

Francis R. Valeo

Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977

Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966

Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963

On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958

Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952

Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

PREFACE

The careers of Secretary of the Senate Francis Valeo and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield were so thoroughly intertwined for so many years that it was only natural for Frank Valeo's oral history to also be a memoir of Mike Mansfield. For decades their interests and activities ran parallel: Mansfield as representative, senator, majority whip, majority leader, member of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, and Far Eastern specialist; Valeo as chief of the Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service and specialist in the Far East, staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee, assistant to Senator Mansfield as majority whip and majority leader, Senate Democratic party secretary, and secretary of the Senate.

Both men were born in New York City of immigrant, Catholic families: Mansfield in Greenwich Village on March 16, 1903; Valeo in Brooklyn on January 13, 1916. Both men became interested in China: Mansfield studying and teaching Far Eastern history at Montana State University; Valeo studying Asia during his graduate program at New York University. Both first visited China while in military service: Mansfield as a Marine P.F.C. in 1922; Valeo as an army sergeant in 1944—at the same time that Congressman Mansfield was touring China on a special mission for President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

After the war, Frank Valeo returned to the Legislative Reference Service where among other assignments he began doing

special projects for Congressman Mansfield, generally based on their mutual interests in the Far East. In the 1950s, when Mansfield went to the Senate, Valeo served occasionally as a staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee, on loan from the Library of Congress. The two men traveled together extensively, frequently to Southeast Asia. They were in Hanoi on the eve of the French evacuation, and they repeatedly visited Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. In later years both became critical of the war in Vietnam. And in 1972, Valeo accompanied Senator Mansfield on the first congressional visit to China since the Communist revolution.

In 1959, while Mansfield was serving as Senate majority whip, he invited Frank Valeo to become his assistant. Valeo remained in this position until 1963, when the Bobby Baker scandal shook the Senate. Senator Mansfield, then majority leader, appointed him to replace the seemingly irreplaceable Baker as Democratic party secretary. Among the duties of that post, Valeo found himself "counting heads" before votes to assist the leader in legislative maneuvering. He performed that task during the protracted debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and through the explosion of Great Society legislation in 1965. The following year, the Senate elected Frank Valeo as secretary of the Senate, a post he held until 1977. Although supervising a vast assortment of administrative functions for the entire Senate, he continued to devote special attention to the majority leader, acting as his advisor, speech writer, traveling companion, and surrogate.

This oral history recounts the long and fruitful working relationship between a staff member and a senator. It provides a panorama of American foreign policy in the Far East, from World War II to the Philippine turmoil of 1986. And it offers an institutional history of the Senate by the secretary who presided over much of its modernization.

"Both as secretary to the majority and secretary of the Senate, Frank Valeo brought honor to himself and to the institution that he served," said Senator Robert C. Byrd when Frank Valeo retired as secretary of the Senate. "He has a deep appreciation for the traditions and heritage of this body, and he has labored selflessly for it." Senator Quentin Burdick added, "As a person Frank has exemplified the same qualities as his close and dear friend, the former Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana. He has been intelligent, kind, open, fair, and honorable in his relationship with all the distinguished members of this chamber There is no question that he understood the mechanics and the spirit of the United States Senate better than anyone else."

About The Interviewer: --Donald A. Ritchie is associate historian of the Senate Historical Office. A graduate of C.C.N.Y., he received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Maryland. He has taught at the University College of the University of Maryland, George Mason University, and the Northern Virginia Community College, and conducted a survey of automated bibliographical

systems for the American Historical Association. He has published several articles on American political and economic history, a book, James M. Landis: Dean of the Regulators (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), and has edited the Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) for publication by the committee. He has served as an officer of both the Oral History Association and Oral History in the Mid-Atlantic Region (OHMAR), and in 1984 received OHMAR's Forrest C. Pogue Award for distinguished contributions to the field of oral history.

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FROM CHINA TO WASHINGTON

Interview #1
Wednesday, July 3, 1985

RITCHIE: I've been doing these interviews in a biographical, chronological framework, beginning with people's backgrounds, their family life, where they grew up, the schools they went to, and what they did before they came to the Senate. I wondered if you could tell me a little bit about your parents, who they were and what they did?

VALEO: Yes, my father came as an immigrant around the turn of the century, at the age of sixteen. He worked as a shoemaker, or shoe repairer, and then in a shoe factory; eventually became a foreman of the factory. My mother was born on Hester Street, on the Lower East Side, also of immigrants who had arrived a few years earlier. Her family grew up in Brooklyn. They moved there at a rather early date because there was a large shoe factory there called Wickett and Gardens. Her father, something of an entrepreneur, had opened a series of small businesses, starting with a barbershop, and then a bar, and a grocery store, things of that sort. She went to work at the age of nine in the factory. She had only three years of schooling. My father had perhaps five. Both recognized the value of education and were insistent that I get it. So that's where it began.

I can't say too much positively about the Brooklyn public school system. It was an extraordinary experience, especially for immigrant kids, of which many in that area were. They came from maybe twenty different countries. They were very dedicated people in the school system.

RITCHIE: So you went through the public schools?

VALEO: I went through the public schools in Brooklyn, and I think learned in that experience a sense of the United States, which you could get no where else. After that it was relatively routine. I went to NYU [New York University], and then graduate school at night. Worked in the daytime at Brooks Brothers, the clothier, went to school at night. I came here in 1942, on invitation of Ernest Griffith, who had then recently become head of the Legislative Reference Service, which as you know evolved into the Congressional Research Service. I came down on a temporary job. I had just finished my master's at night, when I came down. I stayed at the Library for about eight or nine months and then went into the army, and eventually wound up in China, which was where I wanted to go in the first place. I got there almost by accident, but I got there.

I spent a good portion of my military service in China, traveling really from one end to the other. We flew the Hump to get in. That was the wartime route from India. Actually, it was

an extraordinary voyage. We left from the port of Los Angeles, went all the way around Australia in a troop transport, and then came up into Bombay, escorted on that side by Australian warships. We had about five thousand men on the ship. From Bombay we went across India by troop train, which took four or five days, to Calcutta. And then from Calcutta we went also by train to northeast India, to a place called Chabua in Assam. That was the Indian terminal of the Hump—our route into China. There was no road route into China at the time, you had to go in by air. The air force flew the Himalayas into Kunming, in Yunnan Province in western China. Then from there we moved as a group eastward towards Canton. The master strategy was to bring the Chinese armies in that direction to Canton, with allied naval forces supposed to land troops in Hong Kong. Well, the war ended at that point. After that I went to Shanghai, waiting for a few months to come home, and then back to the Library, where I was raised from a GS-5 to a GS-7, on the basis of my wartime experiences.

RITCHIE: Could we backtrack a little bit? I wanted to fill in some information. I was interested in the fact that you went to NYU, and that was during the Depression. It must have been difficult getting out of high school then and deciding to go to college.

VALEO: Well, you know I knew so little about it. Ironically we had only one other person in our family who had ever

graduated from college. He was a medical doctor, who had married my mother's sister. That was the basis for our connection with him. But at that period of time, among immigrant families, the stress was on education. Nobody really knew why, but it was. Again, it may have been the product of these Brooklyn schools. It was picked up in a way by mother, and to a lesser extent by my father. She had gone to the same school that I went to, P.S. 35, but only for three years. So she recognized the importance of education and was very determined that I get an education, if not my brother who had seemed to show little inclination to go in that direction. Without her, I don't think any of this would have happened.

The normal pattern would have been maybe to have graduated from elementary school and then perhaps do some high school at night. But then go to work at about the age fourteen or fifteen, get something they called working papers, and go to work. That was basically the pattern of that area. But she was very determined and so she went wherever she could get information about schooling. They were very thrifty people and saved enough money to pay a tuition, which was not excessive in those days. And then later, of course, I paid for my own when I began to work. But they started it off, basically, and they were determined that it would work that way.

RITCHIE: How did you happen to pick NYU?

VALEO: Only because it was a subway school. You could get there for five cents, and back for five cents.

RITCHIE: And when you got there you majored in political science, how did that come about?

VALEO: That came later, actually. I went, groping vaguely I think at the time. Again, you always come back to this pattern of immigrant families. Immigrant families wanted you to be a professional. That meant—in the order of importance—a doctor, a lawyer, or a teacher. I guess I was scheduled for law, maybe I was afraid of blood, I don't know exactly what. We already had a doctor in the family, and that had taken so long. I don't know, it just happened that they sort of set on the law for me, and that's the way I got involved. I didn't really find myself that comfortable with the law, and once at the university my interests widened. I became interested particularly in theatre. And as Walter Lippmann has very wisely pointed out, there's a very close relationship, as we see now, between theatre and politics. From that I gravitated towards government. I should also mention that when I was in high school I was voted the class politician. I have not the slightest idea why, except that once I got up and said, "I rise to a point of order," at a school meeting, a student meeting. In the old yearbook it shows me as the class politician. So maybe these things have deeper roots than we realize. That was about it. Did you have any other questions about background?

RITCHIE: You said during those days you worked at Brooks Brothers.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: What did you do at Brooks Brothers?

VALEO: I was an accountant. So I never was afraid to add two and two, as so many members of Congress are. They have great respect for accountants. As far as I can see, members of Congress that I have known, most of them, have had great respect for either accountants, or writers, or both. Of course, many members of Congress have difficulty with mathematics, and all of us have difficulty with writing.

RITCHIE: Well, when you finished in 1936, did you have any idea what you wanted to do at that stage?

VALEO: Yes, I wanted to work in government. This was the New Deal period. Young men or women who had any real inclination toward service looked toward government. It was kind of a salvation for the country. It had, in theory if not in fact, rescued the country from a Depression. Roosevelt had inspired a lot of people. I actually graduated in '42, the war had come at that point too.

RITCHIE: I was wondering about when you graduated from college, before you went back to get the master's degree.

VALEO: Oh, I decided that I did not have it for the theatre. That was not my forte, and that I better stick to my major, which was government in undergraduate school, and that this would probably give me the most satisfaction and also be one of the best routes to get a job. That being time of the Depression, getting a job was extremely important.

I began at that time to get very interested in China, when I went back to graduate school. A fellow student in one of my classes in graduate school was from China. I began to help him with English and he said, "Would you like to learn Chinese in return?" I said that sounded all right. But unfortunately he was Cantonese, so he didn't really know the principal dialect of Chinese, which now prevails in China. "I know Mandarin," he said, "but I don't know it very well." And he said, "So I'll teach you Cantonese and in any event you can always talk with the laundry man even if you can't go to China."

My thought at that time was probably the best place to start a working career was either to come to work in Washington or to go abroad as a teacher. In the latter connection, I thought of China as the place to teach. We had still not gone into the war, and China at that time was resisting the Japanese invasion. It had inspired a lot of people to want to support what they were doing, and I happened to be one of them. I thought I might do

something useful by going to China at that point. Eventually I did, but it was in a different context.

RITCHIE: So was international relations your specialty in the master's degree?

VALEO: Yes, it was. I wrote a thesis for the M.A. called "The Japanese Techniques for Promoting Manchukuoan Nationality." The Japanese had established in Manchuria a country called Manchukuo in the old, classic pattern of the Forbidden Emperor. Actually, it was an attempt to restore the original Ching dynasty family descendants in a new, puppet government. They used a number of fascinating public relations techniques to try to produce that. There was something called the Kwantung Army, which really ran Manchukuo almost as a separate entity from Japan. It was really an army enterprise from beginning to end.

In graduate school I was first introduced to the books of Owen Lattimore, who later figured in the McCarthy period, but who at that time had fascinated me as being probably the most interesting of all the people I read on China. His books on Inner-Asia, the whole area around Mongolia, into Sinkiang and that area, are probably the most authoritative books that were produced in that period. There was a lot of exploration being done then by people like Sven Hayden, and Stern, who were essentially archaeologists, and some of them were collectors, I think. But

Lattimore really understood the area, and really immersed himself deeply in it. So I used him for a good deal of the authority of the thesis at the time.

RITCHIE: Were there any professors at NYU who were especially influential?

VALEO: Yes, there was a fellow named Hodges, Charles Hodges. Hodges had been fascinated by the League of Nations and had worked for them briefly and had been totally disillusioned in the process. He was a cynic with a marvelous sense of humor. He was probably more responsible for my thesis than anyone else. He knew I worked during the day and went to school at night. I don't know how you feel, there were maybe three or four teachers in your whole life who really influenced you deeply, and he happened to be one. It was his sense of human survivability, I believe, that impressed me most. It was during the period of the Nazi ascendancy in Europe. I guess the war had already begun at that point, or it was on the verge of beginning, and the Nazis had gone through Czechoslovakia and other places already.

He used to look very discouraged when he'd come to class and he had two phrases which always stuck in my mind. One was, he said, "I'm determined to organize a society for the presentation of suicidal weapons," and he had a number of people in mind, including Hitler, that he thought should get these weapons. The

other one was that he didn't really care how serious things would get, and how much men would destroy each other, because he said the survivors would always plant potatoes. Now, this was before nuclear weapons. I don't know what Charles Hodges might have thought after nuclear weapons, but up until that point he felt that the world would survive the Hitler period in some way, and of course he was right.

He had traveled, interestingly enough, the Trans-Siberian railroad, and had come down through Manchukuo. He gave me a lot of fresh material that he gathered en route that I used to write my thesis. He said, "You work. I'll never use this material. Why don't you just take this? You don't have time to go to the library very much. Take it and write it up. See what you can come up with." And that's how I did the thesis with him. He was my advisor on it. He was very important in that period, and very inspiring really.

RITCHIE: You said when you got your master's degree you were invited to come down to the Legislative Reference Service.

VALEO: Yes, the story behind that's a rather interesting one. I had taken the Foreign Service exam, studied for it myself. At that time it was a three or four day exam, a very complicated, complex exam. You could take it in several parts of the country. I took it in New York. Passed it, but there were two sections to

it. One was the written, and then there was the oral, which was given in Washington. I passed the written one, not high up. I was maybe, oh, three or four points above passing. I came down for the interview, and I wasn't accepted.

But Ernest Griffith, in trying to build up the Legislative Reference Service, began looking everywhere for what he felt were people who would be useful in doing this. One of the things he hit upon was to take the list from the Foreign Service exam and find the individuals who were not accepted for the Foreign Service and interview them and see whether or not they might fit into the Legislative Reference Service. So that's how my name came to his attention. He sent a fellow named Ray Manning to see me in New York. He was head of the new economics section that Ernest had set up. I talked with him about an opening in the economics department. Because my mark on the economics part of the Foreign Service exam had been particularly high, he was interested in me. But he didn't hire me. He went back and then Ernest Griffith later offered me a job in connection with another section of the service. I came down, and that's when I started to work. That's the background of how I got to the Library of Congress.

RITCHIE: Was that your first visit to Washington?

VALEO: No, I'd come down for the Foreign Service exam, and I'd come down as a twelve-year-old with my class, like kids still do. CI was noticing it on the steps today.

RITCHIE: I was wondering what your impressions were of Washington in 1942?

VALEO: I stayed at a hotel at 14th and K, it's since gone.

RITCHIE: The Ambassador?

VALEO: The Ambassador. It seemed appropriate since I was trying to get into the Foreign Service to stay at the Ambassador Hotel. It didn't help.

I didn't have strong impressions. It seemed crowded and bustling. When I first came down to work it was a twenty-four hour town. People were up all night because you had different shifts working in the government. But it was still essentially a small town. I lived in a rooming house near 14th Street, way out on Decatur Street somewhere, where I was asked to leave after being there for two weeks because I insisted upon opening my window and coal was scarce. The landlady said, "I can't have anybody who opens their windows." So I was asked to leave. Then I roomed with a Chinese chap over on North Capitol Street. He was here studying with the Census Bureau, and he was going back to help reshape the Chinese census system. We decided to join forces

and we roomed together, again in a furnished room, not too far from the Library. I used to take trolleys, there were a lot of trolley cars in Washington then, it was the way to travel. The winters were just as bad, just as inimical to traffic as they are now.

RITCHIE: What was the Legislative Reference Service like when you first got there?

VALEO: Well, I guess the best way to tell you that is to tell you a story about it. I'm now talking about 1946, which was really the beginning of the growth of Legislative Reference. In the 1942 period the La Follette-Monroney bill had not yet been passed, so it was a vision that Ernest Griffith had, more than anything else. The service had been in existence, but it was essentially a library reference service for members of Congress. Members would call up and they'd send a book out. There was very little writing done over there, bibliographies perhaps but not much more than that. In '46 the La Follette-Monroney bill was passed, it made a large place for the Legislative Reference Service in the reorganization of the Congress. That's when the service really began to take shape as a research organization. It still was in its infancy, and all of the researchers—I guess Francis Wilcox was the only senior specialist at the time—all the

other researchers were grouped together in a couple of large sections, one of which was general research, the other I think was legal research.

General research was headed by a fellow named Doc Knight, a nice man. He was a Ph.D. from I don't know how many schools—more than one. It was his job to make assignments. When I came back from the war, it was known generally that I was interested in Asia since I'd just been there as a soldier, so they made a point of giving me any inquiries that came in connected with Asia. I had mentioned that to Knight, and he said, "Oh, sure, I'll send them down." So he got one on some Indian tribe in North Dakota once and he said, "Here, give this to that fellow Valeo back there, he's interested in Indians." So it was not very specialized. We did what we could. We did almost any kind of request. I remember there were many assignments to me having nothing to do with Asia, internal problems in the United States. I also started writing statements for use on the floor of the two Houses.

Once the difficulties began to develop in Eastern Europe, one of the consistent requests was to write short speeches statements for members to put in the *Record* on national day for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I don't know how many statements I wrote on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania! If they had had computers in those days they could have been done mechanically. But to do them day in and day out, maybe a dozen a day until Estonian day, was

a real challenge, to come up with something different for each one of them. One statement was a speech draft for the then Vice President Alben Barkley to use in Chicago. He sent me a commendatory letter in return. But that was the way a good deal of that early period passed.

Actually, my first significant request came from Mike Mansfield, which was the beginning of the relationship with him. I remember because Ernest was very happy with the work I was doing, not happy with the fact I didn't have a Ph.D., but he was happy with the kinds of things I was turning out, because he was getting good comments from the people that he brought them to. He came in one day and he said, "Come quickly. I want you to meet a congressman." I'd never met a congressman before. He said, "It's a congressman from Montana, his name is Mansfield. He's had some problems getting what he wants from the service. I want you to listen and find out exactly what it is he wants and do it for him." So I went to see him in what was then the Congressional Reading Room.

He was a sort of gangling figure. He looked like he'd been clothed at J.C. Penney's. He was sort of raw-boned. He had had a deep interest in China, and his name had a good ring to me because he was one of the congressmen who had passed through China after the war. In Shanghai, he had said we're going to get these fellows out of here and get them home as soon as we can. So that

meant he had very high credentials on a personal basis with me, because I was one of the fellows he was going to get out and get home as soon as he could.

I listened carefully to his request, and I did two or three research papers for him on the questions which he had raised. They had mostly to do with Asia. One was on what was happening in Japan in the early occupation period, and another was an evaluation of the situation developing in China, and so forth. I did these studies for him, and never got any comment from him. Then about six months later he called me and he asked me to come over to his office. Again, I guess it was the first time I had ever been in a congressman's office. He said, "I liked those papers you did for me six months ago." He said, "They were awfully complicated, but you answered the questions I was trying to get answered." He said, "I'm going to be on a program with General Marshall (who was then secretary of state), and I want you to do a statement for me." I guess it was on China, as I recall, on the China situation. "This one," he said, "I want you to make much more conversational than the others."

All things fit together in a way. This was my first real attempt at a substantive speech. I'd done a lot of small potboilers, but this was the first real thing. Then the early interest in the theatre came very much into play, because again, the relationship, as Lippmann pointed out, particularly in speech

writing, is very closely associated with theatre. You have to have a speech that builds up to an inevitability, and then you come through with a conclusion that follows logically from it, much the way a play goes to a climax and then a denouement. So I did that speech.

From that we established a fairly solid relationship. We're now talking about 1951-52. Meanwhile I went on writing lots of speeches for other people and doing a lot of research papers for other members of Congress. He ran for the Senate in that '52 campaign, and it was a particularly dirty one. He was being accused of supporting the Chinese Communists and so forth, not for any of the speeches I'd written for him, but as a result of a report on one of his China trips which he had given to either Roosevelt or Truman. I don't know what the origins of that report were, but it plagued him in that campaign. But he was very popular in Montana, and even though Eisenhower had a landslide in that election, Mansfield came through. He was one of the few Democrats that ran against the Eisenhower tide, even though it was the first time he'd tried the Senate.

After he moved into the Senate, and then I began to have a good deal of contact with him. By that time I'd already gone over on loan to the Foreign Relations Committee, and he didn't know anyone else on the committee staff, so he came to see me and talked with me, asked me about who the people were and who he

could count on for what. I was still on a loan arrangement, I was still with the Library. I don't know whether you want me to go on on this point or not?

RITCHIE: Well, what I'd like to do is go back again and fill in on some things that I'm curious about. I wanted to go back to your being in the army. You had been down here for a year. Did you get drafted in '43?

VALEO: Yes, that's right.

RITCHIE: And then when you trained, did the fact that you had studied Chinese have something to do with your assignment?

VALEO: It's very interesting how that worked in the army. My interest was listed on the initial entry papers. But there was never any reference made to it at all in the ensuing months. Then I applied for an ASTP unit, Army Specialized Training Program, for the study of Chinese. I was selected for that, and I went first to the University of Illinois and then to the University of Washington, where they had a special course for people who were training in Chinese.

It was an interesting experience, because the group I was with were all Cantonese, immigrants or children of immigrants. None of them spoke the northern dialect. They spoke a variety of Cantonese, usually village dialects. These were fellows out of

New York's Chinatown or San Francisco's Chinatown, or elsewhere. They spoke a variety of village dialects—well, I have to digress a bit to give you some background on this. Most of the Chinese in the United States come from two or three villages about fifty to a hundred miles from the city of Canton, and most of their families came to the United States by way of Macau or Hong Kong, as indentured labor of some sort. They spoke only their village dialect, didn't even speak the Canton city dialect, which is actually a court Chinese of the Tang dynasty, it's like Old English would be to present day English. So at this ASTP unit they wanted these people's linguistic skills to be useful, but to be useful they had to have some of the northern dialect, or the Mandarin as it was then called, or national speech. And because I knew some Cantonese I was thrown in with them. I was the only Caucasian in the group, the rest were all overseas Chinese.

So we got training, using Cantonese as the medium, in the northern dialect. Many of those people did go to China, but I was not among those scheduled to go, for some reason or other. I was scheduled to become a pole climber in a communications team going to the South Pacific. At the very last minute, one of the Cantonese fellows on a team that was scheduled to go to China came to see me. We were then in Missouri near Joplin, a place called Camp Crowder, which was a Signal Corps Camp. He said, "We have a group that's about ready to go to China and one of the people is

sick. " He said, "I know you always wanted to go to China. Would you like to go?" So I said yes, I'd be delighted to join the group. That's how it happened. I went out with about a week's training in what they were doing, to fill out the complement.

We went as a group. We were an eighteen or nineteen man team, about half of whom would have been overseas Chinese, and I guess I would have had to be included in that number. The rest were Caucasian radio operators, code clerks, and that sort of thing.

RITCHIE: What was the mission?

VALEO: This was just about the time that [General Joseph W.] Stilwell got into a knock-down, drag-out fight with Chiang Kai-shek. One of the reasons why was that Stilwell didn't believe any of the intelligence reports he got from Nationalist sources. He always thought they exaggerated what they wanted to exaggerate and underplayed what was important. So after the Stilwell-Chiang fight, [General Albert C.] Wedemeyer came over, the first thing he was determined to do was to get his own sources of information on what was going on at the front. He organized these teams which would parallel the Chinese army organization down to company level. But we would only, of course, be a mock-up organization, a skeleton. We would have maybe two men out at company level just

to see what was going on, to see if we could get a more accurate picture of the actual battlefield with the Japanese.

On route to China, we sailed around Australia to Bombay and then went by rail to Calcutta. We got as far as Chabua, in Assam, and we were waiting around on Christmas eve for a flight into China. I remember when the Japanese launched their last big offensive. No one knew whether they were going to take Chungking or not. There was nothing to stop them, but their lines got very extended and I guess they decided at that point they'd better not go any further. They were trying to really knock China out of the war before the United States got into full power, and they failed. So they had to pull back. We waited there, not knowing whether in the end we would go to China or not, because if Chungking had fallen there would have really been very little point in it. But they didn't take Chungking, and then we flew in to Kunming, and with the Chinese, began the countermovement towards Canton.

RITCHIE: Well, having studied China, what was it like to get there?

VALEO: It was fascinating. The most amazing thing, I think, was to see it from the air, when you came in from India. You had—I don't know how to describe it exactly—you knew the moment you had passed the borderline, more or less, between China and India, because you saw immediately the impact of human beings

on the land so much more clearly in China than you would see it in India. In India the human beings faded into the landscape, particularly in the rural areas around Chabua. But the minute you were over Yunnan Province and nearing Kunming, you began to see what you had imagined it would be like, the terracing of the fields and a great greenness, which was lacking, as I recall, on the Indian side. It wasn't until later that you began to see deeper, the poverty and the terrible human exploitation. Yunnan Province had not yet been touched very strongly by the war. It was a center for dispatching Americans elsewhere. It was also on the receiving end of American supplies, so that it was in somewhat better condition than the rest of China. It wasn't until we moved into Guerzhou Province by road that we began to see what the war had really done in the way of devastation to the country.

RITCHIE: Did your teams ever follow the Chinese armies?

VALEO: Yes, we set up an organization. We did function, vaguely, the way we were expected to do. It was hard to say how much really the language training had done. It was certainly useful in traveling around from one place to another. But in terms of how much greater insight it gave us into what was going on, I don't know. It's very hard to say.

RITCHIE: Were you able to file reports on what the Chinese army was doing?

VALEO: Yes. We sent them through regularly. We would encode them. But we were always receiving them from people still further out. I don't know who they were, or where they were, but we had some units out with the actual Chinese army, working with the Chinese army directly. They would report to us, and we in turn would file these reports. These were American reports and the reporting got more accurate in that period. That was the function, and to that extent the teams fulfilled the function.

RITCHIE: And you were there through '46?

VALEO: Through the early part of '46, in Shanghai after the war—and the city was just about what you would have expected.

RITCHIE: When did you go to Shanghai?

VALEO: I actually went to Shanghai on V-J Day, which was in September of 1945. We flew in from a place called Luzhou, in Kwangsi Province in the south. There weren't many of us; there were several thousand of us, I guess, in all, when we were finally filled out. I was billeted at the YMCA building on what was then called Bubbling Well Road. It was right in the heart of what was then the foreign settlement in Shanghai.

RITCHIE: Were you in China long enough to get any sense of the politics of China at that stage?

VALEO: I really wasn't that alert to it. It's interesting, when you're in the army you don't really have time to think much about politics. Yes, you got it in the press. There was an English language newspaper in Shanghai. There were one or two English weeklies. One was run by a fellow named Powell, whose family had been there for a long time. This was the son of the original publisher. He took a very militant anti-Chiang position, although never separating himself from the government, but he was one of its strongest critics. It had already begun at that point, and later on it became stronger and stronger. You had the feeling that it was a country that was obviously terribly impoverished by the war, and with a government that was not really capable of doing very much about it. There wasn't much more than that that you could see as a soldier in the area. Basically, that was it. You know, people would die on the streets. That was true not so much in Shanghai, but during the war there were so many refugees that people would die almost anywhere. It was a very rough, rough time.

RITCHIE: I wondered how that experience shaped your view of China and the Far East in later years.

VALEO: Well, what it did mostly was make me realize how far they've come when I saw it for the first time again in 1972, about the time of the Nixon visit, but we can take that up at another time. My own personal feeling at that time was—and I

don't know if I bought the official line or what—but I kind of accepted our own policy that the only way in which they had a chance of coming out of this would be by staying united around Chiang Kai-shek. I did not accept the view that he couldn't do it. I just refused to do that, because all I could see was a return to warlordism if he didn't do it.

I had no idea of the real appeal of the Communist Party at that time in China, which was enormous, as we found out later, but which at that time was still very remote. We're talking about a time when Chou En-lai was still trying to negotiate. He was in Chungking himself trying to develop some kind of rapport with the National government. We're talking about the time just before Pat Hurley went over there as Roosevelt's special emissary, to see if he could bring "Moose Dung" and "Shanka Jack" together, as he would call them.

RITCHIE: When you came back, China became a big issue very shortly after.

VALEO: Very quickly, and I was astonished that it had become that much of an issue. From being in China, I didn't see the Communists as a major factor at that point. At the time I left they still did not appear to be a major factor. It was not till about 1948 that their full strength—it wasn't so much the Communist strength at that time, it was the weakness that existed

under the Nationalist government, quite apart from mistakes of strategy and everything else. China needed a revolution. It had no choice, I don't think. I saw that in retrospect. I didn't see it at the time. But in retrospect, the weight of the past was so heavy, and the social decay so deadly, that they probably could not have reshaped it without a thorough-going revolution.

RITCHIE: Did you find yourself in demand for the congressmen and the senators who were particularly interested in China?

VALEO: The truth of the matter: there were very few who were, I mean, who really were deeply interested. It was only after it became a political issue, after the collapse of the Nationalist government, that congressmen really began to get interested in China. It was still pretty remote. You had a man like Walter Judd and a few others who had some experience in the situation, who were anxious to have the United States do something, or not do something, either way. Mansfield was another because of his experience there as Roosevelt's emissary as a young congressman, as a teacher of Asian history, and the fact that he had been a Marine there in the '20s. He knew the country. There were a few like that, but they were very few. Walter Judd never asked me, or never put a request into the Library which was assigned to me, and that's probably because Walter Judd probably did know a lot more about the situation at that point than I did.

RITCHIE: There were practically no speeches at all about China before 1949.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: But in 1949 the *Congressional Record* was packed with them.

VALEO: Well, it became *the* issue in '49 because that's when the Nationalists collapsed and it became a major issue in the United States. I remember people saying at the time—very good Republicans, saying: Wasn't it terrible what those Democrats did with the "Malta" Agreement, meaning the Yalta agreement, of course. But it was terrible what they had done, obviously given China away in the Malta Agreement.

RITCHIE: Did you then, after that, find that you were in demand?

VALEO: Yes, the demand went up very quickly at that point. I'm trying to remember. I was still at the Library of Congress. I was then chief of the Foreign Affairs Division, which had only been organized for about two or three years. I would say from about '49 on the interest rose very rapidly and I did a lot of work, although I can't remember now the particular members for whom I did requests.

I remember only one incident, almost deadly incident, that occurred when [Joseph] McCarthy's office called me. He had a research assistant who later became his wife, her name was Jean Kerr. She used to call me all the time for bits of information, a date or something like that. I had specifically requested that McCarthy's inquiries be referred to me, because I felt they had to be treated very carefully. At that time it was the custom in the Library to answer things by phone, you didn't have to have a memorandum on everything you did.

She called me one day about Owen Lattimore, the name I mentioned earlier. She wanted to know more about him. She said, "Is he a doctor? I mean, is he a Ph.D.?" I said, "Well, I'll check and see what I can find on him." She said, "He's out there saying he's a Ph.D. from a university." So I got out whatever information I could and I went to see Sergius Yacobson, who knew about the university that Lattimore had gotten the degree from. He said, "Well, it's not a Ph.D. in our sense of the word, but it's the equivalent." So I passed this back to Jean Kerr, but it came out "He's no Ph.D. at all" on the Senate floor, that Lattimore was a spurious character masquerading as a Ph.D. when he wasn't!

There was a senator from Rhode Island at the time, [Theodore Francis] Green, who was a stickler for detail. He asked, "Well, where did you get your information from?" McCarthy said, "It came from Mr. Valeo in the Library of Congress." I didn't know any-

thing about what was going on. I got a call from the Librarian, and he asked me to come in to see him. I went to his office, and he said, "Did you just give McCarthy some information?" I said, "Yes, I gave his office some information about Owen Lattimore." He said, "Senator Green is challenging that information, and he wants to know whether we actually supplied the information or not." He said, "I've told him that we are not at liberty to say whether or not we were the source of the information. However, I said if he wanted to he could ask us the same question and we would answer the question."

So I answered the question again, as I had answered it to Jean Kerr, perhaps even a little more carefully this time. And that went to Green, who then put the other matter in the record. I got a call from Jean Kerr the next day, she said, "Got you in a little trouble yesterday, didn't we, Mr. Valeo?" She said, "We'll make it up to you." She said, "I'm going to send you a copy of the senator's new book, autographed to you personally." It was *General Marshall: Ten Years—or Twenty Years—of Treason*, or something like that. I still have that book somewhere. After that, any information that went to McCarthy's office went as a memo. Nothing went on the telephone anymore.

RITCHIE: What about Senator Knowland, who was known as the senator from Formosa?

VALEO: Interesting guy. Oh, he'd call occasionally for minor things, but never anything significant. I have funny feelings about Knowland. He was a very distant man. The only time I ever really found myself in a kind of human exchange with him was out in Denver, Colorado. We'd been there on some kind of hearings. We were sitting in the airport, waiting for a plane, and he was there on some other matter, I think. He came and sat in the waiting room, and then the snow started to fall. It was a spring snowstorm, and about eight inches fell in an hour or two, so we were snowbound for a period of time. Carl Marcy was there too. That was the only time I ever saw Knowland take on some human dimensions, in that one little incident.

I always had the feeling that he really disliked intensely being in public life, and that some kind of force for better or for worse was pushing him in that direction all the time. Of course, Tom Connally of Texas used to give him a hard time. I'm sure Pat Holt probably gave you this sort of thing, but Tom Connally used to call him "The senator from Formosa." He would never call it Taiwan. He would always call him "The senator from Formosa."

RITCHIE: At the same time, a lot of these senators who were giving speeches on China were getting information from what was called the "China Lobby," headed by Alfred Kohlberg.

VALEO: Very much so. I went up to see Kohlberg in New York, as a matter of fact, in response to one inquiry that we had. Griffith said, "You'd better go up and talk to him personally in New York." So I went up to see him. He had a linen business. He used to ship linen from Ireland to, I think, Swatow, or to some of those port cities in South China, mainly to those in Fukien Province, where they had a lot of hand skills. They'd do a "put out" system. They'd put the Irish linen out to the rural areas to have work done. The peasant women would make them into magnificent tablecloths, and napkins, and handkerchiefs, and whatnot. Then he'd sell the finished product elsewhere, usually in the United States. It was an early example of what we've since tried in many parts of the world.

I had a talk with Kohlberg. He was convinced that everybody who opposed Chiang Kai-shek in any way was obviously influenced by the Communists in some way—he didn't even say influenced, just obviously were Communists. I mean, there just was no question. I found out later he had lost a son to the Communists somewhere along the line. One of his own children, at least that was told to me—I think he himself said it to me at the time. He said, "I know what they're like, because my son went off with them," or something like that. I've often wondered how much that might have influenced him. But he was feeding McCarthy a lot of information. He spent all of his spare time in the public library on 42nd

Street in New York, researching this information, all of his spare time. I think he neglected his business, he got so obsessed with this question, and he would feed it all to McCarthy or later on to Pat McCarran of Nevada.

RITCHIE: Do you feel it really was a political issue?

VALEO: It was a political issue only because the other issues weren't more important. There was a country of great surplus, when these questions arose. We had escaped unscathed from the war, except for those families who had lost people in it. We came out of a depression into prosperity. We were sitting on top of the world in every way, in almost any way that you could imagine. I think that that explains why it could become an issue. We had time to think. China, which had been our particular missionary field for more than a hundred years, more so than any other place abroad, kind of regarded as our special thing because we'd never taken any extraterritorial rights. Although we sat in the British compounds, we'd never taken any territorial rights ourselves. We'd always defended the Open Door, and the integrity of China, including Manchuria. We could not accept the fact that the course we had followed might have possibly been wrong. There had to be a devil somewhere.

I used to think that in a way we were a little bit like missionaries in China, as a nation—not simply those who actually

were, but as a nation—and like missionaries one of the things that is the hardest to accept is when your charge grows up and doesn't need you anymore. I think that underlay the whole thing. It was the point of a major transition in a relationship with China which had gone on for more than a hundred years. We had to accept the fact that it couldn't go on in the same way, and it was very difficult for us. I think that underlay the problem. It's the main psychological factor, there were obviously specific things that were involved.

But incredibly the aid program that originally went into China, in connection with the Marshall Plan, that was Walter Judd's doing entirely. The Senate actually tried to throw it out at that point. They didn't want to put any more aid into China. Walter Judd had written this in. I remember hearing him in exchanges with George Marshall at the time in a hearing. It was apparent that Marshall thought it was a total waste of money, but it was one of the prices he paid to get the Marshall Plan set up for Europe, which was what he was mostly concerned with. Marshall was smart enough to say that if you really wanted to have an influence on the China situation you were thinking in terms of three or four million men, and even then of dubious influence on it.

Marshall, I think, was probably the profoundest military brain of World War II, much more so than Eisenhower, who had other positive characteristics. But I think the depth belonged to

Marshall. He understood the situation more deeply than anyone else. In a way, so did [Douglas] MacArthur. MacArthur did not want a war in China unless he could use nuclear weapons, and he would not have been averse to using them. That was very clear from some of the statements he made. But he would never think in terms of a conventional war in China. MacArthur, like so many others, was carried away by the idea that we were the ones that had *the* bomb and that should give us the right to dictate just about anything we wanted. Well, it was a very short period of time that we had the bomb.

RITCHIE: When you came back to Legislative Reference in '46, at that stage it had been set up by the Reorganization Act, and Francis Wilcox was still listed as the senior international affairs specialist.

VALEO: Yes, he was on loan.

RITCHIE: He was on loan sort of permanently after that.

VALEO: Yes, and the same thing happened to me, actually, because I went out on loan in '52. I was head of the Foreign Affairs Division, which was a group of maybe a dozen researchers. We'd built it up over the years until that point, and it was doing some awfully good work, and getting good responses from the Hill, from both parties and from various sources. Then a request came in for me to go over to the [Foreign Relations] committee to help

them. It also had something to do with the McCarthy period, because McCarthy had started his inquiry into the information program. Senator [William] Benton of Connecticut thought that he was really going to destroy the Voice of America, which was Benton's particular pet. He had set it up, or had something to do with the establishment of it. He and Chester Bowles had something to do with the establishment of the information program, and he didn't want to see it destroyed by McCarthy. So his response to that was to get, I guess, Connally to go along with setting up a similar investigation in the Foreign Relations Committee. He was successful in doing that, but then he was defeated in the next election, and the new chairman became [J. William] Fulbright.

I went over when Fulbright was chairman of that subcommittee, and [Bourke] Hickenlooper was the ranking minority member. They were having trouble getting it off the ground, and they needed somebody who could do an analytic approach to it, so I went over to design the basic studies. This was an early attempt at oversight in foreign relations. It had never been done before in systematic fashion. It became known as the "good committee" on the information program, as contrasted with McCarthy's "bad committee." This was the way the *[Washington] Post*, looking around eagerly for anything to hit McCarthy over the head with, would constantly refer to the work of this committee. This became especially true when Bourke Hickenlooper became chairman [in 1953]

because he was a very conservative Republican and he didn't want to tangle with McCarthy. He didn't like what McCarthy was doing, but he didn't want to get in the middle of it, as so many Republicans felt at the time.

Hickenlooper kept me on; he wanted me to stay on because I had traveled to Asia with him, in connection with the study when it was under Fulbright. That was the beginning of a very long, and very close relationship between Bourke Hickenlooper and myself. He had taken me on the trip to Asia under duress. Francis Wilcox insisted that he take somebody from the committee. He wanted someone from New York, a lawyer that he knew, who had been associated with him for a long time. Wilcox finally said, "Well, you can take him if you'll also take Frank Valeo." "Who's Frank Valeo?" And so forth. Well, he took me, under duress, very irritated by the fact, which made my job almost impossible. It was the first time I had traveled abroad for the committee after the war. But in the course of that trip, somehow or other he developed some respect for me.

By the time the trip was over, and I'd done a report, he took occasion, when he became chairman of the committee in the next Congress, because of the shift in the majority in the Senate after Eisenhower's landslide in '52, he took occasion to say that he would take that subcommittee on the information program only on one condition: that he could have Frank Valeo on the staff. He

was very glowing in his praise. It came out of the blue. I happened to be there, and got red while he was saying it. I knew that he had changed his mind somewhat about the value of having somebody from the staff along, but I didn't think it had gone that far, because he was a rather taciturn man. They used to call him the "gloomy pragmatist." I think the *New York Times* called him the "gloomy pragmatist." But I had a lot of respect for him and while we had differing political views I was very comfortable working with him on that study. He had admonished me: "Stay clear of McCarthy. Don't get drawn out into a fight with him. You just proceed in your own way and stay away from the McCarthy thing completely," which I did. I took the advice and we kept it that way. Even McCarthy used to identify us as the "good investigation!"

RITCHIE: I was struck by how many people from the Legislative Reference Service wound up working for the Foreign Relations Committee.

VALEO: It started with Wilcox and Morella Hansen, and then me. I brought over other people, because they didn't have a large professional staff. That fit in with my view of the La Follette-Monroney bill in its original concept. Partly out of discussions with Ernest, partly from my own vision, I saw the main source of research being lodged in the Legislative Reference Service, while the staff on the committees would be kept to an absolute minimum.

I think it's a disaster the way it has gone. I think it is a disservice, this huge expansion of Hill staff structures under the committees. Much of what is done is redundant with the Congressional Research Service. Then there was also the expansion of the GAO [General Accounting Office], which at that time was not into this at all. They audited government accounts and that was it. But there was one Comptroller, I think it was [Joseph] Campbell, who felt that there was great growth potential in a bureaucratic sense in the GAO, so then they began to develop these other aspects of GAO which could have been handled by Congressional Research. As I saw it, originally that was envisioned for the Library of Congress.

I thought that senators would become increasingly less effective the more they had the research people right under their noses; that with that sort of thing they would be bound in by their own staff people. How can a chairman of a committee control fifty staff people in any meaningful sense?

RITCHIE: What were the prime functions that the Legislative Reference Service set out to do in those early years?

VALEO: I think Ernest wanted—and one keeps coming back to Ernest Griffith, because I think he's the key person in this. Luther Evans had it for a while, but it was not quite the same thing. Luther Evans was interested in much more flamboyant

things. Ernest, when he took it over, was a scholar. What he was trying to put into the legislative process, as I understood it, was a major contribution from what was produced by academic scholarship. Basically that's what he had in mind. What Ernest did not fully grasp was that you could not put this directly into the legislative process, that most congressmen had neither the time nor the inclination to deal with scholarly treatises, which were not written primarily with legislation in mind. So somewhere you had to have a bridge—and the way I saw the role of the service was to act as an intermediary taking essentially the fruits of scholarship, redesigning them in a form which would fit into the legislative process, into realities of the legislative process.

One of the reasons why the Foreign Affairs Division at the time was successful was because we put great stress on that. I used to take papers done by researchers and I would spend hours trying to understand the point that was being made. Well, I could do it because I'd be willing to stay till eight or nine o'clock, and I would have nothing else to do anyhow, so I would do it. But then I would reshape those papers so that when a congressman saw them he would be able to grasp the salient features from the point of view of legislation in twenty minutes or a half hour, or how much time he could give to it. But Ernest never fully understood that that was an essential point if you were going to do the

service that the Legislative Reference Service could do. I have noticed that the output in recent years from Congressional Research has been much better, much closer to that kind of thing, but it's been a long time getting to that point.

RITCHIE: It has to understand its audience.

VALEO: You have to understand the audience, that's precisely it. And Ernest didn't quite understand that, because he had really very little exposure to Congress. He had a father-in-law who was in Congress, I think, but that was his major exposure. Ernest was essentially an educator.

RITCHIE: And people like Thorstein Kalijarvi went from LRS over to the Foreign Relations Committee, and Sergius Yacobson went over to the committee.

VALEO: Yes. Now, I did not bring them over. Those are people who went over independently. Yacobson, I guess, came considerably later. He went, I think, more to the House side than to the Senate side. But Kalijarvi was a special arrangement. I don't know the details. He and I were not close friends by any means. He was brought in for the first time from a political source, I don't know all the details. But there was something else in the case of Kalijarvi. He later became an ambassador during the Eisenhower administration.

RITCHIE: I was looking down the list of names of people in the LRS and realized that they were the same names that I had seen on the staff of the committee in the 1950s, and was surprised how much fluidity there was between the two.

VALEO: I brought Ellen Collier over to work on the information program. Charlie Gellner came over. There were a number that we brought over at that time, when we set up the subcommittee on disarmament, the first disarmament subcommittee with Hubert Humphrey, I think Ellen and Charlie both came over.

RITCHIE: You said earlier that Ernest Griffith had trouble because you didn't have a Ph.D.

VALEO: Yes, there's a story connected with it. It's interesting, most of the Ph.D.s he had on his staff were pushing him to appoint me to the job, people like Howard Piquet and I guess Francis [Wilcox], among others. There were a number who said: you've had this young fellow working here for a year and a half as an acting chief; don't you think it's time you gave him the job? Well, he wasn't quite sure. He had to check out a few more people first. I must say, I don't know whether Ernest would concur in this, but it had gone on for a long time, and he had tried out somebody who later went out to the House committee. Sergius Yacobson, who started, didn't really want the job, and he

left it to go back up to the Slavic Division of the Library, so I was the acting chief, and it went on for at least a year and a half, maybe more.

Finally, there was a fellow named Charlie Dean, he was a congressman from North Carolina. Charlie Dean was very important to Ernest, because he was on the House Administration Committee, and the House Administration Committee handled the Library's budget. Charlie Dean was somewhat skeptical of money going into the Library for these purposes, so he at one point asked Ernest to send over somebody to help him on a foreign policy matter. Ernest said, "You'd better go over and talk with him." So I went over to see Charlie Dean, who had only been out of the country once in his life. He had gone on a trip by request of Harry Truman, who was then president, and he'd gone to Asia, all over Southeast Asia.

He came back very much inspired by Burma, of all places, because the Baptists from his hometownCa fellow named Abonerim Judson had been the principal missionary in Burma. So he had a great, warm feeling for Burma and the new government. He thought they were doing very well as an independent state. U Nu was then the president of Burma. Dean said, "What I'd like you to do, President Truman asked me to give him a little note on my travels out there, and I'd like for you to help me write that note." I said, "Sure, I'd be glad to." So he gave me whatever he could and I filled it out with whatever else I could pull out of the blue,

and we wrote a report for him to go to President Truman. It went to the president and Dean got a personal call from President Truman telling him how useful that was and how good that report was. So that had raised my stock with Charlie Dean very high. Ernest again thought it must be a freak: how could you do that without a Ph.D.? But after that, Charlie Dean was very friendly to the Library's budget, and especially to the Legislative Reference Service's budget.

In the meantime, a fellow named [Gordon] Seagrave, who had been a medical missionary in northern Burma, was arrested and charged with treason because he'd given some medical help to the Kachins and some of the other rebellious tribes in the north, against the Rangoon government. So they had arrested him. Seagrave had a very colorful history out there. He loved Burmese women, that was the story that I got, anyhow, that he was crazy about Burmese women. His wife didn't stay out there with him, she lived somewhere in Baltimore. He was well known in Burma. He was part of the Burma of that time. You couldn't really grasp Burma in that period without knowing Seagrave.

He was sentenced to death for treason. Well, nobody in Burma really thought he was going to be hung, they just thought they were punishing him for a while for his behavior, which had displeased U Nu. Instead, Congressman Dean took it very seriously. He called me one day and he said, "I want you to write me a

statement and tell them they must not harm Seagrave or we're going to send the navy over to get him out." He said, "Just lay it on heavy. If we have to send the whole navy over there, we're going to get him out. I want you to write me a statement and I'm going to make it on the floor tomorrow." I thought about this. I pondered it. I tried to write the statement, and I couldn't write it. I felt that that approach would probably sign Seagrave's death warrant. I just couldn't bring myself to write a statement of that kind. I just knew what the effect would be on the Burmese. So I called Dean up at home.

It was about eight o'clock at night, and I hadn't even gotten by the first paragraph on this thing. I called him at home and I said, "You know, Congressman, I would not normally do this, but I just have great difficulty writing this statement along those lines. I'm afraid it may actually have very serious consequences for Dr. Seagrave." He said, "Well, you know, I've been thinking about it too. Maybe you better not. Besides, I just talked to his wife in Baltimore." He said, "I think you better do it just anyway you think it ought to be done." So I did, I wrote a very conciliatory statement. I wrote a letter for him to go to the Burmese ambassador to transmit to U Nu, whom he had met and whom he had liked and gotten along so well with. It was a very conciliatory thing, asking him to reconsider what they were doing.

Well, to make a long story short, Seagrave got sprung, but at the same time, Ernest went over to get his budget worked out with Charlie Dean and just at that time comes this beautiful letter from Charlie Dean about how this fellow Frank Valeo—Francis Valeo, as he used to call me—had just done so much good work for him, and he just thought he ought to have some kind of a letter over there. That was the thing that made Ernest make up his mind. Finally he dropped the acting and left me as chief. After that happened, I only stayed in the job for another year or two before I began to be loaned out to the committee.

RITCHIE: In the early years, the Foreign Relations Committee didn't have substantive subcommittees. They had consultative subcommittees.

VALEO: That's correct, and even then they didn't have that for a long time. All they had was this special subcommittee which was set up on the information program, and then at a subsequent point we put another one up—Carl Marcy and I worked that one out—on disarmament. I don't know if he told you the story of that, but that's a classic, too.

RITCHIE: I'd like to hear it.

VALEO: We'll get to that. The State Department came up with the idea of having consultative subcommittees. It originated with State. With some reluctance, because they didn't like to break it up into units, the committee decided to do that.

RITCHIE: Maybe at this point, since we're beginning to talk about the Foreign Relations Committee, this would be a good time to close today's interview, and we can start with the committee next time.

VALEO: That's a good idea. I was just going to suggest a break.

End of Interview #1

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Interview #2
Wednesday, July 10, 1985

RITCHIE: Why don't we begin with the points you wanted to raise about the Legislative Reference Service?

VALEO: All right. The first one has to do with the Marshall Plan, in that period around '48. One of the main inspirations for that was Dean Acheson. General George C. Marshall was then secretary of state. I always regarded Marshall as one of the truly outstanding figures in American history. Little understood, largely because he refused to keep any memoirs, and he never had an oral history! But he was an extraordinary man and probably the key to the military victory in World War II. You may recall, Roosevelt jumped him from colonel to chief of staff over a lot of old heads, after Pearl Harbor. Anyway, Marshall, after he first presented the Marshall Plan to Congress, insisted upon including the Soviet Union under that plan. It always struck me that in spite of the hysteria which had already begun, he refused to put the Marshall Plan in the terms of an anti-Soviet program. The theory was to restore Europe, and any country in Europe, so that all could eventually become effectively a part of the United Nations. You restored any that were willing to cooperate in the Plan.

The invitation was extended to Eastern Europe, much to the chagrin of some members of Congress at that time, who were really beating the drums already on the anti-Communist end. But Marshall never changed that. He refused to do it, refused to put it in any terms other than that: that it was open to any country that had been one of our partners in the war. I always thought that was a characteristic of his greatness. On another side of it, when the question of including China came up, Marshall also stood fast against Congressman Walter Judd, who was pressing for the inclusion of China. He finally yielded to a degree, in order to get support for the Plan. Judd tried to get him to say that China should be treated the same as our European allies, that it was just as strong and just as important an ally. Marshall refused to go beyond saying that he would include it. And he only included it because it was an afterthought and a compromise. But the original plan did not include China. The inclusion was Judd's doing, primarily.

Well, the Legislative Reference Service got into this thing largely because the question, inasmuch as it involved money, gave the House Foreign Affairs Committee its first real grip at something big. Up until that time, the House Foreign Affairs Committee had not been very active. It had a chairman named Sol Bloom, who used to make occasional speeches on subjects, generally in support of Roosevelt and Truman. But the first major role came

with this Marshall Plan. Chris Herter, who later became secretary of state, was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the time, and became part of a special group. I believe it was based on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, but it was called the Herter Committee. I think it was probably a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Herter needed help and he went to Ernest Griffith. Ernest turned to Dr. William Yandell Elliot, at Harvard, who was then one of the leading—or the emerging, significant anti-Communist figures and big business figures after the Roosevelt administration. Although he was ostensibly a Democrat, he had begun already to move into a much more militant anti-Communist position than was ever taken by the Roosevelt administration. Bill Elliot came down, he was a rather overbearing man—he was big and booming—and he was assigned as staff director to the Herter committee. This was an important element in the development of the Legislative Reference Service. Elliot had a tendency to run roughshod over anyone around, and one of the people around was a fellow named Boyd Crawford, who had been the clerk of the committee for many years. Crawford was later to catch one of the people who shot up the House of Representatives. He was a meek, unassuming man, you would never have thought of him doing it, but he disarmed one of the people in that Puerto Rican independence demonstration.

Boyd Crawford resented Elliot very much, who had been brought in primarily because of his knowledge of national defense, and national security affairs. I was then rather junior at the Library, and had been befriended by Dr. Howard Piquet, who was the international trade specialist, one of the early people hired by Ernest Griffith. He came from the Tariff Commission, where I believe he had been either a member or the executive director, and then he had been one of the founding staff members of the Food and Agriculture Organization. He came to the Library as a senior specialist, and I served as his young assistant. Piquet went over to work with Elliot, and I went with him as his aide and mainly paper carrier. We sat in on those early meetings when Herter really dominated the proceedings.

One of the things that sticks in my mind most clearly from that period was that there was a congressman, I believe from Ohio, named [John M.] Vorys who was a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. At that time there were several aid programs, one called GARIOA, which was the Army's General Relief Program to prevent disease and unrest in the occupied areas. In addition, I believe Greek and Turkish aid had also started, and then came the Marshall Plan. People came from the Department of State who were trying to push the Marshall Plan bill, and Vorys said to them "Oh, for God's sakes, you've got so many of these aid things floating around. Please put them all together in one bill. We can't be

bothered doing them separately." That was the origin of the Aid bill, which has since had, of course, not only those original things in it, but hundreds of others. But the original consolidated aid legislation grew out of one comment by Vorys, who was defeated the next year. It was done primarily to please him. It's something that occurs repeatedly in the legislative process: you put something into a piece of legislation to bring one of the members along who is critical at that moment; long after he's gone it's still in and a whole bureaucracy is trying to enforce something which had no more meaning other than the fact that one member at the time the legislation was passed tended to need that or want it for some reason. It's a very strong argument for sunset legislation.

Well, I wanted to bring in the Herter committee, and the role that the Legislative Reference played. Yandell Elliot was eventually eased out by Boyd Crawford, who then became chief of staff and began to develop a regular staff structure. I had the feeling then that had Elliot not been so aggressive in his behavior, there was a strong possibility that the concept that we talked about last week, where research for Congress, at least in foreign affairs, might have developed and stayed in the Legislative Reference Service. Boyd Crawford was not a foreign affairs specialist. He was a general clerical, administrative person, and

would have been glad to work with something like that, and would have kept the committee staff smaller had that been possible.

Had it developed that way, then I believe you would have seen the use of senior specialists in the pattern that Ernest Griffith had in mind, on special assignment to committees for a period of time and then back to the Library for research and for recharging of batteries in the periods when there was no immediate legislation. That did not work out. I think partly because again, the problem of the need for a bridge between the scholar and the politician was not recognized in that period. It's one of the things I thought Ernest did not understand.

RITCHIE: Did you think that the Legislative Reference Service had any difficulty balancing House and the Senate requests?

VALEO: Not in that period. Ernest was eager to take on anything that he could get, and I agreed with that approach. He brought in a lot of people, as many people as the budget would allow. Many of the more senior members of the service at that time were sometimes lacking in work to do, so Ernest went out to find work for them, wherever possible. He had many run-ins with members of the Appropriations Committees who insisted that that was what he was doing. But Ernest felt that there was no way to

build a service that could be effective, if you didn't bring people in and hold them when you had a chance to get them.

The budget of the Legislative Reference Service in those days had lots of ups and downs. Some Congressman would be antagonized by a job from the Service and he'd be strategically placed and he'd throw in a fifty thousand dollar cut, just to express his anger. Then, of course, Ernest would go over to some friend on the other side—it often happened to be Pat McCarran on the Senate side, whose daughter happened to work in Legislative Reference Service—and he'd try to get it restored. But that was part of the early, and really relatively simple, politics of the Legislative Reference Service. Ernest, a religious man with great faith, always looked on the brighter side of things, even when we took beatings from the Hill. But gradually the concept took root. One has to bear in mind, at that time the idea of professional research specialists was alien to about 90 percent of the Congress. They just didn't know what you would do with them. It took some time before the idea began to work into the system.

RITCHIE: It's interesting that you mentioned that he was a religious man, because Francis Wilcox said the way he got hired was because he went to the same church with Griffith.

VALEO: Very likely!

RITCHIE: He sounds like he was very imaginative in the way he recruited.

VALEO: There's one other thing that I would like to get into the record, because I take a certain amount of pride in it. In the period of Communist hysteria, which came shortly after the war, growing largely out of a domestic situation projected abroad into a situation where I didn't think it was applicable, there were many, many speeches written in the Library of Congress of an anti-Communist nature. I wrote my share of these, but I take pride in the fact that I never used the phrase "Godless Communism," which was the then-prevailing cliché. I don't know whether it was because it didn't really matter to me whether Communists were Godless and I thought maybe we ought to keep ideology separate from religion, or whether it was just a certain artistic resistance to using clichés. I resisted using that phrase in any speech draft, but it was a common one, repeated ad nauseam.

RITCHIE: On one hand, the Legislative Reference Service was there to give detached advice; on the other hand they were there to provide partisan rhetoric.

VALEO: This was very difficult. As far as I know—there may have been a couple of exceptions—but generally speaking we would not arm a member of Congress against an opponent in a

political campaign. But there was partisanship on ideological questions, and this caused much soul-searching in those early days of Legislative Reference. Everybody could agree that if you were asked for a bona fide study, you did a bona fide job, and did it as objectively as you knew how, and you presented the arguments on both sides of any issue. That much was accepted generally, many congressmen had no interest in that sort of thing. They wanted a speech that they could make, either to express a viewpoint or to condemn another viewpoint. The question came up and Ernest ruled that we would do "objective speeches on one side of an issue," with a clear understanding that this was not an objective treatment of the entire subject. That was the way it was resolved. To do those speeches was essential at that time in order to develop the kind of rapport with members of Congress which was to make the service increasingly useful as an institution of objective research. Had it not been done, I don't think the Service would have ever gotten off the ground.

RITCHIE: When you were doing that early research on foreign policy, did you have any cooperation from the State Department?

VALEO: We began to develop it at that time. The only place I can think of involving me was a publication put out by the Department of State which attempted to wash our hands of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang government. They put out something called the "China White Paper," which became a classic in its

time. It was a very elaborate treatment, assembling virtually of all the papers associated with our relationships with the Nationalist government. It was a best seller, quickly out of print. And it was a long thing, maybe about a thousand pages. Members of Congress didn't want to read it, but wanted to know what was in it. So my job was to do a summary. We had a number of requests for something like that. It became a challenge in a sense to do it objectively, and a source of worry. If you did an objective summary it clearly came out that it was time to get away from the Nationalist government of China. The White Paper didn't say to go to the other side, it merely said get away from the Nationalist Government. It was after Marshall had come back from China, had given up on his mission of bringing the two sides together.

So I did the job. We pondered for a long time how to make it acceptable to people who were very passionate supporters of the Nationalist government. We decided to put an addendum on it which would include press comment from both points of view on the White Paper. That was the way it was published. Now, I believe, it is in the Rare Book collection of the Library of Congress!

RITCHIE: Well, before the Legislative Reference Service, and before there was a staff for the committees, the State Department really provided the background for the Foreign Relations Committee. I just wondered if they might have felt somewhat suspicious of what you were doing.

VALEO: They were, as everyone was at that time, in other departments as well, because when congressmen needed expert advice, they normally turned to the executive branch. This was characteristic of the whole Roosevelt period and it carried over into the Truman period. That changed when the Republicans took control of the Eightieth Congress in 1946. They didn't trust the administration, didn't trust anything that came out of the executive branch. So it was one of the things that gave a rather formidable boost to the Library and the Legislative Reference Service as an arm of Congress.

The reason why I raised the White Paper, I did get cooperation from the Department of State on the summary. Before we printed it, we asked for a review in the Department of State. The man who reviewed it was Carl Marcy, whom I didn't know at the time. He sent it back with no changes and he said it was a great job, or something to that effect. That was one of the things that began to establish some of the credentials of the Legislative Reference Service with the Department of State. In that situation, I presume they saw us as an ally, which of course, we weren't. It just happened that in that instance the service's work worked to their advantage. But it was a very gradual thing, and some of the early contacts, as we'll get into later, were periods of great suspicion of the upstarts from the legislative branch of the government.

Eventually it evolved into what is still a distrustful relationship, in my judgment, but at least has some elements of interchange between the two. I think the Department of State has finally come to recognize that the Congress is here to stay and that they'd better work with the staff people on the committees, at least, and with the Congressional Research Service. As time went on, we had more and more telephone contact with the department on questions which we could not answer from public sources. But by the same token, we also developed contacts with the embassies, to get information, largely from their information officers. In those early days however, we worked primarily from newspapers, periodicals, and books.

RITCHIE: It was in a sense synthesizing larger amounts of material into shorter reports for congressmen who didn't have much time to do it themselves.

VALEO: Precisely. I'm sure it was helpful in that period. Although you have a mixed bag. There are some congressmen who believe there isn't anything they don't know. And there are some who really want to be informed on issues. We tried to help those, at least, who wanted help.

RITCHIE: Well, I wanted to ask about the Foreign Relations Committee as it existed when you first went over there in 1952 with the information subcommittee. Could you give me sort of a general description of how it appeared to you when you first got there?

VALEO: Well, it was two rooms in the Capitol, one of which is still the historic office of the committee. We had another room across that little corridor from the historic office. I think later they acquired an adjoining room, which prior to that time had been used, I think, as a hideout for some member. I can't remember which one it was, but he used to sleep down there most of the time in between sessions. Oh, and there was a third room behind the main committee room that served as Francis Wilcox's office. There were two male clerks, Cy O'Day and a fellow named Emmett O'Grady. They were Connally's people maybe before that, I don't know. Of course, Francis Wilcox was there with his secretary, and Pat Holt, Carl Marcy and eventually myself, and Nancy Dickerson, the TV commentator, then Nancy Hanschman, who was the secretary in that office.

Francis handled the staff work very cautiously. He knew that it would be regarded as an upstart activity from the Hill on the part of Acheson and the State Department. But Francis had an awfully good way of working with people in the executive branch. He was educated at a time, bear in mind, when foreign policy was

regarded almost exclusively as an executive prerogative, growing out of the war situation and out of Roosevelt's enormous popularity; the State Department and other departments rode on those coattails. There would be polite meetings with the committee, very little exploration in depth. If there were hearings, Mr. Acheson would come, or Mr. Marshall would come. Very rarely anyone under the level of undersecretary; confirmations were perfunctory. The ambassador at the UN would meet with the committee. The first one was [Warren] Austin, who left the Senate in order to become ambassador. I can't imagine a member of the Senate doing that now.

The hearings were very formal. I'm not the best source on this. Carl and Francis especially were in attendance at most of those meetings and I rarely became a participant, except when the information program was in the forefront. But I got descriptions from various members, and occasionally, if they were open meetings, I would sit in on them. There were very small audiences.

To show you how limited our knowledge was at that time, I came to work one morning and there were a number of people in what I took to be essentially African clothing, standing outside the door of the committee, a group of about eight or ten. I overheard one of the policemen on duty say to a friend, "Here, he'll be able to tell us who they are." So he said, "Do you happen to know

where those people are from? What country?" I replied that I didn't know about specific countries, but "I think they're probably from Africa." Well, the group turned out to be a very militant American Moslem group from Chicago who were then petitioning Congress for money for resettlement in Africa. They were opposed to the breakdown of segregation and they just wanted to move their group back to Africa. Our knowledge at that point of foreign relations generally was rather limited.

But the committee was a very friendly place, very warm. You knew everyone, you could talk to any member. Senator [Alexander] Wiley of Wisconsin used to come by whenever he was anywhere in the neighborhood and greet the "boys and girls" on the staff. I met [Arthur] Vandenberg, I met Connally, but I never really got to know them. A good deal of tension developed in that period, it was probably during the 81st or 82nd Congress, when the Democrats took over and Connally became chairman again, but there was still a great deal of deference between Vandenberg and Connally. Connally particularly zeroed in on William Knowland of California, who later became the Republican floor leader. He would insist upon calling him "the Senator from Formosa," which he did repeatedly on the floor, much to Knowland's unhappiness. It was in a way, in a political sense, an apt description, because Knowland really carried the torch for the Nationalist government, I think partly due to his constituency in California. San Francisco's

Chinatown at that time was pretty much Nationalist. There was very little support for the Communists in that community. The same would have been true in the Los Angeles community.

But, as I say, the committee was a sort of open and easy place. I had a couple of experiences at that time which would be typical of the way it was. I guess by this time Carl Marcy had become staff director. He said to me one day, "What have you done to Senator Morse?" I replied, "I haven't done anything to him." He said, "Well, he's sure down on you." I said, "What for? I can't imagine why. I hold him in very high regard. I think he's probably one of the brightest members in the Senate. I can't imagine saying anything more offensive than maybe he talks at the wrong time, or he talks too much and that makes him less effective. That would be absolutely the worst thing I can think of, although I didn't remember even that." He said, "Well, one of his staff people overheard you saying on the subway something derogatory about Senator Morse, and reported it to the senator, and the senator wants you fired." I said, "Well, I hope not. Maybe I better talk with him." He said, "No, I've talked him out of it. But be very careful with him because he was really very angry."

Well, I gave Morse a wide berth, I didn't go anywhere near him at the time. About a year later, Marcy asked me to write a minority report on the foreign aid bill. "It's for Senator

Morse. " This was the first time there had been an official dissent on the foreign aid bill in the committee. He said, "He needs it for tomorrow. He wants it on the floor." So I worked most of the night and got out a minority report on the bill. Marcy gave it to Morse. Morse came back to him an hour later and said, "I want you to know, that's the finest report I've ever had done for me in all my years in the Senate. Who did it?" Marcy said, "That fellow Valeo." "Well," Morse said, "that's all right, that's all right. I'll, tell him myself." That was the end of my dispute with Senator Morse! He took the report and went up on the floor. The report could have been read verbatim in about fifteen minutes. He spoke for three or four hours on the report, in absolutely perfect syntax, and with really profound reasoning. He was an extraordinary man. He couldn't get along with anyone for any length of time, but his capacities were tremendous. I had only the highest regard for him.

But the committee was kind of personal in that way. You did know the members and you did develop relationships and rapport, as I did with Senator Hickenlooper and of course with Senator Mansfield. I can remember people like Theodore Francis Green of Rhode Island and Walter George of Georgia; they were not close relationships but they were friendly. If you had an idea you could get it into the pot, somebody would listen to you. I think that's changed a great deal, largely because of the size of the

committee staffs. It just becomes relatively impossible to move an idea from way down the line up to the point of action.

RITCHIE: When you first went over, you were with the subcommittee on information. What kind of responsibilities did you have there?

VALEO: Well, they'd never done a study in depth on the committee, at least none of the people there, as far as I know, had ever done one. It was the first real exploration of the oversight function of the Congress in a non-domestic subject; they've always had them on domestic subjects. It was left pretty much to me to design the inquiry. What I did, again bearing in mind the point I raised earlier about the need to focus professional learning into a usable format for members of Congress who are not scholars, generally speaking, and who have, in turn, to communicate it to people who are even less so, to their constituencies. I kept that very much in mind. From my experience in Legislative Reference, I felt the only way you could do that—the only way you could get scholars to do that was to delineate in detail the dimensions of their research assignment. Left to do that themselves, they would look at it from a quite different point of view than a member of Congress. I had accumulated enough experience working with members of Congress, as well as scholars, I had a pretty good idea of what one needed from the other in a given foreign policy situation.

I designed in detail four or five research studies, which were assigned to the Library of Congress. They were designed to fit closely into the needs of that particular inquiry, in the hope of producing either adjustments in the governing legislation or new legislation, or at least to get us to the point where you could say it doesn't need anything, it's fine, just leave it alone and everything will be fine. In addition to that—Carl Marcy was working very closely with me—his thought was that members of the committee needed to go abroad and see these information posts themselves. So we designed four or five trips abroad to be headed by individual members of that committee. I think we got together a basic approach sheet or questionnaire for use by all of the missions so that we would get the same information from the various locations visited. One trip went to Latin America, one went to Asia, another went to Europe, and so forth. In the end, we were able to bring them all together.

The Legislative Reference Service's studies and the trip observations eventually produced a very successful report. Whether it would have been successful in today's context, I don't know, with so many reports coming out, but at that time it was somewhat innovative and more important, perhaps, it stood in contrast with what was happening on the McCarthy committee. The press locally gave us every break and praised the report, which was restrained but also critical of many aspects of the information program. The

press really gave us a great boost on that report. They all editorialized on it. And that was the beginning of an attempt to get at oversight, at least in foreign policy matters.

RITCHIE: Basically, the senators who were on it felt very positive about the experience?

VALEO: They became increasingly positive. One has to take in consideration, at that time there wasn't a great deal of foreign travel. It was still something of a novelty to go abroad, and many of them had not traveled a great deal abroad. Some were suspicious about the idea of even going abroad. I think they started out almost in the sense of it being kind of a lark, or something of that sort, but as they gradually got into it, they worked more and more on the substance of the problem.

Even then, one questions how far you got. I remember in the report, before it was brought out, I had to go over it line by line with Bourke Hickenlooper, who was then the chairman. He had taken over from Fulbright. He was fine on the technical aspects of the information program. Wherever we criticized the shortwave signal, it wasn't loud enough and so forth, he had no problem with that sort of thing, but I put a line in the report to the effect that while the signal may be bad, far more important is the content, because if you don't have the right kind of content, you might just as well not have a signal that's going out. He said,

"Now, what the hell does that mean?" Well, I tried to explain it. Oh, he said, "we don't want to get into that sort of thing."

But Bourke Hickenlooper grew. One of the things that always impressed me: there were some members who grew the longer they were in the Senate and achieved a stature which brought them beyond their state localities into something larger, something national. There were others who never did. They stayed the same or they deteriorated after they got into the Senate. But Bourke Hickenlooper was one of the people who grew, and grew in the sense of his understanding of what was happening in the world. Mike Mansfield was another, although he had a lot to begin with, he was another who grew in the same way. There were others.

RITCHIE: Hickenlooper and Fulbright were the two ranking members, and they apparently got along very well together

VALEO: They did.

RITCHIE: Although they seemed a very odd couple.

VALEO: Part of it was the information program study. They worked well on that together, and it was the first time really, I think, that they'd gotten to know each other. When Hickenlooper took over from Fulbright as chairman, he still deferred a great deal to Fulbright, and I think it came as somewhat of a surprise to the latter. You know, he would praise the Fulbright

Program and things of that sort. Much of it had to do with the information program. They began to work extremely well together. From the point of view of staff people, there was no political differential in their approach as chairman, except in one instance which illustrates the difficulties of objective activity anywhere in a government when a political side is involved.

One of the recommendations of the Information Program Study's report up until the moment of printing was that the U.S. Information missions in each country should remain where they were, that is, at the time, under the full control of the Department of State. They had been put there when the Office of War Information dissolved at the end of the war and information people from that agency, around various parts of the world, had been moved into the embassies. From all of our objective accounts, we had talked with these information officers all over the world, about eighty to ninety percent of them said: just leave us where we are; this is the best possible administrative arrangement; we're closely interrelated with policy, and we can do our job most effectively from where we are.

Well, just about that time, that the report of the committee was to be published, President Eisenhower appointed a fellow named Johnson, who has been president of the University of Pennsylvania, I believe. He was a personal friend of Eisenhower's, and a super academic salesman. He had been a fund-raiser for the university,

put the university on the map, or at least gave it a little brighter color on the map. Eisenhower brought him down to run the information program. The first thing Johnson raised with Eisenhower was: that he wouldn't take the job unless he could handle it in his own way. He had this thing about winning "the battle for the minds of men." He did not want the secretary of state interfering with his approach. So Eisenhower got word to Hickenlooper that he could not get Johnson unless the information program came out of the State Department." Hickenlooper told the president, "I've got other members of the committee and we're all in agreement that it's in the best possible place where it is." Hickenlooper pointed out that that position reflected the view of the people who worked the program."

When Johnson heard that, he called many of the Public Affairs officers to Washington, the same officers that members of the committee had interviewed abroad. He brought them before the committee and had them reverse their testimony. That was the way it was done. That was the beginning of the United States Information Agency as a separate entity from the Department of State, with all the problems that that's entailed along the way. It's grown in different ways as a result of that decision. The only thing that the Committee had agreed should stay out of the Department was the Voice of America, which was then a major shortwave broadcasting system. But after the reversal, the entire program came out of

the department. Ironically, Johnson had a heart attack a few months later. He left the government and never came back.

It was amusing, when Johnson came down for confirmation, a hearing was held in the Old Supreme Court Chamber. He had just started—one has to say that in his defense—he had just started in the job and really didn't know very much about what he was getting into. Least of all did he know what it was like to deal with a member like Theodore Francis Green from Rhode Island. Green had certain very set ideas, particularly about syntax. He spoke in a very soft voice, and it was sometimes very difficult to understand what he was saying. Johnson made a stirring speech on winning the battle for the minds of men as his introductory statement and then committee members began to ask questions. Hickenlooper praised the statement, and Fulbright praised the statement, Theodore Francis Green's turn came next. He said, "In paragraph 3 on page 4," or some such thing, "you say," and then he read what Johnson had said. He then inquired, "What does the word 'no' mean in there? Why did you put that in that sentence?" Johnson, not understanding that the question was simply one of syntax and not knowing what fate awaited him, immediately got back into the war for the minds of men and talked for about five more minutes on that subject. When he ended, rather triumphantly, Green said, "Are you through?" Johnson replied, "Yes, sir." And Green said, "But that was not what I asked you." So he said,

"I'll ask you once more." He asked him the same question and Johnson just sat absolutely silent. Green got up with a look of disgust and came around to where I was sitting at the end of the table. He leaned over and said, "They're all alike. He won't last six months." Well, he lasted probably eight.

RITCHIE: You talked about the relationship between Fulbright and Hickenlooper being so surprisingly good. Was that a sign that there really was a bipartisan spirit on the committee?

VALEO: Yes. They had different views. They did not approach issues the same way. At that time, Fulbright was an extremely strong supporter of the aid program. Hickenlooper was a very pragmatic man and very skeptical of the aid program, to cite one thing. You could say clearly that Fulbright was internationalist in viewpoint, in the best sense of the word. Hickenlooper was essentially a midwestern isolationist who, along with the Midwest, had been forced by World War II to face the realities of dealing with the rest of the world, and reluctantly, grudgingly accepted the idea that we were not going to get out of it. But he quarreled with the change continuously in his own mind, so that what he said very often was certainly internationalist in viewpoint, but had a strong nationalist flavor.

In a way I would compare it with Reaganism, not as extreme as Reagan's approach, which is a rhetoric which is intensely—well

it's more than rhetoric, it's the way you look at the world. I would regard Reaganism in foreign affairs, if I had to give it terms, as an isolated internationalism. If he goes along the way he is, he will have us eventually isolated from everyone else in the world, which is what we were before World War II, essentially.

Hickenlooper was never that extreme, but he had the same tendency to want to get back into that simple life in the Midwest. He just knew it wasn't possible, largely not because he was on the Foreign Relations Committee but because he was the Senate chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. He never talked about that part of his Senate experience to anyone, as far as I know. He certainly didn't talk to me about it, except once when we were in New York. He and Mansfield were then the delegates to the Thirteenth General Assembly of the UN. I was the congressional staff advisor. Hickenlooper and I were riding in a taxicab along Park Avenue, going to a reception which Andrei Gromyko was giving. While riding in the cab, we came to that area where there were then a lot of new buildings, mostly glass, very, very glassy type of architecture. Hickenlooper was looking out the window of the cab at these buildings and he said, "You know Val, if a bomb ever fell here, this would be meaningless. It would all be gone." That, of course, was twenty-five years ago. He said, "This would all be gone." He knew that, and he knew that you couldn't escape

from that. So he never had the kind of extreme tendencies towards isolationism that you find in President Reagan.

On a personal level, he could be a very amiable person, much more so than Fulbright, as a matter of fact. Fulbright was somewhat dour and very often irritated by the way things were going. But between them they seemed to have a decent respect and a decent rapport.

RITCHIE: I've noticed from reading the committee hearings from later in the '50s, when Fulbright was chairman, that he always acted very deferentially with Hickenlooper, let him speak as long as he wanted.

VALEO: Of course, that's somewhat traditional in Congress. If you're a smart chairman you always let your ranking minority member have an awfully full sway. If you don't, you're soon in trouble.

RITCHIE: At the end of the Eighty-third Congress the information subcommittee filed its report and went out of business. At that stage, you said that you and Carl Marcy came up with an idea for another subcommittee.

VALEO: Not immediately. First I went back to the Library for a couple of weeks, two or three weeks. It was beginning to become very difficult because I constantly being called over to

the committee. At that point I went to see Ernest and said, "You know, I'm really not doing justice to either job because I'm going back and forth." He didn't want me to leave, and I didn't want to leave, so we finally agreed that I would become a senior specialist and then be assigned over to the committee as necessary, and that's the way we worked it out.

We had to get a new chief for the Foreign Affairs Division at the Library. One of the people who came up as a possible successor to me was [Henry] Kissinger, who was then at Harvard teaching. Another one was this chap who later became assistant secretary of state under Kennedy.

RITCHIE: Roger Hilsman?

VALEO: Roger Hilsman. These two names came up. It was clear that Ernest favored Roger Hilsman, but he didn't want to pass over Kissinger, so he raised his name. I helped him to ease Kissinger out. I said, "I don't know the man, but I've read his books, and I really think that he's got a one-sided slant on the use of force as an instrument of policy. I just think that he'd run into lots of problems if he came down here." We got Hilsman, who turned out to be more of a hawk than Kissinger when he got involved in Vietnam and a few other places later on.

RITCHIE: But then how did you go back to the committee?

VALEO: I went over on loan. I can't remember the precise order. There were two studies that came up at that time. I got involved in both of them, primarily to do the design. One was an early oversight review of the aid program; the other one had to do with disarmament. I believe it was Carl Marcy who raised that as a possible subcommittee. Eisenhower had appointed Harold Stassen of Minnesota to head a disarmament group to study disarmament problems as distinct from other foreign policy questions. Carl Marcy was not one to let the executive branch get too much of a jump on the committee. He said, "You know, we ought to have a subcommittee of our own on this subject." It struck me as being a good idea. I thought disarmament was a dangerous subject, full of problems and with very little with which you could at the time come to grips. But Marcy wrote it up as a proposition and we took it up with Walter George, who was then chairman. George said, "It's not a bad idea. Maybe we should have something like that."

Then the question came up as to whom we should suggest for chairman of that subcommittee. Carl said, "I've got it!" "It ought to be Hubert Humphrey, because he's also from Minnesota, and we'll match him against Stassen." So he went back and Walter George said, "That's very good." Walter George didn't want Hubert too close, I think, and saw the subcommittee chairmanship as a way of removing Humphrey a little from the main flow of committee

business. Hubert was then a brash fellow out of Minneapolis, and was a very active civil rightist. None of these characteristics set too well with George, who was a very dignified chairman and very proper in his ways. Anyhow, that was the origin of the Senate disarmament subcommittee.

Then the question came up, who was going to do the staff work for it. Carl said, "You're going to have to do it." It was not a subject which interested me greatly, and I tried really not to get involved in it. I was already working on the aid program study, but I took it over finally. "You better start it," Carl said, "Humphrey loved the idea and we've got him going, so you better get moving on the study." I spent six months thereafter trying to get a grip on the subject itself. I brought people over from the Library of Congress. Ellen Collier came over and Charles Gelner, both of whom are still with the Library. In addition, Humphrey asked me to take on a woman from the University of Minnesota. Her name was Betty Goetz, later Betty Lall. She joined the staff and later replaced me as staff director. Using as much as I could the techniques which we had developed in the information program, I tried to design the disarmament subcommittee's approach in the same way. It was much more difficult. There was so much less that was tangible in the subject.

The first thing that we attempted was some kind of a rough estimate of the then relative military strengths of the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe and ourselves and Western Europe. The figures that came out of that—all taken from public sources, mostly from the *New York Times*—the figures made us look rather formidable compared with the Soviet Union! To be on the safe side, we sent the report that we were going to put out on this comparison, it was a chart, among other things, that we wanted to publish, rather a primitive kind of thing, we sent it down to the Department of Defense to be reviewed. The reaction from the Department was as though we had just given away all of the state secrets to the Soviet Union—or more likely to Congress. But they just were absolutely adamant that it should not be published. I went back and I said, "It's all from public sources." "Yes, but it's a totally distorted picture." Finally, I took it up with Humphrey, and he said, "Well, let's let it lay for a while." So we just put it aside. It was that way with almost any part of this subject that we tried to deal with.

Finally, Humphrey came to me one day, and said, "You know, Val"—at that time everybody called me "Val" around the committee, this was a nickname that had come over from the Library—he said, "You've been going for three or four months and I haven't got anything to show for it." He said, "I've got to make a speech on this. It's just time that I do something." I said, "Well, I don't really know what to give you. I can give you a report on what the committee's doing. It's going to be pretty drab, there's nothing

really that's been achieved." He said, "Well, I'd like to get something that's got some punch in it." I said, "There's only one thing I can think of that might possibly make a subject for a speech. It's nuclear test ban treaty." This was before the idea of a ban was raised by Adlai Stevenson in the 1956 campaign. There were lots of suggestions in the press pointing out the dangers of nuclear testing, but no American leader had yet proposed a ban, nor had any Soviet official.

I had weighed all the factors as far as I could identify them and it seemed to me that the fears of the strontium 90 in the milk, plus the fact that we were still far ahead of the Russians in the numbers of weapons and bombs we had, and a number of other considerations, particularly the attitudes of the Europeans on this, suggested that this might be a doable thing as a first step in disarmament. Humphrey said, "Write up something for me and let's take a look at it." I drafted a speech proposing a test ban and gave it to him. He said, "You know, that's an interesting thing," he said, "but I want to get reactions from some other people." So he showed it to Tom Hughes, who later became the president of Carnegie, and worked in the State Department for a while, and who was at that time working for Chester Bowles over in the House. He showed it to Senator [Henry] Jackson and Jackson threw up his hands in despair: "You can't advocate anything like that!" Hughes was more inclined to go along with it. He didn't

think the expression of the idea was very good, but he thought the idea might have some merit. Humphrey showed the draft to three or four other people.

After doing that, he said, "I'm going to do it on the floor of the Senate, but I can't do it tonight. For tonight, I've got a speech to make on humane slaughter, one on UNESCO, and one on margarine"—which is important to Minnesota. He said, "I can't do four speeches in one evening, that's too much. You have it printed up, and get some copies for the press. I'll do it the first thing tomorrow." So we did, we got it ready, we ran off the copies. The next day, I got to the office early and I went up to the lounge to look at the news ticker, which was the first thing I did everyday. The first item on the ticker was a report that the Russian foreign minister had advocated a nuclear test ban treaty.

RITCHIE: So he scooped you.

VALEO: Yes. It all went to Hubert's tendency to go off on any subject that interested him. If somebody put a piece of paper in his hand that intrigued him, he'd follow through. He was so far over the lot that it caused most of his problems. Anyhow, he called me immediately. He'd seen or heard the news item, too. He said, "Did you see the news?" I said, "Yes, I did." He said, "What does that do to the speech? Let's have a meeting." So we met in Carl's Marcy's office. Humphrey brought down a couple of

his office people. I was there, and Carl was there, and there were several others. We went over the ground and he finally decided it was politically too risky, he could not do it, and the speech was never made. Then it came up in the subsequent presidential campaign. But that was really the beginning. From then on the issue of a test ban came into worldwide focus. In retrospect, he should have made the speech. Had he made it, we would have had the initiative and it probably would have sped up the development of the nuclear test ban treaty by at least a year or so. But once the Russians had called for it, it would have been high political risk for Humphrey. The reactions at that time were: if you ever agreed with a Russian initiative, you obviously were a fool or worse.

The incident illustrated one of Hubert's problems as a politician. He had great difficulty in his timing. He was either too soon or too late on issues, and he was into too many things. He couldn't repress his natural exuberance, his tendency to get into everything that came within his ken.

RITCHIE: What was he like to work for?

VALEO: He was easy to work for, but his staff was not. He had staff people that were pushing him for the presidency at all times. Some of them went all the way back to the very beginning of his political career in Minnesota. It was difficult, they were

constantly intervening between the senator and the staff on the committee. That's a common complaint, but in his case it happens to be particularly apt. Later he had to let go the woman who was basically responsible for that attitude; she had been his secretary for many years in Minneapolis. But I traveled with him on this disarmament subcommittee. We went up to see Cabot Lodge at the U.N. in New York. We did four or five hearings around the country on the subject, one in Minneapolis. He was pleasant, he was easy to work with in that sense. The main problem was to find him and pin him down. Once you got into a conversation he was very quick, his mind was extremely quick, and if he decided that he wanted to do something, he'd do it rather impetuously.

RITCHIE: I would think he must have had a hard time having patience for things to develop.

VALEO: It was hard for him to do that. But that was the beginning of that disarmament subcommittee and it became an important element in the foreign policy structure. I got out of it after nine months. I really had had enough of it. I didn't want to work with Hubert's staff. It was too difficult to work with them, and besides, I was afraid that we were just not going to come to grips with anything substantial at that point. The nuclear test ban treaty was about the only thing feasible, but then it got involved with the political campaign. Stevenson advocated it and got beaten down by Eisenhower with it, so I saw

no immediate prospects of doing even that. And that was actually the case. It didn't come up again until Kennedy.

RITCHIE: Did you get any cooperation at all from Stassen?

VALEO: No. I never met Stassen, as a matter of fact. His group worked on their own level. Nothing much came out of it although eventually, you got a Disarmament Agency set up, but that really wasn't primarily derived from the Stassen group. What did emerge was a readiness on the part of the Department of State to work in close collaboration with the committee staff on the subject. Betty Goetz took over that as staff director of the committee after I left it, and new members came onto it. Eventually, in the Geneva negotiations, the State Department got into the practice of inviting a staff person from the committee—Betty Goetz in this case—and then also a couple of members of the committee, to sit in as observers on the negotiations.

RITCHIE: It does seem as if arms negotiations is an executive function. What role does the Congress really have in it?

VALEO: Well, we were looking for new ideas. The executive branch was so sterile at the time. Invariably they came out with the same kind of proposals. Here again, I think the constitutional validity for the Senate getting involved in foreign policy was vindicated. Leaving aside the question of the Senate antiquated procedural machinery, I personally am convinced that

one of the roles seen for the Senate in a constitutional sense is the injection of creative concepts into all aspects of government. The original concept of their selection by state legislatures would suggest that, I don't want to say that the Constitution saw the Senate as a body of superior men, but rather men with many viewpoints and with a great potential for achievement. This view was later vindicated in Vietnam, because you had an administration that got frozen tight in a position that was bringing disaster to the country and we didn't know how to get out of it until the Senate took the initiative. One of the ways you can break that kind of executive branch log-jam is by the injection of ideas from elsewhere. In my judgment at that time, the Senate became the place to do it.

RITCHIE: How well did the subcommittee work as an educational tool for the senators themselves?

VALEO: It deepened their understanding of specific issues, which were of considerable importance. The attempt to use the oversight function of the Senate did have that effect, but bear in mind, that at the time senators still had relatively limited responsibilities. They had time to work the committees, or the special committees or subcommittees. The way it runs now, they have so many of these assignments, they just cannot get into depth on the committees. Their staff may, but they don't.

RITCHIE: At the time you were doing that, the Foreign Relations Committee still tended to meet as a whole more often than in subcommittee.

VALEO: Yes, so far as I know, those consultative subcommittees were not used very often. They were greeted with certain skepticism by members. As I mentioned, they were set up primarily at the request of the Department of State, which wanted to have a sounding board somewhere in Congress.

RITCHIE: How did the various chairmen of the committee react to the subcommittees?

VALEO: They did not give much credence to them. They did give it to these special subcommittees, which was the title we finally came up with for them, after a long dispute with the parliamentarian, who said they could either be special or subcommittees, but they couldn't be both. The chairmen reacted well to them in part because they generally got a good press. They got credit for at least trying to increase understanding of rather complex problems. We never had any problem with the various chairmen and we did not set them up as legislative committees. The special subcommittees made proposals which were relevant both to the executive branch and also to the possibility of legislation. But we did not try to make them into decision

makers, in lieu of the full committee. That was understood from the very beginning. There was never any deviation from that.

RITCHIE: The last time, you mentioned how when Mansfield came on the committee, he checked in with you to ask about who was who, and what was going on. He wasn't on the subcommittee, was he?

VALEO: Well, he headed one of the subcommittees which I did work on, which was the one on the aid program, and he put a lot of time in it. He was a new member, came from a small state, so he had plenty of time. Again, we used essentially the same techniques that we had on the earlier oversight subcommittees. Each one became more elaborate, or evolved as we corrected problems or omissions in the earlier approaches.

But Mansfield's interests were in Asia, from the very beginning. He asked me to travel with him in 1953. I had been out with Bourke Hickenlooper in '52, and then Mansfield in '53 called me one day. I guess it was a period when I was back at the Library. He called me and said, "You know, I'm thinking of going to Indochina. Would you like to come with me?" I said, "Well, sure, if it can be arranged, I'll be glad to do it." He said, "Well, I think I can arrange it over at the committee." That was the beginning of our collaboration on Asia—well, actually we'd had a small experience in the House—but not in the Senate.

I knew a little about Indochina. I was the Legislative Reference Service's Asian specialist, but that meant all the way from Vladivostok down to Karachi, and there's just so much you can carry. Much of my attention at the Library had gone into Korea, because of the natural problems in Korea—the war was just about over at that point—and into China, which were the two main issues of politics and policy at the time. Well, Vietnam was sort of—it wasn't even called Vietnam, just Indochina, nobody mentioned Vietnam as such. I knew there were three kingdoms in the Indochinese peninsula. I always thought of it as three or four places, I wasn't really sure which was the case in an official sense. Mansfield said that he would like to go to the capitals of "all of the states in Indochina." Well, I knew Saigon was a capital, and I knew that Hanoi was a capital. Beyond that, I wasn't sure what the capitals were. So I said, "Well, I'll see if I can work out an itinerary." I went back into the Library's map division; there were no maps in English on Indochina at that time. They were all in French. I found Phnom Penh, which was clearly marked as the capital of Cambodia. Then looking at Laos, I found two capital stars on the French map, one being Vientiane, and the other being Luang Prabang. I said, "My God, I wonder what this means?" I finally reasoned from a related subject that since these places dated from the simultaneous spread of Chinese influence into Japan, that one was a royal capital and one was an administrative capital, which of course is what proved to be the

case. So I called Mansfield back and I said, "We're all right on Phnom Penh in Cambodia and Saigon in Cochinchine, but when it comes to Laos, I don't really know which is the capital." He said, "Why not?" I explained my findings to him, and he said, "Well, let's put both places in the itinerary." That illustrates how primitive our knowledge was at the time.

Mansfield wanted also to go to Paris, because he thought that a lot of matters affecting Indochina were still being decided there, which was certainly true. None of the states was yet fully independent and the United States was only represented in Saigon at the time, with the embassy there still reporting through the U.S. Embassy in Paris. So we went to Paris at the beginning of that trip. Then we went on to Saigon. There was an ambassador there named Heath, and he was very insistent that he go with us on the trip through Indochina. We had a Navy Beechcraft, which was supplied by the military attaché who called it in from the fleet somewhere. It was two-engine propeller plane, with a crew of two and four seats for passengers. The plane had trouble with its landing gear from the very beginning. We flew to Hanoi as a first stop. We had at that time in Hanoi a consulate with about six Americans in it. It was really my first exposure to the French war in Vietnam. The city was filled with French military uniforms but it remained a charming place, very French in its attitudes and

behavior. The consulate was safe. There were no problems of security. The French were still there in full force.

I went to a briefing supplied by the two then-chief commanding French generals of the war against Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh. One was [Henri] Navarre, and the other was [Rene] Cogny. Cogny was the field commander and Navarre was the strategist. Dick Russell happened to be there at the same time. So all three of us sat in on the briefing. I had never met Russell before that. We got the briefing. Navarre spoke, as I recall, rather good English. He was not using an interpreter, he was speaking English, and he described in rather flowery terms his grand strategy for winning the war. The key point was to set the bait for a trap at Dienbienphu. He intended to put troops there that would attract the Viet Minh out of the hills. When they came in for the kill they would be killed instead, and that would be the end of the Viet Minh. He was very persuasive, I must say. I thought this man obviously knows what he's saying, he expresses it so well. Cogny, the field commander, was also a very impressive fellow. He would follow this on the map and interject from time to time some points.

When the briefing was finished Russell said, "Well, that sounds very impressive. You have some very good strategy. Is there anything the United States can do to help you in this situation?" At that time, we were already supplying a considerable

amount of aid, I think about three hundred million dollars to the French. Navarre went into a tête-à-tête with Cogy and he came back and said, "Well, you're being very generous with us already. But if you could send us about a half a dozen more helicopters. This we think would be extremely valuable. We don't really need anything more than that. We really have it all arranged, and we're quite confident that this strategy is going to work." He said, "You know, the Viet Minh is a small group and they don't really have much support anywhere, and we have three hundred thousand Vietnamese troops on our side." And so forth.

We went from there to Laos. The crew that was flying the plane were in no better shape than we were in the sense of Laotian geography. They had French maps too. So we flew over the spot where Vientiane was supposed to be, and there was no Vientiane. From the charts, they didn't know what to make of it. All they could see was that it was supposed to be on the Makong River. The crew decided that they would fly at three hundred feet and stick to the river so they wouldn't miss it! And that's how we found Vientiane the first time, about 200 miles from where the map said it should be. It was really a primitive place. The airport was a grass field. There were not more than twenty thousand people in the city.

The French Legionnaires who were there were mostly Germans, about 80 percent of the contingent. They had French

commanders, of course. We had lunch with two of the French commanders, we asked them whether the Laotians were involved in the fighting and all. He smiled sadly and said, "They're such sweet people. They're not warlike. It's very hard. We have two battalions that we are training and we tell them that they must stay in camp, but on the weekends they want to go home and they go." He said, "This is just not a warlike country. We will never make soldiers here. No one wants to fight wars here." That was 1953. Most of the language we heard around us was German as we approached somewhere, what was purported to be the front, somewhere outside of Luang Prabang.

We never did get to see the then king in that royal capital. He was ill, rumored to be under opium almost all the time. You could always get a pipe, if that was your inclination, in either Luang Prabang or Vientiane. The going price at the time was twenty-five cents in the opium dens which were wide open at the time. There were only two Americans in the entire state of Laos at that time: one young foreign service officer named Mike Reeves and one of the ubiquitous information officers. The two were living in very primitive quarters, no running water or very much of anything else. But it was the beginning of our involvement in Indochina.

When we came back from the 1953 trip to Indochina one of the things Mansfield began advocating was separate recognition of

three countries, and the establishment of separate relations with them. Well, the French didn't want this, and the State Department didn't want it, and [John Foster] Dulles had a hard time with it. I think his inclination was to go along with Mansfield, but he didn't want to antagonize the French. In any event, Mansfield's view was that it was very hard to justify aid to a colonial country, and if you didn't have these three states as independent entities, what were they? They were colonies of the French. So he finally won his point and Dulles then came down on the side of recognition of three independent entities which eventually came to pass in spite of French reluctance.

One of the problems of our dealing with the situation in Indochina, I think, was that during World War II we had worked with Ho Chi Minh, very closely. The OSS had very close ties with Ho Chi Minh and had a close working relationship with him. I think they wanted to continue that. There was one school of thought that thought you should go that way, that Indochina should remain a political entity and serve as a counterfoil to an emerging China. Of course, the other side, which really began to emerge about the time of our deep involvement, was the question of how you could possibly support colonial-controlled governments, which was what the French wanted. After Dienbienphu, I think they still had some hopes of holding their influence in Laos and Cambodia. But by that time the game was up.

Well, how are we doing? Is this a good stopping point?

RITCHIE: I think so, yes. I was just going to ask one more question: how influential do you think that first trip for Senator Mansfield and for yourself?

VALEO: It was very important. First of all it introduced me to an area that I did not know with any depth. During World War II, I had been a soldier on the Indochina border, that would have been the Vietnamese border with China. I was in Kwangsi Province in China. My first introduction to Indochina, I didn't even know there was a war still going on down there after the Japanese surrendered, but the Ho Chi Minh people staged an uprising immediately at the end of the war. The Japanese let them out of jail and took over from the French Vichy officials who had been left in place by the Japanese. Of course they went for the French Vichy supporters who were nominally in charge. Many of the French lost their heads in that brief encounter because the uprising was very vicious.

I was in a camp in China on the Kwangsi border, waiting to go to Canton when the war ended. The word came up somebody was needed who spoke some French because some Frenchmen had staggered into camp and they couldn't speak English. I didn't know much French, but I was able to help. I got to know the half a dozen Frenchmen and Senegalise who had reached our camp. They had been in

the Foreign Legion in Tonkin and had been forced to run when the Japanese authority collapsed. They had run across the border for safety after losing a number of their companions along the way. That was my first introduction to the Indochina war. The Legionnaires spoke of the vicious hostility which they had encountered from the Viet Minh.

RITCHIE: So from the very beginning you thought that this was a troublesome place.

VALEO: Yes, but only in that context. I thought Indochina was all going to be set up under Ho Chi Minh's people at the end of the war. That seemed to be the prevailing wisdom. I vaguely remember writing an article to that effect in about 1947 for the *Annals* up in Philadelphia. Then of course, Indochina sort of dropped out of my ken while we were working on China and Korea and Japan. But it came back rather suddenly when Dulles decided—no Truman decided that we were going to do a rescue operation of the French after the Nationalist government in China retreated to Taiwan. I remember Acheson made a speech saying that the Chinese revolution had gone beyond all bounds and therefore we had to help the French in Indochina too. And that, of course, opened up all of the questions, which until that time we had not had to face.

The British had helped the French to go back, not us. Roosevelt's views were clearly known. He didn't want to get

involved in Indochina. He thought the colony should have independence, maybe under some sort of UN trusteeship for a while. But once the Korean War broke out, we aligned ourselves with the French, who were insisting they had to return to restore order before any further political change could take place. That was a difficult position for us to be in, because most of the analysts, including, I'm sure, some in the Department of State, felt there was no chance of the French being able to return. The French didn't accept that. So therefore, if you aided them, you were going to be first of all on the losing side, and also on a colonial side, which tended to go against our grain. We ourselves had just let the Philippines have independence at that point.

RITCHIE: Well this probably is a good place to break.

VALEO: Okay.

End of Interview #2

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

TRAVELS, WITH MANSFIELD

Interview #3

Wednesday, August 14, 1985

RITCHIE: We concluded the last interview with your first trip to Vietnam. Can you tell me about your subsequent trips to Vietnam with Mike Mansfield in the 1950s?

VALEO: Yes. I think it's important to get the Senate's role in Vietnam a little bit more clearly than the historic record now shows it. I'm thinking particularly of that TV show which was on Channel 26 not too long ago [PBS series, "Vietnam: A Television History"], which was a rather complete and thorough job, except for the congressional aspect of it, and particularly the Senate's role. They interviewed me in connection with that, but then omitted a good deal of the material that involved the Senate. I think the Senate was central to the whole Vietnamese resolution, so I think that that should not be lost.

Last time we were talking about the 1953 trip. It was an eye-opener for Mansfield as well as for myself. There were very few members who knew much about Southeast Asia at that point. It was not on the main stops for any of the missions that went out, with the possible exception of Bangkok, but Indochina certainly was not in the usual itinerary. There had been one or two members who went to Saigon: Bill Knowland went through; Nixon went

through in that early period. As far as I know, that was about it. It's possible that there were others, but I don't remember any. In any event, as a result of Mansfield's report, and talks with Dulles after we got back, I think [John Foster] Dulles was very favorably impressed with him and to a degree shared his views on Indochina. The net result was that in '54 he invited Mansfield and Senator [John] Sparkman to become members of the delegation that was due to set up the SEATO organization. There was a 1954 meeting in Manila for that purpose. He not only invited Mansfield to be a member of that delegation, along with Sparkman, but he invited Mrs. Mansfield to go out with him in his own plane. Mansfield and I went out by way of California but separately from the Dulles people because, for one thing, Mansfield and his wife didn't, at that time, fly on the same plane. So we went out commercially and Mrs. Mansfield went out on Dulles' plane.

Well, while we were at Manila for the SEATO conference, I was pretty much in the background. I did not attend any of the meetings. Mansfield was regularly there with Dulles. It was at that time that the Dienbienphu crisis occurred. Mansfield later related to me that Dulles had pulled him aside and said the French situation in Dienbienphu was extremely critical and that it was essential that something be done or they were going to have a disaster. He said that—I believe it was Admiral [Arthur] Radford who was Chief of Staff at that time had recommended a surgical

strike to support the French at Dienbienphu. This had been proposed to Eisenhower, and Dulles asked Mansfield what he thought he should do. He had not yet spoken with Eisenhower himself, but the message had come out to him. Mansfield's response was not to do anything until he had discussed it with the congressional leadership, that if he couldn't get their concurrence, he should stay completely away from it. I don't know how that subsequently registered in policy. Eisenhower in the end decided not to do the strike, as you know. I'm sure that if it got into the pot at all it was obviously a constructive aspect of that decision.

After the SEATO meeting, the treaty was signed in Manila, and I think Mansfield was a signatory, along with Sparkman and Dulles. Dulles went back home. We went on to Vietnam. I think we spent two or three days in Hanoi first, because the French had already lost at Dienbienphu at this point and they were preparing to evacuate Hanoi, in accordance with the terms of an agreement which they had worked out with the Viet Minh. So we were in Hanoi in the last three days while the city was still under French control. They had set up a Vietnamese front government. We were invited by the Vietnamese who was then the governor of Tonkin to a dinner. It was a very gloomy occasion, since all of them had to get out within the next two or three days. I sat next to one, and it was done still in a very French style, although these were Vietnamese. The jackets were all white, the suits were all white at that time,

that was the formal dress in Southeast Asia. The dinner was superb. I mentioned that to the person who was sitting along side of me. He said, "We might as well as least have a good dinner, since we have to leave now." He looked very rueful, naturally.

That was the period when the refugees—the Catholic refugees primarily—started to flow out of Tonkin through Haiphong, down to the south. Ho Chi Minh at that time said there was no need for them to leave, that they would not be molested. But they were frightened, and their priests, and undoubtedly the Vatican, must have decided that that was a desirable thing to do. There was a committee under Leo Cherne, who had provided some funds for refugees at that point. Our navy moved in to provide the transportation down to Saigon. When we got back to Saigon they were receiving these refugees. A lot of women from the embassy were passing out immediate supplies. They were in rather wretched condition. They were mostly peasants from the fields.

At a dinner at the embassy that night—I guess Heath was still ambassador at the time—I began a discussion with somebody from the embassy staff about what we were going to do now in Vietnam, whether we would move out of Saigon as well and just clear out and let the French work out their own arrangement. He said, "Oh, we haven't got time to think of that. We've got to worry about the refugees now." It struck me then, very forcibly, how when you're faced with a virtually insurmountable problem, and

no matter how you turn it looks like it's going to be negative, you'd rather not look at it. You look at the immediate situation. It's a little bit like that novel, *On The Beach*, which was an early book on the aftermath of nuclear war, when people are doomed to die in Australia, but all they can think about is their gardens and that sort of thing. Much the same kind of reaction.

From there we went on into Laos again and into Cambodia. This was the first time Mansfield and I met Sihanouk. In the previous trip, the '53 trip, we had tried to see him, but he had gone up to Seimrap, which is where Ankor Wat is, and he refused to see us. The reason was that the French were trying to persuade him to lead a front government that they would set up, in an effort to save Cambodia from the rest of the downfall. He refused to have anything to do with it. I remember, in the bar in the hotel in Phnom Penh, meeting a French cavalry officer who had been Sihanouk's teacher at St. Cyr. He said, "I don't understand him, he was like my son. I did everything for him when he was in St. Cyr, and now he won't even talk to me!" But Sinhanouk was not being deliberately malicious. He knew that if he had any chance of leading the independence movement, which was then beginning to take very strong roots in Cambodia, he had to do it thoroughly independent of the French, and in a way of us, because our relationship with the French at that time was still not too clear.

The passion in Cambodia in terms of independence at that time was extraordinary. I remember getting up in the very early morning and seeing hundreds of men walking around with wooden rifles, parading and drilling with obvious enthusiasm. Sihanouk at that time established himself in my mind as one of the few leaders in that area who was in very close rapport with what was happening in his own country. He was extremely astute, extremely patriotic, in Cambodian terms, and far, far, at that point at least, from the image of the playboy, which was spread—I don't know by whom—later on. He may have had that when he was younger, but that was certainly not his character at that point. And I think his political survival through all these years is indicative of that.

On the other end, in Saigon, Ngo Dinh Diem was just beginning to come into prominence. He had had a background of being an official under the old Hue government, which was Bao Dai's government, a front, in effect, for the French colonial regime there. Ngo Dinh Diem had been an official under that, and a very effective one, who had a reputation for being intensely nationalistic, in Vietnamese terms. The French did not like him. He was too independent for their taste. They didn't really want him; they had other people that they sought to put into the role of president of the new government. Ngo Dinh Diem had the endorsement of former Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, who had met him and had

introduced him to Mansfield and others in this country, saying how if we had any sense this would be the kind of person we'd support in Asia, instead of some of the others that we had taken up with. So Mansfield met him in Saigon with a kind of positive attitude, and it was reciprocated.

Diem at that time was very bright, very active. He was clearly determined to establish an independent Vietnamese government and would not have anything to do with a French-sponsored regime. So there was a struggle between Diem and other Vietnamese whom the French had endorsed, generals, military figures largely, that the French wanted to put into the presidential palace. Diem was in his own quarters at that time, not yet living in the presidential palace. A French governor general was still in Saigon. But we caught the flavor of what was happening in this situation from discussions with Diem. He had been in the United States at a Catholic monastery for a period of time—he was not a priest, but he was a very religious Catholic—and he had clearly won the endorsement of many of the leading people in the Catholic hierarchy in the United States. So he had an inside track so long as the French could no longer afford to run what amounted to the occupation on their own resources and had become dependent on us. By the time we went out again in 1955, he was in the president's seat.

The story is complicated, because at this point the first Geneva conference on Vietnam was meeting and trying to establish the terms under which the French would withdraw completely from Indochina. I don't know that I should get off into that, because I had no direct connection with Geneva. But as it looked out there in Saigon at the time, they were going to divide the country, at least for an interim period. Then presumably there would be some kind of elections, but nobody really expected that those elections would take place. And as it worked out, Diem refused to have the elections as provided for in the Geneva Accord.

RITCHIE: Would you say that you and Senator Mansfield were optimistic about the situation at that time?

VALEO: No, not at all. It was a way out chance. I think if we were asked for our own personal reactions, we would have said the best thing would be to forget the whole thing and get out. But that was not possible for a variety of reasons, which were essentially domestic, rather than international or foreign policy reasons. Eisenhower had made a speech about falling dominoes in Southeast Asia and I'm afraid the Democrats, as well as some of the Republicans who didn't like Eisenhower, were just waiting for another place to fall to the Communists—or at least Eisenhower so thought, so he just did not feel that he could move out of the situation at that time.

I don't think anyone expected Diem to be able to rally anyone. At most, he was seen as an interim figure. One of his sources of strength were the Catholics who had moved down from the North into the South. In addition to that, he attracted some bona fide Vietnamese nationalists who came back from Paris, largely intellectuals who served to round out his government. Some of them were very capable people. His brother Ngo Dinh Ngu had not yet appeared on the scene as a significant figure, nor had his brother's wife. They came somewhat later.

Well, I don't want to leave this hanging, but when we came back in 1954, in Mansfield's report that year there were two basic recommendations: that we ought to get clear of the situation unless there was a bona fide national government in place, which was so recognized by its own people. That was one point. The second point was that that government had to root itself in its own people and unless it did that, no matter what kind of assistance came from outside, it would not alter the situation. We were looking for a bona fide, national, anti-Communist leader. Diem really filled that bill, and he was the only one. He was the only one in that period who had any kind of stature in his own country. At one time, Ho Chi Minh had offered him a cabinet position in the coalition government, when the Viet Minh first took over after World War II. He had competence, and there was no question about his disdain for the French, his desire to separate

himself completely from French support. And really he was not that pro-American either. He was a bona fide Vietnamese nationalist.

Somewhere in this period between '54 and '55 he did become president. Sihanouk took over in Cambodia. There was also a new leader named Souvanna Phouma, whom we met in this period, in Laos. He had impressed us as rather capable and sincere in his efforts to form some kind of workable government in Laos. He was a pipe smoker, as was Mansfield. In these situations I acted as interpreter. I'm not that good in French, but it was adequate for the situation and there wasn't anyone else. They would sit there, largely in silence, puffing on these pipes. One would make a remark, and then the other would make a remark, and gradually there emerged some kind of meeting of the minds between them.

Souvanna Phouma wanted to play basically the same role as that of Diem in Vietnam. He did not want to be seen as the tool of the French. He knew there was no future in that, for one thing. Nor did he want to be particularly a tool of the Americans, that was clear. He wanted to be someone who would be identified with the Laotian nationality, and that was difficult enough because there were two or three main strains, racial strains or cultural strains, in the Laotian kingdom, which had been put together by the French strictly for geographical administrative purposes and nothing much more. The king was still in Luang Prabang. I think

again we did not see him. Someone entertained us there, but it was probably his prime minister or privy counselor, but it was clear that Souvanna Phouma had already begun to run the government. The French could deal with him. He was the best they could find from their point of view. And that's where we left the situation in '54.

I must go back again to the Hanoi scene, because in those last two or three days of French-controlled Hanoi, it was really a fascinating thing to see. People were selling their belongings for just anything to raise some money if they were going to go south. There was great chaos. The soldiers had ceased to worry about it. I walked through one street and the paper makers were making Picasso's "dove of peace." They were getting ready to welcome the Viet Minh in three days, Ho Chi Minh and the rest. There was a sort of mixed atmosphere, on one hand a festive mood among those who were staying, and a panic mood among those who were leaving. It was a very strange time. But along what they called the Grand Lac, the big lake in the center of town—it was a beautiful city in those days—you still had the same situation with lovers strolling through the streets and the shops operating pretty much as usual. Well, in any event that was where we left the situation in '54.

We went back in '55, again to all three countries. This time we saw the Ngo Dinh Diem. He was in the palace as president and

looking very self-confident, noting that things had changed since the last time we had been there. The military people who had been proposed by the French as an alternative to Diem had either gone into hiding or left for Paris. He had begun to operate the country in a rather effective way. But it was still very obvious to us that his chances were very minimal that the situation could hold much beyond the date that was set for the election. In the meantime, he was playing the question of the elections, at that point, rather coyly. He didn't say he would not hold the elections. He would only say he would hold them if conditions permitted it, or something to that effect.

There were some charges already afoot that his military—who were left there by the French really, there were a couple of hundred thousand troops in operation—there were some charges that they were attacking against the terms of the Geneva agreement, some pockets of Viet Cong in the South. But the main attacks were against the old sects. There was one called the Hua-hao and another called the Kao-Dai. They were sort of cultures within a culture. They were similar to the old Chinese protection organizations, they not only committed crimes but then sold protection against the crimes—very much like a Mafia kind of process. These were the ones Diem really hit at. The French still had great influence in those sects, and Diem was trying to get rid of them because they were a threat to his own control.

They were rather ruthless people. Many of them later showed up in the war as some of our less desirable friends and allies.

But Diem's regime was well underway. We gave him whatever advice we could, it mostly had to do with land reform, and the need to develop a real, active rapport with his own people. That was basically our advice to him: to get out as often as possible in his shirtsleeves. He was still wearing the colonial uniform of the white linen suit. Interestingly enough, he wanted us to meet with his cabinet, and all of them came in so clothed. Mansfield, as a kind of symbolic gesture, took his jacket off and hung it on the back of his seat. Gradually, all of them did the same thing. I can't remember whether Diem did or not. He hired a fellow, through our aid program (Wolf Ladesinski) who was very famous in land reform in that period and had done the land reform in Taiwan. He had hired him as a principal advisor.

At the time, we were playing very close with him. Under the terms of the Geneva settlement to which we were not a signatory but whose terms Dulles had stated we would honor, we were supposed to have all of our advisors out of the situation, but we kept a small group there, under some sort of guise. That was the beginning of our subsequent aid mission to Diem, military aid mission. There were about forty or fifty Americans, I think it was something called Materials Recovery Unit. But it was a front, basically.

RITCHIE: Did you check with those people when you got to Vietnam? Did you get briefings from them?

VALEO: Not briefings from them. Probably we got them, I don't recall now. We probably got them from the military. We had an embassy there, so we probably got it from the military attaché.

RITCHIE: But you were aware of these other operations?

VALEO: Yes. They didn't really try to conceal it from us.

In Cambodia, Sihanouk had taken over, and this time he did invite us to meet with him. It was clear that he was on top of his own situation. I can't remember whether he was king then or not. His father died in this period. He succeeded him, and then abdicated to become prime minister, because he knew there was no future in his being in the monarchy, that it would have removed him from the active political scene. He was very warm and courteous.

I saw the beginning of our subsequent problems in Cambodia in that 1954 visit. Sihanouk gave a dinner for Senator Mansfield, it was a rather elaborate affair at the palace in Phnom Penh. Then he had the official court dancers afterwards; that was the entertainment for the evening. We had an ambassador there named [Robert] McClintock. It was his first post as ambassador. He had been a deputy chief of mission under Heath in Saigon, and when we

recognized Cambodia he was made the first ambassador there. He really bollixed it badly. I think really many of our troubles with Sihanouk, and there were many later on, traced to that first ridiculous, stupid encounter.

McClintock was a martinet. He carried a riding crop and he walked with two poodles wherever he went. He was determined that Sihanouk would listen to what he, McClintock, thought was best for his country. This had something to do with what kind of aid that we were supposed to supply, and so forth. Sihanouk, of course, would have no part of it. First of all, he was a king, and he was an authentic king in the sense of the old-fashioned concept of that word in Asia. On top of that, he was a very bright man and he really knew his country a little bit better than McClintock did. But McClintock was determined; he grew to despise Sihanouk; he gave him the nickname "Snooky," which began to spread around the town and Sihanouk heard it. This was the beginning of a hostility which got deeper and deeper as they went on. I'm surprised that Sihanouk never asked for his removal, but he should have at some point. It would have done him some good and it would have certainly done us some good.

Anyhow, the thing that underlined this personality clash was McClintock's ritualistic stupidity at the end of this dinner for Mansfield. We were lined up waiting for transportation. The cars started to come up for the departure and somehow or other the U.S.

military attaché got in the car ahead of the ambassador. I don't think it was intentional but McClintock was absolutely furious. He blamed it all on his local chauffeur. I can remember him saying "Je suis l'ambassadeur! I have to be the first one in line!" It was so ridiculous, it made me almost sick to my stomach. I'm sure that many of our problems in Cambodia had nothing more to them than this kind of personal clash with Sihanouk that started with McClintock.

One thing that I've noticed in the years of visiting American embassies abroad, they take on a kind of personality. Even though the figures change, the persons involved change, the attitudes have a certain continuity. It's an institutionalization of attitudes of a sort, so that it's very difficult to break the pattern. New people came in to the embassy in Phnom Penh and they too, began calling Sihanouk "Snooky." By the same token, the problem of how to control "Snooky" became a key to the behavior of that embassy. There was only once in all the years that I went there that it became apparent to me that there was an effort being made to break out of that pattern but it was very late. By contrast, the ambassador from Australia, who remained a very close friend of Sihanouk's, up until the downfall, had given strict orders in the Australian embassy that anyone who used the word "Snooky" would be returned immediately to Australia. He understood the significance of that kind of thing in dealing with a

personality such as Sihanouk. He did not take it lightly. So that's where we got off on the wrong foot with Cambodia, and I think much of our agony and that of the Cambodians later came from that initial arrogance.

I don't have any particular recollections of the Laotian situation from the 1955 trip, except that we met the new king. The old king had died and his son had taken over. He impressed Mansfield greatly. I don't think he quite lived up to the promise that we thought he had, but at that point Mansfield was very much impressed by him and thought that his future would be very bright in Laos.

RITCHIE: Did Mansfield ever consider visiting Hanoi on these trips after '54?

VALEO: Never. Never discussed it, never even suggested it, not after the fall.

RITCHIE: Do you have any thought on why he might not have considered it? At least in '55 there might have been more of an opportunity.

