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Wordtrade Reviews:

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TIMELESS: A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH by Steve Weidenkopf [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681921488]

All the makings of your favorite adventure story - drama, intrigue, promise, love, hope, and heartache spanning two thousand years...and **YOU** are a part of it!

TIMELESS: A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH is a fresh retelling of the history of the Church. In this easy-to-read, not-your-average history book, Steve Weidenkopf introduces you to the vivid, dynamic story of God's work in the world since Pentecost. Along the way, you will meet the weird, wonderful, and always fascinating heroes and villains of the Catholic family tree.

Read **TIMELESS: A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH** and you'll

- Learn the past in order to make sense of our world,
- know Christ better,
- be prepared to defend your Faith and the Church, and
- understand where you fit in the greatest story ever told.

About the Author

Steve Weidenkopf teaches Church History at the Christendom College Graduate School of Theology in Alexandria, VA. He is the author of *The Glory of the Crusades* (2014), *The Real Story of Catholic History: Answering Twenty Centuries of Anti-Catholic Myths* (2017), and *20 Answers: The Reformation* (2017). He is the creator, co-author, and presenter of the adult faith formation program *Epic: A Journey through Church History* and is a popular author and speaker on the Crusades and other historical topics.

Reviews

Written for a popular audience, including high schoolers, It is a good example of apologetics for catechumen.

Often, we view the study of history as something mundane and tiresome.

In a world focused on the sciences and business, history may be seen as a quaint subject.

But in reality it is the subject, along with theology and philosophy, that can provide a sense of our human identity.

Identifying with the Catholic Church is an important part of our faith lives, but that can be difficult if we do not know the history of the Church. You may have participated in Bible studies or learned Church doctrines or apologetics, but you are not alone if you have never studied Church history.

Excerpt:

> "The Christian is someone who has a good memory, who loves history and seeks to know it."' POPE BENEDICT XVI, 2010

Often, we view the study of history as something mundane and tiresome. This is partially due to the way history is taught in the modern world. Teachers have limited time for instruction and are restricted by standards that require meeting objectives set by authorities outside the educational environment. As a result, the teaching of history is reduced to requiring students to memorize information — that is, names, dates, and events — with no meaningful link to their personal lives. The result is that students study to pass their tests and then quickly forget the material. History is just another boring subject. Historians also make history boring by writing for each other in thick, academic, and mundane tomes. Nonprofessional historians write many of the popular history books, because they are writers who

desire to tell a historical story. These books sell because history is presented as it should be: a dramatic story of heroes and villains, told in a way that resonates with the reader and explains the makeup of the modern world by providing the context of the past. In a world focused on the sciences and business, history may be seen as a quaint subject. But in reality it is the subject, along with theology and philosophy, that can provide a sense of our human identity. Identifying with the Catholic Church is an important part of our faith lives, but that can be difficult if we do not know the history of the Church. You may have participated in Bible studies or learned Church doctrines or apologetics, but you are not alone if you have never studied Church history. This may be the result of the daunting task associated with learning two thousand years' worth of events and people! Where does one begin? Perhaps we should first explore what we mean by "the Church."

What is The Church?

In a document from the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965), titled Lumen Gentium (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church), the conciliar fathers wrote about the mystery of the Church, her hierarchical structure, the universal call to holiness of all members of the People of God, and the role of the Blessed Mother in the plan of salvation. Early in the document, the conciliar bishops provide a succinct definition of the Church: "Christ, the one Mediator, established and continually sustains here on earth His holy Church, the community of faith, hope and charity, as an entity with visible delineation through which He communicates truth and grace to all." With this in mind, what is the Church? She was established by Christ — not created by a group of people who decided to get together and believe the same things. Rather, God himself founded the Church and sustains her in existence. The Church lives out the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love communally and through the actions of her individual members. She is an organization with a visible and hierarchical structure (pope, bishops, priests, deacons, laity). The Church's structure is not the work of a committee or majority vote; it was divinely instituted, and is not subject to change by human whim. The definition from Lumen Gentium also answers the question of why Christ founded the Church: The Church is the instrument through which he communicates truth and grace (through the sacraments) to the world. The Church has a salvific mission, which is a continuation of Christ's own mission of salvation. Lumen Gentium also describes the Church as a "complex reality" composed of both visible and invisible elements, which we describe as the Communion of Saints. The Church exists in three states: you and I are a part of the Church Militant (those on earth), while those who have died are members of the Church Suffering (souls in purgatory), and the Church Triumphant (the saints in heaven). The study of Church history is mostly concerned with the visible element of the past actions of the Church Militant, but it cannot ignore the invisible reality of the Church. The Catechism of the Catholic Church reminds us that "the Church is in history, but at the same time she transcends it. It is only 'with the eyes of faith' that one can see her in her visible reality and at the same time in her spiritual reality as bearer of divine life."

The Church is a living Church — she is neither confined to one historical era, nor does she remain static through the centuries. The story of the Church comprises the actions of the men and women who lived the Faith. Although the dogmas and doctrines of the Church are immutable, the presentation of those teachings and their lived expression by the faithful change and develop through the centuries of human existence, so that she presents the timeless treasures of the Faith to each new human generation. Therefore, we should not be alarmed at the changes that occur in the Church (although not in her essential elements) as she marches through human history.

Finally, the Church is comprised of fallen, yet redeemed, human persons. As a result, the study of Church history is the study of their actions, both good and bad, and the effects of those actions on the life of the Church. The story of the Church is the story of saints and sinners and, more often than not, sinners who became saints! Studying the lives of those who came before us should encourage us in our struggles, and help us realize the need to continually fight against temptation and live our vocation to holiness in imitation of Christ. Through two thousand years of the Christian faith, there have been those, even in the highest office of the Church, who did not authentically live their vocation to holiness. There were popes who lived immorally, and an authentic study of Church history cannot gloss over their actions or make excuses. Rather, it should analyze them in order to learn from their mistakes and to defend the Church.

Ultimately, the study of the history of the Church — our own family history — should help us grow in our devotion and love of the Holy Spirit, who guides, guards, and animates the Church. For without the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, the Church would be simply a human institution, and would have disintegrated long ago. Indeed, as the Catholic historian Hilaire Belloc (1870-1953) wrote, "When one remembers how the Catholic Church has been governed, and by whom, one realizes that it must be divinely inspired to have survived at all."

What is History?

Did you know that there is a Catholic understanding of history?

In the ancient world, Greeks and Romans viewed history as a series of repetitive cycles with no beginning, central event, or end — they believed that human events repeated themselves in a never-ending cycle. History in the pagan world had no central meaning. The modern understanding of history is myopically narrow on the modern era and views the past with disdain, clinging to the supposed superiority of the present. A Catholic understanding of history, on the other hand, recognizes the central role of God. Presented originally by Saint Augustine of Hippo in his epic work The City of God, history is linear — it has a beginning and an end. God oversees and is involved in human history, proving his love for humanity and his intimate involvement in human affairs by sending the Second Person of the Trinity to take on human flesh. Christ's Incarnation is the central event in human history — all history radiates outward (both forward and backward) from this crucial event. The climax of the Incarnation provides meaning to human history and a path out of the circular view of history espoused by the pagans. Christ came in "the fullness of time," when the world was composed of the three great civilizations of the Jews, Greeks, and Romans. This is illustrated by the placard placed on Jesus' cross by Pontius Pilate, identifying him as the "King of the Jews," written in the three languages of those civilizations. The establishment of the Church ushered in a new civilization, forming a new culture out of the ancient world. The history of the Church is the study of this new civilization and its impact.

History, in the Catholic sense, is more than just the recording of human events. We refer to it as salvation history — the unfolding of God's plan for his people, their sanctification, and their eventual union with him in heaven. Salvation history began with God's act of creation ex nihilo (out of nothing). God created the world, plants, and animal life, and then man and woman in his image and likeness. Unfortunately, the disobedient act of our first parents broke the relationship between humanity and God, but God did not leave us to our own devices. He sent his only begotten Son to restore that relationship and our chance for a share in the heavenly kingdom. In time, the created world will come to

an end with the Second Coming of Christ, who will usher in a new heaven and a new earth. We must keep in mind this divine dimension of human history, especially when studying Church history. This is not merely one subject among many; it is a way to grow deeper in relationship with the Holy Trinity by recognizing and discerning the spiritual meaning of human affairs.

Our Family History

Given the importance of learning Church history, and the method by which it should be learned, we can ask another question: "How should we view Church history?" This book seeks to tell the story of the Catholic Church through the actions of the men and women who came before us in faith. Christ revealed God to be a loving Father, and we are adopted sons and daughters in Christ and heirs to the kingdom of heaven. We all live in the family of God, the Church. When we study the actions and events of our brothers and sisters in the Faith, we are studying our spiritual genealogy. Many people spend hours and resources tracing their earthly lineage, but, more importantly, because we hope to live with them in eternity, we should study the history of our spiritual family. Viewing Church history in this manner helps us understand that history is the subject by which we grow in our Catholic identity.

Part of our Catholic identity involves using the proper terms when learning Church history. As an example, the term "Christianity" is an unhistorical, post-Reformation term that "connotes an opinion or a theory; a point of view; an idea."' The Catholic faith is none of those things, as Catholics are not attached to an idea or a philosophy but to a Person (Christ) and to a thing (the Church). Additionally, "Christianity" implies a multiplicity of ways of living the Faith — that is, "Catholic Christianity," "Protestant Christianity" — but there is only one Church that contains the fullness of Christ's revelation, authority, and grace. Therefore, the term "Christianity" is not used in this book; rather, "the Faith" is utilized in accordance with the historical understanding of the Church.

The Importance of Learning Church History

Now that we understand the definitions of the Church and history, we must ask and answer another question: Why study Church history?

Learning Church history is vital for the modern-day Catholic for the four following reasons:

1. To make sense of our world
2. To know Christ better
3. To defend the Faith and the Church
4. To know who we are

The knowledge of our Catholic story gives meaning to the present age, which allows us to view modern-day problems with a deeper and more accurate perspective. Additionally, knowing the past can help shape our future decisions so that we can benefit the Church and the world. This worldview is not common thinking in our current culture, but is essential for the modern-day Catholic. Today's society condenses complex issues and policy decisions into thirty-second sound bites. But focusing on the present is ultimately detrimental, since it makes humanity "lose their sense of the past, of history; but by doing so it also deprives them of the ability to understand themselves, to perceive problems and to build the future."

Since "Christ is the foundation and center of human history, [and] he is its meaning and ultimate goal," studying Church history leads to greater knowledge of Jesus, which is the consummate goal of any Christian study. It can be difficult to see Christ in every event and human activity in the Church's history, especially when those actions are not in conformity with Jesus' example and teachings, but he is always present in his Mystical Body. Learning Church history allows us to grow deeper in love with the Lord and his Church.

Most Catholics in the United States learned non-Catholic history in school (unless they went to a Catholic school that taught them authentic Catholic history) because history as a whole is taught in the American educational system from an English Protestant perspective. As an example, I remember learning in secondary school about the cruelty and barbarism of the reign of "Bloody Mary" Tudor and the cultured, civilized court of her half-sister Elizabeth I. The standard Protestant (false) historical narrative paints "Good Queen Bess" as one of England's greatest monarchs: a strong, intelligent woman with excellent judgment who led England into an era of prosperity and who was beloved by her people because she exhibited their strong Protestant convictions. This narrative is a "monstrous scaffolding of poisonous nonsense [that] has ... been foisted on posterity." In reality, the "Virgin Queen" was a figurehead, used and controlled by powerful men behind the scenes. Under her reign, the first state-sponsored persecution of the Catholic Church in Europe since the Roman Empire was undertaken. Elizabeth and her thugs killed, tortured, and imprisoned thousands of English subjects simply because they were Catholic (although Elizabeth's Catholic half-sister Mary was inappropriately given the nickname "bloody"). Unfortunately, that historical truth is rarely presented in today's history class. It is vital for us as Catholics to be able to defend the Church when she is maligned or misrepresented, and when myths are presented as historical fact. Catholics have an obligation to embrace the truths, both good and bad, about our past, and retake the historical narrative from the dominant Protestant (and increasingly secular) view.

The Church is called to continue Christ's salvific mission, and each Catholic is given a role to play in that important drama. Before we can play our part, though, we need to know who we are — we must have a sense of Catholic identity, which we can find in Church history. The modern Western world exhibits cultural and historical amnesia on a national level. Nations that separate themselves from their Christian origins are apt to embrace immoral and totalitarian political systems, which erode individual rights and place the individual at the service of the state. In order to regain its identity, the Western world must relearn its Catholic history and hold in high esteem the supernatural and transcendent character of history — the recognition that God acts throughout human history. We must embrace what Hilaire Belloc termed "the Catholic Conscience of History," wherein the Catholic understands the history of Western civilization from within precisely because it is the story of the Catholic Church and her influence on that civilization. Belloc believed that a rightly formed Catholic should have "an intimate knowledge [of history] through identity."" Learning Church history from an authentic Catholic perspective should produce a deeper personal identity with the Church and lead to a "new, forceful consciousness of being Catholic."

The Best Method of Learning Church History

In any form of catechesis, the method of teaching should be established in the example of the Master Catechist, Christ. The Gospels provide numerous examples of Jesus' teaching methods, which usually varied depending on his audience. To his apostles Jesus was very direct, so that they would have

complete understanding of what he was trying to convey (though they still did not seem to grasp it at times). To the larger crowds of people who gathered to see and hear him, he spoke in a simpler manner — he told stories. People remember stories because we are relational beings, who build relationships with others through shared experiences that are recounted as stories. For example, a photo of siblings at a hockey game, viewed years later, will produce stories from that shared experience ("Remember when Dad took us to that game?"). History is best taught and learned as story. Indeed, for most of human existence, history was conveyed through oral tradition (stories) and, when written down, continued to be told in a narrative format.

Until the late eighteenth century, history was seen as a form of literature and taught under that genre. In the nineteenth century, German nationalist and Lutheran author Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) changed history to a form of science, where textual criticism and primary source material dominated the field. Ranke taught at the University of Berlin, which had been opened in 1810, a few years after the Prussian Army was defeated by Napoleon. The purpose of the Berlin institution was to train and educate citizens and civil servants to staff the Prussian state bureaucracy. This university instituted a change in the role of higher education. Previously, universities "served the common good by passing on a shared intellectual heritage," a cultural identity. The new university was less concerned with handing on the cultural identity of a civilization, instead focusing on the "development of new knowledge through original scientific research." This scientific focus moved the study and teaching of history from literature — a narrative retelling of a national, racial, and religious identity — to an "objective science" focused on written sources. Indeed, this shift in understanding the historical profession was a deliberate rejection of the "traditional approach to history." This shift continues into the modern world, where narrative history is seen as biased, and history written or taught by a believing Christian is doubly suspect. The modern-day belief that historians of no faith are more "objective" than historians of faith is a fallacy, for "the rejection of some or all religious truth is every bit as much an intellectual position as is the acceptance of religious truth. Both the believer and the non-believer have a point of view. ... Objectivity does not derive from having no point of view." It has been forgotten that all presentations of history rest on the worldview of the historian. The task of the historian is to review available sources and find a way to craft a comprehensible narrative from the mass of raw materials. The crafting of the subject into a readable and presentable book is heavily influenced by the worldview of the author, who, if honest, will openly communicate that worldview to the reader or student. I am a faithful Catholic, and as such I approach the subject of Church history from that perspective. That does not mean that I will ignore or gloss over the negative events or actions in the history of Church, but it does mean that I will interpret those events in light of my faith and the unique role of the Church in human history. <>

COSMOS AND CREATION: SECOND TEMPLE PERSPECTIVES edited by Michael W. Duggan, Renate Egger-Wenzel, and Stefan C. Reif [Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2019, DE GRUYTER 9783110676969]

This volume contains essays by some of the leading scholars in the study of the Jewish religious ideas in the Second Temple period, that led up to the development of early forms of Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity.

Close attention is paid to the cosmological ideas to be found in the Ancient Near East and in the Hebrew Bible and to the manner in which the translators of the Hebrew Bible into Greek reflected the creativity with which Judaism engaged Hellenistic ideas about the cosmos and the creation. The concepts of heaven and divine power, human mortality, the forces of nature, combat myths, and the philosophy of wisdom, as they occur in 2 Maccabees, Ben Sira, Wisdom of Solomon and Tobit, are carefully analysed and compared with Greek and Roman world-views. There are also critical examinations of Dead Sea scroll texts, early Jewish prayers and Hebrew liturgical poetry and how they these adopt, adapt and alter earlier ideas. The editors have included appreciations of two major figures who played important roles in the study of the Second Temple period and in the history and development of the ISDCL, namely, Otto Kaiser and Alexander Di Lella, who died recently and are greatly missed by those in the field.

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Excerpt: The biennial meeting of the ISDCL took place at St John's College in the University of Cambridge from 16th until 19th July, 2017. Twenty-four members from Austria, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States delivered lectures on the theme of "Cosmos and Creation" and each session also attracted a few other scholars who came to audit the presentations. The keynote address on the first evening was given by William Horbury, Emeritus Professor of Jewish and Early Christian Studies in the Faculty of Divinity and Fellow of Corpus Christi College, in the University of Cambridge. The meeting at St John's College was arranged by Stefan Reif, a Fellow of the College and Emeritus Professor of Medieval Hebrew Studies, who also gave a guided tour of the College and the Genizah Exhibition being held at the University Library. The ISDCL is especially grateful to him for having stepped into the breach when an arrangement to hold the 2017 conference in another European city had to be cancelled because of unforeseen circumstances. He did this with virtually no secretarial staff to assist him. The conference papers that have been submitted and approved for publication now appear in this volume. Before the papers themselves, the editors have included appreciations of two major figures in the history and development of the ISDCL, namely, Otto Kaiser and Alexander Di Lella, who died recently and are much missed.

Environment

Stefan Beyerle explains how temple concepts denoted certain cosmological ideas in the Ancient Near East and in ancient Judaism. He points to archaeological, iconographic and literary evidence, including texts in the Hebrew Bible, that demonstrate the links between sanctuaries and heavenly spheres and explains that their overall purpose is the symbolization of divine or royal power. Barbara Schmitz argues that the Greek-Hellenistic context for is not primarily the theology of creation, but the very specific Hellenistic concept of kingship in which the king as the has the specific role of founding cities. The paper explores this meaning in the book of Judith, 2 and 4 Maccabees, the Letter of Aristeas and Gen 14.

Greek translators

Comparing the Masoretic text with the Greek version of Job 38, Markus Witte demonstrates how the Greek translators transfer elements of Near Eastern cosmologies into the Greek world, and how Job 38 in its Greek form participates

in the cosmological discourse of Hellenistic philosophy. He draws attention to similar notions in Ben Sira, Wisdom and Testament of Job. In her paper on the Additions to the Greek book of Esther, Kristin de Troyer explains how the translator, with the help of specific cosmic imagery, which functioned on both a secular and a religious level, already pointed to a good outcome for the Jewish people. This outcome is clear in Addition F but is already adumbrated in the religious undertone of Addition A's image of cosmic events. Pancratius Beentjes rejects the widespread view that Dan 3:57-90 is "the earliest imitation"' or "an exact paraphrase of Psalm 148", pointing out that this hymn exhibits a diversity of reference points, which include Ps 102:20-22 (LXX), and Ps 135:1-2 (LXX). He also suggests that allusions to specific biblical passages referring to creation or cosmology are less frequent than one would expect in a text that bears the name "A Song of Creation."

2 Maccabees

For Michael Duggan, the four epiphanies of 2 Maccabees confirm that the cosmos is vulnerable to God's intervention on behalf of observant Jews in the land of Israel. The epiphanies blend ancient Israelite depictions of YHWH as the commander of heavenly armies with Hellenistic portrayals of horses to illustrate how the Jews were empowered to defend their land and culture against imperial invasion. A similar idea of heavenly intervention on behalf of the defending Jews receives the attention of Renate Egger-Wenzel. Her paper deals with worldly and other-worldly references to gold in 2 Maccabees and argues that their main purposes are to encourage or protect the Temple, Judas and the righteous Jews as well as to threaten and to defeat the powerful Hellenistic opponents.

Ben Sira

Various questions are raised by Severino Bussino. How people understand the meaning of the creation is significant in order for them to understand themselves. Is this also the case when it comes to the book of Ben Sira? Which perspective does Ben Sira have in mind when he refers to cosmos and creation? He analyses the passages in which the master refers to nature, with specific attention to anthropology and to the function that these teachings have in the book. Núria Calduch-Benages tackles the little treatise on the binary structure of creation in the Hebrew text of Ben Sira 33:7-15, of which she offers an annotated translation. She concentrates on the concept of opposites or complementary pairs in creation and, by way of a literary study of the passage, draws attention to its central theme, namely, the polarities in creation. Ben Sira's hymn of praise to the Creator and his creation in 42:15 — 25 is the subject of Otto Mulder's paper. All God's works are useful and nothing is made in vain and Wisdom is only part of creation. Unlike many wisdom traditions in post-exilic biblical literature, Ben Sira is critical of opponents with an apocalyptic view based on heavenly revelations. Although, in Jeremy Corley's view, Ben Sira's creation theology is rooted in the priestly vision of a sole Creator (Gen 1:1— 2:4), his cosmology also has parallels with Stoic thinking in his attitude of praise toward God (as in Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus) and the notion of creation's perfection (as in Cicero on the nature of the gods). Turning from God's almighty power, the sage contemplates the smallness of human beings, limited by their mortality.

Wisdom of Solomon

William Horbury suggests that in Wisdom, as often elsewhere in Greek, Roman and Jewish literature, cosmos and earthly empire are interconnected. In Wis 1:1-11:1, the cosmos is treated within the framework of the manifestation of divine rule in the empire of David and Solomon. The extent of resemblance between Wisdom and Virgil on this theme is also noted. Angelo Passaro's paper is part of a broader study of Wisdom 19 that seeks to describe the evolution of the author's discourse with regard to the composition history of the sections making up the book. For each section there is an attempt to grasp the interpretative implications of the literary analysis. The current article concentrates on the third part of the book, the sunkrisis. The question raised by Martina Kepper is whether a subtle philosophic approach underlies Wisdom. She argues that the author is aware of various philosophical challenges being made in Hellenistic times and is skilled in Greek-Hellenistic literary form and vocabulary. The book regards the somewhat traditional figure of Lady Wisdom, already mentioned in the traditional Hebrew writings, also as a kind of intermediary.

Tobit and 4Q Instruction

Francis Macatangay's article argues that the creation motif informs the portrait of chaos and restoration in the book of Tobit. God's conflict with the dragon and the chaos monster forms the background for the narrative appearance of an enormous fish that attacks Tobias. In evoking the combat myth, the narrative actualizes God's creative might in the days of old not only for Tobit's tormented present but also for his future restoration from exilic chaos. The essay by Helen Cashell-Moran assesses cosmology and creation in 4QInstruction, a previously unknown writing until its discovery among the caves of Qumran. It presents and discusses three fragments of this composition: 4Q416 1, 4Q417 1 1, 13b-18, and 4Q423 1:2 1, 1-4, in which the themes of cosmology and creation occur.

Rabbinic ideas

For Stefan Reif, the compilers of the early rabbinic prayers eschewed colourful and mystical notions in favour of more literal descriptions of the Creator, the creation and the cosmos, sometimes relating these to the human world. The tensions between universal and national preoccupations gradually dissipated and space was again given to angels and to cosmology, with complex notions of the Godhead slowly finding broader acceptance. Dalia Marx's essay discusses the possibility that the later part of Ben Sira (42:15 — 50:24) may have served as a literary inspiration, a precedent or maybe even an Urtext, at least to some extent, for the Seder Ha-`Avodah poems of later rabbinic liturgy. Such a development exemplifies the possible use of Second Temple texts in identifying and understanding some of the nascent concepts and literary patterns to be found in such rabbinic compositions. <>

To Cast the First Stone: The Transmission of a Gospel Story by Jennifer Knust and Tommy Wasserman [Princeton University Press, 9780691169880]

The story of the woman taken in adultery features a dramatic confrontation between Jesus and the Pharisees over whether the adulteress should be stoned as the law commands. In response, Jesus famously states, "Let him who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her." *To Cast the First Stone* traces the history of this provocative story from its first appearance to its enduring presence today.

Likely added to the Gospel of John in the third century, the passage is often held up by modern critics as an example of textual corruption by early Christian scribes and editors, yet a judgment of corruption obscures the warm embrace the story actually received. Jennifer Knust and Tommy Wasserman trace the story's incorporation into Gospel books, liturgical practices, storytelling, and art, overturning the mistaken perception that it was either peripheral or suppressed, even in the Greek East. The authors also explore the story's many different meanings. Taken as an illustration of the expansiveness of Christ's mercy, the purported superiority of Christians over Jews, the necessity of penance, and more, this vivid episode has invited any number of creative receptions. This history reveals as much about the changing priorities of audiences, scribes, editors, and scholars as it does about an "original" text of John.

To Cast the First Stone: The Transmission of a Gospel Story calls attention to

significant shifts in Christian book cultures and the enduring impact of oral tradition on the preservation—and destabilization—of scripture.

Review

"This valuable and delightful book leaves no stone unturned in tracing the fascinating reception history of the biblical story of Jesus's encounter with the adulterous woman. Deeply scholarly and wonderfully accessible, **TO CAST THE FIRST STONE** will prove relevant for many discussions on the early church."**--AnneMarie Luijendijk, Princeton University**

"Brilliantly conceived, massively researched, and convincingly argued, Knust and Wasserman's wide-ranging analysis of the pericope adulterae is a milestone in the field of textual studies, destined to be the definitive account for a generation."**--Bart D. Ehrman, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill**

"Knust and Wasserman show how the story of Jesus and the woman taken in adultery came to be popular in spite of its dubious origin. Compelling and masterfully researched, *To Cast the First Stone* is an important book."**--Kim Haines-Eitzen, author of *The Gendered Palimpsest: Women, Writing, and Representation in Early Christianity***

"Knust and Wasserman use the story of the adulteress to illustrate the fascinating transmission history of gospel literature and the various personalities and forces that contributed to the process. *To Cast the First Stone* will undoubtedly become the standard book on this story."**--Chris Keith, author of *The* Pericope Adulterae, *the Gospel of John, and the Literacy of Jesus***

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Introduction: Loose Texts, Loose Women

Some 1,700 years ago, the anonymous author of the third-century church order the Didascalia apostolorum reminded his audience of an episode involving Jesus and a woman accused of adultery. In this story, as now known from the Gospel of John, scribes and Pharisees bring a woman taken in adultery before Jesus, asking him to make a decision about her and the law; should she be stoned as the law commands? Instead of offering an immediate reply, Jesus stoops and writes on the ground. Finally, he answers, "Let the one without sin among you be the first to throw a stone at her:' They then go away, leaving Jesus alone with the woman. Jesus asks her, "Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you?" She replies, "No one, Lord," to which he responds, "Neither do I condemn you. Go and sin no more" (John 7:53-8:11, NRSV).

First written in Greek but preserved in Syriac and Latin, the Didascalia's discussion of this story offers the earliest explicit reference in the Christian tradition to an episode involving Jesus and a woman caught in adultery, now known to scholars as the pericope adulterae. Citing a version somewhat different from what is printed in the Gospel of John as it appears in modern editions of the New Testament (the writer speaks of "elders" rather than "scribes and Pharisees," for example), the Didascalia exhorts local Syrian bishops to forgive repentant sinners and welcome them back into the

church. If Christ did not condemn the sinful woman but sent her on her way, the writer argues, then bishops should also be willing to reconcile former sinners to the faith in imitation of their Savior (Did. apost. 7).

In 1975, the Nobel Prize—winning poet Seamus Heaney presented a very different interpretation of this same story in "Punishment," one of his "bog poems." Inspired by the discovery of a set of two-thousand-year-old mummified bodies, murdered and left to rot in a Danish bog, Heaney offered a series of reflections on archaeology, history, and place that linked these lion Age murders to the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland. "Punishment," addressed to the body of an adolescent girl (age fourteen?), associates the Gospel's adulteress with a victimized Viking girl and a group of Irish women tarred for fraternizing with British soldiers. Silent witnesses who observe but do not prevent these punishing acts, Heaney implies, are full participants in the perpetuation of violence and abuse they later decry. The allusion to the pericope in this poem is indirect and yet unambiguous: Heaney names the drowned girl "little adulteress" (her specific crime is not actually known) and laments that he, the poet, would have thrown "the stones of silence" as an "artful voyeur:' Blaming mute spectators for complicity and hypocrisy, the poem therefore indicts those who observe acts of "tribal revenge" and yet speak with "civilized outrage" after the fact.

By the time Heaney composed "Punishment," it was possible to call the pericope adulterae to mind merely by mentioning an adulteress and stones, but this was not always so. From the first reference to the story in the Didascalia apostolorum until today, the pericope adulterae boasts a long, complex history of reception and transmission, which, at least early on, placed it on the margins of Christian interpretation. Absent from early copies of the Gospels and rarely cited, it finally emerged as a popular tale only in the fourth century, and then largely among Latin-speaking authors. Writers like Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315-67/8), Pacian of Barcelona (ca. 310-91), Ambrose of Milan (ca. 339—(d.395), 97), Gelasius Rufinus ofAquileia (ca. 345-411), Jerome (ca. 345-420),

Augustine of Hippo (345-430), Peter Chrysologus (ca. 400-450), Leo the Great (d. 461), Sedulius (active ca. 450), and Cassiodorus (ca. 485-580) referred to it, often in great detail, and in versions similar to what is printed in modern editions of the Gospel of John. The Greek writer Didymus the Blind (ca. 313-98), a fourth-century theologian and teacher living in Alexandria, also knew this story but in a slightly different version and probably not from John. Codex Bezae (D/d os, ca. 400), a bilingual Greek and Latin copy of the Gospels, Acts, and Catholic Epistles, provides the earliest manuscript witness to the presence of the story in a canonical Christian Gospel. Many but not all early Latin manuscripts of John preserve the story; the vast majority of Byzantine Greek manuscripts include it, though in several slightly different versions. Other Greek manuscripts omit the story, however, most significantly those identified with the 'Alexandrian text," a type of text thought to be most faithful to the initial text of the Gospel. In Against the Pelagians Jerome acknowledges that the passage is found "in many of both the Greek as well as the Latin copies" of the Gospel of John (in multis et Graecis et Latins codicibus; Pelag. 2.17); in other words, he knew it could not be found in every copy.'° Nevertheless, he included the pericope when composing his own Latin translation, a translation that was ultimately preserved in the Latin Vulgate.

Although not everyone knew the story, those who did took pains to ensure its survival. For example, an eighth- or ninth-century corrector of an Old Latin Gospel book, noticing that the story was missing from the seventh- or eighthcentury Codex Rehdigeranus (n, 1), copied Jerome's translation in the margin. At a later stage, the pages were trimmed, but this part of the margin was retained and folded. A

few scribes, unsure about how they ought to handle differences between their exemplars, appended the tale of the adulteress to the end of the Gospel. In one family of manuscripts, the pericope was incorporated into the Gospel of Luke; other locations were also possible, including after John 7:36, 7:44, 8:12, or between Luke and John. A sixth-century Syriac compilation by a monk in Amida suggests that the story was found within John in a tetraevangelion once owned by Mara, an anti-Chalcedonian bishop exiled for eight years in Alexandria.16 The memory of the story's uncertain place in the Gospel was retained. Byzantine scribes often placed a series of asterisks next to the text, either to indicate that it should be skipped by the reader (the passage was omitted from the Pentecost liturgy, which jumped to John 8:12) or to show that it was spurious.' A few scribes left a blank space where it could be copied, but omitted it just the same." Augustine, aware of the problem with the passage, proposed an unlikely explanation for the story's occasional omission from the Gospels: it is not found in every copy of John, he argued, because "men of slight faith," afraid that their wives might commit adultery after hearing about the woman, deleted it (Adulterous Marriages 2.7.6).

The irregular transmission of the story within the Gospel books, however, did not prevent it from securing a home in Christian worship and art. By the sixth century the Johannine version of the passage had been incorporated in the Roman stational liturgy, read at the titular church of the Gai (later Santa Susanna) on the third Saturday of Lent. In the Byzantine church, the pericope was often read during the feast days of various female "sinner saints," though the date of its inclusion in various menologia (a calendar of saints' days and the readings to accompany them) remains unclear. It was also occasionally featured in decorative art; for example, it is depicted on two sixth-century Egyptian ivory pyxides, on the golden cover of the Codex Aureus of Saint Emmeram, a ninth-century copy of the Vulgate, and in ivory scenes of the life of Jesus carved in Magdeburg in the tenth century. In some later

Byzantine manuscripts, an extra chapter was added to the kephalaia of John, identifying the passage explicitly. Eventually, the woman taken in adultery emerged as one of the favorite subjects of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European painters.

Today the story is so widely known, so widely quoted, and so often alluded to in art, literature, film, and public discourse of all sorts that "throwing stones" serves as a cliché. Even so, the textual instability of the episode has not been forgotten, especially by biblical scholars, who continue to debate the implications of its unusual past. By now, most scholars have concluded that the pericope was not original to the Gospel; rather, it was added by a well-meaning interpolator at some later date, after the Gospel of John was already circulating. This conclusion, however, raises other questions: If the story was not included in the original or most primitive versions of the Gospel of John, should it be printed within the Gospel? In what sense can such a free-floating tradition be considered canonical? Is it authentically "Johannine" or something else? These concerns are further complicated by the popularity of the story among Christians today. The pericope adulterae is simply too well known and too beloved to be easily ignored, let alone expunged from the Gospel. The fame of the passage has guaranteed that it will continue to be mined for information about who Jesus was, how early Christian traditions were transmitted, and what this story might mean for Christians today. If anything, the unusual history of this story has enhanced rather than detracted from its already significant appeal.

Though the pericope adulterae remains the main focus of this study, tracing the threads of its journey across nearly seven centuries of Christian storytelling, art, liturgy, and Gospel book transmission has much larger implications for the study of ancient Christian books and traditions. The modern

preoccupation with the question of the story's textual standing has sometimes prevented readers from noticing that "the gospel" has rarely been limited to what can be found in texts. What is represented in art, employed in liturgy, or cited in the context of a polemical argument can extend well beyond traditions now associated with "the canonical Gospels:' Moreover, the practical use of texts has a tremendous impact on how these texts circulate, endure, or fall away. Thus, as we will argue, differences between Latin and Greek receptions of this passage had more to do with the early development of the liturgy than with any clear-cut ecclesial decision either to include or exclude it. Such a decision simply cannot be detected. And current efforts to exclude the story from the Gospel of John on the basis of its textual instability have failed: preachers continue to preach it, students still seek to unlock its hidden meanings, and most Christians remain blissfully unaware of the current scholarly consensus. As the history of the pericope adulterae shows, the gospel will not be limited either to canonical pronouncements or to scholarly interventions. Some culture of book production and storytelling has permitted the pericope adulterae to survive. Some culture of book production and storytelling keeps the story alive even now. Dismissing the passage as extraneous to the Gospel fails to explain how the passage entered the tradition at all, and embracing the story without question masks the situated and local character of both Gospel books and Christian practice. To tell the history of the pericope adulterae is to tell the history of the Gospels, and vice versa.

Plan of the Work

Our discussion begins in part 1, "A Case of Textual Corruption?," with an evaluation in chapter i of modern scholarship on this passage. Debates about the pericope adulterae have been central to the development of both modern textual criticism and historical-critical approaches to the Gospels, as these disciplines emerged in the nineteenth century. When nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholars advocated for the necessity of correcting ancient scribal error, they did so in part on the basis of this pericope, which was relegated to brackets or margins and thereby effectively removed from the canonical Gospel of John. The displacement of this story, as well as a few other passages, was inextricably linked to a new scientific approach to textual editing that finally overturned the Textus Receptus, the Greek text that had been employed in Europe since the Renaissance. This new approach also impacted the modern reception of the so-called Longer Ending of Mark (Mark 16:9—20), an equally unstable and "late" passage, but with a significant difference: Whereas most scholars came to regard the Longer Ending of Mark as a compilation of church traditions, appended for the sake of smoothing out the ending of the Gospel and harmonizing it with other accounts, the historical if not canonical authenticity of the pericope adulterae continued to be defended. Invested with contemporary meanings in a way that the Longer Ending of Mark has not been, the story of the woman taken in adultery is more often consulted by scholars, theologians, and lay Christians for important information about Jesus and the movement he founded. Historical-critical studies of the passage therefore continue apace, whether or not the pericope is regarded as Johannine.

Part 2,, "The Present and Absent Pericope Adulterae," intervenes in previous scholarship on the passage by challenging the firm link between "Gospel" and "Gospel book" implied by textual and historical-critical studies to date. Rather than attempting to solve the relationship between the pericope adulterae and an initial text of John, chapter 2 seeks to describe and understand a climate of Gospel production and interpretation that could lead to the story's incorporation within an already published Gospel of John. As this chapter shows, while it is true that the pericope was not likely to have been materially present in the earliest copies of John, its absence from the fourfold Gospels would not have prevented interpreters

from highly regarding the story. Moreover, with books produced by hand and distributed within circles of affinity groups (churches, schools, and among friends), it would have been difficult for even the staunchest editor to prevent an interpolator from going about his or her work. Once placed within some copies of John, few (if any) would dare to remove it, a point examined more carefully in chapter 3.

Chapter 4 revisits the possibility that the story was deleted rather than interpolated. Contemporary scholars have often suggested that the unusual history of the pericope adulterae can best be explained by its seemingly radical content. In a world where adultery on the part of women was heavily censured, it is argued, this story may have pushed the limits of Christian mercy too far, especially since the earliest Christians were often accused of sexual misconduct. In addition, the woman showed no apparent signs of repentance. Yet, we argue, outright deletion or intentional suppression are both highly improbable: scribes and scholars were trained never to delete, even when they doubted the authenticity of a given passage, and the widespread affection for stories about adulterous women across the ancient world belies the thesis that this story was censored.27 Always "gospel" to some Christians somewhere, the pericope adulterae may not originally have been Johannine, but it had no less claim to importance than any other well-known and highly regarded story about Jesus.

Part 3, "A Divided Tradition?," addresses the presentation and preservation of the pericope in late antique and early medieval manuscripts, exegesis, and art, dispelling the notion that the story was in fact marginal to Christian thought and practice. By the mid-fourth century, educated Christians had begun to register discrepancies among their copies of John, acknowledging that the pericope adulterae could be found only "in certain Gospels," "in many copies in both Greek and Latin," or "in most copies" but not all, statements that are confirmed by surviving manuscripts. Chapters illuminates this evidence by considering editorial work, Gospel translation, traditions of reception, and attitudes toward the fourfold Gospels among late ancient scribes and scholars. The great Greek pandect Bibles of the fourth and fifth centuries omitted the passage, as did Eusebius when he developed his canon tables (a paratextual instrument that enabled easy comparison of the Gospels, thereby demonstrating their overall harmony). Yet, as chapter 6 shows, the Latin-Greek diglot Codex Bezae (D /d os) included it, and Latin writers like Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine understood it to be fully Johannine. This inconsistency points back to rival local texts, some of which incorporated the passage when others did not, and reflects the continuing fluidity of Gospel texts and traditions even after the advent of imperial patronage. As in the earlier period, however, those who knew the pericope held it in high regard, whether or not they found it in John. It was more widely known in Latin-dominant contexts, but it was neither ignored nor overlooked in Greek.

