The Institute for the Study of War

"Policing Iraq"

Welcome:
Tara Sonenshine,
Executive Vice President,
U.S. Institute of Peace;

Marisa Cochrane Sullivan,
Deputy Director,
Institute for the Study of War

Moderator:
Robert Perito,
Director of Security Sector Governance Center,
U.S. Institute of Peace

Speakers:
Lieutenant General James Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.),
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War;

Austin Long,
Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs;

Ginger Cruz,
Former Deputy Inspector General,
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)

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ROBERT PERITO: Good morning. I'd like to welcome you all here this morning. Thank you for coming out and in the rain. And thank you very much for being with us on Leap Year Day, a unique time.

My name is Bob Perito. I'm the director of the Security Sector Governance Center at the United States Institute of Peace. Today we're going to look that the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. This event is a unique event. It's co-sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for the Study of War.

We are honored this morning to have with us the executive vice president of USIP, Tara Sonenshine, and the deputy director of the Institute for the Study of War, Marisa Cochrane Sullivan. They've both agreed to make welcoming remarks. And I'd like to bring them to the podium. We'll start with Tara.

TARA SONENSHINE: Thank you very much, Bob. We're really delighted to be doing this as a partnership with the Institute for the Study of War. What I thought I'd like to do is just put this whole event in some context more generally about the institute and its work.

But I remind all of us, as you all know because you follow Iraq so closely, that on February 19th a suicide car bombing killed a number of Iraqi police recruits as they were emerging from a police academy in Baghdad. This was one of a number of recent terrorist bombings that have specifically targeted the police. And in looking at the critical role that the Iraq police have played in the conflict and the importance of the police continuing to receive support, it reminds us of the importance of police everywhere in conflict zones and the importance of staying focused, staying committed and staying engaged in what really becomes a law and order, a security and a rule of law situation in many conflict zones.

Since 2003, USIP has assisted the U.S. effort in Iraq through the work of our office in Baghdad and through programs such as the institute's facilitation of the Iraq Study Group in Washington. And what we all need to keep doing with all of you and those experts in the field is sharing the lessons learned. Our Lessons Learned program has focused on the role of police and inputs for the work of understanding police, and particularly contributing to the work of the special inspector general on Iraq and the Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting.

I'm very proud of our Security Sector Governance Center and enormously proud of its director, Bob Perito. He has continued to produce timely, relevant, important materials, publications, hosting conferences using his unique convening power on the Iraq police and the interior ministry. What's become increasingly important is Bob's testimony before congressional committees on this topic. As most of you know, he's co-author of a book, "Police in War." And it's interesting, that book was written in response to a question from a U.S. Marine Corps officer whose unit has been asked to train Iraqi police. And the question always is: How? So be careful what question you ask today. It could lead Bob to write another book.

And on that, I would like to invite Marisa to say a few words and to thank you all for remaining engaged in this critical subject. Thank you very much.

MARISA COCHRANE SULLIVAN: Well, thank you so much for coming today. It's great to see such a big crowd on Iraq, especially on a day like today where it's quite rainy. And I'd also like to thank Bob Perito and the United States Institute of Peace for co-hosting this event for us and for doing so much of the heavy lifting to make today happen.

I want to echo Tara's remarks on the importance of today's discussion. And while the focus today will be on Iraq, I think it's an issue that has relevance beyond Iraq – well beyond Iraq to many of the places that are making headlines today – Afghanistan, Libya, Haiti and places where the United States may be conducting stability operations in the future. Police training's also been a very important focus of the work done at ISW, led by Lieutenant General James Dubik.

And for those of you who are unfamiliar with ISW, our goal is to educate military and civilian leaders, reporters and the public to enhance the quality of policy debates. And all of our work on Iraq as well as our other research as part of the Middle East Security Project and the Afghanistan Project can be found on our website, www.understandingwar.org.

As I mentioned, General Dubik has really led ISW's research on security force development and security sector reform. And he joined ISW in 2009 after completing his last command in the Army as head of Iraq's – the Multinational Security Transition in Iraq, which was the effort to train Iraq's police and military forces. So I – he's quite the expert. And I'm looking forward to his and all the panelists' remarks today.

But I will – I would like to recommend his specific series on security force development as part of our Best Practices in Counterinsurgency series. And I think his report, "Creating Police and Law Enforcement Systems," is really a must-read on the issue of police development. It's valuable because it focuses not just on how to build police, but how to do so under very difficult circumstances while you're fighting a counterinsurgency. And it focuses not just on training police and getting them out onto the street, but building the overarching law enforcement system as well. So I can't recommend his work enough. And we have some copies here today, but it also can be found at our website.

So with that, I'd like to thank you all again for coming today. Special thanks to USIP. And I look forward to the discussion.

MR. PERITO: Thank you very much for those remarks. Today's program looks at the history of the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. As we enter the post-intervention phase of the Iraq experience, it's an appropriate time to review the – this important program, to see if there are lessons to be learned that might be applied in Afghanistan and to future conflicts.

The Iraq program, from its very start, was groundbreaking. The U.S. had carried out police assistance programs in Latin America and in the Balkans, but the Iraq program had several unique characteristics. Iraq was the first time that the United States and its allies attempted to

build a police force in a large country with a large population. The previous program had been undertaken in Serbia – in Kosovo. Kosovo had a population of about 1.8 million. Iraq's population was 32 million – 16 times larger. Iraq was the first time that the United States tried to build a police force of more than 20,000 personnel. The Kosovo police force was about 6,000. The Haiti police force about 5,000. So Iraq was a adventure of a very different magnitude.

Today the Iraq police number: over 412,000. Since 2003, the United States has spent about $8 billion in the effort to train the Iraqi police. Iraq was the first time that the Department of the Defense and the U.S. military took the lead in training foreign police. Previous to that, it was the Department of State and the Department of Justice who did this work. And Iraq was the first time that the United States and its allies tried to train an indigenous police force under fire. In all previous events, they really were in fact post-conflict. But in Iraq, the conflict was going on.

Iraq was the first time the United States decided to take on a challenge of this magnitude. The second time was Afghanistan. And so as we approach the endgame in Afghanistan, there are lessons that obviously can be learned from the Iraq experience. And as we'll hear, Iraq has influenced Afghanistan over time, and that will be the same experience in the future.

This morning we have assembled a very distinguished panel. And I would like to introduce them in the order in which they'll speak. You have their bios. They were on the table outside, so I won't waste a lot of time on introductions. But I do want you to meet our panelists.

Our first panelist this morning is Ginger Cruz. Ginger is the former deputy inspector general of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. SIGIR, as you all know, has done extensive work and made an extensive study of the Iraq experience. They have published extensively on the police aspect of that. And Ginger has volunteered this morning to talk about the beginning of the police development program, the Coalition Provisional Authority period.

Lieutenant General James Dubik, as you've heard, was the former commander of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq. He is the architect of the current Iraq security forces. General Dubik is also a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. A great friend of the institute, he's spoken here many times before. We're very happy to have him back with us today.

And finally, Dr. Austin Long, assistant professor at Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, my alma mater. Don't let Professor Long's mild manner mislead you. He is a former adviser to the first Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, and also the Combined Force Special Operations Command in Afghanistan. He has been in both theaters and speaks with experience from those encounters.

So without further ado, I'd like to get started. And so I'll invite Ginger to come to the podium.

GINGER CRUZ: Thank you very much to Bob, to the U.S. Institute for Peace and to the Institute for the Study of War for having me here today.

It's a very interesting topic that we're addressing today. And one of the things that makes it the most difficult is to really refrain from playing Monday morning quarterback on something that at the time was incredibly difficult. When I first started working at SIGIR and we began to look at this issue of police training and how the U.S. government was getting involved, I remembered it was almost impossible to pull apart all of the threads and be able to give a coherent report to the U.S. Congress and to the American people of what exactly was going on.

There were so many efforts. There were so many thought processes. There were plans that were created and tossed and conflicting ideas about what to do. And overlaying that was the urgency of war and crisis and this sense of we need to do something and do it fast, and we're really smart and we've got all the experts. But then at that point, it just fractured into thousands of pieces.

And one of the things that we did at SIGIR from the very beginning was to really pull together an understanding – just the most basic understanding of what is it we're doing to try and build the capacity of the security forces in Iraq. And as we did that, over time our understanding of what had happened during the CAPA period got clearer and clearer. The – it was like a river that was all sort of (welled up ?) and then you have to wait a couple of years. And once it starts to settle, it starts to make sense – OK now it makes sense to me; these people were trying to do this. They're trying to do the right thing, but it didn't work because of – because of all of these other pieces.

So let me sort of lay out for you, I guess, from the back kind of going forward. If you would've started out in Iraq with a proposal to do police training and you would have said to Ambassador Bremer at the time, you have $8 billion and eight years to develop a program to train 250,000 police that will need to do some counterinsurgency, some gendarmerie, Carabinieri-type work and do community policing – if you would have been able to say that in 2003, you would have had a completely different outcome. I guarantee it. I'd lay my entire paycheck on it. But you didn't have that.

Instead, what you had was a completely unknown set of circumstances. You had an unknown program. You had an unknown organization – multiple organizations managing the process. You had an unknown budget. You had a Congress who in the beginning, only gave $2 billion for the entire Iraq effort, and then, realizing that the oil revenues were not quite there to actually help this happen, had to rush in at the last moment and literally dump $20 billion on Iraq, of which a small portion was used for the Iraq security forces.

When you look back and you just look at the statistics, the statistics are the most shocking of all. The United States government did not put a lot of money in that first year into building the Iraq police forces. And when we worked with the Iraq government, that sort of interim, temporary shadow government that was sort of propped up by the United States government at the very beginning, the first budget in 2003 – or 2004 was for $24 million.

The first budget in 2003 – or 2004 was for $24 million -- $24 million for the whole police. Today their budget is 6 billion (dollars), roughly, to run the police in that country. I mean, what was everyone thinking when they put the 24 billion (dollars) in there? It rose to 100 million (dollars) the next year. Still crazy. You know, eventually it rose exponentially over time.

When everything started, there were 4,000 police officers in Baghdad, in a city of about 6 million people – 4,000 people with guns. And at the time – I mean, when Saddam Hussein was there right before the whole war started, there was about 60,000 police officers there. And it was not the police that kept law and order. I mean, it was all of these other security apparatus that kept law and order. So at the time that all of this chaotic event happened – and one of the things that I remember most clearly was the absolute conflict between what was the military's role and what was the policing role going to be. In a more traditional effort where you have the United Nations come in and you have peacekeeping forces, there is this real understanding that there's a need for policing and a need for military.

