

**FOREIGN
RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1977-1980

Volume XXIV

**SOUTH AMERICA;
LATIN AMERICA
REGION**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



**Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1977–1980**

Volume XXIV

**South America;
Latin America
Region**

Editor

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the docu-

ment in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2016 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the decision to withhold 7 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 44 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable

record of the Carter administration's policy toward South America and the Latin America region.

Adam Howard
Acting Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2018

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. This volume documents the policies of the Carter administration toward South America, as well as providing documentation on the goals and policies of the Carter administration toward the Latin America region as a whole. For further coverage of Latin America, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XV*; Central America, 1977–1980 and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII*; Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV

This volume documents U.S. foreign policy toward 10 countries in South America. It also includes a regional compilation containing documentation on broad Carter administration goals and issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Carter administration's human rights policy made both a broad and unpredictable impact on U.S. relations with South American nations. In Ecuador, the policy led the United States to press for the first free elections in six years, which were held successfully. The same focus on elections in Bolivia, however, could not stave off a period of political instability that saw four coups in just over two years, including the notorious "cocaine coup" in July 1980. U.S. suspicions that Argentine military advisors had supported the July 1980 coup in Bolivia are also covered.

The military dictatorships of the Southern Cone interacted with human rights policy in complex ways. Officials in the Carter administration could not agree on the most important goal for U.S. policy towards Argentina. Some officials, led by Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian, sought to end human rights violations in Argentina through continuous pressure on the Argentine *junta*. Other officials, more concerned with the stability of the Argentine Government and its economic and other policies, tried not to alienate the *junta*, especially as its leader, Jorge Videla, was seen by some administration officials as a moderate and a vital partner in the effort to end human rights violations. This volume covers in broad strokes U.S. efforts to influence Argentina through financial

instruments such as military sales, grant programs, and its votes in the international financial institutions.

This volume also touches on administration perceptions of the different degrees to which the Uruguayan and Paraguayan Governments were willing to reform their human rights practices and accept monitoring from international bodies, which led to a cooling towards Paraguay and a warming towards Uruguay over the course of the Carter presidency. The ongoing investigation into the assassinations of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and U.S. citizen Ronni Moffitt in Washington in 1976 also led to a deep chill in U.S. relations with Chile during most of the Carter administration.

Compilations regarding U.S. policy toward a number of other countries focus on issues other than human rights. In Venezuela, the Carter administration enjoyed a close working relationship with President Carlos Andres Perez, encompassed by some cooperation on Central America and ongoing investigations into the Cubana Airlines bombing and Letelier assassination. The administration only paid occasional high-level attention to Colombia, most notably during a hostage crisis involving U.S. Ambassador Diego Asencio. The compilation covering Peru focuses on complex U.S. relations with its leftist military junta, dealing with the Peruvian economic crisis, and eventual elections. U.S. relations with Brazil were generally cool during the Carter administration, with disputes over non-proliferation, trade, and human rights at the forefront of bilateral problems.

The compilation on the Latin America region in this volume contains documentation on broad administration goals in the region and guiding documents such as PRM-17. In addition, the regional compilation contains documentation on U.S. policy regarding multiple border disputes, including the dispute over the Beagle Channel between Chile and Argentina. High-level meetings with multiple hemispheric leaders are also covered in this compilation, including those head of state meetings which took place in the White House at the time of the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977. Finally, the regional compilation contains documentation on human rights policy as it affected and was implemented in South America as a whole, including documentation on Operation Condor.

Some topics are prominent in the documentary record regarding U.S. policy in South America, but are covered in other volumes in the subseries. The administration's guiding documents regarding human rights policy, including those regarding Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs*. A few documents regarding U.S. knowledge of the beginning of the dispute between the United

Kingdom and Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas islands during the Carter administration are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984. Extensive high-level negotiations with Brazil and Argentina regarding their nuclear capabilities and the Carter administration's efforts to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco are covered in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Some topics are prominent in the documentary record but are not printed here, either because they are primarily reporting about the internal situation in a country, or because of space constraints. Embassies and analysts frequently reported on human rights violations in South American countries, and these reports received varying degrees of attention in Washington. Reports which gained the most high-level attention in the U.S. Government are printed here or referenced in footnotes, but the extensive reporting by Embassies on human rights—in some cases, weekly cables—could not be accommodated within the space constraints of this volume. Readers are encouraged to consult the documentation declassified and released on the internet during the special Argentina and Chile Declassification Projects by numerous U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. U.S. efforts to influence the United Nations and the Organization of American States on questions affecting South America are largely not covered here. A notable exception, covered in some depth in this volume, is U.S. efforts to convince Southern Cone countries to accept visits by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. U.S. efforts to encourage trade with South American nations, including high-level trade missions, are not covered here.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Ceri McCarron; the National Security Council, especially John Powers, Greg Koch, and John Fitzpatrick; the National Archives and Records Administration, especially David Langbart and Don McIlwain; the Department of State, especially Keri Lewis, Rasheeda Purifoy, and Greg Murphy; the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Library of Congress. The Latin Americanist cohort of Michael McCoyer, Nathaniel Smith, and Alexander Poster in the Office of the Historian provided countless research suggestions and informed commiseration.

The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Myra Burton, Chief of the Africa and the Americas division. She and Kristin L. Ahlberg, Assistant to the General Editor, reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Heather McDaniel and Matthew

R.G. Regan did the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy A. Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Sara E. Berndt
Historian

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Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIV

The presidential papers of Jimmy Carter at the Carter Library are one of the best sources for documentation on U.S.-South American relations from 1977 to 1980. Several collections within the National Security Adviser files are especially relevant, including the Brzezinski and Staff Material. The National Security Council Institutional Files contain records of high-level meetings and documentation related to presidential directives.

Department of State records are also critical to understanding U.S. policy toward South America during the Carter administration. The Department of State's Central Foreign Policy File, consisting of D, P, and N reels, replaced the pre-1973 paper subject-numeric file. The P (Paper) reels consist of microfilmed versions of memoranda of conversation, letters, briefing papers, airgrams, and memoranda to principals. The Department lot files, available at the National Archives and Records Administration, are important as well, especially the files of Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, several lot files related to Human Rights, and the various subject files and office files for Inter-American Affairs.

The editor also utilized the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Valuable records from the Department of Defense can be found in RG 330, notably FRC 330–81–0202, the Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Several collections from the Central Intelligence Agency were also particularly useful: the Office of Congressional Affairs, the Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, and the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

Central Foreign Policy File. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

- P Reels
- D Reels
- N Reels

INR/IL Historical Files

Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination, containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s, maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

- Lot 80D177, Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, 1976–1977
- Lot 81D183, Subject files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1975–78
- Lot 81D113 (Entry P–14), Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980
- Lot 81D208, Human Rights Country Files, 1977
- Lot 84D241, Records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980
- Lot 82D100, Official Files and Briefing Books of Edmund Muskie, 1977–1981
- Lot 82D177, Human Rights Country Files, 1980–1981
- Lot 80D135, Records of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, 1977–1980
- Lot 82D298 (Entry P–9), Records of the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Anthony Lake, 1977–1981
- Lot 81D154, Records of David P. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 1978–1981
- Lot 85D366, Chronological files and official records of Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Murphy Derian
- Lot 81D5, Records of Philip C. Habib, 1976–1978
- Lot 82D180, Human Rights Subject Files, 1980
- Lot 85D427, U.S. Mission to the Organization of American States Files, 1971–1985

Record Group 84, Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

- Lot 81F93, Embassy Buenos Aires Post Files, 1978
- Lot 81F113, Classified and Unclassified Files of Ambassador Trusten Frank Crigler, 1976–1980

Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Records of the Office of the National Security Adviser

Brzezinski Material

- Agency File
- Country File
- Subject File
- Trip File
- Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron
- President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File
- General Odom File
- President's Daily CIA Brief File

Donated Historical Materials

- Brzezinski Papers
- Mondale Papers

Staff Material

North/South, Pastor Files,

Country Files

Subject Files

Chron Files

North/South, Thornton Files

Country Files

Subject Files

Freedom of Information/Legal Files

Office Files

Plains File

President's Daily Diary

National Security Council, Institutional Files

Central Intelligence Agency**Office of Congressional Affairs**

Job 81M00980R

Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence

Job 78T02549A

Job 79T00975A

Job 79T01316A

Job 80T00071A

Job 80T00634A

Job 82T00150R

Job 82T00466R

Job 07S01568R

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence

Job 80M00165A

Job 80M01542R

Job 81B00112R

Job 81M00919R

Library of Congress

Harold Brown Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-81-0202, Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1978

FRC 330-80-0035, Records of the Secretary of Defense, General/Country Files, 1977

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Abbreviations and Terms

- AAA**, Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance
- ABA**, American Bar Association
- ACDA**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- ACDA/WEC/ATE**, Arms Transfer and Economics Division, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- AD**, *Accion Democratica* (Democratic Action), Venezuelan political party
- ADB**, Asian Development Bank
- Adeco**, a member of Venezuela's AD party
- ADN**, *Accion Democratica Nacionalista* (Nationalist Democratic Action), Bolivian political party
- AFP**, *Agence France Presse*
- AID**, U.S. Agency for International Development
- AID/LA, LAC**, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. AID
- AID/RDP**, Regional Development Program, U.S. AID
- AID/LAC/SA**, Office of South American Affairs, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. AID
- AIFLD**, American Institute for Free Labor Development
- AP**, Andean Pact; Associated Press
- APRA**, *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (Popular Revolutionary American Alliance), Peruvian political party
- ARA**, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/AND**, Office of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/AND/CH**, Chile Desk, Office of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/BR**, Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/ECA**, Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/ECP**, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/PPC**, Office of Policy Planning Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/RPP**, Office of Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/RPP/PM**, Regional Political Program, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARA/SC**, Office of Southern Cone Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- ARENA**, *Aliance Renovadora Nacional* (National Renewal Alliance), Brazilian political party
- ARMA**, U.S. Army Attaché
- AS**, Assistant Secretary
- ASEAN**, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
-
- BA**, Buenos Aires, Argentina
- b/d**, barrels per day (of oil)

BHN, basic human need (a category of loans in the IFIs)

BOP, balance of payments

B/P, balance of payments

BPD, barrels per day (of oil)

CAP, Carlos Andres Perez

CARICOM, Caribbean Community

CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper

CBF, *Corporación Boliviana de Fomento* (Bolivian Development Corporation)

CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation

CDU, Christian Democratic Union, West German political party

CENTO, Central Treaty Organization

CEOSL, *La Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres* (Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organizations)

CERP 0001, Comprehensive Economic Reporting program; annual policy assessment mandated by the Foreign Affairs Manual

CHMN, Chairman

Christopher Group, The Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Christopher

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CIEC, Conference on International Economic Cooperation

CINC, Commander in Chief

CIPEC, Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries

CNI, *Central Nacional de Informaciones* (National Information Center), Chilean intelligence service, successor to DINA

CNO, Chief of Naval Operations

COB, Bolivian Workers' Central Confederation

COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

COMASPO, Uruguayan Armed Forces Political Commission

COMIBOL, *Corporación Minera de Bolivia* (Mining Corporation of Bolivia)

COPPAL, Conference of Latin American Political Parties

COPEI, Venezuelan Christian Democratic Party

Copeyano, a member of Venezuela's COPEI party

COSENA, Uruguayan National Security Council

COSEP, Superior Council for Private Enterprise (Nicaragua)

CPE, *Concentración de Fuerzas Populares* (Concentration of Popular Forces), Ecuadoran political party

CSA, Chief of Staff of the Army

CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force

CTV, *Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela* (Venezuelan Workers Confederation); Venezuelan labor union linked with AD political party

CUS, Nicaraguan Labor Organization

CVDS, countervailing duties

CY, calendar year

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

D/HA, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

DA, David Aaron

DA, Defense Attaché

DAM, *disposicion autoridad milita* (disposition of military authority), prisoners held under military authority in Argentina

DAO, Defense Attaché Office

DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary

- DATT**, Defense Attaché
DC, Developed Country
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration
DGI, Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence
DI, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
DINA, *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (Directorate of National Intelligence), Chilean secret police and intelligence service, abolished and replaced by CNI in late 1977
DINE, Chilean Army Intelligence Directorate
DISIP, *Dirección de los Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención* (Directorate of Intelligence and Preventive Services), Venezuelan intelligence agency
DMA, Defense Mapping Agency
DNCSP, *Dirección Nacional para el Control de Substancias Peligrosas* (National Directorate for the Control of Dangerous Substances), Bolivian anti-narcotics agency
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
DOE, Department of Energy
DOS, Department of State
DR, Daily Reading (President Carter's early morning reading)
- E**, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ITA/EWT, Office of East-West Trade, Office of International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD/ODF, Office of Development Finance, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD/OMA, Office of Monetary Affairs, International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
ECLA, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ERP, People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina)
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPM, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, Exclusive distribution
EXIM, Export-Import Bank
- FA**, *Frente Amplio* (Broad Front), Uruguayan political party/coalition
FAE, Ecuadoran Air Force
FAO, *Frente Amplio de Oposicion* (Broad Front in Opposition), Nicaraguan anti-Somoza group
FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombian leftist guerrilla group
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDI, foreign direct investment
FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FFB, Federal Financing Bank
FMS, Foreign Military Sales

- FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany; West Germany
FSB, *Falange Socialista Boliviana* (Bolivian Socialist Falange); Bolivian right-wing political party
FSLN, Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)
FSO, Inter-American Development Bank Funds for Special Operations
FY, fiscal year
- G-77**, Group of 77
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GN, Guardia Nacional (National Guard), Nicaragua
GNR, Government of National Reconciliation (Nicaragua)
GOA, Government of Argentina
GOB, Government of Bolivia; Government of Brazil
GOC, Government of Chile; Government of Colombia
GOE, Government of Ecuador
GOES, Government of El Salvador
GON, Government of Nicaragua (Somoza)
GOP, Government of Paraguay; Government of Peru
GORM, Goals, Objectives, and Resource Management
GOU, Government of Uruguay
GOV, Government of Venezuela
GSP, Generalized System of Preferences
- H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HA/HR, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HR, Human Rights
HRH, see HA
- IADB**, Inter-American Defense Board; for Inter-American Development Bank, see IDB
IAHRC, Inter-American Human Rights Commission (OAS)
IAJC, Inter-American Juridical Committee (OAS)
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICA, International Communication Agency
ICJ, International Court of Justice (UN)
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
IDCA, International Development Cooperation Agency
IFC, International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank
IFI, International Financial Institutions (World Bank, IMF, etc.)
IG, Interagency Group; Interdepartmental Group; Inspector General
ILHR, International League for Human Rights
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMET, International Military Education and Training
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INM, Bureau for International Narcotics Matters
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDC, Office of the Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/DDR, Office of the Director for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

- INR/IAA**, Office of Analysis for Inter-American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- INR/RAR**, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- INR/RSE**, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- IO/UNP**, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
- ISA**, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
- Itamaraty**, Brazilian Foreign Ministry (refers to the Itamaraty Palace, in which the ministry is housed)
- ITT**, International Telephone and Telegraph
- JBUSMC**, Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission
- JCR**, Revolutionary Coordinating Junta
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JRG**, *Junta Revolucionario de Gobierno* (Revolutionary Governing Junta), ruling junta in El Salvador)
- Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment (P.L. 95-92, sec. 11)**, signed into law August 4, 1977, prohibited all U.S. military aid, training, and weapons sales to Argentina after September 30, 1978
- L**, Legal Advisor, Department of State
- L/ARA**, Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- L/PM**, Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- LA**, Latin America; Latin American
- LAC**, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. AID
- LAFTA**, Latin American Free Trade Association
- LAWS**, light anti-tank weapons
- LDC**, Lesser Developed Country
- LDCs**, Lesser Developed Countries
- LIMDIS**, Limited Distribution
- LOA**, Letter of Agreement
- LOS**, Law of the Sea
- LST**, Landing Ship Tank
- M**, Undersecretary for Management, Department of State
- M/CT**, Office for Combating Terrorism, Under Secretary for Management, Department of State
- M-19**, April 19th Movement, Colombian leftist guerrilla group
- MASM**, Military Assistance and Sales Manual
- M-B-B**, Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski lunch
- MDB**, *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (Brazilian Democratic Movement), Brazilian political party.
- MFM**, Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS
- Milgroup**, military group
- MIR**, *Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Leftist Movement), Bolivian political party
- MNC**, multinational corporation

- MNR**, *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement), Bolivian political party
- MNR-A**, see MNR-H
- MNR/Alianza**, see MNR-H
- MNR-H**, "Historical" wing of the Bolivian MNR party
- MNR-I**, "Institutionalist" wing of the Bolivian MNR party
- Montonero**, left-wing guerrilla organization based in Uruguay and Argentina
- MOU**, Memorandum of Understanding
- MPLA**, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
- MTN**, Multilateral Trade Negotiations
- MTT**, Military Training Team
- MVD**, Montevideo, Uruguay
-
- NAM**, Non-Aligned Movement
- NCU**, Narcotics Unit
- NE**, see Noform
- NFAC**, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency
- NFZ**, Nuclear Free Zone
- NG**, National Guard
- Niact**, Night Action
- NIEO**, New International Economic Order
- NIO**, National Intelligence Officer, Central Intelligence Agency
- Nocontract**, Not releasable to contractors
- Nodis**, No distribution
- Noform**, Not releasable to foreign nationals
- Notal**, Cable not received by all addressees
- NPT**, Non-Proliferation Treaty
- NSC**, National Security Council
- NWFZ**, Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
-
- OAS**, Organization of American States
- OASGA**, Organization of American States General Assembly meeting
- OAU**, Organization of African Unity
- OC**, See Orcon.
- OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
- OES**, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
- OMB**, Office of Management and Budget
- OPEC**, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
- OPI**, Office of Primary Interest, Central Intelligence Agency
- OPIC**, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
- Orcon**, originator-controlled
- ORPA**, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
- OSCE**, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
- OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense
-
- P**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- PAF**, Peruvian Air Force
- PARM**, Policy and Resources Management, annual policy review
- PCB**, Partido Comunista de Bolivia (Communist Party of Bolivia)
- PCT**, percent
- PD**, Presidential Directive
- PDC**, Christian Democratic Party

Pro-Ag, Project Agreement

Pro/Ag, see Pro-Ag

PEN, National Executive Power, which allowed the Argentine government to hold prisoners indefinitely under state-of-siege provisions of the constitution

Petrocan, Canadian state-owned oil company

PLN, *Partido Liberal Nacionalista* (Nationalist Liberal Party), Nicaraguan political party

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/ISO, Office of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/ISP, Office of International Security Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/MC, Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/SAS, Office of Security Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNG, *Persona non grata*

POL, Petroleum, oils and lubricants

PPC, *Partido Popular Cristiano* (Christian People's Party), Peruvian political party

PRA, *Partido Revolucionario Auténtico* (Authentic Revolutionary Party), Bolivian political party

PRC, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee

PRD, Dominican Revolutionary Party

PRM, Policy Review Memorandum

PRIN, Revolutionary Party of the National Left, Bolivian political party

RA, Regional Affairs

Reftel, Referenced telegram

retorno (return), the process of returning to civilian government in Ecuador after the period of military rule

RI, Rick Inderfurth

Rio Protocol, January 1942 peace agreement between Ecuador and Peru in boundary dispute

Rio Pact, 1947 treaty providing for mutual defense in the Western Hemisphere, signed by the United States and 20 other countries

Rio Treaty, see Rio Pact

RP, Report

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/AS, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty

SCC, Special Coordinating Committee

SDR, Special Drawing Rights.

SELA, *Sistema Economico Latinoamericano y del Caribe* (Latin American and Caribbean Economic System)

Septel, Separate telegram

SET, Supreme Electoral Tribunal (Ecuador)

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SI, Socialist International

SIDE, Argentine State Secretariat for Intelligence

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State

SPD, Social Democratic Party, West German political party

S/S, Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State

S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State

S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State
SSOD, Special Session on Disarmament
STADIS, State Distribution, distribution within Department of State only
STR, Office of the Special Trade Representative
SWAPO, South West Africa People's Organization

T, Bureau of Arms Control and International Security Affairs
TNC, Transnational Corporations

UDEL, Nicaraguan Union of Democratic Liberation
UDP, *Unidad Democrática y Popular* (Democratic and Popular Union), Bolivian political coalition

UGA, University of Georgia

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations

UNCHR, United Nations Commission on Human Rights

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force in the Sinai

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNHRC, see UNCHR

UNITAS, an annual exercise jointly undertaken by United States and South American navies

UNP, *Unión Nacionalista del Pueblo* (Nationalist Union of the People), Bolivian political coalition

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UP, *Union Patriótica*; Allende's political coalition in Chile to 1973

USCINCLANT, U.S. Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia

USCINCSO, U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command, Canal Zone

USCINCSOUTH, U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command, Canal Zone

USA, U.S. Army

USAF, U.S. Air Force

USDA, U.S. Department of Agriculture

USDEL, U.S. Delegation

USG, U.S. Government

USIA, U.S. Information Agency

USICA, U.S. International Communication Agency

USN, U.S. Navy

USOAS, U.S. Mission to the OAS

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USUN NY, U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York

V-B-B, Vance-Brown-Brzezinski meeting

VIP, Very Important Person

WB, World Bank

WOLA, Washington Office on Latin America (non-governmental organization)

WR, Weekly Reading

X-M, Export-Import Bank

XMT, Exempt

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)

ZB, Zbigniew Brzezinski

Persons

- Aaron, David L.**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Adriázquez Valda, Oscar**, Major General (retired), Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship until July 1978
- Agosti, Orlando**, Brigadier General, Argentine Air Force Chief and Junta member from 1976 until 1981
- Aguirre Asanza, Carlos**, General, Chief of Staff of Ecuadorian Joint Command
- Aja Espil, Jorge**, Argentine Ambassador to the United States from 1976 until 1981
- Alba, Wenceslao**, Bolivian Minister of Finance from 1978 until 1979
- Albright, Madeleine**, Congressional Relations Officer, Press and Congressional Relations Office, National Security Council, from March 1978 until January 1981
- Allara, Gualter Oscar**, Admiral, Argentine Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Allende, Salvador**, President of Chile from 1970 until 1973
- Allitto, Tony**, Ecuador Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978
- Almeyda, Clodomiro**, leader of the Chilean Socialist Party and Foreign Minister from 1970 until 1973
- Alvarado, Luis**, Peruvian Ambassador to the Organization of American States until 1978
- Alvarez, Alvaro**, Uruguayan Director of Foreign Policy Issues from 1977 until 1978
- Alvarez, Gregorio**, General, head of the Uruguayan National Security Council from 1973 and Commander in Chief of the Army from February 1978 until February 1979
- Alzamora, Carlos**, Peruvian Representative to the United Nations
- Amenabar, Tomas**, Chilean Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, 1978
- Anderson, David**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978
- Anderson, Jack**, investigative journalist
- Araoz Levy, Gaston**, Bolivian Foreign Minister, 1980
- Arbulu Galliani, Guillermo**, Peruvian Prime Minister and Minister of War from 1976 until 1978
- Arce Alvarez, Roberto**, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States from 1979
- Arce Gomez, Luis "Lucho"**, Colonel, Bolivian Minister of Interior from 1980
- Arias-Schreiber, Alfonso**, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States, from 1979 until 1980
- Arismendi, Rodney**, leader of the Uruguayan Communist Party, in exile in the Soviet Union from 1975
- Arlia, Juan Carlos**, Chief, Human Rights Working Group, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Arnez Camacho, Antonio**, General, Bolivian Minister of Defense from 1980
- Arns, Paulo Evaristo**, Cardinal, Archbishop of Sao Paulo, Brazil
- Arrata Macias, Andres**, General (retired), Ecuadorian Defense Minister until 1979
- Arria, Diego**, Venezuelan Minister of Information and Tourism from 1977 until 1978; independent candidate in the 1978 presidential election
- Asencio, Diego Cortes**, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from 1977 until 1980
- Ayala Lasso, Jose**, Ecuadorian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs until July 1977; Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1977 until August 1979
- Banzer Suárez, Hugo**, President of Bolivia until July 1978
- Barcella, Jr., E. Lawrence**, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Letelier investigation
- Barco, Virgilio**, Colombian Ambassador to the United States

- Barnebey, Malcolm R.**, Director of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
- Barrios Bustillos, Gonzalo**, Venezuelan politician; founding member of the Democratic Action party
- Barros, Jose Miguel**, Chilean Ambassador to the United States from 1978
- Bartholomew, Reginald H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from January until November 1977; member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1979
- Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio**, President of Cuba from 1952 until 1959
- Bedregal Gutierrez, Guillermo**, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, November 1979
- Begin, Menachem**, Prime Minister of Israel from June 1977
- Belaunde Terry, Fernando**, President of Peru, from 1980
- Bell, Griffin B.**, U.S. Attorney General from January 26, 1977, until July 19, 1979
- Bendahan, Raul**, General, Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Air Force from 1978
- Bennet, Douglas J.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, Department of State, from March 1977 until August 1979; Administrator of the Agency for International Development from August 1979
- Bensinger, Peter**, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration
- Benson, Lucy Wilson**, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Department of State, from March 1977 until August 1977; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, Department of State, from August 1977 until January 1980
- Bentsen, Lloyd**, Senator (D-Texas)
- Bergland, Bob S.**, Secretary of Agriculture
- Bergsten, C. Fred**, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs; member, Board of Directors, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
- Bernal, Rene**, General, Christian Democratic Party candidate in the 1978 Bolivian presidential election
- Bernal, Carlos**, Colombian Ambassador to the Organization of American States from 1979
- Betancourt, Romulo**, President of Venezuela from 1945 until 1948 and again from 1959 until 1964
- Blake, Melville**, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Panama City from 1978
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P.**, National Security Council Staff from June 1979 until August 1980
- Bloomfield, Richard**, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador until 1978
- Blumenthal, W. Michael**, Secretary of the Treasury from January 1977 until July 1979
- Boeker, Paul Harold**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia from September 1977 until February 1980; Director of the Foreign Service Institute from March 1980
- Borad, Jorge**, General, head of Uruguayan delegation to Inter-American Human Rights Council-related discussions, January 1978
- Borg, C. Arthur**, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until April 1977
- Borquez Montero, Israel**, President of the Chilean Supreme Court from 1978
- Botelho Gozálviz, Raul**, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship from November 1978 until August 1979
- Boumediene, Houari**, President of Algeria until December 1978
- Bourne, Peter**, Special Assistant to the President for Health Issues and Director of the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy from June 1977 until July 1978

- Bova, Michele M.**, Acting Director, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1977; Economics and International Financial Institutions, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, , Department of State, from 1977 until 1979
- Bowdler, William Garton**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from December 1979
- Boyatt, Thomas David**, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Santiago until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Colombia from December 1980
- Bravo, Alfredo**, co-president and founder of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights
- Bremer, L. Paul III "Jerry"**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Oslo until 1979; Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1979
- Bretel Barba, Hugo**, Bolivian Minister of National Defense until July 1978
- Brown, George S.**, General, USAF; Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until June 1978
- Brown, Harold**, Secretary of Defense
- Brown, Leslie H.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from 1977 until 1979; Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from 1979
- Brown, Timothy C.**, Uruguay Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from October 1978 until October 1979
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Bucaram, Assad**, leader of the Ecuadoran Concentration of People's Forces party
- Buchanan, James E.**, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Buffum, William**, United Nations Undersecretary for Political and General Assembly Affairs, September 1977
- Bumpus, James**, Argentina Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1977
- Busch, Alberto Natusch**, See Natusch
- Bushnell, John A.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from January 1979 until 1980
- Cahill, Jacklyn A.**, Staff Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance from 1977
- Caldera, Rafael**, President of Venezuela from 1969 until 1974
- Calderon Berti, Humberto**, Venezuelan Minister of Energy and Mines from March 1979
- Calderon Munoz, Abdon**, Radical Alfarist Front candidate in the 1978 Ecuadoran presidential election; assassinated November 29, 1978
- Calderon Fournier, Rafael Angel**, Costa Rican Minister of Foreign Relations from 1978 until 1980
- Callaghan, James**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until May 1979
- Calvani Silva, Aristides**, Venezuelan Senator; Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1969 until 1974
- Camacho Leyva, Luis Carlos**, Colombian Minister of National Defense, from 1978
- Campora, Hector**, President of Argentina from May until July 1973
- Camps, Ramon Juan Alberto**, Brigadier General; chief of Buenos Aires provincial police
- Caprio, Giuseppe**, Archbishop, Substitute for General Affairs, Vatican Secretariat of State until May 1979
- Carazo Odio, Rodrigo**, President of Costa Rica from 1978
- Cardenal, Ramiro**, Nicaraguan businessman and opposition leader; member of the Group of 12
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique**, Brazilian academic
- Cardozo, Hilarion**, Venezuelan Representative to the Organization of American States

- Carter, Hodding III**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department of State spokesperson from March 23, 1977, until June 30, 1980
- Carter, James Earl "Jimmy"**, President of the United States
- Carter, Rosalynn**, First Lady of the United States
- Carvajal Prado, Patricio**, Vice Admiral, Chilean Minister of Foreign Relations, until 1978
- Casaroli, Agostino**, Cardinal, Vatican Secretary of State
- Castro, Fidel**, President of Cuba
- Castro, Raul Hector**, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina from November 1977 until July 1980
- Cauas Lama, Jorge**, Chilean Ambassador to the United States from January 1977 until March 1978
- Cavalcanti, Gerardo Holanda**, Brazilian Ambassador to UNESCO from 1978
- Cerda, Carlos Horacio**, Lieutenant Colonel, Argentine presidential aide
- Chafee, John H.**, Senator (R–Rhode Island)
- Chamorro Cardenal, Pedro Joaquin**, director of the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper *La Prensa*; assassinated January 10, 1978
- Chaplin, Maxwell**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires until 1980
- Cheek, James R.**, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Montevideo from 1977 until 1979
- Christopher, Warren "Chris"**, Deputy Secretary of State
- Civiletti, Benjamin R.**, Deputy Attorney General from 1978 until 1979; Attorney General from 1979
- Clegg, Calvin**, FBI special agent
- Clift, A. Denis**, Assistant for National Security Affairs to Vice President Mondale
- Cohen, Roberta**, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1977
- Cohen, Steven B.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, from 1977 until 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978
- Consalvi Bottaro, Simon**, Venezuelan Representative to the United Nations to July 1977; Minister of Foreign Affairs from July 1977 until March 1979
- Contreras Sepulveda, Juan Manuel**, Colonel, Director of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence to its abolition in August 1977; indicted for the murder of Orlando Letelier in August 1978
- Cooper, Richard Newell**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
- Cordova Rivas, Rafael**, member of the Nicaraguan Provisional Junta from May 1980
- Cornick, Carter**, FBI agent
- Corr, Edwin G.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Quito, 1978. U.S. Ambassador to Peru from October 1980
- Cranston, Alan**, U.S. Senator (D–California)
- Crespo Gutierrez, Alberto**, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States until 1977
- Crespo Zaldumbide, Ricardo**, Ecuadoran Ambassador to the United States from 1979
- Crigler, Trusten Frank**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Bogota, 1979
- Crimmins, John H.**, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil until 1978
- Crowley, John Joseph**, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Caracas from 1977 until 1980
- Cubillos Sallato, Hernán**, Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1978 until 1980
- Cura, Raul**, Under Secretary for International Economic Relations, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, from 1977 until 1980
- Cutler, Lloyd N.**, White House Counsel from 1979
- da Silveira, Antonio Francisco Azaredo**, Brazilian Foreign Minister until March 1979; Brazilian Ambassador to the United States from March 1979
- Dalton, Roberto**, Argentine Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affaires in Washington from 1978

- de la Puente Radbill, Jose**, Foreign Minister of Peru from 1977 until 1978
- Delfante, Enrique**, Uruguayan Sub-Secretary of Foreign Relations until 1978
- Delfim Netto, Antônio**, Brazilian Minister of Planning from August 1979
- Denend, Leslie G. "Les"**, member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from July 1977 until June 1979; Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 1980
- Derian, Patricia Murphy "Patt"**, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State, from June 1977 until August 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from August 1977
- D'Escoto Brockmann, Miguel**, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister from 1979, member of the Group of 12; Maryknoll Catholic priest
- Devine, Frank J.**, Office Director, Office of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1977
- Diaz Bessone, Ramon**, Argentine Minister of Planning until December 1977
- Diez Urzua, Sergio**, Chilean Representative to the United Nations
- Dion, J. Mark**, U.S. Alternate Representative to the Organization of American States in 1977; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Asuncion from 1978, Chargé d'Affaires from January until September 1980
- Dodson, Christine**, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January until May 1977; Staff Secretary from May 1977
- Donovan, Hedley**, Senior Advisor to President Carter from August 1979 until August 1980
- Drexler, Robert W.**, Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Bogota until 1978
- Driscoll, Robert S.**, Chile Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1977
- Duncan, Charles W., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1977 until 1979; Secretary of Energy from 1979
- Durán Arcentales, Luis Guillermo**, General, Commander of the Ecuadorian Army; Member of the Supreme Council of Government, 1979
- Durán-Ballen Cordovez, Sixto**, National Constitutionalist Front candidate in the 1978 Ecuadorian presidential election
- Dworkin, Douglas A.**, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978
- Earle, Ralph II**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1980
- Eastman, Jorge Mario**, Colombian Ambassador to the United States from 1980
- Eaton, Samuel**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs from 1979 until 1980
- Einaudi, Luigi**, Director of Policy Planning for Public and Congressional Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1977; Bureau of Inter-American Affairs Staff Director for National Security Council Interdepartmental Groups, 1980
- Eizenstat, Stuart E.**, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the Domestic Council
- Erb, Guy F.**, member, International Economics Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from September 1977 until January 1980; Deputy Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency from January 1980
- Ericson, Richard A., Jr.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, until November 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Iceland from November 1978
- Escobar Sierra, Hugo**, Colombian Minister of Justice from 1978 until 1980
- Escovar Salom, Ramon**, Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1977
- Espeche Gil, Manuel Angel**, Official, Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- Espinoza Bravo, Pedro**, Brigadier General, Director of Operations of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence to its abolition in August 1977; indicted for the murder of Orlando Letelier in August 1978
- Etcheberry, Alfredo**, Chilean attorney representing the U.S. Government in the Letelier proceedings in Chile
- Febres-Cordero, Leon**, Ecuadorina political operative
- Feinberg, Richard**, member, Policy Planning Staff, from 1977 until 1980
- Fernandez Saavedra, Gustavo**, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, August 1979
- Fernandez Laríos, Armando**, Captain, Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence agent; indicted in August 1978 for his part in the murder of Orlando Letelier (also used pseudonym Alejandro Romeral)
- Fernandez, Sergio**, Chilean Interior Minister from 1978
- Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson**, Uruguayan Senator from 1967 until 1973
- Figueiredo, Joao Batista**, Chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service until 1978; President of Brazil from 1979
- Fimbres, Rudy Valdez**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Quito, 1979
- Fisher, Richard W.**, Executive Assistant, Department of State, 1978
- Flood, Patrick J.**, Regional Affairs Officer, South America, Caribbean and the Organization of American States, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1980; Officer in Charge of Human Rights Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, from 1980
- Folle Martinez, Adolfo**, Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Minister from July 1978
- Fraser, Donald M.**, Member, House of Representatives (D–Minnesota) until January 1979
- Frei, Eduardo**, President of Chile from 1964 until 1970
- Fretes Davalos, Alejandro**, General, Chief of Staff of the Paraguayan Army
- Fuller, Alexander S. C.**, Peru County Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1977; Alternate Director of Andean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, August 1978
- Galtieri, Leopoldo Fortunato**, Major General, Argentine Army office; Commander in Chief of Argentine Army after 1980
- Garcia Bedoya, Carlos**, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States until January 1979; Peruvian Foreign Minister from February 1979
- Garcia Bustillos, Gonzalo**, Venezuelan Minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency from 1979
- Garcia Meza Tejada, Luis**, General, Commander of the Bolivian Army; led military coup and became President of Bolivia in July 1980
- Gardner, Richard N.**, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
- Geisel, Ernesto**, General, President of Brazil until 1979
- Gelb, Leslie H.**, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, from February 1977 until June 1979
- Giambruno, Carlos**, Uruguayan Representative to the United Nations, 1977; Foreign Policy Director, Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978
- Gilman, Benjamin A.**, Member, House of Representatives (R–New York)
- Giscard d’Estaing, Valery**, President of France
- Glenn, John**, Senator (D–Ohio)
- Gonzalez, Raymond E.**, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador from 1978
- Gonzalez Revilla, Nicolas**, Panamanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Goodpaster, Andrew J.**, General, USA, Commandant of West Point; Envoy to Argentina and Brazil in 1980 for talks regarding the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan
- Graham, Richard C.**, Desk Officer for Uruguay and Paraguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

- Graiver, David**, Argentine banker and stockholder in *La Opinion*, a newspaper published by Jacobo Timerman died in a plane crash in 1976; posthumously accused of laundering money for the Montoneros
- Griffin, Robert P.**, Senator (R-Michigan) until January 1979
- Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Guanes Serrano, Benito**, Colonel, Paraguayan Army Intelligence Chief
- Gueiler Tejada, Lidia**, President of Bolivia from November 1979 until July 1980
- Guerra, Manuel**, Ecuador Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
- Guerreiro, Ramiro Saraiva**, Brazilian Foreign Ministry General Secretary until 1978; Foreign Minister from 1979
- Guevara Arze, Walter**, Authentic Revolution Party candidate in 1978 Bolivian presidential election; President of Bolivia from August until November 1979
- Gutierrez, Mario.**, leader of the Bolivian Socialist Falange party
- Guzman, Ralph C.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from 1978 until 1979
- Guzzetti, Cesar Augusto**, Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship until May 1977
- Habib, Philip C.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 1978; thereafter, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State on Caribbean Issues
- Hanson, Thor**, Admiral, Director of the Joint Staff, from 1979 until 1980
- Harguindeguy, Albano**, General, Argentine Minister of the Interior
- Harkin, Thomas**, Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Iowa)
- Harris, F. A. "Tex"**, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, from 1977 until 1979
- Haya de la Torre, Victor Raul**, founder and leader of the APRA party; President of the Peruvian Constituent Assembly from 1978 until 1979
- Heaphy, Eileen M.**, Colombia Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, November 1980
- Heavner, Theodore "Ted"**, Director, Office of Operations and Policy, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from August 1977
- Henning, Geraldo Azevedo**, Admiral, Brazilian Minister of the Navy
- Heredia, Horatio H.**, President of the Supreme Court of Argentina until 1978
- Hernandez Acosta, Valentin**, Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons until March 1979
- Herrera Campins, Luis**, President of Venezuela from 1979
- Hervas, Anthony**, Department of State interpreter
- Hidalgo, Edward**, Secretary of the Navy from 1979
- Hidalgo Sola, Hector**, Argentine Ambassador to Venezuela; member of the Radical Party, disappeared in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1977
- Hill, Robert C.**, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina until 1977
- Hodges, Luther H., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Commerce from 1980
- Hollings, Ernest "Friz"**, Member, House of Representative (D-South Carolina)
- Hormats, Robert D.**, National Security Council Staff for International Economics until October 1977; Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from October 1977 until December 1979; Deputy U.S. Trade Representative from December 1979
- Hoyt, Mary**, Rosalynn Carter's press secretary
- Huerta Montalvo, Francisco**, candidate in 1978 Ecuadoran presidential election; disqualified in March 1978 and replaced by his uncle, Raul Clemente Huerta Rendon
- Huerta Rendon, Raul Clemente**, candidate in 1978 Ecuadoran presidential election
- Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr.**, Senator (D-Minnesota) until January 1978; Vice President of the United States from 1965 until 1969

Hunter, Robert, member, West Europe Cluster, National Security Council staff, from January 1977 until August 1979; member, Middle East/North Africa Cluster, from September 1979

Hurtado, Oswaldo, Vice President of Ecuador from 1978; leader of the Popular Democracy Party

Hurtado Navarro, Hector, Venezuelan Minister of Finance until 1977; Minister of State and President of the Investment Fund, 1978

Hyde, Henry, Member, House of Representatives (R-Illinois)

Inderfurth, Karl F. "Rick", Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, from January 1977 until April 1979

Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D-Hawaii)

Iribarren Borges, Ignacio, Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States

Iturralde, Carlos, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States, 1978

Iturriaga Neumann, Raul Eduardo, Lieutenant Colonel, senior officer in the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence

Jarrin Cahuenas, Bolivar, General, Ecuadoran Minister of Government until December 1978

Jimenez, Guillermo, Bolivian Interior Minister, 1978; Acting Foreign Minister, May 1978

John Paul II, Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church from 1978

Johnson, Richard E., Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Brasilia, until 1978; Director of the Regional Political Program, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1980

Jones, David C., General, USAF Chief of Staff until June 1978; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1978

Jones, Ellis O. "Ollie", Politico-Military Affairs, Security Assistance, Office of Human Rights, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, until January 1979

Jordan, Hamilton, Assistant to the President from January 1977 until July 1979; White House Chief of Staff from July 1979 until June 1980

Jorden, William, U.S. Ambassador to Panama until 1978

Katz, Julius, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs until 1979

Kennedy, Edward "Ted", Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Killgore, Andrew I., U.S. Ambassador to Qatar

Kissinger, Henry A., Secretary of State from September 1973 until January 1977; National Security Advisor from January 1969 until November 1975

Klix, Jose Maria, Argentine Defense Minister until October 1978

Klutznick, Philip M., Secretary of Commerce from January 1980

Kramer, Franklin S. "Frank", Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Kriesky, Bruno, Chancellor of Austria

Laghi, Pio, Papal Nuncio in Argentina until December 1980

Lake, Anthony "Tony", Director of Policy Planning, Department of State

Lamb, Dennis, Deputy Director, Office of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1977 until 1978; thereafter, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the European Communities at Brussels

Lambruschini, Armando, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Argentine Navy from September 1978

- Landau, George W.**, U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay until October 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Chile from November 1977
- Lane, Lyle Francis**, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay from October 1979 until July 1980; U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay from September 1980
- Laugerud García, Kjell Eugenio**, President of Guatemala until July 1978
- Lauria, Carmelo Lesseur**, Venezuelan Minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency from July 1977 until March 1979
- Lechin Oquendo, Juan**, Leader of the Bolivian Workers Union
- Lechin Suarez, Juan**, Bolivian Minister of Planning until 1978
- Leigh, Gustavo**, General, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Air Force; member of the ruling junta until 1978
- Leoro, Luis Anibal**, General, Ecuadoran Air Force Commander and member of the Supreme Council of Government
- Letelier, Orlando**, Chilean Ambassador to the United States from 1971 until 1993; Chilean Foreign Minister, 1973; assassinated in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1976
- Lievano Aguirre, Indalecio**, Colombian Foreign Minister until 1978
- Lister, George**, Special Assistant and Human Rights Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
- Lopez Escobar, Mario**, Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States
- Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso**, President of Colombia until August 1978
- Lopez Portillo, Jose**, President of Mexico
- Lucas Garcia, Fernando Romeo**, President of Guatemala from July 1978
- Lucey, Patrick**, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from July 1977 until October 1979
- Luers, William Henry**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1977 until 1978; U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from October 1978
- Machin, Jose Maria**, Venezuelan Ambassador to the Organization of American States
- Madero, Castro**, Argentine Admiral
- Majano Ramos, Adolfo Arnoldo**, Colonel; member of the Salvadoran ruling junta from October 1979
- Manley, Michael**, Prime Minister of Jamaica
- Marchand, Luis**, Peruvian Ambassador to the Organization of American States
- Marquez, Hugo L.**, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Navy
- Marshall, Ray**, Secretary of Labor
- Martinez, Carlos**, General, Argentine Secretary of Intelligence from 1978
- Martinez de Hoz, Jose**, Argentine Minister of the Economy
- Massera, Emilio Eduardo**, Admiral, Commander of the Argentine Navy; member of the ruling junta until 1978
- Mathews, Jessica Tuchman**, member, Global Issues Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until June 1979
- McAfee, William**, Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- McAuliffe, Dennis P.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Commander of U.S. Southern Command until September 1979
- McGee, Gale**, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States
- McGiffert, David E.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from April 1977
- McHenry, Donald**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from September 1979
- McMahon, John N.**, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
- McNeil, Francis J. III "Frank"**, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from 1977 to 1979

- Medeiros, Octavio Aguiarde**, General, Chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service
- Mena Salinas, Odlanier**, General (retired), Director of the Chilean National Information Center from November 1977;
- Mendez Manfredini, Aparicio**, President of Uruguay
- Mendoza, Cesar**, Chief of the Carabineros (Chilean national police force); member of the ruling junta
- Menendez, Luciano Benjamin**, Major General, Commander of Argentine Army Corps III in Cordoba
- Merino, Jose Toribio**, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy; member of the ruling junta
- Mezvinsky, Edward M.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights from 1977 until 1979
- Miller, G. William**, Secretary of the Treasury from August 1979
- Miranda, Rogelio**, General, Bolivian Army officer, presidential candidate in 1979
- Moffitt, Veronica "Ronni" Karpen**, colleague of Orlando Letelier; killed on September 21, 1976, while riding in car with Letelier in Washington, D.C., when a bomb exploded in Letelier's car
- Mondale, Joan**, wife of the Vice President of the United States
- Mondale, Walter "Fritz"**, Vice President of the United States
- Montanaro, Sabino**, Paraguayan Minister of Interior
- Montano, Galo**, Ecuadoran Minister of Industries and Commerce
- Montero, Enrique**, Chilean Air Force; Under Secretary of the Ministry of Interior
- Montes, Jose**, Major General, Argentine army officer
- Montes, Oscar**, Admiral, Argentine Foreign Minister from May 1977 until November 1978
- Montes de Oca, Rafael Andres "Pepi"**, Venezuelan Interior Minister from 1979
- Morales Bermudez Cerutti, Francisco**, General, President of Peru
- Moore, John L., Jr.**, Chairman, Export-Import Bank
- Mota Sardenberg, Ronaldo**, Counselor; Advisor for Bilateral Affairs, Brazilian Foreign Ministry, 1978
- Muskie, Edward S.**, Senator (D-Maine) until May 1980; Secretary of State from May 1980
- Natusch Busch, Alberto**, Colonel, advisor to Bolivian President Juan Pereda, 1978; led a military coup in November 1979; President of Bolivia, from November 1 to 16, 1979
- Nava Carrillo, German**, Director General of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister from 1979
- Newsom, David D.**, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until October 1977; U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines from November 1977 until March 1978; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1978
- Niehous, Donna**, wife of William Niehous
- Niehous, William**, U.S. citizen director, Owens-Illinois company in Venezuela; kidnapped February 27, 1976, freed in June 1979
- Nogueira Filho, Jose**, Counsellor, Advisor for Political Affairs, Brazilian Foreign Ministry
- Nogues, Alberto**, Paraguayan Foreign Minister
- Novo Sampol, Guillermo**, Cuban exile convicted of the Letelier and Moffitt murders
- Novo Sampol, Ignacio**, Cuban exile convicted of lying to the grand jury and failing to inform authorities of a crime in the Letelier and Moffitt murder case
- Nutting, Wallace H.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Commander of U.S. Southern Command from 1979
- Odom, William E.**, Lieutenant General, USA, Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1977 until 1981
- Oduber Quiros, Daniel**, President of Costa Rica until 1978

- Olmedo Gonzalez, Renan**, General, Chairman of the Ecuadoran Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Orfila, Alejandro Jose Luis**, Secretary General of the Organization of American States
- Orozco, Hector**, General, head of the Chilean Army Intelligence Directorate; ad hoc military prosecutor and investigator of passport fraud case related to Letelier assassination
- Ortiz Mena, Antonio**, President of the Inter-American Development Bank
- Oxman, Stephen A.**, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1977 until 1978; Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978 until 1979
- Owen, Henry D.**, member, International Economics Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from 1977; also Special Representative for Economic Summits from October 1978
- Oyarzun, Maria Eugenia**, Chilean Ambassador to the Organization of American States, 1977
- Pacheco Areco, Jorge**, Uruguayan Ambassador to the United States from June 1980; President of Uruguay, from 1967 until 1972
- Padilla, David**, General, Bolivian army, led a coup against President Juan Pereda in November 1978; President of Bolivia from November 1978 until August 1979
- Pallais Debayle, Luis**, cousin of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza; director of *Novedades*; Nicaraguan Liberal Party spokesperson
- Palmer, Stephen E., Jr.**, Director, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Staff Director, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Director, Country Reports Project, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State, from 1978 until 1979; Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, U.S. Mission in Geneva, 1979; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1979; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1980
- Pantoja, Jeronimo**, Colonel, Chilean army officer and Deputy Director of the National Information Center
- Pappalardo, Conrado**, Advisor to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner
- Pareja Diezcanseco, Alfredo**, Ecuadoran Foreign Minister from August 1979 until July 1980
- Pastor, Carlos Washington**, Argentine Foreign Minister from November 1978
- Pastor, Robert**, member, Latin American/Caribbean, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff
- Pastora Gomez, Eden**, also known as "Commandante Zero", commander in the Nicaraguan Sandinista National Liberation Front
- Paz Estenssoro, Victor**, Nationalist Revolution Mombement ("historical" wing) candidate in the 1978 Bolivian presidential election
- Paz Romero, Virgilio**, Cuban exile indicted for murders of Letelier and Moffitt; fugitive from justice until 1991
- Paz Zamora, Jaime**, Bolivian politician from the Revolutionary Leftist Movement party
- Pereda Asbun, Juan**, General, candidate in the 1978 Bolivian presidential election; led a military coup after elections were annulled; President of Bolivia from July until November 1978
- Perez, Carlos Andres "CAP"**, President of Venezuela until 1979
- Perez, Enrique**, Bolivia Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, November 1978
- Perez Caldas, Jose**, Uruguayan ambassador to the United States
- Perez Chiriboga, Marcial**, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States
- Perez Guerrero, Manuel**, Venezuelan Minister of State for International Economic Affairs

- Perez Jimenez, Marcos**, President of Venezuela from 1952 until 1958
- Perez Vives, Alvaro**, Colombian Secretary General of the Presidency
- Peron, Isabel Martinez de**, President of Argentina from 1974 until 1976
- Peron, Juan Domingo**, President of Argentina from 1955 until 1964 and again from 1973 until 1974
- Perry, Jack R.**, Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of State
- Pezzullo, Lawrence A. "Larry"**, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay from August 1977 until May 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua from July 1979
- Pinheiro, Joao Baptista**, Brazilian ambassador to the United States until 1979
- Pinochet Ugarte, Augusto**, General, President of Chile; Chairman of the military junta; Commander in Chief of the Chilean army
- Plaza, Galo**, President of Ecuador from 1948 until 1952; Secretary-General of the Organization of American States from 1968 until 1975
- Popper, David H.**, U.S. Ambassador to Chile until 1977
- Poveda Burbano, Alfredo**, Admiral, President of the Ecuadoran Supreme Council of Government until 1979
- Powell, Jody**, White House Press Secretary
- Prado, Gary**, Bolivian Planning Minister until 1979
- Press, Frank**, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, from June 1977
- Price, George Cadle**, Premier and Minister of Finance of Belize
- Propper, Eugene M. "Gene"**, Assistant U.S. Attorney; prosecutor in charge of the Letelier investigation
- Pustay, John S.**, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Quainton, Anthony "Tony"**, Director, Office for Combating Terror, Department of State
- Queirolo, Luis**, Lieutenant General, Chief of Uruguayan military mission to the United States and Uruguayan representative at the Inter-American Defense Board until February 1979; Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan army from February 1979
- Quintana, Julio**, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua from 1977 until 1979
- Rachmeler, Louis**, Major General, USA, coordinator of security assistance for the Department of the Army
- Ramos, Pedro**, U.S. citizen indicted for the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in Nicaragua
- Reuss, Henry S.**, Member of the House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin)
- Richardson, Elliott**, U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference
- Richardson, Henry**, member, Sub-Saharan Africa, North/South Cluster, National Security Council Staff, from February 1977 until November 1978
- Robelo Callejas, Alfonso**, member of Nicaraguan Provisional Junta until April 1980
- Roel Garcia, Santiago**, Mexican Foreign Minister until 1979
- Rogers, Stephen H.**, Deputy Director, Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1977
- Roldos Aguilera, Jaime**, President of Ecuador from 1978
- Romeral, Alejandro**, pseudonym; see Fernandez Larios, Armando
- Romero, Carlos Humberto**, President of El Salvador from July 1977 until October 1979
- Rondon, Fernando E.**, Alternate Director, Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1978
- Ros, Enrique**, Argentine Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Ross Diaz, Alvin**, Cuban exile convicted of murders of Letelier and Moffitt
- Rovira, Alejandro**, Uruguayan Foreign Minister until July 1978
- Rowlands, Edward**, Minister of State, British Foreign Office, until May 1979
- Roybal, Edward R.**, Member, House of Representatives (D-CA)

- Royo, Aristides**, President of Panama from October 1978
- Ruser, Claus**, Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Brasilia until April 1978; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires from July 1980
- Sadat, Anwar**, President of Egypt
- Sáenz Barsallo, Alcibiades**, Peruvian Finance Minister
- Salvador Lara, Jorge**, Ecuadoran Foreign Minister until 1978
- Samore, Antonio**, Roman Catholic cardinal, Vatican mediator for Beagle Channel conflict, 1979
- Samudio, David**, Leader of Panamanian Liberal Party
- Sangurgo, Francisco**, Rear Admiral, Deputy Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Navy
- Santini, James D.**, Member, House of Representatives (D-Nevada)
- Saunders, Harold H.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State until April 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 1978
- Sayre, Robert M.**, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from 1978
- Scherrer, Robert W.**, FBI special agent; legal attaché, U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, from 1970 until 1978
- Schlesinger, James R.**, Special Assistant to the President, Energy Office, from January until August 1977; Secretary of Energy from August 1977 until July 1979
- Schneider, Mark L.**, Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State until 1977; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from 1977 until 1979
- Schuller, Gordon J.**, Rear Admiral, USN, Director of the Inter-American Region, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Schweitzer, Miguel**, Chilean attorney
- Sendic, Raul**, Uruguayan leader of the MLN-Tupamaros; captured by the Uruguayan Government in 1972
- Service, Robert Edward**, Country Director for Argentina, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1980
- Shlaudeman, Harry Walter**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, until March 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Peru from June 1977 until October 1980; U.S. Ambassador to Argentina from November 1980
- Siles Salinas, Luis Adolfo**, Bolivian UDP candidate for Senator, 1978; head of the Human Rights Assembly until 1978; President of Bolivia, 1969; half-brother of Hernan Siles Zuazo
- Siles Zuazo, Hernan**, UDP candidate in the 1978 Bolivian presidential election; half-brother of Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas
- Silveira, Alarico**, Brazilian Ambassador to the Organization of American States, 1978
- Simonsen, Mario Henrique**, Brazilian Minister of Finance until 1979; Brazilian Minister of Planning, from 1979
- Siracusa, Ernest**, U.S. Ambassador to Uruguay until April 1977
- Sithole, Ndabaningi**, Founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union
- Sloss, Leon**, Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau and later International Security Programs Bureau, Arms Control, and Disarmament Agency, until 1978
- Smith, Gerard C.**, Special Representative of the President on Nonproliferation Matters
- Smith, Ian**, Prime Minister of Rhodesia until June 1979
- Solomon, Anthony**, Under Secretary of the Treasury until 1980
- Somoza Debayle, Anastasio**, President of Nicaragua until July 1979; resident of Paraguay from August 1979 until his death in September 1980
- Sosa Rodriguez, Carlos**, Venezuelan Representative to the United Nations from 1958 until 1965

- Sparkman, John J.**, Senator (D–Alabama) until January 1979
- Spiegel, John W.**, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from 1978
- Stedman, William Perry**, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia from until June 1977; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from June 1977
- Steven, Robert S.**, Chile Desk Officer, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from August 1977 until April 1979; Operations Center, Office of the Secretary of State, from April 1979
- Strauss, Robert S.**, U.S. Trade Representative from March 1977 until August 1979
- Stroessner, Alfredo**, General, President of Paraguay
- Suarez Gonzalez, Adolfo**, Prime Minister of Spain
- Suarez Mason, Carlos Guillermo**, Major General, Argentine army officer, Commander of Corps I, Buenos Aires; Chief of Staff of the Argentine army
- Surut, Lee E.**, Major General, USA, member of military delegation on Under Secretary of State Newsom's trip to Argentina, 1978
- Tapia, Edwin**, Bolivian Minister of Industry and Commerce, 1978
- Tarnoff, Peter**, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Western Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until April 1977; Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, from April 1977
- Tavares Fleitas, Flavio**, Brazilian-born journalist working for Mexican newspaper *Excelsior*; imprisoned in Uruguay, July 1977
- Terra, Juan Pablo**, leader of the Uruguayan Christian Democratic Party
- Thornton, Thomas P.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until 1977; member, South Asia/UN Matters, North/South Cluster, National Security Council staff from 1977
- Timerman, Jacobo**, Argentine publisher of the Buenos Aires daily newspaper *La Opinion*; arrested April 1977
- Todman, Terence A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from April 1977 until June 1978
- Torres, Juan Jose**, President of Bolivia from October 1970 until August 1971; assassinated in Buenos Aires, June 2, 1976
- Torrijos, Omar**, Chief of Government of Panama
- Townley, Michael Vernon**, U.S. citizen convicted in Letelier murder; DINA agent; used pseudonym Juan Williams Rose
- Trudeau, Pierre**, Prime Minister of Canada until June 1979
- Tuchman, Jessica**, See Mathews, Jessica Tuchman
- Tunnerman Bernheim, Carlos**, Leader of the FAO, Member of the Group of 12; Nicaraguan Minister of Education from 1979
- Turbay Ayala, Julio Cesar**, President of Colombia, from June 1978
- Turner, Stansfield**, Director of Central Intelligence from March 1977
- Twaddell, William H.**, Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of State, from January 1977
- Tyson, Brady**, staff member, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
- Uribe Vargas, Diego**, Colombian Foreign Minister from 1978
- Vadora, Julio**, General, Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan army from 1977 until 1978
- Vaky, Viron P. "Pete"**, U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela until June 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from July 1978 until November 1979
- van Reigersberg, Stephanie**, Department of State interpreter
- Vance, Cyrus**, Secretary of State until April 1980
- Vaquero, Jose Antonio**, Major General, Chief of Staff of the Argentine army, 1980
- Vesco, Robert**, fugitive American financier

- Vidal Basauri, Rene**, General, Chilean Secretary of Government
- Videla, Jorge Rafael**, Lieutenant General, President of Argentina; Commander of the Army; member of the ruling junta
- Villagran Kramer, Francisco**, Vice President of Guatemala from 1978 until 1980
- Villanueva de Campos, Armando**, Secretary-General of the APRA Party and candidate in the 1980 Peruvian presidential election
- Villot, Jean-Marie**, Roman Catholic Cardinal, Vatican Secretary of State until 1979
- Viola, Roberto**, General, Chief of Staff of the Argentine army; member of the ruling junta
- Vorster, B.J.**, Prime Minister of South Africa until September 1978
- Wagner, Robert F.**, U.S. Presidential Envoy to the Vatican
- Waldheim, Kurt**, United Nations Secretary General
- Walker, Jenonne R.**, member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- Walker Martinez, Liliana**, pseudonym, see Lagos, Monica Luisa
- Walters, Vernon**, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1972 until 1976
- Warnke, Paul C.**, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from March 1977 until October 1978
- Watson Alexander F.**, Special Assistant for Congressional and Public Affairs, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1977; Director, Office of Development Finance, International Financial Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, from 1977 until 1979; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in La Paz, from 1979
- Weissman, Marvin**, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, from March until July 1980
- White, Robert E.**, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States until 1977; U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay from November 1977 until January 1980; U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from March 1980 until February 1981
- Whitman, Gerald J.**, staff member, Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1980
- Williams, Eric**, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
- Williams Rose, Juan**, pseudonym, see Townley, Michael V
- Willis, Franklin K.**, Assistant Legal Advisor for Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until 1978
- Wilson, Charles "Charlie"**, Member, House of Representatives (D-Texas)
- Wisner, Frank G., II**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from 1979
- Wolff, Lester Lionel**, Member of the House of Representatives (D-New York) until 1980
- Yatron, Gus**, Member, House of Representatives (D-Pennsylvania)
- Ycaza, Gustavo**, Ecuadoran Ambassador to the United States
- Youle, John J.**, political officer, U.S. Embassy in Montevideo from 1977 until 1980
- Young, Andrew**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 1977 until September 1979
- Zambrano Velasco, Jose Alberto**, Venezuela. Foreign Minister from March 1979
- Zimmerman, Robert W.**, director, Office of East Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1977

South America; Latin America Region, 1977–1980

Latin America Region

1. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-17¹

Washington, January 26, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Commerce
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Special Trade Representative

SUBJECT

Review of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 2, PRM/NSC 1–24 [1]. Secret.

The President has directed that the PRM/NSC–1 on Panama² lead into a broad review of our overall policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The PRC, chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for preparation of this review, which should clearly state areas of inter-agency agreement and disagreement.³

The study should analyze the major issues of concern to the U.S. and Latin America and examine whether the current assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward the region as well as the policies themselves are appropriate to an effective handling of these issues. The review should concentrate initially on six areas and then proceed to a discussion of an overall policy.⁴

The study should be completed by March 1.

The six areas for initial analysis include:

1. *Interests.* What economic, political, and military changes have occurred over the past decade in the international environment, in the U.S. and in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean? How have these changes affected the ways in which U.S. policies can advance or protect U.S. interests in the region or influence the internal or external policies of the region's governments?

What are U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean today, and how have they evolved over the past decade? What is the broad psychological climate within the hemisphere into which U.S. policies and action will be projected over the next decade?⁵

2. *Economic Issues.* The economic issues of concern to Latin America, including trade, commodities, debt, international financial institutions, foreign direct investment, science and technology, and development

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, Documents 2 and 3.

³ See Document 4.

⁴ In a January 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "Rather than begin such a study with a discussion of a 'general approach,' which would probably lead into an unnecessarily entangled philosophical debate over the 'special relationship,' I thought it would be much more fruitful to address specific issues and proceed inductively and in steps to a conceptual summary. After addressing economic issues and human rights considerations,—the two central elements of any U.S. policy to Latin America, it will be clear why the U.S. cannot realistically adopt one policy to Latin America and another for the rest of the developing world, and why a single foreign policy to a region as heterogeneous as Latin America is not the best way to approach the problem." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 64, PRM–17 [Latin America]: 1/77–3/14/77)

⁵ A January 25 draft of this PRM included the following additional sentences here: "Do covert operations or other forms of intervention damage or further U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean? What can be done about Latin American perceptions of covert U.S. interference in their internal affairs?" In a January 26 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor attached this draft and noted that Einaudi had redrafted those sentences to read: "What is the Latin American perception of our past covert and military intervention and of our future intentions in this respect? How can those perceptions be

assistance make up the agenda of the North-South dialogue. Therefore, in developing options for U.S. policies on these issues, the review should include a discussion of (a) how it would impact on U.S. and Latin/Caribbean interests, and (b) how it might be implemented, including possible need for new legislation or a modification of existing legislation. These options should take explicit account of the differentiation of Latin America and the Caribbean as between middle range powers and less-developed countries. Discussion of strategies for each option should address its relationship to the broader North-South dialogue and should identify which institution(s)—if any—might be the most appropriate and effective for dealing with the issue.

The review should also include an analysis and possible options for U.S. policy toward Latin American and Caribbean efforts at regional economic integration, including the Central American Common Market, Caribbean Community, Andean Pact, LAFTA, and also the Latin American Economic System (SELA).

3. *Human Rights*. What options are available for U.S. foreign policy to reflect a higher and more effective level of concern for fundamental human rights in all nations?

Options should be developed for U.S. policy in: (a) bilateral relationships (taking into consideration distinctions between degrees of human rights violations and types of governments); (b) multilateral organizations, including intergovernmental organizations like the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Commission; non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists; and third parties like Western European governments and the Vatican; and (c) signing and ratification of various conventions, including the American Convention on Human Rights.⁶

A discussion should also be included of ways to strengthen the internal capacity of the U.S. Government to assess reports and to make determinations on “consistent patterns of gross violations of human

dealt with most effectively?” Pastor wrote to Brzezinski: “I felt that this formulation focused attention on Latin American perceptions rather than on the reality of covert operations and whether we should continue to undertake them (some or all) in Latin America and the Caribbean” and that Lake had recommended that “this question should be addressed” in the SCC. Pastor continued: “Given the very real and continued importance of this issue in U.S.-Latin American relations, I do not believe a review of overall U.S. policy would be complete without a good discussion of the past and the future of covert operations in the hemisphere.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 38, PRM–17 [1])

⁶ Carter signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, pp. 1050–1051*)

rights". It should also include a review of present U.S. policy with regard to temporary asylum in U.S. Embassies, and emigration to the U.S. of refugees from political repression.

4. *Special Country Problems*. With regard to each, what are U.S. interests, and in the light of those interests what should U.S. objectives be? What options and strategies are available to the U.S. to attain those objectives?

- a. Cuba (can be dealt with separately and more quickly)
- b. Brazil
- c. Mexico
- d. Central America

5. *Caribbean*. This section should consider: (a) a discussion of the economic and political problems of the independent and non-self-governing islands of the Caribbean; (b) a review of U.S. security, economic, humanitarian, and political interests in the region, and strategies for advancing or protecting those interests; and (c) the desirability and feasibility of assisting the development of the region in a way which will not collide with the aspirations for national independence of the new independent countries of the region.

6. *Institutional and Other Issues*. Issues for review include, but need not be limited to:

- a. *Inter-American System*: U.S. purposes with respect to the Organization of American States, the Rio Treaty,⁷ and other regional organizations like the Inter-American Defense Board.
- b. U.S. Policies on *Territorial Disputes*:
 - (1) Bolivia-Chile-Peru
 - (2) Peru-Ecuador
 - (3) El Salvador-Honduras
 - (4) Belize
 - (5) Guyana-Surinam-Venezuela
 - (6) Venezuela-Colombia
- c. *Arms Sales*, military training and U.S. military representation.
- d. *Nuclear Proliferation* and safeguards.
- e. *Narcotics*.
- f. *Illegal Immigration*.

⁷ The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, a treaty of mutual defense also known as the Rio Treaty or Rio Pact, was signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947. For the full text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, September 21, 1947, pp. 565–567.

This review should identify at the conclusion the basic options for an overall U.S.-Latin American policy in light of the options identified for the major issues considered above.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

2. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Your Request for an Assessment of Peru's Military Threat and Appropriate U.S. Response²

Attached at Tab A is the study you requested on the Peruvian armament level and potential threat.³ State prepared it in consultation with Defense, CIA, and NSC Staff. At Tab B is the quantitative summary of the military capabilities of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and also some options for U.S. policy suggested [*less than 1 line not declassified*]⁴ At Tab C is a short paper prepared by the CIA assessing the Peruvian threat.⁵ At Tab D, the State Department has prepared a comprehensive list of options for U.S. policy with regard to the arms build-up in the Andes and the possibility of a war.⁶

The principal points made in the studies include:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 39, Peru, 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² In a February 18 note to Brzezinski, Carter wrote: "I'm concerned about Peru & armament level. Advise how best to express our concern to P. & USSR, & give me more detailed assessment of the potential threat to neighboring countries. J." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Peru, 2-12/77)

³ Tab A is attached but not printed.

⁴ Tab B, the undated quantitative summary entitled "Comparative Order of Battle for the Andean Region," is not printed. The policy options portion of Tab B is presumably the paper marked "Annex B" in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Peru, 2-12/77.

⁵ Tab C, the February 23 paper entitled "Peru: An Assessment of the Threat," is attached but not printed.

⁶ Tab D, an undated paper entitled "Options for Action to Reduce Tension in the Andes," is attached but not printed.

1. Since 1973, Peru has bought or made commitments to purchase weapons from the Soviet Union valued at approximately \$500 million. This has permitted Peru to gain a considerable advantage in materiel over its neighbors. One reason the Peruvians have done this is to compensate for clear inferiority in human materiel (education and competence of its Indian soldiers).

2. While Peru's neighbors fear its possible expansionist and revanchist (lost territory to Chile in 1879) designs, State, Defense, and CIA believe that, if anything, Peru has grown more cautious as a result of its near-war with Ecuador in December, 1976. The political instability in Peru, however, could conceivably create a situation or a (Peruvian) government that would attack its neighbors. The combined assessment of State and the CIA is that the chances for an outbreak of hostilities this year are slight.

3. With its military materiel advantage, Peru will undoubtedly call for regional arms limitations agreement, but its neighbors are not likely to want one. The U.S. can try to play the role of honest broker to bring the countries together, but it is possible that our motives would be questioned. Bolivia, however, has invited the United States Government to make a clear public declaration of its strong opposition to conflict in the region.⁷

4. While Peru's neighbors have sent missions abroad to purchase arms, an arms race is hardly inevitable. The Bolivian Foreign Minister, for example, has informed our Ambassador that he believes Bolivia will not shift funds out of economic development into the purchasing of new weapons.⁸ Nor are we likely to see a significant shift in preferences from U.S. and western sources of supplies to Soviet sources. In spite of our veto of the Israeli sale of Kfirs to Ecuador,⁹ the President of Ecuador has informed our Ambassador that he intends to send a high-level mission, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, to Washington—not to Moscow—to reaffirm Ecuador's interest in close ties with the U.S. as well as to discuss their concern for Ecuador's military security.¹⁰

⁷ In telegram 1386 from La Paz, February 22, the Embassy reported that Adriaola "emphasized that US has a major responsibility to preserve peace in the Southern Cone, especially to prevent weak country such as Bolivia from being hurt by armed conflict. Said he thought US should make clear public declaration of its strong opposition to conflict in Southern Cone." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/77–12/79 #1)

⁸ In telegram 1386 from La Paz, February 22, the Embassy reported that Adriaola believed that Bolivia would not "spend significant amounts on new weapons." (Ibid.)

⁹ See footnote 2, Document 266.

¹⁰ See Documents 265 and 266. In telegram 1408 from Quito, March 3, the Embassy reported that the Government of Ecuador had "decided that before sending the high-level mission which it had previously requested, it wishes to send a mission at the Under Secretary level to test the water in Washington." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770072–0592)

5. By cutting FMS credits for Peru this year and vetoing the Kfir sale, we have already taken a few steps to show our resistance to an arms race in the region. Besides privately urging the nations of the region, especially Peru, to limit their arms purchases and publicly stating the need for peace in the region, other options for the U.S. (Tab D) include stimulating a multilateral effort among arms suppliers to limit sales and monitoring purchases closely with the idea of trying to lend balance when possible. It is not expected that any U.S. initiative to the Soviet Union, except in a multilateral framework, will succeed in limiting their sales to the region. The Policy Review on Conventional Arms Sales (PRM-12)¹¹ and on Latin American (PRM-17)¹² will look into these questions more deeply.¹³

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 259.

¹² See Document 1.

¹³ Carter wrote and underlined "ok" at the bottom of the memorandum.

3. Article in the *National Intelligence Daily* Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 8, 1977

LATIN AMERICA: The Human Rights Question

The vigorous actions of military governments in South America against real or perceived threats from subversive groups has led to numerous human rights violations in recent years. The abrogation of constitutional guarantees protecting individual freedoms has also focused the attention of church groups, international agencies, and the international press on human rights practices in that region.

Chile has been the main target of this criticism, but heavy attention has also been directed at other authoritarian regimes in the Southern

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 79T00975A, Box 299, Folder 1, National (Current) (Central) Intelligence Daily/Cable. Top Secret; [handling restriction and drafting information not declassified]. The information in this article was covered in the March 11 President's Daily Brief. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Daily CIA Brief File, Box 1, 3/1/77-3/13/77)

Cone. The bloody struggle between the left and right in Argentina, resulting in over 1,200 deaths in 1976 alone, is subjecting the government of President Videla to increasingly adverse criticism.

The Uruguayan government has been widely criticized for its mistreatment of political prisoners. The Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay has ruled with an iron hand for more than 20 years, and its internal security practices have long been a subject of criticism. Less attention has been paid to Brazil in recent months, even though human rights violations still occur there.

As a whole, however, there has probably been a slight improvement in the human rights situation in these countries during the past year. The prospects for further progress are encouraging as long as the full weight of international opinion is brought to bear on the problem. Any US action construed as a threat or reprisal, however, could lead to some backsliding and surely would stimulate more charges that the US is intervening in the domestic affairs of these countries.

Argentina

Human rights violations both by the left and the right remain serious in Argentina, but the frequency and scale of abuses by the security forces and by rightist vigilantes has diminished noticeably since the peak last summer. The government now at least issues public lists of those it detains, although the completeness and accuracy of the lists are open to question.

It is difficult to judge how many prisoners have now been released or at least accounted for, since the total number of those arrested is not known. International criticism and investigations of the human rights situation in Argentina have generated considerable irritation among Argentine officials, particularly those charged with putting an end to leftist guerrilla warfare.

Although the armed forces have had marked success against the terrorists, the job is still far from complete. If the guerrillas stage renewed provocations, those in charge of counterterrorist activities will probably push for a return to the brutal roundups of suspected leftists that were relatively common last year. President Videla [*less than 1 line not declassified*] expects some worsening of relations with the US over the human rights issue but apparently finds his hands tied by political constraints imposed by hard-line factions within the armed forces.

Brazil

Brazilian security forces have operated with considerable autonomy since the military took power in 1964. The constitution of 1967 and a number of extraconstitutional decrees have suspended such rights as habeas corpus for persons accused of crimes involving “national

security" and given the security forces the authority to detain suspects arbitrarily for lengthy periods, leading to abuses of human rights.

Last year, however, President Geisel took a strong public stand against torture by removing a military security official and a major commander after two civilians died in military jails. Since January 1976, there have been only occasional reports of torture of political prisoners.

There are no reliable figures on the number of political prisoners in Brazil. In October 1976, Amnesty International reported that some 2,000 political prisoners were arrested during 1975 and 1976 and that between 700 and 800 of them were still under detention. US embassy officials in Brasilia believe that both these estimates are exaggerated; they acknowledge, however, that they do not have any firm statistics.

The improvement in the human rights situation in Brazil during the past year has been primarily because of President Geisel's personal intervention on the side of moderation, the strong interest shown by the Brazilian Catholic Church, and the attention given to the subject in the international press.

Chile

The government of President Pinochet has demonstrated progress in its human rights practices over the past several months. Overall improvements have also been noted by some of the junta's most persistent critics and supporters of human rights in Chile, particularly the Catholic Church's Vicariate of Solidarity and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The number of prisoners held without charge has declined sharply; the government says only one major figure from the Allende era is still imprisoned without charge. It has offered to exchange him for a prominent prisoner held by the Cubans.

Most of those being tried or serving sentences are now out on bail, on parole, or under house arrest. The government is also taking steps to commute the sentences of many persons already convicted.

Reports of illegal detentions, torture, or killings have tapered off considerably. There have apparently been no such instances this year. On the other hand, the authoritarian control of the junta has not been relaxed, and state-of-siege restrictions remain in effect more than three years after the military takeover. Cases of the 13 persons who "disappeared" late last year, along with hundreds of others missing since the 1973 coup, have not been resolved, and suspicions often point to the Directorate of National Intelligence.

The directorate has operated as a secret police force responsible only to Pinochet. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* it may have refined its practices and adopted more subtle methods of dealing with alleged

“enemies of the state.” [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] and it is difficult to pin down responsibility for the illegal detentions and unexplained disappearances.

The government asserts that these people have either fled the country or gone underground. In some cases, leftists may be attempting to discredit the government by concocting stories of alleged missing persons.

The ad hoc group of the UN Human Rights Commission has issued a report condemning the “unlimited powers” of the Chilean intelligence directorate and charging that the machinery for political repression in Chile has not been dismantled.² Committee members strongly resent the Pinochet government’s stubborn refusal to allow an inspection team to visit the country.

Human rights remain a pervasive problem. The junta will probably continue the slow trend toward normalization. The pace, however, will depend largely on the junta’s perception of its security requirements and Pinochet’s willingness to enact more effective reforms.

Uruguay

The military-dominated Mendez government, which came to power last September, has grown increasingly conscious of its poor reputation abroad on the human rights issue. It has shown serious concern over the deteriorating state of its relations with the US.

Some positive measures have been taken, but the military’s grip on the government has tightened, and many civilians have been deprived of their political rights.

A high government official, in a recent address to an international organization, publicly committed the government to rectifying the situation. New measures reportedly under consideration include inviting inspection by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and establishing an action committee that would quickly determine the status of individuals about whom concern is expressed.

Administration officials also have promised that a general liberalization is in the works for the detention system for subversives and that other significant improvements will be announced soon. The government late last year moved to ease severe anti-subversive penalties; other measures that are aimed at restoring due process, however, are bogged down in the legislative process. As of October, about 2,000

² United Nations Ad Hoc Working Group to Inquire Into the Present Situation of Human Rights in Chile, “Study of Reported Violations of Human Rights in Chile,” Report E/CN.4/1221, February 10, 1977.

persons reportedly were being detained on charges of crimes against the state.

Paraguay

Those concerned about human rights in Paraguay often point to the detention of political prisoners and the treatment of the unassimilated Indian population.

Investigative field trips to Indian areas have failed to confirm any official plan of abuse or genocide. It is likely, however, that Indians living outside these areas do suffer abuses.

President Stroessner heads the most stable regime in South America, but official concern about "terrorism" and "subversion" is paramount and accounts for the state of siege that has been in effect for the past 30 years. Estimates of people currently being detained on such charges range from 100 to 400.

The government has been moved by recent international criticism to take steps to improve its tarnished image. It is apparently living up to its promise to bring subversives to trial and to release those against whom there is no solid evidence. Trials of political prisoners—the first held in years—began at the end of 1975.

Living conditions for most detainees have improved considerably. Press reports also indicate that as many as 60 persons suspected of subversion have been released since August, including four who had been in jail for 23 years [*portion marking not declassified*]

4. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

REVIEW OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

We have prepared the response to PRM/NSC-17 in two parts. The first is this overview. It integrates major policy problems into two

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77. Secret. Borg forwarded to Brzezinski under a March 12 covering memorandum and noted that Vance requested that copies of the study be distributed to members of the PRC for use at the meeting scheduled for March 15 (postponed to March 24). See Document 7.

conceptual and eight specific issues. The second is a set of papers² that examines particular policy areas in more detail, presents pros and cons on individual options, and reflects work undertaken prior to preparation of this overview.

In the overview we have sought to be didactic by posing somewhat stark options that show the occasional conflicts among U.S. interests and between U.S. interests and those of other hemispheric nations. We have formulated these issues in ways *to elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy directions*.

Finally, the outcome of separate Presidential Review Memoranda on human rights, non-proliferation, and North-South questions³ will have a major impact on U.S. policy toward the hemisphere. Because of their global nature, these issues are touched upon in the overview, but are not drawn out as distinct issues.

II. *The Setting*

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are more diverse, prosperous, confident, independent and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third World. They also have an alarming population growth, the dizzy rate of urbanization and the most highly developed systems of military government. As population and economic pressures have increased, the governments of this hemisphere have increasingly moved from the one-man *caudillo* to institutionalized, largely military regimes. Democracy, never strongly rooted, is weaker today than at any time since the Second World War. Its immediate future is not bright.

Trade and resource flows are the central concerns of the nations of this hemisphere in their dealings with us. Escalating import bills and heavy debt burdens seriously cramp development prospects—creating strong pressures for better terms of trade and credit from us. They also want us to respect their sovereignty, independent interests, and dignity.

What we want from them is less focused—and often intrinsically negative. We want them *not* to aggravate East-West tensions; *not* to deny us access to their energy reserves and other raw materials; *not* to develop nuclear capabilities. In sum, we want sufficiently stable and

² Tabs 1–10 are attached but not printed.

³ PRM–28 on human rights is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 46. PRM–12 on arms transfer policy and PRM–15 on nuclear proliferation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 259 and 317, respectively. PRM–8 on North-South strategy is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 254.

healthy economic and political growth *not* to weaken our security, create new global problems, or offend our values. We want moderation on North-South issues and support in world councils on matters of importance to us. At our most hopeful we want democratic systems to be revived in this hemisphere.

It is self-evident, however, that the U.S. is neither capable nor ready to undertake the resource transfers on a scale that could eliminate the disparities between us. It is just as self-evident that mounting frustrations over trade and financial issues are likely to undermine the international support we have traditionally received from Latin America, increase the flow of the unemployed over our borders, and damage our economic, political and security interests.

Latin America and the Caribbean bring home most dramatically the importance of North-South issues. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own society or create such an implicit obligation to help. The Alliance for Progress made important contributions—but its programs proved unsustainable both here and in Latin America. Moreover, because it was conceived largely in response to fears of Soviet penetration and assumed greater U.S. influence than in fact existed, the Alliance had strong overtones of intervention.

Our relations since the Alliance have led to a steady reduction of official contacts. For a decade, we have appeared increasingly out of step with the processes of change in either Latin America or the Caribbean, even on matters directly affecting our own interests. Our criticism of repressive governments has now placed us more clearly on the side of change, but we have little leverage on how that change comes about. Our pressures for human rights and non-proliferation have raised new fears about U.S. intervention and paternalism.

III. ISSUES FOR DECISION

A. *Conceptual Issues:*

The first two issues are conceptual—designed to elicit overall guidance for considering the directions under the specific issues presented subsequently.

1. *The Special Relationship:*

Discussion of the “special relationship” has focused in recent years on economic issues. But shared traditions, historical links, and common institutions are also involved. Four concepts are frequently combined under the heading “special relationship”:

—preferential economic treatment for Latin America (as a whole or to individual countries such as Mexico);

—an inter-American system of political, cultural and security links based on the OAS and the Rio Treaty.⁴

—our historical hegemony and its freight of paternalism; and

—the accompanying rhetoric about shared values.

We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the first, useful to retain the second, and undesirable to prolong the third. And whether or not we “share values,” there is little doubt that we expect more from Latin America and they from us.

To reject the special relationship *in toto* because of its traditional paternalistic overtones and its irrelevance to most economic issues risks discharging a potential asset in the North-South dialogue and in maintaining hemispheric security.

Issue for Decision. How do we reconcile the “special relationship” with our global commitments and the desired independence of the nations of the Hemisphere?

Direction A: Seek to end the “special relationship” in its various manifestations. Make clear there will be no hemispheric preferences in the trade area, downplay the OAS and Rio Treaty, and play a passive role in other hemispheric institutions. Move toward eventual withdrawal. Stress bilateral relations and global institutions, pointing out that Latin America’s development gives it a relative advantage over other LDC’s. Deal with subregional disputes or conflicts through global institutions (UN) or bilaterally. Drop the the rhetoric of shared values and historic ties.

Direction B: Differentiate by using bilateral, regional, and global institutions as necessary. Concentrate on the global for the North-South issues. Strengthen bilateral ties with major hemispheric nations. But remain active in those hemispheric institutions that can further our mutual interests—particularly the OAS, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and those institutions that promote cultural and technical cooperation. Use the OAS and Rio Treaty for dealing with regional conflicts.

2. A North-South or East-West Approach?

Our reaction to political change in Latin America is critical. Our major interventions of the post-war period—Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, and Chile—have probably had more impact on our relations than all our resource-transfers and business activities combined. They were motivated by a strong East-West bias.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 1.

In recent years, we have been thinking more in North-South terms. We are more tolerant of Guyana's Burnham declaring himself Marxist-Leninist, and of Peru's military purchases from the Soviet Union.⁵ But should we consider significant help to Manley's Jamaica⁶ to divert him from "communism" and Cuba or primarily to assist an important neighbor who is trying to bring about social change and development simultaneously?

The following directions are not mutually exclusive. The emergence of North-South issues does not eliminate East-West concerns. We can accept more ideological pluralism in 1977 than we could in 1962—but we could not be happy with a communist Brazil, Mexico or Panama. Can we abide additional Soviet military sales or increased Soviet influence in some countries? Do we have a choice?

Issue for Decision. How do we react to Soviet or Cuban involvement in political change or regional conflict in this hemisphere?

Direction A—East-West Focus: Devise programs and policies—short of military intervention—designed to head off significant Soviet influence or indigenous communist control over governments in the area. Should armed conflicts arise in this hemisphere involving Soviet or Cuban participation, support the other side. Place our economic resources where Soviet or Cuban efforts threaten. Bend our arms sales policies to head off new Soviet inroads in this area.

Direction B—North-South Focus: Our primary concern now is tension between the rich north and the poor south. Encourage independence—political, economic and psychological. Do not discourage diversification of contacts, even with communist countries. Place no ideological conditions on economic assistance. If another communist or radical socialist government emerges, or if a conflict situation arises, avoid actions that would polarize it into an East-West problem. Do not deviate from policy lines on arms transfers to head off Soviet sales in the area.

B. Specific Issues:

The new Administration has already set a new course for hemispheric relations. It has confirmed the need for a new treaty with Panama as the best means of protecting our interest in an open, efficient and secure canal. The State Visit of Mexico's President⁷ set in motion

⁵ For Peru's purchases from the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-11, part 2, Documents on South America, Document 293.

⁶ Additional information on U.S. assistance to Jamaica in 1977 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Documents 174, 176, and 180.

⁷ The memoranda of conversation between Carter and López Portillo during this visit are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Documents 131 and 132.

a reexamination of relations with the Latin American country with the most pervasive impact on our own society. Separate consideration is being given to the reestablishment of contacts with Cuba—a process with important implications for our relations with Latin America, and with the entire Third World.

This overview now raises eight additional specific issues for decision. These issues do not pretend to be all-encompassing. They highlight major problem areas. They also address those problems where the Administration may have the greatest flexibility to give a fresh and more constructive tone to inter-American affairs.

1. Intervention:

Our concerns over human rights, the nature of our relations with military regimes, our past policies toward Cuba, the revelations of CIA activities, and some activities of multi-national corporations affect the way we view ourselves and have significant implications for how others view us.

The common thread linking these concerns is U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Covert intervention in Chile in 1970–73 led the United States to become identified with the military dictatorship that replaced Allende, and associated us to some extent with its subsequent abuses of human rights. U.S. actions designed to control Latin American behavior have ranged from economic sanctions to direct military intervention. They have cumulatively cast a pall over our motives and aroused suspicions that may take years to overcome.

Some of our programs and activities are still viewed as interventionist:

—Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain close liaison with local security forces in most countries, collaborating to combat crime and drug traffic, counter communist activities and develop national security information.

—Our efforts on behalf of imprisoned American citizens has led us to urge on governments new laws, changed prison regulations, and new judicial procedures.

—Our concern for human rights has led us to take actions that have been criticized as interventionist by some of the major nations in the hemisphere.

—Can one really exclude the possibility that we may have to intervene in Panama should negotiations break down and violence break out?

—And what of the activities of Cuban exiles and other rightists who operate out of and in the U.S. against foreign nationals and foreign governments? Exile terrorism is frequently believed to be controlled, or at least condoned, by the U.S. Government.

Issue for Decision: Given our past history and current interests and programs, how do we deal with the continuing charge that we are interventionist in Latin America?

Direction A—Limited Intervention—A Part of Interdependence: Reaffirm publicly and forcefully our commitment to non-intervention in the OAS Charter; announce a policy of broader contacts with all legal political forces, including visas to communists; explain that cooperation with others in combatting drugs, crime, and terrorism requires activities by U.S. agencies abroad; and explain that our promotion of human rights and protection of U.S. citizens is justified under international law. But stress our actions will not extend to interference into internal political processes.

Direction B—Dramatically Reduce Interventionist Activities: Announce a firm commitment to non-intervention combined with a decision to make a major cutback of U.S. activities in the hemisphere. Announce the end of all covert action and make an unequivocal commitment opposing the unilateral use of force in the hemisphere. State firmly that U.S. concerns for human rights will be stressed primarily through recognized multilateral institutions.

2. Relations with Military Regimes:

Fifteen governments in Latin America are now run directly or indirectly by military officers. We are uncomfortable with this level of military involvement in politics, all the more so since some of the regimes involved are consistent violators of human rights.

Our posture toward military regimes is complicated by the fact that:

—Military rule has deep roots in Latin America and is legitimized to some extent in most constitutions;

—The fragmentation of political parties and the relative weakness of civilian institutions sometimes provides no viable alternative to military rule;

—Military rule, traditionally directed largely at repressing popular disturbances, is now in some cases combined with efforts to expand the technocratic and even political roles of civilians in government.

The military regimes resulting from these patterns vary greatly, reflecting the different conditions in each country. Although these national distinctions and institutional differences are significant, strong generalized U.S. opposition to military rule could unite South American military regimes into a bloc directed against us. Our decreased military presence and our dramatically reduced role as arms supplier has already diminished our capacity to influence—or even relate to—the leading military elites.

Moreover, generalized U.S. opposition to military regimes combined with U.S. rhetorical and political support for civilian opposition

elements could promote heightened internal tensions and political instability combined with charges of U.S. intervention in internal affairs.

Issue for Decision: Given our objectives on human rights and a clear preference for democracy, how should we relate to military governments in the Western Hemisphere?

Direction A: Work with all Military Regimes. Develop new programs for military relations as incentives to support democratizing trends and greater civilian participation. Use military training programs, sales and joint maneuvers as tools of influence.

Direction B: Diverse Treatment. Adopt a deliberate and evident strategy distinguishing among civilian regimes, non-repressive military regimes, and the most repressive military regimes. Maintain warm relations with the first, normal relations with the second, and cool but correct relations with the third. Do not attempt to polarize the hemisphere between democracies and military regimes, but stress non-military aspects of cooperation with countries where the military come to power. Cut back military programs and contacts with the most repressive military regimes.

3. Arms Transfers

Our policy on arms transfers to the region should be closely related to the previous issue of relations with military regimes. It should also relate to our global arms policies and our posture on non-proliferation. The introduction of costly modern weapons systems into the world's least armed region is creating new dangers of local conflicts and posing new challenges to the global control of conventional arms.

Because military security is the ultimate expression of national sovereignty, an aggressive US posture could easily become counterproductive. We have traditionally maintained a more restrictive policy toward arms sales to this hemisphere than toward the rest of the world. By sharply reducing military programs over the past decade, we have reduced our capacity to influence local military postures or limit new acquisitions. (We are the fourth-ranking arms seller in the region now.) There is little left to cut. To move further in that direction while increasing our attention to human rights could result in a virtual break with the critical institutions in Latin America—the military.

The United States, however, has taken no major initiatives on arms transfers to Latin America for several years. We have made no high-level pronouncements of any consequence or detail on the growth of local tensions and war fears. The Declaration of Ayacucho in which eight South American nations pledged themselves in 1974 to limit acquisition of "offensive" weapons may offer a potential opening for a cooperative review of military security issues.

Issue for Decision: How should we approach arms transfers in the region in view of our declining role with the Latin military and the rising role of extra-hemispheric suppliers?

Direction A—Actively Promote Restraint: Continue our regional restrictive sales of advanced weapons; seek a suppliers agreement to limit sales; and actively promote regional or subregional arms control efforts. Refrain from competitive sales with the Soviets and other suppliers. Resist use of arms sales as means of relating to Latin military establishments.

Direction B—Flexible Approach: Use arms sales modestly to restore U.S. influence with some military regimes (e.g. a carrot for human rights improvement). Also selectively promote U.S. arms sales to limit intrusion of Soviet arms and retain some control over the pattern of regional weapons build-up. Promote voluntary restraint agreements among suppliers and buyers.

4. "Rights"

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes a wide variety of social, economic and political "rights". The United States and Latin America tend to view these rights from different perspectives. We emphasize political rights—from habeas corpus to freedom of assembly and speech. The Latins admire our political freedoms, but believe economic and social rights—jobs and income—are more important to most of their citizens, particularly the poor. The debate over "rights" thus frequently becomes a clash between the libertarians and the egalitarians.

Obviously, however, the Latin leaders and military are often egalitarian abroad and elitist at home. They do not readily share their wealth. Yet if there is one issue that unites the poor of this hemisphere with their rulers it is that the United States must share more of its wealth and consume less. We must not deceive ourselves—this growing rich/poor dichotomy is the bottom line in our relations in this hemisphere.

As the United States projects its values on human rights abroad, we can be more effective if we demonstrate in word and deed that we also give great weight to the egalitarian aspirations of the poor nations. We may be entering a period of fiscal restraint on foreign lending (reduced contributions to the IFI's) in order to retain our way of life. We risk being seen as justifying our reductions on moral grounds so that we can continue to absorb a third of the globe's resources. The Harkin Amendment symbolizes to many our overriding stress on political as opposed to economic rights.⁸ Moreover, any moves toward trade

⁸ For the Harkin amendments to foreign aid bills, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, footnotes 3 and 4, Document 1.

protectionism will hit Latin America first and most severely. Our concern for fundamental political rights is thus out of phase with the appeals and ideologies of most of the developing world. Most simply, the poor nations see life and survival as more important than liberty.

Issue for Decision: Can we square our renewed emphasis on human rights with the rest of the hemisphere's obsession with economic and social rights?

Direction A—Stress Fundamental Human Rights: Stress that the real linkage between economic and political rights rests in democracy and mixed economies. Extend Harkin to all IFI's. Voluntarily recognize our responsibility for increased resource transfers but link it to foreign governments' willingness to distribute income.

Direction B—Recognize Link between all Rights: Move forcefully to expand IFI contributions and bilateral assistance. Take forthcoming posture in North-South dialogue. Move to repeal Harkin, reexamine our negative position on the UN Charter on Economic Rights and Duties⁹ and "collective economic security" in the OAS Charter Reform. Pressure governments politically to eliminate torture and assure habeas corpus and due process.

5. Resource Transfers: Private Investment

The outcome of the presidential reviews on North-South issues (PRMs 7 and 8)¹⁰ will be critical to our economic relations with Latin America. Trade—not aid—is *the* issue for Latin America. Any move toward or away from concessions to the Third World affects Latin America first.

This overview addresses two issues where we may have greater flexibility in regional terms: private investment and the MNC's (considered in this section) and public development assistance (considered in the section that follows).

Multinational corporations are key agents of resource, managerial and technology transfers. They have also been one of the most consistent sources of tensions between the US and the other nations of this hemisphere.

Latin American governments are now more secure in their dealings with foreign investors. MNC's are more mature in recognizing the need to respect—and adapt to—the laws and development priorities of

⁹ U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/29/3281, December 12, 1974, adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. The United States voted against the resolution. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, p. 391)

¹⁰ PRM-7 on an International Summit is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 3. For information on PRM-8, see footnote 3 above.

the host countries. Now that a large portion of investments in extractive industries and utilities have already been nationalized, and that new modes of non-equity investment have become a more prevalent method of doing business in the area, the wave of expropriations that swept Latin America in recent years seems to be receding.

In this changed environment, we may have an opportunity to work out—with both foreign governments and US corporations—some new approaches to bring our policies on investment disputes and the promotion of US private investment more into line with the new working relationships that are evolving.

We could, for example, revise President Nixon's 1972 policy statement on foreign investment and expropriation¹¹ to recognize more explicitly the rights of host governments to define the terms of receiving foreign capital, as well as their duties to provide fair treatment. We could even explore the far more legally complex and time-consuming possibility of negotiating bilateral investment treaties with Latin American governments.

Alternatively, we could seek to take advantage of the absence of expropriation disputes and the comparative quiescence of controversy over MNC's to quietly disengage from active promotion of private investment.

As for other forms of private capital flows, there ordinarily is no major role for the US government to play with respect to borrowings from private money markets. Consideration might be given, however, to the establishment of some sort of balance of payments safety net or guarantee facility which would enhance the attractiveness of paper floated by Latin American countries.

Issue for Decision: Should the US government encourage US private investment in Latin America?

Direction A—Disengage: Make clear that MNC's are on their own. Eliminate incentives designed to increase new investment. Say nothing new on expropriation. Stress that these are decisions for private corporations and foreign governments, not for the USG. Maintain a hands off posture toward commercial bank lending.

Direction B—Promote New Investment Relationships: Work on standards of conduct with the private sector and foreign governments and formulate a modified US global policy statement on expropriations.

¹¹ Presumable reference is to Nixon's January 19, 1972, statement announcing U.S. policy on economic assistance and investment security in developing nations. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 31–34) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 172.

Seek repeal of Hickenlooper and Gonzalez Amendments.¹² Consider measures to facilitate Latin American access to U.S. private capital markets.

6. Resource Transfers: Development Assistance

US involvement in development in Latin America and elsewhere takes many forms: trade, debt rescheduling, investment, official development assistance (ODA), actions on international monetary matters, initiatives in the fields of science and technology, food, population, etc.

Official development assistance, which facilitates cooperation in many of these fields, now plays a decreasing role. Bilateral US AID financing for Latin America has been on the decline for a decade. International financial institutions (e.g., IBRD and IDB) now provide the region with most of its official external capital—but we are in arrears in our contributions. In addition, under present criteria, only Central America, the Caribbean, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru will have bilateral aid programs after 1980.

These trends create a gap in the instruments available to us. The IFIs focus their attention on growth; in countries where our bilateral assistance has ended, only limited attention is paid by official capital suppliers to the many problems still associated with income maldistribution. In addition, the middle income countries are important to us politically in the context of the North-South dialogue, but we have virtually no bilateral aid instruments to promote institutional and human resource development in countries other than the poorest.

Issue for Decision: Should US official development assistance be increased, and if so, should the increase extend to both multilateral and bilateral assistance and include middle-income countries as well as poorer countries?

Direction A—Maintain the Status Quo: Meet current US commitments to the IDB and OAS. Do not seek to resume bilateral assistance in countries where we no longer have such programs. Continue bilateral aid phase-outs. Sustain the current bilateral aid focus on the poorest countries.

¹² Reference presumably is to the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which required that the United States terminate foreign assistance programs in countries that had expropriated U.S. citizens' property without conforming to standards of international law. It also required the United States to vote against loans from the IFIs to countries that had expropriated U.S. property. The Gonzalez Amendment to the Inter-America Development Bank Act, the International Development Association Act, and the Asian Development Bank Act required the President to instruct his representatives to vote against any foreign loans to countries that expropriated U.S. investment without compensation.

Direction B—Expand, Innovate and Strengthen Development Aid: Strengthen support of IFI's. Develop new ways to cooperate with middle-income countries on institutional and human resource development, food production, technology transfer. Develop new criteria for such cooperation, including harder terms, greater matching contributions, jointly managed projects, and use of US guarantee mechanisms which do not necessarily call for flows of public funds. Expand both bilateral and multilateral assistance to the poorest countries and the poorest sub-regions (Central America and the Caribbean).

7. Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The level of professional and academic exchanges and cultural programs with Latin America, as well as support for research and study on Latin America in the U.S., has fallen drastically over the past 10 years. The Fulbright-Hays program in Latin America (and worldwide) is 30% less in constant dollars than it was in 1968; USIA book publishing and distribution have dropped by 50%; and the staffs of our Binational Cultural Centers have dropped from 114 to 14 in recent years.

Greatly expanding these programs would dramatize a new approach to Latin America and the Caribbean. The goals of such an initiative would be (a) improving intellectual and institutional relationships within the hemisphere; and (b) strengthening the capacities of Latins and North Americans to perceive each other accurately, and to cooperate on the solution of common problems. Such a program might include joint initiatives—including joint commitments of long-term funds—with at least a few of the major Latin American countries.

Such an undertaking would also:

- symbolize our commitment to human rights by providing new means of communication between intellectuals, professional associations (such as lawyers), universities, think tanks and other interested groups in the hemisphere.

- enhance the development of human resources through graduate education and professional exchanges.¹³

Issue for Decision: By how much should our educational and cultural programs for the hemisphere be increased?

Direction A—Double Funding for Current Educational and Cultural Program to Approximately \$30 Million. Such an increase would enable

¹³ The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs observes that a greatly increased program in Latin America could produce pressures for similar increases in exchanges with other areas of the world. [Footnote is in the original.]

us to devise and establish much broader linkages between universities and communities, including Hispanic-American groups.

Direction B—Recast and Expand Programs: Direct the Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, to reexamine basic objectives and programs in consultation with U.S. institutions and with selected Latin American governments, preliminary to making a major specific proposal to the White House. Then approach Congress for new funding (up to \$100 million a year). This level would imply major support for relevant U.S. and Latin institutions. It would subsume some of the activities now conducted by AID, USIA and HEW. Care would have to be exercised to avoid charges of cultural imperialism. New or amended legislation might be required.

8. Style and Attention

Many Latin Americans believe we alternately take them for granted, then expect too much of them. They suspect that US leaders have time for everything and everyone except for Latin America. They feel unheard, unappreciated, and discriminated against.

Much of this is inherent in the relationship. But much is not. We sometimes spring unnecessary surprises by not consulting or informing others in advance on matters of vital interest to them. And their cabinet ministers and even presidents sometimes have a hard time getting through to us.

During 1977, as a minimum program we should plan on one or two additional State Visits by democratically elected Latin American leaders (Perez of Venezuela and perhaps Williams of Trinidad) and a return State Visit by President Carter to Mexico. The Vice President might likewise consider visiting one or more Latin American countries. The Secretary of State should attend the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June for 2–3 days¹⁴ and visit Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil, plus one or two Caribbean countries.

In addition, we should carry out continuing formal and informal consultations with Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Costa Rica and Argentina on global issues, such as Law of the Sea and the North-South Dialogue, as well as on bilateral initiatives and our major foreign policy directions in other parts of the world.

Members of Congress should also be involved whenever possible in both travels and consultations.

¹⁴ Vance headed the U.S. delegation to the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June. His intervention before the General Assembly, statement on U.S.-Panamanian relations, a transcript of his news conference, and his remarks upon returning to Washington are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, pp. 69–76.

A more ambitious program for the President and the Vice President would be to prepare for visits during the Administration's second year to other democracies such as Colombia, Costa Rica and one of the Caribbean nations. Such early "attention" by a newly elected President and Vice President would be unprecedented and would help set a new tone.

Issue for Decision: How much attention should the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary give to Latin America and the Caribbean in the first year?

Direction A—Minimum: Plan two State Visits here, a return Presidential Visit to Mexico, and a possible visit by the Vice President to the region. The Secretary should attend the OASGA, make one or more trips to the region, and exchange occasional letters with key foreign ministers.

Direction B—Maximum: Plan the above plus Presidential trips to two or three democracies in the hemisphere during the President's second year in office. The Vice President might make an additional visit or two as well. Both the President and the Secretary of State would seek to maintain a regular correspondence with their key counterparts.

5. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 14, 1977

SUBJECT

PRC Meeting on Latin America

"Do We Need a Latin American Policy?"

Your question² struck at the heart of the issue. The idea of "Latin America" as a *region* is a myth. It is composed of extremely diverse economies and politics, which can manage to form a collective negotiating position only when there is a symbolic need to confront the U.S., such as in the case of the Trade Act of 1974 (GSP/OPEC provision).

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 64, PRM-17 [Latin America]: 1/77-3/14/77. Confidential. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Brzezinski initialed the first page of the memorandum.

² Not found.

The most important business of the governments of the hemisphere is dealt with bilaterally or globally. One symptom of this trend toward globalism and bilateralism is the decline of the OAS.

Secondly, given the diversity of the economies, it is unrealistic to believe that a single foreign economic policy—like the Alliance—to so diverse a region is possible any longer, even if it were desirable.

So the answer to your question is “no.” In terms of the objective realities, we do not need a Latin American policy, and I hope that in the future, we will not have one.

But the fact that the President chose Latin America as the one region to have an overall policy review, and the fact that he is being besieged to speak on Pan American Day³ and to give a major policy address on Latin America, and the fact that the President has repeatedly expressed a *special* interest in Latin America—all these are indications that we cannot move from our current policy—which is indeed a special one—to no policy in a single step. (To put my point in perspective, I should mention that ARA thinks it would be too risky if the President did not have a Pan American Day speech.) We must do it gradually with some sensitivity to the region and to its constituency in the United States, but I agree with you entirely that if there are the same kind of demands for a Latin America speech in the first year of the President’s second Administration, then we will have failed. Therefore, the policy that we should seek in this first review is one which will help us to move from a special policy for the region to a global North-South policy.

Attached at Tab A is the response to PRM/NSC–17.⁴ There are parts of the Overview and of Tab 1 (Interests Section) which are first-rate, but the document as a whole is unwieldy. The issues slated for decision are posed poorly—sometimes they miss the principal question entirely. The options are deliberately skewed; they seldom offer a real choice.

The whole exercise has been a great disappointment to me personally, and it has lead me to conclude that if you want new policy directions toward Latin America, the last place you should turn to for advice is ARA. Since ARA is the principal source of advice for Secretary Vance, however, *I strongly urge you to discuss with him before Tuesday’s meeting what it is you would like to emerge from the meeting.*⁵ I would also

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 33.

⁴ Attached, printed as Document 4.

⁵ Reference is to the PRC meeting, scheduled for Tuesday, March 15, which was held on March 24 (see Document 7). No record of a discussion between Vance and Brzezinski between March 14 and 24 has been found.

recommend that the meeting follow the agenda⁶ rather than the specific issues and options listed in the “*Overview*.”

Permit me to make some suggestions, starting with the peg which we should use to hang the new approach on, and then suggesting the specifics of a new policy.

Outcome of the Meeting

As I wrote to you in my memorandum of March 10 on the request for the President to give a Pan American Day speech,⁷ I believe a speech on Latin America by the President *is necessary before* Pan American Day (April 14) in order to preempt any criticism that he is ignoring the region. There are, however, more important reasons for a speech. If the U.S. is to move to a point where Latin American speeches are not necessary, the *President must give the bureaucracy some guidance because they are moving in the other direction*. He must also alert Latin America and the entire developing world of his views, concerns, and perspective on this question. Thirdly, it is necessary for him to focus on the problem *soon* with some guidance from the PRC as to the right approach, lest he inadvertently send conflicting signals during a press conference to Latin America, to the bureaucracy, and to the U.S. public. Fourth, it would be more desirable for him to make the speech *in the United States now* rather than save it for a possible trip to the Latin American democracies later in the year, not only because of timing, but more importantly, because Presidential trips tend to bring out the worst kind of rhetoric about our “historic ties” and “shared values,” and thus, it would be more difficult to expect an address setting for such a new approach.

What would he say? An outline of the speech can follow the agenda of the meeting.

I. Overall Approach—General Policy Directions

Important changes within Latin America, within the U.S., and in international politics and economics have dramatically transformed U.S. relations with Latin America, but our psychology and the assumptions underlying current U.S. policy have not adapted to these changes.

—In *Latin America*, relatively rapid economic development and increasingly institutionalized governments have made them more resistant to foreign influence, particularly North American. At the same time, the economic changes have increased the heterogeneity of the region, making the notion of “Latin America” as an homogenous region more unrealistic than ever before.

⁶ Attached as Tab B but not printed.

⁷ Not found.

—*Internationally*, Latin Americans have been at the forefront intellectually, politically, and economically of a determined movement by the developing world to alter the terms of exchange between the industrialized and developing worlds.

—In the *United States*, several developments, including the passing of the Vietnam trauma and the reduced insecurity due to detente, served to divert American interest from the problems of the developing world. At the same time, Americans still maintained the “special relationship” mentality, demanding more from Latin America in human rights, restraint on arms transfers, and on other issues, while also promising (though not delivering) more resources to the region.

The *guiding principles of a new approach*—rather than a new policy—to the region should include:

1. *North-South*. Rather than trying to divide Latin America from the rest of the developing world, we should encourage Latin American leaders to take the general issues which concern them to a North-South forum and to take a forward (leadership) position on these issues.

Rationale: Several Latin American leaders have been in the forefront of this movement, and we should recognize their efforts, by adopting a global as opposed to a regional approach. Regionalism in all its manifestations—the OAS, the Inter-American Defense Board—has declined in importance over the last two years, and the trend not only seems irreversible, it makes sense. There is less reason to use regional institutions when the issues can only be effectively addressed globally.

2. *Global Policy: A Single Standard for the Developing World*. U.S. policy on trade, finance, investment, science and technology, aid, human rights, arms transfers and nuclear proliferation should be formulated according to global criteria. In the formulation of these policies we could consult bilaterally with selected governments, or regionally if the forum is an effective one, but the policy we adopt should be a general and a global one.