Part 4, "Liturgical and Scholarly Afterlives of the Pericope Adulterae," considers the afterlives of the story in the text, paratext, liturgy, and art. Chapter 7 examines the importance of the Johannine passage in Old Latin and Byzantine texts, with particular attention to paratextual notes, chapter headings, and annotations. A few have claimed that the story was rarely cited in the Latin West, but our research overturns this misconception. Some Old Latin Gospels retain traces of the pericope's earlier absence, but most include it, highlighting it in capitula, the chapter summaries and lists that also accompanied Vulgate Gospels, often preserving Old Latin forms. By contrast, the story remained comparably marginal in Greek contexts, as scholars have frequently noted. Even so, the story was popular enough to provoke an exceptional event: at some point in late antiquity, the passage was interpolated in some manuscripts into the kephalaia, a set of chapter headings with titles that prefaced most Byzantine copies of the

Gospels. This manuscript evidence challenges the impression that the story was marginal, even in Greek. While it is true that no Christian bishop, priest, or monk working in a Greek-dominant context cited the passage in the centuries between the unique citation of a (non Johannine?) version by Didymus the Blind (ca. 313—98) and the twelfth-century exegetical and scholarly works of Euthymios Zigabenos and Eustathios of 'Thessaloniki (nearly eight hundred years), this does not mean that the story was either unknown or unloved.

Chapter 8 addresses the divergent liturgical history of the passage. As signed to the third Saturday of Lent in Rome, the story gained even greater prominence in Latin contexts, particularly during the Carolingian and Ottonian periods. Carolingian biblical reform preserved and promulgated the Roman stational liturgy, Jerome's Vulgate, and also the pericope adulterae, which was featured in an imperial-sponsored homiliary and depicted in luxurious copies of the Gospels. The story was comparatively peripheral in Byzantine contexts, yet it was incorporated in this context as well. Featured as a lection on the feast days of female sinner saints and read in penitential contexts, the story was readily accepted within earlier traditions about repentant prostitutes and the mercy Christ extends. Liturgical reading guaranteed that the pericope would be remembered in both contexts, albeit differently.

As our study shows, editions of the New Testament are representations in script or print of systems of valuation that seek to institute some current understanding of "the best text." Other systems of valuation are also possible, however, as ancient manuscripts and any number of other Gospel editions—ancient, medieval, or modern—can demonstrate. Yet an honest reckoning of the contingency of both interpretation and textual transmission should not imply that texts cannot be interpreted. To the contrary: it is possible to acknowledge the intricacies of New Testament textual transmission while still attempting to describe this transmission accurately, to accept the contingency of meaning making while making meaning claims anyway, and to regard material Bibles not as problems waiting to be solved but as witnesses to the kaleidoscopic and ever-changing character of human communities and the stories they tell. Rather than troubling the importance of "initial" texts and meaning making, the remarkable history of the pericope adulterae illustrates the irregular, temporal sedimentations through which gospel, story, and text survive, not in neat, linear sequences of progress and decline but through fits and starts, accidents and chance.

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FAUST IN MUSIC edited by Lorna Fitzsimmons and Charles McKnight [Oxford University Press, 9780199935185]

Since its emergence in sixteenth-century Germany, the magician Faust's quest has become one of the most profound themes in Western history. Though variants are found across all media, few adaptations have met with greater acclaim than in music. Bringing together more than two dozen authors in a foundational volume, **THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FAUST IN MUSIC** testifies to the spectacular impact the Faust theme has exerted over the centuries. The Handbook's three-part organization enables readers to follow the evolution of Faust in music across time and stylistic periods. Part I explores symphonic, choral, chamber, and solo Faust works by composers from Beethoven to Schnittke. Part II discusses the range of Faustian operas, and Part III examines Faust's presence in ballet and musical theater. Illustrating the interdisciplinary relationships between music and literature and the fascinating

tapestry of intertextual relationships among the works of Faustian music themselves, the volume suggests that rather than merely retelling the story of Faust, these musical compositions contribute significant insights on the tale and its unrivalled cultural impact.

CONTENTS

Without music the Faust myth would not have lived on after Goethe. Life, however, means transformation.—Hans Joachim Kreutzer

The story of Faust, the magical tale that has so intrigued not only European culture but also, increasingly, the world, arose in Germany in the sixteenth century. Today, the identity of the "Faustus" figure remains enigmatic. In the extant documents, the name is associated with necromancy, fortune telling, and disrepute. The documentary evidence for the "historical" Faust(s) is sparse and often unreliable. Palmer and More, in The Sources of the Faust Tradition from Simon Magus to Lessing (1936), cite twenty-four mentions in letters, account books, Luther's Tischreden, and other writings. These extend from a letter by Johannes Tritheim (1462-1516) in 1507 to the Operae horarum subcisivarum of Philipp Camerarius (1537-1624) published in 1591. All mentions of Faustus as a living person disappear around 1540.

The oral tradition of Faust took on such fantastic trappings that in 1587 the Lutheran printer Johann Spies (ca. 1540-1623) published the Historia von D. Johann Fausten (History of Doctor John Faustus) by an anonymous author as a warning against the ghastly end awaiting anyone who transgresses the God-given limits of human knowledge. The Historia's narrative relates a fascinating account of the divinity scholar Faustus's pact with the devil, his adventures, his magic, and his last year of life. The pact with the devil remains a fairly constant element in subsequent versions of the tale of Faustus. The adventures and conjurings vary a bit more in later works, with Faust's death and damnation prevailing until Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) Faust (1808,1832).

Soon after its publication in Frankfurt, the Historia was translated into English, Dutch, French, and Czech. The earliest surviving English edition was translated by the anonymous "P. F." and published in London in 1592 under the title The Historie of the Damnable Life, and Deserved Death of Doctor John Faustus. It was probably circulating in England as early as 1588. The English Faust Book was the basis of Christopher Marlowe's (1564-93) influential play The Tragicall History of D. Faustus (ca. 1588-89 or ca. 1592), first published in 1604. Note the word "Tragicall" in the title. Marlowe's Faustus is a more fully developed human personality, and his quest for knowledge leads to tragedy; the hero still perishes at the

end, but his intentions are not entirely evil. As the chorus in the epilogue states, "Cut is the branch that might have grown full straight, / And burnèd is Apollo's laurel bough, / That sometime grew within this learnèd man:' Marlowe's Faustus seeks forbidden knowledge and is punished, but his desire to possess the secrets of the universe has a more sympathetic quality than that of the Historia's Faustus. Although the Marlovian play is high-minded tragedy, it has plenty of comic scenes, which became an important aspect of the next dramatic incarnations of the Faust story as it traveled back to Germany.

As well as being performed on the boards, the story of Faustus filled the air musically at an early stage in its history. Songs about Faustus conjuring students or silencing peasants were being heard by 1588.3 On February 28, 1589, an English ballad was entered in the Stationers' Company Register as "A ballad of the life and deathe of Doctor Faustus the great Cunngerer" by "Ric. Iones:' Since it has been lost, its relation to "The Judgment of God shewed upon one John Faustus;' entered in the Register in 1674/75, remains unclear. This ballad was sung to the tune of "Fortune My Foe;' which by 1636 had gained the alternative title of "Doctor Faustus."

Early modern audiences beheld incarnations of Faustus revealed in stage and marionette adaptations of Marlowe's tragedy, which itinerant troupes brought to Germany. The comedy of the clowns' roles was very popular in German towns, and puppeteers emphasized, therefore, comic antics and magic spectacle, which recontextualized the meaning of Faustus's pursuits.6 Remaining popular to the nineteenth century, the Faust puppet tradition led to a turning point in the history of the legend when Goethe first encountered the Faust story at a puppet show. Dramatizations of Faustus were almost driven from the serious German stage but found timely rescuers, most importantly, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), and, subsequently, Goethe.

Lessing's contributions to Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend (1759-65) include the "17. Literaturbrief" ("Letter on Literature XVII") (1759), in which he dismisses Johann Christoph Gottsched's (1700-66) call for German playwrights to follow the path of the French, and upholds the plays of the English Elizabethans and local traditions as valuable alternatives to classicism. Applauding Doktor Faust (Doctor Faust) as an exemplary work of theatrical genius, Lessing appended a scene from his own Faust drama, depicting Faust and seven spirits. Although Lessing's initial references to Faust imply a critical perspective toward the theme, reports of his Faust play, which was never published, suggest that he came to reconceive the hero's fate in terms of redemption instead of damnation.

Goethe, who knew of the "17. Literaturbrief;' first engaged the Faust story seriously in the early 1770s and gave readings from his Faust in 1775; the draft that became known as the Urfaust, transcribed by Luise von Göchhausen (1752-1807), was not published until 1887. Faust. Ein Fragment (Faust, A Fragment) appeared in 1790, followed by Faust.

Eine Tragödie. Erster Teil (Faust, A Tragedy, Part I) in 1808. Goethe appears not to have taken up the Faust project again until the mid-1820s. The third act, Helena, klassischromantische Phantasmagorie (Helena. Classical-Romantic Phantasmagoria), was published in 1827. The complete second part of Faust was published after Goethe's death in 1832. The composition of Faust thus spanned a period of sixty years.

Goethe's Faust is a profound masterwork with deep philosophical implications and social criticism. Although in some respects satiric of the Age of Reason, Goethe represents Faust as an Enlightenment

hero striving to surpass the limitations imposed on him by nature and society. Goethe's hero sought knowledge but also experience. Faust gives up his life as a scholar because he believes there is more to be known and experienced outside his book-laden study. The pact he makes with Mephistopheles is not for the traditional twenty-four years. It is made in the form of a wager that Faust will never be content with any single moment:

> Werd' ich zum Augenblicke sagen:
> Verweile doch! du bist so schön!
> Dann magst du mich in Fesseln schlagen,
> Dann will ich gern zu Grunde gehn!
> Dann mag die Totenglocke schallen,
> Dann bist du deines Dienstes frei,
> Die Uhr mag stehn, der Zeiger fallen,
> Es sei die Zeit für mich vorbei!
>
> (If I should ever say to any moment:
> Tarry, remain! — you are so fair!
> then you may lay your fetters on me,
> then I will gladly be destroyed!
> Then they can toll the passing bell,
> your obligations then be ended—
> the clock may stop, its hand may fall,
> and time at last forme be over!)

Mephistopheles is obliged to serve him until that "beautiful" moment arrives. After many years, and many adventures, it is Faust's constant striving that in the end saves him. His salvation, a major departure from the traditional story, is another point of contention between Goethe and his contemporaries.

Goethe's other major departure from the Faust tradition was the Gretchen tragedy. Earlier Fausts had encountered women or a spiritual semblance of Helena of Greece, but the Gretchen tragedy in its depth and significance is something of a completely different order. Since Faust I was all that was known of the drama for twenty years, the Romantic generation of the early nineteenth century viewed the Gretchen love story as the vital center of Faust. While the play as a whole is informed by Goethe's interest in music, the Gretchen tragedy is particularly musical in its use of solo songs, choruses, and dances—all the ingredients for a good opera, but also ample inspiration for other genres.

Franz Schubert (1797-1828) composed five Faust settings (1814-17), the most well known of which is "Gretchen am Spinnrade" ("Gretchen at the Spinning Wheel") (1814) (see Chapter 2). The musical genius of Schubert turned this small moment in Faust I into one of the composer's most profound Lieder. Goethe created the scene as a small window into Gretchen's state of mind, but in Schubert's hands it became a highly dramatic scene that is carried beyond the words by the music.

The first well-known large-scale work based on the Faust legend that is not an opera (though it is operatic in style, as seen in the composer's designation of it as a "dramatic legend") is by Berlioz (see Chapter 3). His La damnation de Faust (The Damnation of Faust) (1846), based on the earlier Huit

scènes de Faust (Eight Scenes from Faust) (1829), made a significant departure from Goethe, as can be seen from the title of the work: while Faust descends to hell, Marguerite experiences a glorious apotheosis in heaven. Berlioz also places Faust in Hungary at the opening of the piece, where he witnesses a rousing display of Hungarian nationalism conveyed by the "Marche hongroise" ("Hungarian March"). Berlioz dedicated La damnation de Faust to Liszt.

Also to mid-century belongs Scenen aus Goethe's Faust (Scenes from Goethe's Faust) (1853) by Robert Schumann (1810-56) (see Chapter 4). This project began as an opera in Schumann's mind but he decided to make it an oratorio. Schumann draws the text for the first part of the oratorio from four Faust I scenes: Faust and Gretchen in the garden (mainly "Garten" [`A Garden"]), Gretchen's prayer to the Mater dolorosa ("Zwinger" ["By the Ramparts"]), and Gretchen's scene in the cathedral ("Dom" ["Cathedral"]). The second part draws on three scenes, this time from Faust II: the sunrise and Faust's monologue from the opening of act I. ("Anmutige Gegend" ["A Pleasant Landscape"]), the visit of the four gray women in act 5 ("Mitternacht" ["Palace"]), and Faust's death ("Großer Vorhof des Palasts" ["Palace"]). The third and largest part of the oratorio,

"Faust's Verklärung" ("Faust's Transfiguration"), is taken from the final scene of Faust II ("Bergschluchten, Wald, Fels" ["Mountain Gorges"]). Schumann's aim was not to recount Goethe's story, which was certainly known by audiences in central Germany, but to imbue these dramatic scenes with a lyrical and orchestral halo.

Wagner had an enduring interest in the Faust theme, first shown in Sieben Kompositionen zu Goethes Faust (Seven Compositions on Goethe's Faust) (1831), which includes "Branders Lied" ("Brander's Song") and "Lied des Mephistopheles" ("Song of Mephistopheles") (see Chapters 1 and 5). Later in the decade, the German composer began his Eine Faust-Ouvertüre (A Faust Overture) (1839-40, revised 1854-55), which he intended as the first movement of a symphony. Expressive of the Faust character, with a hint of the Mephistophelean, the overture is Goethean in origin. Goethe's concept of the "Ewig-Weibliche" ("Eternal Feminine"), with which Faust II concludes, appears to have been inspirational to a number of Wagner's works, though he considered Goethe's hero deficient in various respects. Like Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, Goethe's Faust had an indelible impact on the development of Wagner's music drama.

Liszt dedicated Eine Faust-Symphonie in drei Charakterbildern (nach Goethe) (A Faust Symphony in Three Character Sketches after Goethe), which was premiered in 1857, to Berlioz (see Chapter 6). It is notable that the two great Faustian orchestral incarnations in the middle of the nineteenth century were not by German composers, but rather one French and one Hungarian. Liszt's Faust-Symphonie is not only a compelling musical masterpiece, but also an example of the deep psychological insight into the Faust story that became a hallmark of twentieth-century thinking about Faust. The Faust-Symphonie takes the form of three character sketches, with that of Faust serving as the first movement. The music suggests that Faust is "redeemed" in the end, but this is not explicit.

Faustian fantasias become popular in Spain following the great success of Charles Gounod's (1818-93) opera Faust (1859), which was premiered in Barcelona in 1864 (see Chapter 7). Among them, Pablo de Sarasate's (1844-1908) Nouvelle fantaisie sur Faust (Fantasy on Gounod's "Faust" for Violin and Orchestra [or Piano]) [1874] is the best known. Joan Baptista Pujol's (1835-98) Fausto opera de Ch. Gounod: gran fantasia para piano (Faust opera by Ch. Gounod: grand fantasy for piano) [1866] has a

fascinating relationship to Marià Fortuny's evocative painting Fantasia sobre Fausto (Fantasy on Faust) (1866). Felip Pedrell i Sabaté (1841-1922) also wrote Faust fantasies, Transcripción de la serenata del Fausto (Transcription of the serenade of [Gounod's] Faust) and Fantasia sobre motivos del Fausto (Fantasy on motifs of [Gounod's] Faust) [1867], as well as two Gounodian rhapsodies.

Like Schumann, Gustav Mahler (1860-1911) employed the final scene of the second part of Goethe's Faust in the second of two massive movements of his Achte Symphonie (Eighth Symphony), which was composed 1906-7 and premiered in 1910 (see Chapter 8). The first movement is built on the ninth-century Latin hymn "Veni, creator spiritus:' Why these two texts? Mahler does not use them for dramatic effect, though they are dramatic in his setting. He seems to be drawing on the intertextual resonance of the traditions associated with each text. Ending with the "Chorus mysticus" from Faust gives the symphony an air of mysticism that transcends the work's enormous size.

In the twentieth century, the Faust story became increasingly political. The most powerful political version of the Faust legend is Thomas Mann's (1875-1955) novel Doktor Faustus (Doctor Faustus) (1947). In this novel, the Faust figure symbolizes Western cultural history in general (especially music) and German history in particular. Mann's Faust is a composer, based not on Goethe but the 1587 Historia. Mann has much to say about the essential musicality of German culture and the demonic nature of musical creativity. The author's concern with infusing political allegory into the Faust story would render the novel a landmark in Western literature.

Hanns Eisler (1898-1962) had read Mann's novel in 1948, the year before he accepted a commission to compose a work for the celebration of Goethe's bicentennial in the Soviet Occupation Zone, soon to be the German Democratic Republic, in 1949 (see Chapter 9). Intending to set part of the third act of Faust II, Eisler recycled some of his earlier music in the resultant Rhapsodie für großes Orchester (Rhapsody for large orchestra) (1949), with Goethe's text sung near the start. 'While his Rhapsodie was well received, his subsequent Faust work, the proposed opera Johann Faustus, did not fare so well. His libretto, published in 1952, drew on several Faust sources, the heart of which were the Faust puppet plays. Eisler also had Mann's Doktor Faustus in mind as he worked on the piece. With Goethe's Faust far from central to it, commentators objected to the adaptation choices Eisler had made in his use of Faust legend. The project never progressed beyond the libretto.

A number of composers discussed in this book have taken a personal interest in the Faust story. Alfred Schnittke (1934-98) read Mann's Doktor Faustus shortly after its publication in German and drew many parallels between himself and Mann's hero (see Chapter io). Mann's Faust figure is a composer, Adrian Leverkühn, who appears to derive his creative powers through a bargain with the devil—at least that is how Leverkühn himself explains it. The novel's complex portrait of the modern composer is indebted to the work of Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951) and Theodor W. Adorno (190369). Leverkühn is Faustian in several respects, including his composition of a Faust cantata, D. Fausti Weheklag (The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus). Deeply inspired by the novel, Schnittke, in turn, composed a Faust cantata, Seid nüchtern and wachet (Be sober and watch) (from the First Epistle of Peter) (1983), and an opera, Historia von D. Johann Fausten, which was premiered in 1995, based on the Spies Faust Book.

Part 2: Faust In Opera

It seems almost inevitable that the Faust story would find its way to the operatic stage. When Goethe and Johann Peter Eckermann (1792-1854) discussed a musical setting of Faust in 1829, Goethe suggested

that the music would have to be in the style of Mozart's Don Giovanni and that Mozart would be the appropriate composer. Don Giovanni had been composed forty-two years before this conversation, and Mozart had been dead for thirty-seven years. Goethe's musical sensibility was rooted in the eighteenth century, and he did not think of suggesting composers such as Beethoven (who had died two years before). His next suggestion was Giacomo Meyerbeer (1791-1864), seemingly unaware that the German composer was working on Robert le diable at the time. (It was premiered in 1831.)

In Romantic terms, Goethe's Faust has many features that lend themselves to operatic adaptation, including "a foredoomed love affair, a hero in conflict with himself, a villain of suave charm and real menace, an aura of the supernatural, and, at the end, a veritable deus ex machina providing salvation."' Table I.2 summarizes the operatic Fausts discussed in this book. As can be seen, they are almost all based on the first part of Goethe's Faust, but interest in the Faust puppet play tradition is also important. It is also noteworthy that, with the exception of Louis Spohr (1784-1859), whose opera in some ways recalls Klinger more than Goethe, a number of major German composers viewed the Faust story not so much as a vehicle for full-scale dramatic settings, but one suited to smaller, more intimate compositions. Large-scale theatrical works were common in France and Italy but still relatively rare until the middle of the nineteenth century in Germany, Der Freischütz (The Freeshooter) (1821), by Carl Maria von Weber (1786-1826), which features a demonic bargain, being a notable exception. It was in a gruesome Sturm and Drang (Storm and Stress) form that the Faust legend made its first significant appearance on the operatic stage, in Faust by Spohr, with a libretto by Josef Karl Bernard (1780-185o) that draws on a number of sources, including Klinger's novel and Heinrich von Kleist's (1777-1811) play Das Käthchen von Heilbronn (181o) (see Chapter 11). Already a noted violinist and composer of concerti, Spohr sought to make a name for himself as an opera composer. The subject of Faust would have been attractive to the audiences of his day, given the plethora of literary Faust incarnations circulating then. Spohr's Faust was first performed in 1816 as a Romantische Oper (Romantic opera), and in the composer's revision as a grand opera in 1852. Perhaps the aspect of Spohr's Faust that has received the most attention is his use of a series of leitmotifs that later influenced Weber and Wagner.

The most successful Faust opera has been Gounod's Faust (see Chapter 12). Jules Barbier (1825-1901) and Michel Carré's (1822-72) libretto is based on Carré's play Faust et Marguerite (Faust and Marguerite) (1850), which, in turn, is based on Faust I. Its focus on the Marguerite story made the opera extremely popular. The Metropolitan Opera in New York opened with it in 1883. Not until World War I did its popularity begin to ebb.

On stages today (such as the Royal Opera House, London, 2019), it continues to appeal. The Faust that it portrays is almost overshadowed by the powerful characterization of Méphistophélès. Marguerite's brother, Valentin, has a prominence in Gounod's Faust that is far greater than that in Goethe's Faust. At the end, Marguerite is redeemed by a heavenly decree, as in Goethe's scene, but Faust kneels and prays, protected by the sword of an angel, much to the consternation of Méphistophélès.

Arrigo Boito's (1842-1918) opera Mefistofele (Mephistopheles) premiered at La Scala in i868, but it was the revised version, staged in Bologna in 1875, that entered the repertoire (see Chapter 13). The composer drew on his extensive knowledge of the Faust theme in literature and music in adapting Goethe's Faust for the opera. In the second version, he suppressed some of the irreverence of the first, a Goethean legacy, while tightening the pace. Few changes were made to the eponymous Mefistofele, however, whose power towers over the other characters in the work.

Ferruccio Busoni (1866-1924) presents us with a Faust composer of a rather different type, perhaps the most learned of all the Faust composer-poets (see Chapter 14). Busoni worked on the music of his Faust opera, Doktor Faust (Doctor Faust), from 1916 to 1923, leaving it unfinished at the time of his death in 1924. His pupil, Philipp Jarnach (1892-1982), completed the work for the first performance in Dresden in 1925. In 1985, another version of the score, completed by composer and musicologist Antony Beaumont (1949-), was premiered in Bologna. Although some glances at Goethe appear now and then, Busoni's Faust takes as its main point of departure the puppet plays, as the composer makes clear in the prologue addressed by the Poet to the audience. The Poet explains that he considered Merlin and Don Juan as heroes, but finally settled on the resilient puppet-play Faust.

The period immediately following World War II was rich in Faust incarnations. It is no coincidence that Thomas Mann, Eisler, and Igor Stravinsky (1882-1971) all spent the war years in southern California. The Rake's Progress (1951) by Stravinsky, W. H. Auden (1907-73), and Chester Kallman (1921-75) is the story of a Faust-like character inspired by the satirical drawings of William Hogarth (1697-1764) (see Chapter 15). Auden's versification served as an inspiration for the structure and musical texture of the opera. The hero loves his sweetheart, Anne Trulove, but is corrupted by the devil and life in the big city (eighteenth-century London). Auden and Kallman drew on Goethe's Faust in the libretto.

For his opera Faust (1955-56), Havergal Brian (1876-1972) created a libretto by condensing Goethe's Faust I while trying to respect the drama's philosophic turns (see Chapter 16). This was an ambitious project by any standard, especially one by an English composer writing in German. To Brian, the thought of Germany conjured medieval, Gothic imaginings, yet the "Hexenküche" ("Witch's Kitchen") and "Walpurgisnacht" ("Walpurgis Night") scenes from Goethe's Faust are not part of his opera, which represents the first part of Goethe's drama with thirteen solo voices. That Brian's "musical prose" is also dense has likely played a role in preventing this opera from gaining the popularity that often accrues to Faust musical settings.

In the mid-twentieth century, Faust moved into the avant-garde experimental musical world. Although the hero of Belgian composer Henri Pousseur's (1929-2009) Votre Faust (Your Faust) (1969), a composer called Henri, might call to mind Mann's casting of Faust as a composer, Pousseur and his collaborator, French writer Michel Butor (1926-2016), based their "fantaisie variable, genre opéra" (variable fantasy in the operatic genre) on Goethe's and Marlowe's versions of the legend, with colorful borrowings from the puppet play tradition, rather than the Faust Book on which Mann centered Leverkühn (see Chapter 17). In this innovative work, which was premiered in Milan in 1969, the Goethean romance is given the iconoclastic twist of a bifurcating storyline, which invites audience participation in determining the heroine's fate. Votre Faust is also distinctive in the breadth of its musical quotation, which ranges from Monteverdi to Webern. Conceiving of Faust as an "open question;' Pousseur's adaptation of the myth created new directions for the operatic genre and serialism.

The innovative creative energy of the 196os is also evident in Czech composer Josef Berg's (1927-71) grand opera Johanes doktor Faust (Johanes Doctor Faust) (1965-70) (see Chapter 18). Basing his libretto on the Faust puppet play by Matéj Kopeckÿ (1775-1847), Berg wanted to emphasize a folk-like approach to the Faust story, rather than a high-literary one. He composed the opera in parallel with his work on a demythologistically naive chamber opera featuring Faust, Andél (Angel), and Bohodábel (God-devil), entitled Provizorní pfedvedení opery Johanes doktor Faust (The provisional performance of the opera Johanes Doctor Faust) (1965-70), first performed, in part, in 1971. The score of Berg's grand

opera Johanes doktor Faust is suggestive of his humor and his interest in the revival of the madrigal. Left half-scored, upon his early death, the work was completed by Miloslav Istvan and Milos Stédron and premiered in Brno in 1981.

Faust has appeared on the operatic stage in at least two new notable incarnations in the twenty-first century. Featuring a libretto by Peter Sellars (1957-), John Adams's (1947-) Doctor Atomic (2005), commissioned by the San Francisco Opera, portrays J. Robert Oppenheimer (1904-67) as an American Faust who makes a pact with the military that enables him to assemble a team of the most brilliant scientists of the day to work on the development of the atomic bomb (see Chapter 19). Oppenheimer's eventual fall from political grace and his troubled conscience over the use of the weapon he and his team constructed parallel those of the pre-Goethe Fausts. In composing the libretto, Sellars used a "montage" technique that recalls Mann's Doktor Faustus.

French composer Pascal Dusapin's (1955-) opera Faustus, the Last Night (2006) is a critical commentary on the Faust legend itself (see Chapter 20). The libretto Dusapin wrote for the opera is highly reflexive, giving prominence to Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew. The style of the piece reflects a revival of the composer's earlier interest in speech intonation, associated now with the jester figure Sly. It also recalls the work of Alban Berg, but without the Bergian lack of light humor. The Mephistopheles who counterfeits as a rabbit encapsulates the "atmosphere of kitsch" in this ironic revamping of the Faust legend. <>

LAW AND THE PASSIONS: WHY EMOTION MATTERS FOR JUSTICE by Julia J.A. Shaw [Routledge, 9780415631594]

Engaging with the underlying social context in which emotions are a motivational force, Law and the Passions provides a uniquely inclusive commentary on the significance and influence of emotions in the history and continuing development of legal judgment, policy formation, legal practice and legal dogma.

Although the emotionality of the law and the use of emotional tropes in legal discourse has become an established focus in recent scholarship, the extent to which emotion and the passions have informed decision-making, decision-avoidance and legal reasoning – rather than as simply an adjunct – is still a matter for critical analysis. As evidenced in a range of illustrative legal cases, emotions have been instrumental in the evolution of key legal principles and have produced many controversial judgments. Addressing the latent influence of fear, hate, love and compassion, the book explores the mutability of law and its transformative power, especially when faced with fluctuating social mores. The textual nature of law and the impact of literary forms on legal actors are also critically examined to further elucidate the idea of law-making as both rational and emotional, and significantly as an essential activity of the empathic imagination. To this end, it is suggested that critical scholarship on law, the passions and emotions not only advances our understanding of the inner workings of law, it constitutes a fundamental part of our moral reasoning, and has the capacity to articulate the conditions for a more dynamic, adaptable, ethical and effective legal institution.

This interdisciplinary book will be of interest to scholars and students in the fields of law and literature, legal theory, legal philosophy, law and the humanities, legal aesthetics, sociology of law, politics, law and policy, human rights, general jurisprudence and social justice, as well as cultural studies.

Index

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All human beings experience life entirely through their thoughts, feelings, impressions and sensory perceptions of the world. As we are constituted according to a set of physiological processes which take place in the mind and body, every thought, feeling and action is essentially a function of these evaluative and motivational influences. Similarly, all cultures develop a distinctive vocabulary of emotions to express a range of feelings about the social world. Those indicative words constitute a primary form of meaning, capable of communicating and sharing (by standing in for, rather than replicating) a range of intuitions, perceptions, sensations and experiences. In this way, emotions — as social constructions and judgments of value — constitute a fundamental part of our moral reasoning that also forms the ethical core of our institutions (Nussbaum 2013). The vocabulary of emotion and consequent discursive consciousness, as evidenced in many historical and modern legal cases, is realised within legal practice and policy as a fully socialised practical consciousness — to the extent that recent scholarship has argued that law in fact produces its own set of emotions (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 180; West 2016: 343). Accordingly, emotions are claimed to have exerted a profound influence on the legal community, not least of all in the evolution and further development of legal judgment, reasoning and policy formation, legal practice and legal scholarship.

Previous research into law and emotion has largely focused on the analysis of either the tension between reason and emotion in law, or on a narrowly conceived role for emotion in a clearly defined bounded area of legal scholarship. Love and attachment, for example, are familiar topics within discussions on family law, and the law of tort seeks to quantify emotional suffering (Huntington 2008). Criminal law has typically addressed the impact of fear, shame and the role of vengeance, forgiveness and remorse, in the aftermath of violence and in relation to conflict resolution (Karstedt et al 2011;

Murphy 2012). Although the connection between law and emotion is not new, the presumption that emotion (often wrongly conflated with the fickleness of desire) has subversive properties, that the passions are the enemy of reason and have no place in law, is both ancient and persistent (Maroney 2011). Quite possibly the yearning for objective truth about the world is borne out of a fear of uncertainty, which often finds expression in a suspicion of emotion and the subjective. Yet, just as emotions are an inevitable fact of life, the courtroom is an emotional place where judges are exposed to the full spectrum of emotions, many of which are unpleasant.

Since emotions and emotional states are claimed to define and shape our individual and collective humanity, the developmental history of law is understood as centring on the effective harnessing or channelling of particular emotions. From infancy our initial experience of external realities is mediated through the sensibilities, primarily emotion, affect and mood, which in turn enable us to attribute values and categorise our experiences in the social domain, and articulate these through language. As we live in a world of contoured passions and our experience of pleasure and pain is constituted between individuals who stand in a specific relation to each other, it is appropriate that the formation of legal categories and concepts acknowledge the significance of an individual's emotional, intellectual, spiritual and sensory attributes, rather than bracketing these out in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Not only are those who make our laws human subjects, and as such are vulnerable to human feelings, but also our key institutions are constructed on the basis of assumptions about human behaviour and attitudes. Accordingly, 'a good judge ... [is] one who is capable of fancy and sympathy, can imagine pain and suffering and understand what it means to be oppressed and excluded' (Ward 2002: 123).

Although there is already an impressive body of research which addresses the influence of a single emotion or how the application of empathic emotions might be useful in specific legal contexts (Goodrich 1996; Bankowski 2001), it is intended to provide a more holistic appraisal of key passions and investigate their persuasive authority in evolving the legal mindset, past and present. To this end, the book begins by examining the history of law as a history of the passions; and, despite all evidence to the contrary, how feeling and emotion have significantly informed the development of legal doctrine, underlying legal principle and the overall character of law. Against the Cartesian dualism of mind and body, in Chapter 1 the work of modern neuroscientists is used to illustrate the impossibility of separating emotions from reason, particularly with reference to making sound moral judgments. Emotions are shown to be not merely expressions of arbitrary subjective inclination; they can realise authentic objective standards which have the ability to provide both rational justification for behaviour, and can themselves be rationally justified. Consequently, not only is emotion an integral part of the human psyche, but a reduction in, or absence of, emotion has also been proven to `constitute a significant source of irrational behaviour' (Damasio 1996: 53).

Chapter 2 discusses how the cultivation of an empathic literary imagination is essential for the promotion of both a rational and emotional sense of justice. Speaking at a conference in 2009, former Vice-President of the UK Supreme Court, Lord Hope of Craighead, stated: `In our tradition writing judgments is an art, not a science' (2014: 78). Even though law and affect' may have, to some extent, superseded 'law and literature' (Olson 2016: 336), it is maintained that the passions are arguably stimulated and elaborated most effectively through the rich rhetoric of literature, art and aesthetics. This may explain why judges often utilise references to literature, popular culture and poetry to introduce empathy and creative imagination into their judgments, and in so doing offset the deadening

effect of dry legal jargon. Various affective influences which permeate law as text and performance are explored, suggesting it is possible to meaningfully distinguish between a range of emotions and even between different instances of the same emotion by showing how these play out similarly in literature, real life and in the courtroom. The remaining chapters on fear, hate, compassion and love comprise an interdisciplinary exploration of the complex interaction between emotion, social organisation and law by applying a variety of diverse modern controversies, case law examples and writings from a range of leading ancient and modern thinkers from Aristotle to Zizek. A wide range of disciplines, representing inter alia the social sciences, politics, psychology, arts and the humanities, are used to shed light on the disregarded or often hidden collection of emotions that currently pervade the legal system.

The emotions and emotionality are demonstrated to exert a profound influence on the legal community in terms of the evolution and further development of legal judgment, reasoning and policy formation, legal practice and legal scholarship. However, there are clearly vast differences between types of emotion, their degree of adaptivity or transformativity, their potential for disruption, and their effect on reasoning, especially legal reasoning. This means it is imperative to understand the impact of emotional states on lawmaking, and to distinguish the characteristics of positive, and positively directed, emotions from those emotional states that give rise to, for example, fear and suspicion. Fear is often a major directing force, as revealed in case law judgments and in hastily constructed statute, but this motivation is largely unacknowledged or concealed. It tends to manifest itself as anger, which is described by Maroney as 'the quintessentially judicial emotion' (2012: 1207-1208). Perhaps the only way forward to avoid laws and rulings made via negative reactions, and non-beneficent emotions, is to embrace the idea of emotional judgment, and channel those passions into laws which have greater legitimacy and resonance for those individuals (the non-lawyer majority in society) with whom the law seeks to connect and represent. After all, the history of law is also a history of mutability, with the proven ability to transform itself and adapt to reflect changing social mores and morality. In which case, the legal culture is eminently capable of producing judges and law-makers who openly acknowledge the impact of emotions on lawmaking, and who may eventually acquire a passion for law's passions — finally understanding why emotions matter for justice. <> <>

HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING edited by Hans Landström, Annaleena Parhankangas, Colin Mason [Research Handbooks in Business and Management, Edward Elgar Publishing, 9781788117203]

The digitalization revolution has significantly altered conditions for financing new and small firms. Crowdfunding is at the forefront of this movement. While research in this area has increased significantly, it is heavily fragmented. Reflecting on this, the Handbook of Research on Crowdfunding reviews and synthesizes current knowledge on crowdfunding finance and provides an agenda for further research.

This Handbook covers the role of crowdfunding and the platforms used, as well as discussing the characteristics of crowdfunders themselves and the businesses that seek finance from the 'crowd'. It also investigates the process once crowdfunding is complete, and how it is used by non-profit, social and

creative ventures as well as for-profit businesses. Potential negative aspects are also discussed, including inequality, risk, fraud and regulation. Finally, the future of crowdfunding, including new finance models, is outlined.

Bringing together a wealth of previously fragmented knowledge, this **HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CROWDFUNDING** is a key reference for all entrepreneurial finance researchers as well as those interested in the effects of crowdfunding more generally across entrepreneurship, innovation, management and economics.

Crowdfunding: an introduction

Definition, History and Scale

Crowdfunding can be defined as `efforts by individual entrepreneurs or groups to fund their ventures by drawing small contributions from large groups of individuals over the Internet without using standard financial intermediaries' (Mollick, 2014), or 'open calls, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of

financial resources either in the form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some form of reward to support initiatives for specific purposes' (Belleflamme et al., 2014). Crowdfunding emerged as part of a recent movement where the general public, or 'the crowd', is invited to participate in the process of value creation traditionally conducted within more closed systems. Whereas crowdsourcing, its close relative, focuses on how the crowd may take an active part in a company's innovation process (Bughin et al., 2012; Ghezzi et al., 2018), crowdfunding provides a mechanism through which the general public can financially support nascent ideas and entrepreneurs, a role traditionally reserved to a select few, such as accredited equity investors and bankers.

In this sense, crowdfunding has led to a more distributed or collective nature of entrepreneurial finance and created new classes of investors, such as `customer investors' (Aldrich, 2014). This allows entrepreneurs to engage with a greater number, and a more diverse set, of backers and investors all over the world (Nambisan, 2017). Some see crowdfunding `democratizing' access to entrepreneurial finance for underrepresented minorities and entrepreneurs hailing from unfavourable geographic locations (Agrawal et al., 2011; Greenberg and Mollick, 2017).

As a phenomenon, crowdfunding has a long history in the areas of art, charity and political campaigns (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018; Ordanini et al., 2011). Famous projects that were funded by small contributions from a large number of donors include the Statue of Liberty, some of Mozart's piano concertos, and the translation of Homer's Iliad from Greek to English (Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2018; Short et al., 2017). The recent surge in crowdfunding activities draws from the emergence of Internet and particularly Web 2.0 facilitating interaction between users, which drastically reduces time and opportunity costs associated with soliciting small sums from a large number of contributors (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). The first successful online crowdfunding campaign took place in 1997 when British rock band Marillion raised money from its fans for an overseas tour (Agrawal, 2018). The first online crowdfunding platform, ArtistShare, was launched in 2003, a website where musicians could seek donations from their fans to produce digital recordings. The success of ArtistShare inspired many other crowdfunding platforms to enter the markets, most prominent of them Indiegogo in 2008 and Kickstarter in 2009. The take-off of the crowdfunding industry was further facilitated by the financial crisis of 2008, leaving many entrepreneurs and new businesses searching for alternative sources of funding (Pelizzon et al., 2016).

The first crowdfunding activities were associated with arts, but since then a proliferation of new platforms have been formed that host campaigns for social causes, entrepreneurs and small businesses (Freedman and Nutting, 2015), and consumer lending which is now the largest market segment. There are more than 1250 platforms globally (Statista, 2018d), catering to varied audiences, such as large corporations, scientific research, real estate, social enterprises, personal causes and cultural enterprises.

Crowdfunding has grown from US$1 billion in 2011 to US$34 billion in 2018 (Massolution, 2015; Fundly, 2018). In the United Kingdom (UK) crowdfunding has grown year on year, from £0.31 billion in transactions in 2011 to £4.58 billion in 2016 (CAF, 2017). Crowdfunding is also growing fast in China — especially peer-to-peer (P2P) and reward crowdfunding — and some large platforms have emerged, although it remains less developed than in the West (Daxue Consulting, 2017). According to some estimates, crowdfunding has created 270000 jobs worldwide and added $65 billion to the global economy (CreditAngel, 2015). Currently the volume of the crowdfunding activity is similar to venture capital investments (UNDP, 2017), but as the crowdfunding industry is projected to grow to more than

$300 billion in 2025, it is likely to surpass the volume angel and venture capital investment (Meyskens and Bird, 2015). In the UK equity crowd-funding accounted for 17 per cent of the total seed and early-stage equity market in 2016, up from just 0.3 per cent in 2011 (CAF, 2017).