In this case, the fundamental misstep was the idea that somehow the police were just going to be left and we're going to continue to do whatever work it is that they do, and we're going to be able to bring in a military force and do what we needed to do militarily and then step out and let the police that was there continue to do the work that they did. And that I think was one of the fundamental missteps of the entire endeavor. And it's ironic because, again, if you do the Monday morning quarterback and you trace back the insurgency, how it started, the problems, the fact that we needed to do a $60 billion reconstruction program, because most of their infrastructure at all of their ministries was gutted from looting. I mean, they took the wire out of the walls. They took – you know in a drain when you have a sink, they didn't just take the kitchen sink, they then would dig into the walls and actually take the piping out of the walls and the copper tubing. I mean, it was unbelievable. And so a lot of that reconstruction that needed to happen you can trace back to some very simple fundamental missteps and one of the biggest ones was what is the policing capacity going to be in a country that you're going in and you're reshaping and you're restabilizing? What is that policing capacity? That wasn't there.

And I remember all of the stories that were told by the Iraqi ministers at the time who said it was shocking. They stood there at their ministry and they watched Iraqi citizens running in and looting. And there were U.S. military guys that were standing there. And they said: Aren't you going to do anything about this? Aren't you going to arrest them? Aren't you going to, you know, shoot somebody? And they said: That's not our – that's not our role. We were not here to be police.

And you know, throughout all of this, you know, somebody will say, well, there was a lack of planning. That's the irony. There was planning. There were plans. There were clear plans. I mean, Bob, several other people had looked at this and said, you need to have 5,000 police trainers on the ground. You need to have the resources to be able to do what you need to be able to do to go in there. But none of that was in place.

And as assumptions fell, without a plan B, without a plan C, or even if there was a plan, without the funding, without the personnel, the entire system started to – it turned into a spider web. You had something small, and then there were all of these unintended and unexpected

outcomes that migrated out from the initial decision not to put sufficient resources into training and supporting and having a police presence in Iraq at the very, very beginning. So it really is interesting to sort of look back and to look at that and say, where did we go wrong?

One of the things that I found the most shocking was the number of people that we put in there to do the training. Having gotten the plan that required over 5,000 people to do training, when the CPA stood up, essentially at all of the critical moments in time, there were about six advisers – six people. Who thought six people could do this? And these were six people who had to do things like border control and trying to think through what do you need to do to make sure that the borders are controlled Gee, where's al-Qaida coming from? Well, if they're going to be sending people over the borders, you need border control. You need crown control. You need looting control. You need just common policing.

Saddam Hussein forget the fact had just opened the jail cells and let 38,000 criminals out on the streets to increase the chaos. Who's supposed to go find all of these guys – in the middle of war, in the middle of everything that was going on? It's just really incredible to look back and to say, we sent in six people and didn't fully fund and really thought that Saddam's 58,000 police officers would do the job.

Most of them deserted. The CPA put out a threat and said, you're not going to continue to receive your paycheck if you don't come back. This happened in about July of 2003, I believe it was. And so about 38,000 people came back.

In the initial days they trained up about 40,000 people to do policing. But when we say trained, the one thing that I don't see in a lot of the stuff that you read, and one of the most unbelievable parts of this, was how many Arabic speakers were part of the CPA at this time when they were trying to figure out how to interface with the existing police elements and to do the training. Almost none. So you didn't have language capacity. You didn't really know what was there or assess it. You just basically dropped the pot, it broke into a thousand pieces, you didn't have glue, you didn't really have a plan for how you're going to put it back together, and despite all of that, you had some of the smartest people in police training available, you had the financial resources of the federal government potentially available, so it wasn't like the pieces weren't there and it wasn't like you didn't understand the problem. It was really the execution. It was really the decision-making. It was really the commitment to say, we know this is going to happen, therefore we're going to commit to actually fix it. And that's where everything started to fall apart.

One of the other things that was really kind of amazing is this whole civilian-military split, because at the time, I mean, this is – I remember very vividly how there was a tension between who has the capability and the knowledge to build police capacity, and who has the resources. And that is just an eternal conundrum of these nation-building exercises. The military has the budget, can move around, has the people, has the financing. The civilians don't have any of that. They can't get around, they don't have the budget, they don't have the armored – they just – they physically can't move and they just don't have enough people, but they know what to do. They know how to build policing. Department of Justice has that capacity. INL has that capacity. They have the experience to do that. But in a war zone, they're not able to just sort of walk in, set up an office, establish the training centers. They're unable to do that. So you

turn to the military, and so what does the military do? Does the best job it knows how, but it's not a good fit because they're trained for their needs.

So you end up with a very interesting conundrum that is not really fully clear until afterwards. I went to speak to the police in Mosul, and they were telling me that one of the problems was the military did a great job of training these guys, equipping them, giving them what they needed, but what they didn't spend time on when they trained the police was getting these new police recruits to understand the criminal justice laws of the government of Iraq, for example. So when they went out to arrest somebody, they wouldn't use due process, they wouldn't know the forms to fill out, they wouldn't have, you know, all of those nitty-gritty things that are really kind of boring. The military doesn't really have time for them. But in a rule-of-law system, they're absolutely critical.

And so one of the frustrations that happened afterwards was a lot of people that were criminals or who had done things that – you know, if you get the police to actually find these guys and arrest them, the court system – I mean, here we are sitting saying, rule of law, it's so important. The court system and the judges, if they were really going to legitimately do their job, couldn't convict these guys and stick them in jail, because the simple rules had not been followed. They had not done the proper investigation. They had not filed the correct paperwork. And in frustration, a lot of these guys were let back out onto the streets, which, you know, the military went, well, that's crazy, and they'd go right back out there, grab them by the collar, because these guys were going to kill people and join militias and do all sorts of things. And so they'd put them right back in jail.

And, you know, as we've extricated ourself from this, it's those – it's the simple things that really string you up. It's not buying them all guns. It's not buying them all body armor and then sort of giving them the two-week training or the three-day training and sending them out on the streets. It's really the fundamental question of, if you're going to build a nation and you need to put together the pieces, you need to be able to have the plan in place.

So I'll answer questions if there are any but all I can say is, we can learn a lot just simply from looking at what was done in those first months of the U.S. intervention. And it wasn't for lack of planning and it wasn't because we didn't know what we needed to do; it was because the system was not in place and we just plain didn't do what we needed to do. And if that happens again, them shame on us for letting that happen again.

Thank you.

GENERAL JAMES DUBIK: Let me echo my thanks to both institutes, and Bob for your introduction, but I want to say to Ginger publicly, thanks to the SIGIR. And if any of you represent other auditing agencies, whether money auditing or Department of Defense, Department of State, service IGs, thanks to you, too. When you're in – when you're in the middle of doing something like we had done during the surge and other times, you don't have time, often, to step back. And the external audits, whether they're audits for performance in overall organization or they're audits for money, are hugely important to those of us who lead it.

We don't generally like it at the time, but it is a key component of keeping things on track. So thanks.

I want to do a couple of disclaimers before I start. First, I understand that Iraq is not Afghanistan and Iraq is not Libya and Iraq is – so I got all that. But there are some principles and some approaches that, if properly adapted, can be transmitted from one place to the other. And doing that makes one of my key conclusion points, is that you have to have some flexibility in the way you do these things. There's not one size fits all. It's not that we did this here and it worked, therefore we're going to take this and move it over here. There's got to be a little bit more nuance and thinking to it.

Second, I'm not going to claim that what we did in Iraq during the surge was a model for all time. It was not. It was good enough to get us from where we were in the beginning of 2007 to where – closer to where we wanted to be at the end of 2008. It was good enough to do that. And that's the maximal claim I'm going to make.

Last, I'll use the plural personal pronoun "we" throughout my remarks. And by "we," I mean both the coalition side and the Iraqi side. This is not something – I am not going to talk about what we, the U.S. and coalition, imposed on the Iraqis. I'm going to talk about what we, the Iraqis and the coalition, did together. "We" also includes military from all the services, civilians from a good number of agencies, and contractors. So this is a large "we," and rather than disaggregate it all the time, I'm just going to use "we."

So in the interest of time, let me just kind of get right at it. I'll talk about three categories: first, briefly, the state of play when I arrived in May of 2007; second, a broad brush stroke of some of the major changes that we had made during the surge; and then last, a little bit of retrospect with five or six – five or six comments.

So first, the state of play. The violence in Iraq was at its apex in the late spring and summer of 2007. It was extremely violent on the streets, in indirect fire, direct fire, IEDs. It was not at all safe to do anything. And back here, I would – I think I won't be stretching it by saying there was near despair. When I made my trip through Capitol Hill before I left, there were many more condolences than there were congratulations on me taking this job: Thanks, General, I really appreciate you're willing to do this, but, you know, it's all screwed up and there's no hope, and probably you'll be back very soon. It's hard now in 2012 to remember the state, but all you have to do is Google the headlines in 2007 and you can get a pretty good sense from around the country of what we thought.

The second bit of background is, Minister Boulani, Jawad Boulani, who was the minister of the interior at the time when I arrived, had been in the job less than a year. And he was specifically chosen because he didn't have his own political base. The guy he replaced, Bayan Jabr, was, to be kind, not the kind of guy you would want to run the Ministry of Interior. And he prevented much of my predecessor's – General Marty Dempsey's – much of my predecessor's actions that he, Marty, would want. Jabr just prevented any kind of movement. So the conditions under which my predecessor operated and what I operated were way different. Boulani was, in retrospect, I think, a pretty enlightened leader. But in May, he was just getting

his legs and figuring out what he could or couldn't do and how to manipulate the Ministry of Interior.

The third little bit of state of play is the MNSTC-I approach up to that time was probably all that could be done given the policy and the realities on the ground – maybe a little bit more; I want to be – I always like to be kind to my predecessors so that I get kindness in return from my successors – but in fact it was wrong for the surge period.

The surge, I would like to point out, was first an intellectual surge – had nothing to do only with the 30,000 or whatever-so troops we added and the money we added. In fact, in MNSTC-I, we got no more trainers during the surge than we had. We got really no more money than was already programmed by my predecessor. The main surge was the intellectual surge, the shift in policy and the shift in strategy. And that shift had to be reflected in MNSTC-I. The MNSTC-I that I inherited was not entirely, but predominantly one that was focused on training and equipping a set of numbers and then transitioning to Iraqi control.

And to emphasize that, I'll one of my key subordinates came up to one day and say, I've reached the number of police required; we're done. I mean, I was just flabbergasted. But that was reflective of the overall attitude.

So the first thing we had to do – now I'm into the second part – is shift this mindset. And it took several months to do this and a long set of discussions with the senior leaders, military and civilian, in MNSTC-I. The first shift was from transition to security. We're in the security business, not the transition business. And we're going to generate new forces and replenish old forces, whether military or police, so that we can improve security, and as security improves, the transition will start to take care of itself – the kind of indirect approach to security.