Rationale: If we are interested in furthering Latin American economic development, then we should adopt a general policy which will confer special trade and financial benefits on Latin America by the nature of the region’s relatively advanced economic position. In the long-term, a special and direct American effort will not bring any more benefits to the region than a general policy, and it is likely to have significant negative political consequences since direct resource transfers inevitably get tied to special American *political* concerns (i.e., human rights, or treatment of U.S. investors, or anti-Communism), leading to unintended paternalism.⁸

⁸ Pastor highlighted this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Raise expectations—only lower.”

3. Mature *bilateralism* will be enhanced by a global approach, but particularly from the decline of a regional institution which encourages artificial unity on the wrong issues posed in the least constructive way.

4. *Diversification of Political and Economic Relationships.* In response to the central political need of all Latin American countries to *reduce their dependence* on the United States or any single source, the U.S. should encourage the present trend toward increasingly diversified relations between Latin America, Europe, Japan, and even Eastern Europe. At the same time, the U.S. should exhibit a *greater tolerance* for regimes of widely *different political philosophies*, distinguishing only on the basis of their respect for fundamental human rights.

5. *Non-Intervention.* The U.S. should pledge its full respect for the sovereignty of each Latin American nation and should commit itself not to undertake unilateral military intervention or covert intervention in their internal affairs.

Rationale: This simple statement will go far in a region that has experienced the vast majority of U.S.-military exercises abroad.

The question to which this answer is addressed is not only how do we view and respond to political change in Latin America, but also to what extent and in what ways can we influence it.⁹ U.S. policy to Cuba from 1959 to 1961 offers a classic illustration of the way power and its use have been transformed. Currently, our ability to influence events in Latin America appears greatest not when the power equation is most weighted to our advantage, but when we are cognizant and sensitive to the principal norms of the developing world—sovereignty and social justice.

Bearing this in mind, a reflexive action by the U.S. to counter Soviet efforts to gain influence—either through arms sales or increased trade—is more likely to have the opposite effect. Andy Young's argument that we are more likely to influence events in Africa if we pay attention to Africa's obsession—racism—than to our own with respect to the East-West conflict—has direct relevance to Latin America, where the North-South economic issues are their principal preoccupation.

II. *Economic Issues*

1. *Relevant Criteria for Formulating U.S. Economic Policies.* The U.S. should adopt economic policies which relate to two or three levels of development of the Third World,¹⁰ rather than to an heterogeneous regional grouping. This means concessional assistance for the poorest

⁹ Pastor highlighted this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: "Take Defense the add. step."

¹⁰ An unknown hand highlighted this phrase in the left-hand margin.

countries, and increased trade prospects and improved and coordinated debt management for the middle-income developing countries, which are most of the Latin American countries. *Trade, not aid.*

2. Thus, external financing to the region should increasingly be made through the *international financial institutions*, and less and less through *bilateral assistance*.

This represents both a political desire to begin a post-aid relationship, where we do not respond to problems as donors and recipients, and an economic urge to get the most out of our money, since U.S. contributions to the IFIs are multiplied more than ten-fold because of other country pledges.¹¹

3. On *foreign direct investment* (FDI), we should recognize the sovereign *rights of host countries* to set the terms of investment. Similarly, the United States Government should adopt a more *independent stance* premised on an independent definition of the national interest in investment disputes.

Rationale: We should begin to steer an independent, neutral path between labor, which wants to discourage U.S. FDI, and U.S. corporations, which seek U.S. help. On investment disputes, which have been the source of considerable tension in inter-American relations, the U.S. should also seek to identify a position which is representative of the national as opposed to a specific interest.

4. The U.S. should work with the governments of Latin America to seek ways to increase access of the products of Latin America and other developing regions to the markets of the industrialized world on a non-discriminatory basis.

Rationale: The Lome Agreement between the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries has a discriminatory impact on Latin American exports. Furthermore, vertical and regional preferential arrangements (between industrialized and developing countries) run counter to the U.S. objectives of an open global economy.

III. *Human Rights*

1. *Single Standard.* The U.S. should not adopt a different standard for human rights violations in this hemisphere than for anywhere else.

2. *IFIs.* Human rights considerations should enter into all U.S. decisions with regard to the developing world, but the U.S. should not adopt any automatic or fixed formulas. This means that we should try to obtain some flexibility of the Harkin amendment (to the Inter-

¹¹ An unknown hand marked this sentence with an "X" in the left-hand margin.

American Development Bank Act),¹² while resisting its extension to other IFIs.

3. *Multilaterize Our Efforts.* To the extent possible, the U.S. should try to multilateralize its concerns and its efforts on human rights by working through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

IV. *Relations with Military Regimes*

Excluding the use of punitive sanctions, the U.S. should nevertheless adapt its relations with individual governments to the character of the regime, maintaining warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with non-repressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments. The U.S. should put particular stress on non-military aspects of cooperation with military governments.

V. *Arms Transfers*

Again, the policy should be a global one, but one which *actively promotes restraint* in any appropriate fora or framework (bilateral, sub-regional, regional, or global). We should also avoid competitive sales with the Soviets or with other suppliers.

VI. *Organization of American States*

The OAS should be reorganized so that it only carries out those functions for which it has a comparative advantage. These functions are peacekeeping and human rights. Its economic and technical assistance functions could be done more effectively by the IDB.

Rationale: Despite recurrent efforts to strengthen the OAS, it continues to decline, largely because the most important business in the hemisphere is not hemispheric. Secretary General Orfila has said this to me in a conversation two weeks ago.¹³ He also said that he needed the help of the U.S. to reduce the OAS bureaucracy from its current 1,500 to a staff of about 300 which could have responsibility for peacekeeping and human rights. He would also like to do away with the Permanent Council, and believes that if he obtained the complete support of the U.S. he would succeed. It remains to be seen whether he would succeed, but we should certainly help him do that.

One indication of the irrelevance of the OAS in addressing economic issues is the lack of any enthusiasm (or even support) for the Secretary General's proposal for an OAS Special General Assembly on

¹² For the Harkin amendments to foreign aid bills, see footnote 8, Document 4.

¹³ March 7. A memorandum of this conversation is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 60, OAS, 1-12/77.

Economic Cooperation and Development. They still have not yet set a date or a site for this meeting, and it is not clear whether they ever will.

VII. *Educational and Cultural Exchanges*

The Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, should reexamine basic objectives and programs in educational and cultural exchanges in consultation with U.S. institutions and with selected Latin American governments, and suggest a specific proposal to the NSC for improving U.S. policy in this area.

VIII. *Country and Sub-Regional Issues*

Mexico, Cuba and Panama have all been dealt with in other contexts. The two critical areas demanding some kind of U.S. Government attention are Brazil and the Caribbean.

With regard to Brazil, the critical question is whether the U.S. should maintain the *Memorandum of Understanding* in the light of quite critical comments of this arrangement made by President Carter during the campaign. Given the extreme sensitivity of our current relationship, it would not be advisable to make the decision on the Memorandum of Understanding at this time.¹⁴

With regard to the Caribbean, you might want to recommend that we devote a special PRC meeting to that at some future date.

IX. *Final Items*

1. President's speech—University of Texas?
2. A quick trip by the President to the democracies in November?
3. A Vice Presidential trip?

For your use, I have prepared an abbreviated outline of the agenda and the major points recommended in this memorandum. It is attached at Tab B.¹⁵ A draft Presidential Directive is attached at Tab C.¹⁶

¹⁴ See footnote 2, Document 165.

¹⁵ Attached but not printed.

¹⁶ Attached but not printed.

6. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Chile¹

Washington, March 24, 1977, 1455Z

65403. Subject: Operation Condor.

1. The CIA has prepared the following summary of the status of Operation Condor as of March 1977 which we are passing for your information only.

2. QTE: Operation Condor is a Cooperative Effort by Security Services of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil to counter terrorism and subversion. As it was first envisaged, the operation was to bring about an exchange of information among the participating services on subversive groups, but later discussions included consideration of mounting assassination operations abroad, security services of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay agreed to send teams to Europe, but apparently Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay did not commit themselves to this aspect of the operation. A training course was later set up in Buenos Aires for the teams that were to be sent to Europe, and *[less than 1 line not declassified]* a Condor team of Uruguayans and Argentines was sent *[less than 1 line not declassified]* against Uruguayan terrorists. This team was unsuccessful in carrying out its objectives and its failure was attributed to the operation having been leaked to the terrorists. As a result of the supposed leak, the Uruguayans were having second thoughts about the desirability of participating in further joint Condor operations.

3. According to one report *[less than 1 line not declassified]*,² the activities of the Condor Operation outside of Condor countries are confined to the collection of information on extremists. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* said that if information is obtained revealing the whereabouts of an extremist abroad, a Condor team might be sent to the location, but only to verify the extremist's presence and to determine his future travel. If unspecified actions against a particular extremist were desired, the Condor service would ask a security service of the country where the extremist resides to carry out these actions. It should be noted that *[less than 1 line not declassified]*, once a Condor country refuses to participate in a Condor program, that country is no longer included in further discussions related to this program.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción 1969-1979. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted by Zimmermann, cleared by Luers and in INR/DDC/OP-F, and approved by McAfee.

² Not further identified.

4. Recent reporting³ suggests that the Condor Operation may be shifting more to non-violent activities. At a meeting of Condor in December 1976 the principal subject of discussion was the planning of coordinated psychological warfare operations against leftist and radical groups. Sometime earlier a program had been approved whereby one member country would publish propaganda useful to another member so the country of major interest would not be revealed as the source. Extensive use was to be made of the communications media in carrying out this psychological warfare program. Another Condor meeting is to be held in [*less than 1 line not declassified*] which may clarify the future direction of the operation. End quote.

Vance

³ Not further identified.

7. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 24, 1977, 3:30–5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Latin America

PARTICIPANTS

State

Warren Christopher

Terence Todman

William Luers

Defense

Charles Duncan

Major Gen. Richard E. Cavazos

Joint Chiefs of Staff

General George S. Brown

Lt. General William Smith

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Portions of the minutes are also printed in part in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 266.

CIA

Deputy Director Enno Knoche

Robert Hopkins

Treasury

Anthony Solomon

Edward Bittner

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Leon Sloss

Commerce

Frank Weil

NSC

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Thomas Thornton

Robert A. Pastor

Overall Approach: Should the U.S. Move Away From the Special Relationship?

Deputy Secretary Christopher opened the meeting by saying that the new Administration had been dealing with many specific Latin American problems—for example, Panama, Cuba, and Mexico—but we had not had an opportunity to develop an overall approach, particularly with respect to those economic issues which were of greatest concern to the Latin Americans.

He suggested that the best overall policy may be a non-policy. To follow the remarks in the President's United Nations speech,² the U.S. should treat Latin America in a global context, rather than think about a regional policy. The President's Pan American Day speech on April 14³ provides the natural culmination of this process and the opportunity to suggest this approach.

He then initiated a discussion of whether the U.S. had a special relationship with Latin America or not.

Assistant Secretary Todman suggested that we drop the rhetoric about a special relationship and deal with Latin America on bilateral, regional, or global levels depending on the issues. In the major economic areas, it is necessary to deal on a global basis and develop a single policy, and this is also the case on nuclear proliferation and immigration. But because of the geographical proximity, Latin America impinges on us more directly than other areas. For example, we share a border with Mexico and that requires special policies. We have certain regional institutions, and they require special policies.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29.

³ See footnote 3, Document 5.

Under Secretary Anthony Solomon agreed that we had special problems with respect to Mexico and Brazil, but the question of the special relationship relates to the region rather than to individual countries. He suggested that we would need special policies to these two countries. He said that the arguments *against* an overall special relationship to the region are very powerful.

Enno Knoche said that the possible consequences of ending the special relationship would be that it would tend to encourage Latin America to form blocs against the U.S., but he added that since this would not be in Latin America's long-term interest, he felt such blocs would not endure.

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan said the U.S. has had a special relationship with Latin America, and it still does. General Brown agreed, but he said that our special military relationships are eroding, and that we are going to miss them when they are gone. He said that this relationship—for example, the training assistance program for foreign air force personnel—provides an opportunity for us to influence these governments on human rights and other matters.

Todman said that this issue aroused the greatest interest and controversy in Latin America where the U.S. has had a long history of intervention—most recently in the Dominican Republic and Chile. Now, we are being accused of intervention on behalf of human rights. The question is: to what extent do we need to intervene?

Duncan said that we first needed to define our interests in the hemisphere, and said such a definition would be necessary to decide on the need for a "special relationship." Then, he prefers the option of "limited intervention."

Brzezinski returned to the question of whether we should have a special policy to Latin America. He said that the notion of a special policy is ahistorical. In the past, it has done nothing more than lock us into a cycle of creating unrealistic expectations and then having to live with the subsequent disappointments. The Monroe Doctrine which underlines this approach is no longer valid. It represents an imperialistic legacy which has embittered our relationships.

He recommended that if our relationships are to become healthier, then we need to put them on a more normal footing. He said that we can do this by stressing our bilateral relations and in seeing the region's problems in a global context, as the President said in his UN speech. And we should use this as a point of departure in the Pan American Day speech. What was needed was a normalization of our relations with Latin America. We did not want another Alliance for Progress.

Christopher said that he agreed with Brzezinski's assessment.

General Brown agreed and said that we should put the statement in the context that we have recognized that Latin America had reached

adulthood. Brzezinski warned, however, that such an approach was also patronizing. Instead, he said that we should encourage Latin America to diversify its relationships with other countries and regions, and that we, in turn, should differentiate our approach to different governments.

Duncan agreed that a bilateral approach makes sense, but he said the relevant question on intervention is how should we react to the Soviets in this hemisphere.

Brzezinski said that we should not react reflexively; rather we should judge our response in terms of the likely consequences if the U.S. did not intervene. Nevertheless, he does not see a great likelihood of the U.S. intervening in Latin America in response to Soviet probes. He said that individual governments have a good sense of their own independence and therefore our reactions should be contingent on the way the other Latin Americans respond. But we cannot accept a blanket policy for all cases. Later, he said, and Solomon agreed, that a statement on nonintervention might be misinterpreted.

Leon Sloss of ACDA said that he agreed with Brzezinski's emphasis on a global and a bilateral approach, but he said that we should not discourage some regional institutions which have potential to contribute to the solution of certain problems—for example in arms control areas.

Brzezinski agreed that we should not discourage regional institutions, but he suggested that the healthiest approach would be a hands-off one, where the Latin Americans would approach us—instead of we, them—to pay attention to the regional institutions.

Solomon and Brzezinski agreed that the President should redefine our relationship rather than renounce it. Solomon said that the only viable regional economic institution was the Inter-American Development Bank, and a sign of its relative importance is the fact that Secretary Blumenthal will attend its annual ministerial meeting whereas he would not attend the one at the Asian Development Bank.⁴ Even the IDB has diversified its relationships—bringing on donors from Europe and Japan—although we are still the biggest contributor. But in trade or aid, it is hard to see a special relationship.

David Aaron pressed the issue of the special relationship a couple of steps further. One implication of a change in strategy would involve a shift in the distribution of U.S. resources abroad. Secondly, he noted that there was, in fact, a collective consciousness in Latin America.

⁴ The Inter-American Development Bank Board of Governors was scheduled to meet in Guatemala City May 30–June 1; Asian Development Bank representatives were scheduled to meet at its headquarters in Manila April 21–23.

Brzezinski said that we should not deceive ourselves. The consciousness is only collective when it is negative and in opposition to the U.S. Constructive relations demand greater specificity.

—In ideology, we want to show an affinity for democratic states.

—Security considerations demand that we recognize the geopolitical importance of Brazil and perhaps the special importance of the Caribbean to the United States.

—Economically, we need a more diversified strategy.

However, Brzezinski said we should not try to package these clusters of interests into a single policy.

Weil from Commerce agreed.

Relationships With Military Regimes

Christopher applied the approach suggested by Brzezinski to this next issue. He suggested that we adjust our relations so as to differentiate according to the kind of regime: warm relations with civilian and democratic governments, normal relations with nonrepressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments.

Brzezinski agreed, noting that Brazil was not so repressive as is commonly thought. Duncan and General Brown also agreed with Christopher and repeated the need to distinguish between kinds of military governments.

David Aaron suggested joining the two agreed approaches—the movement toward globalism and establishing a closer affinity with democracies—by a Presidential trip to selected democracies, say in Latin America as well as in Africa or Asia.

Aaron also said that if we are going to be sincere about moving toward a global approach, we must make clear that our policies with respect to democracies or repressive regimes must be the same in Latin America as in Africa or Asia. Given the special constituencies in the U.S., that would not be easy. We will have to go out of our way to do that.

Human Rights

Christopher said that it was very important for us to stay committed on our policy on human rights, but at the same time, we must *explore affirmative ways to express our policy*.

Solomon said that we should work with Congress to make clear why they should not be thinking about a Latin American policy on human rights. He and Christopher agreed on the need to obtain more discretionary authority and make more relevant distinctions in the application of our policy. If we define gross violations as torture or degrading treatment, instead of denial of due process, then we only

single out seven-ten countries rather than 60–80. Then, we can have some impact.

Todman said that we should look at aid as a way to improve human rights conditions in very poor countries. For example in countries like Haiti, violations of human rights occur often because of impoverished conditions, and it does not make much sense for us to cut off aid in these circumstances.

Arms Transfers

Christopher asked whether the United States, as a declining source of arms to Latin America, is justified in adopting a special policy on arms transfers to Latin America.

General Brown reminded everyone that in the early Kennedy years we tried to get Latin American governments to shift defense expenditures to nation-building, but as sovereign states, they just turned to other sources to buy arms. As long as they are going to buy, he preferred that they buy from us rather than the Russians.

Sloss from ACDA said that we must approach this problem globally at both ends. Discuss it with the Soviets and with other suppliers, and at the same time urge restraint by purchasers. If this does not work, he is inclined to agree with George Brown.

Organization of American States

Christopher asked whether the OAS was part of the special relationship.

Todman thought the OAS was useful, but that it wasted a lot of time because it is not well-focused. He said he would like to see it strengthened.

Christopher suggested that we alter our relationship to the OAS to the way we relate to other regional organizations, like CENTO or ASEAN.

Solomon asked Todman how he would strengthen the OAS, and Todman answered that he would eliminate the Permanent Council and reduce the U.S. contribution, but we should do so after consulting with the Latin Americans.

Solomon said that in his experience in State and in ARA, every Administration had tried to strengthen the OAS and tried to make it more efficient, by cutting personnel and reorganization. The trouble is that the Latin Americans are very sensitive to their “perks,” and they perceived every effort to strengthen the OAS as an attempt to weaken it. He concluded that the OAS was useless, and there was nothing that could be done.

David Aaron said that if we want to follow the global approach to its logical conclusion, then our involvement in the OAS, which once

played the role of a mini-UN, should be phased out. We really do not need it any longer. We should say we want to deal with Latin America like other regions.

Solomon acknowledged that that would indeed be perceived as the end to the special relationship, but noted that before doing that, we should look at the political ramifications and the domestic reaction, which he predicted would be negative. In conversations he has had with Latin American leaders, they all acknowledged privately that it was a worthless organization, but at the same time, they were horrified at the prospect of its being abolished. But he did not see anything we could do.

In fact, Latin Americans use the global North-South forum more and even take the SELA more seriously than they do the OAS.

Christopher said that the OAS was one of those institutions which would not die a natural death. Whenever it looks like it will, somebody turns the oxygen back on, and it has another life.

Aaron said that rather than try to leave it, abolish it, or resuscitate it with new ideas, the U.S. should just ask the OAS to justify itself.

William Luers from State said that we should be careful in formulating our policy to the OAS and more generally to the hemisphere, lest our new policy be perceived as a massive rejection of Latin America.

Cultural and Educational Exchanges

Todman said that the value of individual contacts is very important to increase mutual understanding.

Christopher asked whether we should return to a more enlightened and generous policy with respect to cultural and educational exchanges with Latin America. Todman nodded yes.

Technical Assistance

Christopher asked whether we should put more money into technical assistance to Latin America.

Weil from Commerce said that question brought the discussion back to the beginning: What are our interests? If they are not special, then we should not give special assistance.

Summary and Miscellaneous

Christopher noted that Todman will be meeting with the Cubans in New York,⁵ that the Canal Treaty negotiations will be continuing, and that we should be increasingly sensitive to Brazil. Any overall

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 11.

statement needs to take into account our concern for special problems. He noted that the discussion was a little more philosophical than usual, but that we were probing for a relationship which adapted to the new realities.

The next step is the speech at the Organization of American States.⁶

⁶ See footnote 3 above. Pastor sent Brzezinski a draft Presidential Directive, based on this meeting, under a March 25 covering memorandum. Pastor wrote that the draft was “picking up most of the conclusions and suggesting a few which were not completely discussed. I need some feedback on this from you. The value of having such a PD is that it would give explicit direction to the bureaucracy. This would be particularly helpful since the PRC meeting left a great number of people confused and uncertain of what consensus and decisions had been reached.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 60, PRC 008—Latin America—3/23/77) No PD based on PRM-17 or this PRC meeting was issued. Brzezinski sent Carter a Summary of Conclusions of this meeting, dated March 30, which Carter initialed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, PRM-17 [Latin America]: 3/15/77-5/78)

8. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, March 29, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Latin America]

Security Assistance and Human Rights. As you may know, five Latin governments “rejected” American military assistance based on the submission to Congress of the required human rights reports.² It is interesting to note that four of the five seem to be having second thoughts about turning their backs on American military aid.

—Although the Argentines turned down our FY 78 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program of \$15 million, they still want to receive \$700,000 in grant training. They also want to sign contracts for over

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 3/77. Secret. At the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “To Warren J.”

² Reference is to Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay. The House Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance released human rights reports for 82 countries in March 1977. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, footnote 7, Document 17.

\$30 million in unobligated FY 77 funds, but we have refused thus far to honor their requests because of human rights conditions in that country.

—We have begun to receive indications that Brazil didn't realize that its rejection of the \$50 million credits for FY 78 meant that they would be unable to participate in the Foreign Military Sales cash sales program. They may ask permission to buy spare parts for American F-5E fighters and naval equipment, drawing on unobligated FY 77 money.

—El Salvador and Guatemala are now hedging on their initial refusals to participate in rather small credit and training programs for FY 78 and unobligated FY 77 money.³

We have told the Congress that we are not now asking that the FY 78 budget request for these countries be withdrawn. We prefer to let the situation settle down and assess our security relationships at a later date. However, the atmosphere in the House Appropriations Committee is such that some of these FY 78 programs may be eliminated, although we doubt that the Congress would eliminate the FY 77 funds still in the pipelines.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Latin America]

³ In the left-hand margin next to this and the previous two paragraphs, Carter wrote: "We won't beg them to take aid, but should leave door open as they moderate their stand. Sending Nelson R. [Rockefeller] will help, if he can go."

9. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP 77-10090

Washington, April 1977

Soviet Interest in Latin America

Key Judgments

The Soviet Union has long been interested in increasing its influence in Latin America, but has had difficulty in formulating a successful policy for the area. Early attempts by Moscow to use the local communist parties to gain a foothold failed, in part, because the Soviets did

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 31, RP 77-10090: Soviet Interest in Latin America. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]

not understand the Latin American milieu and had little expertise in Latin American affairs. Until the early 1960s they seemed to assume that because of the basic instability of the area, "socialist" revolution was inevitable once a local communist party was activated. The basic flaw was their belief that Latin America was, and is, overwhelmingly dominated by conservative forces that have been unsympathetic to Moscow. Moreover, the area did not fit the Soviet mold of revolution in less developed nations. The countries have been independent for a long time; they are culturally and politically developed; they have a rather extensive educated elite, and for the most part, they are not attracted to foreign political ideologies and have regarded the Soviet Union as a political and ideological pariah.

In recent years, however, the Soviets have had some success in the area—most dramatically, of course, in Cuba. They have made these gains by shifting their emphasis from local communist party relationships to state-to-state relations. Soviet prospects are still limited, however, by Moscow's own economic problems and its inability in most cases to provide the Latins with any civilian technology they do not already have. Soviet successes have been partly the result of growing expertise in Latin American affairs and a relative decline of US influence in the area. Other factors have been the latent anti-US nationalism present in Latin America, the Soviet Union's emergence as a global power with observable economic, military, and political clout, and the survival of Castro's Cuba with Soviet assistance.

There now seems little doubt that the Soviet presence in Latin America will increase in the future, especially as East-West tensions relax. The Soviets are now beginning to view the area not as a region within the US sphere of influence, but as an arena for US-Soviet competition. Although Latin America certainly is not on the "front burner" of Moscow's priorities, the Soviets are not likely to ignore any opportunity to erode the economic and political power of the US. The Latin Americans' grudging appraisal that they have been overly dependent on the US for political, economic, and military assistance and should now seek alternative friends, suppliers, and markets is made to order for Soviet exploitation.

The current economic recession in the West, the increasing effort by many Latin nations to use their raw materials as an economic lever against the US, and the current impasse between Washington and much of Latin America over the human rights issue can only encourage Moscow. As long as the Soviets continue their low-key approach to the region, as long as they are willing to cut their losses during periodic reversals such as in Chile, and as long as the US fails to stabilize its

own relationship with the Latins, Moscow will be able to make inroads on the still-preponderant US influence in the area.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

10. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Multiple Recipients¹

Washington, April 23, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-up of the President's Latin America Speech on April 14, 1977

The President wants the State Department to coordinate with appropriate agencies a report which contains proposals to follow-up on his speech of April 14, 1977, before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States.² Proposals for implementing action need not be limited to the items mentioned in this memorandum. With the exception of the first two items—American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I, both of which should be forwarded to the White House by April 29—please provide a combined status report of no more than ten pages by COB May 2, 1977, covering the following items:

1. The American Convention on Human Rights should be forwarded for signature by the President and transmittal to the Senate.³ Appropriate reservations should be submitted in two forms: a single general reservation and specific reservations.

2. In coordination with the Defense Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department should forward Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with interpretative statements, reservations, or whatever is considered necessary for Presidential signature and Senate ratification.⁴

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 4, Defense Department, 4-5/77. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent the memorandum to Vance, Blumenthal, Brown, Bell, Lance, Warnke, and Strauss.

² See footnote 3, Document 5.

³ Carter signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977, and sent the Convention to the Senate for ratification on February 23, 1978. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 1050–1051; *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 395–396)

⁴ Carter signed Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on May 26 and sent it to the Senate for ratification on May 24, 1978. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 437. Humphrey signed Protocol II of the Treaty on behalf of the United States in 1968. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 226.

3. Please provide proposals for implementing the following pledges, initiatives, or concepts mentioned in the President's speech:
- a. To consult with Latin American governments in advance of major decisions on global policies made by the United States and in the formulation of "a wider and more flexible approach" in North-South economic relations, in conventional arms transfers, and in peaceful uses of the atom. (State should coordinate with Defense, Treasury, ACDA, and STR.)
 - b. To increase support for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and for other multilateral approaches to promote human rights and democratic values.
 - c. To support, in cooperation with international agencies, broadened programs for aiding, protecting, and resettling political refugees. (State should coordinate with the Justice Department.)
 - d. To devise and/or expand programs for training technicians for remote sensing and for using space communications technology for helping national television systems to promote educational and cultural objectives. (State should coordinate with NASA, AID, and OMB.)
 - e. To develop proposals by which other nations can deal more effectively with the problems of the needy through institutional, human development, and technological approaches. (State should coordinate with AID, Treasury, and OMB.)
 - f. To avoid differences and misunderstandings in problems related to U.S. foreign direct investment and Latin American governments. (State should coordinate with Treasury.)
 - g. To contribute to the implementation of the Ayacucho Agreement. (State should coordinate with DOD and ACDA.)
 - h. To support the peacekeeping efforts of the OAS Secretary General on an individual case basis. (State should coordinate with DOD and ACDA.)
 - i. To support regional and subregional integration efforts.
 - j. To increase the number and kind of people-to-people programs, bilaterally and through the OAS, to increase professional, cultural and scientific exchanges.⁵

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁵ For a response to this memorandum, see Document 21.

11. Report Prepared in the Department of State¹

No. 785

Washington, April 28, 1977

PROBLEMS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN WEST COAST

Overview

The developments that have led to the present degree of tension among the West Coast countries of South America extend back over a century. Peru's current efforts to establish itself as the dominant West Coast power have alarmed its neighbors and have provided a South American foothold for the USSR, which has become Peru's major supplier of arms since 1973.

Analysis of the available evidence leads to the following conclusions:

—Peru has and will maintain for some time *arms* superiority, but it will be unable, in our judgment, to effect a definitive shift in the balance of power on the West Coast because (a) it lacks the economic and human resources, and (b) there is no real, imminent, external threat.

—Peru's arms program will nevertheless spur a costly and divisive arms race with its neighbors and could eventually lead to armed conflict.

—US influence and leverage in this situation is reduced—sharply in comparison with the past. Nevertheless, countries which feel themselves threatened (Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador) look for protection first to the United States and second to the Organization of American States (OAS).

—The roots of any solution over the mid- to long-term lie in South America itself:

—through the efforts (including self-restraint) by the states most directly concerned (i.e., Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia);

—through the efforts of leading South American states (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela); and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30–6/13/77: 3/24/77–6/16/77. Confidential. Drafted by Hyman and Estep. Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 5 covering memorandum from Pastor, who recommended that the report be sent to Mrs. Carter in preparation for her trip to the region. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Inderfurth "apparently" forwarded the report to the First Lady. (Ibid.)

—with US support (if not leadership).²
 [Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

² In the May 5 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "In a conversation I had at the CIA a couple of weeks ago, several Andean specialists said that one of the factors contributing to the instability of the region is the absolute certainty that the U.S. would not get involved even if the Peruvians launched a preemptive strike. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the U.S. *would not and should not* get involved, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] if we could just find a way to *introduce a doubt* in the minds of the Peruvian military, they might be a little more reluctant to do anything rash. Mrs. Carter's trip to the region provides just such an opportunity." (Ibid.)

12. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, May 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone

The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly carry out operations against subversives on each other's soil. This effort, dubbed "Operation Condor", is not publicly known.² One aspect of the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to foreign security services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of cooperation in Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange of intelligence information by governments facing a common problem is a routine practice throughout the world.

The military-controlled governments of the Southern Cone all consider themselves targets of international Marxism. Having endured real and perceived threats from leftist terrorists, these governments

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Terrorism, 5/77-1/78. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*] No drafting information appears on the paper. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, Pastor wrote: "File Terrorism."

² For more on Operation Condor, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Documents 238 and 367.

believe that the very foundations of their societies are threatened. In most cases, government leaders seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of suspected subversives, but control over security forces generally is not tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated. Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long way toward explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law, for instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In addition, most Latin American constitutions have provisions for states of seige or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments' powers of arrest, detention, and censorship.

There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security officers on government business from one country to the other.

Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay. The JCR [*less than 1 line not declassified*] coordinates activities and provides propaganda and logistical support for its members. The Junta has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involved in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last May and an Uruguayan military attaché in 1974. The attaché had been involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros, a member group of JCR.

Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was intensified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more detailed, long-range plans. Decisions included:

—The development of a basic computerized data bank in Santiago. All members will contribute information on known or suspected terrorists.

—Brazil agreed to provide gear for "Condortel"—the group's communications network.

—Uruguay consented to join Chile and Argentina in covert operations against JCR activities [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

The basic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was "to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non-terrorists also were reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of Amnesty International were mentioned as targets. Ferreira may have been removed from the list, however, because he is considered to have

good contacts among US congressmen.³ A training course was held in Buenos Aires for the team heading overseas. More recently Condor leaders were considering the dispatch of a team to London—disguised as businessmen—to monitor “suspicious activity” in Europe. Another proposal under study included the collection of material on the membership, location, and political activities of human rights groups in order to identify and expose their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to be collected on Church and third-world groups.

Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last May, for example, armed men ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic Commission on Immigration and stole records containing information on thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not investigate the crime—a signal that Latin refugees, principally from Chile and Uruguay were no longer welcome. A month later, 24 Chilean and Uruguay refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted their interrogators were security officers from Chile and Uruguay. A number of Uruguayans were held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military officers offered to spare them their lives if they would agree to allow themselves to be “captured” by authorities—as if they were an armed group attempting to invade the country. Moreover, two prominent political exiles in Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances.

Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign. These programs heavily use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists. By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs aim to secure the support of the citizenry in the hope they will report anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to another—without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source. For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that allegedly support leftist movements. Bolivia will collect information on the groups and then send it to Argentina for publication.

³ For more on Ferreira’s efforts to raise the issue of human rights in Uruguay, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976, Document 343.

The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype. Member countries communicate via radio and each is required to maintain an open channel. No commercial equipment is used, but each country can monitor the conversations of another over the Condor net. Sensitive data, not of concern to all members, are forwarded via diplomatic pouch. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Condor suffers from some organizational inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectiveness. Condor has tightened security measures [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] Security has been strengthened at Condor's operations center in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been increased. In addition, once a Condor member has declined to participate in an operation, he is excluded from all further details of that particular plan. Hence, less active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia—[*less than 1 line not declassified*]—may not be aware of many operations.

Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation between other security organizations in the region also is strong. For example, intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countries primarily to identify subversives in exile.

13. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights Policy Impact: Latin America

The Carter Administration's human rights policy is having a significant impact in Latin America. A good many Latin American governments have reacted negatively, but some of these have nonetheless taken steps to improve their performance. There have been numerous indications of approval in important sectors of Latin American public opinion. Of course these generalizations should be treated with caution.

The United States Government's new higher priority for human rights, as reflected in Administration speeches and statements, diplomatic representations, military aid cuts, actions taken on IFI loans, and Congressional hearings, has caused the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador to reject, in whole or in part, security assistance predicated on human rights considerations (actually the Brazilian Government attributed its reaction to the issuance of our Brazil Human Rights Report, a decision made prior to the Carter Administration).² Leaders in these and other governments have expressed resentment and concern, as well as some bewilderment, at the United States Government's human rights stand. Many in Latin American ruling circles regard our actions and words as intervention in their domestic affairs and a self-defeating abandonment of old allies who are fighting a common enemy, international Communism. This reaction has been reflected in pro-government press comment, at least some of which has been directly inspired by local regimes.

On the other hand, some officials of these governments have privately expressed approval of the Carter human rights policy. And a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Lister on April 27 and cleared in draft by Todman and Schneider. (National Archives, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights-Latin America) Pastor forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 16 covering memorandum, and recommended that Brzezinski send the memorandum to Carter and the First Lady. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77) For the CIA's assessment of the impact of U.S. human rights policy, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-80*, vol. II, Human Rights, Document 42.

² See footnote 2, Document 8.

significant minority of Latin American governments, including those of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia, have openly voiced their support.

Impact on the actual human rights performance of Latin American governments has also been mixed,³ with a few regimes taking more progressive and repressive measures at the same time. In some cases our human rights campaign seems to have strengthened the hand of hardliners (e.g., in Brazil, Uruguay and probably in Argentina), at least temporarily. The Geisel Government has used alleged Yankee intervention in Brazil's domestic affairs, specifically the Government of Brazil's nuclear energy and human rights performance, to rally domestic support for its policies. Geisel has subsequently weakened the legal opposition MDB through amendment of the Constitution by Executive Decree. However, there is no question but that a good many Latin American governments have become increasingly concerned about their human rights image. Some undoubtedly have been influenced, consciously and/or unconsciously, to release prisoners (e.g., Chile, Paraguay and Haiti), to caution security officers against excesses (e.g., Brazil and Nicaragua), to refrain from repressive actions which otherwise might have been taken, etc. Some of these positive results were already underway even before the Carter Administration, partly as a result of Congressional stimulus. The net incremental changes are difficult to identify and impossible to quantify. No government is likely to admit that it is pursuing a more civilized and humane policy towards its own citizens because of outside advice or pressure. But there are indications that some governments hope for public or tangible recognition of positive steps taken. These might well be encouraged in the direction of still further progress.

It is much more difficult to calculate the reaction of Latin American public opinion.⁴ Unquestionably much of it has been positive, although often muted in fear of reprisal. There has been considerable favorable, independent press comment. Some Brazilian papers, even while supporting the official reaction to foreign government preparation of a Brazil Human Rights Report, criticized human rights violations and called for a domestic investigation. Many democratic opposition parties and groups have hailed our human rights stand,⁵ including the Christian Democrats in Chile, the PRD in the Dominican Republic, some

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrases "impact on" and "performance of Latin American governments."

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "reaction of Latin American public opinion."

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "Many democratic opposition parties and groups."

factions of the MDB in Brazil, and the opposition coalition in El Salvador. Catholic church representatives have commented very favorably. And there have been warm words of praise and encouragement from influential intellectuals, journalists, sociologists, etc. Once again, this positive reaction has not been uniform. Various supporters (e.g., some Latin American government officials as well as leaders of the Buenos Aires Jewish community) have quietly cautioned against pushing so hard publicly as to make repressive regimes feel they are being cornered,⁶ thus leading them to take even harsher measures.

It is, of course, far too early to make any definitive judgments as to the net impact of our current human rights policy. Many Latin leaders are still trying to sort out where they stand in the face of what they regard as an onslaught on their legitimacy. Some see, or pretend to see, the most recent public human rights statements by United States Government officials⁷ as a backing away, at least to some extent, from our previously voiced high priority for human rights. Latin Americans both in and out of government are watching carefully to see whether and how effectively we intend to continue our present human rights commitment. In this connection, there is attached the revealing March 27 comment of Robert Cox, the courageous British editor of the English language *Buenos Aires Herald*. Mr. Cox predicts President Carter will become "more and more effective" if he sticks to his guns.⁸

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

⁶ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "cautioned against pushing so hard publicly."

⁷ Reference presumably is to Vance's April 30 speech at the University of Georgia Law School. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 37.

⁸ Not attached. An unknown hand underlined the phrase "'more and more effective' if he sticks to his guns." Attached to a different copy of the memorandum is an undated editorial from the *Buenos Aires Herald* entitled "What if Jimmy Sticks to his Guns?" (National Archives, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights-Latin America)

14. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, May 19, 1977

[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

Todman Trip to Latin America. Assistant Secretary Todman returned this week from a quick swing through Latin America. In *Colombia*, President Lopez Michelsen pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which we are hesitant to deliver because of reported narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government.² Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but warned that we should not try to be the “world’s moral policeman.” He urges that we internationalize the effort (which of course we are trying to do). Colombian officials pressed their view that we should give special preferences to Latin American goods to offset the preferences the European Community extends to former European colonies.

In *Venezuela*, President Perez, looking forward to his forthcoming state visit, is anxious to cooperate with us in all areas and to take a strong stand on human rights.³ The Venezuelans stressed that the single most important issue in our bilateral relations is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the list of OPEC countries excluded from our system of generalized trade preferences.

Todman talked with President Videla of *Argentina* who was also visiting Venezuela.⁴ Videla said that he understood our human rights position and did not argue with its importance, but that Argentina just could not meet the highest standards until it wins the war against terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of Argentina’s difficulties.

Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that *Brazil* attaches great importance to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in 1976.⁵ He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77. Secret. Carter initiated the first page of the memorandum. Vance was in Geneva to meet with Gromyko.

² Telegram 4247 from Bogotá, May 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770164–0874)

³ Telegram 4808 from Caracas, May 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770171–0402)

⁴ Telegram 4775 from Caracas, May 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770170–0962)

⁵ Telegram 3891 from Brasília, May 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770198–0899)

future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S.-Brazil relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week during the CIEC meeting⁶ and will try to put his doubts to rest on this score. Although not discussed extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of primary concern to the Brazilians.

Bolivian President Banzer and other Government officials promised to speed up adjudication of the cases of Americans held on narcotics charges.⁷ Based on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Government is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution for the cocaine-source coca now produced there.

[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.]

⁶ The CIEC met in Paris May 30–June 3.

⁷ Telegram 3758 from La Paz, May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770177–0194)

15. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-up on the President's Pan American Day Speech: Peacekeeping

In the Pan American Day Speech, when the President said that the United States will support the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS in his "active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solutions to several longstanding disputes in this hemisphere," he was signalling a departure from past policy. Since U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S. policy has been to keep our distance from any territorial problems in the hemisphere because it was felt that our involvement would be the "kiss of death" for any initiative, regardless how desirable. Thus, the U.S. did not even

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for action. On the first page of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, "ZB—See my comments. DA." Dodson also initiated the memorandum.

comment favorably when the Andean countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 calling for mutual arms limitation in the region.

This non-profile policy may have been appropriate for the decade after the Dominican Republic, but times have changed. There are now many leaders in the hemisphere—and I would count Secretary General Orfila as a *potential* leader—who are either looking for U.S. support or leadership in this area. The President signalled the possibility of such a new posture in the Pan American Day speech not only in his reference to the OAS peacekeeping efforts, but also in his *positive* comment about the Ayacucho Declaration.

“I spent most of this morning working on a new United States policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms around the world. Again, you in Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American nations to limit the acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a striking example. If the eight nations can implement their pledge, their own people will not be the only ones to benefit. They will have set a standard for others, throughout the world, to follow.”

There are three relatively serious territorial disputes and several others less serious problems in the hemisphere. The *three* deserve our attention:

1. *Belize-Guatemala*. Belize is a colony of Great Britain which would have achieved independence had it not been for the fact that Guatemala, which has claims to Belize, has threatened to invade if it becomes independent.² This is the most urgent issue because it has divided Latin America, which supports Guatemala, in varying degrees, and the Caribbean, which supports Belize. Panama has recently shifted to the side of Belize, and Guatemala broke diplomatic relations. The British have asked us to help, and Secretary Vance asked ARA for options, which I believe they provided, albeit reluctantly. (Luers said he thought it would be a mistake for us to get involved.)³

2. *El Salvador and Honduras* still do not have diplomatic relations. A little support for Orfila’s efforts might help there.⁴

3. *Andean Tensions*.

In the memorandum asking for follow-up on the President’s speech, options on peacekeeping efforts were requested, but we never received any.⁵ ARA is split on this issue. Bob White, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission to the OAS, believes that we should take a more active

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 4.

³ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Aaron wrote, “I agree. DA.”

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Aaron wrote, “Maybe, what’s the catch? DA.”

⁵ See Document 10.

role in this area, and Secretary Vance's request for options on Belize is one indication that he may be in agreement with this new posture. Obviously, I think an active—not necessarily as a leader, but at the least, as an interested party searching for the most effective way to get involved—role is entirely consistent with the main theme in the President's speech.⁶ I mentioned this to Bob White, and he immediately organized a meeting in ARA on May 25, and in my opinion, it was the most productive meeting I have ever gone to in ARA.⁷ The people he brought in knew each of the disputes and had some good ideas on what the U.S. could do. Luers attended the meeting only for the first ten minutes, and I suspect he was the one who slipped that ridiculous note to the Secretary which you mentioned on Friday.⁸ The irony is that I would bet that the Secretary would support a more active role by the United States in this area.

Anyway, I suspect that the only way that we will get any movement on this issue is either by a formal request or perhaps a phone call to Secretary Vance.

I would recommend a formal request for two reasons: (1) in order to give us the opportunity to show something to the President on this subject—letting *him* choose the options on the questions of future involvement; and (2) so that we can monitor the interagency process to ensure that it is not sandbagged in ARA.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at Tab I.⁹

⁶ Inderfurth underlined most of this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin, "I agree. RI."

⁷ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁸ Not found. "Friday" presumably refers to May 27.

⁹ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but Dodson wrote: "signed 6/14/77." The memorandum, attached, is printed as Document 18. In the left-hand margin next to the recommendation, Inderfurth wrote, "A good idea. I believe this is the kind of follow-up to the President's speeches, etc. that should be taken. RI." At the bottom of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: "ZB—ARA is a State Dept within the State Dept. Bill Luers is extremely *uncooperative* with us. (By the way he is being considered for the Dep Asst Secretary slot in the Bureau of European Affairs *dealing with the Soviet Bloc*.) We should sign out the directives for disciplinary reasons, if no other. DA."

16. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP 77–10129

Washington, June 1977

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA

Key Judgments

Human rights have been violated—sometimes flagrantly—by the authoritarian military regimes that have come to power in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Repression, characterized by torture and other inhumane practices, has been directed for the most part at leftists, but others have been victimized as well, largely by governments reacting to real and imagined threats to stability. As a result, human rights guarantees have been subordinated to the priority concerns of imposing order on sometimes fractious societies and concentrating on economic development and growth. Our basic judgments about this pattern are that:

- Authoritarian military or quasi-military governments will remain in power for the foreseeable future and will continue to accord low priority to the human rights question.
- Improvements in human rights practices will depend more on the military's assessment of local security and insurgency conditions than on outside pressures.
- Where basic reform is instituted, the process will be slow at best and may be measured only in terms of cosmetics rather than substance. Moreover, the continued existence of security apparatuses geared to repression increases the chances of retrogression.
- Where the terrorist threat has subsided, there has been a gradual easing of the worst kinds of offenses, but this trend is by no means irreversible.
- External criticism of human rights abuses in the Southern Cone may lead to limited improvements; reprisals by Washington will be viewed as infringements on national sovereignty, and are more likely to provoke continued defiance than serve as catalysts for improving the human rights situation in any fundamental way.

The judgment of what rights all people are entitled to enjoy is a subjective one, and it varies from culture to culture. Human rights for the purposes of

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 136, RP 77–10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Confidential. [drafting information not declassified]

this paper are defined as protection of persons from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, torture, and murder. Although this paper addresses the relationship between authoritarianism and human rights, a broad definition of human rights that includes the right to a democratic form of government and to certain social and economic benefits goes beyond the scope of this discussion.

In trying to define human rights there are limitations in venturing generalizations about a geographic region. In the case of the five South American countries—the Southern Cone—discussed in this study, however, there are some common trends that can be discerned and various conclusions that can be drawn about recent developments.

The Roots of the Problem

Human rights problems are not new in Latin America. Throughout the history of the region, even so-called “democratic” governments have sometimes engaged in repression and systematic violations of basic individual rights. The notoriety of these acts—especially among the authoritarian governments—has become more pronounced in recent years because of improved worldwide communications and greater international emphasis on human rights problems.

South American military regimes today are reacting in similar fashion to real or imagined threats to order and stability and have adopted a doctrine that is stridently anticommunist, but largely anti-democratic as well. The resort to torture and other inhumane practices to suppress perceived threats to stability has been a part of this pattern.

Constitutional rule has been extinguished or drastically altered; political freedoms have been shelved; and political parties have been banned or tightly circumscribed. Where elections are still held, they are usually rigidly controlled with little doubt as to their outcome.

The protection normally afforded by the judicial process has been abrogated by the imposition of states of siege in some countries, thereby giving the military broad discretionary powers to suspend many rights and guarantees. Governments have used these emergency powers to crack down on suspected subversives. Although the target has been leftist extremists and other opponents, innocent persons have also felt the impact of arbitrary actions.

The preeminent role of the military in countering subversion in Latin America and a longstanding tolerance of highly centralized governments have reinforced the trend away from democratic practices. Once in power, the military has assumed sweeping measures to guarantee security and combat leftist influence.

There are a number of sociopolitical factors that have facilitated this process. The first is that little value is placed on the rights of the individual. In the Latin American context, fundamental rights are not viewed as sacrosanct. The state is the arbiter of what rights are inalien-

able and determines how justice will be administered. The vast majority of the people, by and large, is not bothered by what happens to the fringe elements of society. In addition, although a separation of powers exists in theory, in practice the Latin American executive has usually functioned in an autocratic manner. Judicial and legislative organs, where they exist, do not have the independence that marks North American and some West European models. Moreover, in their desire for security and the preservation of their society, Latin Americans have often acquiesced in strong military rule and endured constraints on their individual freedoms.

Those who have had their rights abused tend to come from all walks of life, and their political views or activism seem to be the primary criteria that make them subjects of government repression. In many cases, young people from middle- or upper-class families who have participated in extremist movements or sympathized with leftist causes have been jailed or tortured by security services to obtain information about their associates and subversive organizations.

Among the military officers who now direct the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, there is a firm conviction that former civilian politicians had failed to halt a drift toward political polarization and violence in their societies. The armed forces have equated this failure with the inability of the democratic system to cope with the complex problems of Latin America's "less developed" status. Their authoritarianism has been improvised as a result and does not follow the classic pattern of military dictatorship. The old archetype of the military strongman as defender of the oligarchy and of elite interests has been supplanted by a new image of the military as catalysts of national development and progress as well as defenders of national security.

An important aspect of the trend toward military dominance in the area is the impact of the drive for modernization on the thinking of the current generation of armed forces leaders. The economic difficulties generated by political dislocations have impressed them with the need to channel their countries along a path of sustained development and growth. While most of these countries have been plagued at one time or another by runaway inflation, a lack of investment capital, or economic stagnation, their societies have been strained by the demands of a rapidly expanding urban population and middle class.

After taking power, the military has sought to guide the process of economic transformation by imposing tough and sometimes unpopular policies. A concentration on assuring political stability at any cost to guarantee a continuity of policies within a coherent modernization strategy has frequently meant that concern for basic human rights has had a very low priority.

The Southern Cone

Where the terrorist threat has subsided—in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay—we believe there has been a gradual easing of the most offensive kinds of violations, including torture, illegal detention, and political kidnappings. Firm confirmation of this sort of information is hard to come by, but the impression held by [*less than 1 line not declassified*] independent international organizations that monitor the human rights situation in Latin America is that fewer violations in these countries have been recorded so far this year than a year ago. In general, there is no discernible pattern in the number of human rights violations in the Southern Cone, but as long as the repressive machinery remains in place the chances of a resurgence cannot be ruled out.

Repression by the military regime in Brazil has been mitigated, in part, during the past year or so by President Geisel's removal of officials responsible for illegal arrests and torture. Military and police organizations [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have orders from high-level officials to prohibit torture and other forms of mistreatment. Detainees in security cases have experienced improved conditions, but there are still occasional reports of harsh treatment and arbitrary detentions.

[Omitted here is a map of South America.]

Although leftist guerrilla activity has virtually been wiped out in Brazil and Uruguay, Argentina is still suffering from sporadic acts of terrorism. The zealous pursuit of the remaining terrorists by Argentine security forces still gives rise to abuses. Killings and disappearances continue to characterize the antsubversive campaign, even though many hardcore terrorist leaders have been eliminated and their support apparatus gravely weakened.

Argentina may now be at a crossroads. The terrorists, although by no means out of business, are clearly on the run. This is obvious to all Argentines, and the security forces take considerable pride in their achievement. At the same time, however, there are officers who believe that the elimination of the guerrilla activists is merely the beginning and that there must now be a grand offensive against the intellectual authors of subversion to root out the basic causes of terrorism.

Should such an offensive take place, it could occur in the form of purges of school and university faculties, government bureaus, and journalistic, intellectual, and artistic circles to a degree not yet experienced. In such an environment, anyone even remotely identifiable with leftist or merely liberal views would have reason to fear for his job or position, if not his very life. Thus far, the military government has not seemed inclined to move in such a direction. From what we know, President Videla and his supporters are opposed to repressive tactics against these people.

The outcome hinges, however, on Videla's ability to control the so-called "hardline" officers, which he has been able to do so far. Some moderate officers may now be alarmed at the implications of a current investigation of prominent citizens allegedly linked to subversion. Among the hardliners, the more vengeful may want to exploit the case by exaggerating it to "prove" their contention that subversion is so deeply imbedded that extremely harsh measures are justified.

The case centers on the family and associates of a wealthy financier who are under suspicion because of the financier's purported financial assistance to the Montonero guerrillas.² The number of persons implicated has grown steadily, but firm charges of subversion have been leveled against few, if any. Moreover, accusations against the principal figures have yet to be substantiated. Many of those implicated are Jewish; some occupied key positions in the Peronist government; some are journalists. One is a former military president. At least some Argentines are becoming uneasy that anti-Semitism—always close to the surface in Argentina—and political retaliation are as much behind the investigation as a genuine belief that real links to subversion exist.

Human rights problems in the smaller and more backward nations of the continent, such as Paraguay and Bolivia, have not aroused as much international attention. These isolated nations have experienced long periods of dictatorial rule, and periodic episodes of abuse are not unusual. The current lack of political turbulence probably accounts for the slight attention paid to violations within these countries. On the other hand, in cases such as Uruguay and Chile, where long traditions of civil liberties existed, the worst aspects of military repression have triggered strong protests abroad.

The military-dominated Mendez government in Uruguay has grown considerably more conscious of its poor reputation on human rights. Prior to the recent US aid cut,³ Uruguay appeared to be making some effort to bring improvements. In reprisal for US moves, however, military hardliners have put aside—at least temporarily—any plans for further relaxation. The Council of State earlier approved legislation reducing minimum sentences for certain kinds of activities associated with subversion but its effectiveness has not yet been shown. In November 1976, the US embassy estimated that approximately 1,800 persons

² Reference is to David Graiver, an Argentine banker, who was investigated in the 1970s by the Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau for alleged money laundering for the Montoneros. In telegram 2948 from Buenos Aires, April 21, the Embassy reported on the scandal involving Graiver. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770139-0236)

³ See footnote 2, Document 317.

were still being detained for political reasons.⁴ Instances of torture and prolonged detention have decreased, but the military retains a firm grip on the government and has extensive powers in the area of individual rights and guarantees. Most of the violations recently cited by human rights critics cover complaints dating back a year or more.

In Chile, the experiment with Marxism under Allende led to the end of a period of democratic rule that had extended over nearly half a century. The intervention of the armed forces in 1973 brought to power a military establishment with little practical political experience, a strong distaste for partisan politics, and no coherent program to deal with Chile's economic and political problems. The result has been the imposition of draconian measures that have made Chile an international pariah—although its human rights violations in many respects have been no worse than those of its neighbors.

Early this year, the Pinochet government appeared to be turning toward legal practice in security cases. The procedural cleanup may have been temporary, however, since new evidence of torture, illegal detentions, and "disappearances" is coming to light. This backsliding comes at a particularly bad time for Chile, since West European governments were beginning to take note of the substantial improvement in human rights practices. A renewed wave of abuse by intelligence organizations is certain to refuel the human rights controversy and provide new ammunition for Chile's critics.

Meanwhile, the courts are pressing the government on past cases, some of which are almost certain to embarrass the regime. Perhaps the most positive advance made by the government in moderating its hardline policy during 1976 was the release of some 2,700 political prisoners, leaving only about 500 still incarcerated on various charges.⁵ Civil freedoms remain rigidly restricted, however, and the outlawing of the remaining democratic parties in March was a stark reminder that open political expression is not tolerated.

The Legal and Humanitarian Aspects

While concern for human rights has generally been defined in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN, wide differences of opinion exist about what are violations of human rights. International requirements of states in human rights

⁴ Reference presumably is to telegram 4324 from Montevideo, November 11, 1976. The Embassy reported that in a press conference "Vadora said there are a few more than 1800 persons still detained for crimes against the state, while more than 1400 others have been freed after completing their sentences." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760421-0142)

⁵ See Document 189.

matters are, for the most part, vague and nonobligatory. Statements of good intentions about achieving minimum standards are more common than a willingness to take concrete steps to uphold them.

Where military regimes have enforced state-of-siege decrees, prisoners have been denied access to civil courts and have been deprived of such procedural safeguards as *amparo*—the Latin American juridical equivalent of habeas corpus. In some countries, summary courts martial have dealt with internal security cases, normally the most sensitive politically. These tribunals tend to deal more sternly and expeditiously with cases than the civil judiciary, which is notoriously cumbersome and inefficient in much of Latin America. Adding to the problem are the civil judges themselves and their fear that either the subversives or right-wing groups will take action against them.

Some military regimes have rewritten or are in the process of redrafting national security codes. The aim apparently is to ensure that the military has a significantly enhanced role in controlling future situations considered inimical to national security and stability. In spite of legal requisites, in practice the armed forces are likely to act on the basis of expediency rather than any firm dedication to observance of legal principles. As long as constitutional rule is in abeyance and no real independent check on executive authority exists, this situation is not expected to change dramatically.

Deference to legal propriety has been disregarded most often by intelligence and security services, which usually have wide-ranging powers and virtual autonomy in their operations. This broad mandate has been used at times to conduct activities of an illegal nature—although ostensibly designed to protect the national interest. Acting under the state of siege and other extraordinary powers, prisoners have been held incommunicado and without being charged. Authorities have been able to detain, search, and interrogate anyone at any time or place. Physical and psychological torture have been employed as devices to extract information. Such practices have generated strident criticism abroad.

Working against abandonment of these practices in Latin America is the fact that torture has been found to be an effective tool in rooting out subversion. Intelligence services have obtained information quickly that has enabled them to foil insurgent operations, frequently by surprise. The sophistication of torture technology today is such that there are few individuals who cannot be made to reveal information or to confess to charges. Military regimes have also perceived the utility of the threat of torture to intimidate opposition political movements.

It is highly probable that the leadership in most instances has either condoned such practices outright in the past or at least turned a blind eye to them. External pressures and the reduction of an internal threat

evidently are having some success in compelling a few regimes to halt the worst kinds of excesses, but there will probably be no fundamental change as long as these governments deem it necessary to resort to extreme measures against their "enemies."

Obstacles to Reform

The new breed of military ruler in South America has been slow to respond to charges of human rights violations but quick to voice annoyance with what they see as external "meddling" in matters they believe fall exclusively within their sovereign prerogative. Most have insisted that if the rights of a minority have been disregarded, it has been to protect the rights of the majority from internal subversion.

Military and security forces consider themselves to be the front line of defense against a relentless Communist offensive in which they are also usually a prime target. Reinforcing this siege mentality is the officers' conviction that what they are doing is in the highest national interest. They also believe that their mission is partly one of saving Western Christian civilization from Communism, a task that they think has been abandoned by a weakened and divided US. They point to detente as evidence that US accommodation with Communist countries is a sellout and an invitation to infiltration of alien ideas.

Another closely related factor contributing to the military's rationale that its ironhanded methods are correct is the evident lack of strong opposition on the part of a substantial portion of the population. Most Latin Americans do not view human rights per se as a domestic problem. Indeed, the vast majority is unaffected by the brutal treatment inflicted on a minority considered to be extremists.

The Latin perception of the human rights situation is quite different from that of other Western nations, where it is seen from a different cultural perspective. In countries such as Uruguay and Argentina, where rampant terrorism has caused the most fear and apprehension among substantial elements of the population, the restoration of order by other than legal means has been viewed as a nasty but unavoidable business.

The traditional inclination of Latin Americans to accept authoritarianism may also increase the tendency to overlook behavior that is unacceptable elsewhere. Many Latin Americans have been prone to dismiss criticism from abroad as simply ill-informed or Communist-inspired.

In Chile, the violent and chaotic conditions of the Allende years left a deep scar on the nation, and internal support for the junta was impressive, if not universal, at the outset. Disillusionment has set in during the past several years, but the absence of free opinion makes it difficult to judge the extent of support for the junta or its opponents.

Many people are not effusive about the methods of the austere military regime, but have accepted the necessity for it while expressing guarded optimism that gradual improvement is possible.

For most of these governments, however, the future of democratic institutions does not appear bright. Whatever form of government evolves under military auspices, the authoritarian infrastructure is not likely to change substantially. Because they have come to power by extraconstitutional means, these governments will probably attempt to compensate for their lack of legitimacy by creating a new institutional framework that reflects and reinforces their own doctrines and ideas. This process probably will offer a few openings for a loosening of the present restrictions on human rights.

Reaction to Foreign Criticism

Criticism by the US and the suspension of aid to Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile have provoked a sharp reaction. Much of the outburst stemmed from a belief that Latin America is being unfairly discriminated against by economic reprisals since Communist nations receive little more than a tongue-lashing. Indignation rose even higher when Latins saw South Korea and the Philippines being granted exceptions because of their security value to the US. Latin Americans resent the insinuation that they are not important to the US.

Latin pique over the US position has been manifested by a conspicuous cooling in relations and, in some cases, the rejection of US aid. The Brazilians acted to terminate military agreements with the US.⁶ Argentina made clear that eradication of terrorism will be undertaken by whatever means the military government deems necessary, even if it entails a deterioration in relations with the US. Chilean leaders signaled their displeasure by cracking down on political opponents—particularly former president Frei's Christian Democrats—and by vowing that no further concessions would be made to world opinion, which the Chilean junta believes it cannot appease in any case.

The irritation expressed by the Southern Cone governments to US chiding on human rights will subside eventually, but the issue seems likely to remain an underlying source of trouble. As tempers cool and military leaders have a chance to reflect on the situation, attitudes may shift enough to permit renewed movement toward moderation.

International censure has had a measurable impact on the human rights situation, in large part because of the efforts of the world press to draw attention to the problem. In Argentina, for instance, the much publicized habeas corpus petitions filed by relatives on behalf of 425

⁶ See Document 163.

persons whose whereabouts are unknown appear to have prompted the Supreme Court to ask for an investigation by the government.

In addition, organizations such as Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the human rights commissions of the UN and the OAS have participated in investigating or publicizing human rights violations. Other groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Committee for European Migration have aided in resettlement of political refugees and monitoring of humanitarian conditions. The Catholic Church has been an outspoken source of criticism and has facilitated some improvements in Brazil and Chile; in Argentina it recently issued its first formal condemnation of human rights abuses. In a number of instances, the release of political prisoners, the reduction of torture and illegal disappearances, and better conditions for political prisoners can be attributed to the cumulative efforts of these groups.

Political and economic pressures—such as withholding loans or making arms sales—exerted by other governments have also compelled change in the human rights situation, but the results have varied from country to country and are difficult to evaluate. Where such actions have had a corrective influence, they have not always been without unfortunate side effects. As a *quid pro quo* for their steps to curb abuses, the military governments expect some recognition of their efforts. The unfavorable image of most of these governments abroad, however, is such that the slow pace in restoring fundamental rights does little to appease their critics.

Private diplomatic persuasion has been used with some limited success to influence the course of human rights protection, but there is no assurance that the device will work in the absence of other means of leverage. Given the drawbacks of using the stick, however, the value of using the carrot may be increasing.

An approach tailored for each country that recognizes and applauds even small steps taken to limit human rights violations may induce concessions from governments that employ murder, torture, and kidnaping as weapons against their enemies. But southern cone regimes will continue to be suspicious of US motives as well as of initiatives for international oversight that appear to interfere with their sovereign national rights.

With the restrictions now placed on some of these governments by the US in the areas of economic and military aid, there may be a limited amount of leverage available to achieve substantial new improvements. The Latins have balked at what they believe is a US plan to use aid as a weapon, and they are certain to react negatively to any further moves they consider punitive. Chile, Brazil, and Argentina are already looking elsewhere for military hardware that they cannot procure from the US.

To avoid being further isolated at the international level, the countries of the Southern Cone may find it prudent to take a new look at possible policy adjustments. They will only do so, however, at a time when it does not appear that they are bowing to foreign pressures. An easing of repression is more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society than from external demands for change, which tend to bolster a siege mentality.

An Inter-American Challenge?

All of the Latin American nations have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and most of them have incorporated it in their respective constitutions. The Chapultepec Conference of American States, which met in 1945 to lay the groundwork for the postwar reorganization of the inter-American system, adopted a resolution appealing for the international protection of human rights. Since then the Organization of American States has included provisions on human rights, which are further strengthened by amendments to the Protocol of Buenos Aires concluded in 1967. Noncompliance with these statements of principle has been the rule more often than the exception.

Recommendations have occasionally been made in Latin America favoring enforcement of basic human rights, but misgivings over possible encroachments on sovereign rights have prevented agreement on any solution. As early as 1945, a Uruguayan foreign minister called for "multilateral collective action, exercised with complete unselfishness" to bring about the "reestablishment of essential rights" in any country suffering under dictatorship. The US gave unqualified support to the idea, but a majority of the American republics turned it down.

The Inter-American Convention adopted by the OAS Council in 1968 provided for the creation of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Compulsory judgment was to be optional, however, and the court has never been used to settle a human rights dispute because of the special sensitivity of Latin Americans to the question of intervention.

Despite the recent dismal record of Latin American states in upholding human rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, functioning under the OAS, has scored relatively high marks in the past for acting on complaints and undertaking investigations. It has used its powers more boldly than most other regional or international organizations. Its observers have periodically exercised a close supervisory role in monitoring and bringing human rights problems to the attention of governments in the Americas.

The commission has encountered obstacles in fulfilling its objectives. Nevertheless, it is dedicated to impartial fact gathering and to exposure of the more flagrant violations of basic liberties and might

well be the most acceptable and workable solution to the question of how to effect action on human rights abuses. This, of course, would depend greatly on the extent to which political realities permit even the present commission to operate evenhandedly and to muster majority support for compliance with adequate safeguards.

Members of the commission made an on-the-scene visit to Chile in 1974, but OAS inertia in dealing with the group's findings has done much to immobilize it since then. In any case, Latin Americans would probably prefer dealing with the OAS than with the UN. Relations between Chile and the UN Human Rights Commission have been strained since July 1975, when President Pinochet reneged on a promise to allow a visit by a UN fact-finding mission.⁷ While the Chilean junta is hypersensitive to outside attacks on its human rights record, it believes a more sympathetic hearing can be obtained from the American states than from radical Third World countries in the UN.

Multilateral representations on human rights make the US less vulnerable to charges of great power coercion. The OAS Secretary General, for example, might serve as a moderating force in encouraging greater hemispheric respect for human rights.

Outlook

We expect that the South American governments singled out most frequently for human rights infractions will remain authoritarian for the foreseeable future. In the absence of any realistic challenges, there is no current alternative to the military as arbiters of power. Respect for human rights will be largely dependent on the military's judgments regarding internal security conditions or local insurgency—not outside pressures.

Where progress occurs, it will be a slow process. Ameliorative action to correct the worst abuses of human rights will probably be taken in the short term, but real movement toward broader liberalization measures is less likely within the next few years.

The ruling generals in most of the Southern Cone share similar views on enforcing stability—if necessary, by repressing any activity they consider threatening, particularly from the left. The military's mission, as the Chilean junta has stated in its Declaration of Principles, is one of "cleansing our democratic system from the vices that facilitated its destruction."

These countries will remain sensitive to international opinion and will weigh their responses in terms of the potential costs, such as

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976, Document 194.

increased isolation or economic and political reprisals. As they comprehend the earnestness of the US commitment on human rights, the principal offenders may strive to alleviate some US concerns, to contain further antagonism over the issue, and to restore some balance to bilateral relations.

On the debit side, it is evident that US-Latin American relationships are apt to be strained for some time over the human rights issue. Continued resentment and defiance on the part of some Latin American governments could persuade them to side more actively in international forums with Third World initiatives that run contrary to US interests. If pressures were reduced, on the other hand, these governments might continue to rely on repression and stall on taking measures to liberalize their regimes.

17. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, June 8, 1977, 0252Z

131774. Subject: Guidance on Southern Cone Bloc Initiatives. Reference: Asunción 2279²

1. Reftel reports that the prospective June 3 meeting of Southern Cone Chiefs of State has been postponed and downgraded to a pre-OASGA meeting in Grenada among Foreign Ministers. This cable provides general guidance on our response to this and similar efforts to organize against our policies on human rights.³

2. While the disruptive potential of a geo-political and ideological bloc centered on the Southern Cone is clear, the difficulties encountered by the promoters of a Chiefs of State meeting suggest that practical

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770203–0746. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Einaudi; cleared in S/S-O and in draft by Devine, Rogers, White, Schneider, Feinberg, Barnebey, and Zimmermann; approved by Luers.

² Landau reported, June 4, that representatives from Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia would be attending the June 9 meeting in Grenada. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770200–0114)

³ In a May 26 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote that the presidents of Southern Cone nations “disturbed by US policies, particularly on human rights, are apparently attempting to organize a summit meeting, perhaps as early as June 3, to coordinate their response.” Vance noted that “Brazil is key to the meeting” and said that he would keep the president informed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77)

feasibility of such a bloc is still limited. Unless some catalytic event intervenes, therefore, we suspect that if some Southern Cone foreign ministers do eventually meet in Grenada, they are likely to do little more than attempt to coordinate privately their views and positions prior to the OASGA.

3. As there is ample precedent for Latin American caucuses prior to international meetings, a Southern Cone mini-caucus in Grenada does not in itself warrant alarm. Nor for that matter, is it something we could at this point do much to prevent.

4. The longer-run implications of a regional or subregional coalition against our human rights policies are considerably more serious, however. Clearly, it would serve only Pinochet's interests to inveigle other countries into identification with Chile. Conversely our interests would suffer. Argentine and Brazilian membership in such a bloc would tend to provide moral and diplomatic support for continued human-rights abuses and render both countries less amenable to our approaches on this subject. Moreover we have received assurances from the government of Paraguay that it would invite the IAHRC to visit Paraguay this year.⁴ Were this decision to be changed now under pressures from an international coalition of military hardliners, the result would be very damaging to the inter-American system as well as to prospects for multilateralizing the promotion of internationally recognized human rights. Lastly, we cannot discount the possibility that the existence of such a bloc might attract support from, or exert pressure on, some countries that are marginally inclined to support our policies at present. It would also inhibit any constructive role Venezuela and Colombia might play.

5. Our responses to feelers on these matters must keep several considerations in mind. We do not want to overreact in ways that would fuel fears of US intervention, provide ammunition to hardliners, embarrass our friends, or otherwise provoke a new wave of Latin American "solidarity" against us. Of equal importance, we do not want to take such a soft line that we appear defensive, confused, or prepared to yield to extreme nationalist reactions. In particular, it is essential that we not appear disposed to retreat on human rights.

6. Action requested. We should not now appear overly interested or overly concerned about the possibility of a pre-OASGA mini-caucus. If asked about more formal initiatives tending toward bloc formation, however, you should respond that, while we obviously cannot object to meetings among other governments, we just as obviously have reservations about any moves antagonistic to the effective promotion of

⁴ See Document 289.

human rights or, of course, to the United States itself. We expect to be able to work constructively, both bilaterally and in the OAS and elsewhere, to develop human rights policies that will be supported by the nations of this hemisphere. We see no value in not discussing these issues openly and in a non-confrontational spirit.

7. While the above should be communicated in response to all inquiries, some additional tailoring to specific situations is also desirable. When an inquiry comes from a government that has turned down Southern Cone approaches, you should state frankly that we are pleased that they are not joining what appear to be ill-conceived efforts to form an organized front against our common efforts. When an inquiry comes from a government that is undecided or from an official who is sufficiently open to understand the point, you should note that the emergence of bloc politics can only serve to polarize relations. This would complicate the efforts of the U.S. and like-minded countries to tailor an effective policy taking full account of our bilateral leverage and differing national problems and progress in human rights.⁵

Vance

⁵ In telegram 4747 from Brasília, June 10, Crimmins reported that Silveira told Rosalynn Carter “that Brazil had opposed such a meeting” and “that the other countries believed that they could convince the US to be aware of other facts in the current situation,” but that “Brazil cannot accept a situation not applicable to it, as Brazil is not in a situation such as Argentina.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207–1195) In telegram 6039 from Caracas, June 15, Vaky reported on “a copy of the agenda that would have been proposed for Operation Beacon, the Southern Cone countries’ effort to organize a front against President Carter’s human rights policy by stressing nonintervention.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770214–0047) This telegram was repeated to Vance and Todman in Grenada. (State 140124/Tosec 60064; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770215–0817)

18. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹**

Washington, June 14, 1977

SUBJECT

Peacekeeping

In the President's speech to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, he signalled a new and more active approach by the United States to international disputes in the Western Hemisphere.² He gave strong encouragement to the Andean countries to implement the Ayacucho Declaration, and he said that the United States would support the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS in finding solutions to longstanding disputes in the hemisphere.

Supporting the OAS Secretary General's initiative is only one option we might want to consider in choosing an appropriate strategy for the United States in dealing with disputes in the hemisphere. Please provide by July 7, 1977, a short paper discussing options which the President might want to consider in dealing with the following disputes:

- Belize-Guatemala.
- El Salvador-Honduras.
- The Andean countries (Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia).

The review need not be limited to these cases. The State Department should coordinate this review with the Defense Department, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.³

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. For the origins of this document, see Document 15.

² See footnote 3, Document 5.

³ For the agencies' responses, see Document 22.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 16, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-up of Mrs. Carter's Trip²

We have compiled a set of checklists on those specific items raised in each country which Mrs. Carter visited.³ I have sent follow-up memoranda on all those items with an asterisk beside them.

The Venezuela checklist (pages 10 and 11) is of particular importance because it represents a concise agenda of the items which Perez will want to discuss during his State Visit. I will send follow-up memoranda on all the items in the checklist, but if you could examine the list first and suggest some direction that we might take in providing you with a good response to these issues, we can ensure that your dialogue with Perez will be as productive as possible.⁴

The discussions with Perez will be of great importance to our overall policy in the hemisphere since he is currently the most outstanding leader in the hemisphere, and more importantly, because his position on the major issues which we care about in the hemisphere—human rights, nonproliferation, and arms control—are identical with our own. He wants to play a leadership role on these issues, and we should probably encourage him and provide some direction. Furthermore, we may need his help again on the Canal Treaty if we are going to be able to complete it this summer.

We are presently working on the drafts of letters for you to send to the seven countries which Mrs. Carter visited, but we thought we would wait until Secretary Vance returns from the OAS so as to take

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30–6/13/77: 3/24/77–6/16/77. Confidential. Sent for information. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote, "To Zbig, Cy. C." Pastor sent this memorandum to Brzezinski under a June 16 covering memorandum in which he recommended that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter. (Ibid.)

² Underneath the subject line, Brzezinski wrote, "Only for quick scanning because of your interest."

³ Attached but not printed are checklists dated June 15 regarding Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. Rosalynn Carter visited those seven countries May 30–June 12. For more on Mrs. Carter's visit to Costa Rica, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 330, footnote 3.

⁴ For Carter's June 28–29 discussions with Perez, see Documents 336 and 337.

into account his follow-up efforts before we forward the letters to you.⁵ We have not yet heard from Colombian President Lopez Michelsen on when or whether he will meet with Peter Bourne or Mathea Falco, and we may not receive a response for a while. Perhaps, we should draft a letter from you to him to reiterate your interest in this and other matters, and later when Peter Bourne goes to Colombia, he could bring a separate letter.⁶

There were several issues which were discussed in almost every country Mrs. Carter visited. I have just asked State for a report which includes options for your consideration on ways the United States can effectively contribute to the peaceful resolution of both the Belizean problem and the problem of the Andes. Other multilateral issues which we are examining in the context of a report being prepared for you by State and NSC on the follow-up of your Pan American Day speech include: human rights, nonproliferation (Treaty of Tlatelolco), and political refugees.⁷

⁵ The OAS General Assembly meeting was in Grenada. Carter underlined the phrase "forward the letters" and wrote "Expedite" in the right-hand margin.

⁶ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "After DEA mtg—I'll write a personal ltr to López for Peter to deliver—Draft same." See Document 242.

⁷ In the margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote, "good." For more on the speech, see Documents 10 and 18.

20. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RPM 77-10168

Washington, June 28, 1977

The OAS General Assembly and the Human Rights Issue

Delegates to last week's OAS General Assembly in Grenada returned home convinced of the depth of Washington's commitment to the defense of human rights. The conference, in fact, turned out to be a battleground for the US human rights policy and almost all of the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

discussions were devoted to it.² Even though the delegates have been thoroughly sensitized to the issue, however, the outlook for progress in curbing human rights abuses is still mixed at best.

The thirteen nations voting for the US initiative on human rights were Panama, Jamaica, Barbados, Surinam, Grenada, Costa Rica, Trinidad, Mexico, and Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela, and Peru.³ Seven of these countries are from the Caribbean. Five are countries visited by Mrs. Carter in early June. The Southern Cone countries of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay abstained—a polite “no” vote—as did Guatemala, Colombia, and El Salvador. Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia did not vote.

It has been apparent for some time now that US spokesmen, including Mrs. Carter, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador Young, have been getting the human rights message across to the Latin Americans. The doubts about Washington’s long-term seriousness on the issue have given way in many cases, in fact, to concrete action by several of the countries to curb the worst abuses. For example, Chile claims that it has freed its last political prisoner. While the OAS was in session the Chilean government also negotiated a settlement of a hunger strike, staged by families of missing persons, that had been in progress at the United Nations ECLA headquarters in Santiago. Argentina and Brazil have directed security forces to be more circumspect when arresting suspected terrorists. Paraguay is again talking about inviting the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to make an onsite inspection in Asuncion.

These positive steps, however, do not mean that the OAS community will soon develop a unanimity of views on the human rights issue. Although no country would ever voice opposition to the defense of human rights intrinsically, the reasons for the negative votes continue

² In telegram 81 from the U.S. delegation to the OASGA in Grenada, June 23, McGee wrote to Vance and Todman that the OASGA “was battleground for Carter Administration’s human rights policy in this hemisphere” and the “fact” that “almost all” of OASGA’s time was “spent on this sensitive issue, usually scrupulously avoided or treated with kid gloves in the OAS, was triumph for our insistence that inter-American system must focus on defense of human rights if bilateral breakdown is to be avoided.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770224–0345) In his June 17 Evening Report to Carter, Vance wrote: “It was important to get the issues on the table and have them discussed.” He also noted: “Even among the opposition there is a growing recognition that the matter of human rights cannot be swept under the rug any longer.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 6/77)

³ In a June 23 memorandum to Carter, Christopher wrote that the resolution “affirms the rule of law and asserts that no circumstances justify torture or prolonged detention without trial” and “commends the OAS Human Rights Commission.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 6/77)

to be fear of political and economic destabilization caused by communism and terrorism. The psychological and real factors are unlikely to go away in the near future. In fact, it is conceivable that some of the countries voting with the US on this issue may be faced in the future with a security problem which could lead to systematic violations of human rights. Haiti, for example, already has one of the worst records in the hemisphere on human rights. Politically-related violence is already common in Jamaica, always threatening in Panama, and never far from the surface in the Dominican Republic. Haiti's vote for the US resolution is difficult to understand except for Ambassador McGee's explanation that the Haitians had decided to vote yes on everything that came up at the meeting.⁴

Although we do not have much hard evidence, the positive vote by Jamaica, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela could well have been influenced by Mrs. Carter's visit to these countries.⁵ More than likely, however, other considerations were just as important. Even though Mrs. Carter reportedly was assured by Jamaican Prime Minister Manley that he would support the US on human rights, Manley was effusive in his praise for President Carter on the human rights issue well before Mrs. Carter's trip.⁶ Moreover, Jamaica sorely needs US financial assistance now. Costa Rica and Venezuela, two of the few practicing democracies in Latin America, would be expected to support the US, as would Mexico.

An Ecuadorean spokesman has said that his country's vote for the US resolution stemmed from a sincere belief in human rights. Another Ecuadorean said, however, that Quito has an ambivalent attitude toward the issue because it could be construed as interference in internal affairs. He added, however, that the government had decided to support the US policy before Mrs. Carter's visit and could not change its position even if it wanted to. Both denied that the possibility of acquiring arms from the US was a factor in their vote, but the Ecuadoreans are again inquiring about US aircraft. In the case of Peru, the positive vote was not out of character with the Morales Bermudez government. Peru has generally supported public declarations of human rights and it is believed that the US declaration on human rights will be incorporated into the new Peruvian constitution.

⁴ See footnote 2, above.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrases "the positive vote" and "could well have been influenced."

⁶ An account of the First Lady's meetings with Manley is in telegram 3616 from Quito, June 2. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 30, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, Kingston 5/30/77-6/13/77). For an analysis of Mrs. Carter's May 30-31 visit to Kingston, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 178.

The support for the US position by Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Surinam, Grenada, and Trinidad-Tobago was not unexpected, but Jamaica had to put pressure on the Grenadans in order to get their vote. Progress in the canal negotiations certainly was a factor in winning Panama's vote.

In the final analysis, the Grenada meeting of the OAS may be remembered in the future as the beginning of a new era of understanding between the US and Latin America or it may go down as the final dissolution of the special relationship most Latin American countries have long assumed they enjoyed with Washington. Despite the US victory on the human rights issue, the voting pattern raises disturbing questions. The Southern Cone countries remain a solid intransigent bloc, with Brazil emerging as a leader of this faction and exerting its influence to a certain extent over Bolivia and Colombia. The US is thus left with solid support from Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic among the Spanish-speaking countries. Continued backing for US initiatives from the English speaking Caribbean appears to be tenuous at best and may, in the long run, be contingent on how forthcoming Washington is in providing economic assistance.

21. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-up to President Carter's Pan American Day Speech and Mrs. Carter's Trip.

The attached Memorandum was prepared on an inter-agency basis under the chairmanship of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs in response to various National Security Council requests.

The Memorandum provides:

—an assessment of what we have accomplished so far;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Box 25, Latin America, 2/68–12/78. Confidential. Pastor forwarded the memorandum and attachment under a July 20 covering memorandum to Thornton, Tuchman, Denend, Hormats, and Huberman. (Ibid.)

- the approach we propose to further our objectives in major policy areas;
- the status of key program elements in each area; and
- certain issues on which we would particularly welcome the President's further guidance.

To make the report as manageable as possible, major issues are highlighted in the Memorandum itself, with additional detail in individual tabs.²

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

THE PRESIDENT'S LATIN AMERICAN INITIATIVES:

Initial Assessment and Follow-up Strategy.

A precedent-setting OAS General Assembly and Mrs. Carter's success have confirmed the new directions the President set forth on Pan American Day.

We now have hard evidence that human rights concerns have genuine support in Latin America—from a number of governments as well as from many ordinary citizens.

To consolidate that support will require sustained action and progress on some intractable underlying issues.

This memorandum reviews our evolving strategy to give practical effect to the President's statements, summarizes activities underway on major issues, and requests policy guidance on some key choices.

The OAS General Assembly

At Grenada in June:

- A new issue—human rights—dominated debate.
- After years of fighting alone on major issues against a united front of other members, this time half of Latin America, including the entire Caribbean, lined up with us.

² Attached but not printed are Tabs 1-11.

³ Confidential.

—Our key resolution, which commended the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and proposed steps to facilitate its work, passed undiluted with the backing of thirteen other governments.

The politics of success were delicate.

—Our coalition was difficult to assemble. The Secretary of State met with eighteen Foreign Ministers. Our USOAS delegation had to work well and hard to the last.

—Opposition was strong and concentrated. Led by Uruguay and Chile, and behind the scenes by Brazil, the Southern Cone was backed by most Central American states, and fell only two votes short of blocking our resolution.

—Mrs. Carter’s trip was almost certainly decisive in obtaining the support from Peru and Ecuador that proved critical.

Latin American solidarity has broken over the human rights issue. But there are disadvantages as well as advantages:

—The unconvinced, Brazil and Argentina in particular, have the power to hamper us in important ways.

—Our human rights policy cannot be fully successful unless we succeed in reaching countries where major abuses exist. This will take time, skill, persistence and patience.

Our conclusion is that we have made a major step forward in obtaining regional support for human rights. The direction is set, and set well. But we still have a long way to go. We must now keep our coalition together and find ways of broadening it.

The Months Ahead

The support we received for the aspect of human rights we stress most—individual freedom—came from conviction. This conviction, however, included the expectation we would also support the aspect of human rights emphasized most in Latin culture—socio-economic well being.

The Grenada Assembly put us clearly on notice that we cannot escape the economic dimensions of human rights. Our resolution on protecting the sanctity of the person received one vote more than an absolute majority—but a Colombian resolution calling for promotion of human rights through economic cooperation was carried by acclamation.

Giving substance to the President’s new directions from now on will require action more than rhetoric. Progress on economic issues will be critical to allay fears that we are defining human rights narrowly to divert attention from basic North-South issues of growth and equity.

Starting from a far lower base than we do, and less able to cope with escalating oil and other import costs, many nations of Latin Amer-

ica face a cruel choice between cutting deeply into economic growth—and thus the social change it facilitates—and incurring increasingly heavy external debt to sustain more moderate growth levels. Like most other developing countries, they are not looking for handouts, but for ways to develop effectively and in an ultimately self-sustaining fashion.

In moving ahead, we cannot return to a “special relationship” with Latin America. Rather, we must apply global policies with the kind of attention, effort and individual sensitivity that will enable us to sustain our current hemispheric coalition and give us some meaningful chance for progress with the others.

Promoting Human Rights

The development and application of our global human rights policy, now under review in PRM-28,⁴ is a case in point. One of its major dilemmas is sharply defined in this hemisphere. It is:

How can we promote human rights in those countries whose governments have poor human rights records?⁵

Attitudes toward this issue are as complex and sensitive as the issue itself. In fact, the issue presents a recurring dilemma more than a general policy choice, for country specific criteria and interests other than human rights have to be weighed each time we move from abstract premises to decisions on particular cases.

The President should be aware, however, that two aspects of this issue have recently aroused considerable debate and have serious implications for how many Latin American governments will evaluate and react to our initiatives on human rights.

—The first is how to help meet basic human needs without endorsing a government’s repressive practices. We have to be careful not to appear to be so rigid on political rights that we appear to deny pressing socio-economic rights.

—The second is how to use available executive discretion on military relationships, and specifically whether to reduce further our already declining military ties in countries where repressive military regimes are in power. The pivotal role of military officers and the uniformed services in the domestic and foreign affairs of most Latin American countries—and our own interest in regional peace and coop-

⁴ In an undated note on Pastor’s July 20 memorandum, Tuchman wrote, “PRM-28 is not completed. Many of the things asserted in this memo are under discussion but have not been resolved in PRM-28.” (Ibid.) PRM-28 is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 46.

⁵ Tuchman crossed out the word “promote” and inserted the phrase “achieve USG objectives with respect to” in its place.

eration—make the necessary introduction of human rights concerns into our military relationships a particularly sensitive issue.

In sum, just as we must seek to balance political and socio-economic human rights, so we must weigh the appearance of implicit support for repressive military acts against the possibility of influencing military institutions on a wide range of matters, perhaps including human rights as well as regional tensions.

These two issues highlight a more general problem. We have found it easier thus far to deny assistance on human rights grounds than to provide it. Clearly, we increasingly need to find ways of engaging individual countries, including both governments and private groups, in positive activities that recognize good performance and stimulate improvements in human rights conditions.

In the weeks and months ahead we intend to explore ways in which *all* available policy instruments can be used, in *all* countries, to actively promote our fundamental commitment to human rights and peace. We need carrots as well as sticks for the long haul ahead.

We believe this approach is the surest way to achieve our objectives and would welcome the President's thoughts on this matter as we move into a more active phase.

Action Areas

Tabs 1 through 10, prepared on the basis of extensive inter-agency deliberations, summarize our approach and action program by issue.

In addition to specific comments the President may wish to make on individual items in the tabs, his sense of priorities—and in some cases guidance—would be particularly useful to us on the following:

I. Consultations (Tab 1)

In this critical area, we are acting to:

A. Embark upon a major program of visits by senior officials to Latin America; and

B. Establish an inter-agency coordinating procedure, under the Department of State, to assure that these visits and contacts are mutually supportive of overall Administration policy objectives.

II. Human Rights (Tab 2)

Assistant Secretary Todman cabled basic guidance to all our Embassies in Latin America on June 17.⁶ Human Rights Evaluation Reports,

⁶ Telegram 141243 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, June 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770218–1071)

spelling out short and long term strategies for every Latin American country, are in preparation.

We are acting now to:

A. Use our voice and vote in the international financial institutions in support of human rights objectives.

B. Strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, possibly including visits to Paraguay, Haiti, and other countries—and to the U.S.

C. Intensify consultations with like-minded hemispheric states on means to improve compliance in offending states.

D. Explain, and mobilize support for, our human rights policy among religious, business, professional and ethnic communities in the U.S.

III. *Economic Issues (Tab 3)*

In this key area, we plan to:

A. Urge agencies to continue to use every appropriate occasion to press both developed and developing countries to adopt forthcoming postures on trade issues in the MTN.

B. Assure that Administration studies now underway on assistance policy, IMF facilities and international financial institutions⁷ clearly focus on two questions essential to our relations with the LDCs:

—the extent to which the U.S. should provide, or support, more “fast disbursing, balance of payments assistance” and which bilateral or multilateral instruments we should use for this purpose.

—the desirability of more flexible criteria and conditions on the part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in using its facilities, particularly the anticipated \$10 billion new Witteveen facility,⁸ in assisting developing and other countries with balance of payments difficulties.

IV. *Cultural Affairs (Tab 4)*

We strongly recommend that the President approve in principle the development of a significantly expanded high-visibility cultural exchange program reflecting our emphases on human rights and on the role of the individual citizen in foreign affairs. This effort would require a supplemental appropriation for FY-78 (of \$6 to 7 million),

⁷ For the Carter Administration’s review of foreign aid options, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 277-279 and 282.

⁸ Named after IMF Managing Director H. Johannes Witteveen, the facility constituted a special fund to provide economic assistance to oil-importing nations and became operative in 1979.

and sustained increased funding in future years. If the President agrees, we would conduct further feasibility analyses and prepare submissions for OMB review.

V. Science and Technology (Tab 5)

We recommend that the President consider an expanded S&T program for Latin America. Some of the benefits are long range, possibly difficult to justify to the Congress and relatively expensive; nevertheless, they are of considerable interest and potential usefulness. Our top priorities, described in more detail in Tab 5, are:

- A Technology Cooperation Package (\$10–20 million per year)
- Remote Sensing Projects (\$15–20 million per year)
- Advance Communications Technology (\$20–25 million per year)

The President's general guidance on priorities and possible funding would allow us to develop further feasibility analyses and prepare submissions for OMB review.

VI. Other Major Issues

Additional topics for review and guidance include:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation	Tab 6
Conventional Security Issues	Tab 7
Terrorism	Tab 8
Narcotics	Tab 9

Finally, Tab 10 gives a status report on those items raised with Mrs. Carter not covered elsewhere.

Follow-up Procedures

We have established inter-agency working groups to ensure that the initiatives taken in support of your April 14 speech are developed and implemented in a coordinated manner. We will when necessary provide reports on progress achieved and decisions required on individual issues. Reports already planned or requested are listed in the tabs.

We are also beginning reviews of policy toward two major subregional areas.

(1) The Caribbean—where sound development initiatives are required to promote human rights, sustain democracy, and help manage the mini-state problem; and

(2) The Southern Cone—whose countries are of fundamental importance to us on human rights and nuclear transfer issues and in the regional balance generally.

In summary, we have taken the initiative in Latin America. And the inter-agency participation in the follow-up process (listed in

Tab 11) demonstrates that we are beginning to coordinate in ways that will sustain the momentum.⁹

⁹ Pastor forwarded a summary of this memorandum under an August 15 covering memorandum to Brzezinski. In an August 19 memorandum, Gates advised Pastor to revise the summary. An NSC routing slip indicates that Pastor declared the summary OBE on September 12. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs. Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30-6/13/77: 3/24/77-6/16/77)

22. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Peace-Keeping

[Omitted here are sections on El Salvador-Honduras and Belize-Guatemala, which are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 10]

3. *The Andes*

There are three distinct though closely related issues subsumed within State's paper on "Disputes in the Andes": (a) Bolivia's desire for access to the sea; (b) reducing tension and military expenditures in the region; and (c) Ecuador's quest for access to the Amazon.²

(a) *Access to the Sea*

It is true, as State suggests, that Perez's support for Bolivia's desire for access to the sea as the only way to solve the security problem in the Andes is simplistic; there is more to the problem than that. But

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 47, Latin America: Bilateral Meetings Decision Memoranda, 9/77. Confidential. On a different copy, the memorandum is dated August 31, 1977. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Territorial Disputes, 4/77-12/78)

² Brzezinski wrote "(Tab. 3)" at the end of this sentence. Reference is to an undated paper prepared in the Department of State entitled "Peacekeeping: Tensions and Territorial Disputes in the Andes," which is attached but not printed.

resolution of Bolivia's long-standing grievance would go a long way toward reducing tension in the area.

The key to this problem and to the other two is Peru, and that is why we have scheduled your bilateral with Morales Bermudez first among the major Andean countries.³ If Morales could be persuaded of the need for a mediation effort, and at the same time, learn of our deep interest in seeing this dispute and that of Ecuador (Amazon) resolved peacefully, then I think the probability of reaching such a settlement would have increased quite dramatically. Since Peru and most other Latin American countries have recognized the legitimacy, at least in principle, of Bolivia's claim, it would not hurt, and may be positively catalytic, if you told Morales that you too considered Bolivia's dream to be a fair and legitimate one.

You may also want to subtly explore his reaction to having Perez or his representative serve as mediator,⁴ and perhaps also explore Perez's proposal of developing and de-militarizing the border area. It's a sound approach which awaits someone's initiative, and the U.S. may want to take it. Most countries in the region are now very receptive to U.S. leadership. NSC therefore recommends a variation on Option #2.⁵

(b) Reducing Tensions in the Area

Again, the key to this issue is Peru. If you could succeed in extracting a pledge of non-aggression from Peru or a statement that Peru will not purchase any major new military equipment,⁶ these actions would significantly contribute to reducing tensions.

Secondly, you might want to explore with Morales and with other Andean leaders, whether—and if so, how—the U.S. could contribute to the implementation of the Ayacucho Agreement to limit arms purchases by the eight Andean countries.⁷

³ See Document 304.

⁴ Carter underlined "Perez" and "serve as mediator."

⁵ Option 2 advised Carter "to indicate individually to the Presidents of Peru, Chile and Bolivia that we favor a Bolivian corridor, and that we would be prepared to actively and significantly support the economic development of the surrounding region as part of a package settlement. This option would, of course, require an important resource commitment." Brzezinski marked the last five lines of Option 2 and wrote in the margin, "this point I would omit. ZB." Option 3 was "to stop short of actually endorsing a Bolivian corridor, but to indicate our interest in exploring a jointly developed multilateral approach, including economic assistance, designed to ensure regional peace and development." Carter checked his approval of Option 3 and wrote next to it, "but indicate personal hope for corridor."

⁶ Carter underlined "non-aggression from Peru" and "not purchase any major new military equipment."

⁷ Carter underlined "implementation" and "Ayacucho Agreement to limit arms purchases by the eight Andean countries."

Thirdly, you might want to bring up the magic year—1979—the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific, in the context of mentioning your interest in the peace of the region. You might also want to hint of an interest in traveling to the region in 1979.

(c) *Ecuador: An Amazon Nation*

The question of whether Ecuador will ever gain an outlet to the Amazon can only be answered by Peru, and they're not talking.⁸ There is really little the U.S. can do here, other than encourage Peru to take Ecuador's claim more seriously.

⁸ Carter underlined "Ecuador" and "outlet to the Amazon."

23. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Nineteen Bilaterals: The Significance of the Treaty Signing for Inter-American Relations

Your decision to meet with all the Heads of State who would attend the signing ceremony² was made to assure a good attendance. However, nineteen bilaterals provide not only a show of support, but

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America 9-12/77. Confidential. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum.

² Reference is to the Panama Canal Treaty signing ceremony. See *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 2, Document 95. For the memorandum of conversation of Carter's meeting with Torrijos, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XXIX, Panama, Document 94. For the memoranda of conversation of Carter's meetings with Romero, Melgar, and Oduber, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XV, Central America, Documents 366, 346 and 330. For the memorandum of conversation of the meeting with Balaguer, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977-1980, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 219. For the memoranda of conversation of Carter's meetings with Morales Bermudez, Stroessner, López Michelsen, Pinochet, Perez, Poveda, Banzer, Videla, and Mendez, see Documents 304, 290, 244, 205, 340, 120, 273, 319, and 63. A collection of [text not declassified] papers regarding bilateral issues for each of the meetings, prepared by the CIA, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 47, Latin America: Bilateral Meetings Background Material (III), 9/77.

also a unique opportunity to make genuine progress on a number of important issues.

Never before have so many American Heads of State journeyed at one time to Washington. (Coincidentally, about 20 Heads of State went to Panama in 1956 on the occasion of the 130th anniversary of the First Panama Congress, and President Johnson met with 18 Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este in 1967 to discuss the Alliance for Progress.)³ In spite of the short notice and the problems each leader had in planning for his meeting, many of the Latin American leaders are rushing to use this unique opportunity to press certain multilateral problems closer to resolution. Intelligence reports indicate that:

—Chile is trying to set up separate meetings with Peru and Bolivia to discuss Bolivia's request for a corridor to the sea and other matters.

—Bolivian President Banzer has requested that you meet with him and with the Presidents of Peru and Chile to discuss the question of access to the sea for Bolivia.⁴ (While we have gently told him that such a quadri-lateral was not likely, we have scheduled your meetings in such a way that would permit it to occur if it looked as if it might be fruitful. Among the three, Peru is the key, and you will be meeting with Morales Bermudez first. If some progress is made with him, then the chances are good that Pinochet, whom you will be meeting with next, will accept that. Then you might want to consider inviting those two leaders to sit in on part of your meeting with Banzer on Thursday.)⁵

—Probably as part of a strategy to increase Chile's international contacts, Pinochet has also requested a meeting with Argentine President Videla to discuss the simmering border dispute in the Beagle Channel, and he is trying to solicit the support of Oduber and Perez for an inter-American conference of Latin Chiefs of State to increase their influence in international politics.

—Morales Bermudez has organized a meeting of the Presidents of the Andean Pact countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia) to try to resolve current problems (on allocation of industries), invigorate the organization, and express strong support for the importance of regional economic integration. (Our Ambassador in Lima suggests that you use the opportunity of the meeting to issue a strong statement

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, Document 435, and *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Haiti; Cuba; Guyana, Document 195.

⁴ In telegram 6909 from La Paz, August 31, the Embassy reported that it had been given an aide memoire with this request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770315–0575)

⁵ September 8.

supporting Latin American economic integration,⁶ and I agree that such a statement would be well received, particularly since Perez, for example, still believes that we are antagonistic to Latin American efforts at integration.)

The good atmosphere generated by the signing ceremony could conceivably transform the flurry of multilateral activity into some concrete results.⁷ Of course, the reason why so many leaders are attending is not so much because they want to help us on the Canal Treaty but because they want us to help them on one issue or another. This is particularly the case with the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay, who will want to explain the “real situation of subversion” in their countries so that we can better understand the harsh measures which they have taken.⁸

From the perspective of U.S. interests there are several objectives which can conceivably be achieved in the next few days and which would make the 19 bilaterals worth the effort. *Our goals include:*

(1) *Peace-Keeping*

(a) *Bolivian Access.* This is one of the most difficult and long-standing boundary disputes in the Hemisphere; it is also the most important since the problem of Bolivian access goes to the heart of the question, how can tensions in the region be reduced? A strategy will be suggested below, but our goals should be to express our agreement with the principle—accepted, in general, by all interested parties—of gaining a corridor to the sea for Bolivia, and our interest in contributing to a resolution of the problem.

(b) *El Salvador-Honduras.* A clearly realizable goal is to try to obtain from Salvadorean President Romero a *public* assurance that his country would soon ratify the mediation agreement.

(c) *Guatemala-Belize.* If President Laugerud acknowledged that he had spoken to President Carter about the Belize issue and had agreed that a *quick* resolution of the dispute on terms agreeable to both Guatemala, Great Britain and Belize, was a shared goal of the U.S. and Guatemala, that would be a significant advance.

⁶ Reference presumably is to telegram 7630 from Lima, September 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770319-0445)

⁷ An undated memorandum of conversation describes Orfila's discussion with Vance and Todman regarding the meetings between heads of state that had taken place during the week of the treaty signing ceremonies. (National Archives, RG 59, USOAS Files, 1971-1985, Lot 85D427, Memoranda of Conversation 1977-79)

⁸ [footnote not declassified]

(2) *Human Rights*

The Southern Cone leaders will need to hear directly from you of your commitment to human rights, your willingness to recognize *real* improvements (as opposed to announcement of intention), and your preference for pursuing U.S. policy through a multilateral mechanism (e.g., the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).

(3) *Caribbean Cooperation*

If you could reach a consensus with the leaders of the Caribbean basin on the following points, then we could develop the policy in greater detail:

—The need to approach the problems of the region on a comprehensive basis, involving multilateral cooperation on both the donor and the recipient ends.

—The comprehensive approach should involve the sharing of the burden of assistance. The burden-sharing formula and the balance between bilateral and multilateral programs should be worked out in consultations between donors and recipients.

—The overall objectives of the program should be to promote more economic integration among the English-speaking countries, closer collaboration between them and such other countries as Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and closer cooperation between them and countries such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, Mexico, the U.S., and Canada.

—A meeting held at the World Bank, co-sponsored by the Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank, and involving selected representatives from the area, should be held to decide how best to proceed in this comprehensive development effort.

Strategy for Day 1: Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, and Chile

Rather than duplicate the points made in the briefing papers, let me just focus on one issue—Bolivian access to the sea—and suggest a strategy for the first day for pursuing our objectives in this issue. Our objectives include: (1) reducing tensions in the area; (2) helping Bolivia get access to the sea—a very popular international cause; (3) using the resulting corridor as a kind of “cordon sanitaire” to deter Peru from any possible aggression; and (4) encouraging cooperation among the three countries in the area.

In December 1975, the Chileans made a secret offer to Bolivia of a 10 km. strip of land, which gave Bolivia access to the sea but did not include an area for a possible seaport (see Tab A).⁹ In exchange, Chile

⁹ Tab A, containing maps of the Peru-Bolivia-Chile border region, is attached but not printed.

asked for some water rights and a similar amount of Bolivian territory. It is obvious that Chile's major goal was to cultivate an alliance with Bolivia against Peru and improve her security by constructing a "cordon sanitaire." Bolivia, however, wants the corridor to include the port of Arica and is opposed to giving any territory to Chile or to Peru.

By the Treaty of 1929, Chile cannot dispose of territory formerly owned by Peru without Peru's consent. When confronted with the Chilean offer, Peru counter-proposed that Chile give the strip of land with a joint Peruvian-Chilean-Bolivian condominium zone at the Pacific end of the corridor as well as a trinational port authority in Arica. Chile immediately rejected the proposal, as Peru had probably guessed it would.

The key to a settlement is Peru, which probably has not yet given up its hopes of reconquering the territory it lost in the War of the Pacific 100 years ago. Peru publicly supports Bolivia's claim, but its proposal was so unrealistic that one can infer that it is not eager to settle.

A respectable compromise proposal might include the 10 km. corridor which leads into a neutral free port at Arica. But we probably want to avoid suggesting a proposal as specific as that.

We are, however, in a position to exercise considerable influence. Morales Bermudez sent you a long letter on August 27th with a rather detailed analysis of the Peruvian economy and description of a proposed fiscal program.¹⁰ He has said that he considers your meeting of "great significance" and contrasts that with your other meetings, which he described as "protocolary." He has come to ask for your support in getting an IMF stand-by loan, and believes U.S. support is determining since in his mind we totally dominate the IMF. You might tell him that his observation is incorrect; the IMF is an international organization, and we are only one—albeit, a most powerful one, member. Since Morales' economic program is quite sound, and he will probably obtain the kind of support he needs even without our help, you might want to subtly link the IMF issue to our concern over the corridor.

On the IMF issue, you might want to say that you understand that Secretary Blumenthal will be meeting with President Morales Bermudez,¹¹ that you look sympathetically on Peru's great concern, and that you will ask our representative to the IMF to convey our assessment of the situation and our concerns for Peru. On the other hand, the IMF

¹⁰ A translation of the letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 9-12/77.

¹¹ No record of this meeting has been found.

is *not* our organization, but an international one. On the Bolivian access issue, you might want to offer our good offices alone or with Venezuela.

If the Peruvians respond positively, you will want to discuss this issue with Pinochet, although you will probably want to devote much of the time to human rights.

24. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, October 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals With Latin American Leaders

The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed.² For a number of your bilaterals, State and NSC felt it would be very useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which confirm the commitments made during the meeting and underscore areas where we have a continuing interest.

In certain cases—for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay—our intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet, Stroessner, and Mendez felt that you were in agreement with them that their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate propaganda, and that the human rights policy which is being implemented in your name does not really reflect your views. No doubt this may be a result of wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors in the field, State, and NSC believe it would

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 9–12/77. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote, “Zbig—ok—except Bolivia—The verbiage is excessive. Did Fallows ok them? (3 or 4 ‘I was pleased’ in Suárez letter) JC.”

² For these memoranda of conversation, see footnote 2, Document 23. In an undated memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote, “Our Executive Directors of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank have a need to know the President’s views on human rights to those countries and also to better understand what transpired during the meeting and how the other leaders are likely to perceive President Carter’s views on this matter.” A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates that Aaron approved a recommendation to excerpt the applicable portions of the memoranda of conversation and send them to the Directors. (Ibid.)

be useful for you to re-state clearly your continuing commitment in this area.

Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters from the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, and Peru,³ and we have included references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was delivered directly to the White House on October 18, and it refers to the Deutsch case which you raised with him.⁴

There are a number of specific commitments made or repeated in the letters. Let me outline them briefly for you here, and flag any potentially controversial sections:⁵

Issues Or Points Which Are Noted In The Letters

Argentina

1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such visits. Your letter repeats that point.

2. Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations—particularly human rights groups—at the United Nations.

3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it.

4. With regard to Videla's statement that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation. The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would "consider" the possibility of ratification at the proper time. Nonetheless, we believe that it would be helpful to re-state our interpretation of his statement so as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that issue.

Bolivia

1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U.S. in the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia's desire to achieve access to the sea.

2. It states U.S. continued support for integration in Latin America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the automotive industry.

³ Not found.

⁴ See Document 65.

⁵ Below this paragraph, Carter wrote and then crossed out: "Add: Pinochet—Invite 2 UN observers. Videla—Approve Tlatelolco this year."

3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given the Bolivians the list of names.

Chile

1. The letter states that “friendly and close relations” between the U.S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of improvements in the human rights situation in Chile.

2. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the procedures which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so “without publicity” and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN. The Chileans (would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only “under certain circumstances,” which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with the UN on providing a report on the people who “disappeared,” but his report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in both matters should help.

3. Finally, you note Pinochet’s pledge to bring Tlatelolco into effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty.

Paraguay

1. Stroessner’s pledge to receive the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is noted, and you add that U.S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials “should that be helpful.”

On the loans from the Inter-American Bank and A.I.D., you restate decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee⁶ to approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay’s decision to permit a visit of the IACHR, but others are withheld until the visit, in fact, occurs.

Peru

1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the Ecuadorean–Amazon issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the fourth.

⁶ Reference is to the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by Christopher.

2. You reiterate U.S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties, and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance. This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able to give \$5–10 million of food assistance.

Uruguay

1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of having close relations with Uruguay.

2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority" and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in the letter.

3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights commission.

These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared by Jim Fallows.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.⁷

⁷ Carter checked the approve option, and an unknown hand indicates that the letters were signed on October 31. See Documents 65, 292, 306, and 320, as well as footnote 9 to Document 120 and footnote 8 to Document 205.

25. **Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, January 30, 1978

SUBJECT

The President's Trip

Countries Selected

Obviously, the first questions that need to be addressed in drawing up scenarios for the President's trip are: (1) Which countries will he visit? and (2) How much time will he spend in each country?²

First of all, let me repeat the point that I think a stop in Trinidad and Tobago is very important

—to show that we are not lumping the Caribbean into Latin America as we have done in the past,

—to try to gain the cooperation of a very important leader in the Caribbean which has resources as a donor, and

—to show a balance in our approach to the Caribbean between Manley on the one side and Williams of Trinidad on the other.

I understand that Secretary Vance agrees on the importance of putting a stop in Trinidad on the trip.

Of importance, but secondary compared to a stop in Trinidad, would be a second stop in Brazil to Sao Paulo, the center of Brazil's business and intellectual life and a city which symbolizes the ferment and political dynamism of Brazil in a most interesting period of transition.

In addition, you may want to resist two temptations as you consider the schedule. First, there may be an attempt to make a "Latin America

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 11, President, Latin America and Africa, 3/28/78–4/3/78: 10/7/77–1/31/78. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "RP, give me a revised memo to Jim Schl (copy to Vance) urging once more the Ven. talks. If he doesn't react (and pt. out that I wrote earlier) I will go to the P. ZB." Inderfurth also initialed the first page of the memorandum. In a January 24 memorandum to Pastor and Richardson, Brzezinski wrote, "With reference to the forthcoming trip, I think it is extremely important that we *now* develop plans for specific and concrete actions which could be associated with the trip: agreements to be signed, initiatives to announce, joint statements, etc. Please develop an initial scenario and consult with me within a week." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President's Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1–5/78)

² Carter traveled to Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia from March 28 to April 3, 1978. See Documents 345, 346, 172, and 173.

only trip" and do Africa in the summer. I think this would be a mistake. Right now, we are trying to encourage Latin American leaders to get involved in international politics, particularly African politics.³ A trip *only* to Latin America might tempt us into the rhetoric of the "special relationship" while a trip that includes Africa will give him the opportunity to make points about global interdependence, the North-South dialogue, and "constructive" links between Africa and Latin America.

