

# PART 2

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILES





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# ABOUT THE CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILES

The 30 civil society profiles contained in this report are based on the research undertaken by CIVICUS and country partners as part of the 2008 to 2011 CIVICUS Civil Society Index (CSI) project.

The CSI builds indicators on a scale of 0-100 which assess the strength of civil society on the five key dimensions of: the levels of civic participation; the institutional arrangements of CSOs; the extent to which CSOs practise progressive values; the perceived impact of civil society; and the external environment in which civil society operates. It is from these percentage scales that CSI numerical values given in the text are drawn. When the text refers to percentages of CSOs, this implies percentages of CSOs surveyed. All such values have been rounded into whole numbers.

Sometimes, published information from the World Values Survey was substituted by country partners for the public opinion survey for reasons of cost. In addition, the CSI makes use of some available external indicators from other indices, such as those published by Freedom House, Transparency International and World Bank Governance Indicators. CIVICUS is grateful for usage of those indicators.

Beyond the surveys, the CSI is an inclusive process of convening and consultation. A broad-based national advisory committee, made up of people from different parts of civil society, and those outside civil society, is drawn together to oversee the project. The country partners and advisory committee are tasked with consulting as wide a range of civil society as possible, beyond formalised NGOs and other CSOs.

One of major outputs produced from this process by the country partners and CIVICUS is a comprehensive Analytical Country Report. The civil society profiles presented here are largely distilled from the material published in the Analytical Country Reports in 2011, which analysed information mostly gathered in 2010 and 2011. CIVICUS has worked with partners to update this information to take into account the significant developments that took place as 2011 progressed and to verify wherever possible that the information presented is accurate and in keeping with consensual civil society positions. CIVICUS is grateful to CSI country partners and, in some additional cases, the inputs of members of the Affinity Group of National Associations, a group of CIVICUS members which are national civil society umbrella networks.

Each national process is supplied with CIVICUS' working definition of civil society but is asked to adjust it according to national nuances. One area where countries vary is in the inclusion of political

parties as part of civil society. In some countries there was a clear view that political parties form part of civil society; in others there was certainty that they do not. In all cases CIVICUS has respected the decision that was arrived at nationally. It should also be noted here that the CSI methodology makes a distinction between socially-oriented CSOs (those which have an emphasis on association in its own right and do not exist to seek to advance a particular interest or change) and politically-oriented CSOs (those which combine explicitly to advance interests and positions and which seek some kind of policy or political change). Again, the classification of CSOs into these two groupings is determined at the national level.

The civil society profiles contain the following sections:

- **Context and environment for civil society:** the main influencers of the environment and space in which civil society works, including recent political events; economic, political and social power relations; experience of the legal and regulatory environment for civil society.
- **Make up of civil society:** what some of the common types of CSOs are in a country; what their strengths are in relation to each other; how they relate to other types of CSOs.
- **Participation:** to what extent people are members of and volunteer in CSOs; what other arenas people participate in, including informal associational activity and individual political action.
- **Public trust:** the trust in different types of institutions, and other indicators of social capital; the perception of corruption in society, and in CSOs.
- **Networks:** the extent to which CSOs join formal networks, and network informally with other CSOs.
- **Resources:** the financial and human resource conditions of CSOs.
- **Impact:** the perceived impact both CSOs representatives, and informed external stakeholders, believe CSOs are making, both on the social situation of citizens, and at the policy level.
- **Recommendations:** some of the key recommendations which emerged from the convening process of the CSI for improving the state of civil society in a particular context, which may be addressed either at people within civil society or those outside it, usually governments.

The civil society profiles contain a selection of indicators from the CSI and, where available, indicators from other sources relevant to assessing the environment for civil society. Four country partners – Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal and Tanzania – applied an earlier version of the CSI methodology that scored indicators on a scale of 0 to 3, and therefore their CSI numerical indicators are not comparable with those of the other 27 here. Similarly, some country partners completed their quantitative data sets but did not subsequently publish country reports, and CSI rankings for countries are therefore ranked on a scale of 1 to 33.

In addition, the civil society profiles provide a few web links to sites which may be of interest for people wanting to learn more about civil society in a particular country. These usually include the website of the CSI country partner and, when applicable, that of the member of the Affinity Group of National Associations. For reasons of space it is not possible to provide a comprehensive list of links, and listing of a website does not imply endorsement of its contents by CIVICUS. Similarly, flags and maps are provided for visual purposes only and do not imply any opinion concerning the legal status of any territory or its borders. Monetary figures are given in US\$ unless stated otherwise and conversions were correct at time of writing.



Basic facts	
Capital	Tirana
Official language	Albanian
Population	3.0m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$3,678

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: ALBANIA

Despite progress achieved towards political rights and freedoms since the end of communism, the political context in Albania remains challenged by a low level of state effectiveness, with corruption and the rule of law key areas where reform is still needed. It is difficult for CSOs to achieve influence, due to internal challenges, limited dialogue and inefficient interactions with the state, and a generally distrustful attitude of citizens towards key institutions and processes, including civil society itself. While the institutions of civil society are well established, very few CSOs have an active membership base, demonstrating a pattern of largely donor-driven CSOs. Low levels of civic participation represent a barrier to CSO success, while there is also lack of coordination, both within civil society and with other sectors.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Key contemporary issues are poverty, high unemployment, widespread corruption, organised crime, poor infrastructure, environmental pollution, human rights, the rule of law and the EU. The major pillars of the Albanian public sphere are the government, the two main competing political parties (the ruling centre-right Democratic Party and the opposition Socialist Party) and law enforcement agencies. Other important actors are universities, international donors and the media, which can all to some extent exert influence on the government.

Local elections were held in May 2011, according to the constitution and electoral code, which was agreed by the two main parties in 2008. However, the EU's assessment of the elections was negative, concluding that the electoral framework needs to be reformed. Albania is formally considered a 'potential candidate' for EU membership, but its hopes of progress have been disrupted by these events, as the local elections were considered key to moving on from a two-year political crisis caused by the Socialist Party's rejection of the 2009 parliamentary election results and resultant boycott of parliament. The July 2012 presidential elections will therefore prove a key test of the functioning of political competition. Albania's aspiration towards EU membership represents an opportunity for civil society to push for a more enabling environment, given that accession elsewhere has forced more inclusive civil society policy and opened new civil society space.

Some recent positive efforts by the government can be seen towards improving the situation for civil society. In October 2007, the Council of Ministers

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 55.1. Civic Engagement: 47.6; Level of Organisation: 58.1; Practice of Values: 58.6; Perception of Impact: 51.2; External Environment: 60.2. Ranked 9 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	7.5%
CSOs network membership	73.6%
Policy activity	78.5%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.739. Ranked 70 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.1. Ranked 95 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.27. Percentile rank: 45.5. Rule of law: -0.44. Percentile rank: 40.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 34.4. Ranked 96 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: moderate. Score: 74 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 61. Ranked 121 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.81. Ranked 87 out of 167

established a separate budget line to support civil society, while in March 2009, parliament approved a law on the organisation and functioning of a civil society support agency. The objective of the agency is to encourage the sustainable development of CSOs through the provision of technical and financial assistance for capacity-building initiatives. Additionally, the Civil Society Charter – a non-legally binding framework for cooperation – was developed through a consultative process between government officials and civil society representatives. The Charter is viewed as a political commitment which underscores civil society's role as a key development partner. While a general upward trend in the willingness of state agencies to cooperate with civil society can be noted, it is often characterised by a pro forma approach. It is also noteworthy that the success of many of these reforms can be attributed to support from international donors and partners.

Despite these developments, there are still very few government ministries and departments that have established formal mechanisms for engaging with civil society, and their administrative capacity to do so is often inadequate. This is reflected in the fact that 56% of CSOs surveyed view civil society-state dialogue as limited. Further, only 41% of external stakeholders assess civil society's relations with parliament as effective, and only 43% view

relations with the government as effective, rising to 57% for relations with the judiciary and a more encouraging 77% for relations with local government.

Freedom House assesses Albania as a partly free country, and 28% of CSOs surveyed by CIVICUS state that they have experienced illegitimate restriction or attack from local or central government, while 39% believe that the legal framework for civil society is quite limiting. In July 2010, parliament enacted a law on 'financial inspection' that has potential impact on civil society, without a consultative process. In January 2011, a corruption scandal involving the Deputy Prime Minister resulted in public unrest, with tens of thousands of peaceful protesters taking to the streets of Tirana demanding early elections. Three protesters were killed in the ensuing clash between protesters and police.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Human rights organisations were among the first to be established following the end of communism, while the late 1990s economic crisis, caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes, and the Kosovan war that led to a large increase in refugees, saw a dramatic growth of CSOs, with almost 49% of registered NGOs established between 1997 and 2001. This period also saw the development of think tanks, conflict resolution and management organisations (especially following the revival of the Kanun – a body of traditional laws - and ensuing blood feuds), organisations dealing with landmines, and women's rights, environment, economic development, youth and media organisations. The business community, unions, CBOs and religious groups are all considered as important segments of society, but links between these are minimal.

Compared to the distribution of CSOs in most countries, where service-oriented organisations dominate, institutional civil society in Albania has a high representation of civic groups, human rights organisations, think tanks and local capacity development NGOs, along with a smaller number of women's groups. It can therefore be broadly characterised as an advocacy rather than service-oriented sector, reflecting a heavy donor role. CSOs are also concentrated in the capital, Tirana, with much fewer and weaker CSOs in rural communities, even though Albania remains a predominantly agriculture-based economy.



Civil society activity after 2005 saw a growing tendency of civil society leaders to transition into politics, blurring the boundaries between the two sectors in the public's opinion and fuelling disillusionment.

## PARTICIPATION

Albanian citizens display little willingness to take part in civil activity, and there have been few initiatives that focus on developing an active citizenry, suggesting an enduring challenge to civil society success. A relatively small middle class and high levels of inequalities are also factors behind low rates of participation. Only 18% of people surveyed describe themselves as active members of social organisations such as sports clubs and voluntary or service organisations, with volunteering at the same level. Levels of participation in informal social associational activities are higher, but at around 29%, this is still low compared to other countries. Individual activism, such as signing a petition or taking part in a demonstration, is also low, at 28%.

Political engagement is slightly higher, with 24% membership in more politically-oriented CSOs, and 30% volunteering. Formal volunteering in organisations still has an image problem, given the compulsory voluntary service that existed under communism. The main motivations for participating are shared values (44%) and pursuit of personal interests (31%).

## PUBLIC TRUST

A significant lack of public trust and interpersonal confidence, and high levels of intolerance towards distinct social groups, make the environment for CSO operations difficult. Low levels of participation go alongside low levels of public confidence in political organisations, with political parties and labour unions enjoying the lowest levels of confidence of citizens, and many types of CSOs and state organisations having the trust of only 40%. However, religious organisations, charitable and humanitarian organisations and women's organisations have public trust as high as 60%. Most trust is exercised in international bodies such as the EU, UN and NATO, where the average level of trust is 80%. It is also noteworthy that the private sector and media enjoy low confidence, as on average only 33% of people trust these institutions.

Albania is ranked 95th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, with slightly higher levels of perceived corruption than most other Balkan countries. Civil society is affected by this: 38% of CSOs surveyed believe corruption in the sector is frequent and 27% that it is occasional, while over half of external stakeholders consulted believe civil society lacks transparency.

## NETWORKS

Albanian civil society considers itself as highly networked, with 73% of CSOs surveyed being members of at least one support network. A total of 92 different networks and umbrella organisations are identified, with 48 of these being national structures and 44 Balkans, European or global networks. In addition, substantial cooperation goes on outside formal networks: 88% CSOs have met with other CSOs and 89% exchanged information with them within a three month period.

High reliance on donor support has been identified as one of the weaknesses of networks; in the main networks deliver results and members remain active only for as long as there is donor funding.

## RESOURCES

Having built up a good infrastructure in the past two decades of donor support, which saw a relatively stable financial support base, CSOs must now adapt to donor withdrawal. However, most

CSOs apparently do not have plans that go beyond the existing framework of opportunities and conditions. The majority of CSOs surveyed, 57%, report that foreign, non-EU donors are their main source of financial support, followed by government (18%) and Albanian corporations (10%). Only a minor portion of CSOs, 2% each, cite service fees, individual donations or membership fees as a significant funding source. Although the EU has allocated considerable funds for civil society, which are expected to grow, problems that have been experienced in other countries, where CSOs have to be of a large size to navigate bureaucratic application procedures and receive funding, mean that only around 8% of CSOs expect to take advantage of this. The government also seems unprepared to increase its support. 75% of surveyed CSOs believe that donor priorities are very influential in shaping civil society's agenda, although 72% also believe they have had some impact in influencing donor priorities.

The cost and sustainability of human resources is one of the most problematic issues for CSOs, which are predominantly project-based, receiving funding on an annual or grant basis. Only 16% of CSOs surveyed are assessed as having a sustainable human resource base, defined as having no more than 25% voluntary staff.

## IMPACT

60% of CSOs surveyed believe civil society has tangible impact on transparent governance and 42% on tackling corruption. It can be noted that these are also key areas of donor focus. External stakeholders rate impact on governance as higher but only a quarter of them believe CSOs have tangible impact on another issue they identify as important, poverty reduction and economic development. 73% of CSO representatives and 60% of external stakeholders believe impact is tangible on the key issues of social development, education and support to vulnerable and marginalised groups.

When asked about the policy activity of their own organisation 74% of CSOs declared that they had pushed for a policy change in the past two years but only 38% of those that did so reported success in their advocacy, suggesting systemic barriers to advocacy or enduring capacity challenges. There are however some past examples of government consulting civil society in the preparation of public policies, for example, the national social and economic development policy, and more recently on the laws on domestic violence, legal aid and consumer protection, the first two of which emanated from draft laws proposed by CSOs.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

A key recommendation for Albanian CSOs is to initiate actions that expand and deepen people's participation in CSO actions and structures, including initiatives that increase public confidence in CSOs through enhancing internal transparency, accountability and democratic decision-making. There is also need to increase communication and outreach towards citizens and communities; improve advocacy efforts with government actors and the donor community; undertake campaigns

to promote values of non-discrimination, tolerance, and inclusion of marginalised groups, such as women, Roma, sexual minorities and people with disabilities; and intensify cooperation with Balkan and European networks and integrate with EU-based civil society. From the state, there is a need to introduce a new taxation and financial reporting legislative framework and to implement the Charter for Civil Society.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

Institute for Democracy and Media - [www.idmalbania.org](http://www.idmalbania.org)

Albania Helsinki Committee - [www.ahc.org.al](http://www.ahc.org.al)

Citizen's Advocacy Office - [www.cao.al](http://www.cao.al)

Institute for Development Research and Alternatives - [www.idra-al.org](http://www.idra-al.org)

MJAFT! Movement - [www.mjajt.org](http://www.mjajt.org)

Open Society Foundation Albania - [www.soros.al](http://www.soros.al)



Basic facts	
Capital	Buenos Aires
Official language	Spanish
Population	41.8m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$9,124

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: ARGENTINA

Argentine civil society has earned higher public visibility and strengthened its capacity for dialogue with government and the private sector in recent years. A wider acknowledgement of the role of civil society by government can be seen in the creation of new areas within government which include in their mission the strengthening of civil society and CSOs, and the development of some formal consultation channels, such as consultative boards, participatory budgets and citizens' audits. Limiting factors, however, include a continuing low level of trust between civil society and state, a lack of continuity in government approaches to civil society consultation and a tendency to involve CSOs at the level of implementation and consultation, rather than in the real design of policies. CSOs believe that they are hindered through fragmentation and lack of coordination, and also face challenges of high state centralism, political favouritism and a welfarist culture.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Left of centre President Fernandez's power was consolidated in the general election of October 2011, in which she won an absolute majority of the popular vote (54%) with the highest winning margin (36%) since the restoration of democracy in 1983. The president's power is buttressed by supportive groupings, such as labour unions, human rights organisations and some grassroots organisations, which formed in response to the 2001-2002 financial crisis and which have now solidified into social movements associated with political parties. Also important for the governing coalition, which has a majority in both Chambers of Congress, are provincial and municipal governments, most of which support the current Presidency. Formal political opposition became fragmented after the election, with many other political parties and figures losing public support and visibility. Some political tension exists between government and the media and private sector. An open dispute began when the government tried to reduce the influence of some of the major media groups that take a persistently critical position on the government, while tensions are still unresolved with the private sector following the imposition of interventionist rural and industrial economic policies.

Argentina's recent socio-economic history is one of recovery from its 2001-2002 financial crisis, which saw 20% unemployment and 50% poverty in 2002. The following years witnessed a decade of economic expansion and the extension of the social safety net for low income

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 48.6. Civic Engagement: 38.8; Level of Organisation: 52.6; Practice of Values: 39.6; Perception of Impact: 47.6; External Environment: 64.6. Ranked 24 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	17.6%
CSOs network membership	46.5%
Policy activity	67.7%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.797. Ranked 45 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 2. Civil liberties score: 2
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3. Ranked 100 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.21. Percentile rank: 46.9. Rule of law: -0.58. Percentile rank: 32.7
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 14. Ranked 47 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: strong. Score: 87 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 41. Ranked 145 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.84. Ranked 51 out of 167

families. However, problems such as unemployment, poverty and inequality persist. Inflation remains a challenge: the rate is disputed, but on some rankings it was believed to be the third highest in the world in 2010, and is estimated as second in Latin America after Venezuela at the time of writing.

Electoral processes are deemed to be broadly free and fair and there are guarantees of political rights and freedoms. However, freedom of access to public information is restricted, media freedom has some limits and there are some abuses of political authority. Consequently, only 43% of CSO representatives surveyed believe the legal and political environment for CSOs is enabling and nearly a quarter report having experienced attacks or illegitimate restrictions on their operations from local or central government within the past 10 years. CSOs report particular grievances about access to and transparency of government funds, laws and policies on donations, tax exemptions and labour rules, and procedures for gaining legal entity status.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The period following the end of dictatorship in 1983 saw an unprecedented growth and increase in the diversity of civil society.

Emerging organisation types post-dictatorship included think tanks and research centres, community clubs and unions, cooperatives, cultural organisations, self-help groups, protest movements and corporate foundations. Particularly prominent newcomers on the scene were CSOs promoting and defending rights. Some of these surged during the dictatorship in pursuit of truth and justice for the state's crimes, but many others followed, broadening their objectives to other issues of rights. Examples include CSO related to environmental issues, women's rights, minority rights, citizenship participation and democracy promotion. Persistent socio-economic problems together with the decentralisation policies implemented in the 1990s saw the creation of new arenas of operation for CSOs at the local level such as education, nutrition, health, housing, and, especially after the 2001-2002 crisis, the growth of CSOs focussing on poverty with approaches such as microcredit and workers' management of enterprise. Protest movements also grew into a new actor in the political arena, using forms of dissent such as blocking streets and pot-banging. Some of these movements gradually turned into more formalised organisations and networks offering strong ties between local and political arenas. Alongside this growth in the last two decades, other important developments were the creation of organisations with a specific mission to try to strengthen civil society, the academic study of the sector, the development of corporate foundations, and increasing media coverage of civil society activities. Most recent developments include organisations for emerging social causes such as human trafficking, drug addictions, delinquency and traffic accidents.

In civil society, the most prominent actors are assessed as the ruling Justicialista Party, the unions belonging to the CGT (General Confederation of Labour), rural and industrial sector organisations, and the Catholic Church and its related organisations. NGOs constitute a wide range of organisations and networks with little internal coordination and wide differences in their relationships with other sectors such as media, donors, the state and private sector.

## PARTICIPATION

Participation and membership in CSOs is low, with participation in socially-oriented CSOs higher than in politically-oriented ones: only 26% of Argentineans consider themselves an active member



of a social CSO and only 11% of a political CSO. Volunteering for such organisations is even lower than membership. Volunteering as a whole experienced a noticeable decline from 2002 (32%) to 2008 (19%), although it recovered a little in 2010 (22%). This remains, however, lower than world and regional averages. Regarding the diversity of civil society, while women are well represented – 57% of the CSO workforce is female – poor people and the rural population are not.

Informal participation is higher: around 43% of people report participating in informal associational activities, while 32% take part in individual acts of political activism.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Only around one in four of the population trust civil society as a whole, when trust in different CSO types is averaged, which is much lower than the Latin American average. This result reflects particularly low levels of trust in political parties and unions, each with 8% trust, and there are also pervasive low levels of trust in other types of institutions, such as the public service (8%), Congress (14%), the justice system (20%), corporations (25%) and the press (36%). Amidst this general picture of distrust, particular sections of civil society occupy the four highest spots: 68% trust charitable or humanitarian organisations, 62% the environmental movement, 56% the church and 40% trust the women's movement. Perceptions that society is characterised by high levels of individualism and distrust also affect perceptions of civil society. More positively, levels of tolerance for minorities and marginalised groups, such as gay and lesbian people, immigrants and people with HIV/AIDS, are far higher in Argentina than regional and world averages.

Argentina is ranked at joint 100th out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating much higher levels of perceived political corruption than in neighbouring Chile or Uruguay. Regarding corruption within civil society, over half of CSO representatives surveyed believe corruption cases are either frequent or very frequent, a perception likely to have been strengthened by a high profile embezzlement scandal in a CSO run by a close ally of the president in 2010.

## NETWORKS

CSO networks are characterised by their diversity and differing levels of formality, with rising use of ICTs driving new forms of interaction. Argentina however scores below the Latin American average for CSO network membership, at 47% of CSOs compared to the average of 58%, although the Argentinean figure is assessed to have grown by 10% in the last ten years.

Large scale networks are seen as weak, particularly those which seek to promote the interests of the sector as a whole. Similarly the degree to which CSOs informally exchange information, while standing at just over 75%, is a little lower than the Latin American average. There is a low level of relationships between CSOs working on different issues, and clear gaps in exchange between different types of civil society actors, such as between NGOs and unions or business groupings, and also between political movements, religious organisations and sports clubs. Organisations linked to universities are also not seen as well connected to other CSO types. Civil society believes itself to have minimal international interaction, something reflected in low membership of international networks, few interactions with foreign CSOs, and very low levels of foreign aid.

*“Civil society believes itself to have minimal international interaction.”*

## RESOURCES

Volunteers in CSOs outnumber paid employees by about four to one, with about 60% of CSOs relying on unpaid staff only. There is a high rotation of personnel, but about two thirds of CSOs

assess their human resources to be adequate. This can be compared to 40% which regard their technological resources as adequate and only 17% which think the same about their financial resources. CSOs in Argentina are highly dependent on government, with one in ten CSOs obtaining 90% of their funds from the state. 45% of CSOs have only one or two sources of funding, and for 33% of these, one of those two sources is the state. Membership fees and private donations are the other significant sources of funding, with 47% and 41% of CSOs having these sources.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves as having most impact on the promotion of rights (72% surveyed considered impact to be high or intermediate), education and culture (67%), and support to the poor and other vulnerable groups (65%). Lower impact is perceived on the promotion of good governmental (28%) and corporate (31%) practices, and tackling insecurity and delinquency (33%). External experts largely agree with this picture, but rate CSOs' ability to help protect the environment and natural resources more highly (63% vs. 57%), and their impact on unemployment lower (42% vs. 51%). Over half of CSOs surveyed assess that the sector has a high or medium impact on social issues, but there is also realism about their ability to tackle significant and complex social issues beyond their immediate capacity, and an acknowledgement that civil society's treatment of issues tends to be somewhat palliative and in response to immediate and specific needs, rather than as part of a medium or long term strategy.

68% of CSOs surveyed have made some attempt to influence public policies over the last two years, and 49% of these were able to cite at least one successful attempt. At the same time the picture is complex: CSOs assess their policy influence pessimistically, with 64% saying the sector makes none or a limited impact on policies. Among external stakeholders, over 70% of those surveyed could cite an example of civil society successfully influencing public policy within a two year period, but only 44% rate the overall policy impact of the sector highly.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the strengthening of Argentine civil society include: promoting public figures as ambassadors for civil society and its organisations; creating public access resource centres on CSO strengthening; encouraging university programmes to place students in CSOs as part of their studies; and stimulating the creation of local level bodies with a mandate to promote civil society and its organisations.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Social and Institutional Analysis and Development Group – GADIS - [www.gadis.org.ar](http://www.gadis.org.ar)

Pontifical Catholic University of Argentina - [www.uca.edu.ar](http://www.uca.edu.ar)

Argentine Network for International Cooperation – RACI - [www.raci.org.ar](http://www.raci.org.ar)

Social Sector Forum - [www.forodelsectorsocial.org.ar](http://www.forodelsectorsocial.org.ar)



Basic facts	
Capital	Yerevan
Official language	Armenian
Population	2.97m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$3,031

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: ARMENIA

Civil society in Armenia appears to have made some progress in indigenising itself and addressing sustainability issues, amidst criticisms that it has been a foreign-led, donor-funded phenomenon. Civil society identifies the most pressing issues in Armenia today as corruption, with its deep-rooted, and limited freedom of expression. One of the defining characteristics of Armenia is the strong role of its large diaspora, which has a potentially more significant role to play in the future support of civil society.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Armenia now ranks as a lower middle income country, having grown significantly economically since independence, with poverty levels having reduced from 55% to 25% in the first decade of the 2000s. Some progress was also made on tackling inequality levels, but significant urban-rural divides exist. The global economic crisis served to reverse this rapid growth, with Armenia experiencing one of the most severe recessions in the world. Another challenge is the high outward migration of educated people. Armenia is one of the world's top exporters of people per capita, and at least twice as many Armenians live in the diaspora as in the country itself, estimated at 6 million compared to 3 million in Armenia. Remittances are therefore important, and yet these dropped by 30% between at the height of the crisis between 2008 and 2009.

The Armenian diaspora is therefore an important actor in the economy, politics and civil society, having played a role in shaping both Armenian independence and its resulting civil society. Within this there are distinct sub-groups, such as the Russian diaspora, which tends to have heavy business interests in Armenia, and the American diaspora, which tends to be engaged in political issues, such as those resulting from the Armenian Genocide of the early 20th century and the Nagorno-Karabakh War of the 1990s.

The most powerful forces within society are the president's administration, the ruling coalition parties and oligarchs and large national and international corporations. The prime minister is appointed by the president and is less influential. Other significant forces include local government bodies, the Central Bank of Armenia and business associations. The most recent presidential election, in 2008, was seen as unfair, and marked by post-election violence. Party

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 46.54. Civic Engagement: 37.4; Level of Organisation: 54.9; Practice of Values: 51.1; Perception of Impact: 35.1; External Environment: 54.2. Ranked 28 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	17.8%
CSOs network membership	39.4%
Policy activity	35.2%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.716. Ranked 86 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.6. Ranked 129 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.15. Percentile rank: 49.8. Rule of law: -0.47. Percentile rank: 39.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 27. Ranked 77 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: moderate. Score: 72 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 101 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 4.09. Ranked 111 out of 167

politics is characterised by patronage and the judicial system is widely viewed as compromised.

Recently, previously undeveloped state-civil society and private sector-civil society linkages have started to evolve. Two state institutions now have codes of participatory cooperation with public organisations, which entail the formal involvement of CSOs. There is advocacy around the adoption of such a code across the government. Most laws are in line with international standards, but enforcement is weak. Around two thirds of CSOs surveyed believe the legal and regulatory framework to be at least moderately enabling, and registration can be done locally. However, the Law on Public Organisations outlaws direct economic activities, inhibiting funding diversification, and the law does not provide tax benefits for CSOs, which are taxed as businesses. Legal and regulatory weaknesses are also believed to hinder people from volunteering.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There are currently around 5,000 registered CSOs. While associational life has a long history in Armenia, civil society in its modern form emerged after the break up of the Soviet Union, and was predominantly shaped by foreign forces. The influx of donor

funds led to a large growth of organised and goal-oriented NGOs, formed largely to promote values of democracy and human rights. As a result, the civil society discourse in Armenia has generally had a quite narrow focus, equating civil society with professional advocacy or service delivery NGOs.

The most powerful forces within civil society are international NGOs and the local CSOs they support, and civic entities led by former politicians and state officials. Also significant are some national advocacy groups, the Armenian Apostolic Church and the mass media. Some non legitimate CSOs have been set up by authorities and political parties, and there is a lack of independence in broadcast media. Polarisation of some CSOs around governing or opposition political parties is also an issue, which reduces trust in civil society.

## PARTICIPATION

Armenia records low levels of participation. Only around 12% of people are members of a socially-oriented CSO, and only around 8% volunteer for one, while rates of political membership, at 9%, are no higher. Most political parties do not seek broad-based membership and do not connect with CSOs, while religious and cultural organisations enjoy the highest rates of participation. There is a chilling effect of past mandatory participation under communism on the current willingness to participate. Financial conditions are also a constraint: the lowest socio-economic class is the one that participates least, which implies that economic downturn is likely to have influenced participation. Further, many CSOs are critiqued for insufficiently capitalising on potential volunteers, and for providing a poor experience for those who volunteer. Those who are engaged, however, participate frequently and extensively. Around two thirds of people who participate in community activities do so at least once a month. Women and ethnic minorities are assessed to participate strongly in civil society, and around 80% of CSOs are estimated to be led by women.

There seems to be low potential for individual activism: 72% would never sign a petition, 71% never attend a demonstration and 86% never join a boycott. Against this, community participation in rural Armenia is strong, often expressed in the contribution of voluntary labour for community



infrastructure and local environmental maintenance initiatives. Informal, unmanaged volunteering is the dominant form of volunteering. However, the weakness is that this does not translate into an ability to influence the design of local policies and decisions over resource allocation. This suggests there is a need for CSOs to better engage with and provide channels for this high level of non-formal activity to connect with CSO activities.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Public trust in CSOs stands at around 40%, which is higher than a 2007 study that established a figure of 18%. There is a long standing perception of CSOs, particularly NGOs, as consumers of grants and servers of foreign interests, although this new level suggests this may be changing. The highest level of trust, 78%, is accorded to church CSOs, followed by charitable and humanitarian organisations at 59%, women's organisations at 49% and environmental organisations at 48%. Confidence in political parties and unions is low: over 80% do not trust them.

Over half of CSO representatives believe corrupt practices in civil society are frequent or very frequent, although this contrasts with public opinion, with over half of people believing corruption in civil society to be very rare. Corruption is an endemic problem, with Armenia ranked 129th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Critical areas for corruption are the judiciary, tax and customs, health, education and law enforcement. Government attempts to combat corruption are inconsistent and are yet to be seen to meet with success.

*“Over half of people believe corruption in civil society to be very rare.”*

## NETWORKS

39% of CSOs report being members of a network. However, this could represent an improvement from a low level, given a figure of only 20% in 2007. Increased networking may to some extent be donor-driven, as networking is often a requirement of funding, and there are concerns about the sustainability of networks if donor support is not forthcoming. At least eight coalitions formed as a result of USAID grants for work around elections, three of which subsequently continued as networks. Around 60 CSOs now also network to collaborate with the National Assembly, resulting in ongoing work with parliamentary committees. Beyond formal network membership, 71% of CSOs meet other CSOs, and 64% regularly exchange information. Organisations that represent people from ethnic minorities have weak coordination, which is seen to inhibit their impact. International participation is felt to go beyond formal involvement in international networks, but most international connections are maintained by larger, capital-city based CSOs.

## RESOURCES

19% of CSOs are entirely reliant on external donor funding and a further 21% rely on this for the greatest part of their budget. A recent decrease in foreign funding has seen weaker organisations fold, but there is acknowledgement that this may have driven up the perception of the overall quality of organised civil society, and therefore trust in it. There are the beginnings of funding diversification strategies amongst Armenian CSOs, and a government commitment to expanding the system of social contracting for welfare services, which has fed CSO expectations of state funding, although a challenge here is existing practices of favouritism and patronage exercised through state funding. Diasporic foundations are also an important part of the funding picture.

Many CSOs exist on a grant to grant basis, making the retention of staff difficult. Volunteers make up the nucleus of most CSOs, with around 80% of CSOs surveyed assessed as being reliant on them.

## IMPACT

47% of CSO representatives surveyed believe that the sector makes some impact on freedom of expression, but only 27% that it makes headway on corruption, and external stakeholders consider these assessments as overstating impact. However, 48% of external stakeholders believe civil society is making a discernible impact on social issues. Education, social development and support for the poor and the marginalised are assessed as the areas in which CSOs achieve most influence. Only around 35% of CSOs reported pushing for a policy change, but 64% of these state that their policy was subsequently approved, suggesting unrealised potential to influence policy if the level of activity could be increased, although there are also concerns about reliance on personal contacts for policy influence, rather than systematised relationships with the state. External stakeholders assess the policy impact of civil society higher than people working in civil society itself, with the highest areas of influence being election-related issues and human rights.

Communication of success seems to be an issue here, perhaps reflecting a culture of prioritising reporting to donors rather than to other CSOs and the public. The environmental movement is seen as a sector that can be learned from as it mounts imaginative and attention grabbing public campaigns, with key factors of success being identified as mobilising local support, involving the diaspora, and proposing alternative solutions rather than simply campaigning against an issue. Organisational capacity is a hindrance to impact, while CSOs are also critiqued as pursuing short term goals and offering ad hoc activities, rather than working strategically.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Among recommendations to strengthen civil society in Armenia are: reaching out to non-formal volunteers to bring them into formal volunteering; developing new cooperation mechanisms for civil society internally; involving the diaspora in structured and deeper ways; and strengthening civil society watchdog functions to address the lingering issues of political patronage, clientelism and corruption.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Counterpart International Armenia - [www.counterpart.am](http://www.counterpart.am)

Civic Development and Partnership Foundation - <http://cdpf.am>

Professionals for Civil Society - [www.ngo.am](http://www.ngo.am)

Caucasus Research Resource Centre Armenia - [www.crrc.am](http://www.crrc.am)


Open Society Foundations Armenia - [www.osi.am](http://www.osi.am)

NGO Centre - [www.ngoc.am](http://www.ngoc.am)

Eurasia Partnership Foundation Armenia - <http://epfound.am>

Civil Society Institute - [www.csi.am](http://www.csi.am)

Centre for the Development of Civil Society - [www.cdcs.am](http://www.cdcs.am)



Basic facts	
Capital	Sofia
Official language	Bulgarian
Population	7.1m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$6,325

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: BULGARIA

The context for civil society in Bulgaria has changed considerably since the country joined the EU in 2007. EU accession has altered the civil society context in four principal ways: it has shifted the locus of much decision-making from the national to the EU level; implied by this is a need for new partnerships, including in decision- and policy-making, thus shifting the advocacy targets and agendas of domestic CSOs; EU reforms have introduced different levers over the domestic policy agenda; and the funding pattern for CSOs has changed, with many established donors for CSOs reducing their financial commitment in acknowledgement of increased EU funding opportunities. Changes to EU funding processes have arguably created more difficulties than opportunities for CSOs, as the mechanisms and funding requirements are new, there is often a need for co-financing, and there have been problems with delays, management issues and misappropriation. Further, EU funding is channelled through inadequate, bureaucratic and non-transparent public administrative structures, which exclude CSOs from planning and programming.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Bulgaria is the poorest member country of the EU and most people report that the economic crisis has worsened their living conditions, with high levels of rural poverty and disproportionate poverty amongst marginalised groups, such as the Roma population.

The executive branch is the major power holder, compared to a weaker parliament. The presidential election of October 2011 means that the rightwing Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria party controls all major political positions. The Orthodox Church and other religious actors are seen as having very little power, compared to which CSOs have greater visibility. Reforms in areas such as healthcare, social policy and education are seen as unfinished. The political representation of women, while improving, is still low.

There is also concern about the rule of law and the functioning of the judiciary, which is understood to offer a particular corruption challenge. A July 2011 EU monitoring report expressed concern about the number of acquittals in trials involving organised crime, fraud and corruption, suggesting a gap between the formal existence of laws and concrete actions to enforce the laws.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 49.44. Civic Engagement: 39.6; Level of Organisation: 56.1; Practice of Values: 44.8; Perception of Impact: 43.6; External Environment: 63.2. Ranked 23 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	17.9%
CSOs network membership	54.9%
Policy activity	38.1%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.698. Ranked 95 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 2. Civil liberties score: 2
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.3. Ranked 86 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.01. Percentile rank: 56.5. Rule of law: -0.08. Percentile rank: 53.1
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 29. Ranked: 80 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: strong. Score: 84 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 51. Ranked 130 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.78. Ranked 52 out of 167

The main law regulating civil society is the Non-Profit Legal Entities Act of 2001, which allows for non-profit entities to be identified as either associations or foundations, and to register as either organisations in pursuit of private benefit (the benefit of their members) or public benefit (the pursuit of broader social goals). Organisations registered as in public benefit face stricter transparency and accountability criteria and closer state scrutiny, which should also come with preferential access to governmental processes. While CSOs on the whole regard the regulatory environment for their work to be satisfactory, they believe that corruption and the functioning of the law limit the potential of civil society to achieve impact. Civil society government dialogue is not continuous and somewhat arbitrary.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The civil society sector grew considerably in Bulgaria since the passing of the 2001 Act. There are estimated to be over 30,000 registered CSOs in Bulgaria, but only about 6,000 are considered to be active. Organisations working for the public benefit make up the minority of registered CSOs, standing at under 7,000, with further

large concentrations of community centres, religious organisations and trade unions. CSOs in Bulgaria are found to be relatively well institutionalised, largely as a result of the foreign financial support for the development of the sector in the 1990s.