The second was from a train-and-equip focus to an enterprise focus. Now, we had this chart called "two bangs for one buck," and the one bang – or the one buck was force generation of new units, police and military – but now today I'll talk about police – and replenishment of current units. That was the – that was the one buck. The two bangs – by doing that, we would get better security forces if we did it right, and we would use this to stimulate ministerial capacity. And we talked a little bit more about this. This is very much a stimulus-response kind of approach.

And this stimulation was important. So it was not the case that we came with an answer to the Ministry of Interior, but we came with a set of problems that the – to the Ministry of Interior: Look, what are you going to do, for example, about the fact that you can't generate enough police leaders fast enough? And then it helped him structure an answer – his answer, not our answer – and then helped him execute his answer. That's using the problem as a stimulus to get a response in the minister. It's not just, we could do it. Hey, we could have done it – set up a school, set up a program, bring them in and do it. That gives no ministerial capacity. And this is the point of the – of the job in its larger sense.

So the second was transition from train-and-equip to running an enterprise, ministerial capacity as well as stuff that happens at province as well as stuff that happens at the local level.

Third, we moved the debate – internal debate from quality versus quantity, which to me is – I'm a philosopher by academic training – is much more akin to metaphysics than it is to practicalities. The practical case was, look, we needed sufficiently good and sufficiently large police forces. And sufficient was going to change over time. Quality is not a characteristic that's once-and-for-all. Quality is an iterative characteristic. So if this year you're better than last year, it's good; you're improved quality.

So if I would have waited to have absolutely top-quality police training, we would have lost the war. And if it would have been really crummy police training, we would have lost the war because that would have been equally bad. So where in the middle here is the trade space, and how can we improve it over time?

There was a lot of simultaneous activity going on. So while I'm talking about those three transitions, the Jones commission shows up. Jones commission – General Jones, led by – brought in a group of military police guys – tremendous help to me because he came right after I took over, so I could always say, well, that was screwed up when I got here. It was very easy to hear their criticism. But more importantly, Minister Bolani took their – took their report seriously, established his own little study group that concluded, A, what Jones said about the police and the Ministry of Interior was generally true, but B, I'm not going to disband it, as Jones recommended; I'm going to transform it.

So it was helpful to me and helpful to the ministry. These kinds of reports were hugely important. As a result of, really, the Jones commission analysis of our own senior leader shifts, we established kind of four priorities. And I would say we subordinated these priorities to the operational commander, that is, General Odierno, because whatever we did had to be coordinated with the counteroffensive. You can't have police development in areas where the – where the counteroffensive had not yet been successful. So this was kind of an informal subordination.

The first priority was the national police. The Jones commission said, we've got to get rid of them. Bolani had a different view. He had a concept. He knew what he wanted to do with the national police, and he knew that the national police were not there yet, to be kind. The fact that they were still running death squads – that, you know, gives you an indication that they're not there yet.

So what Minister Bolani did was change out the commanding general of the national police, all nine of the brigade commanders and 17 of the 28 battalion commanders, virtually a clean sweep. This started just prior to me showing up there. And he accelerated it after the Jones commission report. Then a couple other guys got refired. So the division commanders – first two got fired, and the other one got fired later on, and nine brigade commanders – all nine got fired; a couple got fired again later on. So this kind of firing and cleansing of the leadership was hugely important.

We put the priority there, from the MNSTC-I side, on national police, because the requirement in 2007 was to impose security, not enforce security. You can't impose security

with a guy with a pistol. You impose security with military and paramilitary police forces. And then later on you can enforce security once there's some semblance of agreement.

So the second priority was local police. We just wanted to keep them afloat until the counteroffensive got to the hold phase in that area. And during the hold phase when insurgents were beaten back, their networks were under attack, the intimidation was reduced, you had the conditions where you could put some emphasis on local police; you could take and scrub the rolls; you could look at (ghosts ?); you could check the leadership; you could do some training; you can check backlog of training. All this has stimulus to the Ministry of Interior: What's your plan, buddy? We're going to go through Baqubah here in about two weeks; what's your plan for scrubbing the rolls? How are you going to do that? How are you going to check leadership? So again, stimulus-response – it's not, we go in and do it, but we use the problem set to stimulate the ministry.

The third and the same in – priority was to improve the ministry's capability. We focused not on all 10 areas of the ministerial capacity, but only a few. One was force management; what size of force do you actually need, how you recruit it; how do you pay it; how do you reward it? Number two, how do you acquire your things; how are you going to buy things for the Ministry of Interior? Number three, how will you do training? Ginger mentioned the two-week training.

This was his plan: I'm going to – I, Bolani, am going to do it in two phases, two weeks now – after everybody has got two weeks, I'll come back and do three weeks later; this is insufficient, but it's better than zero. And you couldn't wait for the 10 weeks that he wanted. How am I going to set up training for each of the provinces? Internal affairs – how am I going to investigate myself? A grim metric for internal affairs – the 15 months that I was in Baghdad, there were over a dozen attempts on the director of internal affairs' life. This showed that he's relatively a threat to people. Programming and budgeting – his budget went from 20 percent spent to 85 percent spent in 87 and almost a hundred percent spent in – or in 2007, almost a hundred percent in 2008 – and developed – once you get people on board, how do you develop it, and more importantly, how do you develop leaders? You don't have a program right now with one – with one Baghdad police college to produce enough leaders that you need across the country. So what's your plan? And you integrate, plan for it – and I'll be happy to tell you a little bit about that.

Then a managerial scheme – we set in place – the deputy minister of interior set in place monthly and quarterly reviews, and the – and the Ministry of Interior was wandering around all over the place. You did not want to travel with this guy at night. He just drove all over the place to get a sense of how his police were doing. This was the period of Sons of Iraq. Really, I can't say a whole lot about that – over a hundred thousand of these guys, usually important to the security, but a huge problem to the Ministry of Interior and to the government. Different problems. The government was just afraid of them and didn't really want to go very quickly through the vetting process. The minister of interior wanted to go through quickly, wanted to be in charge, wanted to set up a CCC equivalent and give all these guys jobs, but couldn't get that through the government. But that's, you know, another problem that I'd be happy to talk about.

So a little bit in retrospect. I wish we would've had some embeds in our staff, more embeds with – from the Department of State. I tried to do this to get seven officers, mid-grade or senior officers on our staff, let them rotate however the State Department wanted to rotate them, to build managerial capacity in understanding what's necessary. Never took off, and I'm sorry about that, but we didn't do that. We didn't – as Ginger pointed out, we didn't integrate sufficiently judicial and penal systems into what we were doing. The Iraqi security force money prevented me from doing that. I could not use money, the Iraqi security force money, for justice – for justice activities.

And so we had two different rates of development, the police going at this rate and the rule of law going at that rate. It's not a good thing. Now, there's always going to be some natural difference in rates of development between how you grow police and how you grow a judicial system, but ours was way out of whack. We did start in 2008 with a pretty aggressive rule-of-law program, but you know, it was well later than the rest of the policing.

Third, we built security ministries much better, much faster, much stronger than other ministries, so we got out of balance, security ministries and other ministries around the country. Again, it's completely understandable, but unfortunate and leads to problems that we still have now.

And then a couple things that I'm firmly convinced of: First, the stimulus response business is exactly right. You can't solve the problems (that you face ?). You must use the problems to stimulate solutions in the – in the indigenous ministry.

Second, the American decentralized approach, community-based police approach, is not appropriate for most countries around the world, at least not initially. Once they're stable, once you can enforce the law, then it's completely appropriate. But as long as heads are being lopped and IEDs are being blown up and police stations are being attacked with RPGs nightly, handing a guy an arrest warrant and a pistola is not going to be as helpful as handing a guy something that will save his life. And until you reduce the intimidation, no policeman is going to enforce the law as long as he knows his family's life's at stake.

So our approach really has to be, I think, rethought in more of a progressive way. What's needed right now given the conditions, and what are we aiming to do and how do we move from here to there?

That leaves me my third item. I think that this kind of approach should be joint interagency task force with shifting leads. The fact that we didn't have enough State Department or Justice guys in MNSTC-I was a huge disadvantage. The fact that the military led it during the surge period, I think, was right, but we should have shifted it in a more – in a more reasonable way, and we should have shifted it by shifting the lead of people who were already there. And we don't seem to be able to do that.

Fourth, that there is a difference between imposing security and enforcing security. And police do a good job enforcing something that's already there; military and paramilitary police do a good job imposing something that's not there.

Last, everything is reversible; that if you don't take the proper steps to continue to reinforce this, it's reversible. This is a transformative activity, not merely a training-and-equip activity. And transforming cultures takes time and takes people who work together, and the fact that we're seeing some walking away now, I think, is indication of that perspective.

So thank you very much. Appreciate it.

MR. PERITO: Thank you very much.

At this point in our program, I'd like to do two things. I'd like to introduce a new USIP report, and also I'd like to bring our history up to the present.

On the table outside is a report entitled "The Iraq Federal Police." The Iraq Federal Police are the constabulary or paramilitary component of the Iraq police force. The history of this organization parallels the entire history of the Iraq police force in general, from a difficult beginning to a successful conclusion.

In 2006 the Iraqi police, who had been trained and equipped as a community police force, found themselves outnumbered and outgunned by heavily armed militia, the Mahdi Army, and by al-Qaida in Iraq. In street battles with armed groups, the police either broke and ran, or they went back to their stations, laid down their guns and went home.

In response to this challenge, the United States military started developing what were called "heavy police units" modeled on European gendarme forces. At the same time, the Iraqi interior minister of the day organized police commando units made up of Iraqis who had served in the Iraqi army. These new police constabulary units proved initially effective. But then, as you're heard, there was a change of government. A new interior minister came in, and the composition of these police units changed. As the sectarian conflict spread following the bombing of the Samarra Mosque, Shia militia infiltrated these units, and after a while, they began to operate as death squads.

In October 2006, the U.S. military, with the support of a new interior minister, intervened and began to take these units offline, retrained them, and then as you've heard, when the surge troops arrived in 2007, these units went back on the streets with their American counterparts. It's a very interesting story I hope you'll take the time to read.

I now want to turn to the final chapter in the history – or what is the current chapter, I guess – maybe not the final one, hopefully – in the history of the development of the Iraq police. In October 2011, the Department of Defense transferred responsibility for managing the Iraq police assistance program back to the Department of State, where it had been in 2003. The goal of the State Department's new Iraq Police Development Program, the PDP, is to strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi police to better maintain internal security. Within State, the leadership of this program has been assigned to the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which will provide advisers to mentor and to advise senior-level Iraqi police personnel.