I understand that some consideration is being given to doing the Africa portion after the Summit in the summer. I think *that* is the time for him to do his travelling in the U.S., campaigning for Congressmen, rather than abroad.

A second temptation might be to begin the trip in Panama to fulfill the President's pledge of exchanging the instruments of ratification there. I think such a trip is an easy and *discreet* one-day or weekend trip which should occur after ratification by the Senate. I think it would be a mistake to make the rest of the trip contingent on the quick and easy resolution of the Canal Treaties. I know that the Congressional people believe that we will finish the treaties in February, but I continue to believe that it will take March and perhaps part of April as well. I think the trip to Panama should be kept separate. With luck, he can do it in a day before the global trip. Otherwise, afterwards.⁴

VENEZUELA

Events

As originally planned, the first *major speech* on North-South economic issues by the President should be made before the Venezuelan Congress.⁵ After meeting with Perez, the President also needs to meet separately with the two leading Presidential candidates—Piñerua Ordaz of Perez' party, Acción Democrática; Herrera Campins of COPEI.

Finally, the President should meet briefly with the Venezuelan press, only one of two entirely free press corps in South America. When

³ In a January 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "I believe that your idea of involving Latin America in our strategy on the Horn is a far-sighted one, and I enthusiastically support it. As it relates to Latin America, *our objective in the Horn should be: to brief, gain support, and engage leading Latin American nations (and Heads of State) in a multinational effort to influence the Cubans, the Soviets and ultimately international opinion for a peaceful settlement.*" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 12/77-7/78)

⁴ The Senate approved the first Panama Canal treaty on March 16 and the second treaty on April 18. Carter traveled to Panama June 16-17 to deliver the instruments of ratification. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 2, Document 185.

⁵ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence with an arrow in the left-hand margin.

I was travelling with Secretary Vance in November,⁶ Pete Vaky took me to task on the issue of a press conference. He said the question we face in Caracas and Brasilia is not whether to have a press conference, but how it will be handled. Either the press will surround the President when he arrives or after meetings—as they did with Secretary Vance—or it is organized in a way so as to achieve maximum impact—i.e., questions on *all* the major issues, translation, orderliness, quiet, and a listening audience when the President answers. I continue to believe that a press conference in Brazil is *essential and critical*, whereas one in Caracas is just *important*. I would recommend both, however.⁷

Issues and Decisions

There are two broad categories of issues for the Perez-Carter discussions: seeking cooperation from Perez on a variety of international issues and exploring modes for cooperating on research and development in alternative energy sources.

Consultations on Global Issues. As a result of the President's meeting with Perez in June and again in September,⁸ we have tasked our Embassy in Caracas to consult with Venezuela on Tlatelolco and non-proliferation, human rights, Belize, Bolivian corridor, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. In each of these areas, we need to clearly define our objectives between now and the trip and then decide how Venezuela can best contribute to those objectives. If you approve, I will organize a meeting with State and Treasury people to do that, and will send you a memo on it.⁹

Energy Cooperation. In June, the President suggested to Perez that we have Ministerial talks on energy. Since then, Schlesinger has shown little or no interest in meeting with the Venezuelans in spite of the fact that working-level groups have defined a full agenda. Provided that someone can persuade Schlesinger to meet with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hernandez, there will be much that the two Presidents can talk about in this area.

Though Schlesinger has postponed the meeting three times, Hernandez has come back again and asked for a meeting between February

⁶ Vance traveled to Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela November 20–23, 1977. See Document 68 and footnote 3, Document 342. In telegram 9691 from Brasília, November 23, the Embassy transmitted a draft memorandum of conversation for Vance's talk with Geisel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–0418)

⁷ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence with an arrow in the left-hand margin. For Carter's March 28 exchange with reporters in Venezuela, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 616–617. For his March 30 press conference in Brazil, see *ibid.*, pp. 627–634.

⁸ See Documents 336, 337, and 340.

⁹ Brzezinski checked the approve option. No record of the meeting has been found.

20 and March 5 (see Tab A).¹⁰ That's already quite late if we want to use it as a preparatory meeting for the President's trip. But unless you or the President persuade Schlesinger to meet with Hernandez, I don't think it will ever come off, and we will have lost an important opportunity. I have prepared a memo for you to send to the President (Tab I),¹¹ but you may prefer to use it as background and just talk directly with Schlesinger.

RECOMMENDATION:

In the light of Schlesinger's failure to respond to your memo to him of January 10 (Tab B),¹² I would recommend that you send the memo to the President first (Tab I).¹³

or alternatively, phone Schlesinger directly.¹⁴

In addition, there are two other areas we may want to explore with the Venezuelans:

Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC). An idea which has attracted a good deal of interest at the UN is to build scientific research centers in middle-income developing countries, like Venezuela and Brazil, to develop intermediate or "appropriate" technology for LDCs. In addition to helping develop technology which is more labor-intensive and thus better-suited to their needs, this program would help to create horizontal linkages among developing countries, permitting them to relate to one another directly rather than through industrialized countries. We could explore ways to develop such a program in Venezuela (and in Brazil).

Themes: A Common Responsibility to Help the Poor. One theme, which was in the President's Pan American Day speech,¹⁵ but has not yet been elaborated, is that "all of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries." The stop in Caracas, the capital of one of the "new rich," seems to be an appropriate place to restate the commitment, which OPEC must share with the industrialized countries, to help the

¹⁰ Not found.

¹¹ Not found.

¹² Not found.

¹³ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a March 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote that according to "the informal cooperative arrangement worked out between Schlesinger and Venezuelan Minister of Mines Valentin Hernandez," Bergold "will be going to Caracas later this year to begin a program of technical exchange and cooperation on a wide range of energy issues." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President's Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1-5/78)

¹⁴ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

¹⁵ See footnote 3, Document 5.

poor countries and the poorest people. If you approve, I will develop this concept a little more fully in the speech.¹⁶

BRAZIL

Scenario

The single most important event in Brasilia which the President could do is a *press conference*. Both Mrs. Carter and Secretary Vance have had receptions for a broad cross-section of Brazilians, including people who have criticized the government. The significance of these receptions was lost on the Brazilian people. On the other hand, Mrs. Carter's press conference was the event which made her stop in Brasilia so successful.¹⁷

In addition to meeting with Geisel, the President should also meet briefly with General Figueiredo, Geisel's appointed successor, and also with Magalhaes Pinto, the first civilian of the post-1964 period to seek the Presidency. I think the meeting with Figueiredo would be important since he is likely to be the President from March 1979–1985. The meeting with Magalhaes will be of enormous symbolic importance, underlining our interest in continued liberalization without being unduly provocative.

The President may also want to give a short speech on the role of law in the Brazilian Congress.¹⁸

I would also recommend a short stop in Sao Paulo to meet with Cardinal Arns and with representatives of business, labor, professionals, and academe. Given the traditional independence of "Paulistas", you may want to consider scheduling a small seminar of people like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Helio Jaguaribe to discuss Brazil's future. Even if the President didn't participate, I believe you and Secretary Vance could really profit and would definitely enjoy such a discussion.

Issues

I am currently working with S/P in State on a proposal for US-Brazilian cooperation in non-nuclear energy research and development, and we should have a draft by the end of the week.¹⁹ This is one area we may be able to make some progress.

¹⁶ Brzezinski checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: "Start on it urgently with Erb."

¹⁷ For Rosalynn Carter's trip to Brazil, see Document 165.

¹⁸ For the text of Carter's March 30 remarks before the Brazilian Congress, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 634–636.

¹⁹ Not found.

State is currently trying to decide whether to issue a human rights report for Brazil because of OPIC. Given Brazil's open and strong distaste with these reports—leading to their renunciation of the US-Brazilian military agreement, I believe it would be a disaster to release such a report and would probably expose our investments to possible arbitrary action. I understand that Christopher is considering the decision at this time, and you may want to phone him on this.²⁰

Cuba's presence in Africa is another subject for discussion. I am tasking [*less than 1 line not declassified*] an update on Brazil's policy toward Africa as a way to probe for the best approach to them.²¹

²⁰ Brzezinski highlighted the second sentence of this paragraph, underlined the phrase "you may want to phone him on this," and wrote, "check status and let me know if to call." For Christopher's decision on Brazil and OPIC, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 108.

²¹ [*text not declassified*]

26. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman)¹

New York, February 14, 1978

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS

I am pleased and honored to be here at the Center for Inter-American Relations, which plays such a unique and respected role in the life of this hemisphere. As analysts and in many cases participants in the policy process, you know that decisions are not made in a vacuum. In fact, the policy process at its best is based upon the creative interaction of public officials, outside intellectuals, businessmen, and other community members. Your contributions are invaluable; I greatly appreciate this opportunity to share my own thoughts with you.

This evening, I would like to discuss how I see the evolution of our relations with the peoples and governments of Latin America. My

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Human Rights. No classification marking. Todman spoke before members of the Center for Inter-American Relations.

purpose, frankly, is to gain your support for what President Carter last April referred to as our need to “awake our institutions to a changing world.”²

A Restructuring of Basic Relationships

Since World War II, a succession of Administrations have³ acknowledged the importance of Latin America to the United States, and sought policies that would adequately reflect that importance. The results, however, have often been frustrating. Friends of the United States in Latin America, and serious students of U.S.-Latin American relations here, remain skeptical that American policy truly reflects either the region’s importance or the many and varied interrelationships between our country and Latin America.

President Carter came to office convinced that, if our behavior toward Latin America and the Caribbean reflects the values and priorities of the American people, it would then be possible to look to a new era of cooperation in this hemisphere. This Administration has not yet dispelled the skepticism of the past. Indeed, because the prevailing frustrations are frequently rooted in our societies themselves, they cannot be resolved by governments alone.

Clearly, however, the traditional environment of hemispheric relations has already changed fundamentally in recent years. Traditional security concerns have yielded to new human rights and trade issues. At the same time, what was once unchallenged U.S. dominance has evolved into a growing interdependence.

Latin American nations have grown in population, economic weight and political power. The trade among us provides a major market for U.S. exports and supplies us with key imports. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean bring leadership and voting strength to international forums.

In sum, the other countries of the hemisphere affect us increasingly—and they know it. Having seen similar changes occur in Africa and Asia, I know that the new self-confidence of Third World leaders will require readjustments on our part. But I also believe it creates an opportunity for more mature and healthy relationships.

These shifts in global priorities and power have also brought foreign policy issues into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens, affecting their pocketbooks and their consciences. Increasingly, people are

² Reference is to Carter’s Pan American Day speech at the Organization of American States on April 14, 1977. See footnote 3, Document 5.

³ An unknown hand crossed out the word “have” and replaced it with the word “has.”

realizing that they are affected by foreign events, not just as citizens, but as workers and consumers—as coffee drinkers and car drivers.

These shifts are healthy for our relations with Latin America. The importance of Latin America to the United States has begun to make sense to the average American. And I believe this growing public consciousness offers the best hope in decades for developing a consistent framework for addressing issues that really matter.

The new awareness challenges us to move beyond a preoccupation with government activities alone, and to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has both public support and community involvement.

What do we consider to be the nature of such a policy? *First, it must speak to Americans where they live.*

Events in Latin America and the Caribbean directly affect American communities. The strong ties between our peoples are growing. Black and Hispanic citizens in our communities are often linked by families and friendships to the Caribbean and Latin America. The Western Hemisphere, in fact, is unique in that the drama of its recent history has been played out not in the movement of armies or diplomats, but in the mass movements of ordinary people. Each year millions of U.S. citizens visit Mexico and the Caribbean nations, coming back with lasting impressions and leaving a profound imprint on the societies they visit. American communities in turn feel the influx of several million immigrants, most of whom come from Mexico and the Caribbean.

The importance of good hemispheric relations is also brought home by our growing energy needs. Latin America supplies 17% of our imported oil. Our dependence on our neighbors for energy, including natural gas, is likely to increase.

Even narcotics have become a major aspect of foreign affairs: the street value of narcotics from Latin America in the U.S. is said to be over \$4 billion a year; their traffic darkens millions of lives and erodes thousands of communities.

Second, our foreign policy must speak to Americans where they work.

In the last ten years, our exports to Latin America have more than tripled, from \$5 billion to almost \$18 billion annually. We now sell more machinery, consumer goods and chemical products to Latin America than to the rest of the Third World combined—as much, in fact, as to the entire European Common Market, and more than to Japan. In addition to petroleum, Latin America, in turn, supplies us with copper, bauxite, other key minerals and a growing number of consumer products. U.S. private investment in the area is \$23 billion.

What these statistics mean is that the overall growth of the U.S. economy and of employment in the U.S. is, and I believe will increas-

ingly be, influenced by similar growth in Latin America, and by our relations with its countries.

Requirements for Progress

Moving to a more community-based policy toward Latin America will require a major reorientation of national thinking. It cannot be accomplished overnight.

For too long the United States has assumed Latin America could be dealt with as a single, monolithic region. Too often, we have viewed internal social and political struggles through a lens that distorted Latin American realities and recast them in terms of our own East-West concerns. Too often, we have viewed Latin American efforts to reform their economies with suspicion. At our best moments, we have acted as champions of Latin American development. At our worst moments, our resort to military intervention has given credence to Latin American fears that their territorial integrity had less than our full respect.

Only rarely have we recognized Latin America for what it is: a grouping of nations with individual and distinct goals, aspirations and importance to the world community—and to us.

During the Administration's first year, we have come far, I believe, in *recognizing the individuality of the Latin and Caribbean countries*. In an effort to get to know the countries better and to increase communication, I have visited every nation in the region and met with a broad cross section of leaders and citizens. Mrs. Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Secretary Blumenthal, Ambassador Young and other key Administration leaders have carried the dialogue to many parts of the hemisphere. We have approached each country with a readiness to listen and to cooperate whenever we can.

The most dramatic example of this direct approach was the individual meetings President Carter held with the hemispheric leaders who came to Washington last September to witness the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.⁴ With each, he took the occasion to listen to their views and to convey in turn a strong sense both of our concerns and of our desire for cooperation.

I am convinced that, as a result of these many direct contacts, hemisphere leaders share a high degree of understanding of each other's concerns. The major challenge facing them—and all of us here tonight—is to translate that understanding into practical activities that improve the lives and prospects of ordinary citizens.

The new Panama Canal Treaties are an important beginning. They secure the future of the Canal. They offer the opportunity to put behind

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 23.

us the kind of one-sided and archaic relationship which the 1903 treaty epitomized to the whole hemisphere.

U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, which I am confident, will take place in the very near future, will establish more than any words our willingness to deal with others as our sovereign equals, whatever their size or relative power.

Ratification will thus confirm a cardinal principle of the Carter Administration's foreign policy: that the United States recognizes and is determined to respect the national sovereignty and independence of every state.

But non-intervention alone is hardly a positive basis upon which to build effective foreign relationships. It is the first stage in a far more complex process. Having accepted the individuality and sovereignty of Latin American countries, *we must follow through with the practical implications of that recognition in our bilateral relations.*

During the past year, we have set in place a number of building blocks in addition to the new partnership with Panama. We have strengthened our working relationships with Mexico, Venezuela and many other countries. Recognizing the importance and needs of the individual island states of the Caribbean, we have participated in the creation of a new multilateral group to address the economic problems of the area and to foster cooperation within the entire Caribbean Basin.

We have accepted that governments will not go away just because we may not like them. Only governments can represent a nation's sovereignty in the international arena; only the people of a country have the right to determine the nature of their government. Outside powers have no choice but to deal with existing governments—whether they approve of them or not.

With this in mind, this Administration has tried to place our policy toward Cuba in a more rational context. Our problems with Cuba remain, but we have exchanged inflexible hostility for a pragmatic willingness to negotiate issues which have some prospect of solution. This does not reduce our problems with many of the Castro Government's policies, especially in Africa. But, by talking, we have a reasonable framework for dealing with our differences.

Ultimately, the challenge is to develop a foreign policy that responds essentially to human, not just governmental, concerns. The basic dilemma is as straightforward to state as it is complex to resolve: how to encourage respect for the dignity and freedom of the individual, the development of democratic institutions, and the fulfillment of basic human needs without interfering in a nation's internal affairs, and while maintaining the constructive working relations necessary to advance all our many objectives.⁵

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph and underlined, "without interfering in a nation's internal affairs, and while maintaining the constructive working relations necessary to advance all our many objectives"

Promoting human rights is a fundamental tenet and a cornerstone of this Administration's foreign policy. It is central to our relations with all nations. I know that this deep personal conviction of my own, is profoundly held by the President and the Secretary of State. Moreover, because this commitment reflects universally recognized values, it binds us rather than separates us from the other peoples of this planet. It calls on the conscience of all governments to live up to their sacred obligations. It gives all people hope for a better future knowing that we stand behind their aspirations to share in the fullness of life.

That is why we have made clear to all countries that the nature of our relations with them will depend on their practices in the human rights area. In doing so we are not interfering in their internal affairs, but determining our own behavior in response to what we see.⁶

And it explains why President Carter's emphasis on human rights has struck such a responsive chord throughout this hemisphere and the world.

Our efforts, of course, have done more than spark people's hopes. They have provoked lively debates both here and abroad. For us, the central issue is not the direction of our policy or the strength of our commitment. That is unwavering. Rather, it is how our objectives can best be accomplished.⁷

Our experiences over the past year have shown clearly that we must be careful in the actions we select if we are truly to help and not hinder the cause of promoting human rights and alleviating suffering.⁸

—We must avoid speaking out before learning all the facts, or without calculating the likely reaction and responses to our initiatives.

—We must avoid expecting other governments to achieve overnight fundamental changes in their societies and practices in response to our bidding and without regard to historical circumstances.⁹

—We must avoid assuming that we can deal with one issue in isolation without considering the consequences for other aspects of our relationships.¹⁰

⁶ An unknown hand underlined this paragraph.

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "the central issue is not the direction of our policy or the strength of our commitment" and the last sentence of the paragraph.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined, "we must be careful in the actions we select if we are truly to help and not hinder the cause of promoting human rights and alleviating suffering."

⁹ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "avoid expecting other governments to achieve overnight fundamental changes in their societies and practices."

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "avoid assuming that we can deal with one issue in isolation."

—We must avoid believing that only the opposition speaks the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, about conditions in their country.¹¹

—We must avoid presuming to know so much more about another society than its own citizens that we can prescribe actions for them without bearing any responsibility for the consequences.¹²

—We must avoid punishing the poor and already victimized by denying them assistance to show our dissatisfaction with their governments.

—We must avoid pointing to some and not to others. Selective morality is a contradiction in terms.¹³

—We must avoid condemning an entire government for every negative act by one of its officials.

—We must avoid holding entire countries up to public ridicule and embarrassment, trampling on their national dignity and pride.¹⁴

—Finally, we must avoid being so concerned with declaring the rightness of our course that we lose sight of our true objective—to alleviate individual suffering.

Tactical mistakes such as these do not promote human rights.¹⁵ They sacrifice communication and possibly influence, and resurrect old issues of sovereignty and intervention. And they can be avoided through good will, common sense, compassion and careful diplomacy.

While taking care to avoid such mistakes, *we will not by any means retreat into silence or indifference.*

We must proceed on the conviction that I consider to be the only basis for hope and optimism in our hemispheric relations: that it is possible to advance the rights and meet the basic needs of individual human beings while, at the same time, respecting the sovereignty of their governments.

We know we are not infallible. We know that we have faults to correct in our own society. But we will continue to attempt in every way to associate ourselves with the promotion of basic individual rights, the enhancement of political freedom, and the alleviation of those conditions of suffering that keep entire social groups at the margin of existence:

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined this paragraph.

¹² An unknown hand underlined the phrase “avoid presuming to know so much more about another society than its own citizens.”

¹³ An unknown hand underlined “avoid” and “selective morality.”

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined this paragraph.

¹⁵ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

—we will weigh all of our relationships to ensure that they contribute, not to the restriction or denial, but to the promotion of human rights;

—we will use every possible means of public and private persuasion to bring an end to abuses of the person wherever they occur;

—we will work to increase support for internationally recognized human rights standards with all governments that will work with us;

—we will work with the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Human Rights Commission to strengthen regional cooperation to identify abuses and seek their remedy; and

—we will endeavor to promote the kinds of economic, social and political development required to enjoy all the rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This last goal, promoting development, poses a special challenge to our active support for human rights. Under present foreign assistance guidelines, for example, poor people in a generally impoverished country can be helped; equally poor people in a better off country cannot. If this pattern continues, by 1980 U.S. bilateral assistance will be unavailable to most of the countries of Latin America.

Vital human rights are at stake. Aggregate GNP figures fail to reflect the poverty of high infant mortality, disease, illiteracy and inferior housing. More than 100 million Latin Americans are forced to subsist on less than \$200 per year.

Assistance policies that cut off help to the poor because some of their fellow citizens live too well, like those that deny help to the poor because their governments are repressive, create an ironic paradox: if we decide to confine our assistance only to those developing nations that are at once desperately poor and models of enlightened democracy, we risk crippling our ability to contribute to socio-economic development in Latin America.

In the developing world, the predicament of the “middle-income” country is often very much like that of the middle-income American taxpayer. And Latin America is increasingly the region in the middle: too “rich” to receive aid, not strong enough to play a decisive role in shaping events.

Without some degree of outside support in times of financial difficulties, even the relatively advanced developing countries of Latin America will be hindered in carrying out reforms to narrow the gap between rich and poor and meet the needs of all their people.

In the long run, of course, the development issue is not properly one of assistance as it has been traditionally defined. At least in this hemisphere, both sides in the North-South dialogue agree that development hinges on trade, not outside aid. Both we and the Latin Americans

need expanding markets for exports, stable prices, and a voice in international economic decisions. We have made realistic proposals to help stabilize commodity prices. We have encouraged greater utilization of the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries.

It is true that increased domestic demands for import protection have increased concern abroad that new trade restrictions may limit future growth. However, few petitions for import relief under the Trade Act have resulted in actions adversely affecting Latin American products. Moreover, to regain momentum toward increased trade, we are vigorously supporting the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Tropical Products Agreement with Mexico, worked out in the context of the MTN this past year, is a model of mutual benefit.

In the last analysis, our ability to pursue a credible course on the whole range of developmental and economic issues will depend, not on the intentions of any one Administration, but on the commitment and priorities of the American people. The growing impact of foreign policy on local communities often means in the short term that domestic and foreign policy objectives will be perceived to be more sharply in conflict.

Increasing public understanding of the full implications of issues such as these is one area where all of you in this room can be particularly helpful.

This need to increase public understanding of how foreign policy affects local communities brings me to the last point I want to discuss with you tonight. It is *the importance of making governmental relationships a coherent part of a much wider spectrum of cooperative private relations among our societies.*

During the past year, we have, of course, continued to deal with many of the traditional problems of inter-American relations. For example, to preserve the peace, we have increased our support for the dispute settlement efforts of the Organization of American States in Central America and other potential trouble-spots. And we have made nuclear non-proliferation and conventional arms restraint key elements of our hemispheric policy. Our decision last spring to reverse past policies and support the Nuclear Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean gives us new credibility in seeking peaceful nuclear cooperation with other hemispheric nations.

It is nonetheless increasingly apparent that the new issues—such as the flow of narcotics—are ones in which many more citizens have a direct interest than in the past. To reduce the narcotics traffic that destroys so many young American lives, we have in recent years sought the cooperation of many Latin American governments. To ease the human costs of foreign imprisonment, we have implemented a prisoner exchange program with Mexico, and are developing similar programs

elsewhere. To resolve differences over migration, we are working with Mexico to relieve unemployment pressures on both sides of the border.

As these few examples demonstrate, our society and those of Latin America now interact in too many ways for government to monopolize the message. This trend is increasing. It is foolish to deny it and unnecessary to fear it.

The new challenges are ones that an open, multidimensional society like the United States is best equipped to meet. And they are challenges I am convinced most Latin Americans are prepared to meet with us.

Already we are seeing many U.S. companies and multinational enterprises respond to changing realities in Latin American societies, sometimes faster than either governments or intellectuals. Most American businesses abroad now maintain healthy and constructive relationships with their host countries, contributing to the development of the entrepreneurial skills and productive activities essential to our mutual well-being.

It has not been generally noticed, but in providing for a generation of partnership based on increasing Panamanian participation in the management of the Canal, the new Panama Canal Treaties reflect a practice that is already widely followed in the inter-American business community, where joint ventures and local managers are increasingly common.

The times call for similar creative and responsible problem-solving at all levels of our communities. They call for intellectual dialogue to strengthen common institutions and to encourage broad-based leadership in all our societies.

Drawing fully on the hemisphere's basic wealth—its people—is a major challenge to our press and our universities, and to institutions—like this Center—which already understand that writers like Borges of Argentina, Fuentes of Mexico and Vargas Llosa of Peru are also giants of our own culture.

As our own society changes, government too must awaken. Government can move far beyond present efforts in facilitating academic, technical and cultural exchanges, including in them minorities and other groups not previously tapped for such programs. It can build on the many contacts that take place in the world of business. It can, in sum, help bring the many persons dedicated to improving hemispheric relations together with the even greater numbers dedicated to resolving local community problems. It is time they met.

I am encouraged to know that you will be an active partner in that effort.

Thank you very much.

27. Editorial Note

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman's February 14, 1978, speech (see Document 26) engendered reaction and commentary from inside the Department of State, from governments abroad, and from the press.

In a February 17 memorandum for the files, Director of Policy Planning for Public and Congressional Affairs Luigi Einaudi wrote that the speech was followed by a question-and-answer (Q&A) session, which the memorandum for the files reconstructed. Questioners asked Todman about Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, Belize, the Beagle Channel, Panama, Cuba, and Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Human Rights) Einaudi's reconstruction of the Q&A session was transmitted to all American Republic diplomatic posts as telegram 44242, February 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078-0295)

The Embassies in Managua, Montevideo, Asunción, and Buenos Aires reported on local press and government reaction to the speech. The Embassy in Managua reported on February 15 that the "Somoza family newspaper *Novedades*" published a "banner headline 'Sandinistas Provoke Violence, Todman Says,'" and quoted the translation of Todman's answer to a question on Nicaragua as printed in the newspaper. The Embassy requested that the Department send "text of Todman comment (which, article indicates, was in response to question) and any clarification which we may use here ASAP." (Telegram 786 from Managua, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070-0397) The Department responded on February 16 that the quotes attributed to Todman "are incomplete and garbled, evidently intentionally. Todman did not enter into detail about who did what or how." In addition, the Department advised, "Embassy should avoid being drawn into polemics." (Telegram 41418 to Managua, February 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780072-0462)

On February 15, the Embassy in Montevideo reported: "All Montevideo media gave prominent, heavy play to Assistant Secretary Todman's speech at the Center of Inter-American Relations, stressing his advocacy of 'a more moderate, balanced, and realistic' U.S. campaign on human rights." The Embassy also noted, "Not surprisingly, the pro-government media has picked up and emphasized these and other aspects of the Todman statement which serve to prove the GOU's arguments on human rights and have been similarly selective in their use of human rights comments Todman made to the press following

the formal address.” (Telegram 533 from Montevideo, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070–0236)

The Embassy in Asunción reported on February 17: “The speech of Assistant Secretary Todman to the Center for Inter-American Relations has had a great impact here. A morning headline reads ‘Todman severely criticizes human rights policy of Carter.’ The government is jubilant.” Ambassador Robert E. White reported, “All government officials with whom we have spoken are unanimous in their praise of the Todman speech.” In addition, he stated, “Those in Paraguay who have supported our position on human rights have expressed themselves in the strongest terms. An internationally known scientist said the speech was a ‘tragic event.’ An opposition leader who faces a prison term on a trumped up charge came to the Embassy and told us that ‘if this is the new policy of the United States, there is no hope.’” White concluded, “If the Department has any guidance which would assist me in lessening the disastrous effects of the interpretations being placed on this speech, I could make instant use of them.” (Telegram 679 from Asunción, February 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076–0674)

On February 24, the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported: “Assistant Secretary Todman’s Latin America policy speech received wide coverage and editorial comment in the local press, with initial emphasis placed on ten points cautioning US response on human rights. Subsequent distribution and publication of full text largely cleared up misconceptions that speech meant other than firm commitment to existing human rights policy. Human rights groups were distressed that speech could be and was used to suggest US backing away on human rights.” (Telegram 1406 from Buenos Aires, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780088–0064)

In telegram 45684 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 22, the Department advised: “In some areas press is distorting speech as change in criticism of President Carter’s human rights policy. Distortion has occurred where listing of types of action we should avoid has been misinterpreted as criticism of the conduct of the policy. There has been no—repeat—no change in human rights policy,” and “there is no basis for construing speech as criticism of the human rights policy.” The Department instructed, “Where press, official or private opinion has picked up line that there is change in human rights policy or criticism of such policy you should move forcefully to counter it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780082–0791)

On March 2, *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that the speech “has sparked controversy in the State Department over how the administration should pursue President Carter’s human-rights policy,” that “a number of State Department officials have criticized the speech,”

with those officials “arguing that it put too much emphasis on restraint and amounted to a brake on implementation of the rights policy,” and that it “may have sent the wrong ‘signal’ to some Latin American countries.” (Daniel Southerland, “Rights Policy Speech Highlights State Department Split,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 2, 1978, p. 3)

28. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, February 26, 1978

Country Priorities in Latin America

SUMMARY:

Six Latin American countries appear especially to warrant our attention over the next year: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Chile.² The challenges and dilemmas of each relate to the global concerns the Administration stressed in the first year. The problems raised in this memo could provide for a lively discussion should you decide to attend an ARA staff meeting.³

Our Latin American policy during the first year focused, as elsewhere, on issues such as human rights, nonproliferation and arms restraint. Our priorities in terms of issues were relatively well elaborated, but less clear was the importance we attached to the various countries of the hemisphere. Partly in reaction to the apparent crowning by the previous administration of Brazil as a “subhegemonic” power, we publically emphasized the individuality of each Latin state, and eschewed establishing priorities.

The internal setting of priorities—as opposed to public signals—need not imply that selected countries represent our interests in their geographical area; but it can help to clarify our thinking, place developments in context, and order our own time.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780046-0321. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Feinberg on February 24. A stamped notation indicates that Vance saw the memorandum.

² An unknown hand underlined the names of the six countries.

³ At the end of this paragraph, Lake wrote: “It might also be of interest for the ARA Chiefs of Mission conference next week.”

Criteria

The criteria for deciding which countries deserve attention is somewhat arbitrary. If we consider, however, the extent of US interests; the pace of change (and the US ability to influence it); and the country's regional weight, six countries appear especially to warrant our attention over the next year: Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Jamaica, Nicaragua and Chile. Of course, Panama will remain the number one domestic issue. Cuba's African policy is of increasing concern, but Cuba's importance in a hemispheric context will depend on progress in normalizing relations.

Other countries will demand our attention from time to time:

—We will want to encourage the democratization processes in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, and press for improvements in basic human rights practices in Uruguay and El Salvador;

—Should the Peruvian financial crisis worsen, we may want to discourage the seizure of power by a severe "Pinochet-style" regime or the temptation to default;

—Venezuela will be preoccupied by its presidential election, but its stance on NIEO and OPEC issues will be important. The President's trip will permit even greater cooperation and coordination on issues—non-proliferation, human rights, arms restraint—where perceptions are shared;

—And we will want to monitor regional tensions, including Guatemala/Belize, Peru/Chile/Bolivia, and the Beagle Channel (Argentina/Chile).

Mexico

Two difficult issues—immigration and energy⁴—are complicating the bilateral relationship. Perhaps 20% of Mexico's labor force works from time to time in the US, and the receipts from energy exports could double Mexico's foreign exchange earnings; while from the US perspective, immigrants from Mexico could reach 10% of our labor force and Mexican oil could support 30% of our import needs by 1985.

Mexico is unhappy with the Administration's proposal on limiting illegal immigration, and our refusal to agree to pay \$2.60 per thousand cubic feet for their natural gas. Agreement on smaller issues—tropical products, prisoner exchange—cannot compensate for the deterioration in relations caused by these two central issues.

We are, however, talking to the Mexicans about reducing the immigrant flow by increasing rural development credit which goes to the

⁴ An unknown hand, presumably Vance, underlined the phrase "immigration and energy."

root of the problem and serves the human rights of unemployed Mexicans: but we may need to go further. The Mexicans would like to see us reinstate a modified *bracero* program. The Mexicans also seek assurances that the US market will be open to an increasing quantity of Mexican manufactured goods.

The bargaining process on natural gas pricing may come to a friendly compromise: but if it does not, our energy relationship that holds great promise for substantially reducing our dependency on OPEC will have gotten off to a sour start. Should that occur, we ought to reconsider our "hands off" approach toward Mexican energy development, and, perhaps, design a program for bilateral cooperation on energy.

Lopez Portillo's first year has generally been successful largely because of the economy's fulfillment of IMF-recommended performance criteria but at the cost of a decline in industrial employment when 700,000 young Mexicans are entering the job market each year. Mexico's 65 million population will double in 20 years at current growth rates. The Mexican economy will have to sustain an impressive period of growth to avoid rising unemployment which could generate social and political tensions of great consequence to the U.S. Our long-term interest in Mexico's economic success may dictate a more forthcoming attitude on certain issues including trade, aid and energy, than our immediate economic interests would seem to warrant.

Brazil

The US will want to give Brazil top priority next year, as Geisel's successor defines himself on human rights, international economic issues and non-proliferation. The President will arrive in Brazil just when the official ARENA party will be choosing its candidate for the presidency. Geisel's choice, and therefore the almost certain winner, General Figueiredo, is a relative unknown. Nevertheless, he is under increasing pressure from the candidacy of Magalhaes Pinto, a civilian businessman, to commit himself to preserving and continuing the liberalizing reforms begun by Geisel. But hardline military elements continue to see threats from "internal subversion," and some fear losing their high-level jobs in government-run enterprises. Should they "capture" Figueiredo, or replace him by force with one of their own, repression could begin anew and the liberalization process be set back.

We should try to encourage the moderates in the military to see the reassertion of democratic traditions as aiding Brazil's rise to greatness, and entry into the "club" of industrial nations. A democratic Brazil could be a counterweight to the hardline Southern Cone regimes, at a time when our own leverage in the region appears to be on the decline.

The Brazilians are ambivalent about their status, demanding the concessions granted LDCs, while seeking the attention worthy of a nascent global power. Brazil finds itself bumping up against rules designed to regulate relations among developed countries—despite being, in many respects, underdeveloped. Brazilian aspirations for “grandeza” center on rapid economic growth, which is linked to export expansion. The success of the MTN, especially in liberalizing trade in labor-intensive manufactures, is vitally important for Brazil. But if Brazil is to become a global power, it must accept the accompanying responsibilities; in the context of the GATT, this translates into a willingness to offer reciprocal tariff reductions, and to discuss such trade-distorting practices as export subsidies.

We are currently drawing up a plan for possible non-nuclear energy cooperation that would apply to LDCs generally, but which the President might announce in Brazil. The proposal is being conceived with Brazil first in mind, to refute the charge that our non-proliferation strategy is actually aimed at crippling Brazil’s industrialization by depriving it of energy. Progress on non-proliferation itself, however, will probably have to wait until the rigid Geisel leaves office in early 1979.

Argentina

Your presentation of the list of 7500 “disappeared”⁵ helped jolt the Argentine military into releasing series of lists of names of prisoners, and movement on the Deutsch case (although not on Timerman) is anticipated. But a pattern of gross violations, including disappearances and torture, continue. Absent significant improvement in the human rights situation, congressional restrictions will prohibit sales of military equipment and training beginning next October 1. In the interim, we will want to leverage available military transfers (with non-lethal, non-internal security applications) to maximum advantage. The issue is whether the Argentine military will more likely respond to blunt, categorical sanctions, or to the gradual release of appropriate items in response to tangible human rights improvements. We are also examining how best to orchestrate our entire range of possible instruments of influence.

⁵ In telegram 8958 from Buenos Aires, November 28, 1977, the Embassy reported that during Vance’s trip to Argentina, Vance and Montes had discussed “a list of persons missing or imprisoned, prepared by private groups in the U.S. and having no official character,” and that the Embassy had transmitted that list to the Government of Argentina. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770440–0373) See Document 68.

The dependence of the liberal economic model of Martínez de Hoz⁶ upon foreign capital makes it highly unlikely that the Argentine government would retaliate against US business interests. Of greater concern is the failure of the Argentines to follow through on their repeated indications that they will sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Their decision will ultimately hinge on their perceptions of their own national security and the threat posed by the Brazilian nuclear program. However, our nuclear interests in Argentina are the most powerful reasons for maintaining a working relationship with the Argentine government.

The Argentine political scene is showing the first signs of rebirth since the March, 1976 coup. The apparently ineffectual Videla is being openly challenged by junta member Massera, who is seeking to appeal to domestic and international opinion by calling for human rights improvements and more equitable social policies. The traditional political parties are beginning to regroup and pressure for more political "space." Many of these voices are unabashedly pro-American—clear indication that our principled stance on human rights may have a handsome political payoff in the future.

Jamaica

Jamaica is increasingly important to the US for several reasons. Manley's attempts to pursue a basic human needs development strategy within a democratic framework places Jamaica, almost uniquely among LDCs, exactly in tune with two central thrusts of our foreign policy. Jamaica will also be important to our Caribbean initiative. But Jamaica's preference for immediate balance-of-payments relief conflicts with our longer-term development assistance approach, and could interject a sharply discordant note into the Caribbean Group before it can get off the ground. And since Jamaica is the chairman of the G-77 this year, maintaining a working relationship with the Jamaicans will be central to our efforts to move the North-South dialogue in a more constructive direction.

We greatly improved our relations with the Manley government during 1977, but Manley is not convinced that we are planning to do enough for him to resolve his fundamental problems. Undoubtedly, his expectations are unrealistic and he has not been sufficiently willing to confront hard trade-offs at home. Nevertheless, we will need to convince Manley—the leader in the Caribbean, after Castro, with the greatest regional and international image—that the West can provide his struggling island with sufficient opportunities. We need to keep

⁶ Lake inserted the phrase "Finance Minister" before Martínez de Hoz's name.

the broad range of our relationships with Jamaica under review, to see where and how, these opportunities can be enhanced.

Nicaragua

Because of our long association with the Somoza regime, the political changes underway pose a considerable challenge to the U.S.: a harsh outbreak of anti-Americanism is possible—unless the US can demonstrate to Nicaraguans our absolute neutrality. Our human rights policy has begun to improve our image, but Congressional approval of FMS credits, the physical presence of American military advisers to Somoza's armed forces, and our ongoing AID mission (for basic human needs, a distinction difficult for Nicaraguans to grasp) has made the US position vis-a-vis the Somoza regime less clear than it is, say, in the case of Pinochet in Chile.

In a recent policy review, we decided that we would try to avoid being seen to be propping up Somoza by remaining as aloof as possible from internal political maneuverings. At the same time, the opposition must comprehend that no *deus ex machina* (i.e., the U.S.) will find solutions for them. Our underlying assumption is that Nicaraguans can only build a viable and lasting democracy if they undertake and complete the task themselves. Continuing entreaties for support from the various political groupings will test our resolve to stick to our private and public policy of non-interventionism.

Chile

Our energetic human rights stance has gone a long way to undoing, in a remarkably short period of time, US identification with the Pinochet regime. During the last year, Pinochet may have gone as far as he felt was consistent with his regime's security, in reducing the worst forms of human rights abuses. Disappearances and torture are much less frequent now. Whether Pinochet will lift the state of seige and remove other decrees that impinge on the rule of law may be determined in the course of this year. Pinochet's banishment of twelve leading Christian Democrats indicates that he will not yet tolerate opposition political activity.

The dilemma we face is how to continue subtly to press the GOC to improve its human rights practices without jeopardizing the major points we've gained in domestic and international opinion by separating ourselves from the Pinochet regime. If the human rights situation actually deteriorates, as Pinochet's speeches following the plebiscite suggested, we will have to find ways to show our displeasure without eliciting further repressive measures that would jeopardize dissenters within Chile.

Should the recent decisions by Exxon Minerals and Goodyear to invest in Chile be echoed by other US firms, a new domestic constitu-

ency favoring more sympathetic treatment for Chile would develop. Highly visible US investments may generate a second difficulty: Chileans will wonder at the apparently divergent concerns of private and official US citizens.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, these priority countries will not be easy to deal with in the coming year. Indeed, they become priorities because of the challenges they pose. In each case, the central issues involve global concerns: Mexico, energy; Brazil and Argentina, human rights and non-proliferation; Jamaica, balance-of-payments financing and other North-South issues; Nicaragua and Chile, human rights. This indicates that our general foreign policy priorities are right. Our ability to implement them in these concrete country cases will determine their ultimate success or failure.

One of your next meetings with bureau staffs might be with ARA. The problems raised in this memo would provide for a lively discussion.

29. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Beyond Panama: A PRC on Latin America/Caribbean?

The most difficult and important issue in inter-American relations—the Canal Treaty—is now behind us. Your question² whether a PRC meeting on Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) would be a useful way to take stock of where we've come and chart a course for the next year(s) is timely. The President's trip to Panama³ provides us the perfect opportunity to set in motion the next steps in our policy.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977–1980, Box 38, PRM–17 [2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erb, Mathews, and Denend. Inderfurth and Hunter initialed the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "Good memo base PRC discussion. ZB."

² Not found.

³ June 16 and 17. See footnote 4, Document 25.

In this memo, I propose to summarize what we have achieved in the last 16 months, analyze where we have failed, and suggest those areas where we should begin to work. In the final part, I will make some recommendations on the next steps we should take.

I. The First Sixteen Months: What Was Achieved

I think we can take great pride in the accomplishments of the Carter Administration in its policies to Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, it wouldn't hurt to get the President out talking about it since there are few regions where we have done more or been as successful. At Tab A is a brief summary which I prepared describing these accomplishments.⁴

II. Our Failures

There is no question that the major area of failure for the Carter Administration is in the economic area, and it threatens to undermine our success primarily because it is this area which is of highest priority to LAC.⁵ Though some might argue that our most serious problem is lack of progress in the North-South dialogue, I would disagree. We have been criticized most vigorously not for what we have failed to do, but for what we have done. Specifically, the decisions which hurt include: the doubling of the duty on sugar; the support of legislation to dispose of 50,000 tons of tin; the failure by Congress to appropriate funds for the International Development Banks as pledged by the USG; the failure to significantly increase the proportion of meat quotas for the Latin American meat producers (as opposed to Australia and New Zealand); and the decision to countervail against export subsidies by Brazil. These decisions do not seem terribly important to us, but each has provoked a bitter response in Latin America, and they have a cumulative effect.

Previous administrations have, at times, analyzed similar decisions and established coordinating and monitoring devices to prevent such adverse decisions, but these mechanisms have proven ineffective and naive. The problem is that, at times, other interests—either domestic or diplomatic—do prevail and sometimes should prevail. Perhaps, all we can reach for is a deeper understanding and sensitivity to the likely impact of such decisions on LAC by people like yourself, Stu Eizenstat, Secretary Vance, Bob Strauss, etc. Perhaps the mechanism warrants another examination.

⁴ Tab A, an undated paper entitled "The First Sixteen Months: What Was Achieved," is attached but not printed.

⁵ Hunter highlighted this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin, "agree! RH."

In the other North-South economic issues—the Common Fund, development bank replenishment, trade policy, etc.—progress has been slow and our position exceedingly cautious.

III. *Opportunities Lost or Not Yet Taken*

Let me suggest four areas where we should focus our attention:

(1) *Consultations on Global Issues*

In my opinion, the one achievement in the first 16 months with the greatest potential importance is the decision to view Latin America in a global as opposed to a regional context. But “globalism”—as a strategic approach to eliciting support and advice from the hemisphere’s leaders in addressing global problems—has scarcely been explored, though there have recently been a few excursions into this new area. My memo on gaining Latin American support in the NAM as a way to pressure Cuba is one such excursion.⁶ Another example is the amount of time and effort the President spent with Perez and Geisel on issues like Africa and the Middle East.⁷

The strategy of extensive consultations on a wide range of issues is based on the premise that we will increasingly need Latin America’s support for a wide assortment of issues—not just North-South issues, but also East-West, African, non-proliferation, etc. To obtain support for positions we consider important, however, we need to be prepared to be forthcoming on issues which they deem important. One could distinguish between the input and the output parts of consultation:

—*Input.* We need to not only touch base, but to solicit reactions and be genuinely prepared to alter our position if a reasonable case is made.

—*Output.* Once our decision is made, we should be sensitive to informing the governments, to solicit their reaction, and if possible, their support.

Organizational Problems. State should be asked to prepare a paper explaining how it would organize itself internally to undertake a large number of consultations with a great many governments on a great many issues not always the responsibility of the area. ARA is not only unable to deal with this approach, but there seems little interest in exploring it. Of course, the strategy is as important as the organization,

⁶ Dated February 28. Pastor wrote, “I think we should begin communicating with receptive or potentially receptive members of the non-aligned in an effort to influence the direction of the non-aligned conference. We should brief them on events in the Horn and encourage skepticism about whether Cuba can realistically consider itself non-aligned when it is fighting the Soviet Union’s wars.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 12/77-7/78)

⁷ See Documents 345 and 172.

and I would recommend that the PRC discuss both within the context of the other issues considered below. In addition, a thorough review of the North-South economic issues of bilateral and multilateral concern to Latin America is an essential element in our overall review.

(2) *A Fast-Disbursing Balance of Payment Support Fund*

In the past 16 months, we have had to stand defenseless, unable to respond to a problem which keeps repeating and threatening to get worse. As a result of the leap in petroleum and food prices in 1973 and 1974 and a decline in concessional assistance to the LAC, the region is falling under a more and more severe debt burden. Peru, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Guyana are the worst cases now, but most of the countries in the region suffer from varying degrees of the problem.

We have found ourselves totally unable to respond since our aid instruments have been phased down and out. The problem becomes a doubly troublesome one when the governments are democratic or are trying to become democratic. Then, inevitably, people question the sincerity of our human rights policy—why we fail to follow our words with dollars.

There are several options available to us including: an expansion of security supporting assistance to the region; creation of a new fund for democratization, financed by aid re-flows (which currently exceed aid loans to the region); or an expansion of Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund.

(3) *Arms Sales and Restraint*

We have a two-edged problem in this area as well. On the one hand, *we will not have any military relations* with Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and Chile as of October 1978. In effect, we will have a total arms embargo with these countries, which is really unprecedented in relations between allies. Obviously, DOD is having fits about this prospect, and they have a point. Of course, any change in military relations with these countries would require new legislation, and that is not likely to be easy.

We need to simultaneously approach this problem from a different direction: we need to seek support for an arms restraint agreement in the region. We have held discussions with the Venezuelans, and they are extremely enthusiastic. Perez asked us for detailed papers, and we have forwarded them to him. He, in turn, has asked that we undertake simultaneous discussions with arms suppliers.⁸ In another two weeks, we'll be in a position to evaluate the chances of moving towards a

⁸ Not found.

genuine arms restraint program for the region which would be as unique as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is for nuclear weapons.

(4) *Caribbean*

Since the December meeting at the World Bank establishing the Caribbean Group, the Bank has been preparing papers for the May 26 Donors Meeting and the June 20 meeting of the Group. The Bank's analysis of the economic problems of the region and its recommendations for ways to raise the level of structural and human development are excellent, and the USG will have to make some hard decisions between now and then. In particular, the Bank has drawn up two proposals:

(a) *A Caribbean Development Facility* for channelling \$125 million annually for three years to the region to serve as local counterpart costs for projects financed by the Development Banks. With rigorous stabilization programs, most countries have had to sharply curtail their investment programs, and this facility would enable them to continue these programs.

(b) *A Caribbean Technical Assistance Fund* (about \$12 million/per year) to develop regional project proposals.

In addition, it is necessary to develop a strategy of consultation with other governments to insure that our goals in the Caribbean are shared and the proposals can be implemented.

IV. *Next Steps*

I have focused on four issues not because I believe they are exhaustive, but because I think they represent areas worth pursuing at this time. In particular, each of these areas contain initiatives for the U.S. to take in tandem with the other leaders—particularly the democratic ones—in the hemisphere.

Torrijos has invited the Presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica to Panama for the ratification ceremony, and President Carter will have a 1–2 hour meeting with these Presidents there.⁹ That seems like a perfect opportunity to discuss these issues and try to obtain a common view.

If I had to circle a theme for the correct approach to Latin America in the next 16 months, it is that *Latin American nations are important actors in the world. We need to demonstrate our respect and responsiveness to gain their cooperation in dealing with the global problems which face all of us.*

⁹ See Document 30.

The President should reiterate this theme in his speech in Panama.¹⁰ (The main thrust of the speech should be to place the Canal Treaties in the context of his other foreign policy accomplishments in the hemisphere. I will prepare a suggested outline for you this week.) But instead of just having the President state this theme and *our* position and goals on the four issues outlined above, it would be appropriate and extremely effective if we could translate our positions into a *Declaration of Panama*, which could be issued by the five democratic leaders at the ratification ceremony.¹¹ That would embody in a document the theme of a multilateral, cooperative approach. For too long, the President of the U.S. has been asked to state *his* policy to Latin America. When President Carter stated his approach last year and explained why it no longer made sense for the U.S. to have a policy, few understood what he was saying. The way to get the message of multilateralism and globalism across is to issue a multilateral statement. And there is no more legitimate vehicle than the five Democratic Presidents invited to Panama. This idea also dovetails with Hamilton's desire to turn the Panama ceremony to our advantage, underscoring the new era which the Treaties will bring.

The PRC should consider policy options for each of the four issues described above. To permit us sufficient time to consult with the Five to gain their support for our positions and to negotiate a "Declaration of Panama", a PRC meeting should be held by the third week in May.¹²

We may also want to consider at the PRC meeting whether the USG should support Panama's request that the O.A.S. move its headquarters to the area near the Canal. I think the idea is ripe, but I know there are many in State who prefer the status quo. Therefore, a position paper would be in order.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, I will draft a PRM which follows the outline of this memo, consult with ARA, and forward it to you for signature as soon as possible.¹³

¹⁰ June 16. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 2, Document 185.

¹¹ A "Declaration of Panama" was not made. On June 17, the leaders of Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Jamaica, Panama, and the United States made a multilateral statement, affirming that they were "determined to build on this example," a reference to the Panama Canal Treaties, "so that attention can be focused on economic cooperation and integration in order to promote socio-economic development and thereby strengthen solidarity among the peoples of the Americas." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1978, p. 51) See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 3, Document 185.

¹² Brzezinski underlined the phrase "held by the third week in May." No PRC meeting on Panama, Latin America, or the Caribbean took place.

¹³ Brzezinski checked the approve option. A draft PRM, dated May 12, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, PRM-17 (Latin America), 3/15/77-5/78. No final version of the PRM was issued.

30. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Panama City, June 16, 1978, 7:30–9:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of First Multilateral Meeting in Panama

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
 Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U.N.
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
 Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State
 William Jordan, U.S. Ambassador to Panama
 Jody Powell, Press Secretary
 Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member (note taker)

President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela
 Simon Consalvi Bottaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela

President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, Colombia
 Virgilio Barco, Colombian Ambassador to the U.S.

President Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rica
 Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier, Minister of Foreign Relations for Costa Rica

Prime Minister Michael Manley, Jamaica
 P. J. Patterson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Tourism for Jamaica

Omar Torrijos, Chief of Government, Panama
 Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, Minister of Foreign Relations for Panama

Other members of other governments' delegation attended but are not identified.

Torrijos opened the meeting by noting that it was a timely and propitious occasion to exchange ideas frankly. There are problems which cannot be postponed. In discussions among the six countries' leaders, we should hope to find a design which will eventually lead to a solution to these problems.

Human Rights

Carazo said that all present had governments which aspired to a full application of the concept of human rights. *Carazo* referred to the San Jose Pact (the American Convention on Human Rights) which was signed on November 22, 1969 and would, when it enters into force, establish a supreme court on human rights matters. At his inauguration,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 6-7/78. Confidential. The meeting was held in the El Panama Hotel.

he proposed to the whole hemisphere the need to complete ratification of the Convention and establish this body. He expressed concern that only eight nations have ratified the convention, with three more needed to bring it into effect. He suggested that there are three countries represented by their leaders around the table who had not ratified it. Finally, he proposed his country as the site of the future court.

Perez jokingly suggested that we look to the countries to the north of Costa Rica for future ratification of the Convention.

Carter said that we have signed the Convention, but not yet ratified it.²

Manley said that Jamaica had signed and was preparing legislation that would secure its ratification.

Carter said that he would be delivering the opening address to the Organization of American States General Assembly, and he planned to ask other nations to expedite ratification.³ He promised to do the same but doubted that the US would ratify this year.

Perez suggested that we draw up a list of all those countries that have signed and ratified, as well as those that haven't.

Torrijos said Panama had already ratified it, but had not yet deposited the instrument of ratification.

Carter suggested that *Torrijos* help him to persuade U.S. Senators to ratify it since *Torrijos* knows the Senators better than *Carter* does. *Carter* also noted that Chile had invited the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to visit their country.

Perez said that we would celebrate the 30th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights this December. He suggested that December would be an ideal time for a ceremony to bring the American Convention into force, and the ideal place would be Costa Rica. He suggested again that we would do well to start the human rights activities on the northern border of Costa Rica. *Perez* then suggested that instead of issuing a formal declaration by Chiefs of State at the end of the two multilateral meetings, a press statement which summarized those points on which agreement was reached, could be issued. As the first point, he suggested that we should urge that all countries in the hemisphere ratify the Convention on Human Rights, that it should be on the 30th Anniversary of the universal declaration on human rights, and that San Jose should be the site of the next inter-American Court on Human Rights.

² See footnote 3, Document 10.

³ June 21. See footnote 2, Document 31.

Carazo volunteered to prepare a draft for consideration.⁴

Non-Proliferation

Carter suggested that another item to be considered in this press statement would be the completion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on non-proliferation. Argentina had promised to ratify the Treaty and should be pressed to do so. He said that making Latin America a nuclear free zone would be a perfect example for others, in other regions and in other areas. He had referred to it in his conversations with Indian Prime Minister *Desai*.⁵

Perez suggested that one of the problems in bringing Tlatelolco into effect is that Brazil is afraid of Argentina. He then suggested that each of the Heads of State around the table address themselves separately and privately to President *Videla* and urge him to sign (sic) Tlatelolco.

Carter asked Prime Minister *Manley* whether he could induce the Cubans to sign the Treaties.

Manley said that he was unsure.

Perez said that he had read a statement that *Castro* had said Cuba did not feel obligated to sign, but if others did, they might.

*Michelsen*⁶ changed the subject and said they were talking about very sensitive matters and it was very important that certain things be kept secret. He argued that the right of information is a human right, just as not to give information is also a right. Confidential matters should not be publicly disseminated. We should all be extremely careful that this doesn't happen. He was very concerned about leaks that came from the U.S. *Lopez* said that he was particularly disturbed that the political campaign in his country was affected by the divulgence of confidential matters. He said that this case was not the only one and Colombia was not alone in this regard.

Perez jokingly interjected, "Don't look at me."

Michelsen said that diplomatic documents should not be within the reach of the press. This is extremely destructive of good inter-American relations. He offered this as a "last testament", since he will be leaving office shortly.

Lopez said he thought that the Soviet Union could induce Cuba to sign Tlatelolco. *Lopez* said that he would be in Cuba on July 26, the

⁴ See footnote 11, Document 29.

⁵ The memoranda of conversation between *Carter* and *Desai* are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

⁶ Colombian President *Alfonso López Michelsen* is referred to as *López*, *Michelsen*, and *López Michelsen* throughout the memorandum of conversation.

anniversary of Cuba's revolution, and that he would be happy to bring this issue to the attention of Castro at that time.

President Carter said that he didn't know the origin of the documents to which Lopez Michelsen referred. He explained that the press in the U.S. had absolute freedom, and we cannot have as much secrecy as we would like. He expressed his deepest apologies to President Lopez and also to President Perez for any embarrassment that the press may have caused them. He also thanked President Lopez for offering to convey the concerns of the others on Tlatelolco to Castro.

President Carter said that we now have communication with the Cuban government, and he will repeat the request for ratification of Tlatelolco through these channels.⁷ This is a very important message.

Arms Restraint and the Southern Cone

President Carter said another important issue is the sale and acquisition of conventional weapons. He explained the U.S. policy to try to reduce the total sales of arms. He complimented President Perez for his work and his initiatives in this area.

President Perez said that what Lopez Michelsen said is of great importance because we live constantly fearful of manipulation by the news. There are strange hands in the U.S. that go into the file cabinets and leak the secret information they find there. He said that, for example, someone from the State Department once came down to speak to him as well as to President Lopez, and to ask them not to hold a meeting that they were going to hold with Cuba. When the incident leaked to the press, Perez and Lopez had to hasten the meeting. This kind of leak is bad because it affects our relations with one another, makes one cautious about what is said, and also greatly affects our actions, often making us do things we would prefer not to do.

He said that he was not hurt, but anguished.

Referring to conventional weapons sales, he said that it affected the economy of countries concerned. The problem of weapons sales has more to do oftentimes with the seller than with the buyer. He said he was astonished to hear President Giscard's representative had asked in a major speech at the United Nations for the countries of the world to shift their funds from arms to economic development, and then one week later he read in the paper that France had sold \$10 billion to Saudi Arabia.

It is not possible to wage this battle against arms sales alone. If we can get the right attitude from salesmen, that would be extremely helpful. He spoke of a respected Venezuelan industrialist, who had

⁷ Not found.

been visited in Puerto Rico by U.S. arms salesmen, asking him to be the arms representative in Venezuela. The Venezuelan was told that he would be given a 5 percent commission, 3 percent for himself, and 2 percent to use as he wished. Perez summed it up by saying that the LDC's are being manipulated in this business. A way must be found to put an end to the permanent stimulation of weapons sales, because whatever poor countries do, they will fail unless the sellers agree not to sell.

Perez said that at the OAS meeting, the members of the Ayacucho group will sign an agreement on arms control, and then try to expand this agreement to include all the countries of Latin America. But the efforts of the U.S. are needed with arms producers for if there is no agreement among the producers, then there is little that the buyers can do.

President Carter said that we have not only taken actions on our own, but also have talked with the USSR. The French have not been willing to participate up till now, as they are waiting to see how we do in our discussions with the Russians. But he is determined to hold down the sale of arms internationally. He explained the process by which arms are sold abroad, and said that permission must be obtained from the State Department first and that he is personally approving all sales. It is a slow process. He had hoped that the Special Session on Disarmament⁸ would be able to find a program that would work. To *President Perez*, *Carter* said that he would certainly follow up on his advice. However, he believes that the initiative should come from Latin America, because we do not want to appear as if we are preaching to the Latin Americans on this issue.

General Torrijos referred to two causes of this predicament. The apparent cause is that nations arm for expansionist or for defensive purposes. Why are they doing it? How much of their budget is being spent on defense matters? How much is being used to serve the people? We must also look for the real causes behind arms races. Certain armed forces magnify the problem in order to justify themselves. If the cause of war disappears, then the military government cannot justify its purchases to its own people or to the world. Could we impose certain kinds of sanctions or deny loans as an incentive to get military governments to stop their purchases of weapons? The real effect of arms sales is to negate development. *Torrijos* then commented on the fact that Panama is often the bridge through which many outside groups can travel. He has talked with leaders of such groups, and they complained about the excessive military burden of their governments.

⁸ May-June 1978.

President Lopez Michelsen said that it is very difficult to condemn the countries who deal with weapons because the arms business is part of their own defense system; arms exports are used as a way of subsidizing domestic defense. This won't be solved at this meeting. In inter-American relations, this is not a problem for the countries represented at this meeting. The problem is south of the equator, and that is because of the War of the Pacific, and of differences with regard to Bolivia's desire for access to the sea. Lopez suggested that they discuss ways to "cure the infection" by mediating specifically with regard to Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia. We should call for patient action, because that would eliminate all the problems.

President Perez said that he was in total agreement. The crisis in the Southern Cone is becoming more serious. He said that the problem of Bolivia is at the center of the problem of weapons purchases in the region. Peru has just bought some Soviet airplanes, and he had read of the severe criticism in the United States because they used U.S. airports for refueling. He said that Venezuela had encouraged Peru to stop purchasing weapons, and he had said the same to Chile as well. He said that we should offer not mediation, but cooperation. He proposed that representatives of the six governments around the table send confidential communications to the three nations—Bolivia, Peru, and Chile—telling them that we would be willing to offer cooperation to settle their dispute. In the case of the Ayacucho countries, all the parties accepted the fact that the problem existed, and that would be an advantage.

Perez suggested that all of the Presidents attempt the same approach with regard to Belize, so that independence would not have to be delayed. The problem, as he saw it, was to help Guatemala and Belize find a solution which would permit Belizean independence, while at the same time allowing some room for Guatemala to save face and accept independence. Perez was concerned that a solution to the Belizean problem was necessary to avoid severe repercussions in the Caribbean.

President Carazo spoke as the leader of a country with no arms purchases. He was anguished to learn that since World War II, conventional weapons have caused more than a hundred wars. The purchase of weapons was disastrous on a country's economic development program. At the heart, he believed it was a problem of attitudes and of military governments. In other words, the demand factor. He was disturbed that illicit trade in arms had been found in Costa Rica. He proposed that regional agencies be established to wage an intense campaign to stop the purchasing of weapons. The only way not to do something, Carazo said, is not to do it at all. Don't buy any weapons. Thirty years ago, Costa Rica took this decision, and he would hope that other countries would do likewise.

President Carter referred to the problem of illicit payments which *President Perez* had noted. The United Nations is presently discussing this issue, and the U.S. would like support for negotiations for a new treaty. *Carter* thought *Costa Rica* had good luck in not purchasing weapons. This is an excellent example for other countries and regions and he congratulated *Costa Rica*. However, the U.S. has different responsibilities in the world. Yet the big objective of the United States is to prevent the spread of all weapons.

Prime Minister Manley noted that this was an enormous and complex problem, that *Jamaica* has tried to use its influence to dissuade buyers and sellers. He said moderation in arms purchases should be rewarded by the transfer of more economic resources. If there could be a significant shift of resources to development, then countries would see the real importance and benefits of slowing arms purchases.

President Carter said we would do all we could to support the Caribbean Group, which has 30 nations and 15 international institutions and will be meeting in Washington next week. We should do all we can to help it. To the extent that there is restraint on arms purchases, we would try to be helpful in the economic area. He noted that *President Perez* and *Prime Minister Trudeau* of *Canada* had tried to be helpful. He hoped we could get the *Federal Republic of Germany* to do likewise. He felt that progress was being made in this area.

President Perez suggested that this would be another good subject for the press statement. He suggested that the leaders say that armamentism was of great concern to all the countries. An important effort was being made by the *Ayacucho* countries, and it was hoped that this effort could be broadened to include all of Latin America. He said that although not for the communique, the leaders should extend their cooperation not mediation to *Peru*, *Bolivia*, and *Chile* and to *Belize* and *Guatemala*. The idea of contributing to finding a point of agreement between *Guatemala* and *Belize* is an important one. If we offer our cooperation, we can find a solution. He thought something could be offered to *Guatemala*, which would not humiliate *Belize*.

Caribbean

Perez referred to *President Carter's* mention of the Caribbean Group. He confessed that he was indignant to learn in the press that the West was planning to establish a Pan-African force and a \$2 billion Pan-African fund, while at the same time it was impossible to get money for the Caribbean Group. He warned that small nations in the Caribbean would fill the vacuum with political or economic mafias. He noted that *Vesco* was thinking of settling in *Grenada*. This could happen if we don't assume a responsibility to work for a Caribbean plan and to contribute our resources to it. He said that *President Carter*

has taken this issue up with enthusiasm, and has been trying to gain support from other countries, but few have helped. If there are not enough funds contributed to this group, then it might be better not to have it at all. Perez said that he had offered \$30 million to this new fund, provided that it be 10 percent of the total value of the fund. He suggested that there be \$300 million per year over five years—a total of \$1.5 billion. This would change the present conditions in the Caribbean. The only important thing is that the plan should point to the economic integration of the region. The problems are very serious, and all of us need to contribute. However, he was not optimistic.

Carter said that the press has erroneously reported that the United States was considering a Pan-African force. It was not true. All that the United States did was to transport soldiers, food and equipment to Zaire and help stabilize the situation in Shaba.⁹ We have not asked for a Pan-African force, and we would not participate in one which did more than just this effort.

In arms control, the United States has a firm policy. We do not introduce new types of weapons or permit an escalation of weapons sales. We sell a smaller percentage every year, and we hope others will join in our effort. We are now in fifth place in arms sales to the region. It is very important also that Tlatelolco be concluded. We think, furthermore, that the example should be expanded and extended to other areas.

Carazo said less investment in arms permits more investment for development. However, once a country advances, then the terms for securing loans and other assistance becomes harder than for those who invested in arms and did not advance. So a country is punished for focussing on development instead of on arms.

Michelsen complimented *Carazo* for his approach to the problem. He added, however, that conflicts often come from arms sales rather than purchases. Colombia supports the Caribbean Development Bank, but the problem is not of aid, but of market and price for commodities. What the Caribbean needs is the market for the sugar. Coffee producers have a similar problem. When the economic situation is not dealt with, we will not have a problem of arms purchases by governments; the problem will be one of smuggling in weapons to the peasants as a result of growing political instability. Take the case of coffee. If there is a frost in Brazil it will create an unprecedented rise in the price of coffee; if there is no frost, then there will be a severe drop in the prices. The price should not be allowed to depend on whether or not there is

⁹ Reference is to the mid-May 1978 invasion of Angola-based Katangan separatists into Zaire's Shaba province.

frost. Because of such violent swings in commodity prices, the situation in Latin America could become as bad as that of Africa. You don't have to be a Marxist to recognize the relationship between economic instability and weapons purchases. He had asked President Carter in September that we not wait until the economic situation grows so badly that a catastrophe occurs.¹⁰ Let's try to agree now to establish a fair price. The coffee agreement is temporarily suspended, but we should not wait. If the U.S. would implement the coffee legislation, and apply quotas and stabilize prices at a timely date, he was sure that if the group met again in one more year they would spend much less time discussing weapons and economic assistance. These agreements would restore this kind of stability. The situation in these countries, in Lopez's words, "is not correctable by just warm washcloths."

Perez said Lopez Michelsen had mentioned a most serious point. He referred again to the press statement, and suggested that another item to be included in it should be the Caribbean Group meeting which would be held on the 19th in Washington. We should state our full support for the Caribbean Group. He added two additional items which he believed should be in that press statement. First, the Coffee Agreement which was one of the few good things which began with the Alliance for Progress, has remained, and should not die. If the Senate does not ratify the Coffee Agreement soon, the whole agreement will die because over 50 percent of the coffee exports go to the United States. *Perez* said that the press statement should express our great concern over this Coffee Agreement. A second problem, of course, is the International Sugar Agreement and the extremely low price of sugar, and the signs of protectionism in the U.S. We should mention our concern about this as well.

Carter responded by saying that he would not be disturbed for the group to express its concern about the stabilization of market prices. He noted, however, that the U.S. is a large producer of sugar and U.S. producers had to be protected. He repeated his concern about the importance of the multilateral trade negotiations as an effective vehicle for reforming world trade; and noted that many of the countries represented around the table are not members of GATT.

Responding to the more specific points made by President *Perez*, *President Carter* explained that we have intense feelings within the United States among the farmers of sugar and the ranchers of beef, and their Congressmen are deeply committed to protecting the cost of production. We have tried to get the International Sugar Agreement ratified, and the President has resisted efforts to raise the price of sugar.

¹⁰ See Document 244.

He concluded by saying that he has no objections to the expression of concern.

Manley noted that it would be very useful if the International Sugar Agreement could be ratified soon and asked what were the prospects.

Carter said that Senator Church, who is accompanying the President, is extremely active in sugar policy, and is a firm advocate of higher sugar prices, perhaps as much as 17 cents. He said that he would be meeting with Senator Long next week, and Senator Long represents sugar cane producers, which are not always the most efficient. He pledged, in conclusion, that he will do the best he can to get the International Sugar Agreement ratified and to keep sugar prices down. By the time of the O.A.S. meeting, he said that he might have a clear picture, and he would try to relay that to the nations. He said that the problem is that the Senate is far behind its schedule right now as the result of the Canal Treaties, and he is uncertain whether they will have time to look at these additional agreements. Nevertheless, he reiterated his complete commitment to ratification without delay.

Michelsen put the discussion on commodity price stabilization in a broader context. He said that producing countries hurt themselves in the long term by excessively high prices because housewives inevitably reduce their consumption or change to substitutes, for example, from coffee to soft drinks, from sugar to corn sugars. Therefore, it's important not to force too high a price; indeed, it is in both interests to try to establish fair and reasonable prices.

Perez agreed with President Lopez Michelsen. Since President Carazo would be leaving after this session, *Perez* suggested a few additional items to be included in the press statement so that Carazo could agree with it today. On the Dominican Republic, he said that we should express our satisfaction with the electoral process in a very discreet way which would make it easier for Balaguer to resist the pressure which he is feeling from those who would like to reverse the elections.¹¹

Carter interjected that he believed that the certification of the final election results would be coming in one day.

Perez said that a discreet statement would help overcome any difficulties that might arise in the near future.

Carter agreed, saying that we should encourage the completion of the electoral process in the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere.

Manley said that the meeting they were holding presented the leaders with a historical opportunity to try to press along several outstanding disputes. He suggested that the group offer cooperation which

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–81*, vol. XX, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 235.

might lead to a resolution of the Guatemala-Belize problem. He suggested that the leaders develop a simple plan to offer cooperation on this. This could be one concrete accomplishment of this meeting. It would be preferable not to publicize the means by which the group would cooperate to help resolve the dispute, but it would be useful to begin to do that.

Perez said the decisions on Belize and the Andean tensions should be kept confidential.¹²

¹² In a second multilateral meeting on June 17, Carter, Perez, López Michelsen, Manley, Torrijos, and Calderón discussed the North-South dialogue, trade negotiations, and the economic issues facing LDCs. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 6-7/78)

31. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Your OAS Speech

Attached is your OAS speech which Jim Fallows and Bob Pastor worked on.² It incorporates comments we received from the State Department today, and I think you will find it a useful description of the state of our relations with Latin America at this time.

Under Secretary of State Newsom has raised just one point in dissent, and I wanted to bring it to your attention. He is concerned, on pages 4 and 5, that we may be over-extending ourselves in the peacekeeping area, pledging our involvement in three extremely diffi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. Brzezinski wrote "6-20-78" and "10:19 pm" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² An outline of the speech, dated June 19, is attached but not printed; the text of the speech is not attached. Carter's remarks at the opening of the OASGA on June 21 are printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1141-1146.

cult disputes.³ He is concerned that we may be raising expectations that could not easily be satisfied.

Of course, you have made all of the points in those two pages either in private conversations with each country's leaders, or in letters to them. I believe there are several important reasons why you should publicly state your position:

—First of all, all of the countries in the region are looking for our leadership and have asked for our help.

—Secondly, for the first time, you make clear that the “hard decisions can only be made” by the parties concerned; we will only be helpful to that effort.

—Thirdly, these issues, particularly Bolivian access, are among the Hemisphere's most important since the Canal Treaties were ratified.⁴ Bolivia has obtained a seat on the United Nations Security Council and plans to take its case to the United Nations in every possible form, just as Panama had done. It would be to our interest to be put on the record at this time.

—It would enhance your moral standing in the Hemisphere since everybody acknowledges the goal of Bolivia's getting access to the sea; they only disagree on how to do that.

—Lastly, the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific has been causing anxiety tremors throughout the region for the last two years, and this is likely to increase as we approach 1979. Your public statement of concern—like Mrs. Carter's visit—will be a sign of U.S. interest in stability in the region and peaceful resolution of that dispute.

State is concerned that our offer of help is open-ended, and is therefore reluctant to make it. I believe that the time is ripe for such a statement, and it would be viewed as perhaps the most important part of your statement. I therefore recommend that you keep the relevant passages in; if you find Newsom's concern warranted, you could accommodate it by merely deleting the final sentence on page 4 and the first full paragraph on page 5. I do hope, however, that you will retain that portion of the speech, since I think it is one of the most valuable parts of the speech.⁵

³ The three disputes were “Bolivian access to the sea, the Honduras–El Salvador border dispute, the future of Belize.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 1142)

⁴ The Senate ratified the Neutrality Treaty on March 16 by a vote of 68 to 32. On April 18, the Senate ratified the Panama Canal Treaty by an identical margin.

⁵ In the speech, Carter stated: “I pledge today my Government's willingness to join in the effort to find peaceful and just solutions to other problems.” He further stated: “The difficult decisions in their region can only be made by Bolivia, Peru, Chile. But we stand ready with the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and other countries to help find a solution to Bolivia's land-locked status that will be acceptable to all parties and will contribute to the permanent peace and development of the area.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1142–1143)

32. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Conversations in Santo Domingo

With Andy Young and others, I had conversations in Santo Domingo with General Torrijos, Former President Oduber of Costa Rica, Foreign Minister Consalvi of Venezuela, and Armando Villanueva of the Peruvian APRA party. Copies of the memoranda of conversation are attached,² but I thought I might summarize a few overall impressions.

In discussing individual countries' political affairs and particularly return to democracy, the theme that kept recurring is the problem of polarization. In Peru the activities of the ultra left and ultra right are threatening the efforts of the Constituent Assembly. In Ecuador the outspoken leftist Bucaram threatens to alienate the military and provoke them into fixing the election to ensure that Bucaram's nephew, Roldos, cannot win. Oduber volunteered that leftist and rightist terrorist groups in El Salvador were both strong enough to make political accommodation impossible. Torrijos even opined that in Bolivia opposition leader Siles was as responsible for provoking the coup as Pereda was for making it. All of the people we talked with seemed aware of the need to help those who seek to develop the broad consensus necessary for functioning democracies: Consalvi is going to Peru at Perez' request to talk to leaders there; Oduber's party is rendering technical assistance to Torrijos' new party and to Samudio's liberal party.

Andy correctly observed that he sensed a new idealistic pragmatism among the leaders we met: an inner confidence that the direction of political change in Latin America was towards more democracy, and that the best guarantee of arriving there would be by small steps which reassure the military.

There is a different variation on this theme in Nicaragua, where efforts are directed to finding a democratic alternative to Somoza.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 7-10/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth, Bartholomew, and Denend initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand crossed out Aaron's name in the addressee line. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "v. interesting. ZB."

² Attached but not printed.

Consalvi once again urged us to “twist arms” on behalf of change in Nicaragua.

Other interesting items:

On Belize: Torrijos was very excited by President Carter’s reference in the OAS speech,³ but there was general agreement that the new Guatemalan government would have to settle internal differences between the Vice President and the Foreign Minister and that the ball is in the Guatemalans’ court.

On Africa: in response to Andy Young’s briefing, Torrijos promised to provide troops for a UN peacekeeping force in Namibia.⁴

On Colombia: Consalvi expressed concern that the U.S. had not given Colombia sufficient attention and that a special effort should be made since Lievano, their Foreign Minister, will be assuming the presidency of the UN General Assembly. Andy Young is considering a trip there, and I am following up on this issue.

³ See Document 31, footnote 2.

⁴ In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, an unknown hand wrote an exclamation point.

33. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Impact of U.S. Human Rights Policy in Latin America

After our discussion at the staff meeting last week, I tasked the CIA to do an overall assessment of the impact of our human rights policy in the Southern Cone.² No one questions that the sensitivities of certain government and military officials have been affected by the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8–12/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum.

² Brzezinski highlighted this sentence in the left-hand margin and wrote, “good.” Reference is presumably to Document 35. No record of a staff meeting has been found.

human rights policy; the important questions are whether our long-term relationships will be strengthened or harmed by the policy and whether the policy has led, and will continue to lead, to improvements in the human rights situations in those countries and in others.

While the human rights policy may be a good instrument of ideological diplomacy in other areas, I don't think that ought to be one of our purposes in this hemisphere. I was working under the impression that the goals of our human rights policy include: to contribute to a climate in which human rights are increasingly respected and the costs of repression have increased as well; to identify the United States with a universal cause, which you have described as "the increasing self-assertiveness of man on behalf of his own human rights"; and to project the U.S. as an idealistic, moral nation actively working toward a better world.

If our overall human rights policy is to be effective and credible, one aspect needs to be that we have warmer and closer relationships with those governments which share our ideals and cooler and more distant relationships with those governments that don't. This necessarily means that our relations with the military governments in the Southern Cone should range from being cordial and correct—as in the case of Brazil, where we have a wide range of consultative mechanisms—to being distant, as in the case of Chile, where the Letelier investigation³ currently prevents us from taking any other position.

Another element of our policy should be a willingness, at appropriate times, to back up our rhetoric with actions, many of which are mandated by law anyway. At the same time, we need to continue to distinguish between the three different "baskets" of human rights in implementing our policy. For example, with respect to Argentina, we have informed the government that our concern with human rights there is focused on basket #1 (integrity of the person), and we recognize and accept the government's assessment that democratization is a *long-term* goal.

I am sending you a couple of articles that were in the *New York Times* in the past year, which deal with this subject.⁴ I would be very interested in your comments on these articles and on my perception of our human rights policy.

³ See Document 209.

⁴ Not further identified. No response from Brzezinski was found.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State¹

Asunción, October 13, 1978, 1905Z

4260. Subject: Second Meeting With Chief of Staff RE Letelier Case.²
Ref: Asunción 4375

1. On October 11 I called again on Chief of Staff General Alejandro Fretes Dávalos. After preliminary courtesies, he read me the *acta* or summary minutes resulting from the visit of General Orozco, Chief of Chilean Intelligence, to Asunción. The document itself makes no direct reference to the Letelier case. Fretes said the President had authorized him to brief me on the *acta* but he preferred to read it verbatim.

2. The document is basically an agreement to coordinate all intelligence resources in order to control and eliminate subversion. It speaks of exchange of information, prompt use of communication facilities, monitoring of subversives and their detention and informal hand over from one country to the other. It repeats over and over the need for full cooperation and mutually facilitative acts in the context of a fight to the death against subversion.

3. In response to my questions, Fretes Dávalos gave the following account of the meeting between Chile and Paraguay. It was simply another in a regular series of meetings which take place annually among the Chiefs of Intelligence of the countries of the Southern Cone. This system of consultations came into being mainly as a defense against the threat of Argentine subversion spreading to other countries. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay make of the net, although Uruguay is now almost on the inactive list. Fretes Dávalos

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción, 1969–1979. Confidential; Roger; Immediate. The Department repeated the cable to Santiago as telegram 265779, October 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago, 1963–1979)

² Dated October 10. White reported that during his October 9 discussion with Fretes Dávalos, he had asked about “the recent meeting of Southern Cone intelligence chiefs in Asunción.” Fretes had assured White that the meeting “was in no way related to the Letelier case” and that “not all the Southern Cone intelligence chiefs attended; only Argentina, Chile and Paraguay.” Fretes offered to “supply” White “with the *acta* or written record of the meeting.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción, 1969–1979) In telegram 4237 from Asunción, October 2, the Embassy reported that Orozco visited Asunción around September 11–14. The Embassy cited “an unconfirmed report” that a “secret meeting of the chiefs of intelligence of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, and perhaps Bolivia” had taken place, and that the meeting’s purpose “was to discuss the Letelier case and adopt a common position.” However, “the meeting ended badly because the Argentine representative tried to influence the others to his government’s point of view of the Beagle Channel case.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780403–0415)

said the meetings are not particularly useful anymore, in his judgment, because the main threat (from Argentina) has been eliminated. They keep in touch with one another through a U.S. communications installation in the Panama Canal Zone which covers all of Latin America. This U.S. communications facility is used mainly by student officers to call home to Latin America but it is also employed to co-ordinate intelligence information among the Southern Cone countries. They maintain the confidentiality of their communication through the U.S. facility in Panama by using bilateral codes. In his view the whole network is practically useless and serves mainly to permit Chiefs of Intelligence to exaggerate their own diminishing importance.

4. Comment: Obviously this is the Condor network which all of us have heard about over the last few years. Although Fretes Dávalos told me he had only mentioned to President Stroessner that we were going to talk about the meeting, I suspect the president vetoed Fretes' stated intention of providing me with a copy of the ACTA and instead told him to read it to me. Either I misunderstood or Fretes misspoke in our previous meeting (RefTel) when he said Argentina had also attended. Apparently two bilateral meetings with Chile and Argentina took place one after the other and some sessions may even have overlapped.

5. Recommendation: The two FBI agents here³ tell me there is likelihood Condor will surface during Letelier Trial in the U.S. If General Fetes Dávalos is accurate in describing the communications it uses as an encrypted system within U.S. communications net (and I have no knowledge whether this is true), it would seem advisable to review this arrangement to insure that its continuation is in U.S. interest.⁴

White

³ Clegg and Scherrer.

⁴ In telegram 290735 to Asunción, Santiago, and Panama, November 16, the Department reported: "We have looked into the allegation (reftel) by General Dávalos that a U.S. facility is being used to coordinate intelligence information among the Southern Cone countries. We do not rpt not believe he can be referring to the Condor communications network, which is centered in Santiago and does not rpt not use any U.S. facilities." In addition, "The U.S. operated net control stations" in the Panama Canal Zone "have never detected any transmissions by Southern Cone participants of the nature described by General Dávalos." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asunción, 1969-1979)

35. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RPM-78-10410

Washington, November 6, 1978

*SOUTHERN CONE PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICIES²**Summary*

The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view of US policies toward Latin America. Their perspective is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccupation since the mid 1960s with other parts of the world has left the US out of touch with Latin American realities. They view US policy toward their region as inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive. There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the US has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing its ability to lead the West.

Many of the differences between the US and the Southern Cone nations have historical origins. At the present time, however, each country in the area has specific grievances against the US, with the most common problem being human rights. The military leaders of the region believe that security against leftist terrorism and international Communism takes precedence over personal well-being and individual freedom. Most of these leaders are convinced that intervention by the military prevented a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic development and a slow, incremental approach toward democratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated national weaknesses. For the countries that have experienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for national survival has been very real. All of the Southern Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion, and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights policies.

The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their poor image in the world press and in international forums, where their military leaders are commonly described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilian official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers that the Israelis were

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A, Box 4, Folder 49. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified] Requested by Pastor and prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

² This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. It was requested by the NSC Staffer for Latin America. [less than 2 lines not declassified] [Footnote in the original.]

praised for staging a raid into Uganda against terrorists,³ while counterterrorist activities in Brazil were denounced by the US press.⁴

Leaders in the Southern Cone believe that investigations by unofficial and official organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human Rights are overzealous and misguided, and that US policymakers accept these findings uncritically. They deplore the United States' selective attention to Latin America while it ignores human rights violations in Communist countries.

This does not mean that US human rights policy has had a completely negative impact on the area. On the contrary, police and military officials in these countries are now sensitized to human rights considerations. Every chief of state in the area claims to have made clear to his subordinates that torture and arbitrary arrest will no longer be tolerated. All of these countries have shown general improvement during the past year in their treatment of prisoners.

From their perspective, however, these improvements go unacknowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent of criticism, adversary treatment, and antagonistic US legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the US is playing a game with them—using human rights as a way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed, return to “democratic government” is the real issue, their answer is that competitive politics is not possible in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable until the various military regimes are convinced that they have established economic progress and ensured the permanence of political changes they have brought about. Continued US pressure to speed up the process will probably only increase the bitterness and recrimination.

Public Views of US Policies

It is much more difficult to get an accurate reading of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most citizens seem to support the military governments; the rest are either unconcerned with politics or belong to a declared opposition. The Chilean Government probably enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the plebiscite vote held there earlier this year,⁵ even though rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this support.

³ On June 27, 1976 an Air France plane was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists and flown to Entebbe, Uganda. The Israel Defense Force mounted an operation the following week, on July 4, to rescue the hostages.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ In telegram 41 from Santiago, January 5, the Embassy reported on early returns from the Chilean plebiscite and noted: “Given the loaded question and totally one-sided propaganda before the vote, the GOC did not have to resort to electoral fraud to emerge victorious.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780007-0951)

Judging from newspaper commentary and personal conversations, US human rights policy has had little impact on the general populace. Some political groups that have long opposed the various governments and other groups representing civil and human rights causes have used the policy to air their own specific grievances. Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar to their own programs.

Argentina

The human rights issue is the major point of contention between Argentina and the US.⁶ Senior Argentine officials view human rights abuses as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship. Current US policy is perceived by the Argentines as a sign that the US considers good bilateral relations to be expendable.⁷ They believe that this policy is selective and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for “punishment” regardless of their internal problems. Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it would also understand the government’s tough measures.

Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating, the government is attempting to wind down its massive security operations and exert tighter controls over police and military units. It has ordered the release of many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal procedures, and the government has strengthened requirements for proper police identification. In an effort to appease its critics, the government has published several lists of those arrested or under detention and is making a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter-American Human Rights Committee has been invited to visit the country, possibly between March and May 1979.⁸

The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of foreign military sales, the reduction in the size of the US military mission, the nonappropriation of training funds, and the lack of authorization for Argentina to pay for military training in the US. Buenos Aires has been concerned about the recently implemented Humphrey-Kennedy amendment that prohibits foreign military pur-

⁶ See Document 95.

⁷ See Document 92.

⁸ The IAHRC visited Argentina in September 1979.

chases, export licenses, and training.⁹ The State Department's recent decision to authorize a small military training contract for noncombatants¹⁰ alleviated some of the tension, but Senator Kennedy's letter to President Carter protesting the decision¹¹ is sure to rankle Buenos Aires.

Another problem is the Argentine plan for an "experimental" plutonium reprocessing plant, which is to be completed in the early 1980s. The decision runs counter to President Carter's desire to curb the spread of proliferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty,¹² contending that it discriminates against countries without nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and the US will have to relent in its current policy. Meanwhile, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can independently decide whether or not to reprocess.

The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet expansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more active role in the nonaligned movement to counter Cuban activities. The hardline attitude is taken by Army General Agosti, who commented earlier this year that Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead without anybody's help or advice" and that something should be done about Africa.

There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos Aires against the US over the Export-Import Bank decision not to finance equipment exports for the Yacreta Dam project.¹³ The Export-Import Bank's change of mind on this issue has lessened the hue and cry, but many military men think that the financing turnaround is somehow linked to the visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Linking the Export-Import Bank financing with other problems with the US, many Argentine leaders seem determined to begin redirecting their country's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Montes, for example, played up Argentina's potential as a nuclear supplier during his recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers, meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abrogating the Rio defense pact¹⁴ and expelling the US military group.

⁹ See footnote 5, Document 60.

¹⁰ See Document 84.

¹¹ Not found.

¹² See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 443.

¹³ See Document 83.

¹⁴ See footnote 7, Document 1.

Brazil

Brazil's foreign policy reflects its very real great power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is working to achieve and demonstrate independence of the US in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but resentment of US human rights and nuclear proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance last year of military ties with Washington.

Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted intrusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic demands for basic changes. While President Geisel and President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberalization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring habeas corpus in many political and national security cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime sweeping dictatorial powers.

Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that the country's economic well-being is still fragile and vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend to view certain US trade positions—such as countervailing duties—as harmful to their development drive, fueled as it is by ever-expanding exports. This is especially true this year because poor agricultural performance has forced the government to concentrate on alleviating the balance of payments problem by promoting more exports of manufactured goods to developed nations. One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to basic Brazilian interests.

The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation concerns in a similar context, often saying that US opposition to the Brazil-West German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth. They point out the critical importance to them of nonfossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high cost of imported oil. Argentina's decision to develop reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt Brazil to follow suit.

Added to these specific problems with the US is the growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and the aftermath of its experience in Vietnam. The situation in Africa is perceived as the best current example of this development.

The US is viewed from an environment in which there is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses. At present the government is controlled and supported by a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the international Communist movement.

The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist activity in the country and the growing civil rights movement among the black population. The Brazilian church has also been a factor through its long championing of the human rights cause and its protests against government policies. Nevertheless, like other Latin American countries, Brazilians in general adhere to authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service rhetorically questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil—the US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil's problems and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward democratic government rather than engage in constant and unproductive criticism.

Chile

Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by this because it believes that it has made substantial progress in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to hear any favorable comment from Washington. President Pinochet [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] disappointed by the lack of US recognition of the improving situation in Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the same intensity as before he tried to make improvements. The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN Human Rights Committee's attempt to provide funds to "victims" of Chilean human rights violations.

Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for political prisoners and official consent for most exiles to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the intelligence service, which had been responsible for much of the abuse of human rights;¹⁵ civilian appointments to the cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the intelligence service;

¹⁵ See footnote 4, Document 203.

accelerated completion of a new constitution and advancement in the timetable for an elected government; preparation of a new labor code with plans to reinstitute collective bargaining next year; and the visit of the UN Human Rights Committee delegation.

The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional ally of the US and believes that Washington “encouraged” the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown, however, the military believes that the US was forced by domestic political concerns to become strongly critical of the new government and to deny any part in the coup.

The Chileans are now convinced that US-Chilean relations will never be the same. They believe that there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist Allende regime. They also think that the US is being overzealous in its prosecution of the Letelier case;¹⁶ the Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the “truth” in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nationalism is easily aroused. For example, a *Washington Post* editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be replaced by a Christian Democratic government¹⁷ was denounced in a series of man-in-the-street interviews and was described by nearly everyone as an unwarranted intrusion in Chilean affairs.

The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US human rights policy as made to order for their own campaign against the government. The Christian Democrats, in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier case will bring down Pinochet.

While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly treated by Washington, there is still a strong pro-US feeling in the country. Military officers and civilian officials alike admire the US and would like their country eventually to evolve along US lines. Despite a current perception distrust of the US, the Chileans’ great concern is that the poor relations between the two countries will deteriorate even further. The Chileans appear determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement against the US and continue to hope for better treatment. For example, Foreign Minister Cubillos recently devoted most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth the Chilean position in the Beagle Channel negotiations with Argentina.¹⁸ Despite the poor relations with

¹⁶ See Document 210.

¹⁷ See footnote 7, Document 218.

¹⁸ See footnote 3, Document 226.

the US, Cubillos clearly hoped that Washington would use its influence to soften Argentina's position in the dispute.

Cubillos went on to explain the evolutionary process of the return to democratic government in Chile. He acknowledged the Chilean belief that civilian government is impossible now, but pointed out that political institutionalization is under way. Cubillos' remarks and the general atmosphere in Santiago suggest that even though there are strong feelings in Chile favoring an accommodation with the US, there is little chance of a quick return to civilian rule. Not only has the government been successful in solving the country's chronic economic problems, there are strong memories of the political and economic chaos of the Allende years—in sum there is little desire to return the country to the politicians.

Paraguay

President Stroessner has been in power since 1954, and there appears to be little chance for any change in the policies that, in his view and in the view of many Paraguayans, have brought the country internal peace, stability, and economic progress. The Stroessner regime has a poor human rights record, but there is some evidence that improvements are being made and indications that combined Western diplomatic pressure is beginning to have an effect, however slight.

One recent example is the case of arrested human rights activist, Domingo Laino, in which the combined efforts of the US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France resulted in Laino's release from prison. Indeed, largely as a result of US pressure, Paraguay has released almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem because of the subservience of the judiciary to presidential authority and the lack of control over police interrogation methods.

The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last May that the Paraguayans were improving their human rights performance.¹⁹ He called the move by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits and the military training program for Paraguay from the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence.

The Paraguayan Government's public response to the US human rights policy has been negative. President Stroessner often cites his

¹⁹ Telegram 2029 from Asunción, May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780213-0617)

staunch anti-Communism as well as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan political elite are plainly worried by what they see as the US failure to meet the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa. They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They regard US criticism of their country as naive and an invasion of their domestic affairs.

Because of the extent of media censorship in the country, it is difficult to determine what the populace thinks of the Stroessner regime. The President appears to be personally popular, however, and his travels about the country are enthusiastically received by the citizens. A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely.

Uruguay

Uruguay has taken some steps during the past year to improve human rights conditions, although the overall situation remains poor. The government retains extensive statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give up. On the average, fewer political arrests have been made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners. Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive controls and is far from independent, military courts are reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases and are ordering the release of increasing numbers of detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more freely—if cautiously—an expeditious return to civilian government.

Among the positive measures taken by the government are: permission for an American Bar Association visit in April;²⁰ plans to publish a list of prisoners released since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the International Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground rules for a visit; and curtailment of prisoner detentions under emergency powers. Most indications are that the regime would like to improve its image abroad and will move steadily to change its human rights practices.

Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay may now be the region's most highly controlled society. To explain this, Uruguayan leaders point out that Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan military sees this battle as a defense of its national moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and has attempted to discredit the US through a well-managed media campaign.

²⁰ See Document 324.

Many rightist military officers oppose the US and want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the other hand, General Gregorio Alvarez, the commander in chief of the Army who wants to be President some day, supports a new evaluation of the human rights situation and is moving cautiously to compel military officers to accept his reform measures. The strength of the rightist officers, however, should not be underestimated, however. Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive.

Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of ending its control of the government until 1986. Meanwhile, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together with US legislative and policy restrictions on economic and military assistance, are impediments to better relations. Uruguayans hope that a new, more positive attitude toward human rights will result in better relations with the US, but they insist that Washington should have no illusions about the prospects for an early return to civilian government.

36. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

GC 78-10220

Washington, November 1978

Argentina-Chile: Dispute at the End of the Earth²

The current dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel and related territorial claims has a long and complex history. It is typical of many other South American boundary problems that stem from early, ambiguously worded agreements and treaties that were formulated before accurate maps were available. This paper addresses the major issues in the Argentina-Chile dispute.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 11, Beagle Channel. Confidential. An unknown hand wrote "Country File 11/29/78" in the right-hand margin of the first page of the paper. A December 1978 version of this paper, with document number GC 78-10224, is identical except for a corrected map detailing the Antarctic claims of Chile and Argentina. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of [text not declassified] Job 79T01050A, Box 2, Folder 6)


² Note: This paper was prepared by [name not declassified] and [name not declassified], Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research. [less than 1 line not declassified]. [Footnote in the original.]

The Beagle Channel lies near the southern tip of South America and serves as an alternate route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Strait of Magellan and to the course around Cape Horn. A treaty negotiated in 1881 stipulates that the boundary between Argentina and Chile should run north-south through Tierra del Fuego, dividing Isla Grande into two parts, with Argentina getting the eastern part and Chile the western part. All islands along the Atlantic coast were to belong to Argentina; those south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn and all along the Pacific coast were to belong to Chile.

Differing interpretations of the treaty soon arose. The Chileans claimed that the north-south line dividing Isla Grande was to stop at the northern shore of the Beagle Channel, so that the channel itself as well as all territory to the south belonged to Chile. The Argentines countered that the north-south line reached midchannel and that a portion of the channel belonged to them. The Chileans also held that the channel extends eastward as far as Cabo San Pio, making the small islands of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva theirs; whereas the Argentines claimed that the channel turns southward to the west of Picton and Lennox, and the islands are therefore Argentine.

Picton, Lennox, and Nueva, ownership of which has become a matter of national pride to both countries, have no more than a dozen or so permanent or seasonal Chilean residents and no Argentines; gold placers once exploited on them have long since played out, and with the possible exception of some nitrate deposits, they contain no known mineral or other resources of significance. In recent years, however, the importance of Tierra del Fuego as a whole has grown, both economically and strategically. Oilfields and enormous sheep ranches occupy the northern part of the region. In the south, Ushuaia, Argentina, has grown from a mere outpost to a town of 6,000 inhabitants. It has an airfield, a naval base, port and petroleum storage facilities, a radio station, a hydroelectric plant, and a road that allows overland communication with the north. Chile maintains a small naval base at Puerto Williams, south of the Beagle Channel on Isla Navarino. Puerto Williams has an airstrip, a radio station, a hotel, and a civilian population of about 700.


A series of incidents, including one in which a Chilean PT boat entered Ushuaia Bay and was fired at by an Argentine patrol ship in 1967, led Chile to unilaterally seek British arbitration. Argentina rejected the idea at the time, but signed a treaty in 1972 whereby the International Court of Justice would study the problem and submit its verdict to the British Crown for approval or disapproval. In May 1977 the Court decided that the Beagle Channel should be divided between the two countries and the disputed islands awarded to Chile; implementation of the decision, which was accepted by the British, was set



for 2 February of the following year. But in December 1977, Argentina, which had already indicated it would not accept the Court's ruling, began a press campaign and a number of economic and military moves to prompt concessions from Chile. Presidents Videla of Argentina and Pinochet of Chile met in Mendoza, Argentina, in January 1978, and in

Puerto Montt, Chile, in February, and signed agreements creating a joint commission and outlining a phased negotiation process. The first phase ended in April without any significant progress.

As the second phase of negotiations proceeded, the focus of attention shifted away from the islands in the mouth of the Beagle Channel to a number of smaller islands to the south, including Evout, Barnevelt, and Hornos. Argentina wants a boundary that would link these islands before it turns south along the Cape Horn meridian, or, better yet, an alignment that would place one or more of the islands entirely in Argentine territory. Intrusion of the Chileans into the Atlantic is resented by the Argentines, who feel that it breaks a gentleman's agreement between the two countries that Argentina should be an Atlantic power and Chile exclusively a Pacific power.



Argentina is also concerned about the affect the Court's awards to Chile might have on control of ocean resources; both countries claim sovereignty over resources within 200 miles of the coast. Ownership of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva may bear on the location of the boundary between the two respective 200-mile zones and could give Chile a sizable slice of the South Atlantic. Continental shelf petroleum and coastal fisheries are the resources of greatest interest, but the value and the extent of these in the area are unknown. The shelf east of Nueva Island, however, is quite narrow, about 15 miles wide, beyond which the bottom drops rapidly to abyssal depths. It is, therefore, much less attractive for development than Argentina's broad shelf on the north-eastern side of Tierra del Fuego, which has rich, relatively untapped fish resources and potential oil deposits that may rival those of the North Sea—although the latter will take many years of exploration to determine.

An additional Argentine concern is that the International Court ruling will adversely affect their Antarctic claim which overlaps that of Chile. Presumably, they fear that any extension of Chilean territory eastward into the Atlantic will lend weight to Chilean claims to territory directly to the south on the Antarctic Peninsula.

[Omitted here are Figures 1–7, photographs of the Beagle Channel and its islands.]

37. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Beagle Channel Update

Since November 2 when the special Argentine-Chilean commission adjourned without having reached an agreement on the jurisdictional dispute in the Beagle Channel, several diplomatic messages between the two countries' Presidents have been exchanged. The Argentines

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8–12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum.

agreed to a Chilean proposal that a mediator be chosen to resolve the dispute only if boundary questions could be discussed first. The Argentines want exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and three islands in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threaten these claims. The Chileans have resisted the idea of setting such terms of reference for a mediator.

Intelligence reports indicate that the GOA has been hastily purchasing arms: patrol boats from Israel, France, West Germany, and South Korea; aircraft from Israel (30 Mirage III jets) and France (parts for Alouette helicopters); ammunition from France (the Exocet naval missile), U.K., West Germany, Belgium, Italy; and communication equipment from France and Israel.² Hardliners in the Argentine military believe the time has come for a show of force. One of the leaders of this group, the commanding general of Argentina's I Corps, told our Ambassador that if the dispute is not resolved by the first two weeks in December, Argentina would take the initiative and fight Chile.³ Reinforcing this message, the admiral who commands the Argentine Coast Guard told an American Embassy officer last Friday (November 24) that Argentina will occupy the disputed territory and will break diplomatic and trade ties with Chile unless negotiations are resumed in ten days.⁴

We have just learned from the Chilean Foreign Minister that he is pleased by the conciliatory nature of Argentina's latest note, which is reported to have recommended the modalities of the December 11 Foreign Minister's meeting in Buenos Aires, and he will recommend that Pinochet accept it.⁵ It's not clear yet whether this means that the Chileans have accepted Argentina's definition of the issue.

Our position has remained one of talking to both sides (and others—e.g., the Brazilians) without getting in between. I continue to believe that is the best course. Trying to mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans would make Camp David look easy, and we just don't have the same kind of stake in the Beagle Channel that we have in the Middle East.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 9248 from Buenos Aires, November 22, Castro reported on his conversation with Suárez Mason. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780481–0639)

⁴ In telegram 9307 from Buenos Aires, November 24, the Embassy reported on a conversation with Santa Maria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780485–0222)

⁵ In telegram 9010 from Santiago, November 26, Landau reported on his conversation with Cubillos. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523–0264)

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy¹

Washington, December 8, 1978, 2343Z

310384. Subject: Beagle Channel. Ref: (A) Buenos Aires 09558² (B)

1. (C—Entire Text)

2. Summary. Department is increasingly concerned that hostilities may be imminent in the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the islands south of the Beagle Channel and the resulting claims to maritime zones in the South Atlantic. Mediation by the Pope—a possibility in which Argentina is interested—may be one of the few remaining possibilities of avoiding bloodshed. Ambassador is requested to approach Vatican, express our grave concern that Argentina may resort to military action if the December 12 Foreign Ministers' meeting³ is not successful and encourage Vatican make a firm offer to mediate the dispute as soon as possible.

2. Argentina and Chile have carried on an increasingly acrimonious dispute over territorial rights to islands and islets south of the Beagle Channel for nearly 100 years. The dispute was submitted to arbitration in 1971 and the award which was handed down by the British Crown for the three major inhabited islands principally favored Chile. Argentina declared the award void in January 1978. Negotiations between the two countries since that time have been largely unsuccessful and even before formal talks ended on November 2, Argentina began sabre rattling exercises intended to convince the Chileans that hostilities would result if a negotiated settlement could not be agreed upon. Changing political realities in Argentina have projected hardliners who favor a war with Chile into increasingly powerful positions.

4. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires has had several conversations with Papal Nuncio to Argentina, Laghi, who has suggested that the Pope might be willing to mediate the dispute if he felt that situation

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507-0584. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogotá, Brasília, Caracas, Montevideo, Mexico City, and Lima. Drafted by Ruser and Bumpus; cleared by Guzman and in EUR, IO/UNP, and S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

² Dated December 5. Castro reported that the Nuncio had "denounced GOA's tactics in its news releases creating feeling Pope was only acceptable person as a mediator," that Laghi had said that the "Pope was not anxious to accept mediator role," and that the Nuncio had said that "when all was said and done Pope would accept role if he became convinced war was imminent and possibility lives could be lost." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780500-1015)

³ Meeting was between Cubillos of Chile and Pastor of Argentina.

was sufficiently critical and that further bilateral progress could not be made (REFTEL A).

5. The Department believes that critical point in the dispute may have been reached (REFTEL B).⁴ In fact, latest intelligence reports indicate situation may be even more critical than we had previously thought.

6. You should immediately contact highest ranking Curia official available and make following points:

—USG believes that possibility of hostilities between Argentina and Chile is imminent.

—Demarches to Chile and Argentina by the US, the EC-9 and numerous Latin American countries have not diminished the possibility of war; the two countries maintain their apparent collision course.

—If the December 12 meeting of Foreign Ministers does not reach substantive agreement, and this appears increasingly unlikely because of the Chilean insistence on limiting the question to maritime boundaries while Argentina demands that all territory in the far south be considered, war seems likely.

—However, if the Pope were to immediately offer his good offices to mediate the conflict, this might possibly avert conflict. Only the moral authority of the Pope may be able to avert what appears to be a slide into war.

—Papal efforts could be expressed in a number of ways, including: personal messages to both presidents, public statement urging peaceful resolution of the problem and/or an invitation to presidents of the two countries to meet with him to review situation if this is appropriate.

—If the situation is deteriorating as it appears to us that it is, whatever is done must be dramatic enough to give Argentina serious pause.⁵

Vance

⁴ No telegram was referenced. In telegram 9630 from Buenos Aires, December 7, Castro reported: "While the final decision probably has not yet been made, I am convinced that the Argentine armed forces will initiate military operations against Chile," "unless Chile comes to the December 12 talks prepared to deal forthrightly with the issues." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780505-0243) In telegram 9323 from Santiago, December 8, Landau reported: "As matters now stand it is likely that the December 12 foreign ministers meeting will fail." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780506-0740)

⁵ In telegram 24060 from Rome, December 9, Wagner reported his discussions with Villot, Caprio, and Casaroli. Casaroli "undertook to recommend promptly that Pope send parallel messages to Videla and Pinochet, prior to foreign ministers meeting December 12, urging them to continue effort towards peaceful settlement of dispute and issue public statement along same lines." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509-0012)

39. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown and Mr. Aaron, 8 December 1978, on Covert Action Finding (U)

1. I raised the issue of a possible covert action finding on the Beagle Channel in order to let us use our influence to keep the situation calm.² There was instant and vehement rejection of this in view of the fact that the United States has overtly supported keeping the sides from going to combat. [*less than 8 lines not declassified*]

2. I think we should send a cable [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that it is the US open position to oppose military conflict over the Beagle Channel issue and that they can support that position [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Stansfield Turner³
Director

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R, Box 15, Folder 41: DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, August–December 1978. Secret.

² The item on the Beagle Channel was a proposed new line item under the generic, or worldwide, section of the June 7, 1978, Omnibus Finding. In an attachment to a November 29 memorandum to Turner, Raymond proposed a Beagle Channel item that [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] that would “promote the peaceful resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile.” Raymond recommended that this and other worldwide findings be submitted to the SCC for approval. On December 11, Turner approved a package of proposed findings for release to the SCC, which did not include the Beagle Channel item. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of [*text not declassified*], Job 81M00980R: Subject Committee Files [1947–1978], Box 27, Folder 12: [*text not declassified*])

³ Ratliff signed for Turner above Turner’s typed signature, according to Ratliff’s handwritten notation below the signature line.

40. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, December 13, 1978

Beagle Channel. The meetings in Buenos Aires between the Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile on the Beagle Channel dispute were not successful. The Argentines rejected a Chilean compromise package, including Papal mediation, by insisting that the two countries first resolve the issue of sovereignty over the islands. The Chilean Foreign Minister returned to Santiago this afternoon. Senior Argentine military commanders are expected to meet tomorrow morning to consider further steps. Chile put its military forces on full alert early this morning, matching actions taken by Argentina several weeks ago.

Yesterday I called in the Argentine and Chilean Ambassadors to warn them against using force to resolve the dispute.² Both recognize that it is a dangerous situation, but I am not at all confident that their countries will show the restraint I urged on them. Right now, the risk of armed conflict seems high.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to Latin America]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem December 9–15.

² In telegram 313794 to Buenos Aires and Santiago, December 13, the Department summarized Christopher's December 12 meetings with Aja Espil and Barros. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780513–1040)

41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and Chile¹

Washington, December 15, 1978, 0118Z

315625. Subject: Beagle Channel Message to President Videla

1. (C—Entire Text)

2. Embassy Buenos Aires: You should deliver the following message soonest to President Videla from President Carter (Embassy Santiago: This is for your background in making similar approach set forth in Septel):²

Begin Text:

As you know, for some decades one of the great accomplishments of the countries in this hemisphere is that disputes have been managed peacefully. In this spirit, my country negotiated with Panama a new treaty on the Canal to deal with a longstanding source of tension between our countries. I am concerned that the current military mobilization in Argentina could result in events getting out of control with hostilities commencing and escalating. I know these concerns are shared by many of our colleagues in the hemisphere and in the world. We are working for peace in the world and have always been forthright and clear in quickly condemning aggression. If aggression were to occur because of the Beagle Channel dispute, we would speak out strongly against it.

