilot to maintain the
approach path and perform a go-around.
– The pilot should be able to align with the runway without the HUD adversely
affecting the task.
– If command information is provided for the flare and landing, it must not be
misleading and should be consistent with the characteristics of normal manual
maneuvers.
– If only one HUD is installed, it should be installed in the pilot-in-command station.

– The HUD guidance must not require exceptional piloting skill to achieve the
required performance.
– The HUD system performance and alerting should be consistent with the intended
operational use for duties and procedures of the flying pilot and the pilot not
flying.
– If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the airplane to intercept and
establish the approach path, the point during the approach at which the transition
from automatic to manual flight takes place shall be identified and used for the
performance demonstration.
– Any transition from autopilot to HUD guidance must not require exceptional
piloting skill, alertness, strength, or excessive workload.
● Hybrid systems, such as enhanced vision systems (EVSs) require a proof of concept
evaluation to establish suitable criteria.
● If a HUD is used to monitor an autopilot system, it should be shown to be compatible
with the autopilot system and permit a pilot to detect unsuitable autopilot performance.
● Satellite-based systems should be shown to provide equivalent or better capability
than ground-based radio aids for comparable operations or meet provisions applic-
able to RNP.
● Satellite-based systems should not exhibit adverse characteristics during acquisition
or loss of satellites.
● Area navigation systems should comply with criteria contained in the applicable ACs
previously noted.
● If an RNAV system’s operational software program can be modified, a ‘‘version’’
identification must be provided and available for display to the pilot or maintenance
personnel.
● The RNAV system must have a database that is suited for the specific aircraft and
navigation system and must be assessed as having current data.
● The RNAV system pilot input/output functions, keys, and displays should have
standard functions available and operate with industry standard convention and
practice.
● Single RNAV systems must be accessible and usable by either pilot located at a pilot
or copilot crew station.
● Dual RNAV systems must have a convenient and expedient way of cross-loading and
updating data.
● The RNAV system performance must be consistent with the operational levels sought
or be consistent with an identifiable performance standard, such as for various levels
of RNP.
● If credit is sought for operating on complex and closely spaced multiple waypoint
paths, an interface with a suitable ‘‘track up’’ or ‘‘heading up’’ navigation map dis-
play is necessary.
● The RNAV system must provide a means to monitor lateral and vertical deviation
and a means to ensure suitable operation and updating; if RNP is included, the system
must be able to identify the RNP level to be used and the actual navigation position or
expected positional error.
● If autothrottle capability is installed, the applicant should identify any necessary
modes, conditions, procedures, or constraints that apply to its use.
● Use of autothrottle should not cause unacceptable performance of any of the autopilot
modes intended for use, and vice versa.
● If a data link is used to provide data to the airplane, then the integrity of the data link
should be commensurate with the integrity required for the approach.
● The role of the data link in the approach system must be addressed as part of the
aircraft system certification process until such time as an acceptable national or
international standard for the ground system is established.
AC 27-1B addresses localizer and glide slope systems; for the localizer:
– At minimum 10 nm from the transmitter, the signal should be received for 360 of
rotorcraft heading at bank angles up to þ /–10 , at all normal pitch angles at an alti-
tude of approximately 2000 ft
– Localizer should be checked for rotor modulation in the approach by varying the
RPM throughout its normal range
– Intercept angles of 50 at ranges of at least 10 nm should be demonstrated
– At least three acceptable front and back course flights should be conducted to 200 ft
or less above the threshold
For the glideslope:
– The glide slope signal should remain valid at all aircraft headings while at least 10 nm
from the transmitter at þ /–30 of the localizer course
– Verify correct tracking and command
– At least three approaches to 200 ft above the threshold should be accomplished
– Glide slope should be checked for rotor modulation and EMI/EMC; the AC notes that
some interference from the VHF is acceptable
The AC also specifies correct operation of the marker beacons. A sample fixed-
wing compliance matrix for an ILS Cat 1 installation is shown in Table 6.48, and a
compliance matrix for a Part 29 installation is shown in Table 6.49.
6.16.5.2 Airworthiness of Category II Systems

In general, the airworthiness requirements for category II landing systems are quite
similar to the airworthiness requirements detailed in the previous section for category I
landing systems. In this section, I will address only the differences between the two.
The general requirements are identical for category I and category II. Area navigation
landing systems do not meet the criteria for category II systems, so they are not dis-
cussed in this section.
Approach System Accuracy Requirements Performance shall be demonstrated by
flight testing, or analysis validated by flight testing, using at least three different
representative facilities for a minimum of 20 total approaches, with a representative
range of environmental and system variables that have an effect on overall performance.
TABLE 6.48 ¢ ILS Cat I Compliance Matrix 480
Requirements AC
1 AC 120-29A 5.1.3.1 Lateral Lateral Tracking Performance from 1000’ HAT to 200’ HAT should be
stable without large deviations from indicated path
2 AC 120-29A 5.1.3.2 Vertical Vertical Tracking Performance from 700’ HAT to 200’ HAT should be
stable without large deviations from indicated path
3 AC 120-29A 5.1.3.4 Typical Wind and Wind a. Should be capable of coping with at least,
Gradient Disturbance
● Headwind—25 kts
Environment
● Tailwind—10 kts
CHAPTER
● Crosswind—15 kts
6
b. Wind Gradients/Shear—at least 4 kts per 100 ft. from 500 ft. HAT to the surface;
c. Recommended Capability—Ability to cope with 8 kts per 100 ft for 500 ft, mod-
erate turbulence, knife edge shears of at least 15 kts over 100 ft, 20 kts lateral
directional vector shears of 90 over 100 ft, and ability to cope with a 20 kt
logarithmic shears between 200 ft and the surface.
4 AC 120-29A 5.5 Flight Director System ● Should be compatible with autopilot
● Situational information displays of navigation displacement must be provided to
both pilots
● Displays must be appropriately scaled and readily understandable in the modes or
configurations applicable, to ensure unacceptable deviations and failures can be
detected
5 AC 120-29A 5.9.1 Instruments, Systems and ● The following must be provided to both pilots
Displays
Attitude Indicator/EADI/Primary flight displays
HSI/EHSI/ND
● T format instrument panel layout, conventional airspeed and altitude scale
● Location and placement of instruments must be appropriate for both pilots, with
appropriately scaled and readily understandable presentations and mode of display

● Redundant lateral and vertical path displacement information from the final
approach course and specified glide path must be provided
For DA(H) below 250 ft, lateral and vertical displacement must be provided on
PFD/EADI
DA(H) should be provided to both pilots—use RH/RA or Baro for indication of
altitude/height
● Appropriate system status and failure annunciations
● Automatic audio callouts as described in 5.11
● Suitable rain removal method
6 AC 120-29A 5.10 Annunciations Mode annunciation labels should not be identified by landing minima classification
(CAT I/CAI II)
7 AC 120-29A 5.11 Auto Aural Alerts 1. Should not interfere necessary crew communication or coordination procedures
● At 500 ft
● At flare, 50 ft/30 ft/10 ft as appropriate
2. Low alt radio alt callouts should address the situation of higher than normal sink
rate during flare, or an extended flare
8 AC 120-29A 5.20 GPWS/TAWS Airborne equipment should have appropriate interface or compatibility with GPWS
and TAWS
9 AC 120-29A 5.21 FDR Interface Airborne equipment should have appropriate interface or compatibility with FDR/
Cockpit Voice Recorder
10 AC 120-29A App 2/6.2 Approach System Accu- 1. Performance shall be demonstrated by flight test, or analysis validated by flight
racy Requirements test, using
● Three different representative facilities

● A minimum of nine total approaches
● With a representative range of environmental and system variables
● Configuration of the airplane
6.16
● Center of gravity
● Landing weight
● Conditions of wing, turbulence, and wind shear
● Characteristics of ground and space based systems and aids
● Parameters such as airport altitude, approach path slope, approach speed, which
may affect system performance
Landing Systems
2. An approach guidance system shall not generate oscillatory flight path control or
requires unusual effort by the pilot
3. The approach system must cause no sustained nuisance oscillation or undue atti-
tude changes or control activity as a result of configuration or power changes or
any other disturbance
(Continues)
481
482
Requirements AC
11 AC 120-29A App 2/6.2.1 ILS Approach ● Lateral tracking performance—from 1000’ HAT to 200’ HAT should be
stable without large deviations
CHAPTER
● Vertical tracking performance—From 700’ HAT to 200’ HAT should be

6
stable without large deviations

12 AC 120-29A App 2/6.3 Approach System ● The aircraft system response to loss of ILS guidance signals (Localizer and Glide
Integrity Slope) shall be established
● Able to maintain the required flight path within the containment limits when un-
annunciated failures not shown to be extremely remote are experienced
13 AC 120-29A App 2/6.4 Approach System ● Below 500 ft on approach, the demonstrated probability of a successful landing
Availability should be at least 95%—no more than 5% of the approaches result in a go-
around, due to the combination of failures in the landing system and the
incidence of unsatisfactory performance
14 AC 120-29A App 2/6.5 Go-Around ● Must be able to initiate a missed approach at any point during the approach until
touchdown on the runway, or that results in a momentary touchdown on the
runway
● A go-around should not require unusual pilot skill, alertness and strength
● No more than 5% of the approaches result in a go-around below 500 ft, due to the
combination of failures in the landing system and the incidence of unsatisfactory
performance
● Information (speed/altitude/attitude) should be available to the operator to assure
that a safe go-around flight path can be determined
15 AC 120-29A App 2/6.6.1 Flight Deck Information ● For manual control of approach flight path, the appropriate flight displays must
provide sufficient information, without excessive reference to other cockpit
displays, to enable a suitably trained pilot to
Maintain the approach path
Make the alignment with runway, safely flare and roll out
Go-round
● Sufficient information should be provided to the pilots to monitor the progress and
safety of the approach
Unambiguous identification of the intended flight path (approach identifier/
frequency, and navigation source)
● Indication of the position of the aircraft with respect to the intended path (raw data
localizer and glide path, or equivalent)
16 AC 120-29A App 2/6.6.2 Annunciation ● Positive, continuous and unambiguous indication should be provided for the
modes actually in operation, as well as those armed for engagement.
Clear indication must be given when the mode has been armed either by flight
crew or automatically
17 AC 120-29A App 2/6.6.3 Alerting ● Warning—A warning indication must be provided if immediate corrective action
is required
● Caution—a means shall be provided to advise the flight crew of failed airplane
system elements that affect the decision to continue or discontinue the approach,
the guidance system shall indicate to the flight crew when the Actual Navigation
Performance exceeds the RNP
18 AC 120-29A App 2/8.2 Auto Pilot ● Criteria applicable to A/P systems is as specified by section 25.1329
19 AC25-7C 1301,c,(2) Localizer System a. Antenna pattern
b. Localizer Intercept
c. Localizer Tracking
20 AC25-7C 1301,c,(3) Glideslope System a. Antenna pattern
b. Glideslope Intercept
6.16
c. Glideslope Tracking
21 AC25-7C 1301,c,(4) Marker Beacon System a. In low sensitivity, the marker beacon annunciator light should be illuminated for
a distance of 2,000 to 3,000 ft when flying at an altitude of 1,000 ft on the
localizer centerline in all flap and gear configurations. Glideslope Intercept
b. If a high/low sensitivity feature is installed and selected, the marker beacon
annunciator light and audio will remain on longer than when in low sensitivity.
c. The audio signal should be of adequate strength and sufficiently free from inter-
ference to provide positive identification.
Landing Systems
d. As an alternative procedure, cross the outer marker at normal ILS approach alti-
tudes and determine adequate marker aural and visual indication.
e. Illumination should be adequate in bright sunlight and at night.
22 AC25-7C 1301,c,(4) Marker Beacon System f. EMC
483
484
TABLE 6.49 ¢ Part 29 ILS Cat I Compliance Matrix
Test Item Description
AC 29-2C Subject Sub Topic

AC 29-2C MG1 4 (ii) ILS LOC Signal reception The signal input to the receiver presented by the antenna system should be of sufficient
CHAPTER
strength to keep the malfunction indicator out of view when the rotorcraft is in the
6
approach configuration and at least 10 NM from the station. This signal should be
received for 360 degrees of rotorcraft heading at all bank angles up to 10 degrees
left or right at all normal pitch altitudes, and at an altitude of approximately
2,000 ft.
AC 29-2C MG1 4 (iii) ILS LOC Course Guidance The deviation indicator should properly direct the aircraft back to course when the rotor-
craft is right or left of course.
AC 29-2C MG1 4 (iv) ILS LOC Signal identification The Station identification signal should be of adequate strength and sufficiently free from
interference to positive station identification, and voice signals should be intelligible with
all electric equipment operating and pulse equipment transmitting.
AC 29-2C MG1 4 (v) ILS LOC Rotor modulation Localizer performance should be checked for rotor modulation in approach while varying
rotor RPM throughout its normal range.
AC 29-2C MG1 4 A ILS LOC Intercept Localizer Intercept. In the approach configuration and a distance of at least 10 NM from the
localizer facility, fly toward the localizer front course, inbound, at an angle of at least
50 degrees. Perform this maneuver from both left and right of the localizer beam. No
flags should appear during the time the deviation indicator moves from full deflection to
on course. If the total antenna pattern has not been shown by ground checks or by VOR
flight evaluation to be adequate, additional intercepts should be made.
AC 29-2C MG 1 4 B ILS LOC Tracking While flying the localizer inbound and not more than 5 miles before reaching the outer
marker, change the heading of the rotorcraft to obtain full needle deflection. Then fly the
rotorcraft to establish localizer on course operation. The localizer deviation indicators
should direct the rotorcraft to the localizer on course. Perform this maneuver with both a
left and a right needle deflection. Continue tracking the localizer until over the trans-
mitter. At least three acceptable front course and back course flights should be conducted
to 200 ft or less above threshold.
AC 29-2C MG 1 5 (i) ILS Glide slope Signal The signal input to the receiver should be of sufficient strength to keep the warning flags
Reception out of view at all distances to 10 NM from the facility. This performance should be
demonstrated at all aircraft headings from 30 degrees left to 30 degrees right of the
localizer course.
AC 29-2C MG 1 5 (ii) ILS Glide slope Intercept While flying the localizer course inbound in level flight, intercept the glide slope below
path at least 10 NM from the station. Observe the glide slope deviation indicator for
proper crossover as the aircraft flies through the glide path. There should be no flags
from the time the needle leaves the full scale fly-up position until it reaches the full scale
fly-down position.
AC 29-2C MG 1 5 (iii) ILS Glide slope Tracking While tracking the glide slope, maneuver the aircraft through normal pitch and roll atti-
tudes. The glide slope deviation indicator should show proper operation with no flags.
At least three acceptable approaches to 200 ft or less above threshold should be
conducted.
AC 29-2C MG1 5 (iv) ILS Glide Slope EMC With all rotorcraft electrical equipment operating and all pulse equipment transmitting,
determine that there is no interference with the glide slope operation (some interference
from the VHF may be acceptable), and that the glide slope system does not interfere with
other equipment.
AC 29-2C MG1 5 (i) ILS Glide Slope Guidance The deviation indicator should properly direct the aircraft back to path when the aircraft is
above or below path.
AC 29-2C MG1 5 (i) ILS Glide Slope EMI Interference with the navigation operation should not occur with all rotorcraft equipment
operating and all pulse equipment transmitting. There should be no interference with
other equipment as a result of glide slope operation.
AC 29-2C MG1 5 (v) ILS Glide Slope Rotor Glide slope performance should be checked for rotor modulation in approach while varying
Modulation rotor RPM throughout its normal range.
AC 29-2C MG1 6 (i) ILS Marker Beacon The marker beacon annunciator light should be illuminated for a period of time repre-
6.16
senting 2000 to 3000 ft distance when flying at an altitude of 1,000 ft as it passes over a
marker beacon.
Landing Systems
485
Specifically, the airborne system should be demonstrated in at least the following con-
ditions, taking into account manual/coupled autopilot and autothrottle configurations:
● Wind conditions
– 20 knots—headwind component
– 10 knots—crosswind component
– 10 knots—tailwind component
Specific accuracy performance standards for the ILS are as follows:
stable without large deviations (within 25 mamp deviation) from the indicated
course for 95% of the time per approach.
stable without large deviations (within 35 mamp deviation) from the indicated path
or 12 ft, whichever is greater, for 95% of the time per approach.
Specific accuracy performance standards for the MLS are as follows:
stable without large deviations (within 25 mamp deviation) from the indicated
course for 95% of the time per approach.
stable without large deviations (within 35 mamp deviation) from the indicated path
or 12 ft, whichever is greater, for 95% of the time per approach.
Specific accuracy performance standards for the GLS are the same as above for the
ILS and MLS.
Specific accuracy performance standards for the RNP are the same for category I
and category II systems.
Approach System Integrity Requirements The requirements for category II systems
are the same as for category I with the following addition:
● For ILS and MLS, the aircraft system response during a switchover from an active
localizer or glideslope (or active elevation or azimuth) to a backup transmitter will be
established.
● For GLS, the aircraft system response during any switchover to alternate differential
augmentation, pseudolites, and data services, as applicable, shall be established.
Approach System Availability Requirements The availability requirements are the
same for ILS, MLS, and GLS for category I and category II systems.
Go-Around Requirements The go-around requirements are the same for ILS, MLS,
and GLS for category I and category II systems.
Flight Deck Information, Annunciation, and Alerting Requirements The display
requirements are the same for category I and category II, with the following addition for
category II systems:
● Although excessive deviation alerting is not required, the authority will approve
systems with this function as long as it meets appropriate criteria.
● If a method is provided to detect excessive deviation of the airplane laterally and

vertically during approach to touchdown, and laterally after touchdown, then it
should not require excessive workload or undue attention.
● The provision does not require a specific deviation method or annunciation, but may
be addressed by parameters displayed on the ADI, EADI, HUD, or PFD.
● When a dedicated deviation alerting is provided, its use must not cause excessive
nuisance alerts.
The following criteria from CS-AWO 236 are an acceptable means of compliance
for category II systems:
● Excess deviation alerts should operate when the deviation from the ILS or MLS glide
path or localizer centerline exceeds a value from which a safe landing can be made
from offset positions equivalent to the excess deviation alert without exceptional
piloting skill and with the visual references available in these conditions.
● Excess deviation alerts should be set to operate with a delay of not more than 1 sec
from the time that the deviation thresholds are exceeded.
● Excess deviation alerts should be active from at least 300 ft HAT to the DH, but the
glide path alert should not be active below 100 ft HAT.
Multiple Landing Systems and Multimode Receivers The category I and category II
requirements are the same for multiple landing systems and MMRs.
Airborne System Requirements There are soma additions/modifications to the air-
borne system requirements for category II systems.
● The autopilot must not have normal features or performance, or performance in
typical adverse environmental conditions that would cause undue crew concern and
lead to disconnect (inappropriate response to ILS beam disturbance or turbulence,
unnecessary abrupt flare or go-around attitude changes, unusual or inappropriate
pitch or bank attitudes or side slip responses).
● The autopilot must maintain the approach path or, if applicable, align with the run-
way, flare the airplane within the prescribed limits, or promptly go-around with
minimum practical loss of altitude.
● Autopilot performance must be compatible with either manual speed control or, if
applicable, autothrottle speed control.
● Autopilot mode definition and logic should be consistent with the appropriate
industry practice for mode identification and use (labeling, mode arming,
engagement).
● Definition of new autopilot modes or features not otherwise in common use should be
consistent with their intended function and consider the potential for setting appro-
priate or adverse precedent.
● The autopilot alerting system should be consistent with the intended operational use
for duties and procedures for both the flying pilot and the pilot not flying.
● If the autopilot is used to control the flight path of the airplane to intercept and
establish the approach path, the pilot should be able to transition from automatic to
manual flight at any time without undue effort, attention, or control forces and with a
minimum of flight path disturbance.
● If a HUD is installed, any transition from autopilot to HUD guidance, or vice

versa, must not require exceptional piloting skill, alertness, strength, or excessive
workload.
● An FD system or alternate form of guidance, if used, must be compatible with the
autopilot.
● A fault must cause an autopilot advisory, caution, or warning as necessary. If a
warning is necessary, the pilot must be able to detect the warning with a normal level
of attention and alertness expected during an approach or go-around.
● With heads-down displays, an FD system or alternate form of guidance must be
designed so that the probability of display of incorrect guidance commands is remote.
● Whenever practical, a fault must cause guidance information to be immediately
removed from view on the heads-down displays.
AC 29-2C notes that aircraft and systems, certification and continuation training of
flight crews and a continuing maintenance program for the aircraft and Cat II required
systems are required for Airworthiness. The additional equipment necessary for Cat II
approval is the flight control guidance system; either a flight director system or an
automatic approach coupler. A flight director system needs only to present computed
steering data for the localizer and raw glide slope data on the same instrument. A single
axis steering autopilot could be used if it is coupled to the ILS localizer.
Contemporary rotorcraft flight director and autopilot systems use at least two axes
command guidance or coupling and some provide guidance in three axes: localizer,
glide slope and airspeed. A marker beacon system or a RADAR altimeter is required for
operations with decision heights of 150 ft or less. The AC states which data must be
recorded for every approach and provides a suggested data card (AC 29 MG 3-1 and
3-2). In order to certify the FGS, a demonstration of 50 ILS approaches with a 90%
success rate must be accomplished. If the FGS has not been previously certified in any
other rotorcraft, then a certification program on the FGS must be completed before the
50 ILS approaches.
The installed equipment must meet the performance requirements specified in
AC 20-129 appendix 1; the accuracy requirements for tracking equipment are also in
accordance with the Appendix. Coupler systems that require manual trimming by the
pilot to center the AFCS actuators should be evaluated in turbulent conditions; these
systems may not meet the trim requirements at the 100’ DH or provide sufficient
tracking accuracy without an unusually high workload. Hardover malfunctions need to
be evaluated in all axes and the MUH needs to be determined and incorporated into
RWFM.
6.16.5.3 Airworthiness of Category III Systems

AC 120-28D provides an acceptable means, but not the only means, for obtaining and
maintaining approval of operations in category III landing weather minima and low-
visibility takeoff, including the installation and approval of associated airborne systems.
As with category I and category II systems, the AC addresses the operational approval as
well as the airworthiness approval. This section will address only the airworthiness
approval of airborne systems used during a takeoff in low-visibility weather conditions
and systems used to land and rollout in low-visibility conditions. The airworthiness
criteria are found in appendices 2 and 3 of the AC.
6.16.5.4 Airworthiness of Systems for Takeoff in Low Visibility

These systems are required when visibility conditions alone may be inadequate for safe
takeoff operation. The airworthiness criteria provide the requirements to track and
maintain the runway centerline during a takeoff from brake release on the runway to
liftoff and climb to 35 ft AGL, and from brake release through deceleration to a stop for
a rejected takeoff. The use of this takeoff system must not require exceptional skill,
workload, or pilot compensation. The takeoff system shall be shown to be satisfactory
with and without the use of any outside visual references, except that outside visual
references will not be considered when assessing lateral tracking performance. The
airworthiness evaluation also determines whether the combination of takeoff guidance
and outside visual references would unacceptably degrade task performance or require
exceptional workload and pilot compensation during normal and nonnormal operations
with system and airplane failure conditions. For the purpose of the airworthiness
demonstration, the operational concept for coping with the loss of takeoff guidance is
based on the availability of some other method for the flight crew to safely continue or
reject the takeoff.
The intended takeoff path is along the axis of the runway centerline. This path must
be established as a reference for takeoff in restricted-visibility conditions. A means must
be provided to track the reference path for the length of the runway to accommodate
both a normal takeoff and a rejected takeoff. The required lateral path may be estab-
lished by a navigation aid (ILS, MLS) or by other methods if shown to be feasible by a
proof of concept (the AC calls this a PoC). Methods requiring a PoC include
● The use of ground surveyed waypoints, either stored in an onboard database or pro-
vided by data link to the airplane with a path definition by the airborne system
● The use of inertial information following initial alignment
● Sensing of the runway surface, lighting, or markings with a vision enhancement
system
● Deviation displays with reference to the navigation source (ILS/MLS receiver)
● Onboard navigation system computations with corresponding displays of position
and reference path
● Vision enhancement system
In addition to indications of the aircraft position, the takeoff system should also
compute and display command information (flight director) as lateral guidance. Para-
meters that should be provided are airplane position, deviation from the reference path,
and deviation rate. Takeoff systems that provide only situational information in lieu of
command information might be found acceptable but do require a PoC.
General Requirements for All Takeoff Systems There are three basic types of takeoff
systems: ILS, MLS, and GLS. GLS can be used in concert with a differential system,
ground-based augmentation system, or data link. The airplane elements of the takeoff
system must be shown to meet the performance, integrity, and reliability requirements
identified for the types of operation for which approval is sought. The relationship and
interaction of the aircraft elements with nonaircraft elements must be established and
understood.
When international standards do not exist for the performance and integrity aspects
of any nonaircraft elements of the takeoff system, the applicant must address these
considerations as part of the airworthiness process. A means must be provided to inform

the operator of the limitations and assumptions necessary to ensure safe operation. It will
be the responsibility of the operator and the certification authority to ensure that
appropriate criteria and standards are applied.
General requirements that need to be applied to all takeoff systems are as follows:
● Systems should ensure that a takeoff or a rejected takeoff can be safely completed on
the designated runway, runway with clearway, or runway with stopway, as applicable.
● The system performance must be satisfactory, even in nonvisual conditions, for
normal operations, aircraft failure cases, and recovery from displacements from
nonnormal events.
● The system should be easy to follow and not increase workload significantly com-
pared to the basic airplane.
● The display should be easy to interpret in all situations. Cockpit integration issues
should be evaluated to ensure consistent operations and pilot responses in all situations.
● The continued takeoff or rejected takeoff operation should consider the effects of all
reasonable events that would lead a flight crew to make a continued takeoff or a
rejected takeoff decision.
● The airplane must not deviate significantly from the runway centerline during takeoff
while the takeoff system is being used within its established limitations.
● The performance of the system must account for the differences, if any, between the
runway centerline and the intended lateral path; compliance may be demonstrated by
flight testing, or by a combination of flight testing and simulation.
● Flight testing must cover those factors affecting the behavior of the airplane
(e.g., wind conditions, ILS characteristics, weight, CG).
● In the event that the airplane is displaced from the runway centerline at any point
during the takeoff, the system must provide sufficient lateral guidance to enable the
flying pilot to control the airplane smoothly back to the intended path in a controlled
and predictable manner without significant overshoot.
● The performance envelope for evaluating takeoff systems includes
– Takeoff with all engines operating
– Engine failure at Vef (continued takeoff)
– Engine failure just prior to V1 (rejected takeoff)
– Engine failure at a critical speed prior to Vmcg (rejected takeoff)
– Wind and runway conditions consistent with basic aircraft takeoff performance
demonstrations
● The aircraft response to a permanent loss of localizer (azimuth) signal shall be
established, and the loss of the localizer (azimuth) signal must be appropriately
annunciated to the crew.
● The aircraft system response during a switchover from an active localizer (azimuth)
transmitter to a backup transmitter shall be established.
● The takeoff system should provide required tracking performance with satisfactory
workload and pilot compensation under foreseeable normal conditions.
Takeoff System Integrity The onboard components of the low-visibility system and
associated components considered separately and in relation to other systems should be
designed to meet the requirements of Part 25.1309. The elements not on the airplane
should not reduce the overall safety of the operation to unacceptable levels. The fol-
lowing criteria are provided for the application of Part 25.1309 to takeoff systems:
● The system design should not possess characteristics, in normal operation and when
failed, that would degrade takeoff safety or lead to a hazardous situation.
● Any single failure of the airplane that could disturb the takeoff path must not cause
loss of guidance information or give incorrect guidance information.
● Failures that would result in the airplane violating the lateral confines of the runway
while on the ground should be detected by the takeoff system and promptly annun-
ciated to the pilot.
● If pitch or speed guidance is provided, failures that would result in rotation at an
unsafe speed, pitch, or rate angle should be detected by the takeoff system and
promptly annunciated to the pilot.
● There may be failures that result in erroneous guidance yet are not annunciated. For
these failures, other information and visual cues allow the pilot to detect the failure
and take corrective action. These failures must be identified and the ability of the
pilot to detect them and mitigate their effects must be verified by analysis, flight
testing, or both.
● Whenever the takeoff system does not provide valid guidance appropriate for the
takeoff operation it must be clearly annunciated to the crew and the guidance
removed. The removal of the guidance alone is not an adequate annunciation.
● The probability of the takeoff system providing misleading information is improb-
able when the crew is alerted to the condition by a suitable fault annunciation or by
information from other sources within the primary field of view.
● The probability of the takeoff system providing misleading information is extremely
improbable if the takeoff system does not have the capability of detecting the failure
or if no information is provided to the pilot to immediately detect the malfunction
and take corrective action.
● In the event of a probable failure (e.g., engine failure, electrical source failure), if the
pilot follows the takeoff display and disregards external visual reference, the airplane
performance must meet the requirements shown in Figure 6.53.
● Loss of any single source of electrical power or transient condition on any single
source of electrical power should not cause the loss of guidance to the flying pilot or
loss of information that is required to monitor the takeoff to the pilot not flying.
● Takeoff systems that use navigation aids other than ILS/MLS require an overall
safety assessment of the integration of aircraft and nonaircraft elements to ensure the
takeoff system is acceptable.
Takeoff System Availability When the takeoff operation is predicated on the use of a
takeoff system, the probability of a system loss should be remote (105 per flight hour).
Flight Deck Information, Annunciation, and Alerting Requirements The controls,
indicators, and alerts must be designed to minimize crew errors that could cause a
hazard. Mode and system malfunction indications must be presented in a manner
FIGURE 6.53 ¢ All Engines Take-off

Takeoff Command
Guidance Runway
7 m 14 m
Performance Centerline
Envelope
0 Airplane Speed V1
VLOF h = 35
Failure/Continued Take-off
Runway
7 m 14 m
Centerline
0 Airplane Speed
VFailure h = 35
Failure/Rejected Take-off
Runway
7 m 14 m
Centerline
0 Airplane Speed
VFailure Stop
compatible with the procedures and assigned tasks of the flight crew. The indications
must be grouped in a logical and consistent manner and be visible under all expected
normal lighting conditions.
The system shall be demonstrated to have no display or failure characteristics that
lead to degradation of the crew’s ability to adequately monitor takeoff performance,
conduct the entire takeoff, and make the appropriate transition to enroute climb speed
and configuration for all normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.
Prior to takeoff initiation, and during takeoff, positive, continuous, and unambig-
uous indications of the following information about the takeoff system must be provided
and made readily evident to both pilots:
● System status
● Modes of engagement and operation
● Guidance source
The takeoff system must alert the aircrew whenever the system suffers a failure or
any condition that prevents the system from meeting the takeoff system performance
requirements of Figure 6.53.
Warnings shall be provided for conditions that require immediate pilot awareness
and action. Warnings are required for the following conditions:
● Loss of takeoff guidance
● Invalid takeoff guidance
● Failures of the guidance system that require immediate pilot awareness and
compensation
During takeoff, whenever the takeoff system does not provide valid guidance
appropriate for the takeoff operation, it must be clearly annunciated to the crew and the
guidance must be removed. The removal of the guidance alone is not an adequate
annunciation. The annunciation must be located to ensure rapid recognition and must not
distract the pilot making the takeoff or significantly degrade the forward view.
Cautions shall be provided for conditions that require immediate pilot awareness
and possible subsequent pilot action. The cautions need not generate a master caution
light, which would be contrary to the takeoff alert inhibit philosophy; they should not
cause flight crew distraction during takeoff roll.
Advisories shall be provided for conditions that require pilot awareness in a timely
manner; they should not be generated after the takeoff has commenced. The status of the
takeoff guidance system shall be provided to the crew.
Performance Evaluations For new systems and any significant changes to an existing
system, the performance of the airplane and its systems must typically be demonstrated
by flight testing, which must include a sufficient number of normal and nonnormal
operations conducted in conditions that are reasonably representative of actual expected
conditions and must cover the range of parameters affecting the behavior of the airplane.
The performance evaluations must verify that the takeoff system meets the center-
line tracking requirements shown in Figure 6.53.
The system performance must be demonstrated in nonvisual conditions for
● Normal operations
● Engine failure cases
● Recovery from displacements from nonnormal events
The performance shall be demonstrated to have a satisfactory level of workload and
pilot compensation. The demonstration of system performance should comprise at least
the following:
● 20 normal, all-engine takeoffs
● 10 completed takeoffs with simulated engine failure at or after the appropriate Vef for
the minimum V1 for the airplane; all critical cases will be considered
● 10 rejected takeoffs, some with simulated engine failure just prior to V1, and at least
one run with simulated engine failure at a critical speed less than Vmcg
Other areas that need to be addressed by the certification plan include
● Engine failures should be assessed with respect to workload and pilot compensation
throughout the entire takeoff phase.
● Demonstrated winds during normal, all-engine takeoffs should be at least the head-
winds for which credit is sought and at least 150% of the crosswinds and tailwinds for
which credit is sought but not less than 15 knots of headwind or crosswind.
● The takeoff system shall not exhibit any guidance or control characteristics that
would cause the flight crew to react in an inappropriate manner.
● The system shall be demonstrated to have no display or failure characteristics that
lead to degradation of the crew’s ability to adequately monitor takeoff performance.
● The system must be demonstrated as meeting the annunciation and failure annun-
ciations noted in the previous paragraphs.
● For takeoff systems that use an ILS localizer signal, the airplane response to a loss of
localizer or switchover to a backup transmitter shall be demonstrated and properly
annunciate to the crew.
● For takeoff systems that use an MLS, the airplane response to a loss of azimuth or
switchover to a backup transmitter shall be demonstrated and properly annunciate to
the crew.
● Failure cases should typically be spontaneous and unpredictable on the subject’s or
evaluation pilot’s part.
Safety Assessment A safety assessment is required as part of the certification plan.

Airborne System Requirements To safely perform takeoff operations in limited-vis-
ibility conditions, there may be other aircraft systems that need to operate correctly and
in concert with the takeoff system. Although most systems use either ILS or MLS, there
are some systems that may have potential uses on future systems. These types of systems
will require a proof of concept.
Peripheral Vision Guidance System Peripheral vision systems have not been shown
to be suitable as the primary means of takeoff guidance. Such systems may be used as a
supplemental means of takeoff guidance only if a suitable minimum visual segment is
available. A PoC will be required if the applicant is seeking approval as a primary means
of takeoff guidance with this system.
HUD Takeoff System The following criteria are applicable to heads-up display take-
off systems:
● The workload must be satisfactory.

● The HUD installation and display presentation must not significantly obscure the
pilot’s outside view.
● Appropriate transition from lateral takeoff guidance (35 ft AGL) through transition to
an enroute climb for a takeoff and from brake release through deceleration to a stop
for an aborted takeoff should be ensured.
● For the entire takeoff, for all normal and nonnormal situations (except for the loss of
the HUD), it must not be necessary for the flying pilot to make any immediate change
of primary display reference for continued safe flight.
● The HUD takeoff system must provide acceptable guidance and flight information to
enable the pilot flying to complete or abort the takeoff as required.
● The HUD shall provide information suitable to perform the intended operation; the
current mode of the HUD and FGS shall be clearly annunciated on the HUD unless
they can be acceptably displayed elsewhere.
● A proposed system that displays situational information in lieu of command infor-
mation (lateral deviation as a cue) requires a PoC.
● If the system is designed as a single HUD configuration, then the HUD shall be
installed at the pilot-in-command’s station.
● Associated cockpit information must be provided to the pilot not flying to monitor
the flying pilot’s performance and perform other assigned duties.
Satellite-Based Systems The performance, integrity, and availability of any ground

station elements, any data links to the airplane, any satellite elements, and any database
considerations when combined with the airplane system should be at least equal to the
performance, integrity, and availability of an ILS-based system. The role of the satellite-
based elements should be addressed as part of the airplane system certification process
until such time as an acceptable national or international standard is established for the
satellite-based system.
Onboard Database Unless there is a means to upload the path definition via data link, the
required lateral ground path should be stored in an onboard database for recall and incor-
poration into the guidance/control system when required to conduct the takeoff. In addition,
● A mechanism should be established to ensure the continued integrity of the takeoff
path designators.
● Corruption of the data is considered hazardous and therefore the probability of its
occurrence is extremely remote.
● The flight crew should not be able to modify (either intentionally or inadvertently)
the database.
● The integrity of the onboard database should be addressed as part of the certification
process.
Data Link Data may be sent to the airplane via data link so that the takeoff flight path
can be defined with the required accuracy. The required takeoff path may be stored in a
ground station database that is uplinked to an airplane; the airplane guidance and control
system may then incorporate this information to conduct the takeoff. If using such a
system, the following must be determined:
● The integrity of the data link must be commensurate with the integrity required for
the operation.
● Satellite systems used during takeoff must support the required performance, integ-
rity, and availability (including the assessment of satellite failures and the effect of
satellite geometry [GDOP]).
● The capability of the takeoff system failure detection and warning system must
preclude an undetected failure or combination of failures that are not extremely
remote from producing a hazardous condition.
● The safety assessment should include failure mode detection coverage and adequacy
of monitors and associated alarm times.
● The effect of aircraft maneuvers on the reception of signals and reacquisition of the
signal after the loss must be assessed.
Enhanced Vision Systems AC 120-28D does not really address the approval of
enhanced vision systems. This topic is covered in section 6.18 of this text.
6.16.5.5 Airworthiness of Systems for Landing and Rollout
in Low Visibility
The low-visibility landing system is intended to guide the airplane down the final
approach segment to a touchdown in the prescribed touchdown zone with an appro-
priate sink rate and attitude without exceeding the prescribed load limits of the airplane.
The rollout system is intended to guide the airplane to converge on and track the
runway centerline from the point of touchdown to a safe taxi speed. The general con-
siderations for this system are the same as noted for the takeoff system described in
section 6.14.5.4.
Types of Landing and Rollout Operations There are four types of category III
landing and rollout operations typically considered:
● Fail operational landing with fail operational rollout

● Fail operational landing with fail passive rollout
● Fail passive landing with fail passive rollout
● Fail passive landing without rollout system capability
NOTE: A fail operational system is a system capable of completing the specified phases
of an operation following the failure of any single system component after passing a
point designated by the applicable safety analysis. A fail passive system is a system that,
in the event of a failure, causes no significant deviation of the aircraft flight path or
attitude.
Each of these types may be considered with landing with an engine failure prior to
the initiation of the approach or landing and rollout with an engine failure after the
initiation of the approach but prior to the decision or alert height. The latter is considered
as a basic requirement for any system demonstration intended for category III.
The types of sensors used for category III landing systems are the same as those
identified for the takeoff system, and the airworthiness considerations will be the same,
although adding vertical deviation requirements. MLS and ILS are supported by inter-
national standards. GNSS can provide lateral deviation, however, it must be augmented
to meet the vertical accuracy requirements for category III systems. This augmentation
may include LAAS, or GNSS and WAAS augmented with equivalent DME distance or
marker beacon determination, all of which will require a proof of concept.
Landing and Rollout System Performance The performance, integrity, and avail-
ability are applied to both the landing portion of the system as well as the rollout portion
of the system. There are some common requirements for both portions and they are
addressed first in all three sections. The following define the common requirements for
landing and rollout system performance:
● If the landing system is designed to perform an alignment function prior to touch-

down, to correct for crosswind effects, it should operate in a manner consistent with a
pilot’s technique typically using the wing low-side slip procedure.
● Nonavailability of the alignment mode or failure of the alignment mode must be
easily detectable and annunciated to the pilot.
● Although derotation is not a requirement, if it is provided, the FGS should provide
derotation, consistent with pilot technique.
● Systems that provide derotation must avoid any objectionable oscillatory motion or
nose wheel touchdowns, pitch up, or other adverse behavior as a result of spoiler
deployment or thrust reverser operation.
● Automatic control during the landing and rollout should not result in any airplane
maneuvers that would cause the flight crew to intervene unnecessarily.
● Guidance provided during landing and rollout should be consistent with a pilot’s
manual technique.
Landing System Performance All types of low-visibility landing systems, including
FGS guidance, guidance for manual control, and hybrid shall be demonstrated to
achieve the performance accuracy and associated probability described below:
● Longitudinal touchdown earlier than a point on the runway 200 ft from the threshold
to a probability of 1 106
● Longitudinal touchdown beyond 2700 ft from the threshold to a probability of 1 106
● Lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear more than 70 ft from the runway
centerline to a probability of 1 106
● Structural limit load to a probability of 1 106. An acceptable means of estab-
lishing that the structural limit load is not exceeded is to show separately and
independently that
– The limit load that results from a sink rate at touchdown of not greater than
10 ft/sec, or the limit rate of descent, whichever is greater, does not exceed the
structural limit load
– The lateral side load does not exceed the limit value determined for the lateral drift
landing condition
● Bank angle resulting in a hazard to the airplane (wing, high-lift device, engine nacelle
touches the ground) to a probability of 1 107
● Airspeed control must be to within 5 knots of the approach speed, except for
momentary gusts, up to a point where the throttles are retarded to idle for landing.
Rollout System Performance The rollout system, if included, should control the air-
plane or provide guidance via the FGS for manual control from a point of landing to a
safe taxi speed. The loss of rudder effectiveness as the airplane is slowed could be a
factor in the level of approval that is granted to a system. The applicant should describe
the system concept for rollout control so that the absence of low speed control, such as
nose wheel steering, can be assessed. The rollout system should be demonstrated to
● Not cause the outboard tires to deviate from the runway centerline by more than 70 ft
starting from the point at which touchdown occurs and continuing to a point where
safe taxi speed is reached to a probability of 1 106
● Capture the intended path or converge on the intended path in a smooth, timely, and
predictable manner.
● Minor overshoots are acceptable; sustained or divergent oscillations or unnecessary
aggressive responses are unsatisfactory.
● Promptly correct any lateral movement away from the runway centerline in a positive
manner.
● Following touchdown, if not already on a converging path, cause the airplane to
initially turn and track a path to intercept the runway centerline at a point far enough
in front of the airplane that it is obvious to the aircrew that the rollout system is
working properly.
● The rollout system should intercept the centerline sufficiently before the stop end of
the runway and before the point at which taxi speed is reached.
Variables Affecting Performance The performance assessment shall take into

account at least the following variables, with the variables being applied based on their
expected distribution:
● Configuration (flaps/slats)
● CG
● Landing gross weight
● Conditions of headwinds, crosswinds, turbulence, and wind shear
● Characteristics of the applicable navigation systems and navigation aids with regard
to variations in flight path definitions (e.g., ILS, MLS, GLS)
● Approach airspeed and variations in approach airspeed
● Airport conditions (elevation, runway slope, runway condition)
● Individual pilot performance (for systems with manual control)
● Any other parameter that may affect performance
Landing and Rollout System Integrity A safety assessment is required as part of the
certification plan. The plan should identify the assumptions and considerations for the
nonaircraft elements of the system and how these assumptions and considerations relate
to the airplane system certification plan. The effect of the navigation reference point on
the airplane on flight path and wheel to threshold crossing height shall be assessed.
Landing System Integrity The applicant should show that landing system design
meets the intent of section 25.1309. The following criteria are provided for the appli-
cation of 1309 to landing systems:
● A single malfunction or combination of malfunctions of the landing system that
could prevent a safe landing or go-around must be extremely improbable, unless it
can be detected or annunciated as a warning to allow pilot intervention, and then it
must be extremely remote.
● Failure to detect and annunciate malfunctions that could prevent a safe landing or go-
around must be extremely improbable.
● The exposure time for assessing failure probabilities for fail passive systems is the
average time required to descend from 100 ft HAT or higher to touchdown, and for
fail operational landing systems it is the average time to descend from 200 ft HAT or
higher to touchdown.
● For a fail passive landing system, a single malfunction or any combination of mal-
functions must not cause a significant deviation of the flight path or attitude fol-
lowing system disengagement.
● A fail operational landing system, following a single malfunction, must not lose the
capability to perform vertical and lateral path tracking, alignment with the runway
heading, or flare and touchdown within the safe landing requirements.
Safe Landing Requirements For the purpose of analysis, a safe landing may be
assumed if the following requirements are achieved:
● Longitudinal touchdown no earlier than a point on the runway 200 ft from the threshold
● Longitudinal touchdown no further than 300 ft from the threshold (not beyond the
end of the touchdown zone lighting)
● Lateral touchdown with the outboard landing gear within 70 ft of the runway cen-
terline (assumes a 150 ft wide runway; lateral touchdown performance limit may be
appropriately increased if operation is limited to wider runways)
● Structural limit load (as described previously)
Rollout System Integrity As with the landing system integrity, the rollout system, if
provided, is expected to meet the intent of section 25.1309; a safety assessment is
required as part of the certification plan. The following criteria are provided for the
application of 1309 to rollout systems:
● A fail operational rollout system must meet the safe rollout performance require-
ments (no deviation greater than 70 ft from the centerline) after any single mal-
function or any other combination of malfunctions not shown to be extremely
remote.
● For any rollout system below 200 ft HAT, unannounced malfunctions that would
prevent a safe rollout must be shown to be extremely improbable.
● For a fail passive rollout system, the loss of a fail passive automatic rollout function
after touchdown will cause the FGS to disconnect; the loss of a fail passive rollout
system after touchdown will be shown to be improbable.
● Whenever a fail passive landing rollout system does not provide valid guidance, an
annunciation should be provided to both pilots and the guidance information
removed. Removal of the guidance alone is not an adequate annunciation unless
other systems within the primary field of view provide additional information.
● For any rollout system, malfunctions that only affect low-speed directional control
should not cause the airplane wheels to exceed the lateral confines of the runway
from touchdown to safe taxi speed for a probability of 1 107.
Landing System Availability Below 500 ft on approach, the probability of a suc-
cessful landing should be at least 96% for approach demonstrations conducted in the
airplane. Compliance with this requirement typically should be established during
flight test with approximately 100 approaches. For an airplane equipped with a fail
passive landing system, the need to initiate a go-around below 100 ft HAT due to an
airplane failure condition should be infrequent (1 per 1000 approaches). For a fail
operational landing system below 200 ft HAT, the probability of total loss of the
landing system must be extremely remote. For any annunciation that is provided, that
annunciation must enable a pilot to intervene in a timely manner to avoid a cata-
strophic result. Total loss of the system without annunciations shall be extremely
improbable.
Rollout System Availability For a full passive rollout system, from 200 ft HAT
through landing and rollout to a safe taxi speed, the probability of a successful rollout
should be at least 95%. For a fail operational rollout system, during the period in which
the airplane descends below 200 ft HAT to a safe taxi speed, the probability of degra-
dation from fail operational to fail passive shall be fewer than 1 per 1000 approaches and
the probability of total loss of rollout capability should be extremely remote. After
touchdown, complete loss of fail operational automatic rollout function or any other
unsafe malfunction or condition shall cause the FGS to disconnect. The loss of a fail
operational rollout system after touchdown shall be extremely remote.
Automatic Braking System If automatic braking is used, the following criteria apply:
● The automatic braking system should provide antiskid protection and have manual
reversion capability.
● It should provide smooth and continuous deceleration from touchdown through full
stop.
● Disconnect of the automatic braking system must not create additional workload or
distraction.
● It should not interfere with the rollout control system.
● Manual override must be possible without excessive brake pedal forces.
● It should not be susceptible to inadvertent disconnect.
● A positive indication of system disengagement or failure should be provided.
● Braking distances with the automatic braking system on wet and dry runways need to
be demonstrated and presented in the AFM performance section.
Flight Deck Information, Annunciation, and Alerting Requirements The same
general rules for controls, indicators, and warnings for the takeoff system apply to the
landing and rollout system as well. There are some additional flight parameters for
monitoring capability:
● Unambiguous identification of the intended path for the approach, landing, and
rollout
● Indication of the position of the aircraft with respect to the intended path (situation
information localizer and glide path)
After beginning the final approach, the loss of a fail passive or fail operational
system shall be annunciated. Whenever a fail passive system, for manual control, does
not provide valid guidance, a warning must be given to both pilots and the guidance
removed.
After initiation of the final approach, a fail passive system (landing, rollout, or
guidance) shall alert the flight crew to any malfunction or condition that would
adversely affect the ability of the system to safely operate or continue the approach and
landing.
After initiation of the final approach (between 1000 ft HAT and the alert height), a
fail operational system shall alert the flight crew of any failure that would adversely
affect the ability of the system to safely operate or continue the approach and landing or
any malfunction that degrades the system to a fail passive status. Below the alert height,
these malfunction alerts are inhibited.
Although excessive deviation alerting is not required, the authority will approve a
system with this function as long as it meets appropriate criteria. If a method is provided
to detect excessive deviation of the airplane laterally and vertically during approach to
touchdown, and laterally after touchdown, then it should not require excessive workload
or undue attention. The provision does not require a specific deviation method or
annunciation, but may be addressed by parameters displayed on the ADI, EADI, HUD,
or PFD. When a dedicated deviation alert is provided, its use must not cause excessive
nuisance alerts.
A means must also be provided to inform the flight crew when the airplane has
reached the operation alert height or decision height, as applicable.
Performance Evaluations For new systems and any significant changes to an existing
system, the performance of the airplane and its systems must typically be demonstrated
by flight testing. Flight testing must include a sufficient number of normal and non-
normal operations conducted in conditions that are reasonably representative of actual
expected conditions and must cover the range of parameters affecting the behavior of the
airplane.
The reference speed used as the basis for certification must be identified; the
applicant should demonstrate acceptable performance within a speed range of 5 to þ10
knots with respect to the reference speed. The transition from landing to rollout must be
smooth, without characteristics that would lead the flight crew to react in an inap-
propriate manner.
Landing systems for manual control with guidance must meet the same requirements
for touchdown footprints, sink rates, and attitudes as automatic systems. The landing and
rollout system must be shown to be acceptable with and without outside cues.
For the initial certification of a landing and rollout system for manual control with
guidance in a new type of airplane or new type of HUD installation, at least 1000
simulated landings and at least 100 actual aircraft landings are typically necessary. If
demonstrating engine-out performance, and the procedures are the same as the all-
engine case, then compliance may be demonstrated with 10 to 15 landings. If the pro-
cedures are different, then the certification authority will determine the number of
engine-out approaches case by case.
For aircraft intending to use an automatic landing system at high altitudes, the
airport elevation at which satisfactory performance may be attained must be demon-
strated. The AC provides detailed test procedures in appendix 3 to perform this
evaluation.
Simulation may be used in part for the airworthiness certification process of cate-
gory III landing systems. These systems are typically called ‘‘pilot-in-the-loop’’ and
require high-fidelity, engineering-quality simulation. AC 120-40B, ‘‘Airplane Simulator
Qualification,’’ provides a means to qualify simulators for pilots. Meeting these
requirements provides a known basis for acceptance of simulator capability, and is
desirable, but may not necessarily be sufficient, to meet the requirements of an engi-
neering simulation to demonstrate landing system performance. AC 120-28D imposes,
again in appendix 3, the required simulation capabilities to demonstrate airworthiness
for category III landing systems.
A flight test performance demonstration should be conducted to confirm the results
of the simulation. The principal performance parameters are as follows:
● Vertical and lateral flight path with respect to the intended path
● Lateral deviation from centerline during rollout
● Altitude and height above the terrain during approach
● Air data vertical speed
● Radar altitude sink rate
● Airspeed and groundspeed
● Longitudinal and lateral runway touchdown point
Data acquired during demonstration flights should be used to validate the simula-
tion. Unless otherwise agreed by the certification authority, the objective of the flight
test program should be to demonstrate performance of the system to 100% of the steady-
state wind limit values (25 knot headwind, 15 knot crosswind, and 10 knot tailwind).
The simulation can be considered validated if at least four landings are accomplished
during flight testing at no less than 80% of the intended steady-state wind value and a
best effort has been made to achieve the full steady-state wind component values. It
must be shown that the landing system is sufficiently robust near the desired AFM wind-
demonstrated values.
Safety Assessment A safety assessment is required as part of the certification plan.

Airborne Systems The performance, integrity, and availability requirements of the on-
aircraft systems must meet the requirements applicable to the type of operation intended.
Specific requirements for airborne systems used for category III landing and rollout
operations are contained in the following paragraphs.
Automatic Flight Control Systems

● When established on the final approach path below 1000 ft HAT, it must not be
possible to change the flight path of the airplane with the FGS engaged except by
initiating an automatic go-around.
● It must be possible to disengage the automatic landing system at any time without
significant out-of-trim forces.
● It must be possible to disengage the automatic landing system by applying a
suitable force to the control column, wheel, or stick.
● Following a failure or inadvertent disconnect of the autopilot or loss of the automatic
landing mode, when it is necessary for the pilot to assume manual control, a visual
alert and an aural warning must be given.
Autothrottle System
● An automatic landing system must include autothrottles unless airplane speed can be
controlled manually without excessive workload and the touchdown limits can be
achieved in normal and nonnormal conditions.
● Approach speed can be selected manually or automatically. In either case, each pilot
must be able to determine that the aircraft is flying an appropriate speed.
● Thrust and throttles should be modulated at a rate consistent with pilot expectations.
● An indication of the pertinent automatic throttle system engagement must be
provided.
● An appropriate alert or warning of autothrottle failure must be provided.
● It must be possible for each pilot to override the automatic throttles.
● Automatic throttle disengagement switches must be mounted on or adjacent to the
throttle levers, where they can be operated without moving the hand from the throttles.
● Following a failure, failure disconnect or inadvertent disconnect of the automatic
throttle, or uncommanded loss of a selected automatic throttle mode, a suitably clear
and compelling advisory or indication should be provided.
HUD Guidance The requirements for HUD performance previously mentioned in
sections 6.16.5.1 and 6.16.5.4 apply here as well.
Hybrid HUD/Autoland Systems Hybrid systems (fail passive autoland system used in
combination with a monitored HUD FGS) may be acceptable for category III if each
element of the system alone is shown to meet its respective suitability for category III
and, if taken together, the components provide the equivalent performance and safety to
a nonhybrid system. Hybrid systems with automatic landing capability should be based
on the concept of use of the automatic landing system as the primary means of control,
with the manual FGS serving as a backup or reversionary mode.
Hybrid systems must be demonstrated to the certification authority via a proof of
concept evaluation during which specific airworthiness and operation criteria will be
developed that meet the requirements of nonhybrid systems. Combining an automatic
landing system that meets the fail passive criteria with a HUD that also meets the criteria
does not necessarily ensure that an acceptable fail operational system will result. These
systems may be combined to establish a fail operational system for low-visibility
operations provided certain considerations are addressed:
● Each element of the system alone meets the requirements for a fail passive system.
● The automatic landing system will be the primary means of control, with the manual
system a backup or reversionary mode.
● Manual rollout guidance must be provided for hybrid systems that do not have
automatic rollout capability.
● The transition between automatic and manual modes should not require extraordinary
skill, training, or proficiency.
● The transition between automatic and manual modes must be safe and reliable.
● The capability of the pilot to use a hybrid system to safely accomplish the landing
and rollout following a failure of one of the hybrid system elements below alert
height must be demonstrated (even if operational procedures call for the pilot to
initiate a go-around).
● Appropriate annunciations must be provided to the flight crew to ensure a safe
operation.
● The combined elements of the system must be demonstrated to meet fail operational
criteria.
● The overall system must be shown to meet accuracy, availability, and integrity cri-
teria suitable for fail operational systems.
● Demonstrations are necessary for each element of the hybrid system for low-altitude
go-around in the altitude range of 50 ft HAT and touchdown.
● Hybrid system demonstrations must be conducted in the following conditions:
– Without external visual reference
– With visual reference
– With the presence of external visual reference that disagrees with instrument
reference
Other Airborne Systems The requirements for other proof of concept systems (GLS,
data link, and enhanced vision systems) were addressed in earlier sections, and the
aforementioned requirements are the same for category III operations.
6.17 FLIGHT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

A FMS is just that. It takes inputs from many sensors within the aircraft and assists the
pilot with the management of the aircraft flight plan, departure, enroute flight, transition,
approach, fuel, and time. The system improves crew performance, reduces the crew
workload, and assists air carriers with increased efficiency. The system relies heavily on
automation, which is a good thing for efficiency and a decrease in workload, but it tends
to take the pilot out of the loop, which is not a good thing.
A FMS is a generic term that encompasses a wide variety of capabilities and
subsystems:
● Flight planning
● VNAV and LNAV
● Fuel management
● Cautions, advisories, and warnings
● Moving map
● Weather radar
● Communications
● Outputs to the electronic flight instrument system (EFIS)
A typical FMS interface is shown in Figure 6.54a, where the FMC is the central
processor or flight management computer for the FMS.
The FMS can provide guidance for the specific departure and transition, climb with
fuel and thrust management, and navigation for the route. It can provide guidance for the
best endurance and fuel economy and performs continuous evaluation and prediction of
fuel consumption along the route. During the descent the FMS will automatically
comply with speed and altitude restrictions and provide the transition to the automatic
landing system. The pilot is advised of the proper landing speed and the approach
minimums. The FMS can also provide the proper guidance for missed approach/go-
around, the missed approach holding point, and the proper direction of the turn in
holding. A typical FMS sequence is shown in Figure 6.54b.
The typical FMS will use two or three multifunction display units (processors) that
provide the operator with the ability to program the flight. The departure, transition,
route, arrival, approach, runway, and alternates are all entered by the crew prior to flight.
Additional information such as fuel on board, number of passengers and their associated
weight (with baggage), and runway condition are also input by the crew to determine
takeoff roll, refusal and rotation speeds, fuel consumption, and best climb and cruise
speeds.
The navigation sensors on board, such as GNSS, INS, VOR/DME, TACAN, and
ADF are fed to each of the processors to compute the best estimate of position. The
setup allows complete redundancy between the processors. The processors output dis-
play information as well as guidance to the autopilot/autothrust systems. The FMS also
provides cautions, advisories, and warnings to the aircrew as required. Informational
messages may also be provided on some systems. The FMS is capable of providing
LNAV, and some systems also are capable of providing VNAV. A typical FMS archi-
tectural design is shown in Figure 6.55.
FIGURE 6.54a ¢
Pilot Inertial Reference

Typical FMS
Thrust Interfaces
System/Attitude
Management
Heading Reference
Computer
System
Control Distance
Digital Display Measuring
Clock Unit Equipment
(DME)
Very High
Electronic Flight
Frequency
Instrument
Omni Range
System
(VOR)
Instrument
Total
Fuel FMC Landing
System
Air
Fuel
Data
Flow
Computer
Flight AFS
Control Glare Shield
Computer Controller
Global
Air/Ground Navigation
Data Link Satellite System
(GNSS)
Optimum economy Provides continuing guidance FIGURE 6.54b ¢

climbing to a higher altitude along the flight plan route.
as the cruise progresses. Including great circle ‘direct’ routes. Typical FMS
Airplane levels off
Sequencing
Fuel saving idle
and cruises at the most thrust descent to the
fuel saving speed. destination airport.
Continuous evaluation and

Navigation information is prediction of fuel consumption
displayed on the moving along with reclearance data.
map display.
Automatically complies with
Commands speed and thrust speed and altitude restrictions.
for optimum fuel economy.
Provides the transition to the
The flight plan route is Captures and tracks the automatic landing system. Aircraft
entered and fuel planning assigned flight plan route. delivered at proper approach speed.
data is computed.
The pilot is advised of the

proper landing speed.
FIGURE 6.55 ¢ System Architecture

Typical FMS Flight
Architecture Instruments
Antenna Flight Antenna
Guidance
DME DTU DME

Air Data
VOR VOR
Crosstalk
TAC Fuel Flow TAC
UNS- UNS-
OSS or External
INS LORAN Radar AFIS
GPS/OS GPS
Maximum of five in any combination AFIS: Airborne Flight Information

System
DTU: Data Transfer Unit
INS: Inertial Navigation System
OSS: Omega/VLF Sensor System
6.17.1 Airworthiness Certification of the FMS

AC 25-7C refers you to AC 20-129, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Vertical Navigation
Systems’’, September 12, 1988 (canceled by AC 20-138C), and AC 20-130A,
‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Navigation or FMS Systems Integrating Multiple Naviga-
tion Sensors,’’ June 14, 1995 (canceled by AC 20-138C). The basic FMS AC, AC 25-15,
‘‘Approval of FMS in Transport Category Aircraft,’’ November 20, 1989, remains
in effect and will be used in conjunction with AC 20-138C (described in detail in
section 6.11 of the text. AC 23-8C, paragraph 1307, Miscellaneous Equipment is marked
reserved.
AC 27-1B and 29-2C do not specifically cover FMS; information regarding test is
contained in the Controls and Displays and IFR sections. AC 20-138C, ‘‘Airworthiness
Approval of Positioning and Navigation Systems,’’ May 8, 2012, cancels AC 20-129 and
AC 20-130A and incorporates this information. The MOPS is contained in RTCA/DO-
283A, and the applicable TSO is TSO-C115C, January 9, 2012.
The certification program for extensively integrated FMS should be through the TC
or STC process; a comprehensive certification plan should be developed by the appli-
cant. System reliability and integrity should be evaluated IAW AC 25.1309-1E. As with
any integrated system, the FMS installation must meet the system reliability and
TABLE 6.50 ¢ NAS Lateral Navigation Requirements
Enroute Enroute
(Random Routes) (J/V Routes) Terminal Nonprecision Approach
Equipment Error, þ3.8 nm þ2.8 nm þ1.7 nm þ0.3 nm (þ0.5 nm for navigation
Along and Cross data that comes from a single
Track (2s, 95% collocated VOR/DME station)
Probability)
integrity requirements of 14 CFR 25.1309. Software development must be done in

accordance with RTCA DO-178B/C, and the environmental conditions and test proce-
dures for airborne equipment (RTCA DO-160G) must be satisfied.
6.17.2 AC 25-15 Airworthiness Requirements

The FMS should be integrated with other onboard systems and functionally mechanized
with the basic airplane such that all lateral, vertical, and autothrottle modes perform their
intended function and permit the crew to safely, readily, and efficiently operate the
airplane within its approved flight envelope.
The navigation accuracy requirements vary with the airspace the aircraft is operat-
ing in. For aircraft intending to operate in U.S. airspace, the accuracy requirements in
Table 6.50 must be satisfied.
Other lateral navigation requirements apply:
● Systems that use multiple navigation sensor inputs should meet the requirements of
AC 20-138C; the FMS is in reality an RNAV system, and therefore must meet the
requirements for RNAV systems previously defined in section 6.11.
● FMS equipment may provide the capability to conduct various nonprecision
approaches utilizing data from a variety of sensors.
● Other sensor inputs may be used to enhance the navigation solution, however, the
specified reference facility for the approach being conducted must be used in the
navigation solution; the applicant should demonstrate that the system accuracy is not
degraded below that established by the use of the specified reference facility.
● FMS equipment may be used to conduct nonprecision approaches where the specified
reference facility that defines the approach is not used as long as the applicant shows
that the accuracy and failure modes are compatible with the approach.
● To provide acceptable agreement between the FMS track line and the ILS/MLS course
centerline, the FMS should use ILS/MLS sensor data to compute FMS position.
● FMS equipment should provide the capability to proceed to a selected waypoint and
hold on a specified inbound course to a waypoint with a repeated crossing of the
selected waypoint.
● Proper magnetic variation must be applied within the FMS to accurately maintain a
course from a designated navigation aid.
The vertical navigation function relates to a vertical profile defined by two way-
points. The FMS should meet the vertical performance criteria defined in section 6.11
under RNAV equipment.
A navigation database is used in the FMS and should be updated every 56 days. The
aircrew should be provided with the expiration date of the database and it should contain
all of the information required for successful operation of the system. The pilot must not
be able to alter the contents of the database. Flight plans built by the crew should not be
erased with electrical transients or a loss of electrical power.
The following controls and displays functions should be available in the FMS:
● Automatic frequency tuning may be employed in the FMS, but must not override a
manual selection by the pilot.
● The display of time or distance to go should relate to a navigation aid or waypoint
located on the programmed airplane course unless adequate annunciation is provide
to the contrary.
● A means should be provided to indicate on demand the sensors currently being
used in the navigation solution as well as the status of all sensors or stations being
tracked.
● It is recommended that a manual update function of the FMS be provided.
The FMS should annunciate the status of the selected navigation mode and alert the
aircrew in the event of failures that could affect the navigation of the airplane; a lack of
adequate navigation in the approach mode should be annunciated by means of a flag on
the primary navigation display. Other required annunciations are as follows:
● Adequate annunciation should be provided for system failures that result in a loss or
reduction of function.
● When the aircraft is being controlled in pitch, roll, thrust, or airspeed by FMS
functions, the annunciation of these modes or submodes shall be presented in the
primary field of view.
● It is desirable to have the FMS provide a means to annunciate a significant position
deviation from the computer programmed flight path of the airplane; a hazardous
deviation is marked by a full-scale deflection.
● A means should be provided to annunciate an approaching waypoint crossing.
● The system should annunciate when the accuracy for which the navigation mode was
approved can no longer be assured.
● The probability of providing hazardously misleading information in LNAV, VNAV,
long-range navigation, position information, or in the navigation database must be
shown to be improbable.
The FMS may provide the function of computing and displaying achieved
airplane takeoff performance information to the crew in real time. It is desirable that the
accuracy of the individual performance parameter displays fall within the following
ranges:
● Takeoff distance: 100 ft or 2% (whichever is less)

● Airspeed: 4 knots or 2% (whichever is greater)
● Longitudinal acceleration: 0.2 ft/sec2 or 2% (whichever is greater)
● Distance to rotation speed: 5%
6.17.3 FMS Flight Tests

The following tests should be included in the applicant’s flight test plan to verify that the
FMS performs its intended function and that there are no adverse affects to other air-
plane sensors and systems:
● Evaluation of all normal operating modes such as speed command, attitude/thrust in
combination with lateral and vertical navigation modes for takeoff, climb, cruise,
descent, and approach.
● Evaluation should include a sufficient number of simulated engine-out conditions. At
least one actual engine shutdown should be accomplished.
● FMS-controlled buffet boundary margin should be checked.
● Autothrottle function should be tested for approach and takeoff modes.
● Fuel state computations should be compared with flight planning data.
● Data obtained from flight demonstration should be referenced to flight deck instru-
mentation, not corrected for position error.
● Evaluation requirements for RNAV systems listed in AC 20-138C.
When performing these evaluations, it is important that the following correct
operation of function be noted:
● Smooth course guidance information transition between different sources
● Verify nonuse of a navigation aid for nonprecision approaches
● Evaluate small intercept angles transitioning from FMS navigation to ILS final
approach course
● Holding patterns hold over the same point/remain within protected airspace
● Appropriate alerts for VNAV
● If pilot can select speed, cannot exceed VMO/MMO or go below 1.2VSI
● Current database date displayable
● Flight plans not lost or changed due to power transients or loss
● Automatic frequency tuning should not override pilot-selected frequency
● Should be able to determine sensors/stations being used for navigation
● Should be possible to manually update FMS position
● Proper FMS annunciation
– Loss of function
– Mode
– Excessive deviations
– Waypoint alerts
– Visual cue or continuously displayed map mode
● FMS engine-out detection and behavior
● Proper reference speed with an engine failure during takeoff
● Observance of 250 knots below 10,000 ft as appropriate for aircraft weight
● Input units should be clearly discernible
● Proper computation of maximum altitudes considering buffet margin

● FMS should not reduce speed (i.e., reduce power) before safe levels with anti-ice
systems on
● Should be able to adjust Vapp but not Vref
● Use of FMS/ATS (automatic thrust system) to set ‘‘clamp speeds’’; ATS should be
able to advance throttles to required limit before hitting 80 knots
● ATS should be free of ‘‘hunting’’ when in either speed or thrust control modes
● FMS should automatically advance ATS to go-around mode if go-around selected
6.17.4 Multisensor Flight Tests

Flight tests are conducted to verify proper operation and accuracy of the multisensor
equipment as installed in the aircraft. The following VFR flight tests recap some the
evaluations previously called out in section 6.11:
● Evaluation of the installed multisensor equipment to verify that it is functioning
safely and operates in accordance with the manufacturer’s specifications
● If coupled to an autopilot, evaluation of the steering response while the autopilot/flight
director is coupled to the system during a variety of different track and mode changes
● Evaluation of all available display sensitivities
● Verify the installation does not adversely affect other aircraft equipment
● Accessibility of the controls
● Visibility of the controls in all types of lighting
● Validate multisensor equipment navigation accuracy in each mode (e.g., oceanic,
enroute, terminal) for which approval is requested
For certification under IFR, multisensor flight testing will require all of the eva-
luations listed for VFR plus the following:
● Required flight evaluations for any new sensor should be conducted according to the
AC for installation of that sensor
● Review of the various failure modes and associated annunciations
● Evaluation of displayed multisensor equipment parameters on interfaced cockpit
instruments such as HSI, CDI, and moving map
● Assessment of all switching and transfer functions, including electrical bus switching
● Evaluation of satisfactory EMC
● Analysis of crew workload
● Verify continuity of navigation data during normal maneuvering, including holding
patterns and up to at 30 of bank for left and right 360 turns
● Verify that the FTE can be maintained
● For equipment including an approach mode, conduct a sufficient number of
approaches using the navigation database to verify the proper operation of annun-
ciations, waypoint sequencing, and display sensitivities
A sample compliance matrix for Part 25 FMS installation is shown in Table 6.51.
TABLE 6.51 ¢ A Sample Compliance Matrix for Part 25 FMS Installation
Requirements AC
1 AC 25-15 5d System integrity Determine the detectability of a failure condition
Determine the required subsequent pilot actions
Make a judgment if satisfactory intervention can be expected by a properly trained crew
Failure of the FMS should not degrade the integrity of other safety related systems
installed in the airplane
2 AC 25-15 5e(1)(i) Long range navigation Sensors should be evaluated to demonstrate accuracy suitable for the airspace for which
the approval is sought
3 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii) U.S. NAS navigation Systems that are intended for enroute, terminal and approach operations in the NAS
should meet the following accuracy criteria.
4 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)A Sensor qualification
5 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)B(1) Non-precision Approach Display of course guidance information should be smooth during transition among the
with use of Navaid various sensor inputs. For NDB approaches, data from the NDB that defines the
approach procedures should be displayed in the pilot’s primary field of view.
6 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)B(2) Nonuse of Navaid The system accuracy and failure modes are compatible with the performance require-
ments and terminal instrument procedures criteria
7 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)C Precision approach ILS raw data must be displayed in the ADI/EADI or primary flight display (PFD).
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Transition from FMS to ILS by the AP/FD should be smooth and without significant
overshoot
8 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)D Holding patterns The equipment should provide the capability to proceed to a selected waypoint and hold
on a specified inbound course to a waypoint with a repeated crossing of the selected
waypoint. If holding patterns are pilot selectable or included in the database, they
should be defined.
9 AC 25-15 5e(1)(ii)E North Reference Effects If the FMS has course selection in degrees (‘‘TO-FROM’’ operation), such as charted
airways, should have technical or operational provision to ensure that the proper north
reference is used to define the desired course.
10 AC 25-15 5e(2) Vertical navigation The error of the airborne VNAV equipment should be less than the special value.
11 AC 25-15 5e(2)(i) Cruise Altitude Departure Adequate annunciation of an impending automatic departure from a cruise altitude
should be provided.
12 AC 25-15 5e(2)(ii) Speed Selection If the system provides for pilot selection of speed, it should not be possible to select a
Flight Management Systems
speed above Vmo/Mmo or a speed below the speed 1.2Vs1 for the existing airplane
configuration.
13 AC 25-15 5e(3) Navigation database FMS should include information such as flight plan magnetic variation and victor and
Jet airways and so on.
Displaying to the flight crew the dates for which the data is current and a means for
updating the database.
(Continues)
511
512
Requirements AC
14 AC 25-15 5e(3)(i) Flight Plan The FMS should provide a means to allow the flight crew to easily define additional
waypoints and insert them into the flight plan. The accuracy of the data defining-
waypoints should be the location to the nearest 0.1 minute of latitude and longitude or
the equivalent in terms of bearing and distance from a defined location or Nav aid.
The flight plan should not be changed or erased by electrical transients or the loss of
electrical power.
15 AC 25-15 5e(3)(ii) Data Base Modification The flight crew should not be able to modify information in the database.
16 AC 25-15 5e(4)(i) Automatic frequency Automatic frequency tuning feature should not override the manually selected
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tuning frequency.
6
17 AC 25-15 5e(4)(i) Remote tuning If remote tuning of communication transceivers through FMS is available, it should
provide a means to manually tune the radios to the emergency frequencies (121.5/
243 MHz).
18 AC 25-15 5e(4)(ii) Time and Distance The display of time or distance to go should relate to a Navaid or waypoint located on
Display the programmed airplane course unless adequate annunciation is provided.
19 AC 25-15 5e(4)(iii) System Status Display A means should be provided to indicate the specific sensors and/or stations currently
used in the navigation calculations as well as the status of all sensors and/or stations
being tracked.
20 AC 25-15 5e(4)(iv) Position Update It is recommended that the ability to manually update the FMS position be provided.
21 AC 25-15 5e(5) Status Annunciation The FMS should provide the means to annunciate the status of the selected navigation
mode and to alert the flight crew to system failures.
22 AC 25-15 5e(5)(i) Loss or reduction of Adequate annunciation should be provided for system failures that result in a loss or
function reduction of functions
23 AC 25-15 5e(5)(ii) Mode Annunciation When the aircraft is being controlled in pitch, roll, thrust or airspeed by FMS functions,
the annunciation of these modes or submodes of FMS operation shall be presented in
a clear and unambiguous manner in the flight crew’s primary field of view.
24 AC 25-15 5e(5)(iii) Excessive Deviation It is desirable to have the FMS provide a means to annunciate a significant position
Annunciation deviation from the computer programmed flight path of the airplane.
25 AC 25-15 5e(5)(iv) Waypoint Alert A means should be provided to annunciate an approaching waypoint crossing.
26 AC 25-15 5e(5)(v) Sensor and Station The system should annunciate when the quality of the navigation signals or sources,
Quality including signal to noise ratio and station geometry, has degraded to the level where
the accuracy for which the navigation mode was approved can no longer be assured.
27 AC 25-15 5e(6) Failure modes An equipment installation failure modes and effects analysis should be provided.
28 AC 25-15 5e(7) Navigation integrity The computation and display of hazardously misleading navigation information should
be shown to be improbable.
29 AC 25-15 5f Performance management The performance management logic should provide protection against exceeding
250 knots IAS below 10,000 ft MSL, however pilot override of this feature should be
provided.
30 AC 25-15 5f(1) Ground procedures The computer should contain reasonableness logic to prevent the airplane from being
operated beyond its certificated envelope limits.
31 AC 25-15 5f(2) Takeoff mode The takeoff mode generally displays some or all of the takeoff speeds and appropriate
engine thrust settings based upon the airport ambient temperature, airplane weight
and thrust reduction.
32 AC 25-15 5f(2)i Takeoff auto throttle The auto throttle servo configuration may impact the performance of the system when
operating in some modes. Such a system would be usable only as an aid for setting
takeoff power.
33 AC 25-15 5f(2)ii Engine failure The method of detecting an engine failure should be reviewed to establish the validity of
the scheme. Low EGT sensing may not account for a slowly failing engine or simu-
lated failure during training. Automatic bleed-shut-off sensing may not account for
MEL item, for example. This type of review will aid in establishing the AFM lim-
itations and procedures, and possible MEL revisions.
34 AC 25-15 5f(2)iii Takeoff pitch attitude Airspeed must be used as the primary reference and this should be clearly stated in the
AFM.
35 AC 25-15 5f(2)iv Engine-out flap retraction The FMS should capture the target speed for each flap/slat configuration.
36 AC 25-15 5f(2)v Takeoff speed command The system should provide commands that lead to the airplane smoothly acquiring a
modes pitch attitude that results in a takeoff reference speed of V2 þ 10 knots by the time the
airplane has reached approximately 35 ft altitude.
The FMS may provide automatic takeoff thrust control system (ATTCS) functions that
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will allow for reductions in takeoff thrust up to 10% of the takeoff thrust.
37 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(A) Takeoff The system should provide commands that lead to the airplane smoothly acquiring a
pitch attitude that results in a takeoff reference speed of V2 þ 10 knots by the time the
airplane has reached approximately 35 ft altitude.
38 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(B) Takeoff noise thrust The system should provide commands that result in an indicated airspeed of V2 þ X at all
cutback takeoff flap settings prior to thrust cutback.
39 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(C) Reduced thrust takeoff The thrust should be at least 75% of the takeoff thrust or derated takeoff thrust if such is
the performance basis, for the existing ambient conditions.
40 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(D) Automatic takeoff thrust The FMS may provide automatic takeoff thrust control system (ATTCS) functions that
system will allow for reductions in takeoff thrust up to 10% of the takeoff thrust.
41 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(E) De-rated takeoff thrust A derated takeoff thrust is a takeoff thrust less than the maximum takeoff thrust and for
which a set of independent takeoff limitations and performance data may exist in the
FMS computer memory. When these data are used for a derated takeoff, the thrust
setting parameter, which establishes thrust for takeoff, is considered a takeoff oper-
ating limit.
42 AC 25-15 5f(2) (v)(F) Transition The system should provide commands during periods of transition that are commensu-
rate with what would be expected from manual operation during the same condition.
(Continues)
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514
Requirements AC
43 AC 25-15 5f(3) Climb Mode The performance management function may provide a menu for manual or automatic
selection of the climb speed schedule.
44 AC 25-15 5f(4)(i) One-Engine-Inoperative The performance management function may control the drift down with one engine
Drift down inoperative.
45 AC 25-15 5f(5) Descent Mode The computer should provide logic that would prevent the power being automatically
reduced below safe levels or the minimum required when descending with ice pro-
tection systems operating per AFM instructions.
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46 AC 25-15 5f(6) Landing Approach The system should provide commands that result in an indicated airspeed of Vref þ wind
6
speed for all landing flap settings. This speed should be maintained even if the critical
engine fails during stabilized approach.
47 AC 25-15 5f(7) Landing Approach Go- 1. The airplane performance following addition of go-around thrust, during the landing
Around approach go-around maneuver, with or without the simultaneous loss of an engine,
should be such that the indicated airspeed is not reduced below what existed upon
initiation of the maneuver.
2. The automatic and manual go-around procedures and speeds should be the same.
48 AC 25-15 5f(8) Performance Information 1. The performance management primary flight modes selected by the flight crew
Display should be displayed in the pilot’s primary field of view.
2. Airplane performance information that was processed or computed by the FMS should
be readily retrievable for display by the control display unit during any phase of the
flight.
49 AC 25-15 5g(1) ATS Take-off Mode 1. The ATS design should provide an auto throttle clamp (inhibit) speed during takeoff.
2. Adequate annunciation should be provided for the system failure condition where the
throttles either fails to clamp at the takeoff inhibit speed or the throttles become
unclamped during the takeoff mode below 400 ft AGL.
3. Verify there is no throttle stagger that may result in unacceptable thrust differential
after throttle clamp.

50 AC 25-15 5g(2) ATS Climb Mode The ATS logic (operate in either speed or thrust control modes) should provide flight
envelope speed protection based upon airplane configuration.
51 AC 25-15 5g(3) ATS Cruise Mode The system should be free of excessive throttle oscillations/hunting and it should be
compatible with the autopilot pitch axis relative to speed on pitch/speed on throttles.
Engine over boost, and flight envelope speed protection should be provided.
52 AC 25-15 5g(4) ATS Descent Mode The ATS logic (operate in either speed or thrust control modes) should provide flight
envelope speed protection based upon airplane configuration.
53 AC 25-15 5g(5)/5g(6) ATS Landing Approach 1. The ATS (both at speed or angle of attack control modes) should be designed to
Mode & Go-Around control speed to within þ5 knots of the target speed but not less than the higher of
mode Vref or 1.3Vs of the landing configuration.
2. In the FMS go-around mode, the ATS should operate in the thrust control mode. The
system should automatically transition from the speed mode to the thrust control mode
upon selection of the FMS go-around mode.
54 AC 25-15 5h Takeoff performance The FMS may provide the function of computing and displaying achieved airplane
monitor performance information to the flight crew in real time.
55 AC 25-15 5h(1) System accuracy System tolerances will affect error in takeoff distance, airspeed and longitudinal
acceleration.
56 AC 25-15 5h(2) Runway considerations If the time to a specific takeoff speed is computed and displayed, that speed should be
sufficiently below decision speed V1 to allow the flight crew adequate time to decide
if the difference between actual and computed performance is acceptable. The FAA
feels that approximately 5 sec is sufficient for this purpose.
57 AC 25-15 5h(3) System threshold The system should alert the flight crew when the achieved performance is less than the
reference performance by 5%.
58 AC 25-15 5h(4) Takeoff thrust The implementation of the takeoff monitoring function should consider the manner in
which the flight crew will set thrust at the beginning of the takeoff roll. The thrust
used for the AFM should be used for this purpose.
59 AC 25-15 5h(5) Airmass analysis The applicant should perform air mass analysis to show the effects of a typical runway
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gust condition such as 10 knots/gust to 20 knots to show the suitability of the concepts
used.
60 AC 25-15 5h(6) Annunciation and display A real time digital or analog display of achieved and reference performance should be
provided in the flight crew’s primary field of view.
61 AC 25-15 5h(7) Function integrity Annunciated system failure conditions are considered major in accordance with AC
25.1309 since the display of the computed data no matter how it is presented will
influence the flight crew’s decision to continue the takeoff roll or initiate a rejected
takeoff.
62 AC 25-15 5i Fuel State The accuracy and resolution of the displayed fuel state computations should be equal to
or better than that provided by the flight deck instrumentation.
63 AC 25-15 5j Flight deck checklist The FMS may provide additional features such as takeoff, landing and emergency flight
deck checklists.
64 AC 25-15 5k Flight management Airborne data links can be used by the FMS to provide a medium for the automated
system data link acquisition of flight plan navigation and airplane performance related data.
65 AC 25-15 5l Software identification If the FMS or its sensors are designed to display a software program identifier to the
flight crew, the program identifier should be displayed by the FMS control display
unit and the AFM should indicate the approved identifier.
(Continues)
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516
Requirements AC
66 AC 25-15 5m Equipment installation An equipment installation failure modes and effects analysis should be provided, the
extent of which is dependent upon the degree of integration of the FMS with new or
existing airplane systems and sensors.
67 AC 25-15 5n Test and evaluation
68 AC 25-15 5n(1) Environmental Tests The major components comprising the FMS should be qualified to the appropriate
sections of RTCA document DO-160B, ‘‘Environmental Conditions and Test Proce-
dures for Airborne Equipment,’’ or equivalent.
69 AC 25-15 5n(2) Ground Tests The applicant should provide a ground test plan that includes the tests necessary to
CHAPTER
verify that the FMS as installed in the airplane performs its intended function and that
there are no adverse effects to existing airplane systems and sensors.
6
70 AC 25-15 5n(3)i Reevaluation Flight test evaluations should be made to determine that prior approvals of existing
airplane systems have not been compromised.
71 AC 25-15 5n(3)iii Navigation systems If approval is sought for certain sub-(reversionary) operating modes utilizing single or a
employing single or reduced 24 combination of sensor inputs, the evaluation must include an appropriate
multisensory inputs. number of data points for each configuration for which the approval is sought.
72 AC 25-15 5n(3)iv Reference to the flight The data obtained from the flight demonstration should be referenced to the flight deck
deck instrumentation for airplane configuration and airspeed that the flight crew normally
uses to determine airplane performance when operating the airplane manually.
73 AC 25-15 5n(3)vi Take off engine out The evaluation should include a sufficient number of simulated engines out conditions
for the takeoff mode to demonstrate that the AFM engine out speed is smoothly
captured and maintained.
74 AC 25-15 5n(3)vii Engine out Electrical load At least one actual engine shutdown should be accomplished to evaluate bus or gen-
erator load switching effects on the FMS.
75 AC 25-15 5n(3)viii Buffet Boundary An FMS controlled buffet boundary protection margin should be demonstrated for all
Protection applicable flight modes by commanding a relatively large speed change at a point
close to the boundary
76 AC 25-15 5n(3)xii Fuel computation An evaluation of the fuel state computations should be made for reasonableness when
compared with flight planning data.
77 AC 25-15 5o Airplane flight manual The AFMS should provide the appropriate system limitations and a comprehensive
supplement description of all normal and submodes of system operation including what actions
are expected by the Flight crew for each case.

78 AC 20-138C 6-3.d1 GNSS RNAV multisensor equipment must provide a smooth guidance transition between
baro-VNAV and GPS/SBAS or GPS/GBAS vertical guidance and a clear mode
annunciation to the pilot
79 AC 20-138C 6-4.a(1) DME/DME 1. Provide position update within 30 sec of tuning DME navigation facilities
2. Auto-tune multiple DME facilities
3. Provide continuous DME/DME position updating
80 AC 20-138C 6-5 VOR/DME Multisensor incorporate VOR/DME meet the performance for the route to be flown
81 AC 20-138C 15-2 Interface to primary Navigation data must be displayed on a lateral deviation display.
navigation display The display of navigation parameters data should meet the requirements
82 AC 20-138C 15-2.a The navigation system in use must be clearly and unambiguously indicated for instal-
lations where multisensor outputs can drive a display that is shared in common with
other navigation equipment
83 AC 20-138C 15-2.b When in terminal and approach modes, the bearing and distance to the active waypoint
must be displayed with a minimum resolution of 1 and 0.1 NM up to a range of
99.9 NM.
84 AC 20-138C 15-2.c Navigation data, including a TO/FROM indication and a failure indicator, must be
displayed on a lateral deviation display such as a CDI or HIS.
85 AC 20-138C 15-2.1a Nonnumeric deviation Nonnumeric cross-track deviation must be continuously displayed in all navigation
displays modes
86 AC 20-138C 15-2.1b(1)(2) Nonnumeric deviation displays with a TO/FROM indication and a failure annunciation
should have the following attributes:
1. Distance to the active waypoint must be displayed either in the pilot primary field of
view or on a readily accessible display page unless there are alternate means to indi-
cate waypoint passage.
2. Nonnumeric vertical deviation must be continuously displayed when in an approach
mode containing vertical guidance
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87 AC 20-138C 15-2.1c The lateral deviation scaling must be consistent with any alerting and annunciation
limits, if implemented.
88 AC 20-138C 15-2.1d The lateral deviation scaling must also have a full-scale deflection suitable for the
current phase of flight and must be based on the required total system accuracy
89 AC 20-138C 15-2.1e The full-scale deflection value must be known or must be available for display to the
pilot commensurate with enroute or terminal values
90 AC 20-138C 15-2.1f The lateral deviation display must be automatically slaved to the RNAV computed path.
The course selector to the deviation display should be automatically slewed to the
RNAVcomputed path or the pilot must adjust the Omni bearing selector (OBS) or
HSI selected course to the computed desired track.
91 15-2.2 Map displays Map displays should give equivalent functionality to a nonnumeric lateral deviation
display described above, and be readily visible to the pilot with appropriate map
scales (scaling may be set manually by the pilot.)

(Continues)
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518
Requirements AC
92 AC 20-138C 15-3a Interface to Remote Multisensor equipment may drive remote annunciators in the primary field of view.
Annunciator
93 AC 20-138C 15-3b Visual annunciations must be consistent with the criticality of the annunciation and must
be readable under all normal cockpit illumination conditions. Visual annunciations
must not be so bright or startling as to reduce pilot dark adaptation.
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94 AC 20-138C 15-3c Waypoint sequencing, start of a turn, turn anticipation, TO/FROM indication, approach
6
mode annunciation, and automatic mode switching should be located within the
pilot’s primary field of view or on a readily accessible display page.
95 AC 20-138C 15-3d The multisensor equipment should provide annunciations for loss of integrity monitor-
ing, loss of navigation, TO/FROM indication, and approach mode annunciation
within the primary field of view.
96 AC 20-138C 15-4 Unique Software
Considerations
97 AC 20-138C 21-1 Ground test
98 AC 20-138C 21-2.a EMC test Evaluation to determine satisfactory EMC between the multisensor equipment
installation and other onboard equipment
99 AC 20-138C 21-2.b Multisensor accuracy Validate multisensor equipment navigation accuracy in each operating mode.
100 AC 20-138C 21-2.c VOR/DME DME/DME Initial certification for systems including a VOR/DME or multiple (scanning) DME
certification sensor that has not been previously certified must be based upon a demonstration of
system accuracy by recording the VOR/DME or DME/DME sensor position and
comparing it to the actual position during evaluation flights.
101 AC 20-138C 21-2.d Evaluation of INS/IRU
102 AC 20-138C 21-2.e Data continuity during the Verify navigation data continuity during normal aircraft maneuvering for the navigation
normal maneuvers modes to be validated (e.g., bank angles of up to 30 and pitch angles associated with
approaches, missed approaches and departures).
103 AC 20-138C 21-2.f Normal operation of FMS Verify the overall operation of the multisensor equipment
104 AC 20-138C 21-2.g FTE Verify that FTE does not exceed 1.0 NM for enroute, 0.5 NM for approach transition
and missed approach operating modes, and 0.25 NM for nonprecision approach, both
with and without autopilot or FD use, as applicable.
105 AC 20-138C 21-2.h Barometric input If the equipment uses barometric input, verify that the equipment properly interprets the
barometer reading.
106 AC 20-138C 21-2.i Switching and transfer Verify/assess all switching and transfer functions, including electrical bus switching,
functions pertaining to the multisensor installation.
107 AC 20-138C 21-2.j Failure modes and asso- Various failure modes and associated annunciations, such as loss of electrical power and
ciated annunciations loss of signal reception
Verify that a warning associated with loss of navigation is accompanied by a visible
indication within the pilot’s primary field of view.
108 AC 20-138C 21-2.1a Steering response FD/AP Evaluate steering response while the FD or autopilot is coupled to the multisensor
coupled with FMS equipment during a variety of different track and mode changes.
109 AC 20-138C 21-2.1b Fly by turns Several fly-by turns should be accomplished with varying wind conditions for FD and
autopilot. Verify the equipment accomplishes the turn as a fly-by waypoint and dis-
courages overshoot.
110 AC 20-138C 21-2.1c Annunciation of impend- Verify that the lateral maneuver anticipation supplied by the multisensor equipment is
ing waypoint crossing appropriate for the aircraft type. Verify that if the multisensor equipment is coupled to
an autopilot or on approach, an appropriate annunciation of impending waypoint
crossing is provided.
111 AC 20-138C 21-2.1d Direct-To function Verify that execution of the Direct-to function with a resultant aircraft heading change
does not overshoot and cause S turns that exceed the lateral path tracking FTE
requirements.
112 AC 20-138C 21-2.1e Autopilot response to a Evaluate the autopilot response to a multisensor equipment fault by pulling the circuit
multisensor breaker for the equipment. This test should be done in each of the sensor modes, if
applicable.
113 AC 20-138C 21-2.2 GNSS precision approach For manual control to the approach flight path, the appropriate flight displays must
6.17
provide sufficient information without excessive reference to other cockpit displays,

to enable a suitably trained pilot to maintain the approach path, make alignment with
the runway or go-around.
114 ANM 99-2 Human factors
519
6.18 ENHANCED VISION SYSTEMS (EVS)

The generic term for systems that utilize sensors to enhance the vision of the operator is
enhanced vision systems. All EVS Systems share a commonality in providing Situa-
tional Awareness to the operator. Some of the benefits of EVS systems:
– Aid in CFIT avoidance in conjunction with TAWS
– Runway incursion detection
– In-flight and on-ground safety enhancements
– Helicopter heavy-lift operations
– Helicopter EMS services
– Helicopter oil rig servicing
– Helicopter desert landing dust blow up
Enhanced Flight Vision System (EFVS) is a subset of the EVS, however, EASA
uses the term EVS as an equivalent to the FAA EFVS (which is a little confusing). EFVS
systems use active or passive sensors to see along the flight path and may be used as an
aid in nonprecision approaches and meet the requirements of 14 CFR § 91.175. They are
used to provide enhanced flight visibility while flying a straight-in standard approach
procedure. The EFVS provides enhanced flight visibility at the Decision Height or
Minimum Descent Altitude in lieu of flight visibility by using a HUD to display sensor
imagery of the approach lights or other visual references for the runway environment at
a distance no less than the visibility prescribed in the instrument approach procedure
being used. Simply stated, the system provides enhanced visibility to the pilot.
An EVS provides a display of the forward external scene through the use of imaging
sensors such as FLIR, MMW RADAR or low light image intensification. An EVS is
different than an Enhanced Flight Vision System in that it provides Situational Awareness,
but does not allow CFR 14 § 91.175 (l) Operational credit. EFVS systems are integrated
with an FGS and provide additional symbology and steering cues to the pilot via the HUD.
All EVS systems, including EFVS comprise the following elements:
– Sensor system
– Sensor display processor
– EVS display
– Pilot interface
EVS sensors may be passive or active. Passive sensors utilize the IR spectrum;
within the IR band there are four areas of interest for the designers of these systems:
– 0.72–1.5 microns for image intensifying devices (NIR, night vision systems, night
vision goggles)
– 1–2 microns for detecting light bulb filaments (SWIR, not including LED)
– 3–5 microns for cultural returns at greater range in high moisture (MWIR)
– 8–12 microns for maximum cultural definition (LWIR)
Systems designed as an aid to the pilot can use a combination of the NIR, SWIR, MWIR
or LWIR frequency bands. EVS may also use an active sensor; millimetric wave radar
(MMWR) may be used in lieu of or in addition to an Infra-red (IR) imaging device,

MMW RADARs are less susceptible to attenuation (scattering and absorption) than IR
systems and therefore have superior performance in weather penetration.
As opposed to the use of sensors, the synthetic vision system (SVS) uses a com-
puter-generated image of the external scene from the perspective of the cockpit. The
image is derived from aircraft attitude, precise positional accuracy and a database of
terrain, obstacles and relevant cultural features. SVS provides situational awareness but
does not provide operational credit (lower minimum approaches). The SVS may be
presented on a primary flight display from the perspective of the flight deck or on a
secondary display as a moving map; the AC calls these views egocentric and exocentric.
The elements of the SVS:
– Display
– System interface
– Terrain and obstacle database
– Position source
– Altitude source
– Attitude source
– Heading and track source
The terrain database is normally referenced to a NIMA (national imagery and

mapping agency) Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) model. There are three DTED
levels of varying resolutions:
– DTED Level 0 uses 30 arc second spacing (nominally 1 km)
– DTED Level 1 uses 3 arc second spacing (approx 100 m)
– DTED Level 2 uses 1 arc second spacing (approx 30 m)
When evaluating an SVS, some characteristics must be addressed. Display factors
such as conformality, refresh rate, FOR and FOV (field-of-regard and field-of-view) and
display placement such as primary FOV versus secondary FOV, Heads-up versus
Heads-down are critical. The method of terrain presentation such as depiction, grid,
color and shading, resolution and range indications must be evaluated. System modes of
operation and functionality such as alerts (terrain, obstacles, traffic and airspace),
declutter modes, mode reversion and image control are called out as high interest items.
The integration of guidance symbology (if incorporated) such as guidance cues, pathway
markings, navigation information, crosswinds and unusual attitude recovery must also
be evaluated.
A combined vision system (CVS) involves a combination of synthetic and enhanced
systems. An example of CVS may be a database driven images combined with real-time
sensor images superimposed and correlated on the same display. The initial portion of an
approach may be provided by SVS with sensors providing the imagery as the aircraft is
nearer to the runway. CVS will provide situational awareness but not necessarily
operational credit. The AC usually considers CVS as a combination of EVS and SVS; if
the applicant combines SVS and EFVS he is expected to meet the applicable perfor-
mance criteria for SVS and EFVS.
6.18.1 EFVS
The FAA defines enhanced flight visibility as the average forward horizontal distance,
from the cockpit of an aircraft in-flight, at which prominent topographical objects may
be clearly distinguished identified in day or night by a pilot using an EFVS. This
enhanced visibility allows the pilot to continue the approach from the DH or MDA down
to 100 ft above the touchdown zone. At this point and below, certain things would
have to be visible to the pilot without EFVS to proceed to a landing on the intended
runway.
The use with an EFVS with a HUD improves the level of safety by improving
situational awareness; it provides visual cues to maintain a stabilized approach and
minimizes missed approach situations. Additionally, an EFVS allows the pilot to
observe obstructions on runways, such as aircraft or vehicles earlier in the approach and
during ground operations in reduced visibility conditions. Command guidance, path
deviation indications, flight path vector and flight path reference cue must be displayed
on the HUD. In order to perform its intended function, the flight path reference cue
needs to be set by the pilot to the desired value for the approach. The pilot needs to see
the cue in the context of pitch scale to verify that it’s correctly set, and it needs to be
shaped and located so as to allow the pilot to monitor the airplane’s vertical path (glide
path anchored to TD).
The EFVS imagery and external scene topography must be presented so that they
are aligned with and scaled to the external view. When using an EFVS, the approach
light system (if installed), or the runway threshold (lights or markings), and the runway
touchdown zone (lights or markings) must be distinctly visible and identifiable to the
pilot before descending below the DH or MDA for the pilot to continue the approach.
The FAA requires that several components be provided by an EFVS to provide an
adequate level of safety. The EFVS sensor imagery must be presented on a HUD that is
centrally located in the pilot’s primary field-of-view and in the pilot’s line of vision
along the flight path. The imagery must be real time, independent of the navigation
solution derived from the aircraft avionics, and clearly displayed so that it does not
adversely obscure the pilot FOV through the cockpit window. Aircraft flight symbology
that must be provided on the HUD includes the following:
– Airspeed
– Vertical speed
– Attitude
– Heading
– Altitude
– Command guidance
– CDI
– Reference cue
Cues that are referenced to the imagery must be aligned with and scaled to the external
view.
The all weather window system was the first system to be certified for lower landing
minimums by the FAA. Gulfstream is the A/C integrator using a Kollsman IR sensor and
Honeywell HUD. The sensor is a staring array, cryogenically cooled InSb sensor
optimized in the 1–5 micron region. It has been certified for Gulfstream IV/V as well as
the G300-G550 series models and by FedEX for their entire fleet of MD-10/11 and
A300/310 A/C.
6.18.2 EVS Airworthiness

AC 20-167, ‘‘Airworthiness Approval of Enhanced Vision System, Synthetic Vision
System, Combined Vision System and Enhanced Flight Vision System Equipment,’’ June
22, 2010, provides a means, but not the only means, of showing compliance with air-
worthiness regulations. EFVS approaches are approved by a change to the operating rules:
– Part 91 para 91.175 (General Flight Rules)

– Part 121 para 121.651 (Domestic Flag Carriers)
– Part 125 para 125.381 (More Than 6000# and 20 Passengers)
– Part 135 para 135.225 (Commuter and On-Demand Carriers)
The AC covers equipment installed in Part 23/25/27/29 aircraft. As with all of the newer
advisory circulars, AC 20-167 provides the applicant with a compliance matrix, flight
test considerations, Safety assessment and human factors requirements. The AC is
arranged as follows:
– Intended function
– General requirements
– Specific requirements
– Installation considerations
– HIRF
– Performance demonstration
– Environmental qualification
– Compliance matrix
– Systems safety
– Flight test considerations (includes human factors)
– Sample AFM supplement
Intended Function
For EVS, SVS or CVS, the airworthiness package should contain the intended functions
of the system: what features are displayed and the criticality of pilot decision making
using the display. Any intended additional functions (i.e., terrain alerting) should be
defined according to AC 25-11A, AC 20-175 and other category unique ACs in accor-
dance with 14 CFR § 2X.1301. For EFVS, the functions must be clearly defined: its use
to visually acquire the references to operate below the MDA/MDH or DA/DH as
described in CFR 14 § 91.175 and the criticality of the pilot decision making using the
display.
General Requirements
EVS, SVS or CVS functionality can be superimposed on the EFIS System (i.e., the PFD)
as installed in the flight deck; the information may also be superimposed on a HUD or
equivalent display system. EVS, SVS or CVS may also be selected on an MFD or
navigation display as one of the stand-alone formats on the flight deck. If the applicant
would like to display this functionality on side-mounted displays (electronic flight bag,
or EFB) they should follow the guidance in AC 120-76A. Utilization of the EVS display
should not be used during ground operations if sensor proximity to the taxiway surface
causes a distraction.
EVS/SVS/CVS systems are required to:
– Have a means to control the brightness
– Not degrade the presentation of essential flight information
– Meet the requirements of the original approval
– Not adversely affect any other installed system
– Perform its intended function in all conditions for which approval is being desired
– Display the mode of operation to the flight crew
– Not have any undesirable characteristics
If the EVS/SVS/CVS is implemented on the primary flight display (PFD) the fol-
lowing requirements must also be met:
– The image, or loss of image may not adversely affect the PFD functionality
– The imagery should be aligned with the aircraft’s flight path and not be confusing to
the aircrew
– The FOR may be variable but cannot distract the aircrew
– The display must not impede a visible zero pitch reference line (the AC recommends
the incorporation of a velocity vector)
– The imagery may not provide the pilot with misleading information
The EVS/SVS/CVS may be implemented on a HUD, or equivalent. If this imple-
mentation is chosen then the system must not conflict with the pilot’s compartment view
(for Part 25 airplanes, the FAA will issue special conditions to achieve the intended level
of safety in § 25.773). It must also not impede the pilot performing any task during all
phases of flight. The imagery must be conformal to the real world, and the design of the
HUD should be IAW Aerospace Recommended Practices. The EVS/SVS/CVS may be
implemented on a secondary display. If so, the orientation of the imagery must be clear
to the pilot and if PFD information is displayed, it should meet PFD integrity and
availability requirements. The imagery, or loss thereof, must not adversely affect other
approved display functionality.
Specific Requirements
EVS installations must meet the following requirements:
– The imagery must be de-selectable; if implemented on a HUD the switch must be on
the yoke or thrust control
– Status of the EVS must be obvious to the crew
– FOR should be sufficient for the intended functions

– SAE design standards should be incorporated
– The display should not have any undesirable characteristics
The AC states that displays for Part 25 should apply the characteristics listed in
AC 25-11A, Part 23 should use AC 23-1311-1B; other aircraft (Part 27/29) should also use
these ACs as recommended guidance. On an HDD, the FOR should be suitable for
the pilot to transition from heads-down to out the window or HUD. The image must be
refreshed at 15 Hz or better, and the latency cannot exceed 100 msec. On a HUD, a control
for brightness/contrast must be available. The presentation should not be distracting or
impair vision, not mask hazards, and should not degrade task performance or safety.
For SVS implementations, the design and installation safety levels should be
appropriate for the system’s intended function; ACs 25-11A and 23.1311-1 should be
used as guidance. Failure or de-selection of the imagery should obvious to the crew, and
the FOR should be appropriate. All dominant topographical features should be present
and identifiable by the crew.
For terrain presentations, a potential obstacle should be obvious and not conflict
with TAWS or HTAWS. Topographical features must not intersect approach guidance,
and terrain that generates an alert should be displayed above the artificial horizon zero-
pitch line. SVS based primary displays should be clear and unambiguous when unusual
attitude recovery is required. The FOR should be appropriate for use, and water should
be displayed and distinguishable from the sky. An update rate of 15 Hz or better is
required and the pilot’s view must not be depicted below the earth’s surface.
The scene range should be the natural horizon, except in systems used for departures
and approaches where it should be the lesser of the following: the natural horizon, 40 nm
or 10 min at maximum cruise. The scene range must not be misleading (i.e., no moun-
tains in the distance); obstacles taller than 200 ft must be displayed conformably. The
horizontal position source for the SVS should at least meet the criteria for TAWS or
HTAWS. Any aircraft incorporating an egocentric perspective must also provide a
TAWS, HTAWS, or terrain warning system.
Additionally, for SVS implementation:
– The attitude, heading and track sources cannot conflict with information on the
navigation display
– Resolution and accuracy of the database must comply with that contained in TSO-
C151c or TSO-C194
– Runway elevations must be accurate at the approach end, not just the center
CVS requires a real-time imaging sensor and display that provides demonstrated vision
performance for its intended functions; CVS must meet the respective requirements of
EVS and SVS. EVS and SVS must be conformal to each other and the data fusion requires
the alignment to be within 5 mrad laterally and vertically at the boresight of the display.
Image discrepancies between SVS and EVS due to failures must be obvious to the crew.
EFVS General and Specific Requirements

In addition to the EVS requirements, EFVS design:
– Should mitigate system failures more frequent than extremely improbable, which
produce unsafe conditions
– Requires a HUD or equivalent display

– FOR should be sufficient for the system to operate in all anticipated flight, config-
uration and environmental conditions
– Should display the required flight instrument data
– Include brightness/contrast control, which is effective with dynamically changing
background conditions
– Controls must be visible and accessible to the pilot from any normal seated position
The controls must be adequately illuminated in all lighting conditions, and not
create objectionable glare. Unless the applicant can show that fixed illumination is
satisfactory under all lighting conditions for which approval is sought, there must be a
readily accessible control to immediately deactivate or reactivate the EFVS image on
the HUD. This control must be on demand without the pilot removing his hands from the
yoke or thrust control.
The AC devotes some time to the minimum detection range required of the sensor.
The detection range will be a function of the sensor: detector element(s), Detector
Angular Subtense and transmissivity of the atmosphere on a particular day. The dis-
cussion in the AC regarding performance is rather simplistic although it does mention
utilizing the LOWTRAN and MODTRAN models.
The EFVS image must be compatible with the FOV and head motion box of a HUD
designed against SAE ARP 5288 (Transport Category HUD Systems). The EFVS dis-
play criteria must meet the airworthiness certification requirements in 14 CFR parts
23/25/27/29; these requirements are identified by part/paragraph number in appendix I
of AC 20-167. The guidelines for the HUD displays apply to EFVS: MIL-STD-1787C,
AC 25-11A, SAE AS 8055, SAE ARP 5288, and SAE ARP 5287.
The EFVS image and installation:
– Must be able to perform its intended function
– Must allow for the accurate identification of visual references
– Must not degrade safety of flight
– Must not have unacceptable display characteristics
– Must have a control of brightness
– Must have an accessible control for removing the imagery
– Must not degrade the presentation of the flight information
– Must not be misleading or cause confusion
– Must conform to the external scene
– Must not distort the compartment view
– Must not cause fatigue
– Must not significantly alter the color of the external view
– Must allow the pilot to recognize a nonconformal view
Additionally, the EFVS should have a latency not to exceed 100 msec (latency may
exceed 100 msec if it demonstrated not to be misleading). The minimum fixed FOR
must be 20 horizontal and 15 vertical; in applications where the FOR is centered about
the velocity vector, the minimum vertical FOR must be 5 (þ/2.5 ). A variable FOR is
allowed using a slewable sensor if centered about the velocity vector with a minimum
FOV of 5 (þ/2.5 ).
6.19 Summary 527
Installation Requirements
For EVS/SVS/CVS, in addition to those already noted:
– BIT is required
– A complete fault hazard analysis and systems safety analysis (SSA) should be con-
ducted to identify failure modes and classify the hazard levels
– Any failure or malfunction that could cause misleading imagery should be immedi-
ately annunciated and the imagery removed
– EVS/SVS/CVS operation may not adversely affect other aircraft systems and vice
versa
– The system must meet the environmental conditions specified in RTACA DO-160G
to include HIRF and EMI testing
All requirements previously mentioned for EVS/SVS/CVS are applicable to EFVS
as well. Any mode of EFVS operation must be annunciated on the flight deck and visible
to the crew; the modes of EFVS operation must be made available to the flight data
recorder as required. During installation, it is required to validate all alleviating flight
actions that are considered in the safety analysis for incorporation in the AFM limita-
tions section or for inclusion in type-specific training. The applicant must demonstrate a
Design Assurance Level for hardware and software to be no less than that required for
non-EFVS precision and nonprecision approaches with decision altitudes of 200’ or
above. A sample EFVS systems safety requirements guidance is provided in appendix 2
of AC 20-167; an example of an FHA is given in Table 4.
Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation will require bench testing, flight testing, data collection,
and reduction to show the proposed performance criteria can be met. Minimum per-
formance standards require an evaluation of the system used during anticipated opera-
tional scenarios (i.e., taxi, takeoff, approach, missed approach, failure and crosswind
conditions and approaches into specific airports appropriate for the system’s intended
function). For EFVS, the applicant must demonstrate performance at the lateral and
vertical limits for the type of approach credit being sought. Appendix 4 of the AC
provides sample EFVS Flight Test considerations.
No specific test procedures are cited; system performance tests as they relate to
operational capability are the most important tests. The applicant should specify the
individual verification methods to be used in the Certification Plan; this should be
confirmed with the appropriate certification office as an acceptable course before eva-
luation begins. Human Factors testing needs to be accomplished; a sample evaluation
matrix is found in section 4-15 of appendix 4 in the AC. The requirements for design
assurance levels for hardware (RTCA/DO-254) and software (RTCA/DO-178B) should
be followed; appendix 5 of the AC contains a sample AFM supplement.
6.19 SUMMARY
After completing this section, it should be easy to understand why the certification
authority grants 3 to 5 years to complete the certification process. There are some items
to remember when dealing with civil certifications. The first is that, when dealing with
avionics systems, the critical subparagraphs are 1301 and 1309: Can the system perform
its intended function, and can it do so without adversely impacting other aircraft sys-
tems? In attempting to answer these questions, the evaluator will first be led to the
design of the system. The key to avionics design is software, and the overriding gui-
dance on software is RTCA DO-178B/C, ‘‘Software Considerations in Airborne Sys-
tems and Equipment Certification.’’ More recently, and not really called out in the
previous discussions, is guidance on avionics hardware design. The overriding doc-
umentation in this area is RTCA DO-254, ‘‘Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne
Electronic Hardware.’’ These two documents, along with RTCA DO-160G, ‘‘Environ-
mental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne Aircraft,’’ are going to be refer-
enced in every avionics system civil certification.
And how do we comply with the intent of these documents? That is where the best
practices of the SAE documents come in. Software, by its very nature, is highly complex
and integrated, and therefore we turn to SAE ARP-4754, ‘‘Certification Considerations
for Highly Integrated or Complex Aircraft Systems.’’ This document states the need for
a safety assessment, and that assessment is described in SAE ARP-4761, ‘‘Guidelines
and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems
and Equipment.’’
When dealing with individual avionics systems, the chain of command is the MPS
or MOPS for the equipment (usually an RTCA document), followed by the TSO (for the
equipment manufacturer), and lastly the AC (a means, but not the only means, of
showing airworthiness compliance). If done right, all three of these documents should
basically say the same thing, but due to the published date and changes in the technol-
ogy, each document may addend the previous one.
These documents, together with the human factors guidance offered by the
authority, serve as the basis of your certification and flight test plan. As with any flight
test program, it is incumbent upon the evaluator to do her homework prior to designing
a plan.
Only deal with military applications and think that this will never apply to you?
Think again. The U.S. Department of Defense is continually dropping MIL-STDs and
adopting the civilian versions (like RTCA DO-178B). In addition, military aircraft
routinely fly in civilian airspace and must abide by the same rules (read certification) as
civilian aircraft do.
1. What system, when installed, can achieve integrity within the GPS?
2. What role does mode S play in the TCAS II system?
3. Can TCAS II provide horizontal resolutions?
4. Briefly describe the RAIM predictive algorithm.
5. What is the major deficiency of the basic ground proximity warning system?
6. What is the major deficiency of the enhanced ground proximity warning system?
7. Name the four factors that must be considered when using a system as a navigation
reference.
8. What is TAS? What can it be used for?

9. Why are numerous pilots required for controls and displays evaluations?
10. What is RNAV? What does RNAV-5 mean?
11. What is the difference between a major hardware change and a minor hardware
change according to FAA/JAA regulations?
12. What are the two types of software changes according to FAA/EASA regulations?
Who makes this determination?
13. In dealing with civil certifications, what does MOPS mean?
14. Which agency controls the TSO process?
15. What are the advantages of installing an FMS in an aircraft?
16. Why is EMI/EMC an important consideration in TCAS installation?
17. Is the military exempt from RVSM requirements?
18. What is the purpose of RVSM?
19. Would you employ a TAWS in a military aircraft? Why or why not?
20. What is flight technical error?
21. What is the minimum horizontal accuracy required for IFR GPS installations?
22. What is the minimum vertical accuracy required for IFR GPS installations?
23. How many major equipment classes of GPS are called out in the specifications
(TSO C-129A)?
24. What would be a possible alternative to the TCAS II system?
25. What problems are associated with faulty altitude encoders in regard to TCAS
advisories?
26. What is ASE in the RVSM approval process?
27. What are the three acceptable methods of determining SSEs in the RVSM approval
process?
28. Why is human factors a consideration when installing a GPS/FMS/EFIS in an
aircraft?
29. What is the standard color scheme for warnings and alerts in the cockpit?
30. How does TCAS compute a closest point of approach?
31. Why is waviness of the aircraft skin a consideration when applying for RVSM
certification?
32. Briefly describe a means of determining altitude loss during an approach when
experiencing an autopilot malfunction.
33. What are the military standards for altitude and heading hold during autopilot
operations?
34. What are the five categories of ILS?
35. How does the aircraft determine glideslope on an ILS approach?
36. List five test objectives for a possible ILS installation.
37. What is the difference between ATC and ATM?
38. What is the specified accuracy of the FMS during enroute and terminal operations?
39. List four possible test objectives for a possible FMS installation.
40. Are there any significant drawbacks (disadvantages) to cockpit automation?
41. What must be checked immediately upon FMS initialization?
42. What are performance charts used for in FMS installations?
43. Are operators allowed to access and change the FMS database?
44. What can the basic TCAS provide to the aircrew?
45. What are the two types of TCAS advisories?
46. Are there any concerns about how aural tones are implemented in an avionics
system?
47. At what frequency does the TCAS operate?
48. Can TCAS be saturated?
49. What information is displayed to the aircrew by TCAS?
50. TCAS II, version 7, reduces the TA from 1200 to 850 ft. Why?
51. What does the VSI or VVI provide the aircrew in the TCAS mode?
52. List four potential problems with the current TCAS.
53. What is the potential problem with the TA aural tone in the cockpit?
54. Briefly describe how the GPWS operates.
55. What are the seven alert modes of the GPWS system?
56. What are the four additional modes of the EGPWS system?
57. What is CFIT? Can it be eliminated by TAWS?
58. Can the TAWS alerts be overridden?
59. What is a display override?
60. What is an aerospace recommended practice?
61. In civil certifications, what is a highly integrated system? Give an example.
62. What altitude bands are incorporated in RVSM?
63. What are some of the altitude errors that need to be considered under ASE?
64. What is an AC (FAA or EASA regulations)?
65. What is SSE? What three variables contribute to SSE?
66. What is the difference between the basic envelope and full envelope under RVSM?
67. What is the difference between group and nongroup aircraft under RVSM?
68. What errors contribute to the total height keeping accuracy as defined by RVSM?
69. Is RVSM approval, once granted, always in force? What would rescind an RVSM
approval?
70. Why is the aircraft structural repair manual a part of the RVSM submittal?
71. Are avionics controls and displays standardized? Why?
72. Which lighting tests must be conducted when evaluating controls and displays?
73. What is meant by ‘‘positive feedback’’? Why is it important?

74. In a controls and displays functional test, what is being evaluated?
75. What are the two acceptable means of informing the operator that the data are no
longer acceptable?
76. What are some of the drawbacks in allowing engineers to develop controls and
displays?
77. What three things need to be recorded during controls and displays evaluations?
78. What is the relationship between criticality and probability of failure?
79. What are digital-only displays not used in cockpits?
80. Describe one method for quantifying display usability.
81. What does an RNAV 0.5 approach mean to you?
82. Each major class of GPS equipment (A, B, C) is further subdivided. What are these
subdivisions?
83. What is the basic premise in paragraph 1301 and 1309 of the FARS/EASA (Part
23/25)?
84. What is meant by maneuver anticipation for GPS evaluations?
85. When shall GPS units certificated for VFR/IFR flight provide a navigation warn-
ing flag?
86. When shall the GPS provide an integrity alarm (certificated equipment)?
87. Which documents are the overriding authorities for software development?
Environmental conditions?
88. What is a RAIM-equivalent system?
89. What is a predeparture RAIM program?
90. What is FDE in a RAIM system?
91. What is a pseudorange step error in a RAIM system?
92. What is the primary reason for installing an autopilot in an aircraft?
93. What is an autoland approach?
94. Why are disconnects (auto or manual) required in autopilot systems? Give three
reasons for these safety devices.
95. Name three ways that an autopilot may be disconnected
96. In evaluating autopilot malfunctions, a 1 sec delay is typically used under what
conditions?
97. A 3 sec time delay for autopilot failure modes is used in which flight conditions?
98. ILS and MLS provide the aircrew with what type of information?
99. What is the significance of the deviation dots for the autopilot localizer?
100. What is the significance of the deviation dots for the autopilot glideslope?
101. You are attempting to certify a transport category helicopter. What would be your
basis for certification?
102. What is a development assurance level?
103. What impact would a new software delivery to the display processors have on your
controls and displays subsystem?
104. You are tasked with evaluating a new FMS installation. What instrumentation
would you require?
105. FAA regulations have eliminated the requirements for verifying the accuracy of a
GPS. Is this a sound judgment?
106. The FMS you are evaluating displays present position to the nearest 0.1 min. The
navigation function must provide 0.124 nm horizontal accuracy. How do you
perform this test?
107. The system that you are evaluating digitally displays EGT to the nearest 1 . You
have collected five data points (display versus truth) with values of 0.1, 0.2, 0, 0.1,
and 0. What is the accuracy of the display?
108. The system that you are evaluating digitally displays bearing to the nearest degree.
You have collected six data points with values of 2 , 0 , 1 , 2 , and 1 . What is
the accuracy of the system?
109. What is the relationship between assurance levels and probability of failure?
110. The result of a potential problem would cause a loss of aircraft and loss of life.
What is the assurance level and what probability can we live with?
111. What does RNP 0.3 mean?
112. Do antennas have to be matched with GPS/GNSS equipment?
113. Are there any cases where the MOPS have been amended by the TSO?
114. What is an airworthiness directive?
115. Who can ask for an exemption to FAA requirements?
116. What is a notice of proposed rulemaking? Why is it done?
117. What is the difference between a TC and an STC?
118. What is an equivalent level of safety?
119. You are attempting to certify a normal, utility aircraft. What is the basis for
certification?
120. Where would you go to find information on a human factors certification plan?
121. Does optional equipment need to be evaluated? If yes, to what degree?
122. What are the basic requirements to allow oceanic and remote operations with
the GPS?
123. Can it be assumed that all TSO equipment meets the MOPS?
124. Where would you find a flight test guide for transport category aircraft?
125. Where would you find a flight test guide for small airplanes?
126. What is LNAV? VNAV?
127. Where would you find requirements for workload assessment for Part 25 aircraft?
128. What is workload assessment used for in civil certifications?
129. Are all FMS systems built the same? Are they all intuitive?
130. Why does TCAS II change the TA threshold for higher altitudes?
131. Are GPS and SATCOM compatible?

132. Can a system depend on pilot memory for correct operation?
133. Where would I find EMI/EMC test considerations for avionics systems
installations?
134. What is the difference between a fly-by and flyover waypoint?
135. Give two examples of a flyover waypoint.
136. What is a predictive RAIM program? When is it exercised?
137. What is barometric-aided RAIM? What is it good for?
138. Are civil certifications an easy process?
CHAPTER
Electro-optical and Infrared

Systems 7
Chapter Outline
7.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 535
7.1 Infrared History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 536
7.2 IR Radiation Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 547
7.3 IR Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 552
7.4 The Thermal Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 554
7.5 Atmospheric Propagation of Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 556
7.6 Target Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 562
7.7 EO Components and Performance Requirements . . . ....... ........ .. 567
7.8 Passive EO Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 581
7.9 Laser Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 588
7.10 Passive EO Flight Test Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 594
7.11 Active EO Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 614
7.12 Selected Questions for Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ........ .. 618
7.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the flight testing of electro-optical (EO) systems (e.g., day
television [TV], image intensification [I2] systems, etc.) and infrared (IR) systems
(e.g., forward-looking infrared [FLIR], IR line scanners, etc.). There have been vast
improvements in both of these types of systems as a result of miniaturization, production
techniques, and processing technology since their introduction to the military world in
the 1960s. As accuracies in detection and identification improve, the method of testing
these systems becomes more exact. As with radar testing, the evaluator must be cogni-
zant of the target environment and how changes in this environment alter the results of
testing. There are many texts that explain the basics of EO systems. I would recommend
reading Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance, 5th Edition, by Gerald C. Holst
(Bellingham, WA: International Society for Optical Engineering, 2008). This text does a
very good job of explaining FLIR models and the environmental factors that affect
system performance. Other texts that may prove helpful to the evaluator are Introduction
to Sensors for Ranging and Imaging, by Graham M. Booker (Raleigh, NC: SciTech
Publishing, 2009), and Introduction to Infrared and Electro-Optical Systems, by Ronald
G. Driggers, Paul Cox, and Timothy Edwards (Norwood, MA: Artech House, 1999).
535
536 CHAPTER 7 Electro-optical and Infrared Systems
The Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD), an

advisory group for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), published the
Avionics Flight Test Guide (March 1996), which may be of use for military testing.
AGARD has since been renamed the Research and Technology Organization (RTO).
John Minor, formerly of the U.S. Air Force’s test pilot school published and presented
an excellent paper at the Society of Flight Test Engineers 33rd Annual International
Symposium, August 19–22, 2002, entitled ‘‘Flight Test and Evaluation of Electro-
Optical Sensor Systems,’’ which is a good companion to the AGARD text.
7.1 INFRARED HISTORY

It is hard to believe that IR studies began as early as 1800, when Sir William Hershel
used a prism and thermometer to show an increase in temperature below the red light in
the visible spectrum. This increase in temperature, and thus energy, below the visible red
light was dubbed infrared, or below red (or sometimes beyond red, depending on how
you are viewing an electromagnetic spectrum chart). It was also demonstrated that there
was a relationship between temperature and wavelength, and scientists spent the next
hundred years or so trying to define this relationship. By 1830 it was recognized that IR
radiation emitted by all bodies whose temperature was above absolute zero is thermal
radiation. Gustav Kirchhoff initiated the studies of radiation in 1859 by showing the
proportionality of absorption and emission. Steady progress was made through 1900
by the scientists whose names are near and dear to engineers everywhere: Stefan,
Boltzmann, Wien, Rayleigh, and Planck.
7.1.1 Applications
R. D. Hudson listed more than 100 separate applications for thermal imaging systems in
1969. He identified four major categories: military, industrial, medical, and scientific.
These major categories were further subdivided into six subcategories: search, track and
ranging, radiometry, spectroradiometry, thermal imaging, reflected flux, and coopera-
tive sources. In the test world, two broad categories can be identified—military and
civilian—although the boundaries between the two are becoming blurred. Since the
mission requirements of military and civilian systems differ, one can infer that their
performance will also differ. The design of the system will depend on the application.
Design parameters must take into account atmospheric transmittance, available optics,
and detector spectral response. For example, the design of a system to detect a missile
plume is very different from one that is designed to detect people or vehicles involved in
illegal poaching.
Due to atmospheric spectral transmittance, electronic imaging system design is
partitioned into seven spectral regions:
● Ultraviolet (UV) region (optical sensors for missile warning systems)
● Visible spectrum (new-generation night vision goggle [NVG] systems)
● Near-IR imaging region (most NVG systems, laser)
● Short-wavelength IR imaging band (laser systems, FLIR, IR line scanner, missile
seekers)
FIGURE 7.1 ¢
Electromagnetic
Spectrum
.4 .5 .6 .7 (μm)
105 102 3 102 104 106 (μm)
Reflected IR
Gamma X-Ray UV Radio
Thermal IR
Microwave
Visible
● Mid-wavelength IR imaging band (civilian thermal imagers, FLIR, newer focal plane
arrays)
● Long-wavelength IR imaging band (FLIR)
● Very-long-wavelength IR imaging band
Terminologies among the UV, visible, and IR communities are further segregated and
will be addressed later. Figure 7.1 shows the area of interest for electronic imaging
systems within the electromagnetic spectrum.
The EO part of the spectrum is broken out in relation to wavelength, expressed in
micrometers (mm) or microns:
● Infrared 0.72 mm to 1000 mm
– Very far IR 15 mm to 1000 mm (sometimes called extreme IR)
– Far IR 6 mm to 15 mm
– Middle IR 1.5 mm to 6 mm (reflected IR < 3 mm)
– Near IR 0.72 mm to 1.5 mm
● Visible 0.39 mm to 0.72 mm
● Ultraviolet 0.01 mm to 0.39 mm
Figure 7.2 shows a more detailed relationship between wavelength and the
EO spectrum.
Military and civilian EO avionics systems attempt to exploit the best and worst
attributes in each of the spectral wavelengths. Near-IR systems were developed to assist
with normal night vision. Common names for such systems are night vision devices
(NVDs) and night vision goggles (NVGs). There are a variety of these types of systems.
They may be scopes (as applied to rifles) or monocular visual devices (used in driver or
dismounted soldier applications) or binocular systems (mostly used in aviation). These
systems greatly enhance night operations, but they do not turn night into day. There are
limitations to these systems, and when used in aviation, these limitations must be well
understood. Failure to know and heed these limitations can have disastrous results.
Night vision goggles are devices that make an object more visible at low light
levels. Often called image intensifiers, these devices make use of available ambient
light, either visible or near-IR energy that is reflected off the object, and amplifies the
light. The performance of these systems is directly related to the amount of available
ambient light. The measure of light is the lux, or in some cases foot-candles, which
is a measure of illumination (1 lux ¼ 0.0929 ft-candles). For example, direct sunlight
FIGURE 7.2 ¢ 105 3 kHz

EO Wavelength
Relationship VLF
Frequency
Wavelength (m)
104 30 kHz
LF 0
103 300 kHz A
MF 250 MHz
B
102 3 MHz 500 MHz
C
1 GHz
HF D
2 GHz
E
10 30 MHz 3 GHz
F
4 GHz
VHF G
6 GHz
1 300 MHz H
8 GHz
I
UHF 10 GHz
101 3 GHz J
SHF
Microns 20 GHz
2
30 10 30 GHz K
EHF 40 GHz
L
103 300 GHz 60 GHz
Heat Far IR M
6 104 100 GHz
3
Mid IR
Red Heat + Light 105
1.5
Orange 1 Near IR
Yellow 0.8
106
Visible
Green Light 0.4
Blue
107
UV
Violet
0.2
illumination is approximately 100,000 lux. The illumination of the full moon on a clear
night is approximately 0.1 lux. Common practice when discussing NVGs is to use
millilux (mlux), which is equal to 0.001 lux. Table 7.1 shows common illumination
conditions.
There have been many advances in NVG technology since the first military
applications in the 1960s; each major advancement is marked by a new generation of
systems. Current technology is defined as generation IV, which uses on-chip processing
and is sometimes called ‘‘filmless’’ technology, which will be discussed later.
Generation I (Gen I) systems were introduced as aids for military riflemen in the
1960s. The common name for such systems was the star scope or starlight scope
(Figure 7.3). They were rather large (more than 17 inches in length), very heavy, and
required considerable power to operate. The amplification was based on electron
TABLE 7.1 ¢ Illumination Levels
Foot-candles
Human Vision Lux (approximate) Condition
5 4
Photopic (Good Acuity, 10 10 Sun or Snow
Color) 104 103 Full Daylight
103 102 Overcast Daylight
102 101 Very Poor Daylight
101 100 Twilight
100 101 Deep Twilight
Scotopic (Poor Acuity, 101 102 Full Moon
No Color) 102 103 Quarter Moon
103 104 Starlight
104 105 Overcast Starlight
FIGURE 7.3 ¢
Generation I
Starlight Scope
acceleration, and the light amplification was on the order of 1000 times ambient
lighting. While the amplification would be considered exceptionally good, even by
today’s standards, the excessive size, weight, and power requirements rendered Gen I
NVDs unacceptable for aviation use.
Generation II systems were introduced in the late 1960s and used electron multi-
plication via a microchannel plate (MCP). The gain was increased to approximately
20,000 times ambient lighting and improvements reduced the size, weight, and power
requirements. The U.S. Army AN/PVS-5 NVG system employed a full face mask
and the user could not wear eyeglasses (Figure 7.4). This system was modified
(AN/AVS-5A) for use in aircraft.
Generation III systems improved on MCP performance by using an aluminum oxide
coating. Spectral response was increased by switching to a gallium arsenide (GaAs)
photocathode. These systems have a gain of approximately 30,000 to 50,000 times
ambient lighting and are used extensively in ground and airborne applications
(Figure 7.5). Common applications of the Gen III systems are CATS EYES (U.K.) and
Aviator Night Vision Imaging Systems (ANVIS) (U.S.). The latest U.S. iteration is the
AN/AVS-9 or ANVIS 9.
The difference in performance of the three generations is illustrated in the Figure 7.6
comparison.
Thermal imaging systems (exploiting middle and far IR emissions) developed in
much the same way as the near-IR and visible light systems. These thermal imagers (TIs)
FIGURE 7.4 ¢
Generation II
AN/PVS-5
FIGURE 7.5 ¢
Generation III
Aviation System
may also be categorized by ‘‘generations,’’ with current technology identified as third

generation. Each generation is categorized by the type of scan, electronics and proces-
sing, and wavelength of interest. Most first-generation TIs use a bidirectional scan with a
linear array comprising 60, 120, or 180 vertical elements and employ a 2:1 interlace,
much like a TV tube. They use analog electronics and filtering and are optimized for a
single waveband. Examples of first-generation TIs are the common module and EOMUX
systems.
The first TI systems took advantage of the thermal emissions in the far-IR region;
the detectors were optimized for the 8 to 12 mm range. The common module FLIR
(Figure 7.7) is an example of a first-generation TI which allowed a user to directly view
the intensity sensed by individual detector elements. Because of multiple optical paths,
there were significant signal losses, resulting in poor picture quality.
FIGURE 7.6 ¢
Generation I, II, and
III Comparison
FIGURE 7.7 ¢
Common Module
FLIR
Analog Electronics
Amplified and Filtered
Single Wave Band
Bidirectional
Linear Array
Detector
Dewar
Electrical Connection
IR Imager
Led
Array Observer
Afocal
Scan Visual
Mirror Optics
FIGURE 7.8 ¢ Detector

EO MUX FLIR Dewar
Electrical Connection
IR Imager
Observer
Led
Array
Afocal
Display
Scan I2 Device or Vidicon
Mirror
The initial advance in this first-generation TI device was the ability to put the
optical signal into a TV format. The system was still analog and the picture was obtained
by passing the optical signal through either a vidicon (optical image scanner) or
employing image intensifier technology. The basic system was still the same, and losses
from the multiple optical paths were still present. The quality of the display was better,
and allowed for multiple observers, but the additional equipment increased the size and
weight of the system. Figure 7.8 shows the improved common module system, now
identified as an EO MUX FLIR.
The next logical step in TI advancement was the addition of the electrical signal
processor, or the digitization of the optical signal. In this system, the detector directly
feeds an electrical signal processor. The FLIR image is then put into a standard TV
format. This architecture provides a greatly improved signal due to a reduction in signal
losses. By eliminating unnecessary equipment, this system is relatively small and much
lighter. These improvements are known as an EMUX FLIR. Figure 7.9 illustrates these
improvements.
The EMUX FLIR is classified as second generation and is different from first-
generation TIs in that it employs a unidirectional scan usually with a 4 480 detector
array (4 horizontal detectors by 480 vertical detectors). Since every pixel in the vertical on
the display is matched to a vertical detector in the array, the optics need only be scanned
in the horizontal. Since there are four detectors in the horizontal, time delay integration
(TDI) is used, which improves the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and reduces blurring. TDI
is a method of scanning in which a frame transfer device produces a continuous video
image of a moving object by means of a stack of linear arrays aligned with the object to be
imaged in such a way that as the image moves from one line to the next, the captured
image moves along with it. It is also used in radar as well as charge-coupled devices
(CCDs) (to integrate more light from the scene).
Most of the iterations of FLIR technology for first-generation systems incorporated
flat mirrors for scanning. These limitations were overcome with second-generation
technology. Scanning systems that use flat mirrors have relatively slow maximum
scanning rates. At the higher scanning rates, the mirrors tend to bend because of inertia,
causing image distortions. By using a rotating, multifaceted mirror, scan rates can be
increased without suffering a loss of resolution. Since the FLIR image is presented in a
FIGURE 7.9 ¢
EMUX FLIR
Analog Electronics (On-chip)

Digital Processing (Off-chip)
Single Wave Band
Unidirectional Scan
4 × 480 TDI Array
Detector
Dewar
Observer
Afocal Mux Display

Optics
Signal Processing
Electronics
Scan
Mirror
Scan FIGURE 7.10 ¢
FLIR Parallel
Processing
Line Outputs
Scanner
standard TV format, a picture resolution of 480 640 lines is needed (for U.S. systems).
A series of 60, 120, or 180 detector elements have to be scanned throughout this
dimension by adjusting the vertical tilt of the scanning mirror or by employing a
secondary nodding mirror to account for all of the horizontal lines. By increasing the
number of detectors to 480 (vertical), a single horizontal scan will populate the entire
frame (Figure 7.10). An array of 480 640 detectors would not have to scan, but rather
stare, in the direction of interest.
Up until the late 1990s, U.S. fighter forces relied on the low-altitude navigation
and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pod for low-altitude navigation and
weapons delivery. As the Cold War ended and improved ‘‘smart’’ weapons entered the
inventory, the need developed for a TI sensor that could be used for these weapons in
high-altitude strikes. The LANTIRN, as a first-generation IR device, was ineffective for
this role. The U.S. Navy launched an advanced targeting FLIR (AT-FLIR) program for its
F-18s, while the U.S. Air Force launched its own program, known as the advanced tar-
geting pod (ATP). The outcome of these development programs was the third-generation
FLIR and CCD camera targeting system. Pods that are in use include the Sniper, Litening,
and Terminator systems. Figure 7.11 shows the Litening and Sniper targeting pods.
The third-generation TI devices use a focal plane staring array with indium
antimonide (InSb), with a peak response in the 3 to 5 mm region, or mercury cadmium
telluride (HgCdTe), also called merc-cad or MCT, which has a peak response near
12 mm. The detectors are arranged in a mosaic with common arrays of 240 320 and
480 640, but are available up to 2048 2048. An array of 480 640 would have a
FIGURE 7.11 ¢
Sniper (top) and
Litening (bottom)
Targeting Pods
detector for each pixel on a standard display, whereas in a smaller array, such as a
240 320, the scene would have to be shifted on successive looks to fill in the picture
(much like a raster scan on a radar). This scanning process is called a dither or micro-
scan. Because the image must be scanned across the array, there will be an overall
reduction in the scene dwell time that results in a loss of sensitivity and increases the
possibility of smearing.
Another improvement in the third-generation TIs is the incorporation of digital
processing on the same chip as the detector. The savings on weight and required real
estate realized by this technology are evident. Digital visible imagers, such as cameras
and video recorders, may use a CCD or a complementary metal oxide semiconductor
(CMOS) (more on these later) as the detector element. These detectors are fabricated
from silicon but are only sensitive in the visible and near-IR spectra. The InSb or MCT
detectors need some sort of analog-to-digital (A/D) converter to transmit the voltage,
resistance, or charge of each of the detectors to the measurement circuitry. This is
accomplished by the incorporation of a readout integrated circuit (ROIC), which
mechanically and electrically interfaces the individual detector outputs in the focal plane
array (FPA) with the external digital electronics. The ROIC transforms the relatively
small electrical output of the detector into a relatively large, measurable output voltage.
The ROIC is typically fabricated in silicon using the same processes as CMOS and
then is either hybridized (hybrid mosaic) or bonded to the detector array; the resultant
assembly is called the FPA. The FPA may also be constructed as one combined
(monolithic) array, as shown in Figure 7.12.
Detector Array FIGURE 7.12 ¢

Focal Plane Array
Large-Format Array
Digital Electronics On-chip

On-chip Digital Signal Processing
Can be Multispectral
Detector Array
240 × 320
480 × 640
2048 × 2048, etc.
Focal Plane Array
Monolithic Hybrid
ROIC Chip
Integrated
Detectors Detector Chip
and ROIC Separate
ROIC and
Detector
Chips
The FPA may also have the capability of being multispectral, which is sometimes
called two-color. This capability offers the benefits of both the mid-IR and long-IR
spectra. The FPA does have some disadvantages; probably the greatest being the ten-
dency of the electrical responses of the individual detector elements to be nonuniform.
When the array is at rest (not receiving any thermal energy), each of the elements has a
different baseline or zero-signal level (i.e., there are offsets to each of the elements).
This also occurs when the element is radiated and the delta in the signal is also different.
If uncorrected, it would make the array unpractical. Fortunately these deltas can be
measured in controlled conditions and then corrections can be made in the software or
even directly in the ROIC. The process is much like an instrumentation calibration done
for strain gauges on a test aircraft. The arrays are more difficult to fabricate than the
scanning arrays, which increases the cost, and they still need to be cooled down to
eliminate thermal noise.
In contrast to passive TV systems, which use reflected energy (sunlight,
moonlight, or starlight), passive IR depends on emitted energy or emittance;
ambient light does not directly affect the detection of this energy. IR detection
sensors have become an integral element of modern avionic systems because of
their ability to provide information that complements and improves the effective-
ness of the overall system. The IR system also has some advantages over other
airborne sensors. First, the sensor is independent of artificial or natural illumination.
Second, the sensor is virtually impervious to most camouflage techniques and the
classification of targets can be made on the basis of their respective radiation
characteristics.
Each IR system is designed to perform a specific task, and its components are
chosen to optimize system performance for a particular wavelength region, maximum
detection, high resolution, etc., depending on the type of source. Regardless of the task,
all IR systems include the following components:
● Optics to collect IR emissions

● Detectors to convert radiant energy into electrical signals
● Electronics and processors to amplify the signals
● Displays to permit the operator to see the information
7.1.2 IR Terminology
Infrared emissions have many properties that should be understood prior to beginning
any evaluation. The first thing that should be addressed is radiometric terminology so as
to alleviate any confusion over discussion on performance or characteristics. Table 7.2 is
a summary of the basic radiometric terminology, including quantities, definitions, units,
and symbols.
As can be readily seen from the terms in Table 7.2, the words commonly end in ance
or ivity. Those terms that end in ance represent a term that describes the property of a
specific sample. Those terms that end in ivity represent a term that describes the property
of the generic material. If we want to describe a process, then the terms would end in
ion, and we would have emission, absorption, and reflection.
TABLE 7.2 ¢ Radiometric Terminology
Symbol Term Meaning Unit

Q Radiant energy Energy joule (J)
F Radiant flux Radiant energy per unit time, also radiant power watt (W)
M Radiant Power emitted from a surface Wm2
emittance/exitance
I Radiant intensity Power per unit solid angle Wsr1
L Radiance Power per unit solid angle per unit projected source area Wm2 sr1
E,I Irradiance Power incident on a surface Wm2
e Emissivity Ratio of radiant emittance of source to that of a blackbody None
at the same temperature
a Absorptance Ratio of absorbed radiant flux to incident radiant flux None
r Reflectance Ratio of reflected radiant flux to incident radiant flux None
t Transmittance Ratio of transmitted radiant flux to incident radiant flux None
El Spectral irradiance Irradiance per unit wavelength interval at a particular Wm2 mm1
wavelength
Ll Spectral radiance Radiance per unit wavelength Wm2 sr1 mm1
NOTE 1: Terms qualified by ‘‘spectral’’ and symbols subscripted with l indicate a quantity specified per unit wavelength interval.
NOTE 2: The processes of absorption, reflection (including scattering), and transmission account for all incident radiation in any particular
situation; the ratio of total incident flux is equal to one; i.e., a þ r þ t ¼ 1 (total incident radiation).
7.2 IR RADIATION FUNDAMENTALS

As mentioned throughout the text, it is not the author’s intention to derive mathematical
equations. Equations are used where they can help the reader to understand a particular
concept, or if the text would suffer if the equations were not included. Temperature is
the basic concept, however, in EO, several temperatures must be defined. An object at a
particular temperature does not necessarily radiate that temperature.
Emissivity is generally discussed in terms of how much IR energy an object radiates
as compared to that energy radiated by a blackbody. A blackbody is defined as an object
that absorbs all IR energy incident upon it. If part of the energy incident to the object is
reflected rather than absorbed, the object becomes a graybody (the term graybody does not
refer to the color perceived by the eye). Kirchhoff’s law shows that a good absorber is also
a good emitter and that the emissivity (e) of a surface can be determined as follows:
Total radiant emittance of a graybody
e¼ ; (7.1)
Total radiant emittance of a blackbody
with both bodies being at the same temperature.
The emissivity factor of a blackbody is equal to one since all IR energy incident
upon the object is absorbed and reradiated. If part of the energy is reflected, the object
becomes a graybody and the emissivity factor becomes less than one. The more energy
that is reflected, the grayer the body becomes and the lower the emissivity factor
becomes. The emissivity factor is, therefore, an indication of the grayness of the body.
Different types of surfaces have different emissivity factors. Typically a dull, dark
surface will absorb and reradiate most of the energy incident upon it and will have a high
emissivity factor, while a bright shiny surface will reflect much of the energy and will
have a low emissivity factor. Suppose that two identical aircraft are parked on the
FIGURE 7.13 ¢ Emissivity

e 1 (Blackbody at 300 K)
Radiator Response
Monochromatic Energy Density

Curves
e 0.9 (Graybody)
Watt/cm3-micron
eλ Varies as Wavelength
(Selective Radiator)
10 20 30 μm
TABLE 7.3 ¢ Emissivity of Common Materials
Material e
Highly Polished Silver 0.02
Highly Polished Aluminum 0.08
Polished Copper 0.15
Aluminum Paint 0.55
Polished Brass 0.60
Oxidized Steel 0.70
Bronze Paint 0.80
Gypsum 0.90
Rough Red Brick 0.93
Green or Gray Paint 0.95
Water 0.96
taxiway and are allowed to be solar heated throughout the day. Also suppose that one
aircraft is painted blue and the other is burnished aluminum. If we were to view these
two aircraft through an IR imaging device late in the day we would see quite different
pictures. The aircraft that is painted blue will show up as a ‘‘hot’’ object, whereas the
shiny aircraft will show up as a ‘‘cool’’ object. This is because the painted aircraft is a
good emitter and a poor reflector. The polished surface is a good reflector, but a poor
emitter. Figure 7.13 shows the radiator response curves for a blackbody, a graybody, and
a selective radiator, and Table 7.3 lists the e for some common materials.
The Stefan–Boltzmann law states that every object in the universe is constantly
receiving and emitting thermal radiation from every other object. The amount of
radiation emitted is a function of its temperature, absorption, or emittance and its
surfaces. The Stefan–Boltzmann law is expressed by equation 7.2:
M ¼ esT 4 ; (7.2)
where
M ¼ rate of emission per unit area (W/cm2),
e ¼ emissivity of the radiating surface,
s ¼ Stefan–Boltzmann constant ¼ 5.670 373 1012 W cm–2S–1K–4, and
T ¼ absolute temperature (K).
Ultraviolet Visible Infrared FIGURE 7.14 ¢

1023 Wien’s
6000 K
Surface Displacement Law
of the Sun
1021
1336 K Melting
Temperature
Spectral Radiant Photon Emittance
of Gold
1019 2856 K
(ph cm2 sec1 μm1)
Tungsten
Lamp
1017
800 K
Fighter 500 K Dinner
Exhaust Roasting
1015
300 K
Warm Day
1013 250 K
Very Cold Night
1011
0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 10.0 50.0
Wavelength (μm)
So if an object has an emissivity of 0.6 and its temperature is 300 K, what is the rate
of emission? Answer: 0.027 W/cm2.
Wien’s displacement law states that maximum radiation occurs at specific
frequencies that are temperature dependent. The plot of spectral distribution of energy
indicates that the wavelength of peak radiation decreases as temperature increases.
Peak wavelength and temperature are related in Wien’s displacement law. This law
states that the wavelength (l) at which Ml is multiplied by the absolute temperature
(in K) of the blackbody is equal to a constant.
lm T ¼ 2898 mmK; (7.3)
where
T ¼ absolute temperature (K), and
lm ¼ wavelength of maximum energy (mm),
or as an approximation:
lm ¼ 3000 ðmmKÞ=TðKÞ: (7.4)
Figure 7.14 illustrates Wien’s displacement law.