The Contents of The Book and Future Directions of Crowdfunding Research

In this fourth volume of the Edward Elgar Publishing book series of Handbooks of Research on Venture Capital we focus on crowdfunding. Our aims are to provide a state-of-the-art knowledge of the field, and provide suggestions for future research directions. The book is divided into five parts: 'The Characteristics of Crowdfunding' (Chapters 2-3), `Crowdfunding Platforms' (Chapters 4-6), 'The Crowdfunding Process' (Chapters 7-8), `Specific Aspects of Crowdfunding' (Chapters 9-12) and 'The Future of Crowdfunding' (Chapter 13).

The Characteristics of Crowdfunding

The first contribution in Part I, Chapter 2, is by Claire Ingram Bogusz who discusses the multidisciplinary nature of crowdfunding research. In this chapter she examines the knowledge that we have on crowdfunding in fields such as entrepreneurial finance, entrepreneurship and information systems. In Chapter 3, Gary Dushnitsky and Diego Zunino provide a broad overview of our knowledge on crowdfunding, particularly bridging two important issues in contemporary crowdfunding research: the 'problem of riches', that is, crowdfunding has been popular across scholarly disciplines and knowledge is embedded in disciplinary silos; and the `dearth of evidence' in crowdfunding research, that is, although there exist thousands of platforms, most studies analyse funding patterns using data from a single platform.

The authors of these chapters that comprise Part I propose several areas for future research, for example:

- We need a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon, and as crowdfunding is a heterogenous and complex phenomenon, we also need knowledge on niche areas of funding and niche funding methods.
- There is a lot of empirical work within the field, and it is timely to synthesize our knowledge, and identify surprising or conflicting results in this knowledge.
- The theoretical frameworks used to understand crowdfunding need to be deepened, and new theoretical frameworks are required.
- There is a need to more strongly integrate our knowledge on crowd-funding with the broader literature in entrepreneurial finance.

Crowdfunding Platforms

Part II of the book focuses attention on crowdfunding platforms, the crowd-funders (the supply side), and the ventures searching for crowdfunding (the demand side). In Chapter 4, Michael Ciuchta, Roberto Santos, Peiyi Jia and Amy Yacus focus on crowdfunding platforms, addressing the issue of how crowdfunding platforms may create and capture value in solving particular problems for the crowdfunders and the ventures. In the following chapter (Chapter 5) Stefan Katzenmeier, David Bendig, Steffen Strese and Malte Brettel take a supply perspective on crowdfunding, providing a review of what is known about the characteristics of the crowdfunders, and explore what influences the decisions they make to invest in crowdfunding campaigns. In the final chapter in Part II, Chapter 6, David Townsend

and Richard Hunt focus on the demand perspective of crowdfunding. In this chapter the authors examine the different options for early-stage financing, addressing the issue of crowdfunding as a democratizing power to resolve the funding gap that many young ventures experience.

Some of the suggestions for future research identified by the authors of the chapters in Part II are as follows:

- It is important that future research quantifies the different forms of value creation made by the crowdfunding platforms, and examines the sustainability of the platforms over time.
- A more nuanced understanding is required of the motives of crowdfunders across different types of crowdfunding.
- Crowdfunding might democratize the access to finance, but democratization comes at a cost — for example, as regards the agency risks — and there is a need to explore how these governance mechanisms are incorporated within the platforms and the costs of deploying such governance mechanisms.
- New methodological approaches could advance our knowledge significantly — for example, using machine learning, eye tracking and quasi-experiments — having the potential to provide further insights into decision influences of crowdfunders.

The Crowdfunding Process

Part III of the book synthesizes our knowledge on the crowdfunding process. In Chapter 7, Chandresh Baid and Thomas Allison ask the question: Why are some crowdfunding campaigns successful while others are not? In order to answer the question, the authors make use of signalling theory, communication and social capital to show how each of these theoretical lenses can help us to understand whether, and how, crowdfunding deals get done. Chapter 8 by Tom Vanacker, Silvio Vismara and Xavier Walthoff-Borm asks the question: What happens after a crowdfunding campaign? The authors argue that `success' in the crowdfunding context is often defined as raising funds in a crowdfunding campaign, but although this is an important milestone, it only represents a beginning of building a viable business. This chapter reviews what is known about firms and projects after they have successfully raised funds (or failed to raise funds) on crowdfunding platforms.

Some of the suggestions that the authors in Part III identify for future research are as follows:

- Seen from the perspective of the crowdfunding entrepreneurs, we still know very little about their decision-making and behaviour. For example, what drives their selection of one crowdfunding mode and platform over another? What is the behaviour of the crowdfunding entrepreneurs when interacting with potential crowdfunders? Future research on crowdfunding should seek to expand our understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind the decision-making and behaviours of fund seekers and funders.
- More detailed insight is required into the potential selection effects in crowdfunding. Are outcomes in the ventures primarily driven by selection effects or value-added effects? Crowdfunding may also bring extra-financial benefits to the venture, such as access to employees, increased media visibility and expertise. Exploring these impacts is also a research priority.

Specific Aspects of Crowdfunding

Part IV of the book focuses on some specific aspects of crowdfunding. In Chapter 9, Maija Renko, Todd Moss and Anna Lloyd discuss the emergence of crowdfunding as a promising financing option for non-profit and social ventures — ventures that have limited access to finance — reviewing the main ways in which these organizations participate in crowdfunding. The following chapter (Chapter 10) by Jann Tosatto, Joe Cox and Thang Nguyen takes a closer look at another sector: creative and cultural industries. The authors explore the drivers behind the growth of crowdfunding as a source of finance for ventures in the creative and cultural industries, and its impact. The focus of Chapter 11 is on the impact of crowdfunding as a solution to different kinds of inequality in access to finance (for example, gender, ethnicity, and geography). Jason Greenberg reviews the evidence on the extent to which groups that are marginalized in terms of access to finance from traditional sources — for example, on account of gender, race or location — are able to raise finance from the crowd. Finally, in Chapter 12, Francesca Tenca and Chiara Franzoni discuss the risks associated with crowdfunding, notably fraud, and the ways in which policy-makers have sought to address these challenges through regulation.

The authors of Part IV offer some suggestions for future research on these different aspects of crowdfunding:

- Most research focuses on large general crowdfunding platforms; future research needs to go beyond these widely used platforms, and give greater attention to platforms that specifically cater for the needs of non-profits and social ventures.
- There are many unexplored and underdeveloped research questions on crowdfunding that relate to ventures in the creative and cultural industries. For example, how do their campaigns differ from other types of ventures? Do the platforms undertake the same signalling and intermediation functions for the campaigns of ventures in the creative and cultural industries? And what influences the performance of the campaigns of such ventures?
- Few studies have focused on the negative side of crowdfunding, hence there are many research opportunities to add to our knowledge of risks and fraud in the crowdfunding process, how entrepreneurs and crowdfunders involved in crowdfunding campaigns could protect themselves from these risks and, more broadly, the distribution of risk and return in equity crowdfunding. 1.4.5 The Future of Crowdfunding

In Chapter 13, Victoriya Salomon explores the emerging trends in crowd-funding in the age of the `FinTech Revolution', discussing the implications that these trends have for the main stakeholders in crowdfunding: the platforms, the crowdfunders and the ventures. She identifies the need for more research, for example, to better understand innovative forms of crowdfunding in the context of existing regulatory and institutional frameworks. Future research should also examine the issue of strategic partnerships and collaborations between fintechs and traditional financial players.

Summary

Crowdfunding has emerged in the past 15 years, quickly becoming a 'hot' topic for research which has generated considerable knowledge. Our aim for the book is to synthesize this knowledge. Many of the existing crowdfunding studies are rather descriptive, reflecting the fact that at the early stage of a research topic, before the phenomenon can be theorized, a detailed empirical understanding is required, and that such understanding will strengthen the validity and power of the concepts and theories that are

developed (Ghoshal, 2005). The contributors to this book emphasize that crowdfunding is still an open field with many research opportunities. However, in order to take the next step in our knowledge development it is necessary to summarize, synthesize and consolidate the knowledge that we already have. We hope that this book will achieve this purpose. <>

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM edited by Tasha Oren and Andrea Press [Routledge International Handbooks, Routledge, 9781138845114]

Feminism as a method, a movement, a critique, and an identity has been the subject of debates, contestations and revisions in recent years, yet contemporary global developments and political upheavals have again refocused feminism's collective force. What is feminism now? How do scholars and activists employ contemporary feminism? What feminist traditions endure? Which are no longer relevant in addressing contemporary global conditions?

In this interdisciplinary collection, scholars reflect on how contemporary feminism has shaped their thinking and their field as they interrogate its uses, limits, and reinventions. Organized as a set of questions over definition, everyday life, critical intervention, and political activism, the Handbook takes on a broad set of issues and points of view to consider what feminism is today and what current forces shape its future development. It also includes an extended conversation among major feminist thinkers about the future of feminist scholarship and activism.

The scholars gathered here address a wide variety of topics and contexts: activism from post-Soviet collectives to the Arab spring, to the #MeToo movement, sexual harassment, feminist art, film and digital culture, education, technology, policy, sexual practices and gender identity. Indispensable for scholars undergraduate and postgraduate students in women, gender, and sexuality, the collection offers a multidimensional picture of the diversity and utility of feminist thought in an age of multiple uncertainties.

The Handbook: structure and sections

The contributions in this volume are organized by sections, each taking up feminism through different scales or types of questions. In the first section, Ways of Being, authors consider feminism philosophically and categorically as they examine notions of gender, essentialism, identity, epistemology, and political terminology and interrogate feminism's encounter with definitions. Next, Ways of Living examines feminism as a lived, everyday practice. Here, contemporary life — especially as experienced within an environment dense with digital tools and practices — is analyzed in a variety of contexts and feminist implications. The third section, Ways In, thinks through feminism as means of access to, and entry into, mainstream institutions. Essays in this section critically engage with feminist strategies of inclusion, change, and transformation within educational, industrial, and cultural institutions. The final essay section, Ways of Contesting, arrives at feminism as a global political movement. Here authors take up feminism as organized politics, charting contemporary and historical case studies that analyze the success and failures of feminism as activist ethos. In the final coda section, we engage in a conversation

about the status, methodology, limits, and future potentialities of feminism with three notable feminist critics: Sherry Ortner, Jack Halberstam, and Tressie McMillan Cottom.

Section 1: ways of being

Are categories useful? If thinking about difference is at the core of contemporary feminism, what set of unified terms, methodologies or definitions are still at play? Which distinctions remain or become vital? Which central notions require troubling? We begin with categories of gender, identity, and the fraught notion of essentialism. Feminism's complex relationship with essentialism has been brought to the fore yet again in recent years. In "Taking Exceptions Seriously: Essentialism, Constructionism, and the Proliferation of Particularities," philosopher Mimi Marinucci revisits the contested concept as a vital arena for feminism's engagement with categories such as sexuality, gender, and sex. Feminist critiques and rejection of essentialism have been a common element in so-called third-wave feminism and remain a troubling taxonomy — a notion that perceives gender as a biological and "natural" category of difference. However, essentialism (both strategic and "real") has also been enormously useful as a category that mobilized feminist legal and political arguments. In contemporary thought, gender as a constructed concept (arbitrary and non-empirical) and notions of gender fluidity coexist (in various degrees of comfort) alongside arguments for "true" gender identity mobilized by trans activists (among others) against gender border policing by conservative political antagonists. Similarly, arguments about sexuality have also deployed categories of "natural kind" as important political tools. In these arguments, the deployment of cisgendered biology as a source of gender or sexuality is rejected and replaced by different essential taxonomy (inherent gender identity or natural sexuality).

In this context, Marinucci thinks through the case for social construction and for our various attempts to make systematic sense of the various charged categorical deployments of gender, sex, and sexuality. This, in a moment where investment in a form of essentialism (take for example the rights of transgendered people to use bathrooms corresponding to their actual lived gender identity, or the rights of gays and lesbians to define their lives not as "lifestyle choice" but as a product of their inherent selves) is experienced as both politically progressive and fundamentally "true." Addressing this impasse, Marinucci formulates an argument for categories of sex and sexualities that are made, yet importantly are neither arbitrary nor outside empirical observation. In this sense, her formulation does not make sexuality and gender identity any less "real," while keeping the notion that taxonomies are constructed systems and alternatives are always, necessarily, available.

Alternative feminist systems of knowledge are at the heart of gender and religion scholar Sarojini Nadar's essay. "`Stories Are Data with Soul': Lessons from Black Feminist Epistemology" addresses a question central to feminist epistemology since the early days of feminism in the academy: is there a specifically "feminist" methodology that is more useful for feminist research, and for research about women? Nadar begins with distinguishing feminist research from research about or by women yet goes on to argue that even newer intersectionally driven research about women, much like the African-based scholarship she highlights, needs to draw from the main wells of feminist theory about research, position, and perspective. Nadar turns to the tradition of black feminism to extract a series of tenets about feminist methodology, which for her are useful specifically for research about African women. Basing her discussion on the long and distinguished traditions of black and African feminist theorists, Nadar draws out important commonalities between historical tenets of feminist methodology and traditions within African culture to stress the power of narrative and storytelling for the production of

feminist modes of knowledge. Stories yield emotional and personal data, which are often discounted by the modes of judgment dominant in the academy. However, she argues, these modes of account and retelling, especially in the African context, are precisely called for in feminist research projects and offer unique knowledge for progress toward gender equality. Nadar's argument now works back to resonate with the unfolding project of #MeToo, as it also gained power through stories. In the #MeToo context, generating feminist knowledge is illustrated by the insistence on personal accounts and the outpouring of emotional knowledge as generative work in archiving, recording, and combating gender inequality and sexual abuse.

Nadar's work importantly highlights how traditions of feminist thought can be relevant across and with specificity of experience, location, and culture — a notion that later essays in the collection challenge. In this section, however, the question of persistent and new categories within feminist thought turns again to relevance, but from place to time. In "`Does Feminism Have a Generation Gap?' Blogging, Millennials, and the Hip Hop Generation," media scholar Alison Winch examines how contemporary feminism has been shaped by the notion of a generational divide and suggests important implications for the stubborn persistence of the "wave" metaphor.

Winch discusses the ways in which generational metaphors have dominated historical accounts of feminism and points to important continuities between the feminism of "our mothers"' generation and current feminist activities. Analyzing contemporary feminist blogs (the UK-based hagenda, the US-based Crunk Feminist Collective, and the UK Feminist Times), Winch highlights similarities between their approach to feminism and those of past generations, demonstrating how these "new" practices by young feminists are linked to, and continuous with, a tradition of alternative feminist publishing. Feminism's so-called generation gap is central here to understating the dominating logic of "waves" in feminist history and to the narrative of each new "wave" as a historical counter-response. This "conflict" discussion is often seized upon by the mass media and dominates its portrayal of feminisms. For Winch, thinking in these terms promotes a vision of feminism as harboring an inherent generational conflict that is neither accurate nor useful. Instead, she invokes Braidotti's notion of "zigzagging" as a more useful metaphor than generational progress or conflict. This moves away from reaction, counters, and discontinuities, and allows for a more productive narrative of feminism's history and ongoing project, as it stresses dynamic continuity. The approach advocated by Winch resists the logic of historical irrelevance and with it, of course, the notion of "postfeminism." As the feminist anthropologist Sherry Ortner argues in "Too Soon for Postfeminism: The Ongoing Life of Patriarchy in Neoliberal America," the notion that feminism's relevance remained fixed in a "past" historical point has gained prominence in steady parallel to the development of a feminist paradigm in the late 1980s. Arguing against postfeminism as a framework, Ortner notes that there is a persistent need to understand and employ the central feminist concept of "patriarchy" in order to make sense of the continued and possibly growing sexism in a variety of arenas in contemporary society. Accounting for a range of postfeminist theory and its uses, Ortner reads a series of recent popular films as ideological "illustrations" for feminist theory's explanatory power within contemporary global politics. As she emphasizes, it is patriarchy, not feminism, which has thrived under neoliberal capitalism, making postfeminism's claim for historical reframing both misguided and dangerous. Ortner's argument, written before the recent resurgence in feminist identification and the concomitant attention to widespread sexism in the workplace, is particularly instructive for our current moment, as she reflects in our interview in the book's final section.

The recent resurgence of feminist activism and critiques of patriarchy, paired with new attention to intersectionality, have reignited discussions about feminist practice, focus, and politics but have also posed new challenges for feminist identity and the question of "who is" or "who counts" as a feminist. It is this central question of category admission that the last two essays in this section address, from two very different vantage points. In "Lost in Translation: Challenging (White, Monolingual Feminism's) <Choice> with Justicia Reproductiva," civic communication and Latina/o/x scholar Kathleen M. de Onís presents a case study for the challenges of integrating an intersectional perspective to definitions of feminist politics and identity. De Onís traces the history of reproductive choice activism in the United States, so central to second-wave feminism, and illustrates how it has simply ignored or spoken past the concerns of many in the Latina and immigrant population. As De Onis argues, terminology and language can either forge an inclusive movement or fortify borders in place of shared concerns and alliances. Focusing in particular on discursive strategies, and the centrality of the word "choice" in the history of feminist reproductive politics, she points out how the term itself alienates and marginalizes those who espouse a "family first" identity, so central to many women in Latina culture. Here language and emphasis come to stand for the "whole" of feminism, as language itself confines Latina women to the "borders" of the reproductive rights movement and marks feminist identities as synonymous with the priorities of privileged, white, mainstream actors. To counter this exclusion, a Latina feminist activist group, the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, has coined the term "reproductive justice" (justicia reproductiva) to replace what they argue is the more selectively applicable term "choice," coined and used primarily in white-dominated feminist activist groups.

The author urges a closer communication between the political pro-choice movement, which tends to be white- and privilege-centered, and representatives of active Latina-based feminist movements, who are also concerned about reproductive rights but cannot fully take on the identity of those in the mainstream movement given the marginalizing nature of the latter's language and priorities. The piece ends with an anticipated meeting between the president of NOW and representatives of the justicia reproductiva/reproductive justice group. With this, it imagines a more unified future for a feminist movement that can think and speak priorities across racial, cultural, and class-based differences.

The challenges of inclusion, identification, and boundary-drawing within feminism — as well as the issue of whom feminism serves within a larger political order — are also central concerns for closing the section as it circles back to the question of essentialism, which opened the collection. Who counts as feminism's subject? Despite the emergence of pluralist feminism, critiques of feminism's conventional erasure of difference around issues of race, class, poststructuralist critiques of the fixity of sex and gender in the '90s, and debates over gender identity as a feminist category, all remain stress points. The site of the body, as we've seen with several of the preceding essays, is central to feminist intervention (health care, sexual violence, pregnancy, abortion, etc.) and forms a particularly charged place for feminist politics. In "The Feminist Frontier: On Trans and Feminism," transgender studies researcher Sally Hines examines disputes over who can take up an identity as a feminist and highlights a key area of contestation over "gendered authenticity" within the politics of who and what constitutes women within feminism. Hines's analysis of the fury over the invitation of a transwoman to speak at Dykes March London, and debates over toilet use and safe spaces, reveal the anxiety of "takeover" and erasure that link trans people with patriarchy, misogyny, and potential violence. As she notes, feminist texts that linked biology to sexuality laid the groundwork for these ideas as early as 1979, and disputes over gender identity and biology have persisted for at least five decades of feminist thought and practice.

However, as the trans rights movement has gained visibility in recent years, these antagonisms have grown (especially in the UK), are virulently played out in social media, and for Hines, offer dangerous points of co-option of feminism into broader conservative political practices.

As Hines shows, surprisingly common anti-trans arguments from prominent feminists mirror conservative (and anti-gay) rhetoric that has also characterized the "bathroom debates" in both the US and the UK contexts (although Hines limits her discussion to the UK). These debates, in turn, are braided into larger feminist discussions of safety, identity, and free speech that have particular resonance in this current moment of #MeToo, with its emphasis on the need to attend to and believe women's accounts of their experience. This current emphasis pointedly contradicts the essay's focus on panic over "gender fraud" and the anti-trans feminist practice of discounting and disbelieving transwomen's own accounts of their sexuality and gender identity. As Hines concludes, anti-trans feminists may not represent the majority feminist position yet they enjoy an outsized presence in social media and cultural politics. Importantly, these boundary-policing discourses and reductive definitions of gender are deployed in the name of female safety and feminist truth-claims that produce trans bodies as feared others and belie everyday, embodied gendered experience.

Section II: ways of living

In this section, authors consider women's everyday experience, particularly in our contemporary digitally dense environment with feminist history or as an emergent social history. If the first section's emphasis was on identity, authors in the following section focus on feminism's encounter with everyday activity and ways of "doing." In this, the authors also stress the private and domestic realms where women have traditionally been located in theory, if not in reality. One of feminism's earliest interventions, of course, was to reintegrate the domestic and everyday life of women into political and economic discourses of power and labor. As such, the notion of a gendered "everyday life" or "women's private sphere," long overlooked by much historical and literary scholarship, has been a central theme in feminist historical and literary studies.

In "Everyday Life Studies and Feminism," literary scholar Susan Fraiman provides a theoretical overview of the emergence of "everyday life" or the quotidian as a locus for theoretical investigation. In her essay Fraiman argues for the re-evaluation of early feminist writers Simone de Beauvoir and Luce Giard, who she notes are often cited but rarely acknowledged for their contributions as pioneering theorists of everyday life. Fraiman analyzes how these texts theorize the place of domesticity and the repetitive, everyday actions involved in domestic labor, which decades of feminist theory have equated with women and femininity. Through her analysis, Fraiman illustrates how feminist work on the everyday has cleaved into "critique" and "appreciation" in parallel with notions of "difference" and "equality" feminism. These two competing tendencies, she argues, continue to give shape to feminist work on the domestic and everyday practices and, in large part, form an ongoing core tension within feminism itself. In linking an historical analysis of literary texts to contemporary feminist activism, Fraiman illustrates the importance of the politics of the everyday to conceptualizing just what feminism is, and demonstrates how this far-reaching question is far from settled.

How to account and theorize ordinary feminist practices in terms of feminist traditions and activism? How do we understand feminism as ways of making things in contemporary culture? These are the questions that guide feminist media scholar Carrie Rentschler as she takes on women craft, zine, and

media makers as feminist practice within a contemporary makers' culture. In "Making Culture and Doing Feminism," Rentschler examines how material practices by girls and women constitute "acts of feminist making" that create not only objects but also a set of feminist attachments. This "we-ness" approaches feminist making as an often collaborative and network-based set of practices emerging from relations between friends, family members, colleagues, mentors, students, fellow activists, and other makers. An attentive analysis of these networked practices speaks directly to the broader definitional issue of how feminist identities are made in discourse and through material production and exchange — in short, how they are lived. As Rentschler argues, such maker practices are important (but often undervalued) sites of feminist work and material agency that function not only as culture-making but as critiques of labor, race, and class politics. Moreover, as an expansive theory of "doing" and "making" can challenge and enrich our conceptions of fabrication, it also enhances our grasp of what it means to "do feminism."

While Rentschler stresses agency and connected labor within contemporary digital culture, sociologist Rosalind Gill follows a starkly different aspect of contemporary digital labor, that of cultural practices of self and peer surveillance. In "Surveillance is a Feminist Issue," Gill considers the central role of surveillance through a host of popular practices and digital tools — from beauty apps to social media hubs and self-trackers — as she traces recent work that links surveillance and the production of selfhood with feminist theory. Paradoxically, for contemporary feminists the growing regulation of bodies, activities, and essential ways of being in the world often originate with women themselves. In examining this contemporary mode of peer and self-surveillance, Gill positions it as operating within the specific logic of postfeminism and neoliberalism. She rejects a top-down model of surveillance and argues that digital and media cultures and postfeminist modalities of subjecthood are coming together as "neoliberal optics" to produce a novel and extraordinarily powerful regulatory gaze on women. As her essay suggests, this contemporary era of surveillance, while located in the self, is facilitated and largely practiced through digital tools.

How everyday practices and conventions have formed, changed, and transformed with the use of digital tools in a densely connected, always-on digital environment has been a major line of inquiry for feminist scholarship across disciplines — and for many in this collection. One common, much discussed but as yet understudied contemporary practice is that of intimate sexual behavior and the casual culture of "hooking up," made easier by traditional social media and dedicated apps such as Tinder, Grindr, Blendr, Feeld, Bumble, and more recent variations. Women's sexual behavior and the gendered quality of erotic pleasure have animated and divided feminist theory and continue to ignite debate about the meeting place of sexuality and power. And while relatively new digital tools have often been the focus of cultural discourse around contemporary sexuality, their use has not so much changed sexual behavior as it has highlighted more fundamental shifts in some sexual mores and practices — especially among young women whose sexuality formed within such "new" norms.

Recent interest and increased publicity about the alleged epidemic of sexual assault on college campuses, paired with the pervasive casual sexuality of swipes and hookups, has raised new questions about feminist responses to hookup culture as a commonplace practice on contemporary college campuses. In "Hookup Culture and Higher Education," social researchers Joseph Padgett and Lisa Wade set out to provide a kind of primer for what we know about hookup culture. They begin with a historical overview of sexual practices and norms among straight undergraduates from the rise of the fraternity in the early turn of the 20th century, the transition from courtship to dating in the 1930s, and the emergence of

"partying" culture in the 1960s as precursors to current practices. As the authors show, while male interests and sexual pleasure were certainly at the center and evolution of such practices, the women's movement and the sexual revolution played an important role in reframing many women's participation in such sexual practices on campus, emphasizing partying and casual sex as a right and granting an access to fun and pleasure once reserved only for men. The authors further account for the demise of dating and the rise of "hookup culture" on campus as they collect and synthesize how recent research accounts for and explains this phenomenon as a new cultural norm. Important for a feminist perspective are the notions of both harm and agency in such sexual practices and the difficulties inherent in fully accounting for young women's sexual freedom and desire while also attending to a host of problematic power imbalances and potential violence in such situations — the latter is addressed specifically in later sections and at length in the coda section of this collection. Here again, the tensions between "difference" and "equality" that opened this section also emerge as we consider how feminist approaches have historically framed sexual practices and their cultural significance.

We conclude the section on everyday, seemingly banal practices with an essay that considers feminist theory as an interventionist strategy into how such mundane activities are framed and represented in digital art. This final essay builds on the notions of labor, domesticity, and culture-making already explored by Fraiman and Rentschler and brings together material and digital culture. It also lays the groundwork for the next section by juxtaposing this research with contemporary feminist philosophy and art making as a critical (and institutional) practice. Through an analysis of Circles, an interactive, augmented reality digital work by Canadian artist Caitlin Fisher, comparative literature scholar Jessica Pressman explores how feminist critique serves as an important corrective to contemporary philosophical approaches to both materialism and the digital. Pressman's essay, "Circling Back: Electronic Literature and Material Feminism," offers a remarkably lucid introduction to the philosophical foundations of materiality and objectoriented ontology (000), a discussion of its potential, and a reflection on how feminist intervention in this context reaffirms the vitality of feminist thought as it insists on embodiment, situated context, historical specificity, and felt power relations.

Circles is a work of digital storytelling that combines interactive digital tools and small, ordinary feminine objects (which readers are invited to handle) to tell "small" domestic, interconnected stories about women's lives that emerge as fundamentally relational. Reading the work as a disruption, a feminist reworking of how digital aesthetics are commonly used, Pressman employs it as a tutor text to illustrate how feminist critique, feminist digital theory, and feminist philosophy have productively intervened in emerging theories of matter and digital theory. In Pressman's reading of the work and its feminist ethos, the sense of self and the process of its formation is one of mediation — social and technological — where subjects and objects are inseparable. Pressman's method of reading Circles' own style as argument identifies the aesthetics of "cute," long associated with femininity and devalued aesthetics, and "glitch," an intentional interruption in the smooth digital flow of operation. In the context of an intellectual history of "error" and "glitch feminism," the work becomes an ongoing feminist exploration into making art, making theory, and making sense of the physical and the digital.

Section III: ways in

This section considers feminist interventions into mainstream structures of knowledge and cultural production. Feminist critique has long functioned to point to, push against, and analyze how mainstream institutions maintain and delimit power through exclusion. How institutions deal with such critiques,

create their own protocols for admission, access, or change (or entrenchment) form an important context for feminism's continuous engagement with what we think of as "mainstream" and how we imagine its future shape and function.

The essays collected in this section interrogate notions of inclusion and participation in educational institutions, the art world, filmmaking and exhibition, and developing digital technologies. As these analyses make clear, barriers to gender — and proposed solutions for inclusion — must account for multiple axes of oppression while contending with complex questions of what various visions of inclusion might practically look like.

Much recent literature about gender in education has posed a variety of questions about the progress women have made, the specific problems they encounter in STEM fields, and the crisis boys are experiencing in progressing through K-12 educational institutions. While other essays in our collection analyze inequities in gender achievement and participation in STEM fields, science education specialist Jennifer A. Fredericks's essay, "Gender and Schooling: Progress, Persistent Inequalities, and Possible Solutions" addresses the question of whether there is a crisis for girls in early K-12 education. To do this, she summarizes and analyzes a wide swath of studies addressing gender inequality in education.

Existing data on women's success or failure in STEM fields suggests systematic disadvantages for women's educational and professional advancement in these areas. And despite an increasing number of programs targeted at improving their progress, little concrete success is shown for women entering these fields. Perplexingly, women have achieved greater in-school success in the field of math. However, this has not translated into broader success and representation in STEM careers in later life. Moreover, while boys have slightly lower test scores on average, they outperform girls on post-school options, employment, and other economic indicators. Although the focus on achievement measures that show girls' advantage simply fails to capture the full range of inequalities in school, it is similarly unable to measure how gender is both constructed and reinforced in the classroom. Fredricks's essay provides important insights into such systemic classroom practices (both cultural and practical) as she points out mismatches between research and implementation and suggests strategies for educators and administrators involved at the K-12 level.

As Fredricks's research underscores, the continuing underrepresentation of women in STEM fields has stymied the most dedicated feminist researchers, educators, administrators, and policy-makers. How can feminist theory more effectively intervene and address the persistent lack of women in these fields — in both academia and in industry — accounting for a variety of complex structural and cultural conditions?

For women working in technology, corporate culture is most often a primary obstacle for advancement and success. These challenges are all the more magnified in the videogame industry, where under-the-hood technological skill is so commonly associated with a (hyper)male cultural practice. Feminist engagement with videogames has more traditionally concerned their textual manifestation — specifically, representation of women. More recently, girl and women players have also garnered some much-needed attention as an understudied (and rapidly growing) part of gaming culture. Reflecting on her own work and on feminist game studies as a burgeoning discipline, game studies scholar Mia Consalvo argues for the necessary extension of game studies beyond the symbolic world of games to analysis of the industry of game-making and the cultural field that encircles it. In "Why We Need Feminist Games Studies," the work of developers, marketers, critics, reviewers, garners and their social media sites, as

well as the academic discipline of game studies are all (and together) crucial arenas for feminist intervention in scholarly and institutional terms. In her expansive account, Consalvo begins with the experiences of female game designers, critics, and scholars (herself included) who found themselves targets of a virulent misogynist strand within gamer culture. This culture came to light most powerfully in what has since been called "Gamergate." Consalvo breaks down "Gamergate" as a long-brewing cultural process with deep roots that entangle and link certain corners of game-player culture, gaming publications, and long-entrenched industry practices. Approaching "Gamergate" not as an unprecedented and isolated explosion of venom but rather as part of an ongoing practice of exclusion and retaliation against women, people of color and other minorities, Consalvo reads it in relation to what she calls the "feminization of social, mobile and casual games" as both a counter-force and a phenomenon that stokes the ongoing cultural war over gaming.

In tracing these tensions further, Consalvo documents efforts by female game developers to bring working conditions and sexist exclusionary practices within their own industries to light. Resonating powerfully with recent revelations and the #MeToo movement, these practices are most pernicious not in public moments of acute and shocking bad behavior (by a few powerful men) but in their revelation of a system all but designed for persistent exclusion and disregard. As Consalvo shows, feminist analysis has been crucial in tracing how the gaming industry actively and tacitly guards long-cherished structural inequalities in mainstream gamer culture, even as it works to market to a female consumer. The next two essays examine how feminist production can be organized and disseminated while negotiating similar institutional dynamics in the field of culture.

In "Acting Out: Performing Feminisms in the Contemporary Art Museum," feminist artist Rachael Hynes and educator/curator Courtney Pedersen interrogate the label "feminist art" and its relationship to contemporary museum exhibition. "Feminist art," they observe, can easily become a label that at once valorizes and archives work, marking it part of a historical movement rather than a timely set of attitudes or strategies. How to keep such a category alive and vital? How to process feminist art's inclusion in mainstream art institutions without losing its political urgency? The authors offer an answer using the LEVEL feminist collective public programming around the Yoko Ono show WAR IS OVER (IF YOU WANT IT) at the Museum of Contemporary Art Australia (MCA). Through an overview of curatorial strategies of feminist work and performance, the authors introduce the challenges (and past failures) in exhibiting feminist art work and the difficulties in avoiding a "fixing effect" that renders them static, isolated, and stripped of their charge. As they review prominent critiques they also reveal how, in terms of ongoing political relevance, canonization can often be the flipside of non-inclusion, especially in light of the persistent underrepresentation of women artists at all levels of mainstream exhibition. What's more, they question the very possibility of mainstream inclusion in museums, contemporary institutions that, more than ever, depend on corporate support and the economic and political status quo. The design and work of the LEVEL collective in conjunction with Ono's exhibit is here explored as a series of activities and decisions that considered such challenges and worked to position the events not as mere confrontation and critique but as progressive solution and alternative visions that refuse the line between artists and viewers, history and present, and the sanctioned museum space and its "outside."

As other contributors in the volume suggest, the line between "feminist" and "woman" cultural practices and production is an important — and often productive — point for interrogation. Cultural work by

women is not, of course, inherently feminist. But structural practice around the project, as well as its focus and means of production, can often infuse a work with feminist urgency as vital as their content and political impetus. In her essay "Can't I Just Be a Filmmaker? Women's and Feminist Film Festivals' Resurgence in a Postfeminist World," scholar and co-founder/co-director of the Chicago Feminist Film Festival Susan Kerns considers the recent resurgence of women's and feminist film festivals, their evolving mission and growing popularity. How do festivals take part in debates surrounding the purpose of such mission-specific endeavors? How have current women- and feminist-centered festivals found new success after being dismissed as "retrograde" nearly two decades ago? Kerns positions film festivals' history within both the film industry at large and the festivals' own evolving role from alternative showcase to a full participant in a competitive mainstream international film industry. The reemergence of women's and feminist film festivals, Kerns argues, is fundamentally linked to this history and the changing status of the film festival as cultural event. Film festivals are now a thick and highly hierarchical network of "tiered" showcases and exhibition organizations. Within them, women, queer, and feminist festivals have similarly multiplied and have staked out particular mission statements that reflect their own negotiation among the push and pull of artistic investment, activist outreach, and industry participation.

Kerns considers debates about what qualifies as a "feminist" or "women's" film in terms of various festival models. How such categories of films and filmmakers are defined, she finds, is largely shaped by the festival's purposes, its perceived mission, and how it constructs and addresses its public. In tandem, Kerns addresses the role of "general" film festivals in perpetuating underrepresentation of women filmmakers and feminist themes while decrying the absence of women as a problem.

Section IV ways of contesting

In this section, we turn to feminist organizing and political activism. In a series of historical case studies from Russia, Egypt, the United States, and Slovakia, the authors here sketch out specific feminist action and stress the importance of context, distinct shared experience, access, and address for successful feminist intervention. Sociologists Linda Blum and Ethel Mickey open the section with an important early US-based case study of organizing around prevention of sexual harassment. In "Women Organized against Sexual Harassment: Protesting Sexual Violence on Campus, Then and Now," Blum and Mickey relate and analyze an early example of sexual harassment activism by tracing the history of a pioneering sexual harassment activist group formed in Berkeley in 1978. The notion of "sexual harassment" itself, its definition, and the argument that this structural gender hostility was a major factor keeping women from advancing in a variety of workplace settings were both novel notions, introduced by Lin Farley in 1975. "Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment" (WOASH) was formed at the University of California three years later and, as the authors argue, while short-lived, WOASH played an important role in the diffusion of a then new feminist critique. Coming on the heels of early women's movement organizing of the late '60 and '70s, WOASH was a part of a more widespread proliferation of so-called second-wave activist groups and women's communities at the end of an era, just before the Reagan landslide and years of conservative backlash.

Drawing on recently archived WOASH papers (now in the Bunting Library) to detail the events and discourses involving WOASH, the essay brings to light the obstacles to effectively addressing the structural issue of sexual harassment; the process of developing procedures for reporting and adjudicating complaints; tensions in the group's formation and activism and its work to manage media

coverage of its aims and work. These insights are particularly valuable to contemporary work on renewed public discourse about and coverage of harassment — of which the #MeToo movement is only the most recent and visible example.

Vanda Cernohorská charts the history of another historically significant collective, that of the prominent Slovak feminism collective ASPEKT, from its post-communist founding to its migration into digital space. As her chapter "Online Feminism: Global Phenomenon, Local Perspective" argues, the organization's eventual use of digital technologies emerged directly from its particular historical conditions, beginning with its struggle to undo lingering notions of feminism as a bourgeois ideology and the communist party's strained relationship to women's labor and social role. In approaching digital technologies not as tools but as sites of culture, Cernohorská shows how ASPEKT's investment in its past history, its founders' experience with a communist regime skilled in erasing and rewriting history, and its engagement with international organizations largely shaped how ASPEKT envisioned its digital presence. As she writes, ASPEKT "embraced new technologies in order to preserve old heritage."

Highlighting an important theme in this section, Cernohorská argues that while feminism and digital technologies can be easily imagined as "global," each of these (and their relationship to each other) must be understood with an emphasis on their specificity of place, history, sociopolitical experience, and cultural context — in other words, what can easily look like a familiar trajectory of development emerges as deeply and instructively singular. Like feminism, digital technologies themselves are conceived as transnational forces yet have distinct impact on a variety of scales from global organizational practices to individual and very private realms. In this sense, tracing particular digital feminisms works not only as feminist history but also as an important corrective to a tendency to think of feminism (and digital technology) as homogeneous. The tension that structures connective digital technologies as potentially global while simultaneously specific and culturally particular, their function for feminist activism, and the parallels they offer to feminism as theory and practice continue to serve as the theme to the next essay in this section.

In "Arab Women's Feminism(s), Resistance(s), and Activism(s) within and beyond the 'Arab Spring': Potentials, Limitations, and Future Prospects," Sahar Khamis sets out to analyze the development of cross-national Arab gender politics and activism forged within multiple invisibilities (media, economic, and academic), oppressive regimes of political and cultural power, and beside Western feminism — which until recently has had little to say to or about Arab and Muslim women. Arab feminist activism may have been gathering force before the events of 2011, but the eruption of the Arab Spring provided new momentum as many young women took up leadership positions in the uprising and took to social media to organize and publicize their struggle. While crucial for communication and organization in an environment of restrictive control of space and the threat of violence, a reliance on social media also left activists vulnerable to surveillance, misinformation campaigns, and direct state retaliation. Equally pernicious was a rapid loss of momentum due to media fatigue and empty gestures of "clicktivism," leaving activists demoralized. As Khamis notes, social media tools were uniquely suited to amplify moments of solidarity but were equally powerful in deepening divisions and fragmenting the burgeoning movement.