The United States does not want to inject itself into the substance of this complicated matter and we hope early progress can be made building on your talks this week, perhaps including a mutual military stand-down. However, we would be prepared, if both parties wished, to consult with others to help develop a prompt mediation by some other party.³

Given the peaceful tradition of our hemisphere, I believe open and clear communication of our positions is critical for all our efforts toward a peaceful world. Please accept my message in this spirit.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1813. Confidential; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to USUN. Drafted by Bushnell; cleared in ARA, IO, and S/S-O and by Brzezinski; approved by Christopher.

² In telegram 315626, December 15, the Department transmitted a similar message from Carter to Pinochet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1816)

³ In a December 14 evening report to Carter, Christopher wrote: “Paralleling your message to Presidents Videla and Pinochet, the Brazilians have made a similar approach to both governments, and Carlos Andres Perez has telephoned Videla. Also, the EC–9 is considering a joint démarche to both parties strongly urging a peaceful solution.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21,

I am also indicating my concerns to the Government of Chile.⁴

End Text.

3. White House does not plan to release text and would prefer GOA follow same practice.

4. For USUN: You may inform Waldheim that the President has encouraged the parties to settle their differences.

5. Please deliver text in English, since we wish to avoid any differences in translation nuances.

Christopher

Evening Reports [State], 12/78) In a December 14 conversation, McGee and Brazilian Ambassador to the OAS Alarico Silveira discussed “what actions might possibly be taken in the OAS” regarding the dispute. (Memorandum of Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, USOAS Files, 1971–1985, Lot 85D427, USOAS—Beagle Channel Dispute) In telegram 24503 from Rome, December 15, Wagner described his ongoing conversations with Vatican officials and reported that Casaroli “stated that Holy See will continue to ‘do all it can’ to defuse crisis situation and to bring about peaceful settlement of the dispute.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780517–0331)

⁴ In a December 16 evening report to Carter, Vance wrote: “Presidents Videla and Pinochet both expressed appreciation for your messages,” and Cubillos “asked that we send military attaché as observers, which we have declined.” Videla “said he was exploring with his military commanders possible ways of resuming confidential talks with Chile,” although he was “being pressed by his hard-liners to authorize military action.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78)

42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, December 21, 1978, 1754Z

321148. Subject: Beagle Channel Dispute. Ref: BA 9958²

1. (C—Entire Text)

2. For Ambassador Castro: You should seek immediate interview with General Viola to deliver following message.

—Essence of his morning conversation was reported to USG, where it caused deepest concern.

—USG does not RPT not believe that present situation in any way justifies military action by Argentina against Chile.

—War is definitely not RPT not the only option available to Argentina. There is the reasonable option of avoiding hostile action.

—If Argentina were to take military action, and we would understand occupation of uninhabited islands in dispute to constitute military action, the USG and the world community would be forced to view such a move as aggression.

—If such aggression took place, it would have to be brought immediately to the attention of the Organization of American States.

—The USG wishes once again, in the strongest terms, urge that Argentina settle this territorial dispute with Chile in a peaceful manner.³

Christopher

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528–0313. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Santiago and Rome. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared in ARA/ECA and S/S-O and by Guzman; approved by Vaky.

² Dated December 21. Castro reported that Viola “pleaded for USG understanding of their dilemma. He said Argentina options had been narrowed down to one, to-wit, military action. He said he hoped I personally and my government would help them interpret their problem to the family of nations.” Castro “told Viola I detected a fatalistic attitude that military action was inevitable” and “said the Pope had not been heard from as yet and perhaps word could be received from His Holiness before the end of the day.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 24, Beagle Channel)

³ In telegram 9980 from Buenos Aires, December 21, Castro reported that he had not been able to reach Viola directly and relayed the message to Torres, Viola’s aide. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528–0521)

43. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, December 21, 1978

1. *Beagle Channel*. The Pope today decided to send a special emissary to Argentina and Chile to assist them in reaching a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Argentina has accepted the emissary, and we expect Chile will do the same.² Danger of conflict is still present. Basic differences over boundary lines remain. Hardline Argentine military officers who pushed Videla toward war retain their commands and could undermine the peace effort at any time.

Late this evening (December 21), Chile has called for a special OAS meeting tomorrow under the Rio Pact.³ We hope this will not derail the Pope's effort.

[Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in Geneva meeting with Gromyko concerning SALT. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² In telegram 10005 from Buenos Aires, December 22, Castro reported that he had met with Viola, who said, "the GOA was pleased with the papal initiative," and "the GOA knew the USG was behind the papal move and was warmly grateful." Castro concluded: "There has been a dramatic turnaround here in GOA attitudes as a result of the papal initiative. The basic problem is not resolved, of course, but great hope is being placed in the Vatican's ability to break the stalemate between the two sides." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780530-0019) In telegram 9629 from Santiago, December 22, the Embassy reported that Chile had "accepted Pope's proposal to send emissary and urges that he come now rather than after Christmas. GOC nevertheless is concerned that GOA might attack because it doubts that GOA can control its hardline generals. Therefore it plans to invoke Rio Treaty at OAS tonight or tomorrow." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-1084)

³ See footnote 7, Document 1.

44. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 25, 1979

SUBJECT

Consultations with Latin American and Caribbean Governments on Global Issues (C)

An important new direction which the President set in his Pan American Day speech of 1977 was his pledge to consult more fully with Latin American and Caribbean governments on global issues.² This new policy direction rested on three premises: (1) that the cooperation and support of Latin American and Caribbean governments are necessary to deal effectively with a wide range of global issues; (2) that Latin American governments view world affairs from a combined western and Third World perspective, and thus their advice could be useful to us as we formulate our policies; and (3) that regular consultations on global as well as bilateral issues will demonstrate our trust and attention to these countries and help us achieve more balanced and mutually respectful relationships. (C)

There is a great need today for such global consultations. Many of the governments in the area play important roles in global fora yet they often lack the information with which to make reasoned judgments. Other governments sometimes fill the information gap and gain the kind of trust which genuine consultations can bring.³ We risk too much by remaining idle in this area. (C)

Let me suggest that we begin to implement a comprehensive plan for consulting on a wide range of global issues on a regular basis with selected governments in the region.⁴ Obviously, one wants to tailor the briefings to the particular country, and one wants to allow the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America, 2-5/80. Confidential.

² See footnote 3, Document 5.

³ In an April 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote that it "became clear to me" that an official at the Mexican Foreign Ministry "was getting his information on Cuba's activities in Africa and Yemen elsewhere. The Cubans are probably briefing him and others in Mexico on a regular basis; they're probably repeating the briefing elsewhere, notably in Jamaica." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 27, Latin America, 8-12/79)

⁴ In the April 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "ARA has never felt very comfortable with the 'global' approach. Part of the reason is that the briefing papers on Southern Africa, the Middle East, etc., necessarily have to be written in other bureaus. For that reason, Vaky agreed that a memo from you to the Secretary could be useful in his obtaining the cooperation of the rest of the departments." (Ibid.)

Ambassador discretion as to timing, audience (Foreign Minister or President), and even whether a particular briefing should be given. (C)

With respect to Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, we should try to be sensitive to consulting on virtually all important issues or informing these governments of decisions, very much like we do with NATO countries. In addition, our Ambassadors should consult with the Foreign Ministers (or perhaps Heads of State) of other countries in the area with influence in international affairs, including Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad, Barbados, and Costa Rica. Issues for routine consultations could include: Southern Africa, the Middle East, Cuba, international economic issues of particular concern to the developing world, energy, and SALT. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

45. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 10, 1979

SUBJECT

Conversation, 9 May 1979

1. I discussed the briefings [*less than 1 line not declassified*] our respective Ambassadors conducted for the Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela.² [*less than 4 lines not declassified*]

2. A brief discussion took place on Herrera [*3 lines not declassified*] The Vice President endorsed [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that Herrera was a likeable personality, and said he thought the President would enjoy working with him.

3. I mentioned Argentina and briefly noted that the war against terrorism had been won, but in the process a number of innocent people had been killed. Nevertheless, Argentina's human rights performance is now improving.

4. In connection with human rights, I recalled the President's statement to the Cabinet a year ago³ that while we must continue to press

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, Box 6, Folder 12: B-303 President 1 Jul-31 Dec 1979. Secret.

² Not found.

³ Not further identified.

our human rights policy, we also needed to understand that many of these countries are our friends and that they have real problems. I said I didn't think Argentina and Brazil perceived our policies as being implemented in that sense. In particular, I found three areas of concern:

a. The public report card aspect. This is particularly grating to the Brazilians who consider themselves a great power.

b. A lack of flexibility in our policy when a country does improve its performance. We seem to be unable to provide incentives.

c. The training of military people in the United States. Much of the merit of these training programs has been in exposing them to U.S. values, including our human rights values. Yet, in the name of human rights we are cutting them off from this exposure. In addition, we are creating a new generation of military people in key countries who will be oriented in other directions, and may possibly even be bitter toward the U.S.

5. The comment was made that most of these are statutory provisions. I said yes, but I thought some flexibility existed. The comment was also made that these were all good points, which should be conveyed to the Congress.

6. [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

7. [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

8. [1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

Frank C. Carlucci

*Deputy Director of Central Intelligence*⁴

⁴ Carlucci signed "FC" above his typed signature.

46. Aide-Memoire Prepared in the National Security Council¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

SUBJECT

Secretary Vance's Trip to Ecuador, August 10, 1979

The Secretary's trip to Quito comes at a portentous moment in inter-American relations.² The approach to Latin America which the Carter Administration has articulated over the last two and one-half years represents a significant and positive departure from that of previous administrations, but it is seriously threatened at this time. The Secretary's trip presents us with a unique opportunity to not only preserve the integrity of our approach but to enhance it. (C)

The Carter Administration has approached Latin America, guided by three fundamental principles: (C)

—A commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. (C)

—A pledge of support for democratization, human rights, and social justice. (C)

—A commitment to multilateral consultation, and to the extent possible, action. (C)

In practice, our policies have distanced the U.S. from the status quo and from authoritarian regimes of the right. (We had already found ourselves at such a distance from the one leftist dictator in the hemisphere that the impulse for communication necessarily led us towards him.) Our commitment to human rights and social reform not only led us to withdraw support from historical "friends" like Somoza, but it also changed the power equation in many countries—increasing the cost of repression, encouraging opposition groups, and in a sense de-legitimizing the arbitrary use of power. Our pledge of non-intervention prevented us from direct involvement when our interests were jeopardized, but it didn't stop the Cubans and others from intervening. Our preference for multilateral consultations often meant that we would lose critical moments seeking support from others when independent action could have been decisive. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17, Ecuador, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the aide-memoire.

² Vance traveled to Quito for the inauguration of Roldos August 9–12. See Documents 284 and 285.

These are the drawbacks of our approach. Critics claim that we have de-stabilized Latin America without providing an alternative. This is a weak argument, attributing too much importance to U.S. influence and too little to indigenous factors, but it is one that has been made. Nonetheless, there have been important and to a great extent unanticipated changes in inter-American relations these past two and one-half years, and unless we take them into account and make some basic changes in our approach, we may find ourselves trailing in the wake of the Cubans. (C)

The Heads of State and/or the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, and Panama will be in Quito. These countries and a few like-minded countries from the Caribbean like Barbados, Dominican Republic, and perhaps Trinidad could form a nucleus of a working group to deal with the problems gripping Central America and the Caribbean. There are three objectives which could be set for the Secretary's talks: (C)

(1) *To seek a common perception of the problems facing Central America and the Caribbean.* The problems in Central America are different than those of the Caribbean; the only thread that connects these divergent problems is Cuban policy which seeks to aggravate and exploit local situations for their purposes, as they serve the broader geo-political aims of the Soviet Union. In Central America, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are all troubled, though to varying degrees, by gross inequalities and a rigid and closed socio-political system. The masses are increasingly alienated from the governments; political polarization is growing worse. In the Caribbean, a new and young generation of leaders are looking to Cuba for answers to the economic dilemma posed by non-viable mini-states. (C)

(2) *To seek common action among as many of the leaders as possible.* In Central America (including Nicaragua) we must actively seek to strengthen the moderate democratic process. In the Caribbean, we must make the Caribbean Group work, and demonstrate to the new leaders that a moderate democratic path can be more just and successful than a radical Cuban model. We must also seek to contain Cuba as a source of revolutionary change, and try to deny Cuba the legitimacy it desperately seeks—from Latin America, perhaps as much as from the U.S. (C)

(3) *To develop a mechanism to insure good coordination and immediate action on the problems that face us.* We should not look to the O.A.S. at the beginning because it is too slow and too open. We need to develop an ad hoc mechanism to deal with the crisis that stands in front of us. Turbay of Colombia may want to deal in abstractions, searching for the "new dimension" in inter-American relations, but he, like Herrera, is also a problem-solver, and they are beginning to sense a problem. They need to be encouraged to act. (C)

The success of the Cubans in Nicaragua has had a paradoxical impact on Latin America. On the one hand, it has raised the level of concern about Cuban motives and capabilities. On the other hand, it has raised the level of respect by Latin America for Cuba as a political force of global importance. Undoubtedly, there are probably some leaders in Latin America who are questioning our strength and resolve as well, and it will be important to make clear that our policy in Nicaragua was not a reflection of weakness, but of strength. At the same time, we should make clear to them that the Cubans are pushing us to the limits of our tolerance. (C)

These Latin American leaders have a stake in the Carter Administration's policies for four reasons, which could be used as instruments to weld a new coalition of like-minded American democracies. (C)

—First, the principles which guide our policies are Latin America's, particularly non-intervention and multilateral consultation. (C)

—Secondly, events in Central America and the Caribbean will affect them as much, if not more, than they will affect the U.S. (C)

—Third, the U.S. made good on its pledge to replace Somoza; our credibility with these countries ought to be high. (C)

—Fourth, Cuban expansion and Cuba's military build-up should be sources of growing concern for Latin American leaders. Cuba now has one of the largest, if not the largest, Latin American military forces; it has submarines; it has an offensive capability. It has recently increased its subversive political activities through legitimate (Caribbean) groups and illegitimate guerrilla (Central American) groups. (C)

What specifically should be done? A lot, of course, depends on the extent to which agreement can be reached on the three objectives described above; and a lot will depend on what the Latins have to say. The Cubans have set us and our democratic colleagues off-balance, if not on the defensive, and I suspect this will be evident in the conversations. The Venezuelans, Costa Ricans, Panamanians, and others are all afraid that the child—Nicaragua—that they thought they had fathered may actually be Fidel's. They need to stand together now. We should encourage them to raise their voices in praise of Ecuador and the democratic process and in condemnation of Cuba and the violent revolutionary path. We should share intelligence information more and consult regularly. (The Panamanians, for example, have a lot more information on the Cubans in Nicaragua than we do.) We should all agree to help El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala by the formula we have agreed to: reforms for assistance. If the conversations are productive, we may want to consider a summit meeting along the lines suggested by Colombian President Turbay, only much more specific

and only after full staff preparation.³ We may want to try to develop the idea of a multilateral military assistance program for Nicaragua and for other Central American countries. (C)

The Quito meetings have certain similarities with the Commonwealth Summit in Lusaka.⁴ If we can emerge with a unified perception and approach, we will have succeeded in enhancing our policies and retrieving the initiative from the Cubans. (C)

³ See Document 251.

⁴ The Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting was held August 1-7.

47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua¹

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2221Z

211262. Subject: The Secretary's Meeting With Andean Foreign Ministers: [August] 11. Military Assistance to Nicaragua

1. Entire contents Confidential.

2. Summary. During his August 11 meeting in Quito with the five Andean Foreign Ministers, Secretary Vance asked for views on possible military and police assistance to Nicaragua. He said USG has been approached informally by GNR to provide such aid and we are considering how to respond. Ecuadorean ForMin Pareja and others said they had not been approached for such aid, and believed Andean efforts at this stage should instead be focussed on humanitarian and reconstruction aid. End summary.

3. The Secretary, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, continued his discussions with the Andean Foreign Ministers (see Septel)² in a discussion of possible military and/or police

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts except addressees. Drafted by Barnebey; cleared by Pastor and Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

² In telegram 211259 to Bogotá, Caracas, La Paz, Lima, Managua, and Quito, August 13, the Department summarized Vance's discussion with the foreign ministers regarding "Nicaragua's needs for humanitarian, reconstruction, and long-term development assistance." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979)

assistance to Nicaragua. The same Andean Foreign Ministers mentioned in Septel participated.

4. The Secretary discussed the possibility of direct military assistance to Nicaragua, explaining that USG had been approached informally to provide such assistance. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja said that the Andean Group had not been approached by the GNR for such assistance, and asked if other LA countries had been approached. The Secretary replied that Panama had been asked for assistance and had responded with a modest program. He said USG had come to no conclusions about our response to this Nicaraguan inquiry. He added that he believes there are good reasons to be responsive, and that others should consider providing what they can (jeeps or bulldozers, arms or whatever a donor country might decide upon). He said USG considers this a serious issue and he would welcome views of the Andean Foreign Ministers on this subject.

5. Assistant Secretary Vaky said that the problem has a deeper dimension; the GNR must reform its military forces and police, and the manner in which this is accomplished is of interest to the entire hemisphere. Vaky said that this request for assistance would meet a legitimate need, and in the case of police assistance this is not possible for USG in view of our legal restrictions. He asked whether, since USG is thus impeded from certain kinds of assistance, would it not still be in the best interest of hemisphere democratic countries to help, so that GNR need not resort to Soviet and Cuban sources.

6. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja said that it would be difficult to give an immediate answer. He commented that to aid an army is a political act, in this case recalling assistance in the creation of the Nicaraguan National Guard. He said that public opinion would recall the circumstances of the formation of the GN (read the USG role). He said the matter is a serious one which should be studied by the Andean Group, but he did not see any way in which the GOE for its part could render such assistance.

7. Assistant Secretary Vaky stressed that he was not suggesting forcing any aid upon Nicaragua, but rather asked how LA countries might respond to the GNR's own felt needs. Peruvian FonMin Garcia Bedoya replied that GNR must eventually re-equip its armed forces in order to have a stable army, and will organize its military forces to that end. He said that to meet these needs, if democratic countries cannot provide them, GNR "might have to go elsewhere." Garcia Bedoya listed various unknowns: whether the FSLN will become a regular army, whether new units will be formed, what type of equipment they would need, and whether they would seek equipment from USG or other sources. He asked if Nicaragua's armed forces would only comprise the guerrillas as at present, or that group plus others

in some new institutionalized system. He asked if USG had information on this point. The Secretary said we have no clear indication, but rather only a request in the most general terms for USG assistance. The Secretary recognized that a USG decision is involved in this case, but such a decision affects the entire hemisphere and the views of others are important to us. Finally he asked if a multilateral effort might be made to provide equipment, if that were found to be Nicaragua's principal need.

8. At this point Colombia FonMin Uribe dwelt on a list of difficulties in hemispheric relations. He said that democracies are in danger due to excessive arms inventories. He said that arms procurement was causing problems, as in the case of the high prices countries have to pay for their essential arms. He said that to offer arms in Central America would go directly athwart hemispheric and world initiatives for disarmament. He said that LA democratic countries cannot become policemen, but should stress social measures in support of their democracies. He said it would be very difficult for LA democracies to mount a military action when it is precisely this which the democracies have opposed for so many years. He said that this is the GOC position, but each country in Central America and elsewhere will have to decide for itself on the subject. He concluded by saying that hemisphere should not overemphasize "traffic accidents" in Nicaragua but the larger social economic problems of the hemisphere.

9. Ecuadorean FonMin Pareja countered that he has sometimes "had to walk with the devil." He said that a case might arise, say in an unnamed neighbor of Nicaragua, where former GN personnel might try to invade Nicaragua, and thereby the GNR may need help for its defense. He said Andean Group Foreign Ministers would have to consult among themselves and with GNR in that event. He said no decision could be taken today and the matter is not pressing, and that instead humanitarian assistance should be relied upon to help establish democracy in Nicaragua. When GNR sees humanitarian aid provided without conditions, Pareja said, the GNR reaction will be favorable, and decisions on arms can be delayed until more information is available. Pareja then suggested a high-level commission, possibly to be set up in San Jose with Andean Group and USG participating, to analyze developments in Nicaragua. He said that this is merely an idea which has not yet been elaborated.

10. The Secretary asked what the purpose of such a group would be. Pareja replied that he did not know, but that a special commission to study the aid needs of Nicaragua might be useful. Bolivian FonMin Fernandez spoke up, insisting that all actions regarding Nicaragua should be coordinated through the Andean Group Foreign Ministers, and any such committee as suggested by Pareja would be "misinter-

preted" in the Andean countries. Peruvian FonMin Garcia Bedoya agreed, asking why such a group should be in San Jose, what attributes would it have, why countries other than the US were not involved, etc. Pareja persisted that his suggested commission would avoid delays in Andean Group consultation and provide flexibility in Andean Group dealings with the GNR. He acknowledged that coordination can be accomplished in other ways as well.

10. Bolivian FonMin Fernandez stressed that the Andean Group Presidents' recent agreement at Cartagena provides that only the Foreign Ministers can consult on political questions. He said that as there is a need for daily information on the "evolution of cooperation" in Nicaragua, Andean technical organs could provide this information. Pareja said he disagreed "a little," in that the commission should also deal with political subjects. The Secretary added that such a commission obviously involves an Andean Group decision, but that he thought this is an interesting idea and that we would like to follow it up if the Andean Foreign Ministers go this route.

11. Venezuelan FonMin Zambrano urged that this improved liaison could be obtained by assigning—as Venezuela is doing—high-level, experienced ambassadors to Managua to ensure close relations with the GNR and a flow of information back to the Andean countries.

12. Pareja then concluded the meeting by urging his colleagues to keep talking about this problem of coordination. He said that the Andean Group countries' ambassadors might be a workable substitute. He then thanked the Secretary and other foreign ministers for attending this meeting. With the Secretary's in turn thanking the chairman, the meeting adjourned.

Vance

48. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Goals for Latin America

As requested, the following are the goals and objectives I see for Latin America during the next eighteen months.

As an overall preliminary comment, let me underline the point made to you during the Quito consultations: we need to refurbish our relationship and improve the region's perception of us. Essentially, this will mean being seen by these countries as relevant to their problems and interests.² Trade, development, economics, security—these are all major parts of our total relationship. We cannot be effective in them, however, without a) attention; b) resolution of conflicts with domestic interests to the extent possible and, c) applying reasonable resource inputs.³

Goals and Objectives

1. *Central America*

Deal with the regional crisis in ways that will a) prevent the consolidation of extreme left regimes in the region; b) contain Cuban/Soviet influence and control; c) prevent armed conflict within or among countries in the region; and d) promote broader political systems, equitable economic and social development and observance of human rights. The uniqueness of the Nicaraguan situation is the key to this area, but this in turn can probably only be managed in a context of stability in Honduras and controlled change in El Salvador and Guatemala. Specifically, we should:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry 1979. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In an August 9 memorandum to Vance, Tarnoff and Lake indicated that they had solicited input on Vance's goals and objectives for the next 18 months, see Document 123, *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Copies of the other bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry.

² Vance underlined the phrase "need to refurbish our relationship and improve the region's perception of us" and most of the sentence beginning with "essentially," and wrote "yes" in the left-hand margin.

³ Vance underlined points (b) and (c) and wrote "agree" in the left-hand margin.

—Seek non-communist political development in Nicaragua as well as (and through) economic recovery from great devastation.

—Seek to reduce the potential for violent confrontation in El Salvador and Guatemala by promoting freer political processes, development and elimination of repression.

—Support Honduras' scenario of return to constitutional government and economic/social development.

—Help Costa Rica sustain its democratic system.⁴

2. Caribbean

Improve political and economic stability in the region and reduce vulnerabilities to Cuban expansion. Specifically,

—provide appropriate economic and security assistance to the Eastern Caribbean to reduce vulnerabilities; encourage sub-regional cooperation among the mini-states; and create a sense of U.S. interest and concern that affords a stable diplomatic framework for our on-going relations.⁵

—wean Jamaica and Guyana away from radical international line; and

—preserve recent democratizing gains in the Dominican Republic.⁶

3. Cuba

Seek to:

—mute or counter Cuba's aggressive revolutionary drives; discourage Soviet/Cuban military ties;

—contain Cuban power and influence in the NAM; and

—reexamine and probe for ways to ease US-Cuban tensions and find a *modus vivendi* that might promise a way to affect and moderate Cuban objectives and intentions toward us.⁷

4. Mexico

Establish a constructive, effective working relationship to handle the complex, difficult set of issues that comprise that relationship.⁸ Specifically:

—confirm and implement purchase agreement on gas;

—resolve tomato and winter vegetable problems;

⁴ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.

⁵ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to the underlined portion of this recommendation. He also underlined the remainder of the paragraph beginning with "encourage sub-regional cooperation" and wrote "ok" in the margin next to this recommendation.

⁶ Vance wrote "ok" in the margin next to both of these recommendations.

⁷ Vance wrote "ok" in the margin next to each of these recommendations.

⁸ Vance wrote "Easier said than done" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

- secure Mexican accession to GATT and bilateral agreement within MTN framework;
- resolve tuna issue;⁹ and
- strengthen working relationship, understanding and exchange on migration and border issues.¹⁰

5. *Brazil*

Develop a closer cooperative relationship with this largest and significant Latin American country, drawing it into closer association with our hemisphere and global policies. To do this, we will need to reach a *modus vivendi* on a myriad of trade problems and nuclear policy.¹¹

6. *Andean Region (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia)*

The Andean region is becoming an economic (Andean Pact) and political force (through coordinated foreign policy actions). It is also an area where democratization is well underway. We should recognize both its specific gravity as a useful force and the trends toward democracy.¹² This will involve:

- cooperation with the Andean Pact Common Market including resource assistance, and dealing with it as a multilateral institution;
- extending assistance and supportive bilateral relations with each of the countries, e.g., economic aid to Peru, trade policy issues such as tin with Bolivia, narcotics aid to Colombia, etc.; and
- developing a systematic consultative procedure with these countries on multilateral political issues, e.g. Central American cooperation.¹³

7. *Argentina*

Find ways to deal with (and hopefully improve) the human rights situation, without at the same time cutting ourselves off from a large and important country whose role and weight can affect our global policies.¹⁴

8. *Chile*

Seek to handle the unique problem of the Letelier extradition¹⁵ and our anti-terrorism policy in a politically charged situation,¹⁶ without

⁹ Reference is to negotiations between Mexico and the United States about regulating tuna fishing within Mexico's exclusive economic zone.

¹⁰ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.

¹¹ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.

¹² Vance wrote "agree" in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.

¹³ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to each of these recommendations.

¹⁴ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.

¹⁵ See Document 229.

¹⁶ Vance wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

at the same time acting so severely that we endanger peace in the area by indirectly encouraging Argentina, Peru or Bolivia to pursue territorial demands against what they may perceive as an isolated Chile. Nor do we wish to destroy the basis for some future relationship with the Chilean nation (as distinct from the Pinochet government).

9. *Panama Canal*

Implement the treaties beginning October 1 in a peaceful, constructive way and use the period to reaffirm strengthened joint Canal defense posture.¹⁷

10. *As an overlay to our country-specific policies we need to pursue certain regional policies:*

—*Conventional arms restraint*—stimulating multilateral efforts such as Mexican CAT talks.¹⁸

—*Strengthening the regional institutions*—OAS, IDB, Human Rights Commission—by improved consultations with appropriate resource support.¹⁹

—*Pursue reasonable economic and trade policies* to respond to widespread—and largely legitimate—demands for open markets and international cooperation in commodities. In particular, to find ways to deal with the disproportionate, severe impact on one country of broad policies such as sugar and the Dominican Republic.²⁰

—*Strengthen our human rights approaches*, seeking to reduce sanctions as human rights improvement and rewarding good performance in addition to sanctioning bad performance.²¹

—*Reconceptualize our military assistance program* to relate it more to objectives, to the role it can uniquely perform in our policy and to reasonable levels of effectiveness.²² Our program now is the result of accretions and amendments over several years responding to ad hoc stimuli, and has lost much coherence and intrinsic logic.

—*Continue cooperation in narcotics interdiction programs.*²³

¹⁷ Vance wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹⁸ Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

¹⁹ Vance underlined “appropriate” and wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

²⁰ Vance wrote “yes, requires prompt planning” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.

²¹ Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation.

²² Vance highlighted this sentence and wrote “work with Lucy on this” in the left-hand margin. Reference is to Benson.

²³ Vance wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin next to this recommendation. In an October 31 memorandum to Christopher, Lake wrote, “The Secretary agreed with each of Ambassador Vaky’s specific goals.” (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Next Seventeen Months—Mtg’s w A/S)

49. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State and the White House¹

Panama City, October 4, 1979, 2239Z

8114. Subj: Draft Memorandum of Vice President Mondale's Meeting With Andean Pact Presidents

1. (Secret—Entire Text)

2. Participants:

Walter Guevara Arce, President of Bolivia; Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, President of Colombia; Francisco Morales Bermudez, President of Peru; Luis Herrera Campins, President of Venezuela; Alfredo Pareja Diezcanezo, Foreign Minister of Ecuador and President Roldos' Representative; Vice President Mondale (accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky, Ambassador Popper, Robert Pastor and Denis Clift)

3. Place and Date: El Panama Hotel, Panama City, October 1, 1979, 6:10 p.m.

4. Summary: The Vice President conveyed a letter from President Carter to the Andean leaders outlining the President's October 1 message on Soviet troops in Cuba.² The Vice President described the background to the President's message and reviewed recent trends in Cuban-Soviet relations which were of particular concern to the U.S. Government. The Andean Presidents did not address the Soviet troop issue in substance. Herrera regretted that news coverage of the President's speech would overshadow the positive impact of the Treaty Day ceremonies. The principal theme of the Andean Presidents' presentations was the threat to democratic institutions from economic disorders, especially in the Caribbean area, and the need to attack these economic problems through joint efforts. Guevara Arce of Bolivia appealed for reconsideration of the U.S. proposal to sell 35,000 tons of tin from the strategic reserve and Morales Bermudez asked for special consideration for Peru in the administration of canal tolls. End Summary.

5. The Vice President opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with the Andean Pact, a group with which the Carter Administration had sought to establish a high-level and significant dialogue. It was particularly noteworthy that this meeting should occur on the occasion of the entry into effect of the Panama Canal Treaties, an historic event for all of Latin America.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790456-0061. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² For the full text of Carter's October 1 address, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 129.

6. After the departure of the press, the Vice President informed the other participants of the receipt just minutes earlier of a letter to them from President Carter outlining the President's address to the American people that evening on the subject of Russian troops in Cuba. The Vice President recalled that the administration had labeled this a serious matter and stated that the status quo was not satisfactory. The Vice President then reviewed the facts of Soviet military involvement with Cuba, its economic subsidies and its shared responsibility for Cuba's wide-spread foreign involvements. He ended his remarks to await the arrival of the text of the President's letter.

7. Bolivian President Guevara Arze raised the proposed sale of 35,000 tons of tin from the U.S. strategic reserves.³ He said the U.S. action could not be understood in view of the adverse impact such a sale would have on Bolivia's democratization process. He mentioned that he had raised this directly with the Vice President during their encounter at the State Ceremony that morning, but wished to express this concern which had the support of the Andean Pact members.

8. The Vice President responded that he would fully report this concern of Bolivia and the other Andean countries. The U.S. Government was very sensitive to the concern and did not wish to place a burden on Bolivian society as it pursued an objective which had full U.S. support. He reiterated the U.S. position that the President intended to consult with the international tin authority in carrying out legislation for tin sales, and would make the sales prudently and in an orderly manner in full consultation with Bolivia. He concluded that he appreciated that this answer, which had been given to the Bolivian Government before, was not satisfactory to it, and would make that point to President Carter.

9. Guevara responded that the U.S. had taken a similar position on the previous occasions when tin sales were made. While he did not attribute ill will to the USG experience had shown that past sales had been harmful. He asked that the message be taken not only to the President, but also to members of the U.S. Congress.

10. The Vice President said he would undertake to do so and would remember the figure given by Guevara that every one-cent drop in the price of tin cost Bolivia about one million dollars.

11. President Herrera of Venezuela began his remarks by calling attention to the harmful effects of poor market situations of a whole series of raw materials of interest to the hemisphere. He then made two principal points in his presentation: The first concerned the problem of maintaining democratic forms of government in poor countries.

³ See footnote 3, Document 149.

Economic pressures, he said, forced those countries to turn to governments of force. These problems particularly affected the Caribbean where perspectives were poor. Governments there needed support and Venezuela wished to help them. Herrera turned secondly to the issue of the Soviet troops. He said the Panama Treaty Ceremonies had been a cause of real joy and satisfaction. The news of the event, however, would be displaced by President Carter's statement on Cuba. While recognizing U.S. interests, he wished to express the preoccupation, even anguish he felt that the impact of the success of the treaty would be marred. He asked that his remark be accepted as the personal concern of a good friend.

12. The Vice President responded that his Government agreed with Herrera's analysis that the success of democracy was affected by economic conditions. The U.S. had tried to be helpful in this regard in many ways, especially in the case of new democracies. Turning to Herrera's second point, he said that the treaties were of great importance to the Carter Administration and were a vivid expression of the administration's commitment to a foreign policy "based on fairness, not force." It was nonetheless necessary to deal with the Russian troop situation. Cuban involvement in Africa and the Horn had been very destabilizing: the Cubans had consistently supported the cause of violence and blocked moderation. It was the trend of Cuban-Soviet military relations which caused concern. Further, the matter had now become caught up with the SALT II ratification. He said the President believed that failure to ratify treaty could introduce a dangerous phase in U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. To avoid this, the U.S. had proposed many things but the Soviets did not cooperate; they had made concessions, but none were significant. Vice President concluded that President Carter was moving, in his address this evening, in a restrained way. His address reflected our deep objections but sought to contain the situation by showing that there was no threat to the U.S. and that the troop presence should not be linked to SALT ratification. (At this point President Carter's letter was distributed.)

13. Colombian President Turbay Ayala began a discursive presentation by expressing his support for Bolivia with regard to U.S. tin sales, but then noted that Colombia had many problems, not just one. For example, while the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba was a matter for concern, he felt the general problem of world armaments should be kept in mind. World problems should be discussed at this meeting, he felt.

14. Turbay identified inflation as the first of these problems, a common enemy. Like other world issues, it could not be tackled by nations acting individually; rather, a joint effort of Latin America and the United States was needed. Serious economic problems were creat-

ing social pressures all over Latin America, including the Caribbean. These pressures were directed against local governments and against the United States. Anti-Americanism could grow in a soil of economic difficulties prompted by the price of oil, unemployment, etc. The USG faced similar economic and social tensions, but there the alternative was a democratic one. In many Latin American countries the alternative was the loss of democracy.

15. Turbay continued that a joint effort was necessary which covered not only the Caribbean but all of the hemisphere. It should not be dependent on the U.S. alone, but rather “we all have to help.” He proposed for consideration a “fund for peace” or “fund for democracy” which would be used to fight “difficult situations”. If the democracies of Latin America could become partners, he argued, others would be stimulated to join the fund or to take dramatic actions. In conclusion, he acknowledged that President Carter might see the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba as making the situation in the Caribbean more serious. He recognized that the extension of “these movements” in the Caribbean affected the entire hemisphere.

16. The Vice President in response acknowledged the importance of such international problems as inflation. The U.S. was working very hard on its domestic problem, aware that, as a large economy, it affected the welfare of others. He said Turbay’s appeal for joint consideration of the major problems should be pursued.

17. In closing, President Morales Bermudez of Peru thanked the Vice President for the opportunity to express their individual thoughts and preoccupations and to exchange views. In summary, he stated that, while appreciating U.S. interests and the significance of world problems, the Andean Pact members felt that their domestic problems could not be solved without a hemispheric approach. To a great extent, the hemisphere shared in global concerns. In urging a hemispheric approach, the Andean Pact countries did not seek a return to paternalism but rather mutual understanding. He then asked that the administration of the tolls of the Panama Canal take into account the fact that a large portion of Peruvian territory carries out its trade through the Amazon in addition to the principal commerce of the Pacific Coast.

18. Note: Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Pareja did not speak.

Blake

50. **Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, October 29, 1980

SUBJECT

The Carter Administration and Latin America: An Assessment of the First Term and an Agenda for the Second

Attached at Tab A is the first installment on the papers which I promised you.² I have tried to keep it brief, but we have covered a lot of territory in a short time. The third section identifies the new agenda which we will need to face in the second term. My next paper will provide some proposals for answering the questions on that agenda.

I also recommend that you send a copy of the assessment to Secretary Muskie, as he will be undertaking his trip to Latin America without much of an idea of what we have tried to do in the last four years.³ While I have some reservations about the timing and the itinerary of his trip, nonetheless there is no question that his conversations could be extremely useful in sounding out some of the most important leaders in the hemisphere on the central issues which we will try to address in a second term. I have checked with ARA, and they are also a bit confused on the trip, and have not provided him much focus. I think the assessment at Tab A could help. I would also like if you could ask him whether I would be able to accompany him and sit in on the meetings. It would be enormously useful to try to develop some ideas on what we should do in a second term, and I also expect that I would be of help to Muskie as the "historical memory" of the Carter Administration's approach to Latin America. (Since 1977, there have

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 27, Latin America, 1-12/80. No classification marking. Sent for action.

² Tab A is printed as an attachment. In an October 16 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote that he would "develop some comprehensive and effective answers to new issues, to assess our implementation of first term objectives, and to examine systematically and critically where we have failed to reach objectives or where our objectives may have been mistaken." He proposed to write papers on five subjects: "A review of our policies as they affected Latin America and the Caribbean," "An analysis of the changes that have occurred in the hemisphere in the last four years and what we can expect in the next four," Cuba, "the foreign policy making process," and "a detailed agenda and strategy, recommending priority areas and specific proposals, relating substantive ideas to a schedule." (Ibid.) (no classification marking)

³ Muskie made an official visit to Mexico from November 29-December 1, but did not travel elsewhere in Latin America during his term as Secretary.

been three Assistant Secretaries of ARA and about fifteen Deputy Assistant Secretaries.)

RECOMMENDATION: I look forward to discussing this assessment with you to see if you would like me to modify it in any way for the President. I have provided a memo at Tab I, if you should decide to send it as is.⁴

That you sign the memo at Tab I.⁵

That you speak to Muskie about my accompanying him on his trip.⁶

Tab A

Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff⁷

Washington, October 28, 1980

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN AMERICA: AN ASSESSMENT

I. Introduction: A Brief Summary of Four Years

During the last four years, your Administration gave more time to Latin America and the Caribbean and pursued a more active, coherent, and consistent approach to Latin America than any previous Administration.

—In 1977, you gave a new direction to U.S. policies to the region. The foundation was set by your decision to give a high priority to negotiating new Canal treaties. After a sometimes difficult interagency review (PRM–17⁸), you enunciated a unique new approach to Latin America in your Pan American Day speech to the OAS, which described the three central principles that have guided our policies: a recognition of the individuality and a respect for the sovereignty (principle of non-intervention) of each nation, a commitment to try to improve respect for human rights and extend democracy, and a willingness to consult on the global economic issues of central concern to the area.⁹ Rather

⁴ Tab I, undated, is attached but not printed. Below this recommendation, Brzezinski wrote, "Too long by far. Develop a brief, more capsulated report. It does distinguish between the two at the front. ZB."

⁵ Brzezinski checked the disapprove option.

⁶ Brzezinski checked the approve option.

⁷ No classification marking. No revised paper was found.

⁸ See Document 1.

⁹ See footnote 3, Document 5.

than a slogan to mask the diversity of the region, you suggested a flexible approach more attuned to the important changes that have occurred in the Americas in the last two decades, specifically to the self-assertiveness of nations interested in shaping a new world rather than being satisfied as just members of an inter-American system. Through Mrs. Carter's trip and your personal meetings in 1977, you personally engaged twenty heads of state in the region, explaining your approach, especially your personal commitment to human rights and democratization, and becoming conversant in the gamut of bilateral, regional, and global issues of concern to our countries. We began a dialogue with Cuba and opened Interest Sections to permit regular communication. You began to define a special approach to the Caribbean, and initiated what has since become known as the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, led now by the World Bank with 31 nations and fifteen international institutions involved. You signed the American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; both still await ratification in the Senate. The amount and the quality of attention which you and your Administration gave to Latin America in 1977 probably exceeded that of any other Administration's first year, including that of Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress.

—1978 was largely spent implementing the initiatives taken in 1977. The Canal Treaties were ratified and exchanged during your trip to Panama. You travelled to Venezuela, where you gave an important speech on North-South relations (calling for shared responsibility to implement a new economic order) and announced the Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program, and to Brazil where you lent additional credibility to your human rights policy.¹⁰ Also, we moved to strengthen U.S.-Mexican relations through the Consultative Mechanism. In consultations with Mexico and the Ayacucho countries, arms control initiatives began to be seriously considered. The Caribbean Group took shape.

—In 1979, we faced our most serious crises and challenges—Nicaragua, Grenada, and the Cuban brigade—and we distinguished ourselves only in that we didn't veer too far from our original objectives. All three forced us to focus on the security dimension of inter-American relations in a not always constructive way. At the same time we were wrestling with these three issues, we also were strengthening our relationships with the Andean Pact as a group (particularly because of the trend toward democracy in Ecuador and Peru) and with Venezuela,

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 346 and Documents 172 and 173. Documentation on the Humphrey Scholarship Program is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXX, Public Diplomacy.

Mexico, and Brazil. Your two meetings with Lopez Portillo,¹¹ the strengthening of the Consultative Mechanism, the appointment of a Special Ambassador¹² to coordinate U.S.-Mexican relations within the U.S. governments and to ensure that it be given the deserved priority, the conclusion of a gas agreement and an extensive science and technology pact as a result of Frank Press's efforts—all those led to more attention and results than the relationship has seen for a long time. Vice President Mondale's trip to Venezuela and Brazil and Frank Press's follow-up trip also served to deepen our relationship with the two key countries in South America.¹³ The Brazilian Foreign Minister was moved to say in April 1979 that U.S.-Brazilian relations were "excellent."

—In 1980, your attention has largely been focused on the hostages, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the economy, and the campaign. The Administration's attention to Latin America has been focused on the Caribbean basin—instability in Central America and the Caribbean, Cuban and Haitian refugees, and Cuban subversion. After Grenada, we have managed to turn the tide back in favor of democracy in the Eastern Caribbean and to halt the revolution in Central America by fostering moderate change in El Salvador and Honduras and by trying to play a positive role in Nicaragua. Through your personal initiative, "Caribbean/Central American Action," a unique experiment in people-to-people diplomacy, was launched to improve the quality of our peoples' relationships in the area. We have done a good deal, but hardly enough. The Caribbean Basin is one area in need of your attention in 1981.

In summary, you have set a course in 1977 and kept to it even through the trying times in 1979. We have made remarkable progress toward our goals. Still, there is much that remains to be completed, and many new issues that remain to be confronted. Let me discuss these within the context of an assessment.

II. *An Assessment*

This assessment will proceed by examining the goals associated with each of the three basic principles.

(1) *Peace*. Recognition of the individuality of each relationship. Respect for non-intervention.

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Documents 156 and 157.

¹² Robert Krueger. Carter announced the appointment on June 22, 1979. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 1134–1135)

¹³ See Document 357.

A. *Overall Approach—Slogans, Global Consultations.* The Carter Administration has avoided the temptation to reduce its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to a slogan, but that has a downside: our flexible, global approach is not easily grasped; our approach has therefore become known not by its principles but by its most salient features: human rights and democracy by those who like our policies; Nicaragua, Grenada, and Cuban refugees by those who don't.

Recognizing the increasing international role of many of the region's governments, we set a clear objective of consulting on a regular basis on global and regional political and economic issues. We have probably done more of this than any previous Administration, but we haven't done enough, and we have not yet built a systematic mechanism for ensuring such consultations on a regular basis. Given the region's increasing importance in the UN, the NAM and Socialist International (SI), it is essential that we consult regularly on US policies and on developments in controversial areas like Southern Africa, Middle East, East-West relations—issues where our briefings and consultations are likely to produce a confluence of perspectives.

Despite many efforts to forge a coalition of like-minded democracies (especially Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Brazil) to pursue a common policy to Central America and the Caribbean, we have not been successful. Mexico views the region's turmoil from a totally different perspective. Brazil is focusing on its borders and believes the Caribbean is our problem, not theirs. Colombia is preoccupied. And Venezuela, which is playing the most constructive role in the area, enjoys consultation, but prefers parallel rather than a common policy.

During the Nicaraguan crisis, we were pulled into playing a more direct role in an internal matter than what we had originally preferred, but we have still clearly maintained the integrity of our pledge of non-intervention during the past four years, unlike many other in Latin nations.

B. *Non-Proliferation.* The Senate has not yet ratified Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It is not clear whether our efforts to discourage Brazil and Argentina from obtaining a full fuel cycle without full scope safeguards has had much effect, but it is clear that both governments have scaled down their initial nuclear programs considerably. At the same time, both nations established a cooperative program in nuclear power. This is just one more indication that the longstanding rivalry between Argentina and Brazil may have passed into history, thereby reducing our concerns about the explosive implications of a possible nuclear arms race.

C. *Arms Control.* We lent strong support to two regional arms control initiatives (by Mexico and by Venezuela), and we made a pre-

liminary effort to discuss the issue with the Soviets; all three initiatives got nowhere. Nonetheless, we have exercised unilateral restraint, and this conceivably could have helped restrain overall arms expenditures in the hemisphere. At the same time, the US was overtaken by five other nations in arms sales to the region. Despite your explicit decision (in PD-52)¹⁴ to reverse the decline of the amount of FMS allocated to Latin America as a percentage of the global amount (from 2% to 4%), this has not been done. State is once again recommending a level of 2% for Latin America in FY 82. We need to take a hard look at this issue again; perhaps the Secretary of State can initiate consultations on this issue during his trip.

D. *Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.* Before your Pan American Day speech, the US had refused to play much of a role in settling the many territorial disputes in the hemisphere. Since then, we have played a very active role, trying to stimulate the negotiating process from the side while keeping a mediator in front—the Pope on the Beagle Channel, a former Peruvian President on the Honduran-Salvadorean dispute, and the British on Belize. We have already raised other disputes, including Ecuador's desire for access to the Amazon, Bolivian access to the Sea, and we have encouraged dialogue where only silent confrontation had existed before.

E. *Central America.* We tried to find a peaceful path through mediation in Nicaragua, but failed for several reasons: Somoza was too intransigent; the middle class too ready to accept the promises of the Marxist left; and most importantly, our friends, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama, were so obsessed in getting rid of Somoza and pre-empting Castro that they unwittingly played Castro's game, successfully insulating him from us. We are having a little more success in El Salvador, but it's by no means clear that the middle will prevail there. Honduras is making the transition from military to civilian governments, but the pettiness of the politicians, the arrogance of the military, and the machinations of an emerging left could derail that. Guatemala is polarizing very rapidly as the rightists assassinate anyone who suggests there is a middle way. We are pursuing a delicate experiment by encouraging peaceful democratic reform in a region of violence, obsolete sociopolitical structures, and gross inequalities. The Marxist left have dressed themselves in our human rights banners, and Fidel Castro has concentrated his energies on helping them seize power. We are still intransigent. The problem of helping to maintain democracy in the Caribbean has proved easier than creating it in Central America. The Cubans succeeded in subverting Grenada, but the same strategy failed

¹⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 81.

in Suriname; and more importantly, Cuba's radical allies were decisively beaten in free elections by moderate, pro-US groups in St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, and St. Kitts. The Caribbean Group has added stability to the region. Still, we haven't done nearly enough to enhance the security of the region or to assist its development. Despite your promise to increase aid to the area in your October 1, 1979 Soviet brigade speech, we maintained aid at the same level as the previous year. We need an imaginative new approach to the area which takes into account its special importance in security as well as in immigration matters.

F. *Cuba*. While we have had great success in the human rights area in Cuba, we are further away from our geopolitical goals than in 1977. Cuba has more troops in more countries and is more actively pursuing its revolutionary goals today than in 1977. This is another area in need of a new look.

G. *Summary*. With the exception of Central America, LAC is, by and large, a more peaceful and less militarized place than in 1976. The Panama Canal is safer; the border areas in dispute are subject to heated negotiations; South America is focused on development rather than internal security.

(2) *Human Rights and Democracy*

A. *Overall Approach*. The effective pursuit of human rights is clearly the most successful achievement of your Administration. You have finally, and with some cost, imprinted your commitment to human rights on the consciousness of all the leaders in the hemisphere. Repression is now much more costly, and there are fewer disappearances and political prisoners and less torture. You have restored the image of the US as a nation that stands for human rights, social justice, and democracy.

B. *Regional Norms and Institutions*. When you signed the American Convention on Human Rights on June 1, 1977,¹⁵ while Mrs. Carter was in San Jose, only two nations had ratified it. Even though the Senate still hasn't acted, at our urging, 14 nations have ratified the Convention, bringing it into force, and establishing a new institution, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In addition, we have significantly strengthened the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which has done five important country reports.

C. *Refugees*. We have born the burden of the refugee problem largely on our own. We have not been successful in getting other nations or the OAS to play an important role. This is one of the "new" set of issues which we will have to address early in the second term.

¹⁵ See footnote 3, Document 10.

D. *Democratization*. We have tried to use every opportunity to show that democracy pays, and the trend is clearly in a positive direction—the first time in at least two decades. Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Honduras, Dominican Republic—all have made the transition. We have also engaged the Andean Pact in trying to help facilitate this democratic process. Our success is due to letting people know where the U.S. stands rather than from helping to build political parties or train young leaders or fund private initiatives. However, when a young political leader in Nicaragua asked us to help him organize a political party, we lack means to help. Our approach is strict neutrality with respect to political parties and candidates, but we are partial to free elections, yet we have no mechanism for either training people to conduct free elections or observing them, and the OAS has shown no interest in this. This is another area worth pursuing.

E. *New Forces*. New international political forces have emerged recently and are having an impact on the region, though not very favorably from the perspective of our interests. The Socialist International, the Conference of Latin American Political Parties (COPPAL—Mexico in the lead), the German SPD and CDU Foundations, the Non-Aligned Movement—all these organizations seem to have accepted as their working premise that the U.S. is the problem; some of them think Cuba may be the solution. We have tried dialogue with them and should continue, but we also should reassess our approach to each of these organizations to see whether they will listen, or just speak, and to try to comprehend why we are so often the whipping boy.

(3) *Economic Cooperation*

A. *Aid*. You promised to double foreign aid, but Congress and your intention to balance the budget prevented you from fulfilling that promise. During the 1970's, we have been gradually phasing out our bilateral aid programs to the middle-income developing countries (most of LAC), and with increased priority to Africa, Egypt, and Israel, the overall levels to LAC have declined markedly. At the same time, we have been reasonably successful in shifting these declining resources to the sub-region of highest political priority, Central America and the Caribbean, although, even there, we are talking about funding levels which were much smaller than during the Alliance. We have improvised by eliciting additional support from the IFI's and from other Western donors.

B. *Trade*. The MTN in Geneva was primarily a negotiation among industrialized countries and last minute efforts to encourage the LDC's to participate did not disguise that fact. The overall reduction of trade barriers will certainly help all nations, but not as much as a set of arrangements designed to specifically assist the LDC's. We consulted, but frankly did not take them too seriously.

C. *Commodities*. We have been able to negotiate agreements on coffee, sugar, cocoa, rubber, and a Common Fund, but in almost all cases we were the most conservative and inflexible. More importantly, none of the agreements seem to be working.

D. *Science and Technology*. Frank Press's efforts have been exceptional, particularly when one realizes he had so little to offer in aid. He has helped to establish a framework and to build linkages which will serve our interests in collaborative relationships in this field very well for years to come.

E. *North-South Relations: A Summit*. The resurgence of East-West relations combined with Congressional constraints placed the North-South dialogue on the back burner. Unfortunately, we have little economic aid to offer and so we should begin to examine political and symbolic options, particularly because these often have a greater importance than we think and perhaps than they should. A North-South Summit is definitely one way to demonstrate continued U.S. interest in a dialogue; it would be a terrible mistake if we were to sit that out.

III. *Second Term Agenda*

I believe the objectives and the course we set to LAC in the last four years is the correct one, and we have made great progress. We have consulted often with the nations in the region and encouraged them to play a more active role in international affairs, and while their policies have often diverged from our own, we are generally well served by this new assertiveness.

Your re-election will, in and of itself, strengthen our ability to enhance human rights and extend democracy in the hemisphere as leaders who had hoped our commitment would dissipate will find themselves having to adjust to its institutionalization. Secretary Muskie's trip and the OAS General Assembly (opening in Washington on November 19) offers an opportunity to begin a major new effort to enhance human rights and facilitate the extension of democracy in the hemisphere. We should try to develop a number of specific ideas for the Secretary to suggest in his consultations, and if the response is positive, perhaps you could develop them in a speech to open the OAS General Assembly. In that forum, you could also announce a renewed effort to obtain Senate ratification of the human rights conventions (and also Protocol I).¹⁶

¹⁶ Carter gave an address to the OASGA on November 19. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1980-1981*, Book II, pp. 2733-2736) (U) In a November 28 memorandum to Carter on the completed OASGA, Muskie wrote, "We were successful in achieving a constructive compromise resolution on human rights which strongly endorses the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and specifically names the countries, including Argentina, which have been subjects of critical reporting by the IAHRC. The resolution calls upon countries which have not yet done so to correct remaining violations." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports [State], 11/80) (S)

A major new initiative to Central America and the Caribbean is urgently needed, and we have a number of opportunities to enunciate such an approach: the signing ceremony on November 19 of the Honduran-Salvadoran Peace Treaty, which could initiate a new effort toward Central American integration and Caribbean/Central American Action's important conference on November 23 in Miami which a large number of heads of state from the region will attend. We will send you a paper on this soon.¹⁷

Another "now issue" which we need to address concerns the flow of people for economic and political reasons, most of it illegal, to the US. Other areas in need of work include: Mexico, Cuba, a new approach to the military regimes in the region, and North-South relations.

¹⁷ Not further identified.

Argentina

51. Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 12, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

2. *Human Rights in Argentina*: The Argentine Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires, where the government is currently reviewing U.S.-Argentine relations.² To insure that our concern over deterioration of human rights in Argentina is fully appreciated in Buenos Aires, Warren called in the Argentine Charge d’Affaires this morning.³ He told the Charge that although we recognize Argentina’s serious terrorist problem, we are deeply concerned about torture, witch hunts and other gross violations of human rights. Warren stressed that a continuation of such abuses would have an adverse effect on our relations with Argentina. Our Ambassador in Buenos Aires conveyed a similar message at high levels last week.⁴

The Argentine Charge argued that “barbaric terrorism” was rampant in his country before last year’s coup. Violence is now decreasing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 2/11–2/28/77. Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote, “To Cy. J.”

² In telegram 881 from Buenos Aires, February 3, Hill reported on the conversation between Guzzetti and Aja Espil over “question of human rights and impact on US-Argentine relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770039–0983)

³ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote, “Keep me informed.” In telegram 36422 to Buenos Aires, February 17, the Department summarized Christopher’s conversation with Gay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770057–0303)

⁴ Reference presumably is to telegram 1165 from Buenos Aires, February 11, in which Hill reported on his meeting with Guzzetti. In the meeting, Hill noted that the U.S. ability “to have the best relations possible with the GOA” “may be jeopardized unless the GOA can take measures with regard to improved respect for human rights.” Hill suggested “as two possible immediate steps toward that objective (a) the publication of a list of all those detained for political or security reasons and (b) that those responsible for excesses be brought to justice.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770050–0291) In telegram 1177 from Buenos Aires, February 14, Hill reported on an additional point made in his conversation with Guzzetti on February 11: “During discussion of human rights issue I noted that most observers have been struck by the number of extremists who are reported as being killed in ‘ambushes’ and while ‘trying to escape.’ Rumors round town have it that many of these are prisoners who are being killed in cold blood by security forces and their deaths then being disguised as a result of confrontations with terrorists.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052–0144)

and prisoners are being released from jail. He pleaded for American understanding of Argentina's "special case" and promised to report our views to his government.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

52. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RPM 77–10030

Washington, February 22, 1977

ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE JUNTA²

Argentina's ruling generals have made substantial progress in dealing with the problems of leftist subversion and economic disarray that led to their takeover nearly a year ago. Terrorist capabilities have clearly declined and economic signs, such as a reduction of the inflation rate and last year's reversal of the trade deficit are encouraging. Although the initial crisis is over, the divisive forces that have complicated life for both military and civilian governments in the past are rapidly reemerging. Ultimately, the success of the junta is at stake; the regime will find it increasingly difficult to govern unless it can restore unity or at least stave off widespread disaffection. There are already signs of restiveness in civilian ranks, especially in the pivotal labor movement. Moreover, tensions within the junta itself have developed because of personal rivalries and differences over how to proceed.

Background

In theory, the regime has virtually unlimited powers and can enforce its dictates by exercising tight military control over the government at the national and local levels. In reality, however, the situation is much more complex and the military's control is far from complete as a result of Argentine political practices and behavior of the military.

Argentina's politics are marked by intense competition among political sectors, who are extraordinarily jealous of their prerogatives, even by Latin American standards. Although competition is keen, the

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 17. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated by the Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of Operations.

² This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and was coordinated by the Office of Economic Research and the Directorate of Operations. [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] [Footnote in the original.]

interested parties—including the military—are bound together by a complex set of interrelationships.

Key sectors compete directly with each other largely unfettered by formal institutions that smooth over differences in other societies. The legislature and the courts, for example, are viewed as entities that are unable to mediate impartially the competition for power. In Argentine society political parties serve more to advance personal ambitions than to promote ideologies or philosophies. The limits of political activity are set by how much an individual or group can get away with before an opponent reacts.

The key political sectors are acutely aware of each other's every move. Each group nearly always interprets any gain by another as an automatic loss for itself. Compromise is not valued; instead, it is considered as a sign of weakness. A certain amount of violence, while not formally condoned, is regarded as within the rules of the game.

No sector has ever completely dominated the others for any length of time. Alliances and loyalties tend to shift too readily for any group to maintain its hold indefinitely. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to envision a durable totalitarian regime in Argentina, even though the executive branch traditionally is granted extensive putative powers. Only with the greatest difficulty can a particular approach to a problem gather the necessary consensus to become firmly established.

Civilian Pressures

The chief source of potential trouble for the junta is the labor movement, the most formidable civilian grouping since it achieved political maturity under the tutelage of Juan Peron in the 1940s. There is considerable hostility between labor and the military, much of it stemming from the days of Peron. The military, first spawned, but ultimately rejected Peron. Workers, however, still retain a strong loyalty to the man who for decades dominated Argentine politics. They see the military as unalterably opposed to Peron's populism and to the gains they perceive he made for them. For example, every attempt to limit wage increases or rein in the activities of unions is interpreted in this light. Many officers, on the other hand, blame the Peronists for virtually all the ills Argentina has suffered for more than a generation and consider it their duty to extirpate all vestiges of Peronist influence. Many generals believe labor's ascendancy under the former government nearly destroyed the nation's economy.

The military are no less politicized than their civilian counterparts. Disputes and rivalries abound, but most officers prefer not to risk a breakdown of military unity by pressing their differences too far. The safeguarding of military unity frequently means that crucial decisions are deferred and important policies watered down.

Ironically, disputations officers often seek the backing of civilian groups in an effort to outmaneuver fellow military men. Thus officers regularly scheme with representatives of various groups, even the unions. Civilians do their best to exploit the officers' differences by joining whatever side has the most to offer them. The lineups change often, at times inexplicably.

Further complicating the political scene is the propensity of the regime to undermine its own claims of authority by failing to act promptly on policy matters. Whether or not because of internal divisions, the government has acted inconsistently on several major issues, displayed serious lack of coordination on others, and failed to act at all on still others.

Under these circumstances, civilians feel more or less obliged to test the government at every opportunity. This testing process is in full swing and manifesting itself in a number of ways. The unions are at the forefront of the activity because they have so far been the most affected by junta restrictions to date. Despite the government's takeover of major unions and confederations and the ban on all strikes, workers have repeatedly challenged the junta by staying off the job, staging slowdowns and committing sabotage.

Labor's defiance reflects a mix of economic and political concerns. Workers have in fact lost considerable purchasing power due as a result of inflation, while pay raises have been limited in the name of austerity. At the same time, labor leaders bridle at the continuing limits placed on their authority and activity. Union leaders are in a particularly difficult situation. Stripped of their ability to demand benefits for workers, there is little they can do to retain the already waning loyalty of the rank and file. They must try to deliver something tangible for union members, if they are to rebuild their support.

We believe that the labor bosses will continue to press the government by encouraging labor protests but only those that stop short of provoking serious retaliation. Only in this way can the leaders strengthen their credibility among those they purport to represent. The junta's relatively mild reaction thus far to labor protests probably has encouraged union leaders to pursue this tactic.

Other civilian sectors bring pressure to bear in whatever way they can. Currently, a vigorous debate is going on regarding restructuring the executive authority. The question revolves on whether the presidency should continue to be held by a member of the junta or should go to a "fourth man." Most of the arguments suggest that the present government setup worked well during the initial crisis and subsequent consolidation of the junta's authority, but that it does not give the presidency enough authority to direct longer term policies and plans. Some commentators contend that to leave the presidency within the

military junta increases rather than reduces the potential for crippling military rivalries.

The debate not only raises substantive issues but also presents another opportunity for Argentines to put pressure on the regime. It is difficult for President Videla to ignore the debate, which is at least tacitly approved by some potential military rivals eager to advance their own ambitions. He clearly will need to devote an increasing amount of his time to protecting himself politically. As a result, it will be hard for him to address the policy issues he is expected to deal with as chief executive.

How far civilians can go in pressing the government depends on their tenacity and on the tolerance of key generals. The outcome hinges on a complicated series of relationships between Videla and other officers as well as between civilians and the military. The efforts of civilians could be counterproductive.

Military Opposition

Videla is committed to a form of military rule that is moderate in all areas except counterinsurgency, and he seems to value open dialogue with a wide variety of military and civilian groups. Videla's conciliatory approach has caused him problems, however, particularly from rival officers. [2 lines not declassified] A sizable number of officers reject Videla's policy of conciliation and have called for greater restrictions on civilians and an even more ruthless campaign against the terrorists. Videla and his military supporters have spent a good deal of time working to block this concept.

Navy chief and fellow junta member Admiral Massera has been especially strident in his criticism of the President, apparently in order to gain the support of officers opposed to Videla's moderate ways. Massera's tactics are brazenly opportunistic and self-serving; he is reported to be in contact with certain civilians interested in seeing him move up.

The planning minister, General Ramon Diaz Bessone, could pose a more serious threat to Videla. Last year Diaz Bessone engineered the establishment of the post he now occupies, and he is now next to Videla in the line of succession. This was accomplished over the President's objections. Diaz Bessone, who enjoys a reputation as a hard-liner, obviously has his eyes on the presidency.

At some point, Videla's military critics may muster enough support to force him to abandon his moderate approach or step aside. The arguments of such officers would take on increased importance if in the interim, under the leadership of Videla, the government should suffer a major reverse either in the anti-terrorist fight or on the economic front.

Outlook

The military clearly do not intend to give up power in the near future. The problems they intervened to tackle are not subject to short-term solutions, and the officers are committed to their solution. As a practical matter, moreover, there is no alternative to military rule in sight.

The eradication of subversion will continue to preoccupy the regime. The military are encouraged by the very real losses they have inflicted on the terrorists, but they know that the war is still not won. Many believe the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been all but destroyed, but there is less optimism regarding the urban-based Montoneros. Although the Montoneros have been hurt by the counterinsurgency campaign, they retain the ability—and the will—to carry out attacks on businessmen, police, and others. It is possible that changes at the top will take place within the next month or so. Rumors to this effect are rampant in Buenos Aires. Should Videla lose either the presidency or his position in the junta, it will be taken as a decisive defeat for his moderate policies and a corresponding gain for his hard-line opponents.

Real or perceived pressures from the US on human rights may have an important influence on Videla's ability to retain the upper hand. If he is seen as caving in to the US, the hard-liners can hope to use nationalistic arguments to strengthen their case against him. Videla must, therefore, make it clear to his detractors that he is willing to stand up to Washington.

Whether or not Videla remains in office the human rights problem will persist in Argentina. It will continue to be a troublesome factor—and a potential cause of friction with the US—as long as the Argentine military believes it faces a serious subversive threat.

53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, March 4, 1977, 0126Z

48062. Subject: Call on Deputy Secretary by Argentine Ambassador

1. Deputy Secretary Christopher received Argentine Ambassador Aja Espil March 3.

2. The Deputy Secretary opened by noting he had earlier talked with the Argentine charge.² He said he was pleased the Ambassador had come in as the USG is anxious that the channels of communication be kept open.

3. Aja Espil referred to the long history of good relations between Argentina and the U.S. based on mutual understanding and respect. Argentina assumed that the new US administration would take the same view. But the Government of Argentina was notified of the decision of the new administration to reduce FMS credits through the press which quoted the Secretary's testimony and Inouye's remarks during the hearing of the Sub-committee on Foreign Operations of Senate Appropriations Committee.³ That is not, he said, the real problem, however. The problem is that by this decision Argentina is accused of perpetrating gross violations of human rights—a charge the GOA rejects. Therefore he had been instructed by his government to present a note stating the decision of the GOA not to use 1978 FMS credits.⁴

4. Aja Espil then presented the following first person note: Begin text: Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to inform you, according to instructions received from my government, that the Argentine republic will not make use of the Foreign Military Sales Credit for Fiscal Year 1978.

Accept Mr. Secretary the assurances of my highest consideration. End text.

5. Deputy Secretary accepted the note on behalf of the Secretary. He said that the US recognizes that the decision not to make use of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-0443. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Zimmerman; cleared by Luers and in S/S; approved by Christopher. Repeated to Santiago, Brasilia, and Montevideo.

² See Document 51.

³ Vance testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on February 24. The prepared statement is printed in part as *Foreign Relations, 1977-1981*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 22.

⁴ In telegram 1574 from Buenos Aires, February 28, Hill reported that Guzzetti noted that "now the USG has taken a step against the GOA and has publicly attributed that step to human rights situation in Argentina. The GOA must decide whether and/or how it should respond to this development." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068-1202)

FY 78 military credits was entirely the province of the GOA, just as the decision to reduce the figure was appropriately a decision for the U.S. He expressed the hope that relations would continue on the basis of mutual understanding and respect as in the past. The U.S. is fully conscious of the security problems facing the GOA but it would seem that the point had been reached in reestablishing control where it should be possible to combine firmness with restraint.

6. Christopher noted that he had personal experience with situations similar to that facing Argentina, although clearly not as serious. It is essential in these conditions to combine firmness with restraint. Otherwise stability will not be achieved.

7. Saying he liked the Ambassador's use of the words mutual understanding, Christopher affirmed the US desire to continue good relations. He emphasized, however, the US belief that the future depends on respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. We are anxious to maintain communications and improve our relations, Christopher said, and it is in that spirit that he was receiving the Ambassador.

8. Aja Espil responded that his government fully agreed with that portion of the Secretary's testimony regarding the need to foster a climate of cooperation between North and South. Christopher said the U.S. would do its best to improve the consultative process between North and South and between Argentina and the U.S. We would also, he said, seek to maintain consistency of standards in our approach to problems. Aja Espil replied that the last point was very important.

9. Atmosphere was relaxed and friendly throughout. The Ambassador and the Deputy Secretary said they hoped to see one another soon under different circumstances.⁵

Vance

⁵ In a March 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance noted the substance of Christopher's conversation with Aja Espil. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 3/77) In a memorandum of his March 18 conversation with Aja Espil and others, Robert Pastor discussed similar themes. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2–12/77)

54. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance's Delegation to the Department of State¹

Grenada, June 19, 1977, 1830Z

52. Subj: Secretary's Bilateral With Argentina (June 16)

1. Participants: US: Secretary Vance, Ambassador Todman, Undersecretary Habib, Ambassador McGee, Mrs. Van Reigersberg (Interpreter) Mr. S. Rogers (Notetaker). Argentina: Minister Montes, Vice Minister Guatter Oscar Allara, Minister Juan Carlos Arlia, Jose I Garcia Ghirelli, Atilio Norberto Mottenti.

2. Subjects: Bilateral at OASGA with Argentina; Human Rights; nuclear non-proliferation.

3. After brief remarks about former Foreign Minister Guzzetti's medical visit to the United States, and the Secretary's comment that he was about to confer with Prime Minister Williams in Trinidad, the conversation went directly to Human Rights.

4. The Secretary informed the Argentines that the US would abstain on the two loans to Argentina in the World Bank but make a reference to the progress on Human Rights that had taken place. Montes nodded but said nothing at that point in response. The Secretary asked what Montes thought would come out of the General Assembly discussion of Human Rights.

5. Montes referred to his statement in the informal dialogue.² He then described the situation and views of Argentina at considerable length. The 1976 army takeover was a national reorganization, not a revolution. There has been no political persecution. The Communist party, for instance, remains legal and publishes its newspaper freely. The problem is terrorism, not political rights—certain guarantees are indeed suspended but the constitution provides for suspension in a state of siege. Argentines are being governed by the law. The consequences of the state of siege apply only to terrorist criminals. He could not say precisely when the state of siege would be lifted, but so much

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14–17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OASGA. In telegram 6019 from the Secretary's delegation in Port of Spain, June 17, summarized the conversation. (Ibid.)

² In his June 15 remarks, Montes "concentrated on terrorism as aggression from abroad aimed at destroying social fabric of his country, the object of a vast international conspiracy." (Telegram 16 from Grenada, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770214–0933)

improvement had taken place that terrorism might effectively be ended by the end of 1977.

6. Allara described the terrorist threat at the time the Armed Forces took over. Montes then returned to the question of the World Bank loans. He said Martínez de Hoz had reported on his conversation with Secretary Blumenthal and Dr Brzezinski.³ He said Argentina is very concerned that technical matters are being subordinated to political considerations. Martínez de Hoz had reported that people in the United States were not well-informed for instance concerning the number of people who had been released.

7. The Secretary responded that we had been able to decide to abstain instead of voting against. We would watch for further progress to see if we could soon vote in favor of loans for Argentina. Allara then proposed a collaborative effort to begin with a permanent, frank and thorough dialogue between the US and Argentina on all matters of common concern.

8. In answer to Undersecretary Habib's question, Montes described Argentina's vulnerability to trafficking in arms for guerrillas. Habib noted the Senate action of the day before to cut off all arms sales to Argentina after September 30, 1978, if no progress had been made by then on Human Rights, instead of an immediate cut off as proposed by Senator Kennedy.⁴ The Secretary said this change reflected the undoubted progress Argentina had made.

9. Coming back to the proposal for cooperation, Montes suggested a group of US Army officers visit Argentina to see the real situation. Allara then explained at length why the Argentine Government does not feel that it is violating Human Rights. Better knowledge would show the US that Argentina was merely defending the Western way of life.

10. Arlia then named five "subversive activists" who he said were providing the most abundant information on Argentina in the US: Robert Guevara (Che's brother), Lucio Garzon-Macedo and Gustavo Roca, both lawyers with the People's Revolutionary Army, Pedro Dualde, and Mrs Lily Mazzaferro. He said Guevara and Roca had worked with Brady Tyson on the US statement at the UN Human

³ Blumenthal met with Martínez de Hoz in Guatemala City on May 31. Blumenthal was in Guatemala City to attend the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank. (Telegram 3446 from Guatemala City, June 1, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770195–0758) Brzezinski met with Martínez de Hoz in Washington on June 4. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78)

⁴ Spencer Rich, "Senate Approves Bills on Economic, Arms Aid," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1977, p. A-19.

Rights Commission.⁵ He said that these people were frequently seen with Father Drinan. Roca, he said, had just been arrested in Denmark for robbing supermarkets and for having false identification papers. He had discussed this with Ms. Derian.

11. The Secretary described Ms. Derian as completely dedicated and very knowledgeable; Montes and Allara quickly agreed she had been very useful to the Argentines in her visit to their country,⁶ they added. She might be the first link in the collaborative effort that Argentina wants. In answer to the Secretary's question, Arlia said Argentina favored strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights Commission by giving it more precise terms of reference. Its real job was to cooperate in the promotion of rights generally, not just focusing on government activities.

12. Ambassador Todman had earlier asked why Argentina did not accede to the Treaty of Tlateloco. Arlia said Argentina's position was well known—that Tlateloco and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty discriminated against countries that needed to develop their nuclear energy capacity, such as Argentina. Argentina's needs are entirely Pacific. Argentina needs to double its energy capacity by 1982. Nuclear power is indispensable.

13. The Secretary accepted that Argentina needed nuclear power but said that nothing in the treaty infringes on the right of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would be entirely consistent for Argentina to sign the Tlateloco treaty. Allara said the Argentine Government was reviewing its attitude towards Tlateloco and the NPT, but safeguards were a more likely approach. Ambassador Todman stressed the international psychological importance of Argentina's signing to encourage the few remaining others to do so.

⁵ Reference is to the March 8 statement by Tyson, a U.S. delegate to the UNHRC. In telegram 1725 from Geneva, March 8, USUN transmitted the text of Tyson's comments. Tyson said, "In discussing Chile we would be less than candid, and untrue to ourselves and to our people, if the delegation from the United States did not in any discussion of the situation in Chile express its profoundest regrets for the role that some U.S. Government officials, agencies and private groups played in the subversion of the previous, democratically-elected, Chilean government, that was overthrown by the coup of September 11, 1973." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770080-0278) In telegram 51963 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, March 9, the Department transmitted press guidance on the Tyson statement: "Tyson's statement was a personal one that was not approved in advance and is not an expression of the administration views." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770080-0479)

⁶ Derian visited Argentina for 4 days in late March and early April. (Telegram 2496 from Buenos Aires, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770117-0230; "Carter Rights Aide, Visiting Argentina, Warns on Violations," *New York Times*, April 3, 1977, p. 11; Karen DeYoung, "Carter Aide in Argentina to Gauge Rights Impact," *Washington Post*, March 31, 1977, p. 17)

14. In conclusion, the Secretary said he would ask Ms. Derian to carry on her consultations with the Argentines on Human Rights. On other matters, he would work through our Ambassador and specialists. He hoped that he and Montes could continue their discussion. Montes agreed.

McGee

55. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, June 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Human Rights in Argentina

The President noted that the Argentines have recently announced a series of actions designed to improve their human rights image.² These actions include:

- releasing of 342 persons from custody;
- processing in the courts the cases of nearly 1,000 persons awaiting trial on charges of subversion; and
- hinting at the reinstatement of the individuals' constitutional right to leave the country.

The President would like you to acknowledge this Argentine commitment to human rights.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1977–1978. Secret.

² In telegram 4638 from Buenos Aires, June 22, the Embassy concluded that while these announcements, made on June 14, "themselves show little by way of certifiable substantive change in government human rights practices, the government's decision to compile examples of human rights improvements demonstrates its rising sensitivity to the seriousness of the U.S. human rights position and our adverse votes in international financial institutions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–1036)

56. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Your Remark That Argentine Improvements in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged

The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A)² assessing the significance of Argentine President Videla's recent steps (on June 14) to improve the country's human rights image. Our mission in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps—the release of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of the right of exile—should be “viewed cautiously.” Nonetheless, the Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge and express our continued interest and encouragement for these and other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The State Department also requested further information on whether the announced steps have been taken.³

A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay⁴ appears to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military governments at face value. At his press conference at the conclusion of his visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation of a democratic form of government.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1977–1978. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Pastor forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski under a July 7 covering memorandum and recommended that it be sent to Carter. A handwritten note indicates that Brzezinski discussed the memorandum with Carter on July 9. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2–12/77)

² A July 2 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski on human rights in Argentina is attached but not printed. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78)

³ See footnote 3, Document 57.

⁴ Telegram 2567 from Montevideo, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770236–0142)

57. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, July 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Recognition of Improvements in Human Rights

The following is based on a conversation I had with the President this morning:²

1. As you know, the Argentine Government has stated its intention to release 342 political prisoners. The President would like you to acknowledge this and express his gratification to the Argentine Government when they have released the prisoners.³

2. At the same time, the President would like the State Department, on background to the press, to acknowledge this action by the Argentine Government and express the President's gratification.

3. The President would like it to be a matter of policy to acknowledge and express gratification for improvements in human rights once it has been determined that these improvements are real rather than cosmetic. This should be done not only with the Government concerned but, on background, with the press.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. This memorandum is also printed as Document 66 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

² The President met with Brzezinski from 9 to 9:15 a.m. in Carter's private office in the White House. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) No record of this conversation has been found.

³ In telegram 162292 to Buenos Aires, July 12, the Department instructed the Embassy "to approach the GOA at an appropriately senior level and note the considerable interest which the United States has in recently announced GOA steps and inquire whether further information could be provided concerning these steps." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770248–0245) In telegram 5303 from Buenos Aires, July 18, the Embassy responded that it had concluded "that an initiative invoking the President's name would not be advisable at this time. This course is, however, one we may want to take in the very near future." The Embassy explained that although there were "encouraging signs," there was also "much that disturbs us," which "leads us to hesitate in using a presidential acknowledgment of an improving situation, lest subsequently we discover that human rights gains here were illusory." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770256–0445) See Document 59.

58. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, July 22, 1977

SUBJECT

Restriction of Arms Sales to Argentina in the light of Human Rights Situation

ISSUES FOR DECISION

How restrictive should we be in denying pending commercial and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) under cash and financing procedures to the armed forces and police of Argentina, in light of the serious abuses of human rights in that country?

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

In Argentina, there is no question that human rights are being violated including arbitrary detention, torture and summary executions. While there have been some recent signs which may be a cause for hope, the level of violations remains high. This led us to abstain in June on two World Bank loans.

Non-Proliferation is a major interest in Argentina. As the second largest country in South America in population, area and per capita GNP, Argentina is and will remain an important political influence in the region. It has substantial uranium reserves and an ambitious nuclear power program. It has the most advanced nuclear capability of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for an autonomous fuel cycle. U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation in Brazil, and Latin America generally, depend critically on Argentina's acceptance of full-scope safeguards (which it has shown a conditional willingness to consider) and deferral of its fuel reprocessing program.

Argentina is also important economically. The U.S. is Argentina's largest trading partner (we currently have a \$250 million trade surplus). U.S. banks hold \$3 billion of Argentina's debts and U.S. industry has

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina I. Confidential. Sent through Benson and Habib. Drafted by Rondon, O. Jones, L. Brown, and Borek; Titus, Robinson, Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas concurred. Rondon initialed for Jones, Brown, and Borek. Keane initialed for Todman. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it. An unknown hand initialed for Derian. Rondon initialed for Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas. Titus initialed for himself and Robinson. Anderson initialed the first page of the memorandum.

some \$1.2 billion invested in the country. Argentina is a major food exporter and may have in its extensive continental shelf large reserves of oil. Although the country has recently suffered severe economic troubles, it is a generally self-sufficient industrial and economic leader in Latin America.

Over 40 applications for commercial arms exports to Argentina are pending. The most urgent of these cases is a \$15 million commercial order from Bell-Textron for eight armored helicopters, equipped with exterior gun mounts and wiring. Two of them are for Presidential use and the rest for Argentina's Antarctic activities. If we approve this "major" sale, routine Congressional notification is required. There are also two outstanding FMS cases (See Attachment).²

The Department has been denying commercial export license applications for defense articles and services for police and other civil law enforcement use, and FMS purchase requests for articles and services which could be diverted to such use. The extension of FY 77 FMS financing is also being withheld. The conference report on the FY 78 security assistance authorization bill³ contains a provision prohibiting all FMS sales and financing, grant training, and licenses for the export of defense articles and services to the Government of Argentina, beginning, however, only in FY 1979.

Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, expresses a policy of promoting human rights and of not providing security assistance to any country engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances. It is not necessary at any time to characterize expressly the human rights practices of a recipient government. Moreover, the annual human rights report required by that section has been submitted to the Congress with respect to Argentina. Nevertheless, the Congress may at any time request from you a supplementary report on Argentina. To continue such assistance it then would be necessary for you to state your opinion that extraordinary circumstances exist so that, on all the facts, the continuation of security assistance to Argentina is in the national interest. While no such report has been requested, the potential for subsequent legal problems exists if you are unable to conclude that such circumstances (sufficient to meet the requirements for continued assistance under Section 502B (c)) now exist.

² Attached but not printed is an undated list entitled "pending FMS cash cases and munitions list license applications."

³ The International Security Assistance Act (P.L. 95-92) was signed by Carter on August 4.

THE OPTIONS

There is general agreement that we should not sell or license the export of defense articles and services of usefulness to police and other civil law enforcement organizations in Argentina. The present issue, then, is whether to extend such restrictions to cover other sales and exports to Argentina, and if so, which.

There are three options, all of which would be subject to review dependent upon the human rights situation:

1. Continue our present policy of denying internal security sales, allowing, on a case-by-case basis, FMS sales and commercial exports for the Argentine military. No new extensions of FMS financing would be contemplated, but disbursements against prior years' financing to meet payments for previously approved purchases would continue. Under this option, some of the pending 40 cases would be approved, including helicopters, armored vehicles, periscopes and torpedoes.

2. Deny all new FMS sales and licenses for commercial exports. This would deny pending requests.

3. With the exception of spare parts for equipment previously sold, we would deny all new FMS and commercial sales.

Option 1—Current Policy

PROS

- Does least damage to our other interests in Argentina, particularly those involving nuclear non-proliferation.

- Preserves a minimal tie with the Argentine armed forces—a dominant institution in Argentina—in a period of political instability.

- Is consistent with our policy toward other countries with poor human rights records (e.g. Korea, Iran, Philippines).

- Provides some incentive for the Government to improve its human rights practices before the anticipated legislative embargo takes effect.

CONS

- Will mean that weapons and other equipment will be provided to the Argentine military forces which are directly involved in human rights violations.

- Will be opposed by a significant number of Congressmen and by other influential groups as inconsistent with the spirit of Section 502B.

- May encourage the Argentine Government to assume the U.S. Government's policy is hortatory only and that there is no cost involved in continued repression.

Option 2—Temporary Embargo

PROS

- Is consistent with the spirit of 502B.
- Sends a clear message to the Argentine government that we cannot provide arms while human rights conditions remain as they are.
- Will probably have wide public and Congressional support.
- Other instruments can be used to foster U.S. interest.

CONS

- Will antagonize the Government and the armed forces and seriously damage such leverage as we have, both on the important nuclear proliferation problems and on human rights.
- Will force Argentina to look elsewhere for arms, possibly including the USSR, thus complicating U.S. efforts to develop regional arms transfer controls, pursuant to the new arms transfer policy.
- Might undermine Argentine President Videla, viewed generally as a force for moderation.

Option 3—Spares Only

PROS

- Fulfills an implicit obligation to service previously supplied equipment.
- Same as Option 2.

CONS

- Similar to Option 2.

Recommendations

That you approve Option 1 which would limit denials of arms and exports to articles and services for police and civil law, enforcement uses, or which could be described as such (favored by ARA, PM and the Department of Defense).⁴

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 2 to deny Argentina all FMS cash and commercial export licenses for defense articles on the Munitions List (favored by D/HA).

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 3 to restrict arms sales to spare parts and repair parts for equipment previously sold or approved for export (favored by S/P).

⁴ An unknown hand wrote, "We will review all proposals on a case by case basis." Cahill checked the approve option for Vance on July 25.

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, July 27, 1977, 2151Z

5522. Subject: US Interest in Human Rights Improvements. Ref: (A) STATE 162292,² (B) Buenos Aires 5303³

1. Ref A instructed that an approach be made to the GOA at an appropriately senior level to note the USG interest in recent GOA steps to improve respect for Human Rights. The instruction also provided that, if the steps announced by the GOA and reported in B.A. 4638⁴ were real rather than cosmetic, the Argentines should be made aware of the President's interest in these and continuing steps toward the restoration of the rule of law.

2. Ref B concluded that there appeared to be a detectable trend toward improvement in respect for human rights, but did not specifically address the point of whether the GOA measures cited were real or cosmetic. After attempts by all elements of the country team to follow-up on the seriousness of the measures announced by the GOA on June 15, we have now concluded that they do have some substance, but should not be taken entirely at face value. We believe that some restricted form of the right of option to leave the country will be formally reestablished (perhaps as the opportunity to "petition" to leave the country as now exists in practice if not in law.) The suppression of *Cabildo*⁵ was not as extensive as it seemed, since one of the two suppressed editions had already been distributed. We have still been unable to confirm the release of all of the 342 persons listed as released between May 27 and June 14. Both [*less than 1 line not declassified*] say that it seems likely that many of these persons were released. We have confirmed four cases actually released and assume, as has occurred with other release lists, that many of those listed as no longer being detained under executive powers have been formally charged with some crime. (The government did not provide a list of persons detained during the period covered by the 342 releases.)

3. In the approximately six weeks since June 14, the GOA has issued three lists of detainees and releasees under the executive power.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770269-0610. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

² See footnote 3, Document 57.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 55.

⁵ A far right-wing, anti-Semitic monthly magazine. (Telegram 3370 from Buenos Aires, May 6, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770160-0389)

These total 199 detained and 77 released. Some of those released on the July 23 list were shown as having been apprehended on the July 2 list. Inquiries of the Permanent Association for Human Rights, the ICRC and the *Nunciatura* elicited neither rejection nor confirmation of the lists. They observed that many of the persons on the June 14 list had been imprisoned by the previous government, and that there were many names on the list from outside Buenos Aires. The lists of apparent releases since June 15 do not show any particular trend. The lack of a clear positive trend on prisoner releases, the disappearance of Hidalgo Sola,⁶ and the harassment of labor leaders combine to argue against a close association of President Carter with any specific favorable development.

4. The Economy Minister, Martinez de Hoz, was the obvious high-level channel for expression of USG interest. In a meeting with him on July 22 the Chargé expressed our continuing deep interest in steps toward restoration of rule of law and our interest in knowing any further details relating to the steps announced June 15. The Minister said he was not in a position to go into details about numbers or names. But that he was confident that the procedures announced on June 15 were going forward. When pressed for details, the Minister said the matter was outside his area of responsibility and indicated that he did not wish to become involved in specifics. Chargé noted that the USG was prepared to give recognition to favorable developments in the Human Rights area, as was done by our Director at the World Bank, and we hope that the Minister might be able to provide us with more such instances. As a further evidence of our interest and willingness to recognize favorable developments, Chargé provided Minister with teletype copy of President's remarks at Yazoo City which mentioned releases or Argentine prisoners.⁷ Martinez de Hoz appeared interested but limited his comments to observing that in Argentina those detained are not called political prisoners.

5. Though Martinez de Hoz was unwilling to deal in specifics, he did expand on the need to improve the dialogue between the two countries and do more in the Human Rights field which would further that end. He said he hoped to have something suitable for announcement prior to the arrival of Assistant Secretary Todman.⁸ He thought

⁶ Hector Hidalgo Sola disappeared July 18 in Buenos Aires. (Telegram 5341 from Buenos Aires, July 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770257–0001)

⁷ In answer to a question about human rights during a July 21 public meeting in Yazoo City, Mississippi, Carter said, "We have seen recently in Argentina 342 political prisoners, who had been there for a long time, released." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, p. 1324)

⁸ Todman traveled to Argentina in August. See Document 61.

something specific on the right of option might be ready shortly, but was unsure. He then changed the subject to ask for clarification of a puzzling cable he had received from the Argentine Embassy in Washington regarding the status of the Reuss Amendment to the bill providing funding for IFI's.⁹

6. On two other occasions Embassy Officers have raised with an official of the Presidency the deep US interest in further specific steps toward the rule of law. These exploratory observations were met with little more than polite interest.

7. Comment: The Argentine response in these instances is not particularly encouraging. The tactic of expressing interest in Human Rights issues did not elicit positive responses, for this is an area where few wish to take the blame or share credit.

Chaplin

⁹ Reference presumably is to H.R. 5262, which Reuss introduced in the House on March 21. The conference report was filed in the Senate on July 26, and Carter signed P.L. 95-118 into law on October 3.

60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, August 15, 1977, 1758Z

192822. Subject: Derian Visit With Admiral Massera For Chargé Chaplin

Begin summary

1. At his request, U.S. Coordinator for Human Rights Patt Derian met with Junta member Massera on morning of August 10. The Admiral stressed that Argentina was in the process of returning to normal legal procedures and that much progress had been made since Ms. Derian's

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294-0106. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Limdis. Drafted by Bova, approved by Derian. In telegram 6644 from Buenos Aires, September 7, the Embassy forwarded the corrected text of this cable for information to Asunción, Brasília, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770345-0462)

last visit.² Mrs. Derian expressed her hope that normalization could be accomplished soon and in such a way that all levels of the security apparatus would understand it. End summary.

2. The Admiral started the conversation by stressing that progress was being made in controlling the situation. While noting that false information circulates, and some incidents continue to occur (“some groups still escape us”) he stressed that the end was in sight. Mrs. Derian expressed her hope that this was the case and noted two things of particular concern to the USG: (1) the large number of disappeared and (2) the conditions of being held *incomunicado* where people are treated too harshly. She said she hoped new procedures will be introduced.

3. Admiral Massera said he did not know what numbers President Videla or Admiral Allara had provided regarding the number of people charged or taken illegally but he said the last few months showed rapid progress. He explained that the Argentine Army was somewhat different from others in that its organization contained core commanders who had some independence in administering internal security but said that this did not mean that President Videla was not in control. He advised that there could be a difference between the impression received of the current situation and the actual reality.

4. Mrs. Derian expressed her concern over the number of people who don't know if members of their family are dead or alive. She mentioned that labor leaders and others have been in jail since 1975. She said that the system seems to have ground to a halt, e.g., people were picked up and never charged, some were held with no evidence against them, some were tried and found innocent but still detained. She explained that after a period of time the government, having won the fight against terrorism, should show its strength by saying to the people that it has won but it needs help in this mop-up phase. She said the terrorists achieve their main objective of destroying the legal institutions of the state if the government doesn't admit it has won the war and must now return to the judicial system by bringing those detained to trial. She cited the case of Jacobo Timmerman as an example, adding he has been mistreated while under detention.³ Admiral Massera said he didn't believe Timmerman had been mistreated although he may have said he has been.

5. Returning to the general situation, Mrs. Derian said that many people in the Argentine Government had told USG representatives

² See footnote 6, Document 54.

³ Jacobo Timmerman, the publisher of the Buenos Aires daily newspaper *La Opinion*, was arrested in April 1977.

that the navy is responsible for abuses which occur when people are taken into custody and interrogated before they enter the system. Admiral Massera responded that, while he doesn't wish to give the appearance of "washing his hands of the matter," internal security is not the navy's responsibility, that the navy has not territorial jurisdiction⁴ and when it does do something in this area it does so with the knowledge of the army. He said that those who say otherwise are trying to deceive. Mrs. Derian said that on her prior visit she had been told that one of the worst interrogation centers was the Navy Mechanical School in Buenos Aires. The Admiral denied this, saying that the navy's entire anti-subversive role was carried out by no more than thirty people.

6. Mrs. Derian said that when she was in Argentina before there was a general attitude that the war against terrorism was coming to an end but was not really over. This time she got the distinct impression that everyone concludes the war is now over and the government has now reached the equally difficult phase of getting back to normal democratic procedures. She advised that the people become impatient if this phase takes too long to carry out. She mentioned that she had discussed this problem with the Minister of Economy and that he gave her the impression that he, too, was worried about time. She referred to the legislation passed in the U.S. Congress which sets a one year time limit on continuing certain relationships which we have with Argentina.⁵ She said that international opinion was becoming more and more critical of the Human Rights situation in Argentina and said it would be devastating if Argentina became the next Chile in the eyes of the international community. Mrs. Derian explained that she thinks there are people of great integrity in the government who hold the same values that both our constitutions inscribe for our citizens and that she feels very unhappy that there is such a difference between theory and practice.

7. The Admiral responded that, while he couldn't talk of a time period, that he had no crystal ball with which to predict, Argentina

⁴ In telegram 6221 from Buenos Aires, August 23, Chaplin suggested "that 'navy has no territorial jurisdiction' be changed to 'virtually no' or 'no Buenos Aires jurisdiction' (as I recall Massera skated very close to being misleading on this point but did not flatly state they had no jurisdiction. This would be obviously false, since the navy controls considerable area in the south of the country.)" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770304-0650) In telegram 6644 from Buenos Aires, September 7, the relevant text was changed to "the navy has virtually no Buenos Aires jurisdiction." See footnote 1.

⁵ Reference presumably is to the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment to the International Security Assistance Act (H.R. 6884), which prohibited U.S. military aid, training, and weapons sales to Argentina after September 30, 1978. Congress cleared H.R. 6884 for the White House on July 22, 1977, and Carter signed it into law on August 4 (P.L. 95-92). (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977-1980, p. 39-42)

was on the road to normalization. He admitted that in the rough battle against terrorism some things got out of hand, but that there has been real improvement since March. He referred to one of his officers especially designated to receive people looking for their relatives and said his case load has dropped markedly.

8. Mrs. Derian referred to the recent case of the lawyers and their wives who had been kidnapped and the case of the Argentine Ambassador to Venezuela.⁶ Admiral Massera said the Ambassador's case was clearly political, that he knew some people blamed the navy for it, but that something else was involved, perhaps, a leftist group trying to make trouble for the government. He said he doesn't believe that one of the government's forces out of control is responsible, as this would go against the government and doesn't make sense.

9. Mrs. Derian said that because of the disorder so many can operate thinking they have the approval of either the government or the people, that the left wing has been licked but a monster created. Admiral Massera said he didn't see it that way. He said the right wing is very small in Argentina and the government has taken steps, like the closing of the magazine *Cabildo*. He said the right exists only as a political force. Mrs. Derian mentioned that the incident against the lawyers couldn't have occurred without some official support. Admiral Massera asked what President Videla had told her about this incident and, when she responded that they hadn't discussed it,⁷ he said that incidents such as it could be counted on the fingers of your hand.

10. Mrs. Derian asked what the chances were for either a complete or partial reinstatement of the right of option.⁸ Admiral Massera explained that this constitutional right had been suspended for six months, that this time was nearly up, and that the thought was to reinstate it. He explained that in the beginning many people were under executive judgment and it was difficult to clarify cases. He expressed a desire to get cases moving and brought to trial so that

⁶ In telegram 5217 from Buenos Aires, July 15, the Embassy reported that "eleven persons—eight lawyers and three of their wives—have been abducted by heavily armed, unidentified persons in Mar del Plata in the past week." Three were later released and one had been found dead as of July 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770253–0668) On Hidalgo Sola, see footnote 6, Document 59.

⁷ In telegram 5889 from Buenos Aires, August 11, the Embassy reported Derian's August 9 meeting with Videla. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770290–0318) In telegram 193418 to Buenos Aires, August 15, the Embassy reported Derian's August 10 meeting with Harguindeguy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770309–0751) In telegram 5943 from Buenos Aires, August 12, the Embassy reported Derian's meeting with Martínez de Hoz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770291–0575)

⁸ The "right of option" was the constitutional right of a prisoner held under the state of siege laws to leave the country. The junta had suspended this right in March 1976.

there could be releases and a restoration of the right of option. He asked Mrs. Derian to maintain an equilibrium realizing that while these cases were important, they were old and few and the junta was on the road to normalization.

11. Mrs. Derian said she had the sense but was worried about uncertainty among lower grade officials and wondered whether when the changes come they would be direct and clear so that people won't feel themselves in jeopardy and the process of locating the disappeared will be enhanced rather than hurt. Admiral Massera said the government could, at least, publish a list in the newspapers of all the people it has stating it doesn't know what has happened to others. He said the list wouldn't be long, that some lists are being published and that while many have been brought to trial he realizes there are some in a grey zone and that this hurts the government.

12. Mrs. Derian ended by referring to the *habeas corpus* petitions submitted to the executive by the Supreme Court saying it was much on people's minds and that she would be glad when all this was over. She said that the reinstatement of legal procedures would certainly help relations between our two countries and stressed that we were anxious to return to normal good relations.

13. Action requested: Please add comments and suggest distribution.

Vance

61. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, August 24, 1977, 1545Z

6281. Subject: Asst Sec Todman's Meeting With President Videla. Ref: Buenos Aires 6127.

1. The Assistant Secretary called on President Videla at 1030 am August 15.

2. President Videla expressed his warm welcome to Asst Sec Todman and asked if he had been able to talk with all those whom he had

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770306-0198. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Asunción, Montevideo, and Santiago.

hoped to see in Argentina.² Videla wanted him to be aware of the views of a wide range of Argentines. He hoped and believed that his government was faithfully interpreting the desires of this large group.

3. As a backdrop to current events, the President sketched out recent Argentine history—the progressive deterioration of political, economic and social conditions in the 1969–75 period. By the end of 1975 there was a power vacuum at the center of government, but there was also great reluctance by the armed forces to intervene in view of their previous experience. Finally, faced with imminent economic collapse of the country which would have thrown thousands of workers on the streets, prey to previously unsuccessful recruiting efforts of the terrorists, the military had to take over when the political parties admitted they were incapable of resolving the situation.

4. The armed forces takeover was not just another palace coup. It was the assumption of power by the armed forces as an institution. They did so reluctantly, and their objective was exclusively to get the country back on the track. They had no sectarian or personal ambitions. They were committed to returning the country to a thoroughly representative democracy. They had made much progress in the intervening 16 months and hoped within a short time to make more and to demonstrate specifically what this government wanted to achieve.

5. Asst Sec Todman noted the progress made, the economic recovery, and the virtual elimination of terrorism—great achievements. He stated that the basis of the tension between our two governments was the American administration's conviction that the most important aspect of a government's performance—indeed its sole purpose—was how it treated its own people. Where it appeared that Human Rights had been violated, we felt impelled to speak up. We had received many reports of violations of human rights in the GOA's campaign against terrorism and the administration and Congress were strongly motivated to take a stand against any such abuses. The USG appreciated the crucial situation which the GOA felt itself to be in but could not be supportive when suppression of terrorism violated the rights of the innocent. He said that the politicians he saw said that the government had to do what it did to counter terrorism and they generally supported the government and felt the situation is greatly improving. They contend that the improvement is such that the government should now relax restrictions on political activity.

6. President Videla said he would not be pictured as one who is unconcerned about the rights of his citizens. He felt that man, as God's

² In telegram 6127 from Buenos Aires, August 19, the Embassy reported Todman's visit to Argentina. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770300-0507)

work, must be respected and viewed as the purpose of society. He argued the greatest good for the greater number and challenged Asst Sec Todman to find an Argentine who disagreed with him. He said that he would not pretend that there were no excesses by the security forces in their fight and perhaps even some score-settling. He said that what was most important was the government's objective: Peace under the law and a monopoly of force under government control. When questioned about several recent dramatic disappearances, he freely admitted that at this stage of the war against terrorism the problem was of elements of the security forces which—frankly—were beyond the government's control. They were working hard on this and success was indispensable to the achievement of the government's objectives, but so far they had not solved the problem.

7. Asst Sec Todman said the GOA cannot expect international respect and support until internationally recognized rules of behavior are observed. He hoped we could work cooperatively with the GOA to this end, but violation of Human Rights would undermine any efforts to strengthen relations between our countries. The GOA had made such impressive strides in dealing with terrorism that it would now be seen as a demonstration of strength if the GOA took measures with prisoners and other detained persons which reflected that strength. Such measures might include lists of all prisoners now held, reinstatement of the right of option to leave the country of reinstatement of the right of *habeas corpus*. There were some cases in which international opinion became especially concerned. He cited the detention of Jacobo Timerman which had awakened much concern because it involved presumed anti-semitism.³

8. President Videla said he thoroughly rejected any imputation of racism to his government and said he was thoroughly dedicated to principles which did not tolerate it. Timerman was not a victim of racism; he is suspected of involvement of economic crimes with Graiver, who in turn was involved with terrorists. Timerman will be dealt with by justice, but this does not involve anti-semitism.

9. Asst Sec Todman explained President Carter's concern about the spread of nuclear arms and asked if President Videla might give his most serious attention to the possibility of GOA reatification of

³ In telegram 6604 from Buenos Aires, September 6, the Embassy reported Todman's August 15 meeting with Allara and Arlia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770322-0607) In telegram 6138 from Buenos Aires, August 19, the Embassy reported Todman's July 15 meeting with Montes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770300-0830) In telegram 6605 from Buenos Aires, September 6, the Embassy reported Todman's and Lister's meetings with the Argentine Supreme Court, human rights organizations, relatives of the disappeared, and religious groups. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770322-0606)

the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Such action would be an example for the hemisphere.

10. President Videla said that the GOA has accepted nuclear safeguards, which in practical terms are more extensive controls than those of the NFZ treaty which has political liabilities for the GOA. He said quote we will look at the situation, however, and see if acceptance might be feasible. End quote

11. Asst Sec Todman noted that the GOA has expressed its support for Human Rights in a variety of documents and statements of the government. He hoped that the GOA might do so again by signing the inter-american convention on Human Rights. This, too, would give impetus to the hemispheric concern with the issue. President Videla said that ratification was under consideration and he would see what might be done.

12. Following an exchange of expressions of friendship the 65-minute conversation ended.

Chaplin

62. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 31, 1977

SUBJECT

An Update of Human Rights Developments in Argentina

I. Hopeful Developments

—*Prisoner releases.* While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners² is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm that there have been four releases,³ and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand corner.

² See Documents 55 and 57.

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “four releases.”

must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.

—*Right of option.* It seems likely that the Argentine government will restore a limited form of the “right of option”, whereby state of siege prisoners may seek voluntary exile.⁴ This will be an important measure if it actually leads to prisoner releases.

—*Political tolerance and the courts.* There are signs that President Videla may be gaining support from other generals for a greater ventilation of political ideas with civilian leaders. This has prompted Argentina’s oldest party, the Radicals, to criticize the government’s human rights record. The Radicals were accused of engaging in politics by the government, but rather than summarily punish the politicians, the government took the case to the courts. The lower courts ruled against the government, and the matter is under appeal. An Argentine government ban against the Jehovah’s Witnesses is now in the Supreme Court, and there is hope that the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

II. *Negative Developments*

—Eight lawyers or their wives were kidnapped at a sea resort near Buenos Aires in mid-July; one subsequently was found murdered brutally. It appears the others were later released. It seems likely that the security forces were responsible.⁵

—In mid-July, Argentina’s Ambassador to Venezuela was kidnapped in Buenos Aires. He has not been found yet. It appears that the kidnapping reflected hard-line military resentment against President Videla, who made a very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

—The publisher of the only major Argentine newspaper, which has demonstrated consistent courage on behalf of human rights, is being held by the government on economic charges at a secret place of detention; he was tortured.⁶

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “voluntary exile.”

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 60.

⁶ In telegram 6326 from Buenos Aires, August 25, the Embassy reported on an August 19 meeting between Timerman and Gilman. Gilman “asked how he was being treated and how he was feeling. Timerman replied that a prisoner in his circumstances should not answer that kind of a question, but he was allright now—with emphasis on the ‘now.’” Timerman “said he did not know why he was being held, as no formal charges had been lodged against him” and “he had not been allowed to see the military judge’s investigating report, which was secret.” In addition, Timerman “said his interrogators never once asked him about Graiver. Instead, the bulk of the questions had to do with a presumed world Jewish conspiracy against Argentina.” Finally, the Embassy reported that Timerman “went out of his way to explain to the Congressman the Government’s need to take extraordinary action against terrorist subversion” and “said he was a strong supporter of the Videla administration and hoped that the U.S. would do everything it could to support Videla.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770308–0014)

—At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.⁷

III. *Conclusion*

Most serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hardliner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the very uncertain nature of recent human rights developments, Embassy Buenos Aires recommends that we should await developments before further public comment.⁸ State will continue to keep you fully informed as events unfold.⁹

⁷ Jacobo Kovadloff, the representative of the American Jewish Committee in Argentina, left the country on June 22. (Telegram 4679 from Buenos Aires, June 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770225–0330)

⁸ See Document 59. In an August 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, Christopher wrote: "I believe we should await developments before further public comment." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78)

⁹ In the margin below this sentence, Carter wrote "ok" and initialed the memorandum.

63. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1977, 9 a.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Videla Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

ARGENTINA

Lt. General Jorge Rafael Videla
 President of Argentina
 Oscar A. Montes, Minister of Foreign
 Affairs and Worship
 Jorge A. Aja Espil, Ambassador to the
 United States
 Julio Cesar Carasales, Ambassador to OAS
 Enrique Quintana, Chief of Protocol
 Cdr. Eduardo Alberto Traid, Aide-de-camp

US

President Carter
 Vice President Mondale
 Secretary Vance
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 Assistant Secretary Todman
 Robert Pastor, NSC
 Charge Maxwell Chaplin

President Carter opened the conversation by expressing his pleasure at the attendance of the Argentine President and emphasizing its significance as a demonstration of hope for the Panama Canal Treaty. He was also pleased that it provided an opportunity for the hemispheric leaders to have conversations about issues of common concern.

President Videla expressed his satisfaction over the opportunity to witness an event of such major importance as the Canal Treaty signing, as well as the opportunity to have a face-to-face discussion with the President. He observed that the signature of the treaty not only denotes the end of one era but opens a new one in which the United States has demonstrated its sincerity and goodwill toward Latin America. He added that the Argentine presence was his government's effort to establish its goodwill in response. He observed that while US-Argentine relations have had their ups and downs throughout history, the temporary circumstances which impeded close relations have always been overcome by the basic identity of interests of the two nations.

As a parenthetical comment, President Carter observed to Videla that his Spanish was the clearest and easiest to understand he had ever

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina I. The meeting took place at the White House. Drafted by Chaplin. A typed note at the top of the memorandum reads, "Text has not been revised by the NSC." No other record of this meeting has been found. Portions of this document relating to non-proliferation are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 420.

heard—the President either chose simple words or had an unusually clear manner of expressing himself. He found this typical of the Argentina which he and his wife had visited some years previously. President Carter also added his thanks for the hospitality that President Videla had shown to Assistant Secretary Todman during the latter's recent visit to Argentina.²

President Carter said he hoped to have a frank discussion of two major issues with the objective of optimizing relations between the two nations.

Non-Proliferation

President Carter considered the threat of nuclear explosives the greatest problem facing the hemisphere. Because Argentina leads the Latin American nations in nuclear technology—which is a great credit to Argentina—he hoped that Argentina could also lead in the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the area and the prevention of introduction to nuclear explosives. He observed that all hemispheric countries but Cuba and Argentina had signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that Chile and Brazil had conditioned their approval of that treaty upon Argentina's ratification and acceptance of it. He expressed the hope that Argentina would ratify this treaty which would provide unrestricted use of nuclear energy for power but no introduction of nuclear explosives.

President Carter said that the United States, the European Community, Canada and Australia were now evolving a study of fuel cycle from ore to reactor wastes and safeguards. On October 19 there will be a three-day meeting on this subject,³ and it would be helpful if the GOA could be represented at this meeting. He envisaged establishing common policies with regard to the export of nuclear technology, heavy water and enriched uranium. He said this policy envisages restriction of sale of these items to countries which do not cooperate in the non-proliferation effort. President Carter said he understood that Argentina was cooperating with Canada with respect to limited safeguards but stressed the importance the United States places on the NFZ and the NPT.

President Videla responded by observing that the two countries' coincidence of interest was mirrored by the fact that the two Presidents' agendas were the same. He did not perceive these issues as problems

² See Document 61.

³ The first International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Organizing Session took place at the Department of State October 19–21. The press release, Carter's October 19 remarks in plenary, and the text of the communiqué issued on October 21 are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1977, pp. 659–664.

but as opportunities for progress. He reviewed Argentina's 25 years' work in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, noting that one power reactor is currently in use, a second under construction and a third in the planning phase. He understood President Carter's concern over the misuse of nuclear energy and said Argentina had offered to establish safeguards beyond those which were really needed. However, he understood that even this may not be sufficient reassurance for Latin America and the world.

President Videla said the GOA had considered ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco but stressed that President Carter must be aware of the great need for proper political timing of such an action. Argentina was only 18 months away from its gravest national crisis, so the government must be particularly careful not to disturb the progress toward normalcy. He stated that as soon as political conditions permit—perhaps before the end of the year—he would give proof of the GOA goodwill with regard to non-proliferation by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He asked if this reassured President Carter.