Planck’s law defines the spectral radiation from a blackbody. This law states that
the spectral exitance is a function of wavelength and absolute temperature only.
FIGURE 7.15 ¢ 8
900 K
Planck’s Law
7
Spectral Radiant Emittance

(Watts/cm2 103 (μm))
5
800 K
4
3
700 K
2
600 K
1
500 K
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Wavelength (μm)
The relationship between the radiation intensity, spectral distribution, and temperature
of a blackbody is given by equation 7.5:

C1 1
Ml ¼ 5 ðC =lT Þ ; (7.5)
l e 2 1
where
Ml ¼ radiation emitted by the blackbody per unit surface area per unit wavelength
(in W/cm2/unit wavelength),
T ¼ absolute temperature of the blackbody (K),
l ¼ wavelength of emitted radiation, and
e ¼ base of natural logarithms ¼ 2.718.
C1 and C2 are constants; their values are dependent on the unit of wavelength used. If l
is in meters, then
C1 ¼ 3.7418 108 W-mm4/m2 and
C2 ¼ 1.4388 mmK.
The effect of a change in temperature may be graphically illustrated by plotting
radiated energy versus wavelength at specific blackbody temperatures (Figure 7.15).
Infrared radiation has the same transmission properties as all other electromagnetic
radiation. It will radiate outward from the source in all directions. The power available at
a receiver in a nonatmospheric case (i.e., transmission is not affected by the atmospheric
medium) will vary inversely as the square of the distance to the source. This is known as
the inverse square law. This law states that the intensity of radiation emitted from a point
source varies as the inverse square of the distance between the source and a receiver.
The equation relating power and distance from the source is as follows:
Mreceiver ¼ sT 4 =4pd 2 : (7.6)
Thus it can be seen that doubling the distance (d) will cause the power available at the
receiver (M) to decrease by a factor of 22, or 4. Tripling the distance will decrease power
3000 1/9 Watt/cm2 of Power Received FIGURE 7.16 ¢

Power Available at
the Receiver
2000 1/4 Watt/cm2 of Power Received

Altitude
1000 1 Watt/cm2 of Power Received
Power Source
FIGURE 7.17 ¢
Effect of Viewing
Watt/cm2
m2
Angle on Power
tt/c
Wa
Received
.87
m2
t/c
at
q 30°
W
1
.7
q 45° 2
cm 120°
q 60° att/
.5 W
2
q 70° m
att/c
.34 W 140°
Radiating Surface
by a factor of 32, or 9. This is graphically illustrated in Figure 7.16, and once again
assumes that the transmission is not affected by the atmosphere. Conversely, the total
radiated energy is a function of the fourth power of temperature and is represented by the
area under the exponential curve for specific temperature. The value of the peak radiation
is found to be a function of the fifth power of temperature. Therefore doubling the tem-
perature of a blackbody will increase total radiation 16-fold and peak radiation 32-fold.
Another factor influencing the amount of power available at the receiver is the angle
at which the radiating source is viewed. The amount of power is a function of the cosine
of the angle from which the surface is viewed (q). This is known as Lambert’s law of
cosines and is graphically illustrated in Figure 7.17. Lambert’s law of cosines is expressed
in equation 7.7:
MA
I¼ cos q; (7.7)
2pd 2
where
I ¼ radiant intensity received at the detector,
M ¼ radiant emittance, and
A ¼ area of the source.
7.3 IR SOURCES
It has been noted that all bodies with temperatures above absolute zero radiate energy,
and the brief physics tutorial in the previous section cannot predict the type of radiation
that the body will radiate or reflect. IR sources can be either controlled or natural.
Controlled sources may be a target of interest or a calibration device. The temperature,
size, aspect, etc., of the object is known. Natural sources are those that contribute to the
background. They can be terrestrial, atmospheric, or celestial. Terrestrial sources can be
either man-made or those that occur naturally. Some examples of man-made natural
sources are road material, paints, oil slicks, and construction material. Naturally
occurring emitters and reflectors are water, sand, rock, metals, and foliage.
Determining the true reflectance or emittance of natural sources can be very difficult.
This is because natural sources are rarely uniform: planar, homogeneous, or without
losses. In many cases, we try to determine radiation by looking at surface and bulk
reflectance. Surface reflectance is that radiation reflected from the surface without
penetration. Bulk reflectance is the part of the radiation refracted at the surface and
transmitted into the body and scattered randomly, with a portion returning to the surface.
At certain incident radiation frequencies, the surface reflectance becomes maximum and
bulk reflectance approaches zero. These regions are called reststrahlen bands and are due
to minerals in rocks, sands, and soils. Reststrahlen bands populate the 8 to 14 mm region.
Another determinant for natural radiation is the effect of wet and dry stacking. This
type of reflectance applies to a commonly occurring condition in nature in which a
rough diffuse reflecting material is covered by a thin sheet of smooth dielectric such as
water. In this case, the surface reflectance is based on the specular reflectance of the
dielectric. The bulk reflectance is less than that for the dry material alone. This is
commonly seen against wet soil, even though the film is not planar. Figure 7.18 is from
Holst (Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance) and shows the differences in
reflectance of wet and dry soils taken from four different areas of the United States.
Similar to wet and dry stacking is layering. This is formed by foliage and canopy
cover. Many vegetative canopies tend to exhibit a layered structure, with particular
botanical features occupying the top, middle, and lower layers. Soil typically forms the
lower boundary, and the top tends to provide the dominant influence on bidirectional
reflectance. The reflectance of a canopy when viewed remotely will be the sum of
directly illuminated components, shadowed components, and components indirectly
illuminated by scattering.
Whenever the IR device looks above the horizon, the sky provides the background
radiation. The prime IR sources in the sky are celestial and atmospheric sources.
The radiation characteristics of celestial sources depend primarily on the source’s tem-
perature and the characteristics undergoing modification by the earth’s atmosphere.
In addition, the received radiation characteristically changes depending on the altitude
of an observer.
The sun being an approximate blackbody radiator at a temperature of 6000 K has
its radiant energy peak at 0.5 mm. Half of its radiant power occurs in the IR wavelengths,
as shown in Figure 7.19, and the distribution of radiant power falls off as the wavelength
increases.
The next most important celestial source of IR is the moon. The bulk of the energy
received from the moon is solar radiation, modified by reflection from the lunar surface,
7.3 IR Sources 553
70 70 FIGURE 7.18 ¢
60 60 Reflectance of Wet
and Dry Soils
Reflectance (%)
Reflectance (%)
50 50
Dry Dry
40 40
30 Wet 30 Wet
20 20
10 10
0 0
300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Wavelength (nm) Wavelength (nm)
(y) Pedalfer Soil. Type-three Curves. (z) Pedocal-type Soil. Type-three Curves.
Woodlawn, Colorado. 12 miles W. of Elk City, Oklahoma.
70 70
60 Reflectance (%) 60
Reflectance (%)
50 50 Dry
Dry
40 40
30 30 Wet
Wet
20 20
10 10
0 0
300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Wavelength (nm) Wavelength (nm)
(aa) Pedalfer-type Soil. Type-three Curves. (bb) Pedalfer-type Soil. Type-three Curves.
6 miles N. of Del Rio, Texas. 4 miles N. of Griffin, Georgia.
6000° Blackbody FIGURE 7.19 ¢

IR Spectral Region Spectral Distribution
Relative Radiated Energy
of Solar Radiation
Above Atmosphere
Through Atmosphere
at Earth’s Surface
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 10.0

Wavelength (μm)
slight absorption by any lunar atmosphere, and the earth’s atmosphere. The moon is also
a natural radiating source. During the lunar day its surface is heated to as high as 373 K,
and during the lunar night the surface temperature falls to 120 K. Other celestial sources
are very weak point sources of IR radiation, when compared to the sun and moon, and
can be disregarded except in special astronomical applications.
Because the sun is such an intense source of radiation, the background of the sky has
to be considered separately for day or night. The primary differences between night sky
FIGURE 7.20 ¢
Spectral Energy Clear Day Sky
Relative Radiant Energy

Distribution of
Background
Radiation From the Clear Night Sky
Sky H2O1 CO2 CO2 H2O
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Wavelength (μm)
background radiation normal to the earth’s surface are shown in Figure 7.20, which is a
plot of the spectral distribution of energy for clear night and clear day skies. At night, the
short-wavelength background radiation, caused by the scattering of sunlight, air mole-
cules, dust, and other particles, disappears. In fact, at night there is a tendency for the
earth’s surface and the atmosphere to blend with a loss of the horizon, since both are at
the same ambient temperature and both have approximately the same high emissivity
factor. Radiation from the clear night sky approximates that of a blackbody at 273 K,
with the peak intensity occurring at a wavelength of about 10.5 mm, and as Figure 7.20
illustrates, the overall energy level is slightly lower than that of a clear daytime sky.
One of the main constituents of the lower regions of the atmosphere is water vapor,
and a special effect on background radiation occurs when the water vapor condenses into
clouds. Clouds produce considerable variation in sky background, with the greatest
effect occurring at wavelengths shorter than 3 mm. This is caused by solar radiation
reflected from the cloud surfaces. Early IR homing missiles showed a greater affinity for
cumulus clouds than the target aircraft. Discrimination from this background effect
requires the use of not only spectral filtering, which eliminates the shorter wavelengths,
but also spatial filtering, which distinguishes the smaller area of the target from the
larger area of the cloud edge.
Terrain produces a higher background-energy distribution than that of the clear sky.
This is caused by reflection of sunlight in the short-wavelength region and by natural
thermal emission at the longer wavelengths. The absence of sharp thermal dis-
continuities and breaks in the radiation pattern between an object and its surroundings
complicates the problem of the detection of terrestrial targets. While generally good
pictures are obtained, occasionally objects with different emissivities and temperatures
produce the same radiant emittance, and thus there is no contrast in the picture. This is
known as thermal crossover and results in a loss of picture information.
7.4 THE THERMAL PROCESS

In steady state, the heat flux (heat per unit area) that is incoming must equal the
outgoing heat flux. From the previous section, remember that an object receives
radiation from multiple sources: sunlight (direct and reflected), diffuse skylight, and
deep space. These sources constitute the incoming heat flux. The outgoing heat flux
7.4 The Thermal Process 555
TABLE 7.4 ¢ Thermal Properties of Common Materials
Material k/chD (m2/sec) k (W/m C) Diurnal Depth, d (m)

7
Stone concrete 4.8 10 0.92 0.115
Granite 12.7 107 1.9 0.187
Pine wood 0.7 107 0.1 0.043
Lime stone 8.1 107 0.7 0.149
Ice 11.2 107 2.2 0.176
Damp soil 5.0 107 2.6 0.116
Dry soil 3.1 107 0.35 0.093
Building brick 4.4 107 0.63 0.11
Cast iron 121.0 107 57.0 1.73
Aluminum 860.0 107 203.0 4.48
has four components: surface exitance, convective heat, conductive heat, and eva-
poration. The surface exitance is always positive, while the other three depend on
relative temperatures. All three vary with the surface temperature, which is the vari-
able of interest.
The thermal emission of a source depends on the absolute temperature of the
material and its spectral emissivity. The temperature of the emission need not be the
surface or contact temperature; it might be the core temperature of an object. Thermal
emission can be written as
TR ¼ e¼ T ; (7.8)
where
TR ¼ thermal emission,
e ¼ emissivity, and
T ¼ temperature of emission.
For very thick material, the diurnal depth of heat penetration might be surprisingly
small. With these small diurnal depths, the contact or surface temperature can be used
as the temperature of emission. Table 7.4 shows the diurnal depth of some common
materials.
Thermal inertia is a result of the delayed transfer of heat energy between the surface
and the bulk interior. The maximum surface temperature occurs at some time after
maximum income or sun loading. The maximum diurnal temperature will peak some
3 hr after solar noon. In the case of large bodies of water, the shortwave daylight is
absorbed deep within the bulk of the body. In this case, there will only be a slight diurnal
surface temperature change. This is because the surface temperature is relatively close to
the bulk temperature. This is not true with a swimming pool, where surface temperature
can be quite a bit higher than the bulk temperature during daylight heating. Soil moisture
below the surface increases both heat capacity and conductive heat exchange, and will
therefore exhibit greater thermal inertia than dry soil.
There are also special cases that can alter the thermal emission of a material. Buried
heating pipes will obviously add additional heat to the surroundings. Volcanic regions
are also causes for changes in surface temperature, largely due to convective heating. In
sub-Arctic regions in winter (when the surface is covered by snow), the soil temperature
below the snow is normally higher than the temperature of the snow itself. Differences
in surface temperature will be observed based on differences in subsurface convective
heating. The temperature of snow lying over a frozen large body of water will be slightly
higher than the snow lying over soil due to the higher temperature of the subsurface water.
Compressed snow from vehicles will have a higher temperature than noncompacted snow
due to the increase in the heat transfer coefficient.
7.5 ATMOSPHERIC PROPAGATION

OF RADIATION
Electromagnetic radiation, when propagated through the atmosphere from the source to
the receiver, is subjected to three modifying phenomena. These modifiers include
● A reduction in radiation intensity
● Nonscene path radiance scattered into the field of view (FOV), reducing the target
contrast
● Forward small-angle scattering caused by aerosols and turbulence, reducing image
fidelity
All three of these modifiers will be examined as to their exact nature and cause, and
how they will affect the viewed image.
As previously noted, EO system performance is a function of the radiation tem-
perature (TR) of an object. Also recall that the radiation temperature of an object is
related to either the core or surface temperature of the object in view and its emissivity
(see equation 7.8).
The temperature or temperature differential measured at the aperture of the viewing
system depends on the slant range and the atmospheric transmittance. Simply put, the
radiation is going to be attenuated as it travels through the atmosphere. In an equation
form, it looks like
DT ¼ tatm R DTR : (7.9)
It is useful to identify this attenuation in terms of a coefficient of reduction of

radiation. For IR systems, the most common term is called the coefficient of extinction.
Extinction is the total reduction of radiation along the line of sight. The two contributors
to this reduction are absorption and scattering. Absorption may be defined as energy
being removed from the photon field, and scattering implies an altering of the radiation
propagation. By using the Beer–Lambert law for transmittance (t):
tatm ðlÞ ¼ egðlÞR ; (7.10)
where
R ¼ path length/slant range,
tatm(l) ¼ transmittance f (l), and
g(l) ¼ spectral extinction coefficient f (l).
Because absorption and scattering are independent:

gðlÞ ¼ sðlÞ þ kðlÞ; (7.11)
where
s(l) ¼ scattering coefficient f (l), and
k(l) ¼ absorptive coefficient f (l).
For IR systems, an unusual coefficient has been adopted:
tatm(l) ¼ eg(l)
or
½tatm ðlÞR ¼ egðlÞR ; (7.12)
where typical values are

g(l) ¼ 0.0010.4/km
tatm(l) ¼ 0.650.95/km
In transparent media, g ¼ 0, tatm ¼ 1.
The factors affecting absorption and scattering are many. They can be aerosols,
pollutants, fog, rain, snow, water vapor, etc. High absolute humidity, for example,
reduces transmittance by causing particulate growth or particle clusters. Water vapor
concentration may range from a few tenths of a gram per cubic meter in desert areas to
40 or 50 g/m3 in the tropics or near the sea surface. Unfortunately for the tester,
extinction is not linearly related to vapor content. Some normalizations and assumptions
must be made with any IR detection test. Since the IR spectrum contains wavelengths
5 to 20 times the visible spectrum, IR detectors are not susceptible to many of the
particulates that may affect EO systems or normal vision. As particle sizes grow, the IR
and EO systems will be affected equally.
As with any system, noise will affect the capability of a system to differentiate
targets of interest. Atmospheric self-emission is independent of the source and is seen
even if the source is not present. This noise is called path or background radiance. The
magnitude of the background radiation varies with the direction of the observation, air
density, location, time of day, and meteorological conditions. Path radiance reduces the
SNR and, for background limited systems, introduces noise. Background limited system
is the name given to an idealized detector. It is one that is limited only by the noise in the
incoming photon stream. It is also called a background limited IR photodetector (BLIP).
Refractive index fluctuations in the medium of transmission create optical turbu-
lence, which in turn causes image distortions. These fluctuations are caused by density
gradients, temperature and humidity gradients, and pressure differences. Atmospheric
turbulence affects image quality by deviating the path of scene photons away from the
receiver.
The concentration of gases, particulates, and water concentration vary from location
to location and from day to day. It is important to understand how these concentrations
affect transmittance.
The atmosphere is composed of many gases and aerosols. In order of concentration,
they appear as follows: nitrogen, oxygen, ozone, water vapor, carbon dioxide, carbon
FIGURE 7.21 ¢ 100

Transmittance
Reductions Due to 80
Absorption
Transmittance (%)
60
40
20
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Wavelength (μm)
Absorbing O2 CO2 CO2 H2O CO2 O3 H2O CO2 CO2

Molecule H2O O3
H2O
monoxide, nitrous oxide, and other trace gases. Aerosols that are suspended particulates
include dust, dirt, carbon, minute organisms, sea salt, water droplets, smoke, and pol-
lutants. Absorption is wavelength and absorbing molecule dependent; that is, absorption
is at a maximum at the natural frequency of a particular molecule. Figure 7.21 shows
transmittance reductions versus wavelength and absorbing molecule.
The dominant absorber in the 3 to 5 mm region is carbon dioxide. The absorption
band is obvious after a few meters of path length, and is zero for any reasonable path.
Water vapor determines the upper and lower limits for both the mid-wave infrared
(MWIR) and long-wave infrared (LWIR) regions. In the 8 to 12 mm region, water vapor
is the dominant absorber. Water vapor affects transmittance more dramatically in the
LWIR region; as water vapor increases, transmittance decreases. Because of this fact, it
may be inferred that an MWIR system may be better for maritime or tropical use. Noise
would have to be considered prior to making such a decision. Knowing this information
is nice, but how can we apply this knowledge when evaluating IR system performance?
There have been many normalizations developed over the years relating transmis-
sivity to atmospheric effects, and Holst reviews these normalizations in chapter 15 of
Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance. The first model relates transmittance as a
function of meteorological range (Rvis). For a wavelength of 0.555 mm:
tatm ¼ esR ¼ e3:912=R vis ðRÞ (7.13)
and
Rvis ð1:3 0:3ÞRvisobs ; (7.14)
where
s ¼ scattering cross section,
Rvis ¼ meteorological range, and
Rvis-obs ¼ observer visibility.
Observer visibility is obtained from the International Visibility Code (Table 7.5).
TABLE 7.5 ¢ International Visibility Code
DESIGNATION VISIBILITY
Dense fog 0–50 m
Thick fog 50–200 m
Moderate fog 200–500 m
Light fog 500 m–1 km
Thin fog 1–2 km
Haze 2–4 km
Light haze 4–10 km
Clear 10–20 km
Very clear 20–50 km
Exceptionally clear >50 km
0.95 FIGURE 7.22 ¢

0.90 Transmissivity as a
Attenuation Coefficient
Meteorological Function of AH and

0.85 Range (km)
Meteorological
0.80 Range
25
0.75 15
7.5
0.70
5
0.65
3
0.60
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Absolute Humidity (g/m3)
1 FIGURE 7.23 ¢
0%
Transmissivity as a
Attenuation Coefficient
Function of Humidity
0.9 Summer
Winter
0.8
100%
100%
0.7
0 5 10 15
Absolute Humidity (g/m3)
The transmittance or attenuation coefficient may also be obtained as a function of

absolute humidity (AH) and meteorological range (Rvis). For a low visibility coupled
with a high AH, the transmittance will suffer; similarly, a low AH with a high visibility
will yield a very good transmittance. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7.22. Since
the AH is derived from the relative humidity and the absolute temperature, it would
make sense that transmissivity will suffer more in summer than in winter. This rela-
tionship is shown in Figure 7.23, and calculation of the AH is shown in Figure 7.24.
There are models that can provide the extinction (transmittance) for given meteor-
ological conditions. The most common models in use today are low, moderate, and high
FIGURE 7.24 ¢ 100

Conversion of 60% 40%
Relative Humidity to 80%
100%
Absolute Humidity
Absolute Humidity 10
1
10% 5%
30% 20%
0.1
15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Temperature (°C)
FIGURE 7.25 ¢ 10
Extinction Light Fog
Coefficients for
Different Aerosols
1 Haze
Extinction Coefficient (1/km)
Light Haze
0.1
Clear
0.01
Rayleigh
0.001
0.1 1 10
Wavelength (μm)
transmittance (LOWTRAN, MODTRAN, HITRAN) models. The LOWTRAN model

has been replaced by the MODTRAN model, but many books and test procedures still
address the LOWTRAN model. The extinction coefficient values in the models are per
kilometer. For wavelengths of 7 to 10 mm, typical values are
● Clear air, 0.1 to 0.005/km
● Light haze, 0.6 to 0.05/km
● Haze, 2 to 0.6/km
● Light fog, 6 to 1.5/km
What this says is that for every kilometer of travel, it is possible to lose a percentage
of the radiated energy. In the worst case for clear air, 99.9% of the radiated energy
will be seen at 1 km, whereas the same energy can be attenuated by 6% (94% seen)
in light fog. This attenuation factor will be applied for every kilometer of path travel.
This relationship is shown in Figure 7.25.
Meteorological Range FIGURE 7.26 ¢

34 m Scattering
100 Coefficients for
Cloud 170 m Spherical Particles
10 Fog 830 m
Scattering Coefficient (1/km)
Haze
1 5.2 km
Clear
Air
0.1
0.01
Rayleigh
0.001
0.0001
0.1 1 10 100
Wavelength (μm)
Scattering and absorption by particles depends on the radius of the particle, its
shape, the wavelength of the incident radiation, the angle between the radiation and the
viewing direction, and the complex indices of refraction. When the particles are small
(diameter of the particle is much less than the wavelength), so-called Rayleigh scattering
occurs, with the scattering proportional to l4. For most naturally occurring low-density
aerosols and artificial aerosols, significant scattering occurs in the visible wavelengths
and minimum scattering in the IR band. As the particles grow in size, the region of
maximum scattering occurs in the IR bands; of course, very large particles will affect all
regions equally. The relative scattering coefficients for different-size spherical particles
is shown in Figure 7.26. As with extinction, the coefficient is per kilometer and
percentage lost.
In the LOWTRAN model, the scattering coefficient has been related to rain rate in
millimeters per hour and is defined as
srain 0:365ðrain rateÞ0:63 : (7.15)
If it is assumed that the raindrops act as scatterers and the attenuation coefficient is
assumed to be independent of wavelength, then the transmittance is defined as
tavg ¼ es rain : (7.16)
The rain rate in millimeters per hour associated with the definition of rain intensity
is found in Table 7.6.
The average attenuation values (t) from data collected over 5 to 10 years yield the
values shown in Table 7.7.
TABLE 7.6 ¢ Representative Rain Rates
Rain Intensity Rain Rate (mm/hr)

Mist 0.025
Drizzle 0.25
Light rain 1.0
Moderate rain 4.0
Heavy rain 16
Thundershower 40
Cloudburst 100
TABLE 7.7 ¢ Average Attenuation Values
Weather Average Approximate Percentage

Quality Attenuation of Time with Better Weather
Poor 0.70/km 80%
Fair 0.80/km 65%
Average 0.85/km 50%
Good 0.90/km 25%
Excellent 0.95/km 2%
For IR systems, knowing the environmental conditions of our area of operations and
how this will influence the performance of the system under test is a very important
consideration. MWIR systems will be affected by scattering caused by natural aerosols
more than LWIR systems, but LWIR systems are more adversely affected by absorption
due to water vapor. The key extinction molecule for MWIR systems is carbon dioxide.
Before acquiring a system for operational use, the area of operation must first be
investigated in order to determine which detector (MWIR/LWIR) is best suited to the
environment.
7.6 TARGET SIGNATURES

A target is an object that is to be detected, located, recognized, or identified, whereas the
background is any distributed radiation that offsets the target. Target signatures use the
following features that distinguish them from the background:
● Spatial (size, length, width, height, or orientation)
● Spectral
● Intensity features
For IR system performance predictions, the target signature is represented with an
area-weighted differential temperature (Dt). For optical systems such as cameras or
closed-circuit TV (CCTV), the performance predictions are based on a differential
contrast (DC), which is a function of lighting intensity. The weakness in using an
area-weighted system is that the sum of hot-cold or black-white of a target can mathe-
matically equal zero. This approach works well for passively heated targets and
backgrounds, but starts to fall apart with active targets that have a distribution of
FIGURE 7.27 ¢
FLIR Image of
Military Transport
Truck
FIGURE 7.28 ¢
Calculation of Tavg
T2A2
T1A1
T5A5
T4A4
T3A3
temperatures due to internal combustion and friction that render the results of the Dt
approach less accurate. For IR systems, this distribution leads to target detection,
recognition, and identification. This section will focus on thermal signatures; however,
path radiance and methods to analyze data are generic to all spectral bands.
Because of target signature complexity, an area-weighted target temperature
will be used:
X
N
Ai Ti
i¼1
Tavg ¼ ; (7.17)
XN
Ai
i¼1
where the target contains N subareas Ai, each having a temperature of Ti.
If the background has an average temperature of TB, then DT ¼ Tavg TB. This is
illustrated by averaging the temperatures in the FLIR image of Figure 7.27 by using the
areas of Figure 7.28.
Natural backgrounds are heated passively through the absorption of solar energy
with daily heating beginning at sunrise. After midday, solar heating declines and
backgrounds begin to cool, and after sunset, the backgrounds approach air temperature.
Low thermal inertia objects tend to track the solar radiation; this is called a diurnal
cycle, which is shown for various natural elements in Figure 7.29. All target signatures
are a function of
● Absorption coefficient at the solar wavelength
● Emissivity
● Thermal inertia
The diurnal cycle can also apply to the fixed object’s orientation, as shown in
Figure 7.30.
FIGURE 7.29 ¢ 180

Diurnal Cycles of
Natural Elements 160
140
Dry Wood
Dry Clay Loam 120
Asphalt Road
100
Dry Sandy Loam
T (ºF)
Dry Gravel
80
Concrete Road
Dry Grass Field 60
Granite Bedrock
40
20
0
0 8 16 24 8 16 24 8 16 24 8 16 24
Time of Day
FIGURE 7.30 ¢ West

Diurnal Cycle as a
Function of
Orientation
Roof
Relative T
East
South
0 Grass
North
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AM Time of Day PM
Normally the sky is very cold with an effective temperature of 20 K (deep space); if
the atmospheric transmission is high the sky will appear cold. As the transmittance
decreases, the path radiance increases and the sky appears warmer. For example, an
aircraft flying at high altitude may be comparing targets of interest against a 20 K
background, but when near the horizon the same target may be against an effective
293 K background.
The environment can also modify the Dt that is seen by an IR sensor. Passing clouds
can modify target signatures; a heavy overcast may obliterate any Dt. When raining or
snowing, the solar loading is often zero. The high thermal conductivity of water aids in
heat dissipation and can wash out the scene. Water and mud reduce frictional cues
through cooling and insulation, respectively. Wind aids in heat transfer so that under
moderate wind conditions target temperatures will be lower and the surrounding areas
will be hotter. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 7.31 in which the wind is
blowing from left to right.
Optical turbulence is the fluctuation of the index of refraction resulting from
atmospheric turbulence. It is responsible for a variety of effects, including
● Temporal intensity fluctuations (scintillation)
● Beam wander and broadening in lasers
● Image dancing
● Image blurring
The turbulence-induced fluctuations in the refractive index produce a phase dis-
tortion of the wavefront. The distorted wavefront continues to propagate and is itself
further distorted.
There are two central issues that will influence the overall performance of optical
systems utilized in an aerodynamic environment: aeromechanical and aero-optical
effects. Aeromechanical effects arise from the interactions of the external flow fields
with the airborne platform and combine with vibrations to cause jitter. Jitter results in
image blurring and general optical misalignment and spurious laser beam motion on
targets. Since jitter will be a result in almost all installations, it will be one of the major
drivers for airborne testing. Aero-optical effects arise from index of refraction changes
induced by moving through a flow field. Aero-optical effects will cause a loss of con-
trast and resolution, beam spread and wander for outgoing wavefronts (lasers), and
reduced far-field peak intensity.
FIGURE 7.31 ¢ IR
Scene Modified by
Wind
When high-energy lasers (HELs) are used, the wave propagates through the atmo-
sphere and small amounts of energy are absorbed by matter in the air. This absorbed
energy heats the air, forming a distributed thermal lens along the atmospheric path.
The lens has the following effects on the laser:
● Beam spreading
● Beam bending
● Distortion
This thermal blooming limits the maximum power that can be efficiently transmitted
through the atmosphere.
There are two major classes of targets that are of interest to optical sensors. They are
surface targets (including subsurface) and airborne targets. The surface group contains
all land vehicles and water vessels. The specific radiation characteristics of these types
of targets are seldom, if ever, reported in open literature. Some things to consider are
factors that will affect the radiation characteristics:
● Weathering and general deterioration (such as surface paint)
● Dust, dirt, and mud accumulation
● Different parts of the vehicle are at different temperatures, with the exhaust areas
being the hottest
● Different materials are used in the manufacture of the vehicle that have different
emissivities
● Use of heat suppression devices may be used to reduce the IR signature
Most of the comments made about surface vehicles are equally applicable to air-
craft, except that aircraft tend to emit large quantities of hot gasses. A comparison of
the IR signature from an aircraft’s IR exhaust plume to the entire aircraft signature is
shown in Figure 7.32. It should be noted that the exhaust plume shows peak responses
at about 4.2 and 4.5 mm. These are the spectral bands called the blue spike plume
(4.1 to 4.3 mm) and the red spike plume (4.3 to 4.6 mm). Because of atmospheric
attenuation of the combustion gases, they become a negligible contributor to the total
aircraft IR signature at ranges of a few kilometers from the aircraft. The aircraft also
experiences skin friction during flight, which heats up the skin and produces a response
in the 8 to 15 mm spectrum.
In order to judge the true performance of any IR system, it is paramount to know the
attributes of the target as well as the current and historical atmospheric conditions.
Knowledge of the true attributes of a target constitutes a calibrated target, whereas
knowledge of the target within a set of atmospheric conditions constitutes a calibrated
signature. Unfortunately this is almost always very difficult to accomplish in flight test
environments.
For IR data to be called calibrated, the following two requirements need to be met:
● The radiance or the apparent temperature of any given surface area on the target in
the real world must be retrievable from the collected data.
● The geometry of the measurement setup (or the relationship between the pixel size in
the image and the actual target area) must be known.
T = 823 °K FIGURE 7.32 ¢
T = 773 °K IR Signatures
T = 723 °K
of Aircraft
Radiant Intensity
0 2 4 6 8 10
Wavelength (μm)
Nozzle
Airframe Combustion Gases

Radiant Intensity
Radiant Intensity
T = 300 °K
0 2 4 6 8 10 14 18 22
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Wavelength (μm)
Wavelength (μm)
It is important that the entire measurement chain is in the loop; for example, video
errors must be known and external reference blackbodies must be used. There are many
organizations who perform these measurements. The Georgia Tech Research Institute
(GTRI) performs measurements of both ground-based and airborne targets. The target is
placed on a turntable at a known bearing and range from the sensors. A blackbody is
placed at an equal bearing and range and comparisons of the radiance of the target and
blackbody are analyzed. A picture of the target setup is shown in Figure 7.33.
7.7 EO COMPONENTS AND PERFORMANCE

REQUIREMENTS
The major components of EO sensors are the scanning mechanisms, detectors (for the IR
systems), optics, and displays. We will briefly examine these components and highlight
some of the key principles.
FIGURE 7.33 ¢
IR Turntable
Measurement
Facility
Any scanning system is a complex arrangement of optical, mechanical, electrical,

and electronic systems. Scanners and scanning systems are used in one or more of the
following applications:
● Warning systems
● Tracking
● Pointing or designating
● Communications
● Imaging
7.7.1 Scanning Techniques

Image-forming IR systems fall into two categories: those in which an image is formed
directly and those in which an optical scanning principle is employed. Direct imaging
systems normally exploit a comparatively long exposure time, especially if the object of
interest is stationary with respect to the detector. However, they all suffer from one or
more disadvantages, such as poor angular resolution due to thermal spreading or tem-
perature gradients within the detector, insufficient dynamic range, low contrast, limited
spectrum coverage, and poor temperature resolution. The best method, at the present
time, for providing high-quality imagery is to use arrays of cooled quantum detectors
that are fabricated into FPAs, as described in section 7.1.1 (Figure 7.12).
The simplest method for obtaining a thermal image using scanning techniques is to
use a single, small IR detector to scan all the points in a scene and use the output to
modulate a display. The use of a single detector means scanning in two dimensions.
If a linear array of detectors is used, scanning can be confined to one dimension; both
these techniques are used in airborne systems. A two-dimensional (2D) array or mosaic
of detectors can be used without scanning, which comes back to the idea of a direct
image-forming device. These types of mosaics are called staring FPAs. A typical two-axis
scanning system is shown in Figure 7.34.
Infrared radiation from the scanned scene enters the system’s optics through the IR
window. It passes through the IR optics and is focused onto the detector array. This IR
energy is absorbed by the detectors and transformed into a very small electrical signal.
This very small signal is then used as the input signal for the preamplifiers. In the
Detector FIGURE 7.34 ¢

Two-Axis Scanner
Cold Shield
(Loral Polygon
Aperture Stop
Scanner)
Detector Lens
Collimator Lens
Radiation
from Scene
Field Stop
Temperature Reference
Orbital Lens High Speed Spin Mirror
60 Hz Field Mirror
earlier-generation systems there is one preamplifier channel for each detector. The signals
generated by the detectors are unusable as a composite video signal because of their low
level. For this reason, several stages of amplification are required to produce a usable
signal. In the case of the FPA, the amplification is done on the chip via a readout inte-
grated circuit (ROIC) which can be integrated with the detectors or as a separate ROIC
chip. This miniaturization is one reason why newer generations are superior (smaller and
lighter) to their predecessors.
As the scan mirror moves across the scene, IR energy is reflected onto the detectors.
At certain points in the scan cycle the mirror will be in a position where IR energy
passing through the optics will not be reflected onto the detectors. This part of the scan is
referred to as the inactive part of the scan cycle, and that part of the cycle where video is
reflected on the detectors is called the active part.
On many of the IR systems, the operator can select either white hot or black hot by
utilizing a polarity switch located on the control panel. This switch activates an additional
inverter stage on each of the postamplifiers and reverses the polarity of the video signal.
Thus hot IR targets can be made to appear as either black or white targets on the display.
The IR level (brightness), video gate, video polarity, and gain control circuits are all located
in the auxiliary electronics. These signals are mixed with the video signal in the post-
amplifiers to produce a composite video output signal. This composite signal is used to
control the brightness and contrast of the light-emitting diodes (LEDs) during the active
part of the scan cycle. The LED output is used to reproduce the image of the scanned scene.
7.7.2 IR Detectors
The responsive element of the detector is a radiation transducer. Transducers can be
separated into two groups: photon detectors and thermal detectors.
Photon detectors rely on four processes to accomplish IR detection:
● Photoemissive effect
● Photoconductive effect
● Photovoltaic effect
● Semiconductors
Thermal detectors rely on one of five basic processes to accomplish IR detection:
● Thermocouple
● Bolometer
● Calorimeter
● Fluid expansion thermometer
● Evaporograph
Photon detectors operate according to the photoelectric effect. They are the most
sensitive and have been the most widely used optical detectors. All electromagnetic
radiation occurs in discrete quanta called photons. Each photon contains an amount of
energy (E) determined solely by the frequency of the radiation according to equation 7.18:
Eg ¼ hn ¼ hc=lðjoulesÞ; (7.18)
where
h ¼ Planck’s constant ¼ 6.6256 1034 (W/sec2),
c ¼ velocity of propagation ¼ 3 108 (m/sec),
n ¼ frequency of radiation (Hz), and
l ¼ wavelength of radiation (m).
The incident radiant flux (P) is related to the photon rate (jg) by equation 7.19:
P ¼ jg Eg ðwattsÞ
(7.19)
P ¼ hcjg =l:
The electrons surrounding the nucleus of an atom exist in energy bands as illustrated
in Figure 7.35. Electrons in the lower energy state, E0 through En, are bound to the atom
in sharply defined energy levels and take no part in electrical conduction. Electrons in
the nondiscrete energy band above En, but below that required to escape the material
(En þ j), are not bound to the atom and are therefore free to take part in electrical
conduction. Electrons that have energies above the escape level take part in emission
FIGURE 7.35 ¢
Energy Levels of Emitted Electrons
Atomic Electrons
f Conduction Electrons
Energy Level
En
E3
E2
E1 Bound Electrons
E0
(escape from the surface of the material). The work function (j) is the minimum
incremental energy required to cause a bound electron to be emitted from the material.
An incident photon of radiation can interact directly with an atom to raise the energy
level of a bound electron to the conduction band or even to the point of emission. Both
of these events are termed the photoelectric effect. When the freed electron remains
within the material, the process is called photoconduction. When the freed electron is
emitted from the surface of the material, the process is called photoemission. In either
case, the photon of radiation is annihilated.
As previously indicated, the energy contained in a photon of radiation is propor-
tional to the frequency of the radiation. In order for photoconduction to occur, the
incident photon must possess enough energy (the radiation must be of high enough
frequency) to raise the energy level of a bound electron into the conduction band.
In order for photoemission to occur, the incident photon energy must be even higher, as
indicated in Figure 7.36. Thus photon-type radiation detectors exhibit a cutoff wave-
length beyond which they do not respond. There is a corresponding cutoff frequency
below which they do not respond.
The existence of a cutoff frequency is an unfortunate characteristic of photon detectors;
many targets of military significance are at temperatures so low (IR radiation frequency
so low) that photon detectors do not respond well to their radiations. Figure 7.37 shows
the below and beyond cutoff frequencies for common detector elements.
D*, shown as the y-axis in Figure 7.37, is a normalized detectivity that is particu-
larly convenient in comparing the performance of detectors. Since the conditions
of measurement can affect the value of D*, these conditions are normally quoted in
parentheses with any statement of D* as follows:
(77 K, 3.7 mm, 1000 Hz).
This would mean that the value of D* quoted was obtained at an operating temperature
of 77 K, at a wavelength of 3.7 mm, and using a frequency of 1000 Hz.
The interaction between an absorbed photon and the absorbing atom (the photo-
electric effect) is essentially instantaneous. Photon detectors are therefore characterized
by a relatively fast time constant (on the order of microseconds). This characteristic
generally makes photon detectors more suitable for rapid-scan sensors than the much
slower thermal detectors.
FIGURE 7.36 ¢
Photoelectric Effect
Photoelectron Emission Band
Photoelectron Conduction Band

Electron Energy
Bound (Valence) Band
Bound Electron Bound Electron

Photoconduction Photoemission
FIGURE 7.37 ¢ D* MCT

Cutoff Frequencies MCT
195 K 77 K
for Various
Detectors
1011
InSb
PbS 77 K
293 K
MCT MCT
230 K 195 K MCT
77 K
1010
0 5 10 15 l μm
FIGURE 7.38 ¢ Photoemissive Material

Photoemissive
Radiation Detector
E E
L Photon L
E E
C C
T T
R – R
O O
D Photoelectron D
E E
I
– +
The SNR at the output of a photon-type radiation detector is generally larger than that for
a thermal-type detector. Thus the detectivity (a direct measure of SNR) is, in general, higher.
Most photon-type detectors perform well only at extremely low (cryogenic) tem-
peratures. Since detectivity generally decreases rapidly with increasing temperature,
most sensors operating in the IR band that utilize photon-type detectors must incorporate
relatively elaborate cryogenic cooling mechanisms.
A photoemissive radiation detector consists of an evacuated vessel in which two
electrodes are located. One of the electrodes, the cathode, is coated with a photoemissive
material. The external circuit consists of a voltage supply (the battery) and an electrical
current measuring device (the ammeter). Photons of sufficient energy striking the sur-
face of the coated electrode produce photoemissive photoelectrons that flow to the
positive electrode (anode), thus causing an electrical current in the external circuit,
indicated by the ammeter. This type of detector is shown in Figure 7.38.
Photon Photoconductive Material FIGURE 7.39 ¢

Photoconductive
Radiation Detector
E + Hole E
L L
E E
C C
T T
R – R
O O
D Electron D
E E
I
– +
Semiconductor Junction FIGURE 7.40 ¢

Photon Photovoltaic
Radiation Detector
E E
L L
E E
C C
T T
R + – R
O O
D Hole Electron D
E E
V
+ –
A photoconductive radiation detector consists of a piece of semiconductor material

with two electrodes attached, as shown in Figure 7.39. The external circuit consists of a
voltage source (the battery) and a current measuring device (the ammeter). Photons
entering the semiconductor material produce photoconductive photoelectrons within the
semiconductor material (and corresponding ‘‘holes’’ in the bound states of the atoms).
Under the influence of the externally applied electric field, the photoelectrons move
toward the positive electrode and the ‘‘holes’’ move toward the negative electrode, thus
causing a measurable electrical current to flow in the external circuit. Since the energy
required to induce photoconduction is less than that required to induce photoemission,
photoconductive detectors can respond to longer-wavelength radiation.
A photovoltaic radiation detector consists of a semiconductor diode as shown
in Figure 7.40. The external circuit consists of an electrical voltage measuring device
(the voltmeter). Photons entering the semiconductor material produce photoelectrons
and corresponding ‘‘holes.’’ As a result of the difference in energy levels in P-type and
N-type semiconductor materials, the photoelectrons tend to migrate into the N-type
material and the holes tend to migrate into the P-type material, thus producing an
electric potential (voltage) across the P-N junction. This voltage is measured by the
external voltmeter. The photon energy required for photovoltaic detection is essentially
the same as that for photoconduction. Therefore the cutoff wavelengths are approxi-
mately the same.
Photovoltaic detectors are the most commonly used processing in the third-
generation FPA systems. Photoconductive detectors are most commonly used in
earlier-generation IR systems and most civilian applications since they are capable of
operating out into the far-IR region. Two kinds of semiconductors are available: intrinsic
semiconductors and extrinsic semiconductors.
Intrinsic semiconductors are obtained by refining the material to a high degree of
purity. They are insulators at absolute zero since the valence band is full and the con-
duction band is empty. As the temperature is increased, an increasing number of elec-
trons obtain sufficient energy to cross the energy gap between the valence and
conduction bands. If the semiconductor is irradiated with photons of the correct energy,
electrons can again be excited into the conduction band, and this is the photoconductive
process. The thermally excited electrons are a prime source of detector noise, and this
effect can be reduced by cooling the detector to very low temperatures. The character-
istics of common intrinsic detectors are given in Table 7.8.
Progress toward operation at longer wavelengths has been based mainly on the
exploitation of the small amount of energy required to ionize impurity atoms in the pure
host material. The deliberate introduction of impurity atoms into the host material is
known as doping, and quite small concentrations of impurity substantially increase the
conductivity of the material, which results from irradiation. This process is called
extrinsic detection; the lower the ionization energy, the lower the detector’s operating
temperature if thermal ionization (noise) is to be kept acceptably low. The character-
istics of common extrinsic detectors are given in Table 7.9.
A thermocouple consists of one hot and one cold junction. The hot junction (ther-
moelectric junction) generates a voltage in response to incident radiation. The cold
junction is always in thermal equilibrium with the environment. The voltage (V) generated
across the two junctions is related to their temperature differences by equation 7.20:
V ¼ Ct ðTh Tc Þ; (7.20)
where
Th ¼ the temperature of the hot junction (K),
Tc ¼ the temperature of the cold junction (K), and
Ct ¼ the thermoelectric power coefficient (V/K).
TABLE 7.8 ¢ Characteristics of Common Intrinsic Detectors
Detector Material Approximate Cutoff Operating Typical Time D* at 1000 Hz

(Operating Mode) Wavelength (mm) Temperature (K) Constant (sec) (cmHz0.5/W)
Lead Sulfide (PbS) (pc) 4 77 3 103 2 1011
Indium Arsenide (InAs) (pv) 4 77 5 107 4 1011
Lead Selenide (PbSc) (pc) 6.5 77 4 105 3 1010
Indium Antimonide (InSb) (pc) 5.5 77 6 106 8 1010
TABLE 7.9 ¢ Characteristics of Common Extrinsic Detectors
Detector Material Approximate Cutoff Operating Typical Time D* at 1000 Hz

(Operating Mode) Wavelength (mm) Temperature (K) Constant (sec) (cmHz0.5/W)
Mercury-Doped Germanium 14 27 2 107 2 1010
(Ge:Hg) (pc)
Mercury Cadmium Tellurium 13 77 <1 108 5 109
(Hg:Cd:Te) (pv)
Cadmium-Doped Germanium 20 4.2 1 107 2 1010
(Ge:Cd) (pc)
Antimony-Doped Silicon (Si:Sb) 23 4.2 1 107 1 1010
(pc)
Copper-Doped Germanium (Ge: 27 4.2 5 107 3 1010
Cu) (pc)
Zinc-Doped Germanium (Ge:Zn) 40 4.2 2 108 1.5 1010
(pc)
The bolometer is the thermal detector most frequently employed in airborne

systems. A bolometer senses the change in resistance of a sensitive element caused
by the temperature change. The sensitive element may be a metal, a semiconductor,
or a superconductor. Metallic and semiconductor bolometers are the most widely
used. The resistance change in a metallic bolometer is linearly dependent on changes
in temperature. The resistance change in a semiconductor bolometer is an exponen-
tial rather than a linear function of temperature. For small temperature variations,
however, the resistance change can be assumed to be linearly dependent upon tem-
perature changes.
The calorimeter consists of a radiation-absorbing mass, the temperature increase of
which is measured, directly, as an indication of total radiant energy absorbed.
The fluid-expansion thermometer consists of a radiation-absorbing liquid or gaseous
mass, the temperature rise of which is determined indirectly by measuring the change in
volume of the fluid.
The evaporograph consists of a radiation-absorbing screen, the temperature rise
of which is indicated indirectly by the rate of evaporation of a thin film of volatile
substance. By focusing an image of the sensor FOV upon the screen, a thermal image
is obtained.
7.7.3 Detector Cooling

For the reasons previously noted (i.e., avoidance of internal noise and the ability to sense
small temperature differences), many detectors must be cooled, although some of the
newer bolometers can operate at room temperature. There are four types of cooling
processes used:
● Liquid cooling: nitrogen (77 K), hydrogen (20 K), and helium (4.2 K)
● Joule-Thomson cooler: gas transferred into liquid
● Cryogenic/Stirling cooler: like a refrigerator, contraction and rapid expansion of
helium or freon
● Thermoelectric cooler: works on the opposite principle of a thermal detector
7.7.4 Optics
The function of the optics within any of the EO systems is to collect and focus energy onto
a detector. In some cases, such as IR, the optics may also function as a filter allowing only
frequencies of interest to be passed on to the detector. The glass window may be coated or
fabricated of materials that only allow certain IR frequencies to be passed through, or they
may be designed to reflect or absorb all IR frequencies and only allow visible light to pass.
Some of the common materials used in these windows may be germanium sapphire, zinc
sulfide, silicon, zinc selenide, or calcium fluoride. In all cases these windows are specially
manufactured to very high tolerances and add cost to the system.
When designing an EO system, probably the two biggest concerns when considering
the optics are the size and the performance. The amount of space required for the optics
and its associated weight will be directly related to the cost. Performance requirements
will drive the resolution and sensitivity of the optics.
Figure 7.41 depicts the thin lens approximation used for analysis in most optical
subsystems. The clear aperture is not necessarily the diameter of the optical element; D
is the effective aperture diameter. The effective aperture may best be visualized with a
camera. Although the lens may have a fixed diameter, the operator can select how much
light is allowed in by reducing or expanding the pupil diameter by adjusting the camera
f-stop. The focal length ( f ) is the distance from the aperture to the focal point of the
collected energy. A magnifying glass can collect the sun’s energy and focus it to a single
point on the ground where it is strong enough to start a fire. Moving the glass closer or
farther away from the sun will move the focal point away from the ground surface.
The f-stop, or focal ratio, expresses the diameter of the effective aperture in terms of the
focal length of the lens. If the focal length is 16 times the effective aperture, then the
f-stop would be f/16; the greater the f-stop, the less light (energy) per unit area will reach
the image plane of the system. Images will be fainter as the focal ratio is increased.
This information will come into play when discussing the EO system FOV, which is
directly related to the focal length of the optics used. In IR systems for a given detector
size, as the focal length decreases, the FOV increases and the resolution decreases.
7.7.5 Field of View

As noted previously, the optical design will dictate the area seen by the system; this area
is known as the system FOV. A FLIR system will most often have a wide FOV, narrow
FOV (and sometimes a medium FOV), and a zoom. The wide FOV is typically on the
order of 25 horizontal and 20 vertical to match the display resolution, which for U.S.
FIGURE 7.41 ¢ The f-stop or focal ratio

Focal Ratio is equal to the focal length
divided by the effective
aperture diameter: f-stop = f/D
Lens
Focal Point
Diameter (D)
Focal Length ( f )
Optics FIGURE 7.42 ¢

f for
NFOV Field of View
WFOV NFOV
f for
WFOV Detector
Array
Range to
Target
systems is 480 640 pixels (or in a ratio of 4 vertical:3 horizontal; V/H). The narrow
FOV will usually give a 4:1 resolution increase, for a reduction in the FOV to about
6.25 horizontal and 5 vertical. The zoom function may be optical (a real zoom) or
digital (brings the picture closer with no increase in resolution) and is normally on the
order of a 2:1 increase in resolution. TV systems normally use a pan and zoom function
that allows the operator to run the system from zero magnification out to the limits of the
optics. In slewable systems, the field of regard (FOR) is the area with unobstructed
viewing as the system is slewed throughout its azimuth and elevation limits. In fixed
systems, the FOR equals the FOV.
An instantaneous FOV (IFOV), or the detector angular subtense (DAS), as noted by
Holst (Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance), is used to describe the FOV of a
singular detector element. The IFOV can be calculated by dividing the detector
dimension by the effective focal length. The relationship of FOV to the focal length ( f )
can be seen in Figure 7.42. In the figure, the optics are the complete set of optics for the
system and f is the effective focal length of the complete system. By knowing the IFOV
for a staring array, the FOV can be obtained for the horizontal and vertical by multi-
plying the IFOV by the number of elements (either horizontal or vertical) in the array.
7.7.6 Displays
As with all technology, the way information is displayed to an operator has changed
significantly over the years. Like the home TV, displays have gone from large boxy
units with relatively small viewing areas to large flat screens that are extremely thin and
can be hung on a wall like a painting. Older displays are of a cathode ray tube (CRT)
design, which is a vacuum tube containing an electron gun and a fluorescent screen,
while newer displays use liquid crystal display (LCD) technology. Both will be descri-
bed here for completeness.
7.7.6.1 CRT Displays

The construction and principles of operation of a typical TV display are the same as
those associated with any CRT. A raster scan is used for imaging detail, whereby the
spot formed by the electron gun is moved over the whole area of the screen in a regular
series of parallel horizontal lines. The image is built up by varying the brightness of the
spot in synchronization with the raster. The process is repeated at a sufficient refresh rate
and usually involves an interlace method so as to produce an apparently continuous and
dynamic image.
The TV raster used for EO systems is produced by deflecting an electron gun in

the aircraft TV picture tube in a series of horizontal scans and vertical deflections
(Figure 7.43). The aircraft electron gun and the weapon electron gun are aligned or
synchronized by the master oscillator sync signals. U.S. Air Force EO systems use a
horizontal scanning frequency of 15,750 Hz and a vertical deflection period of 60 Hz.
The product of these parameters is a TV picture or field consisting of 262½ lines of
video. An entire field is generated every 1/60th of a second.
Apparent resolution of the displayed TV presentation is improved by using a tech-
nique called a 2:1 interlace. The lines of each successive field are interlaced by scanning
first the odd lines of the display and then filling in the even lines when the following
field is generated (Figure 7.44).
Two interlaced fields comprise one frame consisting of 525 lines of video whose
repetition rate is 60/2, or 30 times/sec. The frame constitutes a complete TV picture
element, but its relatively low repetition rate does not generate flicker because of the two
vertical scans required to produce it. The result is an improved apparent video resolu-
tion. The human eye then uses the property of image retention to tie successive frames
together and create apparent motion, in the same manner as a motion picture.
The detail of a TV picture in the vertical direction is determined by the number
of scanning lines. Resolution in the horizontal is similarly determined by the speed
with which the TV system is able to respond to abrupt changes (i.e., by the frequency
FIGURE 7.43 ¢
TV Raster
FIGURE 7.44 ¢
TV Raster with 2:1
Interlace
band that the TV system transmits). Using the U.S. domestic TV system as an
example, and assuming that in scanning a horizontal line the transition from black
to white is accomplished in a distance along the line equal to the spacing between
adjacent lines, then
● For active lines with a width-to-height ratio of 4:3, the distance is
1.33 ¼ 0.00155 of the active length of one line.
● The spot moves from left to right across the scope in 53.5 msec; hence, the time
interval for resolution is
53.5 ¼ 0.08 msec.
● In situations where the overshoot is less than 5%, the relationship between rise time
and bandwidth (B) is given by
Rise time ¼ 0.35/B.
● Hence a video system that will permit the response to rise from a minimum to a maximum
in this length of time without overshoot must have a bandwidth of not less than
B 4.375 MHz.
A larger bandwidth than this will give greater horizontal resolution, while a
reduced bandwidth degrades the horizontal resolution.
All photon sensors are characterized by some form of limiting resolution, that is, the
smallest detail that can be seen will be limited by some sensor parameter. An optically
perfect lens will create a divergent beam; thus, once a lens size has been chosen for a
system, the maximum angular resolution is then determined and system resolution can
never be better than the diffraction limitation of that lens. (This aspect is more applic-
able to IR rather than visual systems.) In the case of film, the limit is due to the pho-
tosensitive particles, which are of a finite size. With TV, as already discussed, vertical
resolution is set by the number of horizontal lines employed, horizontal resolution is
determined by the video bandwidth, and the size of the electron beam affects both
horizontal and vertical resolution.
When the TV camera itself has a resolution limit, greater scene detail can be viewed
at a given range only by increasing the lens focal length ( f ). However, such an increase
in f without a corresponding increase in lens diameter may result in a decrease in lens
resolution and a loss of image light level resulting in a less than hoped for scene reso-
lution. In low light level conditions, this method of increased focal length will probably
result in a loss of scene resolution. Therefore, when designing a system, the required
scene resolution must be determined first, and then the particular elements are sized to
meet the required performance.
7.7.6.2 Liquid Crystal Displays
There is an excellent tutorial available online describing the components, uses, problems,
and resolutions of LCD technology. It was put together by the 3M Company and can
be viewed at http://solutions.3m.com/wps/portal/3M/en_US/Vikuiti1/BrandProducts/
secondary/optics101/.
Each individual pixel in a black-and-white LCD and each subpixel in a color display
is created from a source of light and a light valve, which can turn the light on, off, or to
some intermediate level. In an LCD, millions of light valves form the display panel,
while a backlight and various display enhancement films create the illumination.
FIGURE 7.45 ¢ Lower

LCD Components Reflective Upper
Reflector Diffuser Polarizer Polarizer
Glass Glass
Light Source Prism LCD Surface Films
The LCD panel is at the center of the display, which is where the liquid crystal
itself is located. Transparent electrodes patterned on each pane of glass encompass
the liquid crystal. The orientation of the liquid crystal can be changed in subtle ways
by applying a voltage to the electrodes in order to change the level of illumination
displayed in each subpixel. A simplified drawing of the construction of an LCD is
The panel is sandwiched on one side by various front surface films that enhance
the display properties and on the other side by a source of light known as a backlight.
The LCD panel is the essential component in a display that controls the amount of light
reaching the viewer. Light passes through a bottom polarizer that orients the light to a
single state of polarization by absorbing more than 50% of the incoming unpolarized
light. The polarized light then passes through the liquid crystal layer. The orientation
of the liquid crystal can be controlled by applying a voltage to the transparent
electrodes on the glass encompassing it. The liquid crystal’s degree of orientation
controls to what degree it will rotate the incoming polarized light with a typical LCD.
When there is no voltage applied to the electrodes, the liquid crystal is naturally
oriented to rotate the light 90 , allowing it to pass freely through the top polarizer.
However, if a voltage is applied, the liquid crystal aligns to the electric field and does
not rotate the light, allowing the top polarizer to block it completely. By applying an
intermediate voltage, the liquid crystal can be partially oriented to partially rotate the
incoming light, creating shades of gray.
Adding a color filter to the LCD panel creates color displays. In a color LCD, each
red, green, and blue subpixel is individually controlled, allowing varying amounts of
red, green, and blue light through to the viewer for each pixel.
Active matrix addressing (each pixel is individually controlled) allows for very-
high-resolution LCDs and is used for nearly every laptop, most cell phones, LCD
monitors, and TVs. Each subpixel of the display is individually controlled by an isolated
thin-film transistor (TFT) which is patterned onto the glass and allows the electrical
signal for each subpixel to be locally stored without influencing adjacent elements. For a
standard notebook computer screen that has a resolution of 1024 768 pixels, there are
3 1024 768 subpixels (more than 2 million), and each one of them is individually
controlled by a TFT.
The surface films are used to enhance or restrict viewing of the display. On an
automatic teller machine (ATM), for example, the screen cannot be read unless the
viewer is directly in front of it; this is done for obvious security reasons. In aircraft, we
may have quite the opposite problem. The display may not be mounted directly in front
of the operator and therefore must be able to be read off-boresight; a film is available
that diffuses the light to make this viewing possible. Another film may be used to
enhance viewing capability in direct sunlight or to reduce glare.
7.8 PASSIVE EO DEVICES

7.8.1 IR Line Scanners
An analog IR line scanner (IRLS) is an imaging device that forms images by successive
scans of a rotating mirror. The scans are transverse to the line of flight of the vehicle
carrying the IRLS. The second scan needed for a 2D image is provided by forward
motion of the vehicle along its flight path. An IRLS in a high-speed reconnaissance
aircraft is one of the most efficient means of gathering pictorial information.
The velocity-to-height (V:H) ratio is one of the dominant parameters in IRLS sys-
tems because it determines the required scan rate. The units are in radians per second,
and the IRLS may scan with a single detector or multiple detectors in the along track
axis to keep rotation rates at practical values. The IRLS typically uses either single-facet
or multifacet axe head scanners.
Simple trigonometry determines ground coverage once the maximum FOV has been
determined from the maximum V:H ratio and scan rate. Figure 7.46 shows the rela-
tionship between ground coverage and V:H/scan rate.
It can be seen that for use on low-level flights, the system requires a very large FOV
in order to obtain the desired coverage. The low flight altitudes and the need to view in
both directions drive the need for a 180 FOV.
The IRLS must also be stabilized against aircraft roll motions, because high roll
rates and large roll excursions of reconnaissance aircraft will interfere with image
interpretation and can cause a loss of image. The roll angles, rates, and accelerations can
all be very high. Pitch excursions will be encountered in those aircraft that fly at very
low levels, especially in a terrain-following mode. Since the terrain is very rarely flat,
the IRLS requires a signal from the aircraft so the film or tape recording rate can be
FOV = 2qmax FIGURE 7.46 ¢

qmax = FOV/2 = tan−1(X/H ) IRLS Ground
IRLS
RMAX = H/cos qmax Coverage
XMAX = H tan qmax
qmax qmax
R
X MA
R MA X
XMAX XMAX
W = 2XMAX
adjusted to the proper V:H ratio. The signal also permits channel selection in multi-
channel designs (i.e., variable number of along-track detector elements selected as a
function of airspeed). Only some detectors in the along-track axis may be needed at a
low V:H ratio, but more will be required at a high V:H ratio.
The digital IRLS scans along the wing line, much like the analog IRLS, but now
uses on-chip processing as described in section 7.1.1. The digital IRLS is one of three
classes of reconnaissance sensors currently in use. The IRLS is called a whisk broom
sensor because of the sweeping action along the wing line. It has the same requirements
of line-of-sight (LOS) stabilization as noted for the analog IRLS, but has a higher
resolution over the same patch of terrain. This is because the detector array may be
comprised of thousands of elements stacked in one axis (vertical array swept horizon-
tally). This provides a unique problem of collecting so much data that it cannot be easily
data linked in real time. Data compression or sending only a subset of the data are
options that are used. The F-18 IRLS and sensors aboard the land remote sensing
satellite (LANDSAT) and advanced very high resolution radar (AVHRR) satellites are
examples of the whisk broom reconnaissance sensor.
There are two other types of reconnaissance sensors, which are not classic IRLS.
These are called push broom and framing sensors. The push broom sensor uses the same
type of array as the whisk broom sensor, but orients it along the wing line and pushes the
array along the flight path (horizontal array pushed vertically). With this setup there is
no scanning mechanism required. Push broom sensors are generally lighter and less
expensive than whisk broom sensors. The Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance
System (ATARS) is an example of a push broom reconnaissance system. The framing
system uses a very large focal plane array (1000 1000 up to 5000 5000) to take
snapshots of the area of interest (hence the picture frame). In some applications these
frames can be patched together to produce a picture of a larger area; the Global Hawk
uses a framing sensor. Each of these sensors produces large amounts of data due to the
resolution obtained, and the transmission of large data packets is a problem. LOS sta-
bilization is not as large a factor in framing systems as it is with whisk broom or push
broom sensors.
7.8.2 Forward-Looking Infrared

A FLIR imaging system is the IR analog of a visible TV camera. The purpose of the
FLIR is to provide a scene image by the detection and appropriate processing of the
natural radiation emitted by all material bodies. A system that operates in the 8 to 14 mm
region is usually referred to as an LWIR FLIR. A system that operates in the 3 to 5 mm
region is usually referred to as an MWIR FLIR. A modern FLIR forms a real image of
the IR scene by detecting the variation in the imaged radiation and creating a visible
representation of this variation. Characteristics such as FOV (degrees), resolution ele-
ment size (milliradians), and spatial frequency (cycles/milliradian) are expressed in
angular units. Noise is essentially constant and is usually expressed in terms of tem-
perature and is dominated by the large background. The noise equivalent temperature
difference (NETD) is the internal noise figure converted to a minimum resolvable
temperature difference (MRDT).
The FLIR systems are divided into two categories: staring systems and scanning
systems. Staring systems fill up the desired focal plane area with detectors, thus scan-
ning is not required.
7.8.3 Television Systems

7.8.3.1 Analog TV Systems
Television has been applied to a wide variety of uses in avionics systems ranging from
aerial reconnaissance cameras to missile homing devices. The airborne TV versions
differ in size and ruggedness from their commercial counterparts, but their principles of
operation are identical.
Television is accomplished by scanning different parts of a scene with a camera
tube which converts the incident light into photoelectric energy with a voltage propor-
tional to the light intensity of the scene under examination. The varying voltage
resulting from this scanning is amplified and can either be passed directly to a display or
it can be modulated on a radio frequency carrier wave that is radiated to another area.
The display, or TV receiver, synthesizes the original fluorescent scene of a CRT by
causing a cathode ray spot to trace over successive portions of the reproduced scene in
accordance with the scanning of the original scene. At the same time, the CRT varies the
brightness of the spot in accordance with the envelope amplitude of the received signal.
Because the scanning process is carried out with sufficient rapidity, an illusion of con-
tinuous, nonflickering motion is achieved.
As stated previously, a TV camera receives light energy from a scene and converts
it into photoelectric energy. The TV camera is more sensitive than the human eye
since it has higher quantum efficiency and a larger light-sensitive area. There are two
processes by which the conversion of light energy into electrical energy is obtained:
photoemission and photoconduction. These processes are the same as previously
described for IR detectors.
There are two basic types of TV camera tubes: the vidicon and the orthicon. The
vidicon TV camera tube, shown in Figure 7.47, is an electron beam scanning imaging
sensor that scans the overall FOV by deflecting an internal electron beam.
In the vidicon, the incoming radiation is focused onto an internal screen composed
of photoconductive material. An image is thus formed on the screen consisting of
Input Window FIGURE 7.47 ¢

Signal Plate Vidicon TV Tube
Photoconductive Layer
Electron Beam Thermonic

Cathode
+ Mesh + + –
Optics
R C
Electron Gun
Video Out
areas of greater or lesser conductivity. A narrow beam of electrons is deflected in such

a way as to scan the back of the photoconductive screen, as shown in the figure. When
the electron beam impinges upon an irradiated area of the screen, the electrons are
conducted through the screen to a transparent, conductive signal plate and into an
external circuit. The resulting current in the external circuit constitutes the output signal
from the sensor.
One limitation of the basic vidicon that must be emphasized is its tendency to smear
moving images, an example of the effect known as lag. Lag occurs in all TV tubes to
some extent and becomes worse at low light levels; it can represent the real limit to tube
performance in airborne applications. The causes of lag vary considerably from tube to
tube. In the vidicon, the main lag effect is target element capacitance.
As a rule of thumb, if the human eye can discriminate a specific target or contrast
feature, the EO weapon vidicon will also be able to define and display that particular
feature. However, notable exceptions occur when we deal with variations of the same
basic color groups. Since EO vidicons deal only in black, white, and shades of gray,
certain camouflage schemes when viewed against a similar background will be dis-
cernible by color contrasts to the human eye. The same color contrasts, however, may be
converted to the same shade of gray and be indistinguishable on a TV display. Low
ambient light conditions present special problems for an EO system. The vidicon system
normally lacks the low light level TV system’s filter wheels and iris-type devices used to
operate over a wide range of lighting conditions. The photoconductive material used by
the vidicon needs a minimum level of light intensity to function. Under low ambient
light conditions, normally around sunrise and sunset, the SNR between the light and
dark contrast areas becomes too close for the video processor to resolve. The result is
insufficient video contrast for video identification and target tracking.
Extremely bright light conditions (the sun in particular) also cause special problems
for the vidicon system. A direct view of the sun, focused by the lens system onto the
signal plate, will actually burn the photosensitive material. This damage shows up as a
‘‘scar’’ on the video and will severely degrade weapon performance if the scar covers
any part of the tracking gate.
Another type of electron beam scanned TV camera tube is the image orthicon,
shown in Figure 7.48. The orthicon is the basic photoemissive tube. In an image orthi-
con, the incoming radiation is focused on a photocathode, thus producing an electron-
cloud ‘‘image’’ of the FOV. These photoelectrons are accelerated toward a target screen,
as shown in the figure. The accelerated electrons strike the target screen, producing
secondary emissions and leaving areas of the screen deficient in electrons. The screen is
FIGURE 7.48 ¢ Glass Target

Photocathode Electron
Orthicon TV Tube Multiplier
Mesh
Target
Imaging Scanning
Electrons Electrons
Video
Out
Optics Photoelectrons Scanning Return Secondary

Electron Electron Mesh
Electrons
Beam Beam
Target Detail
then scanned from behind by a narrow beam of electrons. Where the scanning beam
impinges upon an electron-deficient area of the target screen, the beam loses electrons
to the screen. The electrons remaining in the beam (not absorbed by the target)
constitute the output signal and are returned to an electron multiplier at the base of the
camera tube. The electron multiplier, a device that amplifies current by cascading
secondary emissions, greatly increases the output current. The image orthicon is there-
fore much more sensitive than a vidicon. However, it has limitations as a low light tube
because of its poor noise performance at low light levels.
7.8.3.2 Digital TV Systems

Television systems have followed a pattern of development similar to the IR devices
described earlier. Modern TV and camera systems use one of two types of digital sensor
technology, with a third in early development. The sensor is a silicon semiconductor
that is composed of an array of photosensitive diodes, called photosites, that capture
incoming photons and convert this energy to an electrical signal. The electrical signal
is then converted to digital data as pixels. The pixels are stored in their correct order as a
file that can be viewed or retained in memory. The types of sensors include CCD,
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) (sometimes referred to as active
pixel sensors), and single-carrier modulation photo detector (SMPD).
Charge-coupled devices were developed by Bell Labs in the 1960s and are silicon-
based integrated circuits consisting of a dense matrix of photodiodes that operate by
converting light energy in the form of photons into an electronic charge. This is essen-
tially the photovoltaic radiation detector described previously in section 7.7.2. CCD
sensors derive their name from how the charge is read after an image is captured.
Utilizing a special manufacturing process, the sensor is able to transport the built-up
charge across itself without compromising image quality. The first row of the array is
read into an output register, which in turn is fed into an amplifier and an A/D converter.
After the first row has been read, it is dumped from the readout register and the next row
of the array is read into the register. The charges of each row are ‘‘coupled’’ so as each
row moves down and out, the successive rows follow in turn. The digital data are then
stored as a file that can be viewed and manipulated.
Complementary metal-oxide semiconductor sensors were first discussed at length in
a paper by Dr. Eric Fossum, a scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), in
1992. The JPL developed much of the technology that would be implemented into the
CMOS sensor. CMOS sensors are created using the same manufacturing technology that
is used to make microprocessors. These chips contain transistors at each pixel position
that amplify and move the charge using conventional wires, which is a more flexible
technology, as every pixel can be read individually. Because the transistors occupy
space on the array, some of the incoming light hits the transistors and not the photosites,
which leads to picture noise. CMOS sensors function at a very low gain, which may also
contribute to noise.
Each of these sensors has its advantages and disadvantages. CCD sensors are
expensive to produce because of the special manufacturing processes that must be
employed. CMOS chips can be fabricated easily, so they tend to be extremely inex-
pensive compared to CCD sensors. CCDs use more power than their CMOS counter-
parts; an increase of up to 100%. This limits the use of CCDs where power consumption
is an important factor. CMOSs are susceptible to noise, whereas CCDs can produce
high-quality, low-noise images. CCDs suffer from vertical smearing on bright light
sources; CMOSs do not. Since CMOS sensors have amplifiers built in, the uniformity
(same response for a given lighting condition) is low. CCDs have better sensitivity in
low light situations because part of the CMOS chip is taken up by transistors, which are
not sensitive to light. The entire surface of the CCD is used for light capture. All camera
functions can be placed on a single chip in the case of CMOS sensors, which is not the
case for CCDs.
A newer technology that is in development is the SMPD. The SMPD is a variation
of the CCD sensor that reacts to light levels of less than 1 lux and can capture low light
video at a rate of 30 frames/sec, which is faster than either CCDs or CMOSs. Companies
who make these chips claim that SMPD is the first, full-color, high-sensitivity image
chip for taking pictures in the dark without the use of a flash. The sensor is 2000 times
more sensitive than a CMOS or CCD sensor, is half the size, and is projected to be more
cost effective.
7.8.4 IR Search and Track

An IR search and track (IRST) system is a specific type of FLIR that is used to pas-
sively and autonomously detect, track, classify, and prioritize targets of interest.
Because IR systems can only provide azimuth and elevation attributes of targets, signal
and data processing algorithms must be used to calculate the other attributes of the
target that are required to build a track file (range, range rate). The advantage over
active systems such as radar is that they collect all information passively, and hence do
not highlight themselves.
The technologies used in FLIR and IRST are similar in the actual detection of
targets of interest, but since longer-range detections are desirable for identification and
weapons employment, some additional processing is used in IRST. Detection of small,
point-size targets is not possible in a cluttered environment unless the SNR of the target
is increased; the same data must be postprocessed to decrease false alarms.
Infrared search and track systems calculate the range (and from the range, range
rate) by using kinematics ranging calculations or by incorporating a laser range
finder (LRF). Ranging calculations require some intelligence of the target and rather
large processors. The ranging calculations are preferred, as they can calculate range
at distances beyond the capabilities of the LRF and do not highlight the search
aircraft. Another concern is that an LRF will add considerable size and weight to the
IRST system.
The simple range formula for a point detection system such as an IRST is given by
rffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
DW tðRÞ
R¼ ; (7.21)
NEI K
where
R ¼ range to target,
t(R) ¼ atmospheric transmittance over the range,
DW ¼ target radiant intensity contrast,
NEI ¼ noise equivalent irradiance of the sensor, and
K ¼ required SNR for a given detection/false alarm probability.
The range and type of target can be calculated by the IRST by estimating the
atmospheric transmittance and background spectral radiance from available meteor-
ological data. In each consecutive scan or frame, the contrast irradiance in the direction
of a target is measured as well as the azimuth and elevation. A target type is selected
from the library of the IRST computer based on the measured irradiance and the target
range is calculated based on the selected target type, estimated atmospherics, and
measured contrast irradiance. When the target is not radially inbound, the range is cal-
culated based on the target type selected, the angular movement of the target (aero-
triangulation), and the range estimate based on the last scan; the estimates are constantly
combined to form a best estimate of range.
The F-14D AN/AAS-42 IRST was one of the first IRST systems to be fielded in the
United States; a comparable system was fielded by the Soviets on the Su-27. The AN/
AAS-42 operated in the 8 to 12 mm spectrum using a MgCdTe detector array, aligned
vertically, and scanned horizontally. The system provided track file data on all targets
while simultaneously providing IR imagery to the cockpit displays. The U.S. Air Force’s
airborne laser (ABL) program is currently equipped with a version of the AN/AAS-42.
The F-18 IRST set being developed by Lockheed Martin uses slewable, liquid-
cooled, focal plane array MgCdTe detectors that are mounted in the forward section of
the aircraft’s centerline fuel tank. The location gives the system a desirable 70 70
FOR. The system can track multiple targets in a track-while-scan (TWS) mode or pro-
vide a single target track (STT); modes are integrated with the cockpit hands-on stick
and throttles (HOTAS).
There are two IRST systems that have been developed in Europe: passive infrared
airborne track equipment (PIRATE) and the infrared optical tracking and identification
system (IR-OTIS). The PIRATE was developed by a European consortium led by Thales
for the Typhoon. IR-OTIS was developed by Saab Bofors Dynamics for the Saab JAS39
Gripen. Both systems are Gen III sensors utilizing focal planar arrays of HgCdTe
detector elements. The PIRATE claims long-range (up to 100 km) detection, tracking,
and prioritization of multiple airborne targets with high resolution and scene imagery.
IR-OTIS has three operating modes: IRST, in which the system uses several different
search FOVs; FLIR, in which the system LOS is directed by the aircraft; and track, in
which the tracker controls the LOS. It is also possible to automatically switch from IRST
to track.
There are three other systems that are in concurrent development in the United
States: the electro-optical targeting system (EOTS), the electro-optical distributed
aperture system (EO-DAS), and the distributed aperture system infrared search and track
system (DAS-IRST). The EO-DAS is a common module in EOTS and DAS-IRST.
EOTS is being developed for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), whereas the DAS-IRST
is being developed by the U.S. Navy for fleet defense. Northrop-Grumman and Lock-
heed are developing the EOTS and EO-DAS and the Naval Research Laboratory’s
Optical Sciences Division is coordinating the efforts on DAS-IRST.
The EOTS is based on the Sniper pod and will be carried internally on the F-35
under the nose. The EOTS comprises a Gen III FLIR, laser, and digital CCTV. The
system will provide long-range target detection and identification, automatic tracking,
IRST and laser designation, range finding, and spot tracking. The DAS-IRST is com-
prised of a 512 2560 HgCdTe focal plane array and two FOVs: 3.6 48 and
10 48 . The system also employs a combination of filters to provide spectral band
coverage in the 3.4 to 4.8, 3.8 to 4.1, and 4.6 to 4.8 mm ranges.
7.9 LASER SYSTEMS

The name laser is an acronym derived from the phrase ‘‘Light Amplification by
Stimulated Emission of Radiation.’’ It functions on the same basic principle as its
forerunner, the maser, and as such is often known as an optical maser. In both devices,
atoms that have had their energy increased are stimulated, causing them to release this
excess energy. Stimulation is the key to the principle of laser operation and is the basis
for the unique characteristics that distinguish the laser from other optical radiation.
The process of stimulated emission of radiation was first described, theoretically,
by Albert Einstein in 1917. It is a process whereby a light beam of a specific color or
wavelength interacts with an atom in such a way that the atom emits additional light
that moves in the same direction and has the same wavelength as the original beam.
If a beam is fed into a suitable laser amplifier, the amplifier preserves the original
direction and wavelength of the input beam and the intensity of the light increases.
An oscillation can be produced by placing mirrors at the ends of the amplifier, for-
cing the light to bounce back and forth between the mirrors. The intensity of the light
in such an oscillator can build up to many orders of magnitude greater than the
intensity of the original light signal, producing a highly directional laser beam of an
extremely pure color.
The laser is based on the fact that electromagnetic radiation can interact directly
with the atomic structure of a material in such a way as to result in the absorption or
emission of electromagnetic radiation by the material. The structure of an atom is
represented by the Bohr model shown in Figure 7.49.
The protons and neutrons are assumed to be located in a nucleus at the center of the
atom. The electrons are assumed to orbit about the nucleus in ‘‘shells,’’ as shown in the
figure. In actuality, the ‘‘shells’’ are energy levels, as shown in the energy diagram in
Figure 7.49. Each ‘‘level’’ represents a fixed, discrete energy and can be occupied by no
more than a specific number of electrons. An electron can be raised from one energy
level to a higher energy level by absorbing energy from a photon of electromagnetic
radiation (in a laser, this process is called pumping). Conversely, it can fall to a lower
energy state by emitting energy in the form of a photon of electromagnetic radiation
(this process is called radiative decay). Other non-radiative processes exist by which the
energy level of the electrons can be changed. In radiative absorption or decay, the
Electronic
FIGURE 7.49 ¢
Orbits
Bohr Model 2S 2P 2D
E3 12 32 52
7p 6d
E2 7s 6p 5d
6s 5p 4d
E1 5s
E3 4p 3d
Electron 4s Metastable State
Energy
Pumping Transition
Radiative Decay Transition

3p
Nucleus E2
Non-Radiative Decay Transition

3s
E1
Ground State Ground State
Orbit
(a) Bohr Model (b) Energy Diagram
frequency of the radiation involved is determined entirely by the difference in energy of

the two levels between which the transition occurs:
DE ¼ hn ðjoulesÞðenergy or frequencyÞ; (7.22)
where
n ¼ frequency of radiation absorbed or emitted (Hz),
h ¼ Planck’s constant ¼ 6.63 1034 (W/sec2), and
DE ¼ difference in energy between transition levels (joules).
Thus, in Figure 7.49, the ‘‘pumping transition’’ shown requires an energy input equal to
(E3 E2).
In a laser, the electrons in the lasing material are raised to higher energy states
(pumped) by one of several methods. Some of the electrons in the higher energy levels
then fall back to lower energy levels by emitting a photon of electromagnetic radiation
(radiative decay). In order for the radiant flux contributed by newly emitted photons to
add to that of the existing photons (constructive interference), the emitted photons must
be coherent and in phase with the existing photons. Such synchronous emission is
achieved in the laser by passing the previously emitted radiation through the lasing
material. The electromagnetic fields created by the passing photons encourage the
radiative decay of electrons in a manner that produces photons in phase with the passing
photons. In most implementations, the laser photons are passed repeatedly through the
lasing material, inducing ever-increasing rates of radiative decay (increase of flux) on
each pass.
There are three important electromagnetic processes that can take place in a particle:
● Absorption
● Spontaneous emission
● Stimulated emission
Absorption occurs if electromagnetic energy is incident on a particle in the ground
state. Part of this energy can be extracted from the radiation field to cause the ground-
state electron to make a transition to one of the higher energy states.
During spontaneous emission, the transition the electron makes is from a higher
energy level to a lower one, and the difference in energy between the initial and final
states of the particle is converted into electromagnetic energy in the form of a single
photon. This process forms the basis of operation for the ordinary fluorescent light bulb.
Since there is no constraint on the phase or direction of the photons resulting from
spontaneous emission, the radiation is noncoherent.
The process of stimulated or induced emission is similar to absorption in that an
electron undergoes a level-changing transition under the influence of an external
radiation field. However, in this case the induced transition is downward, from a higher
to a lower energy level, so that there is a net loss in energy of the particle accompanied
by an increase in the energy of the radiation field. The most significant point here is that,
unlike spontaneous emission, the radiation resulting from stimulated emission propa-
gates in the same direction and has the same frequency as the stimulating field. Imagine
starting with a single photon that interacts with a particle to stimulate the emission of a
second, similar photon, and these two interact to stimulate two additional photons, and
FIGURE 7.50 ¢
Absorption,
Spontaneous, and
Stimulated Emission
(a) Spontaneous Emission (b) Absorption (c) Stimulated Emission
FIGURE 7.51 ¢ Higher than

Three-Level Laser the Upper
Laser State
Scheme
Fast Decay
Upper Laser
State (Excited)
Pump
Stimulated
Emission
Lower Laser
State (Ground)
these four interact to stimulate four more. Eventually a large radiation field will build up
and every photon will have the same characteristics as the one that started the process.
Figure 7.50 shows this absorption, spontaneous, and stimulated emission.
What has been described so far is a two-level process; the particles have only two
available energy levels: the grounded state and the excited state (sometimes called the
lower laser and upper laser states). The difference between the two states is referred to in
terms of photon energy, or hn. Since the probabilities for stimulated absorption and
emission processes are equal, it is detrimental to have any particles in the ground state.
For this reason, two-level lasers are not practical; it is not generally possible to pump
more than half of the molecules into the excited state. There are two methods for
avoiding this problem: three- and four-level laser schemes.
The three-level scheme first excites the particles to an excited state that is higher in
energy than the upper laser state. The particles then quickly decay down to the upper
laser state. It is important for the pumped state to have a short lifetime for spontaneous
emission compared to the upper laser state. The upper laser state should have as long a
lifetime (for spontaneous emission) as possible so that the particles live long enough to
be stimulated and contribute to the gain of the laser. Figure 7.51 depicts the three-level
laser scheme.
The four-level laser scheme goes a step further by also depopulating the lower laser
level by a fast decay process. This greatly decreases the loss of laser photons by sti-
mulated absorption processes since the particles in the lower laser level have a short
lifetime for spontaneous emission. Figure 7.52 depicts the four-level laser scheme.
Higher than FIGURE 7.52 ¢

the Upper Four-Level Laser
Laser State
Scheme
Fast Decay
Upper Laser
State (Excited)
Stimulated
Pump Emission
Lower Laser
State (Ground)
Fast Decay
Level Lower
than the
Lower Laser
State
The main attributes of lasers, as compared to other sensors, are

● Collimation
● Monochromaticity
● Short pulse capability
● High spectral radiance
Laser beams can be collimated to approximately the diffraction limit; that is, the
rays are nearly parallel to one another and diverge only slightly as they travel. In fact, a
plane-wave laser source radiates a beam that is almost constant in width for a distance
(D) given by the following relationship:
D ¼ d 2 =4l; (7.23)
where
d ¼ the diameter of the source, and
l ¼ the wavelength of the radiation.
Another important feature of laser light is that it is monochromatic, or a single color;
all the light waves in the beam have the same wavelength. Almost all conventional light
sources emit light that is a mixture of wavelengths, or colors, and as a result, the light
appears white. A few conventional light sources, such as mercury-vapor lamps and neon
lights, emit nearly monochromatic light, but their light is neither coherent nor inherently
collimated. A laser assembled with sufficient care to operate at all, operates at a Q in
excess of 104. Q is a measure of the power distribution or efficiency, and is calculated as
Q ¼ f =BW ; (7.24)
where
f ¼ central radiation frequency (Hz), and
BW ¼ bandwidth of radiation (Hz).
Because the triggering mechanism for energy release in a laser is the passage of
photons rather than transport of mass particles, stored energy can be released rapidly to
provide short-duration, high-energy pulses as compared to microwave or other visible or
IR pulsed power sources.
Perhaps the most important limitation of ordinary light sources is their inherent low
brightness. No matter how high their temperature, they cannot emit more energy than a
perfect radiator. The theoretical output of a perfect radiator, a blackbody, is given by the
blackbody radiation curve first derived by Planck. The visible surface of the sun, for
example, behaves much like a blackbody with a temperature of about 6000 C. The sun’s
total radiation, at all wavelengths, is 7 kW/cm2 of its surface, and no matter how we
collect and concentrate sunlight it is impossible to achieve any greater radiation. If
desired, the laser’s power can be focused to produce intense heating. For instance, a lens
with a focal length of 1 cm will focus the beam to a spot only 102 cm in diameter,
corresponding to an area on the order of 104 cm2. In this spot the laser beam will
deliver power at a density of 100 million W/cm2. Brief though the flash is, its power is
thousands of times greater than that which could be obtained by focusing sunlight, and is
enough to melt or vaporize a spot on the surface of even the most refractory material.
This ability to deposit huge amounts of energy must be carefully considered anytime the
laser is fired. Very expensive test equipment has been destroyed in the past because of
operators failing to appreciate this fact. This high spectral radiance is a result of the
spatial coherence of the laser light.
It should be noted that the output power of the laser is quite high and that many of
the operating wavelengths are in the visible spectrum, which creates a problem for
possible eye damage. The cornea is the transparent window at the front of the eyeball
and transmits light with wavelengths between 0.4 and 1.4 mm. Laser light in this band
can penetrate the retina of the eye and be a potential source of damage. Light entering
the eye is brought to a point on the retina producing an optical gain of between 2 105
and 5 105; if a gain of 5 105 is assumed, a beam of energy 1 mJ/cm2 at the cornea
becomes 500 J/cm2 at the retina. The light passes through the nerve layers of the retina
and reaches the light-sensitive layers, which rapidly heat. Causing damage to these
layers produces a blind spot. The extent of the damage depends on the energy reaching
the light-sensitive layers and the area irradiated. Short-pulsed lasers (less than 10 msec)
may give rise to a different damage mechanism owing to the large amount of energy
being delivered in a very short time. A rapid rise in temperature occurs such that the
liquid components of the cells are converted to gas, with a resultant swelling of the cells.
In most cases these changes are so rapid that they are explosive and the cells rupture.
The pressure transients produced result in an annular blast zone around the thermal
damage; the immediate damage is severely compounded if a blood vessel is ruptured
and blood flows into the vitreous.
NATO STANAG 3606 gives maximum permitted exposure levels of irradiance that
are agreed to provide an acceptably low probability of optical damage for neodymium:
yttrium aluminum garnet (Nd:YAG) lasers. These are 50 mJ/m2 for single-pulse lasers
and 16 mJ/m2 for a train of pulses at 10 Hz. The eye can be protected from laser light by
the use of absorbing plastic filters, dynamic eye protectors, or eye patches. Absorbing
plastic filters incorporated as a visor are the most practical current method of aircrew
eye protection. Organic dyes within the plastic are used to selectively absorb specific
wavelengths. However, there will always be a trade-off between optical density and
visual transmittance; as one increases, the other decreases. Low visual transmittance,
and hence color attenuation, leads to eye fatigue and difficulty with reading cockpit
instruments. The ideal dynamic eye protector is nearly transparent except when acti-
vated by a hazardous light source, at which time it becomes nearly opaque. Such helmet
visors have been demonstrated for use against nuclear flash, but have reaction times on
the order of 150 msec, which is too slow for use against laser pulses on the order of
nanoseconds.
One other method of making lasers eye safe is the process of Raman shifting, where
the laser output is sent through a different medium, such as helium. The wavelength is
then shifted out of the 0.4 to 1.4 mm region.
The major areas in which lasers have found military application are
● Communications
● Range finding
● Target marking
● Optical radar
● Direct fire simulators
● Thermonuclear fission
● High-energy laser (HEL)
Speech communication equipment requires a bandwidth of approximately 4 kHz/
channel to avoid mutual interference. In the overcrowded radio frequency bands there is
insufficient bandwidth available to avoid this interference. Since lasers operate at optical
frequencies, there is sufficient bandwidth available to accommodate all the information
links in the world without overlap, and recent developments have made it possible to
achieve signal modulation at these high frequencies. Unfortunately laser light is atte-
nuated and scattered by the atmosphere in the same way as ordinary light; clouds, haze,
and fog limit the long-range possibilities. The high monochromaticity of the laser makes
it unwise to use wide-band transmission models such as LOWTRAN to estimate the
atmospheric propagation of a laser beam. A GaAs laser is being developed by the U.S.
Navy for secure, short-range, ship-to-ship communications. Fiberoptic communications,
as described previously in chapter 3, use lasers extensively.
If a pulse of light is timed from initiation to reception on reflection from a target,
then, since the velocity of light is known, the range can be determined with an accuracy
set by the pulse width. In pulsed lasers, the pulse width is as low as a few tenths of a
nanosecond, and ranges can be determined to within 10 m, as shown in Table 7.10.
Laser target markers (LTMs) have been developed to pinpoint specific targets in a
confusing battlefield target array. Such LTMs, which usually double as a range finder,
can be used to reflect laser energy into an airborne laser sensor or a laser-guided
weapon. The laser signal normally has a coding superimposed such that the airborne
sensor can reject other laser reflected signals.
TABLE 7.10 ¢ Typical Laser Range Finder
Minimum range 100 m Maximum range 20 km

Range accuracy 5 m Angular divergence 1 mile
PRF 6 to 10 ppm Pulse width 10 nsec
Weight 20 kg Energy output 200 mJ
The higher frequency and shorter wavelength of the laser compared with conven-
tional radar permits its use for the determination of position and velocity in circum-
stances where radar clutter is normally a limitation. In theory, it is possible to detect
high-speed, low-flying aircraft by optical radar; however, in practice it is difficult to
direct the laser beam on to such a target and then track it.
The narrow laser beam has been used with GaAs IR lasers to simulate gunfire for
training. The weapon is provided with a laser whose LOS is collimated with the weapon
and is activated whenever blank ammunition is fired. Targets are fitted with IR detec-
tors. Each laser is coded for identification and the signal is decoded by the target to
determine the probability of a kill. Normally, after a hit, the target’s laser transmitter is
automatically deactivated.
The precision focusing of high-intensity radiation afforded by the laser has been
exploited to achieve the high temperatures in deuterium discharges necessary to initiate
nuclear fission by thermal means.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines an HEL as any laser device having
an average level greater than 20 kW or a single pulse of energy greater than 30 kJ.
7.10 PASSIVE EO FLIGHT TEST EVALUATIONS

The primary purpose of any EO system is to discriminate targets. For these systems, it is
the ability to break out a target from the background, either by contrast or a difference in
temperature. Three basic descriptions are used for EO systems:
● Detection—an object is present (a blob is seen and has a reasonable chance of being
an object of interest)
● Recognition—the class the object belongs to (the blob can be distinguished as a tank,
truck, destroyer, fighter, man, etc.)
● Identification—the object is discerned with sufficient clarity to determine type
(the blob can be specifically identified as T-52 tank, an F-18, an AEGIS class
friendly ship, etc.)
This is best illustrated by Figures 7.53 and 7.54, which are taken from chapter 21 of
Holst’s text (Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance). The first figure is that of a
Soviet Bear bomber. View A is a silhouette of this bomber in its clearest detail. View B is
what would be seen with the least angular resolution. Each one of the pixilated blocks in
each picture is called a resolution cell, or detector angular subtense (DAS); this concept
was previously discussed in section 7.7.5 of the text. The DAS is defined as the detector
size divided by the focal length; it can be thought of as the angular cone over which the
detector senses radiation. Since this is an angular measurement, the detector will see more
of the scene as the range increases. Since the object of interest will become smaller with
range, it should be obvious that the resolution will also decrease with increased range. As
the object is covered by more resolution cells, the image becomes clearer and more
distinguishable until Figure F, when it is covered by 64 contiguous DASs across the wing.
The same process can be seen with the Sherman class destroyer in Figure 7.54.
Figure A is what the destroyer would look like with total clarity. At some longer range,
fewer of the resolution cells will cover the object and less clarity will be obtained
(Figure B). Eventually, as the destroyer moves closer to the sensor, more and more
Soviet Bear Bomber FIGURE 7.53 ¢

(A) Silhouette Discrimination
(B) 4 contiguous DASs across wingspan Versus DAS
(C) 8 contiguous DASs across wingspan Coverage
(D) 16 contiguous DASs across wingspan
(E) 32 contiguous DASs across wingspan
(F) 64 contiguous DASs across wingspan
A B
For a staring array, the DAS and pixel
are the same. Eight levels of gray are used.
C D
E F
Sherman Class Destroyer FIGURE 7.54 ¢

(A) Silhouette Discrimination of a
(B) 8 contiguous DASs across length Sherman Class
(C) 16 contiguous DASs across length Destroyer
(D) 32 contiguous DASs across length A
(E) 64 contiguous DASs across length
For a staring array, the DAS and pixel

are the same. Eight levels of gray are used.
E
resolution cells fall upon the object until the type can be identified. In both cases we
would be able to claim a ‘‘detection’’ with Figure 7.53B and 7.54B, a ‘‘recognition’’
with Figures 7.53C and 7.54C, and an ‘‘identification’’ with Figures 7.53E and 7.54E.
The detection, recognition, and identification process just described is true only for
the static case. In reality, there are many external clues that will aid in our discrimination
levels. In all cases, there is a human observer involved, and the human image inter-
pretation process is very difficult to model.
One of the key parameters that determine the true resolution of an EO system is
called the modulation transfer function (MTF). Literally, the MTF is a measure of how
well the system reproduces, or displays, the actual scene. Mathematically, the MTF is
defined as the displayed image modulation divided by the input scene modulation. The
system MTF is really a summation of the transfer functions of each of the components.
In a FLIR system, for example, there would be an optical MTF, a detector MTF, and a
display MTF; taken together they represent the FLIR MTF.
An easy way to interpret the MTF is to imagine an optical system looking at an
equivalent bar chart. The chart is comprised of alternating black and white bars evenly
spaced at 100% contrast. A lens cannot fully transfer this contrast (to the CCD, CMOS,
or IR detector) because of the diffraction limit. As the bar spacing is decreased, the
frequency is increased and it becomes more difficult for the lens to efficiently transfer
the image contrast. This scenario is shown in Figure 7.55, which shows that for a large
spacing (low frequency), the contrast is replicated very well with minor loss in contrast.
As the bar spacing is decreased (frequency increased), the contrast suffers. The MTF is
the measurement of a system’s ability to transfer contrast at a particular resolution level
from the object to the image, or a way to incorporate resolution and contrast into a
single specification. An MTF graph will normally be supplied with the documentation of
FIGURE 7.55 ¢ Equivalent Bar Chart Image

Percentage of
Contrast Transferred
to Image
Lens
White
100% Contrast
Black
90% Contrast
Equivalent Bar Chart Image
White
100% Contrast
Black
20% Contrast
the system from the vendor and plots spatial frequency (cycles/mrad) versus MTF
(percent contrast). The MTF is used to approximate the best focus of an IR system and is
usually set for the spatial frequency associated with corresponding 0.5% contrast (50%).
Sometimes the discrimination levels are fairly easy: an aircraft with a sky background
or a moving boat on the water. Sometimes they are fairly difficult: a cool tank in a high-
clutter background, natural objects viewed during the diurnal crossover, etc. At any rate, a
process for equating range predictions versus system angular resolution must be devised.
This process is similar to taking an eye test. If we are told that our vision is 20/40,
this really means that what we can discriminate at 20 paces from the chart is what a
‘‘normal’’ person can discriminate at 40 paces; or to put it a different way, your eye’s
angular resolution is not as good as a normal person’s. Conversely, if your vision is
measured at 20/15, you can discriminate at 20 paces what the ‘‘normal’’ person can
discriminate at 15 paces; your angular resolution is better than the ‘‘normal’’ person’s.
Poor vision can be aided in most cases by improving the optics of your eyes (wearing
glasses or contact lenses). The same is true for EO systems.
A very smart man by the name of Mr. John Johnson is credited with determining the
relationship between discrimination and DAS. His approach is called the equivalent bar
pattern and was first developed for NVGs. He used scale models of eight military
vehicles and one soldier against a bland background. Multiple observers were then asked
to view the targets through NVGs and ascertain the distances at which they were able to
detect, recognize, and identify the targets. Air Force tribar charts were viewed with
similar contrast and the maximum resolvable bar pattern frequency was determined.
A typical bar chart is shown at Figure 7.56. For optical systems (TV, NVG), the length
of any bar is five times the width (L:W is 5:1); for IR systems (IRST, FLIR), the length
of any bar is seven times the width (L:W is 7:1). One cycle is defined as one black bar
and one white bar, or twice the width of the bar. For optical systems, the discrimination
is based on contrast, whereas with IR the discrimination is based on temperature
FIGURE 7.56 ¢
–2 –1 Equivalent Bar Chart
(1951 U.S. Air Force
2 1 Resolution Target)
2
3 1
1 0 3
2
2
3
4
3 4
4 5
6
0
4
5 5
1 6
6
5 –2
6 1
FIGURE 7.57 ¢
Johnson’s
One-Dimension
Equivalent Bar
Pattern
TABLE 7.11 ¢ Johnson Criteria
Discrimination Cycles Across

Level Meaning Minimum Dimension
Detection An object is present 1.0
Recognition The class to which the object belongs 4.0
Identification The object is discerned with sufficient clarity to 8.0
specify the type
difference (DT). For optical systems, the board is painted black and white, for 100%
contrast. There are other boards that are distributed shades of gray which enable the
evaluator to plot spatial frequency versus minimum resolvable contrast (100% contrast
boards will only provide spatial frequency plots versus lighting levels). For IR systems,
the board can either be temperature controlled, as with hot water, or it can be made with
black-painted metal with the white bars cut out, then only the board needs to be heated.
Through analysis, Johnson was able to equate the number of cycles, from an
equivalent bar pattern (see Figure 7.57), needed across an object in order to discriminate
as detection, recognition, or identification. Johnson used the smallest dimension of the
object as the critical dimension, so all of his studies are based on one dimension.
Johnson’s criteria (Table 7.11) were revised by the Night Vision Laboratory,
yielding the current industry standard for a one (minimum dimension)-dimensional
target discrimination with 50% probability level (Table 7.12).
7.10.1 Determination of Spatial Frequency

Spatial frequency is used to predict detection, recognition, and identification ranges.
Conversely, if we know the size of the target, we can compute the required spatial
frequency. As previously mentioned, since the DAS is an angular measurement, it will
subtend a larger area of the scene as the distance increases. There are two methods that can
be used during ground tests to calculate the spatial frequency of an EO system. The first
method is the scientific method, which entails using a collimator with calibrated targets.
TABLE 7.12 ¢ One-Dimensional Target Discrimination (50% Probability)
Discrimination Cycles Across

Level Meaning Minimum Dimension
Detection An object is present (object versus noise) 1.0 0.025
Orientation The object is approximately symmetrical or 1.4 0.35
unsymmetrical and its orientation can be
discerned (side view versus front view)
Recognition The class to which the object belongs (e.g., tank, 4.0 0.8
truck, fighter, destroyer, man)
Identification The object is discerned with sufficient clarity to 6.4 1.5
specify type (e.g., T-52 tank, friendly jeep)
Parabolic FIGURE 7.58 ¢

Focusing Mirror Optically Collimated
EO Sensor EO Test Target
under Test
Sensor Line-of-sight
Planar
Path-folding
Mirror
EO Target
(Placed at Focal
Point of Mirror)
This method is used by larger testing organizations who can readily access specific
lab equipment. The second method can be accomplished if better equipment is not
available and can achieve results very close to the scientific method.
7.10.1.1 Scientific Method of Determining Spatial Frequency

Spatial frequency can be determined scientifically by using a combination of the bar
chart and a collimator. This procedure is described in detail in the Avionics Guide to
Flight Test (section 4.2.9), from the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development (AGARD). AGARD has since been renamed the Research and Technology
Organization and is under the auspices of NATO. The procedure is also described in
detail in John Minor’s article, ‘‘Flight Test and Evaluation of Electro-Optical Sensor
Systems.’’ It will also be a requirement to test the spatial frequency while airborne, as this
will enable the evaluator to determine if there are any aeromechanical or aero-optical
effects (see section 7.6 of this text).
The EO collimator consists of a spherical collimating mirror and a planar path-
folding mirror mounted on an optical bench with an EO target. The target can consist of
a radiation source, such as a laser or other illuminator, a reflective target to be illumi-
nated by an external source, or a thermal bar target for IR sensor testing, so the same
setup can be used for any EO system. The arrangement of the collimated target com-
ponents is as shown in Figure 7.58.
The EO target is positioned at the focal point of the collimating mirror. The radia-
tion from a single point on the target is thus reflected from the collimating mirror with
all rays parallel to the line of sight from the EO sensor under test to the point on
the target. The image of the target therefore appears to the sensor as if it is at an
infinite range. The purpose of the collimated source is to provide calibrated targets for
long-range sensors without the difficulties associated with actually providing targets
at large ranges.
The thermal bar target consists of a temperature-controlled surface (IR source) with
a slotted template mounted in such a way as to block part of the radiation from the
source. The temperature of the template is held constant at ambient temperature by
mounting on a heat sink. A bar of the target is formed where a slot in the template allows
the sensor under test to view the temperature-controlled source through the template.
The spaces of the target are formed where the spaces between the slots in the template
block the radiation from the temperature-controlled source. The spatial frequency of the
collimated bar target image is adjusted by changing bar target templates with different
bar and space widths (smaller will yield a higher frequency and larger will yield a lower
frequency). The typical temperature-controlled source is electrically heated and ther-
moelectrically cooled to produce a bar-space temperature differential of 20 C to þ20 C.
The temperature differential must be configurable to allow sufficient testing of the
system under test at its design limits (e.g., 0.2 C to about 0.05 C). A representation of an
IR sensor under test is shown in Figure 7.59.
FIGURE 7.59 ¢ IR Sensor

Parabolic
Collimated Thermal Mirror
Bar Target
Planar
Mirror
Temperature Optical
Controlled Collimator
Block Cart
Bar Target Template

7.10.1.2 A Secondary Method of Determining Spatial Frequency

By using the equivalent bar chart (or spatial frequency board), we are in effect calculating
the angular resolution. On the ground, the board is placed perpendicular and in front of the
sensor at a given distance (Figure 7.60). The actual board will have many different-size
bar patterns, but all in the correct ratios, similar to the chart depicted in Figure 7.56.
In the optical case, the lighting at the board (with a light meter) is measured and the
bars are viewed at the sensor display in wide FOV or minimum zoom. The board is moved
either toward or away from the sensor until the bars become indiscernible. The next step is
to refine the exact point that is the maximum distance at which the bars are seen clearly.
Measurements that need to be made are the distance to the board, light intensity at
the board, width of one full cycle (one white plus one black bar), and FOV selected. The
exercise is repeated for different FOVs and different lighting levels. The test is repeated
using contrast boards to determine the minimum resolvable contrast. Everything is the
same for the IR sensor, except temperature measurements are substituted for lighting levels.
The temperature differences (DT) are obtained by heating the metal board with an appro-
priate device (heat gun, heating elements, etc.) and measuring with a thermocouple (board
temperature minus ambient temperature). A data card for the test is shown in Table 7.13.
The angular resolution and the spatial frequency are calculated from the recorded
data. If we call the width of one cycle d and the distance to the board R, then the spatial
frequency (fS) is given by
fS ¼ R=d 0:001 cycles=mrad: (7.25)
The angular resolution (qr) is equal to 1/fS(cutoff). It should be noted that the angular
resolution provided by the manufacturer is normally for one detector element or DAS.
The spatial frequency that we calculate and plot is based on 1 cycle (1 black/1 white or
2 DASs). If the angular resolution is provided by the manufacturer, then the fS(cutoff) will
be equal to 1/2qr.
FIGURE 7.60 ¢
Spatial Frequency
Ground Test
TABLE 7.13 ¢ Spatial Frequency Ground Test Card
Sensor Type/Installation: Date:

Lighting DT Time FOV Cycle Distance to Angular Resolution Spatial Frequency
Width Board (Calculated) (Calculated)
FIGURE 7.61 ¢
fS (cutoff)
Spatial Frequency
Results
T (ºC)
C
MRT
MRC
fS (cycles/mrad)
FIGURE 7.62 ¢
EO
Airborne Spatial
Board
Frequency Test
Sensor under
Test
The spatial frequency can then be plotted as a function of DT for IR systems, or

lighting level (i.e., contrast) for optical systems. A series of plots are then developed for
all FOVs available. If a system has a wide, narrow, and zoom FOV, then three spatial
frequency plots will be developed. These plots become the installed spatial frequency
and are compared to the manufacturer’s stated spatial frequency to calculate the
degradation due to installation. An example of the spatial frequency obtained from the
ground test is shown in Figure 7.61. The figure is bounded horizontally by the MRDT; at
lower spatial frequencies the system is sensitivity limited by its ability to resolve tem-
perature differences. The figure is bounded vertically by the cutoff spatial frequency,
which is the resolution limit of the system.
To be done correctly, the airborne test should be done against a calibrated EO
ground target. A representation of the setup is shown in Figure 7.62.
The DT of the IR board is known. The aircraft flies toward the board and the operator
calls ‘‘mark’’ when the bars are discriminated. This test is repeated for different DT, FOV,
polarity settings, and automatic versus manual level and gain. The airborne spatial fre-
quency test for EO systems can be flown the same way, but the EO target board may be
painted on the ground, on a wall, or on mobile boards of known contrast. Truth data are
required for this test, as I have to know where I am in space when the ‘‘mark’’ is called. I
also need to know the surveyed position of the target board and my altitude, as well as the
atmospherics for the test so that data can be corrected for transmissivity (see section 7.5).
For TV and camera systems, the lighting conditions must also be known; a photometer
may be used to obtain this information. A sample test matrix is found in Table 7.14. The
airborne spatial frequency that is calculated is then plotted against the manufacturer and
installed spatial frequencies to obtain the aeromechanical and aero-optical effects.
The end result should look something like Figure 7.63.
A Note about Spatial Frequency: It is possible to obtain a horizontal spatial
frequency and a vertical spatial frequency. This happens when either the vertical or
TABLE 7.14 ¢ Flight Test Matrix for Spatial Frequency
System
under Test DT FOV Level and Gain Polarity
Approximately six Wide medium Manual and White hot and
0 C–15 C narrow zoom automatic black hot
FIGURE 7.63 ¢
fS(cutoff) Differences Between
Installed and
In-Flight Spatial
Airborne fS
Frequency
T(ºC)
C
Ground Test fS
MRT
MRC
fS (cycles/mrad)
horizontal bars merge while the other set can still be discriminated. If we remember the
setup with standard U.S. TV systems, there are 480 640 pixels that make up the screen.
This would indicate that the vertical bars on the display should be present even as the
horizontal bars start to merge. In order to use a combined spatial frequency, take the
square root of the product of the horizontal and vertical spatial frequencies.
A second note about Spatial Frequency: If you are attempting to calculate the
spatial frequency of an EO system which incorporates an automatic iris, the automatic
iris must first be disabled before changing lighting levels. If it is not, the evaluator will
find that the spatial frequency will remain constant for all lighting levels.
7.10.2 Range Predictions

By knowing the spatial frequency, the atmospherics, and some of the attributes of the
target, we can make pretty good estimations on detection, recognition, and identification
ranges. By performing the following steps, you too can make these predictions.
Step 1. Determine the spatial frequency (described in section section 7.10.1).
Remember that the ratio of width to height in the bar pattern is 5:1 for EO (minimum
resolvable D contrast) and 7:1 for IR (minimum resolvable DT).
Step 2. Determine the critical dimension. As previously discussed, and shown in
Figure 7.57, and Tables 7.11 and 7.12, the one-dimensional (1D) target discrimination is
based on the smallest dimension of the target. A 2D discrimination is based on the
square root of the area. If we let hc be the critical dimension, then
hc ¼ smallest
p dimension ð1DÞ
(7.26)
hc ¼ LW ð2DÞ
It should be noted that as the aspect of the target changes, the apparent length and
width (as seen by the viewer) changes. This will affect the range at which the target is
seen. This is graphically represented in Figure 7.64.
FIGURE 7.64 ¢
Aspect Change
versus Recognition
and Identification
Ranges 10 8 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10
0° 0°
No. of Cycles
Required
15°
15° Recognition
30°
30°
°
45
45
Identification
°
90°
Step 3. Determine the critical distance. This is really the process of overlaying the
required bar patterns over the target with the bars aligned to the longest dimension.
The parameter is designated as dc and is defined as
dc ¼ hc =N: (7.27)
The critical dimension is known from step 2, and N is the required number of cycles
across the target for each phase of discrimination. From Table 7.12, we see that the
number of required cycles for detection, recognition, and identification for the 1D target
discrimination is 1, 4, and 8, respectively. Should we be interested in a 2D discrimina-
tion level, we would need another table. For military applications, two sets of tables are
provided which call out ‘‘extended’’ discrimination levels. These tables try to define the gray
areas between detection, recognition, and identification and are included as Tables 7.15 and
7.16 for completeness.
Step 4. Calculate the predicted ranges for specific targets. The basic range predic-
tion formula is given by
RPred ¼ dc fS 1000: (7.28)
This formula is rarely used since it is only good for a 50% probability of detection in a
moderate clutter environment. (These are the conditions for Tables 7.15 and 7.16.) What
would happen if you wanted a 75% probability of detection, or if the target was in a
high-clutter environment? For these cases, the range prediction formula becomes
hc
RPred ¼ fS 1000: (7.29)
NxTTPF
The only variable not known in the second form of the equation is the target transfer
probability function (TTPF). Think of the TTPF as an adjustment of the number of
cycles required due to changes in the probability of detection requirement or clutter
environment. The TTPF due to changes in the probability of detection is shown in
Table 7.17. A combined TTPF for clutter region and probability is shown in Table 7.18.
TABLE 7.15 ¢ Extended 1D Discrimination Levels
Extended 1D Discrimination Levels
Recommended
Task Description No. of Cycles
Detection A blob has been discerned which may warrant investigation 0.5
The blob has a reasonable chance of being the object sought 1.0
The blob has a high probability of being the object sought due to location, 1.5
motion, etc.
Orientation The object is roughly symmetric or orientation can be discerned 2.0
Clutter Rejection The object is a potential target and not clutter 2.25
Classification The broad class of object types to which the object belongs can be determined 2.5
Type Recognition Object discerned with sufficient clarity that the class can be determined 3.0
Classical Recognition Object discerned with sufficient clarity that its specific class can be determined 4.0
Identification Friend The country of manufacture can be determined 6.0
or Foe
Identification Object discerned with sufficient clarity to determine specific type within the 8.0
class
Target Selection Real targets can be distinguished from replica decoys 10.0
Operational Success Ownership of the object can be determined and probable hostile/nonhostile 12.0
intent established
TABLE 7.16 ¢ Extended 2D Discrimination Levels
Extended 2D Discrimination Levels
Recommended
Task Description No. of Cycles
Detection A blob has been discerned which may warrant investigation 0.38
The blob has a reasonable chance of being the object sought 0.75
The blob has a high probability of being the object sought due to 1.13
location, motion, etc.
Orientation The object is roughly symmetric or orientation can be discerned 1.5
Clutter Rejection The object is a potential target and not clutter 1.69
Classification The broad class of object types to which the object belongs can be determined 1.88
Type Recognition Object discerned with sufficient clarity that the class can be determined 2.25
Classical Recognition Object discerned with sufficient clarity that its specific class can be determined 3.0
Identification Friend The country of manufacture can be determined 4.5
or Foe
Identification Object discerned with sufficient clarity to determine specific type within the 6.0
class
Target Selection Real targets can be distinguished from replica decoys 7.5
Operational Success Ownership of the object can be determined and probable hostile/nonhostile 9.0
intent established
TABLE 7.17 ¢ TTPF for Probability of Detection
Probability of Discrimination Multiplier

1.00 3.0
0.95 2.0
0.80 1.5
0.50 1.0
0.30 0.75
0.10 0.50
0.02 0.25
0 0
TABLE 7.18 ¢ TTPF for Clutter and Probability of Detection
Probability of Low Clutter Moderate Clutter High Clutter

Detection SCR > 10 1 < SCR < 10 SCR < 1
1.0 1.7 2.8 **
0.95 1.0 1.9 **
0.90 0.90 1.7 7.0*
0.80 0.75 1.3 5.0
0.50 0.50 1.0 2.5
0.30 0.30 0.75 2.0
0.10 0.15 0.35 1.4
0.02 0.05 0.1 1.0
0 0 0 0
*Estimated.
**No data available.
The SCR in Table 7.18 is the signal-to-clutter ratio; there are three defined SCRs
used in the evaluation of EO systems. The SCR is defined as
SCR ¼ ðmax target value background meanÞ=sclutter ; (7.30)
where
s
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi

PN
sclutter ¼ 1
N si ,
2
i¼1
si ¼ the pixel value root mean square (rms) in a square cell that has side
dimensions twice the target minimum dimension, and
N ¼ the number of adjoining cells.
This multiplier can now be inserted into the previous equation and the predicted ranges
can be computed.
Step 5. Adjustments to the predicted ranges based on atmospherics. If you
remember from the previous discussions, the transmissivity, or extinction coefficient,
changes with respect to the current atmospherics. The ranges will have to be adjusted for
the loss of energy due to scattering and absorption. If the transmissivity is 80%, or a loss
of 20%, then all of the predicted ranges will be adjusted (reduced) by 20%. The new
range will be calculated by multiplying the calculated range by 0.80. These adjustments
can be found in section 7.5 of this text, or for a better explanation, see chapter 15 of
Holst’s text, Electro-Optical Imaging System Performance.
Step 6. Operational considerations when performing range predictions. There are
some other considerations that must be dealt with when calculating detection, recognition,
and identification ranges. In normal operations, search would be performed in a wide
FOV; therefore, the spatial frequency used in calculating the detection range will be the
one calculated in wide FOV. Once something is detected, the operator will normally select
a medium FOV or narrow FOV for recognition; the spatial frequency used here is the one
for the appropriate FOV. Since the spatial frequency will increase for the same DT, it is not
uncommon to calculate a recognition range that is higher than the detection range (see the
range prediction formula in step 4). When this occurs, use the recognition range equal to
the detection range due to the change in FOV, and hence the spatial frequency. The same
considerations apply to identification range if another FOV is available.
In looking at the information required to perform range predictions, we can readily
see that if we do not have a calibrated target, then we have to make some assumptions.
We will have to know (or assume) the target size and the associated DT or contrast of the
target with its background. Some evaluators make the mistake of using a very high DT or
a very high brightness level in their predictions, especially when looking at targets that
generate their own radiation (combustion engines, etc.). Remember that detectors have a
cutoff frequency, and there will be a temperature at which the detector will not respond
very well with increased temperature (see section section 7.7.2). These detectors will be
resolution or gain limited. The area-weighted DT approach described in section 7.6
works well for the range prediction problem. The answer obtained may be slightly
conservative, but it is better than being overly optimistic.
The same is true for target size. Theoretically, as target size increases, the apparent
detection range has no bounds, but one has to remember how the spatial frequency is
calculated. As the target size (d) grows, the spatial frequency approaches zero; with
inhibitory response, the detection range actually decreases as target size grows. When
performing range calculations, it is best to concentrate on a portion of large targets
rather than the entire complex (smokestacks of a factory, the locomotive of a train, etc.).
The last consideration is how the operator will use the system. The inexperienced
operator may elect to have the system provide the displayed picture. This is an automatic
level and gain select feature of EO systems. The experienced operator may elect to
manually limit what is displayed to him and control the level and gain. The level and
gain of an IR system can be somewhat equated to the brightness and contrast of a TV
system. The level is associated with the minimum resolvable temperature. The operator
may elect to see all targets (temperatures) that the system is capable of seeing (max-
imum level). If a system can detect targets above 1 C and can resolve targets to within
0.1 C, maximum level will show all targets in the FOV whose temperature is 1 C or
higher. During the daytime, probably everything in the FOV is above 1 C, and the
display will be washed out. As the operator levels down, the minimum resolvable
temperature (the temperature of objects displayed) is increased and the noise is removed
from the display. In order to get definition (contrast), the operator uses the gain control.
Maximum gain will show contrast based on the maximum gain of the system; in this
case 0.1 C. This will once again wash out any definition, since most objects will be
within 0.1 C of each other. As the operator gains down, the contrast is based on higher
DT and the picture has more definition. When spatial frequency is being determined, the
more experienced operator, using manual settings, will invariably yield higher spatial
frequency values and better results.
7.10.3 Field of View and Field of Regard

Field-of-view and FOR testing are important for two reasons. The first is that we want to
ensure that wide FOV covers an area large enough to aid in detections, but not so large
as to degrade resolution. Narrow FOV should be small enough to provide enhanced
resolution, but not so small to cause objects to leave the FOV with small slew inputs.
The second is to ensure that the FOR is suitable for the mission in regards to view and
tracking requirements.
The easiest way to calculate the FOV is to position the aircraft with the sensor at bore-
sight pointing toward a wall. For each FOV, have an assistant mark on the wall the edges of
the FOV as called out by the operator. This test is shown pictorially in Figures 7.65 and 7.66.
If the sensor is slewable, the FOR is calculated by rotating the sensor through 360
(or the slew limits) in azimuth or elevation, noting any obstructions. The FOR should
then be plotted, noting these obstructions.
7.10.4 Boresight
Boresight testing is accomplished to ensure that all sensors (including the pilot) are
using the same plane of reference and are free from parallax errors. Slight errors in
boresight may prevent an operator from seeing a target in a narrow FOV display because
the target is outside of the azimuth or elevation limits of the display. Corrections to the
boresight can be accomplished either mechanically or in software, and ground tests will
determine if the corrections were implemented successfully.
The alignment of the EO sensor LOS reference (boresight) with the aircraft armament
datum line is normally determined by employing a special test fixture incorporating an IR
FIGURE 7.65 ¢
Horizontal FOV
Determination
Wide FOV
Narrow FOV
Zoom
FIGURE 7.66 ¢
Vertical FOV
Determination
FOV
target and collimator (or autocollimator) that bolts to the airframe and provides an
on-boresight target. The following procedure is employed:
● Mount the test fixture on aircraft.
● Set sensor LOS reference to zero azimuth and zero elevation.
● Note the indicated position of the test target in relation to the sensor LOS reference
(boresight).
The relative alignment of the boresight of an EO sensor with respect to the bore-
sights of other sensors and systems can be determined by simultaneously acquiring a
known target on the boresight of the respective sensors and comparing their indicated
positions. Both on-the-ground and in-flight procedures are employed.
For operational considerations, and if a fixture is not available, use the same wall
that was used for the horizontal FOV test and note the relative positions of the pilot
design eye point and the boresight (0 azimuth, 0 elevation), then calculate the angular
difference from the pilot point of reference. It may be found that the difference is sig-
nificant enough (especially in narrow FOV or zoom) that the system is unusable (i.e., the
target is out of the sensor’s FOV). The same procedure is carried out for the horizontal
and vertical FOV (shown in Figure 7.66).
7.10.5 Sensor Slew Rate

Slew rates are tested to determine if the operator can adequately control the movement of
the sensor. Slew rates are critical in manual track systems; overly sensitive controls will
cause operator-induced oscillation, whereas highly damped controls may prevent tracking
entirely. Excessive slew rates in the narrow FOV will cause the target to leave the FOV
and the operator may be forced to return to the wide FOV to reacquire the target.
The maximum sensor LOS slew rates are most readily determined by commanding
sensor head slew from one limit to the opposite limit and timing the transit with a
stopwatch. The test should be accomplished in both directions (left/right and up/down)
and should be repeated for repeatability and statistical significance. The evaluator
should note if the slew rate is pressure sensitive, that is, more pressure on the switch
commands a higher slew rate. The test should also be repeated in all FOVs, since the
slew rate decreases with decreasing FOV.
7.10.6 Line-of-Sight Drift Rate

Drift is a significant problem when EO systems are used to either slave other sensors,
such as a laser designator or range finder, or when they are used in weapons employ-
ment. Pointing errors in an LRF will result in erroneous ranges, and bearing miscues to a
weapon may result in an errant bomb. The evaluator needs to determine the drift rate of
the system and determine its impact on mission requirements.
The long-term LOS instability (i.e., drift rate) of an EO sensor is best determined on
the ground, using the following procedure, illustrated in Figure 7.67. This test can be
accomplished in conjunction with the horizontal FOV test covered in section 7.10.3.
● Zero the drift with the sensor control as per manufacturer instructions.
● Mark the sensor LOS reference (cross-hairs) on the wall.
● After various time intervals, note the positions of the points in the target plane at
which the sensor reference is then directed.
● Calculate the sensor drift rate according to the formula:
tan1 ½Dðt1 Þ=R
q¼ ; (7.31)
t1 t0
where
D(t1) ¼ linear drift distance at range R at time t,
R ¼ range from sensor to target plane,
t1 ¼ time of measurement, and
t0 ¼ time of initial alignment.
The same procedure is employed to determine drift in elevation.
FIGURE 7.67 ¢ Target Plane

Sensor LOS Drift EO Sensor
Rate
LOS Ref. at t t0
LOS R
ef. at t
t q D (t1)
1
R
7.10.7 Bearing Accuracy

Bearing accuracy is tested in conjunction with the FOV and drift rate tests described in
sections 7.10.3 and 7.10.6. Place the sensor boresight (cross-hairs) at increments of 10
(as indicated by the display) and have an assistant mark the wall where the sensor is
pointing. Compare the calculated bearing to the displayed bearing. In-flight determi-
nation of bearing accuracy can be performed according to the following procedure:
● Fly the prescribed flight path, at constant altitude, toward a well-defined target of
known position.
● Acquire the target on the sensor and vary the bearing to target and record the indi-
cated bearing as a function of time.
● Note the aircraft position using appropriate TSPI data and calculate test aircraft to
target bearing.
● Compare the target bearing indicated by the sensor to truth data by time correlating
the data.
7.10.8 LOS Jitter

The short-term LOS instability (jitter) of an EO sensor must be determined in flight because
in-flight vibration is a major contributor to LOS jitter. The usual method of measurement of
LOS jitter is indirect and utilizes the measurable loss of sensor angular resolution due to
LOS jitter (delayed detection ranges). A direct method of determining the LOS jitter of an
EO imaging sensor is to record the displayed image of a well-defined source (using a
camera or video recorder) and measure the actual jitter in the displayed image.
7.10.9 In-flight Detection, Recognition, and Identification Ranges

The maximum ranges at which an EO sensor provides detection, recognition, and
identification of a target must be determined in flight and can utilize an EO sensor bar
target or predetermined operational-type targets. The EO bar target has the advantage of
known, controlled characteristics. Mission-related targets have the advantage of realism.
Although the radiant intensity of some mission-related targets can be measured by
independent instrumentation, quantitative sensor evaluation generally requires the use of
a specially designed target such as the bar target. The procedure for determining the
maximum detection and recognition ranges is as follows:
● Fly the prescribed flight path, at constant altitude, toward a well-defined target at a
known location (turn-in ranges will have been established by the range predictions
made previously).
● Determine the aircraft’s position (range to target) by range (ground) instrumentation or
by an onboard ranging system (laser range finder/radar) and record as a function of time.
● Align the sensor LOS to place the EO target of known anticipated position in the
wide FOV.
● Acquire the target (detection) on the sensor (noting the time of detection).
● Switch to the medium FOV or narrow FOV and continue to observe the EO target on
the sensor until the target features, or bars for a bar target, become distinguishable.
● Note the time of feature definition as the time of recognition and note the same
parameters as for detection.
● Continue the run until identification of the target is obtained and note the same
parameters as for detection.
● Correlate aircraft-to-target range times with detection and recognition times to obtain
maximum ranges for detection, recognition, and identification.
NOTE: The maximum detection, recognition, and identification ranges are a function of
the radiant and spatial characteristics of the target, the ambient background illumination,
and the atmospheric conditions at the time of the test. To be meaningful, the maximum
ranges must be associated with specific target characteristics and test conditions.
7.10.10 Target Tracking

There are three fundamentally different methods of ‘‘position tracking’’ employed with
EO sensors. True tracking systems use the video signal produced by the target and track
some feature of the target image as seen by the tracker (the centroid of the image, edge
[contrast] of the image, etc.). Inertial position tracking uses information from an inertial
navigation system and tracks a fixed location on the surface of the earth and not
necessarily a specific feature. Target designator tracking tracks illumination from a
target designator (i.e., a laser designator). In any case, the tracking error can be deter-
mined by the following:
● Fly a prescribed flight path toward a prominent EO target of known location.
● Determine the sensor/aircraft position and velocity with suitable range or onboard
instrumentation.
● Acquire the EO target on the sensor.
● Initiate target track at the earliest practicable instant.
● Record the corresponding range as maximum track acquisition range.
● Alter the flight path and attitude of the aircraft in order to subject the EO sensor
tracking LOS to specified LOS rates.
● Measure and record the EO sensor video signal and tracking error signal as a function
of time (the EO sensor display can also be recorded using a cockpit camera).
● Correlate the derived tracking errors with LOS slew rates by time correlating the data
obtained in the previous steps.
It is usually a good idea to first test the tracking accuracy on the ground, working from
very low LOS rates (such as an assistant walking across the FOV) to higher LOS rates
(such as an aircraft in an overhead pattern).
7.10.11 Other Lab Tests

There are other tests that are accomplished in the lab, normally by the engineering group;
they are included here for completeness. It is important to note, however, that these tests
assess the inherent (i.e., design) characteristics of the system under test. In most cases,
these characteristics are advertised and well known. The assessment of these character-
istics really only need be addressed when a system is in development and is being prepared
for production, or when a system is consistently failing in performance and a decision has
been made to determine if the advertised performance is, well, as advertised.
7.10.11.1 Minimum Resolvable Temperature Differential

(Thermal Resolution)
The minimum target temperature differential resolvable by an imaging thermal detector
is best determined by the combined angular resolution/thermal resolution test. A simpler
procedure for determining MRDT also employs a bar target, as described below:
● Set the spatial frequency of the bar target to a value well below one-half of the sensor
cutoff frequency.
● Adjust the bar target temperature differential to a value well above the expected
MRDT of the sensor under test.
● Focus the sensor on the bar target and optimize the sensor control settings.
● Gradually reduce the bar target temperature differential, allowing sufficient time for
stabilization between changes, until the variations in radiant intensity due to the
individual bars are no longer discernible on the sensor display.
● Gradually increase the bar target temperature differential until the variations in
radiant intensity due to the individual bars are just discernible.
● Record the bar target temperature differential attained as the MRDT for the sensor.
7.10.11.2 Noise Equivalent Temperature Differential

The noise equivalent input temperature differential (NEDT) for a thermal detector can be
determined by the following procedure:
● Set the spatial frequency of a thermal bar target to a value well below one-half of the
sensor cutoff frequency.
● Adjust the bar target temperature differential to a value well above MRDT for the
sensor under test.
● Focus the sensor on the target and optimize the sensor control settings.
● Adjust the bar target temperature differential to a value that produces a target signal
just large enough to be measured accurately in the presence of the noise.
● Record the target temperature differential and resulting sensor video output voltage
response attained in the previous step.
● Block the target input to the sensor and measure the rms noise on the sensor video
output voltage.
● Calculate the sensor NEDT according to
NEDT ¼ NDT=S; (7.32)
where
N ¼ rms noise voltage on sensor video output signal (volts),
S ¼ peak-to-peak variation in sensor video output voltage due to bar target
(volts), and
DT ¼ bar target temperature differential producing the output signal S (K).
The response of an EO sensor to time-related variations in target radiant intensity can be

determined as a steady-state (sinusoidal) time-frequency response or a transient
(impulse or step-function) response. The time-frequency response can be determined by
subjecting the sensor to a sinusoidal intensity-modulated source and measuring the
amplitude and phase variations in the video output signal from the sensor. The transient
response can be determined by subjecting the sensor to a pulsed-intensity modulated
source and recording the sensor video output signal response as a function of time.
7.11 ACTIVE EO SYSTEMS

7.11.1 Lasers
NOTE: The following test procedures are attributed to Dr. George Masters as printed in
section 4.4 of Electro-Optical Systems Test and Evaluation, revised September 2001,
from the U.S. Navy Test Pilot School systems course syllabus. These procedures are in
use in many test organizations around the world.
The performance testing methods for passive EO sensors are also applicable to the
performance testing of laser ranger/designators, with the comments, modifications, and
exceptions noted below. The following test procedures are applicable without exception
to the testing of laser designators:
● LOS slew limits
● LOS slew rates
7.11.2 Boresight Accuracy

The boresight alignment of a laser designator is best determined by ground testing using
a collimated target. The test procedure is as follows:
● Acquire and focus the EO sensor on a point-source target aligned with the aircraft
armament datum line (ADL).
● Place a paper shield over the target and mark the ADL reference position on the paper
(materials other than paper can be used).
● Fire the laser, burning a small spot on the paper shield.
● Measure the displacement of the laser burn spot from the ADL reference mark.
● Convert linear laser boresight error (De) to angular laser boresight error (de) according
to the equation
de ¼ tan1 ½De =FLc ðradiansÞ; (7.33)
where
De ¼ linear laser boresight error, and
FLc ¼ focal length of the collimator.
The pointing accuracy of a laser designator can be determined by using the above
test procedure to check laser alignment with points off-boresight (displaced from
the aircraft ADL).
7.11.3 LOS Drift Rate

The long-term LOS instability (drift rate) of a laser designator is best determined using
the collimated target test setup employed in the boresight test. The procedure is as
follows:
● Conduct the first four steps of the boresight test, obtaining a laser burn spot on the
paper target.
● After a suitable designated time, fire the laser again, obtaining a second burn spot on
the target.
● Measure the relative displacement between the two laser burn spots.
● Calculate the laser designator LOS drift rate, qd, according to the equation:
qd ¼ ½1=td tan1 ½Dd =FLc ðrad=secÞ (7.34)
where
Dd ¼ relative linear displacement between two burn spots,
FLc ¼ focal length of the collimator, and
td ¼ time interval between two laser firings.
7.11.4 LOS Jitter

The short-term LOS instability (jitter) of a laser designator must be determined by flight
testing because in-flight vibration is a major contributor to LOS jitter. The test procedure
consists of the following steps:
● Fly the prescribed flight path, at constant altitude and airspeed, on a heading designed
to pass directly over the EO target and normal to the face of the target.
● Acquire the EO target with on an onboard sensor.
● Designate the target (fire the designator laser); observe the (designated) target using
the ground-based TV camera and record the resulting video as a function of time.
● Determine the airborne designator-to-target range using suitable onboard or range
instrumentation.
● Determine the laser designator LOS angular jitter by time correlating the
jitter-induced movement of the laser spot on the target with the designator-to-target
range data.
7.11.5 Laser Ranging Accuracy

The ranging accuracy of a laser designator is best determined by flight test employing an
EO target. The procedure is as follows:
● Fly the prescribed flight path, at constant altitude and airspeed, on a heading designed
to pass directly over the EO target and normal to the face of the target.
● Acquire the EO target with an onboard sensor.
● Designate the target and laser range on the target.
● Record the resulting data as a function of time.

● Independently determine and record the aircraft-to-target range using onboard or
range instrumentation (the highly accurate ranging provided by laser ranging makes
it extremely difficult to obtain ‘‘truth’’ data of sufficient accuracy).
● Time correlate the laser range data with the ‘‘truth’’ data to determine ranging error.
The static ranging accuracy of a laser ranger can be determined by ground tests using
optical retroreflectors positioned at known ranges from the test aircraft position.
7.11.6 Laser Beam Divergence

The divergence of a laser beam is best determined by ground tests employing the col-
limating apparatus. The laser is fired into the collimator, as shown in Figure 7.68.
Templates with various circular apertures are placed at the focal point of the colli-
mator mirror. The size of the circular aperture is varied until the aperture just begins to
occlude the beam, as indicated by a reduction in the radiant flux received by the
radiometer. A reduction to 90% of the no-aperture value is taken as the reference point.
The angular beam width (divergence) of the laser beam is then equal to the diameter
of the (90% flux) aperture divided by the focal length of the collimator. The geometry of
the test is illustrated in Figure 7.69.
If all of the rays in the laser beam were parallel (a ¼ 0), they will all be focused to a
point at the focal point of the mirror. If the most divergent rays (edge of the beam) make
FIGURE 7.68 ¢ Laser Laser Beam Collimator Mirror

Laser Beam
Divergence Test
Setup
Fl C
Radiometer Template with

Circular Aperture
FIGURE 7.69 ¢ Collimating Lens Aperture

Laser Beam (Mirror) Template
Divergence Test
Geometry
FLC
Non-divergent Most Divergent

Ray of Laser Beam Ray of Laser Beam
Laser Calorimeter FIGURE 7.70 ¢

Laser Output Power
Measurement
Laser Beam
an angle a with the beam axis, they will just graze the edge of the hole in an aperture
plate of radius r, as shown. Thus the half-angle of the beam is equal to
a ¼ r=FLc ðradiansÞ; (7.35)
where
FLc ¼ focal length of the collimator (m), and
r ¼ radius of the aperture that just grazes the beam (m).
7.11.7 Laser Output Power

The average output power of a laser ranger/designator is best determined by ground
testing employing the test setup depicted in Figure 7.70.
The test procedure is as follows:
● Align the laser output beam with the center of the calorimeter.
● Fire the laser.
● Record the calorimeter output reading (laser average output power).
The pulse peak power and pulse energy of a pulsed laser can be calculated from the
average power by means of the following equations:
Ppeak ¼ Pavg =DC; (7.36)
DC ¼ tp =PRI; (7.37)
Epulse ¼ Ppeak tp ; (7.38)
where
DC ¼ duty cycle,
Epulse ¼ energy in a single pulse (W-sec),
Pavg ¼ laser pulse average power (W),
Ppeak ¼ laser pulse peak power (W),
PRI ¼ laser pulse repetition interval (sec), and
tp ¼ laser pulse width (sec).
7.11.8 Laser Pulse Amplitude

The pulse amplitude and pulse amplitude stability of a pulsed laser ranger finder/
designator are best determined by ground tests employing the test setup depicted
in Figure 7.71.
FIGURE 7.71 ¢
Laser Pulse Radiometer High-speed
Laser
Recorder
Parameter Test
Setup
Laser Beam
High-speed
Counter
Printer
The laser is fired into the radiometer and the output of the radiometer is recorded on
the high-speed recorder, as shown in the figure. Pulse amplitude stability can be deter-
mined by comparing the output recording over a specified time interval. Laser misfire
rate (missing pulse rate) can also be determined by examination of the recorded radio-
meter output.
7.11.9 Laser Pulse Width

The pulse width of a pulsed laser ranger finder/designator is best determined by ground
tests employing the test setup depicted in Figure 7.71. The laser is fired into the radio-
meter and the output of the radiometer is recorded, as shown. Because of the small pulse
widths and the extremely fast rise and fall times associated with a laser pulse, an
accurate determination of pulse width requires the use of special, fast-response detectors
and recorders. In addition, corrections are generally made for the response times asso-
ciated with the detector and recorder.
7.11.10 Laser Pulse Repetition Interval

The pulse repetition interval (or frequency) of a laser range finder/designator is best
determined by ground tests employing the test setup depicted in Figure 7.71. The laser is
fired into the radiometer and the output pulses are counted and timed by the counter, as
shown. The output of the counter (pulse count and pulse rate) is recorded by a high-
speed printer. Analysis of the high-speed printout yields pulse repetition frequency
(interval) and PRF stability.
1. What is the relationship between frequency and wavelength?

2. What attributes of a target can an optical system provide?
3. What frequency bands do most military applications of FLIR use?
4. What characteristics would one find in the MWIR band?
5. What characteristics would one expect to see in the LWIR band?
6. What band would you expect to see NVGs operate in?

7. What is an IRLS?
8. How many detectors would you expect to see on a staring array system?
9. Briefly explain how a scanning array operates.
10. Why are FLIR arrays grouped in factors of 480 640?
11. Why do air-to-ground missiles come in versions of EO/IR and laser?
12. If you wanted to launch an IR missile from a distance of 3 nm, and the error of the
system was 1 mile, how small could the target be?
13. You want to track missile plume and you have a choice of detectors: indium
antimonide (InSb) or mercury cadmium telluride (HgCdTe). Which would
you choose?
14. What are the critical parameters to know when employing an IRLS?
15. How is scan rate related to velocity, height, and FOV in an IRLS?
16. In which frequency band would you expect to find a staring array?
17. How is background radiation compensated for in a FLIR system?
18. How are detectors cooled?
19. What is an IRST system? What advantages are there over a FLIR system?
20. How does an IRST system determine range?
21. What is transmittance?
22. What is a blackbody?
23. What is the relationship between a blackbody and a white body?
24. For an MWIR system, there is a dead zone of zero transmittance at 4.2 mm. Why?
25. What is the relationship between absorbed, scattered, and transmitted power?
26. What are the two types of reflectance?
27. What is surface reflectance?
28. What is bulk reflectance?
29. Name three sources of radiation.
30. Name three methods of heat loss from a body.
31. When identifying the temperature of an object we can use either surface or core
temperature. On which types of material would we use one or the other?
32. What is meant by the sun’s zenith angle?
33. How is the spectral irradiance of the sun affected by zenith angle?
34. Why is compressed snow of a higher temperature than noncompressed snow?
35. What is spectral extinction?
36. Name the two major components of extinction.
37. Give four examples of atmospheric phenomena that contribute to extinction.
38. How does humidity contribute to transmittance reduction?
39. Explain the relationship of scattering and particulate size.
40. How does atmospheric turbulence affect image quality?