Arab women's feminist struggle remains, as Khamis concludes, an "unfinished revolution," and deeply entwined with larger struggles over the political future of the Arab world. But the analysis here illuminates both the built-in paradoxes of social media as political force and, more importantly, the

necessity for understanding modern and indigenous feminisms not as "versions" of, or in comparisons to, Western feminist traditions but as complex, multifaceted, and particular movements emerging from women's lived experience.

Marina Yusupova's follow-up essay also takes on feminism in a particular national context, but with a sobering reversal: what if a practice is celebrated as feminist resistance outside of its own national contexts but is met largely with incomprehension within its local culture? "Pussy Riot: A Feminist Band Lost in History and Translation" proposes the example of the celebrated band as a "rootless" feminist practice and a case study of a "failure of feminism" in the region. Using the band's arrest as well as its contradictory reception in the West and in Russia, the author investigates the status of feminism in Russia and finds a disheartening picture. In stark contrast to the embrace of Pussy Riot as feminist icons in the West, the band's performance, politics, and celebrity were met with general bafflement or dismissal within Russia, even among liberal and anti-Putin critics. Yusupova finds this response consistent with diminishing interest or even recognition of feminism as a social movement that promises benefits to women — a trend she attributes to a growing informational isolation of Putin's Russia and a steady increase in support for traditional values and gender roles. Why, asks Yusupova, despite feminist activities and writing, has no home-grown feminist movement emerged in Russia? "Why has one of the most subversive ideologies of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries lost its revolutionary potential in Russia?"Yusupova's analysis highlights how the band's own words and performances highlighted feminism as a foreign gesture; notions of feminism's universal appeal, she warns, may well serve as barriers for local feminist voices.

As so many of the authors collected here note — and as the current moment in which we write attests — feminist social media is no longer a singular sphere of activity or a mode for feminist expression and organization but a complex and dispersed lived environment where multiplicities of elements continuously vacillate, diverge, and coalesce. Yet as Alice E. Marwick examines, in her concluding essay for this section, the history of how we got here and how such histories are understood and organized are crucial to understanding where we are and the challenges ahead.

In "None of This Is New (Media): Feminisms in the Social Media Age," Marwick excavates a largely North American prehistory of feminist social media through the hidden history of online feminism (from early LISTSERVs and Usenets to the "cyberfeminism" of the '90s, homepages, e-zines, and more), linking these to more contemporary, US-centered social media practice on Twitter and Tumblr like "hashtag feminism." For the latter analysis, she takes the infamous Gamergate controversy and feminist debates over intersectionality as case studies. As she finds, much is to be celebrated about this history, and the proliferation of feminist social media spaces "normalizes a feminist gaze on the world," yet peer content also starkly reflects the structural power relations among users. Thus a history of a "feminist internet" is as much a history of racial, ethnic, and economic division within a narrative of sharing and collaborative politics. Marwick's two case studies further illustrate how connected media simultaneously foster collaboration and conflict not only across seemingly opposing "sides" but within understandings and deployment of feminism itself. What's more, these two controversies offer concentrated examples of the two problems that continue to dog feminist activism at large: male harassment and White normativity. As this last essay observes, some of the challenges inherent in various conflicts among feminists — especially as correctives against privilege, assumption, and normativity — also demonstrate

feminism's possibilities as conversations expand, voices and perspectives multiply, and new experiences shape priorities for the way forward.

Throughout this introduction, we have consciously avoided using the multiple "feminisms" to connote diversities of voices, perspectives, and priorities. We did so as the collection endeavors to investigate whether "contemporary feminism" remains a useful notion in the singular. Taken together, the articles collected here — most written specifically for the volume at our invitation to consider feminism as both methodology and subject — suggest that feminism's ethical charge is inseparable from its internally contested state. In this sense, arguing about feminism is important, indeed necessary, feminist work.

In this spirit, we offer the coda section of the collection, a conversation among leading contemporary feminist thinkers. For this unconventional conclusion, we chose three prominent feminist scholars, from three different disciplines and intellectual traditions, and invited them for an informal joint conversation on current and future directions for feminist scholarship and activism: anthropologist Sherry Ortner, whose celebrated scholarship on the cultural dimensions of gender and societal transformation have inspired us (as they have many scholars and readers); literary scholar Jack Halberstam, whose influential work in gender studies and popular culture offers an exciting working model for feminism's productive encounter with queer theory and the emerging field of trans studies; and sociologist Tressie McMillan Cottom, whose scholarship and popular media contributions to debates over feminism, race, and digital culture demonstrate how feminist public intellectuals can simultaneously impact and analyze contemporary discourse.

In the conversation that followed (reproduced almost entirely in the coda), we asked these scholars to comment on where feminism is now and what each perceived as feminism's future, limitations, and most promising potential. Each offered rich personal narratives of their intellectual development, feminism's role in their scholarship, and their hopes and concerns for the future. Our conversation covered feminism's scholarly tradition, Black feminism's rich intellectual legacy, queer critiques of feminist identity, #MeToo and its aftermath, the limitations of administrative and legislative powers for feminist ends, practical intersectionality, academic feminism and popular culture, and why the future belong to young queer BlackLivesMatter activists. <>

THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL MAGIC edited by Sophie Page and Catherine Rider [Routledge Histories, Routledge, 9781472447302]

THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL MAGIC brings together the work of scholars from across Europe and North America to provide extensive insights into recent developments in the study of medieval magic between c.1100 and c.1500.

This book covers a wide range of topics, including the magical texts which circulated in medieval Europe, the attitudes of intellectuals and churchmen to magic, the ways in which magic intersected with other aspects of medieval culture, and the early witch trials of the fifteenth century. In doing so, it offers the reader a detailed look at the impact that magic had within medieval society, such as its relationship to gender roles, natural philosophy, and courtly culture. This is furthered by the book's interdisciplinary

approach, containing chapters dedicated to archaeology, literature, music, and visual culture, as well as texts and manuscripts.

THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL MAGIC also outlines how research on this subject could develop in the future, highlighting under-explored subjects, unpublished sources, and new approaches to the topic. It is the ideal book for both established scholars and students of medieval magic.

Review

"The breadth of this volume – geographical, linguistic, chronological and disciplinary – is a huge feat, and The Routledge History of Medieval Magic is an important addition to existing scholarship. The sections entitled 'Future directions' are perhaps the book's most important component, providing a way forward for future research in a field that offers so much, standing as it does, in the words of Kieckhefer, at a 'kind of crossroads where different pathways in medieval culture converge'."— Joanne Edge *Ceræ: An Australasian Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*

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The study of medieval magic has seen a great deal of important work in recent decades. Since the 1990s, scholars have demonstrated that a wide range of people were engaged in magical activities from all groups in society, and that a great variety of magical texts were in circulation. In addition to this, they have continued to explore topics that have long attracted attention, such as the relationship between medieval magic and the witch trials of the early modern period. It has become clear from this recent scholarship that magic was not a marginal area of medieval culture but intersected with many larger and more conventional historical topics. Taking a lead from Richard Kieckhefer, who in an influential 1989 book described magic as a "kind of crossroads where different pathways in medieval culture converge", historians have explored the ways in which magic interacted with mainstream religion, medicine and science, law, and the culture and politics of royal and aristocratic courts, to name but a few areas. The resulting publications are spread widely across academic publishers and journals — another sign that medieval magic is no longer regarded as a marginal topic — but the subject has found a place particularly in Pennsylvania State University Press's Magic in History series and SISMEL's Micrologus Library series.

This Routledge History therefore has two aims. First, it offers an overview of the work that has been done since the 1990s, exploring historiographical trends and the lively debates that now exist in many areas of medieval magic studies. Second, it aims to act as a guide for future research, setting out what still needs to be done, highlighting manuscripts and texts that would benefit from further study, and discussing topics that remain under-researched. It is not primarily intended to act as an overview of the history of medieval magic as there are other publications that offer this, some focusing purely on the

Middle Ages and others covering a longer chronological span.2 Rather, it aims to move beyond these surveys to set a research agenda.

The book looks primarily at the period from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, which have been the focus of most of the recent work on magic by medievalists. In several respects, these centuries can be seen as a distinct period in the history of magic. This is not to say that the twelfth century marked a complete break from what ad gone before, and important points of continuity with magic in the earlier Middle Ages are discussed in this volume. One of these was the influence of Augustine (d. 430), who laid the foundation for much of the medieval theorization and critique of magic. Another was the nature and use of texts and objects that were accessible to the illiterate.5 These practices, which Richard Kieckhefer termed the "common tradition" of magic, saw a high degree of continuity from the early Middle Ages into the early modern period and beyond.

Nevertheless, the twelfth century saw the beginning of two developments that had profound implications for the ways in which magic was understood and practised in later centuries, as well as how it was viewed by the secular and ecclesiastical authorities. The first of these was the appearance in Latin of magical texts translated mostly from Arabic but also, to a lesser extent, from Greek and Hebrew. This was part of a much broader translation movement that took place in the Latin West in the central Middle Ages. Beginning in the late eleventh century and continuing into the thirteenth, numerous philosophical, scientific and medical works were translated into Latin from these languages. The translations from Arabic were made in the areas of Europe that had Muslim and Jewish populations most notably Spain, southern Italy and Sicily. Their impact has been well documented by historians of medicine, science and philosophy but they had an equally profound effect on magic, because a significant number of magical texts were translated alongside other works. Indeed, magical works were often closely related to scientific and philosophical knowledge.

Scholars such as David Pingree and Charles Burnett have outlined some of the routes by which Arabic, Greek and Hebrew magical texts entered the Latin West and were disseminated but much remains to be discovered.8 Although these magical texts were at first only accessible to the small minority of the medieval population that was literate in Latin and able to gain access to sometimes rare manuscripts, they offered to intellectuals new techniques for doing magic such as the creation of images or talismans linked to celestial influences. They also sometimes sought to justify the place of magic in wider schemes of learning, for example by presenting it as one of the seven liberal arts. By the mid-thirteenth century, however, learned magic texts were beginning to circulate in court circles and in the vernacular, reaching new audiences such as the nobility and the urban elites.

The second development that shaped the history of magic after 1100 was the establishment of universities and the emergence of a class of educated clerics who studied there. Again, the development of universities, from the informal schools of early twelfth-century France to the carefully organized and powerful corporations of the thirteenth century and later, has been well studied. So too has their impact on later medieval society. However, the rise of universities had several implications for the history of magic in particular. They provided one setting in which magical texts circulated: for example William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris (d. 1249), claimed to have read magical texts as a student. Perhaps more importantly, the university disciplines of canon law and theology shaped later medieval thought about magic by offering systematic, detailed discussions of what magic was, how it worked, and which aspects of it were, or were not, legitimate. Canonists sought to clarify which ritual practices should be

categorized as magic and prohibited by the Church. Theologians and natural philosophers explored the place of magic in the universe, including such issues as the role of demons in magic and their relationship with human magicians, as well as the question of why magic was wrong. And sometimes why it was right. Some thinkers approved of the use of the term "natural magic" to refer to the production of marvellous but natural effects, argued that the science of images was based on natural forces and used the vocabulary of experiment or empirical knowledge to explain the effects of occult properties in the natural world that magic texts utilized.

When they considered these issues, medieval canonists and theologians drew on earlier Christian writers (particularly Augustine) but from the twelfth century onwards their discussions were far more detailed and covered a wider range of practices. They also engaged with texts, such as works of astrological image magic or the Ars Notoria, which had not existed in Augustine's time but were circulating in later medieval universities. The legal and theological frameworks that resulted shaped educated churchmen's attitudes to magic throughout the late Middle Ages and also informed the laws that were made against it and the activities of secular and ecclesiastical courts and inquisitors.

This volume ends in the fifteenth century, which again marks a transitional period in the history of magic. It saw the beginning of two developments in particular which continued to the early modern period. The first was a growing fear of magic, and with this a growing emphasis on the relationship between demons and magical practitioners. Superstitions were being demonized more strongly than before, and clearly defined and gendered mythologies of witchcraft were emerging. This was also the period which saw the increasing numbers of trials for witchcraft.14 This increased readiness to demonize magic and put practitioners on trial was far from universal in fifteenth-century Europe but nonetheless it marked a change from earlier centuries. For much of the Middle Ages, although churchmen had repeatedly condemned magic as demonic, trials of magic workers (or alleged magic workers) seem to have been comparatively rare.15 During the fifteenth century, this began to change. The 1430s-1440s saw the emergence of a new mythology of diabolical witchcraft in the Alpine areas of modern Switzerland, Austria and Italy. This new mythology encompassed a cluster of characteristics. Besides being a practitioner of harmful magic, the witch came to be seen as a member of a devil-worshipping sect that engaged in a variety of antisocial activities. The nature of the witch and her (or, less often, his) practice varied according to different trials and areas, but key to the stereotype of diabolical witchcraft (at least in the Lausanne region) was that witches attended secret meetings known as "sabbaths", at which they worshipped the devil and engaged in orgies, cannibalism and child murder as well as harmful magic. According to some sources, they also flew to these sabbaths. At the same time, some regional authorities, clerics and secular elites became convinced of the existence of sects of devil worshipers and initiated trials. The number of witch trials and witchcraft treatises really only intensified after 1560 (although scholars of early modern witchcraft now emphasize that even then many suspected witches were never prosecuted and peaks in witch-hunting were often short-lived and localized); nevertheless the fifteenth century laid the conceptual and legal foundations for these later prosecutions.

However, the fifteenth century also saw a second important development: the emergence of less fearful and more confident attitudes to learned magic which continued into later centuries. Magic texts were reaching ever wider audiences through vernacular translations, with learned magic appealing to readers from the court to the cloister. In fifteenth-century Italy, a new intellectual climate allowed authors of learned magic texts to underpin their writings with Neoplatonic, Hermetic and humanist currents of

thought. The translation of Neoplatonic texts from Greek gave educated writers such as Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) new ways to conceptualize magic and develop philosophical justifications for the human capacity to manipulate the forces of the universe.

Scope of this book

This companion to medieval magic's history begins by discussing the conceptual issues involved in studying medieval magic, focusing on the difficult question of definition. Scholars working on many different societies — historical and modern — have long debated how to define magic and how magic relates to religion on the one hand, and science on the other. This issue is intimately bound up with practical questions about how medievalists should approach magic: Which practices and ideas fit into a history of "magic"? What questions should scholars ask? And what methodologies should they use? The four short pieces in the first section of the book offer different approaches to this problem. Richard Kieckhefer argues that "magic" is too general and ambiguous a term to allow for rigorous analysis, and instead suggests that scholars focus on "constitutive terms", that is, subcategories such as "conjuration". These constitutive terms refer to individual elements of the broader phenomenon of magic that may, or may not, be combined and are, he argues, precise enough to allow for meaningful analysis. Claire Fanger, from a different perspective, argues that scholars should not be afraid to use the term "magic" (or other large, ambiguous terms) as the focus for analysis. Instead, she suggests that we acknowledge the term's ambiguity and view it not as a single entity but as denoting "a particular kind of problem" in medieval thought: the problem of how to deal with phenomena (positive or negative) whose causes were mysterious or opaque. Viewed in this way, medieval anti-magical and pro-magical arguments are part of the same conversation rather than simply opposing views of particular practices.

Bernd-Christian Otto agrees with Kieckhefer that a generalized or universal definition of magic is not precise enough for scholarly analysis. Focusing on learned magic in particular, he argues for the importance of understanding the "insider discourse" of magic, as articulated by its medieval practitioners. Finally, in contrast to Otto, David L. d'Avray argues that we cannot just focus on the categories used by medieval writers themselves, either the "insider" categories used by those who practised magic, or the categories of churchmen who condemned magic. He suggests that scholars need to find their own modern, scholarly terms for the phenomena they study. These will allow analyses of medieval magic which distinguish between different phenomena that medieval writers may group together, or conversely highlight the similarities between phenomena which medieval writers regarded as distinct. He goes on to suggest some possible categories that can be used to analyse different aspects of the relationship between magic and religion.

These four pieces highlight different, often contrasting, approaches to how scholars can or should define magic; whether the term "magic" is useful for scholarly analysis at all; whose definitions scholars should use (medieval or modern, insider or outsider); and the ways in which different definitions allow us to ask different questions about medieval magic or focus on different aspects of the topic. The responses — in which Kieckhefer, Fanger, Otto and d'Avray discuss aspects of each other's chapters — show just how much scope for debate there is. Taken together, this section demonstrates that there is no single "right" way to define or approach magic, in the Middle Ages or in any other period. However, it also underlines the importance of thinking carefully about the concepts and definitions one plans to use, however one plans to approach the history of a particular aspect of medieval magic. Definitions are tools that can be

used to serve a variety of purposes, and the ones that scholars choose will direct them towards particular questions and problems in the history of magic.

The other sections of the book cover the major areas where research into medieval magic has occurred in the last twenty years. "Languages and Dissemination" examines the dissemination and impact of magic as it acquired distinctive identities in different parts of Europe. It focuses first on the reception into Europe and later influence of the magic texts from the Arabic and Jewish traditions, which transformed the status of late medieval learned magic from an illicit activity into a branch of knowledge. Later chapters examine the geographical spread of these works into central and Eastern Europe; their dissemination in the vernacular; and the ways in which Western European magic interacted with existing magical traditions in two areas of Europe where these are especially well documented: Scandinavia and the Celtic lands.

"Key Genres and Figures" examines one of the most significant research areas in the recent historiography of late medieval magic: learned magic texts. These texts circulated in manuscripts, described complex rituals and often drew on the same cosmological concepts as more scientific works such as ideas about the influence of the stars on earth, or the nature and powers of spirits. More than one hundred distinct texts and several hundred surviving manuscripts with magical contents have now been identified by scholars, although many remain hardly studied and new copies of magic texts are frequently being identified. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some authors of magical texts also, for the first time, allowed their works to circulate under their own name rather than ascribing them to legendary figures such as Hermes or Solomon. Since theological condemnation made it dangerous to claim authorship of a magical text, the fact that authors were becoming confident enough to put their real names to works of magic is a striking development, and is evidence of a gradual shift towards more positive attitudes towards certain magical texts and ideas in Western Europe. The second half of this section examines the work that has been done on these important "author-magicians".

The fourth section, "Themes", looks beyond the traditions, genres and authors of medieval magic to explore the ways in which magic interacted with other aspects of medieval culture. Several of the chapters in this section highlight areas that have seen exciting scholarship in recent years such as Jean-Patrice Boudet's chapter on magic at court, or Peter Murray Jones and Lea T. Olsan's chapter on magic and medicine. Others discuss important issues that would benefit from more research, for example Robert Goulding's chapter on conjuring and illusion, and Catherine Rider's chapter on magic and gender (a topic that has received more systematic attention from early modernists than from medievalists). The final chapters in this section explore the relationship between magic and other media and disciplines: visual and material sources for magic; magic in medieval literature; and the role of music in magic rituals. These chapters are intended on the one hand to highlight sources that have been underexploited by scholars and on the other to bring expertise from other disciplines to bear on the history of magic.

The final section of the book surveys the key ways in which medieval writers — often, but not always, clergy — tried to categorize magic and discourage people from practising it. The sources left by condemnations and trials provide much of the surviving evidence for medieval magic and for ecclesiastical concerns about illicit rituals. They range from the sophisticated critiques of magic made by highly trained theologians in medieval universities, discussed by David J. Collins, to simpler works aimed at a wider audience of clergy and laity, as discussed by Kathleen Kamerick. Michael D. Bailey's chapter examines negative medieval attitudes towards popular "superstitions", exploring how by the fifteenth

century churchmen were increasingly concerned with "elite" as well as common superstitions, and how they were diabolizing common practices and associating superstitious error increasingly with women. The chapter on Witchcraft by Martine Ostorero brings this section together arid concludes the volume by examining the early witch trials, drawing on the large amount of important work done by Swiss scholars in recent decades which is discussed in more detail below. Finally, a short piece by Alejandro Garcia-Aviles concludes the book by analysing the cover image in detail and the cosmological ideas that lie behind it. It is a helpful illustration of the ways in which visual and textual sources can be brought together to shed light on medieval ideas about magic and is an example of the kind of work this book hopes to stimulate, which combines the approaches of different disciplines to shed new light on medieval magic.

Recent developments in the history of medieval magic

The individual chapters in this volume discuss, and draw on, several major developments in the historiography of medieval magic that have taken place since the 1990s. The most important of these is the discovery and detailed study of surviving magical texts, which has revealed the extraordinary cosmologies of learned magic texts originating in diverse Arabic, Jewish, Greco-Roman traditions, their successive Christianization through processes of translation, adaptation and dissemination, and the richness of the imaginative worlds that their readers subsequently had access to. In the exotic rituals of occult texts translated and disseminated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Christian authors found Arabic and Jewish spirit hierarchies, images and characters, lists of occult properties in natural objects and correspondences between heaven and earth. Perhaps surprisingly, they interpreted these as viable instruments for achieving goals that ranged from the pious seeking of the vision of God to the transgressive pursuit of knowledge from demons. Significant work in this field has investigated the hermetic roots of ritual magic, and more recent scholarship has focused on unpacking the "Solomonic" tradition' and its influence.

In addition to discovering and editing learned magic texts, historians in this field have begun exploring their readership and circulation among physicians and in the clerical underworld, competitive court circles and the monastic cloister. Our knowledge of the routes of transmission of magic texts is still patchy, and it is hard to bring individual practitioners to rounded life based on the surviving sources, but it has become increasingly clear that manuals of ritual magic were tailored to the individual interests of their owners, whether this was talking to spirits or having success in love. The circulation of ritual magic texts among physicians and in universities is less well studied, and research into the vernacularization of magic texts from the mid-thirteenth century onwards is at a very early stage. In addition, few links have yet been made between this process of vernacular iza-tion and the "common tradition" of magic, although historians have long acknowledged that many collectors of learned magic texts were also interested in charms, recipes and textual amulets and that non-literate practitioners were influenced by the ritual magic tradition. Whether this frequent (if not typical) combination of interests influenced the increasing condemnation of popular practices as superstitious in the fifteenth century has not yet been explored. But historians have recently revealed vibrant and inflammatory links between ritual magic and other parts of mainstream religious practice such as mystical texts and exorcism.

As noted above, historians generally agree that there was a shift towards positive attitudes to learned magic in the late Middle Ages, despite increasing concerns about witchcraft. This means that the strategies with which the authors of learned magic texts appealed to the intellectual curiosity and the

spiritual thirst of medieval men and women were to a large extent successful and flourished even in the difficult conditions of the late Middle Ages. Historians have begun to explore one of the reasons for this success: the fact that the theology of witchcraft shifted the authorities' gaze onto female popular practitioners and away from the male practitioners of learned magic.27 Another contributing factor to the late medieval success of ritual magic was the ways in which texts were stored, annotated and rewritten to avoid censorship and reflect the creative choices of scribes. Some strategies are well known such as the concealment of occult texts owned by the cleric, surgeon and writer Richard de Fournival (c.1201—c.1260) in a secret room to which only he had access, and the compilation of magic texts with more acceptable genres such as astronomy, medicine, devotional literature and natural philosophy. Some readers took the view that a pious vocation enabled them to safely handle suspicious texts and even draw out useful things from them, while powerful secular rulers did not necessarily need to conceal their occult interests. Finally, in manuscripts themselves, tactics to evade suspicion took the form of cautionary marginalia or even notices condemning magic, which allowed the piety of the owner to be expressed while the usability of a ritual was unaffected. The general history of the censorship (and self-censorship) of magical texts, of rituals being cut out of manuscripts, names erased, magical characters being altered to turn them into crosses and books being revised and burnt has yet to be written. When it is explored more fully, it is likely that further lines of comparison and influence will be opened up with contemporary attitudes to heresy and witchcraft.

Important work has also been done on other kinds of source material. Some of this has sought to shed new light on genres of source which scholars have known about for a long time. For example, texts produced as part of the activities of the medieval church have long played a central role in the history of medieval magic. Ecclesiastical sources have been especially crucial to studies that focus on tracing the earlier medieval origins of fifteenth-century ideas about diabolical witchcraft. Since, as Norman Cohn argued in the 1970s, these ideas seem largely to have originated among the educated, the writings produced by educated clergy are one obvious place to look for evidence. Cohn himself used inquisitorial manuals and theological treatises, alongside other kinds of source material, to analyse changing stereotypes of magical practitioners and the relationship of those stereotypes to early modern witchcraft. A number of more recent studies have continued this line of investigation, including Michael D. Bailey's 2001 discussion of changing clerical attitudes to magic (which used the fourteenth-century inquisitorial manuals of Bernard Gui and Nicholas Eymeric) and Jean-Patrice Boudet's important book on magic and astrology in the medieval West, which included substantial discussion of ecclesiastical condemnations of magic, among many other sources.31 New studies have also analysed individual genres of source in depth such as Patrick Hersperger's survey of magic in the commentaries on the twelfth-century canon law textbook, Gratian's Decretum.

Even with ecclesiastical sources, however, in recent decades the focus has broadened to include a wider range of texts. For example, Alain Boureau has published and analysed a document from 1320 (first rediscovered in 1952) in which Pope John XXIII consulted a series of theologians and canon lawyers about ritual magic. Another broader kind of source material that has attracted renewed attention is the literature of pastoral care, including sermons, preaching materials and treatises on confession. These sources, often structured around mnemonic schemes such as the Ten Commandments or Seven Deadly Sins, were intended to help clergy in their dealings with the laity, and so often focus on the sins and problems that priests might encounter on the ground. They frequently included some discussion of magic and "superstition", although these particular sins were not the first concern of most preachers or

authors of confessors' manuals. Related to these general works on pastoral care are treatises that focus on the sin of superstition. These were primarily a product of the fifteenth century and scholars such as Karin Baumann, Michael D. Bailey and Kathleen Kamerick have investigated what concerns they express about magic and why, as well as their relationship to emerging ideas about diabolical witchcraft. Some of this work intersects with a wider scholarly discussion of "superstition" in other periods. These genres of source were not completely neglected by earlier scholars (Cohn, for example, uses the thirteenth-century exempla of Caesarius of Heisterbach and a pioneering article published by G. R. Owst in 1957 considered magic in medieval English sermons) but recent scholarship has investigated this material in far greater depth.

Looking across these different forms of ecclesiastical text, we now have a much more diverse view of medieval churchmen and their attitude to magic. Authors of canon law texts, pastoral care literature and treatises on superstition were always influenced by a core of authoritative texts and ideas but within these general parameters there was a considerable amount of variation. Authors differed as to which practices they discussed, with some describing activities they claimed happened in their own regions. We can also see varying levels of concern. Much of the confession and preaching literature of medieval England, for example, devoted a relatively small amount of space to magic and superstition. By contrast, authors of fifteenth-century superstition treatises were clearly more concerned about these issues, but even then there were differences. Some worried about any unofficial ritual practice that might be defined as superstition or magic, while others identified genuine (if sometimes muddled) expressions of lay piety or legitimate protective practices that could be employed against maleficent witchcraft.

A further important development links to the work on fifteenth-century superstition treatises. This is a renewed interest in the fifteenth-century sources that describe the new crime of diabolical witchcraft. At the heart of this is a large project centred on the University of Lausanne, which since 1989 has published and analysed many of the earliest witch trials and witchcraft treatises. The many scholars involved in this project have made these previously understudied sources available in modern editions and translations (usually into French, sometimes German) as well as studying the trial procedures, defendants and evidence for witchcraft. One focus of their research has been a register of twenty-seven fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century trial records which was probably put together in the early twentieth century, but the team has also published an important anthology of the earliest treatises which described devil-worshipping witches. More recently, some of the scholars involved in this project have published detailed studies that discuss demonology (Martine Ostorero) and the relationship between fifteenth-century witchcraft and heresy (Kathrin Utz Tremp). Taken together, these studies have emphasized the importance of understanding the local factors and local judicial systems that lay behind individual trials. They have also underlined the continuity between earlier persecutions of heretics and fifteenth-century witchcraft trials, at least in Western Switzerland. In addition, this work has given us a far more nuanced understanding of the intellectual debates surrounding the new stereotype of the witch, and has led several scholars to suggest that ideas about witchcraft were less homogeneous than earlier studies often suggested.

Finally, scholars have turned to sources that did not set out to discuss magic but often mentioned it within their scope. Medical and scientific texts often include information that could be categorized as magical. Their authors discussed (sometimes in great detail) how astrological forces or powerful words could affect the human body; treatises on the properties of stones, plants and animals list the marvellous

effects these objects could have; and medical texts included remedies for illness which involved the speaking of charms or the wearing of amulets. The power of words — both written and spoken — has received particular attention. Meanwhile, Michael McVaugh, and Lea T. Olsan and Peter Murray Jones have focused on incantations and charms, examining their relationship with other aspects of medieval medicine and the ways in which medical writers presented them, as well as how these rituals might have been performed. Don C. Skemer has investigated the related area of textual amulets — powerful words and symbols that were written down and worn on the body, focusing in particular on their relationship to mainstream religion. Much of this research has emphasized that many so-called "magical" cures in fact held an accepted, if marginal place in medieval culture.

Other significant sources for understanding late medieval magic are the visual and material culture of magic and literary instances of spells and enchantment. The former is very under-researched, a situation that three chapters in this book, respectively on the iconography of magic and magicians, magical diagrams and the material culture of magic, address. Visual sources in particular allow us to track transformations in the perceptions of magic and its relationship with mainstream religion and science (as Garcia-Aviles does in his discussion of the cover image), and to note the appearance of late medieval Christian innovations such as the magic circle. The rich evidence of literary magic is explored in chapters by Mark Williams and Corinne Saunders, who ask questions that reveal fruitful contrasts to current understandings of medieval magic and complicate our view of it: "Where does magical power come from? What are the imaginative conventions which govern its representation? What are the range of attitudes to its use, and how do they differ by genre?" One of the aims of this volume is to set these analyses of diverse genres side by side so that new connections can be revealed. The richly imagined vision of a pre-Christian world in medieval Irish literature, with magical immortals and fantastic sequences of enchantment, complicates the Christian understanding of the cosmos in an appealing and provocative way that is comparable to the syncretic cosmological frameworks of learned magic texts. Another example of similar connections being made in different genres is the close relationship between necromancy and natural magic, and of both to the theory and practice of medicine. This is discussed by Corinne Saunders in the context of medieval romance and by Isabelle Draelants in her chapter on natural philosophical texts. We hope that our readers will notice further connections.

Conclusion

The study of medieval magic is developing in many exciting ways. As the footnotes to this Introduction make clear, a great deal of work has been published in recent decades by scholars from many countries including the USA, Canada, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Hungary and Britain. Although much remains to be done, our understanding of certain areas — in particular the contents and readers of magical texts — is now much clearer than it was three decades ago. One result of this is that the field is now so large and lively that even scholars who research medieval magic struggle to keep up with all the new work being published, in several languages. It is therefore a good moment to take stock, to summarize new developments for the benefit of scholars in the field as well as other medievalists and to consider where to go next. This Routledge History is designed to showcase the new research that has been carried out in recent years and is still ongoing, with contributions from both established scholars in the field and recent Ph.Ds. However, many sources, in a range of genres, are still unpublished and little studied. For this reason, the book sets out some of the directions that the field could take in the future. It discusses areas that would benefit from more research; questions that remain unanswered or only partially answered; and authors and texts that need more in-depth study.

The chapters in the book were chosen to reflect the vitality of medieval magic studies at this point in time. They also reflect its diversity. As editors, we gave all the authors featured here a similar remit: to outline the most important developments in their field and discuss future directions for research. They have responded admirably. Within this general framework, however, we have tried to preserve the different approaches and styles employed by scholars who work in different places, different languages and different scholarly disciplines. We hope that the results will inspire scholars in the field and in related areas, as well as students who are embarking on their studies of medieval magic. <>

THE GREATER & LESSER WORLDS OF ROBERT FLUDD: MACROCOSM, MICROCOSM & MEDICINE by Joscelyn Godwin [Inner Traditions, 9781620559499]

An illustrated reference book on a seminal figure of occult philosophy and Renaissance thought

- Explains Fludd's thoughts on cosmic harmonies, divination, the kabbalah, astrology, geomancy, alchemy, the Rosicrucians, and multiple levels of existence
- Includes more than 200 of Fludd's illustrations, representing the whole corpus of Fludd's iconography, each one accompanied by Godwin's expert commentary
- Explores Fludd's medical work as an esoteric Paracelsian physician and his theories on the macrocosm of elements, planets, stars, and subtle and divine beings and the microcosm of the human being and its creative activities, including material never before translated

One of the last Renaissance men, Robert Fludd (1574-1637) was one of the great minds of the early modern period. A physician by profession, he was also a Christian Hermetist, a Rosicrucian, an alchemist, astrologer, musician, and inventor. His drive to encompass the whole of human knowledge--from music to alchemy, from palmistry to fortification--resulted in a series of books remarkable for their hundreds of engravings, a body of work recognized as the first example of a fully-illustrated encyclopedia.

In this in-depth, highly illustrated reference, scholar and linguist Joscelyn Godwin explains Fludd's theories on the correspondence between the macrocosm of elements, planets, stars, and subtle and divine beings and the microcosm of the human being and its creative activities. He shows how Fludd's two worlds--the macrocosm and the microcosm--along with Paracelsus's medical principles and the works of Hermes Trismegistus provided the foundation for his search for the cause and cure of all diseases. The more than 200 illustrations in the book represent the whole corpus of Fludd's iconography, each one accompanied by Godwin's expert commentary and explanation. Sharing many passages translated for the first time from Fludd's Latin, allowing him to speak for himself, Godwin explores Fludd's thoughts on cosmic harmonies, divination, the kabbalah, astrology, geomancy, and the rapport between the multiple levels of existence. He also analyzes Fludd's writings in defense of alchemy and the Rosicrucians.

An essential reference for scholars of Renaissance thinkers, traditional cosmology, metaphysics, and the Western esoteric tradition, this book offers intimate access to Fludd's worlds and gives one a feel for an epoch in which magic, science, philosophy, spirituality, and imagination could still cohabit and harmonize within a single mind.

Robert Fludd (1574-1637) was the first encylopedic author to appreciate the power of illustrations and to have the resources to put it into practice. He wrote, of course, in the universal language of Latin, with a prolixity and redundancy that are a translator's nightmare. However, nothing better confirms the adage that a picture is worth a thousand words. Fludd's illustrations, entrusted to some of the best copper engravers in Europe, often bypass the text and make his point directly via the eye. They also include some of the most impressive abstract compositions in the history of engraving. Once understood, they provide a master key to the blend of Neoplatonism, Hermeticism, and Christianized Kabbalah that is at the center of the Western esoteric tradition.

I became interested in Robert Fludd in the early 1970s as part of an exploration of esoteric writings on music. In 1979 the London house of Thames & Hudson published my two short books in its Art and Imagination series: Robert Fludd, Hermetic Philosopher and Surveyor of Two Worlds and Athanasius Kircher: A Renaissance Man and the Quest for Lost Knowledge. With translations into French, German, Spanish, Greek, and Japanese, they gave many readers access to the marvelous imaginations of these two seventeenth-century polymaths. Thirty years on, with interest in Athanasius Kircher growing exponentially, it was time to do him better justice. The result was a large-format book, Athanasius Kircher's Theatre of the World, copublished in 2009 by Thames & Hudson and Inner Traditions, with over four hundred illustrations and a text to match. This too has appeared in French and Italian.

Fludd also deserved a fuller and a fresher presentation, especially as there had been surprisingly little scholarship and almost no new publications about him. Two works by William Huffman stand out, one a historical study and the other an anthology (see the bibliography). The present book aims to fill the gap, taking advantage especially of recent German scholarship. After decades of absence from the field, I returned to the original volumes at Cornell University for a fresh reading and mining of their illustrations. Only the account of Fludd's controversies with his contemporaries has been lifted from my previous book. Having outgrown the somewhat "New Age" approach of the 1970s, I resolved to follow Fludd's own program rather than imposing a thematic one of my own. Hence the greater emphasis placed here on his medical writings, which were the grand project of his later years.

For all the immediacy and ingenuity of Fludd's illustrations, they still need exegesis and the translation of Latin terms. Whenever possible, the captions provide this in Fludd's own words (sometimes paraphrased and distinguished from my text by being set in a different type style), and the appendices add some passages selected for pure pleasure and even humor. While almost everything about the Fluddean philosophy is alien to today's world, its consistency and grandeur can only command admiration.

In the captions to the illustrations, Fludd's works are cited by abbreviations, to be found at the beginning of the bibliography. The final citation in a caption is to the relevant book of Fludd's and to the page therein on which the illustration occurs. Any internal parenthetical citations following passages of text or translations refer to the book in question.

A Memory Palace

An encounter with the works of Robert Fludd (1574-1637) is like exploring a Renaissance memory palace, perhaps on the scale of the Pitti Palace in Florence or the Escorial in San Lorenzo, and equally labyrinthine and laden with meaning. I imagine two vast symmetrical wings marked with the signs of the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, the latter still unfinished. At the juncture of the two is a library, where grandiose lecterns support the Holy Scriptures and the works of Hermes Trismegistus, with those of Plato within easy reach. The central hall of each wing is hung with heraldic shields celebrating Fludd's ancestry and views of the foreign cities he visited. From it, many corridors radiate, their walls lined with charts, tables, and diagrams, leading to further clusters of rooms, no two alike. One room may hold a collection of cannons; another, a bubbling alchemical furnace or a giant mechanical harp. Here a group of students is spattering paper with ink dots, to be interpreted through geomancy; there, they are reading each other's palms.

At the back of the main building is a third wing, half built and more austere in architecture. Pictures of all the organs and internal details of the human body decorate its walls, as well as portraits of the angels and demons who take an interest in it. No surgery is done here, but corpses are sometimes smuggled in, for concoction of the weapon salve. The official faculties are those of urinomancy and astrology, with a research institute for studying the pulse in the light of the recent discovery of the circulation of the blood. There is a consulting room, and a Protestant chapel in which prayer is offered when medicine fails.

Outside the palace is a yard for military drill, a large herb garden, and some ingenious waterworks, but nothing affording pleasure for its own sake. Statues of Fludd's friends and opponents dot the parterres. The former, more numerous, include King James I, King Charles I, the royal physician Sir William Paddy,

and one or two archbishops. The second group incudes Johannes Kepler, Pierre Gassendi, and two twisted, leering figures labeled "Father Mersenne" and "Parson Foster." A small pavilion, its door sealed, is marked with Rosicrucian symbols. Other outbuildings house a meteorological station and, surprisingly, a factory for the forging of steel. The whole complex is surrounded by moats and bastions in the shape of a star. Nowhere in it is a single woman to be seen.

Thus, emulating Fludd's flair for visualization, we may sketch an intellectual world unrivaled in its breadth and ambition; for the era would soon pass in which one man's mind could encompass so much of human knowledge. This very ambition was one cause of the obscurity into which Fludd fell, almost as soon as he was dead. He was not original enough in any of the disciplines that would make history, such as astronomy, mechanics, philosophy, medicine, or the arts. Another reason was his obsession with a few dominant ideas, such as the pyramids of spirit and matter, the monochord, the weatherglass, a theory of winds, geomancy, and an alchemical experiment with wheat. Each of these generated book-length studies in which every circumstance and combination is laboriously explained, with frequent recourse to biblical authority. The reader can usually get the point in a fraction of the time from the illustrations, as Fludd himself admitted when he wrote against Kepler's prolixity: "What he has expressed in many words and long discussion, I have compressed into a few words and explained by means of hieroglyphic and exceedingly significant figures."' The number of illustrations in Fludd's works exceeds those in any encyclopedic literature before Diderot's. It was these that kept Fludd's reputation alive and his books in the libraries of bibliophiles, though more out of curiosity than respect.