President Carter said it did, and stated that if the GOA decided to send a delegation to the fuel cycle conference, it would be particularly exciting if it would be possible to announce intended ratification of the treaty at that time, but he would defer to President Videla on the best political timing. With Argentine ratification, the treaty would be in effect for all countries but Cuba, and the United States would be raising this issue with the Cubans. The President added that Argentine ratification would also remove our concerns about technology and heavy water supply to Argentina from the United States and other suppliers. The President had discussed this very issue the previous day with Prime Minister Trudeau in the interest of establishing a common export policy.

Human Rights

The political changes in Argentina have been given careful study by the American government, and recent developments there, said President Carter, have impressed me as much as the natural beauty of the country. He stated his admiration for the achievements of President Videla's government in dealing with the problem of terrorism and the reconstruction of the Argentine economy. He said the study of the achievements of President Videla's government led to the conclusion that the GOA had achieved great strength, stability and influence. He hoped that the security and the strength of the government would lead to the alleviation of concerns expressed by many about the observation of human rights in Argentina. The President stated he did not have a way to assess the many charges of human rights violations and noted the particularly high press interest in this subject in the United States.

Certain cases drew particularly intense interest here, such as that of editor Timerman and the Deutsch family, who have many relatives in the California area.⁴ He said that a Washington group concerned with the subject of human rights had provided a list of 3,000 people being detained in Argentina without public notice of their arrest or charges against them.⁵ The President acknowledged that some of these allegations may be false or exaggerated, but he felt that in the privacy of the room he could express our concerns about the state of human rights in Argentina. He would make the list available so the State Department could provide it to President Videla's government for its use. President Carter felt that the friendly bilateral relations of over a hundred years were of great value, and he was concerned that this issue could come between the two countries. He felt that more progress in this area would be welcome. In summary, he said he personally admires and approves of what President Videla has been able to do for his country and asks what can be done to alleviate the concern in the United States (which, indeed, may have been exaggerated) about the state of human rights in Argentina.

President Videla recounted the situation in which Argentina found itself in March 1976, with an economic, political and social crisis aggravated by terrorism, which led the armed forces as an institution reluctantly to take over to fill the power vacuum and protect those enduring values and human rights of which President Carter spoke. Those who recognized that man was created in God's image must recognize his dignity as an individual. Terrorists wanted to change that view of man, and Argentina had faced what amounted to a war over the issue. All wars have their undesirable consequences, and President Carter as a military man would know of this. Argentina has suffered all of these misfortunes of war.

President Videla said that the war, while virtually over in a military sense, continued in the political arena, both domestically and internationally. The terrorists wish to isolate the GOA from a civilized world, but their charges were not true; the people of Argentina opposed terror-

⁴ In telegram 212170 to Buenos Aires, September 3, the Department notified the Embassy that five members of the Deutsch family were abducted on the night of August 26 from their home in Cordoba, Argentina. A Deutsch family relative in California reported the disappearance to Senator Cranston. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770320–1154) (U) In telegram 6629 from Buenos Aires, September 7, the Embassy reported that the Argentine Army announced that it had arrested the Deutsch family. The Embassy commented, "Unusual late evening issuance of Army announcement is indication of GOA effort to avoid Deutsch family disappearance adversely affecting Videla visit. Prior to last night's announcement Army in Cordoba had denied any knowledge of Deutsch family whereabouts." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770323–0318)

⁵ Not found.

ism and the system it advocated. They were dedicated to democracy. Argentina faced the intentionally exaggerated publicity abroad of admittedly unfortunate incidents. President Videla said there were incidents for which the government was responsible, and he accepted that responsibility for them and stressed his efforts to control abuses of power.⁶ He said, however, that he could not accept the image of a brutal and uncivilized Argentina and the attempt to isolate his country from those other nations which shared its basic values. He stressed that he would do his utmost to reestablish order and control, and meanwhile he needed the understanding of Argentina's friends, especially natural friends such as the United States.

With the war almost over, President Videla felt that the need for repressive action was less. He felt that within a short period the negative consequences of the repression would be eliminated.

He agreed to accept the list of names of those who were reportedly detained in Argentina and welcomed the opportunity to comment on the Timerman case. He assured President Carter that Timerman was detained under due process, charged with dealing with subversive elements. He was not detained because of his name—there was definitely no anti-Semitic connection to this detention. The same was the case of the detention of the Deutsch family: they were detained for investigation of possible connection with subversion, not for racial reasons.

President Videla stated that 1,990 persons had been detained under the national executive power in the first year of his government and 2,020 in the subsequent six months. Since March 1976, 300 of these cases had been tried in the civilian courts with 73 found guilty, and 370 in the military courts with 187 found guilty. In the last two months, 300 persons detained on suspicion of terrorist activities have been liberated. President Videla was most reluctant to give a date, but he hoped and wished the problems of the detainees might be resolved by Christmas 1977. He would make a major effort to achieve this and meanwhile hoped for US understanding.

President Carter ventured a question about the Argentine judicial system, noting that one of the great concerns expressed in the United States is the fact that there are no announcements of the arrest of Argentines or the charges on which they were being held. He asked if this is customary. President Videla responded that the Argentine courts are independent institutions and operated beyond the control

⁶ In his personal diary, Carter wrote that Videla "was calm, strong, competent, sure of himself enough to admit Argentina does have problems in the eyes of the world." (*White House Diary*, p. 94)

of the executive. In cases dealing with subversives and their detention as a preliminary security measure, no announcements of the detentions were made. As soon as the case was investigated, it was turned over to the military or civilian courts or the individual was released. While for security reasons it is not convenient to provide public information on detentions at the initial stage, the GOA has an office charged with providing information to relatives about the possible detention and charges against family members.

President Carter expressed his desire to help restore world appreciation of Argentina and what its government stands for. He hoped that President Videla would give the United States the opportunity to do so. As President, he said he knew how much opportunity he had to preserve the liberties of the US citizens. He asked if, at sometime in the future after Christmas, it might be possible for representatives of the OAS or the UN to visit Argentina, not in the sense of investigating events there, but to confirm the progress made by the GOA.

President Videla said he was pleased to respond with the same frankness shown by President Carter and observed that facts were infinitely more important than words. The visits of Mr. Todman, Mrs. Derian, the Congressmen and the Senators⁷ is the best way to show that Argentina is not ashamed of its record. He thanked President Carter for sending these groups and for providing lists of detainees. He admitted that there were disappearances in Argentina for four reasons: first, when an individual joins the subversive underground, second, when a terrorist is killed by his associates who may suspect betrayal, third, terrorists were killed in battle and fourth, people were killed by excesses committed by forces of repression. He said this fourth case is under our control, and it is his responsibility to eliminate it. He said he was not concerned about visits or lists or any future visit made in goodwill which can testify to the facts in Argentina.

President Videla regretted that it was necessary to devote the short time available to discussion of the two fundamental issues raised. Since there were a number of important remaining bilateral issues which should be covered, he wished to invite Secretary Vance to visit Argentina after his trip to Brazil to complete the consultations.

President Carter and Secretary Vance both accepted the invitation for Secretary Vance to visit Argentina.⁸ President Carter said he regretted that the two items had dominated this discussion, which would have to be ended because the President of Uruguay was arriving

⁷ See Documents 61 and 60. A number of Members of Congress had visited Argentina in the previous months, including Yatron and Gilman. See footnote 6, Document 62.

⁸ See Document 68.

shortly. Should President Videla wish, he said that Vice President Mondale could meet with him now,⁹ or the conversations could be continued during the Secretary's visit. President Carter expressed his hope he could return to Argentina before long and presented President Videla with his book and a collection of satellite photographs of the world. The meeting terminated with expressions of mutual goodwill.

⁹ No record of the meeting between Videla and Mondale has been found.

64. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, September 15, 1977

Arms Transfers to Argentina

Issue for Decision

Whether to authorize the sale to Argentina of MK-44 torpedoes, submarine periscopes, 3 Boeing CH-47C "Chinook" helicopters, 2 Lockheed KC-130 aerial tanker aircraft and various types of ammunition.

Essential Factors

On July 25 you approved a recommendation to limit denials of arms transfers to Argentina to those articles and services which could be used by police and other civil law enforcement agencies. You added, however, that you would review all proposals on a case by case basis.²

We are submitting for your decision several sales proposals by U.S. firms and requests to purchase by Argentine military organizations. With the possible exception of light mortars, none of the items listed is known to have been used against urban or rural guerrillas, to have been otherwise involved in human rights violations in Argentina or to be potentially effective instruments of repression against individu-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. Confidential. Sent through Benson. Drafted by Titus on September 8. Cleared in ARA/RPP/PM, PM, ACDA/WEC/ATE, and PM/MC and by Bumpus, L. Brown, and Lake. O. Jones was informed.

² See Document 59.

als or small groups. Nonetheless, D/HA objects to the approval of most of these cases because there has been no improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina. D/HA is sending you a separate memorandum concerning its views on these proposed arms transfers.³ A legal brief is attached.⁴

Cases to be Decided

No objections have been raised to approval of the following cases by PM, ARA, or ACDA.

1. *Periscopes*—A Munitions List license application by Kollmorgen Corporation to export six sets of attack and search periscopes (12 periscopes in all) valued at \$4.4 million for installation in six new West German-built submarines.

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of the license.⁵

2. *Lockheed KC-130 Tanker Aircraft*—Lockheed has applied to the Office of Munitions Control for an advisory opinion on eventual approval of the sale of two aircraft if present Argentine Government interest in them results in a contract. Although an advisory opinion is not binding, its issuance anticipates eventual approval of any sale which might materialize. These planes would most likely be used to refuel aircraft involved in search and rescue operations and in Antarctic activities.

³ In a September 15 memorandum to Vance, Derian noted that “all, but one, of the pending Argentine requests for government to government FMS cash sales are for deadly weapons and ammunition.” She added: “Fine distinctions can be drawn about which of these are useful for internal security purposes and which are not, but I, for one, do not wish to argue such fine distinctions before Congress or in the public press.” She recommended that Vance “disapprove or defer at this time the pending arms transfers to Argentina with the exceptions noted in the attachment.” In an undated attachment entitled “Cases to be decided,” HA recommended that approval be given for some items, provided that “we reserve the option to stop the actual export if human rights conditions do not improve,” and for some sales which “should only be permitted if the Argentine government is willing to assure us that the equipment will not be used for internal security purposes.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Box 1, 1977—Human Rights—Argentina Arms) In a September 20 memorandum to Vance, Benson disagreed with the conclusions of the Derian memo. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Christopher initiated the approve option. In a September 27 memorandum to Lamb, Ericson wrote: “It seems to me the item that *must* be approved is the periscopes. These have no human rights implications and to deny this sale would be to extend our embargo to German-manufactured equipment. We certainly would not wish to complicate this situation with problems with the Germans.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina—I)

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of a favorable advisory opinion.⁶

3. *Helicopters*—Responding to an Argentine Army request for a proposal, Boeing Vertol Division has applied to the Office of Munitions Control for an advisory opinion about the possible sale of 3 CH-47C Chinook logistic transport helicopters. Although an advisory opinion is not binding, its issuance anticipates eventual approval of any sale which might materialize. These aircraft, which are variously configured to carry 33–44 persons and equipment, are limited to transport functions. They cannot be used as “gunships”.

Recommendation: That you approve the issuance of a favorable advisory opinion.⁷

4. *Torpedoes*—An Argentine Navy request for cost and availability data for 18 Mark 44 torpedoes. These are acoustically guided anti-submarine torpedoes, which are being replaced in the USN inventory by more modern models.

Recommendation: That you approve the Argentine Navy request.⁸

5. *Bombs and Artillery Ammunition*—Argentine Army, Navy and Air Force requests to purchase ammunition and ammunition components as follows:

- a. 15 projectiles, 5" 38mm-illuminating (for naval guns)
- b. 150 projectiles, 155mm-high explosive artillery
- c. 50 projectiles, 155mm-illuminating artillery
- d. 250 propelling charges for 155mm artillery projectiles
- e. 762 artillery fuses
- f. 750 artillery percussion primers
- g. 10,000 cartridges, 20mm electric (used to ignite charges in naval artillery)

⁶ Christopher initialed the approve option. Next to his approval, he wrote, “if delivery possible before 10–1–78,” then crossed out this comment. In a September 29 memorandum to Christopher, Bennet wrote that he had “real problems” with the memorandum from Gelb to Vance, noting that “approving these requests in face of continuing human rights violations, appears to me to fly into the face of Congressional sentiment on Argentina. The sales may be impossible to implement in any case because of the embargo.” (Ibid.)

⁷ Christopher initialed the approve option. Next to his approval, he wrote, “if delivery possible before 10–1–78 and with same guarantees [illegible] Bell helicopters,” then crossed out this comment. In a September 30 memorandum to Christopher, Oxman wrote: “Incidentally, the Argentine desk has learned that the Argentines are very likely to refuse to give the assurances we sought re the eight Bell helicopters.” (Ibid.)

⁸ Christopher crossed out a check written in the space for the disapprove option, wrote in a “hold” option next to it, checked it, and marked an asterisk next to it. At the bottom of the page, he marked an asterisk and wrote: “for consideration with other requests now pending.”

h. 10 bombs, 500lb. general purpose, MK–82, with retarding fins.

Recommendation: That you approve the sale of the medium artillery ammunition and bombs.⁹

6. *Cartridges*—The Argentine Navy wishes to buy the following:

- a. 50,000 cartridges, cal. .50 ball (standard bullet), aircraft grade
- b. 30,000 cartridges, cal. .50 tracer, aircraft grade (above are probably for use in the A–4 aircraft)

Recommendation: That you approve the sale of these cartridges.¹⁰

7. *Shells*—The Argentine Army wishes to buy the following:

- a. 550 shells, 4.2", 107mm-high explosive, for mortars
- b. 40 shells, 4.2", 107mm-illuminating, for mortars

Recommendation: That you approve the sale.¹¹

⁹ Christopher crossed out a check written in the space for the disapprove option, wrote in a "hold" option next to it, checked it, and marked an asterisk next to it. At the bottom of the page, he marked an asterisk and wrote: "for consideration with other requests now pending."

¹⁰ Christopher checked the disapprove option. In a September 27 memorandum to Lamb (see footnote 5, above), Ericson wrote, "Since the Navy is the hardnosed outfit in Argentina, and since the caliber 50 ball and tracer cartridges come the closest of any items on the list to being useful for the suppression of dissidents, you might wish to disapprove their sale. We would, of course, sigh and shake our heads." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina I)

¹¹ Christopher crossed out a comment written in the space for the disapprove option, wrote in a "hold" option next to it, checked that option, and marked an asterisk next to it. At the bottom of the page, he marked an asterisk and wrote: "see prior page," a reference to the option noted in footnotes 8 and 9 above: "for consideration with other requests now pending."

65. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹**

Washington, November 3, 1977, 1643Z

262832. Subject: Letter to President Videla from President Carter

1. Please pass following text to President Videla ASAP.

Begin quote: Dear Mr. President: Let me say again how pleased I was to meet with you during your visit to Washington for the signing of the new Panama Canal treaties.² Our conversation gave me a better understanding of your concerns and those of the Argentine people, with whom we wish to have the best of relations.

2. I was particularly impressed by your comment that we both had the same items on our agenda—Human Rights and nuclear proliferation—and that you saw opportunity for progress on both. I share the same hopes.

3. We both recognize that Argentina is frequently charged with serious violations of Human Rights. You were certainly correct in stating that terrorists have sought to isolate Argentina in their propaganda. However, I am confident that such propaganda will lose its force in the court of international opinion as your government demonstrates progress in Human Rights. And I can assure you that the United States will always be ready to acknowledge such improvements.

4. I was also pleased to hear that you would not object to visits by Human Rights specialists from respected international organizations. Such visits will be an important means of educating international public opinion on improvements in Human Rights in Argentina.

5. In this regard, let me mention the very important role played by non-governmental human rights organizations, and my hope that they will continue to contribute to the advancement of Human Rights and my firm belief that they should retain their consultative status at the United Nations.

6. I welcome your expression of hope that the detainee problem might be resolved by Christmas this year. As I told you, there is great interest and concern in the United States over the fate of people detained in Argentina under the national executive power. The clarification of their status would be well received, I believe, throughout the international community. Like your government's recent announcement of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770405-0653. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted in the White House, cleared by Bumpus and in S/S-O, and approved by Zimmermann.

² See Document 63.

the restoration of the right of option and a parole for detainees, such a clarification would be another important step in demonstrating Argentina's commitment to the protection of Human Rights.

7. I was most gratified and pleased to learn that your government intends to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.³ I realize that the timing of your government's ratification is dependent upon political considerations, but I hope that you will find it possible to ratify the treaty in the near future. Argentina's full adherence to the treaty would have great importance. It would not only demonstrate Argentina's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy; it would also, I am convinced, give a significant impetus to world-wide acceptance of the treaty as an important means of avoiding war.

8. I was very pleased that your government participated in the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation conference in Washington.⁴ I believe it will provide a great opportunity for our nations to work with others in making nuclear energy an important and safe means of meeting our energy requirements.

9. Mr. President, the personal relationship which we established in Washington provided me this opportunity to write you. I very much hope that we continue to exchange views with frankness and candor so as to strengthen relations between our two great peoples.

10. In this regard, I particularly appreciate your letters of September 28 and October 11, 1977, and the information which you related in the second letter concerning the Deutsch family.⁵ As I am sure you are aware, there is considerable and continuing congressional and public concern on this matter in my country.

11. In his meeting with you in November, Secretary Vance will have the opportunity to continue our dialogue.

12. I want to thank you and Mrs. Videla for the very kind invitation to attend your son's wedding, and regret that we were unable to attend. Please give our congratulations and best wishes to your son and his bride. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End Quote.

Vance

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 422.

⁴ See Document 63, footnote 3.

⁵ In an undated memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski attached the October 11 letter from Videla and noted that Videla had written that two members of the Deutsch family were still being held because of their involvement with the Communist Revolutionary Party but that three others had been released. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1977–78) The September 28 letter from Videla to Carter has not been found.

66. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, November 11, 1977, 2212Z

270937. Subject: Deputy Foreign Minister Allara Meeting With Deputy Secretary Christopher

1. Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister Gualter Allara accompanied by Ambassador Aja Espil and Ministers Juan Carlos Arlia and Miguel Angel Espeche Gil called on Deputy Secretary Christopher on November 4, 1977. Ambassador Castro, Deputy Assistant Secretary McNeil, Special Asst. Oxman, Desk Officer Bumpus, and Interpreter Hervas also attended.

2. Subsequent to introductory remarks, the question of the Secretary's visit was discussed.² Mr. Christopher pointed out that the Secretary very much wished to make his visit as scheduled but that some uncertainty over the President's world trip might call for some adjustments. However, the Argentines should proceed with the original schedule, as we are doing, on the assumption that the Secretary will visit Argentina on November 21, 1977.

3. Allara said he understood the difficulty in the scheduling, but wished to make the U.S. aware that the Secretary's visit had created great anticipation in Argentina. Cancellation or postponement would cause real difficulties as President Videla had put great emphasis on the visit. Mr. Christopher assured the Argentines that the Argentine concerns would be strong factors which would motivate the Secretary to make the visit.

4. At Mr. Christopher's invitation, Allara discussed the Secretary's agenda while he is in Argentina. Terrorism and human rights should certainly be considered along with a number of other topics which had been discussed earlier with Assistant Secretary Todman.³

5. Mr. Christopher said he wished to discuss Human Rights further. During the Panama Canal Treaty signing ceremony conversations we had been quite impressed with President Videla's commitment to change and reform in Argentina.⁴ We understand him to be dedicated to the promotion of Human Rights. We were sorry to hear of the recent

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770419-1318. Confidential. Drafted by Bumpus, cleared by McNeil and Oxman and in S/S, approved by Christopher.

² See Document 68.

³ See Document 61.

⁴ See Document 63.

resurgence of terrorism in Argentina but hope that the government's response will be confined to the legal process. The war against terrorism should not be used as an excuse for violation of Human Rights.

6. Allara pointed out that the Argentine government had suffered terrorist aggression and had been forced to resort to exceptional measures. There have been recent outbreaks of violence, but despite these the government is pledged to return the country to normality. The U.S. should be assured that President Videla's commitment to President Carter to return Argentina fully to the rule of law in the shortest period of time remains valid.

7. Mr. Christopher stated that some actions by the Argentine government in the Human Rights area do stand in the way of better relations between our countries. He specifically mentioned disappearances, detainees and the Deutsch family.⁵ We continue to hear of disappearances; we had hoped that investigations carried out by the Argentine government would have resolved the problem, but they apparently have not. The large number of detainees, President Videla said some 4,000, is also a cause for concern. The Deutsch case is an example of the public and congressional interest which is being concentrated on Argentina. The U.S. Jewish community has been very interested in the fate of the family. It would be a very good case to resolve.

8. Allara responded that the Argentines were aware that Human Rights caused difficulties between our two countries. It probably created more problems than were merited. The Argentines have tried to investigate reports of disappearances, but it is difficult to reach a conclusion. Some people go underground to join the terrorists, others to illegally leave the country and some "disappear" to escape responsibility for common crimes. Moreover, armed forces personnel who have committed excesses are being punished and the ministry of interior is investigating all alleged disappearances. Eighty per cent of the reported disappearances had occurred before the government came to power in 1976.

9. Concerning the Deutsch family, Allara said that three of the family members had been released but two would be tried because they were seriously compromised by ties to terrorist organizations, as was the brother, Daniel, who had left Argentina. Allara used the Deutsch case to deny accusations that anti-semitism existed in Argentina. The government repressed anti-semitic literature and had made it a crime to incite racial hatred. President Videla has close contact with leading Jewish citizens and organizations. Jews who are prosecuted in

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 65.

Argentina are brought before the courts because they have committed crimes, not because they are Jews.

10. Mr. Christopher said he wanted the Deputy Foreign Minister to know that it was not only the executive branch but the Congress and the public who were strongly supportive of actions on human rights. On the Deutsch family, Mr. Christopher said he wanted Allara to know the great symbolic value the case had in the U.S.

11. Allara said the Argentines were very aware of the symbolic value; President Videla had written personally to President Carter about the family.⁶ Argentina understood U.S. concern over Human Rights, and has done much to improve the situation there. However, not only Human Rights but also terrorism should be considered. Terrorism has spawned Human Rights violations; plane hijackings violate the rights of the passengers. The UN recently passed a resolution condemning hijacking,⁷ but we need more such measures to combat terrorism. Deputy Secretary Christopher said he agreed fully with the minister's concern with hijacking. We must work to get all states to ratify the anti-hijacking convention.

12. Mr. Christopher said that he wished to introduce a happier note; he had been able to advise Secretary Vance that we should issue a license for the export of periscopes to Argentina. Favorable advisory opinions on the issuance of licenses for the export of Chinook helicopters and Lockheed C-130s had also been given. These actions were an indication of our faith in President Videla's moderation and our hope that the rocky relations we have had are now improving.

13. Allara spoke of his concern over the limitations on military equipment—especially spare parts and FMS items for which Argentina had already paid. These limitations were causing real difficulties. The Argentines had hoped that the series of high level U.S. official visits which had begun in March would have convinced the U.S. that progress was being made on Human Rights in Argentina. Apparently they did not.

14. Secretary Christopher said he was pleased to see nuclear non-proliferation on the Argentine agenda for the Secretary's visit. President Carter places great emphasis on the nuclear question. The U.S. does not wish to keep countries from exploiting nuclear energy, but we do want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons which present a grave danger for the world. We want to see Argentina using nuclear power, but avoiding nuclear weapons development and reprocessing. The

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 65.

⁷ On November 3, 1977, the UNGA adopted Resolution 32/8, which called for enhanced security at airports and on airplanes and legal action against alleged hijackers.

president is anxious for Argentina to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco and agree to full-scope safeguards. Mr. Christopher said the secretary would put great emphasis on the nuclear question when he was in Argentina.

15. Allara said that nuclear topics were of great significance to Argentina, which was a leader among the Latin American countries in nuclear matters for over 30 years. Argentina had developed its nuclear capacity for peaceful ends and it would continue to do so. The Argentines do not want to disturb the power balance in the area by an irresponsible nuclear weapons program. Allara said that Argentina was conducting a thorough review of its policy on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and that he saw virtually no impediment to Argentina's ratifying it.⁸ The Argentines are looking forward to a full discussion of the nuclear question when the Secretary is in Buenos Aires.

16. Mr. Christopher thanked Allara for this good news about the willingness to ratify Tlatelolco and the thoughtful and candid conversation which they had held. This type of exchange strengthened relations between countries. Problems exist but they must be discussed, not avoided. In this way they can be resolved.

Vance

⁸ In a November 5 memorandum to Carter, Christopher quoted this statement by Allara and noted, "Such a decision would require considerable courage on Videla's part in view of the pressure against ratification from important military elements." In the margin, Carter wrote: "Be forceful on this." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 11/77)

67. Briefing Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 19, 1977

President Videla: An Alternative View

A common view has been that President Videla would gradually but effectively move to improve the human rights situation in Argentina, and that he also represented the best hope for Argentine ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. If these views appeared probable when General Videla assumed the Presidency in March, 1976, a year and a half later, they are increasingly difficult to support.² It is widely agreed that the GOA is failing to improve its human rights performance, and Videla is unlikely to counter his advisers who are opposed to ratifying Tlatelolco.

Videla probably has good instincts on human rights, but several fundamental factors are preventing him from taking effective action:

—He adheres to the “clandestine war” doctrine, which argues that subversion must be countered with illegal measures. He also accepts that this illegal war be waged in a decentralized manner, with local captains and commanders acting largely on their own. This makes it impossible for the top generals, including the junta, to effectively control the security forces—but does provide the junta members with plausible deniability.

—Videla fails to make a sharp distinction between terrorism and dissent. The loose application of the term “subversive” to the government’s enemies has encouraged the security forces to strike not just at terrorists but at a wide range of civilian opinion. Certainly less than half of the prisoners and disappeared persons (estimated by human rights groups at 15,000) were active terrorists; some estimates place the figure at under 15%.

—Videla is closely tied to his minister of economics, Martinez de Hoz, whose austere economic policies have hit the middle and working classes very hard. These policies, which have successfully improved Argentina’s external accounts, have failed to bring the rate of inflation under 100%. As the government now moves to attack inflation through stringent monetary measures, economic discontent will mount, as a

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL November 16–30 1977. Confidential. Sent through Lake. Drafted on November 18 by Feinberg.

² See Document 72.

recent wave of strikes foretells. Mounting popular discontent threatens to provoke further official repression. However well intended Videla may be, he will be hard put to fail to take the necessary political measures required by his economic policies.

—Videla's own personality and governing style is to seek a cautious consensus, in order to attain the central objective of maintaining unity of the armed forces. Therefore, even though the moderates in the military are numerically superior and could probably win in a showdown with the hardliners, they are less aggressive in putting their views forward. Videla prefers to accede sufficiently to right-wing pressures rather than risk a rift in the military. In the most recent promotion cycle, Videla apparently failed to make a serious effort to retire certain key hardliners.

These very basic elements help explain why Videla's performance on guaranteeing the security of his citizenry has been—and is likely to continue to be—disappointing.

The presence of Videla and other moderates has probably inhibited the hardliners from attempting to mount an all-out war on "intellectual and economic subversion," i.e., dissenters of all stripes, "speculators," tax evaders, etc. Nevertheless, the numbers of dead, disappeared, tortured and jailed are so high as to have directly touched a large percentage of Argentine families.

68. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House¹

Buenos Aires, November 22, 1977, 0025Z

Secto 11012. Subject: Meetings in Buenos Aires

1. During a series of long and frank discussions with President Videla,² the other two members of the Junta,³ and Foreign Minister

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0545. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to the Department of State. Vance was in Argentina November 20–22.

² A November 21 memorandum of conversation for Vance's courtesy call on Videla is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2-12/77.

³ Memoranda of conversation for Vance's November 21 courtesy calls on Massera and Agosti are Ibid.

Montes,⁴ we reached breakthroughs in two areas of principal interest. The Argentines agreed to a public announcement of their intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. This will be contained in a communique being issued this evening. They also agreed in the communique to language stating that all governments which adhered to Universal Declaration on Human Rights have a major responsibility to protect and enhance human rights of their people, to respect integrity of persons and the rule of the law.⁵

2. In completely private meetings, Videla reaffirmed his commitment to you,⁶ which he said he has also made to the Church, to release significant number (well over 500) prisoners and to publish a list of all detainees before Christmas, if at all possible. In addition, the Argentines have agreed to permit the International Commission of Red Cross (ICRC) to resume visits to places of detention. The latter cannot be publicly stated. I urged Videla to get the ICRC's permission to make this public. I also urged him to invite in the ICRC or other independent agency in cases where torture is charged to make an independent investigation. They will take this under consideration.

3. The joint communique also repudiates international terrorism and agrees on the necessity for multilateral cooperation in this area. We also agreed to reactive the mixed commission to discuss economic subjects.

4. On specific case of Jacob Timerman, Argentines told me privately that they had evidence he was linked with handling of funds from terrorist sources and is subject to civil charges. They showed me a confidential file indicating Deutsch assisted in the escape of his son, who was head of intelligence of Communist operations, and that his daughter is also involved in Communist activities here. They expect the father will be released by the courts, but not his daughter. I am not sanguine that either Mr. Timerman or Miss Deutsch will be released despite our urging.⁷

5. In meeting with Jewish leaders later, they stressed that government is not officially anti-semitic, but that there are a number of anti-

⁴ A memorandum of conversation for Vance's November 21 meeting with Montes is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 3, Argentina.

⁵ The text of the joint communiqué is attached but not printed. U.S. and Argentine officials discussed the joint communiqué, as well as human rights, at a working session on November 21. (Telegram 9289 from Buenos Aires, December 7, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770455-0301)

⁶ See Document 63.

⁷ See footnote 4 above.

semites in government over whom government is unable to exercise full control.⁸

6. During our meetings, I stressed that the major impediment to an improvement of our relations is the Human Rights situation in Argentina, and that unless that situation improves our relations will worsen, particularly after a congressional amendment imposes an arms embargo beginning in October.⁹ My sense is that Videla and some others around him are trying to improve situation, but there still remains much for them to do to ameliorate the situation.

7. Our views generally coincided with regard to the Middle East, on which they expressed willingness to help in any way possible, and on various North/South issues, where we agreed Argentina could be especially helpful falling as it does between the developed and lesser-developed countries.¹⁰

8. Argentines were demonstrably, extremely pleased with the fact of the visit and the nature of our conversations, which they hope will lead to better understanding.

[Omitted here is the draft text of the joint communiqué].

Vance

⁸ A memorandum of conversation for the November 21 meeting between Vance and Argentine Jewish leaders is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 3, Argentina.

⁹ Reference is to the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment. See footnote 5, Document 60. A memorandum of conversation for a November 21 meeting among Vance, R. Castro, Todman, Derian, Harris, and representatives of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 3, Argentina.

¹⁰ Vance discussed the Middle East with Videla; see footnote 2. Vance, Smith, Castro, Todman, Videla, Montes, Madero, Allara, and Aja Espil discussed North-South issues during a November 21 luncheon conversation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2-12/77)

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, December 14, 1977, 1930Z

9523. Subject: Detained or Abducted Human Rights Activists. Ref: Buenos Aires 9420;² STATE 295886³

1. Ambassador raised matter of recently detained or abducted Human Rights activists from Mothers of Plaza de Mayo group during social occasion with Admiral Massera evening December 12, during courtesy call on Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz earlier on the same day, and on December 13 with Chief of the Army Staff General Roberto Viola. We are certain Viola will tell President Videla of US concern over this incident.

2. Massera professed not to have known of event until told by Ambassador. He then refused to register surprise since—in his words—this sort of muddled, ill-judged caper is what one has come to expect of the army. Viola knew of incident but disclaimed any knowledge of the abductions' origins and/or intentions. He confided that he has made and will continue to make considerable effort to discover who authored and carried out the event but so far has not been successful. Viola went on to speculate that some "official authorization" of the abductions had taken place, hinting thus his belief that another military service (read navy) had been responsible. Martinez de Hoz—and also Defense Minister Klix, to whom the subject was raised at a social occasion with a larger group of people—took the hard line that this is but a new dirty incident in an old dirty war, essentially justifying the abduction as having proper security motivation even while disclaiming knowledge of the facts.

3. Persons associated with the Mothers' Protest Movement speculate that the abduction-detention might have been staged to deter a large pre-Christmas demonstration at the Plaza de Mayo slated for tomorrow December 15. If this is the case then they expect the detained

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770465-1125. Confidential; Priority; Limdis.

² Dated December 12. The Embassy reported, "In what appears to be concerted government action, about sixteen persons associated the 'Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo' are reported to have been taken by security authorities on December 8. Another woman prominent in the movement was snatched December 10. The whereabouts of those taken are unknown." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770462-0641)

³ December 12. The Department directed "that U.S. government concern over the arrest should be communicated to the Argentine Foreign Ministry." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770462-0125)

group to reappear over the weekend, Monday⁴ at latest. If this fails to take place then clearly the incident will take on extraordinary significance in the history of disappearances in Argentina.

4. *Buenos Aires Herald*—which is still the only local paper that has covered the disappearances—reported today December 14 that the Embassy of France has protested the disappearance of two nuns working for a French missionary order here. The first, Sister Alicia (nee Ana Maria Domon), a naturalized Argentine, was mentioned in the Buenos Aires reftel among those who disappeared from the church of Santa Cruz. The second, a Sister Leonie (nee Renee Duquet) is reported to have been taken over the past weekend by four men driving an unmarked, US-made car. Sister Alicia is reported to have worked with a Monsignor Novak in the ecumenical movement, while Sister Leonie was associated with the Bishop of San Justo, Monsignor Carreras, at the Chapel of San Pablo in Ramos Mejia. The *Herald* gave ages of Alicia and Leonie as 40 and 61, respectively.

5. We will pursue our inquiries, of course, including at Foreign Ministry.

Castro

⁴ December 19.

70. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, December 30, 1977, 1715Z

310191. Subject: Sales to Argentine Armed Forces

1. Department has authorized export of pontoon bridges and recommend to Department of Commerce approval of Bell commercial helicopters. Although Argentine Embassy in Washington has been advised of action, post also may wish to advise GOA of U.S. action on these cases, which serve as evidence of USG interest in a better

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780003–0409. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Rondon, cleared for information by Oxman and O. Jones and in EB/ITP/EWT and H, approved by Zimmermann.

relationship with Argentina—one which we hope will evolve favorably as Human Rights situation improves.

2. On December 19, Argentine Ambassador appealed to ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Mcneil for prompt action on export of Pontoon bridges, helicopters and Neptune aircraft.²

3. On December 20, Department authorized export of almost \$3 million in aluminum pontoon bridges. These items had been purchased under FMS and paid for in full.

4. On December 27, sale of 8 commercially configured Bell helicopters to air force was approved in Department.³ Department of Commerce has been notified. We understand these helicopters will be used *inter alia* for rescue purposes, and we were informed that Argentina became very concerned about its deficiency in helicopters during November earthquake relief efforts as well as Australian airlines crash rescue operations. Furthermore, Argentines agreed to deletion of armor and Collins kit which had placed helicopters previously on munitions list, and assured us that the helicopters “would be used for customary air force purposes.”⁴

5. Decision on Neptune aircraft for cannibalizing will be communicated to you as soon as possible.

Christopher

² Not found.

³ Not found.

⁴ On August 30, Todman told Aja Espil that “the helicopters would be sold, but the machine gun mounts would not be permitted on any of the planes, and armor plating would be allowed on only those two aircraft used to transport President Videla. Todman also informed Aja Espil that assurances would have to be given by the Argentine government that the aircraft would not be used for internal security purposes.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770321-0095)

71. **Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, January 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Is the Argentine Navy on the Side of the Angels?

You requested our thoughts on whether Argentine Navy Commander Massera may not be one of the villains in the Argentine drama, after all.²

Massera has worked actively of late to foster the notion that he is the most democratic member of the Argentine ruling junta and the one who would show the greatest respect for human rights. He has gone out of his way to befriend union leaders, Peronist politicians and Jewish leaders. He has also made it a point to tell visiting American officials that his Navy is innocent of wrongdoing because it has only a peripheral role in counter-terrorism. But this is nonsense. Massera's 1,000 man marine force is among the most active of the counter-terrorist forces. We have quite credible reports that the Navy has been responsible for repression against priests, and that the Navy Mechanics School in Buenos Aires has been used as a torture center. None of these activities could escape Massera's knowledge because of all the services in Argentina, Massera's is the most tightly controlled.

On the other hand, Massera is the most astute and ambitious of the Junta members, and smart enough to realize that a public stance on behalf of human rights will enhance his chances to become Argentina's President when he retires from the Navy (possibly late this year). It appears that Massera would like to seduce Argentina's labor unions and the Peronist Party into supporting him, much as Peron (no democrat, either) courted labor in the forties. This explains Massera's public opposition to the belt-tightening policies of the Economy Minister,³ who is at once anathema to labor and closely linked to Videla.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Memos from WC to Bureaus, 1978, 4 of 5. Secret. Drafted by McNeil and Rondon on January 27.

² In a January 27 note to Bushnell, Christopher asked, "May we have an evaluation of this new spin—the Navy as the white hat," and attached Karen DeYoung, "Rift Reportedly Growing Among Argentine Rulers," *Washington Post*, January 27, 1978, p. A-1. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 19, Memos from WC to Bureaus, 1978, 4 of 5)

³ José Martínez de Hoz.

Human rights aside, Massera is, or affects to be, a jingoist. He ordered the Navy to fire against Russian trawlers last fall in an action which caused casualties and had not been approved by Videla. And he seems to have flirted with the notion of a grandstanding military action against Chile in the Beagle Channel in an effort to curry nationalist favor. He has not shared Videla's desire for a close relationship with the United States, and had privately criticized Videla's attendance at the Panama treaty signing and indicated that Argentina should not accommodate to us on the nuclear issue.

The prevailing Argentine view is that Massera is a strong leader, not usually said of Videla, but that he is unprincipled. What militates most against Massera's ambitions is that the Army, which cares little for Massera, is by far the most important military force. At all events, the image which he seems to be successfully cultivating in some quarters does not exactly accord with the facts as we know them.

We have asked Embassy Buenos Aires for further comment.⁴

⁴ In telegram 742 from Buenos Aires, January 30, the Embassy reported: "It is difficult for us to believe that Massera is on the side of the angels where human rights in Argentina are concerned." The Embassy further stated, "It is widely believed here that the Navy (as well as the Army, Air Force and Federal Police), has been responsible for abductions, torture during interrogations, summary execution, and extra legal detention. There is no firm evidence, however, of this." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780044-1059)

72. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 6, 1978

SUBJECT

ARA/INR/CIA Weekly Meeting, February

PARTICIPANTS

ARA—Assistant Secretary Todman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bushnell; CIA—
[*name not declassified*] INR/DDC—Ted Heavner

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA weekly meetings, 1978. Secret. Drafted by Heavner.

No Human Rights Moderates in Argentine Regime. Responding to an earlier inquiry from Ambassador Todman,² [1 line not declassified] a report³ on the human rights attitudes of the Argentine military leadership. He said the report indicates there are *no* moderates there on the question of using harsh methods against subversives. All the military leaders are in agreement that they must use rough methods to control subversives. The references we had heard to “curbing excesses” meant only that the regime will not tolerate use of the campaign against subversives as a cover for settling personal grudges.

Ted Heavner

² In a November 7 memorandum for the record, regarding the ARA/CIA/INR weekly meeting on that date, Todman said that “we have been operating on the theory that Videla is a moderate who is frustrated and circumvented by others in the Argentina military. He asked that [less than 1 line not declassified] examine this thesis very carefully; is it possible that the apparent divisions do not really exist, i.e., that Videla is only playing the white hat while Massera and others do the dirty work on which all agree.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA weekly meetings, 1976–77) The issue was also discussed at the ARA/INR/CIA weekly meeting on January 23, when Bushnell “noted that we really are not very clear about who is moderate and who is hard line on human rights matters.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA weekly meetings, 1978)

³ Not found.

73. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, February 15, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Reaction in IFIs to Argentine Human Rights Actions

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether recent human rights actions by Argentina are sufficient grounds for revising your earlier decision to vote against two Argentine loans in the World Bank, now scheduled for a vote on February 21.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

A vote is expected on February 21 on two Argentine projects which, before the developments outlined below, you decided to vote against: a \$109 million silo project in the IBRD and a \$9 million cement plant loan in the International Finance Corporation. The Argentine Ambassador has mentioned publicly that the silo project was developed after discussions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, referring to our possibly negative position on it as an indication of mixed and confusing positions being taken by the U.S. government. Even if we follow current instructions on voting, we need to know what to say to Argentine feelers about our response to human rights actions which they believe are positive.

A progress report on the human rights situation in Argentina was sent to the Department by our Embassy on February 7 and is attached.²

—*Prisoner releases.* Approximately 440 prisoners have been released from the state of siege powers of the Argentine Executive since December 20, 1977.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. Confidential. Drafted on February 14 by Rondon; cleared in draft in EB/IFD/ODF, S/P, and the Department of the Treasury and by Bova. Rondon initialed for all the clearing officials.

² Not attached. Reference is to telegram 965 from Buenos Aires, February 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780057–0810) In a February 22 memorandum to Carter, Vance reported many of the points in this section and wrote that the lists of prisoners “are important because once the government acknowledges that it holds an individual, the likelihood of physical harm is diminished.” Carter wrote, “good.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 2/78)

—*Prisoner lists.* On February 3, in a significant, long sought after step, Argentina published a list of 705 state of siege prisoners. A second list of 795 prisoners appeared on February 13; further lists are expected.

—*Right of option.* Our Embassy believes that the right of option program, whereby prisoners may opt for exile, is now “definitely” being implemented, and the Argentine government has told foreign embassies that it will cooperate in helping prisoners meet visa requirements. The Embassy has underscored the importance of this measure to prisoner releases.

—*Treatment of prisoners.* The International Committee of the Red Cross resumed prison visits in December and has reported that political prisoners are being held in the same physical conditions as other prisoners. This is an improvement.

—*U.S. interest cases.* The Argentines have authorized the departure of certain high U.S. interest cases recently, including Guillermo Vogler and one of the Panero sisters.

—*Intangibles.* The attached cable reports that the Argentines are becoming more “sensitized” to the importance of human rights steps and are no longer “stonewalling” the subject. The cable states also that there is an attempt underway to reorganize counter-subversive forces in order to achieve tighter control over them by the central government.

On the other hand, and as the same cable reports, there continue to be many problems. While disappearances may have declined in 1977, more recently they appear to have run at the same rate as a year before. According to our Embassy, it has heard of 39 disappearances since December 1, including two French nuns and mothers of the disappeareds who were abducted without a trace in mid-December.³ The Embassy adds that reports of secret detention centers persist, and that there is no evidence to suggest that torture for information is no longer practiced. In addition, the GOA admits that it is holding over 3600 prisoners under executive detention. Human rights groups estimate that many thousands more are being held secretly, in non-official detention centers. To date the GOA has answered few of our requests for information on missing persons. The International Committee of the Red Cross has not visited military camps where unaccounted for prisoners may be under detention. Few prisoners have been released by the right of option program to date. In the case of high U.S. interest cases such as Timerman or Deutsch, they remain detained. Internationally, the Argentine government has mounted a campaign in the United Nations against Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

³ See Document 69.

However you decide to handle this issue, our response will come very shortly after Under Secretary Benson decided against the sale of any further military training to Argentina.⁴ This means that we have continued to get progressively tougher with Argentina.

Under Public Law 95-118 (FY 1978 IFI authorizing legislation),⁵ opposition to a loan may consist of either a no vote or an abstention. Neither of the proposed options recommend support for Argentine loans at this time.

THE OPTIONS

1. *Follow current instructions but acknowledge change privately.* We would advise the Argentines that we decided to vote no on the \$109 million silo loan and the \$9 million cement plant because of continuing concern with the human rights situation in Argentina. We would note that improvements in human rights will be factored into the stance we take on future projects. We would acknowledge privately, however, to both the Argentine and other bank directors that we have noted favorable signs and express the hope that they indicate a new trend.

Pro:

—This would demonstrate our ongoing serious concern over continuing disappearances and other human rights abuses but inject an element of hope into our IFI voting pattern in return for further human rights performance. We would not run the risk of suggesting that we are willing to alter our policies in response to minor improvements.

Con:

—This would fail to recognize sufficiently or encourage actively Argentine human rights change, which may seem minimal to us but is important in the Argentine view of things. It risks signaling, especially when we have just decided to deny all military training requests, that we remain opposed adamantly to the government, and in the context of our posture, our action might not only serve as a human rights disincentive but impact negatively on other major interests, notably non-proliferation.

2. *Abstain on both loans.* We would inform the Argentines that their recent steps will affect our stance on the two loans, but we would not be more explicit prior to the votes. We would abstain on the loans, and explain privately to the Argentines and interested Bank members that our stance was taken in recognition of recent positive signs, emphasizing the need for further steps leading toward overall improvement in what remains a poor situation.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See footnote 9, Document 59.

Pro:

—This represents a prompt revision of our earlier negative stance in the IFIs, signaling our willingness to change as the Argentines change. It could also: a) help to stem human rights regression, because the Argentines would not wish to precipitate a return to no votes in the banks and, b) it would strengthen the hand of those in the government who are seeking human rights improvement and who would be able to point to our action as indicating acknowledgment of steps being taken.

Con:

—The publication of two lists and some prisoner releases represent only the beginning of what is needed for real improvement in the human rights situation; to reverse our position with alacrity would undermine the seriousness with which we have viewed past violations, including very recent disappearances.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option 2 to abstain on both the silo and cement projects, and privately explain our votes in terms of Argentine human rights steps (favored by ARA, S/P, Treasury, and the U.S. Director to the IBRD).

ALTERNATIVELY, that you approve Option 1, (favored by HA) maintaining your earlier decision to oppose the two projects but authorize representations to the Argentines recognizing hopeful human rights developments.⁶

⁶ Christopher checked the approval option.

74. Note From the Deputy Executive Secretary of State (Wisner) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, undated

Mr. Vance:

The issue here² is whether to take a new look at the enormous backlog of Argentine arms transfer³ cases, with a view toward making selected approvals as an explicit “carrot” for Argentine human rights reform and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Harold Brown has suggested in his letter to you that we do this.⁴ PM, S/P, ARA, and L agree with Brown’s suggestion and have identified certain categories of spare parts and safety equipment that they think we should approve. These approvals would be given to Argentina with a request for significant human rights reforms to be made before October 1 (the Congressional-mandated cut-off date for further sales to Argentina) and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco before the SSOD. Argentina would be told that no further approvals could be made until these conditions were met.

H also agrees that we should make some approvals, but proposes an alternative method of deciding which to make. There is a “grandfather clause” in the Congressional cut-off legislation which would allow us to go forward with those cases where contracts or LOAs were signed before August 4, 1977. PM, ARA, S/P argue against this approach, because it would allow some large end-item cases to go, which they think should be held, and it would not allow some essential spare parts for items we have recently approved. They also suspect that the total dollar value of approvals made by the H-proposed method might be larger than the categories of cases they proposed for approval.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II. No classification marking.

² Reference is to an undated paper entitled “Argentine Human Rights Strategy” that Lake sent to Christopher under a March 6 covering memorandum. Lake wrote that the paper “puts our human rights interests in Argentina in context with other major interests there, and briefly sketches all possible instruments of positive or negative leverage.” Lake noted that the memorandum “is not an action memorandum. Rather, it attempts to set an intellectual framework for subsequent decisions. It identifies broad areas of agreement on appropriate U.S. actions, and one important issue—what to do about the munitions control list—on which we differ.” (Ibid.)

³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “Argentine arms transfer.”

⁴ Brown’s letter, dated March 17, is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Records of the Secretary of Defense, 1978, Argentina.

HA is very much opposed to any approvals until Argentina has made meaningful human rights reforms. They have a considerable body of Congressional opinion on their side.

Harold Brown has also recommended that we approve training for some 68 Argentine officers. This has already been decided against within the Department,⁵ but not yet communicated to the Argentines. Opinion is split: one side argues that training is the last thing we should cut off, so long as those involved have not been guilty of human rights violations; the other side argues that training should be cut, at least for now, because of the domestic political controversy about human rights abuses by military officers.

The key consideration is whether our willingness to provide some of these spares as evidence of our continued interest in maintaining good relations with the Argentine military will indeed work to produce any “human rights” benefits in Argentina, or a more tractable Argentine position on nuclear non-proliferation. We have no firm evidence either way, except that they are moving very close to ratification of Tlatelolco right now.⁶

PM, ARA, S/P, and L believe that with time running out on military sales decisions, this “card” is worth playing. The Argentines may do nothing in which case they will have gotten much-needed spare parts without having to put up anything in advance. But their need for spare parts will continue and they will clearly be mortgaging any prospects for further approvals on our part if they show no response, a point we would make clearly to them in communicating our decision.

Because of the very intense domestic political interest in Argentine human rights abuses, we must be well prepared to explain the rationale behind and nature of approvals on these cases, should you make them. There is a question of whether to consult interested members of Congress before or after making the decision. At any rate, no decision should be announced until after the President’s trip.⁷

The recommendations are at pp. 6–8. This memo, although long, is the most concise statement yet produced of the issue and the various positions, and it is the only one that has proposed specific solutions. Whatever your decision, someone will be unhappy.

Frank

⁵ See footnote 9, Document 59.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control, Document 431.

⁷ Carter visited Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, and Liberia March 18–April 3, 1978.

75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, April 7, 1978, 0108Z

89468. Subject: Report of Nuns' Death. Ref: BA 2346²

1. Department has received with deepest concern reports of murder of two nuns and five other women picked up in December abductions.

2. Department believes we must act forcefully now to make GOA aware of our outrage at such acts. Argentines must understand that as long as such disappearances occur our relations will be placed under great strain, even though we continue to respect Videla's expressed personal intentions.

3. Accordingly, Ambassador should seek appointment with President Videla to express U.S. shock at the reported deaths of seven women. Failure of remainder to appear on PEN lists heightens our concern. Ambassador should explain to the President that this development has come at an especially unfortunate time. There had been some modest but positive steps on the part of the Argentine government and the United States had responded to these with positive actions. We had moved from "no" votes on IFI loans to abstentions on the last two loans and had approved the sale of some military equipment. Our positive actions will be hard to maintain, however, in light of the reported deaths of the seven women.³ To offset the very negative impression caused by the seven deaths—and the presumptive deaths of the other 6 "madres"—Argentina would have to make substantial further visible progress in the Human Rights area.

4. Ambassador should continue presentation by suggesting that GOA consider actions which can be taken against the people who

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149-1018. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Schneider, McNeil, and Zimmermann; approved by Bushnell.

² Dated March 30. The Embassy reported on news stories, rumors, and confidential information that all indicated that the bodies of two French nuns and five of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo abducted in December had been identified. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780139-0649) See Document 69.

³ In an undated note to Oxman regarding this telegram, Christopher wrote: "If true, these reports adversely affect Argentine cases you are considering." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina II) See Documents 76 and 77.

committed this crime.⁴ They should be brought to trial and if some in authority winked at the crime those involved should be disciplined. There will be great pressure in the United States for changes in our policy toward Argentina if significant positive steps are not taken. We realize how difficult this will be for the GOA, but we must be able to show convincing progress or our relations will undoubtedly suffer. Our government believed that President Videla had committed the GOA to release or try all political prisoners, to return to the rule of law and to put a halt to disappearances. Yet all of these areas of concern continue. The deaths of these women underline our concern.

5. FYI. Department realizes that our information about the deaths of the nuns and the others is based on sensitive sources and that the Embassy correctly is concerned about protecting these sources. Your presentation will have to take this into consideration. We cannot, however, refrain from confronting the Argentines with this crime.

6. Department is also most conscious of the reports of the impending ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the possible release of Jacobo Timerman and the publication of the last prisoner lists. We understand that our proposed demarché could effect these positive GOA steps, but feel nonetheless, we must speak out.

7. You should know that Frank McNeil raised this matter with Aja Espil on March 30 on basis AFP ticker item. Aja Espil expressed horror at possibility report was true and speculated that incident would not only anger Videla but perhaps put him in position to take action against those who sanctioned this outrage. Subsequently, Aja Espil suggested to John Bushnell, presumably as a result of conversations with BA, that report might be false.⁵

8. Department will make parallel presentation to Aja Espil.⁶ To insure that the presentations are synchronized, would appreciate your

⁴ In telegram 482 from Buenos Aires, January 20, the Embassy reported: "We have tried hard to clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of two French nuns and some 11 other Argentine citizens in a series of abductions December 8–10. Our findings are contradictory and inconclusive, the fact remains that at this writing we have no sure knowledge regarding the nuns' abductors or their present whereabouts. Our sources generally agree that the operation was carried out by some arm of the security forces, but which specific group and the level of responsibility is unclear." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780031–0855)

⁵ No record of a meeting has been found.

⁶ In telegram 97542 to Buenos Aires, April 15, the Department reported that McNeil told Aja Espil on April 11 "that the murders of the nuns and the continuing credible reports of disappearances had cast a pall over our earlier optimism that things were getting better in Argentina. He particularly stressed the need for further positive developments to offset these tragic events." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780163–0125) In telegram 102617 to Buenos Aires, April 21, the Department reported that Aja Espil responded on April 19, noting that "his government refused to accept the charges that Argentine security forces had been involved in these disappearances." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780171–0993)

cabling Dept date and time of Ambassador's appointment with President Videla.⁷

Vance

⁷ In telegram 2663 from Buenos Aires, April 10, Castro reported on his meeting with Videla that day, noting that "the reports of the deaths of the two nuns had dealt a serious blow to USG views of Argentine progress on observance of human rights. It was our view that it is crucial for the GOA to establish responsibility for the deaths of nuns and punish those responsible." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780154-0513)

76. Memorandum From Stephen Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, April 12, 1978

SUBJECT

Argentine Arms Transfer Cases

In view of the recent tragic reports out of Argentina,² it is not clear that now is the appropriate moment to go ahead with any of the arms transfers which are the subject of the underlying Action Memorandum.³ Castro delivered the demarche on Monday⁴ concerning the nuns' deaths. McAuliffe was with him which is good. (The cable reporting the demarche is attached at Tab A.)⁵ Videla's response, while sympathetic, is like the responses he always gives, and it does not really change anything.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III. No classification marking.

² See Document 75.

³ Reference is to an eight-page action memorandum entitled "Argentine Arms Transfer Case," dated March 24, from Gelb and Todman to Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina IV) No decision is marked on the memorandum.

⁴ April 10.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 75.

Tab 1 of the Action Memorandum sets forth the various categories of cases which are being held up and makes recommendations as to which categories ought to be approved and which delayed.⁶ While I think some of the suggestions in Tab 1 are logical, I am afraid that by focusing too heavily on the particular cases and categories in question, we could lose sight of the forest.

The core issue in our relations with Argentina is whether we are going to see genuine human rights improvements, and I think we are really at something of a crossroads with respect to that issue. The trend over the last six months has been quite halting: modest improvements punctuated by major retrograde developments such as the murder of the nuns. With the arms embargo⁷ six months away, it seems to me the time has come for us to sit down with the Argentines and have a rather explicit discussion of the various ways things could develop over the next six months. I think we should explain to them that because of strong views both within the Administration and in the Congress, we are frankly not in a position to go ahead with the large number of arms transfer cases that has accumulated and that the only way to begin to break this logjam is for there to be substantial, authentic human rights improvements in Argentina.

Specifically, I think we should tell them that unless they curtail the irregular detention practices routinely used by the security forces, and begin to charge and try—or to release—those held under executive authority, we will be unable to approve most of these transfers. If there were solid steps in these directions, we would be prepared to be responsive in a “calibrated and sequential” fashion, but if there are only minor improvements, then the *status quo* will persist.

I am afraid that unless we make this type of approach—and instead simply approve certain categories of equipment and disapprove others—we will send a very mixed signal to the Argentines, provoke considerable confusion and criticism on the Hill, and most importantly, forfeit a good chance to cause human rights improvements in Argentina. When all is said and done, we have, through this backlog of cases, built up a very considerable amount of leverage over the Argentines, and I think it would be a pity to squander it. In general, it is preferable to avoid *quid pro quo* arrangements in the human rights context, but

⁶ The four categories recommended for approval were “safety and safety related equipment,” “spare parts and support equipment for items previously supplied by the U.S.,” “items previously approved for sale or financing,” and “items destined for non-governmental users.” The three categories recommended for delay were “promotional activities,” “armaments and accessories” related to lethal equipment, and “other exports or sales not previously approved.” See footnote 3 above.

⁷ Reference is to the ban on U.S. arms transfers to Argentina as specified by the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment. See footnote 5, Document 60.

in this particular instance, given the gravity of the human rights problems and the strength of our leverage, I think it would be worth making an exception.

I have informally discussed my suggested approach with Frank McNeil, and he thinks it is promising.⁸ A recent cable from the Embassy (Tab B)⁹ suggests that an approach of this kind would complement domestic pressures building in Argentina for the same types of improvements I have mentioned above. (What I am suggesting is in a sense a variation of the HA suggestion set forth at pages 3–4 of the Action Memorandum.)¹⁰ If the course I have suggested seems too problematic, then I would make the following recommendations:

—Categories I.C. and I.D.¹¹ (listed at Tab 1) should be approved. (Indeed, I.D. should perhaps be approved right away, irrespective of my suggested approach. Perhaps the same is true of I.C., but I am less sure.)

—Category I.A.¹² should be approved after a month or so.

—Category I.B. (spare parts), which is the big ticket item in this whole package, should be approved in stages over the next few months.

—Category II should be held in part and disapproved in part. (The items in II.B. are probably the best candidates for disapproval.)¹³

⁸ In an undated note to Oxman, Christopher wrote: "Please prepare a decision, in conjunction with McNeil, in accordance with your recommendation. Establish a role for the military in your program. Training should be an important element." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III) See Document 77.

⁹ Not attached. Reference presumably is to telegram 2234 from Buenos Aires, March 28, in which the Embassy reported: "With the publication of the final lists of prisoners held by the executive under the state of siege power, many in Argentina and abroad will have to face the likelihood that missing friends and relatives must be presumed dead. This will create some political pressures within Argentina, but likely will not have a major domestic political impact. It will also generate pressures and campaigns seeking to force the GOA to render an accounting for the missing. This situation raises the question for the USG of how to react. The Embassy recommends that the USG should concentrate its efforts on the opportunities created for continued progress toward return to the rule of law. While not condoning or pardoning the GOA for its part in the disappearances, we should avoid endorsing demands for an accounting." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780135–0419)

¹⁰ The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs noted that it was "agreeable to sending a team of officers to support a diplomatic demarche with specific requests that the Argentine Government release or bring to public trial all political detainees, account for all disappeared persons and demonstrate effective control of the presently completely uncontrolled and competing security forces."

¹¹ "Items previously approved for sale or financing," and "items destined for non-governmental users."

¹² "Safety and safety related equipment."

¹³ For the categories recommended for delay, see footnote 5 above. Category II.B. was "armament and accessories, such as bomb racks and sights, directly related to the lethal capabilities of equipment previously supplied or approved."

—Training should be disapproved.

—Congress should be informed as we take the foregoing steps.

Finally, Lucy says in her covering memo that she is asking DOD to give us an accounting of the FMS “pipeline”.¹⁴ I see no particular problem with this, although it does single out Argentina, since we have not sought such an accounting for any other human rights problem country. (Note that the FMS “pipeline” is quite different from the “pipeline” referred to by H in the Action Memorandum. Indeed, H’s use of that term is *sui generis* and misleading. H uses “pipeline” to mean not only signed FMS contracts, which is what Lucy is asking DOD about, and Category I.C. but also any *application* for an export license or an FMS contract that was received prior to August 4, 1977, the day the Kennedy embargo was enacted. I see no rationale for claiming that applications which we have never acted upon are in any kind of “pipeline”. I think Kennedy’s office simply told H that they could live with such a formulation, and H has dubbed it “pipeline”.)

¹⁴ In a March 27 memorandum to Vance, Benson wrote: “This morning I called a meeting of the principals involved” in the question of arms transfers to Argentina, and “no real consensus developed out of that meeting but the basic issues that divide the various bureaus did become crystal clear.” She recommended “that you approve the pipeline cases in principle, recognizing that we lack a full accounting from DOD of what exactly is in the FMS pipeline (we have a fairly good handle on the commercial pipeline).” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina IV)

77. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State
(Christopher) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 26, 1978

SUBJECT

Arms and Training for Argentina

Cy:

I have reviewed the Argentine situation carefully. There have been some improvements in human rights conditions there, including the recent release of Timerman,² but these are more than outweighed by the continuing disappearances and the tragic, unexplained deaths of two nuns and five other women who were picked up while demonstrating in December.³

In view of this situation and the strong Congressional interest in our policy on arms transfers to Argentina, I think it would be inappropriate to go ahead with any of the pending arms transfer cases or to grant the Argentine request to purchase training. Instead, I would suggest that in conjunction with Raul Castro, a team consisting of senior State Department officials and senior U.S. military officers should meet at a high level with representatives of the Argentine Government.

The team would explain that because of human rights abuses in Argentina, we are not in a position to act favorably on either the large number of arms transfer cases that has accumulated or the Argentine request to purchase training,⁴ and that only substantial, authentic human rights improvements in Argentina would permit us to act favorably on these matters.

The team would inform the Argentines that if they curtail the irregular detention and abduction practices used by the security forces,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina III. No classification marking.

² Timerman was released from government custody on April 17 and placed under house arrest. (Telegram 2908 from Buenos Aires, April 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780165–0838)

³ See Document 75.

⁴ Vance underlined the phrase “purchase training” and wrote in the left margin: “What about this—might this not help move them in the right direction?” In a May 2 memorandum to Vance, Christopher wrote, “In view of your note concerning the Argentine request to purchase training, the instructions will authorize the team to respond favorably to that request if the discussions in Buenos Aires go well and it appears that such approval will help move the Argentines in the right direction.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 2 of 2)

and establish and meet a schedule for charging and trying—or releasing—those held under executive authority, we will respond in a calibrated and sequential fashion, as the human rights improvements occur, with approvals of the pending matters. Depending upon Argentina's response to the foregoing, the team would have authority to indicate approval of some of the pending cases.

If you agree with this approach, I will ask ARA in conjunction with other bureaus and DOD to prepare for my review proposed instructions for the team. I would envision the team going to Buenos Aires within the next ten days. The proposed letter at Tab 1 from you to Harold Brown informs him of the approach set forth above and requests DOD's cooperation.⁵

Warren Christopher⁶

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Discuss_____⁷

⁵ Vance signed the May 1 letter to Brown, which is attached but not printed. In a May 8 letter to Vance, Brown responded: "We are in complete agreement with your proposal to send a State/DoD team to Argentina as outlined in your letter." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Records of the Secretary of Defense, 1978, Argentina) In telegram 114913 to Buenos Aires, May 5, Christopher informed Castro of Vance's decision, informing him of the team's impending arrival, and asking for his views "on how we might best proceed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004–1615)

⁶ Christopher signed "Chris" above his typed signature.

⁷ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

78. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, May 11, 1978, 1552Z

120048. Subject: Argentine Human Rights. Ref: BA 3538²

1. Departments of State and Defense appreciate your constructive cable concerning Argentine mission. We fully agree that preparatory work is advisable to assure success. Accordingly, you are authorized to approach General Viola along lines you suggested in Para 5, Reftel,³ subject to the following.

2. In your presentation you should note that USG is interested in overall improvements in human rights conditions in Argentina. For example, we are interested in and would welcome the normalization of arrest and detention procedures as well as a program for the release of prisoners held under executive detention. You should stress that these and other steps by the Argentine government to improve the Human Rights situation would have a profound influence on what we may be able to do. In your presentation you should avoid any impression that we are looking for an "escape hatch." Rather, we are interested in a serious exchange with the Argentine government as to where our relationship is heading in view of the human rights situation in Argentina.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1569. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Rondon and Bushnell and in S/S-O and in substance by Schuller and Schneider; and approved by Christopher.

² In telegram 3538 from Buenos Aires, May 9, Castro supported what he described as the Department's "positive and most timely initiative in its effort to bring Argentina back to the rule of law." He noted that "it is doubtful that GOA is willing to swap spare parts or training for what they consider 'hypocritically' an infringement of their right to fight Marxism and subversion. On the other hand, GOA's image abroad is a vital concern." Castro proposed that he be directed to do "advance spade work" before the mission's arrival, by approaching Viola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-2432)

³ Castro proposed that he tell Viola "that the Secretaries of State and Defense are concerned about the deterioration of our relations and would hope to send a high-level mission to Buenos Aires to consult at the appropriate level to see if this trend might be arrested. Recognizing that U.S. law prohibits sales of exports or training and military equipment after Sept 30 and that events in Argentina have not changed enough to convince our Congress that this legislation should be withdrawn, we would like to explore seriously to see how it may be possible to reverse this trend. If the security operation practices in Argentina change in some major respect in the near future (we have particularly in mind the normalization of arrest procedures in cases of suspected subversive activity), the USG would be in a position to acknowledge this positive development and to authorize some sales or licenses as an indication of progress toward normal relations." (Ibid.)

3. Because the composition of the delegation is still unresolved, you should simply refer to it as “high level,” but you may point out that it would include both State Department and military representatives.⁴

4. We believe that visit should take place as soon as possible, preferably in May 17–25 time frame.

Vance

⁴ In telegram 3703 from Buenos Aires, May 13, Castro reported that Viola “received this proposal calmly and even appeared to welcome it.” Castro concluded, “I am encouraged by Viola’s positive response and I am impressed by his attitude. He said that the GOA is prepared to deal with us and intend to deal in good faith. This atmosphere is very promising.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2436)

79. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, May 20, 1978

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MISSION TO ARGENTINA

1. The purpose of the mission of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs² is to try to effect a change in United States relations with Argentina, a key state in Latin America.

2. United States relations with Argentina are at a crossroads due to continuing violations of human rights by the country and the resultant deterioration in our security relationships.

3. Argentina is particularly important to the United States because it is Latin America’s leading nuclear technology state, with very advanced plans for the production of plutonium through reprocessing. Argentina also has a growing arms production and export capability, and is one of the most influential political and cultural leaders in the Spanish speaking world. Its present (world’s 4th largest wheat exporter) and potentially far more impressive agricultural role, as well as possibly

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III. Secret.

² David Newsom.

immense offshore petroleum prospects ensure Argentina's importance into the future.

4. The President, the Secretary of State, a growing number of Members of Congress as well as informed Americans are concerned about the course of events in Argentina, and the impact of these events on our human rights, non-proliferation, economic and military interests.

5. The Mission will serve to underline the United States desire for an improvement in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary would emphasize the problems which currently prevent fully normal relations and, depending on the Argentine response, state that the United States is prepared to be responsive, including with respect to Argentine requests for arms and training.

6. The Under Secretary will advise the Argentine Government that present practices in Argentina make it politically, and in some cases legally, difficult for the United States to follow through with previous military programs. We consider that the following practices and policies are at the root of the problem:

—irregular detention procedures, that is, the practice of secret arrests, disappearances and summary executions of thousands (memo attached);³

—large numbers of prisoners under prolonged detention without charge or recourse to due process;

—the persecution of members of the judiciary and of those members of the legal profession who defend political prisoners exacerbating the lack of legal remedies and due process;

—standard practice of torture, brutality and psychological abuse of political prisoners (memo attached);⁴

—the limited "right of option" for political prisoners under executive detention;

—and a wide variety of restrictions on religious, political, press and labor activities (specifically, the arrests and disappearances of political and labor leaders; prohibitions on political and union activities; constraints on the press, including punitive short-term closings and arrests of many journalists; official harassment of religious groups, in particular the Jehovah's Witnesses and other sects denied government registration, and reports of incidents of anti-semitism targeted at members of the Jewish community and Jewish prisoners.)

³ Not found attached.

⁴ Not found attached.

7. If appropriate, the Under Secretary would continue that the United States believes the following are examples of the kinds of⁵ actions which we feel would contribute tangibly to an improved atmosphere for government-to-government relations:

—A promise and perceptible action by President Videla to curtail the irregular detention and abduction practices of the security forces.

—An end to torture and mistreatment of prisoners.

—An accounting of those who have disappeared—or at least those about whom information is known.⁶

—The establishment of a timetable for promptly charging and fairly trying (preferably in civilian courts) or releasing those held under executive authority, in particular those not suspected of violence.

—The establishment of numerical goals by the Argentine Military Review Board for Right of Option for the release each month of a significant number of persons from executive custody.

—The actual release of a considerable number of prisoners from executive custody—either freed or remanded to civilian or military courts—by August 1. We have in mind action on perhaps 500 cases.

—The release of another tangible number of prisoners (for example, 500 additional cases) by September 15.

—An undertaking to continue this process so that during 1978 the Argentine government will release, grant right of option to, fairly try, or schedule for trial, in civilian or military courts, all remaining executive prisoners.⁷

—The enforcement of procedures to investigate at a high level allegations of security personnel involvement in future disappearances

⁵ An unknown hand inserted the word “initial” here.

⁶ In a May 17 memorandum drafted for Newsom’s briefing book, Buchanan wrote, “Most Argentines, while not condoning the carnage of the past two years and the preceding Peronist era, believe that terrorists are receiving their due and will want to put the ‘mistakes’ suffered by non-terrorist victims behind them rather than prolong the ordeal. Foreign groups, including governments, that press for an accounting, may well find the Argentines arguing that more can be done in human rights terms by seeking to prevent future disappearances than by demanding explanations for past ones.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 2, Argentina) In a May 17 memorandum to Schneider, Cohen characterized this conclusion as “misleading,” noting dissenting opinions inside the Embassy in Buenos Aires as well as “the innumerable letters from the relatives and friends of the disappeared received by our office, by ARA, by the Embassy, and by the White House. These letters call for an accounting. They do not express ‘good riddance’ to those who disappeared or a desire to put the past behind them.” Cohen argued that “the US should not be pursuing a policy at variance with the major human rights organizations in Argentina, not to speak of the Argentine Church and the Holy See.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 2, Argentina)

⁷ An unknown hand marked this paragraph with an “x” in the right-hand margin.

and torture, to try those who engage in, or are otherwise responsible for such practices, and to punish those found guilty.

8. The Under Secretary will, on the basis of their replies to the foregoing, inform the Argentines that as they take action on improving human rights, we will respond, in a calibrated, sequential fashion.

9. The Under Secretary may inform the Argentine Government that as human rights improvements are taken in the above mentioned areas, the United States will begin to consider favorable action, in a calibrated manner, on pending aspects of the military relationship. These include the purchase of military training, safety related equipment, spare parts for previously supplied items, and items previously approved for sale or financing or needed to fulfill previously approved contracts.⁸

10. If in early 1979, it is evident publicly that all prisoners have been removed from executive custody, and that there has been a resolution of the problem of violations of the rights of the person, including political prisoners, disappearances, torture and due process, and that some beginning steps have been taken toward restoration of civil and political liberties, the Administration would move to counteract the Kennedy/Humphrey Amendment.⁹

⁸ In a note to Oxman regarding an earlier draft of these instructions, Christopher wrote, "The more general, less specifically linked it is the better I will like it." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III)

⁹ See footnote 5, Document 60.

80. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Buenos Aires, May 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights and United States Relations with Argentina

PARTICIPANTS

Lieutenant General Rafael Videla, President of Argentina
Col. Malea Gil, Presidency
David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Ambassador Raúl Castro
Fernando Rondon, ARA/ECA

The Under Secretary met with President Videla for approximately 90 minutes.

Mr. Newsom opened the conversation, outlining the purpose of his mission, on behalf of the Secretary of State, to seek an improvement in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary said that he recognized the problems Argentina confronted and the extraordinary steps that had to be taken to face the situation. He acknowledged important Argentine steps to restore normalcy, including Christmas releases, action on the Deutsch and Timerman cases, and Red Cross visits.² The Under Secretary further acknowledged President Videla's interest in good relations as manifested by the ratification of Tlatelolco, a new civil air agreement and the resolution of all but one investment dispute.³

President Videla welcomed the dialogue he said he began with President Carter and Secretary Vance.⁴ He commented that dialogue is worthwhile even if disagreeable things are said.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Lot 81F93, Embassy Buenos Aires Post Files, 1978, Box 48, POL 7—Newsom Visit. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rondon on May 25. There is no indication as to when or where the meeting took place. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: "Key point is last paragraph of p. 4. See also—don't know where—'scope paper' for this visit."

² In a meeting with Christopher, May 19, Aja Espil said that the GOA had "taken steps to meet United States expectations. A Christmas amnesty was granted to 389 prisoners, lists of executive detainees have been published, four of the Deutsch family members have been released (even though David Deutsch who escaped Argentina was a terrorist). Timerman was transferred to house arrest and a decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been publicly announced." (Telegram 133806 to Buenos Aires, May 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221–0927) Red Cross visits to Argentina resumed in January 1977. (Telegram 130078 to Bogotá, May 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780216–0068)

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 437.

⁴ See Document 63.

Mr. Newsom noted that he had read the reports of conversations between Videla and President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Assistant Secretaries Todman and Derian. Newsom remarked that Ambassador Castro has also conveyed the views of the United States, so that President Videla has participated in more than his share of dialogues.

Mr. Newsom then outlined the political situation existent in the United States after the sixties, stemming from Vietnam and controversies over relations with other governments. He stated that there is a strong feeling in the U.S. Congress, represented, for example, by Senator Kennedy and Congressman Fraser, that while we should not interfere in other states, we should not appear to be endorsing the policies of other governments through our assistance programs, when it appears the human rights situations in these countries are not consistent with normal international standards. This predates President Carter's election. When he ran, human rights was part of his platform and, at the time, Patricia Derian was one of his national campaign managers.

The Under Secretary cited the Eximbank situation as an example of a case where the Executive does not have a free hand. The Bank currently has authorizing legislation before the Congress, part of which deals with lending to human rights problem countries. Eximbank therefore does not wish to take steps which could complicate its dealings with Congress. This is not an embargo as some have pictured.

President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Secretary Brown all recognize the importance of relations with Argentina, Mr. Newsom observed. In confidence, he said he is in Argentina because Secretary Brown raised with Secretary Vance the implications for the U.S. of a possible termination of military relations with Argentina. It was his task to determine, Newsom continued, whether present and future prospects for normalization are such that we can go before Congress and defend the resumption of military relationships on the basis that the Executive is confident of a favorable trend for human rights in Argentina. We recognize there are those who do not want good relations between our two countries. Actions may take place outside the control of Argentina which, nevertheless, affect the climate for relations. We had hoped that the Christmas amnesty would have helped us to demonstrate to Congress that resumption of normal relations is justified. Then we had the disappearance of mothers and nuns and we could not demonstrate a positive trend.

Mr. Newsom said that all you can tell me regarding future hopes for normalization, including control over disappearances, plans for the release of prisoners, right of option plans, will help me to present a positive picture when I report to Washington.

President Videla responded that Argentina confronted two types of subversive action: one armed and the other ideological. Both sought

to destroy the Argentine way of life and seriously undermined the governing institutions. The armed forces had to step in to save the country.

Having engaged in combat, borne the brunt of subversive action, and proven to be the only unified institutions, the armed services could not now risk internal disunity (within the military) and destabilization in order to prove Argentina is “western”. Argentina had had no choice but to adopt certain measures. These were matters of Argentine internal affairs.

Videla stated that Argentina will have full democracy when its house is in order, economically, socially, politically, and in the field of internal security.

He would not be sincere if he were to give dates and numbers in order to save Mr. Newsom’s visit.

President Videla stated there are no “loose groups” operating any longer. He added that the “right of option” would be applied with increasing generosity.

As an example of those we are interested in, Videla referred to a recent German request for information on eight of their citizens, six of whom have been charged and are being tried, one who has disappeared, and one who is a two-time murderer who was released in the 1973 amnesty and jailed again by the military government. This latter individual cannot be brought to trial legally by the military government because of the amnesty, yet he is unquestionably dangerous to society.

Mr. Newsom thanked Videla for his comments but noted the American tendency to ask for statistics and figures. Because we do get information from sometimes inaccurate sources, Mr. Newsom asked for statistics on detainees and a guess on the number of releases that might occur over time. Newsom suggested this information might be given to him later in the day.

Mr. Newsom referred to four categories of detainees, according to the Minister of Interior:

- those arrested under military law and tried by military courts;
- those being held for terrorist acts against whom there is insufficient evidence for a conviction;
- those who are being tried under civilian law and courts; and
- those who will be permitted to exercise the “right of option”.

The President observed that 2,000 of 3,200 prisoners were arrested before March 24, 1976. All these cases are under review. He could not say how many of the cases would be subject to military courts and how many to civilian courts. The review would determine who should be held because they are dangerous and who can be released or given option.

In answer to the Under Secretary's question, Videla responded that those being examined by the review commission do not have access to counsel or the right to appear personally before the commission. Videla said the commission is not a court.

Mr. Newsom asked if President Videla might give us an idea of how many prisoners might be released by August 1 or September 15. Videla replied that commitments of this kind would be difficult.

Mr. Newsom continued, asking whether the release of 500 prisoners might be possible in 1978. President Videla stated that there would be an important number of releases and options by Christmas.

President Videla acknowledged that a U.S. parole program would help to implement Argentina's right of option program.

As Mr. Newsom moved to sum up his impressions, President Videla said that he wanted to place a positive weight on the Under Secretary's scale. Argentina would facilitate a visit by the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and this decision will be communicated to the IAHRRC in June when Foreign Minister Montes travels to the UNGA. Until then, Videla asked that this decision be held confidentially.⁵

Mr. Newsom then outlined positive signs, notably Minister Harguindeguy's decision to enforce humanitarian treatment of detainees by the police and security forces and Argentina's willingness to accelerate the "right of option" if we receive more prisoners. Newsom said he would have difficulty, however, with the question of indefinite detentions.

After discussing the desirability of calls on the Supreme Court and other Junta members, Mr. Newsom said he would paint an honest picture of his conversations. Whatever decision is reached by the United States Executive, it would not reflect a lack of interest in Argentina. A decision would be made in light of the total political circumstances in the Executive and Congress. He noted that if progress continues, we will seek to reverse the Kennedy/Humphrey Amendment⁶ but that will take time and probably cannot be faced until next year.

One way or another, Mr. Newsom promised that Ambassador Castro would convey the results of this trip.

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph, referenced in marginalia on the first page of the memorandum. See footnote 1 above.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 60.

81. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, May 25, 1978, 1737Z

4040. Subject: Department Pass Secretary Brown DOD and Chairman JCS

1. Summary: After day of extensive conversations in Buenos Aires, I conclude that favorable steps are being taken in Human Rights field in Argentina and that President Videla, at least, wishes this trend to continue. Picture emerging in one area—processing of detainees—less clear and we were able to get no numerical commitments on releases. Most positive new element was President's confiding in us that he has instructed Foreign Minister at OAS session in June to announce Argentina's willingness to have visit from OAS Human Rights Commission.² On this basis, I am recommending that Ambassador Castro be authorized to inform Videla privately that, once this announcement has been made, we will, after congressional consultations, resume sale of military training. End summary.

2. On May 24, Ambassador, Fred Rondon, and I met successively with Under Secretary Allara and group at Foreign Office, Foreign Minister Montes, Minister of Interior Harguindeguy, President Videla, President of Supreme Court Heredia, Air Force Chief Agosti and Admiral Massera, navy chief. These sessions were followed by further meeting with Interior Minister and General Viola during reception at residence in evening.³

3. My approach in each meeting was to state that my visit was manifestation of desire within USG for normal relations with important Latin American country, but that such relations were not possible in light of widespread U.S. concern for Human Rights and perception of situation in Argentina. I was in Buenos Aires to examine whether Argentine progress in this field was such as to justify in executive and Congress release of outstanding Argentine orders. We understood what Argentina had been through and agreed on desirability close relations these two significant American nations, but political realities in both countries appeared to place limits on what we could do.

4. Exim Bank loans were raised only in Foreign Office meeting. I explained bank's difficulties in proceeding while its legislation in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860101–2444. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 80.

³ No individual record of this meeting has been found.

Congress and in face strong human rights feelings, but emphasized final decisions had not been made. I had feeling this not major leverage point with GOA. They have ample other sources of supply and financing, except possibly, for \$200,000,000 commercial aircraft order.

5. Quite apart from obvious interest in relations with us because of military supply, I found, more than I had expected, feeling that relations with us were important for their own sake. There is mystique about U.S. here which is important element in decisions they make.

6. From conversations, these positive elements emerged (in addition to actions on Timerman, Deutsch, and December releases):

A. President informed us in confidence (which I promised to respect) Argentina would announce its willingness receive OAS Human Rights Commission at meeting in June. This may have been decision he made as result my visit. In earlier meeting with Foreign Office we had been informed Argentina unhappy with OAS Commission because they had interrupted dialogue to press for visit. I had made clear in that and other conversations importance we attached to visits by outside organizations.

B. Minister of Interior in recent speech to police chiefs has emphasized need for humane treatment of all arrested persons. Similar word apparently has gone out more quietly to army. There appears definite diminution reports anti-terrorist operations and disappearance. (In meeting with president, I asked for accurate data on detainees. Minister of Interior handed me fact sheet in evening stating that 3,363 persons are presently detained—1,544 apprehended since the military takeover in March of 1976, the remainder before that date. Claim is made that 3,328 people arrested for "terrorist" activity have been released from custody (2,554 of them since the military takeover), and that a total of 1,679 additional have been sentenced or released through judicial process, civil and military. (Of these cases, 911 have been tried since March of 1976.) The fact sheet states that 600 people have been permitted to leave the country under "right of option", 160 foreigners expelled, and 58 persons have died while in custody. (Note: No dates were given for these last figures, nor other circumstances explained.) Minister and foreign office officials acknowledged far larger numbers of disappeared. Referring to lists published in press by human rights organizations they said they were now seeking to establish identity so they could respond to relatives.)

C. Cases of all some 3,300 political prisoners are now being reviewed to determine which shall be given right of option, which released, and which remanded to civilian courts.

D. President Videla stated he would speed up exercise of right of option if we were to offer more spaces in U.S. (I did not make any

commitment in view my uncertainty as to what action attorney general may take in pending proposal for 500 right of option paroles.)

E. President Videla and other members of Junta made clear their goal of ultimate return to civilian rule. While it may be superficial impression, I did not gain feeling that personalities in Junta were seeking to retain position for own personal political or financial gain as in some other countries. I was impressed by fact that each has date for stepping down from Junta role. However we may dislike the way they carry it out, there does seem definite feeling of responsibility for bringing country back to normal political processes.

F. ICRC visits continue to prisons with some effect on conditions.

7. There are, on the other hand, less positive elements:

A. The detainee review process is an administrative one only; there is no opportunity for accused to appear or be represented as dossiers are reviewed.

B. President and others were unwilling make commitment on time table for review, although they said release of addition 500 by end of 1978 was "reasonable expectation."

C. It is unclear how long those will be detained who are suspected terrorists, but on whom there is insufficient evidence to convict in court. I hammered hard on unacceptability this situation in US and have, at least, raised their consciousness of this problem area. Since total review still going on it is difficult to state how many may ultimately fall in this category of indefinite detention without trial.

D. There will continue to be arrests under state of siege orders. President of one Communist Party dominated human rights organization was arrested few days before my arrival. I pointed out this was exactly kind of event which set back efforts to normalize relations. He was released last night (May 25) after being held at police precinct station.⁴

E. Reports of torture continue to be received but confirmation is difficult.

8. It would be rash to predict that there will be uninterrupted positive trend in human rights in Argentina. Hardliners within regime will undoubtedly continue to sanction or take reprehensible actions which will gain world attention. Control over elements at lower echelons is far from complete. Nevertheless, there is on part of President

⁴ Antonio Sofia, president of the Argentine League for the Rights of Man, was arrested on May 19. (Telegram 4002 from Buenos Aires, May 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780218–0925) He was released on May 24. (Telegram 4038 from Buenos Aires, May 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221–0001)

Videla and members of Junta I met clear desire to improve situation. Succession of discussions with U.S. officials, including President Carter, has clearly raised consciousness of Human Rights concerns and has, I believe had positive impact. Ambassador Castro has effectively continued dialogue and is in position to continue and, particularly, to raise individually acts which represent set back to our efforts.

9. Out of these considerations, I reach conclusion that trends here and importance of responding to Argentine desire for normal relations justify modest step. Without such step, I cannot say our access here would be seriously reduced, but I do believe that with such step our leverage in Human Rights will continue and cooperation in other fields (such as nuclear questions) more likely.

10. President's decision to permit visit by OAS Commission gives us positive step on which to base positive response. To let him know that we are responding, propose that Ambassador Castro be authorized to inform him immediately that, as result visit, I am recommending that, once this announcement is made, we will consult with key Members of Congress and, following such consultations will resume sale of military training.⁵ We will thereafter, continue to examine situation and, if positive trends continue (particularly on detainees), will seek to respond with other releases.

11. At same time, I am suggesting to Ambassador that he continue, as he has, to point out immediately those actions which will complicate our efforts (such as further arrests, reports of new disappearances, etc.)

12. General Surut and Admiral Schuller will make calls tomorrow on service chiefs and will convey message similar mine (para 3 above).⁶ They will make no commitments on future sales or give indication our conclusions. Their visits will be helpful in giving us further feed back on yesterday's conversations.

13. I will meet with U.S. correspondents in Buenos Aires on background basis before my departure. Embassy will send report.⁷ My plan is merely to outline problem without indicating where I come out or what I am recommending to Department.

⁵ In telegram 134918 to Buenos Aires, May 26, Christopher instructed Castro to tell Videla that this recommendation had been approved. Christopher continued, "We of course assume, and you should make this clear, that the Argentine invitation will be for an IAHRIC visit in the near future under mutually acceptable ground rules so that the IAHRIC can fulfill its legitimate mission." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128-2358) In a May 26 memorandum to Carter, Vance informed the president of this decision. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 5/78)

⁶ In telegram 4085 from Buenos Aires, May 27, the Embassy summarized the visit of Surut and Schuller. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-2468)

⁷ No record of this meeting has been found.

14. I am also meeting with representatives from Human Rights organizations, including “mothers of disappeared” group, and privately with Buenos Aires *Herald* Director Cox, noted for his courageous public advocacy of Human Rights.⁸

Castro

⁸ In telegram 4080 from Buenos Aires, May 26, the Embassy transmitted a draft memorandum of conversation for Newsom’s meeting with representatives of the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. No final version of that memorandum has been found. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2452) A memorandum of conversation for Newsom’s meeting with Cox is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Human Rights Country Files, 1977, Lot 81D208, Box 3, Argentina.

82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, May 30, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

Argentina. We have had our first indication that Under Secretary Newsom’s trip to Argentina may be sparking needed action on human rights. Subsequent to Newsom’s return, Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded that in addition to the announcement, positive strides would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, and that by year end an impressive number of people would be released.² Such action could

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 5/78. Secret. Carter wrote, “Cy J” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² In telegram 4086 from Buenos Aires, May 29, Castro reported on his meeting with Videla. Videla stated “that GOA didn’t have any positive answers on the disappearances that can be documented publically. Videla was most emphatic in stating that very positive strides would be made in the area of prisoner releases. He asserted he could not now give me figures. He was sure that by September 30 many prisoners would be released. Speaking confidently, he said that certainly by the end of the year the list of persons released from prison would be most impressive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2476)

enable us to resume some shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal of the Kennedy/Humphrey new arms embargo.³ Videla seems genuinely to want improved relations with the US, and the question is whether his political situation will give him room to take the necessary steps.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

³ Carter wrote "good" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, June 26, 1978, 2313Z

162533. Subject: Human Rights and U.S. Programs in Argentina.
Ref: State 161509²

1. On basis fact that IAHRC does not feel able accept conditional Argentina invitation,³ Secretary has decided that:

(A) We cannot go forward, as hoped, with military training package and defense is being informed;⁴

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0540. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Schneider, Bushnell, McGiffert, Oxman, in H and S/S-O, and for information in EB; and approved by Newsom.

² The Department reported, June 24, on Newsom's meeting with Allara: "Newsom once again explained need to do something about prisoners, torture, disappearances and international inspection if United States is to justify policy changes, including military programs. Newsom welcomed invitation to Inter-American Human Rights Commission but there was no indication whether Argentine invitation would be acceptable to Commission." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780263-0255)

³ The invitation permitted the Commission "to verify that the actions taken by the GOA in dealing with the subversive/terrorist threat are fully consonant with the state-of-siege powers authorized by the constitution" and did not authorize the IAHRC to "take testimony from individuals, nor would it visit jails or meet with human rights groups." (Telegram 4814 from Buenos Aires, June 23, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780261-0530)

⁴ Vance informed Brown of these developments in an undated letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 27, Human Rights—Argentina III)

(B) In recognition of modest improvements, we will (after congressional consultations) release safety items (listed Septel)⁵ including compasses for vessels of U.K. manufacture;

(C) We will inform ExIm Bank that, on foreign policy grounds, we recommend against financing for Argentina at this time (this applies primarily to Allis Chalmers application for Yacireta hydroelectric project);

(D) We recommend against ExIm financing of aircraft but would not object to export if they can be privately financed.⁶

2. Department hopes arrange congressional consultations, including Senator Kennedy, on these cases this week.

3. Embassy may inform GOA, stressing disappointment that they have not been able extend normal invitation to IAHR (along lines of other Latin American countries) and have not as yet been able move appreciably on either releases of detainees or establishment of responsive machinery for those seeking information on relatives who have disappeared. Of course, any mutually acceptable agreement between the IAHR and the GOA enabling the commission to go to Argentina would be viewed as a positive development.⁷ These points stressed to Deputy Foreign Minister Allara as reported RefTel. (FYI: Argentina also has not halted illegal detentions and disappearances. End FYI)

4. FYI: Any prospect that we might have considered ExIm Bank financing apart from Human Rights matters was eliminated by Allara's insistence that GOA looked upon restrictions on ExIm financing as political act and clearly sought approval of such financing as indication of U.S. acceptance. End FYI.

5. ExIm has informed both Allis-Chalmers and Boeing of decision.

Vance

⁵ In telegram 163244 to Buenos Aires, June 27, the Department transmitted the list. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780266–0527)

⁶ In a June 28 memorandum to Carter, Vance noted that "if the invitation had been acceptable to the Commission, we had planned to go forward with the sale of military training to Argentina and to recommend that the Export-Import Bank approve certain pending applications for financing of some sizeable projects in Argentina. We do not plan to take these steps now in view of the character of the Argentine offer." In the margin, Carter wrote, "my slight inclination would be to find an excuse to approve training & to hold back ExIm deal." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 6/78)

⁷ In telegram 4971 from Buenos Aires, June 28, Castro reported on his meeting with Viola, who said "that he didn't think the USG would be expecting substantial results in such a short time—referring to Newsom visit. Having difficulty in speaking, he mumbled the World Cup had sapped all of Argentina of its energy and GOA had almost come to a complete stop for a month. He felt the USG was being somewhat inconsiderate." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780268–0082)

84. **Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)**¹

Washington, August 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Argentina: Your Questions

You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The item for the President is at Tab A.² The other questions are answered below.

I. Argentina's Human Rights Situation

Argentina is still one of the world's most serious human rights problem countries.³ Just this month, Amnesty International launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8–10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of arrest and torture. (One report from our Embassy is at Tab B.)⁴ On human rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that.

While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We understand that the Minister of Interior⁵ has instructed the police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "What do we do to get hold of the initiative? ZB."

² Tab A, undated, is attached but not printed. Brzezinski wrote, "While we are eager to build good relations with Argentina, the current human rights situation is so dismal that our relations may be reaching a breaking point." He outlined the steps taken by the Administration up to that point and concluded, "We are currently looking into a new strategy to break the deadlock."

³ Brzezinski underlined the phrase "the world's most serious human" and placed a question mark next to it. He wrote: "Cambodia Cuba USSR" in the right-hand margin.

⁴ Tab B, telegram 5656 from Buenos Aires, July 21, is attached but not printed.

⁵ Harguindeguy.

right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstated. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest—Jacobo Timerman, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family—the Argentine Government has released them.

II. U.S. Policy

In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting “no” on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI’s to abstaining. We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests.

We have informed the Argentine government that *if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation, we will go ahead* with military training to them and will recommend that the Export-Import Bank permit two major credit sales.

The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment prohibiting new arms transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be committed before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for \$50 million and \$150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a “slight” inclination to find an excuse for approving.⁶

Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the IAHRRC to visit in accordance with the IAHRRC’s regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without rearresting them); (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of law.

Everything is stuck now pending Argentina’s reaching agreement with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements, was made by State without consulting NSC.⁷

III. Future U.S. Policy: Who Blinks at the Brink?

Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression?

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 83.

⁷ Brzezinski underlined the phrase “without consulting NSC,” highlighted the last sentence of this paragraph, and wrote in the left-hand margin, “give me memo on this.” The memo is printed as Document 86.

The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all, President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he was working to restore the rule of law.⁸ Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government-sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice . . . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence . . ."⁹

I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find ourselves, would be judged as a presidential retreat just as surely as a different decision on Dresser.¹⁰

Personally, I am most disturbed about the decision not to finance \$270 million worth of Export-Import Bank credits. I don't believe that this is either a legitimate or an effective instrument, though I do agree with State that the law gave us little choice.¹¹ The decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business community (there are \$600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M), and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week.

I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first.

⁸ See footnote 6, Document 75.

⁹ Vance's speech to the OAS General Assembly, June 14, 1977, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, p. 70.

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 140 and 141.

¹¹ Brzezinski underlined the phrases "about the decision," "finance \$270 million," and "I don't" and highlighted the two sentences in which those phrases appear.

It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the *Times* and have given at least \$1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond.

So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you.

IV. *The Southern Cone: Are We Winning or Losing?*

I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against us is out-of-date and wrong.¹² For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries—led by Brazil but including Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay—tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Assembly.

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with extremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Argentina have almost gone to war over the Beagle Channel,¹³ and Brazil and Argentina have strained their relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights.

¹² Kissinger visited Argentina for the World Cup in June and met with Newsom on July 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 81D154, David Newsom Files, 1978–81, Box 14, Latin America) In a January 16, 1981, memorandum to Brzezinski, Bloomfield noted that Mathews' Evening Report for August 22, 1978, had stated "that Dr. Brzezinski had remarked to her on the previous week that the human rights policy had 'ruined' U.S. relations with Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Demurring, Dr. Mathews blamed the problems that had arisen on attempts to 'implement ill-advised Congressional directives,' particularly those mandating human rights actions on OPIC and the Ex-Im Bank—the Harkins Amendments.' An historic footnote: The staff had information that Dr. Brzezinski's reaction to the damage caused by U.S. policy took place the day after former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had reported to Dr. Brzezinski on the private results of the Carter trip to Argentina." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 131, Human Rights Policy, 1/81)

¹³ For the Beagle Channel dispute, see Document 37.

Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year.

What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Communism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike anything the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. *a future* in Latin America, which we had almost lost.

The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel—including Kissinger—to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines would ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real.

The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scapegoats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time.

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, August 10, 1978, 2100Z

6232. Subject: Derian Testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee

1. *Prensa, Clarin* and *Buenos Aires Herald* carried prominently UPI report of testimony by Assistant Secretary Patricia Derian before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, saying Derian “charged the Argentine Government with ‘systematic tortures’ and ‘summary executions,’ and claimed there are no significant signs that the human rights situation in Argentina is improving.”²

2. “In testimony before a subcommittee of the US House of Representatives, Miss Derian declared that so much evidence of human rights violations in Argentina has accumulated that to argue about it would be a ‘waste of time’.”

3. According to UPI Derian also said the GOA has failed to carry out its commitment to invite the IAHRC to visit Argentina and said Argentina has a very serious human rights problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 1 of 2. Confidential; Niac Immediate. Sent for information to USICA.

² A transcript of Derian’s August 9 testimony is in “Arms Trade in the Western Hemisphere,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, June 27, 28; June 19, 20; August 2, 9, 1978, p. 169–192. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978) In an August 11 memorandum to Vance transmitting this cable, Christopher wrote: “You should probably be aware of the attached telegram reporting Patt Derian’s very harsh language with respect to Argentina. Unquestionably the situation is very bad.” Christopher notified Vance that he was “encouraging Pete Vaky to go to Buenos Aires as soon as his schedule will permit.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 1 of 2) In a September 13 letter to Cohen and Bumpus, Harris wrote: “The human rights organizations here are ecstatic over the EXIM decision and Patt’s statement. They have all streamed into my office to express their pleasure and profound thanks. Unfortunately, I was out when the Embassy reaction cable was being drafted and the positive news did not get folded in.” Harris noted that “this was the first time in my recollection that we have mentioned the words ‘torture’ and ‘summary execution’ in public. This indication of what we really think (and know) touched the usually well hidden guilt complex among a number of the Argentine military. I had several incredible discussions as a result. I am becoming a confessor to both sides. The problem is that for many military leaders knowledge equates with accountability. The Derian statement questioned the military’s belief that the law of forgetfulness will in time absolve them of responsibility. Their domestic and international campaign of plausible denial was shaken by a few accurate words.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Box 1, Argentina—August 9 testimony)

4. *Herald* headlined “harsh statement on Argentina in the U.S.,” and *Prensa* “accusation against the Argentine Government.” In an unusual move, *Prensa* columnist Manfred Schonfeld strongly criticized the reported Derian remarks in what we expect will be the first of a number of editorial attacks against the U.S. Beside the Derian story in *La Prensa* was a UPI photo of a Philadelphia cop pushing his foot down on the head of one of the move group arrested titled “repression against extremists in the U.S.”

5. We received the wireless file text of the Assistant Secretary’s statement and USINFO 092045Z brief report on some of her testimony.³ However, the latter does not contain the quote that UPI featured. We have asked ICA to provide if available the verbatim testimony on Argentina ASAP.⁴

6. Comment: In the already overheated atmosphere I believe we can expect even sharper GOA and public reactions to the Derian remarks than we had after the ExIm Bank refusal of credits to Allis Chalmers which was perceived here as a public and formal accusation by the USG of Argentina. This is the second bombshell within a short period. I attended a reception this morning sponsored by the Argentine Air Force at Newberry (Aeroparque). I was the only ambassador and also only U.S. Embassy staff person invited. I felt as though I was walking into proverbial lion’s den. Immediate reference was made to Pat Derian’s alleged statements. Great concern was expressed about a total deterioration in USG-GOA relations. The Argentine concern was expressed in a tactful and courteous manner and not in anger, as I had anticipated. I do anticipate that when the whole affair is better digested all hell will break lose.

7. My “gut reaction” is I may be called in again by the FonMin as to the source of assistant secretary’s information on systematic torture and summary executions.⁵ I fear GOA’s assumption is info came from this embassy. GOA may well demand that USG support its public accusation with evidence.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In telegram 208752 to Buenos Aires, August 17, the Department transmitted a summary of Derian’s testimony before the subcommittee and her answers to questions at the session about Argentina. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780336-0931)

⁵ No record of Castro being called in by Montes at this time has been found.

8. Would appreciate department's comments on line I might take with GOA.⁶

Castro

⁶ In telegram 203729 to Buenos Aires, August 11, the Department instructed that any Embassy response to GOA questions about Derian's testimony should note that the testimony was "routine and made at subcommittee request on the overall issues of arms transfer policies in the region," that Derian's "prepared testimony did not in fact mention Argentina at all," that only two members of Congress were present, and that "in response to specific questions," Derian "was required to describe the human rights situation in Argentina. The answers were not meant to be provocative in any sense, but simply responsive to Congressional questions. You might reiterate that the written testimony did not mention Argentina." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329-0426)

86. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 14, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy to Argentina

This memorandum responds to your questions and comments on my memo of August 9 on Argentina.²

You asked how we can get hold of the policy and also asked me for a memo on the fact that State did not consult with NSC in selecting its policy towards Argentina. I don't think it would be *productive* to send a memorandum to the Secretary expressing displeasure for not being consulted on a previous decision.³

On Friday, I spoke to Vaky about Argentina. I asked him as well as Christopher's office, to keep me fully informed, and I expected that

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: "RI DR item for the P."

² See Document 84.

³ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin, "why not?"

I would be asked to attend the meeting to discuss it.⁴ I wasn't, but Vaky brought me up-to-date. He said that he and Newsom had agreed to send Vaky to Argentina at the end of the month to make one last attempt at breaking the impasse in U.S.-Argentine relations. In order to improve the prospects of a successful meeting between Vaky and Videla, they hope to obtain State-NSC⁵ approval of several items in the munitions control list. This could then be presented as a positive gesture of our interest in good relations. In addition, it is vitally important that we make an attempt at mediating between an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Argentine Government in a way which permits the latter to save face and the former to preserve its institutional integrity. Vaky also thinks that a Presidential letter reiterating the President's interest in good relations with Argentina would be useful, and while I think it is also a good idea, I think we should wait until we have looked at the whole range of decisions that need to be made before we consider a letter.⁶

I had originally planned to recommend that you send a memo to Vance which, in effect, requested that the next round of decisions on U.S. policy to Argentina would be made with full NSC involvement and consultation by the NSC, but after speaking with Vaky, and repeating your interest that we stay very much involved, he assured me that he would keep me involved. I am not so certain that Dave Newsom, who made the previous decisions without the NSC's involvement, is as interested as Vaky is. Perhaps a brief mention of this to the Secretary would be helpful. To the extent that I am involved, I will, of course, keep you fully informed.⁷

⁴ "Friday" refers to August 11. In an August 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Christopher wrote, "We have been probing for ways to take a more forthcoming stance on Argentina." He further noted, "After Vaky returns from Colombia on Wednesday, he, Newsom, and I will meet to review the situation again." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78) "Wednesday" refers to August 9. No record of this meeting has been found.

⁵ Brzezinski underlined the phrase "State-NSC."

⁶ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence.

⁷ In a memorandum to Pastor, August 16, Inderfurth wrote, "ZB has informed the President that Vaky will go to Argentina, several items on the munitions control list may be approved, we will make an attempt to mediate between the Human Rights Commission and the Argentine Government, and a letter to Videla from the President may be necessary." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78)

87. Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, August 22, 1978

Dear Cy:

As a follow-up to the August 17 discussion between you, Zbig, and me concerning our deteriorating relations with Argentina,² I would like to recommend some positive steps which I believe should be taken on an urgent basis to reverse the recent sharp downturn in those relations.

I believe there was general agreement between us that our relations with Argentina have very seriously deteriorated. I believe the recent Argentine Navy decision to withdraw from UNITAS may represent just the first of negative steps which the GOA will feel forced to take unless we moderate our approach. While our human rights policy is very important, we need also to take into account that Argentina is a key nation with respect to our non-proliferation policy and that a go-it-alone Argentina—whether that might mean formation of destabilizing ties with Peru, a more provocative stand on the Beagle Channel issue, withdrawal from the Rio pact,³ or enhanced relations with Soviet bloc countries—is not in our interest. Further, it may well be at this point that some modification of our approach, if properly explained, will actually help on the human rights issues.

I welcome Secretary Vaky's proposed September visit. But in addition, concrete actions are needed. On the military side, I recommend we moderate our position by approving before September 30 all the pending Argentine spare parts requests, including but not limited to those which are safety related, offering this as a gesture of U.S. good faith at a time when what Ambassador Castro characterizes as "outraged nationalism"⁴ seems to be the governing factor in Argentine politics. Also, to the extent our law allows, I believe we should approve the pending requests to purchase DoD training courses.

There have been several developments since a hold was put on these transactions. Argentine public reaction to the denial of the \$270 million EXIM Bank loan for the hydroelectric project⁵ and to the public

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9–12/78. Secret.

² Not found.

³ See footnote 7, Document 1.

⁴ Telegram 6383 from Buenos Aires, August 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780337–0502)

⁵ Reference is to the Allis Chalmers project for the Yacyreta dam. See Document 83.

testimony by Pat Derian before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs⁶ has been, as we understand it, very negative.

The terrorist bombing of Admiral Lambruschini's residence, resulting in the death of his teenage daughter, has also served to strengthen the argument of minority hard-line elements of the Argentine military that reforms are premature. The alleged Tyson statement reflecting USG support for the Montonero terrorists, even though totally false,⁷ has done further serious harm to our efforts to promote democratization. The GOA has, in fact, taken some positive steps to meet the conditions laid down during Dave Newsom's visit⁸ by initiating an invitation to the IAHRC, by agreeing to a majority of conditions necessary for such a visit, and by continuing to consider the remainder. Finally, in view of the new junta-president power relationship established August 4,⁹ power plays between the president and junta, and within the junta itself, will probably continue for the near term, delaying the resolution of key policy issues.

Unlike the EXIM Bank decision, our decision to withhold training and spare parts has not been made public here or in Argentina. For this reason, I think we could safely modify our current position without seeming to vacillate. We need to do this immediately—or at the latest by the time of the Vaky visit because of the administrative lead-time prior to the legislated embargo date of September 30 which would be needed to implement any go-ahead decision. In connection with such a decision we could inform the GOA privately that: (1) we recognize the internal political difficulties which have recently developed, (2) we are offering these approvals as concrete evidence of our good faith and determination to work together toward mutual objectives, and (3) we hope and expect they will see fit to develop and implement a set of substantial human rights initiatives soon.

Sincerely,

Harold

⁶ See Document 85.

⁷ In telegram 6317 from Buenos Aires, August 15, the Embassy noted that "there is an assertion being disseminated in Argentine political circles that the USG perceives the Montonero terrorist organization as a legitimate political expression worthy of support. This allegation can create irreparable harm and should be repudiated." The Embassy traced the rumor to a statement made by Brady Tyson, an official in USUN. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780334-0743) In telegram 4520 from Santo Domingo, August 17, Tyson wrote: "At no time did I ever advocate legitimization of any terrorist or guerrilla group, but rather only that the Argentines need to talk more among themselves before asking us for solutions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780336-1028)

⁸ See Documents 79, 80, and 81.

⁹ Videla resigned his commission as commander in chief of the army. The junta's "fourth man," he was sworn in as civilian president, and Viola was chosen as the new army commander in chief.

88. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights in Argentina

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single-spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-President and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights.² Bravo spent four hours with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself reading through the entire 14-page Memcon,³ though I had intended only to skim it.

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have prepared below a short summary of that Memcon.

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"—plain-clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. Then begins the horror.

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punishment. He himself was:

- beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;
- subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;
- subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1–8/78. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Mathews. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski placed a check mark and wrote the phrase "a compelling, forceful report. ZB."

² July 10. Attached but not printed. Schneider sent the memorandum of conversation to Christopher and Oxman. On the August 11 covering memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: Copies sent to Vaky, Newsom and Pastor. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights—Argentina IV)

³ Inderfurth inserted a handwritten comment in the right-hand margin: "so did I. Worth reading. Rick."

—subjected to “the submarine”—repeatedly being held under water until almost drowned.

Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:

—As he was moved from detention center to detention center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.

—Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was applied; a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by and her boy friend shot when he objected; the group was beaten.

Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a litany of questions about the activities and political affiliations of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session, Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded, heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired. Then he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and to detention.

Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on an entirely different plane—as civilized people conducting a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a “regular prisoner”, and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would be found to have committed suicide. During his months in La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his own and worse.

In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said he provided this information “to show you what you are fighting for”.⁴ He asked that the Embassy treat the information carefully, “as my life is in your hands”.⁵

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence and underlined the phrase “show you what you are fighting for.”

⁵ At the bottom of the memorandum, Inderfurth wrote, “ZB, This is a very good summary of the memcon. Do you want to use it in the WR? Rick.”

89. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 31, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy to Argentina

In my last memorandum to you on this subject,² I told you that Vaky had assured me he would keep NSC fully informed as we developed *an overall strategy* to deal with our deteriorating relationship with Argentina. I regret that this has not been the case. Decisions are beginning to be made by the State Department in a haphazard, uncoordinated manner. I understand that Newsom has approved the licensing of several munition items, and today Christopher's staff called to inform me that Christopher had approved the sale of two Boeing helicopters for the Argentine army.