VALEO: I guess it could still have been done, if he wanted to do it. But I think you can't divorce this from the atmosphere at this time. Diem would certainly not have understood it. Moreover, we had already labeled Ho Chi Minh as a monster in public

opinion circles here in the United States, and to go and talk with him would have been politically difficult to begin with. I don't think he ever met Ho Chi Minh. It's conceivable that he ran into him back in China during World War II, but I doubt it. As I recall, Ho Chi Minh during that period was under the patronage of Chiang Kai-shek and he was in a southern Chinese city near the Indochina border. I think in Guilin or Liuzhou in Guangxi Province. At this point, Don, I can either go on with the Vietnamese story, or I can break it off, because there is a hiatus for a period of time. We didn't go back again for several years—I went back with Carl Marcy, but I can't remember what year that was.

RITCHIE: In '59.

VALEO: It was '59, yes. That was my next trip back. In the meantime, I'd been doing a lot of other traveling around in other places. Hickenlooper came to Mansfield after I went to work for Mansfield and asked him if he could borrow me for one trip that he wanted to make. Mansfield agreed to do it, and I went out with him for a long trip. It started in Austria—he was then on the International Atomic Energy Commission—and went around the world. Oh, it went all over the place, into Taiwan and a dozen other countries.

RITCHIE: Did Mansfield stop going to Vietnam at that stage?

VALEO: Yes. He may have made one trip without me, while I was traveling with Bourke Hickenlooper, or while I was traveling with Carl Marcy, I can't remember which. He stopped going for a period of time. His interests ran elsewhere. He kept tabs on the situation, but we began to get these discouraging reports about Diem's situation, that his brother and his wife had taken over from him, in effect. So as far as I know he did not go again to Vietnam in that period, up until the problem broke out that Marcy and I went to check on.

RITCHIE: Since you made so many trips there, you must have gotten a reputation as somebody who knew the area. Did any other senators ever approach you with any questions about Vietnam or Indochina in general?

VALEO: Oddly enough, no. By this time I was already seen as Mansfield's man. Except for Hickenlooper, who had this long, old friendship with me, there was no other request. I used to have meetings with the State Department people frequently. They would come back and make sure that I was briefed on what was happening. I'm trying to think of some of them who were involved. I should mention in this period I met Frank Meloy, who was later killed in Lebanon. He and I struck up a very strong friendship, this was in 1953. And Colonel [Edward] Lansdale was another one who later became a rather significant figure in the situation.

It was the embassy policy at that time not to support Diem quite that strongly. I think now we're talking about the embassy as distinct from Dulles. The Department itself had some reservations about Diem, largely because they were still reporting on Vietnam through Paris. And the French didn't want him, so they reflected in some ways the French attitudes. But that was not true of Frank Meloy, who was then a young Foreign Service officer. He had a very open mind on the subject. He was a very bright fellow. He introduced me to Lansdale in 1953 or 1954 in Saigon. He said there were two people other than Diem who were promising presidential candidates—Lansdale had his favorite, which was not Diem. It was a Vietnamese dentist who apparently had taken to politics. So Frank set up a breakfast, at which I met Lansdale and the dentist, whose name now escapes me. But they were obviously still pushing for someone else other than Diem. This would have been probably in '54.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Lansdale?

VALEO: Well, at that point I didn't really know him. I didn't even know of his reputation in the Philippines. I learned more about that later. But at that point he was quiet, he was in the background, he did not push things. He put forth, in effect, the dentist, but that was it. As I recall, he was wearing a moustache. He looked a little bit like Erol Flynn, I think. I got nothing much more clearly about him from Frank, because he was

a CIA operator, obviously, and Frank was also under restrictions in terms of talking about him. Frank never spoke of him in glowing terms, nor did he speak of him in hostile terms. He just introduced him as a member of the staff or something, who sat in while we were talking to the dentist.

RITCHIE: Did you have any other meetings with Lansdale in the '50s?

VALEO: I may have met him one other time. But the last time I can remember seeing him was about three years ago, at a party at the former ambassador's house, the former ambassador from Vietnam to Washington who is now a very old man, if he's still living. He and his wife had Lansdale and me and a few other people with ancient connections with Vietnam. So I really don't know that much about him. I know more about him from his reputation in the Philippines. I did meet at that time the chap who wrote the book, *The Ugly American* sometime in the fifties, and I think Lansdale was the prototype for the hero in the book.

RITCHIE: Eugene Burdick?

VALEO: Not Burdick, but the other one.

RITCHIE: William Lederer.

VALEO: Lederer. He had been, I guess, a public relations man for one of the U.S. fleets out in the Pacific. He was a

great, amiable guy. He didn't know anything at all about Vietnam, but it was just that he was sick and tired of the kinds of stories that we were hearing. He wrote potboilers, and *The Ugly American* was a potboiler. But it had a good title and it appealed to Americans' sense of guilt about everything they do abroad, so it fit in. I can remember having dinner with him sometime later, he was then on the staff of the *Readers' Digest* as a consultant, I think. He invited me to dinner in a hotel here in Washington. We sat down to dinner and he was the first man I've ever seen send a bottle of wine back! The fellow poured the sample of the wine, he looked at it and shook his head no, and said take it away. After the man left, he said, "I don't know whether the wine was good or bad. But he asked me and I just thought I'd try it." But that's the kind of personality he was. He was an amiable guy. I liked him very much personally.

RITCHIE: I edited the volumes of the Foreign Relations Committee for the late 1950s, and I never saw Vietnam mentioned at all from the mid 1950s until the scandal over aid in 1959, when Albert Colegrove started writing articles about it.

VALEO: The reason why it doesn't come up in their records is because they never had hearings, never did anything about it. Mansfield was the only one that paid any attention to it, really. He was the only one who knew anything about it. We always did a report to the committee, and it was then circulated, but who read

it, I don't even know. I don't think they regarded it as part of the official committee records; it had nothing to do with the committee per se. It was an advice to the committee, in effect. But the State Department read the reports, Dulles read the reports, and that's where the impact was felt.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me about the trip to Vietnam you made in 1959 with Carl Marcy?

VALEO: Yes, the background to that had to do with the Colegrove reports. Colegrove was a young reporter at that time with Scripps-Howard. These stories appeared, I guess, in the *Washington Daily News*. It was a tabloid; the stories were sensationally done. Mansfield picked them up and said, "What do you think of that?" We hadn't concerned ourselves much with Vietnam in this period because we assumed things were moving along fairly well. He said, "Don't you think we should look into it?" That's the way it began. We set up an inquiry through the committee and through Carl Marcy to look into the charges which were appearing in these Colegrove stories.

The first thing we did was to get Colegrove in for a talk. He had not been to Vietnam before. It was a first trip for him. He had had very little exposure to Asia, as I recall, certainly none to Vietnam before the trip. My own reaction to the stories was that they were not an extraordinary picture of what probably

went on not only in Vietnam but in most Asian countries at that period. A lot of it had to do with the corrupting influence of U.S. dollars through the aid program, which were poured into that area in quantities which had never been seen there before. Since the area is full of people who knew how to trade sharply, it looked like a bonanza, and in many instances it was turned into that. When you add to that the fact that we knew virtually nothing about it—I don't think we had a Foreign Service officer until about the mid-'50s who could even speak Vietnamese. It was assumed the language there was French. So if you spoke French you got assigned to Vietnam. To a degree, that was true. The people in authority spoke French. But if you got away from the top layer you began to run into something quite different.

In pursuing the Colegrove inquiry we tried to get a hearing that focused on the subject he had raised. We called in [Elbridge] Durbrow, who was then the ambassador. We called in somebody named Williams, who was the commanding general of the aid program. We had them up for a couple of days of testimony in hearings over which Mansfield presided. After that, we decided that Carl and I would go out there and make a circuit of the country to the places where Colegrove had indicated there were problems with contractors. He and I went out to Saigon, to Banmethuot I believe it was, we went to Hue and to several places up in the highlands.

We came down from Hue to Saigon by the railroad. I don't know if Carl told you the story about the fellow in the compartment alongside ours on the train. He and I went into the dining car to have lunch or dinner, and the waiter said to me in French, "You must be very important people." I said, "No, we're just Americans who are traveling. We work for the government." "Oh, no," he said, "you must be, because there are two people in the next compartment who are going along with you to make sure that nothing happens to you."

RITCHIE: Were they bodyguards, or were they just trailing you?

VALEO: I don't know for sure which, maybe both. I won't go into a description of the railroad if he already did. There's no point in repeating it.

RITCHIE: He said it was quite luxurious.

VALEO: Well, it was luxurious in one sense, but when you had to cross the rivers the bridges were in pretty bad shape still. Many of them had been blown up by the Viet Minh and Viet Cong. It was a twelve hour trip which probably would normally take about five hours or thereabouts. It was an old-fashioned Orient Express kind of train. Diem was very proud of the railroad and the restoration of railroad communication between Hue and Saigon, because it had been out for years and years. It was one

of the things he really felt indicated that his government was on the way back. That was still a very promising time. They were beginning to export rice again, which had been a main export crop in the South in the prewar days.

Things did not look that bad in '59. Again, I don't know how much of it was his doing, or the doing of his government. I think they have to be given credit for some of that. On the other side, Ho Chi Minh was still hoping that they would come to some peaceful solution which would permit him to take over, so they were restrained in terms of their efforts to undermine Diem's government. This may have been due to the fact that Ho Chi Minh and Diem had had previous contacts in the revolt against the French. Certainly Ho Chi Minh must have recognized him as a bona fide nationalist in every sense of the word. In a way, it was a little like the Mao Tse-tung/Chiang Kai-shek thing. I constantly drew that parallel. Vietnam was almost a microcosm of the Chinese revolution.

RITCHIE: In what way?

VALEO: Well, you had the factions dividing in the same way. You had the sects, who were the equivalent of the warlords or the red and green dragon societies which went back to an even earlier period of imperial Chinese history, when these groups started as protective organizations in China as they did in these other countries. Particularly in Vietnam, not quite so much in

Cambodia and Laos. In Cambodia and Laos you could see the other inputs of influence, particularly the Indian cultural influences. But in Vietnam it was heavily Chinese influence. The sources of the society were so clearly Chinese. There were some primitive tribes up in the hills that were not in that pattern, but the overwhelming characteristic was clearly Chinese culture, or an obvious derivative of Chinese culture. Much more so than even the Japanese or the Korean. So it was not surprising that many of these Chinese patterns repeated themselves.

RITCHIE: In December of 1959, Senator Albert Gore, Sr., held a couple of hearings in Saigon, as part of that Colegrove investigation. Were you involved in those? I think he chaired the subcommittee that went over.

VALEO: Oh, did he? No, I don't recall that at all.

RITCHIE: That was the first time I had seen his name associated with Vietnam. I wondered if you had served as an advisor.

VALEO: I don't think his association was a deep one. It was probably on the basis of a single trip. I never talked with him about it. He never talked to me about it. But then you get into Gore's personality.

RITCHIE: In what way?

VALEO: Gore was a rather—how shall I describe him—he was a very egotistical man. He really loved the sound of his own voice, which he used beautifully, I must say. I don't think he really needed any support, or wanted any support in anything he did. He just felt that he was on top of just about anything he picked up. He was always pleasant, I don't mean to suggest that he wasn't pleasant, it was just that he sort of lived in his own world.

RITCHIE: Is that a common characteristic of United States senators?

VALEO: No. But there are some that do have it. He certainly would have been one. There are others that I can remember, but I remember him particularly for that. He also had intellectual competence and so did Wayne Morse. Wayne Morse was much the same way. They were not club-men in the Senate sense. They were part of it, but not part of it. One can almost say they were looking at the presidency. You could almost pick out the ones that were looking for the presidency, in terms of those characteristics.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with John Kennedy in those days?

VALEO: Yes, that came in, but I don't know whether we want to take that up here, Don, or whether we want to take it up under presidency relationships.

RITCHIE: I just wondered in terms of Vietnam. He did make a few speeches on that in the Senate.

VALEO: Well, we have to go on from '59 for that. I did not know him well as a senator. I had met him maybe once or twice in the Senate, but I didn't know him at all.

RITCHIE: I was trying to ascertain who the senators were who showed some interest in Vietnam.

VALEO: Kennedy would have shown it for the same reasons Mansfield showed it, because Bill Douglas introduced Diem to both of them. Kennedy also had a favorable impression of Diem at that time. And I think justifiably so, because Diem was an impressive person and it was clear where his heart was.

RITCHIE: Before we go ahead to the Kennedy administration, let me backtrack a little. The Colegrove investigation was an aid investigation, and you had spent much of the late 1950s studying the aid program.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: Was that one of the reasons for your connection with that investigation?

VALEO: Well, by this time I was closely associated with Mansfield, and Mansfield had the investigation. They turned to him immediately on this, and he was the one actually who raised the question, whether they ought to look into it. So it would be through that channel that I became involved in it.

RITCHIE: Could I ask you just a little about the aid investigation? I wondered if you could give me some of the background of that investigation which was, I think, around 1956, '57, or '58.

VALEO: Yes, somewhere in that period. It started out with a Point Four study. I was still in the Library when Truman suggested the original Point Four Program, which was essentially a kind of nonreligious missionary approach to the underdeveloped world. I think it was a kind of afterthought in his inaugural speech but it had a very wide appeal. Everybody talked about it. In South America they talked of "Punto Quatro." And "Le Point Quatre" in France. It was all over. Everybody was talking about Point Four. Nobody really talked about aid.

Point Four came in when the Marshall Plan had just about expired. It was part of the birth of the whole aid program beyond the Marshall Plan. In a way, we still had an awful lot of energy

for use abroad, we still had a lot of personnel who had gotten trained on the Marshall Plan, there was still a lot to be done in the world, and the two sort of came together in the beginning of the Point Four, which was really a nominal, limited kind of concept originally. But it immediately grew from that into the idea of a much broader program. It was a point of decision, I think, that we probably in retrospect should have restrained ourselves from getting into aid on the kind of scale that developed.

Once you bureaucratized the aid structure, you made it compelling to find things to do abroad. It was one thing when you picked out a particular situation, you aimed your effort at it, you built up the staff you needed to do that, and then closed it out. But it's another thing when you set up a permanent bureaucracy, because my whole experience in government is that once you have a structure set for one country abroad, it becomes almost imperative to have it set up for as many other countries as you can. I think that's been the pattern of the spread of the aid program. That's not to say that there isn't a need for a lot of this, but when it takes on that pattern, then you have to worry about personnel who are only going to be there for a limited period of time. You have to shift them from this post to that post at the end of a two-year term. You begin to put in the pattern of a foreign service in a number of places where, in my judgment, it doesn't belong.

It's one thing to put Foreign Service officers in a country and keep them there only for brief tours. It's another thing to put an aid personnel there and keep them there only for two or three years, or whatever it is. There's a need for Foreign Service officers; they're reporters and it's essential that they learn to report anywhere. That is not necessarily true for aid personnel. When aid became a permanent organizational structure, I think that it began to lose its real sense of mission.

The Point Four Program originally was conceived of as something of a mission where we would send out groups of people in the pattern of the old missionaries, to help improve agriculture, public health and so forth. It was very naive in many ways, but it had a good deal of very genuine, social motivation. We felt that this was part of our responsibility as a world leader, and I think very properly so. We had at that time a lot of techniques which were meaningful in underdeveloped countries, particularly because of our own Department of Agriculture, which had done so much work here during the Depression in developing skills and capabilities which in a sense were very similar to the ones that were needed in many of these countries. But the aid program evolved in patterns which made it essentially an instrument of international politics, and a bad instrument of international politics in my judgment. Then once we got into a military aid program for a particular situation, it became necessary to have a

military aid program wherever you could put it. As a result we involved ourselves in situations where really, our national interest is not necessarily served by deep involvement.

That was my reaction generally to the aid program. To some degree, that was reflected in the studies that we did of the aid program. There was a long report on the program. Part of it had to do with the organizational structure; as a matter of fact, much of it had to do with the organizational structure. We tried to deal with it, as I recall, by proposing to break up the organization and put the parts that were relevant to politics in one place and the parts that were not relevant to politics, such as the Point Four, in something away from the government as far as possible, or by using the U.N. channels. But it was very difficult to do that once you had an aid-bureaucracy established. In subsequent years, if a new administration had somebody to pay off, it put them in charge of the aid program. It didn't matter whether it was a Republican or Democratic administration..

RITCHIE: There's a sort of a dance that the Congress was doing at that point: the Senate would increase the amount of foreign aid, the House would cut the amount, and they would go to conference committee and split the difference. But nobody seemed really to have a sense of how much aid was necessary, or was it doing any good.

VALEO: Precisely, and it was so hard to measure it. When we set up the committee study, I guess it was Eisenhower who set up his own Rockefeller group—and later on I'll tell you a story that belongs in the historic record, because it's one of the funniest stories involving Nelson Rockefeller—but Rockefeller's group resisted any changes in the situation, so we got nowhere with the recommendations from the committee. The same recommendations keep reoccurring in subsequent investigations and studies of the aid programs.

The Rockefeller story I mentioned is very amusing. During the aid study, [Nelson] Rockefeller requested time to come up before the committee, which Mansfield was chairing. We had a hearing. It was a small hearing, it wasn't public. Rockefeller just wanted to tell Mansfield what they were doing in the commission and so forth. The only other senator present at the meeting, besides Mansfield, was Bill Langer of North Dakota, who was really a Plainsman of the old school. He was right out of central casting. He had given up smoking, but he couldn't get over the business of chewing on a cigar, so he used to chew on a cigar in the cellophane wrapper. He was sitting there watching intently and chewing on the cigar and Rockefeller was going on at great lengths about what they were doing in his commission. When he finished, Mansfield said, "Bill, do you have any questions?" Langer was an absolute isolationist at this point. Moreover, he was furious at

the State Department because there had never been an ambassador from North Dakota, and he had said repeatedly and publicly that he wasn't going to vote for anything for the Department of State until an ambassador from North Dakota had been appointed.

So he was sitting there looking at Rockefeller, and he said (this is my paraphrase of his quote): "Wasn't your Daddy out in the Dakotas one time?" Rockefeller looked perplexed. "My father?" he said. "Oh, I think I know who you mean, you mean my uncle. You're right, I did have an uncle who was there." Or a granduncle, I don't know which it was. "Yeah," Langer said, "I thought so. You look a little like him." He went on, "You know, he used to sell medicine." Rockefeller said, "Oh, of course, he had a patent medicine and he was selling it all over the West." "Yeah," Langer said, "and it wasn't any good either. My Daddy had cancer. He sold some to my Daddy and he said it would cure his cancer. My Daddy died." Rockefeller looked absolutely flabbergasted. Mansfield interjected, "How old was your father, Bill?" Langer said, "He was ninety-three." Well, you know, years later, when Rockefeller was vice president, I reminded him of that story. I said, "Do you remember that hearing?" He said, "How could I ever forget it. It was the most incredible thing that ever happened to me!" He said, "I didn't know what to do. I didn't know whether I should laugh or what. It completely took my words away."

RITCHIE: Do you think Senator Langer was suggesting the aid program was a patent medicine scam?

VALEO: No. He wound up by saying, "But you're not like your uncle. If you want to get confirmed for something, I'll vote for you."

RITCHIE: Well, do you think that as a result of your study that Senator Mansfield really developed some strong opinions about the aid program, that it wasn't really working?

VALEO: Yes. But he may have felt that before and the study simply confirmed it. I don't know what his record is. I don't recall his voting record on later aid bills. I think some he voted for, some he didn't. But he certainly never felt the program was effectively used. He thought there was a great deal of wasted money in it.

RITCHIE: He was way ahead of someone like Senator Fulbright on that.

VALEO: Well, the Fulbright story is interesting in this connection. Fulbright was at this point, around the time of this investigation, beginning to develop his doubts about the program. He asked Carl to do a speech for him in which he'd express some of these doubts about the way the program was being administered. Carl gave me the draft to do. I did the draft of the speech, and

it was a very critical speech of the aid program, not wiping it out completely, but highly critical of some aspects of it, as I recall. Fulbright used the speech, and about a week later he called me in to talk with me. He showed me a big pile of mail he'd gotten on it. He said, "Carl tells me you did that speech." He said, "This is some of the mail I'm getting. How do you explain that?" I said, "Well, I think there's a good deal of concern in the country." And there was at that time, about what the program was doing to us in the sense of our getting involved. Maybe there may have been in the mail—also a reflection of a recrudescence of isolationist sentiment too. But the fact that the door was open to that was largely, in my judgment, due to the way the aid program had evolved after the Marshall Plan, which had had almost universal support in the country.

You can almost date Fulbright's change from that speech. He became progressively more skeptical. I remember one meeting of the committee, he was going through the aid program authorization bill and he was pushing it through with great impatience. He wanted to get it over with in a hurry. It was almost as though he had heard it so many times and he just didn't want to get into details. It was a two- or three-billion-dollar bill at the time. The committee was going down the items in the bill, with an executive branch witness and Fulbright came to an item and said: "What's this?" It was something for the Inter-American Sanitation

Commission. It was a fifteen-thousand-dollar increase in their budget, or something like that, which probably amounted to fifty thousand to begin with. It was a real peanut. He said, "What is this?" They had a witness from the State Department, the Latin American officer, and the fellow said, "Well, that's a small increase." Fulbright said, "I know it's a small increase, but it's still fifteen thousand dollars. What is it for?" He said, "It's an old inter-American organization," I don't know how he described it. Well, Fulbright said, "Are any of the other countries putting any money into this, or are we the only ones?" He spent about twenty minutes or a half hour on that one item for fifteen thousand dollars, and he finally cut it out. But I think that really was the way he began to express his doubts in the way we were operating abroad.

RITCHIE: The program, I guess, had become so large and complex that it was hard for any one senator to have any sense of what it all meant and where it all was going.

VALEO: Oddly enough, some of the senators had more sense of that than the people in the executive branch, because they kept changing the administrators so often. The greater continuity was in the members of the committees on the House and on the Senate side. They really knew more about the program at that point than the people who were trying to justify it.

RITCHIE: One of the proposals that came out was to abolish the International Cooperation Administration, and put into the State Department the non-military aid program.

VALEO: Right. Was that in our recommendation or in a later one?

RITCHIE: I'm not absolutely sure, but Senator Mansfield introduced that several times in the late 1950s.

VALEO: Yes, that was one of the recommendations probably. What we did was to try to draw a distinction between what amounted to political aid and what amounted to the kind of things that were involved in Point Four, or similar things which really had no real direct political implication, at most a remote one. The theory was that if it's political, then the State Department knows best how to administer it. Much of that had to do with budgetary support for other governments. It had to do with funds for the maintenance of their military. It seemed to us that it should be clearly labeled as political aid if you were going to use it, instead of getting it mixed up with things which had really a rather noble purpose, such as the Point Four Program and some of the money which was funneled through the U.N. development fund and other programs of that sort. They didn't want that, because the great bulk of what we were already calling economic aid really was political aid and not economic aid at all.

RITCHIE: So the State Department opposed it?

VALEO: I guess the whole administration was opposed. It was probably taken up in NSC and decided they had to resist that because it would be too obvious then what the money was being used for.

RITCHIE: Mansfield's proposals were defeated in the late '50s, but in '61 there was a reorganization of the aid program. They did abolish the International Cooperation Agency and set up AID.

VALEO: But they changed names rather than changing the way the thing functioned. Their argument was—we go back to Vorys, whom I mentioned earlier—you really have to keep it all concentrated so you can see the whole picture. But that really wasn't it. In some respects, there may have been some national purpose in not revealing how much was political, but everybody else in the world knew it except ourselves. Really, it was kind of like putting our own heads in the sand so that we didn't see it. It was a way of living with ourselves and feeling good about aid as a noble gesture, even though some of it had nothing to do with nobility at all. I think we suffer from that. I'm not saying you don't have to sweep things under the rug every once in a while but every time you do it you pay a price for it. I don't think we're ready to pay that price, but I think we're paying it anyway in many places.

RITCHIE: You watched it all evolving in the 1950s when it was falling into place.

VALEO: When it fell into place and when we moved more and more away from the noble concepts which attended our policies at the end of World War II, when the U.N. was a great hope, when we moved more and more back in the Machiavellian direction, and probably reached an apex with Kissinger.

RITCHIE: Well, I wanted to start talking about your work with Senator Mansfield when he was whip. Maybe that should be a separate subject.

VALEO: That is a separate subject.

RITCHIE: So this would be a good point for us to stop today.

VALEO: Fine.

End of Interview #3

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

JOHNSON AND MANSFIELD
Interview #4
Wednesday, August 21, 1985

RITCHIE: We talked the last time about your various trips to Vietnam with Mike Mansfield, and about your work on the Foreign Relations Committee, particularly in connection with the aid investigation which Mansfield chaired. I thought we could begin today by talking about your relations with Mansfield in general and the period when you went to work for him.

VALEO: Before we get into that, let me go back to one more item on the Foreign Relations Committee, which I neglected to mention. I'm not really sure whether this subcommittee was set up before or after the disarmament special subcommittee. It must have been before Wiley was chairman of the committee at that point, and the Republicans had control of the Senate—this was Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin. Francis Wilcox was always very deeply interested in the United Nations, it was one of his passions, certainly in that period. He was very protective, almost like a mother hen when it came to the U.N., as far as he could protect it in terms of attitudes in the Senate.

The criticism had just begun to develop of the United Nations, partly growing out of the Korean experience, mostly because the veto power was at that point being used very

extensively by the Soviet Union and our protests were all against this usage. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had developed the concept of moving an issue from the Security Council to the General Assembly as one way of circumventing the veto and countering the criticism of the ineffectiveness of the United Nations. That of course, as you are probably aware, was a basic factor in getting the U.N. involved in Korea. But there were opposition groups beginning to form around the country, and the slogan first appeared: "Get the U.S. out of the U.N. and the U.N. out of the U.S." So, I guess it was Carl's idea, or Francis and Carl together—no I guess Francis was a little worried about the concept, so it must have been Carl's idea originally—that we ought to try to take the committee out into the country, in a sense to get a step ahead of the critics by finding out what the country was really thinking about the U.N.

We set up a special subcommittee on review of the U.N. charter. Charter revision was a substantial issue at that time, the League of Women Voters, I recall, was discussing it, and a number of others, again largely growing out of the veto question. As far as I know, that was the first time the Foreign Relations Committee ever met outside the city of Washington. Under Wiley's chairmanship, we took it to about five or six cities. Our idea was to open up the question to public discussion. Carl always believed in the educational value of the committee. I did not, as

such. I thought its primary function was to legislate, and that any educational function had to be purely incidental to the question of legislation. I thought constitutionally that was the way it ought to work. But we did go out and to a degree it was an educational exercise.

We started in Akron, Ohio and then Greensboro, North Carolina. When we announced that the committee for the first time in its history was going to have hearings outside of Washington, there was a great deal of interest around the country. A number of mayors and alert public relations officers in the cities began to write to the committee and offer us all kinds of facilities if we'd meet in their city. Besides Akron and Greensboro, we met, I believe, in Denver; another was Louisville, Kentucky. We were going to meet in Birmingham, Alabama, but canceled when the Birmingham authorities said they could not desegregate the audience. They would be glad to admit Negroes to the hearing, but it would have to be in a separate section of the auditorium. That's how far back we're going.

The hearings were interesting. We discovered all sorts of public affairs groups around the country, some of them going far back in history. I can think of one, I believe it was the Daughters of Patrick Henry, in Tennessee. They had no objections to the United Nations, they were just against the federal government! Then we began to get some really vicious right-wing

appearances at the committee. The same ones that had engendered this slogan of "Get the U.S. Out of the U.N. and the U.N. Out of the U.S." They would come in a group. They had no sympathy with the committee; it was just they had even less sympathy for the U.N., and they felt it was necessary to make a public statement to that effect. Edward R. Murrow covered one of the sessions outside of Washington and used it on one of his TV programs.

I don't know that we got a great number of ideas on what ought to be done from the U.N., but we did get some new thinking by going outside of Washington. What we did do, I think, was to engender a great deal of thinking about the United Nations in many places where otherwise it would have just been remote at best. I don't know, as a technique, how valuable it was. We did use the same technique on the disarmament subcommittee, bringing in a somewhat different group of participants, mostly academic audiences. In any event it was a pioneering effort and I think it's worth making note of that. The committee eventually reported, made a number of recommendations, some of which—not because of the committee's recommendations necessarily—gradually began to be absorbed into the U.N. system. I think it was a worthwhile experiment, and probably opened the doors for the Vietnamese hearings, which came later in the committee. Now, let's go back—unless you have any questions on that.

RITCHIE: Would you call these educational hearings?

VALEO: In a way. But I always contended that we had to have a legislative purpose, otherwise it wouldn't work. We would not be acting really in my judgment constitutionally. I would say they had an educational offshoot, but that basically our purpose in going, we stressed it—I wrote the opening statements for the chairman and all the senators—and they kept stressing the point that we were meeting for an input into legislation, which might or might not be useful in terms of the United Nations, and that any other purpose was incidental.

By the way, there was one incident in the hearings which illustrated the value of this approach. After we'd been going on for about two or three meetings, an extremist group, this "Get the U.N. Out" business, began to appear at every hearing, no matter what city we were in. I wasn't sure, but I thought I recognized the same faces. They began to make speeches rather than to offer testimony and their followers in the audience would applaud and whistle and what not. At first, we had set the witness chair at a right-angle to the committee, so that the witness could turn to the audience and turn to the committee as he saw fit. Well, we found that these witnesses were essentially addressing their remarks entirely to the audience, and creating something of a stir. They were beginning to get a bit out of order.

We wondered how to deal with this and finally hit on a very simple solution. We just turned the witness chair around so that

the witness's back was to the audience and he faced the committee, reasoning that we were there for a legislative purpose. Any value to the audience was strictly incidental. The audience heard the testimony over the loudspeakers while it was being given directly to the committee for legislative purposes. It worked like a charm. Once the hearings ceased to be a kind of public forum and became primarily a legislative matter, the heat died down. The procedure became duller, to be sure, but it was also something much more in keeping with what we needed.

RITCHIE: This raises a question: in looking through back hearings, whenever there was a major issue, from foreign aid to whatever, usually the last day of testimony would be opened up to non-administration people, various citizens groups and others. But it almost invariably seemed to be fringe group representatives.

VALEO: It's a standard procedure in most committees.

RITCHIE: Is there any way of getting more mainstream opinion, or is it basically just going to draw those people who are most disaffected by the system?

VALEO: I guess it's mostly those who are disaffected by it or those who have a very positive interest in the subject. We did try, though, to open up the procedure to the general public. We developed certain rules to make it feasible. We agreed to hear

anyone who wanted to testify. We guaranteed them a minimum of five minutes, so long as time permitted. If there was any fuller statement that they wanted to put in the record, we accepted that. We did take a great deal of testimony, and there was a great deal of input. The League of Women Voters appeared pretty steadily in most places. They were most interested because it was their annual discussion subject, at the time.

It was a fascinating experience. It was the first time that I think the Senate ever tried to go beyond Washington in terms of foreign relations, and we found that there was a great deal of interest in the U.N. in the country, and an interest in world federalism. We tried as far as possible in that first experiment to hold the hearings where a member of the special subcommittee's state was involved. That, of course, stimulated further interest in it, because it was a way of talking directly to your own senator in those locations.

RITCHIE: Well, would you like to switch now to Mansfield?

VALEO: Yes, you'd better give me your question again so I have it clear in my mind.

RITCHIE: Basically, you introduced Mansfield earlier, but I wondered about how your relationship with him evolved in the 1950s up to the point when you decided to go to work for him, when he was whip.

VALEO: Well, trying to pick it up from where we left off, on this theme, we worked on the foreign aid thing together, and we traveled a great deal. He began to travel elsewhere other than Asia and he asked for me from the committee. We went to Latin America to Panama and Peru and Bolivia in 1956. Again, it was in pursuit of the aid program, or the Point Four program. I believe there was a report on the Point Four program in those areas which stressed the importance of staying with the original concept of the Point Four program.

RITCHIE: From all your travels with him, getting to see him in action and presumably talking with him over long stretches, how would you judge his character as an individual?

VALEO: It's an interesting thing, we talked very little on the trips, except on matters of business. On a personal level, there was a minimum of conversation. Oh, occasionally something personal would come up at dinner when he and I were traveling alone. In the case of the Latin American trip, his wife was also along, so that put it in a somewhat different category. But when we were alone, I guess we crossed the ocean two or three times by boat, coming back from these trips to Vietnam. I would be working on a draft of the report and he'd be in the library. He'd spend the whole day in the library on the ship. We'd meet only for meals, for lunch and for dinner, that was all. And we barely exchanged a half a dozen sentences on each occasion. I was quite

young and a little overawed by the position I found myself in. He, at the same time, was the most taciturn man I had ever encountered anywhere. He had a great way of keeping long silences and he was almost without small talk.

It used to cause all kinds of problems in the embassies. We'd be invited to dinner and invariably he would sit next to the ambassador's wife. She, trying to do what she regarded as her duty, would bravely attempt to engage him in conversation. It was virtually impossible to do. He just simply had no small talk. I used to feel sorry for them. I knew exactly what they were going through. Now, that changed as we got to know each other more, but in those early years, I must say it was a very difficult thing to deal with. I could talk to him on any matter of business, he would be glad to listen and it would be a very adequate conversation. But it was almost impossible to chat. Occasionally he *might* mention a personal thing, but it was a very rare occasion.

RITCHIE: You said that he spent a lot of time in the library. Do you have any idea what he was reading in those days?

VALEO: Just about anything. He always read five or six newspapers everyday in the office, at least that many, all the papers from home and about five or six other papers besides, usually the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, and all of the Washington papers, there were three at that time. And he'd read

the New York *Daily News*; I could understand why. This was his way of trying to understand the lower middle-class and poor and the more militant nationalistic elements whose support he felt was very, very critical to win, particularly in terms of foreign relations questions. If you didn't have that you didn't have a majority. So he read that religiously. The New York *Daily News* was always very negative on international participation. I don't think it ever went as far as "Get the U.S. Out of the U.N." and vice versa, but it did come very close. It was an extremely jingoistic newspaper.

My relationship with Mansfield began to give me problems at the committee, because he would tie my time up a great deal. He would come to me directly, not going through Francis or Carl, and I was still on a loan arrangement with the committee at that point. He had asked me to go to work with him. The first time must have been shortly after his election, maybe about two years after his election. I remember the incident very well because we were in the Senate dining room having lunch on a Saturday—he was one of the few senators who worked every Saturday. He offered me a job and I told him that I hadn't left the Library and I really didn't want to leave the Library. He said, "But you're over here all the time anyhow." I said, "I know that, but I always expect to go back to the Library at some point." I said, "But I'll give you whatever help I can through the committee."

The thing that helped to fix the occasion in my mind was that there was a correspondent, Jack Bell I believe, of the AP. He came in and sat down and Mansfield told him to have a cup of coffee, he always did that with the press. Jack Bell began to ask him some questions. I don't know how it came up, but his response was, "Well, you know Jack, I don't know that I'm going to run again." This was after he'd been in the Senate about two years. And Jack Bell said, "You want to make a bet!" Mansfield smiled. I learned later that it was almost a standard response from senators in their first term. They weren't at all sure that they wanted to stay in the Senate, but invariably they did. It reminds me of a much more tragic setting some years later when I went up to Wilmington to swear in Joe Biden after he was elected for the first time. He would not come down for the general swearing in of new senators because his children were in the hospital. They had been in a terrible automobile accident, in which his wife had been killed. He made a speech to his supporters in the hospital room where I swore him in, and he said the same thing: he was not at all sure that he would run again for the Senate. He felt so badly about what had happened and he was so worried about his children. Of course, he's been around now for a while, into his third term.

Mansfield asked me again, a year or two later, I guess about 1956, on one of the trips, to go to work for him. I still stalled on it. Then in 1958 we were at the U.N. I was the congressional

advisor to the delegation, and he and Hickenlooper were the U.S. delegates from the Congress in that particular General Assembly session, which was the thirteenth. He always regarded that as a lucky number, maybe that will give you some indication of his nature! But anyhow, we were there. I had been ill with an appendix and I had just gotten married. I wasn't in my best shape. And he was in the middle of an election campaign in Montana while serving up there in New York.

The assignment at the General Assembly was not a particularly taxing one. It was pretty cut and dried. One thing that disturbed me: the permanent U.S. delegation at the U.N. was so frozen into position that they didn't even want to change words even in innocuous statements. The permanent mission just wanted the same thing year in and year out. They just wanted everything left exactly as it was. We tried to modify at least statements that were going to be made either by Hickenlooper or by Mansfield, but they resisted it all the way. Even trying to change the traditional language of the U.N., which had become so stilted, to try to put a little more life into it was impossible; they just resisted it all the way.

Mansfield ran again that year, 1958. In contrast to his first election to the Senate, which was in '52, he won by a landslide, a very large landslide. He came back to New York and he said, "I've just been reelected. I'm going to ask you once again:

Do you want to go to work with me?" He said, "I've got six years. If you stay with me for a couple of years, I'll help you get whatever you want in the government." I said, "Let me think about it." I went back and talked it over with my wife. We decided that the staff structure on the committee was beginning to get a little bit difficult to deal with, in part because Mansfield was using a great deal of my time. This caused some resentment among the other staff people. And he wouldn't accept any change. He was that sort of a person. Having once learned to work with somebody he just hated to make any changes and he didn't like staff people forced on him. I had done some work for Fulbright, very little but an important job in connection with his concepts of foreign aid. And I mentioned the Morse incidents, but those were minor. Most of my time really went heavily into helping Mansfield and mostly on Asia.

So we thought about it and decided that it was time to make a change. He was then only a member of the Senate, he had not yet become whip. I said, "Okay, I'll do it." At that point I had just gone over to the committee, that is, made the formal change from the Library to the committee, and I'd been on the committee staff per se for about eight months when this happened. So I guess it was in January 1959. I had no sooner gone to work for Mansfield when Johnson tapped him for whip, and we moved up into the rooms on the gallery floor over what is now the Democratic

leader's office. We used to hold forth there every Saturday with the press, in particular there were two members, one was Tony Vaccaro, who represented the AP and the other one was Warren Duffy, who was with the UPI (it may have been just the UP at that point). They would always be on hand on Saturday, they'd always come up.

An interesting sidelight—which is one of the reasons why I would want this held in confidence, at least for a while longer. The same year Mansfield was elected whip, [Thomas] Dodd came over from the House and so did Bob Byrd. I never forgot a conversation at a Saturday meeting, when Tony Vaccaro said to him, "Mike, there's some funny people coming over here from the House this year. Do you know it?" He said, "Who do you have in mind?" He said, "Well, that fellow Dodd, he's a kind of strange guy." Actually, Dodd was alcoholic, but Vaccaro didn't say it in so many words, but he said, "You know, he likes to make long speeches. Then you got that other fellow Byrd" he said. "He's a wild one!" Mansfield only smiled. He would never let himself be drawn into a conversation which might be in the least disparaging of his colleagues.

We did a lot of speeches. He kept me working mostly on foreign policy questions, even though we moved into the whip's office. The whip in that period really had a very limited amount to do. The leadership wasn't highly structured as it is now. The

whip had no function except to substitute for the leader when he wasn't around, and Johnson used to go away periodically because he had had a heart attack and was under instructions to get out of town a lot. So he'd leave the Senate with Mansfield, and Mansfield would carry the burden for long hours and run them into the evening very often, which was in accord with Johnson's wishes. I had very little to do with the floor. That was still Bobby Baker's realm. I was still feeling my way in the Senate structure, because up until this point my interest had only been in foreign relations. I had no real interest in the inner workings of the Senate as such. So I spent most of my time trying to hammer out speeches, developing new positions, many on Europe in this period, as well as on the Far East.

Mansfield had a good working relationship with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles liked Mansfield even though he was a constant critic of Eisenhower policies, but he did not do it on a personal level. He always deferred in the end to the power of the president and his secretary of state. Dulles appreciated that kind of approach, which was somewhat in contrast with what he had to confront in Fulbright, who liked the adversarial role with him. So Dulles constantly turned, I think, to Mansfield on the Democratic side of the Senate in that period.

RITCHIE: Do you have any idea why Johnson chose Mansfield for whip?

VALEO: It's a hard question to answer. I didn't know Johnson at that point, hardly at all. I'd seen him and watched him in action. I think there were a number of reasons. First of all, I think he wanted to have a line out to the Democratic liberals in the Senate, men like Paul Douglas and Hubert Humphrey, Morse, Gore, and others. He couldn't pick a Southerner for balance. Even though he claimed he was a Westerner, it didn't really register. It was always greeted with a smile when he claimed he was a westerner. He was regarded as a southerner, by the liberals in any event. So he felt he had to have a liberal whip if they were going to keep the party unified. And I think he found Mike Mansfield the most compatible of any of the liberals in the Senate, largely because Mansfield never gave him any trouble. He just did what Johnson asked, upheld him whenever he could, and spoke only on foreign policy, which was of no great interest to Johnson at that point. He hadn't yet learned that if you want to run for the presidency you should know something about it. He was mostly interested in budgetary questions, and he was in a constant struggle over who was causing the budget to be unbalanced—shades of today—he or Eisenhower. There was a lot of give and take between them. And then Johnson used to work very closely with Speaker Sam Rayburn over on the House side. They sort of figured out their strategy together. It was mostly involved with domestic issues, tax questions and things of that sort. Natural resources were important, particularly oil.

I think he found that Mansfield really was totally noncompetitive. He never saw him as a rival. I don't think he ever felt comfortable with Mansfield—it's very hard to feel comfortable with Mansfield, very few members of the Senate ever did, even after held been leader for ten years. He had enormous reserve, which I think is part of his basic personality. It goes well in certain places; the Japanese have an appreciation for a sort of removed person who doesn't talk too much except when it's necessary to talk. That's the way he was. His interests were, as I say, in Montana affairs, which he really watched very, very closely, and in foreign policy. And the number of people interested in foreign policy in that period, in a deep sense, was rather limited in the Senate as well as in the country. I think that probably explains why Johnson chose him.

There was another factor too: the southerners liked Mansfield. I'm talking about the old patriarchs, people like Walter George and Dick Russell—who wasn't so old at that point, but he knew he couldn't do the job of whip even if he wanted to, and he didn't want it. He knew no southerner could do it, he was astute enough to know that. It had to be somebody from the Northeast, or it had to be someone from the Northwest or the West. Mansfield was respected among the members from those areas. However, the show was still run pretty much by Johnson. Mansfield

made very little in the way of an original contribution to the leadership. It was not his style. He deferred to Johnson on just about everything.

RITCHIE: I've heard it said that Mansfield was whip in name but Bobby Baker was really whip in deed.

VALEO: Well, Bobby Baker had great influence. I don't think he was whip, but it depends on how you define whip. If you mean in the House sense of whip, where your purpose is to try to get votes lined up, yes. But that was never the whip function in the Senate. I don't think it is even today. Bobby Baker did the vote catching, and he went out with his butterfly net to catch whatever he could. But Mansfield would never do that. It would not be his nature. As whip I don't think he ever asked anybody for a vote. But his very presence in the leadership, and his support of Johnson on a lot of difficult questions, tended to modify the hostility which was gathering very strongly against Johnson in liberal circles in the Senate at that time. Mansfield was sort of a cap on that. He held it somewhat in check.

RITCHIE: Did Mansfield have any difficulties dealing with Bobby Baker because of his role in that?

VALEO: Oh, no. You didn't see much of Bobby Baker. He spent most of his time either with [Robert] Kerr or with Johnson. You rarely saw him on the floor except when there was a vote. He

had a private project going on down at the—I think the whole Baker story I'd better deal with as a separate set, because it was part of a transition in the pattern of leadership in the Senate when Baker finally came to his—desserts, I guess that is the best word.

RITCHIE: After you started working with Mansfield, did you have any more dealings with Johnson?

VALEO: Still very limited. Extremely limited. I didn't really get to know Johnson until he became vice president. Johnson was running for the presidency at that point, clearly. We're talking now about '58, '59, in that period. But there were about fourteen other members of the Senate also running for the presidency. I remember a conversation with Hubert Humphrey when we were out on the disarmament subcommittee hearings. We were in Minneapolis where he had a lot of labor support, and he had been meeting with labor leaders incidental to our trip to Minneapolis for the disarmament subcommittee hearings. I had dinner with him one night during that trip. It was just on the verge of the Democratic Convention, it was approaching rapidly. I remember we got talking about his prospects for the vice presidency. I told him I didn't think he had a chance for it. But he really thought he did that year. I expressed the view that he ought to wait awhile and concentrate a little bit more on building up his reputation in the Senate. But he was running. Had he not done

that, I don't know what might have happened. He might very well have wound up as majority leader instead of Mansfield, but it was, again, part of Hubert's character to either be too far out ahead or too far back. His timing was always off. That was the year Stevenson and Kefauver ran, I believe.

RITCHIE: '56.

VALEO: Right.

RITCHIE: Well, when you got into the whip's office, even though you really weren't on the floor, how did the Senate begin to appear to you? Now you were seeing it from beyond just one committee but looking at the whole institution.

VALEO: And it was a great body, I must say. It had some of the most unique individuals that I've ever known in a group. It was a great concentration. One of the questions which always confounded me was how from a given state you might get two totally contrasting personalities. At first I tried to think of senators as being reflective of the area of the country from which they came, in a kind of representative sense. But that is not a fully satisfactory explanation of the people who in that period were elected to the Senate, because you would have, in some instances, a very real liberal in terms of that period in contrast with a stark conservative from the same location. I could never quite develop a theory to explain why that would happen.

But what you did have was the fact that they were very unique individuals, and yet, compared with the Senate today, they were able to work together as parties much, much better. Certainly this is true of the Democrats, who seem to me to have less and less sense of party as time goes on. I think it's true also of the Republicans to a great extent. But the Democrats in that period did work and did think of themselves primarily as Democrats. They didn't run from the fact that they were identified as Democrats, which seems to me to be the pattern of current election campaigns. You don't play your party identification. I think this is one of the by-products of television, and the use of television as the principal politicking instrument in the country. In that period, first of all you didn't have to be good looking, you didn't have to have a photogenic face. You never got photographed that much, and it seemed that what you had in your head was a lot more important than how you looked on the television screen.

They had stark identities in terms of issues, very often. Douglas of Illinois was always out there campaigning against bigness. I mean, you could always count on him for that, and he would get extremely passionate on the subject. Humphrey was there for civil rights. And you'd get an Eastland who was just as much opposed to civil rights. You could identify people: Russell was always on the military end of things. Well, it was that kind of Senate, with very clearly marked, definable personalities. The

debate was very edifying. Much of it was spontaneous on given issues. There were not so many set speeches. There was a great deal of humor in the Senate. There was a show in the Senate, as well as a legislating body. But it was a genuine show, it was not a cheap imitation of Hollywood. It was basically a legislative show. It was quite fascinating, actually.

RITCHIE: In the election of 1958, the Democrats swept the Senate races and took over the Senate in great numbers. For the ten years before that, the parties had been almost even in the Senate.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: But suddenly you had this huge body of freshmen Democrats coming in.

VALEO: I'm trying to remember what it was. I guess it was the disillusionment with Eisenhower at this point.

RITCHIE: Yes, and there was a recession.

VALEO: And a recession was involved. It was interesting, just prior to that, an important footnote in the history of the Senate: the Republicans had control of the Senate in '53, and I think they held it in '54 barely.

RITCHIE: I think the Democrats took over barely then, by one or two votes.

VALEO: In '52 the Republicans had only a one-vote margin, and something happened, I think there was a vacancy somewhere, so for a period of time Bill Knowland of California had no majority but he was the majority leader. There was a discussion in Democratic circles at the time whether or not to let them continue in control of the Senate. They decided not to disrupt it since the elections were coming soon. So Knowland used to speak of himself as a majority leader without a majority, and Johnson used to speak of himself as a minority leader with a majority! I guess Nixon was in the vice president's chair and that made it possible to do that.

RITCHIE: He broke the tie at one point.

VALEO: Right.

RITCHIE: But for years the Senate had been very close, two or three vote margins between the parties, and now all of a sudden there was a twenty vote margin. And you had a brand new set of young, ambitious Democrats. What kind of problems did this pose for the leadership?

VALEO: Well, again I was still not deeply involved in floor matters, but I used to hear that it drove Johnson crazy. He

used to say that it was a lot easier to work with a one-vote majority than it is with twenty. There is a certain truth in that: if you're holding a very small majority—I think that this is true of [Robert] Dole, for example now, he's in not exactly the same boat, but it's much easier to hold your troops in line when you're very close to the line than it is when you have a big majority. It's the natural tendency for fractures to occur in any political group. You don't have room for the refinements of divisions when you're only close to a majority, but when you have plenty of margin, you can say, "Oh, what's the difference if I don't go with them?" And you tend to go in other directions. Then, again, you can't divorce this problem from the fact that there are so many people in the Senate running for the presidency, or at least the vice presidency.

RITCHIE: Well, in 1960, Johnson was elected vice president and the majority leadership became vacant. Did Mansfield really want to become majority leader? He seems like such an unlikely person in a lot of ways to want a leadership role in a body like the Senate.

VALEO: It's very, very difficult to discuss Mansfield's motives. Even I, who probably knew him as well as anybody around the Senate by the time he left—as a matter of fact, he said that at one time, that I knew him probably as well as anybody ever will know him, except maybe his wife. It's very hard to explain his

motives. I think Mansfield was very heavily influenced by China where he had served as a young Marine in the twenties. You can either see him as a master Machiavellian or as a very honest, simple man who just didn't really want anything that came his way. But a great deal came his way.

I guess the Senate is about the only place left in the world where he who would be first is last. That is still very much a factor in the whole character of the Senate. It's a body of very jealous men of each other—and women, I wouldn't except them. Margaret Chase Smith was no different from the rest. They have been through an extraordinarily fine sieving in the political process, and having reached that point which wouldn't be reached without a certain degree of paranoia to begin with, senators are constantly protecting their flanks from challenges, real or imagined. Having reached that point, they're very anxious, if not to go the one step further to the presidency, at least to hold their full rights at the Senate level. In this respect Mansfield was no different than the rest. There are some who think he's an aberration, that he was not in the normal Senate pattern, and I think there's truth in that. But in arriving at the Senate in the first place, he had to be very much like the rest. I think he grew beyond that point in the office. This is an important characteristic.

Once the extreme need for alertness in terms of protecting flanks was past, once he won the election in 1952, in the face of the Eisenhower landslide, he had some room for maneuver. They really pilloried him on the China issue in the 1952 election, he was attacked by all of these McCarthy supporters and still managed to come through, by a very close margin in that first election. Once he'd gotten through that, the only question that I ever found Mansfield really afraid of was the China Question. He went to great extremes to protect that flank of his political personality. So he had to have some—let's call it Machiavellianism—just to survive. But once he was past that point of extreme danger, then I think the other elements in his character became a much more powerful factor in his subsequent behavior. We're talking now of a western politician moving from the level of just western politics up to national statesmanship. He would be the last one to accept that definition of himself as a statesman. But once having met the worst requirements of political necessity, then I think he moved into a new realm. I think you can apply this to the leadership question.

He certainly did not expect to become whip in 1959. He talked with me about that at the time it happened. He said, "Johnson wants me to be whip." He said, "I don't know why he suddenly fixed on me. I told him I thought there were a lot of other people. I'd only been around for a couple of years and I

didn't think he ought to do that, but he's very insistent." He ascribed Johnson's offer to Walter George. He was on the Foreign Relations Committee already and George was chairman or ranking on the committee at that point. He said, "I think Walter George must have suggested that I be the whip." He took it reluctantly. But he took everything he got reluctantly; I think that's an important point to remember.

When it came to the subsequent question of the majority leadership in 1960, my own guess is that Johnson wanted [George] Smathers for the job. Smathers was a kind of Johnson protégé to begin with. Kennedy would have found that extremely difficult, even though the Hill stories had it that Smathers was supposedly one of his close friends, and they went out chasing women together. I don't know how true those stories are, but even so, Kennedy, being the kind of person he was, would not have wanted Smathers in that job. It would have been a disaster for Smathers, who would have been very much amenable to Johnson's guidance from the vice presidential chair. We came back to practical politics. Maybe Johnson recognized that there was really no alternative to Mansfield, and he probably thought that he could still run the Senate from the vice president's chair. So Mansfield would have been Johnson's ostensible candidate, even though Johnson may have wanted someone else in that chair. That would be the way I would size it up. That may also have been true of a lot of people

around Kennedy. I think they would have preferred what they could have defined more accurately as a liberal than a Mansfield. Mansfield was regarded by many of the Kennedy people as an out-and-out conservative! Whether Mansfield himself wanted it, if I were forced to vote on the issue I'd say, yes, he probably wanted it, but he wouldn't have raised a finger to get it.

RITCHIE: So he didn't campaign at all?

VALEO: Oh, not at all. Nothing. Quite the contrary, he would say, "Well, look around, you've got a lot of other people, there's Hubert" and so forth. That would have been his reaction. The last thing he would have done would have been to campaign for it.

RITCHIE: To some degree, his greatest strength was that he wasn't Lyndon Johnson. He was just the opposite, and the Senate apparently—or at least the Democrats—were pretty tired of Lyndon Johnson.

VALEO: Well, they had that first Senate Democratic Conference in the new Kennedy administration. It was clear Johnson really was stunned by the fact that Kennedy not only had gotten the nomination instead of him, but also that he had won the election. I think in both instances he was overwhelmed. Whatever else he was, Johnson was a good Democrat, but he was such an egotist that he must have pondered along these lines: how did

this ever happen? The wrong person is in the White House, obviously; since I'm here as vice president, I have to make the most of my talents. I'm going to preside over the Senate and I think I'll run it pretty much the way I ran it before. Well, of course he found out very quickly that he could not, that the vice president is neither in nor of the Senate, and was again shocked. The truth is Johnson didn't really know the institution of the Senate that well. He knew his own cronies and he knew how to manipulate some of the more exasperating liberals (and he exasperated the liberals in turn), but he didn't really know some of these underlying feelings that had gathered against him. I don't think he ever recognized the depth of the hostility until it hit him in the first Democratic Caucus, which elected Mansfield.

Mansfield, playing it again like he always did on every issue, went in there not even expecting to be named. Kennedy had actually spoken with him on the phone, and said, "What's this? I hear you don't want the job. I want you for the job." And Johnson reinforced the president. Reluctantly, I guess, Mansfield agreed. So he knew he was going to get it, but he went in as though it could be anybody. Johnson presided over that caucus. Of course, Bobby Baker was there. Baker was still the secretary for the majority. I went into the caucus, I was invited in by Mansfield. Mansfield's first act after his election by acclamation was to nominate the vice president, Johnson, as the permanent chairman of

the caucus. Well, it was as though he had brought down the east front or the west front. I don't remember who was on his feet first, whether it was Gore or Clark of Pennsylvania, but they were up there in an absolute fury, and then it all began to come out, all the hostility to Johnson.

Johnson just sat there, absolutely flabbergasted at the kind of hostility that was shown to his face. In the chair, he didn't make any comment. When the liberals finished pouring out their wrath and anger, either Holland of Florida, or Russell, or both perhaps got the floor. It was Mansfield's motion that had brought forth the outpouring. He'd just been named by acclamation as majority leader, and then he made the motion to put Johnson permanently in the chair of the conference, which at that point was essentially an honorary job, but the members just didn't want any part of Johnson. He had had it. Then Holland and Russell, either one or both, got up to chastise Mansfield for being too modest, pointing out that after all, he was the leader and this was his place and he should take it. And again, reluctantly, he accepted that. Once he had been made leader, Bobby Baker tendered his resignation. Mansfield refused to accept it and said, no, he wouldn't even think of running the Senate without Bobby Baker's help and assistance. He went on to say that Baker was the finest majority secretary the Senate ever had. Baker, who was anxious at that time to get into the hotel business and other enterprises and

who was also, I think, overwhelmed by the offer wasn't so reluctant, he agreed to stay on. And that's the way it was set up.

Then Mansfield assured Johnson that he was going to consult with him on every question that came up. But the first question that I recall came up was the appointment of Democrats to various Senate delegations. Technically, these are appointments of the chair. The appointment is officially made by either the president pro tem or the vice president, when he is there as the president of the Senate. So Johnson got this list from the parliamentarian that we needed six people or so for some meetings somewhere, and he asked me to convey to Mansfield that he had some ideas on who he wanted to appoint. And Mansfield said, "No dice. You just put these names down there and tell him to appoint them." Johnson didn't try to fight it once it was put to him.

RITCHIE: Do you know if Johnson asked Mansfield to make that motion, that he be permanent chair of the conference?

VALEO: I do not know that. My guess is he did not. My guess is that it was Mansfield's way of easing Johnson out gradually. First of all, I don't think he'd want to hurt Johnson. I don't think he had any malice towards Johnson, but he also knew that there were some things he'd have to do if he were going to be leader, and one way of softening the blow—Johnson had already

suffered from the fact that he wasn't going to be president—was to give him something to do that would be a little more meaningful than sitting in the vice president's chair.

RITCHIE: The irony was that the conference really didn't meet all that much. When Johnson was majority leader it only met once a session.

VALEO: It only held occasional meetings. That was one of the evolutions in the system during the Mansfield tenure.

RITCHIE: So Mansfield himself was caught off guard by the hostility that followed that motion?

VALEO: Whether he was or whether he wasn't is a question I have never answered to my own satisfaction. He must have anticipated that the proposal would not go without a great deal of opposition. Again, it comes back to the question whether you think he's naive or whether you think he's a Machiavellian. And I don't think that you can survive for fourteen years as majority leader of the Senate if you are naive. I mean, I just don't think it's a possibility, so therefore I have to conclude that he must have expected some adverse reaction, that it would not just go through perfunctorily. Whether he expected the vehemence of it or not, I don't know. I certainly didn't. I didn't realize how deep seated was the hostility to Johnson at that point.

Let me give you two reasons why I think that the caucus reacted that way. First of all there were a lot of Democratic senators who smarted under Johnson's manipulation and his buttonholing, and his use of petty prerogatives and things of that sort, to either reward or punish. I think there was a lot of anger at that. The other thing was that there were a lot of other disappointed presidential candidates in the Senate at the time and they vented their wrath on Johnson. I think both things were involved.

RITCHIE: Once Mansfield became majority leader, how did your role change?

VALEO: Once he became majority leader we moved into what is now called the Kennedy Room, a name given to it by Mansfield. Interestingly enough, shortly after he became majority leader, Bobby Baker came in and asked him if he could change his office. The majority secretary's office was then down on the terrace level of the Capitol. He wanted to move right up next to Mansfield, into the Brumidi room that Johnson had occupied when he was majority leader. Mansfield said no. He turned that one down very quickly. He knew what he was doing in a way with Baker. He was afraid of Baker, and he was afraid of Baker's influence with some very powerful southern Democrats, or at least western—I don't know what you'd call Oklahoma-border state Democrats like Kerr, particularly Kerr, I think. So he handled Baker with kid gloves.

But there were points at which he had to draw the line or look entirely foolish, and this was one of them. He just turned it down flatly.

RITCHIE: Symbolically it would have looked wrong.

VALEO: Said he'd like to do it, but that Johnson's quarters had to be a ceremonial room. It would have been symbolically a very, very bad thing. There's an amusing sidelight on this room business. Jackie Kennedy was redoing the White House and Johnson came in one day with a letter that he'd received from Jackie, a "Lyndon Dear" letter. It had to do with a chandelier in the hall of the Senate, one of those massive crystal chandeliers, there are about a half a dozen, in the Senate. She wanted it for the White House, and she had been trying to get it from the then architect of the Capitol, George Stewart. George Stewart was dragging his feet. He knew the chandelier had come out of the White House originally. It was put in the White House during the Grant administration and came out in a subsequent administration. But Stewart didn't want to let the chandelier go so Jackie wrote this letter that Johnson gave to me to look into.

At this point I was beginning to know him better and have some dealings with him. He gave me the letter and it was the most stinging letter I had ever seen. Somewhere that ought to be in the record. Maybe it's up in the Kennedy Library—or in the

Johnson Library more likely—but she said, as I recall that "George Stewart can either be the hero or the villain in this piece, but one way or another I'm going to get that chandelier." So he said, "Here, take this. Do something with this. You know, I'm not the majority leader." So I talked with Mansfield about the letter and he said, "I don't know, talk to Stewart and see what you can do." So I talked not with George Stewart, it was impossible to talk with George Stewart, he was so set in his ways—I'll tell you some funny stories about him at some point if you want them—but I talked with Phil Roof, who was his administrative assistant, a rational human, soft-spoken but astute. So I said, "What are we going to do about this letter?" And Phil said, "Oh, let her have the goddamn thing." So I brought it up with Mansfield. "The advice of Phil Roof is to let her have it." He said, "Well, okay, but let's do it on a loan basis." I guess it's been recouped by the Senate since then.

George Stewart at that time—if I can digress for a minute—there are two amusing incidents. I was just getting to know him. He was obsessed with the idea of the west front. He really wanted that extension. He didn't want to restore it; he wanted the extension, and he wanted to bring the tourist buses right into the Capitol. Left to his own devices he would have set up the Capitol basically as a tourist haven, that is the Capitol Building itself, and move the Congress' real business elsewhere. That was a

concept I certainly was not sympathetic with, nor was Mansfield. But I did think there was some use in the idea of having more space in the Capitol for senators, and we began to figure out ways in which it might possibly be done. Anyhow, I remember going to my office on a Monday morning, and Stewart was standing in the hall. His office was near mine, this was after I'd become secretary of the majority. He said, "Frank, I want to show you something." So he reached into his pocket and pulled out a chunk of stone. I said, "What's that, George?" He said, "It's a piece of the West Front. I was walking out there last night and it chipped off and almost hit me on the head! We have to do something about it before it falls down." I said, "George, what were you doing there on Sunday night?" or something to that effect. He said, "Well, I always walk around the Capitol to see what's going on."

Another time he came to me, this was when I was secretary of the Senate. One of the perquisites of the secretary of the Senate is a supply of calendars every year with a picture of the Capitol for distribution. One day he came in to see me and said, "Frank, could you let me have about a hundred of your calendars?" I said, "Sure, George, we never give them all out. We get a large quota. If you want them, you can have them, George. But don't you get your own from the House side? Why don't you ask the House Administration Committee." "Well," he said, "they aren't the same

calendars. Over there they're still printing the calendars with the old east front picture, because they didn't like the idea of changing it in the first place, but the Senate has the new front on it." So he said, "If you don't mind, I'd like some of yours." That was another one of his pet projects in which he was successful—extending the east front.

The Senate at that period had a lot of that sort of very close, intimate kind of exchange; you really knew everybody you were dealing with. There were very few staff people, for example, that I didn't know at least enough to recognize them by name.

RITCHIE: You said before that you got to know Johnson better when he was vice president.

VALEO: Yes. Well, of course the main source of my direct contact was when I traveled with him to Vietnam.

RITCHIE: Did you go in '61?

VALEO: Yes. I was on the '61 trip. The way that came about—we're sort of at a stopping point. Do you want to go on with this?

RITCHIE: Would you like to start the next time with that?

VALEO: Maybe we could get into that the next time.

RITCHIE: Oh, yes, because I'm really interested in that '61 trip.

VALEO: That was a very fascinating trip. It was very important in fixing Johnson's ideas about Vietnam. It was an extraordinary experience.

End of Interview #4

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

WITH LBJ IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Interview #5
Wednesday, August 28, 1985

RITCHIE: At the end of the last session we talked briefly about your trip with Lyndon Johnson in 1961 to Southeast Asia, and I wondered if you could tell me some of the story behind that trip?

VALEO: Yes, I believe that Kennedy had mixed motivations in sending Johnson to Southeast Asia in 1961. On the one hand he wanted to get some clarification of the Indochina situation from a politically sensitized person; most of his information at that point was coming from people who were not. As a matter of fact, if you look at the State Department's position papers of that whole period, they don't vary much from about the time of the very early Eisenhower period right on through. The pattern was essentially the same and it had to do with asserting our position in Southeast Asia in ways which we could, usually involving some sort of a military show of force. I think that was the advice that was going to Kennedy. I don't think he trusted it completely, and he wanted to get some outside view, so I think he asked Lyndon to go at that point even though Lyndon had never been in Southeast Asia. In addition to that, I think Lyndon may have been getting in his hair a little bit too much down in the new setup of the White

House. He was undoubtedly very restless in that period and Kennedy probably thought that the mission would be a good way to keep him occupied. Then to be on the safe side I think he included sister Jean in the party, and her husband, Steve Smith. Johnson also brought along some people that he could trust, or that he thought would be desirable, one being the black columnist, who was an ambassador for a while under Johnson.

RITCHIE: Carl Rowan?

VALEO: Carl Rowan was part of the press party. So was Nancy Dickerson, then Nancy Haunchmann. It was an interesting press group. Jack Bell was in it. Bill Theis of the U.P.I. who was their senior correspondent on the Hill and a friend of Johnson's. There was a good selection of press. There were two planes, one was the press plane and one was the party's plane.

Johnson asked Mansfield to go with him, and Mansfield said, "I'm just taking over in the Senate. I can't very well leave now for two weeks." "Well," he said, "I've got to have some advice from the Hill." This was related to me later. He said, "I don't trust those fellows downtown that much. I need somebody." Mansfield said, "Well, why don't you take Frank? He's been traveling with me on all these trips." So he said, "Well, if you think so, and anybody else you can think of." Mansfield talked to me about it and said, "I think you should go with him and try to

steer him right, because he needs a lot of advice on the area. He doesn't really know it." He said, "Anybody else you want to take with you that you think would be worthwhile?" I immediately suggested Frank Meloy, one of the people whom I had known earlier in Vietnam. I knew him as a fine Foreign Service Officer who would give me a straight and honest story but at the same time would do his best to present and defend the department's position no matter what it was. Even though we might disagree I knew he would at least give me a straight story. I knew I could count on that.

The other fellow I asked for was Horace Smith. I knew Horace Smith through Bourke Hickenlooper. He was a good friend of Bourke Hickenlooper's. Horace had been in the Philippines and had been a great China specialist at one time. He was an incredible guy. When he was a young vice counsel he walked out of China during the war by way of the Himalayas. I think he went straight from Nanking, running back away from the revolution—or from the war, I'm not sure which—going all the way through Tibet and into India. So I asked for these two people. Both were Foreign Service officers; both were totally unobjectionable to the State Department. Johnson didn't know either of them, and I thought between the three of us we could come up with something that might be a fairly well balanced picture of the situation, and also reasonable recommendations in terms of what was doable.

Johnson accepted all three of us without any question. We had a briefing downtown a couple of days before the departure. The State Department handled most of the briefing, and it was true to the long-standing position papers. After the briefing, Johnson grabbed me by the lapels, which was his usual way, and he said, "You know, I don't trust anybody down here. I'm counting on you. I know your first loyalty is to Mansfield, but I want you to give me the benefit of your advice. I want you to be absolutely honest with me." I said, "Well, Mr. Vice President, I'll do what I can. I'll most certainly give you a straight story as far as I see it. I could be wrong, but I'll give it to you the way I see it." He said, "Now, remember that, and remember it all through the trip." Well, this was my first real close-up exposure to Lyndon Johnson.

There's a little side story to this. Just before the trip, my wife asked if I could get the vice president to speak before her group. She was having a national convention of the National Committee for Children and Youth, which had then just finished the White House Conference on Children and Youth and this was an outgrowth of it. First, of course, her people wanted to get the president, but when they couldn't they thought they'd settle for the vice president. She came to me and asked if I could get the vice president. Well, I didn't know him well enough to go directly to him, so I went to Bobby Baker and said, "Can you get the vice president to make a speech before my wife's group?" I

said, "It's for a good cause. It won't pay anything, but it's for a good cause." He said, "I'll talk to him and see what he says." So he did, he went to Lyndon, and Lyndon said, "If he writes the speech." So I had him lined up for the speech, which happened to coincide with the exact day we got back from the trip. All during the trip, in dribs and drabs, I wrote the speech for him.

That's a side point which I will come back to, but to get on with the main narrative: I went back and told Mansfield what had happened at the briefing. He said, "Well, do it that way. Give it to him straight. Whatever it is, just tell him." That's a rather formidable task with somebody like Johnson. It's hard to say what you think in front of somebody whose sort of beaming down on you—scowling down on you is probably closer to it. But I felt I had the right to do it. I had a preliminary meeting with Horace Smith. Frank Meloy was then in Rome, and he came in for the trip. We agreed that it would not do for us to take the lead, the lead would have to be with the people in the executive branch. Our role would be that of observers and commentators on what he was being advised or what conclusions he was drawing for himself.

All three of us saw the situation in Asia in just about the same way. We had our own nuances, but basically we were in accord on the central role of China in the situation and the way the flow of events would probably go, and what would eventually emerge from it. So with that as starters, we set off.

Johnson was surrounded by people like Carl Rowan, Horace Busby and the big fellow that worked for him as his press secretary for a while, George Reedy, and two or three other intimates as well as Lady Bird. But they had one thing in common: none of his immediate people knew anything about Asia. He was relying primarily on the Department of State and some military attaches for advice on the substance of the mission. Jean Smith and Steve Smith were brought along primarily for window dressing. He would always push Jean out in front. She was young and attractive, looked a little like Jack Kennedy. Steve Smith was amiable and pleasant. That was the party that took off. I guess we were about twenty-five or thirty in the main party, and there must have been thirty or forty correspondents.

We went by way of San Francisco and then Guam, as I recall. And if I'm not mistaken our first stop in Asia was in Hong Kong. It was a rest stop. We went then from there to the Philippines. Up until this point I had placed as much distance between Johnson and myself as possible on one plane. I did not want to push myself forward, I didn't see my role in that context. I thought when we started to get memorandums and press releases, any part I would have to play would be more effectively done in that setting.

Johnson was continuous energy. He moved restlessly on the plane back and forth. There was a lot of comic relief. I think

it was Knight of the Secret Service who was on the trip. Johnson kept saying to Knight, "I don't want you hanging around close to me. I get this from you wherever I go, and I don't want it." The poor guy would reply, "But that's my job." He said, "I don't care what your job is, I don't want you near me. Don't get yourself in between. You did that in San Francisco and you did it in Guam and I don't like it." It was one of his beefs, the Secret Service. The other was his personal military attaché. Johnson wanted soup in his diet at all times and he had asked this fellow to bring along some Campbell's Soup, I think. He was a Colonel. Well, they didn't have it and, so Johnson was furious at this fellow. He said, "Do I have to get myself a General in order to get a can of soup on this plane?" There was enough comic relief of that kind to make the flights bearable.

The people in his immediate circle, like Horace Busby and Walter Jenkins and others, were very energetic. They were part of the whole pattern of the early Kennedy period. They were sort of the Johnson version of the Kennedy mafia. So there was really never a dull moment. Lady Bird Johnson would sit in the forward cabin knitting most of the time. Later on, I decided she was like Madame Lefarge in a Tale of Two Cities, knitting my name into her patterns, as one whose head would have to come off later. But it was a great experience.

When we finally got to the Philippines, Johnson said to me, "Where have you been? You been with me on this trip or not?" He said, "I haven't seen much of you." I said, "Well, I've been around." He said, "I want you up front. I want you near me so I can see you, especially in the Philippines." Well, I knew something of the Philippines by this time, I'd been there so many times. I knew the politics of the situation and I found myself writing speeches on one-minute notices. He'd come up with something from the State Department and say, "Look at that, they want me to do that. I can't do that. That's not a decent speech. You go back and rewrite it." Well, he was due to make it in two hours or so. Fortunately, the State Department had a marvelous administrative man along at the time who gave full support for this kind of thing. His name was William Crockett. He was assistant secretary for administration. He was not a Foreign Service officer. He was an administrative type, I believe from Nebraska, awfully effective as an administrative officer. Wherever we went he could marshal any kind of resources he wanted in the embassies. Between that and help from Frank Meloy and Horace Smith I must have put together two or three speeches for him to use in the Philippines, all in about three hours as I recall. But he always wanted more political context than the stuff in the State Department drafts. Again, understandably, they

were doing their thing, and he wanted to do his. So we had one really difficult period in the Philippines. He would turn to me frequently for that kind of assistance.

My recollection is wrong; we probably went to Vietnam first. But in any event it was either the Philippines or Vietnam first. In Vietnam, which was the most tricky of the stops, Meloy, Smith and I had, as far as we could, alerted him to be very careful, warning him that there were a lot of dreams about the possibilities there, but not too much reality. Most of that dreaming was an effort to build up South Vietnam's confidence, which was at that point still pretty shaky. As a matter of fact, it was very shaky.

Well, we got to Vietnam, and the first thing struck us was this statement by Johnson about Diem being the Churchill of Asia. We did not see that until after it was done. I believe it came from a fellow who was to be ambassador in Bangkok, his name was Ken Young. He was not officially a member of our party, but he had asked for a ride out to Bangkok, and the vice president was rather taken with him. Ken Young—who by an odd coincidence had had the same Chinese teacher I had ten years before, my Chinese teacher had been a schoolmate of his at Lingnan University in Canton. He apparently struck Lyndon's fancy. Ken Young supplied, I believe, that statement on the Churchill of Asia. I didn't see much of Ken in that early period. Yes, we did go to Vietnam

before we went to the Philippines. He was up front with Johnson most of the time, and I was in the back. But I began to have some difficulties with Lyndon at that point because he—well, let me go back first and tell you something of the details of what happened.

Of course, Johnson was received with wide open arms in Saigon by the government. He played it to the hilt. He didn't know what else to do except play it as a politician. So when we landed at the airport in Saigon, he immediately made a stump speech as though he were running for office in Vietnam. The initial reception was conducive to that because it was a very colorful setup, with thousands of people literally jamming the airport. Lyndon went around shaking hands, with this fellow from the Secret Service still trying to get between him and the crowds, and Lyndon ignoring him as far as he could! That was where he first pushed Jean Smith ahead of him and I remember him saying in one place, "We think so much of this country, I've even brought the president's little sister with me." Well, she was about as tall as he was. But it was "little sister."

These were typical political gestures, which I found no fault with, because Americans were not expected to behave like Vietnamese. His behavior was in no sense offensive. Some of the stories which later appeared about how he had been so ridiculous and so forth, may be true, but people in Asia expect Americans sometimes to be a little ridiculous in terms of their mores. So

he was very much characteristic of an American politician from anywhere in the United States. I didn't think any of that was in any way offensive or hurt us with anyone.

He got along well with Diem. I sat in on the interviews, most of the interviews, and I thought he did well. They discussed the aid program and how the war was going. It was a kind of generalized discussion. But the event that struck me most strongly was a meeting we had at midnight in the U.S. Embassy, at which Johnson wanted to discuss the situation only with Americans. Not being able to sleep early at night, he was restless and worked very often until two and three in the morning. Well, he called this meeting at midnight and we rounded up through the embassy people about as many of the relevant officials as we could. Some were in the sporting club, Le Club Sportif, which was Saigon's foreign club. Others were out wherever they were, but they brought them in for the meeting. In comes the man who was in charge of military aid, a general carrying a riding crop, which was part of the foreign affectation of that period. The riding crop and the white suit were so much the hallmarks of the era.

Well, we sat around the room—about twenty of us—and they gave him a briefing on the aid program. After he'd listened for about twenty minutes Johnson said, "That's all very fine, but what I really want to know is: what can we do to end this situation?"

He added, "The American people are getting very tired of what is going on over here. We're spending something like 350 million dollars a year on this country, and they're tired of spending that kind of money. They want to wind it up. Now what's it going to take to end it, to get rid of the Communists?" Well, everybody hemmed and hawed or was absolutely silent. He said, "Well, you know, tell me what you need. How many men do you have here now in your military aid group? You've got seventy or eighty? Do you need to double that number?" He said, "Or do you need another twenty?" I think he started out with twenty or thirty. He said, "You get 350-400 million dollars. What do you need, another 100 million dollars?" Well, this general who was trying to answer the questions said, "That would help."

Johnson said, "I don't just want to help. I really want to get the thing wound up. The president's getting tired of it. The people are getting tired of it. It's time to do something about it." He said, "Tell me what you need." Well, obviously the guy didn't want to say it. So Johnson said, "Suppose we doubled it. Suppose instead of giving you 350 or 400 we gave you 800 million? Suppose instead of leaving seventy men here, or eighty men here, we give you 160?" The general said, "Well, that would help a great deal. I think we could do it. Johnson said, "Well, how long? About a year?" He loved to put words in people's mouths and then

say: well, he agreed with me. The fellow didn't say it in so many words that it would end in a year, but he permitted Lyndon to think that.

What he needed to say—and I can understand with the overbearing manner of Johnson why he might not have said it—but his responsible role there as an official of the U.S. government, in a very difficult position, would have been to say, "No, Mr. Vice President, it can't be done that way. There is no way in which we can wind this up in a year if we mean to keep to the objectives which we seem to have set for ourselves here." That would have been a responsible answer, and that's the answer he would have gotten from somebody like General Marshall. He would have gotten it from a number of the generals in the postwar period. He would have gotten that kind of an answer from Bradley. But this was an aid general and he just couldn't say it; perhaps he didn't know himself at that point. So Johnson came away with an optimistic view that a solution could be found. All we had to do was increase the amount of aid.

He wrote up, or somebody in the group wrote it up, I don't know who—it may have been Ken Young, who's now dead—but he wrote up a report to wire back to the president on the Vietnamese stop. I remember there was a reception at the palace, given by Ngo Dinh Diem. I was in the room, I had gotten there earlier, and before Johnson came into the room he sent word for me to come out. I

came into the hall and he thrust this cable into my hand. It was his first report back to the president. He said, "What do you think of this?" I read it and I said, "Well, Mr. Vice President, it's awfully optimistic. I just don't think that that's realistic and that you can expect that." "Well," he said, "how do you want to change it. You change it." I said, "Well, I can't just sit here and change it in five minutes. It's going to take a lot of adjustment." "Oh," he said, "I can't wait for that. But will you write a memorandum to Mansfield, and I want to see it before you send it." I said, "I'll do that." He said, "All right, sign this that you've seen this memorandum," the one that he was going to send to the president. So I signed that I had seen it—I didn't write "I have seen it."

But that was the way he operated. Having made up his own mind then, he wanted to be able to say, "Well, you told me that." It was a very destructive characteristic, destructive for himself as well as for the people who worked around him. Anyhow, I wrote a telegram for Mansfield, praising the way Johnson had performed in public and being much more cautious than he had been in the report on the situation.

At that dinner, which was an elegant dinner, and at the reception before, Diem looked quite different to me at that point. I already detected there was a change. He was not unfriendly, he was simply removing himself. He was almost going back deeper into

the characteristics of a recluse that he certainly had before that but it seemed to be developing even more intensely at that point. He exchanged pleasantries, but the person who took over the occasion was the wife of his brother, Madame Nhu. She was a beautiful woman, very elegant and imperious in her behavior. I had never met her before; she had not been part of the scene in the early trips to Saigon. But she sort of presided at the dinner. Diem was there, but he said very little. She did most of the talking. The dinner was otherwise a rather formal occasion. Johnson said the right things about our cooperation with them, and so forth.

There was one other point: Johnson got his first taste of the real Asia of that period in Saigon. He began to see it, I believe—this would later come out more strongly when we got to Bangkok—but I think he began to see it as an enormous challenge in a constructive sense, that this was a place that was big enough for his talents. Here with the right kind of American know-how and energy, why, you could transform this area of great poverty into something that would be rather spectacular and beautiful and democratic. This was the preacher part of Johnson.

There were two parts of him: one was the soldier who never was, really, and the other was the preacher who never was. But these were, I think, the two fantasy characters in Johnson that operated simultaneously. That's why he could be greatly fond of a [William] Westmoreland later, and Bill Moyers, who was a

missionary type at that time, and I think was actually part of the ministry. Both of these forces worked simultaneously in Johnson. I think he saw for the first time the other side of Asia, which was not a military problem but which was essentially a social problem and a development problem. I think that's about it for the Vietnam part of the trip.

RITCHIE: Is it possible for an American official of his level to travel into an area and really get a good view of what's going on? I would imagine in some respects their schedule is arranged by their hosts and things must be orchestrated to a great degree.

VALEO: No, he can't really get a good view of it. Except that he asked for certain things. But even then, it was a kind of bird's eye view of it. There's no way that you can do otherwise. So much of the demands of an official on a mission of that kind are official in nature. Much of it is ritual. He wasn't there really to get a picture. He was there primarily to express our solidarity with the Saigon government, to give them a boost, and to find out what they needed from their officials, not from the people. So, no, you can't say that he would have come away with a greatly clarified view of the whole situation, except that he may not have realized the extent and the nature of what was at that time the poverty of these places. They were very much impoverished.

Again, one has to be careful. Our sense of being impoverished and theirs is quite different. In Southeast Asia you live under a tropical sun, you really don't need a shirt and tie. You're much, much happier if you have nothing on the top of your body. It doesn't mean that you're poor, it just means that you're feeling better with the kind of heat that's involved. Sihanouk told me that one time, and I was very much taken by the observation. He said, "You know, Americans come here and they say, 'Oh, the poor Cambodians, their children go around naked.'" He said, "It's not because they don't have clothes, it's because they don't need clothes. This is a much more comfortable way to be when you're in a tropical country." There is a great deal of truth in that. What we see as poverty sometimes is an adaptation to the environment. That's not to say that there isn't poverty, but we can be easily confused by that.

RITCHIE: After Johnson saw the memo that you wrote to Mansfield, did he raise questions about Vietnam or his meeting with Diem?

VALEO: No, he did not. He really was looking for somebody to okay what he had already reached as his conclusion of what needed to be done, which was essentially to double the aid, and that would clear it up that we just weren't doing enough.

RITCHIE: When Johnson came back to the Senate after that trip he made a presentation to all the members of the Senate . . .

VALEO: Yes, and he asked me to be there and I was there with him. He did it in the House and the Senate both. I was at both briefings with him, but I did nothing in connection with it. I just listened, that's all.

RITCHIE: On two occasions at that time, senators asked him would we have to send troops to Vietnam. And in both cases he said flatly no, that the last thing we should do is send troops.

VALEO: And he meant that. But then again he was going by some of this advice that all you needed to do was have another eighty or ninety military advisors there and a little more money and the whole thing would be cleared up. That was the prevailing wisdom in Saigon in the bureaucracy, and it applied to the military bureaucracy primarily. I must say, the Foreign Service at the time was not much more enlightened. A fellow named Durbrow, I believe, was ambassador. His staff, from my own contacts with them, were limited people who were running an establishment without really much knowledge of what was going on in the country. I guess they had begun to get some people who spoke Vietnamese, for the first time. There was young fellow, who later became assistant secretary of state for the Far East under [Jimmy] Carter. He was then a very young Foreign Service officer, but I

believe he was studying Vietnamese. He and one or two other very young officers were used as interpreters by Johnson in going around among the people.

RITCHIE: That wasn't Richard Moose, was it?

VALEO: No, it wasn't Richard Moose. We had him as an intern in Mansfield's office for a while too, for a brief period of time. I can't think of his name.

RITCHIE: I'll look it up. Was that Richard Holbrooke?

VALEO: Yes, it was. He's one who still talks a great deal on Southeast Asia. He quit under Johnson, somewhere along there he decided to get out of the Foreign Service because he felt they were wrong on Vietnam. He had been, in effect, right on it. Then Carter made him assistant secretary. He was very young even when he became assistant secretary.

RITCHIE: At the time you got to Vietnam, the most troubled place in Southeast Asia was really Laos. Was there some concern that because Laos was so uncertain, that maybe it was better to focus on Vietnam where things were a little more stable?

QVALEO: Well, I get this from some readings and also from some of my own personal recollections. It was again part of the same thought process which I mentioned the last time we discussed Vietnam: The officials there don't worry about Hanoi falling,

they can't be thinking about that, they can't be thinking about North Vietnam now, all they can think about now are the refugees who are coming south. Something has to be done immediately about them and that is a full time preoccupation. I think some of the same sort of thought processes worked on the Laos and Vietnam thing: We can't really think about what's going on in Laos, we've got to concentrate on Vietnam because this is the really critical area. The most immediate thing becomes the target of all energies and efforts. Of course, the long-range factors which are moving in on this, and moving in relentlessly, are lost in this process. No matter how immediate the danger—and it wasn't that immediate in Vietnam, by any means, the Viet Cong were not moving in Saigon or anything of that sort, there was no sign of that. But in an effort almost to avoid thinking about Laos, everybody began concentrating then on Vietnam. How are we going to save Vietnam since we're obviously going to lose Laos? That attitude was prevalent among all of the careerists, or many of the careerists with the exception of people like Frank Meloy and a few others. So there was no discussion of Laos in Vietnam, and that's ironic.

Another thing that happened, which was intriguing to me, was when we were setting out, Johnson had first sent me his schedule of places to visit, and Cambodia, which was neutralist, was conspicuously absent from the proposed itinerary. I sent it back with the observation that the schedule looked fine except I

thought that it should include Cambodia, which was probably the most stable place in Indochina and probably where we had the most hope of not seeing some sort of collapse because of the political strength of Sihanouk personally. Well, he took that up with the State Department and they just ruled it right out. They didn't want anything to do with Sihanouk—and we're talking about 1961. We're back to that same business of how policy gets off the track. Now we're backing him, when it's far too late. But at that time nobody wanted to even touch him, except Mansfield. The State Department successfully dissuaded Johnson from including Cambodia.

We went up to Laos, as I recall, on that trip, and again the position paper was already established. The State Department position paper, which came, I expect, out of the National Security Council, was that we would not move troops into Laos, but we would land them in Thailand to make a show of force. That had not yet happened at the time of the Johnson trip, but that was planned in that period on the belief that would be enough to dissuade the Laotian communists from a complete takeover.

We were still reluctant at that time to deal with Souvanna Phouma, who was essentially a neutralizing figure in that situation. We did not like the concept of neutralization. That dislike went all the way back to Dulles. I don't think Dulles personally was that opposed to it, but he was dealing with the whole McCarthy situation, and the prevailing political wisdom was

that you don't have neutralization, you don't have coalition governments with Communists or anything of that sort, they're all what lost China. And because they lost China, therefore they will lose every other place in Asia, all this with a complete unawareness of the complexity of the backgrounds in these situations. I mean in the case of Laos, what was ignored by this approach was that Souvanna Phouma was dealing with his brother the Communist, or his half-brother the Communist and his half-brother the militarist!

There was no awareness of the relevance of factors such as these in those very, very, primitive (in a political sense) societies, where you still had the old Japanese concept of the king living in one place and the functioning government in another place so that they wouldn't get in each other's hair. All of that was completely lost because of that one overriding concern with who lost China. And it applied whether you were in Vietnam, or whether you were Bangkok. The whole State Department bureaucracy had shifted gears from some relatively intelligent policies on China, in my judgment, primarily because of the fears induced by the McCarthy period.

RITCHIE: Was China seen as the principal threat in Southeast Asia, as opposed to Russia?

VALEO: At this time, yes. Well, of course we were seeing both as being a unified threat. It was a monolithic concept. It ran from Moscow to Peking to Hanoi or wherever else, or to Vietienne for that matter. But the truth is that at this time, the only people under modern arms in Laos were people we had armed with rather sophisticated military equipment. All our modern equipment did was to build up casualty counts without really changing the fundamentals of the situation. This was part of the whole tragedy of this area, which was composed basically of societies so simple and really so remote from any of our experiences. And of course, Johnson had absolutely none of this background. It was all black-and-white. He would come back and say time and again, "If we don't stop them here, we're going to have to stop them in San Francisco." He missed Honolulu somewhere in between—he lost that! He said, "I'd rather stop them there." That was the pattern of thought that prevailed in this period.

RITCHIE: Do you think this trip really set Johnson's thinking about Vietnam?

VALEO: Yes. We go to Bangkok for that, and in Bangkok he'd gotten all kinds of warnings about cultural niceties, you know, don't touch a Thai on the head! These were the kind of things that were taken out of nineteenth century missionary tracts. How to behave with Thais. Well, Johnson would have none of that. I don't know how much you want of humorous asides but,

there's a marvelous story of what happened in our first official meeting in Bangkok. By this time he wanted me present at all of the formal meetings, largely because of the Philippine experience. He said, "I want you in the room where we meet."

I sat in on this meeting with the fellow who was the then prime minister. He who was a typical peasant general. His name was Sarit. He was right out of the rice fields, you could see it. He was as coarse and as growling as Johnson was, except he didn't talk as much as Johnson. He grunted most of the time. They sat there together. The audience room in Thailand, where I had been many times before, is a sort of horseshoe shaped room in one of their beautiful palaces. It's all plush. Invariably, the minute everybody sits down all the photographers come in and take the pictures of the horseshoe with the people sitting around it. Johnson was up front, and I had gotten a seat maybe about six or seven down on the horseshoe. He motioned to me, "Sit here," so I came closer to where he was sitting. Sarit, who was a rather portly man sat next to him. He sort of fell into the cushions and lay there as though he couldn't move.

Johnson started off on what by this time had become the usual pitch. You know, how we have to stay together and fight the Communists, and we've got to stop them wherever we can. In this meeting with Sarit, he did the pitch with appropriate gestures, and whenever he made a point, Sarit would simply grunt, "Uuuuuh,

uuuuh," periodically to indicate his concurrence, as his interpretor relayed to him what Johnson had said. As a climax, Johnson said, "You know, Mr. Prime Minister, this is like a fire. What do you do when you have a fire? You try to put it out." Sarit grunted: "Uuuuh." Johnson went on, "How do you put it out? You take out your hose," he said it again with proper gestures, "and you put the fire out." And Sarit grunted "Uuuuh." They got along famously.

One result was that there were some immediate problems on the aid budget or something and we sat across the table from the Thais and worked the problems out immediately, but they were minor. By comparison with Vietnam, these were trivial. In Bangkok, Johnson liked the idea of getting out early in the morning on the klongs, the canals where a good deal of the life of Bangkok at that time centered. You get a view of what looks like appalling poverty, you know, people living in houses on stilts with trash and what not flowing down the rivers. That's where I first had the very strong impression that Johnson was beginning to discover the other mission in Asia, which was to uplift these people and bring them up to not Christianity necessarily but to Americanism or something of the sort, maybe American capitalism, I don't know. But anyhow he would look around with a kind of fascination at the size of the

problem. I had the feeling that running through his mind at that time was the thought that here we could really do something constructive.

There were two other major stops on that trip that I think were significant. The first one was in New Dehli. I remember the meeting very well. I had met Jawaharlal Nehru on previous trips, and he was a rather standoffish man. I think he probably was very suspicious of Americans generally, and felt disappointed by America's attitudes towards India. But at that time he was feeling the threat of a potential invasion from China. Something had gone wrong with the whole Bandung concept, the five principles that he and Cho En-lai had worked out. There was a lot of tension over the border situation in the northeast, in Assam and along the borderlines there, as well as on the western borders of Tibet. The Chinese had really only entered in force and were moving fully through Tibet at this time. They were beginning to come into contacts with, I guess it was the McMahon line, which had originally been designed by an early British official as a delineation of the border between Tibet and India. There had been some clashes between Indian and Chinese troops, although not to the degree that came later. The border had clearly come into dispute.

So Nehru, swallowing his pride, had come to the airport to greet Johnson on the tarmac. I remember the day so well because it was viciously hot. I had never been in India in the spring.

This was I think early spring, just before the monsoons. When I got out of the plane I thought I was going to be blown away by the heat. It was just so fierce. The hot wind was blowing, very strongly, and the heat was overwhelming. Nehru was standing out there, I think the plane was delayed, waiting under a canopy. He came out to greet Johnson. And if I'm not mistaken, his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, who was then Nehru's official hostess, also came out to the airport. They greeted Johnson with open arms. Nehru was in his Gandhi cap, and the white, closely fitted pants and white jacket that was the Congress party uniform of that period. They went through the usual greetings. John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador at the time, but I don't recall his being there for that particular experience. He may have been out of the country at the time. Anyway, Johnson and Nehru had meetings and, as I remember, discussed the Chinese threat. I mention it because it was Johnson's first meeting, I believe, with Nehru, and he may have formed his opinions of him then. Or maybe he had seen him at the Hill before that when Nehru made a speech to a joint session. But Johnson did not seem to be impressed with Nehru and the meetings were rather stiff and formal.

We went from New Delhi to Pakistan, where Johnson was greeted by this Sandhurst graduate, General . . .

RITCHIE: Ayub Kahn.

VALEO: Ayub Kahn, the president or prime minister who was a charmer, a total charmer. He affected very British clothes and mannerisms. His English was good, as was his humor. His mannerisms were Sandhurst. He had the moustache, and the full-figure and the fleshiness of a Colonel Blimp. This had a certain appeal for Johnson. They had a meeting and Ayub Kahn presented the Pakistani position vis-à-vis India with great perfection, Johnson listened closely to it. It was the open-and-shut, black-and-white kind of thing that Johnson liked. He mentioned the Soviet threat, again in those black-and-white terms that Johnson seemed to like so much. This meeting was in Kharachi. At that time they had not yet moved the capital north.

On the next leg of the flight, Johnson showed me a dispatch he was sending back to Kennedy. After Vietnam these dispatches were routine and I didn't find any great fault with them. Unless I saw something that was really offensive, why I just said, "It looks fine," and let it go at that. But while on the plane after Kharachi, he was showing me one of these dispatches; it was the Karachi report. Afterwards said, "What did you think of that fellow, Ayub Kahn?" I said, "Oh, he's a very impressive man." So he said, "Yeah, but I didn't think much of that fellow Nehru. I sure think a lot of this fellow." I said, "But there's one thing that you ought to keep in mind, Mr. Vice President. Did you notice how he was dressed?" "Yeah," he said, "he had a sport

jacket on, pants, and a tie." I said, "He was dressed in a very British style. And did you remember how Nehru was dressed?" He said, "Oh, yeah, yeah. He had on that white suit and white cap." The point I was trying to make was that one was deeply rooted in the mores of his own country and the other, Ayub Kahn one was essentially a superficial reflection of the short period of British control in the history of the area.

I tried to make the point but failed to do so. The idea that leaders in Asian countries needed to be rooted in their own culture rather than ours was something that went beyond Johnson. In that way he was being very representative of American attitudes, at least of that period. If people were like us, if they spoke English, that was enough to make them the right kind of people. If they didn't understand us when we talked, and if they didn't look like us, or didn't dress like us, why, they were either people to be uplifted or shunned, one or the other. These were the black-and-white attitudes which existed in the country at the time. Johnson was no monster. He was representing the realities of American attitudes towards the rest of the world.

RITCHIE: Was that also true of the State Department's view of those things?

VALEO: I'm not really sure whether you could say that. There were certainly people in the State Department who knew better than that. But to some degree there was some of that in their approach. From the State Department's point of view, it was easy to deal with certain people, and that was a primary concern: how easy is it for us to deal with them? You can read into that, if you want to, in many places: how easy is it for us to dominate them? But basically the State Department saw in that period as its mission two things in approaching Asian countries: make sure that there were no Communists involved in the government, and make sure the country is safe for American investments. They didn't even think in terms of trade very much at that point. They thought in terms of U.S. investment in the country and in terms of making it safe against communism as our primary national interests. Of course the third factor was: can we deal with them? If you could deal with them in those two contexts, it was safe. It was safe for our diplomacy, it was safe for our aid program, therefore it was desirable. That seemed to be the general thought. Whether or not the government was really rooted in its own people seemed, at best, to be a secondary consideration.

RITCHIE: They just had to be adamantly anti-Communist.

VALEO: That, plus the secondary factor was to be safe for American investment. Those seemed to be the way they read the national interest at that point.

RITCHIE: Was that the prevailing view on the Foreign Relations Committee as well, or did you see some members breaking away from that?

VALEO: There were people on the Foreign Relations Committee who certainly subscribed to that view, perhaps even more adamantly than the State Department, but there were also others who saw it another way. They were beginning to be heard a little bit more frequently. I'm trying to remember whether that included Fulbright at that point.

RITCHIE: In 1959.

VALEO: He had taken over in '59? That early? Yes, he would see the situation with a deeper perspective. But even he had his limitations. I'm not going to suggest that he looked at it only with depth.

RITCHIE: He really hadn't paid much attention to Asia.

VALEO: That's right. He was interested primarily in Europe. On the committee at that time, Mansfield was really the only one who had spent a great deal of time and a great deal of thought on Asia, and had done his homework, really, on the

situation. I guess [Frank] Church was on it. Hubert was on the committee at the time. Church wasn't really interested yet in the situation. Hubert was on to so many different things that Asia didn't really have much meaning for him as such.

RITCHIE: Morse and Gore seemed to be beginning to pay attention to Southeast Asia.

VALEO: Morse was interested because of the aid program. He had then become really a bitter enemy of the aid program and the way it was operated. Gore, as we discussed the last time, was Gore. He had his own way of getting interested for a brief period of time, and posing and displaying great erudition in regard to a problem, and then kind of dropping it and leaving it.

RITCHIE: Were there any Republicans at that stage who were interested in that area?

VALEO: Again, in the same category, not quite the same as Gore, I think would be [John Sherman] Cooper. Cooper had the sensitivity. I always thought he was in some ways, in terms of dealing with foreigners, the most effective of all the Republicans. I think he was seeing where we were going wrong. [Jacob] Javits sensed it with a kind of brashness and a hardness out of New York City. If you wanted to do some business effectively with Asian countries, then you'd also better have some people that

you're dealing with who have some connection with their own people. He saw it in brash terms that turned other senators off, but he was beginning to see it.

There was a certain rivalry between Javits and Mansfield. Whenever Mansfield would take up a new point on the floor, or break new ground on the situation, Javits would first oppose it very vehemently, and then come around, and wind up in about the same place. This was a common pattern, particularly on Asia. Javits didn't know it that well, but he had enough sense to know that Mansfield had done a great deal of homework on this. At first he would resist it, partly because he hadn't said it first, but then he would come around to it. I think that's what probably bothered him. But he was good on Asia, basically.

RITCHIE: George Aiken was always very quiet on this subject, but he seemed to be a little more perceptive than most.

VALEO: George Aiken had a good deal of sensitivity. He was on some of the trips with Mansfield. I don't know how deep his understanding of the problem was, but he was certainly inclined to trust Mansfield's views on anything dealing with Asia. I think he had, again, the sensitivity to recognize that Mansfield did have some unique characteristics which made him extremely useful in that situation.

RITCHIE: When you got back, what kind of report did you give to Mansfield about this trip?

VALEO: Well, I think more important, before we get to that, was the rest of the trip. The rest of the trip is sort of a haze to me. I'd been working eighteen and twenty hours a day as we moved around the world, and I was beginning to get very tired. We stopped on the way back in Athens, Cairo and in Libya. And I think from there we went directly to Bermuda. Bermuda was a rest stop. We were supposed to rest up over night before we landed. Instead, I worked the whole night through with Frank Meloy and others.

Somewhere in there, Johnson called us in. Someone else had drafted the report. It was probably a combination of Carl Rowan, Horace Busby, and the State Department people who were along on the trip. They drafted the report, and Johnson gave it to me for comment. He said, "You look at it with Frank Meloy and Horace Smith and see what you think." He said, "Everybody else is going to have a rest here, but you fellows look at that and work it over." We looked at it and we just thought, God, if he gives this to the president and it prevails, it's going to be so misleading in regard to the ease of the situation or the optimism—basically it was the optimism—that it's going to really give us all kinds of problems. I think the way we decided to deal with it

was that we would go over it line by line and draw up, in effect, a clear-cut opposition to what we thought was invalid, and have some alternative to give him.

I remembered my first experience when we landed in Vietnam, when he had given me this thing and said, "Sit down there and rewrite it." So instead of having a good time—he gave a big party and gave each of us one of those Johnson watches, and there was a lot of camaraderie with the press plane as well at this point, we had a good time, but we left it early and everybody else went on having a good time. We went up to work on the report. We worked it over and over and over again. We worked, I don't know, until two or three in the morning, and the plane left shortly at dawn.

We got on the plane, and Frank and I went in to see him with our comments on the report. We said that we thought it would be a very serious mistake to give the president the report that he originally showed us. I remember the scene very well, because there was a table on one side of the plane. He was on one side and Frank and I were on the other side of this small table, and the bed almost came up to the table. Mrs. Johnson was sitting on the other bed, knitting. Frank and I really gave it to him straight, to try to get him to tone it down in terms of its optimism. He was irritated with us, but I must say that he took a lot of the suggestions that we made. It wasn't completely to our

satisfaction, but at least it did change it somewhat. We made it clear that you could not suddenly put in a big shot of new aid—especially in the dimensions of which it had been discussed—and expect that to have any real influence on the situation. We went so far as to say, if you really meant us to have an influence on the situation, you have to think in terms of thousands of people and putting them out into every village, practically, and the towns, which we did not recommend, but which would be what would really be involved in it, if you really tried to change the situation from what it was. I don't know how much of that survived, I can't remember now. I never kept a copy of the report.

RITCHIE: The section on Diem was interesting, because it said that he was a remote figure who was not close to his people, and this was after Johnson had just called him the "Winston Churchill of Asia."

VALEO: Exactly, and I think that was part of our doing.

RITCHIE: Some commentators have noticed the difference between that final report and his earlier statements.

VALEO: It could very well be. I remember what Mrs. Johnson said while we were doing this. She said, "Mr. Valeo, you strike me as a man who always objects." She didn't say anything else. She said it with obvious disdain and distaste. I

said, "Mrs. Johnson, I have to speak my mind. If I'm asked to do it, I have to tell it the way I see it," or something to that effect.

We got back, we were on the last leg of the flight, and Johnson came out on the plane and said, "Frank, where's that speech I'm supposed to give for your wife's meeting tonight?" I said, "I gave it to you two days ago, Mr. Vice President." He said, "I know you did, but I can't find it. Do you have a copy?" I said, "No, I don't have a copy, that was the only copy." So he said, "It must be those State Department people. They're always losing things." So the plane was turned upside down. I'm trying to remember the name of the chap who was the administrative undersecretary's assistant who had come out on the trip, and who was later an ambassador to Iceland, Ericson. Dick Ericson was the paper carrier on the trip for the State Department. He was quite young at the time. He was being badgered and he said, "I don't have it! I haven't seen it! I haven't seen it! I haven't seen it!" The search went on for two hours on the plane while we were flying in from Bermuda, and no speech.

So Johnson said, "Well, there's only one thing you can do. I don't have a speech, I don't know what the subject's about, I don't know anything. You're going to have to write another one." I said, "Okay, when we get in, I'll go to my office." "No," he said, "I don't want you to go to your office. You have to come to

see the president with me." We got to the airport, and we separated into groups. Two or three of his closest people, and I guess a couple of State Department people and myself went with him by helicopter to the White House to see Kennedy. Johnson knew why he took me. It wasn't that he wanted me to be there for advice or anything, he wanted to make it clear that Kennedy thought: now, here's Mansfield's man and he's in agreement with it, and everybody else is in agreement. So Johnson made his presentation to President Kennedy who was sitting behind his desk in his rocker and the rest of us were sitting in sort of a semi-circle. Johnson handed Kennedy the report and the president threw it on the desk without looking at it and said, "How did Jean do?" Then he said, "How was Steve?" You know, that family tightness showed up immediately. He sort of heard with only one ear what Johnson was saying about Vietnam. He was more interested in what Jean and Steve did. At least that's the impression he gave at that meeting.

Well, after the meeting, I went back to my own office and I tried to reconstruct this speech out of memory. It was probably one of the most difficult things I ever did. I was so angry, I wrote a line in it at the beginning. It was about school dropouts, and I wrote as the first line in the speech something to the effect of "There but for the grace of God went I. I could have been a school drop-out!" I went on from there and developed this horrible speech on school drop-outs. Johnson, of course, had not

seen any of this. When I left him, after meeting with the president, he said, "I'll see you at the hotel tonight. You be sure you have that speech, and have enough copies." So I said, "I'll meet you at the hotel before you go in for the speech."

Sure enough, he was there. My wife was all aflutter because she'd gotten all the credit for bringing the vice president in. So I was waiting at the foot of the stairs, where I knew he was going to come in. When he arrived, he said, "Where's the speech?" I gave it to him, and he didn't even open it. He went up the stairs into the ballroom, it was at the Capitol Hilton down on K Street. I found a seat in the back; it was a banquet. It came his time to speak, and he got out the speech, and after looking around he said, "You know, I have an associate but the best thing about him is his wife Rita Valeo." Of course, he had never met Rita before that day. Of course, that got a good laugh. Then he opened the speech and he read the first line! He stopped short, and I could see him looking around to see if he could find out where I was sitting! By this time I had sort of slunk a little bit further into the chair. But he went on with great generosity and made the speech. He skipped parts of it. He was so tired, I could see that he could hardly stand on his feet. He got through about fifteen minutes out of a half hour speech by skipping paragraph here and there. Of course, he got great applause and then he left.

But that was typical of Johnson. On a personal level he could be a very warm and very endearing person. It was one of the things which unfortunately was probably his undoing, because it led people to be kind of taken into his trap. You didn't really want to offend him at times by opposing him. So it probably did him a lot of damage, and probably did people around him a lot of damage too, because in a way they lost their objectivity where they shouldn't have lost it. It was a very hard thing if you were close up to Johnson. I noticed that George Reedy left, and Horace Busby left, and a couple of others of his real close aides. Bill Moyers left, and maybe that's why Jack Valenti left, even though he felt better sleeping at night because Johnson was president. That's not the end of the Johnson story by any means, it goes on from there.

RITCHIE: But in some respect, since that covers the trip, this might be a good breaking point. I just wanted to ask one more question: did you report to Mansfield when you got back and brief him on the trip?

VALEO: Oh, yes. I don't know if I gave him a written report on it or not. But I told him what I thought. I said I thought the State Department was unfair in their reports and leaks to the press on Johnson, that he had done a very good job in his personal contacts in these various countries. He left maybe a picture of an eccentric, but nevertheless an amiable one, not a

bad one, not a brutal one. I thought that was good. And I thought for a man who had not been exposed to that area before, that he had learned a good deal, which I think is true.

The bad treatment of him was not by the press who traveled with him. In a way, they sensed probably the same thing. The stories that came out were of a kind of snob stuff. Oh, there was the famous story about the camel driver. That was in Karachi. I was not with him, but he was out sightseeing. Typically, he'd give everybody he met a ticket to get into the Senate gallery. He carried them around, and would say, "When you come to Washington, you come to see me at the Senate." It was part of his technique, and his invitation to the camel driver, which he probably never expected any response to, was probably in that same category. Again, as a human-interest story, I never thought it hurt us. It probably helped.

RITCHIE: I think that was the single most memorable thing about that trip, to most people, that camel driver.

VALEO: Yes, that's the way it comes out. And probably it was a good thing on balance. It may look foolish, but it might have been a good thing. Johnson didn't know what to do with him after he got him here! But that was Johnson.

End of Interview #5

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE NEW FRONTIER
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RITCHIE: Was there anything additional from that trip in 1961 that you think we should include?

VALEO: We made several other stops. We stopped in Greece and at Wheeler Air Force Base in Libya. Of course, in those days our relationship with the Libyans was very pleasant and happy. I remember a large airport, that's all. We spent only a few hours there and then went on to Bermuda where we made our final stop.

But I did want to go back for one purpose to the Library of Congress, and that is to stress, if I haven't already done enough, the significance of Ernest S. Griffith in this whole process. I think, if one has to trace the origins of the present staff structure of the Congress, and certainly what is now Congressional Research, he is the key person. He and George Galloway, who was the specialist in politics and a long time associate of Ernest, I believe, were the ones that put together the La Follette-Monroney Act, the original legislation in 1946 that began to develop the concept of a professional staff for the Congress. Prior to that, there was really nothing in the way of professional staff except perhaps on the Finance Committee and the Ways and Means Committee that would have passed for that.

Up until that time, most of the need for experts and professionals was filled by the executive branch of the government. They'd simply send down a tax expert, or they'd send down a foreign relations expert or whatever, depending upon the need of the committee. The concept of divided powers at that point, as it's involved in the Constitution, was not really fully appreciated on the Hill. I think this was an outgrowth, in part, of the whole Roosevelt period. Roosevelt so dominated the politics of the United States as well as the Congress that there was no chance of reversing it significantly while Roosevelt was alive. When Truman became president and the war ended, then, of course, all of these repressed tendencies towards division began to emerge. In that atmosphere, the idea of a professional staff, responsible only to Congress rather than to the executive branch, was far more acceptable than it would otherwise have been.

Ernest was a remarkable man. He was a Methodist, and he probably missed his calling, he would have made a great minister. He was a tee-totaler. He didn't like alcohol and he didn't like cigarettes, but he suffered the people around him who smoked, such as I and others at the time, and occasionally drank. He never preached to us, but it was very clear that he suffered us in that situation. We used to have a director's council meeting the first thing in the morning once a week, and of course smoking was still very much in evidence in that period, so there would be a lot of

tobacco smoke around and Ernest would wince, but he would never say anything about it. He had two great faiths: he had great faith in God, and he had great faith in the Constitution. He read it as a purist, pretty much, and tried to develop the whole concept of staffing on the basis of his understanding of it. He also had great faith in education. His whole approach was to try to integrate the reasoning which emerges from good research into the actual political and the legislative processes.

He was a really remarkable man, and he not only had to suffer a rather tattered staff, which included me and others, but he had to deal with Luther Evans, who was for the most part the Librarian while Ernest was head of Legislative Reference. Luther Evans was a totally different type as Librarian. I think Archibald MacLeish brought him into the Library as the first head of the Legislative Reference Service, and Ernest was his assistant. Then Luther became Librarian, he was a Texan, he was a relatively small man in height but very stocky and he had a voice like a bull. He dominated everyone around him, including poor Ernest, who kept his faith as far as he could. Luther could be rather cruel sometimes. He was derogatory of people and he looked for their weaknesses and played on them.

He contrasted beautifully with Ernest, who was basically a conservative Republican. Luther Evans was a somewhat left wing Democrat, in the terms of that period. The two of them politically made an excellent team. Luther got to depend on Ernest when it came to getting along with Congress, which he didn't. His arrogance gave him all sorts of problems with Congress, which became increasingly conservative in that period, certainly in the Eightieth Congress. So he depended on Ernest's good relations, particularly with the House Administration Committee, to carry the budget for the whole Library of Congress. I must say, the combination was very, very effective.

I was very young when I was made a division chief in the Legislative Reference Service, which entitled me to attend the Librarian's conference, which was held about once a month. Of course, I had been introduced to Luther Evans, but he could never remember my name. He had an assistant, whose name I think was Anderson, again a long-suffering person, who had to bear Luther's tyranny. I noticed that whenever I came in for a luncheon—the minute Luther spotted me he would lean over to Anderson and I'm sure say: "What's this guy's name?" And of course, by the time I got to shake hands with him in the line, he'd say, "How are you, Mr. Valeo?" Well, this must have happened half a dozen times. Then Luther left the Library and became the staff director for UNESCO. I didn't see him for a long time, then once when I ran

into him on the tarmac at Bangkok airport, and he knew my name immediately! I never understood why he couldn't remember it in the Library, but he remembered it a year later on the tarmac in Bangkok.

But I just wanted to stress the importance of Ernest Griffith in the whole development of the concept of professional staff for the Congress and the constitutional principle of divided powers. For better or for worse, he deserves a lot of the credit or blame for it.

RITCHIE: I suppose even he couldn't imagine how large the Congressional Research Service would become.

VALEO: Not at all. When I say this about Ernest's role, it also involved the committee staffs, because the La Follette-Monroney Act of 1946 laid the legislative basis for the staff development within the Congress as well.

RITCHIE: Some of it had to do with the fact that the issues were becoming so much more complicated.

VALEO: Precisely.

RITCHIE: And that the Congress no longer could rely on outside sources but needed to generate its own information on a year-round basis.

VALEO: That could have been said by Ernest Griffith! That's exactly right. Well, I wanted to get that into the record somewhere.

RITCHIE: Going back to after the 1961 trip. Did you make any other trips with Lyndon Johnson?

VALEO: No. That was the only one. Our relations became very strained, progressively, during the Vietnamese War, and it was not until after he decided not to run again that we rediscovered the fact that we really weren't enemies. He came down for a reception on the Hill that I think Senator Mansfield and the leadership gave him, or maybe it was a combined reception of [Hugh] Scott and Mansfield. He sought me out during the reception. He grabbed me again by the lapels, with a big smile, and said, "When are we going to make a trip together again?" But that was the finale. In the meantime, he had blamed me for the congressional attitudes on the war, at least in the Senate through Mansfield. Senator [Russell] Long of Louisiana came in to see me one day, and he said, "You know, Frank, I've just been down to see the president on a matter and your name came up. I didn't bring it up, he did. He called you the most dangerous man in the American government." He said, "Why would he think that?" I said, "I really don't know, Senator, unless it's about Vietnam, and he's probably blaming me for most of what goes on in the Senate about Vietnam."

But one learned to take that sort of thing from Lyndon Johnson with a grain of salt. His exaggerated speech was part of his nature. He fired Horace Busby and George Reedy and two or three others of his intimate staff over the Pacific Ocean. He said, "Get off the plane, right now! I don't want to see you again!" It was in the same vein. If you'd lived with Lyndon Johnson at all, you knew that you didn't take that too seriously. He was going to send the whole State Department back at one point; he decided they were the ones who were leaking stories to the press that he didn't want leaked.

RITCHIE: Did you have very many dealings with him when he was vice president?

VALEO: You know, it wasn't a very long period. It was shortly after that that he became president. But there were things that were most interesting in that period. I didn't have direct dealings with him, but I came into contact with him a lot, because I began to sit in on most of the leadership meetings and occasionally he would come. Mansfield would always invite him. He never came to the caucus again, I think until the very end of his presidency, but he did come occasionally, I believe, to policy committee meetings—again, by invitation of Mansfield; he never came without an invitation.

I remember in some of those early policy committee luncheons, which were quite private, he talked very frankly about what was happening in the White House. One of his pet peeves at that point, or so he implied, was Walt Rostow. He said, "Kennedy's got some real strange people around him down there." He mentioned Walt Rostow by name and there was this speechwriter named [Richard] Goodwin at the time too, he mentioned him. He said, "Those fellows want to go to war tomorrow!" It was ironic that he depended heavily on Rostow when he became president, but at that time he said, "I try to calm it down a little bit. Those fellows are all gung-ho to go to war in Vietnam." Of course, Mansfield delighted in hearing that at the time, because he was doing the same thing with the administration: attempting to dissuade them from the course of ever-deepening involvement. And at that time it was still a relatively modest involvement.

Johnson was a strange man. I don't want this to reflect on what he did later. I think it was more a mannerism of speech than anything else. But at one point he said, "The president is real worried about this civil rights question. He doesn't know what to do with it, whether he should send a bill up or not." He said, "He's not going to get a bill through, I've told him that. You know, the way to deal with that problem is appoint a nigger to the Supreme Court. " It was interesting that he did appoint a negro when he became president. He appointed Thurgood Marshall, the

first black justice to the Court. It was his way of dealing with it. The symbolic action was extremely important to him, and he thought that that was persuasive. I don't think he realized the depth of the civil rights issue at that point. Nor did many other people. We had not yet had the Atlanta riots and the Birmingham riots, so it's understandable that he would have thought in terms of his background, and an appointment would have been his solution to the problem of pacifying the black community.

I went through several meetings at the White House with him as the Vietnamese thing deepened, but I think they're probably better treated when we deal with the whole Vietnam situation, as it developed.

RITCHIE: Did Johnson at that stage participate very much in Kennedy's legislative program, when he was vice president?

VALEO: Not really, no. I don't think he did any arm twisting at all. He knew it would have been ineffective in any event. He played his own game. It was interesting because there was a great contrast in the way he behaved towards Kennedy and the way Humphrey behaved towards him as president. Humphrey felt he was compelled to follow whatever line Johnson put out and he did, whereas Johnson did not do that with Kennedy. He still stayed Johnson, and you knew he was Johnson. He sounded just like Johnson two years before. I think that's an important contrast,

because I think it explains some of Humphrey's difficulties and why he didn't quite make it to the White House.

RITCHIE: This when Mansfield had just become majority leader. How difficult did Mansfield find it to be majority leader following after a Lyndon Johnson?

VALEO: Extremely difficult. But he had immense good will in the Senate when he started. It's like any leadership, you get a honeymoon. But he had a really deep-seated one because senators all liked him, and coming after Johnson, all of them were willing to go out of their way to help him in some way or other. Those who were running for president had subsided now, because Kennedy was president and was likely to be president for eight years. So they were grumbling and looking primarily for their situation or their future in the Senate. So he had a lot of support.

Mansfield depended very, very heavily on Baker for the mechanics of the Senate. He knew very little about them. I knew even less. The first questions that came up as leader were the appointments to committees. This started, I believe, in that first caucus and continued. There were many complaints that the two controlling committees of the party, that is the Steering Committee for appointments, and the policy committee, presumably for policy—it didn't really work that way under Johnson, but presumably for policy—were overly dominated by the South and by con-

servatives. There were some offers immediately from southerners to get off. They said this had simply reflected what had happened in the elections in the past. Southerners tended to be elected and remain, whereas the liberals and the northerners on the committee were defeated, so they weren't replaced as rapidly. But this became a heated matter of discussion in the early caucuses.

Mansfield then asked someone to put what they would like done on these two committees in the form of a resolution. The record will show precisely what it said, but basically the idea was that the two controlling party committees should be elected by the caucus, on the recommendation of the leader, who would choose the people that he recommended on the basis of a consideration of the strength of the party as it related to the geographic distribution of the membership. Well, I did the first arithmetic on how to divide it up so that it would be that. It came out not very different from the way it was, but it set a pattern which was very important, and this was followed continuously from then on. I think now it's a very well established principle. But again it has lost meaning because Bob Byrd does not call policy committee meetings. But at that time it was important because Mansfield meant to use the policy committee as a policy committee. And we did.