Historians, at least until recently, have neglected the current of thought to which Fludd made his most permanent contribution: it was the esoteric tradition, and specifically the blend of Christian Hermetism with the occult sciences. Here his amplitude of mind found its true range, which was not the horizontal one, taking in the multiple fields of man's activities, but the vertical one that starts from the first principles of theology and metaphysics, and descends the chain of being to its limit.

Fludd's Philosophical System

At the summit of Fludd's cosmos is one Absolute God, whom he usually represents by the Hebrew Tetragrammaton or its transcription as "Jehovah." This supreme, impersonal principle is beyond the distinctions of good and evil. But although it is a perfect unity, it has a dual power: it can either remain in itself, contained in a state of potentiality, or it can act. The Kabbalists call both of these powers by Aleph (X), the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet, distinguishing them as the "light Aleph" and the "dark Aleph." Fludd says that God's dark side seems like an abyss of chaos, the parent of all the evils and discord in the world. It is the source of Satan and the demons who trouble the world and fight perpetually against the angels of light. But since God's unity includes it, we must accept it as an aspect of him and hence ultimately good. God's active state, on the other hand, is obviously good, for it gives the whole universe being and sustains it with all its creatures. Fludd calls this dichotomy a "Sphyngian riddle" that will not be solved until the end of the world, when (as described in the book of Revelation) the seventh seal will be opened. Then the mystery will reveal itself, and the two opposites will return to one harmonious unity.

The process of creation, on every level, fascinated Fludd, and he was anxious to find the common ground of the creation myths in the two books he most respected: the Bible and the writings ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus (Corpus Hermeticum). He explains the creation of the universe as the result of

a ray of God's active light, sent out into the void and diminishing gradually as it went farther from him. The light was pure spirit, and around it the darkness coalesced in the form of matter. The stronger the ray, the less matter could exist in its presence. But in the outer reaches of God's illumination, the darkness gradually prevailed over light, exceeding and finally extinguishing it. The various compounds of spirit and matter became worlds and regions of worlds, of which there are three main divisions. First is the empyrean world, or heaven, where light exceeds darkness, the latter taking the form of very rarefied matter. Second is the ethereal world, in which light and darkness are equal and make a substance we call ether (the "quintessence" of Aristotle's system). Third is the elemental world, where darkness predominates over light, producing the four elements of fire, air, water, and earth. The earth itself is the darkest and most material place in the universe, of which, following the geocentric system, it is the center.

There is a curious ambiguity in this image of creation. First we are led to imagine God as the center, presumably of a sphere, and the states of light and darkness surrounding him, getting darker and more material as they are farther away. But then the system is turned inside out, with the earth at the center and God at the circumference. The entire cosmic system is then enclosed as a miniscule bubble within his infinity. This is more like the Kabbalistic idea that God made the cosmos by withdrawing from a part of himself, creating by absence the only space that is not God. When we examine Fludd's illustrations we discover that the limitations of graphic design not only force him to represent this "bubble" as a two-dimensional circle, but to show only a slice of this circle from its center to its circumference. The result is a one-dimensional scale with God at one end, the earth at the other. Out of this come his three major symbols, which are all linear: the monochord, the intersecting pyramids, and the weatherglass.

Far from being lifeless spaces, Fludd's worlds are thronged with beings: the empyrean with angels; the ethereal with stars, planets, and demons; the elemental with men, animals, plants, and minerals. All these creatures partake of God's light in measure according to their place on the hierarchy. But there is one level in particular that, though not the top of the scale (or the circumference of the sphere), is especially favored by God. This is the sun, which is placed at the crucial midpoint of the ladder of being, where spirit and matter are in perfect equality and balance. As the psalmist says, God has set a tabernacle in the sun, and from this secondary residence his active power radiates anew to all the lower realms. God's powers, says Fludd, are transmitted to the three worlds by his ministers. The angels are the servants of his light aspect, the demons of his darkness: two parallel hierarchies that strive perpetually one against the other. They are not exactly equal, however, for the demons were beaten down from the empyrean heaven by the archangel Michael and his host before the lower worlds were even created, and Michael then took up his abode in the sun.

Fludd's theogony and angelology are complicated and intertwined in such a way that some very remarkable conclusions emerge. His most important concepts are those of nature, the anima mundi (world soul), the Kabbalists' Metatron, the archangel Michael, the Messiah, and God the Son. Nature is the feminine, maternal principle, whom Fludd describes in glowing terms as God's first creation and also as his spouse. As such, we see her dominating the great frontispiece of the History of the Macrocosm (see ill. 2.1, pp. 30-31). In later works Fludd speaks less of nature and more of the world soul. This is the same thing, though less personified: the creative forces of light, will, intellect, and so on, which sustain the cosmos. He describes its origin as follows: the Logos gives off an emanation of light, which is the "eternal spirit of wisdom." This creative principle infuses the humid chaos, turning it from a potential

state to an active one, so that it becomes the substratum for the world. From the world's viewpoint, this divine light is its very soul. In the words of Mosaicall Philosophy, "the soul of the world, or mens divina in mundo [the divine mind in the world], simply taken, is that divine mental emanation absolutely in itself, being distinguished from the created spirit" (149).

In the same chapter Fludd draws a parallel with the individual soul, which gives life to the body and spirit (the latter meaning the subtle substance between body and soul). Analogously, the world soul provides the essential life of the world's body and spirit. Fludd recognized the same principle in Metatron, which he translates as "the gift of God." Again, in the words of Mosaicall Philosophy, he calls it "that universal Spirit of Wisdom which God sent out of his own mouth, as the greatest gift and token of his benignity ... which reduceth the universal Nothing into a universal Something" (151-52).

Fludd's answer to Kepler implies that he considered this principle to be none other than the second person of the Trinity. Here he actually says that the Light Aleph is the Son, or Wisdom, or Light, or the Word, adding "And the Platonists accept this `Wisdom' of the Hebrews, and `Messiah' of the Christians, and `Mittatron' of the Cabbalists, and `Word' of the Prophets and Apostles as the true Soul of the World, whom they say filled harmonically all the intervals of the world in threes, squared and cubed" (302-3). The reference here is to the description of the world's creation in Plato's Timaeus where, following Pythagorean number theory, the universe is organized mathematically and harmonically.

This kind of syncretizing had its roots in the Florentine Platonists of the fifteenth century, especially Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, who sought to reconcile the pagan philosophers with the Jewish and Christian revelations. (See appendix 2, "The Wisdom of the Ancients.") By Fludd's time the CounterReformation had made such compromises suspect, and Marin Mersenne objected in virulent terms. Nothing could be more impious, said the friar, than Fludd's equating this world soul that permeates all beings—angels, demons, men, and beasts—with the angel Michael, Metatron, the Messiah, and ultimately with Christ.

Fludd's reply explained that he was not equating these to one another, but that they are manifestations of a single principle in different worlds. In the archetypal world (above even the angels), it is Adonai, the Lord, whose light is Ensoph, the infinite. In the angelic (empyrean) world the principle is the soul of the Messiah, whose light is Elchai, the living God. In the celestial (ethereal) world it is the anima mundi or Metatron, whose light is Sadai, the all-powerful. And in the human microcosm it is the soul, illuminated by mind. This dispute highlights the most essential principle of Fludd's philosophy: the correspondence between worlds or levels of being. That the whole of magic rests on this presupposition may explain why Mersenne, the enemy of all things occult, found it so repellent.

The same principle underlies Fludd's demonstration of the harmony between microcosm and macrocosm. According to this, man is a miniature universe, and the universe is structured like a great man. Therefore if one understands the little world, one will have a key to understanding the greater one. Fludd interprets in this spirit the words that God speaks in Genesis: "Let us make man in our own image;' and also the Hermetic axiom "That which is above is like that which is below."

Harmony implies relationships, and nowhere are quantitative relationships so keenly felt as when they manifest as musical proportions. Here quantity becomes quality and numbers are experienced as feeling. The ratio of 1:2 gives the octave, 2:3 the perfect fifth, and so on with other intervals. The chords and

intervals that he posits between different levels of being may not be scientifically demonstrable or even accurate, but they testify to Fludd's faith in an orderly world, in which nothing is related by chance and all is imbued with a harmony that we will one day understand and hear for ourselves.

These areas of Fludd's thought illustrate his independence from sectarian Christian theology, his readiness to recognize wisdom wherever he found it, and his conviction that reality consists of multiple states of being. All three set him apart from the dominant philosophical and theological concerns of his own day and of the centuries that followed. Seen from one viewpoint, he did represent, in William Huffman's phrase, "the end of the Renaissance." But the Renaissance, with its respect for antiquity, its curiosity about the origins of religion, its practice of concordance between different systems and faiths, and its vision of the dignity, even the divinity, of man, did not end with the Scientific Revolution. Seen from another viewpoint, Fludd takes his place in the tradition of Christian esotericism that includes figures as disparate as Hildegard of Bingen, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Nicolas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino, Cornelius Agrippa, Paracelsus, Michael Maier, Jacob Boehme, Thomas Vaughan, Jane Leade, Emanuel Swedenborg, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin, Franz von Baader, Eliphas Levi, Rudolf Steiner, and Valentin Tomberg. <>

JUNGIAN LITERARY CRITICISM: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE by Susan Rowland [Jung: The Essential Guides, Routledge, 9781138673731]

In **JUNGIAN LITERARY CRITICISM: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE**, Susan Rowland demonstrates how ideas such as archetypes, the anima and animus, the unconscious and synchronicity can be applied to the analysis of literature. Jung's emphasis on creativity was central to his own work, and here Rowland illustrates how his concepts can be applied to novels, poetry, myth and epic, allowing a reader to see their personal, psychological and historical contribution.

This multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach challenges the notion that Jungian ideas cannot be applied to literary studies, exploring Jungian themes in canonical texts by authors including Shakespeare, Jane Austen and W. B. Yeats as well as works by twenty-first century writers, such as in digital literary art. Rowland argues that Jung's works encapsulate realities beyond narrow definitions of what a single academic discipline ought to do, and through using case studies alongside Jung's work she demonstrates how both disciplines find a home in one another. Interweaving Jungian analysis with literature, **JUNGIAN LITERARY CRITICISM: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE** explores concepts from the shadow to contemporary issues of ecocriticism and climate change in relation to literary works, and emphasises the importance of a reciprocal relationship. Each chapter concludes with key definitions, themes and further reading, and the book encourages the reader to examine how worldviews change when disciplines combine.

The accessible approach **JUNGIAN LITERARY CRITICISM: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE** will appeal to academics and students of literary studies, Jungian and post-Jungian studies, literary theory, environmental humanities and ecocentrism. It will also be of interest to Jungian analysts and therapists in training and in practice.

Getting started in Jung and literature

Overview

This is a book about a psychology of the creative imagination, that of C. G. Jung and Jungians, and how it might aid the study of literature. It is designed for those who want to use Jungian ideas to develop an understanding of literary texts. Therefore, this book's first audience is those readers new to Jung whose primary purpose to extend their knowledge of literary writing. Yet, there is a second readership for Jungian Literary Criticism: The Essential Guide, because the book and the work it sponsors go two ways. It also aims to help Jungian clinicians, scholars and therapists to explore literature as a means to developing their practice, either in writing or in the consulting room. Indeed, a key theme of this book is such reciprocity, that Jungians can aid the study of literature while literary critics can similarly inform Jungian psychology.

So why might Jung, a pioneer of the psychology of the unconscious (sometimes known as `depth psychology'), have something to say to the diverse field of literary studies? Similarly, what can imaginative writing and its scholarship have to do with a psychology developed for psychotherapy (for the practical improvement of mental well-being by means of consultation)? The first two chapters set up the structure of the whole book, starting by tackling these fundamental questions in a thorough overview. Chapter 1 has a section exploring the definitions and consequences of key Jungian ideas and concludes with a summary of the key issues in three sentences, found in all subsequent chapters from Chapter 3. Chapter 2 shows how the Jungian and literary ideas find a home in literature by means of a case study of a significant literary work followed by looking at specific Jungian texts. Chapter 2 will also begin the introduction of significant aspects of Jungian literary criticism so far.

While following this basic structure, all chapters will also end in what I am calling 'the big questions', such as what happens to knowing — and the worldviews implied by them — when disciplines are combined? For the relationship between disciplines, which is what this book is about, proves to have important ongoing implications for more than the organisation of degree programmes. Ultimately, this book will suggest, how we treat our forms of knowledge in the twenty-first century affects more than the academy. It could be part of practical change to help a troubled and ecologically stressed world. But first of all, let's begin with psychology in the distinctive approach of C. G. Jung.

Why Jung?

Jung is important for arguing that psychic creativity is the foundation of who we are, how we think, and the ways in which we connect to our world. To Jung, nothing is more influential in human life than this

basic core of creativity, the capacity to generate something new. Whatever our personal or social circumstances, we have an inner power to change our lives and affect our surroundings. Indeed, this notion of fundamental creativity means that human existence has a goal or a purpose. We may not possess answers to our problems, but within us is an energy directing us towards a meaningful and fulfilled life.

Jung located this creativity in the power of imagination in the psyche, our inner being, and in particular in that hidden and mysterious part of it known as the unconscious. (For more on these notions see the 'Key definitions' section below.) As a psychologist, Jung was part of an early twentieth-century movement developing psychological therapy. After a difficult collaboration with the founder of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud (see 'Key definitions' section on `libido'), Jung broke away from Freud's ideas because he felt that nothing should restrict the possibilities of unconscious creativity. It is for this championing of the intrinsic creativity of the psyche that Jung influenced many writers, artists and philosophers, as well as inspiring a range of subsequent therapies, including those using the arts to facilitate therapy.

So Jung is a critical thinker in three ways. Firstly, he is critically important-as a major pioneer of working with the unconscious, a factor of crucial importance in the twentieth century and arguably even more significant in the twenty-first, in which a loosening of all kinds of boundaries allows the psyche to develop in new ways. Secondly, Jung is critical to literature because he has been acknowledged as an influence in the work of writers, artists and philosophers. Among such notable figures are D. H. Lawrence, James Joyce, Walter Benjamin, Gilles Deleuze, Herman Hesse, Thomas Mann, John Fowles, Ted Hughes, Doris Lessing, Jackson Pollock, Anselm Kiefer; and filmmakers such as George Lucas, John Boorman and Derek Jarman.

Finally, Jung is critical in the sense of offering a way of meaningful criticism because his work provides a framework for analysing and evaluating creativity. Jung thereby provides an interpretative approach to the arts and humanities, those disciplines such as literary studies, philosophy, history and religion that are devoted to what it means to be human. Jung gives a distinctive way of knowing and valuing knowing, or epistemology. As this book will show, he offers a number of concepts and ideas that enable texts to be read productively for what they contribute personally, psychologically, socially, historically and cosmologically.

In this sense, Jung is also a textual critic, although the texts he preferred were typically dreams and neuroses. His textual practices on non-literary material do manifest a hermeneutics, or a way of working with texts and theorising about that work. For example, Jung's potential for exploring reading and writing will be the focus of Chapter 3.

Moreover, there is a second dimension to Jung as a source of interpretation, which returns us to his key notion of creativity as the essence of being human. Since creativity comes first, meaning that it is more endemic to Jung than anything else, so then nothing can be allowed to limit the possibilities of the imagination. Whatever Jung's theory does must liberate rather than limit creative, artistic and imaginative work. No exception is made, even in Jung's own account of the psyche.

So Jung is a critical thinker who places imagination above ideas, even his own ideas, as we will see in this book. His prioritising of imagination extends into his own writing. Since creativity is so uniquely valuable,

it must be allowed to inhabit, play, even guide, Jung's own expressions. Jung is a critical thinker with many psychic voices striving to come to life in his writing. He is therefore a powerful resource for evaluating texts of all kinds. Indeed, his works meet many criteria for literature itself as we will see.

Ultimately, in Jung for literary criticism, his study of the human psyche incorporates three trajectories. These are firstly, exploring personhood or individual being; secondly, the role of interconnectedness or how we are who we are through relationships; and finally, treating culture through seeking what is lost, marginalised or yet to come into being. In fact, Jung could be placed appropriately as a figure in the academic study of the humanities for his focus on what it means to be human, as an individual, through such forces as sexuality, family and social roles, and as a member of cultural and national groups.

Significant here is that his approach to culture enacts his fidelity to the creativity of the psyche in remaining `open', as in never absolute, finished or complete. No psyche is ever fully knowable (because of the existence of its unconscious), no person is ever unable to grow or change, no culture is ever complete or perfect. Seeking what is lost, marginalised or yet to come, Jung believes in re-connecting with psychic resources consigned to the past, as well as becoming more aware of what is being banished from the present, and also remaining open to an as yet unknowable future potential. In this and in other ways, Jungian psychology joins some of the most potent properties of that cultural body we call literature.

Why literary criticism?

Literature is variously described as artistic or imaginative writing. Such terms disguise the fact that the definition of literature, both as an object for study and in its long cultural history, has been vigorously contested. Perhaps it is worth noting that literature is a creature of historic contraction. Pre-history suggests to us oral communities where literature lived in memories and recitation. We know this literature by those few surviving works that were eventually written down. Such ievidence indicates that much of the culture of the tribe, its history, religion, laws and practices, were contained in long narrative poems. Literature was culture; almost all of it.

In the later ages of writing and latterly of printing, literature was `valued writing', which included religious, philosophical, scientific and historical texts. Such a category remained effective until the divorce between science and religion provoked a revival of interest in the imagination in the era called Romanticism in the 1750s to the 1830s (Eagleton 1983: 17). After Romanticism, `literature' rapidly contracts to signify imaginative and fictional works in the major genres of poetry, novels and plays.

Whether literature covers all such publications from pulp fiction of the city streets to esoteric experimental poetry, from music hall sketches to serious drama, from the major entertainment modes of the people to elite art, this debate has infused the academic study of vernacular literature from its setting up as a degree programme in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, the role of new technologies for imaginative productions in film, television, and internet texts is also open for exploration under the heading of literary studies. Fortunately, the recent publication of the comprehensive Jungian Film Studies: The Essential Guide means that this book can focus on the written word (Bassil-Morozow and Hockley 2016).

Whatever may get included in the category `literature', the literary does possess some agreed-upon characteristics. Literature demonstrates the role of creativity and imagination in writing; it has a

particular history of development with specific forms and genres, and, it has played a social role in the transmission of stories, ideas, themes, codes and tropes in societies. In this latter mode, literature participates in social power in its ability to influence behaviour and to fulfil a society's expectations. On the other hand, literature can also be a space in which norms are tested and new ideas emerge; it can be subversive of conventions. Above all, in its reliance upon the creative imagination, literature both requires and reveals the workings of the human psyche. And by psyche we mean all the experiences of being, including those unknown and intimated through the body, and encounters with the world beyond.

One crucial issue for literary criticism and this book has already been alluded to. While literature itself, however disputed as a category, extends back into prehistorical times, the investigation of literature as an academic degree subject is a relatively recent phenomenon. How literature is typically studied both affects and is effected by the range of theoretical approaches brought into the discipline and constituting it. That there are issues and problems of knowing and being for both Jungians and literary critics will be an explicit part of this book, beginning in this chapter. It is first necessary to consider how and why literature became academic. Why was literature subjected to higher education, becoming a degree subject in its own right?

A note of caution

As noted above, there are issues and difficulties when theories and practices from one discipline, such as the psychology of the unconscious, is used to examine the material of another discipline, such as literary studies, and vice versa. Above all there is a trap in the notion of interdisciplinary academic research, a trap that has the potential to work against liberatory values. For if the theories of a psychology are used to `explain' literature, then they are functioning as a kind of mastery of the Other, that Other here being the literary text. A power differential has been erected. And the same differential of power exists if psychology's material were treated as texts to be considered with exactly the approaches of the discipline of literature. Literature then surmounts and marginalises psychology.

Such activity may well yield valuable results, but it is not interdisciplinary; it is rather one discipline colonising another by seizing its territory (such as literary works) as its own. Put another way, different academic disciplines have different starting points. For literary studies it is the reality and importance of the text that is capable of sponsoring its own meanings and knowing: epistemology begins with the work, not the person producing it or studying it. For psychology, it is the psyche that is the generator of being and meaning. Hence a written text may be treated as evidence of psychological processes, but it is not a source of meaning in its own right. Conversely, Jungian psychology might be regarded by literary scholars as having something to say about the creativity that helps to generate texts, but the psyche in itself is not the object of literary study.

Behind this seeming incompatibility is the fundamental division between subject and object, between psyche and the reality that it encounters as `Other`. This division stems from philosophical positivism and scientific empiricism as detailed above in this chapter. It is further considered in the last section of this chapter. For now, I want to emphasise that true interdisciplinary work is extremely rare since it requires accepting the reality of starting points (ontologies) and the ways of making and justifying knowing (epistemologies) of both disciplines without marginalising either.

More typical in both literary studies and Jungian research, is borrowing and experimenting with the matter and modes of other disciplines in order to extend one's home field. Fortunately, the similarity of

literary and Jungian studies in their shared concern with creativity has yielded valuable results, as we will see in this kind of disciplinary cross-overs. For this reason, it is time to look more closely at the key Jungian concepts and ideas.

Key definitions

Psyche and soul

This book will follow Jung's practice and use the term `psyche' for the totality of psychological processes, functions, manifestation and potentials. Many Jungians have moved to adopt the word `soul' because they resist the overt sense of fixed structuring that comes with words like 'ego' and `unconscious'. However, since the psychological use of soul does differ significantly from its religious antecedents and literature bears witness to a culture's religious traditions, Jungian Literary Criticism: The Essential Guide will accommodate psyche.

Jung's creative psyche is also teleological, which means that it is goal-oriented. It looks forward to making future meaning and being.

Ego/unconscious

Jung liked to see the psyche as expressed through oppositional pairs such as this one. Such pairs would form a stronger more integrated relationship through healthy psychological development (see `individuation'). Put another way, Jung's oppositions are meant to break down and remake themselves into a nuanced relationship. The ego is the focusing of consciousness in knowable personhood that is inextricably tied to and needs to be fed by, an intrinsically creative unconscious. Therefore, the ego is the centre of psychic experience concerned with the sense of a personal identity, the maintenance of personality and the sense of continuity over time. However, Jung considered the ego as something less than the whole personality, as it was constantly interacting with more significant archetypal forces in the unconscious. Jung tended to equate the ego with consciousness in his writings.

To Jung, the term `unconscious' denotes mental contents not directly perceptible by the ego as well as a psychic arena with its own properties. The Jungian unconscious is superior in potential to the ego and exists in a compensatory relation to it. It is the prime source of meaning, feeling and value in the psyche and is autonomous of the ego. The unconscious is not separate from the body; it offers a third place between that perennial duality, body and mind or spirit. Both body and culture influence unconscious contents (archetypal images), yet the unconscious is not subject to, or determined by, either force. The unconscious is structured by archetypes as hypothetical inherited structuring principles (see Chapter 4).

Collective unconscious

Jung adopts the Freudian unconscious created by repression (see `libido' below) and further adds his own collective unconscious of inherited potentials for images and meaning. What is not always made clear is that these potentials, or archetypes, are not inherited images. Instead, archetypes are non-specific meaning-generating impulses. Moreover, historical tradition does shape the archetypal image, while being neither the origin nor the determining source. For example, Jung finds confrontations with dragons imaged in railway accidents or a bird sent by gods in the representation of an airplane (Jung 1930, CW30: para. 152).

Hence a crucial misunderstanding of Jung can be righted. While insisting on a common human substrate of an actively creative psyche, this universal property is never accessible to consciousness unmediated by culture. Jung understands the psyche as culturally shaped and influenced. In fact, psychic creativity often works is by compensating for ego biases, which are often culturally derived (Jung in Samuels, Shorter and Plaut: 156).

Libido

Jung uses `libido' and `energy' in the same way to mean life force, the energising power driving and motivating psychic activity. In this he crucially differs from Freud who coined the term libido to signify that psychic energy was sexual at root. For Freud, the libido's repression via the Oedipus complex (when a boy renounces desire for the mother under threat of castration by the father, and a girl has to shift desire from mother to father) provokes the founding ego-unconscious psychic division. To Jung, Oedipal energies are present and do create the ego/personal unconscious split as Freud averred. However, unlike Freud, the Oedipus complex does not dominate the psyche into adulthood. Far more lastingly prevalent is the generation of meaning, feeling and value via the work of the autonomous collective unconscious. Libido or psychic energy is neutral and can take many forms including the sexual (Samuels, Shorter, Plaut 1986: 53-54).

Image

It is important for anyone engaged in Jungian literary criticism to be clear about Jung's specific use of the word image, because it stands for psychic matter in its essence. It is not therefore the visual perception or external single element, such as images on a computer screen or mobile phone, nor physical material in art or in writing. Jungian images are the psyche manifesting itself.

> When I speak of `image' in this book, I do not mean the psychic reflection of some external object, but ... a figure of fancy or fantasy-image... it then has a greater psychological value, representing an inner reality which often far outweighs the importance of external reality. (Jung 1987: 113)

Images for Jung are psyche initiated, so succinctly conveying the different orientation between the disciplines of psychology and literature: images in and of the psyche, versus images in and of a literary text in metaphors and similes etc. However, Jung did not deny the power of words to provoke internal archetypes; to produce images in the independently generative power of the imagination.

Provoking images does not mean entirely causing them. Such word-initiated images in literature were given special terms: signs and symbols.

Sign/symbol

Another of Jung's theoretical binaries concerns images experienced through reading words. Jung divided such images into two types of signifying: signs and symbols. Signs point to a known or knowable meaning. They are therefore primarily concerned with collective consciousness or general cultural understanding, and are the main ingredient of what he named `psychological art' (see below). Symbols stand for what cannot be represented except in words that evoke deeper mysteries. They point to what is hardly known, not yet known, or unknowable. They are the chief conduit for the collective unconscious and its archetypes in dreams and in art. Symbols make up most of the fabric of visionary literature (see below). Archetypal images (Chapter 4) very often manifest as symbols, and the term stands for their numinous quality. Chapter 3 will explore signs and symbols at work in reading literature more closely.

Psychological visionary

Jung divided literature (and by extension all art) into psychological and visionary categories (Jung 1930, CW15: para. 139). Psychological works mainly consist of signs, which points to what is known or knowable. Consequently, psychological writing expresses the collective consciousness of a society, what the particular society or era is consciously debating. Jung felt that in this kind of work the author has already done most of the psychic work for the audience — hence `psychological' text. By contrast, `visionary' art is characterised by symbols, which point to what is not yet known or is consciously unknowable in the culture. Consequently, visionary art is primarily expressive of the collective unconscious. As such it compensates the historical moment for its biases; it brings to consciousness what is ignored or repressed, and furthermore, it may predict something of the future direction of the society.

Jung and knowledge

Jung treated the unknown parts of the psyche seriously. In fact, he was so serious about the importance of the unconscious that his attitude towards knowledge is that no field or discipline can be complete or absolute because our rational knowing faculties do not encompass all that we are. Since there are parts of the human psyche that we cannot map, it follows that we cannot know if there is more to understand beyond our limited faculties.

> Nobody drew the conclusion that if the subject of knowledge, the psyche, were in fact a veiled form of existence not immediately accessible to consciousness, then all our knowledge must be incomplete, and moreover to a degree that we cannot determine. (Jung 1947, CW8: para. 358)

Knowledge as we habitually describe it in scholarly categories is by this definition `open' because it can never be closed' as in finished, done, or sorted. The creative potential of Jung's unconscious includes an epistemology of radically incomplete knowledge. Such a foundational proposition has implications for framing the very idea of academic disciplines.

Jung and academic disciplines

Unlike Freud, who regarded Oedipal repression as the heart of human being and therefore fundamental to knowing, Jung refused to privilege any psychological idea, except making all knowledge provisional because of the creative role of the unconscious. Jung's founding principle is that there is no founding principle because the unconscious means that we cannot erect a hierarchy of ideas. There is no `unifying principle' that would enable one way of knowing to claim superiority over all others (Jung 1921, CW15: para. 99).

To Jung, there is no basic structure in being because the autonomous creativity of the unconscious is more innate, more productive, even more real, than any Oedipal tensions in early existence. Hence, although on the one hand Jung liked to see the psyche as encompassing other disciplinary materials, he was explicit that his psychology could not be a master-discipline, subordinating other types of knowing.

For example, in his essays on poetry and literature, he insists that there are aesthetic issues proper to the literary critic and not to the psychologist, as he terms himself (Jung 1922: paras. 97, 135). In fact, in calling the psyche 'the womb of all the arts and sciences,' Jung's metaphor is precise, since a womb contains and nurtures, rather than being something that would account for the total significance of the person in later life (Jung 1930: para. 133). This question of disciplinary relations will be continued in the final section of this chapter.

A summary in three sentences

For ease of use, each chapter will provide three key sentences that serve to sum up the argument.

(1) The potential for linking Jungian psychology and literary studies arguably lies in their mutual dedication to the study of creativity as foundational to meaning.
(2) Both literary studies and Jungian psychology have a critical attitude to the making of meaning: Jung in the role of the unconscious, literature in its interrogation of what makes a text literary.
(3) The two disciplines possess different starting points to be negotiated: Jung in the creativity of the psyche; literature in the written text as material, collective or linguistic object.

PHRASIKLEIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF READING IN ANCIENT GREECE by Jesper S Venbro, translated by Janet Lloyd [Myth and Poetics, Cornell University Press, 9780801425196]

First published in French in 1988, this extraordinary book traces the meaning and function of reading from its very beginnings in Greek oral culture through the development of silent reading.

One of the most haunting early examples of Greek alphabetical writing appears on the life-sized Archaic funerary statue of a young girl. The inscription speaks for Phrasikleia, who "shall always be called maiden," for she has received this name from the gods instead of marriage.

PHRASIKLEIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF READING IN ANCIENT GREECE by Jesper Svenbro, addresses a question of central importance and interest—the beginnings of literacy in Greece. This question, as the author argues, requires an anthropological understanding of reading as well as writing, viewed in the specific historical context of ancient Greek culture. For the Greeks, the concept of reading is to be grasped not just in intellectual or psychological terms, which Svenbro reconstructs by analyzing such distinct words as anagignõskein, nemein, or epilegesthai, all of which we translate simply as "read"; it also finds expression in myth and poetics. In fact, as Svenbro shows, a dazzling variety of

traditional metaphors articulate the relationship between reader and writer. Some of these metaphors are built into the oldest myths that tell about the "discovery" of writing, while others come to life in the most sophisticated newer creations of the Greek poetic tradition.

The author finds a particularly striking poetic metaphor in his reinterpretation of Sappho's celebrated Fragment 3 I, which captures the synaesthesia of passion evoked by what seems on the surface a love triangle in the making. For Svenbro, the triangular relationship that links the passionately jealous first-person female speaker in the poem with the languidly distracted second-person female beloved and with the attractively attentive third-person male lover of the second person is tantamount to a relationship that links the writer with the poem that she has written and with the reader who reads that poem.

Svenbro shows many other kinds of erotic models as well, most notably in the complex metaphorical world of Plato's Phaedrus. Besides the sublime homoerotic model constructed by Socrates himself in this dialogue, another such model is that of sexuality without love, as problematized in the Phaedrus and as actually realized in some of the most notorious surviving ancient Greek graffiti. A key to this negativized kind of homosexual relationship, a foil to "Platonic love," is the power-play of sexual domination as exerted by the older erastes over the younger erõmenos.

Given that this relationship of erastes and erõmenos serves as a prime metaphor for the relationship of writer and reader in ancient Greece, Svenbro's book refers to the reader consistently with the pronoun "he," excluding explicit reference to any potential reader who happens to be "she." As we contemplate the games of domination that come into play with the eroticized metaphors of reading, this particular instance of gender omission may actually seem welcome. Although I personally find the ancient Greek mentality of exclusion unwelcome in a hoped-for contemporary world of genderinclusiveness, where the reader can become interchangeably "he" or "she," the default translation of the reader as an accessory "he" in . Phrasikleia is historically faithful to the metaphorical world of reading in ancient Greece. If Svenbro's interpretation is right, even Sappho's projected reader defaults to a "he."

The feminine gender does indeed find its authority—but not so much in the reading or decoding of ancient Greek writing as in its encoding. It could even be said that the feminine gender is the code of reading, as brought to life, for example, in the mythical figure of Phoinike, who becomes in Svenbro's argument the very embodiment of Greek letters or phoinikela grammata. So also with the historical figure of Phrasikleia, the young woman who becomes memorialized for all time in a poem inscribed on her statue—and whose identity or even essence takes pride of place in Svenbro's book. In the language of Phrasikleia's poetic inscription, her statue speaks with her own authority as she proudly identifies herself in the first person, equating her identity with what is called by the poem a sema or sign that presents to the world her three-dimensional essence. Her words equate her own self with the sema or sign that bears the inscribed words announcing that self. And her very name, Phrasikleia, proclaims that she both "draws attention" and "pays attention" (phrazein, as in phrasi-) to her own poetic "glory" (kleos, as in -kleia). In the world of the Phrasikleia inscription, the speech-act of poetry has already taken place in the fact of writing. The reader's voice, as reading out loud, is but an accessory to the fact.

Svenbro's elaborations on the ideas of Foucault and Derrida, and also his new insights into the distinctively Greek uses of "silent reading" as a means to achieve power, make his book a timely one for students of comparative literature and literary theory, not only Classics.' More than that, his reading of

Phrasikleia's sema in all the senses of that Greek word—sign, signal, symbol, and tomb—promises to become a classic in the history of semiotics.

Over the past decades, scholars of ancient Greek have become extremely interested in the alphabetic writing of the ancient Greeks, in all its many aspects. During the first half of the first millennium B. c. the Greeks borrowed the alphabet from the Semites, modifying it considerably for their own purposes. Alphabetic writing burst on a Greece accustomed to an oral tradition; and ever since 1963, when Eric Havelock's Preface to Plato appeared, a whole stream of research has been devoted to determining how, when, and to what degree writing became established in Greek culture. Did Greece remain essentially "oral" up until the time of Plato? Or had writing sounded the knell for traditional culture long before? Considerable progress has unquestionably been made by research in this field, in particular, perhaps, by making the questions to be asked more specific and by identifying the unresolved problems.

Upon consulting the available bibliographical information, however, a scholar specializing in written communication in ancient Greece may well be surprised at how little attention has been devoted to reading, that is to say, to the receiving side that after all would seem to represent one-half, if not more, of the phenomenon. From a sociological point of view at least, it seems perverse to concentrate on the emission side, the act of writing, to such a degree that the number of books and articles devoted to various aspects of writing in ancient Greece runs into hundreds, whereas studies on reading are extremely few and far between. Two to be noted in particular, however, are Pierre Chantraine's article on Greek verbs meaning 'to read' (1950) and Bernard Knox's study of silent reading (1968). The situation is all the more curious in that, seen from a perspective in which an opposition is set up between orality and writing, reading would appear to represent a zone of interference which is of the greatest interest since it is known that the ancient Greeks normally tended to read aloud. Writing itself could thus logically claim to be "oral." For, as we shall see, Greek writing was first and foremost a machine for producing sounds.

In concentrating chiefly upon the emission side, scholars have in a way remained faithful to the Greeks' own way of looking at things. Those Greeks who did not quite simply reject writing, as Pythagoras and Socrates did, tended to prefer the activity of writing to the "passivity" of the reader (who is passive in that he is "subjected" to the writing). As soon as we recognize the instrumental nature that one who reads aloud assumes in relation to the writer, we are struck by the analogy between the categories of written communication and those of another Greek social practice, recently analyzed by Michel Foucault: I refer to pederasty. The relationship between the erastés `lover', who is active and dominant, and the erómenos `beloved', who is passive and dominated, raises questions similar to those inherent in the relationship that binds the writer to the reader and tends to make reading the devalued underside of writing. The inscription on a kylix vessel found in Sicily and dating from soo B.C. (to which we shall be returning) in its own crude way makes use of the terms of that analogy: "The writer of the inscription will `bugger' [pugíxei] the reader." By making available his vocal apparatus, an inner (one might almost say "intimate") organ, to what is written, the reader puts himself into a passive role similar to that in a pederastic relationship. By reading it, he is subjected to the inscription.

One consequence of the Greeks' reading aloud is that the reader is thus presented as an eromenos. But there are others. The writer necessarily depends on the voice of the reader. At the moment of reading, the reader relinquishes his voice to what is written and to the absent writer. That means that his voice is not his own as he reads. While it is employed to bring the dead letters to life, it belongs to what is

written. The reader is a vocal instrument used by the written word (or by the one who wrote it) in order to give the text a body, a sonorous reality. So when the reader of a funerary stele reads out the inscription "I am the tomb of Glaukos," logically there is no contradiction, for the voice that makes that "I" ring out belongs not to the reader, but to the stele bearing the inscription. No contradiction is involved, but a kind of violence undoubtedly is.

This opens up a whole field ofinquiry for what one might call the microsociology of written communication. The fact that the written word (or the writer) makes use of the reader as he would make use of an instrument (that is to say, an object) constitutes the starting point. This starting point prompted me to study the relation between the writer and the reader not only as a pederastic relationship, but also as a "genealogical" one, for I was very soon led to formulate the hypothesis of a relationship of affiliation which, through the medium of the writing, linked the writer with the logos `speech' eventually read out loud. In contrast to the Platonic model, where the written logos is the son of the writer,4 this affiliation gives the writing a role of its own: it is the daughter of the writer and the mother of the lógos that is read aloud by the reader. The tension here is different from that which obtains in a pederastic relationship, for here the tension develops between a father and a suitor for his daughter's hand, the father who is loath to let his daughter go but needs a son-in-law, and a suitor who seeks to tear the daughter from her father and from the paternal home.

By choosing how the Greeks read rather than how they write as my subject of research, I thus arrive at a perspective that, at a stroke, clarifies a number of hitherto perplexing factors. Let me take an example with implications that seem to me particularly important. Clearly, one of the first tasks in a study of reading in ancient Greece is that of drawing up an inventory of verbs meaning `to read'. Four are listed in the above-mentioned article by Chantraine. But among the omissions of that great French scholar is the verb némein, which without the slightest doubt did possess the sense of `to read'. Now, the Greek word for law' is nómos, for which no "truly satisfactory" etymology has yet been produced. Formally speaking, however, nómos is a noun derived from némein and, accordingly, might be open to the sense of "reading." In a culture that set such a very high value on the spoken word, that the law should be something to be read aloud rather than written down is, no doubt, significant. In Greece, nómos is accounted king, and reading rules. The legislator can rely on this king (whose imperious voice will end up as the inner voice of conscience). And the "oral" prehistory of némein `to cite, recite' allows us to glimpse how it was that an "oral distribution"—another possible translation of nómos—based on writing came to replace one based on memory.

Like the legislator, every writer counted on a reader so that his words at one remove could sound forth. It was essential that they should do so, to the Greeks, a people as it were obsessed with the idea of "resounding renown" or kléos. Writing could not do without a voice. In truth, letters were meaningless for the average Greek reader until they were spoken. Letters had to be pronounced aloud if the text was to become intelligible. Sound and sense coincided in the lógos, which was both réson and raison—'resonance' and 'reason'—to borrow the felicitous pun made by Francis Ponge. By listening to the resonant sequence of sounds produced by the reader from the string of written words, the same reader could recognize the meaning of those words committed to writing. Not surprisingly, then, the Greeks chose as a technical term for `to read' a verb meaning `to recognize' (anagignoskein). And we immediately realize that, for those Greeks, whose reading was always done aloud, the letters themselves did not represent a voice. They did not picture a voice. Only a voice—the reader's—prompted by those

letters could be produced, a voice that, for its part, could claim to represent the voice transcribed, even if that voice was a fictitious one.