41. What is refraction? How does it affect image quality?
42. How do pressure gradients affect image quality?
43. What is the biggest atmospheric contributor to extinction in the LWIR region?
44. Can we determine an attenuation coefficient by knowing the international visibility
code? How?
45. Is attenuation as a factor of humidity linear? Do seasons affect this relationship?
How?
46. With rain, is the size of the raindrop the only consideration in radiation scattering?
If not, what else affects scattering?
47. Which would be the best sensor choice for a mid-latitude, winter operating envir-
onment? A tropical, over-water environment?
48. All other variables normalized, a mer cad and InSb detector operate about the same
with a background temperature of about 300 K. Which performs better with a higher
background temperature? Lower temperature?
49. Explain a diurnal cycle. How many diurnal cycles are there in a day? At what times?
50. What type (medium) is most common in military lasers?
51. What frequencies can lasers operate in?
52. What are the eye safe considerations in laser operations?
53. How can we operate on the eye with an IR laser without damaging the optic nerve?
54. What is the difference between optical zoom and digital zoom?
55. Why is stabilization important in laser systems?
56. What is meant by thermal bloom?
57. Would it be easy to determine closure rate with a laser? Why or why not?
58. What is an edge tracker system?
59. You intend to attack a factory complex at night using laser-guided bombs (LGBs).
If you are the designator, which direction would you attack from?
60. Your actual detection ranges are less than predicted. You have accounted for clutter,
transmittance, and actual DT. What is the probable cause?
61. What does the inverse square law mean to you?
62. What does Lambert’s law of cosines mean to you?
63. Name two problems associated with flat mirrors in FLIR systems.
64. What problems are associated with single-detector systems?
65. Why are multiple detectors used in some serial scanning arrays?
66. What is a Nyquist frequency?
67. Briefly explain what is meant by diurnal depth. What do we use this information for?
68. What temperature in Celsius is 300 K? What temperature is this most commonly
associated with?
69. What is the relationship, if any, between temperature and peak spectral response?
70. At what wavelength would we find a blue spike plume? Red spike?
71. It is a clear day, meteorological range 25 nm, and absolute humidity 9 g/m3. What is
the attenuation coefficient?
72. What is an aerosol in relation to optical systems?
73. You are interested in a target that has a spectral response of 4.3 mm. Which detector
element would you choose?
74. If you use the FLIR 92 detection model with a 2D critical dimension. Do you need
to consider MRDT due to aspect ratio?
75. A CO2, pulsed, 20 nsec laser is to be tested by your organization. Is there an eye
hazard?
76. Calculate the critical dimension in 1D for a man when his dimensions are 2 ft 6 ft.
In 2D?
77. What happens to spatial frequency with increasing DT?
78. What is a lux? What is a foot-candle?
79. What is the basic concept of NVG/NVD?
80. What is emissivity?
81. Total radiation is a function of temperature by what relationship?
82. I double the target temperature. What can I say about the total radiation?
83. How is peak radiation related to temperature?
84. I double the target temperature. What can I say about the peak radiation?
85. Target temperature is 300 K. What is the peak spectral radiance? At what
wavelength?
86. What could be a problem with an IR MAWS system?
87. Briefly describe a FOV test for an optical system.
88. Briefly describe a slew rate test for an optical sensor.
89. Why is the display itself an important part of FLIR/EO testing?
90. How is core temperature of an object related to radiation temperature?
91. Briefly explain the effect of wind on potential IR targets.
92. What is the relationship between extinction coefficient and transmittance?
93. Would you expect longer-range detections with an MWIR or an LWIR system?
Why?
94. What problem would you expect to see (aero_optical) with an EO detection system
as an aircraft increases speed?
95. What two things must be known for IR data to be called calibrated?
96. What are the significant differences between DT and OT testing of an EO system?
97. What is the normal sequence of events when detecting, recognizing, and identifying
targets?
98. What are the differences in spatial frequency boards for optical and IR tests?
99. What is the TTPF for low clutter 90% probability?
100. Using FLIR 92, 2D, how many cycles are required to ensure operational success?
Using 1D Johnson criteria?
101. How does an LGB discriminate between own-ship and spurious directed energy?
102. Explain the importance of boresighting. What is parallax correction?
103. What is the effect of recent rain on IR targets?
104. You have a laser ranger, FLIR, and pulse Doppler radar on board your aircraft.
How would you optimize a target track?
105. When looking at a sky background, what is the effective background temperature?
106. What happens to background temperature as the target approaches the horizon?
107. Name three environmental modifiers that will affect DT between the target and
background.
108. Explain how Arnold Schwarzenegger defeated the predator in the movie Predator.
109. Explain jitter. How important is jitter in flight testing?
110. Explain centroid track in video tracking systems. What is the primary purpose of
an AVTS?
111. What is ATR? How does it work? What are the human interface requirements with
ATR?
112. List the three higher-order discrimination levels.
113. What is detection?
114. What is recognition?
115. What is identification?
116. How clear are the lines between the three?
117. Which FOV is selected for each of the three?
118. Johnson criteria are an equivalent bar pattern approach for angular resolution. How
does the FLIR determine resolution? How does an EO (optics) determine
resolution?
119. What is the level in a FLIR system?
120. What is the gain in a FLIR system?
121. Which parameter (level or gain) relates to sensitivity? Which relates to resolution?
122. If a FLIR system operates in a detection range of 10 C to 100 C and the MRT is
1 C, what is the sensitivity limit? What is the resolution limit?
123. Briefly explain a spatial resolution test.
124. In order to accurately chart spatial frequency, what must the tester do?
125. Why is it important for more than one operator to perform spatial frequency tests?
126. What is the difference between minimum dimension and critical dimension? What
are each used for?
127. Can the aspect angle alter lab tests? Field tests?
128. What clutter environment does Johnson criteria assume?
129. How can we adjust the basic Johnson criteria for an increase in clutter?
130. What is FLIR 92?

131. How are range predictions for a system made? How accurate are they?
132. Can we use the same tests for a TV system as we do for the FLIR system?
133. How would you set up a test of a postlaunch guided EO munition to ensure that the
munition received the desired commands?
134. What would be a good countermeasure against an EO-guided munition?
135. What would be a good countermeasure against an IR-guided munition?
136. Explain FOV and FOR.
137. What considerations regarding FOV must be observed when employing flares?
138. Is EMI and EMC a consideration in EO and FLIR testing?
139. Identify three human factors considerations when evaluating an EO/FLIR system.
140. What workload considerations should be addressed when considering an EO/FLIR
system?
141. Why do you think, or do you, that it would be very difficult to obtain statistical
numbers for detection, recognition, and identification?
CHAPTER
Radio Detection and

Ranging – Radar 8
Chapter Outline
8.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 625
8.1 Understanding Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 626
8.2 Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 629
8.3 Radar Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 630
8.4 Radar Detections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 636
8.5 Maximum Radar Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 641
8.6 Radar Sample Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 645
8.7 Pulse Delay Ranging Radar Modes of Operation and Testing . . ........ .... 652
8.8 Doppler and Pulse Doppler Modes of Operation and Testing . . ........ .... 668
8.9 Air-to-Ground Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 694
8.10 Millimetric Wave Radar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 710
8.11 Miscellaneous Modes of Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 712
8.12 Some Final Considerations in Radar Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 712
8.13 Selected Questions for Chapter 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .... 714
8.0 INTRODUCTION
Radar evaluation is perhaps one of the most exhaustive, complex, and challenging types
of testing that the flight test engineer will encounter. As with all other avionics and
weapons systems, it is imperative that the evaluator possess a basic knowledge of radar
and an in-depth knowledge of the system under test. For the tester who is new to radar,
I recommend that you start with Stimson’s Introduction to Airborne Radar, 3rd Edition
(Raleigh, NC: SciTech Publishing, 2014). This is a wonderful book, an easy read, and a
must reference for the radar engineer. A companion text is Merrill I. Skolnik’s Intro-
duction to Radar Systems, 3rd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002). This book is
more of the textbook that you have seen in your college or university, but it gives an
excellent treatment of clutter and detections at sea. Another reference is one given in
previous chapters: the NATO Aerospace Group for Avionics Research and Develop-
ment (AGARD), now called the NATO Research and Technology Organization. They
have two excellent guides: RTO-AG-300, volume 16, Introduction to Airborne Early
Warning Radar Flight Test, and basic radar flight testing information is contained in
625
626 CHAPTER 8 Radio Detection and Ranging – Radar
AGARD’s Introduction to Avionics Flight Test. Attendance in a radar and radar flight
test course is also highly recommended.
The purpose of this section is not to repeat what is contained in the aforementioned
references. Radar theory is covered only to make the test procedures understandable.
The section will review radar fundamentals, identify radar modes of operation, examine
the methods of test for these modes, and address any special test considerations.
8.1 UNDERSTANDING RADAR

Radar is an acronym for radio detection and ranging, and as the name implies, radio
energy is used to determine the attributes of a target. The information that we hope to
obtain from the radar is range, range rate, azimuth, and elevation. Most objects reflect
radio waves. The intensity of the reflections is dependent on some key parameters. The
first is the polarization of the radio signal. Polarization is a term used to express the
orientation of the wave’s field (in particular, the electric field). If the electric field is
vertical, it is said to be vertically polarized; if the electric field is horizontal, it is said to
be horizontally polarized. A circular polarization can be developed by simultaneously
transmitting horizontally and vertically polarized waves 90 out of phase. A receiving
antenna can extract the maximum amount of energy from a received signal if the sig-
nal’s polarity and the antenna’s polarity are the same. If the polarizations are different,
the energy is reduced in proportion to the cosine squared (cos2) of the angle between
them (i.e., a power loss factor is said to be equal to cos2q). Table 8.1 shows the reduction
in extracted energy due to polarization differences.
A linearly polarized antenna will only pick up the in-phase component of a circu-
larly polarized wave; as a result, the antenna will have a polarization mismatch loss of
50% (3 dB), no matter what angle the antenna is rotated to.
The ‘‘dB’’ noted in the second column is a loss expressed in decibels. The unit
originated as a measure of attenuation in telephone cable and is named after Alexander
Graham Bell. It is a ratio of power input at one end of a cable to that received at the other
end; a decibel was the attenuation of 1 mile of telephone cable. The decibel is a loga-
rithmic unit and has the advantage of reducing the numbers needed to describe a gain or
loss of radio energy. It is extremely useful in radar discussions as well as for data links,
and will be addressed again in the UAS chapter. For our discussions, a gain is described
as the output (final) power/input (initial) power (P2/P1), and a loss is described as the
input power/output power (P1/P2). Converting power gain ratios to decibels and decibels
to power ratios is given by
Converting power ratios to decibels: Power ratio ðin dBÞ ¼ 10log10 P2 =P1 (8.1)
TABLE 8.1 ¢ Signal Losses Due to Differences in Polarization
Polarization Angular Difference Signal Loss (dB) Signal Loss (%)

0 0 0
30 1.3 25
45 3.0 50
60 6.0 75
90 Infinite 100
8.1 Understanding Radar 627
TABLE 8.2 ¢ Basic Power Ratios
Basic Power Ratios
dB Power Ratio
0 1
1 1.26
2 1.6
3 2
4 2.5
5 3.2
6 4
7 5
8 6.3
9 8
and
Converting from decibels to power ratios: P2 =P1 ¼ 10dB=10 : (8.2)
Stimson provides the reader with an easy way to perform these conversions by
remembering some simple basic power ratios. These basic power ratios are provided for
reference in Table 8.2.
If we want to express a power ratio in decibels (equation 8.1), we can do so by
following a couple of easy steps. Suppose that we had a gain of 63,000 and we want to
express this in terms of decibels to make the numbers more manageable. The first step is
to express the gain in scientific notation. Thus
63;000 becomes 6:3 104 :
In this expression, 6.3 is the basic power ratio and 10 is raised to the fourth power. The
number four will become the first term of our decibel expression and 6.3 is converted
to decibels (Table 8.2) and applied as the second term, equating our gain of 63,000 to
48 dB:
63,000 = 6.3 × 104 = 48 dB.
In order to convert a d term to a power ratio, we merely work in reverse and convert
the second term of the decibel expression to a basic power ratio:
34 dB = 2.5 × 103 = 2500.
Negative decibels are used to determine power ratios less than 1 (loss). A ratio
expressed in decibels can be inverted by putting a negative sign in front of it. For
example, beamwidth is commonly measured at the 3 dB point (the distance away from
the antenna where power is measured to be 50%).
3 dB ¼ ⅓ dB ¼ ½ 100 ¼ ½ ðpower ratioÞ:

A loss of 1,000,000/1 can be expressed in decibel terms by
1=1;000;000 ¼ 1=1 106 ¼ 1=60 dB ¼ 60 dB:
A more in-depth explanation with further examples can be found in Stimson’s chapter 6.
The second parameter of concern in our ability to see reflected energy is the fre-
quency that we employ. The frequency of the signal is represented by ( f ) and has the
relationship
f ¼ c=l; (8.3)
where
f ¼ frequency (Hz),
c ¼ speed of light (3 108 m/sec), and
l ¼ wavelength (m).
The choice of frequency will influence many of the performance parameters of the
radar as well as impact the design. These considerations will be addressed shortly. Most
of the airborne systems that we employ are called metric radars because of the fre-
quencies that are employed; some applications utilize the millimetric (millimeter
wavelength) spectrum. Table 8.3 provides the frequency bands radars that are discussed
in this chapter. It is interesting to note that there is an ‘‘old’’ designation and a ‘‘new’’
designation. The old designations were given during early radar development, and in the
hopes of confusing nosy-buddies, the lettering scheme followed no rhyme or reason. The
new designations further define the frequency spectrum and follow an ascending order.
You will find that most radar people still use the old designations, while folks involved
with electronic warfare use the new designations.
The evaluator may find it useful to be able to identify the center frequency for
common airborne radar. The center frequencies can be found in Table 8.4.
TABLE 8.3 ¢ Radar Frequency Designations
IEEE US NATO, US ECM

(Old Radar (New Radar
Designation) Origin Frequency Range Wavelength Designation)
W W follows V in the alphabet 75–111 GHz 400 mm–270 mm M (60–100 GHz)
V Very Short 40–75 GHz 700 mm–400 mm L (40–60 GHz)
KA Kurtz (above) 26–40 GHz 1.1 cm–0.7 cm K (20–40 GHz)
K Kurtz (which is German for short) 18–26 GHz 1.6 cm–1.1 cm J (10–20 GHz)
KU Kurtz (under) 12.4–18 GHz 2.5 cm–1.6 cm
X Used in World War II for fire control 8–12.4 GHz 3.7 cm–2.5 cm I (8–10 GHz)
as an ‘‘X’’ for crosshairs
C Compromise between S and X 4–8 GHz 7.5 cm–3.7 cm H (6–8 GHz)
G (4–6 GHz)
S Short Wave 2–4 GHz 15 cm–7.5 cm F (3–4 GHz)
E (2–3 GHz)
L Long Wave 1–2 GHz 30 cm–15 cm D (1–2 GHz)
UHF 0.3–1 GHz <1 m–30 cm C (0.5–1 GHz)
8.2 Performance Considerations 629
TABLE 8.4 ¢ Radar Center Frequencies
Radar Center Frequencies
Frequency Band (Old) Center Frequency (GHz) Center Wavelength (cm)

Ka (above) 33 0.8
Ku (under) 16 2
X 10 3
C 6 5
S 3 10
Fraction of signal getting through 1 km of atmosphere FIGURE 8.1 ¢

Atmospheric
0.00001 50 Absorption Versus
Frequency
0.01 10
Loss (dB/km)
Sea level
0.79 1
0.98 0.1
0.9775 0.01
1 10 50 100 200 300
Frequency (GHz)
Attenuation by rain Attenuation by water clouds

10 10
R)
dB/km
dB/km
R)
/H
R)
1 1
R)
R)
/H
IN
/H
/H
/H
IN
IN
IN
(6
IN
.05
(1
1
HR
.0
.2
(0
R
(0
(0
M/
/H
R
R
/H
0.1 0.1
0M
/H
M
/H
M
M
M
M
8°C
5M
15
5°C 20°C
5M
25
25
1.2
0.
0.01 0.01
1 10 100 1 10 100
Frequency (GHz) Frequency (GHz)
8.2 PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS

As mentioned previously, the choice of frequency will have a direct effect on the
performance and design of the radar. The first thing to be considered is the attenuation
of the signal as it propagates through space. Radio waves are attenuated by two
properties: absorption and scattering. The absorption is due mainly to oxygen and
water vapor, and the scattering is due to condensed water vapor (such as raindrops)
and other particulates in the atmosphere: smoke, soot, pollution, oil vapor, etc. As the
frequency is increased, the transmittance through the atmosphere is decreased (more
energy is absorbed and reflected). Figure 8.1 shows the dramatic effect of absorption
with increasing frequency.
Because of this relationship between absorption and frequency, it should be evident

that increasing amounts of power would have to be generated for higher frequency
signals in order to obtain greater ranges. Note that at 50 GHz (millimetric radar), fully
99% of the signal is attenuated by the atmosphere.
Electric noise from sources outside the radar is high in the high frequency (HF) band
(3–30 MHz) and decreases with increasing frequency, reaching a minimum somewhere
between 0.3 and 10 GHz, depending on the level of galactic noise. Beyond 10 GHz,
man-made noise dominates, becoming stronger at K band (20–40 GHz) and higher
frequencies.
Lower frequencies (longer wavelengths) are directly proportional to the size of the
equipment required, that is, lower frequencies require larger equipment (e.g., wave-
guides) to generate and transmit the signal. At lower frequencies, the equipment is large
and heavy, whereas higher-frequency radars can be placed in smaller packages and
weigh substantially less. Figure 8.2 shows three types of radar operating in three dif-
ferent bands: millimetric, X band, and S band. The millimetric radar is found on heli-
copters or actively guided ordnance, while the X-band radar is found on a typical fighter
and the S band is used for early warning. The size differences in these three types are
obvious.
The width of the radar beam is directly proportional to the ratio of the wavelength to
the diameter of the antenna. This phenomenon will play a large part in low probability of
intercept (LPI) and beam shaping. Narrow beamwidths provide higher power densities
and excellent angular resolution, but the antenna normally has to fit in the nose of an
aircraft, thus limiting size (diameter). In order to make the beam narrower, you
must increase the frequency (shorter wavelength) or increase the size of the antenna.
Figure 8.3 shows the PAVE Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS) which
operates in the UHF Band. Originally designed to track incoming ballistic missiles
during the Cold War, its purpose now is to track all of the junk in space down to the size
of a beer can. It uses a low frequency to obtain range, but in order to obtain angular
accuracies it must employ an extremely large antenna.
Doppler shifts are proportional to the rate of closure as well as frequency. The
higher the frequency, the larger the Doppler shift for a given closure. Doppler sensitivity
to small differences in closing rate can be increased by selecting higher frequencies. The
performance considerations are summarized in Table 8.5.
8.3 RADAR UTILITY

When using radar for target detection, ground mapping, weather avoidance, or any of the
other modes of the radar, the operator is in search of four basic variables:
● Range
● Range rate
● Azimuth
● Elevation
The simplest method of determining range to a target is to measure the time it
takes for energy to be returned from the target. Since the radio wave travels at the speed
of light, range can easily be determined by multiplying the time it takes to return by
FIGURE 8.2 ¢
Radar Size as a
Function of
Frequency
Millimetric Wave Radar, 0.8 cm
X-band Radar, 3 cm
S-band Early Warning Radar, 10 cm
the speed of light and then dividing the result by two, since the path of the wave is a
round-trip.
c
R ¼ Dt: (8.4)
2
The time is measured in microseconds, where 1 msec equates to a wave travel
(to the target) of 150 m, or roughly 500 ft. The accuracy of the range measurement is
dependent on the shape of the pulse (Figure 8.4). The radar can measure the range to the
FIGURE 8.3 ¢
PAVE Phased Array
Warning System
(PAVE PAWS)
TABLE 8.5 ¢ Radar Performance Considerations
Component Power Required Beam Doppler

f l Attenuation Size for Range Shaping Measurements
Low Long Low Large Low Poor Poor
High Short High Small High Good Good
FIGURE 8.4 ¢
Accuracy
Dependent on Pulse
Shape
Actual
Power
Pulse
Desired
Pulse
Time
target by using the leading edge or the trailing edge of the pulse. In an ideal world, the
pulse would be perfectly square and the leading and trailing edge would be easily
observed. Since there is going to be some ramp-up and decay time in the transmitter, the
pulse will not be exactly square, which results in some uncertainty and therefore some
inaccuracy in the measurement.
Pulse delay ranging works well as long as there is only one pulse to be measured. If
there are two pulses in space because the target is very far away, the radar will not know
which measurement to use. Figure 8.5 shows an airborne radar detecting a target that is
slightly further than the distance traveled by one interpulse period. Simply put, the echo
from the target is not received from the first pulse before a second pulse is sent by the
radar. In Figure 8.5, the true distance to the target is 60 nm, but the interpulse period will
Echo of FIGURE 8.5 ¢

pulse no. 1 Range Ambiguity
Pulse no. 2
Pulse no. 1
Target
Pulse no. 1 Pulse no. 2

Echo of pulse
no. 1
T ∝ 50 nmi
Transit time ∝ 60 nmi
Apparent
range: 10 nmi
only allow detections up to 50 nm before another pulse is sent. The radar will compute
the transit time based on pulse no. 2 and provide an incorrect range; in this case 10 nm.
This situation can be determined beforehand by computing a maximum unambig-
uous range. For a given pulse repetition frequency (PRF; number of pulses per second
represented as Hz), the longest range that may be observed without being ambiguous (no
more than one pulse in space) is called the maximum unambiguous range (represented
as Ru). Since the interpulse period (called the pulse repetition interval [PRI]) is equal to
one divided by the PRF, we can substitute our PRI in place of Dt in equation 8.4 and
solve for Ru:
Ru ¼ cT =2; (8.5)
where T equals the interpulse period (PRI).

We can also put equation 8.5 in terms of PRF by a simple substitution for T:
Ru ¼ c=2PRF: (8.6)
A rule of thumb is Ru in nautical miles is equal to 80 divided by the PRF (in kHz); Ru in
kilometers is equal to 150 divided by the PRF (in kHz).
As you can see, ambiguous range returns can severely limit the range at which we
can detect targets if the ambiguities cannot be solved. Fortunately there are ways to
resolve some of these problems. The most common method of resolving a range ambi-
guity is called PRF switching or sometimes called PRF jittering. This technique works
by taking into account how much a target’s apparent range changes when the PRF is
changed. Knowing this, and the amount the PRF has changed, it is possible to determine
the number of whole times, n, that Ru is contained in the target’s true range.
Determining n is best illustrated by a hypothetical example provided in Stimson’s
chapter 12 (p. 156). We will assume that for reasons other than ranging, a PRF of 8 kHz
has been selected. Consequently the maximum unambiguous range, Ru, is 80/8 ¼ 10 nm.
However, the radar must detect targets out to ranges of at least 48 miles—nearly five
times Ru—and undoubtedly it will detect some targets at ranges beyond that as well. The
apparent ranges of all targets will, of course, lie between 0 and 10 nm. To span this
10 mile interval, a bank of 40 range bins (range gates) has been provided. Each bin
position represents a range interval of ¼ mile. The range gate width is maintained con-
stant while switching PRFs.
A target is detected in range bin no. 24, 64, 104, etc. The target’s apparent range
is 24 ¼ ¼ 6 miles. On the basis of this information alone, we know only that the
target could be at any one of the following ranges: 6, 16, 26, 36 nm, and so on. To
determine which of these is the true range, we switch to a second PRF. To keep the
explanation simple, we will assume that this PRF is just enough lower than the first to
make Ru ¼ mile longer (Ru ¼ 10.25 nm) than it was before. (A practical system would
not be mechanized with PRFs so closely spaced.)
What happens to the target’s apparent range (closest range) when the PRF is
switched will depend on the target’s true range. If the true range is 6 miles, the switch
will not affect the apparent range. The target will remain in bin no. 24, but will also
appear in bins 65 (16.25 nm), 106 (26.5 nm), etc. But if the true range is greater than Ru,
for every whole time Ru is contained in the target’s true range, the apparent range will
decrease by ¼ mile.
We can find the true range by 1) counting the number of bin positions the target
moves, 2) multiplying this number by baseline Ru (10 nm), and 3) adding the result to
the apparent range (shortest range return).
Suppose the target moves from bin no. 24 (apparent range 6 miles) to bin no. 21, a
jump of three bin positions; the target’s true range is (3 10) þ 6 ¼ 36 miles.
Rtrue ¼ nRu þ Rapparent : (8.7)
There will come a point with very high PRFs where range ambiguities will not be
able to be resolved. Another method of calculating range will have to be used; this
method will be discussed later in the pulse Doppler radar section.
Range rate can be calculated from the rate of change of range with respect to time
from our pulse delay ranging calculations. Range rate can be directly measured by sensing
shifts in Doppler frequencies. As illustrated in Figure 8.6, a wave radiated from a point
source is compressed in the direction of motion and spread out in the opposite direction. If
the radar and the target are both in motion, the radio waves are compressed (or stretched)
at three points: transmission, reflection, and reception. As seen previously in section 5.6:
Doppler shift ¼ 2ðf =lÞ:
The Doppler shift is defined as positive when the target is approaching the
radar (compression) and negative, or opening, when the target is receding from the radar.
FIGURE 8.6 ¢
Doppler
Compression
Object receding: Object approaching:
long red waves short blue waves
In X-band radars, one knot of range rate is measured approximately as 35 Hz of Doppler

shift.
In most airborne applications, the azimuth and elevation are measured as the
pointing angle of the radar with respect to a fixed reference. The radar may have either
an earth or aircraft stabilization. With earth-stabilized systems, the radar maintains level
with the center of the earth and true north. It accomplishes this with information from
the aircraft navigation system (INS, AHRS, etc.), or in some cases, a dedicated radar
stabilization package. The radar scans with reference to the earth regardless of aircraft
attitude. In aircraft stabilization, the radar scans with reference to the fuselage reference
line (FRL), or boresight, and the aircraft wing line. Aircraft stabilization is normally
used in a dogfight or heads-up display (HUD) mode so aircraft maneuvers will not cause
a loss of stabilization or loss of target track. In Figure 8.7, the operator has selected a 0
tilt (level scan) on the radar. With earth stabilization selected, the operator will not see
the target because the radar will scan level with respect to the earth. With aircraft
stabilization selected, the target is now in the scan volume of the radar.
When azimuth and elevation accuracy are required, a narrow beam must be employed.
Angular measurement is derived from the antenna pointing angle when the echo is
received and is a direct function of the beamwidth. The beamwidth can be measured in
two ways: the first is the null-to-null beamwidth, and the second is the measurement of
the beam at the 3 dB point.
Radar energy cannot be directed entirely through the main lobe of the radar. There
are sidelobes and back lobes to the radar beam, and they rob as much as 25% of the
available radar energy from the intended direction. Figure 8.8 is a three-dimensional (3D)
FIGURE 8.7 ¢
Earth Versus Aircraft
Stabilization
0° Tilt selected
aircraft
stabilization Flight path
0° Tilt selected
earth
stabilization
FIGURE 8.8 ¢
Antenna Beamwidth
Measurements
First null
location 3 dB
measurement
representation of a radar beam. The edges of the main lobe (beamwidth) are most easily
defined as the nulls on either side. This is called the null-to-null measurement of the
beamwidth. From the standpoint of the radar, it is more realistic to define the beam at a
point in space where the power has dropped to some arbitrarily selected fraction of the
center of the beam. Beamwidth is commonly measured between points where power has
dropped to one-half of the maximum (3 dB).
For either a linear array or a rectangular aperture over which the illumination is
uniformly distributed, the null-to-null beamwidth (in radians) is twice the ratio of the
wavelength to the length of the array:
qnn ¼ 2ðl=LÞ; (8.8)
where
l ¼ wavelength of the radiated energy, and
L ¼ length of the aperture (same units as l).
The 3 dB beamwidth is a little less than half of the null-to-null beamwidth:
q3 dB ¼ 0:88ðl=LÞ: (8.9)
For a uniformly illuminated circular aperture of diameter d, the 3 dB beamwidth is

q3 dB ¼ 1:02ðl=dÞ: (8.10)
If the antenna has tapered illumination, the beamwidth becomes

q3 dB ¼ 1:25ðl=dÞ: (8.11)
The rule of thumb for X-band radars is that the 3 dB beamwidth for tapered
illumination is 85 divided by the diameter in inches and 70 divided by the diameter in
inches for untapered illumination.
8.4 RADAR DETECTIONS

There are many factors that will determine a radar’s ability to detect targets. Optimi-
zation of these parameters will affect sizing and performance. Some of the parameters
for consideration are
● Power
● Antenna size
● Reflecting characteristics of the target
● Length of dwell time on the target
● Wavelength/frequency of the transmission
● Intensity of background noise and clutter
● Processing
Knowledge of the parameters that affect target detection will allow the determina-
tion of a probability of detection. Examining the energy received from a target can help
FIGURE 8.9 ¢
Target Target Detections
echoes
Signal strength
Noise
Detection
Range
us to understand a detection range. A detection range is defined as the point where the
returned echo signal is stronger than competing noise. Figure 8.9 shows the relationship
between range to a target and the received signal. The detection occurs when the target
echo return exceeds that of the noise.
When the radar antenna is directed at the target, a portion of the radiated energy will
be incident upon the target. A portion of that energy (since some is reflected away and
some is absorbed) is returned to the antenna, and only a portion of the returned energy is
captured by the antenna. This process can be expressed mathematically in the general
range equation:
Pavg GsAe tint
Received signal energy ¼ ; (8.12)
ð4pÞ2 R4
where
Pavg ¼ average transmitted power,
G ¼ antenna gain,
s ¼ radar cross section of target,
Ae ¼ effective antenna area,
Tint ¼ integration time, and
R ¼ range.
If we substitute in the minimum detectable signal energy, Smin (as depicted in
Figure 8.9), we can solve for the maximum detectable range. This solution is found in
equation 8.13:
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4 Pavg GsAe tint
Rmax ¼ : (8.13)
ð4pÞ2 Smin
Equation 8.13 is only good for an antenna trained on a target, that is, nonscanning. If
we assume that the gain is the same throughout the entire scan volume of the radar, we
merely have to replace integration time (tint) with time on target (tot) to determine the
maximum range detection with a single scan of the radar, which is slightly more useful.
If we equate Smin to a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 1, Smin will be equal to
the noise, which is simply KTs (K is Boltzmann’s constant and Ts is the equivalent
system noise temperature). By also knowing that gain is equal to 4p(Ae/l2), the terms in
FIGURE 8.10 ¢ PW PAVG PPeak PW

Peak Versus PRI
Average Power
PPeak
PAVG
PRI
equation 8.13 can be rearranged to make more sense of what is contributing to target
detection:
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
4 Pavg sAe tot
2
R0 ¼ ; (8.14)
ð4pÞkTs l2
where R0 is the range at which the integrated SNR is 1 and l is the wavelength.
We will next look at the individual terms to see how they affect range detections
with radar. The first term in the equation is the average power. Average power is defined
as the peak power multiplied by the ratio of the pulse width (PW) over the PRI. The
PW is the length of time the transmitter is on. An infinitely long pulse would approx-
imate continuous wave energy, where peak power equals average power. The ratio of
PW/PRI is called the duty factor, or sometimes the duty cycle. Figure 8.10 shows these
relationships.
We can see from equation 8.14 that increasing the average power will increase the
detection range, if only by the fourth root of the factor. There are three ways of
increasing the average power; each of the methods carries with it some problems. The
first method is to increase the peak power. Referring back to Figure 8.10, it is easy to see
that if the peak power grows, the average power will also grow. Unfortunately this
would require larger equipment, which is not really an option for most airborne
applications.
A second method for increasing the average power is to increase the PRF. If more
pulses are sent in the same period of time, the transmitter must fire more often and the
average power will increase. Increasing the PRF is an option, but the ambiguities in
range must be accounted for. As previously mentioned, there will be a PRF that is so
high that all range ambiguities cannot be eliminated.
A third way to increase the average power is to increase the length of the pulse.
A longer PW causes the transmitter to remain on for a longer period of time for each
pulse. If the PRF is not decreased, the average power will increase. This method affects
a capability of the radar not previously addressed, that is, the ability of the radar to
resolve two targets separated in range, called, interestingly enough, range resolution.
Figure 8.11 shows an airborne radar detecting two targets flying in trail (i.e., separated
only in range). In order for the radar to see both targets, the trailing edge of the trans-
mitted pulse must have passed target A before the leading edge of the echo from target B
reaches target A. In Figure 8.11, L represents the PW. If the PW in this example is
1 msec, the separation between targets A and B must be at least 500 ft in order for the
radar to resolve both targets (1 msec is equal to 300 m or 1000 ft distance traveled
Leading edge of Leading edge of FIGURE 8.11 ¢

echo A echo B L Range Resolution
A B
L L
2
B A FIGURE 8.12 ¢
Pulse Compression
Received (Chirp)
echo AB
Filter Filter
B 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Transit
A 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
time
Frequency
through space). A rule of thumb therefore is range resolution is equal to 500 ft/msec. If
the PW of the radar is 5 msec, the targets must be separated in range by at least 2500 ft in
order to be resolved as two targets.
At very long ranges, resolution of targets within the radar’s resolution cell is not as
important as the actual detection of the targets themselves. As the range decreases, it
becomes more important to determine the actual number of targets the radar is seeing. In
order to accomplish this, the PW will have to be shortened. But if we shorten the PW, we
shorten the range of detection. In many radars, the PW is determined by the range scale
selection. If a long range is selected by the operator, the radar will employ a long PW;
the opposite is true for a short range selection. There will be some cases, however, where
the PW will be too long and targets will not be identified due to a merged return.
It is possible to code successive increments of the transmitted pulse with phase
or frequency modulation. Then, when receiving the echo, the modulation is decoded
and successive increments are progressively delayed. The radar now superimposes
one increment on top of the other (and so on) and in this way a range resolution can
be achieved as if a pulse was transmitted with the width of an increment. This method
is called pulse compression; one example is linear frequency modulation, also known
as ‘‘chirp.’’
With chirp, the frequency of each transmitted pulse is increased at a constant rate
throughout its length. Every echo has the same linear increase in frequency and is passed
through a filter that introduces a time lag that decreases linearly with frequency at
exactly the same rate as the frequency of the echoes increases. In this way, the trailing
portion of the echo takes less time to pass through than the leading portion. Successive
portions thus tend to bunch up. When the echo emerges from the filter, its amplitude is
much greater and its width is much less than when it entered. The pulse has been
compressed. Figure 8.12 shows what happens when the echoes from two closely spaced
targets pass through the filter. The incoming echoes are merged indistinguishably; in the
output, however, they appear separately.
Noise shows up in the bottom term of equation 8.14, and it tells us that we can have
the same effect of doubling the average power if we halve the mean level of the back-
ground noise (KTs). The time on target term (tot) is in the numerator, and if the scan rate
was halved, it would have the same effect as doubling the average power or halving the
noise. It would appear that if the antenna size is doubled, the detection range will also be
doubled. This would be true except that, if the antenna size is doubled, the beamwidth is
halved, which implies that the scan rate will also have to be halved in order to maintain
the same tot.
The radar cross section (RCS, s) appears in the numerator, and corresponding
increases act just like the average power. RCS is not, however, just dependent on the
size of the target. There are three attributes to the RCS of an object: geometric cross
section, directivity, and reflectivity. Geometric cross section is a fairly easy concept: it is
the area as seen by the radar. The area will change based on the aspect of the target with
respect to the radar. An aircraft that is coming directly at the radar will have a smaller
geometric cross section than the same target at a beam aspect (90 to the radar). The
directivity of the RCS is the ability, or inability, of the target to redirect energy back to
the radar. The reflectivity of the target is the term for the fraction of the intercepted
power that is radiated back to the radar. The RCS of any target is dependent on the
transmitted frequency and changes based on the angle of intercept.
An example of how geometric shape interacts with the directivity is shown in
Figure 8.13. All incident energy on the cube is going to be returned to the radar since all
points on the cube face are orthogonal to the radar energy. There is only one point on the
sphere that is orthogonal to the transmitted wave, so only a very small portion of the
incident energy is reflected back to the radar. The figure tells us that we should not have
shapes like F-4 intakes mounted on airplanes.
Aircraft designers reduce their radar cross section by eliminating strong echo
sources such as corner reflectors, aircraft antennas, and engine inlets. The designs
include rounded edges with no corners and variable dimensions on aircraft access panels
and doors. The two aircraft shown in Figure 8.14 are stealth aircraft; the B-2 employs
a geometric sphere at the nose of the aircraft and appears devoid of any straight edges.
FIGURE 8.13 ¢
l << 1 m
Radar Cross Section
Cube of 0.866 m
side
Area = 0.785 m2
RCS = 8600 m2
Sphere of 1 m
diameter
Area = 0.785 m2
RCS = 0.785 m2
FIGURE 8.14 ¢
RCS Applied to
Aircraft Design
The recently retired F-117, on the other hand, appears to be composed of all flat plates
joined with rounded corners. The F-117 took advantage of directivity rather than geo-
metric shape; radar energy incident on the F-117 is directed away from the transmitting
antenna by the angular construction of the plates.
Reflectivity is used by both aircraft, as they are coated with radar absorption
material (RAM). RAM is applied in a multilayer, wafer structure and can reduce the
transmitted signal by as much as 60 dB.
Because aircraft are made up of many complex scatterers, the reflections from air-
borne targets will not be uniform. The reflections will appear to make the return scin-
tillate, with peaks and valleys in the return varying with aspect angle. Some aspects may
lead to early or late detection. Since this phenomenon is dependent on the wavelength,
an airborne radar can help solve this problem by periodically switching frequencies.
8.5 MAXIMUM RADAR DETECTION

In airborne applications, we strive to obtain detections at the maximum range possible.
In this regard, we must determine the probability of obtaining that detection. The most
commonly used probability is the blip-scan ratio (BSR); it is the probability of detecting
a given target at a given range any time the antenna beam scans across the target. It is
sometimes referred to as single-scan or single-look probability, and obviously the higher
the probability desired, the shorter the detect range. The BSR is used in the evaluation of
surveillance-type radars, and may be associated with fighter- and attack-type radars.
8.5.1 Blip-Scan Ratio

NATO document RTO-AG-300, volume 16, Introduction to Airborne Early Warning
Radar Flight Test, provides an excellent reference for BSR and BSR flight testing. In
simple terms, a sample radar scans the search volume, sending out pulses at a rate equal
to its PRF. Each pulse is an opportunity for the radar to receive an echo from a target.
Since the beamwidth, scan rate, and PRF of the radar are known, the number of
opportunities on a given target is also known. Detection must imply that not only does
the radar receive energy from a target, but the received signal must be recognized as a
target. When the radar processor determines that the energy received meets the
requirements to be declared a detection, the operator is presented with a ‘‘blip,’’ or
return, at the target range, azimuth, and elevation. In a real radar display (not synthetic
video), the operator is responsible for determining if returns are true targets.
If we define a blip as a positive indication of a target, and the scan as the passage of
the beam through the search volume containing the target, the BSR is the quotient of the
number of integrated detections divided by the number of detection opportunities. The
BSR value must be associated with a range to be of value, so it is typical to define bins
of radial ranges where this ratio is calculated. For surveillance systems, the typical value
of interest for the BSR is 0.5. This may be equated to a probability of detection of 50%.
The expression is written as R50, and represents the range for which the probability of
detection is 50%.
The simplest way to perform the calculation is to divide the search volume into
discrete range bins of equal length; the bin is identified by its start and end range. For
example, if a surveillance radar had a 300 nm range capability, we can describe 30 range
bins of 10 nm each. If a target remains in the 150 to 160 nm range bin long enough for
the radar to sweep its position 20 times and a blip is present 10 times, the BSR for this
bin would be 10/20, or 0.5. The R50 for this radar and target would be 155 nm.
It is possible to see a BSR higher for some longer ranges than some intermediate
ranges. This may be due to changes in PW, PRF, etc., based on the range scale selection.
It is best to graphically represent the results of a series of blip-scan detection tests run
against the same target and the same test conditions. Figure 8.15 shows a typical plot of
BSR for a surveillance radar.
As can be seen in Figure 8.15, there are significant decreases in the detection cap-
ability between range bins 180 and 200 and again at 100 to 120. Although an R50 is
achieved at 225 nm, it is not sustainable until 100 nm.
8.5.2 Prediction of Maximum Range Detection

Prior to embarking on any flight testing, it is mandatory that the evaluator gather as
much information as possible regarding the capabilities of the system. You may find that
predictions indicate that there is no possible way that the radar will meet the require-
ments (we have never seen that before). Stimson (chapter 11) provides a method of
predicting radar range performance for any desired probability of detection.
Video type: Synthetic FIGURE 8.15 ¢

Test A/C Target A/C Blip-Scan Ratio
Date: 1 Jan 97 Model: E-9C Model: Lear 36 Results
Flight: 486 Buno: 179000 Buno: 150000
Run: #1 Altitude: 24,000 ft MSL Altitude: 28,000 ft MSL
Terrain: Near-land GND Speed: 205 KTS GND Speed: 320 KTS
Profile: 44
Range bins 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230 240 250
Blips 6 13 17 18 18 26 24 18 7 6 18 24 29 12 11 13 4 8 13 13 9 5 3
Scans 8 16 20 18 20 28 29 26 20 29 26 48 48 20 20 21 21 21 21 22 24 23 30
B/S Ratio .75 .81 .85 1 .90 .92 .82 .80 .35 .30 .69 .60 .72 .60 .55 .61 .19 .28 .61 .59 .37 .21 .10
1.00
B/S ratio
.50
.00
0 50 100 150 200 250
Range (nm1)
In this analysis, for a given probability of detection, a corresponding detection range

can be computed:
● Choose an acceptable false alarm rate.
● Calculate the false alarm probability for the individual threshold detectors.
● Find the corresponding threshold setting.
● Determine the mean value of the SNR for which the signal plus the noise will have
the specified probability of crossing the threshold.
● Compute the range at which this SNR will be obtained.
The false alarm rate is the average rate at which false alarms appear on the radar
display. The false alarm time is merely the reciprocal of the false alarm rate. The false
alarm rate must be chosen based on mission requirements. A very low false alarm rate
can be obtained by raising the threshold; however, detection ranges will suffer. For
fighter-type aircraft, a false alarm time of about 1 min is considered acceptable.
Each time the antenna beam sweeps over the target, a stream of pulses is received. In
the radar’s signal processor, the energy contained in the stream is added up. This process is
called predetection integration. As the target range decreases, the strength of the integrated
signal increases. Because of the random character of the noise, both in amplitude and in
phase, the mean strength of the noise remains about the same. At the end of each integration
period, the output is applied to a detector, and when this output exceeds a certain threshold
(false alarm [FA] threshold), a synthetic target blip is presented on the display.
The completely random noise occasionally exceeds the threshold and the detector
will falsely indicate that a target has been detected (Figure 8.16). This is called a false
alarm. The higher the detection threshold relative to the mean level of the noise energy,
the lower the false alarm probability, and vice versa.
FIGURE 8.16 ¢ Target

Signal-to-Noise False
Threshold alarm
Threshold Target
Mean noise level
Noise
Time
The setting of the threshold is crucial. If it is too high, detectable targets may go
undetected. If it is too low, too many false alarms will occur. The optimum setting is just
high enough above the mean level of the noise to keep the false alarm probability from
exceeding an acceptable level. The mean level of the noise, as well as the system gain,
may vary over a wide range. Consequently the output of the radar’s signal processor
must be continuously monitored to maintain the optimum threshold setting. If the false
alarm rate is too high, the threshold should be raised; if it is too low, the threshold should
be lowered. For this reason, the automatic detectors are called constant false alarm rate
(CFAR) detectors.
The mean time between false alarms is related to the false alarm probability of the
radar’s threshold detectors. In general, a bank of Doppler filters is provided for every
resolvable increment of range (range gate) and a threshold detector for every filter. The
probability of false alarm is the integration time divided by the product of the number of
range gates, the number of filters per bank, and the desired false alarm time.
tint
Pfa ¼ ; (8.15)
tfa xNRG xNDF
where
Pfa ¼ probability of false alarm,
Tint ¼ integration time,
tfa ¼ false alarm time,
NRG ¼ number of range gates, and
NDF ¼ number of Doppler filters per bank.
As seen in equation 8.15, the probability of false alarm can be decreased by
increasing the number of range gates or Doppler filters. There is a limit to increasing
these terms beyond a certain amount.
The required SNR versus detection probability for a wide range of false alarm
probabilities has been calculated with standard mathematical models. Where specific
RCS data are not available, or a rigorous calculation is not required, curves can be used
TABLE 8.6 ¢ Swerling Cases
Fluctuations
Case Scan to Scan Pulse to Pulse Scatterers

I X
II X Many independent
III X
IV X One main
to identify the appropriate SNR. Swerling curves are commonly used to match detection
probability with the required SNR. These curves can be found in almost any radar text.
Stimson provides these curves in chapter 11, whereas Skolnik addresses them in chapter 2.
There are four cases to which the Swerling models apply (Table 8.6): cases I and II
assume a target is made up of many independent scattering elements, as in a large (in
comparison to wavelength) complex target, such as an airplane; cases III and IV assume a
target is made up of one large scattering element. Cases I and III assume that the RCS
fluctuates from scan to scan, while cases II and IV assume that the target fluctuates from
pulse to pulse.
Once the required SNR is determined to obtain the desired detection probability, the
range can be easily calculated by returning to equation 8.14 and inserting the required
SNR into the denominator. The range of the required probability of detection is rewritten
as equation 8.16:
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Pavg sAe 2 tot
RPd ¼ 4 : (8.16)
ð4pÞ2 ðS=NÞREQ kTs l2
To account for the effects of closing rate (which is almost always the case in air-
borne applications), the detection range is expressed in terms of a cumulative probability
of detection. The cumulative probability of detection (Pc) is defined as the probability
that a given closing target will have been detected at least once by the time it reaches a
certain range. The cumulative probability of detection is related to the single-scan
probability of detection by the relationship
Pc ¼ 1 ð1 Pd Þn ; (8.17)
where n is the number of scans.

We will see a variation in the cumulative probability of detection when we address
R90 flight testing a little later. It is very important that evaluators run through the pre-
vious equations with the manufacturer’s data to see if the system can realistically meet
the specification requirements.
8.6 RADAR SAMPLE APPLICATIONS

Armed with a basic knowledge of radar and its properties, we should be able to ‘‘build’’
a radar based on known mission requirements. The following examples are generic
systems and are meant to give the reader a feel for the physics behind the build.
The first type of system is one designed for tactical air-to-air (Table 8.7). The
mission of this radar is to detect targets at long range and employ missiles at beyond
visual range (BVR). The old, now retired F-14A/D was tasked with fleet defense and
possessed such a radar. The F-15C Eagle possesses a similar type of radar.
The choice of frequency provides the ability to shape the beam and take advantage
of the Doppler content because of the relatively low attenuation by the atmosphere.
Better resolution and beam shaping can be accomplished with a higher frequency, such
as Ka or Ku, but the attenuation would be unsatisfactory. The PW is large in order to
increase the average power, which will increase the detection range, but decrease range
resolution (if a version of pulse compression is not used).
At long ranges, range resolution is not as important as the detection itself. At shorter
ranges, the PW is shortened in order to enhance range resolution. The PRF is high in
order to decrease Doppler ambiguities as well as enhance detection by increasing the
average power. Because the PRF is high, this radar will not be able to calculate range
from simple pulse delay ranging and will have to employ another method (called fre-
quency modulation [FM] ranging), which will be addressed later. The beamwidth is
large in order to scan large volumes in space. A raster scan allows the radar to scan in
elevation as well as azimuth, thereby increasing the scan volume.
Most air-to-air radars have multiple scan selections. Figure 8.17 shows three raster
scan selections. The first is an 8-bar raster scan; the antenna slews one elevation
beamwidth from left to right through the azimuth sector. As it reaches the maximum
positive azimuth, the antenna steps up one elevation beamwidth and slews to the left.
TABLE 8.7 ¢ Tactical Air-to-Air Radar Parameters
Radar Parameter Value Reason

Frequency X band (9–10 GHz) Good Doppler resolution
Beam shaping
Attenuation not too high
Pulse Width Large (>2 msec) Range
PRF High (>300 kHz) Range
Beamwidth Large (>4 ) Search volume
Scan Raster Scan volume
Display Type B scope range vs. azimuth Range or range rate
or range rate vs. azimuth information
Stabilization Earth or aircraft Search or dogfight modes
FIGURE 8.17 ¢ Azimuth

Radar Raster Scan
Elevation
8-Bar scan 4-Bar scan 2-Bar scan

FIGURE 8.18 ¢
B Scope
Target Presentation
Range
Azimuth
TABLE 8.8 ¢ Tactical Air-to-Ground Radar Parameters

Frequency Ku band (16–35 GHz) Beam shaping
Equipment size not a factor
Pulse Width Small (<0.4 msec) Range resolution
PRF Low (<1 kHz) Little or no range ambiguity
Beamwidth Narrow (<1.5 ) Azimuth resolution
Scan Azimuth only (although some Update rates
terrain-following radar
will use a raster scan)
Display Type Sector PPI Range and azimuth information
in a true representation
Stabilization Earth Search and track modes
Weaponry will require information
based on an earth coordinate system
The process continues until the selected bar pattern is reached. If the elevation beam-
width of the radar is 2 , an 8-bar raster scan will search 16 in elevation. Detection range
will decrease, since the tot will decrease (assuming the scan rate remained the same).
A B scope is a particular method of displaying target information to an operator.
The B scope provides either range versus azimuth or range rate versus azimuth to the
operator. It is not a true depiction of the volume as seen through the window because the
bottom of the display is distorted. Figure 8.18 shows a B scope.
The stabilization may be either earth stabilized (normal search and track modes) or
aircraft stabilized for close-in, highly dynamic tracking.
Our second system is of a type that is designed for tactical air-to-ground. These
types of systems are designed to accurately identify ground targets and resolve multiple
targets for the purpose of delivering some sort of weaponry. One would expect to suffer
maximum range for maximum resolution (Table 8.8).
The frequency employed here is fairly high and will suffer much greater attenuation
than the X-band system seen in the previous paragraph. The range at which these sys-
tems are used, however, is generally very short, so attenuation is not generally a pro-
blem; there can be severe problems when attempting to identify targets obscured by rain
or snow. This is a penalty that is endured in order to obtain very narrow radar beams for
enhanced azimuth accuracy and resolution.
The PW is small, which lowers the average power, which in turn decreases the
detection range. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, since operational ranges are
small, this is not a problem. The narrow PW does provide enhanced range resolution,
which is an important requirement of tactical air-to-ground radars. The 0.4 msec PW will
provide a range resolution of two targets separated in range of 200 ft. The PRF is kept
low, which also adversely impacts the detection range, but at the same time it allows for
a longer maximum unambiguous range. Ambiguities are easily solved, as the maximum
range of detection is kept small.
Most air-to-ground radars will only sweep in azimuth, and the scan rate is kept fairly
high at short ranges. The system has the capability of using a fan or pencil beam,
depending on the accuracy that is required. Some systems that use this type of radar for
terrain following (TF) may employ a pencil beam in a raster scan in order to obtain
accurate height of terrain measurements at greater distances from the aircraft.
Many of today’s multimode radars operate in X band but use special processing to
obtain the resolutions needed for accurate weapons delivery. These processing modes
are synthetic aperture radar, Doppler beam sharpening, and inverse synthetic aperture
radar, and are covered in section 8.9.4 of this text.
The display is called a plan position indicator or present position indicator (PPI)
(depending on which text you are reading). The display is an accurate representation of the
world as seen by the pilot through the windscreen. Unlike the B scope, the picture is not
distorted at the bottom of the display. The display presents azimuth versus range, where
range is marked by range rings emanating from the bottom of the display. The airplane is
at the bottom of the display and aircraft heading or track is at the top of the display.
Figure 8.19 shows a PPI presentation.
A ground mapping radar is commonly employed as an aid to navigation. Unlike the
tactical air-to-ground system, range is important to this system. The parameters for the
ground mapping radar are shown in Table 8.9.
The frequency for this system is chosen to reduce attenuation and enhance the
available range. It is usually combined with a weather detection system. As noted in the
tactical air-to-ground system, weather can cause severe problems with a Ku-band radar.
A high-frequency radar can easily detect weather; the problem is seeing through the
weather to find out what is on the other side. An X-band system has the capability of
detecting weather, but since the wavelength is larger than the object (raindrop), only a
portion of the radiated energy is reflected back to the transmitter. Some of the energy
FIGURE 8.19 ¢ PPI Rotating

sweep 0°
Scope Presentation Returns 15° 15°
from 30° 30°
aircraft 45° 45°
60° 50°
20
15 Mi
10 Mi
5 Mi
Range Mi
marks Range
marks
Circular scan Fan-shaped scan
Plan position indicator

TABLE 8.9 ¢ Ground Mapping Radar Parameters

Frequency X band (10 GHz) Frequency not susceptible to large attenuations
Size can fit in most tactical aircraft
Pulse Width Small (<1 msec) Range resolution
PRF Low (<300 Hz) Little or no range ambiguity
Beamwidth Narrow (~3 ) (enhanced azimuth accuracy Azimuth resolution
and resolution with Doppler
beam sharpening [DBS])
Scan Azimuth only (although some terrain- Update rates
following radar will use a raster scan)
Display Type Sector PPI Range and azimuth information
Stabilization Earth Search and track modes
Navigation based on earth coordinates
TABLE 8.10 ¢ Airborne Early Warning Radar Parameters

Frequency As low as 450 MHz (UHF) Frequency not susceptible to
attenuations; very long range
Pulse Width Very large (>13 msec) Increased average power for
greater range
PRF Low (<200 Hz) Range ambiguities easily resolved;
long maximum unambiguous range
Beamwidth Very wide (>7 ); function Large scan volume
of frequency
Scan Azimuth only, 360 scan Large beamwidth negates elevation scan
Display Type PPI or sector PPI Range and azimuth information
Stabilization Earth Targeting information is provided
on WGS-84 earth models
passes through the weather and is reflected back by objects (such as mountains) that lie
beyond the weather system.
The PW remains small for range resolution, and the PRF remains low to resolve
range ambiguities. The beamwidth is fairly large, but this is a result of the frequency that
we have chosen. There is a special processing method called Doppler beam sharpening
(DBS), which effectively narrows the beamwidth an order of magnitude, thus producing
excellent azimuth accuracy and resolution. DBS will be discussed later. The scan and
the display are as with the tactical air-to-ground radar.
An airborne early warning radar (sometimes called an airborne early warning
system [AEWS]) is designed to detect targets at the maximum range possible and
direct airborne interceptors to engage these targets. The AEWS does not concern itself
with fine resolution in range and azimuth; there may be cases where two or three
targets are identified by the AEWS as a single target. Table 8.10 presents the AEWS
radar parameters.
The frequency is extremely low in order to get maximum range for the available
power. Since the frequency is so low, a very large antenna is required to shape the beam
to a usable beamwidth. The PW is very large in order to increase the average power, and
therefore increase the detection range. Since the PW is large, range resolution suffers.
With a 13 msec PW, targets would have to be separated by more than 6500 ft in range in
order to be classified as two targets by the AEWS. The PRF is kept low in order to
resolve range ambiguities; it also provides for a greater maximum unambiguous range.
The scan is normally 360 , but can be sectored by the operator if desired.
The presentation can be the same as shown in Figure 8.19, or it can display the
entire 360 volume, as shown in Figure 8.20.
The aircraft is at the center of the display, and in this figure north is up, so the
display correlates to a map in the normal position. The operator can also display track up
or heading up as the top of the display.
Because the elevation beam is so wide, there is no need to scan in elevation; a 7
beam will subtend 210,000 ft at 300 nm. There will be quite a bit of ambiguity in the
altitude (elevation), on the same order as seen with the azimuth.
The basic weather radar as installed in civil aircraft looks much like the
ground mapping radar previously identified. The only significant difference between
the two is that the weather radar employs a longer PW to add to detection range cap-
ability (Table 8.11). The range resolution will suffer, but this is not a huge loss when
searching for weather cells.
FIGURE 8.20 ¢ 0
360 PPI Display
Range
270 0 90
Targets
180
TABLE 8.11 ¢ Weather Radar Parameters

Frequency X band (10 GHz) Frequency not susceptible to large attenuations
Pulse Width Large (>5 msec) Range
PRF Low (<200 Hz) Little or no range ambiguity
Beamwidth Narrow (~3 ) Azimuth resolution
Scan Azimuth only Update rates
Display Type Sector PPI Range and azimuth information in a true representation
Stabilization Earth Navigation based on earth coordinates
8.6.1 Other Display Types

There are other presentations of radar data that the evaluator may come across in testing.
The first of these display types is called an A scope. This presentation provides raw
radar video in terms of range versus amplitude of the radar return. It is up to the operator
to determine the real target echoes from the noise. This type of display is not seen much
anymore. Many of the older surface-to-air missile (SAM) tracking radars utilize this
display. Figure 8.21 shows the A scope presentation.
Another display type is called a C scope, and it is used to relate radar information to the
HUD. The C scope displays azimuth versus elevation without range. This 2D presentation
is exactly what the pilot sees when looking through the HUD. In many tactical aircraft, the
pilot can select an autoacquisition mode (sometimes called autoguns, HUD mode, air
combat maneuvering (ACM) mode, boresight, and others) and the radar will enter an
aircraft stabilization mode and refine its search pattern in azimuth and elevation to match
the HUD field of view (FOV). A representation of the C scope is shown in Figure 8.22.
The final display is called a patch map, and is the result of synthetic aperture radar
(SAR), inverse SAR (ISAR), or DBS processing; the output of the display in many cases
looks like a photograph. The radar dwells over an operator designated area of interest
and collects data to put together a collage; the smaller the resolution cell of the pro-
cessing, the higher the resolution in the display. SAR, ISAR, and DBS will be covered
later. In older systems, the data were written to disk and the presentations were not
available until postflight. Modern aircraft have the capability of processing and dis-
playing the area of interest in near real time—on the order of a couple of seconds. Pilots
can use these presentations for precision bombing, target designation, and even airborne
radar approaches to a runway. A patch map display is shown in Figure 8.23.
FIGURE 8.21 ¢
A Scope Display
Target
Noise
Amplitude
Range
FIGURE 8.22 ¢
C Scope Display
Target
Elevation
Azimuth
FIGURE 8.23 ¢
Patch Map Display
8.7 PULSE DELAY RANGING RADAR MODES

OF OPERATION AND TESTING
The simplest type of pulse radar is the weather radar installed in many of the civil
aircraft in operation today. The required evaluation of this type of radar was covered in
section 6.9 and will not be repeated here.
The pulse radar gives us excellent ranging to a target by measuring the time it takes
a transmitted pulse to return back to the receiver after being reflected from a target
(equation 8.4). The pulse radar can provide us with azimuth and elevation to a target
referenced to either earth or aircraft coordinates. It should come as no surprise then that
much of our testing will involve the accuracies of range, azimuth, and elevation.
There are other tests that must be accomplished as well when evaluating the pulse
radar:
● Built-in test (BIT)
● Stabilization
● Observations
● Detections
● Maximum detection range (R90/R50)
● Minimum detection range (short pulse)
● Measurement accuracy
● Track initiation range
● Track accuracy
● Resolutions
● Transition time
8.7.1 Pulse Radar Built-In Test

The built-in test (BIT) function of the radar comes in many types: power-up BIT (PBIT),
initiated BIT (IBIT), operational readiness test (ORT), periodic BIT (PBIT), and
maintenance BIT (MBIT). All of these tests are designed to alert the operator to the
health and welfare of the system. The key to all built-in testing is that BIT results should
be understandable, retrievable, and timely. The BIT will check all radar interfaces
(navigation, stabilization, own-ship parameters, etc.), transmitter operation, video
injection, antenna drive, and mode selections. It will run software routines and compare
the results to the expected results. If there are any failures that will degrade mission
capability, then the operator is supposed to be apprised of such situations, usually
through the pilot fault list (PFL). Other failures may be written to the maintenance fault
list (MFL) in memory for maintenance review at a later date. The preferred method of
test to evaluate the radar’s ability to recognize and capture faults is through deliberate
fault injection. This test is more easily accomplished in the lab, as access to the inter-
faces is available and failures are easily introduced. It is more difficult, if not impos-
sible, to run these tests on the aircraft because of limited access and the inability to inject
software failures into flight-worthy software. On-aircraft testing may be limited to
shutting down systems, such as the global positioning system (GPS), that interface with
the radar and observing that those failures are logged.
One of the primary concerns is the number of false alarms, or conversely, the
number of faults not detected. This particular test is part of the operational test and
evaluation (OT&E) reliability and maintainability evaluation. When maintenance
detects a failure in the MFL, the failure should point to a line replaceable unit (LRU) as
the guilty party with some degree of certainty (on the order of 99.999%). What this
means is that when a failure is logged in the MFL, that failure is cross-referenced to
possible LRU problems. The cross-reference will identify three possible LRUs that may
be at fault and the probability that one of them is the cause is very high. Maintenance
will pull these three LRUs and rerun the BIT to see if the failure is cleared. If the fault
has cleared, it now becomes a task of determining which of the three LRUs was at fault.
This can involve local-level, depot-level, or vendor-level testing. What happens on some
occasions is that none of the LRUs appear to be at fault. The cards are returned for
inventory (RFI), and at some later date they are back in another airplane. And then what
do you think happens? Of course, the same failure returns. This is one reason why
configuration control is such an important aspect of flight testing. The LRUs may also
be good, and in this case, the radar BIT has provided us with a false alarm. The other
side of the coin is where the radar fails either in total or in some mode and the BIT does
not report a failure; this is a fault not detected, and is also not good.
The last portion of the BIT is the time it takes to execute the BIT and display the
results. There will be a specification for each available BIT and the amount of time it
should take to execute. A power-up BIT of around 3 min is probably the norm, whereas
initiated BIT (during flight) is an abbreviated BIT and may run only 30 sec. The time in
BIT should be noted every time it is executed during the flight test program.
8.7.2 Pulse Radar Stabilization

The stabilization tests are similar to those explained in section 6.9.1; however, with a
military application, the radar receives platform stabilization reference from a navigation
system or separate gyro package dedicated to the radar platform. The primary purpose of
this test is to ensure that the radar can maintain stabilization throughout the operational
envelope of the aircraft up to the physical limitations of the radar. The radar can scan
physically (i.e., hydraulic or electric drive motors) or electrically, and the evaluation
demonstrates that the radar points to the position commanded by the operator. In cases of
physically scanned antennas, the antenna drive unit will detect a failure if the commanded
position does not match the actual position and the failure is announced on the PFL.
The initial tests should be conducted in pulse search with the smallest raster avail-
able (1-bar or 2-bar raster) and earth stabilization selected. The stabilization limits of the
radar can be obtained in the same manner as with the weather radar. Incremental
changes of pitch will establish the elevation limits, and incremental changes in bank will
establish the roll limits. The limits are established when the returns start to disappear
from the top (pitch down) and bottom (pitch up) and when the returns start to fade from
the up-wing side of the display during bank maneuvers.
Probably of more importance in military applications is the effect of ‘‘g’’ on the
radar stabilization. This test determines if the antenna can slew to the correct position
under aircraft maneuvers. This test may require additional instrumentation if antenna
position information cannot be obtained from the bus. The operator should select the
smallest raster available, earth stabilization, and 0 tilt. From a shallow dive, start a pull-
up with ever-increasing g; the aircraft needs to be recovered before the pitch stabiliza-
tion limits of the radar are reached. This test needs to be repeated to maximum g for all
raster scans available. The radar should be able to maintain the correct scan pattern in
azimuth and elevation throughout all of these maneuvers. In addition, there should be no
interference noted between the antenna and the radome. You can see that this test is of
some importance to the operational capability of the radar system. If the scan collapses
under certain maneuvers, target illumination will not be maintained, and hence all
information about that target will be lost.
8.7.3 Pulse Radar Observations and Detections

An observation is defined as the radar’s ability to see targets in the pulse search mode. These
returns (echoes from objects within the radar scan volume) are not displayed to the aircrew,
but rather are forwarded to the airborne radar signal processor (ARSP) for processing.
The only way to evaluate this function is to analyze internal radar processing data. This can
be a difficult undertaking as these data are usually proprietary and not normally available to
the evaluator. The test team must work with the radar vendor to retrieve this information.
If an observation passes the screening criteria of the radar, the return is declared a detection
and sent to the airborne radar display processor (ARDP) for display to the operator.
This evaluation is a ground test and is normally accomplished with the vendor during
radar development. Most radar developers will utilize a roof house antenna where the test
item is mounted atop a tower and is slid out on rails so the radar can view targets of
opportunity. Range ambiguity resolution, pulse compression, detection thresholds, and
false alarm rates are tested and adjusted to obtain maximum operational usefulness of the
system. The truth data are usually FAA data tapes (IFF tracks) of targets in the area. Using
these tapes, the radar developer can sort out the true airborne targets from the false alarms.
Additional logic is employed before radar observations are declared detections.
The logic may state that an observation must be seen in three of five consecutive frames
before it is declared a detection (a frame is one complete scan of the radar; an 8-bar scan
requires the entire 8 bars be complete to produce a frame). The logic may state that
observations must be seen on two of three consecutive bars in three consecutive frames.
Each radar is different and the radar evaluator needs to be aware of, and understand, the
logic in order to make a proper evaluation. These tests will be ongoing throughout the
entire development cycle of the radar.
The key to this evaluation is to determine if the correct information is reaching the
operator. In some cases, detections are claimed by the ARDP but not displayed to the
aircrew. In other cases, the logic is flawed and observations that do not meet the criteria
are displayed anyway. It is extremely important to complete these tests prior to
attempting installed system ground and flight testing. The evaluator will find that radar
development is extremely incremental in nature (i.e., software driven). For this reason,
as mentioned in chapter 1, plan on regression testing. As a corollary, strive to find and
fix large problems early in the program, as this will decrease the need for performing
large amounts of repeat testing.
One last point about detections: For a radar developer, a detection occurs when the
radar says it occurs. For the user, a detection occurs when the operator sees it on the
display. Is this ever a problem? You bet it is, and sometimes it takes a court to determine
who is right. This problem occurs routinely for the aircraft integrator, since the displays
and the system are not necessarily built by the same company. When developing a test
plan and exit criteria (what data need to be collected and what must the results be in
order to satisfy the requirement), ensure that there is agreement among all parties about
what will be classified as a detection.
8.7.4 Pulse Radar Maximum Range Detections

The maximum detection range is expressed in terms of probabilities, and the most com-
mon method of determining the probability of detection is the BSR, as explained in
section 8.5.1. This method is called the single-scan or single-look probability and is used
for surveillance radars. In fighter aircraft, it is more common to determine the R90, or the
90% cumulative probability range of detection (the range at which the cumulative prob-
ability equals 90%). The method of determining the R90 is best illustrated by an example.
Suppose you were given a specification that stated that the ‘‘APG-XXX radar shall
have the capability of detecting a 5 m2 target with a velocity of closure of 1075 knots
flying at an altitude of 35,000 ft by the test aircraft flying at 15,000 ft at a range of
60 nm.’’ It is further stated that 60 nm shall be the 90% probable range of detection. The
first thing to be agreed upon is what a detection consists of. For the radar engineer, a
detection might be when a detection occurs in the radar instrumentation data; an aircrew
member may declare a detection when he observes a target on the radar or tactical
situation display. Once this discussion is over, we can set about developing the geometry
for the test. The intercept should be set at a 180 aspect (head on) at a range equal to
120% of the specification value (in our case, 120% of 60, or 72 nm). This is done to
prevent late detections (caused by early turn-in or observer latency) from skewing the
statistics. When the detection is observed, either in radar data or by the observer, the
truth data of the test aircraft as well as the target are noted and a true range is calculated.
This range becomes one data point to be used in calculating the mean, or X . The R90 is
defined in equation 8.18:
R90 ¼ X ts; (8.18)
where
R90 ¼ range at which cumulative probability equals 90%,
X ¼ mean value of the test data,
s ¼ standard deviation, and
t ¼ standardized Student’s t variable.
A simple review of statistics tells us that the sample mean, X , is defined as
1X N
X ¼ xi ; (8.19)
N i¼1
where
X ¼ mean value of the test data,
Xi ¼ value of the specific measured variable, and
N ¼ number of test points.
The sample standard deviation, s, is defined in equation 8.20:
& X ! ’12
N
1 N 2
s¼ xi 2
X : (8.20)
N 1 i¼1
N 1
The variable t is the standardized Student’s t variable, which is used to account for
sample sizes that are very small when compared to the population. We normally use the
Student’s t distribution when our sample size is less than 30. Since this evaluation takes
a bit of time to accomplish for one data point, it is a safe assumption that we will not be
doing more than 30 setups. The Student’s t distribution can be obtained from any sta-
tistics book for a 90% probability. The value of t would be 3.078 for 2 data points, 1.383
for 10 data points, and 1.328 for 20 data points.
We can now begin the test process and start to collect data toward specification
compliance. Figure 8.24 describes the geometry and data required for the maximum
detection range evaluation.
This test is relatively easy as long as the variables of RCS, closure, and altitude
match the specification. If they do not, then we must normalize the conditions and adjust
the setup. Suppose that the RCS of the target provided is 10 m2 instead of the 5 m2 called
out in the specification. What are the ramifications of this change? We remember from
the radar range equation that an increase in RCS will increase the maximum range of
FIGURE 8.24 ¢
Maximum Detection 180º aspect
Range 120% of specification range
Mark present
position of aircraft
upon radar detection
detection, but by how much? The normalized range for a target RCS other than 5 m2 is
given empirically by equation 8.21:
14
sT
xis ¼ xi ; (8.21)
sT 0
where
xis ¼ range normalized for target size,
xi ¼ actual range demonstrated in flight,
sT ¼ specification-defined RCS (5 m2), and
sT0 ¼ actual test target RCS.
If we turn inbound at 72 nm and note a detection at 70 nm, we would normalize this
range using equation 8.21:
14
1
xis ¼ 70 ¼ 58:8 nm:
2
The answer of 58.8 nm does not meet the requirements of the specification (60 nm)
and cannot be included in the data set. We need to reverse engineer the equation in order
to determine what our new turn-in range must be for this different RCS target. By setting
xis to 72 nm (our original 120% specification value) and solving for xi (our new turn-in
range) we find: 14
1
72 ¼ xi ; xi ¼ (72)/(0.84) ¼ 85.7 nm (~86 nm).
2
In order for our geometry to meet the requirements of the specification, our new
turn-in range for a 10 m2 target is now 14 nm greater than the original turn-in range. This
reverse engineering can be accomplished for any RCS size target and a series of graphs
plotting RCS versus turn-in range can be generated. This is a good tool for any test
conductor on a radar development program.
As with RCS, changes in the closure rate will also affect our detection range. The
example specification calls for a closure of 1075 knots. If our test aircraft flies at a
comfortable 400 knots, that means that our target would have to fly at 675 knots in order
to meet the closure specification. This is not going to happen; and even if you could get
the target up to that speed, it would probably be out of gas after the first pass. We have to
normalize our test conditions for velocity of closure differences in a fashion similar to
RCS normalization.
The radar range equation shows the term time on target in the numerator. With more
time on target, the detection range will increase and with less time it will decrease. If the
scan rate of the radar remains the same, a slower closure rate will mean more scans across
the target for the same range traversed. Assume that the radar completes one frame every
second. A closure rate of 1000 frames/sec will yield one radar hit on the target every
1000 ft. If the closure is reduced to 500 frames/sec, the radar will have two hits on the
target every 1000 ft, thus increasing the time on target, and hence the detection range.
The xis will be scaled if the range rate differs from the nominal value using equation 8.22:
xis
xisR ¼ ; (8.22)
SR
where
xisR ¼ range normalized for target size and range rate,
SR ¼ scaling factor that is a function of range rate (NOTE: SR is provided by the
radar vendor), and
xis ¼ range normalized for target size (calculated in equation 8.21).
The data must also be scaled for atmospheric attenuation due to altitude changes.
Our specification calls for detections at 35,000 ft. What would happen if there are clouds
at 35,000 ft and the test has to be accomplished at 20,000 ft? Because the density
increases at lower altitudes, the attenuation will increase, causing shorter detection
ranges. This relationship for normalization purposes is shown in equation 8.23:

xi
xiA ¼ xi inv log Logðxi Þ SA ; (8.23)
20
where
xiA ¼ incremental range for atmospheric attenuation, and
SA ¼ scaling factor that is a function of altitude (NOTE: SA is provided by the radar
vendor).
The completely normalized range (xi0 ) that will be used for statistical calculations is
obtained by
x0i ¼ xisR þ xiA ; (8.24)
where xi0 is the range normalized for RCS, closure rate, and altitudes.
Table 8.12 provides a possible data card for pulse search R90 detections.
The number of data points to be collected to satisfy the R90 requirements is really
determined by equation 8.18. The key is to have a small standard deviation and a small t.
Since the standard deviation will not become evident until the collection of data, the
only variable the tester can control in the planning process is t. The t distribution does
not change much after 20 samples for 90% (t ¼ 1.328), so planning to accomplish more
than 20 samples would be counterproductive. The test plan would call out 20 passes to
successfully accomplish the requirement.
8.7.4.1 Other Considerations in R90 Testing

The previously described testing positioned the target in a clear or clutter-free region,
since the target was located at 35,000 ft. There are other considerations that will require
TABLE 8.12 ¢ Pulse Search R90 Detections Data Card
Radar Pulse Search R90
Detection
Test Range Test Test
Run Turn-in Target Target Target (per Target Target Aircraft Aircraft
No. Range RCS Altitude Groundspeed radar) Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude
evaluation by the test team. The first of these considerations is look-down, or clutter
testing. The specifications will be less stringent, as the target is now competing with a
strong ground return. The method of test is identical to the clear region R90 test, and the
number of passes required, normalizations, etc., are the same.
There may also be a requirement to test look-down geometry over terrain with
differing backscatter coefficients. The most common evaluation is over land and over
water, as the coefficients differ greatly.
These conditions are added to the test matrix and the total number of conditions
required is accomplished by multiplying across the matrix. If we need to test clear and
clutter, over land and over water, the number of test conditions (and hence the number of
test points) required would be multiplied by four.
8.7.5 Pulse Radar Minimum Detection Range

This test is really a validation of the physics of radar. The minimum detection range is
the shortest range to the target at which the radar can provide usable information to the
operator. This test is sometimes called short pulse detection, since the radar uses the
shortest PW available in order to get as close as possible to the target. In many radars
this is an automated feature tied to range scale selection by the operator.
As previously discussed, the resolution range is equal to the PW (in microseconds)
times 500 ft. The minimum range is computed in exactly the same fashion. If the range
to the target is too close, the trailing edge of the pulse will not arrive at the target before
the leading edge of the pulse is already back at the receiver. This range is equal to one-
half of the trip time of the pulse, or 500 ft/msec. If the PW of the radar is 1 msec, the
minimum detection range of the radar is 500 ft.
The test is set up as shown in Figure 8.25, and a data card is provided in Table 8.13.
The test aircraft sets up behind the target aircraft at the same speed and at a range that is
1000 ft greater than the predicted minimum detection range. The test aircraft marks
when there is a detection in pulse search. On the test conductor’s call, the test aircraft
increases speed by 10 knots and calls when the target is lost. On that mark, the true
FIGURE 8.25 ¢
Pulse Search
0 aspect Minimum Detection
same speed outside
Range Geometry
minimum detection range
TABLE 8.13 ¢ Pulse Search Minimum Detection Data Card
Initial Detection Loss of Detection

Test Test Test Test Test
Run Target Target Aircraft Aircraft Target Target Aircraft Aircraft
No. Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude
positions of the test and target aircraft are recorded. The test aircraft then reduces speed
by 20 knots and calls when a detection is seen; the true positions of both aircraft are
recorded again. This procedure is repeated as necessary. It is imperative that the test be
initiated in a trail position, as opposed to head on.
8.7.6 Pulse Radar Measurement Accuracy

The pulse delay ranging radar provides the user with the range, azimuth, and elevation
of the detections. It would make sense therefore to assume that there should be some
specification defining the accuracy of these variables. And there is. There will be an
accuracy specified for each of these parameters. The accuracies must be shown
throughout the operating limits of the radar. For example, if the radar can scan 60 in
azimuth, then range, azimuth, and elevation accuracies must be shown throughout the
azimuth scan volume. The same holds true for elevation and range volume. Another
matrix of test variables will be made to determine the test conditions required.
The ranges should be broken out into range bins, much like what was accomplished
during the R50 blip-scan tests. The accuracies are stated for the midpoint of the bin. For
example, if the range bin is 21 to 30 nm, the accuracies would be stated for 25 nm, the
midpoint of the bin. A sample test matrix for measurement accuracy is shown in
Table 8.14. In this example, the maximum detection range is 60 nm, and the radar scans
60 in azimuth and þ 45 /30 in elevation.
As shown in Table 8.14, a total of 2400 test conditions are required for this test if we
agree that testing every 5 is the way to go. If we assume that we would need about six
test points for every condition, we are looking at 14,400 test points. Here is another case
where the program manager is going to be quite unhappy upon hearing the bad news,
and you are about to receive a serious tongue lashing; that is, unless you can describe
how this test is not going to take 100 flights to complete.
The key here is to remember the data rates, and how many data points can be
collected with every pass. This matrix can be accomplished in relatively quick fashion
(about four flights) if it is set up accurately and sufficient radar and truth data are
available. Figure 8.26 shows the geometry of how this test should be run.
TABLE 8.14 ¢ Pulse Search Measurement Accuracy Test Matrix
Pulse Search Measurement Accuracy
Range Bin Azimuth Elevation

(0–60 nm) ( þ60 /60 ) ( þ45 /30 )
Accuracy Required 500 ft 1 1
Total test conditions:

Test Variables 10 nm bins (6 bins) Every 5 (25) Every 5 (16) 6 25 16 ¼ 2400
0–10 nm
11–20 nm
21–30 nm
31–40 nm
41–50 nm
51–60 nm
FIGURE 8.26 ¢
Measurement
Accuracy Geometry
Initial setup at 120% of

maximum detection range.
At detection, test aircraft
executes a porpoise maneuver.
The initial setup is performed exactly as the maximum detection range test. After
the detection is accomplished, the test aircraft executes a porpoise maneuver that will
continue through crossover; the operator must maintain the detection. You can see that
during this maneuver, the range and elevation are continuously changing, filling in the
matrix; the azimuth is constant. If the data rate for the radar data is 25 samples/sec and
there is matching TSPI data at the same rate, 25 data points will be collected every
second. These passes are accomplished a number of times until the matrix is filled in.
In order to collect the azimuth data, the same setup is used; however, this time the
test aircraft executes a saw-tooth maneuver in the horizontal to vary the azimuth with
range; elevation is held constant. It is important that the test aircraft perform the man-
euvers and not the target. When the target is maneuvering, the test aircraft will lose
control, and valuable time and effort will be wasted.
Measurement accuracy is normally assessed using ensemble statistics. Ensemble
statistics allow the weighting of data collected at different times by the total amount of
data collected at that time. For example, if we collect five data points today and
tomorrow we collect 500 data points for the same evaluation, the mean and standard
deviation for tomorrow’s data will hold more weight than today’s. For measurement
accuracy, the absolute value of the ensemble mean plus twice the ensemble standard
deviation are compared to the specification:
Measurement accuracy ¼ ðjXE jÞ þ 2sE : (8.25)
The ensemble mean and ensemble standard deviation are further explained in equations
8.26 and 8.27:
N1 X1 þ N2 X2 þ NK XK
XE ¼ ; (8.26)
N1 þ N2 þ NK
where
XE ¼ ensemble mean of the total sample space,
XK ¼ sample mean of the Kth test data sample, and
NK ¼ number of test points in the Kth sample mean; and
" #12
1 X k X N
T
sE ¼ xj 2 XE 2 ; (8.27)
NT 1 j¼1 NT 1
where
sE ¼ ensemble standard deviation of the total sample space,
NT ¼ total number of test points equal to N1 þ N2 þ . . . NK,
XE ¼ ensemble mean of the total sample space,
k ¼ total number of test points in the sample space, and
X
xj 2 ¼ sum of the square of the specified measured variable and is equal to
X
xj 2 ¼ ðNj 1Þsj þ Nj X j 2 ;
where
Nj ¼ number of test points in the jth sample,
sj ¼ standard deviation of the jth sample, and
X j ¼ mean of the jth sample.
8.7.7 Pulse Radar Track Initiation Range

A pulsed delay ranging radar can acquire and track only one target; this track is known
as a pulse single-target track (PSTT). There have been many methods of tracking targets
with airborne radars, and now is perhaps the best time to review some of those modes. A
target is said to be tracked by a radar when the radar can predict where the target will be
in the next time frame and smoothly slew the antenna so that the target is always within
the tracking beam.
The earliest type of tracking was called lobing. The radar operator designates a
target of interest via acquisition symbols and through some means (trigger detent, button
depression, etc.) informs the radar that he wants the system to track this target. The radar
switches to a pencil beam and lobes the target (places the beam to the left and right of
the target) (see Figure 8.27).
This type of tracking works alright as long as the target only maneuvers in the
horizontal plane. If the target maneuvers in the vertical plane, the radar is unable to
detect the movement and tracking is lost. In order to combat this problem, a conical
track was developed. The same pencil beam is utilized, but now the antenna is nutated in
FIGURE 8.27 ¢ Lobe 1 Lobe 2

PSTT Lobing
Radar lobes left then right on the target

and drives the antenna to equalize the
returns in both lobes. When the returns
are always equal the target is being
tracked.
order to develop a conical lobing about the target. This type of scan can cover the
horizontal and vertical movements of the target (Figure 8.28).
Versions of these two types of tracks are found with surface-to-air tracking systems.
These systems use two antennas: one transmitter and one receiver. The transmitter
radiates the target while the receiving antenna rotates or lobes from side to side. The
results are the same as just described; however, the target does not know it is being
tracked because all tracking is passive. These systems are called conical scan receive
only (COSRO) and lobe-on receive only (LORO).
Modern radars employ a method of tracking called monopulse, which is employed
with planar array–type antennas. In theory, it works the same as the conical scan;
however, the antenna is not rotated. The echo from a target is received by the antenna
and partitioned into four quadrants. The return is analyzed for the strength of the return
in each of the four quadrants and is steered to obtain an equal return in all four quadrants
(Figures 8.29 and 8.30).
FIGURE 8.28 ¢
PSTT Conical Track
Conical beam nutates about

the target seeking an equal
return in each lobe position.
Feed point for FIGURE 8.29 ¢

typical array module Planar Array
Mechanism
Typical
reactive
power
Typical slot divider
array module
Output to
summing
network
Face view Back view

FIGURE 8.30 ¢ RF slots

Monopulse Tracking
Quadrant 3
Quadrant 1
Quadrant 2 Quadrant 4
The array in Figure 8.30 contains many radio frequency (RF) slots, each of which
transmits and receives radar energy. The slots may work independently or all together,
depending on the task at hand. The array in the figure is divided into four quadrants
labeled 1 through 4. The radar processor sums the quadrants in hemispheres and com-
pares the return to the opposite hemisphere. If the sum of one and two is higher than the
sum of three and four, then the antenna must be moved to the left (from our perspective).
If the sum of one and three is higher than the sum of two and four, then the antenna must
be moved upward. These comparisons are continuously made in order to smoothly drive
the pointing angle of the radar to the centroid of the target.
The first evaluation regarding PSTT is the track initiation range. The track initiation
range is that range where a track file can be initiated and maintained all the way through
target crossover. This statement is made because there is a probability that the track may
drop out after some time and then be reacquired at a shorter distance. The shorter dis-
tance becomes the track initiation range.
The track initiation range tests are conducted the same way that we initially tested
R90. There are two exceptions: one, as previously noted, is that after the track is initiated,
it must be held through crossover; the second exception is that the range need not be
normalized for range rate. This is because of the high rate of track initiation opportu-
nities (the antenna is trained on the target). The range must still be normalized for RCS
and density differences. The specification may also require the variables of clutter and
terrain type be included in the evaluation.
8.7.8 Pulse Radar Track Accuracy

This test duplicates the evaluation of measurement accuracy detailed in section 8.7.5.
This test evaluates the radar’s ability to determine the range, azimuth, and elevation of a
target that is being tracked (as opposed to accuracies in the search mode). Since the
target will be tracked in PSTT, all radar energy is devoted to this one target and the
accuracies will be very good. TSPI data which was used for the measurement accuracy
tests may not be good enough for this evaluation, and is something that must be con-
sidered. The test matrix in Table 8.14 can be used again for this test with the appropriate
changes to the specifications.
8.7.9 Pulse Radar Resolutions

Since a pulse radar can provide attributes of range, azimuth, and elevation, it should also
be able to resolve two targets separated by any of these variables. This evaluation is a
verification of the radar’s resolution cell. If two targets lie entirely within the radar’s
resolution cell, the radar will only detect one target. Two targets that lie outside any of
the resolution parameters of range, azimuth, and elevation will show up as two targets.
Figure 8.31 depicts the radar resolution cell.
Range resolution is dependent upon the PW and was explained previously in
section 8.4 and depicted in Figure 8.11. Remember that many radars will change the PW
based on range scale selection, while others may employ pulse compression (chirp;
Figure 8.12), which will enhance the resolution. In order to perform this test, we must
first be aware of the PW and if it is changed with range selection. Remember also the
rule of thumb on range resolution: 1 msec is equal to 500 ft. A typical radar set of PW
parameters is shown in Table 8.15.
In this particular radar, the range resolution is 250 ft on a 5 nm range display and
10,000 ft on a 200 nm display. If all range scale selections have to be evaluated, this
radar will require six test conditions (one for each range scale selection).
The test geometry is relatively simple, as depicted in Figure 8.32.
All aircraft should be at the same speed and on the same heading. The targets should
be at a 0 aspect angle and separated by 1 PW of distance plus 3000 ft. The range
resolution is not range dependent, so the distance between the test aircraft and the targets
Radar FIGURE 8.31 ¢

resolution Radar Resolution
cell Elevation Cell
Range Azimuth
TABLE 8.15 ¢ PW Variations with Range Scale Selection
Range Scale (nm)
5 10 25 50 100 200
PW (msec) 0.5 1 2 5 10 20
FIGURE 8.32 ¢
Range Resolution
Geometry
Test aircraft 300 Target aircraft 300 knots
knots in trail, separated by 1 PW
0 aspect of resolution plus 3000 ft
is not critical. The distance will only become a factor with the ability to see the targets
on the display. Prior to performing the flight test, do some homework on the number of
available pixels on each display setting. In some cases, the display resolution is not
adequate to meet the specification, especially in the largest range scale settings.
On the test conductor’s mark, and after the test aircraft has two positive detections,
the trailing target will increase his airspeed by about 10 knots and stabilize. The test
aircraft will mark when the two detections merge to a single return. The trailing target
will then decelerate 20 knots and the test aircraft will mark when two detections reap-
pear. This test should be repeated multiple times as data requirements dictate. The dis-
tance between the targets can be adjusted based on the range scale selected by the test
aircraft. A sample data card is shown in Table 8.16.
Azimuth resolution is a function of the beamwidth and is dependent on the range to
the targets. The beamwidth was described previously in section 8.3, and the determi-
nation of the beamwidth is given in equations 8.8 through 8.11. Figure 8.33 shows the
effect of beamwidth on azimuth accuracy and resolution. A large beamwidth will mask
two targets (two targets will appear as one), while a narrow beamwidth will break out
the two targets at the same range. It is important to note that even with large beam-
widths, radars can resolve two targets in azimuth as the targets get closer to the radar.
TABLE 8.16 ¢ Range Resolution Sample Data Card
Range Resolution Evaluation
2 Targets Displayed 1 Target Displayed

Run Target 1 Target 1 Target 2 Target 2 Target 1 Target 1 Target 2 Target 2
No. Time Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude
FIGURE 8.33 ¢ Antenna beamwidth Radar

Antenna Beamwidth pattern display
Versus Resolution
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 8.34 ¢
Azimuth Resolution
Geometry
Flight path
Antenna
beamwidth
Test aircraft
All aircraft are at the same

speed, altitude, and heading.
Targets line abreast at 6000 ft
separation.
Similarly, the azimuth accuracy is a function of the beamwidth. A narrower beam

will be able to more accurately depict the target’s location. With a wide beam, the target
can be anywhere within the beam as it sweeps across the target. The depiction on the
display will be an apparent smearing of the target, making it appear larger than it really
is. The width of the target will appear to be equal to the arc of the beamwidth, and this
error will increase as the range to the target increases.
The azimuth resolution tests are conducted in a similar fashion to the previously
discussed range resolution tests. Figure 8.34 presents the geometry of the azimuth
resolution evaluations.
The target aircraft should be set up at 6000 ft, line abreast, in front of the test
aircraft. All aircraft should be on the same heading, altitude, and airspeed. The test
aircraft should be exactly between the two targets; the flight path will intersect the
beamwidth. The distance that the test aircraft should be in trail depends on the beam-
width. We can determine this distance by using the formula
Range ðnmÞ Inclusive Angle ð Þ ¼ Separation ðftÞ 100: (8.28)
The formula is best illustrated by using an example. Suppose that the beamwidth of the
antenna is 2 and the targets are separated by 6000 ft. At what range does the separation
equal the beamwidth? Using equation 8.28,
R 2 ¼ 6000/100,
R ¼ 60/2,
R ¼ 30 nm.
For this set of parameters, we would set up our test aircraft 35 nm in trail of our two
targets. At this range, the operator will see only one target on the display. At the call of
the test conductor, the test aircraft increases his speed and drives toward the targets. The
operator will call mark when the return splits into two separate detections. At the call of
the test conductor, the test aircraft then decreases speed to less than the target’s speed
and calls mark when the two detections merge to a single return. This procedure can be
run as often as the data requirements dictate. For this test, the position of all three
aircraft must be recorded at the mark. Table 8.17 provides an example of an azimuth
resolution data card.
The final resolution test is the ability of the radar to resolve two targets separated in
altitude. This is a difficult test to perform in the air for multiple reasons. The first is that the
geometry is difficult to attain, as the targets must be one atop the other. The second reason is
TABLE 8.17 ¢ Azimuth Resolution Sample Data Card
Azimuth Resolution Data Card
Position at Mark Call
Test No. of
Run Target 1 Target 1 Target 2 Target 2 Aircraft Test Aircraft Displayed
No. Time Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Targets
the display’s inability to depict this information in a usable manner. If the test is accom-
plished using a one-bar scan, two targets will never be seen unless the operator manually
adjusts the tilt. If a multiple raster scan is used, the operator will see both targets, but not at
the same time, since each target (if separated by an elevation beamwidth or more) will
reside on a separate bar of the scan. This test is best accomplished in the lab using aircraft/
radar representative hardware and software and utilizing a radar target generator. Trying to
accomplish these tests in flight testing generally turns out to be a time waster.
8.8 DOPPLER AND PULSE DOPPLER MODES

OF OPERATION AND TESTING
8.8.1 Doppler Characteristics
When an RF signal is pulse modulated it will appear in the frequency spectrum as peaks
on both sides of the original RF spaced by the PRF. Now it is possible for a target to
return a Doppler shift greater than the PRF. If that happens, we do not know if this is a
shift in the original RF or a shift in one of the harmonics, that is, the Doppler shift is
ambiguous. To resolve Doppler ambiguities, we must have some way of telling what
whole multiple of the PRF, if any, separates the observed frequency of the target echoes
from the carrier frequency. If not too great, this multiple (n) may easily be determined.
There are two common ways: range differentiation, and PRF switching.
Generally the simplest way to determine the value of n is to make an approximate
initial measurement of the range rate by the differentiation method. From this rate we
compute the approximate value of the true Doppler frequency. Subtracting the observed
frequency and dividing by the PRF yields the factor n.
Suppose, for example, that the PRF is 20 kHz and the observed Doppler frequency
is 10 kHz. The true Doppler frequency then could be 10 kHz plus any whole multiple of
20 kHz, up to 70 kHz. The true Doppler could have one of these values: 10, 10, 30, 50,
and 70 kHz. Figure 8.35 illustrates this example.
The approximate value of the true Doppler frequency computed from the initial
range rate measurement was computed as 50 kHz. The difference between this fre-
quency and the observed Doppler frequency is 50 10 ¼ 40 kHz. Dividing the differ-
ence by the PRF, we get
n ¼ 40 20 ¼ 2:
98 kHz FIGURE 8.35 ¢

Computation of the
Max Max Multiple (n)
negative positive
Observed
−28 −10 0 10 30 50 70
10
n=0
10
20 n=1
10
2 × 20 n=2
10
3 × 20 n=3
n = −1 20
Doppler frequency (kHz)
The echo’s carrier is separated from the observed Doppler frequency by two times the
PRF.
Although we assumed that the initial range rate measurement was fairly precise, it
need not be particularly accurate. As long as any error in the Doppler frequency com-
puted from the initial rate measurement is less than half the PRF, we can still tell in
which PRF interval the carrier lies. The initially computed ‘‘true’’ Doppler frequency,
for example, might have been only 42 kHz, almost halfway between the two nearest
possible exact values (30 and 50 kHz).
Nevertheless, this rough, initially computed value (42 kHz) is still accurate enough
to enable us to find the correct value of n. The difference between the initially computed
value of the Doppler frequency and the observed value is 42 10 ¼ 32 kHz. Dividing
the difference by the PRF, we get 32 20 ¼ 1.6. Rounding off to the nearest whole
number, we still come up with n ¼ 2. After having determined the value of n once, we
can, by tracking the target continuously, determine the true Doppler frequency, and thus
compute range with considerable precision based solely on the observed frequency.
The value of n can also be determined with a PRF switching technique similar to
that used to resolve range ambiguities. In essence, this technique involves alternately
switching the PRF between two relatively closely spaced values and noting the change,
if any, in the target’s observed frequency.
Switching the PRF will have no effect on the target echo’s carrier frequency, fc. The
target carrier frequency equals the carrier frequency of the transmitted pulses plus the
target’s Doppler frequency, and is completely independent of the PRF. However, this is
not the case with the sideband frequencies above and below fc.
Because these frequencies are separated from fc by multiples of the PRF, when
the PRF is changed, the sideband frequencies correspondingly change (Figure 8.36).
Which direction a particular sideband frequency moves (up or down) depends on
FIGURE 8.36 ¢ Doppler

Relationship of shifted
fr1 carrier
Changing PRF
with Sideband
Frequencies
PRF 1
−3 Δ −2 Δ −Δ +Δ +2 Δ +3 Δ
PRF 2
fc
fr1 + Δ
Frequency
FIGURE 8.37 ¢ fr1

Change in Observed
Frequency with PRF
Switching
fr2 = fr1 + Δ fr
Δ f = nΔ fr
two things: 1) whether the sideband frequency is above or below fc, and 2) whether the
PRF has been increased or decreased. An upper sideband moves up if the PRF is
increased and down if it is decreased. A lower sideband, on the other hand, moves down
if the PRF is increased and up if it is decreased.
If the PRF is changed by 1 kHz, the first set of sidebands on either side of fc will
move 1 kHz, the second will move 2 kHz, and the third, 3 kHz. If the PRF is changed by
2 kHz, each set of sidebands will move twice as far.
By noting the change, if any, in the target’s observed Doppler frequency, we can
immediately tell where fc is relative to the observed frequency. If the observed fre-
quency does not change, we know that it is fc. If it does change, we can tell from the
direction of the change whether fc is above or below the observed frequency. And we
can tell from the amount of the change by what multiple of the PRF fc is removed from
the observed frequency (Figure 8.37).
The factor n by which the PRF must be multiplied to obtain the difference between
the echo’s carrier frequency fc and the observed frequency is
n ¼ Dfobs =Dfr (8.29)
FIGURE 8.38 ¢
Computation of the
True Doppler
Frequency
fd Obs. +2 fr
fd True
fo
20 kHz
Frequency
where
Dfobs ¼ change in target’s observed frequency when PRF is switched, and
Dfr ¼ amount PRF is changed.
If, for example, an increase in PRF (Dfr) of 2 kHz caused a target’s observed
Doppler frequency to increase by 4 kHz, the value of n would be 4 2 ¼ 2. In order to
avoid the possibility of ‘‘ghosts’’ when returns are simultaneously received from more
than one target, the PRF must generally be switched from one to another of three values,
instead of two, just as when resolving range ambiguities. Switching the PRF has the
disadvantage of reducing the maximum detection range due to shorter integration times.
Having determined the value of n by either of the methods just described, we can
compute the target’s true Doppler frequency, fd, simply by multiplying the PRF by n and
adding the product to the observed frequency (Figure 8.38).
8.8.2 Doppler Clutter Regions

Ground return falls into three categories: main lobe return, sidelobe return, and altitude
return, which is sidelobe return received from directly beneath the radar. Main lobe
return is the signal used in many ground applications, but it is clutter for radars that must
detect airborne targets.
The principal means of discerning target echoes from ground clutter is Doppler
resolution. The way in which the clutter is distributed over the frequency band is its
Doppler spectrum.
The range rate of a patch of ground is entirely due to the radar’s own velocity. The
projection of the radar’s velocity on the LOS to the patch can be substituted for DV. For
a ground patch directly ahead, this projection equals the radar’s full velocity, VR. For a
ground patch directly to the side or directly below, the projection is zero. In between, it
equals VR times the cosine of the angle (L) between VR and the LOS to the patch.
The Doppler frequency of the return from a patch of ground is
fd ¼ 2VR cos L=l ðl ¼ c=fc Þ: (8.30)
The radar has a look-down angle that is also a factor in the calculation; this is
disregarded in the formula above. Since returns can be received from ground patches in
FIGURE 8.39 ¢ 800 fps 1600 fps

Mainlobe clutter spectrum
MLC With Radar 60° 60°
Look Angle 4° 4°
Look angle
Mainlobe
clutter
Doppler frequency 8 16
Doppler frequency (kHz)
any direction, the ground return generally covers a broad range of frequencies. It can also
be seen that for a return at an angle of 0 (on the nose of the aircraft), the Doppler shift
will be equal to groundspeed, and for an angle of 90 (under the aircraft or abeam), the
Doppler shift will be equal to zero. For this reason, main lobe clutter (MLC) is commonly
addressed as groundspeed and sidelobe clutter (SLC) is commonly addressed as zero
closure. We will see that in reality clutter is evident for the full 360 around the aircraft.
Main lobe clutter is produced whenever the main lobe intercepts the ground.
Because the ground area intercepted by the main lobe can be extensive and the gain of
the main lobe is high, MLC return is generally quite strong. Each type of surface has a
typical backscattering coefficient, which is a measure of how much clutter is returned.
Another factor is the grazing angle. Smooth surfaces at small grazing angles produce
little clutter, but at large grazing angles they produce a strong return (sea, lakebeds, flat
terrain). This will be covered later in the air-to-ground section.
The spectrum of the MLC varies continually. As the antenna look angle increases, the
center frequency of the spectrum decreases, and the width increases from nearly a line to a
broad hump. As the speed of the radar increases, both the frequency and the width
increase; if the aircraft speed is doubled, the center frequency and the width of the
spectrum will also double. Figure 8.39 shows an MLC and its relation to radar look angle.
The SLC is the radar return received through the antenna’s sidelobes, and it is
always undesirable. Excluding the altitude return, SLC is not nearly as concentrated as
MLC, but it covers a much wider band of frequencies. Its strength is governed by the
gain of the particular sidelobe within which the ground patch lies, by the backscattering
coefficient, and by the grazing angle. Man-made structures can produce strong returns.
Sidelobes extend in all directions, even to the rear. Therefore, regardless of look
angle, there are always sidelobes pointing ahead, behind, and at virtually every angle in
between. As a result, the frequency band covered by the SLC extends from a positive
shift corresponding to the radar’s velocity to an equal negative shift. The area illumi-
nated by the SLC is extremely large, as shown in Figure 8.40, and much of it comes
from relatively short ranges.
Beneath the aircraft there is usually a region of considerable return where the
ground is so close to a single range that the sidelobe return from it appears as a spike on
a plot of amplitude versus range. This return is called the altitude return, since generally
its range equals the radar’s absolute altitude. The altitude return is not only much
stronger than the surrounding SLC, but may be as strong as the MLC. The area from
which it comes may be very large and is often at extremely close range. This point is
illustrated in Figure 8.41. A radar is at an altitude (h) of 6000 ft over flat terrain. As you
FIGURE 8.40 ¢
VR
Sidelobe Clutter
Spectrum
–2VR 0 +2VR
l Doppler frequency l
FIGURE 8.41 ¢
Altitude Return
h AMPL
0
h
Range
can see, the slant range to the ground at an angle of incidence of q equals h/cos q.
Because the cosine of a small angle is only slightly less than one, the slant range to the
ground is only 500 ft greater than the altitude (vertical range), even when q is as much as
22 . If the slant range at an angle of incidence of 22 is rotated about the vertical, it
traces a circle on the ground having a diameter of roughly 5000 ft. A circle this
size contains nearly 20 million ft2. Thus the radar receives all of the return from a
20 million ft2 area, at a range of just 1 nm, in the round-trip transit time for a range
increment of 500 ft. That is only 1 msec. At near vertical incidence, the backscattering
coefficient tends to be very large.
The altitude return also peaks in a plot of amplitude versus frequency, but not
sharply. The projection of the radar velocity, VR, on the slant range to the ground equals
VR sin q. Unlike the cosine, the sine of an angle changes most rapidly as the angle goes
through zero.
While the Doppler frequency of the clutter is zero when q is zero, it increases to
nearly 40% of its maximum value (2VR/l) at an angle q of only 22 . The return from a
circle of ground that produces a sharp spike in a plot of amplitude versus range therefore
produces only a broad hump in a plot of amplitude versus Doppler frequency. Normally
the Doppler frequency of the altitude return is centered at zero. However, if the altitude of
the radar is changing, such as when the aircraft is climbing, diving, or flying over sloping
terrain, the return varies about the zero Doppler. For a dive, the Doppler frequency will be
positive and for a climb it will be negative. Even though the frequency is fairly low, it can
be considerable. In a 30 dive, for instance, the altitude is changing at a rate equal to half
the radar velocity. Figure 8.42 depicts the math behind this explanation.
FIGURE 8.42 ¢ VR
Zero Doppler Return q
as a Function of Dive VR Sin q
Angle
22°
2 VR
fd = Sin q
l q
Clutter
Despite its strength, the altitude return is usually less difficult to deal with than the
other ground returns. Not only does it come from a single range, but its range is
predictable and its Doppler frequency is generally close to zero. Unfortunately this is
also the Doppler frequency of a target pursued at constant range (e.g., a tail chase with
zero closing rate). Some radars apply a notch for the zero Doppler (100 knots for rising
and falling terrain), but only at a range equal to the aircraft’s altitude. This way, targets
on the nose with zero closure will be detected as long as they are inside or outside of the
range equal to the aircraft’s altitude.
Having addressed the characteristics of MLC, SLC, and altitude return individually,
the next step is to view the composite clutter spectrum and its relationship to the fre-
quencies of the echoes from representative airborne targets. It is assumed that the PRF is
high enough to avoid Doppler ambiguities.
Stimson does an excellent job of explaining the composite Doppler clutter spectrum
in chapter 22 of his book, and some of his pertinent figures on the subject are included
here for completeness. The relationship between target and clutter frequencies for a nose-
aspect approach is illustrated in Figure 8.43. The target’s Doppler frequency is greater
than that of any of the ground return. This target is said to be in the ‘‘clear region.’’
Figure 8.44 depicts a tail chase with a low closure rate. Because the closing rate is
less than the radar’s velocity, the target’s Doppler frequency falls within the band of
frequencies occupied by the SLC. Just where it falls depends on the closing rate.
Figure 8.45 depicts the target in the beam (perpendicular to the LOS of the radar),
where the closure is equal to the groundspeed (MLC). As a result, the target is hidden in
the MLC.
In Figure 8.46, the target’s closing rate is zero. In this situation, the target echoes
have the same Doppler frequency as the altitude return.
Figure 8.47 shows two opening targets. Target A has an opening rate that is greater
than the radar’s groundspeed, so this target appears in the clear beyond the negative-
frequency end of the SLC spectrum. On the other hand, target B has an opening rate less
than the radar’s groundspeed, so this target appears within the negative frequency por-
tion of the SLC spectrum.
Nose aspect approach FIGURE 8.43 ¢

Nose-on, Clear
VR VT Region
Altitude MLC
return
Target
Sidelobe clutter
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
Tail chase, low closing approach FIGURE 8.44 ¢ Tail

On, SLC Region
VR VT
Target
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
Target velocity perpendicular to L.O.S. FIGURE 8.45 ¢

Target in the Beam
VR
Target
(in mainlobe
clutter)
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
FIGURE 8.46 ¢ Tail chase, zero closing rate (VR = VT)

Target in the Altitude
Line
VR VT
Target (in altitude return)
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
FIGURE 8.47 ¢ VT
Effects of Opening A
Target Velocity VR B
Target B
Target A (R > –Vr)
(R < –Vr)
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
With these situations as a guide, the relationship of the Doppler frequencies of target
return and ground return for virtually any situation can easily be pictured (Figure 8.48).
Remember that at lower PRFs, Doppler ambiguity can occur which may cause a target
and a ground patch having quite different range rates to appear to have the same Doppler
frequency.
8.8.3 Doppler Ambiguities

The disturbing effect of clutter is even more pronounced when range or Doppler
ambiguities exist. For this we take a look at an aircraft flying at low altitude over terrain
from which a considerable amount of clutter is received. Assume that we have the
situation depicted in Figure 8.49. Two targets, A and B, are in the antenna’s main lobe.
Target A is being overtaken from the rear and has a low closing rate. Target B is
approaching the radar head on and has a high closing rate. Target A is at a range from
Zero FIGURE 8.48 ¢

closing rate The Doppler Clutter
(Target in altitude return)
Spectrum
Low
Low closing rate
opening rate VT normal
High
opening rate to L.O.S.
(<VR) (Target in MLC) High
closing rate
(>VR)
Amplitude
Opening Closing
rate rate
≈VR ≈VR
SLC SLC
Altitude Mainlobe
return clutter MLC
Doppler frequency
Altitude FIGURE 8.49 ¢

return Ambiguities
A
B
h
Altitude
return
XMTR Mainlobe R
spillover clutter
Sidelobe clutter
which only sidelobe return is being received; target B is at a range from which both main
lobe and sidelobe returns are being received. Within the ground patch illuminated by the
main lobe is a truck, heading toward the radar.
If we look at the range diagram of Figure 8.49, we see that SLC extends outward
from a range equal to the radar’s altitude. It decreases rapidly in amplitude when the
range increases. The echoes from target A stand out clearly above the SLC. The echoes
from target B and the truck are completely obscured by the much stronger MLC. Even
though we know where to look for these echoes, we cannot distinguish them from the
clutter. Toward the left end you will notice two strong spikes. The one at zero range is
due to what is called transmitter spillover—energy from the transmitter that leaks into
the receiver during transmission, despite all efforts to block it. The second spike is the
altitude return. The Doppler profile for this example is shown in Figure 8.50.
FIGURE 8.50 ¢ A
Doppler Profile for B
the Example
(–) 0 (+)
Doppler frequency
In Figure 8.50, the aircraft is shown with the Doppler profile beneath it. Target A is
being overtaken, so its Doppler frequency falls below that of the MLC, in the band of
frequencies blanketed by SLC. Because a good deal of this clutter comes from shorter
ranges than the target’s range, the target echoes barely protrude above the clutter. If the
target were smaller or at a much greater range, its echoes might not even be discernible.
Since target B and the truck are approaching the radar, they have higher Doppler fre-
quencies than any of the clutter.
As was seen earlier, when transmissions are pulsed, each element of the radar return
has sideband frequencies separated from the Doppler-shifted carrier frequency by mul-
tiples of the PRF. The altitude return that has zero Doppler frequency also appears to
have Doppler frequencies of PRF, 2 PRF, 3 PRF, etc. The same is true for every return
in the Doppler profile. The entire profile is repeated at intervals equal to multiples of the
PRF. The true profile is called the central line return, and the repetitions are called PRF
lines.
If the PRF is sufficiently high, the repetitions of the Doppler spectrum will in no
way affect the ability of the radar to discriminate between target echoes and ground
clutter. However, if PRF is low, repetitions begin to overlap (Figure 8.51). This can
result in a target’s echoes and ground clutter passing through the same Doppler filter(s),
even though the true Doppler frequencies of the target and the clutter may be quite
different.
Examples of this phenomenon can be seen with target B and the truck. If the PRF is
reduced, the repetitions of the profile increasingly overlap; more and more SLC occu-
pies the space between successive MLC lines and the MLC lines move closer together.
Since the width of these lines is independent of the PRF, reducing the PRF causes the
MLC to occupy an increasingly larger percentage of the receiver pass-band and causes
the altitude return and other close-in SLC to bunch up in the space between.
As the percentage of the pass-band occupied by MLC increases, it becomes
increasingly difficult to reject even the MLC on the basis of its Doppler frequency
without at the same time rejecting a large percentage of the target echoes. The lower the
PRF, the more severe the effects of Doppler ambiguities on ground clutter.
The formula used to express the maximum unambiguous Doppler is
Maximum unambiguous Doppler ¼ PRF 2VR =l: (8.31)
A Truck B FIGURE 8.51 ¢

Doppler Ambiguities
0 Central line return
fr
1st lower sideband
fr
1st upper sideband
2fr
2nd lower sideband
2fr
2nd upper sideband
Truck A B
fr fr fr fr fr
10,000 FIGURE 8.52 ¢

PRF Versus Closure
for Unambiguous
Doppler
Ambiguous
ΔV (knots)
Doppler 5000
Unambiguous
Doppler
0
0 100 200 300
PRF (kHz)
In Figure 8.52, the maximum closing rate for which the Doppler frequency will be
ambiguous in a clutter environment is plotted versus PRF. A wavelength of 3 cm and a
nominal radar velocity of 1000 knots are assumed. The plot decreases linearly from a
closing rate of about 8000 knots at a PRF of 300 kHz to a closing rate of 1000 knots (the
radar groundspeed) at a PRF of 70 kHz. (It is terminated at this point since, at lower
PRF, the maximum positive and negative SLC frequencies overlap.) The area beneath
the curve encompasses every combination of PRF and closing rate for which the
observed Doppler frequencies are unambiguous. Conversely, the area above the curve
encompasses every combination for which the Doppler frequencies are ambiguous.
For example, at a PRF of 250 kHz, and a closing rate of 5000 knots, the Doppler
frequency is unambiguous, whereas at a PRF of 150 kHz and the same closing rate, the
Doppler frequency is ambiguous. If the radar-carrying aircraft’s groundspeed is greater
than 1000 knots, the area beneath the curve will be correspondingly reduced, and vice
versa. Since Doppler frequency is inversely related to wavelength, the shorter the
wavelength, the more limited the region of unambiguous Doppler frequencies.
To illustrate the profound effect of wavelength on Doppler ambiguities, Figure 8.53
plots the maximum closing rate at which the Doppler frequency will be unambiguous for
a 1 cm wavelength. Not only is the area under the curve comparatively small, but even at
a PRF of 300 kHz, the maximum closing rate at which the PRF is unambiguous is less
than 2000 knots.
The regions of unambiguous range and unambiguous Doppler frequency (for l ¼ 3 cm
and VR ¼ 1000 knots) are shown together in Figure 8.54. Drawn to the scale of this dia-
gram, the region of unambiguous range (first range zone) is quite narrow. To the right of it
is the comparatively broad region of unambiguous Doppler frequencies. In between is a
region of considerable extent within which both range and Doppler frequency are ambig-
uous. Clearly the choice of PRF is a compromise. If the PRF is increased beyond a rela-
tively small value, the observed ranges will be ambiguous, and unless the PRF is raised to a
much higher value, the observed Doppler frequencies will be ambiguous.
Because of the tremendous impact the choice of PRF has on performance, it has
become customary to classify radars in terms of the PRF they employ. The following is a
widely used, consistent set of definitions:
● A low PRF is one for which the maximum range the radar is designed to handle lies
in the first range zone; range is unambiguous.
● A medium PRF is one for which both range and Doppler frequencies are ambiguous.
● A high PRF is one for which the observed Doppler frequencies of all targets are
unambiguous.
FIGURE 8.53 ¢ 10,000

PRF Versus Closure
for a 1 cm
Wavelength
ΔV (knots)
Ambiguous 5000
Doppler
Unambiguous
Doppler
0
0 100 200 300
PRF (kHz)
l = 3 cm FIGURE 8.54 ¢
VR = 1000 knots Unambiguous
10,000
400 Range and Doppler
for PRF Versus
Ambiguous range Closure
300 and Doppler
ΔV (knots)
Range (nm)
5000
200
Unambiguous
range
100 Unambiguous
Doppler
0 0
0 100 200 300
PRF (kHz)
8.8.4 FM Ranging
From the previous discussions it has been shown that if we want to increase detection
ranges, one of the best ways is to increase the PRF. As the PRF is increased, there will
come a time where the range ambiguities cannot be resolved and pulse delay ranging
will be impossible. Even at short ranges there will be a distance where pulse delay
ranging will be rendered inoperable due to the pulse length. This is due to the fact that, at
short ranges, the leading edge of the pulse is returned to the transmitter before the
trailing edge of the pulse is incident on the target. This is best illustrated in the case of
the radar altimeter.
8.8.4.1 Radar Altimeters

The earth is a very good reflector of radio energy, and since aircraft are flying relatively
close (a few miles), altitude can be measured very accurately. A low-powered system
can give a constant reading of altitude above ground level by measuring the range to the
ground. A version of TF can be accomplished by using the radar altimeter and following
a preprogrammed, timed course across known terrain.
Radar altimeters are continuous wave (CW) and employ FM ranging to obtain range
(as opposed to pulse radars). These altimeters operate in either the UHF or the C band. In
the C band, frequencies of 4.2 to 4.4 GHz are reserved for operation. We can use
frequencies this low because the directivity of the beam is not critical and the power
required is not high; therefore, the components needed are quite small.
There are disadvantages as well to employing these types of frequencies in altimeter
operation. These frequencies are good for cloud penetration, but this same advantage
makes flight over ice and snow unfavorable. Under some conditions there may be no
echo from the top of the ice, and the ice may be deep enough that there is no reflection
from the bottom. If there is a reflection from the bottom, the distance is measured by the
altimeter as if the propagation was through the air (ice, 0.535; snow, 0.8). If flying
over ice, for example, your altitude would read roughly double your true altitude.
The range to the ground can be measured indirectly with CW radars. The most common
method in use in altimeters is linear frequency modulation, or FM ranging. FM ranging
FIGURE 8.55 ¢
Simple FM Ranging
Frequency
Δf
Δt
Time
converts the time lag between transmission and reception to a frequency difference.
By measuring the frequency difference, the time lag (range) is determined. The
mechanics for implementing FM ranging are illustrated in Figure 8.55. The transmitter
frequency is increased at a constant rate so that each successive pulse has a slightly
higher frequency than the previous one. The modulation is continued for a period of time
in order to reach the most distant target and the instantaneous differences between
transmitted and received frequencies are measured. The transmitter is then returned to
the starting frequency.
For the static case—target not moving (as in a same-speed tail chase, or in the case
of the radar altimeter, flat terrain)—the determination of ranges is simple. Since we
know the rate of change of frequency of the transmitter, we can compare the frequency
received at any period of time and equate that change to a time, and hence a range. The
rate of change of frequency is given by k, where
k ¼ Df =Dt: (8.32)
Once again referencing Stimson, I again use one of his examples (chapter 14).
Suppose the measured frequency difference is 10,000 Hz and the transmitter frequency
has been increasing at a rate of 10 Hz/msec. The transit time can be calculated using
equation 8.32 and solving for Dt:
Dt ¼ 10;000 Hz=10Hz=msec ¼ 1000 msec:
Since 12.4 msec of round-trip transit time corresponds to 1 nm of range, the target’s
range is equal to 1000/12.4 ¼ 81 nm. Since there are truly no static cases, the effects of
Doppler must be removed. A constant frequency can be inserted at the end of the rise
cycle and the target echo will report the Doppler shift. A more common way of elim-
inating Doppler effects is to use a two-slope cycle where the two slopes are identical, yet
rising and falling. The net Doppler effect in the rising slope is cancelled out in the falling
slope. Examples of these two methods are shown in Figures 8.56 and 8.57.
The accuracy of FM ranging depends on the slope (rate of change of frequency [k])
and the accuracy with which the frequency difference is measured. The greater the
slope, the greater the frequency difference for a given period of time; the greater this
difference and the greater the accuracy with which the frequency can be measured, the
greater the accuracy (see equation 8.32). The ability to accurately measure the frequency
is dependent on the length of time in which the measurement is made. We have seen this
parameter in the radar range equation (tint), and it is limited by the amount of time it
FIGURE 8.56 ¢
Doppler Frequency
Accounted for with a
Transmitted Constant Frequency
Received
frequency
frequency Segment
Frequency
Doppler
frequency
Time
FIGURE 8.57 ¢
Two-Slope
Modulation with
Positive and
Negative Doppler
Transmitted Received
frequency frequency
Frequency
f1 = ktr + fd
f1 = ktr − fd ktr
ktr
fd fd
tr tr
Time
takes for the antenna to scan across the target. For radar altimeters, k is very high, and
very accurate measurements of height above the ground can be made. For air-to-air
pulse Doppler search modes, k is made fairly shallow to reduce clutter. Because k is
shallow, range accuracy suffers. Pulse delay ranging accuracy is on the order of feet, but
FM ranging accuracy is on the order of nautical miles.
8.8.4.2 Flight Testing of Radar Altimeters

Radar altimeters are used to measure the aircraft’s height above the ground. They are
normally accurate up to about 5000 ft. There are some radar altimeters, such as those
used for TSPI, that are calibrated and may be used to 10,000 ft. The accuracy of radar
altimeters is on the order of
● 0–100 ft (1 ft)
● 100–5000 ft (1% of altitude).
Since the radar altimeter directly measures time, and range is computed, it will be
difficult to obtain a TSPI source that is four times as accurate as the range measurement.
Normally cinetheodolite or laser theodolite systems will be required for the demon-
stration testing. The ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ testing can be accomplished by performing a cursory
check with the barometric altimeter with flight over known terrain. A detailed check can
be performed by accomplishing a tower fly-by. A detailed description of FAA require-
ments can be found in appendix 1 to 14 CFR FAR 91.
Other checks that will be required are bank angle effect and flights over a variety of
terrain types. Since the radar altimeter is not gyro stabilized (such as the Doppler
navigation system), there will come a point during a bank where the altitude information
is no longer reliable. Because the beam is wide and the distance is relatively small, bank
angles of up to 60 will still produce accurate altitude information on most platforms.
The true bank angle limitation must be determined during testing.
Flight over snow and ice (as previously mentioned) may yield inaccurate altitude
information. Flight over smooth surfaces such as lakes, sand, or snow may not produce a
return due to scattering, and flight over the ocean may provide multiple Doppler returns
that corrupt the altitude solution. Other sources of error can be caused by leakage from
the transmitting antenna to the receiving antenna, also corrupting the altitude solution.
8.8.5 Special Cases: Detection of Targets at Sea

Because of the unique characteristics of Doppler, detections of targets against certain
backgrounds can be difficult. The case of detection of targets at sea is a prime example.
For a thorough discussion on this topic, I recommend Merrill Skolnik’s Introduction to
Radar Systems, sections 2.7 and 13.3. As with previous sections, I will refer to Skolnik
in the interest of completeness and not to repeat the entire text.
As with land or airborne targets, the RCS of the target must first be known. The RCS
of the target is a function of its geometric shape, reflectivity, and directivity. The ocean
offers a unique background for the radar, and many factors, not the least of which are RCS
and grazing angle, will affect what the radar can see. Normally a 50th percentile is used
when describing the RCS of a ship, with the peak at the broadside being omitted. For low
grazing angles, the following formula is used to describe the ship’s RCS:
s ¼ 52f 1=2 D3=2 ; (8.33)
where
s ¼ RCS (m2),
f ¼ radar frequency (MHz), and
D ¼ ship’s full-load displacement (ktons).
Equation 8.33 is only good for targets at the grazing incidence or very close to it.
For other than grazing angles, the ship’s 50th percentile RCS can be approximated as
equivalent to the ship’s displacement in tons. RCS may change by an order of magnitude
by adjusting the incidence angle. Of course, ships are even going stealth, as illustrated in
Figure 8.58.
Since grazing angle has been introduced, there are a few other considerations for the
radar. At grazing angles approaching zero, the return received from the target is nearly
cancelled by a return from the same target reflected off the water. This cancellation
FIGURE 8.58 ¢ The

Stealth Sea Shadow
is due to a 180 phase shift occurring when the return is reflected. As the grazing
angle increases, a difference develops between the direct and reflected returns, and the
cancellation decreases. The shorter the wavelength, the more rapidly the cancellation
decreases.
The echo from the surface of the sea is dependent on a number of variables as well:
● Wave height
● Wind speed
● Length of time and distance (fetch) over which the wind has been blowing
● Direction of the waves relative to the radar beam
● Whether the sea is building or decreasing
● Presence of swell as well as sea waves
● Presence of contaminants
● Radar frequency
● Polarization
● Grazing angle
● Radar PW
● Sea ice
Given all of the variables that feed into clutter, about the only thing we can say with
certainty is that we are uncertain about the clutter. Since the state of the background is
never completely known, an uncertainty exists for the background. Data have been
gathered to measure sea clutter; however, due to uncertainties, the data contain inac-
curacies on the order of 3 dB. Sea state is commonly used to describe sea clutter, but it
is not a complete measure in itself. Table 8.18 contains sea state information as defined
by the World Meteorological Organization.
Some test organizations use the sea state to define the clutter region when per-
forming evaluations over the ocean, but as noted previously, sea state does not address
all of the issues that affect detection. The following paragraphs highlight the variables
that need to be considered when performing detection at sea.
TABLE 8.18 ¢ World Meteorological Organization Sea States
Wave Height
Sea State Feet Meters Descriptive Term

0 0 0 Calm, Glassy
1 0–⅓ 0–0.1 Calm, Rippled
2 ⅓–1⅔ 0.1–0.5 Smooth, Wavelets
3 2–4 0.6–1.2 Slight
4 4–8 1.2–2.4 Moderate
5 8–13 2.4–4.0 Rough
6 13–20 4.0–6.0 Very Rough
7 20–30 6.0–9.0 High
8 30–45 9.0–14 Very High
9 >45 >14 Phenomenal
There are three scattering regions defined by the grazing angle:

● Quasispecular: at angles near vertical which are a result of facet-like surfaces.
● Interference region: at angles that are very low and the scattered wave produces
destructive interference.
● Diffuse region: at all other angles, where the chief scatterers are components of the
sea that are of a dimension comparable to radar wavelength (Bragg’s scatter, similar
to rough surface).
It appears that sea clutter is essentially independent of frequency for vertical
polarization except at the low grazing angles. With horizontal polarization, the clutter
echo decreases with decreasing frequency and is also most pronounced at lower grazing
angles. The effect of polarization on sea clutter also depends on wind.
Except for grazing angles near normal, sea clutter will increase with wind speed.
Over the range of 10 to 20 knots, the effect is approximately 0.5 dB/knot; at wind speeds
greater than 20 knots, the effect is approximately 0.1 dB/knot. Backscatter is generally
higher when looking into the wind as opposed to downwind or crosswind. Wind affects
higher frequencies and horizontal polarizations.
It has been found that when the resolution is relatively small, the sea echo is not
spatially uniform, causing spiking. It has also been noted that small ships stand out much
better in a 2 beamwidth than in a 0.85 beamwidth. This would imply that higher-
resolution radars may have a higher probability of false alarms.
There is little backscatter energy from smooth sea ice, and it is much smaller than
for the sea; rough ice behaves much like land clutter. Similar to radar altimeters, lower
frequencies will penetrate sea ice more deeply and give erroneous indications.
Oil slicks have a smoothing effect on breaking waves and damp out the capillary and
gravity waves normally developed by wind. This phenomenon allows high-resolution
radars to detect oil spills, sometimes as small as 400 liters. Vertical polarization appears to
give more contrast than horizontal polarization.
By knowing the effects of the variables on detections over water, the radar designer
can optimize performance. Optimization includes
● Moving target indicator (MTI)
● Frequency
● Polarization
● Pulse width
● Beamwidth
● Scan rate
● Observation time
● Frequency agility
As described in the airborne case, employing a pulse Doppler radar will aid detections,
as sea clutter is generally stationary. Even without MTI, detecting ships should be a relatively
minor problem due to the large target-to-noise ratios. Aircraft without MTI will experience
problems while flying over land–sea contrast, as land clutter may enter through the sidelobes.
Although lower frequencies enjoy less effect from sea clutter, higher frequencies
have other advantages that are more important: beam shaping and direction, size,
reduction of multipath effects, and resolution. Horizontal polarization results in less sea
clutter than vertical polarization.
With all other factors constant, the shorter the PW, the shorter the maximum range.
Decreasing the PW also decreases the amount of clutter the target must compete with. If
peak power is limited, the target may be lost in clutter. The shorter the resolution cell, the
higher probability of false alarms, and a short pulse may only see part of a large vessel.
Some final considerations are beamwidth, scan rate, observation time, and fre-
quency agility. A smaller beamwidth is not better against sea clutter. Since the sea is
relatively frozen with a time required for the clutter to decorrelate of 10 msec, high scan
rates can take advantage of this fact. A longer observation time is required to pull small
targets out of clutter. The benefit of frequency agility is decreased since the sea spikes
are correlated over a relatively long period and appear as target echoes.
8.8.6 Velocity Search

Some fighter aircraft employ a mode called velocity search. This mode detects and
presents targets as a function of azimuth versus range rate. This search mode employs a
high PRF waveform and processing to provide increased detection ranges. Unfortu-
nately this high PRF processing results in a loss of range information for targets.
Normally this mode only detects targets that have a positive velocity vector along the
own-ship radar LOS.
Unlike other radar search modes, tail aspect (tail chase) targets will not be detected.
The displayed velocity is the target velocity; own-ship velocity does not influence the
displayed target velocity. Velocity search rejects ground clutter (groundspeed, GS
notch) and is thereby suited for look-up or look-down operations. Target range is not
available until a spotlight search or track has been established. A moving target rejection
(MTR) feature is normally included.
Velocity search should blank all sidelobe returns. Velocity search processing will
not normally filter out jet engine modulation (JEM) (engine sidebands) and therefore
may display multiple returns on targets. The minimum detectable velocity varies in
proportion to antenna LOS, and may be higher than the selected MTR velocity. Velocity
search is not as discriminatory as other search modes and often allows spurious signals
to pass through to processing. These spurious signals can be the result of mutual inter-
ference from own-ship or wingman avionics equipment.
FIGURE 8.59 ¢
Velocity Search Test
of MTR Feature
Test Target
aircraft
Since the primary use of velocity search is for maximum range detection of closing
targets, it can be assumed that this would be our primary flight test. Maximum range
detection tests are planned in the same manner as R90 or R50 detection tests. In velocity
search testing, however, target airspeed is varied throughout the entire range of
detectable target speeds (1200 to 2400 knots maximum). Azimuth accuracy is the only
other variable provided in this mode and can be piggy-backed onto minimum
detectable velocity tests.
Other testing that needs to be accomplished in this mode includes
● Moving target rejection
● Elimination of sidelobe returns
● JEM effects
● Minimum detectable target velocity
The MTR feature can be tested in a head-on geometry as a continuation of the
maximum range detection tests. This test has to be done head-on, as tail chases are not
displayed in this mode. After the maximum range detection, adjust the test bed heading
in increments of 10 and note the closure when the target is dropped from the display
(Figure 8.59). As we turn away from the target, the LOS produces smaller and smaller
closure solutions. The target should disappear when the LOS closure is equal to or less
than the selected MTR. This test is also run with the MTR deselected in order to
determine the minimum detectable target velocity.
During the maximum range detection and bearing accuracy tests, the ability of the
radar to eliminate sidelobe returns will also be evaluated. If the testing is in a controlled
area, all aircraft positions will be known and hence spurious detections can be correlated
against antenna position. Since we know that JEM may not be filtered out, this test
becomes an aircrew determination of the impact of JEM false alarms on the display, and
whether or not these returns adversely impact the pilot’s situational awareness.
Remember from previous discussions that JEM produces varying range rates about the
same azimuth and range of the true target. On a range rate versus azimuth display, this
can be very confusing (see Figure 8.60).
8.8.7 Pulse Doppler Search and Track

In order to obtain range, range rate, azimuth, and elevation, many of today’s airborne radars
employ a pulse Doppler mode. Depending on the mission, these radars may use either a high
or medium PRF. In order to take advantage of high and medium PRF performance, the ideal
solution may be to interleave the two based on mission requirements.
Pilot’s FIGURE 8.60 ¢

display Target JEM Lines on a
aircraft Velocity Search
True velocity of Display
closure (VC)
Range
rate
JEM
Test
Azimuth aircraft
The two most common implementations of pulse Doppler on today’s airborne radars
are range-while-search (RWS) and track-while-scan (TWS). Both of these modes are
incorporated together on many radars. The good news for testers is that the processing is
similar enough that data points for one mode will often satisfy the requirements for the
other. In most cases, RWS detections are fed to TWS for track processing.
As the name implies, RWS displays Doppler targets to the aircrew in a B scope
format of range versus azimuth. The aircrew may elect to ‘‘hook’’ or ‘‘bracket’’ a
target to enter the single target track (STT) mode. As with the velocity search mode,
RWS allows the aircrew to select an MTR feature, which eliminates some moving
targets by employing a Doppler notch. In addition, the MTR may be selectable for a
high or low notch. Typical notches are on the order of 90 to 120 knots (high) and 50 to
75 knots (low).
Range-while-search is a search mode only, and the aircrew has to select STT or
TWS in order to obtain detailed information about the target. RWS provides the aircrew
with range, range rate, azimuth, and elevation. The mode may also allow an altitude line
blanker function, which eliminates zero Doppler at a range equal to altitude (medium
PRF only). In medium PRF applications, RWS operation at low altitude will cause a
clutter automatic gain control (CAGC) to kick in. This prevents saturation of the radar
and results in shorter detection ranges. There are some variations on the basic RWS
function.
● Up-look search does not disable MLC in medium PRF operations. This allows for
longer-range detections since clutter processing is eliminated. Of course, false alarms
are increased (weather, antenna elevation too low, etc.).
● Air combat maneuvering (ACM) and pilot assist lock-on (PAL) modes are designed
to initiate an STT on targets within a selected scan volume. The scan volume can be
fixed, slewable, or slaved to boresight.
Track-while-scan is designed to automatically track multiple airborne targets. Track
information is obtained from repetitive search target detections as the antenna sweeps
the scan volume. Detection is achieved through RWS processing. Since the time on
target, or dwell, is significantly less than STT, TWS can be expected to be less accurate.
The aircrew does have the option of transitioning from TWS to STT by ‘‘hooking’’ or
‘‘bracketing’’ the target.
Depending on the radar implementation, TWS can track from 5 to 25 targets

simultaneously. These tracks are automatically prioritized or can be overridden by the
aircrew. One of the tracked targets is designated as the primary, or ‘‘target of interest,’’
by the operator. This is the only target that can be designated as an STT or requested for
more information. An expand mode may be available for TWS where the range and
azimuth about the primary target can be expanded (about 4 or 5 to 1).
There are some other pulse Doppler modes and functions that may be incorporated
into the radar under test. Raid assessment (RA), expanded data request (EDR), or raid
count request (RCR) allows the operator to request information about the STT con-
cerning the true number of targets within the tracked cell. RA may be entered from
TWS; however, a dwell time will be required and other tracked targets may extrapolate.
RA can be extremely helpful during resolution testing, especially on range scales that do
not allow sufficient pixels to display multiple targets.
Some radars have the capability of interleaving modes, thus providing the optimum
amount of information to the aircrew. The situation awareness mode (SAM) on the F-16,
for example, allows an interleave of TWS and a pseudo-STT. The main difference from
TWS is that the radar actually leaves the scan pattern to dwell for a period of time on the
designated target. STT has a higher-quality track than SAM; however, SAM has a
higher-quality track than TWS. In flight testing, the evaluator will be tasked to prove the
accuracy of each of these modes.
8.8.7.1 RWS, TWS, and STT Flight Testing

Maximum detection range testing is the same for pulse Doppler search as it is for pulse
search. R90 should not be attempted in TWS, as a single bar scan is not normally
selectable in TWS; R50 may be computed. If true maximum range detection is desired
(as in the case of the F-15/F-14), the proper way to test would be detections and mea-
surement accuracy in RWS and track initiation range and track accuracy in TWS, STT,
and SAM (if available). Remember that the accuracies in TWS will not be as good as in
SAM, and SAM accuracies will not be as good as STT.
The parameter of range rate must be added to our measurement accuracy matrix in
pulse Doppler. Range accuracy specifications for high PRF operations will not be as
restrictive as medium PRF due to FM ranging. Range rate accuracy specifications for
medium PRF operations will not be as restrictive as high PRF due to range rate ambi-
guities. Track accuracy and track initiation range must be tested in TWS, as well as STT
and SAM if available; STT accuracies will be superior. Table 8.19 replicates Table 8.14
from section 8.7.5 with the addition of a range rate column, which is our newest mea-
sured parameter in pulse Doppler search. Also note that the number of test conditions is
greatly increased (72,000 versus 2400). This is not a huge problem, for two reasons. The
first is that as the saw-tooth or porpoise maneuver is being flown, the range rate is
constantly changing, so there is no additional geometry to be flown. Data points can be
collected at rates equal to the bus rate. The second is that there is no way that you are
going to be able to flight test range rates of 2700 knots closing or 1200 knots opening.
These test points are excellent candidates for the lab, and that is exactly where they are
done. In flight testing, we only test the heart of the envelope (where most operational
geometries are expected), the others are evaluated in the lab with a target generator.
Resolution testing in the pulse Doppler modes requires an additional resolution test
for targets differing in range rate. In testing resolutions for pulse Doppler modes, the
tester will find that the geometries are very difficult to set up and most of the geometries
will resolve in range rate. The proof may be found in internal radar data if the resolution
TABLE 8.19 ¢ RWS Measurement Accuracy
Pulse Doppler Search (RWS) Measurement Accuracy
Range Bin Azimuth Elevation Range Rate Total Test

(0–60 nm) (þ60 /60 ) (þ45 /30 ) (1200/2700 knots) Conditions
1 nm ¼ 1% 6 25 16 30
Accuracy Required of range 1 1 10 knots ¼ 72,000
10 nm bins Every 5 Every 5 Every 100 knots
Test Variables (6 bins) (25) (16) (30)
0–10
11–20
21–30
31–40
41–50
51–60
FIGURE 8.61 ¢
Range Rate
Resolution Setup
of the display is worse than the resolution of the radar. You may also want to try raid
assessment to assist in the testing.
Figure 8.61 describes the setup for range rate resolution testing. Targets 1 and 2
should be in close formation at the same speed (assume 300 knots). The test aircraft is in
trail with the formation on the same heading and speed. The range between the test
aircraft and the formation is not important, as range rate resolution is not dependent on
the range. The range should be consistent with the ability of the test aircraft to maintain
a visual to control the test. At the test aircraft mark, aircraft 1 should increase speed by
2 knots and stabilize. The procedure is repeated in 2 knot increments until two targets
are resolved by the test aircraft. Notice that if we attempt to run the range resolution test
as described in section 8.7.8, the targets will resolve in range rate before they are
resolved in range. A pulse Doppler radar’s best attribute is range rate, since it is mea-
sured directly. Almost any setup for resolution testing (range, azimuth, elevation, or
range rate) will result in the radar resolving targets in range rate long before any of the
other variables. For this reason, I recommend that range rate resolution tests for pulse
Doppler radars be accomplished in flight testing, with all others accomplished in the lab.
Other pulse Doppler tests that may be required include
● Up-look search
● Air combat maneuvering (ACM) modes
● Interleaving
● RA/raid cluster resolution
● Noncooperative target recognition (NCTR)
● Multiple track accuracy (TWS)
Up-look search will provide the operator with longer detection ranges than RWS
because the main lobe clutter processing is not disabled. The testing is accomplished in
the same way as previously described in pulse search R90 testing (section 8.7.4). This
test will be for head-on, look-up (target altitude greater than the test aircraft altitude)
targets only. The evaluator will need to ensure that the target altitude is high enough to
avoid the radar painting the ground at these long ranges.
Air combat maneuvering mode testing is the pilots’ favorite type of radar testing
because they are actually able to fly the airplane rather than droning along in straight and
level flight. By selecting an ACM mode, the system will switch to aircraft stabilization
and the pilot will be presented with a C scope display. This display was mentioned in
section 8.6.1 and is shown in Figure 8.22. The radar will only search within the selected
area and it will establish an STT on the first detection. For example, if the pilot selects a
HUD mode, the radar will search the same volume depicted by the HUD. If the HUD
presents the pilot with a FOV of 25 horizontal by 20 vertical centered about the design
eye point, the radar will search the same area in a raster scan. In a boresight mode, the
radar will run the range gate out to some distance, perhaps 5 nm, along the boresight
line. Any target along the boresight line and within the specified range will be acquired.
The test is initiated with the test aircraft 3000 to 9000 ft in trail with the target aircraft.
On the test aircraft’s call, the target aircraft begins the prebriefed set of maneuvers. The
test aircraft cycles through the ACM modes of interest, breaking and reacquiring the
STT. Of particular interest in the evaluation is the system’s ability to acquire and
maintain lock throughout the maneuver and within the scan volume, harmonization
between the HUD and the radar, minimum and maximum ranges, ease of reacquisition,
and ease of cursor movement (as in the case of a slewable ACM scan). The primary
analysis tools for these tests are pilot comments and the HUD video.
Interleaving is the ability of the radar to operate and display two modes of the radar
to the operator. The modes do not have to operate at the same rate (i.e., alternate scans).
In most interleave operations, the secondary mode is operated at a slower rate than the
primary mode. For example, suppose the pilot is interested in airborne search as well as
weather detection. The primary mode may be RWS or TWS interleaved with the sec-
ondary mode of weather detection. The system may be mechanized to switch to weather
every 20th frame. The pilot would receive updated information on TWS for 19 frames
and on the 20th frame would receive weather information. The display may physically
shift to a weather presentation for the update, or simply overlay the TWS display with
weather information. The interleave may be transparent to the user, such as a position
velocity update (PVU) interleaved with RWS. If you remember from chapter 5, some
radars have the ability to measure the aircraft’s groundspeed and update the navigation
system with this information. In this scenario, the operator does not see any display
change other than an advisory that the PVU is in operation. The purpose of this eva-
luation is to check proper operation and update rate and to ensure that the primary mode
is not adversely affected (i.e., TWS targets extrapolating) when the secondary mode is
interleaved. One of the more common interleaves is TF with terrain avoidance (TA),
which will be discussed later.
The next three modes may be evaluated in flight; however, most organizations tend
to evaluate them in the lab with only a cursory flight test. Raid assessment may come in
very handy when performing resolution testing. Remember from section 8.7.8 that
systems may be display limited; although the radar sees two targets, the display is not
capable of displaying more than one due to resolution limits. In these cases, the operator
can bracket the single target, request raid assessment, and the radar will reply with a ‘‘2’’
next to the target, indicating two targets within the cell.
Noncooperative target recognition (NCTR) is not resident in all multimode radars.
The radar processor examines the JEM returns from a target and attempts to classify the
target (either by engine or airframe) and display this information to the operator. The
distribution of the JEM returns (variances in range rate) will change as the radar look
angle on the target changes. The radar must have sufficient intelligence (prior knowl-
edge) about the target in order to make this classification. Evaluations include flight
against targets while varying aspect and radar look angle to the target, and measuring the
success rate of the radar in its ability to classify the target.
Multiple track accuracy is a required test of the TWS mode. The tests for track
accuracy described earlier in this section for TWS, STT, and SAM need to be repeated
for multiple TWS tracks. If the system you are evaluating can track up to 32 targets
simultaneously, do not attempt to perform a flight test with 32 controlled targets—it is
not going to happen. Track accuracy for the maximum number of TWS tracked targets is
a lab evaluation. You may be required to track two or three targets simultaneously and
compare the accuracy to the previously determined single TWS track accuracy. The
amount of testing and number of tracks required is a discussion item to be resolved
between you and your customer.
8.8.8 Beacon Mode

