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# THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN PANAMA: 2006

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Alianza Ciudadana  
**Pro Justicia**



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY



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## Presentation

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance is still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

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## Foreword

### The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

by

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Vanderbilt University

I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt

University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire were pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always

seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

Country	Researchers
Summary Report	Prof. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University (Project Director)
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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University</li> <li>●Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador</li> <li>●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</li> <li>●José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Prof. Manuel Ortega-Hegg, Director of the Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural (CASC) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua, Nicaragua</li> <li>●Marcelina Castillo Venerio, Centro de Análisis Socio-cultural (CASC), Universidad Centroamericana. (UCA)</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP, and Professor at the Universidad de Costa Rica.</li> <li>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Professor of Political Science at Central Michigan University</li> </ul>



Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee</li> <li>•Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology Science at Temple University</li> </ul>
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Mark Bynoe, Director, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Guyana</li> <li>•Ms. Talia Choy, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of Guyana.</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>• Yves François Pierre, Groupe de Recherche en Sciences Sociales (GRESS)</li> </ul>
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Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor at the Universidad de los Andes</li> </ul>
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Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the US, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> <li>•Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</li> </ul>
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Dr. Mitchell Seligson Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>•Abby B. Córdova, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>•Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>•Daniel Moreno, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>•Diana Orcés, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> <li>•Vivian Schwarz-Blum, Ph.D. student, Vanderbilt University</li> </ul>
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay</li> </ul>
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile</li> </ul>
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Denise Pavia, Universidade Federal de Goiás, Goiás, Brazil</li> <li>• Simon Bohn, York University</li> <li>• Rachael Meneguello, Brazil, Director of the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) and Professor of Political Science, University of Campinas, Brazil</li> <li>• David Samules, University of Minnesota</li> <li>• Luicio Renno, University of Arizona</li> </ul>

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 27,000 individuals in these countries who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
December, 2006

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## Executive Summary

This executive summary outlines some of the study's principal findings, which are explored in greater detail in the chapters that follow. The results of this study contribute to the debate about democracy in Panama at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

- The analysis presented here is based on a probabilistic national survey conducted between June 16 and July 14, 2006. This is LAPOP's second study in Panama; the first was carried out in 2004, also with the support of USAID.
- For this study, we created a stratified, multi-staged, cluster sample that was probabilistic at all stages, except at the household level where we used sex and age quotas. It contained the following parameters: (1) a minimum of 1,500 cases; (2) clusters of 6 to 8 interviews in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas for each sampling point (census segment); (3) a minimum of 125 probabilistically determined sampling points.
- For this study, the national territory was divided into four geographic strata: the Metropolitan Area, comprised of the districts of Panamá (the national capital) and San Miguelito; the East, formed by the provinces of Panamá (excluding the districts of Panamá and San Miguelito), Colón and Darién; the Center, formed by the provinces of Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas; and finally, the West, formed by the provinces of Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí and the *Comarca* Ngobe-Buglé.
- We interviewed 1,536 people in 2006, which means that the total error was  $\pm 2.5\%$ . With a sample of this size, the survey precisely represents people's opinions, with an error not greater or less than 2.5% of the results we would obtain if we were to interview all Panamanian citizens. This kind of error means that if we were to repeatedly conduct samples of this size, then 95% of them would reflect public opinion with an inaccuracy no greater than  $\pm 2.5\%$ . For the different strata, the sampling errors were:  $\pm 4.1$  for the Metropolitan Area,  $\pm 5.3$  for the Center,  $\pm 5.4$  for the West, and  $\pm 5.5$  for the East. It is worth pointing out that the sample is self-weighted; that is, no type of weighting was applied to the results.
- In the interest of greater clarity, the survey results are accompanied by numerous figures, methodological notes, and the complete text of the questionnaire that was used. We also include some multivariate analyses of the data in order to validate the conclusions. In many parts of the study, the reader will have the opportunity to compare the analysis of the Panamanian data with that from other countries in the region where similar surveys were conducted almost simultaneously.
- In the last 20 years, Panama has undergone a series of enormously significant political transformations. On the one hand, it went from a military regime (1968-1989) to a civil government based on periodic elections in which the largest parties alternate ruling. It should be emphasized that, at the beginning of the 1990s, Panama eliminated the constitutional basis of its military. Even more impressive, Panama and the U.S. concluded a process through which the latter transferred the Panama Canal to the former and evacuated its military bases.

On the other hand, over the last two decades, Panama has been experimenting with policies to liberalize its economy.

- ❑ Starting in 2005, Panama entered the group of 57 countries with high human development, based on its index of 0.809 (out of one) in the Human Development Report 2006. In the ranking of developed countries in the Human Development Report 2006, Panama occupies ninth place within Latin America and the Caribbean, only surpassed by Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Cuba.
- ❑ Although the economy has been among the fastest growing in Latin America, and its GDP per capita – US\$4,318 in 2004 – is high if we compare it with regional levels (adjusted for purchasing power parity, it is around US\$7,000), this has not translated into an appreciable decline in poverty. The poverty rate is 37% and unemployment is persistent, especially in rural areas.
- ❑ It is estimated that, in 2003, 63% of the rural population lived in poverty, and that one-sixth of the total population lived in extreme poverty (that is, on less than US\$1.50 per day). In indigenous areas, 98.5% of the population lives in poverty, and 89.7% in extreme poverty.
- ❑ Despite the macroeconomic growth that Panama has enjoyed in recent years, and the government's prediction of good future economic growth, the vast majority of Panamanians believe that the country's economy has remained the same or deteriorated in the last 12 months. Some 92.3% think that the country's economic situation is the same or worse than it was 12 months ago.
- ❑ In Panama, 52.7% of the population demonstrate normative conceptions of democracy, 19% use utilitarian definitions, and 22.7% give “empty” opinions (that is, they do not know what it means, they decline to define it, or they believe it does not mean anything). In terms of normative conceptions, these results put Panama in the penultimate place among the countries studied. Analyzing other ways to measure support for democracy, we see that Panamanians tend to reject authoritarian solutions since they prefer democracy to an authoritarian government, and prefer a government in which everyone participates to a heavy-handed government.
- ❑ The results we present here indicate a marked reduction in support for political institutions and the political system in general, a reduction in the levels of political tolerance and, as a consequence, a reduction in the values that favor stable democracy. It is important to note that these results, although interesting and troubling, do not indicate an inevitable breakdown of the Panamanian political system.
- ❑ We have seen that, in 2004 and 2006, more than three-quarters of the population believe corruption among government officials is very or somewhat widespread, with a significant rise in the more negative perception.
- ❑ The percentage of respondents who admit they had to pay a bribe in the municipal government and the courts rose significantly between 2004 and 2006.

- ❑ Panama is among the countries with the least number of people who were victims of corruption at least once in the last 12 months: only 11.3% compared to 34.6% in Bolivia, the country with the greatest number of corruption victims.
- ❑ The main predictors of victimization by corruption are gender and income. Men and people with higher incomes tend to be victims of corruption more frequently.
- ❑ Trust in the institutions charged with protecting basic civil rights fell significantly between 2004 and 2006.
- ❑ The main factors that influence the levels of trust in judicial institutions are: the lack of confidence that the judicial system can tackle the crime problem; fear of being a victim of crime; and the perception that there is corruption among judges and the police.
- ❑ Ninety-three percent of respondents say that they were not victims of a criminal act in the last year, and 57.4% of crime victims did not report the crime. Of those who did not report a crime, 44.3% said that they did not because it serves no purpose.
- ❑ We see that although most people think that the police are trustworthy and feel safe near them, a significant minority believes the opposite. Levels of trust in the National Police are negatively affected when respondents do not know any police officer.
- ❑ Panama is one of the countries in this study with the lowest levels of support for and participation in local government.
- ❑ We see that the most important explanatory factors of the level of trust in local government are satisfaction with municipal services, education, income, and the size of the place of residence.
- ❑ People neither support giving more resources and responsibilities to local governments nor paying higher municipal taxes.
- ❑ Voter turnout is high in Panama compared to the other countries of the study.
- ❑ The results of the logistic regression analysis indicate that the important factors explaining electoral participation are: the socio-demographic variables of education, age, and the size of the place of residence; and the variables that measure other forms of participation or interest in politics, such as contributing to resolve community problems, working for a political party during elections, trying to convince others how to vote, and the general degree of interest in politics.
- ❑ The factors that significantly influence participation are: education, sex, number of children, whether the person is married (or in a civil union), and fear of crime in one's neighborhood.

- ❑ Panamanians most participate in religious organizations and then in parent-teacher associations.
- ❑ In Panama, participation levels in civil society organizations are lower than in most of the other countries that are part of this project.

## I. Panama's Political Culture

This study was conducted as part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University, with financial support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Panama, and the collaboration of Ciudadana Pro Justicia. Borge y Asociados were in charge of data-collection. The analysis presented here is based on a probabilistic national survey conducted between June 16 and July 14, 2006. This is the second study that LAPOP has carried out in Panama; the first was conducted in 2004, also under the auspices of USAID. The previous study has been published (Pérez and Gandásegui, 2004) and is available, along with its questionnaire and sample design, on the LAPOP web page. In this report, we compare the results of both studies in order to examine the changes and continuities in Panamanian political culture.

In this introduction, we present all the pertinent background information to this study of political culture in Panama. We divide the introduction into two parts. In the first, we offer a general overview of the economic and social situation in Panama at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its immediate antecedents. We complement this overview with a description of the most important political events in Panama in recent years. In the second, we survey Panamanian political culture, its evolution and its constituent elements. We also take the opportunity to comment on the most important qualitative and quantitative studies conducted both in Panama and abroad.

### *The Economic Situation*


Table I.1 provides basic information about the Panamanian economy between 2002 and the first semester of 2006.

**Table I.1 Selected Economic Indicators**

	2002	2003	2004	2005	1st Semester 2006(E)
GDP (nominal) (millions of US\$)	12,272.40	12,933.20	14,179.30	15,483.30 (P)	16704.0 (E)
GDP (at constant 1996 prices) (millions of US\$)	11,691.10	12,182.80	13,099.20	14,004.80 (P)	7,381.30(E)
GDP (growth rate, at constant US\$)	2.20%	4.20%	7.60%	7.40%	8.1%(E)
Service Sector (growth rate, at constant 1996 US\$)(1)	0.0	3.40%	8.10%	8.30%	9.10%
Others (growth rate, at constant 1996 US\$)(2)	-1.20%	7.70%	4.30%	2.70%	6.50%
GDP per capita (at 1996 US\$)	3,821	3,909	4,131	4,318	2,248
Population (millions)	3.06	3.12	3.17	3.23	3.28

Source: Contraloría General de la República. (P) Preliminary figures; (E) Estimated figures.

(1) Includes real estate, public administration, commerce, hotels and restaurants, financial services, the Colon Free Zone (CFZ), the Panama Canal, transportation, and public services; (2) Includes industry, agriculture, fishing, and construction.



**Figure I.1 Gross Domestic Product: Annual Growth Rate Calculated in the National Currency at Constant 1996 Prices<sup>1</sup>**

Figure I.1 shows the economic growth since 2002. Starting in 2005, Panama entered the group of 57 countries with high human development, with an index of 0.809 (out of one) in the Human Development Report 2005. Within Latin America, based on the Human Development Report 2006's ranking of developed countries, Panama occupies ninth place, surpassed only by Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Cuba. Figure I.2 shows that Costa Rica, among Central American countries, ranked highest in the index of human development in 2004. Panama and Costa Rica are the only countries in the region whose ranking places them among those countries with a high level of human development.

<sup>1</sup> Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on official figures.






Figure I.2 Central America: Human Development Index, 1990-2004<sup>2</sup>

Panamá, however, has a dual economy. The country boasts an advanced regional financial center, a prosperous construction industry stimulated by foreign demand, a thriving tourism industry, and a solid service export sector. Although the economy has shown some of the highest growth rates within Latin America, and its GDP per capita – US\$4,318 in 2004 – is high compared to regional levels (adjusted for purchasing power parity, it is around US\$7,000), this has not translated into an appreciable reduction of poverty. The poverty rate is still 37% and there is persistent unemployment, especially in rural areas. In fact, a large part of the labor force, which does not have the training to work in the fast growing sectors, remains concentrated in the informal sector.

<sup>2</sup> Source: UNDP, Human Development Reports, various years, 1999-2006.





Figure I.3 Human Development Index by Province and Indigenous Area<sup>3</sup>

Figure I.3 shows the disparity in the levels of development between Panama's provinces and its indigenous areas (*comarcas indígenas*). While the provinces of Panamá and Colón have indices comparable to the national average and to countries with a medium-high level of development, the indigenous areas have a level of development comparable to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in the same year, Mali had an index of 0.386, Rwanda 0.403 and Ethiopia 0.327.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Source: *Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, Panamá 2002, Proyecto Informe de Desarrollo Humano*, Panamá: Programa Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Ciudad de Panamá, República de Panamá, 2002. The data presented here is for the year 2000.

<sup>4</sup> *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World*, United Nations Development Program. Oxford University Press, 2002.



**Figure I.4 The Unemployed as a Percentage of the National Economically Active Population, Including Hidden Unemployment<sup>5</sup>**

Figure I.4 shows persistent unemployment levels between 10% and 14% in the 1997-2005 period. The relatively high unemployment rate is partly determined by the economic structure of the country, with its high dependence on the service sector where temporary and low-skilled employment predominates, especially in retail commerce and tourism. However, the construction boom and economic growth over the last four years have reduced unemployment.

Table I.2 shows poverty levels. Between 1990 and 2004, the poverty rate only fell half a percentage point (to 37.2%). It is estimated that, in 2003, 63% of the rural population lived in poverty, and that one-sixth of the total population lived in extreme poverty (that is, on less than US\$1.50 a day). We can see that in the indigenous areas 98.5% of the population lives in poverty, and 89.7% in extreme poverty. The difference in the poverty rate between the Metropolitan region and the indigenous areas reflects the dualism of the Panamanian economy and the concentration of the most dynamic economic sectors in the urban area bordering the canal zone.

<sup>5</sup> Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on official figures.

**Table I.2 Incidence of Poverty  
(Percentages)**

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Extreme</b>	<b>Not Extreme</b>	<b>Not Poor</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>37.2</b>	<b>16.7</b>	<b>20.5</b>	<b>62.8</b>
Incidence of Poverty, by geographic region and poverty level				
Metropolitan Region	23.5	6.0	17.5	76.5
Panamá-San Miguelito (1)	13.4	2.5	10.9	86.6
Central Region	47.0	18.3	28.7	53.0
Western Region	39.0	14.7	24.3	61.0
Eastern Region	67.8	32.7	35.1	32.2
Indigenous Areas	98.5	89.7	8.8	1.5

Metropolitan Region: Provinces of Panamá and Colón.

(1) Corresponds to the Districts of Panamá and San Miguelito, included within the Metropolitan Region.

Central Region: Provinces of Veraguas, Coclé, Herrera and Los Santos.

Western Region: Provinces of Chiriquí and Bocas del Toro.

The Indigenous Areas includes the geographic areas where these communities are located.

Source: *Encuesta de Niveles de Vida, 2003*. Dirección de Políticas Sociales/Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. Dirección de Análisis y Políticas Económicas, Departamento de Información Económicas y Estadísticas.

Finally, the Panama Canal represents one of the most important sectors of the Panamanian economy. In 1999, the year in which Panama received control of the Canal, the interoceanic route, with its multiplier effect, contributed to 18.6% of GDP, 20.4% of national employment, 28.6% of government revenue, and 41.2% of all exports. This significance was maintained during the 2000-2005 period; in 2005, the total contribution was US\$2,876.7 million.<sup>6</sup> The report on the economic impact of the canal indicates that “In fiscal year 2005, the Canal Authority collected a total of \$847.5 million in tolls.”<sup>7</sup> The transit of containers through the canal grew 12% during fiscal year 2005, according to the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). At the close of fiscal year 2005 (ending in September), 7.2 million containers were shipped through the canal, which operates at almost full capacity. In the previous period, the ACP, in its bi-monthly newspaper *El Faro*, reported that 6.4 million containers moved through the canal.

<sup>6</sup> See, Intracorp Estrategias Empresariales, S.A. “Estudio del Impacto Económico del Canal en el Ámbito Nacional”, Autoridad del Canal, April 2006, <http://www.pancanal.com/esp/plan/estudios/0019.html>.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 1-12.

### Public Perceptions of the Economy

In this section, we analyze the survey results of Panamanians’ opinions about the state of the national economy and their own economic situation. Although Panamanians perceive the country’s economic situation rather pessimistically, their views have improved slightly between 2004 and 2006. In Figure I.5, we can see that, that while 53.4% of the population thought that the country’s economic situation was bad or very bad in the March 2004 survey, this percentage fell to 43.6% in 2006. In 2004, only 5.5% believed that the economic situation was good or very good; in 2006, this percentage increased to 8.1%.




Figure I.5 How Would You Describe the Country’s Economic Situation?

Despite the macroeconomic growth that Panama has enjoyed in recent years, and the government's prediction of good future economic growth, the vast majority of Panamanians believe that the country's economy has remained the same or deteriorated in the last 12 months. Figure I.6 indicates that 93.2% think that the country's economic situation is the same or worse than it was 12 months ago.




Figure I.6 Current Economic Situation, 2006

Figure I.7 gives the results of respondents' evaluations of their own economic situation. In 2004, 14.5% of the population considered their personal situation was good or very good. This percentage fell to 13.1% in 2006. The percentage of people who think that their personal economic situation is bad or very bad increased from 24.7% in 2004 to 27.2% in 2006. The great majority of people – around 60% – prefer to respond to the question reticently, saying that their economic situation is neither good nor bad.




Figure I.7 How Would You Describe Your Personal Economic Situation?

## Democracy and Elections

The current Panamanian political system arose in the wake of the U.S. military intervention of December 20, 1989, which ended 21 years of military-led governments. Since 1990, Panama has institutionalized a political system characterized by free, competitive elections and a multiparty system, though with a tendency toward bipartisanship. Three general elections for president and the legislature have been held since 1994. In all the presidential elections, power has shifted between the country's two dominant parties, the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (Democratic Revolutionary Party or PRD) and the *Partido Arnulfista* (Arnulfista Party). Additionally, three referendums put forward by the government have been held. The consolidation of free elections are largely the result of the institutionalization of the Electoral Tribunal as an independent institution dedicated to supervising and regulating country's electoral process. Despite the consolidation of elections, there is a marked weakness in the party system, which is characterized by low levels of support for political parties. Figure I.6 shows that 77.8% of respondents in the 2006 survey did not support any political party. As we will see in Chapter IV of this study, political parties receive the lowest level of trust of all the country's political institutions.




Figure I.8 Do You Support a Particular Political Party, 2006?



The administration of President Guillermo Endara (1989-1994), installed immediately after the U.S. military intervention (he had won the May 1989 elections only to have them annulled by General Manuel Antonio Noriega), tried to establish the necessary economic and political stability to strengthen the new democratic regime. As a result of U.S. economic assistance during the first months of his administration, and the normal recovery after the U.S. lifted the economic sanctions it had imposed during the Noriega regime, the economy grew quickly, establishing the bases of macroeconomic stability. However, the Endara administration sought to implement free market economic policies – the so-called Ford Plan, named after Vice-President Guillermo Ford, its driving force – which caused numerous confrontations between the government and trade unions. During the Guillermo Endara government, important steps were taken to restructure the Panama Defense Forces (FDP), which had been dismantled during the U.S. intervention. The FDP were transformed into a public force under civil command, and divided into three operational branches, the National Air Service, National Maritime Service, and the National Police. In 1994, the National Assembly approved a constitutional reform that formally prohibits Panama from having an army. This turns Panama into the second country in Central America, after Costa Rica, to abolish its army.

As a result of the economic policies, hundreds of government employees were laid off, the unemployment and poverty rates grew in real terms, the cost of living rose, and the perception of corruption in some government sectors also increased. The government's incapacity to provide effective solutions to many of these problems created public frustration and discontent. On top of these economic problems, President Endara had a weak image. In these circumstances, the 1994 election witnessed the return to power of the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (Democratic Revolutionary Party, or PRD), the party that was a product of the military regime but by this time had renovated and democratized itself internally. President Ernesto Pérez Balladres, despite having severely criticized the neoliberal policies, implemented an economic program whose central aim was to continue the economic restructuring which sought to redefine the public sector's role and move toward the privatization of all state-owned companies.

The prominent trait of the PRD government was the privatization and concessions of various state companies, such as the *Instituto Nacional de Telecomunicaciones* (National Telecommunications Institute, or INTEL) to the British company Cable & Wireless in 1995; the *Hipódromo* (Racetrack) at the end of 1997; the *Casinos Nacionales* (National Casinos) in January 1998; the *Ferrocarril Transístmico* (Transisthmus Railroad) in February 1998; and the *Instituto de Recursos Hidráulicos y Electrificación* (Hydraulic Resources and Electrification Institute, or IRHE) at the end of 1998 to eight companies to distribute electricity. In mid 1998, the initiation of the management concession process for the *Instituto de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Nacionales* (National Aqueduct and Sewer Institute, or IDAAN) caused violent street protests and demonstrations rejecting the privatization of this service. These demonstrations obliged the government to suspend the process. Another episode was the debate over the constitutional reforms proposed by the government at the beginning of 1998, since they permitted incumbent presidents to run for immediate reelection. The referendum was conducted on August 30, and the results demonstrated the public's massive rejection (see Table I.4).

In a general way, the 1999 elections were characterized by the absence of political debate that would allow the public to assess the strengths and capabilities of the contenders. The elections

showed the public's discontent as well as the efforts of the opposition, such as the *Arnulfista* and *Molirena* parties, to reach a lasting agreement that would lead them to jointly present a single candidate. In this way, Mireya Moscoso headed the list of a coalition of parties called *Unión por Panamá* (Union for Panama) in which, besides the *Molirena* and the *Arnulfista* parties, *Morena* and *Cambio Democrático* (Democratic Change) were also included. Mrs. Moscoso had also been the *Partido Arnulfista's* candidate in 1994. Mrs. Moscoso is the widow of Arnulfo Arias, one of the most important figures in 20<sup>th</sup> century Panamanian politics. In turn, the PRD nominated Martín Torrijos, son of General Omar Torrijos, for which it maintained some of its 1994 political alliances, especially with *Solidaridad* (Solidarity) and *Liberal Auténtico* (Authentic Liberal), and at the last minute joined with *Papa Egoró*, the movement led by Rubén Blades. The Christian Democrats, headed by Alberto Vallarino, dissident banker from the *Partido Arnulfista*, constituted a third force. Vallarino's candidacy caused the already weakened party to fracture as a group of party members who decided to not support him joined the ranks of the *Partido Arnulfista*. Moscoso beat Torrijos by more than 100,000 votes and inaugurated her government on September 1, 1999 (see Table I.3), becoming the country's first female president.

Mireya Moscoso's administration started out with great optimism due to the populist style of the president and her ability to talk directly to the people. Additionally, on December 31, 1999, only four months after taking power, Moscoso presided over the ceremony that, fulfilling the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, gave Panama control over the Panama Canal for the first time since the construction of the maritime route in 1914. This historic event for the country signaled the consolidation of national sovereignty.

But Mrs. Moscoso's administration was also characterized by numerous corruption scandals that questioned the government's credibility and wasted the good will with which she began her term in office.

The 2004 election saw General Torrijo's son, Martín Torrijos, return as the PRD's candidate. The government's internal problems, especially the corruption charges, divided the political forces that supported it, resulting in the candidacy of ex-President Guillermo Endara, a prominent member and founder of the *Partido Arnulfista* and supported by the *Partido Solidaridad*. The Arnulfistas nominated ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Miguel Alemán. The businessman Ricardo Martinelli, representing the *Cambio Democrático* party, was a fourth candidate. The campaign mainly focused on the topic of corruption. In his second campaign, Torrijos beat ex-President Endara by a wide margin (see Table I.3).

One of the most controversial topics during the first two years of the Torrijos administration has been the reforms to the Social Security Administration (*Caja de Seguro Social*, or CSS). The government approved a structural reform to the Social Security Administration in order to guarantee the institution's financial sustainability in the medium and long term. The public rejected the first attempt because it implied increasing the retirement age. In the face of social pressure, the government was forced to suspend the law and call for talks that resulted in Law 51 of December 27, 2005. This law establishes a pension model that combines the traditional payment system with personal savings accounts, progressively increases the worker-employer quotas from January 2008 until 2013, and strengthens the sanctions to include jail time for employers who evade paying the quotas. In terms of corruption, partial progress has been made

with measures such as the implementation of a transparency law, the creation of the National Anticorruption Council (*Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción*) and sustained efforts by the Attorney General (*Procuraduría de la Nación*). But the perception of impunity still persists.

The attention of the government and civil society during 2006 was focused on the widening of the Panama Canal. On May 24, 2006, President Torrijos formally announced the proposal to widen the Panama Canal by constructing a third group of locks and widening the navigation channel. This project is based on the construction of nine locks, one on the Atlantic side and the other on the Pacific side of the Canal, to allow Post-Panamax size ships, which cannot currently pass through the interoceanic waterway, to be able to navigate through. The approximate cost of this operation, according to the Panama Canal Authority (ACP), would be US\$5.25 billion, equivalent to 35% to 50% of Panama’s GDP. On October 22, a referendum was held to approve the plan to widen the Canal. Panamanians approved the proposal with 77.8% in favor and 22.2% against. The level of abstention was 56.7%. The plan intends to finance the project with tolls paid by canal clients – they would increase an average of 3.5% per year for the next 20 years, starting in 2007; and by borrowing US\$2.33 billion between 2009 and 2011, with the ACP, which has separate accounts from the government and a more favorable international credit rating, as guarantor. If all goes as planned, the canal would increase its revenue from \$1.42 billion in 2006 to \$6 billion in 2025. What most excites the government is that half of this money would be revenue entering its accounts, and the project would also generate 6,500 jobs directly and up to 40,000 indirectly.

The following tables show the results for the presidential and legislative elections, and the referendums, since the restoration of democracy.