We worked out the distribution. I remember having great trouble with West Virginia. What do you regard them as, southern

or western or eastern or what? We did the best we could to develop a geographic spread. The other consideration in the resolution was that his selections should be made with due regard to the spread of the ideological inclinations within the party. It was the first move towards a democratization of the inner process of the Democrats in the Senate after Johnson and an erosion of the seniority system. Frankly, I don't know what the situation was before that, I think these committees were unimportant. There was no policy committee to begin with until '46. So we took the first step. Bobby Baker shook his head on this. He thought this was a mistake, that this should have been fought in the caucus as weakening the leadership. I remember that. He wanted the control maintained.

The next question came up with the Steering Committee, and the election of members to the other committees by the Steering Committee, which technically is what should be done. But again, this was something Johnson decided on his own, and just picked people, including Mansfield for the Foreign Relations Committee as a freshman. This had been a great bone of contention at the caucus, that people were chosen on the basis of favoritism and so forth, so Mansfield said, "All right, from now on, they'll be elected by the Steering Committee." So the first meeting of the Steering Committee, which included then some more liberals than it had in the past, was held. Mansfield decided the procedure there

would be for individual senators to request two or three committees that they would like to go on, in a letter to him or to the secretary for the majority. These letters would be presented to the Steering Committee and a decision made by the committee.

I was still not the person who handled this, the secretary for the majority was responsible, but I sat in on all these meetings at Mansfield's request. I was learning how the process worked, in doing so. When the question came up about electing members to committees, there was some reluctance: we don't want to have hard feelings, so let's have a secret ballot. So the new committee assignments were decided by secret ballot. As secretary for the majority, Bobby Baker had to work out the mathematics of it, because there were ratios involved and what not, ratios between the Republicans and Democrats. But the elections were made, and this satisfied what had been a basic complaint against Johnson: one, that he was favoring southerners over liberals, and second of all, that he was picking people out of his own hat without due regard to any kind of democratic process.

So we got off on the right foot with that. Mansfield was still feeling his way very, very cautiously, still depending heavily on Baker for the general functioning of the Democrats in the Senate. The other key committee was the Campaign Committee, which was potentially the root of corruption in the inner workings of the Senate and the party within the Senate, because at the time

this was where campaign funds were distributed. He put down a flat fiat that every Democrat running for the Senate would receive exactly the same amount as a base; that if they individually wanted to redistribute their funds on the basis of the fact that they didn't have a need for them, that would be acceptable, but that he would not do that. As far as the committee was concerned, it would function strictly on the basis of an equal distribution of funds to all of the members.

Now, it is true, some members didn't need the full amount, and others did. And of course, campaigns then didn't cost what they cost now. But it ended the kinds of things that had happened before, where Johnson would say, "Well, give him another ten thousand, send him another ten thousand," the arbitrary decisions that were made. What it did do, however, was to shift a lot of that from the Campaign Committee over to Bob Kerr. This was the problem that eventually got Baker in trouble, because he was working very closely with Kerr in this period. The money, the oil money particularly, no longer came into the committee per se, but went through Kerr, and Kerr was beginning to build up his citadel of power directly. Before he had done it through Lyndon, but now he was doing it directly.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me a little bit about Senator Kerr? He's not very well remembered, I suspect.

VALEO: Yes, he was a bad man. I have no other way to describe him. Bad, no, perhaps that's wrong, I don't want to say that. How can I describe him? He was a nasty man, basically a nasty man. He looked like he was angry with the entire world all the time. Yet he tithed to his church a very large percentage of his income. He had a foul mouth. He used the most horrible kind of profanity. I can't remember whether he smoked cigars or what, but he was a scowling, overbearing kind of person. His interests were Oklahoma, he played it very closely, and yet he was the first one to challenge [Joseph] McCarthy. So there was this redeeming feature. You take the worst members that I have seen in a lifetime in the Senate and there was almost inevitably some kind of redeeming feature. He was the first one to take on McCarthy. He was the only one that I know of that would have dared to do it at that point. He really ripped into him at the very beginning, which of course gave him a great standing in much the same way that [Sam] Ervin got it as a result of Watergate, because of his willingness to go to the mat with somebody whom he felt was damaging the country badly. He did that.

By the same token, I think he's the same one who wanted to declare war on Cuba because of the first hijacked plane, in the mistaken belief that Cuba had hijacked it. Of course, the Cubans were in the process of releasing it, but Kerr was in the process of putting in a declaration of war on Cuba at the same time. It

was stopped only because of Bob Taft, Sr. on the Republican side, saying "We better let this one lay over until tomorrow."

The only man who really could take Kerr on in Senate debate was [John] Pastore, and Pastore would really floor him. Kerr didn't want to mix with Pastore. Pastore was about half his size, physically, but he understood Kerr and Kerr aroused in Pastore all of his aggressiveness. He would treat him with an incredible sarcasm that even topped Kerr's and Kerr was an awfully sarcastic man. So he avoided conflicts, but Pastore didn't. Pastore was always looking for an occasion to go to work on Kerr, and he was usually quite successful with it when he did. He'd get him torn down to size with sarcasm and scorn.

RITCHIE: The rules of the Senate all work toward defusing that sort of situation; everything is very polite. How is it that someone can come along and let loose and in a sense violate the spirit of the rules and the comity of the institution?

VALEO: Well, it's done politely! The Senate's the only place that I know where you can do that. Of course, it's not uncommon in parliamentary debate. You see it in the House of Commons in England and in other places, where it can be even more vicious than it is in the Congress. There are limits, and if it goes beyond a certain limit—I think the rules were set up primarily to prevent people from coming to blows. The practices

have reinforced that, by the use of courteous address, "the distinguished senator," and so forth, which defuses it. If, in effect, you're saying "the distinguished senator is an ass," the "distinguished" part of it sort of modifies the "ass." I never saw blows in the Senate. I saw anger, real anger, very serious anger, but never blows. Sometimes alcohol was involved in that.

RITCHIE: How would you say that Kerr was treated by other members of the Senate? Were they fearful of him?

VALEO: Well, there were two reactions to him. One was unctuous, in the sense of wanting to get campaign funds. And those who didn't need him, or didn't think that was the way to get campaign funds, were disdainful of him. But all of them were mollified, I think, at least among the Democrats, by his stand on McCarthy, because the Democrats suffered most from that. There were a few Republicans who also suffered, but mostly the Democrats paid the price of McCarthy politically. Mansfield was one of them. McCarthy never attacked Mansfield directly, but he released forces in the country which went out to Montana in that 1952 campaign to call him "China Mike," and "the agrarian reformer" and all of these very unenviable titles.

RITCHIE: When Mansfield became majority leader, Kerr was chairman of the Finance Committee, Russell was chairman of Armed Services, there were some really powerful chairmen. How can a

leader work in a situation when the power centers were so identified in other people outside of the leadership?

VALEO: Many of them were on the policy committee, and of course almost all of them were committee chairmen and therefore were in the committee chairmen luncheon group, which would meet periodically. Mansfield treated them all with great, great deference, including Kerr. There were certainly no clashes with Kerr, quite the contrary. But I think one has to differentiate between certain people in these powerful groups who were very anxious for Mansfield to succeed and those who were indifferent to it. Kerr was one who was quite indifferent. He didn't care whether Mansfield succeeded or not; he had already mapped out his own particular sphere of activity. So long as Mansfield could keep the Senate running, he was quite satisfied. But Russell, [Warren] Magnuson, [Henry] Jackson, a number of others in that period, were very supportive of Mansfield, and were somewhat dismayed because he showed none of the Lyndon Johnson traits that would tend to either cower people into line, or cajole them into line. Mansfield left it all, in effect, to them. They already had a number of privileges in their special positions as chairmen, but he seemed to be showering them with even more. They were perplexed by it, frankly. Very often they tried to give it back to him, but in the end, they said, "Well, if you want us to do it, we'll do it." But he never tried to force an issue.

Bear in mind, too, we're talking about the early period of the Kennedy administration, which was a shaking down period also for the White House. Kennedy was feeling his way. He had a lot of skilled people who were putting together programs that there had long been a need for. What later was to become the whole Johnson Great Society program was really being formed by Kennedy's immediate entourage, either in the cabinet or in the White House. They were beginning to shape policies that they felt would move the country towards the "Great Society"—they didn't use the term, but that's in effect what it was. They felt there were a lot of neglected social problems within the country that needed attention, and they were beginning to develop the kinds of programs and the legislation to go with it that would produce an effort to correct what they felt was a long period of social neglect and social injustice.

The first question that came up in this connection was the civil rights question, and Johnson had gotten through a bill a year before or two years before, and it was beginning to have some effect in certain places in the South, but a very limited effect. Meanwhile the pressure from the black community was growing very rapidly. So I'm quite sure Kennedy asked Mansfield directly what he thought were the prospects, if they should put some legislation through. Mansfield advised him strongly against it. He said, "We haven't even really begun here in the Senate.

It will go nowhere. I can only advise you not to do it." I don't know what the words were, but basically, that's what it amounted to. Kennedy concurred with him. He had the same kind of feeling about it at that point. Again, we had not yet had the flair-ups of violence in the South. That came, I guess, somewhere between the first and second session. The problems began then to take on a physical side in the South, and I think that's what ultimately brought the legislation to the floor in the Senate, which was where the hold-up was. They were ready to move in the House. And it was true, there was no way that at that point, and in that atmosphere, that the civil rights bill would have gone through the Senate.

The only other pieces of legislation of any consequence that developed in that period had to do, I believe, with taxation. Kerr was the leader in that on the Finance Committee. I think what they were pushing were basically tax breaks for accelerated depreciation, and things of that sort. But there was an important side development. In one of these measures that were pushed through, which were basically conservative, business-oriented measures, Wayne Morse launched a filibuster. I think it had something to do with communications, I'm not really sure now what the issue was. He launched a filibuster, and he kept it up for quite a while. I remember discussing it with Mansfield.

He had made up his mind at the very beginning and had so discussed it with me that there would be no night sessions of the kind that Johnson had done, with people in their pajamas and that sort of thing, to break a filibuster in the Senate. He'd made up his mind that the Senate would run as far as possible on a noon-to-five basis, five days a week. If there were any problems, he was going to throw them back at the Senate. He was not going to try to resolve them himself by maneuver.

Well, since that had been set as the base for the approach to the Senate leadership, the question came up of how to handle Morse's filibuster. Whether I suggested it or not, I said, "The only way you are going to do it is to apply the Senate rules, which is cloture." Of course, Baker's view was you couldn't get cloture. I said, "There is no alternative." At this time I had begun to sit in on some of the meetings between Baker and Mansfield. I said, "There's no other way." Well, they talked about going round the clock and so forth, but Mansfield would not have that. So he put a cloture petition in, and surprise of surprises, it succeeded. That was the first time in many, many years. Morse was flabbergasted. So was the Senate. Actually, none of the members had ever seen a cloture vote succeed, as I recall. Oh, [Carl] Hayden probably would have seen one, way, way back, but there had been no history of success for cloture motions.

RITCHIE: That was because it was usually invoked on civil rights issues.

VALEO: They never got anywhere with it. But it came up on some other issues. It had very rarely been even tried, because most people felt you'd never get anywhere with it. But the success of it was very critical, because this then became the precedent for the great Civil Rights bill in '64, when again the same technique was used. Well, Morse took his defeat well. He didn't try to extend or break the cloture rule. He just accepted the fact that cloture had been imposed. The thing passed. Nothing more was thought of it, except that it was an unusual occurrence in the Senate to adopt a cloture measure. It was partly because of the substance of the bill, but partly because everybody had gotten tired of hearing Morse talk. And Morse could do that endlessly. He was marvelous when he came to debate, but he went on forever. He would not stop. There was no way you could stop him, except by a cloture vote. So the pattern was set in that cloture vote for what was to come next, and then was to become a regular practice in the Senate.

There had been some attempts, as I recall, it was either in that Congress or the second one, to try the same tactic that had been tried with Nixon in the chair as vice president under Eisenhower, of changing the rule to make it more easy to get cloture. The attempt had not succeeded. Mansfield had opposed

the attempt. He, at that point, fought to hold the cloture rule the same way as it was, which was again typical of the way he was moving in the leadership, with extreme caution, and in the process endearing himself to the Southerners because of his respect for the traditional practices. He was treating them all with great deference, letting them pretty much carry their own bills. Johnson as leader always wanted to carry measures on the floor. Mansfield would take a back seat and let the chairman of the committee get up in front and carry his own committee's measures, and things of that sort, which really endeared him to the committee chairmen.

But then there were some rumblings beginning in the Senate that, you know, this fellow's no leader at all. What kind of a leader is this? He doesn't lead. He's a leader without leading. I would catch repercussions of it, from time to time, through the assistant secretary for the majority, Jay McDonald. He was a minor figure in the Senate operation. He really had charge of the pages. He later ran as a Republican for governor in the State of Washington. Brought in by Warren Magnuson, Jay McDonald despised Bobby Baker. He may have been a little bit off his rocker, as well, I'm not really sure.

McDonald would bend my ear whenever he had an opportunity. He'd catch me in the halls to tell me what Baker was doing and the way he was beginning to spread corruption, and undermining the

leadership, and everything else, fully expecting that I would carry these stories back to the majority leader, which I did not do. I needed to have something more tangible than the view of an assistant secretary about the secretary. So I treated it with great caution and held it to myself while it was developing. I would always say, "Well, would you want to see the majority leader and talk to him about it?" Oh, no, he didn't want to do that, but he wanted the stories to get around. Baker was playing his own game. He'd already gotten started on a hotel business out in Ocean City, the Carousel, as I recall. He was borrowing stuff from the Senate restaurant to take out there to get his hotel started. It was petty stuff at that time around the Senate, but the important Baker connection was with Kerr and the oil money that was coming in through Kerr to finance campaigns.

The financing of campaigns is always a major cause of corruption in the Senate. Most men whom I've seen in the Senate in my life were not corrupt, but it took money to run campaigns. Now it takes a great deal of money, so the potential for even greater corruption is there, as compared with that time. Money was important then but it did not play the kind of role that it plays today. There was one big flair-up on it when Francis Case—I can't remember whether this happened under Johnson or whether it happened under Mansfield—but Francis Case was absolutely furious. He was a paragon of virtue, a Republican from the Dakotas, and a

very decent man, very conservative and very decent. A good deal like Ernest Griffith. Someone had come up and tried to bribe him in his office with several thousand dollars for his campaign in return for a vote. He was outraged. That brought the matter to the newspapers. But then, somehow or other, it was glossed over. I can't remember why or how, but it did get a flair-up of attention at the time. Somebody said, "Oh, it's just Francis Case. He just imagined that somebody's trying to bribe him. Probably just wanted to give him a regular campaign contribution." I think that's the way it was treated. But it was the first sign, either in the later days of Lyndon's period or in Mansfield's earlier days, where this came to the fore.

Let me see if there was anything else in terms of procedures that changed then. Again, the same things that had happened in the Steering Committee and the policy committee were carried over to the floor. Mansfield would not try to force the issue on anything with any member. I remember writing dozens of opening statements in this period for the opening of Congress: saying over and over again, if there's a problem, the Senate is going to have to solve it. The leadership has no power beyond what any other member has, except the power of recognition. Traditionally, if he's on his feet, he's recognized as the person first on his feet.

RITCHIE: This was a period in which the Democrats had a solid majority in the Senate and the House. They had a new president with an ambitious program, and yet things moved very slowly. Everybody remembers those as quiet, pleasant days around the Senate.

VALEO: Inactive, almost, one might say. Everybody was making speeches and getting restless. Because first of all, the press lost interest. This was precisely what Mansfield wanted. He would make the briefest statements to the press people at the opening of each session. "What are you going to take up?" It would be some bill, the confirmation of so-and-so to be major general or some minor thing. The press would say, "Well, isn't there anything else coming up? How do you feel about the economy." But, you see, it was very important to do that, because he was trying also to solidify the Kennedy administration and have Kennedy be the spokesman for the Democratic party. The policy committee, which would later develop into a very powerful tool, in this period had to be kept subordinate to the White House if you were going to have any semblance of unity among the Democrats. Kennedy was, of course, obliging, because he was highly effective with the press, so many of the correspondents began to move downtown from the Hill, because the Hill was no longer a showplace.

It was a very quiet place. You would usually see two or three members sitting around on the floor. At five o'clock the

adjournment bell would go off, unless Morse wanted to make a speech for the West Coast newspapers, and then held take the floor and somebody would complain about "Oh, I don't want to sit in the chair and listen to him for two hours." You'd get that kind of reaction—which once blew up because of Danny Brewster. That story has probably been told, but Brewster was in the chair and the hour was late. Morse stopped speaking for a glass of water or something, and Brewster adjourned the Senate. He apologized the next day, I think, to Morse, but Morse was furious.

RITCHIE: How did Mansfield treat that situation?

VALEO: With humor. There was no other way to treat it.

RITCHIE: Looking back on that period, '61 and '62, and the slowness of the legislative program, was any one party more at fault? The Kennedy administration, the Senate, the House, what was slowing things down?

RITCHIE: Well, in terms of the program, the Kennedy administration hadn't gotten it in order yet. It's one thing to make speeches, another thing to reduce your political philosophy to legislation, how you're going to do it. We were thinking about such bills as Medicare, which didn't exist at that time. There were many other modifications to the Social Security program under consideration. There were civil rights measures that they had in

mind. There were tax bills that they had in mind. There were many, many reforms that they hoped to make, many programs that they wanted to interpret into legislation.

The cabinet members used to make a fairly steady march down to the Hill. [Arthur] Goldberg was at that time labor secretary. I remember him particularly because he immediately established a good working relationship with Mansfield. The fellow who was later senator from Connecticut, [Abraham] Ribicoff, who had been a member of Congress and knew how it worked, he came down, because many of the programs that were going to be involved were going to be HEW programs. He came down and established a good relationship. [Robert] McNamara less; Rusk did not; but then his responsibilities were somewhat different. The fellow who was interior secretary, [Stewart] Udall, was seen around. But again, when Kennedy administration leaders saw the way the land lay, and that it was different from Johnson, they began to bypass the leader's office and go directly to the committee chairmen. This was one of the significant changes. Of course, Mansfield would encourage them. He'd say, "Well, you'd better go down and talk with Jackson if you want to get into Interior matters." He deliberately almost pushed them away.

The door was always open. He always worked with his door open. We always had a coffee pot. We had a fellow named Morris,

an old man who had been around the Senate and worked for the sergeant at arms for many years. He was getting too old to do a lot of the labor work, so the sergeant at arms offered him to Mansfield. Mansfield said, "All right, if you want to send him down to take care of these rooms, send him down." He did, so Morris came down. I never called him anything but "Mr. Morris." I don't even know whether he had a first name, or whether that was his first name. But he was a nice fellow, and he used to keep the coffee pot on, and when anybody came in he automatically would bring them a cup of coffee. The office was a very quiet place. I was still in Mansfield's office at that time. I hadn't yet moved to the majority secretary's office. The Senate ran along for that first session very peacefully.

We made one trip to Vietnam in that period, it would have been about six months after the Johnson trip, in the fall of 1961. It was a very elaborate trip, forty-five days, an around-the-world trip. Mansfield wanted to cover all of the places that he thought might present us with significant problems. He spoke to Kennedy about it, and Kennedy said, "Yes, I would like very much for you to do that. " So I drafted a letter for Kennedy to sign, asking Mansfield to take the trip. The people who went along included [Claiborne] Pell, [Benjamin] Smith, who had replaced Kennedy in the Senate and was a lame duck, Danny Inouye joined it later—he had just been elected, I think he met the plane when we got to

Hong Kong—or was it Hiram Fong? I can't remember. And the senator from Delaware at the time, awfully nice guy.

RITCHIE: Caleb Boggs?

VALEO: Cale Boggs was on the trip. Who else? Mansfield, Pell, Boggs and Smith, I guess that's it. I went on it, and since it was a presidential mission, we had an assignment of people from the State Department to handle the administrative affairs. There was a fellow named Henry Ford, who was the chief administrative officer, who was later killed in an automobile accident in Germany, after he became counsel general in some German city.

It was an extraordinary trip. We went first directly to Germany, and went through the usual procedures at the Wall, which had just been established then. Pell and I and our wives went over into East Germany. You could still do it. You could do it on the subway train if you wanted to, and we came back that way. We actually crossed on foot. It was bleak and depressing. In the cold it was really very, very bleak. There was very little to do; we found a little coffee shop to sit in. We walked around. The city was still very bombed out; very little reconstruction had yet been done. I think actually the Soviet Union had done that deliberately. They wanted to downplay the significance of Berlin. They didn't even use it as the capital of East Germany. They used another place nearby as the capital. We came back then to the

West by subway train from the East. No check coming by subway. It was only if you crossed the Wall that you had to check through.

We went from there, I think, to Greece. I can't remember what the significant problems were with Greece at the time. We went to Egypt, where we met Nasser, who had only recently taken over and had within three or four years become the president and had begun to establish, or was moving in the direction of a relationship with the Soviet Union. From there we went across probably to Ceylon, or some such place. We went to India, and we went to Burma. Burma was important because Mansfield established a relationship with Ne Win, who had just overthrown U Nu. He and I alone went to see Ne Win. He wouldn't receive the whole group. He was in his military headquarters then; he was a general at the time and he was behind sandbags and barbed wire. We went to see him, and he and Mansfield developed a certain rapport. I don't know exactly why it worked that way. He was also very friendly with me; I don't know why. I think we were the first American officials that he had seen. He started out by being very suspicious, which is basic to his nature in any event, and then gradually warmed to us.

There was an interesting incident in connection with this. While we were en route, the U.S. ambassador in Rangoon sent word that he would be glad to entertain the Senate members of the party for Thanksgiving dinner, but that he couldn't take care of the

rest. So Mansfield sent a wire back which said we would invite him to come to the hotel to have dinner with the entire party. In which case the ambassador suddenly discovered he could take the whole party for Thanksgiving dinner and Mansfield interpreted that to include the plane crew as well. That was the way Mansfield would very often act, where he thought he saw anything that smacked of arrogance or any kind of inequity, he would immediately respond that way. It was very effective in situations of that kind, and I think it's one of the things that endeared him to a lot of Asians, who recognized that as a trait, even when he didn't show it. It was in his whole manner.

We went from there to Cambodia and Laos and to Vietnam. In Cambodia, Sihanouk gave a very large dinner for Senator Mansfield. He thought Mansfield was one of the few Americans who understood what he was trying to do in Cambodia. He went all out. He even arranged the menu himself; he composed music for the occasion. He had the court dancers. He did the whole thing up as only he could do, in the most elaborate kind of reception for the whole party. In the conversations with him it was clear that he was having great difficulty with the American embassy at that point—and this was even before we became deeply involved in the Vietnamese War. He looked for Mansfield to help him resolve his problems, and he hoped that Mansfield would be helpful, which Mansfield always tried to be with a view to keeping a neutralized

Cambodia during this period when the executive branch just disdained the whole idea of a neutral Cambodia.

The party did not go to Laos, but Mansfield and I and the Senate members all went up to Vientiane. We saw Souvanna Phouma, who was then prime minister of what was about to become a neutralized tripartite government in Vientiane, something which was still being resisted by our own executive branch people, whether it was the CIA or Department of State or what. They still had another Laotian that they had bet on, somebody else whom they had armed who was proving totally incompetent in the situation. Souvanna Phouma, again with his pipe smoking practices—I think Mansfield may have brought him some tobacco, I'm not sure. But it was clear that he was treading very, very carefully. He didn't really know what was going to happen.

I can't remember whether it was before this meeting, or afterwards, but Souvanna Phouma had been in exile in Paris. His wife had come to the office and we had her to lunch. She said that there was pressure on her husband, particularly from the French, to go back to Vientiane, where he had been upset and forced out of office by a military coup. She said, "He's going to do it. But he's not going to play it the way he did before. He's just going to fill the job and not try to force any issues." I don't know whether Souvanna Phouma eventually went on opium or what, which was a common occurrence in that part of the world.

When things got too much, you went on opium. Whether he ever did that or not, I don't know, but from that time on, he gave the impression of really leaving everything in the hands of someone else. In this case, as time went on, it became more and more the American embassy which ran the country. But at that period his half-brother was supposedly the Communist leader, whom we met at the time. Souvanna Phouma gave a reception. He was a very impressive person. He spoke about seven or eight languages, very articulate and very militant in his views. It came across to me more as a nationalist rather than as an exponent of any particular economic ideology. The other fellow, the military person, I think was also at that dinner. Souvanna Phouma just didn't talk very much and when he did, he talked in terms of pleasantries, about having Mansfield and how important Mansfield had been to them, and so forth.

We went up and met the new king in Luang Prabang. We had met him previously as crown prince. He too was bewildered by what had happened. He didn't know which way to turn. He was very concerned about a Chinese road which was being built down under the terms of the agreement which they had made for the neutralization of Laos. Again, my timing may be off. I may be mixing up the '61 trip with the '64-'65 trip, which was in the same area. But in any event, we did meet him and talk with him at some length, and then went on down to Vietnam.

In Vietnam, Mansfield and I had a private meeting with Diem, in addition to the one with the regular group. Both he and I noticed that there were some very significant changes in Diem. He seemed to be faltering in speech, and not at all certain about what he was saying, and very non-committal, which contrasted very sharply with the way he had been earlier with us. Meanwhile, his sister-in-law had really taken over as his hostess (he was never married). She was just the opposite: she was very articulate and very affirmative in her views of what the United States should do in Vietnam, and what they shouldn't do.

Then I got word that his brother [Ngo Dinh Nu] wanted to meet with me privately, and could I come to see him for a very late supper. I remember going from the dinner with Diem to his house. It was about midnight. He and I had late supper together. He said he wanted to talk to me because he knew that I would explain to Mansfield what was involved, and he didn't want to do it in front of everyone else. He said that he felt that they were on top of the situation, that they had this new system of whatever they called them, I can't remember, some kind of strategic hamlets. He was very articulate and brilliant in many ways. He talked at great length about their program, and he made it very clear that what they really wanted from the United States was more understanding and less involvement in their own affairs, that they

felt that they could do it, and they would be effective in controlling the country, which I of course duly related to Mansfield when I went back.

We went down to the Philippines and met the predecessor of [Ferdinand] Marcos, who was [Diosdado] Macapagal. These were essentially official, more or less ceremonial meetings, with briefings from their point of view on what was happening in their country and their attitudes towards U.S. relations. We did, I believe, also meet Marcos, who was then the majority leader of the Philippine Senate. I have only a vague recollection of that meeting, but I think that was our first meeting with Marcos.

After that, we went to Hawaii, and Frank Meloy and I started to work on the report going across the Pacific. We agreed that Frank would draft the public report, and I would draft the one for the president. I talked to Mansfield at some length before I started to work on it, to get more of his attitudes and his reactions to what had happened. He said, "We have to be very careful about getting in deeper in Vietnam. We've just got to discourage that. First of all, I don't think Diem is functioning as well as he might, physically, and I think that it's an extremely dangerous situation." This was, of course, the way I drafted the report, which he gave to Kennedy, subsequent to our arrival in the States.

Now, his findings in that situation would have been completely in accord with his attitude towards the whole area. He thought Diem was an able fellow and a very dedicated Vietnamese nationalist. But he knew the situation was touch-and-go from the very beginning. The last thing he wanted was a U.S. involvement, even to rescue Diem. He didn't want any part of that. But he always thought Diem was the key person, that if you couldn't do it with Diem, there would be no other way in which you could do it, because Diem did have nationalistic characteristics that were very strong, and were recognized by his own people in that sense. So we wrote what amounted to a very discouraging report.

The public report on the trip was drafted by Frank Meloy and he and I worked it over. I remember a conversation with Frank on that on the plane. There was something that I was finding fault with in the report, so he said, "Well, you know, the key to this thing is China. We're not talking about Vietnam, we're talking about China. We either have to make our peace with China, or there is no way really that you can solve this kind of problem." I said, "Well, why don't we say that?" He said, "Are you kidding? You know you can't say that." Of course, he was right. At that point you couldn't say that. That would have been anathema to Rusk and to anybody in the State Department, it was anathema to almost anyone in the administration except possibly Kennedy, but

Kennedy wouldn't have known what to do with it if you said it at that time. The country was not yet ready to listen to it.

When we got back, Kennedy did ask for Mansfield to come down to see him. I remember Mansfield saying he was going down to see Kennedy in Florida, Kennedy was vacationing in Florida, and I think it was to discuss the report. This is second-hand; some reports said that Kennedy was extremely angry with Mansfield for the report, even though he couldn't find fault with it, he was just angry with him for having told him things that he felt he couldn't do anything about. I don't know whether that was true or not. Mansfield, in talking to me about his meeting with Kennedy, merely said, "We had a pleasant meeting. We talked for a long time about Vietnam. We went over the whole thing." He didn't say anything about his being angry or so forth. He said, "He asked a lot of questions, and I gave him straight answers as far as I could."

RITCHIE: I've heard that Mansfield wrote memoranda to Kennedy fairly frequently about Vietnam and about Asia.

VALEO: In that period there was a struggle to get Kennedy's attention. The careerists in the executive branch, and Rusk was one of them, were for carrying over the previous policy. They continued to recommend exactly the same policies, which was understandable, notwithstanding the change in administration. If

you believed in what you were doing a year ago, you don't change it because of a change in the presidency. But those were, in my judgment, badly informed policies, colored too much by the fear of the bureaucracy over what had happened to them as a result of McCarthy and the China experience. They had couched the whole approach to policy only in part on the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia; they also were influenced by the fears of being clobbered in Vietnam and elsewhere with the same club that had hit their colleagues earlier on China. They were still talking about the Communist axis from Moscow to Beijing to Hanoi, even though it was already beginning to come apart. But they were still talking about it in those terms. The only thing that tended to bring it together and hold it still, was our involvement in Vietnam, prior to that it was actually falling apart.

So I think that their advice was bad, and there was no place that Kennedy could get any other advice except from the Hill. Mansfield recognized that, so he kept me writing memoranda. He'd come up with something from the newspapers indicating some new twist in policy, that we were getting prepared for a deeper involvement, and he'd say, "Let's get a memorandum out on this. I'll make a statement on the floor, and let's get a memorandum to the president." I don't know how many we wrote, or how many statements he made on the floor on this subject. But he tried to keep a counter pressure on Kennedy through this whole period.

He mentioned to me once the meeting that Kennedy had held on Laos, with a number of members of the Senate, including Bourke Hickenlooper and Fulbright and himself and many others from both sides. He said, "He talked to us about military involvement and nobody opened their mouth, except a few of us. I did. I told him to be very careful about deepening it. So did Fulbright and Bourke Hickenlooper—I was surprised at Bourke, he went the same way. He warned about being very careful with involvement in that part of the world." There were two or three other names he mentioned. "But basically," he said, "most of the congressional leadership, [John] McCormack and the others, they just took it the way it was, and if anything encouraged him." But Mansfield's whole thrust was to attempt to neutralize the pressures which he knew were on Kennedy to deepen our involvement, and he was trying to push in the other direction.

RITCHIE: Did you ever get any feedback from the White House about those memoranda—or from the State Department?

VALEO: No, they went to the president. Mansfield might have gotten it orally. There weren't that many memoranda. Mansfield felt if you overdid it, then nobody would pay any attention to them. So he was careful with that. When he felt that they weren't paying attention, then he'd make a statement on the floor. That was almost the way it went. Then he'd get atten-

tion in the press from it, and then he might get a response from the White House. It was something of that pattern.

RITCHIE: Do you have any sense of what Mansfield's relations with Kennedy were at that stage; how close he was?

VALEO: Yes, he had a blow-up of a news picture on the wall in the office with Kennedy throwing the first ball out at Griffith Stadium, where the Washington Senators were playing the first ball game of the season. Kennedy's sort of leaning back and getting ready to throw the ball, and Mansfield is holding out his hands to hold him up. He said, "I always like to think that that's the relationship. I want to try to support him as much as I can." There was a lot of dissatisfaction with him in the case of others in the White House staff, I know that. They felt he was not the kind of man Kennedy needed in the job. Did we get into that, on how he got the job? The recommendations, did we cover that last time, do you recall?

RITCHIE: You mentioned that Kennedy had talked to him on the phone.

VALEO: Yes, right. And there were others who were passing out rumors about who Kennedy really wanted. Mostly they centered on Humphrey. My own feeling was that Johnson wanted George Smathers, but he was too smart to go in that direction. So he came out for Mansfield; mildly, but he came out for him. In the

end there was absolute agreement on the part of all of them that Mansfield was the logical one to be Senate leader, the contested question was: who was going to be number two? It boiled down to whether it was going to be Humphrey or Smathers. I think, again, Johnson would have preferred to have Smathers in number two, and the Kennedy people preferred to have Humphrey in number two, so they wound up with Mansfield, Humphrey and Smathers as the leadership.

RITCHIE: What was Smathers' official position?

VALEO: He was secretary of the conference. I had very mixed feelings about Smathers, largely because I thought he defeated one of the really outstanding senators, and he did it in a rather tricky way. He had been on his staff and then ran against him—and that was Claude Pepper, who was the first senator I met when I came to Washington. I had a high regard for him, born out, I think, by what he had done during the Roosevelt administration. He remains a remarkable personality.

RITCHIE: You mentioned about Humphrey becoming whip. What were Mansfield's relations with Humphrey in those number one and two spots?

VALEO: Well, the important thing is that Humphrey changed after that. I remember a luncheon we had in the office with Humphrey and a number of others there. Of course, he had a great

sense of humor, you never knew when he was serious and when he was being funny. But he said, "From now on, I'm taking everything that's coming my way. I don't care what it is, I want it all. I'm sick and tired of all these do-good causes that have been hanging on my neck for years. I just want anything that comes my way." Well, of course, everybody laughed. It was typical behavior on the part of Hubert Humphrey.

But he had a very aggressive staff, he always did have that, and the staff would say, "If he's the whip, he should take over on the floor." Of course, they ran into Bobby Baker on that. I wasn't directly involved in it at that point. But there was beginning to develop a certain amount of friction between Humphrey's people and Baker. Also, apparently Baker was the target of Bobby Kennedy. Bobby Kennedy, I suspect, had him in mind for a long time as being somebody who had to be disposed of. I can remember two things. I mentioned the Jay McDonald thing in a previous meeting. His stories on Baker kept coming to me and I knew they were going to other people as well, probably to Humphrey's people among others, and perhaps even to Kennedy's. Then Baker once said to me, and this was not too long before Kennedy's assassination, he said, "They've been looking into me. I don't know what they're trying to do down there." I always played it dumb with Baker about what was going on. I said, "What do you mean, Bobby? I don't understand what you mean." He said, "Oh, they've got people

looking into my records and everything else." I said, "Who?" He said, "Oh, Bobby Kennedy, who else?" I can remember that going on. I said, "Oh, I didn't know that." Then Mansfield fired Jay McDonald, because Jay McDonald went to him with the Baker story. Whether Bobby Baker had gone to him too and insisted that Jay McDonald be fired, I don't know. He never told me that, but he did fire him. I remember Magnuson coming in, who was McDonald's sponsor, to argue with Mansfield about firing Jay McDonald, or trying to find him a job somewhere else. Then Mansfield said to me, "I don't know about that fellow. He's crazy. He keeps coming in to talk to me. I don't know what the hell he's talking about half the time. I finally got fed up with him and I just had to get rid of him." And he didn't rehire him. So we are beginning to approach the point where the story breaks on Baker.

RITCHIE: I think that would be a good place to start the next time, but I wanted to ask one more question about Mansfield and Humphrey. Mansfield, in so many ways, took a passive leadership role; Humphrey was such an aggressive activist. Were they able to divide tasks that way? Or did Humphrey just go off on his own?

VALEO: The problem with Humphrey was that it was never a continuous thing. Humphrey had so many irons in the fire. He'd come down and make a big stir. You'd think, "Well, gee, he's going to take over the Senate. He's going to be on that floor all the time." Something else would distract him, and then after

having made a big flourish on the floor about getting some action, on something or other, you wouldn't see him for a week. That was his nature. So they really never had any great flair-ups. Humphrey never seriously went after Mansfield's job, and Mansfield had another thing in mind for Humphrey, and that was the Civil Rights bill, which was going to be Humphrey's great moment in the American government, clearly. If he's remembered for anything, he'll be remembered for his role in that Civil Rights bill, because he was the key figure in the Senate. I think Mansfield never took Hubert as whip that seriously. Basically, he liked him, but he didn't really take him too seriously.

End of Interview #6

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

SENATE DEMOCRATIC SECRETARY

Interview #7
Thursday, September 12, 1985

RITCHIE: I wondered if you could, from your perspective at the time, tell me about the background to Bobby Baker and his problems.

VALEO: I think I mentioned earlier some of the lead-up to his resignation. I didn't really get to know Bobby Baker until after he became majority secretary under Mansfield; but he was a very ambitious, very energetic and clever young man at the time. He had been very close to Lyndon Johnson, and served as Lyndon Johnson's floor man. He was there at all times. He would carry out Lyndon's instructions; he did not, at that time, try to operate, in my judgment, independently. He was actually Lyndon's person, and he worked that way, which meant he developed connections largely with southern senators, and other communications centers, except the Democratic liberals, through which he funneled Lyndon's intentions. Now, he may have done some interpreting of Lyndon's intentions at various times, but basically, I knew of no quarrel between Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Baker. As far as I know, they always saw eye to eye. When Baker got into trouble later, Lyndon tried to draw a little distance between himself and Baker by pointing out: "Well, nothing like this ever happened when I was

majority leader," or something to that effect. But that was an attempt to get off a sinking ship, and like most politicians, Lyndon Johnson had no use for sinking ships. So I think you start with that.

Bobby got to know the personalities in the Senate. He was quick to read character, knew their weaknesses, knew their strengths, and would be basically the principal adviser on the legislative process to Lyndon. My guess is that he fully expected to terminate his career in the Senate when Lyndon left to become vice president, and that he either wanted to go into some kind of a lobbying business or he wanted to go with Lyndon into the vice president's office and prepare perhaps for the day when Lyndon would become president. He was quite surprised when Mansfield asked him to stay on. Not only did he ask him to stay on, but he said he couldn't think of running the Senate without him. I mean, he went that far in his endorsement of him, again this being the political thing that LaGuardia always talked about: in politics you're always doing for your enemies what you should be doing for your friends.

I have to conclude that Mansfield knew the situation. He was too astute not to. He knew the dangers of a Baker. I think that his way with dealing with what he regarded as enemies of the Senate was not to recognize them as enemies, but to embrace them and then gradually, maybe spider-like, consume them and get rid of

them. I basically think that that was his whole approach. It was not naiveté for him to say Baker was the best secretary for the majority the Senate ever had, as he did later. He meant that Baker knew how to count votes, and that's all he meant, not beyond that. I can't imagine him not knowing that, even though there will be nothing in the historic record to show that he thought in those terms. Rather, people looking at the straight historical record would say: "Well, God, what an awfully naive man." That would be a natural reaction and I think a mistaken one.

When Baker decided, he must have talked it over with Lyndon Johnson at the time, and my guess is that Lyndon told him to stay on until he felt his own way, at least, in the executive branch of the government. This would, in effect, keep Lyndon's hand in the Senate. Baker already had enemies, but he had many of the same enemies that Lyndon had, so that was not unexpected. I think that Mansfield wanted it partly from the point of view of how to handle the transition. He also wanted it because he needed a point of ready communication with the southern members at that time. He knew them, and he knew them on a rather friendly, personal basis, but he also knew that they had been very responsive to Lyndon Johnson, very often through Bobby Baker. So it began on that note.

Once the session got underway, Baker suddenly realized that he had what amounted to virtually a free hand to do what he wanted in the Senate, without having to report to Mansfield. He began to develop his own range of activities, which might or might not be related to Mansfield as leader. He also began to strengthen what were already probably strong ties with Bob Kerr of Oklahoma. The key to this was that Kerr had oil money and he could use it for distribution to members who needed money to run. The amounts were nominal in that period. We talk now in millions of dollars for Senate elections; at that time we were talking about tens of thousands of dollars. Even in the most hotly contested election, I don't think anything more than a couple of hundred thousand dollars was ever spent on it. And that was a rarity. Mansfield ran on less than ten thousand; Aiken ran on less than a hundred. So you can see what actually happened, from the financial point of view. At that time, ten thousand dollars would go a great deal towards putting a member in your debt, if you gave him a ten thousand dollar contribution. I suspect, and I think this was brought out in later proceedings, that a lot of this money passed under the table.

Bobby Baker also had trouble with money. It sort of stuck to his fingers. He had difficulty distributing all that became available for campaign funds and some of it, apparently, found its

way into his own pockets. It was at this time that Jay McDonald, whom I mentioned earlier, from the state of Washington, who was then assistant secretary, probably at Magnuson's insistence in an earlier period, began to come and report that there were some terrible things going on in the Senate. I listened very intently, but I felt that I didn't know enough about it to carry any stories back to the majority leader at that point about Baker, simply because Jay McDonald, first of all, was very vague in his accusations, and I didn't feel that I could, in all honesty, endorse those without knowing a lot more about it.

Mansfield, meanwhile, went blithely on his own way, giving every support he could to Baker, except one that I recall. Baker wanted Lyndon Johnson's old office, which is now known as the Johnson Room in the Capitol. It's a beautiful Brumidi room. Johnson tried to keep it at first. Instead, Mansfield dug in on Johnson and said, "No, it's not the vice president's office, that's the little office to the side." He gave Lyndon only that little office to the side; he explained to Lyndon that it would be very, very damaging in the press if he let him keep his old office at that point. Johnson growled, but went along with the idea. It was Mansfield's way of beginning to cut down the previous regime to size, so that he could manage the Senate in his way. Up until this point he was afraid to do it, literally afraid to tackle it head on.

At this time, Mansfield was still chairman of the Rules Committee. It came to him because of his seniority, and it gave him control of the new rooms in the east front of the Capitol, which had just been completed. Nobody had ever occupied those rooms. He said he wanted them turned over to the most senior members. I drew up the list for the assignment of those rooms. And he wanted all of the rooms evenly distributed in terms of proportions within the Senate as between Republicans and Democrats. This again was a step in the direction of reducing the partisanship, but at the same time enhancing the privileges of the already fat committee chairmen. He just added more food and fuel to their already extensive powers. They again were surprised. I remember some that I approached. [John] McClellan was one, I think [John] Stennis was another. [Richard] Russell was certainly another.

These were elegant offices, the new offices on the east front, many of which Johnson had ear-marked for himself had he remained majority leader. So we went down the list, strictly by seniority. The only exception Mansfield made to this was to recognize that Margaret Chase Smith needed one of these rooms, and Mrs. [Maurine] Neuberger, who was then a member on the Democratic side. They had complained to him about no bathroom for women senators in the Capitol. There were two offices side by side which shared a bathroom, so he put the two women senators in those offices in the new east front, again endearing himself to people

like Margaret Chase Smith. He would do that whenever he could. Once having distributed these new rooms, Mansfield stepped down as chairman of the Rules Committee, elevating Everett Jordan of North Carolina to that post.

Well, I think one of the consequences of this first demonstration of leadership, if I can call it that, was that people began to recognize, or have reconfirmed their view of Mansfield as being an awfully nice guy, who really had a sense of the equality among members. However, this did not automatically translate into legislation that was wanted by the Kennedy administration. Mansfield turned again to Baker, as Johnson would have done, to try to line up votes, and Baker now, operating essentially independently, began to say, "Oh, we can't do that," or "There's no way you can get those votes," and so forth. Generally speaking, Mansfield would take that and relay it back to the White House. What Baker also found, however, at this point, was that some things were changing. For example, he could have held out, on behalf of Johnson, inducements in the form of committee assignments to members to go along. Mansfield would not have that. As I explained earlier, on the Steering Committee he had already made it clear that committee membership would be by election on the basis of people self-nominating themselves, or making their selections of preference and then the decision would be by secret ballot in the Steering Committee, which took that out of the

process of maneuver, one of Johnson's favorite devices, shall I say flim-flam, really in terms of: "I'll do this for you and you do that for me," the usual kind of thing that went on during Lyndon's tenure.

RITCHIE: Wasn't Mansfield weakening himself, in a sense, by losing that leverage?

VALEO: Yes, he was giving up a device that Johnson had clearly used to collect power. But Mansfield's view from the very beginning was there was no other way he could do it. He would not do it the Johnson way. He would run the Senate as an orderly place, and that if it failed, it would be the whole Senate that failed, not him and vice-versa. He was not going to be neither the star nor the villain in the piece. This came as a surprise. Some of the Republicans at first greeted it with disbelief. They were very skeptical. [Everett] Dirksen was then the minority leader. He was a very pleasant person. He had lived through a large part of the Johnson period as minority leader, and had learned to spar with Johnson. He was very clever on the floor. He looked for the same kind of sparring with Mansfield and got nowhere, because Mansfield would greet it with either a look of not understanding where the humor was, or whatever. So Dirksen soon changed that. He found it was no longer necessary to put on

this performance, which he was very good at, on the floor or he waited until Humphrey or some other member might be substituting for Mansfield to engage in his witty repartee.

Baker at this time had offices near the Architect of the Capitol and the doctors, down on the terrace floor, which I later occupied as secretary for the majority. One of the things I used to get from Jay McDonald was, "You ought to see the string of people going in to see Baker these days." These were mostly, apparently, lobbyists of one kind or another who had certain things they wanted to try to get. They didn't know any other channel. You couldn't go to Mansfield. Unless you were from Montana, he wouldn't even talk to you. So they went to Baker, who would listen. In that way, I think, he was building up his power, primarily by the collection of campaign money, which he would then later distribute.

On top of this, Mansfield changed the structure of the Senate Campaign Committee, which, in a sense, shut off the legitimate channels for somewhat tainted money. It could not go through the Campaign Committee because Mansfield laid down a dictum to the first chairman that the money collected by the committee would be distributed absolutely equally between all Senate candidates who were seated senators in allotments, and then if there was surplus it would go to Democratic senatorial candidates who had not been in the Senate, Democratic candidates on the outside. So basically

the Campaign Committee became a source of equality. Now, some members themselves distributed their funds because they didn't need them. They would say, "I don't need the money, I'll give it to him, he's in trouble." Mansfield said, "That's your doing, but the committee itself will treat all members with absolute equality, and so far as I know, he kept very close to that principle.

Well, in the circumstances, if Baker received campaign money, he couldn't very well put it through the Campaign Committee, because the Campaign Committee was not responsive to Mansfield, and not to him either. So I would think that a lot of it, the money that came from Kerr and others that was later distributed by Baker for campaign funds, went through Baker, that which didn't stick to his fingers. This was one aspect of Baker. He still did his usual floor work, but he was seen less and less on the floor. He'd come up just for votes and things of that sort.

He had one other thing going which was something called the Carousel. It was a hotel down in Ocean City, he was involved as an investor, and ultimately as an operator. These two things were the things that ultimately did him in. The Carousel had been building for a couple of years and was about to open in this period. This would be probably in '62-'63. I remember him talking to me about the Carousel. He said, "We're going to have a grand opening." I think somewhere the press was just beginning to get on to Baker. They had not bothered him at all during the

Lyndon period. They began to pick up stories about how he was using his limousine, which was a Senate vehicle, to run things back and forth to his hotel, which was perhaps trivial at that point, because the officers of the Senate use their cars almost as personal cars, not quite but almost. It was the accepted thing. They had to be on duty twenty-four hours, so it was not surprising that he would run out to his hotel with a Senate car. I didn't find that particularly offensive, but when the press began to get on Baker, this was one of the things they picked up. In addition to that, he borrowed cutlery from the Senate restaurant for his opening party.

He hired a bus to bring down people from the Senate for the party. I received an invitation. I didn't want to offend Baker at this point, but I also thought the better part of wisdom would be either to plead my sick father or my young son, I'm not sure which. So I decided not to go. But the party was a great success, a lot of staff people went down, a number of senators went down, and the Carousel got underway. Well, this more and more distracted Baker from his work in the Senate.

The final factor was apparently a feud with Bobby Kennedy that went all the way back to the '60 convention, or perhaps even before that. Bobby Kennedy was now attorney general and he began to look very closely at Baker's affairs, undoubtedly put the FBI on it to be sure, particularly his financial affairs. It would

have had to have been before [John] Kennedy's assassination. I can remember Baker talking to me on the floor one day, saying, "What are they trying to do downtown?" I said, "Who?" He said, "The Kennedy people. You know, Bobby Kennedy. They've had people going into my affairs, and I know it." I said, "I don't know anything about it, Bobby. I don't know the Kennedy people that well." But he had then begun to worry about a possible interference with his affairs from the Kennedy administration. Meanwhile, on the surface, everything went on as usual.

RITCHIE: When he opened the motel, and when he had the Quorum Club in the Carroll Arms across the way, didn't people begin to wonder? He was only earning twenty thousand a year from the Senate.

VALEO: This was the beginning of the concern, actually. When these things came out into the open and became associated with him, then they began to figure there was a real corruption problem with Baker.

RITCHIE: Was the Quorum Club open by that stage?

VALEO: Yes, I think so. Again, it was one of those things I was not a party to, and in this case, genuinely out of naiveté. I didn't fully appreciate what was going on.

Meanwhile, I think Jay McDonald had gotten himself fired because he had taken the story directly to Mansfield, and Mansfield didn't want to hear it. Finally Mansfield—probably at Baker's insistence—fired Jay McDonald. Magnuson made a plea for McDonald, and Mansfield said, no, he couldn't do that, that Baker didn't want him, and Baker was secretary and McDonald was his assistant. It really embittered Jay McDonald, who later became a Republican. I don't know if it was because of this, but he became a Republican out in the state of Washington at a later point.

I can't remember what particular incident triggered it, but it was something sensational in the press that finally seemed to blow the whistle on Baker. There was a big meeting in Mansfield's office. I was not a party to that meeting but I was outside. Baker was there; Kerr was there; some of the leading older members of the Democratic party. It went on for a good deal of time. Then Republicans came into the meeting. I think Sherman Cooper was one of them. I'm not absolutely sure of that, but I believe he was one of them. I think Dirksen came in at some point and John Williams. It was at that point that Baker was given a chance to resign, which he took. He resigned. Mansfield came out to me, as they were passing out to see the press, and he said, "You take over as acting majority secretary." Really, I didn't know which way to turn at that point. I knew of course what the secretary

did but I still didn't know how to count votes. I took over without knowing what that meant in terms of full responsibility. So when he came back, the first responsibility was, he said, "I want you to go down—take a lawyer—to Baker's office," and talk with Bobby Baker's secretary, a girl who later died in a plane crash out in Ocean City.

RITCHIE: Carol Tyler.

VALEO: Was it Carol Tyler? Yes. She said she wanted to go through the files to take out Baker's personal papers. He said, "You go down there and see what she takes out, and make sure the lawyer says its okay." So I took one of the policy committee lawyers and went down to the office and Tyler cleared out Baker's files. That was the first responsibility I had. By this time the FBI was hot on what was going on. I moved my office down there a couple of days later. I had my first interview with the press as acting secretary for the majority. It was a fellow from the *Washington Post*, Larry Stern. Of course, I had a couple of old friends, whom I mentioned earlier, Tony Vaccaro and Warren Duffy, from the AP and UP, because of our frequent Saturday meetings. I got a lot of national publicity at the time, began to hear from people named Valeo that I didn't even know existed.

I gave an interview to Larry Stern. We went through the interview, it was mostly on personal matters. When we got to the

end, he said, "You have a very unusual name. What is it?" I said, "Well, it's a pure Latin verb. My father was Italian. The name is valeo in Latin; if you look it up in a Latin dictionary you'll find it as such." He said, "What does it mean?" I said, "To have influence." He smiled and then used the line in the story the next day, he used it with humor, and in ways that didn't hurt me.

Well, at this point, the question came up: what to do with Baker, who was really in serious trouble. Now I began to sit in on the inner meetings of the party in the Senate as I had not done fully before. I had been at policy committee meetings and Steering Committee meetings, but where some of the linen had to be washed, I had not been in on any of that. I think Mansfield was trying to protect me, partly because he knew I was pretty naive in politics. So I began to sit in on these meetings. The decision had been made for a Senate investigation and the question was who was going to pursue it. I believe Humphrey was there, [B. Everett] Jordan, who was chairman of the Rules Committee at the time—a really fine lovable man, and a very decent human being—was there, Mansfield was there, and Smathers was there. You could kind of feel who was trying to protect Baker and who wasn't, and it was interesting to see the maneuvering that went around.

But the net result was poor Jordan got stuck with the job, as chairman of the Rules Committee. He didn't really want it. He

didn't dislike Bobby, I don't think he was particularly close to Bobby, but he didn't dislike him. As a matter of fact, Bobby had some deep-seated liberal enemies, but that was about all. He had done a lot of favors for a lot of people in the Senate. Jordan didn't want the job of doing these hearings, and the press later gave him a hard time with it—probably cost him his reelection. But the plan definitely was to go ahead with the hearings but to minimize them; don't go any further than you have to go. And Jordan had the job.

I was called as a witness for the Rules Committee hearings. It was my first appearance before a congressional committee. I remember the incident well. Jordan knew me well, and we were very good personal friends. As a matter of fact I still keep in touch with his widow, and it's twenty-five years later. The questions were routine, about when I took over as secretary. I was still only acting secretary at this point, I hadn't been elected. Mansfield kept it that way for a couple of months. So I appeared as acting secretary for the majority. What I remember most from the meeting was John Sherman Cooper, who was then the ranking minority member. He knew me, not well, but he knew me. He knew me through my association with Mansfield, and he knew that I had worked on the Foreign Relations Committee. So he began to ask me a series of questions about the Carousel and what had happened in connection with it. He wound up by asking me, "Did you go to

the opening party?" I just answered with one word, "No," no explanation or anything else. After the meeting, he caught me on the side. He said, "I had to ask you a few questions, but I don't think they hurt you." And he was right, of course. It kind of left me in the clear of being disassociated from Baker's friends and colleagues.

There were two other things that I recall from that period. This was immediately after I had taken over from Baker. The first one was an interview with an FBI man who came in. I thought he wanted to know about Baker's records and so forth, and he said, "What is this check that Baker sent to you?" I said, "Check?" He said, "Yeah, a check for \$64.28," or some such figure. I couldn't for the life of me remember it, what it could have been. I didn't remember Baker ever owing me \$64.00 or trying to bribe me with \$64.00. "Oh," I said, "my God, yes, I know what that is." I said, "That's the balance in the luncheon fund that Carol Tyler sent to me," because the secretary of the majority had custody over the funds for the Majority Policy Committee luncheons. Since he paid the bills, the members used to contribute \$25.00 or \$30.00 periodically. This was the balance that was left over, and Carol Tyler very honestly had asked me what she should do with it. I said, "Well, send it to me and I'll put it in the bank and we'll go on from there."

Actually, my present wife was then my secretary. She went down from Mansfield's office with me to take over from Baker. That's Beth Shotwell, who at that time was Beth Oliver, as I recall.

The other thing was an interview by Joseph Alsop. He called me one morning and he said, "I'd like to come in see you." He said it in this very imperious way of his. "Well, fine," I said, "anytime you want." So he came in. He said, "I want to ask you some questions, now that you've taken over in this job. Do you have any background for this?" Well, I gave him such background as I had. I said, "Well, I'll answer any questions you've got beyond that." Instead of asking me any further questions, he then immediately went into a long dissertation on how the Senate couldn't possibly run without somebody like Bobby Baker. If it wasn't Bobby Baker it would have to be somebody else, but there was no way in which the Senate could operate unless they had such a figure somewhere in the structure. The dissertation went on for at least ten or fifteen minutes. He never asked me a question. At the end of the dissertation he got up and put his hat on and said "Thank you, very much," and he left! I was absolutely flabbergasted. I had no idea what he wanted to know. He just wanted to make a speech and leave.

It was funny, because later on I mentioned the incident to Frank Meloy, who at one time, I guess, was head of the European desk in the State Department. Frank said, "I had exactly the same experience with him. He called me up one morning for breakfast. He said, 'Could you come to my house for breakfast, I want to ask you some questions about Europe.' I went over for breakfast and he said, 'Now what would you like? Would you like eggs or ham' and so forth." Frank gave him his order. Then Alsop said, "Now, I want to ask you some questions about Europe." Frank said, "He never asked me a single question. He gave me a speech about Europe. I never got my breakfast. At the end of the speech he said, 'Well, it was so nice of you to come,' and I left without breakfast!" That was Joe Alsop.

Mansfield told me a story about him once, too. This was in the very early period of our association. He said, "I was on the train going to New York and it stopped at Philadelphia. I was in the diner, and Joe Alsop came in. He sat down next to me and we started chatting. The train took off, and he said, 'Where have you been, Mike?'" Mansfield said, "What do you mean, 'where have I been'?" He said, "Are you going back to Washington?" "No, " Mansfield said, "I'm going to New York." Joe said, "Oh, Jesus, I'm on the wrong train!"

Well, the Rules Committee hearings brought out some of the manipulations of Bob Kerr in terms of campaign funding and gave a

strong indication that some of that money had stuck to Bobby Baker's personal fingers. The press got on it very heavily, of course, and the stuff came out about the club and the Carousel as well—some of it trivial, some of it of some significance. It was some time thereafter that Baker was indicted. But before that happened, the report on the Baker investigation was presented in the Senate by Jordan, with much trepidation. He was not an aggressive, contentious man. He put out what amounted to a mild report, and it was attacked, very vehemently, by Clifford Case, the New Jersey liberal Republican.

It was the only time I saw Mansfield become strictly, strictly partisan. He got the floor—I don't recall the sequence of the procedure by which he got the floor, but as I recollect there may have been a time limitation on the debate on the report. Clifford Case tried to get the floor back from him. Mansfield would not yield the floor, would not even yield for a question, and Case really hit the ceiling. He was a rather strict moralist and he knew there was something very, very fishy in the whole Baker thing and he just was furious with Mansfield, whom he liked and with whom he usually saw things the same way. But Mansfield would not yield. He felt, I think, that this was a party duty that he had to do.

It took Case a good deal of time to get over the heat that was generated in that debate. He never got the floor on the situation but he got it later on, or the next day, to make a long speech. By then the press heat had come off the Senate part of the investigation. I don't think Mansfield meant to protect Baker in this but I think he was trying to protect the Democrats and Jordan as far as that was possible. The situation was bad and Jordan's committee report, while it indicated there had been problems, did not treat the element of corruption with the kind of vehement outrage that Clifford Case and some of the other saints on the Republican side wanted at that point.

RITCHIE: John Williams made a big protest.

VALEO: John Williams also did something on it, I can't remember. He was one of the key figures.

RITCHIE: He stormed out of the hearing one day and called it a whitewash.

VALEO: Yes. Of course, he brought up a lot of stuff on the floor. I don't know who was feeding it to him, but there was a good deal of it. He was a strange man, John Williams. He did have a very puritanical streak, provided it didn't involve what you might call white-collar crimes. He seemed to be singularly blind to some of the depredations on the Treasury of big business,

or any kind of business. But he was a puritan in terms of his expectations in personal behavior particularly of public officials. He was very, very adamant on this point not only on Baker but on everyone else. One can say that in the case of Williams this was probably not partisan, although the impact of it was partisan. He probably meant it just because he was outraged by government people he felt were irresponsible with public funds.

RITCHIE: Do you recall, when you sat in on those damage control meetings, was there any concern about Lyndon Johnson's involvement in the Baker scandal?

VALEO: Oddly enough, I don't recall any reference to Lyndon on this. I don't think he was there, but I don't recall any reference as such. I think it was more the damage to the party than anything else, and how was the best way to deal with that. Mansfield, I know, favored the hearings. Some people did not want to have the hearings. Mansfield favored the hearings, felt it was necessary, that the heat was too much and that you couldn't evade it. But I don't recall that it was linked at that point to Johnson. I remember Hubert saying, "Keep it away from downtown," or something to that effect, but that was all.

RITCHIE: Do you think that Mansfield essentially gave Baker too much responsibility, or gave him too much of a long leash?

VALEO: It depends on whether you look at this long range or short range. One of the impacts of the whole Baker incident was that it resulted in practically the complete undermining of Kerr's influence, per se. He didn't live much longer after that, but the effect of this was to make people extremely wary of any kind of funds that might come from Kerr. That was one effect of it.

Given my way of doing things, yes, I would say that he gave Baker far too much leeway. But again, I think the full understanding of Mansfield's character involves a recognition of his tendency to do that, to an extraordinary degree, with people who later are destroyed by that or destroy themselves or at least have their wings clipped as a result. That's precisely what happened, not only to Baker but in a more amiable way, with the committee chairmen, which we'll get into as we go further into it. He showered them with privileges and rights, except he always would stress one-man-one-vote in the Senate, and we're all equal in the Senate. People would look at him and say "What Senate is he talking about?" But that was his approach, and ultimately it came very close to that. So if you look at it in that long-range approach, then one could say no, he didn't; he helped Baker to destroy himself in this process, which, of course, he did, politically.

RITCHIE: One of the quotes I came across was that Lyndon Johnson kept Bobby Baker too busy to get into trouble.

VALEO: Well, Lyndon was looking for all sorts of ways to get off the Baker thing. He said, "Yeah, he gave me a stereo once for a present for one of my daughters," or something, "but it was a strictly business association." Well, that was bull. It was a very close, close relationship.

RITCHIE: But the idea was that Johnson kept the Senate running so long and kept Baker running around so much that there wasn't as much time for his extracurricular activities.

VALEO: It sounds real, but I suspect that the extracurricular urge was there even before Mansfield took over the Senate. The difference was that Baker would never have thought of doing anything that would embarrass Johnson, in any circumstances. Whereas with Mansfield, he really didn't give a damn. He had, by that time, lost interest in the leadership. He felt he was cut free to do his own thing, and he did it.

RITCHIE: In Baker's memoirs, he has some sordid stories about procuring women for senators, and drunkenness, and private financial deals. He really makes the Senate seem kind of seedy at that stage. Is that a truthful or an exaggerated description?

VALEO: Of course, most of that was during the Johnson period. But bear in mind we're also talking about a period of social time, not much after the time when a Supreme Court Justice was reported to pick up a prostitute outside of Garfinckel's on Friday nights. That was Justice [Frank] Murphy, who had been governor of Michigan. So what sounds seedy in the present context may have seemed less so in that period. You didn't flaunt your vices but it was something which everybody suspected went on. There were such stories about Smathers, of course, many, many such stories, and about Jack Kennedy as well. It's hard to say who was the strongest womanizer in the Senate. I don't really know that any of them were that strong. Well, [Carl] Hayden had a reputation for this, up into his eighties—if it's any satisfaction to our older citizens! He had a very strong reputation for this.

But prostitution was pretty open in that period. Women were readily available, and the idea of linking sex with payment was not necessarily anathema—this was before it had become the free ride as it seems to be today. Basically, that was a part of Senate life, and I don't think, in the context of its time, any more corrupting than a lot of other things. Money was far less corrupting then than it is now. It's much more corrupting now. And Baker undoubtedly played the role he describes in the book. Well, I say undoubtedly; I shouldn't go that far. He may well have played

that role. He liked women himself. He used to boast about it all the time, and would have known where to find them if he were asked to find them.

RITCHIE: He considered that a legitimate part of head counting, I guess.

VALEO: Very likely! He was well known over at the Carroll Arms, where I guess the [Capitol] Police now hold forth. I don't know if he kept rooms over there, I guess he did. According to the stories, in any event, he had Carol Tyler set up in Southwest in one of the then-new townhouses in that area, and that these were supposedly the scene of parties. Again, I think there must have been a great deal of exaggeration by implication in the press stories. I don't think it was nearly as extraordinary as we make it out to be.

RITCHIE: Well, what was it like to take over as majority secretary after Bobby Baker?

VALEO: Before I get to that, I want to wind up the Baker story. I only saw Baker one more time after that in all the years. It was strictly by coincidence. It was Sunday morning. I was out with my wife and my mother who was visiting us at the time. We were walking in Georgetown and we wanted to stop to have a sandwich and we stopped at Clyde's in Georgetown, which was very crowded. The waiter finally sat us right next to Baker, who was

there with some woman. He sat about where you're sitting, and I sat facing him a little bit to his right. He immediately started up a conversation about how he was going to write a book. I had said, "Hello, Bobby," when I came in, and then dropped the conversation, but he kept persisting in trying to pursue the conversation almost to the point of trying to provoke me to hit him in the nose, I think. But I didn't. My son said, "Well, why didn't you hit him in the nose?" You know how kids are.

But he talked about the book he was going to write and how Mansfield was the worst majority leader the Senate ever had. He didn't say anything about me at this point, but he did say it about Mansfield, and that I wasn't going to look very good in his book. He said, "I was just down with Lyndon and I talked with Lyndon about something or other." I guess Johnson had left the presidency by that time. He went on for a while, and that was the end of it.

I guess what irritated me later on was that Mansfield had an interview just about this time. Somebody asked him about the Baker period; it was a press group that he had asked me to sit in with. He said, "Well, Baker was about the best majority secretary the Senate ever had." I thought it was getting a little late in the day for still holding to that line! Just as he used to say Lyndon was the best majority leader the Senate ever had. I thought he really could tone that one down a little bit, that it

was no longer necessary. But he persisted. We had a chance to edit the transcript of this interview, and I said to him, "Do you really want to leave that line in?" He said, "Well, you know, he knew how to count votes." I said, "Well, do you mind if I change that and say he was a very competent secretary for the majority, or something?" So he said, "No, go ahead and change it." But he stayed with his story right up till the end.

RITCHIE: This was probably in the '70s?

VALEO: It may have been as late as the '70s, yes. It was certainly long after the whole experience with Baker, and the Senate had already changed rather drastically at that point.

I guess Mansfield had a great capacity for keeping his eye on the main target and not being sidetracked by what would be the meat and drink of newspaper people, these small events which develop into a kind of flurry and then disappear within a week or so, or a month or a year even. He was really looking in terms of the legislative record, and in that context, one can understand a lot of the things that he was doing. I didn't fully understand it at the time, but in retrospect I can see it.

RITCHIE: Do you think one of the attractions that Baker had for Mansfield was that it freed Mansfield from having to do all the nitty-gritty of leadership?

VALEO: No, I don't think it had anything to do with that. I think it had only to do with his estimate of the power cores in the Senate and how best to deal with them. Mansfield was a hard working man, and the least of his problems was that he would have had to work a little harder. He just didn't know how to deal with that situation except in these terms. Maybe he was the only one who could have effectively dealt with it without splitting the Senate, or at least the Democrats in the Senate, wide open.

RITCHIE: Bobby Baker did have such a reputation for being the wheeler and dealer and the hard-nosed secretary for the majority. Did you find that people had that same expectation for you when you came into that position?

VALEO: No. I think they figured that anybody who followed Baker, that Mansfield would appoint to follow Baker, would have to be a somewhat totally opposite type, and if he came from the Library [of Congress], how could he possibly have any scandal attached to him? Unless he led a double intellectual life of some kind! But I think that was the answer. I was elected by acclamation then, after having been secretary for a while, handling it for two or three months. Then Mansfield thought it was safe enough to bring it up at the Caucus. I think I was great relief to them, because they knew that the Baker experience was unlikely to repeat itself, largely because Mansfield chose me to replace him and the spotlight was so strong on it. They wanted somebody who was a little

on the naive side, who could be ten points off on a vote, which I was at that point! I learned to count later, but at that period I was still pretty far off in my estimates, thinking always the best of people and assuming they would vote like I would vote on some items.

RITCHIE: Did you find that the other Democratic senators started coming to you?

VALEO: Yes, but not in the same way. No one ever approached me about "How can I get some more money" or anything like that. I never had any such approach. They knew that if Mansfield appointed me, I would be somebody very similar to him in temperament and in attitudes. So there was never any case of that. Not a single case. What I used to get—and I got it more and more frequently from Dodd Senior, Tom Dodd, as time went on: "Why doesn't Mansfield lead?" He would talk to me at great length in the lobby of the Senate. He said, "You know, we can't follow if he doesn't lead. What does he want on this?" I'd say, "Well, he wants you to vote your convictions." You know, what does *he* want?

There were some that were always looking for that. [Russell] Long of Louisiana was always irritated with him. There were flair-ups from both of these people, both I think partly alcoholic at that point, I mean the flair-ups were alcoholic. In both cases Mansfield adjourned the Senate to save them from embarrassment.

One was with Dodd, who began to make this speech quite vehemently, comparing Mansfield with Johnson—this was all extemporaneous—and saying how the Senate was going nowhere and it was ambling and doing nothing, and so forth, and they didn't have any leaders; we needed some leadership of some sort. Then Russell Long came storming on the floor in a drunken rage at another point raving against something or other and Mansfield immediately adjourned the Senate, because he knew what the situation was.

The Dodd outburst came just before Kennedy's assassination. I know that, because at that point, Mansfield was totally exasperated with the situation, and was beginning to think seriously of resigning as majority leader. He said, "I don't really think we can do it this way." He said, "I want you to write up a speech saying what we think, how we think it can be done, and say if they can't go along with that, well, it's their choice and they can decide."

RITCHIE: By "they," do you mean the Kennedy administration?

VALEO: No, the other senators on the Democratic side. No, Kennedy was not pushing Mansfield at this point.

RITCHIE: Once you stepped in the majority secretaryship, I assume the Kennedy people got in touch with you to try to push their program.

VALEO: Yes, I used to see Larry O'Brien a lot, and Mike Manatos a lot, but the Kennedy people played their own game. They had a large liaison office and they used to go directly to committee chairmen. I think they all decided there wasn't much Mansfield would do for them one way or the other, and they'd just have to do it themselves. Mansfield encouraged that. He said, "Go to the committee chairman," or go to so-and-so and talk to him. But he would not do it for them, as Lyndon would have been more than glad to do had he been majority leader.

RITCHIE: They didn't want you to do more, at this stage?

VALEO: They didn't want it because, again, I think they figured he's really only Mansfield's man and he wouldn't know what to do anyhow. I suspect that was their attitude at that point. It wasn't until Vietnam that some of the Kennedy people came back to eat some crow on some of these things. But in that early period, oh, Mike Manatos would come into the office. Mansfield's door was open all the time, so he really didn't have to come to me. It was not like Lyndon. Oh, I talked with them, but I didn't know a lot of them. I'd meet them. They'd come in and Mansfield would call me in sometimes if he thought there was something I should be aware of, so I'd sit in with them. I met most of them during that period, but I never had any private beating of a path to my door down on the terrace level; very, very little of it.

RITCHIE: Did you think that Kennedy's liaison staff was an effective one?

VALEO: Yes. Larry O'Brien was very good. Much of the interest at that point had to do with tax bills. The civil rights thing had been soft peddled.

RITCHIE: Medicare they took a drubbing on.

VALEO: Medicare probably had been beaten already. So that was not their doing. It is true, very little was moving at the time just before Kennedy's death, and there was very great unhappiness in many quarters. But if there were any tendencies to blame Mansfield for it, it would be that "he's too easy going," "he's too soft," "he doesn't want to antagonize anyone." But all the while, Mansfield was building up his connections on a personal basis, particularly with Dirksen. The relationship with Dirksen improved steadily. There were some issues Mansfield was able to carry in this period, only because of that developing relationship with Dirksen. One, of course, being the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which as we mentioned earlier in connection with Hubert Humphrey, then was picked up again by Kennedy.

Well, there were two things I dealt with them on this early period. The first item had to do with a U.N. appropriation, which was running into a great deal of resistance on the Hill. I think it was an additional appropriation of some sort. Mansfield was

trying to win over enough Republicans to carry this appropriation for Kennedy, who wanted it very badly. I remember, he sent me down to see Ted Sorenson, who was writing a speech on it, to give him some advice on what needed to be said by Kennedy to be persuasive in the Senate. Aiken had finally come around, and he said, "If you do it this way, I'll go with it." I was the messenger to relay that to the White House, and to Ted Sorenson in particular, who was putting the speech or the message together for it. I did that, but there was not a lot of that in that period. Mansfield let the White House pretty much function on its own. He said, "If it's Senate business, we'll take care of it; but let them take care of their own."

Then came the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This was the first, I think, real payoff of the Mansfield methods. I think that had he not won Dirksen over, there would have been no chance of passing it. He had Jackson against it; he had Goldwater against it, and they were big guns on issues such as this. I expect [Robert] Byrd was against it among others, I don't remember. But he had won Dirksen over to it. I remember the speech. He made a very passionate speech and Dirksen rose to the occasion and made it even more passionate with his favorite phrase: "An idea whose time has come," which he used in civil rights; he used it in many of the key votes of that period. He went along with it, and that carried the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Mansfield always deferred to Dirksen, permitted him whatever rights he wanted on the floor. Dirksen found he didn't have to fight for anything. It was all there, waiting for him. In the same way, Mansfield's treatment of the committee chairmen, many of whom were Southerners and who were opposed to many of the measures of the Kennedy administration, his treatment of them had the effect of reducing their hostility to these measures, or at least the expression of their hostility to these measures. They recognized him as being a very amiable and very decent and totally responsible leader; that they could trust his word completely. And when he came out in favor of a measure, even though they were opposed to it, they were less inclined to make vehement speeches which would have roused other members who were shaky on some of these issues, like the fellow who was junior senator from West Virginia, just retired.

RITCHIE: Jennings Randolph.

VALEO: Yes, Jennings Randolph. There were a number of people who waited to hear before making up their minds, like Jennings Randolph. So if you cut down the pressure to go in the other direction, they would normally go with the leadership, and that made the margin, I think, on a number of these critical measures.

RITCHIE: Do you think Mansfield just assumed that he had time on his side? That Kennedy was going to be there for a while and that they were slowly going to build their program?

VALEO: I think Mansfield still thinks he has time on his side, and he's eighty-five or thereabouts. It was his nature, that if we don't do it in this generation we'll do it in the next. That's the Chinese influence. It's an important element in Mansfield's character.

His attitude toward the Kennedys I found very confusing. I think there was certain natural pride since Kennedy was an Irishman and he was—he would never say this. Very often in Montana he was supported not as an Irish Catholic, but as a Protestant Mansfield, probably from German background. He let that stay confused. He never played up his Catholicism in any way near the way that Kennedy did. But I think there was a certain natural pride that another barrier—not pride, so much, but another sense of satisfaction—that another barrier to equality had been broken in the country. That, I think, is another key to Mansfield's personality; it is this need to break down barriers to equality. Some places he saw it more easily than in others. On the black question, it came slower, but he recognized the basic need to do this. He was very much a constitutional purist in every sense of the word. That's why we got along so well on issues, because I felt pretty much the same way.

RITCHIE: But his style was certainly different from the Kennedy administration's emphasis on getting everything moving again.

VALEO: Oh, yes. I'm sure there must have been a lot of irritation with him, at times, because he would not move. Maybe he over estimated his opposition, and there might have been one or two items of importance that could have been carried a year or two sooner, had he used Johnson's method; but I think if you look at the total record, it would have been drastically different if he had used Johnson's methods, it would not have been as favorable, nowhere near as favorable.

I think the period of Mansfield's leadership, if you add up measures of importance, would rank among the greatest in the history of the country. Certainly it would be something very close to the first two years of the New Deal, especially in social legislation. Now, that's not all Mansfield's doing, by any means. But in politics some of it's luck, some of it's being in the right place at the right time. Allowing for all of those factors, Mansfield's leadership was also another factor, because when the flood of Great Society legislation came—which I regard still of high importance to the nation, no matter what the present administration would think of that—when that great flood came, it

came through virtually without opposition in the Senate. It just poured right out. But we'll get into that another time.

RITCHIE: Were you around the Senate on the day that Kennedy was assassinated?

VALEO: Oh, yes. I remember it very, very vividly. I had someone for lunch in the restaurant, and I came back from lunch alone. I saw these long faces in the office. I said, "What's the matter?" I guess it was Beth Shotwell who said, "Didn't you hear?" I said, "No." She said, "Kennedy's been shot." It just took my breath away. Mansfield was not in the office at the time, he was out on the floor. I went out on the floor immediately. He was saying at the time, "We had better all pray." I don't know who I asked, but I said, "How serious is it?" He said, "It's very, very serious."

I had been working on a speech that was to be the response to Dodd, in effect. It was supposed to be done on that day, as a matter of fact, or the next day. The speech was Mansfield insisting that he was going to be himself, no matter what happened, and if that meant they had to find another leader, they could go find another leader, but he would not do it any other way. The speech was later put in the *Record*. He never made the speech, but he put it in the *Record* right after Kennedy's burial, saying that he had planned to make this speech, but that he had no

stomach for it, in view of what had happened, but it belonged in the *Record* so he put it in without making it. But it was a speech in effect making it plain that if they couldn't do it his way they might just as well get themselves another leader. It's ironic, because it was beginning after that that the full pay-off of his kind of leadership became apparent.

The word came through that Kennedy was dead. Mansfield adjourned the Senate and made arrangements to go out to Andrews to meet the plane coming in. He asked me to go along, and George Aiken. We went out in his car. We were bucking traffic going out, it must have been about 6:30 or so. We finally got out to Andrews. Well, the plane didn't get in till about nine o'clock or later. I remember that scene at the airport so vividly. I guess the newspapers wrote it up, but I remember it as a personal thing. The plane came in. Jackie was the first one to appear in the doorway of the plane. You know, it was a strange impulse. You didn't know whether you wanted to applaud or cry or what. You applauded so many of these arrivals in the past that it seemed like the logical thing to do, and yet obviously it wasn't, so obviously you didn't. She was blood-spattered, and came down the steps, and then Lyndon came out at some point. Meanwhile they lowered the casket through some sort of an elevator arrangement. She came down and went with the body in the hearse. Then Lyndon came down. Of course, he was already president at that point. We

all went around to shake hands with him and wish him well. He was very sad. The press was with him. I think he just said we'd carry on and do whatever we could. He had already taken over, in effect.

Then came the days of the funeral; it was really a very, very sad time. It was a family sad time. We had an Irish housekeeper at the time and she cried through the whole period.

RITCHIE: Senator Mansfield made probably the most moving eulogy at that funeral.

VALEO: Yes, I can give you the story of the eulogy. I have a copy of it at home, autographed by him. He came in in the morning or sometime that day and said, "We're going to have to do the eulogy. I've got an idea we can use." He picked up this thing about a ring; he showed me a clipping from the newspaper where somebody had used the phrase, something about a ring. He said, "See what you can do with it." So I took it home and I worked, oh, I guess 'till three or four in the morning on it, just to reduce it to some kind of poetry. It seemed to me that it really called for that. In any kind of drafting I did, I always used an approach that seemed to come naturally. There were a number of times when we did speeches in poetic language, if not actually poetry. This occasion obviously fit that.

I came in the next day with the draft. He liked it. I think he showed it to Maureen Mansfield, and she liked it. He showed it to Pastore, who happened to come into the office, and Pastore looked at it. "Damn good," he said. He made one or two suggestions on how to improve it, which we adopted. That's what Mansfield used. There are recordings of it. They're not very good recordings of it, but there are recordings of it. Afterwards, the thing created an enormous stir in the country and abroad. I had never seen anything that we did have quite that impact. I always had the feeling that there was a lot of guilt involved in that reaction. A lot of people had probably said at one time or another, "I wish that guy would die," and when he did, they felt all kinds of guilt, and somehow or other this was a natural way to atone for it. A lot of letters came in from people you just knew were not normally Kennedy supporters, although there were plenty from those who were. There were thousands of letters and they kept coming for months.

The eulogy was eventually translated into about twenty-five languages, as I recall, and circulated widely abroad. Then, of course, we got another response. People would write up variations on it, and ask for a reaction to it. It was put to music. It was part of a symphonic poem which was used on Kennedy's birthday, as a symphonic reading, on a number of TV anniversary shows. It was put to music in a popular song by some songwriter, giving

Mansfield the royalties. He turned the royalties over to the Kennedy Foundation or the Kennedy Library Fund. It really had an extraordinary circulation. It obviously touched a note which had a lot of meaning to a lot of people.

During the whole period of mourning at the Capitol, we were there almost all the time, through the night and what not. It was a very sad, sad time. Jackie Kennedy called Mansfield later to tell him that he had said what she wanted to hear. I can remember his telling me that or something to that effect.

RITCHIE: It's the only eulogy that I can remember from that ceremony, and there must have been plenty of others.

VALEO: Yes. I guess [Earl] Warren did one, and there were several others at the time.

End of Interview #7

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Interview #8

Wednesday, September 18, 1985

RITCHIE: After Kennedy's assassination, how quickly did things begin to change with Johnson in the White House?

VALEO: Well, of course, everybody was pulling for Johnson at that point, after the Kennedy assassination. There was some muttering at Johnson, poor Johnson, because it happened in Texas, unrelated kinds of hostility still being expressed to Johnson. But basically everyone really wanted Johnson to take over. And he did. He was smart enough to keep on the whole Kennedy staff, almost intact. The splurge of Great Society legislation, which was about to come, was really the fruition of the first two years of the Kennedy administration, when he had many experts and many politically creative people working on a program which he eventually expected to present. I think it would have come about the third year of his administration, had he lived. So, in effect, Johnson really picked up the ball from Kennedy.

I think, at least my impression was from the way he behaved from then on in, at least for the first two years, that Johnson was determined to prove that he could do this program, because of his legislative skills, in a way that Kennedy would never have been able to do it. If all other things were equal, that

is probably true. Johnson had enough understanding of the legislative process and would have brought in people who had sufficient understanding of it to move a great deal of this legislation, whereas Kennedy and the people he brought in did not have, in all cases, that kind of legislative acumen. But all things were not equal. There were many other things that favored Johnson when he came in.

First of all, we had the massive national sympathy for the death of a young and very popular president. And with Johnson, you had an older man saying, "I'm going to do what he wanted, come what may," and everybody would nod their heads in agreement, "Yes, we have to do what he wanted." So you had that kind of thing working for Johnson. In addition to that, you did have Johnson's power among the southern legislators, which Kennedy did not have at any time; Southern legislators who would want Johnson to succeed, whereas they would have been not necessarily hostile to Kennedy, but indifferent to his success. Then, I think, the final fact was that you had Mansfield in the leadership, which set the stage almost perfectly for the kind of program that was about to be pushed forward as the Great Society legislative program.

I remember Johnson's "We Shall Overcome Speech." I don't know who did it, might have been Dick Goodwin, because he kept him on at the time along with Walt Rostow and others of Kennedy's group. Or it might have even been Ted Sorensen, who was really an

outstanding speech drafter. But the speech to a joint session was very moving. He got a tremendous and very heart-felt ovation in the House chamber, and he was off. I guess he had his eye on Bobby Kennedy, even then. He was always concerned about Bobby Kennedy. He knew Bobby Kennedy was the political manipulator under Jack, and he knew that Bobby Kennedy really did not love him. But he bided his time to deal with that. On the executive side you can get that from other sources better than I can give it to you. I was only looking on as an observer, and I would catch an occasional comment in the meetings which I attended.

I was at this time secretary for the majority, either acting or elected, I can't quite remember how the chronology had worked out. We began to get this flood of legislation. The attitude expressed in that Mansfield speech, right after Kennedy's assassination, about the legislative situation in the Senate, was kind of reflective of what was going to come later on in the legislative program. People just didn't want to be bothered discussing it, even. I mean, they were just prepared to vote for it in most instances. They had their minds made up one way or the other, and most were favorable to the program. It was essentially this long-neglected social situation in the United States which the legislation of the Great Society was designed to correct.

Dirksen became more and more cooperative with Mansfield. This was partly Mansfield's doing. Mansfield handled Dirksen

beautifully. He deferred to Dirksen a great deal. Dirksen responded. Dirksen was a bit of a ham, and he loved the spotlight. He was not a fool; you couldn't win him over by blatant flattery, and Mansfield never tried that, but he did defer to him, and Dirksen responded extremely well to that kind of treatment. As far as I know, he never crossed Mansfield, never took delight in a defeat that Mansfield may have suffered. He still remained very partisan, and there were a couple of points you could press the button and Dirksen would become extremely partisan. But it was never directed at Mansfield, it would always be directed at other people on the Democratic side whom he thought were trying to maneuver him or manipulate him. He was a charming man. I got to know him very well during the civil rights debate because I spent a lot of time in his office, but we'll defer that until we discuss the civil rights question.

The Senate moved pretty much as Mansfield wanted it to move. It was a nine to five thing, well, actually a twelve to five, or eleven to five. He began an interesting practice: he began coming in a little earlier, sometime in this period, to accommodate people who wanted to make speeches. So instead of making them at the end of a session each day, they'd make them at the beginning, and the Senate would wind up normally about five or six o'clock. I can't recall any really serious hang-ups in the Senate until the Civil Rights bill in this period. But, again we come back to the Vietnamese

thing, and Mansfield constantly had his eye on that, and I had my eye on it as well. Johnson simply continued Kennedy's policies for the time up until the '64 election. A lot of good legislation was passed, but the key piece was the Civil Rights bill, so we really have to go to that now as the main legislative problem in that period.

As you looked around the Senate after Kennedy's death, there were really no changes in the membership of the Senate and probably no great likelihood of any changes in votes. The outlook at that point was still rather grim for civil rights. Mansfield, and certainly I would have concurred, was persuaded there was only one way in which this issue was going to be won and that was by getting sixty-seven votes, which was what was needed for cloture. That was not going to be an easy task. You couldn't possibly do it without Dirksen's cooperation. You had to envision a line of division in the Republican party on any issue, which again in the context of the time would have been called a liberal issue, a significant liberal issue and you could count on six or seven Republicans falling on the Democratic side. Well, with the Democratic majority and losses in the South you could pass a lot of legislation on that basis. But if you needed sixty-seven votes you had something that was entirely different. You were talking then about midwestern, western Republicans, and Dirksen above all, because a lot of people went the way Dirksen went on the Republican side. On

liberal issues they were normally on the conservative side, normally against it, but in an extreme situation they might be persuaded to go in the other direction.

The details in which the bill came up elude me now, except that it was suddenly decided, I think on the basis of what was happening in Atlanta and Birmingham and other places, that civil rights legislation could wait no longer, that it had to move, and if it didn't the country was going to have some very serious problems, in the South in particular. So the decision was made in the administration and conveyed to Mansfield, who was still reluctant to face the issue, that it had to be faced and it had to be done. It would have been in '64, so it would have been the second session of that Congress. The decision was made early in the Congress, or perhaps not too long after Kennedy was assassinated, that we had to go this way, and one way or another, we'd have to make the attempt. It was going to be win or lose but we had to make the attempt.

The question came up of how you were going to do this in the Senate. I wrote a memorandum on this—I don't know if it's in the record—on an approach. By this time I'd learned a little bit about how the Senate worked on the floor and I felt myself competent to do that kind of thing and offer that kind of advice. I wrote a memorandum on how the thing could be approached, if we were going to have any chance of doing it, taking

into consideration the leader's determination that it was not going to be done by anything other than a cloture vote, unless there was a yield on it before, which was highly unlikely. I had watched, in the previous years, two debates on civil rights, and studied very carefully how Russell, who was the leader of the southern forces in the opposition to it, worked. He enjoyed an alliance with the Senate rules, which are great rules, providing you assume that time is endless and that everybody will be gentlemanly and not excessively use time. Well, if you accept those two premises, then they work fine. But obviously, they are easily manipulated without violating them. It's just the way they are set up to protect every individual member in the fullest exercise of his rights, and if all people choose to exercise their right fully, or even a half a dozen, the Senate is in trouble. To hold up the Senate in that period you didn't need more than seven or eight members in agreement, and that only had to do with questions of exhaustion, because there was no way that the Senate could pass a measure which seven or eight senators were determined to oppose until their death, if you will—at least legislative death.

Russell knew the rules well, he was a delightful man in that respect. He knew what he was doing on the floor at all times. He did it with a certain amount of deference and a certain amount of aggressiveness. But basically he was a graceful man and he knew

how to handle himself on the floor without antagonizing anyone deeply. But he could tie everybody in knots because of his knowledge of the rules. I don't know how many times people like Paul Douglas and others would think they'd found an answer in the rules and they'd come forward and try to hit Russell head on, and then all of a sudden they'd find themselves flat on the legislative ground again, because there was no way in which you could use the rules to beat a determined, small group of opponents.

The thing was that Russell, while in the business of winning, always looked as though he was being badgered and beaten. That was the secret of his effectiveness. He would say, "Here we are, holding out, just a small group of patriots trying to make the Senate see the light, and we are being pushed and pilloried." Well, of course the exact opposite was true. The six or seven who were in opposition were pushing and pillorying the overwhelming majority, but the majority didn't realize fully that was happening. In the previous Civil Rights bill debates that I had watched, the proponents would come out in pajamas for quorum calls and Russell would have them there all night long, while he would be home sleeping. All he needed was two people on the floor and they needed fifty-one.

The key to passage of the Civil Rights bill became the holding of a quorum on tap at all times. If you could do that, it seemed to me, you could focus sufficient attention on the issue to

make the public realize that the situation wasn't at all as it was being contended, that these five or ten people were winning a great victory over the others because of the Senate's archaic rules. Then you could paint the opposition as really serious obstructionists on a very important national measure. So my first recommendation to the majority leader was that he organize an ever-ready quorum for the Senate. You could only again do this with Dirksen's cooperation, because there weren't enough Democrats allowing for absenteeism and occasional situations in which they could not be there, to keep the quorum there at all times.

There were two main attorneys on the civil rights issue. One was on the Majority Policy Committee, a fellow named Ken Teasedale who had been recommended by [Stuart] Symington and came from St. Louis. He'd been in the Justice Department briefly. He was heart and soul with the idea of civil rights legislation. He was a very bright lawyer and a very fine fellow with a good sense of humor. The other one was Neil Kennedy, who was Dirksen's attorney, I believe, on the Judiciary Committee. Neil was an extremely conservative Republican, but once Dirksen had made up his mind to go on civil rights, Kennedy was prepared to go with him. We had a number of meetings, myself and Teasedale and other Senate lawyers; there were two other lawyers on the Republican side and Ken Teasedale had a couple of assistants whose names escape me now.

The first order was for the policy committee attorney, Ken Teasedale, to work with the Republicans to organize a regular roster at least two or three weeks in advance for guaranteed appearance at the Senate. We knew that we had about fifty-eight people or thereabouts who were willing to do a little extra in order to pass the bill. The rest might have voted with us, but would not necessarily want to do any extra work. So that gave us eight people who could be off at any given time, but there always had to be the fifty-one on call. They organized the quorum and fifty-one did appear regularly and promptly.

Before this was done, Humphrey was brought into it. Mansfield had decided that there was no way in which a bill could go through the Judiciary Committee, that [James] Eastland would block it as chairman, no matter how you tried it. There was no way you could possibly get it through. So he decided that the only way would be to do what amounted to the committee work right on the floor of the Senate, in effect with the Senate sitting as a committee of the whole. He had only one man in mind. He never considered anyone else but that it would have to be Hubert Humphrey who would carry the ball on the floor. Of course, Hubert was more than anxious to do it. It was the thing that he was born for, to do this civil rights bill. When he got the bill he mastered the problems and legislative technicalities almost within a day or two. He had a full grasp of what was involved in it. He

also had very strong lines out to civil rights groups, Negro groups and others, to the labor unions, some of which were supporters of the measure. He could use them to try to bring some pressure to bear on individual members. Mansfield would never do that, but Hubert had no qualms about doing it. In a way, it's part of the proper procedure, the constitutional right to petition. So Hubert was designated to run the show on the floor, and to carry the substantive part of the debate.

Again, the critical factor in breaking the filibuster was to hold that quorum on the floor at all times. A corollary of that was that you would have to take the lead away from Russell in terms of tying up the Senate. Russell always tied up the Senate when there was a filibuster. He would not let the committees meet while the Senate was in session, for example, which is permissible under the Senate rules. One man at that time, one objection, would have prevented committees from meeting. Of course, Russell would do that, and then senators with little interest in the measure on the floor would be irritated at the people who were pushing it because it interfered with their committee activities. When we started on the Civil Rights bill, Mansfield announced right off the bat that no committees would be permitted to meet while the bill was under discussion on the floor, that all other business of the Senate would be stopped until the Senate faced what was then the most critical issue in the country. Russell was

taken aback by this. He was quite surprised. He looked up at Mansfield. Mansfield was stealing his thunder in effect.

But the difference was that public opinion in the country had shifted from a position of essential indifference to civil rights; it had now become activist in terms of wanting to see civil rights legislation. Except in the South, this had become a major factor of influence, stronger in some places than others, but no one in the Midwest at this point needed to fear a positive vote on civil rights for any reason. That would be true also in the West, as well as in the Northeast, which was, of course, the citadel of the push for civil rights legislation.

After the maintenance of the quorum on the floor at all times there was a decision to take the bill out of Eastland's hands. That was done by a parliamentary maneuver which was a perfectly proper one. When the House bill came over, Mansfield intercepted it at the door. That prevented a routine referral to the Judiciary Committee. It meant the bill would lay on the table, subject to referral or to direct taking up by the Senate. Eastland did not push that issue. There was some ritualistic outrage at violating the Senate's normal procedures, and so forth, but by that time, everyone knew that this was the only way that you could possibly move the bill. Ironically, Wayne Morse defended Eastland's prerogatives in this, and if I can recall correctly, Mansfield offered to send it to the Judiciary committee for three

or four days, with the understanding that it would be reported back on a day certain, which meant that it could no longer be bottled up in Eastland's committee. I don't remember whether we actually sent it or not. It made no difference in the outcome of the bill. The bill then was on the floor of the Senate and in effect had been taken up.

If you recall, I mentioned we had gotten cloture the previous year of the session against a Wayne Morse filibuster. That had been a harbinger for what might come later. One of the effects of that was to weaken the arguments that people from the West would use for not voting for cloture, although professing to believe in the content of a bill. The reasoning went something like this: we're small states and the cloture rule is designed to protect us as small states, therefore even though I'd love to vote for gun control I just can't vote for cloture on it; if you can get it to a vote we'll be glad to vote for it, but So it was a way of straddling and walking on both sides, although many westerners, such as Carl Hayden, took it very seriously. He made a point to say that he had never voted for cloture in his life and he meant not to do that. But it was really an escape hatch for difficult pieces of legislation for many of them.

The debate droned on from day to day. Russell tried his usual tactics, which was to suggest the absence of a quorum, make it live, count the heads; this time fifty-one would show up. Mansfield

lengthened the session till about six o'clock in the day, but he would go no later than that. Meanwhile, word would reach us that Johnson was raving: "Why doesn't Mansfield go round-the-clock? Why doesn't he go round-the-clock? That's the only way we'll ever get civil rights legislation." Well, Mansfield wasn't about to go round-the-clock, and Mansfield told him that he was going to do it his way—or sent word back that it would have to be done this way or it wouldn't be done at all. And Johnson deferred to that.

I don't know whether Johnson understood that this was the only way you could really get a major Civil Rights bill at this point. He had in mind the experience by which he'd gotten the initial civil rights bill after many years, which had something to do with voting rights. But what we were talking about here was a bill which in the case of the expansion of rights for blacks was tremendously different. Maybe ten times as many aspects of civil rights were involved in this as were involved in the original voting rights bill. That is not to make light of the voting rights act; that was an important bill and it began to open the gates for what was coming later. But this was a geometric expansion of that bill. It involved public facilities, it involved giving teeth to the voting rights, it involved just so many things that had to be done, and for which the riots were taking place, or were the sources of the riots.

The debate went on, and Russell saw what was happening. There was irritation now in the committees that couldn't meet—I guess Mansfield made one exception to that, and that was the Appropriations Committee, because the bills would have to be available at the end of civil rights debate in any event. I think that was the only exception that was made, but all the other committees were stopped from meeting. They were furious, because this was where you got your publicity and this was where you presumably did your creative work in legislation. But this time the blame was not on the leadership; it began to fall on those who were filibustering the legislation. The reason that it was possible to shift the blame was because Russell could not make the majority look foolish. Once you had a quorum on the floor, there was no way in which you could make the majority look foolish. Several times, as the debate wore on, we didn't really have the quorum, but the Southerners began then not to push it to the limit. They didn't want people called back, because there was enough irritation with them already. And we were determined; we had the sergeant at arms ready to pick them up and bring them in as necessary if the quorum was forced to a live quorum. So they avoided doing that. After having tried it several times, and seeing that we could produce a quorum within a half hour or there about, they dropped that as a tactic. They simply droned on in speeches to keep the Senate going and to prevent a vote, hoping, I think, for a compromise.

As the process wore on, we began to pick up a vote or two for cloture. This was being done in several ways. It was helped by the pressure generated by Hubert's allies on the outside, who were constantly around. Mansfield did not want to meet with any of the people who were pro-civil rights. He stayed completely out of that aspect of it; he left it entirely to Hubert. We began to get public announcements here and there to this effect: if this goes on much longer, I may have to vote for cloture. It was very clear at this point, that was the only way the legislation was going to be brought to fruition. There would be no compromises on the substance of the legislation itself, except for adjustments that were necessary, but that would not be the basis for passing the bill. It would be done by cloture and no other way. And you began to hear people who were shifting or on the fence, or said, "Give it another week, and we'll see; then maybe we better go for it." These were reports of progress that kept coming back to us from either Hubert's people or our own policy committee people.

We were adding up the votes. I was keeping a very close tally. I was extremely conservative in my counts. I wanted to be sure we had them. Then word came down one day through Mike Manatos, who was Larry O'Brien's assistant in the legislative liaison office of the White House for the Senate. Mike Manatos had been in the Senate; he had worked for a [Joseph] O'Mahoney of Wyoming, at one period, so he knew the Senate quite well. He was

an amiable person. Everybody liked him. He spent a lot of time working in the Senate. He worked the offices; he was around all the time; he knew his job. He was constantly talking with members or staff people.

So he came down one day, I was in Mansfield's office—oh, before I get to that, I've really got to give you something else: what was happening was that we were meeting very regularly in Dirksen's office, with his group of pro-rights people, who included not only the staff people but in terms of senators it included Jake Javits from time to time and the fellow from Nebraska . . .

RITCHIE: Roman Hruska?

VALEO: Hruska. Hruska was a lawyer, he had a very legal mind. Hruska eventually voted for cloture. He was for it, but he wanted the bill delineated precisely. Bobby Kennedy used to come down occasionally. More often than not he had the tall fellow who later became attorney general . . .

RITCHIE: Ramsey Clark?

VALEO: No, not Ramsey Clark.

RITCHIE: Or Nicholas Katzenbach.

VALEO: Katzenbach used to come down. And the best one he had was a chap who later became legal counsel to IBM. He was an outstanding lawyer. Do you remember his name? A very bright, extremely bright lawyer.

RITCHIE: Burke Marshall was down there then.

VALEO: That's who it was, Burke Marshall. He was awfully good. Not only was he good, but he didn't rub people the wrong way. Katzenbach rubbed people the wrong way, and Bobby Kennedy had a lot of natural, in-built enemies. I personally think Burke Marshall did more than any of the lawyers from the Justice Department to move this bill in the Senate, to work out the legal compromises which satisfied the lawyers, and there were many at that period involved in it. They were all lawyers, almost, except Dirksen was not, I was not, and Mike Manatos was not, and of course Mansfield was not. These meetings would occur frequently. They were designed to hold Dirksen, who assured everybody he was for civil rights, but also to help him make adjustments that would enable him to get key people on his side to go along.

So while the debate was going on on the floor, this was going on in the back rooms, mostly in Dirksen's office, by Mansfield's insistence. He had a bar back there, and they'd sit around by the hour and try to work out various legal questions. Then for some reason or other they moved over to Mansfield's office, and they

were housed in the back room of the majority leader's office, the Justice Department lawyers. I guess Dirksen needed his office for other matters. So the Justice lawyers mostly sat around in Mansfield's back office, playing with words and waiting for something to develop, or if there were questions, trying to answer them. That was the actual working arrangements. They would work mostly, not so much with me or Mike Manatos, but more with Ken Teasedale and Neil Kennedy. Neil speaking for Dirksen, and Teasedale speaking for Mansfield in those exchanges with the Justice Department lawyers.

The thing went on, and we kept adding up votes. We were getting two or three over the sixty mark when word came down through Mike Manatos one day from the White House. He said, "I was talking with the president, Frank. He thinks this has been going on too long and he's got so many other things that we have to do. He wonders how he can help to perhaps speed it up." I looked down the list of senators and I said, "Well, Mike, if he wants to do it, he might try a call to Bourke Hickenlooper. There's no reason why Hickenlooper shouldn't eventually vote for this thing, but he's now on the negative list. He's not with us. Ask him to give Hickenlooper a call; he always liked him. See if he can persuade Bourke to consider going for cloture." Two days later, Manatos came back and he didn't say anything to me. I asked, "Did you tell that to the president?" He said, "Yeah, I did and he said,

'What the hell's the matter with Frank?' That was his response. 'He's asking me to get Bourke Hickenlooper? That's like asking me to get Strom Thurmond to vote for civil rights!'"

I laughed. I went out on the floor shortly thereafter and I found Bourke Hickenlooper in the Republican cloakroom. He was an old friend of mine from traveling with him on Foreign Relations Committee business. He always liked me personally, even though our views weren't the same. He said, "Come over here and sit down Valejo." He always called me "Valejo." I sat on the sofa next to him. He said, "How's my valet?" That was a reference to something that had happened on one of the trips we were on together. It was an election year for him in the '50s, and Drew Pearson had done a column on him, or Jack Anderson, who was then Pearson's assistant. They had a column on Bourke Hickenlooper that said: "We're glad to tell the people of Iowa, where Bourke Hickenlooper is running, that the senator was not traveling in the Far East with his valet." The column said, "We received an anonymous note that Hickenlooper and valet were traveling in the Far East." This was a typical State Department wire that had obviously misspelled my name. He said, "The person he was traveling with was somebody named Valeo, and he's a legitimate staff man from the committee." They called him out there, I guess Anderson called him—he later told me the story. Anderson asked him, "Is it true that you were

traveling in Asia with your valet?" He said, "What?" You know, you'd have to know Hickenlooper to know how ridiculous that was. The last thing he would want was anybody near him helping him with his clothes. He said, "What the hell are you talking about?" Anderson said, "Well, I've got a copy of an authoritative wire here that says you've been traveling in Asia with your valet." "Oh," he said, "for Christ's sake, you mean Valeo." And that was the way the story had developed.

Anyhow, I sat down next to him. I said, "I've got a funny story for you." He said, "Well, go ahead and tell me." I related the story, right down to the Strom Thurmond part, of what had come from Lyndon Johnson. Hickenlooper got very red in the face. He obviously didn't appreciate being linked with Strom Thurmond, who was then a militant segregationist. He said, "Well, what the hell. He doesn't know what he's talking about. I've got nothing against civil rights, it's just that the goddamn bill is no good. If they'd make some changes in it, maybe I could go ahead and support it." I went back and I told Mansfield what had happened. He said, "Go in there and talk to those lawyers"—this would have been Katzenbach and the other Justice people. Mansfield said, "You and Mike go in there and tell them I'm going to bring Hickenlooper in here and they're to make any changes in the bill that he wants." Then he called Hickenlooper. I was there when he

called him. He said, "Bourke, I understand you're not satisfied with the bill. You know, it's not frozen. Why don't you come on over here and talk to these lawyers. I'm sure you'll find them very amenable to changes."

Well, we had gone in to tell the lawyers in precisely the words of Mansfield how they were to treat Hickenlooper. Hickenlooper came in, he sat down. I don't know how much he was hostile to the actual bill itself, but he went through it. "Well," he said, "that phrase ought to be changed. That won't go." Of course, lawyers hate to give up any words they've already gotten in, but they swallowed hard and made three or four really minor changes in the bill. "Well," he said, "that's a hell of a lot better bill than it was." He said, "I'm not giving you any promises, I'm not saying I'm going to vote for this, but the bill is a lot better now than it was before." Well, the debate went on then for about three days more, and then I heard that Hickenlooper was ready to vote for cloture.

I knew that once he went, we would get the rest of the votes, because there were three or four people over there on the Republican side with about the same measure of interest in the bill that he had, who would go the same way he went and were waiting for his lead. People like [Jack] Miller of Iowa and that real snippy fellow from Nebraska, [Carl] Curtis. There were three or four of them over there who waited for Bourke Hickenlooper's

lead on this thing, and I knew they were waiting for it. So we thought we had it. We counted and we came up with sixty-seven or thereabouts. We had Hayden in reserve. Even though he had never voted for cloture, he said he didn't want to vote for it, but if his vote was absolutely essential he would vote for it. He had reached the point where he thought it was the only thing to do. We had Clair Engle of California in the hospital, very seriously ill. We didn't know whether he would be able to come out. There were a couple of dubious votes, but we thought that we had it, and we were ready to make the attempt.

Mansfield put the cloture petition in, and the real ardent supporters were anxious to get on the cloture petition. I think we had to put an extra one in so that they could all sign it. The petition went in, and [Sam] Ervin of North Carolina immediately began to put dozens of amendments into the hopper so that they would be in order if cloture were adopted. Then that day came for the vote. I had my own list. I was right on the total but with one switch. I think we got sixty-seven or sixty-eight votes, I'm not sure. I was conservative on that, I think I had one under what we actually had. Clair Engle was the dubious one. He came in. He couldn't talk. I think he suffered from a brain tumor, and had to be supported on both sides. But you could see from the expression on his face that he was voting yes and he was so recorded. I guess it was the last great moment of his life. It was a very

moving thing to watch. Hayden was in the backroom, waiting if necessary to give his vote; it wasn't needed.

It was really a tremendous moment, and a tremendous moment in American history. Without that, I don't know where we would have gone as a country. But that definitely cast the die. Afterwards, Mansfield did not even show up for the press. He pushed Humphrey out there and he pushed Dirksen out. He pushed everyone else, but not himself. I don't even think he was there for the press interview. But that was exactly the style that he worked on anything of that kind.

Well, we had cloture. We didn't have a Civil Rights bill, but everybody knew that cloture was going to be the key to it. Something occurred then that shows the influence of trivial decisions on what happens later. We still knew very little about how the cloture rule would act, because there were so few precedents. The ones that existed, except for the Morse experience, were way back in history. Cloture hadn't been done since, I guess, 1917 or 1918. As you know, the cloture rule gives you an hour of debate for each member, nontransferable after its adoption. It also provides for no dilatory tactics, and that sort of thing. Well, here was this big pile of Ervin amendments that he had put in just before the rule went into effect. He was getting prepared to go through them and prolong the struggle against the Civil Rights bill by delaying tactics. Well, how did you handle it?

Ervin would introduce an amendment, then he'd call a quorum, and force the clerk to call the roll. It would be a live quorum, you'd get at least fifty-one members, they'd vote down the amendment. We had agreed at this point everything would be dropped; we would defeat any amendment that came in. Both leaders agreed. Unless it could be done by unanimous consent they would just defeat them. We had the votes. It couldn't be debated more than the set period of time. But with that pile of amendments, the post-cloture period could have gone on a long time; just reading them would take time.

Ervin sent word up to the desk, to Charlie Watkins, who was then the chief parliamentarian, by way of Floyd Riddick, who was his assistant and was keeping the time records. Floyd relayed the message. I happened to be standing there when it was relayed. He said, "Charlie, Senator Ervin wants to know how are you going to count the time on amendments? Whose time is charged for the quorums calls? And whose time is charged for the reading of the bill?" Charlie Watkins, God bless him, said, "Oh, we won't charge it to anyone." He said, "Just charge his debate time when he debates the amendment, but don't charge the reading time and don't charge the quorum time." I heard this, and I said, "Charlie, do you know what you're saying? He's got 150 amendments there. Just reading them can hold this thing up for another two or three weeks at least. And if all the opponents had done the same thing, you know what that could mean. The cloture rule would mean nothing."

"Oh," he said, "Frank, don't worry about it. He'll get tired of it. After he does a few of them, he'll get tired and he'll stop."

So the word went back to Ervin. Well, he did get tired of it after two days—I think partly through Russell's prodding that he better drop it. But Russell was a sensible man, and he knew the Senate. Ervin was prepared to listen to Russell's guidance on something of this kind, so the thing was dropped. But the next time we had a cloture vote, the same question was asked officially of the chair, and according to the advice of the parliamentarian, the president of the Senate or the presiding officer of the Senate replied, "According to the precedents of the Senate, the time for quorum calls and reading will be charged to neither side." So the cloture rule, which was the only weapon that you had to combat a prolonged dilatory tactic, was in effect completely sabotaged by that casual advisory of a parliamentarian, even though his analysis was correct for Senator Ervin.

Later on this casual ruling became a new way for exploiting the cloture rule and reducing it steadily to irrelevance. We're almost back to 1919, but not quite. But what it did was to compel the leadership to try to get cloture even more easily. Mansfield got off his high horse of saying "I'd never go for majority cloture." He didn't quite get that, but he eventually got it down to sixty votes, by progressive adjustments of the rule. He began to run

into people like the senator from Alabama, whose name escapes me. He served briefly; a nice man, but he learned and exploited the rules very well.

RITCHIE: Oh, James Allen.

VALEO: Yes. And Allen saw how you could easily circumvent the intent of cloture, and he used to manipulate it all the time. Then he'd go into league with Jesse Helms or someone else. But Allen was much smarter on how to handle the rules. In many ways, that one off the cuff advisory of Charlie Watkins has determined the pattern of the Senate's behavior on these critical issues more than any other single thing for the past two decades. Of course, Byrd, when he became leader, I'm told, spent all sorts of time trying to figure out how to put teeth back into the cloture rule as amended unofficially by Watkins' interpretation and how to make it more effective. It was as simple as that in the origins this problem.

There was one other thing I remember from the civil rights debate, it was I think after we got cloture, or after Russell had made his last speech in opposition to it. He came off the floor and he went over to the elevator which was right outside the majority leader's office at the time, and I was headed towards the majority leader's office. He had rung for the elevator and was waiting. He looked very tired and beaten, and I made some casual

remark to him. "Oh," he said, "what a hell of a way to make a living." I laughed and he smiled sadly and got on the elevator.

RITCHIE: All of this was taking place prior to the presidential conventions.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: Did national politics enter into this debate? Barry Goldwater was a member of the Senate, and eventually wound up voting against the Civil Rights Act.

VALEO: He voted against civil rights. No, I think Goldwater knew he couldn't get the black vote, such as it was, at that time. I think he was playing for the Southern white votes, which was still then predominant. He probably anticipated it would remain that way for a considerable length of time, if he thought of it at all. But that also reflected Goldwater's behavior. His reactions were very much those of a southerner, and a very conservative southerner.

RITCHIE: Did that enter into the discussions with Dirksen at all, on what effect it would have on the Republican party?

VALEO: No, certainly not in my presence. There may have been a great deal of it among Republicans themselves, but it did not come up during the mixed party discussions. Dirksen was the real hero of the bill, in my judgment, in the Senate—Dirksen and

Humphrey. Humphrey was flawless in his handling of the substance of the bill. He was such a bright man. And Dirksen moved a lot of his colleagues among the less conservative on the Republican side. Bourke Hickenlooper eventually was the key to the more conservative Republicans. He was the decisive figure in that sense, on the counting of the cloture vote. When he went, I knew we had it.

RITCHIE: From the way you've described it, it sounds as if Johnson really was not intimately involved.

VALEO: That's correct, he wasn't. He never was. He never understood how it would be possible to do it by cloture. He'd already been away from the Senate for a period of time, and things change, attitudes change so fast. Unless you're there all the time, listening to what's going on and picking up reactions to the news everyday, you very quickly lose touch with the changing trends that are occurring at all times in the Senate. It flows all the time. At this time it was flowing very heavily towards civil rights, and he didn't realize that, I don't think at that point. He was already beginning to get the isolation of the White House. So I think it caught him quite by surprise that Mansfield was able to do the bill in the way it was done.

Of course, he claimed most of the credit for it later. Again, he deserves some, only in the sense that he cooperated very

strongly with the civil rights groups on the outside and gave them a kind of carte blanche in blessing which helped to increase the impact of their pressures on the more reluctant members. But he himself played virtually no role in it. It was all done, insofar as there was a role, it was done by the Justice Department, and not much even by Bobby Kennedy. I come back to the people whom I thought were critical, and Burke Marshall I would put at the top of that list. He was very effective with Republicans in persuading them to make adjustments, or giving in and yielding to things which they wanted changed in the bill, in a way that Katzenbach, who was a sort of arrogant man—he was intellectually arrogant—would not be willing to do. He would make a big mountain out of a molehill, very often. But Burke Marshall knew how to move and maneuver, and he was a smart lawyer as well. I certainly would give him top credit.

Bobby Kennedy was interesting to watch in that period, particularly in Dirksen's office. I guess I saw him two or three times. He was still feeling his way on the bill. Again, I think it had finally registered on him how deep the feelings were in the black community. I'll never forget reading about his meeting with [James] Baldwin, the black novelist, in that period; and Baldwin's comment afterwards: "I never saw such incredible naivety." I think that probably shocked Bobby Kennedy and probably began to make him think more deeply. I always thought that marked a

turning point in his attitude on Negro rights because he was like a kind of naive kid up until that point. But after that he began to see it more and more deeply, and I think by the time of his death he was very much emotionally involved in the issue.

RITCHIE: Would you say that Johnson's being on the fringe of this issue, or at least not intimately involved in the Senate side of it, was that similar to other bills in '64? Was he getting more personally involved in legislation?

VALEO: Very little involved. He was amazingly little involved in legislation. He'd call committee chairmen once in a while, rarely Mansfield, on a bill. He even called me once on a foreign aid bill, at home on Christmas Eve. I got on the phone and the first thing he said was, "I always said the best thing about you is your wife." That was his typical way. It came as a complete surprise to me. We had had a late session, and he was wondering what was going on. It was over a foreign aid tie-up and he was wondering what was going to happen, how it would get through. I gave him the best that I could in terms of my estimate of the situation. But he liked to do that. He liked to startle people. Of course, it delighted everybody to have a call from the president, including my young son at the time!

RITCHIE: Well, he got a tremendous amount of credit for everything that got passed that year.

VALEO: I know.

RITCHIE: Do you think that the press just assumed that because he was Lyndon Johnson, who had been the super majority leader, that everything was attributable to him?

VALEO: Yes, it was partly that, and partly that Mansfield never had a press agent, never had a press secretary, and didn't want one. He had no desire to have a press secretary. Mansfield would smile when these things would happen. It would be a very slight smile, but I could detect it, when somebody would say, "Oh, Johnson's done this thing." But somebody once said Mansfield was like a cigar store Indian, he was very poker-faced, and he would very rarely make any comments except to praise the president always. Or he'd say, "I've always said Johnson was the best majority leader the Senate ever had." He would use phrases like that, all of which would feed Johnson's ego. The press just took it as face value. They didn't know the inside story. Very few of them followed it closely. Oh, there were a few like Joe Stern of the *Baltimore Sun*, who probed a little more deeply. Sometimes Ned Kenworthy of the *New York Times*, and others, who had a better sense of what was going on, but it was limited. Most of the press get pretty superficial when it comes to handling the Senate.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that is?

VALEO: Well, they're always looking for the drama, and the drama's really a sort of afterthought. The real achievements in the Senate are not dramatic, they happen before the drama. It's only when you lay that sort of groundwork that the drama can happen. There are certainly dramatic moments in the Senate, but they have nothing to do with the way the thing has reached that point. It's usually agonizing, slow, miserable, tedious work. As Mansfield once said to me, he said, "Frank, you can do anything you want in the Senate provided you live long enough and you have enough patience." And that was the way he did it, by patience and living long enough, in the sense of being majority leader for such a long time.

RITCHIE: You mentioned at one point that he was not a lawyer.

VALEO: He was a historian, actually.

RITCHIE: Do you think that that affected his style and the way he dealt with the Senate?

VALEO: Oh, very much so. He could ignore minor things in bills and it would not trouble him at all, whereas lawyers have great difficulty doing that. Very few of them can take a broad view. They think that piece of legislation or a phrase in it is it, and that's the end of the world. But he never saw it in those terms. He saw it in the long view. He thought like a historian.

I think what he did in the Senate, in changing the Senate, was a kind of outgrowth of his historical background, plus his Chinese experience. He was very much involved in China and fascinated by China, always, in all the period I knew him. The Chinese view was also the long view. I think that those two things—and also a Chinese attitude, a predominant philosophical view in China of the bamboo as the ideal, of bending with the wind and not breaking. It's a little like "the last shall be first" kind of philosophy. Not really going too strongly against the tides, but trying to move the tides gradually in the direction you want them to go.

He was a very different kind of man in that job, and it did make for a very different kind of Senate. I don't know what would have happened on civil rights if it had not been done his way. My guess is there would have been a compromise. We would have gone around the clock and there would have been some kind of compromise which would have been a very much watered-down bill, which may very well have been inadequate for the then prevailing emotional situation in the country. You could have seen a great deal more violence. We saw a lot as it was, but you could have seen a great deal more violence as a result. So I think that his insistence that there would be no compromise on the bill, his insistence that the Senate would have to face the issue, really was a great service to the country. And I'm not sure Johnson would have handled that at all had he been in that position. He would not have

realized the depth of the combined anger and anguish that existed in the black community at that time and the measure of sympathy with the blacks in the rest of the country.

RITCHIE: Yet Mansfield himself didn't have very much of a record of seeming to be concerned about civil rights issues.

VALEO: No, as far as I know he never hired a Negro on his staff. He never felt he had to go into tokenism. Of course, he came from Montana, where there are very few Negroes. But as far as I can remember there were no Negroes on his staff. I don't think he would not have hired them, I mean be opposed to hiring them, he just never did.

RITCHIE: Didn't you hire the first black secretary to work for the Senate?