In some mission scenarios, it is critical to obtain information on friendly locations.
Cooperative targets can be airborne refueling tankers, air and ground controllers,
friendly ground forces, or ground targets. Most multimode airborne radars employ a
beacon mode that is similar in design to the FAA radar beacon reporting service
(interrogate friend or foe [IFF]). A discussion of IFF and airborne interrogators can be
found in section 5.8 of this text. In beacon mode, the radar sends an interrogation pulse
and then goes into a listening mode for a time equal to the maximum expected range of
the cooperative reply. Even in an interleave mode, sufficient listening time must be
allowed or you risk the chance of eclipsing the reply. The reply is provided to the
operator in a B scope format providing a range and bearing to the target. In order to
prevent erroneous replies from targets other than the desired target, the interrogate and
reply frequencies are matched and have a unique delay setting.
8.8.8.1 Beacon Mode Flight Testing

The primary evaluation of this mode consists of functionality (to include proper blanking
pulses to the radar) and range and azimuth accuracy. Detection ranges for this mode are
superior to the search modes, as the reply is initiated at the target and is effectively a point
source. Maximum detection ranges are run as described in the pulse search R90 section
(section 8.7.4) of this text. Where the radar look angle to the target is critical in maintaining a
constant RCS in pulse search and pulse Doppler search R90 testing, such is not the case here,
as we are looking at a transponder versus a radar reflection. The turn-in is still accomplished
at 120% of the specification value; that is, if the specification calls for a maximum range
detection of 100 nm in the beacon mode, the setup will be initiated at 120 nm.
The azimuth accuracy test is performed the same way as previously described in
section 8.7.5 (pulse radar measurement accuracy), noting that the test is controlled from
the test aircraft and all maneuvering is done by the test aircraft.
8.9 AIR-TO-GROUND RADAR

When looking at an air-to-ground ranging radar, the same range equation described in
section 8.4 (equation 8.13) may be used.
sffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Pavg GsAe tint
Rmax ¼ 4 : (8.13, previously referenced)
ð4pÞ2 Smin
The RCS value in the numerator is replaced with a backscattering coefficient (s0)
which is the RCS of a small increment of ground area (DA). If you remember our
discussion on RCS in section 8.4, it was stated that the RCS is a function of geometric
shape, reflectivity, and directivity. For the air-to-ground case, the geometric shape is the
projection of the incremental area (DA) onto a plane perpendicular to the LOS of the
radar. This projection upon the plane depends on the incidence angle, which is repre-
sented by q, and is illustrated in Figure 8.62.
The projected area is reduced in proportion to the cosine of the incidence angle. As
q increases, the projected area perpendicular to the beam decreases and less energy is
returned to the receiver. This was discussed earlier in the special case of the RCS of
ships (section 8.8.5). In that section we used grazing angle, which is equal to 90 q
(i.e., a grazing angle of zero would be looking broadside at a boat). In many cases, s0 is
normalized by dividing it by the cosine of q. This normalization is given a new symbol,
g (or in some texts h), and is called the normalized backscattering coefficient. Over most
angles of incidence, g is more or less constant, and that is why it is used.
Stimson provides a table of typical backscattering coefficients, and it is included
here for completeness as Table 8.20.
We have seen how the Doppler return changes when looking at an off-boresight
position. A quick review of section 8.8.2 provides us with the Doppler frequency of the
return from a patch of ground:
fd ¼ 2VR cos L=l ðl ¼ c=fc Þ: (8.30, previously referenced)
The radar has a look-down angle, which is also a factor in the calculation (this is
disregarded in the formula above). Since returns may be received from ground patches
in any direction, the ground return generally covers a broad band of frequencies. It can
also be seen that for a return at an angle of 0 (on the nose of the aircraft) the Doppler
FIGURE 8.62 ¢ Radar

RCS of a Ground beam
Patch of Incremental
Area DA
q
Projected
area
Ground
Incremental
ground area
(Δ A)
TABLE 8.20 ¢ Typical Backscattering Coefficients
Coefficients (dB)
Terrain s0 g (h)
Smooth Water 53 45.4
Desert 20 12.4
Wooded Area 15 7.4
Cities 7 0.6
Values are based on a 10 grazing angle and 10 GHz frequency
FIGURE 8.63 ¢
Note: Radar reflector spacing Radar Ground Array
500 ft and size are symmetric with
Radar reflector
respect to the array center
along both the range and
azimuth array arms.
200 ft
50 ft
100 ft 120 ft 300 ft 500 ft
50 ft
3000 m2 750 m2 200 m2 100 m2
100 m2 200 m2
Reflector orientation
Array
Run-in heading 750 m2 Azimuth
Arm
Array range
arm
3000 m2
shift will be equal to groundspeed, and for an angle of 90 (under the aircraft or abeam)
the Doppler shift will be equal to zero.
8.9.1 Air-to-Ground Radar Test

Of concern to the tester is maximum range detection, range, and azimuth resolution.
Since most air-to-ground radars scan only in azimuth, no elevation accuracy is required.
Maximum range is determined the same way as for the weather radar, trying to identify
targets at maximum range. Once again, targets such as land–water contrast make
excellent maximum range targets. If there is a specification of range versus RCS,
the target dimensions and backscattering coefficient must be known. Range and
azimuth accuracy are tested on a radar reflector ground array. A typical array is shown in
Figure 8.63; these arrays can be found at most major test facilities.
As run-ins are accomplished on the array (from left to right in Figure 8.63), the
operator calls out when and if any of the individual reflectors become visible.
Remember that range resolution testing is not a function of range, but rather a function
FIGURE 8.64 ¢ Determination of range resolution

Air-to-Ground # of Reflectors
Range resolution
resolved
Range Resolution
5 Less than 60 ft
Test 4 120 ft
q = antenna/beam depression angle 3 300 ft
= reflector elevation angle 2 500 ft
1 Greater than 500 ft
q
(ft AGL)
altitude
Test
Radar reflectors
Ground level
q
60 ft 120 ft 300 ft 500 ft

Radar reflector spacing
of PW. We will know before the test is accomplished how many of the reflectors should
be visible as we turn inbound toward the array. A range resolution test is shown in
Figure 8.64. This test may have to be accomplished a number of times if the PW changes
with range scale selection. This concept was already covered in section 8.7.8.
Azimuth resolution can be accomplished on the same run-in, noting when the hor-
izontally spaced arrays become visible. Remember that azimuth resolution is a function
of range, as the beam subtends less distance as range decreases, thus making more of the
reflectors visible. The range at which the reflectors become visible can be calculated
before flight if the beamwidth is known by applying equation 8.28, which was discussed
in section 8.7.9:
Range ðnmÞ Inclusive Angle ð Þ ¼ Separation ðftÞ 100:
(8.28, previously referenced)
8.9.2 Ground Moving Target Indicator and Track

The ground moving target indicator (GMTI) mode is designed to detect moving targets
on land or sea. Moving vehicles, including cars, tanks, trucks, ships, and aircraft while
taxiing or in flight, can be detected at very low speeds. A background map is normally
available for navigation and detection of stationary targets. A moving target rejection
feature is incorporated to eliminate false targets due to stationary ground returns. The
MTR velocity changes as the target becomes further from the own-ship velocity vector.
Most land-based targets can be considered point targets. Due to their size, the
possibility exists that the radar will jump from target to target (same range cell). In order
to assist tracking only targets of interest, an expand mode (perhaps a 4:1 increase in
range resolution) is incorporated. The expand mode may cause a loss of track against
large targets such as ocean-going tankers.
Ground moving target track (GMTT) is designed to automatically maintain an
accurate track of a moving vehicle on land or sea for weapons delivery. GMTT is
entered from the GMTI mode and will track the target as long as the return of the target
exceeds that of clutter. Operation and track in the GMTT mode is similar to the
TWS/STT air-to-air modes and provides the aircrew similar information. Detection and
track is assisted by positioning the target along the own-ship velocity vector.
Some airborne radars also incorporate a mode that will track a designated fixed
point on the ground. Fixed target track (FTT) is designed to automatically maintain an
accurate track of a stationary discrete target for fix-taking and weapons delivery. The
radar searches the area of a cursor designation for returns that exceed the background
clutter. The radar may be mechanized to change its PW if the target is too large or small
for the existing PW set.
Another mode associated with GMTI and GMTT is a position velocity update
(PVU), which was addressed briefly in chapter 5. The radar looks at the MLC along the
ground track of the aircraft and reports the velocity of closure as groundspeed to the
navigation system. The navigation system uses this information to update the nine-state
vector parameters of velocity.
8.9.2.1 GMTI and GMTT Flight Testing

Testing is normally accomplished against enhanced targets at known locations and
speeds. It is not uncommon to augment cars, trucks, and barges with radar reflectors in
order to separate them from other ground moving targets that may affect the test. Some
organizations have constructed test vehicles from dune buggies, augmenting the basic
vehicle with radar reflectors and outfitting them with GPS and radios. However,
operational testing would not be predisposed to such setups, as real-world targets will
not be augmented.
The testing that needs to be accomplished includes
● Maximum range detection
● Velocity cutout
● Track accuracy
● FTT acquisition and track
● FTT track accuracy
● Navigation update accuracy
Since it is difficult to find an area where the target of interest is the only target in the
area, consideration has to be given to enhancing the target of interest. When performing
maximum range detection, it is best to start with the easiest task for the radar before
graduating to the higher levels of difficulty. The first test should be on an augmented
target located along the radial axis of the radar, maximum level of closure (target speed),
and at reciprocal headings. The setup should be initiated at 120% of the maximum
expected range. Subsequent test runs should be run at decreased target speed to just
above the velocity cutout.
The velocity cutout test is performed as described in section 8.8.6 for the velocity
search moving target rejection feature. The measurement accuracy (GMTI) and track
accuracy (GMTT) tests are conducted as previously described for pulse search and pulse
Doppler search measurement accuracy (section 8.7.5). A word of caution for this test:
Do not turn away so far from the original heading as to cause the target radial velocity to
drop below the velocity cutout. If this occurs, this will cause the detections (GMTI) to be
lost or the tracks (GMTT) to extrapolate.
Fixed target track, acquisition, and accuracy are tested in a similar fashion, only this
time with known ground targets. Once again the testing should be structured with benign
testing first (large RCS targets free from competing clutter) and difficult testing last.
Large, clutter-free targets could include radar reflectors, mountain peaks, and large
vessels at anchor. The most difficult targets may include a particular building in an
industrial area. In addition to evaluating the accuracy of the track, ease of acquisition,
and the ability to maintain track on the original target without a transfer of lock needs to
be evaluated. If implemented, the ability to adjust the PW and its impact on the ability of
the radar to track large and small targets also needs to be tested.
Positional velocity update may be transparent to the user, so most of the work will
be accomplished postflight during the analysis phase. The obvious errors (incorrect
velocities being sent to the navigation system) will be fairly easy to detect. Timing
errors such as data latency and senescence or errors within the Kalman filter will be
more difficult to detect and identify. With the addition of groundspeed (which is directly
measured by the radar), the accuracy of the navigation system will improve, and your
testing needs to verify this. Compare the baseline navigation accuracy to the accuracy
obtained with PVU enhancement.
8.9.3 Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance

Terrain following radar provides accurate information on the terrain ahead of the aircraft
for input to the TF processor. TF accomplishes this task by measuring the height of the
terrain within the scan volume of the radar. TA provides situational awareness of the
terrain in front of the aircraft within the scan volume of the radar. TF provides an
accurate radar-measured height of objects in front of the aircraft, whereas TA provides
layers of terrain clearance displayed similar to a weather radar.
The height of the terrain is determined by a submode of the radar called height
above terrain (HAT). In order to accomplish this task, the radar must have accurate
information about its own height above the terrain. Because of the accuracies required,
q (depression angle)
Radar R1
altitude
H1
R2
H2
q
D1 D2
Height of
terrain
FIGURE 8.65 ¢ HAT Determination

Discussion of Figure 8.65: The radar in Figure 8.65 sees a return from the terrain for the
given depression angle (q) and calculates a range equal to R1. It knows its own altitude from
the radar altimeter. If the terrain is flat, for the given depression angle and altitude the distance
measured for the return should be R1 þ R2; R2 can therefore be determined. By using similar
triangles, the height of the terrain (H2) can also be determined by their ratios:
ðR1 þ R2Þ=R2 ¼ H1=H2:
Similarly, the distance (D1) to the terrain may also be computed either by the tangent function
or Pythagoras’ theorem (a2 þ b2 þ c2).
this measurement is done with a radar altimeter. The calculations are rather straight-
forward and are depicted in Figure 8.65.
The antenna will scan a narrow azimuth in front of the aircraft and calculate the
distance and height of each return. Some systems will raster scan in elevation as well as
azimuth. In this case, the narrowest beam and shortest PW is employed to obtain max-
imum accuracy and resolution. Each of the calculations is fed to a terrain following
processor (TFP) which uses this information and own-ship parameters (groundspeed,
altitude, track. etc.) to plot a path for the aircraft while maintaining a set altitude
(commonly called a set clearance plane) over the terrain. These commands are sent to
the autopilot, which will fly the path prescribed by the TFP. The crew has the option of
selecting a ‘‘hard’’ ride or a ‘‘soft’’ ride in the TF mode. In the ‘‘hard’’ ride, the TFP
attempts to maintain the exact set clearance plane, even though the g excursions are
high. In a ‘‘soft’’ ride, the TFP eases the aircraft over the terrain, smoothing the path to
make the ride more comfortable by limiting the aircraft g.
Because the TF mode employs a relatively high frequency (usually Ka or Ku for beam
shaping), short PW, LPI, and high processing workload, the maximum range in this mode
is restricted. The calculations of height and distance may only extend out to 6 or 8 miles
and in a narrow azimuth in front of the aircraft. In order to provide situational awareness
to the crew, TA is interleaved with TF. In many cases, TA uses a digital terrain database
very similar to a GPS moving map, although the military database resolution is sig-
nificantly better than what is available to the civilian world. The display that is provided
to the aircrew is much like an A scope (see section 8.6.1), where the amplitude is replaced
by height of the terrain versus range. The first 6 to 8 nm of range is a true presentation of
the terrain as determined by the radar. The additional information is filled in by the TA
mode. A representative TF display augmented by TA is shown in Figure 8.66.
The figure depicts the aircraft altitude (y-axis) versus the range to upcoming terrain
(x-axis). The white lines indicate the height of the terrain and the red line indicates the
FIGURE 8.66 ¢
Representative
TF Display
projected flight path to maintain the 500 ft set clearance plane (caret on the left side of
the display). The aircraft’s radar altitude is 475 ft (bottom left of the display) and
the right side of the display is augmented with digital terrain elevations (DTEs). The
information to the left of the vertical white line is actual radar information and the
information to the right of the vertical line is from the digital terrain database. The scale
reference marks are at 5 nm increments. The gap between 9 and 12 nm is due to a valley
that the radar cannot see due to the obstruction at 9 nm.
Terrain following must also be able to determine the type of object detected by the
radar. Precipitation, towers, cables, and terrain must be accurately identified, their
height determined, and presented to the aircrew. TF is not normally a long-range
detection system, and the area of interest is normally small. Based on the mission, the TF
mode must also possess an LPI. LPI means that the radar should not radiate energy in
such a way that it highlights itself. If an aircraft is flying in the TF mode, there must be
some mechanism to prevent the radar from radiating energy at a positive elevation
setting that will not intercept terrain. Due to the varying signal return of different types
of terrain, the TF mode must be able to perform in many background environments.
Terrain avoidance may be provided by the radar sensor or the digital terrain data-
base. Figure 8.67 depicts a typical TA display that is using the digital terrain database.
Note that it is very similar to a weather display, but in a B scope format. There are four
colors on the cockpit display: black for terrain significantly below own-ship altitude,
green for below own-ship altitude, yellow for terrain at the aircraft altitude, and red for
terrain higher than own-ship altitude. Figure 8.67 shows black for well below and
increasing intensity for higher terrain. These displays are not to be used for TF, but are
used for pilot situational awareness.
When the radar sensor is used, the display information is presented in a PPI format
giving the pilot a true picture of the area in front of the aircraft. The display shows terrain that
is either above (red) or below (blue) the selected altitude. Figure 8.68 shows the TA mode
using the radar sensor only. The upside-down ‘‘Ts’’ at 15 right and 2.5 nm are towers.
FIGURE 8.67 ¢
Terrain Avoidance
With Digital Terrain
Database
FIGURE 8.68 ¢
Terrain Avoidance
with Radar Sensor
There are some inherent problems with the TF and TA modes. The first is the
inability of the radar to scan large volumes in azimuth. The azimuth scan is intentionally
kept small so that the radar can stay ahead of the aircraft. You can see that if the radar
scans a full 120 as it does in most other modes, as well as raster scan in elevation, the
scan rate will have to be increased significantly. All of the data need to be processed in
the TFP and commands need to be issued to the autopilot. Since this is flight critical
information, and the probability of it being in error must be exceptionally small
(1 108 to 1 109), a deterministic (i.e., 1553) data bus must be used. We know from
previous discussions that the 1553 data bus is limited in the amount of data that can be
sent, and this will slow down the data transfer rate. The amount of data, and hence the
scan rate, must be scaled to the bus data rate. By keeping the scan narrow, we can live
within these restrictions. What would happen if the aircraft, while in TF mode needed to
take evasive action (break right or left)? If the TA display is not up in the cockpit, the
pilot would be turning into a blind and perhaps hazardous area. Since the radar beam is
fixed ahead of the aircraft (scanning left and right of boresight), it is not going to be of
any help in this situation. This problem becomes more hazardous with increasing speed
of the aircraft. Pulling straight up will disengage the TF system, but this maneuver may
not be the most expedient one to avoid the threat. This can be a very real problem and
may have to be investigated during the flight test evaluations.
A second problem is the basic limitations of the radar due to physics. We discussed
earlier the concept of backscattering coefficients and their relation to grazing angle. At
the altitudes we are flying, the grazing angle is very shallow; in some scans, close to
broadside. What would happen in flight over snow, sand, or calm water? In these con-
ditions it will be very difficult for the radar to obtain an accurate measure of the height
of the terrain.
Another problem is the determination of man-made objects and precipitation. Since
we are using a high-resolution radar in the K band, precipitation may look much
like terrain. This presents an obvious problem while flying TF, as the aircraft will attempt
to maintain the clearance plane over the precipitation and eventually disengage. The
determination of the height of towers and the classification of cables that support them are
other unique problems for the radar. The tapering of the tower may cause the radar to
provide an inaccurate measurement of the height, and the polarity of the return from cables
may cause them to be invisible to the radar. These problems can be mitigated with special
processing or polarity changes, but the solutions must be evaluated in flight testing.
8.9.3.1 Terrain Following and Terrain Avoidance Flight Testing

Safety is the primary concern during TF/TA flight test evaluations. For all of the testing,
the following sequences shall be observed: buildup in risk, buildup in speed, build-down
in terrain, and build-down in altitude. In layman’s terms, we are going to start with the
least risk and progress to the higher risk test conditions. The initial testing will probably
be accomplished at 10,000 ft so that if the system does not behave as planned there is
plenty of room for recovery. The initial testing is accomplished over reflective terrain,
probably rolling hills, at the best maneuvering speed. Subsequent tests are performed at
the same altitude and speed with varying terrain; the tests are repeated at varying speeds.
These tests must be approached cautiously, noting and correcting any anomalous con-
ditions. A typical test sequence is shown in Table 8.21. The table assumes an airspeed
TABLE 8.21 ¢ Terrain Following Step-Down Logic
Terrain Following Flight Test Conditions
Condition Number Aircraft Altitude Aircraft Speed Terrain Type

1 10,000 ft 300 knots Gently rolling hills
2 10,000 ft 300 knots Slightly rugged
3 10,000 ft 300 knots Mountainous
4 10,000 ft 300 knots Land/water contrast
5 10,000 ft 300 knots Ocean > sea state 4
6 10,000 ft 300 knots Ocean < sea state 4
7 10,000 ft 300 knots Sand
8 10,000 ft 300 knots Snow
9–16 10,000 ft 350 knots Repeat terrain types in conditions 1–8
97–104 500 ft 300 knots Repeat terrain types in conditions 1–8
Repeat as necessary for any lower set clearance planes.
Tests should not be conducted in precipitation or in areas of towers or cables.
range of 300 to 450 knots and a set clearance plane down to 500 ft. The table will have to
be expanded accordingly for increased speeds or lower set clearance planes.
Before progressing to each successive level of difficulty a measurement accuracy
test must be performed. Of interest in this test is the ability of the system to determine
accurate height of the terrain as well as bearing accuracy and range to the terrain. These
tests must be conducted in straight and level as well as turning flight.
In order to accomplish this test successfully, an accurate model of the terrain being
overflown must be known. For every position of latitude and longitude there must be a
corresponding altitude that has been accurately measured. Most ranges that provide
this type of truth data can guarantee the measurements to about 4 m. In addition to
knowing the position of the terrain, we must also know the accurate position of
our aircraft. Once again, most ranges that provide this data will use differential GPS,
which is corrected postflight. As the antenna scans in front of the airplane, the range,
height of the return, and bearing to that return are calculated and sent to the TFP.
For each calculation a true range, height, and bearing angle to the terrain is calculated
from the TSPI data and the two answers are compared to obtain the true accuracy of
the calculations.
The following additional tests must also be accomplished in the TF and TA modes:
● TF letdowns over varying terrain
● TF/TA tower, rain, and cable classification
● Transverse flight profiles
● Flight over snow, sand, water, and ice
● Horizon detect algorithms
● Interleaving
● Pull-up cues to aircrew
● Primary and degraded navigation performance
There will be occasions when it will be necessary to let-down in the TF mode to the
desired set clearance plane. This would be the case for high-low-high profiles where the
aircraft ingresses at high altitude until a desired let-down point where the aircraft will
descend to the low level altitude, complete the mission, and then egress at high altitude.
If the initial descent is done in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions, it is critical that
the TF mode detect the height of the terrain from a high altitude and allow a smooth
transition down to the desired set clearance plane. These let-downs will be evaluated
against the same types of terrain described in Table 8.21.
Tower classification is accomplished in both TF and TA modes. The problem with
towers (other than that previously mentioned regarding the taper) is that they are not all
constructed the same. Towers can be made of concrete, wood, aluminum, steel, or any
combination thereof. They can be solid, or those that look like erector sets. They come
in all sizes; some are as short as 50 ft and some may be as tall as 1500 ft. Towers must be
detected, classified, and displayed to the crew in sufficient time to allow for any evasive
maneuvering. In almost all cases the aircraft will be commanded to fly over, rather than
around, the tower due to the possible nondetection of support cables around the tower.
The specifications normally call for correct detection and height determination of small,
medium, and large towers constructed of a variety of materials. Table 8.22 provides a
possible breakdown of test conditions for tower detection and classification.
TABLE 8.22 ¢ TF/TA Tower Detection and Classification Sequence
TF/TA Tower Detection and Classification
Test Condition Tower Height Construction Geometry

1 Small (50–150 ft) Wood Solid
2 Small (50–150 ft) Metal Solid
3 Small (50–150 ft) Concrete Solid
4 Small (50–150 ft) Wood Open
5 Small (50–150 ft) Metal Open
6 Small (50–150 ft) Concrete Open
Test conditions 1–6 are repeated against medium (150–400 ft) and large (400–1500 ft) towers.
Rain classification is to be displayed in the same manner as in weather radar. The

TF mode should be able to detect and classify rain as
● Light: 1 to 4 mm/hr
● Moderate: 4 to 12 mm/hr
● Heavy: 12 to 50 mm/hr
● Cloudburst: >50 mm/hr
In all fairness, the TF mode will not be able to differentiate terrain from a cloud-
burst, but it is not unusual to see it quoted in the specifications. As previously noted, it is
extremely difficult for a radar operating in the K band to operate effectively in weather
because it cannot penetrate the weather to see what terrain lies beyond. In order to claim
the return as weather rather than terrain requires some very special processing, which
will not be introduced here. Flight in rain and the ability to detect rain is a requirement
and will be performed in flight testing; unfortunately we cannot schedule rain. If you are
testing the radar in a desert locale, you might be waiting an awful long time to fly in
weather. It may be a requirement to deploy off-site to find the appropriate weather
conditions, so take this into consideration when formulating the test plan.
Like rain, cable detection may be a fight with physics. There may be a means of
switching to circular polarization to aid in the detection of cables as well as aid in
weather performance.
Transverse flight is quite an interesting test, and is sure to give the pilots an inter-
esting ride. It is a situation where the terrain in front of the airplane is sloped upward
along the wing line, almost like flying in a ‘‘V’’ notch. Figure 8.69 shows this situation.
In Figure 8.69 the aircraft is flying toward you with a set clearance plane safely
established, but if the pilot looks out of his right window the terrain seems very, very
close. For a transverse slope, the TFP calculates a safe horizontal separation as well as
maintains the selected set clearance plane. The test is accomplished against terrain with
varying slopes, starting with shallow or gently sloping terrain and increasing the slope
with successive test points. As with weather, the scheduling of this type of test may
necessitate the aircraft to fly off-site.
Flight over known no-show areas (dry sand, snow, ice, and smooth water) is
accomplished to ensure that the system properly initiates corrective action and advises
the crew when accurate measurement of the terrain height can no longer be guaranteed.
Similarly, tests must be accomplished against terrain where the radar cannot detect the
horizon. This case is illustrated in Figure 8.70.
FIGURE 8.69 ¢
Terrain Following
Transverse Slope
Set
clearance
plane
FIGURE 8.70 ¢ No
Horizon Detected
The aircraft in Figure 8.70 still detects terrain in the uppermost vertical raster of the
radar. The aircraft will be commanded to pitch up. While in the pitch, the radar will
continue to scan and attempt to detect a horizon (i.e., no return from the radar beam), but
because of the height of the terrain, the radar will still not detect a horizon. At this point,
the system will issue an audio warning to the pilot, usually a ‘‘No Horizon Detect,’’
while simultaneously issuing a pull-up cue, then the TF mode will disengage. The
timing of the scenario described is based on own-ship parameters such as altitude, air-
speed, g available, and range to the terrain. The flight test of this function cannot be
accomplished without validating the algorithms in the lab. As with all of the previous
TF/TA testing, this function is tested with a build-up in risk and with the most benign
conditions tested first.
Tests of the interleave function are as described previously; interleaving a second
mode cannot adversely affect the performance of the primary mode. Common interleave
situations are TF with TA and TA with weather.
The final evaluation of TF and TA involves degraded navigation and its impact on
the ability of the aircraft to continue safely in the mode. Of primary interest is the loss of
the primary radar stabilization input. Suppose that the primary navigation source for the
airplane is an integrated GPS/INS. The stabilization information, which is key to
establishing a depression angle for the radar, comes from the INS. What happens if the
INS fails? We know that GPS on its own cannot provide this information, so maybe the
aircraft is outfitted with a second INS. But what if the second INS fails? Maybe a
secondary backup is provided by an attitude heading reference system (AHRS). What
are the implications to the TF system if one of these backups is employed? In order to
answer these questions the range, height, and bearing accuracy tests previously descri-
bed must be reflown with each change of navigation sensor.
8.9.4 Synthetic Aperture Radar, Inverse SAR, and

Doppler Beam Sharpening
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is a Doppler mode of the radar that uses sophisticated
processing to produce a high-resolution image of the ground patch of interest. It can only
be used by a moving radar beam over a relatively immobile target (stationary or as close
as possible to stationary). The process involves looking at an object from multiple angles
with a small antenna, and when combined can replicate a picture as if taken by a very
large antenna. When combined with very small increments of range (small PWs), the
picture can be of quite high resolution.
In a typical airborne application, a single antenna is attached to the side of the aircraft.
The beamwidth will be as small as allowable based on the size of the antenna and its
operating frequency; the PW will be as small as the desired resolution. The radar emits a
series of pulses as the aircraft travels forward and the amplitude and phase of the returns are
recorded and combined within the processor. The result is as if they were made simulta-
neously from a large antenna; this process creates the ‘‘synthetic aperture’’ much larger
than the transmitting antenna or the aircraft carrying it. Suppose we want a 5 ft resolution
cell over a target at a 25 nm range from the aircraft. We can obtain a range resolution of 5 ft
by narrowing the PW to 0.01 msec. If we calculate the beamwidth we need for a 5 ft
azimuth resolution at 25 nm and then use the X-band beamwidth rule of thumb:
R BW ¼ resolution (100 ft)
25 x ¼ 0.05
x ¼ 0.05/25
x ¼ 0.002
q3dB ¼ 85 /d, where d is the diameter in inches

0.002 ¼ 85 /d
d ¼ 85/0.002
d ¼ 42,500 inches ¼ 3542 ft
In order to obtain this resolution we would need an antenna ½ mile long. The
3000þ ft of the synthetic aperture is accomplished by the aircraft’s forward motion. In
reality, the beamwidth of the synthetic array is about one-half of the equivalent antenna.
So in our example, the aircraft would have to examine the target for about 1500 ft of
travel in order to produce a 5 ft resolution cell. Stimson provides the following
achievable resolution relationships in his text (chapter 30):
Resolutionrange ¼ 500ðtÞ ft ðt is the PWÞ: (8.34)
For a real array:
Resolutionazimuth ¼ l=LR ðL is the length of the array and R is rangeÞ: (8.35)
For a synthetic array:
Resolutionazimuth ¼ l=2LR: (8.36)
NASA and the military have long employed SAR techniques for mapping and
imagery obtained from space-based vehicles. Figure 8.71 is a NASA photo identifying a
container ship.
FIGURE 8.71 ¢
SAR Imagery of a
Container Ship
BULK CARGO CARRIER
NASA photo
FIGURE 8.72 ¢
Tank Convoy
Sandia labs
Figure 8.72 is a photo of a column of tanks and Figure 8.73 is a SAR image of the
same tanks taken from an aircraft. These photos were taken by Sandia Labs.
One other type of SAR processing, not normally found on aircraft, is 3D SAR
or interferometric SAR, which was developed to add a third dimension to SAR maps.
FIGURE 8.73 ¢
SAR Image from an
Aircraft
Sandia labs
FIGURE 8.74 ¢ Black Mesa Area, I-25 and US-85

Interferometric SAR South of Albuquerque, NM-22 December, 1994
NASA has made extensive use of this technique for space-based imaging of the earth and
planets. By having two antennas side by side, these systems can make stereo pairs of SAR
images of the earth, providing maps with elevation information or actual 3D presentations
requiring special glasses for viewing. Figure 8.74 is an example of an interferometric SAR.
Inverse SAR (ISAR) techniques were developed for imaging of ships and space-
based objects. For ships, it would be next to impossible for a slow moving ship to
FIGURE 8.75 ¢
USS Crocket
FIGURE 8.76 ¢
ISAR Image
employ the SAR techniques previously covered. In ISAR, the radar records the echoes
from moving targets such as ships, spacecraft, and rotating planets. The recordings are
made over many viewing angles, forming a microwave hologram of the moving or
rotating target. Like SAR, but in reverse. Figures 8.75 and 8.76 are from the U.S. Navy’s
Radar Analysis Branch showing the USS Crocket as an ISAR image.
A commonly used technique for SAR systems is called Doppler beam sharpening
(DBS). Because the real aperture of the radar antenna is so small, the beam is relatively
wide and spreads energy over a wide area in a direction orthogonal to the direction of the
platform. DBS takes advantage of the motion of the platform in that targets ahead of the
platform return an up-shifted Doppler signal and targets behind the platform return a
down-shifted Doppler signal. The amount of shift varies with the angle forward or
backward from the orthonormal direction (target orientation). By knowing the speed of
the platform, the target signal return is placed in a specific angle bin that changes over
time. Signals are integrated over time and the radar beam is synthetically reduced to a
much smaller beamwidth. Based on the ability of the radar to see small Doppler shifts,
the system can effectively have hundreds of very small beams acting concurrently,
which dramatically increases azimuth resolution. This is a common mode on many
fighter and bomber aircraft and is most effective when the target of interest is placed at
the 11 o’clock or 1 o’clock position.
8.9.4.1 Flight Testing of SAR Modes

The most common way to evaluate these modes is against a ground radar reflector array,
as depicted in Figure 8.63. These modes are designed to provide the user with very
small resolution cells. With run-ins against the reflector array, the user should be able to
identify the number of reflectors with spacing equal to the resolution selected.
Most systems allow the operator to select a cell from as large as 250 ft down to a cell as
small as 4 to 5 ft. For operational evaluations, the user may try Google Earth as an aid
to truth data. Comparisons of urban areas, roads, factories, and airfields can all be
accomplished by comparing the radar presentation to the satellite view provided by this
software. It is not useful for finding vehicles, aircraft, or ships, since Google Earth is
not a real-time system. If there is a need to evaluate the system against these targets, then
the evaluator will have to arrange to have them placed at known locations, as described
in section 8.9.2.1.
Synthetic aperture radar testing is a validation of the mechanization of the mode
within the radar. Figure 8.77 depicts what is going on inside the radar in order to obtain
the azimuth resolution required.
8.10 MILLIMETRIC WAVE RADAR

Millimetric wave (MMW) radar operates in the 30 to 300 GHz frequency bands; it is a
cross between the metric radar and IR. MMW radars have advantages over IR systems in
that they are not as susceptible to aerosols and particulates due to their wavelength. They
also have advantages over metric radars in that they can be made much smaller and are
able to produce very narrow beams, thus aiding in resolution. They have disadvantages
as well. MMW radars are active systems (as opposed to IR) and thus can be detected by
other sensors. Because of the frequency employed, there is very high atmospheric
attenuation. Figure 8.1 shows the relationship of frequency and attenuation. At an
operating frequency of about 50 GHz, only 1% of the signal will pass through the
atmosphere. This indicates that MMW radars are probably not good for long range
unless a huge amount of power is added.
Generally MMW radars have less of a problem with multipath effects because the
beam is more directive, and ground reflections are more diffuse because of the shorter
wavelength. Rain backscatter is appreciable in the millimetric region, which limits radar
performance. Although precipitation is the principle source of backscattering, it will
occur with chaff, birds, and sometimes insects. The reflectivity of various grasses, crops,
and trees produces variability in the terrain backscatter and change with the season (tall
crops, harvested area, leaves or no leaves on the trees, etc.). Reflectivity changes with
moisture content; the reflectivity of snow depends on the free water content, with dry
8.10 Millimetric Wave Radar 711
FIGURE 8.77 ¢
SAR Requirements
Radar Transmitted Pulses
1 through n
d
L = length of the aperture
L = n (number of pulses) × d
d = Vradar × time
d = Vradar × 1/PRF
Object of
Interest
Range (R) Required L Resolution

25 nm 750 ft
50 nm 1500 ft 5 ft
100 nm 3000 ft
Remember that the L required is roughly one-half of that required for a real beam.
snow being more reflective than wet snow. Sea clutter behavior is much like that
encountered with metric radars.
Some typical applications of MMW radar are
● Seeker and missile guidance
● Airborne radar (ground surveillance and fire control)
● Ground-based radar (surveillance, fire control, track of air and space-based targets)
● Instrumentation radar (TSPI)
● Automotive warning and braking systems
In many applications, the MMW radar is part of a sensor-fused weapons system. IR
applications use MMW radar as a second color to discriminate between targets and
decoys (directed IR countermeasures flares). MMW radar is also used in civilian
enhanced flight vision systems in concert with IR to detect airfields and the runway
environment as an aid to landing in marginal weather (see section 6.16).
FIGURE 8.78 ¢
Radome Test Fixture Anechoic chamber
Antenna Angle b
& servo track
Dividing
head
a Data
RF signal record
generator −
b + a−b
a
d(a − b )
da
Radome
Differ-
entiation
d(a − b )
= Radome error slope
da
a − b = Radome induced error
8.11 MISCELLANEOUS MODES OF RADAR

All radars have built-in electronic protection (formally known as electronic counter-
measures). These functions include automatic gain control (AGC), sidelobe blanking or
cancellation, sensitivity time constant (STC), and pulse length measurement, or they
employ a guard channel. There are more than 70 functions that may be part of the
airborne radar’s electronic protection package. Most of these functions are discussed in
chapter 9.
In addition, all of the modes of the radar should be evaluated with loss or degra-
dation of the navigational inputs. This has been emphasized throughout this section and
is repeated here as a reminder.
One other test that may or may not be the responsibility of flight testing is the
effects of the radome. Since the manufacturing process is not perfect, each radome will
be slightly different than the next. Imperfections can cause a loss of transmissivity or
diffraction that will cause angular errors in the radar measurements. These errors can be
calculated in a lab and then applied in software. In some extreme cases, the radar and the
radome are a matched set and must be replaced as a unit. This is an important aspect of
configuration control that needs to be understood by the evaluator. Figure 8.78 shows
the lab setup and Figure 8.79 shows the results of the test.
8.12 SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

IN RADAR TESTING
In these last few paragraphs I will address some of the issues that evaluators will
come across if they are ever involved in the flight testing of a radar system. The first
lesson is that radar testing is probably going to be dreadfully boring to the flight crew
(with the possible exception of the ACM modes). There will be a lot of straight and level
flying and boring holes in the sky, but for the analyst, these tests are some of the most data
intensive and time consuming. Also understand that, unlike other tests, pilot comments
are minimally useful in radar testing. When planning radar flight tests, do not overbook
8.12 Some Final Considerations in Radar Testing 713
0.06 FIGURE 8.79 ¢

0.04 Radome Errors
0.02
0
Radome error slope (°) - per degree
−0.02
−0.04
−0.06
25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Look angle (°) - in plane
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
−0.02
−0.04
−0.06
25 20 15 10 5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Look angle (°) - cross plane
FIGURE 8.80 ¢
Radar Roof House
Facility
Missile and
support
equipment
Building
your flights, for the two previous reasons mentioned. Allow enough time between mis-
sions to properly analyze the data and ensure that the system is functioning as expected.
Without exception, all radar vendors will utilize either a flying test bed or roof
house (or both) to develop and validate radar software. It is imperative that the customer/
aircraft integrator be involved in this testing to understand exactly how the radar works.
Remember that the systems flight tester has to be as knowledgeable about the system as
the design engineer. An example of a roof house facility is shown in Figure 8.80.
When building a test plan, pay particular attention to the types of targets and facil-
ities that will be required. Do the targets require a particular RCS? Is there a requirement
for very small, high-speed targets? Do you need high altitude, bomber-size targets? Can
you augment the targets you possess to mimic the requirements (radar reflectors,
Luneberg lens). Is there a requirement for jamming targets or chaff-dispensing targets?
Do you need ground or oceangoing targets? Do I need to instrument the targets or obtain
surveyed points? Is there a requirement for a radar ground array? Who can supply these
targets and how much lead time is required? These are the types of questions that should
be asked for every test event that is planned.
Once the types of targets are determined we must then determine where we can
accomplish these tests. Is the range available for the time frame anticipated? Is range
space adequate for the setup ranges we have determined? Is adequate TSPI available?
What is the data turnaround time? How many flights can be supported, and at what rate?
Does the range require radar beacons or laser reflectors? Is the control room adequate
(types of data, number and types of displays, communication, etc.)? What is the method
for range control and geometry setups? What is the cost? These are questions that pro-
gram management will also be asking you to answer.
TSPI may be a problem, especially when attempting to prove functions such
as range rate accuracy. Remember that the velocity of closure is measured directly by
the radar. There is no way that the range will be able to provide velocity data that is
four times as accurate as the radar, which will force you into testing to the limits of the
truth data.
Finally, radar testing is not going to be done overnight, no matter who dictates it.
Plan on regression testing, as the software will be incremental; especially so with radar.
Attempt to solve the big problems first. It is no fun to be nearing the end of a program
and have a massive software change thrown at you and you realize that the last 200
flights have to be repeated.
1. What does radar mean?

2. What is the relationship between component size and frequency?
3. In the radar range equation, what does s stand for?
4. What are the components of s?
5. Why is gain important to an antenna?
6. Convert the power ratio of 1000 to decibels.
7. Convert 45 dB to a power ratio.
8. What is the relationship between size, radar frequency, and wavelength?
9. What is the relationship between wavelength and the ability to detect targets?
10. Does RCS change with wavelength?
11. What attributes of a target can a pulse radar determine?
12. How does a pulse radar determine range?
13. What is the relationship between range accuracy and PRF?
14. What is PRF?
15. What is the relationship between pulse length and range accuracy?
16. For a radar with a pulse length of 12 msec, what would be the expected range resolution?
17. What would happen if you closed on a target for a gunshot with this radar?
18. How can this problem be avoided?

19. Can a radar altimeter be designed by using a pulse radar?
20. What are the characteristics of the radar altimeter? How does it work?
21. What does Doppler measure? How?
22. What attributes of a target can a pulse Doppler provide?
23. Which target attribute of a pulse Doppler radar is the most accurate? The least?
24. What is a Doppler notch?
25. What are the advantages of a notch? The disadvantages?
26. What is clutter?
27. Can a Doppler radar pull a target out of clutter?
28. In what areas can a pulse Doppler radar resolve targets?
29. Which is the most accurate? (Reference question number 28.)
30. Given a 3 dB beamwidth of a radar as 5 , how far apart would two targets have to
be at 60 nm in order to be resolved?
31. What is JEM?
32. What does JEM provide the aircrew?
33. What sort of frequency would you expect to see in terrain following radars? Why?
34. What are three variables that should be taken into account when testing the
detection range of a radar?
35. Which detection variable has the most effect?
36. Which detection variable has the least effect?
37. In which direction are the ranges affected by each of the detection variables?
38. What is beacon mode?
39. On an F-15 radar, what would you expect to see for PRF, pulse, beamwidth, etc.?
40. What is the difference between peak power and average power?
41. How can we boost the average power?
42. Why would we want to boost the average power?
43. What are the disadvantages of employing low frequencies in a radar altimeter?
44. What is the relationship between atmospheric absorption and frequency?
45. How would you calculate the RCS of a ground target?
46. What is LPI? Why is it important in choosing a radar operating frequency?
47. How is target ranging accomplished in a high PRF radar?
48. What is PRF stagger? What is it used for?
49. What is chirp? What is it used for?
50. Name two types of pulse compression.
51. What is a radar PRI?
52. Explain the difference between earth- and aircraft-stabilized radar.
53. A radar dish looks like a big banana, what is it used for?
54. What is SLC on a pulse radar?

55. What is SLC on a PD radar?
56. What is MLC on a pulse radar?
57. What is MLC on a PD radar?
58. What are the advantages of applying a Doppler notch at the earth’s Doppler
return?
59. What are the disadvantages of applying a Doppler notch at the earth’s Doppler
return?
60. What can be done to eliminate the problems associated with the zero notch?
61. What is velocity search mode?
62. What can be said about resolution testing done at long ranges?
63. What is a velocity reject feature?
64. What problems are associated with the MLC notch?
65. Why are low and high velocity reject switches employed?
66. Briefly describe a monopulse tracker.
67. Briefly describe a conical scan tracker.
68. How can a radar employing very low frequency establish fine resolution?
69. What is the relationship between strength of target return and range?
70. As Vc increases, what happens to the probability of detection?
71. In a circular antenna, what are the two factors that affect gain?
72. Briefly explain the amount of energy returned to the radar versus what was sent.
73. How can RCS fluctuations be accounted for in predicting range?
74. What is the aspect rule of thumb when conducting maximum detection testing?
75. What is a false alarm rate?
76. In which frequency would you find WX radars?
77. Would you use a K band radar as a WX radar?
78. Which frequency would the California Highway Patrol (CHiP) use to deter
speeders?
79. Name two applications for MMW radar.
80. Name three advantages of MMW radar.
81. Name three disadvantages of MMW radar.
82. What is a PPI scope?
83. What is a B scope?
84. What is the determining factor in range accuracy of a pulse radar?
85. How is the beamwidth of a radar measured?
86. What is meant by the 3 dB point?
87. What is a resolution cell?
88. What should be the turn-in range for maximum detection tests?
89. Name three parameters that must be normalized in maximum detection tests.
90. Why is multipath harmful to a radar?

91. What is an ensemble mean?
92. If our sample size is small, what must be done to the standard deviation?
93. What parameters must be included in our test matrix when performing measure-
ment accuracy?
94. Are azimuth and elevation resolution range dependent?
95. What TSPI data should be used when performing range rate accuracy tests?
96. What did you learn about radar testing from this module?
97. Are there any radar tests that are inappropriate for flight testing?
98. What is a backscattering coefficient?
99. What is the purpose of a radar reflector array?
100. What problems are associated with flying over snow and ice with a radar altimeter?
101. Using statistics, what is meant by knowing when to stop collecting data?
102. Name two problems with radar altimeters for obtaining accurate altitude.
103. How is Doppler shift accounted for in FM ranging?
104. What is the relationship between Doppler shift and frequency?
105. If the Predator was equipped with MMW radar instead of IR, would he have been
able to kill Arnold Schwarzenegger?
106. What is an advantage of a DNS?
107. At best, what can we say about target detections at sea?
108. Name three factors that affect detection of targets at sea.
109. For other than grazing angles, what would be the RCS of a ship at sea?
110. Name four factors that affect sea clutter.
111. In sea detect, which would perform better, high- or low-resolution radars?
112. What is the major problem associated with velocity search mode?
113. What are transition tests?
114. What is the advantage of employing CW in a Doppler radar?
115. What is the disadvantage of employing CW in a Doppler radar?
116. If we wanted to install an MMW radar for long range detect, what problems would
we encounter?
117. Which parameter must be known when conducting TF radar tests?
118. What is TA? How is it used?
119. Why is RWS used in maximum range detection versus TWS?
120. What is the good news for testers about RWS/TWS testing?
121. What is an STT?
122. Which has better accuracy, TWS or STT tracks?
123. What is an advantage of up-look search?
124. What should be done to targets when conducting GMTI/GMTT tests?
CHAPTER
Electronic Warfare
9
Chapter Outline
9.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 719
9.1 Electronic Warfare Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 720
9.2 The Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724
9.3 Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
9.4 Electronic Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
9.5 Noise Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
9.6 Deception Jamming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 738
9.7 Chaff Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
9.8 Flare Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743
9.9 Electronic Protection Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
9.10 Electronic Warfare Systems Test and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 748
9.11 Finally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760
9.0 INTRODUCTION
For the most part, technical or operational discussions of electronic warfare (EW) and
electronic countermeasures (ECM) are classified and are restricted to a ‘‘need to know’’
basis. This chapter will not discuss classified material, but will try to guide the evaluator
through a basic knowledge of EW systems and provide a generic series of tests that can be
tailored to a specific system. When performing EW testing, the flight tester may want to
reference Radar Electronic Warfare, by August Golden, Jr. (Reston, VA: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1987), for a good overview of radar and EW
methods. The Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD)/
Research and Technology Organization (RTO) has published Electronic Warfare Test
and Evaluation (RTO-AG-300, volume 17). This document is more of a tool for mana-
ging an EW program and is similar to the ‘‘Electronic Warfare Test and Evaluation
Process: Direction and Methodology for EW Testing,’’ AFMAN 99-112, March 27, 1995.
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) also uses a supplementary text called Electronic Warfare
Fundamentals which is handled by Detachment 8 at Nellis Air Force Base; the most
recent publication is November 2000. This document has been in publication for many
years in various shapes and sizes and I have included some of its artwork in this chapter.
719
720 CHAPTER 9 Electronic Warfare
This chapter will cover the functional areas of EW and provide some examples for
each category. ECM will be addressed, looking at passive and active ECM techniques.
As promised in the previous chapter, we will cover electronic protection measures
(EPM), mostly as they pertain to the onboard radar. Finally, we will cover EW systems
test and evaluation.
9.1 ELECTRONIC WARFARE OVERVIEW

Electronic warfare has been around as long as the telegraph. In those days, in order to
prevent the enemy from using the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, you cut the wires.
The concept of EW has evolved much like the old MAD comic book ‘‘Spy vs. Spy.’’
Whenever a new technology is developed, somebody else is developing a new tech-
nology to defeat it. There is a really good book on the history of EW. It is by Alfred
Price and is called Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare
(London: Macdonald and Jane’s Publishers Ltd, 1978). Mr. Price is also the author of the
three volume The History of US Electronic Warfare (Alexandria, VA: Association of
Old Crows, 2000).
The first real use of EW was in World War I when the British used direction finders
to locate German fleet movements. With increased use of radar came increased use of
countermeasures. World War II introduced jamming, chaff (called rain), early warning
systems (e.g., Chain Home self-defense), night fighters, and deception. In addition, in
the Korean War, Allied losses were estimated to have been three times higher had they
not used EW.
A boom in technology during the Vietnam War years accelerated the use of ECM and
electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). USAF losses during the Linebacker II
campaign were 15 B-52 bombers. Without ECM, losses against surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) were estimated to have been 75 to 100 bombers.
In the same conflict, the U.S. Navy had 85 losses due to missiles. Had they not employed
ECM techniques, their losses were estimated at 425, with an additional 200 losses to AAA.
Against man-portable air defense (MPAD) heat-seeking SA-7 missiles, aircraft employing
ECM techniques could expect to survive against 80 launches before being hit. The same
aircraft without ECM could only expect to survive seven launches before being hit.
During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israelis used chaff and jammers against
51 surface-to-air missiles and there were no hits. Egyptian aircraft did not use EW and
lost nine aircraft to Israeli missile shots.
The Yugoslavia–Kosovo action of 1999 by NATO forces was against a Soviet
inspired integrated air defense system. This system consisted of widely dispersed
fixed and mobile EW radar systems with multiple SA-3 and SA-6 missiles. The
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRV) utilized emission control (EMCON) engage-
ment tactics (acquisition radars were not used) of SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, and SA-18
infrared (IR) missiles as well as barrage AAA. They used ‘‘old’’ but very effective
deception tactics utilizing camouflage, constant relocation of SAM and AAA assets,
decoys of SAM systems and aircraft in the open, and radio frequency (RF) radiators
mimicking SAMs.
NATO employed saturation tactics, force protection and force integration, stand-off
jamming (SOJ), and self-protection jamming (SPJ) by all NATO aircraft. Suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD) was carried out by the EA-6B prowler, F-16CJ, and
Tornado with high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) and air-launched antiradiation

missiles (ALARMs). Kosovo saw the operational debut of the B-2 bomber with the joint
direct attack munition (JDAM). Communications jamming (chatter and spoofing),
communication antijam, and communications intelligence (COMINT) operations com-
prised the air order of battle and engagement orders.
One F-117 ‘‘Stealth’’ and one F-16C were downed by 1961-era SA-3s; unfortu-
nately most SAM systems were still operational by the end of the war.
9.1.1 Electronic Warfare Terminology

Electronic warfare is military action involving the exploitation of the EM spectrum to
attack the enemy or render their operations ineffective. There are three major divisions
of EW:
● Electronic attack (EA)
● Electronic protection (EP)
● Electronic warfare support (ES)
Electronic attack uses EM or directed energy to attack an enemy’s capability. It is
comparable to the older term of electronic combat. The intent is to neutralize, degrade, or
destroy the enemy’s combat capability. It uses a combination of nondestructive actions
(intrusion, jamming, and interference) and the destructive capabilities of antiradiation
missiles and directed energy weapons. The following terms are associated with EA:
● Antiradiation missile (ARM): a missile that homes passively on a radiation source.
● Directed energy (DE): use of DE weapons (soft kill [scramble the electronic brains]/
hard kill [destruction]), devices, and countermeasures to cause direct damage or to
prevent use of the EM spectrum (e.g., airborne laser [ABL] in the Boeing 747).
● Jamming: radiation, reradiation, or reflection of EM energy to degrade or neutralize
an enemy’s capabilities.
● Deception: manipulation of the enemy’s EM spectrum for the purposes of deception.
Some representative systems included in EA include
● EA-6B (ALQ-99 SOJ)
● HARM, ALARM (Figure 9.1)
● ALQ-131 jamming pod
● AN/ALQ-165 airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) (Figure 9.2)
Electronic protection is that division of EW involving actions taken to protect per-
sonnel, facilities, and equipment from the effects of friendly or enemy employment of
EW, including ECCM and infrared counter-countermeasures (IRCCM). EP focuses on
the protection of friendly forces against enemy employment of EW and any undesirable
effects from friendly employment of the same. EP includes protection from destructive
and nondestructive threats.
The following terms are associated with EP:
● Emission control (EMCON): selective and controlled use of emitters to optimize
command and control and to prevent detection by enemy sensors.
FIGURE 9.1 ¢
High-Speed
Antiradiation Missile
FIGURE 9.2 ¢
Self-Protection
Jammer
● Operations security (OPSEC): EM hardening; action taken to protect personnel,

facilities, and equipment by filtering, shielding, grounding, or attenuating friendly
and hostile emissions.
● Frequency agility, diversity, and deconfliction (frequencies).
● Other procedures and techniques such as EW expendables (chaff, flares, decoys), war
reserve modes (radar), and OPSEC.
Some representative systems in EP include
● ALE-44 chaff/flare dispenser (Figure 9.3)
● ALE-50 towed decoy
● MJU-8 (flare) (Figure 9.4)
● F-117 low observability/stealth
● ALE-55 fiber-optic towed decoy (FOTD)
Electronic warfare support is that division of EW involving actions to intercept,
identify, and locate sources of EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition
(electronic support measures [ESM]). ES provides the information to guide threat
avoidance, targeting, and homing. ES data can be used to produce signal intelligence
(SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronic intelligence (ELINT).
The following terms are associated with ES:
● Combat direction finding: actions taken to obtain bearings to emitters.
● Combat threat warning: actions taken to survey and analyze the EM spectrum in
support of the operational commander’s information needs.
FIGURE 9.3 ¢
ALE 44 Chaff/Flare
Dispenser
FIGURE 9.4 ¢
MJU-8 Flare
Some representative ES systems include

● AAR-47 missile warning system (MWS)
● ALR-56C radar warning receiver (RWR)
● ALR-67(v)3 RWR (Figure 9.5)
● ALR-69A digital RWR
● Joint surveillance target attack radar system (JSTARS) (Figure 9.6)
● On-board EW simulator (OBEWS)
FIGURE 9.5 ¢
ALR-67 Radar
Warning Receiver
FIGURE 9.6 ¢ Joint

Surveillance Target
Attack Radar
System
9.2 THE THREAT

Radar systems have the inherent capability to determine accurate range, range rate, azi-
muth, and elevation for airborne targets. Military commanders have taken advantage of
these capabilities by employing radar systems to provide air defense for high-value targets.
The primary missions of radar systems employed for air defense are attack warning and
threat engagement. The EW community groups threat radars in three classifications:
● Indirect threats
● Direct threats
● Environmental radars
Early warning radars (EWRs) or long-range radars (LRRs) are indirect threats and
are used to alert air defenses against incoming aircraft. These radars are characterized by
● Long pulse widths (high average power)
● Low pulse repetition frequency (PRF) (long listening time)
9.2 The Threat 725
FIGURE 9.7 ¢
Height Finder Radar
● VHF, E band (30 to 3000 MHz)

● Normally a slow circular scan; 2 to 3 in azimuth beamwidth and up to 10 in
elevation beamwidth
Acquisition radars are a variation of the EWR and LRR systems that are used to
support AAA and SAM batteries by providing range, azimuth, and elevation information.
Compared to the early warning systems they have
● Shorter pulse width (lower power, better range resolution)
● Higher PRF (accuracy, better velocity resolution)
● Higher frequency (I band for beam shaping), faster circular scan rate
Another indirect threat radar is the ground controlled intercept (GCI). GCI is any
site that can accurately fix a target and direct an airborne interceptor to the area.
EWR in concert with height finders can accomplish this task via VHF/UHF
communications.
Height finder radars (HFRs) are indirect threats used in conjunction with EWR to
determine the altitude of an incoming target. In order to accomplish this it employs a
narrow beam in azimuth and an elongated (~4 ) beam in elevation. In order to shape the
beam without the antenna being too large, the frequencies are high. A height finder radar
is shown in Figure 9.7. Height finder radar properties include
● Medium pulse widths
● Moderate PRF (compatibility with EWR)
● E band
● Rapid, large vertical scan (~30 )
V-beam radar are a type of EWR that employ two beams in a circular search pattern.
The first beam is vertical and the second beam is at some angle away from vertical. As
the beam sweeps, a time delta (Dt) is obtained when the target intercepts the second
beam. By knowing this Dt, the distance up the second beam, or altitude, can be deter-
mined. The V-beam radar is shown in Figure 9.8.
Direct threat radar systems are used for acquisition and tracking, constantly feeding
updated information to weapons systems computers. Conical scan (Figure 9.9) radars
utilize a conical beam rotated in a circular fashion. The beam overlaps itself in the center
of the scan, thereby reducing the effective beamwidth. The target is tracked in this
overlay. General characteristics include
● Short pulse widths
● High PRF
● High frequency
● F–I band (beam shaping)
Airborne intercept (AI) radars are direct threats that utilize techniques similar to
ground-based radars for tracking targets. The exception is that these radars must
FIGURE 9.8 ¢
V-Beam Radar
FIGURE 9.9 ¢
Conical Scan Radar
9.2 The Threat 727
employ higher frequencies (smaller wavelengths) in order to keep the components

small. Frequencies are normally in the H through K bands. Types of AI radars
include
● Monopulse
● Track-while-scan (TWS)
● Doppler, continuous wave (CW)/frequency modulation CW (FM-CW)/pulsed
Monopulse radars accomplish tracking by comparing the ratio of two or more signals
received by two or more feeds which transmit together but receive independently. By
comparison of the energy returned in each of the beams, azimuth and elevation correc-
tions can be made. A monopulse radar has advantages over conical scan in that it gathers
data more quickly and has the ability to track a target even through pulse-to-pulse fading.
Monopulse is used by SAM batteries. A complete description of monopulse tracking can
be found in section 8.7.6 of this text.
Track-while-scan is not a true tracking radar in the normal sense in that it is not
centered on the target. TWS as it relates to ground-based tracking radars employs a
different mechanization from that of airborne radars (section 8.8.7). It transmits two
beams on different frequencies sectored so that they overlap in the same region of
space. The horizontal beam provides azimuth and range, while the vertical beam
provides elevation and range. A separate beam is transmitted to guide an associated
missile to the target. The SA-2 Fan Song (NATO designates threat radars by a two-
word code; the first letter of the first word indicates its frequency band) which is a
typical TWS radar.
Doppler radar exploits the frequency shifts from changes in relative velocities. CW
Doppler cannot provide range, but is an excellent tool for measuring closure. Since it is
CW, it is difficult to obtain the high RF power required to detect targets at long range
because of the closeness of the transmitting and receiving antennas to each other. This is
a problem in all CW systems. FM-CW Doppler radar is similar to CW radar except that
the frequency is modulated. This modulation allows the system to determine range as
well as relative velocity. The problems relating to power as previously mentioned for
CW still apply to the modulated system. Pulsed Doppler radar is similar to CW systems
with the exception that it employs a pulse modulation. By modulating the pulses, a
higher peak power is generated, providing greater range detection. Since all information
is detected on one pulse, the system is difficult to detect, is less susceptible to unfriendly
interdiction, and components can be made smaller.
Although not a specific type of radar, all systems previously mentioned can gain
azimuth and elevation information on an aircraft that is radiating RF energy. This is
accomplished in a receive-only or ‘‘sniff’’ mode (angle-on-jam [AOJ], home-on-jam
[HOJ]). This mode of operation is a serious threat because it is impossible to detect.
Jamming may be ineffective since the radar type is also concealed.
Nonthreat radars include navigation, mapping, and space surveillance systems.
Over-the-horizon radars are primarily used to detect missile launches at ranges beyond
line of sight (LOS). These radars use an RF scatter system that can detect disturbances in
the ionosphere caused by missile penetration. These types of radars are rare and nor-
mally one does not come in contact with them.
Airborne navigation radars operate in the HF band (I–K band) and provide a map of
the terrain below the aircraft. Scan patterns can be conical or sector and are used in
conjunction with inertial navigation systems (INS), global navigation satellite systems
(GNSS), or Doppler to provide extremely accurate presentations.
Side-looking radars (SLARs) are Doppler ground mapping radars that take advantage of
a zero Doppler shift to create an extremely small ‘‘artificial aperture.’’ Each successive beam
position is stored, and when put together they form a moving map of the area of interest.
Space surveillance radars are low frequency (UHF) radars with extremely long
pulse widths and peak power in excess of 3 MW. These radars can track 1 m2 targets
to ranges in excess of 2000 nm. Targets are analyzed by their roll and tumble rates.
The Space Debris and Tracking System (SPADATS) in northern Florida is an excellent
example of this type of radar.
Airport surveillance radars (ASRs) are located at most major airports. Their primary
role is to track arriving and departing flights. They are precise, short pulse (near
detection), high PRF systems with detection ranges of 50 to 90 nm. Frequencies of
operation are normally in the E and F bands.
9.3 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

The obvious problem affecting today’s aircrews is how to penetrate the enemy’s defenses
without being detected, or detected late, and at the same time be able to utilize the EM
spectrum without interference. We will briefly examine a typical air defense system. The
system that is modeled most often is one designed by Russia, known as the Soviet Block
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The IADS network is shown in Figure 9.10.
The IADS is a network of interdependent entities that can be divided into four
categories:
● Passive detection
● Active detection
● Weapons systems
● Command and control
FIGURE 9.10 ¢
Integrated Air
Defense System
The most important thing to remember is that no one piece of the defensive system is
isolated. Each entity is tied to the others by communication links, voice, or data link. This
transmission of information among units is described as ‘‘cross-tell.’’ The system’s effi-
ciency is wholly dependent on effective, clear communications throughout the network.
Initial detection of incoming forces can be accomplished with passive detection. Passive
detection is that element of the system which is tasked to intercept RF energy emanating
from an attacking force. The key to determining an enemy force’s position is aero-
triangulation (angle only ranging [AOR]), similar to automatic direction finding (ADF),
GPS, or IR ranging. The range of this equipment is variable; however, it is normally the
longest range detection system.
Active detection is that category which employs active radar emissions in order
to determine the range, azimuth, and elevation (altitude) of an incoming force.
The EWR and LRR have the longest range and are employed first to determine the
range and azimuth of the threat. This information is handed off to the HFR to
determine altitude. GCI controllers can then direct airborne interceptors to an opti-
mum location for intercept. Location information is not precise enough from EWR
and HFR to direct the intercept. Because of the lack of precision information from the
EWR and HFR, acquisition and target tracking radars for terminal defense weapons
are employed. Acquisition radars provide precise azimuth and range information to
the terminal defense radars. This handoff negates long search periods for the terminal
defense trackers.
Weapons systems attempt to destroy an incoming force by the use of
● Interceptor aircraft
● SAM batteries
● AAA batteries
The command and control system is the final component of the air defense system.
Clear, concise, and accurate communications allow the network to be extremely effi-
cient. Areas are normally broken into sectors, with each sector commander reporting to
an area commander. Without reliable communications, the network will collapse.
An additional component of these networks may be forward search radars mounted
on ships or other platforms. Two detection platforms used by the United States and
NATO are the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and JSTARS. AWACS
provides battle commanders with information on airborne traffic, while JSTARS pro-
vides commanders with ground movement information. Similar information is obtained
by the U.S. Navy via the E-2C.
Radar systems are the cornerstone of a modern IADS. Radar and IR threat systems
operate at frequencies that span most of the EM spectrum. In order to effectively employ
air power on the modern battlefield, the systems that support the IADS must be negated.
A basic knowledge of how radar and IR systems operate, their capabilities, limitations,
and available countermeasures is the key to defeating these systems.
9.4 ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Electronic countermeasures is defined as the employment of electronic devices and
techniques for the purpose of destroying or degrading the effectiveness of an enemy’s
aids to EW. This definition encompasses all actions taken to deny the enemy full use of
the EM spectrum, including jamming, deception, deployment of expendables, suppres-

sion, and destruction. ECM is now called electronic attack (EA).
There are two general ECM techniques: passive and active. Passive techniques may
be employed against all systems:
● Radar
● IR
● Electro-optical (EO)
Active techniques against radar include
● Noise jamming
● Deception jamming (repeater and transponder)
What types of countermeasures to employ, if any, and when to employ them is
contingent on many factors. Some of the factors that need to be considered are
● Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
● Antenna beamwidth
● Frequency agility
● Receiver threshold
● Sensitivity of the receiver
● Bandwidth
● Signal processing
● Gain
● Atmospheric conditions
● Day/night
● Identification friend or foe (IFF)
We will see that countermeasures are most effective when they are used at the
appropriate time. This may require some previous intelligence about the threat.
9.4.1 Passive Techniques

As the name implies, EA passive techniques require no radiation or reradiation from
your aircraft to destroy or limit the enemy’s ability to use the EM spectrum against you.
Some of the techniques that fall into this category are
● Avoidance
● Saturation
● Destruction
● Intimidation
● Emission control and reduction (EMCON)
● Radar cross section reduction
● Chaff, decoys, and flares
● Color and camouflage
● Minimize/reduce size
● Speed and maneuverability
Avoidance separates your aircraft from the threat. Terrain masking is a technique of
avoiding enemy radars by taking advantage of no-show areas due to LOS limitations.
Diversionary raids meant to occupy the threat operator’s time are also a method of avoid-
ance. Other measures include changes in heading, speed, and altitude and reversing track.
Saturation is a technique of employing a large strike force that will saturate the
enemy’s defenses to the point where all targets cannot possibly be tracked. Destruction
calls for elimination of the defense network support radars. Obviously, if the target loses
radar support, the site cannot track you. This technique is also called suppression of
enemy air defenses (SEAD) and was most notably accomplished during Desert Storm by
Tornados and EA-6Bs.
Intimidation causes the defense network to fear for its own safety if detection radars
are turned on. Imminent destruction by HARM or similar missiles can cause the
defensive network to remain silent. This technique was used in the Iraq no-fly zone
during the time between the two Gulf Wars. Emissions reduction is a technique of
reducing RF emissions in order to deny the enemy passive detection capability. This
technique may also involve using a narrower radar beam during own-ship navigation.
This technique can also be described as low probability of intercept (LPI). Radar cross
section reduction will reduce the range at which a threat radar can detect and track your
aircraft (low observable, stealth).
Expendables may also be used in your arsenal of passive techniques. These
expendables include chaff, decoys, and flares. Chaff is used to either hide your aircraft
from the threat radar or create false targets and saturate the enemy’s radar. A chaff
corridor can be dispersed ahead of the attack force which will shield the incoming strike
package from being detected by the enemy’s radar. The actual mechanics of chaff
employment are covered in a later section.
Corner reflectors are small hardware devices that have a very large radar cross
section (RCS). They appear as very large targets to a low PRF radar. In most applica-
tions they are used in overland scenarios to appear as large ground-based targets. They
may also be used at sea to mimic small ships or gunboats.
Towed decoys are used as a self-protection device for strike aircraft. The RCS of the
decoy as well as the length of the tether deceive enemy radar into believing that the
towed decoy is in reality the strike aircraft. Unlike expendable decoys, the towed decoy
remains with the strike aircraft and is only released while over a friendly airfield. The
towed decoy can consist of a radar reflector, RF decoy, or even towed flares to aid in
defense of IR threats.
Decoys may also be expended/launched from an aircraft. Most of these decoys use a
reflector to enhance their size and fool the threat radar. These decoys can be as large as a
cruise missile or very small, as is the case with the miniature air-launched decoy
(MALD). A MALD is shown in Figure 9.11.
There are two passive IR techniques that are in use: false target creation and sup-
pression of radiation. False target creation is done with flares; the flare is used to shroud
the aircraft’s IR signature. As with chaff, the mechanics of flare employment is covered
in a later section. Suppression of IR radiation can be accomplished by shielding and
cooling of jet engines. An example would be helicopter exhaust directed up into the cool
rotor downwash or by running cool bypass air in fan engines. Ground/sea installations
FIGURE 9.11 ¢
Miniature Air-
Launched Decoy
FIGURE 9.12 ¢
CF-18 With Canopy
Painted on the
Bottom of the
Aircraft
use screening agents such as smoke composed of plastic particles. Cooling fluid is used
in U.S. Navy installations around hot stacks of ships.
Color and camouflage can delay recognition or, if conditions are right, deny recog-
nition by enemy observers and EO systems. Color schemes that have worked well are
‘‘ghost’’ paint jobs on air-superiority aircraft, and black, mottled green and brown, or tan
and brown on strike aircraft. Canopies have been painted on the underside of aircraft to
confuse enemy air interceptors. This has been done on all Canadian CF-18s (Figure 9.12).
If the color is subdued or has a matted finish, reflections will be reduced. Shiny objects or
surfaces highlight an aircraft when struck by the sun, such as the rearview mirrors in the
rear cockpit of the F-4. At night, both external and internal lighting should be dimmed to
decrease detection ranges. When initiating an attack, it is always best to come from the
sun or moon and utilize available shadows.
Size, speed, and maneuverability play an important role in avoiding detection. As
was shown previously, the smaller the target, the harder it is to detect. The B-1B was
designed to ingress to targets at very low altitude and very high speed. Speed in com-
bination with its defensive electronics countermeasures suite provides the aircraft with a
degree of safety from threat detection.
In summary, we can say that passive ECMs work and are relatively cheap, with
the exception of stealth, and effective. They require a conscious effort to be effective,
and work best when used intelligently and against the threats for which they are
designed. For example, uncoordinated flare deployment tends to highlight you rather
than protect you.
9.4.2 Active Techniques

Active techniques in EA include noise and deception jamming. Radar jamming is the
intentional radiation or reradiation of RF signals to interfere with the operation of the
victim radar. Radar jamming creates confusion and denies critical information to negate
the effectiveness of enemy radar systems. Noise jamming is a series of pulses, each of
which has an amplitude unrelated to the amplitude and phase of any other pulse. In
deception jamming, the system intercepts and returns target-like pulses. One or more
characteristics of the radiated signals are different from the signals scattered by the
target. With a repeater or transponder, the system receives the radar pulse of energy that
strikes the aircraft, amplifies it, modulates it, delays it or augments it, and retransmits it
back to the radar.
To be effective, radar jamming must have detailed information about the threat
radar. The electronic support portion of EC is responsible for gathering this detailed
data. This information is then programmed into onboard EC systems. There are cur-
rently three employment options for noise and deception jamming techniques:
● Stand-off jamming (SOJ)
● Escort jamming
● Self-protection jamming
To counter EW radar, GCI, and acquisition radars, noise and deception jamming
techniques are employed by stand-off jammers. SOJ aircraft deny the enemy informa-
tion on the size of the attack package, ingress and egress routes, and critical acquisition
information. SOJ aircraft can employ noise techniques to display strobing on the victim
radar or generate false targets to create confusion.
Escort jamming requires the jamming aircraft become an integral part of the strike
package. EA-6B Prowlers are currently being utilized by all services in the United States;
however, they will soon be replaced by the EA-18G Growler. Using noise (ALQ-99)
jamming, the escort jammer attempts to deny range and azimuth information by injecting
high-power signals in the main radar beam and sidelobes.
Self-protection jamming systems use deception jamming techniques for a variety
of reasons. The systems are small—noise requires power, and less power requires less
weight—and can be called upon to jam multiple threats.
9.5 NOISE JAMMING

Noise jamming is produced by modulating an RF carrier wave with noise, or random
amplitude changes, and transmitting that wave at the victim radar’s frequency. It relies
on high power levels to saturate the radar receiver and deny range and occasionally
azimuth and elevation information. The effectiveness of a noise jammer is dependent on
the jamming-to-signal (J:S) ratio, power density, quality of the noise signal, and polar-
ization of the transmitted signal. In order to achieve a high J:S ratio, noise jammers
usually generate high-power signals. The signals are introduced into the main beam to
deny range information or into the sidelobes to deny angle information.
When detecting a target with a radar, a portion of the energy radiated through your
antenna is incident upon the target. A portion of that energy is reflected back to your
antenna and a portion of that energy is intercepted by your antenna. If the SNR is greater
than the prescribed value (something slightly higher than one to reduce false alarms) a
target is detected and displayed to the aircrew. Now imagine that same target radiating
noise energy in your direction. If his noise jammer put out the same amount of power as
your radar (and assume similar gains), the received jammer power would be much
higher than the signal of the reflected return (because the jamming signal does not have
to make the round-trip). In order for you to see the target, the reflected radar return must
be higher than the jamming signal. This is the J:S ratio, provided mathematically below
(for the jammer as the target).
PR GR2 sT l2
PRT ¼
ð4pÞ3 R4
or
J PJ GJ BR 4pR2
¼ (9.1)
S PR GR BJ sT
where
PRT ¼ received signal power
P ¼ power
G ¼ antenna gain
B ¼ bandwidth
R ¼ range
s ¼ radar cross section (at the wavelength of the radar)
l ¼ wavelength
J/S ¼ jammer-to-signal ratio
Subscripts:
R ¼ receiver
T ¼ target
J ¼ jammer
Equation (9.1) can be simplified to
J PJ GJ 4pR2
¼ (9.2)
S PT GT s
where
J/S ¼ jamming-to-signal ratio
PJ ¼ jamming power transmitted
GJ ¼ jamming antenna gain
PT ¼ peak power transmitted by the radar
GT ¼ radar antenna gain
R ¼ range from the jammer to the radar
s ¼ aircraft RCS
From this equation it is readily apparent that if a noise jammer is to be effective we
should employ high power and gain. It also shows us that the jammer will not be
effective at short ranges unless the power is increased proportionately. These relation-
ships are shown in Figures 9.13 and 9.14.
A radar noise jamming system is designed to generate a disturbance in a radar
receiver to delay or deny target acquisition. Since thermal noise is always present in the
receiver, noise jamming attempts to mask the presence of targets by substantially adding
to the noise level.
If the noise jamming signal is centered on the frequency and bandwidth of the
victim radar, the jamming signal has a high power density. This can only be accom-
plished with some intelligence. If the generated jamming signal has to cover a wide
bandwidth or frequency range, the power density at any one frequency is reduced. Radar
systems that use frequency agility or employ a wide bandwidth can reduce or negate the
effectiveness of the noise jammer.
FIGURE 9.13 ¢
J:S Ratio Greater
Strength
Signal
Target Return Than One
Frequency
Jamming Pulse
Strength
Signal
Target Return
Frequency
J/S > 1
FIGURE 9.14 ¢
Jamming Pulse J:S Ratio Less Than
One
Strength
Signal
Signal
2500 3000 3500 Frequency

J/S < 1 Therefore Burnthrough Occurs
FIGURE 9.15 ¢ Sweep

Swept Spot
Jamming
500 MHz Victims 600 MHz
The quality of the jamming signal has an impact on effectiveness. The jamming
signal must exactly match the victim radar’s thermal noise profile in order to be effec-
tive As previously mentioned in chapter 8, polarization mismatches will have a profound
impact on effective radiated power (ERP). A 100% loss will occur if the jamming radar
is orthogonal to the victim radar.
There are many variations on the basic noise jammer. Some of them include:
● Spot or broad-band noise
● Barrage noise (low average power, continuous)
● Swept spot noise (high peak power, intermittent)
● Stepped pulse frequency modulation
● Polarization modulation (effective against monopulse radars)
● Multiple noise/target sources (for centroid tracking)
● Cover pulse
● Sidelobe jamming
Barrage jamming is a type of noise jamming used to cover a large bandwidth or
range of frequencies. The power density will be lower than a spot noise jammer whose
bandwidth is narrow. This type of jamming is effective against frequency agility or
multiple-beam radars; barrage jamming was used extensively in World War II.
The obvious advantage of spot jammers (centering the jamming on one or a series of
closely spaced frequencies) is the high power density that can be accomplished over a
narrow bandwidth. But what happens when the victim radar shuts down or changes
frequencies? The jammer then becomes a beacon highlighting itself to the rest of the
world. An operator or a computer must constantly monitor and tune the jamming signal
to the target radar’s frequency. The complexity of this task increases when attempting to
jam frequency agile radars, which can change frequencies with every pulse.
When high power is required over a large bandwidth, one solution is to take spot
jamming and sweep it across a wide frequency range. A rapid sweep can approximate
barrage jamming at a higher power density by using a high sweep rate. Victim radars can
experience ringing with fast swept spot jamming. Figure 9.15 shows the sequence of
swept spot jamming.
Cover pulse jamming is a modification of swept spot jamming. A repeater jammer
acts as a transponder. It receives several pulses and determines the PRF. Using an
oscillator which predicts the next arrival time, it responds with an amplified return, thus
giving erroneous range information. The cover pulse is shown in Figure 9.16.
FIGURE 9.16 ¢
Noise Cover Pulse
Cover Pulse
2500 3000 3500
Range Gate FIGURE 9.17 ¢

Range Gate Pull-Off
Cover Pulse
Amplitude
AGC Clutter Level

Target Return
Clutter
or Noise
Range or Time Delay
Jamming Pulse FIGURE 9.18 ¢
Velocity Gate
AGC Level Pull-Off
Amplitude
Target Return
Frequency
Clutter Filter
Tracking Gate with

Acceleration Stops
The range gate pull-off (RGPO) utilizes the cover pulse. The deception jammer
transmits a cover pulse that is much stronger than the target return. The cover pulse
raises the automatic gain inside the range gate and the range gate tracking loop initiates
tracking on the cover pulse. The jammer then increases the time delay, driving the range
gate off of the true target. This sequence is shown in Figure 9.17.
Against CW and pulse Doppler radars, a type of cover pulse jamming is used to
initiate velocity gate pull-off (VGPO). The cover pulse is a strong signal with the same
Doppler shift as the aircraft return. As with the RGPO, this false return steals the velo-
city gate and drives it off of the true target. This sequence can be seen in Figure 9.18.
Modulated jamming alters the noise jamming signal at a frequency that is related to
the scan rate of the radar. The frequency of the sine wave is slightly higher than the scan
rate. This results in constantly varying phase differences between the jammer and the
radar. A strong signal to the radar will occur wherever the phases reinforce each other,
causing the radar to track those false returns; the scan rate must be known. Modulated
jamming against a conical scan radar is depicted in Figure 9.19.
FIGURE 9.19 ¢
Jammer Output
Conical Scan
Modulated Jamming
In “Phase” Out of “Phase”
Radar Echoes
FIGURE 9.20 ¢
TWS Modulated +20 +20 +20
Noise Jamming +10 +10 +10
0 0 0
–10 –10 –10
–20 –20 –20
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15
No Jamming Noise Jamming Modulated Noise
Against a TWS radar, a rectangular waveform is used to modulate the noise signal.
The PRF of the modulation is set to some harmonic of the TWS rate. In the example
shown in Figure 9.20, a modulating signal frequency is four times the scan rate of the
radar, resulting in four jamming strobes. If the jamming is slightly out of phase with the
scan rate, the jamming strobes will roll across the screen.
9.6 DECEPTION JAMMING

Deception jamming systems are designed to inject false information into a victim radar.
This false information can be range, range rate, azimuth, or elevation. To be effective, a
deception jammer receives the victim radar signal, modifies the signal, and retransmits
this altered signal back to the victim. Unlike the noise jammer, deception jammers need
precise intelligence on the victim radar signal characteristics.
The following are two basic methods of deception jamming:
● False target generation (which causes confusion)
● Track breaker (which are deception techniques used to induce errors in range, angle,
elevation, and velocity)
Deception jamming is accomplished by making modifications to the pulses. A
change in the time of arrival will result in a deceptive range. A change in the amplitude
of the pulse will result in angle deception. A change in the frequency of the pulse will
result in erroneous velocity/range rate. A change in polarization or sending multiple
pulses from multiple sources will result in angular errors.
False target generators are effective against search and track and GCI radars. There
are two objectives with the employment of false target generators: create an inability to
ascertain the real target from the false target, and make the victim believe that perhaps a
mass attack is occurring in a particular sector. This is done by generating constant range
targets over a sector using a straight-through repeater or by generating many targets over
an azimuth by using a transponder.
Track breakers can be used to break the lock of the victim radar in range, angle, or
range rate. Range deception is accomplished by covering the skin paint with a jamming
pulse; the automatic gain control decreases the sensitivity of the radar. The jammer then
slowly increases or decreases the time delay to walk off in range. This is the previously
described RGPO.
Angle deception works against sequential lobing radars. The jammer makes use of
several antenna beams in conical scan tracking radars. The jammer amplifies weaker
pulses more than stronger pulses which confuses the tracker nulling into believing a
false position.
9.6.1 Special Types of Deception Jammers

Range deception jammers are effective against high PRF (HPRF) and low PRF (LPRF)
radars. Against HPRF radars, the following techniques can be employed:
● Multiple frequency repeater
● Narrowband repeater noise
● Pseudorandom noise
● Pulse repeater
● Repeater swept amplitude modulation
Against LPRF radars, the following techniques can be employed:
● Range gate stealer (range gate pull-off)
● Velocity gate pull-off
● Chirp gate stealer
Range deception jamming against HPRF radars that employ frequency modulation
ranging (FMR) methods is accomplished by transmitting a number of evenly spaced fre-
quency components. The spacing of these components determines the range error, which is
usually kept small in order to generate a number of false targets around the true target.
The multiple frequency repeater (MFR) generates false ranges in the radar by
transmitting a fixed set of frequency components, usually centered about the true target
value. The false ranges are not only designed to confuse the operator, but the short
ranges may also raise automatic thresholds, thus denying further observations.
The narrowband repeater noise jammer (NBRN) is designed to create a noiselike
spectrum about the target return, denying the radar the capability to detect in Doppler.
Since the noise is very narrow, the jamming detection circuits may also be unable to
detect the target, thus denying all tracking capability.
The pseudorandom noise jammer (PRN) is designed to create a noise-like spectrum

about the target return. The difference between an NBRN and PRN is the method of
generation and the resulting spectrum. The NBRN spectrum is created by a number of
closely spaced frequency components whose pattern varies with time. The PRN spec-
trum is generated rapidly enough that it does not appear to change from one radar look to
another.
The pulse repeater (PR) generates a set of closely spaced frequency components in
the same way as the MFR. The difference is that the minimum MFR spacing is set to the
range error that the jammer will create. The PR spacing can be varied over a much wider
range; the MFR can be thought of as a specific type of PR.
The repeater swept amplitude modulation (RSAM) jammer is designed to be an
angle deception device, but the on/off switching creates closely spaced frequency
components. When RSAM is swept across lobing frequencies that match the false range
values, false observations are created. While the MFR frequencies are fixed, the RSAM
frequencies are constantly changing.
The chirp gate stealer (CGS) is designed to break the track against an LPRF single-
target track mode that employs pulse compression. The jammer transmits a pulse that
has been shifted in frequency. When this pulse is compressed in the radar, the shift in
frequency corresponds to a shift in range. As the frequency shift increases, the range
increases, and the result is the same as for the range gate stealer previously discussed.
The random Doppler (RD) jammer is designed to create many false Doppler targets.
The jammer transmits a randomly varying frequency component around the true target.
Each target will thus appear at about the same range, but each will have a different range
rate. This is designed to confuse the signal processing to an extent where true range rate
cannot be determined (Figure 9.21).
Angle deception jamming is designed to prevent the radar from tracking the target
in single target track mode. The jamming can disrupt the tracking by either corrupting
the signal processing loop or by taking advantage of the hardware limitations of the
antenna. In the first case, the jammer must be designed for the specific tracking method
used by the radar.
The RSAM jammer is designed to break the angle tracking of a radar that uses
iterative lobing. It is a pulse repeater which varies the on/off frequency across the lobing
frequencies of the radar in an attempt to induce false drive signals in the angle tracker.
The amplitude modulation (Figure 9.22) is varied from the lowest expected value to the
highest expected value every jammer cycle.
Cross-polarization (X-POLE) (Figure 9.23) jamming is designed to break the track
against single target track modes. The jammer transmits a signal that is about 90 out of
polarity with the transmitted signal. This results in the radar attempting to track in an
antenna cross-polarized lobe, which does not have the same angular characteristics as
FIGURE 9.21 ¢ Doppler

Doppler Noise Doppler Noise
Radar Jammer
Jammer
Threat Scan Rate FIGURE 9.22 ¢

Angle Deception
Frequency
Nutation or
Scan
Frequency
Range
Time
FIGURE 9.23 ¢
+ 25–35 Db Cross-Polarization
Jamming
– +
– +
Tracking Point Tracking Point
and Beams and Beams

Design Polarization Cross Polarization
FIGURE 9.24 ¢
Cross-Eye Jammer
180° Phase
Shifter
R T Repeater R T
Repeater
Antenna Antenna
Pair 1 Pair 2
the normal main lobe. The cross-polarized waveform is usually superimposed on

another type of jammer.
Cross-eye (X-EYE) (Figure 9.24) jammers are designed to break the angle track
against radars that utilize a phase-dependent monopulse tracking method. The jammer
uses two isolated receive/transmit antenna pairs that retransmit the radar signal 180 out
of phase with respect to each other. This results in a phase-distorted wave front arriving
at the radar antenna, which causes an angular drive off.
9.7 CHAFF EMPLOYMENT

Chaff was first used by British bombers in World War II. It worked so well that it was
used for the duration of the war. Today, it is still the most widely used EA expendable.
The most important chaff characteristics are RCS, frequency coverage, bloom rate,
Doppler content, polarization, and persistence. The RCS of a chaff bundle is dependent
on the frequency of the victim radar and the dispensing aircraft’s aspect angle. Chaff
RCS is greatest when the chaff bundle and the dispensing aircraft are abeam of the threat
radar and smallest when they are nose- or tail-on. The optimum size of the chaff is one-
half the wavelength of the victim radar’s RF. Since a single size is restricted in effec-
tiveness to a narrow range of frequencies, different lengths are normally packaged
together. A typical chaff cartridge (RR-180) is shown in Figure 9.25.
Within the cartridge there are a number of different length dipoles of varying
number. The length and number of dipoles is wholly dependent on the expected threat.
A typical grouping for the RR-180 chaff dispenser is shown in Table 9.1. Notice that the
frequency coverage for this grouping covers the S through Ku bands or the acquisition
through fire control radars. In order for the chaff to be effective, there will have to be
some intelligence of the known threat so the cartridges can be constructed properly.
FIGURE 9.25 ¢ Dual Squib Assembly

RR-180 Chaff
Seal Individual Squib (2) Compression Member
Cartridge
Liner
End Plug (2)
Pistons (2)
Dipoles cut to several lengths
to provide broad frequency coverage
Note: Length = 21.0 cm
TABLE 9.1 ¢ RR-180 Frequency Distribution
Cut Center Cut No. of Dipoles Total No.

Number Fre. (GHz) Length Per Cut of Dipoles
1 2.84 2.0000 (5.10 cm) 360,000 360,000
2,6 9.15 .6200 (1.57 cm) 360,000 720,000
3,7 8.10 .7000 (1.78 cm) 360,000 720,000
4 5.15 1.1000 (2.80 cm) 360,000 360,000
5 14.92 .3800 (.96 cm) 360,000 360,000
8 6.44 .8800 (2.24 cm) 360,000 360,000
2,880,000
9.8 Flare Employment 743
The ability of the chaff to effectively defeat a target tracking radar is directly related
to the chaff dispense and blooming rate, which determines the chaff RCS. The chaff
RCS needs to be larger than the aircraft’s RCS and it needs to bloom within the radar
field of view (FOV) or resolution cell. Chaff release with a nonmaneuvering dispensing
aircraft in low turbulence will produce a small chaff cloud, whereas release in turbulence
or during maneuvers will produce a large chaff cloud. The Doppler content of the chaff
will reside at the main lobe clutter (MLC) for a beam engagement and move toward the
target velocity as the aspect moves toward nose-on. It will never equal the target velo-
city, as the chaff speed is reduced at bloom. Polarity plays an important role based on the
polarity of the victim radar.
Chaff may be employed against most tracking radars. Chaff employed against a
TWS radar is designed to put multiple targets, with an RCS greater than the aircraft, in
the resolution cell of the horizontal and vertical beams. Since the tracking loop tracks
the strongest return, TWS will switch. Against a conical scan radar, chaff puts multiple,
large RCS targets within the separate scans of the radar. These returns generate error
signals in the tracking loop and drive the radar off. Like the conical scan, chaff against a
monopulse radar is designed to put multiple targets in at least two of the tracking beams,
generating azimuth and elevation errors, thus driving the track signal off of the target.
9.8 FLARE EMPLOYMENT

Self-protection flares were developed to counter threat systems operating in the IR
spectrum. Chaff and flare dispensers such as the ALE-40, ALE-45, and the ALE-47 are
designed to allow the pilot to dispense flare cartridges when engaged by an IR threat.
The most important characteristics of the flare’s ability to decoy a threat are IR fre-
quency matching, flare rise time, and flare burn time.
The MJU-7 flare, for example, is used in both the ALE-40 and ALE-47. The flare
grain is composed of magnesium and tetrafluoroethylene, which burns at 2000 to
2200 K. As the flare burns, it emits IR energy at different wavelengths from the lumi-
nous zone. It also produces smoke, which can highlight an aircraft. The wavelength
coverage and associated energy of the MJU-7 is shown in Figure 9.26. Its coverage is
good in the 1 to 2.5 mm range, where most older threats reside. The 2.5 mm range is
100 FIGURE 9.26 ¢

MJU-7 Frequency
80 Coverage
Relative Energy
60
40
20
0
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Wavelength (Microns)
FIGURE 9.27 ¢ 1.0

MJU-7 Burn Times
.8
Ground Level Static
Relative Intensity
.6
Flight at 40,000 ft msl
.4
.2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
.4 2.5
Time (Sec)
found aft of the aircraft and is comprised of hot exhaust gases. Older IR missiles did not
have cooled seeker heads and therefore were only good for aft engagements. The
response in the 3 to 5 mm region, where newer threats reside, is reduced; newer threats
require that multiple flares be dispensed in order to defeat them.
A flare must reach peak intensity shortly after ejection or it will not be effective.
The MJU-7 shows a rise time of 0.4 sec in the static case. In order to counter a short
missile engagement or missiles with a narrow FOV, the rise must be as short as possible.
As altitude increases, the rise time also increases (Figure 9.27). At 40,000 ft the MJU-7
reaches peak intensity at 2.5 sec. The flare takes longer to attain peak intensity at alti-
tude; however, it burns longer (5 sec at sea level/10 sec at 40,000 ft). A longer burn time
increases the probability of success with a single flare, but once again it must be in the
missile’s FOV.
The flare must ignite within the missile’s FOV or the decoy will not work. Newer
missiles have incorporated countermeasures that make it more difficult to decoy the threat.
Since the missile is passive, most aircraft need to detect a launch visually in order to employ
flares. Missile attack warning systems, or Missile approach warning systems (MAWS), that
can detect missiles via IR, ultraviolet (UV), or millimetric wave (MMW) radar have been
deployed in some aircraft. However, many suffer from a high false alarm rate.
9.8.1 Infrared Protective Measures

There are two important characteristics of IR missiles that influence the effectiveness of
self-protection flares. The first is the ability of the missile to discriminate between the
aircraft IR signature and background clutter. The second is the flare rejection capability
built into the missile seeker and missile guidance section. The detector influences the
ability of the missile to discriminate the target IR from background IR. Older missiles
with uncooled seekers had a peak sensitivity of about 2 mm and were therefore limited to
stern shots. By cooling the detectors with an inert gas such as argon, missiles can track
longer wavelength radiation.
Flare rejection capability, or IRCCM, allows the newer IR missiles to track the
aircraft while rejecting multiple flares. Flare rejection is based on two computer func-
tions: ‘‘switch’’ and ‘‘response.’’ Both functions must operate successfully to reject flares.
An IR missile using a rise time switch monitors the IR energy level of a target.
A sharp rise in received energy within a specified period of time indicates a flare.
The flare response is turned off when energy returns to its original levels. This switch
can be decoyed with multiple flares using slow rise times, but flares currently in use
have rapid rise times.
Infrared missiles using a two-color switch sample IR returns in two different
wavelength bands. A sudden increase in the lower bandwidth without a comparable rise
in the second bandwidth triggers a flare response. Advanced missiles may employ two
separate detectors to monitor the bands; target tracking may be accomplished by either
detector.
A kinematic switch takes advantage of the fact that flares separate very quickly
from the dispensing aircraft due to drag. In a beam engagement, the seeker transfers to
the flare and sees a dramatic change in LOS and triggers a flare response. In a head or
tail engagement, the LOS is not as dramatic and will probably not trigger a response.
Current flares can defeat this switch in a beam engagement by dispensing multiple flares
at short intervals.
The seeker’s response to a switch is to reject the flare or limit its effect on target
track. As long as the flare remains in the seeker FOV, the missile will operate in a
degraded mode. The following four responses are possible to a switch:
● Simple memory
● Seeker push-ahead
● Seeker push-pull
● Sector attenuation
A simple memory response is merely a coast mode. The seeker assumes that the
flare will exit to the rear and maintains its motion relative to the target. The missile will
continue to reject track data until the switch times out. If time out occurs before the flare
leaves the FOV, the missile will track the flare.
The seeker push-ahead response causes the seeker gimbals to drive the seeker for-
ward in the direction of target movement. This causes the flare to leave the FOV more
rapidly. The faster the bias, the faster the flare will depart the FOV.
The seeker push-pull causes the gimbals to push the seeker away from the higher
IR source. When the lower energy from the target is detected, it pulls the seeker to that
source. The sector attenuation response is accomplished by placing an attenuation filter
across part of the seeker.
9.9 ELECTRONIC PROTECTION MEASURES

The continuing battle for unrestricted use of the EM spectrum has resulted in more than
150 radar EP techniques. The most common techniques are
● Radar receiver protection
● Jamming avoidance
● Jamming signal exploitation
● Overpowering the jamming signal
● Angle discrimination
● Doppler discrimination
● Time discrimination
Radar receiver protection is meant to limit the amount of energy entering the
receiver. Sensitivity time control (STC) is used to counter close-in chaff or clutter.
Receiver gain is normal for long range and reduced for close-in targets. Automatic gain
control (AGC) is used to counter chaff, clutter, and most types of transmitted jamming.
The AGC senses the signal output of the receiver and creates a back-bias to maintain a
constant output level (fast AGC, instantaneous AGC). Automatic noise leveling (ANL)
counters noise jamming and modulated or unmodulated constant wave jamming by
sampling receiver noise at the end of each PRF and sets the gain accordingly for the next
pulse interval.
Jammer avoidance can be accomplished in several ways. Noise jammers can be
rendered ineffective by the use of frequency agility or frequency diversity which will
cause a noise jammer to sweep across a greater bandwidth, reducing its power density.
Jammers can be countered by changing the polarity or switching to circular polarization.
As discussed earlier in chapter 8, the radar has the ability to track via the leading or
trailing edge of the pulse. By varying this method, manipulated pulses can be detected
and discarded. The radar may also use coherent detection. The radar internally generates
the signal that is sent and compares the returns to best match the internally generated
attributes.
The jammer itself can be exploited by a number of techniques. Home-on-jam (HOJ)
and angle-on-jam (AOJ) are two methods employed against airborne interceptor noise
jammers. A noise jammer will display a strobe on the radar display at the azimuth of the
jammer; range will be unknown. In the simplest case, the strobe is held at a constant
azimuth which results in your radar rolling out in trail with the AI. The rollout distance
is dependent on the azimuth where the strobe is held. This concept is illustrated in
Figure 9.28.
The initial contact on the target (blue airplane, black strobe on radar display) is at
50 right and you turn to the right to place the target at 45 right (red strobe on radar

display). You maintain the strobe at 45 right and you will eventually roll out in trail and
offset 45 . Radar and some missiles have AOJ and HOJ capability and follow this same
scenario.
The radar may also employ aural recognition to recognize threat signals. Most
radars will incorporate a ‘‘sniff’’ mode, which is simply an idle mode where the radar
FIGURE 9.28 ¢ Radar 1

HOJ Operational Display
Scenario
5
Range
−60° Azimuth +60°

1
ceases to radiate and only listens for signals. A jammer that continues to radiate while
the radar is in ‘‘sniff’’ mode will highlight itself. As a last resort, the radar operator may
resort to a manual gain selection on the radar, controlling the amount of energy seen by
the receiver.
As seen earlier in the discussion of noise jammers, the target will eventually burn
through as the target return (SNR) exceeds that of the jammer (J:S ratio). Employment
of a narrowband long pulse may increase the burn-through range.
The radar may also discriminate the attributes of waveform in pulse, angles, or
Doppler. A fast time constant (FTC) used in radars is a circuit with a short time constant
used to emphasize signals of short duration to produce discrimination against extended
clutter, long-pulse jamming, or noise. Based on time, the radar receiver will only allow
pulses equal to its own pulse width to pass and be displayed as targets. A pulse width
discriminator (PWD) is similar to an FTC in that it is used to discriminate against
received pulses that do not have the same duration as the radar transmitted pulse.
A PWD is used in eliminating the effects of pulse-type interference when the inter-
ference pulses are not the same length as the real radar pulse. Since the circuit generates
a blanking gate that shuts off the receiver when a pulse of improper length is sensed, a
loss of valid target data can result. It offers good discrimination against long-pulse
jamming and jamming signals employing low-frequency noise modulation. It offers
little protection against short pulses and high-frequency noise modulation. A clutter
elimination (CE) circuit discriminates against any target echo that exceeds three times
the transmitted pulse width. It is normally employed on the lower beams of a high-
frequency radar; this allows targets above a preset signal strength to be presented, while
the clutter (land) is eliminated.
Sidelobe blanking (SLB), sidelobe cancellation (SLC), and sidelobe suppression
(SLS) are three EPMs used to block angular interference. SLB is a device that employs
an auxiliary wide angle antenna and receiver to sense whether a received pulse origi-
nates in the sidelobe region of the main antenna and to gate it from the output signal if it
does. The technique uses an omnidirectional antenna and compares relative signal
strength between the omnidirectional antenna and the radar antenna. The omni-channel
(plus receiver) has slightly more gain than the sidelobes of the radar, but less gain than
the main lobe of the radar. Any signal that is greater in the omni-channel must have been
received by a sidelobe and is blanked. SLC is a device that employs one or more aux-
iliary antennas and receivers to allow linear subtraction of interfering signals from the
desired output if they are sensed to originate in the sidelobe of the radar. This technique
employs the same configuration as the SLB, except that gain matching and cancellation
takes place; extraneous signals entering the sidelobes are cancelled, while the targets
remain. SLS is the suppression of that portion of the beam from a radar antenna other
than the main lobe.
Angle discrimination may also be accomplished by varying the antenna position or
scan rate. Antenna manual positioning allows the operator to slew the antenna to the
desired angle of interest. Antenna jog allows the antenna to deviate from the normal
sector scan, much like was seen in the discussion of situational awareness mode in
chapter 8. Antenna slow scan varies the scan rate of the radar, causing the jammer to
radiate at the wrong time.
Doppler discrimination can be accomplished by varying the PRF, either jitter or
stagger. It can also be accomplished by pulse-to-pulse or beam-to-beam correlation.
9.10 ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEMS

TEST AND EVALUATION
The USAF has put together an acceptable process for EW test and evaluation. It is
outlined in AFMAN 99-112, ‘‘Electronic Warfare Test and Evaluation Process:
Direction and Methodology for EW Testing,’’ March 27, 1995. This process is similar
to all avionics systems testing, however, it stresses the need to predict, test, and com-
pare as opposed to fly-fix-fly. This is critical since many of the required tests are
difficult to fly and can be extremely costly. The process mandated by the USAF
requires the military as well as contractors to comply. The initial planning must be
coordinated with the EW Single-Face-to-Customer Office located at Eglin Air Force
Base in Florida.
Rigorous ground testing is required in any EW test program. The use of modeling
and simulation is a requirement in USAF testing. Simulations are used to predict ground
and flight test results; ground tests can be used to validate simulation results and provide
a high confidence level for flight test results. By validating ground test results at key
points within an operating envelope, flight testing will not have to be done throughout
the complete envelope.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has also emphasized commonality of test
resources to reduce cost and correlate system results, including
● Modeling and simulation
● Measurement facilities
● System integration labs
● Hardware in the loop
● Simulations
● Installed system test facilities
● Open air ranges
Public law requires that testing and evaluation be performed at each of these facil-
ities for first-level EW systems. The names and locations of these facilities can be found
in the previously referenced AFMAN 99-112.
When considering the evaluation of an EW system, it is important for the evaluator
to develop a systems approach to testing. All of the systems within the EW suite will be
interconnected and any changes in one will very likely impact others. Some of the
systems that should be considered in the EW evaluation are
● Fire control radar
● Radar warning receiver
● Missile approach warning system
● IR/radar jammer
● Chaff/flare/decoy dispenser
● Towed decoys
● Weapons (antiradiation missile, precision guided munitions)
The basic architecture of the EW system should include

● Integration of all available EW systems on a single dedicated avionics bus
● Minimize electromagnetic interference (EMI) and minimize electromagnetic com-
patibility (EMC)
● Reduce pilot workload
● Minimize reaction time
● Automate the deployment of decoys
● Automate the selection of the jamming program
Almost all fighter, bomber, and attack helicopters with a self-protection system
employ a dedicated 1553 data bus for the EW system. Newer-generation aircraft use the
Ethernet or fiber-channel for bulk data transfer and the 1553 for command and control.
I recommend that the reader revisit section 4.16 of this text for an example of the pro-
blems that may be encountered when trying to integrate an EW suite and the concerns
that arise with EMI and EMC. Human factors issues are important, especially when
dealing with a single-pilot cockpit. You can imagine the workload of integrating the
ALQ-99 from a four-man cockpit to a one-pilot cockpit. The only way that this switch
could be feasible is if the defensive/attack system is automated to the maximum extent
possible, like in the Joint Strike Fighter. The same problems that have been discussed
earlier are relevant here as well. What is the possibility of the system triggering a false
alarm? What is the possibility of a threat not being detected? What is the possibility of a
threat being detected and the wrong type of jamming being employed? What indications
are given to the aircrew for situational awareness? Remember that automation is a good
thing except when the pilot is out of the loop, does not understand what the automation is
doing, or is not apprised when something is wrong. We certainly do not want to salvo
chaff and flares over a threat area when no threat is looking at us, for it soon will be.
When evaluating each of the EW systems/functions, we must look not only for the
level of protection that the system offers, but also for any degradation of capabilities
caused by the installation of such systems. If we add EP to the radar, we would like to
know (a) Does it work? and (b) How does it adversely affect the basic performance of
the radar? In the previous chapter, radar capabilities and performance requirements were
covered. These included
● Detection range (look-up/look-down)
● Target angle/angular accuracy (azimuth/elevation)
● Target range/range accuracy
● Target Doppler (target detection, tracking, and identification)
● Range, angle, and Doppler resolution
● False alarm rate
● Self-test and fault reporting (built-in test [BIT])
● Controls and displays
● Response to crew commands
For each of these functions we determined the basic performance and then could
predict with some certainty how the radar would perform in operational scenarios. With the
FIGURE 9.29 ¢
ULQ-21
Countermeasures
Set
FIGURE 9.30 ¢
ALQ-167
Countermeasures
Set (Inboard)
addition of EP, these tests must be revisited, much like regression testing which was
described earlier.
The targets for these tests will be equipped with an ECM threat simulation pod.
Most of these pods are built upon one of two basic systems: the AN/DLQ-3C or the
AN/ULQ-21(V), commonly known as DLQ-3 and ULQ-21. These systems are capable of
generating noise, deception (repeater), transponder, and combination ECM techniques.
The ULQ-21 system is shown in Figure 9.29.
These two basic systems are normally built into a pod that is capable of being
carried on an aircraft. These systems are cockpit controlled and contain recorders and a
time code to retrieve data postflight. The U.S. Navy uses an AN/ALQ-167(V) which
houses both the DLQ-3 and ULQ-21. The ALQ-167 mounted on a U.S. Navy aircraft is
shown in Figure 9.30. All of the radar maximum range and accuracy testing described in
chapter 8 will be repeated for radar EP where all targets carry some form of counter-
measures set. The tests measure the effectiveness of the radar EP system as well as the
FIGURE 9.31 ¢
Typical RWR Display
degradation of the radar performance in the presence of jamming. Range and accuracy
tests will be performed against each type of jamming being countered by the radar EP.
A radar warning receiver (RWR) is designed to alert the aircrew of an impending
radar threat (enemy fighter, missile) in a timely, clear, and unambiguous manner. Most
RWR systems will provide the aircrew with
● Threat azimuth
● Threat range
● Threat identification
● Threat prioritization
● Missile launch warning
In some of the documentation (especially the older documentation), RWR systems

are identified as radar homing and warning (RHAW) systems; aircrew call them RHAW
gear. The RWR is a passive detection system that provides radar warning and display.
The system monitors the EM spectrum over the limits of its receivers and identifies
emissions by matching received characteristics to known threat signature characteristics
stored in its internal memory/library:
● Radio frequency
● PRF/PRI
● PW
● Scan rate
Some systems can estimate threat range by direction finding (DF) and triangulation, or
by means of lethal signal strength curves. Threats are automatically prioritized (depending
on flight altitude and on an aircrew-selected priority table). These threats are displayed to
the aircrew via numbers and symbols on a GCI-type display (own aircraft is at the center
of the display. Figure 9.31 shows a typical display implementation of RWR information.
The following paragraph describes a generic approach to an RWR display as pre-

sented in Figure 9.31. The symbology and layout of the screen is typical, but not
representative of any specific system.
The ‘‘S’’ in the figure is a search radar and is about 5 right of the nose just beyond
the second range ring. The ‘‘6’’ is an SA-6 15 right of the nose on the second range ring
and is the highest priority threat based on the diamond and hemisphere graphics. The
‘‘15’’ is an F-15 at 150 left at the second range ring. The range rings can be either true
target range or threat lethality based on the system’s capabilities. If it is true target range,
each range ring will be equivalent to some range. If the system displays threat lethality,
the inner ring is the most lethal, whereas the outer ring is the least lethal. If this is the
case for Figure 9.31, and we continue on our same heading, the ‘‘6’’ will move toward
the innermost (most lethal) ring. As it crosses the inner ring (meaning you are surely
within launch parameters) it starts flashing and a loud launch audio is heard from the
integrated communications system (ICS) as the SA-6 launches the missile. The ‘‘S’’ will
also move toward the center of the display, assuming the same heading is maintained.
Assuming that the F-15 is your wingman, it will not move because your wingman should
be maintaining a tactical trail formation.
When evaluating the RWR, there are a number of objectives to be accomplished.
The system must be able to detect the threat at some minimum range. It should be able to
determine the mode or function of the threat (search, acquisition, target tracking, fire
control). It should provide a direction of arrival (DOA) of the threat (bearing accuracy)
and range to the threat or threat lethality. It should be able to resolve ambiguities
between threats possessing similar attributes. False alarms should not exceed some
desired number and the information should be presented in an unambiguous, concise,
and timely fashion. Audio warnings should be clear and easily understood.
When conducting any EW testing it is a good thing to first check on the capabilities
of the EW ground test facility. The parameters of the emitters that you are flying against
must match the parameters in the RWR library. You will have no control over these
parameters, as they are encoded by either the vendor or the military command, but they
must match. If not, the display will only provide you with a ‘‘U’’ (unknown) and perhaps
the frequency band that the threat resides in.
In addition to matching library parameters, the evaluator will use this information to
determine the geometries of the setup as well as the maximum range of detection
expected. A typical set of parameters provided by the ground facility is shown in
Table 9.2.
The first column of the table contains the name of the emitter. If the name of the
emitter has two words with the first word starting with a ‘‘B’’ then it emulates a known
NATO threat. The second word’s first letter indicates which band the threat resides in.
The second column also gives the threat’s operating band, but it is given with the old
radar designation series. The first column uses the standard NATO, or new, designation
series. For example, Brand Iron is in the ‘‘I’’ band when discussing standard NATO
frequency designations or ‘‘X’’ band when using the old radar frequency designations.
The third column provides the emitter’s center frequency, and the fourth column indi-
cates the pulse width. The table is rounded out with the threat antenna’s polarity,
beamwidth, and transmitter’s peak and average power.
One additional piece of information the evaluator will have to obtain from the EW
ground facility is any obstructions or blockage areas that affect the LOS of the threat
TABLE 9.2 ¢ Typical EW Test Range Parameters
EW Test Range Emitter Parameters
Center Pulse Extreme Power

Name Band Frequency (MHz) Width (msec) Polarity Beamwidth ( ) Peak/Avg.
G2 VHF 216 5.0 H 30 2 kW/5 W
G4 UHF 450 6.0 H 28 5 kW/15 W
G6 L 1600 6.0 V 28 5 kW/15 W
Blind Eyes S 2840 0.82 Rt Circ 4 200 kW/280 W
Bright Fire S 3170 1.5 H 1.2 1 MW/500 W
Bad Find S 3315 1.47 H 1.1 1 MW/1.5 kW
Best Guess C 5570 0.30 V 1.1 180 kW/53 W
Big George C 5600 2.0 V 1.5 250 kW
Blue Grass C 5690 1.0 V 1.6 250 kW
Bleak Hope C 6525 0.49 H 1.6 175 kW/55 W
Black Ink X 9350 0.25 V 1.1 250 kW/51 W
Brand Iron X 9425 0.25 V 0.9 200 kW/32 W
Burst Joint Ku 16,530 0.80 V 1 24 kW/34 W
Big Job Ku 17,530 2.46 V .4 125 kW/77 W
CW7 S 3300 — V 3.6 100 W
CW8 C 6500 — V 2.2 100 W
CW9 X 9225 — V 1.3 100 W
emitters. We do not want to set up our aircraft in blockage areas during the tests, for
obvious reasons.
The first test of the RWR system could be DOA testing. The aircraft is equipped with
four receiving antennas in order to provide 360 omnidirectional coverage about the
aircraft. The antenna also provides coverage in the vertical. The specifications will
probably call for two accuracies: one for straight and level flight, and the other for a
maneuvering aircraft; the accuracies will be much less for a maneuvering aircraft. The
geometry of the setup is performed as described for communications testing in chapter 4
of this text. Remember to perform antenna pattern testing before you spend a lot of time
flight testing. For the bearing accuracy you will need your present position, the threat’s
position, and a record of the indicated bearing in the cockpit. If the system provides range
versus lethality, you will also need to record the displayed range to the threat. Postflight,
perform a coordinate conversion of latitude, longitude, altitude to range, azimuth, and
elevation and compare the data to the recorded bearing and range. If the specifications
call for the system to classify the threat at maximum range, then the evaluator will have
to do a little homework to calculate the range by using the radar range equation. You will
need to know the threats average power and the gain of your receiving antennas.
If your system displays lethality versus range, then you will need to have additional
information from the EW ground facility. The time the threat changes modes (acquisi-
tion, target tracking, and fire control) must also be recorded and compared to the
movement of the threat on the display and any change in symbology.
The system will also have a specification for the amount of time it takes to correctly
identify a threat and display it to the crew; this is called the system response time. Once
again, this parameter will be classified. This test is performed by flying a route that
FIGURE 9.32 ¢
System Response
Testing
places your aircraft in the radar beam of the threat and noting how long it takes the
system to recognize, classify, and display this threat. You will have to know when you
entered the beam and the time from beam entry to the time it was correctly displayed
(i.e., not as an unknown). This is why you need the beamwidth attribute of the threat.
Another option is to have the ground station track the aircraft by some passive means
and then engage the radar system. This may alleviate having to know the radar
beamwidth.
This system response also needs to be tested against multiple threats in multiple
frequency bands and in multiple quadrants. Figure 9.32 shows the proper way to conduct
this test. A route should be flown that places the aircraft among multiple threats in
different quadrants. The purpose of the test is to stress the system’s capabilities to
perform multiple classifications using all of the receiving antennas on the aircraft. Many
test facilities use simulators to emulate the threats, and one pedestal can contain as many
as four antennas emulating four different threats. Although this is good from an eco-
nomic standpoint, all threats will reside in one quadrant, which will not properly test the
capability of the RWR.
While on the subject of simulated threats it should be noted that the real threats
aircrews encounter are probably not going to be brand new, out-of-the-box systems. The
pulse from the actual threat may differ from the manufacturer’s stated specifications
(due to age, calibration, etc.). If we test against a simulated threat where the pulse looks
exactly like the manufacturer’s specifications (called a clean emitter) we may get great
results; but aircrews encountering a real threat may only see an ‘‘unknown’’ (called a
dirty emitter). For this reason, we need to intentionally degrade the simulators to repli-
cate real-world threats. Most operational test and evaluation (OT&E) organizations
require testing against real threats as opposed to simulations.
Another problem that has been seen in RWR testing is the failure of the system to
detect threats above the altitude of the aircraft; not only AI threats, but ground-based
threats as well. Imagine the scenario of flying down a valley with a SAM or AAA on the
overlooking hills. It must be a consideration for your testing if the aircraft will be flown
in these conditions (e.g., attack helicopter, etc.).
Additional testing includes threat display and prioritization, which can be accom-
plished automatically by the system or selected by the operator. The operator has the
ability to display all threats (up to the limits of the system) or just a particular class of
threats (AI, ship-borne, ground-based, unknowns). The operator may also classify which
threats should be the highest priority. This type of testing is ideally suited for the lab or
the anechoic facility, as it require a huge amount of resources to accomplish in flight
testing. Threats can be injected (in the lab) or radiated (in the anechoic facility) as the
operator steps through the available selections and notes the changes in the displayed
information.
In most electronic systems that have any critical operational function, there will be
three types of BIT: power-up BIT (PBIT), operator initiated BIT (IBIT), and continuous
BIT (CBIT). PBIT is completed at system power-up and completes both a continuity
check of the subsystems and primary system as well as a software check to determine if
the software has been corrupted. Typically the display will indicate a ‘‘pass’’ or ‘‘fail’’
and potentially some error codes. In addition, anytime the software is checked, there will
be a ‘‘checksum’’ number or alphanumeric sequence displayed to the operator that the
operator should compare to the correct value. CBIT is a BIT process that runs on a
noninterference basis (i.e., low priority) continuously while the system is operating.
Anytime the system is performing operational processing, the CBIT processes get
dropped while the operational processing is occurring. IBIT is an operator initiated BIT
that is purposely selected by the operator. This will typically be used if, during the CBIT
process, some error indication is provided to the operator. IBIT is typically intrusive,
meaning it takes priority over any other process when initiated. However, there will
likely be some sequence the operator can use to stop the IBIT process in the event that
the system is required for operational use. All three types of BIT should be verified
during testing, including the injection of known fault conditions to determine if the BIT
processes function properly.
BIT and self-test are normally run at power-up or by operator selection. The BIT
portion tests the software, whereas the self-test portion checks the electrical continuity
through to the antennas. Software faults that adversely affect mission capability are
reported to the pilot on the display; all others are written to the maintenance fault list
(MFL). The self-test tests the capability to detect threats at each antenna for each of the
operational bands (normally four). A typical band structure for an RWR is shown in
Table 9.3.
TABLE 9.3 ¢ Typical RWR Frequency Bands
RWR Frequency Band EW Frequency Band

Band 0 C and D Bands
Band 1 E and F Bands
Band 2 G and H Bands
Band 3 I and J Bands
FIGURE 9.33 ¢
RWR Self-Test
Band 1
1 1
1 1
As the self-test runs, the operator can monitor the progress on the display.
Figure 9.33 shows a successful self-test of band 1 in all four quadrants. The system will
cycle through each of the four bands and advise the pilot of the success or failure in each
of the four quadrants. For example, if band 1 failed in the right forward quadrant, the
‘‘1’’ would be missing in the top right section of the display.
The last portion of the controls and displays testing is the aural warnings and cues.
Each system is mechanized in a slightly different way, but there are some common
features that should be present. There should be what is called a ‘‘new guy’’ tone that
sounds whenever a new threat is displayed. It cues the operator to note that a new radar
has been detected and is displayed. Typically there will also be some momentary
flashing enhancement of the displayed symbol that provides situational awareness to the
aircrew. A missile launch audio is just that: when the system determines a launch has
occurred it produces a distinct and annoying audio tone that will not go away. The
corresponding display shows the suspect threat, typically with a flashing symbol
enhancement of the basic threat symbol (e.g., flashing diamond or circle). The aircrew
can adjust the volume or can adjust the system to only issue audio warnings on the
highest priority threats. As with the displays, exercises can be run in the lab or anechoic
facility to validate the logic of the audio warnings.
Missile approach warning systems (MAWS) are used to alert the aircrew, in a
timely and persuasive manner, of an approaching missile. These systems provide the
aircrew with a bearing and range rate (some systems also provide range) and typically
are installed with a countermeasure dispenser system (CMDS) to initiate an automatic
selection of appropriate countermeasures, often chaff and flares. The single biggest
problem with these systems is the false alarm rate.
The systems can operate in the ultraviolet (UV), IR, or radar spectrums. Two typical
MAWS are shown in Figure 9.34. The photo in the upper right of the figure is an
AN/AAR-54 missile warning system made by Northrop-Grumman which operates in the
UV spectrum. The photo at the bottom left of the figure is a Soviet Azovsky MAK-UT
MAWS which operates in the IR spectrum; this installation is on a Bear Bomber.
The IR and UV system variants look for emissions from the missile plume to
identify the threat and estimate range rate by rate of change of intensity. Radar variants
employ Doppler detection and can provide range, range rate, azimuth, and elevation.
The IR versions are susceptible to false alarms created by flares, explosions, truck
backfires, own-ship missile launches, and unguided missile launches. This can be a
FIGURE 9.34 ¢
Two Types of
MAWS Systems
problem, especially at low altitude or in an airport environment. You can imagine an

aircraft on approach, say into Los Angeles International Airport, when a false alarm is
received when the aircraft is over the 405 freeway and a salvo of flares is commanded to
be released. UV systems are a little more discriminating, but are susceptible to other
sources, such as arc-welders. Radar systems need to detect the target first, and the target
is competing with the ground. A delayed detection time severely reduces the crew’s
available reaction time.
When evaluating a MAWS, the test engineer needs to pay particular attention to
● System search volume
● Maximum/minimum detection range
● Bearing accuracy
● Velocity of closure measurement
● False alarm rate
The search volume evaluation should be accomplished in an anechoic facility and is
merely an extension of antenna pattern testing. The evaluator needs to ensure that the
entire area of interest below the aircraft (detection footprint) is seen by the antennas
without any detection holes.
The maximum and minimum detection ranges can be calculated on the ground as
long as the attributes of the sensors are known (FOV, detector sensitivity, target RCS,
target velocity, Dt, etc.). The actual tests for the IR and UV sensors are conducted the
same as previously described in chapter 7 of this text. Testing of radar detectors will be
next to impossible to evaluate in the air, as the test requires missile shots directed toward
the aircraft.
Bearing accuracy for IR and UV systems is a simple task, as it only requires a point
source (at a known location) on the ground; the tests are conducted as described in
chapter 7. The same comments for radar detection ranges apply here as well.
Velocity of closure measurements are a tough test for any of these systems. How do
you measure the accuracy of Vc without launching a missile at the test aircraft? Many
test organizations have used some clever test setups with varying degrees of success.
One organization built a ramp and installed flashbulbs at incremental points to simulate
a missile flight toward the aircraft. Another organization installed flashbulbs along the
side of a mountain and had the aircraft fly a parallel course with the string of bulbs. At
any rate, this will be a very difficult exercise.
The false alarm rate will probably not meet the desired specifications, as there are
too many competing objects that could possibly be a missile signature. The evaluator
may find that special procedures/restrictions must be applied when using a MAWS. For
example, the aircraft may be required to turn the autodispense feature (chaff and flares)
off when flying an approach due to the probability of false alarms.
Self-protection jammers work in a similar fashion to the RWR, only in this case,
when the jammer classifies a threat it automatically selects the best jamming mode to
counter the threat. The aircrew may elect to manually override the system, which will
prevent the jammer from activating until compliance is received from the operator. As
with the RWR, the library is critical in classifying the threat; if the library is wrong, the
threat may be misrepresented or declared an unknown. The jammer may also be syn-
chronized with the chaff and flares dispensing system and initiated by the jammer if
selected as the appropriate jamming technique. The requirements for testing are similar
to those described for the RWR:
● Self-test and fault reporting (BIT)
● Cockpit controls and feedback displays
● Autonomy system
● Area coverage
● Interference blanking
● Synchronization with dispensers
● Aircraft performance implications
● Store certification (carriage limits)
● Miscellaneous (power, cooling requirements)
The self-test checks the continuity through the forward and aft transmit and receive
antennas. The cockpit indications will be very similar to those described for the RWR.
In the automatic mode, the display will indicate to the pilot when jamming has been
selected against a detected threat. In the manual mode, the system will inform the
operator that a threat has been detected and a recommended jamming package has been
selected, but not initiated. The pilot may opt to allow the selected jamming package, or
in some systems he may be allowed to select a different jamming scheme.
The system does not indicate its effectiveness, only that it is operating (type of
jamming, frequency band, and observed threat). The jammer will incorporate a look-
through to ensure that jamming ceases if the threat goes silent.
Area coverage can be accomplished during antenna pattern testing in the anechoic
facility. Remember, we are not testing the coverage of the unit (that is already known
from the manufacturer), we are testing the coverage as the unit as installed.
Interference blanking is listed as a test because this system is an active system, as

opposed to the RWR, which is passive. Once again I refer the reader to the test described
in section 4.16 of this text, which fully describes the scope of EMI/EMC testing of EW
systems. In short, the jammer will not be able to radiate continuously because it will
adversely affect other installed systems (e.g., RWR, radar, HARM, and radar-guided
missiles). For this reason, blanking pulses must be sent to the jammer whenever other
onboard systems need access to the spectrum. Similar pulses are sent to the radar to
allow the jammer access, and so on. CW operation of the radar is prohibited with jam-
mer operations, for obvious reasons. These blanking pulses, inhibits, and, in some cases,
notch filters are controlled by either the mission computer or EW bus controller. They
are aircraft unique and must be evaluated as part of any EW program.
When required, and if implemented, the jammer will send a dispense signal to the
chaff and flare dispensing unit. This is also an aircraft-unique implementation and must
be included in testing. The signal can be monitored on the bus for proper operation or, in
the case of integrations that are hardwired (jammer to dispensing unit), by observing the
firing of squibs (Figure 9.25). For a ground test, we can remove the chaff and flares from
the dispensing unit and only leave the firing squibs (which is like a fuse that initiates the
charge). As a fire signal is sent to the dispensing unit, the appropriate squib will fire. If
the squib does not fire, then the signal was not sent. Similarly, the number of squibs fired
will determine if the correct program was issued.
The last three items relate to the testing required whenever a store is placed on the
aircraft. In every contract you deal with, the first rule of the contract will state that ‘‘the
addition of store XXX will not adversely impact the performance of the aircraft.’’ In
reality, this is nonsense, yet every contract will make this statement. Before the systems
group gets the airplane and system, the performance and flying qualities and loads and
flutter groups will have to clear the airplane to fly with this store attached. We will cover
some of these requirements in chapter 10.
Expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys) are used to delay or negate a weapons
launch. They can accomplish this by target screening, such as a chaff corridor, or con-
fusing the operator with multiple targets or delaying target acquisition. In a tracking
situation they can cause a break lock, increase miss distance after launch, or, as a last
line of defense, shift the intercept point or affect weapons fusing.
Some of the considerations in expendables testing are
● Total available quantity of each

● System response time
● IR/radar frequency coverage
● Available salvo/interval options
● Ejection parameters
● Dispenser location
● Ejection trajectory
● Velocity
● Blooming/IR rise time
● Aircraft performance implications/maneuver limits
● Separation/dispense testing
● Store certification (carriage limits, jettison limits)
The quantity available is a fixed parameter over which we have no control. The
purpose of this test is to ensure that the pilot is properly apprised of the current condi-
tions of the system (quantity remaining, program set, automatic/manual, slaved to
jammer, low quantity, and empty advisories). All of these tests can be accomplished on
the ground by changing the physical conditions of the expendables and ensuring the
information is properly relayed to the operator.
System response time is important in as much as we are testing the latency or aging
through the system. Remember that the chaff bloom or flare peak intensity should occur
within the resolution cell of the threat system. Any latency could adversely impact this
objective. This test is also a ground test and can be piggy-backed with the jammer
integration test described previously by monitoring and timing the squib fire. The pilot
should also have the option of selecting a program or salvo and automatic or manual
modes. The program is based on the optimum dispense rate (of chaff or flares) to defeat
a particular threat. For example, it may be determined that in order to defeat an SA-XX
missile in its tracking mode, chaff should be dispensed two bundles at a time for a total
of eight bundles spaced at 0.2 sec. The pilot would then input the bundles per drop,
interval, and total bundles into the programmer. This applies to the flare program as
well. In addition, automatic and manual operation should be checked. This test can also
be accomplished on the ground and piggy-backed with the previous test.
All of the other tests mentioned are either engineering design problems or perfor-
mance and flying qualities tests for the addition of a new store. We may be called upon
to evaluate the success or failure of an installation by flying an operational scenario
against EW trackers.
9.11 FINALLY
I cannot emphasize enough the importance of EMI/EMC and anechoic chamber testing
for these systems. The basic tests of these systems are relatively simple, yet the eva-
luation of their effects on other aircraft systems and the possible degradation of cap-
abilities is not a simple test and is critical for successful operation of the aircraft as an
integrated system. Perform a good series of antenna patterns before embarking on any
flight test program; failure to do so will result in poor results and a waste of time and
money. Whenever possible, attempt to run as many tests as possible in an anechoic
facility; it is a lot cheaper than flight testing, and real-time troubleshooting can be
accomplished. It may also be a necessity because of security considerations. We do not
want to let them know what we know. Be prepared to spend some time in the chamber;
experience has shown that these tests can run for as long as 3 to 6 months.
1. What are the three major divisions of electronic warfare?

2. Name three direct threat radars.
3. Name three indirect threat radars.
4. Give three representative examples of electronic attack.
5. Give three representative examples of electronic protection.

6. Give three representative examples of electronic support.
7. What is an IADS? Where can they be located?
8. What is a radar warning receiver? What is it used for?
9. Name four parameters that must be known about threat emitters prior to using them
in flight testing.
10. How does antenna polarization affect the outcome of EW testing?
11. How does a V-beam radar obtain height?
12. What is target burn-through? When does it occur?
13. How is a range gate pull-off accomplished?
14. How is a velocity gate pull-off accomplished?
15. Name three types of deception jamming.
16. Name three types of passive deception.
17. What are the major benefits of employing passive deception?
18. Is intelligence about the threat a requirement for deception jamming? Why or
why not?
19. What is DOA? How is it tested?
20. What EW testing would you schedule in the anechoic chamber if you were to
perform an RWR integration?
21. What is a threat library? Where does it reside?
22. Explain the difference between a ‘‘clean’’ and a ‘‘dirty’’ threat.
23. Explain the difficulty in evaluating a MAWS.
24. What is interference blanking used for?
25. What are some of the concerns in the geometric setup of receiver response testing?
26. If you required an airborne jammer, what type of system might you employ on the
target?
27. What type of display information can the RWR provide to the crew? How about a
self-protection jammer?
28. Would you normally have a selection for noise jamming on a self-protection
jammer? Why or why not?
29. Does the onboard radar possess inherent countermeasures?
30. Why would you paint a canopy on the bottom of your aircraft?
31. What is a MALD? How does it work?
32. How is home-on-jam accomplished?
33. What is a false target generator? How does it work?
34. What is a track breaker? How does it work?
35. What is the effect on a victim radar if you employ cross-polarization jamming?
36. What are the problems encountered when using flares as a countermeasure?
37. How does chaff affect a victim radar?
38. What is sidelobe blanking? How about sidelobe cancellation?