Previously, the goal of the U.S. military assistance program, as you've heard, is to – was to develop large numbers of police and multiple police units as quickly as possible and deploy them on the streets. The goal of this new program is to improve the ability of senior police officials who are now in place to manage their organizations and accomplish their mission.

In FY 2012, the State Department will deploy 115 advisers who will be directly hired by the U.S. government. This replaces a practice which has been used in the past of relying on contract personnel to do this work. I think, General, after all of this time, your embeds have finally arrived.

The program will cost approximately $500 million for the first year. It's expected to go on for five years after that. These advisers will have extensive police experience, and they will be able to establish professional relationships and provide expertise in strategic planning, recruitment, logistics and managing criminal investigations.

The Department of State advisers will operate primarily from three locations: Baghdad, Basra in the south and Erbil in the north. The advisers will travel out from these locations to work with Iraq police at police headquarters and training centers in neighboring provinces.

Now, the PDP has been somewhat controversial. Critics have noted that only 12 percent of the funding actually goes to fund the police advisers. The rest of it goes for force protection and life support. They've also noted that there have been shortfalls in the design and the setting of objectives for the program. This program is under way, but in these troubled budget times in Washington, I think the future is somewhat uncertain.

So I'd now like to invite Professor Long to the podium for his summary remarks, and then we'll open it for questions.

AUSTIN LONG: So I have to both recap and offer some original thoughts, hopefully.

I have five points that I think tie into the sort of broader themes that have come out of the other panelists, which I'll address. And then hopefully I'll spend a little bit of time at the end talking about the bit of the police I've worked the most with, which is police intelligence. It doesn't get talked about very much, but I think it's crucially important, particularly for the kind of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns that U.S. police support are going to be involved in.

So the first point, and this ties in to most of the other five points I'm going to make, is that, to paraphrase Clausewitz, policing is politics by other means. And I think the more we can sort of get our heads wrapped around that, the better. And I'll offer a couple of anecdotes on this, one from Anbar and one from Kirkuk.

So Anbar Province through 2006 was the most violent place in Iraq. And part of what made it so violent was it was nearly impossible to get people to join the police. Anbaris were just not interested in joining the police for some of the reasons General Dubeck (sp) suggested.

They thought they would get killed, there was not a lot of community support for police activity, et cetera.

What began to change, really in 2005 but certainly in 2006, was Anbaris began to join the police. And that was in part due to some efforts on the part of the Marine Corps and other government agencies to encourage them to do so, but it was mostly because the politics of Anbar had changed. Al-Qaida in Iraq had become persona non grata. It had begun attacking Anbaris, and I'm happy to talk in Q-and-A about why that happened. But the point is, the politics had to change before the policing could change. And I think that's going to be an important point to remember going forward in any of these campaigns – whether in Iraq or in Afghanistan or elsewhere.

And, you know, the leader that was chosen for the Iraqi police in Anbar, Major General Tariq, he'd been a very low-level policeman in the Saddam regime. So he was both sort of clean hands, but had some police experience. He was not who you would have chosen had you been picking someone that was a real expert policeman, but he had a lot of political support because he had been one of the first people to turn against al-Qaida, he was liked by most of the tribal leaders, et cetera. So sometimes the best leader is not the one that sort of looks best on paper, but the one that matches up to the political situation the best.

And then to give you a little snapshot of Kirkuk circa early 2010, their politics had to be very carefully managed. You had Arabs, you had Turkoman, you had Kurds all in this sort of fiercely contested city. And the compromise that came about was to essentially parcel out different jobs to different ethnic groups and even Kurdish political parties.

So you would have a PUK leader with a – with a KDP deputy and maybe a Turkoman deputy as well. So there was a very careful effort on the part of these communities to try and figure out how to balance policing. And it may not – again, it may not look good on paper, but sometimes it's the best thing for the situation.

So the second point which ties into this is that technocracy – you know, the idea of improving quality, quantity, capacity, all of these things – is crucially important, but it's really only half the problem. There are a lot of issues, and this again ties into the politics, that you simply can't address by better training.

So I'll give you a couple of examples here. If you look at checkpoints in Baghdad, by 2009, 2010 there were over 500 checkpoints in Baghdad. And I spent some time there sort of riding around looking at checkpoints just in a – you know, a beat-up Toyota Corolla with an Iraqi driver and interpreter. And they were pretty squared away in a lot of ways. You know, people would keep their – (inaudible) – weapons covered when they weren't in use. There would, you know, be an – of an eight-man checkpoint there would usually be – most guys would be actually there rather than, you know, sacked off somewhere or racked out.

So you know, on paper from a technocratic angle this looks pretty good. And yet bombs were still going off in Baghdad and still are to this day. So I think there are a lot of technocratic improvements that were – that were made in the quality of the Iraqi police. But it didn't answer

all of these – all of these issues. And so politics, I think, ties into that. Something else ties into it, which I'll touch on as my third point, which is corruption. We haven't heard very much about corruption today, but it's a – it's a crucial issue and one that I think all police training programs need to account for. And again, corruption is inherently tied into politics.

So I'll give you an example here. Major General Jihad, who was the head of the Iraqi police EOD through 2010 – Major General Jihad was, you know, a personable fellow, having met him a couple of times. But he was responsible for one of the most, you know, odious examples of corruption ever in Iraq, which – those of you who have been to Iraq you saw the magic wand bomb detector that was so popular circa 2009, 2010. He was responsible for that. And he would assure you in person that there were so many checks on procurement in the Ministry of Interior that he could not possibly, even if he wanted to, have been corrupt. But of course, he was. And he was relieved in 2010.

How was he able to do this despite all of these numerous bureaucratic checks? Again, it goes back to politics. He had certain patrons that were willing to protect him. There were kickbacks that went around. But it really undermined the effort to build security. And again, this ties into the checkpoint problem.

A lot of these guys were told specifically, look, rely on this – essentially this magic wand to detect bombs, rather than really doing your job. So corruption is crucial part of police training. And I wish I had a better answer than: It's a problem. But it is a huge one that has to be – you know, you had to be cognizant of.

And, you know, at the same time, the corruption that was at the high levels would not always filter down to the low levels. Major General Jihad's sort of worker bees were all very disciplined. I mean, they had to be. These were the guys who would go out and defuse bombs. So if they didn't do a good job they were going to end up getting killed.

The flip side is also true. Sometimes you'll have a leader like Minister Bulani who is – who is, you know, very clean hands, very apolitical. But his subordinates end up being the problem. So you have to look at the various levels of command as well. Just because you have clean hands at one level doesn't mean you have clean hands at all levels.

Tied into corruption, I want to touch just briefly on the judiciary, which was always anemic in Iraq. And without a sort of competent judiciary, police are really going to be crippled. I mean, you saw this almost everywhere in Iraq. And the – there's not really an answer for it other than you have to – you have to look at policing as a system, not just as sort of guys on the street. So that's – you know, that's going to be an issue going forward in all of these training things.

Time horizons – Ginger mentioned this and I'm glad she did. You would not have done a lot of the things you ended up seeing done in Iraq if you had known very clearly you have eight years and $8 billion. And I think that plays out at a micro level across the country.

Just to give one specific example I saw, Camp Bucca was the main U.S. detention facility in Iraq for a long time, down in southern Iraq. It was also where the training academy for the Iraqi penal service was, at least at the time. And Camp Bucca was this place that you would never have chosen to actually locate your main detention facility at. It's way away from all logistics hubs. It's almost in Kuwait. It's really far from the central criminal court in Baghdad, et cetera. But just sort of for historical reasons, that's where it ended up started – you know, we started putting prisoners there after Abu Ghraib was closed. And it sort of took on a life of its own.

Now, every commander at Camp Bucca limited the amount of infrastructure improvements he did because he was told, look, you're only going to be there another year, so don't bother building an airfield, don't bother doing all these things to improve quality there. And he would – his time would come and go and his successor would be told, you're only going to be there another year, et cetera, et cetera. So you saw this on a rolling basis at Camp Bucca for years, and it led to underimprovement, it led to decisions not to – not to move prisoners elsewhere, et cetera.

And I think the – so that's sort of – you should have been planning long but you ended up planning short. I think – and we were talking a little bit about this before the meeting – I think you also see examples of where you're planning long when you should be planning short. And I think perhaps, you know, to touch on what Bob (sp) talked about, some of the current examples of police training in Iraq may be – we're planning long when it fact it might be shorter than we anticipate.

So I think, you know, getting the time horizons right will do a lot to improve the quality of police training. But again, this all tied into politics. And I mostly talked about the politics on the Iraqi side, but bear in mind, there are also other politics – I mean, I don't have to tell this audience that – that go on right down the road from here. So that's going to be something the U.S. side has to manage better, is figuring out time horizons.

And, you know, just to touch on Afghanistan for a minute, there's some who think putting a definitive sort of exit date is problematic. And it has a lot of downsides but at least in theory it allows you to plan against an actual benchmark.

Now, unfortunately, that benchmark is subject to moving due to politics, as anything. Unfortunately you can't actually commit to a hard deadline in this country because the politics can change, right? The current administration may have its ideas about what an appropriate timeline is, but it's subject to change, you know, circa next January, depending on how the election goes. So that's just going to be an issue going forward. The more that can be done to manage it the better, but it's a difficult one to manage.

I'll talk a little bit about success and then I'll wrap up with the intelligence police. There were – Bob (sp) touched on some of the successes with elite units. You saw this in numerous places, where Iraqi SWAT or other sort of heavy police units would work with U.S. special operations forces, or in some cases U.S. conventional forces.

These units tended to be very successful, at least when politics allowed them to be. The downside to that though is that – you know, there's only so much eliteness that's needed, right? You can have an Iraqi SWAT team for every city, and it will be very useful – to use the general's words – in enforcing peace. But at some point, you're going to need, you know, more sort of Shirtas in the blue polyester shirts, you know, being the thin blue line.

And, you know, those guys are relatively easy to generate, but they're not very easy to support. And this was another sort of shortcoming of a lot of the U.S. program in Iraq, not just on the police side, but military as well. We spent a lot of time trying to generate the thin blue line or the thin green line – the actually shirta or jundi out there who was going to fight – just because that was – we were doing this under fire.

The problem you run into is these guys have shortfalls in logistics. They have shortfalls in intelligence. They have shortfalls in all these sort of critical components that allow them to sustain themselves. And that was OK, certainly, during General Dubik's tenure and after, because we were there to do it for them. And we were going to, you know, build this front line and then build out those capacities.