Not until silent reading was conceptualized—possibly as early as the late sixth century B.C..—could writing be regarded as represent ing a voice. Now the letters could themselves "speak" directly to the eye, needing no voice to mediate. In his article on silent reading, Bernard Knox cites a few striking examples of this remarkable and, it must be admitted, marginal, or even parenthetical, phenomenon in Greek culture. For if the purpose of writing was to produce sound, silent reading inevitably has the air of an anomaly. Although Knox does not succeed in establishing a distinction between silent reading ("in one's head") and reading that is just inaudible to others (but which is, in principle, still "vocal"), it is possible to corroborate the findings of his inquiry by a study of the mental structure of silent reading. In short, the internalization of the voice in silent reading corresponds to the metaphor of "letters that speak," which became current at the point where silent reading began to be more or less commonly practiced. For anyone reading in silence, as Theseus does in Euripides' Hippolytos, the letters "speak," they "cry out" or even "sing." The eye sees the sound.

A written page can now become a scene. A scene? Certainly, a scene, as is attested by the Athenian poet Callias' ABC Show (second half of the fifth century B. c.). Surviving fragments allow us to form a general idea of this astounding play. In it the Ionian alphabet is literally set on stage and its twenty-four letters address the spectator in the same way as they were by then accustomed to address, in perfect silence, the metaphorical spectator whom the reader had become.

What motivated me to undertake the line of inquiry I have just summarized? I would say that, in a sense, it was the unease provoked by the contradictory figure of the reader or, to be more precise, by the two conflicting models of the reader with which we are familiar today. On the one hand is the reader despised by the writer, that is to say the ancient model which I have described above, consolidated by a certain romanticism that set up an opposition between the sublime poet and his vulgar readers. On the other is the reverse, more recent model, namely that of the "superreader" for whom the poem is simply a pretext for a reading that considers itself to be infinitely superior to its object.

Confronted by those two models of the reader, it is legitimate to wonder whether it would not be possible to postulate a more evenly balanced relationship between writer and reader without minimizing the specific features of each, as formulas such as "to read is to write" tend to do. At any rate, it was with just such a "more evenly balanced relationship" in mind that I began the present inquiry into Greek reading. I did not do so under the illusion that I would discover it ready-made among the ancient Greeks, but rather in the hope of coming up with a few ideas that might serve in its elaboration. In other words, I conceived this inquiry as a preliminary study on reading, to be carried out under the "laboratory conditions" provided by Greek culture.

When I was reaching what then seemed the conclusion of my inquiry, I discovered something like—yet distinct from—that more evenly balanced relationship that I was seeking. And, to my astonishment, it was in Plato's Phaedrus that I found it, at the point where Socrates redefines not only the relationship between lovers in a pederastic union (as Michel Foucault has shown8), but also, through that very redefinition, the relationship between writer and reader, both of whom, as subjects, take part in one and the same search for truth. <>

How Reason Can Lead to God: A Philosopher's Bridge to Faith by Joshua Rasmussen [IVP Academic, 9780830852529]

Do you seek the truth? Do you value reason, science, and independent thinking? Are you skeptical of beliefs that people maintain merely "on faith," yet you remain interested in the big questions of life? Do you hope there could be a greater purpose to the universe, if only that were realistic? If so, then philosopher Joshua Rasmussen can encourage you in your journey. Beginning with his own story of losing faith and the belief in any ultimate purpose in life, he then builds a bridge to a series of universal truths about ultimate reality. Using only the instruments of reason and common experience, Rasmussen constructs a pathway—step by step, brick by brick—that he argues can lead to meaning and, ultimately, a vision of God.

Reviews

"Rasmussen's book is destined to be a modern classic. Rasmussen combines simplicity, clarity, and depth to an extraordinary degree, resulting in a book that makes some of the most advanced work in contemporary philosophical theology accessible to the general reader, without sacrificing any logical precision. Rasmussen's style is winsome and engaging, drawing the reader into a thrilling adventure of metaphysical investigation of the existence and nature of reality's ultimate foundation." — (Robert Koons, professor of philosophy, University of Texas at Austin)

"This short book contains a bold, original, and provocative argument that shows how reason can lead a person who is genuinely seeking truth to God. It is written in simple, ordinary language and makes no appeal to authority. Although Rasmussen appeals only to truths that he thinks should be universally accepted, a good deal of the force of the book stems from the personal story of Rasmussen himself; his courage and honesty draw the reader into a similar journey." — (C. Stephen Evans, university professor of philosophy and humanities, Baylor University)

"**How Reason Can Lead to God: A Philosopher's Bridge to Faith** is beautifully written. It is truly exceptional in its clarity and simplicity of prose. While some concepts and arguments may be difficult to digest, the interested reader, up for a rigorous, intellectual workout, will be very richly rewarded. Engaging. Humble. Winsome. Rasmussen strikes just the right tone given the aim(s) of the book. A real gem!" — (Kevin Corcoran, professor of philosophy, Calvin College)

"Rasmussen provides a masterpiece argument for God. He delivers every step in a clear and engaging style. Powerful. Beautiful. Transformative." — (William Lane Craig, professor of philosophy, Talbot School of Theology and Houston Baptist University, coauthor of Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview)

"Rasmussen's superb and unique book provides arguments that are deep, convincing, expressed with admirable clarity, and informed by the very latest in philosophical thought." — (Alexander R. Pruss, director of graduate studies and professor, department of philosophy, Baylor University)

"Professor Rasmussen is a top Christian philosopher, a deeply devoted believer, and a longtime personal friend. He identifies his primary audience as a skeptic who cares about truth, is interested in life's big questions, and believes only what can be supported by reason. And Rasmussen hits the bull's-eye. Along with *Mere Christianity*, *How Reason Can Lead to God* is *the* book to give to such a person. But don't let this aim fool you. This book is a must-read for believers who love philosophy or apologetics. You will learn a ton by reading this book, and by reading it your ability to think will be vastly increased. The flow of Rasmussen's argument for God is developed with such precision and care that, quite frankly, it could not be improved. I am so excited about *How Reason Can Lead to God* and can't wait to see its impact. So put on your thinking hat, buy it, and study it carefully." — (J. P. Moreland, distinguished professor of philosophy, Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, author of Scientism and Secularism)

"**How Reason Can Lead to God: A Philosopher's Bridge to Faith** is an extraordinary book. Rasmussen builds, piece by piece, a bridge from the basic structures of reality to God. This work is meticulously structured. Rasmussen's writing style fits perfectly with the project. He is clear, careful, and patient. He never jumps to a conclusion. He considers objections fairly and engages them thoughtfully. This is simply the best philosophical defense of theism I have read in a long while. But, it is more than a defense of theism. It is a guided tour through the foundations of metaphysics." — (Gregory E. Ganssle, professor of philosophy at Biola University, author of Our Deepest Desires: How the Christian Story Fulfills Human Aspiration)

"A magnificent and prodigious talent as deft in analytic skill as he is adept at uncommon common sense, Joshua Rasmussen has produced a disarming, brilliant, bridge-building book that renders the recondite accessible. It takes readers on a fascinating journey, inviting them to think for themselves, try out his arguments, and come to their own conclusions. He is a remarkable philosopher in the best and old-fashioned sense: respecting his readers; asking vitally important, existentially central questions; rigorously following the evidence where it leads; animated by deep confidence in the revelatory power of reason to show the way. Any genuine seeker of wisdom and truth will find in these pages an eminent kindred spirit and faithful fellow traveler." — (David Baggett, coauthor of The Morals of the Story: Good News About a Good God)

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You value reason, science, and independent thinking. You question beliefs propped up by "faith" without sufficient evidence. Maybe you would like your life to have a deeper purpose, but you cannot believe something based on a mere wish. Whether you are a student, an academic, or just a curious person, you want one thing: the truth. If you can relate, this book is for you.

You might worry that this book is not about truth, not really. From the title, you might wonder whether I might be trying to use reason to rationalize a prior conclusion. Am I trying to contort "truth" to fit with my convictions? Am I interested in facing reality, even if it contradicts my desires or existing framework? Am I willing to be wrong? If you have these questions, this book is especially for you. I want you to ask these questions. They are the mark of an explorer. They are the questions that sparked my own journey, which ultimately led me to write this book.

I want this book to serve you no matter what perspective you come from. My purpose is not to knock you over with arguments or to suggest that you can only be rational if you agree with my viewpoint. Instead, I want to share with you some of the steps in my own journey in the hope that those steps may encourage you in yours.

My reason for writing this book is to mark out a pathway, step by step, that can inspire a greater vision of the ultimate foundation of everything.

I begin with a story of my own journey. Then I begin the project of constructing a bridge of reason for your examination and exploration.

In the final chapters, I examine common questions about evil and suffering that can present obstacles to the destination.

While our inquiry will reach to the deepest layer of reality, I aim to make this book as readable as I can. Thus, I seek to replace all technical jargon with commonsense definitions in ordinary language. I never rest an argument on scholarly authority. Instead, I use the instruments of reason and common experience to serve you in your quest.

In my effort to maximize the value of this bridge, I follow three construction rules:

- Rule 1. Make it inclusive: use materials—reason and experience—that are accessible to a wide audience, so you can check each piece.
- Rule 2. No guessing: build each part on principles that you can see to be true.
- Rule 3. Aim to serve: make a bridge that you can make your own—to analyze, reorganize, and build upon further.

Enjoy the journey. <>

DIVINE ACTION AND THE HUMAN MIND by Sarah Lane Ritchie [Current Issues in Theology, Cambridge University Press, 9781108476515]

Is the human mind uniquely nonphysical or even spiritual, such that divine intentions can meet physical realities? As scholars in science and religion have spent decades attempting to identify a 'causal joint' between God and the natural world, human consciousness has been often privileged as just such a locus of divine-human interaction. However, this intuitively dualistic move is both out of step with contemporary science and theologically insufficient. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind. Sarah Lane Ritchie suggests that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God's active presence, one may affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world.

The Theological Turn and Theistic Naturalism

One aim of this book is to critique the causal joint thesis that locates divine action in the nonphysical mind. This deflationary aim challenges not only the standard causal joint model but also the theological tendency to affirm the mind as nonphysical or somehow "more than" the body. I would even suggest that it is as least possible for physicalist explanations for the mind to be theologically affirmed. However, achieving this goal is dependent on a more constructive argument involving what I call the "theological turn" in science and religion. The theological turn, as I will define it, can be taken to indicate the trend in divine action theology that eschews causal joint models altogether, instead reframing divine action and, indeed, nature, in theological, metaphysical frameworks. As will become clear, representatives of the theological turn argue that only by questioning the metaphysical assumptions undergirding standard models of divine action can a theologically adequate model of divine action be developed. The reverse is also true: only by embracing a more theologically robust model of the God-nature relationship can standard causal joint models be rendered theologically unnecessary. In short, the theological turn (and, in particular, a robust theistic naturalism) may provide muchneeded alternatives to scientifically implausible and theologically insufficient causal joint models.

The theological turn in science and religion, and particularly in divine action theology, is perhaps best described as a reaction to the metaphysical assumptions implicit in standard noninterventionist, incompatibilist causal joint models. The standard causal joint approach presumes that nature is, by default, autonomous and self-sufficient apart from God's ongoing, active presence. Similarly, the laws of nature are generally treated as having prescriptive, ontological status, which in turn establishes the parameters within which divine action might lawfully occur. Within this presumption of autonomy, divine action from the "outside," as it were, is almost inevitably viewed as aberrant and in need of justification: "It is as if for God to act in the world, something in the world has to move over to make room for God to act."38 It is almost as if God and natural processes are competing with each other, and God is only able to act within specific undetermined natural processes. The clear assumption in the standard causal joint model is that the sciences are the final arbiters not only of what is true about nature but also of what God can do in nature. This common assumption in science and religion has led to all the various ways that scholars have sought to harmonise theological affirmations with scientific knowledge; the expectation is that one must not "question the `science' side of the conversation, and in particular, one not ruin the party by calling into question the governing naturalistic assumptions of science."39 For their part, of course, causal joint theorists would argue that they are merely attempting to take

scientific knowledge seriously and to recognise empirical knowledge as God given and to be respected when one develops, say, a theory of divine action. After all, seeking traction on such issues as divine action would seem to be the raison d'être of the science-and-religion field, and "to argue that God works against the laws of nature, or suspends them temporarily, would make the concept of God inconsistent." Asserting that God acts in a way that seems at odds with the laws of nature, then, would seem to undermine much of what the field is about. Causal joint theorists would thus assert that they are acting in good faith when they require divine action to conform to scientific knowledge. A more generous assessment would be that causal joint theorists are trusting that scientific knowledge is from God; therefore, divine action must not contradict what has been revealed by the "book of nature."

It is evident that standard divine action theorists attempt to affirm SDA and scientific knowledge at the same time; philosopher Taede Smedes asserts that "contrary to what we might expect, the context in which the contemporary dialogue takes place is very much determined by scientistic presuppositions."" It is perhaps ironic, then, that those in the theological turn dismiss these theories as both theologically insufficient and scientifically implausible. Indeed, the theological turn is marked by the assertion that causal joint theories are entirely wrongheaded, and that standard divine action theorists are seeking scientific answers to theological questions. In other words, the theological turn is just that movement within science and religion that seeks to recognise the boundaries of scientific knowledge and reframe both nature and divine action in explicitly theological terms. The theological turn challenges the notion that nature's default state is devoid of divine action, and its advocates would agree with theologian and philosopher Aubrey Moore that "a theory of occasional intervention implies as its correlative a theory of ordinary absence." While causal joint theorists debate interventionism and noninterventionism, both of these models presuppose the God-world model in which nature's norm excludes divine activity. The theological turn, then, urges a re-examination of nature, such that "the ontology of divine action determines the understanding of the laws of nature, rather than the other way around." The theological turn urges an approach to divine action in which both God's activity and the natural world are defined theologically, rather than scientifically - science cannot define the basic ontology of nature, nor can it define the basic God-nature relationship.

Among those in the theological turn who would critique the standard approach to divine action, some have begun to constructively and explicitly articulate theological models that purport to affirm both scientific knowledge and a robust account of divine action. I will call these theological models "theistic naturalisms," as they purport to give a fuller definition of the natural world than does scientistic naturalism as generally understood. It is important to note that theistic naturalism, as I will use it here, is not to be confused with more deistic forms of religious naturalism that render divine action as subjective experience of otherwise scientifically explainable processes. Rather, theistic naturalism is here taken to indicate a position that affirms the natural world as being always involved with an immanent, active God: to be natural is to participate in God's active presence. As Orthodox theologian Christopher C. Knight argues, the "naturalism" part of theistic naturalism works only if it is understood as being related to ontology (rather than an epistemology based on current scientific knowledge), which is "far more complex than the kind of picture favored by most who think of themselves as naturalists. ... What they call naturalism is ... in fact no more than subnaturalism." Indeed, "true naturalism must go well beyond what a subnaturalism of this kind is able to say... . Only in the context of what has been revealed to us by God can the universe in which we live be fully understood. Within theistic naturalism, broadly defined, nature can only be fully known when an account is given of the God-nature relationship - including, importantly, divine action. Within theistic naturalism, divine action is seen not as unnatural or unlawful, but as serving to make nature even more natural. It is apparent, then, that while theistic naturalism incorporates the whole of scientific knowledge into its ontological picture, it draws on specific theological frameworks to understand nature and God's action in nature.

While there are potentially a great many different versions of theistic naturalism, Part 2 will focus on three distinct theological versions of theistic naturalism, particularly as they relate to divine action in the mind. These three theological models involve Thomistic theistic naturalism (Chapter 7), panentheistic naturalism (Chapter 8), and pneumatological naturalism (Chapter 9), respectively. My goal is not to argue for one specific model of theistic naturalist divine action, but to demonstrate the strengths, weaknesses, and commonalities of these noncausal joint approaches to divine action in the mind. Namely, all three models reject the metaphysical premises on which the standard causal joint model is based, argue for a compatibilist (or at least not incompatibilist) account of divine action, and insist that physicality is utterly unthreatening to theology and divine action. In fact, by insisting that all physical realities are always and already involved with and participating in God, these theistic naturalisms are well poised to embrace naturalistic accounts of the human mind. Within these models, the physicality of the mind is not threatening, for the immanent God is fundamentally involved with all physical processes to begin with. Expounding upon this meaning of "involved" will be the major task of Part 2 of this project. While I will argue that theistic naturalisms do indeed face serious challenges (namely regarding their potential lack of real engagement with the natural sciences), I yet suggest that they represent a more promising direction for divine action theology than that offered by the dominant causal joint approach.

Outline and Methodology

This book is divided into two parts. The purpose of Part is to offer a sustained critique of the mind-based causal joint approach to divine action. To this end, Chapter 2 examines what I call the "standard" causal joint model, highlighting the metaphysical presuppositions underlying prominent divine action models, as well as the scientific implausibility of such models. Chapter 3 then examines Philip Clayton's emergent mind proposal, which uses emergence theory to locate and constrain divine action in the uniquely nonphysical human mind. Chapter 4 goes further into the philosophy of mind, examining and

critiquing the so-called Hard Problem of Consciousness, while Chapter 5 examines physicalist approaches to consciousness that, at the very least, offer alternatives to pessimistic conclusions about the mind's supposed inexplicability. Overall, Part argues that causal joint proposals privileging the mind are scientifically implausible, relying on unnecessary philosophical and theological assumptions about consciousness and the God-nature model, respectively. In other words, Part uses consciousness as a test case demonstrating the insufficiency of standard divine action models, arguing that the mind is neither uniquely nonphysical nor uniquely open to divine action.

In sum, Part 2 challenges Saunders' claim that contemporary theology (and, particularly, divine action theology) is in crisis. While the standard model of recent decades has been unsuccessful both theologically and scientifically, specific theological traditions offer rich resources with which to reframe divine action in an explicitly theological model. Such models do not require that the mind be more than physical to allow for divine-human interaction, for the physical is not unspiritual. By re-examining the concept of nature, science and religion is freed up to become audacious in its acceptance of physicality, exploring new ways to envision the participation of nature in God and God's interactions with created, physical beings. This theological embrace of physicality does not explain away or minimise divine action, but allows for a more robust account of divine action than that afforded by standard models of recent decades - within the mind and elsewhere.

While Part challenges Clayton's emergent mind proposal and the apparent necessity of a nonphysical mind more generally, Part 2 explores more constructive ways to think about divine action in the mind and elsewhere. I here argue that the naturalised mind need not be theologically threatening, nor uniquely nonphysical for one to affirm divine action in human consciousness: precisely because all nature is inherently involved with God's active presence, one can affirm God's activity in a far more expansive way than suggested by the standard model. Indeed, the mind may, after all, be a site of particularly intense divine action, but for very different reasons than those assumed by Clayton and other nonphysicalists - and not to the exclusion of divine action elsewhere in nature.

To this end, Chapter 6 introduces the complicated subject of naturalism, highlighting the various arguments surrounding naturalism, supernaturalism, physicalism, and the boundaries of science. This philosophical analysis sets the stage for Chapters 7-9, which move the discussion of naturalism into explicitly theological territory. These chapters form a three-part exploration of specific forms of theistic naturalism, identifying relative strengths, weaknesses, and commonalities. Chapter 7 discusses Thomistic divine action, suggesting that while it is essentially the "gold standard" of theistic naturalist divine action, its formulation of double agency is problematic. Chapter 8 highlights the panentheistic naturalism of Christopher C. Knight, which uses an Eastern Orthodox framework to emphasise both God's immanence and the possibility of divine action through atemporal laws of nature. Chapter 9 then engages with pneumatological naturalism, an approach insisting that nature is what it is by virtue of the Spirit's involvement in all nature at all times.

RELIGION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE by Gavin Flood [Oxford University Press, 9780198836124]

RELIGION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE considers how religion as the source of civilization transforms the fundamental bio-sociology of humans through language and the somatic exploration of religious ritual and prayer. Gavin Flood offers an integrative account of the nature of the human, based on what contemporary scientists tell us, especially evolutionary science and social neuroscience, as well as through the history of civilizations. Part one contemplates fundamental questions and assumptions: what the current state of knowledge is concerning life itself; what the philosophical issues are in that understanding; and how we can explain religion as the driving force of civilizations in the context of human development within an evolutionary perspective. It also addresses the question of the emergence of religion and presents a related study of sacrifice as fundamental to religions' views about life and its transformation. Part two offers a reading of religions in three civilizational blocks--India, China, and Europe/the Middle East--particularly as they came to formation in the medieval period. It traces the history of how these civilizations have thematised the idea of life itself. Part three then takes up the idea of a life force in part three and traces the theme of the philosophy of life through to modern times. On the one hand, the book presents a narrative account of life itself through the history of civilizations, and on the other presents an explanation of that narrative in terms of life.

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In William Golding's novel The Spire, the protagonist, the Dean Jocelyn, sets out to build the tallest spire of any cathedral hitherto constructed, but there are grave concerns that the foundations will not be deep enough, and the spire will topple. Jocelyn's vision for a new architecture in a new age and his aspiration at the edge of human imagination seems an appropriate image for current human aspiration for a better future realized through technology; we are living through a period of rapid change in understanding the nature of the human and in shaping the future in response to challenges from the environment, from new technology, from population density, and from global economic remodelling; and

all this set within the ongoing complexity of, as always, lamentable human politics. In this new context, there is a reshaping of the intellectual landscape with rapid progress in the hard sciences that to some extent is influencing the humanities, with scientists reflecting on their work in the light of humanistic concerns. While each has its distinct sphere of operation, there is a case for humanist disciplines themselves, including the social sciences, to move beyond what we might call the linguistic paradigm and social constructivism towards building models and accounts of the human based on knowledge gleaned from the hard sciences but read through the lens of humanism, in the broad sense, or the humanum. This is not to give way to any kind of hegemony of natural science over the humanities, but rather to use knowledge in the service of understanding (and we might even say in the service of phronesis).

With this background in mind, this book seeks both to address a problem and to tell a story. The problem is the relation of life to religion, or the explanation of religion as it has developed in the history of civilizations, within the framework of understanding life itself. This is a problem, first, because the nature of religion is much contested, with some scholars even questioning whether it is a viable category; and second, because the nature of life, its place in the universe, and whether we can even speak of life itself are much contested. There are many stakeholders in these debates from those who wish to make claims about a particular religious perspective and see value in religion, to those who wish to see the demise of religion as a human good on ethical and political grounds. This book addresses the issue of religion by offering an explanatory account grounded in the nature of the kind of beings that we are, in our biology and specifically in the idea of life itself, while at the same time recognizing complexity and the necessity of a humanistic account. The story the book tells is the way life itself has been conceptualized and understood in the history of religions and the philosophies of life that have driven civilizations. The double nature of this project is intimately connected, as `explanation' shows us that human beings have an innate pro-sociality that can be traced deep into our hominin past, while the `narrative' of religions shows us that human beings have developed institutions and forms of inwardness that support human pro-sociality. I present a combination of explanation and narrative because of the necessary acceptance of the complexity of human reality and of life itself, and as such this work is not an eliminative reductionism. Philosophies of life have developed within civilizations to account for such complexity, in particular advancing the theme of life itself as the foundation of human reality.

The book considers how religion as the source of civilization transforms human bio-sociology through language and through the somatic exploration of ritual, meditation, and prayer. After outlining an account of current ideas about the theory of life (biology) and the philosophy of life, the book goes on to present a narrative of the ways in which life itself has been understood in the histories of three civilizational blocks—India, China, and Europe/the Middle East—particularly as they came to formation in the medieval period. It then develops the story into secular philosophy up to the present, integrating this with an argument for the explanation of religion in terms of life itself, rooted in the bio-sociology of human life: an integration of classical, religious worldviews with modern natural science. This is important because religions remain central to human life in much of the world and have been the creative resources for civilizations, as well as destructive powers that have threatened the human future.

Writing this book has necessitated that I venture into areas where I have relied entirely on the scholarship of others—such as Chinese civilization—but in all of these fields, I have presented a narrative and offered description in the service of my argument about life itself as the wellspring and resource for these histories. While I regard this project as a humanistic account of religion and its place

in human life, I wish to absorb what current science tells us about the world and what current knowledge shows us about ourselves. Such an account accepts the integrity and relevance of personal and interpersonal understandings of meaning as well as impersonal or third-person explanations of reality. As such, some may regard it as too conciliatory to religious understandings of person and world, while for others it may be regarded as too conciliatory to scientific accounts, thereby missing the importance of theological understanding. But I regard this position to be a strength, as understanding the meanings of human life must continue to absorb current knowledge, while still operating within a humanistic discourse. The existential primacy of human freedom as one frame for understanding life itself needs to be integrated with the frame provided by the sciences: life in the singular seen in two ways. Such a view is not antithetical to theology, although the theologies of religions will need to absorb current knowledge of person and world if they are to remain relevant. Indeed, although not my task, this is imperative in order to avoid destructive fundamentalisms (both religious and secular) that denude human life.

The opening quotations reflect the assertion of life, as articulated by Blake, that must be balanced by the reality of death, as articulated in the responsory of John Sheppard. That life entails death and vice versa is a startlingly simple truth that must always govern what we say about life itself.

At one level, the book presents a methodological agnosticism regarding the referents of the traditions it discusses, the gods and supernatural forces of the religions, while at another level it implicitly takes the view that the contemporary sciences offer descriptions of the universe more adequate to the data. Furthermore, the book wishes to develop a kind of abductive argument concerning life itself as the animating force of civilizations. We know more now about the universe we live in than our ancestors, but perhaps we don't know much more than they about how to conduct our lives, and, as they have always been, the metaphysical structures we inhabit are tenuous and subject to revision.

This book therefore offers an interdisciplinary link between religion, science, and philosophy. It is intended to speak to a number of audiences: to those within the religion and science debate, including theologians; to those in the study of religions, including scholars involved in the comparative history of traditions; and to philosophers and intellectual historians of life. This is a broad range of people and I hope that those involved in these disciplines will find some contribution to debate in the book's pages. At the end of the day, we are creatures orientated towards a future that always exceeds us, constrained by the limitations of time and place, while, like Jocelyn's spire, defying gravity.

Philosophical Implications

The general thesis that religions are the transformation of the bio-energy of face-to-face social cognition is, as we have seen, an empirical/historical claim about bio-sociology, but also a philosophical claim insofar as we can begin to articulate its implications for the way we understand the human; there is an implicit philosophy of humanity here which is also a philosophy of life. The data of social cognition and its transformation in religion implies a realist ontology that we can understand in terms of a non-dualist vitalism. The idea that religions function to provide social bonding is, of course, close to Durkheim, but differs from Durkheim in drawing the claim from recent scientific knowledge of social cognition and wishing to emphasize not only sociology and the group function of religion but also phenomenology and the individual experience of religion. Similarly, the position is close to Luhmann insofar as religions can be seen as autopoietic communication systems that are self-regulating and rooted in human biology, but

again wishing to bring religion back from a purely systems theory approach to an emphasis on the person (Luhmann's `psychic systems') and the second-person relationality thereby entailed. We must necessarily bring explanation into the realm of phenomenology, but a hermeneutical phenomenology that recognizes the particularity of location in space and time and the particularity of the interpersonal.

There is then a symbiosis between religion as system, as a higher-level communication-generating and bonding process, and religion as personal experience, although always historical, that enacts or performs the practice of religion, transforming bio-energy into action. Because of the necessity of historical location, the need to begin the study of religion with the historical as Heidegger insightfully observed, experience is always necessarily interpreted.

If the face-to-face encounter is the primary human experience biologically rooted in mother-child connection, then this is always mediated through language (as Ricoeur teaches us) and through the mechanism of the higherorder system (such as religion). There are a number of philosophical implications here, perhaps first the phenomenological and post-phenomenological understanding that we are embodied, both mind and body in world (as many philosophers and cultural theorists have now emphasized, particularly Merleau-Ponty, Streets-Johnson, Varela, and Csordas). Second, in an embodied understanding of religion, language is central as the medium of communication, particularly the mechanism of identification between person and system. Third, religion as the transformation of bio-energy entails a realism and a materialism that articulates with contemporary science but that maintains continuities with the cultural philosophies. Religion as social cognition is in sympathy with new realist philosophies now emerging and re-establishes seeing religion in terms of process, in terms of life itself, and in terms of human transformation. I need to say something about them here.

(1) That mind and body are integrated within a single system or person is widely, although not universally, accepted in philosophy and neurobiology. The structure of human neurobiology is reflected in consciousness and consciousness reflected in our neurobiology. This is hardly surprising but important insofar as the integration of mind and body in relation to religion points to the importance of practice; that action affects mind or rather action and cognition form an inseparable unity. In his later thoughts Husserl recognized the importance of the lifeworld that consciousness was part of, but that could reflexively stand outside and inquire into its origins. The possibility of such true distanciation was questioned by later phenomenologists, particularly Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, although even their thinking has come under critical scrutiny for remaining theoretical and not pragmatic enough in their understanding because reflection, for Varela and his colleagues, is itself experience. This view is in consonance with Deleuze's field of immanence previously discussed, where each particularity, being integrated into a system, speaks with a single voice, a univocity. Within this cluster of philosophical views—integrationist and immanentist philosophies of life—there is generally a strong non-dualist claim about the integration of consciousness and neurobiology as embodied act. This is important for understanding religion as primarily focused on practice that is considered transformative of person and community. Through liturgical movement, through prayer, fasting, and meditation, through pilgrimage, and through social action people enact religion and integrate themselves into religion as system.

(2) Second, in the integration of embodied person into system—another way of putting this would be the appropriation of system by person—language forms a crucial dimension. Through language the integrated mind-body system establishes a deep connection to tradition. Language is shared by everyone: it is an objective system (langue) that is also my own (parole), as the Structuralists long ago observed.

One of the important ways to understand this is through pragmatics, the inquiry of the ways in which language functions in the world. Of particular importance is indexicality and the way the first-person pronoun brings with it the identification of person with tradition, which is crucial to identity formation. Urban has convincingly argued for the importance of the 'indexical-I', the first-person pronoun used by all human beings, that in different social circumstances comes to be identified with the `I of discourse', the `I' implicit within text or tradition. In Urban's account there is a spectrum of use of the first person from ordinary indexicality indicating, for example, desire (`I want that') to possession by a god in which indexicality is overwhelmed by another presence, by another `I'.49 Between the indexical-I and possession are various degrees of identification of the first person with the I of discourse, thus we have theatre in which the indexical-I is partially subsumed by the I of discourse (the actor takes on the role) or poetry in which the indexical-I identifies with the poem. In one sense we are seldom ourselves, much of the time being identified with an I of discourse. This is important because it shows the mechanism whereby identities are formed. Strong identification of the I with tradition can lead to a person, perhaps, undertaking roles that they would not in other circumstances. The overwhelming of the indexical-I by a narrative of martyrdom might lead someone to become a suicide bomber, for example.

(3) The orientation presented here thirdly implies a realism and philosophical materialism that is not positivism but nevertheless takes seriously materiality and responds to cultural philosophies of postmodernity of a previous generation. The realism of understanding religion in terms of social cognition is not a crude materialism. Rather, it implies that the bio-energy of life itself is articulated through human social cognition. This is a position that seeks to meet religion and explain religion on its own level through maintaining that this understanding cannot be reduced to biology, but neither can it be reduced to consciousness. The true understanding of religion lies in this realm of embodied cognition that exceeds both genetics and consciousness because it operates at a higher level of system. The bio-energy of life is a force that cannot be explained purely biologically, but nor can it be accounted for in consciousness because it clearly exceeds it. Religion as the transformation of bio-energy entails a new mode of explanation that draws on both the natural and human sciences. Indeed, there could even be theologies of embodied action that assume the transformation of bio-energy that we are discussing. We might say religion is a way that life thinks itself, a reflection not restricted to consciousness but articulated through action and practice in a process that is open because enacted through time. Terry Pinkard makes a point from Hegel, that religions are forms of self-reflection through symbols and stories, through which, for Hegel, the spirit knows itself as spirit. The form that religious reflection takes, its representation (Vorstellung), which includes religious practice, is a way of moving `individual agents out of their natural, egoistic state (their merely personal point of view) into a communal state in which they accept reasons, obligations and proscriptions that for them place objective limits on belief and action'. In modernity this, for Hegel, is a move from the `unhappy consciousness' of the pre-modern world that has lost faith in itself to the modern secularity of a religion of morality, an insight that reflects the shift to a regnant disenchantment in the modern North Atlantic, along with the possibility of a transformed sociality in the future. If religions contain closed eschatologies (and arguably they do), then understanding religion as the articulation of life itself entails a challenge to traditional religions in implying an open eschatological explanation of religion. An infinitely open universe, as contemporary physics claims, requires an infinitely open notion of life that can account for the eschatological structures that have transformed that bio-energy of life and that have been necessary structures in the development of the human experiment.

In sum, to return to our opening question of how we can account for the persistence of religion, we can say that religions are still forms of life that give meaning to human communities and provide ways of living and dying. They form and influence life in the unrepeatable nature of the ethical act—they constrain people's choices—and in the non-identical repetition of the ritual act—they lay claim to the social space enacted in repeated acts of worship and meditation. That the churches are emptying in much of northern Europe does not indicate the demise of religion; indeed analogous forms of culture will inevitably develop that lay claim to the face-to-face and attempt to control social cognition. Of course, other societal patterns can do this—even secular practices of socialization such as sport or the shared experience of plastic art or music—but only religions are cultural forms with historical depth and semantic density that to date have successfully negotiated and developed the primacy of the human encounter. It seems to be the case that other forms of cultural life are developing in which people choose different aspects of religion to engage with and people might participate in more than one religion in the modern world.53 If religions are central to human communities because they stem from life itself and reflexively control social cognition, then religious studies as a critical discipline is crucial for understanding these cultural forms, both in terms of cognition and the processes in the brain that accompany religious activity, and in terms of cultural production and the representation of communities and people.

Modernity and the Life of Holiness

I have told a long story about the category of life itself, of the human desire for life, of human longing, of the need for repair, and of how civilizations have sought to address this need through the religions that have driven them and the philosophies that have guided them. The endpoint we have arrived at, although not the end of the story, is an ending in which life itself articulated through civilizations can be understood in terms of repair that can be envisaged as a kind of holiness of life, a bringing of human reality into an intensity of life, and a repairing of shattered communication. This intensity is human integration of life itself into modes of culture at the level of linguistic consciousness. We might say that civilization and the religion that drives it have bridged the evolutionary gap between a pre-linguistic mode of being human and the linguistic one facilitated through the neo-cortex articulated in the structures of civilization. Reflecting this distinction, I have attempted to integrate two modern accounts of human life into a coherence: on the one hand, a tradition of humanist, particularly philological, scholarship on traditions within the broad parameters of Indic, Chinese, and European/Middle Eastern civilizations, and on the other, a tradition of scientific, particularly evolutionary discourse about human life. It seems to me that we need both humanism and science to offer descriptions adequate to the complexity of life in human history and the ways in which civilizations have attempted to repair the human condition. These are distinct modes of description within which to frame both the constraints on human reality along with its freedom. Throughout this story we have seen how the human desire for life has been commonly recognized as a deep human trait and how this desire is transposed as a longing for completion, fulfilment, or even redemption. The religions directly address this desire that is related to a desire for meaning in life. But what are we to do once religions are no more? What cultural forms address the desire for life and the need for repair? What is the human future without religions?

It seems to be certain that in what Charles Taylor has called the North Atlantic region, traditional religions, particularly Christianity, are in rapid decline and the churches are emptying.' This is not the case, however, outside of this world in Asia, South America, and Africa where Christianity and Islam in particular are growing. Nor must we forget the individualistic spirituality in the North Atlantic world

developing in the wake of Christianity's decline.' I have argued in this book that civilizations have sought repair of the human through the great edifices of religion and have claimed that an important explanation of this is rooted in our evolutionary history and human niche construction. Civilizations have developed as a kind of niche for the protection not so much of the genotype as the phenotype as the driver of evolutionary change. The linguistic creatures that we are, allowed by the development of the language-bearing neocortex, has been at odds with the deeper and older social cognition that takes us more immediately into life. The repair that civilizations seek is also to address the desire for life itself and to bring linguistic consciousness into harmony with social cognition. Once religions cease, there is nevertheless still the need for repair and human fulfilment, the human longing for meaning and place. In a thought-provoking book Marcel Gauchet sees religion in terms of a negation of an established order that has allowed freedom to critique the political and has developed a strong notion of the individual. But even for him, 'the religious after religion' will still have a place within human subjectivity where it functions to provide meaning in the face of the discontinuity of religion's social function. This will be 'a major source for cultural innovation'.3 But it is not clear how the post-religion world will address deeper questions of human meaning and belonging; the human desire for life in the face of death that erases any trace of our presence. The life of holiness that all religions have conceptualized in some form as something to be cultivated will remain, although traditional lives of holiness will be lived through individual choice in the secularized world rather than as an institutionalized goal.

The question of life itself in relation to the living along with the human desire for life has shifted in modernity from the imaginal realm of mediation between human and divine fostered in religions, in the Religious Cosmic Model (RCM), to a contraction of imagination or rather a re-configuring of the imaginal through technology, and a dominance of 'the screen' as a primary mode of human interaction with the world and fellow humans (in the Galilean Mathematical Model (GMM)). The contemporary, disenchanted citizen of the globe is a buffered self that has largely replaced the cosmological, porous self of pre-modernity.' Certainly rapid developments in technological innovation have led some thinkers to envisage a post-human future encapsulated by one of the founders of this ideal, Donna Haraway's concept of the human as cyborg in which the organic and the mechanistic are fused,' and in a condition almost in which questions of meaning are redundant. This vision of the future is itself a proposal for human self-repair. More immediately and more practically, developments in science raise questions about human meaning through new possibilities in biomedicine. Helga Nowotny raises important questions about reinventing the human in the molecular age and about human value in relation to bioethical questions. In contemporary research, life has a 'new visibility' through molecular biology that allows interventions into life processes, such as cloning or the transfer of cell nuclei, which would not have been possible, or thinkable, in the past. In the new world of the molecular, old distinctions between knowledge and application, science and technology, are outdated: `Under the hegemony of the molecular glance, knowledge has become action. Today the fact is that understanding life means changing life.

It is possible, thinks Nowotny, that we stand on the brink 'of an epochal rupture in the history of humankind" in that the rapid developments in assisted reproductive technologies mean that for the first time humans have control over their future genetic inheritance, and drugs are developed to increase happiness and achievement, from cognitive enhancers such as Modafinil and Ritalin to modifiers of somatic states such as Viagra and Prozac. These developments that offer a biochemical route to a better life are parallel in many ways to the goal of human self-repair. Perhaps with the demise of traditional

religions in the secularized North Atlantic, new technologies (other than prayer, fasting, and liturgy) seek to enhance life and to bring us into deeper contact with life. The distinction between vitalism and mechanism breaks down in the molecular age. These new technologies challenge traditional religions' solutions to the need for self-repair through re-conceptualizing what a person is and through new imaginings of the universe at a molecular level. The universe that science took over from the cosmos of religion, beginning in the seventeenth century, has now reached a point of modelling reality and changing reality in radically new ways that undermine old certainties and dualities (such as culture vs. nature, male vs. female, human vs. animal). Bioethical discourse has become a political process that `undermines the cultural plausibility of the code of meaning that religions can offer'.9 The emergent new meanings generated by new research inform a public that in a globalizing world people can become citizens who imagine life in new ways and whose desire for life is transformed into specific wants for life enhancement. New technology allows us to be `somatic individuals" in a world in which traditional eschatologies have been abandoned by the educated elites and freedom of choice—and choices that are not trivial but potentially significant in life enhancement—is privileged over conformity to normative, religious regulation.