39. What does AGC do for the receiver?
40. What are some problems associated with using simulated threats to evaluate your
EW system?
41. Are there any concerns with EMI/EMC for EW installations?
42. Is it possible to lose mission capability with the installation of an EW suite?
If so, why?
CHAPTER
Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground
Weapons Integration 10
Chapter Outline
10.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 763
10.1 Weapons Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 764
10.2 Stores Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 767
10.3 Air-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 785
10.4 Air-to-Ground Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 803
10.5 MIL-HDBK-1763 Test Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 812
10.6 AGARD Flight Test Techniques Series, Volume 10 Requirements . . . . . . . .... 820
10.7 Weapons Delivery Considerations for Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 824
10.8 Selected Questions for Chapter 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 828
10.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will discuss the system aspects of weapons integration. The chapter is
not concerned with loads, flutter, captive carry, or station clearance issues, although they
will be touched upon during the discussions. As usual, some references are available to
the evaluator, and these will be quoted where necessary. The first reference is the
MIL-STD-1760D, ‘‘Interface Standard for Aircraft-Store Electrical Interconnection
System,’’ August 1, 2003. This document covers the digital data bus requirements for
aircraft and stores, and was covered at some length in chapter 3 of this text. The second is
MIL-HDBK-1763, ‘‘Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engineering Data Require-
ments and Test Procedures,’’ June 15, 1988. A detailed examination of the requirements
in 1763 is covered in section 10.5. A third reference is from the NATO Aerospace Group
for Avionics Research and Development (AGARD), now called the NATO Research and
Technology Organization. AGARD Flight Test Techniques Series, Volume 10, ‘‘Weapon
Delivery Analysis and Ballistic Flight Testing,’’ July 1992, is perhaps one of the better
documents available to evaluators for the test and evaluation of weapons systems. The
highlights of this AGARD document are explained in section 10.6. A general document
used for all aircraft is Mil-A-8860B, ‘‘General Specifications for Airplane Strength and
Rigidity,’’ May 20, 1987.
For rotary wing operations, Air Standard 20/21, ‘‘Airborne Stores Ground Fit and
Compatibility Criteria,’’ Change 1, April 21, 1991, establishes the requirements for carriage
compatibility; electrical power interfaces are covered in Mil-Std-704F, ‘‘Aircraft Electrical
763
764 CHAPTER 10 Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground Weapons Integration
Power Characteristics,’’ March 12, 2004. Four documents cover the airworthiness
requirements: Army Regulation 70-62, ‘‘Airworthiness Qualification of Aircraft Sys-
tems, May 21, 2007; ADS-20 HDBK, ‘‘Armament and Fire Control System Survey for
Army Aircraft,’’ December 19, 2005; ADS-45 HDBK, ‘‘Data and Test Procedures for
Airworthiness Release for US Army Helicopter Armament Testing,’’ December 19,
2005; and ADS-62-SP, ‘‘Data and Test Requirements for Airworthiness Release for
Helicopter Sensor Data and Testing Requirements in Development Stage,’’ June 29,
2001. Rotary wing weapons testing is covered in section 10.7.
10.1 WEAPONS OVERVIEW

Some general characteristics apply to all air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The
broad categories are as follows:
● Seeker head/guidance section
● Target detection section/fuse
● Control section
● Warhead section
● Propulsion section
● Battery/gas grain generator
● Umbilical cable/arming and option wires
The seeker head in guided weapons is composed of a sensor whose purpose is to
acquire and track a target. The sensor may be a passive radar, as in the case of a semiactive
homing missile (AIM-7 Sparrow), and/or active radar using terminal guidance (advanced
medium range air-to-air missile [AMRAAM]). The seeker may be infrared (IR) or
ultraviolet (UV), as in the AIM-9 Sidewinder or stand-off land attack missile (SLAM),
or it may use optics (television), such as the glide bomb GBU-15. The systems will
normally contain a gimbaled gyro package for space stabilization and may contain an
inertial navigation system (INS) or global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for pre-
cision navigation.
Associated with the sensors are the antennas, lenses, processors, and detector ele-
ments required for operation. There will be associated physical limiting factors such as
the field of view (FOV) and field of regard (FOR) (FOV plus gimbal limits), as well as
operational limitations such as weather, day or night operations, smoke, or any elec-
tronic protection measures employed. The guidance section houses the navigation
computer, autopilot guidance, and homing techniques.
The following common fusing (arming and detonation) mechanisms may be
employed:
● Time
● Proximity
● Impact or delay
● Hydrostatic (pressure)
Time is the simplest and is self-explanatory; a timing sequence is initiated at
release, and the weapon is armed after the prescribed amount of time. A time of fall or
10.1 Weapons Overview 765
FIGURE 10.1 ¢
Doppler Proximity
Fusing
travel less than the prescribed time results in a dud. Proximity fusing is normally a
Doppler function; when the weapon sees a step in the velocity of closure up from zero or
near zero, the weapon detonates. Figure 10.1 depicts this concept.
The missile in Figure 10.1 radiates a beam of energy slightly forward of orthogonal
to the direction of flight. At the point shown, there is no Doppler return, but as soon as
the target enters the beam, the missile sees a step input of positive Doppler and deto-
nates. The missile can also use an active sensor, such as radar or laser, and detonate on
range. Another form of proximity fuse is one that calculates the proximity to the earth;
this is accomplished with either a barometric or radar altimeter. Most weapons incor-
porate an impact fuse (when high g forces are sensed, the weapon detonates). Another
version of the impact fuse incorporates a delay in detonation to allow the weapon to
penetrate the surface.
The control section of the weapon allows it to ‘‘fly’’ by utilizing control surfaces
or vectored thrust. The control surfaces can be wings, fins, or canards, and the
movement is powered either electrically or hydraulically. The weapon is self-
contained, so there is limited power available to the servos unless a ram air turbine
(RAT) is outfitted to the system. Electric power is supplied by batteries, whereas
hydraulic power is usually supplied by pressurized reservoirs. There are limitations on
the maximum rate and torque of the servos, which limits the performance (or g
available) of the weapon.
The warhead incorporates a series called an explosive train. This train consists of a
primer, delay, detonator, booster, and bursting charge. The weapon causes its damage by
fragmentation, blast, or incendiary. All weapons have safety mechanisms in place that
prevent inadvertent release on the ground and in the air or harmful detonation too close
to the delivery vehicle.
There are five basic classes of weapons:
● Free fall/unguided/single trajectory: these consist of general purpose bombs (GPs)
● Free fall/unguided/multiple trajectory: these consist of cluster bombs (CBUs)
● Free fall/guided: these consist of laser-guided bombs (LGBs) and inertial-aided

munitions (IAMs)
● Propelled/unguided: these consist of rockets
● Propelled/guided: these consist of air intercept missiles (AIMs) and air-to-ground
missiles (AGMs)
The designations of munitions tell you what they do if you know the code. The
codes are shown for missiles and munitions in Tables 10.1–10.4.
TABLE 10.1 ¢ Missile Designations
YAIM-7F
Status Prefix (Prototype)
Launch Environment (Air Launched)
Mission Symbol (Intercept)
Vehicle Type Symbol (Guided Missile)
Design Number (7th Missile)
Series Symbol (6th Version)
TABLE 10.2 ¢ Missile Designation Codes
Status Environment Mission Type

J-Special Test/Temp A-Air D-Decoy L-Launch Vehicle
N-Special Test/Perm B-Multiple E-Special Electronics M-Guided Missile
X-Experimental C-Coffin G-Surface Attack N-Probe
Y-Prototype F-Individual I-Intercept Aerial R-Rocket
Z-Planning G-Runway Q-Drone
H-Silo Stored T-Training
L-Silo Launched U-Underwater Attack
M-Mobile W-Weather
P-Soft Pad
R-Ship
S-Underwater
TABLE 10.3 ¢ Munitions Designations
CBU-87 A/B
Item Identification (Cluster Bomb)
“U” for Unit
Serial Number (87th Cluster Bomb)
Model (1st version of CBU-87)
Installation (Aircraft Installed, expended)

TABLE 10.4 ¢ Munitions Designation Codes
Identification Identification Identification Identification Installation

Designator
AD-Certain CN-Misc Containers LM-Ground PW-Internal A-Aircraft
Adapting Items Based Launcher Dispenser Installed/Fixed
AB-Explosive DS-Tgt Directing LU-Illuminating RD-Dummy Rocket B-Aircraft
Items Device Units Installed/Expendable
BB-Simulated FM-Fuses MA-Misc Items RL-Rockets E-Ground
Bombs Item Moveable
BD-Bombs and FS-Fuse Safety MD-Misc SA-Sights
Mines Simulated
BL-Bomb Racks FZ-Fuse MH-Munitions SU-Store Suspension
Related Item Handling and Release
BR-Retarding GA-Aircraft Gun MJ-Munitions CM TM-Tanks
Device
BS-Stabilizing GB-Guided Bomb MT-Mount TT-Test items
Device
CB-Cluster GP-Pod Gun PA-External Device WD-Warheads
Bomb
CC-Actuator LA- Aircraft PD-Leaflet WT-Training
Cartridges Launcher Dispenser Warheads
CD-Clustered MK-USN Bomb PG-Ammunition M-US Army Bomb
Munitions Designation Designation
10.2 STORES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

As with other avionics systems, a conversion from analog to digital was necessary in
order to save weight and space and allow the sharing of information across a distributed
bus. The stores management system (SMS) is controlled by the stores management
processor (SMP), which is normally a remote terminal (RT) on mission or avionics
busses 1 and 2 and is the bus controller of the weapons or armament bus (Figure 10.2).
Most military aircraft utilize a 1553 bus for avionics and a 1760 bus for weapons.
The 1760 bus utilizes the same protocol as the 1553 bus, with two additions: header
words and cyclical redundancy checks (CRCs). In more state-of-the-art applications,
such as miniature munitions/stores interface, EBR-1553 may be used to increase speed
as well as the total number of RTs. The reader is again referred to chapter 3 of this text
for a review of 1553 and 1760 data busses.
The general requirements for the SMS are to
● Provide the control logic necessary to prepare, release, fire, and jettison all stores
● Provide the interface with the mission computer via the 1553 bus and be capable of
monitoring, interpreting, and providing store status
● Provide the interface with aircrew controls and displays and issue alerts
● Provide test capabilities for built-in tests (BITs), installed weapons tests, and ground
tests for all stations
The major functions of systems management include system initialization, stores
inventory, missile preparation, power distribution and control, and avionics and
FIGURE 10.2 ¢ RT RT RT RT
X ≤ 31
SMS 1553 #1 #2 # #X
Relationship MC BUS 1A
MC BUS 1B
RT DP ARDP
MC #1 Inter- BC/RT RT
NON- MC #2
BC #1 computer RMUX
SMS 1553 BC #2
BUS BBC #2 BUS RT conv. BUS
BBC #1
RT RT RT RT
SMS system RADAR system
MC BUS 2A
MC BUS 2B
RT RT RT
DP RT #X X ≤ 31
#1 #2
EW
BUS
RT
EW system
armament bus communications. The stores jettison function includes emergency jet-
tison, air combat maneuvering (ACM) jettison (which is a prebriefed selective jettison
feature), selective jettison, and auxiliary jettison. Systems tests include SMS BIT,
weapons test, ground test, and system reporting. In many cases an in-flight training
mode is available that inhibits weapons release but provides normal cockpit indications.
The typical SMS will comprise the following as a minimum:
● Stores management processor

● Missile power relay unit (MPRU)
● Decoders (type 1, 2, etc.)
● Fuel tank jettison unit (FTJU)
● Gun control unit (GCU)
A typical SMS architecture is shown in Figure 10.3. The SMP is a programmable

digital computer that provides control of the SMS. It is the bus controller of the
ARMUX (armament bus) and an RT on the AVMUX (avionics bus). It is the electrical
interface between the SMS avionics systems and the weapons/stores interface of the
SMS. Normally the SMP will contain an emergency jettison generator circuit.
The MPRU functions as an RT on the ARMUX. It provides the distribution of
alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) power to all store stations under control
of the SMP. The MPRU provides AC and DC power to the GCU and provides AC and
DC release power to the decoders and FTJU. It also provides AC and DC power to
onboard missiles.
Decoders function as an RT on the ARMUX and perform all of the analog-to-digital
(A/D) and digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion functions to allow the SMP to talk to non-
1553 stores. A type 1 decoder can interface with the AIM-9M, AIM-7F/M, or AIM-120,
or any combination of two of these missiles. A type 1 decoder provides interlock return
Weapon Gun Fuel tank FIGURE 10.3 ¢
System Sta 2 & 7 Fuel Typical SMS

Control Jettison unit
Operator Unit Architecture
Controls
Sta 1 & 8 Aim9
Type 1
Pilot Decoder
Controls SMP Logic & Sta 3/6 4/5 Aim7
Timing
Processor
Sta 1/3/4/6/8 54C
Mission Type 2
Computer 2 Decoder
Station 3/4/5/6 Bomb
Mission
Missile
Computer 1
Power
Relay
Phoenix
Power
Radar Supply
and release consent circuits for the AIM-120. A type 2 decoder can service only one
weapon at a time and interfaces with the BRU-32A or triple ejector rack (TER) bomb
racks. A type 2 decoder provides the release or separation signals to bomb racks as well
as circuitry for mechanical arming (e.g., nose/tail) of MK80 series bomb types.
The FTJU
● Provides firing voltages to squibs to jettison a specific fuel tank

● Provides relay logic for selective jettison
● Provides a separate relay logic in the event of an emergency jettison (emergency
jettison commands are received directly from the SMP emergency jettison circuit)
The GCU provides the interface between the SMP and gun system. The GCU
incorporates a burst limit switch to select maximum rounds fired during trigger squeeze
and provides orderly firing termination at detection of trigger release, burst limit, or last
round.
10.2.1 SMS Processes

There are two basic processes within the SMS: cold start and warm start. The cold start
process will power up, initialize, command BIT, and perform inventory for all stations.
Warm start will normally perform a safety check only; inventory will not be performed.
The SMS is required to maintain status and inventory after a warm start.
At start-up, the SMP commands the MPRU to initialize the decoders (i.e., supply
power). The SMP also polls the FTJU and GCU; the MPRU responds back with BIT
results. Each individual decoder replies back with BIT results and polls stations to
determine if a store is present, and if the store is compatible. If a missile or smart
weapon is present, the store is prepped after the inventory process.
FIGURE 10.4 ¢
SMS Inventory
A complete inventory is performed at cold start. The SMP checks the MPRU for the
SMS weapons replaceable assembly (WRA) complement. All decoders are powered up,
BIT checked, and then checked for stores present. If a decoder finds a store present, but
the store is not compatible, power is removed from the decoder and the store is rendered
inoperable. The SMP reports inventory to the mission computer for display to the
operator. A display of a weapons inventory page is shown in the upper left (multifunction
display 1) of Figure 10.4. It should come as no surprise that the total of all permutations
and combinations of stores that can be loaded is a very large number. Just look at any of
the pictures that accompany any aircraft (Figure 10.5). The testing to validate inventory
and compatibility issues on the aircraft should never be attempted on the airplane, as the
amount of time required to upload and download stores would be excessive.
The SMP is smart enough to identify invalid/unauthorized weapons configurations.
Concerns include weight, drag, and hazardous stations (unsafe firing or release of certain
stores from multiple aircraft stations). Depending on the implementation, the SMP may
display a red X across a station, issue an aural alert, or display a master caution/warning.
Power is removed from the station until the condition is resolved and another cold start
is performed. The same results will occur when an actual aircraft to preloaded config-
uration conflict is present.
Once a valid inventory is established, missiles and smart weapons can be prepped. A
store declared invalid during inventory cannot be prepped. Weapons prep is an interface
check between the weapon and other required avionics systems on the aircraft. Missiles
are tuned, BIT checked, or run through a missile on aircraft test (MOAT). Weapons
requiring navigation information are checked using synthetic inputs from the aircraft.
Prebriefed target coordinates with associated weapon IDs are verified as being accepted
correctly. Stores can be selectively prepped by the operator; a store will not be declared
ready until prepped.
FIGURE 10.5 ¢
Combinations of
Weapons
Tuning is accomplished on semiactive homing missiles and tests the ability of the
missile to ‘‘tune’’ to the onboard radar’s frequency. On U.S. and Allied platforms,
missile tuning applies to the AIM-7 Sparrow. Each missile on the aircraft must be tuned
separately to be declared prepped and ready for use.
A test request is received from the mission computer to execute a missile tune. The
mission computer commands radar to continuous wave (CW) or pulse Doppler (PD)
mode. If the missile was previously tested, the SMP cycles off power to the station for
6 sec and then on. The SMP sends a CW/PD select command to the missile and then
transmits an injected video (simulated Doppler) signal to the missile. The radar applies
tuning to the missile and sweeps until rear automatic frequency control (AFC) and speed
gate lock are achieved. The missile transmits ‘‘Missile Ready’’ (tuned) to SMP and the
SMP transmits ‘‘Missile Tested’’ and ‘‘Missile Ready’’ to the mission computer for
status display. Missile tuning is not really comprehensive, as it tests only the ability of
the missile to lock onto the speed gate. In some applications, this test can only be
accomplished in CW mode. A complete test takes approximately 3 sec.
The MOAT is performed on missiles that receive postlaunch communication from
the mother ship. When MOAT is selected on a missile, the SMP receives a test request
from the mission computer; the SMP provides the missile test control. The SMP then
commands the radar to select semiactive channels and transmit missile messages. The
SMP receives the missile responses and processes the test data. It provides test results to
the mission computer and saves the test results for postlaunch examination.
There are specific tests that MOAT commands:
● Prelaunch tests: verify initialization and frequency lock to the selected semiactive
channels
● Postlaunch tests: verify the rear message link and the ability to acquire a simulated
target
● Autopilot tests: verify the system interface and autopilot functions dependent on
weapons system for stimuli
● Built-in self-test (BIST): initiates the BIST and collects test results
● Nonselected channel tests: tests phase-lock and radio frequency (RF) message
reception capability of the remaining semiactive channels
A complete MOAT takes about 15 sec; the results are used to determine weapon
system and missile capability and fault isolation of failures. Results are normally dis-
played in hexadecimal format to the pilot and recorded in the maintenance fault list.
The AMRAAM BIT also has commanded logic from the SMS. When AIM-120 BIT
is selected, the SMP receives a BIT request from the mission computer. It then deter-
mines if duty cycle timeout has been satisfied. If yes, the SMP initiates AMRAAM BIT
by applying power to the missile and outputting launch initiate discretes to the radar and
mission computers. The SMP transmits system time and targeting and uncertainty data
blocks to the missile. The SMP interprets the missile status message to determine when
BIT is complete. Power is removed from the missile when a BIT complete message is
received from the missile, 5.5 sec has elapsed from the start of the BIT, or the BIT has
been terminated.
10.2.2 SMS Weapons Interfaces

The following examples will be covered in this section:
● AIM-9
● AIM-7
● AIM-120
● Gun
● Bombs
AIM-9 Sidewinder
A typical AIM-9 Sidewinder interface to the SMS is shown in Figure 10.6. A normal
launch of an AIM-9 consists of the pilot first selecting a cooled AIM-9 (Figure 10.7).
The newer AIM-9 series missiles have cooled seeker heads for better temperature dif-
ferential (DT) discrimination. As was discussed in chapter 7 of this text, the detector
element must be cooled down before a usable system is ready. Missiles on the aircraft
are cooled by a gas or thermoelectric cooler and take a little time before a missile is
ready. The cool-down of the detector is normally initiated during weapons prep. A hot
trigger or ‘‘Ready’’ light will appear when ‘‘Master Arm’’ is on. Trigger activation starts
the launch-to-eject (LTE) cycle in the SMP. The SMP transmits a fire command to the
LAU-7 launcher and an engine derich command to the engine midcompression bypass
(this is so the engine does not compressor stall with an ingestion of the missile exhaust
gases). The launcher puts the AIM-9 in self-track and activates the gas grain generator.
The missile guidance section transmits a motor fire signal to the rocket motor through
the LAU-7 and the missile is rail launched from the station.
AIM-7 Sparrow
The AIM-7 Sparrow is a semiactive homing missile that homes in on reflected radar
energy from a target with a particular Doppler shift. This scenario is shown in
AIM-9 COOL
PILOTS
AIM-9 COOL OVRD
AUX
PANEL
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MLGH UP
HANDLE SWITCH
MASTER ARM P/O

PILOTS MASTER ARM GLOVE
ACM HOTTRIGGER
ACM JETT COOL ON RELAY MASTER ARM 6
PANEL IFT BOX
P/O COOL ON 20 AIM-9 M
GLOVE ACM SELECT
ACM JETT OUT PWR INTRLK GNO
RELAY STA(X) PH PWR P/O
STA(X) 1 PH PWR SIDEWINDER
BOX GLOVE
ACM JETTISON 28VDC PWR RELAY 28VDC PWR
BOX LAU-7
LAUNCHER
PILOT’S BOMB BUTTON OUT
GRIP BOMB BUTTON IN
AIM-9 AUDIO 19
EMERGENCY EMJETT ACTIVATED MISSILE 9

DECODER
JETTISON EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 OUT POWER 15
28VDC DCDR PWR TYPE
SWITCH EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 IN RELAY
STORES 1
UNIT MSL ID 13
MANAGEMENT 28VDC REL PWR
PROCESSOR PWR INTLK GND 26
MISSION (SMP) RT FIRE CMD 1
COMPUTER
EQUIPMENT READY
10.2
1
RT UNCAGE CMD 25
R/L REF 23
BC BC AMRAMENT BUS RT ACQ LAMBDA 21
SEAM SLAVE 22
MISSION
COMPUTER BC MISSION BUS 2 RT A/C GND 16
2 A/C GND 10
EQUIPMENT READY A/C BUS 28VDC ESS PWR
JETT STATION SELECT

SELECT JETT OUT
RIO SELECT JETT IN EMERGENCY JETTISON BUS
ARMAMENT AUX JETT OUT
PANEL AUX JETT IN
MISSILE PREP
FIGURE 10.6 ¢ Typical AIM-9 Sidewinder Interface

Stores Management System
773
FIGURE 10.7 ¢
AIM-9 Sidewinder
FIGURE 10.8 ¢
AIM-7 Semiactive
Homing
T
I
Figure 10.8. Based on the geometry of the intercept, the velocity of closure between the
radar and the target will change. The radar tells the missile to look for a Doppler shift
either up or down (remember that the missile knows the frequency of the radar since it
was tuned during weapons prep). This Doppler shift is called a speed gate.
The aspect of the target, and hence the range rate, is sent from the radar to the
missile. The missile then searches within its FOV for a return equal to the carrier fre-
quency plus the Doppler shift; it then homes in on that signal. The speed gate logic
within the missile is represented in Table 10.5. These are not the real numbers of any
missile, but they serve as an example. If we tell the missile to look for a head-on speed
gate, it will look for a velocity of closure (Doppler) equal to 900 to 1200 knots; a beam
speed gate would be 200 to 500 knots. If the initial geometry at missile firing was a
head-on and the target then turns to the beam, what happens? The missile initially guides
TABLE 10.5 ¢ Semiactive Homing Speed Gates
Aspect (Speed Gate) Target Velocity of Closure

Head On 1200 - - - - - 900
Quarter Head 900 - - - - - 500
Beam 500 - - - - - 200
Quarter Tail 200 - - - - - 0
Tail 0 - - - - - (300)
on the high closure return, but then it disappears. It searches through the speed gates
from high to low until it sees a return. The target return will appear in the beam speed
gate, but so does the main lobe clutter. There is therefore a chance that the missile will
guide to the ground, especially in a look-down geometry.
In a normal AIM-7 launch the pilot selects a ‘‘Ready’’ AIM-7 (tuned); a hot trigger/
launch button will appear when the master arm is on and the mission computer transmits
‘‘Launch Enable.’’ When the pilot pulls the trigger/launch button the activation results in
‘‘Launch Initiate’’ being sent to the mission computer and radar, and the start of LTE in
the SMP. The radar transmits in CW or PD mode. The mission computer sends injected
video and ‘‘PD/CW Select’’ to the missile via the SMP. The SMP transmits ‘‘Missile
Battery and Hydraulic Activate’’ to the missile and the mission computer sends antenna
pointing commands, steering commands, target data, and own-ship speed to the missile
via the SMP.
If the missile ‘‘tunes,’’ passes BIT, and detects battery up, it transmits ‘‘Commit to
Launch’’ to the SMP. The SMP removes power from the missile and transmits an engine
derich command to the engine midcompression bypass. The SMP then sends an eject
command to the LAU-92 launcher; the SMP sends a ‘‘Motor Fire’’ command to the
missile after the ejector foot has extended.
The AIM-7 and its components are shown in Figure 10.9. A typical AIM-7 Sparrow
interface is shown in Figure 10.10.
AIM-120 AMRAAM
In a typical AMRAAM launch the pilot selects a ‘‘Ready’’ AIM-120. A hot trigger/
launch button appears when master arm is on and the mission computer transmits
‘‘Launch Enable.’’ The trigger/launch button activation results in ‘‘Launch Initiate’’
being sent to the mission computer and radar, and the start of LTE in the SMP. The radar
transmits in single target track (STT) or track-while-scan (TWS) mode. The SMP
applies station power and transmits ‘‘Release Consent’’ to the missile, which starts the
batteries. The SMP transmits system time to the missile and receives a wakeup time
from the missile, which in turn is transmitted to the mission computer. The mission
computer transmits targeting and uncertainty data to the missile via the SMP. The SMP
receives ‘‘Commit to Launch’’ from the missile if the missile is operable. The SMP
removes station power and the ‘‘Release Consent’’ from the missile and transmits an
engine derich command to the engine midcompression bypass. The SMP then transmits
an eject command to the LAU-92 launcher.
The AIM-120 is shown in Figure 10.11, and the interface is depicted in
Figure 10.12.
FIGURE 10.9 ¢
AIM-7 Sparrow
AIM-7 Components
Fins
Motor Fire Connector
Umbilical Connector Aft Hanger
Wings
Forward Hanger
Ceramic Radome Mk-58 Rocket Motor
Control Section
Tunnel Cable
Wdu-27/b Warhead
Guidance Section
Guns
Gun firing is initiated by an SMP detection of a trigger discrete with the master arm on
and gun selected. A concurrent receipt of gun discrete at the GCU enables the hydraulic
drive command enable relay. While the hydraulic drive command and the low rate drive
are enabled, the gun clearing command is disabled. The SMP transmits a trigger select
discrete to the GCU and an engine derich command to the midcompression bypass via
the MPRU. The hydraulic drive command is generated by the GCU if
● Gun clearing command is false

● Last round is false
● Gun arm enable is true
● Trigger select is true
If all the interlocks are correct, the purge command and interlock drive are activated
and the air control is set to zero (full air flow). The GCU receives interlock compliance
and applies power to the gun. The GCU detects and uses the feed rate signal to generate
rounds fired and rounds remaining to the SMP. Rounds/pulse count is used to accu-
mulate the burst count, which will terminate the firing cycle. The latest rounds
remaining count received by the SMP is reported to the mission computer in the current
inventory message.
MAIN LANDING GEAR MLGH UP
HANDLE SWITCH
MASTER ARM
MASTER ARM GLOVE
PILOTS HOT TRIGGER RELAY
ACM JETT ACM ACM IFOL
P/O IFT BOX
GLOVE ACM SELECT PANEL STA
ACM JETT OUT
RELAY (X) STA(X) 3PH PWR
BOX PWR
ACM JETTISON SPARROW PRES
RLY
TRIGGER OUT BOX
PILOT’S AIM-7F/M
TRIGGER IN
GRIP SPARROW
MR SELECT MISSILE GONE MISSILE
DECODER
TYPE
RLY EXT PWR

EMERGENCY EMJETT ACTIVATED
STA(X) 3PH PWR

28VDC NO.1 PWR
28VDC NO.2 PWR
JETTISON EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 OUT 1 LAU-02
SWITCH LAUNCHER
EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 IN
MISSILE EJECT 1 A
STORES POWER 28VDC DCDR PWR EJECT 2 B
MISSION MANAGEMENT RELAY
COMPUTER PROCESSOR UNIT MOTOR FIRE 1 5
EQUIPMENT READY 28VDC REL PWR
1 (SMP) MOTOR FIRE 2 14
RT
RT
MISSILE DESIGNATE D
ALTITUDE 3 D
MISSION RT NEGATIVE CLOSING VELOCITY/
E
COMPUTER BC MISSION BUS 2 BC AMRAMENT BUS RT MINIMUM RANGE COMMAND
2 EQUIPMENT READY BATTERY HYDRLAULIC ACTIVATE J
ROLL COMMAND K
DOPPLER ACQUISITION MODE P
A/C BUS 28VDC ESS PWR ENGLISH DIAS YAW R
10.2
JETT STATION SELECT MISSILE READY S

PD/CW SELECT U
RIO SELECT JETT OUT HEAD AIM PITCH/
ARMAMENT Y
SELECT JETT IN EMERGENCY JETTISON BUS TRUE INERTIAL SPEED
PANEL HEAD AIM YAW/
MISSILE PREP Z
RANGE AT LAUNCH
ENGLISH DIAS PITCH o
ALTITUDE NO. 1 d
ALTITUDE NO. 2 e
COMMIT TO LAUNCH f
INJECTED VIDEO k
SYSTEM GROUND A
POWER GROUND B
LAUNCH CMD F
TEST PIN GNDS L,M
FUZE SAFETY N
FIGURE 10.10 ¢ Typical AIM-7 Sparrow Interface

777
FIGURE 10.11 ¢ Target

AIM-120 AMRAAM Inertial Detecting Control
Antenna Batteries Reference Unit Device Actuator
Transmitter Electronics Armament

Rocket Motor
Section Data Link
Gun firing is terminated under the following conditions:

● Removal of trigger discrete
● Burst limit exceeded
● Last round detected
● Removal of master arm
● Loss of interlock compliance
● Loss of gun command enable
● Receipt of weapons clear or other weapon selected
● Loss of trigger interlock
The Vulcan cannon is shown in Figure 10.13, and a typical gun interface is shown in
Figure 10.14.
Bombs
The delivery of bombs is initiated when the pilot selects the bomb type. The weapon
program is accessed by the SMP; the program includes quantity, interval, arming, and
fusing. Placing the master arm on provides power to the bomb release unit (BRU) or
TER. The hot trigger/bomb button appears when master arm is on and the mission
computer transmits ‘‘Release Enable’’ to the SMP. The SMP transmits an arming
command to the type 2 decoder and, when the bomb button is activated, allows release
power to be transmitted to the decoder. The SMP transmits release pulse and eject
MAIN LANDING GEAR
MLGH UP
HANDLE SWITCH
MASTER ARM
MASTER ARM GLOVE
PILOTS HOT TRIGGER RELAY
P/O ACM JETT ACM ACM IFOL
IFT BOX
GLOVE ACM SELECT PANEL STA
RELAY ACM JETT OUT (X)
STA(X) 3 PH PWR 8, 10, 12
BOX PWR
ACM JETTISON 28VDC NO.1 PWR (TM PWR) 21
RLY
BOX 28VDC NO.2 PWR (LOCK CLOSE)
PILOT’S BOMB BUTTON OUT AIM-120/
GRIP BOMB BUTTON IN AMRAMENT
DECODER MISSILE
EMERGENCY TYPE
RLY EXT PWR

EMJETT ACTIVATED
STA(X) 3PH PWR

28VDC NO.1 PWR
28VDC NO.2 PWR
JETTISON 1 LAU-7
EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 OUT LAUNCHER
SWITCH EMERGENCY JETTISON 1,2,3 IN
MISSILE EJECT 1
STORES POWER
MISSION MANAGEMENT 28VDC DCDR PWR EJECT 2
RELAY
COMPUTER PROCESSOR LOCK OVERRIDE
EQUIPMENT READY UNIT
1 (SMP) 28VDC REL PWR LOCK MONITOR
RT UNLOCK MONITOR
RT
MISSION RT
COMPUTER BC MISSION BUS 2 INTERLOCK 15
BC AMRAMENT BUS RT
2 RELEASE COMMENT 6
EQUIPMENT READY
A/C BUS 28VDC ESS PWR

INTERLOCK GND 16
10.2
JETT STATION SELECT

SELECT JETT OUT EMERGENCY JETTISON BUS
RIO
SELECT JETT IN
ARMAMENT
AUX JETT OUT
PANEL
AUX JETT IN
MISSILE PREP RT
ADDRESS PARITY 13
ADDRESS A0 9
ADDRESS A1 11
ADDRESS A2 24
ADDRESS A3 25
ADDRESS A4 26
ADDRESS RTN 14
FIGURE 10.12 ¢ Typical AIM-120 AMRAAM Interface

779
FIGURE 10.13 ¢
Vulcan Cannon
Characteristics
Gun Externally powered, six barrel, 20 mm Gatling

Weight (Total) 841 lb (381 kg)
Feed System 270 lb (122 kg)
Gun 252 lb (114 kg)
Ammunition 319 lb (145 kg)
Firing Rate 4000/6000 shots per minute
Ammunition
Capacity 570 rounds
Type 20 mm M50 series, PGU-28/B Saphei
Feed System Rotary linkless, double-ended
Drive System Hydraulic
Barrel Life 40,000 rounds
Reliability 15,000 mean rounds between failure
System Life 250,000 rounds
Gun Life 150,000 rounds minimum
commands to the BRU/TER, energized nose/tail solenoids capture arming wires, and
fuse voltage is applied to the bomb as it is ejected from the aircraft.
Representative bombs are shown in Figure 10.15, and a typical bomb interface is
10.2.3 Other SMS Interfaces

There are three other interfaces that are common to most SMSs:
● Sidewinder expanded acquisition mode (SEAM)

● SMS interlocks
● SMS jettison
TRIGGER INTERLOCK
LOW RATE CMD
HYDRAULIC
TRIGGER SELECT LOW RATE CMD
DRIVE LOW RATE
TRIGGER IN
GCU PWR ON CONTROL HYDRAULIC SOLENOID
PILOT’S HYDRO
TRIGGER OUT DRIVE CMD
GRIP GCU DRIVE
TRIGGER PRESENT SOLENOID
INTALK DRV INTERLOCK
DRIVE
WPN SEL LOGIC 600 MSEC HOLD
POWER
SUPPLY LAST ROUND
300 MSEC DELAY LAST
28VDC NO 2 ROUND
MPRU SWITCH
FIRING
115VAC FIRING VOLTAGE
POWER FIRING ROUND
SUPPLY VOLTAGE INTERLOCK
PILOT’S HOT TRIGGER CONTROL COMPLIANCE
CNTRL 28VDC NO 1
MASTER ARM PURGE CMD PURGE
&
DOOR
DISPLY
GUN ARM PURGE AIR PURGE AIR SOLENOID
CONTROL CNTR CMD PURGE
ENGINE ENABLE
AIR SHUT
SMP DERICH
OFF VALVE
AIR PURGE
SOURCE 35 SEC HOLD DOOR
GUN ARM SWITCH SWITCH
COMMAND
10.2
THERMAL
BIT COMMAND CONTROL
BIT CLOCK SWITCH
BIT
BIT STATUS
CAM CLEAR
GUN CMD CLEARING
CLEARING CAM
CONTROL SOLENOID
BURST
LIMIT
COUNTER
ROUNDS
REMAINING ROUNDS ROUNDS FIRED FEEDRATE MAGNETIC
FEED RATE
REMAINING SPEED
MONITER
COUNTER SENSOR
GCU GUN SYSTEM

FIGURE 10.14 ¢ Typical Gun Control Interface

781
FIGURE 10.15 ¢
MK-82 (top) and
BLU-107 Durandal
Runway Buster
(bottom)
The SEAM has two modes of operation: cage and SEAM. SEAM mode is auto-
matically entered with an AIM-9 selection; the operator can toggle between SEAM and
cage. Detection of a valid false/true transition causes the SMP to switch from SEAM to
cage mode. Each subsequent detection causes the SMP to switch back and forth between
SEAM and cage.
The Sidewinder message is received from the mission computer and is examined for
valid track true indications. If the track is read as true, full SEAM mode is engaged. The
SMP responds by applying a manual uncage command to the missile. The SMP then
allows the missile seeker head to be slaved to external commands (system target or
system track). The SMP mode process entails the extraction of seeker head position
MAIN LANDING GEAR
HANDLE SWITCH MLGH UP
MASTER ARM
GLOVE
PILOTS MASTER ARM
HOT TRIGGER RELAY MASTER ARM
ACM ACM IFOL
ACM JETT BOX
P/O PANEL IFT
GLOVE ACM ACM JETT OUT STA
RELAY SELECT (X) WEAPON RAIL PRES
BOX PWR
ACM JETTISON RLY 28VDC NO 1 PWR
BOX 28VDC NO 2 PWR
PILOT’S BOMB BUTTON OUT WEAPON
GRIP ACM
BOMB BUTTON IN RAIL
IFOL
ADAPTER
STAX 3PH PWR

28VDC NO.1 PWR
28VDC NO.2 PWR
RLY EXT PWR
BRU-32
EMJETT ACTIVATED STORES BOMB
EMERGENCY DECODER
MANAGEMENT 786A7-J20 RACK
JETTISON EMERGENCY JETT 1,2,3 OUT MISSILE TYPE BRU-32
PROCESSOR
SWITCH POWER 28VDC DCDR PWR 2 UMBILICAL
EMERGENCY JETT 1,2,3 IN (SMP) c
RELAY 1
28VDC REL PWR 15 B
UNIT
MISSION 27 R
COMPUTER RT 8 EJECT 1 18 H
EQUIPMENT READY 1 EJECT 2
1 20 J
RT 64 LOCK OVERRIDE 24 M
63 LOCK MONITOR 22 S
BC AMRAMENT BUS RT 29 UNLOCK MONITOR 21 T
93 NOSE ARM 11 a
MISSION 35 TAIL ARM 4 U
COMPUTER BC MISSION BUS 2 RT 25 STORE ABOARD 13 A
2 7 AUX JETTISON 16 F
EQUIPMENT READY A/C BUS 28VDC ESS PWR 21 TIMER ZERO SET 10
10.2
40 ACT FREQ ID 9
JETTSTATION SELECT
SELECT JETT OUT EMERGENCY JETTISON BUS
RIO
SELECT JETT IN
ARMAMENT
AUX JETT OUT
PANEL
AUX JETT IN
MISSILE PREP
INTERLOCK BYPASS
PICKLE RELAY ELECTRIC FUZING J3-B
READY RELAY AWW-4
HV SELECT RELAY POWER
HV POLARITY RELAY SUPPLY
AWW-4 RELEASE PULSE
HV INDICATE
BIT GO GROUND TEST

BIT NO GO PANEL
FIGURE 10.16 ¢ Typical Bomb Interface

783
parameters from the missile and transmission of these coordinates to the mission com-
puter. The SMP also receives pointing commands from the mission computer and
compares commanded seeker head position to actual seeker head position (x, y to polar
coordinates). The comparison of commanded versus actual generates error signals that
are used to correct to the desired pointing angle.
In the SEAM lock-on process, the SMP detects the missile audio tone as
exceeding the specified threshold and transmits an audio true discrete to the mission
computer. The mission computer determines if the target position and the seeker head
position coincide within tolerance. If it does, the mission computer transmits
‘‘Coincidence True’’ to the SMP. The SMP removes SEAM enable from the missile
and allows the missile to self-track while the SMP continues to extract seeker head
position parameters.
If the audio falls below the specified threshold for more than 1 sec, the system
reverts to SEAM slaving. A SEAM break lock condition will also exist if the cage/
SEAM switch is depressed, commanding the missile to be caged to boresight, or if a
‘‘Break Lock’’ command is received from the mission computer. The mission com-
puter transmits a missile masking command when the seeker head is pointing to the
nose of its own aircraft. The SMP will step to the next missile station, providing the
station is on the opposite side of the aircraft and the current missile is not in self-track.
If the conditions are not met, the mission computer transmits a break lock command to
the SMP.
The SMS is responsible for monitoring the entire weapons system for clearance to
release a store (safety, arming and fusing considerations, aircraft performance, etc.).
Some key interlocks are
● Weight-on-wheels (WOW) switch. On most aircraft, power cannot be supplied to

stores stations when the aircraft is on the ground (however, some past accidents have
shown that this is not always the case).
● Gear handle position. The gear handle must be in the up position to fire/release belly-
mounted missiles/bombs.
● Boarding steps. Some aircraft have self-contained boarding ladders or steps that are
retracted into the aircraft once the crew is aboard. If these steps extend in flight, or
the discrete is not properly set, power will normally be removed from forward-firing
ordnance.
● Type weapon select. Depending upon the aircraft mechanization, some systems will
not allow the firing or release of a weapon that the SMS believes is incompatible for
the situation. For example, if AIM-120s and AIM-9s are on the aircraft, the SMS will
not allow the pilot to fire an AIM-9 at a target on the nose at 20 nm (incompatible
range).
● Station selected. The station selected must match the type of weapon desired; a
mismatch will usually cause a red X to be drawn over the tactical information
display.
● Master arm. Think of the master arm as the master power switch; weapons cannot be
released without placing the master arm to the ‘‘on’’ position.
● Consent switch. This is usually associated with weapons that require two-man
control, such as nuclear devices.
10.2.4 SMS Test and Evaluation

The following evaluations are required of the SMS:
● Weapons inventory
● Weapons prep
● SMS sequencing
● SMS interlocks
● MIL-STD-1760D messages
Most of the SMS validation tests are going to be accomplished in the lab. As seen in
Figure 10.5, and previously described in the text, the combinations and permutations of
possible stores configurations may seem endless. On-aircraft inventory should only be
accomplished with the most common load-out, which will be determined by the user.
All other weapons combinations should be demonstrated by lab testing. Remember that
even invalid loads must be evaluated in order to determine if the SMS can detect
improper and incompatible configurations; proper feedback must be available to the
aircrew.
Weapons prep is accomplished in the lab and on the aircraft. Depending on the
store(s) being carried, the SMS must demonstrate the ability to successfully prep the
weapon for delivery. Weapons prep must provide the aircrew with positive indications
of whether the store is available for firing/release. If a weapon fails to prep, the aircrew
must be properly advised that the store is unavailable.
Weapons sequencing for firing/releasing stores must be demonstrated to operate
properly. The initial testing is done in the lab by recording all the weapons bus data
during the LTE or release sequence. A bus analyzer is required for this testing. Initiate
the record cycle at the initiation of the sequence (e.g., trigger squeeze, bomb button
depression) and record all data on the weapons bus for the expected period of the
sequence (usually not more than 1 or 2 sec). The data should then be reviewed to ensure
that the sequence is performed in the correct order and that timing requirements are met.
Sequencing or timing that is incorrect will result in either a hung store, release of an
unarmed store, or an unguided munition.
Interlocks must be evaluated to show that release is inhibited if one or more of
the required interlocks are not set. The easiest way to conduct this test is to repeat the
sequencing tests in the previous paragraph with interlocks set and not set and verify
the outcome.
Although not mentioned specifically in this chapter, MIL-STD-1760D messages,
formatting, and timing must be demonstrated successfully. The 1760 bus is described in
detail in chapter 3 of this text. Safety is an overriding concern when evaluating the
message content and format of the armament bus.
10.3 AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

The basic configuration of an air-to-air missile is shown in Figure 10.17.
The airframe type will determine the initial response and the amount of torque
required to execute a maneuver. Typically missiles with wing control (controls at or near
the center of gravity [CG] of the missile) will provide a rapid initial response to control
FIGURE 10.17 ¢ Airframe

Basic Air-to-Air
Missile
Configuration Data Link and
Flight Controls
Guidance Fuse Propulsion

Section
Warhead/Telemetry
FIGURE 10.18 ¢
Airframe Types
Body Lift, Tail Lift, and Wing Control Body Lift, Tail Lift, and Canard Control
Body Lift and Tail Control Body Lift, Wing Lift, and Tail Control
inputs, but large servo torque is required. Missiles with tail control or canard control will
provide a slow initial response, but require relatively low levels of torque. Since less
torque is required, the electromechanical servos can be kept small, requiring less space
with less of a weight penalty. Four typical missile airframe types are shown in
Figure 10.18.
The coordinate systems used by missiles varies; it can be an earth-stabilized coor-
dinate system, such as an INS, it can be referenced to the aircraft coordinate system, or it
can use a polar coordinate system. The thing to remember here is that if the missile is
using a coordinate system other than what the aircraft is using, a coordinate conversion
has to be made prior to sending target location, pointing angle, etc., to the missile. Pitch,
roll, and yaw conventions will also have to be determined and converted, if necessary, to
ensure a successful release. The standard convention system for missile attitude is
The autopilot used in the missile may be a basic lateral autopilot that uses attitude
and rate gyros as well as accelerometers, or it may be a lateral autopilot that uses a
pseudoattitude reference. The latter eliminates the attitude gyros, which saves on weight
and space.
The missile can use any of the tracking methods previously described in chapters 7
and 8 of this text and will not be repeated here. A radar-guided missile can use con-
tinuous semiactive homing, sampled data midcourse with updates from the launch
vehicle, flight by INS with updates, or active terminal guidance. Some typical radar-
guided missiles and their guidance modes are shown in Table 10.6. The Skyflash, a
x Roll (j) y FIGURE 10.19 ¢

Missile Coordinate
System
Pitch (q)
Yaw (y)
TABLE 10.6 ¢ Air-to-Air Guided Missile Modes
Continuous Sampled Data Inertial Terminal

Semiactive Midcourse Midcourse Active
Missile Type (CW and PD) w/Updates w/Updates Guidance
Skyflash Aspide X
Sparrow AIM-7 X
Phoenix AIM-54A X X X
Phoenix AIM-54C X X X X
AMRAAM AIM-120 X X
European semiactive homing missile, and the AIM-54 A/C, a retired, long-range missile
requiring postflight missile messages, are included in the table only to show other types
of guidance.
The way the missile navigates to the target also varies from missile to missile. In the
simplest case, the missile can use pure pursuit, which constantly keeps the target on the
nose. This is the least optimum route, as it takes the long way around. Proportional
navigation is the shortest route to the target but requires a prediction of where the target
will be at missile impact. Some missiles use a combination of the two: initially using
proportional navigation, then transitioning to pure pursuit. These two navigational
modes are shown in Figure 10.20.
The propulsion section determines the maximum velocity and time of flight of the
missile. A boost provides the highest velocity in the shortest period, while a sustained
propulsion design provides a constant velocity over the entire time of flight. The rela-
tionship between thrust, velocity, and time for various propulsion sections is shown in
Figure 10.21.
The warhead section is selected based on the type of damage that is desired. A
continuous rod warhead is designed to cut structural members of the target; it has a
narrow fragment field with relatively low fragment velocity. The warhead is designed
with side-by-side interconnected rods (like an accordion or chain-link fence) that expand
FIGURE 10.20 ¢
Missile Navigation
Intercept
VT A
VM
Line-of-Sight (s )
Pure Pursuit Launch Point
Intercept
VT
VM
Line-of-Sight (s )
Proportional Navigation
FIGURE 10.21 ¢ All-Boost Boost-Sustain All-Sustain

Propulsion
Section Profiles
Thrust
3–5 sec 3–5 sec
MACH 4.5–6
MACH 2.5–3.5
Velocity
MACH 0.7–2.0
Time
as they leave the missile. Annular blast fragmentation (ABF) is designed to penetrate
internal target components with high-velocity fragments (BBs, discrete rods, and
fleshettes). The weapon can also use a zirconium disk as a secondary incendiary damage
mechanism. A selectively aimable warhead (SAW) uses several detonators fired in a
TABLE 10.7 ¢ Warhead Characteristics
Fragment
Warhead Type Fragment Type Velocity Kill Mode Miscellaneous
Continuous Rod Continuous Rod 4000–5000 fps Cuts Surface ● Padding required to
Structure Members ensure continuous
rod – reduces
explosive content
● Narrow field
● Low velocity fragments;
week against high
velocity target
Fragmentation Small Fragments, 6000–8000 fps Penetration of Internal ● Wide spread of
30–2000 Grain Components; Pilot, fragments, 60 –90
Fuel, Engine
● High velocity fragments
good against velocity
target
Annular Blast Discrete Rods, 6000–8000 fps Attack Structural ● Good against high
Fragmentation Light-Weight Members velocity targets
(ABF)
Selectively Discrete Rods Very High Attack Structural ● Requires target
Aimable Warhead Velocity in Members with direction/aspect
(SAW) in Design Aimed Direction Penetration in fuzing
Development >8000 fps Capatbility
sequence to direct the force of the warhead explosion in the direction of the target. The
sequence delay is a function of target closure to maximize damage. This warhead
requires intelligence of the target’s location. A summary of warhead characteristics is
found in Table 10.7.
10.3.1 Air-to-Air Missile Test and Evaluation

A good starting point for the test and evaluation of air-to-air missiles can be found in
MIL-HDBK-1763, ‘‘Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engineering Data Require-
ments and Test Procedures,’’ June 15, 1988. Do not be fooled by the title of the document,
as it provides a lot more guidance than just stores compatibility. It applies to every
activity of the system life cycle involving aircraft and stores, including development,
manufacturing, deployment, operations, support, training, and disposal. The document is
for guidance only and cannot be cited as a requirement. The handbook defines all the
engineering data package requirements and provides standard test methodology, test
instrumentation, and data from each test to establish the extent of aircraft/stores com-
patibility. There are four separate compatibility situations that must be considered when
certification of a store on an aircraft is required:
● Adding inventory/stores (or stores configurations/flight envelopes not previously
authorized) to the authorized stores list of inventory aircraft
● Adding inventory/stores (or stores configurations) to the authorized stores list of
modified or new aircraft
● Adding new or modified stores (or stores configurations) to the authorized stores list
of modified or new aircraft
● Adding new or modified stores (or stores configurations) to the authorized stores list
of inventory aircraft
The handbook provides a good flow diagram for the certification process as well as
a list of applicable documents. Section 3 of the handbook is a glossary, and sections 4
and 5 contain general and detailed test requirements. Appendix A contains detailed
ground test procedures, and appendix B details flight test procedures. Appendix C
describes the compatibility engineering data package (CEDP), which is a standardized
list of reference data essential for determining the extent of aircraft/stores compatibility
and is the source from which service technical publications are derived.
The tests described in the handbook comprise all of the tests necessary to ensure
compatibility. As this text is concerned with systems integration, many of the tests
described in the handbook are beyond the scope of this text (loads and flutter testing, for
example) and are only mentioned here for completeness. It is best to consult with the
experts if you are responsible for this type of testing. Some of the tests, particularly the
lab and ground evaluations, will be accomplished by the engineering department and
will have been accomplished long before you receive the missile for integration testing.
The following discussion refers to missiles; bombs, and their related 1763 requirements,
are addressed in a subsequent section.
The general objectives include
● Analytical study
● Laboratory tests
● Analytical simulation
● Hardware integrated simulation
● Captive carry tests
● Live missile launches
Analytical studies provide a review and understanding of the technical documents.

They also determine the strong and weak points of the proposed system. An analytical
study provides an assessment of the potential performance and defines the specifics for
testing.
Laboratory tests provide a controlled open-loop laboratory environment for
collection of specification data, threshold data, and basic subsystem performance.
Analytical simulation is a mathematical representation of the missile system/
subsystems in closed-loop operation. A part of the analytical model is trajectory simu-
lation, which is a nonlinear 5 or 6 degree of freedom (DOF) aerodynamic and kinematic
model. It provides a detailed representation of the guidance/autopilot functions and a
simplified representation of seeker and signal processing as well as a lethality simulation
(probability of kill [PK]).
Hardware integrated simulation is a closed-loop analytical/hardware representation
of the missile system used to evaluate missile performance as affected by guidance,
seeker, and signal processing.
The systems evaluator will be intimately involved in captive carry and live launch
testing. Captive carry involves tests where the missile is carried aloft into representative
environments (e.g., live targets, ECM, IRCM, decoys, chaff, flares, clutter, atmosphere,
weather). Live missile launches are performed in combat representative environments:
● Clutter backgrounds (desert, sea, rural, cultural, look-up/look-down)
● Target maneuvering
● Multiple targets (RCS, aspect, speed/altitude)
● Weather
● Electronic attack (ECM, IRCM)
10.3.2 Air-to-Air Missile Lab and Ground Tests

These tests are described in detail in appendix A of MIL-HDBK-1763. Many, if not
most, of these tests are accomplished long before the missile is accepted for aircraft
integration. The tests are normally accomplished by the vendor or, in the case of soft-
ware tests, by the aircraft integrator in the systems integration lab. Some of these tests
include
● Seeker tests
● Fuse tests
● Warhead tests
● RCS tests
● Radome tests
● Trajectory simulations
● Launch acceptability region determination
Seeker tests come in many forms. They can involve laboratory tests with RF sti-
mulation in an anechoic chamber or signals hardwired to the seeker. Field tests can be
accomplished with ground-mounted target representations or ground-based seeker
acquisition and tracking of airborne targets in a setup similar to radar roof house testing.
An example of a laboratory test is shown in Figure 10.22. An RF signal generator is used
Power Liquid/Air FIGURE 10.22 ¢

Supplies Cooling Seeker Test Setup
Control section
TM Guidance
Rear R’C’R
Transmitter
Reference
DLQ-38
Data
Recovery RF
Signal
Transmitter Generation
Reference
FIGURE 10.23 ¢
Warhead Velocity Screens
Characterization and
Lethality Test Setup R
Velocity
Monitor
Warhead R
Test
Control
6–10
Witness
Panels
to generate targets to send toward the missile seeker head. The DLQ-38 in Figure 10.22
is a jammer that is used to test the missile’s electronic protection capabilities. The ability
of the seeker to acquire and track the generated target is monitored either in real time or
postflight from the missile telemetry signal (a telemetry package is installed in the
section where the warhead has been removed). Additional cooling may be required, as
the missile will be powered up for much longer periods of time than it would experience
operationally.
Fuse tests verify fuse design thresholds and assess fuse sensitivity. These tests
determine fuse detection capability as a function of target type, size, and aspect. They
also determine vulnerability to electronic attack (premature fusing or failure to arm).
Warhead tests are accomplished with two goals: characterization and lethality.
Characterization tests determine the fragment pattern and velocity; lethality tests
determine the damage mechanisms and PK. A typical warhead characterization and
lethality test setup is shown in Figure 10.23.
Radar cross-section measurements of missiles are accomplished the same way as for
aircraft, which was previously described in chapter 8 of this text. The same can be said
for radome refraction tests; it is important that the refractive errors be known and
accounted for. It is even more critical with missiles, as the sensor FOV is much smaller
than an aircraft radar.
Analytical trajectory simulations are used to determine launch envelopes (at
required PK); these envelopes go by many names, depending on who built the system:
dynamic launch zone (DLZ), missile launch envelope (MLE), launch acceptability
region (LAR), or no-escape envelope. These simulations are also used to investigate
aerodynamic performance and look at the separation trajectory during employment/
launch and jettison.
Launch envelopes are provided to the crew on the heads-up display (HUD) or
tactical situation display when a valid track file is selected and all SMS interlocks are
satisfied. The envelopes are built based on own-ship and target attributes, missile
FIGURE 10.24 ¢
Launch
Beam Acceptability
Envelope
Head-On Tail-On
Tail Aspect
High Aspect
Beam Aspect
60º
120º
performance parameters, and the desired PK. The most common parameters used in the
formulation of the envelope are
● Probability of kill (PK)
● Missile internal electrical power supply, which is limited by either a thermal battery
or gas grain generator
● Missile speed profile, which is based on average missile Mach for the missile time of
flight, target range, and minimum missile airspeed or Mach
● Own-ship airspeed, altitude, and heading
● Target airspeed, altitude, heading, and aspect
● Missile end-game performance (g available)
● Minimum missile closure for fuse functioning
● Missile seeker head gimbal limits
● Actuator servo limitations
The SMS computes the launch envelope for the weapon selected and then displays it
to the crew. The envelope itself looks much like a traffic collision avoidance system
(TCAS) envelope. The envelope is dynamic and varies based on changes in the input
parameters (Figure 10.24).
The analytical simulation addresses the separation region around the airplane for the
first 1 to 3 sec after release/firing. The flow field around the airplane will change based
on airspeed, altitude, angle of attack, weight, acceleration, and presence of stores on the
airplane. The missile, when fired, may not behave as expected, based on changes in the
aforementioned parameters. The loads, flutter, and separations group (engineering,
flight testing, or both) has the responsibility to ensure safe separation is possible for the
operating envelope of the airplane. The initial data modeled in the analytical simulation
will come from wind tunnel results or analysis by similarity. The model will be refined
based on flight test results. The end result of the analysis is an operational employment
envelope (firing/launch as well as jettison) available for the missile (Figure 10.25). More
will be said about these types of tests in the air-to-ground section of this chapter.
10.3.3 Air-to-Air Missile Launcher Qualification Tests

The delivery system of the missile will be either an ejection launcher or a rail
launcher. If the missile to be integrated requires modifications to an existing launcher
FIGURE 10.25 ¢
Separation Region
B A
Jettison With Motor Fire
n
gio
Re
ld
w fie
Flo
FIGURE 10.26 ¢ Ejector

Ejection Launcher Cylinder
Piston Return
Spring
Gas Flow
Control
Piston
Bleed
Hole Breech
Pyrotechnic
Cartridges
Beam
Structure Missile Release
Linkage Pyrotechnic
Ejector Foot
Cartridge
Igniter
or the development of an adapter or new launcher entirely, a full series of tests

similar to those of RTCA/DO-160G will be required; all other implementations
will require a subset of the full testing. The two types of launchers are shown in
Figures 10.26 and 10.27.
Suspension FIGURE 10.27 ¢

Aircraft Electrical
Lug/Bolt Rail Launcher
Connection
Forward Fairing
Rail Launcher
Umbilical
Connection Missile Lug
Missile
Launcher Rail Launcher Rail
Missile Lug Missile Lug
Missile Missile
A B
There are five types of testing associated with launchers. The first set of testing
comprises the qualification tests that are the responsibility of the vendor. The vendor is
responsible for meeting the performance requirements set in the environmental
standards:
● Temperature (high and low, shock and storage)

● High-g load
● Lock-shut firing (ejection launcher, cartridge ignition without missile release)
● Structural static loads (worst-case captive carry and landing loads)
● Dynamic loads (vibration, shock, and acoustic)
● Fatigue (long-term static loads program)
● Rain/moisture intrusion
● Humidity
● Salt spray
● Icing
● Fungus
● Sand and dust
The second set of testing is on-aircraft installation tests, which check compatibility,
electrical connections, clearance, etc. The third test is called a ‘‘pit’’ test or sometimes a
‘‘catcher’s mitt’’ test, where the launcher physically ejects the missile from the aircraft
while the aircraft is on the ground. This is part of the safe separation tests and allows the
program to progress to the fourth set of testing, airborne launch. The ‘‘pit’’ test is not
accomplished with rail launchers, for obvious reasons. The final tests are the lab inte-
gration tests, which are an ongoing series of tests throughout the program development.
The full series of ejection launcher test procedures are summarized in Table 10.8. The
rail launcher testing matrix is similar to the ejection launcher matrix, with the exception
of the ‘‘pit’’ tests, which are not required.
TABLE 10.8 ¢ Ejection Launcher Test Requirements
Ejection Launcher Test Parameters
Tests
Parameters Qualification Aircraft Install Pit Air Launch Laboratory

1. Linear velocity imparted to the missile
2. Angular rate imparted to the missile
3. Missile trajectory
4. Ejector firing
5. Umbilical separation
6. Missile acceleration
7. Sequence of events
8. Foot pressure applied to the missile
9. Cartridge ignition
10. Gas residue effects
11. Maintenance analysis
12. Loading
13. Unloading
14. Access space
15. Electrical connections
16. Visibility of indicators
17. Physical compatibility
18. Handling
19. Safety
20. Electrical circuity performance
The length of time required to clear the aircraft for integration testing is a function
of how many stations and combinations of launchers/missiles are desired. For example,
the AMRAAM can be fired from either a rail or ejector launcher. There may be a
requirement to carry the missile on two wing stations (rail launcher) and four belly
stations (ejector launcher), for a total of six stations. Historical data show that just to
clear the safe separation and jettison envelopes would require approximately 60 assets
(10 separations per station). These tests do not include the ‘‘live fire’’ program, which is
the responsibility of the systems flight test group.
Do not be lulled into believing that you can combine separations and systems testing
to save time and money. The objectives for each of these tests are unique and are
mutually exclusive of each other and therefore are not easily piggybacked with each
other. The data requirements, geometries, targets, and special assets such as jammers are
not the same for separations and systems testing. All too often, decisions are made early
on to combine testing to save time and money. The end result is always the same: out of
budget and out of time without a qualified system.
10.3.4 Air-to-Air Missile Reliability and Maintainability

Reliability and maintainability are normally an operational test and evaluation (OT&E)
requirement, and the systems world rarely gets involved in this type of testing. Relia-
bility is the probability that the missile will provide satisfactory performance for a
specified period of time when used under certain conditions. The maximum time of
Temperature FIGURE 10.28 ¢

21% Distribution of
Missile Service
Failures
Nonenvironmental
(duty cycle,
handling) 48% Vibration
14%
Moisture
10%
Other Environments
Sand and Dust
4%
3%
consideration is the mean time between failure (MTBF) and the minimum time of
consideration is the flight time of a typical operational mission. One would expect that
the reliability would be very high for the short time of an operational mission and then
steadily decrease out to the MTBF time. Typical numbers used in the United States are
about 97% for the operational flight and 35% at the MTBF.
Service failures (failure of the missile to provide satisfactory performance) can be
narrowed down to a few primary causes: nonenvironmental, temperature, vibration,
moisture, sand, and dust. The pie chart in Figure 10.28 shows the typical spread of
service-related failures. It should be noted that the primary cause of these failures is
nonenvironmental, which is a combination of shipping, handling, and component
failure.
Similar to the qualification testing, the reliability and maintenance group performs a
series of reliability ground tests. These tests are designed to detect failures that may be
resident in the missile. A breakdown of these tests and the method of evaluation is
presented in Table 10.9.
A final test commonly used to determine reliability is the all-up-round test (AURT),
which is designed to provide as complete a test as possible of the assembled, ready-to-
use missile without activation of the rocket motor, fuses, and warhead. This test is
performed at contractor facilities, depots, weapons stations, and test sites. The ideal goal
is to detect 100% of all bad missiles and not reject any good missiles. In reality, quality
figures for the AURT are
● Percentage of malfunctioning (bad) missiles detected is approximately 95%
● Percentage of functioning (good) missiles rejected is approximately 5%
A typical AURT stand is shown in Figure 10.29.
10.3.5 Air-to-Air Missile Systems Test

After the missile has been successfully cleared for carriage on our aircraft we can begin
true systems integration testing. As has been said numerous times in this text, we are not
testing the missile (unless, of course, it is a new design). We are testing the integration of
the missile into the aircraft. Missile prep, inventory, tune, MOAT, BIT, and message
sequencing are all tested as previously described under the SMS portion of this chapter.
TABLE 10.9 ¢ Reliability Ground Tests
Environment Failure Source Test Techniques

Percent
Acceleration, Captive Carry <2 Centrifuge
Humidity 5 Combined Temperature, Altitude, and Humidity Chamber
Salt Fog <2 Salt Fog Chamber
Shock, Captive Carry <5 Shakers or Flight Test
Shock, Ignition <5 Drop Test or Electro-Dynamic Shaker
Temperature, Altitude 40 Combined Temperature, Altitude, and Humidity Chamber
Temperature, Shock <5 Soak at One Temperature and Place in a Chamber at Lower Temperature
Vibration, Captive Carry 40 Shaker and Acoustic
Vibration, Transportation <2 Shakers
Altitude <5 Altitude Chamber
FIGURE 10.29 ¢
AURT Test Stand Output Computer
Switching RF
and Generator/
Test Adapter
Equipment
Cooling Power
System Supply
Anechoic Chamber
Up
Umbilical
TTM Control Center
Propulsion Warhead Guidance
R. Rec Section Side
Rear
Signal Fuze Antenna
Hoods
Oscillating Missile Support Stand

Mechanism
Further testing includes ‘‘captive’’ flights, where the missile stays with the airplane, and
‘‘live’’ fire, where the missile is operationally directed at a target.
Captive carry tests are used to ensure that the integration between the missile and
aircraft systems has been accomplished successfully. For these tests, an inert, telemetry-
equipped missile is used. In most test organizations, these inert test vehicles (ITV) are
known as silverbirds and goldenbirds. They have empty warhead and propulsion sec-
tions and are modified to carry electronics, cooling, hydraulics, telemetry, and recording
equipment that are required for captive test flight operations. These ITVs make the
launch aircraft believe that the missile has been launched after a pilot launch command.
Because of the telemetry on board the missile, analysts in real time or postflight can
compare what was sent to the missile (aircraft telemetry) to what was received by the
missile (missile telemetry).
FIGURE 10.30 ¢
Three-Plane Captive
Carry Geometry
3 Target
1 Shooter
2 Carrier
Telemetry
Station
The most common geometries used are called three-plane captive carry tests. In this
scenario, one aircraft acts as the ‘‘shooter,’’ one aircraft (carrying an ITV) acts as the
missile, and one aircraft acts as the target (Figure 10.30).
At the initial setup, planes 1 and 2 detect plane 3 (target) and establish a track file
(e.g., TWS, STT). Once the track file is valid, planes 1 and 2 select a missile for launch
(this is the ITV on each airplane). Plane 1 will count down . . . 3, 2, 1, fire. Planes 1 and 2
both initiate an LTE and plane 2 turns off its radar and initiates a climb ahead and above
of plane 1. Plane 1 continues to track the target and update the ITV on plane 2. Postlaunch
missile messages issued by plane 1 are received by the ITV on plane 2 and the data are
telemetered to the telemetry (TM) station. Messages that are sent by plane 1 as well as
target information are sent to the TM station via the aircraft telemetry. All the information
that is necessary to evaluate the performance of the missile integration is available in the
TM station. Although this discussion is centered around air-to-air guided missiles, this
geometry works for all missiles—AMRAAM, Walleye, SLAM, Harpoon—that have
some type of postlaunch control or update.
The way the information is used is depicted in Figure 10.31.
Working from the top left box in Figure 10.31, the radar detects the target and
telemeters target information (range, range rate, and azimuth). The time, space, position
information (TSPI; see chapter 2) system (right top of Figure 10.31) knows where the
target is and where your aircraft is so it can calculate a true range, range rate, and
azimuth to the target. These values can be compared in real time or postflight and the
accuracy of the radar can be determined. With a weapon selected, the SMS provides
steering commands for the optimum engagement envelope as well as provides the air-
crew with a LAR. On the ground, we can see the steering commands and the LAR
envelope either by down-linked video of the displays or from bus traffic (left side of
second and third boxes in Figure 10.31). Since we have our own-ship parameters
FIGURE 10.31 ¢ Weapon

Data Analysis of a System Parameter Calculation Range Computer
Missile Launch TGT Range RADAR BET
Tracking
RNG Rate GEO
RADARs
Atmospherics
Azimuth
AZ STRG CMD
A/A STRG
EL STRG CMD
Rmax
Ropt LARS
Topt
Own-Ship
State Data
P/L MSG MSG’s
TGT Aspect ANG
TGT RNG North
TGT RNG East MSL Interference
TGT Altitude
A/C Altitude
available on the ground (from the aircraft telemetry) and the own-ship parameters of the
target (from TSPI), we can run them through the steering command and LAR algorithms
and output the true steering and launch envelope. They, in turn, can be compared to the
aircraft-generated data and steering and launch envelope accuracy can be determined.
The final box in the figure is the postlaunch missile messages and commands. We know
what was sent to the missile because this information comes to us in the aircraft tele-
metry. We also know what was received by the missile since that information comes to
us via the missile telemetry. We can compare the two to identify any communications
problems.
The test just described would be initially done under the most benign conditions: for
example, target not maneuvering or jamming, firing at optimum range, in the heart of
the firing envelope. Subsequent tests will measure the true missile–aircraft performance.
Some modifications to the basic test include
● Continuous missile support (illumination, data link) during fire control computer
master mode transitions (AA-NAV-AG)
● Continuous missile support during radar mode transitions (STT-TWS-SAM)
● Continuous missile support during master arm switch manipulations
● Continuous missile support during simultaneous multitarget engagement
● Frequency deconfliction (missile/radar)
● Data link interference
● Continuous missile support during periods of target fading, or after break lock
● Cluster target engagement
● Uncertainties (radar, navigation)
● Jamming targets
When the test team is sure that the missile–aircraft interface is correct (by validation
of the captive program), it can progress to the ‘‘live fire’’ portion of the program.
FIGURE 10.32 ¢
Missile Safety
Footprint
Anticipated
Shooting
Missile
Box
Footprint
Murphy’s
Area
The primary concern of any live fire program is the safety of flight. The test plan that
you write for this event will be the most scrutinized plan that you will ever produce, and
do not be surprised if it takes up to 6 months to get approval; so think ahead. The plan
should be designed just as the captive program was; start with the most benign of
launches and progress to the most difficult ones. Live fire will probably be accomplished
by all of the testing agencies involved from contractor through OT&E.
The first consideration is the footprint of the missile. In most operations, the launch
will be accomplished in a designated shooting box on a specified heading and the
missile’s maximum range can be plotted (Figure 10.32). But what happens if the missile
loses a fin during the launch or if Murphy decides to ride along with you? The missile
safety footprint is built on the notion that the missile can maneuver 360 around the
desired heading. Based on the delivery conditions, the maximum range of the missile is
plotted for every possible track the missile may take. The combination of desired missile
track and possible missile track becomes the safety footprint for the launch.
It should be obvious that this footprint can become quite large when dealing with
long-range missiles. While the along-track range for older AIM-9 missile variants may
only be a few miles, an AIM-120 may include 50 to 60 mi. Very-long-range missiles
may require a footprint on the order of hundreds of miles. This was certainly the case
with the now retired AIM-54C Phoenix missile. Knowing the footprint tells us two
things: where we can fire and how much area needs to be cleared. Missiles can only be
fired in areas that are controlled and that can be cleared of intruders on the day of the
launch. Edwards Air Force Base, in California, is a large flight test center for the U.S.
Air Force, yet it does not control enough area to test even the smallest missiles. Flight
test programs at Edwards must deploy to the large water ranges in order to perform live
fire exercises.
And how do we clear the ranges of traffic on the day of the exercise? This is easier
said than done in many cases. The safety office determines what percentage of traffic
must be cleared prior to launch, and it may be 100%. This will require NOTAMS,
notices to mariners, and maybe boats and aircraft to search the area and chase away
unwanted guests. This operation may commence many hours before the actual launch
time, and a clearance to launch will depend on their success.
Targets for the evaluation must match the characteristics of the target called out in
the test plan. Targets will be drones that are either ground or air launched. Drones can be
enhanced with lenses or flare pots, depending on what target it is trying to mimic. Most
organizations try not to ‘‘kill’’ the drone but rather measure miss distance to the target
without detonating a warhead. The drones are then recovered for reuse. Kills are
determined by miss distance telemetry in the missile or via TSPI sources (normally
cinetheodolites).
As with the ITV, the missiles used for live fire, especially for contractor and
development test and evaluation (DT&E) testing, will have the warhead removed and a
telemetry package installed in the missile. OT&E, concerned more with operational
realism, will use full-up rounds without telemetry. The drone may also have some
telemetry either for position or own-ship parameters.
You might be thinking to yourself, ‘‘This sounds like a lot of money!’’ It is. Live fire
exercises require a lot of time and money in preparation, range clearance, and assets.
Many organizations run a full dress rehearsal a day or two prior to the actual launch to
ensure all aspects of the test have been addressed. This is sound thinking, but it effec-
tively doubles the cost. Since these operations do cost a lot of money, you want to make
sure that the probability of an abort is low. This is normally accomplished by redundancy:
backup drone, backup shooter, and backup missile. Redundancy does indeed reduce the
probability of an aborted mission due to a failure, but it introduces more assets, players,
and once again more money. The operation is going to be some combination of all of
these things, and close cooperation with program management is imperative.
Aside from a wayward missile, the biggest safety concern during live fire is com-
munications. There are many players involved in the exercise: area clearance, range
safety, test conductor, TM station, TSPI site, drone control, ground control intercept
(GCI), shooter, backup shooter, safety chase, and photo chase. All of these players have
communications and are an integral part to the success of the mission. If radio discipline
is not exercised, the likelihood of a mishap is significantly increased. Suppose a ‘‘clear
to launch’’ call is given to the drone delivery aircraft and is misinterpreted by the shooter
as a ‘‘clear to launch’’ his missile. Shooting down the drone delivery vehicle would
certainly ruin someone’s day. The entire exercise must be scripted, with distinct calls
made for each event along a timeline. That way everyone can follow along and know
exactly the status of that timeline.
The amount of data acquired during these evaluations is enormous, but more
importantly, it will come from many different asynchronous sources. If you remember
back to chapter 2, asynchronous implies that the data arrive at different times and
therefore must be time aligned and merged. The data station that is accustomed to
handling three or four streams of telemetry data is now faced with time aligning and
merging five or six streams, and it must be done in real time. It must be done in real time
because an abort must be called if an analyst detects a problem with the missile, the
aircraft, or a sensor.
Because of the complexity and cost of live fire exercises, they are usually fairly
small in number. They are not small in duration and cost for the reasons previously
mentioned. Table 10.10 provides some historical data on previous missile live fire
programs. New missile programs typically average about 90 live fires over the life of the
program, whereas modifications entail a slightly lower number.
Although there will be many other things going on, the time to start working on the
live fire plan is about 1 year before the proposed start date. The individuals assigned to
TABLE 10.10 ¢ System Missile Launches
Contractor U.S. Navy Test and Operational Test

Demonstration Evaluation/Joint Test and Evaluation
System Test (CDT) and Evaluation (JTE) (OPEVAL) Total
1 1
AIM-9L Sidewinder 15 20 30 65
AIM-7F Sparrow 62 362 1–253 11–25 92
AIM-54A Phoenix 63 29 30 122
AGM-84 Harpoon 26 18 24 68
Skyflash Aspide 12 11 5 28
F-15/AIM-7F 7 15 34 56
F-14/AIM-7F 15 6 21
Active Fuse
AIM-7M Prototype 9 (13)6 29 (38)6 35 (45)6 96
Sparrow 54
AIM-120 Valid 205 10 (13)6 42 (55)6 22 (29)6 97
AMRAAM
1
Approximate values.
2
Twenty tests originally planned for a combined CDT/NTE.
3
Negative results of initial OPEVAL resulted in a second OPEVAL.
4
Two tests per contractor.
5
A total of 16 assets per contractor originally planned but reduced to 10 assets per contractor during validation.
6
Test (planned) assets based on estimated achievement ratio of approximately 1.3.
coordinate this effort should have no other responsibilities during this time frame,
should be able to work with program management, and should have a lot of patience.
10.4 AIR-TO-GROUND WEAPONS

For air-to-ground weapons evaluation, especially ballistics testing and accuracy, I
recommend AGARD-AG-300, volume 10, ‘‘Weapons Delivery Analysis and Ballistic
Flight Testing,’’ July 1992. This AGARD document provides an historical look at
computing ballistics errors and measuring accuracies of unguided weapons. It provides
an excellent baseline for the evaluator in how to go about measuring errors within the
system and how to account for them in the final delivery. Although the document is
based on the method of test by the 3246th Test Wing at Eglin Air Force Base, in Florida,
appendix A contains a list of questions regarding how ballistics analysis and testing are
performed in other nations; responses are provided by Canada, Germany, and France.
Appendix B of MIL-HDBK-1763, ‘‘Aircraft/Stores Compatibility: Systems Engi-
neering Data Requirements and Test Procedures,’’ June 15, 1998, provides flight test
procedures for the following:
● Ballistic tests (test 290)
● Weapon free-stream ballistics test (test 291)
● Operational flight program (OFP) ballistics evaluation test (test 292)
● Separation effects derivation test (test 293)
● Operational flight program (OFP) ballistics verification test (test 294)
FIGURE 10.33 ¢ z
Vertical Plane Bomb
Trajectory
V0 rKD
D VT2, KD SCD
2
z0
ẋ
g
ż
VT
mg
x
x0
V0 - Release Velocity of Bomb g - Flight Path Angle

VT - True Airspeed of Bomb r - Air Density
D - Drag Force on Bomb
KD - Drag Parameter of Bomb (SCD)
S - Surface/Area of Bomb (Frontal)
CD - Drag Coefficient
The purpose of this section is not to repeat the excellent work already done in the
referenced documents, but to look at and try to understand the basic theory of air-to-
ground weapons delivery, know the inputs required by the weapons system computer to
solve the delivery problem, and be familiar with the process used in air-to-ground testing.
In the end, it is desired that the reader understand the concept of error budget analysis.
The basic problems in air-to-ground weapons delivery are threefold. The aircraft
delivery system must determine the position of the target, predict the trajectory of the
weapon (missile, bomb, bullet, or rocket) and provide guidance, and release the weapon
in such a way that its trajectory coincides with the target position. In order to make the
problem as simple as possible we can assume a few things. We can assume that there are
no normal forces (i.e., no angle of attack or sideslip) and that there are negligible gyro-
scopic forces (unlike a bullet). We can also assume, due to the low ejection velocity, that
there is no motion with respect to the air mass in the vertical plane and nonaerodynamic
forces are only due to gravity. With these assumptions we can plot the trajectory of a
bomb, for example, in the vertical and horizontal planes (Figure 10.33 and Figure 10.34).
The drag parameter of the bomb (KD) is calculated separately for each store and can
be different with changes in the fin assemblies. These are known as low-drag and high-
drag configurations. A representative diagram of the drag parameter versus Mach for a
low-drag and high-drag configuration is shown in Figure 10.35.
The bomb equations of motion come directly from Newton. We know that mass
times the acceleration equals the sum of the applied forces, therefore mass times
acceleration in the x plane equals the sum of forces in the x plane, and mass times
acceleration in the z plane equals the sum of forces in the z plane. The mathematical
derivation of the resulting equations of motion is not important to this discussion.
The equations (since they represent acceleration) are integrated once to get velocity.
The velocity of the bomb is added to the velocity of the air mass; this resultant velocity
(with respect to the earth) is integrated to compute trajectory (position). This process can
y FIGURE 10.34 ¢
Vw Horizontal Plane
Bomb Trajectory
P3
ind
it h W Vwtf
ec t ory w
Traj
y0
V0 Trajectory without Wind P2 P1
x0 x
P1 Impact Point in Vacuum

P2 Impact Point without Wind
P3 Impact Point with Wind
tf Time of Flight of Bomb
V0 Release Velocity of Bomb
Vw Wind Velocity
x Range Displacement
y Cross-Range Displacement
Low-Drag High-Drag FIGURE 10.35 ¢

Configuration Configuration Bomb Drag
Parameter (KD) for
3.45 1.33 the Mk 81 Bomb
3.38 1.26
3.31 1.19
KD 102
KD 102
3.24 1.12
3.17 1.05
3.10 0.98
3.03 0.91
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
Mach Number Mach Number
be calculated in real time in the weapons computer and repeated until the computed
bomb position coincides with the target position at the time of impact.
In air-to-ground gunnery, the equations of motion are nearly the same as for bombs,
with the following exceptions:
● Large release velocity gives much a shorter time of flight and a much different drag
profile
● Reduced importance of aircraft velocity
● Gyroscopic effects are not negligible but are unpredictable and are included in
nominal dispersion
At any rate, the differential equations are integrated to determine the trajectory exactly
as with bombs.
For rockets, the equations of motion differ from bombs and bullets because of a
time-varying force (thrust) along the longitudinal axis, and the mass of the rocket is also
changing with the depletion of propellant. Significant normal (nonlongitudinal) forces
exist, but like the gyroscopic forces on a bullet they are included in the dispersion.
Trajectory is calculated the same as with bombs and bullets.
10.4.1 Air-to-Ground Release Geometry

We know the forces that act upon a store as it is released from an aircraft, but how do
they affect what the pilot will visualize? Figure 10.36 shows the geometry for one given
set of conditions. That is, that an aircraft at a given range to the target at a known
velocity and one set of wind conditions, at a given altitude, known groundspeed, track,
aim-off-distance, etc., which releases a store will have an impact point as shown in the
figure. Any changes to the parameters without compensation elsewhere will lead to the
bomb impacting at a different point. In the predigital days (e.g., F-4, A-7), pilots used
fixed sights to deliver weapons. The delivery conditions were prebriefed, and the pilot
made every attempt to meet the delivery conditions as closely as possible to get an
accurate bomb impact. Pilots learned to compensate based on the conditions at hand. If
the pilot was too fast on the delivery he would release early because he knew that being
fast would result in a long bomb. He would adjust the sight depression for head- or
tailwinds and offset the airplane into the wind for crosswinds. Today a computer does
the compensation and tells the pilot where the bomb will hit, but input errors to the
calculations will still produce a bad bomb. The evaluator needs to understand the
mechanics of the trajectory to troubleshoot bad bomb circular error probable (CEP),
even with an automated system.
Manual weapons delivery is simply the procedures and techniques that allow the
pilot to compute a weapons release point without the aid of a computer. In manual
weapons delivery, the pilot uses a limited set of cues to first determine how to initially
aim his plane at the target and then determine the actual release point. To do this, the
FIGURE 10.36 ¢ Release Geometry Total Depression/Sight Setting

Release Geometry
Horizontal r
g ar r
θ
gr fr D
α fr
Yr
h ath
Pat
light Sr
ight P
F Fl
g gr
Aim-Off Distance Bomb Range
r = Weapon release Sr = Slant range

g = Flight path angle D = Total depression
gr = Flight path angle + SDFP a = AOA
fr = SDFP ar = ZSL AOA
q = Pitch angle (climb/dive) Yr = Release altitude
pilot uses two sets of cues: the gun sight aiming reticle (pipper) and the aircraft instru-
ments (airspeed, dive angle, attitude, and altitude). To understand manual bombing, the
pilot has to understand the basics of weapons ballistics.
Every weapon that is dropped from a plane is affected by gravity; when the weapon
is released, it moves forward and down. During weapons delivery, a pilot selects an aim-
off point at some distance beyond the target; if the pilot were to maintain a constant dive
angle, the aircraft would impact the ground at this point. If a weapon is dropped or fired
from this plane, it will never impact at the aim-off point, but at some distance short of
this point. A gun sight depression angle (mil setting) is used to advise the pilot of where
the real impact point will be (as long as all other flight parameters are correct).
In looking at other parameters of the delivery equation, we can see the effects of not
releasing in the correct flight conditions:
● Altitude (using sight picture): higher than planned will result in a shorter bomb, lower
than planned will result in a longer bomb (i.e., higher than planned gives early sight
picture on target and results in a short bomb; lower than planned gives late sight
picture on target and results in a long bomb)
● Altitude (manual bombing, i.e., no sight picture and relying solely on proper release
parameters/conditions): higher than planned results in a long bomb, lower than
planned results in a short bomb
● Airspeed: higher than planned gives a longer bomb, slower than planned gives a
shorter bomb
● Roll: right wing down throws the bomb to the right, left wing down throws the bomb
to the left
● Yaw: the airplane track needs to cross the target
● Pitch: a shallow dive angle gives a shorter bomb, a steep dive angle gives a longer
bomb (see the explanation for altitude; a shallow dive angle gives an early sight
picture)
● g: a negative g gives a longer bomb, a positive g gives a shorter bomb
● Range: a shorter slant range gives a longer bomb, a longer slant range give a shorter
bomb
● Winds: wind tends to affect lighter and higher drag weapons more adversely than
heavier and lower drag weapons; a tailwind gives you a longer bomb, a head wind
gives a shorter bomb
● Head add/tail subtract: for a headwind you add to the depression angle, for a tailwind
you subtract from the mil setting; a nominal 1 mil/knot is commonly used
● Crosswind: you need to offset the aim-off point into the wind; a nominal 10 ft/knot
offset is commonly used; you can also just ‘‘fly your butt over the target’’ (crab)
In modern weapons delivery systems, the computations for release are made in the
weapons release computer or in the stores management processor. The computer uses
own-ship inputs such as airspeed, altitude, and attitude; an accurate measure of range to
the target (radar, laser range finder [LRF], and GNSS); and ballistics information to
compute where the weapon will impact. Other information the computer will need is the
fudge factor determined during separation effects testing, which will be discussed later.
The continuous computing impact point (CCIP) is an automatic bombing mode

wherein the computer continuously solves the bomb’s free-fall equations and displays in
the HUD the predicted impact point. Thus the pilot simply ‘‘flies’’ the pipper to the target
and depresses the bomb release (pickle) button. To make the calculations, the computer
needs to know the aircraft’s speed, dive angle, and height above target, and the bomb’s
drag coefficients.
Once the CCIP is selected, a bomb fall line (BFL) is drawn between the flight path
marker and the pipper. The pilot’s job is to fly the CCIP pipper across the target. When
the pipper is coincident with the target, the pilot depresses and holds the pickle button for
release. Normally, at pickle button depression the bomb is released immediately. How-
ever, if the instantaneous bomb range is shorter than can be displayed in the HUD (bomb
impact point below the nose), the CCIP pipper is actually a pseudo-CCIP pipper and the
weapon system will automatically enter a delayed continuous computed impact point
(DCCIP) mode and a delayed bomb release cue (horizontal bar) will appear on the BFL.
Assuming the pilot continues to keep the pickle button depressed (providing release
consent), when the horizontal bar reaches the CCIP pipper, the flight path marker flashes
and the bomb is released. Between pickle and release the pilot must follow the horizontal
steering guidance by keeping the flight path marker on the postdesignate BFL.
There are other factors that can affect the outcome of any weapons delivery:
● Bomb physical properties
● Atmospheric conditions
● Bomb separation effects
The bomb physical properties are the differences in mass and weight, and therefore
‘‘ballistics,’’ in bomb-to-bomb comparisons. Atmospheric conditions include unknown
winds, shear, and pressure gradients. The store is usually considered to be free of
separation effects (aircraft influence) 1 to 3 sec after release when it reaches steady-state
conditions. What happens during the first 3 sec identifies the true trajectory of the store.
AGARD-AG-300, volume 10, presents a concise summary of data grouped by each of
the four error sources (the three just noted as well as errors resulting from aircraft release
conditions). The table is repeated here (Table 10.11) for completeness.
As can be seen from the table, the two largest contributors to errors are release
conditions and separation effects. Release conditions for the most part are now handled
in software, and there is better quality control in the fabrication of weapons. Separation
effects need to be determined by the joint test team, so they too may be accounted for
in software.
Separation effects need to be accounted for in manual as well as automated weapons
deliveries. There are two ways of determining separation effects of weapons: statistical
TABLE 10.11 ¢ Predicted Error Sources for Mk 82 Low-Drag Deliveries (TAS/Altitude/Dive Angle)
450 knots/ 360 knots/ 450 knots/ 360 knots/

Error Source/Test Conditions 5000 ft/Level 5000 ft/Level 8000 ft/45 8000 ft/45
Aircraft Release Conditions 57% 40% 53% 54%
Bomb Physical Properties 10% 30% 7% 5%
Atmospheric Conditions 2% 8% 1% 2%
Separation Effects 31% 22% 39% 39%
and analytical. If an infinite number of bombs were dropped while trying to hold all
other release conditions the same, the CEP would identify the separation effect on the
weapon. This method is sometimes called the ‘‘offset correction method.’’ This method
is pooh-poohed by purists, as it could take quite a bit of time and many weapons
deliveries.
The other method is determined analytically by first observing the separation effects
in wind tunnel testing where the initial corrections are made. Follow-on flight separa-
tions using high-speed stores separation cameras and TSPI (normally cinetheodolites)
tracking from release to impact will determine true trajectories, and adjustments to the
release algorithm or manual depression settings can be made. This method is detailed in
MIL-HDBK-1763 test 293; the test describes the requirements, assets, data collection,
and analysis necessary to obtain separation effects.
It is important to note that these tests would have to be carried out with all weapons
loads and aircraft configurations, as the separation effects will change. Once again, the
reader is referred to AGARD-AG-300, volume 10, which is covered in section 10.6.
10.4.2 Air-to-Ground Sources of Errors

The first source of error is weapon boresighting, or where the weapon is looking.
Correct weapon boresighting is critical for guns, rockets, and missiles and less critical
for free-fall (nonpropelled) bomb deliveries. But boresight errors may affect weapon
separation. Abnormal weapon separation might cause a flight safety hazard or affect
the bomb range. Weapon boresighting is verified on the ground (carriage installation)
and modeled for flight. The weapon boresight may change during differing flight
conditions. Wings may twist in certain flight regimes, which may affect the boresight
of wingtip-mounted munitions; boresight changes in flight are accounted for in the
OFP software.
The second source of error is the system boresighting. By revisiting Figure 10.38,
we can see that a failure of any of the systems onboard the aircraft to provide accurate
range, altitude, depression angle, attitude, and groundspeed will produce an error in the
impact point. System boresighting is performed in order to optimize weapon delivery
accuracy by
● Minimizing pilot aiming errors
● Minimizing sensor LOS errors
● Minimizing sensor ranging errors
● Minimizing postdesignate aim-point drift
Pilot aiming errors can be caused by a number of things. The first is the design eye
point (DEP) in the cockpit. The DEP has been addressed several times already in this
text. One can imagine that a pilot who is sitting too high in the cockpit will have a later
sight picture and the bomb will go long; the reverse is true for a pilot who is sitting lower
than the DEP. Any parallax errors in the HUD will also cause aiming errors; the true
world may not be what the pilot sees through the HUD. Parallax errors may also show up
in the HUD video recording system. Since the HUD video is a prime tool in data ana-
lysis and error budgeting, it is imperative that the evaluator determine any differences
between the recorded HUD picture and the picture that the pilot sees. This is accom-
plished by comparing the HUD video to the verbal pilot feedback during flight testing.
FIGURE 10.37 ¢ A
2 B
F-15 References to 5
1 3 C
Boresight
D
4
E
Reference lines: Angles:

A - Gun cross line, zero sightline 1 - Angle of attack
B - Water line (WL), Fuselage reference line 2 - Gun cross elevation angle
(FRL), Radar boresight line (2° or 35 Mils above WL)
C - Aim-9 missile boresight line 3 - Pipper depression angle from zero sightline
D - Aircraft flight path 4 - Pipper depression angle from flight path
E - Depressed pipper sightline 5 - Aim-9 weapon depression angle
(0.5° or 9 Mils)
FIGURE 10.38 ¢ A
2 B
F-16 References to 5 C
1 3
Boresight D
4
E
Reference lines: Angles:

A - Gun cross line, zero sightline 1 - Angle of attack
B - Water line (WL), Fuselage reference line 2 - Gun cross elevation angle
(FRL), Radar boresight line (2 or 35 Mils above WL)
C - Aim-9 missile boresight line 3 - Pipper depression angle from zero sightline
D - Aircraft flight path 4 - Pipper depression angle from flight path
E - Depressed pipper sightline 5 - Aim-9 weapon depression angle
(0.5 or 9 Mils)
Sensor errors due to incorrect boresighting (or incorrect parallax correction within
the OFP) will also cause impact errors. The onboard radar may be used to calculate the
range to the target and the height of the target. Range is accomplished by pulse delay
operations, and determination of height is obtained by use of the radar depression angle.
If the radar is not boresighted to the ‘‘system’’ (everyone is referenced to the same point
in space), errors in range and height of the target will occur. This is demonstrated in
Figures 10.37 and 10.38, which depict the references to boresight in the F-15 and F-16,
respectively. You will notice that in both cases the fuselage reference line (FRL), DEP,
and radar bore line are all aligned. In the case of the F-15, the AIM-9 bore line is offset
from the FRL, and the same is true for the centerline and wing stations on the F-16.
These are parallax errors, and are corrected for in software to allow the stores, sensors,
and pilot to look at the same point in space.
Like the radar, a laser is used to calculate range to the target and altitude. The
pointing angle is critical in determining these measurements. Similarly, the laser ‘‘spot’’
must be shown correctly on the HUD for pilot awareness. An incorrectly displayed laser
spot will be corrected by the pilot, resulting in an impact error. Other electro-optical
(EO) systems such as TV and FLIR provide the weapons solution with azimuth
and elevation (pointing angle) of the target position. An error in this input will slave
the ranging device (laser or radar) to the wrong position, again resulting in range and
altitude errors. Even small angular errors can contribute to large errors in the weapon
impact point if released at long ranges (angular error subtends more range at greater
distances).
A targeting pod may house the EO systems (laser, FLIR, TV), and incorrect
boresighting of the pod or incorporation of the parallax corrections will contribute to
a bad bomb. Not thought of normally as a weapon’s sensor, the INS provides key
inputs to the weapons release algorithms. Groundspeed (cross-track and along-track),
attitude (pitch, roll, and yaw), g (acceleration in three axes), and rates are all pro-
vided by the INS. You know from the discussions in chapter 5 of this text that the
INS is only as effective as its alignment to each of the three axes. Although this has
become much easier in recent years with GPS/INS integrated systems, where the INS
can align from the GPS, there are basic mechanical problems that can contribute to
gross errors.
There have been documented instances where the INS was not installed properly
and the case did not seat properly in its compartment. Imagine a box that is not square
with the corners but rather ‘‘rides up’’ against the compartment wall. The INS, because
of its mechanical alignment, will induce an error equal to the angle of the case. Also,
remember that the vector velocities and accelerations are also formulated from these
angles.
A second item worth noting regarding the INS (and, in truth, the aircraft navigation
system) is the possible mismatch between cursor placement and aircraft position. This is
a case where the pilot places the cursor over a target such as a HUD, FLIR, or radar, and
the target position coordinates (obtained from the navigation system) are fed to the
weapons release computers. If the sensor presentation is not perfectly aligned with the
navigation system, an error in position will be sent to the processors, resulting in a poor
delivery. An easy test is to designate known target locations with the sensor systems and
read on the data bus the coordinates that are being sent to the weapons release
computers.
The boresighting process must be initiated as part of the flight test preparation
period. The evaluator needs to account for all possible errors and endeavor to minimize
their impact on the ballistic accuracy tests. In many cases, the errors are known and are
accounted for in the weapons release algorithms in the OFP. The evaluator needs to
know which ‘‘fudge factors’’ are modeled into the software; yet another instance where
the evaluator must be as smart as the engineer that designed the system. Only after you
have a firm grasp of potential problems should the test team embark on weapons
delivery flight testing.
The final contributor to errors is the pilot. In manual weapons delivery profiles, the
pilot needs to meet the delivery parameters exactly or the weapon will not impact at the
desired location. In a computerized delivery, the software will compensate for not being
on the exact parameters, but the pilot still needs to stabilize on parameters in order to
allow the processor to perform its job. The weapons release computers use information
provided by the sensors; if the delivery is dynamic rather than completely stabilized, the
fire control solutions will still be in error due to system lag.
10.4.3 Minimum Release Altitude

When evaluating the live fire of missiles we considered the safety footprint of the
missile. With air-to-ground weapons we concern ourselves with a minimum release
altitude (MRA). The MRA must be determined before the release of live weapons. The
MRA is defined as the greatest of the following:
● Altitude lost during pullout plus some safety buffer
● Minimum altitude required for safe escape
● Vertical drop of the weapon required for fuse arming
The altitude lost during pullout is a function of
● Gross weight
● True airspeed
● Dive angle
● Pullout load factor (g)
The safety office must take into consideration
● Delivery stick length
● Pilot response
● Delay (1 to 2 sec)
● AOA limiters
● Aircraft G limits
The safety buffer that is applied is generally given as a function of release altitude,
release speed, and dive angle.
The aircraft flight path has to remain outside the weapon fragmentation envelope
during weapon delivery. Weapon fragment travel charts (1/1000), which depict vertical
and horizontal fragment travel range and the frag full up/frag full down time (time it
takes for the maximum vertical travel of the bomb fragments), are used to compute the
envelope. Fragment travel is a function of the type of weapon and warhead, the target
density altitude, and the impact angle. Safe escape should take all possible weapons
failure modes into consideration.
The weapon has to be armed before fuse functioning criteria are reached (impact,
proximity, etc.). A minimum fuse arming time is required to allow safe separation of
the weapon from the aircraft during release (bird hits, bomb-to-bomb collisions, etc.).
Low-drag munitions generally have high minimum arming delays (4 to 6 sec minimum).
The vertical drop required for fuse arming is a function of the weapon/fuse combination,
release altitude, release speed, and dive angle.
10.5 MIL-HDBK-1763 TEST REQUIREMENTS

An integral part of validating the aircraft–stores interface is the assurance that the
weapon, when employed, will hit the target. MIL-HDBK-1763 addresses this validation
as ballistics tests. The handbook is for guidance only; it cannot be cited as a requirement.
If it is cited as a requirement, the contractor does not have to comply. The handbook
applies to all Agencies within the U.S. DoD and Industry with determining the extent
of compatibility between military aircraft and aircraft stores.
Four separate compatibility situations must be considered when certification of a

store on an airplane is required:
– Adding inventory/stores (and/or configurations/flight envelopes not previously
authorized) to an inventory A/C
– Adding inventory/stores (and/or configurations) to the authorized stores list of
– Adding new or modified stores (configurations) to the authorized stores list of
– Adding new or modified stores (configurations) to the authorized stores list of
inventory aircraft
The certification process is not an easy one; the average duration for the aircraft/
store certification process lasts just over 3 years. As with all of the military and civilian
guidance there is a long list of reference material provided to the reader: for example,
Mil-B-81006B, which is the demonstration of dispersion requirements for free-fall
bombs, is noted (this spec will be covered later and is mandatory). Another disclaimer in
the document states that in the event of a conflict between the text of the document and
the references cited the text takes precedence. Nothing in the document, however, can
supersede applicable laws and regulations unless a waiver has been obtained. The
document provides a glossary of terms and notes that there are some differences
between USAF and USA terminology, such as store certification versus airworthiness
qualification.
The handbook is divided into two sections: general requirements, and detailed
requirements, which are further broken down into ground and flight requirements. The
procedures for each of the ground and flight tests are defined in appendices A and B
of the handbook; appendix C describes the engineering data package, which must be
submitted for stores certification consideration. Many of the general and specific
requirements are covered by engineering, loads, flutter and P&FQ groups within the test
organization before the aircraft and store arrive at the systems group for evaluation; this
can be different from organization to organization. Tests that are nonspecific to systems
will only be treated as an overview in this section.
10.5.1 MIL-HDBK-1763 General Test Requirements

Physical compatibility review is the first consideration and looks at the store to see if it
can be interfaced properly:
– Mechanical compatibility (e.g., suspension equipment, connectors, ejectors, lug
spacing)
– Electrical compatibility (e.g., power, pin assignments, wire size, routing, antenna
requirements)
– Optical compatibility (e.g., wavelength, line run, fiber optic size)
An aid in this evaluation is the Aircraft Stores Interface Manual (ASIM), which is
owned by Naval Air Systems Command in PAX River, Maryland.
Structural analysis is an engineering function and a detailed analysis is required
if the store is not similar enough in nature to other previously qualified stores.
This analysis is covered in Mil-HDBK-244A, ‘‘Guide to Aircraft/Stores Compatibility.’’
An analysis of the structural integrity of the store itself as well as the loading effects
on the aircraft and the suspension equipment must be undertaken. Myriad effects may
have to be analyzed such as strength envelopes (maneuvering, takeoff, and landing),
change of CG due to sloshing liquid, fatigue, ground vibration, and dynamic hang-fire
loads.
Aerodynamic analysis is also in the purview of engineering, and their greatest
concern, other than loads defined previously, is the change of performance and handling
qualities of the carrying aircraft. In every contract that’s adding a store to the aircraft, it
will state in the ground rules and assumptions that ‘‘the addition of the store will have no
impact on the performance of the aircraft.’’ This, of course, is rarely the case. Changes in
the performance and handling qualities could be influenced by weight and CG changes,
changes in lift or increases in drag, asymmetric loads or changes with gust conditions,
and the location of the store with relation to the engine inlet or loss of trim function. The
United States requires the reader to use Mil-A-8860B (AS), ‘‘General Specification for
Airplane Strength and Rigidity.’’
Aeroelasticity is really the study of interactions on the airplane between aero-
dynamic, inertial and elastic forces. With the addition of a new store, it would be
important to see how that store reacts with other stores and flow fields on the airplane.
Aeroelastic consideration looks at multiple aircraft configurations (with the new store)
and their impact on the aeroelastic stability of the entire system, including freedom from
flutter. Multiple load-outs would be evaluated during TO and landings, maneuvering and
cruise, throughout the operating envelope of the aircraft. Since this would entail multiple
aircraft configurations, comparing the new configurations to similar configurations
previously cleared provides a low cost method for a preliminary analysis.
One of the most important pre-flight analyses is that of determining the separation
characteristics of a store, because it affects aircraft safety and weapon accuracy. Proper
use of predictive methods for store separation enhances the safety of store delivery and
jettison during flight testing. Aircraft-store certification flight test programs can be
reduced in scope and cost by reducing full-scale based on analysis and positive corre-
lation of predictions with the flight test data (test-evaluate-analyze). Environmental
analysis of the store, suspension equipment, and any other affected aircraft components
should be qualified to the limits in their respective specifications. These limits may be
substantiated by the procedures described in Mil-Std-810G or RTCA/DO-160G.
There is a need to analyze the effects of gas and other by-products produced by
thrust-augmented stores. The analysis is concerned with two major effects of these
stores:
– The ingestion of the plume (expended gas and suspended foreign material) by the
aircraft engine(s)
– The impingement of the plume on the aircraft surfaces or other stores
Engine ingestion analysis is intended to address the gas plume and any foreign
material suspended within the plume. In a perfect world, the engine would not ingest
any of these gases or by-products. The analysis looks at the maximum amount of
gases that may be ingested at varying flight conditions (e.g., altitude, attitude, A/S)
and seeks to find which of these cases will cause detrimental effects on the aircraft
such as flameouts, overspeed, and non–self-recoverable surge stalls. After the store
has been satisfied with respect to the engine ingestion problems, an analysis must be
made of the impingement effects of the gas plume on the aircraft or on other stores.
Factors that should be considered are:
– Residue build-up and its chemical composition
– Corrosion
– Blast overpressure
– Shock wave
– Thermal effects
– Erosion due to the velocity of the exhaust by-products
Similar to exhaust gas impingement an analysis must also be performed on the
effects of gun gas. Gunfire generates large volumes of gun gas, which is generated at a
rapid rate and is a direct function of the propellant per round, firing rate, and burst
length; gun gas also becomes flammable and explosive when mixed with the outside
atmosphere. The effects considered during exhaust gas impingement are also considered
for gun gas impingement.
An analysis of the ballistic behavior of a store in the presence of separation effects
must be accomplished if accuracy requirements are to be achieved and is assessed for
two store flight regimes. The first is the free-stream ballistics, which are independent of
the releasing aircraft and occur after initial store separation disturbances have decayed.
The second is for the entire store flight trajectory and is characteristic of the weapon, the
releasing aircraft, specific aircraft configuration, and release conditions. Ballistics vali-
dation is accomplished in one of two ways. Undisturbed trajectories can be analyzed to
calculate a ballistic drag coefficient and a ballistic dispersion (CEP); the CEP must be
less than the allowable maximum compatible with an estimate of system accuracy
desired for the worst anticipated delivery system. If ballistics and CEP of the store is not
known it will be necessary to conduct and analyze drops to establish aircraft independent
ballistics; if such drops are required, Mil-B-81006 should be employed to minimize the
number of drops required.
The assessment of ballistic accuracy for the store/aircraft release system requires a
much larger envelope of release conditions and configurations than is required to
establish aircraft independent ballistics. Maximum ballistic CEP values for each
weapon/aircraft combination should be assigned based on PK required, system accuracy,
and the ratio of ballistic error to system error. Free-flight drop tests will determine what
limitations must be placed on aircraft release envelopes and store loading configura-
tions. If employed, an analysis of missile, rocket, and gun accuracy should be conducted.
The effects of missile system errors (background clutter, bore-sighting, installation,
own-ship, and target parameters) should be included in the analysis. For rockets, bore-
sight effect and system errors should be included in the analysis. The error budget and
prediction should address subsystems that interface with the missile system that may
affect hardware and software performance.
1763 addresses the variables affecting gun performance as system errors and
target errors. System errors are ammo dispersion; gun-pointing error; fire control predic-
tion error; aircraft position, orientation, speed, and acceleration errors; and any other
errors like boresight, target track, and range. Target errors include target type, maneuvers,
and range.
Safe escape analyses are required on all munitions systems that could potentially be
hazardous to the aircraft due to munitions fragmentation. For the USAF, the analysis is
conducted IAW methodology described in the Advanced Safe Escape Program (ASEP),
for the USN, IAW the Probability of Aircraft Tactical Hazard (PATH) manuals, and for
the USA, IAW with AIR STD 20/21 for the worst case within the predicted launch
envelope.
EMI, EMC, EMP, and lightning analyses are conducted IAW Mil-Std-464A.
10.5.2 MIL-HDBK-1763 Detailed Test Requirements

Stores certification tests are conducted for two reasons. The first is to validate the results
of the analysis; obviously, if the test results compare favorably to the predictions, the
test program can be significantly shortened. The second reason is to provide data where
no qualitative prediction can be made; data must be examined to determine the
acceptability of the aircraft-store configuration that is being evaluated. Ground and
flight tests for store certification are contained in appendices A and B of 1763. When
determining the extent of testing required, it is important to consult with the using
agency to determine the mission requirements:
– Airspeed and altitude
– Acceleration for carriage, employment, and jettison
– Range
– Delivery modes
– Delivery accuracy
– Loading configurations
– Mission profile
Ground and flight tests are usually required for certification. Much of the ground
testing must be completed before flight tests begin for reasons of safety. In most pro-
grams, captive carry, loads, flutter, and jettison tests should be completed before sys-
tems integration tests can begin. Modeling flight configurations in wind tunnel tests is
extremely useful as it avoids risks; it also can provide data on the aerodynamic effects
on stores which is important in determining store separation characteristics and freedom
from flutter. With this data, the quantity of flight testing is greatly reduced by defining
areas of the operational envelope critical to certification.
For the purposes of this discussion, we will cover only tests that we may be involved
with:
Ground Tests
– 101 and 102, Fit and Function
– 110, Static Ejection
– 160, Gun, Rocket, Missile Firing
Flight Tests
– 290, Ballistics
As emphasized previously throughout the text, all modern aircraft will undergo
software modifications with the addition of new stores/weapons; modifications may
affect the mission computer, stores management system, or any of the aircraft sensors.
The regression testing required as a result of S/W upgrades is normally covered under
Ground Test 102 (Function). When developing the certification plan for any aircraft-
store configuration, dedicated mission effectiveness or human factors should be eval-
uated. Some human factors to consider are as follows:
– Munitions preparation
– Loading, aircraft checkout, and preflight
– Cockpit weapon switchology
– Takeoff and ingress
– Target acquisition and tracking
– Target engagement
– Safe escape maneuvers
– Target egress
– Landing
– Integrated combat turn capability
– Downloading
The purpose of the fit test is to investigate the compatibility of the mechanical and
electrical interface between the store and the aircraft. The test will ensure:
– Adequacy of the loading procedures

– Sufficient clearance exists between the store and its surroundings
– Satisfactory servicing, carriage, and deployment
– Proper store alignment
– Required electrical, electromechanical, and optical connections can be made
Data requirements, Instrumentation and Test Procedures are IAW AIR STD 20/21,
Airborne Stores Ground Fit and Compatibility Criteria. The second half of the Fit and
Function Test is the Function Test which validates the electrical functions for all of the
ground and flight modes of operation including:
– Jettison
– SMS failure reporting
– Weapon inhibits
– Boresight procedures
– Armament control
The final ground test of interest is the gun/rocket/missile firing test. The test is
written from the point of view that both the store and the aircraft are in development;
other cases would require less testing. As with all weapons testing where there may be a
series of unknowns, the test plan should be a build-up in risk, starting with the most
benign conditions first. Once system integrity has been established flight testing can be
accomplished to qualify the weapon system throughout the flight envelope. Ground
gun firing tests are conducted to determine, verify, evaluate, and authorize the safety,
compatibility, and performance requirements of the gun system/aircraft prior to flight

tests. The gunfire induced environments and their effects:
– Muzzle blast and overpressures
– Effectiveness of muzzle and blast deflectors
– Recoil, counter–recoil and loads
– Vibration and acoustic frequencies and amplitudes
– Gun gas impingement
– Proper gun operation in various attitudes and g loadings
– Accuracy
– Interaction with other aircraft systems
– Bullet clearance from rotor blades and other surfaces IAW AIR STD 20/21
The test is performed at an approved facility where the projectile will be contained
within the test enclosure. Test instrumentation, conditions, and procedures are delineated
in the appendix. The test is considered successful if all data is successfully collected, and
a demonstration of the proper operation of the gun system (IAW the design intent
relating to compatibility and safety). The data should indicate the gun system is com-
pliant with the applicable specs and has no adverse impact on other aircraft systems.
Similar to gun firing tests, rocket/missile firing tests are accomplished to verify
safe operating characteristics and establish compatibility with the aircraft. The ground
tests will:
– Provide data on the launchers and associated intervalometers
– Determine plume blast, pressure profile, thrust/impulse, exhaust chemical content,
and temperature distribution
– Determine structural effects on the aircraft
– Determine the effects of a malfunction
– Measure trajectory and attitude changes
– Measure clearances between trajectory and rotor blades and aircraft surfaces
– Assess the effect of firing in ripple mode on aircraft engines
The test is performed at an approved facility where the projectile will be contained
within the test enclosure. The test instrumentation, conditions, and procedures are
delineated in the appendix. The test is considered successful if:
– All data is successfully collected
– Proper operation of the system IAW the design intent relating to compatibility and
safety
– No damage to the launching aircraft that would affect airworthiness
– Data indicate that a launch will not result in an inadvertent release; unacceptable
damage to the aircraft structure, launcher, or other store; or adverse effect on other
systems or equipment
An integral part of validating the aircraft/stores interface is the assurance that the
weapon when employed will hit the target; 1763 addresses this validation as ballistics tests.
There are four tests called out in the handbook to basically verify accuracy. The first
test is called the weapons free-stream ballistics test (listed as test 291 in MIL-HDBK-
1763). This test is run when the baseline aircraft independent ballistics have not been
established for the weapon. The second test called out in the handbook is the operational
flight program (OFP) ballistics evaluation test (test 292). The objective of this test is to
evaluate the initial accuracy of the OFP basic algorithms. Evaluation of the ballistics
includes a CEP test and a range bias test. If both CEP and range bias evaluations meet
the acceptance criteria, then the ballistic accuracy of the OFP for the particular aircraft/
weapon configuration will have been verified. If not, the next two tests (293 and 294)
must be accomplished.
The third test is called the separation effects derivation test (test 293), and as the
name implies, it is meant to derive the separation effects coefficients for the preferred
aircraft–store configurations.
The fourth test is identical to test 292 and is designed to verify the ballistics accu-
racy of the OFP. It is called the OFP ballistics accuracy test (test 294).
If the sequence of these tests sounds a little ambiguous, it is. The decision tree in
Figure 10.39 will attempt to clear up any uncertainty that you may have.
Separation effects need to be accounted for in manual as well as automated
weapons deliveries. The store is usually considered to be free of separation effects
Are the free- FIGURE 10.39 ¢

NO stream YES Ballistics Accuracy
ballistics of Decision Tree
the weapon
known?
Execute test
Execute test 292 OFP
291 weapon ballistics
free-stream evaluation
ballistics test
OFP ballistic Does accuracy

accuracy YES meet CEP and
verified bias
requirements?
NO
Execute test Execute test

YES 294 to obtain 293 and derive
ballistic separation NO
accuracy effects
Does accuracy
meet CEP and
bias
requirements?
(aircraft influence) 1–3 sec after release when it reaches steady state conditions. What
happens during the first 3 sec identifies the true trajectory of the store. AGARD
presents a concise summary of data grouped by each of four error sources (release
conditions, physical properties, atmospheric conditions, and separation effects) (refer
to Table 10.11).
MIL-HDBK-1763 does an excellent job of identifying the instrumentation and data
requirements for all of these tests but does not really go into detail as to why these tests
are required or what the outcome should be. This information is found in AGARD-
AG-300, volume 10, section 4.0, which will be addressed next.
10.6 AGARD FLIGHT TEST TECHNIQUES SERIES,

VOLUME 10 REQUIREMENTS
According to AGARD-AG-300, volume 10, there are three basic objectives of ballistic
test programs:
● To obtain flight test data necessary to establish store free-stream flight characteristics
● To obtain the flight test data necessary to establish separation effects
● To obtain the flight test data necessary to establish the weapons delivery accuracy of
the aircraft’s OFP
It is necessary to perform flight testing to obtain the data necessary to establish or
verify the store’s drag, event times, and other factors that affect the store’s flight char-
acteristics. As previously mentioned, the free-stream drag characteristics are generally
independent of aircraft and mode of delivery 1 to 3 sec after release, as the store is no
longer influenced by the aircraft’s flow field. In general practice, the store is first tested
in a wind tunnel and then verified during flight testing.
Separation effects testing (what happens to the store during the first 1 to 3 sec after
release prior to entering free-stream) involves releasing stores from an aircraft, one at a
time, under very controlled conditions. Truth data are obtained for both the releasing
aircraft and the store and are analyzed to quantify changes in the store trajectory due to
the aircraft flow field. The effects are incorporated into the weapons delivery algorithms
or applied to mil settings in the case of manual deliveries. In the F-16, separation effects
are modeled by adjusting the velocity vectors in the along-track and vertical directions
before they are fed to the air-to-ground integration routine in the OFP. The velocity
adjustments (deltas) are derived from test drops and are curve fitted to a function of
Mach number and normal acceleration. The mission computer uses these functions to
compensate for separation effects for given store configurations and delivery conditions.
Because the look-up tables for these corrections will grow as a function of multiple
configurations and delivery profiles, it is important to prioritize the most important set of
conditions.
AGARD notes that not all configurations and delivery modes need to be tested, as
the accuracy may be good enough without extensive flight testing to determine what
minor deviations may exist. The answer will be obvious after the completion of OFP
accuracy testing.
Operational flight program accuracy testing provides data for the analysis of the
entire weapons system. The pilot will attempt to deliver the store within a specified CEP
on simulated targets. The entire weapons system comprises all of the inputs to the
weapons release calculations: radar, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), laser, HUD, radar
altitude, etc. The pilot will attempt to deliver the store in a controlled, noncompensating
manner, attempting to repeat the deliveries the same way each pass rather than
attempting to score a ‘‘shack’’ (bull’s-eye). Truth data and aircraft instrumentation,
including HUD video, are required for a complete analysis. Analysis of OFP accuracy
testing will enable the evaluator to determine an error budget that will identify the
sources of errors.
If the test results satisfy the user’s accuracy criteria, testing is considered complete;
if the user requires a higher accuracy or OFP accuracy-verification, additional testing is
required. This process is usually accomplished in three phases. Phase I uses a pre-
production OFP with the validated free-stream characteristics of the store; a sufficient
number of stores is dropped for confidence and statistical significance. If the user is
satisfied, Phase I is complete and a production OFP is released. If the user is not satisfied
with the results and it has been determined that there are no problems with the non-
ballistic portion of the system, Phase II is initiated. In this phase, more data is collected
to refine the modeling coefficients in the OFP and a new pre-production OFP (patch) is
generated. Stores are then dropped to obtain a new CEP and bias data (Phase III). If the
user is satisfied, the OFP is productionized; if not, the process is repeated from Phase II,
usually at increasing expense and schedule. AGARD makes the point of using good
judgment when attempting to improve accuracy and cites an example of an F-16 CBU-
58 test. The lesson learned was that accuracy and resource expenditure trade-offs need to
be considered before testing begins. This consideration would constrain natural ten-
dencies of users to keep demanding more accuracy regardless of the expenditure
involved.
When computing the accuracy of the system, CEP and range bias are considered.
CEP is the radius of a circle centered on the target, or mean impact point (MIP), which
contains 50% of all bombs dropped at a given set of delivery conditions for a specific
loadout. Range bias is the distance that bombs hit long or short of the target. Separation
effects will affect accuracies, but so will errors in the avionics systems, which provide
inputs to the weapon release computer. AGARD considers the fire control RADAR,
CADC, INS, and rate sensor unit as the primary inputs to weapons release or fire control
computer (WRC, FCC); it mentions a targeting pod (LANTIRN), but only as a future
enhancement. In fact, DGPS, targeting pods, LRF, EO/FLIR, and off-board tracks are
used today and can be the sources of error. Sensors will provide: range to target, height
above target, depression angle, altitude, airspeed/groundspeed, winds, heading, accel-
eration, attitude, and rates.
Range is the easiest to understand; if the sensed range (from radar, laser, DGPS) is
longer than the real range, the bomb will fall short; if the range sensed is closer than
actual the opposite is true. Radar and laser may also be used to calculate the height
above the target, which requires an accurate measurement of the depression angle (see
HAT mode in the RADAR section). Errors in the stabilization (INS, AHRS) or errors in
the RADAR mount will cause errors in the depression angle which in turn create errors
in height, which in turn will create errors in release range. Cross-checking sensors or
using Best Estimate processing can alleviate some of these concerns.
Errors in airspeed due to inaccurate CADC, INS, or GPS sensors will affect the
range bias. If the sensed speed is lower than actual, the delivery will be at a higher speed
causing a long bomb for example. The RSU is responsible for computing the normal
acceleration of the aircraft; a bad RSU will have two effects on the delivery. A delivery
under a higher g than expected will cause a short bomb and will also affect the
separations algorithms. Failure to account for winds (or incorrectly calculate them) will
result in cross-track errors due to cross winds and short or long bombs due to head winds
and tail winds respectively. Depending on the implementation, the WRC may assume
that the calculated winds are constant for the time of flight of the weapon or may
use some algorithm to linearly decrease the winds to zero at the target altitude; it could
use an average wind for the time of flight. Errors in azimuth and elevation from other
on-board sensors will cause errors in target position (left/right), which will prevent the
aircraft from flying over the target.
Errors in display presentations, symbology, and cursors are not sensors, but can
contribute to errors in the delivery. The steering and aiming symbols are projected on the
HUD; if the HUD plate is not aligned properly the symbols will be improperly located
and aiming errors will occur. For example, if the HUD is angled too low, the projected
pipper or target box will appear lower on the HUD causing the pilot to release the
weapon closer to the target for a long bomb. If the symbology has been corrected for
canopy distortion the wrong corrections will be used since now the information is being
projected on a different area of the canopy. Two other errors are the design eye and
parallax errors. In a fixed sight bombing system, pilot seating height will have the same
impact as previously discussed with an improperly aligned HUD plate. If the HUD has
been properly aligned and the pilot can view the HUD, then he is at the design eye
viewing point. Parallax errors come into account with HUD recording; symbology that
has been corrected for the pilot’s viewpoint may not necessarily be corrected for the
HUD camera due to different distortion errors.
As with avionics system tests, a test matrix must be developed to prove some level
of performance, or, in the weapons case, to determine separations effects or OFP
accuracy. Factors to be considered in the development of this matrix are type of weapon,
weapon functioning envelope, and number of weapons required to satisfy test objectives.
There are two basic types of free-fall weapons: intact and functioning. An intact
weapon is one that hits the ground in the same configuration as it was released. A
functioning weapon will undergo changes in configuration (dispenser) after it leaves the
aircraft. A MK 82 LDGP is an example of an intact weapon; a MK-20 Rockeye dis-
penser is an example of a functioning weapon because at some time after release the
dispenser separates releasing multiple sub-munitions. A GBU-15 is an intact weapon but
since wings deploy after launch they will affect the store trajectory. Functioning
weapons add more complexity because sub-munitions form a pattern that must also be
modeled. This pattern will change as release conditions and time of dispenser func-
tioning change. Because of these two variables there could conceivably be an endless
number of conditions to evaluate.
The flight conditions at which the weapon will properly work as designed is called the
weapons functioning envelope and is usually determined during the DT&E evaluation
period and must be considered when designing a test matrix. The document again provides
two horror stories where the test team wasn’t aware of the functioning envelope and tested
in areas where it wasn’t possible to arm the weapon (speed and altitude). It is also possible
that a weapon design will exceed the capabilities of the carrying aircraft; both the store
functioning envelopes and aircraft operating envelopes must be properly considered.
Flight tests require the pilot to make a series of weapons deliveries against simu-
lated targets on a scorable range. Required TSPI and the data that must be collected can
be found in MIL-HDBK-1763, appendix B. Deliveries will be accomplished in all

delivery modes, such as visual, radar, laser, FLIR, TV, targeting pod) and a CEP will be
computed for each of the modes. A good question to ask is how many deliveries must be
made in each mode to achieve a desired confidence interval? Well, lucky for us.
AGARD addresses this problem in section 6.1.5 ‘‘Number of Weapons Required for
OFP Accuracy Testing.’’ As should be expected, CEPs with small dispersion (small
standard deviations) require fewer deliveries for the same desired confidence levels.
The number of weapons required for store free-stream testing depends on the type of
weapon and functioning envelope and on the type of testing to be performed. For intact
weapons, a minimum of 36 stores is required to fully characterize ballistic performance:
– Level flight, loft, dive
– Lowest operational speed, medium, and highest speed
– Minimum four bombs per test condition for confidence
– 3 profiles 3 speeds 4 bombs ¼ 36
For functioning weapons, the numbers will be increased to ensure that the store fuze
functions as designed in the time and altitude (proximity) modes. Added to the matrix
will be three timer values and three altitudes for dispenser functioning:
3 profiles 3 speeds 4 bombs 3 timer value 3 altitudes ¼ 216
The required numbers of deliveries can be determined statistically, or by analyst
experience; the numbers provided above are from the latter. If you wanted to determine
the free-stream drag coefficient to the 85% accuracy level with a 95% confidence level,
you would need 19 deliveries vice the quoted 4 bombs per test condition.
Stores separation effects are highly dependent on the aircraft loadout. Because of
the limitations noted earlier, usually only one or two stores configurations are tested
(most critical defined by the user). As in the case of free-stream testing, data are required
at a minimum of three airspeeds and at load factors that cover the ‘‘g’’ range sufficiently
to permit modeling between the data points. The example given in AGARD is an F-15E
loaded with 12 MK-82s loaded on the fuselage conformal rack stations; 6 bombs are
loaded symmetrically on each side in two rows of three. The weapons may be delivered
in four modes: level (1 g), dive (< .5 g), toss (2.5 g), and loft (4.0 g). Data are required
for each mode at three airspeeds and a minimum of four releases per station are required;
because the load is symmetrical, two data points are obtained for each station when all
bombs are released. Therefore:
4 profiles 3 speeds 12=2 stations 4 bombs per station ¼ 288 stores
A second example given in the document is an F-16 with 2 2 Durandals; the

loadout is symmetrical. The weapon is delivered either in level flight or 10 dive, so
using the same logic:
2 profiles 3 airspeeds 4=2 stations 4 bombs per station ¼ 48 stores
AGARD notes a couple of other considerations when trying to model separation

effects. Although three airspeeds are recommended, the evaluator needs to be aware that
there is a risk in modeling the intermediate airspeeds and this risk would be high if the
evaluator does not have a historical database for reference. The need to obtain adequate
data to model g is equally important; separation effects can be substantial for some
conditions and loadouts. Separation effects are different for each station and should
therefore be modeled that way.
Once separation effects have been modeled, it is necessary to perform testing to
validate the OFP. The testing provides an end-to-end system assessment of the overall
accuracy of the weapons delivery system; a minimum of 12 stores is required for each
release mode. In the F-15E example noted previously:
4 release modes 1 combat airspeed 12 bombs ¼ 48 bombs
A CEP and range bias is performed and the results are compared to the accuracy criteria.
If the criteria are met, then the testing is terminated.
Eglin AFB, which authored this volume of AGARD and also volume 5, Stores
Separation Analysis, presumes that a range bias does not exist for probabilities greater
than 90% using a one-tailed cumulative binomial test (based on engineer experience).
Table III in AGARD indicates that if 5 of 15 stores impact long of the target and the
balance short, then the probability of a range bias does not exist (short bias). If only 4 of
the 15 impact long, then a probability of a bias is assumed to exist. The table provides
users with probabilities for other combinations of bombs that hit long or short. Figure 15
of the same document shows the relationship between number of stores, confidence
level, and % of acceptable error.
The balance of the document spends considerable time on TSPI, avionics systems
checks, and data analysis including CEP and accuracy analysis, which have all been
addressed over the course of the text. Some examples of the output of the analysis such
as ballistics tables and safe escape charts are provided at Tables VIII through X.
References and a bibliography are provided, and the Appendices contain questions
and answers from Canada, France, and Germany on how they perform ballistics analysis
and testing.
10.7 WEAPONS DELIVERY CONSIDERATIONS

FOR HELICOPTERS
The overriding document for helicopter armament testing is ADS-45-HDBK, ‘‘Data and
Test Procedures for Airworthiness Release for Helicopter Armament Testing,’’
December 19, 2005. This document mimics much of the testing described in MIL-
HDBK-1763 and will not be repeated here. Air Standard 20/21, ‘‘Airborne Stores
Ground Fit and Compatibility Criteria, Change 1,’’ April 21, 1991, is referenced in
ADS-45 and establishes the requirements for carriage compatibility.
The certification process is not a short one and can last for years. The average
duration for the helicopter/store certification process is roughly three years. This hand-
book contains guidance for the performance of a survey on armament and fire control
subsystems integrated on the aircraft. A survey is the act of collecting information to
determine the current state of the design with respect to established performance
requirements. The survey will consist primarily of ground and flight tests; unless
otherwise specified in the contract, the survey will be used to find needed improvements
or problems areas that need resolution. Surveys are normally conducted on new or major
modifications to reduce program risk.
The handbook stresses that test articles (items considered for test) may not be that
obvious. Armament or weapons are easily identified; however, the fire control test
articles are less obvious. The fire control system will consist of any hardware and
software that is necessary to perform:
– Target acquisition/designation
– Target estimation
– Aircraft state sensing
– Environment sensing
– Sensor input processing
– Ballistic solution processing
– Stores management
– Aiming
– Launching/firing/dispensing
– Ballistic solution processing and the stores management
– Postlaunch controlling of the munitions
The general requirements and engineering analysis called out in the handbook are
nearly identical to those previously described in section 10.5.1. The document, however,
does address software considerations. Weapons inhibits, limits, and interrupts (WILIs)
should be validated to show that weapons are prohibited from interfering with each other
and are prohibited from firing when firing constraints are exceeded (e.g., activation of a
LASER on the ground or lazing the cabin). The aircraft flight test phase should be
conducted after S/W integration tests, hazard analyses, safety-of-flight (SOF) analysis,
and tests. Aircraft ground tests are conducted to substantiate that the armament and fire
control subsystem are safe for flight.
The rationale for conducting stores certification tests is described as:
– Validate the results of the analysis; obviously, if the test results compare favorably to
the predictions, the test program can be significantly shortened
– The second reason is to provide data where no qualitative prediction can be made
Data must be examined to determine the acceptability of the aircraft store config-
uration that is being evaluated.
The contractor will prepare an armament and fire control system survey (AFCSS)
test plan that describes a systematic ground and flight test program designed to proceed
in an orderly manner from installation of the system through determination of the
armament and fire control capabilities.
ADS-62-SP, ‘‘Data and Test Requirements for Airworthiness Release for Helicopter
Sensor Data and Testing Requirements in Development Stage,’’ June 29, 2001, will need
to be consulted prior to development flight test. This standard establishes design and
documentation requirements that shall be completed prior to issue of a flight release or
airworthiness release (AWR) to conduct helicopter flight testing pertaining to the
pilotage and target acquisition/designator system sensors. It includes statements and
analyses that should be performed to guarantee a safety standard; the requirement may
be tailored for each test.
10.7.1 Helicopter Specific Weapons Types

Guns
Armor and armament, especially the latter, must be evaluated in contexts other than
survivability. For attack helicopters, the ability to survive a hostile environment,
although essential for the mission completion, is not in itself a measure of the worth of
vehicles’ armament. In other words, the possible trade-offs among performance, armor,
and armament always affect survivability but may involve directly such other primary
variables as performance.
Several types of guns are available for helicopter use. They include air-cooled, gas-
operated 7.62 mm weapons, air-cooled automatic 20 mm and 30 mm weapons, and air-
cooled electric weapons for firing 40 mm grenade ammunition. For some applications,
the gun is installed on recoil adapters. This installation minimizes the effect of gun
recoil forces upon the helicopter structure. In selecting and designing recoil structure
adapters, careful consideration should be given to gun muzzle energy; gun weight
including attaching feeder and drive motor; and the response dynamics of the helicopter.
Feed mechanisms for these weapons vary, and each presents a special set of design
problems. In some instances, the ammunition feed must start from rest and must reach
the peak rate of fire within the time required for the firing of one round; this imposes
high acceleration forces upon the feed train and the storage containers. In other appli-
cations, a feed mechanism is used that extracts cartridges from a recycling conveyor
belt. The integration feeder is adapted for this purpose by replacing the feed cover with
special link guides. The high acceleration forces imposed upon the belt and cyclical
deviation of the gun from a nominal rate of fire require careful design of the ammunition
feed train to ensure equivalent belt tension on both sides of the gun feeder.
There are minimum requirements imposed by the nature of the weapon. The loca-
tion must provide accessibility, unimpeded projectile flight paths, debris ejection paths,
and the ability to jettison externally mounted gun pods. The vehicle must be able to
withstand gun muzzle blast effects. Beyond these minimum requirements, the degree of
optimization must be related to the overall effectiveness criteria used in evaluating the
aircraft. The trade-offs will involve structural and geometrical limitations arising from
the desire to optimize cost and flight performance versus the optimum location to
maximize weapon systems performance.
Gun location must be such as to avoid intersection of the extremes of the projectile
flight path envelope with the helicopter structure, including the main rotor and exter-
nally carried stores. The projectile flight path envelope is described by a circular dis-
persion of the firing projectile, with the circle center being coincident with the gun
barrel centerline. Factors to consider in determining the dispersion envelope include:
gun and ammunition dispersion, aerodynamic forces acting upon the projectile, and
deflections of the gun mount and helicopter structure.
Guns shall be located as far as is possible from helicopter structure to minimize the
effects of muzzle blast. The aircraft skin near the muzzle and adjacent aircraft structure
must be strong enough to prevent gun blast damage. The reinforcement requirement of
the aircraft skin and structure is determined by the distance between gun and skin, the
thickness of the skin, and the density of the frames and stringers. The gun muzzle shall
never be located near enough to canopies, radar antennas, or door frames to cause or
create a hazardous condition. For some guns, a muzzle brake can be incorporated to
reshape the blast pressure field. This device distorts the blast field so that the peak
pressures and impulses are rotated and displaced from their normal positions relative to
the gun barrel thereby reducing recoil forces. Consideration also should be given to the
relationship of different weapons systems to each other, such as machine guns versus
rockets or missiles; both from stationary firing position (of machine guns) and during the
trajectory of rockets, for example.
Ejected ammunition cases and links shall not impinge upon helicopter structure, con-
trol surfaces, rotors, or externally carried equipment. The trajectories of the ejected debris
can be determined from gun ejection velocity. Debris ejected velocities can be increased by
the use of accelerator mechanisms; the selection of this design technique must consider the
available space, and the attitude, kinematics, and shape of the ejected debris. Deflector
plates may be used and can be strategically placed to redirect the case ejection path.
Rockets
The current rocket type qualified for use on U.S. military rotary wing aircraft is the
2.75 in. (70 mm) folding fin aircraft rocket (FFAR). The FFAR was developed at the
Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake in the late 1940s and is available in a variety
of warhead/fuze combinations to suit specific helicopter mission requirements. It is
carried in and fired from the helicopter by means of tubular launchers.
The current 2.75 in FFAR launchers for helicopters consist of a fixed, forward-
firing, rearward venting, open-breech tube cluster. The individual tubes may be reusable
or replaceable, or the cluster may be expendable. The launchers normally are installed
with the launcher axis (boreline) parallel to the line of flight under specific flight con-
ditions. The primary function of the rocket launcher is to release the rocket safely from
the helicopter without disturbing the rocket from its intended flight path. The launcher
design should provide for accurate alignment of the launcher boreline with the heli-
copter aiming reference under all tactical deployment conditions.
The rocket system shall include methods to allow both automatic and manual firing
of rockets in a predetermined quantity, sequence, and timing interval. The requirements
for rocket selection and firing sequence will be defined by the basic helicopter system
specification. At a minimum, the number of rockets to be fired (single, in pairs, or
ripple) at a preset time interval shall be selectable. The timing mechanism shall be
designed for reliability and accuracy under all firing conditions.
Guided Missiles
Guided missile launchers and guidance control equipment of the number and type
described by the governing helicopter specification shall be installed. The missile cur-
rently being used for helicopter applications is the AGM-114 Hellfire which was
developed primarily for anti-armor applications originally for use with the AH-64
Apache, and now used on a number of platforms. Helicopter missile launchers generally
will be installed offset from the helicopter centerline on armament pylons or stub wings
to protect the tail control surfaces and rotor system from possible immersion in the
exhaust wake of the missile.
Good design practices include location of the launcher on the helicopter to prevent:
– Engine compressor stall or flameout as a result of exhaust gases entering the engine
intake ducts
– Exhaust gas impingement upon or ignition debris collision with the airframe and all
rotor systems
– Harmful corrosion effects as a result of deposits of missile exhaust residue within the
engine or upon other components that are not readily accessible for cleaning
– Impairment of pilot’s or gunner’s vision by flash during firing
– Excessive acoustic noise in the crew compartment during firing
– Pitting or coating of the canopy by exhaust gas and debris
– Aerodynamic interference between launchers and control surfaces, sensors, and
adjacent stores
The design and location of the launcher installation should be such as to minimize
corrosive effects resulting from the exhaust particles inherent to solid propellant
missiles.
Proper consideration of preventive or corrective methods, including cleansing of
affected parts, can significantly reduce the possibility of structural corrosion or surface
damage caused by motor exhaust. Ground safety cutout switches in order to prevent
accidental firing during ground operations are required. The firing circuit may be
interrupted by landing gear extension, by landing skid compression under helicopter
weight, or by insertion of an interlock pin at each launcher by the ground crew. A
manual-operated override switch shall be provided to permit ground checkout of the
firing circuit.
1. What is the most important objective to fully understand when conducting weapons
testing?
2. You are about to conduct a weapons accuracy test. What factors will affect your
CEP?
3. What truth parameters must be known when conducting accuracy tests?
4. What is a parallax correction?
5. What impacts will parallax corrections have on the outcome of an accuracy test?
6. Why are boresighting tests performed?
7. Why are sensors boresighted? What are they boresighted/referenced to?
8. How does the pilot/operator performance contribute to the error analysis of weapons
accuracy?
9. List the three measurements that must be taken in order to calculate an error budget.
10. List five potential pilot errors during a weapons accuracy test.
11. List five potential errors in the aiming system (HUD, displays).
12. List five potential errors in the sensor systems.
13. Is video an important tool in error analysis of a weapons delivery system? Why or
why not?
14. List three reasons for computing a minimum release altitude prior to actual delivery.
15. What are the benefits of wing control air-to-air missiles? What are the drawbacks?
16. Why is a three-plane captive carry test used for missiles with postlaunch control?
17. What is a roof house used for?
18. What is the importance of conducting a radome test?
19. Why are reliability and maintainability important factors in considering a new
weapons system?
20. Why are live fire tests so expensive?
21. How does Doppler fusing work?
22. What is sensor fusion? Briefly describe a typical fused weapons system.
23. Define free-stream ballistics and separation effects.
24. If certification by analogy (similarity) is NOT possible, why is the important next
step in the certification process to conduct a physical compatibility review?
25. What is the primary purpose of static ejection ground tests?
26. List the three primary reasons why we conduct wind tunnel tests as part of the stores
certification process.
27. What are three limiting factors when using wind tunnels for stores certification
testing?
28. Which documents would you consult prior to any weapons integration test?
29. What are the general requirements for the SMS?
30. What function does a decoder perform?
31. What is an inventory function? How is it accomplished?
32. A weapon fails prep. What indications are provided to the pilot by the SMS?
33. What is a MOAT? What functions does it perform?
34. What is a missile tune? What functions does it perform?
35. Name four common weapons interlocks.
36. Explain the primary purpose of flight testing in the stores certification process.
37. List the typical instrumentation required for (a) release tests, and (b) free-stream
ballistics tests.
38. (a) When certifying a well-understood store (e.g., Mk 82) on a new aircraft, is it
necessary to collect free-stream ballistics data? Why? (b) When certifying a well-
understood store (e.g., Mk 82) on a new aircraft, is it necessary to collect separation
effects data? Why?
39. Explain the weapons accuracy error budget and why it is important to know it
before beginning a stores certification program.
40. What is the purpose of a speed gate in a semiactive homing missile?
41. Name two types of navigation used by air-to-air missiles.
42. Why would the SMS command an engine derich as part of an LTE?
43. What is a LAR? How is it constructed?
44. Name five instances where gun firing would be terminated.
45. What is a SEAM mode? What is it used for?