Unfortunately, those capacities are still underdeveloped. And I'll talk about why now in terms of intelligence, but logistics is still underdeveloped. We spent a lot of effort building forensics labs for the Iraqi police, for example, that they have no real ability to support in terms of crucial materials. But I'll turn now to intelligence and then wrap up.

So as I said, police intelligence is a critical part of any policing in a counterterrorism and a counterinsurgency environment, which are the likely environments the U.S. is going to be supporting police in going forward. You can think Yemen; you can think Pakistan; you can think Afghanistan – wherever you want to point to.

Unfortunately, we're not a country that's terribly great at police intelligence. You can – there are a lot of reasons for this, but you can certainly go back and look about the September 11th – the September 11th Commission's report on the FBI. The FBI has spent a lot of time trying to restructure itself as an intelligence organization, and it's come pretty far in 10 years. But the point is it doesn't come naturally. There's only one other real police intelligence unit in the United States. It's the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division, which is also a response to September 11th and is still pretty new, and also pretty controversial.

So it's not something we have a lot of capacity with. We have, you know, intelligence services that do sort of foreign intelligence collection, but they're not really policing-oriented. So this was a – this was a gap in U.S. capability and it also emerged as a gap in Iraqi capability. So the answer to this on the Iraqi side was the National Information and Investigation Agency, the N-double-I-A , or NIIA as some people call it.

And people make analogies – this is sort of the Iraqi FBI; this is sort of the Iraqi MI-5. It's some of both, but the point is it's an intelligence organization that also has police powers and is part of the ministry of interior. So NIIA is actually getting its feet under it in 2007-2008, when I was in Iraq, but we did not have a lot of capacity to advise them. So one of the things that was

done – on an experimental basis first, and then later, more widely – was to reach out to other countries that do have experience with police intelligence.

And here one of the big examples was the British Special Branch. Special Branch had sort of grown up over the past 30 years fighting the IRA in Northern Ireland and in Britain, so they had some understanding of policing as an intelligence and counterterrorism function rather than as – than as just a sort of law enforcement capacity. So we brought in advisers from Special Branch in the U.K. to train people, and they were actually very effective initially.

It required a few things. One, they had to embed. Intelligence tradecraft and skills are not something you can sort of teach on a commuter basis. And that was nontrivially difficult. I remember one, you know, one intrepid adviser was sent to Rutba – which for those of you that know Iraq, that's like, you know, the deepest, darkest Ozarks of Anbar Province. It's not a place even Iraqis really go.

And so he gets there and, you know, he's getting – sending these plaintive emails backs that's like, uh, I'm basically living in a hole in the ground with 10 Iraqis. This is not so cool. But they did sort of stick it out and you saw a real increase in Iraqi tradecraft, which was negligible to begin with. Just to give you one example – and then I'll sort of wrap it up because I can see Bob is about to give me the hook.

The Iraqis initially were so poor at tradecraft that they kept getting intelligence that this one al-Qaida in Iraq leader was at this one particular house, and they kept going and searching the house and they couldn't find the guy. But their source kept telling them, hey, he's there, he's there. You can get him. They go back to the source after the second time and they say, all right, what's up? You keep telling us he's there. He's not. We think you're lying.

He's like, look: The guy has a hollow couch. Every time you guys roll up, he unzips the back of the couch, crawls inside and zips it up. So you have to, like, look in the couch – actually take the couch apart. OK, that's good intelligence. But what do you think the Iraqis do? As soon as they go back to the house the third time they go straight to the couch, rip it open and pull the guy out.

Now, that's good in the sense that you have caught the guy. It's bad in the sense that you have now tipped off that someone told you he was in the couch, right? So there was a lot of that tradecraft development that had to – had to take place with the Iraqis, but they came quite far in NIIA. And talking to folks that have recently been there, they're actually one of the better services.

The problem, again, to come back to the big themes, is politics. One problem that NIIA is having is that they're being asked to do more essentially, you know, domestic intelligence as a means to achieve political ends – right – gather intelligence on figure X because we don't particularly like him, rather than he's actually a bad guy.

Two, there's been a real movement away from having a lot of Sunni presence in not just NIIA, but in all of the Iraqi intelligence services. The problem with that is, in addition – Ginger

and I were talking about this a little before – in addition to the fact that some of these guys are the most experienced in terms of intelligence, they're also the folks that have the most placement and access in the Sunni community, right? So the Shia – the Shia intelligence officers probably have good windows into the Shia community. But without Sunnis, you're probably going to lack that placement and access inside the Sunni community, which, unfortunately, at least seems to be the source of a lot of the bombs. So at the exact time that you most need intelligence from the Sunni community, you're actively cutting off your ability to collect it.

And then the final point is the U.S. could make up for some of this while we were there because we had technical means. The Iraqis have now essentially lost all of those technical means. So I think we're – you know, you're in for some real problems on the police intelligence and the broader Iraqi intelligence side. And I'll stop there. Thank you.

MR. PERITO (?): Thank you very much. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military has trained a large police force which now numbers about 157,000 members. As in Iraq, this is a militarized force that has primarily been trained to conduct counterinsurgency operations with only limited capacity to carry out what we understand as police duties and to enforce the rule of law. As in Iraq, the large U.S. military – the large U.S. police assistance program now numbers about 10,000 advisors and so far has cost $14 billion.

This program will inevitably be reduced over the next few years as we transition to the end state of – the end date of 2014. And it's fairly likely that – and I want to warn Walt Redman it's coming – this program will be transitioning back to the Department of State, from which it began back all those many years ago. The experience with the Iraq police assistance program in the post-withdrawal period phase will be very instructive, I believe, to Afghanistan as we move forward into this – into this forthcoming period.

I should probably introduce Walt Redman from the Department of State, who is a great friend of mine, but has been in Iraq and doing police work there probably longer than any of us. And so I'm very happy, as always, to have him with us this morning.

Anyway, we will now open the floor for questions. I would like to invite questions not only from people in this room, but also from people in the overflow room – there are folks watching this on television next door – those people that are watching us online, and particularly from those folks in the U.S. office in Baghdad who are watching us this morning. The way we do this is I'll ask people to come to the microphones; probably this side is easier to get to. When you ask your question, please identify yourself by name and by affiliation, and we'll start.

So please – thank you very much, and we'll take – we'll actually take two questions and then we'll have the panel respond, so thank you.

Q: Wahid al-Samerai (sp), Iraqi National Accord, office of Dr. Ayad Allawi. My question is, first, we thank the efforts for United States to spend a lot of money about developing the Iraqi police. Professor Austin mentioned about kind of the corruption in the high level. I want to add something. There is not just a corruption; there is – some of the police, they are involved with the terrorists also.

And that is very clearly to us what happened a few days ago – 22 car bombs and EID (ph) and hundreds of people killed and injured. And the prime minister now, he's trying to close the police academy in Mosul and in Basra. With this situation, what can we do to save the Iraqi police from these bad issues – corruption, terrorists – and all these – how can we save the Iraqi police from these issues? Thank you.

MR. PERITO: OK, thank you. Thank you very much.

We'll take the second question, please.

Q: Hi, good morning. Thank you all to the panelists for coming. I really appreciated your presentations this morning.

This question is specifically directed to General Dubik. I'm curious – General, you mentioned that Minister Jawad Bolani, when he was nominated and selected, he was selected because, as you said, he didn't have a political base. And I was wondering if you could go into more detail about that in whatever way you deem fit. I mean, you know, how it was a challenge for him because he didn't have a political base to implement some of his initiatives and, as a minister of interior, perhaps why he didn't have a political base or the lack of that or the process of his selection, however you would want to take that. Thanks.

MR. PERITO: Go ahead.

MR. LONG (?): I'll take a crack at the first question, which, I mean, I wish I had a better answer for you, right? I mean, you're sort of asking the $64,000 question, and I don't – I don't have a great answer.

The answer I do have is that the police will inevitably reflect the politics. And until the politics of Iraq are fixed in a sort of genuine way rather than – you know, my impression now is you see a lot of centralization by the current prime minister, right? More and more is sort of coming into his hip pockets. I think that's problematic. Again, it will make – it will make it very difficult to fix the politics if that continues.

I sort of understand why he's doing it, but I think it's going to make solving the challenges of the police – and you're absolutely right; there's clearly some level of infiltration of the police by militant groups – but, you know, the reason they're able to survive is because they have someone that's protecting them, right, either for political reasons, for money or probably for both.

So until there's a genuine accord, right, at the – at the national level, I don't – I don't think these issues can be fully resolved. I think the best you could do in the – in the short term is, you know, sort of to work at the – at the margins to strengthen inspectors-general and things like that to try and do a better job of investigation, some of the things General Dubik alluded to. But I don't – I think those are treating the symptoms rather than sort of the underlying disease, unfortunately.

MR. PERITO: Thank you and let's go – I'll ask the General to respond to the second question, and then we'll – I'll ask Ginger to respond to a question from Baghdad.

GEN. DUBIK: OK, on the second question – I wasn't there when Minister Bolani was selected. So I can't answer (maybe ?) that and maybe Austin has some reflection on that.

But he had no political base and he had no real experience running a ministry. So he finds himself in this politically charged situation. He doesn't really know his limits left and right: How far can I go? How far can I push? He's limited in pushing the reforms because he knows if he pushes too hard, he'll lose his own job. So there's part of just bureaucratic politics involved in this, and part of his own ministry doesn't have a set of systems. He inherited from Bayan Jaber, which was not a good – not a good inheritance as a – as a ministry.

So his task before him is huge. Where do I start? How do I parse this out? What are my priorities? It takes him a while to think this through, but once he does and once he realizes where he can operate and where he can't, he is hugely effective in a relatively short period of time and relatively creative in how he takes certain people and moves them aside, though gives them a great office and a great title, but no responsibility. Because in these kinds of situations you can't fire some people that you'd like to fire – you can't complete the full investigation that you'd like to complete.

The accord that Austin talked about, political accord associated with corruption and infiltration, is part of the dynamics in a situation where the politics is still emerging. You have different scopes of – and different limits of what you can actually accomplish. That – I mean, I love the guy like a brother, and I think that he had done yeoman's work in the time that he was minister of interior. But he's the first to tell you that it was the tip of the iceberg, and there's much more work to do. He was a great partner to work with.

MR. PERITO (?): And Bolani was actually selected after four or five months went by. The government had been in office for about four or five months. They couldn't find a candidate that was acceptable, and so he was sort of the lowest common denominator. They picked a guy who had been a military officer before, had no political base and no experience. He was an engineer; so he was very well organized.

But then, in order to make his life really difficult, they put in as deputies representatives from all the major political factions in the country. So he had four or five deputies who were there to make sure that nobody got offside and that he was totally ineffective. And so his ability to really manage that situation was really quite (remarkable ?).