Nikolas Rose has called the contemporary potential for transformation of the human condition `ethopolitics', 'the self-techniques by which human beings should judge and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they are'." That is, ethopolitics aspires to human self-repair perhaps as the latest development in civilization to address this need. Although traditional religions may pass away—and religion itself could be a purely historical phenomenon with a beginning and an end, as Gauchet thinks—then there still remains the need to address the question of satisfying the desire for life or healing the broken consciousness of human lives. Ethopolitics has developed to address these questions of the meaning of life, and coalesces around a new vitalism that sees value in life itself. Rose expresses the issue quite well when he writes:

> While ethopolitical concerns range from those of life-style to community, they coalesce around a kind of vitalism, disputes over the value accorded to life itself: `quality of life,' `the right to life,' or 'the right to choose,' euthanasia, gene therapy, human cloning and the like. This biological ethopolitics—the politics of how we should conduct ourselves appropriately in relation to ourselves, and in our responsibilities for the future—forms the milieu within which novel forms of authority are taking shape.

These novel forms of authority are not the traditional authority of religions but experts in various scientific technologies and a range of `somatic experts' keen to offer advice on living life to the full. Developments in expertise that has been emerging over the last half-century in the West are sometimes linked to new forms of religion and spirituality, such as what Paul Heelas has called 'the self-religions' and the New Age focus on self-actualization," in which the orientation is to the individual over the collective, to ease of life over ascetic striving, to experience over conceptualization.

Such new forms of authority, de-centred and individualistic, assume a new kind of political order and perhaps an emergent global community or global civilization that is probably moving forward inexorably, in spite of counter-globalization forces and a politics of retrenchment that is a worldwide phenomenon at the time of writing. If we can analyse political orders into ideal types, then we might argue that there are two axes or lines of demarcation along which political systems can be plotted. A horizontal axis of political power or political system that denotes the degree of the centralization of power such that there could be strong or weak centralization, and a vertical axis of the law or legislative system that

denotes the degree and strength of legislation. There is sometimes conflict or tension between the two axes of power. Thus, according to such a grid, where there is a system of strong centralization and strong legislature we might call an autocracy—or a theocracy—in contrast to a system of weak or no centralization and weak legislature that is really an anarchy. Peter Kropotkin's optimistic view of human nature saw this eradication of the state and of law to be the ideal utopian community, whereas in reality we have dysfunctional states where the law of the strongest rules. Strong centralization and weak legislature likewise results in a somewhat dysfunctional state as centralized power, as in a tyrant or dictator, is not regulated or controlled by law. The opposite here would be a strong legislature combined with weak centralization in which power is distributed across a field of local networks. This is democracy in varying degrees.

It seems to me that weak centralization along with a fairly robust legislature is conducive to pluralism and the kind of de-centralized authority that Rose implies. The emergent global civilization would need strong legislation to regulate excesses of free market capitalism, but would also need to be de-centralized to allow power for local communities to make decisions about cultural values and ways of living. Such a system might augur contraction of the importance of the nation state and a re-affirmation of the importance of the city, as Aristotle thought. In terms of the theme of life itself and the repair of human life, it could be that weak centralization and strong legislation allow for human enhancement within a legal framework that protects human rights. Problems emerge, of course, over who decides the legislation within a particular state and what controls the legislation. In the realm of biotechnology, religious constraints are clearly an important issue and religions are important stakeholders in the formation of legislation that affects people's lives, from legislature about stem cell research to abortion laws.

Living a life of holiness to facilitate human repair within this context is a challenge for those committed to particular religious views, but the broader idea that human beings seek self-repair through the structures that have developed to nurture their communities is salient. Religions are systems that unify, yet they are exclusive; but the social cognition system that religions access is universally inclusive. Indeed, I have made a case for seeing civilizations as human niche constructions for human self-repair that have evolved from our biology, but that exceed that biology. The affirmation of life as more than simply survival, or even as more than simply pleasure, has been a constant struggle through history, and we have seen how this struggle has played out in the histories of three civilizations and has also been articulated in secular philosophies of life. Religions as the drivers of civilizations in earlier eras have offered philosophies of life to articulate and even explain human alienation and prescribe practices of life to offer repair and cultivate holiness. The holiness of life that religions have developed, while being specific to each, shares a sense of compassion and openness to future possibility. While religions, as we have seen, are not all the same, they do share ways of addressing the desire for life and bringing people into the fullness of life which, I have argued, is partly explained through the integration of our linguistic apparatus with social cognition. The Dalai Lama and the Pope are revered by their followers as holy men, and exemplify modes of existence whereby the universality of their philosophies of life comes to articulation in the specificity of their action. Both have completely different understandings of the cosmos, but both share a common vision of humanity as having a potential fullness of life that militates against destruction. It is not an issue of particular persons—whether the Pope or the Dalai Lama really are exemplars of true holiness—but rather a structural claim that religions at their best function to intensify life. At their worst they destroy life and contract human reality to a shadow of what it could be.

The holiness of life is, I think, what Derrida meant by the politics of love that I referred to earlier, as a necessity for modern civilization and a necessary condition for any far distant future in which self-repair is achieved as 'A condition of complete simplicity', where 'all shall be well and / All manner of things shall be well', 'with the drawing of the Love and the voice of this calling'. <>

THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO ARENDT edited by Peter Grattan and Yasemin Sari [Bloomsbury Companions, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350053298]

Hannah Arendt's (1906-1975) writings, both in public magazines and in her important books, are still widely studied today. She made original contributions in political thinking that still astound readers and critics alike. The subject of several films and numerous books, colloquia, and newspaper articles, Arendt remains a touchstone in innumerable debates about the use of violence in politics, the responsibility one has under dictatorships and totalitarianism, and how to combat the repetition of the horrors of the past.

THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO ARENDT offers the definitive guide to her writings and ideas, her influences and commentators, as well as the reasons for her lasting significance, with 66 original essays taking up in accessible terms the myriad ways in which one can take up her work and her continuing importance. These essays, written by an international set of her best readers and commentators, provides a comprehensive coverage of her life and the contexts in which her works were written. Special sections take up chapters on each of her key writings, the reception of her work, and key ways she interpreted those who influenced her. If one has come to Arendt from one of her essays on freedom, or from yet another bombastic account of her writings on Adolph Eichmann, or as as student or professor working in the field of Arendt studies, this book provides the ideal tool for thinking with and rediscovering one of the most important intellectuals of the past century. But just as importantly, contributors advance the study of Arendt into neglected areas, such as on science and ecology, to demonstrate her importance not just to debates in which she was well known, but those touched off only after her death. Arendt's approaches as well as her concrete claims about the political have much to offer given the current ecological and refugee crises, among others. In sum, then, the Companion provides a tool for thinking with Arendt, but also for showing just where those thinking with her can take her work today.

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This book brings together some of the most significant thinkers writing today, all of whom are also specialists on Arendt. This book is not just an introduction to Arendt—though that it accomplishes—but it pushes Arendt's work in new directions, such as considerations of climate change, science, feminism, and more, all while our writers remain eminently readable and engaging. We take up Arendt's writings in three sections: first by looking at those who influenced her writings and how she read them, often changing how we read canonical authors; second by introducing each of her major books and how they can be reread today; and lastly by taking on the major topics and themes raised by Arendt's voluminous writings. But let us break from the tedious pro forma academic introduction—the Table of Contents has told you what to expect before you got here—and get to the point: we put together this book because Arendt remains a vital and relevant thinker with whom we often agree and argue, but all in an era we could undoubtedly call, following the title of one of her books, "dark times."

The present is always said to be one of crisis—Arendt herself lived through the Holocaust and the calamities of the Cold War—but there is little doubt that we are continuing the loss of the common world to which Arendt bore witness. Such a loss was already diagnosed by her in her considerations of the role of factual truths in relation to how we form opinions. Politics, for her, never had any grounding in an eternal truth, and in fact, the most fearsome political regimes are those that want to take away the ability of each of us to persuade others with our opinions in order that we hold to some truth of history, of some race, or what have you. A so-called "post-truth" era, then, only testifies to her prescient analyses of the ability of politics to make malleable what can in fact ground our common world.

Politics always occurs between two kinds of power: in the first, might is right and to the victors go the spoils, including the writing of history. Politics is performative in this respect: no God handed down

borders for territories, and the truth is that power does create its own conditions on the ground. But politics is also about power in Arendt's sense: words and deeds that persuade others to one's side. Arendt's view is that politics cannot be about truth, whether we mean one view of history or a vision of how things should be, since politics is about this trading of opinions or it will fall into violence.

Hence, we don't live in a post-truth politics. The politics of right-wing nationalists across the globe very much believe in truths to which politics should adhere: market forces being the natural order of the world, while there are just inherent truths about who is of this nation and who is not. The danger is not a politics without truth but one with a clear adherence to a set of them. Facts, yes, are stubborn things, Arendt held, but to engage in politics is to give oneself over to the come-what-may of the promise of the new, of what has not come before, and is as foreign to the idea of politics being about making something great "again" as it is about a shared sameness enforced by the ugliest forms of violence all-too-visible to us in these dark times.

This is why Arendt, some forty years after her death and despite being a writer of her time, has never been so quoted and commented upon in the contemporary media. But the parts of Arendt used are often moralizing handwaving about totalitarianism and its dangers, not the promise of politics described earlier. Arendt, as you will see, was a thinker of distinctions, and what we face today is not a repeat of the past but something new and, as political, previously unprecedented. We need to reread Arendt and use the tools she gave us to think this new world in which find ourselves, but to simply repeat her, to misapply her key terms (authority, violence, and most of all totalitarianism) is to do an injustice to the horrors of those who faced the holes of oblivion Nazism attempted to create, for example, and to presume history, and therefore politics, is merely a repeat of the past.

The future, when it arrives, is never a priori good, as previous generations of utopians believed, and the task of politics is not merely to catalogue facts and truths, as too many trite movies about journalists winning the day suggest. Every day, facts are reported, but the work of politics comes in activities—words and deeds—that little by little can build another world; without that, we are indeed lost and without hope. Politics is not about nostalgia for a past that never was, or a truth that must be brought into the world, but the very play of differences among and between us as we bicker, cajole, banter, and get infuriated in everyday forms of democratic activism. Those who want a politics of truth want us to be rid of this democratic messiness, which is a dream as old as Plato; and yet as long as human beings in the plural exist, there is no wishing such a politics away. Men, not a man, as Arendt would often say in the gendered language of her day, is what makes a world. Such, in any event, is the promise of politics for Arendt—a promise that some days appears as a dim, if not dim-witted, hope, but is ever possible given the human conditions of what Arendt called natality and our ability always to begin anew. As she puts it in On Revolution, one of her most important writings:

> For political thought can only follow the articulations of the political phenomena themselves, it remains bound to what appears in the domain of human affairs; and these appearances, in contradistinction to physical matters, need speech and articulation, that is, something which transcends mere physical visibility as well as sheer audibility, in order to be manifest at all.

To be sure, the authors in the volume take up the responsibility to articulate and understand better the political phenomena of our times, and in an effort to go beyond the "mere physical visibility" and the "sheer audibility" of such occurrences, this book makes a case for the relevance of Arendt's thought, and to take up what we may call her invitation for a worldly care in thinking.

That is what these chapters consider, all in their different ways. Cogent and up to the moment we face (the weaponization of political lies, the rise of white nationalism, and so on), these chapters make clear Arendt's relevance for not falling for the easy view that politics comes with a pre-given truth or, failing that, we are simply done for. Indeed, she was often clear of the courage and virtues needed to enter politics. This was not some nostalgia for Hellenic values, as some have claimed, but is what is needed politically today and every day.

Given the rise of social media, politics can often appear as mere social posturing, but to enter into the realm of the political is to face down damning criticism on all sides, and this is not new; it was ever thus. The stakes are high: our whole humanity is put in question whenever we enter politics, or just think, which Arendt deemed a most treacherous activity on its own since we are often forced to give up even our most precious preconceived notions. Anything else invites what Arendt feared most—political quietism—a retreat into our homes or private spaces as other people take command. And history, if it has shown anything, demonstrates that this is always a real possibility. Hence Arendt argues that we must act in words and deeds against the barbarity of a dark time in which populism is equaled with nationalistic jingoism hearkening back to a time that never was. If we are to have anything but a technocratic order or defer to a small set of rulers, we must practice our freedom and recover shared spaces where our words and deeds can matter—in short, where we can share a love of the world with one another.

Hannah Arendt's lifetime (1906-75) was marked by some of the most consequential moments in the twentieth century. Hers was an engaged life, and she wrote in response not just to horrors of the world wars but also of promising events such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the civil rights movement in the United States. Born Johanna (Hannah) Arendt in Hannover, East Prussia, into an old Jewish family from Konigsberg, Arendt was raised as a largely secular Jew, though this did not always protect her from the virulent anti-Semitism of her classmates, just as it wouldn't protect her and her family with the rise of the Third Reich in the 1930s. In 1922-3, Arendt began studying classics and Christian theology at the University of Berlin, moving to Marburg University in 1924, where she took up philosophy with Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). She would soon begin a romantic relationship with him, one that would reach its high mark during the period when Heidegger wrote his famous work, Being and Time, but which has become a focus of endless, even lurid, fascination for many of her biographers and commentators. She continued contact with Heidegger even after beginning her studies at the University of Heidelberg for a doctorate with Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), under whom she wrote a dissertation on love in the writings of St. Augustine, obtaining her doctorate in 1928. Her friendship with Heidegger—before moving to Berlin in 1929, she would drop anything to go see him upon his invitation—broke off in 1933, just as she left Germany for Paris due to the rise of the Nazis to power, but also as Heidegger joined the Nazi Party. His last letter to her in 1933 protested that rumors of his anti-Semitism were untrue (they weren't), but this apparently reached deaf ears, since she would not have contact with him again until after the Second World War. Her friendship with Jaspers, however, was continuous, when not disrupted by mail stoppages during the war, and she engaged in their correspondence about matters both personal and deeply philosophical: the nature of philosophical dialogue, the kind of evil represented by the Third Reich, the kind of consequences that should face those who took part in the regime and what counts as political action.

Having completed her doctorate, in 1929, she moved from Heidelberg to Berlin, published her doctoral thesis, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin, and then met and married the philosopher Gunther Stern, with whom she fell in love. In Berlin, she began work on a biography of Rahel Varnhagen (1771-1833), a Jewish writer and well-known Berlin salon host. She completed most of this biography by 1933, when the German political situation intervened. (The biography would be completed in 1957.) In the months after the Reichstag fire and Hitler's appointment as chancellor, Arendt first became politically active. Her apartment would become something of a stop on an underground railroad for Jews and Communists under threat of ending up in the hands of the Gestapo and looking for a way out of the country. Stern was one of those who faced getting caught up in the mass illegal arrests after the Reichstag fire, and he escaped for Paris, leaving Arendt, for the moment, behind. This would be a turning point for Arendt. As she later told Gunther Gauss in a 1964 television interview, so many "ended up in the cellars of the Gestapo or in concentration camps. That was such a shock to me. Ever after I felt responsible," she said, "I no longer felt I could be an observer."

While still in Berlin, Arendt quietly carried out research for Kurt Blumenfeld, secretary general of the Zionist Federation of Germany, detailing the anti-Semitic documents of various German business and civic groups rushing to parrot the new regime's propaganda about World Jewry. Her work was not clandestine enough: she was held under interrogation for eight days (she told the police only a parade of lies about her work and the various Jewish groups with which she was in contact), and not long after, along with her mother, she fled without travel documents to Prague (whose Jewish population ballooned as it was a stopping point for those escaping persecution), then Geneva, and then to Paris, where she would live as a stateless refugee for the remainder of the decade.

Arendt, whose relationship to Zionism would always be complicated, especially after the Eichmann affair of the 1960s, nevertheless heeded her mother's advice: "If attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew," not as a German citizen, not as "world-citizen, and not as an upholder of the Rights of Man." Hence while in Paris she worked with Jewish legal aid groups and Zionist organizations helping to settle refugees safely in Palestine. While working with one these groups, Youth Aliyah, which rescued Jewish youth, she met Heinrich Blucher, who was to become her second husband four years after divorcing Stern in 1936. Her marriage to the former Communist Party member was to be a lifelong romance, friendship, and intellectual partnership until his death in 1970, though his several affairs over the years would wound her deeply. He came from a poor background and lacked Arendt's elite education, but he would later become a memorable lecturer at the New School and later Bard College, and he held a formidable intellect he would need as co-host to many of Arendt's salons in the 1950s and the 1960s. The two were very different: Arendt was the only daughter of a traditional bourgeois Jewish family and the former student of two of Germany's most renowned philosophers, while Blucher grew up poor in Berlin and lacked her Jewish background. Largely self-taught—he had attended some night school but never gained a degree—he had made his living working in cabarets in the period before fleeing Germany. But he was politically active, and Arendt had only begun to think deeply about politics. Blucher, she would later tell Jaspers, taught her "to think politically and see historically." In Paris, she also met fellow intellectuals in exile, including Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, as well as the who's who of French philosophical life: Albert Camus, Alexandre Kojèvc, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jean Wahl.

Arendt's life would be upended again in May 1940, when she, along with other stateless persons, mostly Jews, was declared "enemy aliens" by the collaborationist Vichy government. She was taken to the Gurs

concentration camp and separated from Blucher, who was placed in a camp outside of Paris. Her life in jeopardy, Arendt fled the camp in July, making her way to a safe house where Blucher had also found his way as a fugitive from his camp. After four months on the run, the couple was able to obtain emergency visas to the United States, though they still faced the constant risk of being caught by Vichy authorities. They first made their way to Lisbon, staying there several months, before gaining passage to the United States, arriving in May 1941. (Benjamin would take the same route not long after, but facing arrest at the French-Spanish border, he took his life.)

Despite being luckier than others in getting out of Europe, the family's adjustment to New York City, which Arendt and Blucher would make their home for the rest of their lives, was difficult. They each had to learn English quickly, and in a small, often hot Bronx apartment, Blucher and his mother-in-law found it impossible to get along. His first employment was in a chemical factory. Arendt soon found employment writing a column for Aufbau, a leading German-language newspaper, where she wrote article after article highlighting the plight of European Jews and the frightful growing evidence of the Nazi's Final Solution. She was uncomfortable, she wrote to Jaspers, writing for a German-language publication, but they needed the money and it gave her a forum to remind readers about the plight of the Jews who remained in Europe. As the German hold on the continent came to an end, Arendt worked for the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction Commission, which undertook efforts at reclaiming Jewish cultural artifacts stolen by the Nazis during their brief hold on much of Europe. In 1946, she became an editor at Schocken Books, where she would eventually champion and edit major publications of Walter Benjamin's work into English, an effort that continues to bring some of his greatest works to readers in the English-speaking world. In 1950, she and Blucher became naturalized US citizens.

As if all of this were not enough, Arendt also began work on what is still one of the most important works on the rise of Nazism, her first in English, The Origins of Totalitarianism, which would come out in 1951. The book gained her wide renown: Cold Warriors found her inclusion of the Soviet Union in the last part of the book as further evidence of the need to fight Stalinism at home and abroad, while historians picked apart her historical claims about the rise of anti-Semitism and questioned the equation of the Nazi regime with the Soviet's. Nevertheless, no one doubted that she was an incisive new voice on the American scene. It was also during these years that she would rekindle her correspondence with Heidegger and helped to rehabilitate his intellectual reputation by supporting the publication of his books in English, even finding translators for his magnum opus, Being and Time, published in English in 1962.Their continued relationship scandalized a number of Jews, who could never forgive Heidegger for his activities in the Nazi Party nor his silence about the Holocaust after it. Yet she made visits to him in Freiburg—at first made uncomfortable by Heidegger's wife's knowledge of their affair—and sent him her works, though she doubted he read them with any care, if at all.

A year after publishing The Origins of Totalitarianism, she received a Guggenheim Foundation fellowship to study "The Totalitarian Elements of Marxism," and she began lecturing at prestigious institutions across the United States on Marx and began her critique of the Western philosophical tradition, both of which would come to fruition in The Human Condition (1958). She was also a sought-after voice on contemporary events, with her writings often hard to categorize on the easy left-right split of the era, such as her notorious, if not tone-deaf, essay in 1959 for Dissent magazine critiquing the 1957 decision of the then US president Dwight Eisenhower to use the National Guard to integrate Central High School in Little Rock. Though worried that the weight of the political world was being put on the

shoulders of children surrounded by armed soldiers, Arendt's essay seemed oblivious to the larger racial context of segregation in America, given her own writings on anti-Semitism, and she chose not to republish it during her lifetime, as she did with numerous other contemporary essays. Indeed, in a letter dated July 29, 1965, she wrote to Ralph Ellison, the great novelist and essayist, that while she wasn't bothered by what her "'liberal' friends or non-friends" had critiqued in her essay, an interview by him showed her just how misguided she had been: "I knew I was somehow wrong," she wrote, "and thought that I hadn't grasped the element of stark violence, of elementary, bodily fear in the situation." Then she adds, "But your remarks seem to me so entirely right that I now see that I simply didn't understand the complexities in the situation."

The controversy over Little Rock, though, was nothing compared to one she would face as she turned in full to the question of evil in the wake of the capture by the Israeli Mossad of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in May 1960. A year later, she covered the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem for The New Yorker magazine, publishing her report in five successive issues from February 16 —to March 16,1963, and her account was subsequently published as Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil by Viking Press later that year. The controversy that her work sparked was not merely academic but deeply personal, and it still has not ceded near six decades after its publication. She lost many friendships, though the novelist Mary McCarthy stood by her and defended her in Partisan Review. The accusations against Arendt's account were numerous and, as happens too often in supposed intellectual debates, were often made by people who refused to read the book itself: she naively accepted Eichmann's self-presentation as a mere functionary who held no special hatred for the Jews; his bureaucratic cunning and monstrous deeds were in no way "banal"; she blamed the Jews, especially in her depiction of the Jewish Councils who managed the ghettos, for their own annihilation; she ignored those instances in which Jews did attempt revolts against their Nazi captures; she looked down upon the Israeli crowds and depicted them in anti-Semitic stereotypes; and she used a biting tone that reflected an unseemly lack of empathy for the victims of the Holocaust.

In response, partially to her excommunication by her friends, colleagues, and old-time comrades, and partially to the manner in which she was criticized—often with a vitriol not often seen in intellectual debates—she appended a "Note to the Reader," dated June 1964, to the second edition of the book published in 1965. She wrote, "The factual record of the period in question has not yet been established in all its details, and there are certain matters on which an informed guess will probably never be superseded by completely reliable information." In the "Postscript," she describes the "campaign" against her:

> Even before its publication, this book became both the center of a controversy and the object of an organized campaign. It is only natural that the campaign, conducted with all the well-known means of image-making and opinion-manipulation, got much more attention than the controversy, so that the latter was somehow swallowed up by and drowned in the artificial noise of the former. This became especially clear when a strange mixture of the two, in almost identical phraseology—as though the pieces written against the book (and more frequently against its author) came "out of a mimeographing machine" (Mary McCarthy)—was carried from America to England and then to Europe, where the book was not yet even available. And this was possible because the clamor centered on the "image" of a book which was never written, and touched upon subjects that often had not only not been mentioned by me but had never occurred to me before.

Her work on the Eichmann trial centered both on the trial itself and on a discussion of two activities Arendt deemed crucial to it: the human ability to think and judge. As a spectator to the trial, she reported on one famous set of events—the trial itself—arising from another historical event—the Nazi crimes against humanity—that was of an unprecedented nature. The judgment she accorded to the trial could not be found under cliched categories. Staying true to her Kantian convictions while acknowledging that the faculty of understanding is always at work in judgment, especially in creating new concepts in judging the particular, she set out to demonstrate that at the heart of a trial was a man who was symbolic of the modern "banality of evil."

This phrase was not meant to become yet another cliché, though it has. In judging the nature of the deed, she was mistaken to be condoning—or even defending—Eichmann's personal motives, given that he was just a thoughtless "nobody." His personality, his drive to repeat every cliché he ever heard and the fact that he went about his bloody work as if it were but another bureaucratic step up the chain of command—all this marked him as banal, but no less evil for all that. That's what Arendt's book attempts to come to terms with. To be sure, the ultimate driving force in her thinking was her unfaltering attempt at understanding and reconciling with the world. In this one instance, however, reconciliation was not a possibility made clear by her final conviction. Arendt wrote:

> Just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations—as though you and your superiors had any right to determine who should and who should not inhabit the world—we find that no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must hang.

Arendt responded to the world from out of modernity, from out of her own experiences as a thinker, a writer, a refugee, and, yes, as a Jew who herself was almost caught up in the Holocaust. She clarifies her thoughts on the activity of thinking and its relation to personal experience to Ginter Gaus in a 1964 interview:

> I do not believe that there is any thought process possible without personal experience. Every thought is an afterthought, that is, a reflection on some matter or event. Isn't that so? I live in the modern world, and obviously my experience is in and of the modern world. This, after all, is not controversial. But the matter of merely laboring and consuming is of crucial importance for the reason that a kind of wordlessness defines itself there too. Nobody cares any longer what the world looks like.

This lack of care, however, comes at a cost. In an interview with Joachim Fest from the same year, she alludes to the importance of reflection in assuming responsibility for one's actions:

> Apart from the fact that bureaucracy is essentially anonymous, any relentless activity allows responsibility to evaporate. There's an English idiom, "Stop and think." Nobody can think unless they stop. If you force someone into remorseless activity, or they allow themselves to be forced into it, it'll always be the same story, right? You'll always find that an awareness of responsibility can't develop. It can only develop in the moment when a person reflects—not on himself but on what he's doing.

Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the Eichmann book, Arendt continued thinking and writing about the events of her time, attesting to her own conviction that thinking needs to become manifest—in order to be what it is: "Thinking, however, in contrast to cognitive activities that may use

thinking as one of their instruments, needs speech not only to sound out and become manifest; it needs it to be activated at all."

Her reflections on the concept of revolution, and the constitution of freedom were published in On Revolution (1963), followed by essays on Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Jaspers, Isak Dinesen, Bertolt Brecht, Walter Benjamin, Randall Jarrell, and others in Men in Dark Times (1968). Her critical and timely analyses of culture, education, freedom, politics, and science became Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1968). Her reflections on the crises of the 1960s and the 1970s resulted in On Violence (1970), which was later included in Crises of the Republic (1972), a book that dealt not only with the questions of violence and revolution but also with lying in politics, a work that has gained a new readership given the events of the past few years.

In the 1970s, Arendt continued lecturing and writing, finishing two of three volumes of her last, unfinished work, The life of the Mind, which was published posthumously in 1978. The volumes brought together her lifelong concern to reconcile between what she understood as the vita active and the vita contemplativa. This work can be said to bring to a quasi-close her ceaseless thinking on how to be in the world as a human being—a being who thinks and acts. The bridge she found between these two activities, namely, the activity of judging—accompanied by willing—was meant to be the topic of the last section of the book, which was never finished. Her Kant's Lectures on Political Philosophy, published posthumously as well in 1982, brings together her lectures on Kant's political philosophy, with the novelty resting on its reference to Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). What Arendt would say in the third volume is often conjecture based on these lectures and archival sources. On December 4,1975, Arendt went to her desk at her home, rolled in the first sheet of paper of her Judging manuscript into her typewriter—she had skipped a doctor's visit just days before to collect her notes for it—and then stopped to greet two dinner guests. Over dessert and coffee, they would discuss a Jewish intellectual historian important to Arendt's work in The Origins of Totalitarianism, Phillip Friedman. But at some point, she coughed and then sunk slowly back into her chain Her guests called her doctor to come over, but to no avail. At the age of sixty-nine, Arendt died of a heart attack, leaving behind the work of a life of the mind with which we are still attempting to come to grips. <>

A Guide to Understanding Eric Voegelin's Political Reality by Montgomery C. Erfourth [St. Augustine's Press, 9781587313479]

Eric Voegelin was a German-born political theorist who fled Nazi persecution and immigrated to the United States in 1938, where he had a long and productive academic career. He is widely considered one of the most insightful political scientists of the twentieth century, but is sadly not as well known as other contemporaries like Leo Strauss or Hannah Arendt. This is in large part due to the difficulty of the topics he chose to study and the complex nature of the material produced. While there are other books that discuss his biography and academic/philosophical ideas, none combine these ideas with a practical means of actually utilizing Voegelin's philosophy to define and analyze political reality. This book uniquely applys Voegelin's ideas to real-world political problems and in its utilization of common language, making Voegelin's extraordinary achievements much more accessible to a broader audience than any other previous work. Voegelin's highly original thinking was heavily influenced by the violent and tumultuous

times in which he lived. Because the events of his life are so influential, a brief but thorough biography is presented in the first chapter. The "Western Crisis" he recognized in modern Western culture is revealed as the motivation of Voegelin's quest for truth and the resistance he thought vital to the strains of Gnosticism he felt rejected reality and the symbols needed to articulate it. Because Gnosticism is such a central theme in understanding Voegelin's work, an extensive exploration is conducted on Gnostic origins, history, some complications in the use of this term, and how Voegelin's concept of it evolved over the course of his career. The first chapter concludes with and examination of Voegelin's use of symbol and language indices. Chapter two begins with an introduction to Voegelin's views of how science, theology, and philosophy were used in the ancient world to reveal truth, the basis of order, and how humanity can move away from order by disregarding what the ancients revealed. This is followed by an examination of one of Voegelin's most important contributions, his theory of consciousness and use of anamnesis. Chapter two concludes with a description of noesis' relationship to political reality and how Voegelin's quest to know truth and reality led him to question the state of political science and modernity's willingness to seek truth. Chapter three, on Voegelin's mature political theory, is best described as Principia Noetic, so labeled by Ellis Sandoz. Voegelin asserts that political reality is revealed when the basis of order is found in the ground of being. When man separates himself from God, order is lost, and violence and tyranny are guaranteed as man makes himself the sole arbiter of moral and political order, unrestricted by notions of the divine. The reader of this book should come away with a deep understanding of Voegelin's philosophical insights found in the Principia Noetica, how to apply them in understanding political reality, and how to recognize the symptoms of the "Western Crisis."

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This is to be a study of political reality and what is required to recognize it. It likely seems absurd to analyze "political reality" given the current state of polarized American politics where the "truth of our situation" is grossly maligned on a daily basis. There is a struggle within society to agree on who we are and what is most important to us, which is played out in the circus of our political representatives' bickering and lack of honesty. America does not seem alone in its struggle to agree on what is "real." There is some agreement among academics and others that throughout the Western world there is a certain level of dissatisfaction within society concerning its representative government's ability to take on what is "real" (Federici, 2002, 18). While the term "real" can have many interpretations, there is a correlation between "real" and "reality." The nexus of these ideas is most likely found in the very meaning and basis of "order" for which the government is the representative. Understanding the relationship between order and reality is part of the ancient struggle for society to define human nature and establish a political order that can both honor and impede certain aspects of this nature.

A common "politically conservative" belief is that observing political reality is a matter of common sense and that this reality can be recognized within the totality of Western culture's Christian and Hellenic traditions. This camp would further suggest that the loss of reality is a movement towards "unreality" and that this condition is responsible for the unparalleled human destruction of the twentieth century (Federici, 2002, 16). While those more loosely defined as "liberal" believe that reality is an empirical matter best left to science and that our flirtations with destruction are the result of human systems failing to function properly. In either case, many conservatives and liberals alike agree that there is a looming sense of crisis occurring at the very heart of Western culture that is rooted in how we view the human condition (Federici, 2002, 17).

The West has been very successful and perhaps the most enriched and educated of any collection of people in the history of mankind. This success is often credited to its Judeo-Christian morality, Greek philosophic tradition, Enlightenment ideals, liberal constitutions, rule of law, and powerful economic and military might (Federici, 2002, 15). These ideals and abilities survived two world wars and a third cold one. The West held fast to its traditional beliefs as evidenced by the inherent rejection of and battles against ideologies that crushed individual liberty, ignored the rule of law, and embraced dehumanizing and barbaric practices. The West's defeat and rejection of National Socialism and communism left it free to pursue a reality of its choosing. So why do conservatives and liberals often agree, not on the cause but the sense, that despite its success, there is something wrong within our Western culture?

What political reality needs to be identified and why does it matter? Has science performed some empirical experiments that opened the door to an undiscovered dimension of political reality? For the scientist or layman of today, the surprising answer is "no," but a political reality has indeed been discovered. It was revealed the old-fashioned, and to many the untrustworthy, way of our ancestral past. It was found through the workings of philosophy and the application of reason with its relation to spirit. The man who made this discovery was the eminent twentieth-century political theorist Eric Voegelin. He would tell you that to understand political reality, you have to journey through time, philosophy, social and political order, science, morality, religion, and the ground of being. This journey revealed that the "Western crisis," as he called it, is a sickness in our modern social and political belief system that has

led us to a second ordered reality that occludes our eyes from seeing a certain truth in reality. The sickness is the failure to recognize the ground of being as the basis of social and political order.

In a metaphoric sense, Voegelin views Western culture and its highly functioning societies of today as much like a blind Olympic athlete with cancer of the heart and mind. All of the muscle, sinew, lungs, and prowess are present. But the ability to reason and connect with the sacred in our hearts is significantly underdeveloped; the eyes of our soul do not tell us what they see. This leads us to the misuse and squandering of our excellence in the physical realm. It also makes us long for something better we cannot quite identify. Voegelin believed that modernity, despite all its spectacular gifts and progress, has come at a heavy price: the death of the spirit. For Voegelin, the very definition of the modern age is marked by spiritual loss and sickness. Modernity is the spiritually blind Olympian doggedly making its way through history, attaining immense control of the material world but unable to reason, disconnected from the sacred, and sightless to reality. Natural science seems like the best resource available to alleviate this blindness to reality because it has been such a powerful tool in transforming the physical dimensions of life. After all, natural science has been critical in Western culture's ability to move beyond superstition, magic, unreasonable fear of natural phenomenon, and has been a means to understand our place in the physical world. From electricity to engineering, physics, astronomy, medicine, and industry, natural science has revolutionized knowledge.

However, in the quest to understand our material existence, Voegelin felt Western man left behind the exploration of our relationship with the divine (Federici, 2002, 17). Voegelin knew that this might seem like a vestigial appendage to a modern man, but he thought that knowledge of the divine has been both our most ancient and important quest (NSP, 76-77). He believed the Western crisis was related to the divine and would require an exploration of the human soul to understand and resolve it (Federici, 2002, 20). Most natural scientists would relegate this "human" study to religion and that is not inappropriate. Religion is, however, not the only possible means of human study. In fact there is a science older than, and in actuality gave birth to, the natural sciences. It is a science that has been devoted to the exploration of humanity since the time of ancient Greece: philosophy (NSP, 2). Philosophy is perhaps better suited to the task of understanding man than any other means and plays a central role in Eric Voegelin's analysis of the problem of a lost political reality that is so central to the Western crisis (Federici, 2002, 22-23). Religion, like natural science, is an important pursuit, but the skills and methods developed by Plato and Aristotle make philosophy the best and most appropriate tool for the job.

Eric Voegelin dedicated his life's work to defining the "sickness" he saw in Western modernity and developed a new science within the philosophic tradition to adequately expose and address the problem (Federici, 2002, 22-26). His many years of exhaustive research brought him to recognize the relationship between human participation with the divine and the ways in which societies used this knowledge to develop morality, a system of law and order, and ultimately understand reality (A, 172-24). Whatever political apparatus society adopted, it reflected man's relationship with the sacred and found its legitimate authority in the sacred ground of being.

From this perspective, recovering an adequate understanding of reality is a philosophical task of great importance. Voegelin's was a project of demonstrating how to explore, define, and articulate the basis of order, which is the fabric of reality itself. Without a proper understanding of reality, which has a spiritual dignity and guiding hand at its core, the risk becomes ever greater that Western society and politics may

continue to deteriorate and ultimately fail to serve its ultimate purpose of sustaining order and attuning society to the "good life" conceived by Aristotle and Plato.

Voegelin recognizes that the sacred has been at the heart of great civilizations and societies for most of man's communal existence. The modern Western urge to revolt against its traditional basis of order in the ground of being, which he identifies as a Gnostic malformation, is the sickness Voegelin demands we cure (Sandoz, 1981, 114). Voegelin is a man living in the desperate tension between two poles. On the one hand, he recognized that the divine ground of being is the basis of all legitimate order, and on other hand that Gnostic thinkers are imperiling society by convincing them to abandon this belief (Sandoz, 1981, 115). For most of his career, Voegelin was the revolutionary front guard against the profane forces of Gnosticism he credits with leading man into murderous ideological mass movements like National Socialism and communism. Eric Voegelin the revolutionary, his science, and his findings are the focal point of this guide. This examination of Eric Voegelin the revolutionary, the political theory he develops, his research, and the sickness of the denial found in the Gnostic rejection of the ground of being will ultimately answer the question: what is political reality?

This guide has a specific organization. It is an exploration of political reality, but it does so through the life and works of Eric Voegelin. To that end, the Western crisis Voegelin recognized and resisted is the backdrop of the entire discussion. Additionally, Voegelin's resistance to the Gnosticism he identified will be a constant theme. Therefore, the first chapter will begin with discussion of the Western crisis, explain Voegelin's quest and life, then outline the Gnosticism he believed rejected reality and the symbols needed to capture reality. The problem of truth and reality in Western civilization requires a lot of exposition and is detailed in Chapter 2 along with an explanation of the noetic and pneumatic experience and Voegelin's theory of consciousness. Understanding these issues is necessary for a discussion of the new science Voegelin is proposing and how it can be applied, which is the focus in Chapter 3. The conclusion will demonstrate how political reality can be revealed as understood through Voegelin's work, and how to live a life that maintains a connection to transcendental truth and knowledge. Some critical analysis and a summary of his contributions are also included in the conclusion. Each chapter will be broken down further as described below.

Chapter one offers a short biography of Eric Voegelin and a sketch of the Western crisis. Because the times in which he lived and his overall experience are so fundamental to understanding his revolutionary zeal and broad scope of interests, a short but instructive sketch of his life and work is necessary. This will include his life events and discussion of the personal traits and inclinations that make him a unique and distinct figure worthy of study. Because this is a work of and about science, an explanation is provided on Voegelin's views on the seemingly unscientific use of the concept of God and the divine found throughout Voegelin's work. This will help the reader orient with regard to the use of the term. This guide, and Voegelin's own work for that matter, is not an attempt at religious conversion or endorsement for a particular set of religious beliefs. It is merely the exploration of experiences, concepts, and philosophies that concern mostly Western mythical and theological understanding. The third section explains what the term "Gnostic" means according to Voegelin. Exploration of this idea includes Gnostic history, some complications in its use, and how Voegelin's concept of the term evolved over the course of his career. The last section explains Voegelin's use of symbol and language indices. The overall theme is to show the spark, oil, and torch handle that are the metaphoric "flame" of Voegelin's passion to shed light on truth and political reality.

Chapter two begins with an introduction to Voegelin's views of how science, theology, and philosophy were used in the ancient world to reveal truth and the basis of order and how humanity can move away from order by disregarding what the ancients revealed. Voegelin's historical analysis of what leads man to understand human nature through being, origin, and reality are also studied. In section two, one of Voegelin's most important contributions, his theory of consciousness and use of anamnesis are detailed. This section further explains how anamnesis is a key to unlocking the ancient Greek noetic notions of participation, differentiation, experience, and reason that combine in a creative way to know transcendent truth. The third section explains Voegelin's understanding of noetic and pneumatic experiences. A description of how his thinking evolved on these ideas is necessary and concludes with how he came to incorporate philosophy and theology into a revised science to better research humanity. The fourth section is a description of noesis ' relationship to political reality and how Voegelin's quest to know truth and reality led him to question the state of political science and modernity's willingness to seek truth. Section five is a brief chapter summary of Chapter two. In a sense, this chapter describes the fanning of the metaphoric "flames" of Voegelinian resistance.