**Table I.3 Presidential Election Results since the Restoration of Democracy**

1994		1999		2004	
Candidate (party)	% of the Vote	Candidate (party)	% of the Vote	Candidate (party)	% of the Vote
Ernesto Pérez Balladares (PRD)	33.3	Mireya Moscoso (PA/MOLIRENA)	44.8	Martin Torrijos (PRD/PP)	47.4
Mireya Moscoso (PA)	29.1	Martin Torrijos (PRD)	37.8	Guillermo Endara (PS)	30.9
Ruben Blades (PPE)	17.1	Alberto Vallarino (PDC)	17.4	José Miguel Alemán (PA/MOLIRENA)	16.4
Ruben Carles (MOLIRENA)	16.1			Ricardo Martinelli (CD)	5.3
Eduardo Vallarino (PDC)	2.4				
Samuel L. Galindo (PS)	1.7				

Source: Electoral Tribunal

**Table I.4 Distribution of Seats by Party for the Three Legislative Sessions since the Restoration of Democracy**

<b>Parties</b>	<b>1994-1999 (Total=72)</b>	<b>1999-2004 (Total=71)</b>	<b>2004-2009 (Total=78)</b>
Partido Revolucionario Democrática (PRD)	30	34	41
Partido Arnulfista (PA)	14	18	17
Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC)/ Partido Popular (PP) <sup>8</sup>	1	5	1
Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA)	5	3	4
Partido Liberal Auténtico (PLA)	2		
Partido Liberal (PL)	2		
Partido Laborista (PALA)	1		
Mov. Papa Egoró (MPE)	6		
Partido Solidaridad	4	4	9
Partido Renovación Civilista (PRC)	3	1	
Partido Liberal Republicano (LIBRE)	2		
Movimiento de Renovación Nacional (Morena)	1	1	
Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI)	1		
Partido Liberal Nacional (PLN)		3	4
Cambio Democrático (CD)		2	3

Source: Electoral Tribunal

**Table I.5 Results of the Three Referendums Held since the Restoration of Democracy**

	<b>1992</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2006</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Yes</b>	31.2	34.3	77.8
<b>No</b>	63.9	63.8	22.2
Blank Vote	N.D.	1.0	1.08
Annulled Vote	4.9	0.9	0.83
Abstention	59.9	34.6	56.7

Source: Electoral Tribunal

## **Political Culture**

In the last 20 years, Panama has undergone a series of enormously significant political transformations. On the one hand, it went from a military regime (1968-1989) to a civil government based on periodic elections in which the largest parties have alternated ruling. Additionally, it was the target of a U.S. military intervention (1989). Even more impressive,

<sup>8</sup> The *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (Christian Democratic Party) changed its name to the *Partido Popular* (People's Party) for the 2004 elections.

Panama and the U.S. concluded a process through which the latter transferred the Panama Canal to the former, and evacuated its military bases after a century of occupation (1999).<sup>9</sup>

The problems that have most concerned Panamanians in the 20<sup>th</sup> century have been the national question (the Panama Canal), the political question (democracy) and the economic question (the impoverishment of the population), in that order.<sup>10</sup>

This study was conducted almost 17 years after the end of the military regime. It is an opportune time to examine the current situation to learn how Panamanians' perceptions have changed, how they see the democratic process, and in what direction their political attitudes are evolving. The results of this study will contribute to the debate about democracy in Panama at the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This debate dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the seminal contributions of Justo Arosemena and his notions about local government autonomy (a federalist state), and was continued at the start of the last century by liberals who incorporated social notions into the concept of democracy. The debate about democracy in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been affected by its relation to the struggle for sovereignty and the integral development of the country.<sup>11</sup>

North American political scientists Almond and Verba are pioneers in the study of political culture.<sup>12</sup> They define political culture as a group of orientations toward the system that can be measured. The authors take into account the supposed rationality of the subjects and of the system itself (the state). According to Seligson (2002), the work of Almond and Verba "generated wide and heated debate about the pertinence of the concepts and methodologies used" to measure political culture.<sup>13</sup>

In the Panamanian case, liberal thinkers such as Guillermo Andreve, Roque Javier Laurenza, and Hernán Porras tried to explain Panamanians' political values. Andreve, whose ideas dominated the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, was the most optimistic of the liberal thinkers.<sup>14</sup> He was confident that a policy of universal education would strengthen a sense of citizenship. Laurenza was the most pessimistic.<sup>15</sup> In his classic analysis of Panamanian political culture, published in the 1930s, he foresaw the problems experienced by Panamanian society during the second half of the century. Hernán Porras's classic study of Panamanian "human groups" emphasized diversity as an element that enriched political life but that required careful management.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Regarding these transformations, see, among others, José Luis Moreno, Marco A. Gandásegui, Olmedo Beluche and Brown Araúz. Among North American authors, see Richard Millet and Orlando J. Pérez. Works by these authors can be found in the references.

<sup>10</sup> See Diógenes de la Rosa, Ernesto de la Guardia, Hernán Porras, Ricaurte Soler and also North American authors such as Walter LaFeber and Michael Conniff. Works by these authors can be found in the references.

<sup>11</sup> See Justo Arosemena, Belisario Porras and Mario Galindo H. Works by these authors can be found in the references.

<sup>12</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, 1963, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

<sup>13</sup> Mitchell Seligson and Polibio Córdova, 2002, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*. Quito: CEDATOS.

<sup>14</sup> Guillermo Andreve, 1980, "Consideraciones sobre el liberalismo," in R. Soler, *El pensamiento político en los siglos XIX y XX*, Panamá: Universidad de Panamá, pp. 215-235.

<sup>15</sup> Roque Javier Laurenza, 1998, "El panameño y la nación," *Tareas* N°100.

<sup>16</sup> Hernán Porras, 2002, "Papel histórico de los grupos humanos en Panamá," in *Las clases sociales en Panamá*, Panamá: CELA.

## *Research on Political Culture*

Political debate in Panama has tended to relegate discussion about democracy and how politics is conducted to second place. The central issues of political debate have revolved around questions of sovereignty and development. In the 1980s, the idea of democracy began to appear in the political discourse as a response to the military regime. Two things helped modify the central axis of debate: the Torrijos-Carter Canal Treaties signed in 1977, on the one hand, and the new economic policies (beginning with the economic adjustment policies of 1983), on the other.<sup>17</sup>

The national question and development problems dominated the work of intellectuals tied to the military government.<sup>18</sup> In the 1980s, in the context of a growing movement opposed to the military regime, studies about democracy started to appear.<sup>19</sup> The national question, associated with the struggle for sovereignty, was an obstacle to democracy since it was asked which should have priority. For some authors, the consolidation of the nation lends itself to the development of democracy. For others, by contrast, it is the inverse: democracy can contribute to the development of a national project.<sup>20</sup>

In the 1990s, after the U.S. military intervention, democracy became the focus of debate, displacing the national question and the problems of development. At the forefront of this debate were various North American intellectuals who suggested that Panama could move forward along the democratic path and find adequate solutions to its economic and cultural problems.<sup>21</sup>

An uncomfortable silence arose among Panamanians after some unfruitful efforts to theorize democracy and its implications for the future. Some intellectuals, like Ricardo Arias Calderón, Mario Galindo H., and Nicolas Ardito Barletta have tried to speak out.<sup>22</sup> From a more critical

<sup>17</sup> Documents from the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy (*Ministerio de Planificación y Política Económica* or MIPPE), published between 1984 and 1994, provide a good example of how studies about democracy increased and began to displace other topics.

<sup>18</sup> See Renato Pereira and Rómulo Escobar Betancourt. Works by both authors can be found in the references.

<sup>19</sup> See Ricardo Arias Calderón, 1982, "The Christian Democrats in Latin America: The Fight for Democracy," *Caribbean Review*, Vol. 11, N°2, pp34-37. Also see Humberto López Tirone, Humberto, 1986, *Panamá. Una revolución democrática*, Panamá: Joan Boldo i Climent.

<sup>20</sup> Ricaurte Soler and Simeón González are good representatives of the first perspective, while Mario Galindo could be a representative of the other. Works by these authors are included in the references.

<sup>21</sup> See Richard Millet, 1993, "Preparing for the year 2000," in M. Falcoff and R. Millet, ed., *Searching for Panama. The US Panama Relationship and Democratization*, Washington. Also see Margaret Scranton, 2000, "Electoral Reform and the Institutionalization of the Electoral Tribunal in Post Invasion Panama," in Orlando Pérez, ed., *Post Invasion Panama*, Lanham, Md.

<sup>22</sup> Arias Calderón, 1995, *Conciencia crítica*, Panamá: IPEC. This book is a collection of the author's newspaper articles. Mario Galindo, 1998, *Reelección: Opción perniciosa*, Panamá: ILDEA. Here, Galindo publishes a talk he gave in which he discusses his thesis on the opening of parties toward democracy. Nicolás Ardito Barletta, 1993, "Democracia y desarrollo," in *Revista Panameña de Sociología*, N°8, pp. 118-205. Ardito attempts to reconcile democracy with economic adjustment, discarding notions associated with the plan.

perspective, Simeón González and Rubén D. Rodríguez P. have attempted to redefine the political debate by reviving certain nationalist (populist) values.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Empirical Studies***

As shown above, there have not been many qualitative studies of political culture and democracy in Panama. The same is true for empirical studies of democracy. Orlando J. Pérez conducted one of the first empirical studies in 1991 as part of the University of Pittsburgh's public opinion project. The "*Justo Arosemena*" *Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos* (Center for Latin American Studies, or CELA) collaborated in this study, which was limited to Panama City.<sup>24</sup> During the 1993-1994 presidential campaign, CELA conducted another of the first studies of this kind. This study described the voters, their preferences, and analyzed what values influenced their vote. The study was published in a series of eight installments in the journal *Coyuntura* and in five reports, publications that were widely distributed for educational purposes.<sup>25</sup>

A total of five national surveys were conducted between September 1993 and March 1994, covering an average of 1,200 adults (in their homes) on each occasion.

The results of the study allowed CELA to conclude that Panamanians' vote is associated with their age group, educational level, income level, and place of residence.

They also demonstrated that "the more education people have, the more interest they show in voting." There is greater apathy among the uneducated or those who did not finish primary school (10%). In turn, "it was detected that the more comfortable a person's economic situation, the more likely they would exercise their right to vote. Of people with medium and high incomes, 90% said they would vote (only 80% of people with very low incomes said the same thing)."<sup>26</sup>

Months later, at the end of 1994, USAID and the U.S. Information Agency conducted an empirical study of Panamanian political culture based on a survey of 1,138 people. According to this study, "the success of the elections has apparently given many Panamanians the chance to reevaluate the basic components of their democracy. The findings, product of the survey conducted in September (1994), point out that Panamanians feel rather positive about the level of democratization in four key areas: free elections, civil liberties, the rule of law, and governmental accountability and transparency."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> The pages of the journal *Tareas* compile the writings of González and Rodríguez. The two authors are included in the references.

<sup>24</sup> See the list of references for the works by Pérez.

<sup>25</sup> See CELA, 1994, *Informe del proyecto. Transición hacia la democracia y reconversión institucional*, Panamá: CELA. The project was partly financed by the representative of the European Economic Community in Panama.

<sup>26</sup> CELA, 1994, *Encuesta elecciones 94*, "Informe N°5," Panamá, pp. 2 y 12.

<sup>27</sup> United States Information Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, 1994, *Benchmarks in Democracy Building: Public Opinion and Global Democratization, A Case Study of Four Countries: Ukraine, Romania, Panama and El Salvador*, A Special Report prepared for USAID by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA, Washington, D.C. The full report can be found at <http://www.civnet.org/resources/teach/research/>.

The U.S. agencies indicate, in 1994, that “it is possible that persons with higher education recognize the importance of certain key aspects of the society they live in and can identify its shortcomings. As a result, dissonance persons with higher education present is higher than that shown among persons with lower levels of education.”<sup>28</sup>

In 1998 and 2003, the Costa Rican based research group, PROCESOS, conducted two surveys to “describe and analyze the political culture of the adult population.” Their objectives were “to compare the current political culture with that of five years ago, and to contrast the particularities of each of the countries in the (sub)region.”

According to PROCESOS, in 2003 “around 50 percent of Panamanians said they were proud of or satisfied with the existing democracy in the country. Likewise, 50 percent of respondents said they believe that Panama is a democratic country. The survey shows that persons with greater chances of social ascent (education) are the least satisfied with Panamanian democracy.” This last point mirrors the findings of the 1994 surveys.

The survey also noted that “79.2 percent of Panamanians said they believe that elections should be held periodically. The frustration over the lack of solutions does not weaken the belief in political procedures like elections. Despite the problems of unemployment and poverty, Panamanians believe that political reforms are a way to resolve the limitations of government.”

Lastly, we should mention the first study in this series of surveys by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), carried out in March 2004, whose results we use in this study to make comparisons.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we presented information about Panama’s economy and, using the results of our survey, we showed how the public perceives the current state of the economy. The chapter also presented a summary of the qualitative and quantitative studies about political culture in Panama. The three principal topics that have concerned Panamanian academics, politicians and the public at large through the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> are: the Panama Canal, the consolidation of democracy, and the economic problems, especially the impoverishment of the population.

In the following chapter, we go over the methodology used to prepare, conduct, and analyze this national-scale scale. In the subsequent chapters we will examine how much Panamanians support democracy. We will also address the topic of local government and the state of justice in Panama. Additionally, we will explore the levels of corruption and of public participation and organization.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid. The findings of the survey conducted by the U.S. agencies in 1994 back up the results of the CELA studies of that year. They also tend to confirm the theoretical postulates on the relation between democracy and education made by Guillermo Andreve in the first quarter of the 20th century.



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## II. Methodology and Distribution of the Survey

As mentioned in Chapter I, this study is based on a national survey conducted between June 16 and July 14, 2006. In this second chapter, we briefly describe the methodology used to construct the survey's sample, and we discuss the main socio-demographic data showing its distribution and compare it to the 2004 survey.<sup>29</sup>

For this study, we created a stratified, multi-staged, cluster sample that was probabilistic at all stages, except at the household level where we used sex and age quotas. We established the following parameters: 1) a minimum of 1,500 cases; 2) clusters between 6 to 8 interviews in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas for each sampling point (census segment); 3) a minimum of 125 probabilistically determined sampling points.

Before continuing with the analysis of the sample, it is important to explain what a probability sample is and why it is used. Statistical sampling is a systematic effort to select a certain number of elements (a sample) from a group of data (the population) in order to draw some conclusions about the entire group. To be useful, a sample should reflect the similarities and differences found in the whole group. Sampling refers to the process of selecting the elements, subjects, or cases of a population. For sampling to be well conducted, the chosen elements need to closely represent the entire population. A sample that does not fulfill this requirement is said to be a *biased sample*; by contrast, a well-selected sample is called a *representative sample*. A sample is said to be probabilistic if the selection process is governed by the laws of probability; that is, each population unit has an equal probability of being selected.

For this study, the national territory was divided into four geographic strata. The metropolitan area, composed of the districts of Panamá (the national capital) and San Miguelito. The eastern area, formed by the provinces of Panamá (excluding the districts of Panamá and San Miguelito), Colón, and Darién. The central area, formed by the provinces of Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos, and Veraguas. Finally, the western area, formed by the provinces of Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí, and the *Comarca* Ngobe-Buglé. These areas – officially called regions – are those commonly used by the Panamanian government and private sector agencies that design public policy and development programs. All the Pacific and Caribbean islands were excluded due to the high cost and difficulty of accessing them. The study's object unit is the population at least 18 years old and living in private homes. We excluded persons living in hospitals, orphanages, schools, barracks, hotels, etc. To avoid making the sample biased in favor of more populated areas, each strata was divided into urban and rural areas with a probabilistic selection of the clusters to be interviewed in each region. The distribution of the sample between the various strata was proportional to the strata's population.

We interviewed 1,639 people in 2004, and 1,536 in 2006, which means that for each sample the total error was  $\pm 2.5$ ,<sup>30</sup> in the worst of cases.<sup>31</sup> With a sample of this size, the survey precisely

<sup>29</sup> Annex B contains a complete and technical description of the sample.


<sup>30</sup> The margin of error in the 2004 survey is  $\pm 2.4$  because the sample is slightly larger.

represents people’s opinions, with an error not greater or less than 2.5% of the results we would obtain if we were to interview all Panamanian citizens. This kind of error means that if we were to conduct repeated samples of this size, 95% of them would reflect public opinion with an inaccuracy no greater than  $\pm 2.5\%$ . For the different strata, the real sampling errors were:  $\pm 4.1$  for the Metropolitan area;  $\pm 5.3$  for the eastern area;  $\pm 5.4$  for the central area; and  $\pm 5.5$  for the western area. It should be mentioned that the sample is self-weighting; that is, no kind of weighting have been applied to the results.

The fieldwork was efficiently and professionally conducted by Borge y Asociados.

### *Distribution of the Sample*

In this section we present some of the socio-demographic data that define the general contents of the sample. Figure II.1 shows the distribution by strata.



**Figure II.1 Distribution of the Samples by Strata**

<sup>31</sup> The worst cases arise when responses are equally divided (50/50), making it difficult to determine the preferred response.





Figure II.2 Distribution of the Samples by Sex


Figure II.2 presents the distribution of the samples by sex. We can see that the distributions are almost identical, indicating that even if the same people were not interviewed, the same proportion of men and women were.



**Figure II.3 Distribution of the Samples by Age**

The distribution of the samples by age is seen in Figure II.3. The age distribution reflects some variation, though small, between the two samples. The average age in the 2004 survey is 40.2 years, and in 2006 it is 38.5.





**Figure II.4 Distribution of the Samples by Education**

Figure II.4 shows the distribution of the samples by level of education. We see that the 2006 sample contains more people with low educational levels: double the number of people without any formal education and a 11% reduction in people with a university education.




Figure II.5 Distribution of the Samples by Income

The distribution by income (Figure II.5) shows that the vast majority of the population has a monthly income below \$400. We can see that, between 2004 and 2006, there was an increase in the population without income and a systematic decline in the higher income ranges. This indicates that the population became more impoverished between 2004 and 2006. In Figure II.6, we can see that there is a significant relation between income and place of residence. We see that rural areas have less than half the average income of the capital. This result reflects the poor distribution of wealth in Panama, a country with one of the worst income distributions in Latin America.




Figure II.6 Income and Residence

### Conclusion

This chapter presented a brief outline of the methodology used to construct the 2006 sample, and provided some basic data on the distribution of the sample and how it compared with 2004. In the following chapters, we will examine different aspects of political culture in Panama.

### III. The Meaning of Democracy

What does democracy mean? This question has concerned philosophers, social scientists, politicians, and citizens for thousands of years, at least since the Golden Age of Athens. Its modern usage dates from the revolutionary transformations in western societies from the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>32</sup> As popular participation in government increased toward the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the concept of democracy came to be considered favorably.

During the 1920s and 30s, opposition to democracy became respectable again among radical political and economic groups in Europe and Latin America. With the defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II, the organized opposition to democracy virtually disappeared, not only in the West but throughout the world. Everyone wanted to be identified as a democrat. Universal support for democracy, however, took place at the cost of disagreement over its meaning. Everyone defined democracy according to their own interests. Each person had their favorite type of democracy.

A condensed list could include: direct democracy, representative democracy, liberal (or bourgeois) democracy, proletarian democracy, social democracy, totalitarian democracy, industrial democracy, plebiscite democracy, constitutional democracy, associative democracy, pluralist democracy, economic democracy, people's democracy, and participative democracy.

Various theorists have noted the differences between rationalist, utopian, and idealist definitions of democracy on the one hand, and empirical, descriptive, and institutional definitions on the other. Invariably they conclude that only the latter definition provides the analytical precision and empirical reference points to make it a useful concept.<sup>33</sup> Among North American academics, the arguments about democracy as a normative theory have weakened and have been replaced by initiatives to understand the nature of democratic institutions, their operation, and the reasons for their success and failure.

The key institution in a democracy is the election of leaders through competitive elections. In a democracy, people become leaders through elections in which the governed participate. In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter made the most important modern formulation of this concept of democracy. In his pioneering study, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, Schumpeter discovered the deficiencies of what he called the "classic theory of democracy," which defined democracy in terms of "the people's will" (source) and "the common good" (purpose). Discarding such suggestions, Schumpeter constructed what he called "another theory of democracy." He pointed out that "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> R. R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), Vol. I, pp. 13-20.

<sup>33</sup> See Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962).

<sup>34</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Harper, second edition, 1947), Ch. 21 and p. 269.

Following Schumpeter, but widening the categories that define the democratic system, Robert Dahl shows us that democratic governments are fundamentally characterized by their ability to respond to citizens' preferences without establishing political differences between them. For this to take place, all citizens need to have an equal opportunity to: (1) formulate their preferences; (2) publicly manifest these preferences among their fellow partisans and before the government, both individually and collectively; and (3) be treated equally by the government. That is, the government should not discriminate in any way regarding the contents and origins of such preferences. These three basic conditions should be accompanied by eight guarantees:

- (1) Freedom of association.
- (2) Freedom of speech.
- (3) The right to vote.
- (4) Eligibility for public office.
- (5) The right of political leaders to compete for votes.
- (6) Diverse sources of information.
- (7) Free and fair elections.
- (8) Institutions that make government policies depend on the vote and other forms of preference expression.

Dahl's definition favors institutional processes that guarantee a level of popular sovereignty in the determination of who governs. In this sense, it does not address concepts of socioeconomic rights or guarantee any conditions of equality among citizens. Therefore, liberal or representative democracy is currently founded on institutions that structure the competition between political elites and guarantees that all citizens participate equally in the country's political processes.

By the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>, the concept of "democracy" acquired a universal acceptance that leaves it, in many cases, without any real foundation. All governments try to legitimize themselves by claiming to be democracies. Citizens "learn" this lesson and tend to "pray before the temple of democracy." But the key question is, does the public know the true meaning of democracy? Additionally, what does democracy mean, in conceptual terms, to citizens? The LAPOP surveys always contain various questions that measure attitudes about democracy and democratic government. However, given the problems of the concept's universality, for the 2006 survey we made an effort to measure the different ways citizens conceptualize democracy. For this analysis, the survey asked a series of semi-open questions (DEM13A-C) that required respondents to give up to three different meanings of democracy. The analysis focused on question DEM13D, which asked respondents to identify which of the meanings they mentioned is the most important. (If only one meaning was given, the analysis focused on this one).

Table III.1 gives us the framework we used to classify the various responses.

**Table III.1 Analytical Framework for the Various Concepts of Democracy<sup>35</sup>**  
**Response codes in parentheses.**

Normative and intrinsic concepts of democracy	Instrumental concepts of democracy	Empty or non-specified concepts of democracy	Negative concepts of democracy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Freedom (without saying what kind) (1)</li> <li>- Freedom of expression, of voting, of electing, of human rights (3)</li> <li>- Freedom of movement (4)</li> <li>- To be independent (6)</li> <li>- Right to choose leaders (13)</li> <li>- Elections, voting (14)</li> <li>- Free elections (15)</li> <li>- Equality (without specifying) (17)</li> <li>- Economic equality, or class equality (18)</li> <li>- Gender equality (19)</li> <li>- Equality before the law (20)</li> <li>- Racial or ethnic equality (21)</li> <li>- Participation (without specifying) (24)</li> <li>- Minority participation (25)</li> <li>- Power of the people (26)</li> <li>- Human rights, respect for rights (27)</li> <li>- Justice (29)</li> <li>- Obeying the law, less corruption (30)</li> <li>- Non-military government (31)</li> <li>- Living in peace, no war (32)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic freedom (2)</li> <li>- Well-being, Economic progress, growth (7)</li> <li>- Capitalism (9)</li> <li>- Free trade, Business freedom (10)</li> <li>- Work, greater opportunities of (11)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has no meaning (0)</li> <li>- Other response (80)</li> <li>- Don't know or no response (88)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Freedom, lack of (5)</li> <li>- Well-being, lack of, no economic progress (8)</li> <li>- Work, lack of (12)</li> <li>- Fraudulent elections (16)</li> <li>- Equality, lack of, inequality (22)</li> <li>- Participatory limits (23)</li> <li>- Disorder, lack of justice, corruption (28)</li> <li>- War, invasions (33)</li> </ul>

The idea is that there are definitions that go beyond a rational, profit-maximizing calculus to focus on abstract aspects or political and institutional norms. The people for whom such definitions are more important conceive of democracy as a system based on principles and political processes without hoping for personal or family gain from democratic practices. Logic suggests that as more citizens identify democracy with abstract or normative values, the more stable their support for the democratic political system will be, since this support will not be subject to the ups and downs of the national economy, political scandals, or the weakness of the ruling government.

<sup>35</sup> Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

Obviously, when the public shows greater support for negative or “empty” concepts, the stability and survival of the democratic regime will be in greater danger. It is important to note that even when people have negative or empty opinions of democracy, this does not mean an inevitable breakdown of the democratic order. After all, we are not analyzing the views of the country’s political leaders or important political sectors that, ultimately, have the power to cause the breakdown of the democratic political order. Nonetheless, public opinion is important to establish the parameters of what is and is not acceptable for political leaders. That is, if a wide majority of the people do not believe in democracy, political leaders will have the green light to act undemocratically.

In the following figure, we can see that 52.7% of Panamanians have normative values of democracy; 19% have utilitarian conceptions, and 22.7% empty values. Only 5.5% view democracy negatively.




Figure III.1 Different Conceptions of Democracy

Figure III.2 gives us the results for the countries that make up this study. Here, we can see that Chile and Costa Rica have the greatest number of respondents who define democracy in a normative manner. Panama is the penultimate country, above El Salvador. Panama shows the

greatest percentage of utilitarian concepts, with 19%. It is important to point out that in all countries, most respondents defined democracy in normative terms.