## PARTICIPATION

Low rates of civic participation appear to be an enduring problem: over 80% of citizens do not take part in the activities of any organisation. Participation is low across the board, but slightly higher in educational, cultural and sporting associations, and slightly lower in human rights organisations. One of the major incentives for participation is when personal interest is at stake. Volunteering, however, seems to be on the increase, particularly among young people, and those who volunteer for one organisation are more likely to volunteer for a second, but this growth comes from a very low starting point, with a lack of a supportive legal framework for volunteering.

However, a new potential of informal civic groups to mobilise civic energy around particular causes is being seen. In recent surveys, students, pensioners and environmentalists have received greater public recognition as the legitimate representatives of Bulgarian civil society than NGOs. It is, however, also worth noting that around a third of people believe that there is no authentic civil society at all. This suggests that CSOs do not enjoy high public awareness, and also, if informal interest groups are seen as the true representatives of the sector, that civil society credibility in this context derives less from institutional trappings and the practice of formal accountability, and more from an ability to attract attention, to aim for specific targets (such as preventing a new development, in the context of the environmental movement) and to be seen to have the right to have voice on a particular concern.

Recent times have also seen the growth of new tools to promote civic engagement. The Bulgarian environmental movement is seen to have made good use of the full range of communication and participation methods, including blogs, social networks, flash mobs and online petitions, to reach principally young, educated and urban people who are unaccustomed to activism, and in doing so to have made these mainstream mechanisms to channel and stimulate civic energy. This



suggests that a prevailing tendency towards passivity can be reversed if there is a tangible and comprehensible cause and creative ways are employed to capture public attention. Other networks and NGO coalitions now employ these tools.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Research identifies a lack of willingness to get involved and a low level of trust in other individuals, resulting in a tendency to stay within family structures, with weak and unsustainable social links between citizens. This is one of the key factors driving low rates of participation in CSO activities.

Trust in both public institutions and CSOs is low, with the majority of the public believing CSOs do not fully live up to their standards, and with higher levels of trust being awarded to supra-national institutions, such as the EU and UN. Very few members of the public can name a specific CSO that they trust. One of key reasons for the lack of trust in CSOs is because their development was seen largely as a result of foreign intervention and donor assistance, driven by external demand. Questions about CSO legitimacy and mandates are therefore frequent.

Perception of corruption is a major issue, and a challenge for CSOs, both in terms of how they address it in society, and how they counter concerns about their own ability to resist corruption. Around 57% of CSOs surveyed believe that corruption is either common or very common amongst CSOs. CSOs are concerned about the ways in which reliance on government structures, public procurement procedures and the management of the channels for EU funding can drive corruption of the sector, having recently observed a trend for the setting up of civil society arms of private companies and political parties to enable access to EU funds.

## NETWORKS

While communication between CSOs has increased and various CSO networks exist, these are still not fully instrumentalised and institutionalised, hindering potential impact at the national level. There has been a recent growth of less structured joint advocacy campaigns, with the ForTheNature coalition of over 30 environmental CSOs seen as a success story, along with the National Network for Children and the Coalition for Sustainable EU funds. The newly launched Bulgarian Non-Governmental Organisations Information Portal is seen as another positive development here, while the sustainability of the recently initiated Civic Participation Forum, a non-institutionalised platform of 60 CSOs that convenes working groups on issues of consultation and participation, still needs to be proven. Participation in European networks is improving, although only around one fifth of CSO representatives report participating in EU level platforms, while international linkages for Bulgarian civil society remain low.

## RESOURCES

The funding position for Bulgarian CSOs has worsened during the economic crisis, and financial unsustainability is also directly leading to human resource unsustainability, with a high use by CSOs of temporary or part time staff, and a loss of trained staff to consultancy, private sector or political parties. Corporate social responsibility has however emerged as a steady source of funding, constituting 70% of charitable donations, while text messaging based donation has blossomed, with 750,000 campaigning texts sent in 2010 compared to 250,000 in 2009.

*“The funding position for Bulgarian CSOs has worsened during the economic crisis.”*

## IMPACT

CSOs are seen as most effective when working on issues of education, the environment and support to vulnerable groups. Yet while the public identify corruption, unemployment and income as their

primary concerns, both CSO representatives themselves and stakeholders from outside the sector believe the impact of CSOs on these issues to be limited. However, though limited, around one third of CSO representatives reported having recently undertaken advocacy for policy change, with most of those which had reporting a successful outcome of their advocacy. While impact on policy-making is limited, the situation has improved compared to the previous CSI research.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Suggested steps to strengthen civil society in Bulgaria include: reconnecting citizens with CSOs (for example, through public panels and interactive tools); increasing the visibility of CSOs by focussing on evidences of impact and developing links with media; developing representative CSO coalitions, based on the example of the environmental network; and instigating a database of potential partners for international partnerships.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Open Society Institute – Sofia – [www.osi.bg](http://www.osi.bg)

Bulgarian Non-Governmental Organisations Information Portal – [www.ngobg.info](http://www.ngobg.info)

Balkan Assist Association - [www.balkanassist.bg](http://www.balkanassist.bg)


Bulgarian Centre for Non-Profit Law - [www.bcnl.org](http://www.bcnl.org)

Agora Platform – Active Communities for Development Alternatives – <http://agora-bg.org/en>

Coalition for Sustainable Use of EU Funds - [www.fesbg.org](http://www.fesbg.org)

National Network for Children - <http://nmd.bg>

For The Nature Coalition - <http://forthenature.org>



Basic facts	
Capital	Santiago
Official language	Spanish
Population	16.9m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$12,431

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: CHILE

Chilean civil society can be said to have reached a level of maturity since the country's transition to democracy from 1990, amidst recent conditions of relative economic prosperity. However, CSO challenges include an apparent decline in volunteering, and competition and a lack of cooperation amongst organisations, particularly between large, well-established CSOs and smaller, poorer ones, and between CSOs and communities, which creates difficulties in the public perception of CSOs. The absence of adequate regulations for transparency, as well as the limited institutional mechanisms for strengthening participation in and impact of organisations, fosters a negative outlook and lack of trust. The Chilean climate of dissent also changed dramatically in 2011, with large scale protests on student education and inequality amidst growing political and economic dissatisfaction.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

A little under half of Chile's 17 million population lives in the capital's metropolitan region, and the country's extreme, narrow and elongated geography contributes to significant levels of differentiation between populations in different locales. Chile has tended to be one of the wealthier countries in Latin America, ranked as the highest in the region in 44th place on the 2011 UNDP human development index, but the Latinbarometro annual opinion survey for 2011 has Chile showing the largest decline, of 26 percentage points from 2010, in the number of people who believe their country is making progress, and a fall of those who believe their economic situation is getting better from 48% in 2010 to 30% in 2011. Chile occupied first place in the Latin American Democratic Development Index in 2010 and 2011, but satisfaction with democracy, as assessed by Latinobarometro, stood at only 32% in 2011, down from 56% in 2010, and the same source showed a fall of 26 percentage points from 2010 to 2011, to only 29%, of people believing the country is governed for the common good of all. Chile is marked by entrenched income inequality, despite benefiting, as the world's largest producer, from a boom in copper prices in recent years, with one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world, and the highest such for countries classified as having very high development by UNDP, at 52.1. Inequality is buttressed by regressive taxation policies.

There is a complex set of conflicting and collaborative relations between the most influential actors of the state, market, and civil society spheres in Chile. As well as the presidency and key arms of government, such as the justice department, the central bank and municipal governments, large companies

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 52.1. Civic Engagement: 47.3; Level of Organisation: 52.3; Practice of Values: 42.6; Perception of Impact: 46.9; External Environment: 71.04. Ranked 15th out of 33
Interpersonal trust	12.4%
CSOs network membership	44.3%
Policy activity	45.3%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.805. Ranked 44 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 7.2. Ranked 22 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +1.18. Percentile rank 83.7. Rule of law: +1.29. Percentile rank 87.7
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 29. Ranked 80 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2008	Status: moderate. Score: 77 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 41. Ranked 153 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 7.54. Ranked 35 out of 167

and financial institutions, and the media, are seen as having a high level of influence in society. Although Chilean civil society is diverse, the majority of organisations have a conflictive relationship with the state and the market. Many CSOs had built relationships with the centre-left coalition which governed Chile for 20 years, but the switch to a right of centre government in 2010 has challenged those existing relationships and called for the creation of new ones.

One in five CSOs report experiencing illegitimate attacks or restrictions from central or local government. The public bidding system, in which CSOs can bid for government contracts to carry out public work, also emerges as a system of control for CSOs, as well as a stimulus for CSO competition: CSOs, in contracting as implementers of programmes, effectively cede influence in policy formulation and design.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society in Chile is a very heterogeneous concept, defined by the experience of a long history of authoritarianism after the 1973 military coup, followed by transition to democracy in the 1990s. During military rule, restrictions on individual freedoms and the prohibition of political activity drastically undermined

the public sphere and severely worsened the conditions for civil society, while forcing civil society activism to reinvent itself in safe spaces offered by Catholic and other Christian churches. The return of democracy in 1990 brought important political and economic changes and civil society gradually expanded. Newer types of CSO initiative include those concerned with environmental and indigenous issues, and regional activities.

As a result of this, some CSOs have earned a position of influence, with enhanced access to the media and superior material and human resources which allow them primacy. However, this is not typical of the sector as a whole, and the difference in their positions of influence often generates difficult relationships between large, influential CSOs and grassroots organisations, worsening the reputation of civil society as a whole.

## PARTICIPATION

Participation in socially-oriented CSOs is higher than in politically-oriented CSOs. Research shows that young people tend to believe that spaces for organisation are better in the social than the political sphere, and they have a higher sense of trust in spaces of horizontal association than in traditional, vertical structures of state participation. Volunteering is assessed as in decline, with rates of CSO volunteering lower than rates of CSO membership, and apparent little appetite for multiple civic commitment: only one third of people who are active in a CSO are members of more than one organisation, while only a quarter of volunteers volunteer for more than one organisation.

Informal associative life is more popular than formal participation, with around 48% of Chileans participating in informal activities at least once a month. Chile is also the Latin American country that most intensively uses online social networking. Concern is often expressed that an individualistic and materialistic environment may discourage people from associating and participating. In Chile's recent Democracy Audit project, only 1% believed that being active in social and political associations was one of the characteristics of a good citizen.



However, the picture changed during 2011 when large scale protests flared over persistent structural inequalities in university education. This was connected with a collapse in the government's popularity, and the protest soon broadened into one against economic inequality and the lack of redistributive structures for Chile's copper price gains, amongst popular feeling that the government favours the interests of business. A coalition of students and unions mobilised 600,000 people to take to the streets in a two day strike, the largest protest since the return of democracy. Student leaders made an explicit link from this to the international Occupy movement. This suggests that students and workers, taking inspiration from other protest movements in 2011, have started to apply new methods of activism and create new spaces for protest.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Public trust is low in Chile, compared to other Latin American countries, with only around 12% of people stating that other people can be trusted. Trust in CSOs is generally higher, at 52%, than trust in other types of institution, such as media (48%), state bodies (43%) and companies (39%), while trust in unions (37%) and particularly political parties (19%) is low. Trust is higher in women's groups, humanitarian organisations, environmental groups and churches, being on average at 64%. Chilean society seems characterised by marked distrust for large organisations of any type, improving when it comes to smaller organisations. Tolerance of difference however seems stable and widespread, including towards indigenous communities.

In the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Chile was ranked 22nd out of 183, the best assessed Latin American country.

## NETWORKS

Only around 44% of CSOs report being members of a network, a globally low figure, reflecting some concerns by smaller organisations about potential for cooptation. The figures for informal collaboration are much higher, implying that participation in formal networks rather than collaboration is the fear: around 81% of CSOs recently held meetings with other CSOs, and 79% recently shared information. Smaller organisations report sometimes feeling forced to engage in alliances due to their inability to flourish by their own means. This situation turns critical when CSOs are obliged to compete with each other to gain funding from the state through public tenders. This not only diminishes technical cooperation, but also the sharing of good practice.

International linkages are assessed as low, and there are question marks over the desire of some Chilean CSOs to work regionally, given some public discourse about strengthening links with more developed countries rather than with neighbouring ones.

## RESOURCES

The main resource challenge that Chilean organisations are facing is their capacity to access public funds. As Chile moved towards relative democratic and economic sustainability, international cooperation pulled away, making the government's role more important. The public tender system is critiqued as supporting and therefore strengthening already well-established and relatively well-resourced CSOs, with community-based organisations being the most impeded in accessing funding due to lower capacities to meet the numerous requirements. A handful of CSOs are seen to command resources, while most exist in a state of permanent financial crisis. Questions of transparency are also relevant here, with criticism that in several cases decisions on public funds have followed political interests rather than technical considerations, thereby increasing inequality and competition among civil society.

***“The main resource challenge that Chilean organisations are facing is their capacity to access public funds..”***

A connected issue is that most CSOs do not assess themselves as having sustainable human resource bases, and tend to depend on volunteers to achieve organisational objectives, with connected concerns about the turnover of volunteers and the quality of the volunteering experience. The lack of human resources can also force CSOs to rely on paid external consultants in order to design projects to compete for public funding.

## IMPACT

The social impact of Chilean CSOs is assessed as positive, especially in interventions related to education, basic services, humanitarian assistance and local education programmes, with a high perception of impact at the local level. External stakeholders rate the impact of civil society more highly than internal stakeholders, suggesting a degree of pessimism amongst CSOs. Civil society's contribution and impact on policy related issues is perceived to be more limited – only 45% of CSOs report pushing for policies to be approved in the past two years, and only 28% of these succeeded. One of the factors behind this is the somewhat instrumental and contractual relationship created between the state and civil society through the public bidding system.

The 27 February 2010 earthquake in the south-central part of Chile was a catastrophic event, but provided an important test case of civil society impact, and of different actors working together. Civil society spearheaded assistance activities, and was seen as able to respond to the crisis in a rapid and decentralised manner. Many civil society responses formed spontaneously to assist affected communities, with an accompanying short term rise in civic mobilisation. Civil society was perceived to have a high level of impact in earthquake response, and to have been more adaptable and responsive than other sectors.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for strengthening Chilean civil society include: renewing civic commitment at the social bases, which includes strengthening local unions, in order to ensure that CSO objectives are centred on the realisation of grassroots social concerns; opening spaces for the creation of alliances that include joint training of leaders and social activists; promoting CSO work amongst young professionals through alliances with universities; diversifying funding mechanisms to include more private financing; opening more spaces for CSOs to participate in the policy debate; modifying the public bidding system in order to reduce competition between CSOs; and promoting greater self-regulation and transparency initiatives in CSOs.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Fundación Soles - [www.fundacionsoles.cl](http://www.fundacionsoles.cl)

Asociación Chilena de ONGs (ACCIÓN) - [www.accionag.cl](http://www.accionag.cl)

Genera - [www.generaenlinea.cl/blog](http://www.generaenlinea.cl/blog)

Participa - [www.participa.cl](http://www.participa.cl)

Forja - [www.forja.cl](http://www.forja.cl)



Basic facts	
Capital	Zagreb
Official language	Croatian
Population	4.5m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$13,754

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: CROATIA

Croatian civil society, in common with the civil society of neighbouring countries, sprang to life in the early 1990s, which saw the break-up of Yugoslavia, war and independence, and the development of CSOs focused on humanitarian concerns and social problems in response. Generally, civil society sees itself as having developed in a largely top-down, donor-driven way, causing weaknesses such as financial instability, low membership, a poor public image, lack of professionalism, limited networking and underdeveloped advocacy activities. An improvement of the socio-political environment for civil society followed the 2000 elections, which led to the reform of Croatia into a more democratic system, and the establishment of various forms of institutionalised cooperation between government and civil society, such as governmental advisory bodies with CSO representation. The processes of bringing Croatia towards EU membership have also created new spaces and opportunities for civil society.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The forces in society assessed by CSOs as having the most importance are the central government, major political parties, large companies and their owners and the current mayor of Zagreb, the capital. Together with financial forces (banks and foreign investors) and the Catholic Church, they form the core of public life. Croatia is a wealthier country than many East European members of the EU, with a largely service-based economy, but this has been affected by the global economic downturn, which has brought a high rise in unemployment, estimated at 17.6% in 2010, compared to 11.8% in 2007. 2011 saw the election of a centre-left government for the first time, following a series of corruption scandals which saw the former Prime Minister charged with conspiracy to commit organised crime, and unpopularity at the austerity measures introduced by the centre-right party which had led the government since independence.

Croatia is in the processes of accession to the EU, and following a yes vote in a January 2012 referendum, is expected to join in 2013, having completed the legislative process to bring it in line with the EU *acquis communautaire*. EU accession is a reference point and source of justification for many political decisions, and the process has resulted in the Europeanisation of different policy areas regarding civil society, creating more formal space. The principles of openness, accountability, participation and consultation have become an integral part of the public discourse on civil society.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 49.6. Civic Engagement: 39.4; Level of Organisation: 59.9; Practice of Values: 41.1; Perception of Impact: 43.2; External Environment: 64.1. Ranked 21 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	20.1%
CSOs network membership	75.7%
Policy activity	45.9%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.796. Ranked 46 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 4. Ranked 66 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.62. Percentile rank: 70.3. Rule of law: +0.19. Percentile rank: 60.7
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 23.33. Ranked 68 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 51. Ranked 132 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.73. Ranked 53 out of 167

However, the institutional and legal frameworks are still felt to be inadequate. The implementation of policies such as the Strategy for Creation of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society Development is not always effective. Only around 8% of CSOs surveyed believe the current laws and regulations for civil society to be fully enabling, and 21% of CSOs report illegitimate restriction or attack by central or local government. Around 75% think the state is inclined to overly interfere in the activities of CSOs, suggesting a paternalistic attitude by the government towards CSOs.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

According to the Register of Associations in Croatia there are currently 45,149 registered associations, with around a third of these being sporting associations, followed in number by cultural and business associations. Civil society actors assess the most influential CSOs to be some women's and human rights organisations, and the largest association of homeland war veterans. Other associations assessed in order of influence and public reputation are those for people with disabilities, health

groups and social service associations, NGOs and civic groups, environmental organisations, and youth groups.

The National Foundation for Civil Society Development, established in 2004 as a public, not for profit body with the aim of strengthening civil society, is also influential due to its important role in providing funding and the role it plays in developing cooperation with other organisations.

## PARTICIPATION

Low levels of civic participation, connected to low levels of trust, present a serious constraint to strengthening civil society in Croatia. Around 21% of Croatians report being an active member of a socially-oriented CSO and 13% of a politically-oriented one. Sports and recreational organisations have most members, followed by religious organisations and then cultural ones. Meanwhile, formal volunteering levels are low, at only 9% in socially-oriented CSOs and 5% in politically-oriented ones, in part because volunteering is rarely regarded as a resource which can be used in public institutions, and partly because it does not tend to be seen as a civic virtue worth promoting. Consultations also highlighted the problem of limited capacity within CSOs to accommodate, manage and provide good quality and sustainable programmes for volunteers. There is however felt to be more of a tradition of informal community assistance. Similarly, ad hoc activism is thought to be on the rise, and 40% of people report that they have signed a petition.

## PUBLIC TRUST

There are low levels of trust generally, with over 40% of people stating that it is acceptable to cheat on taxes and around 60% that it is acceptable to dodge fares on public transport. There is low trust in politics and organisations of a political nature. The level of trust in civil society is therefore rather low, at around only 14%. This lack of trust is fuelled by media stories which portray CSOs as seekers of privileges or unaccountable users of funds, and there is public suspicion about the transparency of CSOs, with a common impression being that CSOs are registered only to write project proposals and receive funds.



Not surprisingly, Croatia ranks a relatively low 66th on the 2011 Transparency International Global Corruption Perceptions Index, below neighbouring countries such as Slovenia, Austria and Hungary.

*“The principles of openness, accountability, participation and consultation have become an integral part of the public discourse on civil society.”*

## NETWORKS

Around three quarters of CSOs surveyed are members of networks, with 44% members of two networks and 26% members of three. Those organisations which focus most on the promotion of the rights and interests of their members are most inclined to take part actively in networks. Some of the most widespread umbrella organisations are sectoral in nature, including the Croatian Union of Physically Disabled People, Croatian Women’s Network, Green Forum, Croatian Youth Network, and Coordination of NGOs for Children. Around 80% of CSOs hold meetings with other organisations working on similar issues, and around 85% regularly exchange information. However, cooperation between CSOs working in different areas seems more limited, while there are also examples of networking being hindered by low trust between CSOs, or being donor-driven as a result of funding policies that promote networking. Weak international connection seems to be a widespread challenge: only 24% of CSOs are members of a regional or international network or federation, a low figure given the current emphasis on EU integration.

## RESOURCES

CSO revenues historically come mainly from government (40%) and donors (22%). Around 46% of government funds come from the lottery, while the largest government supporters of civil society are the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport (31% of government support), the Ministry of Culture (18%), Ministry of the Family, Veterans’ Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity (13%), Ministry of Health and Social Care (12%) and the Council for National Minorities (8%). The National Foundation for Civil Society Development now provides 27% of CSO support, while EU pre-accession funds (30%) are a relatively new but important income source. For those organisations with the capacity to draw on and absorb this type of funding, they constitute a crucial source. However, a reduction in the number of calls for applications and complex procedures of applying for EU funds are challenges. Due to low levels of participation, membership fees are a very small source of CSO support, standing at only 3%. The economic crisis is thought to have led to a reduction in donations, while corporate philanthropy is little practised. There is some evidence of financial strain on CSOs: 45% reported that their income had increased from one year to the next, but this was outweighed by 61% that reported an increase in expenses.

Lack of financial sustainability hinders CSO employment, especially of young professionals and people with degrees, resulting in high fluctuations of staff, and thus loss of investment in human capital. 31% of CSOs surveyed have no paid staff, while three employees is the norm. Incentivising young, skilled, junior professionals to work in the sector is therefore a key development priority for civil society in Croatia.

*“Volunteering does not tend to be seen as a civic virtue worth promoting.”*

## IMPACT

CSO representatives assess the impact of the sector on key issues of the day as limited. Only around half believe they are making tangible impact on strengthening people’s participation in public policies, and only 37% believe impact is being made on improving the work of public administration. External stakeholders rate impact in these areas as lower still. The fields where civil society believes it is achieving most impact are education and training, supporting the poor and marginalised, and social development in general. There is a disparity between the views of internal and external stakeholders on the social impact of civil society: 72% CSO representatives rate the impact of the sector as high or tangible, against only 40% of external stakeholders, although 85%

of external stakeholders also believe there is impact on selected fields such as supporting the poor and marginalised and humanitarian relief, suggesting that external stakeholders see CSOs most strongly as playing a classic social welfare role.

Under half of CSO representatives and less than 40% of external stakeholders see significant impact of civil society on policies. 46% of CSOs report advocating for policy change, and of these, 46% indicate a successful outcome. The policy areas which meet with most success are policies for young people, children and people with disabilities, with gender, environmental protection and human rights being other areas of advocacy.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Croatia include: enhancing policies for the transparent allocation of funds to CSOs; strengthening dialogue mechanisms between donors, media and civil society; fostering networking and collaboration between small and large organisations working on similar issues; improving civil society's capacity to participate and engage in the European regional civic space; and expanding efforts by CSOs to demonstrate transparency, and offer greater public promotion of their missions, activities and practice of values.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

CERANEO – Centre for Development of Non-Profit Organisations - [www.ceraneo.hr](http://www.ceraneo.hr)

National Foundation for Civil Society Development – <http://zaklada.civilnodrustvo.hr>

Croatian Legal Centre – HPC - [www.hpc.hr](http://www.hpc.hr)

GONG - [www.gong.hr](http://www.gong.hr)

PSD - [www.psd.hr](http://www.psd.hr)

BABE - [www.babe.hr](http://www.babe.hr)



## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: CYPRUS

Cyprus is a divided island, partitioned in 1974 into its south, with a predominantly Greek Cypriot population, and its north, where the smaller Turkish Cypriot population largely live. The government of south Cyprus is internationally recognised as the government of Cyprus, whereas the north is recognised only by Turkey. The origins of the division are long and deep-rooted, and there has been little recent progress in resolving the dispute. The most recent attempt at a political solution was the Annan Plan for reunification, but in a parallel and simultaneous referendum in 2004, only approximately 24% of the Greek Cypriot Community voted for this, compared to approximately 65% of the Turkish Cypriot Community, which meant that the plan fell, and the country that joined the EU later that year remained a divided one.

CIVICUS' research on the state of civil society was carried out in both parts of the island simultaneously, with partners who worked together on the research design and on comparison of their findings. In the below text, reflecting this process, the two groupings are referred to as the Greek Cypriot Community (GCC) and Turkish Cypriot Community (TCC), and their findings are presented separately.

Looking at the island as a whole, the important and continuing role to people of the 'mother countries' of Greece and Turkey has arguably fuelled a weak sense of a pan-Cypriot citizenship and a lack of commitment to a united island, and can also be said to have inhibited a culture of dissent, with a sense amongst many CSOs that demands towards public institutions should be moderated for the sake of communal unity. The institutional make-up of civil society in the two sections of the island emerge as fairly similar, although participation appears to be more extensive in GCC – with more individuals participating – but deeper in TCC – with people participating more intensively.

There is more participation in bicomunal activities – activities that bring together people from both sides of the Green Line that divides Cyprus - in TCC than GCC, but since the failure of the referendum, bicomunal participation has declined in TCC and increased in GCC. Since restrictions on crossing the Green Line were lifted in 2003, people from TCC have more often visited the other side than people from GCC – but most people overall say they have never done so. CSOs in GCC are more optimistic about the value of bicomunal activities to reconciliation than in TCC, but overall, the findings suggest a lag between donor and civil society enthusiasm for bicomunal activities and people's willingness to participate, and therefore a need therefore to broaden participation and the range of activities on offer.

## CYPRUS – GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

Basic facts	
Capital	Nicosia
Official language	Greek
Population	800,000 (estimate)
GDP per capita 2010	US\$28,779

Ideas of advocacy, citizenship and social tolerance are still developing in GCC, given the experience of conflict and division, and enduring political impasse. CSOs function within a complex socio-political context, where unsupportive legislative and institutional frameworks, and limited funding sources, inhibit the growth and development of civil society. With Cyprus taking the rotating Presidency of the EU in the second half of 2012, the spotlight will again fall on the question of the island's division, suggesting an opportunity for renewed civil society mobilisation.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The UN 2011 Human Development Report assesses GCC as having very high human development, ranking 31 out of 187 countries. However, the global economic crisis has ended 30 years of economic growth and created uncertainty and anxiety. The Central Bank of Cyprus assesses that consumption and unemployment have worsened, and people's confidence in the economy has declined, while three major credit agencies downgraded GCC's credit rating in 2011. GCC has been heavily dependent on the banking sector, which has been hit hard by the collapse of the Greek economy, with Greece being a major trading partner and GCC the largest holder of Greek debt in Europe. Problems were exacerbated by a devastating power plant explosion in July 2011, which led to 13 deaths and daily blackouts, which challenged the financial sector and the crucial tourism industry. Soon after parliamentary elections in May 2011, the president's popularity nosedived, with regular protests demanding his departure from office. In mid 2011, the junior partner in the government, DIKO, left the coalition over disputes on measures to address economic difficulty and the peace talks. At the time of writing President Demetris Christofias' party has 19 out of 56 parliamentary seats and has been unable to attract the support required from other parties to enact austerity measures, including cutting public spending and increasing taxes. The economic and political future of GCC therefore looks volatile and uncertain.

The national question dominates the public sphere, political parties and most aspects of social interaction in GCC. Political power is highly concentrated in the state and leading political parties, which exert a high level of influence over education, the media, cultural production and even some volunteer organisations, which has resulted in the underdevelopment of institutions of civil society. It is common practice for political parties to create CSO-like structures such as youth and women's groups, while the president of the national Red Cross is always the spouse of the political leader. The Orthodox Church has long played a powerful role, while the banking sector and labour unions also have influence. The 2004 referendum provoked discussions in GCC regarding the influence of international donors on CSOs. Opinions were polarised between the authorities and many CSOs, which led to questions over the independence of CSOs, encouraging a view that CSOs are inordinately influenced by external forces.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 55.98. Civic Engagement: 43.6; Level of Organisation: 59.1; Practice of Values: 46.1; Perception of Impact: 53.3; External Environment: 77.1. Ranked 6 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	14.5%
CSOs network membership	80.7%
Policy activity	38.8%

The 2004 accession of Cyprus into the EU was an important milestone for GCC civil society, with CSOs now able to participate in a variety of EU projects and European networks. As a consequence of accession, GCC had to enact legislation to modernise the environment for the establishment, existence, internal governance and external supervision of CSOs and on their funding and fiscal treatment. This process is undergoing a review, in consultation with CSOs and the relevant authorities in GCC. A particular emphasis for advocacy is on updating the tax regime for CSOs, with a view to establishing taxation based upon activity rather than legal status and allowing CSOs to engage in economic activities. As such, the environment for CSOs is not at the same level as in established EU members, but progress is felt to have



been made. 39% of CSOs surveyed believe the environment for civil society is moderately enabling, with the same amount neutral, and only 4% report facing illegitimate attack from government.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

CSOs fall into two main areas: the longstanding social welfare oriented organisations and newer lobbying and advocacy organisations. Within civil society, professional associations, welfare organisations and cultural and sports groups are prominent, while trade unions have long been recognised as legitimate partners by government. Post-2004, advocacy and human rights emerged as areas of greater civil society concern, a number of advocacy organisations were established and peace-building and bicomunal organisations came to greater prominence. This resulted in open discussions on the structure and role of civil society, particularly for peace and reconciliation. However, very few CSOs focus on holding the state to account. In addition, organised civil society remains largely based in the capital, Nicosia.

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.840. Ranked 31 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 6.3. Ranked 30 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +1.5. Percentile rank: 90.4. Rule of law: +1.19. Percentile rank: 86.3
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: -3. Ranked 16 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 61. Ranked 116 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 7.29 Ranked 40 out of 167

## PARTICIPATION

A large number of people engage in associational activities related to family, relatives and friends, and over half of people surveyed have no other forms of participation. In the small and medium sized communities that characterise much of GCC, a very small number of individuals organise and participate in civil society activities, and tend to hold leadership positions in multiple organisations.

Only 14% of people are active members of a CSO, and 80% of the public do not have any kind of involvement with a socially-oriented CSO. In the 2005 CIVICUS CSI research, 43% of people were reported to be members of at least one CSO, suggesting a drop in participation and possible growth in apathy. In consultations, civil society experts believe that in recent years it has become more difficult for CSOs to attract active members. Most also believe that ethnic and linguistic minorities, foreign workers, poorer people, women and young people are under-represented in CSOs.

Professional associations are the most popular vehicle for association, with 12% of people surveyed in membership, followed by unions, sports associations, political parties and cooperative/credit associations and savings groups. Many professions traditionally have strong unions with almost all employees members, including the construction industry, civil service, teaching and banking, while in many professions, such as law, accountancy and medicine, membership of a professional association is compulsory. Cooperative unions can be found in every community and have widespread respect, while sports associations and clubs have strong support.

Volunteering with CSOs is low, coming from a small number of individuals typically volunteering for short durations. Only 12-13% of people report that they volunteer for CSOs, with education groups and sports associations the most volunteered for. Almost all people who undertake voluntary work have at some point volunteered for the Red Cross. The average time spent on volunteer work is only a little over three hours per month, and this is down from the five hours per month recorded in 2005.

The most popular act of political activism is signing a petition (34%), followed by attendance at a demonstration (21%) and joining boycotts (6%). Again, this appears down from the 2005 study, when the same figures were 46% for signing a petition and 59% for participating in a demonstration. Individual activism therefore appears to be in decline, although there has been a recent rise in internet polling and petitioning.



## PUBLIC TRUST

The most trusted institutions are charitable and humanitarian organisations, with 72% of people surveyed expressing trust, environmental organisations (71%), the church (69%) and the armed forces (67%). The least trusted institutions are television stations, with only 40% trust, the UN (39%), major companies (39%) and political parties (26%).

27% of active CSO members surveyed believe that most people can be trusted, compared to 12% of others, which suggests civil society is making a positive contribution to public trust. CSO members also show encouragingly higher levels of tolerance towards Turkish Cypriots and immigrants.

*“In recent years, it has become more difficult for CSOs to attract active members.”*

In recent years a range of social issues have moved up the agenda, including multiculturalism, racism, xenophobia, rights of minority groups, delinquency and the weakening of traditional family values. However, conservative values persist amongst most of the population, and EU accession and increasing foreign travel do not as yet seem to have driven a growth in more liberal attitudes on issues such as immigration, minority and immigrant rights and homosexuality, with the education system felt by many to be still quite conservative. CSOs are only recently beginning to work on such issues, and half of CSOs surveyed say they know several examples of discriminatory or intolerant forces within civil society itself.

Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Cyprus at 30th out of 183 countries, indicating a relatively low level of perceived corruption. However, GCC CSO representatives are concerned about corruption in the sector: 43% believe it is frequent and 21% very frequent.

## NETWORKS

81% of CSOs surveyed are members of a federation, umbrella or support network. There are also many examples of CSOs cooperating by forming unofficial networks and signing memoranda of understanding, with 72% of CSOs reporting holding recent meetings with other CSOs and 82% exchanging information. Some of the key networks are the Home for Cooperation – Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (a multi-functional research and educational centre), the Cyprus Community Media Centre and Cyprus Island-Wide NGO Development Platform (CYINDEP). CYINDEP brings together two member platforms from different sides of the divide, the Cyprus NGO Platform ‘The Development’ in GCC and the Cyprus NGO Network in TCC.

## RESOURCES

The small size of most organisations and the lack of available funds mean that most CSOs do not employ paid staff. Most have a small group of active and experienced members that run them but find it hard to recruit or maintain new active members and volunteers. 42% of CSOs surveyed do not have paid staff, compared to 11% which do not have any volunteers. CSOs most commonly have between six and 20 volunteers, whilst paid staff most commonly number between none and five, and very few have more than five.

Many CSOs are seeing expenses rise faster than income: 25% of CSOs reported income had decreased and 23% that it increased from one year to the next, but 46% also reported an increase in expenditure and only 10% a decrease. There is also a lack of diversity in funding, with limited private sector and microfinance opportunities. One positive development in recent years has been the introduction of small grants programmes which help support CSOs to develop their internal capacities.



## IMPACT

CSOs assess the two most important contemporary concerns in GCC as being the Cyprus question and the financial crisis, and around half of CSOs surveyed believe civil society achieves impact on these issues. However, on the Cyprus situation, a topic that has monopolised the Cypriot social and political scene for almost 50 years, only 20% of CSO representatives believe impact is high, compared to 32% who rate it limited. The ratings are similar for impact on the financial crisis. External stakeholders rate impact less optimistically.

CSO representatives perceive most impact on social issues, with education and social development most highly assessed. More generally, 40% of CSO representatives believe civil society plays a significant role in the promotion of peace and 22% a moderate role. In contrast, 82% feel that policy impact is very limited or moderate. Only 38% were active in advocating for policy change during the past two years, and less than half of these achieved success, with most effort being made in the fields of education, human rights and immigrants' rights issues and sports policies, and no efforts reported on social and environmental policy.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in GCC include organising a wide network to monitor legal reform for CSOs and develop civil society-led law reform proposals; promoting CSOs in rural areas and strengthening their capacities; increasing training for CSOs, including in accountability, improving volunteering and more effective project management; and using examples from other EU member countries to highlight the valuable roles of civil society.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

NGO Support Centre - [www.ngo-sc.org](http://www.ngo-sc.org)

Association for Historical Dialogue and Research - [www.ahdr.info](http://www.ahdr.info)

Cyprus Community Media Centre - [www.cypruscommunitymedia.org](http://www.cypruscommunitymedia.org)

Cyprus CSO Directory (in Greek) - [www.ngosincyprus.org](http://www.ngosincyprus.org)

## CYPRUS – TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

With the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus not having international recognition, and the government of Turkey playing a heavy role in the governance of the territory, civil society in TCC occupies an unusual position. On the one hand, without an independent, institutionalised government, the lines between civil society and the state in TCC have sometimes become blurred. On the other, civil society occupies a unique niche: given the absence of international recognition, the government is usually excluded from international processes, but civil society is often able to participate, meaning that it has become a bridge between TCC and the world. Civil society has also been playing an enduring role in the island's reconciliation process.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Standards of living are lower in TCC than GCC, with lower levels of economic and human development, but given the non-recognition of TCC, there is a lack of reliable comparative data.