GEN. DUBIK: And the former minister of interior became the minister of finance through whom all the money came.

MR. PERITO: And controlled his budget – who controlled his budget. (Chuckles.)

OK, Ginger.

MS. CRUZ: A question came from the Baghdad office and it said, with all the violations and abuse in the news, why and how should Iraqis trust the police?

And I think one of – sort of tying that question in and sort of following up on the other answers, I think it's really important to remember that we're talking about Iraq. We're not talking about the United States. We're not talking about an esoteric, bureaucratic exercise here. We're talking about a country that had an incredibly centralized, very distorted way of doing things for decades. And you cannot just tell somebody who's grown up doing something their whole life that everything that they understand about how to do anything is completely wrong and everybody needs to do the exact opposite.

You take an incredibly centralized government, and you walk in and, in one day, you say, you need to have a completely open democracy. The first thing that's going to happen – and this is going to last for decades – is you're going to get dysfunction. And so the one thing that I always caution people – there's all this talk about, well, you know, Maliki's overcentralizing and all these ministries are too strong, and they're trying to centralize power and run this place too centralized; it must be decentralized.

Well, the first thing is they know how to run a centralized government. If you force them to decentralize, it becomes automatically dysfunctional. So then you have to balance: Do you want it to work or do you want to do it your way? And if you try to do it your way and it doesn't work, you're in the same situation.

So you really have to – I mean, and this is something that – it's very hard because you always think about things from where you sit. And so the perspective, a lot of times, that policymakers bring to the table is – you can't help it, but think about police in your own neighborhood and the programs that you do and you can't think about the Iraq context.

So I'd say, should the – how should the Iraqis trust their police? Well, for starters, they seem to really be taking to democracy. Civil society organizations are blossoming all over the country. People remember in the 1970s and '80s when the country was very functional. So there is a living memory of how to make the country function, number one.

Number two, they've now got a system where they can throw everybody out if they don't like 'em. There was an 82 percent turnover in their last parliamentary election. So if you've got centralized power and you don't like it and you don't trust the police, you've got an election coming. You got provincial elections that'll be happening next year. You've got parliamentary elections that'll be happening shortly after that. There's huge pressure. You've seen it all across the Middle East. You vote for different people, and then you go with the next group.

So it's a process. I think people need to be patient, and I think, as we look at this, we also have to be very careful not to superimpose our sensibilities of how these things work over people that are really struggling and doing an amazing job, completely changing everything that they know, and trying to do this in a way that is both comfortable and familiar to them, but at the

same time, incorporating all of the essential parts of policing, which include rule of law and human rights and so many other things.

GEN. DUBIK: I'd like to piggy-back a little bit on Ginger's discussion of centralization and decentralization. This was a huge problem and remains a huge problem for the Ministry of Interior. They want to run a centralized police force, but the Provincial Powers Act, which is yet to pass I might add, lays powers at the provincial level that limit what the Ministry of Interior can do.

How to work in this was a big, big conceptual problem and procedural problem and remains so at the Ministry of Interior. How do I – how do I operate a nationwide police force while the provinces have certain powers that limit? They can select – they can make decisions. There's – this is – was not an easy thing for them to grasp and remains a difficult challenge.

And last, you know, I made a comment about having – state embeds. I should have said, I did have one; of course it was Walt (sp). But I wanted more than Walt (sp). I wanted several other Walts (sp) –

MR. : Clone Walts (sp).

GEN. DUBIK: – to be there, but unfortunately, he had to carry the load for everybody.

MR. PERITO: Thanks very much. I would invite questioners to come to the microphone. And while people are lining up, I wanted to ask a question that I've been wanting to ask for a long time.

In 2004 President Bush signed a presidential decision directive, which assigned responsibility for police development from the Department(s) of State and Justice over to the military – the United States military and the Department of Defense. The history that we've been discussing is the history that flowed from that decision. Prior to that, all police training programs, starting way back with Panama in 1980, have been done by State and Justice, as – working as a team.

So I want to ask all of our panel members for short responses to the question of: Was that a mistake? Should we have signed this task over to the United States military, as we did in Iraq and then subsequently in Afghanistan?

Matt, since you are the most neutral person up here –

MR. : (Laughs.)

MR. PERITO: – we'll start with you.

MR. SHERMAN: Allegedly. I think it – I think it was, and I think General Dubik touched on this, appropriately – it was the right thing to do at the time. It may not have been the right thing to do, you know, in the long run, and there probably should have been more planning

about how to transition back or how to – how to make it a joint – you know, a JIATF, rather just DOD.

But I think, given where Iraq was in 2004, I don't see that anyone else in any other organization could have done – could have done what needed to be done.

MR. : Yeah.

I can't say anything more. It was necessary. Whether it was right or not, it was the only thing that was going to work, if anything was going to work.

MR. PERITO: OK.

MS. CRUZ: And I'll give you the SIGIR answer. The answer is, it should neither have been DOS nor should it have been DOD. If the United States government is going to and did and is engaging in nation building, it needs to create a unique capacity to do that. To force the Defense Department to shift and change and do something different that it's not designed to do, to force the State Department to try and operate in a war zone, which it's not resourced or able to do, is to commit to failure. And the reason that we have failed in Iraq and the reason that we are failing in Afghanistan is because we don't have the political guts to admit what we're doing, and therefore we have to jerry-rig the solution, using valiant, smart people, and put them in impossible situations and then beat ourselves over the head because we don't achieve success.

MR. PERITO: Thank you.

MR. : (Inaudible) – can I respond to that?

MR. PERITO: Yeah, but then we want to get on to questions.

MR. : OK.

MR. PERITO: Go ahead.

MR. : I think you're right, but isn't part of it that the politics of this country – generally we don't want to be doing these things, so to generate a permanent capacity to do them might mean we would actually do more of them? So I mean, aren't we kind of hosed every time we wander into these situations but we're not going to develop an enduring capacity?

MR. PERITO: My answer to that is always, do you mean that because we have – we have crime because we have police? If you don't want to have a capacity because you're afraid it might be used – I mean, that – that argument – see, if you read my stuff, it sounds very much like what she said.

So – (laughter) – please, we'll turn –

Q: Roy Gutman of McClatchy Newspapers.

MR. PERITO: Hi. How are you?

Q: Hi.

One brief comment and two brief questions. The comment is on the decentralization/centralization issue. It seems to me what Maliki's doing right now in attempting to centralize is driving a decentralization process in the – in the provinces because there's a resistance to his clumsy and heavy-handed and somewhat sectarian if not partisan approach. And you see this, I mean, all over, certainly, central Iraq right now and even in the south.

The questions: Last – maybe it was the end of 2010, beginning of 2011, the police in Baghdad did a spectacular – had a spectacular achievement. They rounded up an entire cell of al-Qaida that was trying to establish its own little caliphate or whatever they called it, their emirate, in Baghdad, and arrested everybody in very fine fashion and brought them to the Interior Ministry. And then a few months later, as you recall, there was an attempt to spring them all. And it turned out that that attempt was from within the Interior Ministry. And I recall myself asking Maliki at one point – and the police basically gave all sorts of excuses at the top level for what had happened.

And after asking Maliki what was this, what was really going on, he described – he said that there was a cell within the Interior Ministry. In fact he said there were really – there was almost like a militia inside the ministry. He said it was the result of politicians nominating members of the force and basically getting them accepted. And it was a – the equivalent of a militia. And I never heard the end of it, whether in fact that really was true and then what they were going to do about it.

At one point Ali Dabbagh told me – the spokesman – that as soon as Maliki had an interior minister, a full-fledged, independent interior minister, he was going to really clean house in the Interior –

MR. PERITO: Is there a question in there someplace?

Q: And the question is, was there a militia? Is there a militia? And has he cleaned house?

I mean, the second, brief question is about the Hashimi case, the handling of it. Was Hashimi running a militia? Are other people in – prominent in politics running militias inside of the Interior Ministry?

MR. PERITO: Thanks.

We'll take a second question.

Q: Sure. I'll try to be shorter. The – I want to talk about the cultural aspects of police training, which – it strikes me that we really don't have to deal with when we train military. You

know, militaries are kind of militaries are militaries, and because they fight each other, you know, periodically, best practices spread internationally. But police forces are very culturally distinct, driven not only by culture but by the rule of law that they (operate under ?), the criminal code. We've had a lot of issues with this. Ginger brought up Mosul. We've seen that elsewhere in Iraq and now in Afghanistan, where well-meaning police trainers that we bring from Louisiana or Arizona are very, very good at teaching these guys what the American penal code – you know, what the American rules of evidence are, which gets them absolutely nowhere when they walk into their court systems.

Just – you know, to illustrate the larger point, I tell people that, you know, most of the countries we get these trainers from are countries where mothers tell their children, if you get lost, go find a policeman. In most of the countries we do this training in, I doubt that's something mothers tell their children. How do we cross this cultural barrier, training a police force that looks nothing like we've experienced, that operates under a different code of law, that occupies a similar but slightly distinct space in their cultural space? How do we deal with that? How do we prepare trainers for that? How do we – you know, how do we adapt an organization to this and then how do we make it different in every distinct country?

MR. PERITO: Thanks very much.

I want to invite Ginger to repeat a story that she was telling us earlier about a training program that she witnessed. You can sort of clean up the details, but I think it was just very insightful as to something – you know, how widely astray some of these efforts can go.

MS. CRUZ: It – to protect the innocent, I won't use names, but – (chuckles) – there's a training program that I went to in which American trainers who were police officers from, you know, someplace like a nice town in Texas or Arlington, Virginia, were talking to some hardened Iraqi police generals. These are men who are in their mid-60s, just grizzled. They had scraped body parts off of the front door of their police stations now for eight years and had so many of their people die. Remember, we're talking about a country where over 9,000 police have been killed.

And so the American trainer had a PowerPoint up, and he's saying, well, you know, we're doing training on suicide bombings. So we want to first identify who the suicide bomber is. So you need to look for behavior changes, behavior pattern changes. For example, if somebody starts to withdraw a lot of money from their bank accounts or if they take up drinking and, you know, it's something that you can start to see in the community, then you want your community to call in to the police, so that you know these changes in behavior.

And of course anybody who knows anything about Iraq at this point is just sort of holding their head.

And they said OK. And then they go for this long, convoluted thing about how do you identify the suicide bomber. They showed a couple of video clips from YouTube on something that happened in Sri Lanka or something.

And you know, they finally get to the end, and these Iraqi policemen are sitting there going, you know, these are Americans; these are the good – they're supposed to really know something. What can I learn from this?

So at the very end he goes, OK, you've finally identified the guy. What do you do about it? How do you isolate the suicide bomber? And you're the policeman on the beat. What do you do to protect your people?