Figure III.2 Different Conceptions of Democracy, Comparative Perspective



**Table III.2 Predictors of the Different Conceptions of Democracy  
Multinomial Regression Analysis  
Parameter Estimates**

condemoc1(a)		B	Error típ.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower limit	Upper limit
0 Negative	Intersection	-1.860	.857	4.708	1	.030			
	Sex	-.140	.232	.368	1	.544	.869	.552	1.368
	Age	.002	.008	.045	1	.832	1.002	.985	1.018
	Education	-.047	.034	1.867	1	.172	.954	.893	1.020
	Wealth	-.038	.081	.216	1	.642	.963	.822	1.129
	Urban/rural	.826	.615	1.802	1	.179	2.284	.684	7.624
	Size of the place of residence	-.223	.180	1.536	1	.215	.800	.562	1.139
1 Empty	Income	-.076	.098	.602	1	.438	.927	.765	1.123
	Intersection	-.789	.500	2.487	1	.115			
	Sex	.126	.132	.910	1	.340	1.134	.876	1.467
	Age	-.008	.005	2.849	1	.091	.992	.982	1.001
	Education	-.033	.020	2.867	1	.090	.967	.931	1.005
	Wealth	-.068	.047	2.126	1	.145	.934	.852	1.024
	<b>Urban/rural</b>	<b>1.492</b>	<b>.370</b>	<b>16.256</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>4.447</b>	<b>2.153</b>	<b>9.186</b>
<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>-.368</b>	<b>.107</b>	<b>11.771</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.692</b>	<b>.561</b>	<b>.854</b>	
2 Utilitarian	<b>Income</b>	<b>-.176</b>	<b>.058</b>	<b>9.026</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.839</b>	<b>.748</b>	<b>.941</b>
	Intersection	-.828	.523	2.508	1	.113			
	Sex	.240	.143	2.814	1	.093	1.271	.960	1.681
	Age	-.003	.005	.386	1	.534	.997	.987	1.007
	<b>Education</b>	<b>-.084</b>	<b>.021</b>	<b>16.307</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.920</b>	<b>.883</b>	<b>.958</b>
	<b>Wealth</b>	<b>.092</b>	<b>.047</b>	<b>3.837</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.050</b>	<b>1.097</b>	<b>1.000</b>	<b>1.203</b>
	Urban/rural	-.026	.329	.006	1	.937	.974	.511	1.857
Size of the place of residence	.102	.104	.978	1	.323	1.108	.904	1.357	
Income	-.124	.065	3.644	1	.056	.884	.778	1.003	

a The reference category is: 3 Normative.

In Table III.1, we can see the multinomial analysis where the “normative” concept is the reference category. There are statistically significant differences in the education and wealth variables between people with normative and utilitarian concepts, although the magnitude of the wealth variable coefficient is small. We also see that people with “empty” views differ significantly from people with normative values in terms of the size of the area where they live.




Figure III.3 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Education

Figure III.3 shows the relation between educational levels and the different conceptions of democracy. We see that people without any formal education tend to favor a utilitarian conception of democracy. We assume most of these people have low incomes and lack basic economic means, thus their concern for the tangible benefits that a democratic system can provide. However, we see an increase in normative opinions as educational levels rise. People with higher levels of education can understand normative conceptions of democracy and generally tend to have economic levels that allow them to concentrate on abstract aspects of the political system.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> The error bars indicate that the difference between the categories of education are statistically significant, with the exception of the negative conceptions. This denotes that the difference between the levels of education are due to a real difference in public attitudes and not to random error of the sample.




Figure III.4 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Urbanization

Figure III.4 shows the results of alternative conceptions of democracy by level of urbanization. We see that empty and utilitarian conceptions receive greater support in rural areas, and that the normative conception receives more support in urban areas.

### Other Measures of Support for Democracy

In this section, we analyze other ways of measuring Panamanians' support for democracy. The survey asked a question that has formed part of the Latinobarometro surveys since 1995.

**DEM2.** Which of the following three statements do you most agree with?

- (1) People like us do not care if there is a democratic or non-democratic regime.
- (2) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
- (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government might be preferable to a democratic one.
- (8) Don't know or No response




Figure III.5 Preference between Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes

Figure III.5 shows a reduction in the preference for democratic government. In 2004, 73.5% of survey respondents preferred democracy to any other form of government. This figure fell to 63.4% in 2006. Also significant is the increase of people who express indifference between democratic and authoritarian governments, rising from 8.6 to 17.7% of the sample. If we add the indifferent people to those who do not have an opinion, that gives us almost one-quarter of the sample. These results, which largely confirm those we presented earlier in the chapter, reflect the fact that a significant number of Panamanians do not have a definition of democracy.

The survey asked: “**DEM11.** Do you believe that our country needs a heavy-handed government, or that its problems can be resolved with everyone participating? (1) Heavy-handed (2) Everyone participating (8) No response.” In Figure III.6, we can see a significant increase in the support for a “heavy-handed” government. There are doubts about the substantive meaning of support for a “heavy-handed” government, since for many people this can mean a government capable of dealing with the country’s problems, especially crime. However, these results, added to the others we have seen and will present in subsequent chapters, confirm the marked reduction in support for democratic values in Panama.





Figure III.6 Support for a Heavy-handed Government or Everyone Participating



Despite the negative results about democratic values that we observed earlier in this chapter, Figures III.7 and III.8 indicate that the vast majority of Panamanians do not support anti-democratic actions by the country’s president.

### Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed democratic values, focusing on various definitions that the public has of the concept of democracy. We use a framework that divides the conceptions into four groups: normative, utilitarian, empty, and negative. In Panama, 52.7% have normative conceptions, 19% use utilitarian definitions, and 22.7% hold empty views (that is, they do not know what democracy means, do not wish to say, or think that democracy has no meaning). These results put Panama in the penultimate place among the countries of the study. Analyzing other measures of support for democracy, we can see that Panamanians tend to reject authoritarian solutions, since they prefer democracy to an authoritarian government, and prefer a government in which everyone participates to a government with a heavy hand.

## IV. Supporting Stable Democracy

In this chapter we examine democratic values and Panamanians' support for democratic political stability. As mentioned in the first chapter, more than fifteen-and-a-half years ago, the U.S. militarily intervened in the country to remove General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power and end twenty-one years of military government. Since then, Panamanians have held three presidential elections and three referendums, two of them to reform the constitution and one to decide whether or not to widen the Panama Canal. These elections have been transparent and competitive. For the most part, Panama has been able to build basic democratic institutions in recent years. The analysis we use in this chapter is based on a framework, developed by Mitchell A. Seligson, in which support for the political system and support for political tolerance are requisites for democratic political stability.<sup>37</sup>

The emphasis on support for democratic stability stems from the premise that although public opinion is not totally determinant in a democratic regime, it is one of the most important factors behind political stability. In large measure, the legitimacy of the system depends on how citizens view it. Juan Linz, in his work on the breakdown of a democratic system, says that legitimacy depends largely on the public believing that existing institutions, despite their problems, are better than the alternatives.<sup>38</sup> We are talking about the political institutions here, not the administration in power. Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as "the capacity of a system to generate and maintain the belief that the existing institutions are the most appropriate for the society." Lipset's theory is based on the premise that political systems which receive the public's support, and therefore legitimacy, can survive even in the face of an economic or political crisis.<sup>39</sup>

The North American political scientist David Easton, in turn, talks about two important types of support: "specific" support and "diffuse" support. The first refers to the public's support for the ruling government. Although this kind of support is important for those who govern, since it can influence the government's capacity to implement its policies, it is not as important as the second type of support. "Diffuse" support refers to support for institutions, that is the political system and the institutions that constitute it. The political system can survive when the administration or ruler in power is unpopular, but it is in danger when the institutions lose support and, therefore, legitimacy.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>37</sup> See Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29.

<sup>38</sup> See Juan Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

<sup>39</sup> See Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, expanded edition, 1981; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 1-22.

<sup>40</sup> David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975), pp. 435-457.

### The Existence of a Political Community in Panama

The first factor we analyze is the existence of a “political community” in Panama. That is, how much do Panamanians feel a part of the nation? Without a common base of nationality, it is difficult to construct a coherent and institutionalized political system. If there is no common nationality that draws the population together, the country can break apart.<sup>41</sup>

Figure IV.1 shows the responses to the question of whether there is a political community in Panama. The survey asked (B43), “How much pride do you have in being Panamanian?” The responses are measured on a scale that goes from 1, which means “none,” to 7, which means “much.”





Figure IV.1 Pride in Being Panamanian by Strata, 2006

We see that there are significant differences between the strata. In the metropolitan (which includes the districts of Panamá and San Miguelito), eastern, and central strata, more than 72% of respondents said they had “much” pride in being Panamanian. In the Western strata, however, only 30.5% feel much pride in being Panamanian. These results are surprising compared to those from 2004.

<sup>41</sup> See Pipa Norris, *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.





**Figure IV.2 Pride in Being Panamanian, 2004 and 2006**

Figure IV.2 compares averages of the 2004 and 2006 responses. In 2004, a substantial majority of 91.6% stated they had much pride, but in the 2006 survey only 64% are very proud of being Panamanian. This drop is significant and occurs in all strata, but especially the Western. These results are alarming since they question the survival of the political community in Panama, which is key to strengthening democracy.

We conducted an analysis to measure the confidence intervals of the pride in being Panamanian by size of the area of each sample. For this analysis, and those that follow in this chapter, we recodified the support variables (the B series in the questionnaire) from a scale of 0-to-7 to a scale of 0-to-100. Using a common metric allows us to present the findings in a clearer manner.<sup>42</sup> We see significant differences between the samples and the size of the area where the survey was conducted. Figure IV.3 presents two results. In the first place, there is no doubt that, between 2004 and 2006, the levels of pride in being Panamanian have fallen significantly. And second, we can see that there is significant variation in the averages, especially in medium and small cities, in the 2006 survey.




Figure IV.3 Pride in Being Panamanian: Confidence Intervals by Size of the Place of Residence

The 2006 findings encourage a more thorough analysis of the factors that determine the level of pride in being Panamanian. To do this, we used a multiple regression model in which the dependent variable is “pride in being Panamanian” and the independent ones are those that measure the demographic characteristics of the population.


<sup>42</sup> The conversion is made by subtracting 1 from each score. Then each score is divided by six, so that each one is located in a range of 0-to-1. Finally, this score is multiplied by 100.

**Table IV.1 Predictors of the Level of Pride in Being Panamanian, 2006**

	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig
	B	Error ttp.	Beta		
(Constant)	70.335	7.095		9.913	.000
<b>Urban/rural</b>	<b>19.452</b>	<b>3.556</b>	<b>.332</b>	<b>5.471</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>-4.469</b>	<b>1.047</b>	<b>-.267</b>	<b>-4.269</b>	<b>.000</b>
Sex	-1.962	1.427	-.035	-1.375	.169
<b>Age</b>	<b>.109</b>	<b>.052</b>	<b>.057</b>	<b>2.110</b>	<b>.035</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>.492</b>	<b>.200</b>	<b>.076</b>	<b>2.454</b>	<b>.014</b>
Wealth	-.096	.509	-.006	-.189	.850
White	-9.176	5.096	-.153	-1.800	.072
<i>Mestizo</i>	-1.678	5.051	-.029	-.332	.740
Black	-6.856	5.462	-.070	-1.255	.210
<b>Indigenous</b>	<b>-15.330</b>	<b>5.653</b>	<b>-.162</b>	<b>-2.712</b>	<b>.007</b>

a. Dependent variable: b43r National pride

Table IV.1 shows us that the factors influencing the level of pride are the respondent's area of residence and its size, age, level of education, and identifying oneself as indigenous. To illustrate the impact of each of these factors, we created a series of figures that can be seen below.



**Figure IV.4 Level of Pride in Being Panamanian by Area of Residence**

Figure IV.4 shows that there is no significant difference in the average level of pride between rural and urban respondents. However, the previous regression suggests that, when other factors are taken into account, the difference is statistically significant. In Figure IV.5, we can see that as age increases, so too does national pride. The figure indicates that there is a significant reduction in the average pride levels among the middle age groups, but then increases for people over 55 years old.




Figure IV.5 Level of Pride in Being Panamanian by Age

We see in Figure IV.6 that national pride increases as the level of education rises. The average pride for people without any formal education is 76.7 points, and for people with a university education it is 84.3 points.




Figure IV.6 Level of Pride in Being Panamanian by Education

Finally, Figure IV.7 indicates that people who self-identify as indigenous show a significantly lower level of national pride than the other ethnic categories. Additionally, although the 2004 results are not presented here for reasons of space, the level of pride among indigenous peoples has significantly fallen since that survey.




Figure IV.7 Level of Pride in Being Panamanian by Ethnic Group

### *Institutional System Support*

In this section, we analyze the opinions related to support for various public and private institutions. As can be seen in the questionnaire, the survey asked respondents how much trust they had in various political and private institutions. In Table IV.2, we can see the average for each question based on a recodified scale of 0-to-100. What first jumps out is the great difference between pride in being Panamanian and pride in the political system. The first receives an average of 82.9 points and the second only 49 points. Additionally, when asked “How much support should the Panamanian political system be given?” the average drops to 47.9 points. We see that support for “political institutions” in general is higher, with an average of 51.6, than trust in any specific institution. The institution that receives the highest trust level is the Canal Authority, with an average of 49.2. It worth noting that this average is slightly below the half-way point on the scale. It is not surprising, however, that the Canal Authority is the most trusted institution, since it has been generally characterized for efficiency, independence, and the absence of corruption. Political parties are the institution with the lowest level of support.

**Table IV.2 Indicators of Support for the System**

	Num.	Avg.
National pride	1523	82.9
Catholic Church	1510	70.5
Mass media	1491	54.0
Political institutions	1502	51.6
Canal Authority	1437	49.2
Pride in the political system	1499	49.0
Electoral Tribunal	1481	48.9
Support for the political system	1489	47.9
National Police	1518	47.5
Free elections	1493	46.9
National government	1492	46.8
Attorney General	1446	46.8
National Ombudsman's Office	1446	46.4
Office of the Comptroller	1448	46.2
Public Prosecutor's Office	1450	45.7
Municipal government	1501	45.3
National Assembly	1412	45.1
System of justice	1480	44.7
Basic rights	1476	43.9
Anti-Corruption Transparency Council	1444	43.8
Supreme Court	1460	43.4
Courts ensure fair trials	1473	41.1
Political parties	1509	39.5
Valid N (listwise)	1259	

Figure IV.8 compares the 2004 and 2006 results. We see that trust has systematically fallen in most of the institutions analyzed. The results particularly underline a significant erosion of trust in the Electoral Tribunal, free elections, the National Police, Office of the Comptroller (*Contraloría General*), and the National Ombudsman's Office (*Defensoría del Pueblo*). However, the levels of trust in political parties, and especially the National Assembly and the national government, rose.




Figure IV.8 Average Institutional Support by Year of the Sample



The question that follows is how Panama compares to other countries. For this analysis, we constructed a scale of support using five questions in the series B1-B6 (B5 was eliminated several years ago).<sup>43</sup> Figure IV.9 shows us the results of comparing the averages on the scale of system support for the countries that are part of this project. We see that the level of political system support in Panama is 46.6 on the scale of 0-to-100. This average places Panama in fifth-to-last place.





Figure IV.9 Average Support for the System in Comparative Perspective

<sup>43</sup> For Panama, these variables have a high level of reliability with a Cronbach Alpha coefficient of .799.



**Figure IV.10 Average Support for the System in Comparative Perspective For Countries with Samples in 2004 and 2006**

Figure IV.10 shows the results of comparing the 2004 and 2006 samples for those countries where surveys were conducted in both years. We see that support for the political-institutional system in Panama suffered a significant drop between 2004 and 2006. Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico show an increase in support for the system.

### *Predictors of Institutional System Support*

Now we turn to analyze the factors that influence the levels of support for the system. For this analysis, we used the multiple regression technique with the scale of support as the dependent variable. We used a variety of independent variables, from the socio-demographic ones of age, sex, education, wealth, and size of respondents' area of residence, to important theoretical political variables such as opinions on the state of the national economy, one's personal economic situation, interpersonal trust, being a crime victim, and fear of crime at the neighborhood and national levels, among others. Table IV.4 shows the results of this analysis.

**Table IV.3 Predictors of Support for the Political System**

	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Error tip.	Beta	t	Sig
(Constant)	25.137	6.360		3.952	.000
Sex	.692	.968	.016	.715	.475
Age	.019	.035	.013	.544	.586
Education	-.152	.129	-.031	-1.174	.241
Wealth	-.311	.321	-.027	-.967	.334
Country's current economic situation	.191	.593	.008	.323	.747
Current personal economic situation	-.775	.655	-.030	-1.184	.237
Size of the place of residence	.622	.352	.049	1.768	.077
Corruption index	1.250	.958	.030	1.305	.192
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>2.011</b>	<b>.243</b>	<b>.198</b>	<b>8.288</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Satisfaction with municipal services</b>	<b>-2.063</b>	<b>.645</b>	<b>-.077</b>	<b>-3.197</b>	<b>.001</b>
Satisfaction with democracy	.418	.734	.014	.570	.569
<b>Support the efforts of the current government</b>	<b>-1.844</b>	<b>.723</b>	<b>-.063</b>	<b>-2.551</b>	<b>.011</b>
<b>Fear of neighborhood crime</b>	<b>-1.397</b>	<b>.581</b>	<b>-.056</b>	<b>-2.402</b>	<b>.016</b>
Crime victim	-.573	1.895	-.007	-.302	.763
<b>Government efficacy index</b>	<b>7.792</b>	<b>.398</b>	<b>.498</b>	<b>19.572</b>	<b>.000</b>

a. Dependent variable: PSA5

Table IV.2 shows those independent variables whose impact on support for the institutional system is statistically significant. The results of the regression indicate that the significant predictors are ideology, satisfaction with municipal services, support for the efforts of the current government, and the government efficacy index.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> The government efficacy index measures respondents' evaluation of the job the current administration is doing to resolve various problems: fighting poverty (N1), promoting and protecting democratic principles (N3), fighting corruption (N9), protecting human rights (N10), improving public safety (N11), fighting unemployment (N12). These variables were transformed into a scale with a Cronbach Alpha coefficient, for Panama, of 0.909.

Below, we present various figures that show more clearly how these significant variables influence support for the system. In Figure IV.11, we can see that people who ideologically define themselves on the “left” tend to express less support for the political system. This result should not be surprising since the Panamanian political system is characterized for its rather sweeping embrace of free market economic policies and a political class with a center-right ideological position. There are no strong political parties on the left. Additionally, we see a slight decrease in the support for the political system among people on the extreme right.





Figure IV.11 Average Support for the Political System by Ideology



**Figure IV.12 Average Support for the Political System, by Satisfaction with Local Government Services**


We can see, in Figure IV.12, that those people who favorably evaluate municipal services tend to express greater support for the political system. Although municipal governments in Panama are generally weak institutions, the job they do influences how citizens evaluate the national political system.



**Figure IV.13 Average Support for the Political System, by Support for the Current Government**

Although David Easton speaks of the difference between “specific” and “diffuse” support, arguing that the latter is more important for political stability, there is no doubt that the two are closely tied.<sup>45</sup> Figure IV.13 demonstrates this relation. To the degree that support for the job the current government is doing (“specific” support) decreases, support for the political system (“diffuse” support) also decreases.

<sup>45</sup> Easton, Op. Cit.



**Figure IV.14 Average Support for the Political System, by Fear of Neighborhood Crime**

Fear of being a victim of crime is a significant explanatory factor in support for the political system. In Figure IV.14, we can see that citizens who feel unsafe in their neighborhoods tend to support the political system less than Panamanians who feel safe in their communities. It is worth noting that the results of this multiple regression analysis indicate that being the victim of a crime is not a significant factor when we hold the other variables constant.

Lastly, Figure IV.15 shows us the relation between the government efficacy index and support for the political system. Citizens who believe that the government in power operates effectively tend to support the political system, while those who doubt the efficacy of the government show less support for the political system. These results are not surprising and again they point to the close relation between “specific” and “diffuse” support. If people question the job that the current government is doing, trust in the political system will be weak.




Figure IV.15 Support for the Political System, by the Current Government's Efficacy Index



## Political Tolerance

In this section, we turn to investigate the levels of political tolerance in Panama and compare them with those of the other countries in the study. Political tolerance is one of the most important democratic values. In the previous section, we analyzed political system support. Support for the system is important for political stability, but it does not guarantee the survival of democracy. Therefore, political tolerance, defined as an individual's acceptance of the rights of others to express varied opinions, is key to establish a stable democratic regime. There is an extensive literature on political tolerance.<sup>46</sup> One of the most debated topics is how to measure tolerance.<sup>47</sup> This study measures tolerance through an index based on the responses to a series of questions (the D series) in the questionnaire. The original scale of these variables goes from 1-to-10. Below, we present the questions related to political tolerance in the LAPOP questionnaire.

The following questions were used for this analysis:

(01)	(02)	(03)	(04)	(05)	(06)	(07)	(08)	(09)	(10)	(88)
Strongly disapprove									Strongly approve	Don't know

**D1.** There are people who always speak badly of Panama's form of government, not only the current administration, but the kind of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these peoples' **right to vote**? Please read me the number on the scale: [*Probe: Up to what point?*]

**D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view? Please read me the number.

**D3.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can **run for public office**?

**D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people appear on television to **give speeches**?

<sup>46</sup> See Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew)," *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982); James L. Gibson, 1993, "Perceived Political Freedom in the Soviet Union." *Journal of Politics* 55:4 November 936-974; James L. Gibson, 1992a, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36:2 May 560-577; James L. Gibson, 1992b, "The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom" *American Political Science Review* 86:2, 338-356; James L. Gibson, 1988, "Political Tolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review* 82, June, 511-529; James L. Gibson, 1989, "The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era." *Journal of Politics* 51:13-35; James L. Gibson and R. Bingham, 1985, "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance." In Gibson and Bingham, *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*. New York: Praeger.

<sup>47</sup> For a more thorough discussion of this topic, see the section on political tolerance in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburgh and CEDATOS, 2002, 45-46.

For our analysis, we recodified the variables to a scale of 0-to-100. The logic here is the same as that for the scale measuring support for the system, although the way the variables were transformed is somewhat different.<sup>48</sup> The results of each question in the two samples can be seen in Figure IV.16.





Figure IV.16 Average Level of Political Tolerance by Year of Sample

We can see there was a significant decline between 2004 and 2006; in some cases, like the right to vote, it was 20 points. In the 2006 sample, almost all the cases have an average approval level below the half-way point on the scale of 0-to-100. This implies that Panamanians generally have rather low political tolerance. The drop in levels of political tolerance is alarming, since this concept is fundamental for living in a democracy.

<sup>48</sup> The conversion is made by subtracting 1 from each score. Then each score is divided by nine, so that each one is located in a range from 0-to-1. Finally, this score is multiplied by 100. These questions have an acceptable level of reliability in order to create a scale with an Alpha of .887.



**Figure IV.17 Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective**


To be able to better analyze these results, it is necessary to compare them with those from the other participating countries in the LAPOP project. Figure IV-17 shows that Panamanians find themselves among the countries with the lowest levels of political tolerance.

**Table IV.4 Predictors of Political Tolerance**

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
	B	Error típ.	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	33.292	4.300		7.742	.000
Sex	.074	1.296	.002	.057	.954
Age	.017	.047	.010	.372	.710
<b>Education</b>	<b>.477</b>	<b>.173</b>	<b>.086</b>	<b>2.755</b>	<b>.006</b>
Wealth	.132	.431	.010	.306	.760
<b>Size of place of residence</b>	<b>-1.705</b>	<b>.467</b>	<b>-.117</b>	<b>-3.652</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>2.836</b>	<b>.308</b>	<b>.245</b>	<b>9.212</b>	<b>.000</b>


a Dependent variable: tol (tolerance scale)

Table IV.4 gives the results of a multiple regression analysis showing the predictors of political tolerance in Panama. In Table IV.4, we see that the statistically significant factors are education, ideology, and the size of the place of residence.




**Figure IV.18 Average Tolerance by Size of Place of Residence**

Generally, places with smaller populations show less political tolerance. Residents of medium-sized cities (populations from 25,000 to 99,999) have the lowest level of political tolerance, although the dispersion around the mean is greater, indicating that there is a wider diversity of opinion in these cities than in the rest of the country. In Figure IV.19, we can see the results in terms of the respondent's ideological position.




**Figure IV.19 Average Tolerance by Ideology**

Figure IV.19 indicates that tolerance levels significantly increase among people who identify themselves to be either on the extreme left or on the right, although there is a slight drop in tolerance among people on the extreme right.



**Figure IV.20 Distribution of Self-Defined Ideological Position**

Figure IV.20 shows the ideological distribution and indicates that most respondents locate themselves in the middle of the scale, with an average of 5.



**Figure IV.21 Tolerance Average by Educational Level**

Figure IV.21 indicates that there is a close relation between education and political tolerance. As educational levels increase, tolerance also rises, except among people without any education and those people who only finished primary school. As noted in Chapter II, 6.6% of respondents reported having no formal education.

### *Support for Stable Democracy*

Now we will analyze the relation between political tolerance and support for the system. This analysis is based on a framework created by Mitchell A. Seligson in previous reports. The analysis is based on dividing each scale in half (50 of 0-to-100) and crossing both variables to obtain a 2-by-2 square that shows us the theoretical relation between tolerance and support for the system (see Table IV.5). It is important to remember that this framework only applies to countries with an electoral democracy, since the effect of high and low levels of both support for the system and tolerance would be very different within an authoritarian system.

**Table IV.5 Theoretical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System<sup>49</sup>**

Support for the Institutional System	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Mitchell A. Seligson explains the logic of the classifications in the following manner: “Political systems in which the public shows a high level of support for the system and high tolerance tend to be more stable. This prediction is based on the premise that the system needs strong support in non-authoritarian situations in order to guarantee its stability. By contrast, if people do not support their political system and have freedom of action, this will almost inevitably produce an eventual change in the system.”<sup>50</sup> In cases where tolerance is low, but support for the system is high, “the system should remain stable (given the high level of support), but the democratic government might be at risk. Such systems tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) regimes which restrict democratic rights.”<sup>51</sup> A situation of low support for the system opens up the possibility of instability in the political system. Where there are high levels of tolerance, “it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or in a period of instability characterized by considerable violence.”<sup>52</sup> If the tolerance levels are low, by contrast, “the breakdown of the democratic order would seem to be the most logical result.”<sup>53</sup>

However, it is very important to note that public opinions cannot cause the breakdown of a political system. There are innumerable factors that influence such an event, from economic conditions and the geopolitical climate to the policies adopted by the elite and ruling governments. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that a political system which has little support and whose citizens are intolerant is more susceptible to a breakdown of democracy.

<sup>49</sup> This theoretical framework was presented in Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 July-December (2000): 5-29.