Basic facts	
Capital	Nicosia
Official language	Turkish
Population	Approx 300,000 (estimate)
GDP per capita 2010	US\$11,700



The Turkish Embassy and the military and police, which are under the direct command of the armed forces of Turkey, are assessed by CSOs as the most influential social actors. Indeed, an ultra pro-Turkey coalition of high-level actors from intelligence, military, police, judiciary and mafia is seen as the deep state mechanism through which Turkey exerts influence on TCC. The EU is also assessed as an influential actor: in response to the rejection of the Annan Plan and the EU accession of a divided Cyprus, the EU instituted an aid programme for TCC, part of which is geared towards civil society, with the goal of promoting social and political development and fostering reconciliation. The EU can therefore be seen as recognising civil society as a key and legitimate actor in TCC, and promoting its development through financial and technical assistance. UNDP-ACT/USAID programmes also play a similar role for civil society, while the UN and GCC are additionally seen as having some influence.

A new draft Law on Associations was developed without consultation from civil society, and in response to this the Cyprus NGO Network, composed of 15 TCC CSOs, threatened to take legal action against the TCC authorities. The majority of CSOs surveyed, 58%, assess the regulatory environment as only moderately enabling, and 25% believe it is highly restrictive. The current Law on Associations bars non-citizens from becoming members of associations, which given a high level of immigration to TCC, reduces the inclusivity of civil society.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Key civil society actors include teachers' and civil servants' unions and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which acts as a highly-organised and prominent voice, not only for the particular interests of labour, but also for democratisation and peace. Public benefit CSOs, such as the Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry, the Farmers' Union, the Union of the Chambers for Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Shopkeepers and Artisans and bicommunal groups also play an important role.

Civil society in TCC further encompasses sports, cultural, educational and youth associations, neighbourhood/village committees, burial societies and religious/spiritual groups, other forms of membership-based interest groups such as cooperatives and savings groups, and rights-based advocacy organisations.

## PARTICIPATION

10% of people surveyed are active members of a socially-oriented CSO and 12% of a politically-oriented one. The highest number of active members are in sports and cultural groups, followed by membership-based interest groups such as unions and professional/occupational organisations, partly because membership is compulsory for some professions. There is lower membership in rights-based advocacy organisations, reflecting the relatively recent history of such organisations

in TCC. Compared to the 2005 CSI research, membership appears to be falling, with membership of unions down from 17% to 6%, cooperatives from 11% to 6% and sports clubs from 9% to 7%, and only membership of human rights organisations rising from a low base, from 2% to 4%, most likely due to the increased visibility of advocacy CSOs receiving international funds in the post-Annan Plan period. However, those people who are active are highly so: 34% of active members of socially-oriented CSOs are involved in more than one, with this figure rising to 44% of those active in politically-oriented CSOs.

People in TCC continue to associate mostly through informal networks, with family and friends. Family remains at the heart of social support mechanisms and there are few moves towards developing more formal, institutionalised support networks, such as for child care and

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 53.04. Civic Engagement: 43.6; Level of Organisation: 50.5; Practice of Values: 50.9; Perception of Impact: 49.8; External Environment: 70.4. Ranked 13 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	8.2%
CSOs network membership	37.9%
Policy activity	60.3%



assistance for disadvantaged people. Historically, neighbours and local communities were an important part of the social safety net, but urbanisation, socio-economic development and lifestyle changes have weakened these support structures.

Low numbers of people, between 12% and 16%, say they have participated in individual acts of activism such as peaceful demonstrations and petitions, and over half of people say they would never do such things. This too appears to be down from the 2005 CSI findings, suggesting apathy following the rejection of the Annan Plan. Against this, 2011 saw the occurrence of mass demonstrations joined by tens of thousands of people - as much as a fifth of the population in many estimates - over austerity measures imposed by Turkish government, and demanding greater autonomy from Turkey, which were organised by the unions' Sendikal platform. Such methods for expressing dissent could indicate a lack of trust in institutionalised forms of civil society, or a lack of willingness to make long-term commitments compared to one-time articulations of interest at critical turning points.

Key indicators*	
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 2. Civil liberties score: 2
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 37.0. Ranked 102 out of 178
* Most international indices do not collect disaggregated data for TCC	

## PUBLIC TRUST

92% of people believe other people cannot be trusted, and there are high levels of intolerance for diversity, which includes intolerance not only of Greek Cypriots, but also of people of a different race, religion or language, immigrants and foreign workers, and people wearing turbans or veils, which includes recent immigrants from Turkey. However institutional trust is quite high, and CSOs enjoy the confidence of most people. Environmental organisations and charitable organisations have more than 70% of people's trust, while women's organisations and churches score more than 65%. Most state structures are trusted by around half of people, with trust in government standing at 49%, parliament 46% and police 56%, while the armed forces and the judiciary have higher trust, at 67% and 63% respectively. Political parties have the least trust, at 26%.

An overwhelming majority of CSO representatives surveyed are highly pessimistic about the prevalence of corruption within civil society. 56% believe that corruption is very frequent, frequent or occasional in civil society, and only 9% believe that it is very rare. Further only 17% of CSO representatives believe there is no racism or discrimination in civil society, and only 36% believe civil society can play an important role in promoting non-violence and peace.

## NETWORKS

A substantial improvement in cooperation and collective action among CSOs can be seen, as the number of CSOs that report belonging to a platform rose from around 20% in 2005 to 39% in 2010. This comes in the wake of visible successes by a number of collective movements in mobilising the masses, such as the Bu Memleket Bizim (This Country is Ours) platform in 2004, and in changing policies, as in the case of the Dumansız Ada (Smoke-free Island) platform in 2008. The emphasis made by international donors such as UNDP-ACT and the EU on the development of CSO networks has also contributed to this development. The Gender Equality Platform, for example, was created with technical assistance from the EU.

Nonetheless, the level of network membership is low compared to other countries. An important factor here is the law, which does not allow legal personalities to formally establish or be members of other legal entities. Further, contacts with INGOs, and in particular their presence in TCC, are severely limited due to the political situation.

## RESOURCES

Only about 8% of CSOs surveyed were assessed as having a sustainable human resources base, calculated on the basis of voluntary staff constituting less than 25% of their staff. 36% of CSOs stated that they have paid staff, but the majority of CSOs with any paid staff also depend to a large extent on active volunteers. Most CSOs in TCC, particularly socially-oriented and advocacy CSOs, are run by volunteer boards and steering committees.

The post-referendum period brought in an influx of international funds for CSOs, particularly from the EU, but most CSOs still rely mainly on membership fees, service fees and private donations. 63% of CSOs obtain membership fees and 46% private donations, compared to only 21% receiving donor funding, 19% receiving funds from government and only 11% from private sector. Around 35% of CSOs surveyed obtain more than half their revenues from membership fees, while 21% rely exclusively on membership fees. Compared to this only 9% derive more than half of their financial resources from international donors and 3% rely exclusively on these funds, while a negligible 1% receive more than half their funding from government sources. 43% of CSOs had seen an increase in their funding from one year to the next, compared to 39% which saw a decrease. There is, however, a lack of specific CSO support organisations.

## IMPACT

Civil society and external stakeholders have similar perceptions of civil society's impact on most issues. The top two issues of concern identified for TCC were economic issues and the Cyprus question. However, the most common response both from CSO representatives and external experts is that civil society's impact on these issues is limited. Only 24% of CSO representatives assess that civil society has a high impact on the economy, and only 21% perceive high impact on the Cyprus issue. External stakeholders assess CSO performance lower than this: only 13% perceive high impact on economic issues and 20% on the Cyprus issue. Civil society is assessed as having more impact on education and social development.

On civil society's impact on policy-making, perceptions of both CSOs and external stakeholders are more negative still. 46% of CSOs and 63% of external stakeholders assess impact on policy-making as very limited.


## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in TCC include promoting networking and the formation of new civil society platforms; a greater focus on changing the way the state understands civil society; more emphasis on CSO communications, including with government, the public and other CSOs; enhanced attempts at policy-level engagements; and inculcating a human rights-based approach by CSOs to help address intolerance and discrimination.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

The Management Centre - [www.mc-med.eu](http://www.mc-med.eu)

Cyprus CSO Directory (in Turkish) - [www.mc-siviltoplumrehberi.org](http://www.mc-siviltoplumrehberi.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Tbilisi
Official language	Georgian
Population	4.5m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$2,620

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: GEORGIA

The challenges Georgian civil society faces include low impact, low levels of organisation and a disabling external environment due to the concentration of government power. A further challenge is that CSOs are not in the main membership-based, but rather mostly exist as a detached, Western-funded class. Civil society's strengths include its organisational experience, the adherence to democratic values among CSOs and its potential for development, should other actors increase their engagement. A positive development to emerge recently in the wake of the government's diminishing credibility are the signals that the authorities would like to cooperate more with civil society groups on a range of issues. Unfortunately, civil society's capacity has been substantially weakened since the 2003 Rose Revolution, and CSOs are thus not usually able to respond adequately to opportunities.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Georgia is a politically polarised society with two distinct value groups: one which essentially orients towards Russia, and one towards Europe and the Atlantic. As a result of privatisation, most companies are now Russian owned, while this is partly counterbalanced by Western donor activity. The cluster of influential interest groups around Russian interests include the Russian government, the authorities of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Georgian Orthodox clergy, which is closely linked to the Russian Orthodox Church and oligarchs. The second group consists of the diplomatic corps and international and regional organisations (such as NATO, World Bank, IMF, EU, NATO and US State Department), although their influence in society is weaker. Most CSOs align with this second group, but there is also some CSO division along these lines. The civil society and business sectors are underdeveloped, allowing the executive, particularly the president, his immediate circle and closely connected state media to dominate, and to some extent negotiate between these two interest clusters. The state also has the largest purchasing power. Georgia's government is typically dominated by a single party, with the creation of pseudo opposition groups. Non-governing political parties are characterised by organisational weakness, patriarchy, under-representation of lower social classes and ethnic minorities, poor recruitment systems for new members and vague political programmes.

The Georgian government has adopted a policy of advocating for solidarity amongst the Caucasus, but the existence of self-declared

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 46.7. Civic Engagement: 17.6; Level of Organisation: 64.5; Practice of Values: 63.6; Perception of Impact: 28.8; External Environment: 59.0. Ranked 26 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	18.9%
CSOs network membership	32.2%
Policy activity	26.8%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.733. Ranked 75 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 4. Civil liberties score: 3
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 35
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 4.1. Ranked 64 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.29. Percentile rank: 64.1. Rule of law: -0.21. Percentile rank: 48.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 38. Ranked 104 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: moderate. Score: 73 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 86.4. Ranked 47 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 4.74. Ranked 102 out of 167

breakaway republics remains a significant political and diplomatic issue following Georgia's failed venture into war with Russia in 2008. The holding of elections in 2011 in Abkhazia and South Ossetia caused irritation for the Georgian government, which regards them as autonomous regions with governments in exile in Tbilisi, Georgia's capital. In 2011, the sour relations between Georgia and Russia centred on Georgia's attempt to block Russia's membership the World Trade Organisation, which was resolved after diplomatic intervention by Switzerland.

Levels of unemployment are high, but after a slump in Georgia's GDP growth rate to -3.8% in 2009, the economy appears to be picking up, with an average growth rate of 5.5% in 2011. Though Georgia is considered to have high human development, standing at 75 out of 187 countries on the 2011 UN Human Development Index, life expectancy has decreased, while maternal deaths and cases of TB and malaria have increased, suggesting a decline in living standards, exacerbated by the migration of health staff. Freedom House classifies Georgia as partly free, with media freedom having declined in particular since the Rose Revolution that brought the current regime to power. Other trends include high emigration, significant influence of law and security agencies and increased power of international criminal cartels engaged in drugs and weapons smuggling.

31% of CSOs surveyed believe that current legislation places too many restraints on civil society. The state does not recognise civil society as a serious partner and there is a lack of a structure to involve civil society in policy processes on a consistent basis. While there is some dialogue, with opportunities generally opened by donors, topics of political or economic power, such as civilian oversight of security and police structures, transparency of budgeting or decentralisation of government, are off the agenda. Engagement is allowed mostly on unimportant issues, and loyalty is expected in return. There is occasional debate about creating a governmental regulatory body to coordinate CSO activities, but this has so far been resisted by civil society.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

CSOs were one of the driving forces of the Rose Revolution, but after this saw a downturn, with many CSOs activists promoted to government and donors shifting towards direct financial support of government. There are estimated to be 10,000 CSOs in Georgia, with around 60% based in large cities. Some parts of civil society are not aligned to progressive values but remain important, such as the Orthodox Church, which is seen as a guardian of traditional values, and some newspapers and other church and ethnic groups. CSOs on the more progressive side include think tanks, watchdogs and professional and sectoral associations.

People in CSOs tend to define civil society as being characterised by active citizens uniting, representing public interest and defending democracy: there is therefore a strong values-based definition of civil society amongst its workers, given its emergence in opposition to communism, and this means that many people in CSOs would not consider trade unions as legitimate parts of civil society, given their past role in communism. Civil society therefore tends to be understood quite narrowly.



## PARTICIPATION

The number of people active in CSOs in Georgia is very small, with only 1-2% of the population an active member of a socially-oriented CSO and less than 1% of a politically-oriented CSO. Volunteering also seems to be decline. The highest levels of membership are in organisations related to the Orthodox Church and other denominations, but this only stands at around 6% for active and passive members combined, and represents association in a relatively conservative milieu. Difficult economic conditions offer a barrier to participation, along with the dismal political situation and lack of trust in public institutions. The euphoria and enthusiasm of the Rose Revolution has given way to widespread public frustration at lack of change and disillusionment. It is possible that there is also some fear in admitting being engaged in political activity. The weaknesses of political parties, which rarely offer meaningful participation routes and do little to retain new recruits, and the lack of thematic diversity in the programmes of CSOs are identified as a further impediments to participation.

*“The euphoria of revolution has given way to widespread frustration.”*

Not surprisingly informal social engagement is higher, at around 44%. Only 15% of people report having taken part in a demonstration, but this is up from 8% in an earlier poll. A demonstration in Tbilisi of 10,000 people in May 2011 to demand the resignation of President Saakashvili was crushed by riot police using tear gas and rubber bullets, and led to the death of two people and the arrest of over 100. Strikes have gone down to almost zero, presumably as a result of fear of losing work in difficult economic times.

Older people are under-represented in CSOs and the middle classes over-represented, but over 60% of CSO members are women, and rural populations make up more than half of CSO membership. There is assessed to be more passivity about CSO participation in cities, partly because of the availability of other participation routes, but political activism is higher in urban areas. Members of non-mainstream religions and sexual minorities are little represented within civil society.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Only the church enjoys widespread high public confidence, with 90% of people having very high or quite high confidence in it. This compares to 41% trust in charities, 35% in environmental organisations, 32% in women’s organisations, 18% in trade unions and only 16% trust in political parties. If anything, trust in the church seems to be going up while it is falling in political parties, but trust in CSOs is also improving.

Some progress can be assumed to have been made on corruption, with Georgia moving from a ranking of 133rd out of 146 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2004 to 64th out of 184 in 2011, ahead of all CIS member countries. However, only 14% of CSOs believe the sector to be free of corruption, and there remains scepticism about the government’s commitment to anti-corruption.

## NETWORKS

Around 70% of CSOs are members of networks, coalitions and associations, although there are only a few permanent CSO umbrella organisations. One of the networks with highest recognition is CENN, an environmental network. Other coalitions are created as part of funded projects, but their lifespan rarely extends beyond the duration of the project and they tend to focus on donor deliverables. There are also coalitions of CSOs created to support government initiatives, such as participation in elections, which do not enjoy high levels of trust from other CSOs, and there is a tendency for coalitions to polarise on pro or anti-government lines. 85% of CSOs hold meetings with other CSOs and 82% exchange information, and there is a perception that cooperation has increased in recent years. In international connections, Georgian CSOs are assessed as faring better

than other Caucasus countries, partly because of the high level of international interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but are less connected than Eastern European CSOs.

## RESOURCES

Financial resources for CSOs seem to be in decline: 37% of CSOs reported that their budgets had shrunk compared to 26% that said they had increased from the previous year. Many CSOs report that their financial resources have steadily decreased since 2003, mainly because there are fewer donor organisations supporting fewer areas of work in Georgia. This is alarming because civil society is highly donor dependent. 37% of CSOs entirely rely on donor funds, and 59% of CSOs obtain half of their funding from donors. Since most donors favour stable and experienced CSOs, newly-established organisations have slim chances of survival, while established CSOs adapt their areas of work to meet shifting donor priorities. A trend therefore seems to be that there are a smaller number of surviving CSOs each receiving a larger share of donor funding. CSOs based outside the capital are particularly challenged as donors tend to prefer to direct funds through intermediary CSOs in Tbilisi. Other financial sources are much smaller in comparison: 88% of CSOs have never received any financial assistance from central or local government, 95% never from businesses, and 83% have never received individual donations.

Contrary to the pattern in most countries, volunteerism is less common than paid employment in CSOs: 33% of CSOs surveyed have no volunteers at all, while 38% have between two and 20. Further, most CSOs tend to recruit new staff through personal contacts, with formal recruitment rare. Loss of CSO leadership to other sectors without adequate replacement is a challenge, given that the balance of earning power has shifted from CSOs to government positions in recent years.

## IMPACT

Only around a quarter of CSO representatives believe CSOs achieve impact on the pressing issues of the day, particularly poverty. CSOs tend to see their role on major issues such as poverty as mainly limited to humanitarian and civic education efforts, effectively admitting that they are not key players. In less sensitive areas CSOs offer a greater range of activities, suggesting unrealised potential for greater action. 70% of CSOs representatives believe their policy impact to be minimal, but perception of policy impact tends to divide between pro-government and other CSOs. Pro-government CSOs tend to have a higher perception of achievement in essentially promoting government programmes and policies, whereas other CSOs believe the government is unwilling to cooperate with them. Where CSOs perceive themselves as having success, it is not in areas that challenge political and economic power. External stakeholders are more pessimistic still about the impact of the sector.

One recent example of advocacy success came in June 2011, when four photographers arrested and accused of being Russian spies were later released, following intense pressure from the media.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development - [www.cipdd.org](http://www.cipdd.org)

Caucasus Environmental NGO Network - [www.cenn.org](http://www.cenn.org)

Open Society Georgia Foundation - [www.osgf.ge](http://www.osgf.ge)

Recommendations to strengthen Georgian civil society include: agreeing on some common values between different CSOs and other segments of civil society to enable greater unity of efforts; developing common frameworks, such as sector specific or regional focuses, across lines of polarisation; intensifying networking among CSOs; and communicating unified CSO views to the public to support greater demand for positive change.



Basic facts	
Capital	Conakry
Official language	French
Population	10.6m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$452

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: GUINEA

In November 2010 Guinea experienced what is widely perceived to have been the first credible election in its history, returning a civilian government, two years on from a military coup that established a government which committed horrendous human rights abuses against its citizens. With a history of one party and military rule, the country continues to face great uncertainty, as evidenced by a July 2011 assassination attempt on the current president, highlighting the urgent need for military reform. The progress of the much-postponed national assembly elections, originally scheduled for 2007 and postponed again in December 2011 for a potential 2012 date, will give a further indication of the health of restored democracy and the prospects for civil society space and influence.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Recent years were characterised by high inflation, slowing growth and declining foreign assets, with economic shocks triggering social unrest. A debt default in 2007 led to the suspension of cooperation between Guinea and international partners, which hit civil society funding hard. Guinea is still one of the lowest ranking countries on the UN Human Development Index, ranked 178th out of 187 in 2011, notwithstanding some improvements in education, infant mortality and water provision. In the most recent statistics over 40% of the population live on less than US\$2 a day, with more than 60% of the rural population assessed as poor. Literacy levels are low, particularly for women and rural people. Guinea manifests division between the main ethnic groups (Fula, Mandinka and Soussou) with each recent election marked by ethnic violence, and there are also land disputes and conflicts linked to the seasonal movement of people, in which civil society is seen as playing a strong role in promoting peace and non-violence.

The state is the most powerful social force, and is closely connected with some major private businesses. The state is also the largest employer. A decentralisation act is on the books, but has not been applied, so power remains highly centred in the capital, Conakry. The army and other security forces remain key players within the state. The commencement of legal proceedings in early 2012 against an army colonel accused of involvement in a particularly brutal action against civilians in 2009 was seen as breaking new ground, and a first sign that the army might no longer be able to act with impunity. International development partners also have influence, while religious groups

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Score: 1.8 out of 3. Structure 1.9. Environment 1.1. Impact 2.2. Values 2.1
Interpersonal trust	21.3%
CSOs network membership	Up to 60%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.344. Ranked 178 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 5. Civil liberties score: 5
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.1. Ranked 164 out of 182
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -1.15. Percentile rank: 11.5. Rule of law: -1.51. Percentile rank: 2.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 30. Ranked 86 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 102.5. Ranked 11 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 2.79. Ranked 146 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011	Score 37.8. Ranked 43 out of 53

and professions command people's respect. The private sector is also largely seen as indifferent or hostile to civil society, and the mining companies are felt to demonstrate poor corporate social responsibility practice towards the environment and their employees. 80% of CSO representatives consulted see the social and environmental role of companies as moderate or limited.

Political rights are still limited but have improved compared to the time of military rule. There are around 50 political parties, which tend to be structured around their founder or leader. Violations of freedom of the press have been frequent. State bureaucracy is cumbersome, and citizens have little faith in the ability of the state to respond to urgent needs. This may account for the growing importance of clan structures as alternatives.

The legal framework for associations and NGOs was set in 2005. The 2005 act is assessed to have made it easier to register CSOs, by simplifying procedures and decentralising the level at which applications are made and approvals given, although less than half of CSOs consulted believe that registration is fast, simple or equal. Registration brings some tax exemptions. The need to supply documentation is however felt to deter some grassroots groups. Not surprisingly given the historical political context, CSOs assess the conditions for their operations as difficult. Over half state that the government intervenes in an inappropriate way in the activities of civil society, while CSOs divide evenly in assessing

dialogue with the government as either limited or moderate. CSOs acknowledge that they are little able, given the context, to play the classical civil society role of holding the government to account.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The notion of civil society came to prominence in Guinea in the early 1990s, as the country took its first steps in moving on from a long term, dominant one party system, which was in place from independence in 1958 to 1984. Trade unions, women's and youth groups existed at this time, but were closely organised around the ruling party. NGOs first appeared as offices of international NGOs, or were started by prominent nationals or as offshoots of religious networks. These early CSOs had diverse evolutions, with some becoming political parties and others formalising into NGOs. CSOs tend to form to defend common interests, or to promote the interests of marginalised groups, while people working in the media also formed associations.

Civil society's make up includes human rights groups, HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB organisations, religious groups, trade unions, women and youth groups and independent media. Civil society activity in addressing poverty includes initiatives such as microfinance, entrepreneurship training, supporting women's empowerment and providing rural infrastructure.

## PARTICIPATION

There is little practice of individual political action, and attempts are sometimes met with violence. There was little possibility to do this before 1984, and a culture of participation can be seen to have gradually grown from 1984 to 2008 before being interrupted by military coup, with political parties and CSOs representing two alternate platforms for participation. Six out of ten people surveyed report being a member of a CSO, and over half of members of one organisation are members of at least a second. Organisations with widespread membership occupy quite diverse points on the civil society spectrum, such as associations of parents and school supporters, environmental



organisations and organisations based on cultural and ethnic identity. Formal volunteering is rare, estimated at about 14% of the population, but it is understood there are much higher levels of local level informal volunteering, characterised by help for a neighbour or community member without expectation of payment. Active volunteers however commit highly, reporting that they volunteer for around 40 hours a month. Almost three quarters of people report being part of a collective community action, such as taking part in a community meeting, within the space of a year. There remains a tradition of common action in rural and agrarian communities, while charitable giving through mosque and church seems to be habitual.

*“Almost three quarters of people report being part of a collective community action.”*

Rural people, women, young people, people with disabilities and other marginalised groups are under-represented in CSO membership and leadership, with very few women leaders of CSOs.

## PUBLIC TRUST

There is little public trust in the law and in the separation of state powers. Guinea is assessed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, ranked at 164th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and civil society is not perceived to play a strong role in combating corruption. However, civil society is highly trusted: 81% of people surveyed trust NGOs, 78% religious groups and 67% trade unions, compared to trust in the armed forces (21%), political parties (21%), the government (15%) and the police (13%). 85% of people report that they would approach a CSO first to help meet the needs of the marginalised, rather than government. There is, however, also critique of some CSOs as being elitist and questions over their claims to speak on behalf of communities, given that many are based in Conakry and some are viewed as being close to bureaucrats and international development partners.

## NETWORKS

A minority of CSOs are thought to be members of CSO networks, although over half of CSOs consulted believe that networks are generally efficient. Compared to this, over 80% of CSO representatives believe CSO support infrastructure is inadequate. Only a few CSOs have international linkages.

*“85% of people would approach a CSO first rather than government.”*

## RESOURCES

Under one in ten CSO representatives believe they have sufficient financial resources to do their work, with two in ten saying they are very short of resources. CSOs are highly dependent on external funding and only a handful are believed to receive state support. The tax system is not very supportive of philanthropy, and less than one in ten CSO receives private sector funding.

However, more than half of CSOs believe they have sufficient human resources. Yet the lack of formal skills and training is noteworthy, as are the limited opportunities for staff progression within domestic CSOs, with international CSOs being able to cherry pick and train the most talented staff. Technical resources, such as IT equipment and internet access, are also widely assessed as inadequate, with only 14% of CSO representatives believing that they are sufficient.

## IMPACT

Civil society is seen as active in the social policy arena, but to have limited impact on improving human rights, due to the difficult political environment. It also recognises itself as active in trying to promote good governance, but to be achieving little impact in this area, and to have no influence on national budgetary processes. Over half the public report that CSOs have helped them take part in community activities, while around three quarters report they have participated in CSO activities

to address issues of marginalisation. Over half of people report that CSOs were most effective in helping them with an issue, compared to only 15% who rated the government as more effective. However, CSO representatives rate their organisations' impact more highly than members of the public, suggesting a gap between medium levels of impact and high levels of activity.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Guinea include: developing citizenship education programmes; instigating a national communication and information network for CSOs; advocating for greater state decentralisation; and prioritising the strengthening of the institutional, financial and technical capacities of CSOs.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Conseil National des Organisations de la Societe Civile Guineenne - <http://cnoscg.blogspot.com>

Programme concerté de Renforcement des Capacités des Organisations de la société civile et de la Jeunesse Guinéennes (PROJEG) - <http://info-projeg.over-blog.net>



Basic facts	
Capital	Rome
Official language	Italian
Population	61.0m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$33,917

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: ITALY

Civil society in Italy is now a mature and solid phenomenon, but its weaknesses lie in its limited ability to influence the attitudes and values of Italian society. Deficits include: low political impact, which research confirms to be far behind social impact; limitations in the international links needed to face the effects of globalisation; insufficient commitment to emerging problems in Italy, such as social mobility and the rule of law; and the lack of inclusion and management of diversity, which includes insufficient attention to the situation of immigrants and the potential for development of their citizenship through participation in CSOs. With Italy experiencing severe economic crisis and the installation of a technocratic, unelected government in late 2011, these identified weaknesses call into question civil society's ability to mount an adequate response.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

While a developed country, and a long established member of the EU and the G8, Italy has marked social and economic differences between its north and south, with higher levels of poverty and exclusion in the south, and this is reflected in the distribution of organised civil society, which is weaker in the south than the north, but also plays a significant role in the south in trying to address this challenge.

Former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi survived numerous trials and political crises, and was criticised for a high level of control of the media, including ownership of the country's largest media group, and for the apparent instigation of laws to protect personal interests. There is consequently a low level of freedom of the press, with a ranking of 61st on the Reporters Without Borders 2011-12 Press Freedom Index, which indicates that press freedom is falling, while Freedom House assesses the press as partly free. 2011 saw a high and growing level of international concern about Italy's economy, with public debt at 120% of GDP and soaring levels of interest on Italian bonds which threatened to destabilise the single currency Eurozone. The response to crisis saw the removal of Berlusconi and the installation of an unelected prime minister who formed a non-party government, offering a new and uncertain context for Italian civil society, while Rome was the only location in the Global Day of Rage protests in October which saw significant violence.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 54.4. Civic Engagement: 48.5; Level of Organisation: 63.2; Practice of Values: 45.8; Perception of Impact: 42.1; External Environment: 72.4. Ranked 10 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	29.2%
CSOs network membership	71.1%
Policy activity	68.9%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.874. Ranked 24 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: free. Score: 26
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.9. Ranked 69 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.52. Percentile rank: 67.9. Rule of law: +0.38. Percentile rank: 62.6
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 19.67. Ranked 61 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: moderate. Score: 78 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 41. Ranked 147 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 7.74. Ranked: 31 out of 167

Italy has a strong continuing culture of corporatism, which has existed since the 1930s, and which accords a special relationship in governance to business associations and trade unions. The state traditionally plays a strong and central role, with public affairs seen as its clear domain, although lately this has been challenged and is in decline. Political parties also traditionally play a central role, and for many years represented the only route for people's participation, while the Catholic Church and its various bodies tends to occupy positions and spaces which a greater diversity of actors might occupy in another setting.

A cornerstone for organised civil society was offered by the 2001 reform of the constitution, which recognised the role of citizens and their organisations at all levels of governance. However, not much more than half of Italian CSOs express satisfaction with the legal framework for civil society. There is widespread scepticism about the ability of the state to enforce laws. More broadly, the political system is critiqued as unstable and not able to adequately fulfil its role. The Economist Intelligence Unit assesses Italy as a 'flawed democracy'.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Key categories of CSOs are: organisations involved in civic activism – those active in the policy system and those defending citizenship rights; social and cultural organisations – those which are seeking to increase social capital in the community and in society; and professional associations and social partners – trade unions, labour organisations and organisations of workers, professionals and employers.

Because of Italy's corporatist history, trade unions do not tend to see themselves as CSOs and do not connect well with the rest of civil society, having effectively been used as the main proxy for civil society participation in the past. Some unions also closely align with political parties.

Civil society has also long worked within the supra-national framework offered by the EU, which implies both a need for civil society to work at the regional level and to take advantage of the domestic spaces created by regional decisions. The opportunities created for civil society by EU processes are acknowledged, but CSOs, particularly locally-based and oriented CSOs, report still feeling somewhat distant from the EU, and not having adequate information about how to use its opportunities for participation and influence, distinct from any engagement with the funding opportunities it may offer.

## PARTICIPATION

Around one in three Italians is a member of a socially-oriented CSO, and one in five volunteer for such CSOs. Only one in five is a member of a politically-oriented CSO, and only one in ten volunteers for such an organisation. Another survey puts the total volunteer population at 8% of those over 14, which is over 3 million people. Around 2.5m people are members of volunteers' associations, while social promotion associations have a membership of 3.5m people. Political parties are estimated to have around 1.4m members and labour unions almost 14.5m. However, as much union membership can be seen as being an intrinsic part of many occupations, it cannot necessarily be read as a meaningful indicator of voluntary participation.



The leadership of civil society remains male dominated, with only 20% of organisations that are members of one key network, the Forum of the Third Sector, being led by women.

Outside of organisations, 40% of the population take part in less formal activities, and 60%, a high number globally, indicate a willingness to take part in individual acts of political activism such as boycotts and demonstrations.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Under a third of people state that they can trust other people. Public trust in civil society institutions is around 43%, which is close to the global average score. Within these, the church and environmental organisations have the support of most people. Meanwhile, political parties and labour unions have less than 30% of public support, while political parties have the highest level of complete distrust, at almost 30%.

There is also a high level of perceived corruption, particularly for an economically developed EU member country, with Italy ranked the lowest in such countries on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, at 67th out of 183 countries.

## NETWORKS

Around 71% of CSOs are members of networks, but the extent to which these networks are substantive rather than merely formal is questioned. Whether members of networks or not, CSOs have a habit of meeting with other CSOs, which 85% report doing within a three month period, while 80% had exchanged information with other CSOs. On average both network members and non members held 13 to 14 meetings with other CSOs in a three month period, but network members are more active in information exchange, and on average exchanged information with 24 other CSOs, compared to 14 for non-network members. 41% of international NGOs are represented in Italy, a high figure compared to other countries

*“CSOs have a habit of meeting with other CSOs.”*

## RESOURCES

In around two thirds of CSOs volunteers outnumber paid staff. Only 15% of CSOs do not have volunteers, compared to 38% which have no paid staff. The organisations that most rely on volunteers include cultural, health and social service groups and associations.

The funding mix for civil society is diverse, but there are few CSOs which can state they have assured multi-year funding. On average an Italian CSO obtains funding from two main sources. The most frequent and significant part of CSO revenues is membership fees, and one in five CSOs relies solely on this source. 40% of CSOs obtain funds from private donations and a third from service fees. Donor funding is the least frequent source.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves as having low or very low influence in the public arena. However, Italian CSOs tend to underestimate the impact they are able to have, suggesting an enduring self-image amongst the sector of being weak organisations with little potential to exert power in the face of strong government. Correspondingly, the perception of impact of the sector by external stakeholders is higher than the perception of the sector itself. Civil society is seen to have a limited ability to influence matters of social mobility, identified as a pressing issue in Italy, but more ability to influence respect for the law. Both internal and external stakeholders agree that civil society has strong social impact, with the key issues it addresses being housing, education, food and social development.

*“Italian CSOs tend to underestimate the impact they are able to have.”*

## RECOMMENDATIONS


Recommendations for the development of civil society in Italy include: gathering more reliable statistical data on civil society in a broad and disaggregated sense, as opposed to the data that exists largely on non-profit organisations only at present, which groups together organisations which have little in common; improving media relations for civil society; and developing more structured ways of enabling civil society participation in policy processes.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Cittadinanzattiva (Active Citizenship) - [www.cittadinanzattiva.it](http://www.cittadinanzattiva.it)

Active Citizenship Foundation - [www.fondaca.org](http://www.fondaca.org)

Forum Terzo Settore - [www.forumterzosettore.it](http://www.forumterzosettore.it)



Basic facts	
Capital	Tokyo
Official language	Japanese
Population	126.5m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$42,831

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: JAPAN

The year in Japan was dominated by the devastating March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear crisis, an emergency unprecedented in modern day Japan. Civil society was heavily involved in response, and a generation has now experienced public protest, against nuclear power, for the first time. New possibilities for civil society therefore seem to have emerged, but alongside this there is the potential for established political orders to reassert themselves. Japanese civil society therefore assesses itself as being at a defining crossroads, facing either stagnation or renewal as it attempts to overcome challenges of low rates of participation, trust and resources.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The March 2011 earthquake and its aftermath have brought new fluidity to the social and political arena in Japan. Commentators on civil society acknowledge new opportunity, particularly given the collapse in trust in government, which in September saw the resignation of the prime minister, and in the businesses most closely associated with the crisis, such as energy companies. This has brought about some new willingness to question ingrained patterns of state-centric social infrastructures and to re-consider civil society as vehicles for participation and partnerships, while new mobilisations of protest have been seen. What is not yet clear is whether the shift is a permanent one, or if the opportunity is temporary.

The state traditionally enjoys a strong role in Japan. Some CSOs are seen as closer to governments, such as former public benefit corporations and social public promotion corporations, due to movement of staff from government to such CSOs. World Bank Governance Indicators suggest an improvement in the quality of governance over the last decade, with progress in control of corruption, quality of regulation and effectiveness of government. Political stability is however assessed to have worsened, and public voice and the accountability of public agencies remain challenging area. A further challenge to public voice comes in the form of homogenous media coverage resulting from a press club system which maintains strong ties between media, senior government officials and politicians.

The shape of civil society in Japan changed substantially after the passing of the Law to Promote Specified Non-profit Activities (NPO Law) in 1998. This made it much easier for grassroots organisations to obtain corporate status as

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 56.3. Civic Engagement: 44.5; Level of Organisation: 62.3; Practice of Values: 41.3; Perception of Impact: 57.2; External Environment: 76.0. Ranked 5 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	39.1%
CSOs network membership	35.4%
Policy activity	40.0%



Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.901. Ranked 12 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 2
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 8. Ranked 14 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +1.40. Percentile rank: 88.5. Rule of law: +1.31. Percentile rank: 88.2
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: -1. Ranked 22 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2008	Status: strong. Score: 83 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 31. Ranked 164 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: full democracy. Score: 8.08. Ranked 21 out of 167

specified non-profit corporations (SNACs). The NPO Law provides for minimum government supervision of SNACs. At the same time, even before the earthquake the political climate for such CSOs is seen to have experienced some improvement, with progress on discussion of the taxation system and the legal framework.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

While the concept of civil society is seen as arising in Japan after the end of the Second World War, the growth of a modern day civil society can be traced to the response to and aftermath of the Awaji Great Earthquake of 1995. The mass response to this was characterised as the Volunteer Revolution, which saw a significant shift in media coverage of CSOs and volunteering. This also drew attention to the outdated nature of the laws then in place for the sector, given that response came largely from grassroots CSOs with no legal status, rather than existing legally established CSOs. This led to the passing of the NPO Law, which brought about a boom in SNACs, of which there are now estimated to be over 40,000, exceeding the number of longer established CSO types. Indeed, while the number of SNACs has increased, the number of other CSOs has decreased, suggesting that these have become the predominant CSO form. Further, the economic scale of the non-profit sector was assessed to have doubled since 1990. However,

over a decade on from the passing of the law, there are now question marks over the quality and effectiveness of SNACs, about their ability to offer useful platforms for civic participation, and the financial and human resource challenges they face.