46. What is the data bus architecture for the SMS and associated weapons systems?
47. What is meant by a postlaunch missile message?
48. What is a pit or catcher’s mitt test used for?
49. What is the largest contributor to missile service failures?
50. What is a safety footprint? How is it constructed?
CHAPTER
A Typical Avionics Integration

Flight Test Program 11
Chapter Outline
11.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
11.1 Vehicle Test Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 831
11.2 Avionics Test Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 833
11.3 Test Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 835
11.4 Responsibilities of the Test Team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843
11.5 Analysis and Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 848
11.6 Selected Questions for Chapter 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 849
11.0 INTRODUCTION
As the name in the title implies, this chapter is a recap of the text put into the context of a
real integration program. It attempts to take the reader from ‘‘womb to tomb’’ on the test
program, attempting to touch on all of the variables the evaluator will be forced to confront.
For this exercise, I have elected to integrate a high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM)
into the F-14D (this should not hurt anyone’s feelings since the F-14D is now retired from
service). The reader can assume that she is sitting in her cube and her boss has just dropped
this requirement on her desk. ‘‘I need you to estimate this job for me. I’m briefing the
Director in an hour and I need a SWAG (scientific wild-ass guess) on the program. You
know, what’s required, length of the program, assets required, etc. Don’t worry, it isn’t a
firm estimate and the company won’t hold you to it.’’ Our fearless tester should be fearful
because everyone knows that this SWAG will be a firm proposal by the end of the day.
11.1 VEHICLE TEST REQUIREMENTS

Prior to the systems integration phase, and in some cases parallel to the phase, the
aircraft must be cleared for carriage and release. In other words, the systems integration
group cannot fly the HARM on the F-14D until the loads, flutter, and performance
groups say it is OK. A description of their requirements can be found in MIL-HDBK-
1763 (revisit chapter 10). The major tests are
● Carriage envelope clearance
● Clearance for captive carry
831
832 CHAPTER 11 A Typical Avionics Integration Flight Test Program
FIGURE 11.1 ¢
Allowable Flight Basic Flight
Envelope for HARM Envelope
Carriage
Flight Envelope
Altitude
w/HARM on
Stations 3 and 6
MACH
● Measure loads for separation analysis

● Demonstrate freedom from flutter
● Survey the vibration environment for the missile
● Determine aircraft performance
It is interesting to note that all programs that involve the integration of a store on an
airplane will have a statement in the ground rules of the contract that states ‘‘the addition
of this store will not adversely affect the basic performance of the aircraft.’’ This state-
ment is, of course, ridiculous, as there will always be some degradation of performance or
capability (range, endurance, g available, speed, etc.). The loads and flutter groups
basically perform an envelope expansion flight test program each time a store is inte-
grated on an aircraft. The result is a modified aircraft performance diagram. Figure 11.1
shows a generic aircraft performance envelope for aircraft altitude versus Mach. With the
addition of the HARM on stations 3 and 6 (assume belly stations), the aircraft becomes
more restricted in terms of absolute minimum and maximum speeds and minimum and
maximum speeds at altitude. These flight restrictions will become part of the basic flight
manual (Dash-1 and Dash-34 for the U.S. Air Force and naval air training and operating
procedures standardization (NATOPS) for the U.S. Navy). There is a possibility of
asymmetric store loading restrictions that occasionally impose further impacts on the
flight envelope and subsequent flight testing that need to be investigated.
Once the aircraft is cleared to carry the missile, it must then be determined that the
missile can be released/fired safely. In order to accomplish this, further testing is
required (again, see MIL-HDBK-1763). The major tests here include
● Store separation tests
● Clear missile firing envelope
● Clear launcher/missile jettison envelope
● Measure skin temperature due to missile exhaust plume impingement
● Evaluate effect of missile exhaust ingestion on engine
Separation tests require special instrumentation and video equipment. Both the
Aerospace Group for Avionics Research and Development (AGARD) and the previously
11.2 Avionics Test Requirements 833
mentioned MIL-HDBK-1763 do an excellent job of delineating the types and quantities

of required data. These tests will validate previous wind tunnel results, and may require
nose and wingtip cameras (high speed, 3 to 5 sec), missile telemetry, a chase camera,
and a safety chase. A store trajectory analysis program that analyzes flow field
anomalies, tumble, and roll rates is normally used during postflight data analysis;
there are vendors (in addition to military units) who can supply the cameras and the
analysis programs.
In some instances, additional tests may be required. U.S. Navy integrations will
require carrier suitability tests, which evaluate the installation under extreme operational
conditions. These extreme conditions could include a demonstration of the structural
adequacy of the HARM installations during high-sink landings, arrestments, and catapults.
The vehicle test and evaluation community will develop the test plan and flight
requirements for the aforementioned tests. Using historical data, the number of flights
required would look like the following:
Typical estimated flight requirements:
● HARM envelope clearance (2 stations) 12 flights

● Aircraft performance 6 flights
6 flights
● Launches 6 flights
● Jettison (HARM/launcher) 30 flights
11.2 AVIONICS TEST REQUIREMENTS

Avionics flight test requirements involve the integration and performance of the HARM
implementation. The test team will
● Define the program
● Initiate the test planning process
● Determine what is needed (assets, instrumentation, data)
● Execute the plan
● Provide analysis and reporting
In all test programs, there are some basic assumptions that are made. Some of the
typical assumptions are that the weapons system performance baseline is the basic air-
craft performance (the integration of the HARM will neither improve nor degrade the
basic aircraft; see Figure 11.1). Another assumption is that the performance demon-
stration requirements are defined as the basic HARM capabilities (i.e., the HARM must
function properly). For this exercise I am also going to add the assumption that full-scale
integration will be conducted as a participatory program and contractual compliance is
the responsibility of the contractor. The government will provide as government furn-
ished equipment (GFE) all target/support/chase aircraft and facilities. Also assumed is
that HARM vehicle/system firings will be conducted at a customer designated location.
It is extremely important to state these assumptions because it tells the customer that
the cost and length of the program is contingent upon these assumptions holding true.
You can see how much the cost would increase if the contractor was on the hook to pay
for support aircraft, facilities, and fuel.
The first task of the avionics test team is to identify the general test objectives. Are
we to evaluate, demonstrate, or show actual performance? An evaluation may mean the
functionality or feasibility of using a system or a particular mode of a system. Demon-
stration or qualification requires the collection of data to statistically show compliance
with a requirement. Performance is a demonstration of system usability under opera-
tional conditions. Misidentifying the basic objective can be catastrophic in terms of time
and money by underestimating the real task.
For the HARM integration, some potential evaluation tasks include prelaunch
missile interface functions, air-to-ground attack steering, HARM launch envelope,
usability of HARM target of opportunity (TOO) video, human factors crew/system
interface, and controls and displays.
A potential demonstration is a proof that there are no adverse effects on mission
capability with the incorporation of this store. Other demonstrable items include launch
modes of the HARM (TOO, prebrief, and anticompromise), and the effectiveness of
built-in tests (BITs).
Some tasks are not as obvious as others. One additional task is the development of
NATOPS/Dash 1/34 inputs. Whenever a new or modified system is installed on the
aircraft someone needs to write descriptions of normal and abnormal procedures for the
flight and tactics manuals. Most contractors and military organizations have an inte-
grated logistics service that is ultimately responsible for publishing the changes; but who
is responsible for writing them in the first place? Unfortunately, in most organizations
this task falls to flight test personnel, since they are writing the reports anyway. It is one
of those jobs that everyone knows must be done but is never budgeted for.
System performance will normally be shown against representative targets during
realistic operational scenarios. Data are collected, but are not normally analyzed to show
compliance. HARM multiple target discrimination, tracking during maneuvers, and
target prioritization are examples of performance objectives for this exercise.
After the generalized objectives for the program are defined, the responsible test
agency and locations for the tests can be established. This is another important aspect of
the test planning process that is also quite often overlooked. If a responsible organization
is not identified during all phases of testing, destructive in-fighting among agencies/
organizations will occur. You do not want engineering supervising the development/
operational test (DT/OT) portions of the test, and in a similar vein, you do not want
flight test supervising the development effort.
Table 11.1 provides an example of how the different phases of the test program can
be broken down. It provides the phase, a brief description of what is to be accomplished
during that phase, where the work is to be accomplished, and who has ultimate
responsibility/authority over the phase. Some of the lines are very clear: engineering is
responsible for software development and flight test is responsible for demonstration.
Some of the lines are not as clear. Identification of hardware and software problems in
the functional phase is accomplished on the airplane as well as in the lab (part of the
fly-fix-fly process has been described in chapter 1)—a sharing of responsibility. It is
important to establish up front that when the system is delivered to test and evaluation
(T&E) for the start of testing, then T&E becomes the responsible organization.
After understanding the generalized objectives and identifying the responsible
organization, the next task for the avionics group is homework. Remember, it is the
tester’s job to be as knowledgeable about the system under test as the design engineer.
This task will require many hours in the lab, speaking with engineering, and researching
TABLE 11.1 ¢ Responsible Test Organizations
Responsible
Phases Purpose Location Organization
Development Develop software and Lab Engineering
subsystem interfaces
Integration Develop total system software Lab Engineering
and hardware functions
Functional Identify hardware and Aircraft, Lab Test and Evaluation
software design and
integration problems
Evaluation Optimize system software Aircraft, Lab Test and Evaluation
functions (as required)
Demonstration Demonstrate specification Aircraft, Lab Test and Evaluation
compliance
Performance Ability to perform the Aircraft Operational Test and
mission Evaluation
the documentation. During this phase the tester will determine the test methodology and
the data required to satisfy objectives. The first document the tester will want to examine
is the program performance specification (PPS), which gives the reader the ‘‘big pic-
ture.’’ This document explains what capabilities the HARM has, how they are imple-
mented, and what modes are incorporated. It provides the tester with an overview of
HARM system operation and the enhancements provided to the operator.
The functional requirements document (FRD) provides an in-depth discussion of the
HARM, its modes of operation, and its capabilities. The interface design specification
(IDS) defines how information is exchanged between the HARM and other systems on
the aircraft. The interface control document (ICD) defines the location of the parameters
on the data bus. It is also the time to review controls and displays, radar warning
receiver, and stores management system (SMS) documentation.
With a firm understanding of system operation and the interoperability requirements
of other aircraft systems, the tester can proceed with test plan preparation and data
acquisition requirements. Instrumentation needs to be consulted at this point in order to
determine if special equipment or processing routines need to be developed for the
program. Remember that special equipment will be an added cost, but more importantly
its development will take time.
11.3 TEST PLANNING

Rather than attempting to write a test plan from scratch, many organizations utilize a
system of test information sheets (TIS) or test summary sheets (TSS). These sheets are a
script for each required test and contain the following information: test title, objective,
profile, prerequisites, test site, test method, data requirements, data reduction, and ana-
lysis and acceptance (exit) criteria. Two examples of the test summary sheet format are
shown in Figures 11.2 and 11.3.
Test summary sheets (TSSs) are a useful tool for many reasons. The first is that any test
can be duplicated by an interested party at a later date just by following the scripted format.
FIGURE 11.2 ¢ Test Summary Sheet H1

Test Summary
Sheet, Example 1 Test Title: HARM Control Panel (HCP) Built-in Test (BIT).
Objective: Verify proper indications during HCP BIT.
Profile: Static.
Prerequisites: None.
Test Site: Ground (Internal Power).
Test Method: Prior to powering up the HCP, the Missile Select (MSL SEL)
switch will be placed in the “OFF” position. Electronic Countermeasures Officer 1
(ECMO 1) will select CDI repeat mode (S1) and toggle the HCP PWR switch
from “OFF” to “ON” to “BIT.” Pilot and ECMO 1 will monitor the HCP, CDI,
and ADI.
Data Requirements: Kneeboard
Data Reduction and Analysis: BIT shall result in a “GO” lamp on the HCP and
no “FAIL” messages on the CDI. The ADI vertical needle shall be driven from its
left side (stowed) position to three viewable test positions: full left, center, and
full right. The ADI horizontal needle shall be driven from its top side (stowed)
position to three viewable test positions: full up, center, and full down. The
needle shall dwell for 1.5 sec at each position.
FIGURE 11.3 ¢
Test Summary Sheet H13
Test Summary
Sheet, Example 2 Test Title: HARM Range Known Mode – Off Boresight (100° Rel Brg).
Objective: Demonstrate the ability to release a HARM off boresight in Range
Known mode.
Profile: Level flight, 350 KTAS, 10,000 ft.
Prerequisites: H11.
Test Site: Within TM and tracking range of the facility.
Test Method: ECMO 2/3 will create a platform track and then hook and assign
that track as a HARM target. ECMO 1 will select Missile Station (1, 2, 4, or 5)
and designate the HARM threat data to that selected station. Pilot will fly toward
the target (±20°) via the HIS steering cues. At a predetermined range (see
CONFIDENTIAL appendix C), pilot will turn the aircraft to position the target
at approximately 100° relative bearing and initiate the launch sequence. Pilot will
loft the aircraft as commanded by the ADI horizontal steering needle.
Data Requirements: Range to target, target bearing, and time to flight at release.
Data Reduction and Analysis: Postflight comparison of avionic, missile, and TSPI
data.
Acceptance Criteria: Upon completion of the HARM selection and assignment
process, a missile ready indication (“MRDY”) shall be displayed on the CDI (S1),
DDI (Zone 4), and HCP. Upon completion of the HARM release sequence,
normal launch indications shall be displayed on the CDI (“DRDY”) and DDI
(“LNCH”). At release, TOF displays on the CDI and DDI (Zone 5) shall
transition to TTI and begin countdown. TOF at release data shall be
approximately equal to predicted performance values (see CONFIDENTIAL
appendix C).
There is no guessing involved as would be the case if you had to interpret the test from
reading a test plan or final report. If written correctly, the flight cards are already done
and can be found in the test method paragraph. TSSs provide exit criteria which are so
important in flight testing. The exit criteria answer the question, ‘‘When can I say the
test is completed?’’ TSSs also note what data are required and what if any manipulation
must be done to the data.
The first example of a TSS in Figure 11.2 is a stand-alone ground test. We know this
since there are no prerequisites and the test is performed in a static condition on the
ground. The data requirements for this test state ‘‘kneeboard,’’ which simply means that
the evaluator is noting the indications and checking off the box on the flight cards. For a
pilot, the flight cards are normally strapped to his knee in flight, hence ‘‘kneeboard.’’
The second example of the TSS in Figure 11.3 is a little more involved; it is to be
accomplished in flight and does have a prerequisites. Note that in the test method section
there is a sentence, ‘‘a predetermined range (see CONFIDENTIAL, appendix C).’’ This
means that the range is a classified value, and if the number is placed here, the TSS and
hence the entire test plan would become classified. Whenever possible, strive to keep the
test plan unclassified. Classified documents must be safeguarded (stored in a safe when
not in use), numbered (accounted for), cannot be copied, and can only cause problems
for anyone who has ownership of them. There is no fun in receiving two weeks unpaid
vacation for a security violation. Most people who are on a distribution for a classified
document will lock it in the safe immediately when received, never to be seen again.
Test plans are going to be used on a daily basis and need to be accessible. Reference
classified values to the classified documents from whence they came and keep the test
plan (and the test report) unclassified.
From the test plan, the evaluator can now determine which test facilities are required
to complete the plan. Table 11.2 provides an example of the required test facilities and
their use for this example.
Anechoic chambers have been mentioned throughout the text and will be used in
this example for many of the basic evaluations. HARM/airframe glinting is a phenom-
enon much like multipath effects. Since the HARM has an active seeker, it is possible
that the missile may see the target (a radiating threat antenna) as glinted off the airplane.
TABLE 11.2 ¢ Test Facilities and Facilities Requirements
Facility Used For

Anechoic Chamber HARM/Airframe Glinting
System Integration
Intrasystem Electromagnetic Interference and
Compatibility (EMI/EMC) (Victim Source)
Electronic Warfare Test Range In-flight Evaluation and Demonstration
of HARM Integration
Warning Area (Military Restricted Area) In-flight Evaluation and Demonstration
Captive Carry Testing
Electronic Warfare Integrated Integrated Testing with the Anechoic Chamber
System Test Laboratory (EWISTL)
Catapult/Arresting Gear System Carrier Suitability
Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake HARM Missile Firings
FIGURE 11.4 ¢
Glinted Target
This will give the HARM the wrong polar coordinates to the target, and the glinted
target will be your own airplane.
Figure 11.4 shows how aircraft glinting can affect the HARM. All tactics manuals
warn operators to never launch against a glinted target . . . for obvious reasons.
For all of the reasons mentioned in chapter 4 of this text, antenna patterns (of the
installed missile), victim/source, and field testing are accomplished in the anechoic
chamber. As a benefit, many full-size chambers also incorporate a data link hookup to a
simulator in an adjacent building where the pilot can see firsthand how the aircraft and
systems react during testing in the anechoic chamber. The U.S. Navy (Patuxent River
NAS, Maryland) calls their system the Electronic Warfare Integrated Systems Test
Laboratory (EWISTL), whereas the U.S. Air Force (Edwards AFB, California) calls
their system the Integrated Facility for Avionic Systems Testing (IFAST).
The electronic warfare test range allows the HARM to engage against real and
simulated threats. These ranges were described in chapter 9 of this text. The warning
area is a military restricted airspace covered by TSPI assets where captive carry and
simulated launches are evaluated. Live missile firings need to be accomplished at a
range that has sufficient area to cover the missile safety footprint described in chapter 10.
For this exercise we have chosen the Naval Air Weapons Center, China Lake, which has
sufficient coverage.
As this is a U.S. Navy program, I have to consider the effects on the HARM during
catapults and arrestments. In the United States, this can be accomplished at Patuxent
River or Lakehurst, New Jersey.
11.3.1 Data Requirements

The initial review of data requirements should not be specific down to the parameter
level, but rather should be a review of the types of instrumentation that are required.
We cannot define specific parameters until the test plan is actually written. There are
two general types of data that are required for any avionics or weapons integration test
program: avionics data and truth data.
Avionics data are of two types: analog and digital. Analog data are what we used to
call pulse code modulated (PCM) data, and consist of things like switch positions,
voltages, and the health and welfare of the weapon. Digital data are bus data, and in our
case will be comprised of 1553 and 1760 formats. Digital data can be sent as selected
parameters, or in some special cases, the entire bus can be telemetered to the control
station. Care needs to be taken that classified data are not put on the data stream, as well
as information that is not classified which could be used to determine classified
information.
Truth data are defined as TSPI and allow us to know where everyone really are, as
opposed to where the system thinks they are. TSPI is covered in chapter 2 of this text.
Almost all ranges in the United States have come to rely almost exclusively on the
global positioning system (GPS), and in particular, differentially corrected GPS (DGPS)
for TSPI data. But if we need to follow the HARM during its launch we will also need
some sort of cinetheodolites.
During the initial review, we also need to check what is to be provided by each of
the parties (government/contractor). The two organizations will contribute government
furnished equipment (GFE) and contractor furnished equipment (CFE). The identifica-
tion of this equipment is found in a preliminary list as an attachment to the statement of
work (SOW). Like ground rules and assumptions, this list needs to be checked to avoid
missteps in estimating the scope of the evaluation. For this exercise, I have identified
the GFE as
● Avionics development lab
● Instrumented HARM with telemetry and cooling
● Aircraft support
The avionics development lab is the aircraft software systems support facility and is
responsible for the development, coding, and integration of aircraft software. The
instrumented HARM is a goldenbird, described in chapter 10, which will be used for
the captive carry program. Cooling is required as a separate environmental control
system (ECS) package so the missile can be run continuously without overheating and
destroying the sensitive HARM electronics. Aircraft support is the routine maintenance,
preflight, postflight, and fueling of the test aircraft.
The preliminary instrumentation list should contain the items necessary for col-
lecting the data needed. Some of the items that should be considered include
● Power and control system
● Pulse code modulation (PCM) system
● Telemetry/tape system
● Time code
● Video recorder (2 hr) and downlink
● Onboard positioning
● C-/X-band transponder
● Missile simulate unit
● Inadvertent jettison monitoring system
Instrumentation, data acquisition, and PCM systems were covered in detail in

section 3.19.1 of this text, which describes the collaboration that is necessary between
the test engineer and the instrumentation group. Pilot’s voice, or Hot Mike, can also be
sent to the telemetry station via a PCM frame. In most development test programs, the
data sent to the ground, including communications, are encrypted. We know from
chapter 4 of this text that in order to encrypt communications we must first digitize
them. Since the voice is now digitized, it is an easy matter to insert it into a PCM frame.
You might be saying right about now that this is really interesting, but what does it
have to do with test planning. The PCM frame is designed by the instrumentation group,
but the determination of which parameters need to be accessed is the responsibility of
the flight test engineer. The test engineer must sit down with instrumentation and decide
which parameters are to be collected and at what sample rates. The PCM frame will then
be filled in accordingly. If the test engineer does not know how the PCM system works
he will be unable to perform this task.
Just as important as the telemetry system is the tape recorder system. The important
thing here is to try and size the recorder capability based on data rates and test time. For
example, suppose you wanted to record six busses of 1553 data (1 Mb/sec/bus) and the
average test time in flight is 3 hr. If you choose a recorder that has a 2 hr record
capability at a max rate of 6 Mb/sec, you are going to run out of record time before the
test is complete. This means the pilot will have to turn the recorder off when it is not in
use and back on when it is required. Unfortunately, Murphy says that whenever a pro-
blem occurs in the aircraft, the position of the record switch will be ‘‘off.’’
The time code, the PCM, and the recorder format all must be in accordance with the
Range Commanders Council Telemetry Group, IRIG (Interrange Instrumentation
Group) Standard 106-07, ‘‘Telemetry Standards,’’ September 2007. The standard allows
interoperability among test facilities and allows the easy exchange of data. The standard
is common across all branches of the service in the United States and is used at many
other test facilities around the world. Remember, IRIG does not provide the correct
time; IRIG provides the standard for formatting the time inserted into data.
Video recording can be accomplished with external ‘‘over the shoulder’’ lipstick
cameras or may be directly recorded from the bus. Most aircraft equipped with a heads-
up display (HUD) will have a manufacturer installed recorder. The problems that we
saw with record time for avionics data should not be a problem with video recorders,
since pilots normally have direct access to the recording device and can change tapes
during flight. Most test organizations use Hi-8 record systems, but they are slowly
giving way to digital recording systems.
Since this is an avionics program, we know that we will need TSPI data. We may elect
to use one of the differential GPS/INS systems discussed in chapter 2. If we elect to use
radar or laser tracking, the range directorate will need to install a beacon or laser reflectors.
The last items on the instrumentation ‘‘wish list’’ are a missile simulate unit (MSU)
and an inadvertent jettison monitoring system (IJMS). The MSU allows us to simulate
many missile firings during the captive carry portion of the program. The SMS will not
allow multiple releases/firings of an inert or test munition because after the release
signal is sent, if the SMS detects a store still present, it will declare it ‘‘hung’’ and not
allow any further access to that station. The MSU allows the SMS to reset that station so
another simulated firing can be accomplished.
During the vehicle portion of the program, the T&E team will clear the HARM for
captive carry and firing. One of the tests they will perform before every load-out is a stray
voltage check at the station. This test ensures that the missile will not be inadvertently
fired because of stray voltage at the station. This test will also be performed during the
avionics integration portion of the program, but is not sufficient to guarantee protection
from an inadvertent release. The SMS sends a digital release signal to the decoders and
the decoders perform the digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion to voltage. How can we
guarantee that there is no stray digital release signal on the weapons bus? The IJMS is a
device that monitors the bus for this signal. Safety will not allow carriage of the HARM
until the T&E community can guarantee freedom from an inadvertent release.
11.3.2 Test Planning Requirements

Only after the program has been defined can we set about to plan the testing. Things to
be considered during this phase are
● Forming a test team
● Generating a test plan
● Asset availability
● Test conduct and responsibilities
The test team members are going to be dictated by the contract or SOW; it is the
project leader’s responsibility to ensure that the members are used in the most efficient
way possible. Remember that we know we are going to get screwed due to late delivery
of software, and program management is not going to allow us more time or budget to
accomplish the flight test portion of the program. Since I am throwing around a lot of
titles, let me delineate responsibilities. The following generic organizational chart is
common for most T&E programs (Figure 11.5).
HARM FIGURE 11.5 ¢

Program Customer Generic Program
Manager Organizational Chart
T&E Engineering
Program Program
Manager Manager
Vehicle Avionics Instrumentation Manufacturing

Project Project Ops (Pilots) Hardware Design
Leader Leader Range Software Design
Test
Conductor
Analysts
Aircraft Coordinator
The program manager is ultimately responsible for the success or failure of the
program and is concerned with schedule and budget; he is the liaison with the customer.
The engineering and T&E program managers report to the program manager and are
responsible for their assigned phases of the program. Within T&E are an avionics and a
vehicle project leader. These are usually two different individuals because of the
diversity between vehicle and systems testing. The avionics project leader is the liaison
with all of the support organizations for the project and supervises the flow of the test.
The test conductor is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the test program. The
responsibilities of the test conductor, analysts, and aircraft coordinator will be covered
in a bit.
In large programs it may be wise to establish two or three working test groups under
the avionics project leader. This would be the case with programs where major software
releases are expected at specific intervals. The avionics project leader appoints a test
conductor for each block of testing. She is responsible for the overall test planning and
test conduct for the particular software release. The test conductor, as a rule, requires a
mix of operational and technical expertise. The project leader assigns a mix of task team
members to each block of testing and each team is responsible for the successful com-
pletion of their respective block/build of software. An example of three teams working
independently would be:
● Team 1: Analysis and reporting of recent tests
● Team 2: Test conduct of ongoing tests
● Team 3: Preparation for upcoming tests
In most organizations the test plan format is governed by a set of operating

instructions or corporate operating procedures. In general the test plan should contain an
overview of all testable items, regardless of the demonstration requirements. It should
contain system operation, method of test, and anticipated results. The system under test
(SUT) can be described by test objectives, test conditions, test points, flight cards, or
test information sheets. The objectives are driven by the top-level specifications; the test
points are driven by the criteria used to satisfy the objectives (i.e., statistical population).
For example, a primary objective of our test plan may be to prove that bearing
accuracy (polar coordinates) is properly displayed to within 2 throughout the opera-
tional field of view (FOV) of the HARM. Assume the FOV of the HARM is 20
(a notional number for the exercise). We may want to place a target at 10 left of
boresight and measure the bearing accuracy. We repeat this test with the target at 5 left,
at boresight, at 5 right, and at 10 right. These are the test conditions to prove bearing
accuracy, but not the number of test points required. Say that for a 90% confidence in
the data we calculate that we need 8 data points. For this exercise we would require
8 data points times 5 test conditions, or 40 total test points. If we had more than one
station to evaluate, these would be multiplication factors in our test matrix. A test matrix
for this objective is shown in Table 11.3.
This is a rather simple matrix, but it is important to understand which number you
enter into the test plan (1 objective or 8 conditions or 80 test points). The U.S. Air Force
offers a slight twist on matrix testing. In the design of experiments (DOE), the same
matrix is built, but not every point in the matrix is evaluated. The rationale is that if
some points are taken throughout the matrix and they all pass, then the probability of the
other points passing is high and need not be accomplished. The net result is that less
TABLE 11.3 ¢ HARM Bearing Accuracy Test Matrix
System Azimuth Stations to be Total Test Points

Under Test Accuracy Evaluated for 90% Confidence
HARM 10 to þ10 Sta 3 and Sta 6 8
Total Test 1 5 2 8
Conditions
Total Test 80
Points Required
flight testing is required. For information on DOE, the reader is should do an online
search of ‘‘USAF Design of Experiments.’’
The completion of the test plan highlights which specific assets are required for the
test program. For most programs there will be four major classes of assets required:
targets, ranges, TSPI, and electronic warfare (EW) targets. There are many different
classes and capabilities of targets that may be required. Some of the attributes that
should be considered include
● Number of targets (resolution cells, raid count, track while scan [TWS], etc.)
● Size of targets (radar cross section [RCS], ability to adjust target size)
● Performance of targets (speed, altitude, turn performance)
● Availability and time on station (unique targets require long lead times, refueling
support)
● Manned versus unmanned (missiles, target drones for live fire exercises)
● Cost (sometimes the ideal target is too costly)
TSPI has been covered in just about every section of this text, so I will not belabor
the point. Just remember that whatever system is chosen should be at least four times as
accurate as the system under test. EW assets, as for our HARM program, are specialized
and only available at a few ranges around the globe. The types of EW assets required are
covered in chapter 9 of this text. Some of the key considerations are the number and types
of emitters required, the range and coverage of those emitters, the ability to change the
emitter characteristics, and the ability to generate threat signals from multiple locations.
There is always going to be a contention for assets, as there are always multiple
programs that require the same assets as you do. There could be problems with a data
reduction and analysis backlog with multiple programs. It is always a good idea to
maintain a close liaison with the scheduling office and be prepared to generate a sortie
when an opportunity presents itself. As corny as it sounds, it is true that flexibility is the
key to good flight testing.
11.4 RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TEST TEAM

This section covers the roles and responsibilities of the flight test team, which includes
the flight crew, team and flight briefs, test conduct, and debriefs. The responsibilities
assigned to individuals listed here are by no means an industry standard, but they have
worked well in the past.
The flight crew is an integral part of the flight test team and not just the bus driver as
we tend to think of them sometimes. They are the operational expertise of the joint test
team and hopefully are qualified in the aircraft with some recent fleet or squadron
experience. This may or may not be true for some test organizations in the United States.
Typically, after test pilot school the U.S. Navy sends the graduate to an operational
assignment. The U.S. Air Force, on the other hand, posts the graduate to a test organi-
zation. The longer a pilot is away from an operational squadron the less relevant they
become in an avionics and weapons setting. In addition, the pilot should be knowl-
edgeable of the system under test.
Ideally the flight crew is identified early in the program so they can follow the
development of the system and become expert in the system’s integration. One of the
problems with military test crews is that they tend to be rotated to a different posting
about every 3 years, which usually coincides with the first development flight of the
program. Now we have a situation where the flying will start to become heavy using a
new flight crew unfamiliar with the system.
The pilot is the safety of flight coordinator on the test team who identifies unrealistic/
unsafe flight tests and is the key in anomaly tracking and resolution. He is the human
factors man in the loop and the link to the control room during the tests. He is a member
of the test planning group and one of the main liaisons with design engineering and
software development, especially during controls and displays mock-up evaluations.
The flight crew is instrumental in lab development and in troubleshooting and problem
resolution.
Two hours prior to the flight is not the time to be discussing the merits of the flight
cards. For this reason, the flight brief should actually be broken down into two briefings:
a technical team brief and the actual flight brief. The technical team brief is held 24 hr
prior to the flight. Flight cards are reviewed for correctness and merit and the flight is
analyzed with respect to program goals (i.e., Are we on the right track?). Results from
the analyses of previous flights are introduced and discussed as to the merits of
repeating/rejecting a proposed test. The meeting is concluded only after all technical
discussions have been resolved and the test cards have been rewritten to everyone’s
satisfaction. Test cards will be highlighted for any special actions required by main-
tenance, the flight crew, or the test team. Flight cards are firm (sealed in concrete) at the
conclusion of the brief, and depending on your organization must be submitted to the
flight card approval authority (normally safety or the project leader).
Flight briefs are normally held 2 hr prior to the flight. Flight briefs must be
attended by
● Aircrew
● Test conductor
● Aircraft coordinator
● Manufacturing/aircraft engineering
● Test team
The test conductor is responsible for the flight brief and will follow a standardized
test conductor’s briefing guide or some facsimile thereof. The first item in the guide
should be aircraft-specific items. In many organizations a technician is assigned the
responsibility of aircraft coordinator, sometimes called a plane follower. It is her
responsibility to basically live with the test aircraft; nothing happens on the airplane that
she does not know about. At the beginning of the brief, the aircraft coordinator provides
a brief of the latest configuration and status of the airplane, including
● Previous aircraft write-ups, gripes, snags (or whatever your organization calls them)
and their resolution
● Aircraft configuration, both hardware and software (Has anything been modified
since the last flight?)
● Weight and center of gravity (CG) (Test organizations have a tendency to add and
remove items from the aircraft, such as instrumentation, which changes the weight
and balance of the aircraft.)
● Limitations and flight operating limitations (All test aircraft will have some limita-
tions that are over and above the basic airplane. This is usually due to development
hardware and software. It could be speed or altitude requirements that are lower than
the basic aircraft envelope or a function/mode that should not be engaged.)
● Special requirements (These may be maintenance or engineering adjustments or
variations in the aircraft normal procedures.)
● Radio frequencies (frequencies to be used for the flight)
You will notice that all of the items covered are important to the test team and need
to be briefed at some point in the flight brief. Some organizations assign these tasks to
many individuals on the team, but by having one individual responsible for them makes
life so much easier.
After the aircraft coordinator brief, the aircrew is called upon to brief some standard
mission items. These include the weather forecast, flight time, takeoff time, and in some
organizations, the emergency of the day. An emergency of the day is a hypothetical
problem with the airplane, and the aircrew is polled to see what they would do. In some
emergency situations there is what is known as ‘‘bold face,’’ which are steps that must be
memorized and followed verbatim.
The test conductor is responsible for briefing the specific test mission. Some of the
items that are covered include
● Flight cards, objectives, test points
● Information from the technical team brief
● Instrumentation
● Station operations and setup
● Debrief time
Notice that I have added the item of debrief time to required briefing items; this
takes away the excuse of not knowing about it. One other thing about debriefings:
Always strive to conduct the debrief as soon as possible after the flight. People tend to
forget things as time passes—usually about 1 nsec.
The aircrew is responsible for concluding the briefing with aircrew coordination
items, a chase or target brief, if required, en route and recovery, and Joker and Bingo
fuel. Bingo fuel is the minimum fuel needed to return to base, make an approach, and fly
to an alternate field. All test activities will cease at a call of Bingo fuel. Joker fuel is a
Bingo fuel plus some cushion, and is called as a warning to the test team that it is getting
close to go-home time.
TABLE 11.4 ¢ Partial Radio Log
Time Event
11:02 Aircrew arrives at aircraft
11:12 Left engine start
11:14 Right engine start
11:16 INS to align
11:19 Radar BIT complete
11:22 INS to navigate
11:25 Taxi
11:28 Predeparture checks complete
11:30 Aircraft takes the active
11:32 Brake release
11:34 Bird strike right engine
The test conductor is responsible for the entire test operation. With the exception of
flight following (air traffic control) and range control, the test conductor should be the
only voice on the radio. Analysts in the control room should have assigned seating;
overflow should be in a viewing room. An overflow room is usually set up to the rear of
the control room where spectators can view the test operation. They can hear and see
everything that is going on, but cannot intrude on the test team. Sometimes we call this
room a VIP or wannabe room. It is amazing how many people show up at the first flight
of a program just to say that they were there. All analysts should have access to Hot
Mike, UHF/VHF, and separate integrated communication system (ICS) nets; however,
access to UHF/VHF should be restricted to those with safety of flight responsibilities.
An individual should be assigned to keep a radio log. This is a rather inexpensive
method of keeping track of what happens during a flight, and can prove invaluable when
searching the data tapes for specific events. The individual writes down the times that
events happen during the test. A partial example is shown in Table 11.4.
Later, in the debrief, an analyst may ask the pilot, ‘‘You said the velocity vector on
the HUD looked a little funny. When was that?’’ The pilot replies, ‘‘Oh, I don’t know the
exact time, but it was just after that bird strike.’’ By looking at the radio log we can see
the approximate time where we should search for the data. This is a real time saver, as
the analyst does not have to search the entire tape for the time slice he requires.
Contact with the TSPI site, instrumentation, and data operations should be main-
tained by the test conductor. Instrumentation start and stop times (such as starting a new
tape when the Zulu time rolls to the next day) are the responsibility of the test conductor.
Start and completion of each step of the flight cards is initiated by the test conductor. Any
refly of an event is initiated by the test conductor after consultation with the test team.
Overall security is also the responsibility of the test conductor. You can see that the bulk
of the responsibility lies with the test conductor, which is where we would like it.
As mentioned previously, debriefs should be held as soon as possible after landing,
even if there is more than one flight, because problems and anomalies are easily for-
gotten over a period of time. Attendance should include design engineering, main-
tenance, and the program/project manager. The aircrew first addresses aircraft crabs
(gripes, squawks, write-ups) and then the mission anomalies.
The test conductor reviews the flight as seen by the control room; radio logs should
be handed out at this time. Time slices for postflight processing should be determined.
TABLE 11.5 ¢ Test Conductor’s Summary Sheet
Test Conductor’s Summary Sheet

Aircraft tail no. 207
Flight no. 16
Software load A2.3
Date January 16, 2007
Takeoff time 11:32
Land time 11:47
Reason for delay Weather
Test points accomplished/planned 0/125
Objectives and results Objective was to test the navigational accuracy
and drift rate of the AN/ASN XXX enhanced GPS/INS.
Test not accomplished due to in-flight emergency.
Flight discrepancies AN/ASN XXX failed in flight
Significant occurrences Bird strike right engine at 11:34
Purpose of next flight Functional check flight (FCF) after engine replacement
Action required prior to next flight Engine ground run at thrust stand
Comments This was the worst run test that I have ever been involved
with. I do not think that I want to do this anymore.
I just might transfer to instrumentation.
Distribution The world
The debrief should conclude with a discussion of overall flight results, success rate, and
probable goals for the next flight. The test conductor should then complete a test con-
ductor’s summary sheet or some record of the flight events.
The test conductor’s summary sheet is a concise record of the events of a test flight
that covers the key aspects of the flight. It is also designed to answer questions that may
pop up about the flight days, months, or even years after the flight was performed. A
sample of a test conductor’s summary sheet is shown in Table 11.5.
Most of the initial information, such as tail number and flight number, date, takeoff
time, and land time are pretty much self-explanatory. The listing of the software load
provides us with some configuration control, especially if we have to go backward to
review data. Whenever a scheduled flight is late, everyone wants to know the reason for
the delay. I have found there are three major reasons for delays: weather, maintenance,
and instrumentation; since weather cannot complain, I just put weather in this block. The
test points accomplished/planned block provides the reader with a measure of perfor-
mance or success; a good metric for program management (even though it is only an
estimate by the test conductor, as data analysis has not yet been performed).
The objectives of the flight and their respective results are listed as the next entry
and are the test conductor’s best guess once again. Any unusual events are annotated as
shown, and based on the results of this flight, the potential purpose of the next flight is
predicted. Actions required before the next flight may include hardware replacement,
software or instrumentation upgrade, or any other maintenance actions.
The comments section is left entirely up to the test conductor, and I used to urge
them to be as truthful and verbose as they wanted. Occasionally we would receive
comments like the ones in Table 11.5. The distribution is self-explanatory, but do not be
surprised if it expands as the test program progresses, as everyone wants to know what
happened on the last flight.
11.5 ANALYSIS AND REPORTING

The first place an analyst can look to gain an overview of the flight is the video review.
If we were smart up front, we will have a complete record of the flight with time and
pilot’s voice. This is one of the more important tools in understanding what went on
during the flight. Video can be obtained in many ways:
● Production HUD camera
● Production camera system
● Instrumentation cameras
● Video downlink
The aircrew will use the video to assist them in writing their daily flight reports, and
analysts use it for assistance in troubleshooting anomalies, locating the proper time for
batch processing, and determining specification compliance.
There are two basic types of flight analysis: specification and performance valida-
tion, and troubleshooting and problem resolution. The analysis can be performed in real
time or postflight, but the analyst needs to be aware of some differences. Real-time data
uses extrapolation to keep up with real time and is not as accurate as postflight batch
processing, which uses interpolation. In real time, the rates (samples per second) are
limited by the PCM frame setup and frame rate. Postflight batch processing allows the
user to access all of the data at rates up to the limits of the data bus.
After the data are compiled they must be analyzed by approved software routines.
These routines may be either government or contractor approved programs. All of the
data we review as analysts are going to be sorted through some type of statistical ana-
lysis. These calculations include
● Circular error probable (CEP) and circular error average (CEA) about the mean and
about the target
● Mean and standard deviation
● Dispersion
● Student’s t distributions
● Normal distributions
● Root mean square (rms)
● Ensemble packages
After all of the hard work is done the reports can be written (although some engi-
neers and most pilots will argue that the report is the hard work). As with the test plan,
most organizations will dictate how the reports are to be written via an operational
instruction (OI). Contractors also have their own formats, and most customers will allow
the contractor to submit reports in a contractor format. Most test pilot schools state that
the final report should stand alone; that is, a test can be duplicated by just using the final
report. This concept assumes that the reader has no access to the approved test plan, and
it puts quite a burden on the analyst since the plan has to be regurgitated in the report. Of
course, this makes the final report a rather large document that will probably be clas-
sified if no references are allowed. But then again, in military circles the saying is, ‘‘The
job is not complete until the paperwork equals the weight of the airplane.’’
I have always been of the opinion that shorter is better, and that test methodology
can be referenced back to the approved test plan in the final report: ‘‘The test was
accomplished IAW the approved test plan, reference X, section X.XX.’’ No matter how
it is done, there are a few items that must be included:
● Executive summary. In one page, summarize the key aspects of the test and state
whether the system under test was found to be acceptable, marginally acceptable, or
unacceptable. If unacceptable, the reasons are normally provided in the executive
summary. Write the executive summary for a general officer or company director who
does not have time to wade through the entire report to figure out what happened.
● Background. Why was this test performed? Who asked for it? Reference to a specific
tasking.
● General objectives and specific objectives. These need to match the test plan, as
unapproved tests are not allowed unless vetted through the test review board (TRB)
and safety review board (SRB) process.
● Instrumentation. Which avionics and TSPI data were collected during the test to assist
you in coming to your conclusions? The parameters can be shown in an appendix or
referenced to the test plan, but should never be included in the body of the report.
● Test method. As mentioned previously, it can be regurgitated here or referenced to
the approved test plan.
● Results. This is the body of the report. It is good to include graphs and tables in this
section if it aids the reader in visualizing the results. Tabular listings and spreadsheets
should be included as an appendix. The results should be identified as acceptable,
marginally acceptable, or unacceptable.
● Conclusions and recommendations. Every unacceptable result needs a must recom-
mendation and every marginally acceptable result needs a should recommendation.
Recommendations are listed in order of priority: musts first and shoulds second.
● Supporting data. All supporting data should be included in the appendix.
● Witnessing sheets. If a customer representative was onsite and witnessed the tests, it is
a good idea to obtain his/her signature on a document that states this fact. If the report
is submitted and the customer has a question about the test, he will more often than not
contact that representative rather than you. It makes the submittal process much easier.
The hardest part of the report writing is the signoff, because it seems that everyone
loves to wordsmith your work. The signoff cycle must be in accordance with your
procedures, and there is really nothing you can do about it other than to grin and bear it.
Test reports are contract data requirements list (CDRL) items (deliverables) and are
submitted to the customer under the terms and conditions of the data item description
(DID). Military development test and evaluation (DT&E) will also be required to submit
a final report under their SOW obligations.

There are no selected questions for this chapter. However, there is one final question for
you to answer. It is a question that I have asked all of my students in every course I have
ever had the privilege to instruct. The question is: ‘‘What, if anything, have you learned
from this text?’’ Hopefully everyone that picks up this book will be able to say that they
learned at least one thing new, and that always makes my day.
There are plenty of flight test engineers out there who have followed these proce-
dures but have never understood why it is done that way. They have always been given
the excuse that ‘‘It has always been done that way.’’ Now you know why.
One other thing. The procedures and techniques that have been discussed are by no
means the only way to perform an avionics or weapons evaluation, but they are all time
tested and they do work. As the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) says in all of
their advisory circulars: ‘‘Presented is a means, but not the only means, of showing
compliance with the applicable regulations (specifications).’’ Good luck.
CHAPTER
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

12
Chapter Outline
12.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 851
12.1 UAV Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 852
12.2 Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 856
12.3 The Airworthiness Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 857
12.4 UAS Communications Architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 860
12.5 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 886
12.6 Autopilots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 889
12.7 Sense and Avoid Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 892
12.8 Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 899
12.9 Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 901
12.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
12.11 Selected Questions for Chapter 12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 902
12.0 INTRODUCTION
The term UAV is a misnomer since the UAV is a part of the UAS, or unmanned aerial
system, which may contain a ground control element (GCE), communications system, the
UAV, and perhaps a shared data system. Other terminology includes unmanned combat
air system (UCAS), uninhabited air vehicle, unmanned aircraft vehicle, and unmanned
aircraft system, depending on the documentation. For this chapter I will use the generic
UAV and UAS to denote aircraft and system. The emphasis has been on military systems,
but this technology has migrated into the civilian world with applications in law enfor-
cement, fire detection, border enforcement, and traffic management. The benefits are
easily recognizable: a pilot is not required to be in the air (hazardous operations will not
endanger a human), machines are not subject to fatigue, systems can be built smaller
which require less fuel and provide longer endurance, and the overall cost is much smaller.
Since a UAV is unmanned, there are restrictions on where it can fly. Currently, there
is no fail-safe guarantee that a UAV can assure safe separation from other airborne
traffic. The FAA has strict guidelines on the operation of unmanned aircraft. To mitigate
this problem and to aid in the development of UAVs and UAV systems, some organi-
zations have turned to surrogate UAVs (SUAV), sometimes called piloted UAVs.
There are regulations on these systems as well, and they still need to go through an
851
852 CHAPTER 12 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)
airworthiness certification process; the reader is referred to FAA Order 8130.34B,

‘‘Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Optionally Piloted
Aircraft,’’ November 28, 2011. The FAA uses aircraft instead of aerial and formalizes
the term optionally piloted aircraft (OPA).
For an overview of UAV aircraft, history, missions, and applications, two texts will
aid in the evaluator’s understanding of the subject: Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (Richard K. Barnhart, Stephen B. Hottman, Douglas M. Marshall, and Eric
Shappee, CRC Press, 2011) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, Develop-
ment and Deployment (Reg Austin, John Wiley and Sons, 2010).
The following publications may also offer some insight into UAV systems: Introduction
to Unmanned Systems: Air, Ground, Sea & Space; Technologies and Commercial Appli-
cations (Jeremy LeMieux, Unmanned Vehicle University, 2013) and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle End to End Support Considerations (John G. Drew, Rand Corporation, 2005).
As with the previous chapters in this text, we are concerned with evaluating
UAV systems and will not delve into the performance and flying qualities of these
systems. The previous chapters provide the foundation for these evaluations, and this
chapter will discuss the nuances of testing when dealing with a UAS.
12.1 UAV TYPES

UAVs run the gamut from small to large, high and low altitude, reconnaissance to
interdiction, and military to civilian. The key to the design and what systems are
required depends entirely on its designated mission. Troops on the battlefield desiring
intelligence of the surrounding area or battle damage assessment may have a need for a
system that is short range, compact, and easily deployable. An example of such a system
may be the WASP, which is one of the smallest drones in operational use (Figure 12.1).
FIGURE 12.1 ¢
WASP
12.1 UAV Types 853
For theatre reconnaissance, the mission may dictate large loiter times over a vast
area of interest. The mission may also dictate that high-resolution sensors be used to
produce images (either in near real time or analyzed offline) to be read by ground
supporting elements. This may force the development of a larger aircraft (to carry the
payload and the required fuel) capable of high altitude flight (for area coverage). The
RQ-4A Global Hawk (35 hr endurance and a ceiling of 65,000 ft), used extensively by
the military and now NASA, would meet these requirements (Figure 12.2).
There may be a requirement for a hunter–killer system operating beyond line of
sight (BLOS) capable of detecting, recognizing, and identifying hostile targets at a safe
distance and employing sufficient firepower to destroy these targets. In surveying the
inventory, a possible candidate exists that can detect and identify hostile targets but
lacks sufficient firepower to deal with them. An upgrade to this existing platform may be
possible to carry out this mission. The MQ-9 Reaper is a scaled-up version of the MQ-1
Predator (which itself is derived from the Gnat-750) and is capable of carrying Hellfire
missiles and LGBs (Figure 12.3).
FIGURE 12.2 ¢
RQ-4A Global Hawk
FIGURE 12.3 ¢
MQ-9 Reaper
UAVs don’t have to be fixed wing aircraft; the MQ-8 Fire Scout is a rotary wing
aircraft made by Northrop Grumman and operated by the U.S. Navy. It is capable of
automated landing on a moving aircraft carrier. Typical missions include surveillance,
locating targets, and directing friendly fire. There have also been weapons tests with a
Fire Scout armed with 2.75 in. rockets; the U.S. Army has now shown interest in
having its own version. The Battlehog 150 is intended to meet the Marine Corps
requirement for a vertical takeoff drone capable of operating from aircraft carriers. It
can fly at over 300 mph with a payload of 500 pounds, with armaments likely to
include Hellfire missiles, rocket pods, and 7.62 mm mini-guns. The Battlehog series is
designed to be as robust as possible, being able to withstand small-arms fire from close
range. The U.S. Army has ordered three long-endurance multi-intelligence vehicle
(LEMV) UAVs from Northrop Grumman; the LEMVs were to be delivered by 2013.
LEMV is based on the existing (and tested) hybrid air vehicle (HAV), which was an
aerodynamic blimp built to transport cargo. HAV looks like a flattened blimp, a wide
airship with much better handling qualities. LEMV is an unmanned blimp that can
carry 1.1 tons of sensors, stay aloft for 21 days at a time, supply 16 kW of power, and
move at up to 148 km/hr at 6400 m (20,000 ft) altitude. The LEMV made its maiden
flight on August 9, 2012, in New Jersey (Figure 12.4). (which was its last flight as the
program was canceled).
The U.S. military tends to classify UAVs based on four categories: size/weight,
range, endurance/altitude, and mission. Table 12.1 delineates these categories.
The pilot can operate a UAS in either internal or external mode. While operating in
internal mode the pilot is located in a GCS viewing real-time video or instruments to
control the UAS. While operating in external mode the operator is directly looking at the
air vehicle outside of a GCS.
The two basic operating modes of a UAV are remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) or
command directed. In RPV mode, a pilot in a control station remotely flies the A/C
through a set of controls. The autopilot controls the A/C in the command direct mode,
but the pilot can make changes to the parameters of heading, airspeed, altitude, and next
waypoint via inputs over the command and control link, similar to autopilot inputs by
the aircrew in a Part 25 aircraft.
There are two types of RPV control: rate and vector control. An RPV utilizing rate
control is the most basic of control modes and provides a direct link between the input
device and the position of the flight control surfaces. Rate control delivers the most
resemblance to manned aircraft control inputs, stability, and handling qualities. The lack
of proportional stick force for pilot feedback degrades efficacy of rate control. Rate
control requires the highest level of pilot motor skills and training.
An RPV utilizing vector control can be highly augmented much like a sophisticated
modern manned aircraft’s autopilot. Using vector control, the operator makes discrete
inputs to the autopilot outer loop (heading, altitude, or airspeed desired), and the
autopilot or stability augmentation system (SAS) manipulates the flight control surfaces
to achieve the desired condition. Operator inputs can be made by stick position, control
knob position, or increasingly via computer interface selections.
In a command directed vehicle (CDV), the aircraft is essentially autonomous. The
CDV takes off and lands automatically and executes all flight maneuvers based on a
preprogrammed set of instructions, or flight plan, stored in the ground control station
prior to flight. A CDV must have an intelligent and reliable fault detection and response
system that ensures predictable autonomous action. The GCE can alter flight plan in
flight by loading a new set of instructions through inputs to the ground.
12.1 UAV Types 855
Artist Rendition Northrop Grumman FIGURE 12.4 ¢

(from the top) LEMV,
Battlehog, and Fire
Scout
Image by American Dynamics Flight Systems Wingspan
US Navy Photo
TABLE 12.1 ¢ UAV Categories
Categories
Size/Weight Range Endurance/Altitude Mission

Micro Short Medium Altitude Reconnaissance
Small Medium and Endurance (MALE)
Medium Long High Altitude Combat
Large and Endurance (HALE)
12.2 INTEROPERABILITY
With the plethora of UAVs being fielded, it was necessary to create and use some sort of
standardization in the data architecture of these systems. One military and one civilian
standard are in use today. Interoperability between allied forces greatly increases effi-
ciency and capability in a joint/combined service environment. This can be accomplished
through the sharing of assets and the use of common information generated by UAV
systems. By enabling the interoperability of multiple vehicles from a common STANAG
(NATO Standardization Agreement) 4586 GCE, NATO operators can operate multiple
UAVs of various types with widely different performance characteristics and features.
STANAG 4586, formally ratified by NATO in 2002 and now at edition 3, defines
five levels of UAV interoperability:
– Level 1: Indirect receipt/transmission of UAV-related payload data
– Level 2: Direct receipt of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data
where ‘‘direct’’ covers reception of the UAV payload data by the unmanned control
system when it has direct communication with the UAV
– Level 3: Control and monitoring of the UAV payload in addition to direct receipt of
ISR and other data
– Level 4: Control and monitoring of the UAV, less launch and recovery
– Level 5: Control and monitoring of the UAV, plus launch and recovery
The Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) (the full name of the standard is
SAE-AS-4/JAUS) is an international civilian standard that defines communication
protocols for unmanned vehicle systems (can also be ground vehicles or any other
robot), some of their internal components, and their interaction with operator control
stations. JAUS employs a service-oriented architecture (SOA) approach to enable dis-
tributed command and control of these systems. The standard defines message format-
ting for transport between system services and sets of standard services, which describe
specific functional components for various unmanned system capabilities. The JAUS
standards are owned and developed by SAE under the Aerospace Standards Unmanned
Systems Steering Committee (AS-4).
The main goal of JAUS is to structure communication and interoperation of unman-
ned systems within a network. All information in a JAUS-compliant system is commu-
nicated in the form of messages, which are variable length sequences of bytes. Information
on how to decode the messages is contained in a message header. The architecture is
similar to the Link-16 TADIL-J Standard Messages and the terminal TIMs and TOMs
(section 5.9.2.1). These messages were standardized so any JTIDS/MIDS terminal could
decode them. There are seven message classes within JAUS: command, query, inform,
event setup, event notification, node management, and experimental. The 16-byte header
for these messages is in a format we saw in chapter 3. Each header contains the source and
destination address, a command code that provides the decode information, and a
sequence number to ensure that messages are not missed or received out of order.
Just as the TADIL-J messages are grouped according to functional areas such as
network management, surveillance, and EW, so too are JAUS messages. Table 12.2
describes the functional areas (called service names in the document), functional pur-
pose, and examples of the messages within that function. It should be noted that there
TABLE 12.2 ¢ JAUS Functionality
Service
Name Purpose Example Messages
Transport Acts as a common gateway for all messages entering None
and leaving the component.
Events Enables other components to request messages from Create Event, Update Event, Cancel Event, Query
services that inherit from the events service on a Events, Reject Event Request, Event
fixed periodic or an on-change basis.
Access Allows services that inherit from the access control Request Control, Release Control, Query Control,
Control service to be exclusively controlled by a single Query Authority, Report Control, Confirm
source component. In turn, the controlled services Control
will only accept commands from their controlling
component. This is how JAUS components
implement mutual exclusion.
Management Allows client components to control and access Shutdown, Standby, Resume, Reset, Set Emergency,
information about the internal state of another Clear Emergency, Query Status, Report Status
components function. For example, this allows
client components to reset or shut down a server
component.
Time Provides an interface for reporting a component’s Query Time, Report Time
internal system time to other components.
Liveness Allows client components to establish whether Query Heartbeat Pulse, Report Heartbeat Pulse
another component is online and responding to
message communication. Similar to the concept
of a network ping.
Discovery Enables components to discover each other’s Register Services, Query Identification, Query
presence and allows them to exchange information Configuration, Report Identification, Report
about which services they implement and support. Configuration, Report Service List
are more than 150 standard messages in the current documentation. If users find that
they require a message not included in the standard catalog they may develop experi-
mental messages, but their incorporation will negate a JAUS compliance of their system.
The USN has declared that all UAV acquisitions will be STANAG 4586 compliant
and all other systems will be JAUS compliant. The USN (PMA-263) (Program Man-
agement Activity) is the custodian for STANAG 4586.
12.3 THE AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATE

A special airworthiness certificate in the experimental category, issued by the FAA, is
required for all unmanned aircraft systems and optionally piloted aircraft to be flown in
national airspace (NAS). As noted earlier in the chapter, the reader is referred to FAA
Order 8130.34B, ‘‘Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and
Optionally Piloted Aircraft,’’ November 28, 2011, for guidance on how to obtain this
certificate. An important note for those seeking airworthiness certificates in this category is
that the FAA considers the entire unmanned aircraft system, not just the UAV. The request
will be evaluated by considering the UAV, data links, and the GCE as the complete
system. This topic is addressed here because testing cannot commence until this certificate
is granted. In addition, minimum aviation system performance standards (MASPS) are still
in development at the time of this writing (hence an order and not an AC) and should
be finalized by December 2014; further discussion on this subject is found in
section 12.7.1.
This special airworthiness certificate will be issued only for research and develop-
ment to nonpublic entities. Public or military organizations must obtain a certificate of
authorization (COA). It is currently not possible to obtain a certificate for commercial
operations. The certification restricts operation of the vehicle outside of a restricted area
unless special permission is given requiring a manned chase aircraft or ground-based
spotters providing visual separation from all other aircraft.
Additional information on keeping the vehicle within specified boundaries may
be found in Range Commanders Council Document 323-99, ‘‘Range Safety Criteria for
Unmanned Air Vehicles’’ (http://www.wsmr.army.mil/RCCsite/Documents/323-99_Range
%20Safety%20Criteria%20for%20Unmanned%20Air%20Vehicles,%20Rationale%20and
%20Methodology%20Supplement%20(Supplement)/323-99Sup.pdf).
Chapter 3, section 1, of the order describes the procedural requirements that must be
followed in pursuit of the airworthiness certificate. In no case may any UAS or OPA be
operated as civil aircraft unless a valid certificate has been issued. The process begins
with a program letter that conveys to the authority the purpose of the certificate, the area
over which the requested operations are to be conducted, the duration of the program,
and other required information. Specific areas of concern that must be addressed in this
letter are containment, lost link, and flight termination.
The letter must show the ability of the aircraft to be contained within the boundaries of
the proposed flight area. The applicant’s ability to provide information that satisfies this
requirement will help define the operational area. The details of the lost link procedures
must be included as part of a safety checklist. In the event that the command and control
cannot be recovered, an independent means to safely terminate the flight must be provided.
A safety checklist is required, and the order goes into great detail of what is
expected in this document. The applicant must provide a presentation consisting of
detailed system descriptions augmented by block diagrams, wiring schematics, and S/W
architecture. It is the FAA’s responsibility to determine that the system is safe to operate
in the NAS based on operational risk and safety assessments. Supporting documentation
that must also be submitted includes the following:
– The proposed operating area plotted on an aeronautical chart with boundaries iden-
tified by latitude and longitude. The length of the boundary legs must be annotated as
well as the proposed altitudes of operation.
– All appropriate operating manuals including operating limitations and checklists
(normal, abnormal, and emergency).
– An appropriate training program for pilots, observers, chase, and ground personnel as
well as documentation that all personnel have successfully completed such training.
– Evidence of an FAA pilot’s license and current medical (private pilot’s license and
Class II medical); personnel not requiring a certificate but required to have success-
fully completed an FAA-accepted pilot ground school must document results of the
written exam.
– Before conducting operations, the frequency spectrum used for operation and control
must be approved by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or other
appropriate government oversight agency. Depending on the frequency and power of
the data link, a license for use may be required.
Chapter 3, section 3, covers the procedures for an OPA. The requirements are much the
same as defined for the UAS with the exception of a statement allowing the applicant to
opt out of the safety evaluation. Of course this comes with restrictions: there must
always be a pilot onboard, and remote control equipment (RPV) must be removed. The
only exception is within restricted airspace by permission of the controlling agency.
The appendices to the order present the applicant with examples of operating lim-
itations for UAS and OPA systems and a sample program letter previously described.
Appendix D provides the applicant with the safety checklist, which is quite lengthy
(some 15 pages). It is imperative that organizations proposing civil applications or
military applications operating in the NAS initiate work on this certificate early on in the
program as ground and flight test operations will not be able to proceed without it.
A synopsis of the differences between the private industry and U.S. government
operations.
Civil Operation: Private Industry
For civil operation, applicants may obtain a special airworthiness certificate,
experimental category, by demonstrating that their unmanned aircraft system can
operate safely within an assigned flight test area and cause no harm to the public.
Applicants must be able to describe how their system is designed, constructed,
and manufactured, including engineering processes, software development and
control, configuration management, and quality assurance procedures used, along
with how and where they intend to fly. If the FAA determines the project does not
present an unreasonable safety risk, the local FAA Manufacturing Inspection
District Office will issue a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental
category with operating limitations applicable to the particular UAS.
Public Operation: U.S. Government Organizations

For public operation, the FAA issues a certificate of authorization or waiver
(COA) that permits public agencies and organizations to operate a particular UA,
for a particular purpose, in a particular area. The FAA works with these organi-
zations to develop conditions and limitations for UA operations to ensure they do
not jeopardize the safety of other aviation operations. The objective is to issue a
COA with terms that ensure an equivalent level of safety as manned aircraft.
Usually, this entails making sure that the UA does not operate in a populated area
and that the aircraft is observed, either by someone in a manned aircraft or
someone on the ground.
Additional information on airworthiness and COAs for UAV operations can be obtained
from the FAA website (http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/cert/).
12.3.1 Military Airworthiness Requirements

STANAG 4671, ‘‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Airworthiness Requirements
(USAR),’’ has established a baseline set of airworthiness standards in relation to the design
and construction of military UAVs. When in compliance with this standard, a UAV shall be
permitted to operate, or have a streamlined approval, to fly in the airspace of other NATO
countries that have ratified the agreement. The airworthiness standards apply to fixed
wing military UAVs with maximum gross weights of 150–20,000 kg (330–44,092 lb.)
TABLE 12.3 ¢ USAR Subparts
UAV System
Command Other
and Control Communications UAV Control Ancillary
UAV Data Link System Station Elements
A General X X X X X
B UAV Flight X
C UAV Structure X X
D UAV Design and X X
Construction
E UAV Powerplant X
F Equipment X
G Operating Limitations X X X
and Information
H Command and Control X X
Data Link
I UAV Control Station X X X
and have been modeled after EASA CS 23 (FAA Part 23) requirements. The agreement
also states that compliance meets the minimum requirements of CS 23.1309 and the AMC
(14 CFR 23.1309 and AC 23.1309). The agreement recognizes that certain unique features
of UAS require particular additional requirements or subparts. The USAR does not cover
‘‘sense and avoid’’ but will include them as requirements are codified.
The USAR is presented like the current EASA regulations; Book 1 contains the
applicable CS codes (FAA Part Paragraph Number) applicable to the UAV, and Book 2
contains the Acceptable Method of Compliance (AMC in EASA terms, Advisory Cir-
cular in FAA terms). Each of the books is divided into subparts (A through I) as shown
in Table 12.3.
As an example, Subpart F, Equipment, starts with paragraph 1301 (which is very
familiar) and is applicable as written in CS-23. Paragraph 1307 in the same subpart
addresses ECS systems but only as applicable to the UAV; this paragraph is labeled
U1307 to tell the reader that this paragraph is unique to USAR. When formulating a Test
Plan for UAVs it is recommended that you consult USAR and incorporate the required
testing called out to show airworthiness compliance; it is also an excellent method of
ensuring that all testing is accounted for in the test plan. Book 2 will provide the
applicant with an AMC to show airworthiness. The AMC for paragraph 1309 is to
perform a safety assessment (which is exactly the same for manned aircraft but
addresses UAV unique problems).
12.4 UAS COMMUNICATIONS ARCHITECTURE

The communications network associated with a UAV or UAS is extensive and must be
reliable. Four basic communications groups must be considered when performing an
evaluation:
– In-vehicle communications
– Data link Communications
– Ground control element (GCE) communications

– Net-centric backbone communications
In-vehicle communications involve the movement of data and data commands within
the vehicle. This is accomplished using one or many of the data busses previously
covered. Data link communications involve the transfer of data and commands between
the vehicle and the GCE. Uplink commands may control the autopilot, sensor operation,
or requests for data. Downlink replies may consist of acknowledgments (ACK) or
nonacknowledgments (NACK) (missed data), health and welfare status, or sensor data.
Additional data link streams may also be used as in the case of Link-16 or TTNT
participation. The GCE communications mostly involve the receipt and display of
vehicle data to pilots, sensor operators, and analysts. Net-centric backbone commu-
nications forward UAV data (e.g., position, velocity, store status, sensor information) to
other users such as command and control or network participants.
The in-vehicle system will be limited by the data bus architecture processing speed
and memory. You may recall that if Mil-Std-1553 or AS15531 is used the throughput
will be limited but deterministic. Data links have other concerns and these concerns are
dependent on the types of data that are being exchanged. Autopilot commands and
weapons arming and firing are critical commands that must be timely, correct, and
interpreted correctly by the vehicle. Audio and video may be streaming or if not critical,
be reassembled and viewed postflight or near real time. So within the data link, we may
have the following:
– Multiple data streams
Sensors
Command and control
Status and health and welfare
– Each with different requirements
Urgency and priority
Reliability
The link itself can also encounter specific problems such as throughput, bandwidth,
latency, dropouts, and what some call lossy links (which is really lost or missing packets
of data and usually referring to transmission control protocol, or TCP). Requirements
may also change based on whether the transmission is an uplink or downlink. For military
applications, and in some cases civilian applications, the links are encrypted for obvious
reasons. This adds another layer of difficulty to the operation and may add to latency
issues. A generalized requirements list based on link type can be found in Table 12.4.
The GCE will receive multiple data streams of asynchronous and isochronous data;
these data need to be time-aligned and merged to present this information to the UAV
pilot, mission manager, or sensor operator/analysts. This can be a daunting task since all
data may arrive at slightly different times. For this reason, it is imperative that all data be
time-tagged when it was sensed for this is the time that will be used by the GCE to align
and reassemble data.
As with the aircraft systems, there must be a contingency plan for cases where
controls and displays within the GCE fail during an operation. What is the amount of
redundancy required? Other concerns often overlooked in the development process are
TABLE 12.4 ¢ UAV Data Link Uses and Requirements
Data Link High Reliability Data Link High Capacity Beyond Line of Sight Redundant/Backup
Types (HRDL) Data Link (BLOS) Data Link
(HCDL)
Primary Use Command and Control Own- Sensor Data (EO/ Relay Transfer High Altitude Command and Control
ship Position and Status IR/RADAR/ and Status Data
ELINT)
Requirements Low-to-Moderate Throughput High Throughput Combined Performance of Low Throughput with
with High Availability and Streaming High Reliability and High High Reliability and
Integrity Audio and Capacity Integrity
Video
FIGURE 12.5 ¢
Predator JIC/GBS INJECTION
Communications REACHBACK OR
GBS THEATER DII
Concept
Ku-Band ENTRY POINT
SATCOM
T-1
GBS
6 Mbs SIPRNET
LOS JWICS
4.5 Mbs
C-Band
512 Kbs
User
User
Data and Still
User
Frames
Exploitation
Cell Data and Still
Expando Van Frames
how much data are expected, how will they be captured, how will they be stored, how
will they be retrieved, and what is their classification?
Shared data with other users are net-centric communications. The problems pre-
viously addressed with the GCE also apply to net-centric users; data must be in a
readable (compatible) format. In large, multiparticipant scenarios, it would not be
unreasonable to suggest that data would have to be distributed over multiple links (Links
4, 11, and 16 and TTNT) and in a timely manner.
12.4.1 Data Link Examples

Figure 12.5 is taken from the U.S. Air Combat Command (ACC), ‘‘Concept of Opera-
tions for Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,’’ Version 2, December 3, 1996, the
communications concept for the Predator UAV. The direct link to the GCE (called a
theater exploitation system in the document) operates in C-band and can deliver a data
rate of 4.5 Mbps. For the Predator, this link provides a full duplex command and control
uplink and product (sensor) downlink out to approximately 100 nm LOS. The link is
used to launch and recover the aircraft and provide EO full color and IR imagery at
30 frames per second; it supports EO/IR and SAR at 7 frames per second.
The Predator uses two satellite links: UHF SATCOM and Ku-Band SATCOM. Both
provide over-the-horizon (OTH) command and control uplink and frame imagery (not
including SAR) downlink. The UHF link supports a bandwidth of 16 Kbs, and command
and control capabilities are limited to ingress and egress due to satellite control-response
delays. The Ku-band commercial link has the same latency problems but can support a
bandwidth of 1.544 Mbs (noted in the figure as a T-1 link), which allows downlinking
high-resolution SAR frames and EO/IR black-and-white or color video.
The JIC/GBS satellites noted in the figure are part of the Joint Intelligence Center/
Global Broadcast Service. GBS operates as a one-way, wideband transmission service
capable of supporting timely delivery of classified and unclassified data and video
products for mission support and theater information transfer. GBS uses commercial
satellite broadcast technology to deliver large imagery and data files that would overload
typical tactical network capacity. GBS disseminates IP-based, real-time video and large
data files (up to 4 GB in size) over-the-air (up to 45 Mbps) to combat forces using net-
centric prioritized delivery based on unit mission reception priority profiles. More
information on GBS can be obtained from the Los Angeles Air Force Base website
(http://www.losangeles.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7853).
Before continuing, a little clarity on nomenclature is required. You will notice in the
previous paragraph that two terms are used to describe data size and data rate. These two
terms are ‘‘4 GB in size’’ and ‘‘45 Mbps’’. When a capital B is used, the term is bytes;
when a lowercase b is used, the term is bits. There are 8 bits to a byte, so a mistake in the
understanding of the term will have you off by a factor of eight. Table 12.5 will hope-
fully eliminate any confusion.
Similar to the Range Commanders Council standardization of instrumentation
and telemetry formats, the format and standards for exchange of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
architectures is governed by the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) standards for inter-
operability. Per DoD Instruction 5000.2, December 8, 2008, highly sensitive, classified,
cryptologic, and intelligence projects and programs shall follow this instruction to the
extent practicable. Note that the DoD IT Standards Registry (DISR) is an online repo-
sitory of IT standards formerly captured in the JTA, Version 6.0; DISR replaces JTA.
SIPRNET noted on the right side of the figure is the Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNet), which is a system of interconnected computer networks used by the
TABLE 12.5 ¢ Data Size Nomenclature
Meaning Term
1 byte 8 bits
1024 bytes 1 KB (kilobyte)
1024 KB 1 MB (megabyte)
1024 MB 1 GB (gigabyte)
1024 GB 1 TB (terabyte)
1024 bits 1 Kb (kilobit)
1024 Kb 1 Mb (megabit)
1024 Mb 1 Gb (gigabit)
1024 Gb 1 Tb (terabit)
U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State to transmit classified
information (up to and including information classified SECRET) by packet switching
over the TCP/IP protocols in a secure environment. The Joint Worldwide Intelligence
Communications System (JWICS) is also noted on the right side of Figure 12.5 and is a
24 hr a day network designed to meet the requirements for secure multimedia intelli-
gence communications worldwide. JWICS provides users with a high-speed multimedia
network using high-capacity communications to handle data, voice, imagery, and gra-
phics. Some sites have video and data capability on T1 lines, and some have strictly data
capability (64 kbps lines).
The T1 line just mentioned may need a little more explanation. In the T&E programs
performed in the 1980s, some organizations linked information over the satellite for
remote operations and the organization paid for the transponder time when being used.
The amount of data that are needed to be transmitted determines which link would be
required. The nomenclature T1 and higher is the terminology for digital, two-way
transmission of voice, data, or video over a single high-speed circuit. The transmission
rate is based on the bandwidth for one voice channel in digital form. This channel is
called DS-0 and consists of 64 kbps of bandwidth. Using time division multiplexing 24 of
these DS-0 channels, the T1 link is formed. To separate the different channels a framing
bit is used. For framing (see the discussion on instrumentation frame rates in section 3.19
of the text), 8000 bps are used. T1 therefore gives you 24 analog voice channels
plus the framing rate. This defines the T1 speed as 24 64,000 þ 8000 ¼ 1.544 Mbps.
Other T-versions use the same equation adding additional voice channels; the results are
Another family of data links in use with UAS is the common data link (CDL). This
program is designed to achieve data link interoperability and provide seamless com-
munications between multiple ISR collection systems operated by armed services and
government agencies. CDL provides full-duplex, jam-resistant, digital microwave
communications between the ISR sensor, sensor platform, and surface terminals. The
CDL program establishes data link standards and specifications identifying compat-
ibility and interoperability requirements between collection platforms and surface
terminals across user organizations.
CDL is a full-duplex, jam-resistant spread spectrum, point-to-point digital link. The
uplink operates at 200 kbps up to 45 Mbps. The downlink can operate at 10.71–45 Mbps,
137 Mbps, or 234 Mbps; rates of 548 Mbps and 1096 Mbps will be supported. The CDL
family has five classes of links:
– Class I: Ground-based applications with airborne platforms operating at speeds up to
Mach 2.3 and altitudes up to 80,000 ft
– Class II: Speeds up to Mach 5 and altitudes up to 150,000 ft
TABLE 12.6 ¢ T(n) Link Capabilities
Carrier Signal Level # of T1 signals # of Voice Channels Speed

T1 DS-1 1 24 1544 kbps
T1c DS-1c 2 48 3152 kbps
T2 DS-2 4 96 6312 kbps
T3 DS-3 28 672 44736 kbps
T4 DS-4 168 4032 274760 kbps
– Class III: Speeds up to Mach 5 and altitudes up to 500,000 ft

– Class IV: Terminals in satellites orbiting at 750 nm
– Class V: Terminals in relay satellites operating at greater altitudes
The CDL has the potential to utilize military satellites and carrier signals as well as
commercial SATCOM. There are two military satellite CDL systems in use: Senior
Span and Senior Spur. Senior Span operates in the I-band, whereas Senior Spur operates
in the Ku-band to gain bandwidth. Other versions of CDL include the tactical common
data link (TCDL) and the U.S. Navy sea-based common data link-Navy (CDL-N). The
TCDL program provides a family of interoperable, secure, digital data links for use with
both manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance platforms. Possible platforms
include UAVs, P-3 Orion, Guardrail, and JSTARS. It will transmit and receive data at
rates from 1.544 Mbps to at least 10.7 Mbps over ranges of 200 km. TCDL should soon
support the required higher CDL rates of 45, 137, and 274 Mbps. Predator was to have
started TCDL testing in 2012.
12.4.2 Latency
Earlier in the text, we examined the concept of data latency with respect to the amount of
time it takes for data to pass through the processing routine (senescence) and the delay, or
transport time, to reach the receiver. We identified the total latency as the time from when
a parameter is sensed to the time when it is received (e.g., telemetry room, another air-
craft, the pilot’s display). The Civil Certification of Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast (ADS-B), also a data link, specifies that a latency study must be conducted
(chapter 6). The reason given is that the information transmitted is being used by other
aircraft and controlling agencies to mitigate traffic incursions. Latencies of over 2 seconds
are deemed unacceptable for safety reasons. When evaluating UAS, the problem of
latency should be obvious; critical functions which require as near real time as possible
cannot be compromised based on ‘‘old’’ data.
LOS links will usually not have a problem with latency; since we are dealing with
radio waves, the transmission time will be measured in microseconds. The largest
component of the total latency will be that contribution of senescence, which is totally
dependent on the system architecture of the in-vehicle communications.
BLOS communications via satellite is a completely different story as the largest
contributor to the total latency will be the transport time. We can take an example of
communicating from an aircraft to GCE over a geostationary satellite. For the satellite to
be geostationary its orbit altitude above the earth must be 19,000 nm. If all other
attenuation factors are removed, it would take a signal traveling at the speed of light
about 250 ms to travel to the satellite and back to the ground. For an Internet packet this
delay is doubled before a reply is received, which provides a typical latency of 500 ms.
If an uplink and a downlink is required (i.e., command and control) this number would
be doubled again to 1000 ms, which would be the theoretical minimum. In reality, the
total latency across the satellite using TCP/IP would be somewhere between 1000 and
1400 ms (1–1.5 sec). Adding layers of security or encryption will increase the total
transport delay. Some acceleration features can be incorporated in TCP/IP, but the
latency will never be completely eliminated.
Medium and low earth orbiting (MEO/LEO) satellites do not have the severe
latency problems associated with the geostationary satellites. LEO constellations have
round trip delays of less than 40 ms, but some are severely limited in throughput of
about 64 kbps. The proposed O3b Networks MEO is scheduled for deployment in 2013,
will orbit at an altitude of 4350 nm, and claims round trip latency of 125 ms, and a
throughput of 2.1 Mbps using TCP Reno (http://www.o3bnetworks.com/media/45606/
latency%20matters.pdf).
Note: TCP Reno, like TCP Tahoe and TCP Vegas, is a congestion avoidance
algorithm used in TCP, which is designed to limit the amount of lost packets of data. It
accomplishes this by increasing a delay time for a new transmission and limiting the
amount of data sent. More on this later.
MSCI’s LEO COMMStellation will orbit the earth at a height of 540 nm in a polar
orientation. The COMMStellation will be composed of 78 microsatellites in six orbital
planes with an additional six redundant microsatellites (one per orbital plane). In its
current configuration, COMMStellation will provide 100% global coverage with up to
15 times the speed and 10 times the total bandwidth capacity of a MEO constellation of
comparable satellites (http://www.commstellation.com/constellation/index.html).
Congestion on TCP links will also add to latency. TCP ensures the error-free
sequenced delivery of data transmitted from a source to a destination. Data are sent by the
transmitter to the receiver in fragments called TCP segments or packets; a maximum size
is defined for the segments. The receiver will confirm the correct reception of sent TCP
segments by acknowledging them (sending the transmitter a response ‘‘ACK message’’
with a correct sequence number). This process can be seen in Figure 12.6. If an ACK
message is not received or if it is not correct, the transmitter will return the message
ensuring a reliable transfer. At the end of the session, it is correctly closed by exchange of
FIN (finished) messages. The key factor in this context is that TCP will send only a limited
amount of data before it needs an acknowledgment; in Figure 12.6 this number is four. The
amount of data is governed by the TCP buffer size; Windows 7, for example, can operate
at 64 KB. If 64 KB of data have been sent, but the acknowledgments have not yet been
received, TCP will wait for an acknowledgment before it sends another packet. This
acknowledgment mechanism is what limits the transmission rate over high latency links.
For data to be declared reliable the following protocol is followed:
– Each message is identified with a session identification and a sequence number.
– Periodic polling is accomplished to tell the receiver which sequence numbers should
have been received.
FIGURE 12.6 ¢ 01
TCP Confirmation 01
(No Data Loss) 02
02
03
Acknowledge Message
03
04 or Packets 1–4
04
05
05
06
06
07
07 Acknowledge Message
08
or Packets 5–8
08
Transmitter Receiver
– Acknowledgments accepted at the transmitter, which clears the send buffer.

– Nonacknowledgments accepted at the transmitter, which then sends the repairs.
In the case of missing, lost, or error detected, the receiver will send a not-acknowledged
(NACK) reply to the transmitter identifying the missing packets. This situation is shown
in Figure 12.7. We can see that delays will increase as data need to be resent and then
validated that it was received properly. A lost or missing packet will block all future
traffic until that packet is repaired (because TCP sends all traffic over one stream).
Similarly, a large message will block all future traffic until it is received. When this
situation occurs the TCP will mistakenly attribute the packet loss to congestion. One
could also assume that the larger the message, the higher the probability that one of the
packets will be lost. If congestion is detected or anticipated, the congestion algorithms
will be employed. One of the first things the algorithms will do is reducing the send
window size (the amount of data allowed to be unacknowledged/outstanding in the
network). For example, if you assume that the normal (uncongested send window) is
32 KB and congestion is detected the window size will be reduced to 16 KB; your 32 KB
message will take twice as long. The window size will be adjusted upward when
the congestion is eased. A new large window TCP extension (TCP-LW) allows windows
up to 232 KB.
Other inherent problems with TCP contribute to latency. One of these items is slow
start, which occurs when a TCP connection is first started or has been idle for a long
time. The connection needs to determine the available bandwidth, and it does this by
starting out with a window size of one packet (maybe 512 bytes) and ever increasing the
window size until packet loss occurs: hence, an idea of bandwidth available (data in
transit ~ bandwidth delay). If we solve the window size problem noted in the previous
paragraph the slow start problem becomes worse.
A final problem with TCP is the lack of prioritization as previously discussed in
chapter 3 of this text. The reader will recall that for many data bus architectures the
carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) can be handled in three ways: collision avoidance
(CA), collision resolution (CR), and collision destruction (CD). Access can be handled
01 FIGURE 12.7 ¢
01 TCP with Packet
02 Loss
02
03
Acknowledge Message
X
04 of Packets 1–2, NACK
for Packet 3
05
06 Receive re-transmission of
06 Packets 3–4
07
07
08 Acknowledge Message
08 or Packets 1–8
Transmitter
Receiver
Packet 3 is missing. Receiver gets 4 and 5 but drops

them because of protocol.
Transmitter sends 3 and 4 followed by 5 through 8.
FIGURE 12.8 ¢ Send Buffers Receive Buffers

TCP Data Buffers
Command and Control
Data Request
Health and Welfare
GCE UAV
Each data type has its own session
by timing, prioritization, or a free-for-all; TCP uses the latter. Transmissions on TCP

may have to be sent multiple times before they are acknowledged.
To recap the problems discussed:
– Blocking, where a byte cannot be delivered until all previous bytes have been
received
– Insufficient buffer size
– Congestion control
– Slow start-up times
– Lack of prioritization
TCP has been addressed in detail here as the relevant discussion was deferred in
chapter 3. In the discussion of military data links (Section 4.11.16 of the text) problems
were noted with the excessive time devoted to complex participant net assignments,
relatively low data throughput, and the inability to drop, add, or replace participants at
will. It was suggested that TCP/IP could be extremely beneficial due to its peer-to-peer
and plug-and-play attributes, which would allow a rapid entry into the net without
complex assignments as the participant would be assigned an address at start-up.
The problems noted with TCP can be solved to some degree with modifications to
the architecture. To solve the reliability, flow control, and disconnections, one would
require data buffers at the transmit and receive side where data are sent from the transmit
buffer to the receive buffer (similar to what was seen in JTIDS/MIDS systems). If
multiple buffers were employed at both ends, it would be possible to exchange multiple
sets of data between a single transmitter and receiver. This process is shown in
Figure 12.8.
For this scenario to work properly, it must be reliable and must have some redun-
dancy. This protocol must allow different buffer sizes, must keep the link active to
prevent start-up times, must allow the buffers and links to survive link disconnection,
and must support prioritization among the links. It should support duplicate packets (and
know what to do with them) and identify (message or session ID) each message set. The
protocol should batch small messages and parse and reassemble large messages.
Another aid to TCP is the implementation of a network middleware, which is a
library between the operating system and the application, thereby insulating the appli-
cation from the raw network; its implementation will increase reliability and allow for
Application Application Application Application Application FIGURE 12.9 ¢

Middleware
Implementation
Middleware
Ethernet Mil-Std-1553 EBR-1553 Shared Memory Link-16 Wireless Radio
buffering, supplying data when the applications need it. The network middleware will
perform interface operations for all sources of data, not only TCP. Middleware has been
mandated for data distribution within the U.S. DoD by DISR. Figure 12.9 provides a
diagram of this concept.
12.4.3 UAV Communications Evaluations

The basic testing of the communications package within the UAV will be much the
same as covered in chapter 4 of the text. The following evaluations must be planned:
– Engineering analysis
– Antenna patterns
– EMI/EMC
– Ground coverage
– Human factors and controls and displays
– Airborne coverage
– Latency
– USAR considerations
12.4.3.1 Engineering Analysis

The analysis listed here may be beyond the purview of the flight tester; it really depends on
how your organization is structured. Either way, it is important for the evaluator to
understand what analysis is required prior to formulating a test plan. Just as any other
aircraft system, we must strive to understand as much as possible as to how the system
under test works. The engineering analysis will be used as a predictor of in-flight perfor-
mance. The analysis should be able to predict possible blockage areas based on aspect
angle, possible interference, and effective maximum range of the communications systems.
Blockage areas can be surmised by examining the locations of the communications
antennas on the aircraft for the primary and redundant systems. Because the size of the
UAV may limit the amount of real estate, some blockage areas may not be avoided. This
problem may be exacerbated by the requirements of separation of systems to avoid signal
interference. Knowing this information ahead of time can direct the evaluator to verify
the analysis as well as structure UAV operations to minimize the impact of dropouts.
We will plan to test the maximum LOS coverage of the communications systems,
but what is the predicted maximum range? Similar to radar we can calculate the theo-
retical maximum range if we know the pertinent parameters which drive this equation.
In some of the documentation, the maximum range can be calculated using a formula
called the link equation, which calculates the received signal power as a function of
FIGURE 12.10 ¢
Link Equation
Contributors
Signal Strength (dB)
Atmospheric Losses
Receiver Ant Ant Transmitter

Gain Gain
Data Link Path Through the Atmosphere
various link parameters. It is different from the radar range equation, which uses a
round-trip propagation, whereas the link equation is a one-way propagation. The inputs
to the calculation will consist of such variables as the transmitted power, the receiver
sensitivity, transmitter and receiver gain, and the effective range of the transmitter. A
graphic description of the data link signal path is shown in Figure 12.10.
If we were to sum up the variables in Figure 12.10:
Received Power ðdBmÞ ¼ Transmitter PowerðdBmÞ þ Transmitter Antenna Gain ðdBÞ

Atmospheric Losses ðdBÞ þ Receiver Antenna Gain ðdBmÞ
(12.1)
where dBm is the normalized dB per milliwatt.
The first two terms of transmitter power and transmitter antenna gain, when com-
bined, form the familiar effective radiated power (ERP), which is the signal power
radiated from the transmitting antenna in the direction of the receiving antenna. ERP is
in dBm as is the transmitter power (1 W ~ 30 dBm):
ERP ðdBmÞ ¼ PT þ GT (12.2)
where PT is transmitter power (dBm), and GT is transmitter antenna gain (dB).

The conversion between watts to dBm and dBm to watts can be accomplished easily
with online conversion tools, or one can remember some of the more common values.
Table 12.7 provides some of these common values.
The term ‘‘atmospheric losses’’ shown in Figure 12.10 and equation (12.1) is
really a combination of two losses: spreading (or diffusion) and attenuation. Spreading
is akin to the inverse square law that was seen in chapter 7 for thermal energy and
chapter 8 for radar energy. Remember that the power available at a receiver in a
nonatmospheric case (i.e., transmission is not affected by the atmospheric medium)
will vary inversely as the square of the distance to the source. The amount of energy
captured will therefore depend on the distance from the transmitter and the size of the
receiving antenna.
TABLE 12.7 ¢ Watt/dBm Conversion
Power (W) Power (dBm)

30 dBm 0.0000010 W
20 dBm 0.0000100 W
10 dBm 0.0001000 W
0 dBm 0.0010000 W
1 dBm 0.0012589 W
2 dBm 0.0015849 W
3 dBm 0.0019953 W
4 dBm 0.0025119 W
5 dBm 0.0031628 W
6 dBm 0.0039811 W
7 dBm 0.0050119 W
8 dBm 0.0063096 W
9 dBm 0.0079433 W
10 dBm 0.0100000 W
20 dBm 0.1000000 W
30 dBm 1.0000000 W
40 dBm 10.0000000 W
50 dBm 100.0000000 W
Power (dBm) Power (W)
0W not defined
0þ W ? dBm
0.00001 W 20.0000 dBm
0.0001 W 10.0000 dBm
0.001 W 0.0000 dBm
0.01 W 10.0000 dBm
0.1 W 20.0000 dBm
1W 30.0000 dBm
10 W 40.0000 dBm
100 W 50.0000 dBm
1000 W 60.0000 dBm
10000 W 70.0000 dBm
100000 W 80.0000 dBm
1000000 W 90.0000 dBm
For two isotropic antennas (as it turns out, the equation applies as well for trans-
missions between any two antennas), the spreading loss will be equal to a constant times
the frequency squared times the distance squared:
LS ¼ K f 2 d 2
Or to put it in the form of dB (since it’s easier to work with):

LS ¼ K þ 20 Log ðf Þ þ 20 Log ðdÞ (12.3)
where LS is spreading loss (dB), K is constant (32), f is frequency (MHz), and d is

distance (km).
Nomographs are available in many antenna textbooks and can save you some of the
calculations. Figure 12.11 is an example of such a nomograph and can help you calculate
FIGURE 12.11 ¢ 100 10,000

Spreading Loss for
Frequency and 50 200
5,000
Range 20
180 2,000
10
Transmission Distance (km)

5 1,000
Spreading Loss (dB)

160
Frequency (GHz)
2
500
1
140
200
.5
.2 120 100
.1
50
100
.05
20
.02
80
.01 10
FIGURE 12.12 ¢ 10
Losses due to Combined Atmospheric
6
Absorption in dB Losses per Kilometer
4
2
Atmospheric Loss (dB per km)
.6
.4
.2
.1
.06
.04
.02
.01
4 6 8 10 20 40 60 80 100
Frequency (GHz)
the loss with a known transmitting frequency and distance between the two antennas.
Figure 12.11 shows a loss calculation for a 10 GHz signal over 100 km (~60 mi) is
approximately equal to 153 dB; or you may expect a loss of 153 dB in this situation.
We have seen attenuation losses in radio waves when addressing radar in chapter 8
(Figure 8.1). Attenuation comprises absorption and scattering; losses are small for low
frequencies and increase significantly above 10 GHz. Since Figure 8.1 is in terms of
transmissivity, it is converted to terms of loss in dB in Figure 12.12. If we use our
previous example of a 10 GHz signal traveling 100 km, Figure 12.12 shows a 0.015 dB
loss per km, or 1.5 dB over the entire path length. By using the graphs in Figure 8.1 (for
rain and fog) and Figure 12.12 for absorption, one can estimate the total attenuation for
the link due to atmospherics. For frequencies less than 1 GHz it is usually acceptable to
ignore atmospheric attenuation.
The signal arriving at the receiving antenna will be the ERP minus the atmospheric
losses (spreading and attenuation) plus the receiving antenna gain. By putting all we
know into equation (12.1) it now becomes
PR ¼ ERP 32 20 Log ðf Þ 20 Log ðdÞ Latm þ GR (12.4)
where PR is signal strength at receiving antenna (dBm), ERP is effective radiated

power (dBm), f is frequency (MHz), d is distance (km), Latm is atmospheric loss (dB),
and GR is receiving antenna gain (dB).
Let us suppose that in our example we generate an ERP of 70 dBm and utilize
a receiving antenna with a 3 dB gain; what would be the received power? Using
equation (12.4):
PR ¼ ERP 32 20 Log ðf Þ 20 Log ðdÞ Latm þ GR
PR ¼ 70 dBm 32 20 Log ð10000Þ dB 20 Log ð100Þ dB 1:5 dB þ 3 dB
PR ¼ 70 dBm 32 dB 80 dB 40 dB 1:5 dB þ 3 dB
PR ¼ 80:5 dBm
Of course, this would be the answer in the perfect world; like the radar equation,
other unknowns may adversely affect the received power. We could have rain, unwanted
noise, interference, or antenna misalignment, which will affect what we receive. In radar
we used Smin or minimum energy required to achieve detection. With data links, we have
a minimum acceptable signal level at the receiving antenna required to ensure opera-
tional success; this is called a link margin and is defined as
M ¼ PR S (12.5)
where M is link margin (dB), PR is power at the receiving antenna (dBm), S is minimum
signal level that must be seen at the receiver for operational success (dBm).
The reader will remember that in radar we determined a minimum signal-to-noise
(S/N) ratio required to enable detections and reduce false alarms; the S/N required was
always above one (a margin). The link margin will be calculated based on operational
need as a function of dropout time; the margin equal to the inverse of the average
dropout time that can be tolerated (once again converted to dB):
– 10% dropout time equates to a 10 dB margin: 1/0.1 ¼ 10, 10 Log 10 ¼ 10 dB
– 1% dropout time equates to a 20 dB margin: 1/0.01 ¼ 100, 10 Log 100 ¼ 20 dB
– 0.1% dropout time equates to a 30 dB margin: 1/0.001 ¼ 1000, 10 Log 1000
¼ 30 dB
Equation (12.4) can be rewritten as signal required with the added term of link margin
and becomes
SREQD ¼ ERP 32 20 Log ðf Þ 20 Log ðdÞ LAtm þ GR M (12.6)

where SREQD is signal strength at the receiving antenna (dBm), ERP is effective radiated
power (dBm), f is frequency (MHz), d is distance (km), Latm is atmospheric loss (dB),
GR is receiving antenna gain (dB), and M is required link margin (dB).
With this equation, we can solve for any one of the parameters in terms of the other
five. For example, if we want to know the effective range of the link, we would rear-
range the terms and solve for range.
12.4.3.2 Antenna Patterns
Antenna pattern testing is as described previously in section 4.10 of this text. In addition
to communications antennas, self-protection antennas such as MAWS and RWR (if
installed) and sensor coverage should be evaluated. Since UAVs are small, and
unmanned, the logical place for the Engineering evaluation is first in modeling and
simulation, followed by a full mock-up in an anechoic facility. Flight against an antenna
farm would be inappropriate as we need to know the potential problem areas before
flight is ever attempted. The communications coverage will be tested in flight but not
before we have an idea of the predicted performance.
12.4.3.3 EMI/EMC
EMI/EMC will be evaluated in accordance with the procedures in section 4.14 of the
text and, for the military, MIL-STD-461F and MIL-STD-464A. If the UAV is slated for
shipboard operations, the evaluator should also consult MIL-STD-1605A (SH). Of
particular concern for the evaluator will be the loss, degradation, or dropouts of data link
communications due to interference. This evaluation may be thought of as susceptibility
to RF interference, or as discussed previously, noise jamming.
In the electronic warfare section we introduced a term called the jamming-to-signal
(J/S) ratio, which would determine when a target would burn through self-protection
noise, or conversely, the effectiveness of the jamming signal. The major variables in the
J/S ratio were the ERP of the jammer and the ERP of the radar. There are similar
considerations with the evaluation of interfering signals on the data link. We would have
to evaluate the ratio of a radiated interference signal to the desired signal as seen by the
receiver. Logic would tell us that power, distance, and aspect would have serious con-
siderations. In the simplest case, our receiver is pointed at the transmitter and tuned to
the specific frequency and the interfering signal is located at some different range and
direction of arrival (Figure 12.13). One can see that if the UAV had a high gain antenna
(directivity) or if the interfering signal was out of band or of a very low power there may
not be a problem.
In this geometry, rather than a J/S ratio, we have an interference-to-signal ratio (I/S),
which is defined as the power ratio of interfering signal to the desired signal sensed at the
receiver. In addition to ERP of the transmitters, it is also a function of the angular isolation
(IA) and the frequency isolation (IF) of the signal. IA is the bore sight gain of the receiving
antenna referenced to the direction of the interference signal; IF is the amount of filter
attenuation in the receiving system that applies to the interfering signal. The I/S is given by
I=S ¼ ERPI ERPD LI þ LD IA IF (12.7)
where I/S is interference-to-signal ratio (dB), ERPI ¼ ERP of the interfering signal
(dBm), ERPD is ERP of the desired signal (dBm), LI is link losses of the interfering
signal (dB), LD is link losses of the desired signal (dB), IA is antenna isolation (dB), and
IF is frequency isolation (dB).
FIGURE 12.13 ¢
Interference
Geometry
GCE
Interfering Signal
We know the link losses from equation (12.3) and can substitute in equation (12.7),
which becomes
I=S ¼ ERPI ERPD 32 20 Log ðFI Þ 20 Log ðDI Þ þ 32 þ 20 Log ðFD Þ
þ 20 Log ðDD Þ IA IF
– The þ32 and the 32 cancel.

– If the two frequencies are close to each other, the 20 Log (F) terms cancel.
– If they are at the same frequency, there is no frequency isolation so IF drops out.
– Equation (12.7) then becomes the equation for interference within the band:
I=S ¼ ERPI ERPD 20 Log ðDI Þ þ 20 Log ðDD Þ IA (12.8)
It is readily seen in equation (12.8) that interference is a function of power, distance, and
the aspect or off angle from boresight of the transmitters. The IA term in the equation
relates to the off boresight angle. If we assume that the UAV’s antenna boresight in
Figure 12.13 points directly at the GCE, then the angle to the interfering signal is
something off boresight. If the gain of the antenna is a maximum at boresight (let’s
assume 10 dB), then the gain in the direction of the interfering signal will be less (let’s
assume 2 dB). It may be easier to visualize if we remember what a radar beam looks
like: the main lobe would be equivalent to the boresight, whereas the off angle direction
would be equivalent to a sidelobe. If IA is equal to the difference between the receiving
antenna’s boresight gain and its gain in the direction of the interfering signal, our
example would yield a value of 8 dB (10 dB – 2 dB). What would happen if the antenna
on the UAV was an omni? Since the gain is equal about the sphere, IA would disappear,
making the link more susceptible to interference.
Suppose the GCE uplink operates at 2 GHz, ERP of þ30 dBm at a range of 40 km;
the interfering signal is operating at 1.8 GHz, an ERP of þ30 dBm, at a range of 100 km
with the same IA as in the previous example:
I=S ¼ ERPI ERPD 20 Log ðDI Þ þ 20 Log ðDD Þ IA

I=S ¼ 30 30 20 Log ð100Þ þ 20 Log ð40Þ 8
I=S ¼ 30 30 40 þ 32 8
I=S ¼ 16 dB
At 16 dB below the desired signal you are probably going to be all right; it may be seen
but not to the degree of degrading the link. You can see from the equation that as the
interfering signal gets closer in range or closer to the boresight gain, the I/S value will
increase, thus creating problems. If we take the GPS satellite signal and assume losses were
negligible (which they are not), how large of a jammer at 10 km away would produce
detrimental effects? The GPS ERP is approximately 170 dB and orbits at 20,000 km; a
1 W jammer is converted to 30 dBm. When placing these parameters into equation (12.7):
I=S ¼ ERPI ERPD 20 Log ðDI Þ þ 20 Log ðDD Þ IA

I=S ¼ 30 170 20 Log ð10Þ þ 20 Log ð20;000Þðassume IA is negligibleÞ
I=S ¼ 140 20 þ 80
I=S ¼ 80 dB
It would appear that we are safe from this jammer, but what would be the result if the
real ERP were half of the stated 170 dB?
This discussion tells us that a survey of the frequencies in use over our proposed
operational/test area needs to be accomplished prior to executing our flight evaluation.
Small, civil UAS may utilize link frequencies of 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, or 5.8 GHz. The
900 MHz band is an industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM) radio band; it does not require
a license below 1 W. Garage door openers, older wireless phones, some LAN systems, and
RC hobbyists clobber this frequency. They use spread spectrum, frequency hopping to
avoid interference, but at 1 W without an amplifier it can be a problem. The other available
frequency spectrums for use without licenses have similar problems: 2.4 GHz is used by
Wi-Fi, and newer phones and is heavily congested; 5.8 GHz is the least crowded of the
three, but its use is rapidly expanding for wireless LANs and cordless phones.
12.4.3.4 Communications Ground Tests

As is the case with all systems evaluations, we initially start with a static test. This will
involve external power to the aircraft, and exercising each of the links may be first to an
external test cart and then to the GCE. If the system is employing multiple links, it would
be advisable to test each link individually at first and then in combinations. We are looking
for satisfactory communications between the UAV and the GCE. When we evaluated
radios we used either a rhyme test or a digital STIDAS system. Since the UAS exchanges
data, the exit criteria for this evaluation will be a satisfactory bit error rate (BER).
The BER testing involves the system’s ability to detect and in some cases correct
message errors. A parity bit, as in the case of 1553, cannot correct errors, and can detect
only an odd number of errors. It would then be advisable to have some other error
detection code to ensure that what was sent is indeed what was received. There are a
number of data encoding schemes designed to meet this requirement. You may recall
that Reed-Solomon encoding is utilized in 1760. Hamming codes, which are used in
telecommunications, can detect up to two and correct up to one bit errors and is probably
a system that you may have to deal with.
BER testing will be accomplished on the ground and in the air utilizing various link
geometries, data rates, and data types comparing transmitted bits to received bits. A
specification will govern the allowable BER; a typical value will be somewhere between
106 (one error per million bits sent) and 108. When encryption or communications
security (COMSEC) routines are used, the BER is usually relaxed. Remember that the
link is tested on both sides: the UAV as well receipt by the GCE. If satellite link or
SATCOM is to be employed, they need to be tested as well; this will be the first
opportunity to evaluate the latency within the system.
The evaluation of video on the link is for the most part subjective; is the image usable
to accomplish mission objectives? Things to look for that may be indicative of fading or
lost signal include snow, pixilation, and frozen images. The picture quality will be a
function of the resolution and frame rate. A high resolution and a high frame rate will
require a large amount of bandwidth; a lower frame rate may cause a loss of resolution
with dynamic targets. A Predator test team performing ground tests on link interference
used a blowing flag in the camera field of view to provide a continuously moving target,
which was an excellent idea. The report is titled ‘‘Predator UAV Line-of-Sight Datalink
Terminal Radio Frequency Test Report,’’ Report # JSC-CR-04-066, Department of
Defense Joint Spectrum Center, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, and can be viewed online.
The direct links are LOS and will be affected by blockage areas such as buildings
and other antennas and may be susceptible to multipath or refraction. One way to
evaluate the possible ground coverage would be to tow the UAV around the airport
(taxiways, holding areas, runways) and note link loss and duration of the loss. Opera-
tional procedures may have to be adjusted based on this testing; it may be advisable to
tow the UAV to the runway rather than taxiing due to dropouts.
How do we track the UAV to ensure the highest gain for the antennas? The UAV
can be tracked in many ways: visually, by signal strength, or some version of an auto
tracker. The communications antennas are slaved to the tracker to ensure optimum
reception. A visual track has obvious limitations: it will be affected by blockage areas,
precipitation, lighting conditions and range. Track by signal strength can be accom-
plished in the same way ADF is implemented in an aircraft; but has the same limitations
with azimuth accuracy. A high gain receiving antenna can be rendered useless with a
tracker accurate to only 10 degrees. Early auto trackers utilized the aircraft’s IFF
transponder. The ARTCC system offers excellent azimuth information but requires an
altitude reply from the aircraft due to poor elevation accuracy. The auto tracker uses the
IFF azimuth and calculates an elevation from the altitude reply to point the antennas.
This type of tracker will be affected by inoperative transponders or errors in the altitude
encoder. A more common method is to use the aircraft’s present position (as sent to the
GCE) and the receiving antenna’s present position, perform a coordinate conversion to
range, azimuth and elevation, and drive the antennas with this information. This type of
tracker requires excellent position information for the UAV, which is accomplished by
using either GNSS or SBAS systems. Our static test and ground evaluation should
include tracking accuracy of the auto tracker as part of the test. We will be looking for
pointing accuracy as well as smoothness of the track. The optimum scenario would
include an auto tracking antenna coupled with a spectrum analyzer to determine the
actual strength of the received signal; the antenna pointing angle can be refined manu-
ally to obtain the maximum strength.
12.4.3.5 Human Factors and Controls and Displays

If the test and evaluation master plan was implemented correctly, the test/operational
team will have had numerous hours of training and familiarization on GCE mockups and
simulations. Many of the human factors concerns should have been addressed during
this period. The ground evaluations, however, will afford the team the first real look at
the installed system using actual links to control the UAV and receive information. It
will offer the first chance to observe link connectivity, latency, and quality of the video.
Even though the aircraft operation is being viewed and controlled remotely, the
human factors principles, certification, and problem issues covered in section 6.8 of the
text still hold true. Crew station evaluation and workload will be concerned with the
GCE operations: mission manager, UAV pilot, and sensor operator. There is little dif-
ference between this team and the team in a multiplace A/C: an AC-130 gunship or P-3
surveillance platform, for example. There are, however, unique concerns when evalu-
ating workload and performance during long duration UAV missions. The need to keep
the crew involved in the operation and focused on the mission during 14 hr missions at
remote locations takes on an added meaning.
The human factors test plan should identify any critical tasks that must be com-
pleted during the mission: timeline, priority, and information required. The tasks should
also state when and if operator intervention is required. For example, takeoff and
landing may require pilot intervention and target identification, recognition, and desig-
nation may require sensor operator intervention. The plan should state the level of
automation that is used and which information is provided, and in what format, to the
aircrew. How are operators apprised of correct operations (e.g., valid receipt of a com-
mand) as well as failures (loss of navigation function)? At a minimum, each task should
be described and potential problems discussed:
– How critical is the task?
– If errors are involved, what is the potential impact (safety and mission impact)?
– What information or lack of information could cause erroneous actions?
– Is there a limited amount of time for the task?
From the HMI perspective, what information is required by the operators and which
actions must be taken?
– Observation of video or data displays
– CAWs, colors, or auditory alerts
– Execution of normal and abnormal procedures
– Ergonomic and anthropometric requirements
Finally, conduct a workload analysis and impact on operator performance:
– Bedford Rating Scale
– Subjective Workload Analysis
– Modified Cooper Harper Rating Scales
A modified form of the Cooper Harper Scale for use in sensor/UAV evaluation was
proposed by Christopher Cotting as part of his dissertation at Virginia Tech (Modified
Cooper Harper Evaluation Tool for Unmanned Vehicle Displays, with M.L. Cummings,
Kevin Meyers, and Stacey D. Scott, available at http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/
papers/Cummings2006_uvs_FINAL.pdf). The Cooper Harper Scale was modified to
become a task generic scale for UAVs. Just as in piloted evaluation, the task description
and comments by the UAV operator will be key in using the scale to properly evaluate
the sensor/aircraft system. Using this new rating scale the UAV and the sensor system
can be evaluated as an integrated system against mission performance. This rating scale
also includes the ability to check an autonomous UAV against disturbances so that the
system can be evaluated in a relevant operating environment. A copy of the Modified
Cooper Harper Scale is shown in Figure 12.14. Specific guidelines for each of the
ratings are described in the subject paper.
Display Qualities Rating Scale
Adequacy for Selscted Interaction Display characteristics Demands on the Operator Rating
Excellent &
Operator not compensating for desired results. 1
Display is Highly Desired
Acceptable Good with Negligible Very minor issues not hindering performance.
YES 2
Deficiencies Questions of preference for individual operators.
Automated assistance or display visualization
Minor but Tolerable
facilitates enhanced human decision making. 3
Deficiencies
Does the display NO Deficiencies Occasionally requires additional editing or time.
facilitate efficient Warrant Moderately Objectionable Displays do not identify alternate decisions or
4
decision making? Improvement Deficiencies courses of action.
Very Objectionable
Displays do not predict decision consequences. 5
Deficiencies
YES
Displays do not clearly or rapidly depict changes in
Major Deficiencies critical information that is required for analysis. 6
Is the depicted Displays overhead is excessive. Multi-layered search

12.4
NO Deficiencies is requires for basic analysis. Display navigation

display what is Major Deficiencies 7
Require requires operator’s complete attention.
needed to analyze the
Improvement
situation? Displays do not support direct perception
Major Deficiencies interaction or direct manipulation. Operators must 8
derive critical information relationship.
YES
Information visualization or automated alerts fail to
direct operator’s attention in a timely manner.
Major Deficiencies 9
Is the displayed NO Deficiencies cause degraded human and system
Mandatory performance that threatens mission success.
information easily
Redesign
acquired? Displays are missing critical information, operator is
Major Deficiencies unable to locate essential information, or retrieval 10
time makes information irrelevant. Mission fails.
Operator Interaction Cummings, M.L. - Modified Cooper Harper Evaluation Tool for Unmanned Vehicle Display - MIT [2006]
FIGURE 12.14 ¢ Modified Cooper Harper Scale

UAS Communications Architecture
879
Each of the following sections will incorporate human factors considerations for
test. For communications, the most important aspect is clear, intelligible, and unin-
terrupted data transfer. How is the GCE made aware of a potential loss of commu-
nications, and what actions, either automatic or operator initiated, are taken to mitigate
data dropouts? Signal strength was addressed earlier, and a method of displaying the
strength of the data link signal should be displayed to the mission manager at all times.
Colors make it easier for the operator to include this parameter in the scan: green for a
strong signal, yellow for approaching the margin, and red for loss, or corrective action
required. The actual numbers used will be determined by the test team and adjusted as
dictated by the flight test results. A second parameter that should be displayed is the
clear LOS region, dictated by altitude of the UAV and the GCE antennas and range to
the UAV. Remembering the LOS equation from the previous chapters:
pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
RMax :86 2hUAV þ 2hGCE (12.9)
where RMax is maximum LOS range in nm, hUAV is height of UAV in ft, and hGCE is
height of GCE antenna in ft.
This information can be displayed either on a vertical profile clearly defining the
maximum LOS or on a moving map color coding or outlining the borders defined by the
maximum LOS (an example is shown in Figure 12.15).
At a minimum, a nomograph for LOS range can be provided to the mission man-
ager. If the GCE software can automatically vary the display presentations based on
changes in UAV height, this function will need to be tested as well. Signal strength and
LOS displays are easily testable during the ground evaluations while towing the air-
craft. Each of these parameters should be superimposed on a moving map of sufficient
detail to aid in situational awareness. Additional items on the moving map may be
proposed: navigational routing, threat areas, targets, loiter areas, safe areas, and lost
link procedures.
Cockpit displays for the UAV pilot are evaluated in the same fashion as in a manned
aircraft: Are the displays readable and understandable? Is there enough information to
make correct decisions? Is the aircraft controllable with the information provided? Is the
information timely? Do the visuals provide adequate situational awareness? Are alerts
sufficient in color, proximity, or loud enough? Is corrective action easily understood?
There may be an added level of difficulty for the pilot when accounting for latency of
the data or visuals. For RPV functions, pilot inputs may not be seen immediately due to
the latency of the data. This may cause a pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) as the pilot
holds in a command too long waiting for an aircraft response and then must apply an
opposite command when the aircraft moves more than required. Sensor operators may
experience a similar problem when attempting to slew a sensor to a desired position only
to find out that the sensor overshoots the desired position and a reverse command is then
required to correct for the overshoot. Operators may need to predict a position based on
previous history. Another problem may arise if the out of the window video is out of
synch with the cockpit display data: what the pilot is viewing is not what is displayed.
Although much of the groundwork for HMI and controls and displays testing was
accomplished during modeling, mockups, and hardware-in-the-loop simulations, there is
no better test than an actual operation. Aircrew workload will be significantly higher
during an operation than during a simulation, and tasks that seemed easily manageable
in simulation may overwhelm an aircrew during an actual operation.
AckRatio >= 90
AckRatio >= 80
35.5 AckRatio >= 55
AckRatio < 55
35.45
35.4
35.35
35.3
Lat
35.25
12.4
35.2
35.15
35.1
35.05
–118.4 –118.3 –118.2 –118.1 –118 –117.9 –117.8 –117.7 –117.6
Lon
FIGURE 12.15 ¢ Maximum LOS/Antenna Coverage

UAS Communications Architecture
881
Other areas of interest that need to be addressed are the cockpit environment, which
include items such as noise level, temperature and lighting, ergonomics, and GCE
internal communications (intercom, radios, and SATCOM). The goal is to ensure that
the mission can be accomplished in the most efficient and reliable manner. The end
result of all of these ground evaluations will also provide an early indicator of what
workload is expected.
12.4.3.6 USAR Human Factors and Controls and Displays Considerations

Subpart I, UAV Control Station, is dedicated in large part to human factors considera-
tions. Many of the requirements and considerations can be found in GAMA Publication
#10, ‘‘Recommended Practices and Guidelines for Part 23 Cockpit/Flight Deck
Design,’’ GAMA Publication #12, ‘‘Recommended Practices and Guidelines for an
Integrated Cockpit/Flight Deck (Part 23),’’ and Public Statement PS-ACE100-2001-004,
‘‘Certification Plan for Human Factors (Part 23),’’ which were addressed in chapter 6
of this text. The subpart addresses HMI, controls and displays, and indicators and
warnings.
HMI considerations involve the work environment and the evaluation of aircrew
workload. The physical parameters of the GCE (e.g., size, temperature, maximum
capacity) that are required to perform the mission must be stated in the UAV systems
flight manual; the workplace must allow the crew to perform their duties without
unreasonable concentration or fatigue. The workplace conditions such as temperature,
humidity, noise, and vibration must not hamper the safe execution of the flight. The
minimum flight crew must be established so that it is sufficient for safe operations;
minimum flight crew is established via a workload analysis. The USAR states the fol-
lowing tasks should be part of the workload analysis:
– Operation and monitoring of all essential UAV system elements

– Navigation
– Flight path control
– Communications
– Compliance with airspace, air traffic, and air traffic control requirements
– Command decisions including crew resource management (CRM)
Workload should take into account the ease and accessibility of the necessary controls
and under all lighting conditions. Crew members should be able to converse without
difficulty and be able to recognize aural alerts under all foreseeable noise conditions.
(Note: The USAR requires that a voice recorder be installed in the GCE to record and
time-tag all radio and ICS communications)
Controls and displays evaluations are much the same as previously discussed; they
must be clearly arranged and visible to the crew, grouped appropriately, and readable
under all lighting conditions. Each control must be located and identified to provide
convenient operation and to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation. Controls must
be arranged so crewmembers have unrestricted access and ease of movement without
restrictions in all flight conditions. The design, location, and accessibility of safety
critical controls must be compatible with a rapid reaction by the UAV crew. The USAR
notes that if pull-down menus are used, then controls that require a prompt reaction
(as in an emergency or abnormal conditions) must be accessible on the first level; if not,
then there must be dedicated controls.
When conventional flight controls and indicators are used, the form, location, and
layout must ensure safe operation. When markings are on the cover glass of the indi-
cator, there must be a means to maintain the correct alignment of the glass cover with
the face of the dial. Each arc and line must be wide enough and located to be clearly
visible to the crew, and all indicators must be calibrated in compatible units. The con-
trols must be designed so that they operate intuitively, and are similar to those found in
manned aircraft. The design of the controls must allow the crew to rapidly and easily
change the UAV heading or track, altitude, and airspeed.
Cautions, advisories, and warnings must follow the color scheme defined in AC
23.1311-1C. The GCE must include an automatic diagnostic and monitoring capability
for the status of the UAV and provide the crew with appropriate warning indications.
The GCE must also be configured to warn the crew of any abnormal or emergency
mode, including cases where an automatic corrective action has occurred. Warnings
must be announced when an excessive deviation from the pre-planned flight path occurs
or if an unsafe status exists within the UAV to alert recovery teams. There are other
alerts required by the USAR pertaining to vehicle parameters (electrics, fuel, hydraulics,
etc.) which are not discussed here.
Every control, switch, knob, or lever in the GCE must be plainly marked as to its
function and method of operation; each remote control must also be suitably marked.
Each emergency control must be red and marked as to method of operation; no control,
other than an emergency control may be colored red. There must be an indication to the
crew that the UAV must be operated IAW the operating limitations and permitted
operations in the UAV systems manual.
There are other requirements if multiple UAVs are operated or if control of the
UAV can be handed off between multiple GCEs:
– The in-control GCE must be clearly identified.
– Positive control must be maintained during handover.
– Handover cannot lead to an unsafe condition.
– The minimum crew must be established for control of multiple UAVs.
– All data, warnings, advisories and cautions previously discussed must be available to
the controlling GCE.
12.4.3.7 Airborne Coverage
Link communications coverage will be evaluated in much the same way as radio
communications testing described in chapter 4 of the text, with the exception of cal-
culating BER rather than determining intelligibility. The geometry that will be used
is the same as described in chapter 3: incremental range steps and executing orbits
or cloverleaf turns to observe communications with changes in azimuth and elevation.
Evaluators should resist the temptation to fly out to the maximum predicted range
and start maneuvering; a lost link at the maximum LOS range will be much more
difficult to recover than an A/C at a moderate range where a change in bank or heading
should rapidly recover the link. A good understanding of the predicted range and
possible blockage areas must be well understood before attempting any flight test.
One would not like to lose the control link on the first test flight of the program.
Many organizations will test the link package on flying test beds or surrogate UAVs.
Some testing has been done by slinging the package under a helicopter or tethering it to
a large mast that can be rotated to test azimuth coverage. All of these test setups will
enhance the evaluator’s knowledge of predicted link performance and enhance safety
when performing initial flight test.
As the A/C is flying, a real-time display of the signal/BER/ACK ratio should be
available in the GCE. As suggested in the controls and displays section, we should color
code the signal. Let’s assume that we look at the acknowledgment ratio (packets
acknowledged/packets sent) of the command signal and we color code this ratio. A
typical scheme may be green for 90%, yellow for 80%, red for 55%, and black
for <55%. The A/C will fly to a range and altitude away from the GCE and execute an
orbit/cloverleaf and the acknowledgment ratio will be viewed and recorded. Any
degradation in the ratio will be noted and correlated postflight: degradations at only one
aspect could indicate an antenna blockage; degradation for all aspects in a portion of the
operating area could indicate interference or multipath. As with all systems testing, the
optimum condition should be tested first: clear LOS and short range. The envelope will
be expanded from here. Problems that occur at the optimum condition will not magically
disappear if we fly further away: diagnose the problem before continuing with the
expansion.
The backup link and BLOS link (if installed) also needs to be tested and these are
accomplished in the same manner. Remember that a comparison between the LOS link
and the BLOS link will have to account for latency. Tests which can’t be scheduled and
still need to be evaluated will be link performance in weather, or the effects of pre-
cipitation on communications. Once these tests are accomplished, a realistic operating
area can now be defined for operations. Performance that is slightly less than predicted
is expected, but if the performance is significantly less than it is necessary to trouble-
shoot. To recap, the possible problems could be (in no particular order):
– Low power/no power at the transmitting antenna; possible bad transmitter or ampli-
fier, transmitter/amplifier mismatch, broken lines, or bad connections
– Low power/no power received at the receiving antenna; broken lines or bad con-
nections, UAV not in the beamwidth caused by wrong auto-tracker positioning or
antenna misalignment, interference from another transmitter, multipath, refraction,
attenuation/scattering due to atmospherics, blockage on the UAV, satellite transpon-
der problems, crypto key problems, or frequency mismatch
12.4.3.8 Data Link Latency Evaluations

There will be latency in the system due to the problems previously described; some
contributors will be fixed, such as senescence, whereas some will vary such as with
TCP. Timing studies should be undertaken to quantify the latency. Earlier discussions in
the text addressed this evaluation; we are interested in the delta time from when a
parameter is sensed on the A/C to the time it is viewed in the GCE. In the testing of
systems on a manned aircraft, we stressed the importance of time-aligning the data prior
to presenting it to the analysts. By performing a time-alignment, all sources of asyn-
chronous data (e.g., aircraft TM, TSPI, target data) could be merged and near real-time
analysis could be performed. We also described the methods of time-alignment: inter-
polation and extrapolation. Extrapolation is used in telemetry systems to stay as close as
possible to real time and interpolation is used postflight to obtain the most accurate data.
Time-alignment of data for UAV missions becomes a little more complicated as

streaming video from out-of-the-window TV and sensor data is also arriving with
autopilot and health and welfare systems data; in some cases LOS data will also be
arriving with BLOS data. The test team will have to determine the actual latency of all
of these streams and then decide on how the data should be presented: time-aligned or
throughput without adjustments. Additionally, we have the added problem of deter-
mining the delta time from a commanded input to the autopilot to the time it is executed.
This is the cause of the PIO (for sensors or aircraft) discussed previously.
In most cases, data will be even further delayed by employing interpolation
algorithms; we will want to stay as close as possible to real time. Video data will be
throughput without modifications so the delay seen will be the link delay. Screen data,
or data displayed on the pilots’ MFDs may or may not be from multisources and hence
the delay may be somewhat greater than the delay in video. The delta time between
the video and the screen data must be known and understood by the pilot in order to
safely conduct RPV portions of the mission. Time should be dedicated during the
initial link testing to evaluate the workload tasking on the pilot using delayed data to
control the UAV.
12.4.3.9 USAR Data Link Considerations

Subpart H of STANAG 4671 (USAR) states the airworthiness requirements for the
command and control data link: Book 1 delineates the requirements, and Book 2 pro-
vides an acceptable means of compliance. This section will detail only the requirements
set forth in the USAR. For detailed compliance statements, the reader is referred to the
document. Requirements that must be considered by the evaluation team are as follows:
– The UAS must include a command and control data link (the USAR only addresses
the command and control data link; ATC communications and sensor data links are
deferred to the operations manuals).
– No single failure can lead to a hazardous or more severe event.
– Operation of data link equipment cannot adversely affect other equipment.
– EMI/EMC testing must be accomplished.
– The effective maximum range of the link must be stated in the UAV flight manual
and must be displayed in the GCE.
– The integrity of the link must be continuously monitored; LOS information must be
continuously displayed in the GCE.
– Latency must be specified in the UAV flight manual; latency must not lead to an
unsafe condition.
– A lost link strategy must be established, approved and presented in the UAV flight
manual and an aural and visual alert must be provided to the UAV crew.
– The lost link shall incorporate an automatic, autonomous procedure to reestablish
communications in the shortest time possible.
– Masking must be stated in the UAV flight manual; warning cues shall be provided to
the crew when approaching masking attitudes.
– Switchover (changing control from one channel/frequency to another) shall not lead
to an unsafe condition; positive control cannot be lost during switchover.
12.5 NAVIGATION
The primary navigational system on the UAV will be an integrated GPS/INS and in
most cases equipped to handle differential corrections. The navigation system may
also incorporate VOR/TACAN/DME as a backup to short-range navigation, a mag-
netometer for emergency/backup magnetic heading, barometric altimeter, and a radar/
laser altimeter.
12.5.1 UAV Navigation Evaluations

Accuracies for these systems are tested by the same means as described in chapter 5 of
this text and will not be replicated here. Mission requirements may dictate a very high
accuracy, and additional redundant systems such as a secondary GPS may be required. It
will be extremely important to test the navigational hierarchy (also previously described
in chapter 5) to ensure that the navigational system degrades gracefully and the system
has a high probability of returning safely with a navigational failure.
Tests involving the navigational system unique to the UAV mission that should be
considered are as follows:
– Ability to fly a preprogrammed route
– Ability to steer to a waypoint
– Ability to designate a point
– Ability to initiate an orbit about a designated point
– Navigation in the vertical plane
– Takeoff
– Landing
– Loss of navigation function
– Execution of lost link procedures
With the exception of takeoff and landing, all of these functions are handled through
the autopilot (command directed), and for the most part we are evaluating the naviga-
tional system’s ability to provide accuracy sufficient to accomplish these tasks. It
should be noted that highly autonomous platforms do not always have the capability for
the crew to rapidly and easily change the UAVs heading or track, altitude, and airspeed.
Other sensors on the A/C will use commands based on navigational information; the
ability to see a target will be dependent on how accurate the sensor is pointed. As
pointed out earlier, some sensors have relatively narrow FOVs; an inaccurate pointing
angle may place the target outside of the sensor FOV. The positional information on a
designated point is dependent on the navigational system as well; correct bearing
information from a sensor applied to an inaccurate ownship position will result in an
inaccurate target position. It is incumbent upon the evaluator to understand the degree
of accuracy required for each phase of the mission and then develop the test plans to
verify that accuracy.
Accuracies should be tested in the primary and degraded modes of operation; it
may be determined that certain portions of a planned mission cannot be accomplished
in a degraded mode. It will, however, be a requirement to safely return in a degraded
12.5 Navigation 887
navigation mode. Ideally, within the NAS, the system will utilize a WAAS enabled GPS
system which will provide differential corrections to the receiver to enhance positional
accuracy. Regions outside of the NAS may be able to take advantage of other SBAS
systems or require uplinked corrections from a portable system via a VHF data link.
BLOS systems may require corrections be sent over a satellite link and then latency will
become a problem especially in a dynamic environment.
Auto-takeoff and auto-land systems will require an even higher degree of accuracy.
The reader is referred to section 6.14.5 of this text for ‘‘Airworthiness of Systems for
Takeoff in Low Visibility and Airworthiness of Systems for Landing and Rollout in Low
Visibility,’’ which are the Category III systems requirements. From a safety point of
view, the system will have to demonstrate very tight accuracy requirements for holding
the runway centerline during many hundreds of takeoffs and landings. It is not realistic
to incorporate an ILS system in a UAV, but it is quite probable that the system will
incorporate a GBAS or JPALS-like takeoff/landing system. For RPV takeoffs and
landings, it must be demonstrated that the navigation system can position the A/C at a
point in space where the pilot can safely execute the takeoff/landing without excessive
workload or piloting skill.
What will the UAV do if the GPS signal is lost? What happens if the differential
corrections are lost on final approach? Will the UAV maintain heading and altitude for
some period of time in hopes of reacquiring navigational information? If a coasting
period times out, what is the desired maneuver of the UAV? Will the UAV plot a course
for home or execute a turn to a safe heading? Questions like these will drive the flight
tester’s plan for a loss of navigation function. We know how the system is supposed to
work by analyzing the Interface Design Specification and working closely with Engi-
neering. Our job is to demonstrate that what was envisioned is actually coded correctly
in the S/W.
A similar problem, although more severe, is when the communications link is lost.
When the link is lost, the UAV will execute a series of lost link procedures. The UAV
may initially hold heading, altitude, and airspeed for a period of time (coasting) or
initiate an orbit about the point where the communications were lost. If the link is
regained the UAV may continue on its mission. After a defined period of time (coasting
timed out) the UAV may next execute a turn to home or a known safe heading. If the
link is regained, there will be intervention of the GCE to inform the UAV on the course
of action. It may be to continue the mission, re-plan the route or RTB. This test is easily
accomplished by shutting down the transmitter/receiver at the GCE and then reinitiating
the transmissions. Remember to evaluate this functional test in an area where commu-
nications are assured—not at the edge of the envelope.
12.5.2 USAR Navigation Considerations

USAR states that the following information must be displayed in the GCE at all times
with update rates consistent with safe operation:
– Indicated airspeed
– Pressure altitude and associated altimeter setting
– Heading or track (when magnetic heading or track is used in the GCE, it must be
automatically compensated for deviation)
– UAV position displayed on a map at a scale selectable by the UAV crew and at a level
of detail to ensure safe operations
– When semi-automatic flight modes are activated, the commanded flight or navigation
parameters sent to the UAV must be displayed in the GCE
The following are the minimum required flight and navigational data to be made
available when selected by the UAV crew:
– Airspeed limitations
– Sideslip angle
– Free air temperature
– A speed warning device for turbine powered UAVs and for others that have an
established VMO/MMO and VD/MD and VMO/MMO is greater than 0.8 VD/MD
– The speed warning device must give an effective aural warning and the setting should
attempt to minimize nuisance trips
– Position of the UAV in terms of range and bearing from the GCE; deviation between
actual track and planned track
– UAV attitude in terms of roll and pitch
– Vertical speed
– Time and navigation system status
– UAV identification when multiple UAVs are being operated
– Wind direction and speed at the UAV altitude when only track data is displayed to the
crew
– For automatic takeoff and/or landing systems, the UAV flight path, deviation between
UAV flight path and planned flight path including glideslope
Note: Many other parameters that address engine, oil, fuel, hydraulics, and electrical
system are called out in the USAR but are not addressed here.
For systems equipped with auto-takeoff and/or auto-land, once the function is
engaged the UAV crew monitors the progress from the GCE, but is not required to
perform any manual intervention except for a manual abort. The automatic function will
reside in the UAV control laws and will utilize navigation and flight path tracking inputs
in such a manner as to not degrade redundancy or overall safety of the FGS. When off-
board sensors are used via data link (e.g., differential corrections), the continued safe
flight of the vehicle must be ensured in the event of the loss of the link. The automatic
system may not cause unsafe sustained oscillations or undue altitude changes or control
activity as a result of configuration or power changes. The status of the automatic takeoff
and landing systems must be displayed in the GCE and designed to minimize errors.
Once the automatic takeoff mode has been engaged, the brake release, takeoff run,
and rotation are automatic. The runway flight path, steering, speed, configuration,
engine settings, and flight path after liftoff are all automatically controlled by the auto-
takeoff system. In the event of a failure that could adversely affect safe flight or
exceedance of limits at speeds up to rotation or refusal speed, an automatic abort
function shall be provided to stop the UAV on the runway.
Once the automatic landing system is engaged, the approach, landing, and rollout are
fully automatic until the UAV reaches a full stop, or a safe taxiing speed is reached and
12.6 Autopilots 889
the crew switches to manual control. The UAV flight path, speed, configuration, engine
settings, runway steering, and braking after touchdown are all controlled by the auto-land
system. In the event of a failure that could adversely affect safe flight or exceedance of
limits during the approach, an automatic go-around function shall be provided above the
Decision Point (DP) at which a safe go-around may be safely performed.
For automatic systems, the GCE must continuously present to the crew:
– UAV flight path
– Deviation between the UAV flight path and the planned flight path
– Glideslope
If the UAV is designed for conventional takeoff and landing on a runway, it must
provide a manual abort and go-around procedure. These functions:
– Must be easily accessible to the crew
– Must be able to stop the UAV on the runway up to rotation or refusal speed
– Must be able to initiate a go-around at every height down to the DP
12.6 AUTOPILOTS
At the heart of the command directed function of the UAV is the autopilot. The basic
autopilot functions such as altitude hold, heading hold, GPS/Navigation guidance, etc.,
are the same as we have seen in chapter 6 when discussing Civil Certifications. A
starting point for the UAV autopilot evaluation should be applicable Advisory Circulars,
but there are a few differences between the Part 23/25 requirements and those required
for the UAV mission. For example, during UAV operations, the default is usually to
have the autopilot engaged, and is used to exercise full control of the vehicle. The
exception is when the GCE operator may have to control the autopilot modes similar to a
manned vehicle (e.g., heading change, altitude override (capture), Direct-To, etc.)
Unlike manned vehicle operations, the UAV autopilot usually has full control authority;
additionally, the UAV autopilot has no concern for passenger comfort, i.e., it may be
‘‘bang-bang’’ control. Limits are often built into the control laws of the Flight Control
System or the autopilot; they may be mission or safety specific.
The autopilot integrated with the UAV may be controlled in one of two ways. It may
be an autopilot controlled from the ground by a pilot (called semi-automatic in USAR),
or it may be an autopilot controlled by an onboard computer that can be updated by an
operator on the ground (called automatic in USAR). Some UAVs have a mode of
operation that has separate (usually more simple) logic that requires constant pilot input.
This method of integration has its pros and cons. The obvious good point is that the
system is redundant (pilot and autopilot); the drawback is that it requires a lot of
attention and the pilot is in a separate location.
12.6.1 UAV Autopilot Evaluations

Some of the autopilot evaluations that were discussed in chapter 6 may not be applicable
to the UAS. Many of the autopilot functions seen previously in manned aircraft are
replicated in the GCE. Tiles, knobs, and rotary controls may appear as exact duplicates
FIGURE 12.16 ¢
Autopilot Submenu
in the GCE, or as an alternate means, the method of selection may look different (point
and click). Figure 12.16 provides an example of a point and click autopilot submenu.
The RPV or semi-automatic mode may replicate the displays in the GCE, whereas
the command directed or automatic mode is more likely to use the mouse and keyboard.
Autopilot disconnects are slightly different for the UAV as well. Usually, the autopilot is
on and in control unless an alternate mode is selected by the operator.
There is no manual override by overcoming the autopilot by force; there may be a
quick disconnect on the stick/yolk, similar to manned aircraft implementations. As
demonstrated with manned aircraft, the controls necessary for the UAV crew to safely
operate the autopilot must be clearly identified, visible in all lighting conditions and
easily accessible. The basic modes of the autopilot (heading, airspeed, altitude hold,
altitude capture, integration with the navigation system, orbits, VNAV, and LNAV)
need to be demonstrated as functioning correctly. These tests can routinely be accom-
plished in concert with navigation testing. As mentioned previously, a good starting
point for these evaluations is AC 23.1329, which contains, similar to the EASA certi-
fication specifications, a Book 1 requirements and a Book 2, which provides a test and
evaluation matrix.
Malfunction testing is required; however, the reaction times will need to be adjus-
ted. Since the crew is in the GCE, a malfunction first has to be announced, then
recognized, and then acted upon (if necessary). The actual reaction time may be quite
longer than seen in manned aircraft, and to add additional time may be unreasonable.
12.6 Autopilots 891
If there is an automatic contingency path following a detected malfunction, that con-

tingency path must be tested as well.
Auto throttles, if installed, need to be evaluated for takeoff, landing, go-around, and
VNAV. Of particular interest will be the low-speed and high-speed protection logic; is
the airspeed controlled via auto throttles or pitch/angle of attack to prevent an overspeed
or stall? Limiters in the control laws or autopilot need to be evaluated as functioning
correctly; for example, can the UAV be commanded to an altitude and speed combi-
nation that places the aircraft in the buffet boundary with minimum excessive available
thrust?
In manned aircraft, the minimum use height of the autopilot was determined and
entered into the aircraft flight manual. In the event of a loss of GPS or RADAR altimeter
on an approach, the UAV may execute a go-around, but what is the minimum altitude
that this procedure can be executed safely? These functions need to be addressed by the
test team and evaluated accordingly.
12.6.2 USAR Autopilot Considerations

The USAR references AMC 1329 whose U.S. equivalent is AC 23-17B and AC
23.1329; each of these ACs is addressed in chapter 6 of the text. It notes that the
autopilot must be designed so that a UAV crew of average skill can operate the UAV
system with acceptable workload (similar to manned systems where the AC notes that
the autopilot should not cause the crew to bust a checkride). The flight director is not
applicable in the USAR.
The UAV must have both an automatic and a semi-automatic mode selectable at any
time by the crew except as noted as follows. The autopilot must apply limits to man-
euvers to ensure the UAV is within flight envelope protection. There are cases where the
UAV crew may be restricted from intervention (i.e., manual flight):
– During emergency situations such as total loss of the data link
– During launch phase, prior to achieving the minimum safe flight parameters
– During landing phase after reaching the decision point
– For UAVs recovered by parachute during landing phase under parachute
– For rocket and catapult-assisted launches, prior to reaching minimum safe flight
parameters
The balance of the required testing comes directly from the civil airworthiness
requirements:
– The FGS must be designed so that the range of adjustment by the crew cannot pro-
duce a hazardous situation.
– A single malfunction cannot produce a hard-over condition in more than one axis.
– If the FGS integrates signals from auxiliary controls or provides signals to other
equipment, positive interlocks and sequencing of engagement to prevent improper
operation are required.
– There must be protection from malfunctions of integrated equipment.
– The FGS must have a comprehensive self-test available and operating during all
phases of flight including preflight.
– With the automatic flight mode engaged a warning must be displayed when excessive
deviation from the preprogrammed flight path occurs (acceptable deviation is deter-
mined by the authority).
There must be a clear and distinctive low speed warning in the GCE with the flaps and
landing gear in any normal position in straight and level and turning flight IAW the
following:
– It should not be possible to command speed values lower than the minimum steady
flight speed (except takeoff and landing) allowed by the flight envelope protection
maintained by the flight control system.
– Adequate low speed cues and warning should be provided in the GCE when
approaching stall speed or Vmin DEMO (if stalling is not demonstrated).
– The warning must begin by a margin of not less than 5 kts and must continue as long
as the condition exists.
There is no mention of high-speed protection in the USAR.
12.7 SENSE AND AVOID SYSTEMS

Manned aircraft have a number of systems at their disposal to enhance flight safety;
these systems were identified in chapter 6 as proximity warning systems, such as
RADAR, EO, TCAS, TAS, TAWS, GPWS, EVS, and ADS-B. TCAS, TAS, and ADS-B
interrogate other transponders or receive aircraft position information and process these
replies from other aircraft enabling them to show these aircraft on the PFD, MFD, or a
stand-alone VSI indicator. TAWS and GPWS alert the aircrew of conflicts with the
terrain, issue aural and visual warnings, and are installed to help prevent CFIT.
RADAR and EO have obvious advantages of detecting and displaying ground and
airborne targets and are used in EVS along with digital terrain to provide an aircrew
with situational awareness of his surroundings. As the name implies, all of these sys-
tems are warning systems and are not coupled to the autopilot to provide active
avoidance. In manned aircraft operations, pilots are schooled in the see-and-avoid
concept: taking evasive action when a hazardous condition exists. Since the UAV is
unmanned, most documentation addresses the need for sense and avoid, or in other
documentation detect, sense, and avoid; the autopilot (or the GCE crew) takes evasive
action when a hazardous condition exists. As far as the FAA (or the national authority)
is concerned, flight of UAVs in the National Air Space (NAS) requires an equivalent
level of safety to manned aircraft flight. An equivalent level of safety currently requires
chase aircraft and five days prior notice to ARTCC and constant communication
between the GCE pilot and ATC.
The FAA has not specifically approved any technology or suite of technologies as
being sufficient to provide acceptable sense and avoid capabilities. Part of the challenge
is that existing technologies do not assure avoidance capabilities under all operational
conditions, including autonomous UAV operations or in situations when UAVs lose
their command guidance links with ground control facilities. Standardized procedures
for responding when UAV guidance has been lost are currently lacking, but will be
needed to ensure that air traffic controllers and airspace managers can redirect nearby
traffic and mitigate collision risks.
The USAF has been testing and developing active collision and avoidance systems
(ACAS) for some years. The initial system was developed to aid in the saving of an
aircraft and crew after a crewmember became incapacitated for some reason (e.g.,
hypoxia, g-lock). Aircraft parameters such as altitude, angle of attack, airspeed, and yaw
rate were monitored by a processor, and when the processor determined that an unsafe
situation was present, with a possibility of an incapacitated crew member, the autopilot
took control of the aircraft and flew it to safe conditions. A system of this type installed
in highly dynamic aircraft (such as fighters) may be susceptible to high false alarm rates.
The national aviation authorities are very concerned with the mixed use of airspace
by manned and unmanned aircraft; hence the regulations restricting UAV operations.
These concerns are justified as the current systems are not accurate enough to mitigate
the possibility of a mid-air to acceptable safety assurance levels.
The most common proximity warning system for aircraft-to-aircraft collision
avoidance is the TCAS II system; however, this system suffers from some problems that
would make an automatic response less than optimum. Remembering our discussion
from chapter 6, the current TCAS system suffers from false alarm rates and the inability
to provide resolution advisories in the horizontal plane. There is an interesting paper on
the subject titled ‘‘Safety Analysis of TCAS on Global Hawk using Airspace Encounter
Models’’ (Thomas Billingsley, under an USAF contract to MIT, June 2006, http://
dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/35294/74468299.pdf?seque). In a nutshell, a
TCAS-equipped Global Hawk would enhance safety when compared with a transpon-
der-only equipped Global Hawk; however, if the maneuver was controlled through the
GCE, safety enhancement will drop with increased latency. Optimally, the RA man-
euver should be automatic.
ADS-B, also addressed in chapter 6, provides a more accurate picture of the aircraft
and its relation to other traffic in the area, but the system is not yet fully developed or
fully deployed. An ADS-B system used for sense-and-avoid currently would have to be
a hybridized ADS-B and TCAS implementation to capture all traffic (using either
ADS-B or IFF codes) in the vicinity of the UAV. As a side note, all aircraft in the United
States must be ADS-B compatible by 2020.
TAWS-based systems are in use on today’s UAVs but like the airborne warning
systems are not automatic. Many of the mission planners utilize terrain databases and
TAWS logic to pre-plan the UAV missions to avoid any possibility of impact with the
terrain. The mission designer interface is based on the FAA TAWS Standards TSO-
C151c and provides terrain awareness for all waypoints of the mission route and real-
time display of the terrain while enroute.
12.7.1 Airworthiness of Sense and Avoid Systems

Similar to the minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) we have seen
developed for airborne systems, avionics equipment to be installed or integrated into
UAVs must meet minimum aviation system performance standards (MASPS). MOPS, as
a rule, are developed by RTCA. The SC-203 Committee of the RTCA is developing
UAV standards related to MASPS for unmanned aircraft systems. MASPS will be
released in two documents: ‘‘Guidance Material and Considerations for Unmanned Air-
craft Systems,’’ RTCA/DO-304, March 2007; and ‘‘Minimum Aviation System Perfor-
mance Standards (MASPS) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems,’’ which was due to be
completed in December 2012 has been delayed. A third document, ‘‘Minimum Aviation
System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Sense and Avoid Systems for Unmanned
Aircraft Systems,’’ was scheduled for release in December 2013, and is also delayed.
The FAA will use these MASPS sections as support regulatory guidance recom-
mendations, along with input from ASTM standards and specifications to develop reg-
ulations for UAVs for use in the U.S. National Airspace.
ASTM International, formerly known as the American Society for Testing and
Materials, is a globally recognized leader in the development and delivery of interna-
tional voluntary consensus standards. Some 12,000 ASTM standards are used around the
world to improve product quality and enhance safety.
The ASTM committee F-38 on UAVs was established at the request of the UAV
industry with participation from FAA on the subcommittees in the developing standards.
According to its website (http://www.astm.org/) the mission of Committee F-38 is to
produce cost-effective consensus standards that, when applied, will enhance the safe
design, manufacture, maintenance, and operation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS).
This will be accomplished in the following steps:
– Define terms and scope of UAS standards
– Adopt current, safe practices and guidance as formal UAS standards
– Develop additional UAS standards as needed
– Maintain currency and relevancy of standards
The ASTM F-38 committee has issued and published a standard for DSA collision
avoidance (F2411-04 DSA Collision Avoidance) which requires a UAV to be able to
detect and avoid another airborne object within a range of þ/15 degrees in elevation
and þ/110 degrees in azimuth and to be able to respond so that a collision is avoided
by at least 500 ft. The 500 ft safety bubble is derived from the commonly accepted
definition of what constitutes a near mid air collision (NMAC). This gives avionic
electronics manufacturers a target for certification. It is likely that the ASTM standard
will be incorporated by reference in eventual FAA certification requirements (MOPS,
TSO and AC). This specification establishes the design, construction, and performance
requirements necessary for the technical reliability of airborne sense and avoid systems
that support the detection of, and safe separation from, airborne objects such as manned
or unmanned aircrafts and air vehicles. It specifically applies to the manufacturer or
component supplier of such systems seeking civil aviation authority approval, in the
form of flight certificates, flight permits, or other like documentation, as providing an
equivalent level of safety to the see-and-avoid capability of a human pilot. The reader
will note that these words mimic the current verbiage of FAA Order 8130.34B. This
specification does not cover transponder or broadcast-based cooperative sense and avoid
systems as well as appliances onboard one or more airborne objects flying in formation
flight. In particular, the specification:
– Covers requirements for the design and performance of airborne sense and avoid
systems
– Includes requirements to support detection of, and safe separation from, airborne
objects such as manned or unmanned aircraft and air vehicles
– Applies to the manufacturer of an appliance seeking civil aviation authority approval,
in the form of flight certificates, flight permits, or other like documentation, as pro-
viding an equivalent level of safety to the see-and-avoid capability of a human pilot
– Is not intended to apply to the design and performance of cooperative sense and avoid
systems
– Does not apply to appliances onboard one or more airborne objects flying in forma-
tion flight
– Does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It
is the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appropriate safety and
health practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use
Existing standards and guidance should be referenced for specifications describing
transponder or broadcast-based systems (examples of existing guidance and standards
for cooperative proximity warning systems include FAA 20-131A, RTCA DO-289, and
TSO-C119B; see chapter 6).
12.7.2 Developments in Sense and Avoid Systems

The proposed standards dictate a field-of-view (þ /110 azimuth and þ /15 eleva-
tion) and a safety bubble (500 ft) around the aircraft. Operators would have to translate
these requirements to detection range requirements that would be influenced by closure
and reaction time (remember that the closest point of approach allowable in TCAS
systems is determined by range divided by range rate). If I want to establish a 500 ft
safety bubble and I know the radial closure on an intruder and the performance of my
aircraft, I can determine a minimum detection range to ensure safety.
These ranges were calculated for the Global Hawk and the Predator B by Northrop-
Grumman and General Atomics-ASI, respectively, and presented by Dr. John F.
McCalmont, USAF Research Laboratory, in ‘‘Small Sense and Avoid System’’ at the
UAV 2007 Conference in Paris. The slides used to present the detection range
requirements for the Global Hawk and Predator B are shown in Figure 12.17 and
Figure 12.18.
Detection Range Requirements (NM) FIGURE 12.17 ¢

“Manned” RQ-4 Actual RQ-4 Global Hawk
Scenario Minimum Detection
(Altitude) AUTO LOS BLOS
Nominal Pilot(1) (2, 6, 7) (3, 5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6, 7) Requirements
Low 2.4 0.9 1.7 2.1
Med 3.1 2 3 3.6
High 5.5 2.6 4.1 4.9
Low Altitude Scenario Medium Altitude Scenario High Altitude Scenario

RQ-4-175 KTAS(8) RQ-4-230 KTAS(8) RQ-4-340 KTAS(8)
Nose-on Intruder-300 KTAS Nose-on Intruder-550 KTAS Nose-on Intruder-550 KTAS
Notes
(1) Per U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 90-48C Communication Delavs
(2) Maneuvers is autonomous, so communications latency is 0.0 Autonomous - 0.0 sec
(3) Maneuvers is approved by human via Line-Of-Sight (LOS) data link Line-of-sight (LOS)-1.0 sec
(4) Maneuvers is approved by human via beyond Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) link Beyond-LOS (BLOS)-4.0 sec
(5) Includes 5 sec for human reponse, per U.S. air force research lab
(6) Guarantees minimum miss distance of 500 feet
(7) Climb/dive rates and turn rate are a function of a altitude
(8) Data provided by northrup-grumman
FIGURE 12.18 ¢ Detection Range Requirements (NM)

Predator Minimum “Manned” MQ-9 Actual MQ-9
Detection Range Scenario
(Altitude) AUTO LOS BLOS
Requirements Nominal Pilot(1) (2, 6, 7) (3, 5, 6, 7) (4, 5, 6, 7)
Low 2.1 0.7 1.4 1.5
Med 3.8 1 2.6 2.8
High 4.1 1 2.8 3
Low Altitude Scenario Medium Altitude Scenario High Altitude Scenario

MQ-9-75 KTAS(8) MQ-9-150 KTAS(8) MQ-9-210 KTAS(8)
Nose-on Intruder-300 KTAS Nose-on Intruder-550 KTAS Nose-on Intruder-550 KTAS
Notes
(1) Per U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 90-48C Communication Delavs(8)
(2) Maneuvers is autonomous, so communications latency is 0.0 Autonomous - 0.0 sec
(3) Maneuvers is approved by human via Line-Of-Sight (LOS) data link Line-of-Sight (LOS)-0.5 sec
(4) Maneuvers is approved by human via Beyond Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) link Beyond-LOS (BLOS)-1.3 sec
(5) Includes 5 sec for human reponse, per U.S. Air Force Research Lab
(6) Guarantees minimum miss distance of 500 feet
(7) Climb/dive rates and turn rate are a function of a altitude
(8) Data provided by General Atomics-ASI
The minimum detection ranges to ensure a 500 ft safety bubble allow for three
altitude scenarios (low, medium, and high), which affects closure speed and UAV per-
formance. For the closure speeds in each of the scenarios, the first column provides the
minimum detection range of the pilot’s unaided eye and is based on appendix 1 of AC
90-48C; this assumes a 12.5 sec pilot reaction from the time an intruder is seen to the
time that the aircraft responds to a pilot input. The three columns on the right indicate
the minimum detection ranges required for each of the altitude scenarios and are
dependent on an automatic maneuver upon detection, a maneuver commanded by the
UAV pilot for LOS data link, and a maneuver commanded by the UAV pilot for a BLOS
data link. Automatic reaction times are 0 and 5 sec for UAV pilot commands; com-
munications delays are provided in the box at the bottom right of the slides.
Since detections are not guaranteed by TCAS II or ADS-B (e.g., no transponder,
faulty altitude encoder, incompatible systems), it would seem that a system based on
sensor detection (active or passive) would be a logical choice. In this case, TV, IR, or
radar would be needed to scan the required volume and report intruders to either the
autopilot or UAV crew. At the present time, automobile manufacturers have developed
77/94 GHz anti-collision systems that provide automatic braking when a potential col-
lision is detected. There is no reason that this technology cannot be adapted for UAV
sense and avoid systems. At 77/94 GHz, the components are quite small; monolithic
microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) and radio frequency integrated circuit (RFIC)
technology has led to a price drop in the production of RF transceivers.
NASA has done some research on MMW detect, sense, and avoid systems using
modeling and simulation. Their conclusion is that MMW RADAR is a viable solution to
the sense and avoid problem in UAVs. (NASA Technical Report, Modeling and Simu-
lation of an UAS Collision Avoidance Systems, Edgardo V. Oliveros and A. Jennifer
Murray, 2010, http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100042541_
2010046831.pdf).
Northrop-Grumman is in the final development stages of its airborne sense and
avoid (ABSAA) system enabling the RQ-4 Global Hawk to fly in civil airspace.
FIGURE 12.19 ¢
Northrop-Grumman
ABSAA in a Calspan
Surrogate
The multi-sensor system has been in development at the U.S. Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL) since 2008 under the multiple intruder autonomous avoidance
(MIAA) science and technology program. The development program used a Calspan-
operated Learjet equipped with the MIAA sensors and algorithms and acted as a sur-
rogate for the unmanned Global Hawk. A system based on MIAA technology is
expected to fly on the Global Hawk in 2015, with initial operating capability planned for
2017. The Air Force is leading development, but the Navy and Army are both partners in
the ABSAA effort. The Navy’s desire is to put the system on their aircraft (the MQ-4C
Triton, commonly referred to as the broad area maritime surveillance, or BAMS), while
the Army’s interest is in controls and displays commonality with its ground-based sense
and avoid system. The system uses electro-optical sensors and radar to detect and track
noncooperative targets; the traffic collision avoidance system and ADS-B are used to
detect and track cooperative commercial aircraft. The camera sensor setup and location
in the test bed is shown in Figure 12.19.
The system can be mounted in the nose of the UAV or in aircraft with a space
problem or, for rotary wing aircraft, in a dome above the aircraft or main rotor. The RQ-
5A Hunter currently uses such a setup for its GCE to UAV data link. This design is
The NASA Ikhana was issued a COA to operate within Class A airspace in the
NAS. Team members worked with the FAA to safely and efficiently integrate the
unmanned aircraft system into the national airspace. NASA pilots flew the Ikhana in
close coordination with FAA air traffic controllers, allowing the aircraft to maintain safe
separation from other aircraft. Additional information on this project may be found at
http://history.nasa.gov/monograph44.pdf.
New Mexico State University (NMSU) has teamed with the FAA and has estab-
lished the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Test Center (FTC) and the Center of
Excellence for General Aviation Research. University faculty and staff research,
develop, test, and evaluate unmanned aircraft systems, which are capable of a wide
range of military and civilian functions, including combat, search and rescue, tracking
marine mammals, assessing forest fires, and gathering climate data. They have tested
sense and avoid system technology aboard the NMSU-leased Aerostar UAV. They have
evaluated The Defense Research Associates (DRA) sense and avoid system which
uses optical technology; the full system uses three sensors and has a field of view of
about 210 degrees. The system’s processors select pixels moving differently from the
FIGURE 12.20 ¢
Hunter with Data
Link Enclosure
Northrop-Grumman Photo
background and issue an alert. Since technology is better than human vision, the FAA
hopes to migrate this innovation from unmanned to manned aircraft operations.
An excellent summary of detect, sense, and avoid technology can be found in the
document DOT/FAA/AR-08/41, ‘‘Literature Review on Detect, Sense, and Avoid
Technology for Unmanned Aircraft Systems,’’ September 2009, published by the FAA
in concert with NMSU, http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0841.pdf). The
reports provide a history of sense and avoid systems, the FAA’s involvement with
manned aircraft proximity systems, and a comparison of technology-based systems
versus manned aircraft see and avoid. The report also provides a synopsis of the coop-
erative and noncooperative aircraft and ground based systems that are currently in use or
in development:
Cooperative
– TCAS
– ADS-B
– TAS
Noncooperative
– RADAR
– LASER
– SONAR
– Motion detection
– EO
– IR
– Acoustic
– Passive ranging
– Electromagnetic visibility enhancement (similar to adding radar reflectors)
12.8 Payload 899
– Visibility enhancements (paint schemes and enhanced aircraft lighting)

– Ground-based radar
Appendix A of the report provides an excellent bibliography, and appendix C
contains a capabilities matrix of technologies, in-service and in development, complete
with notes relating to published articles on these technologies.
12.7.3 Test and Evaluation of Sense and Avoid Technologies

Cooperative systems (proximity warning) have been addressed in chapter 6 of this text.
For tests of highly accurate sense and avoid systems, highly accurate TSPI systems must
also be employed. For radar and EO sensors, the accuracies will be evaluated as
described in the respective chapters of the text. A latency analysis will be required, and a
nominal 2 sec total latency (as required by AC 20-165 and AC 20-172A for ADS-B
systems) should be the maximum allowed.
12.8 PAYLOAD
Payload entails sensors that are embedded or carried by the UAV required to success-
fully accomplish its mission. These sensors may be RADAR (SAR/ISAR), FLIR, TV, or
LASER and may provide real-time imaging or archiving for post-flight processing.
Probably the largest problem the evaluator will encounter is how to get large amounts of
data generated by high-resolution sensors down to the GCE in an efficient and timely
manner.
Latency in video distribution systems is the time it takes from when the video image
is captured at the sensor until it is received on the sensor operator’s screen in the GCE.
The contributing factors to latency are the data transmission to the mission processors
(senescence), data capture and compression, stream encoding, network transmission,
stream reception, de-compression, and data display. Video capture and compression
equipment will affect the front-end contributors to latency up to data transmission, and
the back-end contributors such as stream reception and decompression are dependent on
the software and hardware installed at the destination. As previously described in the data
link section, the video stream transmission time can be the most difficult to predict or
control. As a rule of thumb used by most organizations, 100 ms is the effective maximum
latency for video compression and streaming systems that must be used in real-time
analysis. The time limit ensures that the sensor information being acted on in the GCE is
relevant and correct real time. As latency increases, relevance decreases and action taken
may be too late as the situation may have changed. Latency can be minimized in a video
handling system by an efficient video capture and video compression algorithms.
First, the data must be captured and put into a format which can be transmitted. In
the case of multiple sensors, this operation may be carried out in the middleware
described in section 12.4.2. Video compression can be accomplished by using constant
bit rate (CBR), variable bit rate (VBR), or a hybrid known as capped variable bit rate
(capped VBR).
CBR settings provide a video stream with a specified bits-per-second data rate. This
scheme allows predictability but suffers in dynamic environments; significant scene
changes or motion in the video stream will result in video quality degradation.
VBR settings ensure that the video will be compressed and streamed with a constant
quality; i.e., the exact bits-per-second necessary to transmit the video stream will be
dependent on the contents of the video data. If the bit-rate necessary to maintain quality
exceeds the available bandwidth, frames will be dropped and the decompressed video
being displayed at the GCE will experience ratcheting or skipping of frames. Again, this
occurs with dynamic scene motion and critical information may be dropped.
Capped VBR is a hybrid option between the CBR and VBR approach and attempts
to allow for variability in the bit-rate, but also considers the issue of maximum band-
width available. It sets a bit-rate limit at which point the variable bit-rate approach is
replaced with a constant bit-rate approach; when the bit-rate again falls below the set
limit, VBR again is employed. The approach allows higher quality video transmission
without maxing out the bandwidth.
Additional configuration parameters include the video quality setting (when in VBR
mode), the video frame size and rate, the input video format, and the inclusion of audio
and headers. Some of these settings are present all of the time, such as video quality
settings, while others may be used only during initiation.
The delivery of this video (and audio) most likely will be encapsulated into a motion
pictures experts group (MPEG) format. MPEG is an industry standard for video com-
pression and transmission; if you have downloaded video files you may see that many of
them are in an MPEG format. MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 combine audio and video into a
digital format according to the MPEG standards. By knowing that the stream is for-
matted to this standard, the receiving device can decode the stream and provide the
information to the user. HDTV uses MPEG-2 standards. Another version is MPEG-4
which specifies sending the video in other existing standards such as IP, RTP, and
RTSP; MPEG-4 is used in 3-D broadcasts.
MPEG-1 and MPEG-2 are self-sufficient; however, they do not specify how they
might be transmitted over the IP. You will remember during our discussions of the data
link that we looked TCP/IP and how packets would be resent in the event of a loss or
non-receipt of a packet. You will also recall that this lossiness contributes to latency.
Streaming video and/or audio needs to be isochronous (remember, arriving in an orderly
fashion) as opposed to bulk data transfer which is asynchronous. If one data packet is
missing in a video transmission out of 1000 that were sent, it may not be that noticeable;
but if we requested the missing packet be resent (as discussed earlier), the latency may
make the information out of date.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) does not have a dialog between sender and receiver;
if a packet is lost or not received, the sender is never advised. This situation is analogous
to an ARINC 429 data bus where there is no handshake between the source and the sink.
UDP is better than TCP when latency is a concern and data needn’t be acknowledged.
Control and synchronization of streaming video is enhanced by using Real-time
Transport Protocol (RTP), and it is usually sent via UDP. MPEG-1 and 2 provide their
own synchronization, whereas MPEG-4 will almost always use RTP. What is normally
used in payload streaming video applications is an MPEG-2 transport stream via raw
UDP or via RTP over UDP.
ITU-T H.264 AVC is the current and most popular industry standard compression
algorithm for MISB (Motion Imagery Standards Board)–compliant systems. H.264
compression, as it is called, provides very high compression ratios, low lossiness, con-
venient parameter controls, and can be encapsulated into an MPEG2 transport stream
format for distribution over Ethernet using UDP/RTP packet protocol.
12.9 Optionally Piloted Aircraft (OPA) 901
A second major consideration with payloads is the amount of available space and
the associated power, video encoder equipment and transmitters required for the mis-
sion. One can see that for some applications, it may be physically or electrically
impossible to carry all of the desired sensors at once. Carriage of sensors may have to be
designed around specific missions (e.g., high-resolution video versus infrared for day or
night missions). It may be decided, based on the available bandwidth, that only high
value video will be sent in real time and all other video will be archived for postflight
processing and analysis. Archiving will require a storage system on board and a com-
patible system on the ground for retrieving and analyzing the video. Just as with controls
and displays evaluations addressed throughout the text, the information must be timely,
understandable, and correct.
12.8.1 Test and Evaluation of Payload Sensors

The Test and Evaluation of sensors are described in chapters 7 and 8 of the text and will
not be repeated here. STANAG 4671 makes no reference to payload, other than obli-
gatory adherence to paragraphs 1301 and 1309.
As previously mentioned, the primary concerns of the evaluator will be: the
usability of the data (can the scene be acted upon in a timely manner), the ability of the
operator to detect, recognize, and identify objects, the ability of the sensor to track
objects, and the ability to control, and store and retrieve sensor imagery. Identification
and tracking will be accomplished IAW the techniques listed previously. Workload
evaluations and SRS should be conducted over a number of scenarios with operators of
various experience (low to high) to ensure that the system will be able to accomplish the
mission. Data formatting and transmission was addressed earlier in this chapter.
12.9 OPTIONALLY PILOTED AIRCRAFT (OPA)

The OPA is really a hybrid UAV where all of the capabilities of the UAS addressed in the
previous sections are the same, but with the added benefit of a pilot onboard the aircraft.
The FAA still considers the aircraft, pilot, GCE, and crew as a UAS and is still governed
by the Airworthiness criteria (section 12.3). The requirements are somewhat lessened if
the RPV capability is removed from the aircraft and a pilot is always on board.
The National Test Pilot School (NTPS) located in Mojave, CA has a Special Air-
worthiness Certificate for a C-150 Experimental Optionally Piloted Aircraft. The NTPS
system is in accordance with FAA Order 8130.34B, defining an OPA as ‘‘an aircraft that
is integrated with UAS technology and still retains the capability of being flown by an
onboard pilot using conventional control methods.’’
The C-150 OPA can be operated in both CDV and RPV modes. The system is
completely integrated and can also fly the UAV in the optimum orbit based on a target
designated with the sensor. Figure 12.21 shows the National Test Pilot School’s Cessna
OPA and associated sensors.
The benefits of an OPA are obvious: in-flight emergencies such as aircraft and lost
link can be handled by the pilot onboard, data link capabilities can be tested without
concern of losing the link or the aircraft, automatic takeoff and landing development
incorporates an extra layer of safety, remote control of sensors can be evaluated with
or without the UAV under command direction, and new or upgraded payload or
FIGURE 12.21 ¢
NTPS Cessna UAV
with EO/IR Sensor
National Test Pilot School Photo
communication packages can be tested more efficiently. The cost savings in evaluating
S/W upgrades alone can be phenomenal. Because the OPA is, in effect a UAV, the
development testing covered in this chapter applies to the OPA as well, with the added
benefit of having the pilot in the loop.
12.10 SUMMARY
It is envisioned by the FAA that by 2016 UAVs will be flying in the NAS in fairly large
numbers. There will be an increased need for T&E personnel to validate the designs and
performance of these systems. The test and evaluation of UAV aircraft will encompass
all of the testing previously covered for manned aircraft, but presents some unique
problems not seen with manned aircraft. Safety will play a major role in all UAV testing,
even more so than with the development of manned aircraft; potential hazards cannot be
easily mitigated by aircrew action. Human factors and workload must be evaluated with
respect to the envisioned mission, which may require long missions at remote sites.
Communications are critical and the evaluation team must be cognizant of potential
latencies, lost link, data rates, and volume. Changes to S/W must be approached even
more carefully than with manned aircraft as there is really no second chance.
1. What are MALE and HALE systems?