<sup>50</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson, *Auditoria de la democracia: Ecuador*, University of Pittsburg and CEDATOS, 2002, 52.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*



### *The Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System*


In the following pages, we analyze the relation between tolerance and support in the Panamanian case.

**Table IV.6 Empirical Relation Between Tolerance and Support for the System in Panama, 2004 and 2006**

Support for the Institutional System	Tolerance			
	High		Low	
High	<b>Stable Democracy</b>		Authoritarian Stability	
	2004	<b>2006</b>	2004	<b>2006</b>
	37.9%	<b>22.8%</b>	16.1%	24.2%
Low	Unstable Democracy		<b>Democratic Breakdown</b>	
	2004	<b>2006</b>	2004	<b>2006</b>
	30.3%	15.7%	15.7%	<b>37.2%</b>

We can see a significant reduction in the values supporting stable democracy and an increase in those favorable to a democratic breakdown between 2004 and 2006. It is important to reiterate that these results do not signify that Panamanians want a breakdown of democracy, and even less that it will occur. However, the deep relation between support for the political system and political tolerance result in opinions that do not strengthen stable democracy. In 2006, only 22.8% of Panamanians support the political system and demonstrate high levels of tolerance; 15.7% demonstrate high political tolerance but a low level of support for the system. These results indicate that, in Panama, only 38.5% of the population interviewed in 2006 is found in the boxes of general support for stable democracy. In 2004, more than 60% of respondents found themselves in these “democratic” boxes. In 2006, 37.8% of Panamanians interviewed – a plurality of the respondents – expressed values favorable to a democratic breakdown. How does Panama compare to the rest of the countries in this project?

Figure IV.22 shows the percentage of people located in the stable democracy box for all the countries in the study.<sup>54</sup> We see, in the figure, that Panama has the fourth lowest level of attitudes favoring stable democracy. Figure IV.23 shows us that, between 2004 and 2006, Panama experienced the greatest drop in opinions favoring stable democracy among the countries in the study. Although we have seen a reduction in the support for the political system, it is clear that the reduction we see here is the result of the steep decline in the levels of political tolerance.



**Figure IV.22 Attitudes that Favor Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective**

<sup>54</sup> To create this figure, a new variable, named “bar2x2” was created in the database. This variable eliminates the cases in which there is incomplete data, both in the measure of tolerance and system support. The codification was:

If (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 1)democ = 100.  
 If (psa5r = 1 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.  
 If (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 2)democ = 0.  
 If (psa5r = 2 and tolr = 1)democ = 0.




Figure IV.23 Attitudes that Favor Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2004 and 2006

Now we turn to analyze the predictors of support for stable democracy. For this analysis, we use a logistic regression, since the dependent variable is dichotomous (support or not for stable democracy).

Table IV.7 Predictors of Stable Democracy

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Wealth	-.043	.047	.854	1	.356	.958
Size of the place of residence	-.048	.100	.230	1	.632	.953
Sex	.094	.137	.473	1	.492	1.099
Urban/rural	.196	.338	.336	1	.562	1.216
<b>Ideology</b>	<b>.278</b>	<b>.036</b>	<b>59.634</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.320</b>
Victim of crime	.082	.275	.090	1	.765	1.086
<b>Fear of being a victim of crime</b>	<b>-.253</b>	<b>.085</b>	<b>8.875</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.776</b>
Education	-.003	.018	.018	1	.892	.997
Age	.002	.005	.239	1	.625	1.002
<b>Total index of victimization by corruption</b>	<b>.414</b>	<b>.128</b>	<b>10.482</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>1.513</b>
Constant	-2.541	.799	10.115	1	.001	.079

In Table IV.7, we can see that the significant variables are: self-defined ideology, the total index of victimization by corruption, and being a victim of crime. The analysis shows that the demographic variables such as age, sex, wealth, ideology, education, and place of residence are not significant factors.




Figure IV.24 Favorable Attitudes for Stable Democracy by Ideology

In Figure IV.24, we can see that high tolerance and support for the political system increase as respondents identify themselves more on the right. However, we can see that the pattern in the figure is not totally consistent.




Figure IV.25 Favorable Attitudes for Stable Democracy by Neighborhood Safety

Figure IV.25 indicates that Panamanians who are more fearful of being a victim of crime in their neighborhood or community show less support for values conducive to a stable democracy. On the one hand, these people feel alienated from a political system that, in their view, does not satisfactorily deal the crime problem. On the other hand, they may also show less tolerance toward those people who they consider to be a threat.

### Conclusion

In this chapter, we analyzed support for the political system, political tolerance, and values that favor stable democracy. The results we present here indicate a marked reduction in support for political institutions and the political system in general; a reduction in the levels of political tolerance and, as a consequence, a reduction in the values that favor stable democracy. It is important to note that these results, although interesting and troubling, do not indicate an inevitable breakdown of the Panamanian political system. As we saw in Chapter III, most Panamanians define democracy in normative terms, and the vast majority rejects populist and heavy-handed governments. Nonetheless, domestic and international actors should pay attention to the drop in levels of support for the political system and tolerance among the Panamanian population.

## V. Corruption and Democracy

Corruption in Latin America is currently a very important topic. In recent years, the United States government has focused on the struggle against corruption. In various cases, the U.S. has denied visas to politicians, business people, and military officials tied to corruption.<sup>55</sup> Additionally, they have conditioned bilateral aid to government efforts to combat corruption.

In the case of Panama, corruption has been a topic of utmost importance. Corruption and how to combat it was the most important topic in the last two presidential elections. During the last two administrations, of presidents Pérez Balladares and Moscoso, corruption, nepotism, vote buying in the National Assembly, bribing high-level public officials, and embezzlement dominated public debate and contributed, in large measure, to the ruling party losing in each of the three presidential elections held since the establishment of the current political regime.

In the Panamanian case, it has been estimated that the annual cost of corruption is roughly between \$600 million and \$1,200 million *balboas* (equivalent to the U.S. dollar). Calculations by the United Nations estimate that widespread corruption can cause a country's growth rate to lag 0.5% to 1.0% behind the growth of a comparable country with little corruption.

### *The Magnitude of the Corruption Problem in Panama*


The survey used the following question to measure the public's perception of the corruption problem.

**EXC7.** In your experience, corruption among public officials is...?

(1) Very widespread (2) Somewhat widespread (3) Little widespread (4) Not widespread  
(8) DK/NR

Figure V.1 shows that more than three-quarters of the population in 2004 and 2006 think that corruption among public officials is very or somewhat widespread. We see an increase in the people who think that corruption is very widespread, although the percentage of people who believe it is "somewhat widespread" dropped.

<sup>55</sup> In Panama, this includes ex-President Ernesto Pérez Balladares and other officials from his administration as well as officials from Mireya Moscoso's administration.



**Figure V.1 Public Perception of Corruption Levels Among Public Officials**

We can see in Figure V.2 that the perception of corruption varies significantly between different parts of the country. As expected, residents of the most urbanized areas (that is, more populated) perceive corruption to be more widespread. This might be due to two factors. First, that people in urban areas have greater access to information and, therefore, find out about cases of corruption more easily than people living in small or rural places. Second, people in urban areas probably have greater contact with the government and, therefore, have more opportunity of being the victims of corruption (we verify this second case later in this study)




Figure V.2 How Common is Corruption in Your Region?



### Levels of Victimization by Corruption

To be able to measure the levels of victimization by corruption, the survey included a series of questions which asked respondents to indicate whether or not they had experienced corruption in various circumstances and places. The questions were the following:

	No	Yes	DK/NR	NA	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience about things that happen in your life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last year?	0	1	8		<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> Has a public official solicited a bribe from you in the last year?	0	1	8		<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> Have you had to conduct some kind of business or fill out paperwork in the municipal government in the last year? <b>No → Mark 9 [Move on to EXC13]</b> <b>Yes → Ask:</b> To conduct your business in the municipal government (for example, requesting a permit) during the last year, did you have to pay some amount beyond what is required by the law?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> Do you work? <b>No → Mark 9 [Move on to EXC14]</b> <b>Yes → Ask:</b> In your work, has someone asked you for a bribe in the last year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> Have you had any dealings with the courts in the last year? <b>No → Mark 9 [Move on to EXC15]</b> <b>Yes → Ask:</b> Have you had to pay a bribe in the courts in the last year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> Did you use public health care services in the last year? <b>No → Mark 9 [Move on to EXC16]</b> <b>Yes → Ask:</b> To be attended in a hospital or public health station in the last year, did you have to bribe someone?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> Did you have a child in grade or high school in the last year? <b>No → Mark 9 [Move on to EXC17]</b> <b>Yes → Ask:</b> In the grade or high school, did you have to bribe someone in the last year?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> Has someone asked you for a bribe to avoid cutting off your electric service?	0	1	8		<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> Do you believe that, given the way things are, paying a bribe is sometimes justifiable?	0	1	8		<b>EXC18</b>
<b>EXC19.</b> Do you believe that in our society paying bribes is or is not justifiable given the poor public services?	0	1	8		<b>EXC19</b>

Figure V.3 compares the levels of experience with corruption in various institutions for the two samples. We can see that corruption increased in municipalities and the courts, although in both the confidence bars indicate wide dispersion around the mean, indicating that there are wide difference among respondents. In both years, people experienced the most corruption in municipal governments. These results should worry everyone interested in furthering the decentralization of power in Panama. It is evident that, without a broad effort to combat corruption in municipalities, expanding the power of municipal governments could increase the

levels of victimization by corruption. We should note that in the case of the other institutions, corruption levels either fell or, as in the case of the police, statistically remained the same.




Figure V.3 Experience with Corruption in Panama, 2004 and 2006





Figure V.4 Number of Times Respondents Have Been Victims of Corruption in the Last Year

In Figure V.4 we can see that, between 2004 and 2006, the percentage of Panamanians who were victims of corruption one or more times declined. In 2006, the vast majority of Panamanians were not a victim of corruption (88.7%); 7.6% of the population were victims once, 2.9% twice, and only 0.8% three or more times. These figures were estimated on the basis of valid responses only; that is, they excluded respondents who refused to answer or who said they did not know.

How does Panama compare to the other countries? Figure V.5 shows the percentage of respondents who reported having been the victim of corruption at least once in the last year. We see that Panama is among the countries with the fewest number of people who were victims of corruption at least once in the last 12 months.



**Figure V.5 Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption at Least Once**

Another way to measure corruption levels is to use Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. This index oscillates between 1, the maximum level of corruption, and 10, a minimal level of corruption. In 2006, Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand shared the highest score for the least level of corruption, and Haiti scored the lowest with the greatest level of corruption. Panama moved to 84<sup>th</sup> place (3.1 out of 10) out of the 163 countries that comprise the index. Figure V.8 shows the perception of corruption levels among Latin American countries.





Figure V.6 Corruption Perceptions Index


We can see that Chile has the lowest corruption perception level, while Haiti is the country where corruption is perceived to be highest. On the global scale of 163 countries, Chile ties with the United States in 20<sup>th</sup> place. It is interesting to note that the victimization data presented in Figure V.7 places Costa Rica and El Salvador above Panama, but the Transparency International data shows these countries with lower corruption perception levels.

Using the results of our survey, we can compare the levels of corruption among the countries of the study for each circumstance in which respondents were asked if they were the victim of a bribe.




**Figure V.7 Percentage Who Were Asked for a Bribe by the Police in the Last Year**

Figure V.7 indicates that, in Panama, 6.5% of respondents reported that the police had asked them for a bribe. This percentage is less than in all the countries studied except Colombia and Chile.



**Figure V.8 Percentage Who Were Asked for a Bribe by a Public Official in the Last Year**


Figure V.8 indicates that, in Panama, only 3.7% of respondents said they had been the victim of a public official asking them for a bribe in the last year. Only Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Chile have lower percentages. However, when we analyze bribes in municipal governments, we see a considerable increase in the number of people who say they were asked to pay a bribe.



**Figure V.9 Percentage Who Were Asked for a Bribe in the Municipal Government in the Last Year**

Figure V.9 shows that 15.9% of people who had some business to conduct in the municipal government said they had been the victim of corruption. Although this percentage is much less than in Haiti, it is still the sixth highest among the 15 countries that make up this study.





**Figure V.10 Percentage Who Were Asked for a Bribe in the Courts in the Last Year**

Figure V.10 indicates that a relatively high percentage of people also suffered from having to pay a bribe in the courts. In Panama, 14.1% of respondents with business in the courts in the last year reported that they had to pay a bribe.

Taking into account the results of the preceding figures, what is the general perception of the level of bribery in each country? Figure V.11 indicates that a wide majority in all countries perceive bribes to public officials to be very frequent. In the case of Panama, 73.7% of people said that bribes to public officials are frequent.




Figure V.11 Frequency of Bribes to Public Officials

The classic conception of corruption in developing countries is that its function is to grease the bureaucratic wheels and to navigate the maze of rules and obstacles that form part of the daily life of a rigid and overly-centralized bureaucracy. In the survey, we asked respondents the following question: “Do you believe that in our society paying bribes is justifiable given the poor public services?” Figure V.12 shows the results in comparative perspective. We can see that 22.7% answered positively.




Figure V.12 Paying Bribes is Justifiable Given the Poor Public Services, Comparative Perspective

### Predictors of Victims of Corruption


For this analysis, we employ a multiple regression using a victimization by corruption scale as the dependent variable.<sup>56</sup> The results can be seen in Table V.1.

**Table V.1 Predictors of Victims of Corruption**

	Non-standardized coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip.			
(Constant)	.274	.095		2.876	.004
<b>Income</b>	<b>.028</b>	<b>.011</b>	<b>.077</b>	<b>2.575</b>	<b>.010</b>
Education	.005	.004	.041	1.214	.225
Urban/rural	-.052	.064	-.050	-.821	.412
Size of the place of residence	-.017	.019	-.057	-.902	.367
Wealth	.012	.009	.044	1.396	.163
Age	.000	.001	-.003	-.084	.933
<b>Sex</b>	<b>-.086</b>	<b>.027</b>	<b>-.084</b>	<b>-3.244</b>	<b>.001</b>
Number of children	.002	.007	.009	.280	.780


a Dependent variable: total index of victimization by corruption

The table indicates that the significant factors are income and sex. Figure V.13 shows that women are less likely to be victims of corruption.




**Figure V.13 Victims of Corruption by Sex**

<sup>56</sup> This index includes the items EXC2 (bribe solicited by the police), EXC6 (bribe solicited by a public employee), EXC11 (bribe paid in the municipal government), EXC13 (bribe paid at work), EXC14 (bribe paid in a court), EXC15 (bribe in public health services), EXC16 (paid in a school). We decided that we would count the occurrences of corruption that a respondent had to confront during the year prior to the study.



**Figure V.14 Victims of Corruption by Income**

Analyzing the impact of income on victimization by corruption levels gives us Figure V.14. We can see that as incomes rise, there is a significant increase in the levels of victimization by corruption. Those people with higher incomes are subject to paying bribes more frequently and in more circumstances than people with low incomes. However, because of the few cases in the sample for the highest income range, we see a large dispersion around the mean for one of the high income ranges (\$2,500 to \$4,999) and no level of corruption in the other two high income ranges. It is important to note that when there are fewer cases, the differences around the mean can be very wide and we get results whose statistical significance cannot be established with certainty.



**Figure V.15 Population that Has Been the Victim of Corruption at Least Once in the Last Year, by Sex**

Another way to measure corruption levels is to use the percentage of people who have been victims of a bribe at least once in the last year. For Panama in 2006, this figure is 11.3% of respondents (see Figure V.5). Figure V.15 shows that men are victims of bribes more frequently than women, and that the difference is statistically significant.

Figure V.16 shows that the percentage of the population that has been a victim of corruption at least once increases with income. It should not be surprising that people with higher incomes report being victims of corruption more frequently than people with a lower socioeconomic level.




Figure V.16 Population that Has Been the Victim of Corruption at Least Once in the Last Year, by Income

Another element is the difference in the percentage of people who were victims of corruption in the different regions of the country. Figure V.17 shows that the metropolitan area has the highest percentage of people who were victims of having to pay a bribe at least once in the least year. The western area, composed of the provinces of Chiriquí, Bocas del Toro, and the *Comarca* Ngobe-Bugle, has the lowest levels.




Figure V.17 Population that Has Been the Victim of Corruption at Least Once in the Last Year, by Region



## Corruption Levels in Public Officials

In this section we analyze the results of a series of questions measuring the perception, among Panamanians, of how corrupt or honest various state institutions are. The questions are the following:

*Now I am going to name various public and private institutions. I would like to know how upright or corrupt you believe the representatives of these institutions are. I am going to ask that you rank each one of them on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 would be very corrupt and 10 very upright, or somewhere in between.*

INSTITUTIONS	Degree of Corruption										DK /N R	
	Very corrupt					Very upright						
PC1. Legislators [Read me the number]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC1
PC2. Ministers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC2
PC3. Municipal mayors	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC3
PANPC4. Corregimiento representatives	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PANPC4
PC5. Police	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC5
PC9. Priests, clergy, and ministers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC9
PC12. Judges	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC12
PC14. Political party leaders	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC14
PC15. NGO leaders	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC15
PC19. Mass media	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC19
PC21. Presidents	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC21

Figure V.18 compares the results of the 2004 and 2006 samples. We transformed the series of questions onto a scale of 0-to-100 to illustrate them better. High numbers represent more honesty or less corruption. The results are interesting. First, people's perceptions of the level of honesty in institutions dropped. The levels of honesty that the public perceives in all institutions, including religious leaders, fell with the exception of the president and legislators (whose increase is not statistically significant). Despite a slight increase in the perception of legislators' "honesty," the public continues to view them as the least "honest," followed by government ministers. By contrast, religious leaders maintain the image of being the most honest among the group of institutions.

It is notable that the level of "honesty" people perceive in presidents has significantly increased. This is probably due to two things. First, the 2004 survey was conducted in March of that year and during the last months of Mireya Moscoso's administration, which was involved in various corruption cases and strongly criticized for nepotism and improper use of state resources. In turn, President Martín Torrijos has made an effort to combat corruption, the results of which, although still not completely clear, might have given the public the impression that he is more "honest," or

at least that he is concerned about the topic. We should reiterate that we are analyzing public **perceptions** about the honesty of the leaders of various institutions. Therefore, we do not measure the **real** levels of corruption in these institutions; such an analysis is beyond the scope of this study.




Figure V.18 Public Perception of Corruption Levels in Various Institutions

## Conclusion

This chapter examined the impact of corruption. We have seen that more than three-quarters of the population in 2004 and 2006 believe that corruption among public officials is very or somewhat widespread, with a significant increase in the more negative perception. In urban areas, residents perceive higher levels of corruption than in rural ones. The percentage of respondents who admit they had to pay a bribe in the municipal government and the courts rose significantly between 2004 and 2006. Panama is among the countries with the fewest number of people who were victims of corruption at least once in the last 12 months: only 11.3% compared to 34.6% in Bolivia, the country with the greatest number of corruption victims. The main predictors of victimization by corruption are gender and income. Men and people with higher incomes tend to be victims of corruption more frequently. Finally, we see a reduction, between 2004 and 2006, in the perceptions of honesty in all institutions except the presidency.

## VI. The Rule of Law

One of the definitions that best summarizes the concept of the Rule of Law is that of Ronald Dworkin, who understands it as “the real preeminence of the law and the effective protection of basic rights.”<sup>57</sup> The existence of the rule of law is a basic and essential condition for democracy.

### *Measuring the Rule of Law: A Methodological Proposal*

Seligson contends that there is a close relation “between trust in the judicial system, a vital requisite for the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the political system.”<sup>58</sup> Seligson’s correlation is based on the existence of vigorous and healthy institutions and, above all, that people recognize the existence of such institutions.

In this methodological proposal, therefore, it is argued that it is important to correlate trust in the judicial system and “pride” felt in the political system of a particular country. What specific variables can be used to make this correlation and can explain whether or not there is a feeling of trust and pride in the judicial system and the rule of law? And, at the level of the individual, what does trust in these kinds of institutions depend on? In the ideal scenario, in which the Judicial Branch functions efficiently, on what variables does it depend that the individual and the society as a whole perceive such efficiency and, in turn, that this perception generates trust in the political system?

### *Levels of Trust in the Protection of Rights*

One of the most important aspects of the rule of law is the way in which institutions protect basic civil rights. Our study asked various questions regarding the levels of trust in various key institutions that protect basic rights. These institutions are, in some way, related to the judicial system. The questions are the following, and were measured using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “no” and 7 means “much.”

<b>B1.</b> How much do you believe that the Panamanian courts of justice guarantee a fair trial? <i>If you believe that the courts guarantee <u>no</u> justice, choose number 1; if you believe that the courts guarantee <u>much</u> justice, choose number 7, or somewhere in between.</i>
<b>B10A.</b> How much do you trust the system of justice?
<b>B16.</b> How much do you trust the Attorney General?
<b>B17.</b> How much do you trust the National Ombudsman’s Office?
<b>B18.</b> How much do you trust the Police?
<b>B31.</b> How much do you trust the Supreme Court?

<sup>57</sup> M. Seligson and P. Córdova, 2002, p.103.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., p103.

As we can see in Figure VI.1, between 2004 and 2006, trust in the institutions charged with protecting basic rights significantly diminished in all cases except the Attorney General.<sup>59</sup> The National Police is still the institution that inspires the most trust, but its level has dropped considerably over the last two years.




Figure VI.1 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights

Now we turn to analyze the factors that influence the levels of trust in these institutions. For this analysis, we constructed an index of support that includes the six questions we saw above. Statistically, we can justify treating these institutions as a single variable, based on a statistical reliability analysis with an Alpha coefficient of .836 and a factor analysis demonstrating that these institutions can be treated as just one dimension. Table VI.1 shows the results of the factor analysis. To create the index, we added up the values of the variables, converted to a scale of 0-to-100, as explained above, to thus obtain a general average or index of trust.

<sup>59</sup> For this analysis, the variables were transformed onto a scale of 0-to-100, with 0 meaning no trust and 100 meaning much trust. This transformation was conducted by converting the original scale (1-to-7) into a 6-point scale by subtracting 1 point from each value so that all values are located in a range of 0-to-6. Then, each value was divided by 6, so that the values are located in a range of 0-to-1. Finally these values were multiplied by 100.

**Table VI.1 Factor Analysis of Institutions that Protect Rights:  
Component Matrix(a)**

	Components 1
Supreme Court	.814
Attorney General	.803
System of Justice	.785
National Ombudsman's Office	.773
National Police	.714
Courts guarantee fair trials	.549

Extraction method: Analysis of principal components.  
a. 1 extracted components


Table VI.2 shows the results of the regression analysis. As we can see, the statistically significant factors are family monthly income, the size of the place of residence, and urban or rural residence. Besides these socio-demographic factors, other significant factors are: the level of fear of being the victim of a crime (AOJ11), trust in the judicial system to punish criminals (AOJ12), and the evaluation of the time that court cases take (PANA0J2).<sup>60</sup> The perception that there is corruption among the police (PC5) and judges (PC12) is also significant.

**Table VI.2 Predictors of Support for Institutions Charged with Protecting Basic Rights  
Coefficients(a)**

	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip.	Beta		
(Constant)	26.395	6.027		4.380	.000
<b>Income</b>	<b>1.164</b>	<b>.389</b>	<b>.079</b>	<b>2.990</b>	<b>.003</b>
Education	-.068	.136	-.014	-5.00	.617
<b>Urban/rural</b>	<b>10.716</b>	<b>2.288</b>	<b>.249</b>	<b>4.682</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>-1.975</b>	<b>.689</b>	<b>-.158</b>	<b>-2.866</b>	<b>.004</b>
Wealth	.228	.315	.020	.723	.469
Age	-.004	.034	-.003	-1.07	.915
Sex	-.987	.934	-.024	-1.057	.291
Crime victim	2.464	1.837	.030	1.341	.180
<b>Fear of being a crime victim</b>	<b>-2.050</b>	<b>.564</b>	<b>-.084</b>	<b>-3.632</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Trust in the judicial system to punish criminals</b>	<b>-1.606</b>	<b>.473</b>	<b>-.079</b>	<b>-3.397</b>	<b>.001</b>
Judicial system has improved or worsened in the last year	-.185	.713	-.006	-.260	.795
<b>Duration of court cases</b>	<b>-2.026</b>	<b>.694</b>	<b>-.067</b>	<b>-2.920</b>	<b>.004</b>
<b>Perception of corruption in the police</b>	<b>1.390</b>	<b>.222</b>	<b>.163</b>	<b>6.262</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Perception of corruption among judges</b>	<b>3.727</b>	<b>.248</b>	<b>.389</b>	<b>15.052</b>	<b>.000</b>


a Dependent variable: index of trust in institutions charged with basic rights

<sup>60</sup> Here, respondents were asked: **PANA0J2**. How do you evaluate the Judicial System in terms of the average time court cases take? [Read alternatives] (1) quick and efficient; (2) as long as necessary; (3) somewhat slow; (4) very slow; (8) DK/NR.




**Figure VI.2 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Size of the Area of Residence**

Figure VI.2 shows that the relation between trust in the institutions that protect rights and the size of the place of residence has the form of a “V.” The level of trust declines moving from the capital to large cities to medium-sized ones, and then increases sharply in small cities and rural areas. Figure VI.3 confirms these results, indicating that there is more trust in rural areas than urban ones.



**Figure VI.3 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Urban and Rural Areas**


In Figure VI.4, we see the impact of the perception of neighborhood insecurity on trust in the institutions that protect rights. Those people who feel less safe in their community have significantly lower levels of trust than people who feel safe. In the regression analysis (see Table VI.2), we see that being a victim of crime is not a significant explanatory factor of trust in the institutions that protect rights. Therefore, it is not whether or not one is a crime victim, but the level of insecurity in communities that influences the levels of public trust in the judicial system.



**Figure VI.4 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Perception of Neighborhood Safety**

Another factor with a significant impact is trust in the ability of the judicial system to punish criminals. Figure VI.5 shows that those people who have less trust in the ability of the judicial system also have little trust in the institutions that protect the public’s civil rights, although we see an increase between people who have much trust that the judicial system is capable of punishing criminals and people who only have “some” trust.