As well as SNACs, it is important to understand the many traditional associations and informal networks which exist in Japan, which can be seen as an important generator of social capital, but do not easily conform to Western models of what constitutes a CSO. For example, there are estimated to be almost 300,000 neighbourhood organisations, represented in all 47 prefectures of Japan, undertaking such activities as maintaining local residential environments and supporting local public service provision. On the whole, the service delivery role of CSOs is much stronger than their advocacy role. Social enterprises, meanwhile, are a relatively new phenomenon. There are also around 35,000 small business associations. Civil society in Japan can therefore be seen to be a blend of, and an evolving dialogue between, traditional and young organisations.

## PARTICIPATION

27% of the Japanese population report being members of a socially-oriented CSO and 22% of a politically-oriented CSO, with sports and cultural organisations having the highest membership, but local community participation, for example in neighbourhood organisations, is much higher than participation in more formal organisations. Women participate at the same rate as men in socially-oriented organisations, but have much less involvement in the political sphere. Japan has lower levels of membership of and volunteering in CSOs than the global average in every category of organisation. There are also historically very low rates of participation in peaceful demonstrations, although September 2011 saw an estimated 60,000 people marching in anti-nuclear protest in Tokyo, following earlier protests in June.

While there are many universities and other higher education institutes which provide courses in understanding civil society, these are concentrated in the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan areas, and are mostly offered by lecture, which entails a lack of opportunities for under-graduates and post-



graduates to gain hands on experience of civil society. This has the implication that membership and volunteering in CSOs amongst people who have completed tertiary education is low.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Public trust in civil society is unusually low in Japan compared to most other countries. 36% of people express quite a lot of trust in large scale corporations, 29% in government and 21% in parliament and only 17% in CSOs, while trust in charitable and humanitarian organisations is even lower. The 2012 Edelman Trust Barometer shows major drops of trust in public actors following the March earthquake, with trust in government and the media falling significantly, but also trust in NGOs. A second distinguishing feature of Japan compared to most other countries is the low trust given to religious structures and the low influence they therefore have, even though there are a large number of faith-related organisations, estimated at over 180,000. Reaction to the cult-led poison gas attack on the Tokyo metro system of 1995 is believed to be one of the factors behind this.

Japan is ranked consistently highly on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, placed 14th out of 183 in 2011. Despite this there is still widespread concern about corruption, including in civil society, with 95% of CSO representatives surveyed believing there are corrupt practices present within Japanese civil society. The long standing practice of placing retiring senior government professionals into well-paid positions in public benefit corporations, as mentioned above, can be seen to contribute towards this. There have also been some prominent corruption scandals involving such organisations, which have received heavy media coverage, such as those involving disability organisations and trade unions.

*“Public trust in civil society is unusually low in Japan compared to most other countries.”*

Around 40% of people say they trust other people, which is higher than in most other countries, but there is a perception that this is decreasing.

## NETWORKS

Only about 35% of CSOs surveyed report being a member of a federation, umbrella group or support network. Around 45 different networks were identified, with about half of these being national level networks, followed by 13 provincial networks. Over half of CSOs which are members of one network are members of at least one more, implying that CSOs divide between those which prioritise formal association with other CSOs, and those which do not. Labour unions tend more to be members of networks, perhaps reflecting the fact that they have a longer history on the Japanese CSO landscape, compared to SNACS. However, it is assessed that there are also around 300 unofficial intermediary organisations that serve SNACS.

84% of CSOs surveyed exchange information with other CSOs and 82% report recent meetings, further suggesting that there is considerable informal networking. Communicating and cooperating with local government is also identified as an important connection for CSOs engaged in service delivery. Japan is however assessed as having weak international civil society connections for a country of its size and international influence, reflecting the fact that internationally oriented CSOs only started developing in Japan in the 1980s, and a continuing low awareness of international development issues amongst Japanese citizens.

## RESOURCES

CSOs are seen to depend heavily on subsidy and outsourcing from the government and corporate donations, rather than on donations from the public and voluntary efforts. Individual donation to charitable causes is also very low – at under 0.1% of household spending on most recent

calculations. Taxation incentives for giving are viewed to be weak. There is however some evidence that reaction to the March earthquake saw a large spike in donations to CSOs.

Only 44% of CSOs surveyed assess themselves as having sustainable human resources. Half of CSOs report having five or fewer members of staff, and 45% report having no staff at all. Only 15% have more than 20 members of staff. 15% of SNACs report having no financial resources, and around half of SNACs do not have sufficient resources to employ one full time worker. The average salary of workers in the private sector is 2.3 times higher than the average salary of workers in SNACs, and funding received through outsourcing does not include provision for permanent salaries. In focus group discussions, SNACs have declared financial sustainability to be their biggest challenge.

## IMPACT

External stakeholders assess the impact of CSOs more highly than those working in the sector themselves, both on social issues (70% of CSOs surveyed see tangible social impact compared to 77% of external stakeholders) and with regard to impact on policy (50% of CSOs and 55% of external stakeholders). Only a minority of CSOs interviewed have attempted policy influence within the past two years.

Systematic attempts to measure CSO impact are acknowledged as weak. One organisation, in response to this, has launched an assessment tool with 33 criteria which CSO can apply to be recognised as effective.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Japan include promoting civic engagement through citizens' education, including in lifelong learning initiatives; modifying the taxation system to promote greater giving to CSOs; increasing connections between local CSOs and national ones, so that people volunteering on community issues can be encouraged into activism on national issues; and undertaking further research to understand the low level of trust in Japanese civil society and the ways of improving this.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Japan Centre for Nonprofit Research and Information - [www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/npocenter](http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/npocenter)

Japan Association of Charitable Organisations - [www.kohokyo.or.jp](http://www.kohokyo.or.jp)

CSO Network Japan - [www.csonj.org](http://www.csonj.org)

Japan NPO Centre - [www.jnpoc.ne.jp](http://www.jnpoc.ne.jp)

Japan NGO Centre for International Cooperation - [www.janic.org](http://www.janic.org)

Japan Fundraising Association - <http://jfra.jp>



Basic facts	
Capital	Amman
Official language	Arabic
Population	6.4m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$4,560

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: JORDAN

CSOs in Jordan have long operated within a politically conservative environment with a tradition of heavy state intervention which compromises civil society independence. Recent years saw a gradual decline of the political freedoms and greater openness that developed after 1989, when public protests led to the first parliamentary elections in a generation and the loosening of some state control. The recent wave of protest throughout the Middle East and North Africa has, however, created fresh opportunity for civil society to push for electoral, political and legislative reform.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The king, as head of the executive and commander of the armed forces, enjoys a high level of power and official protection from public criticism. The power of the current king over other levels of government was demonstrated in February 2011, when he dismissed the government in response to popular protest and appointed a new prime minister to form a new cabinet. However, since then, political events have continued to move rapidly in response to popular protest. A broader range of political viewpoints was brought into the government, price cuts in basic goods were introduced and the law restricting public gatherings was relaxed, while the king announced there would be new election and party laws, and future prime ministers and governments would be formed by elected parliamentary majorities, rather than appointed by the king. However, dissatisfaction at the slow pace of reform led to the second prime minister resigning following a vote of confidence, and the appointment of Jordan's third prime minister of 2011, Prime Minister Al-Khasawneh, at the time a judge at the International Court of Justice, with a clear reform agenda. Public preference for multiparty democracy is high and rising, with 80% of people believing that a democratic political system would be good for Jordan.

Political reform needs to address a context in which the separation of powers has been compromised, and connected to the king's power are the security forces, the army and the institutions of government, with government believed to be Jordan's largest employer. The leaders of financial institutions, which are closely bound with kinship ties, religious leaders and the leaders of those tribes linked with the political regime are also assessed as having a high level of influence. Less powerful but still influential in Jordan are the media, parliament, the civil courts and the associations of the professional class, with political parties seen to have declining status and importance.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 50.7. Civic Engagement: 36.8; Level of Organisation: 55.3; Practice of Values: 57.2; Perception of Impact: 49.0; External Environment: 55.4. Ranked 18 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	31.3%
CSOs network membership	80.2%
Policy activity	18.6%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.698. Ranked 95 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: not free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 5
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 42
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 4.5. Ranked 56 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.08. Percentile rank: 57.04. Rule of law: +0.22. Percentile rank: 61.1
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 56.8. Ranked 128 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: very weak. Score: 55 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 95 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.89. Ranked: 118 out of 167

Natural resources, particularly water, are scarce, and a heavily urbanised, service-based economy was hit by the global economic crisis. Unemployment, is high, estimated at 13% in 2010, with female unemployment higher, and more than half of the population believe their family's financial situation has worsened since the economic crisis. Previous high levels of economic growth were also seen to have led to high income inequality, and inflation rose steeply to around 6% by the end of 2010. Women are under-represented at every level, including in local and national politics, public sector leadership and civil society. In the 2011 Social Watch Gender Equality Index, Jordan was assessed as having achieved slight progress, but was still rated as one of the bottom 30 countries for gender equality globally.

Temporary laws introduced under the pretext of preventing extremism and terrorism restricted freedom of assembly and expression, with Freedom House changing Jordan's classification to not free from partly free in 2010. Until the February 2011 reforms, requests had to be made to hold any public gathering, and requests for gatherings by political parties, students and trade unions were usually refused. Government also controls the appointment of imams and the content of the Friday sermons. A key test will be the reform of electoral law, an area which has previously seen little progress, with the result that elections have not returned representative parliaments, partly because of boycotts by parties.

Pre-2011 changes in the law for civil society enabled the establishment of non-profit companies, a new form of civil society in Jordan, with 250 established in areas such as education and health. The 2008 Societies Act regulates charities and social organisations, and was made less restrictive through amendments in 2009, while each of the 12 professional associations has its own law. There is also no right in law to form new trade unions, and public sector employees are not permitted to unionise, although after a series of protests, in 2010 the teaching sector won the right to form the General Union of Teachers.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The period after 1989 saw the growth of CSOs and a broadening of the scope of their activities, including the development of CSOs working on issues such as human rights and gender. Such organisations are acknowledged as gaining some successes, particularly in enhancing the political representation of women. There are currently estimated to be around 5,700 CSOs, with over 1.5m members. Around one quarter of these are social and charitable societies, accounting for around half of CSO membership, and there are also a large number of cooperative societies. However, cooperative societies are weakened by a heavy level of state bureaucracy, while most charitable societies have a very local focus.

Within civil society, the most influential organisations have tended to be those associated with the royal family, international organisations and business and professional associations. However, the picture is one of disconnect between different parts of civil society: business societies tend to seek good relationships with government, while professional associations, although having strong membership and financial bases, are seen as somewhat outmoded and inward-looking. Looser kinship and tribal networks also offer unofficial social safety nets, which became particularly important in economic downturn.



Independent media organisations have grown since these were first allowed in 1993, but the government maintains tight control of major media sources, albeit this has been challenged by the growth in internet access to an estimated 27% and 90% access to satellite TV.

## PARTICIPATION

There is a lack of concrete information on volunteering, but research conducted before the uprisings of 2011 suggest that the highest level of participation, of around 9% of people, is in family associations, with generally under 4% participating in any other form of civic grouping. Membership of political parties is estimated to be under 1%, while the volunteer base is around 35,000, which is 1% of the working age population. Volunteering often has motivations of national or religious duty, but many CSO leaders believe volunteering to be in decline from a low base. It is considered that people are more comfortable with participating in family, neighbourhood and community activities, while the lack of political participation has been attributed to a fear of government attitudes, along with a failure of political parties to show responsive leadership and ability to serve key sections of the population.

Protests that took place during 2011 typically involved several thousand people, a new phenomenon in Jordan, suggesting there was latency for activism that was previously overlooked.

*“Protests that took place during 2011 typically involved several thousand people, a new phenomenon in Jordan, suggesting there was latency for activism that was previously overlooked.”*

## PUBLIC TRUST

Levels of public trust are much lower in Jordan than in neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Further, trust is lower amongst people who have progressed higher in education. Trust resides more in family and social clan, which implies negative consequences for social capital when this translates into support for narrow identity positions, for example in elections. Relations between the Muslim majority and Christian minority are generally positive, but there is high social intolerance of drug users, gay people and people with HIV/AIDS.

The highest levels of trust in civil society are enjoyed by religious institutions, trusted by more than two thirds of the population. Compared to this just over a quarter of the population trust environmental organisations, with slightly lower levels for charities and women’s organisations, but this is still around double the trust in government institutions. Jordan is ranked 56th out of 183 countries on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and perception is that corruption is rising, particularly in the public sector, often expressed through nepotism, cronyism and other forms of favouritism.

## NETWORKS

80% of CSOs surveyed belong to networks, with peak bodies including the General Union of Charitable Societies, with over 1,200 member organisations, the Council of Trade Unions and the General Federation of Trade Unions, and the National Committee for Women’s Affairs. There has also been a recent growth of less formal networks in fields such as environment, human rights and gender. An alliance was formed to monitor the 2010 election, while coalitions also developed to defend the right of access to information, and to successfully propose amendments to the Associations Law in 2009. However, while around 50 international NGOs have a presence in Jordan’s capital Amman, which hosts many regional offices, effective participation of local CSOs in international processes is felt to be limited.

## RESOURCES

Overwhelmingly civil society is organised on a voluntary basis, with 94% of the members of governing bodies of CSOs working for no remuneration, and around half of CSO leaders committing three hours of voluntary work a day to their organisation. Foreign donors provide about 12% of total CSO funding and government support around 13%, with just under half of funding coming from membership fees, donations and other membership contributions. Many organisations, however, have barely adequate resources. There is some scepticism in civil society and the media about receiving foreign funding, which requires government permission, as it is argued that the lack of a coordinated strategy for civil society allows foreign donors to define the agenda by default. There are attempts to develop Islamic funding models, but moves towards developing a code of conduct have not achieved momentum.

## IMPACT

CSOs, as surveyed before the 2011 protests, assessed themselves as having a limited to medium influence on democratisation, and a strong impact on support to poor and marginalised people and education. The major areas in which CSOs attempt policy influence are social policies and the laws of association, but CSOs assess their influence in these spheres as low. External stakeholders assess CSO impact more highly than CSO representatives themselves, suggesting a degree of pessimism about the potential of CSOs to operate in the policy sphere. This also suggests CSOs may need support to develop their capacity to contribute to political and legal reform.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to help strengthen civil society in Jordan include: developing incentives for volunteering, particularly for women and young people, and a legal framework for volunteering; establishing a leadership and good governance institute to focus on developing leadership and management skills for civil society; initiating an independent commission for Jordanian civil society; and instigating studies on the contribution of civil society to GDP.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Al Urdun Al Jadid Research Centre - [www.ujrc-jordan.net](http://www.ujrc-jordan.net)

General Union of Voluntary Societies - [www.guvs-jordan.com](http://www.guvs-jordan.com)

National Centre for Human Rights - [www.nchr.org.jo](http://www.nchr.org.jo)

National Society for Enhancement of Freedom and Democracy - [www.democracyjund.com](http://www.democracyjund.com)

Jordan Environmental Society - [www.jes.org.jo](http://www.jes.org.jo)

Jordanian Women's Union - [www.jwu.itgo.com](http://www.jwu.itgo.com)

Jordanian National Commission for Women - [www.women.jo](http://www.women.jo)

Guide to Civil Society Organisations in Jordan - [www.civilsociety-jo.net](http://www.civilsociety-jo.net)



Basic facts	
Capital	Astana
Official languages	Kazakh, Russian
Population	15.5m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$9,136

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan, as is the case with its neighbouring countries, is somewhat isolated and its civil society does not have prominence on the world stage, despite the fact that it is the ninth largest country in the world by geographical size, and the largest landlocked country. The environment in which CSOs operate is one characterised by corruption, limited political rights and freedoms and significant constraints on the rule of law.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The president, who has been in office since independence, is the single dominant political power in Kazakhstan; his family, the state executive, the ruling party, which dominates parliament, and connected financial and industrial groups command the power landscape. The situation can be characterised as a presidential monopoly of political space. The constitution as amended in 2007 gives the current president unlimited opportunities to stand for re-election. The president, while apparently continuing to enjoy popular support, took 95% of the vote in the April 2011 election, which was called at short notice and was widely criticised for not meeting international electoral standards, including apparent coercion to vote and lack of adequate electoral competition. Ruling political rhetoric explicitly puts economic progress ahead of democratic reform. In the light of this presidential dominance since independence, one challenge for the future is going to be the question of political succession.

A top 20 oil producing country with its economy stimulated by high commodity prices, Kazakhstan is ranked as a middle income country and so does not have a national focus on poverty reduction, yet there is high income inequality, large numbers of disadvantaged groups, and underdeveloped and poor small towns and rural areas. This includes poverty in oil rich areas, with 20% of the rural population below the poverty threshold.

Civil society was acknowledged in the 1995 Constitution, and in a presidential decree of 2006 which recognises civil society as an arena for social relations distinct from the state. Establishing a CSO is assessed as a relatively cheap and easy procedure, but the government is seen by many to distort the operating environment for civil society by exerting formidable powers of patronage to co-opt selected CSOs to help deliver its agenda, rewarding cooperative CSOs with funds and recognition, while portraying uncooperative CSOs as serving

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 46.1. Civic Engagement: 47.3; Level of Organisation: 48.4; Practice of Values: 47.4; Perception of Impact: 40.9; External Environment: 46.7. Ranked 30 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	18.5%
CSOs network membership	50.9%
Policy activity	39.2%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.745. Ranked 68 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: not free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 5
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 55
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.7. Ranked 120 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.28. Percentile rank: 44.5. Rule of law: -0.62. Percentile rank: 31.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 77.5. Ranked 154 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2008	Status: moderate. Score: 76 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 107 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.24. Ranked 137 out of 167

external interests, disruptive or unconcerned with advancing development. Dialogue between state and civil society exists as largely a pro-forma exercise.

Amongst constraints on civil society, the right to hold meetings is carefully controlled. Ten days' notification is required for a demonstration, and a group of 20 or more needs advance permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to meet. 27% of CSOs surveyed report they have experienced illegitimate restriction or attack by local or central government. Against this, 63% believe the legal framework for CSOs is at least moderately enabling.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In common with neighbouring countries, the term civil society became known with the introduction of donor support following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. During this period around 400 CSOs were established, mostly based on human rights. Areas in which CSOs now operate as well as human rights include gender, the environment and youth. There are estimated by government sources to be 25,000 CSOs in Kazakhstan, employing over half a million people out of an estimated population of 16.5m, with 13,000 of these classed as NGOs. A different figure using Ministry of Justice data puts the number at closer to 53,000. Regardless, the overall picture has been one of growth, including in consumer cooperatives,

particularly in rural areas. For example, public associations have increased from under 5,000 in 2003 to over 8,000 in 2010, and foundations from under 3,000 to over 4,500, a growth of 69% and 77% respectively. However, most NGOs are still based in cities, and many are also considered dormant.

Against this, it must be noted that there are 21,000 apparent CSOs which are properly classed as state institutions, and these too have also grown in recent years. The presidential circle, the ruling party and oligarchs have shown a tendency in recent years to form pseudo CSOs.

Some NGOs and religious organisations are assessed as playing particularly significant roles within civil society, along with the media, business associations and international organisations.

## PARTICIPATION

Just over a third of the population are active in socially-oriented organisations, which are often connected to mosques, churches and other religious structures. Under one in five of the population is a member of a politically-oriented CSO, with a similar level of volunteering in such CSOs. Low potential for individual activism is also reported: three quarters of the population say they would never take part in a boycott and over half that they would never join a peaceful demonstration. There is felt to be apathy towards volunteering, and a growth in individualistic, selfish attitudes. Formal mechanisms for volunteering are not well developed.

However, a further important factor in driving lack of participation would seem to be the legal constraints mentioned above. Without space for participation and competition, an active citizenry is unlikely to develop. The result of this is a democratic deficit that does not see people pushing for participation. A lack of education about democracy is also a factor.



## PUBLIC TRUST

Trust in civil society is low, with only around one in five people expressing trust in the sector as a whole, but trust in different types of civil society actors is divergent. Mosque and church groups score highest, with about 65% of the population expressing either a great deal or quite a lot of trust, compared to 38% for charitable and humanitarian organisations, 37% for women's organisations and 31% for environmental organisations. Distrust of political parties and trade unions stands at around 80%.

Overall public trust is low, with less than one in five of people taking the view that other people can be trusted. While general social tolerance is quite high, there are also high levels of intolerance of gay people and people who have HIV/AIDS, and over half the population expresses intolerance about immigrants or foreign workers.

Corruption is a huge issue that is also widely seen to hinder the development of civil society. CSO representatives have a perception of high corruption in the sector, with around 65% believing that corruption is frequent or very frequent. While this is understood to be connected to the very high perception of corruption in general in Kazakhstan, with the country ranked 120th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index and its score consistently under 3 out of 10 (on a scale where 10 indicates the absence of corruption), it suggests a greater need to focus on CSO transparency and accountability.

*“Trust in civil society is low, with only around one in five people expressing trust in the sector as a whole.”*

## NETWORKS

Only around half of CSOs are members of networks, a lower number than most countries, perhaps reflecting the challenges of geography. However one of the strengths of CSOs is seen as their flexibility and willingness to share information with each other, with around 70% reporting that they share information with other CSOs. Duplication of work is however felt to be an issue. International NGOs are felt to be a declining presence, with some having closed offices, and their activities are closely scrutinised.

## RESOURCES

Over 40% of CSOs reported a decline in their organisation's revenue from one year to the next. The CSO resource situation is generally viewed as better in Kazakhstan than other neighbouring post-Soviet countries, but there are still concerns that most leading CSOs are dependent on international donor funding, which is in decline, given Kazakhstan's ranking as a middle income country. This opens up a risk of developing dependency on government funding in its place, given that since 2005 the government has made financial support available to CSOs, ostensibly as a way of countering international donor influence. However, competition for public funding is seen as unfair, with three quarters of government funding going to a small group of around 200 NGOs in 2009.

*“Competition for public funding is seen as unfair.”*

As well as concerns about the accountability and transparency of public funds, the fear of losing hard won funding sources essentially encourages CSOs to practice self-censorship, while the daily struggle for survival means that many CSOs do not pursue wider objectives. There is also an absence of a culture of philanthropy and corporate donation, with early efforts at these hampered by the economic crisis and an unsupportive taxation regime. There is also inadequate use of voluntary opportunities in staffing. Working in the sector is not seen as prestigious, and organisations face high turnover.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves as having most impact in supporting the poor and marginalised communities, with around 40% of CSOs surveyed believing that impact is achieved in this field, while other important areas identified are social development, education and health. Around 40% of CSOs had advocated for a particular policy, but only around 13% of these reported that their efforts at advocacy had met with success. Overall, external stakeholders' perceptions of impact are higher than CSOs' perceptions.

## RECOMMENDATIONS


Recommendations to improve the health of civil society in Kazakhstan include: encouraging participation through citizenship education; improving opportunities to volunteer in CSOs; developing consultation mechanisms for CSOs with citizens; and improving the taxation regime to encourage more individual and corporate giving.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Public Policy Research Center - [www.pprc.kz](http://www.pprc.kz)

Institute for Development Cooperation - [www.ngoidc.kz](http://www.ngoidc.kz)

Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law - [www.bureau.kz](http://www.bureau.kz)



Basic facts	
Capital	Pristina
Official languages	Albanian, Serbian
Population	1.8m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$3,059

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: KOSOVO

Kosovo is in an unusual position, having declared independence in 2008, but being recognised by only a minority of sovereign states (86 out of 193 UN members at time of writing), meaning that it is not a UN member and is not represented in many international platforms. Despite the 2010 International Court of Justice opinion that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not breach international law, no resolution has been reached on the statehood of Kosovo, to which Serbia remains opposed. This means that often its civil society has more international exposure and participation than its government. However, there is an assessment that the recent history of Kosovo has not contributed to the development of a culture of critique, for the reasons that this would have been seen to damage the prospects of international recognition and the process of nation-building, and that international actors and donors have not supported critical voices, such that CSOs have applied self-censorship, which in turn risks their legitimacy with their constituencies. Civil society is adapting to its new role in state-building, while also having to adjust to the loss of donor support, reflecting a general pattern in the Balkans.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe, with almost half of the population unemployed and 45% living below the national poverty line. The economy relies on a large informal sector, and depends on foreign aid and remittances from Kosovars in other countries, which are assessed as having declined due to the global economic crisis.

Freedom House categorises Kosovo as a partly free country, short of being an electoral democracy. The International Civilian Representative, which exists to ensure the implementation of Kosovo's status agreement, has the power to override some political decisions. The 2010 elections were marred by fraud, causing a slide in the popular legitimacy of the government, and came in the wake of a period of political crisis following the resignation of the president and government and what was seen as an opportunistic dissolution of parliament by the prime minister, who nevertheless was returned to power. In 2010 the prime minister also faced widespread allegations of past involvement in organised crime. A January 2012 European Parliament report criticised the EU police mission to Kosovo, Eulex, for the lack of action against top organised crime suspects, while

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 51.7. Civic Engagement: 44.04; Level of Organisation: 70.7; Practice of Values: 59.4; Perception of Impact: 32.9; External Environment: 51.3. Ranked 16 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	9.1%
CSOs network membership	69.7%
Policy activity	59.6%

Key indicators	
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 5. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.9. Ranked 112 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.6. Percentile rank: 32.5. Rule of law: -0.64. Percentile rank: 30.8
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 30. Ranked 86 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: weak. Score: 67 out of 100

the judiciary is widely seen as weak. There is little tradition of investigative journalism.

The NGO Registration and Liaison Department is assessed to have very limited capacity, and around 35% of CSOs surveyed report having no engagement with it. Further, tax incentives for civil society are limited and there are very few benefits of registration. However, most CSOs see the law as allowing for quick and easy registration. Attempts were made in 2010 to introduce new restrictions in NGO Law, but these were resisted by a civil society coalition.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society has undergone several recent changes. In the 1990s it was a vital part of the parallel social provision system that grew in response to a boycott of Serbian institutions by the majority

ethnic Albanian population, and a source of civil resistance. Civil society's structure also mirrored the ethnic division of society. Civil society movements at this stage derived a mandate from grassroots support, and dealt with urgent survival issues such as humanitarian aid and human rights protection. For example, for 10 years the humanitarian organisation Mother Theresa delivered aid and health services to poor people, mobilising over 7,000 volunteers to do so. Following the end of the 1998-1999 war with Serbia, an influx of financial and technical support from donors vastly increased the size of civil society, but did not necessarily improve the quality of its work. At the same time Kosovo was effectively governed by the UN Mission in Kosovo, giving limited opportunities for domestic civil society to shape the agenda. This combination of circumstances can be seen to have moulded a sector that became characterised by donor dependence, inability to set its own agenda, opportunism and hibernation of CSOs when donor support did not eventuate. 6,000 registered NGOs existed in 2010, but only around 10% of these were considered to be active, with no provision in the NGO Law for defunct NGOs to fall off the registration list.

Organised civil society mostly consists of registered NGOs, with other types uncommon. For historical reasons trade unions are rarely seen as part of civil society, and seldom connect with civil society initiatives. Religious communities are also not considered by most as part of civil society, apart from some of their humanitarian and charitable aid initiatives, which are significant. International NGOs are important players, but those dealing with reconstruction and reconciliation have been replaced by a smaller number dealing with transparency, corruption and the rule of law.

## PARTICIPATION

There is a high level of apathy towards public life, with low levels of CSO membership and volunteering. Less than one in five of people are an active member of a CSO, with an even lower rate of volunteering. Religious organisations have the highest membership, while organisations involved in transition have seen a subsequent decline in participation. For example, the Mother Theresa organisation now only has 4,200 registered volunteers compared to its 7,000 peak, most of whom are active sporadically. Other forms of participation have not filled the space. Almost half of CSOs believe volunteering in civil society to be in decline, and many attribute this partly to the lack of a proper legal framework to support volunteering. Yet more than one third of the public take part in informal community activities, and over a third involve themselves in individual acts of activism, such as taking part in demonstrations or signing a petition.

The recent roles of CSOs, and the ways in which they were supported and grown, seem to have fostered a view amongst people that CSOs are a source of benefits rather than a vehicle for participation to address problems. As well as poverty, one reason advanced for the low rate of



participation is disillusionment and activism fatigue, with the solidarity and momentum of the resistance and conflict period now having dissipated in the slow climb to international recognition, compounded by disappointment and low trust in political parties and institutions given experience since independence.

A higher proportion of Kosovo Serbs than Kosovo Albanians participate, both in organised activities and individual activism, suggesting that since national government was achieved, Kosovo Albanians now tend to see government bodies as the legitimate actors to deal with, while Kosovo Serbs may be participating more out of resistance to the Kosovo project than from a willingness to contribute to nation-building.

## PUBLIC TRUST

There is varied trust in CSOs, with humanitarian and charitable organisations enjoying relatively high levels of trust, of over half the population, but advocacy and democratisation organisations low levels, at around 14%. Kosovo Serbs record more trust in CSOs than Kosovo Albanians, again perhaps reflecting a changed perception of the role of civil society by both groups following independence.

There is high religious tolerance, but high intolerance of drug users, people with HIV/AIDS and gay people, and CSOs are seen as reluctant to address these taboo subjects. There also remain high levels of intolerance between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs, as exemplified by tension which flared in 2011 when a trade dispute over control of the border with Serbia, in areas of northern Kosovo with a high Serb population, led to the building of roadblocks by the local population.

Kosovo is rated as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe, ranked at 112th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the lowest amongst all EU and potential EU states. While civil society representatives regard the sector as highly tolerant and non-violent, 70% also believe corruption within civil society to be occasional to frequent. As well as opportunism, many activists are viewed as using civil society as a springboard to a better job.

## NETWORKS

Around 70% of CSOs report being members of networks, and given the small size of Kosovo and the relatively small number of active CSOs, communication within the sector is high, with 90% of CSOs reporting meeting with other CSOs and 87% reporting recent exchanges of information. However, few CSO networks have stood the test of time, the Kosovo Women Network and the election monitoring coalition Democracy in Action being two rare examples, and these have also experienced difficult moments. Networks created by donors are seen to have failed, while other reasons for network failures are competition for resources between CSOs and a lack of effective coordinating bodies. However, the loose coalition which fought the 2010 amendments to the NGO Law was seen as successful, suggesting that an urgent shared issue can enable CSOs overlook their individual interests.

## RESOURCES

Most CSOs remain dependent on international funding, which provides around 70% of overall support, but the nature of this funding is changing, with some donors withdrawing and EU support contributing a larger proportion, which entails bureaucratic application procedures and minimum grant thresholds beyond the absorption capacity of smaller CSOs, thereby widening divides between smaller and larger CSOs. The corresponding loss of many smaller funders has seen an overall decline in the number of active CSOs. Local sources make up under 20% of CSO funding, with the corporate

*The structure of civil society has changed to reflect shifting donor priorities."*

sector and private donations providing less than 5% each, and membership fees only a little above 5%.

The structure of civil society has changed to reflect shifting donor priorities: minority and youth issues are no longer fields with high donor interest, and so the number of CSOs working on these issues has declined, while the transition to a national government has seen an increase in funding for, and therefore CSOs working on, the rule of law and attempting to perform watchdog functions over the state. The environmental movement remains particularly weak. The effect of donor dependence on the coherence of the sector is a worry of many: over 70% of CSO representatives believe CSOs apply for funds outside the field of their mission. The project-based nature of most support means that few CSOs can be considered to have a sustainable human resource base.

This leads to a sense that CSO priorities are set by donors rather than their constituencies, weakening the connection between CSOs and communities, damaging the perceived legitimacy of CSOs and hampering the public's understanding of civil society.

## IMPACT

Civil society regards its impact as low, with around half of CSO representatives assessing that CSOs have very limited impact on what they see as the two key issues of the day, economic development and rule of law, and these views are echoed by external stakeholders. Civil society can claim greater success in improving the legal environment for some marginalised groups. Overall, public policy development is seen as complex and immature still in Kosovo and CSOs recognise they have little influence, with 70% of CSO representatives assessing their policy impact as limited; there is also scepticism that influencing a policy leads to changes on the ground, due to a lack of application of policies in practice and the rapid development of 'copy and paste' policies quickly adapted from other countries.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Key recommendations to strengthen civil society in Kosovo include: increasing education about the concept of civil society and its role in society; developing a civil society led code of ethics for the sector; challenging CSOs' poor public image through promoting success stories and providing more information on civil society's role; and for the government to integrate civil society in national development strategy and allow it a role in oversight.


### FURTHER INFORMATION

Kosovar Civil Society Foundation - [www.kcsfoundation.org](http://www.kcsfoundation.org)

Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development - [www.kipred.net](http://www.kipred.net)

Kosovo Foundation for Open Society - <http://kfos.org>

Kosova Women's Network - [www.womensnetwork.org](http://www.womensnetwork.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Monrovia
Official language	English
Population	3.8m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$247

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: LIBERIA

Civil society is acknowledged to have played a crucial role in helping to end civil war and grow conditions of peace in Liberia. However, the country continues to face multiple challenges in rebuilding itself, and crucially, civil society lacks the capacity, including in financial, human and technological resources, to adequately respond. One important step in 2011 was Liberia's entry into the Africa Peer Review Mechanism, implying greater oversight of its governance progress. A crucial test for the country was the legislative and presidential elections of October and November 2011, which were widely assessed by international observers as free and fair, but which were marked by occasional violence, and a boycott by the second placed candidate of the November 2011 run-off election which resulted in low turnout.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

While Liberia boasts the first female president in Africa in 2011 Nobel peace prize winner Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and moves further on from its civil wars of 1989-1996 and 1999-2003, there remain numerous challenges of state fragility. Poverty is a major problem, with 64% of the population defined as living beneath the poverty line and estimates of unemployment as high as 85%. Further, over half of Liberians are classed as illiterate, and 35% of the population (rising to 44% of women) have never attended school. The weakness of judicial capacity is a factor that challenges the application of the rule of law.

Civil society was given institutional recognition in the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which ended the second civil war and established the Liberia National Transitional Government, which saw civil society assigned seven seats in the National Assembly. While this representation was not assessed as particularly effective, it was considered to have established a useful precedent in the recognition of civil society by government as a legitimate partner. The term 'civil society' now has widespread public recognition and there is higher awareness of human rights issues. This can be seen in the increased calls for CSOs to be included on bodies such as boards and panels of investigation, with the sense that doing so will help serve the public interest, and in the occasional requests for civil society inclusion that come from the government. CSOs work with government agencies on key areas such as women's rights, corruption and development.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 53.7. Civic Engagement: 55.9; Level of Organisation: 50.5; Practice of Values: 54.1; Perception of Impact: 55.2; External Environment: 52.7. Ranked 12 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	27.9%
CSOs network membership	58.3%
Policy activity	42.3%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.329. Ranked 182 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.2. Ranked 91 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -1.24. Percentile rank: 8.1. Rule of law: -1.01. Percentile rank: 17.1
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 40.5. Ranked: 110 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: very weak. Score: 54 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 94. Ranked 26 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.07. Ranked 98 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011	Score 45.4. Ranked 36 out of 53

However, such partnerships are not well documented and may lack visibility.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

CSOs in Liberia can be clustered into three categories: interest and values groups, which generally have mass memberships, and include unions and youth federations; service and humanitarian oriented CSOs, which work to deliver services, particularly for poor and vulnerable people; and policy and advocacy oriented CSOs, such as human rights NGOs and research institutes and think tanks. The main organisational types seen are unincorporated associations (groups not officially certified by government but with some form of leadership and rules), trade and labour unions, cooperative societies and not-for-profit organisations.

Following the end of the second civil war it is estimated that 700 new associations were formed, including those of students, women, young people, people with disabilities, farmers, journalists and nurses. The ratio of international to national or local CSOs is one to four.

## PARTICIPATION

Before the civil war, there was a culture of non-engagement, and civil society was characterised by its lack of power. New community development activities emerged as a response to war, which saw CSOs fulfilling the essential service functions of the collapsed state in some quarters, such as food distribution and education provision. Largely as a result of this active role, two thirds of Liberians now report being a member of a socially-oriented CSO, and the figure for volunteering in such organisations is even higher, at a remarkable 70%. A culture of volunteering is thought to be particularly strong in rural locales, while in cities sports and recreational clubs are strong, and thus may offer valuable alternate vehicles for civic participation. There is a continuing tradition of susu clubs, mostly informal structures which collect regular fees and give payouts to members on a rotating basis. The post war response also saw Liberian diaspora populations become more vocal and active.

Participation in politically-oriented CSOs is much lower, perhaps reflecting the fact that democratic pluralism and participatory democracy are still young concepts. Around 38% of people are members of a politically-oriented CSO, with volunteering in such organisations lower, at 30%. Only around 37% of people take part in individual acts of political activism, such as signing a petition or joining a boycott, and there is felt to be some fear about taking part in political demonstrations, given that these were violently suppressed under previous regimes. These lower rates may also reflect scepticism on the part of the public about formal politics, with political parties being heavily oriented around charismatic leaders and the resulting political practice being personalised.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Not surprisingly, given the recent experience of civil war, inter-personal trust remains low, with only around 28% of people stating that they think other people can be trusted, although around half of people report that they are tolerant of visible minority groups. Around 70% of people report that they trust civil society in some form, a high figure reflecting the essential service roles of CSOs



during the war, and the perceptions among many that some types of groups, such as women's groups, played a crucial role in ending the civil war and in reconstruction.