I asked Vaky what had happened to our agreement to develop an overall strategy, and he said that he had a strategy, and it was "in his head". Vaky said that these individual decisions are designed to send positive signals to Argentina, thus improving the atmosphere in our relationship and providing an inducement for Videla to agree to meet with Vaky.

Vaky's strategy may be correct, but I think there are serious holes in it, and continue to believe very strongly that unless we sit down and develop a paper which sets out a coherent strategy, we will run the risk of having these steps seriously misinterpreted by our domestic audience while at the same time losing potentially significant leverage on the Argentines. For example, when the U.S. business community learns that the Export-Import Bank has, at State Department request, denied issuing a letter of interest on a \$270 million sale of hydro-electric equipment,³ while a few weeks later State recommends the issuance of a license⁴ for the sale of two Army helicopters and other military equipment,⁴ the President and our policy will look foolishly inconsistent. In other words, while individual

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen and Denend. At the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "set up meeting, incl. McGiffert, you, DA, & Vaky ZB."

² See Document 86.

³ Reference is to Ex-Im Bank financing of the Allis Chalmers project for the Yacyreta dam. See Document 83.

⁴ Not found.

decisions may appear right one day, they may (appear to) be inconsistent. Unless we put all the steps together in a logical and coherent strategy *which is publicly defensible*, we will leave ourselves open to serious and legitimate criticism.

After requesting an accounting of items currently being withheld by the State Department for months, finally Pete Vaky gave me a list, and I am absolutely astounded by the sheer quantity of the trade we have, in effect, embargoed against Argentina.⁵ There are now pending 210 munitions lists license requests, valued at \$145 million; 29 Commerce license requests, valued at \$31 million; and approximately 11 Export-Import Bank transactions, valued at nearly \$600 million. (The latter figure I obtained in the brief which Coleman left with Owen;⁶ the brief indicated that the State Department had estimated that there was \$1.25 billion in non-military exports to Argentina being held up for human rights reasons.) The list is so staggering that I am led to wonder just how much U.S. trade world-wide is being held up by the State Department; it may be enough to have a significant impact on our balance of payments. The letter from Harold Brown to Secretary Vance (he sent you a copy at Tab B)⁷ unfortunately does not offer us any guidance. DOD has no strategy, except to open the floodgates.

I believe that there are certain steps that we can take:⁸

—(1) I would send our Ambassador Castro in to see President Videla (or General Viola) to convey a personal message from President Carter of concern about the state of our relationship and a wish that we both take steps to improve that relationship. As a positive gesture, Castro can inform Videla that we have approved licenses for the helicopters and for several other safety-related equipment. He should also state that President Carter would like it if President Videla could receive Ambassador Vaky to discuss ways to improve our relationship in greater detail.

—(2) We approach the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in an informal way and suggest various formulae which could possibly break the deadlock and secure an agreement from the Argentine Government for an early visit. (Once an agreement is reached, we are in a legitimate position to begin moving on a large share of those items which are currently suspended.)

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the second part of this sentence, beginning with "absolutely astounded" and ending with "Argentina."

⁶ Not found.

⁷ Tab B, attached, is printed in Document 87.

⁸ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "certain steps."

—(3) In advance of Vaky's visit, the Export-Import Bank should begin approving several loans which are from our private sector to their private sector. We can justify that by saying that these loans cannot in any way be interpreted as supportive of the Government if they go directly to the private sector.

—(4) The Vaky visit should be more than just atmospheric, although that should be an important element. He should make clear to Videla that we are prepared to move immediately on a large number of items if Videla reaches agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and takes several other carefully calibrated steps.

These four steps are actually a rough outline of what a strategy paper should look like. I have drafted a letter at Tab A⁹ which suggests a high-level review of this issue. I recommend that instead of sending it to Secretary Vance you use it as guidance, and that you call Secretary Vance instead.

I don't believe that a major paper is required, but if State squawks at drafting a paper quickly, I would be prepared to do it.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you call Secretary Vance and urge him to have a paper drafted which sets forth several objectives for an overall strategy.¹⁰

Alternatively, that you send the letter at Tab A.

⁹ Tab A is attached but not printed.

¹⁰ Brzezinski checked the approve option, and wrote "spoke to him" above it. In an August 31 note to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "As I was about to send this package across the street, Orfila called and told me that he had just received a phone call from the Argentine Army Chief of Staff that the Army has recommended that General Videla meet with Vice President Mondale in Rome next Monday. I think that is the opportunity that we have been waiting for." Inderfurth concurred and wrote: "but only if the VP has something to say (e.g. meaning that a coherent strategy on U.S.-Argentine relations has been worked out & agreed to)." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77–12/78)

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Rome, September 4, 1978, 10 a.m.

ARGENTINE SIDE

President Videla
 Col. Miguel A. Mallea Gil
 Dr. Ricardo Yofre

U.S. SIDE

Vice President Walter F. Mondale
 A. Denis Clift
 Interpreter:

VP: I am pleased to have this meeting. I remember the meeting we had in the White House at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty ceremony.² We want good relations and, speaking candidly, there are strains now. I hope today we can make some progress. I told the President of your request. He said by all means I should meet with you and he asked me to extend best wishes. He said we don't want trouble with Argentina, but human rights are a central concern. I will report to the President personally on your views.

V: Thank you, Mr. Vice President, for inviting me. For me it is an extremely important opportunity to discuss these matters because I feel our relations are deteriorating. I fully concur with President Carter's position on human rights. We have profound belief in the democratic process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. We are with the United States and we are not troubled by criticism when it is objective. However, we are concerned by attitudes projecting intervention in domestic affairs. I spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time we have had to delay our announcement of an invitation to the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting intervention.

A second problem—Argentine politicians were invited to visit the United States, but they, too, did not visit because of the U.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations.³

VP: Were her statements made in Argentina or in Washington?

V: In Washington before Congress. Mr. Vice President, the western world must be united, and the United States must lead the western

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–80, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Background. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Gardner's residence. Clift sent an abbreviated record of this conversation under a September 5 covering memorandum to Vaky, Aaron, and Pastor. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9–12/78)

² See Document 63.

³ See Document 85.

world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is our concern.

VP: I fully understand. We don't want to get into such a situation. We want to work with you to have good relations. As you know, the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allis-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be important if you could have the Interamerican Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link your actions with our own, but if you do something, then we could do something.⁴

As you know, the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to our press—people such as Jacobo Timerman. To the extent that you make progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress. We know that you have had problems in your country, and we want to work with you to establish a firm basis for progress.

V: I understand, and government-to-government relations are not easy. My concern is when a problem between us is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where our citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where our businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when Ex-Im does not grant a loan.

VP: I understand. If we could get this turned around then we could move ahead, for example, on Allis-Chalmers. I would also like to suggest that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could

⁴ In a September 1 memorandum to Mondale, Brzezinski wrote: "Cy, Harold, and I believe that the time has come for us to make clear to the Argentines that we value good relations and that we are prepared to explore ways to move our relationship forward. In effect, what that means is that we will take a series of significant steps releasing some loans, commercial sales, military equipment, etc. if they can take a few steps forward in the human rights field, such as reaching agreement for a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, charging and perhaps releasing political prisoners, punishing torturers, etc." (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–80, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Meeting with President Videla of Argentina) In a September 2 letter to Clift, Armacost wrote: "It is Defense's view that in light of current conditions, the Vice President's meeting with Videla can produce a turn-around of the downward spiral of US/Argentine bilateral relations only if he can change the current atmospherics of the relationship. We believe this can be accomplished through the vehicle of a more positive response—using as a catalyst approval of the long-standing Argentine requests for military equipment and training." (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Meeting with President Videla of Argentina)

come to Argentina to meet with you or with a person of your choice for a review of our relations.⁵

V: Would this be after the Interamerican Commission or before.

VP: Oh, I think it should be as soon as possible.

V: Perhaps we could arrange a visit by the commission by mid-October.

VP: But could you announce the visit earlier.

V: Perhaps. I would like to point out that since our meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of our government:

—we have issued a list and names of all the detained;

—we have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared;

—last Christmas we released approximately 500;

—this last week, 65 individuals were freed;

—I have indicated that we are prepared to give a favorable response to the Commission on Human Rights;

—Timerman's situation has changed; he is now out of jail and under house arrest;

—Professor Bravo is now under house arrest and we expect the court to lessen the charges against him.⁶

Officials of the U.S. government are welcome in Argentina, but they cannot give the impression that they are coming to inspect us.

VP: No, they would come exercising discretion. It will be important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the commission.

V: We could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced us to suspend our announcement. In the course of a few days, I believe we could develop a satisfactory announcement.

C: In considering the announcement, it is important to remember the tight timing in the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take its

⁵ In a September 1 memorandum to Mondale, Vance wrote: "The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose." (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Meeting with President Videla of Argentina)

⁶ See Document 88.

decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment comes into effect on October 1.

VP: We would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then.

V: This was our intention. I don't think it can be done, however, before September 15.

VP: We are encouraged that you will receive the commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done.

V: Yes.

VP: When may Assistant Secretary Vaky come.

V: After our announcement on the commission. For Vaky we would prefer no other stops.

VP: You would like him to visit Argentina alone.

V: Ideally, yes.

VP: I won't give you a yes on this, but I will recommend it and I will get back to you.

V: Will you let us know ahead of time what his mission will be to permit us to prepare for it.

VP: I will report to the President on my return and we will contact your ambassador immediately.⁷

V: Mr. Vice President, U.S.-Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels—economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. We can understand this problem if it is addressed in the broader spectrum of our overall relations and is not the single focus.

VP: We have no desire to interfere in the affairs of your country. We have enough domestic problems of our own. If we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. We want the best possible relations. The President was taken by you during

⁷ In a September 7 memorandum to Carter, Mondale summarized his conversation with Videla and wrote: "I suggested that if he could confirm that he would announce a satisfactory invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, we might be able to take favorable action on the ExIm letter of interest prior to his announcement—without linking the two. He said that I could confirm to you that he will make this announcement this month as soon as possible after September 15, and he said that following the announcement he would also be agreeable to having Assistant Secretary Vaky visit Argentina." (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 22, Vice President's Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78–9/4/78: Background) In telegram 226556 to Buenos Aires, September 7, the Department summarized the Mondale-Videla meeting and asked Castro "to follow up in low key fashion" with Videla or Yofre to ask whether Videla had "a clear view of the timetable which might be likely for both the announcement of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visit and the Vaky trip?" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2007)

the meeting he had last year. He is disappointed in the current course of our relations. He wants our relations to head in the right direction. I think we are now at a point where we can turn the right way.

V: I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter.

91. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, September 15, 1978

SUBJECT

US-Argentine Relations: A Status Report Since your Meeting with Videla

Following up your meeting with President Videla,² we asked our Ambassador to speak to Videla's assistant, Ricardo Jofre, to obtain a timetable for Vaky's visit.³ We learned that the deadline for the submission of the bid by Allis-Chalmers was put off one month to October 15.⁴ We were also informed that the Argentines plan to announce in early October an agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a visit and that they expect a visit from Pete Vaky by the second or third week of October.

Christopher and Henry Owen met with John Moore and decided that a letter of interest could be issued to Allis-Chalmers about October 1, which is satisfactory to the Argentines and to Allis-Chalmers. The Argentine Government will be taking a number of steps, including releasing prisoners, before then, and that will make it easy for us to explain to the American public why we have altered our X-M decision.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries—Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential.

² See Document 90.

³ In telegram 7065 from Buenos Aires, September 8, the Embassy reported on an initial meeting with Yofre. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-2501) In telegram 7075 from Buenos Aires, September 9, Castro reported on his September 8 meeting with Yofre. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-2504)

⁴ See Document 83.

Dave Newsom will be chairing a meeting next week to discuss an overall strategy for US policy to Argentina.⁵

We have noticed in our conversations with the Argentines a new receptiveness and interest in discussing a wide range of issues, and we believe this was made possible by your conversation with Videla. Still, there is a long way to go. We have learned, for example, that the Argentines are playing games with us on ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco primarily because they feel we are playing games with them on human rights.

⁵ See Document 92.

92. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Thoughts on the Attached

I share some of Bob's frustration,² but I cannot agree that our policy towards Argentina has been "disastrous". It has certainly been difficult, uneven and tense, but given the conflicting interests at stake I'm not sure exactly how it could have been improved. Consider:

—The human rights record of President Videla's administration is horrible. Reports of vicious and institutionalized torture are well

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9–12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Pastor, Albright, and Renner.

² In a September 25 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor described a September 19 meeting, "chaired by Newsom, which I hoped would deal with the general strategic question. Instead, it dealt with *only two decisions*: IMET training and \$17 million worth of spare parts. We were informed at the beginning of the meeting that State had recently decided to release a large number of military and safety-related items, to clear all of the FMS in the pipeline, and a large number of the commerce-related items." Pastor continued: "This is just the latest set of decisions in a disastrous policy. We are exactly back where we hoped we wouldn't be: dribbling out decisions rather than agreeing to a strategy." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9–12/78)

documented. On the other hand, neither we nor Videla can control the indisputable terrorist threat, and Videla is probably better than anyone who would replace him on the right or the left.

—The GOA is caught between wanting to continue its long and close relationship with the US and wanting to prove its pride and strength by thumbing its nose at us—as Brazil has done.

—The GOA wants to pursue (or at least keep alive) a nuclear weapons option. We don't want them to.

—Argentina has been the site of heavy foreign investment, while the Congress, over Administration opposition, enacts linkages between trade/investment and human rights. On the merits, if these restrictions apply anywhere, they apply in Argentina.

—There is a very high sensitivity to Argentine events in Congress. The Kennedy Amendment which takes effect next week is unique.

Given all these crosscurrents, both between the two governments and within the GOA, I don't know what an overall "strategy" would look like. Our actions haven't been as random as they might seem. *I see two threads as having shaped our behavior toward Argentina.* First, *reaction to conflicting signals from the GOA*—promises of progress, short term progress then regression, a forward and back pattern repeated over and over. Not just on human rights, but equally on proliferation. Secondly, *implementing the law*—the impending deadline of the Kennedy amendment, and the Harkin amendments, particularly on Ex-Im.

At one point an effort to explicitly define a "strategy" was made—with bad results. That was Newsom's instructions for his visit there last spring.³ To a certain extent, that approach was repeated in Mondale's recent meeting with Videla,⁴ in that we tried to define an explicit tradeoff for the GOA—you do this and we'll do that. While that approach seems tight and neat, it doesn't work because when the GOA doesn't do what it promises we cannot be flexible without appearing to "blink". When we change the conditions or give the quid without the quo, I suspect that we strengthen the hands of the hardliners within the GOA and further weaken the credibility of the moderates.

I have only two prescriptions and neither has to do with Argentina—they are of general application. The first is that we devote considerable effort to an education project to convince Congress that linking certain trade and investment policies with human rights does not further the cause of human rights. This would be a long, slow process without a new "accomplishment" at the end, but I suspect it would be well worth the effort. The second is that we try, in administering

³ See Document 80.

⁴ See Document 90.

the human rights programs, to avoid judging trends—positive or negative—at less than annual intervals. This would be hard to apply on visits from the Presidential level down to the Assistant Secretary, for it is on these occasions that we most often look for some hook on which to hang a positive action—gift, loan, agreement or whatever. But there are other artificial deadlines to which we frequently react—an impending IFI vote for example. The truth is that in reacting to short term changes we inevitably condemn ourselves to follow a jerky and inconsistent policy, for change that is lasting and meaningful on a societal scale seldom occurs in less than a year's time, and generally in much longer (obviously there are exceptions—a revolution, etc.). Making this change in policy would require a Presidential decision since it would alter established ways of doing business. It also obviously carries the risk of being overly rigid, but at least it seems to me worth a serious look—a study of its pluses and minuses.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my drafting a Dodson-Tarnoff memorandum directing an interagency study of the advantages and disadvantages of a policy that would explicitly seek to avoid any US evaluation of positive or negative trends in human rights observance at less than annual intervals.⁵

⁵ Brzezinski underlined the words “advantages” and “disadvantages.” He checked the approve option and wrote, “but only after further in-staff discussion. Won’t it lock us in? ZB.”

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina¹

Washington, October 3, 1978, 0029Z

250739. Subject: Secretary Vance's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Montes.

1. Secretary Vance met with Argentine Foreign Minister Montes on September 29 in New York. Ambassador Ros and Ambassador Aja Espil of Argentina and Under Secretary Newsom were also present. Foreign Minister Montes raised the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment and the Treaty of Tlatelolco and offered Argentine assistance on Middle East efforts.

2. Montes noted that during the meeting between Vice President Mondale and President Videla in Rome,² it was agreed that certain steps were to be taken by the United States and then by Argentina. He had been informed of the increased flexibility in the US Ex-Im Bank³ and thanked the secretary for this. The next step, was up to Argentina. He left in Buenos Aires a draft of the positive reply to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and Videla plans to reply before the deadline. Montes hoped that if the IAHRC goes to Argentina it will be as objective as possible.

3. Montes noted that the Humphrey/Kennedy amendment goes into effect October 1. For many years the U.S. has supplied Argentine military equipment and training. The cut off of spare parts will be particularly difficult. Perhaps the next step would be for the U.S. to review the situation and determine if legally spare parts could be supplied to Argentina. Ambassador Newsom noted that the Brooke

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS 1978 Memcons for Vance. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Ruser, Newsom, and Vaky and in S/S; and approved by Perry. Vance was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

² See Document 90.

³ Reference is to the Ex-Im Bank financing of the Allis Chalmers project for the Yacyreta dam. In a September 26 memorandum to Brzezinski, Mathews noted, "Christopher has approved 30 of the 70 requested IMET slots for Argentina. I have discussed this with Pastor and we both agree that coming so soon after the export policy announcement and the change in the Allis Chalmers decision, this could trigger the conclusion that the US has made a major reappraisal of its human rights policy, at least with respect to Argentina." She continued, "I see the need to send some positive signals but haven't we already done that? In the past few weeks we have approved many spare parts and safety related munitions list items, as well as Commerce list items. Now we have reversed the Ex-Im decision. These steps seem to me more than adequate in the circumstances: IMET seems just too much." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78)

Amendment makes it possible to release some goods where the contract was made before the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment. We had reviewed some cases and had released some items, including helicopters and periscopes. Newsom added that the USG had looked at a number of items in light of legislation and inequities to manufacturers. Consultations with Congress, however, indicated the authors of the amendment took a strict view with regard to military supplies, especially spare parts. Newsom said that the United States recognized the hardship for Argentina but must await an improved situation and congressional action. Montes noted that in terms of the political relationship spare parts were very important. Secretary Vance said he would look into the issue.⁴

4. Montes noted that there was some concern in the United States and especially in the State Department with regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁵ He explained the process of ratification. The Foreign Ministry sent a draft to the defense and economic ministries and then the treaty was sent to the president. The president returned it to the Foreign Ministry for changes and the treaty was sent to the defense ministry on August 14 for signature. It then went again to the presidency. From there it was sent to the administrative and legislative commission for approval. Montes indicated it would then require presidential signature to complete formal legal ratification. He emphasized that in accordance with Videla's instructions, all steps in the ratification process would be taken as expeditiously as possible.

5. The secretary briefed Montes on Camp David and Montes congratulated him on the success. Montes related that when he spoke with President Ceausescu in Romania, the Romanian leader said that Argentina could use its good offices effectively with both the Arabs and the Israelis. Montes personally had spoken to both the Jewish and Arab communities in Argentina and offered to speak to the ambassador if the secretary thought that would be useful. The Secretary said he would be grateful if Montes would speak to the ambassadors in Buenos Aires.

6. Montes said he personally had taken steps to improve relations because he felt that US/Argentina relations were fundamental to both countries and noted commercial relations were on the right track. Secre-

⁴ In an October 4 memorandum to Perry, Hughes noted, "ARA drafted memo on 9/30 from Newsom to Christopher stating that Humphrey-Kennedy prohibits transfer of spare parts; memo included an L interpretation supporting this view. Newsom requested D's concurrence to inform Argentines of this fact." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS 1978 Memcons for Vance)

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 443.

tary Vance expressed the desire to move the relations between the two countries in a positive direction and was pleased that the Mondale/Videla meeting had been constructive.

Christopher

**94. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale¹**

Memo No. 999-78

Washington, October 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Argentina to Accept Human Rights Commission Delegation

Argentina announced October 17 its willingness to permit a visit by a delegation from the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), preferably between March and May of next year. An official in the Argentine president's office told Embassy Buenos Aires that the IAHRC delegation will have access to prisons, political leaders and the relatives of missing persons—but not to military bases. Even so, he added, the decision to accept the delegation was controversial in Argentine military and government circles.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries—Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential. Sent for information.

² In telegram 8248 from Argentina, October 18, the Embassy discussed the IAHRC decision and reported: "GOA retains an interest in having a visit by Assistant Secretary Vaky, but our source recognizes that the timing of such a visit may be dependent upon the proposed cabinet change and Beagle Channel developments." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427-0264) For the Beagle Channel dispute, see Documents 37.

95. **Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

Next Steps in Argentina

The increasing magnitude and brutality of Argentine human rights violations convince me that it is time for us to take additional measures to underscore our concerns and bring pressure to bear on the Junta to make improvements. Only substantial pressure across a broad front is likely to have any real effect, and there are a number of things we can and should do.

The situation is clearly deteriorating:²

—38 bodies, many of them without heads or hands, were recently washed ashore on one of Argentina's Atlantic beaches. A Buenos Aires newspaper which had investigated the report killed the story at the direction of the Presidential Press Office.

—Our Embassy estimates that about 55 disappearances a month take place in Argentina. The International Red Cross representative in Buenos Aires recently characterized the disappearances as "a calculated policy" of the Argentine authorities.³

—For the past three weeks, security forces have arrested and threatened to imprison mothers of the disappeared who have held weekly silent demonstrations in the capital's main square for the past two

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 28, Human Rights—Argentina IV. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in D at 6:02 p.m. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, "WC—Here is Patt's thinking on Argentina, which I mentioned in my memo for your meeting Friday." Reference presumably is to Friday, February 2.

² An unknown hand bracketed the word "deteriorating" and wrote "not improving substantially" in the right-hand margin. In a January 29 memorandum to Lake, Feinberg wrote: "Whether the Argentine situation is getting worse, in terms of body counts, will be debated by some, but I would argue that the behavior of the Argentine security forces is now more alarming, in that anti-government terrorism has been virtually eliminated for over a year. Current violations, therefore, are part of a simple and systematic policy of repression of non-violent political opposition." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, [unfolded material])

³ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph and underlined the phrase "55 disappearances a month."

years. This heavy-handed police intimidation follows by only a few weeks the soothing promises given the mothers by a Presidential Palace spokesman at Christmas.

—An officer of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights told our Embassy in December that security forces simply murdered a couple in their own home without bothering to take them to a detention center.⁴ The same source said he had received other recent reports of such killings.

—We continue to receive numerous highly credible reports that torture is used routinely in the interrogation of detainees.⁵ The electric “picana,” something like a supercharged cattle prod, is still apparently a favorite tool, as is the “submarine” treatment (immersion of the head in a tub of water, urine, excrement, blood, or a combination of these).

—Prison treatment of the 3,200 acknowledged political detainees has deteriorated sharply in recent months,⁶ according to the International Red Cross representative in Argentina. Torture, beatings, and dietary neglect are common for them and for the unacknowledged detainees held in secret military facilities. Another source reported that fifty female detainees recently transferred between prisons “have not been exposed to the sun for so long that their skin color is greenish . . . Some have lost their eyesight. Many are mentally deranged.”⁷

These developments illustrate the reasons why I believe we should, at a minimum, take these actions:⁸

—Vote “No” on all IFI loans to Argentina which do not clearly meet the basic human needs criteria, and at least invite other donor countries to take similar action.⁹

—Switch from “Yes” to “Abstain” on IFI loans which meet the basic human needs criteria.

—Instruct our Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission to make a strong statement condemning Argentine human rights violations.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “torture is used routinely.”

⁶ [text not declassified]

⁷ In a meeting with Harris, Hinojose discussed the case of her niece Lillian Vogeler and events in Villa Devoto prison. (Memorandum of Conversation, between Hinojose and Harris, December 4, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, [unfolded material])

⁸ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “at a minimum, take these actions.”

⁹ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “IFI loans.”

—Begin to deny commercial licenses of military-related equipment destined to the Argentine Armed Forces, as we now do with equipment for the police.¹⁰

—Deny or delay Export-Import Bank financing for new projects in Argentina.¹¹ If necessary, we should seek a Presidential determination under the Chaffee Amendment that denial would advance U.S. human rights objectives.¹²

—Mount major new diplomatic effort to persuade foreign arms suppliers to stop selling military and police equipment to Argentina.¹³

—Give careful consideration to suspending or halting entirely the pipeline of U.S.-origin military equipment purchased by Argentina under earlier programs.¹⁴

—In connection with, and explanation of, the above measures, issue a strong public statement condemning the continuing deterioration of Argentine human rights practices.

We simply have to begin to take measures like these if we expect to see any meaningful improvements. There is no longer any doubt that Argentina has the worst human rights record in South America. We cannot wait for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission visit at the end of May. While we hope that Argentine Government preparations for the visit, and the visit itself, will result in some improvements, we should not rely exclusively on this event. A high-ranking Foreign Ministry official recently said his government plans to stonewall the Commission on the disappearance issue.¹⁵

We would not be alone in taking more forceful measures. I understand that both Canada and the UK share the view that the situation is worsening. Canada, as a result, has halted transfers—not just of

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “commercial licenses of military-related equipment.”

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “Export-Import Bank financing.”

¹² Reference is to an amendment to the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act, sponsored by Chafee. The amendment prohibited the Export-Import Bank from denying applications for nonfinancial considerations unless the President determined that it was in the national interest and would advance U.S. policy, including human rights policy. Carter signed it into law as P.L. 95–630 on November 10, 1978.

¹³ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “to persuade foreign arms suppliers.”

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined the word “pipeline.”

¹⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence. In telegram 627 from Buenos Aires, January 23, the Embassy reported that Arlia “bluntly stated that the issue of the ‘desaparecidos’ was not an area of concern as there was nothing the government could do to resolve this problem. The disappearance reports would be a question of the government’s word that they had no information on the cases against that of parents and others claiming that government forces were responsible.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790034–0196)

arms—to the Argentine military.¹⁶ Both countries, as well as some Scandinavian countries, are seriously considering opposing IFI loans to Argentina.

¹⁶ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

96. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)¹

Washington, February 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Evaluation of Argentine Human Rights Situation

Pursuant to your tasking memorandum of January 27² I enclose the paper now approved by ARA, INR, HA and S/P. I have included on two or three points a dissenting analyses and evaluation in the form of footnotes. These were basic differences which could not be reconciled.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Box 1, Argentina—August 9 Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote "Rec'd 2/16." Below this the hand wrote "(cc: SC [Steven Cohen])." Derian crossed out "SC" and wrote below it: "my file Arg."

² In a January 27 memorandum, Tarnoff noted that Vance had established a working group, to be chaired by Vaky, "in order to make a complete and current assessment of the human rights situation in Argentina." The working group members were Vaky, Derian, Bowdler, and Lake. Tarnoff requested to receive its findings and report by February 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, [unfoldered material])

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, undated

ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION

(C) *Parameters and problems.* The following assessment covers the Argentine government's 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments.

(C) Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to rely upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments.

(C) We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below.⁴ The record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged.

(C) *Current situation.* With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

(C)—*Political prisoners:* Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the disposition of

³ Secret; Noform; Nocontract.

⁴ HA Note: HA prefers the following wording for the text from sentence two of paragraph 1 through first sentence of paragraph 3. "Although it is difficult to quantify precisely certain aspects of the situation—such as the exact number of people killed and tortured and the number being held in clandestine military camps—we receive a steady flow of detailed information from a wide variety of credible sources in Argentina about human rights events and conditions. These sources include our Embassy, [*less than 2 lines not declassified*] and Amnesty International, Argentine Government officials, Argentine human rights organizations, victims of arrest and torture, eyewitnesses to incidents of abduction and torture, and relatives of victims." [Endnote in the original.]

the national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution (PEN prisoners).⁵

There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons.

(C) No sustained official effort is being made to substantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

(C) There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

(C)—*Torture and prisoner mistreatment*: Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information about subversion who refuse

⁵ The current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include such things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military's conception of social order) groups, e.g. poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (d) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers. [Footnote in the original.]

to cooperate with security officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or his or her summary execution. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] in August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation.⁶

(C) Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 an IRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year.⁷

(C)—*Disappearances*: Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the figure of 15,000 for disappearances over the past 3–4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.

(C) Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we have any information, could be considered terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made a significant shift in their targetting practices to draw into the security net a range of non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely

⁶ Reports received from released prisoners tend to substantiate [*less than 1 line not declassified*] observations on the frequency of torture. [Footnote in the original.]

⁷ See footnote 6, Document 95.

legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance of persons with a common association past or present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However, there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific act of the victim.

(C) Public criticism of government policies has, with few known exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals have criticized the government's economic, political and human rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the security forces.

(C) There has been no significant official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines' standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.

(C) The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government House in downtown Buenos Aires.⁸ The demonstrations apparently had become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

(C) Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on cases for which their operatives have been responsible.

⁸ In telegram 621 from Buenos Aires, January 23, the Embassy reported, "The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, after three Thursdays of police harassment and brief detentions, have decided to abandon temporarily their demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo. Several Mothers called at the Embassy on January 17th and 19th to explain that they had decided to meet on Thursday afternoons during January at selected churches instead of demonstrating in the Plaza. They stated frankly their fear of being arrested, noting their ongoing responsibilities to their families." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790045-1061)

(C) “Reappearances” emerged as a new and possibly underreported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular “missing persons” cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human rights organizations.

(C)—*Fair public trial*. All who have been detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges against them.

(C) Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in civilian or military courts,⁹ there are two notable problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal groups such as the ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional evidence.

(C)—*Invasion of the home*. The detention practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and stealing the personal property of the detainee.

(C) *Trends*. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the net result was to leave the situation little changed.¹⁰ Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.

⁹ The status of PEN prisoners with respect to judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner held under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half or more of the current PEN detainees are either being tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition for exile under the right-of-option program. [Footnote in the original.]

¹⁰ HA Note: No overall trend of improvement in category-one terms can be shown. There was substantial qualitative deterioration in at least two areas—the widening scope of the victims of disappearance, and the worsening of treatment of political detainees. The simple passage of time can also be viewed as a negative factor—another year of widespread violations long after any terrorist threat has passed. [Endnote in the original.]

(C) It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds of abuses because the available statistical material is not always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month for the January–April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

(C) On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence, the situation changed little during 1978.¹¹

(S/NF/NC) *Counterterrorism uncontrolled*. The conclusion that conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence that the security forces continued to operate without effective central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence sources stated that:¹²

—President Videla and his moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and control over security operations;

—new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and military operations within the bounds of the law; or

—police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for abuses.

(C) Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional and local military authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the

¹¹ HA Note: HA would again emphasize that despite uncertainties with quantitative material, the shift in targeting noted above is a significant negative development. [End-note in the original.]

¹² An unknown hand placed a check mark next to this sentence in the right-hand margin.

law or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central control over operational counterterrorist units.

(C) *The political context.* The “dirty war” argument so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, and no group was judged a serious and immediate security threat. High government officials, including President Videla, have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the “war” is over, i.e. that there is no continuing high-level internal security threat.

(C) The explanation for the continuing human rights abuses lies in armed forces, and especially army, politics rather than in internal security problems. The army is the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President Videla leads a group of military and civilian moderates who would *prefer* to see human rights abuses halted. Videla’s *priority* concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree of army and military unity, because the development of irreparable internal splits probably would spell his own quick demise and the end of the military’s National Reorganization Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed to the military government’s reform program and believes his own role important. Thus, Videla’s preferences give way to his long-term political goals when his preferences threaten military cohesion.

(C) In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla nor any other significant military figure, has questioned the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard core terrorists. Videla’s differences with the so-called hardliners center on violations of the rights of non-terrorists. The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment as subversive. They do not entirely share the moderates perception that the “war” against subversion is over.¹³ Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos Aires) and Major General Luciano Benjamin

¹³ HA Note: However, Videla himself said last year that “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or bomb but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization” (Reported in the London Times, January 4, 1978). INR and ARA view the inclusion of this statement attributed by the press to Videla as potentially misleading when used in the above context. The quote invites the inference that Videla supports the application of extreme security measures against those who have not committed violent terrorist acts. There is no evidence to support that contention. [Endnote in the original.]

Menendez (Corps III, Cordoba) continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics that ensured human rights abuses.

(C) Other factors that diminished Videla's chances of achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment with the general economic and political performance of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention during the last quarter of the year,¹⁴ created highly improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on Videla's part.

(C) The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable changes involved the following officers:

—*Suarez Mason* has been shifted from his Corps I commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in Chief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units, his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.

—Major General Leopoldo Fortunato *Galtieri* has replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial processing of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a needed improvement over Suarez Mason.

—Major General Santiago Omar *Riveros*, another officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.

—Major General Jose *Montes* will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for curbing the abuses heretofore characteristic of counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.

¹⁴ See Document 37.

—Brig. General Juan Bautists *Sassiain's* appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, *Sassiain* is reputedly rough and cruel.

—Major General Luciano B. *Menendez*, a fanatic on subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily, *Menendez's* retention may be attributable to the need for his services in the event of hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the March 1976 coup.¹⁵ Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand change.

(C) *IAHRC visit*. From the Argentine government's perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site investigation.

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than the IAHRC visit.¹⁶

¹⁵ HA Note: The army command changes present a mixed picture from which it is not possible to conclude that the overall political context for human rights improvement is more favorable than in the past. [Endnote in the original.]

¹⁶ S/P and HA Note: S/P and HA would delete this last sentence because it contradicts the assessment that the command changes are "mixed". [Endnote in the original.]

97. **Memorandum From John Spiegel of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff¹**

Washington, February 28, 1979

SUBJECT

Assessment of Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

Attached is a report on the current human rights situation in Argentina, done at Secretary Vance's request by the Assistant Secretaries for Latin America, Human Rights, Policy Planning, and Intelligence and Research.² The report concludes that kidnapping, by official security units, continued during 1978 at a rate of roughly 55 "disappearances" per month. Approximately 90% of those abducted are estimated to have been tortured during interrogation, and many have been summarily executed.

On the basis of the attached report, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher believe that we cannot continue abstaining in the multilateral development banks on non-basic human needs loans to Argentina. The United States moved from a position of voting no on non-basic human needs loans to abstention because of signs that the Argentine government intended to address seriously the very grave human rights situation. We have urged the GOA to do so in repeated diplomatic approaches at the highest levels, including Secretary Vance and the Vice President. We had hoped that the GOA's decision last fall to invite the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina this May would provide a further inducement for improvements in advance of the visit, and for that reason we went forward with Export-Import Bank financing and some IMET courses. Notwithstanding our efforts and expectations, there has been no improvement in what remains the worst human rights situation in the hemisphere.

As you know, the legal restrictions, from a human rights standpoint, on U.S. positions on loans by the multilateral development banks are much stronger and more explicit than in other areas of economic relations such as Ex-Im lending, OPIC guarantees, or export licenses, where we have followed a somewhat more liberal course with respect to Argentina. The U.S. is required by law to seek to channel assistance in the multilateral development banks away from countries whose

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-7/79. Secret.

² Attached, printed in Document 96.

governments engage in “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” and to oppose loans to those countries unless the loans serve basic human needs. We consistently vote against loans to a number of countries where the situation is not as grave as in Argentina. Given these considerations, and taking into account the need to address this difficult bilateral issue in a positive way whenever possible, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher have concluded that the U.S. must move soon to a “vote no” position unless there are substantial improvements in the Argentine human rights situation.

Amb. Vaky is discussing with the Argentine Ambassador this need for improvement in the near future and the likely consequences of a continuation of the current situation.³

Please let me know if you have any reactions to the attached report.⁴

³ In telegram 49984 to Buenos Aires, March 1, the Department reported that Vaky told Aja Espil, “Without substantial improvement, we would have to move to a negative vote on upcoming loans. (Ambassador Aja Espil responded to this by noting that the next loan would not be up for a vote for a month or two, and a great deal could happen by then; Assistant Secretary Vaky replied that he was happy to hear that and he hoped rapid progress would be made.)” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790094–1133)

⁴ In a February 23 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor reported that he had spoken to Spiegel about the paper, “informed him of your interest and the President’s interest in any decision on Argentina, requesting that they suspend a decision until after we have had an opportunity to review the paper. He agreed to send the paper and to try to get a postponement.” Brzezinski highlighted this passage, underlined the phrase “get a postponement,” and wrote “make sure” in the margin underneath it. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1–7/79)

98. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, March 21, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy to Argentina (S)

I understand that you are considering changing our approach to Argentina to reflect the lack of improvement there in human rights. I have read the INR report on the human rights situation in Argentina,² and I agree that it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina may just be the worst in the hemisphere, but in deciding what approach the United States Government should take to Argentina, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to respect human rights? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy?³ When we take actions toward Argentina, which are interpreted as punitive, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that they are required, but it does suggest that we should move *carefully* and *explain* our position to a wide-ranging audience—in the U.S. and elsewhere—before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79–1/80. Secret. Pastor drafted the memorandum on March 20, but recommended that it be used as taking points rather than as a memorandum. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79–12/80)

² Reference is to Document 96. Pastor forwarded the paper to Brzezinski under a March 5 covering memorandum, which summarized the report and stated: "Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote 'no' on loans in the IFI's, lobby OECD countries to follow our example; and assess whether further action in X-M [Export-Import Bank] and OPIC should be taken." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina 1/79–1/80)

³ Mathews appended an undated note to Pastor's memorandum: "While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA. If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-à-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy—returning to the tougher 'no' vote position." (Ibid.)

Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case in our human rights policy. (S)

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us at least in part because the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate. Such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.: (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "small steps" in the human rights area at home. While the "disappearances" continue, still the Argentine Government has released some prisoners, they have released the names of about 3,500 people who remain in prison, they have taken steps on high priority individual cases (e.g., Deutches, Timerman, etc.), and they have invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. (S)

The last—the invitation—may well be the most important. It not only broke the monolithic Southern Cone opposition to the Commission, but it also will provide us a more legitimate basis on which we and other countries should make decisions on human rights to Argentina. (S)

I think our policy toward Argentina should remain cool and correct until such time as the human rights situation dramatically improves and the government has begun to move toward democratization.⁴ I believe that we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to improve their human rights situation. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors but we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

I think to take steps now, which could be interpreted as punitive, would be to invite criticism from moderate and conservative sectors in the U.S. at a time when we need their support on other issues. Moreover, I don't think it would be effective vis-a-vis Argentina. (S)

Even if you would prefer to adopt a tougher approach, I would recommend that you delay implementing this approach until after the

⁴ Aaron wrote beneath Mathews' note: "Maybe we should be friendly, strengthen Videla's hand, and see if he then can clean up his act. We would take short term heat but it might be worth it. DA." (Ibid.)

Commission has completed its report. I realize that this may mean six months to one year, but I think the wait is justified.⁵ (S)

In summary, I hope that you will reconsider your position on Argentina. I think we should continue to maintain a strong, cool, and correct posture to the military regime until progress in human rights is evident. Now is not the time for us to move to negative votes in the IFI's or to cut back Export-Import Bank credits. At the least, we should wait until the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issues its report and then adjust our policy appropriately.⁶ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁵ In a March 10 note to Brzezinski, Mathews informed him that there might be a significant delay between the time of the IAHRC visit to Argentina and the Commission's report: "It took 13 months after the visit to El Salvador to get out the final report. It will take at least as long to do the controversial Argentine report. So we are talking about a probable delay until June 1980 at least." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1979-1980)

⁶ Below this paragraph, Brzezinski wrote, "Or we should have a PRC on the above." Brzezinski signed "Zbig" above his typed signature.

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, March 27, 1979, 1831Z

2399. Subj: (S) Ambassador Discusses Railroad Loan with President Videla. Ref: Castro-Ruser Telecons, 3/26;² STATE 075474;³ STATE 076152⁴

1. (Secret) All text.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165-0611. Secret; Immediate.

² Not found.

³ March 26. The Department transmitted the text of a non-paper explaining U.S. votes on loans to Argentina in the IFIs, which Christopher had presented to Dalton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790140-0195)

⁴ March 27. The Department reported on a meeting between Christopher and Dalton. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790140-0737)

2. I received a call from Department yesterday (Mar 26) informing me message would be arriving shortly reference USG vote on GOA railroad loan to take place today (March 27). I was instructed to seek appointment with President Videla ASAP, anticipating message, I contacted President Videla's office and was told President would shorten his meeting away from Presidential Palace to meet me at 20:30 hrs last night (March 26). Due to non-arrival of Dept's message, I contacted director, (ARA/ECA) for guidance as to contents of message. Contents were furnished me and subsequently an amendment was given just before leaving for my meeting with Videla.

3. On arrival, Videla was waiting for me. He appeared in good spirits and invited me to his working office. I had always met with him in his main office. To my dismay, his working office appears to be an adjunct to some bisilica as the decor is heavily religious. After my making full inquiry into the health and welfare of his family and the president of mine, I gave my opening statement. I translated in full detail contents of message given me. I must admit it was not pleasant to read to the President an indictment of charges that his country was a human rights violator and for that reason USG, as required by law, it was required to vote "no" on loans from multilateral development banks. I then explained to Videla that in 1978 the USG changed its position from voting "no" to abstaining on these loans because there were several indications which indicated improvements would be forthcoming. I told him we considered the IAHRC visit as a very positive factor.

4. I then explained to Videla the year 1978 was extremely discouraging. I then went down the line on charges and told Videla substantial improvements had not occurred in 1978. By this time President Videla appeared very much like the accused and I as the superior court judge. I told the President arbitrary arrests, disappearance of persons due to efforts of Security Forces had blatantly continued in 1978. I explained there was an average of over 50 persons disappeared per month last year. I explained of USG total contempt for torturing and mis-treatment of prisoners during interrogations and that furthermore the number of political prisoners remained very high. During all this time I spoke firmly, succinctly and at a rapid pace so as to avoid the President interrupting my train of thought. I wanted to be sure he heard it all. As I watched the President, it became clear he was in pain over my statements. (Comment: I was happy I wasn't talking to MinInt. Harguindéguy, who weighs about 240 pounds and doesn't speak but instead roars.)

5. I continued telling the President USG had been monitoring GOA's human rights situation hoping to find positive indications so as to avoid voting "no" on loans. I mentioned the President's statement

over the recent Supreme Court decision and also the possibility of the Timerman release.⁵ I then explained there was lack of convincing evidence to indicate torture and disappearances had completely ceased. In view of these factors, Videla was told USG was ready to vote “no” on Tuesday, March 27.

6. Videla was then told that based on statements made by their Ambassador Aja Espil on March 22,⁶ USG was willing to take another look on situation. I informed Videla that Aja Espil had stated disappearances had stopped, that GOA would investigate new disappearances and action would be taken against any security force responsible for disappearances. Videla was then told Aja Espil had submitted to his government name of person supposedly disappeared on February 9, 1979 as per records of Amnesty International. Videla disclaimed knowing any such disappearance on Feb. 9. (Comment: Embassy records fail to indicate any disappearance on Feb. 9. I asked Aja Espil, who was in town for one day, to submit names of missing person, so case can be substantiated. End comment)

7. I told Videla based on his Ambassador’s and other representations on human rights improvements, the USG would continue its policy of abstention on March 27. As I made this statement, Videla gave a long sigh of relief, smiled reached over, and shook my hand and thanked me. (Comment: This action was most perplexing for me

⁵ Reference is to the Argentine Supreme Court decision on the third petition submitted by the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights asking for Court action on disappearances. The December 21, 1978, Supreme Court ruling was made public in February 1979. The court “reiterated its inability to resolve the cases of 1,542 disappeared persons due to the lack of information and cooperation of the executive power, while at the same time acknowledging that such a situation constitutes a denial of justice.” (Telegram 1097 from Buenos Aires, February 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790064–0123) In telegram 1618 from Buenos Aires, February 27, the Embassy commented that Videla’s statement regarding the decision “reiterates the president’s unequivocal intention to put Argentina’s legal system into proper working order—but leaves in abeyance the question of when and whether the specific complaints the court has registered will be answered.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790092–1032)

⁶ In a March 23 memorandum to Vance, Bushnell summarized the points made by Aja Espil during their meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Argentina [2 of 4]) In a March 27 memorandum to Carter, Vance reported that despite “the absence of substantial human rights progress in Argentina” in 1978, and because of Aja Espil’s reports of “a number of potentially significant” developments, “Warren told the Argentines that we are adhering to our abstention position on a World Bank loan today and would continue to watch the situation closely.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 3/79) In telegram 78829 to Buenos Aires, March 30, the Department requested “more detailed information on a more current basis on human rights developments in Argentina” and instructed the Embassy to restructure its human rights reporting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790145–0600)

as I felt as though I had failed in my mission. I anticipated literally being tossed out during my initial phase of the interview, but having the President of Argentina thank me for an “abstention” was totally unexpected. Videla was thoroughly pleased with the “abstention”, even though my charges of his country were hard, factual and not easy to accept. End comment)

8. I then shifted over by telling Videla USG hoped GOA would soon start working on lists of disappeared submitted by US and international organizations. I again stressed need to release political prisoners ASAP and immediately halt to torture and mistreatment of prisoners. I complimented Videla for virtual cessation of disappearances since January and willingness of GOA to investigate and take action against security forces which acted illegally. It was made clear to Videla GOA’s actions would be monitored now and in the future.

9. Timerman case: I told Videla I had heard he and the junta had discussed the fate of Jacobo Timerman. He smiled and said it was true. Videla made a gesture as though putting on a pair of gloves and stated the Timerman case could not be handled with bare knuckles but only with kid gloves. I suggested the putting on of the kid gloves should not prove to be a dilatory technique. Videla then told me he knew I had persistently discussed the Timerman case with General Viola and Viola had in turn discussed the case with him and other members of the junta. I then suggested perhaps it might prove good P.R. work if Timerman would be released ASAP so as to avoid giving appearance of act being one of pressure before arrival of IAHRC. He agreed. I then told Videla I hoped Timerman case would not turn out to be another Tlatelolco ratification—just promises and more promises. With a sheepish gesture, he told me strong efforts were being made to decide Timerman and Tlatelolco case by middle or end of April. In a moment of levity on my part, I told president I hoped Timerman and Tlatelolco would be resolved by April 14, as I would be visiting the Department on that date. I also told Videla I wanted to get credit for Timerman and Tlatelolco before I left as I didn’t want the DCM, Max Chaplin, to get the glory. Videla laughed heartily and said he would make his best to accommodate me. I suggested to Videla that if Tlatelolco was ratified and Timerman released, that he should phone President Carter directly, so the American President would be the first to know the fate of two matters of his high interest. President Videla replied this was what he had in mind of doing.

10. Right of option: I told Videla USG would be very appreciative if he put in a good word with General Harguindeguy, Min of Int, so as to accelerate right of option program. Videla promised he would but then clarified issue by stating a new committee had been formed for right of option cases. He implied Harguindeguy’s role had been diminished.

11. Future human rights actions: the President gave me assurances disappearances had stopped and would no longer be a factor. He explained there will be instances of criminal disappearances for ransom and perhaps an occasional security officer who might go off half-cocked. He did agree to investigate all disappearances and that culprits would be tried in a court of law.

12. Disappearances: Videla stated he foresaw an impasse during the IAHRRC visit. He said GOA in all sincerity lacked information on disappearances and would in all probability not be able to respond to commission requirements. He stated disappearances was one phase of IAHRRC investigation GOA was unable to come up with any answers. Videla expressed great confidence in their ability now and in the future to abide by the rule of law. He told me a sincere effort was being made to clean house before the arrival of IAHRRC.

13. I thanked Videla for receiving me fast as soon as he did. He replied by stating he was glad he could accommodate me as Min Econ Martinez de Hoz told him last week USG would vote "no" on railroad loan. He said he looked upon me as a bearer of good tidings.

Castro

100. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 27, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S.-Argentina Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom
Argentina Ambassador Aja Espil

During the course of a luncheon conversation, Ambassador Aja Espil stressed the need for a continuing dialogue with his country. He noted that it had been more than a year since my visit to Buenos Aires

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, David Newsom Files, 1978-81, Lot 81D154, Box 14, Latin America. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom. The meeting took place in the Embassy of Argentina. The time of the luncheon is not indicated in the memorandum. Copies were sent to ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, P, and the Embassy in Buenos Aires.

and a considerable time since the important meeting between Vice President Mondale and President Videla in Rome.²

Some new contact at a high level was necessary in order to give support to the moderate elements in Argentina at a time when the military were reacting to a series of “shocks.” He mentioned the Nicaraguan situation and the Argentine vote in favor of our resolution at the OAS.³ Also adverse from the military’s standpoint were the recent visits of John Oakes of the *New York Times*—who wrote two articles critical of the regime on May 15–16⁴—and a delegation from the New York Bar Association. The problem with the military will be further aggravated by the results of the upcoming visit of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission.⁵

The Ambassador emphasized that the vote on behalf of our resolution should be seen by us as a positive step to be acknowledged. He acknowledged that there were still human rights problems, but said there had been progress in the release of prisoners and the reduced number of disappearances. He acknowledged that the Timmerman case and the inability of the government to account for the disappeared remained serious problems.

He suggested that Ambassador Vaky might consider a visit to Buenos Aires after the inauguration of the Bolivian President in La Paz on August 6 (if this takes place).⁶ He suggested, also, that the Secretary receive the new Foreign Minister, Pastor, who will be in New York from September 22 to 26. He said “even a half hour” would be very important.

The Ambassador said it was important, particularly in view of the OAS vote to explain to the Argentine government our view on the Nicaraguan situation. The military reaction to this had been further aggravated by the appearance last week in Managua of a Montonero leader who proclaimed that “what has happened in Managua will happen next in Buenos Aires.”

I responded by agreeing to discuss the matters he had raised further with Ambassador Vaky. I said we wanted good relations with Argen-

² See Documents 80 and 90.

³ Additional documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America.

⁴ “Argentina’s Terror,” *New York Times*, May 15, 1979, p. A19; “Vanished in Argentina,” *New York Times*, May 16, 1979, p. A27.

⁵ The IAHRC visit, originally scheduled for May 1979, was postponed until September due to scheduling conflicts of members of the Commission. (Telegram 163619 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, June 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790286–0608)

⁶ See Document 147.

tina, but that some of the matters he had raised clearly stood in the way. I asked whether, for example, it would be possible to make any progress on Timmerman. He said, "perhaps at the end of the year." He said Timmerman, unfortunately, talks too much and says the wrong things as far as the military is concerned.⁷

On Nicaragua, I suggested that Argentina had close relations with some of the Andean states, such as Venezuela and that his government might want to talk to these countries. I said we were trying to take a less central role and to leave such matters as much as possible to the Latin American states directly interested. The Ambassador acknowledged this, but insisted that his government still considered us "the key."

⁷ In telegram 6082 from Buenos Aires, July 26, Castro reported on his meeting with Camps. Camps said: "Timmerman was a dangerous subversive as he had poisoned the minds of young people by his Marxist writings in *La Opinion*." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790339-0880)

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua¹

Washington, August 14, 1979, 2220Z

212082. Subject: The Secretary's Meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor

1. Confidential-Entire text.

2. Summary: Secretary Vance had extensive exchange of views with FonMin Pastor in Quito.² Pastor expressed concern over developments in Nicaragua and the "dangerous" Central American situation. He said that Argentina hopes to proceed toward democracy in near future but not until it gets its house in order. He appealed for better ties with USG and asked that issue of human rights not be sole criteria in our relationship. Secretary Vance expressed appreciation for Argen-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-1171. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Adams; cleared in S/S-O and in draft by R. Pastor and Bremer; and approved by Vaky.

² Vance and Foreign Minister Pastor were in Quito for the OAS General Assembly.

tina's vote in OAS on Nicaragua,³ and noted that U.S. values highly its friendship with Argentina and considers it a friend—an ally. He characterized human rights problem a “festering sore” in our relationship. On Nicaragua, Secretary Vance stressed need to push new government into direction of being independent, unaligned country. With respect to Central America, he pointed to need for collective hemispheric effort to persuade these countries to move in a responsible way. Turning to the nuclear issue, the secretary pressed Pastor hard on the urgency of Argentina ratifying treaty of Tlatelolco as President Videla had assured President Carter would be the case. Pastor responded that Tlatelolco would be ratified after GOA completes arrangements for purchase of heavy water plant and “few other steps.” End Summary.

3. During reception at national palace in Quito August 10, Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Mr. Pastor of NSC (with DCM Fimbres as notetaker) had an extensive exchange of views with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor. Full text of memorandum of conversation of that meeting follows:

CENTRAL AMERICA

The Secretary asked how the GOA saw the Central American situation and what steps the foreign minister believed should be taken in this area.

In response, the foreign minister gave an historic sketch of the spread of communism, beginning with its birth in 1917 and its extension to China and Eastern Europe. He asserted communism had reached Nicaragua and now threatened Salvador and Guatemala. He characterized the Central American situation as very dangerous. He believed the new Nicaraguan Government is under special instructions from Cuba to lay low and to seek as much help as possible from an array of sources. As Nicaragua recovers on the basis of this assistance it will become a severe menace to its neighbors. Again, broadening his perspective, he said that Argentina is aware that in Colombia, for example, terrorism is boiling under a calm surface. There are also signs of great instability in Bolivia, as well as in Peru.

In synthesis, a red stain is spreading over a large number of countries, and a greater number of countries are “intense pink”. He continued that Argentina knows the problem better than others because of its internal struggle. The GOA knows the techniques that communists use in subverting governments. To counter communism Argentina is taking steps in areas such as the universities and is revamping its

³ See footnote 3, Document 100.

economy. The GOA hopes in the near future to proceed along the democratic path but not until it is certain that the problems that befell Peron will not revisit the country.

He maintained that the crucial question is that the southern cone countries recognize the U.S. as the leader of the West. Argentina, especially, has a similar constitution to that of the U.S. and wants to be treated as an ally. The GOA does not want the only thing to matter in bilateral relations to be the issue of human rights. In addressing this issue, the government has done everything in its power: for example, it has invited a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. If this commission applies objective criteria, it will see marked progress in the country and that the trend is one of improvement. This matter of human rights should be put in perspective and should not be interposed as a barrier between the two countries.

Argentina recently supported the U.S. in the OAS and will continue to do so. Although the views of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay do not completely coincide with those of the U.S., these countries are the U.S.' true allies in the hemisphere. After the U.S., the four most important countries are Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina. If this group can establish better communication with the U.S., indeed they have a healthy desire for collaboration with the U.S., they can serve to guide the smaller Latin American countries.

The Secretary responded that the U.S. appreciated Argentina's recent vote in the OAS. Argentina is considered a friend—an ally. The U.S. valued highly its friendship with Argentina and expected this to continue into the future. He frankly characterized the human rights objectives as a festering sore. This and other issues should be dealt with as friends and allies. The U.S. shared the Foreign Minister's view regarding Argentina's important role in the international community. But, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. cannot ignore that human rights is a festering sore in our relations. Turning to Nicaragua, the Secretary said no doubt there are some Marxist/Leninists in the new government and that Cuba supports the Government of National Reconstruction. But there are also moderate elements in the GNR; consequently, the country can go either way. Nicaragua has to be pushed in the direction that we want, to become an independent and unaligned country. The Nicaraguan situation also affects its neighbors who are also under political tension. The U.S. feels that collectively the hemisphere has to help these neighboring countries face their problems. If these tensions are not eased and there continues to be suppression of rights, there will likely be an explosion offering Cuba new opportunities. The Latin American countries should see what they can do about this and try to move in a constructive way since we all have a common responsibility for the good of the hemisphere.

The Foreign Minister said his Andean group colleagues had reported to him that Nicaragua will need a long period of reconstruction which will absorb all the energies of the new government and that the new leadership will have no time to think of extending its Marxist views. But, the minister wondered what the result would be if it is the Sandinistas who distribute humanitarian aid and channel recuperation assistance. Who will get all the credit for this effort, he asked, but the Sandinistas. The result can only be that the leftists will end up enlisting the majority of the people in their behalf so that in two or three years, should the GNR accede to elections, the Sandinistas would be the logical winners and communism would take over.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister if he had an answer to this dilemma. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not have an answer. He went on to comment that Nicaragua's neighbors lacked faith in the U.S. He asserted these neighbors want and need the U.S. to be forthcoming in assistance to them to assure that Nicaragua over time will not be able to topple them. The minister said he perceived this in his talks with his Central American colleagues. He felt there should be greater communication on ideas of how to stop Nicaraguan encroachment in Central America.

The Secretary said that he felt Honduras had a good chance to survive any threats. But with respect to Salvador, the time is short to respond to that country's political problems. The Secretary said he felt that unless Salvador responded quickly its government was in peril.

The Foreign Minister said that he was concerned at news that the U.S. is seriously studying providing military aid to the GNR. He thought the effect would be indirectly to arm Cuba.

The Secretary responded that the general question had been raised, but there have been no specific requests and that is where the matter now stands. The U.S. will continue to do provide humanitarian aid, both from a moral necessity and from the practical influence it could give the U.S. in the future through extending a helping hand. The U.S. also hopes to channel any reconstruction assistance through those ministries run by moderates. Frankly, he observed, short-term aid and reconstruction assistance can be extended both to meet immediate human needs and to serve our longer-range objectives.

The Territorial Sea

The Foreign Minister asked about a wire service account regarding a shift in the U.S. position on waters beyond the traditional three miles. Reportedly, the U.S. would deliberately exercise transit rights beyond the three miles and within the 200 miles to affirm its views on this issue.

The Secretary said he had not seen the news account and was not aware what it might refer to. He commented that it might be a garbled story coming out of the LOS negotiations.

Treaty of Tlatelolco

The Secretary said that he had understood from the Foreign Minister's predecessor that Argentina would move on Tlatelolco,⁴ and he asked about the status of it.

The Foreign Minister said he wanted to be frank. Argentina had various sources of energy, among them nuclear plants solely intended for peaceful ends, for the development of the country, and to complement the country's hydroelectric capacity. Argentina had now reached the stage of being able fully to implement its energy plan. An obstacle to this is the strong pressure being applied with respect to safeguards. He believed the GOA's point of view is a just one. If Argentina can complete its energy objectives it has no objection to full and complete safeguards. Argentina is fully determined to sign Tlatelolco but wants to be in a position to take a few steps to fulfill its energy plan. It hopes to finish negotiations for a heavy water plant in the next two months. Once these measures are achieved, Argentina plans adherence to the ban on biological warfare and to the treaty of Tlatelolco.

The Secretary said he had not understood there were conditions in the previous joint communique.⁵

The Foreign Minister noted that at the time the circumstances he referred to had not existed.

The Secretary again asked when Argentina could sign.

The Foreign Minister repeated this could be in a couple of months after Argentina has arranged purchase of the heavy water plant. The Secretary observed that he had not understood that Argentina was pressed on the matter such that it could not abide by the communique. He assumed Argentina's stated intention would be carried out as indicated in the communique. The Foreign Minister's response was the first indication of a different view prevailing in Argentina. President Videla had told President Carter that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco and this was reflected in the communique.

The Foreign Minister insisted the "central concept" had not changed; what was different were new circumstances which Argentina had to take into account before signing.

Vance

⁴ See Document 93.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 68.

102. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 29, 1979, 0405Z

4059. Subject: The Secretary's Meeting With Argentine FonMin Pastor

1. (C–Entire text).

2. Summary: FonMin Pastor complimented the Secretary on his UNGA address.² They discussed the Havana NAM Summit, assistance to Nicaragua, Soviet troops in Cuba, the Human Rights Commission visit and the effect of Human Rights on US/Argentine relations. End summary.

3. The Secretary met with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor on September 24. Also attending were Argentine Ambassador Aja Espil, Under Secretary Newsom and ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary Eaton.

4. Secretary's UNGA statement. The Foreign Minister complimented the Secretary on his UNGA speech, particularly his call for greater cooperation to combat terrorism; his reference to the Tokyo round³ to which Argentina had been the first country to adhere; and his focus on the refugee problem. In this regard, he informed the Secretary that Argentina had already received the first group of Indo-chinese refugees. The Secretary expressed very great pleasure at this news.

5. NAM Summit.⁴ Pastor said Argentina was not only a friendly country, but also an ally to the U.S. Argentina had sought to support US-favored positions at the NAM Summit in Havana, particularly against efforts to undermine the inter-American system and on Puerto Rico. This is not just for the benefit of the US but because of a coincidence of policies between our two countries. The Secretary expressed his appreciation for Argentine efforts in Havana and said that while he was unhappy with many of the conclusions of the Havana Summit Communique, he was pleased that much of the language of the document affecting the hemisphere was changed. He was also happy that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS memcons 1979. Confidential; Exdis.

² The text of Vance's September 24 address is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1979, pp. 1–6.

³ Reference is to the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1973–1979) that took place in Geneva.

⁴ The sixth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Havana, September 3–9.

the position advocated by President Tito of maintaining the movement's true non-alignment had prevailed.

6. Nicaraguan assistance. The Secretary was happy to report to the Foreign Minister that since their last meeting in Quito⁵ the US had been able to proceed with humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Nicaragua and that we had been able to reprogram funds from other areas. We were considering also a supplemental budget for not only Nicaragua but also El Salvador, Honduras and possibly Guatemala. These funds would be keyed to the efforts of these countries to address the problems which they face, particularly in moving toward more democratic societies. The US had found itself somewhat hamstrung, however, in dealing with emergency situations, and he intended to seek a contingency fund for economic and military assistance in unexpected crises. Pastor said Argentina had decided to give important assistance to Nicaragua, not in financial aid, however, but food aid. His country would give "many thousands of tons" of wheat to Nicaragua. Argentina was distrustful of not only the radicals, but also the moderates in Nicaragua. The Secretary said, however, that if an effort was not made to support the moderates we would yield the field to the radicals which would not be in the interest of the region. Pastor asked what type of military assistance was contemplated. The Secretary clarified that the contingency fund to which he referred was for worldwide use; however, in Central America an example of US assistance would be helpful in providing spare parts of aircraft engines to El Salvador.

7. Soviet troops in Cuba. FonMin Pastor recalled that Argentina had been the first Latin country to extend naval and air assistance in the 1962 missile crisis. Argentina, therefore, was concerned about the presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba. The Secretary said that immediately upon confirmation that the brigade was there the fact was made public and the US entered into discussions with the Soviet Union. The US was seeking rectification of the situation and had taken the position that the status quo is unacceptable. We are seeking a solution based on changes in the status quo which are satisfactory to us.

8. Meeting of American armies. Pastor asked what position the US would take regarding Nicaragua's presence at the meeting of American armies to take place in Colombia. The Secretary said we would favor Nicaragua's presence.

9. IAHRRC visit. The Secretary asked how the visit of the Human Rights Commission,⁶ which he termed a positive step, had gone. Pastor

⁵ See Document 101.

⁶ In telegram 7875 from Buenos Aires, September 21, the Embassy assessed the Commission's September 5-20 visit: "Though their visit may have made human rights an issue for many hitherto unconcerned or uncaring Argentines, it is less certain it changed very many minds or contributed to a cessation of the practices that have earned Argentina a reputation as a major human rights violator and have strained US-Argentine relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790432-0933)

said the visit had been “very satisfactory in general terms” because the GOA had given full facilities to the commission which was able to conduct its business freely. He believed the report would be objective, normal and reasonable. He said, “we do not expect applause or congratulations, but understanding.” He felt it would be difficult for the members of the commission to understand the difference between the situation today and that obtaining in the 1973–75 period in Argentina and to note the economic progress which has been made.

10. Human Rights in US/Argentine relations. Pastor said it was important for the US to differentiate between what is temporary or circumstantial and what is permanent. He said the war against subversion had been a real war and Argentina had suffered an influx of subversives from Uruguay and Chile. “Every war,” he pointed out, “has its dead, its missing in action, and its prisoners.” Argentina, however, was traditionally a country which respects Human Rights and constitutionality; it would have to overcome “this sad period.” It was important for the US to understand that the problem is not permanent. National Security had to take priority over Human Rights; now that the former is guaranteed, Human Rights abuses would end rapidly.

The Secretary said he appreciated the conviction with which Minister Pastor had spoken. The US was concerned, however, about recent disappearances and hoped they would be cleared up.⁷ Pastor said the Secretary “could be assured of that.” He also expressed the hope that Human Rights in Argentina would not become an issue in the US electoral campaign. “We do not want to be pushed away from the US because we coincide in all issues,” he said. The Secretary responded that the US speaks of these issues “as a friend, putting the cards on the table.” We had a mutual concern on these issues and did not wish these issues to divide us.

11. Recommend Department repeat to AmEmbassies Buenos Aires and Managua. Above text has been cleared with ARA DAS Eaton.

McHenry

⁷ In telegram 8067 from Buenos Aires, September 28, the Embassy reported that it had recorded “a total of 13 people who have disappeared since August 1 and not reappeared.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445–0215) In telegram 6707 from Buenos Aires, August 16, the Embassy noted that “the repression is continuing along recognized and previously reported lines, but with a sharp reduction in intake of victims.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790372–0975) In telegram 8074, October 1, the Embassy reported Viola’s comments regarding recent disappearances. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790449–0862)

**103. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, January 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Consultations with Argentina on Human Rights

On January 8, you advised us of President Carter's request for a proposed course of action² on the suggestion (BUENOS AIRES 0163) that the Argentine Government might negotiate specific human rights improvements for a U.S. commitment not to condemn them in the meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights next month.³

Such a plan was drawn up, approved by the NSC, and transmitted to our Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires on January 11 (STATE 8592).⁴ However, earlier the same day, when delivering the message from President Carter to President Videla urging Argentine cooperation with us on restricting grain and soybean sales to the USSR (STATE 8135),⁵ our Charge, as instructed, raised this question. He told the Acting Foreign Minister that we had observed significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation over the past year and had been considering appropriate ways of recognizing these improvements (BUENOS AIRES 385).⁶ He then suggested that the Geneva session of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Confidential.

² Memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, January 8. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80)

³ January 7. Chaplin reported, "The prospect of condemnation by the UNCHR in February has concentrated the government's attention on the human rights problem to a degree I have not seen in the last four years." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-4/80)

⁴ In telegram 8592 to Buenos Aires, January 11, the Department instructed Chaplin to "seek improvements on human rights" by telling the GOA "that we would like to support, if possible, a moderate approach on agenda items of principal concern to Argentina, and that we are prepared to do so. However, GOA will understand that in order for Argentina's genuine friends to do this it will be important for them to be able to point to progress on human rights in specific areas. We thus would be interested in discussing specific improvements in human rights as part of these consultations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001-0609)

⁵ January 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Argentina [3 of 4])

⁶ January 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800001-0681) Cura was the Acting Foreign Minister.

the Human Rights Commission might be an occasion on which we could consult, should President Videla so wish.

The Acting Foreign Minister replied with great satisfaction, saying he would forward this news to President Videla. He asserted that recognition of Argentina's efforts in human rights was what the Government had wanted, and implied that genuine recognition would bring "understanding and support for Argentina." He said President Videla would make a prompt reply to President Carter's message, and the meeting ended with his expression of optimism about the future of US-Argentine relations.

Our Charge had planned to follow up this initial approach with a more substantive exchange with Colonel Cerda of the Office of the President as proposed in his original message. However, in the interim, the Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires and now has been instructed to personally approach President Videla to urge Argentine cooperation on grain sales and to propose that a special emissary be sent to Argentina to discuss with the GOA a number of issues, among them U.S. positions in multilateral fora dealing with human rights in Argentina (STATE 12183).⁷

If the GOA expresses interest in consultations with us as a result of our Charge's approach to the Acting Foreign Minister, as a result of any subsequent approach to Colonel Cerda, or after meeting with our special emissary, we would propose to follow the plan furnished to the Embassy earlier (STATE 8592). Specifically, we would seek from the GOA a commitment to release a certain number of prisoners by a set date (if possible, a schedule of releases); a commitment to additional releases under the right-of-option program; and a reaffirmation of previous Argentine statements, not fully honored to date, that disappearances definitively will cease. With regard to information about the disappeared, we plan to convey our continuing concern that the GOA find a way to inform families of their fate.

For our part, we would plan to assure the Argentines that the United States does not and will not seek public censure or condemnation of the GOA in the coming meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Instead, we would look toward either:

—a Commission request to the Secretary General to establish direct contact with the GOA; or

—the Commission's appointment of a rapporteur to study the Argentine situation.

⁷ January 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0008) An unknown hand underlined the phrase "a special emissary." See Document 105.

We do not believe that the human rights situation in Argentina has improved sufficiently to warrant merely keeping the situation under review, nor do we believe that the other members of the Commission would wish to appoint a special investigatory committee, since this already has been done through the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.⁸ We consider it unlikely that the Commission would seek to censure Argentina publicly, despite GOA fears, as this is the first time the Argentine case will come before the Commission. However, given Argentine fears, and the fact that both direct contacts by the Secretary General and the appointment of a rapporteur are confidential procedures, we believe it likely that our planned position will be acceptable.

We also shall seek from the Argentines a commitment not to lobby against or offer resistance to the proposed resolution in the UNCHR that the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities be given authority to establish a special group of experts to “make contacts with governments and families concerned to assist in locating missing and disappeared persons.” In return for this, we would assure the Argentines that we would not introduce or support resolutions dealing solely with Argentina.

Peter Tarnoff⁹
Executive Secretary

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁹ Dooley signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

104. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 22, 1980, 9–9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran, Olympics, Pakistan, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Intelligence, Military Deployments and Bartholomew/Murray Mission

PARTICIPANTS

State

Deputy Secretary Christopher
David Newsom
Harold Saunders

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown
Graham Claytor

CIA

Admiral Turner
Frank Carlucci

JCS

General David Jones
Lt. General John Pustay

Vice President's Office

Denis Clift

White House

David Aaron
Hedley Donovan
Hamilton Jordan (briefly)
Lloyd Cutler

NSC

William Odom
Gary Sick
Thomas Thornton

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

7. *Argentina*. General Goodpaster has agreed to go to Argentina tonight.² He will have a heavy series of briefings at State and the White

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 31, Meetings—SCC 257: 1/22/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the summary. In preparation for the meeting, Sick sent Brzezinski a January 22 memorandum outlining issues for discussion. (Ibid.)

² The summary of conclusions for the January 21 SCC meeting referenced the issue of grain sales and the Government of Argentina's postponement of a decision regarding Argentinian sales to the Soviet Union: "We should either get our emissary on his way to Argentina by tomorrow or ask them to postpone their decision once more. Dr. Brzezinski said he would call our emissary immediately after the meeting. Mr. Newsom noted that we have raised their expectations about an emissary coming and we should follow through." In the left-hand margin, Carter wrote: "Let's get someone on the road. Delay is excessive. Warren, Newsom, Zbig or David, Goodpaster, etc." (Carter Library, Donated Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 38, Serial XX Sensitive [1/80–3/80]) In telegram 18094 to Buenos Aires, January 22, the Department instructed Castro to "advise GOA that President has designated General Goodpaster as his special emissary," and that Goodpaster "will be prepared to exchange views on new global situation created by Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the range of measures adopted by Western nations to counter Soviet aggression. He will wish to review objectives and status of the restrictions on grain exports to the Soviet Union," and "to discuss Argentine export policies as they relate to these restrictions and the importance of Argentine cooperation." Goodpaster was also "authorized to exchange views on the full range of U.S.-Argentine relations, with a view to strengthening these relations." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina: 1–4/80)

House today. Mr. Claytor said that a finding that Argentina had made substantial progress on human rights (in connection with the Kennedy Amendment) would be extremely helpful. Others noted that the Kennedy Amendment merely established a deadline (October 1, 1978) for Argentinian performance on human rights but indicated no relief for subsequent improvement. Mr. Newsom noted that this amendment would be much harder to lift than the Symington Amendment on Pakistan. The Argentinian record is still very bad, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report which is coming out soon will be extremely derogatory. Mr. Aaron said that General Goodpaster must have something to encourage the Argentines to be helpful. The instructions for his trip are being drafted and will be reviewed this afternoon.³ State will take a new look at the legislation. We are prepared to be helpful to Argentina with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission.⁴ (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina]

³ In telegram 19791 to Buenos Aires, January 23, the Department transmitted briefing materials and instructions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina: 1-4/80)

⁴ In a January 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton wrote that he was "concerned with the long-term implications" of "the scuttling of our human rights policy in Argentina." He noted, "it looks to me like we are about to make major concessions on a human rights policy that has been a mainstay of this administration. In return we are asking for something very tactical and of only passing importance." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina: 3/79-12/80)

105. **Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Bushnell) to Secretary of State Vance¹**

Washington, January 22, 1980

TO

The Secretary

Human Rights Report for Argentina

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to approve the ARA version or the HA version (or parts of each) of the U.S. Human Rights Report for Argentina.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The President has asked that you review the Human Rights report for Argentina.²

ARA and HA have reached substantial agreement on the major part of the Report's contents. However, significant differences remain in the introduction and in Section 1.a. (torture). The attachment highlights the differences between the reports.³

ARA Position

ARA believes that the version of the Introduction to the Human Rights Report on Argentina that is being proposed by HA is unnecessarily provocative. In terms of our maintaining any powers of suasion with the Government of Argentina in the area of human rights, it could even be counter-productive:

—The GOA is well aware that the attention of the Congress, of the media, and of the public focuses most readily on the introduction to these reports.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800028–2024. Confidential. Drafted by Whitman and Flood on January 21; sent through Christopher. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it.

² In telegram 472 from Buenos Aires, January 16, Castro reported that Viola "expressed serious concern over Dept's human rights report on Argentina. He stated USG report is more crucial than UN or OAS reports. Viola's concern was wording of US report could precipitate a wave of emotionalism and anti-Americanism if Argentines felt report was an unfair evaluation of country." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–1015) (C) In a January 17 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski noted that, in response to the information in telegram 472, Carter "has directed that you personally approve the language of the report." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79–1/80)

³ Attached but not printed.

—The version proposed by HA is far more lengthy and substantially more detailed than those on other countries with human rights records no less serious than that of Argentina.

—The detail contained in HA's introduction is repeated in the body of the report.

—There has been substantial improvement in human rights, Basket I, in 1979 for which the GOA should be given credit.

—The length and weight of the historical detail of abuses tends to submerge the evidence of very real improvements, and makes it unduly severe and harsh in tone. It will be seen by the Argentines in this light.

Argentines will compare this report with the ones on other countries and will be strengthened in their conviction that they are being singled out, that the United States has no intention of recognizing the progress they have made. Our actions in the public domain, and those by our representatives to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the private U.S. citizen member of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have already come under severe fire from the Argentines as being discriminatory. Any further exacerbation of their injured feelings might serve only to cut off our dialogue.

As regards the description of torture, ARA's version refers to the severe psychological and physical abuse that took place, but avoids specifics which we believe are inappropriate in a Government report. Such minute detail will certainly be perceived as unduly inflammatory and provocative by Argentina.

We have thus far retained considerable influence with the GOA, and have used it effectively in pressing for improvements in human rights. The HA version of the report would needlessly inflame relations and emotions. It would push Argentina toward greater isolation from us and the remainder of the Western world, and toward the Soviet Union, which has quietly supported Argentina in multilateral fora on human rights.

HA Position

The revision of the report proposed by HA is the result of extensive discussions with ARA's Office of East Coast Affairs (ARA/ECA) during the period before Christmas, which culminated in agreement on December 21. The alternative version resulted from a post-holiday review of this text by the ARA Front Office.

The principal differences between the two reports lie in the introduction and with the section on torture:

—*Introduction:* HA believes that ARA's revision tends to give the unintended impression that the Argentine Junta's repressive activities at least to some extent are justified, that the tone is unduly upbeat and

optimistic, and that it omits essential information about the nature and extent of human rights violations in the country. Although most of the latter are covered in the body of the report, it is important to treat them in the introduction because:

- the introduction sets the tone of the report;
- as ARA points out, many readers focus almost exclusively on the introduction; and
- as this is the first report on Argentina prepared during the Carter Administration, a more extensive treatment of historical antecedents is justified.

Moreover, the length of the proposed introduction is not out of line with those in many of the other reports we have prepared this year. The introductions vary in length from a paragraph to four pages, in accordance with conditions in the country concerned. They tend to be longer for countries being covered for the first time, especially with serious human rights problems.

—*Torture*: ARA's version omits mention of torture methods. However, the guidelines approved last August by the Deputy Secretary for the preparation of all reports specifically requests the inclusion of this information.⁴ ARA's editorial revisions also soften the tone of this section; the same holds true for the opening words of the following section (on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment). These sections would be substantially different from other reports.

ARA argues that adoption of the HA version would complicate our relations with the Argentine Government. However, Congress established the requirements to submit human rights reports for the purpose of obtaining objective, accurate, and comprehensive information on human rights conditions in all countries. The purpose of the report is not to praise or condemn individual governments. The Deputy Secretary's guidelines call for both objectivity and specificity, and we have followed these norms in preparing all 155 reports. No report has been deliberately softened, toughened, or otherwise modified because of the state of our relations with the country concerned. We should not make an exception of Argentina, or appear to be willing to negotiate human rights principles for other objectives.

Recommendations

That you approve the ARA proposal.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 190.

Alternatively, that you approve the HA proposal.⁵

Alternatively, that you approve some combination of the two.

⁵ An unknown hand checked the approve option, and a stamped notation above it reads "Jan 28 1980." Bloomfeld forwarded the final report to Brzezinski and Aaron under a January 30 covering memorandum, which stated: "It was cleared personally by Cy." Bloomfeld recommended that "if you have any problems they be taken up immediately with Secretary Vance." Beneath the recommendation, Brzezinski wrote, "HO, *get this under control.*" Aaron wrote, "ZB—This won't help much but neither are the Argentini-ans. DA." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80)

106. Telegram From the Consulate General in Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State¹

Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1980, 0527Z

313. Subject: General Goodpaster's Mission to Argentina: General Report.

(C—Entire text)

1. I believe discussions of the last three days have opened opportunities for US-Argentine relations which seem promising for both governments to follow up. During the talks I sought to impress on the Argentine officials both the seriousness with which we would view the erosion of the US grains embargo² and the desire to strengthen cooperation with Argentina as a serious and responsible country of the West.

2. The Argentine officials, I feel, approached the talks in a positive, business-like manner. President Videla, recalling his meeting with Vice President Mondale,³ emphasized his desire for better relations. But all the senior Argentine officials also stressed the Argentine view that much of Argentina's support of US initiatives had gone unacknowledged and that US policies had frequently failed to take into account

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0385. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Carter announced a grain embargo against the Soviet Union on January 4. (Edward Walsh and Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. to Withhold Grain From Soviets," *Washington Post*, January 5, 1980, p. A1)

³ See Document 90.

Argentina's severe domestic problems and to recognize improvements when they occurred.

3. The Argentine leaders responded well to my presentation on Afghanistan. They appeared fully to share our view on the seriousness of the Soviet move, our concerns for its broader strategic implications, and the need for Western unity. While they repeatedly questioned the appropriateness and probable effectiveness of the "boycott" (undoubtedly in good part for tactical reasons), they seemed genuinely impressed with the range, weight and seriousness of the measures the U.S. has taken or initiated. One further report: In their response, they also noted Argentina's own recent struggle with left-wing terror and insurgency which had brought them, in their terms, only "isolation and disgrace."

4. Grains exports. While standing their ground on the public position they had taken, in essence the Argentine leaders gave a political and moral commitment that they would seek to prevent direct Soviet purchases substantially greater than normal levels. On the other hand, they made clear that, given this public posture (and the political repercussions in Argentina if they were perceived as giving in to U.S. pressure) they would be willing to do this only through informal and private arrangements; and they declined to take responsibility for transshipments beyond their borders, which they alleged were uncontrollable by the GOA. To the extent they make good on their word, the danger of massive direct Soviet purchases would have been averted, but this leaves us rft us with the equally serious problem of indirect purchases. The Argentines said they would not object to our pursuing this problem with other governments and trading companies, and they gave some indications of cooperation on additional information, but they are clearly reluctant and this will require follow-up. (Additional detail will be the subject of septel.)⁴

5. Human Rights. The forthcoming OAS report⁵ clearly is of intense concern to them, as is the US government's own report.⁶ They had admitted the IAHRG because they expected that it would acknowledge

⁴ The Embassy reported on Goodpaster's meetings with Martínez de Hoz on grain exports in a series of four messages: telegram 692 from Buenos Aires, January 24; telegram 317 from Rio de Janeiro, January 26; telegram 868 from Buenos Aires, January 30; and telegram 869 from Buenos Aires, January 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104-0714; N800002-0400; N800002-0504; P870104-0675)

⁵ The IAHRG report was released in April 1980. (Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Argentina*, Washington, D.C.: General Secretariat, OAS [1980])

⁶ See Document 105. The U.S. Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees released the 1979 human rights country reports on February 4. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, p. 59)

the reforms and improvements made by the national leadership, along with the dismal record of their "dirty war." (In private, they stated bitterly that the commission staff has been unhelpful and partial, citing the personal background of some of its key members.) They asked whether we could be of help in the next phase of the commission's deliberations. We, of course, stressed the independence of the commission and our inability to influence the commission in its review of the GOA's comments on the draft report (due in the commission next month.)

6. We emphasized that the US interest was not in Argentina's international censure but in the improvement of human rights. (The tension which was previously in evidence was reduced considerably by this statement.) There was a good discussion of the forthcoming UNHRC meeting; we indicated that the US, while concerned to maintain the integrity of the commission's work, would support moderate approaches on agenda items affecting Argentina. The Argentines said they would not oppose the proposal in the UNHRC for a general procedure for dealing the question of human rights of persons detained or imprisoned. They expressed some concern that an attempt might be made (possibly by Canada) to introduce a resolution specifically censuring Argentina; we repeated that the US had no intent to censure Argentina.

7. With respect to the complaints against Argentina under the confidential 1503 procedure,⁷ the Argentine officials requested US support for a decision by the commission to keep the Argentine situation under review, in view of continuing and prospective improvements in Argentina's Human Rights situation. We stated that this was not the current US position and that we would have to refer their request to Washington.

8. Nuclear issues. The Argentine leaders, as would be expected, displayed a strong interest and sensitivities over US policies and actions in this area. Foreign Minister Pastor stated that their program was for peaceful uses only; Argentina had no desire to exercise a nuclear option and would do so only if required by world-wide or regional developments (he mentioned Brazil and Chile). He said that the ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty must await the conclusion of an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA, negotiations for which are now under way. (I understand there may be difficulties with the kind of agreement the Argentines wanted.)

⁷ Reference is to the U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503, adopted May 27, 1970, that established a procedure by which a human rights complaint against a member nation could be filed with the United Nations. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1970, pp. 530-531)

9. The Argentine officials raised a number of questions about our representations to the Swiss and the FRG. We stressed that the US objective had not been to stop the sales or to deny technology but legitimate concern over safeguards arrangements as Argentina is about to close the nuclear fuel cycle. Pursuant to your instructions we stated that the US would shortly submit a reply on the assurances we require in order to supply the pending shipments of nuclear fuel for Argentina's research reactors.

10. Military relationship. We detected considerable interest in the resumption of a relationship among our Armed Forces. In response to their question, we stated that we could see no possibility of lifting of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment at this time, but that the ultimate goal of the restoration of mutually acceptable military relations was an interest both countries shared. As first steps towards this goal we suggested the possibility of visits and joint exercises, personnel exchanges and consultations on security matters. They evidenced interest in all of these.

11. General consultations. In the discussions there seemed to be agreement that increased consultations were required as a means of deepening and improving our relations.

12. The Argentines raised numerous other points which will be reported in septels and memcons.⁸

13. An atmosphere of cordiality was maintained throughout even when contentious points were discussed. My overall assessment is that the talks had a positive effect.

Dewitt

⁸ See footnote 4 above. In telegram 316 from Rio de Janeiro, January 26, and telegram 609 from Brasilia, January 28, the Embassy reported on Goodpaster's meeting with Videla. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0399 and P870105-0186) In telegram 828 from Buenos Aires, January 29, and telegram 827 from Buenos Aires, January 29, the Embassy reported on Goodpaster's meetings with Foreign Minister Pastor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104-0691 and P870104-0699)

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, March 26, 1980, 2134Z

2604. Subject: Assessment of My Visit to Buenos Aires.

1. (S) Entire text

2. Conditions for our visit to Buenos Aires were not auspicious. While we held talks with the President of Argentina's nuclear energy agency Castro Madero,² his deputy was in Moscow at the Soviet's invitation. A high-level German delegation, headed by Van Well, was also here to complete negotiations for the Atucha II reactor. During our talks with Videla, Pastor, Martinez de Hoz; Galtieri and Viola we stressed the seriousness with which we view the international situation, that there will be no "lurch towards detente," and our aim to strengthen relations with Argentina.

3. There clearly remain deep differences on major issues from non-proliferation to central American strategy. Some of the expectations of goodwill created by the Goodpaster mission³ were dissipated by the clashes at the UNHRC meeting in Geneva, which were fully reported in the Buenos Aires press. But I believe Argentina's leaders—conscious that relations between the two countries have never been easy—are also interested in improving relations on their terms. They stressed again, as they had to Andy Goodpaster, that while they have pragmatic relations with the Soviets and the third world, they consider Argentina part of the West. They consider some forward movement on military relations and our attitude in the OAS on the IAHRHC's Human Rights report important tests of whether we share their desire for cooperation. My principal conclusions are:

A) We should continue the effort to rebuild the relationship. Argentina's Human Rights situation has improved over the past year—more so than they are internationally being given credit for. Argentina is an important nation, with considerable influence on major US interests, and one with which we should have decent working relations.

B) Human Rights. Our policies should be based on current performance, not the grim record of the past. We should be concerned with current security practices, the current quality of judicial procedures,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005-0023. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. The report was written by Ambassador Gerald C. Smith, Special Presidential Assistant for Non-Proliferation Matters.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 466.

³ See Documents 104 and 106.

and the openness of the emerging political dialogue. But I question whether an accounting of the fate of the thousands of disappearances is a realistic objective at this time; we should continue to urge moves on humanitarian grounds, but without making our relations with Argentina hostage to this issue.⁴ (No major Argentine politician seeks such an accounting.)

C) Political evolution. Most of Argentina's military leadership wishes to return Argentina to its democratic traditions—in a manner that would avoid past patterns of chronic instability. But while progressive improvement in the security of the person can be expected, the installation of an effective democratic civilian political system will be a matter of years. Too much of the country's institutional structure has been destroyed by Peronism and its aftermath. There is no evidence that pressure and sanctions will accelerate this process.

D) Non-proliferation. There was no encouragement during my talks that Argentina will ratify Tlatelolco any time soon; on full-scope safeguards we agreed to disagree. Argentina's nuclear program is well advanced and will move ahead under able leadership. Our central objective must be to prevent the emergence of a nuclear arms race in the hemisphere. The Argentine leadership may be on the threshold of concern over global and regional proliferation and may be interested in a dialogue on political solution. Their new cooperative arrangements with Brazil offer hope of fostering mutual restraint and confidence between these two countries and merit our support.

E) Bilateral nuclear cooperation. For the present? The Argentines do not appear interested in cooperation beyond the supply of fuel for their research reactors, to which we are committed. We should, however, maintain remaining links to their nuclear program by resolving the related safeguards issue in accordance with the requirements of US law. I think we can solve the issue on that basis.

F) Olympics and grains embargo. There is a reasonable possibility that the Argentines ultimately will withdraw from the Moscow games, and they could help swing the other Latin American countries. (We should keep them currently informed about our count of the number of prospective non-participants.) On grains, I see no justification for accusing them of having undercut the Goodpaster understanding. They have a case that we have undersold them in their traditional markets.

⁴ In an April 1 memorandum to Derian, Flood argued that this recommendation was "particularly troubling," and that "if we turn our backs on this issue, we will be condoning state terrorism and mass slaughter on a scale hitherto unknown in South America in peacetime." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, [unfolded material])

The grain they now have available for export has been severely reduced by drought and thus they no longer have future ability to affect a major part of our embargo.⁵

G) Central America. The Argentine leadership is deeply concerned over developments in that region. They have decided to focus their support on Guatemala and Honduras, and are pessimistic about prospects in Nicaragua and El Salvador.

H) Relations with the Soviets. The Soviets continue to probe for opportunities to expand cooperation. They have become one of Argentina's larger trading partners in recent years, cooperate with Argentina in the UN, and now probe Argentine interest in military sales and nuclear cooperation. This should be a matter of real concern to us.

4. In summary, I believe we should continue close consultations on such matters as Central America and the forth-coming IAHRC report. I also recommend that we proceed with an invitation to the army chief-of-staff, General Vaquero, sometime this summer, if developments with respect to Argentina continue favorable.⁶ There is merit in economic talks, which I understand are scheduled for later this year, and in permitting the purchase of such technical services under AID's reimbursable development program as they might find of interest, or the program of technical cooperation worked out between USDA and the Argentine Secretariat of Agriculture. On the other hand, we have told them that we see no possibility of changing our vote in the IFI's or lifting the prohibition on military sales and training until their Human Rights performance and image further improves. Dialogue should be continued on political approaches to global and regional proliferation problems.

Castro

⁵ In an April 3 memorandum to Bowdler, Ruser reported, "Martínez de Hoz stressed that Argentina was in effect priced out of its traditional markets, thus laying a basis for a possible decision to exceed the informal export limits. For this reason we should continue to stress the importance of these limits. While export availabilities are sharply reduced, the present limits are quite generous by historic standards." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-4/80)

⁶ In a March 28 memorandum to Tarnoff and Brig Gen. Carl Smith, Dodson wrote, "Although it was decided at the V-B-B that Ambassador Smith was to invite Vaquero to the United States, we understand that, on advice of Embassy Buenos Aires, he did not do so. He did, however, tell Foreign Minister Pastor that we would welcome a high-level visit, and intimated to Vaquero that he would be welcome as long as there were no untoward developments in US-Argentine relations." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Argentina, 2/80-1/81 #1)

108. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 6, 1980, 2:30–2:50pm

PARTICIPANTS

Argentina

Jose Martinez de Hoz, Minister of the Economy
Ambassador Jorge A. Aja Espil

United States

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

US-Argentine Relations; Grain Sales; Soviet Politics (C)

Dr. Brzezinski opened by welcoming the warming trend in US-Argentine relations but stated his great concern about Argentine grain exports to the Soviet Union. He stressed the need to take tangible actions to show the depth of Western concern and resolve. This involves sacrifices, which we are making. *Dr. Brzezinski* went on to discuss in some detail the strategic meaning to the West of the Soviet move into Afghanistan—affecting not only the immediate region but all of the non-communist world. The increase in Argentine grain sales diminishes the impact of Western pressure on the USSR and it is strange to see a country of Argentina's tradition playing such a role.² *Brzezinski* closed by saying that he found frictions in US-Argentine relations to be unnatural and thus wanted to address the grain problem frankly. (C)

Martinez de Hoz reassured *Dr. Brzezinski* of Argentina's commitment to the West and went on to restate Argentina's rationale on its trade with the Soviet Union. In speaking of the Argentine-Soviet grain sales agreement, *Martinez* said that the figures involved would be less than 1980, which is recognized as a peak year. He urged that the focus of pressure on the Soviets not be limited to grain but be extended to such things as European sales of capital goods. He urged a global comprehensive policy against Communist expansion. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen, Deal, and Pastor. The meeting took place in *Brzezinski's* office.

² In a May 6 memorandum to *Brzezinski*, *Deal* wrote, "The weakness of the present embargo is due to heavy Argentine sales of grain to the USSR. Argentina will ship 5.3–6.0 million metric tons (MMT) of grain to the USSR in the current marketing year, nearly twice the highest previous year. The Argentines have just concluded a new trade agreement with the USSR which provides for yearly minimum purchases of 5MMT." (National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80)

Dr. Brzezinski observed that seeking a total solution often leads to no solution and noted that we are working with the Europeans to limit technology sales and tighten COCOM. He again returned to the question of Argentine grain sales noting that the growth had accelerated greatly this year and this made it harder for us to keep the other major suppliers on board. He urged Martinez to think about this problem not just in bilateral terms but in light of Argentina's role as a member of the West. It would be a pity if Argentina were seen by history to have played the same kind of role that France played when Hitler occupied the Rheinland.³ (C)

Martinez de Hoz said that Argentina wants to take a stand but frankly doubts that grain embargos will be effective. Brzezinski promised to supply information to Argentina to demonstrate that the embargo is being effective. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that there are problems for Argentina in implementing sanctions but said that more can always be done if there is determination. Argentina is, after all, one of the world's major countries and has a critical role to play. (C)

³ In a May 5 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton recommended: "Concerning grain, avoid specifics which will be dealt with by others, but point out the great symbolic as well as the material importance of grain to the campaign against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Argentina, 2/80-1/81 #1) In telegram 120048 to Madrid and Buenos Aires, May 7, the Department reported on Christopher's meeting with Martínez de Hoz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225-0779)

109. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, May 12, 1980

*ISSUES PAPER—ARGENTINA**I. THE SETTING*

The United States has three major interests in Argentina: East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. It also has significant interests in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade and investment relations.

The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits² have introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship while making a promising start at reducing the differences. The current status of our interests is as follows:

East-West Relations. As part of its probings to expand political and economic influence in South America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded to a limited degree because of:

- a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities;
 - a strong desire for Soviet support in international fora on human rights matters;
 - an interest in keeping open the possibility of nuclear supplies;
- and
- some desire for greater balance in its foreign relations between East and West.

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect for at least the next four to seven years have no desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural inclination for economic and political reasons toward warmer bilateral relations. Our improved dialogue with Argentina since January has produced:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80: 5/80. Secret. Drafted by Eaton, Ruser, and Whitman; cleared in draft by Dworkin, Flood, and Buchanan and in P, S/P, S/MS, EUR, E, EB, S/AS, INR/RAR, INR/RSE, OES, PM/ISP, PM/SAS, IO, ARA/PPC, and ARA/RPP. Dodson sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Bergland, Duncan, Earle, Jones, and Turner under a May 12 covering memorandum.

² For the Goodpaster visit, see Document 106. For the Hodges visit, see telegram 2258 from Buenos Aires, March 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800131–0667) For the Smith visit, see Document 107.

—repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic commitment to the West;

—a degree of cooperation on grains exports despite our late start on consultations; and

—greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America.

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's decision to join the Olympics boycott.

Nuclear Nonproliferation. It is clear that Argentina will insist on the continued development of its nuclear technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that it will not respond to pressure on these matters. Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own long-term self-interests will lead it more toward safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, symbolized by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled for May 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina is still considering whether to proceed now with the ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine interpretation that the Treaty permits the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful, and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements to maintain limited nuclear cooperation.

Human Rights. The status of human rights remains a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement on the facts of the situation, views differ on the scope and significance of the improvements that have occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, a central human rights concern, have declined, as have the number of political prisoners. We are aware of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There reportedly were 44 disappearances last year; 55 a month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, however, that suspected active terrorists would continue to be dealt with summarily.³ There is no present prospect that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands of people who have disappeared in recent years. GOA officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about half of the 1300 remaining political

³ Reference presumably is to telegram 3695 from Buenos Aires, May 2. The Embassy reported: "We continue to believe that hard-core, active terrorists who are captured by the government will continue to be treated as in the past: interrogation and, at some point, execution." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800219-0560)

prisoners would be tried or released by the end of the year.⁴ GOA officials say that, although there is insufficient evidence to try the others, the security forces regard them as dangerous and do not plan to release them. The latter group includes some persons who benefitted from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state of siege and lack of due process continue. The military government has committed itself to eventual return to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future form of Argentina's political party system, especially the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue with political leaders is now beginning, although political party activity remains prohibited.

In the economic area, the government continues to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector while strengthening the functions of provincial and local governments, progressively bring inflation under control, and encourage foreign investment as part of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate of investment. In the short term, these policies have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower-middle income groups. However, full employment has been maintained as part of a deliberate government policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In the longer term, these policies could produce sustained dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized economic system more compatible with a pluralistic political order than the statist centralism of the Peron period.

Argentine officials and human rights activists have praised our human rights report this year as balanced and objective. There were difficulties between the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February–March. These reflected honest differences over substantive issues such as the new disappearance procedure and the draft torture convention. The Argentines will be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations of their human rights performance later this year and early next year; they want to see an end to the Humphrey-Kennedy

⁴ In telegram 2652 from Buenos Aires, March 27, the Embassy reported on Smith's meeting with Foreign Minister Pastor: "Pastor said there were further improvements. Disappearances were definitely over. Prisoners held in executive detention continue to be released or processed and the government expects that by the end of this year the approximately 1300 PEN prisoners held now by the government will be reduced by half." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800155–1047)

Amendment against military sales, and positive U.S. votes in the international financial institutions.

The discussion paper previously distributed⁵ described our continued political and economic consultations and military and nuclear relations over the next few months. Is there more that could and should be done in this period?

II. ISSUES FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. *Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and the Appropriate U.S. Response:*

The discussion paper draws a distinction between expanding trade ties and political cooperation. The expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon and will continue, irrespective of U.S. action. The Argentine interest in political cooperation with the Soviets, on the other hand, is related to the Argentine desire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights issues and reduce the danger of censure in UN fora. A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is related to U.S. safeguards conditions (this issue appears to be approaching solution).

The basic approach proposed in the discussion paper is a political one: to manage U.S.-Argentine relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense of identification with the West, to pursue U.S. interests in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to achieve these goals without compromising our human rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have diminished our interest in human rights conditions.

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine-Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the various U.S. interests?

2. *How can the U.S. obtain meaningful Argentine cooperation in restraining exports to the U.S.S.R. for the 1980/81 crop year?*

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Argentine Economic Minister on May 6 for GOA cooperation in a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. in the coming crop year.⁶ Strategy and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain exporting coun-

⁵ An agenda and undated paper entitled "The Argentine-Soviet Relationship," which Dodson sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Bergland, Klutznick, Duncan, Earl, Jones, and Turner under an April 28 covering memorandum, was prepared for a PRC meeting originally scheduled for April 30. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80: 5/80)

⁶ In telegram 120048 to Buenos Aires, May 7, the Department provided a summary of Christopher's meeting with Martínez de Hoz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800225-0779)

tries are currently under consideration in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would seek from each exporter.

a. An Argentine-U.S.S.R. grain agreement is in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it will state Argentine intentions to supply certain minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. take advantage of such an agreement to secure an understanding that Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels be too high to constitute “meaningful restraint”?

b. How can the U.S. persuade Argentina to announce publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the current premium on prices on Argentine grain which have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the cooperation effort.

3. *What is the appropriate human rights stance for the U.S. in this period in the light of Argentine performance and our other interests?*

a. In bilateral demarches and contacts with Argentina?

One approach would strongly press for improvements in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious accounting to families, either directly or indirectly, of the fate of disappeared persons; the other would proceed more selectively, with emphasis on further reform of current security and judicial practices rather than an accounting for the disappeared and other past violations. One approach would include occasional strong public criticism of the GOA’s practices; the other, while maintaining our public posture of criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key, and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations.

b. In the OAS and the UN?

The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential work of the new group of experts on disappearances established by the UNHRC with strong U.S., West European, and Canadian support. It feels that the group’s principal effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances (i.e., torture and summary executions) would lead to demands that those responsible be identified and punished. Although the methods of the working group remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group’s work will be the basis of moves next year to seek the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina and the GOA’s public condemnation in UN fora. This fear

is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora.

The OAS has recently released a report on the human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights last September.⁷ The report is highly critical of Argentina and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The IAHRC report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly this fall.

The Argentine position on how to deal with the IAHRC report is still under study in Buenos Aires. One view circulating within the regime—reportedly angered by the report's alleged failure to properly acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the improvements accomplished since 1978—is that Argentina should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering an exodus by other countries, including Brazil. In private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling on the issue in Buenos Aires. We have no evidence as of this time, however, that this view is about to be adopted as the Government's policy.

How should we deal with these matters in OAS and UN fora?

c. With our NATO Allies?

One approach would be to initiate a series of high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for the purpose of sharing information about human rights developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship, and of discussing the most effective way of dealing with these matters, including possible joint or parallel demarches, public statements, and coordinated action in international institutions (including the multilateral banks).

d. With regard to sanctions (vote in the IFI's, military training, and military sales)?

Our abstentions in the IFI's have not prevented ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases of new equipment to European sources; it is, however, beginning to create problems for the Argentines with respect to spare parts for U.S.-supplied equipment.

On the other hand, our measures have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Any possible modification of our posture in this area would have to take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with major human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and to

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 106.

other countries who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

4. *How far should we carry military-to-military contact and cooperation under present circumstances?*

Cooperation involves three possible levels:

—visits, joint exercises, consultations on security matters;

—the sale of military training;

—a military supply relationship (new equipment and spares).

The sale of training under FMS and military supplies (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system.

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts (visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in our military supply policy at this time.

A second view is that we should avoid the political symbolism of support which these contacts imply, or minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough on human rights. A third view, on the other hand, argues that, because of our strategic interests and the improvement in human rights, we should streamline, liberalize, or lift altogether, the restrictions on the military supply relationship. This would involve a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export licences; and/or b) the modification or elimination of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

The denial of training (the sale of training under FMS is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising careers. (Videla, Viola, and Galtieri all received training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of major or below who have received U.S. training. One view questions whether the U.S. should continue to deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook of the next generation of Argentine military leaders. Another view argues that the present generation of military leaders is responsible for the government's repression of the past four years and questions the premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive influence on their outlook. It also argues that a military training relationship is a clearly visible, high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political support for a government.

5. *Are our present policies with regard to nuclear relations with Argentina adequate?*

The issues are:

—At what level can we and should we pursue nuclear cooperation?

—Is there anything more we can and should do to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco and acceptance of full-scope safeguards?

—How would possible actions in these areas impact on our general relationship and would they be worth the cost?

The *discussion paper* argues:

—*Nuclear Cooperation*. We should try to resolve the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S. cooperation (see also below).

—*Tlatelolco*. We should continue a dialogue with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible or desirable at this time. (We should, of course, on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment to ratify.)

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards assurances, the Administration must also address *the issue of licensing of U.S. components* for Argentine nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian, and Swiss companies. For example:

—the U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, working with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid as a subcontractor for the pressure vessel for Atucha II. Siemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier.

—Sulzer Brothers, the Swiss prime contractor for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian firms about components, some of which may be U.S. controlled.

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage or discourage such industrial collaboration. The current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep good faith with the Canadians who—unsuccessfully—insisted on full-scope safeguards as a condition of the sale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water plant.

Significant U.S. exports, the future of U.S.-Argentine industrial cooperation in this important sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake in this issue.

III. THE BROAD CHOICES

Option A. Continue strong concentration on human rights.

We would maintain a cool and correct posture until the human rights situation shows substantial further progress, making clear that we are prepared to improve relations when and to the degree that fundamental human rights problems are solved. Military relations would be kept to a minimum; political relations should be cool and correct.

Rationale: The human rights situation remains exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance and relevance of other interests in our relations with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine human rights violations—the apparatus of repression, the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful political and labor union activity, and the failure to provide information about disappeared persons—all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting. It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests, but we should continue to watch Argentine-Soviet relations closely.

Option B. Continue the current level of effort for more balance in the treatment of our interests in Argentina.

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen working relations with the GOA, principally through stepped-up political consultations, but also through some increase in cooperation and increased military contact. We would continue to stress the importance of human rights, but need to establish priorities in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability. We should seek further specific improvements through dialogue in the improved atmosphere, but maintain our present policy on votes in the IFI's and the restrictions on military supplies. We should, however, seek to reopen the sale of training (which would require modification of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach, especially in the UNHRC, should seek to avoid pushing Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets.

Rationale: Our approach to limit Soviet influence should be basically a political one. There has been progress in human rights—notably, few new security cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and in public expression and a general decline in violence and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this progress. Certain issues in the relationship which have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked. There is no strategic need to relax military supply restrictions at this time. Training, however, is important to try to influence the next generation of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to create too much of an imbalance in our relations with Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle Channel issue is still outstanding.

Option C. Move a step further toward normal relations.

We would seek further to strengthen working relations with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment restrictions on the military supply relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human rights remain important to us and would continue our abstention on IFI loans. But we would more explicitly and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's general assurances that we were not interested in seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 UNHRC meeting, and would not support future moves for censure in UN or OAS fora in view of current and prospective progress.

Rationale: The deteriorating international security situation makes Argentine cooperation important. We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foster mutually profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of public censure in the UN, essentially for past human rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political observers agree that a solution to the problem of past disappearances is not feasible at this time and will come, if at all, as part of a broader political settlement, including a general amnesty. The Smith mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine political leader is pressing for an accounting at this time. The measures contemplated under this approach are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet probing for influence, to reestablish close working relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains and other East-West issues, and to elicit further Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters.

110. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 14, 1980, 10:30–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Minutes—PRC Meeting on Argentina (C)

PARTICIPANTS

*State*Warren Christopher, Dep.
SecretaryJohn Bushnell, Dep. Ass't.
Secretary*Defense*W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Dep.
SecretaryFrank Kramer, Principal Dep.
Ass't. Secretary*Agriculture*James Starkey, Dep. Under
Secretary*Commerce*Luther Hodges, Dep. Secretary
Abraham Katz, Ass't. Secretary for
Internat. Economic Policy and
Research*Energy*Woody Cunningham, Ass't.
Secretary for Nuclear Energy*Arms Control and Disarmament*Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
Richard Williamson, Nuclear
Exports Div. Chief, Bureau of
Nonproliferation*Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence

Jack Davis, NIO for Latin America

*White House*David Aaron
Henry Owen*National Security Council*Thomas P. Thornton
Robert Pastor

Bushnell began the meeting by discussing Argentinian relations with the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the current government is unlikely to get close to the Soviets and this provides a certain implicit limitation on the process of Soviet/Argentinian ties. The Argentine Government is playing a short-term game in the grain, trade and perhaps nuclear area. The only point of contact between the Soviet Union and Argentina that raises longer term concerns is a possible fishing agreement although even here the Argentine Government is moving to limit its impact on their people. In addition we are very much concerned about Argentinian/Soviet cooperation in United Nations organs. Originally the Argentinians only wanted to prevent the Montaneros from mobilizing Soviet and Cuban support against the GOA. Over time however this has developed into a cooperative vote trade-off between the two sides. In the coming months, *Bushnell* continued,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80, 5/80. Secret. Sent for information. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

Argentina will have a hard time taking any positive actions whatsoever due to the imminent retirement of President Videla. This is certainly true until the decision on a successor is made in September and probably the period of inaction will continue until early next year when a new government is in place. We will not be able to force major decisions on them in this time. In the shorter term the main issue is the Argentine fear of condemnation as a result of the report of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. They might make some minor steps on the human rights front to avert condemnation. The other important short term consideration is the question of the grain embargo where they have not been supportive of our interests.

Hodges asked whether Argentine human rights performance has improved.

Bushnell replied that there has been a major improvement but there are still gross violations and the system of repression remains in place. One could say that they have probably killed most of the people that they wanted to kill, but there are now fewer political prisoners and in some instances the rule of law is being followed better.

Hodges reported that the Argentine Economics Minister had assured him that the current economic policies would continue under a new government next year.² *Hodges* pointed out that we have a great economic potential in relations with Argentina and we should do everything we can to maximize that.

Owen, speaking of the grain situation, said that the Argentines have undoubtedly made their decision and will follow the same policy next year as they did this year. They have almost certainly reached an agreement with the Soviets which would provide only a floor, not a ceiling, on Soviet purchases. This in effect will mean no limit on Argentine sales to the Soviet Union other than that provided by crop conditions.

Starkey agreed with this conclusion.

Aaron said it was not clear from the paper³ what the issue is—are we seeking a decision on overall tone or individual policy decisions? He asked whether the wheat embargo will be circumvented.

Owen replied that once Argentinian policy is clear, and no doubt the Canadians will be equally uncooperative, other countries will not support us.