VALEO: That was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me the story of that?

VALEO: When I was in the Library of Congress, I had a very small division, and they were about to let one of the girls from the typing pool go. I needed someone at the time, but apparently her typing wasn't very good. I had seen her as a very pleasant person, and obviously hard working. Whether it was good or bad typing, she was over that typewriter all the time. I asked Ernest Griffith to give her a chance in my office. I needed a typist and

I offered to take her. She was really worth her weight in gold. The typing ability was not very great, but she had a marvelous telephone manner. You know, there are some people who in effect say, "We're completely at your service," when they answer the telephone; others say, "Why are you bothering me?" Well, she belonged in the first category, and her manner was an extremely valuable asset. When I went over to the Foreign Relations Committee, I needed some secretarial help. There was a secretary in the Foreign Affairs Division at the Library, plus this girl, whose name was Thomasene Smith. She was from Tuskegee, had had a college education. She was not a good typist, I mean she really wasn't, but she did have a good manner and I thought that important. I needed to bring someone, and I think somebody on the committee staff asked me to bring someone over from the Library. Thomasene came on a loan arrangement. She so quickly proved her effectiveness on the committee that when I left they insisted upon keeping her there. So she stayed on at the Foreign Relations Committee for many years.

RITCHIE: Didn't you say that people mistook her for a Puerto Rican.

VALEO: Oh, that was Mansfield's administrative assistant, Peggy DiMichaels, who was very much impressed by this girl when she saw her on the Foreign Relations Committee staff. She said, "You know, Frank, I'm looking for someone up in the Montana

office." Well, I didn't really want to lose her at that point. She said, "I need someone like her." I said, "Well, you know, Peggy, she's not a very good typist. But she has a nice manner." She said, "What is she? Is she Puerto Rican?" I said, "No, she's black." So, I don't know. I'm sure that isn't the reason why she wasn't hired for the Montana office. I think more the fact that I had stressed that she was not a very good typist.

RITCHIE: That was when Mansfield hired Salpee [Sahagian] on his staff.

VALEO: Then he hired Salpee, on my recommendation, again through Peggy. Peggy was a difficult woman and I knew that you'd have to find someone who could live with Peggy or it wouldn't work. I guess Salpee had been over to see me and had asked me about making a change to come over to the Hill. I said, "Well, if I hear of anything I'll be glad to let you know." Just about that time, Peggy asked me if I could recommend someone else from the Library, and I mentioned her. I said, "She's awfully good but she's a little shy." Well, that didn't bother her. She interviewed Salpee and decided she'd take her on. She had Salpee in the Montana office. The Montana office, I don't know much about it, but it must have been a difficult place to work. Salpee Sahagian, who was long-suffering was not given to complaining, I'd ask her, "How's it going," and she'd give me a "what have you done to me?" sort of look. I'd say, "Well, be patient, be patient."

Then when Mansfield became whip, we needed someone in the office right away, and he said, "Who shall we hire?" I said, "You know, it's your choice." He said, "I'd like to bring someone over from the Montana office." "What about Salpee, shall we bring her over?" I said, "She's fine, she'll be very good." So that's the way it started. She worked with both of us. Then when I left to become secretary for the majority, he insisted upon keeping Salpee in his majority leader's office where she stayed until he retired.

RITCHIE: When you did hire a black secretary, there was no precedent in the Senate for it. Was any hostility to the idea of a black secretary?

VALEO: No. I think there may have been a sort of a taken aback kind of feeling, that there was a black secretary working on the Foreign Relations Committee. But it wasn't hostility as such. You couldn't be hostile to someone like Thomasene Smith. She was a lovely woman. I guess Tom Connally was still on the committee—well, maybe not—he may have been gone by then.

RITCHIE: Walter George was probably there.

VALEO: Walter George was certainly there, and Walter George had no problem with it. It was just at the beginning of the change. This was not too long after the Brown decision. We're talking about the fifties. There were blacks working on the Hill, but they were mostly in sort of menial jobs, tending offices

and that sort of thing. And a secretarial job on the Hill was regarded as a fairly high position. There weren't many.

RITCHIE: Washington was still pretty much of a segregated city.

VALEO: It was a segregated city. I remember the first time we took some of the people from our office at the Library to lunch across the way to desegregate a restaurant. It was a big experience to do that for a lot of the people in the office. I remember I had a white secretary at that point who shared the prevailing prejudices. I wanted to give a party for the staff at my apartment and told her that we were going to invite everyone on the staff, so would she send out the invitations. She came back and said, "What about her?" Referring of course, to the black assistant. "Oh," I said, "yeah, it might give us some problems at the door of my apartment building. Somebody's liable to say 'go around to the back,' the servants around the back or something like that." I said, "I'll tell you what, I want you to do me a big favor. I want you and your husband to bring her with you so we don't get into that kind of a situation." Well, she looked shocked when I asked her to do it, but she did it.

That was the way in which you broke them down, if you could, some of the divisions which nobody was really to blame for, it was part of the atmosphere. Certainly the individuals involved were

not to blame for them. We were exploring a new area of human relations in that period. I mean, you still had black people riding on the backs of buses and trolley cars in Washington.

RITCHIE: And the theaters and restaurants in Washington were segregated.

VALEO: Oh, certainly that.

RITCHIE: So that must have added something to the atmosphere that the members of Congress, even if they didn't come from Southern states, were used to in Washington, dealing with a segregated society.

VALEO: They were, yes. Now, I don't know what was the experience in the Northern offices, whether any were hiring blacks at that point for positions of responsibility, and I'm sure some of them must have been. But I never saw it. I think it would have been more common on the House side than in the Senate, if it existed at all.

RITCHIE: I think Senator Humphrey had a black staff member, because he integrated the Senate restaurant by taking him.

VALEO: His black secretary?

RITCHIE: His black staff member, a man who later became governor of the Virgin Islands.

VALEO: Oh, yes, I remember the chap. That was later.

RITCHIE: Blacks waited on tables all the time, but he was the first black person to sit down and eat a meal there.

VALEO: Yes, there was a very famous maitre d' who had been there for fifty years, named Paul, who was black. He was a clever maitre d', he was not an Uncle Tom in the old sense of the word, he knew how to handle himself extremely well, and was very highly thought of. Then there was another waiter, a man named King, who only worked the press table. The press just adored him. I think he was responsible for most of the deficits in the restaurant's accounts, he used to treat the press people so liberally when they came in to eat down there in their own room.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you in general about that year, '64. You mentioned you wrote that memorandum and you were feeling a little bit more confident in your position. How did you see your job as democratic secretary? Was it growing?

VALEO: Oh, yes. It was growing, and I was learning how to handle it. In that period I'd already gotten a great deal of insight into the way it worked. I was briefing people at the back of the chamber as they came in for votes. I used to play games with myself there. Senators came rushing in on a vote and would ask: "What's the vote?" as they came on the floor after the bells. You'd have to try to give it to them as rapidly as you

could. So I'd play games with myself to see how I could reduce the meaning of an amendment into a minimal number of words and still be understood.

There was one amendment in the civil rights bill about boarding houses being exempt from the civil rights bill if they had less than five or six guests. It wasn't an Aiken amendment, but George Aiken had made a classic speech on it the day before, favoring the amendment, saying "If you've got Mrs. Murphy's boarding house with a few roomers, you don't want to include it under this legislation." I remember when the amendment came up. Members started coming in and they'd say, "What's the issue? What's the amendment?" And I got it down to "Mrs. Murphy's boarding house." Four words, and everybody knew immediately what the issue was. You'd try to figure out a way to interpret the legal language of the amendment into something that would be meaningful and yet very quick to explain it.

RITCHIE: Now, when the senators would come running in for a vote like that on an amendment, would most of them tend to go with what the party position was?

VALEO: No, because Mansfield would never lay down a party position or very rarely laid down a party position. There wasn't any such thing, really. But people would say, "What's Mike doing on this?" Very often I would say, truthfully, "I don't know. I

don't know what he's going to do." He usually would hold his vote to the last, just to prevent people from following his lead on it.

RITCHIE: Why was that?

VALEO: I don't know. He wanted to avoid even the slightest semblance of pressure on members.

RITCHIE: Well, then did certain other members become pivot men. Did they say, "What is Hubert doing on this?"

VALEO: That would happen occasionally, Russell on opposition strategy to civil rights for example, but nobody became a pivot. Mansfield wanted each senator to think for himself, that's basically what he was pushing for. It was part of his grand design for the Senate, which was a kind of historic approach to it. It was the Senate of Websters, and Calhouns and people of that sort that he was after.

RITCHIE: Did you ever get a sense that people voted against bills because they were identified with other senators whom they just disliked?

VALEO: It may have happened, but I don't recall any singular instances of this. The other way would be fairly common. Somebody would say, "What's Proxmire done?" largely because they had the same interest that he had, not because they favored him on everything, but on that particular measure they felt that he had

the logical lead on it because of the circumstances of the measure itself. But, no, it was not a negative. People didn't oppose. This would have happened during the Johnson period, but not during Mansfield's period. More and more it became the kind of Senate he wanted: each individual thought out his own position, certainly on the major pieces of legislation.

The net result of this was more and more they needed staff, because if they had to have their own position on every bill, if they were not going to follow somebody else's lead, then they needed to know more about it. So consequently some of them began to try to keep staff on the floor all the time for amendments. Well, this got to be a problem after awhile. The floor got more and more crowded and Mansfield got more and more furious at the number of staff people on the floor. Occasionally he cleared the floor of that, but that was later on when the staff situation had grown very rapidly and had maybe multiplied several times already. He still wanted senators to do it themselves, and I think in a way unfairly. You know, if you're from Montana you don't have the kind of pressures that you have from a variety of constituents that you have in California or in Illinois or someplace like that. I think he never fully appreciated that aspect of it. Having come from Montana, it was more feasible to think in terms of Senate of the early nineteenth century than it would be if you were from New York or from Texas.

But he kept pushing for that kind of a Senate. He kept resisting staff expansions. I remember there was a lot of pressure for him to put people on the Policy Committee staff, and I think he turned back about sixty percent of the funds we got every year for the Policy Committee because he refused to hire any more staff. Now, I don't know how many there are in the Policy Committee, but at that time there were never more than about two or three professionals at the most, and they were lawyers primarily.

RITCHIE: Well, he wasn't interested in generating press releases, and that seems to be a large part of what the Policy Committees do now.

VALEO: Never interested in that, except in one or two issues. One issue, of course, was Vietnam, as that issue developed, and the others would have been Montana matters. Eventually he was interested also in China.

RITCHIE: What's your opinion of the low profile he kept with the press?

VALEO: He once told me, and I don't think this was his motivation, but he once said to me, "You know, Frank, we had a sheriff somewhere out in Montana. He had to get elected every year. We had an election for sheriff every year, and he was elected thirty times. And that man, the whole secret of his

success was, when anybody would say something to him about something, all he would say was, 'Uh-huh.'" Obviously, he didn't go quite that far, but he took that to heart.

He was never interested in making an egotistical impression. He could answer questions in one or two or three words and not make a long speech on things. The press would be bewildered by it. They were not used to this kind of treatment from political figures. The net result is they usually ran out of questions and they looked foolish. They didn't like that, but they knew it was their own fault. He was perfectly willing to answer questions as long as they wanted him to. I watched him a number of times. He would meet with the press once in a while in a group, but it usually would be on an issue of foreign policy that had come up in some way and he felt he had something to say on it. They had difficulty handling Mansfield. The net result of it was they either shied away from him, decided he wasn't much of a leader, or they liked him and they respected him for his integrity and his finding it unnecessary to make an impression. I think that overwhelmed them, that there could be people like that in politics.

RITCHIE: There are still very few, I guess.

VALEO: There are very few, and there always have been very few. Let's talk a little bit about the '64 election, which comes in quite naturally here and which I remember. It was the only

convention I ever went to. My association with the election started out by my being asked to check on several Senate races around the country on behalf of the Democratic Campaign Committee. I went to Texas, where Ralph Yarborough was running against [George] Bush. I went to Arizona, where Roy Elson, who was the brother of the former Senate Chaplain [Edward Elson] was running against an incumbent.

RITCHIE: Was it Paul Fannin?

VALEO: Yes, I believe it was Fannin. And I went to New Mexico, where [Joseph] Montoya was running, and to Oklahoma where [Fred] Harris was running. It was my first exposure to politics at the grassroots, so to speak. It was a very fascinating experience. I was misled on the Elson election. It looked so sure fire that I reported that one back. I was right on the others. Yarborough won handily against Bush. Harris won easily in Oklahoma, and Montoya's was a close race, but he won it. And I had called them that way. But I learned something of politics that way, and sort of enjoyed it.

I came back and we were ready for the convention, which was in Atlantic City that year. Mansfield did not go to many conventions, but he was going to that one. He said, "I want you to come up, too." There was a lot of discussion in the press then about who Johnson's vice presidential candidate was going to be.

Humphrey, of course, fresh from civil rights, was being pushed by liberal groups. Dodd of Connecticut, his name was dropped in the hat. Some people were mentioning Mansfield, and a few other names were around. Oh, George McGovern was there, but at that time he was pushing Humphrey.

RITCHIE: Eugene McCarthy was also mentioned.

VALEO: Gene McCarthy was in the picture. There were a number of people in it. I wondered why Mansfield was asking me to go to the convention. When I got there, I found he had a large suite, which was probably supplied by Charlie Englehart. Englehart owned a lot of Atlantic City, I think, among other things. Englehart was pushing Mansfield. I stayed in a motel somewhere nearby. I asked Mansfield what he wanted, if he needed anything. He said no, just to keep my eyes open. But I wasn't at all sure, so I sat down to try to write out an acceptance speech for the vice presidency. I assumed that that was a genuine possibility at that point. We had not yet had the blow-up on Vietnam with Lyndon.

Lyndon was still posing, in effect, as the peace candidate and warning that Goldwater was going to drop the bomb if you elected him, and what not. There were Democratic ads on TV showing the whole country blowing up, and then Goldwater's picture following. Democrats, no less than Republicans, can be pretty dirty in

campaigns. So I thought Mansfield would make a good contrast to Johnson as a candidate. I guess Bobby Kennedy was also being mentioned and pushed by other groups, but that seemed so remote. Johnson let it all boil along with everything else. The Kennedy mystique was still extremely strong in the country.

I simply could not write a speech on such a shoestring. I just could not get it. It sounded so ridiculous. I said, "Well, I'll just do it in three hours, if it happens." So I dropped it, but I watched what was happening I wandered around through the various hotel corridors, talking with people like McGovern and others. It was still very much up in the air about who Johnson was going to name. The keynoter that year was Pastore, by the suggestion of Mansfield. Traditionally the majority leader of the Senate has named the keynoter for the convention. He had chosen Pastore, and Pastore did a magnificent job on the speech. They were very close and very friendly at that time, Mansfield and Pastore.

Well, it went on and it was jockeyed around and of course it came down to Humphrey at the end. I'm sure that was basically labor union influence. I never was able to tell whether Mansfield was relieved or disappointed by that. Again, he's a complex man, and there may have been a little bit of both in it. I mean, he was relieved on one hand, but probably, in my judgment, disappointed. He expected Johnson to perhaps name him. But I think,

by this time the civil rights experience was beginning to separate them. They didn't see it the same way, they didn't see the Senate strategy the same way, and Mansfield was beginning to gain stature as majority leader. And I don't think Johnson wanted that. He really did not like anything that even remotely suggested a rival. So that was the Democratic convention, and as far as I know, Mansfield never went to another one. I certainly didn't.

The result of Pastore's keynote speech, which was well received throughout the country, was that Pastore came back to Washington flying real high. He expected Mansfield to name him as whip. Mansfield, following his usual procedure, said no, he didn't name anyone, it was up to the Democratic Caucus to elect the whip. It disappointed Pastore greatly. They had a rather serious—not a serious split, but their relationship cooled thereafter and never really regained the warmth that it had had in the earlier period. Pastore got very irritated with Mansfield, began not to criticize him but to be far less cooperative than he had been prior to that time.

RITCHIE: Russell Long had been critical of Mansfield's leadership before, and now he became whip.

VALEO: He became whip, replacing Kennedy, because of the Chappaquiddick. No, Kennedy beat Russell Long. Russell Long didn't become whip, I don't recall.

RITCHIE: No, Russell Long did become whip in '65.

VALEO: He did.

RITCHIE: And Kennedy beat him in '69, and then Byrd beat Kennedy in '71.

VALEO: Was it something like that? The chronological history of it really fades. But I remember Pastore's disappointment in not having been named. Russell Long got it, and Russell Long, of course, was no friend of Mansfield. He was a difficult, and in some ways, I think, a very destructive man. At that period especially he was drinking heavily and pushing oil interests, and not doing much beyond that.

RITCHIE: So Mansfield's style of hands-off denied him a whip who would have been an ally.

VALEO: Who would have been an ally, but probably also a replacement. One has also to consider that. Whereas I don't think Russell Long would ever possibly have been a replacement for him. I can't imagine that happening, his reputation being such as it was around the Senate. But I thought that it was unfortunate that Mansfield lost Pastore at that time, because Pastore was a valuable ally and would really go to bat for him on the floor, and in the Policy Committee.

At that time there was a change that I think I should mention. During the Kennedy administration the policy committee met periodically and did very little. I mean, we just took the lead from the White House and soft peddled the committee. But it developed a regular meeting pattern. The committee chairmen group would also meet regularly, mostly to do legislation. Whereas Johnson would have used those committee chairmen meetings to badger members and to beat them over the head to bring out legislation, Mansfield would even say to Eastland, "How are you doing on that civil rights legislation?" And Eastland would say, "Well, we're working on it. We're going to have a meeting next week." "Oh, that's fine." And we'd go on like that. He would never, or rarely, put any kind of even remote pressure on a committee chairman. Of course, they liked meeting with him. It was a good lunch, and at that time they weren't paying for it. Later on, I think he established a fund so they had to pay for the committee chairmen lunch. But they were really meeting just to keep in touch because you rarely saw them on the floor. The floor became the place of essentially inaction, except for votes, apart for the one vote on the civil rights bill, which came later.

I have one further recollection of that early period. I remember a friend of mine who, I guess, was head of the Washington School of Psychiatry at the time, or he headed an Association of Washington Psychiatrists. His group was so afraid of Goldwater,

they wanted to put money into the Johnson campaign. He said to me "Frank, my colleagues and I are planning to put some money into Johnson's campaign. We're so afraid of this Goldwater. He's a warmonger, and we just can't stand it. We think Johnson's fine. What do you think?" Well, I liked Johnson on the one hand for his social views, which were pretty much the same as mine. But I didn't want to say that you can't count on this guy not going to war, if that's what you're putting your money on. On the other hand, I didn't feel as though I could betray the Democratic party. So I said, "Well he's a nice man." They put the contribution into his campaign, and it came back to haunt me later. He said, "You know, we did that on your advice!" But it was all friendly and it didn't go as far as a lot of us feared it might go in Vietnam.

Once Johnson became president and the war deepened in Vietnam, the policy committee under Mansfield began to come into a different function, which was to express differences of view with the president. It became essentially an independent group. Mansfield always tried to go along with the administration, but on Vietnam less and less could he do that. Of course, that came after Tonkin. But the policy committee then began to take on its own personality. And it was a rather unique one. I guess that's a good stopping point, isn't it?

End of Interview #8

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE VIETNAM WAR
Interview #9
Wednesday, September 25, 1985

RITCHIE: The last time we mentioned Vietnam, it was about your trip there in 1962, with Senators Mansfield, Pell, Boggs and Smith.

VALEO: Right, Smith of Massachusetts.

RITCHIE: After that trip, the situation in Vietnam really began to deteriorate very badly. I wondered where you saw things going in 1963, as there were all the demonstrations in the streets . . .

VALEO: And the Buddhist monks, those immolations. I'm trying to remember now whether we reacted initially the same as everyone else on this. The main thing I think that Mansfield was concerned with in this period, and I would have certainly shared that concern, was that Johnson was going to get in deeper.

RITCHIE: This was still Kennedy's period. It was '63. This was after your trip in '62 when Mansfield came back and saw Kennedy.

VALEO: He gave a report to the president. Kennedy didn't like it. The main thrust of that report was to try to prevent a

deeper involvement. But the pressures on Kennedy, particularly within the administration, were going in the other direction, and he was slipping into it, whether he liked it or not. I think they raised the military aid group in Vietnam to several thousand in this period. It was getting heavier and heavier. Mansfield would make an occasional speech and try to keep some lid on it, but he was not able to stem that tide. The pressure in the other direction was there. People like Hilsman, and Walt Rostow, I don't know how much the Bundys were involved in it, but basically the pressures on Kennedy from his own intimate group were to deepen the involvement. So I think Mansfield sort of stayed away from it, other than occasional statements.

RITCHIE: Do you think he had given up hope on Ngo Dinh Diem by that stage?

VALEO: No, except that he recognized that Diem had slowed down quite a bit and that he didn't know how much longer he was going to be up to it. He certainly had no alternative in mind. At the same time, in the administration—they were looking for some good Vietnamese administrator who would follow our instructions a lot more readily than Diem. Basically, that's what they wanted, and that was the administration's dissatisfaction with Diem. He was too stubborn, he would not go our way.

There was one incident that I don't know if I've related already. It was an extremely important one that came up in this period, because it shows how the administration was pushing, in what direction, that is, the Kennedy advisors were pushing. That was a visit from Diem's brother, who was the Catholic bishop of Hue. He asked to see Senator Mansfield, and Mansfield had him to lunch. (He was coming through the United States.) We had him to lunch, with just the three of us present. The bishop said that the situation was difficult, but it was certainly not unmanageable. The problem was his brother's (Ngo Dinh Diem) stubborn attitude that was difficult; he didn't want to accept a number of ideas that were coming from the United States. He said that just before he left Saigon to come to the United States—I think he came by way of Paris—he had been with his brother. He said, "We had dinner and I argued with him for hours. He said the problem was that the United States wants him to take several thousand advisors in connection with a higher aid amount, but the Americans had linked the two together. Diem said, 'I'll take the increased aid, but I don't want the soldiers. I can do without them.' And I said, you have to take both, that's the way it was put. And I finally convinced him that he should take the advisors as well as the increased aid."

Now, that gives you an idea of the kind of pressure that was on Diem from us, to change the way he was handling the situation.

But the changes we were advocating were basically those which would give us a much greater role, a much deeper involvement, a much more commanding role in it, because once you put that number of advisors in, obviously the whole nature of the aid operation would undergo a change. Diem's argument apparently against it, according to his brother, was "I don't want to look like just an administrator for the United States. That will not sit well with my own people." Diem was an authentic nationalist and that was not the way a nationalist should or would behave. But the situation must have reached the point where he was persuaded by his brother to take the U.S. advisors. That was the last thing he wanted, apparently. He thought he could do it on his own without them.

There's an interesting parallel with the Philippines, where Marcos has also recently resisted American pressure to put a larger group of military aid people in there to tell him how to handle the insurgents; in my own judgment, very wisely, from our point of view as well as his own. But in any event the Bishop's comment was a reflection of what was happening in the executive branch, the kinds of pressures they were putting on Diem. Again, I don't think any of them fully appreciated the force of nationalism in Vietnam. They thought of the problem essentially as technological-administrative and that somehow or other if you could find the right figure over there, someone who would follow

our instructions, the whole thing could be cleaned up rather quickly. That was a prevailing attitude in our own country at that time, and it hasn't disappeared yet. We still think very often in the same terms.

RITCHIE: Did you have any warnings that the Kennedy administration was trying to remove Diem from office?

VALEO: Not at that time. One had that feeling later on, but I don't think at that point they were prepared to try to get rid of him. I think they really wanted to simply increase our role because Diem obviously did not know how to handle the situation and we, not so obviously, but we by implication understood how to handle it. Don't forget, this was the time of the Green Berets and Kennedy's views on anti-guerilla activities and how to combat insurgents. We were greatly under the influence of this chap who had worked in Malasia, the Englishman who had worked in Malasia, I think his name was Thompson. He was giving out a lot of advice in this country on how to beat insurgencies anywhere, because of his own success in Malasia, in quite different circumstances. I'm trying to think of the name of our equivalent of Thompson.

RITCHIE: Colonel Lansdale.

VALEO: Lansdale, yes. My own feeling is that Lansdale was not much different, that he thought it was a problem of technique

that you could do it if you went about it in the right way. There was a book written at that period called *The Ugly American*, and presumably Lansdale was the model for that. Well, I knew Lederer, who had written the book, and Lederer was a great character, but he didn't understand beans about what happened among other people, except that he recognized in a vague kind of way that the problem was not just a military problem, that you had to deal somehow or other with the needs of the people in the country in which you were attempting to produce a situation of stability that was satisfactory to you.

But I did not have at that time any feeling that they wanted to get rid of Diem. I think they thought they could still work with him. Hilsman was working with Diem's brother, or had been in touch with his brother on the strategic hamlet approach, which was developed at about this time. There are other people who can give you better judgments on the value of these things as a technique. It seemed to me that any situation in which you have to uproot people because you can't trust them not to protect your opponents, whatever the reasons, is one that is not based on the needs of the people but again is essentially, as the name strategic hamlets would suggest, some sort of a technological solution to a problem which has much, much deeper social roots. I was skeptical of this.

I thought the best thing was to keep—and I know Mansfield shared these feelings—to keep our own involvement minimal. But this was exactly the opposite of the way the administration was going at this time. I thought: if Diem can make it on his own, fine; if he can't, really the best thing to do is to cut our losses and get out. But this was very early in the game and people had not yet seen what could happen if you didn't take that approach. There was a lot of over-estimation of our capabilities you know, Kennedy's inaugural speech set the tone: we were going to make any sacrifice for freedom. Well, freedom is a vague word in some parts of the world. Sometimes it has more to do with a rice bowl and an honest leader than it has to do with rights of free speech or anything else. But we didn't fully understand it. Really, our ignorance of the situation in Asia at that time was immense. So the situation moved in the direction of deeper involvement.

I guess by throwing in a little more American involvement in Vietnam there may have been some expectation that it would help to solve the Laotian problem by negotiation. I think Harriman at that time was busy trying to negotiate some kind of a solution to the Laotian problem on the basis of neutralization, which was one certainly Mansfield would have endorsed fully, and I certainly endorsed fully. We wanted to see Souvanna Phouma back in power. He

had been the best prospect that we saw for keeping some kind of a meaningful national situation in Laos.

RITCHIE: Why is it that the administration was moving towards neutralization in Laos, and yet was absolutely resisting the idea of neutralization in South Vietnam?

VALEO: That's not clear to me. I'm not really sure why that was the case. Probably because they recognized, or they were afraid, that a neutralization situation would result very quickly in the full absorption of the South into the North, which was probably a correct assumption. I don't think that Diem could have lasted very long in a peaceful situation. Ho Chi Minh was far too important a nationalist leader. He towered so far above everyone else that I would think that it would have been almost for Diem. I suppose Ho was a Communist as well as a nationalist but his identity in Vietnam was not necessarily with a Communist ideology, it was an identification with the cause of nationalism in Vietnam, which extended from Tonkin down to Saigon. He was universally recognized as the leader in the struggle against French colonialism.

Diem was not that well known a figure. He had some recognition in Ho Chi Minh's circles and in other places as a good administrator, and as a nationalist, but he was a totally reticent man and had great difficulty in mixing with his own people. He

was basically a recluse. He would certainly not have been able to stand in any kind of election against somebody like Ho Chi Minh, who really was in full rapport with the prevailing political trends within the country.

RITCHIE: Senator Mansfield was one of the few American officials to advocate neutralization in that period.

VALEO: Yes. He tried to move in that direction because he thought it would be a kind of decent way to get out of the situation, but again I think we come back to China and the point Meloy made which I mentioned to you earlier, that the fear of that same slogan, "Who Lost China?" "Who Lost Vietnam?" "Who Lost Korea?" "Who Lost Malasia?" "Who Lost the Philippines?" that was basically an overriding factor in the political life of our own country. It was largely irrelevant to what was happening in Asia, but it was very, very meaningful in terms of American politics.

What happened, in my judgment, was that the professionals in government, who should have known better, ceased to be professional when that fear of possibly being tagged with the loss of a whole country took over, the irony of it, and the egotism of it—it's so ridiculous in retrospect—but you have to see it in the context of that time. Everybody was looking over their shoulder and saying "I didn't lose it." I mean, that was the kind of reaction you got. I think this affected the professionals in the

government. There were very few, occasionally you found somebody like Frank Meloy, who knew better, and there must have been others who had the courage in the situation in which we found ourselves, and the trust that it would not be betrayed by Mansfield or myself to be honest in the situation. But it was very difficult to find many like that.

RITCHIE: Didn't that undermine his career for a while in the State Department?

VALEO: Yes. That came later, and I'll get into that at a later point. The kind of thing you ran into more commonly from professionals for example, occurred to me this morning: on the Johnson trip I talked with John Holdridge, whom I had met before in Singapore and knew slightly. He later became one of the early heads of the liaison office in Beijing, I think before it was an embassy. Holdridge was a careerist whom I had first met in Singapore, where he had been in the consulate. Strange man. His father had been a general in the army and then became a militant pacifist after World War II. Holdridge was so afraid of being tarred with that brush, of being soft on anything, particularly communism, that again it affected his whole judgment. I remember meeting with him in Taiwan where he was assigned at the time of the Johnson trip. I was trying to work on the departure statement for Johnson at the time. Holdridge wanted to make it a lot more militant in its anticommunism than Frank Meloy and I had

originally. The thing that appalled me though was that he was talking about an invasion of the mainland from Taiwan, as though he believed it were a real possibility. Now, anybody with even an ounce of judgment at that time would have recognized that that was totally out of the question. Even with three million American soldiers it would have been an incredible thing at that early period against the full force of the Chinese revolution, which had already swept into Korea, had swept down into Southeast Asia in its extremities. The force of the upheaval in China was incredible in its power. A whole rural system fell apart and regrouped around a whole new idea in those years, and to expect some kind of technique, an invasion of the mainland from Taiwan, to change that, was an absolute pipe dream. Yet that kind of thinking was fostered by the politics at home which spoke of "unleashing Chiang" to such a degree that it affected even professional judgments, to the point where they vaguely began to think that this was really going to happen, or something along those lines.

Well, of course a man like Eisenhower was extremely important in that period because he knew that wouldn't happen, and there was no way that could happen in any kind of meaningful way for the United States, in any kind of course which would be even vaguely commensurate with whatever benefit that would flow to the United States from it. Eisenhower was a very, very key figure in this

period. I think he saved the country from going really off the deep end, and there was a great danger of that in that period. Kennedy himself, I think, probably didn't believe his own rhetoric. I don't think he believed that we were going to pay any price, and certainly after Cuba he didn't believe that. I think he learned very quickly that there were some prices you don't pay. He recognized the limits of power. But I think there were forces in the country, and forces within the professional structure, and among his own advisors, which were pushing him reluctantly in the other direction.

The thing I remember most about Kennedy's views on this was a final press conference, shortly before his death, in which a reporter asked: well, suppose all this doesn't work in Vietnam; suppose these thousands of people we're sending in as advisors don't work, are you going to send in more? Or something to this effect. And his response was: there are other solutions and he added: I think we need to look at the Burma example and the Cambodian example of neutralism. That was the first time I had a sense of Kennedy being wiser than his words sometimes, that he recognized that there were some limits you did not go beyond, no matter what happened, that you looked for other solutions. That was the first reference he made in a positive way, and the first reference which was made by anyone in the executive branch in a positive way to the situation which existed in Burma, which was

one of neutrality, and the situation which existed in Cambodia, which was also one of neutrality. So I think had he lived longer he may not have gone the way Johnson went. Obviously, this is speculation, but that one comment, I thought, was a tip off as to the way his mind was working. It was a very important one. We never got Johnson to say that. We tried many times, but we never got him to say it.

RITCHIE: You had told me the story about Mansfield taking his report to Kennedy, and that Kennedy read through it and at first was angry but then had an amicable conversation with Mansfield about it. According to Kenneth O'Donnell, who was there, Kennedy said that he got mad at Mansfield for showing him the report, and then he said, "I got mad at myself for agreeing with it."

VALEO: Yes. I suspect that's the same concept.

RITCHIE: It wasn't what he wanted to hear, but it wasn't necessarily something he disagreed with.

VALEO: I think that, again, is indicative of the difference between rhetoric and what he was really thinking.

Oh, there was another incident I wanted to talk about. I got a call, I don't know just when this came. It may have come just about this time. But I got a call from the Vietnamese ambassador

here in Washington, whom I knew. His name was Tran Van Chuong. His wife was the mother of Madame Nhu. The ambassador decided shortly after this conversation to resign, which I thought was indicative of the way the situation was going. Tran Van Chuong, like many of the Saigon leaders, had worked with Ho's Viet Minh in the early days of the freedom movement, just around the end of World War II. He was a lawyer. He's still alive, by the way, and I still know him and his wife; they're getting very old. But on this occasion she called me and asked me to come to dinner.

The dinner was for just three of us. Afterwards, we sat down to talk. She talked in French; she always did. She had just come from Vietnam, where she had seen her daughter, Madame Nhu. She said, "The situation is very bad and it's getting worse. They really should resign and leave." She didn't mean Diem, but she meant her daughter and her husband. "Otherwise," she said, "I'm afraid they're going to be assassinated." Now what she was referring to at this time, I do not know. Whether she had picked up something in Vietnam which suggested this to her. I said, "Did you tell her that?" "Oh," she said, "no." I said, "Well, why didn't you tell her?" "Are you crazy?" she said, "I'm afraid." "J'ai peur, J'ai peur." That gives you an idea of the character of her daughter, who was an imperious person, very strong willed as only Asian women can be when they are. It reminded me a little

of Tsu Tse, the last empress of China, who had the same kind of reputation for being a fierce influence on the way the government ran.

But that was an indication—you asked me whether I had any indication of it before, that was the one. Then shortly after that, Tran Van Chuong resigned as ambassador and stayed in this country. I had a friend at that time who was one of his highest assistants here in the embassy. He was a personal friend. He later became part of the governments which followed Diem's, and he rose to a very high place and became an advisor to one of the later presidents, I forget which one. We used to exchange ideas frequently and I could catch from him the same kind of feeling that there were people who wanted Diem out. I kept pushing the other idea: what's left? He said, "There are many people that could do it." But again he was essentially foreign educated. He was educated in Paris and at Harvard, and his views were quite different from Diem, who basically was still rooted in his own people.

In the same way, one must say, that Chiang Kai-shek was rooted in his own people. He knew his own people, but he knew an older version of his own people. The same thing was true in a way of Diem, he knew an older version of his people. Neither of them had the capacity, or the capability, or the character, whatever it might be, which would have put them more in tune with the changes

that were happening in their own country. Politically, both of them understood the importance of the nationalist movement. But what they didn't understand were the important social factors underneath it, which were also churning and moving their countries in new directions, that people were simply not going to put up with the old kind of exploitation anymore, even from people of their own color, and their own language, and their own race. That's where their failure was. Neither of them paid sufficient attention to that aspect of it.

RITCHIE: So when Diem was finally overthrown, you really didn't know that the United States was involved in anyway, or you just suspected it?

VALEO: I suspected it. I thought it was a plot that went awry, that there must have been some understanding that Diem would be gotten out of the country, because I cannot accept the idea that we would assassinate our friends. Even the worst picture of the CIA does not suggest to me that we would do that. But I think that we may very well have made it clear that if there were a change in government, it wouldn't affect our policies at all; if anything it might make us work a little harder to keep. Now, how deeply we were involved in that plot, I have no way of telling. I wouldn't even want to speculate.

RITCHIE: Senator Mansfield was in a private meeting that President Kennedy had with a few congressional leaders in October of 1963. There's no record of what was discussed at that meeting, but there's some indication that the congressional leaders got some idea that we were putting a lot of pressure on Diem and leading up to a change in government in Vietnam.

VALEO: If he got that, he was certainly still putting the counter-pressure. He never went with that, and when Diem was assassinated I recall we did a statement of great shock at it, while again, pushing for a reduction of our involvement not the other way which was obviously the way it was going to go after that.

RITCHIE: Do you remember talking to him after . . .

VALEO: I don't remember that particular meeting.

RITCHIE: I meant after hearing the news that Diem had been overthrown and assassinated.

VALEO: No, I do not. I'm sure we talked about it, and if I remember anything of it, it would have been in the direction I was saying, that we've got to make some kind of a statement here to try to curb our own involvement. It would have to have been that way. That was part of the pattern of the view of policy which we were following at that time.

RITCHIE: Once Diem was removed, did Senator Mansfield have any optimism at all that a new government could change directions?

VALEO: No. He thought it would not work, and as events proved, of course, each successor to Diem became less and less in touch with the Vietnamese people and more and more in touch with us. It worked exactly the way we expected it to work. They became much more amenable to our direction, each government in succession. Big Minh came in next; he was still essentially out of our control. He didn't last long because we wanted somebody who was even more in our control. Then we had the whole string of other, lesser generals, who came in afterwards. Interestingly enough, I met Nguyen Cao Ky on a Philippine Airlines flight about two or three years ago. He was still blaming us for the failure, that we had just let our friends down. In a way, I suppose you could say that. If a general puts all his eggs in your basket and then you remove the basket and let the eggs fall, why sure he has a right to be bitter.

But the fact was that any kind of policy in Vietnam was doomed to failure unless it was rooted in its own people, and unless the leadership was rooted in its own people. Diem was the last one who had even the degree of rapport or connection with the people that had any hope of success, in much the same way that Chiang Kai-shek was in China. At the end of the Nationalist regime, the Kuomintang regime, there were all sorts of alternatives

offered. They offered the Guangxi generals, and then they tried various other warlords, then they said we needed to fight the Communists with silver dollars, we'd buy off everybody. All efforts to bring about the results we wanted without the one and the only one that would work, which was to look to see what the people themselves wanted in those countries.

You know, you'd think we would understand that, as a democracy, but it seemed impossible for us to understand it. So the same thinking prevailed in Vietnam, as in China, even among people who should have known better. I don't know about [Arthur] Schlesinger and a few of the other historians who were connected with the Kennedy administration, but there must have been people there who would have recognized that, that we were dealing with leaders who had no real connections with their people, that it was not just an administrative problem or a military problem per se. Again, it comes, I think, from a kind of hubris, and a failure to recognize that Asians are fully human and that their reactions are universal human reactions.

RITCHIE: Are you indicating that there was a racist attitude?

VALEO: It wasn't so much racist, even. It's just the acceptance of the idea that America is better than everything else. I mean, I think it's not even racist. It's basically that

somehow or other we know how to do it, and nobody else really does. It's buying the American Dream with a vengeance.

And I think the basis for it, as it applied to Asians, at least in this period, was the enormous success in World War II of the United States as the source of the technical genius that won the war. We did win the war, and it was universally recognized that we were the decisive factor in winning the war, and I don't think we ever got over it. We did not realize that that was a set of circumstances in which the kind of effort which we made was peculiarly suited, and then after that, times changed, particularly in under-developed countries, and that the same kinds of approaches were not necessarily going to be effective. I think it's kind of like carrying a long tail of the past with us, from World War II.

RITCHIE: But we never learned the lesson of the Korean War, which followed right after.

VALEO: That's right, we didn't learn it in the Korean War. It showed up immediately there. That in itself, in retrospect, I think historically will also be seen as some kind of a disaster. But again we didn't learn it even there.

RITCHIE: I was reading in the CRS history [*The United States Government and the Vietnam War*, Senate Print 98-185] that when Johnson called you on Christmas Eve in 1963, he had said in the phone conversation that he didn't want any more Chinas.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: And Mansfield responded the next month—I assume you wrote the memo to Johnson—saying that while it was true we didn't want anymore Chinas, we also don't want anymore Koreas, which struck me as a very important point.

VALEO: Yes, I remember that memorandum.

RITCHIE: But nobody else was saying "No more Koreas."

VALEO: And yet they forgot how quickly the initial patriotic blush went off that rose and how people said, "What are we doing in Korea, anyway?" Just as later on, "What are we doing in Vietnam, anyway?"

RITCHIE: So that lesson was totally forgotten.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: Well, with Johnson entering the White House within a month after the revolution in Vietnam, did Senator Mansfield think he had any hope of influencing Johnson?

VALEO: We started writing a lot of memoranda trying to do it! I thought it was futile. I was afraid Johnson was going to go deeper. Having seen him in action on the '61 trip and not being persuaded by some of the things he said about his pacifistic nature, I had a strong feeling that we couldn't stop it, there would be no way. But Mansfield said, "Let's keep trying." And we just kept trying. We kept on writing memoranda of one kind or another. Of course, he was giving Johnson every support he could in other ways, but on this Vietnamese thing Mansfield didn't change at all. I don't know how much Johnson agonized. I think Johnson still was under the influence of that early trip, that he could do this thing quickly. I remember a Johns Hopkins speech that he made. Mansfield told me about this. Johnson was going to make a speech at Johns Hopkins which was really a step in deeper, but at the same time he put in this dream about how our efforts could restore Southeast Asia. We could build, I guess it was that river project.

RITCHIE: The Mekong Delta.

VALEO: Yes. We were going to light up the whole area and all of this beautiful stuff. Mansfield said, "He gave me the speech and he said, 'Be sure Frank sees it, especially that part about the Mekong.'" So that to me was the tip off. We looked at the speech and we both kind of smiled. You knew which way he was going to go. Yes, he meant the Mekong part of it. I think one

has to understand that in Johnson, just as you have to understand it in the United States. We meant it, in a way. If you just let us do it, we'll do everything for you, and then you'll be happy just like we are. That basically is the underlying theme. It was like the Relief and Rehabilitation of Japan and Germany. After you've yielded and surrendered, then we can do everything for you, but you must do that first. That was, of course, where he failed to understand the psychology that was running in Asia at that time, that there were some things they would not do.

RITCHIE: People said Johnson wanted a TVA-type project, and that he was thinking in terms of the New Deal and the Great Society.

VALEO: Yes, and he meant that. As I mentioned in an earlier conversation, he began to get that feeling, I thought, especially by the time we got to Bangkok on the '61 trip. When he looked around he seemed to be seeing all of the improvements that could be made in that area that needed to be made. He was a populist in that sense. Well, he was Johnson.

RITCHIE: Well, the big event of 1964 was the Gulf of Tonkin.

VALEO: Yes, that of course became the decisive thing. I think by the time of the Gulf of Tonkin it was very evident that without a major U.S. involvement in the area the situation was going to collapse, that there was no way in which you could keep

the governments which in effect we had installed in Saigon—one has to use that term—functioning. We tried, along with General [James] Gavin and a few others to persuade them to the enclave theory, that what you would do was to pull back into four or five coastal enclaves, and try to hold those enclaves as a bargaining point, to get a more reasonable kind of governmental structure when the North took over the area, because we sensed that it was coming. We thought that if you wanted a bargaining tool, this would be it, and it would be defensible because you would then be able to bring, into effect, naval power and air power.

So Gavin put the idea out from the military point of view; we had been thinking along the same lines from a political point of view, of how to reduce the U.S. involvement rather than increase it. This seemed to be the only thing that had any chance of acceptance in the administration, and at the same time would avoid our getting in deeper. Of course, the theory was poo-pooed and laughed at and so forth: there was no way you could do that; we have to go the other way; we have to make sure the government stands in Saigon, and so forth. So we got nowhere with the proposal. I think it was just about where the situation stood when the Tonkin thing happened.

I'm trying to remember how I learned of the Tonkin incident. There were two or three of them at the time. I guess Mansfield had been down at the White House, and I'd seen it either

simultaneously or somewhat later on the news ticker, that there had been some kind of a flair-up, and it looked very bad to both of us at that time. I'm trying to remember whether it was before or after this that McGeorge Bundy was in Vietnam, and there was an attack on one of our outposts somewhere. That was the first significant incident against Americans in Vietnam.

RITCHIE: That was after Tonkin.

VALEO: We took our retribution, such as it was, at Tonkin. The thing came up on the floor. I thought the Senate acted on it with undue haste, but both Fulbright and Mansfield were out there in the leadership trying to get it passed in a hurry. I wondered at Mansfield doing that, but he said, "Well, hell, sometimes you have to do certain things," or something to that effect, "sometimes you have to do things that you may not always agree with, but you don't have any choice." Both he and Fulbright got out in front in support of the Tonkin Resolution. The opposition on the floor was Morse, [Ernest] Gruening of Alaska, and I believe [Gaylord] Nelson. I don't know if they had three votes against this or two.

RITCHIE: Nelson didn't vote against it.

VALEO: He didn't vote against it, but I think he argued against it at the time.

RITCHIE: He was suspicious. He at least asked Fulbright if this was a declaration of war.

VALEO: Yes, and of course Fulbright said no and Mansfield said no, we're just upholding the hand of the president. We're giving a display of unity. Well, this was precisely what we had had under Eisenhower with the Formosa Resolution and of course the Senate had gone along with it at that time but with much grumbling. But now we had a Democratic shoe on the foot and I guess they felt both as leader and as chairman of the committee they had to go along with it. I think neither of them wanted to separate themselves from the president to too great a distance at this point. Are we still in the period before the election?

RITCHIE: Before the election. The conventions had been held but the elections were still to come.

VALEO: Right.

RITCHIE: Now, Mansfield in private was one of the very few senators to speak out against the resolution, but then he turned around on the floor.

VALEO: But that was not uncommon. Mansfield would do that sometimes. He would try to make his point in private, and having failed to do that would then take the position that was expected.

RITCHIE: He felt that as leader he couldn't really take an independent position?

VALEO: He never discussed it with me. Sometimes when he did things I didn't like, why, I never could get a discussion. He just did them. It wasn't until later on he'd say, "I wish I hadn't done that." or something like that. But I'd never get that discussion in advance. That happened during the Bobby Baker thing and it happened in a number of places where I think in part he was trying to keep me out of the middle of it, for my own protection if nothing else, and in part because he wasn't that sure of the step but he knew he had to do it no matter what the reasoning was. After the Tonkin Resolution, of course, the die was cast. That meant we had made up our minds not to let the South fall, in a way that it had never been made up, I think, by Kennedy.

RITCHIE: You mentioned the Formosa Resolution, and there was the Middle East Resolution. There were a number of such incidents in the past, but they had always gone to committee, and the committee debated the resolutions. There was never any committee action on this resolution.

VALEO: No, it was done real fast.

RITCHIE: Was any part of it the sense that they had already debated the issues in the past and it hadn't led to war, and this was going to be a sort of routine action to show support for the president?

VALEO: No. It was not a routine action. It was understood as being something more than routine. But I believe the way it was sold to Mansfield, and probably to Fulbright, was that if we do this now, we make this statement, that will put an end to this and we'll avoid getting ourselves more deeply involved. But we have to do it without debate or without discussion, because if we don't make a unified show of strength in this situation, they'll pluck at our weaknesses or our divisions. As a matter of fact, I vaguely recall Mansfield saying something to this effect: that this was the only way in which it could be done.

RITCHIE: How much was the threat of Barry Goldwater's candidacy involved?

VALEO: I don't know that that was the key factor here. I think one has to look to Johnson. He bought, in a way that Kennedy never bought, a lot of the professional advice he was getting downtown, and against that, you had only people like Mansfield and Fulbright and a few others up on the Hill. And of all of them the only two that he would really listen to would be Mansfield or Fulbright. And beyond that, the most important element was that

he didn't want to appear weak, he didn't want to appear wishy-washy, and I think down deep he always felt Kennedy was that kind of a president, or that kind of a man, and he wasn't going to be that. He had to stand tall with his ten-gallon hat on, and that's what the American people wanted, and that's what he, Johnson, would do.

Still further, beyond that, I think he always had his eye on Nixon. I suspected he knew that Nixon wasn't going to get out of the political situation. He knew that Nixon and Mel Laird had both been pushing the issue of Vietnam in speeches: we have to stand firm here. Mel Laird on the floor and Nixon out in public were making all kinds of speeches about how weak and hesitant and reticent the Democrats were being on Vietnam, implying again that they were going to lose Vietnam just like they lost China. I think he saw all of that as a potential threat in the campaign, not so much Goldwater, but he was thinking even beyond that to his next election. He saw these elements as coming up to haunt him if he didn't make a very strong stand. And of course the Tonkin Gulf gave him a reason. Let's assume that it was as expressed at the time, it gave him a reason for standing firm. He thought he might be able to stop the North Vietnamese that way, but when he wasn't able to do it, then he was stuck with it. What do you do next when it doesn't work, when they don't cower and run for cover? That's where the problem really began.

RITCHIE: After that, Johnson carried around the resolution in his pocket, and claimed that Congress had given him the equivalent of a declaration of war. Was that a reasonable interpretation of the resolution?

VALEO: That outraged Mansfield and Fulbright, and that was part of the beginning of the really serious break between them on Vietnam. Johnson used to carry everything around in his pockets. He used to bring out all the statistics that Bob McNamara gave him about the losses that we were inflicting and so forth. He'd pull them out at the drop of a hat. He'd pull out the public opinion polls. He always had something proving that what he was doing in Vietnam was right and was supported by the public. But Mansfield and Fulbright were angry at that interpretation. When he began to use the resolution as a carte blanche, then he really began to get their ire, because in a way he was making them a part of what had been essentially his own policy, and they felt they had been tricked. Once they thought they'd been tricked into it, their personal responses began to change very rapidly.

RITCHIE: It was sort of a breach of faith.

VALEO: Yes, and it smacked too much of Johnson back in the Senate, and the recollection of how he handled the Senate, which had by that time changed considerably under Mansfield. This led us to the '64-'65 trip. Again, I drafted the letter for Johnson's

signature asking Mansfield to go to Vietnam and go to other places for an independent congressional view. I'm sure this was the farthest thing from Johnson's desires, but Mansfield asked him about it and he couldn't say no to him. He was still trying to win and keep his support for what he was doing, not only in Vietnam but elsewhere. So he signed the letter requesting Mansfield to make the trip to Vietnam.

RITCHIE: Why was it necessary to do that? You did that with Kennedy and you did it with Johnson. Why couldn't Mansfield just have gone as a member of the Senate?

VALEO: He could have, but it gave it greater stature if he was asked to do it by the president. It gave him a reason for reporting back to the president on the return. He could have gone on his own, sure.

RITCHIE: Was it a way of avoiding the appearance of junketing?

VALEO: Well, it may have started with that. But by that point I don't think Mansfield would have been accused of junketing, no matter what he'd done in the way of travel. I think there was another consideration in it as well, it gave him an in to report to the president when he came back, and that gave it a status that it might not otherwise have had. It meant more in terms of what kind of cooperation you got abroad, as well, from

our own embassies. If it had a presidential stamp on it, why they were very careful on how they handled the mission.

RITCHIE: Can you tell me about that trip?

VALEO: Yes, that was when my own health broke down. I'm trying to remember now who was on that '64 trip. Inouye was on that, Aiken was on it, I have a feeling there was another member.

RITCHIE: I can look that up.

VALEO: It was a long, very grueling trip. It started in Paris, from Andrews to Paris, and then went to Poland and to Moscow and then down into Saudi Arabia, across to Ceylon. And then on into Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It was a ceremonial trip in great part, and a very effective one. There was one very amusing incident: in Saudi Arabia living conditions were then quite primitive. They hadn't gotten all that oil money yet. We went to see Ibn Saud. It was just a three or four hour stop en route to somewhere else. We sat and we chatted and we had some tea with him and talked for a while. It was not too long before his assassination. We left to go to the airport, and got on the plane, and all of a sudden the sky opened up and the rain fell and fell and fell so heavily that we couldn't take off for about two or three hours. I understand they got about 70 percent of the annual rainfall in that one Mansfield visit. It got to be a big joke. The king sent for him and told him to come

back to the palace, because we couldn't take off. We always assumed that he wanted to keep him there because he had brought the rain, because it's terribly, terribly dry! We did meet the so-called oil prince in this period too, Shek Yamani, the one who runs the oil cartel. He impressed all of us with his charm and his skill and his Harvard Business School training. For the most part the trip was uneventful until we got to Asia.

RITCHIE: You said you went to Moscow; that was right after Khrushchev had been turned out.

VALEO: Yes. We didn't meet Brezhnev. We met Kosygin, and Gromyko was there. We had a long conversation. This was part of the reason for going to Moscow. He wanted to get a line on the new leaders. I don't remember anything particularly from the conversation. It was pretty ritualized when you talked with the Soviet Union people.

I guess the first really significant Asian stop was in Cambodia. Sihanouk welcomed Mansfield this time with open arms, I mean literally with open arms. He was on the verge of breaking relationships with the United States and sending home the mission. It had all to do with the same kinds of pressure, trying to force him to take more than he wanted, trying to force him out of neutralism and trying to force him to do it our way. There was an ambassador there whom he liked a great deal, Sihanouk did, Philip

Sprouse. He was a careerist and far better than anyone who had ever been before him. He had gotten a positive response from Sihanouk. But Sihanouk was in the middle of playing his own neutralist game and he was very astute, very sharp. He was juggling the forces around him. One of his objectives was of course to keep some contact with the United States. Without that he lost a lot of his bargaining power. He was having trouble with South Vietnam. He was having trouble with the North Vietnamese. He was having trouble with the Thais on the question of sovereignty over a temple on the western border. He was surrounded, literally surrounded, by countries, any one of which could have easily invaded in a matter of days.

He was trying so hard to keep them out and he had had great success. He had done this with some foreign aid—the French were still very active, the Chinese were active. Sihanouk had done a marvelous job of building Phenom Phen from a backwater town into a really elegant, charming capital. It had a lot of French quality to it. Good living was an important part of it, and one had the impression of great popular contentment. In the midst of all of this trouble in Southeast Asia, it seemed to be the one garden spot. One hoped that it would stay that way, but of course it wasn't destined to be. I remember the dinner Sihanouk gave for Senator Mansfield. My God, he composed the dinner music, he devised the menu, supervised the preparation of the food; there were

gold plates on the tables. It was an extraordinary performance, as I recall. Then he personally accompanied the group to Ankor Wat, and he had a picnic for us amid the ruins. He really went all out to express his desire for U.S. understanding. And Mansfield responded very well to it.

Interestingly enough, there were several efforts, I think it was on this trip, several efforts to break up the visit before we got there. Periodically we would get reports or press clippings at U.S. embassies en route to the effect that Sihanouk had made some disparaging statements about Mansfield. I never knew what to make of them, whether these were plants or what. They usually came through State Department channels. They would go to Meloy, he'd show them to me, and I'd show them to Mansfield. Mansfield would say, "Well, what do you think?" And I'd say, "Well, I wouldn't believe anything I hear in this part of the world except from Sihanouk himself. If he tells you that when we get there, then you can believe it. But I would be very reluctant to accept anything as a newsflash or a report or whatever, until we're actually there." I said, "Just keep on going, that would be my judgment, and don't let any of this discourage you." So we did, and it was certainly worthwhile to have done that. I may have two or three trips mixed up here. We went to Cambodia so often. But I know this was an element that came into one of the trips, this obvious attempt to discourage the visit. Whether it came from our

own people or not, I just don't know. I learned to grow very wary of anything that came out of Bangkok or Taipei, particularly where Mansfield's attitude went against what was the prevailing wisdom in the executive branch of the government and in that period Mansfield was about the only friend Sihanouk had in Washington.

So we went from Cambodia to Vietnam. I guess Nguyen Cao Ky was in charge at that point. The last president had not yet taken over. We met with Westmoreland in Saigon. The military build-up had already begun. It was going very heavily at this time. We had over a hundred thousand troops, and we were moving up towards a hundred and fifty thousand already. Westmoreland gave the usual briefings. Somebody in our party—I guess it was [Edmund] Muskie—asked whether he wanted more troops, could he use more people, more support. "Yeah," he said, "but not right now. I've got seven ships waiting out there in the harbor. I can't unload them." That's how fast the involvement was deepening.

Saigon had become a total military city already. In the French days, it was colonial, but it had a certain charm of its own. The military weight was not that heavy. It looked like a little Paris in the tropics. But now all of a sudden it was loaded with soldiers and what usually goes with that had already entered it. Every storefront was a bar, practically. There were the aimless soldiers walking around, not knowing what else to do. And the bar girls were flying all over the place. The situation

had really seriously deteriorated. It had become a war center. I remember walking through the town with Frank Meloy and noticing this. My own reaction was: "I really don't want to be here. It's too late. We're really not going to do anything with this now. There's no way you can turn this around. It's already here."

I'd been through this whole experience myself as a soldier and I knew that there's a certain inevitability in a military enterprise that is, in a sense, almost irreversible by any action. At some point, it develops its own logic. This was brought home very forcibly to me during the Eisenhower administration, when we landed troops in Lebanon. I was following the situation in the *New York Times*, mostly from little boxes in the *New York Times*. There was a minor item about a departure of a number of Marines from a base somewhere in Asia, I believe in the Philippines. They had got on board the ship; they were going to Lebanon. The next box was when they had reached Colombo, Ceylon, or some such place. By that time the situation had clarified in Lebanon and we were beginning to withdraw the forces that had originally gone into Lebanon. Somebody inquired of the commander of this Marine regiment still en route, whether or not they would now turn around and go back to the Philippines. "Oh, no," he said. "We can't do that. We have got to go on to Lebanon first and then we'll turn around and go back to the Philippines."

In a way the situation in Vietnam had taken on some of the same characteristics. Once the military steamroller had begun to move, it would have to go through its own agonizing logic until you could turn it around and pull it out. To me that had become at that point almost a certainty. I don't think Mansfield felt it quite the same way. He still felt you could do something with it, and that, of course, gave us the report that we brought back. There were two reports, there was a public report and there was a report to the president. They had similarities, but the one to the president was much more blunt. It was again in the same tone as I recall, to try to keep the involvement limited, that if we didn't, three hundred thousand or even five hundred thousand troops wouldn't be enough to alter the situation.

It was a very discouraging report and went in the face of what was actually happening. Mansfield gave it to the president. The president gave it to Rusk and McNamara. I understand that both of them poo-pooed it, and said, "It's just Mansfield, and that's the way he thinks and that's the way it's going to be all the time with him. He could almost write his report before he comes back." So I know it didn't sit very well downtown, and I don't think it had any influence to speak of on Johnson. That was to come later, when true to form, Westmoreland emptied his six or seven ships in Saigon harbor and began to ask for more. Then the numbers got up to three hundred thousand, and of course, while all

of this was being done, the relationship between Mansfield and Johnson was steadily deteriorating. Mansfield was becoming increasingly concerned about what was happening in our country as a result of the war.

We were now getting up in the neighborhood of three or four hundred thousand men in Vietnam. We tried the B-54 bombers and that didn't work. We had done everything except bomb them back into the Stone Age, which was Hap Arnold's idea of how to win the war. A few other theories on how you'd win were these: you'd hit Hanoi with a few bombs. Johnson didn't go that far. Cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia. But Johnson didn't go to Cambodia. I remember being in Puerto Rico at one point on a vacation for a few days, it was I think around Christmas time. Mansfield called me in Puerto Rico and said the president had talked to him about the possibility of hitting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia. And he said, "I told him no, I said 'stay away from it, don't go any further. You can't get out by going in deeper.'" So Mansfield was doing everything he could to keep it limited. It was certainly suggested to Johnson, but I don't think he ever really wanted to do that bombing of Hanoi and the Red River dikes. I think he recognized the danger of getting involved with China at that point.

Of course, the problem was that: there was no certainty that you could end this war in a victory in South Vietnam alone, which

was at that time the strategy. There was no certainty that you could end it, even if you went into the North to Hanoi. Then you might have to go on to Beijing, because that would be the next stop. I remember writing memoranda to this effect, and maybe not even in Beijing, maybe from there you'd have to go on to Moscow, and that might be the only way. By that time, where would you be? But there was absolutely no way in which you could isolate and win this war in South Vietnam. That was the basic thrust of our arguments for not going in any deeper anywhere. You'd be chasing victory all over Asia before you were done, and maybe in Europe in the end. Johnson must have begun to see this at some point.

I think Mansfield related this to me at a later date, I should mention, it must have been around this time when things began to go wrong, Westmoreland came to see Mansfield in Manila. We were in Manila for some reason I can't remember now. He asked to see him in Manila and Mansfield said, "I don't want to see him, you talk to him." I talked with him, and again it was an argument for how the war was really going well. I guess this must have been after the big Tet blow-up in Saigon, and how that really was a victory, and he was trying at that time to persuade people to believe that the Tet attack was not decisive. I had a certain sympathy for Westmoreland. I think he was in far over his depth. He didn't understand the situation in Asia at all. He was very

much an orthodox military man. You gave him a job to do and he was trying to do it in a standard military pattern. Of course, he was trying to put the best light on whatever happened. I remember the talk with him at that time, and then relaying the substance of the conversation to Mansfield.

By that time Johnson had on his desk the request from Westmoreland to raise the troop commitment to over five hundred thousand, or something like that. Johnson showed it to Mansfield, and he asked Mansfield what he should do. Mansfield said, "Don't do it." Apparently they had a kind of straight, honest talk at that point. Mansfield said that there was no way that the thing could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. I don't know what brought this on, but Johnson said to Mansfield as he was leaving, "I'd like some support from my majority leader on this." He replied, "Mr. President, I'm not your majority leader. I'm the Senate's majority leader." And he said that he walked out of Johnson's office at that point. I guess after that, the hostility was very clear, but Johnson did not go in deeper after that point. He didn't go along with the Westmoreland request.

From then on, or perhaps even before then, my recollection of the chronological sequence is a little hazy, but we had begun then to try to do something in the Senate about bringing the war to a close. The mail was coming in heavier and heavier. It was getting more difficult, more angry, more agonized. I remember a

conversation with Mansfield in which he said—and I didn't fully understand the implications of it at that time—but he said, "Do you see the consequences of this? If it goes on much longer, Frank, we're going to have riots in the streets." He said, "We're going to have race problems. We're going to have all kinds of things." At that point I still couldn't see how the one would follow from the other, but as time went on I recognized that obviously that that's what was happening. Mansfield had a great deal of farsighted understanding of American reactions. Interesting, since he came from Montana, which is not necessarily typical, but his view was in many ways very, very accurate of what was going to happen in the country. It did happen. It began to get heavier and heavier as time went on.

Because of the view he was taking, which would be reflected from time to time in the press, we got a lot of hostile mail from those who felt he was welching on an American commitment, or was a coward who tucked-tail and ran—all these crazy Johnson clichés. On the other hand, we got this enormous outpouring of mail that said "keep it up," "try to end the war," and that sort of thing. He got so much that he didn't even look at the mail anymore unless it came from Montana; he just put it aside there was so much of it. Then when the demonstrators started to come down to Washington they would try to see him. Sometimes he would and sometimes he wouldn't.

What was interesting was some of the turnarounds of what you would regard as Kennedy people, who now suddenly discovered that the Senate had a different role than they expected it would have. These were obviously people who looked on the American system as essentially president-oriented, who now began to see some hope for ending the war, perhaps in the Senate. I must say, the House was doing absolutely nothing on the war. [Speaker John] McCormack wouldn't budge one inch from full support of the president, again following the old concept from the Roosevelt period that the president did everything in foreign policy. I think that was the main reason for it. There wasn't any great love of Johnson or anything like that on McCormack's part. But the Senate was the only place where the legislative independence that Mansfield had developed through this whole period of his leadership began to pay off.

Mansfield started to use the Majority Policy Committee as a sounding board, and the Democratic caucus as a sounding board. Generally speaking, Russell went with Mansfield on the issues. Russell was the key person in this in terms of how far you could go in the Senate in establishing a kind of independent approach. It was interesting, Mansfield would always remind Russell that when Russell was in the hospital, he, Mansfield, had gone to see him, and Russell had said, "Well, what are we doing in Vietnam?" or something to that effect. Russell always took the view that you either have to go in with everything, nuclear weapons, the

whole works, or nothing. He was an all or nothing person when it came to military action. What bothered him in the Vietnamese thing was that it was only half of involvement. And he thought that it was the wrong place to be involved, and he didn't believe that we should be involved in it. He understood probably that we should not be involved in the Asian mainland in a military sense, anywhere.

Generally speaking, we'd get Russell's independent, but nevertheless genuine, concurrence. He had his own reason for concurring but it helped, nevertheless. And Symington began to take a very active role in this because of the war's impact on the country's financial stability. Dan Inouye also took an active role in trying to bring this thing to an end. Phil Hart was on the policy committee at the time—Hart was beginning to feel, I think, discouraged with life. I don't know if he was sick already at this point or not, but I think he felt his whole experience in the Senate had been a kind of futile endeavor and that he would probably have been better off if he had never done it. At least that's the impression that came across from him. We had very few hawks left on the policy committee. I'm trying to think if anybody really took a strong position. Bob Byrd was only interested in what legislation he could get passed. Ted Moss was on the committee. If you will, remind me and I'll go back and explain the changing nature of the policy committee in a subsequent interview.

It did begin to change about this time, because of other things Mansfield had done earlier in connection with it. But anyhow, Hollings was on it and Warren Magnuson and Ed Muskie. I guess that was the main group.

We began then to put out resolutions on the war. They were very innocuous at first. You know, the president should exert every effort to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible, or something to that effect. Magnuson usually went along with it. He didn't have any strong feelings, but he went along with it. We decided when it was really getting bad, and the public pressure was growing, to take it to the caucus. We drew up a resolution to present to the caucus on the basis of discussions in the policy committee. It was quite a fascinating battle. I heard two of the greatest extemporaneous speeches I've ever heard made, one by Dan Inouye and the other one by Stuart Symington, in one of those caucus meetings, when both began to express—well, each one took a different theme, but they were expressing their awareness of what was happening to us as a people as a result of the war.

Symington of course, had up until that time been essentially—if you want to use these loose terms like "hawk"—he was never a militant person on this, but he believed in strong shows of force. After all, he'd been air force secretary. He made this speech in the caucus, almost in tears. Apparently he'd had a talk with some of the younger people in his family over the weekend, and he came

in and he really spoke in the most moving fashion about how we had to end this thing before it would ruin the country. I don't know what year that was, or what prompted the speech, but he made it. He spoke from the heart. Basically, the tone of it was: we'd better do everything we can to get out of this thing before it ruins us. It moved me very deeply.

Then Inouye got up, and he talked about his war experiences and the loss of his arm. He talked about "the Jap," and the treatment of minorities in this country, and how this had relevance to what was happening in Vietnam. He made a passionate speech, with a depth of an understanding that came out of his Asian background, of what was actually happening among the people in Vietnam. It was a beautiful, beautiful speech. Both of them were. And there was absolute silence in the caucus. It was after that that we got to the point where we were ready to try a resolution in the caucus to express the feelings of at least the Democrats in the Senate on the war in Vietnam. I'm going now from Johnson into Nixon, I don't remember exactly the timing of these things, but they were the highlights of what happened in that period. It may be that the Johnson period was already over when these events took place.

I guess I should wind up on Johnson's role in this thing. I think the decision not to go any deeper was a critical one, and it came after that meeting with Mansfield. I don't know that

Mansfield's attitude was decisive. I think Johnson may have already made up his own mind that he was pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp. Up until that point he would pull out of his pocket these statistics on how much damage the B-54s had done by hitting this city or that, and public opinion polls which would show a rising curve in support of his leadership every time he tried something new. His leadership role would go sky-high in rating at first, and then it would taper off as the war went on. Each new gimmick was of course assumed at that point to be the decisive factor that was going to end the war. What happened on those public opinion curves was that at first the response to any new initiative would show his popularity curve going way up quickly and then gradually tapering off again, until the next one, and then it would go up again. But the pattern changed. After a while it would go less and less high after each new action, and the drop that followed would come much more abruptly. That exactly was what was happening to Johnson politically in the country as a result of the war. I think without the war he would have gone down as one of the really great presidents in our historical experience. But with the war he was doomed.

I remember I was in Japan when word came through that he decided not to run. I was talking with the then ambassador to Japan, one of the people who advised him precisely to take the course that he had taken.

RITCHIE: Was that Reischauer?

VALEO: No, it was after Reischauer. It was a careerist, U. Alexis Johnson, who had been one of the advisors in the other direction. I was talking with Johnson with two or three other people from the embassy when the word came in. They gave him the wire, and he said, "Well, what do you know, Johnson quit." He asked me what my reaction was. I said I was really surprised, although I could see why he would not run again. We got talking about the financial problems which were being produced by the war, along with others. U. Alexis Johnson said, "Well, why can't we have both guns and butter?" The unawareness of what was happening in the country on the part of people who should have known, or should have been advised in some way, was pretty bad.

When I came back, I guess the Senate leadership gave Johnson a farewell party after the announcement. Then the heat went off after that. Sometime prior, Russell Long had come into my office one day and said, "Why is the president so disturbed with you?" I said, "What do you mean?" He said, "I was just down there talking to him. He raised it, I didn't raise it, but he said, 'You know that fellow Valeo, he's the most dangerous man in the American government.'" I kind of half-laughed, knowing Johnson and his tendencies to exaggerate. Long said, "I don't know why. I don't think you're so dangerous." I said, "The only reason I can think

of is he probably thinks I'm influencing the Senate to oppose his Vietnamese policy. I can't think of anything else. He ought to talk to Senator Mansfield."

But afterwards, at the party, Johnson sought me out. He came over and he grabbed me by the lapels, as usual, and said, "When are we going to make another trip together?" And I thought that was the way it finally ended. He realized himself that Vietnam had been his own disaster and that he would have been well advised to take more advice from the Hill.

RITCHIE: There are two questions I wanted to ask you about that '64 trip. You had mentioned at one point about the ambassador you thought was afraid of Westmoreland.

VALEO: Oh, yes. Something came up with Lodge. Lodge was the ambassador at the time. It was a trivial incident. I'm trying to remember now what happened. I think I was trying to get the answer to some question that Mansfield had asked me to get. I just don't remember the exact circumstances. But I saw Lodge, and asked him about the matter. He said, "Well, I don't know about that, you'd better speak to Westmoreland." And I said, "Well aren't you the ambassador?" And he looked at me with a kind of look as though to say: I don't dare touch anything like that; that's a military matter and I can't go anywhere near that. Well, that contrasted very sharply with what later happened when Graham

Martin took over. He really ran the show. Or Ambassador Godley up in Laos who also ran the show the way he thought it should be run.

RITCHIE: Was there something about Westmoreland, that he was a take-over type of person?

VALEO: No. I didn't spend a lot of time with him, but he was always pleasant. He was very much an orthodox soldier, that was my impression of him. He wasn't a martinet or anything of the sort. I wouldn't go so far as to call him "Westy," as Johnson called him, but he was a decent enough man. If I were going to pick a soldier to run a campaign somewhere, I think I would have picked him, too. I would give him a doable job though, because I don't think he would recognize a non-doable job in a political sense.

RITCHIE: The other thing I wanted to ask you was: you alluded to the fact that you had health problems on that trip.

VALEO: Oh, yes. What happened was I had begun to develop a circulatory problem in one of my legs. I guess it was the tension of working so much, and I smoked a great deal and I drank immense amounts of coffee. I began to have difficulty walking. One of my legs would give me trouble all the time. When we got to the Kremlin, some of the old parts of the Kremlin have very steep steps and I couldn't get up the steps; I'd have to sort of pull

myself up on the banister. So I began to get worried about it. We had a doctor with us, he checked it. I said, "I think there's something wrong with my feet, I've always had trouble with my feet." He said, "Well, it might be something more serious." And of course it was. It was a circulatory problem in my right leg. He said, "You'd better get it checked carefully when we get back," which of course I did, and found out what the problem was. Then everything else began to give way at the same time. So I had to change my whole style of living at this point and stop eating at the desk and take long walks and do a lot of other things. I finally got back in shape, but it took me, oh, two or three years actually.

RITCHIE: So the pressures of the legislative process . . .

VALEO: Finally caught up with me. I stopped smoking.

RITCHIE: It did it to Lyndon Johnson certainly, and to a lot of others. But Mike Mansfield always seemed unbothered by it.

VALEO: He knew how to take it. And that pipe seemed to help him. He's the only one that smoking helped, I think! He still smokes it.

But I want to tell you one more story about Frank Meloy, which came during the Nixon administration. We'll wind up the Vietnamese War because then it began to get to be essentially a

legislative effort to end the war against the resistance of the executive branch. It just got worse and worse until it just gave out. The irony of this was that it was Nixon who probably had provoked Johnson into being macho on Vietnam and I think Johnson's reactions were at least in some ways a reaction to a fear of Nixon's criticism. But in the end, ironically, Nixon took over from him. So Johnson fell into the trap. And then Nixon came out, or at least posed as the peacemaker during that campaign. That should have been Johnson's second campaign, and would have been certainly without the war.

RITCHIE: There was a special program on television recently on the last forty years, an overview ("45/85"), and they asked Nixon what was his "secret plan" to end the war that he campaigned on in 1968. "Oh," he said, "there was no secret plan."

VALEO: Yes, exactly. The irony. Well, he saw how the Korean War had helped to beat Truman out of one more term in the earlier period with Eisenhower. I think Eisenhower would have won anyhow, but the public's attitude on the war made it clear that Truman couldn't run and Eisenhower put his campaign in terms of ending the Korean War. The slowness with which politicians learn sometimes is appalling.

End of Interview #9

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE GREAT SOCIETY
Interview #10
Wednesday, October 2, 1985

RITCHIE: Last week we talked about the events in Vietnam and how they affected the Senate in the 1960s. I wondered also about all the other changes that were going on. After Johnson's election in 1964, and the big Democratic victory that year, the Congress changed very dramatically and all sorts of legislation that had been talked about for years got passed very quickly. Could you explain why all this happened, at least from where you stood?

VALEO: The great bulk of that legislation had been held up in the Senate. That was what, in the context of those times, would pass for liberal legislation, social legislation. The House tended always to be more liberal than the Senate, largely because of its representation of the larger population centers, which to some degree was reflected in the Senate, but not that much. The Senate, for example, held up Medicare for many years; but that came through in this period. The eighteen-year-old vote came through. The elimination of the poll tax. The Appalachian Redevelopment bill. There were many, many more. I can't begin to think of them all, but there are good references. The Democratic Policy Committee has excellent references on this whole period.

My own analysis of the reason for this was in part to paraphrase Dirksen, "they were ideas whose time had come." The mood was there for it. On top of that, I don't think you can overestimate the significance of the death of Kennedy and its impact upon all other politicians—and particularly after the death of Bobby Kennedy, where you had the whole family which was very much involved in this movement. In a sense they were the northern expression of populism. Even though both were essentially from what passes in the United States as an aristocratic family, they nevertheless were the essence of urban populism. The death of Kennedy left a kind of feeling: well, if he wanted it, let's pass it. It was never spoken of in these terms, necessarily, but I think it was an underlying factor: don't resist, or how can you resist what Kennedy wanted, after he's given so much to the country. I think that feeling was an extremely important one, that Johnson of course capitalized on in his own way.

He eased the Kennedy crowd out gradually and pleasantly. None of them went in a huff, with the possible exception of Bobby Kennedy, and even that one was not a sharp break, they didn't split the party on it. He eased them out and eased his own people in, and they were interested in proving again that Johnson was a legislative superman. So he gave his blessings to most of these items in one form or another. I don't think he ever did any great lobbying on the Hill for them in any way, nor did his people. But

the circumstances were ripe at this point for their passage, and he being in the White House, as I mentioned earlier, had a moderating effect on the southern Democrats who would normally have been opponents of much of this legislation. They still were, but they didn't go all out to defeat it. They just voted their own convictions.

Here you tie in with what Mansfield did in terms of giving the senior senators all kinds of privileges and rights beyond even what they had under Johnson, much more so, and paying great deference to them. Again, I don't think they wanted to offend Mansfield. When they opposed him, they opposed him reluctantly rather than eagerly, as would have been the case had some other majority leader been there. That made a difference. It made a difference among the Republicans. By taking Dirksen into the Mansfield camp, you broke the back of the Republican southern Democratic conservative coalition which had for many years been the secret of holding up this legislation. There were enough Republicans always prepared, and enough southern Democrats always prepared to join with those Republicans in opposing social legislation of various kinds.

So I think these were the principle factors. One has to add the other one, which was again part of the Mansfield—for want of a better word—technique. I don't think he thought of it as a technique, it was just the way he was. His giving free hand

to the younger members in the Senate was a factor of great importance. For the most part these younger people tended to favor this kind of legislation. By encouraging them to express themselves, the case was made much more strongly for this legislation than might otherwise have been the situation. Mansfield dropped the idea that new senators should be seen and not heard. He urged the young senators to get talking from the very beginning. The subtle way in which this worked was not only that they became much more expressive of their own thoughts and their own feelings in response to many of the social problems of the country, that also influenced the press, and the press in turn then would have an influence on the rest of the body.

That's one way in which it worked; the other way was that committee chairmen, now having in a sense reached the full flowering of privilege, were also confronted with the concept that Mansfield was pushing just as hard the concept of one-man-one-vote in the Senate; the concept that all were equal. He knew what he was doing. They weren't all equal and he knew that, but he thought in terms of what really counts, the vote, and in that sense they were. It made the committee chairmen more conscious of the younger people on the committees, whereas in the past they could have ignored them pretty much and gone on in the ritualistic pattern that juniors were expected normally to vote with the chairman or the ranking minority member, as the case might be.

Under Mansfield, the committee chairmen had to be a little more careful; they wanted to be sure that these people who were expressing themselves and getting press attention were also with them. So they began to defer a little bit, in a way that was not done before, to the younger people on their committees.

I think these were some of the main differences that came with Mansfield. It began to cause a churning within the Senate of a lot of new sources of ideas, new sources of leadership, new sources of inspiration. Some people, of course, were perhaps more impressive in this way than others, but Mansfield made them feel that they were all impressive. This was a theme, the idea of equality among members, was a theme Mansfield kept coming back to. I don't know how many opening statements for caucuses and floor statements we worked in this theme.

Another development I want to touch on was the usage of the Majority Policy Committee. Up until the time of Kennedy's death, the policy committee met regularly, but it did not take policy positions. It discussed legislation and the flow of legislation. There was something called the Legislative Review Committee, which was set up at the same time the policy committee was set up, or shortly after it, by Johnson, I believe. The members were usually freshman who sat with the policy committee without vote. The fact that they didn't have a vote in the early period didn't really mean very much, because Johnson never took a vote in the policy

committee; he merely said, "This is the policy." Those who didn't agree with it simply kept quiet and let it go at that.

But this was going to change with Mansfield, so the presence of these four younger members, who sat in with the policy committee but were really not of it, was a very significant factor. The problem was: what do you do with them? I mean, if you begin to put measures to a vote in committee, do they vote or don't they vote? The initial reaction of some of the older members of the policy committee was no, that's just a review committee, they're just here to go over the consent calendar. Technically, that was true. Their function was to make sure there wasn't any real highway robbery in any of those bills that go through automatically. That was one of their functions and it was a minor function; but Mansfield made it clear that as far as he was concerned, they were going to vote as full sitting members of the policy committee and the policy committee members, some grumbling, went along with it. Well, of course that gave a whole new thrust to the direction of the party in the Senate.

You brought in people like Muskie, Ted Moss, and others who were essentially liberal minded. The balance on the Policy Committee, as a result of that, became much more the prevailing view, I would think, of the center-left of the Democratic party nationally, whereas before it was, if anything, right-center, because of the weighting on the other side. Phil Hart came on at

that time; there were a number of people who in retrospect one would regard as the liberals of that period who became active members of the policy committee by virtue of their being members of the Legislative Review Committee.

After the fall out with Johnson over Vietnam, that became a significant factor. Up until that time there were really no major issues on which the committee took a public position at variance with the president, but after the fall out with Johnson, this became an increasingly significant factor. We prepared resolutions for the policy committee to adopt, and interestingly enough got near unanimous votes, because by that time the whole Senate had shifted pretty much on the issue of Vietnam. It became possible then to pass a policy committee resolution, go to the caucus with it, make some modifications in it, but then get a lot of guaranteed support, so to speak, when you took it to the floor. It became part of the whole technique of trying to end the war by way of the legislative body, rather than the more logical way, but in this case undoable way, of having it ended by the president. Those were some of the changes.

When measures got to the floor, it soon became clear that Mansfield would not attempt to battle a determined resistance to a bill, except by the route of cloture. People began to take a second look at the cloture rule as a result of that. It began to be used much more commonly. The full distortion of it as a result

of the parliamentarian's casual advisory during the Civil Rights cloture in 1964 had not yet taken root. That came gradually over a period when people figured out ways to get around the intent of cloture even after its adoption. But at that point the question was: can you get cloture, and do you have to wait till you get sixty-seven votes? Well, there were a lot of advocates, particularly on the liberal side, who favored majority cloture. Mansfield said he would never support that, and he didn't. So far as I know he never supported it. But he gradually accepted a cutting down of the number that were required for cloture, until you come to your present sixty—which compared with sixty-seven in the Senate is a very, very significant change. I still think it hasn't gone far enough, but I think even more important now is the question of making cloture mean what it says after its adoption.

My own personal view is there's some virtue in permitting a prolonged debate on a measure, but there is absolutely no constitutional basis for claiming that you can delay a measure indefinitely, a measure that is constitutionally subject to a majority vote. If there were a constitutional basis, such as treaty ratification, it would have been written into the Constitution. I don't think that if there is ever a court test of that in some way that the courts could find other than that. The right to vote in the Senate is a sacred one, or in any legislative body for that matter. The frequent use of the cloture procedure under

Mansfield, again, was a change. In a sense it made the senators face the fact that they couldn't shift the blame. If the Senate didn't act on a measure, it wasn't going to be because the supporters or proponents of the bill were too lazy to be there, or the usual subterfuges that were used to cover up the fact that filibusters were preventing the Senate from doing its business. So people began to be a lot more careful about how they opposed measures. A lot of the clowning went out of consideration of serious issues.

Again, I think one has to consider Mansfield's personality here. He was leaning over so far backwards to accommodate members, and in self-effacement, that very few of them had the stomach for opposing him by tricks. I mean, they had reason for opposing measures, but not by tricks. It was almost like a Gandhian attempt to run the Senate by Gandhi's non-violent methods. It was a fascinating experience. It could have only happened under Mansfield. I can't think of another member who would have been capable of trying that trick—or trying that approach. I shouldn't use the word "trick," I don't think he used it as a trick. I think it was his nature. He was that way, and as a result the Senate became another way. It was a brief kind of moment in Camelot, if you will, in the Kennedy words. Not quite the same kind of thing, maybe a moment in New Delhi might be closer to it. But it was a different experience.

And when you combine Mansfield with all these other factors, I think you begin to understand why you had this enormous outpouring of legislation, which in its significance probably exceeded even that of the New Deal, although the New Deal in its time was far more critical. There were items here that could have waited another two, four, six years, or might have been done somewhat differently without destroying the country, whereas in the New Deal days, it was a matter of life and death on those early measure. But allowing for that difference, the outpouring of social legislation during the Mansfield years was about as great as any in the history of the country, if not the greatest. I think any objective analysis will show that. And it makes the so-called Johnson record—again, comparisons may be odious, but only to correct the record—it makes what happened under the Johnson period, if you look at it carefully, really a minor moment having to do with some personalities in the Senate, but having very little to do with the long-range significance of the role of Congress. Again, I repeat, the hold-up had been in the Senate, and then the block gave way in the Senate. This legislation, much of which had started in the House in one form or another and had been sort of culled and consolidated by the Kennedy people when they first came down, began to find a way through the Senate.

In the meantime, another thing was happening. Mansfield was under a great deal of pressure to put more people on the policy

committee staff. They felt it should be used more politically than it was. He resisted this all the time. We had two or three lawyers down there. I guess Charlie Ferris and Dan Leach, and maybe one or two others from time to time. But that was the policy committee staff on the substantive end. He used them on the floor. He wanted them on the floor at all times with legislation. He resisted efforts to expand that beyond those numbers. The result was he turned back a great deal of money from the funds of the committee every year. His reasons were very simple, and they grew in part out of his Montana experience and part out of the fact he thought the senators should run the Senate and not staff, which I think was a very appropriate idea. But the most significant part of the idea was that it compelled senators, because they didn't have the staff assistance that they wanted or thought they wanted, to look at problems from a different level and to see not so much of the details of a piece of legislation or the details of a policy, but to see the larger and the broader implications of it, which in the last analysis is the only way that a legislator really ought to look at it.

It reminds me a little bit of Toynbee in the *Outline of History* in which he said—I'm paraphrasing, but he said there are a number of ways of looking at a situation. If you imagined yourself being in an airplane or a helicopter and looking at the earth from a five hundred foot level, you would see an immense amount of

land features and detail, but the horizons would be rather limited from that level. And, he said, if you then went to ten thousand feet, you would see far less detail of the landscape, but your horizons would be immensely enlarged. Of course, at fifty thousand feet that would be even more the case. Well, fifty thousand feet in this analogy might be for the social dreamers and the poets, but I think the appropriate legislative level, using the analogy, is somewhere around ten thousand feet, because when you get down to five hundred feet—the realm of the technicians and bureaucrats—there is no way, considering the number of questions which flow into a senator as a central rock of the republic, the number of ideas which flow into him, the number of pressures which flow into him, as well as the pressures of getting reelected, if that's his inclination, are such that if to look at issues at five hundred feet there are only two courses: you'll either fall apart in the effort to keep up with them all, or you'll get a lot of staff to do the looking for you, and then give it to you at what they think is the five thousand foot level.

This is basically the problem of staff in the Congress. We go back to our earlier discussions about Ernest Griffith. I think that the La Follette-Monroney bill was an essential thing. It made it possible for senators to come down from a fifty thousand foot level, which belongs to poets, to about ten thousand feet, where they could see the nation's problems at about the level in

which they ought to be seen by legislators. Once you brought it down, as it has now happened in the Senate, where you are looking at problems at five hundred feet, it is very doubtful in my judgment, that many members of the Senate can keep up with the real business of the Senate, which is to draw legislation on many subjects that is good not only for this moment but which has some kind of significance for the country beyond that.

Mansfield was at five thousand feet, and the Senate in the Mansfield period—except in the case of the Vietnamese War—was at five thousand feet. The only reason why it went to five hundred feet in connection with the Vietnamese War, was because the people who should have been looking at it from five hundred feet were not looking at it from five hundred feet. If you were going to end the war, you had to get into the details. Everything else became secondary. You had to try to do it through legislation, which was obviously the most ridiculous way to end the war, by telling the administration that you can't bomb somewhere or you have to stop doing it on such and such a date while they're fighting a war. The place where it should have been ended was, of course, by the president, who could have done it in five minutes, if that was his inclination, by one order. Generally, I thought the five thousand feet level was the greatest level for the Senate. I thought at that level, you could have a pretty good output of meaningful actions in the Senate.

RITCHIE: At the end of 1965, after all those major bills were passed, Senator Mansfield wrapped up that session by saying that we didn't perfect everything this year, we passed the enabling legislation; the main work from now on is going to be to tighten up on some of these bills. Was the real thrust of 1965 just getting people to accept the concepts of Medicare and aid to education in principle rather than in perfecting the system?

VALEO: Yes, I think so. I think there were new concepts of social legislation which most advanced democracies had long since accepted. I mean, you go back to Medicare and the concepts of Medicare have been accepted everywhere, even in Mexico. I shouldn't say that in a disparaging sense, but we tend to look at Mexico as a somewhat underdeveloped country. But they had accepted it years ago. We say, well it didn't help the Indians in Mexico; still, the concept was there. Their ability to deal with it perhaps was far more limited than ours, but at least they accepted the concept, that a nation has a responsibility to promote the health of everyone who lives within its boundaries. These certainly were concepts that Germany, and the United Kingdom, and France, and Italy had long since adopted, not to speak of the Communist countries who had also accepted this a long time before. Even China had accepted it with minimum resources. They found ways to do the best they could within that concept. But we hadn't even accepted the concept at this point.

I doubt that the current administration accepts the concept. It goes along with it because it's on the books, but I don't think that it has actually accepted the concept that there is a responsibility for a nation to see that all citizens get the best they can possibly be given in terms of health care, with some kind of rough equality of treatment. It doesn't have to be precise, but you can't leave anyone out. That's the point in that kind of a concept. And when you legislate, you don't, in theory at least, leave anyone out. It was the same thing with civil rights. Of course it was a long way from perfection. I don't even know that it was a problem of legislation; it was learning to live with legislation. Again you go back to Asia and you see that in India, for example, the constitution outlaws the caste system, but it's been forty or fifty years and they're still trying to eliminate it in places. I don't think there's any crime in that; I don't fault people who are trying to do the right thing and are unable to do it; it's when you ignore what is, from my judgment, at least the way I see it, the moral responsibility which you have as a member of any social group. This is what basically Mansfield was leading the Senate to put into the national computer with all that legislation.

RITCHIE: Up until 1964 there was a lot of writing in the newspapers and among scholars that Congress was structurally unable to deal with major legislation like this, it just hadn't

done anything in such a long period. And then all of a sudden, everything changed very dramatically, and then it sort of went back.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: Does it tend to work in these bursts? Is that natural?

VALEO: I think that's part of it. I think you have to consider that the setting in which it worked has changed. I don't think, as I said before, that the Mansfield leadership would necessarily have been relevant in any other set of circumstances. I think of it as a kind of recessive gene in the constitutional system, which suddenly appeared in the years 1960 to 1980, over the two decades, roughly, a gene that had long since laid dormant. But it came out, and it came out at a time when it was very essential. I think if the civil rights situation in the country had not reached the point of crisis, which it reached in the '60s, it wouldn't have happened. If the Vietnamese War had not occurred, it wouldn't have happened. If the Kennedys had not been assassinated, it would not have happened. I think all of these factors were an essential part, but I don't think you can leave out the relevance of the Mansfield approach to the Senate as an element in this process.

People who write about this period do not see it in those terms. I don't think they quite understand the Senate, and why things pass or don't pass, and the significance of the mood in the Senate, if I can put it that way, as to whether or not things move or don't move. So it's much easier to be glib about it and say, well, we had the best legislative technician the country's ever had in the White House—even Mansfield said it—so obviously it became much easier to pass this legislation. Again, I'm not trying to deprecate Johnson—well, I am trying to deprecate the role which has been assigned to Johnson and which, because of the nature of his personality, he had an inclination to believe to be accurate. So I am deprecating him, because I don't think his legislative skill goes anywhere near to the heart of the explanation of the legislative output from 1963 on. By the time he left the White House over Vietnam, that was pretty evident. It was easier to end the war with Nixon than it would have been to end it with Johnson. He couldn't; he was tied into it by that point.

RITCHIE: You had mentioned that in 1964 Johnson really didn't take that much of an active role in legislation. He sent people like Bobby Kennedy up on the Civil Rights bills. In '65 after he had won his reelection, he seems—at least on the surface—to have gotten more involved. Did you feel his physical presence?

VALEO: No. Not really, not really. That legislation was destined to pass, and it was passed almost without significant debate. I think occasionally he'd make a call, maybe on a foreign aid bill or something, as he called me once as I mentioned. And he'd call people on a piece of legislation that he was particularly interested in. But his real significance in the passage of the legislation was virtually nonexistent.

RITCHIE: I've heard people say that they saw more of him on Capitol Hill than they saw of other presidents, that he would come to see Dirksen and others.

VALEO: Well, he'd come up occasionally, but not that much. He'd come up for a party once in a while. He'd come up for a ceremony. But he didn't by any means hang around the Hill; no, not at all.

RITCHIE: How would you describe in that period his congressional liaison? Were they the well-oiled machine that they're generally seen as?

VALEO: Of course, I saw it mostly through Mike Manatos, who covered the Senate for him. I guess he had Larry O'Brien for a while with overall responsibility on it, and then I can't even remember who he replaced him with—that's how significant it was. I remember Mike Manatos, who was there all the time as he was during the Kennedy administration. Mike was good for that work,

but again Mike was no genius on legislation. He got an order to try to persuade some senators to vote for it, and he'd come down. He knew how to read the votes and he'd know who he'd have to talk to and who he could count on for support, and so forth. He did it, and he did it well. I think Mike Manatos deserves a lot of credit for it. But again just as I was, just as he was, and in a sense just as any individual member was, we were really relatively minor figures in this process compared with the circumstances which created it.

I go to Tolstoy on that, and Tolstoy's view of what happened in the defeat of Napoleon in Russia in his book *War and Peace*. He points out that everybody would give credit to this general or that general for this or that amazing military feat, and then by searching the records he would come up with the fact that the general's tactical orders were never even heard down in the places where presumably they were decisive. I think that, not officials or congressmen but basically the sweep of events had forced us to a certain point. Then, by this fortuitous combination of emotional factors, the Kennedy death, the Atlanta riots and the Mansfield handling of the Senate, among others, and most of all the fact that the country was ready for these things at this point, I think these are the elements that go furthest in explaining why there was this outpouring of social legislation in this period.

RITCHIE: Up to this point, the Congress had really been run by a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats

VALEO: At least the Senate was; the House to a lesser degree. That's why a lot of this legislation got through the House. John McCormack was in office for a good deal of this period. McCormack was basically extremely conservative on foreign policy questions, tended to defer completely to the president, but he also had that same—it's almost a quasi-Catholic view of social responsibility. He carried that, just as I think Mansfield carried it, that sense that you owe something to the group and you have to take care of the people in the group. It's a Catholic concept—not only a Catholic concept—but I think that both of them may have derived their feelings on this subject from the same source, and perhaps I did too. So McCormack was a positive element in the passing of social legislation in the House, where for the most part it went through without any great problems. It was the Senate where you ran into the difficulties.

RITCHIE: Well, after the '64 election there were very few Republicans left in the Senate. I think it was a 2:1 margin of Democrats over Republicans. So that reduced their influence. But what about the southern Democrats, they were still chairmen of committees, men like Eastland, and Stennis, and Russell. Did they put up any resistance?

VALEO: This is where the Mansfield leadership became very important. They did not hold up legislation. He could ask them about a bill, which he would do occasionally at committee chairmen luncheons, or in person sometimes—he would do it not a lot, but he would do it on a bill that he felt was stymied in committee—and he would usually get a positive response. They knew they couldn't hold it up, or they didn't want to hold it up, even though they personally might oppose it. We used to get that at policy committee meetings. Every once in a while, Russell or someone else would say, "Well, I don't really go along with that, but I'll get it out shortly," or something to that effect. The idea that a committee chairman could hold up a measure became a thing of the past. The last time that was tried was Jim Eastland on the Civil Rights bill, up until about '62 or '63, but after Kennedy's death he would have been the only one who would have felt strongly enough, or indifferent enough, to do it. So he was bypassed, and after that there were no more holdups to speak of.

There's an interesting angle to that. Eastland was scheduled to become the president pro tem by reason of seniority. The question came up in the caucus about his election, because the president pro tem, although he is elected by the Senate, is named by the majority caucus. That's one of the few things that the caucuses bind themselves on, the election of officers of the Senate. Of course, Eastland's name was put in by Mansfield, again

deferring to the traditional role of the longest serving member being president pro tem. Phil Hart opposed it. Phil Hart was on the Judiciary Committee. He got up and made quite a speech, saying that on a personal level he liked Jim Eastland, he thought he was a great fellow, and that he was not concerned about his treatment. His personal treatment by Eastland on the committee had left absolutely nothing to be desired, the chairman had leaned over backwards, he said, to accommodate him. But when he saw Jim Eastland possibly sitting in the White House as president of the United States, which of course was possible under the succession law, he said he had horrors and nightmares and he couldn't possibly accept it. Of course, everybody including Eastland roared with laughter. But only Hart opposed his nomination.

It was again a reflection of Hart's character and explains why many members felt great sympathy for him and why this building is named after him. He was one of the least successful of senators, in my experience in the Senate, and he knew it. Towards the end of his life, I think, it really partly embittered him, that he had been so—what he thought—ineffective. He really wasn't that ineffective, but he thought that he had been a total failure in the Senate.

RITCHIE: Because he had set his goals so high that he couldn't reach them?

VALEO: I don't know what the reason was. I don't know him that well. I don't know what Hart wanted. It seemed to me that the legislation that poured out of the Senate in that period would have been precisely the kind of thing that Hart would have wanted, and yet he was so discontented with his own role in it. I can't quite understand why, but it was clear that something troubled him deeply. I think the other members of the party knew it, and they liked him greatly and felt very sympathetic towards him. That would be the whole party, not just liberals, I don't think that was an important element in it.

RITCHIE: Did the conservative southern Democrats object when Mansfield began to move liberals into the policy committee and really take over things that had traditionally been their domain?

VALEO: No, oddly enough. They didn't for two reasons. First of all, he had treated them so well that they could hardly have any objections to his throwing a bone, if you will, to other people in the Senate. As a matter of fact, they tended to go along with it, in most instances. The second reason was that he had deferred to them so much they felt that on a question of this sort they would defer to him. This again would be their normal reactions in any event. A leader who was good for them had to know what he had to do to keep the party in line. I think most of them understood that if you were going to have a party which embraced people all the way from Jim Eastland to Phil Hart, if

you will, you just had to make some adjustments, otherwise you wouldn't have that party. And their own positions, of course, depended upon keeping that party in the majority because it's the Senate that elects its committees, not any one else. There's no rule of seniority, that's a custom. So that their own survival in a sense depended upon a unified party, which probably Mansfield kept as well as anyone in the history of the Senate. The Democrats were a unified party under Mansfield. He unified a few Republicans into it as well!

RITCHIE: Well, after the burst of legislation in '65, in '66 people started talking about "guns and butter," and Vietnam started entering into this. Did it have an effect of slowing down the changes and making people more conservative about what they were voting on?

VALEO: I have a feeling that by '66 most of what we were going to get through in terms of innovative legislation was pretty well gone. There were other measures that came after that, but the great burst of it had come by '66. By then the Kennedys, I don't know when Bobby died, but Bobby was never as significant as Jack.

RITCHIE: He was there until '68.

VALEO: When I said the Kennedys, it really was Jack Kennedy that was involved in the emotional underpinning of this

legislative outburst. When Bobby Kennedy's death came, I think everybody was about ready to throw their hands up in despair over what was happening to politics in the United States. But again the Kennedy mystique was beginning to recede by '66, '67. Johnson was getting carried more and more into the question of winning the war, or how you got out of the war, or how he looked in the war. So the pace of legislation slowed down.

I think it was somewhere around this point that Mansfield and I discussed where the Senate should be really moving. We discussed the role of the Senate in oversight, which we thought was an unexploited role of the Senate, one that should be used to the full if the Senate was going to play its proper role in the government. We always tried, in the opening speech to the caucus in a new Congress, we tried to put an overriding concept of the main activities of the Congress for that session, and at one point we raised for the first time in considerable significance the question of oversight. We got into it on the need to develop this as a proper committee function. I'm trying to think of other things that were perhaps innovative. I think that [Lee] Metcalf was working in this period on a congressional reorganization, trying to improve the procedures of the Congress. Sometime thereafter, we got into the question of the budget process, which was a major question. We were already beginning to see the difficulties of trying to continue in the same procedures that we

were using up to that point, which was simply an authorization and then an appropriations bill, with each committee acting without consideration of the whole.

Later on, during Vietnam, we got into the question of a better utilization of the confirming power of the Senate. We were attempting to develop the full constitutional powers of the Senate, which in some ways had been neglected partly as a result of the Roosevelt period, partly through the growth of practice, which then became absorbed into the accepted way of doing things. On appointments, the general theory was: if the president wants him, why, let him have him. But the departments were becoming bigger than just something that the president wanted. The departments were beginning to have a life of their own, quite distinct from what the president might want. So we felt there was a need to look very carefully at the people that the president selected for major jobs—primarily, I think, growing out of Vietnam. I think we got the caucus to pass a resolution on the need for committees to examine closely the qualifications—well, this didn't really happen till the Nixon period. One of the reasons at that time was, I think, one of the cabinet members said he didn't want to appear, or declined to appear before one of the committees. We felt that this was an impermissible kind of behavior on the part of anyone who would have to be confirmed by the Senate. So in facing that question we got into the whole business of having to

develop the confirming power of the Senate in a fuller way than it had been before that. Especially this got involved with foreign policy.

RITCHIE: About foreign policy and its influence on domestic policy, when Johnson was still president, the leading opponents of the war in Vietnam were Democrats, and the leading proponents of the war were Democrats. You had George McGovern and Scoop Jackson, and you had John Stennis and Wayne Morse. What effect did this have on the party and especially on Mansfield's efforts to keep the party unified?

VALEO: Well, it made you move very cautiously. In the early period of trying to end the war, most of the statements had to do with calling on the president to end the war as soon as possible; they were as innocuous as that. The divisions in the party made it very difficult to draw up the kind of instruments that the Senate was capable of doing, constitutionally. Well, nobody objected to ending the war, but there were a lot of people who said we want the war ended in sixty days, at that point, so you had to find the words which would begin to convey to the president the great unease, the malaise which was being felt in the Senate at that time over the war. It was a concern that extended all the way from one end of the Senate to the other, particularly on the Democratic side. To convey that took words which made the point but which really had no force in them

whatsoever. They were mostly sense of the Senate resolutions. I think once we suggested bringing up Vietnam in the U.N. and things of that sort, trying a number of devices which would again convey to Johnson that he really should not continue on the path that he was on, that there were grave risks that were being felt in the country and were being communicated to the Democratic members of the Senate.

The same concern was also being communicated to the Republican members, and some of them had already begun to shift by this time. They were usually the ones who voted with the majority of the Senate Democrats on social legislation. They felt the same way about the war. There was one long period where we were trying to get one of these resolutions into a piece of legislation. It was still essentially innocuous, but it had perhaps more force than theretofore. It might have called on the president much more directly. I can't quite remember which resolution it was. But the Republicans undertook to give that one a hard time. It was tacked as an amendment on to a bill that they probably didn't care about anyhow. Dole was one of the people, and Bob Griffin of Michigan was the other, and they kept up quite a—it wasn't a filibuster but it was a prolonged, drawn out debate on the relevance of the amendment. I don't know whether we eventually got it or not, but the Republican minority in some ways had no desire to get the Senate into the matter. They probably figured

that Johnson was in his own stew. They were prepared to let him stay there and to keep the Congress out.

Mansfield and other members on the Democratic side were getting mail that was running extremely heavy from all over the country, because they were making speeches beginning to question the whole war situation and our involvement in the war. They were getting very, very heavy turn-outs of mail coming in generally in support of the position which they had taken. But this was towards the end of the Johnson administration, probably just before he decided he wasn't going to run again.

RITCHIE: That was when the public opinion polls really started to change.

VALEO: Well, the problem of the public opinion polls—and I don't know if we discussed this the last time—was the character of the graph.

RITCHIE: Oh, yes.

VALEO: I think we did discuss this last time, yes.

RITCHIE: In that Johnson period, what was Mansfield's relations to the doves of the Senate. Fulbright made his switch at that point, but others like McGovern, and Morse and Gruening, had been outspoken critics of the war.

VALEO: Morse and Gruening were in the vanguard, even before Mansfield, one had Morse and Gruening. But neither of them carried any real weight in the Senate. They made long speeches on the war, but they didn't get much press on them. They got support from anti-war groups very quickly, but they carried very little weight in the Senate. I guess it was Mansfield and Cooper on the Republican side who were the first of the senators who were taken seriously by their colleagues, who began to deal with this question. Then after that, Church came in on it. Fulbright came later. I always kind of had a feeling that the Foreign Relations Committee finally came in on this because they didn't like to see the thunder stolen somewhere else. That may be unfair. Let's say they began to feel it a little later.

I'm only expressing my own opinion on this, and I don't know how much value it has, but I think by this point Fulbright had given up any expectations of becoming secretary of state under Johnson. Then his mood began to change, along with his concern over the war. I think Fulbright had always nourished the hope of being secretary of state under Kennedy, and his position on Israel I think was the thing that prevented that. Otherwise, he might very well have been secretary of state under Kennedy. Then he had hoped to be secretary of state under Johnson. Johnson used to call him "my secretary of state" when he was majority leader, so if Fulbright had some feelings along that way, they had been

deliberately encouraged by Johnson at one point. But when Johnson got into power, for whatever reasons, maybe the same ones that Kennedy might have had, he was not tapped for it. Johnson obviously intended to stay with Rusk.

I don't think that this was true in the same sense with Mansfield. I don't know whether he ever nourished any desires to be secretary of state. I doubt it myself. I did think that he had thought, as I mentioned earlier, in terms of the vice presidency; although he never told me that, I felt that that was involved. But certainly by this point he was not thinking in terms of secretary of state. He was deeply, seriously concerned with the war and what it was going to do to the country, and quite correctly.

RITCHIE: Fulbright's break with Johnson was a very public one. It was very obvious after the Dominican intervention and the "educational" hearings on Vietnam. Mansfield appears to have tried at least to maintain Johnson's good graces.

VALEO: He felt he had to work with him; and that was also his style. I think Fulbright's hostility on the Dominican intervention really traced back to his reaction to the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I think Fulbright's willingness to go with the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which as I recall came very shortly after Johnson's second inauguration, right?

RITCHIE: Tonkin Gulf resolution? No, it was before. It was during the summer of '64 right after the conventions.

VALEO: Right. Okay, that would support My view of what happened here, at least from my point of view. I think Fulbright nourished expectations of being secretary of state in the second Johnson administration. He felt that it would be logical for Johnson to keep on the Kennedy people since he played it that way, including the secretary of state, up until the second inauguration, but then Johnson would do it more and more his own way in the second administration. Fulbright supported the Tonkin resolution fully; so did Mansfield. I don't know whether Fulbright had any reservations about it or not but I do know Mansfield already had some, but he said, "we have to do it; there's no other way." So he went with it. When Johnson did not change his secretary of state in '65, then I think that was the beginning of the break with Fulbright. Then when he misread what both Fulbright and Mansfield thought they were doing in the Tonkin resolution, when he began to talk of it as the equivalent of a declaration of war, then they were both outraged. I think there was the added factor in the case of Fulbright that there was not going to be Fulbright as secretary of state. I think these two factors probably explain Fulbright's reactions here.

RITCHIE: Considering that Mansfield was known among his Senate colleagues to be opposed to what was going on in Vietnam,

and yet publicly he was unable to make the same break that Fulbright did, was there very much pressure on him within the Senate to speak out more, to take more of an opposition role to the administration?

VALEO: Oh, no. He was not under pressure. He was recognized as being in the opposition to the war, almost from the very beginning. Perhaps not as soon as Morse and Gruening, but not too long thereafter he was recognized as the obvious leader of the effort to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible. But Mansfield was a very strong believer in not wasting your energy in trying to do things that you couldn't do in the Senate. He knew at that point that there would be no way that you could turn Johnson overnight on this question, and that the best hope of doing it would be over a period of time in which you could gradually work from within on Johnson, as well as keeping a distance from him publicly. I'm sure many times Johnson thought he had finally persuaded Mansfield, and just then Mansfield would make a speech about his outrage over some event in Vietnam, and Johnson would probably pull whatever hair he had out of his head, trying to figure out what would satisfy this Mansfield. Every time he thought he had him, something else would develop and he would prove not to be safely and solidly in his camp. Again, that was Johnson's way of working. He even thought he had Walter Lippmann on this at one point.

RITCHIE: Did Mansfield encourage, or was he interested in, or involved in any way in the challenges to Johnson's candidacy in 1968?

VALEO: No, not at all. He stayed completely out of that. I don't know that he publicly endorsed Johnson, but I'm sure that he would have felt that there was no way you could change horses. So at most he would have stayed out of it. He would not have made any speech on behalf of any of the other candidates. I'm certain he wouldn't have done that. He might have been a little reluctant to do one on behalf of Johnson too, but from my own recollection he did not have to. So he was pretty much in the clear. We went to Eastern Europe during the election, if I'm not mistaken!

RITCHIE: Do you think that he had any particular respect for Eugene McCarthy or Robert Kennedy as reasonable alternatives?

VALEO: I think he was more amused by McCarthy than impressed by him. In the case of Bobby Kennedy, I think he wanted to keep the Kennedys away from the presidency after the assassination of President Kennedy. He just thought they were an ill-starred family, and that they were only looking for trouble, that they kept chasing it.

RITCHIE: What kind of a senator was Bobby Kennedy. You saw him for about four years.

VALEO: Not a major factor; nowhere near the importance of Ted Kennedy. I don't think he was really interested in the Senate. It was not his way of working. Basically, both he and Jack needed a little more authority. I don't mean to suggest they were authoritarians, but they liked some power that you could use, and in the Senate the best way to use power is not to use it. That kind of approach did not really appeal to them as people. I didn't know Bobby Kennedy very well. He used to sit in the chair as presiding officer once in a while. He always seemed like a rather shy man to me, and pleasant enough, but I didn't really know him.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you a little bit more about your own role in these years. In '65 you were still the Democratic majority secretary. With a 2:1 majority, did that make your work easier or harder?

VALEO: As secretary for the majority I handled almost all of the votes on the floor during this whole period. That's why I can speak with some certainty when I say that they were not difficult votes. My own job on the floor was reduced to figuring out the vote, trying to estimate the vote beforehand, calling in absent members on close votes and then during the vote handling it from the back of the floor, briefing people on amendments as they came in for a vote. Again, I never used any pressure on any member. I never had to. At that point I used to even have

Republicans come to me and ask me what the amendment was, or how did someone vote on it, or that sort of thing. I won't say it was a non-partisan Senate, but it had very little partisanship in it. People either voted for the measure on the merits, or opposed it, but it was not usually for partisan reasons. The job was relatively easy.

Then of course I'd take the notes for the party conferences. We began to use fuller and fuller coverage of the caucuses. When Bobby Baker did the job, his notes on a meeting were maybe a half-page long. Then I used to do something much more elaborate on it, but still primarily in the form of taking notes. Then finally Mansfield wanted an actual verbatim record of it, so we began to bring in the reporters of debates. I think he was also angry at the salaries the reporters of the debates were being paid and the amount of time they had off, and he thought we ought to use them more fully. So they would then come in and cover the procedures verbatim.

RITCHIE: Was that also so you could have an exact record of what was said?

VALEO: That was his doing. I didn't feel it was necessary to do it that fully, but he felt it was necessary, particularly after the Vietnamese thing became very heated. He wanted, I think, a full record of that.

RITCHIE: I was thinking that the Vietnam War must have been at the root of that.

VALEO: I would think so.

RITCHIE: I also wondered if you had anything to do with, or knew anything about, Mansfield and Dirksen's efforts, around the end of 1964, to get Charles Watkins to retire as parliamentarian?

VALEO: I didn't have anything to do with that. I was glad they did it, because Charlie really should have retired at the time, should have retired a little bit sooner, preferably before that '64 Civil Rights bill. I think we would have had a lot different experience on cloture if that had been the case. But it was time for him to retire. I ran into the same problem with Doc Riddick later on. He always wanted to retire but not retire. I kept telling him, "Look, you can stay as long as you want, Doc, but when you retire, that's it." I often said, "You really need to quit; everybody needs to do that at some point." And I said, "It's time to do it fully when you're ready." I think he was looking for some way in which he could be on without being on. I would not give him any opportunity to do that. At that time I really had full authority over who was going to be appointed. Mansfield would have given me complete support on that. So I could speak with authority, and I did. Finally, I got him to retire fully, and then somebody made some motion about making him

"Parliamentarian Emeritus," whatever that means, and then somebody else gave him a job on the Rules Committee, which I thought was outrageous, in all honesty. I felt it was demeaning of the job of parliamentarian of the Senate. But that's what happens with some people in the Senate, they don't know when to leave it.

RITCHIE: Watkins was in his eighties at the time he stepped down.

VALEO: Yes, certainly over eighty. I don't know how much, but he was over eighty.

RITCHIE: Was he just not performing well?

VALEO: No, he was all right. Charlie was all right. His mind was perfectly all right. The problem with Charlie was that he didn't realize that to interpret the rules the way he was doing assumed that the Senate had infinite time and that every member would take only his fair share of infinite time, whatever that might be. The net result was that every ruling he made was to lean over backwards to protect the individual member, even at the expense of the whole body. You could do that in certain circumstances, but by the time the Senate reached 1960, you could not do that and expect a viable legislative body. The only reason why it worked with Mansfield was because Mansfield was the kind of person he was and because of the circumstances in the decade of the sixties.

Even he had to make some modifications. One of them was the double-track system, which became almost an accepted practice. If you have a measure up before the Senate, and it's the prevailing measure—I'm trying to remember how it developed, but it came just kind of strictly out of the blue. I think Mansfield asked whether or not they would be prepared, since the Senate was tied up on a potential filibuster, would they be prepared to leave the pending business until three o'clock, or four o'clock and take up another measure in the interim. Well, technically that is not feasible under the Senate rules, unless you have unanimous consent. But he got unanimous consent, again because he was the kind of person he was, because people realized what was happening on the measure, that it was a hold up on it, and because it became a practical way of dealing with the situation. It became a precedent, and so far as I know that double-track system, as it's called, is being used even today.

But it was one of the ways of getting around what are really some of the idiocies in the Senate rules. They're not idiocies, again, if you assume that time is infinite and all members will use only their fair share of it.

RITCHIE: Well, Watkins had been on the staff since the 1920s. Was that a sign that the institution had just changed so drastically by the 1960s that it had to adopt new measures if it was going to get any business done?

VALEO: Yes, I think so. Again, Charlie Watkins in the context in which he operated was a perfectly honorable man, and a perfectly good parliamentarian. He knew everything the Senate had done in other situations. He had a marvelous memory for it. But it's just that times had changed and the Senate was being called upon to do the kinds of things which it was never called on to do in the '20s, or '30s.

RITCHIE: I get a sense from talking to people who spent a long time on the staff that until the 1960s, the Senate was a very old-fashioned institution. You know, Bill Ridgely talks about the fact that they had no computers, they handed out pay in cash.

VALEO: Well, if you want to get into that, I'll tell you some of what was involved. When I took over as secretary of the Senate, I found that the Disbursing Office was virtually beyond the control of the secretary. Theoretically he was the responsible person, he was bonded for the funds handled in the Disbursing Office, he was responsible for the Senate's finances, but he had no real control over them. This had a rather interesting history. The Disbursing Office originally had been in the secretary's conference room; that had been, I believe, where they paid people off in cash in that room; then it had moved around the corridor. There was a scandal in the early '50s. A disbursing officer committed suicide. He shot himself, due I think primarily to worry over the lax ways in which they had been running the

Disbursing Office. He was being challenged for having permitted it. I don't think he absconded with funds or anything of the sort, he had just not given that much attention to the way it was done.

The net result of that was to bring Bob Brenkworth in as the Financial Clerk. He tightened up greatly on the regulations under which they operated. Bob Brenkworth was a great one for going through the rules books. Every time a senator uttered some new idea on the floor, and nobody objected to it, he made it a part of the rules, in effect, or at least the precedents of the Senate which reduced completely any kind of political control over the Disbursing Office. To a degree, that was warranted, but the fact remains if you are going to have a responsive organization, you've got to have someone who is accountable to somebody, and the disbursing officer no more than anybody else should be a dictator, or completely trusted on his own authority. I think you have to come back to the Senate being responsible, and the only way the Senate could have that responsibility would be through some elected officer. In this case, it was the secretary of the Senate who they had properly designated a number of decades before as the chief financial officer of the Senate.

Well, Bob Brenkworth was a consummate bureaucrat, and knew how to build up his own authority. I asked him how he recruited people. He said he put an ad in the newspapers and then picked

people from that. Well, there were no black people in the Disbursing Office at that point; as far as I know there were no Jews. I mean, he had his own concept of what made for a desirable non-partisan Disbursing Office. I noted that myself. Occasionally people would come and say, "I know an accountant, would you consider putting him on the Disbursing Office?" I'd say, "Well, I'll send him over to see if he has the qualifications. But I let them do their own hiring over there. I don't hire for the Disbursing Office." I did that, and this of course immediately became "political interference" from Brenkworth's viewpoint, and he began to spread the idea that there was political interference in the Disbursing Office. Well, this frightened everybody, because they remembered the suicide and what might have been political influence at that time. He would use tricks like that. Then I noticed that all of the envelopes of the Disbursing Office, even though they went out under the secretary's frank, did not have "The Office of the Secretary" on them. So I ordered a change in that, to make it clear that the responsibility lay with the secretary. Brenkworth's answer to that was to try to get the Disbursing Office out from under the Senate secretary by writing a provision into law making it an independent entity under the president pro tem.

Oh, there was one other question, that of paying in cash. Except for senators who were paid only once a month, everybody else had to be paid in cash. If you wanted your payment every two weeks, you had to get it in cash. There was no other way the Disbursing Office could figure out how to do it by check. We did have some politically appointed cops at the time, and one of them sat outside the Disbursing Office on payday. I don't think he could have stopped a flea trying to get into the Disbursing Office, if there was going to be a hold-up. It frightened me greatly that on paydays we had so much cash in the Senate. I could just see some bold thieves coming in there and just pushing the guy over—he used to sit with his seat back on two legs of the chair—just give him a little push and he would have gone over, and they would have gone in and robbed the Disbursing Office. So I was determined that as a first thing I would get that changed. Believe me, I ran into all kinds of problems trying to get people paid just in checks rather than in cash. I did a lot of research on it, and I had to testify before the Appropriations Committee which was where Brenkworth also served as an advisor or budgetary matters.

He presented the budget for the whole secretary's office, and of course took care of the Disbursing Office in this process. I told him I wanted to appear in person. Well, this was somewhat unprecedented. My predecessor had not gone down for ten years or

something like that to appear before one of the committees. I told him as the responsible officer, I wanted to appear on the budget for the entire office. When I got to the Appropriation Committee, I asked for provision to be made—because I had spoken to Bob Brenkworth, and he said, "Well, it can't be done without the Appropriations Committee's consent, in any event, and it can't really be done anyhow." So when I testified I said I had studied the practices of the federal government and found there was only one other place in the federal government where people were still being paid in cash, and that was at an army outpost in Alaska, where they were still being paid in silver dollars! Well, that was enough to get that corrected. But I could not get him to look at any idea on automation of the Disbursing Office's procedures; he still insisted there was no way in which this could be done.