Against this, there is a widespread public perception that CSOs, particularly those involved in service delivery, are corrupt, with health, education and children's CSOs being involved in recent corruption scandals. This reflects wider concerns about high levels of corruption in general, with Liberia ranked 91st out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, albeit that this indicates a lower level of perceived corruption than many of its bordering countries, and there is frequent media coverage of corruption. There are also cases of former officials forming pseudo CSOs as a front for continuing corruption. The high growth of private radio in recent years is seen to have encouraged greater public awareness and debate of such issues.

## NETWORKS

Around 58% of CSOs belong to coalitions, of which there are several. An NGO Council was established in 2010, building on the former National Civil Society Advisory Committee. It brings together around 15 networks. It is assessed to have a great deal of influence in the sector, but has not yet won the confidence of all stakeholders. However, a key concern of some CSOs is that some coalitions are seen to compete with individual CSOs to win funding and implement projects, which causes tension within the sector. Almost 70% of CSOs report that they share information with other CSOs, but this is low compared to the situation in most countries. Further, the best-resourced CSOs tend to have the least interest in coalitions, unless they can assume leadership positions. Collaboration between CSOs tends to be donor-driven, as a condition of financial support, while competition for resources hinders cooperation.

*“Two thirds of Liberians report being a member of a social CSO.”*

There are weak links between CSOs in the capital, Monrovia, and those elsewhere in Liberia. Although there are estimated to be 57 international civil society groups represented in Liberia, grouped into the Management Steering Group network, international links for Liberian CSOs are weak, even with other West African countries. There are few funding opportunities for CSO staff to attend international conferences and trainings, and this area appears to be in decline.

## RESOURCES

Poor human, financial and technological resources for CSOs result in a debilitating lack of capacity and a difficulty in sustaining operations. Funding tends to be project specific, with a lack of long term funds, and there are few partnerships with the private sector. Religious organisations are recognised as a success story in local fundraising, and closer connections here could benefit other CSOs. Electricity provision and internet access, and the absence of a national postal service, all make the working conditions of CSOs more difficult, particularly in rural areas.

Human resource challenges include low salary levels, lack of training, poor labour standards and difficult working conditions. Loss of staff to better funded organisations, such as the UN, international NGOs and the government is an issue, as is the movement of CSO leaders into political positions in government or political parties. It is estimated that 60% of qualified staff leave CSOs for other fields within 18 months of employment.

## IMPACT

In terms of impact, two key processes which CSOs rate as important are the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is notable however that CSO representatives rate their impact on these two key areas much more highly than external stakeholders – approximately 63% compared to 38%. Civil society was instrumental in mobilising for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and had such roles

*“CSOs tend to respond to opportunities provided by government, rather than drive the policy agenda.”*

as helping to vet potential commissioners and providing civic education about the commission, but concern now focuses on the lack of implementation of the commission's recommendations. CSOs, by comparison, found involvement in the Poverty Reduction Strategy process almost entirely frustrating, exacerbated by the fact that there was no civil society network specifically focused on this process.

Both internal and external stakeholders do however agree that CSOs achieve a high social impact, with just under 70% of both groups believing this. When it comes to the policy impact of civil society, external experts rate it much higher than CSO representatives themselves, at 75% compared to 39%, suggesting that CSO representatives are unduly pessimistic about their ability to influence state agendas. Recent advocacy successes of the sector include the establishment of a Governance Commission, the development of a national youth policy and the adoption of a law that 30% of electoral candidates should be women. A critique here however is that CSOs tend to respond to opportunities provided by government, rather than drive the policy agenda.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Liberia include: increased research and documentation of the contributions of citizens, and analysis of how and why people do or do not participate in debates and elections; greater training for CSO board members in their functions; closer collaboration between the NGO Council and private sector bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and the Liberia Business Association to build funding relationships; staff exchanges and mentoring between CSOs in Monrovia and those in rural locales; and advocacy for a freedom of information law.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Action for Genuine Development Alternatives (AGENDA) – [www.freeagenda.org](http://www.freeagenda.org)

Federation of Liberian Youth - [www.flyliberia.org](http://www.flyliberia.org)

Governance Commission of Liberia - [www.goodgovernanceliberia.org](http://www.goodgovernanceliberia.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Skopje
Official languages	Macedonian, Albanian
Population	2.1m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$4,460

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: MACEDONIA

Macedonia's new Law on Associations and Foundations, passed in 2010, is a key advance for civil society. It can be seen as the culmination of years of advocacy by CSOs for more enabling legislation, which now needs to be fully applied and tested within a context of limited political freedoms. Current EU accession processes also offer an opportunity for CSOs to expand their role, identify themselves as the leaders of key EU values such as participatory democracy, equality and inclusion, and benefit from new funding; at the same time there are also fears about increasing EU funding driving public sector corruption.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Income inequality is high in Macedonia and unemployment stood at around 30% in 2011. During 2011, the economy appeared to be slowly recovering from the effects of the global economic downturn, which were not experienced as severely as in some other countries. For example, real GDP grew by 0.7% in 2010 while core inflation remained low. However, the deepening of the Eurozone crisis raised uncertainty levels and increased economic risks.

There is a powerful intersection between the government, oligarchies, the media and political parties and their leaders, which includes corrupt relationships. The professionalism of civil servants is also an issue. Elections held in 2011, called early following a parliamentary boycott by the opposition, resulted in the re-election of the incumbent prime minister and right of centre government for a third term. The 2011 EU progress report on Macedonia found regressions on media freedoms, which included action by authorities, on tax evasion charges, against a television channel critical of the government, and insufficient progress on the rule of law. A 2011 report of the International Crisis Group also drew attention to declining judicial independence and rising ethnic nationalism. Freedom House classifies Macedonia as only a 'partly free country'.

This implies a relatively narrow political and civil space. Against this, 67% of CSOs surveyed believe the current legislation is enabling, and around 85% are satisfied with CSO registration processes, although 18% report experience of illegal restrictions, such as interference or oral threats from officials. Civic organisations were first defined by law in 1998, and continue to be defined in the 2010 law, as associations based on values and interests, which are positive, non-partisan and not for profit. The law takes, therefore, an explicitly values-

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 52.95. Civic Engagement: 45.0; Level of Organisation: 59.8; Practice of Values: 57.7; Perception of Impact: 45.7; External Environment: 56.5. Ranked 14 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	10.4%
CSOs network membership	67.5%
Policy activity	78.2%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.728. Ranked 78 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.9. Ranked 68 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.18. Percentile rank: 48.3. Rule of law: -0.29. Percentile rank: 46.9
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 31.67. Ranked 94 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: moderate. Score: 77 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 106 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.16. Ranked 73 out of 167

based definition of CSOs. Separate laws cover other aspects of civil society such as trade unions and religious organisations, while there is a distinct law for the Red Cross. The 2010 law introduced the status of an organisation in the public benefit, while other main provisions expanded freedom of association, enabled a greater range of people to establish CSOs and allowed registered CSOs to undertake direct business activities.

54% of CSOs consider dialogue with government to be limited, while 46% say the same about dialogue with the private sector. The international community still has a prominent role and CSOs have some relationships with international actors and political parties.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Macedonia's independence in 1991 triggered a substantial growth in organised civil society, from 4,203 registered CSOs in 1990 to 11,326 in 2010, which would suggest there are 5.5 CSOs per 1,000 inhabitants. However, the 2010 law has required CSOs to pre-register, and in the space of a year and a half only around 3,500 CSOs have pre-registered, implying that this may be a more accurate indication of the number of active CSOs. The early growth of CSOs was largely supported by foreign donors, while

later growth has been assisted by easier registration and EU funding. There is however no common understanding of what civil society means in Macedonia. Following independence, civil society was assumed to mean largely foreign funded NGOs, and many institutions cling to assumptions that NGOs and civil society are synonymous. Not many institutions adopt a broad and inclusive definition of civil society.

Almost all CSOs registered under the previous law in Macedonia are categorised as associations and foundations (10,700), which includes social and political associations, and a large group (almost 3,000) of sports-oriented associations. Compared to this there are 126 registered political parties, 93 chambers of commerce and business associations and 48 trade unions. However the power of these different segments is somewhat inversely proportional: political parties and business associations have more influence than the large association and foundation sector. Due to a desire to separate religion and state, little information is gathered on the religious sector of civil society, although faith-based CSOs are thought to be on the increase.

## PARTICIPATION

Individual membership forms the basis of around 80% of CSOs. However, only around 15% of people are members of socially-oriented CSOs and around 18% volunteer in them, compared to around 44% who take part in less formal activities, such as activities within religious structures, community meetings or sports club activities. Further, only around 6% of people invest more than ten hours a year in activities beneficial to their communities, implying that volunteering is sporadic rather than habitual. Unusually, compared to most countries, the rate of people's participation in the activities of politically-oriented CSOs is higher than in socially-oriented CSOs, with membership here at around 25%. This is influenced by membership of political parties (38%) and trade unions (24%).

Between 2005 and 2010, 49% of the population took part in a non-partisan political act, such as signing a petition, or joining a boycott or peaceful protest. Research suggests that people's participation grew from independence in 1991, but has started to decline in recent years; at the



same time the proportion of people who do not take part in protests but indicate they might in future has risen, suggesting some apathy and participation fatigue, but remaining latency for activism.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Levels of public trust vary greatly, from 24% in political parties and 27% in unions to 65% in churches and religious communities, doctors and the army and 67% in educators. However, trust in the state is low at 40%, with people demonstrating greater confidence in municipalities or international bodies such as the EU, UN and NATO than in national government, parliament or president. Civil society in general is trusted by 50% of people. Only around one in ten people say they can trust other people. An earlier source reported public trust at more than double this figure, suggesting a decline.

Corruption is seen to be reducing on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, with Macedonia having progressed from a ranking of 72nd in the world in 2008 to 62nd in 2010, before falling to 69th out of 183 in 2011, and according to this measure, levels of corruption tend to be lower in Macedonia than in bordering countries. Judicial corruption is a particular challenge, while civil society is seen as the least corrupt sector.

## NETWORKS

68% of CSOs surveyed are members of national or international networks, and the majority are members of more than one network. CSOs report that their main reasons for participating in networks are strengthening capacity and improving lobbying. Over 90% of CSOs also regularly meet or exchange information with other CSOs. However, it is felt that structured opportunities to exchange information are in decline, and that databases and directories have fallen out of date.

*“There is little connection between CSOs and trade unions.”*

There is little connection between CSOs and trade unions, which tend to see each other as having different areas of interest. The establishment of the EU-Macedonia Civil Society Joint Consultative Committee in 2009 created a new forum to bring employers, trade unions and other aspects of civil society together.

## RESOURCES

The largest hundred CSOs receive 59% of all CSO income, although this shows there has been some diversification since 2006, when this figure stood at 72%. The income of trade unions and chambers of commerce appears to have increased, while that of others has stayed stable. There are few organisations that are dependent upon a single funding source (assessed here as 80% of revenue coming from one type of funder), but foreign donations are the largest source of funding for CSOs. Membership fees are also a common source of income for more than half of CSOs, but generally they make up only 5% to 20% of CSO budgets. Most CSOs have a low funding base: 85% of CSOs operate on under US\$2,500 a year.

*“Almost 90% of CSOs have fewer than ten paid staff.”*

Almost 90% of CSOs have fewer than ten paid staff, and the entire employment base of CSOs is estimated to be only around 2,500 people, which amounts to 0.4% of the workforce in a country with a population of over 2m.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves as most active in influencing those policies related to the protection of human rights and security, decentralisation and the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which

guarantees rights for Macedonia's Albanian minority. External stakeholders judge the policy impact of CSOs much higher than those working in the sector themselves, suggesting a level of pessimism or unreasonably high expectations of impact on the part of CSOs. However, civil society influence on the main social challenges of poverty and unemployment, on national budgetary processes and on holding the government and private sector to account are all acknowledged as areas of weakness, compared to stronger impacts on empowering citizens and providing services to meet social needs. Around half of CSO-proposed amendments to three critical laws – on associations and foundations (passed in 2010), discrimination (2010) and access to public information (2006) – were successful, suggesting that civil society is able to exert some influence on core aspects of the enabling environment.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for strengthening civil society in Macedonia include building stronger partnerships, beyond formal partnerships, with other organisational types, including bridging the historical gap between political parties and CSOs, and further strengthening cooperation with business associations, trade unions and civic organisations. CSOs should also involve themselves more in parliamentary work, in the working groups of the government, in the work of municipalities and in processes of European integration, by using existing mechanisms more fully and encouraging their further development. In addition, new funding mechanisms need to be explored, such as direct government support, the instigation of tax benefits for public benefit associations and the development of public funds, including lotteries, to support CSOs.

### FURTHER INFORMATION


Macedonian Center for International Cooperation - [www.mcims.org.mk](http://www.mcims.org.mk)

Foundation Open Society Macedonia - [www.soros.org.mk](http://www.soros.org.mk)

Centre for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution - [www.chrcr.org.mk](http://www.chrcr.org.mk)

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia - [www.mhc.org.mk](http://www.mhc.org.mk)

NGO Infocentre - [www.nvoinfocentar.org.mk](http://www.nvoinfocentar.org.mk)



Basic facts	
Capital	Antananarivo
Official languages	French, Malagasy
Population	21.9m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$421

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: MADAGASCAR

Since the overthrow of its president in 2009, Madagascar has seen a revival of civil society activity. CSOs have shown fresh determination to influence decision-making processes, and have made concerted efforts to organise nationally, but civil society still lacks political influence. The numerous popular protests, and the space that decentralisation processes have opened for civic participation at the local level, have not proved sufficient to successfully configure a stronger institutionalised civil society. Civil society remains highly compartmentalised and hierarchical, and civil society infrastructure is mostly absent outside the capital. A lack of institutional capacities and of a shared vision and identity mean that a disunited Malagasy civil society is not currently a sector with high influence on the definition of Madagascar's development and political agenda.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Malagasy civil society exists in a legally and politically volatile environment with multiple socio-political challenges. Madagascar has a recent political history of deposed leaders, with the current president having been handed the reigns of power by the military after the ousting of the previous president in 2009. The coup led to the suspension of Madagascar from the African Union and the Southern African Development Community, and the withholding of donor support. The holding of fair and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012 will be critical, as the undemocratic transition has resulted in the restriction of political freedoms. Freedom House accordingly assesses Madagascar as partly free and its press as not free. The Democracy Index classes the current government as an authoritarian regime. These unfavourable conditions present multiple barriers to engagement and limit space for civil society, while historical and linguistic barriers between different ethnic and cultural identities also contribute to a citizenship that is not empowered to participate and has little capacity to raise its multiple voices.

Civil society is often used as a vehicle of political interests, and its autonomy and transparency are frequently disputed. Many CSOs are dependent, including financially, on the political connections of their leaders, resulting in a lack of representativeness and accountability to their constituencies and the public. The impact of economic crises on Madagascar has increased this financial dependency, thereby worsening the situation for CSOs.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 49.9. Civic Engagement: 48.9; Level of Organisation: 51.21; Practice of Values: 50.73; Perception of Impact: 43.4; External Environment: 55.38. Ranked 22 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	29.9%
CSOs network membership	61%
Policy activity	39.7%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.480. Ranked 151 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3. Ranked 100 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.82. Percentile rank: 23.0. Rule of law: -0.84. Percentile rank: 23.7
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 29.5. Ranked 84 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 83.2. Ranked 58 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.93. Ranked 116 out of 167

There is no unanimity on the concept and definition of civil society, and there are different types of legal recognition for different civil society forms and groups. The legal framework under the Law of NGOs of 1997 is outdated and applied selectively and inconsistently. This makes it impossible for many regional civic groups to gain access to the relevant registration information and to constitute themselves as formal CSOs, limiting their capacity to access already limited funding options. Accordingly, one in three of CSOs surveyed assess the regulations and laws for civil society as either highly restrictive or quite limiting, although only 7% of CSOs report having faced illegitimate restrictions or attacks from local or central government.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Religion plays a highly important role in Malagasy society, and faith-based organisations constitute the most influential part of civil society. Although around two fifths of the population practise traditional religion, churches have highly developed structures and networks which give them widespread social coverage and a key role in the delivery of basic services such as health and education. Madagascar has numerous CSOs created by Baptist, Catholic, Lutheran and Protestant churches, which

have an important influence in areas such as civic participation and education, the promotion of a democratic culture and conflict prevention.

CSOs assess that environmental and ethnic-based organisations also occupy strong positions in civil society, along with development NGOs and women's groups. Youth organisations have a significant number of members, but are assessed as relatively weak in their actions, as are trade unions and professional organisations. Cooperatives and neighbourhood associations continue to have traditional importance, linked to community development initiatives and strong mobilisation capacities.

Development CSOs grew in number after independence in 1960, influenced by the presence of multiple donors and INGOs, but they are characterised by relatively volatile agendas and membership bases, together with little willingness to collaborate on defining a clear agenda for social change. Extreme poverty and inequality is reflected in the distribution of CSOs, with 60% of NGOs based in Antananarivo and its environs, and a very unstructured civil society outside the capital. The fragility of the public sector has led to the formation of multiple forms of mutual help groups at the local level that have a stronger social base than many more formal CSOs, but capacity and financial resources remain the biggest challenges to the sustainability of these.

## PARTICIPATION

Civic engagement and participation is quite substantial in Madagascar. 44% of the population is actively involved in a socially-oriented CSO. 41% of people under 25 are involved in such CSOs, compared to 34% of the population above the age of 25.

Participation in politically-oriented organisations such as trade unions, consumer organisations and political parties is much lower, at only around 7%. Women are also an underrepresented group here: only 36% of women participate in politically-oriented CSOs, compared to 48% of women who are involved in socially-oriented ones.



CSOs with the highest number of active members and volunteers are faith-based organisations, indigenous associations, sports and cultural groups, women's groups and youth and students' associations. Community life remains highly important in many parts of Madagascar, although it is in urban areas where there are the highest number of active members and volunteers in CSOs, especially in the case of young and educated people: 27% of people who have completed secondary education are active members or volunteers compared to 6% of those who did not.

A history of military rule and overthrow of governments has left its mark in some fear of the consequences of protest and belief in the inefficacy of political actions. 32% of people say they have been involved in some kind of individual political action in the past five years, with more men (37%) than women (27%) having done so. Since 2009, public acts of protest have been subject to strict vigilance by the government. However, in September and October 2011, there was a wave of student protests against maladministration in public universities.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Malagasy citizens demonstrate a very high level of trust in CSOs, which stands at 84% for CSOs in general. Churches (91%), women's organisations (84%) and environmental organisations (84%) enjoy the most public trust. Trust in charitable organisations (63%) and labour unions (58%) is lower, but still stands at more than half the population. This can be compared to the levels of trust in government (55%) and political parties (29%). Lack of trust between CSOs is however one of the major barriers against collaboration, with a range of political and interpersonal conflicts between CSO leaders and members.

Perceived corruption is high, with Madagascar ranked joint 100th out of 183 on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. 25% of surveyed CSOs believe that the level of corruption inside civil society is frequent. Some CSOs also declare that corruption is part of the game which CSOs are forced to play, particularly in Analamanga, the region that includes the capital. There is an all-round lack of accountability and transparency practices in civil society.

*“Malagasy citizens demonstrate a very high level of trust in CSOs, which stands at 84% for CSOs in general.”*

## NETWORKS

More than 60% of CSOs surveyed belong to networks or federations, but levels of active participation are low due to a lack of common interests and of a shared vision on the main social priorities and methods of intervening. The highest number of networks is concentrated in Analamanga, where information and opportunities for affiliation are more abundant than elsewhere.

There have been several attempts, supported in many cases by donors, to create national networks of CSOs, as in the case of the National Committee for Citizen Participation, but due to the political crisis it is too early to assess whether any national networks and platforms have gained real legitimacy, as there are state elements that undermine any effort to develop a stronger structure of civil society. The lack of networking within the sector is echoed in the lack of networking between CSOs and other actors, such as the private sector.

## RESOURCES

67% of CSOs surveyed report that their finances stayed stable from one year to the next, although looking at the change from 2010 to 2011, only 10% declare that their income has increased compared to 33% which report it has gone down. A high dependence on international donors makes Malagasy CSOs vulnerable to fluctuations in Overseas Development Assistance, and the political crisis of 2009 had an impact, as many governments and agencies did not recognise the new leadership and some suspended aid, such as the United States and the European Union, which suspended non-humanitarian aid to Madagascar. CSOs focussing on humanitarian activities were consequently the only ones to experience a higher level of financial support from donors at this

time. CSOs without political ties to the government receive virtually no state funding, while the contribution of membership fees is very low compared to other African countries.

Malagasy civil society includes numerous small organisations with limited human resources. Only 18% of CSOs surveyed assess that they have a stable human resource base, defined as having no more than 25% voluntary staff, and most of them strongly depend on volunteers and staff with limited capacities.

## IMPACT

The overall perception of CSO impact on the main issues of concern to the population is quite low, although it differs from region to region, and depends on the proximity that CSOs have to the public. In general, CSOs assess they have limited impact on public policies, although they are convinced about the relevance of their actions in responding to people's needs, especially in such key service areas as social development (29%), education (28%) and health (10%). Networks of churches are assessed as more effective than other types of CSO alliances, with stronger impact in advocacy interventions and as watchdogs of human rights issues.

Only 29% of CSOs believe they achieve impact on the practices of the government, although this too varies by region, as there are areas in which the influence of CSOs on the development agenda of public authorities is more notable, such as in the Vatovavy Fitovinany region, where 39% of CSOs report having impact.

Only 40% of CSOs, but a higher 51% of external stakeholders, believe that CSO impact is significant in advocating for the implementation of programmes and the promotion of rights. 71% of CSOs and 67% of external stakeholders believe impact on policy change is limited or nil. Attempts to exert pressure for the creation or reform of laws or regulations are challenged by government restrictions. Only 40% of CSOs in the past two years pushed for policies to be approved, and only half of these attempts saw a successful policy change.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Madagascar needs to develop a stronger sense of politics and participation. CSO technical and institutional capacities need to be strengthened, and access to state resources needs to be decoupled from political linkages. Above all, there is a need to create legitimate and representative national platforms of CSOs to avoid polarisation and consolidate an active and independent civic space. Reaching consensus within civil society is a key element in the larger fight for democracy and good governance in Madagascar.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Collectif des Citoyens et des Organisations Citoyennes - <http://ccoc-mag.fisema.org>

National Committee for the Observation of Elections - [www.kmfcnoe.mg](http://www.kmfcnoe.mg)

ONG Madagascar portal - [www.ong-madagascar.org](http://www.ong-madagascar.org)

L'Homme et l'Environnement - [www.madagascar-environnement.com](http://www.madagascar-environnement.com)



Basic facts	
Capital	Mexico City
Official language	Spanish
Population	113.7m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$9,123

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: MEXICO

This is a difficult time for Mexican society, not only because of the effects of the global economic crisis but also because drug trafficking and violence continue to increase, placing the issue of security at the top of public and government agendas. President Felipe Calderón's hardline and militarised approach to drugs adopted in 2006, using public security forces including the army, has seen more than 45,000 people killed. November 2011 saw an appeal to the International Criminal Court signed by 23,000 people to investigate civilian deaths as war crimes, a move which was met with the threat from government of legal action against the activists. The drug conflict consequently defines significantly the context and scope of CSO activities and people's participation, and the actions of CSOs engaged in defending human rights and promoting security have become more prominent. Civil society has also mobilised in the scrutiny of and campaigning against the systematic murder of women in the border zone, especially in the city of Juárez. More than ever, organised citizen participation in public issues is fundamental in building the necessary social capital to face these political, economic and social challenges.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexican politics for over seven decades, and favoured corporatist organisations closely linked to the state, until its defeat by the National Action Party (PAN) in 2000, which brought improvements in civil society-government relations. This led to the legal and institutional recognition of the right to information, a new legal framework for civil society and an increase of social responsibility by business. However, current inequality, violence and insecurity erode the social fabric, while corruption and impunity corrode the administration of justice.

Mexico is considered to have high human development, ranked at 57 of 187 countries in the 2011 UN Human Development Index (HDI), but according to this index, in the past two years extreme poverty has increased by almost 4%, partly due to the impact of natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods. 47.4% of people fall below the national poverty line according to the 2011 Multidimensional Poverty Index, and income inequality is a problem, with the Gini coefficient standing at a high 51.7. Further, there is significant inequality between women and men in social, political and economic life, with Mexico ranked far below the Gender Equality Index average for countries at the same level of development.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 50.7. Civic Engagement: 44.9; Level of Organisation: 46.2; Practice of Values: 50.6; Perception of Impact: 46.3; External Environment: 65.7. Ranked 19 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	22.9%
CSOs network membership	41.1%
Policy activity	42.2%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.770. Ranked 57 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 32
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3. Ranked 100 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.17. Percentile rank: 61.7. Rule of law: -0.56. Percentile rank: 33.6
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 72.67. Ranked 149 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: moderate. Score: 72 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 94 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.93. Ranked: 50 out of 167

The 2004 Federal Law Promoting CSO Activities was a significant development in acknowledging the social relevance of CSO work. It created the Federal Registry of CSOs headed by the National Social Development Institute. Each CSO is given a Unique Registry Code, which is essential for obtaining public resources. However, the judicial framework for CSOs offers a heterogeneous and contradictory set of regulations, particularly within the context of Mexico's federal system. 44% of CSOs surveyed believe the legal framework is somewhat restrictive, 38% assess tax and social policies as limiting, and 12% of CSOs have faced illegitimate restriction or attack by state or federal government.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The exact number of CSOs in Mexico is not known, with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 35,000. This is small in terms of the population size of over 113m, although it is felt to reflect substantial growth and greater visibility in recent decades. Around 55% of CSOs are set up to help others, 24% are mutual benefit associations and 21% are religious, mostly connected to the Catholic Church. 45% of CSOs concentrate on social support and assistance services, 18% on community development and 8% on health. There are also areas of non-organised civil society, which entails spontaneous or issue-specific movements or mobilisations which tend to disappear quickly.

The increased professionalisation of some CSOs has resulted in the widening of the gaps between CSOs, grassroots organisations and social movements. Three quarters of CSOs registered to receive funding are concentrated in the 20 largest cities, particularly the capital.

## PARTICIPATION

People in Mexico participate more in socially-oriented CSOs than in politically-oriented ones, with participation evenly divided between women and men. CSOs with the highest active participation are sports and recreation related, followed by religious CSOs. Only around 5% of people participate in more than one CSO, and active membership in environmental and humanitarian organisations, and trade unions, all stand at under 5%. Volunteer work is highest in sports and recreation organisations, at 12%, followed by 10% in religious organisations and 8% in cultural or education organisations. 36% of people surveyed do not dedicate any time to volunteer work, and most volunteers contribute ten or fewer hours a month.

*“In May 2011, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of over 40 cities to protest against violence.”*

41% of people have signed a petition in the past five years, 24% attended a public demonstration but only 8% have participated in a boycott. There have been some recent large events with mass participation, particularly in marches against violence and insecurity. In May 2011, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of over 40 cities to protest against violence.

## PUBLIC TRUST

The Mexican public is characterised by a high level of distrust, both of other people and of public institutions, with a climate of violence and insecurity contributing to this. 70% of people state that they have no trust in political parties or the Mexican National Congress. Only 5% of people



trust large companies, only 6% unions and only 11% television. The lack of legitimacy of political institutions has not, however, translated into rejection of democracy, despite Mexican citizens' strong disappointment. The church is the institution trusted most by citizens (67%), while CSOs as a whole have 59% trust, with little variation in trust in environmental organisations, human rights organisations, women's organisations and humanitarian and charitable organisations.

The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index indicates that Mexico has regressed on corruption, despite it being a core item of the 2006-2012 National Development Plan. Mexico in 2011 has virtually the same score as in 2001, while many countries have overtaken it: in 2001 Mexico ranked 51st out of 91 with a score of 3.3, while in 2011 it ranked joint 100th out of 183 with a 3 score (a score of 10 would indicate no corruption). Reflecting this, 38% of CSOs surveyed believe that corruption in civil society is frequent.

## NETWORKS

Most CSOs surveyed, 57%, do not belong to a network or federation. Those that do named membership of 119 different groups, but only two were mentioned more than twice, the Mexican Centre for Philanthropy and the Private Assistance Council, suggesting a lack of well-known and wide-ranging national networks. Networks also record trends of loss of active members and resources. 67% of CSOs reported having meetings with other CSOs in a three month period, and 58% exchanging information, low levels in comparison with other countries. In general, CSOs state that the alliances they currently have respond to circumstantial or specific needs, and that political polarisation has eroded previous capacity to form alliances.

Only 7% of CSOs surveyed report working at an international level and only 4% belong to an international network or federation. While Mexico houses multiple international organisations, these seem to provide few opportunities for domestic CSOs.

## RESOURCES

The funding climate for CSOs seems to be worsening, with 61% of CSOs surveyed reporting an increase in expenditure from one year to the next compared to only 23% reporting an increase in income. Only around a quarter of CSOs believe their financial resources can meet their needs. Of CSOs surveyed, 23% obtain funding from individual donations and 22% from government, followed by national donors (12%) and businesses (10%). The fact that individual donors are a major source of financing may imply greater autonomy and a significant investment in outreach. The legal and regulatory framework means that access to public funds involves meeting onerous terms and conditions, and dealing with short project execution timeframes, extremely rigorous methods for reporting expenses and delays in receiving funds. These issues make it difficult for public funders to adapt to the pace and dynamics of CSOs. There are also parallel and disjointed federal and state support policies, which create confusion and duplication. International cooperation has declined as a source of funding, with few donor organisations in Mexico.

35% of CSOs surveyed have no paid staff, while 26% have been one and five. Only around 9% do not make use of volunteers.

## IMPACT

47% of surveyed CSOs consider insecurity to be a pressing issue with high civil society impact while 38% perceive there is high impact on providing support to poor people. Civil society is also perceived to make impact on education, housing and health. External stakeholders assess the impact as more limited, particularly on pressing issues, such as insecurity. A possible explanation here is the lack of visibility of CSOs' actions and of mechanisms to promote their work.

***“47% of surveyed CSOs consider insecurity to be a pressing issue with high civil society impact.”***

CSO policy impact is low. Within the cycle of policy formation, CSOs and external stakeholders believe strongest CSO involvement is in policy diagnosis, but their involvement in policy approval and implementation is particularly limited. 42% of CSOs surveyed have tried to influence policy, with the most common methods being direct petition to the president or state governor, and outreach to parliamentarians and officials, indicating that personal relations are needed and formal mechanisms are lacking. Only 29% of CSOs that attempted policy influence report success, while 27% say that their proposal was not listened to at all.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Mexico include: establishing a tax and legal framework to facilitate the work of CSOs; increasing visibility of CSOs' work; working more within CSO networks to strengthen the sector and increase impact on other strategic actors; and promoting tolerance and democratic values in society, including through citizen participation projects.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Mexican Centre for Philanthropy – CEMEFI - [www.cemefi.org](http://www.cemefi.org)

Citizens' Initiative for the Promotion of a Culture of Dialogue - [www.iniciativaciudadana.org.mx](http://www.iniciativaciudadana.org.mx)

Social Administration and Cooperation – GESOC - [www.gesoc.org.mx](http://www.gesoc.org.mx)



Basic facts	
Capital	Rabat
Official language	Arabic
Population	31.97m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$2,796

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: MOROCCO

The protests which swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 took hold in Morocco on 20 February, when people marched to demand greater limitations on the king's powers, with protest fuelled by the rising cost of living and economic difficulties, as well as demands for public service reform. Protests, spearheaded by the 20 February Movement, continued throughout the year in Morocco's major cities, with a pattern of Sunday demonstrations, even after changes were made to the constitution in July and elections under the new constitution brought forward to November 2011. The challenge for CSOs in Morocco is to take advantage of, and help shape, the changing political landscape in the wake of the concessions made by the king.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The monarchy has long been identified as the most powerful institution in Morocco, sitting at the top of the social and political structure. There is a highly diverse web of consultative councils and advisers underneath this, but all to a large extent have derived their strength and legitimacy from their relationship with and dependency on the monarchy. Following the protests in 2011, a new constitution was introduced in July, passed by an overwhelming majority in a referendum, which curbs the king's powers and gives more power to the prime minister, for example, to dissolve parliament and preside over the council of government. The constitution also shares power between king and prime minister on the appointment of diplomats, obliges the king to appoint the leader of the party with most seats as prime minister, and formally guarantees freedom of thought, ideas, artistic expression and creation, alongside freedom of speech, movement and association. In the subsequent elections held under this revised constitution, the Justice and Development Party, commonly described as moderately Islamist, saw a sharp rise in its vote to become the largest party. The new constitution was committed to by the king in an address in response to the protests in March 2011, but many of the leaders of the 20 February Movement criticise it for being insufficiently far-reaching. Believing the reforms were not radical enough, a further wave of protests erupted in September 2011.

In the 2011 UN Human Development Index, Morocco ranks 130 of 187 countries for state progress in the fields of health, education and income. Income inequality remains a pressing problem, with a high number of low income households and a concentration of wealth in

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 53.7. Civic Engagement: 39.9; Level of Organisation: 50.5; Practice of Values: 59.2; Perception of Impact: 61.8; External Environment: 57.0. Ranked 11 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	20.9%
CSOs network membership	50.7%
Policy activity	65.4%



Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.582. Ranked 130 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 5. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.4. Ranked 80 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.17. Percentile rank: 48.8. Rule of law: -0.19. Percentile rank: 50.2
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 63.29. Ranked 138 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: very weak. Score: 56 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 87 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.83. Ranked 119 out of 167

the hands of a few, and education deficits are widespread, with over half of people surveyed reporting that they had experienced no education, or had not completed primary level education.

Judicial independence is challenged, given the excessive role of the monarchy and executive in the appointment of judges and management of their careers. Some of the larger business groupings, in the areas of investment and banking, are influential due to their connections with the ruling elite, but smaller businesses have little influence. Political parties and labour unions are seen to have lost popular support.

CSOs see themselves held back by a lack of real commitment from government to dialogue and participation, which is made visible by the absence of state funding for civil society and the continuation of laws that restrict civil liberties. The National Human Development Initiative, launched by the government in 2005 to take a participative approach to local development, is criticised for having flawed governance, weak decision-making and consultation deficiencies at each stage of its process. At the political level, while there was some opening up of Moroccan society since the 1980s, which civil society took advantage of to give rise to a new generation of CSOs, in the years up to 2011 CSOs reported trends of a decline in liberties and the effectiveness of laws. This was accompanied by a reversal of trends towards an

independent media, through trials, increasingly high fines and closures, as well as through selective financing. Red lines remain on raising issues to do with the king, Islam and the Moroccan-occupied disputed territory of Western Sahara, accompanied by much civil society scepticism about official media.

Over 40% of CSOs surveyed found the legal environment for their operations unduly restrictive, and this figure rises to almost half for human rights and women’s organisations. Processes around the granting of public utility status, required to qualify for state funding, are felt to be opaque and distorted by favouritism.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Depending on sources, there are estimated to be between 30,000 and 50,000 CSOs in Morocco. The range of this estimate suggests the challenges of defining and measuring civil society in Morocco, and also its diversity, with many CSOs having developed for localised response, often in reaction to government disengagement from public services, and organised around voluntary work and participation.

## PARTICIPATION

People’s participation in the activities of organised civil society is not widespread. People express a preference to spend time with family and friends, while the most common organisational vehicles for membership and volunteering are offered by sports, educational and cultural CSOs, but even these have less than 10% of the population in membership. Volunteering, particularly in rural areas, is associated with traditional forms of solidarity, such as twiza, the communal cultivation of land. CSO membership is lower amongst women, but young people have higher rates, and there is some evidence that membership is higher in rural than urban areas. Only a little over 1% of people are members of a human rights CSO.



Comparing data from 2005 to 2010, the most recent date available, shows an apparent decline in CSO membership. Reasons for decreasing involvement have been suggested to include the lack of transparency and accountability of CSOs, frustrations at low efficiency and barriers to women's participation, along with the challenges of widespread illiteracy and poverty. The lack of mechanisms to bring students and graduates into CSOs has also been noted. It can be argued that these deficits have encouraged participation in the form of protest as an alternative.

Under 2% of the population reported being a member of a political party, and only around a quarter of the population reported taking an interest in party politics, with the figure even lower among city dwellers. One of the reasons behind this was thought to be the lack of representative democracy, with an opaque and unaccountable electoral system. Turnout in the 2007 election was only 37%, although official estimates for the 2011 election suggest it increased to 45%.