They all leaned in and the guy says, I can't tell you that, because I'm not from Iraq, so you're all going to have to sit here and work through this and figure out what it is you need to do to stop suicide bombing.

And it just – it was one of those moments where I then went up to some of the police that were there and I said, you know, in Arabic, trying to use my broken Arabic, what did you think of that? And they said, you know when you graduate from college and somebody comes up to you and with second-year high school material? They're trying to help us out, but – and they were being diplomatic, they were being nice, they appreciate what the United States is doing for them, but for goodness' sake, that session, you know, just – the food and the lodging and the overhead cover and the armored vehicles and the, you know, 28 security guys that it took to get this trainer there cost the American taxpayers probably a million dollars. And that's what the Iraqis get. And so sometimes you mean well, but is that enough?

MR. PERITO: Thank you. Let's take the first question. Who –

GEN. DUBIK (?): Well, I mean, I don't know the precise answer to say yes, no, but it wouldn't surprise me at all if there are inside the ministries – not just interior and defense but other ministries – to have people who are – whose political allegiance are to other than the government. It wouldn't surprise me in the least. And that's going to continue until the politics of Iraq settles out.

The issue is what does the – what does any ministry do once they find it. And is there an investigation? Is there a firing or imprisonment or a trial or whatever the right answer is? That's, to me, much more important than the fact that there is – there's corruption many places here in the United States. The issue is once you find it, what do you do with it? If you turn the other way, that's the mistake for the ministry of interior or defense.

The cultural part – look, this is just hard. I mean, I'd hate to be that short with the answer, but the way we're approaching it is making it harder. You know, there's a line from the Sands of Iwo Jima that I really like, where John Wayne as sergeant or whatever he is – Marine – says to one of his recruits: You know, life is hard. It's harder when you're stupid. (Laughter.) The way we approach this stuff is just unhelpful. To the end, we all achieve – we all want to achieve, we being both the Iraqis and the U.S. And that's, again, about the shortest shrift as I can – I can make with that answer.

MR. PERITO: Do you want to take one more shot, and then we'll –

MR.   : Sure. On the militias question, I doubt particularly Tariq Al-Hashimi is directly involved in militia activity. It's not to say it's impossible. It seems unlikely though. Would there be other lower level death squad and militia activity? I mean, there certainly was, you know, well-documented in the public record, you know, before a few years ago. One can anticipate – as the general said, I mean, Jawad Bulani did a great job, but he really cracked the tip of the iceberg.

So I would be shocked, frankly, if there were – was no death squad or militia activity at all in the Iraqi police now. It would be – it would be a – miraculous. I do doubt though that a senior politician like Tariq al-Hashemi is directly involved.

Now is somebody that's affiliated with his political party maybe somewhere several ranks down involved? Potentially.

On the culture, I mean, you're right. But look, there are differences in military culture. And the U.S. genned up something called U.S. Army Special Forces to deal with this, right? So I think you can sort of have the same type of training and the same type of selection to generate police trainers. You know, if you're going to have a permanent organization that does that, I think there's a lot they could learn from SF and other special operations forces on that front. If there's not going to be a permanent organization, I think you should really look to draw on folks from that background that have been selected and trained for this.

Now the problem is they're from a military background, so the ideal would be to find, you know, ex-special operators that have become policemen. You could probably find three or four of those guys. But I don't know that that's a real – a real answer, because the volume won't be there. And they're probably going to be police chiefs. Why would why want to – you know, they got out of uniform and want to, you know, have a nice job where they can see their family. So it'll be tough to convince them to go to whatever country they need to.

MR. PERITO: Thanks. Let's take two more questions.

Q: I actually have one question for each speaker – quick ones.

MR. PERITO: Can you identify yourself by name and affiliation?

Q: Mohammed Nimer. I teach at American University. To Ms. Cruz, the interior ministry in Kurdistan refused to surrender al-Hashemi to the federal government. Did that violate the federal system in Iraq as was envisioned in the constitution?

To General Dubik, so policing Iraq is also part of the whole mission of the U.S., which was a war mission at the beginning. So what is the mission now as – because the U.S. just declared withdrawal, and it's just back to an embassy – what is the mission now?

To Professor Long, you mentioned a culturally informed solution to question of policing in the north, in which the policing was parceled down along different ethnic groups. Did that work out? And why it wasn't a transfer to other parts of Iraq?

MR. PERITO: Thank you. And let's take another question.

Q: Hi. Hi. My name is Rudy Friederich. I'm a retired chief inspector from the U.S. Marshals Service, and I spent a little time in Iraq. And I didn't intend to say or ask any questions, but a few comments led me to that. I've seen what you've seen – American trainers stand up in front of Iraqi audiences, prepare training material that's not relevant to their needs or their culture. And my question is since we have a long sort of succession of doing this, why do we continue to stand up training programs that don't fit the needs, don't fit the bill?

And the second thing – kind of your comment about tradecraft led me to want to ask this question, and that is there seems to be a tendency to believe that training must be done at some higher official, large-scale level when in many cases training that could be done – what not might be the most necessary – can be done sort of at the local level. And the incident with the car bombs last week where once again dozens and dozens of Iraqi police officers leaving a facility are nailed by a car bomb begs the question: Why are they allowed to leave in one mass group instead of sort of a phased departure? They know they're a target. And it just goes to the point of local leadership and local level tradecraft training. And I don't know if that was really a question.

MR. PERITO: Thank you. It's fine though. It's a good comment. We had three questions. So you want to take the first – everybody had one, so –

MS. CRUZ: Sure. To the first question, does that violate the federal system in Kurdistan, you're asking a very specific question in a very murky environment. And what I would say about the entire Hashemi exercise that is continuing to unfold in Iraq is, I think, if you look at it optimistically, it's very instructive how the regional government in Kurdistan and the central government in Iraq have managed to arrive at enough of a working relationship that so far the country has not completely destabilized over the fact that you've got the vice president hiding out in one of the federal regions.

The laws in Iraq were hastily drawn. The constitution was hastily thrown together with extensive international support that might not have been exactly what they needed, but they've got what they've got. And so then to take a law which was drafted rapidly and may not be the perfect law and then to enforce it as if it were the perfect law is a mistake. So if you take the law for what it is, which is a guideline that they need to maintain order, but then you put that in a political context and you look at what's happening with Hashemi, I think the really interesting thing to pull an optimistic outcome from is to see how the Iraqis are dealing with this. It is a crisis. It is very difficult. The fact that they're using negotiation and using politics and using all of these democratic principles to work this out is incredible. It means that some of the stuff that the United States tried to do is working, because you don't see a bunch of tanks driving up to Erbil and blowing things up, grabbing him and bringing him back down and throwing him in a jail in Baghdad, which is perhaps how it might have turned out in 2008. Instead, you've got reconciliation conferences being scheduled and people working it out. So that would be my answer to the first one.

Real quickly on the second one on this – on that second question with what do we do – why do we do this and spend, you know, all this money and send trainers out and do the same mistakes that we've been doing for eight years, when you sit in the special inspector general's office, it makes perfect sense. We do it because we do it. Nobody actually sits there at the top, like the think tanks do and like the IGs do, and looks at all of the different pieces and goes: Here's the right thing to do. It's easy to do that when you're writing a book. But when you're working in the Congress, you have a bill. You pass a bill, you get some money out. When you're working in the State Department, you've got a project, you're writing that project, you're putting together and you're having to staff it.

What – you know, if you take apart the components, everybody's doing what they do for their job. And so you end up hiring who you can – people who will go – using the money that the Congress will give you to do the thing that the different policymakers have told you that you will do. And there is no one ubiquitous sense. And there is no agency, frankly, for nation building that looks at the whole picture and goes, wow, this is not working out well. And so you end up with the whole not being sum of its parts. Each of the parts is doing what it knows how to do. But when you put it all together, you unfortunately end up making the same mistake over and over and over.

GEN. DUBIK: And I would say the inherent government responsibility – the inherent governmental task is the – put this plan together and to manage the thing as a coherent whole, not merely to contract out the pieces.

The specific question I was asked, what's left in Iraq; what's the mission – there's 152 people – I may be off by three – in Iraq now in the Office of Security Cooperation run by a three-star named Bob Caslen. Their mission is primarily in the three categories: one, to supply equipment that the Iraqis' Ministry of Defense and Interior want to purchase through our foreign military systems; second, to coordinate training, usually individual training, not collective unit training; and third, to supervise exchange programs of Iraqi leaders to the United States and U.S. leaders to the Iraqis. That is the sole footprint – military footprint left in Iraq, 152 people.

MR. : Did you have one of those questions?

MR. : I did. The question was, you know, sort of the political policing arrangement of Kirkuk. Did it – did it work? It appears to still be working. There have been confrontations since the U.S. left, particularly about what used to be FOB Warrior, the U.S. base there. They haven't blown up. So you know, piggybacking off what Ginger said, you know, people like me were sort of doomsayers about what would happen once the U.S. left. And it appears so far the politics are holding. Now, you know, we're only a couple months after the end of the U.S. presence, so there's still plenty of time for the doomsayers like me to be right. Hopefully, we aren't. But it seems to be working now. It's just not necessarily easy to work out similar sort of retail-level compromises across the country. You have in some places, but not in others. So you know, I wish I had a better answer than that on that.

On the – on the tradecraft, I wish I had a better answer there too. It does seem odd that, you know, you have the sort of same mass-casualty attacks happening in the same way that they

did years ago. So certainly more could be done to train folks at the local level, and I think embedded trainers work best for that kind of stuff. But I will say, in defense of the Iraqi police, you know, put yourself in their shoes. As Ginger said, these guys have been doing this war for eight years, right? You can't live your life basically like an intelligence officer in a foreign country for eight years. It just doesn't work. You will melt down into a puddle. So you lose some of the discipline that might keep you alive because you have to live your life. Your family is here, right? You're not deployed; you're home. And it's tough to maintain sort of on-point tradecraft at all times in those situations, in their defense.

MR. : OK. I'd like to invite the – two more questions.

Q: Hi, yes. Katherine Brennan (sp). I work with the Office of the Provost Marshal General with the Department of the Army. And as we know, the military police have taken on the policing mission and have been the bulk of that in Iraq. And what we're working towards now, and also the Provost Marshal General, is to build our police partnership capacity. And my question is on that – the joint interagency cooperation that both Ms. Cruz and General Dubik had discussed is – what can we do now within the interagencies to work together to develop a common operating picture to have those defined (tasked ?) and roles for the future policing operations that we might take upon?

MR. : OK, thank you very much. Good question.