Bob began to feel the pressure from me, and then decided his answer would be to get out from under the secretary's office altogether. Since he had very good friends on the Appropriations Committee staff, they knew him, and because very few senators can add two and two correctly, they trusted anybody who could. He went to the Appropriations Committee and tried to get the legislation rewritten so that the Disbursing Office would be an independent office of the Senate under the president pro tem. Well, this was precisely the opposite way in which I thought the staff structure should go in the Senate. I had visions of the House situation

which has four or five different offices—even the doorkeeper is elected separately over there. I went to the majority leader and I told him what was happening. He went to Russell who was chairman of the committee, and Russell had gone along with the change, he didn't know one thing from the other, he didn't care that much. "Oh," he said, "no, if you don't want it, that's all right. I just thought it was something that it would be all right to do."

So Russell changed positions, and then after that, Brenkworth knew he had to resign. He did, and Bill Ridgely was next in line, but there was nothing automatic; I had to appoint him. He came in and I talked with him and I told him I would appoint him on one condition. I had already hired Lan Potter and Marilyn Courtot to study the procedures of the secretary's office, with a view to bringing them up to date. I told Bill Ridgely I would be glad to appoint him, I had no problems with him as a person, but I wanted one promise in return, and that was he would make a good faith effort to modernize the procedures in that office and use Marilyn Courtot in connection with that. He agreed to do that, so our relationship thereafter was a very good one. We never had any problems, and the office was of course brought up to date.

RITCHIE: In 1970 you had Orlando Potter do a study of the Disbursing Office.

VALEO: Yes, I brought him in to do a study of all the procedures in the secretary's office. He in turn, I think, recommended Marilyn Courtot, or brought her over in connection with another project we were concerned with. No, I asked him to bring Marilyn Courtot from the Library because she had done some excellent work there, and I knew about it, largely in connection with the new campaign contributions law, which was then going into effect, which involved a good deal of record-keeping that we were not equipped to do. So Orlando Potter, whom I had met earlier and was impressed with, he came I guess by way of Pell's office, and Marilyn Courtot were the key people in changing the procedures. Orlando Potter was mostly concerned with the campaign contributions law then, and then Marilyn took Potter's basic study and began to try to apply it in detail in the different departments in the secretary's office.

Since we're on the subject we might as well stay on it a little longer, and get to the establishment of the Curator's office, which came in somewhere in this period. Actually, it started when Jackie Kennedy tried to get the chandelier, which I mentioned in a previous conversation. It occurred to me, I had been reading some articles that said that so much in the way of historic artifacts and art had disappeared from state capitols, and I had to assume that the same thing was happening in our own Capitol, especially when Lyndon Johnson set up his library in

Texas and was sending things down there for storage. When I heard about the ballot boxes—you know, the ballot boxes which carry the Electoral College votes over to the House, I understood they made a new set every election. Somebody just grabbed the boxes after each ceremony, they were lovely boxes, and they were of course historic artifacts. I assumed that there must be some real problems in things disappearing and that really should not be the case. So I talked with Mansfield about it. He said, "Well, why don't we get somebody to keep tabs on it and see what's involved." We decided what we really needed was a curator.

Theoretically, the Architect of the Capitol had some authority over this, and also the sergeant at arms, but neither of them looked at it from a historic point of view. He said, "Go ahead, let's see if we can get a curator set up for the Capitol." He wanted it for the whole Capitol rather than just for the Senate. We tried it that way, I guess three or four successive years. We got unanimous approval in the Senate right away, but couldn't get the House to go along with it, largely because the architect, George Stewart, didn't really want it. He didn't want any more authorities wandering around on the House side. That was one aspect of it. Then he agreed to trade it: he'd do it if we would get him money to extend the west front! The bill came up in our Rules Committee and in our Appropriations Committee both. Well, they didn't want to do the west front, so it was kept hanging.

Then Mansfield said, "Well, let's just forget the House. Just do it for the Senate." And we did; that's the way the Senate Curator's Office was set up.

I had a great deal of difficulty finding someone for the job. There was a fellow named Joseph W. Dougherty, I guess, he was on the Library of Congress Station. I tried to get someone through the Library of Congress, thought that would be a logical place to look for a candidate. He came in to see me about the job, and he had some relevant experience. I think I tried Jim Ketchum, who was then at the White House and was recommended by a friend of Mansfield's who had some connections with the White House, but he wasn't ready to leave the White House at that time. I guess I tried Dick Baker, and he preferred to be an historian elsewhere rather than a curator in the Senate. I could find no one that seemed more suitable, so I got Dougherty, and he had a stroke about two weeks after I hired him, so the problem was extremely difficult. Then finally Jim Ketchum came back; he'd had some sort of altercation at the White House and offered then to take the job, and that's the way the office got started. As you know, we wrote it up so the secretary became the executive director of the Commission on Art and Antiquities, and it was totally bipartisan. By this time, I guess Scott was already minority leader, and so the thing worked very well.

It became a key factor in getting the two historic rooms of the Capitol restored, both the Old Supreme Court Chamber and the Old Senate Chamber, which had languished in the Architect's office for years. They could never get the money for it. But then with the support from the Commission on Art and Antiquities, we were able to finally get the committees to go along with providing the funds to finish that job.

The Historical Office didn't come directly out of that, but at about the same time. It started in another way. The person who was in charge of the Documents Room at the time came to see me and said, "I've got all these old documents going back to the nineteenth century, and I don't know what to do with them. Nobody wants them anymore. Can't we get rid of them in some way?" I said, "What are they about?" He brought me a sampling of them, some of them sounded like very interesting questions, Indian questions and all sorts of things of regional interest. So it occurred to me that one way you might dispose of them would be to send them to historic groups in the states where they were most relevant. Sure enough, we made it known to members of the Senate that we had these old documents that had particular reference to their states, would they be interested in distributing them and could they recommend a repository in their state. The response was very good. So we sent out a lot of these documents at that time. That was the start of it.

Then it occurred to us that we really needed someone to keep a close eye on what was happening in the Senate and to study what had happened in the Senate. I proposed a Senate historian to the Appropriations Committee, because then I was testifying regularly for the secretary's offices. I guess it was Fritz Hollings who was chairman of that subcommittee at the time, and he saw the virtue of the idea immediately. So that's the way the Historical Office got started. And then I heard through Jim Ketchum that Dick Baker was ready perhaps to come up to the Senate. I wanted him, and we got him.

RITCHIE: And you got Arthur Scott as the photohistorian.

VALEO: Yes, he came in to see me. He was a nice fellow, although an odd fellow. I think he really had some sort of a mental problem. But he was very amiable as a photographer. He had been the Republican photographer, if I'm not mistaken, and had always been very accommodating, very helpful. He wanted that job badly. I guess it was his idea originally. I talked to Dick about it at the time, and Dick thought we might use something like that. The problem was that Scott fell apart. He couldn't stand working for anyone, and he had no sense of working in an organization. He was an artist with a camera, but I guess he just didn't understand anything beyond that, so it became a very difficult personnel problem. I really felt a little sorry for him at that point. I knew that he was having some kind of mental

problem, I could see that. But then it got straightened out and he decided it was time to quit.

RITCHIE: Well, I have a lot of questions to ask about the period when you were secretary of the Senate, but I think maybe we should hold those for next time.

VALEO: Are we at a stopping place, my goodness!

RITCHIE: Well, it's twelve o'clock and I should give you a break.

VALEO: Yes, that's enough!

End of Interview #10

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

SECRETARY OF THE SENATE
Interview #11
Thursday, October 17, 1985

RITCHIE: Today I'd like to talk about when you became secretary of the Senate in 1966. I was interested in how you became secretary, when the decision was made.

VALEO: Yes, let me try to recall the circumstances. I had been serving as secretary for the majority for a period of time, without any major problems, for two or three years. There had been no more scandals, and generally speaking I think people were fairly well satisfied with the way the Senate was being handled then. I don't think you can divorce my situation from the general changes that were taking place. Most senators liked the way the changes were going, because it enhanced their own individual stature, and that was basically the whole thrust of Mansfield's leadership—and to move the whole Senate towards a better concept of equal treatment for all members. Although theoretically senators were equal, they actually had not been in practice, and they knew that. They saw the effect of the Mansfield changes as time went on.

Well, traditionally, or at least in everybody's living memory, the secretary for the majority normally became secretary of the Senate. There were several reasons for that. First of all, he

was known to the majority as secretary for the majority, and he would normally be someone who was closely associated with the leadership. So it was a natural kind of thing to put him on what was regarded as one level higher, and along with the sergeant at arms, the principal officer of the Senate. So by tradition the appointment should have come to me, although there's nothing to require that. In fact, as you probably know, the secretary of the Senate is elected by the Senate, not even by the majority, but it's one of the few things that the caucus usually agrees on and stays with and votes together on, the election of the officers of the Senate, along with the committees and the other subsidiary bodies of the Senate. So what it amounted to was that you got an endorsement from the majority and then the minority never opposed that for the simple reason that they knew the majority would stand firm and would, therefore, be able to elect the person that they had given an endorsement to, or nominated in effect.

Normally, there were no opposing nominations on the floor, although I think the precedents will show there may have been one or two fights on that, historically, in the Senate. That was one of the things that came up at that time. Word got around that Senator Long was going to try to get someone else in the job, a fellow named Charles Jones, who later became head of the recording studio. I think he was either a North or South Carolinian. A nice chap, pleasant and amiable and well liked. Had no particular

background for the job as secretary of the Senate. At that time, I forget what his job was, I think the senator he worked for may have died just at that point, or retired and he was sort of at loose ends and they were looking for a job for him. No, I'm sorry, I've got it confused. That was for the secretary for the majority job.

The question arose in this case with Emery Frazier, who was the chief clerk (as it was then called) for many, many years. He had also been the reading clerk at the Democratic presidential conventions. He had a very large booming voice and became a very familiar television figure in those conventions. He was a very pleasant person, had a great love for the Senate, was liked by just about everybody in the Senate, I don't think he had an enemy of any kind, anywhere. He was what you might call a traditional figure of the Senate staff structure. He was the one that did most of the hiring of people for the secretary. He had a good eye for the needs of the Senate in the context of that period, particularly for what was needed on the floor, so he chose people with that very much in mind.

His superior at the time was a chap named Felton Johnston, who was known affectionately as Skeeter. Skeeter had become secretary, as I recall, because [Lyndon] Johnson didn't want him as secretary for the majority anymore, he wanted Bobby Baker in that job, so he found an opening and just made him secretary of

the Senate. He ran it essentially as an administrative job and depended very heavily on Emery Frazier. Skeeter had very little connection, as far as I'm aware, with Johnson, and certainly almost no connection with Mansfield, other than the most formal. He was not liked by Mansfield particularly, tolerated after he took over until Skeeter decided to retire. The only connection really that the secretary of the Senate had at that time with the Mansfield leadership was that traditionally the Policy Committee had met in the secretary's conference room. Mansfield continued that practice while Johnston was still secretary of the Senate. He did sit in on the Policy Committee luncheons and he sat in on the Democratic caucuses. I had no personal feelings one way or the other towards Skeeter. I hardly knew him. He was always most pleasant to me.

But when he decided to retire, an effort was made to elevate Emery Frazier, almost as a gesture to Emery for his long service in the Senate, into the job. Russell of Georgia was a part of that. I'm sure Long must have been a part of it. There may have been others, I don't know who else was involved. Mansfield got wind of that, and he didn't want to have a head-on battle so he moved, rather astutely, on his own—I had nothing to do with it. I knew that there was a problem, that there was some question rising. It didn't bother me one way or the other, I was secretary

for the majority and not discontented in that role. But what Mansfield did was to suggest to Russell that they give Emery Frazier the post until his seventieth birthday, or something like that, and then have him retire; but to do the election of both Emery and his successor—which would be me—at the same time. This headed off any kind of a real dispute in the caucus. Nobody could really argue with that because the desire for Emery in the office was essentially an affectionate one and they knew of course that I was quite close to Mansfield and that I was obviously Mansfield's choice for the job. So that's the way it worked.

Emery took over as secretary for less than a year, and during that period, in effect I was secretary-elect to replace him on his seventieth birthday, or sometime thereabouts. That was how it developed. Emery and I had no problems with it. He was very decent about it. At one point he said, "I don't want to make any major appointments that aren't agreeable with you in this period." He said, "I need to replace myself as chief clerk, and I have somebody in mind whom I think you'll like and whom you'll certainly agree with." I said, "Well, who's that, Emery?" He said, "It's Darrell St. Claire." Well, I had known Darrell for many years and was personally very fond of him and knew that he knew the Senate very, very well indeed. So he was an ideal choice for the job. I told him, "By all means, go right ahead and appoint him. I couldn't think of anybody I'd rather have in there more

than Darrell." And that's the way Darrell was made assistant secretary of the Senate.

This reminds me of another problem I used to run into occasionally with Mansfield on appointments. It became a question of choosing my successor as secretary for the majority. Word came to me from the Montana office that he had Stan Kimmitt in mind for the job. I didn't know Stan Kimmitt very well, but I got the impression from the people in the Montana office that they did not like him. It was clear that what they were suggesting to me was to try to sidetrack the designation. Stan had been around the Senate as a kind of a military attaché, or military liaison for many years, knew a lot of members, mostly on the conservative side of the Democratic party, from the military committees. I received prodding from the Montana people—Stan was also from Montana, and I thought this resistance to him might involve Montana politics in some way. Moreover, I personally had reservations about putting a military man in the job, in all candor.

There was one other person who occurred to me at that time. He was an administrative assistant to Senator Pat McNamara of Michigan, who had just died, Robert Perrin. I knew the man only slightly, but I had a very high respect for him. I liked McNamara very much, I thought he was a really outstanding senator. Considering his background, I think he was head of the Plumbers Union, or he had a card in the Plumbers Union, he brought a bit of

America into the Senate, from that economic group, which I thought was extremely refreshing. He was a powerful, positive influence for social legislation that I thought, myself, personally desirable. Anyhow, he had this assistant and I thought he would have made an ideal person. He was a personality very much like Mansfield, actually, sort of reticent and withdrawing, but with a very deep knowledge of the legislative process. So I dropped the name in Mansfield's presence. I didn't say anything about Stan Kimmitt, but I dropped the name of Bob Perrin. He didn't like it one bit. He sort of pinned my ears back on that one, and he said, "That job goes to Stan Kimmitt." So he had already made up his mind, for some reason or other, that it was going to go to Kimmitt. He later regretted it, but at that time he was very strong for it.

I used to get that situation occasionally with Mansfield. There was another case of a woman who had tendencies towards alcoholism when he hired her. She was a lovely person, and I was very fond of her. He said, "Why don't we put her in the job?" I sort of resisted it for a while, but he finally became very insistent, and I went along with it. The alcoholism caught up with her at a later point. He would say to me later, "You know, we have made some very bad appointments around here," referring usually to appointments he had made. I caught this with Charlie Ferris on another occasion, on the policy committee, where again I had

nothing to do with the choice, but I always got the "we" when he decided they weren't very good appointments.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that was? Do you think he was too trusting of people in the beginning?

VALEO: No, like all of us his judgment wasn't infallible. He could pick the wrong people. He could pick them for the wrong reasons. He could pick them because of pressures that were put on him. I made the same mistake. In one case he had a chap—I won't mention his name—but he must have been a distant cousin of Russell's. He was a lawyer down in the Treasury Department, and Russell had suggested that he be appointed to one of the leadership committees. Mansfield responded to Russell, where he normally would not respond to suggestions of that sort necessarily from other members, but he was always very deferential to Russell, I think in recognition of his power within the southern group. So he asked me to check the fellow out. I had a friend in the Treasury Department who was also a lawyer and had worked in the same department. I called him and asked him about him, and I thought I detected a kind of reticence. He didn't want to say "No, don't hire him," he probably felt he couldn't say that. But it was certainly a lukewarm endorsement.

I didn't think that that was enough to support the appointment, but then the woman who was in charge of that particular

group became very ill, and even though he didn't know her, he wrote her a lovely letter. I happened to go out to see her when she was recovering, and she showed me the letter. I must say, I was completely taken with it. I thought anybody who could write such a warm letter to someone whom he didn't know must be a pretty decent human being. So this persuaded me that the appointment was probably solid. I went back and reported to Mansfield that I thought it would probably be a good appointment. Well, it turned out to be a disaster. We finally had to fire him. So you see, it's possible to make mistakes, usually in hiring people for the wrong reasons. And Mansfield was not immune to that by any means.

I should mention one other thing. The secretary's office was really in the doldrums at that time. Skeeter Johnston didn't do anything with it. At least in the period I knew him he was basically getting ready to fold up and go. His sight was going and he was not in the best of health. He had no influence with the leadership. He had some with Hayden. There were attempts made at that time to move the secretary's office out from the control of the majority leader where it had been with Johnson and put it under the control of the president pro tem, just as the legal counsel's office was under the control of the president pro tem. But Hayden would not buy that. Hayden was president pro tem

during that period. He really didn't want to be bothered with this, so he'd refer all questions to Mike, because he was used to referring them to Johnson. So the office didn't move out from under the control of the leadership. Really the caucus has the control ultimately of it. I think Skeeter finally felt it was time for him to get out, and he resigned. Then I took over after Emery Frazier.

When I was getting ready to move into the office, Emery Frazier knew I was a hiker—I used to hike the Skyline Drive trails and the Potomac Appalachian trails, and he went up there a great deal for vacations. So he said, "How about spending a weekend at Skyline. I'll tell you all about the secretary's office if we do that." I said, "Fine, Emery." We went up and spent two or three days at one of the lodges. Emery gave me the whole background on everything connected with the secretary's office in the thirty or more years that he was with the Senate. It was really very amusing how he picked people. He said, "I hire people on my sense of whether they'll fit in the job, even though their job applications do not necessarily indicate that that's the case. Like for instance, I hired this fellow. I was walking through Union Station one day, and I saw this fellow sitting on a bench and I sat down next to him. We had a little talk. He needed a job and I decided he'd be good for one of the jobs in the secretary's office, and I brought him in. I didn't have an opening for

him at the time, but expected that there would be a change, and I knew he would be ideal for it, so that's the way I chose him." Well, I thought this was pretty far-fetched, but it seemed to work—the fellow is still in the job as far as I know, and would probably recognize himself if he hears the tape!

But the thing, I think, that disturbed me the most in this situation was that, as you may know, in that earlier period there was a kind of dividing line between black employees of the secretary's office and the rest. Black employees were then called messengers, uniformly, although they did a variety of other tasks besides being messengers, one of which was to take care of the secretary's inner sanctum, especially for occasional drinks when people would drop in during a late session. Although I understand at one point the secretary's office was a pretty heavy drinking center, it was not that during my period, very specifically because Mansfield instructed me to cut down on the booze around the Senate, and this was one of the sources of booze. I did not encourage people to come in and have a drink. They went elsewhere perhaps, but they didn't very often come into the secretary's office, except on a very late night sometimes, we'd have a group of maybe eight or nine.

Anyhow, among other jobs, the black employees drove; they waited tables for the secretary's luncheons and for the leadership luncheons. When I was about to become secretary, Emery Frazier

called in all the black employees, including the senior member of the staff, Ellsworth Dozier, who became a highly trusted friend. He lined them up and said, "I want to introduce you to your new boss." He gave my name, and then he said, "and he can fire any one of you, if he pleases." Well, these poor guys were standing there, shivering in their boots, and it just made me feel very, very bad. I knew that something had to be done to change that. I made some sort of gesture of protest at the time, but he was very insistent on making the point, and I thought there was something about this that was kind of—I couldn't live with it, I knew that was not the way it had to go and I did change it.

That, in effect, was the way I started as secretary of the Senate. The next thing I ran into was the tendency of the Disbursing Office to break away from the secretary's office, although the secretary had legal responsibilities with regard to the Disbursing Office. If I had a basic concept of the job, it was based upon what I had seen in the British system, which was that the supporting services of the Senate, at least, if not of the whole Congress, ought to be integrated and put at some point under one direction, and as far as possible removed from politics. That would have been the underlying concept with which I approached the job; it would have been based primarily on the British experience, and partly on the belief that you could not run the kind of Senate it was becoming as though it were a

personal club of some kind, that somehow or other you had to get a structure which gave at least the staff part of it some kind of institutional status and career continuity.

This had not been the case in earlier changes from Republican to Democratic control or vice versa; there had been sort of a wholesale bloodletting of people, and very few, with some exceptions, like Emery Frazier, very few survived. Skeeter Johnston had also seen this problem and he had a lot of time to work on it; he was gradually moving it away from the idea of a change over. He hired Republicans as well as Democrats, he tried to keep some sort of a rough divisions of sources of supply for personnel from both parties. He at least was attempting to move it in that direction. To a degree he had been successful in keeping on people who had lost their patrons, so to speak, who had basically been under something called the Patronage Committee. Well, I found out that Patronage Committee had been Hayden's committee, when he was president pro tem, but again, it was one of those functions which he exercised with Johnson's okay. So I went to the leadership and got Mansfield to become chairman of the Patronage Committee. The way Skeeter had tried to move it away from the old fashioned approach was to have the jobs put under the patronage, so to speak, of the secretary of the Senate, which gave the secretary of the Senate the ability to hire or fire.

When I came in, maybe about 30 percent of the jobs were still controlled by individual members who had been assigned the patronage by the Patronage Committee. I made it one of my goals to try to reduce that and have the appointments consolidated under the secretary so that you could then avoid the political element. By the time I left, we were pretty well down to maybe 10 percent, and relatively minor jobs, still left under patronage. I always took the view that the secretary should change with a change of administration. I felt that essential under our system. And possibly the assistant secretary, but I was trying to get it to the point where you wouldn't go any further than that, that the other people would have job security below that, at least to the extent that it might be jeopardized by political changes. You saw what happened when the Republicans came into a majority on the committees a few years ago. The same sort of thing went on in the committee structures. There was a big changeover and that was what I was trying to avoid as far as possible in the secretary's office.

RITCHIE: And you did. There wasn't much of a change there in 1980.

VALEO: No, there wasn't. And to stress it, I did not expect Kimmitt to succeed me; I thought that Hildenbrand would succeed me. I knew Bill very well and explained to him as I was going along what I was trying to do, on the assumption that he would be the next Republican secretary of the Senate, if ever

there were one. He didn't say he agreed with it, but I thought I made some impression on him. I said, "Look, first of all I'm not hiring any of these people on the basis of whether they're Democrats or Republicans. That's not a question that's being asked any longer." I said that from the point of view of the Senate, I felt it was essential that it be done that way. He didn't say no, and he didn't say yes, but when he finally took over, I saw him again and we had a long talk, and it was clear that he was going to do it that way.

When Robert Dole took over, I saw Dole and had essentially the same talk with him. He referred me to Jo-Anne Coe. I described what we had tried to do, and I said that actually the jobs were technically now under the secretary's patronage so that they were subject to change, but that I didn't think you could run an effective Senate that way, and for the good of the institution I thought you'd have to have a good deal of continuity. I said, "That doesn't mean that some jobs can't change, but I just think that ought to be the guiding principle, or I think you'll run into a lot of trouble." I saw her at the suggestion of Dole. He was a little surprised when he found out how few jobs were left to the leadership for patronage purposes. I don't know how that's developed, I haven't followed it that closely, but I did try to spread that message. When Stan Kimmitt took over I told him the same thing. He certainly accepted the idea, and Bill Hildenbrand

accepted the idea. Both of them ran, I thought, the secretary's office in a very effective way.

One of the ways we got to that state, as I tried to point out, was by having Mansfield assign to the secretary the patronage of every senator who was either defeated or retired. So by attrition we were gradually getting to the point—and some of them didn't even know they had the patronage, they had forgotten about it, and so when we had a vacancy we didn't remind them that they had the patronage. We'd just go ahead and fill them. We lost the lists of who was entitled to what patronage jobs in the secretary's office. I think Darrell and I conveniently lost those lists, I'm not sure. And I must say, there was no heavy pressure for political appointee jobs in the secretary's office at that time, which made it easier. There were a lot of other jobs around. But when you come in after you've been out for a long time, like the Republicans, you're under a lot more pressure. When you change from Democratic administration to Democratic administration that isn't quite as powerful a factor in the situation. So those things conspired to make the institutional development a practical thing. In addition there was a tendency on the part of the leadership on both sides, certainly with [Hugh] Scott as well as Mansfield, to see the necessity for change. I guess when [Howard] Baker came in he changed the parliamentarian, but I think there was a personal problem that precipitated that.

I think I may have mentioned in our earlier discussion how we got the Curator's Office set up, and set up the Historian's Office. The biggest problem that was presented to us in this period was the administration of the campaign contributions law, in its first form, before it was amended, before the commission was set up. There will be one other thing that I'll want to hit, and that's the Commission on the Organization of the Senate, which was also set up in this period.

The campaign contributions law presented us with a major challenge. It was not a responsibility which I would have sought. In connection with the effort to reorganize the office along new lines, I had hired Lan Potter as a consultant to study the structure of the Senate secretary's office and to come up with suggestions on how we might improve it. Before we go into that, I better go back and touch on the dispute with the Disbursing Office, which was a very important one, and a critical one at this period. It was a development which was to determine whether in the long run the staff structure of the Senate might have a chance of going the way I thought it ought to go, that is, towards consolidation, or whether it would go into further dispersal, just like the Senate was going in its dispersal of power in this period, the Senate itself. I was trying to resist that on the staff side, even as it was spreading among the senators.

The problem came up with a Senate clerk who was named Bob Brenkworth. To give you a little background beyond that, before Brenkworth, there was another financial clerk of the Senate who committed suicide. He committed suicide probably because the accounts in the Disbursing Office were so screwed up and there was so little control over the use of funds. I don't think there were any major crimes committed, but it was just almost a paper and pencil bookkeeping system that they used in the Disbursing Office in that period. After he committed suicide, Bob Brenkworth was made financial clerk, this was before I had anything to do with it. He ran it very tightly, but he also ran it extremely bureaucratically.

When I first came into the office, I found out that the Disbursing Office had virtually become an independent office, quite separate from the Senate secretary. The way that was done: Brenkworth came in at the very beginning and said, "Now if you'll sign this, I'll take care of the Disbursing Office." In effect, it was a complete delegation of the secretary's powers over the Disbursing Office. I demurred for a moment, not wanting to sign it until I knew a little bit more about what I was signing. But he said that all my predecessors had done this, and that this was the only way in which you could insure the integrity of financial transactions of the Senate. Well, he was bonded and I was bonded and I thought it would be all right, so I went ahead and did that.

Then I found out this was also part of the business of taking the secretary completely out of the affairs of the Disbursing Office. Brenkworth was able to do this because of the fear engendered by the previous scandal and the suicide, and also by the fact that he had made himself in effect, if not in name, the budget officer for the Senate by a close relationship with the Appropriations Committee, who needed someone in this role. They had a chief clerk at that time named Tom

RITCHIE: Scott?

VALEO: Tom Scott. He had been there for many years and was trusted by Hayden among others. Brenkworth had totally independent access to the Appropriations Committee, which was the nearest thing to a governing committee for the secretary's office as well as for many of the secretary's services. Brenkworth, playing a kind of dual role of being the secretary's disbursing officer and the Appropriations Committee's budget officer, had managed to work both sides of the street, until he was in a rather unassailable position. The only thing I had were some very serious worries about how he was hiring people for the office—I understood that what he did was put an ad in the newspaper and then screen out the appointments on that basis. Nobody knew who he hired. I think I might have mentioned that one time somebody had come to me about getting a job for somebody in the secretary's office. I sent him over there and that was later thrown up at me

as being political interference in the operation of the Disbursing Office. I think it was a Republican who had asked me to look into the possibility of getting him a job!

Anyhow, I went down to testify—this was unprecedented—on the secretary's budget. I made it clear to Brenkworth, who had always done this job for the secretary, that I wanted to appear in person before the committee. He looked a little shocked at this, but he went along with it. He said, "Well, you know your predecessors never went down. I took care of the budget for the secretary's office." I said, "Well, that's all right, you come down too. But I want to go down and make myself known to the committee." I had said to him earlier: "I'm worried about the business of paying people in cash. At this late date in the history of the United States government, we're still paying staff people in the Senate every two weeks in an envelope with cash in it." He said, "That's the only way you can do it." I said, "Well, why is it the only way?" His response was: "They can get paid in check if they're prepared to wait till the end of the month. We'll give them a check at the end of the month." I said, "You know, I'm really very worried about this business of having five hundred thousand"—I don't know how much the payroll was at that time—"every two weeks lying around in the Senate. You know, we don't have the best of cops around here to protect this. It might make sense to try to do it the other way." Well, he said

he'd look into it, but he didn't think it was possible to do it. The other point I raised with him was the office's antiquated system. I said, "Computers are being introduced everywhere else." "Oh," he said, "that's impossible under the Senate system."

Well, that's what I was confronted with. I went down and I testified. I had some research done, and I found out that the only place in the American government where people were still being paid in cash, besides the United States Senate, was an army outpost up in Alaska where they were still paying in silver dollars! This made an impact, and it was shortly after that that he must have decided that I was really pressing too hard on the Disbursing Office, so there began a plot to try to get it out from under the secretary entirely. Since he worked closely with Tommy Scott on the Appropriations Committee, they were able to put something in a bill which in effect would have removed the Disbursing Office from the secretary's jurisdiction and would have made it an independent office of the Senate. This is what happened in the House and it would have gone in exactly the opposite direction from which I thought an effective, efficient management of Senate affairs ought to go.

I discovered the plot in time and I called it to Mansfield's attention. This had been slipped in without any real hearings on it or anything else. Apparently Russell had agreed to it at the time. Mansfield was really furious and he went to Russell, and

Russell said, "Oh, I don't feel very strongly about that. Tommy or somebody told me it would be a good idea to do it this way and I just went along with it. I have no strong feeling about it." Well, it was immediately taken out of the legislation. Not too long after that, Brenkworth resigned.

Bill Ridgely, who was the next in line for the job, came in to see me about it. I had no objections to appointing Bill Ridgely. I had always found him quite accommodating and quite service oriented. He asked about the job. Yes, I said, I didn't see any reason why he shouldn't move into it. But I laid down two conditions. One was that he eliminate all payment in cash as quickly as possible. The second one was that he make a really good faith effort to have the Disbursing Office analyzed for computerization. He agreed to the conditions and I appointed him to the job. He kept both commitments very completely and within a couple of months everyone was being paid in check without any great disasters to any of the staff people or the Senate. I felt safer. I slept better at night. The computer process he went at very slowly. It took him two or three years to do it, and he had both systems running simultaneously for the longest time, but eventually we got to the point where it was adopted. Bill later was very pleased with the outcome of this. He even went one step further; not only did he pay people in check but then he agreed to actually transfer salaries directly to the banks so employees

wouldn't even have to bother with a check. On the computerization, he pointed to it with pride as a great achievement in bringing the Senate's procedures up to date.

All the while, Lan Potter and Marilyn Courtot were both working on various other organizational problems when we were suddenly hit with the campaign contributions law. The reformers were trying to go for the commission approach right away and were attempting to remove the Senate secretary and the Clerk of the House from the process. They couldn't get it through in that form, there was too much resistance to it in the House committee. Then in lieu of a commission they thought of giving the supervisory power entirely to the Comptroller General. Pat Jennings who was then Clerk of the House resisted this very strongly. He came over to see me and he said, "I don't think we should let the control of congressional elections get into the hands of a Comptroller General." He didn't think he was the best person to administer the law. So he said he was going to have somebody put in the bill—I don't know where it was at that point in the process—he said he was going to get the clerk added and the secretary of the Senate as the administering officers for the elections on both sides of the Congress. Well, that seemed to me to put us in an awkward place for us to be, but I didn't know what else to do at that point, if he felt that strongly about it. I didn't want it done for the House without something comparable being done for the Senate.

Well, the campaign contributions law was probably the only thing that made me any enemies in the Senate. I knew I had Lan Potter to do the actual job, so that relieved me to some extent, but I still didn't want the responsibility, because I knew what was going to happen: I'd have a parade in of Senate people who were getting into difficulties complying with the law. But the provision was adopted, so we had the responsibility. I immediately assigned Lan Potter to work on that exclusively. Our first requirement was to get up a list of rules and regulations to interpret the law into practice. I also hired Neil Kennedy, who as a Republican lawyer had been very effective on the civil rights legislation. He had worked for Dirksen and was then in private practice. I hired him as a consultant, and I hired someone I knew, Paul Treusch from the Treasury Department, because I thought the writing of the rules and regulations on this would be very similar to some of the stuff that the Internal Revenue Service puts out—I hoped not as complicated. I didn't know what his credentials were politically, but I thought he might be vaguely a Democrat and that would keep some kind of a balance between the parties. My contribution was to set forth the principles, there were four or five, that I wanted to govern the administration of the law.

Potter went to work on it right away, he was not a lawyer but with their legal advice we got together, before the House or the

GAO, a set of rules and regulations for the enforcement of the law in Senate elections. My thought then was that we should try to bring it into harmony with what they were going to do in the House and what the Comptroller General was going to do in connection with presidential campaign contributions. So we had several joint meetings. Basically they adopted the rules and regulations that Lan Potter together with these lawyers had put together. We were out in front on it.

We went through the first election under the law, and it was really almost a disaster. The first couple of campaigns that Potter brought to my attention for noncompliance had to do with some minor candidates out in one of the western states, I think Arizona or New Mexico or somewhere out there. Somebody obviously was running on a shoe-string, on his own, someone who thought he ought to run for the Senate without any party backing. He said, "This fellow's not filing his reports properly." I said, "Lan, what's the total amount of his contributions?" It was a couple of thousand dollars. It just seemed to me to be ridiculous to try to enforce the law or to refer that to the attorney general for enforcement on such a trivial thing.

From the time Potter began to bring me these noncompliance cases dealing with minor candidates, I saw that the law was going to end volunteerism in politics, that it would frighten away what had been one of the few balancing factors against money in

campaigns, which was the willingness of people to sweat out an election without compensation, without anything else, or maybe throw ten bucks into the pot for a candidate they believed in. They were going to get scared to do things like that, and in a way that's exactly what's happened. Elections have become big business. I had one of the candidates who was running for the Senate, he had been in the House and he was running for the Senate, and he was having problems. He came to see me and he said, "Can you help me? I have a problem." I said, "What's the trouble." "Well," he said, "I have a couple who run a Mom-and-Pop restaurant in my district. They gave me a contribution for about \$150 and instead of giving it to me in cash or on a personal check they gave it to me on the only check they've got, which is the restaurant's check, and that's a corporation. The FBI has been out there going over their books for the last three or four days!" He said, "They just hound those people to death."

I just felt that this was the kind of thing that was going to come from this. I thought that the law itself had attempted to strike so far and so deep that it was going to miss the real point by tracing down trivia. Admittedly, it would have been very difficult to define it another way. At that time—well, you still are, for anything over a contribution of \$10 I think you have to list your occupation and a few other things. Any law involving campaign contributions which tries to get at anything less than a

thousand dollars seems to me is doomed to fail in terms of real control of expenditures by the very enormity of the task, and by concentrating in the area where harmless errors are most likely to occur, that is, in a contribution of less than a thousand, perfectly innocent errors. Meanwhile, those who were able to afford comptrollers and lawyers would have no problems with it. Not long after the law went into effect, I had a letter from the Association of Comptrollers or Accountants of the United States, or something, offering to put out a free book on how to comply with the law if I would distribute it on their behalf. Of course, I turned that down. It was obvious that they saw a lot of business coming in campaign contributions. They were not very happy with me for having turned it down.

I had about half a dozen members who came to me directly with problems of their own, or problems of associates in their states. My reaction to them was uniformly the same: I had laid down some guidelines for Potter when he started and among them were that he would have to approach a sitting member in no different light than a challenger from the point of view of candidacy. Once they began running, from the point of view of the law, you would have to treat them both identically. It wouldn't make any difference whether you were a sitting member or a challenger. It would make no difference whether you were a Republican or a Democrat. I can't remember the full list, but they were essentially the principles

which I thought would have to govern enforcement. I cleared these with Mike Mansfield. He agreed that that would be the only approach that could be taken, if we were going to do it at all. As far as I'm aware, I did it that way, and as far as I know Potter did it that way.

I had maybe a half dozen sitting members who came in at various times on various problems and I stayed with that same pattern. It didn't help me very much, some were angry with it, but I didn't know how else to do it, on both sides of the aisle. I felt that if we tried anything else it would be a disaster. I didn't want to go to jail to begin with and I didn't believe that I should do it any other way. I felt that I had had enough time in government so that if I had to quit I could quit. The only person who could do that kind of a job would be somebody who was in a position to quit if you were forced to it. That's why it irritated me no end when the press began to run stories about how these "political hacks" such as the secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House, were expected to enforce this law against their masters, to have that kind of comment, after having sweated blood trying to do it, and having made enemies for the first time I think in the years I was in the Senate as a result of it, to have that sort of a comment coming out of the local press and from liberal quarters really irritated me no end. But you don't fight with the press in this city. I really got very angry with Common

Cause, when it took much the same tact, and was blithely going along assuming that they had solved the problems of fair elections by getting a campaign contributions law passed. [John] Gardner later came to my office with Phil Hart, they wanted to use my office for a private meeting. I thought he looked a little sheepish after some of the things he said about the secretary of the Senate, without even knowing me. But that's the way we got the campaign contributions law underway.

What came next was the immediate desire to set up a commission to enforce the law. Well, having had one election's experience with the law, I thought we ought to be very careful about moving beyond it, until we knew a lot more about how it was going to work. I knew that from the first election we had learned something, that it had had very little significance in terms of the control of contributions. My view was that we should concentrate on disclosure, continue to concentrate on effective ways of disclosure, how far you should go with disclosure, which ways you ought to go, what requirements you ought to put on people in terms of keeping records. Both from the point of view of trying not to discourage volunteer action in election and from the point of view of seeing from whence the funds were flowing into campaigns. But there was a great impatience in the name of reform, they wanted to go immediately to a commission. I testified against that at the Rules Committee. I guess Howard Cannon was presiding at the time.

I urged them to take an intermediary step, which would link the Comptroller General, the secretary of the Senate, and the Clerk of the House into a committee that would then try to work out and supervise the elections, all three elections. This got nowhere. They were ready to go for a commission, and they went for a commission. The Clerk of the House and I became ex officio members of the commission, without a vote. This was what was going to lead up eventually to *Buckley v. Valeo*, the court case.

I attended maybe the first dozen meetings of the commission, tried to stress the same points on where I felt the need was, but by this time the law also included trying to put limitations on funds. I designated Harriet Robnett to represent me on the commission. She was a lawyer and I thought I ought to have a lawyer there on a full-time basis. I sold the commission Lan Potter as their best bet for executive director, and they took him. From that time on my own interest in the work of the commission declined. I thought they went off the deep end in those early decisions. They antagonized a lot of members who would otherwise have been rather sympathetic to the purposes of the commission. But it was, again, one of those things beyond control and it was going to go through its own irresistible logic. It was interesting that later, I guess, not more than three or four years ago, I met Joe Biden in Hawaii. We were there on a conference and we were talking about the law. He was running at the time, and he

was complaining about the damn Federal Elections Commission and the law on campaign contributions. I said, "Well, you know, Joe, at the time I urged the Senate to go slower, not to go that whole route without knowing more, that in the name of reform they were risking some awfully bad crimes, but nobody paid any attention to my testimony." He said, "I know, I was one of them." I said, "Yeah, everything was reform, and a lot of crimes have been committed in that name."

On the *Buckley v. Valeo* case, I really have no great insights except that I was sued, in my capacity as the administering officer for the Senate elections, by [James] Buckley, who was a candidate, I think, for the Senate, and by Gene McCarthy, who joined Buckley in the suit, and two or three others who felt that this was an infringement on certain of their constitutional rights. Harriet Robnett said, "Long after you'll be forgotten as secretary of the Senate, you'll be remembered for this case, because it's going to be a very important one." It was out of my hands from the very beginning. I had Neil Kennedy and Paul Treusch, keep an eye on the way it went, but they were not directly involved. The attorney general took on my defense and brought in Archibald Cox as the trial lawyer for it.

When the case came up for decision I wanted to go to the Supreme Court to hear it, and I found out you couldn't get in, that they were so crowded with lawyers. I said, "You mean I can't

get in to hear this case even though it's got my name on it?" So I called Warren Burger's office. I knew Burger and I knew his chief administrative officer at the time. I had to go through Burger's office in order to get a seat. I wanted to get Harriet Robnett to hear it too. We went over together. In a way, I guess Harriet was right. I've been approached many times, by lawyers especially, as a result of that case, wanting to know whether or not I was the Valeo in the case. So has my son.

RITCHIE: What was your reaction to the outcome of that case?

VALEO: It was a kind of mixed reaction. In a way I agreed with parts of the decision. I had some difficulties with others. I thought particularly the one of insistence upon the presidential appointing power applying in naming the commission I thought was a bad part of the decision. As it turned out, the president said he would appoint those recommended by the leaders of the two houses. I thought it was a kind of "how many angels on the head of the pin" on that point, because it did involve Senate elections and House elections, and I thought that both houses should have the right to be a participant in deciding how the elections were going to be run. That part of it I disagreed with.

I knew the minute that they took off the limitations on personal expenditures that you were setting up a Senate of millionaires, or people who could rely on other people's money for their

support. There would be no other way to run for the Senate. I thought that was a disaster in terms of what it would do to the Senate, and it is. The Senate has become much too much a money place. But I'm not a lawyer and I don't know the refinements of the law that the justices were reasoning from. I was a little hard pressed to see how putting a limitation on how much you could spend was an infringement on your right of free speech. But that was one of the findings.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with Senator Buckley during the case?

VALEO: No, I sent him an autographed copy of the decision. I got two or three from the Court. I had them bound up and I sent him an autographed copy and got back a nice letter from him.

RITCHIE: Well, your names will be linked together in constitutional history.

VALEO: Yes. I guess he had autographed one for me, to what he called a "good loser," or something to that effect.

RITCHIE: There are a couple of other questions about the structure of the office of the secretary that I was interested in. Going back to the question of patronage, and Darrell's role in all of this. He had been secretary of the Patronage Committee

under Carl Hayden, and now he became your assistant secretary, a new office that had always been chief clerk before.

VALEO: Yes, I had forgotten, but that's right. So he knew where the patronage spots were, and he knew how to handle that. I left it very much to him.

RITCHIE: I was wondering what you saw as his role, and how it changed from chief clerk to assistant secretary. What was involved in all of that?

VALEO: Well, what I found when I went into the office—I knew that I was not going to sever my connections with Mansfield, that the two were interrelated. And I knew that I would be probably over in Mansfield's office as much as I was in the secretary's office on a variety of matters, especially foreign affairs and Senate problems. So I knew I had to have somebody I could rely on really to run the internal workings of the secretary's office. And I knew Darrell could do that. I felt that chief clerk did not fully describe what he was doing. The job had become an essentially administrative one. He wasn't a chief clerk, in the sense of sitting on the floor and acting as the clerk for the proceedings. Emery Frazier used to like to do that. He hated to give up his reading functions on the floor, even when he became secretary of the Senate. But Darrell had no great love for that sort of thing, so I thought the job would be

more properly described as assistant secretary. I thought it would also begin to get people thinking in the direction of an administrative structure for Senate staff that would be a little less chaotic than that which had existed. Those were some of the reasons. I think Darrell appreciated the title and preferred it to chief clerk.

We brought Marilyn Courtot in at that time to do a lot of both the remodeling of the office structure and also to help with the preparations for appearances before the Appropriations Committee. She drew more and more responsibilities from Darrell directly. Although she was attached to me as consultant, she was subordinate to Darrell in terms of the operations of the office. He grumbled at first. He didn't like the idea of having a woman working so closely with him, I think, it was not a customary thing. But he got awfully used to her after a while and eventually became very dependent on her, as I did too, and as all subsequent people until the present secretary did. Again, I didn't know what her politics were. She came from South Jersey, I think, and that would probably make her a Republican. But it didn't really disturb me. She knew what she was doing, and she knew the machines, which I think was very critical because much of the processing was then shifting over to computers.

She studied the Senate Library, and we redid the library, gave it added function. There had been constant threats to abolish the library, and we were trying to save it by giving it more useful functions than it had had before. That's when they put those computers up in the library. We redid the Documents Room. We had to start the Office of Public Records, largely because of the campaign contributions law. I understand since then there have been other functions added to that.

The Documents Room was another real classic in terms of the Senate's use of patronage to run things. There was a chap in charge and he and an associate ran it all out of their heads for the longest time. One of them, I think, died from a heart attack, and the other one was left in charge. He was an old scoundrel from somewhere, I don't know where exactly. But Darrell would come in periodically and say, "We've got to really do something with this guy. We've got to fire him. He's never there." On one occasion someone found a basket full of requests from various Senate offices that had just been thrown in a pile and nothing had been done on them for weeks, and there was drinking and gambling and that sort of thing. He said, "We've got to get rid of him." I said, "Okay, Darrell, write up the papers. We'll get rid of him." And he'd come back a day later and say, "Well, let's give him another chance." I said, "What's the matter? I thought you'd made up your mind." "Well, he said, he's just been to see his

doctor, and he's got cancer, and he's not going to live very long." And of course the fellow's probably still living and going on! But Darrell was very soft-hearted, and so was I when it came to personnel questions. Eventually we did have to fire him. We got Burl Hays there, and Burl proved to be very effective in the job, especially after Marilyn Courtot set up the procedures to simplify the operation of that office. It became much more useful. The library became much more useful too.

RITCHIE: During the period you were secretary the whole operation of the secretary of the Senate really modernized for the first time. How much of that was just from your looking around and saying, "This has got to change?" Or did you feel pressure from the institution? Were senators complaining?

VALEO: No, this was all my own doing, really. If you didn't have somebody do it from inside, it would never have been done from the outside. It's interesting, senators were not complainers. Very few knew about the secretary's office. I daresay even today there would be very few who know just precisely what the secretary's office does.

There were some other interesting experiences in that office. Back on the campaign contributions law and the making of enemies: one of the procedures which we had established, or that Lan had devised and I had certainly agreed with, was that if there were a

complaint against a candidate during the process of an election, that we would give out no information on the complaint until we had a chance to study its validity, whether there was any basis or likelihood that it would be referred to the attorney general. If it were not going to be, we would simply not release any information on it. This proved to be a mistake, but at the time it was designed to protect candidates from frivolous complaints. It made me my first enemy in the Senate, who was Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who was running against [John] Glenn in a primary in Ohio at that time. Glenn had filed with us some charge about Metzenbaum violating the campaign contributions law and, unknown to us, also released it to the press in Ohio.

Metzenbaum called me and asked me what the charges were. He asked me if I had received the charges. I said yes, I had, and they were under study. He said, "What are they?" I said, "Well, I'm sorry, I can't give you that information now." He said, "What do you mean you can't give it to me? He's making statements all over the state about my violations. You mean I can't see what the charges are?" I said, "Not until I've had a chance to study them to find out if there is any validity in them. In the absence of that we have a regulation which was designed primarily to protect people in your situation." He said, "Well, you're not protecting me in this process!" I said, "That may be the case, but I can't change the regulation in the middle of a dispute." By this time I

had made my enemy number one. I realized later that this was not the right thing to do, and we did change the regulation, but I didn't want to do it in the middle of a dispute.

When he came to the Senate he was very angry with me for a long time. It brought on a head-on discussion of the whole campaign contributions law and the way I was enforcing it. There was a luncheon going on of the Democratic Campaign Committee in the Senate, and I was not there. Mansfield called me and said, "Do you have some problems with Metzenbaum?" I said yeah. He said, "You'd better come down, the whole thing is being rehashed down here." So I went down. There was one other person who was also complaining about some other matter that I had to resist. I can't remember now what was involved in it but I had refused to ease up on enforcement at his request. I was not going to put off the operations of the law simply because I'd been asked to do it by a Democratic senator. I explained to Metzenbaum what had happened in his situation with Glenn. I agreed that he had a right to be aggrieved by what had happened, but I had no alternative at that time. It was in the middle of a dispute and I couldn't change the regulation under pressure. There was no way I could do that. I had changed the regulation as soon as I discovered its effect—it didn't help him, that's true, I said, but that's one of the things that sometimes happens. He was much better in his relationship with me after that.

Then I read off the list of principles under which I had had the regulations designed for enforcement. One member said, "We're not going to treat the other side the same as we treat ourselves!" I said, "Well, it's the law, and I'm not going to do it any other way." I had some support. I got support from Edmund Muskie and two or three other people immediately on it, and it stood. I guess Lloyd Bentsen was the one who gave me a problem with that at that point. But I couldn't see myself doing it any other way. I knew Mansfield wouldn't want me to do it any other way. At one point I had the Democratic National Committee chairman, who later was the trade representative for Carter, a well known figure, a Texan

RITCHIE: Oh, Strauss.

VALEO: Yes, Bob Strauss came in on another matter, appealing for a matter involving another member. I told him the way we were enforcing the law, and there was just no other way we could do it. I think I gave him another week, or something, but that I would have done for anyone. He said, "Can you give me a little more time. I'm representing him and I need some time." I said, "Sure, we can give you more time. We can give you a week more," or something like that. But I wouldn't go any further than that. And I would have done that for a Republican, it wouldn't have made any difference. Mansfield called me in at the time Strauss came and he said, "Strauss is in there, and he's got a problem. I

don't want you do anything that conflicts with the way you think the law ought to be enforced. But see if you can help him in some way." Sure, I'd be glad to do that for anyone. So I had the full backing of Mansfield. I could not have done it that way otherwise. And I guess if there had been any other majority leader I would have probably quit right at that point. This was I guess in '73, '74, somewhere in that period.

RITCHIE: It sounds as if the secretary of the Senate has to walk a fine line between partisanship and nonpartisanship. You were elected by the majority but were supposed to administer the Senate as a whole.

VALEO: Yes, and I personally feel I was successful in doing that. I never had any serious complaints from the Republican side that there was any partisanship in the way the Senate was administered. Quite the contrary, I had a lot of praise from the Republican side. That's precisely the role of the secretary. You don't cease to be a member of your own party, but you cannot treat the Senate institutionally except as a concept that's without party in the way you provide services to members. That was also one of the premises under which I took the job as secretary. I defined the job to myself in those terms. But bear in mind that the secretary's job is not officially defined anywhere, and much depends upon the relationship between the secretary and the leadership. Hildenbrand had a good relationship with Baker. I,

of course, had a good relationship with Mansfield, and both of us were reflecting basically the qualities that were in that leadership. My impression is that Kimmitt had no relationship to speak of with Robert Byrd, and I don't know what Coe's relationship is with Dole. But this can have a great effect on the way the job is done, which argues very strongly for strengthening the second position in the secretary's office, because in a way, in terms of the internal operations of the secretary's office, the role of the assistant secretary is very critical. At least it was for me, and Hildenbrand told me it was the same thing for him, when he made Marilyn Courtot the assistant secretary. I don't know about the others.

RITCHIE: What is the relationship of the parliamentarian's office to the secretary?

VALEO: The parliamentarian is appointed by the secretary, usually with the concurrence of the leadership. In my case, it was left to me by Mansfield to make the decision. The problem was with Riddick, did I go into this in the previous meeting?

RITCHIE: You mentioned this.

VALEO: He never wanted to leave, but when he did finally leave, I told Mansfield I was thinking of appointing Murray Zweben. He wasn't that pleased, but he didn't have any alternatives, so we went ahead and did that.

RITCHIE: Why wasn't he pleased?

VALEO: Well, I don't know. He didn't like parliamentarians period. They always confused him, he thought, more than they helped him! I don't think he exempted Murray from that.

RITCHIE: The parliamentarian is supposed to be the Caesar's wife of the Senate, nonpartisan in making the rulings, and yet he's appointed by an officer who is elected by the majority. How do you assure that the parliamentarian's office will be exempt from partisan pressure?

VALEO: You elect a good majority leader!

RITCHIE: Did you ever feel any concern about that?

VALEO: No, I never had the problem. It was never raised with me on a partisan basis. If Mansfield had his irritations, with either Riddick or Zweben, it had nothing to do with politics. It was for strictly the substance of what they were giving him.

RITCHIE: The three elected staff officials of the Senate are the secretary, the sergeant at arms, and the chaplain. Somewhere in the late '60s you had some problems with the chaplain. There was a commission appointed on that. Do you know what the background to that was, that Senator Mansfield was becoming concerned with the chaplain and commissioned a study?

VALEO: I sort of vaguely remember that, but I don't think I got in the middle. I may have mentioned the last time that it had something to do with Mansfield wanting to downgrade that position after Frederick Brown Harris had made it a sort of political forum for a lot of unusual clergymen. Instead of just saying a prayer, he had got it involved in East-West politics and a few other things, and Mansfield did not appreciate that. Even though it did add some color to the Senate when you had an Eastern Orthodox priest appearing in full regalia.

RITCHIE: I came across a letter in your papers in the Library of Congress. Senator Mansfield wrote to someone who had complained that when all the Senate salaries were being increased, I think in 1970, the chaplain's salary was decreased. Senator Mansfield said he thought the salary was sufficient for a man who worked two minutes a day.

VALEO: That's about the way he felt about it, too! I guess it was Edward Elson that he had problems with. He didn't like Harris, particularly, but he sort of suffered Harris. But Elson he didn't like either. He always thought he was political. His big supporter, I think was Stennis. Stennis was the one who brought him in. I think he was Stennis' clergyman.

RITCHIE: I once went to Elson's church, and the flowers on the alter were in memory of Eisenhower and Dirksen, which I thought was probably a sign of the politics of the congregation.

VALEO: It's ironic, because Elson's brother was a Democrat; he worked for Hayden and then ran for the Senate out in Arizona.

RITCHIE: The other thing I wanted to ask was how you would describe the relationship between the secretary's office and the sergeant at arms' office?

VALEO: Well, the best way to get at that is to consider what happened on that Commission on the Reorganization of the Senate. Again, the relationships have varied. In that earlier period, when Joe Duke was sergeant at arms, and then after him that nice chap

RITCHIE: Bill Wannall?

VALEO: Bill Wannall. I can give you some background on that. Joe Duke was a difficult man, and it was strictly a patronage assignment place at that point when he ran it. The police were all patronage, the cleaning people, just about everybody in the building was patronage at that point. He'd been Hayden's person from Arizona. He had no trouble with Johnson as far as I know. He never really felt very comfortable with

Mansfield, but he went out of his way to be nice to Mansfield, in order, I think, to keep a relationship going. Physically, he gave out. He couldn't stand the pressures that he was getting and he left. Then Bob Dunphy became sergeant at arms for a few years. He gave out. Then Bill Wannall took the job. He had come to see me at an earlier time when he was the printing clerk. He was a very amiable, very obliging young fellow out of the GPO. I liked him. I had known him when I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff and knew how he really went out of his way to deliver. He asked me whether or not I would recommend him for the job as assistant sergeant at arms.

Bob Dunphy had followed Joe Duke. He'd been assistant to Joe Duke. He came out of Massachusetts or Rhode Island, and Mansfield liked him. He knew how to handle Mansfield, so they got along well. When he became sergeant at arms, I helped to get Bill Wannall appointed as his assistant. Dunphy knew Wannall too, and was favorably disposed to him. Then Wannall was made sergeant at arms. Mansfield was not too happy with Wannall in that role. I liked him, I thought he had done a very effective job of providing services. Then there was pressure to get a job for Nordy Hoffmann and when Wannall left, Nordy Hoffman was brought in. He was strictly a political appointment in that job, the others were not. Wannall was not a politician, maybe Joe Duke was, I don't know. But it would have been a different kind of politics that I didn't

know much about. Nordy was easy for me to work with. He was feeling his way at the time. He knew that there was some eyebrows raised at his appointment.

When the Commission on the Reorganization of the Senate recommended a consolidation of virtually all Senate staff functions, as distinct from committee functions, under the secretary, I went to see Nordy. I said, "If you go along with this, Nordy, I'll promise to leave within a year or two, and you would certainly have the first shot at taking over at that point. I think this is important enough to warrant doing it that way." He was willing, he said, "but I'm afraid of Stan Kimmitt." I remember his saying that to me. I think Nordy would have gone with that, notwithstanding certain anxieties that he had, but Bill Cochrane on the Rules Committee resisted, very strongly. And I had lost the influence I had on the Rules Committee, which was through Senator Jordan, who had been Bill Cochrane's boss, but who was very fond of me and had a great trust in me. Having lost that influence, the Rules Committee was then under Howard Cannon of Nevada, whom I knew, but who was not disposed to treat me the same way.

RITCHIE: Why do you think that Cochrane opposed it?

VALEO: It's just a strictly jurisdictional thing. He thought that this would mean that the Rules Committee would lose a

lot of influence. That was what disturbed him. They didn't have an awful lot at that point, but they didn't want to lose what they had. Cochrane was a bureaucratic type who wanted to build up an empire, or at least hold the little empire that he had.

RITCHIE: Both the secretary and the sergeant at arms are elected, and so they are presumably independent, but is there any ranking? Is the secretary generally looked to first?

VALEO: It depends. If you're a policeman, you'd look to the sergeant at arms first; if you're a scholar you'd probably look to the secretary's office first. I don't know that you can really differentiate them in terms of rank. Since they're both elected by the Senate, they really are in the same rank, along with the chaplain, if you will.

RITCHIE: Is there a need for them to work in tandem?

VALEO: Not an awful lot of need. The only time that comes up is when you have ceremonials. They used to be handled strictly by the sergeant at arms but when I became secretary of the Senate, Mansfield wanted me always to be on hand with the sergeant at arms to greet the president when he came to the Congress in a ceremonial setting. He wanted it gradually eased away from the exclusive domain of the sergeant at arms. This again may have been a personal preference because he had a personal relationship with me that he didn't have with the sergeant at arms. That's why

I say you can't really define any of these jobs. It depends on who the majority leader is at the time. But what I was doing at that point, to move it in the way I thought it ought to go, was to work with both the majority leader and the minority leader. My working relationships with Scott were exceptionally good, partly because he was new, and partly because I liked him personally and he liked me personally. I think he trusted me not to do anything that would in any way dilute the rights of the minority. Quite the contrary, I would be very zealous in their protection.

End of Interview #11

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

OPENING THE DOOR TO CHINA

Interview #12

Wednesday, October 23, 1985

RITCHIE: Today I'd like to talk about the beginning of the Nixon years, in 1969, and how things changed for the Senate at that stage.

VALEO: There are two things that I need to recall just before this period. I think I mentioned earlier that Mansfield and I were not here for that election, and even the previous Johnson election, actually. I think it was this election that we went to Eastern Europe. We went to Czechoslovakia, because it was a time of expected democratization of Czechoslovakia. We went to Prague and we were briefed by the American embassy and anybody else we could find there, including the Western press people, on what was happening in Czechoslovakia. It was a time of great enthusiasm. There was a luncheon at the embassy with members of the new democratic group who had just come to power. It was a rather heady time, they were talking very much in Western democratic terms. We duly reported this in our report when we got back, and mentioned, in effect, that there was no suggestion of a Soviet invasion of the country to change that situation and there wasn't. That was obviously the question that we put wherever we went, whether there was any expectation of that, and there

was absolutely none in Western diplomatic circles in the area. Everybody on the contrary was very cheerful and it looked as if Czechoslovakia were going to go back where it belonged, with the West, and so forth. I guess Mansfield made a statement on it. It was not a formal report. He made a statement on the floor to that effect. And of course, the next day, I think it was, the Soviet Union moved in in full force and upset that apple cart completely.

It was a time when Mansfield was pushing his perennial measure to try to force a reduction of American forces in Europe. He decided that the better part of discretion would indicate that he'd better not push it that year. Actually, the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe was not an original Mansfield idea, it was an Eisenhower idea. Eisenhower had said in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, I believe, some years before, that there was no way, if the Soviets were determined to move into Western Europe, you could really stop it on the ground. What we were using the troops there for were as a trip-wire, and that one division, I think Eisenhower used, rather than four would be just as good if you have a trip-wire. Well, Mansfield I think raised it to two divisions as a trip-wire, but essentially he was just following through on a thought of Eisenhower's.

But he ran into what seemed to me to be the most formidable entrenched opposition to a change anywhere I've ever seen. The

State Department was adamant, the military people were totally adamant. When there was some threat that we might possibly get it passed in a resolution, I recall Johnson or Nixon brought in a whole battery of former secretaries of State and everyone else he could think of to say how foolish this would be. So the effort was all out to forestall Mansfield. I've never understood why the executive branch was so built in on this. I'm sure the need to stay in Europe was a valid one, I don't think there was any question of that, but it seemed to me that the insistence that even the slightest cut in forces would be a disaster was ridiculous. I think there were two things that probably motivated this kind of reaction. First of all there was a bureaucratic in-built: you have a lovely set-up in Europe, why change it? It's a good place to send your troops when you don't know what else to do with them. So certainly some of that was a part of the resistance

But I think the other thing was not so much a fear of the Soviet Union, that four or one divisions would make that much difference with the Soviet Union. I think the deeper fear, at least in the Department of State, was that if you once made a conspicuous cut, you would unearth all of the latent isolationist forces in the United States who would then say: why do we need any troops in Europe? And that would be the really dangerous thing. I really do not believe that the opposition was based on military considerations primarily. What they did instead was to

throw the idea of reductions into that pot of negotiations with the Soviet Union where it has churned for decades along with disarmament, or control of armaments in Europe. It was argued that we needed the troops as a bargaining chip. Well, if something is an expensive operation, which it is, and it's costing you probably billions of dollars a year to keep those three or four extra divisions beyond a trip-wire that you need in Europe, it seems to me that it makes it a bargaining chip for the other side. Why would they want to relieve you of that burden by agreeing to any kind of a cut-down. On the contrary, they would say: "No, of course not, we're not going to move any of our troops." So the use of the term "bargaining chip" seemed to me to be ridiculous in that situation. You had nothing to bargain with.

I was only partially involved with Mansfield on the troop withdrawal from Western Europe. I think he got tired of seeing the same old tired things that I would give him on the subject. There was nothing new that you could say on it. I think he asked Charlie Ferris or somebody else to try to pick it up and see if they had some new angles, but it still came out the same way. He would use it repeatedly, and he confessed to me one time that he really didn't care whether it got through, the real thing was to keep reminding them downtown that this was a ridiculous situation that they had got themselves into and they really needed to make some changes. I would certainly agree with that. We took the

same view on troops in Japan later on. This was of course before he became ambassador; he's changed his view on it now and is following the administration line. But at that time he was very much in favor of a reduction of U.S. troops not only in Japan but in Korea as well. I personally see no reason why that isn't a valid position even today.

Again, you run into essentially the same reasoning in the executive branch of the political consequences. Some people in the department almost said as much in private. They'd say, "Well, we can make a ten percent reduction quietly, but if we do it on a formal basis, why, it will not look good." They always put it in terms "we'd make our allies nervous," but I don't think it would have made our allies at all nervous. I think it would be much more the question of perhaps scaring up some old ghosts in the United States, the ghosts of isolationism. The danger in not doing it, however, not doing what is logical in the situation, in my judgment, is that you feed precisely the thing that you don't want to see happen. I think that is one of the consequences that we're seeing now in some of these cross-signals in difficult problems. As a nation, you become—I used to like to use the term "isolated internationalist" or you move in effect in that direction. Little by little you lose touch with reality and in the process lose the allies that are essential. So that probably is an even greater danger because it leads then to a certain type of

national imperiousness which can do us a great deal of damage. I think we are seeing more of that.

RITCHIE: It's interesting that you use the bureaucracy as the villain in this story, that policies do get so entrenched. Is the only way the Congress can deal with that by frontal assault?

VALEO: Almost. In the case of the monetary problems which result from entrenchment, the equivalent of it was the so-called "meat-axe cuts" for departments. Rather than trying to do what amounted to a rational, reasonable job, you just said cut the departments by ten percent. Well, one department might really need to grow ten percent. But if you put in overall cuts, or overall freezes, what you're really doing is essentially a "meat-axe" approach. It's one of the techniques which develop out of a sense of hopelessness in dealing with a situation. It is a very dangerous one. The only answer I know is to take a look at why you have this accumulated dry rot in the departments, and you find the roots in the accumulated legislation passed in previous years and decades. So you come to the question of "Sunset" provisions in laws, which I think offer some hope, and which are really another way of utilizing fully the oversight function of the Congress.

The problem with trying to deal with the situation in the direct, logical way of oversight, is that you come up with an

oversight report out of a committee which very often has a good deal of validity in its examination of a department, or a policy, or a way of doing things, and nobody pays much attention to it after the first day or two that it's out. So the report gets buried with everything else. In the case of a "Sunset" law where you write in the provision of automatic expiration, Congress is forced to look at its handiwork and re-pass the law periodically. In that way you are not able to talk about changes for a day or two and then forget it, because if you did then the law would expire and everything would drop and most members do not want to drop everything. I don't think that "sunset" has gotten very far as a device in the Congress. I personally think it is an immensely valuable one.

Now, to go on a little bit to Nixon's victory. Everybody had really counted him out until that time, but ironically it was the Vietnamese War that saved him. I think we mentioned this earlier. My own feeling was that he and Mel Laird were about as responsible as anyone for prodding Johnson in the direction of involvement in Vietnam. This is no excuse for Johnson, it was his business to stand against that, and while they may have been playing politics with a very serious matter, the fact remains that it was politics on their part, whereas on Johnson's part he had the responsibility and he should have acted accordingly. But he didn't. I'm quite sure he was looking over his shoulder always at Nixon. He never

believed Nixon was dead after the defeat in the governorship race in California. Well, Nixon came back and beat Humphrey.

I think Senator Pastore really put his finger on what was responsible for Humphrey's defeat. He didn't say this after Humphrey's defeat, he said it before. He was in my office one day and there were two or three other members sitting around. He said, "I don't know how Hubert's going to do in this. I don't think he can make it." He said, "We all love him, and he's a great guy, but there are some problems. I'll tell you what happened. At the convention, right after he was nominated, he sought me out and I went to see him. We sat down and he said, 'Now John, I want you to give me your best advice on how I should handle this campaign.' So I did, I said, 'Well, Hubert, now that you've asked me, I'll tell you. There are really two things you've got to do: the first is to move yourself away from Johnson on Vietnam. The second thing you've got to do, you've got to shorten your speeches.'" "So," he continued, "What did he do? The next day he went out and made a speech. He went down the line in defense of Johnson on Vietnam, and he did it in the longest speech I ever heard him make."

I think Pastore, who had a marvelous sense of humor, put his finger on it pretty well. I think Vietnam beat Hubert. His eagerness to accept the Johnson embrace, or to seek it even, was very transparent, and that hurt him too. He was probably thinking

in terms of the South and the need to hold the South in line, and that was the way to do it. But it obviously did not work that way for him.

So we come to the Nixon administration. This change to a Republican administration altered the picture in the Senate. For one thing, the direct majority leadership contact with the White House was diminished. It was not completely cut off, but it was considerably diminished. We went through the formalities of the inauguration. Nixon came up, it was the first time I think I'd ever seen him close up, for the traditional luncheon. Mansfield, after his first contacts with Nixon, said something to me, it was—no, I guess that was later, and we'll get to that later when we get to the impeachment questions. But it was clear that Mansfield had great difficulty getting a handle on Nixon, and on how to approach him on anything that we were doing. They had never been close in the Senate. He had no real personal animosities towards Nixon or, at least, he didn't show them if he did. Nixon, I don't think, had been involved directly in campaigning against him in the scurrilous '52 campaign when Eisenhower was elected, when they were calling him "China Mike." Their relations had always been rather, I think, pleasant enough on a personal basis, and somewhat formal.

What it did change most was that with a different party in the White House, meant the role of the policy committee,

considering the way Mansfield had already begun to use it, became very significant. And that's precisely the way we moved. We also began—I can't remember now whether it was in the first Nixon administration or the second when we became very worried about the situation as the Nixon impeachment approached. We inaugurated a new practice at that time of a minimum of one formal meeting a month with the House leadership. This happened after Carl Albert became Speaker, so that may give some indication of the time. Mansfield did not try joint leadership meetings with McCormack as Speaker. McCormack would not even have heard what he said had he suggested it. But Albert was most willing. So these were two major changes, a more forceful use of the Majority Policy Committee on issues of substance and the development of a joint party leadership approach, on a somewhat formal basis, between the House and the Senate. As for the Majority Policy Committee, it began to meet regularly every week and by this time the discussions were heavily on Vietnam, but not exclusively, they got into many other things. We put out many public resolutions of positions.

There was one other thing. Bob Strauss was then chairman of the Democratic National Committee and he was looking for a way to make the Democratic National Committee the spokesman of the Democratic opposition. He pled for opportunities to come up and talk with the leadership. Well, Mansfield handled him rather carefully and kept him at a discrete distance. This was a

traditional situation between the Senate leadership—Johnson certainly did the same thing—and the leadership of the national party. So Strauss was invited to a breakfast from time to time, but what he really wanted was to be there all the time, and that was ruled out.

I must say, the policy committee showed a great deal of understanding of what we were trying to do by establishing party positions as far as that was possible in the Senate. The press went right along with that, because they always need personalities, and the Senate's the only place really where you can get them, except for a few people in the leadership in the House. Most of the members of the policy committee stayed very close to the position that Mansfield was enunciating so that it gradually became more and more a Democratic policy position and, to a degree, a Senate position. This had started with Johnson in the White House over Vietnam and the same practice continued with Nixon. We used somewhat different language with him than we used with Johnson, but Mansfield continued the practice of keeping the heat on Nixon on Vietnam, to try to end the war. Of course, Nixon had already pledged to do this, so that gave you something to hang it on. So you'd always refer to "As the president has said so many times," that sort of thing, in statements. The pressure in the country was getting stronger and stronger. I don't know whether—did the demonstrations start in this period?

RITCHIE: There were demonstrations in the late Johnson period and they picked up again early in the Nixon years. The Moratorium was in November 1969.

VALEO: I don't know that there's anything specific that I can point to. The thing that keeps coming back in this period almost exclusively is Vietnam. The other issues, all of them, seemed trivial by comparison. I noticed that many of those political scientists, such as Richard Neustadt, whom I recognized as being strong, ardent advocates of executive supremacy in foreign policy, began to change their tone very markedly in this period. They came up and ate crow a lot of times, recognizing that if there was any hope of ending this thing it came from the kind of pressure that was being generated now on both sides of the aisle in the Senate.

But we kept looking at the congressional mathematics of it, and the prospects of getting a majority of a hundred senators, and then you really had to think in terms of a two-thirds majority because you didn't know where the administration would go on legislative measures that might curtail the involvement and ultimately end it. We might have had two-thirds on some propositions, if they were innocuous enough. In some ways the attempt would almost make you look foolish, because you'd have to say in legislation, you can bomb below the 38th parallel but not above it. That was like trying to run the war from the Hill, and

there's just no way you can do that. But the pressure was important, and the threat on money curtailment for the war was important. At one point, it became so serious that Mel Laird said he was going to resurrect a law that was passed during the Civil War which would permit him to use funds for the war no matter what Congress said. The GAO was very negative on his suggestion, but that's how bad it got after a while. Senators were thinking in terms mostly of funds cut off; that seemed to be the easiest route.

By this time, Frank Church had taken much of the leadership in terms of devising specific legislation to try to end the war. Mansfield left it primarily to Church and Cooper to get out front on the actual legislative process of termination. There were no defenders of the administration in the Senate to speak of, with the possible exception of Gale McGee, who would make these statements prompted primarily by the State Department at that time. I think he was still there, it was shortly after that that he was defeated, I believe.

RITCHIE: He was there until 1976.

VALEO: Yes. But he was about the only one who even thought to defend the executive branch.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Church's role in all of this?

VALEO: Church had a very deliberate mind. I should tell you a little more about the background. He was Mansfield's choice for the keynoter in the 1960 national convention. He was a freshman at the time. I guess Mansfield was asked by Johnson to name a keynoter, and he chose Church. He was terribly disappointed by Church's performance. After that it never ceased to bother him; he always felt that Church had let him down in some way, because he had apparently thought very highly of him when he first came into the Senate. But Church had a deliberate and very intellectual approach. I don't know how to describe it, he was not a person of warmth. He tried to be friendly, but there was something synthetic about it. One had the feeling that down deep he wasn't very warm. But he was deliberate and cautious, and he didn't object to doing the kind of detailed study of issues that would give you something in legislation to serve as some kind of a curb on the involvement. He went together with Cooper on this a lot. Cooper, I always regarded as the best of the Republicans in that whole period. He and [Charles] Mathias, I thought, were the outstanding members on the Republican side.

Church and Cooper, or their staff people—that's right, Cooper had a very able staff person who later became, interestingly enough, Church's staff director on the CIA study. That was a fellow named Bill Miller, who had come from the Department of State. He became fed up with things in the department, came down

on the Hill and went to work for Cooper. I always thought very highly of him. It was probably his staff work, at that time with Cooper, which may very well have been the way they got at this thing legislatively. He knew enough about the situation to realize what would be effective and what wouldn't. He was also a very cautious careful man who could be trusted with very delicate matters. If I'm not mistaken, he got involved in some way in the Iranian hostage thing. I think Carter may have used him as an emissary at one point. He was probably the key staff person in connection with that whole process of trying to end the Vietnamese War through legislation.

You know, you'd have to be sure of two-thirds of the Senate and two-thirds of the House if you really wanted by legislative fiat to end it, because Johnson and then Nixon would not have accepted a straight majority vote. Probably if you had gotten the two-thirds they'd even have figured out a way around it, but the congressional action had two values: first of all, it kept a constant pressure on the administration, whether it was Nixon or Johnson, to move in the direction of getting the war over, and at the same time it provided a sounding board for literally millions of people in the country who at that time had become not only deeply concerned with the war, but angry at it, especially the young people.

Interestingly enough, Mansfield never became involved with speaking before any of the groups that came to Washington to protest. That was not his way. I don't think he ever met with them as emissaries of any kind. He might have met with them individually, particularly if they came from Montana, but he avoided putting himself in the front of this process. From his point of view that was wisdom, because he was not going to be president and it would be of no value to him personally to have been identified as the leader. Perhaps he was thinking of his place in history, but he used to say, "When I leave here I just want to be forgotten." Whatever the case, he did not try in any sense to become a prominent figure in the anti-war movement. It was also partly due probably to his leadership position, because he had to deal with the president, whoever it might be. By not being the most visible proponent of the peace forces, if you will, it made it easier for him to keep that relationship.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask that, because Johnson worked very closely with Eisenhower, when he was majority leader, and I wondered if Mansfield had any hope that he could work with either Nixon or William Rogers or Henry Kissinger, to influence them in any way?

VALEO: He got along best, I would think, with Rogers and to some extent, with Kissinger. We went together with Kissinger to Mexico to the Tlateloco Treaty conference, along with Carl

Albert and several others. It was Kissinger's first major conference in Latin America, I believe, as secretary of state. We traveled on his plane. That man, I don't know how he ever did it, but he loved to travel in planes. It didn't seem to bother him at all. Everybody else would be worn out, but he never seemed to be. There's a very amusing story, this was right after he had become secretary of state. Pierre Salinger told the story. We were in Mexico City, and Salinger was covering the conference I think for some French newspapers. He wanted to come up and say hello to Mansfield. We had a drink with him in the room, and he said, "I'm picking up some very amusing stories from the Latin American foreign ministers. They're trying to take Kissinger's measure and they haven't quite figured him out yet. Of course they all know Rogers, having met with him previously. Their relations with Rogers had been correct but they thought with Kissinger they would be better. As Salinger related it, one foreign minister had said "when Kissinger gives you an 'abrazo' it is very warm and Latin American. But when Rogers gave you one it was as though he were making an obscene gesture." I thought, in a way, the story was very revealing of the character of the two men. Kissinger had a way, he was relaxed. He could move easily with people, and Rogers was stiff and tense in the secretary's role.

I think what we need to do is to talk now about the China situation, unless you have some more questions.

RITCHIE: I noticed that you made several trips in the late '60s on the "Rim of the Pacific" and to Southeast Asia, but on none of your trips from '67 on did you stop in Vietnam.

VALEO: That's right.

RITCHIE: What was the reason for that?

VALEO: I think Mansfield felt there was nothing you could do by stopping there, that the thing was going to run its course. I certainly shared that view. I saw no particular value in going to Vietnam at that time. We did go to Cambodia in that period. Maybe we ought to take that up, because that got involved with the invasion. I'm trying to remember whether Sihanouk was there then.

RITCHIE: In '69 I think you interviewed Sihanouk.

VALEO: Yes, that's right, he was there. But he was leaving for Europe; it was just before the coup. We saw Sihanouk. Again he welcomed Mansfield with great warmth. At this point there were no attempts to interfere with the visit in any way. I'm trying to remember who would have been on that trip. Maybe Norvill Jones, or it could have been Jim Lowenstein, who was on the committee staff. By this time we had gotten to the point of taking a professional along from the committee on these trips, in part because I was just too pushed for time. It was Mansfield's suggestion that I get some help. So we made it a point of

taking someone from the committee, and we traveled then with an administrative person from the Department of State. It would have been, repeatedly, Ken Calloway. He was someone whom we had met many years before in Hong Kong and thought highly of. He could handle the administrative matters of a trip very effectively. He was later to make the China trips with us too, or at least two of them.

When we went to Cambodia, and I guess this was the time in 1969 or thereabouts, I think Sihanouk already knew there was something afoot to try to overthrow him. I thought later that he may have gone to Moscow and Paris because he suspected a plot, and opened the door to it, because he felt he couldn't stand against it in any event. We went to see him and we had a good talk with him. We had just restored relations on Nixon's initiative. He had sent a chap out as ambassador who had been earlier in Laos. We had met him there in the early fifties when there were only two Americans in Laos, and he was one of the two Americans. Mike Reeves, his name was. Mike Reeves was just feeling his way and when we went to see Sihanouk he came with us. It was, I believe, at this time that Sihanouk gave a small dinner, not more than fifteen or twenty people. He made a speech at the end of it. He said almost in so many words: "I don't believe I can hold it together much longer." He said, "I think circumstances are developing that won't permit this. But there's one thing I'm

going to leave: the people are going to have a remembrance of the golden age under the monarchy."

One can never underestimate the significance of Sihanouk's family in the positions he took, and particularly his mother, who was at this time the queen mother. He was the prince, he had abdicated the throne, but the mother stayed as the queen mother and was a powerful force in his life. He was attempting really to establish—he said, "When things get bad here, they'll remember the monarchy and they'll remember it with longing," or something to that effect. He was a very poetic man. I personally thought he bordered on genius.

We met General Lon Nol, who had been Sihanouk's main military commander. He was very evasive when we talked to him at that time. We didn't know what the cause of it would be. He supposedly had been sick. He had been in Paris where later on the stories were that he had a CIA connection in Paris at the American hospital in Paris, where he had been cared for. Sihanouk was convinced of course that the CIA was responsible for the coup. When the coup actually occurred, the first call Mansfield got that morning was from Richard Helms, assuring Mansfield that CIA had nothing to do with it, which I thought was really an odd kind of compulsion to have to tell him they had nothing to do with it. Mansfield went on a TV interview immediately after the overthrow, and he was asked that question, whether he thought we had had

anything to do with it. He said, "Absolutely not." But that would be the way he would do it. I don't know whether he ever thought we did or didn't. I thought we did, and I thought that went back a dozen or more years. I didn't think it had anything to do with the immediate situation except that the military strategy then had shifted to bring on the invasion of Cambodia, and this laid the groundwork for it. That could have raised all kinds of international complications if Sihanouk were still in power.

Mansfield told me a strange thing at that point. He said he had seen Nixon sometime shortly after the overthrow, and Nixon had said, "Well, they finally did it," almost with disgust, as though he was not a part of it. I never knew whether he and Kissinger had been a part of the plan to overthrow Sihanouk, or whether it was brought about without their knowledge and they were putting the best face on it after it happened. I always kept going back in my mind to the U-2 incident that broke up Eisenhower's summit with Khrushchev. Eisenhower didn't deny responsibility for it, but it was obvious he also didn't know that it was going to happen at that particular moment and in those particular circumstances. I wondered whether there might not have been something similar, but then maybe I give Nixon too much credit, I don't know. Of course, it was another disastrous mistake, it took the one peaceful place in Southeast Asia and destroyed it and increased the cost of the war to us. Whatever may have been done later by Pol Pot really

as a direct consequence of the fall of Sihanouk. It would not have happened without his overthrow.

RITCHIE: So you were watching things that you had seen develop for years beginning to crumble.

VALEO: Yes. We realized that at the time, and I sensed in that last speech of Sihanouk's at that dinner that—I didn't think he was going to be overthrown in the next couple of weeks, but the question still remains in my mind whether he knew it. Whether he knew enough of the details of the plot to decide to get out; whether he'd been forewarned to get out by others, including Lon Nol, those things I never really understood. I don't have any insights into them. One can only make surmises. But Sihanouk lived to fight another day, and in effect to come back, which is something he is still planning to do.

RITCHIE: I was interested to see that your trips seemed to be less in Southeast Asia and more on what you called the "Rim of the Pacific."

VALEO: Yes. Again, these were Mansfield's decisions. I didn't decide where we were to go. We were leading up, I think, to the China trip. There was one final reference that I should make to this last trip to Cambodia. We had sent Sihanouk a letter earlier—sent two letters which I drafted, one to Ne Win in Burma and one to Sihanouk, suggesting that the time might be ripe for a

restoration of some contact with China, and that Mansfield would appreciate their intercession, if they could do anything to have the Chinese invite him to come. The State Department was fully cognizant of what we were doing. He also told Johnson, and Johnson had said, I'm told, "Oh, he'll never get anywhere with that." But it didn't appear to trouble Johnson particularly that he had done it. It was on his own initiative. He didn't ask them for permission, but he informed them that he was doing it. That was the beginning of a period of effort to try to make contact with China through Congress. I don't know whether he was the first to try it, but other members of the Senate sought to do the same thing. At that point these requests were all falling on deaf ears in Beijing. Ne Win, I believe replied that he could do nothing. Sihanouk said when we saw him in PP that he had delivered the letter to Chou En-lai (the letter was written to Chou En-lai as premier) in person, and that Chou En-lai said, "Maybe sometime, but the time isn't right yet." But it did lay the groundwork for the later visits. I don't know whether I should continue with the China situation, or do you want to go back. You were asking about the "Rim" trip.

RITCHIE: I was wondering whether you and Senator Mansfield thought that the future of American involvement in Asia was really going to be in Japan and the Philippines and the Pacific rim, rather than in Southeast Asia?

VALEO: No, I don't think it was from that so much, but he felt that with the war in Vietnam in full force there were no possibilities of having a constructive influence there until it had run its course. He still kept in contact with the Indochina situation. We went to Burma at the same time that we went to Cambodia. And we went up to Laos on that trip too, I should mention that. We met with Souvanna Phouma, but I was appalled at the way he looked at that point. One had the feeling that he just seemed to have lost all interest, and it was clear that the American embassy in Laos was calling all the shots at that time. So Mansfield and Souvanna talked about playing chess or a few other odds and ends of light conversation, but nothing of substance. I felt some change in his personality. We went to see the king; again I felt the same kind of thing, that both of them were completely caught in some kind of an anxiety which would not permit them to be frank anymore.

The king who had been in a way so imperious that he reminded me of the musical "The King and I," had become somewhat meek; glad to see Mansfield, but not really communicative in any way. He was worried about the Chinese lines of supply that were supposedly being built into his northern provinces and what that might do to his country. One had the sense that anything constructive that you could do in Southeast Asia had been done and it had not proved successful in preventing the war, and that until the war had run

its course there would be very little opportunity to do anything by going to these countries.

RITCHIE: It was in '69 that Nixon issued his "Nixon Doctrine," or the "Guam Doctrine."

VALEO: Oh, right.

RITCHIE: What was Mansfield's reaction to that?

VALEO: Mansfield picked it up immediately, and I think this explains in part these Asian rim trips. I remember that he discussed it wherever we went. He was all for it, the idea of reducing American involvement. He wasn't necessarily for the idea that Asians should fight Asians, but the idea of American involvement was what he was mostly concerned with. He wanted very badly to cut that. I think Mansfield gave Nixon's statement the title "Nixon Doctrine." I think he decided to use it, to pin it with that title, in order to raise it in importance. I think that's what he had in mind. So he pushed it wherever he could. He read into it things probably that Nixon didn't intend. Yes, that was one of the reasons that we made that trip around the rim of Asia, which was his selected title for that report, by the way. Jim Lowenstein drafted the original version and I finished it.

We again used the same technique. He had a letter from Nixon asking him to go, and in turn gave Nixon a private written report

on the situation as we found it, mostly, now as I recall, in terms of the very favorable and positive responses to the Nixon Doctrine.

RITCHIE: In a sense there were some movements, Vietnamization of the war, and the Nixon doctrine that really were things that Mansfield had been talking about in the past.

VALEO: Precisely.

RITCHIE: Even though the war continued on for another four years, Mansfield must have felt some sense of positive accomplishment.

VALEO: I think he thought there was a better chance of ending the war with Nixon than with Johnson, largely because Nixon wasn't so embedded in the idea of victory. He came in when the thing was already a disaster, so anything he did to alleviate it was almost beyond criticism. In much the same way, he felt that would be true in the case of the movement towards China. Unless you have any more questions, I'll go into that, because it's a rather interesting story.

We are talking about '71, '72. The first inkling we had of an interest on the part of the Chinese came through the State Department. Apparently a German professor had been in Beijing and had seen Sihanouk, and Sihanouk had said, "Get word to Senator

Mansfield that that thing he wants to do is now doable, that Chou En-lai said it's now doable." So the professor passed this to the State Department and they knew what the reference was. They called Mansfield on it immediately. Well, almost simultaneously we got word through the French embassy that they had heard also from Sihanouk that Chou En-lai was prepared to receive Senator Mansfield. This came shortly after the ping-pong players. It was just around that time, I can't remember what the order was, but it was right around that time.

Mansfield was playing it very cautiously. We kept the Department of State fully informed on anything that we did in connection with it. He asked me to go to see the French ambassador, to try to get something more on it, and I did. I think I have a memorandum on some of these developments in my files still in my office, but they'll eventually wind up in the Library of Congress. The ambassador and his deputy chief of mission said that their ambassador in Beijing, who had an unusual name, it was a Slavic name, I think it was Mana'ch, had informed them of the development. As we found out later, when we met him in Beijing, Mana'ch was a brilliant, brilliant student of Asian affairs, particularly Southeast Asia. He had communicated to the French embassy in Washington substantially the same information that came through the State Department, that Chou En-lai wanted to see Senator Mansfield in Beijing. Well, Mansfield was not persuaded

by this indirect approach. He decided that what we would do would be to write a letter to Chou En-lai and tell him that we'd been hearing these things, but that we needed to know something more specific, a time frame if they were accurate reports, and so forth. So we wrote a letter to Chou En-lai.

The question arose as to how to deliver it. I asked whether we should send it through the French embassy? "No," he said, "let's just send it through the post as a special delivery, or registered letter." I had read somewhere that letters could get through to Beijing via the International Postal Union, and that it might work. So we mailed the letter, and heard nothing more after that. The next thing we heard was about the secret Kissinger trip. About two months later the letter we had sent to Chou En-lai came back. Obviously it had been opened, either in Hawaii or San Francisco, both places where there had been some reports of CIA examining overseas mail to the Communist countries. It was stamped with the phrase: "Not deliverable." This was about two months later.

The conclusion we drew was that the letter had been opened, and that its contents had been divulged, and that Kissinger's sudden trip to Asia had been to make sure that if we were going to move in the direction of restoration, the president should move first. That was confirmed, in effect, by Nixon—not that the letter had been opened, but that they knew of the situation.

Nixon said to Mansfield, after his trip, something to the effect that he knew of Chou En-lai's invitation to Mansfield but that he felt as president he should go first. Mansfield said, "Of course, that is fully understandable." But Nixon also said, "Chou En-lai asked about you when I was there, and I've arranged for you and Senator Scott to go to Beijing in the near future." That was the first of the Mansfield trips. It was with Hugh Scott—I'll try to remember the other people on that trip, although I'm sure it's in one of the reports—we took John Thomas of the State Department and his secretary for the administrative arrangements. Scott took his secretary Margie Lynch, who later married Senator Pearson and and of course Bill Hildenbrand from Scott's office. We took Salpee Sahagian. Both Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott were included. Norvill Jones came from the Foreign Relations Committee.

We decided we wanted no one, absolutely no one, from the executive branch of the government except John Thomas for administrative purposes. Then at the last minute Scott decided to take along a woman from the State Department whom he said spoke Chinese. Mansfield asked me to find out about her, to make some inquiries downtown. I had already begun a refresher course in Chinese at the Foreign Service Institute at this point. My Chinese had not been used for years and wasn't very good to begin with. But I began the refresher. I made inquiries at the F.B.I. to see if they knew about her, I asked Ken Calloway if he could

find out anything about her. Well, the whole thing had a kind of fishy smell to it. They knew her, but only in a sort of vague way. She had been listed as some sort of a student in Chinese and had studied in Taiwan, I believe, where there was a language school at the time. But Taiwan also happens to be a CIA center in Asia. And I was really becoming very, very paranoid about the CIA. The last thing we needed on that trip would be somebody from the CIA because the Chinese would probably know it, even though we didn't. We tried to dissuade Scott from taking her, but he insisted and he stood on his rights, so we took her. Scott insisted on the grounds that she was the daughter of a very important constituent in Philadelphia. She was quite young and knew a little Chinese. As it turned out, she didn't do any harm on the trip. She didn't do much good either.

We approached China in stages. We went to Honolulu, and then to Guam. We were overnight in Honolulu and got a wire the next day that Nixon had inaugurated the bombing of Hanoi. It just couldn't have come at a worse time from our point of view. We had no idea how the Chinese would react to it—they were at that time supporting the North Vietnamese. We did not know whether or not we would still be welcome, whether this meant that the whole situation was going to change. We tried to make some inquiries but could find nothing. We were really flying in the dark. But we decided the best thing to do was just to go on as though nothing

had happened. If the Chinese wanted us to turn back they would probably tell us, not shoot us down. So we thought that would be the best strategy. We went then to Guam and directly from Guam to China. We decided that we would not stop in foreign countries en route, that that would not be desirable. We'd do it on the way back. So we skipped Japan and following Chinese instructions went directly into the airport at Shanghai. Beijing was not yet opened. We landed and left the crew of our own plane, we had a U.S. military plane at that point, we left them in Shanghai, and flew in a Chinese plane to Beijing.

This was the first of the congressional trips. We were received by the acting foreign minister, (Qas Guan-hua) who was later involved with the Gang of Four. I can't remember whether he was one of them or not, but he was certainly associated with them and was dropped out of power after Mao's death. Actually we were guests of the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs, a kind of semi-official arm of the Chinese Foreign Office, which they were using then to greet distinguished foreign visitors and to promote friendship with other countries. They were our hosts throughout.

I must say something of the first impression of going into Beijing—I had never been there before. In the early period that I was in China I had never gotten to Beijing. The thing that impressed me most was the obvious reforestation that they were

doing, right along the road. Everywhere they were growing trees, trees, trees. I think that impressed all of us at that time. It was in early spring. People looked rather poorly dressed. A lot of patches on clothes. And practically nobody wore anything other than the characteristic padded blue cotton—which incidentally did not begin with the Communists, it was the characteristic Chinese clothing for a long time before. The only people who didn't wear it were people who had money, who were few enough. So that was not a shocker to anyone who had seen old China. We were billeted at a guesthouse that had been the Austria-Hungarian Embassy—it really went far back. It was pleasant. The equipage was rather dated, maybe forty, fifty, a hundred years old, but the service was very pleasant. We were extraordinarily well fed. And of course once we got into the city, then the enormous churning of bicycles was the other thing that impressed us greatly.

It was essentially a ceremonial visit. Chou En-lai gave a dinner for Senator Mansfield, rather early in the trip. He was then still in good health, he had not yet become ill. I remember it very vividly, it was a dinner for about twenty-five people. The women in our party, who included Salpee Sahagian and Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott, came out in evening dress, and of course the women in the other party had on blue caps and these warm cotton quilted blue uniforms. That was the last time the American women wore evening gowns on that trip. But anyhow it was

a marvelous dinner. Chou En-lai showed the Beijing Duck around before it was carved. The dinner was after our conversation with him.

We had that conversation in the Great Hall of the People, which we were advised had been built in less than nine months. It was a huge, huge building with immense rooms, looking very Russian actually. They said that it had been built almost eighty percent with volunteer labor, and that it had been completed in eight or nine months, which was really quite a spectacular achievement. As you would expect, there were murals from all of the different provinces of China, mostly on a militant revolutionary note, for example, Red Army people looking like Washington crossing the Delaware, except in Chinese clothes. Almost all of the carvings had some sort of a socially significant theme. They were not carving the old classic Chinese scholar and his girlfriend, they were carving the new things, which were mostly militant, Communist themes, workers, soldiers, etc., usually with the Red banner flying.

They put us through the appropriate amount of sightseeing in Beijing, but from the point of view of the historic record the important thing is the conversation with Chou En-lai. We came into the audience room, it was arranged in a horseshoe of chairs. Tea was served in large cups with covers. And when Chou En-lai saw Senator Mansfield—he apparently had seen him once in

Chungking, when he was the agent in Chungking during World War II for the Chinese Communist party and Mansfield was visiting there on, I think, a trip for Roosevelt. So they had had a very brief meeting at an earlier period. He saw Mansfield, and his first remarks were: "Senator Mansfield, we were expecting you a month ago but instead Mr. Kissinger came. Where were you?" But Mansfield said, "Well, I'm delighted that the president could get here first. That's the way it ought to be. I'm just glad to be here now." So the conversation got off on a good note. We were hit of course immediately with the question of the bombing of Hanoi. We didn't raise that, but they raised it, and of course their gripes about it.

One thing that was very significant in the conversation again shows the importance of the personal element in so many of these situations. Chou raised almost immediately a slight that he had received from John Foster Dulles in the first Geneva conferences on Indochina in 1954. He said that when he saw Secretary Dulles he went over to shake hands with him and Dulles turned away. He had not forgotten that, and this was fifteen years later. The minute that we touched on any theme which was from their point of view objectionable he dropped his charm and he became very vehement in making the Chinese point. Other than that, he was a very charming man with a ready smile, easy to talk with, even through an interpreter, and extremely pleasant. We went to the

Chinese opera with him on another evening. They were showing the—what was that?

RITCHIE: Wasn't that "The White-Haired Girl?"

VALEO: Yes, it was "The White-Haired Girl," not the Red Army Corps of Women. We were sitting in the balcony. We didn't go with Chou, that's right. He was in the orchestra. There was an interesting byplay. Before the curtain, we were watching the arrivals from the balcony and Madame Jiang Qing came in. Chou En-lai spotted her at the entrance door and he was over there in a second to take her by the arm and bring her in to bows and applause. My own feeling on the whole situation in China, partly from reading and partly from watching these sort of off-guard reactions, was that Chou En-lai was not on Jiang Qing's list. Chou En-lai was an essential element in keeping the situation together, and whether she liked or disliked him, she would not have been able to remove him.

Our people, our China watchers in Hong Kong and Taiwan, kept looking for the break between Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Our experts kept playing to this, expecting it. Our press did the same thing. But it seemed to me they forgot something, that Mao's relationship with Chou was really a more important marriage than his marriage to Jiang Qing. Mao Tse-tung could not run a government, Chou En-lai could. Mao could though, inspire and lead

a revolution. Chou could not but he could organize it and a government. This partnership went back to their very earliest associations. At that time, they were both young and Chou En-lai undoubtedly had the same dreams for China as Mao Tse-tung, of leading a revolution in China. After the Chiang Kai-shek military movement north in the mid-twenties and the break between the [?????] and the Chinese communists, the Chinese Communist ranks were decimated. Chou and Mao discovered early in the 1925-'30 period that if there was any chance of a survival of the revolution, they were both needed. From that time on that relationship never was at anytime subject to a break. Every other one was, including Mao's relationship with Jiang Qing, but not that one. But that was precisely where our people were looking for the break. They wasted a lot of years looking for it. This little byplay with Jiang Qing at the theater seemed to underscore the point. She came in smiling and was delighted by the attention. She gave her arm to him and they went down the aisle together to put her in her seat.

We came back from China extremely enthusiastic about what was happening in China. Mansfield had been there in the '20s and then again during World War II. I had been there during the war. The change was great even at that point—bear in mind now we're talking about the closing period of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xioping was still in disgrace, his name wasn't even mentioned at

that point. He was to come back and be there at the next trip that we made, but at that time he was not there and not even mentioned. Mao was seen in public only infrequently. The so-called Gang of Four were in the party, ideologically at the top of the heap. Their views were being accepted and promulgated by the party. Cho En-lai was running a government which had suffered greatly as a result of the Cultural Revolution. It had lost a lot of its talent, perhaps not as much as is sometimes painted now, but there was a lot of human devastation. But he was running the government. The Chinese economy had made considerable progress already in terms of modernization as measured against the so-called Liberation year of 1949.

As we saw, their textile factories at that point, 1973, were maybe forty years behind ours, but in 1949, except for Shanghai mills, they were two hundred years behind ours. So that represented a great advance. They were already making their own automobiles. They weren't the greatest autos, but we rode in them for four days without a breakdown. They had already detonated a nuclear device. So one must not assume that the Cultural Revolution flattened the land. The progress that they had already made, primarily on their own capabilities but secondarily with assistance from the Soviet Union in some of the technological areas, was very evident, and anybody who knew the old China was amazed by what they had done, as I was and as Senator Mansfield was.

It was not only a matter just of their capabilities in many spheres, it was also their very human approach to things. There was a great concern about people. Well, in the old China that we remembered, you would see people literally die of starvation on the street, or rickshaw pullers selling their wives for a dime, anything just for sheer survival; that had disappeared largely. And it wasn't a matter just of being shown show-places. To be sure there was some of that, but I knew enough Chinese to walk around the streets, and I did walk around the streets on my own. They didn't like the idea of my having done it, but I would slip out while everybody was having a siesta and take a walk. You could see very clearly that things were far, far better than they had been before. I was especially impressed by the improvement in sanitation, which had been really appalling under the old system. They had dealt with that. I was impressed with the health care; for the most part, primitive, crude, but at least caring. That was something which was totally absent in the earlier China. In part, because that's the way it was, but in part because it was a war situation and they had no capacities for dealing with it at that time.

On the course of that trip we went to the scenic spots, Hangzhou. It was not an extensive trip. We went to Kuangdong, to Canton, to Shanghai and one or two other cities in between. In every one they pulled out the red carpet. We were curiosities.

There hadn't been many foreigners there to speak of after the Russians left and during the Cultural Revolution. There had been very few, so that we were objects of curiosity, especially coming in a kind of motorcade of four or five cars. I don't know whether we were the curiosities or the automobiles were, because there weren't that many automobiles being used. Almost all of the people were riding buses, bicycles or walking. They had pretty much eliminated the old pedicabs and the rickshaw pullers were gone completely, in all of the cities. In some of the more primitive places—and we did go to one or two, I can't remember now which ones—they still used the pedicabs, but not the rickshaws, they had gone.

In the meetings with Chou En-lai and with the foreign minister, Chao Guan-hua, we got into discussions of policy, and the same questions that come up now came up then, especially the Taiwan question, and the Vietnamese question, but surprisingly less than we had anticipated that we were going to hear. They made some comments on the bombing of Hanoi, but it was more subdued than I had expected it would be. Other than those two conversations, the rest of it was largely ceremonial. We went to the Great Wall and did the things that people were expected to do. We left on a very pleasant note, and if I'm not mistaken it was shortly thereafter that the liaison offices were opened. At that

point there were no liaison offices in China. David Bruce went, I believe, shortly thereafter to become the first liaison man.

RITCHIE: It must have been a very emotional trip for both you and Senator Mansfield.

VALEO: It was, because I was really tremendously impressed by the change for the better, from what I had seen in the China of World War II. Of course, it is true that in the China of World War II, I probably saw just about the worst places including Gueizhou province, which was one of the most backward of all the Chinese provinces. And the other one was Shanghai, which was literally a den of iniquity, and was strictly a foreign-dominated city in the old days. Everything was for sale, it didn't matter what. Well, that had all disappeared. We were immensely impressed by the honesty of people. You'd leave a pack of cigarettes around or something and they'd come chasing after you with the cigarettes.

One of the things that impressed me too was that a good deal of the "front" had disappeared, partly because everybody was wearing the same clothes. You'd have to look at people as they were, because fancy clothes weren't there to mislead you. I noticed this particularly in riding, when you have time for musing, in an airplane. You'd look at the Chinese who were helping us. There were some women and some men. You'd realize

you were seeing them as people, because they did not, by virtue of any artificial add-on, change their basic personality. It was a very fascinating experience. As I said, the trip was mostly concentrated in Beijing. It was a short trip. I think it was less than two weeks.

I must say, Hugh Scott did a very credible job. As you know he's a great collector of Chinese art and antiquities and he knew a great deal about it. He has written a book on the artifacts of the Tang Dynasty. We went to one museum, I can't remember where it was but there was a display of a certain type of artifact, it might have been horses, or something. The interpreter was interpreting the curator's statement. "Yes," he said, "this was a series of twenty-five, but we only have twenty-three here." Scott said, "Well, where are the other two?" And he said, "In the museum in Philadelphia." Scott was quiet after that.

What interested me was that people on the streets had a lot curiosity. They were not in any sense necessarily very friendly. They were just curious. If you passed them, they would pass; if you asked directions of someone, like a policeman as I did, you didn't get a very warm or friendly smile. You got the minimum in terms of an answer. I think part of it was they were still suspicious—they wouldn't know that we were Americans as such, certainly would not have known that about me, walking around on my own. I went looking for places I had known in Shanghai right

after World War II. I found the YMCA where I had stayed, for about two or three months. It was still there. It was used for some sort of office or association headquarters. The buildings next to it were the Pacific Hotel and the International Hotel or the Park Hotel as it was called. These were along what in the old days was called Bubbling Well Road. The hotels were right across from the racetrack, right in the middle of the city, that's the way Shanghai was in the old days; horse racing was very important. The racetrack had been turned into a public park. These hotel buildings had been turned into public buildings. There were three or four of them in a row. Two had been rather elaborate, for the time. One was still being used for food and for restaurant service, but it was not operating as a hotel.

We stayed at a place called—I think it was called the Broadway Mansions, again, something from the twenties, comfortable enough but certainly not what we would now regard as a luxury hotel. In Hangzhou, our quarters were in an old-fashioned, quasi-European type of building on the lake. In Canton it was a very lovely guest house.

RITCHIE: Having been once smeared as "China Mike," was Mansfield at all concerned about traveling to China and becoming too identified with China?

VALEO: No, he had passed over that by then. That's why I should mention the occasion that finally ended that fear. It was somewhat before this trip, two or three years. The University of Montana had set up a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation. The initial financing of it was by private fund-raising; there were sufficient funds to provide for a guest speaker, I guess one or two a year. They had asked, since it was his foundation, if he would do the first address. He talked to me about that, and he said, "What do you think we ought to do it on?" I thought for a while. I had had a dinner date with a young schoolteacher just about a week before, and we got into a discussion of Joe McCarthy and the McCarthy period. I mentioned China in that connection, and she said, "Well, what did McCarthy have to do with China?" She didn't know. I suddenly realized how many years had gone by since McCarthy. It made a profound impression on me. I said to myself, "Here we are acting as though McCarthy were yesterday."

So when Mansfield asked me that question, I said, "I think we ought to do it on China. Don't you think it's about time we took a look at China and did something meaningful instead of going through this same routine as we've been doing year in and year out." I think we were both old enough at this time to take that kind of a position. He said, "Well, I don't know about the risk." I said, "I know, but do you realize how long it's been?" And I told him the story of the schoolteacher and he sort of smiled at

it. He said, "See what you can do with it. Maybe get somebody to help you down on the committee." So I talked to Jim Lowenstein, and I told him what I thought we ought to try to do, how we could approach it, and asked him to put together a draft, which he did. I worked it over for a long time, really sweated over it, and finally showed it to Mansfield. Basically it took the same theme: don't you really think it's about time that we looked at this situation the way it is instead of evading it any longer? That was basically the theme of the speech. We had, as I recall, a plan worked out under which we proposed initiatives that we felt were doable in that period.

He did the speech in Montana as the opening one in the Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation lecture series, and we waited eagerly to see how the press in Montana would handle it. He had only one hostile editorial, and that was in some weekly which had been hostile to him for twenty-five years, one of those things. The other editorial comment in the state was uniformly favorable. So that we realized that the time had come when you could begin to deal with the China question rationally. I think it was Kissinger who told Mansfield later, "When I saw Chou En-lai he waved your speech under my nose and said, 'Now I know where Kissinger is getting his ideas from.'" or something like that. But that really was a decisive moment. I owe a lot to that school-teacher whose name I can't even remember now! It really opened my eyes. That,

and another thing that [Lee] Metcalf had mentioned to me as we were opening the Senate one morning. He said he had a girl in his office and she didn't even remember the Korean War! And here was the Senate acting as though the China thing had happened just yesterday.

RITCHIE: It was the most amazing phenomenon that China went from being our arch-enemy to being a friend almost overnight.

VALEO: Largely because the whole thing had been held in this state of limbo for so many years, beginning as a political issue, it began to take on a kind of permanence, it was like an institution: you'd have to say not just Communist China but "Godless, Communist China." It became an institutionalized irrational hostility. Even when the great break came between the Soviet Union and the Chinese, we couldn't accept that and act to utilize the opportunity. We should have seen immediately that we were talking about two totally different situations in the Soviet Union and in China that theretofore we had treated as an entity, and yet we were unable to do it as a people. I don't think I ever saw an editorial in a major newspaper which made reference to the possibility that China might be something different than what you had in the Soviet Union. Neither do I recall a president or secretary of state making a meaningful differentiation. There may have been some groping in the Congress but it wasn't heeded. The truth of the matter is that the two situations are extraordinarily

different. Basically, the Soviet Union is a suspicion-ridden country. If you travel there you feel the suspicion almost vibrate around you. China is essentially an open country by contrast.

RITCHIE: Why do you think there were some politicians and political leaders who were locked into place, Dean Rusk and others who could never see China differently, and others like Mansfield and Kissinger who could all of a sudden look at it in a new light?

VALEO: Bear in mind that it was a long time before Mansfield could look at it or if he did he kept it to himself. The same was true for Rusk. In the case of Rusk, as a young assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in the early days of the UN, when the big break came with China, he didn't defend the revolution but he was attempting at that point to follow what was State Department policy and that was, I believe, to bring China into the UN and to try to develop some modus vivendi with the new government. He made speeches on that side of the coin. Then came McCarthy, and his earlier stance, like that of many careerists in the State Department, became something that haunted him his whole career in much the same way that it haunted Mansfield, or he thought it did at least for his whole career. I think Rusk was trying to separate himself as much as possible from those who had been tarred by the McCarthy brush. Then later on,

when the situation became a real political one, the potential for personal damage resulting from it was so great that he got a mind-set which I don't think he could ever shake. I think he believed what he was saying after awhile about "yellow hordes" and so forth. But he couldn't have believed it in the early period. I can't imagine that he could have believed it in the early period.

RITCHIE: Did you find that there was more interest in the Senate on China and on Asian policy at this stage of the game? In the beginning you said there really weren't that many members who seemed that interested.

VALEO: Oh, without the Nixon trip you wouldn't have had it. It would have gone on for some more years in the old way. You might have had an occasional ping pong player, or a Senator Mansfield going, but the Nixon trip was so decisive. Whatever you may think of Nixon, that was an extraordinary performance. He knew precisely how to do it in terms of the internal American situation. The use of the media, which I thought was outrageous at first, proved to be one of the most important and compelling factors in producing this changed attitude.

RITCHIE: You mean the coverage of Nixon's trip?

VALEO: Yes, exactly. I mean it suddenly became the thing to do, and people have been doing it ever since: go to China. I thought his understanding of the role of the media so far greater than mine. At first, I thought it was a disaster to bring all those television people to Beijing. That was not my idea of the way you conduct foreign policy. But he understood that the important part of it was what it did at home. Having spent years of his life building up the attitude of hostility to China and communism, I guess he knew best how to change it. Of course, he was one of the people greatly responsible for the distortion for so many years.

RITCHIE: It's interesting because the question just came up this morning: someone asked who were the senators now who were interested in China, and I thought there's nobody like Mansfield or Scott or Baker, or the people who had been so interested and preoccupied almost in the past.

VALEO: Now you've got [Alan] Cranston who wants to go back the other way. In the morning press he's very concerned about the nuclear thing, apparently.

RITCHIE: And he's the ranking Democrat on the Asian Affairs subcommittee.

VALEO: You can't overlook the fact that he's from California, and the Nationalist forces are still strong in the Chinese communities in California. He's had a long connection with them. Any senator would have to have it. Reagan certainly had his connections with it.

RITCHIE: But despite the last ten years of our relations with China, we probably still have more senators who are European-oriented, and Latin-American-oriented than they are Asian-oriented.

VALEO: I think it's difficult to understand Asia. It's not an easy area, and our whole culture is really more oriented European, so it's not surprising to me that you don't have that interest in China, in the absence of big issues. Now, when Japan or Hong Kong or Korea ceases to be number one textile enemy and China becomes number one textile enemy, then I think you'll have it. But it's going to be a negative influence. That may be part of what you're hearing now on other matters. It may also be related to the fact that China's foreign trade is growing very rapidly and it's beginning to come into some very competitive situations with American business, particularly in the simpler manufactured goods. They learn very fast and they produce very well.

I must get on the next time around the setting up of the Chinese liaison office in Washington, which came shortly after this early trip.

RITCHIE: Why don't we start the next session then with that?

VALEO: All right.

End of Interview #12

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Interview #13

Wednesday, November 6, 1985

RITCHIE: You mentioned last time that you wanted to talk about the setting up of the Chinese liaison office after your trip to China. What was the story behind that?

VALEO: Well, of course, Nixon had made the basic arrangements for the liaison offices. We made no particular contribution to it on the first China trip. It did not come up in the course of our discussions. We didn't think it appropriate for us to do it in any event. It's essentially an executive branch function. Somewhere after we got back, I can't remember how much after, it was announced that they were setting up liaison offices in both Washington and Beijing.

The first Chinese officials to come were gathered from various places. Some came from Europe, and some came from China. They were not numerous. There were at most a dozen, I would think, and that included probably some personal servants. But the three principal officers of the first Chinese liaison were Han-Xu, and Huang-Zhen, who was the chief of the liaison office and later became the first ambassador. Han-Xu also had the rank of ambassador, but he was second to Huang-Zhen, who was a major party figure, who had had extensive experience in foreign relations.

He had been a general on the Long March. He was also a painter and later became Minister of Culture. The third person was Ji Chao-zhu, who was Harvard educated. His father had been the publisher of a newspaper, I believe in New York City, in the Chinese community at one time. Ji Chao-zhu spoke Chinese and English with equal fluency. It was a very beautiful Chinese and a very good English. The three of them were the key people.

When they first arrived in Washington they were housed in the Mayflower Hotel. They took a suite of rooms for their headquarters. By coincidence, a personal friend of mine who owns a Chinese restaurant in town, named Van Lung, he owns the Yen Ching restaurant at Porter Street and Connecticut Avenue, was engaged to feed them. He himself is a very interesting personality, and a very significant one in this period. His father had been the chief political leader, the governor of Yunan Province during Chiang Kai-shek's time. He was independent of Chiang Kai-shek but loosely allied with him in the war against the Japanese. Some people called him a warlord; that's a misnomer. He ran his own province, and he ran it as one of the more progressive provinces in the China of that period. We had heard his name as soldiers in China because the routes that led into China from India went through Yunan Province. The capital Kunming, was a major center for the dispersal of American forces throughout China. His name was Lun Lung, the father.

Van Lung was a student here, with his brother, for most of World War II. This was not uncommon in the period. A lot of the leading Chinese tried to get their kids out of China because of the difficulties of life during the war. Van Lung went to school here, as did his brother. In the early '50s, his brother left in anger, saying that he had been bothered by U.S. security forces of some sort. He left to go back to China. What had happened in the interim was that Lun Lung broke with Chiang Kai-shek and became a vice president in the new People's Republic, bringing his whole province into the new government at the time when the Nationalist Government was collapsing very rapidly, in the period about 1948-1949. So he had been given a vice presidency in the People's Republic of China. Later on, during the Hundred Flowers Bloom period, he was disgraced, and then posthumously was reinstated after Mao's death as a bona fide Chinese nationalist.

Well, Van Lung was his son. Unlike his brother, he stayed here, opened a restaurant and other businesses. His name was known to the Chinese liaison people when they came so they asked him to provide food for them. There's one thing about the Chinese, they tend to prefer their own food. They're very insular in that sense. Since I'd known Van Lung for twenty-five years or thereabouts, we shared a lot of our experiences with the early Chinese liaison people. They didn't have their own cooks at that point. We would go there occasionally to the Mayflower for lunch,

to talk with them, Mansfield and I. Mansfield was already planning ahead for his next trip to China, which was to take place in 1974.

We opened this connection with the liaison people very quickly because they, of course, knew that Mansfield had gone to China with Scott after the Nixon trip, and they really knew nowhere else to turn in Washington at that point with regard to the Congress especially. They knew a few people in the Department of State, John Thomas was one. As an administrative officer he was helpful to them in that early period. But apart from John Thomas and a few other people downtown, they really didn't know anybody else in the city. Mansfield immediately invited them to lunch at the Capitol. I think I have some pictures of that first luncheon with the liaison office somewhere in my collection.

They also turned to me. The word "secretary" had a meaning that's very important in the Chinese Communist structure; whether it's the party or whether it's the political structure, the secretary—Mishuzhang is the word in Chinese—is a key figure. He is the doer, so to speak, not as it is in our situation by any means! So they turned to me on two matters. First they needed to move out of the Mayflower. Ji Chao-zhu in particular talked to me about the building they were thinking of buying on Connecticut at the bridge over Rock Creek Park. It was a hotel at the time. He said, "We're thinking of taking that property. We've discussed

it. What do you think?" I said, "Well, from the point of view of an investment, I don't think you can go wrong. It's right next to the French embassy. It's on Rock Creek Park and Connecticut Avenue, and I think it's the kind of property that inevitably will grow in value." But I added, "What do you need all that space for?" I don't know how many rooms there were in the hotel, but there were many. I said, "You're only about a dozen people at most." He said, "Well, as things grow we may need more space." I said, "Well, if the size doesn't bother you, the fact that you will have a lot of excess space, then I think it's probably a good place to move." They bought that property, and moved in.

One of the first things they wanted to do was to give two dinners, one for Senator Mansfield, and a separate dinner for Senator Scott. They called me and asked me about the distribution of invitations. I guess it's one of the few times I ever went out of my way to get involved in a foreign nation's problems in the United States, but I explained to Ji Chao-zhu, who had called me, that I thought it would be most inappropriate. They wanted to give a dinner for Senator Mansfield and then a separate dinner for Senator Scott, and have only Democrats at one and Republicans at the other. I suggested that would probably be bad form, that they really should invite both, that they really shouldn't show that much knowledge of American politics at this point. I explained that party structure here is somewhat different than it is in

China. I said, "I'll be glad to help you no matter what you do, but I have to advise you that I think it's best if you invited them together and mixed up the invitations as between the two parties." Well, they were very deeply appreciative of that advice. The head of the liaison office Huang-Zhen recognized immediately what was involved. He called me personally to thank me for giving them the advice. I didn't know whether I should do it or not, frankly. But I just felt they were getting off on the wrong foot. They sent me over a box of invitations to address as I saw fit.

They gave that first dinner for Mansfield and Scott at the liaison office. Well, it was like dining in an immense cavern. They were using about one-fiftieth of the space, and the rooms echoed with the emptiness. Invited almost exclusively were members of the Senate, and most of those who were invited, I believe, accepted. There were maybe twenty members. They had obtained one or two chefs from China by then and it was an excellent dinner. It was the beginning of their social contacts in Washington. A lot of people were still very leery about going anywhere near the Chinese Communists. The contrast with the present has always fascinated me. When you go to a national day now, they have to screen people, there are so many hundreds and over a thousand on some occasions. In the meantime, they have had to use all of the space in the old hotel and get some in addition.

The food has deteriorated in quality as it has gone up in quantity. In the early days all pitched in to help prepare the food for the national days. Now, of course, it's a highly organized operation that involves I don't know how many chefs. But the professional diplomats actually helped to prepare the food for some of those early receptions and dinners.

Huang-Zhen stayed for a considerable period of time; he became ambassador when the liaison offices changed into regular embassies. I'm trying to remember when that happened; I believe it came in the Carter administration. I'm not sure when they raised them officially to ambassadors; I think even before the agreements were reached on full recognition. He was replaced by a person from China whom I did not know too well, Chai Zemin, and then another ambassador, Lin Zhaonan. And now Han-Xu, who was second in command at the old liaison office, is ambassador in the embassy. Ji Chao-zhu was there through a part of this period. He became an interpreter for Deng Xiaoping for a while and then came back as, I guess, the number two person in the embassy, and is now an ambassador in his own right to the Fijis.