² The record of the conversation has not been found.

³ See Document 109.

Christopher agreed and said that in any event the whole question is irrelevant if the Soviets have a good crop. We may have to find a way to announce a one-year policy success.

Aaron. Do we want to take some move against Argentina because of this or simply forget it? Bear in mind that Martinez was lectured at the highest levels of government here about the need for Argentine cooperation.⁴

Owen said that we should certainly take a tough line on Argentina to match the warnings that were given to Martinez.

Aaron observed that it is clear that Argentina doesn't care very much about its relations with the United States.

Christopher, discussing the purpose of the meeting, said that the real decision to be addressed is one of tone. The paper should then be submitted to an Interagency Group which could work out the individual implementing decisions in line with the broad decision on tone to be made by the PRC. Mr. Christopher also observed that the Argentinians are not going to do anything to court us.

Claytor said he did not blame them; our policies are forcing them to the Soviets.

Owen said that they are sensitive to our concern about being a major supplier for their hydroelectric project.⁵ Martinez had said that he would favor the United States if all other factors were equal.

Hodges noted that OPIC insurance would be important in this regard.

Owen agreed and said this would be discussed with Deputy Secretary Christopher tomorrow.

Keeny, discussing nuclear matters, said it is not clear what the options are. The Soviets are interested in some nuclear cooperation with the Argentinians but there has been minimal activity to date. Thus there does not seem much to preempt there. Our own relations with Argentina are another question. We do not want to (indeed legally we cannot) expand these relations unless they accept full-scope safeguards and ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty. We do have some flexibility though on whether we should continue to cooperate in marginal ways within the law. The question is whether we are willing to supply things that at some future date might be related to a nuclear weapons program.

Bushnell said there is no problem because what we are supplying is for their research program. The issue is whether we want to break a nuclear dialogue with them completely and perhaps turn them to

⁴ See Document 108 and footnote 6, Document 109.

⁵ Reference is to the Yacyreta dam project.

the Soviets. He hopes that we might be able to make greater progress next year when there will be a new administration and leadership on nuclear matters. Thus he asked, should we break the dialogue now or continue to do "minor" things.

Keeny said it depended on which items were involved.

Claytor said that the nuclear non-proliferation policy is bankrupt in general and that we should do absolutely everything we can under the law to cooperate with Argentina.

Keeny inquired whether that would include the provision of tritium. Perhaps the only thing the Argentinians want are things that cause no problem for us. We should look at the specifics.

Christopher pointed out that the President has certainly not abandoned the nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Claytor countered that the policy had been ineffective and that the Soviets are always ready to jump in where we are unable to extend cooperation.

Bushnell observed that there were very few license requests pending from the Argentinians and there probably would be no problem over the next six months or so.

Christopher, returning to the general topic, said he believed that the group should support the middle option. We should give due weight to positive trends in the human rights area but should not try to repeal the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment at this time since that would be impossible with the present Congress and politically unwise. This Option B needs fine tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an initiative on the military side, including training at least.

Hodges said he was encouraged by *Christopher's* summation, for the trends in human rights are important. The Commerce Department also supports Option B.

Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our relations. The options as stated in the paper are too static. Our goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, there is no possibility of changing the military legislation now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time being any change in our military supply policy. The Inter-departmental Group should set up an 18-month program with benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance.

At the same time *Aaron* noted that there is no reason to improve relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We should make clear our irritation with them at this time and then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with Videla. We should take the opportunity of the new administration, however, for turning a new page. If we move to improve our relations with them now we will simply not have the respect of the Argentinians.

Claytor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less the repeal of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment which would be impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine military to restore relations between our two armed services. At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small things interfere with our dealing with this problem.

Pustay supported *Claytor's* statement and noted that we now have a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine military and JCS would like to pursue them. He noted for instance the Galtieri (sic) invitation which is being held up in State Department. *Pustay* said that Galtieri is prepared to come.

Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his own political purposes, would like to receive the invitation but not actually accept it until after the Presidential decision is made in September in Argentina.⁶ Whatever we do we are likely to become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether, following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want to give this signal of reward to them.

Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not take reprisals against them until they publicly announce the content of their agreement with the Soviets.

Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much in all likelihood. In any event the reality will depend on the Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some six months.

⁶ In telegram 4057 from Buenos Aires, May 15, Castro noted that the idea of such an invitation had been raised with the GOA three times, and junta leaders had "responded without much enthusiasm," because "they don't see a visit as an unmixed blessing." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800240-0811)

Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them undermine us.

Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us either next year.

Pustay, returning to the question of General Galtieri's visit, said that it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on the Olympics.

Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere.

Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there seemed to be no stark alternatives that need to be put to the President. It was generally agreed that:

1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement towards improvement in our relationship.
2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the electoral situation in Argentina.
3. We will also have to see whether we need to react to the Argentinian decision on grain.

These are short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group can review as it goes along. On the longer term:

4. If there is continued improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations with the new regime.

The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this improvement might involve.⁷

⁷ Brzezinski sent a Summary of Conclusions of this meeting to Carter on May 16; Carter approved them on May 19. In a note at the end of the Summary of Conclusions, Carter wrote: "I'm inclined to move faster." In a May 19 memorandum to Muskie, which enclosed the Summary of Conclusions, Brzezinski called Muskie's attention to Carter's note. In a May 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton enclosed a draft weekly report item for Carter which noted that an Interagency Group would meet "to develop specific courses of action flowing from the PRC recommendations. In the first instance, military contacts will be examined; this is one area where we can move somewhat more rapidly as you have directed." A note indicates that the weekly report item was not sent to Carter. (Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, 1977-81, Box 80, PRC 141 Argentina 5/14/80)

111. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, June 14, 1980

SUBJECT

Steps To Improve U.S.-Argentine Relations

Pursuant to your instructions,² the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which I am submitting for your approval.

I. *OBJECTIVES*

Our principal objectives in moving to improve our relationship with Argentina are to:

—foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence;

—encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices;

—seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); and

—obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns.

We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978.³ Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and other Hemispheric issues.

II. *ACTIONS FOR 1980*

1. *The Consultative Process*

We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goodpaster's visit to Buenos Aires in January.⁴ We contemplate:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 6–11/80. Secret. No drafting information appears in this memorandum. Concurred in H, EB, OES, PM, EUR/SOV, EUR/RMP, IO, S/AS, USOAS, AID/RDP, OPIC, STR, DOD/ISA, JCS, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, USDA, DOE, EXIM, ACDA, ICA, and L/PM and by Derian, Lake and Thornton. In the right-hand margin, Carter wrote, "Ed-good ideas. Same process should be followed with other difficult countries. J."

² See footnote 7, Document 110.

³ See Document 37.

⁴ See Document 106.

—*a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*⁵ to Buenos Aires, possibly about August 1, during which he will review our policy concerns and the state of our relations and will be prepared to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature of the Argentine response.

—*a meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission* in October, the U.S. delegation possibly to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.⁶ The meeting would include discussion of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand commercial relations.

—*periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues*, with the first round to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

2. Military Relations

We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in these relations (including consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of the PRC meeting).⁷ We plan to:

—*begin periodic security consultations with Argentina*; the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic;

—*invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year* to discuss global defense issues;

—*invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the U.S. Army School of the Americas* after consulting with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative would not be regarded as conflicting with the spirit of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.⁸

⁵ Bowdler. See Document 113.

⁶ Cooper.

⁷ See Document 110. In a May 30 memorandum to Derian, Palmer and Flood reported: "DOD tried hard but failed to win backing for an attempt to modify the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment this year." In addition, they reported: "NSC (Tom Thornton) made it clear early in the meeting that the NSC staff is looking at this review process in a context in which human rights remains a central objective, and that there is no intention to downgrade this objective." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Argentina [1 of 4])

⁸ In a June 5 memorandum to Bowdler, Derian wrote that the proposal to invite an Argentine instructor was "too visible a step for us to take toward normal military-to-military relations now. Guest instructors from several countries were phased out only a year ago because of human rights policy concerns. To re-invite them now is not warranted by the present human rights situation and would wrongly signal to the Argentines that even more dramatic US moves toward military cooperation are in the offing." (Ibid.)

Other issues are:

—*High-Level Military Visit.*

We will keep under review the desirability of proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staff) to visit Washington this year.⁹ A final decision on this (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U.S.-Argentine relations.

—*Sale of P-3 Aircraft.*

In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, of seeking special legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year.

3. Human Rights

We will continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that:

—the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina;

—there will be no new disappearances, including no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists;¹⁰

—all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process;

—guarantees will be instituted to prevent the torture of detainees; and

⁹ Palmer and Flood noted, "It was agreed that, in large part because of Argentine reservations, there will be no high-level military visits this year. These will likely take place next year, depending on the state of affairs at the time. (DOD was disappointed by this.)" See footnote 7, above.

¹⁰ In telegram 4298 from Buenos Aires, May 23, the Embassy reported: "Though restless under current operating instructions which restrict the use of disappearances to currently active terrorists, the hardliners in the security forces are abiding by them." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800259-0169)

—there be substantial progress, in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit, Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners—1,300 at the time—would be released or sentenced by the end of the year).¹¹

The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in UN fora and concluded that, while this should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an important U.S. objective.¹² We should urge Argentina, in bilateral discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the UN Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church.¹³

In addition to human rights discussions initiated by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, and will be fully briefed for this purpose.

4. Nuclear Relations

We want to move Argentina over time to accept IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities (including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to keep open the door for continued cooperation with Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate with your policy. We should:

—try to resolve promptly, in accordance with U.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the remaining *safeguards issues* to permit delivery of highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program, as well as components for its power program;

—once this is done, undertake a review of the conditions under which we could facilitate expanded participation by U.S. industry in

¹¹ See Document 107.

¹² Derian recommended "that we make very clear that we will not drop the subject of accounting for disappeared persons. This must remain a key element of our diplomatic approach. Otherwise the GOA will conclude that we've simply turned the page on this unresolved issue."

¹³ Palmer and Flood wrote that there were "sharper divisions" on the issue of an "accounting" for disappeared persons, and on "the methods we should employ in pursuing this objective. ARA believes we should leave the matter exclusively to multilateral institutions such as the UNHRC. We argued that we need to keep bilateral pressure on the GOA to cooperate fully *with* the UNHRC, thereby reinforcing the latter. We cannot drop the issue from its hitherto prominent place in our diplomatic dialogue because this would signal we have turned our backs on the atrocities. At the same time, we can make clear that the issue of 'accounting' in our policy means something other than 'bringing the guilty to account.' ARA wants to talk further about this whole matter."

Argentina's nuclear program. (A major case currently at issue is an export license application for the sale of a pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor.)

5. *Other Cooperative Steps*

In addition, we would:

- Sign the pending U.S.-Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs;*
- Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty;*
- Seek to negotiate a consular convention.*

6. *Consultations with Other Allies*

The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, the Permanent Council, and the NATO experts group on Latin America. Depending on the results of these consultations, we could consider further actions in Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues.¹⁴ We would continue the practice of consulting on human rights in the appropriate UN fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission.

7. *Implications for U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile*

The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations.

With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that many of these steps will restore a better balance in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations).

Chile is concerned about our improving relationship with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance of war. This issue will

¹⁴ In a May 22 note to Thornton, Brzezinski wrote, "Our circuits with the allies are overloaded. They will think we are silly asking them to help with Argentina. We need ourselves to do something more tangible, as the P. requested. What are we doing?" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1979–1980)

be more fully addressed in the review of our relations with Chile later this year.

112. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Report on US-Argentine Relations (U)

Attached is Warren Christopher's memo to you detailing the steps we are planning to take over the remainder of this year to strengthen ties with Argentina.² This action program was worked out by the Latin American Interdepartmental Group and reflects your injunction to move more rapidly.³ (U)

There is no mention of Navy Secretary Hidalgo's trip, which was a bit of private initiative on Hidalgo's part unrelated to the program elaborated by the Interdepartmental Group. (In fact, DOD never even mentioned it at the meeting.) The Hidalgo trip can be a useful contribution, however, and State has briefed him carefully.⁴ (C)

Assistant Secretary Bill Bowdler will be going to Buenos Aires in late July. His visit and the attendant consultations will be symbolically the high point of our actions with Argentina this year and also the vehicle for tough bargaining, not just on human rights, but to pin down the Argentines on other issues of importance to us, especially their relations with the Soviets. (S)

There are two significant omissions in Christopher's report: A strategy for dealing with Argentine grain sales to the Soviet Union; and an understanding of the implications of a new US policy to Argentina on our overall approach to Latin America. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1979-1980. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Zbig" in the top right-hand corner.

² See Document 111.

³ See footnote 7, Document 110.

⁴ In telegram 5631 from Buenos Aires, July 14, the Embassy reported on Hidalgo's trip to Argentina, July 2-3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800338-0271)

With regard to grain sales, we have received intelligence reports indicating that Soviet trade officials will soon be in Buenos Aires to sign a long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Argentine Government for a minimum of 3 million tons. As this will be Moscow's first new LTA with a western supplier since the US embargo was announced on January 4, this will be a significant positive development for the Soviets and a setback to our embargo policy; it will make it more difficult to keep the Canadians on board. We have already informed the Argentines of our concerns about such an agreement; they claim it is necessary economically, given their large trade deficit with the US and the fact that they are being squeezed out of other markets. (S)

We probably have little hope of turning the Argentines around on this, but should give one more try as a means of demonstrating our concern. In addition, we could argue that they should agree (as Australia, the EC and—questionably—Canada have done) not to exceed this year's sales. If we are to have any prospect of success, this will have to be done at a high diplomatic level—preferably by Secretary Muskie calling in the Argentine Ambassador. Bowdler could follow up on this later in the month.⁵

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I recommend that you approve the steps in Christopher's memo with the following additional points:

—Secretary Muskie would summon the Argentine Ambassador to urge once more that the Argentines not sign (or at least delay signing) a long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union and, failing that, that they hold sales to current levels.⁶ (S)

—That as we proceed to develop closer relationships, DOD/JCS and other agencies involved with Argentina would continually reaffirm the importance which the Carter Administration attaches to human rights and democratization.⁷ (S)

⁵ See Document 113.

⁶ No record of a conversation between Muskie and Aja Espil during this period has been found. In telegram 190145 to Buenos Aires, July 19, the Department reported on a discussion between Eaton and Aja Espil. "Eaton noted the grains agreement signed on July 10 and said that now that this had occurred it was important for the Argentine government to commit itself not to go beyond, in coming crop years, the level of the agreement or the level of this crop year's shipments. It would be desirable for the Argentine government to state the maximum levels publicly. Aja Espil demurred on a public statement but Eaton argued it would not be all that difficult now that Argentina had an agreement with precise figures that could be used as a peg." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800347-1162)

⁷ Carter checked the approve option and initialed underneath it. In a July 11 memorandum to Muskie, Brzezinski transmitted Carter's two additional instructions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Argentina, 2/80-1/81 #1)

113. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, July 28, 1980

1. *Assistant Secretary Bowdler's Visit to Argentina*—I approved postponement of the trip today after reviewing the evidence of Argentine complicity in the Bolivian coup. The evidence is not conclusive, but it points to involvement by at least some elements of the Argentine military.² Bill Bowdler's visit had been designed to advance our dialogue with the Argentines on the issues of grain sales to the Soviets, nuclear non-proliferation and human rights progress.³ Given the need to object publicly and privately to the Argentines' positions on Bolivia, the trip would at best serve no constructive purpose as far as these other issues are concerned. And, cancelling the trip is probably a more powerful statement than any Bill could have delivered in person.⁴

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State), 7/80. Secret.

² See Documents 156 and 157. In a July 28 action memorandum to Christopher, Bushnell noted that "we believe the senior leaders of the GOA (the President, the Junta, and senior members of the Army) were aware of Argentine involvement and that it was significant." Noting that the GOA would soon recognize the new Bolivian regime, Bushnell continued, "Regardless of the timing of recognition, the key point is that the Argentines have exported their worst government terrorist techniques to Bolivia in support of a totally unwarranted military coup." Christopher approved the postponement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800111-2102)

³ See Document 111.

⁴ Carter wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin.

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, August 15, 1980, 1936Z

6584. Subject: (S) Growing Argentine Involvement in Guatemala. Ref: State 203396²

1. S/NOFORN—Entire text.

2. We know from both Argentine and Guatemalan credible sources that the GOA perceives of Central America as a vacuum rapidly filling with radical leftwing exile groups—some terrorist, to include Montonero groups with close ties to Havana. General Carlos Martinez, Chief of the Argentine State Secretariat for Intelligence (SIDE) has stated that his service has incontrovertible proof that the Montoneros and other Southern Cone terrorist groups have transplanted their headquarters in exile from Europe to Havana, with an increasingly greater presence and militant influence in Central America, at this time primarily Nicaragua and El Salvador. (We cannot confirm their views on the establishment of such “headquarters” in Havana.) This is, of course, credited in great part to USG abdication of strong leadership in that region, as ranking Argentine officials view U.S. policy in Central America and the Caribbean. Thus, senior Argentine officials see Central America as a new safehaven and focus for Cuban-linked communist aggression led by the same militants of the radical left expelled from Argentina, Chile and other neighboring countries. Martinez expressed serious concern that these activists of the radical left, if permitted to triumph in Central America, would use that region as a base of operations for renewing subversive and guerrilla operations against Argentina. That is, presumably, the rationale for Argentina’s interest in assisting Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, especially, in resisting the radical left in their respective countries.

3. We also know that the government of Guatemala regards Argentina as the ultimate “success story” in disarticulating the left, and is eager to emulate “the Argentine model” in repeating that experience

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800392–0933. Secret; Exdis; Noforn.

² August 1. The Department noted that it had “received a number of reports suggesting growing Government of Argentina (GOA) cooperation with the Government of Guatemala (GOG).” The Embassies in Argentina and Guatemala were instructed to assess the relationship, to determine the following: “Have the Argentines entered into any specific agreements with the GOG to sell military equipment, to train Guatemalan military or police personnel, or to facilitate Argentine exports to Guatemala? Is the Embassy aware of any other areas of cooperation?” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800368–0290)

in its own country. To that end we are aware of training in the areas of counter-intelligence and counter-insurgency already given or being given to military personnel from Guatemala, Salvador and other Latin American countries. We suspect that the forthcoming visit to Argentina of Guatemalan Foreign Minister Rafael Castillo Valdez may have a great deal to do with bilateral agreements contemplating further Argentine assistance and possibly material support for Guatemala. At this time we are not specifically aware of possible Argentine agreements with the government of Guatemala to sell them military equipment, train police personnel, or to facilitate Argentine exports to Guatemala.

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115. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie's Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Argentina¹

New York, October 1, 1980, 1756Z

Secto 8046. Subject: (U) Secretary's Bilateral with Argentine FM Pastor September 30.

1. (Confidential—Entire text).

2. Summary. Pastor speaking first summarized recent Argentine history and aims of current GOA, was highly critical of OAS report on human rights and efforts to make Argentina a public target, defended GOA recognition of the Garcia Meza Regime in Bolivia while claiming GOA has and will counsel moderation, and depicted US/Argentine bilateral relations as mainly a one way street with his country on the losing end. Nevertheless Argentina is a firm ally and hopes, with improving relations, it will be treated as such. He mentioned a possible visit of the Argentine President-elect to Washington, and invited the Secretary to Buenos Aires. It was a tough performance with no obvious departures from script. The Secretary, while also voicing strong interest in improving relations, emphasized that there are two serious problems—Bolivia and Human Rights. In addition he stressed the importance the USG attaches to continued Argentine restraint on

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800470-0449. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Asunción, Brasília, the U.S. Mission to Geneva, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. Muskie was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly.

grains shipments to the USSR, and expressed hope the GOA will soon ratify Tlatelolco. End summary

3. Bilateral meeting between Secretary and GOA FM Pastor lasted 45 minutes. On U.S. side were Secretary Newsom, AS Bowdler, Country Director Service, and interpreter. In addition to Pastor were Aja Espil, and FM Official Jorge Stock. After pleasantries, Pastor delivered lengthy summary of recent Argentine history, emphasizing the Soviet-inspired Marxist subversion in the period 1973–1976 and the chaotic political and economic situation that prevailed when the military took power in 1976. The Argentine military takeover was not in the classic Latin American mold; rather it was demanded by “all the Argentine people.” The Argentine military set four goals for themselves: establish peace and security; reorganize national administration and make it more efficient; reverse the economic decline; restore democracy. According to Pastor, there has been good progress on the first three of these objectives, and the GOA remains firmly committed to the fourth. In the latter regard, Pastor noted that the military government has been meeting with more than 50 interest groups to discuss how Argentina’s constitution should be changed to ensure “solid and stable democracy” in the future. Pastor concluded this part of his exposition with the argument that Argentina’s military rulers are not like Pinochet in Chile (with his lengthy transition plans) or the government in Paraguay.

4. Pastor then addressed the IAHRC report on human rights in Argentina. He said that the commission had arrived with preconceived ideas, that they spent only 15 days in the country, and that they were not even concerned with taking back the documents provided by the GOA. In Pastor’s view, the primary purposes of the OAS are security and cooperation. He recounted a long history of Argentine cooperation with the United States and other hemispheric nations in these regards. The GOA does not believe the OAS should be a forum for accusations against one or another member. All countries have their problems. We must not let those problems interfere and impede pursuit of the primary objectives. It is neither fair nor just that Argentina should be the target on human rights issues in the OAS. According to Pastor, some Argentines are beginning to ask if it would not be better for Argentina simply to withdraw.

5. On Bolivia, Pastor began by saying that Argentina had been blamed for a military coup in 1962, that Brazil and the U.S. were the supposed villains in 1964, that the U.S. was given credit for the downfall of Torres while Brazil was mentioned when Banzer stepped down, and now it is Argentina’s turn again to get the blame. The GOA has a long history of providing military and economic assistance to Bolivia. Pastor ventured he thought that if other countries had provided more assistance along the way, the Bolivian people would not be in their present

circumstances. Pastor argued that rather than encouraging the Bolivian military, the GOA had in the past counselled restraint (to Banzer earlier this year). When Garcia Meza took power, the GOA waited 14 days before according recognition—an unusually long time for neighbors in that part of the world. More recently in another conversation with Banzer, the GOA has argued strongly for responsibility and prudence on the part of the new Bolivian Government and that it should quickly set forth a serious program. Pastor said that if some Argentine officers have made statements praising the new regime, they are speaking outside the bounds of official policy.

6. Turning to bilateral relations, Pastor asked Jorge Stock to read from a list of all the ways in which the GOA has cooperated with the U.S. in the past year or so (Non-Aligned Movement, refugees, Afghanistan, Middle East problems, hostages in Iran, etc.), and on the other hand, negative U.S. actions involving Argentina (the UN working group on missing persons, votes in the IFI's, nuclear matters, the Malvinas and Beagle, failure to help correct the trade imbalance, etc.).

7. Pastor concluded his presentation with the affirmation that Argentina is a western country and that it recognizes the fundamental importance of U.S. leadership. Argentina is an ally and friend of the U.S., and wants to be treated as such. In this regard, after the U.S. election, Pastor suggested the desirability of a "memorandum of understanding" between the two countries, setting the framework for political, military, and economic cooperation across the board. He also mentioned the desire of the next President-elect of Argentina (unnamed) to meet with President Carter toward the end of the year, and Pastor invited Secretary Muskie to visit Argentina early next year.

8. Secretary Muskie thanked Pastor for his review of relations. He affirmed the US interest in improving relations and referred to the Presidential decision in this regard taken last spring.² While we appreciate the improvements that have taken place and want to see this continue, there are two serious problems from the U.S. perspective. With respect to Bolivia, the U.S. believed that the GOA had something to do with the recent change in government.³ We do not consider the Garcia Meza regime representative, and we dislike the "harsh and bloody" measures which have been employed. Argentine support for the regime is a setback to our bilateral relations; it is a problem which needs to be worked out. While it is not the U.S. desire to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, regimes such as the one now in

² See Document 110.

³ See Document 113 and 157.

power in Bolivia generate very negative feelings among the American people.

9. Turning to the Human Rights situation in Argentina, the Secretary noted recent improvements but also that there continue to be some 2,000 political prisoners, that there have been 11 disappearances this year, and that there is no independent judiciary. To emphasize the importance the U.S. attaches to Human Rights, the Secretary recalled that when he first came to the Senate the U.S. and Argentina had good bilateral relations. There had followed a long period of difficulties, caused in part by internal Argentine problems. The Secretary expressed hope that we may now be entering a new era of improving relations.

10. The Secretary noted that Ambassador Bowdler would be discussing other issues in more detail with Pastor,⁴ but that he wanted to mention them also. Regarding the issue of nuclear cooperation, the Secretary wondered if the GOA was considering ratifying Tlatelolco; it would be a useful step. On the grains embargo to the Soviet Union, the Secretary noted that Argentine shipments this year will exceed by 8 to 10 percent the targets agreed last January. He emphasized that the reduced grain imports of the Soviet Union have forced a cutback in meat consumption and that, as we have seen recently, this is always a sensitive matter in a communist country. He pointed out the current Iran/Iraq war as further evidence of the importance to the west in keeping pressure on the Soviet Union. It is essential that the Soviets not be allowed or encouraged to expand their influence into other areas of the Middle East. If, for example, they were to gain control of the Strait of Hormuz, there would be serious danger of World War III. GOA support on grains is critical to this effort. We are asking other allies to also maintain restrictions in many areas—e.g., the NATO allies to continue high-technology sanctions.

11. In closing his remarks, the Secretary mentioned a current effort within the Non-Aligned Movement to exclude Egypt. Pastor replied immediately that he had already talked with the Egyptians and promised full GOA support.

12. With time running out, Pastor commented quickly on some of the points the Secretary had made. On Bolivia, the GOA can not abandon it because it might fall apart, but it will undertake a conscientious and serious effort to steer the new regime in a more acceptable direction. Pastor denied that there are any political prisoners in Argentina; rather there are 1200 terrorists that are being dealt with by the judiciary whose

⁴ In telegram 263737 to Buenos Aires, October 3, the Department summarized Bowdler's meeting with Pastor, during which they discussed Bolivia, human rights, and the OAS General Assembly. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800472–0234) (C)

power is absolute. Regarding possible disappearances this year, the GOA has about become convinced that persons are being paid to disappear, and he claimed as proof that some have later surfaced. On grains, Pastor said GOA is restricting sales as much as possible but it is difficult and, furthermore, Argentina has an unfavorable trade balance which makes all grain sales important. Pastor affirmed that Argentina is going to ratify Tlatelolco. On this point, he argued that the GOA would have done so before if it had not been for U.S. lack of cooperation on nuclear matters. He noted that the recent decision to sell uranium to India was very difficult for the Argentines to understand.⁵ This line of reasoning prompted a final Pastor comment about recent apparent U.S. approbation for the military takeover in Turkey⁶—again in contrast to our relations with his own military regime.

13. The bilateral concluded with mutual expressions of desire for improved relations.

Muskie

⁵ Additional documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIX, South Asia.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 154.

116. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 20, 1980

SUBJECT

M-B-B Follow-up—Argentina

Yesterday's M-B-B outdid itself in ambiguity on the Argentine front.² (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country Files, Box 91, Argentina, 3/79–12/80. Secret. Sent for action.

² Attached but not printed is a November 19 memorandum from Brzezinski to Aaron and Denend. Brzezinski transmitted decisions taken at the M–B–B lunch: "Argentina: Defer any consideration until just prior to the Videla visit, at which point review for possible Presidential consideration."

State thinks it is supposed to prepare an overall review of US-Argentine policy for use in a PRC. (C)

Defense thinks that it is supposed to do a much briefer paper which would, presumably, find its way via us to the President. The paper would presumably cover only some small-scale actions on the military front that could be taken to keep the ball in play until the new administration(s) take over. (S)

Nobody is quite sure how this is to relate to the Viola (*not* Videla) visit since there is no particular reason to assume that Viola will even be interested in talking to anybody in this Administration. (C)

I would like some guidance from you on what has happened and is supposed to happen. After that I will meet early next week with Kramer (ISA) and Bushnell (State) to develop a plan of action.³ (C)

GUIDANCE REQUESTED: (Please check as appropriate)

1. Are we supposed to do a full-scale review of US-Argentine relations_____or simply put forth some specific decisions for the President to make_____?⁴ (Note that the really big issue is Kennedy-Humphrey and with the Congress going out of session there is no way that this Administration can deal with that. (S)

2. Do you want a PRC_____or a coordinated interagency memo for the President to pass on_____?⁵ (C)

3. Should further action be keyed solely to a Viola visit (which may well never take place)_____?⁶ or should we be thinking in terms of routine contacts (as DOD prefers)_____? (C)

4. What do *you* want to come out of this drill? As you know, my preference is to put everything on ice but my responsibility is to represent your interests. (A phone call or a meeting would seem to be indicated unless your preferences are pretty simple and straightforward.)⁷ (S)

³ No record of meeting minutes has been found.

⁴ Brzezinski checked this option.

⁵ Brzezinski circled the phrase "coordinated interagency memo" and checked it. No record of this memorandum has been found.

⁶ Brzezinski checked this option. Viola did not meet with Carter.

⁷ Brzezinski wrote in the left-hand margin: "an option for the P. in the event he does meet with V."

Bolivia

117. Editorial Note

In early 1977, between 30 and 40 U.S. citizens were imprisoned in Bolivia on charges of drug possession or trafficking. (National Archives, RG 59, ARA Assistant Secretary Subject File, 1975–78, Lot 81D183, Todman Trip: May 8–16, 1977) On March 31, U.S. Ambassador William Perry Stedman discussed the prisoners with Bolivian President Hugo Banzer Suárez: “I used the material furnished by the Dept for my conversations with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Interior to describe U.S. concern about prolonged legal processes in the Bolivian courts. I spelled out the categories of cases which warranted prompt consideration for speedier decisions by the judges. President Banzer was well informed about the situation and said that he would immediately contact the Minister of Interior along the lines of my presentation to see what further action could be taken to accelerate the judicial process.” (Telegram 2417 from La Paz, April 1, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114-0470) (C)

A committee comprised of the prisoners’ parents and relatives, referred to as the Parents Committee, met with Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs A. Denis Clift on February 9 and with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher on May 13. The Parents Committee expressed its concerns about conditions in Bolivian jails and delays in the Bolivian justice system, and asked the Department of State to increase its efforts to advocate on the prisoners’ behalf. (Carter Library, Donated Historical Materials, Mondale Papers, Box 44, Foreign Countries: Bolivia, 1977; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77) On May 11, a group of 11 U.S. Senators sent a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, writing that the prisoners had been denied due process and “that some of the prisoners have been subjected to physical abuse, including beatings, and have been denied medical treatment, even when clearly needed.” The Senators wrote of their “particular concern” regarding “the apparent failure of our embassy personnel to take action—or display much sympathy—on behalf of these prisoners.” They requested “that this situation be given your personal attention and that contact at the highest level of the Bolivian government be initiated.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 12, Bolivian Prisoners) (no classification marking)

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, May 18, 1977, 1440Z

3758. Subject: Todman's Conversation With President Hugo Banzer.

1. Following is my recollection of the conversation that Assistant Secretary Todman had with President Banzer on May 16. Ambassador Alberto Crespo was also present. This reporting telegram was prepared after Todman's departure from La Paz.

2. After an initial exchange of pleasantries and picture taking, President Banzer stated that he was delighted that the Assistant Secretary had come to Bolivia to learn first hand about the new situation in this country. Ambassador Todman indicated that relations between the US and Bolivia were excellent and that he hoped the problem of the US prisoners² would not constitute a difficulty between the two countries. Todman indicated that it is the policy of the USG to respect Bolivian laws with regard to narcotics trafficking but that we wish to see to the extent possible an acceleration of the judicial procedures fully within appropriate legal context. He described the atmosphere in Washington within which the Parents Committee has created great emotional concern about US prisoners and has stimulated several congressional inquiries. President Banzer said he understood the concern of the parents for their children and also understood the position of the USG. He said that there had been frequent speculation about GOB amnesty for American prisoners but that this was not possible either legally or politically. He said it was in the interests of both countries that the cases be expedited and that he has given appropriate instructions to the Minister of Interior to do all that he can. Todman showed President Banzer a copy of the letter from senators on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which was sent to Secretary Vance.³ President Banzer read the letter carefully and at one point looked up to say that the accusation that I had not been active on behalf of the prisoners was an obvious distortion because in all of our recent conversations I had raised the issue of the American prisoners. President Banzer said that as far as he knew I was the most concerned member of the Embassy staff. He noted that the GOB is studying seriously the elimination of the auto-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770177-0194. Limited Official Use. Todman visited Bolivia May 14–16, during a tour of South America.

² See Document 117.

³ *Ibid.*

matic review by the Supreme Court of each sentence. He referred Todman to the Minister of Interior for discussions of specific cases.⁴

3. President Banzer outlined in clear terms his aspirations for Bolivia. The central theme he stressed was the return of government to the people by 1980 through a process not yet decided. He said that he has commissioned several advisers to prepare proposals and that these are being reviewed at this time. He stressed that the military are in power in Bolivia and in other countries in South America on a transitory basis to rectify chaotic conditions and place countries on the path of progress. Todman said that the US considers itself a democratic regime and accordingly does prefer that there be popular participation in other countries so as to facilitate a free and effective relation. However, he made it clear that the timing and the means of restoration of constitutional process in Bolivia, as elsewhere, is a matter for each country and government to determine.

4. President Banzer outlined the Bolivian efforts to obtain access to the sea and described the present status of discussions as a stalemate. He noted that he had called on both Chile and Peru in his speeches of December 24 and March 23 to come forth with new proposals. Nothing has happened since his speeches. The President said that Bolivia must do something before long so as to stimulate some action mainly from Chile which in a sense is the party of the first part. President Banzer showed clear understanding of the difficulties of the Chilean military in giving up Chilean territory but he said others must understand the difficulties that Bolivia has in making territorial exchange. President Banzer said that there is a role for the USG in this matter and suggested that a public statement be made providing moral support for the long-sought Bolivian outlet to the Pacific Ocean.

5. Ambassador Todman inquired about President Banzer's views on Chilean/Peruvian friction. The President's reply paralleled that of the Foreign Minister in that he believes, or so he said, that Chile and Peru will inevitably go to war.⁵ President Banzer said he sees no way in which an armed conflict can be avoided if Chile and Peru are left to their own devices. He said both countries have educated their military to either seek revenge or to prevent it from occurring. Both countries, but particularly Peru, are armed beyond any reasonable need.

⁴ Todman reported to the Department on May 16 that Banzer "expressed interest in having a Mexican-type treaty with the US on the execution of penal sentences," and he recommended that "we should proceed now to negotiate one with the GOB." (La Paz 3693, May 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770201-0157)

⁵ In telegram 3725 from La Paz, May 17, the Embassy reported on Todman's conversation with Bolivian Foreign Minister Adriaola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770176-0400) See Document 14.

The Bolivian policy in the event of war will be to maintain to the extent that it can complete neutrality. Since Bolivia cannot expect to prevent the use of its territory by either belligerent it will need to have support from the outside world to preserve its neutrality. President Banzer said that there is an important role for the US to play in seeking to prevent war between Chile and Peru. He said the US should quietly and diplomatically work in both Lima and Santiago to calm tensions and reduce possible trends to conflict.

6. Todman volunteered information about US policy toward Cuba. He said that after stationing some US personnel in the Swiss Embassy in Havana and a like step by the Cubans in the Czech Embassy in Washington, any other movement toward resumption of diplomatic relations would be contingent upon positive and favorable steps by Cuba. He said the US has concerns about human rights in Cuba and its continued stationing of its military personnel outside of its borders. Todman said that the main purpose of his trip to Cuba was to sort out the overlapping fishing claims of the US and Cuba to work out a basis for fishing activities by both countries in the 90-mile area between them.⁶ He also said that he felt a slight movement in improving relations with Cuba could be used to further our objectives in improving human rights in Cuba and a clarification of Cuba's use of its armed forces. President Banzer said that he felt the US position to be eminently sound. Todman then described briefly US and Panama negotiations for a new treaty concerning the Panama Canal. Todman indicated that one of the Cardinal principles of the US was to preserve the ability of the US to protect the Canal for free and legitimate use by all the countries of the world. Again President Banzer signaled his concurrence in our practical approach. Todman also raised US policy toward the GSA tin stockpile indicating that any such sales after congressional approval would be made only after serious consultation with Bolivia, to the producers and the tin council. He congratulated President Banzer on Bolivia's announced decision to ratify the fifth tin agreement and said that it would be easier to resolve problems related to tin within the agreement. He also said that the Carter administration is seriously considering a modification of long-standing policy so that the US might be able to contribute in some way to stockpiles managed by commodity agreements. President Banzer expressed his pleasure at this possible development and noted that Bolivia agreed with the concept of a US

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, Document 15.

strategic stockpile of tin but was dismayed when the stockpile was used for purposes of reducing tin prices.⁷

7. President Banzer concluded the conversation by noting the US/Bolivian relations are excellent and that further visits by senior USG officials would help in improving their understanding and bettering even more our bilateral relations.

Stedman

⁷ Administration policy regarding the U.S. tin stockpile and the International Tin Council is summarized in telegram 44690 to La Paz, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070-0060) In telegram 4042 from La Paz, May 25, the Embassy gave a general report on Todman's visit to Bolivia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770187-0952)

119. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Grenada, June 15, 1977

SUBJECT

Peace in the Andean Region; Americans in jail in Bolivia

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Mark Dion, USOAS (Notetaker)

Mrs. van Reigersberg (interpreter)

BOLIVIA

Foreign Minister Adriaola

The Foreign Minister said he was delighted to have a chance to meet the Secretary, to discuss the realities of Latin America and to follow up Mr. Todman's recent visit to La Paz. Secretary Vance said he had had a long report from Ambassador Todman who was enthusiastic in his description of Bolivia.² They agreed it would be useful to have these visits on a more regular basis. The Secretary then asked the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14-17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential. Drafted by Dion, approved in ARA and S. Vance and Adriaola were in Grenada for the OAS General Assembly meeting. In telegram 152728 to La Paz, June 30, the Department transmitted this memorandum to the Embassy.

² See Document 118.

Foreign Minister for his views on the Andean region at the moment, particularly with regard to the fragility of peace there.

Adriazola gave the Secretary a lengthy description. Peru has acquired highly sophisticated weapons of great firepower from the Soviet Union. This has created a disequilibrium and produced a geopolitical imbalance that has neighboring countries deeply worried. After its defeat in the war with Chile in 1879, Peru created a mystique about recovering its territories. The current imbalance is the result of a history of hostility between Chile and Peru. Bolivia is involved because it is a neighbor. It hoped that its formula of peace, development and integration would allow it to return to the Pacific ocean in peace. Great powers are indirectly involved in this problem as well. Peru's acquisition of weapons has made it quite dependent on the USSR. War could come. A conflagration in South America would mean chaos for the hemisphere.

Last week, Minister Adriazola spoke separately with the presidents of Peru and Chile. He asked the President of Peru whether it was planning to declare war on Chile. The answer was no, that none of its weapons were for offensive purposes, that they would only be used for self-defense. The Peruvian President explained that the result of a temporary victory now over Chile would be to create much more serious problems for the future because once Chile acquired means of revenge, it would attack again and such a war would be extremely costly to Peru. Adriazola asked the President of Chile whether he expected Peru's armaments to be used in war. The President of Chile said he thought Peru was considering hostile action. Why else had it bought so many arms?

Adriazola noted at this point in his account that Peru had tried to buy weapons from the U.S. When the US refused, the USSR offered large quantities on easy terms. These purchasing arrangements allowed Peru to acquire modern weapons cheaply. Bolivia is a peaceful country. What wealth it has is used for development, not preparations for war. The Government of Bolivia is sensitive to social problems and is working to build a better life for its people. Adriazola asked how Secretary Vance viewed the situation in the Andean region.

The Secretary said that it is our opinion that Bolivia has indeed shown great restraint in weapons purchases and is working hard for development and social justice. We are concerned with the Peruvian buildup; what role could the US play to improve the situation? We refused to sell arms to Peru because we wanted to prevent an arms race. The Peruvians then went to the Soviet Union and bought on favorable terms with low interest. The Secretary reiterated that this situation is of great concern to us.

Adriazola said there were two ways the US could help build a work for detente in the area. One is to help build a balance among the

parties; the other is to warn them that the U.S. will not countenance a war in Latin America.

Secretary Vance asked if the latter were not in fact an act of intervention. Adriazola said the Charter of the OAS and the UN Charter both ruled out intervention in internal affairs. They also called for self-determination and respect for sovereignty of state. Not just two countries are involved. The whole continent and indeed the Western hemisphere will be affected by such a war. The U.S. must therefore make every effort to avert war. Given Peru's clear dependence on the USSR, it could find itself forced into war by Soviet pressure.

The Minister said he was delighted Ambassador Stedman would be coming to Washington to work with Ambassador Todman. Ambassador Stedman knows the situation intimately. Adriazola promised to provide Ambassador Stedman with briefings and documentation that would allow him to discuss the course of action the US might take on his return to Washington. He said Ambassador Stedman was very well liked in La Paz and that Bolivians were sorry to see him go but pleased he would be in Washington.³

Secretary Vance said he was looking forward to a discussion with Ambassador Stedman. He promised to analyze any documents the Minister supplied.

At the conclusion of their talks, the Secretary then raised the question of Americans in jail in Bolivia and asked if the Minister would be kind enough to look into their situation. He hoped that the arraignment, trial and sentencing could be accelerated. Some 40 Americans are in jail in Bolivia, according to the Department's information. Minister Adriazola said he was aware that 25 drug traffickers are now being subjected to legal procedures but he doubted that the process could be hurried up. Instead, he suggested that an interchange of prisoners could be considered along the lines of the Mexican-US exchange. Secretary Vance said he would look into the idea to see what could be done.⁴

³ Stedman left post in La Paz on June 23.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 118.

120. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1977, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Banzer Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

BOLIVIA

President Banzer
Ambassador Crespo
Ambassador Ortiz Sanz
Ambassador Xavier Murillo de la Rocha
Sub-secretary for Political and
Maritime and International Waters
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hernan Antelo Secretary of Press
and Information
Lt. Guillermo Canedo Naval Aide to
the President

US

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Stedman
Robert Pastor (NSC)
Williams Beal, Charge d'Affaires,
La Paz
Interpreter

President Carter welcomed President Banzer to Washington, thanked him for coming and for Bolivia's support for the Panama Canal Treaties.

In replying, President Banzer stressed the importance of the Panama Canal Treaties as an antecedent for the solution of other problems in Latin America in the same spirit of cooperation and friendship. In this connection, Banzer said, he wanted to discuss Bolivia's problem, her geographic encirclement. He hoped that the approach exemplified by the Panama Canal Treaties might serve as a departure point for a resolution of Bolivia's problem.

President Carter, too, hoped that progress would be made. He had spoken to Presidents Pinochet and Morales Bermudez and encouraged them to discuss the matter with the Bolivians.² The President said that the burden of the initiative probably rested with the Bolivians. President Pinochet had told the President that even if there had been an agreement between Bolivia and Chile, Peru was not likely to approve. In turn, the Peruvian proposal for an international zone at Arica had not been acceptable to Chile. The US, President Carter said, had absolutely no desire to interfere in this matter or to force agreement among the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia: 5-12/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

² For the bilateral meeting between Carter and Pinochet, see Document 205. For the bilateral meeting between Carter and Morales Bermudez, see Document 304.

countries. Nevertheless, in view of Bolivia's strong and understandable interest in this matter, the US did want to help.

President Banzer observed that the problem goes back to 1904 the same year in which the original Panama Canal Treaty was signed. In that year the Bolivians were forced to sign a treaty imposed upon them by the victor in a war.³ Banzer felt that in recent times his government had taken the most progressive steps, particularly in presenting a clear proposal. Banzer said that the Bolivian plan rested on three principal elements. These were; *peace, integration, and development*. He thought these constituted a realistic basis for a satisfactory solution.

President Banzer said that at some time there would be war in the area between Peru and Chile. Bolivia has already declared that it will remain neutral. However, he noted, in the area between Peru and Chile there was a strip of about 200 kilometers wide in which no warfare maneuvers were possible. The 100 kilometer wide strip in which maneuver was possible would certainly put warfare in Bolivian territory. Bolivia was most anxious to avoid such a situation. It was a peace-loving country, its resources were limited and Banzer's government was anxious to use those resources to raise the standard of living of the Indians and the campesinos. The Bolivians are very disturbed at the buildup of arms in Peru and in Chile, Banzer said. There is, furthermore a widespread belief that a treaty exists whereby Arica would be returned to Peru. Banzer insisted there is no such treaty and said he is very much concerned that as the centennial of the earlier war approaches the danger of a new conflict increases. Banzer said that in Peru a generation has been reared in the concept of revenge upon Chile. The Bolivians, Banzer stressed, wished to keep the two—Peru and Chile—apart, and thus maintain the peace which is a basic part of Bolivia's proposal for a corridor to the sea.

The area which would be occupied by the Bolivian corridor, Banzer noted, is at the moment economically undeveloped and unintegrated. Bolivia proposes to make it a center of development for which Bolivian raw materials could be used, and which would be beneficial to all three countries. At the present the future looks very disturbing. The Bolivians have proposed a development plan within the context of their plans for a corridor. Chile, Banzer said, accepted but with certain conditions. The first condition was that the area should be demilitarized. The Bolivians responded to the Chileans that they did not plan to put any troops in the area. However, Bolivia could not agree on a formal demilitarization because this would impinge upon Bolivian sover-

³ The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce between Bolivia and Chile, signed on October 20, 1904. (Parry, *Consolidated Treaty Series*, vol. 196 [1904], p. 403–410)

eignty. The second condition on which the Chileans insisted was that they should keep possession of off-shore waters up to the 200-mile limit. This the Bolivians could agree to since all they really wanted was 10 kilometers of shore line.

A further condition was that Chile should have the total use of the water from the River Lauca. This was difficult because the Bolivians felt they needed at least part of those waters for the economic development of the area. This problem, however, could probably be settled. The principal difficulty, however, arose over Chilean insistence on an exchange of territories. On this there could be no agreement from the Bolivian side. The Bolivian people were against this. They had lost 400 kilometers of territory which had been taken forcibly and all they were now asking for was 10 kilometers of coastline.

If there were war in the area, Banzer went on, all ports would be terribly damaged and this would be critical for Bolivia. The country simply could not survive without reliable ports and a normal flow of imports. Banzer again stressed that Bolivia had complete and detailed plans for the full development of the corridor. There had been an attempt at a solution in 1929, Banzer added, in the form of a protocol with which Bolivia and Chile had agreed.⁴ However, Peru had sent a reply not responsive to Chile, which was not prepared to accept an enclave with shared sovereignty. Peru had been asked to withdraw its reply but nothing had happened. Since December of last year there had been a stalemate and in effect nothing was happening.

Banzer noted that he could, of course, tell his people no progress had been made but this was something very dangerous to do since the Bolivian people still had high expectations. Furthermore, if nothing happened Bolivia would be obliged to break relations with Chile again. It was a fact that relations with Chile had been renewed chiefly for the purpose of enabling further talks to take place; some progress must be made.⁵ President Banzer said he had made tremendous efforts simply to get the other two Presidents to agree to meet that afternoon (September 8). He felt he was obligated to make every effort to achieve a meeting of the three Presidents while they were in Washington.⁶

⁴ Presumably a reference to the Treaty Between Chile and Peru for the Settlement of the Dispute Regarding Tacna and Arica, signed June 3, 1929. The treaty confirmed Bolivia's landlocked status but also included a protocol that allowed for free transport of goods through the disputed maritime territory and its ports. (94 League of Nations Treaty Series, 1929, 401)

⁵ Bolivia and Chile severed relations in April 1962, and restored them in February 1975.

⁶ In telegram 7311 from La Paz, September 13, the Embassy reported on Banzer's reaction to his meeting with Pinochet and Morales Bermudez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770332-0616)

President Carter wondered whether an exchange of territory were required. He noted that probably Arica would continue to be used for Bolivian imports. Did the Bolivians consider that it was necessary to construct a new port and facilities?

President Banzer replied that in the long run a new port remained in the plan. However, for the present Arica would continue to be used as Bolivia's port, even though facilities there were extremely poor. For example, US wheat was imported to Bolivia through Arica although there were no warehouses. The wheat was simply unloaded out in the open and the birds ate a great deal of it. Storage rates at Arica were high and there were fines for delays in moving the goods. The railroad itself that went to Bolivia was Chilean. It carried just about 100% Bolivian goods and there was no incentive for the Chileans to move the goods promptly. At the present time Bolivia owed Chile over 300 million dollars in warehousing and fines as well as 32 million dollars to Peru, a very large sum for a country with a small income.

If Bolivia obtains a corridor and continues to use Arica, Bolivia would plan to purchase the railroad and to build a good road alongside as well as warehouses for its imported goods. Bolivia did not contemplate building a new port which would compete with Arica.

President Carter said he understood and that there was a possibility the US might encourage loans from international financing institutions for improvements at Arica, or perhaps to build another port. There was, of course, nothing definite at the moment but there certainly was a possibility of financing. Referring to the tripartite meeting which President Banzer would be attending later in the day, he asked whether the US could send an observer or perhaps get a report as to what went on at the meeting, since it would be helpful to us to keep abreast of developments.

President Banzer said he wanted to be sure it was understood that the problem was essentially a Bolivian one. The US should understand this. Nevertheless, he wished President Carter and the US would follow developments sympathetically and not to be disinterested. The situation could become one of warfare which it seemed to President Banzer the US would wish to avoid in Latin America. Banzer noted that Peru's new military equipment was from the USSR and there were many Soviet technicians in Peru. For the present the Peruvian soldiers were not capable of operating the sophisticated Russian equipment but they would eventually learn. He was not sure what implications warfare might have under these conditions.

President Carter assured President Banzer that the US was and would remain interested in this situation and would very much appreciate receiving reports on any progress made.

The President said there were a few items which the US wished to bring up. He congratulated President Banzer on progress which

Bolivia has made and will be making towards constitutionalization of the government.⁷ He also congratulated him on the reduction of international drug traffic which is taking place.

A related matter, President Carter noted, was the very serious problem presented to the US by the 39 American prisoners detained in Bolivia on drug charges. The US recognizes that a number of them had been detained as a result of efforts to reduce the drug traffic. However, the President went on, some had been in prison for a long time, some were ill, and some had been jailed for minor offenses only. The parents of prisoners were strongly organized. They had good access to the press and the media and there would be Congressional hearings at which US officials would testify.⁸ Coordinator for Human Rights Patt Derian, the President said, had told him of Bolivian efforts to expedite trials and to keep the judicial processes moving. President Carter asked, however, that President Banzer and his government do all possible to release those prisoners who were ill, others who had apparently committed only minor offenses and others who may have served time in jail longer than the sentences which might be imposed. This would demonstrate the concern of President Banzer and the Bolivian Government's with human rights. Moreover, President Carter said, he believed these requests for special consideration would be compatible with the Bolivian system of justice. If such steps were not taken and further progress made, President Carter went on, there could be a great outcry, which the President could not control, from the public, the press and the Congress. His remarks were not critical, the President said, and should not be understood in that sense. However, he just wanted to prevent the problem from getting worse.

President Banzer assured President Carter he would give the matter of the prisoners his personal attention. He noted, however, that the recent Bolivian narcotics law had been a cooperative venture with the US. In addition, Bolivia was receiving funds for enforcement and for

⁷ In telegram 5692 from La Paz, July 21, the Embassy reported on Banzer's July 16 announcement of his plan to return the country to constitutional government by 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770259-1141)

⁸ The House International Relations Committee held hearings in July 1977 regarding consular services to U.S. citizens in Bolivia, among other countries. For the transcript, see "Protection of Americans Abroad," *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, July 12 and 14, 1977*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing in October 1977 specifically on U.S. citizen prisoners in Bolivian jails. See "U.S. Citizens in Foreign Jails on Drug Related Charges," *Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, October 14, 1977, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on United States Citizens Detained in Foreign Jails on Drug Related Charges*. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977)

crop substitution from the US. Banzer also observed that sometimes the US made requests which were against Bolivian law making it extremely difficult for him. He noted that cocaine valued at approximately 300 million dollars or more was shipped from Bolivia to the US every year. This was a serious problem for American youths and Bolivia wants to stop this traffic. It is, he said, good business for Bolivia, but Bolivia doesn't not want this business. President Banzer went on to say there are many faults in the Bolivian prison system and in the judicial system but improvements are being made. He again promised to give this matter his personal attention.

Turning to "constitutionalization" of the Bolivian government, President Banzer said Bolivia is now going through a phase in which the Government is institutionalizing the country's political life. Before moving to a new phase in government in 1980—"perhaps sooner if possible"—things must be put in order so as to avoid the problems which the country had faced prior to his regime.

President Carter expressed his hope that President Banzer's discussion with the other two Presidents would be productive. He expressed pleasure at their meeting and suggested that President Banzer correspond directly with him on this or other subjects, if this should prove necessary. He would send to President Banzer a list of those US prisoners about which we are most concerned. He mentioned Susan Scanlan who is in a hospital, and two others who are ill and who were either caught with only small amounts of drugs or who had been in jails for over a year and a half. Again he expressed hopes that President Banzer might find some way to release these prisoners.⁹

In conclusion, the President again wished President Banzer well at his meeting this afternoon and urged that he continue his efforts with Chile and Peru. President Carter reiterated his desire to stay informed and repeated that he would speak to the Presidents of Chile and Peru regarding the importance of agreement for a Bolivian outlet to the sea.

⁹ In telegram 217970 to La Paz, September 12, the Department noted that the list of prisoners named by Carter was provided to the Embassy via telephone conversation on September 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770330-0322) Carter wrote to Banzer on October 31, noting that the Department had provided a list of prisoners "who appeared to me to merit some special consideration" to Crespo. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia: 5-12/77) In telegram 8908 from La Paz, November 4, Boeker wrote that he would not deliver the letter "pending further instructions, as per my telcon with Arellano." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770415-1135)

121. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin America Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Warren) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, October 26, 1977

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 80M00165A, Box 5, Folder 121: B-11: Bolivia. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

122. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Secretary of State Vance and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, November 3, 1977

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Job 80M00165A, Box 5, Folder 121: B-11: Bolivia. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

123. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, February 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Doing Something Positive on Human Rights—the Case of Bolivia

The Administration is feeling pressure from many different directions to do something positive to show our concern about human rights

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Bolivia, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. Sent for information. In the top right-hand margin of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, “ZB—I am consulting on the Hill this Friday. DA”

abroad. The President has also mentioned it a couple of times, and this point is in the PD on human rights.² Mark Schneider, who is Pat Derian's deputy, phoned me last week to make the same point and suggests that we should try to do something for Bolivia, since its human rights record warrants some special consideration.

I asked Mark to have someone on his staff draft a short memo on human rights improvement in Bolivia, and I attach it at Tab A.³ These improvements include a decision by President Banzer in November 1977 to lift a 3-year-old decree suspending all political activity. At the same time he announced Presidential elections would be held in July 1978; he issued a general amnesty allowing all Bolivian politicians and labor leaders to return from exile. Last December, he released 52 political prisoners, and in January he issued a general amnesty for all political exiles.

If we wanted to do something positive for Bolivia, the one area that would matter the most is USG tin stockpiles. Banzer essentially uses his letter to the President to make a case for why we should be very sensitive to disposals of tin stockpiles.⁴

I understand that the Vice President has asked that we hold up the letter to Banzer from the President until consultations with the Hill on the stockpiles are completed.⁵ I am writing this memorandum simply to repeat that I hope that these considerations—a positive step on human rights in Bolivia—will be taken into account as the final decision on stockpiles is made. I am not saying that this factor should necessarily prevail, only that it should be taken into account—particularly because D/HA in State quite independently suggested that we

² For PD-30 on Human Rights, February 17, 1978, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 119.

³ Tab A, memorandum from Bova to Pastor, February 24, is attached but not printed.

⁴ The letter from Banzer to Carter, January 27, 1978, as well as translations of it and related materials, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79. A summary of Banzer's letter, prepared by the State Department and dated February 14, 1978, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Box 2, Bolivia: 1-12/78.

⁵ For the letter from Carter to Banzer, see Document 124.

single-out Bolivia as the example of the U.S. demonstrating its positive concern for human rights.⁶

⁶ Brzezinski highlighted most of this paragraph and wrote at the bottom of the page, "OK—pursue it with the VP's people and get back to me. ZB". Next to this note, an unknown hand wrote, "'Been taken care of' DA 3/2/78". In a March 3 memorandum to Carter, Mondale, Eizenstat, Brzezinski, and McIntyre detailed the policy that they had negotiated with Congress regarding the purchase of copper and sales of tin and tungsten from the GSA stockpile. They noted Banzer's opposition to USG sale of tin but concluded, "While we must respond to President Banzer, neither the Department of State nor the NSC believes that Bolivian opposition should be the determining factor in whether to proceed with the compromise copper legislation." They recommended that Carter endorse the legislation, including its provision that tin and tungsten sales should be timed so that "such sales do not create market disruption." Carter approved the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79)

124. Letter From President Carter to Bolivian President Banzer¹

Washington, March 6, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure to receive your letter of January 27.²

I believe that the steps your Government is taking to prepare for national elections in July, and for functioning democratic institutions afterwards, are of the greatest importance. You said that "Democracy is a system in which society can be improved in an unlimited form," and I fully agree. When the people make the decisions that determine their political and economic fate, variety, imagination, and human progress all reach their fullest flower. I recognize, and history has undeniably demonstrated, that democratic freedoms can create difficult challenges for those in positions of leadership. But, history has also shown that the temporary problems are a small price to pay for the long-term benefits of genuine popular participation in a society's affairs.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79. No classification marking.

² See footnote 4, Document 123.

I understand your concern over the effect of a democratic system on your nation's economic well-being, and the implications for Bolivia, especially in the months ahead.

I especially appreciate receiving your thoughts on the question of United States stockpile sales of tin. Your recommendations were broadly studied and influential in our consideration of national stockpile policy. We have decided that added sales of tin are warranted, but largely because of your advice, we will insist on safeguards to protect the interests of Bolivia and other producing countries. These safeguards will include phasing of all tin disposals to prevent disruption of producer markets. We look forward to continuing close consultation with you on the implementation of these safeguards.

As participants in the International Tin Council, we are continuing to review our policies toward the international tin industry and the impact on that industry of United States tin disposals. As this review progresses, representatives of our two Governments should discuss the implications.

I understand that your Government has nearly completed a proposal for Bolivian participation in a PL-480 program for Fiscal Year 1978 and beyond. We are aware of the urgency that you attach to implementation of this program, and we will move ahead with our review as rapidly as possible, once we receive the proposal. Although we cannot now promise what decision we will make, you can be confident that Bolivian needs will be given every consideration.

I was very encouraged by the signing of the exchange of sanctions treaty by our two Governments on February 10.³ This agreement will help ease concerns in Congress and among the public about United States citizens incarcerated in Bolivia. I will ask our Senate to ratify the treaty rapidly following the current consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties. In the meantime, I hope that judicial processing of United States citizens who have not completed their trials will progress quickly so that they too might participate in a transfer as soon as the treaty is ratified.

I extend my best wishes to you and your countrymen for success over the coming months. The projects and processes you have initiated merit recognition and support.

³ In telegram 1189 from La Paz, February 10, the Embassy sent the final text of the treaty on the execution of penal sentences to the Department. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063-0017) The United States and Bolivia signed the Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences at La Paz on February 10, 1978. The Senate approved the treaty on July 12, and Carter signed the ratification on July 24. The two parties exchanged instruments of ratification on August 17, on which date the treaty became effective.

Rosalynn joins me in sending you and Mrs. Banzer our warmest personal regards.⁴

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁴ Boeker met with Banzer on March 13 “to emphasize some points” in Carter’s letter. See Document 125.

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, March 14, 1978, 2210Z

2134. Subject: Meeting with President Banzer on GSA Tin Sales, Economic Assistance and FMS Credits. Ref: State 5880,² State 63554,³ State 56637.⁴

1. I met with President Banzer March 13 to review the rationale for the administration’s support of legislation authorizing GSA tin sales, and to emphasize some points in President Carter’s letter of March 6. (Explanations of why Banzer could not see me late last week vary, from reported IRE over GSA sales, which the GOB learned of from commercial sources on Wednesday, to more mundane factors of travel on Thursday and an all-day cabinet meeting on Friday.)⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780114-0036. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for Information to Bangkok, Jakarta, Lima, Kuala Lumpur, Quito, and Santiago.

² In telegram 58800 to multiple posts, March 8, the Department advised posts that “the Administration has agreed to support a congressional proposal for the disposal of tin and the acquisition of copper,” and summarized a bill that was expected to be introduced by Udall and DeConcini. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780103-1016)

³ March 13. The Department transmitted the text of the Udall-DeConcini bill regarding the tin and copper stockpiles. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780111-0946)

⁴ March 6. The Department transmitted the text of Carter’s March 6 letter to Banzer to the Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780101-0056) See Document 124.

⁵ Wednesday, March 8; Thursday, March 9; and Friday, March 10.

2. Despite a great deal of venom in the press, including some from GOB representatives, Banzer displayed no anger in our meeting. His attitude rather was that of an offended friend who was very concerned about the US's adding to his considerable difficulties on the way to July elections. He said others might speculate about the longer-term benefits of GSA sales but for Bolivia the long term was the next four months to elections. During this time Bolivia was living on a financial razor's edge and trying to contain extremist forces threatening the process of democratization.⁶ Even at the high tin prices of recent months, Banzer continued, he faced over \$70 million worth of essential expenditures he could not finance. Each two-cent drop in the tin price cost him another million dollars and the tin price had dropped 50 cents since announcement of President Carter's support for the disposal bill. If this continued, the entire benefit of US aid would be neutralized.

3. Politically Banzer said it becomes harder to cite the benefits of democratization in terms of international support for Bolivia, if in the end the US acts to increase its own welfare at Bolivia's expense. Juan Lechin was already citing US "aggression against the Bolivian miner" as evidence that cooperation with the US did not pay. Banzer said his main political problem was to avoid galvanization of the extreme left and their control over the miners. He feared that the US had hurt him in this. He claimed that miners were now engaged in a systematic sabotage of mining machinery and that production losses were mounting. If these production losses were compounded by lower prices Banzer did not know how he would make ends meet.

4. Banzer said he was encouraged that President Carter had apparently maneuvered politically to give himself maximum flexibility to implement his disposal authority so as to protect producer interests. It was good to know that Bolivia in 1978 was recognized as a special case and that the President was willing to take this into account in the actual proposal we would develop.

5. In my explanation of our policy (which preceded Banzer's reaction above) I started from the widely recognized world deficit of tin, low stocks, possible disorderly supply conditions in the US tin market, and the economic and political impossibility of the President's sitting on all our tin stocks in the face of these circumstances. I said our objective was not a significant drop in price but assurance of orderly supply for our tin users. My own judgment was that the long-term price trend for tin was still up and a GSA program of the size contem-

⁶ Boeker also met with Juan Pereda, a presidential candidate, on March 16, regarding Pereda's reaction to the news of potential tin sales. In telegram 2236 from La Paz, March 17, the Embassy reported on that meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780119-0946)

plated would not change this. I noted that President Carter's letter made clear that he understood Bolivia's particular situation and because of this had insisted on safeguards to protect Bolivia. In particular, I stressed that the President had gone to some lengths to assure himself adequate flexibility to elaborate an actual disposal schedule, in light of consultations with producers, which would prevent market disruption. I said I encountered during my recent discussions in Washington considerable interest in the concept of an announced, steady monthly disposal rate for a multiyear period, thus minimizing the disorderly impact on tin prices of uncertainty as to the level and timing of GSA intervention in the market. But I doubted the President would want a completely fixed schedule which would not permit change in light of market conditions.

6. Banzer said he would like to keep Bolivia's deep concern in business-like channels and wanted to calm down the strident tone of Bolivian public discussion of GSA sales.⁷ He asked whether I could help by giving a press conference (as opposed to the background under the embassy did for writers last Thursday) stressing that Bolivia's needs had been noted and an effort made to leave the President flexibility to reflect them. (I did.)

7. Banzer asked what reaction there was to his request for economic assistance to aid Bolivia's transition to democracy. I told Banzer that I had encountered in Washington a great deal of interest in Bolivia's efforts to restore constitutional role and considerable understanding for the problems involved. What we could consider to help was, first of all, a large PL-480 Title III program, which we were rapidly advancing through US agency consideration. As he knew, this was a long-term rural development program, but it could be initiated, hopefully, in July, and front-loaded in terms of some of the balance of payments effects to reflect Bolivia's needs in the difficult first year of the elected government. We had also increased the size of two FY78 aid projects and were considering advancing an \$8.5 million project from the next fiscal year to the current one. I had talked to Exim Bank and found considerable interest in good Bolivian projects in the mining and energy sectors. We also hoped to reinstate OPIC programs in Bolivia to help private sector confidence. These moves would obviously help Bolivia's economic position in coming years. We could not help with Banzer's immediate liquidity problem. (In contrast to our previous conversation) Banzer asked me what I thought about his borrowing commercially

⁷ In a March 16 Evening Report to Carter, Vance reported Banzer's desire "to calm the situation" and the range of Bolivian negative reaction to news of the tin sales plan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 3/78.)

against the prospects of more longer-term assistance later. I said it looked to me as if that was what he had to do, as well as to plan for a major IMF stand-by after elections.

8. Banzer raised the subject of our FMS credit offer. He said the GOB definitely planned to use the \$14 million offered. He asked me to see Defense Minister Bretel to get this moving as soon as possible. Banzer said he planned to use \$6 million for equipment for the military hospital and the rest for communications equipment and perhaps artillery. He asked whether the US, given Bolivia's situation, could provide the maximum allowable maturity for these items (he said 15 years; I told him the law says 12). I told Banzer I would be willing to seek the maximum maturity for hospital equipment and communications gear, but not artillery. Our policy was to shorten terms on lethal items. He again urged me to get this settled with Bretel asap.

9. Comment: As instructed, I have emphasized to Banzer (and publicly) that the president went to some length to support congressional action on tin sales which would give him considerable flexibility to develop an actual schedule of sales (beginning date, monthly level, period of program) which will avoid market disruption. In fact, we have an international obligation to develop such a program in light of consultations with producers. Indeed, it is this point only of our position that has so far prevented Uncle Sam from being hanged in effigy in Bolivia. I am concerned, however, that in one critical respect the Udall-Deconcini bill we are supporting, unnecessarily denies the president the flexibility we may need to meet our commitment to producers. Why do we have to link financially tin sales and copper purchases? And, more particularly, why do we, in section 2 (B) (1) of the bill, have to prescribe that no copper can be bought until 5,000 tons of tin have been sold in FY78 and 10,000 tons in FY79 so that the copper industries' interest in accelerating TIN sales to buy copper is redoubled. The pace of tin sales should be determined by the needs of the tin market, not our need to buy copper. Unless we can drop section 2 (B) (1) which unnecessarily puts the treasury receipts at the front end of the tin sales program, tin producers are not going to believe that the administration really tried very hard to get the flexibility we need to develop a program, in light of consultations with tin producers, directed to the tin market.⁸ With Section 2(B) (1) the bill looks more like a bill to meet first the needs of the US treasury and second, the needs of the US copper industry, with tin sales being the legal tender the amount of which is determined by these two objectives.

Boeker

⁸ In a March 31 briefing memorandum to Cooper, Bushnell made a similar argument. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Bolivia, 1-12/78)

126. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, March 30, 1978, 1057Z

81744; Tosec 30085. Subject: Bolivia: Elections and Tin Sales. Ref: (A) Tosec 30055;² (B) Tosec 30063;³ (C) La Paz 2529.⁴

1. In your March 30 noon meeting with Banzer you should reiterate importance USG attaches to early elections. You should use your judgment on whether to press for existing (July) schedule or to press Bolivians to specify early new date for elections.⁵

2. With respect to tin, you might draw on following points:

A. The U.S. now has very limited authorization to sell tin and consequently no substantial tin sales will be made before a July election.

B. Other tin producers are worried about the long-term prospects for tin and wish to see reasonable U.S. sales in order to mitigate supply shortfalls over the next several years.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-0218. Secret; Nodis; Niact Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the Secretary's Delegation. Drafted and approved by Cooper, cleared in S/S. Vance was in Brazil accompanying Carter on an official visit.

² March 29. ARA, S/P and HA proposed: "President should authorize Ambassador Boeker tell GOB on Friday that US tin sales will not begin before July elections and that maximum of 5000 tons will be sold in calendar 1978 provided electoral schedule is held." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780136-0934)

³ March 29. Katz advised: "Believe it would be a serious mistake to offer a commitment to Bolivia at this time on either the timing or amount of disposals as ARA proposes or to indicate that we are prepared to reconsider our support for disposal legislation as Boeker suggests. Thus, in my view, we should advise Banzer that if our tin policy is cited in connection with postponement, we will be forced to go on record in refutation of this totally unwarranted linkage." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-0395)

⁴ March 29. Boeker advised the Department: "Postponement of elections appears almost certain at this point." He continued: "The main issue remaining in which we may have some small influence is whether the government takes the high road or the low road on postponement." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780136-0584)

⁵ In telegram 2511 from La Paz, March 29, Boeker requested guidance before his meeting with Banzer and recommended that he "make one final effort (most likely unsuccessful) to talk Banzer out of postponement. Equally important to US interests, we need to protect ourselves from the rap that the US sank Bolivia's democratization plans." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1882) In telegram 2535 from La Paz, March 29, the Embassy reported on Boeker's March 28 conversation with Pereda regarding the elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780136-0947)

C. The U.S. has promised to consult fully before we sell and, to avoid undue market disruptions.⁶

3. If you think it would be useful in avoiding postponement of election or deflection of blame in event of postponement of election, you may advance USG offer that tin sales in the remainder of 1978 would be made in the light of market conditions. Furthermore, with legislative concurrence we would not sell more than 5,000 tons in the remainder of 1978, unless the market is firm (i.e. prices are above present price and rising).⁷

4. The U.S. considers highly desirable that Bolivian election be held as scheduled. We will not accept the blame should the Bolivian government decide to try to attribute postponement to our tin sales. We wish to be helpful about Bolivia's economic problems, but the U.S. cannot be labeled as the cause of them. If President Banzer postpones election, the U.S. would be forced to withdraw this offer. You may warn Banzer that if he attempts to blame election postponement on USG, the U.S. would be forced to respond in public about the existence of this offer.

Cooper

⁶ In telegram 2604 from La Paz, March 30, Boeker noted that in a telephone conversation, Cooper had suggested that he "amplify" paragraph 2c. To do so, Boeker "chose to maintain some image of an offer, but with no price and quantity specification, by simply challenging the Bolivians to tell us what they think they need and offering to do our best to meet a legitimate Bolivian need. This is a surrealist picture of our consultation obligation but I believe its generality and qualifications protect us. I hope I have not stretched the import of our hurried conversation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1885) For the Embassy's full report on the meeting with Banzer, see Document 127.

⁷ In telegram 81860 from the Department, March 30, Cooper instructed Boeker "to drop paragraph 3" of this telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780138-0467)

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, March 30, 1978, 2325Z

2605. Subject: Meeting with President Banzer. Ref: (A) State 81860,² (B) State 81744³

1. I spent an hour at noon today with Banzer, who was accompanied by General Lechin, Minister of Planning, because, Banzer said, he assumed tin would be a topic.

2. I said that the US government understood that Banzer and the government of the armed forces were approaching a critical decision point on elections. We, therefore, wanted to make clear, and expand on our view of elections and our offers of cooperation in support of early elections. The U.S. government believes strongly that early elections, as called by Banzer for July, are of great importance for Bolivia and the region. You (Banzer), I continued, have said early elections will:

—set an example for the hemisphere

—improve Bolivia's security in the region and aid its cause for an outlet to the sea

—increase international economic support for Bolivia. And you are right.

3. It is, I continued, for you not us to judge the internal political factors weighing in your and the armed forces decision. But we are convinced the international position of Bolivia and the health of its economy argue for, not against, early elections. Our cooperation will be directed to this end. The support for an elected government we are considering included the PL-480 title III program of up to \$90 million and a significant increase in the FY 78 aid program if unused funds were available in the Latin American region, as now appeared likely. We would also support a reasonable IMF program for Bolivia as soon as possible after elections. I added that if we could work out a new bilateral OPIC agreement, there was at least one US bank interested in a substantial loan for medium-term projects which could be arranged so as to provide a front-end balance of payments impact. If elections did not take place this year, our official support would have to be reconsidered.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1887. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See footnote 7, Document 126.

³ See Document 126.

4. With respect to tin, Bolivia's representations had been heard and we were prepared to modify our plans in some respects, although we and other producers wish to see reasonable sales to mitigate supply shortfalls in coming years and assure at least the present level of usage for tin over the longer term. Specifically, we could assure him there would be no GSA sales under the expected new authority before Bolivian elections in July. We would also work with the Congress where a reduction in total new authority from 45,000 to 30,000 tons was under consideration.

5. I noted that some of Banzer's private sector advisers were telling him the tin price will continue to fall sharply as a result of GSA plans, thus damaging the Bolivian economy severely. These advisers were wrong. We want tin to have nothing to do with the GOB's decision on elections and are prepared to establish that this is indeed the case and that we have done all possible to assure that there are no grounds for arguing against elections on the basis of tin policy. To assure that this is clear, I told Banzer we wanted to underline a general, but sincere confidential offer. If he really believed that a particular GSA sales program in 1978 was critical to maintaining July election plans, then we were encouraging him to tell us what this was. We were committed to avoid market disruption and I was confident that if his people would give us their concept of what 1978 sales program would do this, we would do what we could in further negotiations within the congress and administration to come as close as we could to legitimate Bolivian requirements.⁴

6. Our objective, I said, was not to win public debates, so I would now say nothing about this publicly. Our objective was to facilitate the GOB's decision on elections. Banzer could use this offer as necessary with his commanders and ministers to assure them that the economy and tin were arguments for, not against, elections. For now these were the people who had to understand that the US had done all possible to prove this point.

7. Banzer listened to all this very intently, while General Lechin squirmed continually. In responding, Banzer said he wanted to talk about economics first and politics second.

8. Banzer said my amplification on the prospects for US economic support for the elected government were very encouraging indeed and meant the new government would probably have fewer economic problems after August 9 than he had now. He was still preoccupied with financing tomorrow and, therefore, wanted me to expand on the possibility of the bank loan. I told him there were two sides to this,

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 126.

an OPIC guarantee, which the bank required, and the private bank's decision. We needed, therefore, to conclude a new OPIC bilateral to make this loan possible. But if he found this attractive, I would get an OPIC private bank team here next week to pursue this. Banzer asked me to do this and asked Lechin to see that the Bolivian side pursued this opportunity.

9. On tin, Banzer said he welcomed our comments because Bolivia desperately needed a change in US tin sales plans. The announcement alone of administration support for the DeConcini bill had cost Bolivia \$45 million in today's price, rather than the price immediately before the announcement, were the one that prevailed for the year. Therefore, Bolivia's position had to be to oppose any sales in 1978.

10. I responded that this was not a very sophisticated way to look at Bolivia's essential interest, given that the interests of other producers, which were different, and consumers were involved as well. It would be more logical to look at Bolivia's essential interests this year in terms of a price or income level and to consider together what GSA sales would be consistent with that objective. From the standpoint of avoiding a speculative, depressing effect on the tin price, I personally thought Bolivia could be better off to have defined precisely as early as possible just what GSA would sell this year and next and beyond, rather than to just play for more delay. But my offer was to press them to define their needs so we could, with the best of good will, see how far we could go to meet them. General Lechin proposed that he and I meet Monday to pursue this and Banzer and I agreed to proceed this way.

11. On election prospects, Banzer simply wanted us to know just where things stood. He, Banzer, favored continuing with election plans, but there were deep problems and these would have to be analyzed by the leaders of the armed forces whom he had convened for Monday. The armed forces government would have to decide what "corrections in course" were required. The biggest problem was an effort to divide the armed forces, which was always a threat to peaceful government in Bolivia. General Bernal was being used by those elements who wanted to divide the armed forces (and Banzer was obviously deeply concerned about this). Banzer said the unity of the armed forces had to be maintained at all costs.

12. I said it seemed to me the best way to maintain the unity of the armed forces under these circumstances was a declaration of neutrality on their part. Banzer said "you mean have both Pereda and Bernal withdraw?" I said no; I was referring simply to a possible declaration of non-involvement by the armed forces in an election in which two retired generals happened to be candidates. Banzer (for the first time ever in my meetings with him) fumbled around a little on this point and finally said: "that would be impossible in Bolivia". The

armed forces cannot deny that they are a political force at this point (this government of the armed forces is a "nationalist" government). And General Pereda is a "nationalist". Therefore, just as incumbent democratic governments in the US work for election of democratic candidates, so members of the armed forces were going to feel obligated to work for Pereda. Bernal was not a "nationalist" but a tool of anti-democratic forces whose approach was headed for violence not winning elections.

13. It concluded by wishing Banzer the best in the result he said he favored for the Monday⁵ meeting and expressing the hope that our very clear view of support for elections would help.

14. Comment: The Fox's statement that he favors maintaining the July election schedule should not be swallowed whole. He most probably does not favor this course and at best has not made up his mind yet. The odds are certainly against July elections, but we may have narrowed them a little. I choose to pitch my remarks entirely to maintaining the July election schedule, rather than the high-road and low-road forms of postponement since there still is a small chance of maintaining the schedule and our arguments can translate simply enough in Banzer's mind to arguments for the high road. We will have to wait for the GOB's decision next week.⁶ In the meantime, I will encourage Pereda to stay the course (since his withdrawal would pull the plug on elections) and see that Mario Mercado (most strident civilian opponent of July elections) and the army knows where we stand.

Boeker

⁵ April 3.

⁶ In telegram 2753 from La Paz, April 5, the Embassy reported that the Bolivian armed forces had announced their support for elections on July 9, and that this represented "a defeat for President Banzer's efforts, partly disguised, to persuade the military to postpone elections and a big step toward constitutional government." The Embassy recommended that the U.S. Government work toward "prompt approval and announcement of a PL-480 Title III wheat program for Bolivia to bolster the decision of Bolivia's armed forces." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780147-0689) In telegram 2987 from La Paz, April 13, the Embassy reported further on the armed forces' decision to support elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780160-0988)

128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 13, 1978, 2133Z

177348. Subject: Bolivian Election Fraud

1. In view your description of serious deterioration in election processes, including likelihood of fraudulent presidential vote count,² it is important that the consequences of current course be understood by the Bolivians. We would like to press to reverse any intention of “stealing” the election and find a way to correct the handling of the vote counting. You are authorized confidentially convey following message at highest levels you deem it useful and effective to do so.

2. Message is that US Government is very seriously concerned over the possibility that the presidential vote count will not be an honest one and will not reflect a true election. Such fraud will definitely be perceived in the US and in other countries as backsliding on pledged return to democratic process and as a violation of the human rights question of civil and political liberties, which would under our policy require an adjustment in our assistance relationship. Unless corrected, such a course of action on part of GOB will clearly have an effect on all our relations, and will force us to review the whole gamut of them. This is an important time in our relationship; and we can either go forward or backward. We would like to have closer cooperation but this will not be possible in the face of a fraudulent electoral process. You should note also that international acceptance of the electoral results will be diminished if the present course continues.

Christopher

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-2811. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted by Barnebey; cleared by Bushnell and in S/S; approved by Vaky.

² In telegram 5496 from La Paz, July 12, the Embassy reported on “widespread irregularities on election day, July 9.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780289-0516) In telegram 5533 from La Paz, July 13, the Embassy reported that the Electoral Court was “unable to sort out the fraudulent returns with which the court is confronted.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287-1140)

129. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, July 15, 1978, 1830Z

5597. Subject: Bolivian Election Fraud. Ref: State 177348²

I conveyed the message in reftel this morning to Foreign Minister General Adriazola, whom Banzer asked me to see in his stead, pleading a full schedule of political negotiations. I had a surprisingly good and frank session with Adriazola. He took our message stoically, reviewed his own analysis of the current mess, and asked what we wanted the government to do now.

He said the current mess had resulted from many mistakes. Banzer picked the wrong man to run and never should have made this decision himself. The candidate should have been a civilian and without the military label the continuity candidate would have won a clean majority. Pereda's UNP was a set of initials and no more whereas Siles Zuazo's UDP was a militant, efficient political machine. The three opposition parties had now forged an ideologically artificial alliance.³ A clean-up of fraudulent votes could well reduce Pereda's vote to 45% to 50%. Therefore, the military was faced with a choice of Pereda with an absolute majority by hook or crook or a "radical leftist" government of Siles Zuazo. The latter was unacceptable to the military and the former would produce a fatally weak government. So what did the U.S. want the government to do?

I replied that I had to preface that answer with my own personal analysis of the mess. A thorough clean-up of the voting result was necessary because it was right, it is what the constitution required and what the Bolivian people had a right to expect. It was also essential politically to avoid a dangerous polarization of Bolivian politics and the fatally weak government he feared. It was the issue of electoral fraud and the conviction that Paz and Bernal had been robbed which was uniting the opposition parties. Unless the government and the electoral court took this issue head on and committed themselves to a thorough clean up, this alliance would hold and there could be no

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1894. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 128.

³ In telegram 5531, July 13, the Embassy reported that the three political parties led by Hernan Siles, Paz and Bernal—the UDP, MNR-H, and PDC, respectively—had "signed a political pact protesting fraud of the government and Pereda forces against all of them and declaring that none would cooperate with Pereda in the new congress." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287-1106)

resolution of the dilemma as he described it. The government and the Pereda forces had created the source of this dilemma, fraud, and they had to resolve it in a fair way or polarization and confrontation were inevitable. What we wanted, and what Bolivia needed, was a clear mandate to the national electoral court to annul all the suspect votes it could find.

Adriazola said he agreed with this analysis, but it would work only if the military were sure that a coalition could emerge. Pereda had gotten at least 45% of the votes by any standard and maybe even a majority. He had the right to form the new government. But Pereda could be too weak to save himself. Adriazola said that when Bernal was approached on a possible coalition, 48 hours ago, he replied that he would deal only with Banzer. I reiterated that I thought flexibility and moderation in Bolivian politics could be preserved only if a conscientious effort were made to eliminate fraud from the electoral result.

Adriazola said he would convey today to Banzer our warning, my analysis, and our request.

I had a chance to talk to Interior Minister Jimenez today as well. I got nowhere with him. He declined to recognize serious fraud, said it was Pereda alone or international communism and generally reflected the hardening Pinochet-like attitude of many of the generals. Jimenez also claimed that Banzer's open letter yesterday to the electoral court (asking them to accelerate the count and do their job) was all the backing the court needed.

Comment: If Banzer's thinking is at all similar to Adriazola's a reasonable result may still be possible, if the generals can overcome their slap at the polls and their paranoid reaction to it.

Boeker

130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 18, 1978, 2125Z

181503. Subject: Bolivian Ambassador Meeting with Ambassador Vaky.

1. Bolivian Ambassador Iturralde called on Ambassador Vaky July 17 to deliver a demarche. The verbal presentation, accompanied by an aide memoire, expressed the GOB's deep concern over the Department's July 13 press statement regarding Bolivian elections and suggested that the attitude reflected in the statement could damage the friendly relations between our two countries.² It added, however, that the GOB wished to see our bilateral relations continue within the present framework of cordiality and respect for the principle of non-intervention. In closing, the demarche offered a reminder that the government of the armed forces initiated the democratic process based upon the principles of self-determination and sovereignty, without external pressure, and that only the people and institutions of Bolivia are qualified to judge the results.

2. Ambassador Vaky responded by emphasizing that our expression of concern over election developments was not intended as an unfriendly gesture. Rather it reflected honest concern and worry about what was happening in a country with which we have very cordial relations. It was not in any way to be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of Bolivia.

3. Following the formal exchange, Iturralde spoke on a more personal and informal level about the political developments in Bolivia. The thrust of his comments was an attempt at rationalizing the lack of effort to clean up the ballot counting by explaining the political dangers that confront the country. He said that, following the Siles/Paz/Bernal pact not to cooperate with Pereda forces in the congress, Paz and Bernal were not willing to discuss any cooperation with Pereda. Under these circumstances, Iturralde said, a plurality victory by Pereda

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780295-0354. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Toyryla, cleared in S/S, and approved by Vaky.

² The press statement, drafted by Vaky, read in part: "Although the vote count is far from complete, there have been numerous allegations by international observers and the Bolivian political parties of irregularities in the voting and in the count. We are deeply concerned about these reported irregularities which we understand have been or will be referred to the National Electoral Court. The Court has the responsibility for dealing with irregularities and we await its action." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780289-0394)

leading to a vote in congress would elect Siles to the presidency. He pointed out that Siles has only garnered 20% of the popular vote and represents extremist elements such as the MIR and the Communist Party. He said not only would Siles not be representative of the popular will but would be unacceptable to the military.

4. Iturralde then touched upon what he called a more profound problem. He noted that, in the election, Pereda won the lowlands, including Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, and the opposition took the Altiplano. This represented, in his opinion, the kind of underlying regionalism that could conceivably lead to civil war, especially under a weak government.

5. Ambassador Vaky reminded Iturralde that the internal political considerations were for Bolivians to deal with and that we could not appropriately make judgments about the election process based upon such concerns. Vaky returned to Iturralde's own comment that the present government chose the path of democracy, and amplified them by asserting that the GOB now had a commitment to the Bolivian people and the world community to follow through in the most honest manner possible. Vaky emphasized that the process was of great concern to us.

6. Noting that President Banzer has an important role in the matter of fair ballot counting, Vaky asked if he had recently talked with Paz or Bernal. Iturralde responded that Banzer had earlier spoken with both candidates, but that since the three-candidate pact, Bernal was maintaining his distance from the government. Paz would not deal with Banzer, he said, because of the animosity between the two growing out of the latter's exiling of Paz. Iturralde said that all in all it appeared extremely difficult to change the present course of events. Vaky closed by warning that, if that was the case, our two countries would, indeed, encounter difficulties in our relations.

Christopher

131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 22, 1978

[Omitted here are portions of the memorandum unrelated to Bolivia.]

4. *Pereda Assumes Power in Bolivia*: The military-civilian group favoring Pereda and opposing the annulment of the fraud-ridden Bolivian elections forced Banzer's resignation on July 21. Banzer handed over power to a military junta which immediately installed Pereda in the presidency. Pereda, who has claimed his assumption of power fulfills the will of the people, may seek to install himself for a lengthy period. We are concerned by the interruption of the process of democratic political development and the example this may set for other Latin countries. We want to persuade Pereda to hold elections. We are expressing our concern about the breakdown of the democratic process and are stating our hope that the government will hold elections. This approach should send the signal we want Pereda to receive without putting him on the defensive.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State): 7/78. Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the first page, Carter wrote, "Cy J."

² Carter wrote in the left-hand margin, "Be as firm as possible."

132. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 22, 1978, 1737Z

185954. Subject: Bolivian Change of Government. Ref: Vaky-Boeker TelCon 7/22/78²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302-0280. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Drafted by McNeil; cleared by Schneider; approved by Vaky.

² Not found.

1. As we discussed, the Embassy in any informal contacts should take the following posture during this period of assessment of the situation.

2. We do not repeat not want to legitimize the interruption of the process of democratic political development.³ At the same time we do not want to inadvertently make it harder for Pereda and his advisers to do the right thing, i.e., continue the process, by publicly pushing them into a nationalist corner that might cause them to harden.

3. Accordingly you should make clear our deep regret at this interruption in the electoral course and democratic political process while also making clear our hope that the interruption is temporary and the new government will renew this process and electoral procedures that will permit the Bolivian people to fulfill their legitimate democratic aspirations. This posture corresponds with what we will be saying publicly during the weekend. In your private talks, the Bolivians should not have any doubt as to the serious concern with which we view these events.

4. We recognize that the situation is not promising, but we plan to tailor our immediate actions here and in Bolivia to do what we can to encourage them to preserve the human rights progress achieved and to return to a process of democratic political development.

Vance

³ In telegram 5799 from La Paz, July 22, the Embassy reported: "In a series of disjointed decisions Pereda and Bolivia's generals have now aborted the promising process of return to democratic, civilian government," and noted, "No one could plan a debacle so complete." The Embassy analyzed the events that had led to Pereda's coup and made recommendations regarding the public reaction of the United States, the question of recognition, and foreign assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302-0294)

133. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, July 23, 1978, 1515Z

5803. Subject: Initial Approach of Pereda Government.

1. I met informally at the residence last evening with Pereda representative Edwin Tapia. Tapia was Pereda's campaign manager and will now be one of his ministers.

2. Tapia asked me if I had any official reaction yet from Washington to Bolivia's new government. I told him that the Department would be saying Saturday² that we were disappointed by the latest turn of events in Bolivia, which seemed to indicate an interruption in the process of return to democratic rule, but that we hoped this interruption would be temporary and that it would not result in any reversal of human rights progress of the last 8 months or so. Beyond that, I said, we were very concerned and would have to know what the plans of the government were with regard to the process of democratization and human rights before we could define our our position further.³

3. Tapia said the Pereda government had not yet developed its position fully, but Pereda wanted to pass on three concepts that would figure prominently in his objectives. First, he would continue to seek a government of national unity and offer participation to all political parties. Second, he would offer worker participation in the management and ownership of the major public enterprises. (He interjected that elections were not the only way to "democratize" society.) Third,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780315-0067. Confidential; Niact Immediate.

² July 22. In telegram 186506 to La Paz, July 24, the Department transmitted a transcript of the portion of that day's press briefing regarding Bolivia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303-0986)

³ In telegram 5819 from La Paz, July 24, the Embassy defined the "key decision" for the U.S. Government: "what support to give Pereda's military government." The Embassy concluded that "if Pereda has not taken a reasonable public position on new elections within the next 10 days," the USG should reprogram monies for FY78 AID loans and FMS credits that had been planned for Bolivia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780303-0829) In telegram 187442 from the Department, July 25, the Department informed the Embassy: "Especially in cases where there are elements of continuity in the situation, the USG tends to take the position that no question of recognition arises. In Bolivia, where President Banzer handed the baton to the military junta, which in turn handed it to General Pereda, without any apparent important change in the form of government, elements of continuity are present." The Department noted, however, that "the timing of a communication to that effect to the new Bolivian Government is still under consideration," and instructed the Embassy that it "is important to avoid any implication that continuance of relations has been decided until Department has opportunity to learn more about Pereda's plans." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780305-0357)

Pereda wanted an open government and did not intend to lock up the opposition, “or anything like that.” I asked Tapia if he thought the opposition parties would buy a piece of a military government when they had declined to participate in a democratic coalition under an elected, congressional government. Tapia shrugged and said Pereda would try, at least.⁴ Regarding his third point, I told Tapia that I understood that 50 politicians were being arrested today. He said he knew nothing about that but would find out.⁵

4. I told Tapia that the interruption of the democratization process by a coup (a characterization he did not challenge) had to be a great disappointment for the U.S. and many other friendly countries, and therefore, we would have to proceed with caution in our relationship until we could see what kind of government this was going to be. We could not condone an interruption of the process anymore than we could condone fraudulent elections. Nevertheless, we had no desire to drive a Pereda government into a corner and to give it any excuse to be a repressive government that would undo the human rights progress Bolivia had achieved. If this happened it would not be because of us. I asked Tapia if he could explain why Pereda had called for new elections on Wednesday and led a coup on Friday.

5. Tapia said he was not sure he could explain this. He felt that Pereda had been forced into the move calling for annulment and new elections and had accepted this out of despair of forming a viable government. Subsequently, however, the outpouring of support Pereda had received from the military and civilians in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba had convinced them that he did have the base to govern and that he had been robbed of his victory by Banzer and his cohorts.

6. Tapia then launched into his own analysis of what had gone wrong. He readily admitted that the central problem was that the generals were ready for democracy. He said that the majority of the generals in the government were against elections right up to the last day. A critical contributing factor in the debacle, said Tapia, was that the opposition parties refused to recognize how delicate this military support was. The military would never have tolerated a government led by anyone other than Pereda because they saw a “transitional” government between military and civilian rule as an essential element

⁴ In telegram 5835 from La Paz, July 24, the Embassy reported on the failure of Pereda to gain opposition support for his government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780306-0481)

⁵ In telegram 5976 from La Paz, July 28, the Embassy confirmed that the Government of Bolivia had arrested “a number of politicians, labor leaders, etc. However, GOB has now announced that all political prisoners will be immediately released.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780310-0149)

in an acceptable “retorno” process. But the intransigent opposition parties refused to recognize this and insisted in going for broke. The final blow was Hernan Siles hunger strike which recalled for the military their humiliation in the January hunger strike and convinced them Siles was going to get power or die a martyr.

7. Some of this was valid, I said, and I had tried to convince some of the opposition leaders of these grey “facts of life,” but there was no doubt that the fatal hardening of positions would not have occurred without the Pereda forces’ disastrous and unnecessary mistake in committing widespread election rigging. Tapia shrugged again and whined a little about all Bolivian elections having been sloppy, Siles having committed his share of fraud, and Watergate being unnecessary as well, but it happened.

8. Tapia asked what aid the U.S. had pending and what we would now do. I told Tapia that the authorized, or virtually authorized, assistance for FY 78 that had not been negotiated or committed yet consisted of 3 aid projects of an uncertain total around \$40 million, a housing guarantee of \$16 million, the FMS credit of \$14 million and some small grants, for a total of about \$70 million. I had no precise instructions on this question, but I expected a request to hold up on all of this until the character of the Pereda government was established.⁶ I personally did not see how we could proceed with new aid decisions until we had further clarification on three questions which, frankly, were at the heart of why the U.S. was particularly interested in Bolivia at this moment in history. First, what were the government’s plans for new elections and democratization process in general? Second, what would be the government’s commitments with regard to treatment of the opposition? And third, would the government maintain the progress on human rights in general that had been achieved in Bolivia in the last 8 months or so—much of it the work of General Pereda himself?

9. Tapia asked me to go over these three points again and then said he would have to meet with me again around mid-week to

⁶ In a July 25 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote, “We have programmed FMS credit to Bolivia for another country and have suspended processing on a number of other pending AID project loans.” Next to this sentence, Carter wrote, “Let Pereda know privately that aid & democracy are related.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 7/78) In telegram 188170 to La Paz, July 26, the Department noted, “We hope to use potential future assistance programs as leverage to move Pereda constructively on both maintenance of individual human rights and the restoration of democratic political development.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780305-0980)

respond,⁷ since the government's position was not yet clear on all these points. Tapia said there were no plans for new elections at this point. I said in that case I was going to have an impossible time getting positive answers from Washington. Tapia said there was not time to organize a straight election in the remaining months of 1978. The following year, 1979, was the centenary of the War of the Pacific and neither the military nor the populace would want the turbulence of an election campaign in this critical year. How did I feel about congressional elections in 1980? I said that it was not my job to tell Bolivians what their election schedule should be. They had to work out a schedule that satisfied their own people who we felt had expressed a pretty clear judgment on July 9 in favor of return to civilian, elected government. All I could say was that if the Pereda government did not have a clear public commitment and plan to renew the process of return to democratic rule this would be a major negative factor in decisions we had to make and in our relationship.

10. Finally, I asked Tapia where Hernan Siles was and what the government's plans were with regard to Siles. Again, Tapia said he did not know for sure, but he thought Siles was in hiding for the moment until things clarified. I told him we would be interested in this as well. Tapia claimed that some of Siles supporters in the Communist Party and the MIR had been involved in preparations for armed subversion and therefore there might be a distinction between the treatment of Siles and some of his followers.

Boeker

⁷ In telegram 5933 from La Paz, July 27, Boeker reported on his meeting with Tapia and Arce and requested Vaky's authorization and guidance for a meeting with Pereda. The telegram reported on Pereda's proposed plan for elections in 1980 and a speech tentatively scheduled for August 6 in which Pereda would announce this plan. Pereda asked the United States to recognize his government "a couple of days" before his speech and sign "a significant aid loan or two" soon after the speech. Boeker commented: "My personal view is that the Pereda plan is for us a bit better than half a loaf and perhaps the best we are going to get," and "on the critical point of the rather late May 1980 election date, I suspect there is a trade off between a later date and Pereda himself agreeing not to run. If so, the better half of the trade is a public commitment for Pereda not to run." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1897)

134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 27, 1978, 1600Z

189662. Subject: Posture Toward Pereda. Ref: La Paz 5933.²

1. You are authorized to see Pereda confidentially and informally.

2. Clearly our goal is to encourage Pereda to get the process of democratic political development back on the track promptly and to preserve earlier gains in personal human rights. We do not, however, want to put ourselves in the position of being a party to an agreement unqte between the Pereda government and ourselves on a political timetable.

3. It appears to us that Pereda may not be set in concrete as to the electoral calendar, and that he might be able to move it forward. He is quoted in a Juan de Onis interview in today's NYT, for example, as saying that elections might be held in 18 months if the electoral law and voter registration can be reformed in time.³ In your discussion with him you should congratulate him on his forthcoming position but urge that he shorten the time span, arguing that this is important to Bolivia's image and his regime's credibility in the hemisphere and in the U.S. It would be very desirable if elections could be held in a year, but in any case, recognizing the work that must be done in preparing, he should try to keep that span as short as he can. In sum, we want to press him to shorten meaningfully the time span (which we think important for its effect on other hemisphere countries) but not so hard that we discourage him from this hopeful course.⁴

4. You should also suggest that Pereda ought to be looking to build some consensus behind his plan and assume that therefore he is doing this with the opposition.

5. We also suggest you turn around his argument on the War of the Pacific and point out to him that under the right circumstances

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2059. Confidential; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by McNeil and Vaky; cleared by Pastor, Schneider, and in S/S; approved by Newsom.

² See footnote 7, Document 133.

³ Juan de Onis, "Bolivian Says Elections Could be Held in 1980 if Reforms are Made," *New York Times*, July 27, 1978, p. A8.

⁴ In a July 27 memorandum to Carter, Christopher indicated that Boeker had been instructed "to urge Pereda to speed up his timetable for the restoration of democracy. The Ambassador will also tell him that our thinking on assistance will be conditioned on the actual steps Pereda takes toward democratic rule." Next to this paragraph, Carter wrote, "ok." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 7/78)

1979 could be a year of progress on the access to the sea issue making it a good year for elections.

6. Tell Pereda he should not be concerned about the recognition issue. We do not see the issue of recognition arising. Our practice is not repeat not to make announcements of recognition or non-recognition, but to make clear that we are qte maintaining unqte relations after a decent interval has passed and we are satisfied as to government's control and basic intentions. From our point of view, and we think from his, it would be preferable to indicate maintenance of relations in low key fashion after his speech. If we do it before his speech, it will be perceived as the result of some sort of preagreement between the United States and Pereda, precisely the sort of thing to which neither he nor we wish to become parties.

7. As far as aid is concerned, the degree to which he can work out something reasonable and credible to put Bolivia back on the path of democratic political development and preserve the gains in individual rights and announce it in his speech will be a significant factor in our consideration of future aid.

8. It would help the credibility of the new regime if Pereda would detail to some degree in his speech the protections he will give to personal rights in preserving the recent gains made in Bolivia, i.e., due process, full press, political and labor freedoms and the continued avoidance of detentions or expulsions from country on political grounds.

9. The foregoing is our position on the substance. You should, of course, tell him that the U.S. is greatly encouraged by the information you have received from Tapia that he intends to make a honest, thoughtful effort to put Bolivia on the democratic track and clean up corruption. His idea of a new electoral court with independent powers consisting of representatives of all the major political parties with the powers he has in mind offer the objective hope that the next Bolivian election could have the legitimacy and credibility denied the last one. To the extent that he can spell out a concrete timetable of steps between now and election date, it would help establish credibility for the new process at home and around the hemisphere. While we regret the interruption of the process and remained concerned, we appreciate his efforts and want to be helpful if he can work something out.

Christopher

135. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, July 27, 1978, 2315Z

5973. Ref: (A) State 189662, (B) La Paz 5933²

1. I met, as scheduled, with Pereda in his suburban home and emphasized the informality of this contact. Pereda spoke in a very low voice and was uncharacteristically very nervous throughout our conversation. At various points in the conversation he indicated deep preoccupation with recent violence in the Yungas region (in which armed *campesinos* have attacked soldiers and police) and with his own problem of maintaining support from the military. He was clearly a worried man operating in a very fragile situation.

2. During the course of the conversation Pereda confirmed all the major elements of the democratization plan previously described to me by Tapia (reftel B); he specifically said he would not be a candidate in the next elections. The one difference I sensed was that he talked about qte inviting unqte the political parties to participate in the electoral commission or court that would prepare the elections. When I questioned this, Pereda said he could not assure the participation of the parties, he could only create the opportunity. I responded that a critical element of the plan as far as we were concerned was that he obtain the cooperation of the major parties and political elements for the plan so that it could achieve its objective of assuring domestic peace. Pereda said that this was his intent, but that he first had a big job in assuring the explicit endorsement of the armed forces for his plan. He has convened a large meeting of military commanders for August 1. Pereda said that once he had obtained the endorsement of the armed forces for his plan he could then go to the political parties. I asked whether he would still be able to negotiate with the parties once he had worked out a specific plan with the armed forces. Pereda responded that he would be able to negotiate, but only to a limited extent. I had the clear impression that Pereda feels he has problems with the armed forces and is not sure his plan will be endorsed as presented. I also understood him to imply that he needs an independent military endorsement for his plan, apart from whatever his speech might say about military support.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1902. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 134 and footnote 7, Document 133.

3. I raised our concern on the timing of elections. It appeared, I said, that an earlier election date would be needed to gain the critical, unifying support of the political parties, Paz was seeking elections in 12 months, Siles in six and Pereda himself in his *New York Times* interview held out the prospect of 18 months.³ None of this seemed to indicate that agreement would be possible on elections in 21 months as now proposed in Pereda's plan. Pereda said that what he meant by the 18 months mentioned to the *New York Times* was early 1980. A few months difference, i.e., elections somewhat earlier than May, was not important. What was important was that the armed forces would not tolerate elections in 1979. Within this constraint, however, he thought he could reach agreement with Victor Paz and probably Rene Bernal (i.e., not Hernan Siles). I tried to turn around the 1979 point and presented our concept of 1979 as a year of opportunity; our effort was to dispel the concern about a year of potential conflict by making it a year of harmony and progress toward resolution for Bolivia's aspirations. I also cited the GOB's original concept that a democratic Bolivia would be in a stronger position to achieve its objective during the critical centennial year. After several tries to ascend this hill, I got the clear impression that 1979 is not seen by Pereda as a year of opportunity for outlet negotiations. He clearly viewed negotiations on an outlet in 1979 as probably one more fight than he could handle. He repeated several times that all of 1979 was an allergic time for the Bolivian military, not just the historic spring dates which I raised. I recapitulated our two major concerns regarding his plan as: (1) that elections be held at the earliest point for which they could be adequately prepared, which could be as early as one year from now and (2) that his elaboration of the plan include negotiations with the political parties, building towards a consensus behind a particular plan. Pereda said he would communicate this to the armed forces and see whether they would go along with some shortening of the schedule for elections.

4. Pereda said his speech on the democratization plan would be given on August 6, regardless of U.S. actions between now and that date. Nevertheless, he said it would be very important and very helpful if the U.S. could recognize the new government before August 6. I explained to Pereda our attitude on this question precisely as indicated in para 6 of reftel A. Pereda said he had a serious image problem which could be important for the military. He said the problem was not so much avoiding the appearance of preagreements but of avoiding the appearance of caving to U.S. pressure in the form of our withholding recognition or affirmation of maintenance of relations, as we called it.

³ See footnote 3, Document 134.

This might be a small point for us but the imagery was terribly important to him in managing the task ahead. Pereda asked that we reconsider the possibility of affirming maintenance of relations before August 6. I told Pereda I would report his request that we reconsider but I could, of course, not give him any indication that our position would change. I told Pereda that if he could keep me informed through Tapia of the results of his consultations with the military and the political parties this would facilitate our overall consideration of our policy. Pereda said he would do this.

5. Comment: I have the impression that Pereda may be in a weaker position than even that indicated in my earlier assessments. In this fragile situation, it is difficult to judge how far he can be pushed before he cracks. Cracking could take the form of a quick shift to a repressive governing policy or a military coup against Pereda. Pereda would obviously like to be president of Bolivia for two years. But he may well not know whether earlier elections are going to improve or worsen the problem of a divided military with which he has to contend. The specter of campesinos shooting soldiers could drive elements of the military in opposite directions. The hardliners who put Pereda in power could see Campesino violence as the final argument for repression. The disaffected army officers who deeply resent the air force/Santa Cruz coup on behalf of Pereda may well see Campesinos shooting soldiers as the ultimate proof of the stupidity of the coup. We can have no confidence whatsoever, however, in the objectives of a new military coup; it could be earlier elections, it could be no elections. Our best hope to preserve what we can of all our objectives is probably still to work toward improvement of the Pereda plan. But we are obviously dealing with an unsteady leader in a very fragile situation.⁴

6. To Pereda U.S. recognition is part of a thin defense against military rejection of him as well as his plan. This makes our recognition a sharp, double-edged weapon that should be used very carefully. A case could be made for a low-key affirmation now so that this U.S. action has nothing to do with Pereda's plan *ex ante* or *ex post*. Holding off until either side of August 6 will obviously put more pressure on Pereda, but it is difficult to predict what that means.

7. Our latest sounding with Hernan Siles would seem to indicate that it will not be possible to get a consensus of the political parties on an election date. Siles apparently meant it when he called for elections within six months. The Campesino violence in the Yungas has at the moment caused him to harden this position. The two center

⁴ In telegram 190620 to the mission at the United Nations, July 28, the Department transmitted Vance's morning summary, which outlined the main points of the meeting with Pereda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File)

parties (Paz and Bernal) cannot regroup themselves in six months' time; they will want a year or more. Probably the next point at which we will know more than we now do is after the August 1 meeting of military commanders.

Boeker

136. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 28, 1978, 2327Z

191823. Subject: Political Situation. Ref: La Paz 5973.²

1. The situation is fragile. The August 1 date, when Pereda presents his political plans to the military is crucial. It would be most desirable if there were a quickened electoral timetable, but it appears that if we press much harder Pereda may not be able to sell anything to the military, leading to a period of lengthy *de facto* rule under Pereda or some other general.

2. Accordingly, we authorize you to tell Pereda, through Tapia or Arce, that we are prepared to indicate maintenance of relations prior to his August 6 speech, so long as he is able to convince the military in his August 1 meeting to approve a credible plan for a genuine restoration of the process of democratic political development, encompassing a reasonable date for fair and open elections with adequate steps to assure the opportunity for political parties to fully participate, protection of individual rights and an early lifting of the state of seige. If this will help in his discussions with the military, he should feel free to use it.³ If August 1 goes well, we will proceed to affirm discreetly at an appropriate moment that we are continuing relations, making

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by McNeil; cleared by Vaky, Schneider, in S/S-O, and in substance by Pastor; approved by Newsom.

² See Document 135.

³ In telegram 6062 from La Paz, July 31, Boeker reported that he delivered the message to Pereda, via Tapia, on July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1907) In telegram 6107 from La Paz, August 1, Boeker reported on his meeting with Pereda and Natusch. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1909)

clear in accordance with our practice that this implies neither approval nor disapproval of the regime.⁴

Vance

⁴ In a memorandum to Carter, July 31, Vance noted that Boeker had been authorized "to communicate privately to Pereda now that we are prepared to indicate continuance of relations prior to his August 6 speech so long as he is able to convince the military to approve his plan." Next to this sentence, Carter wrote, "ok." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State), 7/78) In telegram 6188 from La Paz, August 3, Boeker recommended that he be authorized to acknowledge a note announcing Pereda's assumption of the presidency and to meet with Anaya regarding "on-going business," following Pereda's meetings with the garrisons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1880) In telegram 6172 from La Paz, August 2, the Embassy reported on the note that announced Pereda's assumption of the presidency. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780316-1014)

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, August 3, 1978, 1744Z

195927. Subject: Continuation of Relations. Ref: Boeker-Vaky Telcon, August 2; La Paz 6172.²

1. Per Telcon, we understand Pereda and his principal advisors are now seeking to establish a consensus within the military to hold national elections in late 1979 and install the new democratically elected government in January of 1980.³ We also understand that some elements in the military are reluctant to agree to this scheduling and would delay elections until early 1980 and install the new government in mid-year.