In figures gathered before the protests, small numbers of people reported that they had taken parts in acts of individual activism, such as signing a petition (24%) or joining a peaceful demonstration (22%), but interestingly in view of subsequent events, the survey revealed high potential for people to do so in future – a further 45% said that they would join a demonstration and 55% would take part in a boycott. This can be seen to have translated into action during 2011, with the mobilisations of tens of thousands of people in Casablanca and Rabat in particular. There were also less well reported protests in Western Sahara. Even before 2011 there was a rise of protest movements, such as the Tansikiyat movement, which protests against the high costs of living, and some spontaneous movements in towns and villages, suggesting a loss of credibility of traditional political forms. There are also religious movements associated with the ruling powers, such as Tijania and Boutchichiya, and those that oppose them, such as Adl Wal Al Ihssane. They are understood to exert a strong influence on people's lives, but such movements are opaque and it is hard to gather knowledge on them.

***“45% said that they would join a demonstration and 55% would take part in a boycott. This can be seen to have translated into action during 2011.”***

At the end of 2011, there were just under 4 million Facebook users in Morocco, more than double the number of users of a year before. In conjunction with mobilisations of protest, web-based campaigns have successfully brought about the release of civil society activists who were imprisoned for infringing 'sacred values'.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Civil society enjoys relatively high public trust, particularly religious leaders, trusted by around 72%, charities (74%), community environmental and local development organisations (72%) and women's organisations (62%), compared to low levels of trust in political parties, parliament and international institutions such as the UN and the EU. The army and the police force have traditionally also received high levels of trust. Around three quarters of people surveyed believe that CSOs are important and useful, but only around a third when asked can name a CSO, and this is skewed towards local CSOs. Only around a quarter of people have knowledge of national CSOs, and only around 5% international ones.

Morocco stands in 80th place out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, with slightly lower levels of perceived corruption than most North African countries, Tunisia aside. Around three quarters of people are also concerned about corruption in CSOs.

## NETWORKS

Only around half of CSOs surveyed are members of a network, with the figure being 31% for labour unions or professional associations, and only 42% of human rights and women's organisations. However, 69% of CSOs reported recently holding meetings with other CSOs and 59% exchanging

information with them, with meetings involving an average of around six CSOs, suggesting that there is additional networking going on outside formal networks. Around 80% of human rights and women's organisations regularly meet, with the most common reason for meeting being involvement in joint projects. However, 80% of CSOs are also reported to have no partnership strategy. There are also fears amongst two thirds of CSOs surveyed that partnership can jeopardise identity and autonomy.

## RESOURCES

CSOs regard themselves as underdeveloped, due to lack of finance and staff, which in turn impact on their autonomy and professionalism, identified as key weaknesses of the sector. 62% of CSOs do not have any paid employees, and only 8% of CSOs have more than 10. Volunteering remains essential to sustaining CSOs, with an average of over 20 volunteers per CSO. A concern of CSOs in general is that funding seems to be confined to a small circle of CSOs, with 90% of CSOs not receiving funding from foreign donors and half not receiving funding from the state. Almost 90% also do not receive private sector funding, suggesting a very limited local CSR approach. CSO expenditure appears to be rising faster than income, with almost 70% of CSOs reporting that their general expenditure had increased from one year to the next, and there is a related concern that the need to seek funding is distorting the missions of some CSOs.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess relatively high and localised impact on the areas of education, social development and assistance to poor people, with human rights and women's organisations estimated as having the highest impact, but this does not translate into influence on the national policy level. 65% of CSOs surveyed report pushing for the adoption of policies, and 77% of these report success, but an analysis of the policy initiatives shows that many of these are small scale, and around 51% of CSOs judge policy impact as limited or nil.

CSOs working in the sphere of advocacy, human rights and the reporting of abuses have more national level visibility. Visibility and attribution is sometimes an issue, which concern for example that CSOs did not receive credit for their success in a long campaign to reform the family code.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Key recommendations to improve the state of civil society in Morocco include developing regulations and mechanisms to institutionalise partnership and consultation into decision-making processes for public projects, and to bring greater transparency to decisions on resource allocations; increasing the role of CSOs in defence of citizens and consumers; diversifying civil society funding, including through lobbying for a fund for the promotion of civil society; and introducing schemes to promote greater volunteering in CSOs.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Espace Associatif - [www.espace-associatif.ma](http://www.espace-associatif.ma)

Tanmia - [www.tanmia.ma](http://www.tanmia.ma)

Moroccans for Change - [moroccansforchange.com](http://moroccansforchange.com)

20th of February Movement -

[www.facebook.com/pages/The-20th-of-february-movement/194559543895241](https://www.facebook.com/pages/The-20th-of-february-movement/194559543895241)



Basic facts	
Capital	Managua
Official language	Spanish
Population	5.7m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$1,132

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: NICARAGUA

Civil society in Nicaragua exists in a context of polarisation and politicisation. Following the presidential victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 2006, which remained in power in 2011, the government introduced a new citizen participation system called Civic Power Councils and Cabinets (CPCs). These limit the participation of voices not aligned to the ruling party, and promote the control and intimidation of some CSOs, causing discord within civil society. Civil society groups can be classified into three camps: CSOs allied with the FSLN; CSOs that are autonomous from the government and that campaign against public policies that restrict free participation and citizen organisation, access to public information and electoral observance; and a considerable number of CSOs that seek to work locally according to the interests of their members and avoid taking any positions towards the government.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Compared to other countries in Latin America, Nicaragua has one of the most unequal distributions of income and wealth: the richest 20% of the population hold 47.2% of the total wealth, while the poorest 20% have 6.2%. The deterioration of education, health and income indicators have meant that Nicaragua's ranking in the UN Human Development Index has gone down from 116th in 2000 to 129th in 2011. Unemployment accounts for 12% of the working age population, in addition to 36% who are in not in full-time formal employment. Overall, half the population lacks stable, full-time employment with a fair income.

Since the change of government in early 2007 the situation has become more difficult for that part of civil society that does not align with the government, with the promotion of an exclusive system of social organisations and the limitation of rights of association, expression and cooperation of CSOs. 36% of CSOs surveyed report experiencing aggression from national or local government in the past ten years. Amongst limiting actions towards civil society noted are abuses of power by authorities, restrictions on strikes and mobilisations, deprivations of liberty, fiscal retaliations and discriminatory controls by state organisations, the use of insults and slanders, exclusion from processes due to political motives, closure of legal spaces of participation, impositions of organisational forms, and violations of human and civil rights. Judicial independence is compromised: the

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 58.98. Civic Engagement: 53.4; Level of Organisation: 67.2; Practice of Values: 60.6; Perception of Impact: 59.95; External Environment: 52.9. Ranked 3 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	3.0%
CSOs network membership	76.6%
Policy activity	77.0%



Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.589. Ranked 129 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 5. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.5. Ranked 134 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.96. Percentile rank: 15.8. Rule of law: -0.83. Percentile rank: 24.2
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 24.3. Ranked 72 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2008	Status: very weak. Score: 58 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 81. Ranked 67 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.56. Ranked 91 out of 167

Constitution was reinterpreted by the Supreme Court in order to let incumbent President Ortega run for a third term in spite of the two term limit, raising questions about the separation of powers and legitimacy of the decision.

A political pact between the two main parties is seen to prevent the exercise of political choice, and the municipal elections of 2008 were widely seen as unfair. Ortega won the election in November 2011, polling twice as many votes as the second candidate. This brought allegations of voter fraud, intimidation and refusal to collect and count votes, along with post-electoral violence in which at least four people died. Freedom House classes Nicaragua as partly free.

Under these circumstances, Nicaragua has an unfavourable context for the functioning and development of civil society, assessed as below the Latin American average, which prevents civil society from the fulfilment of its social and political roles. However, CSOs continue to implement programmes focussing on overcoming poverty, making the political system more democratic and promoting human rights.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The civil society panorama in Nicaragua includes labour unions (21 major unions), cooperatives (6,600 cooperatives, encompassing more than 500,000 members), social movements, religious organisations, philanthropic organisations, communal associations, indigenous communities and towns, interest groups (4,130 associations and foundations), development organisations (around 700), education and research centres, environmental organisations, human rights organisations and organisations for women, children and youth.

The concept of civil society gained momentum in the 1990s at the end of the military conflict and the state of emergency, which had restricted citizens' rights of association, information and expression. The FSLN's electoral defeat in 1990 led to a period of liberal governments that implemented profound neo-liberal changes in the state and in society, leading to strong responses from CSOs and social movements. A noteworthy development at this time was the emergence of new CSOs focused on the rights of excluded groups, such as children, women, indigenous people and people with disabilities, and on basic services, with the support of international cooperation efforts. Such CSOs implemented local development projects and facilitated the organisation of thematic networks nationally to exchange experiences and affect public policies.

Most CSOs are not legally registered, whether as non-profit associations or foundations, cooperatives, labour unions or resident associations. Moreover, a good proportion of legally registered CSOs do not maintain updated information on their organisations at the relevant agencies.

## PARTICIPATION

There is significant participation by the public in social organisations, community actions and volunteering, particularly by social groups that are traditionally excluded (women, indigenous communities and rural people). Around 38% of people are members of a socially-oriented CSO and around 27% volunteer for one. A very high 94% of people say that they participate in some kind of informal associational activity at least once a month, which is much higher than the Latin American average of 63%. Church or religious organisations are by far the dominant sphere of participation,



with over 30% of the population being a member of such an organisation, as compared to membership in political parties (10%) and trade unions (3%)

Electoral participation since 1990 has been high, particularly in national elections, but a downward trend is observed, especially in municipal and regional elections, due to a decrease in the legitimacy of political parties, the non-fulfilment of pre-electoral promises and the lack of voter registration cards. For example, turnout in presidential elections declined from 86% in 1990 to 70% in 2011.

With regard to citizen participation in various individual acts of activism, just 29% of people have signed a petition addressed at municipal, regional or national government authorities, 13% have filed a complaint against a private or public company and 24% participated in peaceful protests to claim their rights. The figures are lower for women than men.

## PUBLIC TRUST

There is a very low level of interpersonal trust, with only 3% of Nicaraguans expressing the belief that other people can be trusted, making communication between people and their association in CSOs difficult. Additionally, there is a low level of tolerance of other ideas, beliefs or ways of life, seen in discrimination and rejection towards visible minorities and people with other political party affiliations. In addition, Nicaragua has an extreme level of corruption, which is perceived as the main problem by around 69% of the population. Nicaragua ranks 134th out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Around 40% of CSO representatives also believe there is frequent corruption within civil society.

There is, however, a high degree of trust in CSOs, with church organisations, women's organisations and environmental organisations scoring as the top three most trusted organisations. The three least trusted are political parties, the civil service and parliament.

## NETWORKS

Over the last two decades, several national networks of CSOs have organised in an effort to overcome the dispersion and isolation of the thousands of small CSOs that exist throughout Nicaragua. 77% of CSOs are members of networks, and 88% report recently meeting with another CSO. Nevertheless, CSO representatives also criticise the lack of coordination between some organisations due to their different motivations.

Major CSO networks, in addition to union and church networks, include: Civil Coordinator of Nicaragua, Social Coordinator of Nicaragua, Nicaraguan Network for Democracy and Local Development, Network of Women Against Violence, Coordinator of Organisations that Work for Children and Adolescents, National Commission for the Struggle Against AIDS, Federation of NGOs of Nicaragua, Nicaraguan Health Network Federation, Network of Water and Sewage of Nicaragua, Federation of Rehabilitation and Integration Organisations, Network of Civil Organisations for Migration and National Network of Potable Water Committees.

*“Over the last two decades, several national networks of CSOs have organised in an effort to overcome the isolation of the thousands of small CSOs in Nicaragua.”*

## RESOURCES

CSOs rely on modest funds for the implementation of their activities and their operations. The most important financial resources come from external cooperation agencies, from which more than half of CSOs surveyed receive funds, and, to a lesser degree, from the contributions of members (23%), individual donations (15%), government funds (14%) and service fees and the sale of services (10%). 31% of CSOs report an increase in their income from one year to the next, but this was outweighed by 46% that reported an increase in expenses.

Most CSOs consider that their financial resources are inadequate to carry out their programmes and efficiently respond to demands. Most operate on a low turnover, with 38% of CSOs receiving under US\$10,000 a year. Human resources are also scarce. 59% of CSOs surveyed have fewer than 10 paid staff, and 57% rely on the voluntary efforts of between one and 35 people. 40% of CSOs also lack a regular internet connection.

Financial sustainability could be a growing challenge soon for many CSOs, due to a decrease in external cooperation with Nicaragua as a result of the global economic crisis, changing cooperation policies in European countries, and the lack of democratic governance in Nicaragua.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves as having reached a significant level of impact in activities on education, health, the protection of natural resources and agriculture. CSOs gained in profile following response to the 1997 Hurricane Mitch, when the immediate reaction of CSOs demonstrated their ability to respond to people's needs in a more efficient and faster way than the government. Overall, around 70% of both CSO representatives and external stakeholders believe civil society responds well to pressing contemporary concerns, albeit more so on matters of strengthening democracy than alleviating poverty.

74% of CSOs surveyed have tried to influence policy, but only 22% report being successful. One particular impact has been achieved in the Autonomous Regions of the Caribbean, where specific forms of participation and organisation of the indigenous and Afro-descendent communities have been legally recognised and enabled.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Suggested steps to strengthen civil society in Nicaragua include: promoting the notion of the public sphere and participation as a space underpinned by principles of tolerance, respect and peace, beyond the domain of political parties; opening spaces for different CSOs to work jointly on policy issues, and on social auditing and public performance; establishing observatories for monitoring public policies from a human rights perspective; and promoting spaces of dialogue between CSOs, state institutions, political parties, business and external sources of cooperation on problems of national interest.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Federación Red Nicaragüense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local - [www.redlocalnicaragua.org](http://www.redlocalnicaragua.org)

Coordinadora Civil - [www.ccer.org.ni](http://www.ccer.org.ni)

Federación de Asociaciones Profesionales de Nicaragua - [www.conapro.org](http://www.conapro.org)

Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticas Públicas - [www.ieepp.org](http://www.ieepp.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Manila
Official languages	Filipino, English
Population	101.8m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$2,140

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: PHILIPPINES

Civil society in the Philippines flourished after the People Power Revolution brought about the end of dictatorship in 1986, with civil society recognised as a key player in subsequent democratisation processes. However, major challenges remain: it can be said that there is a tradition of extrajudicial killings and disappearances of activists, particularly during the previous presidential administration, when estimates of killings range between 100 and 800, while 2010 saw the widely publicised detention of the Morong 43, health workers illegally detained for ten months.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Within society, the president and the party the president heads occupy the apex of power, along with the congress, legislature and supreme court. The 1987 constitution gives the president extensive powers to oversee and intervene, and checks and balances are weak. The mass media and entertainment industries, which are mostly privately owned, are seen as able to strongly influence views, particularly of young people and lower income groups, while big business – oil companies, semiconductor manufacturers, and food, telecoms and pharmaceutical companies – and the landed elite, who often hold political positions, are seen as key groups within the market sector. The military still remain important and to some extent independent of government, while major external influencers are the USA and the World Bank.

Government spending on social services per capita shows a decline since the early 2000s, and inequality is high compared to surrounding countries, with an absence of public mechanisms for wealth redistribution. The government's fight against communist forces can be understood to have coloured its stance more generally towards organisations that advocate for change: one CSO, Karapatan, reports that extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of civil society leaders, human rights defenders, trade unionists and land reform advocates averaged more than one a week in 2011. Freedom House awards the Philippines a below average score for political rights and average for the rule of law.

Formally, the state is mandated to provide adequate consultation mechanisms. The 1987 constitution contains clauses that recognise the role of non-governmental, community-based and sectoral

CIVICUS Civil Society Index <i>Key data about civil society</i>	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 55.1. Civic Engagement: 54.7; Level of Organisation: 57.9; Practice of Values: 48.1; Perception of Impact: 62.0; External Environment: 53.1. Ranked 8 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	4.8%
CSOs network membership	63.3%
Policy activity	46.7%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.644. Ranked 112 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.6. Ranked 129 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.1. Percentile rank: 51.7. Rule of law: -0.54. Percentile rank: 34.6
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 64.5. Ranked 140 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: very weak. Score: 57 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 85.0. Ranked 50 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.12. Ranked 75 out of 167

organisations, and independent people's organisations. A number of bodies at the local level, such as local health boards and development councils, are therefore required to involve civil society representatives. However, there is a gap in the realisation of this, and many bodies have a formal consultative role only, while a further issue is favouritism in personnel selection.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Filipino civil society is seen as being made up of a range of typical organisational types, including established, professionalised NGOs; people's organisations, including trade unions and workers' associations; cooperatives; and homeowners' associations. NGOs and related organisations register under Filipino law as non-stock, non-profit organisations, exempt from income tax, and organisations of this type also include religious orders and associations, political parties, foundations, civic organisations, trade, industry and professional associations, and mutual benefit associations.

The most powerful CSOs are those rooted in the Catholic Church, while academic institutions and overseas Filipino

workers, who remain unorganised, offer other centres of gravity. In 60 of the Philippines' 79 provinces, the Communist Party, which is banned, and its armed wing, the New People's Army, are still present, and there are 5,000 armed members, albeit down from a peak of 25,000 in the mid 1980s. In some isolated locales they provide an alternative to the state. There are also Islamist armed groups, such as the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which fight for the independence of the Mindanao region, a particularly poor and neglected region in which much of the Philippines' Muslim population is located.

## PARTICIPATION

The Philippines has a high level of people's participation, comparable with neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and South Korea, with around 83% of people categorising themselves as members of CSOs, and 46% saying they are active. The highest levels of membership are in religious organisations, with 55% of the population being a member and 31% volunteering for them. Around 12% of the population are members of a cooperative society or a sports or recreational organisation. 47% of Filipinos volunteer in a socially oriented CSO, and 33% in more than one. Participation in CSOs with political or advocacy concerns is however limited to 26% of people, with 28% volunteering in these. There are also low levels of individual political activism, such as joining a demonstration (10%) or signing a petition (7%). Participation also appears as relatively inclusive of people from minority groups, including from Mindanao, suggesting that civil society plays a role as a channel for the inclusion of otherwise marginalised communities.

***“83% of people categorise themselves as members of CSOs, and 46% say they are active.”***

It is suggested that one of the reasons for the difference between high levels of social participation and much lower levels of political participation is that Filipino values imply a natural tendency to take an interest in the affairs of other people, particularly at the village level, but CSOs are not providing clear participation routes for citizens, who have also become more aware of CSO corruption, which has fed cynicism about participation. This implies that closer connections need to be made between social activity and advocacy for political change.



## PUBLIC TRUST

Overall trust in civil society institutions stands at a high 85%. The highest level of public trust is held in the church, at 93%, but even the CSO types that have the lowest level of public trust, labour unions and cooperatives, are trusted by the majority, at almost 60%. Of all civil society forms, only political parties are trusted by less than half, at 38%. Somewhat surprisingly, CSO members are less tolerant of diversity than people who are not CSO members, something which may be explained by the heavy role of socially conservative Catholic Church groups in civil society, but which challenges the notion of civil society as a generator of progressive social capital.

There is a high public perception of corruption, fed by several high profile scandals in the 2000s, with 2011 seeing the commencement of congressional hearings to investigate the diversion of military funds. The Philippines ranks at a low 129th out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. As part of this, there is quite a high perception of CSO corruption: only about 30% of CSO representatives believe corruption in the sector to be rare.

*“Overall trust in civil society institutions stands at a high 85%.”*

## NETWORKS

The Caucus of Development NGO Networks acts as a network of CSO networks, having amongst its members the Association of Foundations, the National Federation of Cooperatives, the National Council for Social Development and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas. There are also large federations of trade unions, such as the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and the Alliance of Progressive Labour, and religious networks, including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, the National Council of Churches and the National Ulama Conference for Muslim groups, while the National Council for Social Development has existed for over 60 years. Around 63% of CSOs are members of networks, while 71% have recently held a meeting with another CSO and 64% have exchanged information, but these are globally low figures, perhaps reflecting the challenges of networking in a country of over 7,000 islands. Networking rates are lower for farmers’ and fishers’ groups, which are the least resourced groups on the CSO spectrum. There has in addition been government intervention to support networks, in the form of area-based standards networks, which bring together different groups working with the socially marginalised.

## RESOURCES

CSOs rely mostly on membership dues and service fees for their funding, with limited funding from other sources. No type of CSO is heavily reliant on government or corporate funding, but advocacy NGOs depend on foreign support, while trade unions and homeowners’ associations are highly dependent on membership fees, and religious groups derive about half their funding base from individual donations. One potentially worrying trend is that around a third of CSOs are assessed as being in financial decline, and the main source of income of groups experiencing decline is membership fees, followed by individual donations, suggesting that economic downturn is challenging individual giving to CSOs. Foreign grants, meanwhile, have consistently declined, more than halving over a 15 year period, reflecting the relative political stability of the Philippines compared to others in the region and corresponding shifts of donor attention elsewhere. In response to this, some networks have initiated local funding programmes.

Farmers’ and fishers’ groups have the highest ratio of volunteers to paid staff, at about eleven to one, much higher than the average for the sector as a whole of between two and three to one. A human resource concern is the apparent lack of a successor generation to replace those civil society leaders that emerged following the end of martial law, with fewer young people seeking to work in CSOs.

A self-regulation initiative, the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, has so far certified around 1,000 CSOs in its eight years of existence. One of the benefits of this is to make donations to certified CSOs tax deductible. However, those registered are only a small proportion of the estimated total of CSOs, partly because the certification process is seen as laborious and expensive. Intriguingly, smaller CSOs more often publish their financial information than larger ones, while CSOs which receive a high level of foreign funding do this less often.

## IMPACT

CSOs are seen to achieve a high level of impact in the areas of poverty reduction, environmental protection and anti-corruption, with stakeholders external to the sector tending to rate CSO performance more highly than those in the sector themselves. Only around 45% of CSOs had lobbied for policy change within a two year period, but 61% of these reported a successful outcome. Lobbying to pass a law on agrarian reform was seen as a particular success story in recent years, with success resting on the development of civil society technical capacity, the establishment of good networks with legislators and the church, and the ability to organise campaigns.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in the Philippines include: supporting greater take up of CSO certification; developing guidelines on the roles of CSO boards; improving taxation regimes to encourage public giving; and enhancing CSO networking to enable greater representation in existing multi-sectoral bodies.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) - [www.code-ngo.org](http://www.code-ngo.org)


Karapatan – Alliance for the Advancement of People’s Rights - [www.karapatan.org](http://www.karapatan.org)

Philippine Council for NGO Certification - [www.pcnc.com.ph](http://www.pcnc.com.ph)

Association of Foundations - <http://af.afonline.org>

Institute for Popular Democracy - <http://ipd.org.ph>

Social Watch Philippines - [www.socialwatchphilippines.org](http://www.socialwatchphilippines.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Moscow
Official language	Russian
Population	142.9m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$10,440

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: RUSSIA

Civil society gained prominence in Russia as the country moved along the path of post-communist transition. For example, CSOs play an increasing role in modernising the provision of social services. This expanding role led the state from 2009 to 2011 to introduce a number of laws which open new possibilities for government funding of the activities of socially-oriented CSOs and partnership with the state in providing social services. Against this, the context for CSO growth remained difficult because the level of public trust in CSOs is low. But in a new development, when doubts arose in late 2011 about the counting of votes in the parliamentary elections, civic activity moved into the arena of public policy. Protest rallies in Moscow and other large cities demonstrated a new demand for higher standards of governance and more dialogue with the authorities. Priorities of Russian civil society can now be said to include the rule of law and basic civil rights. The establishment of the League of Voters, a new grassroots group connecting activists for free and fair elections, possibly marks the beginning of mass self-organisation on these concerns. Russian political structures and bodies of state power are challenged to assess these developments and to seek new methods of communication with civil society to build trust between civil society and the state.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Russia is considered to have a high level of human development, ranked 66th in the 2011 UN Human Development Index. As one of the world's largest oil and natural gas holders, high fuel prices have propelled economic growth. However, inequality, as expressed in the gap between the richest 20% and the poorest, remains pressing. Inequality increasingly affects access to quality education and medical care, while there are high levels of drug and alcohol addiction. Nevertheless, a generally high educational level and growing urbanisation suggest assets that could be used to build civil society.

In contrast to the powerful oligarchy, civil society has weak relationships with government, which means that politicians more often consult business interests than those of citizens. There has been some recent establishment of state-civil society dialogue bodies, such as the President of the Russian Federation's Council for the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights and a Public Chamber at the federal level, along with forums in individual ministries and regional and municipal level civic councils. Consultation and support is however characterised by selectivity, while attempts to raise political or human

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 42.5. Civic Engagement: 33.7; Level of Organisation: 51.4; Practice of Values: 39.8; Perception of Impact: 34.4; External Environment: 53.3. Ranked 33 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	18.9%
CSOs network membership	32.2%
Policy activity	26.8%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.698. Ranked 95 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: not free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 5
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 52
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.4. Ranked 143 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.39. Percentile rank: 41.6. Rule of law: -0.78. Percentile rank: 26.1
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 66. Ranked 142 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: moderate. Score: 71 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 82 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.92. Ranked 117 out of 167

rights issues remain controversial. Russia's Basic Law offers ample political and human rights and democratic institutions on paper, but the rule of law is weak. There is a marked lack of separation of governmental powers, with the judiciary subject to undue influence from the legislature and executive, and a general lack of accountability and transparency in the public sector. CSOs which could contribute to the enforcement of the Basic Law and to civic oversight of the public sector are weak. Some political parties critical of the status quo are banned, while some that are allowed to practice are pseudo opposition parties intended to offer the semblance of democratic choice without challenging the regime. The European Court of High Rights in April 2011 condemned Russia's law on political parties as draconian, affirming that the condition on minimum membership numbers was the most prohibitive in Europe. Restrictions on civil and political rights have led Freedom House to classify Russia as 'not free', although it should be said that many Russian analysts express doubts about the Freedom House methods. Research conducted by the Centre for the Study of Civil Society and the Not-for-Profit Sector at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (CSCSNS) in 2009 revealed a gap between the rights and freedoms that people hold important and an assessment of possession of these rights. Political rights and freedoms rated much lower than social rights in importance for Russians, but the enforcement of rights and freedoms as a whole was assessed by Russian citizens as low.

Conflict continues in the Caucasus region, and the fear remains that this could be used to justify heavy-handed government across the country. 2011 saw an interdepartmental commission established, headed by the interior minister, on combating extremism in Russia. Stringent anti-terrorism laws introduced in 2002 and amended in 2006 cast a potentially wide net, but so far this body of legislation has not been used on a large scale.

The Russian Civil Code and the Federal Law on Non-commercial Organisations (NCO Law) regulate public associations, foundations, institutions, non-commercial partnerships and autonomous non-commercial organisations. Public associations are further sub-divided by the Federal Law on Public Associations and are considered to encompass public organisations, mass movements, public foundations and public institutions.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

According to the Russian Statistics Committee, the total number of non-governmental, non-commercial organisations is about 360,000, but the research by CSCSNS indicates that only around 136,000 of these are active. The main types of legally registered CSOs are religious organisations (44%), gardening associations (14%), residents' associations (13%), funds (9%) and non-commercial partnerships (8%).

In the 1990s CSOs were a largely western-supported phenomenon, and tended to be based on western models. More recent years have seen the development of more indigenous models and a greater role for domestic funding. However, while research shows a sufficiently high level of organisation of CSOs, it also highlights that non-institutionalised spontaneous self-organisation to date is weak, situation-specific, not sustainable and not always constructive. A gap is observed between rather safe, but quantitatively rather limited institutionalised development, and relatively rare broad public initiatives.



## PARTICIPATION

Analysis of the Russian population suggests there is a middle ground of people ripe for recruitment into civil society. People who are active in CSOs (8%) and people who are assessed as never likely to be involved in CSOs (9%) are the smallest population groups, but the middle ground includes 27% assessed as involved in charity in some way or well-informed about CSOs, but not currently active, and a further 27% assessed as potentially ready to unite for joint action, but not yet engaged in civic work and not well-informed about the work of existing organisations.

As it stands, participation is low across the board. The share of the population participating in the activities of socially-oriented CSOs is 9%, and for politically-oriented CSOs 8%, with volunteering levels even lower. The main vehicles for participation are sports and recreational organisations, involving 65% of those who take part in socially-oriented activities, with much lower percentages involved in cultural and educational organisations (22%) and religious organisations (21%). Only 6% participate in the activities of charitable organisations or foundations. Three quarters of those participating in politically-oriented CSOs do so through trade unions, 15% in political parties and 10% in professional associations. Less than 3% participate in environmental or consumer rights organisations.

Only around 10% of respondents reported taking part in individual political activity, such as signing a petition or joining a demonstration, in the past five years. There were however no discernible social and demographic differences between these and the other 90%, implying that there is potential to scale up the level of political activism. Heavy social media use by young people also suggests potential for activism, as was demonstrated in the December protests.

The percentage involved in local community activities is a higher 28%, but still a globally low figure, although three quarters of these participate at least once a month. The core civil society constituency tend to live in large cities, have a high educational level and reasonable income levels. On average people volunteer for 26 hours a week. The level of volunteering rises to a third of people when non-formal volunteering is taken into account, and there is felt to be latency for self-mobilisation demonstrated by the rapid civic response to the wildfires experienced in Russia in 2010.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Only around 9% of the public report that they trust CSOs, a globally low figure. While faith organisations register 43% trust, other civil society actors have trust ratings between 1% and 15%. Political parties have a negative rating: the share of those who do not trust them exceeds the share of those who do by 16%. Russians lack confidence in most public institutions, including state bodies and business. Only armed forces have more than 30% trust, while parliament and civil servants record under 10%. The picture is the same for the media, with the press trusted by 8% and television by 14%, and worse for major companies, trusted by only 1%. No are international structures looked on as the answer: the EU has only 8% trust, the UN 12%.

The Transparency International 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index shows Russia as amongst the most corrupt countries, ranked 134th out of 183, corresponding with a visible increase in the levels of corruption in the last decade. Popular perception is that corruption is most common in law enforcement, healthcare and education. People also deem corruption severe in registration bodies, including those responsible for land and property regulation. The number of people paying a bribe to get a service is growing, and 63% of people believe there is little point in pursuing corrupt officials. Only a minority of CSO representatives say they have never encountered corruption within civil society. More encouragingly, the number of people who say they are prepared to help fight corruption appears to be increasing, but the level of civil society-government cooperation here is low.

## NETWORKS

Just under a third of CSOs surveyed are members of an umbrella organisation or network, a low result compared to other countries. However, those which are members value them highly: 87% consider them effective to some degree. Only just over half of CSOs regularly exchange information with others. Public and religious organisations are most commonly involved in interaction with other CSOs. The number of international CSOs involved in Russia is thought to have decreased, due to expanding internal resources, the perceived greater challenges of neighbouring countries and legal restrictions on their activities.

## RESOURCES

For most CSOs, their financial base stayed stable over a two year period, although only 4% said that their financial situation had improved. The most financially stable organisations are trade unions, religious organisations and professional and business associations. 32% of CSOs have just one source of funding, 42% have two or three and only 21% have more than four. Most organisations cite membership fees as their main funding source, but these are generally insufficient to cover project activities, and few have a diversified funding strategy. Government funds are not widely distributed. There seems to be some recent growth in philanthropy, but many CSOs do not approach the funding bodies that award grants. The main reason for this is a lack of training of CSO employees and a shortage of volunteers in fundraising. More positively, a ruling by the Russian Supreme Arbitration Court in 2011 overturned a decision to levy a 24% tax on donations from foreign foundations, thereby preventing many CSOs from bankruptcy.

CSOs in Russia tend to have a small permanent staff. 40% surveyed have no permanent employees, 28% between one and four, and 14% between five and ten. 76% use volunteers in some capacity. Organisations with the heaviest reliance on volunteers are those in the fields of philanthropy, public health and environmental protection. Business and professional organisations, unions, sports and educational organisations are generally less reliant on volunteers.

## IMPACT

CSOs representatives judge their impact highest in the areas of aid to the poor and underprivileged (36%), education (36%), social development (22%), employment (12%) and health protection (11%). However, 76% of external stakeholders assess the responsiveness of CSOs to acute social issues, such as alcoholism and drug addiction, as weak to non-existent.

48% of CSOs feel civil society's impact on political decision-making is low, and only 17% of external stakeholders rate it as significant. Only 26% of CSOs reported advocating for policy change, but 80% of those that did reported success. CSOs concerned with international issues and human rights are most likely to attempt policy change.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Centre for the Study of Civil Society and the Non-for-Profit Sector at the National Research University Higher School of Economics - <http://grans.hse.ru>

Civic Chamber of Russian Federation - [www.oprf.ru](http://www.oprf.ru)

Agency of Social Information - [www.asi.org.ru](http://www.asi.org.ru)

Lawyers for Civil Society - [www.lawcs.org](http://www.lawcs.org)

Siberian Civic Initiatives Support Centre - [www.cip.nsk.su](http://www.cip.nsk.su)

Centre for NGOs development - [www.crno.ru](http://www.crno.ru)

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthening civil society in Russia requires expanding the state's interaction with a wider range of CSOs through clear frameworks and cooperation mechanisms, legislating to improve the enabling environment for civil society and offering competitive grants lines. CSOs need to improve their networking and use modern methods for encouraging participation, promoting their work more widely, and raising awareness of best practices.



Basic facts	
Capital	Kigali
Official languages	Kinyarwanda, French, English, Kiswahili
Population	11.4m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$530

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: RWANDA

Rwanda remains marked by its still recent experience of genocide, and avoiding a return to ethnic conflict remains a preoccupation for a country which is rebuilding itself with a heavy emphasis on promoting economic growth and stability, and prioritising education and new technology. The challenge lies in the toleration of dissent and opposing voices in a system which is heavily centred on the president and ruling party. Rwandan CSOs have long since been characterised by heavy state dependency and lack of independence, and assess themselves as not having the capacity to play a strong advocacy role, being mostly limited to service delivery.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

While President Kagame undoubtedly continues to have widespread public support, the 93% of the vote he received in the 2010 election indicates a lack of political competition and a difficulty in developing credible opposition. Rwanda is often portrayed as pursuing a Singapore model of development, prioritising economic growth and technocratic management, with significant progress made in building an effective state, meeting the MDGs, tackling corruption and promoting women's empowerment, but arguably at the expense of political freedoms, such as freedom of speech and freedom of organisation. The president and government, which remains dependent on overseas aid for around 50% of its budget, have come in for increasing international criticism over the lack of space to express alternative viewpoints. January saw the handing out of severe sentences in absentia on the grounds of threatening state security to former close colleagues of the president now in exile, while there have been a number of suspicious deaths of critics of the government, such as the shooting to death of the editor of a critical website in Uganda in November. There are also occasional violations of information rights and media freedoms. In the run up to the 2010 election, an estimated 30 media houses were closed, while in March 2011 the Rwanda Media High Council released a list of allowed media organs, omitting the most controversial critics.

The issue of free speech is highly complex in Rwanda, given the experience of genocide, which means there are strict restrictions on hate speech and denial of the official narrative of genocide, and a practice of downplaying ethnic identity. 2011 saw several of the trials of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda coming to completion, which resulted in some prominent leaders of the genocide being sentenced. Rwanda has also seen widespread application of community gacaca courts as a form of transitional justice.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Score: 2.1 out of 3. Structure 1.7. Environment 2.1. Impact 1.9. Values 2.6
Interpersonal trust	High level of trust, more than 50%
CSOs network membership	20-60%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.429. Ranked 165 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: not free. Political rights score: 6. Civil liberties score: 5
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 50
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 5. Ranked 49 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.05. Percentile rank: 54.1; Rule of law: -0.31. Percentile rank: 46.0
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 81. Ranked 156 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: moderate. Score: 71 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 91. Ranked 34 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: authoritarian regime. Score: 3.25. Ranked 136 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011	Score 51.7. Ranked 25 out of 53

Civil society cooperates with government through the Rwanda Economic and Social Development Council, which also includes private sector representatives, and at a district level in the Joint Action Development Forum. However, CSOs assess their dialogue with government as moderate and limited. While around 88% of CSOs consulted believe there are few formal government restrictions on CSO activity, it is acknowledged that government keeps a close eye on civil society actions, and CSOs effectively self-police in the light of this. The government has also largely established control over the churches, as was the practice in the past. In the main, CSOs recognise these limitations, which include government power over authorisation and access to resources, and rarely attempt to influence government policy, even in areas of direct concern. Their main role essentially consists of assistance in implementing initiatives on which the government has led. There are some hopes about the potential for political decentralisation, with elected local government established for the first time, but strong question marks over the availability of resources at the local level to make it work and the adequacy of CSO organisation at this level to take advantage of this space. People at the local level lack knowledge on how to engage the administration, and tend to be mobilised by state structures rather than organise themselves. Over half of CSO representatives feel the private sector is not interested in CSO activities, and only around 7% of CSOs have a partnership with the private sector.