Chapter three begins with a general description of Voegelin's mature political theory. It is best described as what Ellis Sandoz describes as the Principia Noetica. In the second section a further discussion of history and revelation is pursued to better fill in important details of this Principia Noetica. It can be hard to imagine how to apply Voegelin's highly philosophical work, and the third section of this chapter demonstrates how effective it can be by discussing Voegelin's political analysis of Nazi Germany. The final section will examine Voegelin's critics. Metaphorically, this is Voegelin's passing of the "flame" of passion that is human knowledge.

This guide concludes with a description of Voegelin's contribution to science, his critics, and how the Principia Noetica illuminates political reality. This includes a proposal on how to live La Vida Noetica and the scientific application of this noesis. This guide ends with a few thoughts on Voegelin's overall contribution to human knowledge and citizenship.

Finding Our Place Nature: Aristotle for Environmental Scientists by Richard Lynn Shearman [RIT PRESS, 9781939125620]

Finding Our Place Nature: Aristotle for Environmental Scientists argues that Aristotelian philosophy provides a much-needed ethical foundation for the environmental sciences and for our daily commitment to practices of sustainability. Shearman challenges previously held interpretations of Aristotle s value to the grounding of environmental ethics. He demonstrates that Aristotelian philosophy is a valuable and under-appreciated resource for any student-citizen who requires ethically persuasive reasons both for pursuing environmental science in the first place and for grounding our social practices as citizens. The author clarifies sustainability as a moral concept as a means to better identify the underlying purpose of the environmental sciences.

This book aims to introduce students of the environmental sciences to philosophical thinking from within an Aristotelian perspective.' The justification for this project emerges from my belief that philosophical reflection should be an important practical and curricular component of applied disciplines - perhaps especially those attempting to address the challenges posed by humanity's current and profoundly unsustainable development path. With its focus on problem-solving, environmental science is necessarily confronted with an assortment of moral questions that emerge from the problem-solving process. These questions can be quite diverse and expansive - ranging from efforts to preserve biodiversity to the realization of environmental justice. At base, and as defined within these pages, environmental science can be understood as a collection of related disciplines seeking to help bring about a better (i.e. sustainable) and more just existence on a resource-limited planet. And yet, with few exceptions,' you would be hard pressed to find substantive attention being brought to bear on important baseline moral questions associated with a sustainable vision of the future. Until environmental science actively engages such questions, I fear it will lack a clearly defined identity and purpose - an untenable situation for any applied field.

I examine the philosophical/ethical questions associated with environmental problems through an Aristotelian lens for two distinct reasons. First, although there has emerged a fairly robust discussion within the environmental ethics literature drawing upon an Aristotelian conception of human virtue, to my knowledge no one has attempted to develop a more thorough-going Aristotelian response to the philosophical questions associated with environmental sustainability. In other words, beyond an analysis of how virtue ethics can be applied to environmental decision-making, little if any comprehensive attention has been devoted to the other elements of Aristotle's extraordinarily rich philosophical works - such as his conception of the common good, self-love, or metaphysics. Second, I think an Aristotelian approach is particularly well-suited to addressing environmental questions, given the emphasis Aristotle places on biological studies. Upon my reading, Aristotle maintained a reasonably sophisticated ecological worldview that shaped much of his thinking, including his political and moral treatises.' If this much is true, then Aristotle should be able to provide a cogent example of how environmental questions can be approached philosophically, and, one would hope, provide a means for non-philosophers to enter the ongoing discussion of "how ought we to live on this earth?"

Chapter 1 begins by offering a synopsis of how Aristotle has been utilized or interpreted within the still relatively new field of environmental philosophy. The bulk of the chapter, however, seeks to defend an Aristotelian approach to environmental philosophy against claims that Aristotle's perspective either is incompatible with a concern for the conservation of nature, or shares an important measure of responsibility for attitudes producing the environmental problems we experience today (possibly impeding or dissuading other scholars from engaging in a broad-based examination of Aristotelian thought within environmental philosophy). The argument asserting the antipathy of the Aristotelian

tradition toward environmental protection originates in a noncontextualized interpretation of Aristotle's teleology found in 1.8 of his Politics. While considering issues in household management, Aristotle states that the purpose of plants and animals can be defined in terms of meeting human need or desire. For some scholars, this is evidence that Aristotle envisioned a hierarchical structure to the world with human beings occupying the pinnacle of creation with little or no regard accorded the rest of nature beyond need satisfaction. Those scholars ultimately conclude that Aristotle was incapable of developing an ecological perspective and thus an environmental ethic. However, I will argue that once Politics 1.8 is placed in context, this profoundly anthropocentric interpretation of Aristotle's position on the relationship of human beings to the rest of the natural world becomes quite tenuous, if not unsupportable. Chapter 1 concludes by arguing that the Aristotelian tradition offers an intellectually stimulating resource from which to reflect on the morality of sustainability, and should be of interest to those of us trying to gain greater conceptual clarity of sustainability as both goal and process.

Chapter 2 attempts to illuminate the structure of Aristotle's moral philosophy. Upon my reading, Aristotle identifies a single grand end consistent with human nature that represents the best life toward which we should aim. Although Aristotle may have identified a single intellectual goal as the object of desire, there are actually many ways to achieve at least a modicum of happiness - all of which are compatible with, or may demand, environmental sustainability. Chapter 3 addresses issues in Aristotle's metaphysics relating to a contemplative life, and the importance of encountering and studying the natural world as a component of human virtue. This emerges from Aristotle's seminal statement "all men by nature desire to know'. It is through the active and empirical investigation of the natural world that we can begin to fulfill our desire to understand and thus participate in a way of life that is most complete and blessed. Chapter 4 explores the contextual nature of Aristotle's moral philosophy in greater depth and seeks to explain the significance of this for developing environmental concern. In chapter 5, I draw on Aristotle's ideas about friendship to speculate on the possibility of valuing other forms of life for their own sake in a manner similar to the bond shared among friends. This will provide an argument for all life having inherent value, and thus not dependent upon human valuation. Chapter 6 provides a summary statement of an Aristotelian approach to the issues related to ecological sustainability and its potential relevance to contemporary life.

The final chapter brings us back to my ultimate purpose in writing this book - to argue why moral analysis should be a foundational component of environmental science and its curricula. I contend that the connection between morality and environmental policy formation should be made much more explicit if only as a reminder of our purpose in making policy and thus of what we are seeking to achieve--a better world (or at the very least a viable world) based upon a set of values which define what constitutes "better': In my judgment, ignoring the moral dimensions of policy development and analysis (or pushing them to the periphery of the discipline) invites a superficial assessment of our motivations and goals for policy, and may unnecessarily limit or obscure our response to a given problem. Without acknowledging our moral compass, we may also become so enamored of technical methodology as to mistake means for ends, or calculation for deliberation. This is not to say that the policy-making process will become easier. On the contrary, it may become much more difficult. Yet the purpose of addressing the underlying moral component of policy in environmental science is not to make the process simpler, but rather to make it more comprehensive and effective.

My motivation for addressing these questions emerged in graduate school while studying biology and then environmental science. I have always been sensitive to environmental problems, and thought I could best contribute to their solutions through scientific endeavors. However, as I commenced my doctorate in environmental science, I started to wonder why I cared. This did not reflect a growing callousness to environmental concerns on my part, but simply an inability to offer a lucid argument supporting environ mental protection. I knew it was a good thing and wanted to contribute to the cause, but I could not clearly explain why it was right or why I should act. Not being able to answer such a basic question was unsettling and I soon found it impossible to engage in any further scientific work before being able to formulate an adequate response to the question, "why do I care?" and by extension, "why should anyone care?"

Somewhere in my search, I stumbled upon Aristotle. Perhaps it was the attention he paid to biological matters that I found attractive, thus offering me some transitional space between biology and philosophy. Beyond finding in Aristotle an apparent kindred spirit, it was clear to me that he was a keen observer of nature with an ecological view of the world that warranted further study. In the process, I became intrigued with two facets of Aristotle's method that struck me as being necessary for any environmental ethic. First was his moral contextualism. In other words, the good life for Aristotle was something that could not be abstracted from the social and material circumstances of existence. A good human being is one who is able to navigate the many challenges of human existence. As I will try to indicate, Aristotle's moral philosophy is readily adaptable for taking into consideration not only the social conditions of the good life, but the broader environmental conditions as well. Second, Aristotle's moral philosophy is grounded in practical activity, meaning that one must live the ethical life within society and nature in order to live well. As Lester Brown once noted, "Saving the planet is not a spectator sport." There may well be value in theory development, but environmental science demands that we develop practical solutions to "planet saving". Although Aristotle maintains a strong intellectual focus in the Nicomachean Ethics, I will endeavor to show that he considered intellectual activity to be constrained by practical reality. At base, the philosophy of Aristotle seemed particularly well suited for any discussion that seeks to define morality within the domain of the natural world.

Another stimulus for this book has been my perception of a diminished appreciation over the years of the importance of ethical analysis as a component of environmental science. This is reflected in a paper by Nelson and Vucetich discussing the impediments to understanding and addressing issues in sustainability from within sustainability science.' Lacking an analysis of sustainability as a moral concept, applied sustainability disciplines have essentially become rudderless in their efforts to address environmental problems, since there is no clearly articulated vision, or the means to develop a vision, of what kind of world sustainability entails. The reasons for this unfortunate situation are not clear to me. Does the reluctance to engage moral questions emerge from the fear that moral analysis is a short step away from advocacy, and thus a possible threat to scientific objectivity? Or do elements of positivism pervade the environmental sciences with practitioners questioning, a priori, the legitimacy of moral analysis as an element of their disciplinary framework? Whatever the explanation, I think we have become good at identifying and explaining environmental problems, but not so good at providing direction toward their solution.

Lastly, in a very real sense this work can be viewed as that of an outsider. I have written a book that is fundamentally philosophical but have no formal training in philosophy. My investigation into Aristotle

began while pursuing a doctorate in environmental science at a university known for scientific research, and continued without the benefit of a philosophical mentor. Therefore, the majority of the volume at hand is the result of a personal and substantially auto-didactical intellectual journey into a research tradition that I joined late in my educational career. Yet I see this work as being fundamentally a derivative of environmental science. Since the purpose of environmental science is to seek solutions to environmental problems within an interdisciplinary structure, then any area of research that can assist our efforts to improve environmental conditions should be welcomed under the environmental science banner. Arguably, the starting point for any such endeavor is "why care about environmental sustainability"?

Life-World and Cultural Difference: Husserl, Schutz, and Waldenfels by Chung-Chi Yu [Königshausen & Neumann, 9783826064517]

The fact that there are different cultures in the world is too obvious for words. COnsidering thus cultural differences in the light of the phenomenological concept of life-world may raise the following questions: Do we live in the same life-world regardless of such cultural differences? Or do we live in different life-worlds because of cultural differences? The first question presupposes a singular life-world, whereas the second question entails a plurality of life-worlds. IN any case, how is the notion of cultural difference related to that of the life-world? Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology seems to conceive the life-world as the bare ground of the natural sciences. The life-world therefore acquires a universal validity regardless of cultural differences. IN contrast, for Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who is more concerned with the foundation of human and social sciences than that of natural sciences, the life-world understood as field of praxis with social and cultural characteristics unavoidably assumes cultural differences. Besides critically discussing these two radically diverging positions, the book also discusses what Bernhard Waldenfels sees as a common denominator: the idea of grounding (Grundlegungsidee). Both Husserl and Schutz develop in their own ways a foundationalist interpretation of the life-world. In whatever case, the book seeks to overcome any foundationalism whether in the form of universalism or culturalism by suggesting to refocus and inquire into the status of cultural objects. Universals are ill-suited for cultural matters. Correlatively, considering cultural objects from alien cultures requires acknowledging difference with a sense of humility that does not preclude the possibility of understanding.

Contents

Both cultural universalism and cultural particularism can be found in the phenomenological movement which relates cultural difference to the phenomenological notion of the life-world. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) are typical representatives of the cultural universalistic and cultural particularistic outlooks, respectively. This book aims to elaborate these two positions in the frameworks of Husserl and Schutz. After elaborating their two positions, I will then introduce the critical perspective of Bernhard Waldenfels.

Husserl has dealt with the problem of cultural difference and cultivated the position of cultural universalism in his phenomenological thinking. He insists on the idea of universalism that originates in ancient Greek and he demonstrates this idea of universalism through the discourse of the life-world. Even though Husserl does not deny the fact that there are particular cultures which exist side by side to each other, his phenomenology, in particular his transcendental phenomenology, aims at describing the universal structure of the life-world. Husserl is convinced of an underlying commonality between all these particular cultural worlds. His conviction results from his confirmation of a universally valid truth. In this regard we may raise the question: from whence comes such a life-world that is treated as universal? How does Husserl come to this conclusion?

Answering to these questions necessitates a way of handling the life-world. How can we approach the life-world scientifically anyway? Methodologically speaking, Husserl suggests disregarding influences from the objective sciences that are characterized as objectivistic and naturalistic. In other words, Husserl proposes an epoché of the objective sciences, in order to avoid being affected by these sciences. Husserl's confirmation of the life-world is philosophical, which means, the universality of the life-world is not already what it is, but what it should be. Conceived empirically, every culture is different from one another, yet culture should not be regarded only from an empirical perspective, but also from the ideal perspective. Only from the latter perspective, can we speak of universality.

Namely, universality is not a result of induction; it is, instead, the goal or ideal that we aspire to achieve.

Husserl claims that the idea of one universal world was born in ancient Greece. The European culture that inherits this ideal is thus unique in the sense that no other culture, except that of the Greeks, has ever given birth to this idea of universalism. For this reason, Husserl suggests that all other cultures should learn from Europe. Thus, Husserl's cultural discourse harbors undertones of Eurocentrism, which gives rise to many criticisms.

Waldenfels, with help of the Husserlian notions of the homeworld (Heimwelt) and alienworld (Fremdwelt), poses the following question: how do the homeworld and the alienworld relate to each other? Husserl, on the one hand, recognizes the essential difference between the homeworld and the alienworld, but on the other hand he eschews this difference by introducing the idea of "one world for all." Such a world is common to homeworld and alienworld and gives all experiences a first ground (erster Grund) and a last horizon (letzter Horizon). The instrument for setting up this grounding level of

meaning is reason (Vernunft). For Husserl, Europe is a geographical name for a comprehensive form of rationality. Europe understands itself as "the guardian of the common world" (Vorhut einer Gemeinwelt) that is to be characterized by universality. Europeans have created the standards and ideals for all cultures, and their right belief and right reason derives from these standards. Measured by these European standards, all the accomplishments of other cultures are seen to be pre-rational or even primitive. The non-European should learn from the European and become European so their accomplishments are not eliminated in the history of reason (Vernunftgeschichte).

Through such a rational overcoming of otherness (Fremdheit), an otherness that is presumed to characterize non-European cultures, the Europeans, paradoxically, lose sight of otherness. Waldenfels takes this blindness of otherness to be a considerable deficiency in European culture. He questions whether it is fair to treat the European order as the only order and suggests, instead, that other cultures could construct their own standards and ideals and integrate the accomplishments of the European into their own orders. This so-called European culture's neglect of otherness is, indeed, inherent in Husserl's discourse of culture.

The theory of the life-world, as Schutz conceives of it, entails cultural difference. He assumes the life-worldly experience of the human being includes culture automatically. For Schutz, people who share the same system of "appresentational references" make up a certain "in-group" and all other people are considered strangers. Inside the familiar milieu of the in-group, everyone can act and perceive naturally according to their standard shared system of appresentational references and embrace the value and significance of their shared system. When a person leaves this familiar environment and enters a different cultural world, the relevant system stops functioning and things surrounding him are bereft of cultural meanings.

Appresentational references reside in all these culturally significant objects. They may originate in the invention of a particular person or various people in a certain epoch, yet so long as they are commonly accepted by a group of people over time, they help constitute a particular socio-cultural group. In other words, they constitute what people take to be normal. Such normality is basically inaccessible to those who do not belong to this group. In particular, those who refuse to accept that normality will be treated as stranger to this society. Thus, for insiders, the value or significance is inherent in the objects, whereas for outsiders, it is added to these objects. Schutz calls the experience of outsiders the "pure" experience of the life-world. It comes up automatically when one is unable to catch the meaning of cultural objects. For example, if someone cannot grasp the meaning of an abstract painting, all that he perceives is nothing but some lines, colors and shapes. This situation demonstrates that the appresentative references fail to function at this moment.

Although Schutz's notion of the life-world is basically characterized by cultural difference, he shares with Husserl the idea of universalism when referring to "universal symbolism." Schutz argues that certain features are common to all social worlds since they are rooted in the human condition. It is the task of philosophical anthropology to work out the basic and universal dimensions of the human condition. Schutz's understanding of cultural difference is thus ambivalent. If we take cultural difference to be a consequent interpretation of the life-world, then how can the idea of universalism be integrated into his understanding of cultural difference? Does Schutz want to argue that a grounding layer of a single life-world exists instead of many concrete life-worlds? Schutz's idea of universality is similar to that of Husserl's. Although Schutz clearly rejects the notion that the pure experience of perception is the

essential life-world experience, he does seem to share with Husserl the idea of grounding (Grundlegungsidee) — an idea which Waldenfels, later, highlights.

Is there a cultural universalism that can plausibly incorporate cultural difference? This should be a perpetual question that remains to be answered from epoch to epoch. This book ventures to deal with this question by reflecting on the problem of cultural objects. How do we encounter cultural objects in a culture different from our own? The answers given by Husserl and Schutz are not satisfying so long as they rely on the natural or pure aspect of those cultural objects. They fail to see that the experience of encountering cultural objects from different cultures may call on us to learn from others and broaden our own horizon. Universals are ill-suited for cultural matters, after all. Correlatively, considering cultural objects from alien cultures requires acknowledging difference with a sense of humility that does not preclude the possibility of understanding. <>

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Bibliography

Timeless: A History of the Catholic Church by Steve Weidenkopf [Our Sunday Visitor, 9781681921488]

All the makings of your favorite adventure story - drama, intrigue, promise, love, hope, and heartache spanning two thousand years...and **YOU** are a part of it!

Timeless: A History of the Catholic Church is a fresh retelling of the history of the Church. In this easy-to-read, not-your-average history book, Steve Weidenkopf introduces you to the vivid, dynamic story of God's work in the world since Pentecost. Along the way, you will meet the weird, wonderful, and always fascinating heroes and villains of the Catholic family tree.

Read **Timeless: A History of the Catholic Church** and you'll

- Learn the past in order to make sense of our world,
- know Christ better,
- be prepared to defend your Faith and the Church, and
- understand where you fit in the greatest story ever told. <>

COSMOS AND CREATION: SECOND TEMPLE PERSPECTIVES edited by Michael W. Duggan, Renate Egger-Wenzel, and Stefan C. Reif [Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2019, DE GRUYTER 9783110676969]

This volume contains essays by some of the leading scholars in the study of the Jewish religious ideas in the Second Temple period, that led up to the development of early forms of Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity.

Close attention is paid to the cosmological ideas to be found in the Ancient Near East and in the Hebrew Bible and to the manner in which the translators of the Hebrew Bible into Greek reflected the creativity with which Judaism engaged Hellenistic ideas about the cosmos and the creation. The concepts of heaven and divine power, human mortality, the forces of nature, combat myths, and the philosophy of

wisdom, as they occur in 2 Maccabees, Ben Sira, Wisdom of Solomon and Tobit, are carefully analysed and compared with Greek and Roman world-views. There are also critical examinations of Dead Sea scroll texts, early Jewish prayers and Hebrew liturgical poetry and how they these adopt, adapt and alter earlier ideas. The editors have included appreciations of two major figures who played important roles in the study of the Second Temple period and in the history and development of the ISDCL, namely, Otto Kaiser and Alexander Di Lella, who died recently and are greatly missed by those in the field. <>

To Cast the First Stone: The Transmission of a Gospel Story by Jennifer Knust and Tommy Wasserman [Princeton University Press, 9780691169880]

The story of the woman taken in adultery features a dramatic confrontation between Jesus and the Pharisees over whether the adulteress should be stoned as the law commands. In response, Jesus famously states, "Let him who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her." *To Cast the First Stone* traces the history of this provocative story from its first appearance to its enduring presence today.

Likely added to the Gospel of John in the third century, the passage is often held up by modern critics as an example of textual corruption by early Christian scribes and editors, yet a judgment of corruption obscures the warm embrace the story actually received. Jennifer Knust and Tommy Wasserman trace the story's incorporation into Gospel books, liturgical practices, storytelling, and art, overturning the mistaken perception that it was either peripheral or suppressed, even in the Greek East. The authors also explore the story's many different meanings. Taken as an illustration of the expansiveness of Christ's mercy, the purported superiority of Christians over Jews, the necessity of penance, and more, this vivid episode has invited any number of creative receptions. This history reveals as much about the changing priorities of audiences, scribes, editors, and scholars as it does about an "original" text of John. <.

The Oxford Handbook of Faust in Music edited by Lorna Fitzsimmons and Charles McKnight [Oxford University Press, 9780199935185]

Since its emergence in sixteenth-century Germany, the magician Faust's quest has become one of the most profound themes in Western history. Though variants are found across all media, few adaptations have met with greater acclaim than in music. Bringing together more than two dozen authors in a foundational volume, **The Oxford Handbook of Faust in Music** testifies to the spectacular impact the Faust theme has exerted over the centuries. The Handbook's three-part organization enables readers to follow the evolution of Faust in music across time and stylistic periods. Part I explores symphonic, choral, chamber, and solo Faust works by composers from Beethoven to Schnittke. Part II discusses the range of Faustian operas, and Part III examines Faust's presence in ballet and musical theater. Illustrating the interdisciplinary relationships between music and literature and the fascinating tapestry of intertextual relationships among the works of Faustian music themselves, the volume suggests that rather than merely retelling the story of Faust, these musical compositions contribute significant insights on the tale and its unrivalled cultural impact. <>

Law and the Passions: Why Emotion Matters for Justice by Julia J.A. Shaw [Routledge, 9780415631594]

Engaging with the underlying social context in which emotions are a motivational force, Law and the Passions provides a uniquely inclusive commentary on the significance and influence of emotions in the history and continuing development of legal judgment, policy formation, legal practice and legal dogma.

Although the emotionality of the law and the use of emotional tropes in legal discourse has become an established focus in recent scholarship, the extent to which emotion and the passions have informed decision-making, decision-avoidance and legal reasoning – rather than as simply an adjunct – is still a matter for critical analysis. As evidenced in a range of illustrative legal cases, emotions have been instrumental in the evolution of key legal principles and have produced many controversial judgments. Addressing the latent influence of fear, hate, love and compassion, the book explores the mutability of law and its transformative power, especially when faced with fluctuating social mores. The textual nature of law and the impact of literary forms on legal actors are also critically examined to further elucidate the idea of law-making as both rational and emotional, and significantly as an essential activity of the empathic imagination. To this end, it is suggested that critical scholarship on law, the passions and emotions not only advances our understanding of the inner workings of law, it constitutes a fundamental part of our moral reasoning, and has the capacity to articulate the conditions for a more dynamic, adaptable, ethical and effective legal institution. <>

Handbook of Research on Crowdfunding edited by Hans Landström, Annaleena Parhankangas, Colin Mason [Research Handbooks in Business and Management, Edward Elgar Publishing, 9781788117203]

The digitalization revolution has significantly altered conditions for financing new and small firms. Crowdfunding is at the forefront of this movement. While research in this area has increased significantly, it is heavily fragmented. Reflecting on this, the Handbook of Research on Crowdfunding reviews and synthesizes current knowledge on crowdfunding finance and provides an agenda for further research.

This Handbook covers the role of crowdfunding and the platforms used, as well as discussing the characteristics of crowdfunders themselves and the businesses that seek finance from the 'crowd'. It also investigates the process once crowdfunding is complete, and how it is used by non-profit, social and creative ventures as well as for-profit businesses. Potential negative aspects are also discussed, including inequality, risk, fraud and regulation. Finally, the future of crowdfunding, including new finance models, is outlined.

Bringing together a wealth of previously fragmented knowledge, this **Handbook of Research on Crowdfunding** is a key reference for all entrepreneurial finance researchers as well as those interested in the effects of crowdfunding more generally across entrepreneurship, innovation, management and economics. <>

The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Feminism edited by Tasha Oren and Andrea Press [Routledge International Handbooks, Routledge, 9781138845114]

Feminism as a method, a movement, a critique, and an identity has been the subject of debates, contestations and revisions in recent years, yet contemporary global developments and political upheavals have again refocused feminism's collective force. What is feminism now? How do scholars and

activists employ contemporary feminism? What feminist traditions endure? Which are no longer relevant in addressing contemporary global conditions?

In this interdisciplinary collection, scholars reflect on how contemporary feminism has shaped their thinking and their field as they interrogate its uses, limits, and reinventions. Organized as a set of questions over definition, everyday life, critical intervention, and political activism, the Handbook takes on a broad set of issues and points of view to consider what feminism is today and what current forces shape its future development. It also includes an extended conversation among major feminist thinkers about the future of feminist scholarship and activism.

The scholars gathered here address a wide variety of topics and contexts: activism from post-Soviet collectives to the Arab spring, to the #MeToo movement, sexual harassment, feminist art, film and digital culture, education, technology, policy, sexual practices and gender identity. Indispensable for scholars undergraduate and postgraduate students in women, gender, and sexuality, the collection offers a multidimensional picture of the diversity and utility of feminist thought in an age of multiple uncertainties. <>

The Routledge History of Medieval Magic edited by Sophie Page and Catherine Rider [Routledge Histories, Routledge, 9781472447302]

The Routledge History of Medieval Magic brings together the work of scholars from across Europe and North America to provide extensive insights into recent developments in the study of medieval magic between c.1100 and c.1500.

This book covers a wide range of topics, including the magical texts which circulated in medieval Europe, the attitudes of intellectuals and churchmen to magic, the ways in which magic intersected with other aspects of medieval culture, and the early witch trials of the fifteenth century. In doing so, it offers the reader a detailed look at the impact that magic had within medieval society, such as its relationship to gender roles, natural philosophy, and courtly culture. This is furthered by the book's interdisciplinary approach, containing chapters dedicated to archaeology, literature, music, and visual culture, as well as texts and manuscripts.

The Routledge History of Medieval Magic also outlines how research on this subject could develop in the future, highlighting under-explored subjects, unpublished sources, and new approaches to the topic. It is the ideal book for both established scholars and students of medieval magic. <>

The Greater & Lesser Worlds of Robert Fludd: Macrocosm, Microcosm & Medicine by Joscelyn Godwin [Inner Traditions, 9781620559499]

An illustrated reference book on a seminal figure of occult philosophy and Renaissance thought

- Explains Fludd's thoughts on cosmic harmonies, divination, the kabbalah, astrology, geomancy, alchemy, the Rosicrucians, and multiple levels of existence
- Includes more than 200 of Fludd's illustrations, representing the whole corpus of Fludd's iconography, each one accompanied by Godwin's expert commentary

- Explores Fludd's medical work as an esoteric Paracelsian physician and his theories on the macrocosm of elements, planets, stars, and subtle and divine beings and the microcosm of the human being and its creative activities, including material never before translated

One of the last Renaissance men, Robert Fludd (1574-1637) was one of the great minds of the early modern period. A physician by profession, he was also a Christian Hermetist, a Rosicrucian, an alchemist, astrologer, musician, and inventor. His drive to encompass the whole of human knowledge--from music to alchemy, from palmistry to fortification--resulted in a series of books remarkable for their hundreds of engravings, a body of work recognized as the first example of a fully-illustrated encyclopedia.
In this in-depth, highly illustrated reference, scholar and linguist Joscelyn Godwin explains Fludd's theories on the correspondence between the macrocosm of elements, planets, stars, and subtle and divine beings and the microcosm of the human being and its creative activities. He shows how Fludd's two worlds--the macrocosm and the microcosm--along with Paracelsus's medical principles and the works of Hermes Trismegistus provided the foundation for his search for the cause and cure of all diseases. The more than 200 illustrations in the book represent the whole corpus of Fludd's iconography, each one accompanied by Godwin's expert commentary and explanation. Sharing many passages translated for the first time from Fludd's Latin, allowing him to speak for himself, Godwin explores Fludd's thoughts on cosmic harmonies, divination, the kabbalah, astrology, geomancy, and the rapport between the multiple levels of existence. He also analyzes Fludd's writings in defense of alchemy and the Rosicrucians.

An essential reference for scholars of Renaissance thinkers, traditional cosmology, metaphysics, and the Western esoteric tradition, this book offers intimate access to Fludd's worlds and gives one a feel for an epoch in which magic, science, philosophy, spirituality, and imagination could still cohabit and harmonize within a single mind. <>

Jungian Literary Criticism: The Essential Guide by Susan Rowland [Jung: The Essential Guides, Routledge, 9781138673731]

In **Jungian Literary Criticism: The Essential Guide**, Susan Rowland demonstrates how ideas such as archetypes, the anima and animus, the unconscious and synchronicity can be applied to the analysis of literature. Jung's emphasis on creativity was central to his own work, and here Rowland illustrates how his concepts can be applied to novels, poetry, myth and epic, allowing a reader to see their personal, psychological and historical contribution.

This multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary approach challenges the notion that Jungian ideas cannot be applied to literary studies, exploring Jungian themes in canonical texts by authors including Shakespeare, Jane Austen and W. B. Yeats as well as works by twenty-first century writers, such as in digital literary art. Rowland argues that Jung's works encapsulate realities beyond narrow definitions of what a single academic discipline ought to do, and through using case studies alongside Jung's work she demonstrates how both disciplines find a home in one another. Interweaving Jungian analysis with literature, **Jungian Literary Criticism: The Essential Guide** explores concepts from the shadow to contemporary issues of ecocriticism and climate change in relation to literary works, and emphasises the importance of a reciprocal relationship. Each chapter concludes with key

definitions, themes and further reading, and the book encourages the reader to examine how worldviews change when disciplines combine. <>

PHRASIKLEIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF READING IN ANCIENT GREECE by Jesper S Venbro, translated by Janet Lloyd [Myth and Poetics, Cornell University Press, 9780801425196]

First published in French in 1988, this extraordinary book traces the meaning and function of reading from its very beginnings in Greek oral culture through the development of silent reading.

One of the most haunting early examples of Greek alphabetical writing appears on the life-sized Archaic funerary statue of a young girl. The inscription speaks for Phrasikleia, who "shall always be called maiden," for she has received this name from the gods instead of marriage. <>

How Reason Can Lead to God: A Philosopher's Bridge to Faith by Joshua Rasmussen [IVP Academic, 9780830852529]

Do you seek the truth? Do you value reason, science, and independent thinking? Are you skeptical of beliefs that people maintain merely "on faith," yet you remain interested in the big questions of life? Do you hope there could be a greater purpose to the universe, if only that were realistic? If so, then philosopher Joshua Rasmussen can encourage you in your journey. Beginning with his own story of losing faith and the belief in any ultimate purpose in life, he then builds a bridge to a series of universal truths about ultimate reality. Using only the instruments of reason and common experience, Rasmussen constructs a pathway—step by step, brick by brick—that he argues can lead to meaning and, ultimately, a vision of God. >?

Divine Action and the Human Mind by Sarah Lane Ritchie [Current Issues in Theology, Cambridge University Press, 9781108476515]

Is the human mind uniquely nonphysical or even spiritual, such that divine intentions can meet physical realities? As scholars in science and religion have spent decades attempting to identify a 'causal joint' between God and the natural world, human consciousness has been often privileged as just such a locus of divine-human interaction. However, this intuitively dualistic move is both out of step with contemporary science and theologically insufficient. By discarding the God-nature model implied by contemporary noninterventionist divine action theories, one is freed up to explore theological and metaphysical alternatives for understanding divine action in the mind. Sarah Lane Ritchie suggests that a theologically robust theistic naturalism offers a more compelling vision of divine action in the mind. By affirming that to be fully natural is to be involved with God's active presence, one may affirm divine action not only in the human mind, but throughout the natural world. <>

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Religion and the Philosophy of Life by Gavin Flood [Oxford University Press, 9780198836124]

Religion and the Philosophy of Life considers how religion as the source of civilization transforms the fundamental bio-sociology of humans through language and the somatic exploration of religious ritual and prayer. Gavin Flood offers an integrative account of the nature of the human, based on what contemporary scientists tell us, especially evolutionary science and social neuroscience, as well as through the history of civilizations. Part one contemplates fundamental questions and assumptions: what the current state of knowledge is concerning life itself; what the philosophical issues are in that understanding; and how we can explain religion as the driving force of civilizations in the context of human development within an evolutionary perspective. It also addresses the question of the emergence of religion and presents a related study of sacrifice as fundamental to religions' views about life and its transformation. Part two offers a reading of religions in three civilizational blocks--India, China, and Europe/the Middle East--particularly as they came to formation in the medieval period. It traces the history of how these civilizations have thematised the idea of life itself. Part three then takes up the idea of a life force in part three and traces the theme of the philosophy of life through to modern times. On the one hand, the book presents a narrative account of life itself through the history of civilizations, and on the other presents an explanation of that narrative in terms of life. <>

The Bloomsbury Companion to Arendt edited by Peter Grattan and Yasemin Sari [Bloomsbury Companions, Bloomsbury Academic, 9781350053298]

Hannah Arendt's (1906-1975) writings, both in public magazines and in her important books, are still widely studied today. She made original contributions in political thinking that still astound readers and critics alike. The subject of several films and numerous books, colloquia, and newspaper articles, Arendt remains a touchstone in innumerable debates about the use of violence in politics, the responsibility one has under dictatorships and totalitarianism, and how to combat the repetition of the horrors of the past.

The Bloomsbury Companion to Arendt offers the definitive guide to her writings and ideas, her influences and commentators, as well as the reasons for her lasting significance, with 66 original essays taking up in accessible terms the myriad ways in which one can take up her work and her continuing importance. These essays, written by an international set of her best readers and commentators, provides a comprehensive coverage of her life and the contexts in which her works were written. Special sections take up chapters on each of her key writings, the reception of her work, and key ways she interpreted those who influenced her. If one has come to Arendt from one of her essays on freedom, or from yet another bombastic account of her writings on Adolph Eichmann, or as as student or professor working in the field of Arendt studies, this book provides the ideal tool for thinking with and rediscovering one of the most important intellectuals of the past century. But just as importantly, contributors advance the study of Arendt into neglected areas, such as on science and ecology, to demonstrate her importance not just to debates in which she was well known, but those touched off only after her death. Arendt's approaches as well as her concrete claims about the political have much to offer given the current ecological and refugee crises, among others. In sum, then, the Companion

provides a tool for thinking with Arendt, but also for showing just where those thinking with her can take her work today. <>

A Guide to Understanding Eric Voegelin's Political Reality by Montgomery C. Erfourth [St. Augustine's Press, 9781587313479]

Eric Voegelin was a German-born political theorist who fled Nazi persecution and immigrated to the United States in 1938, where he had a long and productive academic career. He is widely considered one of the most insightful political scientists of the twentieth century, but is sadly not as well known as other contemporaries like Leo Strauss or Hannah Arendt. This is in large part due to the difficulty of the topics he chose to study and the complex nature of the material produced. While there are other books that discuss his biography and academic/philosophical ideas, none combine these ideas with a practical means of actually utilizing Voegelin's philosophy to define and analyze political reality. This book uniquely applys Voegelin's ideas to real-world political problems and in its utilization of common language, making Voegelin's extraordinary achievements much more accessible to a broader audience than any other previous work. Voegelin's highly original thinking was heavily influenced by the violent and tumultuous times in which he lived. Because the events of his life are so influential, a brief but thorough biography is presented in the first chapter. The "Western Crisis" he recognized in modern Western culture is revealed as the motivation of Voegelin's quest for truth and the resistance he thought vital to the strains of Gnosticism he felt rejected reality and the symbols needed to articulate it. Because Gnosticism is such a central theme in understanding Voegelin's work, an extensive exploration is conducted on Gnostic origins, history, some complications in the use of this term, and how Voegelin's concept of it evolved over the course of his career. The first chapter concludes with and examination of Voegelin's use of symbol and language indices. Chapter two begins with an introduction to Voegelin's views of how science, theology, and philosophy were used in the ancient world to reveal truth, the basis of order, and how humanity can move away from order by disregarding what the ancients revealed. This is followed by an examination of one of Voegelin's most important contributions, his theory of consciousness and use of anamnesis. Chapter two concludes with a description of noesis' relationship to political reality and how Voegelin's quest to know truth and reality led him to question the state of political science and modernity's willingness to seek truth. Chapter three, on Voegelin's mature political theory, is best described as Principia Noetic, so labeled by Ellis Sandoz. Voegelin asserts that political reality is revealed when the basis of order is found in the ground of being. When man separates himself from God, order is lost, and violence and tyranny are guaranteed as man makes himself the sole arbiter of moral and political order, unrestricted by notions of the divine. The reader of this book should come away with a deep understanding of Voegelin's philosophical insights found in the Principia Noetica, how to apply them in understanding political reality, and how to recognize the symptoms of the "Western Crisis." <>

Finding Our Place Nature: Aristotle for Environmental Scientists by Richard Lynn Shearman [RIT PRESS, 9781939125620]

Finding Our Place Nature: Aristotle for Environmental Scientists argues that Aristotelian philosophy provides a much-needed ethical foundation for the environmental sciences and for our daily commitment to practices of sustainability. Shearman challenges previously held interpretations of Aristotle s value to the grounding of environmental ethics. He demonstrates that Aristotelian philosophy is a valuable and under-appreciated resource for any student-citizen who requires ethically persuasive reasons both for pursuing environmental science in the first place and for grounding our social practices

as citizens. The author clarifies sustainability as a moral concept as a means to better identify the underlying purpose of the environmental sciences. <>

Life-World and Cultural Difference: Husserl, Schutz, and Waldenfels by Chung-Chi Yu [Königshausen & Neumann, 9783826064517]

The fact that there are different cultures in the world is too obvious for words. COnsidering thus cultural differences in the light of the phenomenological concept of life-world may raise the following questions: Do we live in the same life-world regardless of such cultural differences? Or do we live in different life-worlds because of cultural differences? The first question presupposes a singular life-world, whereas the second question entails a plurality of life-worlds. IN any case, how is the notion of cultural difference related to that of the life-world? Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology seems to conceive the life-world as the bare ground of the natural sciences. The life-world therefore acquires a universal validity regardless of cultural differences. IN contrast, for Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who is more concerned with the foundation of human and social sciences than that of natural sciences, the life-world understood as field of praxis with social and cultural characteristics unavoidably assumes cultural differences. Besides critically discussing these two radically diverging positions, the book also discusses what Bernhard Waldenfels sees as a common denominator: the idea of grounding (Grundlegungsidee). Both Husserl and Schutz develop in their own ways a foundationalist interpretation of the life-world. In whatever case, the book seeks to overcome any foundationalism whether in the form of universalism or culturalism by suggesting to refocus and inquire into the status of cultural objects. Universals are ill-suited for cultural matters. Correlatively, considering cultural objects from alien cultures requires acknowledging difference with a sense of humility that does not preclude the possibility of understanding. <>