Q: Good morning. I'm Tom Harrison (sp) with the L-3 MPRI. Got two or three questions here, and one really kind of ties back to that. We talked about the fundamental mis-steps at how to do this early on in Iraq. And are we doing anything as a government to take those lessons learned and to develop a system or a fix for future operations going forward? The second piece is we also talked about a capability to react in the future, and at one point we did have a presidential decision directed about there, the call for a 2000-man rapid reaction force. I guess that was never funded. Is there any talk of any potential future for that kind of operation? And if anyone from the State Department here could kind of brief us on what the status is of their current – of them taking the thing in house in Iraq and how they see that going and the future with that.

MR. : OK, let's start, and then we'll ask – we'll give you a minute to think. (Laughter.)

MR. : OK, to the – to the military police question, I would say first that you have a task before you that requires pretty broad study of the types of policing around the world. And I have a great many great MP friends of mine at various levels. And there are some huge bright lights that understand that policing in country A is much different than country B and understands country B and C and D and E. So I think your first task could not look at the interagency, but look at yourself and make sure that the professional education program is broad enough and deep enough to give a – your military police a set of intellectual skills that they can adapt to a particular situation.

Second, in terms of the interagency, I've got no solution to that problem except to encourage you, from your perspective, to include as many of the proper interagency personnel in as many of your professional development and exercise programs as you possibly can and to do that deliberately and wisely. There's not going to be, in my view, any near-term, quote/unquote, interagency solution that will be promulgated from the top. And so as you develop your own programs, do your best to grab in and invite and fund and know that the interagency – your interagency partners are not as well-funded as the Department of Defense and not as well-staffed as the Department of Defense. So you'll have to offset that in both cases.

MR. : I want to make a point that I'm sure you know better than anybody else, and that is that military police are not the answer. What we're talking about here are civilian police. Military police are a unique subset of police. They have specialized skills, and they have a specialized mission within the United States military and with the militaries abroad.

The role that we're dealing with here – the shortfall that we have in the United States is the projection of civilian policing abroad. We don't have a national police force, unlike, say, the Canadians. We don't have a Ministry of the Interior that can organize, support and project abroad, you know, police assistance. And so we have an – we have an institutional shortfall in this country. And so while military police are a partial answer, they're also a unique subset of this answer. And so we have to keep that in mind.

I want to – I want to give Walt a chance to answer the question, since it was asked, is there somebody from State Department here, and luckily, there is. (Laughter.)

WALTER REDMAN (senior police adviser, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. State Department): Yeah. Actually, there are several people from State here that – (inaudible) – just so you know.

MR. : You can all get to speak.

MR. REDMAN: My name is Walter Redman. I'm the senior police adviser for the INL Bureau. I'm a 25-year law enforcement officer from here in the U.S. And having the opportunity to have served overseas in Bosnia and then of course 42 months in Iraq serving very closely with – under General Dubik's command, and I was working with several other members here – when you – when you talk about the utilization of U.S. – particularly U.S. civilian police officers in these environments – you asked the question, well, what are they training; what can they train; what are they qualified – and we generally tell our officers as we're preparing them to deploy – and they are significantly prepared – is that I cannot prepare them – Ron, who is the senior police adviser for the INL Iraq office here in Washington cannot prepare these individuals adequately to – say, to become experts in the law and the procedures of the countries they're going to. You can't. Let's not – let's not kid ourselves.

But what we can do, and what the American police officer has done and done now for, oh, about 17, 18 years starting in '80 (sic) – Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and other places around the world, Iraq and Afghanistan, is that they do teach, and they do bring the sense of accountability that – and the relationship with diverse communities. That, the American police

officer can do better than anyone, is (diversing ?) – is policing in an extremely diverse environment. We use – we – a phrase we coined in Iraq is it's easy to be the police in a police state. It's very challenging to be a police officer in a democracy – and the difficulties – and your concern for your community.

So I can't speak about Ginger's specific example, but the one thing that we do talk about is developing a sense of accountability in these environments, where these entities have to learn to work with those communities that they serve. And that is a major change in paradigm and culture and attitude. And do you know what? You're not solely dependent on the entity of government that's in power, which actually reports to the people. And that has started to change. That has taken hold. And Ginger talked about the development of democratic institutions. That is all a part of it. The police are the people; the people are the police. And you have that sense. The issue of development and the time it takes to actually do that is a reality check that we all must face.

The other – so that – my general point is I am very proud of the efforts of our American police officers who have been taking part, and now our international – (inaudible) – have been doing this for generations, serving in overseas missions. We started, again, in 1994 in Haiti and then moved on to Bosnia and other places. But I say again that the key thing that the American officer brings is how do you police in a diverse environment; how do you actually show concern and care for those citizens that you have to serve?

That's a key piece. That is a transitional piece. As far as the other question regarding our creation of an entity – and I assume that you're talking about the CRC, the Civilian Response Corps – and they started, obviously, moving that forward back in '05. There are going to be significant issues with the budget that will affect that, absolutely, and that's being determined right now.

And of course, we're all – we're a part of it as well as our colleagues at Justice and other interagency components. So we are hopeful that that will develop in a positive – (inaudible) – but obviously, in these economic environments, these terms – we surely expect that they're going to be significant, our cuts on that. Really that's all I'd like to say.

MR. PERITO: Thanks. Thank you for your contribution. What I would like to do now, since we only have a few minutes left, is I'd like to offer the panel final summary remarks. And we'll start – General Dubik, you want to go first?

GEN. DUBIK: Sure. I'd just like to reemphasize the aspect of the duration in transformation. We're not talking about getting a training program that's so good, with one whack you've produced all the results you want in a police force. This is not going to happen. You can't – it's just – it's just the wrong mental attitude to the task.

Imagine yourself our U.S. policing methods, 1800, 1850, 1900, 1950, 2000. Each period is much different, and certainly in the year 2000 you wouldn't hold a standard up to what existed in 1850. But 1850 was better than 1750 and 1900 was better than 1850. What you – when you take on a task like this in Iraq, you take on a task of duration. And the transformation from

where the police were in 2003 at the intervention is not where they are now, but it's still not where they need to go.

But there's not going to be any magic pixie dust where you sprinkle it in the training program and sprinkle it in the advisers and you'll move from 1750 to 2010 instantly. This is a task of duration. And it's part of the reason we back into these things. We don't like to acknowledge that. We like to have the one-year approach. It's not a one-year approach task. And these facts are right in our face, but we refuse to acknowledge them.

MR. PERITO: Ginger?

MS. CRUZ: I've been looking at this issue and all the related issues to it in Iraq for eight years, and I can see a pattern that has emerged. In the very beginning, to oversimplify, we didn't quite know what we were getting into. And then we did and we said oh, shit. And then we started to figure out, well, how do we really get our hands around this? And at the point, I think, about a year and a half ago when we really started to come up with some serious ideas about translating the lessons learned into some serious change, so that we could actually do this right, we then came to the reality that we don't want to do this.

And I would say that from the conversations I've had maybe in the last six months, I do not feel the political will in America, in Congress. And it's, you know, very different outside the Beltway. You get outside the Beltway and there is very little patience for losing lives and wasting billions and billions of dollars for something whose outcome is negative, neutral – you know, maybe in the end it might turn out to have a benefit.

And so I would say, on the lessons learned point, that I very strongly recommend that think tanks and academia step up, because that is the only place that lessons learned are going to reside for a little while, while the politics and the body of the American people sort of just close – close the doors, bar them shut, maybe even nail them shut for a while. And what's going to happen, as we all know in this room, is five years from now, two years from now, 10 years from now, we're going to be doing this again.

And hopefully we're not in this same room and we're not asking the same questions. Because somebody – it's not going to be the politicians and it's not going to be the government agencies, because they're going to move on to something else – but somebody, for goodness sakes, has to keep these lessons alive and has to keep looking at them and thinking about them. And just as Bob talked about Panama, where we saw the exact same thing happen, and just when we threw all the manuals out from Bosnia when we started doing Iraq – don't do it again.

MR. PERITO: Thank you. Austin?

MR. LONG: I actually agree 100 percent with Ginger on those points. And even going back before Panama, you saw the great Vietnam debacle, right, where the military, particularly, did everything it could to not only – not only forget but, like, actively burn out the brain cells of Vietnam. So I'm hoping we don't go through a similar period post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan.

And I will speak for a minute, in my conclusion, about Afghanistan since we haven't talked about it too much today, but there are clearly some shadows of Iraq. I think pretty much everything every panelist has remarked upon as being a problem or an issue in Iraq has been a problem or an issue in Afghanistan. I can't think of any that hasn't.

I would add that you have additional layers of complexity – and you can anticipate this being potentially a problem in the future in Afghanistan – in that you have allies. And allies are great in some ways, but allies are a huge pain in others, in that they have different ideas about policing, they have different ideas about what's an acceptable partner for policing, et cetera. So the lessons learned from Iraq, I think, are clearly applicable in Afghanistan in a lot of ways. I know General Dubik was careful to caveat his remarks, but I do think the overall thrust of the panel is clearly applicable there. You're just going to have, you know, even more issues when you try and do this as part of a big – you know, a real coalition as opposed to the coalition in Iraq, which was America and some friends. This is like a real – a NATO endeavor; it's going to be even more problematic.

However, there are probably some useful lessons in Afghanistan, as well. There's the Afghan local police program, which has been controversial but is still an interesting program to look at, and maybe lessons taken from there; and probably some cross-national lessons learned, comparing maybe Afghan local police to Sons of Iraq, some of the challenges in building the Ministry of Interior in both countries, et cetera. So I think there's – you know, the lessons do travel pretty well. Unfortunately, they're just not very heartening, in that some of the same things keep killing us every time.

MR. PERITO: Thank you very much.

I'd like to thank our panel for really a series of interesting, evocative and frank presentations. I'd like to invite a round of applause. (Applause.)

I'd like to bring to your attention a new USIP online publication, the Security Sector Governance Center's monthly newsletter. Ginger said that we'll probably be doing this in three to five years again, but the rather blurry photo of me standing in front of the barbed wire and the tanks in front of the Ministry of the Interior in Tunisia suggests that –

MR. : It might be sooner –

MR. PERITO: -- it might be sooner rather than later. I was in Libya a couple of weeks ago. It had a very familiar feel, you know, as I saw the guys on the – the guys on the streets with the guns and, you know, the heavy weapons in the back of the pickup trucks going through the checkpoints, you know. It had a very familiar feel. So I think we're probably going to get the call sooner rather than later. So all of this stuff is very useful.

One administrative note. When you leave, if you'll go out and leave the building the way you came in, just straight across the lobby through the double doors and out that way, it will save you walking up those long flight of stairs and getting lost at the top.

So thank you so much for coming. Thank you for braving the weather. And we'll look forward to seeing you the next time we do one of these.

(END)