2. Can a UAV currently operate in civilian U.S. airspace?
3. Name three considerations for UAS data link characteristics.

4. When considering safety, what is the maximum allowable latency in a data link
system?
5. What is the difference between internal and external mode of UAS operation?
6. Which three frequency bands are available for UAV command and control links in
the U.S.? Is a license required?
7. Where would you find a common data link?
8. How many bits are in a byte? Or vice versa?
9. What is the difference between command directed and RPV modes of operation?
10. What are the three components of a UAS?
11. What is an OPA? What are its benefits?
12. Name two applications of data links in UAS systems.
13. What is the difference between rate control and vector control?
14. Which documentation would you consult for UAS airworthiness in the U.S.? How
about in Europe?
15. What are MASPS?
16. Should ACAS systems in a UAV be automatic or GCE controlled?
17. What is meant by slow start in a TCP connection?
18. Why are losses and gains calculated using decibels?
19. What is latency in data link transmissions? What is the total latency comprised of?
20. What is STANAG 4671, ‘‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems Airworthiness
Requirements (USAR)’’ based on? Is it applicable to U.S. military operations?
21. What are ACK and NACKS?
What is effective radiated power? What is it used for?
22. Where would you find a need for high capacity UAS data links?
23. Name two contributors to atmospheric losses in data link transmissions.
24. If you were to receive data across a satellite link, what would you expect for
latency?
25. All other parameters remaining constant, which link would provide a greater range:
900 MHz or 10 GHz? Which would provide greater data throughput?
26. What is TCP? What is TCP/IP?
27. What are the major human factors concerns for the GCE during UAS operations?
28. What is the difference between 30 KB and 30 Kb?
29. What is a T link? Is there much difference between a T1 and a T3 link?
30. What is senescence?
31. How does a modified Cooper Harper scale aid in HMI testing of GCE controls and
displays?
32. Name the important parameters that contribute to the link equation.
33. How is a UAV target tracked?
34. What is an antenna pattern? How is it measured for UAVs?

35. What is network middleware?
36. How does TCP handle congestion?
37. What is the difference between constant bit rate and variable bit rate in video links?
38. Has the FAA approved any type of sense and avoid systems for UAVs? What are
they?
39. How does encryption affect the latency in a data link?
40. How is data sent on a TCP network?
41. What is meant by dBm? dBi? How would 1 W of power be expressed in dBm?
42. What is a TCP buffer size? How is it allocated?
43. How is the minimum flight crew determined for UAS operations?
44. What happens in the case of missing, lost or error detected by the receiver in the
TCP network?
45. Which signals may possibly interfere with civilian UAV data links?
46. State three ways that carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) can be handled. What
happens on Internet connections?
47. Will time-alignment of data be a problem with UAS operations?
48. What is meant by peer-to-peer and plug-and-play?
49. What are ACK ratios and received signal strength used for in the GCE?
50. How does the congestion algorithm work?
51. What is the industry standard for video compression and transmission?
52. What is a link equation used for?
53. Aside from a constant, which two parameters contribute to the calculation of
spreading loss?
54. What is the spreading loss of a 5.8 GHz signal over 20 nm? How about a .9 GHz
signal for the same conditions?
55. What is a link margin? What is it used for?
56. What are some of the contributors to latency in video streams?
57. Your effective range is much less than you calculated. How would you troubleshoot
this anomaly?
58. What is the assumed reaction time from the time an intruder is seen to the time that
the aircraft responds to a pilot input?
59. Are current proximity warning systems good enough to provide a sense and avoid
capability for a UAV?
60. Does the USAR require FGS speed protection for the UAV?
61. Name a possible way of evaluating blockage areas during UAS ground tests.
62. How is jamming-to-signal ratio and interference-to-signal ratio related?
63. Name the three contributors to the I/S ratio.
64. What is the effective maximum latency for video compression and streaming sys-
tems that must be used in real-time analysis?
65. What is a BER? How is it employed in UAS testing?
66. Describe a possible ground test for UAV data links? What would be your primary
concerns?
67. Are detections of intruders guaranteed with the installation of TCASII or ADS-B?
68. How can you avoid start-up time latency on a TCP link?
69. What are the proposed sense and avoid standards for field-of-view and safety
bubble around the aircraft?
70. What is the normal default setting of the autopilot within the UAV?
71. What is BLOS? How is it calculated?
72. What problems may be encountered if the boresight of the GCE command and
control antenna is not correctly aligned to true north?
73. What systems, aircraft or otherwise, could possibly contribute to interference on a
900 MHz command and control signal? How about a 2.4 GHz signal?
74. What problems may you encounter when employing a high gain directional antenna
to control or receive data from a UAV?
75. What could possibly cause a PIO when operating in an RPV mode?
76. What is the difference between asynchronous and isochronous data?
77. The USAR references CS 23.1301 and CS 23.1309. What are they?
78. What is meant by the term navigational hierarchy? Why is it important?
79. What is a lost link procedure? What would you expect to see with a loss of GPS
within the UAV?
80. Is there any benefit to having the GCE pilot constantly provide input to the UAV
autopilot?
81. Are there any disadvantages to employing autopilot point-and-click technology in
the GCE?
82. What reaction time is used in the GCE when evaluating autopilot malfunctions?
83. What are TCP Reno, TCP Tahoe, and TCP Vegas?
84. What is a reasonable TCP buffer/window size?
85. What is meant by CSMA/CD? Provide an example.
86. Name four types of possible proximity systems for a UAV.
87. What is lossiness?
88. Will airlines ever transition to unmanned vehicles?
CHAPTER
Night Vision Imaging Systems

(NVIS) and Helmet Mounted 13
Displays (HMD)
Chapter Outline
Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
13.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 907
13.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 908
13.2 Image Intensification (I2) Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909
13.3 NVG Human Factors Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 918
13.4 Lighting Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 920
13.5 Interior NVIS Lighting Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 924
13.6 Exterior Lighting Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 929
13.7 Test and Evaluation of NVIS Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 931
13.8 Some Final Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 938
13.9 Helmet Mounted Display Systems (HMD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 939
13.10 HMD Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 942
13.11 Test and Evaluation of HMD Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 949
13.12 Selected Questions for Chapter 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 954
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author would like to personally thank Chuck Antonio, aerospace medicine/night
vision systems pilot instructor, National Test Pilot School (MD, Medical University of
South Carolina, Charleston; graduate, US Navy Flight Training and Flight Surgeon
School, NAS, Pensacola, Florida) and Edward ‘‘Dick’’ L. Downs, night vision systems
pilot instructor, National Test Pilot School (BSc aeronautical engineering, Imperial
College London), without whose help this chapter would not be possible.
13.0 INTRODUCTION
The desire to improvement nighttime vision led to development of both FLIR (which
has been discussed in chapter 7 of this text) as well as image intensification (I2). Night
vision imaging systems (NVIS) do not exploit thermal energy but rather attempt to
intensify reflected light just outside of the visible light spectrum; it is referred to as
907
908 CHAPTER 13 Night Vision Imaging Systems and Helmet Mounted Displays
invisible light in some of the documentation. Aviation operational capabilities with use
of I2 have grown with experience and with technological advances, and significant
improvements in nighttime capabilities now exist. When applied to aircraft operations,
the NVIS systems can simply be referred to as night vision goggles (NVG), which
comes from the binocular design of most pilot systems. Helmet mounted display sys-
tems (HMD) are a natural extension of the NVG and can combine elements of FLIR,
NVG, weapons, targeting cues, and HUD projected onto a visor patch, a combiner, or an
eyepiece of the pilot’s binocular system. This allows the pilot to view all tactical
information no matter where his vision may be directed.
To understand the history of image intensifiers, the reader is referred to a wealth of
documentation on the subject. The first is NVG Fundamentals/Techniques, Night Vision
Goggle Compatible Aircraft Lighting (George W. Godfrey, Aerospace Lighting Institute
[ALI], Clearwater, FL). In addition to lighting requirements and lighting compatibility,
the author covers the history of NVGs and the basic physics behind their operation. SPIE
is probably the authority on imaging systems. It was founded as the Society of Photo-
graphic Instrumentation Engineers in California to specialize in the application of
photographic instrumentation. In 1964 the society formally changed its name to the
Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers and in 1981 began doing business
as SPIE: The International Society for Optical Engineering. As of 2007, it is referred to
simply as SPIE. An excellent compilation of papers is found in Selected Papers on Night
Vision Technology (SPIE Optical Engineering Press, 2001), which contains 104 tech-
nical papers on the subject of night vision. The US military and the FAA have issued
numerous standards, orders, and handbooks; these will be called out in the appropriate
sections of this chapter.
13.1 OVERVIEW
The human eye can see images that reflect light from violet to red in the electromagnetic
visible light spectrum. Beyond the visible spectrum for humans is the light known as near
infrared (NIR); the human eye is unable to see that light. The two methods of enhancing
night vision are thermal imaging and image enhancing. Both are used regularly and both
have their own advantages and drawbacks. Capabilities of NVGs include an improved
situational awareness that in turn leads to enhancement of tactical operations. They aid in
maneuverability, navigation, and threat detection. The image quality and resolution (the
ability to identify objects) is better than that of a thermal imager, but the range of the
NVG is much shorter. The thermal imager performs better in less than optimum atmo-
spheric conditions (e.g., smoke, haze, precipitation) and can be used day and night. The
best NVG visual performance is still worse than standard daytime uncorrected vision of
20/20; some of the better NVGs offering an equivalent 20/25 under optimal conditions,
20/40 under starlight conditions, and even worse at lower illumination levels. These
numbers represent laboratory testing. The performance achieved in operational use will
be less depending on factors discussed later in the chapter. The NVG FOV is smaller than
that of a thermal imager and does not employ FOV changes or pan/zoom operations. The
thermal imager is commonly used for targeting, whereas NVGs are not. NVGs add both a
physical and mental workload and contribute to fatigue.
Thermal imaging systems use photon detectors or thermal detectors; from chapter 7,
the reader will recall that photon detectors may be photovoltaic, photoelectric,
photoconductive, or semiconductors. Thermal detectors are classified as thermocouples,

bolometers, calorimeters, fluid expansion, or evaporographs. Image enhancing systems
also use photon detectors, normally silicon semi conductors, and employ CCD or CMOS
technology; these sensors were also previously described in chapter 7 under digital TV
systems. The difference between the two technologies may be demonstrated by exam-
ining avoidance systems currently employed in the automobile market. Cadillac, BMW,
and Mercedes all offer options to drivers for systems that help to identify objects at
night. Cadillac and BMW offer an IR imaging system, whereas Mercedes offers an
image enhancing system.
The Cadillac night vision infrared imaging system works with a staring focal planar
array as the sensor and ties into an active matrix LCD for the HUD. The detector
consists of a barium strontium titanate element bonded to an ROIC. The detector tem-
peratures are stabilized with thermoelectric coolers for peak performance, but there is no
attempt to achieve cryogenic temperatures; it incorporates a 240 320 FPA. A chopper
disc (similar to an AIM-9 reticle) rotates in front of the detector to modulate the scene’s
energy by allowing the pixels to constantly blank on and off. The disc rotates in phase
with the detector ROIC timing. The circuit under each element samples capacitance on a
regular basis, and these readings are converted into a monochromatic video signal that is
imaged on the driver HUD. The detectors operate in two colors, 3–5 mm and 8–12 mm,
and are mounted in the grill. Raytheon is the system integrator.
In contrast, the Mercedes system uses NIR technology and produces an even, clear
picture in the dark. This system is similar to NVGs; the NIR system in the Mercedes
illuminates everything as if it were in the high beams of the vehicle. By utilizing a series
of projection bulbs and cameras, the Mercedes’ active nightvision system picks up the
faintest traces of light and transforms it into a clear picture. The advantage is that the
Mercedes’ system can see warmer living things just as clear as it can spot colder objects
(i.e., dead animals or inanimate objects). The drawback to the Mercedes’ system is its
range: maximum effective range is less than 600 ft. Mercedes’ NIR system doesn’t
handle fog well, while the Cadillac night vision system can see through the dense con-
ditions. Both systems incur an extra $2,000 to $2,500 added to the base price.
13.2 IMAGE INTENSIFICATION (I2) TECHNOLOGY

We will remember from our discussions about the visible light spectrum in chapter 7
that the human eye responds to frequencies between .39 and .72 mm; this band is called
the visible light spectrum. Within this spectrum there is also a peak response for the eye.
Figure 13.1 depicts the spectral response of the eye. The x-axis at the top depicts
the energy of a photon at the corresponding wavelength located on the lower x-axis.
Photopic in the upper right hand of the figure refers to lighting conditions (100 through
105 Lux) that allow good visual acuity and the ability to see color (below 1 Lux, human
vision is said to be scotopic: poor acuity and a loss of color). The peak spectral response
of the eye is at .555 mm with photon energy of 2.25 eV. This frequency/wavelength
corresponds to the color green, which is why HUDs and NVGs are also in green.
NVG sensitivity ranges from .45 to .60 mm (depending on photocathode material) at
the short end up to approximately .930 mm at the long end. This bandwidth extends
into the visible light spectrum and overlays a portion of that bandwidth. Figure 13.2
depicts the spectral responses of the human eye and the NVG photocathode.
FIGURE 13.1 ¢ 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 eV
Human Eye Spectral 100 683
Response 555 nm
CIE 1978
Photopic Vision
100
10–1
Eye Sensitivity Function V(λ)
Luminous efficacy (lm/W)

10
10–2
1
10–3
YELLOW
ORANGE
VIOLET
GREEN
CYAN
BLUE
RED
0.1
10–4
300 400 500 600 700 800
Wavelength λ (nm)
FIGURE 13.2 ¢ NVG

100
NVG versus Human
Spectral Response
80
Relative Response (%)
60
Photopic
40 Night
Sky
Irradiation
20
0
450 510 570 630 690 750 810 870 930
Visible Spectrum Infrared

Wavelength λ (nm)
Note: The graph assumes integration of a blue-green filter, hence the sharp drop-
off in response.
Night sky irradiation is made up of moonlight, starlight, and cultural lighting. An

overlap of the human eye and the NVG sensitivity spectrum includes the orange and red
portions of the visual spectrum. The key to NVG compatibility is filtering the output of
cockpit displays and exterior lights as well as visible spectrum light so that they don’t
enter the NVG.
Some definitions need to be covered prior to continuing the discussion. An I2 tube is
an electro-optic device used to detect and intensify reflected energy in the visible and
near infrared region of the electromagnetic spectrum. Illuminance is the amount of light
that strikes a surface or an object measured in either lux or foot-candle. Luminance is the
intensity of reflected light measured in either foot-lambert or candela per square meter.
Albedo is the ratio of the amount of reflected light to amount of light striking an object;
varying Albedo in the scene is important to add contrast to the NVG image.
The evolution of NVGs was previously covered in section 7.1.1 of the text.
13.2.1 NVG Components

The basic components of NVGs are as follows:
– Objective lens
– Minus blue filter
– Photocathode
– Ion barrier film
– Micro-channel plate
– Phosphor screen
– Image inverter
– Internal power supply
– Eyepiece lens
The photocathode through the internal power supply are part of the I2 tube, where
the others are optics and filters. This grouping is shown in Figure 13.3.
FIGURE 13.3 ¢
NVG Components
Objective Lens Eyepiece Lens
Image Intensification Tube

The objective lens is a combination of optical elements which are used to focus
incoming energy (photons) onto the photocathode. The back side of lens is coated with a
‘‘minus blue’’ low pass (allows lower frequency/longer wavelength) filter that allows for
compatible cockpit lighting. The objective lens may focus from several inches to infinity
depending on NVG design. The space between the eye and the eyepiece lens (eye relief)
allows the operator to use the NVG for viewing outside the cockpit or look beneath or
around NVG for viewing inside the cockpit. A single optical element result in an
inverted image being focused onto the photocathode. The image must be inverted again
so that it is ‘‘the right way up’’ when viewed by the user; which is accomplished by
incorporating a fiber optic twist between the phosphor and eyepiece lens. The purpose of
the minus blue filter is to reject certain wavelengths of visible light and prevent these
wavelengths from entering the image intensifier (refer to Figure 13.2 and review the
overlap area). It allows for use of modified cockpit lighting that does not adversely
affect NVG image performance. The minus blue filters are grouped by classes:
– Class A: blocks below 625 nm (blue/green)
– Class B: blocks below 665 nm (blue/green/some yellow/red which allows the use of
color displays)
– Class C: same as Class B but with a notch or passband cutout added to permit direct
viewing of aircraft HUD information (sometimes referred to as Modified Class B in
the literature)
– Some European manufactured tubes block responses below .645 mm and are also
referred to as Class C
The use of NVGs in aircraft with a fixed HUD will require a notch (Class C)
of 1–2% around .555 mm to allow the green symbology or video of the HUD to be passed
to the eye. Early photocathodes were not that sensitive, so they had to be exposed to a
wide band of light, which included some red and yellow. As a result, early cockpits could
not use red and yellow and had all green lighting schemes. When gallium arsenide (GaAs)
photocathodes were introduced NVGs had a much higher sensitivity; as a result, the
system could be exposed to a narrower bandwidth of light and still provide a useful image.
This allowed some red and yellow to be introduced back into the cockpit lighting scheme.
The Class C filter is susceptible to a phenomenon called leaky green goggle glare.
This is caused by green cockpit lighting entering the objective lens from at least 45 off-
axis (an effect similar to thermal energy [noise] entering the FLIR external to the field of
view). The notch filter at .545 mm allows the green light (energy) to impact the photo-
cathode resulting in glare. The problem is most noticeable when the illumination is low
and goggle gain is high. This problem mitigated by physically blocking off-axis energy
with a hood at the objective lens without reducing NVG field of view (Figure 13.4).
The photocathode, like the detector element in IR systems, converts light energy to
electrical energy (the reader is referred to IR Detectors, section 7.7.2 of the text). The
inner surface of the objective lens is coated with photosensitive material, two of which are
in common use. The first is multialkali antimonide (S-20/S-25) photocathodes, which
have a response of .45–.90 mm and a sensitivity of 600–750 mA/lm. The second is GaAs,
which has a response of .60–.90 mm and a sensitivity of 1000–1800 mA/lm. The sensitivity
of an image intensifier tube is measured in microamperes per lumen (mA/lm). It defines
how many electrons are produced per quantity of light that falls on the photocathode. Like
the D* measurement (Section 7.7.2 of the text) for IR photon detectors, the measurement
FIGURE 13.4 ¢
Effects of the Lens
Hood Extension
Lens Hood NVG Image Without NVG Image with

Extension (LHE) an LHE an LHE
should be made at a specific color temperature, such as ‘‘at a color temperature of

2854 K.’’ Typically, the higher the value, the more sensitive the tube is to light.
S-25 is still used in all European NVGs. It is argued that S-25 has the same area
under the curve (Figure 13.2) as GaAs. This is a true statement until you filter it for
aviation purposes, after which the area under the curve is greater for GaAs. S-25 is not as
sensitive to damage from positive ions (to be discussed momentarily), so there is no ion
barrier. Because no ion barrier is required there is a much smaller gap from the photo-
cathode to the micro-channel plate (MCP), so the halo (also addressed momentarily) is
much smaller. GaAs is used by ITT Exelis in Gen III NVGs, which represents all NVGs
produced by them for aviation use since the late 1970s. GaAs is more sensitive than
S-20/S-25, which implies better performance in low light, and a narrower band of light
(caused by .665 mm cutoff of Class B filters) still results in a usable image. The life of
I2 tube depends on the life of the photocathode. Rapid loss of electrons, as in the case of
exposure to bright light, reduces the tube life.
Positive ions are also given off by the MCP and are attracted to the negatively
charged photocathode; these ions damage the PC and reduce its life (Figure 13.5). GaAs
tubes have an aluminum oxide ion barrier film coated onto the MCP; this extends the
tube life by trapping positive ions and keeping them from contaminating the photo-
cathode. This barrier reduces system performance by degrading the signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). The barrier also requires an increased photocathode–MCP gap to prevent arcing
between the MCP and the photocathode (i.e., arcing between the gallium arsenide and
aluminimum oxide). As metioned previously, S-25 multi alkali tubes do not require ion
barrier film.
Another phenomenom that occurs is the halo effect also shown in Figure 13.5. The
electrons fan out in a cone as they depart the photocathode. The electrons are negatively
charged, so if there is a bright light source in the image this results in electrons being
liberated very close to each other on the photocathode. As these two adjacent electrons
make the journey to the MCP, they are constantly repelling each other and move farther
apart. This fanning out in a cone results in the circular halo seen in the NVG image. This
is not as obvious in the S-25 photocathode NVG as the photocathode to MCP gap is
much smaller due to the missing ion barrier.
The MCP is thin wafer containing millions of glass tubules or channels for electrons
from photocathode to enter. The tube walls coated with a gallium-aluminum-arsenic
compound which causes release of more electrons resulting in a cascading effect.
FIGURE 13.5 ¢ Ion Electron Scattering

– +
Barrier Film
Halo
Photocathode
Input Light
Electrons ions
MCP
Ion Barrier Film
To ensure electrons will impact the tube wall, the tubes are tilted approximately 5 . The
number of tubes is analogous to the number of pixels in a digital camera; more tubes/pixels
result in a more detailed image. Not every electron that hits the MCP will fall into a tube;
these losses along with the positive ions result in a reduced SNR.
The thin layer of phosphor at the output of the MCP is called the phosphor screen
and is analogous to the analog TV systems described in section 7.8.3.1 of the text.
Simply put, phosphor emits light when struck by electrons; the light emitted by phos-
phor creates a visible image. The NVG image is green due to the phosphor that is used.
There are over 100 different types of phosphor, and each has its own chemistry, sensi-
tivity, persistence, and manufacturing qualities. Phosphor selection will be based on
persistence characteristics and manufacturing considerations. Persistence is the after
image or tracking caused by bright lights on the phosphor; ideally a short persistence is
better. Some examples of phosphor used in NVG applications and the colors they pro-
vide are P-20/22, which is green on green; P-43, which is green with a yellow tint; and
P-45 (Y202S:Tb), which is used in hospital x-ray machines and provides a black-and-
white contrast. A P-45 phosphor is used in the ONYX HyperGen IITs and shows a
black-and-white image as opposed to a black-and-green image incorporated on most
other NVGs. Use of a phosphor that allows production of a black-and-white image can
arguably provide better scene interpretation.
The high-voltage power supply is built into image intensifier casing; it receives its
power from source external to the tube (i.e., battery pack). The purpose of the high-
voltage power supply is to amplify the relatively small electrical output of the MCP to a
voltage high enough to produce a scene picture (roughly equivalent to the ROIC on an
IR FPA). The supply is also responsible for providing an AGC function via two inde-
pendent circuits: an auto brightness control (ABC) and a bright source protection (BSP).
The ABC provides for consistent image brightness over wide range of illumination
levels by control of the MCP voltage (it controls number of electrons leaving the MCP).
It protects the aircrew by limiting the effect of sudden bright flashes (such as a missile
plume) and helps avoid eye fatigue by attempting to keep the output brightness constant
regardless of scene brightness. High input light levels (e.g., an incompatible light
source) increase the loss of electrons from photocathode. This results in creation of more
ions, which can contaminate the photocathode and reduce its life. The BSP limits the
number of electrons leaving the photocathode by automatically reducing the voltage

between the photocathode and MCP at high light levels, which prolongs the tube life.
However, this results in darkening of the scene outside the cone of light provided by a
bright light source such as IR spotlight (an IR spotlight illuminates an area with energy
at a frequency compatible with the NVG). Current NVGs have only a single gain value;
a very bright source of light in the middle of a dark scene will cause the gain to
accommodate the bright source. The image will be bright in the middle but dark in the
edges. This is a danger when using a searchlight close to the ground as the horizon is
often lost due to the BSP.
The ABC and BSP work together to form the AGC; as scene brightness decreases
the gain increases to keep the image brightness constant. As the gain reaches 100%, any
further reduction in scene brightness will result in a reduction of image brightness. As
the gain increases both the signal (ambient light) and the noise (randomly liberated
electrons) are magnified. The noise level remains constant, but as the scene gets darker
the signal decreases and the noise begins to dominate the image; in total darkness only
the noise remains and produces scintillation, or a white sparkling effect. The inference
being that an NVG needs some energy to produce an image and in total darkness there
will be no image.
Gain is the ratio of output brightness to input brightness for the total system. Typical
values of gain are 2500–3000 for early Gen III NVGs and 5,000–10,000 for newer
Gen III NVGs. NVG system gain can be measured by using an ANV-126 maintenance
test set or other specialized lab equipment.
The final optical component of the NVG is the eyepiece lens. The lens allows for
focusing of the visible image on the retina by moving the image plane forward and
backward relative to the eye. It does permit some correction for vision variation within
individuals, but corrective lens must still be worn by user and it does not correct for
astigmatism. The size of lens impacts the degree of eye relief, which is important for two
reasons: it must be compatible with equipment that must fit between the NVG and the
eye (glasses or gas masks), and it must allow the user to look under and around the NVG
to view cockpit lighting.
13.2.2 NVG System Characteristics

The evolution of NVIS technologies has been previously discussed in chapter 7 of the
text. However, certain terminologies need to be understood when evaluating these sys-
tems. In addition to the Generation I, II, and III technologies, another US grouping
called OMNIBUS is a US Army contract vehicle that incorporates minor technology
and manufacturing improvements when available; systems may carry the designation
of OMNIBUS II through OMNIBUS VI. There have been significant performance
enhancements with the latest iterations.
The common designation used for NVGs is the aviators night vision imaging system
(ANVIS); an example of a particular product would be AN/AVS-9, model item F4949R.
This system is a Generation III system and the ninth version of an ANVIS system.
Systems within a particular Generation may have vastly different performance char-
acteristics; the generation classification is based on the technology being used. For
example, an AN/AVS-6 is a Generation III system but does not have the performance of
the AN/AVS-9 system, which is also Generation III. OMNIBUS IV outperforms them
both but is still classified as Generation III. One must also be careful with the item
nomenclature; an AN/AVS-9 is also called an ANVIS 9 or a F4949G (model) or a
TACAIR NVG (used by the US Navy tactical air community). You may also put dif-
ferent I2 tubes into different chassis; a new I2 tube in an ANVIS-6 chassis will likely
produce a better image than an older generation tube in an ANVIS-9 chassis.
The United States tends to favor the Generation III, whereas the European Union
tends to favor the Generation II. The performance is very similar under high illumi-
nation, and the limiting resolutions are similar (~64 lp/mm for current IITs); 128 lines
per millimeter means 64 dark lines alternating with 64 light lines, or 64 line pairs per
millimeter. The performance differs under low light/low contrast: the Gen III SNR
slightly better and the Pinnacle (ITT’s OMNIBUS VI system) demonstrably better.
Considering the differences between second- and third-generation NVGs, it was found
that the difference in aided visual acuity (VA) between the two generations widens
under two conditions: (1) when target contrast is constant and night sky irradiance
decreases and (2) when night sky irradiance is constant and target contrast decreases.
The halo size of Generation 3 tubes is approximately 1.0–2.0 mm for a point source
(less for the Pinnacle at 0.7–1.25 mm) versus 0.6–0.8 mm for Super Generation 2 and
HyperGen (Photonis). HyperGen is rated at 60 lp/mm, 700 mA/lm and an SNR of 20. In
the overall scheme of things, current Generation II and Generation III system perfor-
mance is comparable.
SNR is the ratio of signal power to noise power; the primary NVG noise source is
the photocathode and the MCP. The signal portion is generated by photons of light, and
the noise is a result of an imperfect photocathode that liberates electrons without an
incident photon. The modulation transfer function (MTF) is identical to that previously
described for thermal imager systems. The MTF is the system’s ability to replicate a
frequency/contrast to the observer. Image contrast is a function of spatial frequency; high
contrast at the highest possible frequency is desirable. Figure 13.6 depicts resolution
versus MTF for two NVG systems. NVG A and NVG B have the same limiting reso-
lution of 64 lp/mm. System B has better performance because it provides greater contrast
at high spatial frequencies (you can interchange resolution with spatial frequency),
FIGURE 13.6 ¢ Example NVG MTF

Resolution versus 100
MTF 90
80
70
60
MTF (%)
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
NVG A Resolution (Ip/mm)
NVG B
which results in a better image; the area under the curve becomes just as important as
limiting resolution.
The U.S. State Department assigns a figure of merit (FOM) as a measure used for
export control. The FOM is equal to the resolution (lp/mm) the SNR. The product
determines the level of control. US Domestic Emergency Medical Services (EMS) are
authorized a product of 1400–1600 with auto-gating, whereas US Domestic Paramilitary
(SWAT) are authorized a product of 1600–1800 with auto-gating. US military are
authorized products in excess of 1800 with auto-gating. Auto-gating (ATG) is similar to
a fast AGC; it was designed to improve the BSP feature to be faster and to keep the best
resolution and contrast at all times. It is particularly suitable for ANVIS goggles,
operations in urban areas or for special operations. ATG is a unique feature that operates
constantly, electronically reducing the ‘‘duty cycle’’ of the photocathode voltage by very
rapidly switching the voltage on and off. This maintains the optimum performance of the
I2 tube, continuously revealing mission critical details, safeguarding the I2 tube from
additional damage, and protecting the user from temporary blindness. It is particularly
useful in the ITT Pinnacle tube by helping offset the loss in tube life created when
thinning the ion barrier film to allow narrowing of the photocathode–MCP gap.
A comparison of current Generation II and Generation III technologies are shown in
Table 13.1.
Most important to the user will be the image characteristics of the system. The
image characteristics will be determined by the design of the optics and the image
intensifier. Some of the parameters of concern will be the resolution (or image quality),
FOV, chromaticity, halo size, blooming, scintillation, and goggle glare.
System resolution is accomplished in the same manner as spatial frequency for IR
and EO devices. Since NVGs are an optical system, resolution will be measured by
noting the sensitivity in separating shades of contrast (black/white, shades of gray).
Resolution of an NVG can be expressed in line pairs per millimeter (as discussed
previously), cycles per milliradian (spatial frequency; see chapter 7), or even Snellen
acuity (e.g., 20/20, 20/40). The perceived image quality will be from a combination of
system resolution, environmental conditions, and aircraft design constraints (see aero-
mechanical and aero-optical effects in chapter 7). The FOV is determined by the optical
design; a 40 circular FOV is common for most systems. Studies have shown that pilots
prefer good resolution and limited FOV to poor resolution over a larger FOV (as the
two are directly related). The chromaticity is determined by the type of phosphor used;
TABLE 13.1 ¢ Generation II/III Comparison
Euro Gen II US Gen III

Photonis, XR-5, S-25 ITT, F9800VG, GaAs
Limiting Resolution 64 lp/mm 64 lp/mm
SNR 23 28
Figure of Merit 1472 1792
Halo 0.8 mm 0.7 mm
MTF
@2.5 lp/mm 92% 92%
@7.5 lp/mm 80% 80%
@15.0 lp/mm 58% 61%
@25.0 lp/mm 45% 38%
FIGURE 13.7 ¢
Similar Scenes with
Generation III (GaAs,
left) and Generation II
(S-25, right)
Depicting the
Severity of the Halo
a saturated green or green with a yellow tint is used for most systems. Green is used
because it has the highest response of the human eye and lessens eye fatigue during
prolonged use.
A halo, as previously described is a circle of opaque brightness around point light
sources; halos will coalesce to form a larger area of coverage when many light sources
are present. The size of the halo depends on the spacing between the photocathode and
MCP, where Generation III systems will produce a larger halo than Generation II
systems. The intensity of halo depends upon the strength, color, distance and aspect of
the light source, and the gain setting of the NVG. An example of halos created in
Generation II and Generation III systems is shown in Figure 13.7.
Blooming is a common term used to denote the washing out of all or part of the
NVG image due to reduced gain when a bright light source is in or near the field of view.
This can be a result of BSP or ATG activation. Scintillation is electronic noise created at
high gain levels (e.g., during low illumination conditions) and appears as a sparkling
effect (like snow on a television), or pixelating, throughout the image.
There are other system characteristics such as helmet mounting, backup power
sources, low battery indicator, weight and CG, but they are really out of scope for this
discussion and therefore are not covered.
13.3 NVG HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES

As emphasized throughout the text, a system’s compatibility with the aircrew’s flight
equipment and the cockpit environment is an essential test. Some of the items that need
to be investigated are probably obvious. Since the NVG is mounted on the helmet, is
other essential equipment adversely impacted or rendered unusable by the installation?
Compatibility issues include helmet visors, laser eye protection, eye glasses, and
chemical/biological/radiological (CBR) equipment (previously known as nuclear, bio-
logical, chemical [NBC]). Another issue will be the snugness of the fit of the helmet; a
helmet that is allowed to shift on the head will provide an erroneous view of the world
through the goggles.
Integration issues within the cockpit environment include the following:
– Fixed HUD
– Movable HUD
13.3 NVG Human Factors Issues 919
– NVG HUD
– Transparencies
– Crew station design
– NVG stowage
– Ejection seat concerns
A fixed HUD requires the use of a Class C objective filter to see the HUD sym-
bology or the rastered imagery. A movable HUD (e.g., a flip-down installation) poses
potential design issues relative to use of NVGs. There may be blockage of projected
information (as in the case of a rear projector) or physical interference of the NVG with
HUD, or the HUD with the NVG. The shift of eye position relative to HUD location may
require the user to move his seat to obtain the design eye position. Several NVG HUD
systems are available, but design differences result in varying concerns; in particular,
how does one attach the HUD to the NVG? If it is attached to the eyepiece, it may affect
diopter (a unit of measurement of the refractive power of lenses equal to the reciprocal
of the focal length measured in meters; or in layman’s terms: focus) control. If it is
attached to the objective lens, it may cause cockpit obstruction problems, an increase in
head-borne weight, and movement of CG forward. Additional concerns include the size,
location, and length of cables from the control box to the NVG and the ability to control
the brightness of the HUD symbology. Lead was used for bird-strike resistance in older
transparencies (e.g., windows, windscreens); unfortunately, lead partially blocks trans-
mission of near-IR energy degrading NVG image quality. Newer transparencies have
good near-IR transmissivity as well as good bird-strike protection. Applied coatings on
transparencies may also adversely affect transmission of near-IR energy. Transparencies
may also have other deleterious effects; scratched surfaces, pitting, crazing and/or dirt
may affect the user’s ability to see through the transparency. The transparency can cause
a refraction of incompatible light, a reflection of compatible light, or a reflection of
interior lighting. A sharp curvature can create distortion and air vents and sliding win-
dows (as used in helicopters) can result in a large reduction in image quality.
Crew station evaluations are performed as previously described with emphasis on
the proximity and location of aircraft structures such as the canopy bow or window
frame and their inter-relationship to the mounted NVG. Blockage areas caused by the
NVG such as obstructions of the outside view, overhead panels, wires, and lights as well
as any potential for interference with the NVG needs to be investigated—for example,
when the NVG is in the operating position (i.e., down and in front of the eyes) or in the
stowed position (i.e., still on the helmet but moved up and away from the eyes). NVGs
must be shown to work as intended without adversely affecting the operation of other
aircraft systems.
When NVGs are stowed in the aircraft, it must be shown that they remain secure
during tactical maneuvering and, in USN applications, during carrier catapults and
arrestments. When stowed, the NVGs should also be accessible, minimize heads-down
time, and reduce the chance of spatial disorientation when donning and doffing the
equipment.
Ejecting from an aircraft while wearing NVGs present other concerns; loss of the
system during an ejection could cause a serious injury where none existed without
the goggles. Whether the NVGs are on or off the helmet at ejection is a function of the
mount design. If the goggles must be removed before ejection, it will require additional time.
As of this writing there have been automatic removal systems that have been developed and
fielded. Two other concerns during the ejection sequence are an ejection through the canopy
versus after the canopy deploys, and the location of the ejection handles. The NVG’s phy-
sical relationship to canopy must be examined to determine if it will create an unsafe
situation during the sequence. Ejection using a face curtain may be restricted based on
interference with the NVG system. If the goggles must be removed and stowed prior to
ejection, a modification to the minimum safe ejection altitudes must be made in the aircraft
flight manual.
13.4 LIGHTING SPECIFICATIONS

13.4.1 MIL-L-85762 and MIL-L-85762A
In the early 1980s, US government procurement documents began to impose NVG
(NVIS) compatible lighting as requirement. Initially, green lighting was to be used and
approval was sought from the surgeon general. Following this guidance, companies
began to design and manufacture lighting using their own criteria. The systems were
evaluated under lab and field conditions and the findings were mixed; some were good,
whereas others were not. As a result, a NVIS compatible lighting requirements document
was devised to ensure devices provided the same degree of compatibility. Work began in
earnest in 1983 by a Joint Aeronautical Commanders Tri-Service committee composed of
Naval Air Development Center and Industry representatives. The committee’s objectives
were to determine compatible lighting, how it would be measured, and how it would be
implemented. MIL-L-85762 (a USN document) was released by the committee in Jan-
uary of 1986 and was strictly a lighting specification for NVIS compatibility. With the
development of newer NVIS systems the specification was revised in August of 1988
(MIL-L-85762A). The revision added the requirement for lighting compatible with other
types of night vision imaging systems such as Class B to allow an increased use of color
(e.g., annunciators, displays). Use of the specification ensures cockpit lighting will not
adversely affect NVG performance assuming there is proper matching of objective filter
with class of lighting (e.g., Class A lighting with NVG using .625 mm filter).
The specification addresses most cockpit lighting methods to ensure all components
can be modified for NVG use and allows for complete cockpit modification. The spe-
cification mandates that after modification there will be no change in the cockpit scan
habit pattern and that operators can quickly and accurately gather heads-down infor-
mation when using NVGs. It allows for smooth introduction of new NVIS equipment
into an existing NVIS modified cockpit. The advantages of the specification are that it
provides guidance for manufacturers to use when designing and producing NVIS lighting
products and the same for integrators when developing plans for cockpit lighting
modifications. It provides guidance for testers when conducting specification-compliance
testing and standardizes terminology for NVIS types and classes (it matches the NVG
objective filter to the filters required for NVIS lighting).
The specification does have limitations; it does not provide guidance for NVIS
exterior lighting, nor does it provide guidance for the latest color display technology (it
only addresses CRTs). It doesn’t provide guidance for conducting qualitative evalua-
tions of NVIS modifications and it may be more restrictive than necessary for a few
current NVG designs.
There are four types of lighting called out in the specification:
– Type I: Lighting compatible with any direct view NVIS using Gen 3 image intensi-
fication (I2) tubes
– Type II: Lighting compatible with any indirect view (projected image) NVIS using
Gen 3 I2 tubes
– Class A: Lighting compatible with any NVIS utilizing a .625 mm minus blue objective
lens filter. The use of this filter allows energy from portions of the red spectrum to
enter the I2 tube
– Class B: Lighting compatible with any NVIS utilizing a .665 mm minus blue objective
lens filter. This filter lets less of the visible spectrum enter the NVG and allows for the
use of more color in cockpit lighting (e.g., annunciators, displays)
A light source that emits energy in the .60–.93 mm region can cause interference
with the NVIS to the point where the AGC obscures the outside scene. How much
interference is acceptable before the light source can be considered not compatible?
Many methods have been developed to test the NVIS for lighting compatibility but with
poor results.
The acceptable solution was to develop a new term called NVIS radiance (NR),
which is defined as the amount of energy emitted by a light source that is visible through
the NVIS. NR is the integral of the curve generated by multiplying the spectral radiance
of a light source by the relative spectral response of the NVIS. The spectral radiance of a
light source is a known quantity, a ‘‘standard’’ NVIS spectral response is not, and
therefore must be defined. The equation for NR, which was developed empirically, is
stated as follows:
9ð3
NVIS radiance ¼ GðlÞmax GðlÞiN ðlÞdðlÞ (13.1)

:45
where:
G(l) ¼ 1 mA/W (for correct units)
G(l)i ¼ Relative spectral response of the NVIS, where i ¼ A for Class A NVIS
and i ¼ B for Class B NVIS
N(l) ¼ Spectral radiance of the light source (W/cm2)
d(l) ¼ Wavelength increment (.005 mm)
Simply stated, the NVIS radiance is the product of the sensitivity of an NVG and the
light source integrated from .45–.93 mm. As a baseline it was decided that compatibility
could be achieved if the image of the cockpit lighting, when viewed through the NVIS,
was no brighter than the outside scene. Operational experience had shown that because
of its low reflectivity, a defoliated tree is the terrain feature that is the most difficult and
important to see at night. The NVIS radiance of a defoliated tree was determined by
multiplying the spectral radiance of starlight by the reflectivity of tree bark and
inserting the resulting curve as N(l) in the NVIS radiance equation, which resulted in
values of 1.7 1010 NR and 1.6 1010 NRB. (The difference is due to the Class A
and B filters.)
With this information, the illumination levels for cockpit lighting can be determined
to ensure compatibility. Primary cockpit lighting is illuminated to 0.1 fL (foot-Lambert);
this value is based on USAF tests of operationally representative lighting settings.
Monochrome displays, when required to show gray scale (i.e., FLIR), are illuminated to
0.5 fL; higher illumination levels are required to make the image usable. Multi-color
displays are not applicable to Class A NVIS. It was assumed that most color displays
would be located so they would not be in the NVIS FOV when viewing outside the
cockpit. It was also believed that the red portions of the display would occupy a very
small percentage of the cockpit area. In reality, the backlighting of modern displays
creates more issues than the red elements of the display. Even when fully dimmed,
modern displays put out a significant amount of near IR energy (i.e., heat); therefore,
when the display looks black to the unaided viewer it can still be clearly seen through
the NVG. Modern multi-color displays are not adequately addressed in 85762A, so
experience and empirical values are used. Warning, master caution, and emergency exit
lights are illuminated to 15 fL as these lights must be clearly visible through Type I
NVIS; the HUD is illuminated to 0.5 fL. Table 13.2 summarizes the Type I NVIS
radiance limits.
MIL-L-85762A has additional information, which may be found in the Appendices.
Appendix 5 contains information and descriptions on NVG Class A and Class B
objective filters, including a discussion on the 50% cutoff and slope. Appendix 6 con-
tains the rationale and justification behind the requirements in the specification.
Appendix 7 is a PowerPoint overview of how the term NVIS radiance was derived.
TABLE 13.2 ¢ Type I NVIS Radiance Limits
Paragraph
Lighting Component 85762A Class A Class B
Primary 3.10.9.1 0.1 1.7 1010 0.1 1.7 1010
Secondary 3.10.9.2 0.1 1.7 1010 0.1 1.7 1010
Illuminated Controls 3.10.9.3 0.1 1.7 1010 0.1 1.7 1010
Compartment 3.10.9.4 0.1 1.7 1010 0.1 1.7 1010
Caution/Advisory 3.10.9.6 0.1 1.7 1010 0.1 1.7 1010
Jump Lights 3.10.9.7 5.0 1.7 108 to 5.0 1.6 108 to
5 108 4.7 108
Warning Signal 3.10.9.8 15.0 5 108 to 15.0 4.7 108 to
1.5 107 1.4 107
Master Caution 3.10.9.8 15.0 5 108 to 15.0 4.7 108 to
Signal 1.5 107 1.4 107
Emergency Exit 3.10.9.8 15.0 5 108 to 15.0 4.7 108 to
1.5 107 1.4 107
HUD 3.10.9.10 5.0 1.7 109 to 5.0 1.6 109 to
5.1 109 4.7 109
Monochromatic 3.10.9.9.1 0.5 1.7 1010 0.5 1.6 1010
Displays
Multi-Color White 3.10.9.9.2 0.5 2.3 109 0.5 2.3 109
Display Max 1.2 108 1.2 108
The US Navy has determined that for modern multi-color displays if the background NVIS radiance is <5 1011 NRB
when the white part of the display is set to 0.5 fL the display is likely to be satisfactory.
13.4.2 Other Lighting Specifications and Guidance

MIL-STD-3009 is a USAF document derived from MIL-L-85762A (USN document); it
did not supersede or replace 85762A, but most manufacturers now refer to 3009. The
USN, of course, still references 85762A. The major differences between 3009 and
85762A are that 3009 added Class C as terminology for Modified Class B (leaky green)
filters. As mentioned earlier, Class C is also used by others, particularly in Europe, for
the .645 mm filter. MIL-STD-3009 does not provide daylight readability information
although some external lighting guidance is provided.
Since the exterior lighting requirements were derived from a system designed and
tested on a single aircraft type for specific operational requirements, they cannot be uni-
versally applied. NVIS radiance requirements are the same as those called out in 85762A.
Several SAE documents concern NVIS use but are Aerospace Recommended
Practices rather than specifications. SAE ARP4392, ‘‘Lighting, Aircraft Exterior, NVIS
Compatible,’’ describes the recommended performance levels for equipment located on
the aircraft exterior that will produce radiant energy and thus provide desired informa-
tion when viewed with NVIS goggles. SAE ARP5825, ‘‘Design Requirements and Test
Procedures for Dual Mode Exterior Lights,’’ contains the general requirements and test
procedures for dual mode (NVIS friendly visible and covert) exterior lighting for most
rotorcraft and fixed wing aircraft and could be applicable to ground vehicles in which it
is desirable to have a dual mode lighting system. SAE ARP4168, ‘‘NVG Compatible
Light Sources,’’ recommends certain basic considerations that the design engineer
should observe when designing NVG compatible lighting. Night vision goggle compa-
tible light is the condition in which the spectral wavelengths, luminance level, and
uniformity of the cockpit lighting do not interfere with the operation of night vision
goggles. SAE ARP4169, ‘‘NVG Filters,’’ describes the functions and characteristics of
NVG filters used in NVG compatible lighting. (For more information, see http://www.
sae.org/search?searchfield=nvis&typ=std.)
The RTCA Steering Committee 196 was established in December 1999 to provide the
FAA with guidelines for developing rules and regulations regarding civilian use of NVGs.
One such document, RTCA/DO 268, ‘‘Concept of Operations, Night Vision Imaging
System for Civil Operators,’’ describes the concept of operations supporting the imple-
mentation of aviation night vision imaging system (NVIS) technology into the National
Airspace System by civilian aviation operators. Terminology, capabilities, limitations, and
operations for NVIS are discussed as well as training and supporting agencies. The focus of
the document is the safe and efficient implementation of NVIS during various phases of
flight. Another document from this committee, RTCA/DO 275, ‘‘Minimum Operational
Performance Standards for Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment,’’ contains
the MOPS for the ANVIS used to supplement night VFR operations. NVIS consists of the
night vision goggle, interior and exterior lighting, cockpit transparencies and crew station
design and components. Performance and test procedures are provided for the night vision
goggle and lighting. A section on continued airworthiness contains guidance to ensure the
integrated NVIS equipment installation continues to meet the minimum performance
standard once in operational use. Also, RTCA/DO 295, ‘‘Civil Operators’ Training
Guidelines for Integrated Night Vision Imaging System Equipment,’’ presents training
guidance that has been generated from lessons learned by agencies having many years of
experience in the training and operational application of night vision imaging systems.
By tapping this experience base it is hoped that civil aircrew, through appropriate ground
and flight training, will learn how to properly use night vision imaging systems, thus
enhancing the effectiveness of night operations while mitigating the potential for mishaps
relating to the use of these systems. Further information can be obtained from the RTCA
website (http://www.rtca.org).
The FAA also has guidance and regulations regarding the civilian use of NVGs. This
guidance is provided via orders, notices, changes to the operating procedures (Parts 61,
91, and 141), and advisory circulars. Notice N 8000.349 provides guidance for evaluating
the operator’s formal application for an NVIS supplemental type certification (STC)
(remember that notices are internal policy procedures for FAA employees). Notice
N 8900.100 provides guidance for NVG training and training plans and refers to Part 61
of the operating instructions. Amendments to 14 CFR Parts 61, 91, and 141 include
changes to paragraphs 61.31(k), 61.57(f), 61.57(g), and 61.195(k), which refers to NVG
training, currency, proficiency, and flight instructor requirements; 91.205 dictates the
minimum equipment required for NVG and requires the installation of a radar altimeter.
Paragraph 61.31(k) states that a pilot in command’s (PIC) use of NVGs requires
completion of ground and flight training from an authorized instructor with an endor-
sement of such training in her logbook or training record. The paragraph also delineates
the required syllabus for the training; it does provide exceptions for pilots with previous
experience. The pilot must also retain proficiency in NVG usage. Paragraph 61.57(f)
lists the currency requirements for flight with NVGs. An operator is current if:
– A flight with NVGs within 2 months preceding the proposed flight (with passengers)
– A flight with NVGs within 4 months preceding the proposed flight (without
passengers)
To obtain a currency (if currency was lost) an operator must perform:
– 3 takeoff and landings (climb, cruise, descent, approach)
– 3 hovering tasks (helicopters or powered lifts only)
– 3 area departure and arrival
– 3 transitions from aided to unaided to aided
– 3 NVG operations (6 for helicopters or powered lifts)
Paragraph 61.57(g) identifies the requirements for obtaining an initial NVG cur-
rency. An NVG proficiency check is required if the operator does not meet the
requirements in 61.57(f). The training requirements in 61.31(k) must be completed and a
check ride performed by a qualified person. Paragraph 61.195(k) defines the NVG flight
instructor requirements. In general, the candidate must be a CFI with applicable cate-
gory and class rating and a type rating if appropriate. Eligibility requires 100 NVG
operations as sole manipulator at controls and 20 NVG operations as sole manipulator at
controls in category and class aircraft if appropriate; a logbook endorsement is required.
13.5 INTERIOR NVIS LIGHTING METHODS

The AGC circuit is activated by energy to which the NVG is sensitive, and this results in
reduced contrast, especially in darker areas of the image. This energy is emitted from
cockpit lighting, exterior lighting, and environmental illumination, and it does not take
much energy for AGC to reduce the gain. To mitigate this problem, NVIS lighting is
necessary for NVG compatibility; even a minor incompatibility may cause impercep-
tible but real loss of NVG image quality. The human operator can lose as much as 50%
of aided acuity without noticing it, especially in medium/low contrast environments. To
put this in context, the operator would have to be twice as close to see the same image as
before the loss.
13.5.1 Interior NVIS Lighting Modifications

Filters are used to make interior lighting compatible with NVGs. Filters reduce emission
of near-IR energy as well as visible wavelengths within NVG sensitivity range (based on
type of NVG filter—Class A or Class B). The filters will notch out red and near-red
colors while allowing good color transmission in displays. This must be done judi-
ciously so as to minimize color shifts and avoid adversely affecting daylight readability.
Compatibility will use two filters: the display filter is used to stop IR wavelengths from
exiting the display, and the NVG filter is used to block visible wavelengths from
entering the NVG. The display filters and the NVG filter should match and be the same
class. Remember that the filters are not perfect and that at the rated wavelength they are
still passing 50% of the energy. A visual presentation of the filter setup is shown in
Figure 13.8.
There are many NVIS lighting modification methods in use, and choosing one
depends somewhat on the age of the aircraft. For older aircraft it may be necessary to
modify analog instruments, displays, and annunciators that use incandescent technology,
whereas for newer aircraft the use of digital instrumentation and light emitting diodes
(LEDs) may predominate. Also, older aircraft will usually be modified postproduction,
whereas newer aircraft will be built with NVIS lighting installed as part of production.
Methods used for NVIS modifications include the following:
– Internal modification
– NVIS bezels
– Post lights
– Bridge lights
Filters on cockpit FIGURE 13.8 ¢
lights/displays stop NVIS Filters

100
wavelengths to the
Relative Response (%)
80 right of the line

Class A NVG getting out
60
40 Class B NVG
Filters on the
NVG stop 20
wavelengths
to the left 0
of the line from 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800 850 900 950
getting in
Visible Spectrum Infrared
Wavelength λ (nm)
– Annunciators
– Cockpit displays
– Panel lighting
– Flood lighting
Internal or integral modification may provide best display illumination and depends
on age and design of instrument. The modification involves a complete disassembly of
the instrument and filtering all the internal lights with NVIS compatible filters. This
modification is usually more expensive, is technically difficult, and may revoke the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) warranty. After the modification, a recertifi-
cation will be required and the modified and non-modified parts should have different
part numbers. This is a built-in trap as it is easy to accidentally replace modified com-
ponents with unmodified components during maintenance operations.
An NVIS bezel is an open ring design with lights embedded in bezel hardware.
Older designs incorporated glass cover that transilluminated light across instrument
face. The two layers of glass with associated dirt and scratches was very thick causing
blockage of information. The current bezel matches the size and contour of existing
instrument bezel that holds the original glass cover in place. The control knobs are
incorporated on existing bezel with cutouts for the NVIS bezel. Power to the bezel may
present some problems, and the most effective implementation is a design that allows an
easy removal and replacement. Advantages of the bezel modification are that it provides
a balanced illumination across instrument face and can be designed to fit unique
instrument shapes. They can be cut out to provide parallax readability. If designed
correctly, a bezel panel can cover a cluster of smaller instruments. With light redun-
dancy, the system can lose some lights and maintain readability. The NVIS bezel
reduces the use of post lights and provides superior readability. There are disadvantages
as well; bezels are generally more expensive than most other methods and may block
information on instrument face depending on design and viewing angle. A luminance
balance may be difficult to accomplish if varying bezel designs are incorporated in a
display suite.
A post light is essentially a small floodlight. The design consists of a post and a
hood; the post used for attaching the light to surface and a hood is fitted to the top of the
post. The post height is designed to shine light from above the instrument face. In some
applications, you may be able to change the hood without removing the post, or you may
be able to rotate the hood on the post to change the area that is illuminated. A window in
the hood, usually glass, contains the filter material—either NVIS Green A or NVIS
Green B. The largest advantage of the post light is that they are inexpensive and may
provide adequate illumination on smaller instruments or small areas. They may be dif-
ficult to place (especially in multiplace aircraft) because the height of the post may
block some information. Since the light is reflected downward, it may cause reflections
in transparencies or off the instrument face. It is difficult to obtain adequate balance
when used in large quantities and many have reliability and maintainability problems.
Hoods may become loose and create light leaks or get kicked off when entering or
exiting the aircraft.
Bridge lights are essentially two post lights on a bracket and may be used when a
single post light does not provide enough illumination. They are not adequate for larger
instruments as they lack even illumination across the instrument face. A bridge light
may be needed due to space limitations where there is no room for a bezel or other
method. As with the post light, there is an increased risk of blocking information from
the instrument face due to viewing angle.
Annunciators must be recognized in all lighting conditions, must be attention
grabbing and need to be unambiguous. If warning (red) annunciators are filtered, a color
shift will be observed, the red will be less saturated, and the warning will appear orange-
like. This can lead to confusion between red and amber (cautions) annunciations. There
can also be a problem with normal daylight readability due to the reduction of intensity.
Dead-face filters (inverse video) reduce the total amount of red and yellow energy
emitted from the annunciator, which will reduce the possibility of a false on indication.
The emitted energy however, may not be sufficient for some annunciators depending on
location and purpose (e.g., fire warning); the filter may also negatively impact daylight
readability.
It should be obvious that the control of colors will be critical in the NVIS-compatible
cockpit. One needs to apply judicious use of reds and yellows, and limit their usage to
emergency and caution annunciations. The use of NVIS Green B for annunciators may
be a possible alternative to filtering incandescent light. Warnings and cautions may also
be supplemented by aural tones, or placing the annunciation in other locations
(e.g., HUD, HMD). Marginal findings or test failures during evaluations of filtered
incandescent annunciators may be acceptable in certain situations, but the user will
find it difficult indeed to meet the airworthiness requirements of AC 25.1322-1 and
AC 25-11A for civilian applications. In all installations, it will probably necessitate the
capability to increase the brightness of the annunciator for daytime use and allow them
to be dimmable for night operations.
The cockpit displays must also be compatible with NVIS. A glass cockpit contains
multiple displays such as EFIS and MFDs; there are a reduced number of standard
gauges and annunciators. The displays may employ various technologies such as CRT,
LCD, and LED; the displays may be color or monochromatic (although most new
cockpits use color). The displays may or may not be NVIS compatible even if internal
filters are incorporated. Because of its age, the MILSPEC addresses CRT displays but
not the newer technologies.
For displays that are poorly modified or do not include an internal NVIS filter, a
COTS external, removable filter may be required. As noted with annunciators, filters
create daylight readability problems and a color shift. If the filters are removable (for
daytime or unaided night operations) additional problems may be created:
– Aircraft stowage issues
– Location and accessibility
– Lost filters
– Handling problems
– Breakage
– Fingerprints
The use of external filters may require trade-off analysis evaluating the impact on
NVG performance versus color shift and the cost of the units.
Other displays such as the primary flight instruments may also cause unique pro-
blems for NVIS performance. Reflection issues caused by sunlight and nighttime
illumination on the canopy will cause noise to enter the processor. Antireflective coat-
ings may help but may also reduce transmission of colors or further reduce luminance. If
the same dimming circuit is used for all displays regardless of their modification
methods there may tend to be a luminance imbalance where some information is barely
visible, whereas other information produces glare.
Panel lighting is grouped into three classes: Types 3, 4, and 5. Type 3 lights have
replaceable bulbs that internally light the Plexiglas to provide the legend lighting.
There is normally a screw-off cap to access and cover the bulb with a filter. To make
this type of panel lighting compatible, only panel filters are required. In Type 4 panel
lighting, the bulbs are imbedded in the Plexiglas and therefore may only require donut
filters over the lights in the circuit board, but at the trouble and expense of first
digging them out from the Plexiglas. In Type 5 lighting, the bulbs are imbedded in the
circuit board, and will require reworking the circuit boards to obtain compatibility.
For all types of panel lighting, a generalized cleanup effort will need to be undertaken:
old panels may need to be refurbished, the lettering will need to be cleaned, and
scratches will need to be painted over to prevent leakages. A combination of flood
lighting, edge lit, and panel lighting may be needed to see switch position and the
windows in the panels may need to have separate filters installed. Edge lit lighting
provides uniform illumination over flat instruments and panels such as switches and
circuit breakers but is not suitable for contoured displays or displays with multiple
types of information.
Flood lighting may be incandescent, LED, or UV light or Saturn yellow (the planet
Saturn is yellow due to reflected sunlight passing through ammonia; in this application
UV light is used to illuminate Saturn yellow labels). These lights may be suitable for
general lighting, determining switch positions, and for reading placards. Flood lighting
may be adequate as backup or emergency lighting depending on the power source, such
as a battery. They are inexpensive but do present potential problem areas: extensive use
or incorrect positioning leads to increased reflections (canopy, instrument face), sha-
dowing can reduce readability, it is difficult to achieve adequate balance, adequate
locations can be difficult to achieve, and the physical size can obscure part of the
instruments. The aircraft utility light may be selected as a backup source but should not
be used as the primary lighting system. Of course, if the utility light is used for NVIS
lighting then its primary use is lost. Utility lights are not fixed, so the light source is not
stable and they are often awkward to use.
As with everything else today, LED annunciators are being used more often. LEDs
offer low power consumption, low IR emissions and have a long life (>10,000 hours).
LEDs are not easily mixed with incandescent lights. LEDs use a duty cycle to
vary brightness (i.e., pulse width modulation), whereas incandescent bulbs use vol-
tage to vary brightness (they dim as the voltage drops) which will present a problem
for automatic dimming circuits (day/night setting). Brightness can be a problem for
older LEDs; they can be hard to read in daylight conditions, although modern LEDs
are brighter. A multi-LED array is normally used to ensure coverage angles and brightness.
As a recap, standard lighting cannot be turned down enough to be NVG compatible.
The designer/evaluator must ensure that the initial NVIS lighting design includes the
type of NVG filter required. The same design rationale for standard lighting applies to
NVIS lighting, i.e., a poor installation can negate a good modification design. Unaided
readability is just as important as compatibility; a loss of NVIS capability will force a
reversion to unaided flight.
13.6 Exterior Lighting Methods 929
13.6 EXTERIOR LIGHTING METHODS

Modification of interior lighting makes it possible to use NVGs, and the modification of
exterior lighting makes it possible to use NVGs more effectively. For interior lighting,
this requires meeting a formal specification and results in most interior lighting being
invisible when viewed with an NVG (except for some warning/caution lights). For
exterior lighting, there is no formal specification but the intent is to reduce the adverse
effects on NVGs while being able to see the lights in the image. As opposed to NVIS
compatible, NVIS friendly is a term used to describe NVIS compatibility for exterior
lights. Covert lighting is a term initially used to describe IR lighting since it could not be
seen with unaided vision. The proliferation of night vision technology worldwide has
reduced the effectiveness of IR lighting so now the term is used to describe lighting that
will reduce probability of detection.
The aircraft exterior lighting system must meet civil regulations and military
requirements. Civil regulations dictate position lights and anti-collision/strobe lights, the
intent of which are to see and avoid other aircraft in civil airspace. Military requirements
are designed to ensure that aircraft can successfully meet the tactical goals for training
and operations. The two organizations dictate potentially conflicting requirements; a
military tactical requirement may result in diminished visual detection range that could
result in noncompliance with civil regulations.
The original concept was to have two separate lighting systems and/or turn off
exterior lighting off during training; this was not acceptable when military training was
conducted in civil airspace as the aircraft would be noncompliant. It was generally
decided to have one system that met both constraints (civil regulations and tactical
requirements); this, in turn, resulted in the development of NVIS friendly exterior
lighting. The attributes of NVIS friendly exterior lighting include:
– A reduced IR emission from existing or new exterior lights
– Less energy that will adversely affect NVG performance
– Lights are visible without NVGs in colors, distances, and aspects that meet FAA
regulations
– Lights are visible with NVGs
– There is a potential for adverse effects if viewing at closer ranges depending on
modification methods used
– Most needs can be met by the use of LEDs or filtration
All external lights and their potential effects on NVG use should be examined:
– Position lights
– Anti-collision and strobe lights
– Formation lights
– Taxi lights
– Landing lights
– In-flight refueling lights
– Probe lights
– Tanker lights
– Spotlights
– Other lights
– Wind indicator
– Angle of attack indicators
During this examination, it is helpful to ask the following questions:
– Does location of exterior lights cause problems with NVGs?
– Light intruding in the cockpit
– Reflections from props or rotor blades
– How much control should the aircrew have?
– Selection of flash patterns
– Brightness control
– On/off control
When evaluating lighting controls, it is important to determine which lights must be
on and at what times during the flight must they be on. Pilot control of each set of lights
provides more flexibility when given tactical requirements and knowing environmental
conditions. The optical profile (aided or unaided) can be managed by controlling the
brightness. For example, for a constant brightness, the detection range increases when
using NVGs on a dark night due to the increased gain. Providing flash patterns for
various sets of lights enhances tactical flexibility; it is easier to identify an aircraft
against star or cultural backgrounds. As previously discussed, the location and tactile
feel of cockpit controls will limit heads-down time and reduce aircrew workload.
13.6.1 Exterior NVIS Lighting Modifications

The use of LEDs for exterior lighting is currently used on most new aircraft and some
legacy aircraft. LEDs can be compliant with civil regulations and can meet tactical
requirements if clearly stated early in the design phase. They allow a good control of
color and improve brightness. The design must use an array of LEDs to gain proper
coverage; viewing a single LED light off-axis may result in color shift. As mentioned in
the interior lighting discussion, the design cannot mix LEDs with incandescent lights nor
use incandescent dimming controls. The filtration of incandescent lights is most com-
monly used on legacy aircraft.
The two types of filtration used with incandescent lighting are absorption filters and
interference filters. The absorption filter involves the conversion of the transmitted
energy into another form (usually thermal). The conversion takes place as a result of
interaction between the incident energy and the material medium at the molecular or
atomic level. An interference filter consists of multiple thin layers of dielectric material
having different refractive indices; there also may be metallic layers. Interference filters
are wavelength-selective by virtue of the interference effects that take place between the
incident and reflected waves at the thin-film boundaries. The single biggest problem
with filtration is heat. Heat may be trapped within the light unit, and if not vented
properly, or transferred in some way, it will reduce the life of the incandescent light or
worse, pose a fire hazard. It also may be difficult to obtain uniform brightness from
different light sources (i.e., red and green position lights).
A significant aviation safety problem that has resulted secondary to the use of red
LEDs for NVIS friendly exterior lighting designs involves their use as red obstruction
lights. Commonly used red LED obstruction lights (.645 mm) are visible unaided but not
as well with NVGs (depending on which objective filter is incorporated). Remember
that the NVG objective filter blocks wavelengths from the intensification process, which
allows for cockpit lighting that will not adversely affect the NVG image. This has
resulted in red LED obstruction lights being much less visible to pilots using NVGs. The
problem has been identified by numerous agencies and noted in a Flight Safety Flash in
2008 by Canadian Air Force’s Directorate of Flight Safety. An FAA SAFO (Safety
Alerts for Operators) #09007, dated 3/6/09, and an FAA InFO (Information for Opera-
tors) #11004, dated 2/15/11, also address this problem.
13.7 TEST AND EVALUATION OF NVIS EQUIPMENT

The evaluation will consist of a series of NVG ground tests, aircraft ground tests, and
aircraft flight tests. The ground evaluation will examine human factors and MMI as well
as qualitative and quantitative performance of the devices. Aircraft ground tests will
incorporate daylight readability, unaided nighttime readability and aided visual acuity.
Aircraft flight tests will ensure safety of flight and mission suitability.
13.7.1 NVG Ground Tests

The scope of the ground evaluation will be determined by maturity of the system. The
level of testing will be affected if the system is an initial capability or an existing system,
whether it is a newly developed system or an upgrade or replacement of an existing
system. The testing will contain a mix of quantitative and qualitative testing; component
level testing versus system level testing. Normally, qualitative testing is done by flight
testers, whereas quantitative testing is done by special labs.
The preparation for the ground evaluation will be critical as improper preparation
will adversely affect the results. The test area should be in a location where the light
level can be adequately controlled; an ideal setup would be an interior room with no
windows. The test area should have controlled access in order to avoid inadvertent light
intrusion; fluorescent lighting is to be avoided. The size of the area should allow for
inclusion of all test equipment and for the conduct of NVG visual acuity and Human
Factors evaluations. Care should be taken to ensure that paint and flooring (e.g., carpet,
vinyl) do not reflect IR energy, which may interfere with the tests.
Human Factors is evaluated with respect to the helmet, mount and NVG system.
Tests will include the ease of donning and doffing the helmet, its stability and comfort,
the nape and chin strap supports, and the system weight and center of gravity. As always,
the evaluation should be done with the configuration used for flight and with the normal
flight clothing (don’t forget special equipment that may be used on a particular mission,
such as NBC, body armor, weapons, floatation vest, spectacles, and laser eye protection).
Test for the compatibility with the oxygen mask or boom mike, battery pack, and lip
light. The mounting mechanism should be evaluated for ease of attaching and removing
the binocular assembly, stowed versus operating positions, and the position of the mount
on the helmet. NVG items of interest include adjustments and image positioning, eye
relief and tilt, interpupillary distance, and focusing. The location and tactile feel of the
FIGURE 13.9 ¢
NVG Visual Acuity
Resolution Chart
Illumination Source
20 Feet
controls should be evaluated with one hand operation while wearing gloves. The power
supply should be tested for accessibility, redundancy, and proper operation of the low
power warning. NVG performance includes aided visual acuity, image defects, and
cosmetic blemishes. Interoperability issues may include restrictions to reach and
manipulation, restrictions in head and neck mobility and overall creature comfort.
Visual acuity is tested much the same as previously described in spatial frequency
testing for EO systems. The NVG community has its own description of the test (called
an eye lane) and it is really an eye test while wearing NVGs. As with the Snellen eye
exam, the subject should be at a viewing distance of 20 ft to charts, which helps reduce
large visual acuity differences caused by small head movements (Figure 13.9).
The test needs to be accomplished in an area that can be adequately darkened, with a
control of illumination levels for resolution and contrast charts. The tests should be run
against low, medium, and high contrast resolution charts (20%, 70%, and 100%); this
provides for a more critical evaluation of visual performance. Other than the USAF
tri-bar charts used in EO spatial frequency tests, NVG evaluations also use square wave
grating, Landolt C, Open E, and Snellen. Examples of these charts are found in
Figure 13.10. Square wave grating charts can be made with a chart-maker program, and
the others may be obtained from numerous online sources. The illumination source
should provide for various illumination conditions (e.g., full moon, starlight, and over-
cast starlight). The method of test is identical to the spatial frequency ground tests
described in chapter 7 of the text: Adjust the NVG to obtain the maximum performance,
use a high contrast chart with full moon (high) illumination and note the smallest
resolution element seen on each chart for all illumination conditions. The cutoff (best
acuity) is where the resolution lines are clearly vertical or horizontal and distinctly
separated. The test is repeated for each test subject and each NVG. If performance of
the NVG is the sole object of the test (and not human factors or MMI), then it is best to
use trained test subjects that will participate in all of the testing. If novice test subjects
are used, then we must increase the number of subjects considerably.
The complexity of illumination device is determined by the test requirements:
R&D of a newly developed system will require more effort than the evaluation of an
off-the-shelf system. If precise illumination settings are required, the evaluation will
require test equipment such as a color-controlled illumination source. One such system
FIGURE 13.10 ¢
Visual Acuity Charts,
from Left: Square
Wave Grating,
Landolt C, Open E,
and Snellen
is the Hoffman LM-33-80 Starlight Projector (http://www.hoffmanengineering.com/

products_detail.php?item_id=137&cat_id=). If measurement of low illumination levels
is a requirement, then a spot photometer with a Class A or B filter will be used. A
typical system in current use is the Pritchard 1530-AR (http://pdf.directindustry.
com/pdf/photo-research-inc/pr-1530ar-nvispof-night-vision-radiometer-photometer-
colorimeter/32447-184616.html). In order to verify compatibility with internal and
external lighting, a quantitative analysis can be obtained with the use of an inspection
scope. Inspection scopes are precision-calibrated, certified reference tools designed for
the purpose of evaluating cockpit lighting compatibility and external aircraft covert
lighting. These inspection scopes feature up to four calibrated gain settings that enable
them to evaluate a broad range of lighted devices. A typical employable device is the
Hoffman NVG-102B or NVG-103 (http://www.transaeroinc.com/Life%20Support/man/
Hoffman%20Engineering/NVG-102%20&%20103%20NVIS%20Inspection%20Scope).
Less precise settings or self-made illumination devices require a thorough knowledge of
NVG design and performance. During the test, the control of illumination to effect
perceived change in image quality will yield qualitative results.
During the ground evaluation, the operator should note any operational defects or
cosmetic blemishes. If operational defects are noted then the NVGs should not be used;
cosmetic blemishes, although distracting, may be acceptable if still within specifica-
tions. Operational defects are classified as:
– Shading
– Edge glow
– Flashing
– Flicker
Shading is indicative of a dying photocathode. It appears as a dark high contrast

area along the outer edge of the image that will migrate inwards. Edge glow appears
as a bright area along the outer edge of the image. It is caused by a light source
outside the image FOV or from a defective phosphor screen that allows light feed-
back to the photocathode. If cupping a hand over the lens does not eliminate the edge
glow then the problem is within the image intensifier. Flashing or flickering may
be intermittent or may occur at different rates in one or both monocular and for a
number of reasons, including impending tube failure, electromagnetic interference,
faulty wiring, and battery problems. If it cannot be repaired the problem is within the
image intensifier.
Cosmetic blemishes are characterized as:
– Bright spots
– Emission points
– Dark (black) spots
– Fixed pattern noise (honeycomb)
– Chicken wire
– Image disparity
– Image distortion
– Output brightness variation
A bright spot is a small, nonuniform bright spot in the image resulting from a flaw
on the film coated onto the MCP. An emission point is a steady or fluctuating pinpoint of
bright light that does not go away when the lens is covered. A dark (black) spot is seen
as a dark speck in the image that results from dirt or debris between the lenses or from
the image intensifier manufacturing process. Dark spots may become defects depending
on their size, number and location within the intensified image. A honeycomb pattern in
the image results from the fiber optic inverter. It is most often seen against a uniform
background during high illumination conditions. Chicken wire is an irregular pattern of
dark thin lines throughout or in parts of the image. It is a result of defective fibers in the
fiber optic inverter. Image disparity is a difference in brightness between the two
monocular images. Various types of distortion result from problems with the fiber optic
inverter (e.g., shear, wave or bending). Output brightness variation is evidenced by
areas of varied brightness in or across the image area. Examples of image defects are
FIGURE 13.11 ¢
NVG Image Defects
Shading Edge Glow Bright Spots
Dark Spots Honeycomb Distortion

13.7.2 Aircraft NVIS Lighting Ground Tests

NVIS lighting standards and associated documentation were covered in section 13.4 and
will not be addressed again here except to recap the section:
– The basic standard for interior lighting is MIL-L-85762A.
– Data were taken from this specification to develop other NVIS lighting specs (e.g.,
MIL-STD-3009, NATO STANAG).
– There are limitations resident in each standard, so it is important to know which will
be used.
– Contractors use information in the specification to develop and test lighting
components.
– Testers use information in the specification for developing test methods and acquiring
test equipment.
– There are currently no universally accepted specifications for NVIS exterior lighting.
A NVIS interior lighting modification is considered compatible (suitable) if it meets
the following objectives:
– Does not adversely affect perceived NVG performance
– Provides adequate readability and use of instruments, displays, warnings, and controls
during daytime and nighttime
– Does not cause an increase in aircrew workload (although NVG use inherently
increases workload)
– Compliance with the relevant specifications
The data obtained during the aircraft NVIS lighting Ground Tests can be qualitative
as well as quantitative; the tests can be structured in the following way:
– Daylight readability (qualitative)
– Unaided nighttime readability (qualitative)
– Aided visual acuity (qualitative)
– Lighting controls (qualitative)
– Other devices carried aboard the aircraft (qualitative and quantitative)
– Spectra-radiometric data (quantitative)
The testing labeled ‘‘other devices carried aboard the aircraft’’ applies specifically
to items that contain lights or that may cause reflective problems. These items may be
additional cockpit lighting such as flashlights, finger lights, or lip lights. Other lighted
equipment may include handheld laser pointers, emergency radios, laptop computers,
and iPads.
When evaluating daylight readability, the filtered displays are of the most concern.
The lights will include the warning, caution, and advisory annunciators and the filtered
tactical displays (CRT, LCD and EFIS). The evaluator should determine if the filters
should be removable for day operations. The daylight readability can be accomplished at
various times and at various locations, day or night, in a test facility or on the ramp, but a
method of controlling the lighting and measuring the illuminance must be available.
TABLE 13.3 ¢ Nighttime Readability Test Matrix
Nighttime Readability
For each display evaluate each test point and specific conditions; note discrepancies or
enhancing features in the notes column
Test Point Specifics Notes

Blockage of display data by mod- Bezel edges
ification design and/or location Post light or bridge light location
Cross-cockpit readability
Display readability Color discrimination
Range of brightness and contrast
Readability at various head
positions
Chromaticity of annunciators and Discrimination and uniformity
other instruments
Illumination uniformity Across each instrument face
All illuminated items on a single
dimming control (lighting balance)
All illuminated items on all
dimming controls (system
uniformity)
Reflections on instrument faces Filtered displays
Floodlights and post lights
Reflections on transparencies Note locations and offending sources
Degraded modes/secondary Readability of critical displays
lighting
Lighting controls Brightness range adequate for
all conditions
Control linearity
Increases and decreases in a linear
fashion
Grouping logic
Control location
Easily identifiable
Visually and by touch
Easily reachable
The method of test will require the evaluator to hold an illuminance meter next to
display being evaluated and adjust the distance of a sun gun to obtain relevant energy
level. The standard calls for 10,000 fc for diffuse reflections and 2,000 fc for specular
reflections, but these numbers can only be accurately measured in the laboratory. Mea-
sure all of the relevant displays and note the location of the displays; some displays may
not be susceptible to bright conditions. If the component is not readable at 10,000 fc, the
sun gun distance should be increased until it is readable, and then note the illuminance.
Nighttime readability is best evaluated by asking a series of questions similar to an
SRS and then noting specific problem areas. Table 13.3 provides a sample test matrix for
evaluating the cockpit nighttime readability. For each display, evaluate each test point and
specific conditions and note any discrepancies or enhancing features in the notes column.
NVG aided visual acuity will be accomplished by viewing the charts described in
section 13.7 under measured lighting conditions. The test setup, data collection, and
analysis are the same as described for the spatial frequency ground tests described in
chapter 7 of the text. The results are not specific enough for it to be used as a standalone
test method, but do provide a gross evaluation of NVG compatibility and a sanity check
of NVIS lighting system performance. The evaluation will help identify problem areas
and is a balance against spectra-radiometric results. The testing will also determine the
impact of unaided field of view on instrument readability.
The visual acuity will be tested under three conditions: charts viewed directly
(outside of the aircraft), charts viewed through the transparencies with the cockpit
lighting off, and when viewed with the cockpit lighting set at varying configurations. By
performing these steps, a baseline for NVG performance and a baseline for cockpit
lighting effects can be obtained. The cockpit lighting configuration will be operational
brightness setting with no displays, cockpit lighting and displays at operational bright-
ness setting, cockpit lighting and displays at operational brightness setting with all
warning, caution, and advisory (WCA) lights on, and finally, cockpit lighting and dis-
plays at operational brightness setting with all WCAs and fire lights on.
As mentioned the procedure will be the same as spatial frequency measurements:
– Measure and record distances to all charts from the eye position of each station from
which NVG aided visual acuity is being acquired
– Adjust illumination source for resolution chart such that NVIS radiance on the white
portion of the chart equals:
1.7 1010 NRA for Class A requirements
1.6 1010 NRB for Class B requirements
– This illumination level (near starlight) allows for the NVG gain to be maximized
which increases its sensitivity to incompatible light sources
– Measure NVIS radiance with the spot photometer
– Use an inspection scope, such as the NVG-103, to verify results
If degradation is noted, isolate lighting sources to identify problem area. Turn var-
ious components or dimming controls off one at a time, and ensure all lighting within the
aircraft that may intrude into the cockpit is evaluated (e.g., from rear of aircraft). Assess
reflections on transparencies, which are usually caused by displays and floodlights.
Determine the aided and unaided effects at varying brightness levels and consider
moving the acuity charts so that they are behind area of reflection. The object of the test
is to compare the visual acuity at different brightness levels with the baseline; any
potential impact on operations will require flight test for final determination.
In NVG analysis, the visual acuity is presented in terms of the Snellen test—that is,
20/20, or what a person with ‘‘normal vision’’ is able to see. Spatial frequency as pre-
viously used was in cycles per milliradian. Conversion between the two can be
accomplished easily. We know that
NVG Resolution ¼ Spatial Frequency ¼ g ¼ R D (13.2)
where g is NVG resolution (cy/mr), R is chart resolution (lp/mm), and D is distance from
NVG to chart (m).
34:384
Aircrew Visual Acuity ð20=xxÞ; xx ¼ (13.3)
g
where xx is denominator of the visual acuity term, and g is NVG resolution (cy/mr).
NVIS exterior lighting ground testing considerations are limited to an evaluation of

the functionality due to reflection of bright lights in a closed space (test facility). A
human factors evaluation of the controls (accessibility, tactile feel, and discrimination)
and control linearity if applicable can be assessed. A functional test to ascertain whether
the appropriate lights illuminate when selected and that they perform as required (flash)
can also be tested. An extended evaluation may be accomplished by positioning aircraft
at night on a runway or taxiway and viewing aided and unaided at longer distances
(locate an area with limited cultural lighting). The true usability of NVIS external
lighting will require flight testing.
13.7.3 Aircraft NVIS Flight Tests

Flight Test will evaluate issues discovered during ground test and evaluate anomalies
discovered during flight that were not noted during ground test. Throughout the course
of the test, the evaluator should strive to develop techniques or design recommendations
that help reduce pilot workload. The exterior lighting evaluation may involve the bulk of
the flight tests. For NVG-only evaluations the test must be conducted in the relevant
aircraft because this is important for aircraft interface issues such as lighting, obstruc-
tions to scan, and transparency effects.
The phases of flight test mimic the ground evaluations. Daylight readability flight
during daytime should be conducted first in order to note any discrepancies that may
affect safety of flight; maneuver the aircraft to change sun angles relative to the cockpit
during flight. Unaided nighttime readability is conducted in the same manner as the
ground evaluations. Effects on NVG performance are subjective; use the data from the
ground tests to identify potential problems such as reflections on instrument faces or
transparencies, viewing over displays and effects due to WCAs.
The exterior lighting evaluation can be complex, and flight safety is most important.
Test objectives which are required include: the maximum detection ranges of all exterior
lighting from various altitudes and aspects, the suitability of flash patterns for acquisi-
tion against various backgrounds (e.g., stars, cultural lights), the suitability for formation
and rendezvous, and suitability for civil operations. Tactical suitability is normally
accomplished during operational test and evaluation.
If tasked with performing a tactical suitability evaluation, remember to start with the
most benign condition before advancing to real-world operational scenarios. Initial
testing should be conducted using existing night mission profiles with a logical approach
to mission expansion. Conduct evaluation during varying environmental conditions,
over various terrains, and in differing cultural areas.
13.8 SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The use of NVGs increases workload and adds focal tasking; you are essentially asking
the pilot to perform an integration of four scans simultaneously: NVG outside, beneath
NVG inside (instrument scan), beneath NVG outside, and the NVG image itself. There
have been mishaps related to NVG use, and the contributing factors are noteworthy: task
saturation, breakdown of crew coordination, poor judgment, complacency, fatigue,
overconfidence, training deficiencies, and inexperience. This is an important point for
testers when evaluating a new aircraft system while wearing NVGs as the workload will
be even higher. NVG training and currency is key; try to avoid learning or relearning
how to use NVGs while testing other systems.
If test aircrew do not have NVG experience, it is necessary to begin training well
ahead of the scheduled test dates and through lessons from past experience will require
at least six months of lead time. The team should allow for an NVG build-up in the test
aircraft once the training has been completed. You may want to consider the use of
NVG experienced operational aircrew to augment test aircrew that may have limited
experience.
On a final note, don’t reinvent the wheel for each system evaluation. Some of the
techniques which have been tried in the past and proven unsuccessful have been: pilot in
a chase aircraft without NVGs, a safety pilot on board without NVGs, and a pilot at the
controls without NVGs.
13.9 HELMET MOUNTED DISPLAY

SYSTEMS (HMD)
The HMD is really the next step in aiding vision and increasing situation awareness for
the pilot. HMD refers to any system in which a display is helmet mounted. Various types
of information may be presented on a display, such as flight and tactical symbology,
sensor imagery, or any combination thereof. There are two basic types of HMDs: an
aircraft-mounted head-up weapons sighting system, which allows heads-up viewing of
target information but does not portray flight following information; and the aircraft-
mounted head-up-display, which provides flight following and tactical information. In
both cases, it is necessary for the pilot to point the nose of the aircraft at the target.
HMDs have evolved with advances in technology and miniaturization in similar fashion
with FLIR, NVG, and EO systems. As a reference, the reader is referred to two texts
on the subject: Helmet-Mounted Displays: Design Issues for Rotary-Wing Aircraft
(Clarence E. Rash, SPIE Press Book, 2001) and Head-Mounted Displays: Designing for
the User (James E. Melzer and Kirk Wayne Moffitt, McGraw-Hill, 1997).
13.9.1 HMD Overview

The HMD idea is not new; a patent was issued in 1909 for a helmet sighting device, but
it was never developed. The first functional HMD was a helmet mounted sight (HMS)
deployed in the 1970s for the US Navy F-4 aircraft. It was called the visual target
acquisition system (VTAS), and it incorporated an IR optical head tracking system that
allowed the pilot to look off-boresight and slave the radar or AIM-9G Sidewinder
missile to pilot’s line of sight. NVGs were initially deployed by the US Army in the
late 1970s and later as the first successful HMD, which was eventually adopted for all
services. The HMD was originally developed to provide a visual reference during
nighttime. Flight following via a clip-on NVG HUD was developed later. Advanced
capabilities such as an integrated display, head tracking, and wide field of view are
continuously being developed and improved. Various HMD designs are currently in use
by most services worldwide.
There exists an increasing requirement by many countries to incorporate helmet
mounted off-boresight targeting, flight following and visual imagery into their aircraft.
These advanced capabilities require the integration of a head tracking system. There are
many different HMD design approaches to accomplish some or all of these require-
ments, the most common of which are as follows:
– Single component: symbology only; day and unaided night capable

– Single component: visual imagery only; aided night capable
– Two components: symbology and visual imagery; aided night capable
– First component: visual imagery only
– Second component: symbology only
– Two components: symbology and visual imagery; day, unaided night and aided night
capable
– Approach 1
– First component: symbology only; day and unaided night capable
– Second component: symbology and night vision imagery; aided night capable
– Components must be exchanged for day/night operations
– Approach 2
– First component: symbology only; day, unaided night and aided night capable
– Second component: visual imagery only; aided night capable
– First component remains on for all operations and second component added at night
– Fully integrated single component: symbology and visual imagery; day, unaided night
and aided night capable
Note: Head tracking may be integrated in most HMD designs.
Single component systems (Figure 13.12) provide a capability to more effectively

employ a weapon system by the use of off-boresight targeting or provide the user with
night vision imagery. Off-boresight systems require a head tracking system and may
employ a single combiner positioned over the right eye or may be binocular. Night
vision imagery systems are mostly NVGs, but some HMD systems have the capability to
provide imagery from other sensors (e.g., FLIR).
FIGURE 13.12 ¢
Single Component
Systems; Topsight
(left) and
USN/USMC F4949G
NVG System (right)
The purpose of one of the two component system designs (symbology and visual
imagery; aided night capable only) is to provide the user with night vision imagery
and symbology. This is accomplished by inserting symbology onto an NVG image
through one of two techniques: an NVG HUD clips onto either the objective or eye-
piece of an NVG, or the use of a display integrated into NVG optics. Approach 1 for a
two component design (symbology and visual imagery; day, unaided night and
aided night capable) provides the user with symbology and night vision imagery
(Figure 13.13). As the name implies, there are two components: a visor module pro-
vides symbology for day and unaided night operations, and a night vision module
provides symbology and imagery for aided night operations. The drawback to this
approach is that the user must change components when transitioning from day to
night or from night to day.
Approach 2 differs in that the combiner for day and unaided night operations remains
on for all operations and NVG is added for aided night operations (Figure 13.14).
The fully integrated single component (symbology and visual imagery; day, unaided
night and aided night capable) system provides symbology and visual imagery in a
single helmet design for all operations (Figure 13.15). There is no need to change sys-
tems or add systems when transitioning from day to night or from night to day. Night
vision sensors are integrated into the helmet shell, and symbology is inserted in an
optical train; these systems usually include head tracking capability.
FIGURE 13.13 ¢
Approach 1, Joint
Helmet Mounted
Cueing System
(JHMCS)
Day and Unaided
Night Operations
(left) and Aided Night
Operations (right)
FIGURE 13.14 ¢
Approach 2, Q Sight
(left) and Q Sight
with NVG (right)
FIGURE 13.15 ¢
Fully Integrated
Systems, Typhoon
HMD (left) and Top
Owl (right)
13.10 HMD COMPONENTS

As with all avionic systems, the design of the HMD starts with the operational
requirements; what information needs to be presented to the eye. Like the HUD design,
some care must be given as to not provide too much information which renders the
display useless. There may be a need to add a declutter mode. Information which may be
required (based on mission type) include: navigation, situation awareness, weapon
aiming, takeoff and landing, primary flight displays, or simply a HUD replication. The
basic components of the system include: the display device, the drive electronics,
adjustments, viewing optics, and perhaps a helmet tracking system.
The display device can be one of three basic systems: it can be emissive, such as a
cathode ray tube (CRT) or field emission display (FED); it can be transmissive, such as
a liquid crystal display (LCD); or it can be reflective, which may be liquid crystal on
silicon (LCoS) or similar to projection televisions. The drive electronics primary func-
tion is to convert the video signal into the proper display format (PAL/NTSC/VGA).
They also need to be small, lightweight, and at a low cost. The mechanical components
provide support, image adjustments, alignment and focus.
Because of the 25 mm minimum distance from the eye (to allow for eyeglasses, laser
protection, etc.), the HMD requires viewing optics; these optics must provide
suitable performance and be matched to the display. The FOV of the human eye is
approximately 200 . If the HMD provides a WFOV (200 ), then it should account for the
foveal vision versus the peripheral vision. (Foveal vision is literally vision with the fovea;
it is the normal photopic vision in daylight.) Resolution also needs to be maintained: the
human vision resolution is approximately 1.7–1.9 cycles/milliradian whereas Generation
III NVIS is approximately 1.3 cycles/milliradian. Since we are adding another optical
path, a new MTF will be generated and the resolutions noted can only degrade.
It is not possible to simply state that we should optimize all of the components since
HMD parameters are mutually interdependent. As an example:
– Wider field of view will dictate a higher weight.
– Wider field of view will provide increased capability.
– Increased capability also has a penalty of heavier weight.

– Higher protection levels also implies heavier weight.
– A binocular system provides a better capability at higher weight.
– Higher weight equals a loss of overall capability.
– Improved capability will come at higher cost.
The HMD must provide all of the traditional protections of an aircrew helmet, so in
addition to HMD component design, the developer must also take into account the
biodynamics of the design. The concept of weight and CG was addressed previously in
NVIS design, and is included in biodynamics. Simply put, biodynamics is the study of
the effects of dynamic processes, such as motion or acceleration, on living organisms. In
our case, the living organism is the pilot. The basic helmet provides physical protection
(impact, ejection), eye protection (blast visor), and aural protection (environmental
noise). In addition, the HMD must be operationally viable by allowing the pilot to
perform his mission effectively. The HMD must be stable and have a comfortable fit,
especially under high G-loadings. Like the enhanced flight vision systems (EFVS)
addressed in the Civil Certification section, it is imperative that display of flight/tactical
information and NVIS or IR/EO sensor video be harmonized with the outside world.
The packaging of display or on-helmet sensor elements will adversely affect total
head-borne mass (compared to basic helmet) and may adversely affect the CG in some
or all of the X, Y, and Z axes as seen previously with NVIS systems. In the United
States, as part of initial research into HMDs in Army helicopters, studies sought to
actually define a safe limit on flight helmet mass. In 1982, the US Army Advanced
Research Laboratory (USAARL) proposed a limit of 1.8 kg during the development of
the AH-64 Apache Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting System (IHADSS) HMD.
The helmet system subsequently developed met this mass limitation while providing the
desired platform for the monocular HMD and the required acoustic and impact protec-
tion. Unfortunately, the legacy SPH-4 plus AN/AVS-6/9 combination used for night
operations in all other Army helicopters exceeded the proposed 1.8 kg limit by more
than 1 kg. Additional scientific studies have been conducted since, trying to define the
maximum CG (or in some studies, center of mass) in the vertical and longitudinal axes
of the human skull. The information obtained is important as it is used to prevent
injuries, especially during ejection, and to reduce fatigue. It is also important to note that
the initial studies were done by the US Army to support helicopter operations, which is
somewhat benign when compared to fighter operations under sustained G-loadings.
Studies have shown that transport aircraft and helicopters are similar enough to use the
same guidance, however allowances must be made for the cockpit environment.
Fighter HMD implementation has significant differences from the helicopter/
fixed-wing transport cases. Aircrew are subjected to higher snap and sustained-g capability
which will certainly contribute to neck fatigue. The added head-borne mass, cockpit
interference and potential of high speeds in an ejection scenario is more than likely a far
worse scenario than the worst case of a crash landing in helicopters or transport category
aircraft. The HMD equipment may create adverse aerodynamic loads during separation
that could be catastropic; the decision will have to be made as to whether the display
module is discarded, either manually or automatically, or retained during an ejection
(Figure 13.16). The capability for high speed ejection (aircraft velocity approaching
600 kts) may have to be adjusted downward with HMD equipment for safety reasons.
FIGURE 13.16 ¢
Unacceptable HMD
Design
High “Camber” gives

unacceptable lift (and load)
This text gives only a cursory examination of the biodynamics in HMD design. For
further information, the reader is referred to a number of studies in this area:
– ‘‘Cervical Range of Motion and Dynamic Response and Strength of Cervical Mus-
cles,’’ D. Foust, D. Chaffin, R. Snyder, and J. Baum, SAE Technical Paper 730975
– ‘‘Neck Muscle Endurance and Fatigue as a Function of Helmet Loading: The
Definitive Mathematical Model,’’ Chandler Allen Phillips and P.E. Jerrold Scott
Petrofsky. U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command Fort Detrick,
Frederick, MD
– Mechanics of Skeletal and Cardiac Muscle, Chandler A. Phillips and Jerrold Scott
Petrofsky, Thomas, 1983
– ‘‘Simulation of Head/Neck Response to þ Gz Imoact Acceleration due to Additional
Head Mass,’’ Amit Lal Patra and Christina Estep, Virginia Polytechnic and State
University, 1991 Graduate Research Report, Armstrong Laboratory, Wilford Hall
Medical Center
– ‘‘Vertical Impact Tests of the X-31 Helmet-Mounted Visual and Audio Display
(HMVAD) System,’’ Chris E. Perry, USAF Armstrong Laboratory, October 1993
13.10.1 HMD Optical Design

An aircraft sensor (EO, IR, and in some cases radar) renders the outside scene within its
FOV into an electrical signal for relay via databus to a suitable display source. The
display source is composed of an image generator (which converts the electrical signal
into a visual image), a projector (which outputs the image) and a screen (which displays
the resultant image), such as a color MFD. The concept of an HMD is almost exactly the
same; the sensor still outputs the scene within its FOV as an electrical signal, although in
this case, the image generator, projector and screen are integrated into the pilot’s helmet.
Since the scene capture and conversion to an electrical output all takes place within the
aircraft, the HMD is only concerned with the image signal arriving at the helmet. By
convention in HMD documentation, the combination of image generator and projector is
termed the image source.
FIGURE 13.17 ¢
Miniature CRTs,
(from left) Elbit
Systems of America
Integrated Helmet
and Display Sighting
System (IHADSS),
Kaiser Strike Eye,
GEC Marconi Dual
Combiner HMD
HMDs have two basic optical requirements: the display itself and the optical train.
The display requires a method (such as a flat combiner or projection) and a presentation
(monocular, biocular, or binocular). The optical train is concerned with optical char-
acteristics, FOV versus resolution, eye relief, luminance, and focus.
In addition to the concerns of size, weight, cost, and power consumption, a deter-
mination must be made as to the type of display to be implemented. As noted earlier,
displays may be emissive, which is a direct-view device with combined light and image
generation, or they may be transmissive/reflective where a projection is used with
separate light and image generation. For all types, the key performance parameters will
be luminance, contrast, and resolution. All types have their advantages and dis-
advantages; the key is to match the capabilities to mission requirements.
The family of emissive display image sources includes miniature CRTs, phosphors,
electroluminescent (EL), FEDs, lasers, LEDs, and organic LEDs (OLED). Transmissive/
reflective display image sources include the different types of LCDs. Miniature CRTs
(Figure 13.17) are efficient in light conversion and have a high resolution performance;
on the other hand, they are large and heavy and require high-voltage power.
Electroluminescence or EL is the nonthermal conversion of electrical energy into
light energy. This phenomenon is used in EL lamps, LEDs, and OLEDs. EL lamps or
sometimes called high field electroluminescent lamps use electric current directly
through a phosphor (such as ZnS:Mn or GaAs) to produce light. They can be shaped to
be extremely flat, or in narrow wire-like shapes. They are different from LEDs/OLEDs,
which use a p/n junction (two semiconductive materials where electrons and holes
combine on the boundary). In EL there is a layer called an activator in which the whole
layer is emitting light, not just the boundary. EL displays have the advantages of low
power consumption, small size, long life, low weight and can be manufactured into flat
flexible panels, narrow strings, and other small shapes. They are not directional like
LCDs when used as a display, they are viewable at all angles. They are not practical for
general lighting of large areas due to the low lumen output of the phosphors; typical
brightness values are monochrome luminance of 2000 fL and color lumiance of 200 fL.
Phosphors, and particulate phosphors, are a variation on miniature CRTs and use the
same manufacturing techniques. They optimize resolution, luminous efficiency and
contrast and have good adaptation to glass or fiber-optic faceplates. OLEDs have a layer
of organic material sandwiched between two conductors (anode/cathode); the glass top
plate is the seal, and the glass bottom plate is the substrate. When current is applied to
the conductors, electro-luminescent light is produced directly from the organic material.
FDs contain millions of micro electron guns and employ high energy efficiency,
good brightness, high video speed, high contrast, wide viewing angle, and low weight.
A scanning laser with associated optics may also be used and have the attributes of high
brightness capability and low power. A concern, of course, would be retinal safety.
Nonemissive image sources include the family of LCDs which were previously
descibed in section 7.7.6.2 of this text. An active-matrix LCD (AMLCD) display uses
a grid of transistors and capacitors with the ability to hold a charge for a limited period
of time. Because of the switching action of transistors, only the desired pixel receives
a charge, and the pixel acts as a capacitor to hold the charge until the next refresh
cycle, improving image quality over a passive matrix. The F-35 HMD system employs
a flat panel AMLCD, combined with a high-intensity back light, as its image source.
The fully overlapped display provides up to a binocular 40 30 image, depending
on which sensor is displayed. The digital image source provides both symbol writing and
video capability with sensor overlap from the distributed aperture system (DAS)
(Figure 13.18). Whatever optics are employed, it should be remembered that the addition
of another transparency, especially in fighter applications, will further degrade the
pilot’s ability to see the real world.
The presentation may be accomplished by using one of three methods: monocular,
biocular or binocular. As with the display types, each has its advantages and dis-
advantages. The monocular presentatation is lightweight (compared with biocular/
binocular systems) and provides aided information to only one eye. This may cause
physiological issues such as eye dominance and binocular rivalry issues. Biocular sys-
tems utilize a single projection system and this single image is presented to both eyes.
This method is lighter than the binocular system, but is costly when compared to
monocular systems. Binocular systems utilize a dual image projection system, and
individual images with up to 100% overlap are presented to each eye. The image quality
and resolution are significantly better than monocular systems, but are costly and are
more problematic in the areas of weight and CG. Biocular resolving performance is
equivalent only to that of monocular because both displayed features and resolution-
limiting noise are spatiotemporally correlated between the left and right eye images.
Only discrete two-channel binocular HMD systems offer better resolving performance
FIGURE 13.18 ¢
F-35 AMLCD HMD
than monocular; however the size, weight, and design complexities of visually coupled
binocular imaging sensors are far greater than monocular systems. Compared with the
monocular approach, no biocular range resolution performance benefit has been in
evidence, while the binocular sensor system with its potential performance benefit
comes at the price of significantly greater design complexity and cost.
The last two parameters of note within the optical system are the resolution and the
FOV. The relationship of these two parameters was discussed in the EO Chapter,
section 7.7.4. Two definitions not used in chapter 7, but common within HMD doc-
umentation are eye relief and exit pupil/exit pupil diameter. Figure 13.19 provides an
optical path with the HMD nomenclature. In our previous discussions, the exit pupil was
identified as the focal point and the eye relief was defined as the focal length. The exit
pupil diameter is the size of the shaft of light transmitted to the eye. The larger the exit
pupil, the brighter the image will appear. The f-stop, or focal ratio was defined as the
focal length divided by the effective aperture diameter. By increasing the focal length,
we decrease the FOV and increase resolution. We can see that if we limit the eye relief
to no less than 25 mm we limit the FOV unless we adjust the effective aperture. If we
again limit the aperture as in HMD design (most HMD design specifications call for an
approximately 18 mm exit pupil diameter, to allow for helmet movement under high G)
the FOV will be limited by physics. The only other way to increase the FOV would be to
have 2 separate optical systems and overlap, or fuze them in some way. By only partially
overlapping the individual FOVs for each eye, an expanded azimuth total FOV is
obtained.
In our discussions of EO/IR technology, we stated that if we increased the resolution
of the system (e.g., more detector elements) and failed to increase the resolution of the
display, then the net result would be a decreased resolution. The same applies in HMDs
with an overlapped FOV. If we have stretched the horizontal FOV utilizing a partial
overlap in order to maintain system resolution, extra pixels will be required. If we
wanted to maintain a 20/20 resolution, we would require 60 pixels per degree (60 pixels
per degree ¼ 30 cycles per degree ¼ 1.7 cycles per milliradian ¼ acuity of 20/20,
Equation (13.3)). Therefore, for any FOV, we can determine the minimum number of
pixels required to maintain optimum aircrew resolution.
Partial binocular overlap can provide a larger horizontal total field of view without
the penalty of decreased resolution or increased weight from the larger collimating
optics. It requires two separate video channels, high quality optical correction, distortion
mapping, canting correction, and more attention to the details of optical alignment.
There are concerns by some researchers about the minimum amount of overlap required
as well as the possible effects of eyestrain and image fragmentation.
Lens 1 2 3 FIGURE 13.19 ¢

HMD Optical Path
Eye Relief
Entrance Pupil Internal Pupil Exit Pupil

13.10.2 Helmet Tracking Systems

There are two types of helmet tracking systems: a visually coupled system (VCS)
and the helmet/head tracking systems (HTS). A VCS is a special subsystem that inte-
grates the natural visual and motor skills of an operator with the machine he is con-
trolling. An operator visually searches for, finds, and tracks an object of interest. His line
of sight is measured and used to aim sensors and/or weapons toward the object. Infor-
mation related to his visual/motor task from sensors, weapons, or central data sources is
fed back directly to his vision by special displays so as to enhance his task performance.
Two functions are performed: a LoS sensing/control function and a display feedback
function. Although each may be used separately, a fully visually coupled system includes
both. Thus, it is a unique control/display subsystem in which LoS is measured and used
for control, and visual information is fed back directly to his eyes for his attention and use.
The Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA) carried out an airborne
demonstration and evaluation of a fast-jet VCS installed in ZD902, the Tornado Inte-
grated Avionics Research Aircraft (TIARA) for the UK Ministry of Defence. The
installed VCS used a head steered forward looking infra-red (HSFLIR) sensor and an
HTS to provide the pilot with an image of the outside world projected onto a binocular
helmet mounted display (BHMD). In addition to the sensor image, information such as
aircraft altitude, attitude, and airspeed were also presented to the pilot through the HMD
to eliminate the need to look inside the cockpit for critical flight data. The aim of the
trial was to demonstrate the day and night benefits of a fast-jet integrated with HSFLIR
and HMD as an aid to low-level flight, navigation, target acquisition, take-off, and
landing. The outcome of this flight test program was very encouraging and, although
testing has identified that improvements are necessary, in particular to HSFLIR image
quality, AGC performance, helmet fit and symbology design, test aircrew endorsed the
acceptability of a VCS.
In order to achieve a VCS, it must be able to calculate the position and LOS of the
wearer’s eyeline. By utilizing Type I NVG systems, this was simply a matter of defining
the helmet position and orientation; it was assumed that the helmet/head relationship is
constant. The setup allowed stability and comfort, and the relatively small FOV and
Type I on-axis requirement made the calculations relatively easy.
The HMT (head/helmet mounted tracker) is a type of HTS. The system requires a
position and orientation tracker (POT) and head orientation and position (HOP) infor-
mation. These data can be obtaind in a multitude of ways: transducer pairing using
transmitters and receivers or ultrasonic, electro-magnetic or electro-optic sensors; the
Thales Scorpion uses inertial combined with optics. The information may also be
obtained from a platform stabilization system much like a FLIR or radar system. No
matter which type of system is selected, it must meet certain performance requirements,
including the following, which have been determined through operational use:
– Resolution (linear < 1 mm and angular < 1 milliradian)
– Accuracy (at the design eye ~ 1 milliradian, and elswhere in the head motion box < 6
milliradians) (accuracy requirements may change based on the FOV of the weapon
system employed; the target must be in the system’s FOV)
– Update rate > 100 Hz
– Latency < 10 ms (with rapid head movement)
As mentioned multiple times within the text, as more and more processing of data is
accomplished, the probability exists that there will be either senescence or latency when
reported to the pilot. To decrease the total latency, it may be necessary to relax some of
the other performance requirements. The more complicated the system, the higher
probability of latency; managing this latency is extremely important as it can render
even the most advanced system unusable.
13.11 TEST AND EVALUATION OF HMD

EQUIPMENT
As seen with NVIS equipment, the T&E of HMD equipment will involve lab, ground,
and flight test. The quantitative testing will, for the most part, be accomplished in the
lab, whereas most of the on-aircraft evaluation will be qualitative, concentrating on the
user’s ability to increase performance and capability.
13.11.1 HMD Quantitative Testing

Due to the complex nature of HMD designs, several subsystems can contain varying
technologies, and each technology will require slightly different evaluation techniques.
Consequently, it is difficult to develop a matrix that covers all possible combinations
(e.g., CRT versus various flat panel displays, I2 versus coupled designs, magnetic versus
optical trackers, analog versus digital designs). The degree of test complexity is deter-
mined by the system design. Laboratory testing is important and necessary to accom-
plish but alone cannot fully evaluate the performance of an HMD system. To achieve
this goal requires qualitative ground and flight evaluations under actual operating
conditions.
The flow of the lab testing looks very much the same as other avionics systems
covered previously. System level testing investigates integration issues, whereas the
subsystem level looks at the contributing pieces such as the helmet, image source, dis-
play optics, acoustics, tracker electronics, and software. The CRT display performance
measures are legion:
Geometric Electronic Photometric ¢
Viewing distance Bandwidth Luminance

Display size Dynamic range Luminance uniformity
Aspect ratio Signal/noise ratio Grey shades
Number of scan lines Frame rate Contrast ratio
Interlace ratio Field rate Halation
Scan line spacing Ambient illuminance
Linearity Color
Resolution
Spot size and shape
MTF
Gamma
Likewise, the optical test parameters:
¢ System Display
Visual field Field of view

Spectral transmittance Image overlap
Physical eye relief Resolution (visual acuity)
Interpupillary distance range Extraneous reflections
Luminous transmittance chromaticity Luminance range
Neutrality Grey levels
Prismatic deviation Chromatic aberration
Refractive power Contrast ratio
Cockpit display emission transmittance Exit pupil size
Focus range
Spherical/astigmatic aberration
Image rotation
Image luminance disparity
Vertical/horizontal alignment
Distortion
Luminance uniformity
Static/dynamic uniformity
As well as the biodynamics:
¢ System Helmet Head Tracker
Mass properties Shell tear resistance Motion box size

Impact attenuation Chin strap assembly Update rate (latency)
Stability integrity Jitter
Dynamic retention Pointing angle
Anthropometric accuracy
fit/comfort Pointing angle
Ballistic protection resolution
HMD breakaway force
And finally, the acoustics:
¢ System Earphones
Real-ear attenuation Sensitivity
Physical-ear attenuation Distortion
Speech intelligibility Frequency response
The test equipment required for conducting most HMD subsystem laboratory testing
is just as complicated as the subsystem itself, requiring technical training and expertise,
proper facilities, and the infamous necessary funding. Much of the specialized sub-
system testing may be conducted by other laboratories within or outside the responsible
organization. These tests may include RTCA/DO-160G environmental testing, helmet
retention during windblast, and ejection sled testing. Some laboratory testing may be
required before safety of flight approval can be obtained.
13.11.2 HMD Qualitative Ground Testing

The ground testing can be set up in a similar fashion to previously discussed with NVIS
systems. The test will encompass a series of questions for the pilot to answer while
utilizing the HMD equipment. It is easiest to set up a subjective rating scale or Bedford
rating scale to answer pertinent questions about the system. Table 13.4 contains the
questions that should be addressed for a generic HMD system.
TABLE 13.4 ¢ HMD Subjective Rating Scale Questionnaire and Functional Evaluation
HMD Subjective Rating Scale Questionnaire and Functional Evaluation
Subject Question Rating/Comments

Integrated Sensors What image controls are available and how do they
function?
Are I2 modules removable?
One hand, gloved hand?
Can system be focused using existing preflight focusing
equipment?
Is there a new system for preflight focusing?
Integration with NVGs Does the HMD integration interfere with NVG controls?
Does the integration allow for normal positioning of the
NVG image?
Vertical, horizontal and eye relief
Visor Patch Considerations
(1) Monocular system Can imagery or symbology be correctly aligned with
the eye?
Can imagery and symbology be selected independently?
(2) Binocular system Can imagery from each input be correctly registered and
aligned with the eyes?
Is imagery 100% or partially overlapped?
Can symbology from each input be correctly registered and
aligned with the eyes?
Is presentation of symbology selectable (binocular, right
eye or left eye)?
Can imagery and symbology be selected independently?
Monocular and What adjustments are available to the pilot for positioning
Binocular Systems imagery or symbology?
Can imagery or symbology be moved independently in the
area of the visor patch?
Ease of reach, identification and control
What adjustments are hard-mounted (can be set on the
ground but not available to the pilot)?
How is fitting accomplished for each pilot?
If no adjustments are provided, what design technique is
used to allow for variances in eye position (e.g., various
sized visors, various sized modular attachments, helmet
suspension system, helmet liner molding)?
Combiner Considerations Is the combiner used for symbology only, for both imagery
and symbology, or used in conjunction with a NVG?
(1) Monocular system Can imagery or symbology be correctly aligned with the eye?
Can the pilot adjust the position of the combiner?
On the ground or in the air?
Can imagery or symbology be moved within the combiner?
Can imagery or symbology be selected independently?
(Continued)

(2) Binocular system Can imagery from each combiner be correctly registered
and aligned with the eyes?
Can the pilot adjust the position of the combiner?
On the ground or in the air?
Can symbology from each combiner be correctly registered
and aligned with the eyes?
Is presentation of symbology selectable (binocular, right
eye or left eye)?
(3) Integration with NVGs With the NVG image in the proper location relative to the
pilot’s eyes, can the combiner be adjusted to correctly
position the symbology?
Can symbology be moved within the combiner?
Compatibility with Aircrew Compatible with aircrew spectacles?
Equipment
Compatible with laser eye protection
Either spectacles or visors
Comfort?
Ease of donning and doffing?
Storage?
Compatible with existing equipment or designed specifi-
cally for HMD Comfort?
Restriction of head motion?
Restriction of visual fields?
Additional physical obstruction with cockpit components
Effects on head movement (e.g., scan, targeting)?
Stowage and accessibility of equipment?
Aircraft Integration Entering and exiting the aircraft
Normal entrance and egress?
Emergency egress?
Connecting HMD to aircraft
Location of attachment points and how easy to
connect?
Quick release points (emergency egress)?
Effects of HMD and related cables and wires
Restrictions to head movement?
Interference with cockpit structures?
Physical interference of helmet, display module or visor
Contact with canopy and windows?
Contact with overhead panels and wires?
Effects due to location of head tracking components
Physical interference with HMD cables?
Visual blockage?
Changing and stowing HMD modules
Location and accessibility of HMD components
(e.g., two-part design)?
Ease of donning and doffing components?
NVIS compatible lighting testing if required

Effects on the visual field
Does the helmet or combiner hardware block peripheral
vision?
Up, down, or lateral directions?
Is there blockage only in one direction?
Combiner attached to the right side or along the upper brow
of the helmet
Is there blockage caused within or outside the aircraft?
Is information on head down displays or overhead consoles
blocked most of the time or only when viewing in
specific directions?
Are areas of the outside scene blocked most of the time or
only when viewing in specific directions?
Will either or both of these require changes in scan patterns
or CRM procedures relative to current applications?
Are there different considerations based on seat position
(e.g., side by side or tandem)?
Pilot in right seat cannot see lower right terrain when
viewing straight ahead?
Pilot in left seat cannot see tactical display in center console
when viewing straight ahead?
Other human factors Consider any other human factors considerations based on
considerations the aircraft unique system to include integration with
weapon systems
13.11.3 Flight Test of HMD Systems

Flight test of HMD systems is complex and, in addition to myriad human factors issues,
includes the integration of other aircraft avionics and tactical suites. What may appear as
a good system when tested in a lab may prove to have many problems when tested in the
aircraft, partially depending on the design of the HMD and the interface with cockpit
geometry. Ensuring test pilots have the necessary experience to test HMD systems may
require preparation well in advance of the start of the test program.
The initial portion of the flight test program will be retest of the ground test matrix,
only now in a flight environment. Table 13.4 may be reused in-flight to complete the
human factors and functionality test requirements. In-flight testing will really provide
the first opportunity to judge symbology, imagery and latency. How is the ease of visual
focus in binocular and monocular modes; what is the focal point of imagery and sym-
bology. Is it possible to easily focus on imagery and symbology concurrently, and what
is the range of brightness in day and night conditions? The tests should evaluate the
readability and clarity of the presentation, access and ease of controls, declutter modes,
and the ability to switching between tactical and navigation modes. Symbology latency
can be evaluated only in dynamic conditions. The evaluator should note any basic
latency during benign conditions and then compare to the latency experienced during
dynamic conditions and head movements. The evaluator should consider the effects
during various flight profiles (e.g., landing, formation flying).
Integration of the HMD with the sensor and weapons systems will need to be
evaluated in-flight. Of particular concern will be the system boresight, the accuracy of
designation, navigation and targeting, drift, tracking accuracy, the ease of access, and
use of the weapon and sensor interface controls. The bottom line is to provide the
aircrew with improved capability, reduce workload, and not lose any system capability.
1. What is meant by the term image intensification?

2. Where might I find currency requirements for flight with NVGs?
3. What causes leaky green goggle glare? Can it be rectified?
4. What is blooming? What is it caused by?
5. Name three areas of evaluation for NVG human factors.
6. Which modification may provide the best display illumination for NVG use?
7. Are multicolor displays applicable to Class A NVIS?
8. Are there any advantages to using NVGs? If so, what are they?
9. Which spectrum of energy is visible by the human eye?
10. What causes a halo effect?
11. What other spectrum (other than visible light) may be used in NVIS systems?
12. Can NVGs improve upon the standard uncorrected vision of 20/20?
13. What is the best visual performance an operator can expect while wearing NVGs?
14. What technology is employed in NVGs?
15. Briefly describe a single component HMD system.
16. What is the approximate human vision resolution (cycles/mrad)?
17. Why is the NVG image normally green and black?
18. What is an MTF?
19. How is system resolution determined for NVG devices?
20. What is the peak spectral response of the human eye? At what color?
21. What is meant by lighting compatibility?
22. What is the spectrum of energy used in NVGs?
23. What is the difference between absorption filters and interference filters?
24. What is the purpose of an ion barrier in GaAs systems?
25. Provide three sources of night sky irradiation.
26. What is an NVIS bezel?
27. What problems arise from the use of red LED obstruction lights?
28. What is the difference between civil and military external lighting requirements?
29. How can HUD symbology be viewed while wearing NVGs?

30. What must the eye relief account for?
31. How is the electrical output of the MCP amplified to create a usable picture?
32. What is the difference between luminance and illuminance?
33. What is the difference between a display filter and an NVG filter?
34. Name the two types of Helmet Tracking Systems.
35. What is albedo? Does varying albedo in the NVG scene enhance performance?
36. What is an objective lens and what is its function in an NVG system?
37. What is a minus blue filter? What is its purpose?
38. What is the FOV of the human eye?
39. What problems may occur if warning (red) annunciators are filtered?
40. What is meant by the term Electroluminescence or EL?
41. How are aircrew protected from the effects of a sudden flash of light?
42. What are the two circuits that contribute to the NVG AGC function?
43. Briefly describe a two component HMD system.
44. What is eye relief? Why is its purpose?
45. What concerns should be addressed when integrating HMDs with weapon systems?
46. Describe a visual acuity test for NVGs.
47. Where can I find documentation on illumination levels for cockpit lighting?
48. What is Type I lighting?
49. What is the minimum distance from the eye to the HMD?
50. What is a modified Class B minus blue filter?
51. Is it possible to optimize all HMD components?
52. Does NVG use contribute to a decrease in workload?
53. Name three compatibility issues that should be addressed when evaluating NVGs.
54. What does the term NVIS friendly refer to?
55. What filter is required in the NVG if the aircraft has a fixed HUD?
56. What is scintillation in an NVG scene? What is it caused by?
57. What is a post light? Are there advantages to using this modification?
58. What would you think a reasonable value of gain would be for a Gen III NVG?
59. How can I focus an NVG?
60. What are the major differences between Gen II and Gen III systems?
61. Name three causes of degradation which may be caused by transparencies.
62. Is latency a problem in HMD systems?
63. Name three problematic areas associated with ejection and the use of NVGs.
64. What is meant by NVIS radiance (NR)?
65. What are the three conditions for evaluating on-aircraft NVG visual acuity?
66. Can exterior lighting requirements be universally applied?