96% of CSOs consulted say that registration is inexpensive, 89% that there is no favouritism in registration, and 61% that it is simple. However, only 32% say registration is quick. The need to register annually is a hindrance.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The post-genocide period was characterised by an influx of CSOs engaged in activities such as rebuilding infrastructure, resettling returning populations and promoting peace and reconciliation. These were mostly international CSOs, although this period also saw a growth of women's groups at national and regional levels. Activities undertaken by women's groups include the application of gacaca mechanisms, lobbying for assistance for widows, orphans and other vulnerable groups, and providing credit for women to take part in economic activities. Post-genocide civil society is seen as more complex and diverse, encompassing cooperatives, peasant associations, informal associations and microfinance groupings, foreign and local NGOs, churches, women's and youth groups, human rights organisations, trade unions and the non-state media. Distinct organisations of survivors and widows of the genocide are also a new formation.

*“CSOs assess their dialogue with government as moderate and limited.”*

There is concern that CSOs are concentrated in urban locations, and also that most CSOs are not organised to work on the lowest levels of government, such as district and sub-district levels, with churches offering most of the local level work.

## PARTICIPATION

Only a little over one in five of people surveyed report that they regularly volunteer. There is, however, a Rwandan tradition of community service, umuganda, which means that on the last Saturday morning of each month people are expected to take part in activities that benefit the



community, such as clearing land, helping build houses or digging ditches, and this tradition remains strong in rural populations. 80% of people surveyed state that they have attended a community meeting, participated in a community-organised event or taken part in a collective community effort, with over 70% saying that they participated in several of these. However, there is some scepticism about the dependency of these actions on a coordinator to organise them.

There are also concerns about the levels of participation of women and rural populations in CSOs, and about the exclusion of rural populations in particular from CSO leadership.

## PUBLIC TRUST

The highest levels of public trust are, unusually compared to most countries, expressed in the president, the government and the armed forces. Around 75% of people have high trust in the church, and around 60% in the best known CSOs. The lowest levels of trust are in the press and major companies. Around 60% of people believe that it is naïve to trust others. There are predictably high levels of distrust between genocide survivors and those accused of crimes of genocide. There is, however, evidence that respect for the rule of law has increased, and there is widespread condemnation of anti-social acts and free riding behaviours.

*“The highest levels of public trust are, unusually compared to most countries, expressed in the president, the government and the armed forces.”*

The government has placed a particular emphasis on tackling corruption and there is evidence that this strategy is succeeding, with Rwanda moving from a ranking of 102nd out of 180 countries in the 2008 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index to 49th out of 183 in the 2011 index, with much lower levels of perceived corruption than all other East and Central African countries.

## NETWORKS

There are many civil society networks, and national level NGOs tend to join larger umbrella groups that cater to their sectors, including umbrella groups for human rights organisations and media associations, and networks for trade unions and private sector associations. Around half of CSOs are thought to be network members, and over half of CSO representatives assess networks as effective. However, inter-communication between individual CSOs is thought to be ineffective. The Rwandan Civil Society Platform was recently launched to bring together 15 umbrella groups to help address this. However, many associations, cooperatives and religious charities do not necessarily see themselves as part of civil society, and so do not take part in networks, implying that efforts are needed to sensitise them and bring them in.

## RESOURCES

There are concerns about the dependency of Rwandan CSOs on INGOs, and the influence this gives INGOs over the domestic agenda. Nine out of ten CSO representatives consulted believe that CSOs have serious financial sustainability challenges, with lack of resources contributing to high staff turnover, as seen by many CSO leaders moving into international CSOs or government positions. Only one in ten of CSOs consulted believe there is significant corporate philanthropy, and a lack of legal and regulatory framework to encourage corporate social responsibility is acknowledged.

Around 85% of people surveyed report that they contribute to charity, but it is not clear whether these contributions are monetary or take other forms.

## IMPACT

There is assessed to be a lack of CSO capacity for policy analysis and dialogue. Very few CSO representatives feel equipped to play a role in making the government more transparent and there

is very little involvement in budgeting. Most CSOs are also seen to play little role in the promotion of tolerance, this being seen viewed as the purview of government initiatives and some specialist CSOs. CSOs tend to overstate their impact on matters such as holding the state and private corporations to account. Outside of national elections, CSOs are not widely perceived as promoting democracy. An exception is seen in the form of the women's movement, which is assessed to have effectively worked with the relevant ministry and the Forum of Women Parliamentarians.

CSOs' overall strengths are seen as lying in promoting grassroots poverty reduction and in encouraging women's empowerment.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Rwanda include: instituting closer joint working between different CSOs to develop a collective voice and shared advocacy approaches to improve policy impact on government; diversifying funding strategies, including income-generating schemes, to reduce dependence on foreign funding; and strengthening CSO participation in the Joint Action Development Forum.


### FURTHER INFORMATION

Conseil de Concertation des Organisations d'Appui aux Initiatives de Base (CCOAIB) - [www.ccoaib.org.rw](http://www.ccoaib.org.rw)

Rwanda Civil Society Platform - [www.rcsprwanda.org](http://www.rcsprwanda.org)

Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LIPRODHOR) - [www.liprodhor.org](http://www.liprodhor.org)

Rwanda NGOs database - [www.rwandagateway.org/ngos](http://www.rwandagateway.org/ngos)



Basic facts	
Capital	Dakar
Official language	French
Population	12.6m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$1,042

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: SENEGAL

Senegal's 2012 presidential elections, which are heading for a run-off vote at the time of going to print, have been marred by controversy ever since the incumbent president declared an intention to serve a third term. In a bid to retain power, in June 2011 the increasingly unpopular President Wade also sought to change the constitution to lower the percentage of votes required for a first-round electoral victory from 50% to 25% and introduce a vice presidency – a role many observers believe was intended for his son. Popular protest forced the president to pull back from his plans. The run-up to the election in Senegal has provoked a spurt of civic participation from a wide cross-section of society, ranging from nonpartisan rappers driving youth vote registration to service delivery protests that united the irate middle classes, opposition forces and young people. As the only country in West Africa never to experience a coup, there remains a sense however amongst civil society that Senegal fares better than its neighbouring, less democratic countries, such as the Gambia and Mauritania.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Senegal is assessed as a country with low human development, amongst the lowest 40 on the 2011 UN Human Development Index. Over 40% of the Senegalese population lives on less than US\$2 a day and about the same number is illiterate. Socio-economic inequality is serious and unemployment remains high.

Genuine party political competition is lacking, with most parties dormant and voters identifying on personal and geographical lines, rather than on the basis of party manifestoes. Public powers tend to see CSOs as part of political opposition forces, while opposition parties often fear CSOs becoming competitors. The approach to the presidential elections made for a more tense atmosphere in this relatively stable country. For example, at time of writing a leading opposition figure is on a murder charge after video footage caught him allegedly firing on Wade supporters attacking the town hall in his district in December.

In the Casamance region there are restrictions on political freedom due to the low level conflict between the state and an independence movement that has been taking place for almost 30 years. In December 2011, after a period of relative calm, Senegalese soldiers were attacked and 16 people killed by rebel forces. This spike in violence, which continued into 2012, was attributed to the upcoming elections.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 1.67 out of 3. Structure 1.47. Environment 1.17. Values 1.93. Impact 2.1
Interpersonal trust	10-30%
CSOs network membership	Less than 30%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.459. Ranked 155 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 2.9. Ranked 112 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.51. Percentile rank: 37.3. Rule of law: -0.41. Percentile rank: 41.7
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 26. Ranked 75 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2006	Status: weak
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 85 out of 177
Democracy Index, EIU 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.51. Ranked 93 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011	Score 57.5. Ranked 15 out of 53

Although the Senegalese press is assessed as having the best infrastructure in Francophone Africa, investigative journalists can face trials because of stories they have covered, newsrooms have been vandalised and threats of financial asphyxiation have tended to foster a certain amount of self-censorship. In 2011 an editor of a reputable weekly was charged with criminal defamation for reporting on state corruption, and employees of the national radio and television stations demonstrated against the stations' lack of impartiality and pro-government stance. The right to freedom of association came under threat in July, when President Wade banned political demonstrations in central Dakar in response to protests demanding his resignation. Freedom House ranks Senegal as 'partly free'.

Most CSOs believe the state only communicates with a small number of CSOs, and on an ad hoc basis. 61% of CSO representatives consulted believe the state has a significant level of control over civil society, with state inspections of civil society long and hard to pass. Even though the legal framework is assessed as better than that in many neighbouring countries, 61% of CSOs consulted consider the registration system as slow and complex, and a third believe it is discriminatory. The tax regime is also not supportive.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

When considered according to their level of influence, national media, unions and professional networks, religious groups and national and international NGOs are assessed by CSOs as the most influential parts of civil society, while family and clan groupings, credit unions and village committees, and youth, women and disability organisations are assessed as less influential. Other civil society actors, positioned somewhere in between these two clusters, include radio commentators, local NGOs and CBOs, farmers' organisations, diaspora organisations, and universities and academic experts. Senegal is a predominately Muslim country and Muslim leaders are a key social force. Religious groups and the media are seen as having the best access to state institutions, while bilateral and multilateral funders are influential over CSOs.

Most formal Senegalese CSOs are based in the urban centres of Dakar, Saint Louis and Thiès. Recent years have seen a trend by many ethnic and religious CSOs to modernise and adapt to the legal system, and use the media and new technologies to bring their supporters together. As a result, previous differences between formal and traditional CSOs have diminished drastically.

## PARTICIPATION

There is a notable level of individual activism in Senegal, with two thirds of people surveyed reporting they have written a letter to a newspaper, signed a petition, or taken part in a demonstration or march. Membership of CSOs, at just under half of people, is also high when compared to other countries, and 38% of CSO members belong to at least two CSOs. However, while Senegal has one of the highest levels of volunteering in sub-Saharan Africa, at 81% of the sample, only 16% volunteer with CSOs, indicating a high level of non-formal activity. Further, 76% of people surveyed have taken part in a collective community action, such as a community meeting or an action organised to solve a community problem.

On the whole, people feel free to take part in political activity without retaliation. There is a high level of comment on political events in Senegal, but political participation outside elections tends to



be low, and mobilisation tends to be stronger on religious issues than those concerning democracy and citizenship, begging the question of the extent to which participation in religious structures serves more broad-based and progressive causes. However, 2011 saw new forms of mobilisation: born out of frustration with frequent power cuts, poverty and high levels of unemployment, several popular rappers and activists used Facebook, YouTube and rap music to catalyse action as part of the ‘Y'en a marre (“We’re fed up” or “enough is enough”) movement’. This working-class, secular youth movement has since January 2011 been driving voter registration while explicitly refusing to support any particular political party, despite which one of the movement’s founders was arrested and questioned after speaking at a rally. The spontaneous riots that broke out in Dakar on 23 June after President Wade announced his plan to change the constitution marked the start of what became known as the June 23 movement (M23). Since then, sporadic protests and anti-Wade demonstrations have taken place in major cities.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Unusually, the section of society which receives the highest level of trust is the armed forces, with 71% trust, suggesting their role would be pivotal in any future unrest. Trust in religious groups stands at 67%, and in CSOs in general at 66%. Only 41% of people trust political parties. 29% of people have no trust at all in political parties or leaders, and 26% no trust in central government. 83% of interviewees consider CSOs to be more efficient than the state.

Substantial corruption in the public sector, with Senegal’s gradual descent in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, from 85th out of 180 countries in 2008 to 122nd out of 183 in 2011, has led many to consider the state as incompetent and unreceptive. Judicial and private sector corruption are concerns alongside government corruption. Corruption is also present within CSOs, with two thirds of CSO representatives consulted believing civil society corruption to be frequent or very frequent, while financial transparency is largely absent.

## NETWORKS

Many CSO representatives believe support structures and networks for civil society are insufficient and cover only a minority of organisations, with 13% of CSOs consulted assessing them as non-existent and 60% as limited, while only 43% rate networks as efficient. There is a strong tendency towards participation in international networks, but communication between CSOs is considered as only moderate, low or very low by almost 79% of those consulted.

*“Many CSO representatives believe support structures and networks for civil society are insufficient.”*

The principal CSO network is CONGAD - Council of NGOs working in support of Development, and its members are active in areas such as healthcare, education and water. Even though there are many examples of inter-sectoral cooperation – for instance between the CNES (National Confederation of Employers of Senegal) and the CSO Forum Civil as part of the ARMP (Agency for the Regulation of Public Contracts) – these are insufficient. Another significant structure is the Non-State Actors’ Platform, comprising CSOs, trade unions and employers’ organisations. Its 2010-2014 strategic plan aims, among other things, to strengthen non-state actors’ participation in political, social, economic and cultural dialogue and in the definition, monitoring and evaluation of development policies and strategies.

Quite often a lack of cooperation between CSOs is prompted by competition for funding and the weakness of the intellectual property regime in Senegal. Another reason is strong sub-sectoral differences and consequent distrust between types of CSOs (for example between NGOs and Muslim brotherhoods) which means it is difficult for different civil society actors to understand each other and work together.

## RESOURCES

This situation is one of weak technological and infrastructural resources, while a third of CSOs consulted report serious funding problems, and only a third feel that they have a suitable level of resources for their ambitions. Donor funded CSOs (mainly NGOs, compared to unions, which are supported more by membership fees) particularly fear lack of funds. Donors tend to prefer to give large grants to a small range of organisations that they feel are able to manage them efficiently, with smaller CSOs seeking lower amounts of funding particularly challenged. Financial support from the state is viewed as limited and partial, and there is little culture of corporate social responsibility. More than half of CSOs receive at least 10% of their income from membership fees and around 21% receive 10% of their income from service fees.

86% of people surveyed report giving to charity in the past year, which can include non-monetary donations such as food and clothes. Much of this giving is likely to be to religious causes, but it is difficult to obtain information on this. A further question is the extent to which non-religious CSOs might be able to benefit from such giving.

## IMPACT

CSOs assess themselves to be active, while acknowledging that their impact on government accountability and the promotion of democracy remains limited to weak. 62% of CSO representatives consulted believe they have limited impact on holding the state to account. Most believe that CSOs have limited or no impact on policies, and 57% that their public campaigns have little success. CSOs have great difficulties in scaling up, they operate mostly at the level of local or experimental projects, and they assess themselves as not good at developing alternative solutions to existing models.

CSOs are assessed as having far greater social impact than political impact. 75% of the public consulted say that CSOs have specifically helped poor people within the community to improve their living conditions. Success stories advanced include work with people with disabilities, pro-poor programmes in the agricultural and rural development field and programmes supporting people made homeless during the Casamance conflict. 74% of people judge that CSOs have helped women to improve their living conditions, while 73% consider CSOs active and successful in creating or supporting employment schemes and income generating actions, particularly for women and poor people.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

Forum Civil - [www.forumcivil.sn](http://www.forumcivil.sn)

CONGAD - Conseil des ONG d'Appui au Développement - [www.congad.sn](http://www.congad.sn)

Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux - [www.cncr.org](http://www.cncr.org)

Rural Foundation for West Africa - [www.frao.info](http://www.frao.info)

Recontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme - [www.raddho.org](http://www.raddho.org)

## RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the context for civil society in Senegal, efforts should be increased to advocate that the government adheres to the constitution and the international human rights standards to which it has subscribed, and improve and apply freedom of expression laws. Senegalese civil society should apply a working code of conduct, involve members more in making major decisions and be more inclusive of women, young people, rural populations and vulnerable groups such as people with disabilities. CSOs should also prioritise efforts to tackle corruption.



Basic facts	
Capital	Ljubljana
Official language	Slovenian
Population	2.0m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$2,285

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: SLOVENIA

With limited resources and low levels of professionalism, CSOs in Slovenia are often caught in the illusion of inclusion: CSOs are sometimes included in consultations, but these tend to come largely as a formality, particularly given weak CSO capacities to engage meaningfully and the strong, hierarchic and bureaucratic role of the state, which combine to fuel a dominant narrative of CSO weakness and ineffectualness. Cooperation between the government and civil society has not progressed, and this now constitutes a serious barrier against the further development of the sector. Without more spaces and resources, civil society will not grow and mature beyond its present marginalised, circumscribed role. The recent impact of the economic crisis on Slovenian politics makes the situation more volatile.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Compared to other former Yugoslavian countries, Slovenia was considered to have achieved economic and political stability, and to have established a pattern of regular and fair elections. However, in 2011 Slovenia experienced political crisis for the first time since independence. Months of disagreements on proposed pension and social benefit cuts in response to economic downturn led to a vote of no confidence in, and collapse of, the government, with the holding of parliamentary elections on 4 December leading to a newly formed centre-left party winning the largest number of seats. Economic crisis saw the country's debt as a proportion of GDP rise from 22% in 2008 to 45% in 2010, a rate of increase second only to Ireland, while unemployment doubled to 12% and some major companies became insolvent.

Since independence the most influential actors in Slovenian society have been the main political parties, both of ruling coalition governments and opposition. The power of the business community is also acknowledged, as it is able to use its influence to lobby for its interests and shape public opinion through the media.

Government often does not adhere to its own published minimum standards on public participation in the drafting of legislation. Both employers' and trade union associations serve on the tripartite Economic and Social Council, established in 1994, but few recent efforts have been made to develop a systematic framework for dialogue with civil society. There are examples of the government inviting CSOs from particular fields into working groups, for example on drugs or youth

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 51.1. Civic Engagement: 46.6; Level of Organisation: 60.2; Practice of Values: 42.3; Perception of Impact: 32.5; External Environment: 73.8. Ranked 17 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	18.1%
CSOs network membership	69.2%
Policy activity	63.3%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.884. Ranked 21 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 5.9. Ranked 35 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +1.03. Percentile rank: 81.3. Rule of law: +1.02. Percentile rank: 82.5
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 9.14. Ranked 36 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 31. Ranked 156 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 7.76. Ranked: 30 out of 167

policies, but consultation tends to be perceived as a box ticking exercise. One recent exception was a joint CSO memorandum on the financial crisis and civil society's role in overcoming it, with the government's action of forming a cross-departmental group to respond to the memorandum perhaps offering a new example of how collaboration with government could be fostered.

A series of different laws define and regulate different kinds of CSOs: associations, private institutes, foundations, cooperatives and religious communities and organisations, with separate legislation also covering professional chambers, trade unions and political parties. Slovenia's laws on freedom of association and organisation are assessed as being free and democratic, and yet this does not result in a strong enabling environment for civil society. 28% of CSOs surveyed report they have faced illegitimate restriction by local or central government, and around 30% consider the environment for civil society quite limiting. Almost half of CSO representatives believe the state exerts a great influence on civil society.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The number of CSOs increased from 11,000 in 1990 to over 28,000 in 2009. There is, however, some confusion over terminology, with governments tending to refer to the non-governmental sector rather than civil society, while many of those who work in the sector prefer to describe themselves as associations rather than NGOs, with the latter having negative connotations of fund-seeking. During the communist past and following liberalisation in 1974, associations were the only permissible type of formation, and around 75% of all CSOs are classed as associations, but this is down from 95% in 1996. These are defined broadly as membership-based organisations in pursuit of common interests; there is no requirement that they pursue broad public interests. A burgeoning of alternative social movements in the 1980s consolidated themselves into parties and political contestation in the 1990s. In addition, trade unions now make up 12% of all CSOs, private institutes 6% and religious organisations 4%. Over 80% of CSOs surveyed report that they are membership-based.

The distribution of CSO orientations is largely carried over from the communist period, with around 28% of CSOs being sports and recreation oriented, 13% focussing on culture, 10% on business, professions and housing and 9% on social protection. CSOs focused on advocacy and law make up just 1% of the total.

The most influential CSOs are those associated with religion, and trade unions and the employers' association, given their long acknowledged social partnership role. Others with less power but with well-established funding bases include organisations for people with disabilities and students' organisations, while humanitarian, environmental and advocacy CSOs are seen to have little power.

## PARTICIPATION

One third of Slovenians are active members of a socially-oriented CSO, with sports and recreation groups (18%) and religious organisations (12%) having the largest membership. Around two thirds of the public take part in social activities with sports clubs or other voluntary organisations at least once a month. The figure for active political membership is lower, at around one in five people, with the largest membership being of trade unions. Almost one in three people take parts in individual acts of activism, such as signing a petition or joining a peaceful demonstration.



Volunteering is on the increase, following efforts to improve the regulatory framework for volunteering and the passing of a law on volunteering, co-drafted by CSOs, in 2011, which built on financial support from the government to promote voluntary work in 2009. The law stipulates the formal rights of volunteers, and the obligations of authorities and CSOs. However, there is a lack of accurate monitoring of volunteering levels, which is part of a broader lack of recognition and acknowledgement of the contribution of volunteering. Most volunteers contribute around ten hours a month, and it is estimated that the total voluntary hours committed to CSOs amount to the equivalent of over 7,000 full time CSO employees.

*“Volunteering is on the increase, following efforts to improve the regulatory framework for volunteering and the passing of a law on volunteering.”*

## PUBLIC TRUST

Low levels of social capital offer a challenge. The highest levels of intolerance are expressed towards Roma people (39% of people are intolerant), gay people (35%) and people with HIV/AIDS (31%). Civil society is also characterised by low levels of public trust. Only 9% of people trust political parties, while the church, unions and environmental, charitable, humanitarian and women’s organisations have the confidence of around 40% of citizens, low compared to other countries.

Corruption, however, compares favourably to other former Yugoslavian countries, assessed at 35th out of 183 countries on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. There is no consensus about corruption in civil society, but there are concerns about an apparent culture of silence on the issue.

## NETWORKS

Civil society networks are seen to have low, but growing, influence, with almost 70% of CSOs being members of networks. Networking structures and regional hubs are largely facilitated by EU policies and funds. However, there is concern about competition between networks and members, and lack of consensus about who can legitimately represent civil society. Poor communication channels and limited relationships between networks and grassroots organisations are seen to be factors here. More positively, eight out of ten CSOs meet with other organisations, with the average number of meetings being ten in a three month period. A little under half of Slovenian CSOs report that they are members of European level networks.

## RESOURCES

Funding competition between CSOs is assessed as a barrier to further cooperation. CSOs also lack substantial government support. While this means they are relatively independent from the state, the continual struggle for grants awarded through public tenders and the modest donations CSOs receive considerably hinders their ability to operate. Only around 13% of Slovenian CSOs have a permanent, remunerated workforce, with civil society being heavily dependent on voluntary effort, and struggling to challenge perceptions of CSOs as entirely voluntary organisations. Altogether, CSOs provide less than 1% of the total workforce of Slovenia, one of the lowest rates globally. Unstable funding and lack of belief in the possibility for career progression within civil society are seen to be drivers behind the connected challenge of staff turnover.

*“There is concern about competition between CSO networks and members, and lack of consensus about who can legitimately represent civil society.”*

While the number of CSOs multiplied by 2.3 between 1996 and 2008, CSO income as a share of GDP only grew from 1.92% to 19.9%, implying a shrinking of resources available to each CSO. Further, there has been little change in the sources of CSO funding since 1996. Membership fees, service fees and income from sales of products account for 47% of CSO income, compared to 27% from public sources and 19% from private and individual donations. Almost all CSOs report an increased

workload and number of projects, but only around 40% received any corresponding increase in public funds, and over 60% feel their organisation's work has increased out of proportion to the availability of funding. Funding is also heavily project-based. Tax legislation is also felt to be inadequate.

## IMPACT

Both CSO representatives and external stakeholders perceive civil society's impact on the pressing events of the day to be low. Only about a quarter of CSO representatives believe CSOs can make an impact on crime prevention, and only about one in five on economic stability. A challenge is that in the current make-up of civil society, few organisations are working on these topical issues. However, around half of CSO representatives believe they achieve impact on key social issues of education and supporting poor and marginalised communities. Compared to this, almost 70% of CSO representatives believe their policy impact is limited. Only one in five CSOs which had attempted policy advocacy reported that their efforts had met with success. This suggests that there are systemic barriers to advocacy towards government.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to improve civil society in Slovenia include: encouraging links between CSOs and academia, to enhance the capacity of CSOs; establishing uniform criteria that define acting in the public interest as part of more enabling civil society legislation; creating an NGO fund to provide co-financing; and improving the tax legislation to encourage giving.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Legal and Information Centre for NGOs - [www.pic.si](http://www.pic.si)

Social Protection Institute of the Republic of Slovenia - [www.irssv.si](http://www.irssv.si)

CNVOS – Centre for Information Service, Co-operation and Development of NGOs - [www.cnvos.si](http://www.cnvos.si)

Slovenian Platform for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid - [www.sloga-platform.org](http://www.sloga-platform.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Dodoma
Official languages	Swahili, English
Population	42.7m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$527

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: TANZANIA

Tanzania's civil society movement has the potential to play a more significant role in national policy processes. The weakening of the state's ability to deliver services, and the retreat of the state from one party rule in the 1990s led to an unprecedented mushrooming of CSOs. Issues that have persistently confronted the operation of CSOs since then include questions of their legitimacy, accountability and what they stand for, and their relationships with the state, with a persistent lack of an enabling legal and political environment.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society's assessment is that multilateral and bilateral donors are the most powerful actors in setting and influencing the public policy agenda. Second, but much less influential are multinational and transnational corporations, followed by local business tycoons and the similarly wealthy politicians who command the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), which has been in power since independence, followed then by the government's coercive machinery, the media and, least influential, civil society.

Tanzania has a low level of human development, ranked 152 out of 187 countries on the 2011 UN Human Development Index, and while Tanzania has East Africa's second biggest economy, with a steady economic growth rate of an average around 7% since 2001 according to World Bank statistics, one in every third person remains below the national poverty line. Recent times have seen rising dissatisfaction at increasing commodity prices, including fuel prices, and power rationing. Responses have included doctors' strikes and unrest in universities

In the 2010 election, incumbent President Kikwete stayed in power with an overwhelming 61% of votes cast, but the vote saw a low turnout of only 43%, and observers' reports cited irregularities such as vote rigging, manipulation and electoral process corruption. Though there is provision for separation of powers between legislature, judiciary and executive, there are concerns that the executive is overbearingly powerful and still enjoys some of the structural advantages left over from the single party regime, given that the transition to multi-party competition was a top-down process resulting in limited institutional change. Tanzania is therefore considered to be 'partly free' in Freedom House indicators for political freedoms and civil liberties. There are also a number of restrictions on the labour movement, which has a contested relationship with the state, and

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 1.67 out of 3. Structure 1.84. Environment 1.68. Values 2.01. Impact 1.57
Interpersonal trust	31-50%
CSOs network membership	30-50%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.466. Ranked 152 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3. Ranked 100 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.5. Percentile rank: 37.8. Rule of law: -0.51. Percentile rank: 36.5
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 6. Ranked 34 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: very weak. Ranked 59 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 81. Ranked 65 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.64. Ranked 90 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2011	Score 58.1. Ranked 13 out of 53

more so in the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which have their own president and parliament. Both on the mainland and islands, workers are legally prohibited from striking, leaving them without a mechanism to articulate dissent. In January 2011, three protesters were killed and several injured during a demonstration in Arusha over flouted mayoral election procedures, and in November a further demonstration was banned. The president also has the right to ban publications.

The process toward a new constitution is generating controversy. In April 2011 parliament rejected the Constitutional Amendment Bill, with a new bill passed in November 2011. The main opposition, together with civil society groups, coordinated by Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania, the University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Assembly and the Tanganyika Law Society are opposed to the bill, citing deficits such as violation of the current constitution, denial of opportunities for public debate and the flouting of parliamentary procedure. Jukwaa la Katiba Tanzania has resolved to initiate a parallel process, while Tanganyika Law Society has declared a legal pursuit to stop the official process.

Space for civil society engagement with government is accordingly limited. In 2010 civil society representatives were invited by government to participate in the review of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. Previously, CSOs were selectively invited to take part in reviewing policy reforms such as Local Government Reform Programme, Legal Sector

Reform Programme, Public Service Management Reform Programme and Public Finance Reform Programme. Civil society is acknowledged in general terms in the 1984 Bill of Rights, while other more recent texts include the 2003 National Social Security Policy, which states that the government should provide an enabling environment for civil society, the 2002 Water Policy, which mandates the formation of water users' associations, and the 2003 Fisheries Policy, which stipulates a role for grassroots structures in environmental management. However, no formal institutional framework to manage and sustain partnership exists. 41% of CSOs consulted characterised relations with the state as limited and a further 49% as moderate.

There is currently no law that encompasses all CSOs in Tanzania, given the range of their roles and modes of operation, and varied membership. The NGO Act (2002) is currently the national level instrument governing registered NGOs, but it does not cover trade unions, social clubs, sports clubs, political parties, religious organisations or CBOs, which are governed by laws such as the Societies Act (2002) and Cooperative Societies Act (2003). This multiplicity of laws is a source of confusion. 57% of CSOs consulted believe CSO registration is too slow and 42% said that they were subject to unfair restrictions by government. There are examples of the government prohibiting CSOs which raise controversial issues, while the laws prohibit CSOs from engaging in politics and partisanship, without clearly defining these terms. Meanwhile the laws regulating charitable giving, such as the Game Act (2008), Income Tax Act (2006) and Public Order Act (2002), only give tax exemption to religious organisations. Any donation made by the corporate sector is subject to taxation unless it is donated to a local government or religious organisation.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Tanzania is thought to have a large civil society compared to other developing countries, occupying an estimated 2% of the economically active population. Cooperatives, faith-based organisations, community-based organisations and informal grassroots organisations dominate the sector, while



independent media plays an important role. Issue-based groups include those of people with disabilities and older people, and gender-based groups, while key areas of focus include poverty, HIV/AIDS, education and health. Recently, social auditing for government public accountability has become a popular function of CSOs in Tanzania, with CSOs engaged in such activities as budget monitoring, public expenditure tracking surveys, public service delivery assessments and corruption perception surveys, which have provided essential stimulus to CSO advocacy activities.

Clan-based groups, women's informal credit systems, recreation and self-help groups and neighbourhood prayer groups constitute the main parts of informal civil society. By informal is implied the groups' lack of formal registration rather than their mode of operation, since many groups have an agreed objective, structure and administration procedures.

Civil society in Zanzibar and Pemba is weaker organisationally, while efforts at East African regional integration of civil society to correspond with renewed political emphasis on the East Africa Community are mostly led by Kenyan CSOs.

## PARTICIPATION

52% of people surveyed are members of at least one CSO. Farmers' and fishers' groups and cooperatives, and conservation and sports associations offer popular platforms for participation. Further, 90% of those surveyed are involved in savings or credit societies. Multiple membership and cross-membership of both formal and informal groups is common. Membership and volunteering is assessed as highest within informal unregistered groups.

## PUBLIC TRUST

According to the World Values Survey, people report high confidence in religious institutions, the press, labour unions, the government and the women's movement. In the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index Tanzania ranked joint 100th out of 182 countries. Large scale corruption has come to light in procurement in the energy sector and the Central Bank, while a 2010 judgment in the UK found British arms company BAE Systems guilty of bribing Tanzanian decision-makers to secure a weapons deal. The police, health sector, judiciary, energy sector and licensing and revenue services are assessed as particularly corrupt. 29% of CSO representatives consulted state that they see occasional corruption in civil society, 27% see frequent corruption and 23% see very frequent. There is a low level of CSO involvement in anti-corruption campaigns: under 40 CSOs are involved in the Publish What You Pay campaign for extractive industries revenue transparency.

## NETWORKS

There are assessed to be at least 228 networks, 59% defined by specific themes, with the rest more general. At least 170 networks are specific to districts of Tanzania, while there are 25 sub-national and 33 national networks. Some of the key networks that have formed have focused on election monitoring and civic education. During the 2010 general elections, 17 national CSOs formed the Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation, which conducted independent observation of elections along with the Tanzanian Election Monitoring Committee. Key umbrella bodies include the Tanzania Association of NGOs and the National NGO Council.

Almost half of CSOs consulted take part in African level networks, and 42% network beyond the continent. The East Africa Law Society, Federation of East Africa Trade Unions, Trade Mark East Africa and the East Africa Bribery Index are amongst the significant regional networks. However, only 24% of CSO representatives consider civil society umbrella bodies as generally effective, while 52% consider them partly effective or ineffective. Only 19% feel that there is a significant level of communication across CSOs.

## RESOURCES

Around 40% of Tanzania's national budget depends on support from donors, and many CSOs have critical donor dependency. A survey conducted by the Foundation for Civil Society in 2008 showed that 81% of national networks and 78% of regional networks are highly dependent on donors. Overbearing donor dependence has the potential to compromise CSOs' autonomy. It also implies competition for resources with government.

50% of CSOs consulted believe resources to be inadequate compared to 33% who find them adequate, while 44% consider their human resources adequate compared to 30% who rate them inadequate. Most CSOs have five employees or fewer.

59% of people surveyed state that they had donated to charitable causes within the last year. However, charitable giving practices in Tanzania are influenced by local politics and the regulatory framework, with the income tax law a key restraining factor. Charitable giving is more an informal than formal practice. In rural and semi-urban areas, many informal civil society groups donate materials or money to support social needs such as burial, harvest and marriage ceremonies.

## IMPACT

Civil society is perceived as being quite active on social policy issues, but its impact is limited by organisational and capacity constraints. Civil society is perceived as having success in influencing gender rights and human rights, with less influence on transparency, one of Tanzania's major challenges.

External stakeholders mostly see civil society as active in directly meeting pressing social needs through service delivery and promotion of self-help initiatives. The sector's highest visibility is in the provision of social service and financial facilities. For example, the non-governmental sector provides more hospitals than the government. Of people surveyed, 50% believe CSOs are better at providing a service than government, compared to 37% who preferred government.

Policy gains due to CSO lobbying activities are evident in the sectors of water supply, education and health provision, legal services and HIV/AIDS related services. National and regional-based organisations, such as the National Coalition for People Living with HIV and AIDS, have been able to advance their needs for incorporation in the 2010 National HIV and AIDS Policy. Between 2006 and 2009 the Media Council of Tanzania successfully mobilised the public to block a second government attempt to introduce a law widely regarded as inhibiting freedom of information. Further, the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania succeeded in mobilising workers in 2010 to demand pay increases, and improved work conditions. Negotiations with the government are continuing.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Tanzanian civil society requires a comprehensive capacity and needs assessment, accompanied by a capacity building programme for informal and unregistered groups. There is a pressing need to develop a more enabling national constitution, amend laws that constrain basic rights and freedoms and establish a harmonised policy, legal and regulatory environment for civil society. There should be more civil society networking to establish stronger platforms for advocacy, underpinned by a coherent national CSO code of conduct. There is also a need to heighten civic education and make a concerted attack on corruption.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Tanzania Association of NGOs - [www.tango.or.tz](http://www.tango.or.tz)

ForDIA – [www.fordia.org](http://www.fordia.org)

National NGO Council - [www.nacongo.or.tz](http://www.nacongo.or.tz)

Foundation for Civil Society - [www.thefoundation.or.tz](http://www.thefoundation.or.tz)



Basic facts	
Capital	Ankara
Official language	Turkish
Population	78.8m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$10,094

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: TURKEY

Civil society in Turkey can be characterised as being in transition, but with more weaknesses than strengths, and with its pace of development somewhat stalled after some positive developments in the early 2000s. Many CSOs are functioning with insufficient levels of institutionalisation, problematic governance structures, and insufficient resources and relationships. The picture is also one of marked regional differences within Turkey, including in levels of participation, organisational capacities, resources and international relations.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Turkey is now placed among the top 20 economies of the world. Its economy continues to grow and it appears to have weathered the economic crisis better than many other countries. Its GDP growth rate in 2010 was 8.2% according to World Bank data, one of the highest in the world. Yet while economic growth offers an opportunity for the development of philanthropy, Turkey also has by far the lowest employment rate of OECD members, with unemployment reported at 9.3% at the end of 2011, while poverty has increased to around 18%. Inequality is a challenge, suggesting the benefits of growth are not being distributed: the income gap is rising, with the wealthiest 10% having 14 times the income of the poorest 10%.

The most influential actors in Turkish society include those highly connected with religion, both at family and state level. The divide between secular and Islamic discourse is becoming sharper, and secular elites which traditionally encompassed state bureaucrats, media, larger corporations and army are giving way to religious social groups, with the rise of a middle class with an economically liberal but socially Islamic identity. Shifts between secular and Islamic discourse have also seen the ruling AK Party, which has its roots in Islam, consolidating power, and the military's formerly revered place in Turkish society diminishing. Due to a strong central state tradition the prime minister and main governmental bodies also have a significant role, while the business community has a strong voice, manifesting support both for the ruling party and opposition parties. The media are positioned closer to the private sector, rather than under strong governmental influence.

The 2011 election saw incumbent prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remain in power for an unprecedented third term with an increased vote, but with seats just short of giving the AK Party the ability to propose a referendum on

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 46.5. Civic Engagement: 31.4; Level of Organisation: 54.6; Practice of Values: 48.98; Perception of Impact: 40.2; External Environment: 57.6. Ranked 29 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	4.8%
CSOs network membership	41.1%
Policy activity	50.4%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.699. Ranked 92 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 3
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 45
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 4.2. Ranked 61 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.35. Percentile rank: 66.0. Rule of law: +0.1. Percentile rank: 58.3
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 70. Ranked 148 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2010	Status: weak. Score: 68 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 104 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.73. Ranked 88 out of 167

constitutional changes. The election result further consolidated the power of central government and space for opposition has diminished. Erdogan enjoyed immense popularity in the Arab World in 2011, particularly in states in transition, not least for taking a stance against the discredited Syrian government.