**Figure VI.5 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Trust that Criminals Will be Punished**

In Figures VI.6 and VI.7, we can see that the perception of corruption among the police and judges are important explanatory factors for supporting the institutions that protect basic rights. To the degree that people think that the police and judges are honest, their support for the institutions that protect basic rights increases significantly.




Figure VI.6 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Perception of Corruption in Police




Figure VI.7 Trust in Institutions that Protect Rights, by Perception of Corruption in Judges

### Victimization by Crime

Figure VI.8 shows that, in 2006, 92.9% of respondents said that they had not been the victim of a crime in the year prior to the survey. This represents a reduction from the percentage of victims in 2004.






Figure VI.8 Were You a Victim of Crime in the Last Year?

Figure VI.9 compares the levels of victimization by crime among the countries that make up this study. Here we see that Panama has the lowest level of victimization, with only 7.1% of respondents saying that they were the victim of a crime in the previous year. Peru and Chile are the countries with the highest levels of victimization, three times greater than Panama.



**Figure VI.9 Crime Victims in Comparative Perspective**



**Figure VI.10 How Safe Do You Feel in Your Neighborhood?**

Figure VI.10 compares the level of safety that people feel in their neighborhood or locality (AOJ11) between 2004 and 2006. In 2006, 35.6% of respondents maintain that they do not feel very safe in the community where they live, while 64.4% feel some degree of safety in their community. These results show a significant increase in the level of safety since 2004, when 55.4% felt safe in their community.

It is curious that there is a relatively high perception of insecurity (35.6%) but, if we recall, only 7.1% of respondents said they had been the victim of some kind of crime. Of this total, 55.1% were robbed without physical aggression or threat; 15% were victims of aggravated robbery; 14% experienced property damage; 5.6% were burglarized; and 8.4% were physically assaulted without robbery.




Figure VI.11 What Type of Crime Were You the Victim of?

Figure VI.12 shows that 57.4% of respondents did not report the crime they were a victim of. In turn, 42.6% did report it.




Figure VI.12 Did You Report the Crime?

Figure VI.13 compares the percentage of respondents who reported the crime among the countries of the study. We see that Panama is located in the middle of the countries: significantly more Panamanians reported the crime than in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, but much less than in Jamaica.




Figure VI.13 Did You Report the Crime? By Country






Figure VI.14 Why Did You Not Report the Crime?


Figure VI.14 shows that 44.3% of the people who said they had been the victim of some kind of crime did not report it because they do not trust the judicial system, the police, or any of the other institutions charged with watching over public safety. The second reason for not reporting a crime was the lack of proof.

## *Evaluating the Panamanian Judicial System*

In the 2006 sample, we asked a series of questions regarding opinions of the system of justice.

<p><b>PANAOJ1.</b> In the last 10 years, do you think that the Panamanian Judicial System has improved, gotten worse, or remains the same?                  (1) improved (2) gotten worse (3) remains the same (8) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ2.</b> How do you evaluate the system of justice in terms of the average time court cases take? [Read alternatives]                  (1) quick and efficient (2) last as long as is necessary (3) somewhat slow (4) very slow (8) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ3</b> Could you tell me what you consider to be the <b>main</b> problem currently confronting the judicial system in Panama? <b>[Do not read alternatives]</b>                  (1) Corruption                  (2) Slowness of justice                  (3) Lack of training of personnel                  (4) Lack of funds                  (5) Lack of judicial independence                  (6) Other                  (88) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ4</b> If you have a conflict or problem, how do you best like to resolve it? <b>[Do not read alternatives]</b>                  (1) <i>Corregiduría</i>                  (2) Mediation                  (3) Courts                  (4) National Ombudsman's Office                  (5) Police                  Other: _____                  (88) Don't know/No response</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ5</b> Have you had experience with or heard about mediation as way to resolve conflicts?                  (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ6.</b> When you have been close to a National Police officer, how safe do you feel? (1) very safe <b>[SKIP TO PANAOJ8]</b> (2) somewhat safe <b>[SKIP TO PANAOJ8]</b> (3) somewhat unsafe <b>[GO TO PANAOJ7]</b> (4) very unsafe <b>[GO TO PANAOJ7]</b> (8) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ7.</b> Why do you feel unsafe? <b>[Do not read alternatives]</b>                  (1) The police violate human rights (2) The police are corrupt (3) The police abuse their power (4) My experience with the police in the past has not been good                  (5) The police frighten me                  Other: _____ (88) DK/NR (99) NA</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ8.</b> Do you know a police officer by face or name in your neighborhood or community?                  (1) Yes, by face <b>[Go to PANAOJ9]</b> (2) Yes, by name <b>[Go to PANAOJ9]</b> (3) Yes, both <b>[Go to PANAOJ9]</b> (4) No <b>[Skip To VIC1]</b> (8) DK/NR</p>
<p><b>PANAOJ9.</b> How trustworthy do you believe the police officer you know is?                  (1) Very honest (2) Somewhat honest (3) Not very honest (4) Not at all honest (8) DK/NR                  (9) NA</p>

Below, we can see the results of these questions.



**Figure VI.15 In the Last 10 Years, the Judicial System Has Improved, Gotten Worse, or Remained the Same?**

In Figure VI.15, we see that the vast majority of respondents think that the judicial system has gotten worse or remained the same over the last 10 years. Only 11% think that the judicial system improved.





Figure VI.16 Evaluation of the Average Time Court Cases Last

Figure VI.16 indicates that 91.9% of Panamanians interviewed think that court cases are somewhat or very slow, and only 1.6% believe that they are quick and efficient. The main problem facing the judicial system is corruption.



**Figure VI.17 Main Problem Facing the Judicial System**

As seen in Figure VI.17, most respondents (52.1%) stated that corruption is the biggest problem facing the judicial system. Following this are the problems of the length of court cases and the level of training of the people who work in the system.





Figure VI.18 Preferred Institution to Resolve a Conflict or Problem

In Figure VI.18, we see that most Panamanians prefer to use the *corregiduría* (Office of the *Corregidor*) to resolve some kind of conflict or problem. The *corregidor* is a local, quasi-judicial and police figure, appointed by the mayor (*alcalde*) of each district, and can be removed by the mayor at any time. In accordance with the Administrative Code of Panama and Law 112 of 1974, (*Gaceta Oficial* No. 17,769 of January 28, 1975), a wide range of crimes, qualified as misdemeanors and infringements of the Code (*faltas y contravenciones*), such as petty theft, embezzlement and minor fraud, promoting and abetting prostitution and corruption, minor assault, etc., are under the jurisdiction of the *corregidor*. It should be noted that the position of *corregidor* has been criticized since it is a non-elected institution and has few institutional checks and balances at the local level. *Corregidores* have also been accused of corruption in the application of the law and deciding who has jurisdiction over cases. It is, however, an institution that has grown roots in the community and whose assistance the public seeks more than the police or courts.

In recent years, various programs have been implemented to incentivize to the use of conflict mediation techniques to resolve problems in the community as part of an effort to streamline the process of negotiating the judicial bureaucracy and diminish the number of cases that the courts have to address. However, as we can see in Figure VI.19, only 25.4% of the population has heard about mediation as a conflict resolution technique.



**Figure VI.19 Have You Heard About Mediation as a Way to Resolve Conflicts?**

Additionally, we asked about people’s perception of the police. The lack of trust in the police can significantly affect trust in the judicial system. We have already seen that the perception of corruption in the police negatively affects trust in the institutions that protect basic rights. First, we asked how safe citizens feel when they find themselves close to a police officer. Figure VI.20 shows the results: 56.7% feel very or somewhat safe, and 43.3% very or somewhat unsafe.




Figure VI.20 How Safe Do You Feel When You Are Close to a Police Officer?



Figure VI.21 indicates the reasons why people feel unsafe near a police officer. The main reason is that the police are corrupt. While 38.9% of respondents chose this response, 23.7% said they feel unsafe because the police violate citizens' human rights. And 21.5% feel unsafe because the police abuse their power.




Figure VI.21 Why Do You Feel Unsafe?

In the following figure, we can see that half of respondents know a police officer and the other half do not. Of those who know a police officer, 26.0% know the officer by name and face, and 15.8% only by face (see Figure VI.22).




Figure VI.22 Do You Know a Police Officer?

We can see in Figure VI.23 that trust in the police (question B18) declines when a person does not know a police officer. Therefore, community patrolling and the relationship National Police officers have with communities are important to strengthen trust in this institution.




Figure VI.23 Trust in the National Police by Knowing a Police Officer Personally

Finally, we can see in Figure VI.24 that the vast majority of people who know a police officer believe that they are trustworthy: 68% of respondents who know a police officer say that they are very or somewhat honest; 32% think that they are not very or not at all honest.




Figure VI.24 How Honest Do You Think the Police Officer You Know Is?

### Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that trust in the institutions charged with protecting citizens' basic rights declined significantly between 2004 and 2006. The main factors that influence the levels of trust in judicial institutions are disbelief that the judicial system can tackle the crime problem, the fear of being the victim of a crime, and the perception there is corruption among judges and the police. We can also see that as trust in judicial institutions declines, support for the institutional system drops significantly as well. We see that 93% of respondents say that they were not the victim of a crime in the last year, and that 57.4% of the victims did not report the crime. Of those who did not report the crime, 44.3% said they did not because reporting it did not serve any purpose. Finally, we see that although most people think that the police are trustworthy and feel safe near them, a significant minority have the opposite opinion; and levels of trust in the National Police are negatively affected when respondents do not know a police officer.

## VII. Local Government and Democracy

According to ECLAC, “within the framework of decentralization, the strides made in fulfilling efficiency and equity goals have not been completely satisfactory. The economic development of the different countries (of the Latin American region) continues to be geographically concentrated and inequitable. For this reason, it has not been possible to take advantage of the productive potential of the different regions, which in turn constitutes one of the causes of increasing poverty. Therefore, the analysis of the role that localities play in promoting economic development within the context of decentralization has become one of the important new topics for the countries of the region.”<sup>61</sup>

In another section of this same study, which addresses Bolivia, it is pointed out that “even if (local government programs) have improved social conditions at the municipal level, the persistence of poverty, and the migration of peasants to more populated centers in search of a source of income with which to sustain their families, is still troubling.”<sup>62</sup>

The concern for democracy and local government stems from the assumption suggested by Alexis de Tocqueville. The French aristocrat noted that democracy is strong, in part, because of its wide proliferation in many local units.<sup>63</sup> His observation was based on his experience in rural communities in the United States at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

According to Alfredo Rodríguez, “the economic crisis and the exacerbation of poverty have coincided with the process of re-democratization in the region. This process has helped raise the public’s expectation that their standard of living will improve.” For Rodríguez, local political organization, as conceived by de Tocqueville, can contribute to democratization. “In this context, decentralization”, he says, “can facilitate the participation of new social actors who change the contours of civil society – non-government organizations, grassroots organizations, and indigenous groups are going to join the actors that traditionally dominated the local scene.” Rodríguez observes, “however, [that] the social sectors in most need – women, senior citizens, migrants, marginal peasants, informal sector workers, etc. – do not have the capacity to organize themselves effectively.”<sup>64</sup>

The size and proliferation of political decision-making units is only one aspect. “The municipality,” Rodríguez adds, “is a geographic and institutional domain in which decentralization is going to promote new types of decision-making processes. Developing the capacity to participate in these processes is essential to ensure that municipal political life takes the local interests of different social actors and sectors into account. A crucial aspect of municipal politics is getting civil society to participate.”

<sup>61</sup> CEPAL, 2001, *Desarrollo económico local y descentralización en América Latina: Análisis comparativo*, Project Director, Gabriel Aghón. Editors, Francisco Albuquerque and Patricia Cortés, Santiago de Chile: Proyecto Regional de Desarrollo Económico Local y Descentralización, CEPAL/GTZ, p2.

<sup>62</sup> CEPAL, *Desarrollo económico local y descentralización en América Latina: Un análisis comparativo*, Ibid., p97.

<sup>63</sup> See M. Seligson and P. Córdova, 2002, *Auditoría de la democracia. Ecuador*, Quito: Ediciones CEDATOS, p.77.

<sup>64</sup> Preface to Alfredo Rodríguez, 1997, “Descentralización en América Latina,” (SUR, Chile). (The final version is titled “The Contents of Decentralization: Concept, Objectives, Pros and Cons, and Challenges”)

Furthermore, Rodríguez points to the cultural problems of decentralization that transcend the purely administrative aspects of governance. “The government of a locality, to which programs are decentralized, is not reducible to the existence of the municipal administration. At the local level, the social and cultural identity of individuals, families, and communities are expressed more clearly. Decentralization is an opportunity for local cultural identity to express itself in a new way.”

“In summary,” Rodríguez concludes, “decentralization at the local level occurs in a context in which various political and administrative structures, social organizations, productive systems, families, and communities coexist. For this reason, it is necessary to have clear classificatory criteria for different types of municipalities in order to appropriately evaluate their governance, better guide decentralization, and identify the impact on the efficacy and efficiency of the process.”

Panama has a rich history of local demonstrations at the municipal level, especially through open town hall meetings (*cabildos abiertos*) which have been vehicles for voicing worries, protests, and demands.<sup>65</sup> It is worth noting that, in 1821, the municipality of Panamá proclaimed independence from Spain. The separation from Colombia in 1903 was also a municipal act by capital residents. In fact, the secession was not formally legitimated until all the municipalities of the country joined it. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, these expressions of local democracy have been, in large part, mediated by the growing centralization of political administration by the presidency.

Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the power of the regional political boss (*cacique*), who voiced local interests, was replaced by the power of national political bosses (*caudillos*). In the 1990s, municipal decentralization programs were started with foreign support. The most recent project states that “Panama is one of the Central American countries where municipalities have fewer responsibilities for the provision of services and infrastructure and for the collection of revenue. The situation of the sub-national entities is the following: (a) 2% of total public spending is executed by the municipalities and provinces; (b) the contribution of the sub-national entities to the Gross Domestic Product does not exceed 1%; and (c) more than 65% of municipalities depend on the national government for their operation.”<sup>66</sup>

According to Law 106, municipalities have authority over (a) everything related to municipal construction and services, (b) the construction of town squares, parks, public walkways and roads, (c) the construction of slaughterhouses, marketplaces, and cemeteries, (d) establishing and regulating garbage collection and street cleaning, (e) providing communal services, and (f) providing judicial services.

According to the analysts of the municipal development program, “the legislation recognizes the importance of citizen participation in defining local investment priorities but it does not establish operational mechanisms for its implementation. Often, municipal investment budgets are divided

<sup>65</sup> See Justo Arosemena, *El Estado Federal*. It is also worth looking at the article by historian Alfredo Castellero Calvo, in *Tareas* N°116, (January-April 2004), “Los grupos de poder en la colonia,” pp5-22).

<sup>66</sup> See *Programa de Desarrollo Municipal y Apoyo a la Descentralización*, 2001, PN-0143, Gobiernos Municipales y Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF).

equally among the municipal council members (*concejales*). They are then sometimes assigned to projects prioritized by community improvement committees, but mostly go to projects favored by the municipal council members themselves. As a consequence, a good part of municipal investments are inefficient and do not fulfill local priorities. Besides this, municipalities have little capacity to manage their investments.”


The Program has been structured on the basis of three components:

1. **Decentralization and municipal development (20%)**, is concerned with the conception and design of the “municipal system;”
2. **Modernization of municipal governments and citizen participation (30%)**, is concerned with promoting greater public participation and improving the management of investments; and
3. **Local investments (50%)**, which includes public works projects financed by a Municipal Credit Line (*Línea de Financiamiento Municipal* or LFM), administered by the national private bank.

### ***Satisfaction with Municipal Governance***

The survey presented a series of questions aimed at measuring satisfaction with local government services. The main question we asked was the following:


**SGL1.** *Would you say that the services that the municipality offers people are...? ) Very good, 2) Good, 3) Neither good, nor bad, 4) Bad, 5) Very bad, 8) Don't know*



**Figure VII.1 Satisfaction with Local Government Services**

According to Figure VII.1, only 11.5% of respondents in 2006 consider that municipalities offer good or very good services. By contrast, 61.7% believe that they are neither good nor bad. We can see that there was a reduction in the positive evaluations between 2004 and 2006, and an increase in the people who said they were very bad from 5.5% in 2004 to 8.8% in 2006.





**Figure VII.2 Satisfaction with Local Government Services, Panama in Comparative Perspective**

Figure VII.2 indicates that Panama is third in terms of poor satisfaction levels with municipal government services. This reflects, in large part, the weakness of local government in Panama, which generally lacks the economic resources and political authority to address community problems.


To determine some of the demographic, socioeconomic, and geographic factors that influence the evaluation of municipal services in Panama, we conducted a multivariable analysis. To do this we used multiple linear regression models. The first model presented is for satisfaction with municipal services.

The model we developed shows that, when all other factors are held constant, the demographic variable of sex and social variables, like education level, do not have an impact on people's satisfaction with municipal services. The geographic variable like urban or rural residence also is not a satisfactory or significant predictor. However, the socioeconomic variable of wealth does show significant influence on satisfaction with municipal services. We see that evaluations of the national, and one's personal, economic situation also influence satisfaction with municipal services.

**Table VII.1 Predictors of Satisfaction with Municipal Services**  
Coefficients(a)


	Non- Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip.	Beta		
(Constant)	32.318	3.688		8.762	.000
Income	.959	.442	.068	2.170	.030
Education	-.182	.153	-.040	1.190	.234
Size of place of residence	-.327	.387	-.027	-.846	.398
<b>Wealth</b>	<b>-.911</b>	<b>.354</b>	<b>-.084</b>	<b>2.572</b>	<b>.010</b>
Age	.002	.039	.001	.043	.965
Sex	-.639	1.062	-.016	-.601	.548
<b>National economic situation</b>	<b>.173</b>	<b>.025</b>	<b>.195</b>	<b>6.869</b>	<b>.000</b>
<b>Personal economic situation</b>	<b>.060</b>	<b>.029</b>	<b>.061</b>	<b>2.109</b>	<b>.035</b>
<b>Contributed to resolving problems in the neighborhood</b>	<b>.030</b>	<b>.012</b>	<b>.068</b>	<b>2.492</b>	<b>.013</b>
<b>Trust in municipal government</b>	<b>.132</b>	<b>.019</b>	<b>.184</b>	<b>6.883</b>	<b>.000</b>

a Dependent variable: satisfaction with local government services




**Figure VII.3 Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Level of Wealth**

In Figure VII.3, we can see that as levels of wealth increase, satisfaction with the services offered by the municipality declines. The following figures show that when the national or personal economic situation is poor, satisfaction with municipal services declines.




**Figure VII.4 Satisfaction with Local Government Services by National Economic Situation**

Figure VII.4 shows that the perception of the country’s economic situation has a significant impact on satisfaction with municipal services. People who believe that the national economic situation is very bad tend to be less satisfied with local government services.



**Figure VII.5 Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Personal Economic Situation**

Figure VII.5 shows similar results for the perception of one's personal economic situation. Satisfaction with municipal services drops significantly the worse one's personal economic situation.




**Figure VII.6 Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Trust in Municipal Government**

Figure VII.6 shows that the level of trust in municipal government affects satisfaction with local government services: the greater the trust in the job the municipal government is doing, the greater the satisfaction in the services it provides.


### ***Public Participation in Municipal Affairs***

Participation stands out as one of the most important elements of a democracy. On the one hand, it can be viewed as the capacity of the public to mobilize itself. On the other, it can be understood as a process in which the public creates the institutions through which it manifests its interests. Programs designed to strengthen local governments also try to promote participation. In Latin America, public participation is relatively weak despite the electoral processes. Demonstrations call for participation beyond the realm of democratic institutions. That is, political parties, local governments, and other institutions do not become centers of participation.



**Figure VII.7 Municipal Meeting Attendance**

The survey conducted in Panama attempted to measure the level of participation based on one basic question (NP1). The question asks about respondents’ participation in municipal meetings in the year preceding the interview. The results, in Figure VII.7, indicate that 1 out of every 16 Panamanians participated in municipal meetings during the period in question. There is practically no difference between the samples from 2004 and 2006.



**Figure VII.8 Municipal Meeting Attendance, Comparative Perspective**

According to Figure VII.8, Panama has the second lowest participation level in local meetings of all the countries in the study. In Panama, the relationship between local government and the public has apparently lost significance. During the first phase of the military regime led by General Torrijos in the 1970s, there was an effort to create a mediating political institution at the level of the *corregimiento* (the smallest administrative political division in the country). The effort had some success mobilizing local groups, but it did not significantly strengthen democratic institutions. In the 1990s, the experiment with *corregimiento*-level “community improvement committees” was largely abandoned.



We conducted a multivariable analysis to determine which factors are related to public participation. The results, presented in Table VII.2, reveal that family size, wealth, and the sex of the respondent are associated with participation in municipal meetings. Likewise, having contributed to resolve community problems and participating in professional associations are associated with municipal meeting attendance.

The results show that the variables of age, civil state, and income are not associated with municipal participation levels. Neither is participation in parent-teacher association or neighborhood improvement committees.

Table VII.2 Predictors of Municipal Meeting Attendance  
Coefficients(a)

	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip.			
(Constant)	9.840	3.943		2.495	.013
Income	-.034	.522	-.002	-.065	.948
Education	-.060	.188	-.011	-.320	.749
Size of the place of residence	-.718	.456	-.049	-1.574	.116
<b>Wealth</b>	<b>1.021</b>	<b>.420</b>	<b>.076</b>	<b>2.429</b>	<b>.015</b>
Age	-.051	.052	-.030	-.962	.336
<b>Sex</b>	<b>-4.339</b>	<b>1.299</b>	<b>-.088</b>	<b>-3.341</b>	<b>.001</b>
<b>Number of children</b>	<b>.878</b>	<b>.343</b>	<b>.085</b>	<b>2.558</b>	<b>.011</b>
Married	-.011	.014	-.022	-.806	.420
<b>Contributed to resolving neighborhood problems</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>.016</b>	<b>.100</b>	<b>3.488</b>	<b>.001</b>
Participation in parent-teacher association	-.011	.015	-.020	-.725	.469
Participation in community improvement committee	.022	.018	.036	1.218	.224
<b>Participation in professional associations</b>	<b>.189</b>	<b>.022</b>	<b>.229</b>	<b>8.527</b>	<b>.000</b>

a. Dependent variable: Municipal meeting attendance (np1r)




Figure VII.9 Municipal Meeting Attendance by Gender and Wealth

Figure VII.9 indicates that the difference between men and women in attending municipal meetings occurs among high levels of wealth. We see that participation increases significantly for people, particularly men, with high levels of wealth.




Figure VII.10 Municipal Meeting Attendance by Contributing to Resolve Community Problems

Figure VII.10 shows that people who have voluntarily contributed to resolve community problems tend to participate in municipal meetings more frequently. In Figure VII.11, we can see that people who participate in professional, merchant, or producer associations tend to attend municipal meetings more frequently. What we see, therefore, is a relation between various levels of participation. Apparently, there is feedback between the various levels of community participation.




Figure VII.11 Municipal Meeting Attendance by Participation in Professional, Merchant, or Producer Associations

### Petitioning Municipal Governments

People who attend municipal meetings do not necessarily intervene more in politics or petition the appropriate institution. Often, participation occurs at other levels in other institutions.

In this sense, soliciting or petitioning municipal government officials reflects a more active attitude. To capture this side of participation, we included a question in the questionnaire from the March 2004 survey.

NP2 *Have you requested assistance or petitioned a municipal office or official in the last 12 months?*

The results that this question reveals are very important since more people petition local authorities than attend municipal meetings. Figure VII.12 shows that, in the year prior to the 2006 survey, 9.6% of the population petitioned their local government. Two comments can be made about this. On the one hand, the lack of meeting attendance is not the product of public indifference. Rather, it is due to the fact that local authorities do not convoke them. Proof of this is that people make petitions without local authorities having to push them.





Figure VII.12 Petitioned Municipal Government in the Last Year



**Figure VII.13 Petitioned Local Government in the Last Year, Panama in Comparative Perspective**

We can see, in Figure VII.13, that Panama is located in last place in terms of petitioning local authorities. Again, this represents the weakness of local government in Panama and the absence of the decentralization policies that can be seen in other countries.

**Table VII.3 Predictors of Petitioning Municipal Government  
Coefficients(a)**

	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
	B	Error t <sub>p</sub> .	Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	7.459	4.855		1.536	.125
Income	.821	.640	.039	1.283	.200
Education	.039	.231	.006	.167	.867
Size of the place of residence	-.834	.562	-.047	-1.484	.138
Wealth	.874	.515	.055	1.698	.090
<b>Age</b>	<b>-.182</b>	<b>.064</b>	<b>-.091</b>	<b>-2.825</b>	<b>.005</b>
Sex	1.344	1.571	.023	.855	.393
<b>Number of children</b>	<b>1.313</b>	<b>.420</b>	<b>.107</b>	<b>3.125</b>	<b>.002</b>
Married	-.026	.017	-.043	-1.564	.118
<b>Contributed to resolve neighborhood problems</b>	<b>.117</b>	<b>.018</b>	<b>.177</b>	<b>6.615</b>	<b>.000</b>

a Dependent variable: Petitioning local government (np2r)

Table VII.3 shows the factors that explain the differences in petitioning are the respondents' age, the number of children they have, and contributing to resolve problems in the community or neighborhood.




Figure VII.14 Petitioning Municipal Government by Age

In Figure VII.14, we can see the impact of respondents' ages on petitioning the municipal government. The result is a curvilinear relation in which petitioning local government institutions increases among the youngest and middle ages, but declines significantly among older people. This relation might be the result of the number of children that a person has. In other words, people between 26 and 45 years old are more likely to have children in schools, need community services like sports camps, and worry more about neighborhood safety.






Figure VII.15 Petitioning Municipal Governments by Contributing to Resolve Neighborhood Problems

As we can see in Figure VII.15, petitioning the local government increases significantly among people who contribute to solving community problems. This result should not be surprising, since we can assume there is a close relation between soliciting assistance or petitioning local authorities and the efforts to resolve community problems. People who dedicate time to their community probably have better knowledge of the deficiencies in the services and local government structures. Therefore, in their search for solutions to these problems, they request assistance from local authorities with more frequency.