67. Is there a civil standard for NVIS use in the NAS?
68. Name three NVIS lighting modification methods currently in use.
69. What are bridge lights? When are they used?
70. Are LEDs easily mixed with incandescent lights? Why, or why not?
71. Name three attributes of NVIS friendly exterior lighting.
72. Is the flight test of NVIS usually quantitative or qualitative?
73. What is biodynamics?
74. Give four examples of cosmetic blemishes.
75. What is the relationship between visual acuity and NVG resolution?
76. Name the two basic types of HMDs.
77. Is there any possibility that an engineer designed HMD would provide too much
information?
78. Name the basic components of the HMD system.
79. What are the biodynamics concerns in the development of an HMD?
80. What is the difference between monocular, biocular, and binocular?
CHAPTER
Acquisition, Test Management,

and Operational Test 14
and Evaluation
Chapter Outline
14.0 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 957
14.1 Applicable Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958
14.2 The Acquisition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 958
14.3 The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 965
14.4 The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 966
14.5 Operational Test and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 967
14.6 OT&E Test Plan Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 970
14.7 Reliability, Maintainability, Logistics Supportability, and Availability (RML&A) . . 978
14.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
14.9 Selected Questions for Chapter 14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 981
14.0 OVERVIEW
Until now the testing that has been described has been applicable to development test
and evaluation (DT&E) and specification compliance. The final area of testing is
operational test and evaluation (OT&E), where it is the tester’s responsibility to deter-
mine if the system under test can perform the mission. The charter of the OT&E eva-
luator is best summed up in the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center
(AFOTEC) Test Director’s Toolkit, April 12, 2010: ‘‘When our Airmen go to war they
require the weapon system capabilities their commanders requested to defeat an enemy.
Therefore, we will ensure they receive those capabilities at the right time and with
confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission.’’
An overview of the test and evaluation process was covered in chapter 1, and the
reader may want to review that chapter before proceeding. The examples used here are
based on the U.S. military OT&E practices, in particular the U.S. Air Force (AFO-
TEC) and the U.S. Navy Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR). It is
recognized that most other test organizations around the globe do not have dedicated
organizations such as these in place; rather, they use operational units who are trained
as OT&E evaluators. The procedures and policies described here may be used as
guidance in any organization whose goal is to ensure mission effectiveness and
suitability.
957
958 CHAPTER 14 Acquisition, Test Management, and OT&E
14.1 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTATION

The documentation that covers the acquisition, management, and test of a systems
program within the United States is burdensome and can be equated to the plethora of
documentation previously described in the civil certification chapter. The overall gui-
dance for any acquisition program is the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD)
5000.01, ‘‘The Defense Acquisition System’’ and the Department of Defense Instruction
(DoDI) 5000.02, ‘‘Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,’’ collectively called the
DoD 5000 series. These documents have been revised numerous times as acquisition has
evolved from specification compliant to capabilities based. The most current versions
are 2003 and 2008, respectively.
The services, in turn, provide operating instructions on how to implement the DoD
5000 series. The USAF has three instructions that are classified as mandatory com-
pliance: Air Force Instruction (AFI) 99-103, ‘‘Capabilities-Based Test and Evaluation,’’
March 20, 2009; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-601, ‘‘Operational Capability
Requirements Development,’’ July 12, 2010; and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 63-101,
‘‘Operation of the Capabilities Based Acquisition System.’’ The USN uses Secretary of
the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.2D, ‘‘Implementation and Operation of the
Defense Acquisition System and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development
System,’’ October 16, 2008. AFOTEC uses further guidance contained in Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center Instruction (AFOTECI) 99-103, ‘‘Conduct of
Operational Test and Evaluation,’’ November 24, 2004.
For the evaluators, the USAF has issued the HQ USAF/TE, ‘‘Air Force Test and
Evaluation Guidebook,’’ December 2004. AFOTEC provides a checklist of operational
test and evaluation activities and events for program acquisition processes. This
checklist is contained in the AFOTEC ‘‘Test Director’s Toolkit,’’ April 12, 2010;
AFOTEC also publishes AFOTEC OT&E guide, which is now in its sixth edition,
February 12, 2009.
A textbook that may be useful as a reference, although somewhat dated, is Opera-
tions Research Analysis in Test and Evaluation (Donald l. Giadrosich, AIAA Education
Series, 1995).
14.2 THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

As noted previously, the overall guidance for acquisition programs within the United
States is contained in the DoD 5000 series. Deputy secretary of defense Packard signed
the first DoD Directive 5000.1 in 1971. This document was only eight pages long and
created the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), requiring three
major decision points (milestones) with one supporting document. The document was
applicable for all major programs entailing costs of $50M RDT&E or $200M procure-
ment. Over the next 37 years this DoD 5000 process was revised 14 times. The acqui-
sition milestones and the relative lengths of the phases for the original directive are
The conceptual phase begins with program initiation and ends with full-scale
development decision. The second phase concludes with a production go-ahead
decision.
FIGURE 14.1 ¢
Conceptual Full-Scale 1971 Acquisition
Production/Deployment
Effort Development
Milestones
User Needs FIGURE 14.2 ¢

2008 Acquisition
Process
Technology Opportunities and Resources
Milestones A B C
Materiel Technology Engineering Production and Operations and

Solution Development Manufacturing and Deployment Support
Analysis Development
Materiel
Development
Decision
Approval to Approval to Approval to Approval to

Enter Enter Enter Enter Low
Acquisition Technology Engineering Rate Initial Full Rate
Process Development and Production Production
Manufacturing and Decision
Development Deployment Review
The 5000 process has evolved into five phases with three critical milestones.
Decisions are made prior to entering each new phase and are called materiel develop-
ment decisions; they may be thought of as a successful exit criteria from the preceeding
phase and entrance criteria for the new phase. The process is now applicable for all
major programs entailing costs of $365M RDT&E or $2.19B procurement (in FY 2000
dollars). The updated flow for the 2008 acquisition process is shown in Figure 14.2.
The five phases of the acquisition process are as follows:
– Materiel solution analysis (also called the concept refinement phase)
– Technology development
– Engineering manufacturing and development
– Production and deployment
– Operation and support
In addition to the five phases there are three critical milestones:
– Milestone A, which is concept and technology approval
– Milestone B, which is system development and demonstration approval
– Milestone C, which authorizes production or limited deployment approval
The two items that will kick off the acquisition process are user needs and technology
opportunities and resources; these are shown as the initial entries in Figure 12.2.
User needs are generated by field commanders, military departments, or even the
operational users themselves. A user need could be a suggestion (unsolicited) by a
commercial enterprise. A user need is the one that seeks to rectify a deficiency in a
capability or one that may enhance the efficiency or capabilities of the user. A mission
need analysis will validate the need which in turn will be documented as a mission need
or capability. The document is further assessed with respect to other available options
and the final outcome is an operational requirements document (ORD). The structure of
the ORD may be found in section 14.3.
In today’s strategy of capabilities based acquisitions in the United States, a capability-
based assessment (CBA) is performed, and a capability development document (CDD)
will be produced. The CBA is the joint capabilities integration and development system
analysis process. It answers several key questions for the validation authority prior to their
approval. It defines the mission, identifies the capabilities required, determines the attri-
butes and standards of the capabilities, identifies gaps and shortfalls, identifies and
assesses potential non-materiel solutions, and provides recommendations for addressing
the gaps and shortfalls. A non-materiel solution may be thought of as a procedural change
to satisfy a need. Changes may be in doctrine, organization, training, leadership and
education, personnel, facilities, or policy to satisfy identified functional capabilities.
The CDD captures the information necessary to develop a proposed program nor-
mally using evolutionary strategy (which will be addressed later). It outlines an
affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically
mature capability. The CDD may define multiple increments if there is sufficient defi-
nition of the performance attributes (key performance parameters (KPP) and key system
attributes (KSA) to allow approval of multiple increments. A CDD requirements cor-
relation table (CRT) is a summary of all required capability characteristics listed as
threshold or objective values within the CDD text. The CRT provides a concise sum-
mary to assist requirements traceability. The CRT follows a set format that may be
found in Air Force Instruction 10-601, ‘‘Operational Capability Requirements Devel-
opment,’’ July 12, 2010. An example of a CRT is shown in Table 14.1.
A National Test Pilot School example of a possible completed RCT for a fictitious
aircraft and associated systems may be found in Table 14.2.
TABLE 14.1 ¢ Requirements Correlation Table
Rationale and
Development Development Analytical
Paragraph # JCA Tier ½ KPP or KSA Threshold Objective References
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
KPP/KSA 1 Value Value
Where:
(1) The CDD Paragraph #
(2) Joint Capability Area is a collection of like DoD capabilities functionally grouped (per Joint Instruction)
(3) Insert the Operational Performance characteristic
(4) The minimum acceptable threshold value below which utility of the subject characteristic becomes questionable
(5) The desired operational value above the threshold value; the need for improvement over the threshold must be justified
(6) A summarization of the rationale for the KPP or KSA parameter identified within the CDD
TABLE 14.2 ¢ Completed RCT for a Fictitious Aircraft and Associated Systems
ORCD I ORCD II ORCD III

System Capabilities and
Characteristics Threshold Objective Threshold Objective Threshold Objective
1. Non Afterburner Supersonic Yes
Cruise1
a. Sustained TBD 1.5 M 1.5–1.7 M 2.0 M 1.5 M 2.0 M
b. Dash TBD >1.5 M TBD 2.4 M 2.1 M 2.4 M
2. System Availability YES
a. MCP TBD 90% 85% 90% 85% 90%
b. Break TBD TBD TBD 5–10% 10% 5%
c. Fix TBD TBD TBD 80–90% 82% 83%
3. Radar Yes
a. Search (tgts) TBD 12 TBD 16 8 6
b. Track (tgts) TBD 6 4 8 4 8
c. Search range TBD 250 150 200 150 200
d. Track range TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD
4. Terrain Following YES
a. Min Altitude TBD TBD TBD 100 all WX 200 all WX 100 all WX
Note 1: Values of system capabilities, system characteristics and critical system characteristics may change as the system matures.
In much of the documentation, an ORD, CDD, or an initial capabilities document

(ICD) is covered by the universal term of operational capability requirements document
(OCRD).
The user need evolution can be equated to a new product development in the
commercial market. The vendor surveys the marketplace for market demand. If a need is
found, technology is assessed to see if a product or service can be developed to meet the
need. An analysis of the demand versus the potential cost is performed to see if the
venture has potential profit. If the venture appears promising, a directive will be issued
to forge ahead with the project. User needs are evaluated in the same way, substituting
mission capability for profit.
Technology opportunities and resources provide the user with increased or
enhanced capability by exploiting advances in science and technology. Advances may
be accomplished in the form of: basic research as in the case of the NAVSTAR/GPS
program, applied research as in the case of differential navigation, or in advanced
research such CEP enhancement for ‘‘smart’’ weapons. In all cases, emerging technol-
ogy allows enhancements in capabilities not previously achievable. The basic question
should be, ‘‘What will this technology allow us to do that were up till now unfeasible?’’
Science and technology should not be limited in scope to government initiatives;
Commercial off the shelf (COTS) also may provide enhanced capabilities.
The first phase to be entered is the materiel solution analysis, sometimes called the
concept refinement phase. As noted, prior to entering this phase or any other subsequent
phase, a materiel development decision (MDD) must be made. The MDD review is
the formal entry point into the acquisition management system and is mandatory for
all programs. At the MDD the milestone decision authority (approval authority)
approves the analysis of alternatives study guidance, determines the acquisition phase of
entry, identifies the initial review milestone and designates the lead DoD components.
The purpose of this first phase is to refine the initial concept and develop a technology
strategy. A secondary task is to analyze possible alternatives.
The steps in the concept refinement phase should, at a minimum, cover the fol-
lowing topics:
– Assess the critical technologies required for the success of the system. Hardware and
software should be evaluated for maturity technical and financial risk.
– Evaluators should consider innovation on the original idea, competition with other
systems, and COTS.
– Evaluators need to verify that the concept will meet the user’s needs; the system
needs to be interoperable, survivable, and able to be maintained.
– The system needs to be evaluated against program metrics of cost, schedule, and
performance.
– Will the acquisition be evolutionary in nature (incremental), or will it be accom-
plished in a single step?
– It is advisable to consult industry in performing this analysis.
Specific results must be obtained within each phase before the program is allowed to
progress to the next phase. The specific results come under two headings: affordability
and performance. Affordability contains the program metrics of cost and schedule;
performance is the validation that the concept meets user needs and that the technology
is mature enough to adequately support the concept. Affordability and performance
measurements must be agreed on by the acquisition authority and the user community
before satisfying the entrance criteria to the new phase. These results are documented in
a decision memorandum, which
– Documents the milestone decision
– Establishes the entrance criteria
– Provides direction for the next phase
– Provides an audit trail for the program
The content of the decision memorandum will vary between milestones and programs. A
flow depicting the gates that must be satisfied prior to progressing to the next phase is
Technology development is entered when Milestone A is satisfied. A prerequisite
for this approval is an updated mission need statement (based on the analysis of the
previous phase), a draft ORD or CDD and an approved technology development strategy
(TDS). The initial portion of this phase is devoted toward concept exploration, most of
which has been described previously: Does the system meet user needs? What is the cost
and performance? How long will it take? Will it integrate with other systems already
fielded? Can it survive in the operational environment? Can it be maintained? As the
concept exploration progresses, it may be noted that additional components may be
necessary for the system to be optimized. A decision review will deem whether or not
component development is necessary.
Technology Systems FIGURE 14.3 ¢

Milestone Milestone Production
Development Development Acquisition Flow to
Phase Phase Phase Next Phase
Current Current
• Baseline • Baseline
~Cost ~Cost
~Performance ~Performance
~Schedule ~Schedule
• Execution Status • Execution Status
Risks
Next Phase Management Next Phase
• Program Plans (Mitigation) • Program Plans
• Entrance Criteria • Entrance Criteria
Risks Risks
• Cost • Cost
• Schedule • Schedule
• Performance • Performance
Decision Memorandum Decision Memorandum
If the decision is made to develop additional components, the phase continues with
work intended to reduce the overall risk. The tasks may be:
– Develop components
– Develop subsystems
– Develop system architecture
– Build prototypes
The true intent of this phase is to demonstrate that the technology will work.
The outputs of the technology development phase are a final ORD and a draft
program performance specification. In order to progress to the next phase, the system
must be affordable, have demonstrated capability and the ability to be produced.
Milestone B clears the way for entrance into Phase 3, system development and
demonstration. It approves the start of development and initiates the acquisition pro-
gram. The primary goal of this phase is to develop a system and reduce integration and
manufacturing risk. The prerequisites for entering this phase are to have a concept
designed, technology mature enough to mitigate risk, validated operational require-
ments and capabilities and an approved test and evaluation master plan (TEMP)
(section 14.4).
The validated operational requirements and capabilities will have been accom-
plished in order to finalize the ORD/CDD/OCRD. An operational capability, when
discussed within the framework of government acquisitions, is the ability to achieve a
desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means
and ways across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) to perform a set of tasks to execute a specified
course of action. It is defined by an operational sponsor and expressed in broad opera-
tional terms in the format of an operational capabilities document or a Joint DOTMLPF
change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals/documents, the definition
will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the cap-
ability development document and the capability production document.
The TEMP documents the overall structure and objectives of the T&E program. It
provides a framework to generate detailed T&E plans and it documents schedule and
resource implications associated with the T&E program. The TEMP identifies the
necessary developmental, operational and live-fire test activities. It relates program
schedule, test management strategy and structure, and required resources to: critical
operational issues, critical technical parameters, objectives and thresholds in the require-
ments document and milestone decision points. The TEMP is written in terms of measures
of assessment and performance. The structure of the TEMP is described in section 14.4.
The system development and demonstration phase contains all of the elements
addressed previously in chapter 1 of the text: systems integration/development, system
demonstration/qualification, regression, and OT&E. The DT&E portion of the phase
encompasses development, demonstration, and regression testing. The primary purpose
of development is to ensure proper integration and functionality, proper operation in its
operational environment, proper S/W interfaces with other systems, freedom from
interference from those systems, and validation of modeling and simulation results. The
purpose of system demonstration is to collect data and statistically prove that the system
performs to some basic level of performance such as specification compliance. In
incremental programs, regression testing (proving the system performs at the same level
with changes of S/W) needs to be planned and budgeted. OT&E evaluates the system
against the operational requirements in environments that replicate real-world scenarios.
Milestone C provides the go-ahead for low rate initial production; it may allow
limited deployment or fielding of the system. It is the precursor for entry into the pro-
duction and deployment phase. Low rate initial production is defined as production of
the system in the minimum quantity to provide production configured or representative
articles for operational test, establish an initial production base for the system, and
permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system sufficient to lead to full
rate production upon the successful completion of operational testing. The entry criteria
for this phase are an updated TEMP (to include OT&E and live fire testing), a produc-
tion plan, mature technology, and a system that is interoperable, supportable, and
affordable. The output of this phase is full rate production and deployment of an oper-
ationally effective and suitable system with full operational capability.
The final phase of the acquisition cycle is operations and support, which is the basic
care and feeding of the system. The operational support of the system includes:
– Supply
– Maintenance
– Transportation
– Sustained engineering
– Data management
– Configuration management
– Manpower
– Training
– Safety
Throughout the life cycle of the system there will be occasions of deficiency corrections,
product improvement, and life extension. In many of these cases, a follow-on OT&E
14.3 The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) 965
program may be required to ensure effectiveness, survivability, sustainability, and

interoperability. When the system is phased out, it will be demilitarized and disposed of.
14.3 THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

DOCUMENT (ORD)
If we remember from our previous discussion of the acquisition process, a mission need
analysis will validate the need that in turn will be documented as a mission need or
capability. The document is further assessed with respect to other available options and
the final outcome is an operational requirements document (ORD). We will also recall
that in much of the documentation, an ORD, CDD, or an initial capabilities document
(ICD) is covered by the universal term of operational capability requirements document
(OCRD). In this section I will use the term ORD as I think most readers are familiar with
this nomenclature.
The ORD translates broad capabilities into specific operational performance para-
meters and minimum acceptable operational performance requirements. It is important
to remember that the ORD represents specific user requirements and capabilities that are
solution specific. It is also important to remember that the ORD is going to be the source
of all testing requirements and that testing will need to show traceability back to
the ORD.
The ORD should be written to describe the system concept; it should relate the
shortcomings of existing systems and capabilities. For example, collateral damage to the
civilian population can occur when trying to eradicate terrorists from urban areas. The basic
problem may be that current EO sensors do not have the resolution necessary to correctly
identify friend from foe. A sensor capable of xx.x mrad at a range of xx.x ft at an altitude of
xxx.x ft in a defined urban environment is required. So, the ORD should describe the
required performance capabilities. Additionally, the ORD should address infrastructure,
interoperability, and integrated logistics support. The document should identify the pro-
posed buy (quantities and spares) and when the system is needed, that is, schedule.
I tell all of my students that if you are writing specifications for anything, pretend that
you are writing them for the dumbest person in the world; don’t take for granted that the
reader will be as familiar with the concept as you. It’s very rarely the case. Also, if you
want something to operate in a specific way write it as a requirement, or else it will be
implemented the way the designer thinks is best. The ORD should be concise, noting the
performance and related operational parameters for the proposed system; operational
effectiveness and suitability issues should be included. It should be prepared and updated
by the user and not by program or management. We expect the ORD to be done as early as
possible in the program, remembering that it will drive the requirements for test and eva-
luation. The ORD is a living document and will be updated and perhaps expanded as the
program progresses and more information is gained on technology and viable alternatives.
The ORD, as one might expect, follows a standardized format. A template that may
be used for constructing an ORD may be found at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
ORD_Template.pdf. An example of a completed ORD may be found at http://www.fas.
org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/VLFORD.html. The required operational effectiveness and
suitability capabilities must be identified as well as prioritized. Each requirement must
be described in terms of a threshold, which is in reality a minimum acceptable level of
performance and an objective, which is the desired level of performance. The ORD will
identify the key system attributes, key system parameters, and critical operational issues.
These will be covered in detail later, but suffice it to say that these parameters are so
critical that a failure to meet the threshold on any of them would necessitate a reeva-
luation of the solution or termination of the program. Last, the ORD becomes the basis
for developing the contractual system specification.
Since the ORD will be the basis for the contractual specification, the writer needs to
pay attention to some items when formulating an ORD. For example:
– Each requirement should stand alone; do not combine requirements with and, also,
and with.
– Do not write open-ended requirements that may be subject to interpretation; that is,
don’t use etc. within the requirement.
– Similarly, don’t use the terms except, if, when, unless, or but as they provide
ambiguity.
– The terms shall, will, and must make the requirements mandatory; the terms may,
might, could, perhaps, and probably do not.
– Ambiguities and interpretation also come into play when using terms such as the
greatest extent possible, maximum and minimum, state-of-the-art, user-friendly,
flexible, efficient, several, improved, adequate, adaptable, and simple.
– The system should not be engineered; only the requirements should be stated.
The ORD should be concise, but it should be specific.
14.4 THE TEST AND EVALUATION MASTER

PLAN (TEMP)
The TEMP takes the requirements from the ORD, along with inputs from the program
plan (cost, schedule, performance), and generates the test and evaluation plans and
procedures. The TEMP, like the ORD, follows a specified format, and is a living
document being updated as T&E progresses. A template for the TEMP may be found at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/507305/Test-Evaluation-Master-Plan-Template. A good set
of instructions for formulating a TEMP is found in the Department of the Army,
Pamphlet 73-2, ‘‘Test and Evaluation Master Plan Procedures and Guidance,’’ a copy of
which may be found at http://www.if.uidaho.edu/. . . /Test%20and%20Evaluation%
20Master%20Plan.pdf. An example of an FAA completed TEMP regarding next-
generation systems can be seen at http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/portfolio/trans . . . /SE%
20RNAV%20Temp.pdf.
The structure of the TEMP will follow the format:
– Objectives
– Evaluation criteria
– Data analysis
– Resources
– Responsibilities
– Decision milestones
– Schedules
Copies of the mission need statement, system threat assessment, and ORD are normally
attached to the TEMP.
The scope of the TEMP provides a framework for all testing on the program, deli-
neating both DT&E and OT&E with enough detail to generate test plans. The TEMP
will document the schedule and resource implications associated with the test activities.
For example, a word grabber or bus editor must be available and tested prior to first
flight, or test team training must be accomplished 30 days prior to first flight. The TEMP
will cover all test activities, starting with ground evaluations, modeling and simulation
and progressing through combined contractor/DT and operational test. If it is done
correctly, the TEMP will show traceability from the ORD to critical operational issues to
critical technical parameters to the minimum operational performance requirements and
finally the evaluation criteria. Successful completion of the chain will lead to the
milestone decision points.
Just as we have seen previously, a good plan will identify all test objectives and the
logistical support required to achieve success. Logistical support can include:
– Hardware
– Software
– Maintenance
– Training
– Instrumentation
– TSPI
– Analysis software
Testing will always require resources, some of which may be:
– Test articles with proven functionality
– Ranges (e.g., open air, anechoic chamber, live fire)
– Threat systems (real or simulated)
– Targets (e.g., air, ground, augmented, jamming)
– Simulators, test beds
– A trained test team
– A budget
Where we considered test objectives, test points and exit criteria in the DT&E phase, the
OT&E phase will be structured with critical operation issues (COI), measures of
effectiveness (MOE), and measures of performance (MOP).
14.5 OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION

In chapter 1 of the text, we explained the basic differences between DT&E and OT&E.
As a generalized statement we said that the purpose of DT&E was to ensure specifica-
tion compliance and, from the contractor’s standpoint, meet the terms of the contract.
OT&E ensures that the system can meet mission requirements and that the procuring
agency gets what it paid for. We also stated that as a rule, the military DT&E group
wears two hats: one to verify contractor compliance and another to ensure that the
system is ready for OT&E.
The Defense Acquisition Guidebook defines DT&E as:
‘‘Test and evaluation conducted to evaluate design approaches, validate analytical
models, quantify contract technical performance and manufacturing quality,
measure progress in system engineering design and development, minimize
design risks, predict integrated system operational performance (effectiveness
and suitability) in the intended environment, and identify system problems (or
deficiencies) to allow for early and timely resolution. DT&E includes contractor
testing and is conducted over the life of the system to support acquisition and
sustainment efforts.’’
Air Force Instruction 99-103 defines OT&E in two ways:
1. ‘‘The field test, under realistic combat conditions, of any item of (or key component
of) weapons, equipment, or munitions for the purpose of determining the effective-
ness and suitability of the weapons, equipment, or munitions for use in combat by
typical military users; and the evaluation of the results of such test.’’
2. ‘‘Testing and evaluation conducted in as realistic environment as possible to estimate
the prospective system’s operational effectiveness, suitability, and operational cap-
abilities. In addition, OT&E provides information on organization, personnel
requirements, doctrine and tactics. It may also provide data to support or verify
material in operating instructions, publications and handbooks.’’
Table 14.3 breaks down the differences between the two test organizations.
OT&E will normally not use contractor test personnel during their evaluation. In
some cases, the OT&E team has designated some contractor personnel as trusted agents
(the individuals will not divulge information on the tests performed or the results
obtained). Many times, these trusted agents assist the team in Instrumentation and data
collection or, in some cases, test setups and range control.
With the emphasis now on capabilities-based acquisition, it is even more important
that the OT&E evaluation team assess system impacts to combat and peacetime
TABLE 14.3 ¢ DT&E and OT&E Charters
DT&E OT&E
Specification Compliance Mission Performance
System Suitability
Contractor Driven User Driven
Technical Personnel Operationally Current Personnel
Heavily Instrumented Not required; but used in some cases
Development Intensive Determines Capability Using Production
Representative Systems Against Threat
Representative Systems
Reports to Program Management Reports to the Operational Authority
Works with OT&E Relies on DT&E Findings
operations. OT&E is also tasked with determining the impacts of fielding or employing
a system across a full range of operations in many diverse theatres. OT&E is tasked with
determining the reliability, maintainability, and support for these systems as well as the
ability of the maintainers to operate and work on these systems.
14.5.1 Types of OT&E

The documentation makes note of the differences between evaluations and assessments.
Evaluations collect, analyze, and report data against stated criteria with a high degree of
analytical rigor and are used to support full rate production (FRP) or fielding decisions.
This wording is quite similar to the demonstration testing discussed in chapter 1 of this
text. Assessments usually collect and analyze data with less analytical rigor, need not
report against stated criteria, and cannot be the sole source of T&E data to support FRP
or fielding decisions. These words are used in chapter 1 to describe OT&E. The type and
level of OT&E testing varies from program to program and is decided by a consensus of
the OT&E organization, user, and the responsible test organization (RTO). Operational
testing is based on the requirement documents for the capabilities being fielded and can
include COTS, nondevelopmental items (NDI), or GFE. The types of OT&E are many
and varied:
– Initial OT&E (IOT&E): Within the USAF, this evaluation is conducted only by
AFOTEC and is used to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the
items under test using production representative hardware and software, stabilized
performance, and operationally representative personnel. The tests are conducted
under real-world conditions, including simulated combat conditions; it determines if
the critical operational issues (COI) have been met (COI will be addressed in detail).
– Qualification OT&E (QOT&E): Like IOT&E, this evaluation is conducted only by
AFOTEC within the USAF. It is used to evaluate the military applications of COTS,
NDI, and GFE when little or no development takes place. The reader will remember
from previous discussions that this is a trap as all programs will require development
and integration. History is littered with programs that were qualification-only, which
proved not to be the case.
– Follow-on OT&E (FOT&E): As the name implies, FOT&E is the continuation of
IOT&E or QOT&E to answer questions of unresolved COIs or previous deficiencies;
it is also conducted only by AFOTEC within the USAF. It may also complete T&E if
those areas not finished during OT&E.
– Multi-service OT&E (MSOT&E): This evaluation can be I, Q, or FOT&E when two
or more military services are involved. It may be called a force development eva-
luation (FDE) if it is performed and managed by a major command (MAJCOM). The
FDE is used for multiple purposes:
~ Evaluation to verify the resolution of deficiencies or shortfalls
~ Evaluation of routine software modifications such as operational flight programs
(OFP), or incremental software to support upgrades or improvements
~ Evaluation of shortfalls discovered after fielding the system
~ Evaluation of systems against foreign equipment or new or modified threats
~ Evaluation of COTS, NDI, or GFE for military applications
– Tactics development and evaluation (TD&E): TD&E is a specialized form of FDE

conducted by the MAJCOMs to refine doctrine and tactics.
– Weapons system evaluation program (WSEP): WSEP is another specialized FDE
conducted to provide an end-to-end validation of fielded weapons systems and their
support systems using realistic combat scenarios. WSEP is also used to conduct
investigative live firings to revalidate capabilities or better understand malfunctions.
– Operational utility evaluation (OUE): OUE is performed whenever an operational
assessment is required, but a full scope evaluation is not appropriate.
14.5.2 Operational Assessments (OA)

The OA is conducted by AFOTEC or the MAJCOM in preparation for a dedicated
OT&E period; the results are normally used to support the go-ahead for LRIP. They are
supposed to be progress reports and not an evaluation of the overall mission capability of
the system. An OA provides early operational data and feedback to developers, opera-
tors, and decision makers. The objectives of an OA are as follows:
– Assess and report on a system’s maturity and the potential to meet operational
requirements
– Support the decision for LRIP or increments of evolutionary acquisition programs
– Identify design problems and deficiencies that may prevent successful demonstration
of overall mission capability
– Uncover potential system changes needed to update operational requirements
– Support the demonstration of prototypes, new technologies, or new applications
– Support proof of concept initiatives
It is important for operational testers to realize that these assessments are progress
reports and not a declaration of mission capabilities. The author has seen on previous
systems programs, during early operational assessments (OSA), a tendency to report on
functions and capabilities that are not yet present in the test article.
14.6 OT&E TEST PLAN STRUCTURE

The OT&E test plan can be summarized by critical operational issues, critical technical
parameters, measures of effectiveness and suitability, and measures of assessment and
performance. These parameters provide the structure for all OT&E evaluations:
Critical operational issues (COIs): These are the top-level issues that must be
examined in OT&E to determine the system’s capability to perform its mission. COIs
are included in the TEMP and derived from the ORD. There are two categories of COIs:
effectiveness and suitability. COIs are typically phrased as a question:
– Effectiveness: ‘‘Will the system detect the threat in a combat environment at adequate
range to allow successful engagement?’’
– Suitability: ‘‘Will the system be safe to operate in a combat environment?’’
The CDD is the primary source for developing COIs.
There is quite a difference between effectiveness and suitability; if a system per-

forms its function perfectly it is said to be effective. If the system cannot be maintained,
it will not be suitable. A classic example is the emergency power system selected for the
F-16. A backup system was required to provide hydraulic/electrical power when the
engine failed. The lightest and most compact solution was a hydrazine-powered gas
generator. Hydrazine is a highly toxic hazardous material and difficult to handle at home
station and becomes a huge challenge when deployed off-site. The decision to proceed
with the hydrazine system was good for effectiveness but not for suitability.
Operational suitability can be described as the degree to which a system can be
satisfactorily placed in the field. Issues that should be considered when evaluating a
system’s suitability are as follows:
– Availability
– Compatibility
– Transportability
– Interoperability
– Reliability
– Normal and surge usage rates
– Maintainability
– Safety
– Logistics supportability
– Manpower requirements
– Spares
– Documentation
– Training
– Sustainment
– Simulators
– Software
– Human factors
Although the meaning of most of these parameters is obvious, some require some
discussion when addressing an operational suitability requirement. Reliability is the
ability of a system to perform its mission without failure, degradation, or excessive
demand on the support system. Operational reliability can be thought of as the prob-
ability that an operationally ready system will work as required to accomplish its
intended mission or function as planned. Maintainability is the ability of an item to be
retained in or restored to specified condition when personnel with specified skill levels
maintain it using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of
maintenance and repair. Availability is the ability of a system to perform its mission
when needed. When dealing with hardware, availability is a function of MTBF, MTTR
(mean time to repair), MTTF (mean time to failure), and FIT (failure in time). Com-
patibility is the capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material
to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference.
Interoperability is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and
accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use these services to help
them operate effectively together. Supportability is the degree to which system design
characteristics and planned logistics resources, including manpower, meet system
peacetime readiness and wartime utilization requirements. Logistics Supportability is
the degree to which planned logistics support allows the system to meet its availability
and surge (a period of higher than normal utilization or operation, normally over a
relatively short period of time) usage requirements. Planned logistics support would
include: test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment, spare and repair parts, technical
data, support facilities, transportation requirements, training, manpower, and software.
Sustainment is the ability to maintain a necessary level and duration of operational
activity to achieve user objectives in both peacetime (readiness) and wartime
(sustainability).
Critical technical parameters (CTPs): These are the engineering design factors that a
system must meet or exceed to ensure that established performance thresholds are
achieved. CTPs are derived from the CDD, critical system characteristics, and systems
engineering documents. CTPs are listed in a matrix, along with the performance
objectives and thresholds in Part I of the TEMP.
An example of a CTP may be the weight of the system. The CTP is stated as a
specific numerical value and may change as the system matures during development.
The system should show improvement in the performance parameter over time.
Measures of effectiveness and suitability (MOEs & MOSs) - Part III of the TEMP
lists the measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of suitability (MOS). They are
key in assessing the performance capabilities and characteristics identified in the CDD.
These measures (MOEs and MOSs) are used to determine the attainment of the top-level
performance issues.
Examples of an MOE may be maximum effective range or land mobility speed.
Examples of MOS may be interoperability or mean time between operational mission
failures.
Measures of assessment and measures of performance (MOAs and MOPs): These
are the data collected to show suitability or compliance with the MOE/MOS.
The best description of the interrelationship of the COI/CTP/MOE/MOS/MOA/
MOP is found in chapter 4 of the AFOTEC OT&E Guide, 6th ed., February 12, 2009.
The guide provides readers with examples of each parameter and how they show tra-
ceability back to the ORD. A companion to the OT&E guide is the ‘‘AFOTEC Test
Director’s Toolkit,’’ April 12, 2010, which provides a checklist of OT&E activities and
events in an acquisition program.
Coming from the development test world, the OT&E flow might be more under-
standable if related to a typical DT&E flow previously described. Figure 14.4 compares
the OT and DT test process.
14.6.1 Critical Operational Issues

COIs describe key operational effectiveness or suitability issues to determine a system’s
capability to perform its mission. They are selected from list of system operational
issues and usually are stated as a question. Should the evaluator fail to answer the
question in the positive the system is not worthy of procurement. For this reason, COIs
must be written with care and specificity as the outcome of the program depends
on them.
FIGURE 14.4 ¢
CDD D T&E Contract
OT&E SOW
OT&E and DT&E
KSA/KPP
Test Flow
Comparisons
Specification/
ORD/ORCD Capability
COI/CTP Test Objective
MOE/MOS Test Conditions
MOA/MOP Test Points
Let’s assume that a requirement exists for an ILS Cat 1 minimums landing system to
be used by transport aircraft worldwide. The basic COI could read: Can the proposed
system provide landing guidance down to ILS Cat 1 minima? A second COI may read:
Is the proposed system available worldwide. A COTS WAAS-enabled GNSS would
satisfactorily meet the requirements of COI#1, but would fail the requirements of
COI#2. The way the COIs are written automatically discards the WAAS system as a
candidate (and, in fact, any other known system available today). COI#2 could have
been written to ask if it were feasible to develop a portable landing system based on the
WAAS system to be used on remote, unimproved airstrips.
Some organizations relate COI development to a series of questions containing key
elements of concern:
– Do the COIs reflect the user’s priorities?
– Can all COIs be answered by a yes or no?
– Are all COIs supported by MOE/MOS and MOAs?
– Are COIs consistent with the strategy-to-task methodology?
– Are COIs specific to the mission tasks the system must perform?
– Are all COIs consistent with the primary purpose of the OT&E?
– Can the COIs, as stated, be answered through OT&E?
– Do any of the COIs overlap?
– Are the COIs consistent with the existing or planned operations and maintenance
concepts, policies, procedures, and techniques?
– Are new policies and procedures necessary for the test and are they properly factored
into the COIs?
– Do COIs address areas of interface with other end user systems?
Strategy-to-task methodology as well as MOE and MOA will be addressed shortly.
14.6.2 Measure of Effectiveness/Measure of Suitability

The Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) is a qualitative or quantitative measure of a sys-
tem’s performance or a characteristic that indicates the degree to which it performs the
task or meets a requirement under specified conditions. MOEs should be constructed to
measure the system’s capability to produce or accomplish the desired result. The Measure
of Suitability (MOS) is similar to the MOE in that it is a qualitative or quantitative
measure of a system’s capability to support mission or task accomplishment with respect
to reliability, availability, maintainability, transportability, supportability, training, and
other suitability considerations. In our previous example, the WAAS-enabled GNSS
may provide a 95% success rate in CAT 1 landings (MOE), but the system is not
transportable (MOS).
The MOE/MOS can be thought of as a measure of a system’s intended task or
mission accomplishment in terms of representative operational scenarios. These sce-
narios are usually at the engagement or battle outcome level (CAT 1 Landings at an
unimproved airstrip). The evaluators should ask the basic question: ‘‘How well did we
achieve what we wanted?’’ The MOE/MOS must be quantifiable, relevant to COIs, and
measurable/testable.
14.6.3 Measure of Assessment/Measure of Performance

The Measure of Assessment (MOA)/Measure of Performance (MOP) is a quantitative
measure of a system’s capability to accomplish a task. These measures are typically
in the area of physical performance (e.g., range, velocity, memory, throughput). They
are a determination of the system’s actual capabilities or characteristics in real world
operations. They are usually quantitative but can be qualitative and measure the
degree to which a system performs or meets a requirement or specification. The
MOA/MOP must show traceability to a MOE/MOS and then back to a COI. As
opposed to ‘‘How well did we achieve what we wanted?’’ we now would ask ‘‘What
was achieved?’’
The way the MOA/MOPs are written will have a bearing on which testing is
required. If the term demonstrate is used it implies the test must show operation/function
under operational conditions. If the terms determine or measure are used, actual system
measurement in operational conditions is required. Conversely, if the terms assess or
evaluate are used, a subjective estimate is expected. Verify requires quantitative data
against the ORD under operational conditions, whereas validate produces quantitative
data against a prediction under operational conditions.
As noted previously for COIs, organizations may relate MOE and MOA develop-
ment to a series of questions containing key elements of concern:
– Are all MOE related to the COIs?
– Are the MOA linked to the MOEs? To the COIs?
– Are MOE/MOA quantitative where practicable?
– Do the MOE/MOA address the user requirements?
– Are MOE/MOA feasible and executable in terms of time, cost, and resources?
– Can any of the MOE/MOA be satisfied by answering other COI or through add-on
data collection performed on a noninterference basis?
– Which MOE/MOA can be satisfied by field testing, and which must be addressed by
modeling or a combination of field testing and modeling?
– Do MOE/MOA address the information and data requirements in controversial areas?
– Can any of the tests be streamlined and still satisfy data and information
requirements?
– What shortfalls and limitations exist in addressing the requirements? What are the
impacts? Are there any workarounds?
– Do MOEs/MOAs call for evaluation of maintenance and other logistics
requirements?
– Are there unique support aspects related to the system that should be integrated into
the MOEs/MOAs?
– Are RML&A issues properly considered?
– Is software supportability and maturity sufficiently addressed?
– Are databases current and accurate for the users needs?
– Are support issues such as training (both maintenance and flight crew), simulators,
mission planning system, technical data, human factors, safety, and integrated diag-
nostics sufficiently addressed?
– Are the methods of determining the impacts of support issues on system effectiveness
and suitability adequately described?
– Are compatibility aspects properly considered particularly the conditions between
other systems and equipment involved?
– Are environmental compliance aspects properly factored into the OT&E?
The nomenclature differs from organization to organization around the world, but the
basic tenets are the same. Table 14.4 compares the terminology in use by three military
organizations.
14.6.4 Developing the Test Plan

The test plan will be composed of the COI and the measurements discussed in the
previous section. The most common way of developing the plan is the strategy-to-task
TABLE 14.4 ¢ Comparison of OT&E Terminology
The United States Canada Australia

Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) Statement of Intent (SOI) Mission Need Statement (MNS)
Capability Development Document (CDD) Statement of Requirements (SOR) Statement of Requirements (SOR)
Attributes Operational Issues (OI) Operational Issues (OI)
Key System Attributes (KSA)
Key Performance Parameters (KPP)
Critical Operational Issues (COI) Critical Operational Issues (COI) Critical Operational Issues (COI)
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
Measures of Suitability (MOS) Measures of Suitability (MOS) Measures of Suitability (MOS)
Measures of Assessment (MOA) Measures of Assessment (MOA) Measures of Assessment (MOA)
Measures of Performance (MOP) Measures of Performance (MOP)
method. In this process the task definition is related to OT&E (i.e., first define the task
and then go about the methods for accomplishing the task). This method is sometimes
called the top-down method as it is initiated with national doctrine or strategy. The
tasks provide the critical linkage between the need statement (top), the operational
requirements document (ORD), the COI, MOE, MOS, and MOA, and finally OT&E
(bottom).
If we take the time frame of Desert Storm and propose a hypothetical need, the
process can be illustrated. First, the task is derived from the national strategy; the
national security strategy may have been to support our Middle East allies. The national
military strategy may have been to free Kuwait. Within the theatre, the regional military
strategy may have been to neutralize/isolate enemy ground forces. The operational
objective would now be to disrupt enemy command and control; this, in turn would
become COI #1.
The task (MOE) for this COI may have been to destroy enemy command and
control centers and communication links. The assessment (MOA) of how well we could
achieve this objective could dependent on many things:
– System functions/characteristics
– Performance
– Endurance
– Payload
– Navigation
– Target identification
– Warhead effects
The outcome of this exercise would then become the test matrices, showing traceability
between the need and the assessment. Figure 14.5 shows an example of a completed
matrix, which is taken from the AFOTEC OT&E Guide.
A second method for developing the structure of the plan is to use the systems
engineering approach, sometimes called the bottom-up approach. In this method, the
evaluators concentrate on the subsystem engineering performance characteristics; for
example, the performance of a litening target designator. Resolution, range, dis-
crimination, and performance in weather may be evaluated and then applied to the
broader requirement, which may be identification and eradication of hostiles in an urban
area. Engineers tend to prefer this easier method, but it’s possible to lose sight of a user’s
initial need statement.
14.6.5 Executing the Plan

Depending on the complexity of the test scenarios, executing the plan may be more
difficult than plans developed for DT&E. One of the key tenets of OT&E is that cap-
abilities are evaluated in real-world, operational conditions. The choice of where the
testing will be done can be a daunting task. A budget and a timeline for task completion
must still be adhered to. We still can’t schedule weather, and the system will still need to
be supported wherever the testing is scheduled. The points made in chapter 1 of this text
still hold true for OT&E.
Mission Statement FIGURE 14.5 ¢

OT&E Evaluation
Structure
COI COI COI Etc.
MOE MOE MOS
MOP MOE MOS
MOP MOS MOS
MOE MOA
MOS
MOS MOA
MOS
MOA MOS
MOA MOS
MOS MOS
MOS
MOS
DATA Measurements User Comments Observations Other Information
Data are identified within the measure or in the measurement criteria (Figure 14.5).
When reviewing the OT&E structure ensure that the data required for evaluation can
indeed be collected. As we have seen with DT&E, instrumenting aircraft to obtain data
can be a costly and, more important, a lengthy process. If rating scales are to be used,
evaluators will have to be trained in their use. If contractors are used to assist in data
collection, they will need to be identified and approved.
Ranges will also have to be coordinated and scheduled; there is a finite amount of
time as well as assets. At a minimum, ranges will need some sort of support agreement
documentation as explained in chapter 2 of this text. The reader will recall that sche-
duling of specific assets (e.g., anechoic chamber, ground and airborne targets, emitters,
clearance for chaff and flare deployment, RF radiation) must be accomplished well in
advance of their intended use. Six months is probably not unrealistic for most events,
although live fires may be significantly more coordination time. Test review boards
(TRB), flight test readiness reviews (FTRR), and safety review boards (SRB) will all be
required by the support facility.
Chapter 4 of the AFOTEC OT&E Guide provides the reader with test support
considerations for OT&E evaluations as well as assessments. It should be noted that all
of the cited documentation encourages joint or combined test teams during any program.
The author has stated some of the pitfalls to these arrangements in chapter 1 of the text.
14.7 RELIABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, LOGISTICS

SUPPORTABILITY, AND AVAILABILITY (RML&A)
For a system to effectively accomplish its mission tasks, it must be in an operable
condition when needed. Operational effectiveness determines if the system can
accomplish the mission whereas operational suitability determines the ability to field
and support the system. Complex interrelationships exist between reliability, maintain-
ability, and logistics supportability, which combine to produce a system’s operational
availability (which in reality is suitability). The best system in the world cannot be
effective if its availability rate is 50%.
For information, the reader is referred to AGARD-RTO-Vol-300, chapter 22,
‘‘Reliability and Maintainability,’’ and chapter 23, ‘‘Logistics Test and Evaluation.’’
Chapter 22 is from the perspective of the USAF at Edwards AFB, and chapter 23 is
written from the USN perspective at Patuxent River.
RML&A measurements can be difficult and require a great deal of data. It’s not
unusual for the suitability portion of the OT&E program to account for over 75% of the
testing. A correct assessment can identify system deficiencies, correct the deficiencies in
a timely fashion, enhance system capabilities, determine how to best support the system
under operational conditions, and help determine the number of spares required, man-
power to adequately support the system, and training required for the maintainers. In the
perfect world, the system under test would have a high MTBF, is easily and quickly
repaired, requires unskilled labor to fix it, and is easy to deploy with limited mobility
needs. This section will not present an in-depth explanation of the types of analysis,
modeling and simulation used in performing RML&A evaluations. It will attempt to
highlight the areas where testers should be knowledgeable enough to have an intelligent
conversation with their maintenance counterparts.
The operational user should state the RML&A system requirements in terms that
can be measured during test and evaluation (e.g., downtime, weapons upload time,
surge). These measures are going to be dependent on the maintenance concept selected
for the system. For example, is the system expected to be contractor maintained,
organic, or a mix of the two? What will be the operational maintenance environment
(basing concept, climate, weather, and deployment scenarios)? What, if any, are the
maintenance constraints (electronic test equipment, occupational health and safety,
nuclear hardness, NBC gear)? The concept is the same as described in DT&E, where it
was stressed that the evaluator needs to perform the test with the same type of equipment
that the operational pilot would use (i.e., wearing gloves when conducting a cockpit
evaluation).
Other considerations when developing the MOS are as follows:
– Spares, technical data, and support equipment
– Special facilities, special training, special tools
– Types and number of maintenance personnel
– Required skill levels
– Mockups, training aids, and simulators (ops & maintenance)
– Automated test equipment
– Software maturity
14.7 Reliability, Maintainability, Logistics Supportability, and Availability 979
OT&E, and in particular IOT&E, face significant limitations when conducting the
RML&A evaluation. The primary reason for this is that the system being evaluated is
not mature. For the most part, IOT&E will be conducted on an asset that is still in the
throes of a development program. The test environment is different from intended
operational environment and is still dependent on contractor support. There will prob-
ably be a lack of technical data or immature technical data. There will be limited time to
conduct the assessment, and there will be a limited number of test articles. One of the
more unfortunate outcomes can be an unfavorable rating of the system by evaluators
who do not understand the functional capabilities of the system in its present state.
As with the previous sections, RML&A uses specific definitions when defining
suitability. Giadrosich’s text covers the subject very well, and he has culled out the
specific terminology that evaluators should be familiar with. All of the terms have
commonality in that four characteristics are a common theme: probability, satisfactory
system performance, time, and conditions of use.
Reliability is a measure of a system’s capability to satisfactorily perform required
functions under stated conditions for a specific period of time. It entails a measure of
human and machine performance and the probability of successful performance. Critical
parameters that determine reliability are mean time between critical failure and the
probability of a loss of a mission essential function. As with CFR 14, 1301, studied
during the civil certification section, a failure is the loss of an intended function.
Because reliability cannot be measured accurately during DT&E and OT&E due to
system maturity and time constraints, evaluators often depend on a term called relia-
bility growth, which is projected by the use of modeling and simulation. The results are
only as good as model effort and how well the modelers understand how the system will
be used. The input to the model is the reliability data gathered during test.
There are three types of reliability projection estimates:
– Demonstrated/observed reliability
– End-of-test reliability
– Projected (mature system) reliability
Demonstrated/observed reliability is system reliability information directly obtained
during the DT&E and OT&E test programs. The results obtained during OT&E will be
different from those obtained from DT&E. The reasons for this discrepancy are that
OT&E counts all failures equally, even if a particular failure mode has been identified
and corrected, and the failure is not expected to occur again. End-of-test reliability is
also called current or instantaneous reliability. It is the demonstrated reliability as
adjusted by agreed upon growth factors or margins. Projected (mature system) relia-
bility uses agreed upon models and growth factors that extend or project end-of-test
reliability forward to a mature system. It assumes a continuation of the system design
corrections and improvements to correct identified system deficiencies. It also assumes
that the implemented fixes will work; FOT&E data are used to validate fixes.
Maintainability of a system is the ability to return or restore the system to an
operable state. It is really the cost of care and feeding for the system. Maintainability
looks at manpower and skill levels required to repair the system and can be a significant
cost when calculating life-cycle costs. Terms associated with maintainability are mean
down time (MDT) and mean time to repair (MTTR). Reliability and maintainability are
interrelated insofar as their effect on operational availability and system effectiveness.
Cost-benefit analysis of the system looks at both acquisition cost and maintenance cost;
a system may be very reliable but with a high acquisition cost, a competing system may
cost less but is less reliable system or has higher maintenance costs.
Logistics supportability is the degree to which the planned logistics and manpower
meet system availability and usage needs. It is measured during required maintenance
actions using trained user operators and maintenance personnel. Actions requiring an
inordinate amount of time will obviously have a direct impact on system availability.
Availability is the degree to which a system is in an operable state. It is different
from reliability in that reliability depends on a time interval and availability is at an
instant of time (i.e., is the system operable when needed). Availability will depend upon
how often the system is inoperable and how quickly it can be repaired. Availability is
expressed in operational terms:
– Uptime ratio, availability ¼ uptime/total time
– Inherent availability
Ai ¼ Successful operate time/(successful operate time þ active repair time)
Ai ¼ MTBF/(MBTF þ MTTR)
– Operational availability, all segments of time the system is intended to be operational.
Ao ¼ MTBM/(MTBM þ MDT)
where MTBF is mean time between failure, MTTR is mean time to repair, MTBM is
mean time between maintenance, and MDT is mean down time.
Other measures are used by the RML&A community to help describe availability
and sustainability and are mentioned here for the sake of completeness:
– Mission Capable (MC) Rate – The sum of: Fully Mission Capable (FMC) (that is the
system can perform all aspects of the mission) and Partially Mission Capable (PMC)
(that is the system can perform at least one assigned wartime mission)
MC ¼ FMC þ PMC
– Utilization Rate (UR) – Defined as flight hours or sorties per aircraft per relevant
period of time, normally calculated for peacetime and wartime utilization rates
UR ¼ number sorties per day=number aircraft
– Break Rate (BR) - Measures the percentage of sorties from which an aircraft returns
with an inoperable mission essential system; break rate includes both air and ground
aborts
BRð%Þ ¼ Number of breaks=Number of sorties flown
– Combat Rate (CR) - Measures the number of consecutively scheduled missions flown
before an aircraft experiences a critical failure
CR ¼ Number of successful sorties=ðscheduled sorties ground aborts air abortsÞ
– Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF) – Measures the average time between
failures of mission essential system functions (can be hardware or software)
MTBCF ¼ Number of operating hours=Number of Critical Failures
14.8 SUMMARY
In DT&E, the evaluators are tasked to determine if the system meets the requirements of
the specification, the stated capability or the terms of the contract. In fact, the majority
of the time spent in DT&E is to get the system to perform its intended function. DT&E
progresses from the development to demonstration phases of test until enough data are
collected to statistically prove that the requirements have been met. OT&E ensures that
the system is effective and suitable in real-world scenarios under operational conditions.
The test methodology is different, and more importantly the evaluators need to know
how the system will be utilized operationally as opposed to operations in a sanitized
test world.

As chapter 14 is really a study of a process and can vary from organization to organi-
zation around the world, there are no questions for this chapter. For generalized Test and
Evaluation fundamentals, the reader is referred back to chapter 1.
Index
A ACK field: see Acknowledge (ACK) field advanced targeting FLIR (AT-FLIR) 544
A380 121 acknowledge (ACK) field 86 advanced targeting pod (ATP) 544
A-32767 244 ACLS: see automatic carrier landing advisory circular (AC) 238, 300
AAA: see antiaircraft artillery (AAA) system (ACLS) Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) 300
ABC: see auto brightness control (ABC) ACM: see air combat maneuvering Advisory Group for Aerospace Research
ABF: see annular blast fragmentation (ACM) and Development (AGARD)
(ABF) ACO: see Aircraft Certification Office 536, 625, 832
above ground level (AGL) 52 (ACO) AGARD-AG-300, volume 10 803–4
altitude 173 acquisition programs 958–65 flight test techniques series 820
ABSAA system: see airborne sense and affordability and performance separation effects testing 820
avoid (ABSAA) system measurements 962 AEEC: see Airlines Electronic
absorption filters 930 operations and support 964 Engineering Committee (AEEC)
AC: see advisory circular (AC); phases of 959 AEG: see Aircraft Evaluation Group
alternating current (AC) technology development 962–3 (AEG)
AC 20-131A 238 user needs 960, 961 AEIS: see aircraft/store electrical
AC 20-138 330, 333 active collision and avoidance systems interconnection system (AEIS)
AC 20-138A 330 (ACAS) 893 Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM)
AC 20-138C 330 active detection 729 384
AC 20-158 157 active EO systems aerotriangulation 42
AC 20-165 377, 378 boresight accuracy 614 by arcs of range 43
AC 20-168 323 laser 614 cinetheodolites 42
AC 20-172A 377 beam divergence 616–17 AFCSS: see armament and fire control
AC 20-182 323 output power 617 system survey (AFCSS)
AC 23-8B 329 pulse amplitude 617–18 AFDX: see avionics full-duplex switched
AC 23-8C 323, 324, 329 pulse repetition interval 618 Ethernet (AFDX)
AC 23-18 382, 391, 395 pulse width 618 AGARD: see Advisory Group for
AC 25-7C 323, 324, 329 ranging accuracy 615–16 Aerospace Research and
weather radar tests 324–9 see also Laser system Development (AGARD)
AC 25-23 383, 391, 395 line-of-sight (LOS) AGC: see automatic gain control (AGC)
AC 25.899-1 157 drift rate 615 AGL: see above ground level (AGL)
AC 27-1B 324, 383 jitter 615 AHRS: see attitude heading reference
AC 29-2C 324, 383 active-matrix LCD (AMLCD) 946 system (AHRS)
AC 90-105 330 AD: see airworthiness directives (AD) AIF: see avionics integration facility
ACAS: see active collision and avoidance Ada 75 (AIF)
systems (ACAS) ADC: see air data computer (ADC) AIL: see avionics integration lab (AIL)
acceleration 46 ADF: see automatic direction finder (ADF) AIM-9 801
and velocity accuracy 205–6 ADL: see avionics development lab (ADL) AIM-120 801
accelerometer 191 ADS-B 893 AIM: see Aeronautical Information
types of 191 advanced medium-range air-to-air missile Manual (AIM)
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMRAAM) 764, 772 AIM-54 A/C 787
(AMC) 300 operations 163–4 AIM-120 AMRAAM 775, 778, 779
accuracies advanced range data system (ARDS) 224 AIM-54C Phoenix 163–4, 801
GPS 223–4 Advanced Safe Escape Program (ASEP) AIM-9 Sidewinder 764, 772
positional 223 816 AIM-7 Sparrow 163, 764, 771, 772,
accuracy tests, air-to-ground 803 Advanced Tactical Airborne 774–5, 776, 777
AC 20-138D 330 Reconnaissance System AI radars: see airborne intercept (AI)
ACJ: see Advisory Circular Joint (ACJ) (ATARS) 582 radars
983
984 Index
airborne early warning radar parameters modes of 787 performance evaluation 418
649 navigation 787 reduced vertical separation
airborne intercept (AI) radars 726–7 propulsion section profiles 787 minimums (RVSM) 352–4
airborne radar display processor (ARDP) reliability and maintainability 796–7 single-engine approach 418
654 systems test 797–803 airworthiness, positioning systems: see
airborne radar signal processor (ARSP) test and evaluation 789–91 positioning systems airworthiness
654 warhead section 787 airworthiness certificate 857–8
airborne sense and avoid (ABSAA) air-to-ground accuracy tests 803–4 military airworthiness requirements
system 896–7 see also Air-to-ground weapons 859–60
airborne targets 566, 567 air-to-ground range resolution test airworthiness directives (AD) 273
airborne warning and control system 695–6 airworthiness release (AWR) 825
(AWACS) 729 air-to-ground ranging radar 694–5 ALARMs: see air-launched antiradiation
Airbus 121 air-to-ground radar test 695–6 missiles (ALARMs)
air combat maneuvering (ACM) 689 ground moving target indicator alignment types, for INS 200–2
modes 651, 691, 692 (GMTI) mode 696–7 Allied Signal Bendix/King KRA-10A
Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) 275 air-to-ground release geometry 806–12 Radar Altimeter 174
Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) 277 continuous computing impact point all-up-round test (AURT) 797
aircraft(s) (CCIP) 808 ALQ-167 countermeasures set 750
attitude 45 manual weapons delivery 806–9 alternating current (AC), defined 155
clocks 53 modern weapons delivery 807–8 altitude 32, 52, 173–4
communications equipment 142–4 air-to-ground weapons 803 above ground level (AGL) 173
designers 640 accuracy tests 803 flow chart 80
exterior lighting 929 horizontal plane bomb trajectory 805 mean sea level (MSL) 173
glinting and HARM 837–8 minimum release altitude 811–12 measurement 173–4
NVIS flight tests 938 operational flight program weapons relationships 52
NVIS lighting ground tests 935–8 accuracy testing 820–1 return 672, 673
aircraft/store electrical interconnection sources of errors 809–11 AM: see amplitude modulation (AM)
system (AEIS) 100 vertical plane bomb trajectory 804 AMC: see Acceptable Means of
Aircraft Stores Interface Manual air traffic control (ATC) mode 235 Compliance (AMC)
(ASIM) 813 Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System American National Standards Institute
aircrews, responsibilities of 845 (ATCRBS) 234–5 (ANSI) 108
air data computer (ADC) 74 air traffic management (ATM) 330 American Radio Inc. (ARINC) 62, 87
Air Force Operational Test and airways, defined 175 American Standards Association (ASA)
Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) airworthiness 152
Test Director’s Toolkit 957 enhanced flight vision systems AMLCD: see active-matrix LCD
airframe types, for air-to-air missiles 786 (EFVS) 523 (AMLCD)
air-launched antiradiation missiles flight guidance systems (Part 23) amplitude modulation (AM) 143
(ALARMs) 721 412–18 AMRAAM: see advanced medium-range
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 270 cockpit control 413–14 air-to-air missile (AMRAAM)
Airlines Electronic Engineering compliance, alternate means of analog data 839
Committee (AEEC) 87 417–18 analog-to-digital (A/D) converter 64, 77
Airport Facility Directory 187 flight control recovery 418 analog TV systems 583–5
airport surveillance radars (ASRs) 728 flight guidance systems (Part 25) camera tubes 583
airspeed 7, 172–3 418 orthicon 584–5
air-to-air missiles flight management systems (FMS) vidicon 583–4
airframe types 786 506–7, 507–8 CRT 583
basic configuration 785–9 AC 20-167 523 analysis and reporting, of flight test
coordinate systems 786 landing systems program 848–9
lab and ground tests category I systems 471–9 in real time 848
fuse tests 792 category II systems 479–88 software routines 848
launch acceptability region category III systems 488 statistical analysis 848
determination 793 for landing and rollout in low video obtaining ways 848
radar cross section measurements visibility 495–503 writing report 848
792–3 for takeoff in low visibility see also Report writing
seeker tests 791–2 489–95 AN/APX-109 238
trajectory simulations 791–2 malfunction evaluations 414, 416 AN/AVS-6 915
warhead tests 792 maneuvering and approach AN/AVS-9 915
launcher qualification tests 793–6 malfunction 416–17 AN/DLQ-3C 750
missile coordinate system 787 normal flight malfunctions 415 anechoic chamber 50–1
Index 985
angle deception 739, 741 ARTCC system 877 autoacquisition mode 651
angle discrimination 747 artificial aperture 728 auto brightness control (ABC) 914
angle-on-jam (AOJ) 727, 746 ASA: see American Standards autoguns 651
ANL: see automatic noise leveling (ANL) Association (ASA) automatic carrier landing system
annular blast fragmentation (ABF) 788 A scope 651 (ACLS) 239
annunciators 927 ASEP: see Advanced Safe Escape Automatic Dependent Surveillance
LEDs 928 Program (ASEP) Broadcast (ADS-B) 374–382
ANSI: see American National Standards ASG: see aperiodic synchronization gap ADS-B Certification 377
Institute (ANSI) (ASG) ADS-B Out Airworthiness 377–379
antenna beamwidth versus resolution 666 ASIM: see Aircraft Stores Interface ADS-B In Airworthiness 379–382
antenna manual positioning 747 Manual (ASIM) automatic direction finder (ADF)
antenna pattern testing 149–50 ASN-130 144 defined 183
antennas 142 ASRs: see airport surveillance radars loop antenna 183
antenna switching, radio aids testing and (ASRs) operation of 183
188–90 Astec Z-12 48 automatic gain control (AGC)
antiaircraft artillery (AAA) 720 ASTM International 894 213, 746
antiradiation missile (ARM) 721 ATARS: see Advanced Tactical Airborne automatic noise leveling (ANL) 746
AN/ULQ-21(V) 750 Reconnaissance System automatic radio compass (ARC) 183
ANVIS: see aviators night vision imaging (ATARS) automatic teller machine (ATM) 580
system (ANVIS) AT-FLIR: see advanced targeting FLIR autopilots, UAV 889
AOJ: see angle-on-jam (AOJ) (AT-FLIR) auto throttles 891
aperiodic synchronization gap (ASG) 92 ATC mode: see air traffic control (ATC) evaluations 889–91
APG-XXX radar 655 mode malfunction testing 890
ARAC: see Aviation Rulemaking ATCRBS: see Air Traffic Control Radar submenu 890
Advisory Committee (ARAC) Beacon System (ATCRBS) USAR considerations 891–2
arbiter 53 ATM: see air traffic management auto-takeoff and auto-land systems 887
arbitrated loop topology 109–10, 113 (ATM); automatic teller machine availability 971, 980
ARC: see automatic radio compass (ATM) average power 638
(ARC) atmospheric absorption versus average power versus peak 638
ARC-XXX 144 frequency 629 Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
ARDP: see airborne radar display atmospheric effects Committee (ARAC) 272
processor (ARDP) radio aids testing and 190 aviators night vision imaging system
ARDS: see advanced range data system atmospheric noise 142 (ANVIS) 915
(ARDS) atmospheric propagation of radiation avionics development lab (ADL) 14
area navigation (RNAV) 336 556–62 avionics flight tester 21
B-RNAV 329 aerosols 557 avionics full-duplex switched Ethernet
defined 329 carbon dioxide 557, 558 (AFDX) 121
P-RNAV 329–30 extinction coefficient 556 avionics integration facility (AIF) 14
ARINC 429 86–9 absorption and scattering 556 avionics integration lab (AIL) 14
bus-drop topology 87 Beer–Lambert law for Avionics Navigation Systems, 2nd
multiple bus topology 88 transmittance 556 edition 167
RTZ tristate modulation 87–8 gases 557 avionics test 10
star topology 87 long-wave infrared (LWIR) 558, 562 programs 8–9
word format 88 LOWTRAN model 561 requirements 833–5
ARINC 629 89–93 mid-wave infrared (MWIR) 558, 562 AWACS: see airborne warning and
basic protocol aperiodic mode 92 modifying phenomena in 556 control system (AWACS)
basic protocol periodic mode 91 path radiance 557 AWACS Extend Sentry, B-1 115
combined protocol 91–2 refractive index fluctuations 557 awareness and warning system (TAWS)
message structure 90 transmittance 558–60 FLTA 383
word string 90 atomic frequency standard (AFS) functions 383
ARINC 629-2 90 anomaly on satellite 23 217–18 PDA 383
ARINC 629-3 90 ATP: see advanced targeting pod AWR: see airworthiness release (AWR)
ARINC: see American Radio Inc. (ARINC) (ATP) azimuth
ARM: see antiradiation missile (ARM) attitude heading reference system accuracies 37, 666–7, 688
armament and fire control system survey (AHRS) 705 defined 32
(AFCSS) 825 AURT: see all-up-round test (AURT) resolution 665, 695
ARN-118 144 Australian ground-based regional geometry 667
ARSP: see airborne radar signal processor augmentation system (GRAS) sample data card 668
(ARSP) 229, 332 tests 667
986 Index
B boarding steps 784 CAR: see Civil Aeronautics Regulation

background noise 640 Boeing 777 90 (CAR)
backscatter 686 Boeing Phantom Works carrier (CV) alignment 201
backscattering coefficients 694, 701 iNET by 130 carrier sense multiple access/collision
backup, PSSA 293 bolometer 575 detection (CSMA/CD) media
ballistics accuracy decision tree 819 bomb drag parameter (KD) 805 access 115
bank error 184 bomb drop and scoring 50 carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) 90
barometric altimeter 174, 333 bomb release unit (BRU) 778 CAS: see calibrated airspeed (CAS)
barometric altitude 45 Booker, Graham H., 535 ‘‘catcher’s mitt’’ test 795
baro-VNAV system 340, 342, 347 boredom, communications flight testing cathode ray tube (CRT) 942
flight test 347 and 151 miniature 945
ground test 347 boresight 608–9, 614 cathode ray tube (CRT) displays 577–9
barrage jamming 736 accuracy 614 cats and traps 50
basic area navigation (B-RNAV) 329 errors 809 CBA: see capability-based assessment
batch processing 135 BR: see break rate (BR) (CBA)
Battlehog series 854, 855 break rate (BR) 980 CBIT: see continuous BIT (CBIT)
BC: see bus controller (BC) bright source protection (BSP) 914 CBR: see constant bit rate (CBR)
beacon mode 693 bright spot 934 CCA: see common cause analysis (CCA)
flight testing 693 British Aerospace 91 CCIP: see continuous computing impact
beam shaping 630 B-RNAV: see basic area navigation point (CCIP)
beamwidth 142, 646, 667 (B-RNAV) CDD: see capability development
bearing accuracy 611 BRU: see bomb release unit (BRU) document (CDD)
data card 186 B scope 647 CDI: see course deviation indicator (CDI)
geometry 186 BSP: see bright source protection (BSP) CDL: see common data link (CDL)
HARM test matrix 842 built-in test (BIT) 185, 293, 772 CDRL: see contract data requirement list
NDB 185 pulse radar 653 (CDRL)
radar 688 bulk transfers 98 CDV: see command directed vehicle
VOR 185 bus (CDV)
Beidou 227 analyzer 63 CE: see concatenation event (CE);
Bell Laboratories 81 editors 64 conducted emission (CE)
BER: see bit error rate (BER) monitor CE circuit: see clutter elimination (CE)
best estimate trajectory (BET) 48 defined 63 circuit
BET: see best estimate trajectory (BET) types of 63–4 Center of Excellence for General
beyond line of sight (BLOS) bus controller (BC) 63 Aviation Research 897
communications 865 design 75–6 center of gravity (CG) 50
beyond visual range (BVR) 646 BVR: see beyond visual range (BVR) centripetal accelerations 194
BHMD: see binocular helmet mounted certificate of authorization (COA) 858,
display (BHMD) C 859
Biezad, Daniel J., 167 C-32767 244 certification 24
Bingo fuel 845 CAA: see Civil Aeronautics highly integrated system 285–98
binocular helmet mounted display Administration (CAA); Civil history 268–70
(BHMD) 948 Aeronautics Authority (CAA) process 274–82
binocular systems 946 CAB: see Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) of radio aids 190–1
BIT: see built-in test (BIT) CAGC: see clutter automatic gain control Type Certification Board 277–82
bit error rate (BER) 154, 876 (CAGC) see also airworthiness
bits 65–7 calibrated airspeed (CAS) 172 CFAR detectors: see constant false alarm
16-bit word 66 calibration curve, for thermocouple 126 rate (CFAR) detectors
blackbody calorimeter 575 CFE: see contractor furnished equipment
defined 547 CAM: see Civil Aeronautics Manuals (CFE)
emissivity factor of 547 (CAM) CFIT: see controlled flight into terrain
Planck’s law 549–50 CAN 1.0 85 (CFIT)
spectral radiation 549 CAN 2.0 85 CFR: see Code of Federal Regulations
Wien’s displacement law 549 Canadian CF-18s 732 (CFR)
Black-McKeller Act of 1934 269 CAN bus: see controller area network CG: see center of gravity (CG)
Block IIR-M constellation 215 (CAN) bus CGS: see chirp gate stealer (CGS)
BLOS communications: see beyond line capability-based assessment (CBA) 960 chaff 33, 50, 731
of sight (BLOS) communications capability development document chaff employment 742–3
BLU-107 Durandal Runway Buster 782 (CDD) 960, 970 chemical/biological/radiological (CBR)
B-52 missile interface unit test 156 captive carry tests 798–9 equipment 918
Index 987
chicken wire 934 COIs: see critical operational issues conical scan modulated jamming 738
Chinese satellite navigation augmentation (COIs) conical scan radars 726
system (SNAS) 229 combat rate (CR) 980 conical scan receive only (COSRO) 663
chirp gate stealer (CGS) 740 Combined Test Force (CTF) 3, 11 consent switch 784
C4I command, control, and communications constant bit rate (CBR) 899
advances in 258–9 intelligence (C3I) 258 constant false alarm rate (CFAR)
cinetheodolites 41–3 command and control processor (C2P) detectors 644
aerotriangulation 42 242 continuous BIT (CBIT) 755
film-read 41 command and control system 729 continuous computing impact point
tracking system 39 command directed vehicle (CDV) 854 (CCIP) 808
circular error probable (CEP) and drift command words continuous wave (CW) 210
rate 202–5 1553 systems 68–70 contract data requirement list (CDRL)
CIU: see converter interface unit (CIU) anomalous conditions 70–1 9–11, 849
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 269 subaddress fields MIL-STD-1760 102 contractor and subtier specifications
Civil Aeronautics Administration synchronization pattern 67–8 20–1
(CAA) 269 commercial off the shelf (COTS) 961 contractor flight testing 2
Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) 269 common cause analysis (CCA) 294 ‘‘contractor format,’’ 11
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 269 common mode analysis 294 contractor furnished equipment (CFE)
Civil Aeronautics Manuals (CAM) 270 particular risks analysis 293–4 839
Civil Aeronautics Regulation (CAR) zonal safety analysis 294 contractual requirements 9–11
269–70 common data link (CDL) 864–5 controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 382
recodification of 270 common mode analysis, CCA 294 controller area network (CAN) bus 84–6
Civil Certification of Automatic communications flight test CAN 2.0A frame format 85
Dependent Surveillance aircraft communications equipment CAN 2.0B format 85–6
Broadcast (ADS-B) 865 142–4 controller pilot data link communications
Class Beta 331 basics 140–2 (CPDLC) 239
Class Beta-1 equipment 331 boredom 151 control room 51
Class Beta-2 equipment 332 effects of stores, landing gear, and control transfers 98
Class Beta-3 equipment 332 flaps 149 converter interface unit (CIU) 64
Class 4 Gamma and Delta equipment 332 EMI/EMC 154–8 arrangement 77
clean emitter 754 elimination 161–4 C-150 OPA 901
clear to send (CTS) 83 testing 158–9, 161 Coriolis effect 195
clutter automatic gain control (CAGC) executing the matrix 148–9 Coriolis forces 194
689 logistics 150 correlation table (CRT) 960
clutter elimination (CE) circuit 747 overview 139 cosmetic blemishes 934
CMDS: see countermeasure dispenser requirements 144 COSRO: see conical scan receive only
system (CMDS) speech intelligibility 151–4 (COSRO)
CMOS: see complementary metal oxide test plan matrix 146–8 cost-benefit analysis 980
semiconductor (CMOS) three basic steps COTS: see commercial off the shelf
COA: see certificate of authorization compliance tests 145 (COTS)
(COA) static test 144–5 countermeasure dispenser system
cockpits 301–22 ‘‘warm fuzzy’’ test 145 (CMDS) 756
controls and displays weather and 149–50 course deviation indicator (CDI) 178
design principles 304–9 communications security (COMSEC) cover pulse jamming 736
standardization 321–2 custodian 150 covert lighting 929
tests and evaluation 314–21 COMPASS BeiDou 213 CPDLC: see controller pilot data link
FAA identified problems 303–4 compatibility, defined 971 communications (CPDLC)
crew interface 303 complementary metal oxide CR: see combat rate (CR)
disengagement behavior 303 semiconductor (CMOS) 545 CRC: see cyclical redundancy check
mode awareness 303 complex system (CRC)
mode behavior 303 defined 285 critical operational issues (COIs) 970,
speed and altitude protection 303 compliance tests 145 972–3
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information COMSEC custodian: see communications critical technical parameters (CTPs) 972
(CDTI) 375 security (COMSEC) custodian cross-eye (X-EYE) jammer 741–2
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 270 concatenation event (CE) 92 cross-polarization (X-POLE) 740, 741
Federal Aviation Administration conducted emission (CE) 155 CRT: see cathode ray tube (CRT);
(FAA) in 270–3 conducted susceptibility (CS) 155 correlation table (CRT)
coefficient and ballistic dispersion cone of confusion, radio aids testing and crypto keys 150
(CEP) 815 190 CS: see conducted susceptibility (CS)
988 Index
C scope 651 data reduction and processing facilities DID: see data item description (DID)
CSMA: see carrier sense multiple access 24–5 differentially corrected GPS 48
(CSMA) data set ready (DSR) 82 differentially corrected positioning
CTF: see Combined Test Force (CTF) data terminal ready (DTR) 82 service (DCPS) 335
CTPs: see critical technical parameters data transmission equipment (DTE) 81–3 diffraction 140
(CTPs) data words digital converter unit 64
CTS: see clear to send (CTS) 1553 systems 73–4 digital data 839
cumulative probability of detection (Pc) DBS: see Doppler beam sharpening digital flight control system (DFCS) 155
645 (DBS) digital subscriber line (DSL) connection
customer expectations 21–2 DCD: see data carrier detect (DCD) 99
CW: see continuous wave (CW) DCE: see data communications digital terrain elevations (DTEs) 700
cyclical redundancy check (CRC) 86 equipment (DCE) digital TV systems 585–6
MIL-STD-1760 104 DE: see directed energy (DE) CCD sensors 585
dead-face filters 927 advantages and disadvantages 585
D deception 721 CMOS 585
DA: see destination address (DA) deception jammer 737 advantages and disadvantages 585
dark (black) spot 934 deception jamming systems 738–9 sensors 585–6
DAS: see detector angular subtense types of 739–42 SMPD 585, 586
(DAS); distributed aperture decibel 626 dilution of precision (DOP) 39, 44–5, 221
system (DAS) negative 627 effect of satellite removal on 221
DASS: see distress alerting satellite decoders (type 1, 2) 768 directed energy (DE) 721
system (DASS) decoy deployment 50 direction finding (DF) mode 144
data, processing 51 Defence Evaluation Research Agency direct threat radar systems 726
data acquisition, reduction and analysis (DERA) 948 dirty emitter 754
instrumentation Defense Research Associates (DRA) displays
calibration curve for thermocouple sense and avoid system 897–8 CRT 577–9
126 Defense Systems Acquisition Review LCD 579–81
counts 126 Council (DSARC) 958 overview 577
for forced-air cooling 126 Defense Test and Evaluation Professional dissimilarity, PSSA 293
PCM system 124–30 Institute 30 distance measuring equipment (DME)
real-time telemetry 130–1 delta azimuth (DAz) 41 179–80
postflight data reduction 135 delta elevation (DEl) 41 distress alerting satellite system (DASS)
real-time data 132–4 demonstration program 18 215
data acquisition routines 17 DEP: see design eye point (DEP) distributed aperture system (DAS) 946
data arrival, asynchronous 54 Department of Defense Directive diurnal cycle 564
data bus editors 25 (DoDD) 958 DLQ-38 791, 792
data busses 86–9, 89–93, 93–6, 99–100, Department of Defense (DOD) 748 DLZ: see dynamic launch zone (DLZ)
118–21 depression angle DME: see distance measuring equipment
AFDX 121 DNS 208 (DME)
CAN bus 84–6 DERA: see Defence Evaluation Research DNS: see Doppler navigation system
Ethernet 115–18 Agency (DERA) (DNS)
fiber channel (FC) 108–15 design eye point (DEP) 809 doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
MIL-STD-1760D 100–8 destination address (DA) 116 leadership and education,
problems 122–3 detection of targets at sea 684–7 personnel and facilities
RS-232C 81–4 detector angular subtense (DAS) 594 (DOTMLPF) 963
USB 96–9 detectors 545 documentation 298–9, 958
data carrier detect (DCD) 83 cooling 575 EASA and FAA, 300–1
data communications equipment (DCE) IR 569–70 DOD: see Department of Defense (DOD)
81–3 determinism DoDD: see Department of Defense
data encoding Link 16 systems 256 Directive (DoDD)
1553 systems 67–8 development test and evaluation DoD 5000 series 958
data item description (DID) 10, 849 (DT&E) 2, 3, 10, 957, 964, 967 DOP: see dilution of precision (DOP)
data link latency evaluations 884–5 definition 968 Doppler, PRF versus closure for
data link systems, navigation systems 238 versus OT&E 968 unambiguous 679
C4I, advances in 258 TEMP documents 964 Doppler ambiguities 676–80
comparisons 256–7 DFCS: see digital flight control system Doppler beam sharpening (DBS) 649,
flight testing of 257–8 (DFCS) 706–10
Link 16 operation 240 DF mode: see direction finding (DF) Doppler characteristics 668–71
tactical background 239–40 mode Doppler clutter regions 671–6
Index 989
Doppler clutter spectrum 674, 677 earth rotation rate compensation 193 electronic warfare systems test and
Doppler discrimination 747 ECCM: see electronic counter- evaluation 748–60
Doppler effect 207 countermeasures (ECCM) flare employment 743–5
elimination 682 ECM threat simulation pod 750 noise jamming 734–8
Doppler filters 644 ECP: see engineering change proposal terminology 721–3
Doppler frequency 668, 670, 671 (ECP) threat 724–8
accounted for with a constant edge glow 933–4 Electronic Warfare Integrated Systems
frequency segment 683 EDR: see expanded data request (EDR) Test Laboratory (EWISTL) 838
computation 669 Edwards Air Force Base 23 electronic warfare systems test and
computation of the true 671 EEC: see essential employment capability evaluation 748–60
Doppler GPS 45 (EEC) architecture of 749
see also Global positioning system EFAbus (Eurofighter bus) 93, 94 test range parameters 753
(GPS) effective radiated power (ERP) 736 electro-optical (EO) systems 810–11
Doppler navigation system (DNS) 206, EFVS: see enhanced flight vision systems components and performance
207, 684 (EFVS) CRT displays 577–9
advantages and disadvantages 211–12 EGNOS: see European geostationary detector cooling 575
aircraft velocity components 210 navigation overlay service displays 577
beam arrangements 209 (EGNOS) field of view 576–7
depression angle 208 EGPWS: see enhanced ground proximity LCD 579–81
errors 211 warning system (EGPWS) optics 576
flight testing of 212–13 EHF bands: see extra-high-frequency scanning techniques 568–9
Doppler noise jammer 740 (EHF) bands flight test evaluations
Doppler profile 678 EIA 422 82 basic descriptions 594
Doppler proximity fusing 765 EIA 423 82 bearing accuracy 611
Doppler radar 727 EIA: see Electronic Industries Alliance boresight 608–9
Doppler resolution 671 (EIA) drift rate 610
Doppler return EIA 232E 82 equivalent bar pattern 596, 597, 598
zero, as a function of dive angle 674 EIA (RS) 232C signals 84 field of regard (FOR) 608
Doppler sensitivity 630 Einstein, Albert 588 field of view (FOV) 608
Doppler shift 45, 207–11, 630, 672, 772 ejection launcher 794 jitter 611
Doppler-shifted carrier frequency 678 test requirements 796 minimum resolvable temperature
drift rate EL: see electroluminescent (EL) differential 613
CEP and 202–5 electrical noise, defined 141 MTF 596
EO system 611 electric noise 630 noise equivalent temperature
of laser designator 615 electroluminescent (EL) 945 differential 613–14
DSARC: see Defense Systems Acquisition electromagnetic (EM) fields 154–5 other tests 612–13
Review Council (DSARC) electromagnetic interference/ sensor slew rate 609–10
DS-0 channels 864 electromagnetic compatibility target discrimination 597, 598
DSL connection: see digital subscriber (EMI/EMC) 139–40, 154–8, target tracking 612
line (DSL) connection 874–6 passive devices
DSR: see data set ready (DSR) elimination 161–4 FLIR 582
DTE: see data transmission equipment testing 158–61 IRLS 581–2
(DTE) four phases of 158–9 IRST 586–7
DT&E: see development test and issues 161 television systems 583–7
evaluation (DT&E) method of 160–1 Electro-Optical Imaging Performance,
DTEs: see digital terrain elevations electromagnetics 154, 155 5th edition 535
(DTEs) electronic attack (EA) 721, 730 electro-optical sensor 64
DT&E testers 12–13, 14–15 electronic counter-countermeasures elevation, defined 32
DTR: see data terminal ready (DTR) (ECCM) 720 elevation accuracies 37
Duty cycle 638 electronic countermeasures 729 EMCON: see emission control (EMCON)
Duty factor 638 electronic imaging system 536–7 EM fields: see electromagnetic (EM) fields
Dynamic launch zone (DLZ) 792 Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA) 81 emission control (EMCON) 721
electronic protection (EP) measures 745–7 emission point 934
E electronic warfare (EW) emissions reduction 731
EA: see electronic attack (EA) air defense systems 728–9 emissivity, IR systems 547–9
EA-6B Prowlers 733 chaff employment 742–3 of blackbody 547
early warning radars (EWRs) 724 deception jamming 738–42 Kirchhoff’s law 547
earth models 39–41 electronic attack 729–33 Stefan–Boltzmann law 548
differences 40 electronic protection measures 745–7 of surface 547
990 Index
encryption 24 European Aviation Safety Administration FC: see fiber channel (FC)
keys 143 (EASA) 267 FDE: see fault detection and exclusion
end of frame (EOF) field 86 EASA and FAA documents, (FDE)
end of transmission (EOT) word 89 differences between 300–1 F-15E 23
engineering change proposal (ECP) 12 European Aviation Safety Agency 300 FEATS: see Future European Air
engineering unit (EU) converted data European geostationary navigation Traffic Management System
63 overlay service (EGNOS) 225, (FEATS)
Engineer’s Manual, The 154 229, 231–2 FED: see field emission display (FED)
enhanced bit rate (EBR) 1553, 99–100 European Geostationary Navigation Federal Aviation Act of 1958 270
topology 99 Overlay Service (EGNOS) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
enhanced flight vision systems (EFVS) (ESA) 225, 229 48, 152, 267
airworthiness certification 523 European Space Agency (ESA) 226 in Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
with HUD 526 European technical standard order 270–3
enhanced flight vision systems (EFVS) (ETSO) 300 EASA and FAA documents,
522–3, 943 evaluators, notes for differences between 300–1
general and specific requirements concerning documentation 298–9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRV)
525–6 evaporograph 575 720
enhanced ground proximity warning EVS: see enhanced vision systems (EVS) FFAR: see folding fin aircraft rocket
system (EGPWS) 382 EW: see electronic warfare (EW) (FFAR)
see also Terrain awareness and EWRs: see early warning radars (EWRs) FHA: see functional hazard assessment
warning system (TAWS) expanded data request (EDR) 690 (FHA)
enhanced vision systems (EVS) 520 expansion port (E Port) 113 fiber channel (FC) 108–15
airworthiness 523–7 expected positional error (EPE) 221–2 frame, sequence, and exchange
general requirements 524 explosive train 765 structure 114
installation requirements 527 exterior NVIS lighting methods 929–30 port types 113
intended function 523 modifications 930–1 topologies 109, 113
performance evaluation 527 external noise 142 fiber-optic gyro (FOG) 199
specific requirements 524–5 extra-high-frequency (EHF) bands 141 field emission display (FED) 942
enhanced flight vision systems extrapolation 54 field of regard (FOR) 608, 764
(EFVS) 522–3 field of view (FOV) 607, 608, 651, 764
EOF field: see end of frame (EOF) F of HARM 842
field F-14A/D 646 fields, defined 154
EO systems: see electro-optical (EO) F-15 76 figure of merit (FOM) 917
systems system boresighting and 810 fire Scout 855
EOT word: see end of transmission F-16 76, 156 fiscal accountability 21
(EOT) word F-18 76 fixed-format messages 248–50
EP: see electronic protection (EP) F-117 156, 641 fixed target track (FTT) 697
EPE: see expected positional error F/A-18 115 flaps, communications flight testing and
(EPE) F/A-18C 23 149
E Port: see expansion port (E Port) FA: see false alarm (FA) flare employment 743–4
ERP: see effective radiated power (ERP) FAA: see Federal Aviation infrared protective measures 744–5
errors Administration (FAA) flare rejection capability 744
air-to-ground sources of 809–11 FAA data tapes 654 flashing 934
DNS 211 FAA Form 337 274 flickering 934
GPS 217–21 FAA Part 25 76 flight briefs 844
ESA: see European Space Agency fabric port (F Port) 113 flight crew 843–4
(ESA) false alarm (FA) flight guidance systems 410–59
escort jamming 733 rate 643 airworthiness certification (Part 23)
ESD-TR-86-278 322 threshold 643 412–18
essential employment capability (EEC) time 643 cockpit control 413–14
10, 18 false replies uncorrelated in time compliance, alternate means of
ethernet 115–18 (FRUIT) 237 417–18
fields and number of bytes per field false target creation 731 flight control recovery 418
116 false target generation 738, 739 malfunction evaluations 414, 416
star topology 117 F-35 AMLCD HMD 946, 947 maneuvering and approach
ETSO: see European technical standard FAR 21.21 279 malfunction 416–17
order (ETSO) FAR 21.33 281 normal flight malfunctions 415
EU converted data: see engineering unit fast time constant (FTC) 747 performance evaluation 418
(EU) converted data fault detection and exclusion (FDE) 224 single-engine approach 418
Index 991
airworthiness certification (Part 25) 418 for FLTA 392–4 free-text messages 248–9
autopilot MUH 440–1 installation types and 391–2 frequency Allocation Council 51
compliance 437–40 negative climb rate or altitude loss frequency allocations 51
control, indications and alerts 422–3 after takeoff 397–8 frequency-hopping mode 143
disengagement failure 419–20 for PDA function 394, 395 frequency modulation (FM) 143, 646
disengagements, under rare and wind shear warnings 401 frequency modulation ranging (FMR)
nonnormal conditions 420–2 TCAS 365 methods 739
hazardous loads and deviations, terrain avoidance (TA) 702–5 Fried, Walter R., 167, 168
protection from 423–6 terrain following (TF) 702–5 FRP: see full rate production (FRP)
HUD considerations 429–31 flight tester’s task FRUIT: see false replies uncorrelated in
mode characteristics 431–6 1553 systems 79–80 time (FRUIT)
quick disengagement 418–19 Flight Testing of Radio Navigation FSD program: see full-scale development
speed protection 426–9 Systems 167 (FSD) program
transients, by disengagements 420 flight test readiness reviews (FTRR) 977 FSPI: see full-speed peripheral interface
transients, by engagement 420 flight test team, responsibilities of 843, (FSPI)
components 412 844 FTC: see fast time constant (FTC)
documentation for 411 flight test techniques series FTJU: see fuel tank jettison unit (FTJU)
Flight Information Services-Broadcast AGARD 820 FTRR: see flight test readiness reviews
(FIS-B) 375, 379 FLIR: see forward-looking infrared (FTRR)
flight management systems (FMS) (FLIR) FTT: see fixed target track (FTT)
airworthiness certification 506–7 Flood lighting 928 fuel lab 50
airworthiness requirements 507–8 FLTA: see forward-looking terrain fuel tank jettison unit (FTJU) 768
AC 20-167 523 avoidance (FLTA) full operational capability (FOC) 227
flight tests 509–10 Fluid-expansion thermometer 575 full rate production (FRP) 969
multisensor 510 Fly-fix-fly 15–16, 23 full-scale development (FSD) program 8
multisensor flight tests 510 FM: see frequency modulation (FM) full-speed peripheral interface (FSPI) 97
flight test FM-CW Doppler radar 727 functional hazard assessment (FHA)
of data link systems 257–8 FM ranging 681 290–2
of DNS 212–13 flight testing of radar altimeters 683–4 functional requirements document
of GPS 233 radar altimeters 681–3 (FRD) 14, 79, 835
of IFF systems 238 FMR methods: see frequency modulation fuse tests, for air-to-air missiles 792
inertial navigation system (INS) ranging (FMR) methods fusing mechanisms weapons integration
acceleration and velocity accuracy FOC: see full operational capability 764–5
205–6 (FOC) Future European Air Traffic Management
alignment types 200–2 focal plane array (FPA) 545 System (FEATS) 329
circular error probable and drift FOG: see fiber-optic gyro (FOG)
rate 202–5 folding fin aircraft rocket (FFAR) 827 G
navigation updates 206–7 follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) 969 GAGAN: see GPS-Aided Geo
time to align 199–200 FOM: see figure of merit (FOM) Augmented Navigation
of INS FOR: see field of regard (FOR) (GAGAN)
acceleration and velocity accuracy forced-air cooling, instrumentation for GAI systems: see GPS-aided INS (GAI)
205–6 126 systems
alignment types 200–2 forward-looking infrared (FLIR) 62, 382, galactic noise 142, 630
circular error probable and drift 582 Galileo 213, 226, 226–7
rate 202–5 categories of 582 GBAS: see ground-based augmentation
navigation updates 206–7 line-of-sight (LOS) 587 system (GBAS)
time to align 199–200 long-wave infrared (LWIR) 582 GBS 863
need for 6–7 mid-wave infrared (MWIR) 582 GBU-15 764
objective 5–6 purpose of 582 GCE communications: see ground control
organization 4–5 staring systems 582 element (GCE) communications
SAR 710 thermal imaging systems 540, 541, 542 GCI: see ground controlled intercept
TAWS 391–401 forward-looking terrain avoidance (GCI)
advisory callout 400 (FLTA) 383 GCI-type display 751
excessive closure rate to terrain 396–7 FOT&E: see follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) GCU: see gun control unit (GCU)
excessive downward deviation from FOV: see field of view (FOV) GDOP: see geometric dilution of
an ILS glideslope 400 FPA: see focal plane array (FPA) precision (GDOP)
excessive rate of descent 396 FRD: see functional requirements gear handle, position of 784
flight into terrain when not in document (FRD) geodesy for the Layman 39–40
landing configuration 398 free-stream ballistics 815 geoid 40
992 Index
geometric dilution of precision (GDOP) GPWS: see ground proximity warning helicopters
38–9, 221 system (GPWS) delivery considerations for 824–5
cinetheodolite 39 GRAS: see ground-based regional guided missile 827–8
GFE: see government furnished augmentation system (GRAS) guns 826–7
equipment (GFE) grazing angle 672, 684–5 rockets 827
Gigabit Ethernet 116 scattering regions defined by 686 specific weapons types 826
GIVE: see grid ionospheric vertical error grid ionospheric vertical error (GIVE) helicopter TAWS (HTAWS) 382, 409–10
(GIVE) 220 helmet mounted display systems (HMD)
glinting/quadrantal effect 184 ground-based augmentation system 908, 939
global navigation satellite system (GBAS) 225, 229, 330 components 942–4
(GNSS) 64, 213, 333 ground-based regional augmentation equipment, test and evaluation of 949
GPS errors 217–21 system (GRAS) 229, 232, 332 flight test of 953–4
GPS inaccuracy, contributors to 221–4 ground-based tracking radars 48 helmet tracking systems (HTS) 948–9
Pseudoranging 216 ground control element (GCE) optical design 944–7
satellite augmentation systems 229–32 communications 861, 889 overview 939–42
satellite systems 225–8 ground controlled intercept (GCI) 725 qualitative ground testing 950–3
global positioning system (GPS) 30, 44, ground mapping radar 648 quantitative testing 949–50
839 parameters 649 requirements 940
accuracies 223–4 ground moving target indicator (GMTI) unacceptable design 944
certifications mode 696–7 helmet tracking systems (HTS) 948–9
cockpit display and 318 GMTI and GMTT flight testing 697–8 Hershel, Sir William 536
equipment classes 331 groundmoving target track (GMTT) HF bands: see high-frequency (HF) bands
MOPS 331, 333 696–7 HFRs: see height finder radars (HFRs)
TSO 331 ground proximity warning system high-density digital recorders (HDDR)
degradations 39 (GPWS) 382 131
differentially corrected 48 see also Terrain awareness and high-energy lasers (HEL) 566
errors 217–21 warning system (TAWS) high-frequency (HF) bands 141
flight test objectives 233 ground tests 748 high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF)
inaccuracy, contributors to 221–4 NVG 931–4 156, 279
as navigational aid 224–5 ground wave 141 highly integrated system, certification
nine-state vector 216 guided missile 827–8 considerations for 285–98
operational testing 234 gun control unit (GCU) 768 compliance 286
operation of 214 guns 721, 776, 781, 826–7 defined 285
pseudoranging 216–17 gyrocompass alignment 195, 196 references 285
recap 233 gyro-stabilized platforms INS 192–7 safety assessment 290–6
receivers, stand-alone 44–6 CCA 294
satellite augmentation systems 225–8 H certification plan 296–8
satellite systems 225–8 HARM: see high-speed antiradiation FHA 290–2
total electron content map 219 missile (HARM) PSSA 293, 295
user-defined outage levels 220 HAT: see height above terrain (HAT) SSA 295
weapons integration testing 233–4 Have Quick/Have Quick II 143 high-speed antiradiation missile (HARM)
GLONASS operational system 225–6 HDDR: see high-density digital recorders accuracy test matrix 843
GMTI mode: see ground moving target (HDDR) aircraft glinting and 837–8
indicator (GMTI) mode HDOP: see horizontal dilution of carriage, allowable flight envelope for
GMTT: see groundmoving target track precision (HDOP) 832
(GMTT) header word format field of view (FOV) of 842
GNS landing systems 468–70 MIL-STD-1760 104 integration flight test program
GNSS: see global navigation satellite heading 170–2 analysis and reporting 848–9
system (GNSS) measurement of 170–2 avionics test requirements 833–5
GNSS/SBAS equipment 335 heading scale 171 responsibilities of test team 843–7
government furnished equipment/ head orientation and position (HOP) 948 test planning 835–43
contractor furnished equipment head steered forward looking infra-red vehicle test requirements 831–3
(GFE/CFE) 14 (HSFLIR) sensor 948 operations 163
government furnished equipment (GFE) heads-up display (HUD) 177 responsible test organizations 835
8, 833, 839 mode 651, 692 high-speed antiradiation missiles
GPS: see global positioning system (GPS) heat flux 554 (HARMs) 721
GPS-Aided Geo Augmented Navigation height above terrain (HAT) 698 high-speed peripheral interface (HSPI)
(GAGAN) 229, 232 height finder radars (HFRs) 725 97
GPS-aided INS (GAI) systems 46 HEL: see high-energy lasers (HEL) Hi-8 record systems 845
Index 993
HIRF: see high-intensity radiated fields network after bus initialize 119 iNET: see integrated network-enhanced
(HIRF) packet frame 121 telemetry (iNET)
HMD: see helmet mounted display topology 118 in-flight alignment 201
systems (HMD) IFAST: see Integrated Facility for infrared (IR) missiles, characteristics of
HMI: see human machine interface Avionic Systems Testing (IFAST) 744–5
(HMI) IFF system: see identification friend or infrared (IR) signature 7
HOJ: see home-on-jam (HOJ) foe (IFF) system infrared (IR) systems 536
Holst, Gerald C., 535 IFF tracks 654 radiation fundamentals 547–51
home-on-jam (HOJ) 727, 746 IFR: see instrument flight rules (IFR) emissivity 547–9
honeycomb pattern 934 IFR high-altitude chart legend 176 Lambert’s law of cosines 551
hood extension, effects of lens 913 IGI: see integrated GPS/INS (IGI) Planck’s law 549, 550
HOP: see head orientation and position IHADSS: see Integrated Helmet and spectral distribution of energy 549
(HOP) Display Sighting System Stefan–Boltzmann law 548
horizontal dilution of precision (HDOP) 39 (IHADSS) transmission properties 550, 551
horizontal DOP (HDOP) 221 IJMS: see inadvertent jettison monitoring Wien’s displacement law 549
host controller 97 system (IJMS) terminology 546–7
Hot Mike 128, 134 ILC Data Device Corp., 62 see also specific Infrared (IR)
HQ USAF/TE 958 ILS: see instrument landing systems infrared search and track (IRST) 586–7
HSFLIR sensor: see head steered forward (ILS); integrated logistics support AN/AAS-42 587
looking infra-red (HSFLIR) sensor (ILS) concept 586
HSPI: see high-speed peripheral interface image disparity 934 DAS-IRST 587
(HSPI) image distortion 934 EO-DAS 587
HTAWS: see helicopter TAWS image intensification (I2) technology EOTS 587
(HTAWS) 909–11 IR-OTIS 587
HTS: see helmet tracking systems (HTS) imminent destruction 731 PIRATE 587
hubbed loop topology 110, 113 inadvertent jettison monitoring system range calculation 586–7
hubs 97 (IJMS) 840 technologies used in 586–7
HUD: see heads-up display (HUD) incandescent lights 930 initial OT&E (IOT&E) 969, 979
Hudson, R. D., 536 absorption filters 930 Innovative Solutions and Support
Hudson, Ralph G., 154 interference filters 930 (IS&S) 279
human factors 303–4 INCITS: see International Committee for INS: see inertial navigation system (INS)
human factors issues Information Technology INS/GPS program 48
NVG 918–20 Standards (INCITS) INS/IRU 336
human machine interface (HMI) 4 ‘‘index of refraction’’ 34 instrumentation
Indian GPS-aided geo augmented calibration curve for thermocouple 126
I navigation (GAGAN) 229 counts 126
IADS: see Integrated Air Defense System Indian regional navigation satellite for forced-air cooling 126
(IADS) system (IRNSS) 214, 228, 229 PCM system 124–30
IAG: see inertially aided GPS (IAG) Indian Space Research Organization real-time telemetry 130–1
IAS: see indicated airspeed (IAS) (ISRO) 228 instrument flight rules (IFR) 703
ICAO: see International Civil Aviation indicated airspeed (IAS) 172 instrument landing systems (ILS) 62,
Organization (ICAO) inertial-aided GPS receivers 46–7 459–67
ICD: see interface control document inertially aided GPS (IAG) 46 installations 183
(ICD) inertial navigation system (INS) 5, 38, Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
identification friend or foe (IFF) system 46, 64, 78, 80, 728 728
airport surveillance radar 234–5 accelerometer 191 Integrated Facility for Avionic Systems
flight testing of 238 flight testing Testing (IFAST) 838
interrogation timing 236 acceleration and velocity accuracy integrated GPS/INS (IGI) 46
interrogators 237–8 205–6 Integrated Helmet and Display Sighting
mode S 237 alignment types 200–2 System (IHADSS) 943
modes used in 65, 235–7 circular error probable and drift integrated logistics support (ILS) 5
IDS: see integration design specification rate 202–5 Integrated Navigation and Guidance
(IDS); interface design navigation updates 206–7 Systems 167
specification (IDS) time to align 199–200 integrated network-enhanced telemetry
IEEE 802 115 gyro-stabilized platforms 192–7 (iNET) 130
IEEE 1394 118–21 platform structure 192 system interfaces 130–1
asynchronous subaction 120 strap-down systems 197–9 integration design specification (IDS) 13
cable configuration completion 119 test 38 integration flight test program, for HARM
isochronous subaction 121 theory 46 analysis and reporting 848–9
994 Index
avionics test requirements 833–5 IPT-based flight test program 12–13 Johnson, John 597, 598
responsibilities of test team 843–7 IR detectors Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems
test planning 835–43 cooling 575 (JAUS) 856
vehicle test requirements 831–3 photon detectors functionality 857
integrity photoconductive radiation 573 joint direct attack munition (JDAM) 721
defined 224 photoemissive radiation 572 Joint ElectronicsType Designation
types of 224 photovoltaic radiation 573–4 System (JETDS) 144
interactive batch processing 135 semiconductors 574–5 Joint Strike Fighter 115, 123
interface control document (ICD) 73, 74, thermal detectors Joint Tactical Information Distribution
835 bolometer 575 System (JTIDS) 240
interface design specification (IDS) 73, calorimeter 575 architecture 244–8
79, 835 evaporograph 575 communications modes 250–1
interference blanking 759 fluid-expansion thermometer 575 RF signal 250–2
interference filters 930 thermocouple 574 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 258
interim operational flight program IR line scanner (IRLS) Joint Technical Architecture (JTA)
(IOFP) 16 analog 581, 582 standards 863
interior NVIS lighting methods 924 defined 581 Joint Test Team (JTT) 3, 12
modifications 925–8 digital 582 Joint Worldwide Intelligence
interleave function 705 framing sensors 582 Communications System
interleaving 692 push broom sensors 582 (JWICS) 864
interlocks 785 scan rate 581 Joker fuel 845
intermission (Int) field 86 velocity-to-height (V:H) ratio 581 J series messages
internal inertial reference system (IRS) 46 whisk broom sensors 582 of Link 16 system 240
internal noise 142 IRLS: see IR line scanner (IRLS) JSTARS 729
International Civil Aviation Organization IRNSS: see Indian regional navigation JTA standards: see Joint Technical
(ICAO) 329 satellite system (IRNSS) Architecture (JTA) standards
International Committee for Information IRS: see internal inertial reference system JTIDS: see Joint Tactical Information
Technology Standards (INCITS) (IRS) Distribution System (JTIDS)
108 IR sources JTIDS TDMA 244–5
Interoperability, defined 971–2 controlled sources 552 JTRS: see Joint Tactical Radio System
interpolation 54 natural sources 552–4 (JTRS)
Interrange Instrumentation Group (IRIG) celestial sources 552–3 JTT: see Joint Test Team (JTT)
Standard 106-07 840 defined 552 JWICS: see Joint Worldwide Intelligence
interrogators, IFF 237–8 moon 552 Communications System
interrupted alignments reflectance/emittance of 552 (JWICS)
power interrupt 202 sun 552, 553–4
taxi interrupt 202 terrestrial sources 552 K
interrupt transfers 98 IRST: see infrared search and track (IRST) Kalman filter 46–7, 697
In-Trail Procedure (ITP) application 380 IR systems: see infrared (IR) systems Kayton, Myron 167, 168
Introduction to Airborne Early Warning isochronous transfers 98 KEAS: see knots equivalent airspeed
Radar Flight Test 625 ISRO: see Indian Space Research (KEAS)
Introduction to Airborne Radar, 3rd Organization (ISRO) KG-84 150
edition 625 IS&S: see Innovative Solutions and Kinemetrics 53
Introduction to Avionics Flight Test 626 Support (IS&S) Kirchhoff, Gustav 536
Introduction to Infrared and Electro- iteration rate 45, 46 Kirchhoff’s law 547
Optical Systems 535 ITU-T H.264 AVC 900 Knots equivalent airspeed (KEAS) 172
Introduction to Radar Systems 684 Koni 226
3rd edition 625 J Ku-band radar 648
Introduction to Sensors for Ranging and jamming 721 KY-28s 143, 150
Imaging 535 Janus Lambda system 209 KY-58s 143, 150
Invalidity word format JAUS: see Joint Architecture for
MIL-STD-1760 106 Unmanned Systems (JAUS) L
Inverse SAR (ISAR) 706–10 JDAM: see joint direct attack munition LAAS: see Local Area Augmentation
see also Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) (JDAM) System (LAAS)
IOFP: see interim operational flight JETDS: see Joint Electronics Type labs, major drawbacks to 6
program (IOFP) Designation System (JETDS) Lambert’s law of cosines 551
Ion barrier film 914 jet engine modulation (JEM) 687, 693 landing gear
ionosphere 140–1 effects 688 communications flight testing and
effects on wave frequencies 140–1 lines on a velocity search display 689 149
Index 995
landing systems LCD: see liquid crystal display (LCD) logical link control (LLC) standard 115
airworthiness certification LCoS: see liquid crystal on silicon logistics
category I systems 471–9 (LCoS) communications flight testing and 150
category II systems 479–88 LDU: see link data units (LDU) Logistics Supportability 972, 980
category III systems 488 least significant bit (LSB) 89 long-endurance multi-intelligence vehicle
for landing and rollout in low LEDs: see light emitting diodes (LEDs) (LEMV) UAVs 854, 855
visibility 495–503 lens hood extension 913 longitude 32, 168, 169
for takeoff in low visibility 489–95 L1 frequency 214 long-range radars (LRRs) 724
GNS 468–70 L2 frequency 214 ‘‘Long words,’’ 74
ILS 459–67 light emitting diodes (LEDs) 925 loop port (NL Port) 113
MLS 467–8 annunciators 928 LORO: see lobe-on receive only (LORO)
LANDO 175 lighting specifications 920 LOS: see line of sight (LOS)
land remote sensing satellite Class A 921 low-altitude navigation and targeting
(LANDSAT) 582 Class B 921 infrared for night (LANTIRN)
LANDSAT: see land remote sensing and guidance 923–4 543
satellite (LANDSAT) MIL-L-85762 920–2 low probability of intercept (LPI) 630,
LANTIRN: see low-altitude navigation MIL-L-85762A 920–2 699, 700, 731
and targeting infrared for night Type I 921 low-speed peripheral interface (LSPI) 97
(LANTIRN) Type II 921 LPI: see low probability of intercept (LPI)
LAR: see launch acceptability region line-of-sight (LOS) 33, 141, 727 LRRs: see long-range radars (LRRs)
(LAR) closure 688 LRU: see line replaceable units (LRU)
laser drift rate 610, 615 LSB: see least significant bit (LSB)
beam divergence 616–17 equation 880 LSPI: see low-speed peripheral interface
designators 62 in FLIR 587 (LSPI)
output power 617 jitter 611, 615 LTE cycle: see launch-to-eject (LTE)
pulse amplitude 617–18 limitations 48 cycle
pulse repetition interval 618 sensor reference 610
pulse width 618 sensor slew rates 610 M
rangefinder 44 stabilization for IRLS 582 MAC standards: see media access control
ranging accuracy 615–16 line replaceable units (LRU) 6, 21 (MAC) standards
trackers 43 Link 4A 239 magnetic variation
laser systems 588 Link 4C 239 radio aids testing and 190
collimation 591 link data units (LDU) 89 main lobe clutter (MLC) 672, 674, 743
concept 588 Link 16 system with radar look angle 672
eyes determinism 256 maintainability 971, 979
damage 592 J series messages 240–4 maintenance fault list (MFL) 755
protection 592–3 JTIDS architecture 244–8 MALD: see miniature air-launched decoy
high spectral radiance 591, 592 JTIDS RF signal 250–2 (MALD)
military application 593 message types 248–50 Manchester II biphase encoding 67–8
communication 593 fixed-format 248–50 man-made noise 142
direct fire simulators 594 free-text 248–9 man-portable air defense (MPAD) 720
HEL 594 round-trip timing (RTT) 249 Manufacturing Inspection District Office
optical radar 594 variable-format 249 (MIDO) 276
range finding 593 participants 252–4 MASPS: see Minimum Aviation System
target marking 593 ports of 243 Performance Standards (MASPS)
thermonuclear fission 594 PPLI and RelNav 254–6 master arm 784
monochromaticity 591 liquid crystal displays (LCD) 579–81, master control centers (MCC) 232
neodymium: yttrium aluminum garnet 942 master equipment list (MEL) 277
(Nd:YAG) 592 active matrix addressing 580 materiel development decision (MDD)
output power of 592 color filter 580 961–2
process 588 panel 579 mathematical models 7, 644
Raman shifting 593 liquid crystal on silicon (LCoS) 942 MAWS: see missile approach warning
short-pulsed lasers 592 ‘‘Live fire,’’ 800–1 systems (MAWS); missile attack
latitude 32, 168, 169 lobe-on receive only (LORO) 663 warning systems (MAWS)
launch acceptability region (LAR) 792 Local Area Augmentation System maximum detection range 652, 655, 656,
launcher qualification tests for air-to-air (LAAS) 231 690, 693
missile 793–6 localizer performance with vertical maximum unambiguous Doppler 678
launch-to-eject (LTE) cycle 163, 772 guidance (LPV) approach MCC: see master control centers (MCC)
L-band spectrum 214 WAAS 230–1 MC rate: see mission capable (MC) rate
996 Index
MCT: see mercury cadmium telluride MIDS: see Multifunctional Information MIL-STD-1760 62
(MCT) Distribution System (MIDS) command words subaddress fields 102
MDB: see measurement descriptor blocks Mil 36 critical authority format 108
(MDB) MIL-D-8708B(AS) 18–19 critical control 2 format 104, 107
MDD: see materiel development decision MIL-HDBK-1763 831, 832 cyclical redundancy check (CRC) 104
(MDD) aerodynamic analysis 814 header word format 104
MDT: see mean down time (MDT) aeroelasticity 814 invalidity word format 106
MDTCI: see MUX data transfer complete air-to-ground accuracy tests 803–4 MIL-STD-1760D 100–8
interrupt (MDTCI) detailed test requirements 816–20 primary verifications 103
mean down time (MDT) 979 flight tests 816 stores interfaces 100–1
mean impact point (MIP) 205 general test requirements 813–16 store control message 109
mean sea level (MSL) 52 ground tests 816 store monitor message 110
altitude 173 physical compatibility review 813–14 transfer control message
mean time between critical failure test and evaluation of air-to-air missiles format 110
(MTBCF) 980 in 789–91 instruction word 111
mean time between failure (MTBF) 8, test requirements 812–13 transfer monitor message
796–7 MIL-HDBK-237C 157 format 112
mean time to repair (MTTR) 979 military airworthiness requirements transfer status word 112
measurement accuracy 661 859–60 vector word format 103
geometry 661 MIL-L-85762 920–2 MIL-STD-1773 62
measurement descriptor blocks (MDB) 13 MIL-L-85762A 920–2 data encoding 68
Measure of Assessment (MOA)/Measure Miller, Gary M., 140 MIL-STD specifications 4
of Performance (MOP) 974–5 millimetric radar 630 miniature air-launched decoy (MALD)
Measure of Suitability (MOS) 974 millimetric wave (MMW) 50, 731
measures of effectiveness and suitability frequencies 141 miniature CRTs 945
(MOEs & MOSs) 972, 974 radar 710–11 miniature munitions/stores interface
measures of effectiveness (MOE) 972 milliradian 36 (MMSI) standard 100
measures of suitability (MOS) 972, 978 MIL-STD-461D 157 Minimum Aviation System Performance
media access control (MAC) standards MIL-STD-462D 157 Standards (MASPS) 893–4
115 MIL-STD-464 157 minimum navigation performance
media interface unit (MIU) 95 MIL-STD-1472D 322 standards (MNPS) 329
medium and low earth orbiting MIL-STD-1553 bus minimum operational performance
(MEO/LEO) satellites 865–6 bits 65–7 standards (MOPS) 238, 282
MEL: see master equipment list (MEL) bus controller (BC) 63 GPS 331, 333
MEO/LEO satellites: see medium and design 75–6 minimum release altitude (MRA) 811–12
low earth orbiting (MEO/LEO) bus monitor 63–4 minimum resolvable temperature
satellites command words 68–70 difference (MRDT) 582, 613
mercury cadmium telluride (MCT) 544 anomalous conditions 70–1 minimum system performance standards
message contents 74–5 data encoding 67–8 (MSPS) 329
message formats data words 73–4 Minor, John 536
1553 systems 74–5 flight tester’s task 79–80 MIP: see mean impact point (MIP)
3910 systems 94 high-speed data bus implementation MISB (Motion Imagery Standards
message header 249 123 Board)–compliant systems 90
messages historical overview 62 missile approach warning systems
defined 74 message formats 74–5 (MAWS) 756
types of 74 mode codes 101 missile attack warning systems
Link 16 systems 248 problems 122–3 (MAWS) 744
message words, format of 249 remote terminals (RTs) 64 missile designations 766
metric radars 628 simple bus configuration 76–9, 122 missile designations codes 766
MFD: see multifunction displays (MFD) stand-alone remote terminal 64 missile firings 50
MFL: see maintenance fault list (MFL) status words 71–3, 101 missile launch
MFR: see multiple frequency repeater system architecture 62–4 data analysis of 800–3
(MFR) twisted pair shielded cable 64 missile launch envelope (MLE) 792
MG-18 409 word formats 68 missile on aircraft test (MOAT) 770–1
microwave frequencies 141 word types 67 commands 771
microwave landing system (MLS) 225, MIL-STD-1553 compatible tactical air missile power relay unit (MPRU) 768
467–8 navigation (TACAN) system 18 missile safety footprint 801
MIDO: see Manufacturing Inspection MIL-STD-1553 Designer’s Guide 62 missile simulate unit (MSU) 840
District Office (MIDO) MIL-STD-1605 (SHIPS) 157 missile system errors 815
Index 997
mission capable (MC) rate 980 MTBCF: see mean time between critical heading 170–2
MIU: see media interface unit (MIU) failure (MTBCF) latitude 168, 169
MJU-7 flare 743–4 MTBF: see mean time between failure longitude 168, 169
Mk 82 782 (MTBF) position 168–9
low-drag deliveries, error sources for MTF: see modulation transfer function data links 238
808 (MTF) C4I, advances in 258
MLC: see main lobe clutter (MLC) MTR: see moving target rejection (MTR) comparisons 256–7
MLE: see missile launch envelope (MLE) MTSAT: see multifunction transport flight testing of 257–8
MLS: see microwave landing system satellite (MTSAT) Link 16 operation 240
(MLS) MTSAT satellite-based augmentation tactical background 239–40
MMSI standard: see miniature munitions/ system (MSAS) 225, 229, 232 definition of 168
stores interface (MMSI) standard MTTR: see mean time to repair (MTTR) historical background 168
MMW: see millimetric wave (MMW) multibus architecture 78 radio aids testing
MNPS: see minimum navigation multifaceted mirrors 43 aircraft configurations and 188–9
performance standards (MNPS) Multifunctional Information Distribution antenna switching and 189–90
MOAT: see missile on aircraft test System (MIDS) 240 atmospheric effects and 190
(MOAT) multifunction displays (MFD) 81 civil certification 190–1
Mode 1, of IFF system 235 multifunction transport satellite cone of confusion and 190
Mode 2, of IFF system 235 (MTSAT) 225 magnetic variation and 190
Mode 3/A, of IFF system 235–6 multipath, effects of, on radar reception 34 navigation flight testing 185–8
Mode 4, of IFF system 237 multiple frequency repeater (MFR) 739 navigation ground testing 184–5
Modern Electronic Communication 140 multiple intruder autonomous avoidance propeller modulation and 190
Mode S, of IFF system 237 (MIAA) science and technology statistical accuracy and 190
modulation transfer function (MTF) 596, program 897 radio aids to navigation 175
916 multiple track accuracy (TWS) 693 DME 179–80
resolution versus 916 multiplex 62 NDB and ADF 181–3
MOE: see measures of effectiveness multisensor flight tests 510 TACAN system 180–1
(MOE) multi-service OT&E (MSOT&E) 969 VOR 177–9
monitoring, PSSA 293 munitions designations 766 NAVSTAR/GPS program 961
monopulse 663 codes 767 NBRN: see narrowband repeater noise
tracking 664 MUX data transfer complete interrupt jammer (NBRN)
monopulse radars 727 (MDTCI) 242–3 NCTR: see noncooperative target
MOPS: see minimum operational recognition (NCTR)
performance standards (MOPS) N NDB: see nondirectional beacons
MOS: see measures of suitability (MOS) NAD-27 40–1 (NDB)
most significant bit (MSB) 89 NAD: see North American Datum (NAD) near infrared (NIR) 908
motion pictures experts group (MPEG) NAGU: see notice advisories to near mid air collision (NMAC) 894
format 900 GLONASS users (NAGU) NETD: see noise equivalent temperature
mountain effect 184 NANU system 218 difference (NETD)
moving mass accelerometer 191 narrowband repeater noise jammer net time reference (NTR) 247
moving target rejection (MTR) 687 (NBRN) 739 network participation groups (NPG)
MPAD: see man-portable air defense NAS: see National Air Space (NAS) assignments and functions 252
(MPAD) NASA FTB 3000 (Rev A) 322 newer-generation aircraft 749
MPEG format: see motion pictures NASA Ikhana 897 New Mexico State University (NMSU)
experts group (MPEG) format National Air Space (NAS) 887, 892 897
MPRU: see missile power relay unit National Oceanic and Atmospheric night effect 184
(MPRU) Administration (NOAA) Nighttime Readability Test Matrix 936
MQ-8 Fire Scout 854 satellite 157 night vision goggles (NVG) 537, 908
MQ-9 Reaper 853 National Test Pilot School (NTPS) 901, components 911–15
MRA: see minimum release altitude 902 generation I (Gen I) 538–9
(MRA) NATO standard: see North Atlantic Treaty generation II (Gen II) 539
mrad 36 Organization (NATO) standard generation III (Gen III) 539
MSAS: see MTSAT satellite-based NATO threat 751 ground tests 931–4
augmentation system (MSAS) Naval Air Instruction (NAVAIRINST) Operational defects 933
MSB: see most significant bit (MSB) 3960.4B 11 human factors issues 918–20
MSL: see mean sea level (MSL) navigation systems 167 image defects 934
MSPS: see minimum system performance basic concepts pilot in command’s (PIC) 924
standards (MSPS) airspeed 172–3 system characteristics 915–16
MSU: see missile simulate unit (MSU) altitude 173–4 Visual Acuity 932
998 Index
night vision imaging systems (NVIS) notices to airmen (NOTAM) system 218 terminology 975
907 NRZ encoding: see non-return-to-zero testers 12–13, 14–15
aircraft flight tests 938 (NRZ) encoding test plan structure 970–2
aircraft lighting ground tests 935–8 NRZI encoding: see non-return-to-zero critical operational issues 972–3
equipment, test and evaluation of invert (NRZI) encoding developing 975–6
931 NSAM: see noise swept amplitude executing 976–7
exterior lighting methods 929–30 modulation (NSAM) Measure of Assessment (MOA)/
modifications 930–1 NTPS: see National Test Pilot School Measure of Performance
filters 925 (NTPS) (MOP) 974–5
image intensification (I2) technology NTR: see net time reference (NTR) Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)/
909–11 NVG: see night vision goggles (NVG) Measure of Suitability (MOS)
interior lighting methods 924 NVIS: see night vision imaging systems 974
modifications 925–8 (NVIS) types of 969–70
lighting specifications 920 NVIS bezel 926 weapons system evaluation program
and guidance 923–4 (WSEP) 970
MIL-L-85762 920–2 O operational test plan, for GPS 234
MIL-L-85762A 920–2 oblate earth effect 194, 195 operational utility evaluation (OUE) 970
original equipment manufacturer OBS knob: see omnibearing selector operations security (OPSEC) 722
(OEM) 926 (OBS) knob operator initiated BIT (IBIT) 755
supplemental type certification (STC) OCRD: see operational capability OPSEC: see operations security (OPSEC)
924 requirements document (OCRD) optical systems, target signatures
nine-state vector 44, 47, 192 offset correction method 809 aeromechanical effects on 565
NIR: see near infrared (NIR) OFP: see operational flight program (OFP) aero-optical effects on 565
NMAC: see near mid air collision OLED: see organic LEDs (OLED) optical trackers 42
(NMAC) omnibearing selector (OBS) knob 178 optical turbulence 565
NMSU: see New Mexico State University OMNIBUS 915 optics 576
(NMSU) OMNIBUS II 915 optionally piloted aircraft (OPA) 901–2
NOAA satellite: see National Oceanic OMNIBUS VI 915 ORD: see operational requirements
and Atmospheric Administration OPA: see optionally piloted aircraft (OPA) document (ORD)
(NOAA) satellite operational assessments (OA) 970 organic LEDs (OLED) 945
node port (N Port) 113 operational capability requirements organizationally unique identifiers
noise, categories of 142 document (OCRD) 961 (OUI) 116
noise equivalent temperature difference operational flight program (OFP) 16, 819 OT&E: see operational test and
(NETD) 582, 613–14 ballistics evaluation test 803 evaluation (OT&E)
noise jammers 746 weapons accuracy testing 820–1 OUE: see operational utility evaluation
noise jamming 733, 734–8 operational reliability 971 (OUE)
signal 735 operational requirements document OUI: see organizationally unique
noise swept amplitude modulation (ORD) 960, 965–6 identifiers (OUI)
(NSAM) 19 do’s and don’ts 966 output brightness variation 934
noncooperative target recognition template for 965
(NCTR) 691, 693 writing method 965 P
nondirectional beacons (NDB) operational suitability 971 packed-2 (P2) format, of message words
and ADF 181–3 operational test and evaluation (OT&E) 249
classifications 183 2, 3–4, 957, 967–9 packed-4 (P4) format, of message words
non-return-to-zero invert (NRZI) AFOTEC 958 249
encoding 96 definition 968 packet identifier (PID) USB 98
non-return-to-zero (NRZ) encoding 67 versus DT&E 968 PAL modes: see pilot assist lock-on
normal alignment 200 evaluation structure 977 (PAL) modes
North American Datum (NAD) 40 follow-on OT&E (FOT&E) 969 panel lighting 928
North Atlantic Treaty Organization initial OT&E (IOT&E) 969 partial binocular 947
(NATO) standard 33 multi-service OT&E (MSOT&E) 969 participant location and identification
Northrop-Grumman 756 operational assessments (OA) 970 (PPLI) 254–6
Northrop-Grumman ABSAA 896–7 operational utility evaluation (OUE) particular risks analysis, PCA 294
nose-on, clear region 675 970 partitioning, PSSA 292
NOTAM system: see notices to airmen organizations 10 passive detection 729
(NOTAM) system qualification OT&E (QOT&E) 969 passive techniques 730
notice advisories to GLONASS users tactics development and evaluation patch map 651
(NAGU) 226 (TD&E) 970 display 652
Index 999
PATH manuals: see Probability of general installation considerations PSG: see periodic synchronization gap
Aircraft Tactical Hazard (PATH) 342–4 (PSG)
manuals installed performance-test 344, flight PSSA: see preliminary system safety
payload 899–901 test assessment (PSSA)
test and evaluation of 901 aircraft flight manual 349 PSTT: see pulse single-target track
PBIT: see power-up BIT (PBIT) ground test 344–5 (PSTT)
PCM: see pulse code modulation (PCM) VFR installation of GNSS PSTT Conical track 663
PDA: see premature descent alert (PDA) equipment 348 PSTT Lobing 662
peak versus average power 638 RNAV multisensor 346–7 PUF: see probability of unsafe flight (PUF)
pendulum 195 positioning systems TSOA 331–2 pulse code modulation (PCM) 10,
device accelerometer 191 postflight data reduction 135 instrumentation system
periodic synchronization gap (PSG) 92 postflight systems 54 instrumentation system 124–30, 839,
peripheral devices 97 POT: see position and orientation tracker 840
photoconductive radiation detectors 573 (POT) frame format 127
uses 574 power loss factor 626 process 124
photoemissive radiation detectors 572 power ratios 626–7, 627 supercommutation 128
photon detectors power-up BIT (PBIT) 755 pulse compression (Chirp) 639
low temperatures 571 PPLI: see participant location and pulsed Doppler radar 727
photoconductive radiation 573, 574 identification (PPLI) pulse Doppler search and track 690
photoemissive radiation 572 PPS: see program performance RWS, TWS, and STT flight testing
photovoltaic radiation 573–4 specification (PPS) 690–3
process 569–70 PR: see pulse repeater (PR) pulse radar 652
semiconductors 574–5 preamble 143 built-in test 653
photovoltaic radiation detectors 573–4 precision area navigation (P-RNAV) maximum range detections 655–9
uses 574 329–30, 329 measurement accuracy 660–2
piezo-electric effect 199 predator communications concept 862 minimum detection range 659–60
pilot assist lock-on (PAL) modes 689 predator minimum detection range observations and detections 654–5
piloted UAVs 851 requirements 896 resolutions 665–8
‘‘Pipper,’’ 36 predetection integration 643 track accuracy 664
pitot-static system 73 preliminary system safety assessment track initiation range 662–4
‘‘Pit’’ test 795 (PSSA) 293, 295 see also Radar
planar array mechanism 663 backup 295 pulse repeater (PR) 740
Planck’s law 549, 550 built-in test (BIT) 293 pulse repetition frequency (PRF) 210, 638
plan position indicator 648 dissimilarity 293 versus closure for a 1 cm wavelength
plasma 141 monitoring 293 680
POC: see point of contact (POC) partitioning 292 versus closure for unambiguous
pods 544 redundancy 293 Doppler 679
point of contact (POC) 14 Premature descent alert (PDA) 383, 385, lines 678
point-to-point topology 109, 113, 118 394 with sideband frequencies 669–70
polarization 626 test conditions 395, 403 switching 668, 670
signal losses due to differences in 626 Present position indicator 648 change in observed frequency with
ports, of Link 16 system 243 PRF: see pulse repetition frequency (PRF) 670
positional accuracies 223 PRN: see pseudorandom noise jammer pulse search measurement accuracy test
positional DOP (PDOP) 221 (PRN) matrix 660
positional velocity 698 Probability of Aircraft Tactical Hazard pulse search minimum detection range
position and orientation tracker (POT) 948 (PATH) manuals 816 geometry 659
positioning systems airworthiness 333 probability of unsafe flight (PUF) 295 pulse search R90 detections data card 658
Baro-VNAV system program formulation 22–5 pulse single-target track (PSTT) 662,
flight test 347 program performance specification 663, 664
ground test 347 (PPS) 13–14, 835 pulse width discriminator (PWD) 747
equipment performance 333 propeller modulation, radio aids testing pulse width (PW) 638
advisory vertical guidance 333 and 190 PVU enhancement 697
Baro-VNAV system 340–2 proximity warning systems PW: see pulse width (PW)
GNSS equipment 333 TAS 372–4 PWD: see pulse width discriminator
RNAV multisensor 335 TAWS 382–410 (PWD)
RNP approach 337–8 pseudorandom noise jammer (PRN) 740 PW variations with range scale selection
RNP general 337 pseudoranging 216, 216–17 665
RNP terminal 338–40 calculation 217 PZ-90 226
1000 Index
Q radar noise jamming system 735 log 846

Q factor, INS and 47, 200 radar receiver protection 746 modes of operation 143
QOT&E: see qualification OT&E Radar Roof House facility 713 noise 142
(QOT&E) radar systems 726 waves
Q routes 333 radar track accuracy 664 attenuation 629
quadrantal error 184 radar track initiation range 662–4 properties of 33–4
qualification OT&E (QOT&E) 969 radar tracks, versions of 662 radome errors 713
quasi-zenith satellite system (QZSS) 214, radar warning receivers (RWR) 62, 751 radome test fixture 712
228, 229 frequency bands 755 raid assessment (RA) 690
quick disengagement 418–19 generic approach to 752 raid count request (RCR) 690
quick look 134 operations 163 rail launcher 795
QZSS: see quasi-zenith satellite system self-test band 1 756 RAIMs: see receiver autonomous
(QZSS) radiated emission (RE) 155 integrity monitors (RAIMs)
radiated susceptibility (RS) 155 rain backscatter 710
R radiation RAM: see radar absorption material
R90 655, 690 atmospheric propagation of 556–62 (RAM)
testing 658–9, 692, 693 absorption and scattering 556 ram air turbine (RAT) 765
RA: see raid assessment (RA) aerosols 557 random Doppler (RD) 740
radar 746–7 Beer–Lambert law for Range Commanders Council Telemetry
altimeter 683–4 transmittance 556 Group 124, 130, 840
defined 626 carbon dioxide 557, 558 range deception jammers 739
display processor 64 extinction coefficient 556 range gate pull-off (RGPO) 737
error budget 38 gases 557 range interface memorandum (RIM) 52–3
frequency designations 628 long-wave infrared (LWIR) 558, range predictions 603–7
ground array 695 562 adjustments based on atmospherics
lobes 662 LOWTRAN model 561 606–7
lobing 662 mid-wave infrared (MWIR) 558, calculating specific targets 604
operations 163 562 critical dimension and 603
performance considerations 629–30 modifying phenomena in 556 critical distance and 604
position velocity update (PVU) 206 path radiance 557 operational considerations and 607
processor 664 refractive index fluctuations 557 spatial frequency and 603
raster scan 646 transmittance 558–60 range(s) 21
reception, effects of multipath on 34 into free space 51 ambiguity 654
resolution cell 665 radio aids testing assets 21
resolutions 665–8 aircraft configuration and 188–9 differentiation 668
sample applications 645–51 antenna switching and 189–90 gates 644
size as a function of frequency 631 atmospheric effects and 190 interfacing with 51–3
testing 712–13 civil certification 190–1 rate resolution setup 691
radar absorption material (RAM) 641 cone of confusion and 190 resolution 638, 646
radar accuracies 35–8 magnetic variation and 190 geometry 665
degradation 38–9 navigation flight testing 185–8 sample data card 666
sample range handbook 36 navigation ground testing 184–5 range-while-search (RWS) 690
radar band designations 34 propeller modulation and 190 RAT: see ram air turbine (RAT)
radar center frequencies 629 range/bearing accuracy data card 186 RCR: see raid count request (RCR)
radar cross-section (RCS) 33, 640, statistical accuracy and 190 RCS: see radar cross section (RCS)
656–7, 684, 731 radio aids to navigation 175 RCT
for air-to-air missiles 792–3 DME 179–80 for fictitious aircraft and associated
of chaff bundle 742 NDBs and ADF 181–3 systems 961
effect on reflectivity of radio waves 33 TACAN system 180–1 RD: see random Doppler (RD)
meter 50 VOR 177–9 RE: see radiated emission (RE)
radar detections 636–41, 641 radio frequency (RF) readout integrated circuit (ROIC) 545
blip-scan ratio (BSR) 641–2 band designation 141 real-time data 24
parameters 528 energy 139 analysis and 848
prediction of 642–5 slots 664 defined 132
range, defined 630–1 radio magnetic indicator (RMI) importance of 132
target detection 630 VOR display and 178 reduction and analysis 132–4
radar homing and warning (RHAW) radio(s) real-time telemetry 54, 130–1
systems 751 communications flight testing and 139 see also Telemetry
radar jamming 733 energy 31–2 Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) 900
Index 1001
received data (RXD) 82 RF: see radio frequency (RF) S

receiver autonomous integrity monitors RGPO: see range gate pull-off (RGPO) SA: see source address (SA)
(RAIM) 45, 221 RHAW systems: see radar homing and SA-2 Fan Song 727
Receiving antenna 626 warning (RHAW) systems SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice
Recurrence rate number (RRN) 244–6 rhyme list ARP 5583 157
reduced vertical separation minimums for speech intelligibility test 153 SAE AIR 1093 322
(RVSM) 329, 348–56 RIM: see range interface memorandum SAE ARP 1874 322
airworthiness approval 352–4 (RIM) SAE ARP 4102 322
errors 355–6 ring laser gyro (RLG) INS 197–8 SAE ARP 4107 322
loss of approval 355–6 RIVET JOINT 239 SAE ARP 571C 322
minimum equipment requirements for RMI: see radio magnetic indicator (RMI) SAEAS 8034 322
350 RNAV multisensor 335 safety assessment, for highly integrated or
operational approval 354–5 RNP Approach 337–338 complex systems 290–6
system performance 350 RNP General 337 CCA 294
redundancy, PSSA 293 RNP Terminal 338–340 certification plan 296–8
Reed-Solomon (R-S) encoding 248 Robert Bosch GmbH 84–5 configuration index 296
reflection 140, 927–8 ROC: see required obstacle (terrain) FHA 290–2
refraction 140 clearance (ROC) PSSA 293, 295
regression testing 17 rockets 827 requirements 297
relative navigation (RelNav) 254–6 Rockwell Collins 121 SSA 295
release geometry ROIC: see readout integrated circuit validation and verification (V&V)
air-to-ground 806–12 (ROIC) methods 296–7
reliability 971, 979 round-trip timing (RTT) message 249 safety-of-flight (SOF) analysis 825
demonstrated/observed reliability 979 RPV: see remotely piloted vehicle safety review boards (SRB) 977
end-of-test reliability 979 (RPV) Sagnac, G., 197
projected (mature system) reliability RQ-4A Global Hawk 853 SAL: see system address label (SAL)
979 RR-180 chaff cartridge 742, 742 SAM: see situation awareness mode
reliability, maintainability, logistics RRN: see recurrence rate number (RRN) (SAM); surface-to-air missile
supportability, and availability RS-422 84 (SAM)
(RML&A) 978–81 RS-423 84 SAR: see synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
reliability ground tests, for air-to-air RS-485 84 SAR helicopter: see search and rescue
missile 796–7 RS: see radiated susceptibility (RS) (SAR) helicopter
remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) 854 RSAM: see repeater swept amplitude satellite-based augmentation systems
Remote terminals (RT) 64 modulation (RSAM) (SBAS) 225–8
arrangement 77 RS-232C 81–4 Satellite Navigation Augmentation
Remote transmission request (RTR) bit basic configuration of 82, 83 System (SNAS) (China) 229
85 null modem configuration 83 satellite systems
repeater swept amplitude modulation signal levels and character frame 82 Beidou 227
(RSAM) 740 R-S encoding: see Reed-Solomon (R-S) Galileo 225–8
report writing encoding GLONASS 225–6
background 848 RT: see remote terminals (RT) Indian Regional Navigation Satellite
conclusions 849 RTCA DO-178 295 System (IRNSS) 228
executive summary 849 RTCA/DO-309 383 message content 215
instrumentation 849 RTCA/DO-161A 382 Quasi-Zenith Satellite System
items in 849 RTP: see Real-time Transport Protocol (QZSS) 228
objectives 849 (RTP) saturation 731
recommendations 849 RTR bit: see remote transmission request SAW: see selectively aimable warhead
results 849 (RTR) bit (SAW)
signoff 849 RTS: see request to send (RTS) S band 630, 631
supporting data 849 RTT message: see round-trip timing SBAS: see satellite-based augmentation
test method 849 (RTT) message systems (SBAS)
via operational instruction 848 Ruggedization of equipment 75 scanning systems 568–9
witnessing sheet 849 RVSM: see reduced vertical separation direct imaging 568
request to send (RTS) 83 minimums (RVSM) optical principles 568
required obstacle (terrain) clearance RWR: see radar warning receiver scattering 140
(ROC) 384 (RWR) scheduling 50–1
reticle matching 36 RWS: see range-while-search (RWS) Schuler cycle 147
Return-to-Zero (RTZ) tristate modulation RWS measurement accuracy 691 Schuler effect, true error and 204
ARINC 429 87–8 RXD: see received data (RXD) Schuler-tuned platforms 204
1002 Index
Schuler tuning 194 signal losses, differences in polarization light intensity at 601
SDU: see secure data unit (SDU) 626 placement 601, 602
SEAD: see suppression of enemy air signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) 637–8, 913, temperature measurements 601
defenses (SEAD) 916 ground test 601, 602
SEAM: see sidewinder expanded SIL: see software integration lab (SIL) plotting 602
acquisition mode (SEAM) simple memory response 745 scientific method for 599–600
search and rescue (SAR) helicopter 234 simulations 7, 748 vertical or horizontal 603
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network simulators, major drawbacks to 6 Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SIPRNet) 863 single-engine approach 418 (SFAR) 273
sectional aeronautical charts 170 single-look probability 655 speech intelligibility 151–4
sector attenuation response 745 single-pilot cockpit 749 speech transmission index (STI) 152
secure data unit (SDU) 249 single-scan probability 655 speed protection 414–16
seeker head 764 single target track (STT) 689, 690 Sperry, Lawrence 410
seeker push-ahead response 745 flight testing 691, 693 spot jammers, advantage of 736
seeker push-pull 745 SINPO rating scale 152 SRB: see safety review boards (SRB)
seeker tests, for air-to-air missiles 791–2 SIPRNet: see Secret Internet Protocol SRR bit: see substitute remote request
selectively aimable warhead (SAW) Router Network (SIPRNet) (SRR) bit
788–9 situation awareness mode (SAM) 690 SSA: see system safety assessment (SSA)
self-protection flares 743–5 Skyflash, the 786–7 SSI: see software support and integration
self-protection jammers 758 sky wave 141 (SSI)
self-protection jamming systems 733 SLAM: see stand-off land attack missile SSV: see standard service volume (SSV)
self-protect jammer operations 163–4 (SLAM) stabilization 211, 705
semiactive homing missile slant range 673 aircraft 635, 647
AIM-7 Sparrow 774, 776, 777 SLARs: see side-looking radars (SLARs) antenna 327
speed gates 775 SLB: see sidelobe blanking (SLB) DNS 209
semiconductors 574–5 SLS: see side lobe suppression (SLS) earth 635, 647
extrinsic 574 Smiths Industries 91 gyro system 195
characteristics 575 SMP: see stores management processor line-of-sight (LOS) 582
intrinsic 574 (SMP) radar 653–4
sense and avoid systems 892 SMS: see stores management system stadiametric ranging 36
airworthiness of 893–5 (SMS) STANAG 3910 93–6
developments in 895–9 SNAS: see Satellite Navigation high-speed action and status words 94
test and evaluation of 899 Augmentation System (SNAS) high-speed message frame format 96
sensitivity time constant (STC) 712 SNR: see signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) message formats 94
sensitivity time control (STC) 746 SOF analysis: see safety-of-flight (SOF) type A network 93
sensor fusion 48–9 analysis types of 93
sensor slew rate 609–10 SOF field: see start of frame (SOF) field STANAG 4586 856
separation effects testing 803, 820 software build contents 17 stand-alone GPS receivers 44–6
service failures, for air-to-air missile 797 software integration lab (SIL) 14 stand-alone remote terminal 64
SFAR: see Special Federal Aviation software support and integration (SSI) 14 standard lighting 928
Regulation (SFAR) SOJ: see stand-off jamming (SOJ) standard service volume (SSV) 178
SFD: see start frame delimiter (SFD) solar noise 142 stand-off jamming (SOJ) 733
SG: see synchronization gap (SG) sole-means accuracy, performance stand-off land attack missile (SLAM)
shading 933–4 requirements for 224 764
shoreline effect 184 sole-means system accuracy 224 start frame delimiter (SFD) 116
short pulse detection 659 SOT word: see start of transmission start of frame (SOF) field 85
SICP: see subscriber interface control (SOT) word start of transmission (SOT) word 89
program (SICP) source address (SA) 116 static test 144–5
sidelobe blanking (SLB) 747 Soviet Azovsky MAK-UT MAWS 756 statistical accuracy
sidelobe cancellation (SLC) 747 Space Debris and Tracking System radio aids testing and 190
sidelobe clutter (SLC) 672 (SPADATS) 728 status bits 72
spectrum 673 space noise 142 status words
sidelobes 672 space surveillance radars 728 synchronization pattern 67–8
blanking or cancellation 712 SPADATS: see Space Debris and 1553 systems 71–3, 101
side lobe suppression (SLS) 236, 747 Tracking System (SPADATS) 3910 systems 94
side-looking radars (SLARs) 728 spatial frequency 598 STC: see sensitivity time constant (STC);
sidewinder expanded acquisition mode airborne test 602 sensitivity time control (STC);
(SEAM) 780, 782, 784 angular resolution and 611 supplemental type certificate
signal interface unit 64 board (STC)
Index 1003
‘‘Stealth’’ aircraft 33 system(s) TCAS: see traffic alert and collision

Stealth Sea Shadow 685 boresighting 810 avoidance systems (TCAS)
Stefan–Boltzmann law 548 integration 8 TCP Reno 866
STI: see speech transmission index air-to-air missile 797–803 TD&E: see tactics development and
(STI) system design assurance (SDA) evaluation (TD&E)
stored heading alignment 200 parameter 377 TDMA: see time division multiple access
stores, communications flight testing system safety assessment (SSA) 295, 378 (TDMA)
and 149 systems interface unit 64 team member responsibilities 13–15
stores management processor (SMP) system under test (SUT) 842 technical standard order (TSO) 238,
767, 768 282–4, 299
stores management system (SMS) 63 T component identification in 284
architecture 769 TA: see terrain avoidance (TA) GPS certifications 331
combinations of weapons 771 TACAN system: see tactical air interchangeability in 284
documentation 835 navigation (TACAN) system mixing of TSO and non-TSO functions
interfaces 780, 781, 784 tactical air navigation (TACAN) system in 284
inventory 770 18, 143, 180–1 TEC map: see total electron content
key interlocks 784 frequency pairings 182 (TEC) map
processes 769–72 ground station 180 telemetry 51, 54, 124
cold start 770 signal pattern 181 telemetry network system (TmNS) 130
warm start 769 tactical air-to-air radar parameters 646 telemetry station clocks 53
1553 relationship 768 tactical air-to-ground radar parameters 647 television (TV) 62
requirements for 767 tactical digital information link (TADIL) analog TV 583–5
test and evaluation 785 239 digital TV 585–6
weapons interfaces tactical targeting network technology TEMP: see test and evaluation master
AIM-120 AMRAAM 775, 779 (TTNT) 131, 259 plan (TEMP)
AIM-9 Sidewinder 772, 773, tactics development and evaluation TEMP documents 964
774 (TD&E) 970 terminal gap (TG) 90, 92
AIM-7 Sparrow 774, 777 TAD: see towed air decoy (TAD) terminal input messages (TIMs) 240
bombs 778–80, 783 TADIL: see tactical digital information functions 242
guns 776, 778, 781 link (TADIL) terminal output messages (TOMs) 240
strap-down inertial systems 197–9 TADIL-A 239 functions 242
STT: see single target track (STT) TADIL-B 239 terrain avoidance (TA) 692, 698–702
student’s t variable 656 TADIL-C 239 with digital terrain database 700
subscriber interface control program TADIL-J 240 flight test evaluations 702–5
(SICP) 242 message catalog 240 with radar sensor 701
substitute remote request (SRR) bit 86 takeoff and go-around (TOGA) 304 terrain awareness and warning system
subsystem/system development 8–9 target aspect angle 52 (TAWS) 299, 382
supercommutation 128 targets and target availability 50 alerts
supplemental type certificate (STC) 274, target signatures 562–7 class C equipments 401–3
300 airborne targets 566, 567 internal priority scheme 388
IS&S for 279 with area-weighted target temperature prioritization scheme 388
process for obtaining 274 563 standard for visual and aural 385–7,
supportability, defined 972 attributes of 566 389
suppression of enemy air defenses diurnal cycle 564 aural alert, standard for 385–7, 389
(SEAD) 720–1, 731 high-energy lasers (HEL) 566 class C 401, 402
suppression of IR radiation 731 optical systems class C equipment
surface-to-air missile (SAM) 651, 720 aeromechanical effects on 566 cruise 401
surrogate UAVs (SUAV) 851 aero-optical effects on 565 landing 401
sustainment, defined 972 optical turbulence 565 MSL altitude 401
SUT: see system under test (SUT) surface targets 566 phases of flight 401
swerling cases 645 thermal lens 566 RTC 401
swerling curves 645 target tracking 612 takeoff 401
switched fabric topology 110, 113 target velocity, effects of opening 676 class C evaluations 401–8
synchronization gap (SG) 90 TAS: see traffic advisory system (TAS); documentation 382
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) 651, true airspeed (TAS) evaluations 390
706–10 TAWS: see terrain awareness and autoranging 390
flight testing of 710 warning system (TAWS) installation and flight deck
system address label (SAL) 89 TAWS-based systems 893 integration 390
system response time 751, 760 TC: see type certificate (TC) pop-up feature 390
1004 Index
failure monitor function 389 TF: see terrain following (TF) TIMs: see terminal input messages (TIMs)
flight test 391–401 TFP: see terrain following processor TIP: see tetrahedral inertial platforms
advisory callout 400 (TFP) (TIP)
excessive closure rate to terrain TFT: see thin-film transistor (TFT) TIS: see test information sheets (TIS)
396–7 TF/TA tower detection and classification TmNS: see telemetry network system
excessive downward deviation from sequence 704 (TmNS)
an ILS glideslope 400 TG: see terminal gap (TG) TOGA: see takeoff and go-around
excessive rate of descent 396 theodolite (TOGA)
flight into terrain when not in instrumentation 42 TOMs: see terminal output messages
landing configuration 398 limitations 44 (TOMs)
for FLTA 392–4 thermal detectors Tornado Integrated Avionics Research
installation types and 391–2 bolometer 575 Aircraft (TIARA) 948
negative climb rate or altitude loss calorimeter 575 total electron content (TEC) map 219
after takeoff 397–8 evaporograph 575 Total latency 378
for PDA function 394, 395 fluid-expansion thermometer 575 Total System Error (TSE) 337
wind shear warnings 401 thermocouple 574 towed air decoy (TAD) 50
GPS internal 385 thermal emission 554, 555 towed decoys 731
ground test 391 thermal imaging systems 536, 908–9 TPIU: see transmission protocol interface
HTAWS 409–10 electrical signal processor 542 unit (TPIU)
map itself 385 EMUX FLIR 542, 543 TPWG: see test planning working groups
onboard navigation system 385 first-generation systems 542 (TPWG)
phases of flight for 389 FLIR 540, 541, 542, 544 track breaker 738, 739
approach 389 scanning systems 542–3 tracking radars, on same target 48, 49
departure 389 second generation system 542 track initiation range 664
enroute 389 third generation system 545 track-while-scan (TWS) 689, 690, 727
terminal 389 thermal inertia 555, 564 traffic advisory system (TAS) 368, 372–4
visual alert, standard for 385–7, 389 thermal lens 566 class A equipment 372–3
class C 401 thermocouple 574 defined 372
terrain following processor (TFP) 699, thin-film transistor (TFT) 580 class B equipment 373–4
701, 704 1553 word types 67 defined 372
terrain following (TF) 648, 698–702 three-plane captive carry tests 799 traffic alert and collision avoidance
flight test evaluations 702–5 thunderstorm effect 184 system (TCAS) 237, 356, 895
step-down logic 702 TI: see transmit interval (TI) advisories 356
transverse slope 704 TIA: see type inspection authorization Airworthiness Versions 7.0 and 7.1
terrain masking 731 (TIA) 367–368
test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) TIARA: see Tornado Integrated Avionics display 359–60
966–7 Research Aircraft (TIARA) ground test 364–5
format 966–7 time 764 inhibits 360, 362
logistical support 967 time alignment 53–4, 132–3 minimum reaction time 357
scope of 967 time division multiple access (TDMA) resolution advisories (RA) 356, 359
test conductor’s summary sheet 847 91 alert thresholds 359
test information sheets (TIS) 835 architecture 240 aural alerts 360
test matrix time on target term 640 TCAS I 357
communications systems 146–8 time slot block (TSB) 246 TCAS II 357–8, 893
executing 148–9 defined 253 certification 361–4
test planning, for HARM integration time slot duty factor (TSDF) 251 mode S transponders 357, 363–4
program time space position information (TSPI) tests and evaluation 364
data requirements 838–41 10, 29–30, 714 flight tests 365
generic organizational chart 841 assets 21, 47 ground tests 364–5
requirements 841–3 clocks 53 knock it off 365
test matrix 843 data 661 planned encounter flight tests 365–6
test summary sheets 835–7 devices 45 surveillance flight tests 366–7
test planning working groups (TPWG) nine-state vector 47 traffic advisories (TA) 358
53 sources 38–9 alert thresholds 359
test review boards (TRB) 977 summary of 30 aural alerts 360
test summary sheets (TSS) 835–7 system 35–6, 44 versions 357–8
test team composition 11–13 time stamping of data 133 Traffic Information Services-Broadcast
tetrahedral inertial platforms (TIP) 199 time to align, for INS 199–200 (TIS-B) 375
Index 1005
trajectory simulations, air-to-air missiles UDP: see User Datagram Protocol (UDP) UAS communications architecture
791–2 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters 156 860–2
transmission control protocol (TCP) 861, UHF bands: see ultra-high-frequency data link examples 862–5
866, 867–9 (UHF) bands latency 865–9
data buffers 868 ULQ-21 countermeasures set 750 warning systems 862
transmission properties, of IR radiation 550 ultra-high-frequency (UHF) bands 141 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems
transmission protocol interface unit universal serial bus (USB) 96–9 Airworthiness Requirements
(TPIU) 95 packet formats 98 (USAR) 859–60
transmit interval (TI) 90, 92 tiered star topology 97 data link considerations 885
transmitted data (TXD) 82 transfer types 98 human factors and controls and
transmitter frequency 682 universal time code (UTC) 226 displays considerations 882–3
transverse flight 704 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 851 navigation considerations 887–9
TRB: see test review boards (TRB) airworthiness certificate 857–8 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Test
troposphere 140–1 military airworthiness Center (FTC) 897
effects on wave frequencies 141 requirements 859–60 updates, navigation 206–7
T routes 333 autopilots 889 via onboard sensor 206
true airspeed (TAS) 172 considerations 891–2 UR: see utilization rate (UR)
true error, Schuler effect and 204 evaluations 889–91 U.S. Air Force (USAF) 11
trusted agents 968 BER testing 876 U.S. Army Nike Hercules Air Defense
truth data 839 categories 855 Systems 30–1
TSB: see time slot block (TSB) civil operation versus public U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 72,
TSB A-2-11 246 operation 859 130, 239
TSDF: see time slot duty factor (TSDF) command directed vehicle (CDV) 854 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 170
TSE: see Total System Error (TSE) communications evaluations 869 U.S. Navy (USN) 11
TSO: see technical standard order (TSO) airborne coverage 883–4 U.S. Space Command 217
TSOA 331–2 antenna patterns 874 U.S. Standard for Terminal Instrument
TSO C-112 238 communications ground tests 876–7 Procedures (TERPS) 384
TSO C-129 sensor 333 data link latency evaluations 884–5 USAARL: see US Army Advanced
TSO C-161a 332 EMI/EMC 874–6 Research Laboratory (USAARL)
TSO C-162a 332 engineering analysis 869–74 USAR: see Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
TSO-C194 383 human factors and controls and Systems Airworthiness
TSO C-196 sensor 333 displays 877–82 Requirements (USAR)
TSO-C47c 238 USAR data link considerations 885 US Army Advanced Research Laboratory
TSO-C151c 382 USAR human factors and controls (USAARL) 943
TSO C-145c and 146c equipment 331 and displays considerations USB: see universal serial bus (USB)
TSPI: see time space position information 882–3 User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 900
(TSPI) data link uses and requirements 862 user needs 960
TSS: see test summary sheets (TSS) interoperability 856–7 evaluation 961
TTNT: see tactical targeting network link equation contributors 870 USGS: see U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
technology (TTNT) long-endurance multi-intelligence UTC: see universal time code (UTC)
TV: see television (TV) vehicle (LEMV) 854 utilization rate (UR) 980
twisted pair shielded cable 64 maximum los/antenna coverage 881
two-color switch sample IR 745 modified Cooper Harper scale 879 V
TWS: see track-while-scan (TWS) navigation 886 variable bit rate (VBR) 899, 900
TXD: see transmitted data (TXD) considerations 887–9 variable-format messages 249
type certificate (TC) 274, 300 evaluations 886 V-beam radar 726
Type Certification Board 277–82 operating modes of 854 VBR: see variable bit rate (VBR)
primary functions 277 optionally piloted aircraft (OPA) 901–2 VCS: see visually coupled system (VCS)
type inspection authorization (TIA) 277 payload 899–901 VDB antenna 343
test and evaluation of 901 VDOP: see vertical dilution of precision
U pilot-induced oscillation (PIO) 880, (VDOP)
UAS communications architecture 860 885 vector word format
data link examples 862–5 remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) 854 MIL-STD-1760 103
latency 865–9 sense and avoid systems 892 vehicle programs 8
UAV communications evaluations airworthiness of 893–5 velocity accuracy, acceleration and 205–6
869–85 developments in 895–9 velocity gate pull-off (VGPO) 737
UAV: see unmanned aerial vehicles test and evaluation of 899 velocity search 687–8
(UAV) types 852–5 test of MTR feature 688
1006 Index
vertical dilution of precision (VDOP) delivery considerations for WGS-84 40–1, 52, 101
39 helicopters 824–5 WGS: see World Geodetic System (WGS)
vertical DOP (VDOP) 221 five basic classes of 765–6 wide area augmentation system
very-high-frequency (VHF) bands 141 free-stream ballistics test 803 (WAAS) 45, 48, 225, 229, 330
VGPO: see velocity gate pull-off integration, fusing mechanisms LPV approach 230–1
(VGPO) 764–5 reference and master stations 230
VHF bands: see very-high-frequency integration testing, GPS 233–4 simplified architecture 229
(VHF) bands inventory 785 Wien’s displacement law 549
VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) prep 785 Williams, James H., 282
177–9 release sequence 63–4 wind effects, on heading and airspeed
display, RMI and 178 sequencing 785 173
radials emanating from 177 weapons inhibits, limits, and interrupts word formats 1553 systems 68
video, flight analysis and reporting 848 (WILIs) 825 word grabbers 25, 64
visual acuity 932, 937 weapons system accuracy report World Geodetic System (WGS) 40
charts 933 (WSAR) 10 World Meteorological Organization Sea
visually coupled system (VCS) 948 weapons system evaluation program States 686
VOR: see VHF omnidirectional range (WSEP) 970 WOW switch: see weight-on-wheels
(VOR) weather, communications flight testing (WOW) switch
VOR test facility (VOT) 184 and 149–50 WSAR: see weapons system accuracy
Vulcan cannon 780 weather radar report (WSAR)
certification 322–9 WSEP: see weapons system evaluation
W antenna stability 327 program (WSEP)
WAAS: see wide area augmentation beam tilting and structural
system (WAAS) clearances 325–6 X
wander angle 196–7 contour display (iso echo) 326 X-band
warhead section, of air-to-air missiles display 325 beamwidth rule of thumb 706
788–9 electromagnetic compatibility radar 630, 631
warhead tests, for air-to-air missiles 327–9 system 647
792 ground mapping 327 X-EYE jammer: see cross-eye (X-EYE)
‘‘Warm fuzzy’’ test 145, 685 mutual interference 327 jammer
warning systems 862 range capabilities 325 X-POLE: see cross-polarization
warning system (TAWS) specific tests 324–9 (X-POLE)
functions 383 stability 327
WASP 852 warm-up period 325 Y
waves parameters 550 Yom Kippur War 720
interaction of, with obstructions 140 precipitation 313–14
propagation of 140–1 weight-on-wheels (WOW) switch 52, Z
weapon(s) 784 zonal safety analysis, CCA 294
boresighting 809 WGS-72 40 Zulu time 143, 237

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Test and Evaluation of Aircraft

Avionics and Weapon Systems

2010, 2014 by SciTech Publishing, Edison, NJ. All rights reserved.

First edition 2010

Editor: Dudley R. Kay

Typeset in India by MPS Limited

1 What is Avionics Flight Test and Why Do We Need It 1

2 Time, Space, Position Information 29

2.11 Inertial-Aided GPS Receivers 46

3 MIL-STD-1553 and Digital Data Busses: Data Reduction

4 Communications Flight Test 139

4.2 Aircraft Communications Equipment 142

5 Navigation Systems 167

6 Part 23/25/27/29 Avionics Civil Certifications 267

6.7 Important Notes for Evaluators Concerning Documentation 298

7 Electro-optical and Infrared Systems 535

8 Radio Detection and Ranging – Radar 625

9 Electronic Warfare 719

10 Air-to-Air/Air-to-Ground Weapons Integration 763

11 A Typical Avionics Integration Flight Test Program 831

11.4 Responsibilities of the Test Team 843

12 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 851

13 Night Vision Imaging Systems (NVIS) and Helmet

14 Acquisition, Test Management, and Operational Test

14.2 The Acquisition Process 958

Overview and Goals

Significant Changes to the Original Text

A AEEC Airlines Electronic Engineering

AMRAAM Advanced Medium Range ATC Air Traffic Control

C4ISR Command, Control, CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DAS Detector Angular Subtense DP Decision Point

EM Electromagnetics FEATS Future European Air Traffic

G HAT Height Above Terrain

IDS Interface Design Specification J

LCD Liquid Crystal Display MDD Materiel Development Decision

MPAD Man-Portable Air Defense NCS Net Control Station

OT Other Traffic PR Pulse Repeater

RHAW RADAR Homing and S

SLC Side Lobe Clutter STC Supplemental Type Certificate

TERPS U.S. Standard for Terminal TTPF Target Transfer Probability

W WRA Weapons Replaceable

What is Avionics Flight Test

1.0 AVIONICS FLIGHT TEST

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.2 FLIGHT TEST ORGANIZATION

1.3 FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES

1.4 THE NEED FOR FLIGHT TEST

1.5 CLASSIFYING THE PROGRAM

● Build A: raw sensor development

Vendor Development Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ FIGURE 1.1 ¢

Demonstration Flight Test Δ Δ

1.6 CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS

1.7 TEST TEAM COMPOSITION

1.8 TEAM MEMBER RESPONSIBILITIES

1.9 UNDERSTANDING TERMS

FIGURE 1.2 ¢ Tape Release Flight Development Flight Demonstration

Development Issue Problem Analyze

Development Problem No Yes

Lab Fix Evaluate Fix

AVIONICS BUILD 1.0 AVIONICS BUILD 1.1 FIGURE 1.3 ¢

● MIL-D-8708B(AS), Addendum 100 might state:

● Referring to the same paragraph in MIL-D-8708, SD-4690 may state:

1.10 CONTRACTOR AND SUBTIER