The other things I associate with the embassy were the services on the death of Mao in '76. We went to that. They had posted an honor guard for Mao. They were in constant attendance to receive visitors for formal condolences. But Mao's death occurred shortly before we went on the third trip, so I'd better

go back to the second trip to China, which came in '74. Mansfield kept a constant pressure on them to permit a second trip. They were a little reluctant at that point. I think they wanted to spread it out in other ways, but he kept the heat on Huang-Zhen. At one point they had okayed it, and then they canceled it, very abruptly at the last moment. I think it was put off for at least several months. But we did finally go on a second trip and it was a very long one, there were no other members of the Senate with him.

He took along Jane Engelhard, who was then I think a member of a commission to study the machinery of the United States government in foreign policy, of which he was also a member. Jane Engelhard was an old friend, someone whom he had been helpful to in putting on the Library of Congress private citizens board. She later organized the friends of the Library of Congress, a number of things of that sort. She had similarly worked with the Johnson and Nixon administrations in some of the restoration work at the White House. She's a public-minded woman and a very wealthy woman. She had been born in China and she was a member of that second trip.

The thing I remember most about it was that Deng Xiaoping was back in the premiership in '74. He had been restored to favor, probably as a result of Chou En-lai's support. Mao may have made the decision on that basis. Again, this to me illustrates our

tendency to treat Chinese politics in our terms. We have in recent years juxtaposed Deng Xiaoping's views against Mao's views. We forget, conveniently in that kind of logic, that without Mao's concurrence, Deng Xio-ping would not have been brought back from disgrace the first time and placed in the premiership, whether Chou En-lai wanted it or not. This would have to have been done by Chou plus Mao, not by Chou alone. There would be no way that it could have been done in that period by Chou alone. That has been conveniently overlooked by some of the professional China watchers.

Deng was the enfant terrible of the early Communist party leaders. He was in and out of favor. He was a very strongly opinionated person and made enemies, and of course clashed repeatedly with Jiang Qing. That certainly would be the case, but it again shows that at a critical moment if he had his facilities, Mao would have been more governed by what Chou felt was essential than by what Jiang Qing may have desired. Our inability to deal with that reality, I think, was due in part to our feeling that Mao should never have been, that somehow or other he was a fluke of some sort, and that he was not the real voice of China, that Chiang Kai-shek was and, if not Chaing, then Chou En Lai . I think again this was a horrible misreading of the situation and it helped to keep us in this limbo-like Chinese policy for such a long, long period of time, much to our

own damage as well as to, I'm sure, China's damage—maybe not to China's as much as to our own.

But in any event the issues that were raised essentially came down to the same one: Taiwan. There was not a major trade issue at this time, that had not yet developed. There were some issues involving frozen assets and expropriations but the main issue was essentially Taiwan. I have less recollection of that trip than the others. I was ill in Beijing for several days, almost got left behind as the party moved out and moved southward and westward, but I finally managed to make it and travel with them. It was an exploratory trip in the sense of finding out what was happening in China. We went to many communes. I think we went to Yunan. Again I looked for familiar things and found none. China had changed very substantially. The city of Kunming, where I had spent a week or ten days during the war, was totally unrecognizable to me. There were some old green-painted wooden buildings in one spot, which were about the only thing I could even vaguely remember of the original city.

The Chinese treated us royally again, gave us a marvelous experience, and we learned a great deal. We found out much about attitudes on internal Chinese developments—Deng Xiao-ping was the prime minister, so there was none of the "Hate Deng" and "capitalist roader" campaigns which were to come a little later, again as it had come earlier. We had the usual number of

conversations in Beijing and then in each of the cities we visited. We wanted to see particularly a minorities province, in this case it was Guangxi Zhuang, where there are large groups of minorities peoples. We got our first exposure to the differences in Chinese policies as, for example, on population control towards minority peoples as distinct from those directed at the majority of Han Chinese.

What we found was that in most of these places industry was growing up on a small scale. The belief that suddenly China began industrializing after Deng Xiao-ping took over is really quite erroneous. In the northeast Shanghai and elsewhere there was already a very large development of heavy industry. Very often this development was at the expense of consumer industries in this period, but not entirely. The consumer industries were beginning not so much on the basis of national planning, but on the basis of provincial and local initiatives. The communes were a center not only for major development in agriculture but also for the development of small manufacturing. What we found was by no means a system that was alien to the needs of China at that time. The problem was largely to keep—I guess the population was about nine hundred million then—to keep nine hundred million people active and occupied and constructive. And they succeeded extraordinarily well in doing that. The commune structure was part of that success. It was by no means the horror that has

sometimes been painted, insofar as I know it still operates in many parts of China.

The development of "agricultural capitalism," if you will, that has become common in the last few years, has been an add-on to the original commune structure. It has not replaced it. They managed through the commune system to keep people fed, to give them a minimum of housing and clothing, a relatively adequate amount of medical attention, as distinct again from the pre-liberation situation as they constantly referred to it. It was egalitarian. There were exceptions to that, particularly in the minority areas, even in that period, but basically it was very egalitarian. I would say, in my own personal opinion, in the then existing situation, there would have been no other way to handle the rural problems effectively. They were not ready to move to another stage of development. Their first obligation was to see that everybody was fed, clothed and taken care of, and they succeeded in doing that in a rather extraordinary performance.

By the time of the last Mansfield trip, which was '76, he asked me first to go out on my own, which I did. I went to get a view of how countries around the periphery were reacting to the restoration of China-U.S. contact. I went on a trip for two weeks on my own. That may have been in '74, I'm not even sure now. But he asked me to take a trip out, and I did so. Most of the countries in the area were either developing their relations with

China or wanted to develop them. Even South Korea was anxious for contact with China. Japan was moving clearly into the vanguard of foreign economic contact with China, even in that period. And the Philippines had already established full relations with the Chinese. They had managed to work it out and still keep a good economic tie with Taiwan. The Chinese were very understanding of the Philippines' needs in that period. I think it was Mrs. Marcos who went first, and then President Marcos went afterwards. They established a good working relation. This was before we had yet established full diplomatic relations with Beijing.

I remember talking with Mrs. Marcos' brother-in-law, shortly before they decided to make contact with Beijing. He said that they were considering doing that and he asked me for my reactions, what I thought of the idea. I said I thought it was the way the world was going and that it would be very wise for them to do it as soon as they could. I didn't see any reason why they should have to hold back. He was wondering whether they should wait until the United States did it first. I said I didn't know of any reason. I said, "If you do it it may help to stimulate us to do the same thing, and we eventually have to go that way anyhow." I don't know how soon after that that decided to do it.

As a matter of fact, I sent him to see Han Xu, who was then in the liaison office, I said, "Why don't you go and have a talk with them." The Philippines had had no contact with China except

for a visiting group that had gone over, journalists, I believe. I said, "Why don't you go to talk with him and see what he might suggest to you? He's a very able diplomat and he'll be helpful." He did, he went to see him. From that I suspect they began to work out some arrangement.

Then came the '76 trip. Mao had died, scarcely a year after Chou En-lai. Deng Xiaoping was again in disgrace. Hua Guofeng was premier. It was towards the end of Mao's life when Deng Xiaoping was removed from grace a second time. The idea that Hua Guofeng was Mao's selected candidate again was an erroneous one. If I recall correctly, he was probably suggested to Mao by Chou En-lai probably on the grounds that Hua would be someone that Mao would be comfortable with. Hua was Hunanese, from Mao's home province. Mao apparently knew him well. He was very orthodox in his views, very much a party man. So my guess is that he wasn't Mao's selection at all; he was probably Chou En-lai's selection as somebody whom Mao would find satisfactory and who would yet fit into the needs of the situation that was developing, as both he and Mao approached death. The overthrowing of Deng Xiaoping the second time could very well have been the doing of Jiang Qing. By getting a hold of Mao's ear in that period when he was very feeble, and with Chou in failing health, filling him with stories about how badly Deng Xiaoping was doing things. It must have been something of that sort. I must say, Deng Xiaoping being the kind

of character he is—he's blunt and outspoken—would have lent himself to irritating Mao, particularly on a second-hand report of his behavior from Jiang Qing. So he was down again when we arrived on the last Mansfield trip.

When we got to China, the mourning period was still in process for Mao. Tens of millions of black arm bands and huge floral displays everywhere. The Chinese changed our plans so that we did not go directly to Beijing. I think there must have been a great deal going on already in terms of the reshuffling of power and the Chinese did not want us in Beijing. We went instead all the way to the west, to Xinjiang province on the Soviet border, and then came back in stages from there. Senator Glenn and his wife Annie were in the party. It was again a fairly long trip. Deng Xiaoping was still being criticized, that was part of the official campaign that was being waged. Hua Guofeng was being elevated very rapidly into a kind of super position in the party and government by those who had control of the basic machinery of propaganda, in retrospect, clearly Jiang Qing's faction. You got it every morning on the loudspeakers in the communes and everywhere else, along with music.

Then we finally got to Beijing at the very end of the trip. We had no inkling whatsoever of the impending disgrace of Jiang Qing. A friend of mine here at the British embassy had suggested that I talk to the British ambassador in Beijing, and called him

on my behalf. I dropped in to see him. His name was Youde. He later became—I guess he still is—governor general of Hong Kong. Youde was a real old China hand in the British tradition. He knew the language. He had been in China a good part of his career. He had been asked to leave at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution and then had come back again as ambassador. I went to see him and I raised the question of what would happen with Jiang Qing now that Mao was dead. He said something like this: "You know, she's not been in very good health to begin with, some trouble with her legs, so I think that she'll probably just kind of fade out of the picture gracefully, command respect as the widow of Mao, and younger elements will gradually be coming into the control of affairs." There was no suggestion, and he obviously had no idea, that it was going to hit the way it did. Nor did I know of anybody who had any idea that the situation would develop the way it did.

We found out about it for the first time when we came out of China into Hong Kong. There were the first reports at that point that there was a major upheaval underway in the Communist party in China, and that Jiang Qing would probably be forced out. Again, it was not seen necessarily as Deng Xiaoping being the next major power figure in the situation. Hua Guofeng was regarded as leading the anti-Jiang Qing forces. Well, the rest of it is all in the newspapers. We learned little more from anything that we saw.

RITCHIE: What was the general purpose of these trips. Was it just to educate yourselves?

VALEO: Essentially, Mansfield wanted to educate himself, and he wanted to increase the amount of contact with the Chinese, to move it as quickly as possible towards a normal relationship. I think that was basically what he had in mind. Now, he had a great personal interest in China, and I'm sure that that was part of his inclination to go to China. He wanted to see it. He was impressed by the way it was developing. And as I think I've said before, so was I. But the main reason was to get as fully familiar with the situation as possible. There was nobody around who really had had that much exposure to it in those years, and certainly nobody in the Congress. There was a need to have in the Senate people who at least knew something of the situation firsthand. There was the desire on his part to educate himself so that he could talk with some authority on it in the Congress and also in discussions with the president.

RITCHIE: Did you have other members of the Senate asking you about China at that stage, or inquiring about traveling to China?

VALEO: Some, not a great deal. You know, senators are awfully individualistic and each one likes to do it in his own way. Unless you've been with them for a long time, they don't normally ask you for advice. It would be an unusual charac-

teristic of a senator to ask someone to whom he's not closely attached for advice. But there were some, of course.

RITCHIE: You mentioned that the Chinese liaison consulted you in terms of the protocols of setting things up here. Did the American liaison to China ever contact you or Senator Mansfield about your views? Or did you ever have any input into that operation?

VALEO: No. We saw them, of course, in Beijing and we were always welcome when we were there. There were various people in that office during the period when we were going to China, and we saw them, of course, on every trip, and had conversations with them. They were interested in what the reactions were in the Congress. But it came up in the course of informal conversation, never in the sense of formal briefings or anything of that sort. For one thing, I think they felt that they had no right to ask that, since we were there for a short period of time and they didn't want us to use a lot of the time briefing people at the embassy. But we always had conversations with whoever was in charge of the office, and with his associates.

RITCHIE: The reason I asked was that it strikes me that the State Department generally assumes that it knows what's going on and that no one else could possibly have any information that would be valuable to them.

VALEO: This disease is particularly applicable in the case of China, for some reason or other. It has always been. It's not a new situation. It was part of the whole difficulty in the McCarthy period. The State Department didn't want to hear anything else.

RITCHIE: Have you been back to China since you left the Senate?

VALEO: Yes, I was invited in '81 by the People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. It was right at the time of Reagan's first victory. I was in Manila and I went up for a week. I gave one or two talks about American politics to the Foreign Office people. They asked a lot of questions about what they could expect from Mr. Reagan as president. Of course, they knew his connections with Anna Chennault and many of the Nationalist Chinese groups in California. They already knew that. They were quite concerned that he might take a tack that would be different, because he'd been making speeches on Taiwan, of holding Taiwan and so forth, so they really didn't know what to expect. I suggested to them that they shouldn't worry too much, that he was not going to order the nuclear bombing of China, that it would be a different policy but not necessarily as much different as they might expect. That's about the way it's come out, I think. He's made a lot of modifications in what were then his campaign speeches.

I just went to Beijing on that trip. I was not anxious to be traveling, and went up only to get a line on what were supposedly massive changes. At that point they had not yet gone very far. They've gone much further since. There was western dancing, for example, in Beijing in 1981 as contrasted with 1976, but they were foreign communities that were doing the dancing and a handful of bold Chinese, but they were very few. The advertising still hadn't gone much beyond toothpaste. The political sloganeering was more subdued, but it still existed. Those were the external manifestations of it. The Chinese clearly had not abandoned Marxism.

I did a report for my own edification, out of habit, I guess and I sent it to some members of the Senate whom I knew. I think Pell put it in the *Record* at that time. The tone of the report was that the revolution had gone from the stage of self deprivation for the common good to one where people wanted to indulge themselves a little more. I noted that the Chinese didn't fight the revolution to make life worse, that revolutions usually were fought to make it better. And they were moving into that stage where life would get a little better; I think that's probably about what's happened. They've made a lot of modifications on a pragmatic basis, just as anyone in his right mind would do. They found some things worked better than others. I don't think they're being particularly shortsighted. The danger in any

situation of transition of that kind is that we sometimes so concentrate on the immediate improvement that we forget that there is also a long range. It's a little bit like a gasoline shortage: once you get the gasoline back then you don't worry about where you're going to get it maybe ten years from now. They may be suffering from some of that. But I would guess to a lesser degree than we are.

They still use the technique of long-range national planning, which is a critical element in their system as distinct from ours. It's a critical need as everybody knows who has a bank account and is trying to stay solvent or save some money. Our finding planning anathema in this country has always appalled me, because in our own personal lives anybody with any brains does some planning. When it's done on a national scale however, we seem to have great abhorrence of it. Well, the Chinese obviously don't. They do it with enthusiasm and it will help them to avoid a lot of mistakes that tend to plague people who are too shortsighted in defining the public good or their own good for that matter.

RITCHIE: That whole story is being replayed all over again with Senator [Jesse] Helms' opposition to Winston Lord as ambassador because he's not critical enough of family planning in China.

VALEO: Precisely. My own feeling on that, knowing the Chinese I think fairly well, and knowing something about their culture and their usual behavior, their sense of family, and actually from my conversations with my two escorts when I was there in '81, is that the charges are preposterous. The two women, perhaps around thirty, who were assigned to me constantly for the week I was there, to help me in any way they could, expressed concern with the policy but for other reasons. We got into discussions of the one-child family, which had only recently come into policy. These two women would obviously have had to have been very strong members of the party, otherwise they wouldn't have been assigned to that kind of work. Anyway, they each had one child as did I, and they were very concerned about the fact that they had only one child, as they explained it to me, because in China they're afraid that one child is easily spoiled. They said they're so used to large families that they were wondering about the social effect of the one child concept. However, they understood it from an economic point of view, and the necessity for it.

I would have the greatest doubts that as a matter of national policy the Chinese would encourage infanticide in any form whatsoever. That is a resurrection of a nineteenth century missionary story, which undoubtedly may have had some validity at the time because when people were starving they had no means to feed

another mouth, so it became a kind of horrible form of birth control. But the reason for it had to be because of a situation of starvation and not because they disliked women children more than male children. Sure, in an agricultural society, as China was, male children are more desired for a number of reasons. I'm sure it started out because they were stronger and could do farm work better. Eventually that concept was formalized almost into a form of religion—Confucian ancestor-worship—to reinforce the concept. But insofar as the Chinese relationships that I've observed over the years, where their children are concerned, they don't differentiate a great deal between boys and girls. They tend to love children and put up with a great deal from children. So the idea that Chinese have a deliberately cruel policy, I think, is outrageous. It's totally erroneous and I don't know who would want to propagate that idea. It's just so totally out of character.

RITCHIE: I have a couple of other questions about foreign policy, although not necessarily about China

VALEO: Excuse me, let me add one more thought on that, if I may. What you have probably got in some remote areas, which are not reached by government policy so well, except in a sort of fifteenth hand way, it is entirely possible in isolated local situations there could be occasional outrageous occurrences of this kind. But I fully accept the view that the Chinese have

expressed that when they find such instances they not only punish the people but also go into an educational program to explain to them that they're not supposed to kill children or girl children just to keep their families down to one. I think that must be the way that they're handling this. I can't imagine it being done any other way.

RITCHIE: I wanted to go back to finish the Vietnam story. We talked about it in all of its aspects from the time you went there in the early '50s all the way through the Johnson and Nixon periods. I'd like to talk about the winding down of the Vietnam War, which was going on at the same time you were traveling to China. In 1972 Senator Mansfield said that "Congress can't end the war," and that only the president could end the war. Yet at the same time, Congress was trying everything possible to end the war. I wanted to ask you about what Mansfield meant by that, and what really the Congress' role was in the ending of the Vietnam War?

VALEO: He could only have meant one thing by that. To get a two-thirds vote in both houses, which in effect was needed to terminate the war, or to assert from Congress that there will be no more money for the war whatsoever, not another dollar will be spent in connection with it, either way would have worked, would have been a theoretical possibility, but as a practical matter, it would have been virtually impossible. To get two-thirds of the

members of Congress no matter what the situation would be to say "We don't care how you get out of that country, it's over, you have to stop it right now," was totally unrealistic and could not have been done. Of course, by the same token, the president can give an order and say "Start pulling the men out," and that happens overnight with only one person making the decision. Well, that's considerably different than trying to get two-thirds of the House members and two-thirds of the Senate members to say the same thing, which is, of course, what you would have had to do. If you passed a measure of this sort by majority vote, I'm sure that any president would have vetoed it, which means that you would have had to have found two-thirds in both houses to override the veto. And even then you wouldn't be sure that the executive branch wouldn't try to circumvent it in some way. So as a practical matter it was the president who had to end the war.

The role of the Congress was to do two things: one was to keep an irritant in the side of the executive branch so that they would know that they could not go in deeper—and there we were successful in some of the measures. It was a difficult thing and it took two or three years to get to the point where Congress was prepared to do that, where you could try to limit it by putting the provisions that Church and Cooper and others devised into legislation to control the actual extent of the warfare that we were conducting in Southeast Asia. That was one way in which

Congress acted. The other was: to become the sounding board for registering the views of the country. Now, a president is isolated to a considerable degree in this city, and with all due respect, people in the departments do not know what goes on in the country very often. They only know what they're doing, their own function.

Congressmen were constantly seeing the president. They were in turn getting the pressure from the public and they were transmitting that to the president. So the Congress became a formidable force in pushing the president's decisions towards eventually concluding the war, and concluding it as rapidly as possible. There was a lot of face-saving to be done at first, probably in retrospect it will be seen that the war could have been ended a year or two years before it actually ended, because I think the pressure was high enough even then in the country to suggest that that was the appropriate course to take. It certainly would have been better had it been done sooner, or had we never gone in, but the factor of the Congress as a place where you could get a registry of the attitudes in the country on the conflict and transmit them to the president was a very significant element in ending the war.

RITCHIE: I was wondering if Mansfield's comment was a commentary on the legislative role in foreign policy as well; that Congress is really not there to make foreign policy but to react to foreign policy.

VALEO: I don't share that view entirely. I think that's the consent clause in the Constitution, and that's the Senate. There's also an advice clause, in the same clause as a matter of fact, so I think that Congress is warranted in giving advice as well as consenting or not consenting. I think it's its option, and there is a value in the utilization of the advice clause—Mansfield may have said that about reacting in foreign policy but he was constantly giving advice in one form or another to all of the presidents during the period he was majority leader, and even before, he was constantly giving advice to them. The value of the advice clause is that if the president didn't get advice from congressional sources, he would get it really from only the executive departments, and there's an inbuilt inertia in government departments. Anyone who has been in government any length of time knows that.

If there are good new ideas, they are usually in the younger ranks of the bureaucracy, and by the time they get to the top they have been so filtered and watered that the prospects of change in that process are extremely limited. In the Congress you have a kind of free give-and-take of the debate on the floor, a free

contact with the public, that makes for the input of new ideas. So it is perfectly proper in my judgment for the Congress to discuss new ideas in foreign policy and then if they feel as a group that the ideas are warranted, to put them in the form of formal legislative advice to the president and if it's something that lends itself to legislation, to put it in the form of legislation. Let him veto it he will and then see whether there are two-thirds of the people in the Congress who think the same way. That's a proper role of Congress in any subject that the government is seized of.

My concern with what's happened in the Congress today, and particularly in the Senate, from whence I think most of the advice has to come in foreign policy, my concern there is that with the growth of staff, some of the same kind of bureaucratic process which goes on downtown is now going to be shifted into the Congress. You will in a sense dissipate the ability of the Senate to advise, or you may find also a tendency to look at the issues at a level from which it's difficult to give meaningful legislative advice. In a way, the effort to end the Vietnamese War by the Church-Cooper method of delineating where you can bomb and where you can't bomb is an example of what happens when you have, if you will, highly detailed staff work on a situation. It became a necessity in the Vietnam situation because there seemed to be no other way to break through to the president.

But as a general practice, I think it would be erroneous to try to run foreign policy on that level. I think the Senate has to act at a higher level, and give advice within that context. You might, if you examined some of these problems I think, come to a conclusion of this sort. The Congress, you might say that as a matter of policy, in lieu of giving aid to Third World countries, we should open our trade barriers a little bit further so that they could sell more goods in the United States. Now that might be a pattern for the role of congressional advice. Obviously, the chance of getting that kind of a statement in the present climate is very limited, but that kind of advice would be meaningful. Or vice versa, you can say let's give them more aid rather than opening our trade, because we have these other problems at home that we have to deal with, and we can't deal with them if we open trade further. That sort of level is fine, but when you start saying: give them twenty-five dollars for this, or two million dollars for this, and one million for this, but don't give them anything for that, you're beginning to get on shaky grounds. I don't say you can't do it, but I think that the chances of playing an effective role at that level is dubious. It's a little bit like the debate that we've had on the El Salvador thing. I think that the proper advice from the Congress to the president would be to say, "Get the hell out of that situation." But when you try to say you can use funds for ambulances but not for drivers, or something of that sort, I think you're at the wrong level.

RITCHIE: The War Powers Act was one of the major ways that Congress responded to the frustrations of that time. Did Senator Mansfield have much hope for the War Powers Act? Did he see it as a reasonable solution to some of the problems?

VALEO: I don't know that he saw it as a solution but he thought it was a step in the right direction. He thought it was an effort to define what, as you probably are aware Don, constitutionally is a twilight zone. The line has been set in the past, before the War Powers Act, by whether you had a strong president or a formidable Congress. That's what drew the line in the past that separated the president's individual powers, as distinct from those which involve the Senate or the whole Congress. I did not favor the War Powers Act. I thought it was not a desirable way to get at the problem. I felt it best to leave it in a flexible field, for two reasons. First of all I thought that there were times when you needed greater authority in the presidency and there were times when that was not a necessity and when it would be better to have a stronger counter-balance in the Congress. I thought the voters would produce the proper balance in the course of events. I thought that that would be a basic reason for not trying to legislate the precise line on which each body's powers end and begin.

But I had no strong feelings on the War Powers Act. I just felt that that probably would be a better way, that there would be

times when you would not want sixty days notice, or that sort of thing. I was thinking back to the Roosevelt period. Had the War Powers Act been in place during the Roosevelt period ,my guess is that Roosevelt either would have totally ignored it and gotten away with it, or had he tried to follow it, it may have been a terribly difficult thing to do, and may have hurt us in the long run.

RITCHIE: Do you feel that Mansfield took a back seat to some of the other senators in pushing that?

VALEO: Yes, he didn't push it. I guess Javits was one of the main proponents, and Church, I guess, was involved in it.

RITCHIE: [Thomas] Eagleton originally

VALEO: Was it Eagleton originally?

RITCHIE: But he turned against it in the end and decided it was a mistake.

VALEO: I have some real reservations about it. I'd like to think that if I had a vote, I suspect I would have voted for it, but it would not have been an easy decision.

RITCHIE: What was your reaction to the congressional cut-off of funds to Southeast Asia after the Americans had pulled out, in 1975 when Vietnam and Cambodia collapsed? Do you think that was the best way to handle the situation?

VALEO: You mean the cut-off of all funds to them? No. It probably would have made it easier to bring about more satisfactory relationships in that area had they had some flexibility in keeping alive the contacts with Vietnam. It's much the same thing that happened in China. I have always seen this whole Vietnamese situation as a microcosm of China. In fundamentals, it was almost the same thing.

RITCHIE: Was there anything else we could have done at that stage? Or was there just such a mind set in Congress that that was the only thing that they could conceive of?

VALEO: Oh, that's all. There would have been no other way in which it could have been done in Congress at that point. As a nation, we were angry enough about the war having been lost, we would have been doubly angry if you started paying off the enemy at that point. I don't know how else it could have worked in terms of the public. Although I personally feel that it would have made our relationships in that part of the world better if we had been able to do that.

RITCHIE: What was the influence of Watergate on all of this? If Watergate hadn't happened, would the foreign policy have been the same, or do you think Watergate was instrumental in bringing Congress back to the forefront in foreign policy?

VALEO: I really never thought of that. I think that it might very well have been a major factor. Particularly when we were leading up to impeachment. It made Nixon very wary of Congress and very concerned about keeping some kind of a relationship. I think we can probably get into that when we talk about Watergate per se. There's some background on that.

RITCHIE: Fine.

VALEO: I wanted to add something about the business of small being beautiful in the legislative staff situation. It has an interesting analogy. Detroit can't design changes into automobiles very easily. So for a while there they were going to Italy, where your carriage makers are in smaller units, where they could design changes a lot more effectively. The ideas for changes in design came a lot from Pinin Farina and a few other designers in Italy in the automobile field. It's really the same basic principle. If you get too structured it's very difficult to make changes. One of the joys and the beauty of the Senate was the fact that it wasn't so structured and therefore lent itself to the introduction of new ideas. I think all during this Mansfield period there was an enormous input of very meaningful ideas from many sources.

RITCHIE: One of the questions I wanted to ask was having started out in the Senate working for the Foreign Relations Committee, what was your opinion of the committee in that period of the '70s when the president and the Congress were clashing and the War Powers Act was coming along? Was the Foreign Relations Committee effective at that stage, or were you disappointed in their activities?

VALEO: Oh, I think it was all right. I don't have any great admiration for what it did, or any great hostility to what it did. I think the problem goes back to one I had with Carl Marcy in an earlier period. I kept insisting that the primary function of a committee hearing had to be legislation, that you had to keep its activities pitched to legislation, that you couldn't simply use a committee as a public relations forum, or as he would put it, as an educational media. I thought there were better ways of educating people than through a committee hearing, and that your effectiveness, in terms of your real contribution, came primarily from the closeness with which you related what you did to the potential for producing or not producing legislation as the case might be. I won't say exclusively for that purpose, but almost exclusively for that purpose. We never saw eye to eye on that. He believed that the public relations aspect of the committee was much more significant. And I must say that during the Vietnamese War, when many things changed, I mean many standard,

orthodox views had to undergo change, why, it probably served a very useful purpose by having those hearings. I don't think it helped much on China and a few of the other things, but it helped in the Vietnamese situation.

RITCHIE: One of the reasons why I asked that was because the *Post* recently ran one of their periodic articles on how Senator Richard Lugar has revitalized the committee. They ran the same sort of article that Senator Church revitalized it. The only chairman that they haven't run that article on was John Sparkman. We just seem to go back to the same place each time around.

VALEO: Yes, that's true.

RITCHIE: The committee has had a difficult time in defining its role in foreign policy, and has usually started out with a great amount of enthusiasm but then seemed to be frustrated because it can't exert that much influence.

VALEO: You come back to the treaty functions under the Constitution. You come back to treaty-making, and advice and consent, and confirmation of appointments, those are clear-cut functions. Beyond that, for many years when foreign aid had not yet become a big grab bag, when it had real significance in a broader sense rather than providing two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a particular school in Kenya, and a hundred bags of wheat for somewhere else, when it was really trying to define

the usage of American material resources in terms of having a constructive influence not only on our policy but on the potential for peace in the world, then I think the committee had a great usage, going beyond just the treaty power, and also a very valid legislative usage.

The introduction of the budget legislation, which I did not favor by the way, the congressional budget legislation I think was the first thing that drove a nail into the Foreign Relations coffin, because it put everything then in the context of dollars and cents, and that is not the proper role for a committee of substance to be performing; that's the role of the Appropriations Committee. As far as a Budget Committee function, well, it's there, so I don't know that you can do anything about it at this point, but that seems to me to be a secondary function. It's become primary because of the emphasis on the budget, and deficit which means all of your authorizing committee, not just the Committee on Foreign Relations, have really lost a lot of significance. There would be nothing wrong, in my judgment, for example, for the Foreign Relations Committee coming out with some outlandish figure, to make a statement, because you always had the Appropriations Committee to control the amount anyhow. But at least it would show the way you thought a thing ought to go, or a policy ought to go. The control of funds was in the Appropriations Committee with its bookkeepers.

RITCHIE: Did you feel that the growth of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee helped or hurt its mission?

VALEO: I don't think it helped. I don't know that it hurt. I don't think that the committee is producing anything better now with the thirty or forty people than it did with five or ten.

RITCHIE: Did you continue to keep close contacts with the staff?

VALEO: For a while I did. When Norvill Jones was there I did, and Bill Bader. And the present chap who works for Lugar, I know him but only slightly. He was very helpful to me when I was trying to get some money for the United Nations University in Tokyo.

RITCHIE: One other question was about the Congressional Research Service. You started out with the Legislative Reference Service. Do you think that they are fulfilling now the duty that they should be, or do you think that they've gotten too big and bureaucratic as well?

VALEO: Let me say this: if they are being used properly, I think they are much more capable now of fulfilling their role than they were in our period. When I was there, we really did not have the resources to do it. We were doing the best we could, but it

was essentially a rather limited job. And from what I've seen of the papers being turned out by the Congressional Research Service, I think they've improved immeasurably. On all of these Mansfield trips I used to define a request for the Legislative Reference Service to give us the kinds of things we needed to use on the trip. And they did. They wrote some awfully good papers. I now find that that is done as a routine matter on many situations. I used to ask for a situation report before we went out, from public sources, which gave you a good starting point from which to pursue it when you were abroad. But the ones that they're turning out now are much more useful in many ways. I must say, I don't watch it that closely, so perhaps I'm going too far in this direction, but the pieces I've seen have been very, very valuable.

RITCHIE: Is there anything else you want to say about Vietnam? We've covered Vietnam through a number of periods. Is there any other observation you have about your experiences there or the Senate's role in the Vietnam conflict?

VALEO: Yes, there's a sort of little O'Henry story that I think ought to be told. It was an earlier Mansfield trip. Mansfield was not given to dressing formally. A lot of people were taking evening clothes on these trips abroad; he was not. I think we got to Vietnam once and there was a formal dinner. He never had evening clothes, but he had them on that trip. I said, "How come you've got evening clothes?" because I knew he never

traveled with any, and he would avoid it completely if he could. He said, "Well, to tell you the truth, I just want to do it out of respect for Diem." We went to the function and he wore his evening clothes, and I guess I wore mine—I carried mine—and we were the only two people that showed up in evening clothes!

RITCHIE: Do you think they just anticipated that he wouldn't come in evening clothes?

VALEO: Yes, I think that's precisely what was involved.

I'd like to make one more comment about Diem, because I'm concerned by what's now happening in the Philippines. Diem understood that if he had to depend heavily on the United States, he couldn't stand in Vietnam, that the whole structure that he had tried to put together in South Vietnam would have to collapse. The nationalist movement was so strong and powerful in the country as a whole that it would not accept any longer the idea that their wars should be fought by outsiders. I think he understood that and he resisted deeper American involvement. We made the terrible mistake—and I must say it was made during the Kennedy administration—of looking for a Vietnamese administrator in lieu of Diem who would do our bidding more readily. I think that was the root of the disaster. This is quite apart from whether Diem was capable of dealing with the problems that existed in the country or not, but the course we took was bound to lead in the

opposite direction from what we hoped. We would eventually have to find that the cost of what we were doing in terms of lives and in terms of money would be so ridiculously out of proportion with any national interest that we had in that area, that we would have to pull out. I think Diem understood that; we did not. We were still confusing the technique and the machinery with the purpose. And we were good, and we knew we had great equipment, and we knew we had brave soldiers, and we knew we had a very professional military force, but that was not the answer in that situation.

In my judgment, exactly the same thing is true in the Philippines. We are insisting there again that we know better how to handle the internal problems of another country. We may think we're doing the right thing in this; we may put it in terms of stopping forms of totalitarianism, but the danger in this is you usually produce even a greater totalitarianism when you don't let a nationally conscious group work out its own way in that kind of a situation. It's a situation which has repeated itself too many times in American history. It really is at the root of what went wrong in China and the cost that we paid for that. It's the impulse—and it's only one of many impulses in our society—but it's the impulse towards imperialism, disguised perhaps even from those who push it, as being some sort of altruistic and worthwhile sense of service to mankind. I think this is where we go wrong, and we have got to deal with this. Otherwise it eventually will

lead us to a national disaster of the worst kind, because the world has changed greatly out there. You could afford these kinds of mistakes in the nineteenth century and really right up until World War II. But the worldwide situation in which this is now being attempted is one that can only promise the greatest devastation to us if we continue as we are. That's all I'd want to say. I think Vietnam should have taught us that, but I still see signs that it has not taught us that.

RITCHIE: I'd like to talk about Watergate next week, but eventually I would like to talk about your experiences in the Philippines.

VALEO: Sure. I'd be glad to do that. I've kept in close contact with that over the years.

RITCHIE: I think it has so many parallels to what we've been talking about.

VALEO: Very much so.

End of Interview #13

Francis R. Valeo

Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977

Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966

Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963

On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958

Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952

Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

WATERGATE

Interview #14

Wednesday, November 13, 1985

RITCHIE: Today I'd like to talk about Watergate, and I'd like to begin by asking if you could give your perspective of the Senate's role in Watergate, beginning from the beginning and the earliest revelations you had about it.

VALEO: I must confess I did not see immediately the significance of the issue. I did not think it was going to be blown up into the proportions it was. That surprised me. However, I didn't have a lot of company in the Senate. Senators immediately saw it. Teddy Kennedy saw it, and reached for the investigation. Mansfield saw it, and reached to cut off Teddy Kennedy's investigation. He talked to Sam Ervin about taking it on. Sam Ervin at that point was somewhat reluctant, but Mansfield insisted it belonged under his jurisdiction and he agreed to do it. I was present through some of the phone calls but, I don't believe, at the private meetings that went on in connection with this. I think I asked Mansfield what the reasoning was behind his approach. He said, "If you give it to Teddy Kennedy it will make it into a political issue, and that will be devastating to him, and to the Senate, and to everyone else. The person to do it is Sam Ervin." He had an uncanny judgment in this sort of thing, and

he was, of course, absolutely right. Ervin gave it a status and a quasi-judicial stature that it would not otherwise have had.

Of course, the hearings themselves are a matter of public record. I'm giving you now only the parts that came specifically to my attention, and may not have come to the attention of the press. It may have been at this point that we had instituted the regular meetings with the House leadership, which at this time was under Speaker Carl Albert. Watergate was certainly a subject which came up rather quickly and frequently. In those meetings we used to meet on alternate occasions either on the House side or on the Senate side for breakfast. Tip O'Neill was at those meetings, Carl Albert and one or two other members of the House. One was a congressman from California whose name now escapes me, but who was later defeated. He was reluctant to push the investigation. Tip O'Neill was not out in front on it. Carl Albert was not out in front on it, nor was Mansfield. I think both left it respectively to [Peter] Rodino on the House side and to Ervin on the Senate side, and of course that's the pattern in which it developed. Rodino came to one or two of those breakfast meetings to report on what was happening, and he indicated that it was looking worse and worse for Nixon. Occasionally, Ervin would do something similar at the committee chairman meetings that Mansfield would have periodically. So one could see the heat building up.

Mansfield began to get very worried about Nixon in this period and what he might do in certain circumstances. One line that sticks in my head from what he said at the time was, "You have to be very careful with this fellow, Frank. If you get him in a corner you don't know what he'll do." That was one of his reactions. He said, "You have to treat him very, very carefully." Well, the thing kept building up and building up. Then everybody saw the significance of it, including me. I was one of the later ones, but I finally saw it. It began to get very close to impeachment on the House side. I think there were frequent meetings and regular discussions between Scott and Mansfield on the Senate side as it looked that way more and more. Finally, I got the order from Mansfield, but I'm sure he must have had Scott's concurrence in it, to start planning for the trial in the Senate, because it seemed to be a foregone conclusion that he would be impeached in the House.

So I began preparations. I met with the press. Mansfield had said, "This is one we will do with TV." He said, "We have to do this one on TV." He was not in favor of using TV in the Senate chamber prior to this. I guess for ceremonials he did not have any great objections, but he was opposed to the use of TV in the Senate. Still, he said this was one we would have to do. We got Doc Riddick to do the research, or he did it on his own initiative, on previous impeachment cases. I met fairly regularly

with Darrell St. Claire to try to conceive of the physical arrangements that would be involved in it. We ordered from the company that makes these Senate pins and awards, Baldwin or Balfour or something like that, this was Darrell's suggestion, we ordered identification pins for people who would have the privilege of the floor during the trial in much the way you have people identified by a button as being part of a presidential party. We thought we needed something like that to make sure that nobody got on the floor who shouldn't be there. We began to discuss the matter with the press galleries and this brought in the sergeant at arms, I can't remember whether Nordy Hoffman was at that time sergeant at arms, or whether it was still Bill Wannell, but we had discussions with them. The arrangements were essentially being made in the secretary's office. We were prepared to go ahead with the trial. I mean, physically we had figured out what would be done by that time. But of course Nixon resigned and that changed the equations.

The behavior of the Congress, particularly, I think, the House, was excellent, and Ervin's behavior on the Senate side was very critical in keeping the country together in this period. Had they not handled the matter with the kind of discretion and yet honesty that it was handled there could have been very, very serious repercussions. Again you come back to what Mansfield said about Nixon: I don't know what he'd do if you get him into a corner.

Well, he was in the corner, and he resigned. But by that time the weight was overwhelming.

My great fear in all candor was that he would order the chiefs of staff to shut down the Congress. I thought that it might go to that extreme. My wife at the time, who was Canadian by background, said, "I'll take Jamie and go to Canada, and you can stay here and deal with it as best you have to." I mean, that was the way some people's minds went. I never felt it was going to go to quite that extreme. It always occurred to me that had he given such an order, that the joint chiefs would have probably gone down to see Stennis before they obeyed that order. And having talked with Stennis they would probably not carry out that order. One has to speculate on the things you shouldn't be speculating about—you can do this in an oral history—that was the way I saw it happening. But fortunately Nixon was not that far gone, and fortunately it worked out the way it did. I must say, she was not alone in that kind of a view of the situation. I think [James] Schlesinger was quick to say that he was in there to protect the constitutional structure.

But I don't know that I can give you anything more on the Senate's view of Watergate. It was a kind of day-to-day drama, much the same, much more serious but in some ways similar to what had happened in the earlier McCarthy thing as Nixon gradually fell apart and was brought down. I don't know if we got into that in

our earlier discussions, but it was fascinating to watch the effect in that case of censure on McCarthy, and what it did to him as a personality. I don't know whether it was a consequence of what happened in the Senate, or whether events just happened to coincide with a personality disintegration, but when McCarthy was in his heyday he used to have dozens, literally dozens of reporters following him wherever he went. He took the Senate censure vote as being ridiculous and of no meaning at all, it had no effect on him whatsoever. He found it laughable that they'd even try to stop him. There was a Republican senator who ran that, as I recall, it was a bipartisan group. I think his name was [Arthur] Watkins. They were very firm in their handling of it, and again it was well done. Margaret Chase Smith was a key figure in bringing it on, in precipitating it. Her stand against McCarthy came before the Senate's.

But after the censure vote, from then on, it was interesting to see the transition that took place. The press no longer followed McCarthy. Then he'd write these enormous tracts, nobody would be on the floor to hear them anymore. He would run them up to the press gallery personally and say, "Boys, look at this one, I've got some real hot stuff here." And they'd say, "Oh, yeah? Okay Joe, lay it on the table." It was that kind of thing, and gradually the spotlight ceased to shine on him. As it ceased to shine on him he shriveled more and more in every respect,

physically along with everything else. He was heavy on alcohol at that point, towards the end. He more and more lost interest in what was happening. Or I should say, people lost interest in McCarthy.

RITCHIE: Those are two examples of very trying situations in which the Congress, which is normally partisan and divided, came together and handled things fairly well and responsibly. What is it about the institution that enables it to rise to the occasion?

VALEO: I wish I could answer the question. I think it eventually had something to do with a sense of national responsibility, which in certain critical situations rises above local responsibility or a sense of responsibility to your state, or to any special interests with which you might be associated. The institution seems to produce that kind of response, especially when it's pushed in that direction by a man like Mansfield. In the Mansfield Senate I could not have conceived of them acting any differently, in retrospect, than they did in the Nixon crisis, and in a number of other major issues, as in the Vietnamese thing. It took time to bring the Senate to that point, the consensus had to develop slowly and be very carefully nurtured, but they eventually came together and saw clearly where really the national interest lay in a vital sense, using the word vital very carefully in this case.

You can't underestimate the significance of the minority in this process. If the minority is not prepared to do this, you can't do it. I think in a way, at least during the Mansfield Senates, we were blessed with some very fine minority leaders in both Dirksen, in his time and in his context, and Scott. I went to an eighty-fifth birthday party for Scott last night and I thought back over really the tremendous contributions he has made to the United States. Petty people can tear at that and denigrate some of it, and he had his pettinesses like everyone else, but when the chips were down you could count on him. You saw that in the Vietnam situation, you saw it certainly in Watergate, which were the two great crises of that period.

In the case of Dirksen you saw it repeatedly; you saw it in civil rights, you saw it in the Nuclear Test Ban treaty, which was a very critical decision at that time. Without that test ban I think the nuclear rivalry would have gone far beyond where it is now. Only God knows where it would have been at this point. It may very well have blown the whole thing up. But Dirksen knew it was time to change it, that we had to move in that direction if there was going to be survival for anyone. So he moved in the right direction. If you went through the whole record you could find this, and you could pick out those items which particularly underscored the idea that they can converge when they have to.

But I must say I would not underestimate also here the significance of Mansfield. If he had been a different kind of leader; if he had promoted the kind of petty party struggle, synthetic struggle really, which used to go on during the Johnson period—much of it was synthetic—if he had promoted that kind of struggle you would not have seen this result. I'm thinking now of another incident where it happened and why the Senate has its own particular genius. Back in the early days of the problems with Cuba, there was a hijacking of a plane. It was one of the very first of the hijackings, and the plane wound up in Havana. Before we had any facts on it, [Robert] Kerr was on the floor offering a declaration of war against Cuba. Thanks to Dirksen or Taft, the Senate adjourned until the following day. He thought the Senate should not act on a declaration of war without at least laying over one day. So we did, and of course during the night we found out the plane was hijacked not by a Cuban but by an American and I guess Castro was asking, "What am I going to do with the plane?" But that is the kind of thing—there are people who rise to the occasion—you never know where it's going to come from, but somehow it comes out in a crisis.

We can probably get into this more when we talk about the different personalities in the Senate. But you take a man like Ervin for example. Whatever his other shortcomings, and God knows he had plenty, he was born to protect individual rights and to

finish off Nixon as a force in American politics. He rose to the occasion in both instances. On civil rights for Negroes he was absolutely abominable from my point of view. He was difficult, he wouldn't let go, far more difficult than Russell. But on these other issues of protecting individual legal rights, and on Nixon, he performed nobly, and of course found his place in American history probably on that basis, not on his obstructionism in the civil rights issue.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask you what Mansfield's prime motive was in picking Ervin as the chairman of that committee.

VALEO: Well, I think he believed him unassailable from the point of view of politics. He was not running for any office. Everybody knew he didn't want to be anything else, and they didn't even know how long he wanted to be the senator from North Carolina. So he was unassailable, nobody could say this is politics and he'd run a political campaign. The second one was he was a brilliant lawyer, and Mansfield recognized him as a brilliant lawyer. And third, I think he probably sensed that his sense of humor would be helpful in this situation, and it was. I think those were principal reasons why. Mostly though he wanted to sidetrack the bid by at least Kennedy's people—I don't know if it was Ted Kennedy himself, but Kennedy's people.

His motives on that were never very clear to me. I think I mentioned he regarded the Kennedy family as ill-starred in a Shakespearian or Greek tragedy sense. He may have been doing it to protect Ted Kennedy, and I think properly so. In retrospect, I think it was a very wise decision, even from Ted Kennedy's point of view. I think he was afraid of another assassination, which was certainly conceivable.

I must tell you an incident in this connection. It was a rather important one, and it shows sometimes how short-sighted procedures can be when you get too wedded to them. When Bobby Kennedy was assassinated, I was at home. Mansfield called me at about two o'clock in the morning to tell me about the shooting. I was appalled, obviously, as he was. He said, "Can you come down to the office? I'm going to go in in an hour or so." So I got to the office about five o'clock in the morning. By that time I guess Bobby was definitely dead and they knew it. He said, "I've talked to the president and the president said, 'I don't know what to do, I don't know what to do. How can you stop this kind of thing? Give me whatever ideas you have.'" Mansfield asked me if I had any ideas. Well, I didn't know what ideas to give him. It was so overwhelming, coming so soon after the first and in the same family, I just didn't know what to do. I finally thought about it and said, "Well, what else can you do? Set up a

commission." This is usually a solution when you don't know what to do, maybe you'll find some answers.

We drew up a resolution calling on the president to establish a commission on political violence. It was zeroed in on that point, only that point. Dirksen, I believe, was minority leader at that time, and he went along with it, so it was a joint resolution by the two leaders. It passed—I'm trying to remember now whether it passed—no, I think what he did was to send it down to the president. It came back in the rather elaborated form of the Kerner Commission on Violence. Well, that was violence from A to Z. It was a very lovely study and beautifully done, but I think the very scope of it tended to minimize its utility because you cannot cover all of social violence and expect anybody to focus on an aspect of it that you can deal with. So the effort to get at political violence in the United States through a commission was sort of lost in that larger shuffle.

One thing did come out of it, and that was the providing of Secret Service protection to candidates in presidential elections. This was not our idea, this came from downtown. I think it may very well have been Johnson's own idea. The first test of that came in the second Nixon campaign. George Wallace was also a candidate. The question arose in the Democratic primaries. Under the law that was passed on extending the protection, the secretary of the treasury, who was then John Connally, was the administra-

tive person involved in deciding who should get protection. The primaries began and we began to see Gallup polls and Harris polls about how the candidates were jockeying for position. Ted Kennedy was running ahead, way up front on most of these polls, on the Democratic side. But he had not declared himself a candidate, quite the contrary, I think he indicated he had no intention of running, although he was speaking a lot around the country. Connally's Secret Service people asked for a meeting with congressional people because another provision of the law was that they were to have advice from the leadership of the Congress, both houses.

There was one joint meeting with the joint leadership—Republican and Democratic—in which they explained their problem of trying to define who should get protection. It was left for them to work out some formula. Mansfield and either Dirksen or Scott—it must have been Scott—turned the matter over to staff people. I was one of the people on the advisory group who worked with the Secret Service. There was someone from Scott's office, Ken Davis and Tom Kuchel, then a private citizen, was on the advisory group—he was designated by the leadership as a third person on this advisory panel. Well, we had our first meeting with the Secret Service people and they listed the people they were going to give protection to: they included George Wallace and they included one or two others. I asked, "What about Ted

Kennedy?" "Well," one of the agents said, "he doesn't fit our criteria." I said, "What do you mean he doesn't fit your criteria?" "Well," he said, "he's not a declared candidate, and the secretary of the treasury has said that a person, in order to get the protection, would have to be a declared candidate." "Well," I said, "I think that's really kind of foolish. The only persons I know who are probably going to be in danger are George Wallace and Ted Kennedy. They're the two obvious marks for an assassin. If you'll read back through history, you'll know that that's the kind of person in political life who attracts an assassin." The response was, "Well, we have no way of doing that."

We registered our protest, we made it very clear we thought—and this was universal on the part of the congressional advisors—that Ted Kennedy should also have protection. Nothing more was heard of it, until George Wallace was shot. A half hour later, Nixon ordered protection for Ted Kennedy. Either it was shortsightedness or John Connally was trying to smoke out Ted Kennedy on his intentions and trying to force him to declare himself as a candidate. In view of the rest of John Connally's record, I would think the second was the more likely rather than the first. But that's the kind of thing you run into. My own view of Secret Service protection is you can only go so far with it, otherwise you destroy the very meaning of what you're trying to do. If a candidate can't get anywhere near the public, you might just as

well not have candidates, except on TV, which may be the direction in which the country is moving.

RITCHIE: I came to the Senate in 1976 when just about every other senator was running for president, and there were more Secret Service agents in all of the office buildings, surrounding people like Birch Bayh and Henry Jackson and Frank Church, great mobs of them.

VALEO: Yes, and their families and everyone else. It's enormous and I think quite unnecessary and quite overdone.

RITCHIE: Going back to the Ervin Committee, I was also curious about the other Democratic members of the committee, who were sort of an unusual bunch: Herman Talmadge, Daniel Inouye, Joseph Montoya. What was the motivation behind their choice? Did Mansfield pick all of them?

VALEO: No, he did not. Ervin, I believe took them from—that may have been a special committee of what? Government Operations? I believe that's the way it worked, and they were probably all members of that committee. So far as I am aware, there were no additions from outside of Ervin's immediate committee jurisdiction. No, if there was any choice at all it was a choice made by Ervin, not by Mansfield. Ervin was Mansfield's choice to handle the whole question, but after that he left it entirely up to Ervin.

RITCHIE: None of them were people who had presidential ambitions. Was the Democratic leadership deliberately trying to avoid any partisanship?

VALEO: That certainly was Mansfield's view, that there should be no political suggestion in it. How much he talked to Ervin about that, I don't know. Whether he communicated that idea to Ervin or whether Ervin himself reached the same conclusion, or whether it was just the automatic given nature of the committee membership at the time, I'm really not quite sure. But if it's the latter, I think you could just check that and would find that in the records on the membership of that committee. As far as I know, no one was brought in from outside of that particular committee grouping.

RITCHIE: I was also interested to hear you say that you were among the last to think that Nixon really was connected with this.

VALEO: No, no. It wasn't that. I suspected he might be connected with it, but knowing some of the shenanigans that go on at elections, I wondered if they were going to make so much out of what amounted to stealing the other people's thunder. I didn't realize that it would rise to quite the level of crime that it did. I think it probably would not have, if they hadn't gotten involved in the perjury, and not acknowledging from the outset what was involved in it.

RITCHIE: I was going to ask about your general impressions about the Nixon White House, if you had any dealings with the Haldemans and the Ehrlichmans and others on Nixon's staff in the period before the Watergate, and what you thought about the way Nixon dealt with the rest of the government.

VALEO: I didn't know them. I may have met them on some occasions, but I certainly didn't know them before, nor did I know them during and after. The only favorable thing I knew of them was that they had pushed for Frank Meloy's ambassadorship. Frank told me the story of that later on. He said that when he was in Rome, I believe, Nixon came through—and was all but forgotten at that point—Frank Meloy was the deputy chief of mission at the time and went out of his way to help Nixon. But that was in his nature, he was a very decent human being and a very warm person. Nixon said, "I'm not going to forget you," or something to that effect. So when Nixon became president, Frank, who was a careerist, Frank's name was submitted by Rogers, I believe, and was immediately approved by the White House. He said Ehrlichman called him personally, remembering also the incident of the experience in Italy. That's the only thing I knew about them that was positive.

The story on Meloy ties in with Vietnam. Johnson was trying to get Henry Cabot Lodge to go out as ambassador; it would have been his second tour of duty out there, if I'm not mistaken. But

anyhow Johnson tried to get Cabot Lodge to go out. Lodge agreed to go as ambassador, and Rusk called Frank in. I can't remember where Frank was stationed at the time. I think he was still in Italy. Rusk called him in and said that Lodge wanted a very fine Foreign Service Officer as his second in command in Vietnam, and that his name had come up in this connection—I don't know whether Rusk actually suggested Frank to Lodge, or whether it just came up in the course of recommendations along with others. So he asked Frank to talk with Lodge. I remember this, because Frank called me immediately after he had the meeting with Lodge and I met him at the Metropolitan Club. He related the whole story to me.

He said he went in to see Lodge and they chatted for a while, and Lodge offered him the job and told him that he had heard so many good things about him, and so forth. I don't know whether he had actually met Frank before that. He may have, but I'm doubtful that he knew him. When he finished, Frank said, "I said to him: Mr. Lodge, I will go if I am ordered to go to Vietnam. But I am totally in disagreement with American policy on Vietnam at this point and I think you would be better advised to take someone else who would be more sympathetic to what you will be required to do there as ambassador." Lodge was flabbergasted. When Rusk heard about it, he was furious at Frank and said "He'll never be an ambassador as long as I'm secretary of state." And that, of course, was what happened. He wasn't.

Frank told Lodge the truth. Frank did it much more elaborately than I'm giving it to you here, but basically he told him all his reasons for his feelings about it, having been there as a young Foreign Service Officer many years before, having gone through the whole agony of the French experience, and having seen exactly the same mistakes being made by us, he was absolutely adamant that it was the wrong policy. But as a good Foreign Service officer he would have done it, and would have done the best he could with it. But he just could not see his way clear to go with Lodge without first letting him know how he felt about the policy.

Later on, Nixon made him ambassador to the Dominican Republic. He did a very good job in the Dominican Republic. He was later assigned to Guatemala. He again did a very satisfactory job. Then he was named ambassador to Lebanon. He called me—I believe he called me from Guatemala. They had just had a large earthquake down there and he was badly shaken up. It did a lot of damage to the embassy and to his possessions and what-not in Guatemala City. He said, "I have practically no time. They want me to go out there in two or three weeks." He said, "If I don't get confirmed quickly, I'll be months trying to get my things out there." So he said, "Could you possibly do something to get the confirmation through as quickly as possible." They all knew him on the Hill, so it was not a difficult job. He had been confirmed

two times before without any objections. I mentioned it to Mansfield, and Mansfield said sure, we'd try to do it. And we did, we got him confirmed within a day or two.

He came to Washington, and my wife and I took him out to dinner. He was very, very distracted during the dinner. I attributed it to his experience in the earthquake and then going from there to Beirut, which was certainly not the kind of thing that you would expect to follow. It was just one disaster area after another. I remember we tried to talk him out of it and suggested it might be time for him to quit, just resign and let it go at that. But he said no. He said, "This is my whole life. I can't do anything else but this." So he went, and he was killed. He was assassinated.

John Thomas, who was administrative assistant secretary, I believe, at the State Department, called me to tell me of the assassination. He knew I was a close friend of Frank's. He asked me to go to Syria, to Damascus, to accompany the body back, which I did. I went with Frank's only close relative, his brother, who had also been in the Foreign Service briefly and had, I believe, been selected out or resigned at an earlier point; the family of Frank's deputy chief of mission, who was also assassinated with him, was on board. So we went as a group in a military plane to Damascus. The embassy had brought the bodies from Beirut by road

to Damascus. We came back and went through a ceremony at Andrews. President [Gerald] Ford was there, as was Kissinger.

About six months later, Dan Meloy, Frank's brother, came through Washington. By a strange coincidence, Frank's lawyer was a personal friend of mine—I didn't even know it, but he knew it and he called me and said he was handling Meloy's estate. Dan Meloy came down to see him about the estate. We invited him to come back for Christmas, I believe, and he said that he was going on down to Cancun or somewhere on his way to Guatemala. He wanted to do some swimming and snorkeling. He said he'd drop by on the way back. Dan was very, very unsatisfied with the State Department's account of Frank's death. He really tried to get me to have someone in Congress investigate it. I felt I had not enough to go on, that I couldn't open a question like that without something more than his surmise. But he was very adamant, and he kept pressing it himself. Well, he left, and died a week or so later in very strange circumstances in Mexico.

You know, I don't like cloak and daggers, and I don't know if there's any relevance at all in this. But Frank was killed and Dan died a few months later in Mexico; he may or may not have been killed. The evidence was inconclusive but Frank's lawyer was very disturbed by the inadequacy of the autopsy. The story of his death was never fully understood. As for Frank's assassination, a Paris newspaper later on carried a story that the persons who had

killed Frank and the deputy chief and the chauffeur was a member of an obscure Moslem religious group in Lebanon. According to the story, they were determined to show their dissatisfaction with American policy in the area. This was how the article described the event. The chauffeur, who had been raised to great honors in this country, along with Frank and his assistant at the time, according to the story in the Paris papers, had been part of the plot not to kill Frank but to kidnap him and he had been involved for money. The incident occurred when the car was going from the Christian area of Beirut into the Moslem area, where Frank was to present his credentials to the president, whose palace was in the Moslem area. The actual waylaying of the car occurred in the Christian zone of Lebanon, before they reached the no-man's land between the zones. I never knew what to believe. But it certainly was a tragedy. It wiped out that entire family. In the case of Frank, I don't know much about his brother, but in the case of Frank, his death was the loss of a man who had really been a great public servant and had made very substantial contributions to American policy. I think that belongs in the record somewhere.

RITCHIE: When you mentioned about Rusk's determination not to make Meloy an ambassador, I wondered if Meloy's close association with Mansfield and with you and with the Congress might have worked against his career in the State Department, and

if Rusk saw his opposition to the war as somehow connected to his congressional ties.

VALEO: I don't think his connections with Mansfield worked against him. Generally speaking, the State Department was not hostile to Mansfield. I think some secretaries were at various times, and for various reasons. But Mansfield had a very deft way of handling his differences with the State Department. I watched it beginning with Dulles. If he was critical of policy, it was never on a personal basis. He used to always talk of it as sort of covering your flanks, but he was always deferential to the secretaries and the department in terms of the conduct of foreign policy. He was always very good to them when he could be in terms of their financial needs and that sort of thing. He was never petty on that, quite the opposite. He was always very generous if he could be. So I think the one neutralized the other.

He was known essentially as the friend of the Department of State, not necessarily of the Defense Department, but of the Department of State, so that when he criticized it, it carried greater weight than would have been the case, had he been someone who was dug in continuously, as some of the House people were. There were one or two over there—Wayne Hays was one—who used to criticize constantly and who really tried to dominate and run the State Department from his committee. Mansfield never did anything like that, would never even have considered it. He always

recognized the bounds of where the executive branch's authority lay, and where the congressional authority was. There would be no basis for them disliking Mansfield. So I don't think that that was the factor that hurt Meloy. Rusk would not have recommended him to Lodge, or had Lodge talk with him had he felt that way.

I think quite the contrary, the fact that he did command some respect, at least on the part of Mansfield and others on the Hill, would have been a factor in his favor. Frank in turn never played cozy with the Hill. There are some people who come up to Congress, as you well know, and try to make their own separate contacts with members of Congress to strengthen their own individual position. Frank never did that, would not have known how to do it. He was a complete Foreign Service officer. That was all he knew. That was all he wanted to know. He liked the idea of coming up to the Hill from time to time, but it had nothing to do with trying to develop his own influence on the Hill. He was an extraordinary person.

RITCHIE: What did him in was his honesty.

VALEO: In a way, it was his honesty, yes. And that's of course something we need more and more of, not less of.

RITCHIE: But it's interesting that the State Department was unable to tolerate someone who spoke his mind and said what he believed in, but it happened to be opposite to their policy.

VALEO: Yes. At least the secretary had not been able to do that.

RITCHIE: But this case was one case where the Nixon administration was able to reverse the policy.

VALEO: Yes, and performed a service in the process.

RITCHIE: Other than the Meloy incident, you never saw anything positive in the way the Nixon administration was operating?

VALEO: I thought that Kissinger—you remember I related an earlier incident when he was considered for the job as my successor at the Library of Congress—I thought that Kissinger on the whole had done a rather exceptional job, particularly in that administration. It would have been the wrong kind of job in a Democratic administration, but given the Nixon administration, I think that he did a great deal to bring about a degree of accommodation with the Soviet Union, at least in the nuclear field. At least there was a beginning. I think Nixon and Kissinger moved in the right direction in dealing with the Soviet Union. That has been seriously reversed and seriously damaged since, but I think that he was on the right track. Again, just as Nixon was the key factor in starting the Chinese rapprochement, he and Kissinger would have been the key people in trying to get off that merry-go-round of Soviet-American animosity, where it's just

"you're one and you're another," that kind of name calling which had led to nothing, and which of course, has had a great revival in the last few years.

RITCHIE: It's a strange administration, looking back on it, in the sense that it had grand designs and also very petty operations.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: And its treatment of people was on a very petty level. Hugh Scott apparently had terrible relations with the Nixon administration.

VALEO: I'm not surprised.

RITCHIE: And I wondered if the fact that Scott was not a favorite of the Nixon administration might have helped to depoliticize the Senate's response to Watergate, and did that help Mansfield's relations with Scott during that political crisis?

VALEO: It would certainly not have hurt them. I think Scott and Mansfield would have had the relationship anyhow. Given the kind of person Scott is, I think it would have had to go that way. He had a great sense of national responsibility. There's an interesting story on Scott. I'm told that when he was running up in Pennsylvania—this was sort of underscored last night at the reception for him—there was some confusion over whether he was a

Democrat or a Republican to begin with. Well, if you're going to run in a state like Pennsylvania there very well better be some confusion; otherwise you don't have a chance if you're a Republican. But it was so bad at one point, this view of him, that the Republican machine there was on the verge of reading him out of the nomination at least, maybe more. From that point on, Scott had to be more Republican than anyone else when it came to party affairs.

He had this very touchy button. If you pressed that Scott button which had any suggestion of partisanship in it, his Republicanism would come out in full fury and you could get absolutely nowhere with Scott, on any question, it didn't matter. He has an acid tongue, knows how to use it. He has a wonderful command of the English language. If you press that partisan button, for some reason or other, even the slightest suggestion that you were reducing the discussion to a partisan level, he would be out in full force in partisanship. If you stayed away from that, and didn't go anywhere near the partisan element, he was a totally reasonable man and very farsighted, extremely cooperative and warm to deal with. That was my own experience with him. I never pressed the button, but I saw it pressed on occasion and I saw how he reacted.

RITCHIE: Mansfield was very careful not to press that button.

VALEO: Oh, Mansfield would never have touched it, no.

RITCHIE: Did you work with the Republicans when you were doing the planning for the impeachment trial?

VALEO: Yes. I'm trying to think of the chap, he was there last night. He was before Hildenbrand.

RITCHIE: Mark Trice?

VALEO: No, it wasn't Mark Trice. It was somebody out of Scott's office. His name escapes me. He was a rather big fellow and considerably younger. It was Ken Davis. He was in on all of these matters which effected the Senate in its entirety, and there were a lot. Wherever they did, we brought the Republican leader's people into it. I insisted on that.

RITCHIE: Was the Senate ready for television? Could they have televised at that stage? Had you made all the provisions for it?

VALEO: Not the electrical hook-ups, but other than that, the arrangements under which it would be televised had been pretty well discussed and agreed upon.

RITCHIE: I suppose if they had introduced television at that stage it might have promoted quicker acceptance of it; they're still fighting over it ten years later.

VALEO: Well, that question came up during the Commission to Study the Organization of the Senate. I opposed it then, reflecting Mansfield's views and my own. I think it's a bad way to conduct the legislative business of the country, particularly in the Senate. I don't know about the House, but speaking for the Senate, my own concern is with the impact of television on the consideration of national issues. This has been brought home forcibly to me in the recent incident with the Soviet sailor who jumped ship down in Louisiana, or fell overboard, depending on which version you want to take. But again, it doesn't matter what the version is. It really doesn't change the picture, which gives me great cause for concern about the role of television and its relationship to the First Amendment.

If that incident had occurred forty or fifty years ago, regardless with what our relations were with the Soviet Union, my guess is that it would have been headlined in the local newspaper where it happened, and it would probably have been treated with amusement. Sailors are always jumping ship. Sometimes they don't jump overboard, but they jump ship. It's probably one of the most common occurrences on the high seas. I would think that it probably happens five, ten, fifteen, twenty times a day somewhere in the world. This chap would have had a moment of glory in Louisiana. The authorities would have been glad to get rid of him, get him back on the ship and get him off their hands. They

wouldn't have known what to do with him had they not. Whether he wanted to go back or not my guess is he would have been put back on the ship. That would have been an end to it. No great significance would have been attached to it. It's barely possible that it might have rated a line or two in the national press if the relationship with the Soviet Union were bad at the time, and if somebody picked it up from the news services. It might have rated a paragraph in the *New York Times*, maybe, or in the *Washington Post*, or other papers around the country, but not more than a paragraph. That would have been about it.

Well, this one incident, which in itself is a very commonplace incident, was elevated to the central focus of attention in the nation by TV, and when the American people think about foreign policy, they are supposed to think of it in the terms of the context of a sailor jumping ship in America, as relevant to a Soviet/American summit, ignoring the reason for which he jumped off the ship. Now, it's very difficult to see that as a relevant exercise of the First Amendment privilege. When a trivial incident is elevated into a national issue of this kind the press becomes the determinant, through TV, of what will be the national issues at any given time; that that ought to be discussed and focused on by the public.

This was brought home to me too in the Carter administration with the Iranian hostages. God knows one is very sympathetic to someone who is taken while in the service of his country as a prisoner in another country and held in a state of limbo until other questions are resolved. But if one thinks back to that, I would guess that somewhere from 20 to 25 percent of the president's time for almost a year went into concern about the hostage question in Iran. That is a gross misuse of presidential time. Now, I would contend that had this happened in another period of our history, an earlier period, Carter might have been very much concerned with it in the first day or two days in which it happened, but the question of negotiating the release of the hostages would have been turned over to the secretary of state, who in turn probably would have turned it over to an assistant secretary of state or some ambassador to work out the arrangements whereby those hostages could be released.

But the TV, not the press per se, but the TV forced the president to stay on that issue, which involved 150 Americans, in a nation of two hundred million Americans. They forced Carter to put an inordinate amount of his time into dealing with a problem which at best was peripheral to our main concerns. Now, I'm not sure that I know how deal with that kind of situation but, I don't think that that problem is being properly considered where it ought to be considered, which is in press circles, and in

intellectual circles. I do think we have to deal with this, and I'm very deeply concerned at that kind of an influence in the name of the First Amendment on what happens to our nation's policies and priorities. It may be that in the name of the first amendment we're blotting out the usage of the First Amendment as it should be used, which is to put many, many ideas into the ring, and have them all considered.

RITCHIE: Do you think that television would distort the legislative process by focusing on the wrong things?

VALEO: I've watched the House version of this. The networks don't normally run the proceedings unless it's got something to do with a hot issue of some kind, and I think that does distort it. Yes, there's a lot that goes on there day in and day out. Again, people's impression of the Congress will be formed by those rare instances when the press decides that they want to show something from the House. I would force them to show it all the time if they really wanted to do it, not to pick the moments when they want to show it.

RITCHIE: Do you think it might also cause the members to act differently as a way of playing to the cameras?

VALEO: Of course, that's a very great danger. I would say when the courts are ready to have television cameras, when the Supreme Court is ready to have a television camera in the chamber

when they give their decisions, then I think it's time for the Senate to consider doing it. But I would not do it before that, and I don't think the court will ever get to that point for very good reasons.

RITCHIE: Having spent so much time preparing for an impeachment trial that never took place

VALEO: It wasn't a lot of time, but we had dealt with it.

RITCHIE: Did you get a sense in the Senate that there was great relief that Nixon had resigned, or did people feel

VALEO: Cheated?

RITCHIE: Cheated, or anticlimactic, or that the process should have been completed?

VALEO: I think it was a mixed feeling. I think there were some who felt that it ought to go through. I think they were very curious to know how the procedure would work, and it would have been a historic moment and they would have been part of a historic interlude. I don't know. I'm only thinking out loud on this. One can't judge other people's attitudes, but that would be my impression that they felt in part great relief, that it didn't wind up in some kind of a disaster such as I suggested earlier. Either they felt that on the one hand, but on the other hand they probably felt cheated out of a little chapter in American history.

RITCHIE: That was a big chapter!

VALEO: A big chapter, yes, not a little one.

End of Interview #14

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

REFORMING THE SENATE

Interview #15

Wednesday, November 27, 1985

RITCHIE: I'd like to start today by asking if you could tell me about the origins of the Culver Commission and what the whole purpose of that reform was, towards the end of your term as secretary of the Senate.

VALEO: I think at that time I began to realize that if the Senate was going to continue to evolve the way it was going, which meant greater and greater powers in terms of the individual member as distinct from committee structure or from party structure, that they would have to take another look at the way the whole Senate was managed. Certainly that idea was going around in my mind for some time because I saw the potential for a good deal of chaos if there wasn't this reexamination of its processes. Mansfield, without saying it in so many words, was obviously thinking that because at one point he said to me: "It's a good thing we're getting out now, Frank, it's going to get tough around here," or something to that effect, because he saw what was happening not only on the floor but in the structure. He continued to resist in the leadership any expansion of staff. I don't think we added more than one or two members during the dozen years that he was majority leader, and he always turned back a lot of money as a

result of that. But there was constant pressure on him to use that money to the advantage of the majority or for some legitimate legislative purpose.

People began to think in terms of staff growth. But he resisted that, and I guess except for one or two appointments, mostly under the pressure of Russell and one or two of the other conservatives, he held the line very strongly. The issue kept coming up in the Policy Committee meetings. Mike Gravel came in a couple of times and made a big pitch for more staff, how he couldn't possibly keep up with his committee assignments without more staff. And one of the results of that was the Gravel—maybe Moss and Gravel resolution. I'm not sure who was primarily responsible for it, I think it was a Senate resolution, I don't think it was done with the House, but it provided that where a committee staff professional was not supplied to each member by the committee, the member would be given additional funds in his office budget to provide such a staff person for every committee he was on. This was really a very bad piece of legislation, because the immediate effect of course was to break up the concept of a professional committee staff quite apart from politics. The net result was that every committee staff then began to be split between Democratic and Republican designees.

Again, knowing how members of the Senate usually function, the idea of having a choice as between letting the chairman of a committee appoint the staff person or appointing him himself under his financial control, it was obvious that the choice would always fall wherever possible on the second alternative. That's precisely what has happened over the years. After the Gravel change there were additional tendencies towards fragmentation of responsibility beyond even where it had gone at that point.

At the same time the Senate was still functioning not only under archaic rules but under an archaic management structure. We've discussed the modernization of the disbursing office and the beginnings of modernization of the secretary's office, thanks largely to Marilyn Courtot with a lot of cooperation from Darrell St. Claire and myself. We were beginning to do something about those things. But there were other areas of the Senate that everybody knew existed where things were either being done because they had always been done that way or because other cores of competing power were in existence. Essentially, in terms of the management of the Senate as a whole, the cores of competition were in the Rules Committee and the sergeant at arms office and in the secretary's office. So I began to think again in terms of a British approach, which would be to consolidate the all-Senate staff functions under one officer of the Senate. Perhaps again because of personal bias to some degree but also because the

secretary's office, I believe, was the oldest office in the Senate, and also because at that point it had become quite free of political pressures, it seemed to me that the logical place was in the secretary's office. I was getting close to retirement in any event, so it would not have meant much to me except that I could have left it here as a fait d'accompli.

Well, just at about this time, [John] Culver came into the Senate. He was a man obviously of very persuasive oratorical powers. He spoke up in caucus, accepting Mansfield's invitation for new members to speak up and not wait around for any length of time, but to talk if they had anything to say. He began to complain about the impossibility of the services that were being supplied, and how archaic the Senate structure was. Another reformer was [Dale] Bumpers of Arkansas, who joined Culver on a number of occasions. Bumpers made a very strong complaint at one point in the meetings that Mansfield held from time to time for the younger members. I recall suggesting to him afterward a resolution—as a matter of fact I framed it for him—as one way of getting at the particular problem he was at that point concerned about (I can't remember now what the substance of it was). He looked at it and he sort of smiled and said, "But this will get me in trouble with the older members." I said I didn't know if it would get him in trouble with them, but anything he wanted to do to fix the question which he had raised depended upon

his readiness to challenge the existing structure. He was not prepared to do that.

My inclination then was to think more in terms of Culver, who seemed to be perhaps a little less concerned with survival and a little more anxious to get the reforms through that he wanted. At one time he made a statement, I believe it was at a luncheon for new members which Mansfield held from time to time. I underscored his statement for Mansfield later. I said, "Maybe the time has come to do something about some of these procedures. The proposal came, interestingly enough, exactly at the time when [Mark] Hatfield was very much concerned with the archaic office structures in the senators' personal offices. He had gone to the—at that point—extreme form of computerization of his whole office routine, with the assistance of a fellow named Jerry—I can't think of his name now, but he's still with him; he's his administrative assistant—Gerald Frank. The two of them had set up what looked like a twenty-first century kind of office, at least from a Senate point of view, to take care of mail and everything else. The system was very mechanized, and he kept making remarks about how the Senate should really catch up with the times. So I thought the moment might be right to try to push it.

I was trying to figure out how you could get at the problem. If you set up a commission within the Senate, or a special committee, you would always run into the vested interests each pleading

their own case for their own particularly ends. So the thought occurred to me that it was time to let somebody from the outside take a look at the Senate and see what they thought. They would find, I thought, many of the same obvious flaws in the structure that I could observe at close hand. So we did it that way. I remember proposing a slate to Mansfield. I didn't know any of the people who came in for the commission, but I had gotten, I believe, from the Library of Congress and from Beth Shotwell, or someone else, a list of names of people who had been prominently associated with public service commissions of one kind or another in that period. We also, I believe, asked for some suggestions from other members as to who might be suitable for this kind of an assignment.

We decided that we would call it the Culver Commission since he would introduce the resolution and then Mansfield would pick it up from there. Culver did introduce the resolution; he was very anxious to do it. We cleared it with [Hugh] Scott and Hatfield in advance. We decided to work very closely with Hatfield on it, and we did. I think Scott presented a list of names. There was a fellow named Kenneth Davis who worked for Scott in that period, and he was always an easy person for me to work with. He was enlightened in his view of the Senate and the Senate's role, and we rarely had a problem. Gerald Frank was designated by Hatfield to serve with the commission. We set up the commission and

brought in six or seven outsiders, all of whom would have had some relevance to the kinds of problems we would be dealing with. That was the origin of the Culver Commission.

I served ex officio with them as did Jerry Frank on behalf of Hatfield, I don't remember what title we had. Everybody agreed that former Senator Harold Hughes would make an excellent chairman for this group, and he did. We got someone named Vincent Rock, who had served in similar capacities, to become the staff director of the commission, and he did an excellent job in connection with it. He and I together worked out the strategy for the study. We outlined a number of the areas that we wanted to explore. We wanted to do something that would have some practical possibilities so we decided at the outset not to get involved with the question of committee jurisdictions per se, but only in the sense that they might relate to the consolidation of the all-Senate functions. Vincent Rock ran an excellent commission. I thought his people were well selected. The only suggestion I made to him on staff was to include Ernest Griffith as a writer of one of the studies.

We had three or four candidates for the job of staff director; Vincent was one of them. I hardly knew him, I think I had met him once or twice, and I knew he was interested in government structures and organization. There was a professor from George Washington University who was also considered who had not

impressed me at all. I had done a preliminary interview with some of these people. I felt the fellow from George Washington was just interested in getting connected with something in the Senate and it didn't matter what, but that he had no real grasp of what we were trying to do. When the selection came out, the chairman, who was Hughes, liked that professor from GW. I decided I really had to stand firm, because I couldn't see myself working with him. I just felt that his attitude towards the Congress was one of supercilious superiority among other things and I knew it would go nowhere. So I got Hughes on the side and I said, "I really have to caution you against it. I don't care which other one you pick, but I think that's one that you had better not pick." Well, I can't remember now exactly how it was done, but it came to Vincent Rock, and Hughes was very skeptical of Vincent Rock, but in the end, of course, he found that he was highly suitable for the job and he did do a remarkable job.

We brought in Mark Trice as a former Republican secretary of the Senate to give it some depth. We brought in educators, I think there were two college presidents on it. We brought in the woman who later became secretary of commerce, whose name now escapes me. I think she was the "House woman" in a lot of corporations because she was well known. She was a Ph.D. in economics and a very able person, but we were still at that stage where you were using women as symbols almost more than in terms of their

real competence. She came highly recommended on the basis of her past tasks. Her later activities as secretary of commerce and her work on the commission certainly underscored her capabilities.

RITCHIE: Was that Juanita Kreps?

VALEO: Yes, I guess it was. Again, I did not know her. Beth Shotwell knew of her and had recommended her very highly, among others. But in any event, that was the way the commission got underway. It met once a month, people came in for the meetings. Rock's staff people did the preliminary work, prepared the papers. The two issues I think that gave us the most difficulty were the question of consolidating control under one roof, and the question of televising the Senate proceedings. I favored, of course, the idea of consolidation under one essential staff director for the Senate, the secretary or the sergeant at arms whatever the case might be, but under one. I didn't favor the idea of televising the Senate debates, at least not on a random basis, and certainly not with the press having the right to choose when they wanted to and when they didn't want to do it.

The first problem was the question of consolidation. I don't know if I mentioned this previously, but I had a talk with the then Sergeant at Arms Nordy Hoffman, who had not been there for very long. He was appointed to the job primarily in gratitude by the Democrats for his work as staff director of the campaign

committee. They wanted to take care of him, and I think that's basically why he was selected when Bill Wannell resigned. I talked to him about the recommendation for the consolidation under the secretary, which the committee had adopted unanimously at that point. I told him that if he would go along with it, I would resign within a year and let him take the job. He wasn't sure that he wanted to, not because he didn't trust me, but he didn't trust Stan Kimmitt. This was what was bothering him. He thought he was going to have a problem with Stan Kimmitt's competing with him for that job if it were done that way. He didn't say that he would oppose it, but I couldn't get his positive endorsement of it. I don't know what would have happened had it actually reached the point of trying to implement that recommendation, whether Nordy would have gone with it or not. I don't think he would have opposed it vehemently, certainly not if Mansfield were majority leader because Mansfield was completely in favor of it.

The real problem I felt would be with Bill Cochrane in the Rules Committee, which now has a well-entrenched bureaucracy, which Cochrane had a great deal to do with entrenching. It had been very free before that. Ironically enough, when Senator Jordan of North Carolina was chairman of that committee, Cochrane was no problem even though he was on Jordan's personal staff. Jordan was always agreeable to doing it almost any way that I suggested. I never ran into any problems in dealing with Jordan. But after he

died and [Howard] Cannon took over, I guess they found Cochrane a job on that committee staff and then he worked for Cannon. Cannon was not the same sort of personality as Jordan and I think he left it pretty much to Cochrane to run the committee staff. Cochrane was interested in consolidating and extending its powers. I knew there would be resistance there.

But these issues never really had to be faced because Mansfield announced his retirement just at about this point, and once his influence was gone I knew the chances of getting the commission's recommendations through would be extremely remote. I went to Culver and pointed that out to him. He was still willing to try to push it, but he also didn't at this point want to stir too many hornets' nests. So I think the thing died a gentle death, after Mansfield left and I left. I think the recommendations of the commission were essentially right, and I'd go further and say they were were profoundly right. If the Senate is ever going to be a fully functioning twentieth century—let alone twenty-first—body, most of those recommendations make a great deal of sense, and they'll still have to do it. So far as I know, there have been no attempts made by Hatfield to press for the changes. Anyway, he was much more concerned with the automation part, and so he never really pushed any of the other things that were involved.

On the televising of the debates, I lost that one. I think the commission agreed that it would be a good idea to televise them. But so far as I know they have not yet implemented that to any great extent. Mansfield would have opposed it in any event, and Scott would have gone along with him in opposition to it, had there been any effort to open the Senate up to TV as was done on the House side. Our objections were essentially the same: for the same reasons that you don't televise the Supreme Court and its proceedings, that it tends to take away from the dignity of the process. The press tends to operate for humor and for drama, and if it didn't do that there would be very little interest in the debates in any event. So we felt that the options should remain with the Senate itself to decide when it wanted to do it, and that it should be done—at least I felt that it should be done—for major ceremonial occasions or for great moments in the Senate's history. But I felt that choice should be the body's itself, not the TV networks, because the objectives of the two were somewhat different. The Senate's was a legislative purpose, the TV was largely to keep the public interested and entertained. Sometimes those two run together, but very often they do not. That's particularly marked in telecasting as distinct from newspaper coverage which there has never been any question about. I never favored secret sessions of the Senate, I saw no purpose in them, but they did hold them from time to time.

That's the story behind the Culver Commission, and I think it sits up there in four or five volumes on the shelf. Perhaps somebody will come along someday and start from that and go on from there.

RITCHIE: Did you find that many members of the Senate were interested in this, or was it just Culver and Hughes and a few people like them?

VALEO: There were a lot of people complaining about the inadequacies of the services of the Senate at that point. There were people beginning to say, "God, we've just got too much to do, we can't handle it." Well, the more they added staff, the less time they had to do anything. This was part of the problem which one could see developing. The need to try to bring some order out of this chaos was growing very rapidly. We took what was the simplest place to start, the overall staff structure, we knew the problems of organization and the structure of the committees and the senators' own offices would be something maybe for the twenty-first century but not likely in our lifetimes. But we did feel we could do something with the all-Senate services, and I still think that can be done. If you have a leadership which is deeply interested in the Senate per se, and is not running for the presidency or something else, and if there is a secretary appointed who reflects that, or a sergeant at arms who reflects that, you could get a fairly well run Senate.

If you don't, the Senate will fall back into the ways of many state legislatures in which the jobs in the overall Senate staff structure become essentially political—not even plums, but in some ways just political dumping grounds: you don't know what to do with somebody, put him over in the secretary's office, or put him in the sergeant at arms' office, or something of that sort. That's the great danger, and to run a contemporary Senate it's not enough to do it that way. You have to have a staff which is first of all self-respecting and which can add something to the quality of the Senate's production as a legislative body, and as an advisory and counseling body with the president in some areas. I'm not even looking at the problem of where you go beyond that when you look at the House and the Senate together, whether it is conceivable that you could ever have an integrated congressional staff structure as exists in the British system, where you have two separate bodies but actually all of the staff people are affected by the same basic regulations.

I think one of the things that's going to have to come, one of the ways I see as a possible solution of this problem, is a drastic change in the way you handle state constituent business. As it is now, the great bulk of the staff in senators' offices is still essentially performing an ombudsman function. If somehow or other there were some guarantees that somewhere else in the government the ombudsman function can be performed as intimately

and as personalized as in a senator's office, you could then by offering job security as a condition for the removal of those jobs to a central government office, let's say the Library of Congress for want of a better place, or the Congressional Research Service or wherever, if you could remove those jobs from direct control by senators and then really cap a ceiling on the personnel that remains directly available to members themselves, I think you'd have the first step.

First of all, you would provide job security for the people that are involved and hence the need to drop everything for a constituent request or a constituent inquiry would not be quite as overpowering as it is now. The trade off of job security for the removal from the immediate association with the senator's offices might possibly give you a way to it. I know of no other way. But this would still be very difficult to do. Most members don't trust anything that they can't see or touch, sometimes with good reason. How would you prevent that kind of an organization, if you were to set it up, from falling into the ways of any bureaucracy where it takes you two months to get an answer to a letter, I don't know, but I think we have to think in those terms if you are ever going to deal with the problem of order in the Senate itself.

RITCHIE: Of course, the members like to show their constituents that they were the ones who facilitated things.

VALEO: It's conceivable that you could still do that, even under that system. If the letter came into the senator, one of the requirements might be you answer it in terms of "your letter to the senator, he has urged me to do this," or whatever. There are ways in which you might deal with the immediate tactical problem. But I think the more fundamental problem is to get senators to trust a group which is not immediately under their individual control and under their purview. As it is now, this is already happening in terms of individual offices. You know, they have branches out in the field in a large state and they're all connected by computers so they don't see a lot of the mail anyhow. But they know in the last analysis that they can change that if they want, so long as the budget is under their control. The key to it of course would have to be the changing of the financial structure. I obviously don't favor anything like the British system where an individual member of the House of Lords or the Commons is really a vote and nothing more. We're nowhere near that. That involves a party structure which we don't even begin to have. But I do think that if you're not going to go that route, then you've got to, as a practical matter, remove a great deal of the staff, that is now handling constituent requests, out from under the individual offices.

Then you come to the question: what do you do next about professional staff who presumably would be left, who do not

necessarily deal primarily with constituent matters but who deal with matters of substance? There your choices are rather clear. In our system you either build a strong committee staff structure and recognize it as being nonpartisan but essentially one that is a counterfoil for the bureaucracy in the executive branch. Alternatively, that loses all meaning and you simply give a member in his own office sufficient professional staff to staff the committees that he's on but can't attend. It's interesting, one of the suggestions from [Philip] Hart, after whom this building is named, was to permit staff to do preliminary hearings, to hold the hearings in lieu of the senators as one way of saving their time. Well, the proposal raises a real question, whether this function can be performed and still give that personal contact under the constitutional right of petition which is the essential attribute of a legislative person. I would say no, that you shouldn't do that, that if a senator can't be there to hear it, or at least to receive it, then the Senate ought not to be doing it at all. I think the loss of the personal contact with the public would be the beginning of the end of the Senate.

If senators approach the problem from the proper height, as we've discussed already, in the Toynbee analogy, instead of trying to handle issues in great detail, they wouldn't have to think in terms of having staff people to run a referee kind of procedure for them. It's interesting that Hart, who was so dissatisfied

with his own achievements in the Senate, would have made that particular suggestion. He felt the Senate was beyond his reach and I think that explained his reaction. It was because he was trying to grasp the role of the Senate at the wrong level, in my judgment, rather than at the height that would have given him some real input into policy without leaving him bewildered and confused because he was not able to deal with enough of the detail.

RITCHIE: What do you account for the basic explosion of the staff? When you first came here, a senator probably had a half dozen people working in his office; now they've got thirty or forty working there, and the committees are big bureaucracies. Despite the role of people like Mansfield who wanted to keep levels low, between the 1950s and the 1970s the staff just shot up enormously.

VALEO: Yes, there are a number of factors. One has to accept, first of all, the fact that there was a propensity to grow or a pressure to grow as a result of the increasing complexity of the issues. After all, you look at the State Department or look at the Defense Department. The growth is not very much different in the Senate than it is in these other departments over the same period. I think the growing complexity of the issues and the growing demands on the federal government for responses to situations that emerge from these issues, I think that is the overriding consideration.

Then there are a couple of other factors: if you're going to be a miniature president, you have to have a miniature cabinet, and your cabinet is going to be your professional staff. Since all one hundred members think of themselves essentially as miniature presidents—they may not use that term, but that's really what it amounts to—as responsible for everything that happens within their ken, they're going to have to have a cabinet which will prompt them on each of the issues, because they obviously can't keep up with them themselves. Again, I don't see that as a major problem; I think that's legitimate. If you have five subjects which you are following very closely, you should really have five experts advising you. There's nothing wrong with that. The only question is whether you have them on committees or whether you have them in your own personal office. I think from the point of view of legislative function, it's infinitely better for the country to have them on the committee staff rather than in personal offices. But the need for professional staff is quite real. You cannot make sound judgments in five major fields of government activity, or a half a dozen or ten or whatever a member might be deeply interested in, let alone voting on the floor on another twenty-five, you cannot make informed judgments given the amount of time that's available to you without a good deal of professional help.

I think what's very important is that professional help try to think at the level that the senator should be looking at these problems. This is where you begin to run into the problem—the staff finds it cannot think of all the details by itself, because it has lowered the level at which it is looking at these problems. It isn't enough just to say that there should be democratic processes in the Philippines, you have to say there should be elections on February 7, or February 10. Staff feels a compulsion to give that kind of advice. That is an improper form of advice, certainly from staff to members and from Congress to a foreign country. It's probably improper even in the presidency or the State Department, but it's certainly improper, highly improper, from any member of Congress. It has no relevance to anything except to, perhaps, how a situation looks in the newspapers. So there I think is the problem. You've brought in an enormous number of staff people to deal with problems in a degree of detail which is not essential nor even desirable from the point of view of legislating effectively. I think this is where the growth has come from mostly and it tends to blur the principle of separation of powers.

Then another factor, which is the natural propensity for bureaucracy to grow anywhere, not just in the Senate but anywhere in government. When you add that, I think you've got the main reasons for this enormous expansion in the last twenty years. But

as I say, I'd put the complexity of the issues first. The public tendency is to put it the other way. The tendency is always to assume that bureaucracies will automatically grow. There is an element of truth in that, but I don't think it applies so much in Congress as it does downtown. I remember when I first came into government and was at the Library of Congress. This was when the government was quite small, there was a woman whom I thought was very wise. She said, "The real problem is with the Civil Service laws. They judge the importance of your position by the number of people you supervise, and until they change that basic approach to the evaluation of jobs and their relative worth," she said, "there will always be the tendency to grow." I can see that in an executive bureaucracy, but I don't think it is the main cause of growth in the Congress.

RITCHIE: Were there any members of the Senate whom you thought put together particularly effective staffs, or really used their staffs wisely?

VALEO: I'd have to think for a minute to see if there were any that were really good. I didn't know enough about the inner structure of those offices. I know which senators functioned effectively and which ones were always harassed and which ones were not. Whether that was because they had put together effective staffs or not I don't know. So I can't really answer that question with any certitude.

RITCHIE: It's a hard one to judge. I know that from time to time at elections they've said that this senator lost because his staff could never keep track of what he had done in constituent services, etc

VALEO: Well, I'm sure Hatfield with his automated system has been very effective. Certainly Mansfield kept up—if you're looking at it from that angle, I was looking at it more in terms of substantive legislation—but from the point of view of keeping up with your constituent needs, I think many of them have done that. Anyone who was reelected you might say has done that well and has organized his office well enough for that.

RITCHIE: In terms of the legislative side, Senator Ted Kennedy always gets a lot of credit for having a well-oiled staff.

VALEO: Yes, his only problem is that he never gets anything passed! He has a lot of professional competence on his staff, but they get very few things passed. Maybe the staff is operating in a vacuum.

RITCHIE: The Culver Commission was just one of a couple of major reform efforts in the 1970s, with the setting up of minority staffs, and the Stevenson-Brock effort to reorganize committees. What was the motivation in the 1970s for all of these attempts to reform the mechanisms of the Senate?

VALEO: I think it was the great freeing of the Senate from the restraints of the old system, which one might describe as the Mansfield Senate. I think this was the major factor. He may have had great personal resistances to some of these pressures for change that grew up, but the effect of the kind of leadership which he ran was to encourage people to think in new ways about how the Senate ought to organize and how it ought to act. Well, when you say every senator must be equal, and you mean it, as Mansfield did, that leads to a whole new line of thinking. How do you make them equal? How do you get more democratic procedures in committee systems? So that was one area of this explosion.

Another one was I think that political scientists were coming into their own in this period, insofar as Congress was concerned. Again I go back to Ernest Griffith, whom I think is sort of the granddaddy of most of this. Political scientists began to make a very significant input at this point into the way the Congress was structured and functioned. A lot of them became members of committee staffs. Some of them were at the Library. A lot of them came in as professional consultants in one form or another, or just as volunteers for that matter. They came out of the universities, a good many of them. I think these were the main sources of this revolution, if you will. But the key factor, for better or for worse, was Mansfield, because he spoke of a Senate which not only welcomed this kind of innovation—personally he may not

have, but he spoke in those terms, and having spoken in those terms this was one of the consequences that flowed from it.

Bear in mind, too, that this was the period in which a lot of faith in the presidency and the bureaucracy was lost because of Vietnam. So many of the people who would have normally turned to those channels, particularly people out of the universities, began to look somewhere else to make some weight felt and to try to push the government in the direction in which they thought it ought to go. And here was the Senate, which was at this point opened up by Mansfield, and many of them came to the Senate. There was a great flow to the Capitol of the kind of people who would normally not even have thought of going to Congress with any idea or any belief or complaint. They would have automatically have thought in terms of the presidency or the executive departments. People like Dick Neustadt, for example, and others who came down to eat crow because they were essentially presidentially-oriented and really didn't see much value in any of the other bodies in the government. Because the Senate played this rather unique role of counterfoil for an executive branch and a president sort of gone wild, on this Vietnamese thing, they came to the Senate as a last hope, almost in desperation. And of course, as we've noted in connection with the Vietnamese war, there's only so much you can do from the Senate about the kind of things that are properly done

by the executive branch. This is sort of what happened, in the sixties especially, and into the seventies.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier that Senator Mansfield said, "We'd better get out because it's going to get worse."

VALEO: Yes. I used the other phrase. I used: "Après nous, le deluge."

RITCHIE: Did you talk with him in advance about his decision to retire?

VALEO: Yes, he talked to me several times. I wrote his farewell statement. But before we got around to doing it, he'd been up and down this ladder a few times. One time when the Senate went real bad he said, "You know, I really don't need this job. Why should I shorten my life?" There were a couple of times he threatened in private to quit. But I could tell when he was getting close to actual retirement. I was really kind of sharing the feeling myself, because I had been around almost as long as he was, just about the same period of time. He talked to me about it, and he talked about taking care of people on the staff. I guess at this point he had decided to send Beth Shotwell up to the policy committee to take over because we had a vacancy there. He wanted to relieve the people who had been with him a long time and make sure they were taken care of after he left. He began to get very concerned with that.

Then he began to get concerned with me. I told him on a number of occasions not to worry about it, that if he really was ready to leave there was no problem. I said, "I have enough retirement and I'd just as soon go when you go." He said, "No, no, you have to stay here," and we'd go through this periodically. Then finally he must have talked to his wife about it. She was the kind of woman who might go one way one day and then change her mind for the next day. I felt that finally she had come around to agreeing to the idea of retirement and then he ran in quickly to the Senate floor to do it before she changed her mind. So that's the way it was done.

RITCHIE: Did she have a lot of influence on him?

VALEO: Oh, a great influence. I think you have to know about the background of the family. Some of this has been written up, but I don't think her role is fully understood in it. She was a schoolteacher, I believe, in Montana, and he was at that point a grade school graduate when he came back out of a number of years in military service of one kind or another, at a rather low level. He'd been in China and in the Philippines and served as a common foot soldier, I guess, a PFC in one service, the Marines. He'd served in all three services, and he'd gone in at a very early age. He'd lied about his age. When he came back I guess he was working as a mucker in the mines and somehow met Maureen, maybe through her family, who were interested in politics.

She encouraged him to go back to school, and he got his high school equivalent rather quickly and then went on, I'm sure with her encouragement and help, and got his M.A. He began teaching Far Eastern and Latin American history in Missoula. I guess they were married at that point, but life was very tough for them in that period. When he first ran, his campaign was handled primarily by his students. He didn't have any money, machine or anything else, his machine was mostly his students. I remember when he was in the House I used to go over and his wife worked at the office every day in that period. Then came the Senate.

RITCHIE: And she was something of an advisor to him during this period?

VALEO: I think whenever he felt he had a major political decision to make, whether to do something or not to do something, she came into the picture in some way. I know that he would do that with any of the speeches I drafted for him which might have been of a highly controversial and climactic nature in terms of a policy, something which was obviously going to get a lot of public attention if he did it. Before doing it he would take counsel with her. He'd say, "I'm going to take this one home with me." That usually meant he was going to consult with her on it. In the earlier political campaigns she was quite active. Later on she didn't do too much of that.

RITCHIE: Did you concur with him on the retirement, or did you try to talk him out of it?

VALEO: No, quite the opposite. I didn't encourage him, but I certainly didn't discourage him. I made it very clear that if he was worried about me and what was going to happen to me, that that was not a worry and that he shouldn't. Whatever was right for him he should do. I didn't really have any strong feelings one way or the other. I could have stayed around for a little while longer, but if it meant going that day it wouldn't have made any difference. I felt that very strongly in the job as secretary of the Senate, that had I not been in that kind of personal position, had I not had the leadership support that I had, the job would have been an intolerable one, particularly when it got involved with the federal elections and the campaign contribution law. I had to have that independence, first of all of income, and my retirement was adequate for that, and I had to have his support, because otherwise I would have had great difficulty with the job. I think any secretary of the Senate, and perhaps even more in the future, will have to be conscious of that, until such time as the support services, if they ever do, get out from under strictly political pressures and the whole system has to get out, not just the secretary's offices.

RITCHIE: You mentioned also that Mansfield was very insistent that you stay on as secretary.

VALEO: Yes, this was one of the few real problems in our relationship. I didn't really want to stay on. I mean, I had no objections to staying on for a few months to get [Robert] Byrd started, but I'd really had enough of the Senate, I felt I had made my major contribution. But he was very insistent. He said he had discussed it with Byrd and that Byrd said it was all right, there was no problem with it. Even up until that point I said, "Are you sure? Because I don't mind staying on for a few months, but I really don't need it. I've got some other ideas and some things I want to do." I'd begun to work out in my own mind what I wanted to do afterward. He said, "No, no, it's all taken care of." Well, it wasn't taken care of, and the net result was that in the caucus Stan Kimmitt made a play for the job. He had been making a play for it all along, for a long period of time. He didn't really want the job of secretary of the Senate, he wanted the job of sergeant at arms. Nordy Hoffman had expressed concerns about that to me at an earlier time. But Byrd wanted Kimmitt off the floor, apparently, and had indicated that he wasn't going to change Nordy Hoffman, so Kimmitt decided that he'd run for secretary. I guess [Ernest] Hollings got involved in it, because Hollings was connected with the Senate Campaign Committee. All of this had to do with the campaign committee—at least this is the way I pieced it together later—and Hollings had made a commitment to Nordy Hoffman to take care of him in some way, and he must have made the same commitment to Stan Kimmitt on the assumption that I

would leave—it was not personally directed against me. He had just assumed that I would leave when Mansfield left, I'm sure that's the case. As a matter of fact, Hollings wanted me to take the job of historian! Afterwards he said, "Why don't you take the job as historian?" and I explained to him that I didn't want that, that that was not what I would like to do. But once learning that Kimmitt was after the secretary's job, I felt that I had to stay with it through an election and be defeated if nothing else, but I couldn't withdraw under pressure. Again, Mansfield trying to do I'm sure the right thing, wound up giving me a problem by getting me into a situation that I had no desire to be in at all. I would have been glad to have been free of it. But having been challenged, then I felt it necessary to stay with it, if for no other reason than to sort out who my friends were and who weren't.

RITCHIE: Once you found out that Stan Kimmitt was running against you, did you campaign for reelection?

VALEO: Yes, for one day. I called every member. I guess I reached almost every member. It was on a Sunday—didn't find out until a Sunday. I made all the calls, but by that time the commitments had already been made, I'm sure again on the same assumption, many of them, that I would not be running and that I would have nothing to do with it.

RITCHIE: You didn't find any old wounds opening up at that stage?

VALEO: No, not at all. Oh, maybe two or three that I had been a little tough on in the campaign contributions law and had not yielded on what they thought might be desirable.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you also at that stage, looking at the Democratic party as it stood at the time when you left, and the divisions within it: what was the nature of the Democratic party by 1976 in the Senate? Were they together? Were they divided? Was it a fragmented party?

VALEO: No, I don't think it was fragmented. I think it was cohesive enough. It was not at the height of its unity under Mansfield. I think that came earlier. But it was still quite cohesive. Probably what brought it together most, even more than the Vietnamese War, was the Watergate thing. I think that was probably the height of party unity, but that was really all Senate unity as well, one could even go beyond that. It was the apex of the Mansfield Senate, if I can put it that way, because 80 or 90 percent of the Republicans plus almost without exception, maybe one or two, maybe Long of Louisiana or one or two others might have been less inclined to go along with the rest on the Democratic side on Watergate, but not more than two or three. They were all united in the belief that Nixon had to go. The only

question was how you were going to do it. So I think that was the height of party unity and Senate unity and from then on I think there was some falling off. But when we left it was still essentially a unified party.

There was no other potential leader involved at that point that they wanted to replace Mansfield with. I never even heard a rumor of a replacement of Mansfield. Members, I think, on the whole were quite contented to be Democrats, at least as far as the Senate was concerned; they might have had trouble in their states by being Democrats but certainly not in the Senate. Harry Byrd [Jr.], who was at the end of the party so to speak, still preferred to be a Democrat rather than a Republican and he met with us as part of the Democratic caucus. So it was a unified party, and it was only later after Mansfield left that it began to break up.

RITCHIE: I wondered about how deep the roots of the division between the hawks and the doves had gone? Stan Kimmitt, I suspect, was probably identified with the more conservative military-oriented Democrats, like Henry Jackson, and John Stennis. You were identified with Mike Mansfield, who was more with the antiwar group. Were there any lingering problems about that in the party?

VALEO: Not at all. I don't think so. At that point just about all of them were doves. If they weren't, they weren't talking. Even Jackson I think would have been ready to see the war end at that point, quite ready to see it end. No, it had to do more with politics and favors and that sort of thing. Kimmitt was doing a lot of favors for a lot of people; and I was not doing any favors at that point. I did them earlier, but I didn't do it at that point, and that's the way it is in politics.

RITCHIE: "What have you done for me lately?"

VALEO: That's right, the famous [Alben] Barkley dictum.

RITCHIE: During the period that Kimmitt was the Democratic secretary, did you work well with him?

VALEO: I didn't have much to do with him. He was on the floor most of the time. I had very little to do with him, actually.

RITCHIE: I've always found it interesting that Mansfield would have a man with a military background in that post.

VALEO: Well, that's one of the appointments that he later regretted, and was very honest in saying it to me. I think I told you that when he originally thought of appointing Kimmitt I had had some sounds from the Montana office which made it clear they didn't think it would be such a good idea, and that I had tried

to suggest an alternative to Mansfield, without ever mentioning Kimmitt. But he was very adamant in the way he slapped me down on that. There were two or three appointments or people he felt later rather disappointed in. One was Charlie Ferris and another one was Stan Kimmitt. When Stan Kimmitt first came in he had him in the majority leader's office before the shift-over had come so that he could become secretary for the majority. He took my old desk and the first thing he did was put up a plaque, something by Elbert Hubbard, a poem or a wise saying by Hubbard which came right out of the Rover Boy treatises of an earlier period, as I remembered them. This one was "If you're working for someone you must be real loyal to him," and so forth. Well, this really rubbed Mansfield the wrong way! He felt a little sick to his stomach on this one. He said, "Jesus, the first thing he did was to hang that up over his desk!"

But Kimmitt had a lot of ins with the military, and that meant military planes when you needed them and a number of things of that sort, and that was an important asset. And then he had also been a student of Mansfield's in Montana, so that gave him another claim, and apparently he had been a fairly good student. But Mansfield was furious with him, partly because of his retirement situation. Kimmitt was drawing a couple of pensions as well as drawing the Senate salary. Mansfield had the pay schedule that changed so that Kimmitt's total income from the government

wouldn't be about 30 percent more than Mansfield's. That was another thing that gave him a lot of trouble in connection with that appointment.

Charlie Ferris was another one he got very angry with. Charlie was a politician and a conniver. I guess he got in through Ken Teasdale who was staff director of the policy committee and had been a highly effective lawyer in the civil rights struggle. He brought in Charlie Ferris, and later wrote a letter of apology for having done so. Ferris was always running around the Senate looking for the guy who was going to be the next president. He wanted to attach himself to him. He tried Humphrey and he tried Bobby Kennedy and Teddy Kennedy and two or three others that he thought might be possibilities, and Mansfield just despised that sort of thing. But then of course Mansfield got eighty or so senators to sign a petition praising Ferris to the sky in order to get him appointed to the FCC under the other dictum—the LaGuardia political dictum—that in politics you're always doing for your enemies what you should be doing for your friends. But it's all part of the game.

RITCHIE: You mentioned also that Senator Byrd and Kimmitt didn't get along very well.

VALEO: When I first got wind that Kimmitt wanted the job, I went to see Byrd and Byrd said, "I think he's got it." I wasn't

close to Byrd, but I knew him, and I knew enough, and I assumed that he had discussed this with Mansfield, and he had agreed with Mansfield that I'd stay on. But I don't think he had counted on the Kimmitt thing at that time. I think that was valid. But the word apparently had gotten around that Byrd wanted Kimmitt, which was not really the truth. I could tell that from the calls that I made afterwards. But when I went to see him, he said, "I think he's got it, Frank." "Well," I said, "it doesn't change it. I think I've got to go through with it in any event." I said, "I just feel from the point of view of my own conscience I have to do that." I said, "One thing I think you might consider doing, if he does win it, is that I think I'd better stay on for two months to make sure that there's a smooth transition, because I think there have been a lot of changes and I'm really the only one that's privy to most of them. I think in a two-months period we can make a smooth transition." "Oh," he said, "I'll do that right away. You don't have to worry about that. Make it three months." Which was the way it was done, eventually. He moved immediately after the caucus had decided to let it be effective three months later.

RITCHIE: What was Senator Byrd's relationship to Senator Mansfield? How well did they work together?

VALEO: That's a hard question to answer. They worked all right, but they certainly were not close. Byrd kept his own counsel most of the time as did Mansfield. Byrd seemed only

interested in floor proceedings and in smaller bills. He was doing favors for members who had bills they wanted passed. In the meetings with Carl Albert and the House leadership we'd be talking about major issues, what are we going to do on Watergate or Vietnam, and he'd bring up some little bill that some member was interested in and he would ask the House leaders, "How long are you going to hold it up in the House?" That was the way he worked and that reflects, in a way, what's happened to the Senate. It's become more of a state legislature than it used to be. It's lost some of its uniqueness, I think.

RITCHIE: Well, Senator Byrd has certainly been much more interested in procedure and in the rules than Senator Mansfield ever was.

VALEO: Mansfield never was interested in that sort of thing. He used to get furious at the parliamentarians because they couldn't get the floor situation clear for him. Or at least he couldn't understand them when they tried to explain it.

RITCHIE: I wondered how useful it was to have a whip who was so thoroughly steeped in the rules.

VALEO: He liked having Byrd on the floor. It made life a lot easier for him. Byrd was perfectly willing to close the Senate at night, almost every night, and that sort of thing. So Mansfield felt greatly relieved. Byrd got very effective at

propounding unanimous consent agreements, but bear in mind that he was working with Mansfield backing, and people knew that. So what he had in those last days of Mansfield was really Mansfield's influence. When he began to go on his own, then he began to run into very great problems, in part because he was much more partisan in his viewpoint. Partisan in an odd kind of way. I mean, he's not exactly Mr. Democrat, but he's partisan in terms of Byrd and Byrd's leadership ability on the floor. He used to express himself in those terms, and that of course is precisely what Mansfield did not do. It's one of the things that made it very difficult for Byrd to understand after Mansfield why things were not running as they ran with Mansfield.

He never had a high regard for Mansfield's ability as a legislator. He just thought that Mansfield was obviously not a leader of any kind, because leaders are supposed to lead, and obviously lead, not lead subtly as Mansfield did. You're supposed to be first, not last. But the Senate works on a Chinese pattern, or the College of Cardinals pattern. In a way it's a devious body, but that's the wrong word. It isn't a devious body, it's just that if you have ambitions you keep them to yourself in the Senate, and eventually all things come to you.

RITCHIE: Speaking of ambitions, the challenge that Byrd made to Ted Kennedy was one of the more dramatic changes in the Senate, back in 1971. Byrd challenged Kennedy and won by a very narrow vote against Kennedy's expectations.

VALEO: Yes. I think [Warren] Magnuson was the key vote in that. He was angry at Kennedy for something, I forget what it was. But I remembered there was something that bothered him, troubled him, Magnuson talked to me about it at the time. I think that was the key vote. He probably drew Jackson and one or two of the others with him. He should normally have been a Kennedy vote, except for something Kennedy had done or said. Then you had Chappaquiddick. It was a low point for the whole Kennedy family mystique. It just reached the saddest point of the whole experience.

RITCHIE: What was Mansfield's role in that election?

VALEO: Totally neutral. He didn't try to defend Kennedy. He made one broad statement, that the leadership was satisfied with the present structure. He would never go further than that, never did in any of the elections. It made Pastore extremely angry at him one time for this reason. He wouldn't endorse Pastore who was his friend and staunch supporter. He said, "This is a decision for the caucus, not for me."

RITCHIE: Did you have a sense that he was dissatisfied with Kennedy as whip in any way?

VALEO: No. He gave no sense of being dissatisfied with Kennedy. On the other hand, he gave no sense that the Senate would fall apart if Kennedy weren't reelected. I think he was probably relieved that Kennedy was defeated. Again, I'm going on assumptions here, but only for two reasons: First of all I think he was worried about the Kennedy family and I think I mentioned he felt they were operating under a bad star and they would always be having troubles and that it would probably kill Ted Kennedy just like it killed his brothers if he kept moving forward in politics. I think that was part of it. Furthermore he didn't like Kennedy's staff people. He had trouble with Kennedy's staff people. I did too. They were pressing, furiously ambitious. One of them later became a congressman from Utah, I'm trying to think of his name, and then he tried to run for the Senate again just a few years ago and was defeated. He was Kennedy's floor man and he was always on the floor when Kennedy was whip. Mansfield did not like him, he had real reservations about him. His name was Wayne Owens.

RITCHIE: You mentioned about how when Senator Byrd took over from Senator Mansfield he was surprised that things didn't run quite the way he expected they would. I was wondering what your evaluation of Senator Byrd has been as the Democratic leader since then.

VALEO: You come to what you want your Democratic leader to do and what do the times demand that he be. If I haven't already made it clear I'd like to state it again. In the Mansfield period you had really three great issues in a historical sense, one being the 1964 Civil Rights bill, another one the Vietnamese War, and the third Watergate. The demand was for a national leader in the Senate, in part because the presidency was the source of the difficulties, and in part because the House leadership at that point was unable to perform the national leadership function for a variety of reasons, perhaps constitutional but also because of the personalities involved. You had John McCormack, who grew up in the Roosevelt period and never even thought that anything like national leadership could come out of a legislative body. This was a place where you sat around and did what the president wanted or didn't, or you dragged your feet if he had something that you didn't want, but you certainly never thought of leading the country from the speaker's seat if you were John McCormack. You thought of your own constituency and maybe doing some odds and ends of good national legislation.

Carl Albert might have had that capacity, but he wasn't in the job long enough and he didn't command that kind of respect in the House. I think on the whole Carl Albert was a good speaker and a very bright man, but the House being what it is, and particularly in those times, I don't think Carl Albert could have

performed it over there, and I don't think he had any inclination to perform it. From our joint leadership meetings, I would say he was perfectly prepared to defer to Mansfield, because Mansfield had already established essentially a national reputation, in the sense that the others had not. So that in a way, with a president who couldn't perform, you had to have some national figure and some place within the government where the national function could be performed, and this I think was why Mansfield was the kind of leader he was. In effect, the times demanded that kind of a leadership somewhere. In a way, it was just like the times leading up to the postwar civil rights struggle. The only place you could perform the leadership role was in the courts, and [Earl] Warren performed that role in many ways at a time when neither Eisenhower nor anyone in the Congress could have done so. I think that explains in a way Mansfield in the Mansfield Senate.

Byrd became leader, you had a [Jimmy] Carter administration to begin with, which meant it was your own administration, which limits what a leader can do, just as Mansfield was limited during the Kennedy period. Until the breakdown of the relationship with Johnson, he was very much limited in what he could do in terms of national leadership, or the kind of impression that he could exude in that setting. So I think one has at least to recognize that any Democratic leader coming first of all in a Carter administration, coming after Mansfield, was in a tough spot. As someone

might have said it was a very tough act to follow, partly because the issues weren't there. You can say you had the Iranian hostages and issues of that kind, but those are footnotes in history. What could you do in any event with that kind of an issue? When you think of anything else that happened during the Carter administration you're talking about contracting the government and putting it back in the hands of the people. You can wear a sweater and make a fireside chat, or you can walk up Pennsylvania Avenue, which is a nice public relations gesture, but in the total sweep of history it has a very limited meaning. You had that kind of a situation. Nobody felt Carter should be doing other things from what he was doing, the public's impression was that he was oh, a nice enough man, but really kind of a minor figure.

So you start with that, there were no great demands being made on the government at the time. So you had a Byrd. I don't know what Byrd's ultimate ambitions are. If he ever had any ambitions for the presidency I don't think he's had them for some years. Maybe he wants to go on the court. I suppose that's a possibility, but the older he gets the less likely that is. So he makes his role in the Senate. His whole viewpoint of the world was essentially a limited one. He began to expand it somewhat by going to China and going to Russia, and he's been doing it more in recent years, but at the beginning he had very little interest in foreign problems, other than keeping defense strong, in a national

sense he was concerned with that. He had been on the wrong side of the civil rights issue, which reduced his effectiveness considerably. I mean, no liberal would trust him after that no matter what happened. He became in a sense a state legislative leader. What else is there for him? There is nowhere in the Democratic party, in the Senate or outside of the Senate, the kind of a readiness to face new issues which demand a different kind of leadership. Now that may come. One more defeat for the Democrats and you may begin to see that kind of demand coming, but it's not there yet, and if it is then you're going to have a different kind of leadership in the Senate again.

RITCHIE: I wondered if Senator Byrd reflected the changes in the Senate in the sense that what goes on on the floor seems to be less important than what goes on in the committees, and that what the Democrats were looking for was somebody to make the trains run on time on the floor rather than to really be a leader of the party?

VALEO: In a way that's maybe all you need at this point. I don't know that the national leadership of the Democratic party can come from the Senate even in the next election. I think it's going to have to come from somewhere else. It would almost have to come from the governorships. That almost seems to be inevitable.

RITCHIE: Why do you think the Jimmy Carter administration, coming in with a Democratic majority in the Senate and House, seemed to be so much at odds with the Congress, when you'd think that they would have been pulling together?

VALEO: I don't think that they were really that much at odds. I think what you had there was the discomfort among Democrats in the Congress that they were going to lose a lot of elections unless Jimmy Carter made a better impression than the impression he was making. I think that's mostly where the dissent was. It's interesting, Carter first came down to the Senate after the Pennsylvania primary. When it looked very clear that he was going to be the nominee, shortly thereafter he came down to a Democratic caucus. Mansfield introduced him around and he made a very decent impression. Everybody figured, "Well, he is a pleasant surprise." I personally had great difficulties seeing a president coming from a small town in Georgia at that point in the country's history. I just didn't think you could produce a president in that area. But I must say I was completely wrong. Carter first of all had some appeal when he won the Pennsylvania primary, and then when he came down to the Senate I saw the appeal. It was a simplicity, not an unsophisticated simplicity, but it was nevertheless a simplicity and it registered very genuinely. Everybody was enthralled with him, as a matter of fact. He seemed like such a welcome relief after all of the

pressures that we'd been under for so many years. I think it was Hubert Humphrey who got up and suggested that the caucus unanimously endorse him, and they did, they unanimously endorsed his candidacy.

RITCHIE: But he never did really have a strong relationship with Congress, did he?

VALEO: No. But a president doesn't really have to develop one. Roosevelt had no strong relationship with Congress. He had a relationship with several congressmen and he dominated the Democratic party but he didn't have a strong relationship with Congress. Truman had it, and I'm not so sure that was healthy. I think it's a kind of in-breeding which is not necessarily the best way to do it. Johnson, you might say, had it, and look what happened. So the fact that Carter didn't have a close relationship with Congress is not a decisive consideration in my judgment, any more than in the case of Reagan. Obviously he's handling the presidency almost independent of Congress, and Congress doesn't know what to do about it. I'm sure there's a lot of hostility, particularly in his own party on this, but they don't know what to do about it. Great presidents root themselves in the voters as their own constituency, not through Congress. They let Congress stew in its juice occasionally if that's what it wants to do. But it's not easy to do that, and it's become increasingly difficult with the two-term limitation on the presidency.

RITCHIE: Carter appointed Mansfield to be ambassador to Japan. Was that Carter's initiative, or did Mansfield express any interest in it?

VALEO: I think Mansfield expressed an interest in an embassy. I think he wanted China, but that had already apparently been promised to Leonard Woodcock as part payment for labor's support. I gather he did a rather creditable job in China, the reactions were good.

RITCHIE: What was it that made Senator Mansfield want to become a diplomat just as he was retiring from the Senate?

VALEO: Well, you know he was always interested in foreign policy. We had traveled so much abroad and he knew the world. I guess that's the way he felt he wanted it. I'm surprised he's stayed as long as he has. I should have thought he'd have enough after four or five years of it. But then he seems intrigued by the idea of building up records of longevity. He's going to go in the Guinness Book of World Records for a number of things: the longest serving majority leader. And I must say, we never went into the minority while he was majority leader. And here he is the longest serving ambassador to Japan in the history of the country. I knew he would be all right for it. I knew he would have no trouble in the job, but I didn't think he would stay that long. I should think he'd have gotten tired of it. But then you

come back to the question, what are you going to do when you come back? Go to Florida and take it easy? Go to Montana? He's not going to go back to Montana, it's too cold there now.