### *Comparing the National and Local Government*

In the past, national governments were seen as distant entities, sometimes all-powerful. By contrast, local authorities were often people one knew. A very clear distinction was established between the two levels. Even from the economic point of view, this distinction existed: the former was richer while the latter poorer. With the development of roads and changes in communication technology, perceptions have changed. In the survey, we asked people who they would request assistance from to resolve a problem. We formulated four questions to capture the responses:

To resolve your problems, have you ever asked for assistance or cooperation from ...?

1. some legislator from the National Assembly (CP2)
2. some ministry or national government agency (CP4)
3. the mayor of this district (CP4A)
4. the *corregimiento* representative (PANCP4B)
5. the *corregidor* (PANCP4C)

We can see a significant reduction in petitions for assistance to all institutions between 2004 and 2006. This might reflect the marked increase we saw in the alienation between the population and the political system. In the 2006 sample, we can see that 5.9% had asked for assistance from a national agency or ministry and 10.5% solicited cooperation from a legislator. By contrast, 12.1% responded that they had requested help from the *corregimiento* representative. Only 5.5% solicited assistance from the *corregidor*.




Figure VII.16 Which Government Official Did You Request Assistance From?

Figure VII.17 gives us the results by strata. Here we can see that, in the western area (Chiriquí, Bocas del Toro, and the *Comarca* Ngobe-Bugle), 14.6% of those who had requested help, asked a legislator. In the eastern area (Darién, Colón and the districts of the province of Panamá, except Panama City and San Miguelito), people mainly petition legislators and *corregimiento* representatives. In the central (Veraguas and Azuero) and metropolitan (districts of Panamá and San Miguelito) areas, people request assistance from *corregimiento* representatives.

These results confirm the thesis that people see little difference between legislators and representatives in terms of their responsibility for resolving community problems, since both receive similar numbers of requests for help.





Figure VII.17 Requesting Help from Different Government Officials by Strata

### *Trust in Municipal Government*

We also asked respondents the degree of trust they placed in government officials (see Chapter IV). The levels of trust are relatively low. In Figure VII.18, we can see that the levels of trust are statistically equal for local and nation governments.



**Figure VII.18 Support for the Local versus the National Government**

In Figure VII.19, we can see that the vast majority of people think that more resources and responsibilities should be given the national government. This response reflects the low credibility that local governments have in resolving community problems and the historic centralization of the Panamanian political system.




Figure VII.19 Who Should Be Given More Resources and Responsibilities?

These results are confirmed when we see, in Figure VII.20, that only 11.4% of respondents are willing to pay higher taxes to municipal governments.





Figure VII.20 Would You Be Willing to Pay Higher Taxes to the Municipal Government?

What factors influence trust in municipal government? To answer this question, we conducted a regression analysis whose results can be seen in Table VII.4. We see that income, education, and the size of the place of residence are the significant factors. In the case of education, the negative sign of the coefficient indicates that the greater the level of education, the less the trust in local authorities. However, the greater the income, the greater the trust. Additionally, satisfaction with municipal services is also an important predictive factor of the level of trust in local government.

**Table VII.4 Predictors of Trust in Municipal Government Coefficients(a)**

	Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Error tip.	Beta		
(Constant)	30.118	5.152		5.846	.000
<b>Income</b>	<b>1.745</b>	<b>.635</b>	<b>.088</b>	<b>2.748</b>	<b>.006</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>-.512</b>	<b>.221</b>	<b>-.081</b>	<b>-2.316</b>	<b>.021</b>
<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>1.615</b>	<b>.559</b>	<b>.096</b>	<b>2.890</b>	<b>.004</b>
Wealth	.207	.515	.014	.402	.688
Age	-.033	.057	-.017	-.575	.565
Sex	-1.319	1.540	-.024	-.856	.392
Contribute to resolving neighborhood problems	.025	.018	.041	1.416	.157
<b>Satisfaction with municipal services</b>	<b>.290</b>	<b>.039</b>	<b>.207</b>	<b>7.479</b>	<b>.000</b>
Municipal meeting attendance	.009	.032	.008	.279	.781
Requesting help from municipal government	.022	.027	.023	.808	.419


a Dependent variable: b32r



**Figure VII.21 Trust in Municipal Government by Size of the Place of Residence**

Although the pattern is not uniform, we can see in Figure VII.21 that trust in local authorities increases in rural areas.





**Figure VII.22 Trust in Municipal Government by Education**

Trust in local government declines as educational levels increase (see Figure VII.22). But we can also see that trust increases among people with high incomes (see Figure VII.23).




Figure VII.23 Trust in Municipal Government by Wealth

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented abundant information about how Panamanians view local government. Panama stands out, among the countries in this study, for having the lowest level of support for and participation in local government. We also see that factors such as contributing to resolve neighborhood problems, and the national and one's personal economic situation, significantly influence how people evaluate municipal services. We can also conclude that the two factors that most influence municipal meeting attendance are contributing to resolve community problems and the level of participation in professional, merchant, or producer associations. That is, people who are willing to participate in these cases are those who normally also attend municipal meetings. We can also see that satisfaction with municipal services, education, income, and the size of the place of residence are the most significant factors explaining trust in local government. The chapter demonstrated that there was a significant reduction in petitioning various institutions for help between 2004 and 2006, with legislators and *corregimiento* representatives receiving the most requests for assistance. Lastly, the chapter demonstrated that people neither support giving more resources and responsibilities to local governments nor paying municipalities higher taxes.

## VIII. Voting Behavior in Panama


With the return of democratically elected regimes, the legitimacy of the electoral process has become a concern. At the same time, the need to understand citizen voting behavior has become paramount. In this survey, we asked about Panamanians' electoral behavior and analyzed the responses. The dependent variable that we try to explain is Panamanians' voting behavior in the 2004 elections.

**Table VIII.1 Voter Turnout in the 1999 and 2004 Presidential Elections**

	1999 Elections		2004 Elections	
	Absolute Number	% of the population able to vote	Absolute Number	% of the population able to vote
Voters	1,746,989	99.1	1,999,553	99.0
Annulled or blank votes	56,225	3.2	38,295	1.9
Valid votes	1,274,505	72.4	1,499,097	74.9
Total votes	1,330,730	75.5	1,537,392	76.9

Source: Electoral Tribunal

In Panama, more than 75% of the population voted in the 1999 and the 2004 elections. The reason why voter turnout is relatively high, compared to other countries in and outside the region, is that the public still considers that their vote can influence politicians' behavior.



Comparing the survey results from Figure VIII.1 with the real level of participation in Table VIII.1, we can see that the survey reflects the abstention rate in the 2004 elections with relative accuracy. The survey overestimates the level of participation by 2.6%, which reflects the

sample's margin of error and the natural tendency of people to “correctly” respond that they voted even when they might not have. But we should emphasize that the survey reflects voter participation in both elections very well.

Abstentionism is greater in urban areas than rural ones, as seen in Figure VIII.3.





Figure VIII.3 Voted in the 2004 Elections by Urban/Rural



**Figure VIII.4 Voted in the 2004 Elections by Strata**

Figure VIII.4 shows the responses for the different regions of the country. Voter turnout was higher in the central area (provinces of Herrera, Los Santos, and Veraguas) than in the other regions. These results reflect the real levels, in that the area of Azuero generally has the highest level of voter turnout.

How does Panama compare to the other countries of the study? Figure VIII.5 shows that Panama has high levels of voter turnout and trust in the value of elections. In Figure VIII.5, we can see that Panama is in sixth place in terms of voter turnout.<sup>67</sup>




Figure VIII.5 Did You Vote in the Last Presidential Election? Comparative Perspective

<sup>67</sup> We should point out that in some countries, such as Colombia and Guatemala, voting is not mandatory.

### *Predictors of Voter Turnout in the 2004 Elections*


Table VIII.2 analyzes the factors that influenced participation in the 2004 election.

**Table VIII.2 Predictors of Voter Turnout in the 2004 Election**

	B	E.T.	Wald	gl	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1(a) <b>Education</b>	<b>.087</b>	<b>.025</b>	<b>12.341</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.091</b>
<b>Age</b>	<b>.064</b>	<b>.008</b>	<b>71.529</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.066</b>
Sex	.229	.160	2.061	1	.151	1.258
<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>.213</b>	<b>.060</b>	<b>12.494</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.237</b>
Wealth	-.010	.057	.031	1	.859	.990
Income	-.007	.073	.010	1	.921	.993
<b>Contribute to resolve neighborhood problems</b>	<b>.006</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>6.470</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.011</b>	<b>1.006</b>
Participate in political party meetings	-.003	.003	.724	1	.395	.997
Ideology	-.010	.039	.066	1	.798	.990
Municipal meeting attendance	-.005	.003	2.155	1	.142	.995
Petition municipal government	.004	.003	1.284	1	.257	1.004
<b>Convince someone to vote</b>	<b>-.007</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>9.609</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.993</b>
<b>Work for a party or candidate</b>	<b>.008</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>6.395</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.011</b>	<b>1.008</b>
<b>Interest in politics</b>	<b>.008</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>4.978</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.026</b>	<b>1.008</b>
Frequency that talk politics	.006	.004	1.977	1	.160	1.006
Constant	-2.746	.577	22.675	1	.000	.064

a Variable(s) introduced in step 1: ed, q2, q1, tamanor, Wealth, q10, cp5r, cp13r, l1, np1r, np2r, pp1r, pp2r, pol1r, pol2r.


According to the survey results, the socio-demographic variables of education and age exercise significant influence. We can also see that the size of the place of residence is a significant factor. Additionally, participation variables, like contributing to resolve neighborhood problems, trying to convince people how to vote, and working for a candidate or party influence voter turnout. Finally, interest in politics is also an important factor.



**Figure VIII.6 Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election by Education, Controlling for Age**


Figure VIII.6 indicates that voter turnout significantly rises as educational levels increase. In this analysis, we controlled for age and can see that the relation between education and voter turnout remained the same.






**Figure VIII.7 Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election by Size of the Place of Residence**

In Figure VIII.7, we can see that voter turnout increased as the size of respondents' place of residence decreased. Medium-sized cities showed the highest level of voter turnout.



**Figure VIII.8 Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election by Contributing to Resolve Community Problems**

Figure VIII.8 shows the relation between contributing to resolve community problems and voter turnout. People who contribute to the solution of community problems participate in elections 13% more than those who do not.



**Figure VIII.9 Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election by Working with a Political Party**

We can see that more than 90% of people who work for a political party tend to vote, a significantly higher amount than people who do not work for a political party. This result confirms that people with a higher level of party commitment tend to be more motivated to vote more than those without any party affiliation. In these results, we see that active participation at various levels encourages voter turnout. Figure VIII.10 shows that people with more interest in politics participate in elections in greater proportion than those who have little interest.




Figure VIII.10 Voted in the 2004 Presidential Election by Level of Interest in Politics

### Political Orientations

In this section, we analyze the party and ideological orientation of Panamanian voters. For this analysis, we used a variable of self-defined ideology and voting for political parties in the legislative and presidential elections to examine the ideological variation among the supporters of the different political parties. The analysis seeks to understand the ideological positions of Panama's political parties. With few exceptions, political parties in Panama tend to be weak institutions with little ideological integration or a strong relationship with wide sectors of the society. The exceptions are the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (Democratic Revolutionary Party) and the *Partido Arnulfista* (Arnulfista Party; historically called the *Partido Panameñista*, or Panamanianist Party). As we have already seen, these two parties have polarized voter preferences since the restoration of democracy, and have even been the political forces most representative of the voting population since the 1980s.

First, Figure VIII.11 shows that Panamanians' self-described ideological position is concentrated in the middle of the ideological scale of 1-to-10. A reduction in right-wing attitudes between 2004 and 2006 can also be seen. The average on the scale in 2004 was 6.4, while in 2006 it is 5.1, showing a slight movement toward the center. The results allow us to conclude that, ideologically, Panamanians tend to concentrate in the center, with a slight preference for the center-right. There is little ideological polarization among Panamanians.




Figure VIII.11 Scale of Self-Defined Ideology, Comparison Between 2004 and 2006

Now, where do political party supporters sit on the ideological scale?





Figure VIII.12 Party Preference by Ideology<sup>68</sup>

We can see in Figure VIII.12 that the ideological average of the supporters of the main parties is found in the center of the scale, and that generally there are no statistically significant differences between the supporters. Nonetheless, we can see that those who voted for the *Partido Arnulfista* are a little to the left of the PRD, and that the ideological dispersion, that is the wide difference within the party, is greater in *Cambio Democrático* (Democratic Change) and *Molirena* than the other parties. The PRD is the party with the least ideological dispersion among its supporters.

<sup>68</sup> The figure shows the average and the standard deviation for each political party.




**Figure VIII.13 Presidential Preference by Ideology**

Figure VIII.13 shows similar results in voting for president. There is no major ideological difference between the voters for the presidential candidates. Therefore, the differences do not tend to be ideological but personal.

### *Evaluating the Current Administration*


Finally, this chapter analyzes opinions about the administration of President Martín Torrijos. As we already saw in Chapter I, President Torrijos took power September 1, 2004, and has already finished two years of his term. At the time the survey was conducted, from June 16 to July 14, 2006, the administration had already experienced difficult moments implementing fiscal and social security reforms. It also had problems implementing programs to combat corruption and with changes to the Supreme Court. At the time of the survey, the most important political topic was the widening of the Panama Canal and the referendum conducted on October 22, 2006.



**Figure VIII.14 The Job President Martín Torrijos is Doing is...**

Figure VIII.14 shows the evaluation results of the president's job. We can see that 67.5% of respondents said that he is doing neither a good nor bad job. We can interpret this as a neutral evaluation. Only 18.1% thought the president is doing a good or very good job. It should be noted that this represents an improvement over the opinions expressed in the 2004 sample for President Mireya Moscoso, when only 11.4% said good or very good, and 34.8% said bad or very bad. In the case of Martín Torrijos, only 14.4% say he is doing a bad or very bad job. Obviously, it is important to note that President Moscoso was finishing her term when the 2004 survey was conducted, and that Torrijos still has three more years in power.






**Figure VIII.15 Evaluating the President’s Job in Comparative Perspective**

In Figure VIII.15, we can see that Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe has the highest approval rating, followed by President Leonel Fernández of the Dominican Republic , Evo Morales of Bolivia, and Michelle Bachelet of Chile. The presidents with the lowest approval ratings are Alfredo Palacio of Ecuador and Enrique Bolaños of Nicaragua. President Torrijos is located in the middle of the scale, with an approval rating of 50.5.

To measure levels of efficacy in government policies, the survey asked the following questions:

Now, on this same scale ( <i>follow with card A: scale of 1-to-7 points</i> )	<b>Note 1-7, 8 = DN/NR</b>
<b>N1.</b> How much would you say the current administration fights poverty?	<b>N1</b>
<b>N3.</b> How much would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principals?	<b>N3</b>
<b>N9.</b> How much would you say the current administration fights government corruption?	<b>N9</b>
<b>N10.</b> How much would you say the current administration protects human rights?	<b>N10</b>
<b>N11.</b> How much would you say the current administration improves public safety?	<b>N11</b>
<b>N12.</b> How much would you say the current administration fights unemployment?	<b>N12</b>

We used these questions to create a government efficacy scale.<sup>69</sup> First, in Figure VIII.16, we see the comparative results of this scale. Panama is found in the middle of the countries with an average of 40.7 on the scale of 0-to-100. The country with the highest perception of government efficacy is the Dominican Republic, and the lowest is Ecuador.



**Figure VIII.16 Efficacy of the Current Administration in Comparative Perspective**

<sup>69</sup> A reliability analysis gives us a Cronbach alpha of 0.909.


What factors influence the efficacy levels of the current administration?

**Table VIII.3 Predictors of the Efficacy Level of the Current Administration Coefficients(a)**

Model		Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Error tip.	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.933	.252		3.710	.000
	<b>Income</b>	<b>-.061</b>	<b>.028</b>	<b>-.063</b>	<b>-2.139</b>	<b>.033</b>
	Education	-.008	.010	-.025	-.802	.423
	<b>Size of the place of residence</b>	<b>.097</b>	<b>.025</b>	<b>.119</b>	<b>3.923</b>	<b>.000</b>
	Wealth	.002	.023	.003	.087	.931
	Age	.001	.003	.005	.202	.840
	Sex	.043	.068	.016	.625	.532
	<b>Support the president's job</b>	<b>.019</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.249</b>	<b>9.683</b>	<b>.000</b>
	<b>Ideology</b>	<b>.184</b>	<b>.016</b>	<b>.284</b>	<b>11.254</b>	<b>.000</b>
	<b>National economic assessment</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.055</b>	<b>2.049</b>	<b>.041</b>
	<b>Personal economic assessment</b>	<b>.007</b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.110</b>	<b>3.997</b>	<b>.000</b>


a Dependent variable: EFICGOV

Table VIII.3 indicates that the socio-demographic variables of income, size of the place of residence, and respondents' self-defined ideology are the factors that significantly influence the efficacy levels of the current administration. Supporting the president's job and sociotropic and ideotropic evaluations of the economy also influence these levels.



**Figure VIII.17 Efficacy of the Current Administration by Income**

Figure VIII.17 indicates that the relation between income and governmental efficacy is curvilinear, that is, the perception of efficacy increases between people without any income and medium incomes, but drops sharply in the high income ranges.



**Figure VIII.18 Efficacy of the Current Administration by Size of Place of Residence**

In Figure VIII.18, we can see that residents in small cities and rural areas tend to evaluate the current administration as more effective than people in more urban areas.



**Figure VIII.19 Efficacy of the Current Administration by Personal Economic Assessment**

In Figure VIII.19, we can see that the better the respondent's personal economic situation, the better the evaluation of the current administration's effectiveness. This should not be surprising, since we expect that people who feel their personal economic situation is good or very good should be more supportive of the job the government is doing than people whose economic situation is bad or very bad. One's personal economic situation largely determines the evaluations of the current administration. Lastly, we see that there is a close relation between the evaluation of the job the president is doing and the efficacy of his or her administration. This should also not be surprising, since both measurements are logically related.




Figure VIII.20 Efficacy of the Current Administration by Evaluation of the President's Job

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we analyzed Panamanians' voting behavior in the 2004 elections, based on the results of the survey. We can see that the survey results are rather close to the results of the elections. Panamanians show high levels of voter turnout compared to other countries in the study. The results of the logistic regression analysis indicate that socio-demographic variables such as education, age, and size of the respondents' place of residence are important explanatory factors of voter turnout, as are the variables that measure other forms of participation or an interest in politics, like contributing to resolve community problems, working for a political party during the elections, trying to convince others how to vote, and the general interest a person has in politics. It is evident that the forms of participation reinforce each other to increase public involvement in political activities. Lastly, the chapter analyzed the efficacy levels of the current administration. The multiple regression analysis tells us that the important factors to understand the public's evaluation of the current government's efficacy addressing various problems are income, the size of the place of residence, and the respondent's ideology. Additional factors are the evaluations of the state of the national economy, but especially one's personal economic situation, and one's support for the job the president is doing.

## IX. Participation and Social Capital

Public participation is one of the most important factors in a democracy. Participation is necessary for there to be a counterbalance between the government and the people. Democracy is based largely on the notion of “self-government,” that is to say that the people can, individually and collectively, make decisions that affect the public policies adopted by the government. Additionally, participation is an essential factor in the creation and preservation of civil society.

In a democracy, a vigorous civil society allows the people to exercise their civil and political rights. To be able to construct a civil society, it is important to create a system that stimulates the development of what Robert Putnam calls “social capital.”<sup>70</sup> That is, the factors found in a community that facilitate coordination and cooperation to obtain mutual benefits. This means that work done in a community where there is trust, values, social networks and other similar attributes will be more effective than work carried out in a community where these factors do not exist. One of the fundamental elements for the development of these values and practices is the extensive participation of the people in civil society organizations.


The literature on social capital defines interpersonal trust as a key element in promoting public participation. Interpersonal trust promotes sociability among citizens and allows people who do not know each other interact, inculcating habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public disposition. In the following figure, we can see the comparative results to the following question:

**IT1.** Now, talking about the people from your community, would you say that they are ...? **(Read alternatives)**  
 (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Not trustworthy (8) DN/NR

---

<sup>70</sup> Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).





**Figure IX.1 Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective**

Figure IX.1 shows that Panamanians demonstrate relatively low levels of interpersonal trust. Honduras has the highest levels of interpersonal trust. We will be able to better understand these results when we analyze participation levels in Panama, where we will see that Panamanians have relatively low levels.

### Participation Levels


The survey allows us to analyze participation levels in Panama through a series of questions that directly ask how much respondents participated in various civil society organizations.

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK
<b>CP6.</b> Some kind of religious organization meeting? Attend...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP7.</b> A parent-teacher association meeting? Attend ....	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP8.</b> A community improvement committee meeting? Attend ...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP9.</b> A professional, merchant, producer, and/or peasant association meeting? Attend ...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP10.</b> A union meeting? Attend ...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)
<b>CP13.</b> A political party or movement meeting? Attend...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)

**Table IX.1 Participation levels (2006)**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
	%	%	%	%
CP6 Religious organization	26.8	14.6	10.8	47.8
CP7 Parent-teacher association	8.3	16.0	7.0	68.7
CP8 Community improvement committee	5.8	7.1	9.1	78.1
CP9 Professional association	2.9	2.5	4.5	90.1
CP13 Political party	2.0	3.2	4.2	90.7
CP10 Union	1.3	0.9	2.4	95.3

As we can see in Table IX.1, the highest level of participation occurs in religious organizations, and the lowest level in unions. Figure IX.2 compares the participation average in each organization between 2004 and 2006. We can see a significant increase in participation in religious organizations and a reduction in political party participation. The reduction in political party participation results from the fact that the 2004 survey was conducted in the middle of an electoral campaign, and it was to be expected that a significant percentage of people would be working for a party.



**Figure IX.2 Participation in Various Organizations**

### ***Factors that Explain Participation Levels***

To analyze the factors that explain participation, we need to conduct a regression analysis. To do this, we should determine if there is a dimension in which we can create a participation scale. Factor analysis shows us that there is a dimension that includes participation in parent-teacher associations and community improvement committees. Participation in professional associations, political parties, and religious organizations are not related to the other forms of participation. Table IX.2 gives us the results of the factor analysis. For our study, we created a participation scale that includes participation in community improvement committees and parent-teacher associations.

**Table IX.2 Rotated Component Matrix**

	Gross		Rescaled	
	Component		Component	
	1	2	1	2
<b>cp7r2 Parent-teacher association</b>	<b>28.771</b>	<b>6.920</b>	<b>.846</b>	<b>.203</b>
<b>cp8r2 Community improvement committee</b>	<b>18.775</b>	<b>3.095</b>	<b>.668</b>	<b>.110</b>
cp9r2 Professional associations	8.560	.406	.419	.020
cp13r2 Political parties	7.512	.403	.396	.021
cp10r2 Unions	3.754	-.182	.282	-.014
cp6r2 Religious organizations	3.308	42.729	.077	.996

Extraction method: Analysis of the principal components.

Rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a The rotation converged in three iterations.

b year1 = 2006

The results of the multiple regression can be seen in Table IX.3. We can see that the significant factors are: level of schooling, urban or rural residence, number of children, civil state, and fear of neighborhood crime.

**Table IX.3 Predictors of Participation  
Coefficients(a)**

Model		Non-Standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Error tip.	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.102	4.810		-.021	.983
	Income	-1.003	.533	-.056	-1.881	.060
	<b>Education</b>	<b>.656</b>	<b>.192</b>	<b>.114</b>	<b>3.409</b>	<b>.001</b>
	<b>Urban/rural</b>	<b>6.162</b>	<b>3.130</b>	<b>.118</b>	<b>1.969</b>	<b>.049</b>
	Size of the place of residence	-.274	.942	-.018	-.291	.771
	Wealth	-.224	.431	-.016	-.520	.603
	Age	-.071	.053	-.041	-1.338	.181
	<b>Gender</b>	<b>5.322</b>	<b>1.302</b>	<b>.105</b>	<b>4.087</b>	<b>.000</b>
	Crime victim	.031	.025	.032	1.251	.211
	<b>Fear of being a crime victim</b>	<b>-.095</b>	<b>.023</b>	<b>-.107</b>	<b>-4.175</b>	<b>.000</b>
	<b>Married (or in a civil union)</b>	<b>.053</b>	<b>.014</b>	<b>.100</b>	<b>3.768</b>	<b>.000</b>
	<b>Number of children</b>	<b>1.222</b>	<b>.349</b>	<b>.116</b>	<b>3.498</b>	<b>.000</b>

a Dependent variable: Participation

Now we proceed to thoroughly analyze the impact of the significant factors on participation levels. Figure IX.3 gives us the results for the factors of sex and education. First, we see that women participate more than men. We should remember that the scale is composed of two characteristics, parent-teacher associations and community improvement committees, both of which favor women's participation. Second, we see an increase in participation levels to the degree that education increases.





Figure IX.3 Participation, Sex and Education



**Figure IX.4 Participation and Place of Residence**

Figure IX.4 shows that rural residents participate more frequently than people living in urban areas. It is possible that the deficiency of government services in rural areas is an incentive for citizens to collectively participate to improve conditions in their communities. Additionally, people who live in urban areas tend to be more isolated from each other, since the speed and rhythm of urban life sometimes does not allow people to make connections in their community that would facilitate group participation.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>71</sup> See Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).




Figure IX.5 Participation and Civil State

Figure IX.5 presents the results for civil state. People who are married (or in a civil union) tend to participate more than people who are not. This result is logical since one of the components of the participation scale is attendance at parent-teacher association meetings





Figure IX.6 Participation and Number of Children

In Figure IX.6, we can see that there is greater participation among people with more children. We see that above four children, participation remains constant but is significantly higher than for people without children.





**Figure IX.7 Participation and Fear of Being a Crime Victim**

Lastly, Figure IX.7 indicates that participation falls when people feel safer in their neighborhoods and communities. This result might seem illogical, since fear of crime could be a disincentive for people to participate. But people who fear crime tend to have a powerful incentive to participate in community improvement committees, one of the components of the scale.

### ***Effects of Participation on Community Action***

The question we ask now is how participation levels affect peoples' decisions to take direct action to improve their communities. The survey asked the following:

Now, I am going to ask you some questions about your community and the problems facing it...

CP5. In the last year did you contribute, or try to contribute, to solve some problem in your community or neighborhood?