The main accelerator of democratic reforms, the EU accession process, has slowed down as a result of economic crisis and the unresolved Cyprus conflict. EU membership remains a long-term political goal, and movement towards this has entailed the acceptance of the Copenhagen Criteria, which contains the key EU rules on institutions to guarantee democracy, human rights, rule of law and minority rights, amongst others. This had the effect, as in other EU candidate countries, of significantly expanding space for civil society freedoms through constitutional amendments and legal reforms between 2001 and 2005, although EU support is not yet felt to have strengthened CSO capacity. In addition, there were changes in legislation directly concerning CSOs, and some progress on government-civil society dialogue. For example, the law on foundations, introduced in 2008, means that many activities which previously required approval, such as international partnerships, now require reporting only, and there is now an elected Council on Foundations. Not to be underestimated also is the important role of the European Convention on Human Rights in entrenching human rights standards.

However, civil society's expectations of new laws and participatory mechanisms have not been fully met, and some provisions have not been entirely implemented, while taxation laws to support philanthropy remain limited. There are problems more in the implementation of laws related to freedom of association and expression than the laws themselves, and this recent experience of frustrated expectations has weakened civil society-government relations. 26% of CSOs surveyed have experienced illegitimate interference by central or local government. The majority, 69%, believe that the state engages with a selective group of CSOs on a need-only basis, and only 13% believe civil society is fully autonomous from the state. The government has introduced genuine reforms, but its intolerance of criticism has been proved by arrests of opposing journalists and politicians, and heavy application of anti-terror laws established in the context of the conflict between the state and Kurdish separatists, such that many people are questioning whether the government is promoting democracy or its own perpetuation in power.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

There is no legal structure that unifies CSOs in Turkey. Instead CSOs tend to be structured as either associations or foundations. Associations are defined as membership-based and foundations as endowment-based, although restrictions on membership were abolished by a constitutional court decision in 2008. Associations and foundations are subject to different legislation and regulated by different public agencies, yet they show great and converging similarity in their functions.

There are estimated to be 90,578 CSOs (4,547 foundations and 86,031 associations), and the number rises above 150,000 when trade unions, professional chambers and cooperatives are included. There are estimated to be over 58,000 cooperatives. Yet these numbers are quite low for an estimated population of over 72 million, with one CSO for every 780 people.

CSOs tend to be most active in the areas of social services and solidarity, with advocacy and policy oriented activities less common. Around 65% of associations work on delivering social services



and fostering solidarity. Foundations have a similar tendency toward social aid (56%), education (48%) and health (22%) as their most common areas of activity. Only around 1% of CSOs carry out activities that can be classified as addressing democracy, law and human rights. There has however been a notable recent increase of activity and visibility among advocacy oriented CSOs in areas such as women's rights, human rights, consumer protection and student and youth issues, and in addressing two key identity political issues, the status of the Kurdish minority and the secular/ Islamic divide.

## PARTICIPATION

People's participation is narrow and deep in nature, with a small group participating very actively and intensively, and many who are members of one CSO being members of at least one other, but distinct social groups such as young people, women and ethnic minorities are under-represented in CSOs. Low levels of membership, volunteering, political activism and community engagement suggest that most Turkish citizens are disconnected from civil society. Only around 5% of people report being an active member of a CSO, with volunteering levels lower still, at around 3-4% depending on organisation type. Most volunteering is shallow: about half of volunteers commit one to four hours a week, and only 23% commit more than nine hours. The percentage of the population that report undertaking individual political activism in the past five years, such as signing a petition or attending peaceful demonstrations, is only 12%.

There are striking differences in participation levels between Turkey's seven regions. Data show a direct correlation between association membership and population density and urbanisation levels, with social participation and individual activism being disproportionately high in Istanbul, the largest city. Only 16% of association members and 14% of CSO board members are women, and women's membership in associations appears to be decreasing, having stood at 22% in 2005. Young people have higher than average levels of social participation, while people from ethnic minorities tend to have higher levels of individual political activism, suggesting that conventional CSOs are not offering adequate vehicle for such groups.

## PUBLIC TRUST

There is a general level of trust of 51% in CSOs. This is higher for religious organisations (71%) and lower for political parties (33%). Over half the population express trust in unions, environmental organisations, women's groups and charitable and humanitarian organisations.

Turkey stands 61st out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, close in ranking to other EU candidate countries. Around 30% of CSOs surveyed believe that corruption in CSOs is either frequent or very frequent.

## NETWORKS

Only 41% of CSOs surveyed report being part of a network. There has however been a growth in CSO federations and confederations, with the number of federations having increased by an estimated 60% and confederations by 100% since 2005, suggesting new opportunities to network. Moreover, 83% of CSOs surveyed had met and 75% exchanged information with other CSOs in a three month period, with CSOs typically contacting between one and five other CSOs. However, under half of CSOs have regular contact with over five CSOs, and some have no contact at all. CSOs can therefore be understood as functioning rather disconnectedly and independently.

Only 28% of CSOs surveyed report being a member of an international network, while 42% exchange information with international CSOs. Very few have consultative status with UN or EU bodies. International relations may shift following changes in the law that make it easier to receive foreign funding, but remain hampered by language constraints and bureaucratic visa processes.

*“There is no legal structure that unifies CSOs in Turkey.”*

EU funding is assessed to have improved connections with EU-based CSOs, but is critiqued for providing opportunities mostly for CSOs which already have relatively developed capacity.

## RESOURCES

*“CSOs are functioning rather disconnectedly and independently.”*

Most CSOs function with very limited funds, and place financial resources at the top of their most pressing needs, with 79% of CSOs assessing their finances as insufficient. 97% of CSOs surveyed describe the range of CSOs that receive government financial support as limited or very limited. There is also unease about potential dependency on EU funding. Around 45% of CSOs report annual incomes of under 10,000 Turkish Lira (under US\$5,500), and 16% under 2,000 TL. 57% of CSOs do not have paid staff, with six to 20 volunteers on average per CSO. Foundations have much greater annual incomes than associations, and this is reflected in the fact that 37% of foundations have paid staff compared to under 1% of associations.

CSOs therefore channel much of their efforts into fundraising. There is some diversity in funding sources, which include membership fees (34%), foreign donors (18%), individual (18%) and corporate (8%) donations, government funding (8%) and income generation activities (5%). However, given the size of the population, individual giving of 8% to CSOs can be regarded as low. Corporate giving is erratic, generally available to a select group of CSOs, and on an ad hoc basis linked to PR objectives. Project-oriented funding methods are criticised, with many staff dependent on project-based funding. Many CSOs are now seeking EU partnership, but there is acknowledgement that this is based largely on a desire to access the grants available, and so long term relationships are lacking, and there are examples of CSOs designing projects to qualify for grants.

## IMPACT

Civil society was visible in giving and volunteering campaigns in response to the Van earthquakes of late 2011, but the main campaigns were organised by the government instead of CSOs, while during the humanitarian crises in Syria and Somalia, Turkish aid was organised and transferred by public agencies.

Civil society’s impact is perceived to be limited both on social and political issues, with social impact higher than political impact. Internal and external stakeholders agree that CSOs’ contributions to solving pressing contemporary problems such as unemployment are quite limited, compared to higher impact on areas such as education, support to disadvantaged groups and human rights, in which many CSOs fill public service gaps left by government. Although the importance of advocacy is becoming more understood, there is still need to develop internal capacities and stronger governmental structures for dialogue. Half of CSOs surveyed pushed for a particular policy in the past two years, and only 12% of these report that their advocacy was completely ignored, but 73% of internal stakeholders and 68% of external stakeholders believe policy impact is limited or nil.

## RECOMMENDATIONS


### FURTHER INFORMATION

Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV) - [www.tusev.org.tr](http://www.tusev.org.tr)

Civil Society Development Centre (STGM) - [www.stgm.org.tr](http://www.stgm.org.tr)

Istanbul Bilgi University Centre for Civil Society Studies - <http://stcm.bilgi.edu.tr>

Recommendations to strengthen civil society in Turkey include: increasing long-term operational and governance capacity for CSOs; enhancing CSOs’ capacity to promote legal reforms on tax benefits, fundraising legislation and ensuring effective use of participatory mechanisms; improving coordination between donors and CSO umbrella and support organisations; and increasing interaction between CSOs and the public to ensure greater accountability and more participation in CSOs.



Basic facts	
Capital	Montevideo
Official language	Spanish
Population	3.3m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$11,996

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: URUGUAY

For the first time in Uruguay's history, a left-oriented government took office in 2005, which brought additional opportunities for civil society to participate in the execution of public policies. However, strategic participation is not still as frequent as desirable, and in partnerships between government and civil society, the emphasis is on short term issues rather than on any longer term strategic view. Uruguayan political parties have traditionally been and remain strong. Crucial areas for strengthening identified by CSOs include their critical autonomy towards the state and their long term sustainability.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Uruguayan society remains highly centred around the state and leading political parties, which is felt to be a factor behind low levels of political civic engagement in non-institutionalised actions. But civil society's assessment of the socio-political context for its operations is favourable, with a widespread view that it has improved in recent years. The leftist government that took office in 2005 was re-elected in 2009, and this brought the opening of new spaces for and new relationships with civil society.

Few restrictions are placed on CSOs by government, but only just over half – 52% - of CSOs surveyed assess the legal framework for civil society as moderately enabling, and a further 36% rate it as rather limiting. The legal framework is seen as too cumbersome and comprehensive, failing to take into account the diversity and varying capacities of civil society, with one issue being the length of time it takes a CSO to obtain legal status. CSO representatives question whether the regulations discourage the formation of some kinds of associations, as opposed to facilitating or promoting them. Against this, only around 18% of CSOs report facing restrictions or attacks from government. The closest collaboration with CSOs comes from the Ministry of Social Development, which implements its programmes in cooperation with CSOs.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Most CSOs originally defined themselves in opposition to the government, since many organisations played an important role in the fight against dictatorship and in the restoration of democracy in

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 56.3. Civic Engagement: 44.8; Level of Organisation: 59.5; Practice of Values: 43.1; Perception of Impact: 60.9; External Environment: 73.0. Ranked 4 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	17.0%
CSOs network membership	71.3%
Policy activity	59.6%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.783. Ranked 48 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: free. Political rights score: 1. Civil liberties score: 1
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 7. Ranked 25 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: +0.66. Percentile rank: 70.8. Rule of law: +0.72. Percentile rank: 71.1
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 4.25. Ranked 32 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 41. Ranked 154 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: full democracy. Score: 8.17. Ranked 17 out of 167

1985. But after more than 20 years along the democratic path, many CSOs now cooperate with the government in the execution of social policies. CSOs working on gender and human rights issues are seen to have influenced the public agenda quite strongly, especially in comparison to environmental or grassroots organisations.

Cooperatives, particularly peak organisations of cooperatives, are also considered to have some influence. Trade unions have different levels of power, depending mostly on which economic sector they represent. Other types of CSOs, such as networks and think tanks, are assessed as having very little public or governmental influence. The relationship between governments and CSOs varies: in some cases government works effectively with CSO to outsource work, and the relationship is essentially contractual, while in other cases, CSOs are allowed more responsibility and more scope to influence.

## PARTICIPATION

Voluntary work in socially-oriented CSOs has increased in recent years, reaching around 20% of the population of age 14 and above, compared to 7% in 1998, while 43% of the population has volunteered at some point in their lives. The average number of volunteers per CSO surveyed was 66. Men and women devote the same amount of time to voluntary work, but people who identify themselves as lower class contribute more time than people who identify as upper class. There is assessed to be good participation by people from minority and marginalised groups, and when it comes to CSO staff, women outnumber men, including in executive positions. The CSOs that have the highest active population are church and religious organisations, arts and educational organisations, and sport and recreational organisations, with consumer organisations and environmental and human rights CSOs recording the lowest levels of participation.

In general, participation in politically-oriented CSOs is lower than in socially-oriented CSOs, reflecting a practice of politics that is highly rooted in political parties, and so in which there is little perceived scope for individual activism to achieve results. Union membership received a boost following the creation of salary boards for pay bargaining between government, business and workers in 2005, sparking 70,000 new or renewed memberships.

There is also worry about whether the small number of very active people participating in multiple platforms, while demonstrating dedication by this group, may suggest a wider participation deficit.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Over three quarters of the population express some trust in charitable (76%) and women's (77%) organisations, with environmental organisations trusted by 59% of the public. In contrast, around 32% of people trust labour unions and only 44% trust the church, a low figure compared to other countries. The government and judiciary also have the trust of 44% each, and only 19% trust political parties.

According to the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Uruguay is one of the least corrupt countries in the world, ranking 25th out of 183 countries. Interpersonal trust appears to have declined in recent years, with only 17% of people saying other people can be trusted, but tolerance of diverse groups is uniformly high, with over 90% of the public expressing



tolerance of different minority groups.

## NETWORKS

Over 70% of CSOs report being members of networks, of which there are more than 90, many of which have a sectoral or thematic role, including the National NGOs Association, Uruguayan Cooperatives Confederation, Inter-Trade Union Assembly Plenary Session – National Workers Convention and the National Follow-up Commission of Beijing Commitments, on gender issues. But there are concerns about falling levels of active participation in networks, which means many networks do not have sufficient human, economic and time resources to meet their objectives, and so the impact and efficacy of CSO networks is being called into question.

There are also several local networks, but organisations based outside the capital, Montevideo, struggle to be represented, a consequence of the historical concentration of power and assets in the capital, and there is a sense that CSOs based in Montevideo have privileged access to resources as well as space. In contrast, CSOs based outside Montevideo believe they are starved of information and influence, and encumbered by centralist registration procedures. CSOs are also acknowledged to be poor at external communication.

## RESOURCES

CSOs have seen the loss of international funding as donors that came into Uruguay following the restoration of democracy have withdrawn as the country is now stable and classed as a middle income country. Just over half of CSOs believe they have an adequate human resource base and four out of five believe their staff has a sufficient level of experience for the CSO to perform its functions. 65% of CSOs surveyed assess themselves as having a sustainable financial base, but both financial and human resource levels are more challenging outside Montevideo. Members' subscriptions are the most frequent source of CSO funding, followed by foreign donors, government funds and individual donations. Over half of CSOs receiving government funds rely on them, with the funds making up 80-100% of these organisations' funding base. There is relatively little private sector support.

*“CSOs have seen the loss of international funding as donors that came into Uruguay following the restoration of democracy have withdrawn as the country is now stable.”*

## IMPACT

CSOs judge themselves as having a high level of responsiveness to the current priority issues of poverty and employment, and to have high impact on supporting poor and marginalised people and on education. However, only around 60% of CSOs surveyed report attempting policy advocacy during a two year period, and only about half of these report a successful outcome, with the main focuses for policy advocacy being housing, health and education policy. External stakeholders also rate highly the social impact of CSOs, and assess CSOs' policy impact as higher but their responsiveness as lower than CSO representatives do themselves. Visibility of CSO actions is acknowledged as an issue which hampers impact.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Key recommendations for strengthening civil society in Uruguay include: expanding civic participation through creating volunteering demand and supply data banks, and developing volunteering training, compensation and acknowledgment mechanisms; strengthening civil society networks and partnerships, including through promoting trust-

*“Visibility of CSO actions is an issue which hampers impact.”*

building between different institutions and brokering agreements to share different institutional strengths; enhancing the diversity of the sector by seeking direct subsidy from the government for CSOs with fewer resources and technical and administrative capacities; building the capacity of personnel in the sector by developing partnerships with universities; and enhancing the available information on the sector by carrying out a census of CSOs.

## FURTHER INFORMATION

La Sociedad Civil en Línea - [www.lasociedadcivil.org](http://www.lasociedadcivil.org)

Asociación Nacional de ONG (ANONG) - [www.anong.org.uy](http://www.anong.org.uy)

CNS Mujeres - [www.cnsmujeres.org.uy](http://www.cnsmujeres.org.uy)

Mesa Nacional de Diálogo sobre Voluntariado y Compromiso Social - [www.mesadevoluntariado.org.uy](http://www.mesadevoluntariado.org.uy)

Red Uruguaya de ONGs Ambientalistas - [www.uruguayambiental.com](http://www.uruguayambiental.com)

Rendir Cuentas - [www.rendircuentas.org](http://www.rendircuentas.org)



Basic facts	
Capital	Caracas
Official language	Spanish
Population	27.6m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$13,590

## CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: VENEZUELA

Venezuelan civil society exists in an unfavourable, volatile and unpredictable political environment, a proscribed legal environment and a restrictive environment for expression. Society seems to be made up of two blocs: one in favour of the current revolutionary project and one against, with a lack of neutral spaces for collective dialogue. Between these two poles, most CSOs are affected by a model in which autonomous intermediary organisations are not considered by authorities as legitimate interlocutors. The state has centralised powers in the hands of the president, and citizens demonstrate alienation. These conditions limit engagement, networking and coexistence between CSOs, and between civil society, the state and the private sector.

### CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

As Venezuela is one of the world's top oil exporters, oil has long since underpinned the economy and political power, with the state the main distributor of income. While oil has brought undoubted economic gain and distribution of public income, given prices rising from US\$10 per barrel in 1998 to over US\$100 in 2011, inequalities and social exclusion persist, and the power structures oil wealth enables have fed an orientation of looking towards the state as opposed to social organisations for the solution of problems, as well as cynicism over politics, seen as an arena for the pursuit of material interest. Instead of economic growth and job creation, distributive programmes known as 'missions' have been largely responsible for a reduction of poverty. These missions are heavily dependent on oil prices and therefore hard to sustain in the long term. Inflation has remained steadily high at around 30% in the last decade, currently the highest in the world and far exceeding the Latin American average of 7%.

The notion of civil society is contested in Venezuela, where there is a push to introduce participatory forms of democracy directly mediated by the state, under the 'Popular Power' rubric, and political rhetoric attacks CSOs which do not align with the revolutionary project as agents of class or foreign interests. The process of change has been rapid, following a boom period for CSOs in the early 2000s, and CSOs have had to take positions, adapt, move into other organisational forms or close down, expending their energy in defence. A 2000 Supreme Court ruling defined CSOs as Venezuelan associations, groups and institutions which do not receive external subsidy. Between July and August 2010, 34 CSOs were placed under investigation for receiving foreign funding, and there are attempts to introduce an agency for

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 46.6. Civic Engagement: 37.5; Level of Organisation: 56.6; Practice of Values: 37.8; Perception of Impact: 46.5; External Environment: 54.5. Ranked 27 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	6.6%
CSOs network membership	67.6%
Policy activity	61.9%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.735. Ranked 73 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 5. Civil liberties score: 5
Freedom House Freedom on the Net, 2011	Status: partly free. Score: 46
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 1.9. Ranked 172 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -1.02. Percentile rank: 14.8. Rule of law: -1.64. Percentile rank: 1.4
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 55. Ranked 117 out of 178
Global Integrity Report, 2009	Status: weak. Score: 61 out of 100
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 71. Ranked 80 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: hybrid regime. Score: 5.08. Ranked 97 out of 167

international cooperation to exert control over the receipt and disbursement of foreign funds.

In 2007, the President proposed a reform of the Constitution, in order to create a Communal State for the construction of a socialist society. This attempt was rejected in a referendum in December 2007. However, the project is being imposed through a series of laws and regulations, and ahead of the 2012 presidential elections, the government has pursued a policy of consolidating its ideology within social institutions, inculcating an 'us vs. them' mentality. In March 2010, the law of the Government Federal Council was passed. This defines organised society as "...formed by communal councils, workers, farmers, fishermen councils, communities and any other organisations based on the Popular Power, duly registered with the Ministry of Popular Power, competent to hear matters as to citizen participation." Participation is therefore explicitly linked to the revolutionary project and the building of a socialist society, which means the legal framework essentially seeks to define a state-sanctioned, acceptable civil society. It has also increased centralisation, through substantially reducing the power and competences of sub-national levels of government, and many CSOs that work outside the capital, where local governments were close partners, have stressed the negative effects of this on their access to resources and to spaces of decision-making.

The government's reaction to CSOs that try to preserve their autonomy has been to criminalise them and make their operation

more difficult. 70% of CSOs surveyed found the environment for civil society restrictive, and around 40% reported experiencing illegitimate attacks or restrictions from government, a figure which rises to 60% for civic and human rights CSOs. Definitions of libel and slander have been broadened and penalties have been increased. As a result, there is considerable self-censorship. In July 2011, CIVICUS and its partners assessed that 2,500 people faced criminal charges for participating in public protests. Judicial independence also fell under the spotlight in 2011, with international calls to release a judge, currently under house arrest, who was jailed in 2009 for granting bail to a businessman linked to the opposition, who had been detained without trial for over two years, even though her decision had been based on Venezuelan law and recommendations by a UN human rights working group.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

A recent study estimated there are just over 32,000 CSOs, while the government claims to have promoted the creation of almost 58,000 participatory organisations.

Civil society falls into three broad clusters. The first is formed by movements and CSOs which have ideological affinity with the revolutionary project and which defend governmental policies. The most numerous group here is of CSOs promoted by the government, and the cluster includes trade and labour unions, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, and CSOs such as urban land committees, water users' groups, communal councils and semi-legal groups. Battle units and Bolivarian militias are also organised to act in critical circumstances in defence of the revolution. The second bloc includes CSOs that do not identify with the revolutionary project in some way. The most prominent members of this group are CSOs which were formed within the earlier institutional framework of representative democracy, including political parties, other labour unions, business and professional associations and organisations affiliated with the Catholic Church. New networks and movements have appeared here, such as the student movement, neighbours' associations and



human rights and workers' associations, which have developed from individual protest to collective organisations. There is a third group of organisations which is not identified with either rejection or adhesion to the revolutionary project but concerned largely with the preservation of its work and autonomy.

## PARTICIPATION

Civic engagement and participation is lower than international averages, and membership of organisations appears to have decreased, despite a political model of promoting direct participatory institutions. The percentage of the population active in political organisations is a low 14%, with around 8% active membership of political parties, and only 4% of humanitarian and charitable associations, while only one in ten people volunteer in politically-oriented CSOs. Overall, under one in five Venezuelans is engaged in voluntary work, compared with almost one out of three worldwide, with the highest level of voluntary work in activities related to religion. Religious organisations also have the largest amount of active members (16%) and inactive members (12%), followed by sport or leisure CSOs (8%). There is a common perception that the pool of active participants is quite shallow.

There is higher engagement in community-based activities, and growing participation in public protest, with a 105% increase in demonstrations from 2008 to 2009. 26% of Venezuelans reports engaging in individual political activism, such as joining a demonstration or signing a petition, while another third say they would be prepared to do so. The difference between the low rate of engagement in formal organisations and relatively high participation in public demonstrations suggests a lack of institutional channels to take action and express dissent.

## PUBLIC TRUST

One of the reasons for low levels of civic engagement is the low level of interpersonal trust, while there is also low awareness of human rights and some fatalism about the value of participation as a mechanism to solve problems. There is, however, high trust in charitable organisations (74%), the feminist movement (73%), the Catholic Church (72%) and environmental movements (67%). But trust in political parties (27%) and unions (23%) is even lower than trust levels in the public entities which are usually assessed negatively by citizens, such as the armed forces (57%), major companies (48%), national government (45%), the media (45%), the national assembly (38%), the judiciary (38%) and the police (32%). The average trust in civil society of 55% confers legitimacy, offering a source of strength and an opportunity.

Venezuela is ranked very low on the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, at 172nd out of 183 countries, the lowest South American country, and an apparent further decline from its level of 162nd out of 179 in 2007. There is little enforcement of anti-corruption legislation. 43% of CSOs perceive corruption in civil society as frequent.

## NETWORKS

Just over two-thirds of CSOs surveyed belong to networks or federations; half participate in more than one network and three out of four declare themselves as active participants. One third belong to an international network. Almost nine out of 10 CSOs report having an exchange with another CSO of on average once a week. Human rights and development networks that regularly meet include REDSOC, SINERGIA and Alianza Social VENAMCHAM, while Foro por la Vida and Red de Apoyo por la Justicia y la Paz are two human rights coalitions with acknowledged communications and coordination capacity. CSOs promoted by the government also participate in networks. Tracking changes in the political, economic and social situation through watch groups and other monitoring systems has become a common practice of networks, with findings communicated to CSOs and to national and international public opinion.

Despite these high levels of communication, within CSOs there are political and ideological conflicts, which sometimes prevent collaboration, and have caused some previously successful networks to fall into abeyance. Reductions in public funding for CSOs, as well as the channelling of public funding to CSOs identified with the governmental ideology, has fuelled competition and distrust among organisations that previously worked together.

## RESOURCES

47% of CSOs surveyed report that their funding position has declined from one year to the next. The funding base of CSOs is diverse, with not one source dominating. Only 15% of CSO funding comes from national government, 17% from individual donations, 16% from foreign donors, 16% from sales of products and services, 12% from members and 10% from Venezuelan companies. In the case of the Communal Councils, all of their funding comes from the government, but 88% of civic, political and human rights CSOs and two thirds of support CSOs do not receive any government funds. 62% of CSOs believe their human resources are to some extent adequate and 87% that their staff are sufficiently experienced. Compared to this only 37% believe their financial resources are largely adequate.

## IMPACT

CSOs believe they have limited impact on public policies, but have a more positive perception of their social impact. CSOs highlight two issues as the highest social priorities: insecurity and exclusion. Impact on exclusion is assessed as more significant than on insecurity: 49% of CSOs and 63% of external stakeholders surveyed see tangible impact on exclusion, while 36% of CSOs and 40% of external stakeholders see tangible impact on insecurity. CSOs are perceived to have the highest levels of impact on education (according to 78% of CSOs and 83% of external stakeholders), promotion of social rights (around 70% in both cases) and assistance to poor and vulnerable people (75% and 81%). There is a lower impact on the practices of the government, with 35% of CSOs and 42% of external stakeholders believing civil society has tangible impact. With regards to influencing public policy, 63% of CSOs and 74% of external stakeholders believe policy impact is limited or nil. There are attempts to exert pressure on changing laws and regulations, the implementation of programmes and the promotion of rights, but these are challenged by government restrictions. 62% of CSOs have made an attempt to influence policy, but 69% of these met with no success.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Venezuela needs to build a civic sense of politics and participation. Priority should therefore be given to creating dialogue platforms that reduce polarisation, and which include political parties, citizens, CSOs and sectors such as business, academia and donors, and actors with different ideologies. Civic spiritedness and trust need to be improved by enhancing values training programmes, upholding the rights to participate in public spheres and to access state resources without relinquishing autonomy, and by resisting attempts at clientelism. It is also

important to encourage the peaceful settlement of conflicts in order to reduce violence. Fostering civic engagement would entail organising a broad campaign to inform people of their rights enshrined in the 1999 constitution, the obligation of public powers to respect and guarantee them, and the need for citizens to join actively in realising their rights.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

SINERGIA - [www.sinergia.org.ve](http://www.sinergia.org.ve)

REDSOC – Venezuelan Network of Organisations for Social Development - [www.redsoc.org.ve](http://www.redsoc.org.ve)

VENANCHAM - [www.venamcham.org](http://www.venamcham.org)

Foro por la Vida - [www.ucab.edu.ve/foro-por-la-vida.html](http://www.ucab.edu.ve/foro-por-la-vida.html)

Red de Apoyo por la Justicia y la Paz - [www.redapoyo.org.ve](http://www.redapoyo.org.ve)



Basic facts	
Capital	Lusaka
Official languages	Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Kaonde, Luvale, English
Population	13.9m
GDP per capita 2010	US\$1,253

# CIVIL SOCIETY PROFILE: ZAMBIA

Zambia has the highest recorded civic participation rate of all countries profiled. However, participation is assessed to have declined from its peak in the early 1990s, when there was heavy mobilisation in support of multiparty democracy. Furthermore, high poverty levels erode the time available for voluntary activities, and test confidence in the ability of the political system to meet pressing socio-economic needs. Key challenges that civil society seeks to address are corruption, poverty and poor governance. The major internal issues that face the sector are heavy donor reliance, limited scope for policy dialogue with government and the personalisation of many organisations.

## CONTEXT AND ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

The Zambian election of 2011 saw a democratic change of president, with Rupiah Banda accepting defeat to bring to an end 20 years of government by his party, and handing power over to the opposition leader, a trade unionist and former minister. There were instances of riots in the late stages of the election, and criticism over the lack of neutrality of state media, but in the main observers viewed the election as well-conducted.

The most powerful forces in Zambian society are assessed by CSOs to be the political leaders, the police force and the mining and energy industries, with significant external forces including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and international NGOs. Zambia is one of the world's largest copper exporters, and copper mining contributes around two thirds of government revenue. China is a key investor in the copper industry, but there are concerns about poor labour standards, which were a theme of the 2011 election and the subject of a critical report by Human Rights Watch in 2011. Zambia has seen recent economic growth as a result of higher international copper prices, with average annual growth between 4% and 6% in the first half of the 2000s. However, Zambia remains classified as a least developed country by the World Bank, with rural poverty particularly persistent. Unemployment remains high. The national prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS is 16%, which entails the loss of people in the most productive age bracket and high numbers of child-headed households and street children.

There are different types of regulation for different facets of civil society, and not one piece of legislation covers the whole sector. A

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Key data about civil society	
CSI overall scores	Overall score: 59.5. Civic Engagement: 60.8; Level of Organisation: 58.3; Practice of Values: 59.3; Perception of Impact: 61.7; External Environment: 57.2. Ranked 2 out of 33
Interpersonal trust	7.9%
CSOs network membership	72.7%
Policy activity	61.9%

Key indicators	
UN Human Development Index, 2011	Score: 0.430. Ranked 164 out of 187
Freedom House Freedom in the World rating, 2012	Status: partly free. Political rights score: 3. Civil liberties score: 4
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011	Score 3.2. Ranked 91 out of 183
World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010	Government effectiveness: -0.8. Percentile rank: 23.4; Rule of law: -0.49. Percentile rank: 38.4
Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, 2011	Score: 30. Ranked 86 out of 178
Failed States Index, 2011	Score: 83.8. Ranked 55 out of 177
EIU Democracy Index, 2011	Status: flawed democracy. Score: 6.19. Ranked 71 out of 167
Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Score 57. Ranked 16 out of 53

new NGO Act was passed in 2009, but is criticised for investing a government-dominated NGO registration board with too many powers, and for placing stringent requirements on NGOs, including the obligation to report on their funding, activities and the assets of their personnel, which could deter smaller organisations from registering as NGOs. The act does not cover churches and other religious organisations, clubs, professional groups and trade unions. These are regulated by the colonial era Societies Act of 1958, which is also criticised for giving too much power to the state. For example, it allows government powers to cancel the registration of any society, and stipulates government approval for receipt of foreign funding. The 1955 Public Order Act is also seen to give the police excessive authority to regulate public meetings. There is no freedom of information legislation.

Partly as a result of these legal restrictions, dialogue on governance issues is assessed as weak. When CSOs are involved in such processes it is usually at the insistence of donors, with considerable ambivalence about this on the part of government. Government is supportive of CSOs in playing a service delivery role, but there is hostility when CSOs enter the territory of advocacy for good governance, with threats of bans issued against organisations such as SACCORD, the South Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. There is also some

cooperation between private sector and civil society at the community level, e.g. in healthcare and education, and CSOs have worked with companies to develop workplace HIV/AIDS strategies. However corporate social responsibility still tends to be piecemeal.

## MAKE UP OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society in Zambia includes professional bodies, trade unions, gender-based groups, human rights and advocacy groups, service-oriented CSOs, faith-based organisations, international NGOs and the media. Around 43% of CSOs are classed as education, youth and child development organisations, perhaps reflecting an emphasis on and funding support for activities which address MDGs. There are also sizeable concentrations of CSOs in the fields of governance (13%), HIV/AIDS (11%), employment (10%) and water and sanitation (10%).

The independent media is seen as a strong force within civil society, and a necessary counterpoint to the strength of the state media, particularly broadcast media. In 2011, several attacks were noted against independent journalists. Traditional leadership also continues to play an important role, particularly in rural Zambia. CSOs are however seen as overly concentrated in cities, with half of all CSOs based in the capital Lusaka, which challenges CSOs' ability to tackle rural poverty.

Civil society is viewed as well institutionalised, but somewhat untransparent. CSO governance structures are critiqued as often resulting from donor insistence on minimal governance standards as a condition of funding. CSO board members are not felt to be of the same quality as the board members of corporate sector institutions, and many CSOs remain dominated by founder members and other long-serving individuals. This is acknowledged as undermining CSOs' significant role as a watchdog of government and promoter of good governance. Alongside the lack of enabling civil society legislation, CSOs acknowledge the absence of their own code of conduct; the NGO authorising board established by the 2009 NGO Act has been tasked with elaborating a code of conduct for NGOs. A need to develop participatory accountability mechanisms that are oriented around CSO beneficiaries rather than donors is also identified.



## PARTICIPATION

A high 80% of people are members of a socially-oriented CSO, with membership divided equally between women and men; most engagement is through religious structures, which can challenge attempts to promote progressive social change, although church organisations have also been active on campaigns on issues such as debt cancellation. There is also distinctly less participation in politically-oriented activities compared to social affairs: over 50% of people have no participation in political activities other than in voting. A gender divide is also apparent here: in politically-oriented CSOs, 59% of participants are men. Campaigns to encourage greater women's political participation are seen to be highly dependent on donor funding, and therefore unsustainable.

## PUBLIC TRUST

Around 63% of the public express trust in civil society, but unusually, compared to many other countries, people in Zambia also have high trust in the press (70%), television (66%) and major companies (60%), while even state bodies enjoy at least 48% of people's trust. The most trusted CSO types in Zambia are churches (91%), charitable and humanitarian organisations (72%) and women's organisations (65%). Social discrimination exists around gender, particularly in customary courts, sexuality (with the criminalisation of same-sex acts), disability and to a lesser extent people with HIV/AIDS.

Corruption is identified as a major concern of Zambia's citizens, with the extent of corruption suggested by the fact that in 2009 some donors chose to suspend financial support of the health sector due to high levels of corruption. Zambia is ranked at 91st out of 183 in the 2011 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and many civil society representatives assess the Anti-Corruption Commission as lacking in independence.

## NETWORKS

73% of CSOs are members of networks. Sectoral networks are seen to be strong, with a range of peak thematic umbrella organisations for CSOs working on such matters as poverty reduction (Civil Society for Poverty Reduction), gender equality (the Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council and Women for Change), HIV/AIDS (Zambia National AIDS Network and Churches Health Association of Zambia) and education (Zambia National Education Coalition). Many of these umbrella organisations are also members of and take part in international networks. However, communication outside these umbrella groupings is poor, except when civil society mobilises at times of crisis, and there is high duplication of CSO activities due to lack of coordination between CSOs in different sectors and locales.

*“Sectoral networks are seen to be strong, with a range of peak thematic umbrella organisations for CSOs working on such matters as poverty reduction, gender equality, HIV/AIDS and education.”*

## RESOURCES

Only around half of CSOs are assessed as having a sustainable financial base, and CSOs are heavily reliant on donor funding, and compete with each other for funding. This is also seen to lead to questions of CSO autonomy and ownership of development. CSOs experience rapid staff turnover, with loss of staff to international NGOs and donor agencies, and there is a heavy reliance on volunteers by around 70% of organisations. The main reason is that donor-funded projects generally exclude administrative and salary costs.

## IMPACT

Civil society is assessed as highly responsive to citizen's needs on key issues such as poverty and HIV/AIDS, both by representatives of CSOs and external stakeholders. CSOs are seen to have a

strong social influence, as well as having some influence on national budgeting, where it takes part in sector advisory groups alongside government and the private sector, albeit its role here is stymied by lack of information and lack of access to the major decision-making meetings.

Lack of regulations to involve CSOs in policy processes on a consistent basis is a weakness. Even where CSOs have been allowed into processes, such as those around the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, there is the challenge of control of access to information. Other challenges identified for policy advocacy are lack of knowledge about policy processes, limited use of communications strategies, weak connections between CSOs and other actors, and government perceptions of CSOs as competitors for donor funding. As a result of this, only 54% of CSOs report taking part in advocacy for policy change, and only around 20% of these record being successful in their attempts.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Key Zambian CSO recommendations for government are to: reinforce existing structures such as the sectoral advisory groups to strengthen citizen participation in public policy processes; open new dialogue on strengthening cooperation between civil society and government on non-service delivery issues, such as governance, human rights and the rule of law; and revise the 2009 NGO Act to take more account of the diversity of civil society. Recommendations for CSO themselves are to develop income generation schemes in order to reduce donor dependency; and spread CSO presence to rural areas and work to mobilise self-help groups in these areas.

### FURTHER INFORMATION

Zambia Council for Social Development – [www.zcsd.org.zm](http://www.zcsd.org.zm)

Civil Society for Poverty Reduction - [www.csprzambia.org](http://www.csprzambia.org)

Non-Governmental Organisations Coordinating Council - [www.ngocc.org.zm](http://www.ngocc.org.zm)

Women for Change - [www.wfc.org.zm](http://www.wfc.org.zm)

Zambia Civic Education Association - [www.zamcivic.com.zm](http://www.zamcivic.com.zm)



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