RITCHIE: Have you seen him in Japan since he's been there?

VALEO: Oh, yes, several times. But I don't keep in close contact with him.

RITCHIE: He seems to be relishing the position, I gather.

VALEO: Yes, I guess he likes it. Again, I think you come back to his wife. She'll make the decision, and it will happen the same way: she'll say "We've been here long enough," and he'll say "All right," and then he'll get in quick with his resignation before she can change her mind. I think that's probably the way it will work.

RITCHIE: Looking back over your own career as secretary of the Senate, what were your proudest accomplishments?

VALEO: If you're thinking in terms of the office of the secretary, as distinct from my second role, or probably my first role which was as an advisor to Mansfield . . .

RITCHIE: Why don't we look at each role.

VALEO: Yes, there are two of them. I think that in terms of the secretary's role, I think the effort to push the structure of the Senate staff in the direction of a nonpartisan, nonpolitical grouping, except for the principal figures in the office, the secretary and possibly the assistant secretary, but certainly the secretary. I don't think there's any desirability in having that a nonpolitical office at this point given the way the Senate functions or the Senate's history. At some time that may become desirable, but it's not now. I think my efforts to push it in that direction; I think the establishment of the new offices first of the curator and the historian—not to flatter you people here, but I think the concept of this office is an important one, and I think the way [Richard] Baker and you and the other people have developed it has added great luster to the Senate. I think those things are important. I think my efforts to preserve the dignity of the Senate and to give a larger sense of their role to the people who work in the secretary's office and their importance to the Senate and the nation, which I tried to communicate to them and which I think has not always been the case, I think those are the things I'm very contented with. I don't know if I mentioned this earlier, but when I first came into the office, my predecessor, Emery Frazier, had brought in all of the black employees. Did I mention that incident?

RITCHIE: Yes.

VALEO: I don't want to go over it again, but I think by the time I left that attitude had changed greatly in the secretary's office. That was a kind of carry over almost of a pre-Civil War period in the Senate's history. Bear in mind, I'm not interested in breaking down tradition. I think one of the biggest mistakes the Senate made was to yield to press pressure and close the barbershop. I thought that was a very desirable kind of carry over from the past, as distinct from the one involving the black employees in the secretary's office. I think those things were very important to me, and I felt very good about having left them the way I left them. And I must say, to Stan Kimmitt's credit, and certainly to Bill Hildenbrand's, that they both continued that pattern. I don't want to write the book on this secretary until its over; sometimes it takes a little longer to learn what you're really supposed to be doing in an office of public trust. So I think some of that will hold no matter what kind of secretary you have, it's bound to. Those things made the job very worthwhile doing.

RITCHIE: What about on the other side?

VALEO: On the other side, it was a kind of personal vindication designing the strategy for the civil rights floor battle. That stands out very strongly in my mind. In part

because not too long before that I had made my first vote count and was about eighteen off, so I felt that in that period of time I learned very quickly what was involved and how you could do it. I think that strategy, which involved mostly the keeping of a quorum on the floor, and then of course the bill itself, seeing that bill go through after weeks and weeks and weeks of effort to the vote on cloture, that was a great moment. Then, of course, on the Vietnamese War, the statements I wrote which were widely quoted in the press, even though my name wasn't attached to them and which probably helped to form public opinion, also helped to make Johnson describe me as "the most dangerous man in the American government" at one point, among his more effervescent statements. I think those things stand well with me.

RITCHIE: Did you ever feel a problem in the degree of anonymity that's required of a really good staff person, of giving your best to somebody else whose name will go on it?

VALEO: No, I did not, I think because in that period of my life I would not have had the capability of doing it in my own name. I mean, for personal problems of various kinds, personal limitations, it would not have been possible for me to do that. So that I never felt that. As a matter of fact, I sort of welcomed the anonymity of that period. I don't think I'd react the same way today, but at that time I think it was a unique kind of combination. Mansfield needed someone like that, and I needed

to be someone like that in that period. I think those two things came together in a very fortuitous combination for that period of time.

End of Interview #15

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

POST-SENATE YEARS

Interview #16
Wednesday, December 4, 1985

RITCHIE: When you left the Senate as secretary of the Senate, did you have any plans in mind what you wanted to do after that?

VALEO: Yes. About two years before I left the Senate, I sat down at the swimming pool in the apartment where I lived and began to jot down what the world would look like afterwards. I took a week off and just sat at the swimming pool and swam and jotted down notes on where I might go and what I might do. Among the things I listed was taking a shot at business, not necessarily to make any great profit, but just to see whether it was something I could do. It would be a business that I would relate to my experiences in government, although I wouldn't take on a lobbying job for profit per se. I didn't rule out lobbying, but I was not going to go the route which was then already becoming a fairly common one of working in the Senate for a while and then going out and making a lot of money on the strength of the Senate experience and contacts. I knew I couldn't do that, nor did I want to do that. But I thought there was a role for someone who understood both the Far East and the United States and the way government and politics work in both places, to act as a kind of bridge and

perhaps encourage or stimulate, as a catalytic agent, to promote more effective relations between the two places in a range of occupations.

That was one area which I thought I would try to develop. Then I put down a note that I'd want to write a couple of books or three books, possibly some fiction. I had thought of doing a play for years and years and years, but I had not written one since I was in my early twenties. I thought I might take another shot at drama as a form of expression. That went into the notes. I put down too that I wanted to do a good deal of traveling in places which I had been to before perhaps but never had gotten more than a quick glance while on congressional travel, the ones that had seemed to appeal to me most, with or without a wife—I think I added that—to my plans.

I was of course most interested in my son and seeing him come to maturity. He was still quite young at that point. I was almost prayerfully wishing that he'd make it to college and I noted that I would give as much time as necessary to him. That would have first priority. That's about the way it's come out. It hasn't changed. It's come close to it, very close to it. I did get out two printed studies; I didn't actually write the books, but I wrote the introductions to them and designed the studies that produced the books. Of course, they were group jobs.

I tried the play. I haven't thrown it away yet but I haven't shown it to anyone either because I don't think it's very good. I'm a pretty good judge of that, I think. It's interesting after a lapse of so many years how your whole approach to problems changes and your reaction to a theme that moves you does not necessarily lend itself to an artistic expression which would have been very natural when you were younger. But the draft is still there and I may still take one more look at it, although I don't feel under any great urgency to do so.

RITCHIE: Were there political themes to your fiction?

VALEO: The play was set in Hong Kong and concerned the efforts to penetrate the Chinese arms market, and the rivalry between the United States and Japan in that connection. That was the general theme. A twist was that the principal proponent of the American arms company was a woman who had "made" it in a man's world and had come out just as badly as a lot of men. I was also trying to show the breakdown of the structure that had flourished in Hong Kong for a couple of hundred years and how that would have to change. There was also the point that Japan would probably become the main outside stimulus for the China trade and that we would probably withdraw from Asia and our ships would come home so to speak. Those were the basic themes, but the subject didn't lend itself to an emotional treatment, or maybe I wasn't able to give it an emotional treatment at this point in my life. Someday

I might take another look at the draft. I've never even gone back to re-read it, but I did get something down on paper. That seemed to satisfy this inner irritant that has bothered me for all these years to put something down on paper in the form of a play.

RITCHIE: A lot of the journalists who come to Washington feel the urge to write a novel about their experiences. There's something that they can't say in their regular writing that they feel they can say through some form of fiction.

VALEO: Dean Acheson did some fiction writing at the end of his career in government too. I think he wrote some short stories, one of which I read. It was about on par with the way I'd write fiction at this point in my life!

RITCHIE: Well, did you seek institutional connections when you left the Senate?

VALEO: Yes. I was most anxious not to just fold up and stop. So I opened a small office on my own and did some work with the Association of Former Members of Congress, that was the writing part of it, and the conceptualization of studies. The association had no one really in that capacity, so I served them as a consultant. I also did lobby. I lobbied for the United Nations University, which was at that time getting underway in Tokyo. The president of the university, or the rector, was Jim Hester, who had been president of New York University. He came

down and asked me to please help him try to get the United States' promised contribution to the university, which had been held up in Congress for a couple of years. So the two of us really wore out a lot shoe leather walking the corridors here trying to persuade members, particularly in the Senate, to support a small contribution.

The failure to do so had left the State Department embarrassed because however reluctantly they may have been about the idea, they had agreed to try to get some money for it in an effort to encourage a Japanese initiative in international responsibility. After they had encouraged the Japanese, they seemed to fall away from the idea and the Japanese were left high and dry. They had put a lot of money up for it, and then the university looked more like a Japanese gimmick rather than a United Nations University. Hester tried to give the university another slant, not just a campus approach but rather as a hub for worldwide networks of intellectual and scientific specializations which could be brought to bear on specific worldwide problems. I don't think it ever really got off the ground.

We failed to get the contribution. Carl Marcy had tried it previously and he had failed for other reasons. We missed by about two votes, largely because of Chuck Percy, who was a very strong supporter and had taken the lead for us in the Senate. Then on the day of the vote he didn't show up on the floor. He

had an engagement somewhere else, so we failed by about two or three votes. We would have made it had Percy been there. Had we done it in the Senate, it was pretty clear that the House would go along in conference, although they were not prepared to take the initiative.

RITCHIE: Percy was also absent during the Baker-Griffith leadership fight. He was skiing in Europe apparently, and Griffith had counted on his vote.

VALEO: This was probably part of Percy's problem and why he didn't make it again on the last reelection try.

RITCHIE: Did the Senate look any different to you from a lobbyist's point of view?

VALEO: Not really. It came along about the way I expected. I knew the limitations of past Senate friendships. I didn't expect too much. There were one or two I thought I might have persuaded almost on the basis of their trust in my judgment, but I was wrong. There were a number who came through that I really did not expect. One I'm thinking of particularly was [Harry] Byrd, [Jr.] of Virginia. He had been one of the leading and articulate opponents of an appropriation for the university on the earlier attempts. I spoke with him about it and brought Jim Hester in to talk with him. He agreed to reserve judgment. He said, "You know, I've been opposed to this." He did not take the

lead in the second round. I think he voted against it, but he did not get out in front on it. [Dennis] DeConcini was the principal opponent. In a way I blame myself. I went to see him and he was waiting for me to persuade him to drop his opposition to it. I don't think I was as effective as I might have been, although it's hard to tell. I went without Hester. It would have been better had I gone with Hester, because Hester was an evangelist and he could really put the pitch in for the university.

RITCHIE: What does it take to be a good lobbyist on Capitol Hill?

VALEO: It depends on what you're lobbying for in part. If you are lobbying for what amounts to money favors, you just have to have a thick skin on your behind so that you don't mind taking kicks. I think that's the main requirement. And then I think you've got to be someone who does not easily make enemies, who doesn't get his own feelings involved, and who's prepared to do a lot of begging. It's sophisticated begging, as someone has once spoken of a similar occupation, that of trying to get money out of foundations. And one way or another you've got to be able to put thousands of dollars into campaigns that you don't really believe in just to build up the goodwill and the access which might pay off in a vote at some point on something you want which is worth millions of dollars to your client.

My own view is that Charles McC. Mathias is absolutely right: unless we get public financing of campaigns in the United States, we're going to have a government, particularly in the legislative branch, which will grow increasingly corrupt—corrupt in the sense that money will become more and more the dominant factor in deciding how votes are cast. I think TV is primarily responsible for this and I think it's outrageous that we've let an instrument which belongs properly to the entire nation get so far away from any kind of reasonable control by the nation's government. That's the way I see it.

RITCHIE: You mean television advertising?

VALEO: Yes, of course. The need for revenue. I don't mean just the advertising of politicians, that's part of it, but it's only part of it. We've touched on it in other respects as well. I think it has got to be an instrument of public educational and cultural enrichment and entertainment and in that order. It's not enough to have one public station. I think you need a lot more than that, and I think you've got to get some recognition that in political campaigns, this instrument has to be neutral, separated from money entirely. There is no way you can run a commercial television station in that fashion. So until we face that problem squarely, I think we're going to be in trouble, and I think our politics and government will grow increasingly corrupt. I see no alternative to that.

RITCHIE: Did you find that there was any difference in lobbying the Senate than there was in lobbying the House?

VALEO: I personally didn't find a great deal of difficulty. House members usually have more time for you, for one thing. They're much more specialized and much more interested in their specialization and are willing to listen. I didn't have much trouble with access anywhere, really, at that point. It was shortly after I had left and my name was still pretty well known. Most members I think realized I wouldn't be down there wasting their time and mine on something trivial, and this was not trivial. While the money amount was small, the significance of what was involved was, in my judgment, substantial. I'm sorry we didn't win it. I think it would have been a great help in our relations with Japan as well in our whole approach to the U.N.

RITCHIE: Have you had any other lobbying experiences?

VALEO: No, that's it. I've been approached on a number of occasions, including lobbying for Philippine sugar, which I turned down.

RITCHIE: I understand that you continued your international traveling.

VALEO: I did, mostly to Asia. I went to China as a guest of the Chinese government. Spent a week in Beijing as their

guest. This was shortly after Reagan's first victory and they were quite concerned as to what might happen and asked me if I would come and talk to them a little bit about the significance of the election, which I did.

I took my son with me as a beginner for a tour of the Far East, where he had never been before. I wanted him to see it, and I think I aroused an interest in him that he has subsequently followed. He did make it to college, by the skin of his teeth, in a special program at New York University for kids who looked and spoke as though they ought to be in college but whose responses to questions on exams indicated they had little background for college. They had a special program there—a kind of make-up program—that he got into, again by the skin of his teeth, largely because he made such a strong impression on the interviewer.

He told me the story later, he said, "I went in to see the interviewer and he asked me what I was going to do with my future. I said 'I'm going to be a senator.' And he said, 'Oh, you are? What makes you so interested in the Senate?' And I told him about you being the secretary of the Senate and how I'd spent a lot of my life hanging around the Senate. And the interviewer said, 'I'm curious, what does the secretary of the Senate do?'" He said, "I wanted to tell him 'he takes notes,' but instead I said, 'If you want it in a sentence, he's the hundred and first senator.' After that, the fellow said he'd try to get me into the special

course." He did get into it and he was elected in his first year to the New York University Senate as representing this special school of underdeveloped kids, I guess that's the best way to describe them. The plan of the school provided for two years in this special course, which was almost like the hundred great books kind of approach, and if the student made it, then he'd go into the third year of a regular college at the university. If he didn't, they'd give a two-year certificate that he had been there and say good-bye. Well, he made it, and he graduated with a B.A. with honors.

RITCHIE: I can tell you're really proud of him.

VALEO: Yes, I had my fingers crossed for him. I didn't know which way he was going to go. He could have gotten into drugs or something like that, like so many of the kids did. He really had no interest in studies in high school. Now he's in law school at Boston University and he'll be finishing this year.

RITCHIE: Well, he got an unusual education, growing up in the Senate.

VALEO: He did. He used to come down very frequently, especially when the Senate was in session late and he'd hang around. When he was little he had everybody naturally wound around his finger. And he'd break the typewriters and steal the supplies, but he'd do it all with a good sense of humor so that

nobody could really take after him and give him a hard time. He got to be known a good deal around the Senate. He didn't work there as a page. I didn't think that was proper. Also, I saw in some instances what the consequences of kids working as pages are and I did not like what I saw. I never believed in the page system. I thought it was one of those things, unlike the barbershop, which you didn't really need to keep for its historical curiosity value. I really think the system is bad and I think it's bad for the kids and I think it's bad for the Senate.

When the question came up of adding girls to the pages I simply thought that would multiply the original error by another factor. I can remember Everett Jordan as chairman of the Rules Committee on this. He took the matter up with me and with the majority leader and several other members. He was really very reluctant. He didn't want one of these kids getting in trouble, that was his main objection. He was in favor, I think, of getting rid of the whole system too. But it was too much ingrained and it was too much a perk that had some meaning back in the states. You could always give the appointment to the child of one of your favorite constituents and consolidate his support. Jacob Javits was pushing the idea of girl pages. Jordan finally went along with it on one condition, that if senators were going to bring girl pages in, the senators who brought them in would have to be totally and individually responsible for their appointees. There

was discussion at that time of setting up a page residence to go with the page school. That was something that started on the House side. John McCormack was especially interested, and some senators had mentioned it, but it never got to that. I think it's lucky that it didn't. We don't really need a West Point for congressional pages.

RITCHIE: As secretary you were responsible for the page school, weren't you?

VALEO: No, that came under the sergeant at arms, and I did not seek to have that shifted in any way at that time. I really did not want the responsibility. The District school system supplied the teachers for the pages. And the school had a very fine reputation. But it's hard for kids to get up and go to school for four or five hours and then work for six or seven. It's not an easy task. They are pretty much on their own. It has a lot of drawbacks.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you about some of the projects that you worked on in your post-Senate career. You did the book on comparing the American Congress and the Japanese Diet. What were the origins of that project?

VALEO: Well, I always felt that I personally knew too little about how the Diet functioned and I was interested in Asia. We would take groups of senators over to Japan from time to time

on a mission and I realized that they knew nothing about the Japanese system, and they read into it the same kinds of concepts that we have of ourselves and our own legislative body. I knew that was wrong, that it was misleading. So it occurred to me when I had time to think about it that there would be a very valid basis for doing comparative studies, not only of the Japanese legislature but of a number of other significant countries in terms of our relationships. This was especially true if the Congress intended to play an increasing role in foreign relations, which seemed to be the trend that didn't look as though it was going to be reversed. Jed Johnson and I discussed this, Jed Johnson is the executive director of the Association of Former Members, Cale Boggs had introduced me to him. Cale was president of the association at the time. He knew me well, and he suggested to Jed that I could be of help to them.

So we presented the idea to the Japan-United States Friendship Commission. We were able to get a small grant to pursue it. Then I had connections in Japan with a research institute that had done some work on Congress and was interested in Congress. We got them to line it up in Japan. I designed the studies for comparative purposes, trying to put them in really comparative terms. We had papers prepared in Japan through the Japanese research group, and then we put together a group of writers who were capable of handling the specific papers on

the United States Congress. We had an advisory group of some well-known scholars on Japan and the Congress. Out of that came a series of papers on the Japanese Diet and on comparative aspects of the United States Congress. We then took up the papers in discussions at a subsequent meeting, using both sitting members and former members of the Diet and the Congress. The results were, I thought, a very effective comparative survey. That book is now, I guess, in its second or third edition. It's been translated into Japanese and is used quite widely there and here.

RITCHIE: I was wondering which way you thought the people were more curious. Do you think the Japanese are more curious about the American system or vice versa?

VALEO: At that time the Japanese were. I think they know an awful lot about us now. We are now, I believe, showing a rapidly increasing interest in Japan. I don't know how far our knowledge of the Japanese Diet has gone, but I would still give that book out as a basic handbook for anybody who wants to understand what happens in the Japanese political system and the United States system. I think it does point up the things that are meaningful in our terms, and those which are not, and the limitations of any Japanese or United States government.

RITCHIE: The American Congress is so different than most parliamentary governments. Do you find that there is a problem of

perception between a parliament that has executive functions and the American Congress which is so divorced from the executive branch?

VALEO: This has always interested me as a problem and I did personal research on the subject. You find that the American institution of divided powers were adopted, oh, maybe 90 percent of the institutions in the original concept, were adopted from the British system as it existed in the eighteenth century, which was, of course, the time we began to move away from the crown. The various colonial governments were essentially designed from the same British pattern. We didn't have the equivalent of the House of Lords, but we had the governors' councils, which were something like the lords in the American colonies. What we started from as a nation was basically the British system of the eighteenth century elaborated and modified in the original structural design for our system of government.

After the breakaway of the colonies, the British system continued to evolve into what eventually amounted to the absolute dominance of the House of Commons with the executive power shifting from the crown into the House of Commons. Whereas the American system tended to atrophy in the form of the eighteenth century, that is, as a system of divided powers. The pressures on us were not that urgent to consolidate authority and responsibility as was the case in Britain. We were a big country.

We had lots of surplus and room for error, or for inadequate or ineffective functioning, without the whole falling apart. The British were no longer in that position, so their modifications came as a necessity. I have used this explanation for those whose systems were modeled at a later date essentially after the British system as it had worked into parliamentary dominance. Putting the comparison in historic perspective makes it a lot clearer for people to understand. This is especially true of Europeans. If you describe it in these terms, they know what you're talking about. They can see it a lot more clearly. Otherwise, it's very difficult for them to understand what amounts to a three and sometimes a four-part government, when the two houses of Congress are not getting along.

RITCHIE: I recall that Senator Fulbright used to bemoan the fact that we didn't have more of a British system, where the Foreign Relations Committee would actually be more involved in the foreign affairs of the country than it was.

VALEO: He would not have liked it had we had the British system, because by the time the British system had evolved to where it is now, the parliamentary committees had lost most of their significance, whereas ours remain as they were in the nineteenth century—highly significant. One of the reasons for evolutionary reforms of the British system was the runaway committees of the Commons. To a great extent they did what they

pleased until the advent of party responsibility. So I don't think he would have liked it quite as much as he thought he would.

RITCHIE: So the value of comparative studies sometimes is to appreciate what you have.

VALEO: Precisely, and to understand better what you have. In some ways it was an education for us and for our people to go back and to reexamine our system in terms of how it looked from another country. It's a very useful device. I'd like to see more of it done. The association has tried it in connection with Germany, but the study was primarily designed by executive branch people and they don't fully appreciate the problem of what it takes to make things clear to a legislative body, so I don't know how that study will come out. It has not been printed yet.

RITCHIE: Did you see any value in the Interparliamentary Union trips that were made, in the relations between the Congress and the various parliaments?

VALEO: Some. I only went to one or two of them. Darrell St. Claire used to handle that. All of these legislative exchanges and contacts, again in the context of the time, had value because they exposed members of Congress to other systems, other ways of thinking. If you keep in mind that in the first twenty years after the war, our only exposure to other countries to speak of was derived from the World War II experience. That

really was inadequate because we were overwhelmingly present in other countries at that time, and their governments meant relatively little because we had all the military power and later the economic power that was going to save them. So it didn't seem of any necessity to us to learn very much about their governments or anything else. We were still emerging from our own period of isolationism. I think there was a Gallup Poll that showed that right after Pearl Harbor, 70 or 80 percent of the people in the United States still didn't know that the country of India was in Asia. That gives you some measure. Anything that helped to move members of Congress abroad, to me, made sense. That's no longer necessarily the case, but at that time I think it was very desirable to encourage it in every possible way.

The congressional travel then created few problems. There was very little inclination on the part of members at the time to presume powers in foreign affairs, and to presume capabilities which they did not have. So it was essentially an educational process which put them, when they returned to the United States, in a better position to make better-informed judgments in foreign policy. They did not become so involved in detail as to intrude on the powers of the presidency. That has changed. The congressional traveling now is in quite a different vein. Today's congressmen and staff are people who often presume to deal with the kind of details in their contacts abroad that cannot be within

the purview of Congress without it being essentially a serious encroachment on the executive branch's prerogatives.

Now, if we're going to move toward an expansion of congressional power, if we're going to move towards a parliamentary system as Mr. Fulbright would have had us do, then that's different, but then you have to have a structure within the Congress which makes clear the lines of responsibility. It must also be a structure that delineates one committee's powers as a very small fraction of the total congressional powers, and each house has a set share of the constitutional powers of the government. Moreover, you've got to move the executive power, as a practical matter, into the Congress and reduce the president to a ceremonial figure. What you have now, in effect, is the staff of the president, that is the executive departments, moving very often independently of the president and making its own deals with the committees on the Hill. Somewhere in this process the integration of our policies has completely disappeared. You have a government now not by four bodies but by forty or fifty committees plus forty or fifty departments or subdepartments in the executive branch. Instead of moving towards an integrated parliamentary system, we've had a further fragmentation of a very serious nature.

RITCHIE: You've spent a lot of your time in recent years working on things connected to the Philippines. I noticed in your

files that your trips to the Philippines go back to the 1960s. In 1969 you were Senator Mansfield's representative at the inauguration of Ferdinand Marcos.

VALEO: Even earlier. My first trip to the Philippines was in 1952, out of the Foreign Relations Committee with Bourke Hickenlooper. That was my first exposure. At that time, it was a terribly war torn country. As Senator Inouye noted in a recent speech on the floor, Manila was the most devastated city of the war. It suffered really greatly, and very little was done to repair it. The initial magnanimous United States gestures to the Philippines, which included independence and war damage compensation, were also coupled with some things that were designed to protect both our military interests and our economic interests in the situation. We paid off in a kind of odd way the sacrifices of the Philippines in terms of the common effort in the war. The money was distributed randomly, and those who had lost more got more naturally. It had a certain rationale, but in terms of the situation which then existed in the Philippines, all it did was to build back the inequitable economic structure which had existed there during the colonial period. It made the newly independent country very heavily dependent on us in the early period. I think that had something to do with their rather slow recovery from the war and their slow development. This is not the whole picture, but it was part of it. We can't divorce ourselves from our own

role. We have some responsibility for what happened, even though we had divested ourselves of political control.

I saw the devastation in the first visit. I didn't know much more about it than that. I had no particular interest in the Philippines at that time, except for some research at the Library of Congress. Then I went back again during the governments of Garcia, Macapagal and one or two others of the earlier presidents. I really became interested in the country at the time the Marcoses came to power. I use the term in plural because they were a political team. We met them on a trip shortly after his first presidential victory, which was in 1964. We were coming back from a trip, Muskie was on that trip, Inouye was on that trip. We had been around the world but the trip centered on Vietnam. The Marcoses were young and had engendered great enthusiasm in the country. He was then the president-elect. We had a fellow named Bill Blair as ambassador. He was a Kennedy friend and had mis-guessed the election. The embassy assumed that Macapagal was going to win, and I guess the C.I.A. had thrown whatever financial support we were putting into it to Macapagal. He was a known quantity and we wanted to work with him. Instead, Marcos won in a very unexpected victory in that first election.

Well, that was an eye-opener to me. The embassy in Manila never forgave Marcos for winning the election. The quarrel with Marcos began at that point when he won that election. It did not

happen just over human rights later on. This is a much, much later interpretation of the difficulty. But that experience, going out to the embassy subsequently and knowing a lot of the subsequent ambassadors, and talking with a lot of the people who moved in and out of the embassy in that period impressed something on me very deeply—every embassy has its own personality. I'm talking now about almost the building. If the walls could speak they would all say a different thing but it would be the same thing over a long period of time no matter how the personnel changed. The attitudes which were formulated in the original moment of creation of the embassy seem to persist right through up until years and years later.

I'm thinking now of the first time I went to the Philippines. The embassy was in the hands of an Admiral Spruance. The embassy had all the characteristics of a high commissioner's office. They expected everything that happened in the Philippines to clear through the embassy still, even though at this point the Philippines were four or five years beyond independence. The whole attitude in the embassy was that this is the core and this is the center of Philippine life, which is clearly the kind of thing that would have happened in a high commissioner's office. Even the costumes at that point were white linen, which were again a carry over from the days of the high commissioner. That was a characteristic uniform of imperialism in Asia. You found it in Vietnam,

you found it in Hong Kong, you found it in Indonesia. Wherever you went, the foreign men wore white linen suits, which were good only for about a half a day and they would have to be laundered. The United States Embassy definitely had the personality of the office of a high commissioner. There was something known as Philippine independence, but to the embassy personnel that seemed almost an irrelevant factor. Our people, at least in their own minds, were still running the show.

At this point, the Filipinos, if they were rich enough to have anything to do with the embassy, also wore the white linen suit. But they had begun to change to the barong, which was the symbol of national dress and which Marcos wore exclusively. At the first time at embassy functions you would see Filipinos showing up in barongs, which are those embroidered long shirts that you don't put in your pants. Over the years after that, there was a slow modification of the embassy, changes from essentially a high commissioner's office in which the core of everything that happened in the Philippines really had to center on the embassy. I think that kind of thinking was challenged for the first time by the election of the Marcoses.

The Marcoses were young, first of all. The president was in his forties and she was probably thirty-five at the time. They had worked very hard to get elected—in our sense of the term "get elected." They had done a lot of campaigning up and down the

island chain, they'd organized very well for it. And they came in with a lot of promise of a new Philippines, essentially a more nationalist-oriented Philippines. They immediately ran into what you run into when you come in with anything new; you run into what's entrenched. The entrenchments were not only the United States Embassy but also those Filipinos who had been, in effect, the closest friends of the embassy, who were not necessarily the friends of the Marcoses. So as far as the embassy was concerned the Marcoses started out with two strikes against them right off the bat. They were to be regarded with high suspicion.

At this point the embassy was still wearing—I guess it had begun to shift to business suits at this point. The white linen gradually disappeared because it had become recognized as a kind of mark of the old imperialism which presumably was disappearing throughout Asia. So business suits were in order. But very few people in the embassy were ever caught in a barong, although it's perfectly good in that climate. It's a nice cool kind of clothing and rather neat looking. There was always a lot of gossip and titillation over the elaborately embroidered barongs that were worn by Marcos. The hostility toward Marcos was very apparent in Ambassador Blair, who had called the election wrong, basing his estimates, I would think, on his staff's estimate of the situation. Then embassy personnel began to suggest that Marcos had won only because he had spent so much money. But I suspect

that his opponent, Macapagal, must have had at least as much. I think his victory had very little to do with money. The Marcoses represented the new spirit of nationalism, and they represented it very well. They also represented a younger generation of leadership, United States educated and less Spanish oriented, if you will, "Filipino firsters" who were the emerging political leaders of the nation.

The revolutionaries and outlaws up in the hills were there even then. In fact, they had been there for hundreds of years. They were the products of periodic revolts on the part of farmers against oppression from a number of sources including the church—from economic oppression. The movements of rebellion in the Philippines are not new, they did not begin with the Communists, or with Marcos; they began a long, long time ago. The names changed, but essentially they derive from a number of factors in the Philippines. The armed lawlessness has to do with serious economic difficulties, and landlordism, with great family feuds, the importance of which, again, is not understood in the United States, and local injustices. The Philippine system had many parallels in old Spain. We did very little to disturb that in our period of control of the country. Instead, we added our own layer of complications and sources of lawlessness.

Marcos told me this personally. I had mentioned that I was going to Mindinao, and he said, "The problem in Mindinao is essen-

tially one you people left for us." I said, "How is, that?" He said, "Well, originally when the Americans came, Mindinao was Moslem, and the Moslems had no concept of land ownership. They were tribal groupings and the land was owned in common. There was plenty of land, there was no problem, there was no pressure on the land. If you wanted to farm, all you did was to take a piece of the tribal land and farm it. Nobody ever questioned your right to do that." He said, "But when the Americans came, the first thing they did when they took over the islands, when they got to Mindinao was to ask 'who owns this land?' They wanted to register it in some name. People looked around and said 'nobody owns it, it's anybody's.'" He said, "That was inadmissible under the American system. Somebody had to own the land. What they did was to register it in the names of the tribal chiefs."

So the tribal chiefs became the owners of the land from the point of view of American record keeping. When the pressures of immigration started to come down from the other islands and higher birth rates reached Mindinao, he explained "Christians and others came down to buy land. And who did they buy it from? They bought it from the chiefs. When they started to move into the land, the rest of the Moslems said 'This is our tribal land, you have no business here.' And they said, 'Well, I've got a piece of paper. I bought it.'" He said, "And that was the beginning of the major Moslem problem in Mindinao." Later great plantations were formed

too in this way to grow export crops. Obviously the pressures would have happened in any event, but it would have been more difficult and it might have slowed the process of land transfer which is a major source of rural violence in Mindinao.

I'm sort of rambling on this. I want to focus it, but I'm not sure how to focus it. There was also a social aspect of the breakdown of our relationships with Marcos, which happened during [G. Mennen] "Soapy" Williams' time. This is where Mrs. Marcos came into the problem. Mrs. Marcos is a very attractive, very charming woman. She was a very beautiful woman as a younger woman. She still is, but as a younger woman she was extraordinarily beautiful. And she was very talented. She was Miss Manila, I think, in some year, or Miss Philippines. But she was also a very astute and activist politician, Philippine style. The press paints her as an extravagant, over-indulged jet-setter. But I've seen her in black dresses going around among poor Filipinos and knowing exactly what needs to be done in a political sense among poor Filipinos.

To appreciate somebody like Mrs. Marcos, you really have to appreciate Philippine society. It is an extraordinary mixture of an original Malay base, well-integrated with early waves of Chinese migration, and a very powerful overlay of Spanish cultural values, eighteenth and nineteenth century cultural values from Spain. Then finally there is the powerful American input of the

twentieth century, vastly intensified as a result of World War II and its aftermath. All of this is mixed together. When Mrs. Marcos is in Europe, she is the height of elegance, which is straight out of the Spanish background. When she's on the stump, she's the Philippine equivalent of an Eleanor Roosevelt. When she's dealing with social welfare work, which is again one of her strong points, she's like a crusading nun from the churches. Her concern and her ability to move among the very poor is extraordinary. But she is also a highly competitive woman and a driving woman who in twenty years brought about a major transformation in the metropolitan area of Manila.

I think in that early period the comparisons were very evident between Jack and Jackie Kennedy and the Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the Philippines. I think it became almost a kind of unspoken rivalry. "If they can do it, we can do it better" kind of thing for Imelda Marcos. Probably this was a reaction to the humiliations of the American imperial period in the Philippines. People forget that that period was not a happy one in all respects for Filipinos. In order to pacify the Philippines in the early period, it took 150 thousand American troops. These were used—not against the Spaniards but against the Filipinos, who were in high revolt. The province of Samar, for example, suffered greatly as a result of the American occupation where an American commander pursued a scorched-earth

policy. The devastation there was something like the My Ly incident in Vietnam visited on a whole province. Samar never really recovered. It is still the most backward province in the Philippines.

So we did some very bad things in the Philippines, along with some of the things we like to pat ourselves on the back for which are genuine and valid. I would think the most important of these was the contribution of American educators to the islands. The transfer of American constitutional values and legal concepts, as distinct from the transfer of American political institutions, was also important. However, the political institutions transferred into the Philippines at that time were those characteristic of Tammany Hall which was flourishing in this period, 1900 to 1910. As in the aftermath of any war, there were a lot of carpetbaggers and other seedy characters who went to seek a quick fortune in the new colony. Many of them introduced the political and other practices of our big cities of the early 1900s. The American takeover from Spain also brought a new branch of the Catholic Church in at that point, which was essentially, I think, the New York based Catholic Church. Various protestant sects also joined in contesting what had previously been an exclusive Spanish Catholic missionary field.

During the Spanish period the persistent theme in Philippine history is the struggle between the temporal power and the

spiritual power for dominance of Philippine affairs. The church and the Spanish military governors struggled with one another for power over the poor, hapless Filipino, who was caught in the middle. The temporal power at that time came out of the Spanish government, and it was military. The religious power came out of the Spanish church, not directly from Rome. Because of the arrangements between the Spanish church and the Vatican; the Spanish kings, I believe had the power to control the appointments of Spanish cardinals and bishops. It was an exception, as I recall, in the Catholic hierarchy's usual practices.

The Philippine novels of Jose Rizal in the nineteenth century depict this struggle between the church and the temporal power for control of the country. That still persists. In its contemporary form, the Filipino Cardinal Jaime Sin, who loves to speak of his house as the "House of Sin" is its personification. He's a Filipino, but he's essentially carrying on the same historic struggle between the temporal power—which is now a Philippine-based power as personified by President Marcos—and the church. I think this is one of the underlying aspects of what we are dealing with in this situation.

It is not a recent development. Very early in the game, within the first three or four years of Marcos' first term, I had Jesuits coming in to see me at the secretary's office complaining about the deteriorating conditions in the Philippines. Now, this

is in the first three or four years when there was a lot of hope. These were American Jesuits who had been working with Philippine conferees and I suspect they sensed their own positions gradually being undermined by what might be called the stimulation of "Philippinization" by the promising Marcos administration. What we're seeing now in political strife in the Philippines is, in part, a reflection of this background. There are other factors, but the church-state tension is certainly a part of it.

RITCHIE: You also mentioned Soapy Williams.

VALEO: Oh, that's the social part of it. Soapy Williams went out there as ambassador. And Soapy Williams was the first U.S. ambassador to put on a barong. He went up and down the islands campaigning as though he were running for governor of Michigan. It was a little perplexing as to why he was running for office so vigorously in the Philippines. I don't think Filipinos disliked him per se, they just thought he was some sort of an odd ball. They couldn't quite figure out what he was trying to do. His wife clashed with Imelda Marcos immediately for the feminine leadership of Manila society, if you will. That apparently was a factor of the burgeoning hostility with the embassy towards Mrs. Marcos.

I have this second hand, but I was told that Mrs. Marcos was beginning to make a collection of Chinese antiquities which were

being unearthed in the Philippines and was filling Malacanon with these treasures. Again at the embassy, not to be outdone, Mrs. Williams was also buying a lot of these things. The Philippine Congress in the meantime had passed a law against the export of antiquities, which apparently was unknown to Mrs. Williams or ignored by her. She then decided that she was going to hold an auction of these things among the American community to raise money for charity. She did, and of course the people who bought them wanted to take them home. She was accused then of trying to take out Philippine artifacts. So there was a flap. It was petty stuff, but it fed the growing antagonism in the embassy towards Marcos.

He was the first president of the Philippines to be reelected. He invited Mansfield to the second inauguration in 1969, and Mansfield sent me instead to represent him. I had good connections at the United States Embassy at the time. The prevailing wisdom at the embassy at that point—again they had misread the election and expected him to be defeated—was that his victory was due to fraud and the expenditure of vast amounts of money. They couldn't understand how anybody could get reelected to the presidency in the Philippines. It had never happened before. In the second Marcos administration the unsuitability of the political institutions that were left behind by us began to become apparent. For example Marcos had tried to get a land

reform underway, something almost everybody acknowledged was desperately needed. But it was tied up in the Philippine Congress for years and years. For the four years of his first term he could get nowhere with the land reform. The problem meanwhile got worse and worse.

You had almost a completely bought legislative body at the time. You had a press which was as corrupt as it was free. You could get an article to condemn any politician you wanted written for you at any price you wanted to pay. It was called the freest press in the world, and that's true in the sense that the *New York Post* reflects the freest press in the United States. It was about on that same or even a lower level of sensationalism. That was true of just about the whole press in the Philippines. There was nothing else in the field except that, with one possible exception, the *Manila Times*, which apparently tried to do something more responsible.

Well, I was watching the situation at the time in a number of ways, mostly by first-hand observations and discussions in Manila, almost always with Mansfield. An exception was the inauguration when he couldn't leave and he asked me to go in his place. Henry Byrode was ambassador at the time martial law was declared. Byrode may have stimulated or encouraged Marcos to invoke it because he believed the government was about to break down. A constitutional convention had been in session for some time

because the Philippine politicians recognized that they had to do something with the form of government which we left there. The convention was getting slowly nowhere. Well, it had made some progress but then it had bogged down. The government was totally strapped. There was no land reform, which was the key to the problem of maintaining stability, especially in Luzon province. Manila and other cities had become centers of crime and violence on a very large scale.

In view of what happened in the Philippines in that period I worry sometimes about what happens now in Congress. That is especially true when I see the government being conducted by continuing resolutions, repeated rises in debt ceiling limitations and other stop-gaps. We're not talking about comparable situations of course, but you catch echoes of the same kind of thing which was at that point endemic in the Philippine government. Marcos was stopped from bringing about the changes that he had promised. There was some road building, probably with U.S. aid funds, and a few things of that sort, which were positive and constructive. But the real need was land reform, and nothing was happening. Meanwhile you had a great growth of crime in the cities, particularly Manila. Manila became a totally unsafe city. There seemed to be nothing that could be done to check the deterioration. The country was gradually slipping into total chaos. It was ripe for some kind of martial law.

It's my impression that Byrode encouraged Marcos to invoke it. He may have done so without instructions, because he was that kind of a man. He was a golfing companion of Marcos whom he liked. Marcos liked him in return. He was also a general; Byrode was the youngest general in World War II; he was an air force general. So I think these things added up to that moment. My guess is that Marcos may well have done it without Byrode's encouragement, but Byrode certainly did nothing to discourage it.

RITCHIE: Byrode had also been ambassador to a number of countries like Egypt and South Africa that were somewhat authoritarian democracies.

VALEO: Yes, that's right. He was a very interesting personality, a very colorful personality.

Martial law was declared, and I think it probably had almost universal approval in the Philippines, except among some opposition politicians. In the first week, Marcos put out an edict that the people had to turn in weapons, and anyone who didn't was subsequently going to be subject to death penalties and so forth. Several million pieces of arms showed up at police and fire stations in the first week after martial law. That's how bad it was, really. Much of this was a carry over from World War II, arms abandoned there by us and the Japanese. The declaration of martial law also made it possible for Marcos to dissolve the

legislature and to shut off the press. That was, I think, the beginning of the hostility of the U.S. press to him. Among the papers he closed down was the *Manila Times*. I don't think the U.S. press cared so much about the rest of the papers, but the *Manila Times* was something special. They kind of looked on it as the nearest reflection of American journalism in the Philippines. There were a lot of personal friendships involved between the American press people and the *Manila Times* people. I think that action won Marcos the undying enmity of the press in the United States.

So far as I can recall, there were few complaints from the American embassy or from the United States government on the declaration of martial law. No second guessing, nothing of the sort. It was generally recognized that this was going to be, and it was a popular move in the Philippines, there was no question about that. There was a curfew, I remember being out in it one time. It ran from about midnight to four in the morning. It was regarded as a great blessing in many Philippine households because it brought the men back home. That was the case until some clever operators found out that they could also offer overnight accommodations along with the bar and other amenities in many places, so you wouldn't have to worry about the curfew. There was a lot of joking about it. It was a mild kind of thing. There were no deaths. There was one execution in the whole period, a Chinese

drug manufacturer right in Manila, who had four factories in Manila. They made an example of him. But Marcos, interestingly enough, has opposed the death penalty. There have been no executions in the Philippines during his regime for routine crimes. He opposes that as a matter of principle. He's basically an American-trained lawyer and his views are essentially those of American jurisprudence. Again, I think to see him otherwise is a serious misreading of the situation in the Philippines.

But I'm not here to apologize for Marcos. I don't want to do that, except that I think some balance is needed. He's not some sort of monster. You're not dealing with an El Salvador kind of situation. You're not dealing with a South African kind of situation. As a matter of fact, the Marcos government has been much more ready to put pressure and sanctions on South Africa than we have over the years at the U.N. Marcos is a Filipino phenomenon. His government is a mixed thing. And it can't be divorced from its Filipino background. If we read our values into the situation, and only our values, it can look monstrous. But then many, many governments look monstrous in that context, including both Chinese governments, Pakistan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and wherever. Looking back over the various countries I've known in the world, if I had to be caught in a place for the rest of my life, I can think of a lot of others than the Philippines that I would be much more fearful of repression, Indonesia, for example.

In terms of repression, cruelty, and ruthlessness, Indonesia is worse than the Philippines, and I use the word worse cautiously. It's infinitely worse. Thousands of people have died there as a result of political repression. Singapore is probably just as bad, or worse in terms of its repressive rules and regulations. Hong Kong never had any sort of representative government to begin with. Thailand is probably a crueler government, and probably at least as repressive. But we single out the Philippines, and you ask yourself: well, why? And that's when you begin to wonder whether we've gotten over our own past imperial experience, or our imperial thrust. I think we've gotten over it in terms of the gross exploitation of other people. But it's taken on a new slant. We almost experience it in reverse through their gross exploitation of us. Those who exploit us the most, providing they also permit us the illusion of omnipotent power which comes with an imperialist bent of mind, why we seem most satisfied with.

The Philippines is moving in a political sense, I don't mean just under Marcos, I think the whole trend of the country is towards a genuinely independent national structure, which will be comparable to others in Asia, which it was not before Marcos. This I think is what we find difficult to handle. We do have more power in the Philippines, largely as a carry over of our past experience with them, than we have in Indonesia, or in Singapore,

or even in Bangkok. I think this troubles us. We need to have this place where we can tell someone what to do for their own good as we see it, and to feel good ourselves about it. Tie that in with some less amorphous interests, like military bases, and the fact that we are the largest investors in the Philippines—then add the huge Filipino community in the United States. All of this produces a very strong tie. It's a love-hate kind of tie, but it's a tie. We have not yet learned to live fully with an independent Philippines and, perhaps, neither have the Filipinos.

Unconsciously, at least those Americans who make official decisions still think in terms of that pre-embassy period in Manila, they think as high commissioners, with anything good or bad that happens in the Philippines ultimately passing through us. They act as though what happens in the Philippines will be the result of what we do or what we do not do. Well, that is now a formula for disaster in the same sense that it was in Vietnam. The only explanation for why we to take more note of human rights violations in the Philippines as against Indonesia, or a dozen other countries where violations are far more rampant, the only explanation seems to me to be in terms of the imperial thrust in our history. If our interest were only the military bases, we would recognize that we are doing everything to ensure that we shall have trouble with these bases in the years ahead. Our best prospects of keeping the bases is to get ourselves out the middle

of Philippine politics rather than into it, because if you pick the wrong faction in the process of involving yourself in internal Philippine politics, there's almost a certainty that you will have to give up the bases at some point.

So to me, a sensible policy on the Philippines now would be first of all to make a firm determination on the essentiality of the bases. If they're not essential, get the hell out of there as soon as possible. Get out without any question. If they are that essential—and I'm not at all sure they are, but if they are—then your best bet is to pay rent for them. If we need them, if they are essential to our defense; we do what we are doing in Spain which got us through the Franco period and got us into a republican successor without losing the bases; we do what we did in Greece—pay rent—which got us through the colonels into a socialist situation, and we're still there. You do it because you stay out of their politics, not because you get into them. So if there's any hope of keeping those bases in the long run, through a collapse of the Marcos regime or whatever, it's to minimize our involvement in internal politics. Instead we're moving in exactly the opposite direction.

This is what happened to us in Vietnam. Instead of staying out of the internal politics of the country and deciding whether we really ought to be in Vietnam or not, we attributed our problems in Vietnam to an inadequate government in the form of

Diem, and we got ourselves up to our ears in their politics and ultimately into their war. In both cases we did it from what we thought were very decent motivations. We needed a more representative government, a more responsive government, and we're doing the same thing now with Marcos. But the reasons why we're dissatisfied with Marcos, in my judgment, may be deeper than simply whether Marcos is a good government or a bad government, they go back to these longer roots that we've been discussing.

RITCHIE: You've drawn parallels to Vietnam and to Diem. Why do you think we've been unable to draw lessons from our experiences, especially an experience as traumatic as the one in Vietnam?

VALEO: I think it's the imperial impulse. We have not yet overcome that. This has troubled me from the time I was young, that our attitude towards other countries is one essentially of superiority. It's one of our national attitudes, we have others, some redeeming, but the attitude I'm talking about now is one of superiority, that American society, American ideals, American business, American capabilities are essentially better than anyone else. A certain amount of that is inherent in any nationalism. But I think it gets us into trouble when it goes beyond what's reasonable, such as saluting the flag and feeling a certain amount of emotion and pride when you do that. I think if you go too far beyond that, if you begin to see yourself as some

sort of conqueror or savior, you're in trouble. And we see ourselves at different times in both roles.

RITCHIE: Last year, in the presidential debates, President Reagan suggested that the alternative was between Marcos and a Communist takeover of the Philippines. Is there any other alternative that you can see?

VALEO: Not among the orthodox politicians, those who are running against him now, and from whom we have been hearing most of the criticism. The Cory [Corazon] Aquino-Laurel ticket is the church selection, Jaime Sin's selection. He thinks you can beat Marcos with a return to morality, if you will.

RITCHIE: I was asking to get your opinion of whether the American government had any alternative than just to back the administration that is in power at this stage?

VALEO: The American government is in a dilemma. The bureaucracy, not necessarily Reagan, would like to see somebody from the opposition beat Marcos in an election. I don't know how much money they're willing to put into it, but they would certainly like to see him defeated. I think they have wanted that all along. I don't think it just started with this election. When I say "they," I'm talking about the bureaucracy basically, not who happens to be in the White House in any given moment. That changes, but the bureaucratic continuity of policy remains,

and colors what we do in terms of our relationships with that country. I think they have never wanted Marcos, from the very time he was first elected, which is quite contrary to the popular conception. They have been able to live with Marcos even though they didn't want him, but they realize he's getting older and they're now deathly afraid that his wife will take over. I suspect that's the great fear, and if they like anybody less than Marcos, they like Mrs. Marcos even less. I'm talking now again about the bureaucracy.

So they look around among the opposition. Well, you can't look up in the hills, which is probably the only bona fide opposition in the country, because at least many of them—not all, but some of those—are really alienated by very real grievances. They have grievances against local chieftains who exploit them miserably. There are some up in the northern part of Luzon who are concerned about dam building, because it's going to flood their centuries-old terraces and that sort of thing. Those are legitimate grievances which an effective government would have dealt with, and which have only been partially dealt with by the Philippine government. That's not to fault that government necessarily, the problems are difficult and they don't have the resources. But people get hurt, and if they pick up guns and go up in the hills, at least you can understand that kind of opposition. That's what's generally called the Communist threat.

Well, in the hills there are others, the result of family feuds. Somebody takes the local mayor's seat and does some damage to a family, so those family members take off to the hills 'till they can get back and shoot the offending mayor. This is very much a part of the pattern of Philippine violence. There are still others in the hills who are highwaymen; anything that comes along the road they'll just hold up and take. There are many of them. They talk about fifteen thousand and twenty thousand Communists. The numbers are meaningless and so is the description. They go up and down depending upon factors which have nothing to do with ideology.

I personally think that unless we recognize that we are dealing not with one unified country but a country that is only gradually moving towards a concept of one nation, we are lost in this situation. Much of the difficulty comes from the very fragmented aspects of the society. Each region and sub-region very often have their own particular problems that give rise to the violence. It's not all just the opposition to Marcos per se. As a matter of fact, you very rarely read any New People's Army statements against Marcos. They'll say that he can't do anything about the situation in the country; even if he wanted to, only we can do it. They have no great gripe against him personally, that isn't what it is. It's much deeper. It's against local conditions, economic hopelessness, and oppression.

RITCHIE: What has your role been? Have you been a consultant?

VALEO: No. I've seen Marcos maybe three times in the last seven or eight years, and then only briefly and just by accident. I've seen her about the same. No, my role has been primarily in connection with her brother, who is an old friend. The friendship goes back twenty years. He has widespread interests in the Philippines, which have come partly as a result of the Marcos' government's control of office, partly because he happens to be a very capable man. So I go over and I consult with him, without pay, in terms of United States-Philippine relations. I think some of it probably filters into the palace and may have some influence on what policies they adopt. I'm not sure of that, but I would think it might have some. That's basically it.

RITCHIE: Have you tried to advise people here in Washington about the Philippines?

VALEO: Nobody's ever asked me. It's as simple of that. And I don't volunteer it.

RITCHIE: I read an article the other day about Senator [John] Melcher, who has become very interested in the Philippines.

VALEO: Yes, now he has several reasons for that. First of all he's in the tradition of Mansfield who was very interested.

Also, the Philippines is a big buyer of Montana wheat, and that's an important element in his interest. It's a perfectly legitimate kind of state interest, really.

RITCHIE: I noted the Montana connection, and I wondered if you were in any way advising Melcher?

VALEO: No; as a matter of fact I was asked to go up and see him the other day and explain to him why he should support a larger Philippine sugar quota, and I said, "Well, I'll be glad to talk to him if he calls me. But I won't go to see him otherwise." The request was not from a Filipino, but from one of their American lobbyists.

RITCHIE: That's been your policy in general, not to interfere?

VALEO: Yes, unless I have something that's a really burning issue and I think somebody's being done an injustice like [Mark] Hatfield, I'll write a letter once in a while. If I think Byrd does something good, like vote for the Panama Treaty, I'll write him a letter. But that's unusual. I don't do a lot of that.

RITCHIE: Do you see anybody in Washington getting a good grip on what's happening in the Philippines?

VALEO: No, because people in this city are too much in a hurry, and you can't get a grip on a situation as complex as that in a hurry. It's easier to reduce it to a human rights problem and feel good about upholding human rights, and go back to your constituents and tell them "I'm all for human rights in the Philippines." No, I don't think so. I think there are some signs that some of the scholars are now beginning to look a little more deeply into the Philippine situation. But it's still on a scholarly level; it's not in this government yet and not in the press yet.

RITCHIE: It does seem that with the latest developments over the reinstatement of General Ver, it's quite clear the Marcos administration doesn't really care about what the American government thinks. It would have been a great public relations move not to reinstate him.

VALEO: They care. They care a great deal. I had a call from there on what the reactions were in the United States! They care a great deal, but they care more about a basic Philippine characteristic, which is loyalty. If you were to let that happen to one of the people who has been as close to you as Ver has been to Marcos, that would have been unforgivable, and it would have been criticized very widely in the Philippines—quietly, but the appearance of that in Philippine eyes would have been totally the opposite. The opposition would say, "At last, we've got him. If

we can break him with Ver, we've got him." Not because they're worried about Ver running the army against them, but because Marcos would be losing a characteristic which is very fundamental in the Philippines. The other aspect of it, which is not understood by [Stephen] Solarz and people like that is dignity. If you demean the dignity of Filipinos, that's almost a sure fire cause of mayhem. We've done that repeatedly in the case of Marcos. He may not react because he's smart in the old Kennedy tradition: "Don't get mad, get even." But that's what's happened. Did you notice that Australian flights have been cut off to the bases? That was in response to some trivial, but demeaning remark that the Prime Minister of Australia had made on the Philippines; they had their rights to fly into the bases cut.

RITCHIE: By contrast, when the Reagan administration has trouble with one of its loyalists, it appoints them an ambassador somewhere and gets rid of them.

VALEO: Well, that may actually happen in the Philippines, but the reinstatement of Ver was a matter of honor. And in the Philippines this is derived from the Spanish concept of honor. The last thing you do would be to betray one of the people who has been close to you. Even if he was a murderer or whatever he was, you still wouldn't betray him. But in this case, I think the evidence was not at all clear on Ver. It wasn't clear in the Agrava commission's hearing and it was certainly not clear in the

trial. Even though the commission clearly pointed to the military involvement in this in some way, to what degree and at what level I don't think came clear. I followed the commission hearings very closely. To what degree Ver was involved was not clear. Those in the United States who clamored for Ver's scalp forget the fact that the Philippines also has a government of laws. They forget the Miranda decision, when Miranda was so obviously guilty and yet he was let go by the Supreme Court. There is a difference. You can say, "Well, gee, that was just a common criminal. This is a whole government." But if you are going to have a government of laws you have got to accept the idea of legal jurisdiction and legal processes. As one of the lawyers in the trial said, it was the prosecutor or the defense attorney, "What's just is not always legal, and what is legal is not always just." But we don't see that because we've got ourselves wedded now to the idea that Marcos is not what we want in the Philippines. At least some people have that, and it's spreading in the United States. Well, eventually he'll accommodate them by dying, but he's not about to die yet, and my guess is that the opposition, whether they get together or they don't, he'll still beat them in the election.

RITCHIE: We seem to have a pattern of identifying all the problems in a particular person.

VALEO: Exactly.

RITCHIE: If you get rid of Diem, then things will get better in Vietnam. If you remove Marcos, things will get better in the Philippines. Do you think it's because we don't understand oriental culture and politics, and so therefore it's easier to focus on an individual?

VALEO: It's simplistic. It used to be we would do the same thing in our own government. It was all Hoover's fault; or if it was good it was all Roosevelt's doing. The situations kind of went bad because of Truman, but then we discovered it wasn't quite that bad also because of Truman. It's always in terms of a personality. This is part of a superficial view of events. It's easy; it doesn't take a lot of thinking, and the TV, of course, encourages this greatly. We're even more now this way than ever before. The Filipinos have an immensely complex problem, and any government would have to face that. Marcos happens to be, in my judgment, the best of the presidents of the Philippines since independence. I would say he's better than the last governor generals, too, that we had in that situation. He will leave the Philippines in a lot better shape than he found it. Anyone who knows the earlier situation will recognize that. And Mrs. Marcos will have done several things: she will first of all have made women a much more powerful factor in Philippine politics. The idea of their even thinking about Cory Aquino running is only attributable to the fact that Imelda Marcos has been out there in

the forefront of politics and public life for the last twenty or so years. She will also have made a major contribution to the development of a sense of Philippine national identity. She provided, for example, the leadership and the drive to build the great cultural center in Manila and that, in turn, has been a growing source of cultural revival and enrichment for the Philippines. She has also been responsible for forcing the attention of the country to take a look at the condition of the poor in Manila and on the plight of the rural areas. She has set some wheels in motion in this connection that will continue to run regardless of who is in power.

End of Interview #16

Francis R. Valeo

Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977

Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966

Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963

On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958

Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952

Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

SENATE LEADERS

Interview #17

Wednesday, December 11, 1985

RITCHIE: I wondered if there was anything else that you wanted to add either on the Philippines or on your post-Senate career that we didn't cover last week?

VALEO: No. I think it's pretty much there. I'd like to only say this, that if the structure that I think Marcos is trying to build in the Philippines doesn't work, and if he doesn't set it up, then I think at the time of his death there's going to be a very serious problem in the Philippines. To me, that should be an encouragement to try to help him make it work, not to oppose him on every turn. It is the form of representative government, whether we agree with the particular form or not. It's different from the one we left there, and I think that a change from that was absolutely essential. A system of divided powers, especially one that is legislature dominant, does not seem to work in a place like the Philippines any more than it worked in France. Interestingly enough, much of the form that they are trying to put in place now is derived from the French experience.

As a matter of fact, I can recall suggesting that when they were groping, right after martial law, for a new approach, and they were having trouble in the constitutional convention at the

time, I remember suggesting that to the president's brother-in-law, that they ought to examine the situation in France, that it might make a lot more sense in the Philippines than the American system. I said that partly because of the tendency in the Philippines to gravitate around a leading figure or strongman, not necessarily a dictator but a strongman, an Apo or a wise clan chieftain, that sort of thing, which is common to the Moslem parts of the Philippines and to a great extent common to those that felt the predominant weight of Spanish culture. I was thinking, too, of the functioning of the U.S. system during the Roosevelt era. I thought that combined with a legislative body or a parliamentary body, at least vaguely derived from the British system, even through the Americans, and an independent judiciary, might give them about the best possible setup in terms of what they needed. They did examine that, I know that, and eventually the system that they put in place took on a lot of the characteristics of the French system.

One of the things I remember talking many, many years ago, talking to President Marcos about, I think I had lunch with him once when they were at that time experimenting with government on the local level. He said they were trying to find forms that had some roots in the old Malay structure in a sort of village town meeting approach in which everybody was involved, not just a certain older group. He said that the village chiefs in olden

days had to have a way of hearing what the feelings were in the village, and that they had developed forums that were comparable to our town meetings. The system that they did adopt, I forget what they call it now in Tagalog, but it is a village town meeting approach. How successful that's been, I don't know. On the other hand, the need for a lot of politics on the local level is very minimum in the Philippines. It's still essentially a very rural society, certainly not a sophisticated one in our sense, except among a small percentage of the people in Manila, Cebu City, and a few other urban centers.

I'm afraid that if what he's trying to do in terms of the central government does not work, then I think that there might be a brief moment in which the opposition and the church might predominate in the situation, but I think it will quickly give way to some sort of a military structure. And that has been the pattern that we have become involved with in many, many places. When we got rid of Diem, who was essentially a civilian, we got a military structure. We got rid of the fellow in Chile—Salvatore Allende—and we got a military structure. You can think of a number of cases where this has happened. And I can't imagine that the interests of this country lie in establishing military structures all over the world, unless we propose to move in that direction ourselves, and then we will really have our difficulties. That's about all I want to say on the Philippines.

RITCHIE: Is there anything in your recent activities that you think we should record as well?

VALEO: No, I don't think there's anything special in them that would be useful. I'm still hard at work. Beyond the Philippines I'm trying to work with an American company which has some important devices for use in water pollution control, which they'd like to sell in Asia. I'm going to try to open some doors for them in China and a few other places where they might possibly utilize this kind of technology. It also has relevance in terms of aqua-culture, which is an extremely important thing, particularly in a place like China. I should point out that most of the Asian countries have practiced a crude form of aqua-culture for centuries. In the Philippines it's highly developed. What they do is to pen off the fish as fingerlings and then let them grow in captivity. A main source of fish supply in the Philippines is derived from that. Something similar happens in many parts of China. Japan has it, and I think Korea would have it as well. Taiwan is a major center of aqua-culture. The devices I'm involved with simply would improve the cultivation practices and increase the output very greatly. So this is my most immediate interest. I still see a lot of the Chinese in the Chinese embassy, and keep my interests up in what goes on in Asia.

RITCHIE: I understand that you are still studying the Chinese language.

VALEO: Still studying the language. There really is no other way if you want to keep any kind of a fluency in it at all, you have to have at least one or two meetings a month with someone with whom you can talk for an hour or two on end. It gets better. I think memorization is a little harder when you get older, but I think basically your discipline improves too, so that you can put up with a lot more drudgery than you did when you were younger. Maybe in the end the theory that only the young can learn languages is not necessarily so valid. I think it's probably a little slower for older people, but if you want to do it badly enough you can do it.

RITCHIE: The United States seems to be at a real disadvantage against the Chinese, in that there are far more Chinese studying English than Americans studying Chinese.

VALEO: Very much so, and that is interesting because in the first contact, it was amazing how few Chinese spoke English in '72 and '73, but that has changed so rapidly in the last few years. There's a mass movement to learn English. But that apparently has been a pattern in Chinese education for a long, long time. Whatever country is most in vogue is the language of concentration. For a while apparently there was a lot of Russian studied in China, also Russian music and Russian ballet. You could see a good deal of that in the early period of the renewal of our contact, you could see a lot of vestiges of the Russian

period of foreign ascendancy in China. They were making a lot of Russian-type peasant instruments and using them a good deal, and the ballets we saw clearly showed the influence of Russian practices.

RITCHIE: Now they've replaced it with rock music.

VALEO: Well, not quite. This gets to another problem in China, the question of maintaining certain "moral standards," or what they regard as moral standards, which still have a good deal in common with the Confucian ethics and the proprieties. That has not gone as far as a lot of people would assume from reading the press, which zeroes in on things that are primarily of interest to us. It reminds me of one story: after the Nixon trip and before we went on our first trip to China, one of the newsmen who covered the trip with Nixon was Teddy White, who had thirty years before written with an old friend of mine, Annalee Whitmore Jacoby, a book of the month selection, which was called *Thunder Out of China*. The book, in effect, was a kind of last abandonment of the Kuomintang government and Chiang Kai-shek. Teddy White had been very friendly with Chiang Kai-shek for many years, and had covered China for years for *Life* and *Time*. Then when he finally broke with Chiang and wrote that book, it was pretty clear that Chiang was on his way out. I think it was about 1948.

Well, Teddy White never went back to China until the Nixon trip. He remembered the China of 1940, 1941, 1945 that period. He came and had lunch with Mansfield and me and he said he and William Buckley were standing on a corner of a street in Shanghai looking for some old haunts. He said, "You know, they say they have no prostitution in China, but I swear we were approached on that corner!" Well, I wanted to say: Teddy, you probably have forgotten a lot of Chinese that you used to know. At that time an approach by a prostitute would have not been likely. It would have been highly, highly unlikely. It was still in the closing days of the cultural revolution and even the remotest suggestion of something like that would have been subject to great condemnation. Now, it is true that the Shanghai people, as I remember from my own experience, were very friendly and very curious, particularly about clothes. They might very well have gesticulated towards his clothes and he may have interpreted it in a somewhat different fashion. But I was amused that Teddy White would single that out, of all things. He, of course, had experienced the China where that would have been very common. Not only common, it was appallingly common. People were selling their wives just to survive, not to speak of their children. But in that period, in '72, that was highly unlikely. I thought Teddy White was groping for a continuity of perspective of China, as have many other old China hands.

RITCHIE: Did people like White, who were interested in China, seek Mansfield out because they knew he was a China specialist? Or did Mansfield seek them out?

VALEO: In that instance, as I recall, Mansfield sought Teddy White out. No, I don't think they really sought Mansfield out. It was that there was such a hiatus on China after the McCarthy period, nobody even talked about it. The only people who were concerned were some of the political scientists at the universities, and they were mostly talking about Taiwan. Even they avoided a real, honest examination of the situation on the Mainland. In part that was because they had no real contacts, but in part, too, because I think they were frightened to death like everyone else who had had anything at all to do with China. Ironically, they probably analyzed the situation far more accurately before McCarthy than they estimated it afterwards.

RITCHIE: Well, if there are no other areas of your post-Senate career that you think we should explore, I also wanted to spend some time talking about the various senators that you served with. But before we go into the specific ones, I wanted to ask a general question: how do the current senators compare with those you first met when you began to work for the Senate in the 1950s?

VALEO: I'm sure there are just as many geniuses and as many ordinary senators as there were in that period. But what strikes me as the principal difference is the tendency towards homogeneity in the current Senate. I think this is clearly the influence of television. One of the cartoonists has caught this as a touchstone in grasping the present Senate. You have to look a certain way and you have to sound a certain way. Now, that doesn't mean you have to say the same thing, but basically the TV has drawn a new stereotype of a senator. For a while there, before the Mansfield Senate, the outline was the Claghorn. This came largely I think out of Lyndon Johnson's garrulous voice, but also out of other factors. The comedians of that day would caricature senators on the basis of a Senator Claghorn who was a Southerner, who had a Southern accent, usually wore a string tie, and so forth. But it was a caricature.

In actual practice there was great, great diversity in the Senate, even before Mansfield's time and even to a degree during Mansfield's time, although I must say the process of homogenizing began somewhere in the Mansfield period. I don't think Mansfield was responsible for that so much as I think the TV was. He was responsible only in the fact that he let individuals have a much freer reign and therefore aroused a good deal of press interest in individual members of the Senate. But as the process wore on and as the image makers got more and more into the act in terms of

electing senators, when it became a kind of prize to get instead of something you did in part out of a party responsibility, then the homogenizing began to go full force.

Quite frankly now, if I were trying to help someone get elected, I'd first give him a screen test and make sure of how he came across on TV. Well, that would have been unthinkable fifteen or twenty years ago. That would be the last thing you'd look for. Most senators tried to look humble or meek or whatever. They didn't really want to project a Hollywood image of the romantic lead. For the most part, they couldn't even if they wanted to. But especially with Reagan in the White House this has become the accepted image of the politician. It's a kind of moving of Hollywood into Washington, progressively. I understand some other actor is about to take off and try to get the Senate seat in California or somewhere, and there will be more and more of this, because the TV has become almost the arbiter of who gets into the Senate and who doesn't, which is one of the reasons why money has become such an overbearing, overwhelming factor in American politics, and a corrupting influence. It has to be corrupting, if it hasn't already started. If TV is the key, money is the key maker. I go along with Millicent Fenwick who says you either buy your seat or sell your vote. If it does come to that, the Senate itself will lose a great deal of meaning, because institutions can retain their vitality on their own momentum only for a relatively

short historical time. And if they don't deliver what they're supposed to deliver, sooner or later they atrophy and begin to disintegrate, like human beings.

So that's my primary reaction to the difference. The Mansfield Senate, and certainly the Johnson Senate before it, were definitely places of great individuality. In part, it is this individuality that gives the Senate one of its higher meanings. Apart from simply representing a state, the individuality permits a great variety of inputs into the nation's leadership. The Senate can become under those circumstances the source of a good deal of creative political thinking, which is not likely in a homogenized Senate. It may be that we'll move eventually back to a party system, and any creativity that there might be will be expressed through a party approach rather than through individuals. That's a possibility but there are no signs of it at present.

RITCHIE: In the 1950s there was a lot of talk about the "Inner Club" of the Senate. Was there really an Inner Club?

VALEO: Well, there was and there wasn't. Apparently it depended on the seniority element. Those who had been around for a long time were members of the so-called Inner Club. A lot of it had to do with drinking in the secretary's office, as a matter of fact. When Johnson used to run those late sessions, why, the secretary's office became the setting for a lot of that off-the-floor

drinking. It was one of the things Mansfield wanted changed when I took over the job. People could still get a drink, but it was not encouraged and it gradually disappeared. Eventually there were very few people who would come in except on the late nights. But for one thing, the late nights disappeared greatly, and the late nights were one of the stimuli to the drinking.

Yes, there was a kind of Johnson High Command—I would put it that way—or a Johnson staff, of which he was the chief of staff. They were mostly the people like Kerr, to a lesser extent Russell. Mostly southerners, there were some westerners like Magnuson involved. Hayden you could certainly have talked of as being part of that Inner Club. It always amazed me how Hubert Humphrey's supporters would come to the conclusion that Hubert had at last made the inner circle of the Senate. Well, by the time he made the inner circle of the Senate, it really didn't matter that much anymore. I couldn't imagine why they felt such a great sense of achievement because Hubert had made the inner circle. If they knew the inner circle, there were plenty of the Senate scoundrels in the inner circle. I saw that as not really an achievement, and I don't think it was justified in Humphrey's case. I don't think Humphrey himself cared that much about being a part of anything except the politics of his times. His sight was set on the White House at least from the time he became mayor of Minneapolis.

Well, that was my reaction to the Inner Club. Yes, there was some such thing. My main source of information on that was Elsworth Dozier, who for many years had been the man who ran the office and did the bar work. He was a black man who became very close to me on a personal basis. But he had had to run those chores, and his great relief at no longer having to do them was a thing that impressed me greatly. He would tell me some of the stories of the people who had been involved in it, and he had lived through two Inner Clubs, one Republican and one Democrat. Apparently the Republicans favored card playing in the secretary's office, whereas the Democrats favored drinking. I'm not sure how far it went, but that was the picture that came from Elsworth Dozier, who was really a great man and who kept his tongue for a long time and suffered greatly, and did much for the Senate above and beyond the call of duty.

RITCHIE: I wanted to start by asking about some of the old bulls of the Senate of that era, someone like Carl Hayden who had a lot of power yet rarely ever made it into public awareness.

VALEO: And he never really wanted to. Darrell St. Claire, of course, can tell you a great deal more about Hayden than I could even begin to do. My association with Hayden began when I became secretary and I had to open the Senate every morning with the chaplain and the presiding officer. Hayden was then president pro tem, and whenever the vice president wasn't there he would

open the Senate. So we'd sit and chat in the lobby before the opening. I remember one of his comments. At that time, I guess he was ninety already. When I first became secretary he said, "Come sit down here and talk with me." He said, "Is Darrell St. Claire in there working with you now?" I said, "Yes. He's a very old friend." "Well, you take good care of him," he said, "he's a mighty fine boy." Darrell at that time was maybe sixty or thereabouts! He said, "I brought him here years ago, and I know he's a mighty fine boy."

The other thing was Hayden's hostility to cloture. He would never vote for cloture. In the 1964 civil rights bill we got almost to the point where we thought his vote might be essential. Mike Mansfield spoke to him and laid it out to him as a party duty and a national duty. He didn't want to vote cloture. We were getting very close to the time of the vote and we needed to have a little extra in reserve in case something went wrong during the vote. We finally got Hayden reluctantly to stay off the floor and not vote against cloture unless his vote was not necessary, or his absence was not necessary. He agreed to absent himself. I thought that was a great achievement to get Hayden to that point. He agreed to absent himself if necessary, and at the last minute we found out it wasn't necessary, so he came on the floor and voted against cloture. But he did go that far for Mansfield.

Apparently his reluctance on cloture was due primarily to something involving the admission of Arizona to the union. Somehow or other it was related to that. Of course, he had a lot of company. There were other members from the west generally who would take the same view that they would never vote for cloture, because cloture was their weapon against the unbridled majority largely in the House. They felt it was a weapon which gave the sparsely inhabited western states a good deal of extra power, which is true, it did do that. But the question is not whether it should have done that or not, or whether that's good government or not.

RITCHIE: Was the main source of Hayden's influence his position on the Appropriations Committee?

VALEO: I think you have to consider it more in terms of his having been around for so long. Yes, he had influence on the Appropriations Committee, but he never wielded that as it sometimes has been wielded, as a device of great power. I don't think he could ever have been accused of doing that. No, I think it had more to do with the fact he'd been around for such a long time. He didn't really have an enemy anywhere, so far as I know.

RITCHIE: Richard Russell was always cited as the king of the Inner Club.

VALEO: Well, Russell was a brilliant lawyer and a very able senator. I always felt how horrible it was that he had to spend most of his life defending Jim Crow in the south. In the end, that became his main claim to fame, that and getting military installations for the southern states and particularly for Georgia to restore their economy. You have to put Russell in the context of World War II. In World War II everybody in the South was immensely eager for the military installations. Part of that was because the South was a natural place to locate them because of the warmer weather, but much of it had to do with the military activity offering a way out of poverty for the South. People like Russell understood that. The South put up with a lot in World War II. As you know, the adverse impact of the military on a community can be very great, and they got some flack from it, but the dollars in the end counted more.

So as a result, the light of Russell's real abilities lay under two bushels, one being this slavish necessity for placating the military so that they'd set up their installations in the South, or be encouraged to set them up, particularly in Georgia, and the second one being the necessity for opposing any kind of legislation which would have equalized black rights in the South. With those two strikes against him, I don't know how he could have

ever become a national figure, although he aspired to it, and at one time actively sought the presidency or vice presidency. But he saw quickly how futile it was, in great part because of the Democratic party's dependence upon black voters, or the need to keep black voters on the Democratic side, a place where Roosevelt had gathered them.

RITCHIE: What about Harry Byrd, Sr.

VALEO: Senior. He was one the most amiable of men on a personal basis. I knew him, of course, in his later years, I guess during his last term in the Senate. He was an amiable man, but you couldn't move him on any fiscal problem. He used every trick in the bag to delay action on bills so that he could handle them the way he wanted to handle them, and that would mean that he waited very much till the end of the session and then he could swing it more easily as he wished. So he fell back repeatedly, whenever anyone tried to move a bill by such shortcuts as perhaps holding hearings simultaneously with the House, he would fall back on the Constitution and say no, the House gets very angry and it's their prerogative, and so forth. He used that as a device primarily to handle fiscal matters in the Senate as he wanted to handle them.

As I say, he was very amiable. His son was much the same way. He was almost an absolute replica of his father, especially

as he got older, he became more and more like him. I was a good friend of Harry Byrd, Jr. and liked him personally a great deal. He also had a personal fondness for me. What I liked particularly was that he would not go the route to the Republicans. He would not break finally with his Democratic heritage. In the end he stayed with the Democrats, he organized with the Democrats, and whenever possible he voted with the Democrats, which wasn't often, but he did vote that way. He never became a part of an anti-Democratic coalition as some other Southerners did. He never became a part of that. He never switched over. I had a lot of respect for him personally and I liked him. But he was just like his father.

RITCHIE: John McClellan was another old guard powerhouse.

VALEO: Yes, and I had the experience of going to Latin America with him. His first wife had died and he had married his secretary whose name was Norma. I think she was also from Arkansas. John McClellan was a man of very fixed, staid habits. He was a loner. He used to remind me a great deal of Bourke Hickenlooper. He was a kind of southern Democratic edition of Bourke Hickenlooper in his views. He had a stentorian voice and could really snap people when he wanted to. He had two odd mannerisms. He used to eat every day alone, almost all the time. At that time there was a large table in the Senate dining room. When I ate alone, which I did a good deal, I would sit at that table

and I'd very often run into him. He ate the same thing everyday. He always ordered a hamburger and a piece of apple pie and coffee. That was it.

McClellan had a great deal of courage. He was one of the people who took McCarthy on at a very early time in the McCarthy era. He was not afraid of McCarthy, so in a way he did a certain Democratic chore, because McCarthy in the end was after Democrats—well, he was after anybody, but primarily after Democrats. McClellan, as did Kerr, were two of the people who were extremely effective against McCarthy. Their own status as non-Communists—if I can put it that way, I don't want to say anti-Communists, but at that point it was mostly non-Communist, it wasn't quite as anti-Communist as it became later—was obviously unassailable, so they had no qualms about taking on McCarthy. Both of them saw him as a kind of guttersnipe and they had no fears of him. They were solid in their own states, they didn't have any problems on that score. McClellan took him on primarily because he thought he was outraging the Constitution.

On our trip to Latin America, the thing that stands out in connection with him was that he ran into some arrogance on the part of the U.S. military attaché in Mexico, I believe it was. He didn't like it one bit and he thought the man was being very disrespectful of the Senate. And he said, "We'll take care of him when he comes up for confirmation the next time." I don't know

whether he ever did or not, but it was very clear that he was not going to put up with that sort of nonsense. Beyond that he made an effective chairman of that group. We traveled around to maybe six or seven countries in Latin America.

RITCHIE: Did you have any dealings with Lister Hill?

VALEO: Yes, not a great number, but I knew him. Again, a very amiable man, who knew what he wanted. He was determined to put his name on some medical legislation that was going to be meaningful to the country, particularly medical research. I think NIH probably owes more to Lister Hill than to any other single man in the American government. He really was a key person in developing the institutions of NIH. I kept in touch with him after he left the Senate. I'd send him a Christmas card and I think I continued his subscription to the *Congressional Record*, and a few things of that sort. I'd get occasional letters from him from Alabama, where he was in retirement. I liked him. He was a different kind of man than either McClellan or Kerr. I link those together, although I had far more respect for McClellan than I had for Kerr. I think McClellan—in terms of personal integrity—was unassailable. I'm not sure that's at all true of Kerr. But Hill had a more pronounced humanistic characteristic than either of the other two men. The other two were pretty callous to the rest of mankind. Hill was a human man. He had a real human dimension.

RITCHIE: I think of these people as physically big, for the most part, booming, demanding type of people.

VALEO: McClellan wasn't so much that way. Kerr certainly was, and Hill in his own way was a big man, physically. He was a tall man, not heavy but tall. He sort of towered over people.

RITCHIE: Does the position attract a person like that?

VALEO: Well, no you had Pastore, who was on the other end of the scale, and Theodore Francis Green. It looks like states seem to produce certain types. No, Fulbright also came from Arkansas, and he wasn't the same type. I can't think of others from Oklahoma. No, I don't think that's it. What you found in that early period of the Mansfield Senate, it was an odd phenomenon, very often you'd get a state where you'd have two totally different ideologically inclined people. A perfect example being Fulbright and McClellan. They worked well over a long period of time, but they were really on different ends of the scale in an ideological sense, except on those matters which were highly relevant to Arkansas, in which case Fulbright went the way of McClellan on civil rights, and I'm sure against his deeper convictions. There are other examples of that. I'm trying to think of some others, but I recall being conscious of this many times in the Senate. If you look around you'll see that there are a number, and I often wondered why that would happen.

I thought that probably one of the explanations for this was that in a state like Arkansas, considering the time that these men served, coming after the Roosevelt period, Fulbright would have to be regarded as a direct descendant of the Roosevelt period, that without Roosevelt you probably would not have had a Fulbright. What made Fulbright significant in Arkansas was the recognition, probably for the first time after the Civil War, of the significance of education. Fulbright, being an educator, took on a particular meaning for the people in Arkansas, also in addition, of course, to his ability to deal on a one-to-one basis with people in the state. If he weren't able to do that, he would have no relevance in the Senate. Whereas McClellan, I'm not sure where it would come from there, he was more a kind of county official, a small town official who worried perhaps a great deal about local people's problems, much more so than Fulbright. But he was also in many respects in his outlook much more conservative than Fulbright.

You had a Wiley and a McCarthy coming from Wisconsin. Wiley being amiable and pleasant and not doing an excessive amount of the anti-Communist game—because it was a game largely. He did only what he had to do, whereas you had McCarthy shooting from the hip all over the place. Interestingly enough in that, when the question came on the censure of McCarthy, Wiley was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee at the time. God he went through

all sorts of agonies on how to vote on that. His instincts said to censure him, but he was afraid of the political consequences in Wisconsin, and finally decided to vote present. He was looking for a justification for that position. I think Carl Marcy or somebody helped him figure out that since he came from the same state he should not actually become a party to the proceeding against McCarthy.

RITCHIE: You mentioned several of the chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee, and again in any mention of an Inner Club their names always pop up. I wondered if you would talk about people like Wiley and Walter George and Theodore Green.

VALEO: Yes, I knew them all. While they were chairmen I worked on the committee. Part of this Inner Club thing came from a newspaperman, he worked for the *New York Times*.

RITCHIE: William S. White.

VALEO: Right, Bill White. It was his invention. He loved the Senate—he loved Johnson's Senate. He didn't like Mansfield's Senate but he loved Johnson's Senate, and he loved the idea of colorful figures. He was in the Senate press gallery whenever Johnson staged one of his political melodramas on the floor. But we saw less and less of him after Mansfield took over. At first he treated Mansfield gently but after awhile he became increasingly nostalgic for Johnson's Senate. Eventually, he became

openly critical of Mansfield's leadership. Mansfield's only response was an enigmatic smile and greater deference to White. Mansfield was still around long after White had faded from the scene.

I'm trying to remember who was chairman when I first came over to the Senate on loan from the Library. Fulbright was chairman and then it went to Wiley.

RITCHIE: Tom Connally was chairman in 1952.

VALEO: I was tremendously impressed by Connally's constant sparring—not really sparring, he used to run a spear through Bill Knowland time after time on the China issue. He called Knowland the senator from Taiwan—no, from Formosa, he never would use the word Taiwan. But I didn't really know him at that point. Wiley took over the following year. Wiley was always very pleasant to me. We had a series of public hearings on the U.N. Charter. I set them up because I was single at the time and freer to travel, I went out as the advance man. We developed, Carl Marcy and I, this concept of holding hearings around the country on a foreign policy issue as an experiment. I can't say a great deal resulted from it, but I think it helped to spread some interest about foreign policy in the communities where we went. The hearings got a lot of local coverage. Wiley was always very willing to work on that. I remember he was married to an English woman at the time,

a very nice woman, a very lovely woman, and she'd travel with him a good deal on those trips. He always wanted to be sure he had orange juice in his room. He drank it incessantly.

The other thing I remember about him was his reluctance to plan very far in advance. He used to say, "You've got to move very slowly because every time you get your head above the water a little bit somebody's waiting over there with the old shillelagh to hit you over the head." He was very cautious in many ways. And the final thing I remember about him was—this was indirect from reading the hearings at the time, [Millard] Tydings was holding some hearings at the very beginning of the McCarthy thing on China. Much of the dispute at the beginning was that we had made a great mistake by allowing the Russians to come into the war in the Pacific, that they'd only stayed in for two weeks and they'd taken Manchuria and they'd gotten all these rights in Korea and so forth. This was beginning to be described as part of the Democratic plot to sell out the country to the Soviet Union. At one point during the hearings I mentioned, Tydings read a quote from the record. It went something like: "Well, what are the Russians waiting for, when are they going to get into the war in the Pacific? We've helped them out in Europe and they've made a pledge to us that they were going to get into the war and help us in Asia, and why aren't they in it? What are they waiting for?" And Wiley said, "Who said that? Who said that?" And Tydings

said, "You did." That was typical. Everybody at that point was shifting from "Why aren't they in?" to "Why did we bring them in?"

But that was Wiley. He was not a profound man. He was kind of roly-poly, with a good sense of humor. He used to pass out dollar bills as Christmas presents to people on the staff, and you couldn't refuse to take it. If you refused to take it he would have been deeply hurt. He was not profound, and he knew it. He did not make any pretenses of being other than a nice guy from a small town in Wisconsin.

RITCHIE: And Wiley was then succeeded by Walter George in 1955.

VALEO: Yes, and Walter George took that committee, it is said, at Johnson's urging, to prevent Theodore Francis Green from getting it. He gave up Finance in order to do that. Of course, George was in the southern tradition of a man of learning, a judicious man, a very able legislator and a very effective—from his point of view and for the interests that he reflected—chairman of the Finance Committee. He didn't know much about foreign policy. He was friendly with Mike Mansfield, thought very highly of him. In effect he sponsored him and pushed him when Mansfield first came into the Senate, and was probably responsible for Mansfield becoming a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in his first year in the Senate. Mansfield told me that, that he

had spoken with George and that George had been very friendly and seemed very anxious for him to get on the committee.

I can only remember one direct contact with him. For some reason or other I was left in charge of the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee. I think everybody else was on vacation in the period. A question came up that the press wanted George to answer, and George was in Georgia at the time. I drafted what I thought would be a responsible comment, and called him. He was campaigning, I think, and got him on the phone and told him about the press request. I think it had something to do with Eisenhower. He said, "Well, do you have any ideas?" And I said, "Yes, I've written out something," and I read it to him over the phone. "Well, that's fine," he said, "just give them that. That's all right." That was my only direct contact with him.

But I remember two things: I had a secretary at the time who was from Georgia. She had been brought in by George as a matter of fact. When the news of his death came, why she just burst into tears. There was a really strong bond between him and the people in Georgia who supported him. The other thing was the general feeling that it probably broke his heart to be challenged by Herman Talmadge at that time, and that he went back determined to hold on to his seat, but he just didn't have the strength. He was quite an old man at that point. He didn't have the strength to do

it and decided that he couldn't make it. He didn't do anything extraordinary as chairman of the committee. We were still in the era where Congress deferred greatly to the president and George had no trouble deferring to Eisenhower on almost everything in that period. You had the Formosa Resolution and a number of others of those that Dulles was pushing for Eisenhower. They were essentially anti-Russian resolutions of one kind or another and there was no problem in getting them through. If Eisenhower wanted them, they went through. There was virtually no opposition to it.

RITCHIE: What about George's successor, Theodore Green?

VALEO: Theodore Green was a charming man. He's easy to caricature too. He was an old man by the time he took over the committee. I had worked with him a little bit earlier in connection with the Information Program study and I had heard stories about his parsimony and his eccentric habits. I remember we had some hearings in New York at the Voice of America. I was making the arrangements for the hearings and I called him as a member of the committee. The per diem in the government at that time for travel was ten dollars a day. That included your hotel and everything else. He said, "I'm going up to New York. Where is the party staying in New York?" I gave him the name of the hotel, and I explained to him that there would be a ten dollar per diem allowance for it. "Oh," he said, "will you make the arrange-

ments?" I said, "Yes, I'll make the reservations, but each member is going to pay his own bill at the hotel." He said, "I could stay at my club, but I'd better stay where the rest of the party is." We went up to New York and held the hearings. He had to leave early but we still had a morning of hearings. Green called me about seven in the morning in my room and he said, "Now, I have to leave today. Will you take care of my hotel bill?" I reminded him that each person was going to take care of his own hotel bill. He said, "But the per diem is only ten dollars a day, and this hotel costs twelve dollars a day." I said, "I know, I'm sorry Senator, but that's the only allowance." "Well, I could have stayed at my club." I said, "Yes, you could have." He grumbled and grumbled, but finally he paid his bill.

Green was all right. I think we referred to him on occasion throughout these interviews. His problem was partly that he didn't hear too well, and partly that his mind was moving slower than most of his colleagues at that point. Moreover he had this unusual penchant for being caught up in a word or a sentence. The witness would drone on and Green would still be fixed on paragraph one or sentence one and the witness would be on paragraph four of his statement. Green would still be studying the syntax of the particular sentence in paragraph one. Whenever he found anything wrong grammatically with a sentence or a misuse of a word he could not resist fixing on it and trying to get it straightened out. So

when he'd look up he'd ask the witness a question having to do with the syntax in paragraph one. The witness wouldn't know what he was talking about because he had already reached paragraph four. So you used to have this terrible confusion and long silences whenever Green questioned a witness. I thought in the end he showed great wisdom in deciding to resign as chairman of the committee when he did. He was not forced to do that. The seniority rule was in very, very strong favor at the time. Nobody would have thought to force him out of it. There were senators in worse physical shape than he was. Kenneth McKeller of Tennessee, for example, had gone much further towards senility than Green. I rather liked Green personally.

RITCHIE: One of the interesting things about Green was that he was willing to take unpopular stands, and in the middle of the 1950s he endorsed admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, which was absolutely forbidden for anyone else to mention politically.

VALEO: Yes. Well, that's one of the things that sometimes comes with age. Not always, many senators act just the same at ninety as they do at nineteen. But in the case of Green, I think that he felt that he had reached a status where he could express his views pretty freely. Yes, and he was a wise man in many ways, not a foolish man. The foolishness might have been the foolishness of age, but it was not innate in him. He was a wise man,

and a very tough Democratic politician. He had fought a lot of battles up there in Rhode Island.

RITCHIE: Was that one of the reasons why Senator George and the Eisenhower administration didn't want Green to become chairman in 1955?

VALEO: Yes, they thought partly that he might be too radical for the policies we were following at that time. Very likely. I don't know if it was specifically the China question, but generally speaking he was not a man to repress his views, and I think they were looking for someone who would be much more amenable to Eisenhower's guidance.

RITCHIE: After Green resigned, then Fulbright took over as chairman. We've talked about Fulbright throughout the interview, but I wonder if there is anything else you'd like to say about him.

VALEO: Yes. I had a high regard for Fulbright. We didn't have any personal relationship. I didn't dislike him, but he was a somewhat distant figure. Actually, Marcy took care of him most of the time at that point. It was at the base of one of the problems I had with Marcy. Fulbright began to have second thoughts about his strong stand in favor of foreign aid. It's interesting, I mentioned already that Morse had undergone the same change just after the run-in I had with him. Then his attitude of hostility

toward me was reversed by a job on foreign aid I had done for him. I never had had a run-in with Fulbright, but he was a remote figure. He asked for a statement on foreign aid changing his previous stand. Marcy asked me to do it, and I did it. It was for use on the floor.

It was the first time Fulbright expressed formal hostility or doubt on the foreign aid program in any way. The statement is the first time he had expressed any kind of critical judgment on it. Up until that time he had accepted it almost automatically because it came from the executive branch. After he made the statement, a few days later he called me over to his office. He had this big pile of mail, much of it favorable to the statement he had made. Apparently the statement had been widely covered in Arkansas and elsewhere, because it represented a shift. He was amazed himself at the amount of mail that the statement had generated. He wanted then afterwards to go directly to me for statements, and I think Carl took exception to that, and I can understand it. But as a committee staff person in that period you were in a somewhat ambiguous position. You were a non-partisan professional and could not say no to a member's legislative request, or at least I never felt that I could say no or even, "Take this to your staff director, don't bring it to me." So it put me in a somewhat embarrassing position.

It was one of the reasons why I felt I had to really leave the committee at that point. I had the opportunity to, so I left. Fulbright was angry when I left; he was irritated with me. He said, "Why are you doing it?" And I said, "Well, I think Senator Mansfield wants some help." "Oh," he said, "we need help down on the committee too." In any event, he put through a resolution of commendation for me when I left the committee, and presented it himself to the committee.

As I told you, I think that he was embittered because under two Democratic presidents he was not made secretary of state, and he would have been an excellent secretary of state. He would have been a meaningful secretary of state. It's unfortunate that he did not get that assignment either under Kennedy or Johnson, and I'm quite sure that in both cases it had to do with the Israeli and Middle Eastern question.

RITCHIE: Overall, how would you assess Fulbright as chairman? Would you count him as a successful chairman or an ultimately frustrated chairman?

VALEO: I don't know. He personally certainly felt frustrated as a senator. I would guess that he felt frustrated in life generally because he didn't become secretary of state. I think he felt that what he did at the committee was not that much. He did not, at first, regard the legislative branch as too

relevant to foreign policy. He was a little bit like Phil Hart, in a way, not as bad as Hart but I think there was some of the same reaction. I think he felt that he had not used his talents fully. He became increasingly ineffective—well, I'd better not say that. The hearings, coming as they did on Vietnam and in that period of upheaval—were probably a very positive factor in finally clearing up those situations. But his personal irritation, his personal sense of frustration, communicated itself to other people and I think reduced his effectiveness on the floor. So it's a sort of mixed bag in the case of Fulbright. He did some highly constructive things. Certainly the Fulbright program and that concept in that earlier period were immensely valuable and pretty much permanent contributions to the country. But as chairman of the committee, I think you'd have to regard his tenure as a mixed bag.

RITCHIE: And how would you assess John Sparkman, as a long time member of the committee and briefly as its chairman?

VALEO: John Sparkman was on those U.N. hearings and I saw a lot of him. I also ran into him a couple of times traveling abroad. John Sparkman was an extremely able younger man. I think one of the brighter lights of the new south of that period, again a product basically of the Roosevelt revolution, if I can use that term, in politics in the south, and very vastly underrated nationally. I think he was a very logical and very desirable choice as

vice presidential candidate with Stevenson. At the time of his selection as the vice presidential candidate he was an outstanding senator in my judgment. He went through some sort of deterioration as time went on. I used to hear all sorts of rumors about him, much like [Clinton] Anderson and one or two of the others. But you can't take away from the fact that he came from a difficult place to run. His personal achievements were very great: a sharecropper's son, my goodness, that's a long way to come. And he was an enlightened man. Anywhere else in the country his position on civil rights would have been considerably different in my judgment than it was.

RITCHIE: You meant physical deterioration?

VALEO: Well, there were rumors that he was chasing the women around the Senate. But I don't know how much one gives credence to things like that. I never saw any personal evidence of it, but some of the women assured me that it was true. But that's an aberration, and as far as I'm concerned a minor one.

RITCHIE: He's a man who, in a sense, was always in Fulbright's shadow, at least in terms of foreign relations.

VALEO: Until he became chairman, and by that time he was old.

RITCHIE: Which is one of the problems of the seniority system.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: John Kennedy was also a member of the Foreign Relations Committee then.

VALEO: He was a minor figure on the committee.

RITCHIE: Did you have many dealings with him?

VALEO: No. I watched him on the committee a few times. I knew him only as president. I talked to him on the phone maybe two or three times when he was president, but I didn't really know him. I watched him a couple of times at committee hearings. I was impressed by him, but not as a senator. That was clearly not where his ambitions lay.

RITCHIE: And Stewart Symington came on the committee.

VALEO: Yes, Stewart Symington is a good example of somebody who learned as time went on. He was a sort of a Peck's bad boy type when he came over after being secretary of the air force. He was brash and he was much too aggressive for my taste. But that changed as time went on. I think his wisdom increased and he began to worry greatly about the effects of military expenditures and then the costs of the war in Vietnam on the whole American

financial structure. In a sense he was somewhat prophetic in having seen at a very early date the effect that these military expenditures would have on the country's finances. Then on top of that, he apparently felt some family pressure about the pointlessness of the war and what it was doing to the country, apart from the terrible toll it was taking on the young people in the country and all for some very obscure and amorphous reason of policy.

I think I said once before that I heard him make one of the really great speeches, it came off the cuff at a Democratic caucus, quite spontaneous. He first, and then Inouye both made immensely moving speeches against the war, that it was time to bring it to a halt. Symington and Inouye were highly respected and certainly would have had a lot to do with finally getting those first resolutions of the Democratic caucus, that made very clear that the concern with the war was deepening and that we needed to try to bring it to an end. I give him and Inouye a great deal of credit for that.

RITCHIE: On the Republican side you've talked about Wiley and Bourke Hickenlooper. What about George Aiken?

VALEO: Well, George Aiken went around the world with us on one of two trips as I recall. He was a great personality. Simple man but wise, and in his own way very sophisticated. His habits were simple but his wisdom was very sophisticated. He was I guess

the only enduring, close friend that Senator Mansfield had in the Senate. I don't need to go into the details. You know they breakfasted every morning together. George Aiken was here alone for a long time, his wife never came down to live here. Then I believe she died and he married Lola Perotti, who had been his right hand for years and years, even as governor of Vermont.

He also made a very important contribution to bringing the war in Vietnam to an end by an amusing twist, which is well known: his saying we ought to just declare victory and get out. Because he saw that we were carrying on that war as though it were a football game, and that all we were really concerned with was winning. Winning for what? Nobody had ever asked for what or why, this whole question of why. You're in a war, you win it automatically, nobody asks what it might take and what meaning it might have in terms of the real interests of the United States. Unfortunately, Johnson thought about war as though it were a football game, as did a lot of other people. So part of the problem was to get that mind-set, that kind of a thought process, broken up in some way, and Aiken's humor I think helped because it was quoted widely and repeatedly afterwards, and helped to bring the war to an end.

Beyond that, I don't know how much you know about him. Did you know that he was a wildflower authority? He wrote a book on wildflowers, an authoritative book, on wildflowers as a matter of fact. He raised them—I don't know how you raise wildflowers, but

I think he raised them. He had a marvelous sense of humor. It was a wry, New England sense of humor, but a good one. He was invariably cheerful. I can't remember ever seeing him depressed or ever depressing anyone else around him. He was a very even-tempered, charming, warm and lovable man. That's about the best way to describe him.

RITCHIE: On a different temperament, what about William Knowland, who was also on the Foreign Relations Committee?

VALEO: When Knowland committed suicide, all I could think of was that one time I had seen him out in Denver, Colorado. Carl Marcy and I had been out there on U.N. hearings. The hearings were over and we were at the airport and Knowland was already there, he was in the waiting room. We were going to take the same plane. Suddenly the skies opened up and the snow just poured out. It was a spring snowstorm and it piled up about six inches of snow in a half hour or so. So we sat there and talked. It was the only time I ever saw Knowland relaxed. He told some funny stories. He was not an unpleasant man in that period. But I never saw him in the Senate, or around the Senate—I didn't know him well—but I never saw him other than with his shoulders hunched and he looking as though he were either to take a blow or give a blow. He just had that look. He looked as though he were carrying the world around on his shoulders all the time. In retrospect I had the feeling that he was a man who disliked what

he was doing intensely, but was being driven to do it by some unknown element, or some known element that I didn't know. I can't think of him as being particularly an effective leader. He would have been a terrible president. He was a sad man, really.

RITCHIE: What about Knowland's successor as Republican leader, Everett Dirksen?

VALEO: Of course I liked Dirksen personally a great deal. He was a ham but a lovable ham. We had a great deal to do with him during the civil rights bill. Dirksen had a capacity for coming through in a crisis, a national crisis, and coming down in the end on the right side. He would clown. I don't know if anybody has mentioned that marvelous exchange with Humphrey on the Marigold. If you've got the story I'm not going to go over it, but it completely flabbergasted Hubert Humphrey when Dirksen took off on the Marigold and didn't stop for about ten or fifteen minutes. I happened to be on the floor when that happened, and it was a most impressive thing. You could hardly keep from laughing right through it. He did it in such erudite terms, and the ham in him was marvelous when he was doing something that was light. I must say, he did not ham when the issues were serious, that was not where he did it. I thought that he was the key figure not only in civil rights but in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and there were one or two other issues where he was decisive.

One has to credit Mansfield largely for his handling of Dirksen that made a lot of this possible, because Dirksen was decisive in the sense that many of these issues found the Democratic minority, that is the southern Democrats, potentially aligned with the majority of the Republicans and therefore controlling the vote. But Mansfield's handling of Dirksen acted to break that alignment between the southern Democrats and Dirksen and to keep it broken with his successors for that matter. Dirksen never opposed Mansfield on a strictly political basis just to get political gains from it. He opposed him on principle on a number of issues, but not in terms of political purpose, and that is not true of Johnson. Johnson was opposed many times for two reasons: first of all to deflate his ego and often for the purposes of political advantage.

Dirksen was a perfect example of what cigarettes do to you. They eventually kill you. I'm told that when he came out of the operation for lung cancer he was reaching into his breast pocket to get a cigarette. I don't know who told me that story, but I suspect it's probably true, knowing how he smoked constantly. He drank a lot, but he wasn't an alcoholic. His back room was a place for meetings and having a drink. He had a man named Oliver Dompierre who was very close to him and worked the floor with him. We had a lot to do with Dompierre, never had any trouble working with him. On all Senate matters I could count on him. I was

still feeling my own way when Dirksen was leader, but there were no real problems working with Dirksen. I think he was a fine Republican and a great American.

RITCHIE: When you think about those senators in the late '50s and early '60s, Johnson and Dirksen, you think of hard-drinking, hard-smoking, hard-working, long hours. Was that more characteristic at that stage or was that just a necessity of being a United States senator?

VALEO: I think it was more characteristic in part because it was still close to the war, and that was the pattern of wartime behavior on a much broader scale, not just in the Senate. I mean, people worked harder, people drank more, all hours of the day and night. They were reflective of their times, I think.

RITCHIE: I think of the younger senators now playing squash and swimming in the pool, but I can't imagine some of the old bulls of the '50s doing things like that.

VALEO: Well, they tended to go for the massage in the Senate gym. That reminds me of a story Everett Jordan told. I never used the Senate gym, but Everett Jordan told the story about being in the pool one day and the bells rang. He said, "You should have seen those senators jumping out. They looked like frogs coming out of a pond." He had such colorful language, it was really a marvelous expression of Americanism from his own

sector of the country. Another time we were in Canada, in Quebec and we were snowed in at the Frontenac for about three days. It was really a roaring blizzard. He went out and just as he came back covered with snow I caught him at the door of the hotel. He had taken a walk in it and he was wrapped up in his scarf and overcoat with his hat pulled down over his ears. He came in and said, "Oh, it's bad out there Frank, bad. You see those people out there? They're all walking around like chickens." That was his style of language.

And I must put this story in too because it was a classic for Jordan. One time he had owned, among other things, a gasoline station down in North Carolina, his family owned it. He said they had a fellow working for them at the station, he was a loner, never talked very much, never did very much. It was about the time during the early Roosevelt period when they decided to pay a bonus to the veterans of World War I and this fellow was a veteran. He'd been in the war practically from before it began until a couple of years after it ended, so he had a very sizeable amount of money coming to him, something like ten or twelve thousand dollars. After he got the bonus he came in and said, "Mr. Jordan, I think I'm going to be leaving you." "Oh," he said, "what are you going to do that for?" And the fellow said, "Well, I've got all of this money, I thought I'd go down the coast and look around a little bit." So Jordan wished him good luck and the

guy left. About two weeks later he came back and said, "Can I have my job back?" He said, "What do you need a job for? I thought you went down to the coast to look around." "Yeah, " he said, "I did, but I don't have any money left." "What did you do with all that money from the bonus?" The fellow said, "I spent half of it on women and drink and I wasted the rest." That was typical, he had a marvelous sense of humor.

RITCHIE: There must have been many of them who used their story-telling abilities for their own political advantage.

VALEO: Yes, very much so, and it's still done. Of course it was a classic characteristic of politicians in that period and I suppose to some degree it's still true. You start a speech after dinner with a joke.

RITCHIE: There's a certain persona that develops, you expect a Dirksen to have a story to tell, and someone else to be more brittle and abrupt.

VALEO: Nobody ever expected Mansfield to tell stories, and he didn't.

RITCHIE: Also in the Republican leadership of those days was Thomas Kuchel. What were your observations of him?

VALEO: I didn't know him too well, and I didn't have a great deal of actual dealings with him, but he was a very nice person, generally very highly thought of in the Senate as a decent human being. I think I mentioned he served as a designee on the congressional group which was advising Secretary of the Treasury John Connally on Secret Service protection for presidential candidates. When the issue came up as to whether or not Ted Kennedy should have it, he was one that strongly endorsed protection. I had proposed that it be given to him. Treasury did not act on it at that point, but Kuchel joined me very strongly and for much the same reasons. They spread some very spurious stories about him in California, but I didn't know much about that aspect of him. He was a liberal Republican and spoke well on the floor. I don't think he was a major force on the floor, but he was right on a lot of issues of that period—what I would regard as right.

RITCHIE: Another Republican who was more of a behind-the-scenes leader was Styles Bridges. Did you have any dealings with him?

VALEO: Yes, I did. I was in the Library of Congress at the time. I didn't know him in the Senate per se, but he was very much an ally of McCarthy. There were many who said Bridges was the one who was egging McCarthy on, he being behind the scenes. Ernest Griffith knew him very well, and Ernest called me one day and said "We have a very secret job to do, and it's for Senator

Bridges," who was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in that period—that was in the '47 to '48 period. He said, "It's a translating job from Chinese. I want you to take a group of translators and do the job for him." So I said, "Do you have the material?" He said, "Oh, no, you can't have it. You've got to go over to his office to do it." It was right about the time that people were beginning to defect, not Communists but other Nationalist leaders were beginning to leave Chiang Kai-shek, and apparently one had gotten out with a big load of papers, and maybe some cash. These papers had to do largely with that situation. This Chinese had come here to the United States and then he had gone to Mexico. He was one of the quasi-independent generals from Kuangxi province who had worked with Chiang Kai-shek.

So I got two or three Chinese from the Orientalia Division of the Library and we went over to do the translation. We worked a whole weekend, about fourteen hours a day for three days, I think, and we got the job done. He had a fellow named Scott McLeod who was his administrative assistant and later became ambassador to Ireland. Well, McLeod was the immediate supervisor of this job. Bridges came in occasionally, wrote a lovely letter to Ernest Griffith about the marvelous job we had done for him and so forth. But I remember Scott McLeod because he would open the door just a crack to see who might be outside trying to come in the office. He was very conspiratorial. I didn't really know much about

Bridges other than in these two connections. His reputation at least in Democratic circles was not a good one.

RITCHIE: He seemed to be the kind of person who liked to operate behind the scenes.

VALEO: Apparently, and that would be borne out by the McCarthy thing. He was a total Republican, a totally partisan man.

RITCHIE: I also wanted to ask you about Mansfield's colleagues from Montana. James Murray was the senior senator when he arrived.

VALEO: I didn't know Murray. I met him once or twice, just about at the very end of his career. Mansfield, I think, introduced me to him. He was the only one that Mansfield called "Senator." Somebody asked him about that in my presence once. He said, "Well, that's the only name that I've ever known him by and I'm not going to call him anything else." He called everybody else by their first name, which is customary in the Senate. But he never called him Jim or James, he always called Murray "Senator."

Then came Lee Metcalf after that. Mansfield described him as the "ablest congressman that ever came out of Montana," but there were two things that were involved with Metcalf. I got to know him quite well because Mansfield set up the job of permanent

acting president pro tem for him. He did that almost as a palliative for Metcalf, because Metcalf was in his shadow and he knew that, and he knew Metcalf was beginning to resent that in his own way.

When I first met Metcalf he was a bright young fellow, and I watched a kind of progressive personal deterioration over the years. He was heavy on booze and I think it got worse as time went on. And he was very aggressive when he drank. The problem for him in the Senate was that there was no place for him to go. His interests were in foreign relations. Here was Mansfield, a huge presence in that field, in front of him. You can't have two from the same state interested in a subject like foreign affairs without one of them suffering some adverse consequences. Metcalf was destined to suffer. Mansfield tried to defer to him very frequently, but you knew it was synthetic. In an odd way, Mansfield, not unlike all the rest, liked that spotlight, particularly in foreign relations. He gave it up only with reluctance, except when it became a part of his own strategy to give it up, as he did in many instances. In a way you can't blame him, this would have happened with anyone. I'm trying to say in effect he was no different than any other senator on that score. So when he tried to defer to Metcalf it came over to me at least synthetically. And I'm sure Metcalf was aware of that.

I'm not suggesting that Mansfield drove Metcalf to drink. Nobody drives anybody to drink; you either drink or you don't drink. But the net result was that whatever Metcalf's potential was, it was never fully realized when he was in the Senate. I think he yearned at one time to be a judge, or he had been a judge in Montana on a local level, and there was some consideration being given to possibly putting him in a judgeship somewhere, but nothing ever came of that. I think he died a very disillusioned man and a very unhappy man basically.

RITCHIE: You mentioned earlier about the states sending different types of people. It also seems to me that the fact that there are two senators from each state means that no one is the senator representing that state; there's always someone else that they have to deal with as both a colleague and a competitor. Even within the same party it must create competition and tension.

VALEO: I'd like to say that it's almost like a marriage. I mean, if you've got the right combination of two senators, you have the state fully represented and all of its various facets fully represented. If it isn't well represented, you would have either two competing ones, and in this case I would say it was not well represented because Metcalf and Mansfield were essentially the same kind of men and their views ideologically were almost identical. I don't think they ever voted differently on a measure in all the while they were in the Senate together. Only once, yes

they did, on the gun control bill. Metcalf voted against it and Mansfield voted for it. And Metcalf said afterwards that "Mike is the only man in any Western state who could vote for gun control and still get reelected."

End of Interview #17

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE CLASS OF 1958
Interview #18
Wednesday, December 18, 1985

RITCHIE: Last week we talked about Lee Metcalf and Mike Mansfield, and the problems of living in the shadow of another senator. It struck me that one team of Democratic senators who seemed to work it out pretty well for a long time was Warren Magnuson and Henry Jackson. Could you give me your observations of those two?

VALEO: That's very interesting, because now that you mention it I never remember seeing Magnuson and Jackson head-to-head planning anything anywhere in all the meetings that I went to. Both of them attended the chairmen of the committee meetings, they usually sat in different parts of the room. I saw a lot of Magnuson. He used to drop into the office very frequently. Jackson never came in. I was friendly with both of them. I don't know how Jackson took to my views on the military and on Vietnam, which were somewhat different from his. Both senators in a sense were very silent people and both seemed to go their own ways.

Now, I'm sure they cooperated a great deal on matters that involved the state of Washington. They supported each other vigorously in state elections, that is elections to the Senate.

But when it came to actually putting their heads together and conniving in the Senate, there was no indication of that whatsoever. In part, I suppose, because they had somewhat different interests. Jackson was really the defense man, and Warren Magnuson was not. He went along with things in support of defense measures, particularly as they might involve Boeing, but he was not an advocate of large defense budgets as was Jackson.

Mansfield's reactions to the two men were interesting. He got along very well with Magnuson, called him "Maggie," as did everybody else. Magnuson had a good sense of humor. He had a way of going on the floor at the very, very precise moment when he knew he could get a piece of legislation through and saying, "I've got this little old amendment," or this "little old bill that doesn't amount to much." Usually he was able to slip through a great deal of things involving the state which, if advanced by another member, might have been challenged. Everybody got a kick out of his technique. Every time Magnuson said, "I've got this little bill that doesn't amount to very much," everybody would start to laugh because they knew precisely what was coming. But very rarely was he opposed on those measures. He had a great deal of trouble with his legs as he got older. I used to talk with him about that, having had myself a similar problem at an earlier date. I used to urge him to do some exercises. Whether it ever really had an effect or not, I don't know. He was always good

in the meetings of the policy committee. He was a level-headed person, invariably supported Mansfield's leadership on:, almost any issue, and that included Vietnam.

Jackson was not a member of the policy committee. He kept his own counsel largely, and he kept a distance from the leadership. He had a staff person, Dorothy Fosdick, who was his advisor on defense and national security. Her father (Happy Emerson Fosdick) was a famous minister in New York and, I think, a pacifist. He headed one of the major churches in New York. I remember him from my student days at International House. He was highly esteemed. She seemed almost to be apologizing for his pacifism by her vigorous embracing of a militaristic approach. She had this absolute one-track mind on anything involving the Russians, which again was quite in contrast to her father's in an earlier period.

Mansfield did not, down deep, like Jackson. He thought Jackson was the product of an overweening ambition to be president and Mansfield was very sensitive to anybody in the Senate who wanted to be president. He almost invariably knew who had the bug, long before it was evident to anyone else. Still, you couldn't help but admire Jackson. He was a very able, highly intelligent man. As a Democrat, he was a good one. I didn't agree with him on defense questions, and I think he helped to waste billions and billions of dollars by his readiness to swallow

whatever he got from the Defense Department, in much the same way Russell did. The two in combination were probably the main angels of the Department of Defense and its subdepartments and contractors. But Mansfield's particular objection to him was not so much on that score as it was on his belief that Jackson was pushing too hard to be president. Jackson opposed Mansfield's leadership on Vietnam until very much towards the end of the war. Then he too got on board.

My first encounter with Magnuson was when I was in the Library. He asked for someone who knew something about China to do a TV show. This would have been in the early fifties. He had just come back from a trip to China. He had gone to Shanghai, I believe, it was after the Communists had taken over. He was about the only member of Congress who went out in that period. He came back pushing for trade with China. He didn't want to cut it off. Seattle was a main port of embarkation for that kind of trade. I didn't know him, but I was selected and I went on this talk show with him. He did most of the talking. He told about his trip and what had happened. Tris Coffin was the moderator. I guess a cousin of mine in New York happened to have the TV turned on and took a picture of the screen and sent it down to me. I don't know what's happened to that picture, it's probably somewhere in the collection, but it shows a much younger edition of Magnuson.

Magnuson liked to tell an amusing story about Honolulu during the war. He was a naval officer assigned to Honolulu. He said at that time the city was full of prostitutes. They decided at one point to go on strike for some reason or other, and with thousands of naval men in the city, the city fathers were very disturbed about what it might do to the peace of the commonwealth. Magnuson mediated the strike between the spokesmen for the prostitutes and for the Navy and apparently got them some higher rates or something. But he was very proud of that achievement. He loved to tell that story. I liked him personally. I had a close personal relationship with him. I thought he was a very wily man, but he had decent instincts. On the Appropriations Committee he was a very strong supporter of Galludet College for the Deaf.

He was strongly for organized labor. He supported every measure that involved labor. If you recall the history of that period, Washington state in the World War II period and before, in the Roosevelt times, was one of the most radical states in the nation. I believe they actually had two members of the Communist party in Congress at one point in that period—or if they weren't members, everybody acknowledged that they were Communists and they never made any attempt to hide it. I suspected that part of Jackson's later almost-phobia of the Soviet Union may have come from earlier associations in that kind of a setting, where it would have been very natural for any Democratic senator to have

had, if not Communist allies, Communist acquaintances. This was Harry Bridges territory at the time. I had the feeling that maybe Jackson was anxious to put as much distance between himself and that early period of his political career as possible.

Overall the state of Washington was extremely well represented. I never shared Mansfield's view about Jackson's presidential ambitions. Although I'm sure he had them, I didn't think they were either more or less than many other members of the Senate whom I had known. I never saw any evidence of friction between Magnuson and Jackson, nor did I ever see any evidence of closeness between them. Between the two of them, I think they served the interests of their state extremely well. And I was very saddened to see Magnuson defeated. It would have been different had he decided not to run. Normally he won huge majorities in that state, nobody every really challenged him, so it was quite a shock to me when he lost. I don't know that I can add anything more on that combination. It was a good one.

RITCHIE: The combination in the immediate adjourning state of Oregon never seemed to work: that was Morse and Neuberger, who were forever feuding.

VALEO: Both Neuberger! That was Morse. Morse was almost continuously feuding with everyone. It was his nature. He was about as strong a loner as I've known. Now most loners sort

of pull off to the background, but this was a loner who was determined to be out in front, beckoning to the rest of the country to follow him. Maybe someday we'll move in that direction. He might have been twenty or thirty years ahead of his time, it's hard to tell. Certainly he was one of the most brilliant members of the Senate. His capabilities for grabbing the nub of a subject were immense. Walter George spoke of him as the best constitutional lawyer that he had ever known in the Senate, and I think probably correctly so. He was really a brilliant lawyer and a brilliant advocate. The problem was that the distance between him and the rest of the members was so great in this respect that he could not build bridges to them.

He spoke mostly for the record, and he didn't really care whether anybody listened to him or not. He'd be up there in the evenings sometimes until seven, eight, nine at night, making a speech, which would start with the briefest of notes and go on literally for hours. His command of English was superb. His capabilities in penetrating to the real heart of issues was immense. I had only the greatest respect for him. As we've covered in an earlier meeting, I had a run-in with him which had nothing really to do with me, it was a misunderstanding completely, because I admired him greatly. I thought he added an enormous amount of yeast to the Senate. You need people like Morse. He doesn't let you sit on your complacency too long and

pat yourself on the back. He was always looking for the things that needed an honest searchlight on them. And he found them very often. Some of the issues he pursued very early on, more often than not, to the irritation of his colleagues, were eventually chickens that came home to roost. Vietnam, foreign aid, the China situation and our involvement with Chiang Kai-shek, were issues of this kind. There were also many domestic issues. I happened to be more concerned with his views on foreign policy.

There was the time when he shifted over from the Republicans to the Democrats. This was a little bit before my deep immersion in Senate affairs. He apparently had some kind of a run-in with his Republican colleagues and decided to leave that party. His first inclination was to go over to the Democrats. Johnson was leader at the time, and was a little skittish about taking him into the fold. He was such a hair shirt when he wanted to be. When Morse sensed the reluctance, he made it very clear that if the Democrats didn't want him to organize with them, he would organize as an independent, move his chair to the middle aisle, and do all of his committee work on the floor of the Senate. Well, that was enough to get him a place on the Democratic side, where I think he belonged. The Democrats, at least during the period I was there, tended to be the more innovative of the two parties, and if anything, Morse was the kind of person who pointed out where the innovation might be necessary. He was a great

senator, and I think if he's treated with any fairness in history he'll show up that way.

RITCHIE: What did you think about his colleagues Richard and Maureen Neuberger?

VALEO: Neither of them registered very strongly with me. I think Neuberger was a bright man. He was not the sort of personality I like. He tended to be a little bit deprecatory of people in a kind of sly way which I didn't really appreciate. Mrs. Neuberger never really made much of a mark. She stayed only briefly and then decided she'd had enough of it. It really wasn't for her. Actually, I think Neuberger himself was not around long enough really to have shown what kind of senator he might have been. He came at a refreshing time, because I think it was somewhat after the McCarthy period and most of the people from the West were basically pro-McCarthy kinds of people, and Neuberger came in as a welcomed change from that.