(1) Yes [continue] (2) No [Skip to CP6] (8) DK




Figure IX.8 Worked to Resolve Community Problems

Figure IX.8 shows the number of people who contributed to solve community problems in 2004 and 2006. We can see a marked reduction of 10% in citizen participation to resolve community problems between 2004 and 2006. In the 2006 sample, only 27.3% of respondents say they had contributed to resolve problems in their community.






Figure IX.9 Worked to Resolve Community Problems, Comparative Perspective

We can see, in Figure IX.9, that Panamanians have the second lowest level of working to resolve community problems among the countries in the study. Only Nicaragua demonstrates a lower level than Panama.



**Figure IX.10 Participation in Community Associations by Voluntary Participation to Improve the Community**

Figure IX.10 indicates that there is a close relation between participation in community improvement committees and voluntary action to improve the community. It is likely that many of the activities carried out by improvement committees have to do with projects to improve the community and, therefore, it should not be surprising that those people who participate in these committees also dedicate time as volunteers to improve their communities.



**Figure IX.11 Participation in Parent-Teacher Associations by Voluntary Participation to Improve the Community**

In Figure IX.11, we can see that there is also a relation between participating in parent-teacher associations and voluntary participation to resolve community problems. Lastly, we can also see the relation between voluntary participation and participation in political party meetings (Figure IX.12).




Figure IX.12 Participation in Political Parties by Voluntary Participation to Improve the Community

### Conclusion

In this chapter we analyzed the levels of participation in civil society organizations. The factors that significantly influence participation are: education, sex, number of children, whether a person is married (or in a civil union), and fear of neighborhood crime. We can see that Panamanians participate most in religious organizations, and then in parent-teacher associations. Panama’s participation levels are below those of most countries that make up this study. We also confirmed that participating in organizations encourages people to volunteer to improve their communities.

## Annex I: Technical Description of the Sample

### PANAMA LAPOP 2006 Metodología y distribución de la encuesta

Para este proyecto se estableció una muestra probabilística en todas sus etapas, excepto a nivel del hogar donde se utilizaron cuotas por sexo y edad, estratificada, multietápica, por conglomerados. Los parámetros establecidos fueron los siguientes: 1. Un mínimo de 1500 casos; 2. Conglomerados de entre 6-8 entrevistas en áreas urbanas y 10-12 en áreas rurales por cada punto de muestreo (segmento censal); 3. Un mínimo de 125 puntos de muestreo determinados en forma probabilística.

Para efectos de este estudio, el territorio nacional fue dividido entre 4 estratos conformados por las áreas geoFigures del país. El área metropolitana, compuesta por los distritos de Panamá (capital de la República) y San Miguelito. El área oriental formada por las provincias de Panamá (excluyendo los distritos de Panamá y San Miguelito), Colón y Darién. El área central por las provincias de Coclé, Herrera, Los Santos y Veraguas. Finalmente, el área occidental formada por las provincias de Bocas del Toro, Chiriqui y la Comarca Ngobe-Buglé. Estas áreas llamadas regiones en la literatura oficial – han sido las de uso común por parte de las entidades que diseñan las políticas públicas y los programas de desarrollo, tanto del gobierno panameño como del sector privado. Se excluyeron las áreas insulares tanto del litoral Pacífico como del Caribe, debido a su alto costo y difícil acceso. La unidad objeto de estudio está constituida por la población de 18 años y más de edad residente en las viviendas particulares. Se excluye población residente en viviendas colectivas: como hospitales, orfanatos, colegios, cuarteles, hoteles, etc. Para evitar que la muestra este sesgada a favor de áreas más pobladas, cada estrato fue dividido en áreas urbanas y rurales con una selección probabilística de los conglomerados a encuestar en cada región. La distribución de la muestra entre los diversos estratos se realizó en forma proporcional a la población del estrato.

#### Distribución de la muestra:

Área GeoFigure	
Metropolitana	36%
Oriental	23%
Central	21%
Occidental	20%

Fuente: Censo de Población y Vivienda del 2000

**CUADRO MAESTRO PANAMA - 30 MAYO  
PROYECTO LAPOP -2006  
CENSO 2000**

Para la muestra se utilizan como base los datos del censo del 2000. Al igual que en el 2004 se excluyeron las comarcas Embera y Kuna Yala. Se mantienen las mismas regiones y criterios de 2004.

REGION	PROVINCIA	DISTRITO	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	%urbano	% rural	MUESTRA URBANO	MUESTRA RURAL	MUESTRA TOTAL	SEGMENTO URBANO	SEGMENTO RURAL	SEGMENTOS TOTALES
AREA METROPOLITANA	PANAMÁ	PANAMÁ	679794	28644	708438									
	PANAMÁ	SAN MIGUELITO	293745		293745									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>973539</b>	<b>28644</b>	<b>1002183</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>3%</b>	522	15	537	66	2	68
AREA ORIENTAL	PANAMÁ	ARRAIJÁN	134492	15426	149918									
	PANAMÁ	BALCOA		2336	2336									
	PANAMÁ	CAPIRA	9527	23583	33110									
	PANAMÁ	CHAME	5295	14330	19625									
	PANAMÁ	CHEPO	11334	24166	35500									
	PANAMÁ	CHIMÁN		4086	4086									
	PANAMÁ	LA CHORRERA	104404	20252	124656									
	PANAMÁ	SAN CARLOS		15541	15541									
	PANAMÁ	TABOGA		1402	1402									
	COLÓN	CHAGRES		9191	9191									
	COLÓN	COLÓN	137496	36563	174059									
	COLÓN	DONOSO		9671	9671									
	COLÓN	PORTOBELO		7964	7964									
	COLÓN	SANTA ISABEL		3323	3323									
	DARIÉN	CHEPIGANA	1741	25232	26973									



REGION	PROVINCIA	DISTRITO	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	%urbano	% rural	MUESTRA URBANO	MUESTRA RURAL	MUESTRA TOTAL	SEGMENTO URBANO	SEGMENTO RURAL	SEGMENTOS TOTALES
	DARIÉN	PINOIANA		13311	13311									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>404289</b>	<b>226377</b>	<b>630666</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>22%</b>	217	121	338	27	10	37
AREA CENTRAL	COCLÉ	AGUADULCE	26519	12771	39290									
	COCLÉ	ANTON	15882	28157	44039									
	COCLÉ	LA PINTADA		23202	23202									
	COCLÉ	NATA	5546	12265	17811									
	COCLÉ	OLA		5652	5652									
	COCLÉ	PENONOMÉ	13965	58483	72448									
	HERRERA	CHITRÉ	39925	2542	42467									
	HERRERA	LAS MINAS		7945	7945									
	HERRERA	LOS POZOS		7827	7827									
	HERRERA	OCÚ	2942	12994	15936									
	HERRERA	PARITA	2744	6083	8827									
	HERRERA	PESÉ	2529	9942	12471									
	HERRERA	SANTA MARIA		6992	6992									
	LOS SANTOS	GUARARÉ	2037	7448	9485									
	LOS SANTOS	LAS TABLAS	8105	16193	24298									
	LOS SANTOS	LOS SANTOS	5951	17877	23828									
	LOS SANTOS	MARACAS	2052	7085	9137									
	LOS SANTOS	PEDASÍ		3614	3614									
	LOS SANTOS	POCRÍ		3397	3397									
	LOS SANTOS	TONOSÍ		9736	9736									
	VERAGUAS	ATALAYA	2645	6271	8916									
	VERAGUAS	CALOBRE		12184	12184									
	VERAGUAS	CAÑAZAS	2678	13321	15999									
	VERAGUAS	LA MESA	2058	9688	11746									
	VERAGUAS	LAS PALMAS		17924	17924									

REGION	PROVINCIA	DISTRITO	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	%urbano	% rural	MUESTRA URBANO	MUESTRA RURAL	MUESTRA TOTAL	SEGMENTO URBANO	SEGMENTO RURAL	SEGMENTOS TOTALES
	VERAGUAS	MONTIJO	1730	10481	12211									
	VERAGUAS	RÍO DE JESUS		5256	5256									
	VERAGUAS	SAN FRANCISCO		9899	9899									
	VERAGUAS	SANTA FE		12890	12890									
	VERAGUAS	SANTIAGO	42979	31700	74679									
	VERAGUAS	SONÁ	7394	19997	27391									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>187681</b>	<b>409816</b>	<b>597497</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>40%</b>	101	220	320	13	19	32
OCCIDENTAL	BOCAS DEL TORO	BOCAS DEL TORO	3139	6777	9916									
	BOCAS DEL TORO	CHANGUINOLA	32095	39827	71922									
	BOCAS DEL TORO	CHIRIQUI GRANDE		7431	7431									
	CHIRIQUI	ALANJE		15497	15497									
	CHIRIQUI	BARU	21897	38654	60551									
	CHIRIQUI	BOQUERON		12275	12275									
	CHIRIQUI	BOQUETE	5655	11288	16943									
	CHIRIQUI	BUGABA	27482	41088	68570									
	CHIRIQUI	DAVID	104861	19419	124280									
	CHIRIQUI	DOLEGA	1527	15716	17243									
	CHIRIQUI	GUALACA	2606	5742	8348									
	CHIRIQUI	REMEDIOS		3489	3489									
	CHIRIQUI	RENACIMIENTO		18257	18257									
	CHIRIQUI	SAN FÉLIX		5276	5276									
	CHIRIQUI	SAN LORENZO		6498	6498									
	CHIRIQUI	TOLÉ		11563	11563									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	BESIKO		16843	16843									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	KANKINTÚ		19670	19670									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	KUSAPÍN		14691	14691									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	MIRONÓ		10419	10419									

REGION	PROVINCIA	DISTRITO	URBANO	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	%urbano	% rural	MUESTRA URBANO	MUESTRA RURAL	MUESTRA TOTAL	SEGMENTO URBANO	SEGMENTO RURAL	SEGMENTOS TOTALES
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	MÜNA		28330	28330									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	NOLE DUJIMA		9294	9294									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	ÑÜRÜM		10833	10833									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>199262</b>	<b>368877</b>	<b>568139</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>36%</b>	107	198	305	14	17	31
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>1764771</b>	<b>1033714</b>	<b>2798485</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>946</b>	<b>554</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>168</b>
<b>%</b>			<b>63,1%</b>	<b>36,9%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>									
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>946</b>	<b>554</b>	<b>1500</b>							<b>960</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>1536</b>

### Cuotas por edad y sexo

	<b>METROPOLITANA</b>	<b>ORIENTAL</b>	<b>CENTRAL</b>	<b>OCCIDENTAL</b>
<b>18 -24</b>	<b>19.1%</b>	<b>18.5%</b>	<b>16.2%</b>	<b>19.8%</b>
<b>25-44</b>	<b>47.7%</b>	<b>50.4%</b>	<b>43.5%</b>	<b>47.0%</b>
<b>45 Y MAS</b>	<b>33.1%</b>	<b>31.1%</b>	<b>40.2%</b>	<b>33.2%</b>
	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

	<b>METROPOLITANA</b>	<b>ORIENTAL</b>	<b>CENTRAL</b>	<b>OCCIDENTAL</b>
	Urbano	Urbano	Urbano	Urbano
<b>18 -24</b>	2	2	2	2
<b>25-44</b>	4	4	3	4
<b>45 Y MAS</b>	2	2	3	2
	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>

	<b>METROPOLITANA</b>	<b>ORIENTAL</b>	<b>CENTRAL</b>	<b>OCCIDENTAL</b>
	Rural	Rural	Rural	Rural
<b>18 -24</b>	2	2	2	2
<b>25-44</b>	6	6	5	6
<b>45 Y MAS</b>	4	4	5	4
	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>

<b>Urbano</b>	<b>Urbano</b>	<b>Urbano</b>	<b>Urbano</b>
Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24
Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24
Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44
Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44
Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44
Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 25-44
Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más
Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más

<b>Rural</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Rural</b>
Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24	Hombre de 18-24
Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24	Mujer de 18-24
Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44
Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44
Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44	Hombre de 25-44
Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44
Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44
Mujer de 25-44	Mujer de 25-44	Hombre de 45-más	Mujer de 25-44
Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más
Hombre de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Hombre de 45-más
Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más
Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más	Mujer de 45-más



05 de agosto del 2006

## Encuesta LAPOP Panamá

### ASPECTOS METODOLOGICOS DEL ESTUDIO

#### 1. ORGANIZACIÓN DEL TRABAJO DE CAMPO

Este se inicia con una primer reunión con el Sr. Orlando Pérez el día 22 de mayo del 2006 para tratar aspectos referente a:

- ✓ Establecimiento de la fecha de la prueba piloto del cuestionario.
- ✓ Definición de la muestra para el estudio.
- ✓ Forma de llenado de la primer página del cuestionario. Para estos efectos se analizó el concepto de cada punto para clarificar la manera de llenado en la práctica.
- ✓ Posible fecha de capacitación.
- ✓ Posible fecha de inicio del trabajo de campo.

#### 2. PRUEBA PILOTO

Esta se efectuó el día 23 de mayo del 2006. La prueba del cuestionario fue realizada por 4 encuestadores panameños.

Antes de la prueba piloto los encuestadores fueron capacitados por el Dr. Orlando J. Pérez, la capacitación consistió en explicar de manera detallada la forma en que debían realizarse las entrevistas. Se hizo énfasis en la lectura de cada pregunta, en este punto se le indicó al encuestador que cada pregunta debía ser leída textualmente, es decir, que por nada debían cambiar el sentido de la misma. A su vez se les explicó que cada pregunta se le podría repetir a cada entrevistado dos veces como máximo. Una vez finalizada la capacitación se procedió a la prueba del cuestionario.

El lugar de realización fue en una Colonia de Panamá Viejo.

Posterior a la prueba del cuestionario no hubo observaciones relevantes más bien surgieron consultas en algunas preguntas. Estas consultas fueron respondidas por él Sr. Orlando Pérez con su debida explicación.

#### 3. CAPACITACION

Esta se llevó a cabo el día 9 de junio del 2006 a las 10:00am en un Salón del Apartotel Torres de Alba.

Estuvieron presentes:

#### Equipo técnico

- ✓ Dr. Orlando J. Pérez. Central Michigan University y LAPOP.
- ✓ Srta. Claudia Cantón. Borge y Asociados.

#### Grupo de encuestadores

Estuvieron presentes los 12 encuestadores con los que se conformarían cuatro grupos para el trabajo de campo.

En la capacitación se elaboró una guía que se presenta en el anexo 1 del presente documento.

Cabe mencionar que antes de la capacitación los encuestadores ya habían leído el cuestionario y habían sido capacitados por la jefa de campo, esta capacitación previa se realizó con la finalidad de que el encuestador ya estuviera familiarizado con el cuestionario.

En función de lo antes expuesto se utilizó para la capacitación una dinámica participativa que consistió el simulacro de la realización de una entrevista, para estos efectos la Jefa de Campo Claudia Cantón entrevistó al Sr. Orlando Pérez. La respuesta a cada pregunta se daba a conocer se ubicaba en el cuestionario y se transmitía a los encuestadores quienes daban su opinión sobre si la respuesta seleccionada era correcta. Otra dinámica fue de que un encuestador elegido al azar diera su respuesta y entre todos se evaluaba. Los resultados fueron satisfactorios.

#### **4. USO DE LAS PDA EN EL ESTUDIO**

Para llevar a cabo el estudio se utilizaron 16 PDA marca PALM ONE TUNGSTEN E2.

**El CCP de la Universidad de Costa Rica proporcionó un software que permitió realizar la encuesta utilizando computadoras de mano (PDA) para la recolección de los datos.**

**El CCP realizó una aplicación única según el cuestionario. Esta se probó en varias oportunidades hasta que el Dr. Orlando J. Pérez aprobó la aplicación por encontrarse igual que el cuestionario definitivo.**

En cada PDA se configuro e instalo las aplicaciones debidas.

Para la configuración y correcto manejo del software el jefe de cómputo de Borge y Asociados Rafael Gutiérrez diseñó un manual para facilitar el trabajo del jefe de campo.

Tanto los supervisores como encuestadores fueron capacitados en cuanto al manejo de la PDA.

#### **5. USO DE MAPAS**

Se utilizaron mapas para cada una de las áreas de enumeración (segmentos). Estos mapas fueron comprados en la Contraloría General de la República de Panamá.

Dada la cantidad de mapas que se requerían para el estudio y el tiempo que implicaba cotizarlos y seleccionarlos, solicitamos la colaboración del Director del Departamento de Cartografía el Sr. Claudio Bonilla, quien amablemente agilizó el proceso de selección de mapas.

De la muestra total no se tiene mapas de 8 áreas de enumeración de la muestra y corresponden 5 lugares pertenecientes a la Comarca Nogle Bugle dado que los lugares eran

totalmente inaccesibles y 3 lugares de Veraguas, en este último se obtuvieron mapas pero no coincidían con el requerimiento del estudio por ejemplo, se requería un mapa urbano y en la contraloría solo tenían el rural y viceversa. En estos lugares se realizan croquis.

## 6. CONFORMACION DEL GRUPO DE TRABAJO

**Jefa de Campo:** Claudia Cantón.

**Supervisores:**

NACIONALIDAD	NOMBRE Y APELLIDO
NICARAGUENSE	CHARLOTTE MIRANDA
NICARAGUENSE	NORWIN ZEPEDA
COSTARRICENSE	WENDY ZELEDON
COSTARRICENSE	ORLANDO VALVERDE

**Encuestadores:**

NACIONALIDAD	NOMBRE Y APELLIDO
PANAMEÑO	VLADIMIR JUAREZ
PANAMEÑO	AMANDA VERGARA
PANAMEÑO	NADESDHRA ARGELIS
PANAMEÑO	EVA MALEK
PANAMEÑO	YEY CARI RUIZ
PANAMEÑO	CELIA DOMINGUEZ
PANAMEÑO	HILDAURA ARAGON
PANAMEÑO	EDWIN JUAREZ
PANAMEÑO	LUVY MENDOZA
PANAMEÑO	HERSILIA DE GRASIA
PANAMEÑO	ERIKA JUAREZ
PANAMEÑO	LISKA MALEK
PANAMEÑO	MARISENIA ORTEGA

## 7. TRABAJO DE CAMPO

El trabajo de campo se efectuó en 2 etapas:

### ETAPA I: Encuestas realizadas en papel.

Dada la peligrosidad de algunos lugares de la muestra con la debida aprobación del representante de la LAPOP se efectuaron entrevistas en papel.

Las entrevistas en papel se efectuaron en 17 segmentos de la ciudad de Panamá (264 entrevistas).

### ETAPA I: Encuestas realizadas con PDA.

Se utilizó las PDA en 95 lugares a nivel nacional en Panamá lo que representa 1,272 entrevistas.

✓ **Duración del trabajo de campo**

El trabajo de campo tuvo una duración de 29 días.

**Fecha de Inicio del trabajo de campo:** 16 de junio del 2006

**Fecha de finalización del trabajo de campo:** 14 de julio del 2006

## 8. SUSTITUCIONES

Las únicas sustituciones que se realizaron fueron en 5 lugares pertenecientes a la Comarca Nogle Bugle dado que los lugares eran inaccesibles por las lluvias, estos se sustituyeron por lugares con características similares.

## 9. DIFICULTADES ENCONTRADAS.

Las principales dificultades fueron las siguientes:

- ✓ Durante el trabajo de campo se tuvieron retrasos significativos dado que la labor de los encuestadores fue interrumpida por la policía de algunas áreas visitadas.

Esto se dio principalmente en la gira de Chiriquí y la gira de Veraguas – Herrera – Los Santos – Coclé.

En la de Chiriquí la policía interrumpió varias veces el trabajo en el área rural y detuvo equipo al trabajo y los trasladó hasta el área urbana a la delegación policial para interrogarlos, esto implicó una pérdida de tres horas aproximadamente. Esto ocurrió a pesar de que el equipo de trabajo andaba debidamente identificado.

También ocurrió el hecho que en los tramos de carretera los detenían sin justificación y amenazaban con multar al conductor alegando que iba a alta velocidad, sin embargo dado el mal estado de las carreteras esto no es posible en Panamá.

En el caso de la gira de Veraguas – Herrera – Los Santos – Coclé el grupo de trabajo fue detenido por personas que formaban parte del escuadrón antidrogas, en este caso apuntaron con un arma al conductor del vehículo en una pendiente para que se detuviera, bajaron a los encuestadores, los esposaron y trasladaron a la delegación policial donde fueron requisados. A pesar que todos portaban sus identificaciones, los dejaron ir hasta que llamaron a Panamá para verificar los datos de cada uno y al explicarles a quien se le realizaba el estudio y donde estaba ubicada la empresa. Al igual que el caso de Chiriquí esto implicó una pérdida de 3 hrs. aproximadamente.

- ✓ Otra dificultad fue las distancias en las que se encontraban los poblados y la accesibilidad difícil de los mismos, en algunos casos solo se lograba realizar un poblado en el DIA, dado que se tenía que caminar como 2 horas de ida y dos horas de regreso.



- ✓ El tiempo imperante fue otra limitante ya que por las constantes lluvias muchas veces no se podía seguir trabajando, ya que la mayor parte de las personas no dejan pasar a los encuestadores al interior de su hogar por seguridad.

## GUIA PARA LA CAPACITACION DEL PROYECTO LAPOP EN PANAMA

### CONTENIDO

1. PRESENTACION
2. OBJETIVO GENERAL DEL ESTUDIO
3. POBLACION OBJETO DE ESTUDIO
4. MUESTRA
- 4.1 DISTRIBUCION DE LA MUESTRA POR CUOTAS
5. LECTURA DEL CUESTIONARIO
6. PREGUNTAS Y RESPUESTAS

#### 1. PRESENTACION

El presente estudio es realizado por el trabajo conjunto de científicos sociales e investigadores de las siguientes Instituciones:

- a. La Agencia de los Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID).
- b. Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP).
- c. La Universidad de Vanderbilt
- d. Borge y Asociados

Este estudio se ha realizado en el año 1999, 2004 y por tercera vez se realizará en Panamá. Es un estudio que se realizará en el ámbito de Latinoamérica y del Caribe.

Los resultados de este estudio serán analizados y comparados con los resultados obtenidos en estudios anteriores. Es por este motivo que se debe tener sumo cuidado en la recolección de los datos que deben ser realizada de forma rigurosa y siguiendo los lineamientos metodológicos.

#### 2. OBJETIVO GENERAL DEL ESTUDIO

Conocer la percepción de los panameños acerca de la Cultura Política de la Democracia en Panamá.

#### 3. POBLACION OBJETO DE ESTUDIO

La población en estudio estará conformada por hombres y mujeres mayores de 18 años de nacionalidad Panameña.

#### 4. MUESTRA

Se utilizará un tamaño de muestra de 1,536 entrevistas a realizarse a nivel nacional y distribuida de acuerdo a los datos del censo del 2000 por Provincia, Distrito, Corregimiento y Segmento censal.

##### 4.1 Distribución de la Muestra por Cuotas

La muestra se distribuirá por sexo (hombre y mujer) y de acuerdo a los siguientes rangos de edades.

18-24 años  
25-39 años  
De 40 años y más.

Esto se les confirmará antes de iniciar el trabajo de campo. Este punto aún no está confirmado.

#### 5. LECTURA DEL CUESTIONARIO

Antes de leer el cuestionario recuerde leer la Guía de Pautas para aplicación del cuestionario mayo 2006.

##### Recomendaciones generales:

- Leer clara y pausadamente la introducción y la fórmula de consentimiento informado.
- Leer las preguntas *textualmente*, tal como están escritas en el cuestionario. Nunca omitir ni agregar frases.
- Si el entrevistado no comprende la pregunta, o pide que la repitan, leer la pregunta nuevamente, tal como está enunciada en el cuestionario. *No cambiar la frase. No usar palabras propias.* Si la persona no entiende luego de repetir la pregunta, decirle que no se preocupe, que otros entrevistados también tuvieron dificultad para entender algunas preguntas y pasar a la siguiente.
- Si el entrevistado dice que no sabe la respuesta, repetirla una vez más, siempre *textualmente*. Si continúa sin brindar respuesta, *no insistir*. Pasar a la siguiente pregunta.

#### 6. PREGUNTAS Y RESPUESTAS

## Annex II: Questionnaire



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Junio, 2006

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a por sorteo para participar en un estudio de opinión pública, el cual es financiado por la Universidad de Vanderbilt. Vengo por encargo de Borge y Asociados. La entrevista durará de 30 a 35 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Panamá.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse a **Borge y Asociados**, al 67091409 con la Srta. Claudia Cantón.

¿Desea Participar?

Versión # 23bR1 IRB Approval: 060187



LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: PANAMA, 2006

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<b>País:</b> 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica <b>7. Panamá</b> 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 21. República Dominicana <sup>o</sup> 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	<b>PAIS</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	<b>IDNUM</b>	
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (1) Area Metropolitana (2) Area Oriental (3) Area Central (4) Area Occidental	<b>ESTRATOPRI</b>	<b>70</b> __
<b>UPM.</b> _____	<b>UPM</b>	
<b>Provincia</b> _____	<b>PANPROV</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Distrito</b> _____	<b>PANDISTRITO</b>	
<b>CORREGIMIENTO:</b> _____	<b>PANCORREG</b>	
<b>SEGMENTO CENSAL</b> _____	<b>PANSEGMENTO</b>	
<b>Sector</b> _____	<b>PANSEC</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>CLUSTER.</b> (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	<b>CLUSTER</b>	
<b>UR</b> 1. Urbano 2. Rural	<b>UR</b>	
Tamaño del lugar: <b>1. Ciudad de Panamá (área metropolitana)</b> <b>2. Ciudad grande</b> 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	<b>TAMANO</b>	
<b>Idioma del cuestionario:</b> (1) Español	<b>PANIDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]</b>	
<b>Hora de inicio:</b> ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
<b>Fecha de la entrevista día:</b> ____ mes:____ año: 2006	<b>FECHA</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA</b>		

<b>Q1.</b> Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	<b>Q1</b>	
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**A4 [COA4].** Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

**A4**

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen, violencia	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demoFigure	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

<b>DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas]. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?” . Aceptar hasta tres respuestas.</b>			
	1 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?	Sondee: ¿significa algo más?
		2 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13B	3 <sup>o</sup> Respuesta DEM13C
<b>No tiene ningún significado [PASE a A1]</b>	0		
<b>Libertad:</b>			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
<b>Economía:</b>			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
<b>Sufragio:</b>			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
<b>Igualdad:</b>			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
<b>Participación:</b>			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
<b>Estado de derecho:</b>			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
<b>Gobierno no militar</b>	31	31	31
<b>Vivir en paz, sin guerra</b>	32	32	32
<b>Guerra, invasiones</b>	33	33	33
<b>Otra respuesta</b>	80	80	80

<b>NS/NR</b>	88	88	88
<b>Código</b> (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) <b>[Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]</b>	<b>DEM13A</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>DEM13B</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>DEM13C</b> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

<b>DEM13D.</b> ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.] 88. NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]	<b>DEM13 D</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
---	----------------	---

Ahora, cambiando el tema.....[ Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS/NR	
<b>A1.</b> Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A1</b>
<b>A2.</b> Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A2</b>
<b>A3.</b> Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A3</b>
<b>A4i.</b> Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	<b>A4i</b>

<b>SOCT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT1</b>
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>SOCT2</b>
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO1</b>
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	<b>IDIO2</b>

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... ?	Sí	No	NS/NR	
<b>CP2.</b> A algún diputado de la Asamblea	1	2	8	<b>CP2</b>
<b>CP4A.</b> Al alcalde de este distrito	1	2	8	<b>CP4A</b>
<b>PANCP4B.</b> Al representante de corregimiento	1	2	8	<b>PANCP4B</b>
<b>PANCP4C.</b> Al corregidor	1	2	8	<b>PANCP4C</b>
<b>CP4.</b> A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado	1	2	8	<b>CP4</b>

<b>PROT1.</b> Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en	(1) algunas	(2)	(3)	(8)	<b>PROT1</b>
---	-------------	-----	-----	-----	--------------

una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	veces	casi nunca	nunca	NS/NR		
<b>PROT2.</b> ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	(9) Inap	<b>PROT2</b>

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP	
<b>CP5.</b> ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		<b>CP5</b>
<b>CP5A.</b> ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio o colonia?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5A</b>
<b>CP5B.</b> ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5B</b>
<b>CP5C.</b> ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5C</b>
<b>CP5D.</b> ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	<b>CP5D</b>

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP6</b>
<b>CP7.</b> ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP7</b>
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP8</b>
<b>CP9.</b> ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP9</b>
<b>CP10.</b> ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP10</b>
<b>CP13.</b> ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	<b>CP13</b>

**LS3.** Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

**LS3**

**IT1.** Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? (Leer alternativas)  
(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR

**IT1**



**ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1**

**L1.** (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría Ud. en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	<b>L1</b>
<b>Izquierda</b>									<b>Derecha</b>	(NS/NR=88)

**Recoger Tarjeta # 1**

Ahora vamos a hablar de su distrito...

<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>NP1</b>	
<b>NP1B.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la alcaldía hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>NP1B</b>	
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario de la alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>NP2</b>	
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son ...? [ <b>Leer alternativas</b> ] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	<b>SGL1</b>	
<b>SGL2.</b> ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la alcaldía para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR	<b>SGL2</b>	
<b>LGL2.</b> En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la alcaldía, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [ <b>NO LEER</b> ] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [ <b>NO LEER</b> ] (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL2</b>	
<b>LGL3.</b> ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la alcaldía (8) NS/NR	<b>LGL3</b>	

Ahora hablemos de otros temas...

<b>JC15.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Legislativa o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	<b>JC15</b>	
<b>JC16.</b> ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	<b>JC16</b>	

<p>Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo?</p> <p><b>POP1. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario],</p> <p>2. Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP1</b></p>	
<p><b>POP2. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. La Asamblea impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorada, [o al contrario],</p> <p>2. Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la Asamblea.</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP2</b></p>	
<p><b>POP3. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario],</p> <p>2. Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas. 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP3</b></p>	
<p><b>POP4. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],</p> <p>2. Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP4</b></p>	
<p><b>POP5. [Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario],</p> <p>2. Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.</p> <p>8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POP5</b></p>	

Ahora para cambiar de tema....

<p><b>PANAOJ1.</b> ¿Comparado con los últimos 10 años, considera usted que el Sistema Judicial panameño ha mejorado, ha empeorado o se ha mantenido igual?</p> <p>(1) mejorado (2) empeorado (3) mantenido igual (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ1</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ2.</b> ¿Cómo evalúa al Sistema Judicial, en cuanto al tiempo promedio que duran los procesos judiciales? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) rápidos y eficaces (2) duran el tiempo necesario (3) algo lentos (4) muy lentos (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ2</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ3</b> ¿Podría decirme cuál considera usted que es el principal problema que enfrenta actualmente la Administración de Justicia en Panamá? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Corrupción</p> <p>(2) Lentitud de la Justicia</p> <p>(3) Falta de capacitación del personal</p> <p>(4) Falta de presupuesto</p> <p>(5) Falta de independencia judicial</p> <p>(6) Otro</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ3</b></p>	

<p><b>PANAOJ4</b> ¿En caso de enfrentar algún conflicto o problema, que medio preferiría usted utilizar para resolverlo? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) Corregiduría                  (2) Mediación                  (3) Tribunales de Justicia                  (4) Defensoría del Pueblo                  (5) Policía                  Otros: _____                  (88) No sé/No respondió</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ4</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ5</b> ¿Conoce usted o ha escuchado hablar de la mediación como forma para resolver conflictos? (1) Si (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ5</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ6.</b> ¿Cuando ha estado cerca de un miembro de la Policía Nacional que tan seguro se siente? (1) muy seguro <b>[PASE A PANAOJ8]</b> (2) algo seguro <b>[PASE A PANAOJ8]</b> (3) algo inseguro <b>[SIGA A PANAOJ7]</b> (4) muy inseguro <b>[SIGA A PANAOJ7]</b> (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ6</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ7.</b> ¿Por qué se siente inseguro? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) La policía abusa los derechos humanos (2) La policía es corrupta (3) La policía abusa su poder (4) Mi experiencia con policías en el pasado no es buena                  (5) Los policías me dan miedo                  Otro: _____ (88) NS/NR (99) Inap</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ7</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ8.</b> ¿Conoce usted un policía por su rostro ó su nombre en su barrio o comunidad?                  (1) Si, por rostro <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (2) Si, por nombre <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (3) Si, ambos <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (4) No <b>[PASE A VIC1]</b> (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ8</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ9.</b> ¿Qué confiable piensa que es el policía que usted conoce?                  (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>PANAOJ9</b></p>	
<p><b>VIC1.</b> ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?                  (1) Sí <b>[siga]</b> (2) No <b>[pasar a AOJ8]</b> (8) NS <b>[pasar a AOJ8]</b></p>	<p><b>VIC1</b></p>	
<p><b>VIC2.</b> ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? <b>[Leer las alternativas]</b>                  (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física                  (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física                  (3) Agresión física sin robo                  (4) Violación o asalto sexual                  (5) Secuestro                  (6) Daño a la propiedad                  (7) Robo de la casa                  (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (no víctima)</p>	<p><b>VIC2</b></p>	
<p><b>AOJ1.</b> ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución?                  (1) Sí <b>[pasar a AOJ8]</b> (2) No lo denunció (8) NS/NR <b>[pasar a AOJ8]</b> (9) Inap (no víctima) <b>[pasar a AOJ8]</b></p>	<p><b>AOJ1</b></p>	
<p><b>AOJ1B.</b> ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? <b>[no leer alternativas]</b>                  (1) No sirve de nada                  (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias                  (3) No tenía pruebas                  (4) No fue grave                  (5) No sabe adónde denunciar                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) Inap</p>	<p><b>AOJ1B</b></p>	
<p><b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?                  (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>AOJ8</b></p>	

<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11</b>	
<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ11A</b>	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si Ud. fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	<b>AOJ12</b>	

**[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]**

Ahora vamos a usar otra tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos; cada uno indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a Ud. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a Ud. ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada			Mucho				NS/NR

**Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR**

<b>B1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Panamá garantizan un juicio justo? ( <b>Sondee:</b> Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio )	<b>B1</b>	
<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Panamá?	<b>B2</b>	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político panameño?	<b>B3</b>	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político panameño?	<b>B4</b>	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político panameño?	<b>B6</b>	
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	<b>B10A</b>	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Electoral?	<b>B11</b>	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	<b>B13</b>	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	<b>B14</b>	
<b>B15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?	<b>B15</b>	
<b>B16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Procuraduría General del Estado?	<b>B16</b>	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	<b>B18</b>	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	<b>B20</b>	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	<b>B21</b>	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	<b>B31</b>	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la alcaldía?	<b>B32</b>	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser panameño?	<b>B43</b>	
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza Ud. en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	<b>B17</b>	
<b>B19.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la Republica?	<b>B19</b>	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	<b>B37</b>	

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
<b>B46 [b45].</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo de Transparencia contra la Corrupción?		<b>B46</b>
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		<b>B47</b>
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta que punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		<b>B48</b>
<b>PANB49.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza usted en la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá?		<b>PANB49</b>

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A", por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, ( <i>seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos</i> )	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
<b>N1.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.	<b>N1</b>
<b>N3.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.	<b>N3</b>
<b>N9.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.	<b>N9</b>
<b>N10.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	<b>N10</b>
<b>N11.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.	<b>N11</b>
<b>N12.</b> Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.	<b>N12</b>

**[Recoja tarjeta A]**

<b>M1.</b> Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Martín Torrijos Espino es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	<b>M1</b>
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**[Entregue tarjeta B]:** Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo." Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	NS/NR

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR		
<b>ING4.</b> Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		<b>ING4</b>
<b>PN2.</b> A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los panameños tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		<b>PN2</b>
<b>DEM23.</b> Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		<b>DEM23</b>

**RECOGER TARJETA B**

<b>PN4.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Panamá? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	<b>PN4</b>
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<b>PN5.</b> En su opinión, ¿ Panamá es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>PN5</b>
<b>PN6.</b> Basado en su experiencia en los últimos años, Panamá es mas democrático, igual de democrático o menos democrático? (1) más democrático (2) igual de democrático (3) menos democrático (8) NS/NR	<b>PN6</b>

**[Entregue al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]**  
 Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted desapueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que Ud. aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desapueba firmemente</b>						<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>				<b>NS/NR</b>

	<b>1-10, 88</b>
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley.	<b>E5</b>
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	<b>E8</b>
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato.	<b>E11</b>
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	<b>E15</b>
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	<b>E14</b>
<b>E2.</b> Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	<b>E2</b>
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	<b>E3</b>
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	<b>E16</b>

**[No recoja tarjeta "C"]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desapueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desapueba firmemente</b>						<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>				<b>NS/NR</b>

	<b>1-10, 88</b>
<b>D32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desapueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	<b>D32</b>
<b>D33.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desapueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político panameño?	<b>D33</b>
<b>D34.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desapueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	<b>D34</b>
<b>D36.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desapueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?	<b>D36</b>

<b>D37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?		<b>D37</b>	
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Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Panamá. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>						<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>				<b>NS/NR</b>

	1-10, 88	
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Panamá no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]</b>		<b>D1</b>
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		<b>D2</b>
<b>D3.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D3</b>
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?		<b>D4</b>
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?		<b>D5</b>

**RECOGER TARJETA "C"**

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno. (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		<b>DEM2</b>
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde		<b>DEM11</b>
<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer]</b> (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR		<b>AUT1</b>

<b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR		<b>PP1</b>
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR		<b>PP2</b>

**[Ahora vamos a usar tarjeta "D"] [Entregar tarjeta "D"]**

Ahora le voy a nombrar varias instituciones públicas y privadas. Me interesa saber qué tan honrados o corruptos cree que son los representantes de esas instituciones. Le voy a pedir que califique a cada uno de ellos con una nota de 1 a 10 donde 1 sería muy corrupto y 10 muy honrado, o un número intermedio.

**Grado de corrupción**

INSTITUCIONES	Grado de corrupción										NS/ NR		
	Muy corruptos					Muy honrados							
PC1. Los legisladores [Léame el numero]	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC1	
PC2. Los ministros	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC2	
PC3. Los alcaldes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC3	
PANPC4. Los representantes de corregimientos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PANPC4	
PC5. Los policías	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC5	
PC9. Los sacerdotes, clérigos y pastores	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC9	
PC12. Los jueces	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC12	
PC14. Los líderes de los partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC14	
PC15. Los líderes de las ONG's	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC15	
PC19. Los medios de comunicación	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC19	
PC21. Los Presidentes de la República	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	PC21	

**Recoja Tarjeta D**

Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; 3) no corruptas.

<p><b>DC1.</b> Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es <b>[Leer alternativas]:</b></p> <p>1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado                  2) Corrupto pero justificado                  3) No corrupto NS/NR=8</p>	DC1	
<p><b>DC10.</b> Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga B/. 5 de más al empleado del Registro Civil. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es <b>[Leer alternativas]:</b></p> <p>1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada                  2) Corrupto pero se justifica                  3) No corrupto                  8) NS/NR</p>	DC10	
<p><b>DC13.</b> Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es <b>[Leer alternativas]:</b></p> <p>1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado                  2) Corrupto pero justificado                  3) No corrupto NS/NR=8</p>	DC13	



	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?	0	1	8		<b>EXC2</b>
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?	0	1	8		<b>EXC6</b>
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en el último año <b>No → Marcar 9 [Pase a EXC13]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC11</b>
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 9 [Pase a EXC14]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en el último año?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC13</b>
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>No → Marcar 9 [Pase a EXC15]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en el último año?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC14</b>
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9 [Pase a EXC16]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud público durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC15</b>
<b>EXC16.</b> ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? <b>No → Marcar 9 [Pase a EXC17]</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?	0	1	8	9	<b>EXC16</b>
<b>EXC17.</b> ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		<b>EXC17</b>
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?	0	1	8		<b>EXC18</b>
<b>EXC19.</b> ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar sobornos es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	0	1	8		<b>EXC19</b>

<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR		<b>EXC7</b>
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Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...		
<b>GI1.</b> ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <b>[NO LEER: George Bush]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		<b>GI1</b>
<b>GI2.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Legislativa de Panamá? <b>[NO LEER: Elías A. Castillo]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		<b>GI2</b>
<b>GI3.</b> ¿Cuántas provincias tiene Panamá? <b>[NO LEER: 9 provincias y 2 comarcas indígenas. Aceptar 9 o 11]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		<b>GI3</b>
<b>GI4.</b> ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Panamá? <b>[NO LEER: 5 años]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde		<b>GI4</b>

<p><b>GI5.</b> ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <b>[NO LEER: Luiz Inácio <u>Lula</u> da Silva, aceptar también “Lula”]</b> (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde</p>	<p><b>GI5</b></p>
<p><b>VB1.</b> Para hablar de otra cosa ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>VB1</b></p>
<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? (1) Sí votó <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No votó <b>[Pasar a VB4]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pasar a VB6]</b></p>	<p><b>VB2</b></p>
<p><b>PANVB3 [VB3].</b> ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2004? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b></p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. Guillermo Endara Galimany [Partido Solidaridad]</p> <p>2. José Miguel Alemán [Alianza Visión de País, Partido Arnulfista, Molirena, Partido Liberal Nacional]</p> <p>3. Martín Torrijos Espino [Alianza Patria Nueva, Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), Partido Popular]</p> <p>4. Ricardo Martinelli [Partido Cambio Democrático]</p> <p>77. Otro</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. Inap (No votó)</p> <p><b>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)</b></p>	<p><b>PANVB3</b></p>
<p><b>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] [No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? <b>[anotar una sola respuesta]</b></p> <p>1 Falta de transporte</p> <p>2 Enfermedad</p> <p>3 Falta de interés</p> <p>4 No le gustó ningún candidato</p> <p>5 No cree en el sistema</p> <p>6 Falta de cédula de identidad</p> <p>7 No se encontró en padrón electoral</p> <p>10 No tener edad necesaria</p> <p>11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado</p> <p>12 Tener que trabajar/ Falta de tiempo</p> <p>13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad</p> <p>14. Otra razón</p> <p>(88) NS/NR</p> <p>(99) Inap (Votó)</p> <p><b>(Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</b></p>	<p><b>VB4</b></p>
<p><b>VB8. [Para los que votaron]</b> Cuando votó, ¿cual fue la razón <b>más importante</b> de su voto? <b>[Leer todos][Solo aceptar una respuesta]</b></p> <p>(1) Las cualidades del candidato</p> <p>(2) El partido político del candidato</p> <p>(3) El plan de gobierno del candidato</p> <p>(8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p><b>VB8</b></p>
<p><b>VB6.</b> ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>1. Sí <b>[Siga]</b> 2. No <b>[Pasa a VB10]</b> 8. NS/NR <b>[Pasa a VB10]</b></p>	<p><b>VB6</b></p>

<p><b>PANVB7.</b> ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejo boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. Partido Solidaridad</p> <p>2. Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)</p> <p>3. Partido Arnulfista</p> <p>4. Partido Molirena</p> <p>5. Partido Cambio Democrático</p> <p>6. Partido Liberal Nacional</p> <p>7. Partido Popular</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p><b>PANVB7</b></p>
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<p><b>VB10.</b> ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (8) NS/NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b></p>	<p><b>VB10</b></p>
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<p><b>PANVB11.</b> ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b>.</p> <p>1. Partido Solidaridad</p> <p>2. Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)</p> <p>3. Partido Arnulfista</p> <p>4. Partido MOLIRENA</p> <p>5. Partido Cambio Democrático</p> <p>6. Partido Liberal Nacional</p> <p>7. Partido Popular</p> <p>8. Partido Liberal</p> <p>9. Vanguardia Nacional de la Patria (Partido de Guillermo Endara)</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. INAP</p>	<p><b>PANVB11</b></p>
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<p><b>POL1.</b> ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL1</b></p>
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<p><b>POL2.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? <b>(Leer alternativas)</b></p> <p>(1) A diario (2) Algunas veces por semana (3) Algunas veces por mes (4) Rara vez</p> <p>(5) Nunca (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>POL2</b></p>
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**USAR TARJETA “B” OTRA VEZ.**

<p>Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. En una escala del 1 al 7 donde <b>1 significa muy en desacuerdo</b> y <b>7 significa muy de acuerdo</b>, ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?</p>	<p>Escala en NS/NR</p> <p>Muy de Desacuerdo Acuerdo</p>	
<p><b>AA1.</b> Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo con esa práctica?</p>	<p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</p>	<p><b>AA1</b></p>
<p><b>AA2.</b> La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</p>	<p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</p>	<p><b>AA2</b></p>
<p><b>AA3.</b> En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</p>	<p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</p>	<p><b>AA3</b></p>
<p><b>AA4.</b> Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</p>	<p>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8</p>	<p><b>AA4</b></p>

**RECOGER TARJETA “B”**

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:

<b>DIS2.</b> En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>DIS2</b>	
<b>DIS3.</b> Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (No buscó trabajo)	<b>DIS3</b>	
<b>DIS4.</b> En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>DIS4</b>	
<b>DIS5.</b> En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	<b>DIS5</b>	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

**ED.** ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

\_\_\_\_\_ Año de \_\_\_\_\_ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria) = \_\_\_\_\_ años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°	
Ninguno	0						<b>ED</b>
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
NS/NR	88						

**Q2.** ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? \_\_\_\_\_ años (0= NS/NR)

**Q2**

**Q3.** ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas] **Q3**

(1) Católica no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)  
 (2) Cristiana católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)  
 (3) Otra no Testigos de Jehová  
 (4) Ninguna  
 (5) Evangélica  
 (8) NS/NR

<p><b>[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]</b>  <b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?          (00) Ningún ingreso          (1) Menos de \$100          (2) \$100-\$199          (3) \$200-\$399          (4) \$400-\$599          (5) \$600-\$799          (6) \$800-\$999          (7) \$1000-\$1499          (8) \$1500-\$2499          (9) \$2500-\$4999          (10) \$5000 y más          (88) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q10</b></p>	
<p><b>RECOGER TARJETA E</b>  <b>Q10A.</b> ¿Recibe su familia remesas del exterior?  <b>No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C                    99. Inap</b>  <b>Sí → preguntar:</b>          ¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda]</p>	<p><b>Q10A</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10B.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior?          (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (99) Inap.</p>	<p><b>Q10B</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10C.</b> ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? <b>[Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde]</b>          (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente          (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países          (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos)          (4) No          (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q10C</b></p>	
<p><b>Q14.</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?          1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q14</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10D.</b> El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>          1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar          2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades          3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades          4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades  <b>8. [No leer] NS/NR</b></p>		
<p><b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b>          (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>Q11</b></p>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS/NR.....88.</p>	<p><b>Q12</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>PANETID.</b> ¿Usted considera que es una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, Afro-panameño (negra), mulato, u otra?          (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-panameño (5) Mulata (7) Otro (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANETID</b></p>	
<p><b>PANETIDA.</b> Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata?          (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR</p>	<p><b>PANETIDA</b></p>	

<b>PANLENG1.</b> ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Castellano (2) Kuna (3) Emberá (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	<b>PANLENG1</b>	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **(leer todos)**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R1</b>	
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera]	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R3</b>	
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4</b>	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R4A</b>	
R5. Vehículo	(0) No	(1) Uno	<b>R5</b>	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(2) Dos	<b>R6</b>	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(3) Tres o más	<b>R7</b>	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R8</b>	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R12</b>	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R14</b>	
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	<b>R15</b>	

<p><b>OCUP1.</b> ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? <b>[No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar "No" en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</b></p> <p>1. Profesional, directivo                  2. Técnico                  3. Oficinista                  4. Comerciante                  5. Campesino o agricultor                  6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)                  7. Artesano                  8. Servicio doméstico                  9. Otros servicios                  10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria)                  11. Obrero no especializados                  12. Estudiante <b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>                  13. Ama de casa<b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>                  14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista<b>[Pase a MIG1]</b>                  88. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>OCUP1</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p><b>OCUP4.</b> ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <p>1. Sí <b>[Siga]</b>                  2. No <b>[Pasar a DESOC2]</b>                  8. NS/NR <b>[Pasar a MIG1]</b>                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP4</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1A</b> En su ocupación principal usted es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>1. Asalariado del gobierno?                  2. Asalariado en el sector privado?                  3. Patrono o socio de empresa?                  4. Trabajador por cuenta propia?                  5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?                  8. NS/NR                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1A</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1B1.</b> ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Menos de 5 empleados                  (2) De 5 a 9 empleados                  (3) De 10 a 19 empleados                  (4) De 20 a 100 empleados                  (5) Más de 100 empleados                  (8) NS/NR                  (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1B1</b></p>	

<p><b>OCUP1C.</b> ¿Tiene usted seguro social?</p> <p>1. Sí                  2. No                  8. NS/NR                  9. INAP</p>	<p><b>OCUP1C</b></p>	
<p><b>DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] =&gt;</b> ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas                  (88) NS/NR (99) Inap</p>	<p><b>DESOC2</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>

<p><b>MIG1.</b> Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?:</p> <p>1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR</p>	<p><b>MIG1</b></p>	
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<p><b>MIG2.</b> Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>          1. En este mismo municipio <b>[Pase a TI]</b> 2. En otro municipio en el país <b>[Siga]</b> 3. En otro país <b>[Pase a TI]</b> 8. NS/NR <b>[Pase a TI]</b></p>	<p><b>MIG2</b></p>	
<p><b>MIG3.</b> El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>          1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este          2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este          3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este          (8) NS/NR          (9) INAP</p>	<p><b>MIG3</b></p>	

<p>Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____          TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____</p>	<p><b>TI</b></p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
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*Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.*


<p><i>Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.</i>          Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____           Firma del supervisor de campo _____          Comentarios: _____           Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____          Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____</p>
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
## Tarjeta # 1

<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
<i>Izquierda</i>					<i>Derecha</i>				


## Tarjeta "A"



## Tarjeta "B"



## Tarjeta "C"



## Tarjeta "D"

**Muy honrados**

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

**Muy corruptos**

## Tarjeta “E”

**Los ingresos familiares *mensuales* de esta casa:**

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (1) Menos de \$100
- (2) \$100-\$199
- (3) \$200-\$399
- (4) \$400-\$599
- (5) \$600-\$799
- (6) \$800-\$999
- (7) \$1000-\$1499
- (8) \$1500-\$2499
- (9) \$2500-\$4999
- (10) \$5000 y más

## Annex II: C: Precision of the results

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling errors and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the gathering and processing of the information. These errors can be controlled by constructing a good measurement instrument, good interviewer training, good field supervision, and with good programs to input data such errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the comparison of the result of the sample with the population gives an idea if those errors have generated biases that might make the sample unrepresentative of the population. The use of hand-held computers that have been employed in the AmericasBarometer 2006 in some of the countries studied likely reduces these errors by allowing for consistency checks during the actual process of interviewing. In addition, eliminating the process of data entry eliminates errors at this stage as well. With the traditional process of paper questionnaires, it is necessary to code the questionnaires in the office and to clean the data, which is also a process that can generate error. With paper questionnaires, this process goes on only weeks after the data have been collected. Correcting the errors detected in the office during the cleaning process, or by programs that detect errors, still leaves many of those errors uncorrected or uncorrectable.

On the other hand, sampling errors are a produce of chance and result from the basic fact of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, it must be realized that this is only one of the many possible samples that could be drawn. The variability that exists between all of these possible sampling errors could be known only if all possible samples were drawn, which is obviously impossible for practical and cost reasons. In practice, what one does is to estimate the error based on the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sampling error of a statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar circumstances. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design of the sample. The Design Effect, DEFT, indicates the efficient of the design employed in relation to a design of simple random sampling (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by the both designs (complex and SRS) is the same; that is to say, the complex sample is as efficient as the SRS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample produces an error larger than that obtained by SRS.

$$DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$$

In the table below are presented the confidence intervals (95%, that is 1.96 of the EE), and the design effects (DEFT). The table shows also the statistical value of the question (mean or percentage). The EE are estimated by STATA 9. The extreme values originate in a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socio-economic situation, and this reduces the efficiency of the cluster sampling.

It is worth noting that the sampling error is usually 10% to 40% larger than what would have been observed by SRS. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important system support index, (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. That means that confidence interval at 95% (given by the 1.96 of the EE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT from the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained by SRS.

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Error	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			it1r			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican Rep.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican Rep.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53