RITCHIE: Continuing on about Morse, there was a group of independent, loner-type senators. I think of Paul Douglas, Joseph Clark, William Proxmire. Can you tell me about them? And what does the loner really do in an institution that's usually fairly collegial?

VALEO: Well, I'd have to differ with your observations on Douglas and Clark. I think you're right when you talk of Proxmire

in these terms. In a way, Mansfield was a loner. We've mentioned Morse as still another. Clark never wanted to be a loner; he wanted to be at the center of the stage, literally. And the same thing with Douglas, he wanted really to be the center of the Democratic party, both of them did. And they weren't. They happened to be somewhat on the left side of the center, and they really wanted the party to move over to where they were so that they would be the center. But it never worked that way while they were in the Senate. As a result, both became very sharp thorns in the side of Lyndon Johnson when he was leader. I remember some of the debates on the floor. Johnson would hunch over in his chair and listen with much dismay written on his face because he was definitely their target—in particular with Clark. He got along much better with Paul Douglas, I think.

Paul Douglas was a highly emotional man. He never understood the parliamentary manipulation that went on in the Senate. He didn't understand it, in a way much to his credit, because the manipulation was usually something that was a little underhanded and didn't belong really in the Senate. It was one of the things Mansfield got rid of as far as he could. But Douglas was constantly victimized by that. It used to make him furious. He was particularly angry with Bobby Baker. I came in after Bobby Baker, and he began to treat me the same way, thinking automatically that I would be the same kind of person that Baker was in that job.

That straightened out as time went on, but if he thought there was even the remotest chance that I was making some kind of snide attempt to undermine his position, he was up in absolute fury at it. He had a long-time assistant—who later went over to Proxmire, as a matter of fact. He just retired not too long ago. He was Proxmire's administrative assistant for a long time, Howard Shuman, who shared Douglas' views. They were both crusaders for righteousness, and like righteous people sometimes, they were extremely difficult.

Now, that was never true of Proxmire. He never saw himself as a righteous person. He happened to be my neighbor. We lived just a door apart and our kids went to the same camp in the summer. He had a son about my son's age, so they played a lot together. I had a great personal fondness for Proxmire, again one of these absolutely essential people in an ideal Senate, in my judgment, a leaven who moved the Senate to think in somewhat new ways. He was a Democrat, clearly, most of his votes were with the Democrats. But you'd never know it to talk with him. He had his own world that he lived in, that he does live in, and he works out of that world to put into the mainstream of American politics and government ideas which he believes in. I don't know how much success he has had with that but it was a part of the genius of the Senate.

He used to feel fairly lucky when he got fifteen or twenty votes on an amendment that he might offer. He was one of the early advocates of taking a far closer look at the amount of money which was being spent on defense, an idea which I think is now coming into its own. He pushed for years—a speech a day—advocating our adherence to the Genocide Convention. Probably within the next few years we're going to have to face the defense cost problem as a very real one, as one of the sources of the nation's potential bankruptcy, again largely because we built this wall up during World War II of never challenging anything that had to do with the military because it was essential in that period for the conduct of World War II, or it was deemed to be essential, and that has carried over. It was interesting, in connection with a recent plane crash that the Defense Department said it was working under standards which had developed in 1952. When you have that kind of in-built thing, it takes some person like a Proxmire or like a Morse to get the ball rolling in a new direction. And the Senate is an ideal place to put that kind of a burr in the saddle, if you will, to begin to move it. That is because the Senate does allow for a great deal of flexibility, individual expression, among its members.

So I obviously think very highly of Proxmire. I sent him a small contribution in one campaign after I left the Senate, and he

sent it back to me with a note saying, "Thank you, but I never take any contributions for my campaigns. I'd be delighted to take yours if I were going to do it, but I don't do it."

RITCHIE: Hubert Humphrey as a senator was criticized for compromising too much. Would you say that these people didn't compromise enough as senators, this group of liberal, more independent-minded men?

VALEO: I think in a way they didn't listen enough. They were not difficult men in terms of their basic decency and their willingness to recognize other points of view. I don't think that that was the issue. If you have that sort of person, he ought to be able to compromise. But I think they were so determined, particularly after you had had this recession of liberalism from the time of Roosevelt—it had moved pretty far by the time they were in the Senate in the early 1950s. You had the whole McCarthy period in there, which was almost a negation of everything that had happened under Roosevelt from the liberal end. McCarthy was the first negation; Reagan is the second. The Senate liberals of the fifties were so determined to hang on to what they had that they didn't really hear the sounds that were coming up around them. So it was impossible for them to compromise, not because they were uncompromising men, but because they were so determined to try to protect the advances which they saw were an essential contribution of the Roosevelt period and the people who had

supported Roosevelt. I think that's really the explanation of their difficulty.

Now, Proxmire was not in that category. Proxmire simply has his own kind of idea-factory, and he works out of that factory. It's impervious to criticism either on the left or right, it doesn't make any difference to him. He just is going to do it; in much the same way Morse did the same thing. They work out of an inner thrust, let's put it that way, rather than by the forces that are around them. No, I would not speak of any of these people, certainly not Douglas, or Proxmire, or Morse, as ineffective in terms of their own lights and in terms of what they may in the long run have contributed to the country. Ineffective in the sense of somebody who gets legislation through the way they want it, yes they were ineffective in that sense. But they were not meant to get a lot of legislation through. That wasn't their primary function in the Senate, as I see it in retrospect.

RITCHIE: Joe Clark took on the Senate establishment, and wrote a number of books on reforming the Senate. Did you see any value in the suggestions he was making, or any possibility of change?

VALEO: He had young political scientists who worked with him—Bernard Norwitch, I believe, and others—who did most of that writing. It was strictly a political scientist's viewpoint of

the Senate. I can't remember now the content of his ideas on organizing the Senate. I remember thinking, at the time, of it being really irrelevant more than anything else, sort of unrooted in the realities of the Senate. But I 'm sure there were some worthwhile things in his approach. I just didn't see any prospect of anything happening as a result of it. He did a whole series of speeches on reform of the Senate, as I recall. Those were things that gave Lyndon Johnson the shivers. When Clark would be speaking Johnson listened very closely, I must say.

RITCHIE: Another maverick senator in that period was Estes Kefauver, and I wondered what your impressions were of him?

VALEO: I didn't know him well. I met him a few times and I supported him when he made the effort to run for the presidency. I thought he was a great populist in the same—I go on hesitantly—tradition as Jimmy Carter, but after having seen what Carter did in the presidency, I'm not so sure that Kefauver as president would have done very much more. He was a very honest and very courageous man. He voted his convictions. I recall there was one vote, I think he was the only one who opposed McCarthy on one of the anti-Communist votes McCarthy won without even trying. He took him on. He was a quiet man. I remember him best for those crime hearings which he ran for a while. I thought he was very effective. I can't remember which campaign that was, but at that point I thought he would have made a great president.

He didn't carry that much esteem among his colleagues. They did not think that much of Estes Kefauver.

He was teamed up with one of the real problems of aging in the Senate, Kenneth McKellar, at that time. Of course, he was youth as contrasted with McKellar's age. McKellar, I didn't know him, but the stories were that he used to fall asleep during the hearings all the time and was almost nonfunctional, but clung to his chairmanship. Of course the same problem arose with Green of Rhode Island and others. There have been some advocacies of setting a maximum constitutional limit on age for the Senate. I have never supported that view. I think the Senate can tolerate a McKellar once in a while, or a Green, without it being disastrous. But I think that to put a limitation in terms of age on the Senate would be a mistake. That's a judgment that should be left to the constituencies, and the effort to impose an age limit is a prejudice and a mistake. As it is now you get somebody from time to time who is eighty years old or more and is very, very capable. We can see that in the case of the chap over in the House, who is kind of "Mr. Aging."

RITCHIE: Claude Pepper.

VALEO: Yes. I think Claude Pepper is one of the outstanding members of the House. If I picked the dozen outstanding members, I'd pick him among them. And you would have lost that if

you had an age limitation. So I never favored that. I thought it would be wrong to do it. I thought it was a judgment that should be left to voters. Especially with TV the voters can see if a man's aged too much to do the job. That's very possible.

RITCHIE: Older candidates always could run on the platform that they had seniority in the Senate, and that the system rewarded age.

VALEO: Yes, but that they don't have that so much anymore. That isn't as valuable as it used to be. Maybe TV will do what a constitutional amendment would not necessarily have done so well. The TV is a pretty revealing machine and it makes it very possible to make that determination.

RITCHIE: Except that Milton Young in his last reelection campaign combated the age issue by breaking a board with his hand in a karate chop on a television program.

VALEO: What did he have, balsam? He was a good guy, Milton Young, a very pleasant man. I met him once abroad. I was traveling with Bourke Hickenlooper and he asked to join up with us, so we traveled together for about a week in Asia. He was a typical Plainsman. I don't know that he made any great contributions to the country, but he represented what his state needed at that point, and they didn't need to make any great contributions to the country. There weren't that many of them to begin

with. The other one from North Dakota, Langer, I only remember slightly. I was on the Foreign Relations Committee staff when he was a member of that committee. I think I told the story about Langer and Rockefeller, if I'm not mistaken.

RITCHIE: Yes, you did.

VALEO: Well, it was a classic story, really.

RITCHIE: One other senator from that period that I really have to ask you a question about, especially now that Dick Baker has published a book about him, is Clinton Anderson. What were your impressions of him?

VALEO: I didn't know him well. He was an irritable man. He was diabetic, of course, and his health was not good. It never was any good during the period I knew him in the Senate. He definitely carried weight on environmental issues and hydropower. There was no question, people listened to Clint Anderson, including Johnson, on issues involving the west. In some ways you might have, in his period, called him "Mr. West." He really understood the problems of water and power in the West and was regarded by everyone as one of the two or three really outstanding members on those issues. But I didn't know him well enough to know. Then as he got older and he got on that drug, L-DOPA, and there were stories about how he had this revision in his sex life and he was chasing the women around again, an effect which apparently comes

from taking the drug. He was constantly on medication. For years it went on. Everybody always would say, "Poor Clint, he's on death's door again," and then he'd go on for another couple of years and then it would start all over again: he's about to die. But he lasted a long time.

RITCHIE: Is the best strategy for a senator to concentrate on one issue, the way Anderson did on conservation issues?

VALEO: It depends on what your objective is. If you're running for the presidency, the answer would be no. If you want to make a mark in the Senate as such, you pick one or two main issues that interest you deeply and which have some national significance as well as local significance, and you concentrate on them. That is one of the formulas, as far I know, that brings you to the forefront in the Senate. How much that will be changed by the increased relevance of TV on what happens in American politics, I'm not yet sure. Maybe you have to be on five now, maybe you have to be six issues, and you have to be known on all of them. I don't know that for sure but certainly in the period we're talking about, those senators who picked a couple of issues which were of overwhelming importance to their state, and great importance to the nation—here you have the Mansfield example where he picked foreign relations. We were able to draw up the concept that it was damned important to Montana what happened in China or what happened in Europe. If you could do that sort of thing with a

national issue and make it meaningful to your own state; if you could combine that with a great concern about your state's immediate and unique problems, then I think you had the basis for a highly successful member of the Senate.

I think this was part of the problem with Metcalf, which we mentioned last time. He would have liked to do that, and he did it to a degree in the House after Mansfield had left the House. Metcalf had succeeded him, if I'm not mistaken, and Metcalf did much the same thing there. He was making a mark for himself in foreign policy, but there wasn't room for two of them in the Senate, and that was part of his difficulty.

RITCHIE: That he couldn't carve out a separate sphere.

VALEO: You really have to carve out a separate sphere. We talked earlier about Jackson and Magnuson. There was never any real conflict between them. Obviously they both overlapped on many issues, but Magnuson you didn't identify with foreign policy. You identified him with commerce and appropriations, he was very important in those spheres. But in the case of Jackson you identified him with defense and foreign policy and anti-Sovietism, he had very strong views on that.

RITCHIE: I wanted to ask you next about the group that was elected as the "Class of '58," but before I do, I wanted to ask whether there is much of an identity of a class of senators. Do

people think of them as a group? Is there some significance in the fact that people all come in at the same time, especially a large group?

VALEO: I never noticed it. The press makes a big to-do about it. They usually come in on a wave in the country—in the case of the group that came in in '58 it was an anti-Eisenhower economics group. We were in the midst of something of a recession which was blamed largely on the Republicans who were in the White House. That's usually when it happens. You have the group, more in the House than in the Senate, who came in on the Vietnamese wave. I'm thinking now of the Democrats. Then you have the anti-Carter wave that came in on the Republicans as the last major wave as far as I can see. There are a lot of other elections in between in which you don't really have that kind of sharp swing. But I don't think people in the Senate think of themselves strongly as a member of a particular class or year of the Senate except insofar as it involves their seniority. I saw no evidence of that. Only to the extent that very often their closer friends are chosen from that group because they were all in the same boat when they came in and they had much the same problems. They had a lot of shared interests, but only in that sense. They very quickly move out in different direction depending on what other interests drive them.

RITCHIE: I'd like to ask you about some of those people. Running down the list by seniority, Stephen Young is first.

VALEO: When I think of Steve Young I think of Little Napoleon. He was a very aggressive man, and he had a chip on his shoulder, as very often happens with men of shorter stature. They make up for it by their press forward, so to speak. He took offense very easily. Sometimes he didn't hear correctly and he took offense unnecessarily. But basically he was bright; in a classic liberal sense he certainly belonged with Douglas and Clark and people of that sort. His views were very liberal. He was a strong supporter of labor. He was quarrelsome. He took no nonsense from anyone, including his constituents. I don't think he really cared that much about getting reelected. He used to write the most stinging letters; if he got an offensive letter from a constituent he wrote one back that was just about as offensive as the one he got. He didn't try to palliate or salve the constituent. He never did that.

I thought he was unique person, and I liked him personally. When he left, I took one of the people from his staff, I'm trying to remember which one it was, one of the fellows that he had had as a driver for himself, I took him into the secretary's office. I liked Steve Young. He was a man who didn't hear anything around him, much the same way as Clark. He heard only himself and he was so obsessed with projecting his own views that he was a man who

obviously couldn't compromise, not because he didn't want to necessarily—although in this case even more so than in the case of Clark. He was uncompromising. He didn't really like to compromise. When John Glenn first tried to challenge him, he came out slugging which I thought was indicative. He took on an astronaut, and taking on an astronaut in that period was a little difficult, because Glenn was a national hero. But it didn't phase Young; he was ready for it; he was always ready for a fight.

RITCHIE: That was mostly a Democratic class, but there were a few Republicans, including Hugh Scott and Kenneth Keating.

VALEO: Yes, of course I knew Hugh Scott very well, and I knew Ken Keating quite well. As a matter of fact, he was the first congressman who ever came into my house. He came with Nancy Dickerson. I gave a party, and I guess she was hostess for that party. She was then Nancy Haunchman and worked at the Foreign Relations Committee. She brought Ken Keating as I recall. I liked him. He was a sound Republican, one might say a Republican liberal in the context of Dewey and Rockefeller, that sort of person. He was a warm person. He had a family problem. I think his wife had some very serious illness for a long, long time. I don't think she came to Washington. Keating was a progressive legislator, no great shakes, but he was a good senator. As far as Hugh Scott is concerned, I've already said I think he was an extremely able man and made some major contributions to the country.

RITCHIE: Clair Engle came in in 1958.

VALEO: The only thing I really remember about Clair Engle is that vote on cloture, the decisive vote on the Civil Rights Bill of '64, the condition he was in when he cast that vote. He couldn't speak, but he cast the vote with a gesture. It was very moving. He had a look of total satisfaction on his face when he did it. I thought that was indicative of him. He was clearly a man who had some deep motivations. There was a problem with his wife, afterwards she didn't want to move out of his office. They treated her very gently at the time. But it was not an easy problem.

RITCHIE: Eugene McCarthy.

VALEO: I can never think of McCarthy without thinking of that nominating speech for Stevenson, which I think was one of the great convention speeches of our times, when he placed Stevenson's name in nomination. It was a powerful, moving speech, and I think it was the highwater of his public career. From then on I think it was mostly downhill for Gene McCarthy. He again was a person suffering in the same sense that Metcalf suffered, from being in the shadow of a bigger light. He was in Humphrey's shadow, so his efforts to project himself as a political leader were constantly being fuzzed by this larger, looming figure in front of him. I think he suffered from that. He had an almost winsome sense of

humor, pixyish even. It was certainly a subtle thing, and not necessarily one that you warmed to. It left you with a feeling that he was a little odd, or something to that effect. He would come up and talk to me on the floor once in a while, and I would experience it. After he left the Senate I didn't see very much of him until the *Buckley v. Valeo* Supreme Court case, when he was aligned with Buckley. Both for different reasons were opposed to the law. Down deep I was also dubious about it too, but also for my own different reasons.

RITCHIE: Were you surprised when he became the leading antiwar candidate in the '68 election?

VALEO: Yes, I was. He had never given any indication of strong feelings about war or about peace. I just never thought of him in those terms. Then all of a sudden he emerged in that. My first reaction was, well, he sees a road into the limelight, a way of getting back into political activism. But I think his feelings were deeper than that; I don't want to take that away from him. I don't think it was just a gimmick that he saw and wanted to ride. He felt deeply about the war, and I didn't realize that at first. It never came across in his earlier period in the Senate. That's why I was really quite surprised when he came out as the key figure in it.

RITCHIE: Harrison Williams was also in that group.

VALEO: Yes, that was a great sadness for me to see him in trouble. Apparently it had a lot to do with liquor. I remember first hearing about Harrison, or "Pete" as he was called in the Senate, Williams when he was either just entering the Senate or still in the House. A very dear friend of mine at the Library of Congress, Howard Piquet, one of my guides and mentors, had been called over to do some trade work for Williams. He spoke very highly of him, spoke about what a decent kind of person he was. His votes in the Senate were always good votes from my point of view. I thought his was a sound Democratic position, somewhat left of center, but basically a sound Democratic position in his votes. He never got involved much in debate. You didn't see him much on the floor. He came out for the votes, but he didn't hang around the floor a lot. Rarely spoke, and when he did it was in a voice that you could hardly hear. He had difficulty holding staff, which surprised me. He didn't strike me as the kind of person who should have that. I remember he had a series of people who worked for him, and they didn't last very long. So he may have been a totally different man in a private situation.

I remember, I was in Japan when the word of that scam came out. I was interviewed in Japan for a magazine article and I was asked about it. I said that I knew one or two of the people, and at least one of them I would be convinced would not be deliberately involved in something like that. Of course I had Harrison

Williams in mind. When I realized later the way it was done I thought that a very, very, serious misuse of police power by the F.B.I. There was no clear-cut picture of why they picked certain members of the Congress to pursue. It's a little bit like disguising a policeman as a potential customer and then getting a prostitute to proposition him and then arresting the prostitute. My own view of that is that the one who puts on a disguise and does that is really the culprit, not the prostitute. But in the case of Williams, I have no knowledge that would counter the facts as the court found them.

I still find that a very serious matter, because it took out of public life a man who on the whole, in terms of what you contribute in public life, had done a very creditable job, quite apart from his personal life. I just think it's wrong to tempt someone like that. We don't want saints in our Congress, we want decent human beings who are subject to temptation like anyone else, and who might have slightly more resistance than the rest of us. You expect that, but you don't expect them to be absolutely perfect in their resistance. If you do that, you're going to get a Senate which is so totally at variance with the way the nation is, I don't know what it will represent at that point. Represent some sort of ideal? That's not the place to do it, not in the Congress. My sympathies were entirely with Williams in that situation, and I think that the Senate report which came out later

made it very clear that those methods that were being used by the F.B.I. in that situation were very debatable methods, I think properly so.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Vance Hartke?

VALEO: He was one of the people Mansfield thought very lowly of. He just didn't hold him in any esteem. I didn't share Mansfield's view of him.

RITCHIE: Do you have any idea why?

VALEO: No, I don't know. I don't know what brought it on. I knew Hartke reasonably well. We went to a couple of parliamentary meetings together. You usually get to know people fairly well that way. He was personally somewhat offensive. He was somewhat arrogant and overbearing and deeply opinionated. But apart from that, I thought his votes on most issues were ones that I wouldn't quarrel with. I didn't know that he was using his office in any way for more profit than any of the others were doing. So I had no real reasons to dislike him, although I can't say that I liked him greatly as a person. I thought he was a run of the mill senator, usually what you get from Indiana, except once in a while you get an exception like Birch Bayh, who was I thought an outstanding person.

RITCHIE: Could you tell me a little about Birch Bayh?

VALEO: Yes. He was a person I would have supported for the presidency. He thought about making the run at one time and he certainly would have been my candidate had he done so. I would have had no trouble whatsoever in supporting him. He was extremely bright, an able lawyer. He had a short fuse in much the same way that Muskie had. He could be easily riled, that was his weakness. But in terms of his knowledge of the Constitution, I thought he made some major contributions, particularly in the presidential succession laws. They were carefully done amendments. I think their value will be enduring. I was very sorry to see him defeated. I thought he still had a great deal to contribute. Beyond that, I don't know that I can say much about him. I was at a dinner not too long ago at NYU and he was there. It was given by the president, another Indiana congressman, what was his name?

RITCHIE: John Brademas.

VALEO: Brademas gave the dinner, and they obviously had a long-time close association in Indiana politics, very warm, a kind of mutual aid relationship. They worked together well, obviously, in Indiana politics. Brademas' discussion of that in his speech, he made a brief speech about those earlier days in Indiana, suggested typical small town, middle class America, industrial America. Sherwood Anderson, the writer did that in *Winesburg, Ohio*, that type of America. They were both very

clear cut expressions of that, and both excellent products of that background.

RITCHIE: You compared his temper to Ed Muskie's, and Muskie was a member of that class.

VALEO: Yes. He was one Mansfield thought very early would be president, or could make the presidency. Amazing, again I have no basis for explaining his perception, but he'd already decided years before Muskie made the run that he had the characteristics of somebody who could be president, long before it was even discussed. The thing I remember best about Muskie—I've just finished working with him on a job, on a study we've done on the president and Congress in foreign relations—but in that period the thing I remember best was that he was on one of the Mansfield trips to Vietnam. The trip went all the way around the world and got to Vietnam by a very circuitous route, which included Warsaw, Poland. We stopped there and it was fiercely cold. It must have been either in early December or late November. It was the first time I'd really watched Muskie as a politician. We had a dinner with some Polish officials, and after dinner Muskie made the speech. Mansfield asked him to make the speech, again using that very sharp judgment of picking the right person for the occasion. So Muskie got up and made this speech. He had me in tears along with all the Poles! He was talking about his father coming from a small town, a tailor from a small town in Poland, and how hard he

had worked when he came to America. Well, there was nothing more calculated to move the Poles, who obviously almost everyone had a relative in the United States somewhere.

His ability to move them was extraordinary. He had the warmth of language and he has this sonorous voice which just rolls out. He really had them literally in the palm of his hand by the time he was done. He was an extremely able member of the Senate, and he made some major contributions in environmental issues. I don't know that he was really cut out to be secretary of state, or that his interests in foreign affairs were such that it would have justified Carter's appointment of him. I don't know why he chose Muskie for that, but again, he did a credible job there. And he would have made a good president.

RITCHIE: People always talk about his temper. Do you think that helped or hindered him as a senator?

VALEO: He had a temper, very definitely, and not a good temper. That would hurt you in the Senate, although I don't think it was that severe that it did him irreparable damage. He was highly regarded. He used to meet with the Democratic Policy Committee and always made, I thought, significant contributions to the discussions. No, I think he was one of the outstanding people in this whole period.

RITCHIE: There are a whole series of senators who are remembered for being temperamental, having a strong temper and being short-fused. Do you think that people used that politically, in a sense, that kind of reputation? Was it just natural that people blew up, or did they see some sort of calculated political advantage in being known that way?

VALEO: I think it was a mixture of both. Most of it was natural. Occasionally it would be used as a device, sure. I'm trying to think of who might have used it that way. I'm really hard pressed to say who you could say would use it as a device. I think most of it came very naturally.

RITCHIE: The Senate perhaps attracts more temperamental people.

VALEO: And it should. If you conceive of the Senate in its original concept, it should have temperamental people in it. They should not be cut out of the same clay. One of the problems in the contemporary Senate is more and more with TV they're cut out of the same clay because that's the easiest way to get elected, when TV is the main medium of communication with your constituents.

RITCHIE: A couple of people whom I don't think of as temperamental, who were elected in '58, were Frank Moss and Gale McGee.

VALEO: Again, Moss was a person who Mansfield always felt hostile towards. I didn't know why, maybe because both were from the West, or whatever. I didn't share this feeling. I wasn't a close friend of Moss or anything like that, but I always thought he was a solid Democrat and the kind of person you'd want in your party. I'm not saying that Mansfield didn't think that too, but he had other reasons which I never could quite fathom for his judgments of people, and he had some reservations about Moss that I did not feel. I thought Moss on the whole was a good, solid member of the Senate, and performed in that way. His votes left little to be desired. He handled his constituent business, his state business, I thought, well without overpushing it. He liked to travel, but then so did many of the others. I saw no problems with that. It was interesting, he had been governor of Utah at one point, and one of his complaints was: "God, you get no perks when you're in the Senate! When you're governor you get a car, you get a plane, you get a boat," on Salt Lake, I guess, but he said, "but as a senator you don't get anything." Maybe that might have bothered Mansfield, I don't know. But he really complained about that.

As far as Gale McGee was concerned, I first ran into Gale McGee right after the war. I was then, in the Library as a junior researcher and he was teaching at Wyoming University, I think. We were at this conference together in Illinois. I was impressed

then by his ability to express himself so articulately, which I had never been able to do. I was tremendously impressed by his ability. Of course, he's a real stem winder. When he takes off on a speech he's extraordinarily good. His main problem was that he didn't want to work hard. He liked the pleasures of being a senator, but he didn't really want to work very hard. He was caught up in that political scientist's one-sided view of the government's foreign policy as being exclusively in the executive branch's province. He fought that battle for the State Department much to Mansfield's irritation, on many occasions. He fought for the State Department's viewpoint. He was, I would say, the prime spokesman of the State Department's bureaucratic position as sometimes somewhat distinct from the White House's position. He became one of the department's prime advocates in the Senate. Beyond that I don't think he left any strong mark one way or the other. He had a good sense of humor. Nobody disliked him per se.

I remember talking to Mike Manatos about him, Mike Manatos was from Wyoming too. Manatos had worked for O'Mahoney before he went downtown with Kennedy. He was very worried about Gale McGee's tendency to neglect state business. He thought he would be in trouble politically if he continued to do that. He continued and eventually he was beaten. But then the State Department took care of him by putting him in that OAS [Organization of American States] position. I still see him occasionally in

connection with the work for the Former Members of Congress Association. He's still about the same, still interested in international affairs. McGee is probably someone who could have done a lot more if he had worked harder. He had the natural ability.

RITCHIE: Another Western Democrat in that class was Howard Cannon.

VALEO: Yes, I never knew what to think of Howard Cannon. He never did very much, he never spoke very much. I appeared before the Rules Committee when he was chairman to urge them not to move too fast on setting up a campaign contributions commission, Federal Elections Commission, but got nowhere. He and I always had a pleasant enough personal relationship, but I think somewhere in there, that's when the Rules Committee began to make it more difficult to move the changes that I was trying to make in the staff underpinning of the Senate. Bill Cochrane moved down there at just about the same time Cannon became chairman and the committee took on a totally different complexion. Up until that time it had done virtually nothing. Internal affairs had been handled by Lyndon Johnson out of the majority leader's office, and that practice continued under Mansfield for a while, as long as Everett Jordan was chairman. After that it began to develop as a new and independent force in the Senate substructure. I think Cannon came under suspicion sometime around the time of the Bobby

Baker thing, but I never really knew much about that and whether that was warranted in any way or not. I really didn't have a close relationship with him, or one that would give me any insights into his personality.

RITCHIE: It was also that time that the four senators from Alaska and Hawaii were added: Gruening and Bartlett from Alaska and then Fong and Long and eventually Inouye from Hawaii.

VALEO: Yes, I remember them all. Gruening belonged with Clark more than with Morse. He was an innovator in the Morse tradition, but he was nowhere near as competent as Morse. He also heard his own voice and didn't listen to what was happening. He was, I would think on the whole, a highly ineffective senator and did not, in the same sense as Morse, make individual contributions which might later have some great significance in American history. Gruening was an old man by the time he got elected. He had made significant contributions in Puerto Rico, where I first ran into his name. He had a sort of mixed reputation in Puerto Rico. Everybody in the new group that came in with Luis Munoz Marin at that time of the establishment of the commonwealth were of two minds on Gruening. On the one hand they knew that he had done some very constructive things for them, but at the same time they felt they didn't like him as a personality. He was all over the lot. He moved to Mexico after that, and did some things on Mexico, and then went to Alaska. He was a great advocate of

Alaskan statehood and had pushed for it for many years. He was one of the people who moved it eventually. But as a member of the Senate he was not effective. He did very little. I admired his stand on Vietnam, but that was only on a personal basis, not that it meant anything very much in the Senate.

Bartlett was a little different. He was a team player and got along well with Johnson. He was an authentic liberal, in the western sense of the term. He was for public power, he was for conservation and water development and so forth. I liked Bartlett personally. He was a pleasant person. He had a lovely wife who was right out of the plains of Alaska. She was really the salt of the earth and obviously had been a very positive influence in his life.

As far as Inouye and Long were concerned, Long came in only for a brief period of time. A very nice man, and a good Democrat. I don't think that I can say anything more about him. Inouye, I think, is an extremely important figure. I've already mentioned the great speech he made once in the caucus on the Vietnamese War as being one of the turning points on that issue. Inouye's a very, very smart man. There are some rumors now apparently that he may be the next Democratic leader. He knows, as Mansfield knew before him, that the only way you'd ever be that is not to try to be it, and he has done that so far perfectly. So if there is going to be a change, I would say he's well positioned to be the

person to do it. If I'm not mistaken, he was a leader of the Hawaiian house or senate, or whatever body he was in there, and he was chosen that after a period of time in it. He has the characteristics that would make a good leader.

As for his Japanese background, he's been at great pains to keep the Japanese at arms' length. I remember when I was lobbying for the UN university I had heard that the Japanese had gone up in a prior period—I heard this from Jim Hester—to talk to Inouye. They presumed on his Japanese heritage and he just about threw them out of his office. These were Japanese from Japan. He gave them a hard time and refused to support the university. He was very reluctant to support it. We had to undo that in our efforts to get the contribution. Finally we brought him around to the position where he made a speech in support of it. I think he would make an excellent leader if he were chosen. He has some of the characteristics of a Japanese which Mansfield also has, and I think I have probably to some extent. It's the ability to keep your peace until you can move effectively. He has that, very definitely. He's been a very, very positive influence on the Senate in the years he's been here.

I always like to think I had something to do with the birth of his son—in a rather indirect way! He came into the Senate when my son was about two or three years old. I had lunch with him one day. He had no children at that point. He was older, and

I had been older as a parent. We got talking about it. He asked me all kinds of questions revealing his anxieties about parenthood. I gave him reassurances out of my own experience. I told him how great it was to have a son, even though you were older it didn't make a difference. And, by God, within a year or two he had a son.

RITCHIE: You served as a role model.

VALEO: Yes, I think maybe that was it.

RITCHIE: Did you have any observations on Hiram Fong?

VALEO: Yes, I've seen him in Honolulu a couple of times in recent years. The first time I met him was on a Mansfield mission plane. We picked him up in Honolulu and brought him back with us. His family background, of course, was Chinese. He was a down-the-line Republican. He's a wealthy man, of great wealth in Hawaii, and a kind of straight-forward person from that part of American life, from a Chinese-Hawaiian background. He always voted the straight Republican line, whatever the majority position was he went along with it. He wasn't a great senator, and I don't think he'd make any pretenses of being one. He was an organization man and found himself very comfortable in the Republican setting.

RITCHIE: Did you find that senators from Alaska and Hawaii tended to be Asian-oriented in general?

VALEO: I don't think that you could say Fong was Asian-oriented at all. He rarely talked about Taiwan. I think his Chinese ties if he had any would be with Taiwan. I remember being on a plane with him. I talked with his wife in Chinese, and he said, "God, this guy talks better Chinese than I do!" The Chinese part of Hawaii is interesting. It gets faded into the Hawaiian setting very quickly and doesn't have quite that uniqueness any more. That's true of the Japanese as well. No, I think they were oriented as Hawaiians rather than as Chinese or Japanese in much the same way that Long would have been oriented.

RITCHIE: A senator who came in about that time, but not in that class, was Claiborne Pell, who is in line to be chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when the Democrats are in the majority. What were your observations of him?

VALEO: I know Pell quite well. We went on several trips together and one round-the-world trip. I think it was the same one with Muskie, no it was an earlier one. I got to know him very well on that trip. He was so much like Green. He was a younger edition of Green. It was almost as though they came out of the same mold, really. He took essentially, in foreign policy, the bureaucratic State Department position that came up, and I think he still does the same thing. If he gets to be chairman of that committee, that will be the greatest boon to the State Department that they've had in many, many years, since long before Fulbright.

You have to go back to Connally's time, and not even that. Maybe even before that. Pell does not tend to deviate from what you might call the bureaucratic position on foreign policy.

He's motivated, as some wealthy men from his period were motivated, to do some good for the country and to use his wealth constructively. And he has done that in his support for such institutions as the Smithsonian, and also his grants-in-aid program for many of the colleges for very constructive kinds of things that he's sponsored. I think he's been an extremely constructive influence in the Senate, a unique person. My only quarrel with him is that I wish he would not feel that he had to toe the State Department line so much. Of course, he had that background: he was a Foreign Service officer for a brief period of time. That may explain it, and most of those friends probably came from that setting. He probably still is influenced by them on many foreign policy problems. Pell belongs in the Senate. There are some people you can just see that they belong in the Senate, and he does. There's no question about that.

RITCHIE: Also in '58 the two senators from West Virginia were elected—Jennings Randolph and Robert Byrd.

VALEO: Yes, I think I mentioned Byrd earlier, the initial reactions from the majority leader's office. I don't have a strong opinion on Jennings Randolph. He was a man who was

extremely emotional and easily influenced. He was a pleasant man, at least ostensibly pleasant, but I don't think he'll be long remembered. Byrd's a little different. I don't think Byrd will ever grow much more than he is now, and where he is now is about what the Democratic party needs as a leader in the Senate. They don't need much. They're not ready for something else. They're not ready for bigger responsibilities. Until they are, he'll serve well. I don't want to get into my personal reactions to him. I found him a very enigmatic man in personal dealings. He would not have been my selection for leader of the Senate. I'm not sure who would have been, but he wouldn't have been, but then I was looking at a different time. I don't know that I've got anything more to say about him. I just don't know him that well. All I can say is that in my judgment he doesn't have the kind of approach which I feel the Senate has got to have if it's going to play something more than a state legislative role in the affairs of the nation.

RITCHIE: What was your opinion of Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire?

VALEO: He was a personal friend. I liked him immensely as a person. He was a damn good senator. He was courageous on a lot of defense things at a time when it was not easy to be courageous on them. I think New Hampshire should be ashamed of itself for electing what they elected to replace McIntyre. He was a

dedicated public servant and an outstanding senator in every way. He also was another one of these short-fused people. I never felt it, but a lot of people did. He could be irritated very easily. Maybe he was suffering some sickness at that point. Later on he had a cancer situation. I don't know what's happened to him, I haven't seen him in several years. I lost contact with him right after he recovered from that first operation. I thought very, very highly of him, and I was sorry to see him defeated. I thought it was a tragedy.

RITCHIE: That brings up New Hampshire, and I realize we never got around to talking about the Wyman-Durkin controversy. You made a facial expression when I mentioned New Hampshire, do you have any comment about the state? It's a strange state.

VALEO: It is a strange state and I think it's got a lot to do with that crazy newspaper publisher up there, William Loeb. That must explain it, because there's no reason for it to be behave the way it does otherwise. They've had some real lulus in the Senate from that state. That probably is so on both sides of the aisle, but mostly Republicans because they mostly elect Republicans. Winston Prouty came from the state and Prouty was a nice guy and a good senator—no, Prouty was from Vermont, I'm sorry. But Norris Cotton came from New Hampshire, and Cotton was an enigmatic figure. He was hard to judge because he had been a page and people who have been pages, even though they later

on get elected in their own right, have that earlier experience which kind of throws them off. I kind of enjoyed him on the floor, but he was a complete Republican. At one time he played footsie with McCarthy, but he got off that at a reasonable time. You also had Styles Bridges, who was another real character out of that state.

The Wyman-Durkin dispute was discussed widely in our own Democratic circles—how to handle it. What had happened was that the governor had sent in a certification of Durkin's election, and then requested that I return it. The election certificates go into the secretary's office and I had possession of the certification of Durkin. This was brought up at a policy committee meeting. We decided that we would not give back the statement, that there was no way we could do that. So the governor came down and we had a confrontation for the benefit of television, when he came to my door and demanded the return of the statement and I politely refused to give him the statement. He wanted to know if that was my final word, and I told him yes, that the only way that the certificate could be released would be by leave of the Senate, that I personally could not give it back to him. Having once come into my custody as a Senate paper, there was no way in which I could give it back without the permission of the Senate. So he left. The matter was debated at great length here. I remember it being debated on the floor, but I don't remember the details

of how it was finally resolved and how they finally decided to run that election over again.

RITCHIE: Why was it that the Democrats put up such a long drawn-out fight on it? They had such a majority anyhow, they didn't need the one more vote to organize the Senate.

VALEO: Was that the way it worked out? They resisted having the election re-done?

RITCHIE: Eventually Durkin decided to run.

VALEO: On his own, that's what I thought.

RITCHIE: But that was after months of debate.

VALEO: Well, I can't remember what the circumstances were surrounding that. My role in it was strictly as the custodian of the governor's certification of Durkin's election, as to whether to give it back to him or not. I think the Rules Committee handled that, if I'm not mistaken. I didn't get directly involved in the prolongation.

RITCHIE: Some of the Republicans argue that Wyman-Durkin was actually good for their party because it pulled them together, and gave them party discipline, and that perhaps the Democrats did them a favor by being so intransigent.

VALEO: Could be. My only other recollection is that Durkin's father-in-law was a doctor and he'd operated on me for appendix about ten years before that.

RITCHIE: Wyman-Durkin was one of those great battles, but the Senate really isn't in a good position to decide issues like that.

VALEO: No, it really isn't.

RITCHIE: Almost of necessity it becomes a partisan issue, and once it becomes a partisan issue

VALEO: You can't budge it. No, you can't budge it at that point. It's rare enough that they become that way, but when it does it's hard to break it.

End of Interview #18

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

MEMORABLE SENATORS

Interview #19
Wednesday, January 9, 1986

RITCHIE: The last time we talked about the Class of '58, and this time I thought we could survey the senators who were elected in the early 1960s and early '70s, while you were secretary of the Senate. I thought we could start with some of the liberal Democrats who arrived in that period, and Ted Kennedy, who was elected in 1962, was the first of that group.

VALEO: Yes, I think he was greeted in the Senate originally with mixed feelings, in part that he was profiteering on his brother. Then his opening speech was a passionate defense of someone who was doomed not to be confirmed as a judge.

RITCHIE: Francis Morrissey.

VALEO: I don't remember the name, but Kennedy made an impassioned plea for him. I think the reactions were mixed on this: one being that he obviously felt things deeply, more so than most, and that he expressed those feelings much more readily than either Jack or Bobby. Jack concealed his feelings in humor, and Bobby was essentially quiet, also with some humor, but basically not responding to provocations. But Ted Kennedy came out with all guns blasting and made, I thought, a very impassioned

plea. I was impressed greatly by the speech because it seemed it was not politically expedient. It showed an indication of character which I felt was not to be denigrated.

There was some deference in treating him, at first, as the president's brother, but no great amount of that. Of course, the press at that time was full of stories about a Kennedy dynasty, first with Jack, then Bob and then Ted would take over after that. By that time we would be ready for the next generation. But Ted Kennedy played it smooth on the floor after that first speech and did the things that younger senators usually do, without any difficulties. I can't be sure but it must have been after Bobby's assassination that he was elected whip. I suppose that election was almost a blood-debt, if I can use that term, for the deaths of Jack and Bobby. Who was going to oppose him at that point? The mood of the country was enormously Kennedy. There was great sympathy for the family at that point, and it was recognized almost without being spoken that Ted Kennedy had some recognition coming to him just by virtue of being a member of that family.

Then came Chappaquiddick, which was a disaster for him of course. I can't remember when I learned of that. I remember Mansfield being on the telephone in connection with it, and I was in the room at the time. That's where he first used the phrase, after he hung up—I don't know who he was talking with, whether it was actually with Teddy or with someone else—but after he hung up

he said, "My God, what an ill-starred family." He used that phrase for the first time in that connection and many times thereafter. When Kennedy was whip, he wasn't necessarily at that point yet running for the presidency, but his staff was. I think I'd better get into the reactions to Chappaquiddick. There were very mixed feelings in the Senate when he made that statement on TV after the incident. I watched him. My own reaction to it was that it was a bad statement, that he would have been better not to have made any statement. What came across almost was that this incident, tragic as it was—and he did stress the tragedy to the girl that was involved—I had the uncomfortable feeling that he was saying, "God, this has interfered badly with my career." That, I think, was probably what communicated itself to the public, and probably doomed him politically.

I don't think it was immediately after Chappaquiddick, but when the drums began to beat for Kennedy to run for the presidency and then the press reactions came on Chappaquiddick, he finally decided not to make the run. Mansfield's reaction was: "Thank God, for his own good it's better that he doesn't." I think he felt at that point that the Kennedy mystique was beginning to disappear. The public reactions to the mystique was such a mixture of genuine sympathy for the family plus a great deal of hostility to the Kennedys for daring to suggest some new turns in American life, or daring to suggest that there were some darker

areas in the American scene which we hadn't looked at. The hostility came mostly with the older people. The younger generation, I think, were generally taken by the Kennedys, certainly by Jack Kennedy in that period. The Kennedy mystique rubbed off on Ted Kennedy to a point, but Chappaquiddick acted to undermine the mystique as it might have been a political asset to him. After that I think we began to see some books that were anti-Kennedy, and some of the more disreputable writing about Jack Kennedy's personal life and that sort of thing. They began to stick pins in Jack Kennedy's image, and of course to the extent that that had a negative impact, Ted Kennedy felt that.

I never felt particularly close to Ted Kennedy. As I say, I was impressed by his defense of an appointee in the beginning as being an indication of a profound, and, from my point of view, desirable kind of character. But in politics sometimes loyalties are a burden, and his tendency to be very loyal may have hurt him. That may also have been involved in his relationships with his brothers. I think, watching him over the years, he was not an effective senator during the period that I was the secretary of the Senate. He was ineffective as Proxmire is generally ineffective, or as Hatfield is generally ineffective. Their views and their instincts are, from my point of view, essentially sound ones, and someday the country is going to have to go in the direction that Kennedy, and to a lesser extent Hatfield, and to a lesser

extent Proxmire, have been pointing, each in their own particular sphere. In the Senate, it's good to have these new directions in the back of your mind, but the time to introduce them is when you're going to get a motion going that will bring you somewhere near their achievement.

I don't think Kennedy, or certainly the people who worked with him (and much of this, I think, is staff work with Kennedy; he's always had an able staff)—I don't think they were in contact with the realities of the Senate—and certainly with the realities of the public outside of their own state. They were producers of ideas out of time, if I can put it that way. In a way, I'm kind of glad he's not going to make the run again this time. We've already gone over the problem that came up when he thought about running and we had the dispute over whether he should have Secret Service protection. I think if he made the run now it would be less necessary than it was at that point. That was the height, I think, of the perceived Kennedy threat to the status quo, right after Jack's death, one of the considerations that attract political assassins. In a sense, Johnson recognized the wave running for the Kennedy ideas when he became president. He took the ideas that Jack Kennedy's people had formulated and he pushed them over the top. Many of them came parts of the "Great Society" which now Reagan is trying to demolish. Ted Kennedy was a positive force in the same direction as Johnson in that period.

I don't know what his future is going to be. I suspect he'll stay in the Senate as long as he wants to, and apparently he wants to stay another six years at least. I think as time goes on the questions of social welfare that he has raised and will continue to raise are those that country will have to confront. I guess that's why I'm glad to see him stay in the Senate, because if he tried to make the run for the presidency now, with the mood of the country being what it is, he would have to begin to dilute what I think are essentially direction pointers for the nation's need. There were signs of that when he was testing the waters, you know, the little exchange with Jerry Falwell and a few of the others. That's what you do when you run for the presidency, given the mood of the country as it is now. That is not the mood that existed when Jack Kennedy ran. It was different; it was expansive and open and interested. At the moment, the mood in the country is disinterested, contracted and almost reactionary. So it's best for him to stay in the Senate at this point, even if he could win the nomination. He'd have to win by so much compromise that he wouldn't look like a Kennedy that would be worth anything.

RITCHIE: Almost as soon as he came into the Senate he was perceived as someone who was going to run for president someday. Is that a handicap on a senator, that other members see him as a presidential candidate and perhaps see themselves as eventually having to fight him for the nomination?

VALEO: Probably an unconscious one, but generally speaking not among those who have decided to make their life in the Senate, because they're kind of glad. I mean, if somebody's going to run for the presidency he's not going to be a problem within the Senate for them. So the tendency is to give him a good push in the direction he wants to go, as was done with Jack Kennedy and to a lesser degree with Bobby, and for a while with Ted Kennedy. When he decided to make the run against Carter there was a lot of support for him in the Senate. They wanted to get him out. I think that's basically what the reason for the support was, not that they thought he could win or necessarily wanted him to win. I think they did think he'd run stronger than Carter, and therefore help pull in a majority for the Democrats in Congress. Among the real fixtures in the Senate, they're delighted when a powerful personality in their midst decides to run for the presidency.

RITCHIE: Another senator who ran for the presidency was George McGovern. What were your impressions of him?

VALEO: George McGovern asked me to go to work for him at one time. I like him. I still see him, as a matter of fact. I think he's one of the most honest men I've ever run into in politics. I've seen very few people in the Senate or in any aspect of government who have been more straight-forward in what they think and what they believe in and in saying it. He's a very, very determined man. If he gets a hold of the doll he shakes it

and shakes it and shakes it, he doesn't let it go. That's the way he has done with his ideas. My first encounter with him was mostly on account of Vietnam. I think he knew I was doing a lot of the work for Mansfield on Vietnam, and my ideas coincided with his own. We talked a good deal about Vietnam and I had the impression that he would have liked me to go with him when he decided to make the run for the presidency. It never came to an actual discussion of this, but one has this sense without it being said.

We met again in this early period in Atlantic City at the Democratic convention of 1964. The question came up as to who would be Johnson's candidate for the vice presidency. I remember meeting him in the halls of one of the hotels, and we talked for a little while. It hadn't been decided yet, but he said he thought it would be Hubert and he was glad it was Hubert. He himself at that point had not yet gotten into the presidency act, but it was clear that he was thinking in those terms. It's interesting, Mansfield always was on his guard against senators who were running for the presidency. He had an early warning system which told him apparently who they were. He had it on Jackson, he had it on McGovern. He knew early in the game that McGovern was thinking of the presidency—probably even before McGovern knew it himself. He used to always treat them with a certain amount—disdain is the wrong word—but a standoffishness. His interest

was in Senate personalities and he didn't warm to people who were running for the presidency in the Senate. It's either that, or he was thinking of running for the presidency himself. I don't really know for sure. But he spotted McGovern as a candidate very early in the game.

I must say, when McGovern decided to make the run, he made it primarily on Vietnam, like so many others did. I thought that he was really outstanding, from my point of view, but again I thought he was out of step with the times. I think he would have run a heck of a lot better had he kept Thomas Eagleton with him on the ticket. I think the dropping of Eagleton was a grave mistake, which I attributed not so much to McGovern, an act which seemed out of character for him. It occurred to me that he'd be the kind of person who would understand the situation that Eagleton was in. But I attributed it to his campaign manager, whose sense of timing and whose sense of the appropriate thing to do in a campaign was very badly off. He could have run a lot better race than he did.

RITCHIE: Was that Gary Hart you're referring to?

VALEO: No, it was a woman chairman of the national committee. I don't remember her name, I didn't know her. But I think McGovern was ill-advised on the Eagleton affair. He would have run much better with Eagleton. First of all, Eagleton would

have been an excellent campaigner at that time. That was Eagleton at his height. I think he sort of tapered off after that and lost interest, and I can understand it. But at that point he was a very effective politician and could have made a major contribution.

RITCHIE: What were your impressions of McGovern and Eagleton as senators? Were they team players? Were they the type that Mansfield called on?

VALEO: No, neither of them. McGovern was a very determined man and he was very persistent on principle. He was one of the few people in the Senate like that. He would compromise on certain things, but basically he knew what he thought the government needed, what it needed in the way in the legislation, what it needed in the way of political leadership, and what it needed in the way of policies. He was quiet but uncompromising in his advocacy of those views. I think his loss of his Senate seat was a tragedy. He had a lot more still to give. He was also terribly upset by the loss of the presidential election, as most people are who make that run. He would come up on the floor occasionally after that election and say, "You see, I said it in the campaign," referring to something that was going on, "but nobody paid any attention." He kept returning to that theme.

I met him in India on one trip; I was traveling alone at the time. William Saxbe, a former senator, was then ambassador in New Delhi, and we both stayed with Saxbe. I had a chance to talk with him. His views were good. McGovern is a very, very decent human being and I think would have made an excellent president, notwithstanding a lot of the comments which came out at the time. He was not naive—that's the wrong word. He just happened to be decent and at that time there was a tendency in the country to equate decency with naivety, as witness Nixon who was not decent and was not regarded as naive. No, I think McGovern was vastly underrated by the press, and especially by those image-makers on TV. They confused his simplicity with stupidity, and there is quite a difference.

RITCHIE: What was it about McGovern as a senator that drew him into the presidential picture?

VALEO: I guess it was mostly his stand on Vietnam. There were a lot of the young people who mobilized around him, particularly after Gene McCarthy was not viable. I think they turned to McGovern. He really represented the young people of that period in the Vietnamese situation.

RITCHIE: I wondered also what Eagleton had done to make him a national candidate? Was he that effective as a senator?

VALEO: No, I don't think he was that effective as a senator. It would not have been his record in the Senate. I think the judgment that was made on Eagleton was that he was effective in the sense of public relations, which is an essential characteristic of running for the presidency. He came across well. He made a good speech. He had a great sense of humor. He was extremely bright. He was Catholic, which at that particular moment was probably a desirable characteristic. He looked very good. I don't know what the reasons were that led McGovern to select him, what their own relationship was, but I suspect that they probably both had essentially the same ideas and the same views of where the Democratic party ought to go. Eagleton was a little more conservative and much more acceptable among the labor unions perhaps than McGovern.

RITCHIE: Another Democratic senator who ran for president was Walter Mondale. What was your impression of Mondale?

VALEO: Well, he used to come into the office once in a while. He smoked cigars and I'd give him one of my Philippine cigars occasionally. He did that for a while, and then he stopped coming in. He and Gaylord Nelson used to drop into the secretary's office together. They'd chat a lot. They were very close friends in that period. I thought Mondale was bright, I thought he was extremely bright, and I wasn't surprised that he

moved in the direction of the presidency. But I think there were a number of things that kept him from it.

He probably made a mistake by staying out of public office after the loss of the vice presidency. He should have sought some other office, probably governor of Minnesota. I think Gary Hart may be making the same mistake. That hiatus takes an awful lot of the shine off the stone. You lose that touch which has to be constantly nourished as a political figure if you're going to stay in a position of leadership with the public. You have to be in touch with them at all times, and, generally, you cannot do that, in my judgment, unless you are in office. It can be done, but it's much more difficult to do it when you're out of office. You lose the continuity and the feel of the changes which come in public reactions almost imperceptibly. If you're away from it you don't get them. He probably would have been well advised to run for governor of Minnesota before making the run for the presidency, after the Carter defeat.

I think Mondale would have made a good president. I think he got adopted by the Georgetown snobs, or his wife did, although actually they lived in Cleveland Park. He was president of the PTA in the same neighborhood that my son was going to school. His daughter went to John Eaton school with my son, so I knew him quite well in that period. And I liked him personally. But I wasn't surprised by his defeat for the presidency. He was

certainly an asset to Carter. His views were closer to mine than Carter's would have been.

RITCHIE: He always seemed to be someone's protégé. In the Senate he was clearly Humphrey's man.

VALEO: Yes.

RITCHIE: Did that affect his Senate career?

VALEO: Not in the same sense that Eugene McCarthy suffered from that. Here we're coming back to the same problem which reoccurs between two gifted senators from one state. I think there was a sufficient gap in years between them, so that Mondale represented a newer generation, whereas Gene McCarthy was very close in age to Hubert. He really was in Hubert's shadow, and suffered as a result. It sometimes leads the fellow who's in the shadow to do some foolish things. That happened certainly to McCarthy. But Mondale I don't think suffered from that. The gap was large enough in years.

It's interesting that you had a whole series of very competent people coming out of Minnesota in that period, undoubtedly growing out of the Humphrey mystique. He was of the post-World War II reform movement, and Minnesota has a lot of reform movements. I think it comes in part out of the old Scandinavian Germanic liberal background in states like Wisconsin and Minnesota

and goes back to the nineteenth century and who settled those states. Hubert came out of that and he inspired really a whole generation of political figures in that area. I think it's run its course now. I don't think there's anything much out of Minnesota at the moment, but there was a lot for a long time. Mondale was a product of it and he would have made an adequate president.

RITCHIE: Just adequate?

VALEO: Yes, I don't think he'd have made a great president, no.

RITCHIE: What did he lack?

VALEO: Vision.

RITCHIE: Well, we have one other Democratic senator who has been running for the presidency, and that's Gary Hart. Did you have any dealings with him? I know you overlapped briefly.

RITCHIE: Only briefly. I guess my first contact with him was really with his wife more than with him. At that time I was a very close friend of the Washington Zookeeper, Ted Reed. We lived at Ordway Street at the time and my son grew up spending a lot of time at the zoo. Jamie had become very close to Ted Reed, and I had started the custom of taking any children of newly arrived senators on a night tour of the zoo, with Ted Reed.

He'd give them a personal tour of the zoo at night. It was always a fascinating experience. Animals react quite differently when there are not a lot of visitors around, and the zoo is quiet and dark and when they see the zookeeper whom they recognize. I think I took Gary Hart's kids with his wife, and the chap from Vermont

RITCHIE: Patrick Leahy?

VALEO: Leahy's wife and kids, on one of these tours, along with a lot of other kids. That was my first contact with Hart. After that I didn't have a great deal to do with him. I remember Harold Hughes speaking of Gary Hart, I guess Gary Hart was working on the Hill if I'm not mistaken at the time.

RITCHIE: He worked for McGovern.

VALEO: For McGovern, right. I remember Hughes saying at a policy committee luncheon, this was during the Vietnamese thing, he said, "You know, there's a whole new generation coming along here. And man they're powerful. They're thinking deeply about this Vietnamese thing especially." He said, "Take that young kid who was in my office the other day, Gary Hart." He was one that he had singled out as being a particularly formidable newer generation Democrat. He said, "They're not going to take any nonsense. They have a different view of things." But I didn't have a great deal of personal contact with him. I swore him in when he came,

and did the usual treatment for new members, but nothing exceptional. I have reactions to him, but I can't make them on any basis of a direct knowledge of him other than just watching him in action.

Maybe I don't know enough about that generation, and that generation is really becoming the numerical generation now, the majority generation. I have difficulties with him, but then I'm basically urban and this is a suburban generation. Their values are not necessarily the same as mine, they're much more nearer to my son's than to mine. They've grown up essentially in affluence, but they also grew up under the shadow of Vietnam and the shadow of the nuclear bomb. So there's a different mixture of major considerations that have shaped their thinking. They're also the TV generation, everything has to be done in cartoons. So I don't know where Hart is going.

From my own point of view, I don't think he's what I'd like to see in the presidency. I like his views on many subjects; I like his views on defense. He's on the Armed Services Committee, to which Mansfield appointed him. He's cut through some of the baloney and dispensed with it. He is part of the movement for trying to treat defense a little more rationally than we have in the past. I guess my concern with him is my concern for the forgotten people in the country. I don't see enough there of the kinds of things that Jesse Jackson is talking about. These

problems may be beyond Gary Hart's ken. He has never been exposed to them; how would he know about them?

I don't know if he's ever been in northeast Washington, not close up to Capitol Hill, but way out. That's part of America, and it's a very important part of it because that's where your trouble can come from, if you don't deal with that sort of thing. I don't see enough signs that he's prepared to cope with that kind of situation. It's almost as though it didn't exist for him. This is my problem with the affluent generation from which he comes. Maybe if he had the right kind of vice presidential candidate with him the thing could work out, because most of the country isn't looking at that kind of problem either, and he's being in some ways more representative of the country than he would be if he showed more concern for the forgotten. Mario Cuomo in New York does more of this. I think he senses this a little more deeply. That may be his Catholic background in part. Whatever problems may come from Catholicism, a concern for the poor is not one of them. I think Cuomo shows a little more of that. That might be a ticket.

RITCHIE: Among the non-presidential timber but still influential Democrats, Gaylord Nelson always seemed to be a senator with a lot of authority.

VALEO: He didn't have a lot of authority, but he was a good senator. He was another one of these men whom I felt became increasingly embittered when whatever his ambitions were—and they probably were for the presidency—faded increasingly into the realm of the unlikely. His health gave him trouble: he had a bad leg among other things. He, by the way, was one of the people who pushed Stan Kimmitt for the secretary's job and made the basic commitments to Kimmitt that were part of the conflict that later arose. But that doesn't in any way detract from my appreciation of his ability as a senator. I think he was a good working senator and he had an interest in the kinds of problems which you need to have an interest in, such as environmental questions. I think Gaylord Nelson was certainly in the top 20 percent of the Senate that I knew at any given time. He was effective in environmental questions, and he was also very perceptive on the Vietnamese War, or at least on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. He saw through it more quickly than those whom you would expect to like Mansfield and Fulbright, to have seen through it, or if they did they guarded their peace. But he didn't. He didn't go as far as Morse or Gruening, but he saw what was going on and he sensed where we were going. I think he was a good man.

RITCHIE: What was your impression of Joseph Montoya?

VALEO: I was secretary for the majority when he was first elected and I went out to New Mexico for the campaign committee to

see how the elections were going. I can't remember whether I met him out there at the time, probably not. He was busy campaigning somewhere else and I went to Albuquerque. But I talked with his staff and I looked around. From all the reports they could give me it looked rather good for him. Then he came to the Senate. He's out of that same southwest pattern that included Dennis Chavez, but he was head and shoulders over Chavez. Chavez was a Mexican-Indian and he was a real tough cookie. He grew up the hard way in the Mexican-influenced politics of the southwest.

Montoya was much more polished, and he wasn't an alcoholic as Chavez was. I liked him. I felt that his positions on most issues were ones that I would have no trouble endorsing and supporting fully. I thought he was effective. I imagine in that southwest situation, which I do not know well, there is a lot of old-fashioned Tammany-type politics, Latin style. But in the Senate I thought Montoya was excellent. I would have put him rather high on the list.

RITCHIE: He's a senator who didn't get much national attention except during the Watergate hearings.

VALEO: That's ironic, because his interests were elsewhere, not necessarily in that. He was important on natural resources and on water for the West and things of that sort. I think he was a member of the Appropriations Committee and

eminently fair in his judgments. He was definitely out of that Mexican background in that area of the country, but I think he was much broader than that. Chavez was not. Chavez was strictly on that level and worked in a Tammany-type milieu. He got along great with Johnson.

RITCHIE: We've been talking about liberal Democrats; one of the conservative Democrats of that era who stands out is James Allen. I wondered what your impression was of him.

VALEO: Well, he gave me a plaque when I left the Senate. Yes, for outstanding service. Allen was the one who finally destroyed the relevance of the cloture rule. One of my duties at that time, of the secretary's office, was to get presiding officers for the Senate when you couldn't get the president pro tem or the vice president. Allen was always willing to do that. We called him repeatedly and he was always perfectly happy to oblige. He studied and learned the rules very carefully in the process.

As far as I'm concerned, after Russell, he was the new master of the Senate rules and also like Russell, of how to exploit them. And he did. But he was also to some degree in the Russell tradition. You didn't exploit the rules at every turn. You picked an occasional spot only. If you exploited them at every turn you could bring the Senate to a standstill. Eventually the Senate would have to recognize something drastic had to be done about

the rules. Then the game would be over. You don't want that to happen if you're an Allen or a Russell. You want to be in position to exploit them only when you need to do so desperately. However, in time, Allen began to work the rules to circumvent the cloture rule—not so much the rule itself but the parliamentarians' interpretation of the rules, which had come up originally, if you recall, in the Civil Rights Bill of '64, when the first precedents for what cloture meant were being established. Allen understood the significance of these interpretations and he manipulated them very well.

But I must say that except in those matters which he felt very strong on, Allen followed the Russell tradition. He was more exploitative but not excessively so. He yielded enough to permit the Senate to do its business. Mansfield became very concerned about Allen. He said he didn't understand what he was trying to do, but he was making it tougher and tougher to run the Senate. I think the comment was a response to something that Allen had done on the floor which provoked Mansfield to say to me for the first time, "We're getting out of here just in time." I think he sensed that Allen was going to push the interpretation of the rules to such a point, particularly on cloture, that he would be no longer able to function as he had functioned in the Senate as leader, and that the next leader would find that out. He didn't want that to happen to himself. Other than that, Allen was a straight southern

conservative, and a gentleman. Our personal relationships were excellent. I found him always to be essentially a man of integrity in personal dealings. I didn't have any problems with him.

RITCHIE: Another southern Democrat of that period was Sam Nunn, who is now rising to be a power.

VALEO: Yes, I had an experience with him in connection with the campaign contributions law. I feel it's always fair to give my bias before I get into a further discussion so that you can discount some of it which seems too hostile. I didn't know him well, and I didn't get to know him much better as time went on except by watching him. We exchanged pleasantries, that's all. But the problem began with the campaign contributions law. I think he was challenged on some campaign expenditures report in Georgia, and he discovered that I was going to treat him like I'd treat anyone else, even though he was a Democrat. I don't think he fully appreciated that, and I think he became suspicious of me after that, that I might be in league with the Republicans or something of the sort. Whatever the case may be, it seemed to me he was seeking something—maybe it was just the anxiety of a new member and he didn't want anything to go wrong with his situation in Georgia. I'm trying to remember now, did he come in on an appointment at first?

RITCHIE: He beat the guy that Jimmy Carter appointed. Carter appointed David Gambrell, and then Nunn beat Gambrell in the primary.

VALEO: I see. Well, in any event, I always felt he was one of the new cardboard-mold senators, created primarily by TV. Maybe that's the new south too, but it's a southern version of the same thing in the north, as far as I can see. You look good on TV and you make some smooth sounds. He'll probably wind up a longtime senator, as Russell did, but I don't think he has much comparable ability with Russell. I think Russell was head and shoulders over him. An extremely cautious man, I guess maybe that explains the business on the campaign contributions law.

RITCHIE: Did Nunn work well with Mansfield?

VALEO: I don't think that was important one way or the other at that time.

RITCHIE: Another conservative or centrist Democrat is John Glenn.

VALEO: Yes, John Glenn is one of the really fascinating characters of the Senate. He certainly is of a character that should be in the Senate. He brings a note of individuality into it, not because he's an astronaut, I don't think that's a good endorsement. We'd have astronauts coming out of our ears in the

Senate if you thought that was enough to make a man a senator. But Glenn has developed greatly in the Senate in my judgment. I never thought he was for the presidency. He did, but that, I think, came from his astronaut background more than his Senate background. He was on one of Mansfield's trips to China; I can't remember whether it was the second or third. I got to know him well on the trip, he and his wife Annie who is a charming woman. He handled himself on the whole quite well on the trip to China. At that time there was not that much curiosity yet with our astronauts in China, it was still early in the game and the Chinese were still very much concerned with more earthly matters.

He did commit one faux pas, although he didn't know it. Anybody could have done it. We had a Chinese escort, a woman who later became the Chinese ambassador to Rumania. She was a real firebrand from the revolution and she'd been one for a long time. She was one of Mao's strong supporters. I can't remember her name now, Madame Chung or Chong. Anyhow, she called me aside, because we spoke a little bit occasionally in Chinese. By that time, after two years of working on it, reworking it, my Chinese had improved a little bit. She said to me on the side in a very conspiratorial way: "What does Senator Glenn think he's doing?" I said, "Well, what's the matter?" She said, "He showed me a map in which Taiwan is colored differently than China!" I said, "Well, I'm sure he meant nothing by that." It was a *National Geographic*

map, and the National Geographic Society hadn't caught up with political events yet, so they showed Taiwan in a different color than China. I said it wasn't anything, but she was convinced it was part of the business of detaching Taiwan. She immediately tied it into a conference of Sinologists that had met in the states a few weeks before. It was headed by the fellow up at Harvard, what's his name?

RITCHIE: John K. Fairbanks.

VALEO: Fairbanks, who had been pushing for a two-China policy at that time, and she thought Glenn was part of that same conspiracy. I assured her that that was highly unlikely. But the incident shows how really careful you have to be, especially in the initial stages of redevelopment of a relationship. Glenn astonished me in an unusual way. We were in Xinjiang province in the far west and we went into what at that time passed for a department store in the city, the Chinese call "Wulumuqi" but which I guess goes by the name of "Urumchi" on National Geographic maps. It was the capital of Xinjiang province. They had on display in the department store quite an assortment of Chinese made western musical instruments. Glenn picked up a trumpet and blew it as though he'd blown one all his life. I found out that he and his wife were both in the high school band together, she played the trombone. That's how they had originally met. I thought it was a very charming thing in its Americana flavor.

He kept saying while we were in China, "God, you can't get ice cream anywhere!" He wanted to try the ice cream in China and we hadn't come upon it. Our last stop was in Shanghai. In what had become then a custom for the Mansfield trips, we gave a dinner for the people who had traveled with us. I usually made the arrangements, so I went down to the hotel where we were going to hold it and I asked them if they could possibly get some ice cream for the dinner. They did. So Glenn finally got his Chinese ice cream and he was delighted. It was a lovely occasion. I did a farewell speech in Chinese for our party which I had worked on the entire day and which was very well received by the Chinese, with one of their interpreters translating it into English for the Mansfield group. Glenn was a real asset on the China trip. I don't think he showed any great depth of understanding of how to deal with the problems, but he certainly had an appreciation of the difficulties that were involved.

Again, I thought his great weakness was that he didn't know what poverty was. So many of these newer politicians have had that problem. They didn't have the experience of the Depression. They don't know what poverty is, and there is a lot of poverty in the United States. I think he has a full appreciation, because of his technological background, of nuclear problems. I don't know that he's got any solutions for them but I haven't heard anything that makes much sense from any other quarter either. I never

thought that the Nonproliferation Treaty was going to do a damn bit of good, not unless the two primary proliferators did something about it, which was ourselves and the Soviet Union. There was no likelihood that that treaty could hold, that we could hold, a monopoly together with the Soviet Union over these weapons. But at least Glenn understands the dangers of the problem. I was sorry to see him make the run for the presidency. I just knew he was not going to make it. I knew that when most of my Republican friends early in the game eagerly asked whether Glenn was going to be the Democratic candidate, as though they were welcoming the possibility. He was too close to the Republicans in his viewpoints, but a good man. He's made a positive contribution in the Senate.

RITCHIE: What about your impressions of Joseph Biden, another senator who's got perhaps long range presidential ambitions?

VALEO: Yes. Well, I swore Biden in, and I went up to Wilmington to do it. He had had that terrible tragedy at the time, the automobile accident that killed his wife and infant. His two sons were in the hospital. He would not come down to be sworn in at the regular session. He said he couldn't leave the children. Mansfield asked me to go to Wilmington, and the Senate deputized me to swear him in, which I did. We did the ceremony in the hospital. He was then just about the youngest person—

certainly the youngest person who was elected that year. He would have been probably the youngest member of the Senate. He used to speak of himself as the "house youth" of the Senate. I swore him in and he made a short speech. He had some of his supporters and friends around in the room with his two kids in their hospital beds. I guess one had a broken leg. He made this speech and said that he wasn't at all sure that he was going to run again, that he might be just a one term senator, that he wasn't even sure he was going to finish out the term, that it would all depend upon what impact it might have on his children. But I had the feeling then that he was already thinking about running the next time.

He came in with a chip on his shoulder. You can't put yourself in the shoes of somebody who's been through a tragedy like that. He may have been blaming the whole thing on the Senate, you know. But whatever the reasons, he came in with a chip on his shoulder, and Mansfield did everything to assuage him. He showed him all kinds of special attention and privilege. Again, I think, trying to neutralize the effect of the tragedy in some small way. But it seemed to have no effect. Biden would continue to go his own way and be skeptical of everything that came up in connection with the Senate. He was very critical of most of the things that happened in the early caucuses and in some of the luncheons that Mansfield had for the younger members. Then I began to realize

that probably, it had nothing to do with the tragedy. This was his characteristic. This was his nature.

He's bright; he's able. I don't think he's there at the very top of the ladder, but he's bright and able. I'm trying to compare him with Gary Hart. I think Biden knows a little bit more about poverty and economic anxieties, partly because he comes from Wilmington, and that's an industrial city where space is limited and wages aren't that high, and there's unemployment. Whether he's got it for the presidency or not, I would doubt it.

I had an interesting experience with him in Honolulu a couple of years ago. I was conducting a comparative study of the Diet and the Congress, or it may have been on Japanese and United States foreign policies, and he came out and participated in that. He was excellent in his participation. We were riding in a car going to some function one night. He was running that year and he was complaining about the campaign contributions law, the "damn contributions law" and so forth. I said to him, "Well, you know Joe, I testified against that at the time. And all I got back was a lot of flack even from Senator Cannon who was presiding, and who insisted, 'we've got to have reform, we've got to have reform.'" I said, "You know, a lot of crimes have been committed in the name of reform. But I couldn't stop it. I tried to prevent it from going the way it went. I wanted to get more experience before we moved further, but nobody would hear about a delay. Everybody

was for reform and for a commission to administer it." He said, "Yeah, I know, I was one of them." So he recognized that the "reform" had been poorly thought through thanks largely to Common Cause pressuring it.

I think Biden is a good senator. If he wants to stay in the Senate he'll probably stay in it and over the years would make a very, very creditable record. But I don't know about the presidency. I would be doubtful on that.

RITCHIE: This whole group that we've been talking about, the young, mostly liberal and some centrist Democrats who came in after Mansfield had become majority leader. They were formed in that period when he was majority leader. You talked about Mansfield wanting the Senate to be a Senate of individuals who could be equals. These were the people who benefited by what he had started.

VALEO: That's true.

RITCHIE: Do you think they made the most of it? Looking back on them as a group, do you have any observations on what they did with what Mansfield was trying to do with the Senate?

VALEO: Well, they all got a lot of exposure that they may not have had. Whether that really in retrospect will reflect itself in effective legislation, I don't know. I think this is a

study for a scholar to make. There was a great input during this whole period of ideas in connection with social legislation. They certainly were also a factor in breaking down the stereotype reactions of war and patriotism in connection with Vietnam and facing some of the realities in Vietnam. Yes, I think that the Senate performed better as a result of these people taking a more active and a more visible part in its proceedings than would have otherwise been the case without the Mansfield approach. As so often happens, liberty becomes license, and I think what's happened since then is that the freedom of interchange, the introduction of ideas which were listened to, has led to some extremes now which make it almost impossible to run the Senate. I don't think that's the only factor which makes it almost impossible to run the Senate. There are others, but I think that's where it has eventually come out.

These fellows like Biden and Bumpers are reaching the point of maximum authority in their careers as senators. Biden is close to the top in the Foreign Relations Committee. Like the others who have gone before him since the Mansfield time he'll probably wish when he gets to that point that they'll have a little more of the discipline they had in the older Senate. But that's the price that was paid. There is the need now to put some order into the kind of freewheeling liberal—take that word "liberal" out, it isn't important, it could be conservative or liberal, it doesn't

matter—but the freewheeling individualistic expression which was the hallmark of the Mansfield Senate.

RITCHIE: If and when the Senate goes Democratic the next time, all these people we've been talking about will be the chairmen of the committees

VALEO: Precisely.

RITCHIE: Where do you see them going?

VALEO: I see them complaining about the same things that some of the others did: I can't get any order in the committee; nobody shows up for meetings; they're all over the place. I can just see that happening, and them saying "We've really got to do something about this." It will come out to something like that. Unfortunately, it's difficult to reverse that in the absence of a party system, and I guess my primary complaint against Mansfield was that he opened up all the closet doors, like Pope John he opened the windows on the church and let in a lot of fresh air, which it needed. But then he left at the time when the consequences of that had to be faced in terms of the capabilities of the institution to perform its functions. The successor, in his case Byrd, or even Baker—I won't make any judgments on Dole at the moment until I see a little more of him as leader; I think his eyes may be somewhere else too—but the successors in the role

have not understood, in my judgment, the need to institutionalize the Mansfield changes in a way which makes it possible for the Senate to function.

The original constitutional concept of the Senate as I see it is that it would be a body of men very much like the kind of people who served in it through the Mansfield Senate, individuals, many of whom would have profound contributions to make in the sense of political creativity. They would be the best of their states, would be selected for that reason—ideally. They would be able to come to Washington and as gentlemen, in the early days only gentlemen, but now ladies and gentleman, be able to deal with the problems of the nation with a high degree of comity with one another. That's what Mansfield tried to do with the Senate. That's fine if virtually all members behave in that fashion. But under the Senate rules, if there are some mavericks who wish to exploit the rules, which are there to guard this right to function in this fashion, they can destroy it.

When Russell used to do it on civil rights, he was really abusing the institution. He wasn't saving the institution, he wasn't strengthening it, he was abusing it. But Russell never pushed it beyond a certain point where the abuse would begin to lead to the deterioration of the institution. Nobody in the Mansfield Senate, not even Jim Allen, pushed it that far, although he came close. He was followed by the fellow from North Carolina,

Jesse Helms. He conspired with Jim Allen on an issue before the Senate, as I recall. They were out in the corridor planning on how to hold up the Senate, just for the sake of being naughty boys in a way, at least Jesse Helms was, and to force their will on the Senate. Helms went back to the chair, with Allen holding the floor, and they performed in a way which would have done that. He was furiously challenged by Mansfield, and crushed by the leader because the Senate upheld Mansfield completely in that case.

That's not going to happen now without a Mansfield. There is nothing in the rules or in the procedures which have been established, which will permit the preservation of the Mansfield concept of the Senate as being one of equal, dignified, outstanding American leaders, which is the way he saw the Senate. So I don't know where it goes from here. The Senate cannot claim survival on the basis alone of being a popular representative body. It's not a representative body in the sense that the House is, in terms of population, which is in the end where your representative body has to come out, if it's going to be meaningful.

Unless the Senate can organize itself to produce the kind of highly responsible behavior that the Mansfield Senate produced, I see its fate as something of the House of Lords. Sooner or later, if an institution doesn't perform a constructive function, it's bound to be destroyed, or to deteriorate to the point where it has no meaning in terms of political power which is what happened to t

he House of Lords. The Senate may stay on as some sort of ceremonial body. As a matter of fact, there have been advocates of that. J. Howard McGrath, who was in the Truman cabinet, wanted, I think, three senators from each state and he wanted them appointed from outstanding men, a sort of breathing statuary hall. Well, that's all right, and that kind of a Senate would be like the House of Lords. That's fine, but its right to legislate for the country would be highly dubious, whereas the House would remain the body that could legislate for the country on the basis of its genuine representativeness. This is the kind of question which occurs to me when I think about the future of the Senate.

There is an alternative, it seems to me, in which you can keep the substance of the constitutional Senate, but that involves the development of party responsibility, so a lot of the shenanigans which now occur on the floor of the Senate, and which were essentially absent during the Mansfield period, or for much of it, or rarely occurred, can happen in the party halls when the party decides on its major lines and functions. So there may be in that system some potential for the Senate's survival as a meaningful body.

RITCHIE: So you are not necessarily pessimistic, but you are not necessarily optimistic about the future.

VALEO: Definitely not. As of now, I don't see any signs of anything developing that will provide the Senate the kind of structure that would give it a durable legislative meaning. I see it much more likely to go the way of Baker's concept of it, where you came in only for a few months of the year and you leave most of the legislative work basically to the House. I think that's what he was saying.

RITCHIE: Do you think that if the Senate changes, it will change because of events or because of strong personalities of the Lyndon Johnson or the Mike Mansfield mold?

VALEO: I come back to Jefferson. It will only change because of education. And somewhere in our educational system—I don't see it yet, but I think this is why we train political scientists and historians and people of this sort—it has to come initially from sources outside the Senate. We have to see some very creative writing on the Senate from these sources which will put some new ideas on where the Senate can go into the ring. If we don't get that, I doubt that the Senate can develop within itself the kind of forward thinking about itself which might lead the change. I think it almost has to come from outside.

RITCHIE: As someone who came out of political science in the beginning, what do you think about the way political scientists

have dealt with the Senate? Do you think it's been adequate, or that they really understand what's been happening?

VALEO: I think we've had two things. The first crop of political scientists—they were mostly from my generation or a little earlier—were all presidentially oriented. They came out of the Roosevelt period and they saw really very little function in the Congress. They saw the government as being executive government primarily, with very strong leadership—something like you have had in France since DeGaulle or in the Philippines under Marcos! They wouldn't dare to admit that, but that's in effect what they were saying. The new crop that has come along since has suddenly discovered the Congress. They are mostly out of the period of the Vietnamese War. I think primarily because of the Senate, they have now gone to the other extreme and they see the government being run primarily by the legislative body.

The problem with that is: there is no ordered system for administering the nation's affairs from the legislative body. To do that requires a parliamentary and a party system. It depends upon an integrated political leadership which has genuine control over its forces in the legislative body. That doesn't exist in the Senate. To some degree it exists in rudimentary form in the House, but certainly not in the Senate. It's kind of ridiculous the way it is now. It is rule by the individual members who are able to convert an issue into a media event and by committees,

each in its own realm. In the latter case, eventually, of course the Appropriations Committees would rule or more likely the Budget Committee would rule or even more ridiculous the comptroller general! It's ironic, the one committee that survived in the evolution of the British system with any real power is the committee having to do with money. The others which were numerous and powerful in eighteenth-century England are now meaningless in the British system. Presently, the political scientists talk about a role for the legislative body which is far larger than it should be under a system of divided powers with both branches having a popular constituency. They are asking for the powers of a parliamentary system without the responsibilities of a parliamentary system. The way that plays is by having lots of staff on the committees, or related to the committees or in the individual offices.

One of the reasons why I'm going to the Philippines right now is that there are so many Americans going over to watch the election, the Filipinos don't know what to do with them. There are dozens of people apparently from Congress, mostly staff people, trying to tell the Philippines how to run its affairs or, to brief themselves the situation in order to deal with it when they return. Now, that's the kind of situation that has emerged from the Mansfield Senate. Mansfield did not want this to happen. Mansfield always turned back a lot of money. He never kept a

large staff. One of the keys to the Congress playing the role which it should play is keeping staff limited, because once you have staff people they have to be employed, and then you've got to find functions for them.

Gradually this search for function penetrates into greater and greater detail of administration—an essentially executive function. Congress as a body, cannot perform in this realm. Therefore the committees perform, in effect, on behalf of the Congress. Because members of a committee have six other committees or subcommittees to be on, you're really talking about legislative staffs performing the function for the Congress. When you have two sets of staffs, one in the executive branch and one in the legislative branch, clashing with one another on how to run the nation's affairs, I don't know what happens to representative government. It may be even worse if they cooperate. The whole system begins to be in great jeopardy. I don't know that you can reverse this process; that's why I'm looking at where you go from here. Where do you go in trying to make the whole function effectively? As I say, the only paths I see would be to move towards a stronger party system. There are ways of strengthening party systems. Fundamental is to make the campaign money go exclusively through parties and you very quickly have a stronger party system. That's not what's happening now. We're going to further fragmentation, further and further fragmentation.

RITCHIE: Well, I think this is probably the place for us to wrap up our discussions

VALEO: Yes, I think so.

RITCHIE: Which we began last July. This has been an absolutely wonderful interview, one of the best we've gotten for the collection. Do you have any ideas about the restrictions on it? Do you want to set a time period?

VALEO: Yes. I think the way I'd like to do it, Don, is to set an embargo for ten years, subject to shortening either with mine, or in case of my demise, my son's approval. If we can set it up like that, I think that will be fine. But at the end of the ten years then let it go out.

RITCHIE: Well, thank you very much for participating. This has been tremendous.

VALEO: I've enjoyed doing it, it's been fascinating.

End of Interview #19

Francis R. Valeo
Secretary of the Senate, 1966-1977
Secretary to the Majority, 1963-1966
Administrative Assistant to Senator Mike Mansfield, 1958-1963
On loan from LRS to Foreign Relations Committee, 1952-1958
Chief, Foreign Affairs Division of the Legislative Reference Service 1950-1952
Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1946-1950

THE PHILIPPINE ELECTION

Interview #20
Tuesday, March 11, 1986

RITCHIE: I'd like to ask what was it that brought you back to the Philippines?

VALEO: We should make it a point that this is a postscript now to the regular interview. I was invited by a friend of mine to come over, since I had been so long associated with the situation, primarily to see the election—not as an observer or anything like that but just to see how it developed. The friend was a relative of President Marcos, his brother-in-law to be specific. We were old friends and it was his suggestion that I come over and see the election campaign. That's why I went back.

RITCHIE: This was in early February?

VALEO: Yes, it would have been very early February. I was there for about three or four weeks before the election, enough time to see the build-up to it. Actually, the campaign did not run for much longer than that, because they had a constitutional limitation on the length of the campaign. The constitution was the product of a lot of political scientists and lawyers, I should add. The constitution they were functioning under was one essentially modeled after the French system.

RITCHIE: Were you there to help advise them on what to do with all these American delegations that were coming over?

VALEO: Well, to a degree that was it. My friend was bewildered by the number of people who were coming. The Filipinos were not used to having that many people interested in their affairs. That showed up in the press. There wasn't very much I could advise him on in connection with it, but that was one of the things I'm sure that made him anxious. He wanted to be sure that in the treatment of the foreigners, they were doing the right thing. I think they wanted some guidance on that, whether or not that was of real significance or not I don't know, but that could have been a factor in the invitation.

RITCHIE: What kind of suggestions did you have for them?

VALEO: Well, I took President Marcos' own statement as a starting point. He had said, when first queried on TV on this, "We'll have a snap election," somebody had said "Are you going to let the U.S. press in to see it," he said, "You can all come." So I suggested that since he had invited them, the press should be given as much access to whatever they thought they wanted to see, within reason. I didn't think they had to go further with Americans than anyone else. Whatever they gave to Americans I thought they ought to give to other foreign correspondents, and I thought that they ought to give to foreign

correspondents substantially what they gave to their own domestic correspondents. Actually, as it worked out, they gave more to the foreigners, as usual. That brought a kind of uncomfortable, angry reaction from Philippine journalists who claimed that the foreigners were getting more access than they were.

Much of this was involved with whether correspondents could go inside the polling places. There was a statutory regulation that prohibited anyone who was not directly involved in either voting or watching the polls from being within a hundred yards (or something like that) of the polling place, that is a common approach in elections. It wasn't an attempt to conceal anything, in my judgment. It was simply the way most polls are handled throughout the world. That's the way we certainly handle elections in this country. You set up a line and you say if you're voting or a poll-watcher or an official you go in, if you're not you stay behind the line to do your last-minute campaigning. You can't campaign on the inner side of the line. I think it was essentially the same kind of thing in the Philippine election. Much was made in the press about excluding foreign correspondents from the polling places, the implication being that the Filipinos didn't want them to see what was going on. I think that was outrageously inaccurate. It had nothing to do with that.

When the foreign press, particularly the U.S. press, complained, again Marcos overrode the general regulation and issued

some sort of order which said that they could have access to the polling places. Actually, the access meant so very little in terms of whether the election was honest or not. There were ninety thousand polling places and even with about a thousand foreign correspondents there, which eventually they built up to an incredible number—you can see how many polling places could be covered. I guess Evans and Novak got further afield than almost anyone else. Their view of the election was somewhat different from the other correspondents But most of the observing by correspondents was right around Manila.

I think that in assessing this election you have to look at it—at least I did—from three or four different perspectives. The first was the question of the integrity of the electoral process itself. I would say that in theory it was designed by law as though to produce scrupulous honesty. In terms of the actual honesty of the election, it had in the light of our concepts, probably less integrity than an election under Richard Daly in Chicago would have had and a lot more integrity than an election in most southern states would have had before the passing of the civil rights legislation in 1964. That's where it would fall on the scale of integrity that I would develop, somewhere in there. In those situations, Daly or pre-1964 south we never felt that the fraud that was involved, or the exclusion of voters which took place, was sufficient to negate the results of an election.

It was difficult for me to understand then why we could take this holier than thou attitude in terms of the Philippine elections.

We could say: well, we've come a long way since Daly's Chicago or the 1964 south. That's true, but the Philippines also has far less capabilities and resources to conduct an election than we have had. So my own view of it was the election in the Philippines was about, if you put it in terms of another scale, in terms of the elections in the Philippines going back through the commonwealth period, this election would be no worse certainly, and perhaps somewhat better than the others that I'm familiar with at least going back to the early fifties. This would have been somewhat better. There were practices in the election which we would now find horrifying in an American election. However, we would not have found them horrifying thirty or forty years ago. I think the election has to be put in a time frame perspective. These islands are in many ways and, not just in matters of elections, about thirty or forty years behind where we are at any given moment. They use pencils to mark ballots. We use machines. I say that without any smugness. I just think it helps to understand what actually happened.

There was a lot of buying of votes. I would by no means say that that was one-sided—they were undoubtedly bought on both sides. Whoever had the money bought the votes. Much of it is a

local process in the Philippines. I had to compare it with my own experiences as a boy growing up in Brooklyn. We had a mayor called Hylan who, whenever an election approached, always had free operas in Ebbits Field where the ball team played. He had Metropolitan Opera stars who would come and sing. I'm sure they were paid for it. At the intermission Hylan would get up and say: "Did you like the music?" And here were thirty, forty thousand people who had seen a free opera, many of them had never seen one before, and they'd all cheer. He'd say: "Now, don't forget, Mayor Hylan made this possible. On election day go out and vote." Now, a lot of the so-called fraud in the Philippine elections was of that kind.

In addition to that there was the purchase of votes for about the equivalent of maybe a dollar and a half U.S., two dollars. That probably was the going rate for votes. Again I go back to an experience I had in '46, in the United States, right after Roosevelt's death. When I came back from the war I was having a drink with a politician from Kentucky, a newly arrived Democratic politician, local politician from some quasi-rural area of Kentucky. "You know," he said, "there's been years with Roosevelt when people didn't even know who their congressman was. That's all going to change now, Frank, that's got to change. You know how we do it in Kentucky? We line them up and say 'Here's your two dollars, here's your two dollars, now you go down and vote and

you vote this way.' That's the way we do it in Kentucky." Now, that was 1946. Something like that happened in the Philippines, I would think.

I would not limit it to one group. The assumption that all the money was on the side of those supporting Marcos is quite erroneous. There was money on both sides in the election, and where it was used, how much it was used, I have no way of telling. I don't think anybody else does either. Certainly it was used, I'm sure it was a factor, that's part of the history of Philippine political practices. Another element in it was: Marcos would go—I followed him to one major rally in Negros Island. Maybe thirty or forty thousand people had turned out for it. At the end of the speech Marcos said, "I'm putting an edict out today, we're going to cut the electric light rates in this province by twenty percent," or something of that sort. And of course everybody cheered. Very, very similar to the kinds of things I knew as a boy in politics in New York City and also something which still goes on in our national politics, when a president announces a new construction project in a state with a tight race. So, sure, I don't like to see those things, but I know also that the Philippines is a country where elections are still relatively primitive and the difference with some of our practices is largely a matter of wealth and sophistication.

One has to match against this the fact that the Philippine government mobilized—and again I don't want to sound like I'm simply defending Marcos, although I believe that he's been terribly, terribly maligned—first of all, that there was an election at all was due to Marcos. Second of all, his government mobilized something like eighty thousand people, public servants primarily and school teachers, to run the polling places. Well, that's an extraordinary feat in a country which is as primitive in many ways as the Philippines are in terms of communication. I can recall the previous election—I did not see this in this election, but in the previous election for the Botaasan, the legislative body, I went to a number of polling places myself. There were polling places where they didn't even have pencils to write up the ballots. This was not somebody trying deliberately to discourage voting; somebody just had forgotten to bring the pencils so they had to wait till somebody went out and got some pencils.

They also tried to mark people's fingernails in indelible ink in that election as in this so they wouldn't vote twice, and then it was found that the indelible ink didn't hold up. Again, I don't think that was a deliberate thing. Where did you get the ink? It was a local indelible ink and it didn't work that well. In any event, how many people would have scrubbed it off so that they could vote twice? I don't think there were many people scrubbing their fingers. I think the whole impression that was

created by the press reports with reference to things like that was that this was a trumped up election from beginning to end. It was a false impression. I don't know about the count, but I know the election itself was a genuine, bona fide election and a very serious effort was made to get people to vote and to vote without duress. Except in usages on a local level in a few places there was little attempt to coerce that vote; to buy it, perhaps, but not to coerce it.

I think that's the true picture of what happened; it was an extraordinary performance in many ways. You had a turn out of 70 or 80 percent of the eligible voters. The average in the United States is fifty, or it's been so in recent years, not much more than fifty. I think both sides acknowledged that the effort to run an honest election—to run an election, let me put it that way, honest or dishonest, we'll leave that to another point—but the effort to run a creditable election was very genuine. The president made speeches, as did others, on TV with the theme: "Go out and vote." He didn't say, "Vote for me," he just said, "Go out and vote." There were all sorts of appeals, every twenty minutes, half hour, on the radio or TV, "It's your country, go out and vote." Again it was done on what we would describe as a nonpartisan basis. That didn't come across in the news reporting of those elections. You saw only the other side of it, a nun sitting on a ballot box to protest it or reports of

violence, much of it based on either hearsay or only on the most limited amount of actual observation.

You come to the tally, and who won it. Well, there were four unofficial counts of the votes going on simultaneously when I was there. I stayed through these countings of the ballots. One was run by something called NAMFREL, which was generally reported in the U.S. press to be the upright and the honest count. Actually, I don't think it was anymore upright than the other counts, but it was sponsored primarily by—I think one ought to get this into the record: NAMFREL, the national association for fair elections, was the concept of it. It was described as a citizens watch dog group. Actually, NAMFREL was started during the Magsaysay election and it was started with our money. CIA supported it as a tool for helping Magsaysay get elected. The main sponsor of NAMFREL in the present period was the Catholic Church, based in Manila. The man who headed it was a businessman who was not one of Marcos' favorites, let's put it that way, who is now the minister for commerce and industry in the Aquino government. They did use a lot of very good people to run the count. They used nuns and priests among others, but it was very clear, the NAMFREL count was generally acknowledged to be the pro-Aquino count.

Against that was something called the Comelec, the commission on elections, which was the official body for the conduct of the election, they were the ones that set up the whole election.

Their count, also unofficial, was regarded as the Marcos count. There was a big to-do before the election between NAMFREL, which was then appointed as the citizen's arm of the Comelec to carry on the "unofficial" count, but it was obvious that there was a constant tension between the two groups. Comelec was trying to control NAMFREL, and NAMFREL was trying to do its own thing. Well, they finally reached an agreement and promptly broke it when the counting began. Both were unofficial counts; under the constitution the only official count was the one that took place when they opened the ballot boxes, officially sealed ballot boxes, in the legislative body and the ballots were counted in the legislative body and showed Marcos the winner. In addition to that there was the TV count. The stations were getting their own reports of results and it was coming over TV and radio. TV again was regarded essentially as pro-Marcos. So you had all of these counts going on simultaneously in the day or two immediately after the election.

When I left the Philippines the count had been very, very slow up until that point. Of course there were charges that this was deliberate, that the Marcos people were trying to see how many votes they needed before they decided what they had counted. That may be part of it, I don't know. I have no way of telling; I don't think anybody else has any way of telling. But I do know that there are also other explanations for the slowness: the vote

had to go from the localities to the provincial headquarters, from the precincts to a local collection point, and then from the provincial headquarters to Manila. If you know the Philippines, with seven thousand islands, it is not surprising to me that it takes a day, or two days, or three days, or four days for this sort of thing to come through. That reality was never made clear in the U.S. press; that, as a factor, was never acknowledged in the press. It was automatically assumed that delays had something to do with an attempt to further develop the fraudulent victory for Marcos because the press had already pitched its reporting in the framework of a struggle between good and evil, with Marcos the personification of the latter.

I assumed—again, discounting a lot of things that may have been involved, like purchasing votes and other voting frauds in some localities—but when the votes finally came in, my own personal estimate was that Marcos had won the actual count by upwards of a million votes. I base that on one main consideration. I had done some calculating and I had watched the press earlier in terms of how the layout of strengths were in the islands. The key to Aquino's political or voter strength was in the immediate environs of Manila, Metro-Manila was the one area where you could actually observe the election. Her people's own claims were that she would carry the region by a million votes. My own view was that if she didn't carry it by a million, there would be no way she could

possibly win the election. She carried the region by two hundred thousand, and that, oddly enough, was the one count which was listed by all the counters that was roughly consistent. Give or take a few thousand votes, they all acknowledged that she had carried the region by that relatively small majority. Until that point there had been no complaints about excluding voters from the registrations.

When it became obvious, however, that the count was obviously going to develop this way, around a two hundred thousand vote majority, rather than the million she needed as a minimum, then the claims began to be raised that there had been a deliberate attempt to exclude Aquino voters from the registration rolls. That would have been an impossible thing to do in any great numbers. That people were denied the voting in the area of Manila because of registration flaws or other technicalities is true, but there is no way of telling whether they were Aquino supporters or Marcos supporters, and I would challenge anyone to show me the kind of local poll watching that would be able to distinguish, in polling places where there fifteen or twenty thousand voters, who was an Aquino voter and who wasn't. There would be no way you could do that with any accuracy. If there was an exclusion of voters, my guess was that it was probably fairly evenly distributed. And that there was an exclusion of voters again is not so much, I think, a reflection of a wide scale deliberate attempt to do

that, but rather one of the realities of trying to run an election rolls in a very primitive place, politically speaking, without any of the modern machinery of elections. You're talking about people who did it all by hand. Again, that was never acknowledged as a major factor by the U.S. press. We constantly saw this election in terms of an American election where you've got machines, computers and the whole works. It didn't exist there.

When I left the Philippines I assumed Marcos had won by about a million votes. Interestingly enough, the so called pro-Marcos count showed him winning by somewhere around a million seven, the pro-Aquino count showed her winning by six or seven hundred thousand, but they acknowledged that they had counters in only 80 percent of the provinces. One of the provinces which they hadn't counted at all was Marcos' home province, where he probably ran a plurality in the end of at least five or six hundred thousand, that would be a minimum. I forget which the other provinces were but they weren't around Manila. So no matter how you put it, given the distribution of strength, any reasonable vote count would have shown him either as winning the election or at the worst so close that you couldn't even call it. But to interpret the election a few hours after the polls closed as a victory for Aquino was to me a total distortion of the reality of the situation.

One can argue for days on end on how Marcos built his voter strength or where he got his strength. One could do the same thing for Aquino. In his case, I think the strength came primarily from the government machinery, particularly on the local levels outside Manila, which was essentially made up of his supporters and from the poor. In her case it was the Roman Catholic Church under Jaime Sin. I think, by the time the election took place, it was generally recognized in Manila that Marcos was running not against Aquino but against Jaime Sin. The vote against Marcos was actually a vote for change, more than it was a vote for Aquino, except for the city of Manila and perhaps Cebu City in the Visayas and a few other essentially urbanizing areas. I think that was generally the reality of the situation. I assumed Marcos had not only won the election but that he would be inaugurated. There would be resistance in the streets to be sure, but I didn't expect an enormous amount of this. It was very quiet when I left Manila.

I didn't anticipate several things. I didn't anticipate first of all, and most important, the defection of Enrile and Ramos, which turned what had been until that time essentially a civilian opposition to Marcos into essentially a military mutiny. If Aquino is president today it is certainly by no clear-cut mandate of a vote in the election. She's president because of the mobs in Manila who were turned out by Sin's Roman Catholic Church, and

she's president because of the Ramos and Enrile defection which split the military force, a mutiny which was then in a sense undermined by ourselves, largely from Clark Field. Thinking about this for days afterwards, I've come to the conclusion that the result was preordained. The scenario had been written. Had Marcos lost the election in the count, then it would have been described as an honest election, or relatively honest election, but no thanks to Marcos. But I'm convinced that we were not prepared to accept a Marcos victory in any circumstances. Our support, and obviously our inclination, was very clear, we really were sustaining Aquino at every turn, whenever we could.

Whatever aid we may have given financially, if we did, was probably given through Jaime Sin—this is certainly conjecture on my part. There are no documents to support it and there wouldn't be in any event. But Aquino did not hurt for money. Her supporters bought a lot of TV time. They had Radio Veritas, the Catholic station. Her supporters could have bought a lot of votes. I don't think she personally bought votes anymore than Marcos personally bought votes, but a lot of votes could have been bought for her. Her main instrument, her main political machinery, was the Roman Catholic organization which was dead-set against Marcos. I can go way back into this. I explored this much further on this last visit. If you want it in the record it will be there: Marcos' father was not a Catholic to begin with. There

is something in the Philippines called the Iglesia ny Cristo, which literally means the Church of Christ. This was the nearest thing to an Anglican church in the Philippines. His father was a member of that church. His village in the province of Llocos Norte, the town where he came from, was 90 percent Iglesia ny Cristo. His mother was a Catholic, and Catholicism, of course, is the religion of politics in the Philippines. Marcos adopted his mother's religion.

It's fascinating to see this as an element in this situation. Marcos was suspect of the Catholic Church for twenty years at least. He was suspect even when he was in the Congress. The government TV station in the Philippines, in all the time that I've been in the Philippines, never showed a Catholic evangelizing broadcast that I can remember. They've shown the papal visit and things of that sort, but I don't recall ever seeing any evangelizing going on on the government station. Yet everyday you turn that station on and there are evangelists from Virginia Beach or somewhere in the states, who are preaching and evangelizing on the government TV station in the Philippines, in English and Tagalos. I raised that question with friends of mine. I said, "Why do you have this anachronism here?" I never got a satisfactory answer. I thought, well, these sects must have an awful lot of money and they're buying time. I'm not at all sure that was the whole story.

That church—the Iglesia ny Christo—is three million strong in the Philippines now and they were solid for Marcos. The leader of the church made no bones about it, that Marcos was a person he had supported since he began running for office. It's a fascinating sidelight, and I sense that it was in some ways very much involved in the undercurrents of the political forces in the country.

RITCHIE: I wondered what you thought about the congressional delegation that was headed by Senator Richard Lugar?

VALEO: I followed it only through the press. I couldn't tell, really, what they were doing. They had a large group. I think they met with the Bataasan leaders. They were at first greeted rather pleasantly. I don't think it was overdone, but they were greeted pleasantly. Although there was some anger on the part of the local press over what was regarded as an intrusion into Philippine affairs. There was some expression of that in the press. But I thought Lugar made a mistake by starting to talk before he left the country. He should have guarded his peace. I don't think the group had any effect on the election, but I think from the point of view of proper conduct, it was a serious mistake to give out anything to the press while still there, it was a form of intervening. On the other hand, there were so many American press people around, I don't know that Lugar had much choice. They were pressing him all the time. They all hung around the

Manila hotel. It's near the embassy and it became the main center for most of the American observer activity. I thought it was a farce, the press implication that all this observation was helping to keep the election honest. I mean, how can you observe an election like that?

Lugar's mission wasn't the only foreign group. We had sponsored and paid for another group, an international group. I think the joint Republican-Democratic political groups or whatever they are called had brought in a bunch of other foreigners, including some from not very democratic countries, like Colombia among others, to observe the fairness of the election. All of that was dross. I just think that the outcome was preordained.

My own miscalculation was: I knew that U.S. policy makers were set on getting rid of Marcos. I thought it was American policy to get rid of him and I didn't accept any other basis for American policy. The concept that we have been staunch allies of Marcos for years I think is a totally distorted one. The U.S. foreign policy establishment opposed him since his very first successful try for the presidency in 1964, and consistently opposed him thereafter. So I think, as I said earlier, that the outcome was preordained. But I see that in retrospect. I didn't think that we would go so far as to collaborate in the manipulation of his overthrow by the Catholic Church sponsored mobs in Manila and a military mutiny.

I don't know what it took to induce the defense secretary, Enrile, to defect. His reputation is not a good one in the Philippines; quite the contrary, he's considered something of a very slippery character, has been all along. He was the responsible official in the martial law period, and if there were atrocities he would have been certainly first in line for the responsibility for them before Marcos. General Ramos is a different matter. He is an old West Point graduate who worked with our forces in Korea and in Vietnam, essentially a professional soldier, pro-American certainly in his attitudes and in his manners. If the two were gotten to by us, I don't think it would have been directly. I think it would have been through Jaime Sin. After the event, I recalled something that Sin had said just three or four days before the election, something to the effect that high-ranking military officials had assured him that if Aquino won the election there would be a peaceful transition and that they would serve her just as well as anyone else. Now, Jaime Sin put that out about three or four days before the election, which suggests to me that the getting to Enrile and Ramos came through Jaime Sin. Whether we were in touch with Jaime Sin, I'll leave that to your judgment. Certainly, the ambassador saw enough of him and so did many of the official U.S. visitors.

RITCHIE: In addition to the congressional delegation being there, the Senate also passed a resolution declaring that they did

not believe the results of the election were accurate. Do you think that the Congress had a legitimate role in either case?

VALEO: No. It was a mistake for us to become involved in it. How would they know? How would they know really whether the results were accurate? How can you pass a sensible congressional resolution on a question like that? It's possible for people in the American embassy, they had observers around in different parts of the country, it's possible that they could have formed a crude estimate of the fairness of the election, but it would have been so crude, even they, knowing the country, being familiar with what was happening, watching it day to day, even any estimate that they formed would have had to be at best highly tenuous. But how can anyone suggest somehow or other that we had enough information to say within two or three days that these elections were so terribly fraudulent? Unless, of course, the information came from the Catholic church hierarchy. And, in that case, with their bitterness to Marcos, how objective would that information be?

No one that I know of has ever said that Marcos got less—under the most extraordinary conditions—than 45 percent of the vote. That would have been his percentage if you allowed every voiced claim of fraud and if you multiplied them by about four or five times he would have still wound up with about 45 percent of the vote. Well, that isn't exactly a total falling away from somebody who's been leading your country for twenty years. When you can't do a

scientific job of polling, maybe you're better off not trusting the judgment of some people who might not be entirely objective. Obviously, we chose not to do that.

When I left the Philippines, the official results still were not announced. There was a stewardess on the Philippine airlines plane and we got into a conversation. She was a young woman and she had voted in Manila. I didn't ask her who she had voted for, but she volunteered that she had voted and she asked me what I thought of the election. I gave her a reaction. She said, "I'm very disturbed. Frankly, I was for change"— (which I think was basically the character of the anti-Marcos mood) —she said, "I was for change and I voted for change, but I don't like the way they are treating the president." I think, in many ways, that is the reality of the Philippine reaction. Certainly outside of Manila that would be the case. But even inside of Manila, I believe, it would have still been substantially the case.

So I'm led to the second basic observation on this election: that we've been witness here to a journalistic lynching, aided and abetted by the Congress. It appalled me in particular that a paper like the *New York Times*, which I've read for many, many years, would be a party to the attempted destruction of Marcos' war record. Of course, they have been an enemy of Marcos for many years. This is not new with the *Times*. When he first put marshal law in effect in the early '70s, he closed down all the newspapers

including the *Manila Times*, and the editor of the *Manila Times* was highly regarded by press colleagues in the United States. I think that the press animosity to Marcos dates from that period. It's been intermittent over the years. I think the *Times* has been wrong most of the time; they've been predicting his fall for fifteen years, and it's taken fifteen years to bring it around, but they finally won their point.

I say journalistic lynching because when I began to look at the political situation and the election from the Philippines rather than from the United States I began to see that the whole U.S. press approach was taking shape in terms of a kind of morality play, a kind of struggle between good and evil. Everything that was evil was of course associated by the U.S. press with Marcos. Anything good was associated with his opponent, whether the opposition candidate was Aquino or anyone else I think it would have been the same. I don't think it had anything to do with Cory Aquino. At that point she was a total unknown, and she does not make a strong impression in any event.

I actually wrote in my notes shortly after I arrived in the Philippines that somebody was trying to shape the election into a struggle between good and evil. To do that, anything that was good that might possibly be associated with Marcos had to be suppressed, or ignored, as part of the news. Anything that was evil with which he could be linked, however remotely, had to be

played to the heights. By the same token, you reversed it for his opponent. I kept thinking in these terms, that this is the way the election was being developed by the U.S. press, and I couldn't figure out who was pulling the strings. Then finally, a week before the election, damned if Jaime Sin doesn't use the phrase: "This is an election that is going to decide between good and evil." The phrase was actually used by Jaime Sin in a public statement. He never mentioned Marcos by name, but he said it was a battle between good and evil. Well, you know, no political conflict is ever a battle between all good and all evil.

I begin to think back on my years of watching the Philippine scene. I asked myself if one were not putting it in those black and white terms, what would one find that would be good in Marcos? The first thing was that he had fed, or the country has been fed—I don't want to give him all the credit for it anymore than I want to give him all the blame—but they have managed to keep twenty-five million more people fed than were there when he took office. Well, that's no mean achievement in a country of that kind. They started out with a population of thirty-eight or thirty-nine million when he took office, and now there are fifty-eight million. I know his wife believes in family planning; I know she made one attempt to get that idea across and she was slapped down completely by precisely the person who has defined good and evil in this thing, the good archbishop of Manila.

So that's one thing, the fact that a leadership is able to manage to keep the people fed is a very important consideration in any developing country. It ties in with the land reform, which had been talked about for at least forty years before martial law and it was only possible to put it into effect after martial law was declared. The land reform law, yes you can find plenty of faults with it, but basically there are more people farming their own land, particularly on the island of Luzon, than ever in the past, and that that is so is essentially due to land reform. As I say, you can criticize the reform shortcomings just like you can criticize marking ballots with a pencil, but basically the Filipinos did it themselves and they did it reasonably well, certainly enough to keep down the level of discontent in the rural areas of Luzon for the past two decades.

Public education, there are now enough schools to take care of a population which has twenty-five more million people in it, and a very young population. I think a majority of the people in the Philippines are under eighteen years old. These are achievements that one shouldn't dismiss lightly. The country has been run, all things considered, with perhaps less bloodshed than in the past, certainly no more, and maybe less. All of those things must somehow be ignored when you personify the head of the state as a monster. Not only do you have to stage a battle between good and evil, you have to personify them. Cory Aquino comes across as

the dutiful daughter of the church, deeply religious, and Marcos comes out as some sort of monster who goes around killing people. That was not the reality. If we see the situation in those terms we're seeing it inaccurately.

RITCHIE: The press has focused on the wealth and corruption angle

VALEO: I know!

RITCHIE: And contrasted that to the poverty islands. Do you give any credence to this?

VALEO: Yes, but the wealth problem is not confined to the Marcoses. Big wealth and big poverty have been a characteristic of these islands for many, many decades, perhaps centuries. I thought the real straw was Stephen Solarz's comments on Malacanang Palace this morning, how these people lived in such extraordinary splendor. What he really should have said, again, if it were not a struggle between good and evil, was that the palace housed the Spanish governor-generals, and the American governor-generals, and has housed all of the Philippine presidents and the contrast between its splendor and the city's poverty have been there all that time! I noticed that Cory Aquino has now moved into the guest house. Well, we'll see how long she stays there. I mean, I don't find in the Macoses some unique aspect here. I don't like what I see in terms of wealth versus poverty in the Philippines,

never have. But I don't see this as some unique characteristic that has appeared during the Marcos presidency.

The Cohuanco family, which is her family, if you want to get into this sort of thing—I don't think those are the real issues, I think they are sideshows—they own vast lands in the province of Tarlac, and one of their hostilities with regard to Marcos was the land reform. They lost some land, but they still have sugar lands in this province in central Luzon. As part of their campaign, the Marcos' people brought down to Manila poor peasants from what was called the Hacienda Luicita, which was Aquino's family hacienda. They picketed her rallies, pointing out that the hacienda paid them twenty or thirty cents a day. They also complained that the land was supposed to have been divided up, according to the press reports, twenty years ago, and they never got around to doing it. I don't want to get into that because sure, I don't like to see wealth flaunted anywhere, including in the United States, but to assume that that's the critical thing I think is a sideshow. When Solarz talks about three thousand panties in her closet and things like that I found it offensive in the extreme, you know, to look in women's closets to see what kind of clothes they have is not what I regard as a normal function of politics.

RITCHIE: What advantage do you think the State Department saw in switching allegiances, or putting so much support to Marcos' opposition, especially right after the election?

VALEO: I think they've wanted to get rid of Marcos for a long time. They saw no alternative until now. Until the Beninjo Aquino assassination there was no real alternative that they could have grappled for. After the Aquino assassination and the consequences which were largely economic as well as political, I think it became evident for the first time that an opposition was going to take form in some way. I think they played with Salvatore Laurel for a while, found out that he really was probably not viable. They looked for alternatives. I don't know who put this ticket together but I think it was Jaime Sin. Then, for the first time it looked like a viable thing.

As I say, the State Department has not been particularly friendly to Marcos, ever since he's been in office. He's been far too independent in attitude and in viewpoint and far too intensely nationalist for the Americans who have had to deal with him. He's not easily controlled, and they knew that. But that happens in many places and you have to live with what you've got. On top of that, then, I think his aging was beginning to give them deep worries because they didn't know what was going to come next if he stayed in office much longer. They probably feared a succession by Mrs. Marcos whose intense nationalism would have been even more difficult to handle. One can argue whether Marcos should have left office or not at this point for the good of his country. My personal opinion is that he should not have run, he should have

let somebody else take on this election, but that's neither here nor there. The fact is, our officials felt they could no longer live with him.

RITCHIE: Do you think this election in a sense legitimized the opposition by at least showing they had some popular support, and gave us some reason for throwing our support to them?

VALEO: No. I think that a legitimate opposition had emerged in the previous elections for the legislature. We should have encouraged this process but we should not have intervened in any way shape or form in terms of favoring one candidate or another. We certainly should have not helped in the process of electing a president by military defections and manipulated mobs in Manila. This was a Manila election in many ways. Aquino was really put into office by the mobs who were gotten on the streets by the church, and by a defecting military cabal. How you can rationalize that as a victory for democracy, I just don't know.

RITCHIE: It was strange that the Soviets threw their support to Marcos at the end.

VALEO: Yes, of course. They jumped right away on it. They thought surely he was going to be the new president. There's a real irony in this. One of our problems with Marcos was that we were afraid he wasn't going to be able to fight the Communists well enough, and he wouldn't listen to us on how to fight them.

Now we've got a woman whose practically first act in office was to let four of the leading Communists in the country out of jail. I don't know what it adds up to. I don't know whether that's a good gesture or not. But if you make so much about the need to fight the Communists, especially when your military says, "Don't do it, we're fighting the Communists so don't let them out," and yet that's done, I don't know how you can put that together with our policy which presumably is designed primarily to increase the capacity of the Philippine government to control communism. I just don't understand the rationale of it. That's why I don't think "knowing how to fight Communists" was ever really relevant to our position on Marcos.

RITCHIE: Do you think that now we are even more committed to this government than we were before?

VALEO: Well, we'll know that when we get the first aid bill, which is going to be a large one. I saw an item in the press just recently that the Filipinos may default on their debts. That will send the tremors through the bankers and we'll see what it leads to in the way of a new aid program. If it's big enough, why then you'll know we're more committed than ever. And if that isn't enough we'll have to send more. And if that isn't enough I don't know how far it can go. You come back to comparisons with Vietnam, and they all frighten me.

RITCHIE: So you see some parallels to Vietnam in say, 1963?

VALEO: Yes. I see something more than that too, Don. I think—and whether this is a right assumption or not we'll know very shortly—I don't think that Cory Aquino is going to stay in office very long, or if she is she's not going to stay in power very long. I think the power is going to shift. It will go probably in the direction of Laurel and Enrile, if he lives. He's in danger of assassination, in my judgment. He's got two armored cars that go with him everywhere now, and I think properly so, because I think he's a potential target. They have long memories in the Philippines.

RITCHIE: Do you think that Marcos is completely out of the picture now or will he play a role in the future?

VALEO: It's interesting. The first indication that he was still involved came from some complaints from Laurel, that he's still in touch with his people in the Philippines. Supposedly Blas Ople, who was the minister of labor in his government, wants to form a new party. It's interesting, when it was thought that Marcos wasn't going to live a while back, the two people who jumped to the forefront were Enrile and Ople. Both were ready to take over at that point. So I don't know how much of a role Marcos is going to play from now on. I think in some ways if he finds life too impossible in the United States, and right now I

think it's touch and go, I don't think he's going to disappear. It would not surprise me if he showed up in his home province of Llocos Norte, that's not an impossibility.

RITCHIE: If you were still connected with the Foreign Relations Committee right now, what kind of advice would you give to them about the Philippines and the future of the Philippines?

VALEO: I'd say pray! I don't know what's going to come next. We've got some company in the new set up which I would prefer not to keep in the Philippines. But having done what we did, I don't know that we have any alternative if we're going to try to salvage anything but to go the same route which points in the direction of Vietnam. Now, I would say that somewhere long before you get to Vietnam you stop. The first thing I would advise the Foreign Relations Committee to do is: get the military bases out of Subic and Clark. I would say start to negotiate that immediately. That should have been done a long time ago. Or if for some overriding reason we're not going to get the bases out, then just rent them. Find out what's a fair rent for them and give them rent and stop using the bases as a reason for involving ourselves in the Philippines internal affairs. That would be my first advice. Although ideally I think we should get the bases out and move them somewhere else, I don't care where, I'm not even sure we need them, but everybody tells me they're vital, so if we really need them figure out another place away from

the Philippines to put them. There must be many places where you'd have less problems with them.

But failing that then I think the next step is the same thing that we should have done five years ago with Marcos: hold them but pay rent for them. Forget the "aid" myth and then you're out of the internal politics not only in the Philippines but in the United States as well. Then you don't have to be embarrassed by Marcos, or by Aquino, or by Laurel, or anyone else who's in that job. You just say, "Look, all we're interested in is the bases, we don't care what you do with your government. Here's your money for the bases. If you get elected or if you come into power we'll pay you too." I think one has to be that cynical—if you really need the bases. If you don't need them, just get away from them, and get away from those islands and just try to keep a decent relationship which permits you to have a measure of trade, a measure of investment if it makes sense and some mutually satisfying cultural exchange. That's all. But we're not headed in that direction now. We've got ourselves up to our ears and nose matters which should be exclusively Philippine.

RITCHIE: So it comes down to the fact that we have a difficulty in defining what our interests really are?

VALEO: Right. And we come back again to what I think is one of the strains in our society, which we talked about before,

which is the imperialist strain. We haven't shook ourselves free of that yet. By the same token, when I spoke of journalistic lynching today, I think that that's another strain in our society. When we get into a situation that we cannot come to grips with, we search for a personification of evil as the source of our perplexity. Once we have personified the evil then we must lynch it. Whatever redeeming human features the personification might have, just forget them and concentrate on the evil. That is a reality. Historically you must sense that yourself. There are other strains; but those two also exist.

What appalls me is that the press is a part of this. I never thought of the press as a stimulator of lynch mobs. I just never thought of it that way, and yet after this Philippine experience I go back to the McCarthy period and realize how much the press was involved in the making of McCarthy and his power to lynch many, many innocent people. And then in the end the press helped to lynch McCarthy. I'm sure there are many other examples. Those are the ones out of my own experience. That's really serious. It throws a real shadow on the First Amendment, and the meaning of the First Amendment.

RITCHIE: And here we are talking about this in the First Amendment Lounge of the National Press Club.

VALEO: Yes! Okay, Don, I don't know that there's anything else. That's the way the whole experience looked to me.

RITCHIE: Well, I appreciate this. It's a very interesting postscript. The timing was just right.

VALEO: Let me add one more thing. I want my own relationship with the Marcoses to be made very clear in the record. I've known them for twenty years, not as intimate friends, but I've known them and watched them as a political team. I know Mrs. Marcos' brother, who is a very dear friend of mine, has been for many years, especially since I left the Senate. I know these people. I know what I believe are their shortcomings in terms of politics, but I also know their strengths and their contributions to the Philippines. I have a fairly good idea in my own mind of what they have done that is positive in the Philippines, and what has been done that is negative. I think the positive far outweighs the panties in the closet and the thousand pair of shoes.

RITCHIE: Has her brother left the Philippines also?

VALEO: He's in Honolulu, but he's not with them. He didn't come with them. That's it, Don. I don't have anything more to say.

RITCHIE: Well, I thank you. It's been fascinating. This interview really went right up to the daily headlines. Normally I'm used to interviewing people twenty years after the events, not just a week or so.

VALEO: Well, I hope it looks good twenty years from now, but one never knows.

End of Interview #20

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