2. We feel we should now move to indicate that in accordance with current practice, we are continuing our relationship with Bolivia.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-2154. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House. Drafted by Fuller; cleared by McNeil, Vaky, Armstrong, Schneider, Pastor, and in S/S; approved by Newsom.

² Telcon not found. See footnote 4, Document 136.

³ In an August 2 memorandum to Carter, Vance reported this set of dates for planned elections. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 8/78)

3. Embassy is therefore authorized to acknowledge on August 4 the circular note announcing the assumption of office by Pereda as President and the establishment of the new cabinet (reftel). If the August 6 date for Pereda's speech slips and you feel it advisable to delay note after August 4, please request instructions.

4. The Embassy's reply should read as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of the note of July 24 from the Ministry of Foreign Relations by which the Embassy of the United States of America was informed that General Juan Pereda Asbun had assumed the presidency of the Republic of Bolivia and a cabinet had been appointed; that his government guarantees tranquility throughout Bolivian territory and has declared its purpose of establishing a free political system with democratic foundations and with full popular participation originating from the will of the people; that it will respect all international treaties and agreements to which Bolivia is a party; and that it wishes to continue the cordial relations existing between our respective peoples and governments. I have the further honor to inform your excellency that the Embassy of the United States wishes to reciprocate the desire expressed by the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the government of Bolivia to continue these relations between our two countries."

5. Once the US note is delivered, we presume the GOB will let it be known that the US has continued relations. If questioned by the press, the Department will respond as below:

A. Question—has the U.S. recognized the new Bolivian government?

Answer—we have informed the Bolivian government that we will continue diplomatic relations with it. When we continue relations with a country, as in this instance, it is not necessary to address the question of recognition and it has not been our practice to do so.

B. Question—Does this mean that the U.S. supports the new regime?

Answer—Continuation of relations implies neither approval nor disapproval of the nature or programs of a new government.

C. Question—what then is the US position on developments in Bolivia?

Answer—we previously expressed our regret at the events which interrupted the electoral process. However, we note the announced intention of the Bolivian government to respect human rights and to establish a free political system based on the participation of all Bolivians. We hope that the process of democratization, started under President Banzer, will be resumed and will reach fruition under President Pereda.

6. Shortly after the Embassy's note on continuation of relations has been delivered, the Ambassador should seek an appointment with the Foreign Minister to raise the matter of the pending exchange of instruments of ratification on the prisoner transfer treaty. We understand that Banzer did not sign the treaty prior to his resignation and that Pereda has not yet had time to do so himself. You should urge that the final steps be completed by the GOB so that the treaty may come into effect.⁴

Vance

⁴ In telegram 6300 from La Paz, August 5, Boeker reported on his meeting with Anaya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321-1228)

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, November 24, 1978, 1730Z

9552. Subject: Coup Day Plus One; Elections Set for July 1979. Ref: La Paz 9543.²

1. Summary: As its first two official acts, the new Bolivian military government November 24 approved decrees providing for new national elections to be held on July 1, 1979, with the transfer of power taking place on August 6, 1979 and reinstating the 1967 constitution, but with a possibly significant qualifier. General Pereda, who reportedly is under no restrictions but is staying out of sight, has taken sharp issue publicly with the decision to move up the day of elections. End summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780486-0322. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Asuncion, Buenos Aires, Lima, Quito, Santiago, DIA, and USCINCSO.

² In telegram 9543 from La Paz, November 24, the Embassy reported on the UDP demonstration of that date, and also noted that press statements by leaders of the principal political parties "reflect the caution with which the opposition political parties have received news of the coup." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780485-0224)

2. As its first official act, the new cabinet November 24 approved a decree calling for new national elections on July 1, 1979. The decree provides that election procedures will be established by decree and that the armed forces will turn over power on August 6, 1979 (National Day) to the “legitimate” winner of the elections.³

3. Taking sharp issue with the new Junta’s decision to move up the date of the elections from May 1980 to July 1979 was now former President Juan Pereda. Pereda said in a statement [he] had set May 1980 for elections because democracy could not be established with the economy in crisis, and his government had to “rearrange” the economy which is in a state of “extreme gravity.” “The country is not in a condition to support an election process with all its effects on the economy without placing on the shoulders of all the people all the rigor of unnecessary and irresponsible sacrifice. The country needs a moral rearmament and a unification of its citizens regarding the viable political options. Neither exist at the present time.” Pereda, clearly referring to Hernan Siles, then said that “the call for elections in six months means nothing more than to act in complicity with a political group which is with determination seeking power to impose its dictatorship, one repressive of citizen liberties and one characteristic of its ideological orientation. I withdrew from government to avoid a sterile confrontation in my institution. My conscience is clear.”⁴

4. Pereda is reportedly now in Santa Cruz and not subject to any restrictions on his activities. Similarly the Embassy understands that no action has been taken against any of his Cabinet ministers. President Padilla has said that Pereda and the former Cabinet ministers will all be treated as “comrades.”

5. While Pereda publicly suggested that the coup d’etat helps Hernan Siles, Edwin Rodriguez and Manuel Morales Davila, leaders of the MNRH and FRI respectively, both expressed concern to an Embassy officer that Siles at least knew of the coup in advance if he was not actually involved in the plotting. While neither has any hard evidence to support their allegations, Siles was apparently the first civilian political

³ In a November 24 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized the coup and the new election date and added, “the new junta may suspend negotiations with the IMF and postpone a program of economic austerity, living off the country’s scarce remaining reserves through the transition of an elected government.” Vance initialed the memorandum. In the upper left-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, “Sent to C.D. [Camp David]” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 11/78)

⁴ In telegram 9513 from La Paz, November 24, the Embassy reported that Padilla had told a journalist “that ‘his government had no commitments with anyone,’ perhaps a reaction to the image of close coordination between the coup and the political coalition of Hernan Siles Zuazo.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780484-0850)

leader contacted by the coup conspirators once the coup began to unroll. According to *Presencia*, Siles was contacted at 0230 hours November 24 by coup leader and present minister of the interior Lt. Col. Raul Lopez Leyton and told that the military had seized power with the only objective of restoring constitutional government and turning over power to the winner of elections which will be held in July 1979. Lopez Leyton contacted Siles again at about 0630 hours that same morning regarding the consolidation of the coup. At about that same hour Lopez Leyton also made contact with Rodriguez to inform him of the purpose of the coup. The FRI was never contacted and it is unknown if contact was made with the Christian Democrats.

6. In the only new significant political party reaction since those reported reftel Victor Paz, interviewed November 24 in *Tarija*, said "The overthrow of General Pereda had to take place because of his obstinacy in not holding elections during 1979. The banner of a prompt democratization, which the government and General Padilla has raised, must be supported by all the opposition political parties which solidly sustained that position. However, it is the specific actions which the new government will take to implement the elections process which will ultimately be persuasive (to US) that there indeed exists the objective of holding a genuine popular election. Among these steps are fundamental ones including the opening of new electoral registers, the establishment of a proportional representative system in the congress and no support for an official candidate. It will be necessary to avert the danger of a resurgence of Banzerism in the armed forces at the decision level." Paz, according to Edwin Rodriguez, may return to La Paz November 27.

7. Finally, the new junta as its second official act declared the 1967 constitution in effect, but added a phrase reminiscent of the Banzer years, i.e., that the constitution is in effect "in all that is not inconsistent with the spirit and nature of the national government and its actions."

Boeker

139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, December 30, 1978, 1902Z

328053. Subject: Bolivia and the Beagle Channel Dispute. Refs: A) La Paz 10080; B) La Paz 10283²

1. (C–Entire text)

2. Ambassador's views on USG position concerning Bolivian neutrality expressed in para 4 of reftel A are correct. The US generally is disinclined to conclude bilateral defense agreements with other countries of the hemisphere. Since the Rio Treaty provides for collective security arrangements in the hemisphere. We would assume that in the event of aggression or threat of aggression involving Bolivian territory that the GOB would invoke the Rio Treaty. The US has traditionally supported action in that forum to prevent or end aggression.

3. Ambassador's comments with regard to American military assistance were also correct. USG lacks legislative authority to provide emergency military assistance on grant basis. USG could, in principle, respond to GOB request to purchase defensive equipment on cash basis, or by utilizing any existing FMS credits. In either case, we could make no advance commitment on availability of defense articles requested, approval of their sale if available, or timing of delivery if approved for sale.³

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780540-0141. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago and Brasilia. Drafted by E. Perez; cleared in ARA/RPP, L/ARA, USOAS, M, ARA/AND, and RA; approved by Vaky.

² In telegram 10080 from La Paz, December 13, Boeker reported that Botelho "demonstrated extreme concern over the Beagle Channel dispute and the possibility that Bolivian territory would be violated in the case of a generalized conflict in the region." In response to Botelho's question about "whether the U.S. would recognize and urge respect for Bolivia's neutrality in case of a war," Boeker replied: "I told him I thought the U.S. would urge full respect for Bolivia's neutrality if the GOB made a clear public statement of neutrality on outbreak of any hostilities." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780516-0410) In telegram 10283 from La Paz, December 20, Boeker reported that Botelho had asked "for clarification of the US attitude on emergency military aid to Bolivia if its territory were violated." Boeker replied that he "had no response beyond the one I gave him December 13." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526-0551)

³ Boeker also reported that Botelho "asked whether the U.S. would provide Bolivia ammunition and defensive arms if it were the victim of aggression." Boeker replied "that decisions on military assistance in these circumstances would be made by the President, under the circumstances at the moment, and in consultation with Congress. There was no way I could predict those decisions in advance on the bases of hypothetical circumstances."

140. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, January 5, 1979, 2339Z

3634. Subject: FMS for Bolivia. Ref: Bolivia 10394.²

1. Confidential entire text.

2. We share your views on the desirability of encouraging the evolution of an appropriately apolitical and constructive role for the Bolivian military, as the process of return to civilian rule continues. As you point out, our FMS program can be useful in this regard. At the same time, however, we do not wish to encourage Bolivia, in its present strained economic circumstances to set aside large sums for military materiel. We would be prepared to consider, within limitations discussed in paragraph 3 below, modest Bolivian requests for FMS credits to cover sensible needs, including especially equipment with civilian as well as military uses. The hospital and the Italian transport aircraft are cases in point.

3. As you know (Dept's 328029),³ proposals for FY 1980 security assistance programs which we are submitting to the congress (probably in February) included a figure of 5.5 million dollars for FMS credits for Bolivia. Although this is a drop from 6 million in 1979, all other Latin American programs (with the exception of Panama) are taking considerably larger proportionate cuts from FY 1979 levels. This is a reflection of White House and OMB determination to hold down overall security assistance spending.

4. If elections are held in Bolivia and a civilian led government is installed this would reflect the development of the democratic process and Bolivia would have a high priority among Latin American countries in the unlikely event that any FY 1980 FMS funds become available for reprogramming. Obviously, however, nothing can be promised to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780008-0038. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Lima, Quito, Santiago, DIA, and USCINCSO. Drafted by Johnson; cleared in ARA/AND, PM, AID/LA/SA, by Bushnell, and in draft by G. Jones (ARA/RPP); approved by Johnson.

² In telegram 10394 from La Paz, December 27, 1978, Boeker reported on a discussion with Bolivian Army officials who pressed "the need for the Bolivian Army to acquire adequate equipment for its training, conventional military and civic action roles if the military was to stay happy out of government." Boeker replied that he "recognized a problem and sympathized with the need to address it in a sensible way that would have broad impact on the army's sense of military professionalism." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780535-0292)

³ Telegram 328029, December 30, 1978, to multiple diplomatic posts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780540-0018)

the GOB at this point. The Bolivians would have to demonstrate solid, reasonable needs which could not be met within their 5.5 million dollar allocation (bear in mind that credit terms for military equipment in FY 1980 may not be as favorable as those we hope to get for their hospital in FY 1979).

5. In short, you were correct in telling Azero and Herrera that (1) a return to elected civilian rule in Bolivia and (2) the presentation of a modest, reasonable shopping list would facilitate a positive US response on FMS, but prospects for more than 5.5 million dollars are limited. Even that sum will require congressional approval, and should not be communicated to the Bolivians until our proposal is formally sent to the congress, probably in February 1979.

6. We are concerned by renewed reports that the GOB is examining tempting offers from other suppliers. At some early opportunity you should caution the GOB against embarking on an arms purchasing spree. Peru's experience is instructive in this regard, with orders now being cancelled because of severe economic straits which require massive debt rescheduling. Bolivia is in a rapidly deteriorating economic situation, facing a BOP deficit of more than \$100 million, and the IMF is urging belt-tightening measures. It can ill afford the luxury of new and expensive weapons systems. Bolivia has an excellent record on avoiding heavy military expenditures, which is one of the reasons that foreign donors and international financial institutions have been able to assist to such a large degree in financing Bolivia's needs for investment in economic development. Were the Bolivian government to divert substantial sums from urgent economic needs to impractical arms purchases, it would become more difficult for us to argue to the congress that the US should use its scarce resources to alleviate Bolivia's difficult economic circumstances. In our view, the GOB would be well advised to continue its policy of restricted arms purchase, not trying to compete in an arms race with Bolivia's neighbors and relying more on the OAS system and the Rio treaty for its security than on the force of its own arms.

Vance

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, March 27, 1979, 0135Z

75649. Subject: Possible Demarche to General Padilla on Deteriorating Economic Situation. Ref: La Paz 2349 and Previous²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. We share the concerns expressed in your recent messages with the continuing economic and institutional deterioration presided over by the Padilla government such as: replacement of career officials with unqualified military and political appointees; refusal to undertake any economic measures whatsoever, including even enforcement of existing tax laws leading to inadequate collection of customs duties; and over \$100 million purchase of military equipment when foreign exchange reserves are evaporating. We are concerned that this trend could continue at least through the proposed August 6 inauguration.

3. As you are aware, such worsening internal administrative and economic disorganization make it even more difficult for us to justify assistance for Bolivia given the many competing end-users for our limited resources worldwide. While we recognize that General Padilla has heretofore refused to undertake the economic measures that are necessary, we would like your opinion as to whether General Padilla and his government leaders might be persuaded to take at least some measures to slow the economic decline. We are thinking of such limited measures as: increases in the prices of hydrocarbons; freeze on additional public sector employment; minor devaluation of the exchange rate; and reductions of the quantities of military equipment ordered; or, alternatively if they did a thorough job of one measure rather than

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790140-0487. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Knepper; cleared in ARA, ARA/ECP, ARA/AND, S/S-O, and LA; approved by Bushnell.

² In telegram 2349 from La Paz, March 16, the Embassy summarized recent arms purchases of the Bolivian armed forces and reported that "the size of these purchases is reflective of the Padilla government's disregard for the present and future economic health of Bolivia." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790122-0415) (S) In telegram 2023 from La Paz, March 8, the Embassy reported that "while human rights and the electoral process have thus far fared well, the Padilla regime has in the meantime mired itself down in a shabby display of infectious venality and incompetence that has tarnished its image and raised some doubts about its ability to carry forward its well advertised objectives for Bolivia's democratization." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790111-0612)

partial jobs of several. From this vantage point a 100 [percent] increase in hydrocarbons might be the best legacy Padilla could leave his successors.)

4. We appreciate that return to civilian rule is our highest priority goal in Bolivia. However, we also realize that there is a substantial probability that the new civilian government will not stick, and that the more desperate the economic situation it inherits, the greater will be the pressure for its early demise. Hence, while continuing to support return to civilian rule, we would prefer that the turn-over not be made under circumstances which contain the seeds for its destruction.

5. We would appreciate your reaction, analysis, evaluation, and recommendation as to the probable effectiveness of an approach to the GOB, and perhaps to the leading political figures, along the lines of para 3 and perhaps our encouraging similar approaches by other governments and international agencies. Demarche could be made in terms of our wanting to continue to be able to assist Bolivian development as we have in the past, but that recent developments make this increasingly difficult. We realize that General Padilla's government is largely a caretaker operation. But we are concerned that there be something left to be taken care of—other than large foreign debts, bloated bureaucracies, and inoperable military hardware—when the civilian government hopefully assumes office.

Vance

142. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, April 10, 1979, 1830Z

89616. Subject: Possible Demarche to President Padilla on Deteriorating Situation

1. (S—Entire text)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165-0700. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bushnell; cleared in ARA, ARA/ECP, ARA/AND, EB/OMA, HA/HR, and S/S-O; approved by Bushnell.

2. We agree with the approach you suggest in para. nine of reftel.²

3. You have made a convincing case that major effort to correct any of major economic problems is not possible in immediate preelection period. What you suggest is that some of downhill plunge might be avoided at least in terms of management. We wonder if it is possible to use this preelection time also for planning and preparation for later moves in area of institutional reform. Widespread belief here is that major institutional strengthening from tin and petroleum enterprises to agricultural bank are essential to put Bolivia on track for steady long-term development. A new government in August will be faced with so many economic problems in exchange rate and incomes policy areas that institutional issues may be left for a never-never future. One of issues here on which we would welcome views is extent to which institutional reform is sine qua non for successful economic performance in next government.

4. We have continued to examine possibility of program-type loan from us for new government in September or October. We are inclined to the view we should be thinking in terms of how we show strong psychological support for the new government, and for its economic program, if viable, but we should not try to provide significant short-term B/P financing.

Vance

² Presumably telegram 3016 from La Paz, April 5. Boeker summarized his meetings with Prado and Alba and reported: "My assessment is that an approach to Padilla pressing for adoption of one or more serious economic measures (higher petroleum product prices in particular) would almost surely fail." He continued: "This assessment, if you share it, does not rule out a heart-to-hearter between Padilla and me although it would be different in nature from what we had initially contemplated. I could urge him to govern a bit, instead of just surviving, to shape up customs, revenue, and general public administration, to cut back arms purchases, to avoid borrowing of the type that would collateralize gold reserves and future exports, and to tighten up financial management generally." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790156-0446)

143. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, April 26, 1979, 2317Z

3679. Subject: (U) Ambassador's Meeting With President Padilla.
Ref: State 89616.²

1. C—Entire text

2. Summary. In an April 26 meeting with the Ambassador, President Padilla said his health had now stabilized after a scare earlier this week, he projected full confidence that he was in control, that he would finish his term and that he could not be frustrated in his objective to hold elections on July 1. He anticipated a delicate period after July 1 if no candidate wins direct election by an absolute majority and indicated, for the first time, that he might in this case remain in power for an additional 30 days after the convening of the congress, Aug 6, to give it more time to elect the next president. Padilla said he intended to hand over the government in respectable shape and therefore would tighten up his Administration. He foresaw some increase in petroleum product prices in May, more pressure from the palace on weak minister, and an end to arms buying after the military uses its \$100 million authorization (which it has). End summary.

3. I met with President Padilla on April 26 to review problems entailed in keeping the Bolivian economy and electoral process on an even keel until the civilian government takes over.

4. Padilla's Health

I found Padilla alert, decisive and showing no signs of discomfort, other than his usual limp when he rose to greet me. In general, he looked no worse than when I last saw him on April 16.³ He continues to gain weight—in fact, has become quite obese since assuming the presidency. His face and hands were slightly puffy. I told Padilla that we had had everything ready for his examination at Walter Reed and would try to set this up again when he was ready to travel.⁴ Padilla said he had now decided to postpone his medical check-up and treat-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790192-0159. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Lima and Quito.

² See Document 142.

³ No record of Boeker's April 16 meeting with Padilla has been found.

⁴ In telegram 3553 from La Paz, April 23, the Embassy reported that Padilla had requested admission to Walter Reed Army Medical Center for a general check-up. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790186-0864) In telegram 103479 to La Paz, April 24, the Department informed the Embassy that the request was approved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790188-0329)

ment until after he leaves office in August, because his presence was required here and his medical situation did not now appear to be an emergency. He confided that he had some disturbing moments on April 22 and 23. He said that on finishing his visit to Uyuni (which he said was higher than La Paz) he, for the first time in his life, felt severe effects of "altitude" in the form of heart beat irregularities and difficult breathing. On his return to La Paz he suffered severe hemorrhaging from the nose three times during the night of April 22. Padilla ascribed these symptoms to exhaustion and felt his situation was now stabilized.

5. Politics

Padilla reaffirmed his single-minded determination to preside over successful elections on July 1 and said nothing could turn him from this purpose. While still concerned about the number of candidates, Padilla expected the field to narrow in effect to a two-horse, Paz-Siles, race with only two or three other candidates finishing far behind.⁵

6. Padilla said he expected several more candidates to withdraw from the race in the next few days—as the government would clarify that the financial sanctions against candidates receiving fewer than 50,000 votes would be rigidly enforced. Hugo Banzer, Padilla said, would unfortunately persist in his candidacy—against his word given earlier to Padilla and armed forces colleagues.⁶ Padilla was not very concerned about the effects of Banzer's candidacy on the electoral process, but he did consider it a humiliation and disgrace to the armed forces to have an ex-president and distinguished general holding poorly attended rallies in dingy movie theaters in the slums of La Paz—in a hopeless quest that would result in Banzer's repudiation by 95 percent of the electorate. Padilla was clearly relieved that General Miranda had withdrawn his candidacy and was deeply upset that Banzer's ill-starred candidacy might be viewed as a referendum on military government.

7. Rene Bernal, Padilla thought, had hurt his candidacy badly by joining with Mario Gutierrez and the right-wing FSB, but Padilla thought Bernal still had some chance to be the king-maker between Victor Pazestensoro and Hernan Siles Suazo if the election went into the congress.

8. Padilla anticipated a two-way race between Paz and Siles, with three possible outcomes.

—Paz eeks out an absolute majority, and gains direct election.

⁵ In telegram 3545 from La Paz, April 23, the Embassy reported that eleven political groups had petitioned for inclusion on the ballot. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790186-0840)

⁶ In telegram 3497 from La Paz, April 20, the Embassy reported on Banzer's decision to enter the presidential race. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790182-0894)

—Paz gets a plurality, or runs a very close second, and forms a government in the congress with Bernal.

—Siles wins a clear plurality and forms a government in the congress with Paz.

Padilla confided that a Paz government was “probably preferable,” although some in the military have little stomach for Paz. A Siles victory would cause problems within the military, although Padilla insisted that his personal position was “win whoever may.” The problem with Siles, Padilla said, was not the man, whom Padilla professed to consider a good and strong figure, but the internationalist loyalties and financial support of his leftist coalition partners, the Bolivian communist party (Moscow line) and the MIR (leftist revolutionary movement). These elements were hard for the military to swallow—although Padilla again insisted that he will push through the electoral process.

9. If no one gained an absolute majority, and thus direct election, on July 1 (and he thought only Victor Paz had a shot at this), Padilla foresaw a turbulent period between July 1 elections and inauguration, scheduled for August 6. Padilla—as usual viewing himself as the rock surrounded by shifting sands—said that if the parties could not promptly form a “reasonable” coalition government, he would have to call them on the carpet and tell them their responsibilities. These clearly included “respecting the role of the armed forces.”

10. For the first time, Padilla said that if no candidate wins direct election, he may have to delay inauguration, and prolong his government, 30 days beyond the traditional (but not constitutional) August 6 date to give the congress adequate time to form a coalition government and elect his successor.

11. I reiterated to Padilla the strong interest of the US in the integrity and full completion of the democratization process in Bolivia, begun by the government of the armed forces and now very much as well the personal mission and responsibility of General Padilla. I said we were anxious to be helpful where appropriate and possible, particularly in consolidating the position of the civilian government. Padilla said he had some ideas on this question, but wanted to defer this discussion with me until after the election process and advanced and clarified further.

12. Economics

I explained our concern that the current “transitional” government was, in some key areas, particularly economic policy, arms purchases, and the quality of public administration, not running a sufficiently tight ship to meet Padilla’s own objective of handing over the government in reasonable shape. Padilla protested that he had no intention of turning over an unsustainable economic situation to the next govern-

ment. He said he was reluctantly coming to the conclusion that petroleum product prices would have to be raised in May, although he had not yet decided how much. I added that another important area, in terms of handing over an orderly economic situation, was “de-dollarization,” along the lines suggested by the IMF. When Padilla looked blankly over my head I explained to him how the existing widespread system of dollar-value guarantees for peso deposits denied Bolivia necessary use of exchange rate movement, since the guarantees led to massive automatic monetary expansion whenever the exchange rate moved. It would take time and skill to pare away this system of guarantees and the job should be begun as soon as possible if a new government were to have all the flexibility needed to stabilize the economy. Padilla said he would look into this (but clearly his finance minister has not gotten very far in educating him on this problem).

13. Padilla defended his arms purchases as the minimum needed to keep a professional army occupied in its traditional national security mission. He said he would turn off the tap at \$100 million and said almost all of this sum would be accounted for by 25,000 automatic rifles, ammunition, infantry weapon spare parts, six F-27 transport aircraft and some old Austrian “tanks.” (Comment: It is a sad commentary on the Bolivian military’s purchasing methods—but probably accurate—that it can spend close to \$100 million on these items.)⁷

14. Padilla said he was contemplating other actions to tighten up the ship. He said he would continue to turn down all wage increases. (Comment: which he cannot really do, especially in the context of higher petroleum product prices.) He said he also had to do something about the weak sisters in his cabinet. (He mentioned the ministers of education and foreign affairs, by example). Padilla, with his usual directness, asked me what I thought about firing some of his ministers. I responded that this obviously was not my business, but I had noticed that “cabinet crises” in Bolivia were usually associated with a public perception of weakness in the government, so one would have to make sure there were benefits to compensate for this cost. Padilla said this was probably right and with so little time remaining for his government, he would probably do better to sit harder on the weak sisters rather than to replace them.

15. I told Padilla I was upset about the amount of pressure the Soviet Ambassador was putting on the foreign minister to have Bolivia

⁷ In telegram 87295 to La Paz, April 8, the Department approved a request for FMS funds to purchase an antitank weapons system. The Department noted, “Approval is granted because intended acquisition is modest in cost, limited in number, and consistent with US conventional arms transfer policy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790161-0045)

abstain on any UN security council vote on continued deployment of the UNEF in the Sinai.⁸ The government should have no illusions about how strongly the US felt about implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, which Bolivia had up to now consistently supported.⁹ I suggested Padilla might want to review this issue with the foreign minister to make sure Bolivia's interests were being calculated accurately. Padilla nodded energetically and said he would review this personally.

Boeker

⁸ Bolivia was a member of the UN Security Council in 1978 and 1979. For the UNEF in this period, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. IX: Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 270 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁹ For the negotiation and implementation of the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty, see chapters 2-4, *Ibid.*

144. Letter From President Carter to Bolivian President Padilla¹

Washington, May 8, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your letter of February 23 offering Bolivia as a site for a regional remote sensing training center in Latin America.² As you know, the Agency for International Development (AID) is currently studying the feasibility of supporting one or more such centers in Latin America to complement similar facilities already in operation in Africa and planned in Asia.

The AID Regional Remote Sensing Study Team which visited Bolivia along with 17 other Latin American countries has recently returned to the US and is completing its assessment and recommendations on possible sites. In addition, AID will be exploring what further

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79. No classification marking.

² In a February 23 letter to Carter, Padilla proposed that such a regional training center, using imagery from the Landsat satellite, be established in Bolivia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79)

funding may be available for such centers from multilateral donors. The AID team was most impressed with the available facilities and the productive applications of remote sensing projects underway in your country. Bolivia's willingness to share its facilities and experience with others is indeed gratifying.

I expect that AID's deliberations on support, along with other donors, for regional remote centers in Latin America will be completed in several months and have instructed Ambassador Boeker to advise you of the results of these activities at that time.³ In any event, we would expect to be working with your country over the next two or three years as arrangements to harness this modern technology for the development of South America move(s) ahead. In the meantime, please accept my best wishes for Bolivia's continued success as one of the world's leaders in applying satellite remote sensing techniques to national development problems.

My wife Rosalynn enjoyed her brief meeting with your wife last February.⁴ I was particularly pleased to hear of your continued strong commitment to free elections in Bolivia this July. I wish you every success.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ In a May 7 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski, Press, and Owen wrote: "It is likely that we will choose to install such a center in Bolivia. Politically, however, we believe that it is advantageous to withhold notification of any favorable decision affecting Bolivia until after a new civilian government is inaugurated in August so that we may then use the regional center to show support for Bolivian democratization efforts." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 2, Bolivia: President Hugo Banzer Suarez, 8/77-10/79)

⁴ No account of this meeting has been found.

145. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 2, 1979

SUBJECT

Presidential Message to Bolivian President Padilla (U)

Bolivia held presidential elections yesterday and it appears that none of the three major candidates received a majority. Leftist-oriented Siles Suazo received about 40 percent of the vote; Paz Estensoro polled 26 percent; and Banzer got 20 percent. Because no one received a majority, the contest must now go before the Bolivian Congress which will select one of the front-runners as president. The military are nervous about the Siles plurality and are worried that the Paz and Banzer partisans may maintain their divisions to enable Siles to win Congressional approval. There are some intelligence reports that certain elements in the military may feel compelled to take pre-emptive action by carrying out a coup.² (C)

We want to encourage the Bolivians to stick with the legal, constitutional route. To indicate the level of our concern, State has drafted a cabled message from the President to President Padilla. It has been cleared by the speechwriters, and I strongly recommend that you approve it.³ A similar message from the President to Ecuadorean Admiral Poveda last year helped a lot.⁴ (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message at Tab A from the President to President Padilla.⁵ (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia. Confidential. Sent for action. Gates and Denend initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Also in the top right-hand corner, an unknown hand wrote, "critical date: today-7/3." At the bottom of the page, Aaron wrote, "I think this is premature. DA."

² In telegram 5004 from La Paz, June 8, the Embassy reported that "Banzerites" in early June "boldly proclaim that they have sufficient support in the armed forces to bring off a coup at will, but 'conditions are not right.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790260-0808)

³ Tab A, a draft message from Carter to Padilla, is attached but not printed. It read in part: "I am sure you can understand why I am deeply apprehensive over reports that some elements in Bolivia are trying to prevent a constitutionally-elected president from taking office in August, and sincerely hope these reports prove unfounded." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Bolivia)

⁴ See Document 280.

⁵ An unknown hand checked the disapprove option for Brzezinski and wrote, "7-3-79 ZB".

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 11, 1979, 1806Z

178793. Subject: President Carter's Reply to President Padilla. Ref: La Paz 5832.²

1. C—Entire text

2. Text of President Carter's reply to July 6 President Padilla letter follows. No signed copy of letter will follow. As a normal routine, the president's correspondence is privileged and not made public.

3. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: I have carefully considered your thoughtful letter of July 6. I appreciate your raising these concerns with me in the cordial and open manner that is a hallmark of US-Bolivian relations.

First of all, Mr. President, let me congratulate you and Bolivia's armed forces for your leadership in returning your country to democratic rule.—When your government came to office last November, its firm decision to undertake the return to constitutional rule was applauded by my country and Bolivia's friends everywhere. This decision put your country, and its armed forces, in consonance with the Andean Region's movement toward democracy, which we see as an important trend for the entire hemisphere. We have been deeply impressed with the way your government carried out the first stage of the electoral process, which merits the respect and admiration of all of us in the Americas. The successful completion of this process with the August 6 inauguration will place Bolivia back in the ranks of democratic countries of the region as well as enhance Bolivia's international standing and capacity to achieve its social, economic, and diplomatic objectives.

On the matter of tin, this is being urgently studied, and I will let you know through Ambassador Boeker what we will be able to do to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790313-1162. Confidential; Flash. Drafted by E. Perez; cleared by Pastor and Schneider and in ARA, ARA/AND, EB, USOAS, S/CPR, and S/S-O; approved by Bushnell.

² July 6. The Embassy transmitted Padilla's letter to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307-0803) Padilla asked Carter "to hold back any measure which might, through its severe effects on the Bolivian national economy, interfere with, weaken or even frustrate this process in Bolivia. The indefinite calling to a halt of the disposal of tin by the General Services Administration would effectively contribute to such a goal." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia)

meet your concerns.³ Let me assure you that the United States will manage any eventual disposals so as to safeguard against disruption of the tin market and the economic position of producers, including Bolivia. Any sales plans will be developed on the basis of full consultation with the Bolivian government, with other producers, as well as with the international tin council and will be designed, to the best of our abilities, to avoid undue disruption of the international tin market.⁴ In addition, my government will work through the international financial institutions and with Bolivia's new leaders to help the new government raise the financial support necessary to back a sound stabilization program.

To express as clearly as possible to the Bolivian people our goodwill and deep appreciation of the country's orderly return to constitutional rule, I am asking my wife, Rosalyn, to represent me at the inauguration of Bolivia's newly-elected President on August 6.

As you approach the final stage of Bolivia's return to constitutional rule, Mr. President, a process which you have so steadfastly overseen, let me wish you and your people full success in this historic venture, and all the best to you personally in the future. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.
End text.

4. Before delivery of letter, Ambassador Boeker should speak with Robert Pastor, NSC, telephone 202/395-6961, concerning final clearance paragraph on US delegation to Bolivia presidential inauguration.

Vance

³ In a July 16 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson requested the preparation of a cable "to follow up on the President's message, being as responsive to Bolivia's concerns as possible." In a July 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff recommended that the proposed cable "be delayed until either Congress takes action on pending tin disposal legislation or it becomes clear Congress does not intend to act this year on this matter. Ambassador Boeker concurs in this approach." In an August 7 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson asked the Department to "continue to monitor Congress's consideration of tin legislation and follow-up with the new Bolivian president at an early and appropriate time." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia)

⁴ In a July 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "The Senate is currently considering a bill which would dispose of 35,000 tons of tin, and our Ambassador has recommended that we seek a delay on this bill. That has not proven possible, and instead State recommends that the President send a message stressing that we will not do anything to unduly disrupt the international tin market." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia)

147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2000Z

211019. Subject: Secretary's Consultations With Bolivian Foreign Minister, August 11.

1. (S-Entire Text)

2. Summary: Bolivian Foreign Minister Fernandez met with the Secretary for approximately 20 minutes in a private meeting August 11. Fernandez said that President Guevara had sent him to Quito specifically to talk to the Secretary.² He made three points: 1) The GOB needed to face up to the problem of foreign debt, and would within fifteen days present to USG through Embassy La Paz their views on what needed to be done; he hoped then to visit Washington with the finance minister to discuss the matter further. 2) GOB hoped to have the OAS assembly approve a general resolution on the question of Bolivian access to the sea which could constitute a recommended framework within which the three countries involved could work out a solution; he promised to provide a general outline for such a resolution. 3) President Guevara earnestly requested that the Secretary personally attend the OAS general assembly meeting in La Paz in October. The Secretary replied that we would study the proposals on debt and access to the sea. He would reply this week as to whether he could attend the OAS meeting. End summary.

3. Bolivian Foreign Minister Gustavo Fernandez Saavedra requested a private meeting with Secretary Vance at the conclusion of the Andean group consultations August 11.³ The two met for approximately twenty minutes alone. The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary for meeting with him, saying that his trip from La Paz to Quito had been made solely for the purpose of establishing an immediate contact with the Secretary and the U.S. Government. He said that President Guevara had asked him to make three main points in his meeting with the Secretary:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS Memcons, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lima and Santiago. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in S/S and by Bremer; approved by Vaky.

² In telegram 6712 from La Paz, August 7, the Embassy reported that the Bolivian Congress had elected Walter Guevara Arze to be president the previous day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790357-0147)

³ See Document 47.

A) The process of democratization in Bolivia was a difficult and complex one. This process, said the Foreign Minister, had been saved by what he considered to be a miracle, which was the role played by President Guevara. The President had long been active in a political party which in turn had given birth to the two wings that had given their support respectively to Dr. Paz and Dr. Siles in the recent elections; this had made it possible for the followers of both these candidates to give their support to Dr. Guevara.⁴

Over the past three years, and for political reasons, President Banzer, Pereda, and Padilla had not acted on Bolivia's economic problems. These problems had become so serious that they could no longer be ignored. The Foreign Minister said that he was not in a position to make a formal presentation on Bolivia's economic problems at this time, but could say that they were a source of deep concern, particularly with regard to the burden represented by his country's foreign indebtedness. Bolivia needs a prompt decision by the U.S. to give it assistance in this regard.

The Foreign Minister said that in about fifteen days he would have had the opportunity to gather the necessary data to make a formal presentation to the U.S. and other governments on the matter of foreign indebtedness. Their presentation would be made through the American Embassy in La Paz. He said that this problem could not be tackled by traditional means, but that a clear political decision had to be made promptly. He hoped to visit Washington, together with the finance minister, within the next few weeks, in order to further discuss the problem. President Guevara and the cabinet felt that a viable solution had to be found to the indebtedness problem within sixty days, and further felt that it was necessary to get a clear idea of the USG's position within thirty days.

The Secretary replied that he and other members of the USG would study Bolivia's presentation.

B) The Foreign Minister said that his government was deeply interested in the success of the OAS general assembly, scheduled to be held in La Paz later this year, and that this success depended to a large degree on the presence of the secretary of state.

The Secretary said that he would check his calendar, and reply by the middle of next week as to his attendance at the assembly.⁵

⁴ Guevara's party was the Partido Revolucionario Auténtico (PRA; Authentic Revolutionary Party).

⁵ In telegram 211861 to La Paz, August 14, Vance confirmed his attendance at the OAS General Assembly Meeting for "two or three days." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-0721) See Document 150.

C) The Foreign Minister said that the most important item on the agenda for Bolivia was the matter of his country's access to the sea. His government sought a consensus in the assembly that would come as close as possible to Bolivia's interests. He said that President Guevara's thinking on the subject was complete, and that the President hoped for approval by the assembly of something similar to the Security Council's resolution on the Middle East. He hoped for a hemispheric consensus on a recommendation to be made to Bolivia, Peru and Chile, believing that at first none of the three countries would accept the recommended solution. It could, however, become a point of reference in guiding the actions of the inter-American system towards a solution.

The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister referred to security council resolution 242, which had served as a basis for further implementation actions.⁶ The Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative, adding that he had expressed the personal opinion of President Guevara and the Bolivian cabinet. It would be necessary to discuss this approach with the political parties and with the congress. Within two or three weeks, it would be possible for the Bolivian government to present its ideas clearly to the U.S. government; it was very interested in American cooperation on this issue.

The Secretary asked how Bolivia envisaged the presentation of this idea to the assembly. The Foreign Minister said that his government hoped that another Latin American country, perhaps Venezuela, might present the idea to the assembly; Bolivia would not express its opinion on the idea in public. Bolivia hoped that the recommendation would contain an expression of continental concern over Bolivia's obtaining an outlet to the sea and that it should be as precise as possible as to the process to be followed in reaching a solution to the problem.

The Secretary inquired as to whether this idea had been expressed in President Guevara's writings on the subject; when the Foreign Minister replied in the affirmative, the Secretary said that he was familiar with the President's writings.

The Foreign Minister said that the President envisaged Bolivia's access to the sea through a sovereign corridor along the border between Peru and Chile, with an international zone for the port, which would not be in the city of Arica.

4. The Secretary concluded the meeting by expressing his interest in seeing and studying the Bolivian proposal.

Vance

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, vol. XIX: Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 542.

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, August 28, 1979, 0300Z

225771. Subject: Bolivian Stabilization Program.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Department welcomes President Guevara Arce's apparent determination to implement a realistic stabilization program.² In your conversation with ForMin Fernandez and with Guevara Arce, you should encourage this decision, which we believe is an intelligent response to Bolivia's present economic crisis.³

3. As you are aware, apart from Title III and AID project loans there is essentially nothing significant which USG can do to provide the "cushion" Guevara Arce would like to have. We can—and assuming the stabilization measures go forward will—see whether faster disbursements might be made on existing or new credits, recognizing fully that at the maximum such adjustments would have little effect on Bolivia's deteriorating reserves position. We are certainly interested in any symbolic support we could provide, such as timing of signature or other announcements of economic aid projects.

4. However, we are concerned that postponement of exchange rate action with complementary monetary constraints—and also other actions such as increases of POL prices—until mid-October or later, if that is what is envisaged, would risk undue hemorrhaging of reserves and debilitating debate. We therefore believe quick action more prudent. You may make this point.⁴ (FYI only we have compared notes on this with Walter Robichek in IMF, who shares our puzzlement over

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1659. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Bushnell; cleared in ARA, ARA/ECP, EB/IFD/OMA, and S/S-O; approved by Barnebey.

² In telegram 7260 from La Paz, August 25, the Embassy reported that Guevara was "moving as quickly as possible to negotiate a thorough economic stabilization program with the IMF." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1662)

³ In telegram 7331 from La Paz, August 28, the Embassy reported on Boeker's meeting with Fernandez that day, during which they discussed the timing and actions of the economic stabilization program. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1656)

⁴ In telegram 7331 from La Paz, August 28, the Embassy reported that Boeker told Fernandez that "the effects of a first round of economic measures would probably end the government's current honeymoon period and create a less, not more favorable climate in the congress and the trade unions for a second round." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1656)

the concept of moving slowly on the necessary measures at the same time as Bolivia's foreign exchange position is deteriorating so sharply. He has been in touch with IMF permanent representative who evidently now has come up with an alternative approach which he has not yet discussed with Bolivian officials. Robichek also says that he could field an IMF mission very quickly if needed. We of course do not want to get out in front on specifics of program, but we wish to be supportive. But we would also like to be sure that Guevara Ace's opportunity—with the MilGov just departed, and their financial mismanagement well recognized—is not lost. We think it would be better to move quickly in some areas; gain IMF and other international implicit or explicit recognition for those results; and then move as quickly as possible to get agreement with the IMF on the extended fund facility. End FYI)

5. In view of foregoing considerations, Department doubts a visit to Washington by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance would be useful at this time. We certainly would not wish to contribute to any let down in government's determination to carry out necessary remedial measures. However, we would not repeat not wish to suggest or imply that USG can and will be in a position to provide the "cushion" assistance which the new government wants. The best channel for productive discussion at this stage would be IMF, with the USG to remain fully informed on the progress of IMF-GOB negotiations.⁵

6. Embassy should be aware Bolivian Embassy has asked for a meeting for ForMin Fernandez with the Secretary, without repeat without stating what subjects would be covered. No decision has been reached on scheduling this meeting.⁶ Department's view in preceding paragraph only applies to financial discussions rather than to other aspects of bilateral relations.

Christopher

⁵ In telegram 7471 from La Paz, August 31, the Embassy reported on ongoing GOB-IMF negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790399-0678)

⁶ In telegram 7331 from La Paz, August 28, the Embassy reported that Fernandez had decided to postpone his trip to Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1656)

149. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance's Delegation to the Department of State¹

October 20, 1979, 1945Z

Secto 10006. Subject: Letter to the President of Brazil²

For Seitz from Bremer

1. As noted, Mr. Vance was not comfortable with the tone of the President's letter to President Guevara.³ He found it too lecturing in tone and asked Vaky and Pastor to redo it. Their proposed letter, approved by Mr. Vance is below. The tone is changed; not the substance.

2. Please contact Guy Erb urgently and ask him to clear the revised language.⁴ No new signed original is necessary, obviously. We just need authorization to deliver Sunday evening to Guevara.

3. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: Vice President Mondale has told me of the concern you expressed to him earlier this month in Panama regarding the projected sales of tin from our strategic stockpiles.⁵ I have also received a thoughtful message from the Presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, and the foreign minister of Ecuador on behalf of President Roldos following the Vice President's meeting in Panama with the Andean heads of state.⁶

Let me assure you that I truly understand the depth of your concern and how important this matter is to you. It was precisely with this in mind that I have sought to find ways to take what is an essential step for us and, at the same time, meet your concerns.

Our problem is that the US strategic reserves of tin are so far in excess of the amounts required that we must reduce them. We want to do so gradually over time and without market disruption. As you

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790481-1148. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The telegram was sent from the Secretary's aircraft. Vance attended the OAS General Assembly Meeting in La Paz October 20–23.

² The subject should read: "Letter to the President of Bolivia."

³ The signed letter from Carter to Guevara, dated October 19, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Bolivia.

⁴ In telegram 275000 to the Secretary's delegation, Seitz informed Bremer that Katz and Erb concurred with the revisions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790481-1211)

⁵ See Document 49.

⁶ In a telegram to Carter, October 2, Turbay, Morales Bermudez, Herrera Campins, and Parejo wrote of their "serious concern" that a sale of tin from the U.S. stockpile would mean "grave damage" for the Bolivian economy and democratization process. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Vance's Visit to La Paz, Bolivia (10/20-25/79) I, 10/79)

know, there is worldwide shortage of tin production relative to demand at the present time, and world tin stocks are considerably below historic levels. These two factors have resulted in record high tin prices on the international market, considerably above the ceiling set by the International Tin Council. Under these circumstances, I sincerely believe that we can structure a properly managed, orderly disposal program extending over several years which will not cause damage to the economy of Bolivia.

I want to assure you, Mr. President, as I did President Padilla last July,⁷ that any future tin sales by the US government will be managed so as to safeguard against disruption of the tin market and the economic position of producers, including Bolivia. We will develop sales plans on the basis of full consultation with the International Tin Council and with the producers. In fact, I believe we should use these disposals as an opportunity to strengthen the International Tin Agreement, and I intend to use a portion of the tin which we will dispose of as the US contribution to the International Tin Buffer Stock. My administration supports the tin and other international commodity agreements in order to moderate the extreme fluctuations in price that pose difficulties for commodity exporters.

I expect that the US Congress will soon authorize the disposal of surplus tin. It is therefore important that we work together to make this an opportunity rather than a problem. I would welcome your government's suggestions on the timing and quantities of disposals in light of current and prospective market conditions. The views of the Bolivian government, which could be communicated through either of our ambassadors, will be of great assistance as my government develops an orderly, well-managed disposal program for the coming years. I repeat that I share your concern for the effects tin sales could have, and for this reason am determined that all feasible safeguards will be taken.

Let me take this occasion, Mr. President, to reiterate that the recently initiated democratic process in Bolivia has our full support.

The gains in civilian, constitutional government which Bolivia has succeeded in bringing about are worthy of the most profound respect and praise. I believe it is in the interests of every republic in the hemisphere to do everything feasible to secure and consolidate these advances.

Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter

Vance

⁷ See Document 146.

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

La Paz, October 21, 1979, 6 p.m.-7:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Bolivian President Walter Guevara Arze

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Boeker
Ambassador Vaky
Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC
Mrs. Stephanie van Reigersberg,
Interpreter and notetaker

Bolivians

President Walter Guevara Arze
Mr. Walter Guevara Anaya,
Secretary to the President

President Guevara:

First, I should like to extend to you a very cordial welcome. We in Latin America know you well, and I hope that once the effects of the altitude are past the rest of your stay will be to your complete satisfaction.

Now I would like to speak today of three matters, plus any you may wish to add. The topics will be the political situation in Bolivia, the problem of Bolivia's outlet to the sea, and the unavoidable subject of the sale of 35,000 tons of tin. In connection with that last matter, I will add a few thoughts on more general economic subjects.

First, on the political situation as I see it: I believe that we are living in a most viable political atmosphere, and that this political situation is supported by two elements: first, the general consensus in the country, and, second, the decision of the armed forces to let the plan reach its culmination. However, there are some difficulties with the consensus, difficulties which, as paradoxical as it may seem, have to do with certain attitudes in our Parliament. Here as in the United States relations with Parliament are not always easy. The essential difference here, however, is that after 15 years the Bolivian Parliament is just now re-learning how to function. This is creating expectations and certain situations which are not being dealt with as seriously as one might wish. Our relations with the Parliament are complicated by the decision of some political factions to participate in the government. I have no

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Bolivia, 1-12/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in the President's Palace. Drafted by Van Reigersberg and approved December 10 by Bremer. Vance was in La Paz for the OAS General Assembly meeting.

objection to that, but the situation gets difficult for the reason I will now explain.

Unfortunately, there are features in our relations between the Parliament and the Executive Branch which are relatively complex. The Parliamentary resolution whereby I was made President only established my appointment as President and that elections would be held in May of 1980, nothing else. And the decision to hold elections in 1980 only applies to the President and the Vice President, not to the Deputies or Senators. The logical consequence of this is that the President and Vice President will only have a three-year term instead of four years, as the Constitution stipulates, in order that the terms of the Deputies and Senators, who would have already served one year, may coincide with the term of the new President and Vice President.

Another alternative is to elect the President and Vice President for four years and extend the term of the Deputies and Senators to five years. However, neither of these is really viable.

There is another side to this problem. Although the Congressional resolution says nothing about economic problems, this government must confront them. It must confront them because they have been set aside and ignored for the last three to four years, with the result that all of the difficulties have become cumulative. Thus, it is hard to wait any longer to face the problems and start solving them. So, combining the political aspect relating to the duration of the term of the President and the terms of the Deputies and Senators with the problems having to do with our economic realities, it is obviously necessary to establish a general political framework within which the problems can be confronted.

I have pointed out the relationship between these two aspects because representatives of the International Monetary Fund have mentioned this subject to me and have asked what will happen next year. Moreover, any other sources of financing to which we might recur (because obviously we need more financing than what we can get from the IMF) would not fail to raise the same question.

Now the circumstance of this problem is now being used in Parliament by two or three Deputies from the MNR/Alianza Front, headed by Paz Estensoro, who is, unfortunately, not here in Bolivia but who had all the necessary information in hand before he left. So it is difficult to know whether the problem being created by these two or three Deputies is being created with the support of Paz or not. The main difficulty is that these two or three Deputies are going to certain sectors of the armed forces and making proposals to bring a general officer named Natush Busch to the Presidency, to maintain the Parliament open, and to forget about trying General Banzer in order to get Banzer's

votes in Parliament.² This plan would certainly not be accepted by Paz if he were here, but he is not.

Now to get back to the beginning, what is basic in the Congressional resolution is to maintain the democratic process and to conduct the forthcoming elections with reasonable impartiality. Now if only one of the two main factions enters the government, that of Paz or that of Siles, and if the elections were held in 1980, it will be practically impossible to implement the second aspect, which is preserving reasonable impartiality in the elections. Let me clarify what I mean. If only the MNR/Alianza enter the Cabinet, then Paz' supporters will naturally be interested in influencing the elections, something which has traditionally been possible in Bolivia. In that case, my personal alternative would be to go ahead with the elections knowing what I was doing, because I would know that the MNR/Alianza candidate would win. That is why I have proposed that both factions enter the government, both that of Paz and that of Siles. After all, both of them originally belonged to the same party, the MNR. Finally, I should say that whichever group enters the government now is almost guaranteed victory if the elections are held in 1980. But if the elections are postponed until 1981, that possibility is considerably reduced.³

Vance:

I appreciate very much your offering me this background on the political situation in Bolivia, and for explaining it so very clearly. We agree wholeheartedly that the democratic process must be maintained, and that elections must be reasonably impartial. How do you see developments going forward in the immediate future?

Guevara:

Even while the OAS meeting is going on, I will be suggesting to the Parliament the alternative of holding elections next year (which I am prepared to do), or the alternative of facing our economic problems, dealing with stability this year and development next year, and of holding the elections in 1981. I will comply with whatever decision

² In telegram 8491 from La Paz, October 5, the Embassy reported that the Bolivian Congress was considering indictment of Banzer and an "undefined group" of "his associates." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790457-1124)

³ In telegram 8986 from La Paz, October 22, the Embassy reported on Vance's meeting with Guevara and noted: "To strengthen his government, Guevara said he was willing to bring into it the two major political fronts, the MNR and the UDP, but Hernan Siles, head of the UDP, was not willing. To bring in only Victor Paz' MNR and hold a quick May 1980 election would mean, Guevara felt, that the governmental machinery would be abused to assure the election of Victor Paz, a result not consistent with Guevara's mandate to preside over impartial elections." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483-1223)

they take. Also, I will propose that Paz' Alianza enter the Cabinet, and providing that the elections are held in 1981, I will do this even if Siles refuses to let his people join the Cabinet, because, as I explained, if the elections are held in two years, it is less probable that their results can be determined in advance. This change in the Cabinet could take place soon after the OAS meeting. One other important point of information: some Deputies and Senators belonging to Siles' faction are ready to abandon him and join the Cabinet along with Paz' people. This is not an ideal solution, but perhaps it could work.

Vance:

While we are here, we will be saying in the OAS and outside how much stress we lay on the maintaining of the democratic process and we will be speaking of our great admiration for what you have achieved so far. Perhaps that will be of some value.

Guevara:

I think that what you will say will be of value and that it will influence the armed forces and some political sectors.

Vance:

I have here a letter to you from President Carter which covers several matters, but which, in its last paragraph, speaks of his admiration for what you have done and of the importance of maintaining the democratic process. Let me just read that last paragraph:

Let me take this occasion, Mr. President, to reiterate that the recently initiated democratic process in Bolivia has our full support. The gains in civilian, constitutional government which Bolivia has succeeded in bringing about are worthy of the most profound respect and praise. I believe it is in the interests of every republic in the hemisphere to do everything feasible to secure and consolidate these advances. (Full text of letter attached).⁴

Guevara:

Thank you. I think that is all I had to say on the political subject.

Let me proceed to the matter of our outlet to the sea. We have the greatest interest in securing U.S. support, support which we hope you will express by influencing other Latin American countries, for a *demarche* which we hope to carry out in the OASGA. Unfortunately, this is not a simple problem either. We are really on the horns of a dilemma—that of asking the OASGA for something which we cannot obtain or for something which would not even be useful in terms of implementation. What I am saying is that we will ask the OAS to have

⁴ Letter is not attached; printed as Document 149.

Chile return to us the territory it took during the War of the Pacific. This would divide Chile in half, and would give us 20 percent of Chile's continental land area. This is not viable, but this is what Bolivian public opinion wants. The other alternative is to get friendly countries to present another proposal, contrasting with that of Bolivia, using terms which are more viable and which, if supported, could be useful for Bolivia. It is in connection with this second alternative that we need your support. Basically, without going into details which would not be useful at this time, this is what we want. Ambassador Vaky has the initial texts, and we will be giving him others as drafts come in from third countries.⁵

Vance:

I discussed this matter with your Foreign Minister in Quito and told him that we would be glad to help.⁶ Since then, Ambassador Vaky has seen two drafts, and this afternoon we received a new draft, more general than the first two. At first reading, I found it to be quite good. I will study it further tonight, and perhaps it will come up in the meeting with the Andeans this evening.⁷

Guevara:

That third draft was given to you before we were consulted. It is not a draft which is useful to us. We are working on a new draft and will give it to Ambassador Vaky either later tonight or tomorrow morning. So there is no need to waste time studying that draft which is not a useful one at all.

Vaky:

Mr. President, from your point of view, how specific should it be? As you know, the more specific it is, the more problems there are. And we thought that the third draft had at least the element of being a framework which could lead to other things. So, without going into detail, just how specific must it be?

Guevara:

Any draft must cover two aspects: first, it must say that the problem of the landlocked situation of Bolivia is not a bilateral problem, but is one which concerns the entire hemisphere. It would seem relatively

⁵ In telegram 259707 to La Paz, October 3, the Department forwarded to the Embassy two alternative draft resolutions on Bolivian access to the sea that Guevara had given to Mondale at their October 1 meeting in Panama. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number) See Document 49.

⁶ See Document 147.

⁷ Not found.

possible to get broad acceptance for that. Secondly, it should somehow express the basic concepts which must be agreed to in order to solve the problem. It is here where it is difficult to get general agreement. Obviously the text we gave to Ambassador Vaky represents an extreme position, but it should be possible to get another text which is much more dilute, but not totally useless.

Vance:

Ambassador Vaky and I have discussed this subject on a number of occasions, and when I spoke to the Foreign Minister we also discussed how general or how specific the resolution should be.

Guevara:

Let me interject an inconsequential note. I have also been Foreign Minister, and I know that from the diplomatic point of view it is very easy to get agreement on texts that don't say very much, not to say nothing at all. But when you look at the same situation from the vantage point of President it looks very different.

Now on the economic issue, there are two aspects I would like to deal with. The first one you know very well and relates to the sale by the United States of 35,000 tons of tin. The difficult aspect here is that of explaining not only to public opinion but to leaders of public opinion, newspaper publishers and others, the complexities of the U.S. Government. In Bolivia, it is very difficult to understand how the Senate can approve the sale, with the agreement of the Executive Branch, of this amount of tin, which means nothing to the American economy, nor does it have any political significance in the United States. It would seem to be a matter of no importance to the United States, whereas, in Bolivia, its economic importance is great. As you well know, with every drop of one cent in the price of tin, based on a production of 30,000 tons, it makes a difference of more or less \$1 million. Unfortunately, our production now is somewhere around 20,000 tons, but the problem remains the same. I really don't know what can be done at this point.

Vance:

In his letter, President Carter speaks of the tin sales. He fully understands, as I do, the complexities of such sales by the US, and their political effect on Bolivia. On the other hand, the problem in the United States is that we are short of a certain number of strategic reserves and have excesses in others. We have a very tight budget situation, with the President trying to balance the budget, particularly in an election year, which is a complicating factor. The result is that the action which was taken in Congress⁸ was one which recognized

⁸ See footnote 6, Document 123 and footnote 2, Document 125.

the imbalance in our strategic stocks, and which was directed at obtaining the funds necessary to buy what we do not have.

Guevara:

Yes, we understand that the idea was to sell tin in order to buy copper, and that this would tend to relieve pressure on the US budget in an election year. But at the same time perhaps the added factor of the external significance of this measure should also be taken into account.

Vance:

It is clearly recognized. What the President is suggesting is the possibility of holding discussions on how a regime could be worked out between the two countries by means of which the sales could take place over a period of years in a manner which would not be disruptive of price and would not cause negative effects on Bolivia. That is what we would suggest, if you find such discussions to be desirable.

Guevara:

The trouble is that this has already occurred twice in the past, and the people who dealt with the situation here in Bolivia on the prior occasions say that promises were made by the US Government to sell certain amounts over given periods in order not to influence prices. However, after the executive decision was taken, the implementation was left to lower levels, I imagine to the GSA, which sold the tin under difficult circumstances for the producers and in a manner which did not take the producers' interests into account. The fear is that the same thing will happen again this time.

Vance:

We must discuss this and find ways to ensure that this not happen again. We have to work out ways to monitor the lower levels of the government sufficiently so that they will not sell in a falling market and will in a rising one. I think it can be done, and I fully understand your concern. Both the President and I are aware of the problems and of the need to set up procedures, including a monitoring and reporting system, so that these lower levels cannot act independently.

Guevara:

By its very nature, the problem will take several years to work out, and it is difficult to establish a procedure which will really be complied with over that many years. I really cannot imagine such a procedure.

Vance:

I agree that the longer it lasts the more difficult it becomes, but there are procedures which can be established. We can have someone,

either a Cabinet officer or a Special Assistant to the President, function as a monitor on the GSA. I do agree, however, it isn't easy.

Guevara:

A letter from the US Government referring to these antecedents may be something which could calm people here, especially if such a letter were to include the additional promise that the United States would avoid acting in the future as it had in the past.

Vance:

That makes sense. I will discuss that with the President.⁹

Guevara:

The second economic aspect I wanted to raise has to do with the stabilization process. Above and beyond the help we can expect from the IMF, we will be needing additional financing. The deficits of the central government and of the state agencies, including COMIBOL, FPB, CBF, the railroads and others, amount to some hundreds of millions of dollars. The relationship between the Bolivian peso and the US dollar is already artificial. The measures which have to be taken must necessarily be very unpopular and even risky, especially given the political situation I have described.¹⁰ All of this leads to the conclusion that we will be needing additional help besides what is forthcoming from the Fund and other public sector sources. I would like to hear your comments on the possibilities of such additional help.

Vance:

It is obvious that the first step has to be taken with the IMF. And once that is in place, we should sit down and discuss with your Cabinet officers and with your banks, who have a very important role to play,

⁹ A record of a meeting between Vance and Carter on this topic was not found. On a cover sheet for this memorandum, a follow-up note dated November 30 stated, "We have approached the new GOB proposing bilateral negotiations on tin, and await their response." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Bolivia, 1-12/79)

¹⁰ In telegram 9104 from La Paz, October 24, the Embassy reported that during an October 22 reception at the Government Palace, Guevara told Vance privately that "he desperately needed a personal economic advisor who could help him prepare by November 15 the essential decrees implementing an economic stabilization program. Guevara said he felt helplessly caught between standard proposals of IMF staff (in particular for a floating exchange rate) which may be technically faulty in the Bolivian context and the inability of his economic team to either perfect the IMF proposals or propose alternatives." In response, Vance "said he wanted to help out on this request and would try to find such a person on his return to Washington." The Embassy commented that Vaky and Boeker believed Sidney Weintraub "would be an ideal person for this job." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790488-0265) Weintraub was an economist at the University of Pennsylvania.

what we can do. As I told your Foreign Minister in Quito, whenever you are ready to discuss it, we would be most happy to do so. I cannot make any specific promises now in terms of specific dollar amounts, but we can discuss this together and hopefully make progress. When do you expect action could be taken?

Guevara:

It is our hope that by Friday, November 15, the necessary decrees will be ready, providing we obtain from our Congress the special powers which we need to act. Otherwise, if the problem has to go to Congress to be dealt with in detail, the situation will become cataclysmic. The other difficulty is that of arriving at a common plan with the IMF. The IMF adopts extreme views, since, after having given their views, the IMF officials take their leave and do not run the risk of being stoned in the street. (laughter)

Vance:

I would think that to follow up the IMF meetings here, meetings in Washington would be useful. Although our influence is limited, we do have close relations with people at the Fund and we would be glad to do what we can.

Ambassador Boeker:

Mr. President, from our own experience, and we have been close to the people from the Fund, I think that they understand Bolivia pretty well. They are more realistic than they would be in dealings with some other country. They have been working with Bolivia for two years now in order to develop ways and means to correct the distortions in the economy, and have been frustrated by governments unwilling to take the difficult decisions necessary to place the economy back on a sound footing. I think that they have learned from their frustrations.

Guevara:

I hope they have learned, but their first suggestion, not to call it a demand, is that we float our currency. We do not know what consequence this would have, but the peso could well go from 20 to 30 to a dollar. This might correct itself over time, but would provoke a very difficult political shock.

I think enough has been said on these subjects, as far as I am concerned. I would only thank you for the time you have spent in coming here, and for the time you have spent in dealing with problems of interest to Bolivia. I hope that collaboration between us on the topics I have mentioned will be useful; if so, it will be a collaboration for which we will be very grateful.

Vance:

It was a great privilege to come here and meet with you. I am grateful to you for having spent so much time explaining your concerns to me. I think that we can work together. We are prepared to do so. We will stay in close touch, both now and later, with a view to solving all these problems. I know, and I want you to know, the feelings of President Carter, who has great admiration for what you have done and what you are doing. So whatever we can do to promote the movement toward democracy we feel will be in the interest of the whole region and, indeed, of the hemisphere.

Guevara:

Thank you very much. Please tell President Carter that as his decision on the Panama Canal will go down in history, I hope that his influence on the matter of the outlet to the sea for Bolivia will likewise be a factor of great historic value. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I thank all of your colleagues for coming.

Vance:

I should just like to ask you how I should deal with the press, how much or how little you would like me to say. We would be happy to say whatever would be appropriate from your standpoint.

Guevara:

From our point of view, it would be very useful for you to say that we have dealt with these three aspects and, although it may be disproportionate, perhaps you could emphasize the matters dealing with the 35,000 tons of tin and the outlet to the sea.

Vance:

Certainly. Thank you very much.

Guevara:

Thank you very much.

151. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 24, 1979

[Omitted here are portions of the memorandum unrelated to Bolivia]

6. *Bolivia*—I had a useful discussion with Bolivian President Walter Guevara, who described the precarious political situation in his country, urged us not to go forward with the disposal of tin, and asked us to support Bolivia's request for access to the sea. I told him that we would support Bolivia's desire to access to the sea. On tin, I gave Guevara your letter and requested his advice on ways we could dispose of the tin so it didn't have a negative impact on the Bolivian economy.² On Tuesday,³ Ambassador Boeker hosted a lunch for me and virtually all of Bolivia's political and military leaders. I made clear that the US strongly supported the democratization process, and the move to civilian government which had taken place. I also made it very clear that any efforts to mount a coup would be viewed by the US and the international community with extreme disfavor.⁴ I urged them to put their joint support behind the democratic process. I encouraged the civilian leaders of the different political factions to help the Guevara administration to deal with the country's serious economic and political problems, rather than try to topple the government as several appear to be trying. The luncheon conversation succeeded in getting the various leaders to communicate with each other for the first time in a while. My hope is that the luncheon conversation will reduce the chances of a coup and provide the government with necessary support to continue its progress toward democratization.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 10/79. Secret. In the top right-hand corner, Carter wrote "Cy. J."

² See Document 150.

³ October 23.

⁴ Carter wrote "good" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ In telegram 9314 from La Paz, October 31, the Embassy reported that on the morning of October 23 Boeker, Vaky and Vance had discussed "what we might hope for if your luncheon intervention later that day had the desired impact on Bolivian politics." The Embassy reported that three changes had since occurred: "A. Victor Paz' disowning the civilian-military plotting his backers had started; B. Paz' ordering his parliamentary group to cease their kamikaze attacks on Guevara—censure motions, resignation demands, etc.; C. Guevara then being able to conclude a multi-party accord or coalition that would give his government a political base that could just survive until the next elections." The Embassy reported that the fourth of their agreed-upon hopes was "a melting away of military support for several incipient coup leaders," and that this might still "run its course." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-1802)

152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, November 1, 1979, 1617Z

285735. Subject: Guidance on Coup Attempt.²

1. C—Entire text

2. Confirming Eaton-Boeker Telcon, the press guidance we are preparing at this point is similar to that which you proposed, without last sentence.³ (Text will be sent septel at noon today.)⁴ In fact, we are suspending military and economic assistance although we will not say so publicly at this time.

3. Privately, you should convey the following message to Paz, Fellman or Bedregal, and if possible through an intermediary to Natusch: The US is following events with great concern and would deplore any disruption in the democratic process. We are suspending all military and economic assistance immediately and such assistance will not be resumed until we have had an opportunity to review events as they develop.⁵

Christopher

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501-0022. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Drafted by Taylor; cleared in ARA/AND and S/S-O; approved by Eaton.

² On November 1, Natusch led a coup that overthrew Guevara. In telegram 9358 from La Paz, the Embassy reported on Natusch's character and efforts to consolidate power. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501-0459)

³ A record of the Eaton-Boeker telcon was not found. In telegram 9359 from La Paz, November 1, the Embassy recommended that, among other points, the United States "maintain a public line deploring the interruption of the constitutional process in Bolivia and rejecting Natusch's and the MNR defectors' efforts to decorate their coup with legitimacy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501-0490)

⁴ In telegram 285960 to La Paz, November 1, the Department transmitted the statement given by the Department spokesman at the noon briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501-0721) In telegram 9367 from La Paz, November 2, the Embassy recommended that the Department make another statement on the coup as "in Alberto Natusch and Guillermo Bedregal we are dealing with very thick skulls and only a hammer will get through." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503-0980) In telegram 287386 to La Paz, November 3, the Department transmitted a transcript of the November 2 press briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790504-0939)

⁵ In telegram 9346 from La Paz, November 1, the Embassy reported that the Ambassador "informed Paz and conveyed to Natusch that US financial assistance is suspended effective immediately." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790501-0178) In telegram 289360 to La Paz, November 6, the Department instructed the Embassy that contacts with the Natusch regime "should be minimal and low-level, and confined to urgent and essential matters." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790509-0865)

153. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, November 19, 1979

SUBJECT

Your Request About Assistance to the New Bolivian Government (C)²

On Saturday³ Vance sent a congratulatory message to President Gueiler on her election as interim President, assuring her “that President Carter and I look forward to cooperating with you and your people as you begin the task of healing the wounds in your society; and conducting it further on the democratic road.” (C)

Prior to the Natusch coup, PL-480 and development assistance was set at a total of \$49.6 million. State will try to get that restored. State is also working on an increase in the total package in the range of \$5–10 million by raising the Title III PL-480 amounts. (C)

The only problem area is Ambassador Boeker’s request for a \$10 million CCC credit.⁴ We had already turned down a Bolivian request for CCC credits prior to the coup, and because of the full commitment of CCC funds we would have to reprogram from another country. This will be on the agenda of tomorrow’s DCC meeting. (C)

As regards FMS, State reduced the Bolivian level for FY 80 from \$5.5 million to \$1 million after the coup. They are now looking for ways to increase that. My own view is that we should work to restore

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Bolivia, 1/77-1/81. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Owen. At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “ok” and a stamped notation indicated that Aaron saw the memorandum on November 19.

² The Bolivian Congress, after having reached an agreement with Natusch that he would resign, elected Gueiler to the presidency on November 16. A November 17 memorandum summarized recent cable traffic from Bolivia, including Boeker’s call for “prompt and generous” U.S. aid. In the margin next to that paragraph, Aaron wrote, “Pastor get on it” and initialed the memorandum. (Ibid.)

³ Telegram 299180 to La Paz, November 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790529-0566)

⁴ In telegram 9935 from La Paz, November 16, the Embassy recommended: “The U.S. should respond promptly and generously to the new government’s plight. In significant part we can do this by reviving all our suspended economic aid programs, some with an amended focus, and offering immediate help on wheat imports. In particular I suggest the following: Offering an immediate \$10 million CCC credit, as the fastest way to try to get some wheat here by mid-January.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790528-0371)

the assistance we cut, but not consider increases until Bolivia does complete free elections. (C)

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, March 3, 1980, 2300Z

1881. Ref: (A) Boeker-Watson Telecon of 22 February 29,² (B) La Paz 1259,³ (C) La Paz 0798.⁴

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary: President Gueiler is extremely grateful that the US Tin Disposal Policy reflects Bolivia's request, that sales begin no sooner than July. She expressed particular appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary and Ambassador Boeker.

3. President Guiler responded immediately to my request to see her and received me at 5:00 pm local time. I told her that we would announce our Tin Disposal Policy in Washington this evening at 7:00 p.m. La Paz time. I advised her that the Secretary of State had considered very carefully the two requests she had made concerning our Tin Disposal Policy and had taken them up with GSA. After lengthy discussions, I said, the USG had acceded to her first request—that the initiation of sales from our stockpile be delayed until after the Bolivian elections June 29; sales would begin July 1. I emphasized that this decision was reached solely because she had requested it.

4. We found, however, that we could not agree to her second point—to limit sales to no more than 300 tons a month for the first

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800111-0261. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

² No record of the February 22 conversation between Boeker and Watson has been found.

³ In telegram 1259 from La Paz, February 12, the Embassy reported that Gueiler had emphasized that her first point on tin sales "was the most important to Bolivia," and that "she herself in consulting with the U.S. had taken a great political risk, against the grain of Bolivia's traditional position." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800075-1073)

⁴ In telegram 798 from La Paz, January 29, the Embassy reported that the Bolivian government had two proposals for the U.S. tin disposal program: "A. That disposals not begin until the second half of 1980, and B. That disposals during the first year be limited to 300 tons per month." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870095-0297)

twelve months, I told her, explaining that offerings would be at a bi-weekly rate of 500 tons. The total for the first year would be 10000 tons. I stressed that the Secretary himself will monitor very closely the tin sales and their impact on the market and that any change in the rate of offerings would be agreed to by the Department as well as GSA. There will be no abrupt changes. Moreover, if there was a break in the price, the situation will be reviewed by both agencies.

5. I explained the rationale behind announcing today sales which will begin only four months from now. We believe that such an announcement will contribute to market stability and reduce or eliminate the impact the beginning of sales will have on the market in July. Over the next four months the market will discount those sales. Moreover, I added, the market probably has already discounted the sales, perhaps even on the assumption they would begin before July. Therefore, tonight's announcement probably will have little impact on the price in the near future.

6. Noting that predicting what will happen in commodity markets is virtually impossible and that there were many factors besides the GSA sales affecting the international market for tin, I said that we believe we have made a very honest effort to adopt a policy which takes Bolivia's interests adequately into account and which will have a minimal affect on the market. I added, that our announcement would make no reference to consultations with any particular country, only that we had consulted with consumers and producers through the ITC. As far as we were concerned, I said, she could play the issue any way she wished with her people. I did express a hope, however, that our efforts would not be received by hostile demonstrations.

7. President Gueiler was deeply relieved that we had accepted her first point and expressed no concern that we failed to meet her second one. This kind of support from friendly countries was heartwarming, she indicated. She was particularly appreciative of the personal efforts of the Secretary and Ambassador Boeker.

8. The President implied that she would not make any public references to her consultations with us, but she probably will point out that delaying initiations of sales until July is clearly in Bolivia's interests. She said she would contact the COB to try to assure there would be no demonstrations.

Watson

155. Excerpt From the National Intelligence Daily¹

Washington, June 27, 1980

BOLIVIA: Election Outlook

Bolivians will participate on Sunday² in the third general election in two years, but a military takeover in the immediate postelection period is possible. [Portion marking not declassified]

Former chief executives Hernan Siles Zuazo and Victor Paz Estenssoro probably will win the most votes, with former President Banzer running a strong third. If—as expected—none of the 13 candidates achieves a simple majority, the election will be decided by the new Congress when it convenes in July. *[Portion marking not declassified]*

Followers of both Siles and Paz have pledged to support the one who gets the most popular votes, although neither candidate has yet committed himself. The three leading contenders, however, have shown interest in negotiating a settlement to avoid any postelection stalemate.³ The major parties also are considering a coalition government to ensure broad political support for the next civilian administration. *[Portion marking not declassified]*

A repeat of last year's electoral deadlock in Congress would tempt military hardliners to lead a coup on the pretext of restoring order and leadership.⁴ Inveterate armed forces plotters reportedly will accept either Paz or Banzer as president. They consider Siles an extreme leftist,

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00466R: Intelligence Publications Files (1980), Box 3, Folder 2. Top Secret; *[code word and handling restriction not declassified]*.

² June 29.

³ In telegram 4728 from La Paz, June 8, Weissman reported that Araoz was working "to have agreement from Mrs. Gueiler, Paz, and also Siles Salinas to seek to make a deal with Banzer and the military for the elections to proceed, for Paz to get the presidency, but with Banzer and the military sharing power. As for Siles Zuazo, he was completely unacceptable to the military, Araoz indicated, but since the military expects him to be the front-runner in the vote count, they will not let the election proceed unless they have assurances by the contemplated deal that Siles Zuazo cannot win the presidency in the Congress." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800280-0989) In telegram 151293 to La Paz, June 8, the Department advised the Embassy: "We could not give our agreement or support to any arrangement which, in advance of the elections, would exclude Siles Zuazo, one of the principal electoral contenders. Since the military is a major political force, it is logical they would play a significant part in whatever government results from the elections." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800281-0188)

⁴ Weissman reported: "Araoz says that as of this afternoon, June 7, he is now absolutely certain that the Argentines are deeply involved in the planning of all aspects of the coup." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800280-0989)

however, and have threatened an immediate coup if he wins the election. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

In addition to having to contend with a turbulent political environment and the continual threat of a coup from military conservatives, the new president will have to deal with a depressed economy. [*Portion marking not declassified*] [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

156. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, July 17, 1980

1. *Bolivia*: The Bolivian armed forces have launched their long-expected coup against the government of President Lydia Gueiler. It is not clear whether effective civilian resistance can or will be mounted to thwart this military takeover. We have no reports of injury or other harm to U.S. citizens. Our Embassy is operating on a 24-hour skeleton staff basis, and taking pre-planned security measures. We will have twenty-four hour task force coverage in the Department of State. Our response to a successful coup would include suspension of all military assistance, and a careful review of all existing economic assistance commitments. This is the action we took when the military staged a coup last November.² We should also consider recalling Ambassador Weissman on consultation to forestall his being declared *persona non grata*—a likely possibility given the military efforts to kick him out last month.³

[Omitted here are portions of the memorandum unrelated to Bolivia]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 7/80. Secret. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote "Ed J."

² See Document 152.

³ Carter highlighted this sentence with a vertical line in the left-hand margin and wrote: "discuss Fri. A.M." According to the President's Daily Diary, the President held a breakfast meeting from 7:30-9:11 a.m. on July 18 to discuss foreign policy issues. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary) In a July 18 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that Garcia Meza had been sworn in as president, and that the Department had announced that Weissman was being recalled to Washington for consultations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State): 7/80)

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State¹

Buenos Aires, July 22, 1980, 2050Z

5903. Subject: Argentina and the Coup in Bolivia.

1. (C—Entire text)

2. I believe you should have in mind as you plan your trip to Buenos Aires that—whatever the degree of actual Argentine involvement in the Bolivian coup—the consensus here among our diplomatic colleagues is that the Argentine Government aided and abetted the event.² This consensus was brought home to me last night (7/21) when I had a chance to discuss this in depth with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Vatican Ambassador Pio Laghi.

3. At this point it is hard for us to judge the accuracy of these perceptions. There is no well sourced information available to us that points definitively to Argentine involvement in making the Bolivian coup. Despite earlier protestations of non-involvement we detected great Argentine Government concern over events in Bolivia—concern which intensified with the emergence of Siles Zuazo as the next likely President.³ Our best earlier assessment was nevertheless that the Argentines had given up the idea of activating the “Golpe”. Even after elections we believed that if there was impetus toward abetting a coup the decision would be made later, contingent even upon the election process becoming hopelessly muddled and divisive or incoming President Siles Zuazo swamped by his country’s problems. In our talks with military officers subsequent to Garcia Meza’s takeover we see a large measure of satisfaction—which says, of course, only that Argentine

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800352-0669. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to La Paz.

² For Bowdler’s planned trip to Buenos Aires, which was ultimately cancelled, see Document 113. In a July 25 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski reported: “all indications are that the Argentine military, if not the government itself, had a hand in the coup.” He continued, “If Buenos Aires is, in effect, exporting its human rights malpractices, we will have to revise our estimate that they are significantly cleaning up their act.” Carter wrote, “I agree” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. (Carter Library, Plains File, NSC Weekly Reports, Box 30, 6-12/80)

³ In telegram 4532 from Buenos Aires, June 3, the Embassy reported on its conversations with GOA officials regarding “continuing insistent reports of statements by senior Bolivian army officers that Bolivian army had received assurances of financial support from Argentine army in the event of a successful golpe.” In response, Vaquero stated “unequivocally that in no way was Argentina encouraging a golpe. A golpe solved nothing.” The Embassy noted that “Vaquero’s denial of encouraging golpistas was energetic and unqualified. At the same time he displayed a set of attitudes which lead him and other Argentine military to be sympathetic to their Bolivian colleagues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800271-0658)

officers are pleased that Bolivia is not headed toward rule from Moscow or Havana, their earlier expectation. It does not necessarily indicate participation.

4. We have been told by the Buenos Aires Associated Press representative—but have not yet seen the reports themselves—that his colleague in La Paz is reporting that Argentine military supplies are entering Bolivia. If reports of these supply efforts are accurate this could indicate either ongoing assistance or stepped up deliveries designed just to assure Garcia Meza's staying on. (More potentially alarming was a report from the same source that a released Bolivian political prisoner alleged that an Argentine took part in a tough interrogation session. We would welcome comment on this allegation from AmEmbassy La Paz.)⁴

5. As a final straw in the wind we have been given credible testimony by a member of an Argentine Security Service that a popular belief exists at least in his service that Argentine military attaches in La Paz gave Garcia Meza assurances of support in the event of a coup, but that these assurances were put in limbo when world opinion crashed down upon the new Bolivian military regime.

6. As of 1700 there still has been no official Argentine declaration concerning the coup.⁵

Castro

⁴ In telegram 6151 from La Paz, July 23, the Embassy reported that "the Argentines are up to their necks in this coup; perhaps not the government per se, but certainly the Argentine army and its intelligence apparatus." In addition, the Embassy reported, "we are getting reports from many sources that persons actively involved in the detention and interrogation of prisoners are speaking with obvious Argentine accents." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800354-0080)

⁵ Argentina resumed normal relations with Bolivia on July 29. (Telegram 6065 from Buenos Aires, July 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800363-0015)

158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bolivia¹

Washington, July 24, 1980, 0039Z

195173. Subject: Bolivian Coup.

1. C—Entire text
2. Following for addressees information is INR analysis of Bolivian coup situation and aftermath as of July 23.
3. Begin text: Consolidating the coup in Bolivia

Bolivia's new military masters have consolidated their physical hold over the nation, but they face a prolonged period of popular resistance and eventually may be forced to cede power to another, more acceptable military regime. The careful organization and timing of the July 17 coup and the brutal repression that accompanied it assured its initial success. All of Bolivia's regional commanders, even those whose anti-coup sentiments were well known, have accepted the coup for the sake of institutional unity. Widespread misgivings within the ranks and among the junior officers have been momentarily assuaged by the thrill of paramilitary action and the opportunities for personal gain.

The Bolivian high command, under the leadership of Army Commander General Luis Garcia Meza Tejada, demonstrated that it still has the authority and resources to execute a coup. The generals, however, appear to have thought little about developments beyond the initial takeover:

—Garcia Meza has named a hastily improvised, mostly military cabinet of dubious ability and integrity. He has called for economic reorganization and worker ownership of the means of production and wealth (precisely what the conservatives professed to fear if front-running presidential candidate Hernan Sles Zuazo had been elected in the scheduled congressional run off).

—The military are only dimly aware of the extent and complexities of Bolivia's economic problems. In their ignorance they have asserted that the anticipated cut-off of financial assistance from the IFIS, the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800354-0832. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Rome, Madrid, Tokyo, Quito, Bogota, Asuncion, Caracas, Guatemala, Lima, Madrid, Panama, Santiago, London, Paris, Bonn, Department of Defense, JCS, DIA, and USCINCSO. Drafted by Blohm; cleared by Barnebey and in INR/IAA; approved by Eaton.

US² and other donor countries will be counterbalanced by unspecified aid from Argentina, Brazil, and “the Arabs.”

—In its high-handed treatment of the Bolivian Church, the military has ignored at its peril the political weight of the Church and clergy, especially in the wake of John Paul II’s highly successful visit to Brazil.³

—In their haste to eliminate leftist political, labor and peasant leaders, the military underestimated the galvanizing effect of their actions on the most radical and militant sectors of Bolivian society.

Over time, the mounting pressures from within the military, the civilian opposition, and the world at large may force the leaders of the coup to step down in favor of less tarnished officers, perhaps in coalition with civilian conservatives. The installation of presumptive President-elect Hernan Siles Zuazo or the holding of new elections appear far less likely, however.

Factors conducive to prolonged and sporadic, violent resistance to the coup are:

—About 500 persons have been arrested in La Paz and in some cases brutally beaten and mistreated. Reports are inconclusive and contradictory, but it appears that as many as 100 persons have died, including prominent political figures and labor leaders.⁴

—The peasant federations in the Department of La Paz strongly resent the interruption of the democratic process and will probably try to blockade the capital, causing food shortages and hoarding.

—The general strike ordered by the Bolivian labor confederation was 95 percent effective on July 21 in La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia’s first and third most important cities, but its effectiveness has subsequently declined.

—The Armed Forces are spread thin and do not have the resources to counteract prolonged strikes, roadblocks, anti-military terrorism, or sporadic resistance. This is especially true in the mining area to the

² In a July 24 memorandum to Muskie, Tarnoff suggested that at their July 25 breakfast meeting Muskie “may want to bring the President up to date on our moves in the last 24 hours in Bolivia.” Tarnoff noted, “We will withdraw our Military Assistance Group immediately because of its clear identification with the Bolivian military,” and “Terminate by next week all portions of the \$120 million aid pipeline for which non-compliance with loan conditions can be established except for humanitarian feeding programs through voluntary agencies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 82D100, Presidential Breakfasts July, August, September 1980)

³ Pope John Paul II visited Brazil from June 30 to July 12.

⁴ In telegram 198465 to Lima, July 26, the Department reported: “There is substantial evidence that a veritable reign of terror is being conducted by the new authorities in Bolivia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800359-1183)

south, where intense fighting between miners and the military occurred on Monday.

—The Archbishop of La Paz has condemned the wholesale violation of human rights, the attacks on Church property and personnel, and the interruption of the democratic process in a forcefully worded exhortation read at mass last Sunday.⁵

—Latin American reaction to the coup and subsequent repression has been strongly condemnatory. Several governments have recalled their ambassadors, the OAS probably will express grave concern over developments in Bolivia, and Andean Pact Foreign Ministers have denounced the coup.

—Hernan Siles Zuazo, the symbol and leader of the democratic opposition, remains in hiding in La Paz.

Given the potential for prolonged popular resistance and the isolation into which the military has forced itself, the prospects for Bolivia seem particularly bleak. End text.

Muskie

⁵ July 20.

159. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia to the Department of State¹

La Paz, September 10, 1980, 2133Z

7634. Subject: U.S. Policy Toward Bolivia.²

1. (S—Entire text.)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800432-0250. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² A checklist prepared by the White House Situation Room, September 11, summarized this cable. Aaron forwarded the checklist item to Pastor on the same date and noted, "We need to formulate a position; suggest steps." In a memorandum to Tarnoff, September 12, Dodson asked the Department to chair an interagency group "to identify US options." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Bolivia, 1/77-1/81)

2. Summary: Heartened by the continued international isolation of the Garcia Meza regime and indications of growing military and civilian disaffection, some opposition elements are becoming increasingly active in plotting against the regime. As a result, Embassy personnel have been contacted on numerous occasions by individuals seeking support, advice and, in particular, a reading on the type of successor government which the US would encourage and support. If we choose to do so, we might well decisively influence events here. In fact, in responding to these appeals, we have to take great care to avoid inadvertently giving the appearance of promoting anti-regime plotting. Despite our disapproval of this regime, the Embassy believes that we should not be involved in efforts to overthrow it. We believe that our present policy is appropriate and effective, and a Ore Interventionist Policy could produce undesirable results. However, since we are now being asked by Bolivians on an almost daily basis to do more, the Embassy would welcome a critical review of our response to these requests and also of our conclusion that any direct US Government support to or encouragement of anti-regime elements would be unwise. End summary.

3. Current situation: As our reporting has indicated, we believe that the Garcia Meza regime is becoming increasingly shaky. The principal factors contributing to the erosion of its power are: the regime's failure to establish its legitimacy or develop a coherent program of government, its continued systematic widespread violations of human rights, its links with cocaine traffickers, its dependence upon Argentina, chaos within the public sector created in part by arbitrary arrests of employees on the basis of unsubstantiated allegation, the confrontation with the Church, and its ineffectiveness in dealing with its international difficulties. In the latter category are its failures to solve the problem posed by Lydia Gueiler's presence,³ to neutralize international criticism over the continued detention of the Former Minister Fernando Salazar Paredes to counter charges of systematic human rights violations and involvement in narcotics trafficking, to deal with the approximately two hundred people harbored in embassies in La Paz, to deflect or dilute the continued vigorous criticism from Bolivia's Andean partners

³ Former President Lydia Gueiler was detained in the presidential residence immediately after the coup, and then in the papal nunciature in La Paz. In telegram 7154 from La Paz, August 22, the Embassy reported on Watson's August 21 meeting with Gueiler, in which she described negotiations with the regime and "stressed to Chargé that she remained determined not to accept any conditions on her departure." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800408-0335) She departed for Paris on October 4. (Telegram 8250 from La Paz, October 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800474-0497)

and—most important—to persuade the Andeans, Europeans, Japanese and the US to establish normal diplomatic relations.

4. The apparent inability of the regime to handle these domestic and foreign issues is emboldening its opponents in spite of the continued repression and causing its supporters to question the regime's viability and their own association with it. This is evident in recent increased activity by supporters of Siles' clandestine government (more underground documents, minor explosions) and more indications of serious dissidence on the part of some influential military leaders. The regime retains valuable assets, however, particularly the loyalty to date of most major units, the support or at least acquiescence of important upper and middle class elements and Interior Minister Arce' quasi-independent paramilitary operatives.

5. It is by no means certain as yet that, despite the regime's failure, opposition to it will coalesce in such a way as to bring it down. The key in this regard, of course, is the Armed Forces. The current tendency seems to be increased dissolution which feeds on itself as each major actor maneuvers for advantage and discipline erodes. Thus far, however, most military dissidents seem to be acting independently; an organized, coherent opposition movement has not formed. Although powerful units in and around La Paz (such as the Tarapaca and Ingavi regiments) might by themselves be able to topple the regime, their leaders may be reluctant to move without support from other units. Fear within the military that the institution will be destroyed if it divides is a powerful agglutinate. Moreover, Garcia Meza may have succeeded in reinforcing military unity this week during a meeting he called of the commanders of all major military units.

6. In this context, although the positions of the Europeans, the Japanese, the Vatican and the Andeans are very significant, the regime perceives the US stance to be by far the most important to its survival. This is obvious from the regime's constant flailing at the US and particularly President Carter, its recent efforts to appear to be dealing with the narcotics trafficking issue we have raised, and the inquiries we receive from supporters and self-styled emissaries of the regime as to what must be done in order for the US to renew normal relations with Bolivia.⁴ The crucial nature of the US position is also evident from the solicitations we have received from the underground resistance movement, as well as from dissidents within the Armed Forces.

⁴ In telegram 6483 from La Paz, July 31, the Embassy reported on approaches from "high-ranking members of the Garcia Meza regime" to various mission personnel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800367-0577)

7. Overtures: We have had no discussions with policy-level officials of the regime and have rejected overtures from them. Likewise, we have refused to treat with those who represent themselves as official emissaries of the regime. We have described our position, however, to supporters of the regime who have averred that they would like to meet with us on their own account and not as envoys of the regime. To reduce the chances of misunderstanding over the nature of these informal discussions, Charge has not participated in them. We have stressed in these conversations the substantive basis for the US position, noting particularly our concern about the interruption of the democratic process, the continuing widespread human rights violations and the links between the Garcia Meza regime and major cocaine traffickers. We have suggested strongly that, in order for any improvement in relations with the US to be possible, serious efforts to deal with these issues would have to be taken by whoever were in power in Bolivia. We have also pointed out that, Garcia Meza's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the US is not promoting a counter coup or intervening in any way in Bolivian affairs. We are merely exercising our rights to determine the nature and style of our relations with other countries and to decide where our military, economic and narcotics-related assistance can be most effectively and productively used.

8. In our conversations with military dissidents, we have made essentially the same points. Our responses to their direct questions concerning whether or not the US would support a regime replacing Garcia Meza's and, if so, on what conditions have been noncommittal. We have stressed that we are concerned more about major substantive issues than personalities.

9. Embassy personnel have been approached repeatedly by people claiming (at least in some cases accurately, we believe) to represent Hernan Siles or elements of his UDP coalition. They have requested us to: hide them; furnish a clandestine base of operations; give them money; arms, vehicles, radio equipment; take more vigorous action to topple the Garcia Meza regime; provide advice; and most recently smuggle Siles out of the country. In response we have described in detail US actions since July 17 and stressed that the US position is firm and is most unlikely to change under present conditions. Thus far we have deflected successfully requests for asylum and other forms of direct assistance without exposing or alienating those who have approached us.

10. US policy: We believe that our policy toward Bolivia and its implementation have been just right and that we should maintain a steady course. Our position is clear and fully consistent with our overall global and hemispheric policies. While it seems to be having the desired effects within Bolivia, it has not alienated any of the other major foreign

actors with the exception of Argentina and even the Argentines are muting their anger. Garcia Meza's claim that our policy is interventionist is essentially groundless and we believe generally perceived as such. Our stance here also has the important advantage of reinforcing our positions in critical areas such as Central America, the other Andean countries and Brazil.

11. It is quite possible that an encouraging word from US to key military commanders could trigger a coup or Col. Gary Prado's term a "substitution" of the current military leadership. We believe, however, that such an effort by us would be parlous. The outcome of a coup would be far from certain. Whatever the outcome, we would be exposed to legitimate charges of interventionism. If the coup were successful, we might find ourselves wedded to a regime which, while perhaps an improvement over the present one, would still be somewhat out of sync with our overall policies in Bolivia and the hemisphere. We would have assumed a substantial obligation to whomever we had encouraged to seize the leadership of this bankrupt country. We might also find ourselves distanced from major civilian political elements. It would be one thing to acquiesce gracefully to a more moderate military regime which showed clear signs of taking positive action on the principal substantive issues of concern to us. It would be quite another to find ourselves committed to a regime whose behavior is highly unpredictable. We believe on balance therefore that, rather than taking any action here which might influence events more directly, we should continue our diplomatic pressure here and in other capitals, try to remain within a broad international consensus and keep our heads down in La Paz.

12. We suggest that the Department (together with us) begin to formulate contingency measures to be taken if the current regime should fall. We suggest, for instance, that our initial response to any military regime which supplants Garcia Meza's should be very cautious but should reemphasize our interest in effective action on human rights, narcotics and a return to democracy. Any statements should come from Washington, although the Embassy could be authorized to make inconspicuous demarches to appropriate officials to reinforce our positions. Any decisions to renew economic, narcotics or military assistance programs, we believe, should be delayed until we have a sound basis to believe such assistance would be effective as well as politically desirable.

13. We would welcome a critical review of our policy recommendations (both in current conditions and in the event there should be a change of regime) and of our responses to date to overtures from

various Bolivian political interests.⁵ Department may wish to pass this message to Deputy Assistant Secretary Eaton and Ambassador Weissman for their review.

Watson

⁵ For the NSC and Departmental response to this cable, see Documents 160 and 161.

**160. Memorandum From the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Staff Director for NSC Interdepartmental Groups (Einaudi)
to Multiple Recipients¹**

Washington, October 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Report on September 23 IG Meeting on Bolivia

On September 23 ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John A. Bushnell chaired a meeting of the ARA/NSC-IG to discuss the previously distributed policy paper on Bolivia (attached).²

In considering the recommendation contained in the policy paper, the IG agreed to

—Adopt the Short-Term Game Plan (V-A) for what remains of 1980.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia, 1-10/80. Secret. Drafted by Swigert on October 2; cleared by Hart (ARA/AND), Morley (ARA/PPC), Eaton, Bushnell, Graham (HA), and in draft by Wolf. Swigert initialed for all clearing officials except for Bushnell. The memorandum was distributed to ARA, S/P, HA, EB, INR, P, PM, INM, the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Treasury, AID, CIA, ICA, the NSC, OMB, IDCA, DA, IBRD, IDB, and the JCS. In an October 8 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor forwarded this report and wrote: “the interagency group confirmed our short-term game plan, which involves the minimum of contact and recognition to the Bolivian government until it meets our basic concerns in the areas of human rights, democratization and narcotics control.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Bolivia)

² See Document 161.

—Monitor closely the situation in Bolivia. In the absence of any change in Bolivia's policies or political personalities, meet again before the end of 1980 to review our Bolivian policy.³

Short-Term Game Plan

The IG confirmed our present policy and accepted short-to-medium term goals of: minimizing human rights abuses; greater cooperation on narcotics matters; reinstatement of the democratic process; and constructive—not destructive—economic programs, supportive of Bolivia's return to democracy. The IG also endorsed for the rest of 1980 a short-term strategy to isolate the regime, diplomatically and politically, to promote moderation and to exert economic pressures on Bolivia.

With respect to the international development banks, it was agreed to insist on full compliance with loan conditions of projects and programs which already have been agreed upon and to oppose any applications for new loans. With respect to the IMF, it was agreed to urge the IMF staff informally to be strict in enforcing the current standby. No decision was made in regard to future IMF arrangements.

Future Policy

The IG agreed that either consolidation of the present regime or a major change in Bolivian policies—not simply a change of personalities—would require a reassessment of the approved short-term game plan, and therefore decided to meet before the end of 1980 to consider again our policy towards Bolivia.

Action Items

In addition, the IG agreed to the following measures not specified in the policy paper:

1) Make an immediate approach to the other Andean Pact nations to have Bolivia placed on the agenda for the upcoming OAS General Assembly—ACTION: State/ARA

2) Develop better information on human rights abuses in Bolivia (e.g. produce hard figures on numbers of political prisoners)—ACTION: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] State

3) Review the level of staffing at the Embassy in La Paz in the next month, considering security conditions at post, policy objectives, agency needs and likelihood of meeting them—ACTION: State/ARA

³ No evidence of another IG meeting before the end of 1980 was found. In telegram 279070 to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, October 19, the Department summarized the IG meeting and its conclusions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800499-0864) In telegram 8674 from La Paz, October 24, the Embassy responded to the policy review by noting, "We believe the policy is right on target." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800508-0478)

- 4) Prepare informal guidelines to assist in any future assessment of GOB performance—ACTION: State
(Human Rights—HA)
(Narcotics—INM)
(Democratic Process—ARA)
(Constructive Economic Programs—EB)
-

161. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, Undated

POLICY PAPER ON BOLIVIA

I. *THE ISSUE:*

What policy should the USG pursue, in the current situation in Bolivia?

II. *THE BOLIVIA SITUATION:*

The military regime presently has effective control over the entire country. Passive disaffection continues, and several reports indicate that plotting to replace Garcia Meza and his collaborators with less tainted elements is on the rise, but there is no open resistance of any significance from any sector. Even if a palace coup does replace Garcia Meza, Bolivia will likely have a military government for some time. Attempts by Hernan Siles Suazo to establish a clandestine opposition government in Bolivia are unlikely to succeed.

An unprecedented level of brutality sets this coup apart from the numerous Bolivian coups of the past 30 years, as do the regime's close ties to narcotics traffickers. Having violated the human rights of so many, the regime, and indeed most elements of the armed forces, will be reluctant to relax the repression.

III. *U.S. RESPONSE TO DATE:*

We have strongly condemned this further interruption of the democratic process. Ambassador Weissman was called home immediately for consultations and remains away from his post. The Embassy staff

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 2, Bolivia, 1-10/80. Attachment to Document 160. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.

at La Paz has been reduced from 116 to 70 people and all military and much development assistance is being terminated. No new assistance is being provided, and we are limiting our contacts with the regime to administrative and consular matters. Reports showing the present government's intimate connection with the international drug traffic have been released on the Hill and contributed to intense press, Congressional and international interest in this aspect of the junta.

In the OAS we helped pass a resolution deploring the military overthrow, and we have joined the Nicaraguans and others in exploring whether an OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers should be called to consider the Bolivian case. We will oppose loans to Bolivia in international financial institutions.

Through a series of demarches in various capitals, we have pressed other countries not to resume normal relations with the GOB under existing circumstances. The responses have been encouraging. Thus far, only 13 countries (including none of the industrialized democracies) have issued statements indicating a desire to resume full diplomatic contacts with Bolivia.

IV. *OPTIONS:*

- A. Accept the coup—deal with the GOB on policy level.
- B. Distance ourselves—continue our course of the past two months.
- C. Destabilize the Garcia Meza regime—respond to overtures of dissident groups and provide them with material support.

V. *RECOMMENDATION:*

In the absence of any major change in the policies (and presumably personalities) of the present regime, we should maintain our suspension of security assistance and curtailment of development aid, further reduce the size of the Embassy at La Paz and avoid policy level contacts with the GOB at least until after the industrialized democracies and other Andean Pact members have resumed normal relations with the regime.

A. *THE SHORT TERM GAME PLAN*

Our basic short-to-medium term objective is to change the direction of the GOB towards fewer human rights abuses (including safe conduct out of Bolivia for former President Gueiler and asylees in various diplomatic missions), reduced venality and involvement with the drug trade, full implementation of programs to restore economic vitality and an eventual return to democracy.

We can seek to maintain diplomatic, public opinion and economic pressures on the GOB, attempt to persuade the Argentine and Brazilian Governments to use their influence for improvements in Bolivia and

remain flexible to respond to positive changes in the situation. Specifically:

1. Keep the Regime Isolated

We are supporting the convocation of a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to address in the OAS the human rights abuses and the interruption of the democratic process, provided at least 18 votes for a meaningful resolution are assured. (There are now 17.) We will continue to contribute to publicity on the abuses being committed by the regime, as well as its close links to narcotics traffickers. We will continue our discussions with the industrialized democracies and the Andean Pact members in order to ensure there is no breaking of ranks.

2. Influence the Regime Towards Moderation

We are trying to persuade Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia's most influential neighbors, to use their influence positively. Release of drug-related reports is a significant part of this endeavor.

3. Exert Economic Pressures

At this point only Argentina seems prepared to help a financially troubled Bolivia. Even its aid may be conditioned upon some improvements such as reduction of the drug connection and sounder economic policies. We will not support pending application for new loans to Bolivia in international development banks.

B. FUTURE OPTIONS

Even if Latin American and European democracies regularize their relations in the absence of major improvements in Bolivia, we should be among the last in changing our willingness to deal at a policy level with Bolivian officials.

Should there be major improvements in the Bolivian regime personalities and/or policies (as evidenced by a crackdown on the narcotics trade, a reduction of human rights abuses and more positive economic and political programs) we can then consider carefully whether these merit the resumption of more normal relations and a reinstatement of some aid programs. The widespread domestic and international support our present policy enjoys and the absence of major pressures to accommodate to the Garcia Meza regime permit us to move deliberately in this case.

Brazil

162. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP-M-77-10022

Washington, February 11, 1977

SUBJECT

Worsening Brazil-US Relations

US criticisms of the Brazil–West German nuclear accord are producing an extremely hostile reaction in Brazil’s highest policy circles and could result in long-term damages to US–Brazilian relations.²

Within the past few weeks the “special relationship” proclaimed by Secretary Kissinger a year ago³ has deteriorated to the point where military and government leaders speak dramatically of an “undeclared war” and threaten a critical review of all official relations with the US. Such rhetorical outbursts could be translated into strong retaliatory measures; they have already begun to strain the close diplomatic ties that made Brazil the US’s strongest and most important ally in Latin America for most of the 20th century.

The rapid escalation of a difference in views over nuclear proliferation into a major diplomatic dispute is in large measure attributable to a basic conflict in aims and perceptions. It is clear that Brazil sees US efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons technology as a deliberate attempt to impede the country’s economic and technological development. This reaction is not simply a manifestation of nationalistic paranoia. Rather, Brazil sees atomic energy as a supplement to increasingly costly hydroelectric power during the 1980s and beyond, and as means of eventually reducing the dependency on imported fossil fuels.

These fuels currently constitute the most serious drain on the nation’s financial resources. Oil imports provide 40 percent of the country’s energy requirements and last year cost approximately \$3.5 billion in foreign exchange.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 12. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Drafted in the Directorate of Intelligence by the Latin American Division of ORPA; coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Scientific Intelligence [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 397 and 400.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1973–1976*, Volume E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976, Documents 123 and 128.

Ambitions for world prestige also play a role. Brazilian military leaders firmly believe that a sine qua non of great power status is the ability to explode a nuclear device.

Despite the fact that Brazil is one of the strongest and most moderate of the so-called less developed nations, it still seeks major concessions from the industrial powers. This frequently leads its leaders to adopt aggressive and uncompromising positions. As one knowledgeable observer has noted, "The intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policy makers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to Brazil's most basic interests."

Brazil still looks to the US for military defense in the hemisphere, and for economic investment, but its rapidly expanding economy has enabled it to establish close ties with other powerful nations, thus reducing US leverage. Over the past decade the US has lost ground in trade as Brazil has expanded its exports and imports to all corners of the globe.

The US still leads other foreign investors by a wide margin, but West Germany and Japan are moving up quickly. US investment there—which doubled between 1969–1974—now is approximately \$2.4 billion. West European investments already exceed those from the US, and are growing at a more rapid rate. Moreover, Japanese holdings since 1969 have increased eight-fold. Agreements signed during President Geisel's visit to Tokyo last summer will probably add \$700 million to the current \$841 million value of Japan's direct investment over the next decade.

Washington is clearly no longer as vital to Brazil as it once was and its influence will probably decline further in the coming years. It is becoming increasingly obvious that Brazil is willing to take economic risks in its relations with the US on the nuclear issue.

Brazilian intransigence is being reinforced by domestic political developments. President Geisel is clearly benefiting politically from his refusal to consider revisions in the Brazilian—West German nuclear accord or to delay its implementation. Under the agreement, West Germany will sell Brazil plans for uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. The support Geisel is receiving from military leaders and politicians in both political parties is apparently stiffening his resolve to persist in his hard-line approach.

Until a few weeks ago, opposition to Geisel appeared to be growing. One of Brazil's leading newspapers strongly attacked his year-end address to the nation for its failure to admit responsibility for current economic problems. In mid-January, a presidential decision to add a surcharge to the price of gasoline sparked more public criticism and threats of major strikes by bus and taxi drivers in Sao Paulo.

These problems are not resolved, but they have been overshadowed by the present nuclear imbroglio.

Brazilians view US pressure on the nuclear issue as an insult and have rallied behind Geisel's decision. Pro-government sentiment is so strong that widely circulating reports that the administration will not permit direct elections for state governors in 1978, and that Geisel intends to reorganize the party structure next month—issues that normally would have produced strong outcries—have provoked little public comment. Both rumors, however, are causing extreme uneasiness among the political opposition.

In the past, the Brazilian government has rarely used foreign policy issues to rally domestic support; it has preferred to tie diplomatic relations closely to national economic objectives. Brazil regards nuclear development, however, as essential to continued technological and economic progress. For this reason it is increasing its pressure on Bonn to fulfill the terms of the agreement. Brasilia has strongly intimated that if the Germans renege on the provisions for reprocessing, it will look elsewhere to purchase the eight nuclear reactors—currently worth \$4–5 billion—that will provide jobs for thousands of West German technicians.

The fact that Geisel has stated his position publicly makes any compromise politically difficult, especially since his stand met with a favorable response in Brazil. We believe that if the nuclear controversy is prolonged and Geisel does not shift his position, his popularity could increase to the point where he would exercise more control over the choice of his successor than have any of his predecessors. Geisel's term ends in 1979. It is also reinforcing the concept that Brazil needs a military president at a time when the regime is searching for new ways to postpone the return to civilian rule.

[Omitted here is the distribution list.]

163. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, March 5, 1977, 1650Z

1736. Subject: Brazilian Government Refuses Security Assistance in Reaction to Human Rights Report. Refs: (A) State 38407² (Notal) (B) State 46674³ (Notal).

1. At request of Brazilians, I met this morning at 0930 with Foreign Ministry Secretary General Guerreiro, who was accompanied by the Chief of the Americas Department (Araujo). Indicative of the urgency not to say drama of the meeting, from the GOB's point of view, were facts that it was held on Saturday, a sacred leisure day for foreign ministry, and that chief of the ministry's North American division called the political counselor⁴ at home at 2:30 a.m. to set up the meeting.

2. At the meeting, Guerreiro gave me a first-person note, informal translation of which follows: Begin translation of note: Mr. Ambassador: The Brazilian Government guides its international conduct by rigorous and unvarying adherence to the cardinal principles of international law, an outstanding one of them being that of non-intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another.

The Brazilian Government learned today that the American Executive Branch submitted to the US Congress a program of military assistance ("security assistance") in which Brazil is considered. Such assistance requires, meanwhile, that organs of the American Government undertake a critical evaluation of the Brazilian internal situation, which would run counter to the above cited principles.

In consequence, I inform your excellency that, fully aware of its duties and responsibilities, the Brazilian Government refuses beforehand any assistance in the military field that depends, directly or

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770076-1263. Confidential; Niac Immediate; Limdis. Sent for information to the Consulates in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and the Chairman of the US Delegation to the JBUSMC in Rio de Janeiro.

² In telegram 38407 to all diplomatic posts, February 19, the Department summarized the types of human rights reporting to Congress that were required under current security assistance legislation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060-0446)

³ In telegram 46674 to all diplomatic posts, March 3, the Department reported that "an advance set" of nearly 80 unclassified human rights reports would be sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance in preparation for testimony by Christopher on March 7, and noted that posts "may at their discretion bring them to the attention of host governments." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770072-0542)

⁴ David E. Simcox.

indirectly, on a prior examination by organs of a foreign government of matters that, by their nature, are the exclusive competence of the Brazilian Government.

Acting in this way, Brazil remains faithful to its historical tradition, to the commitments solemnly undertaken in the UN charter and the charter of the OAS, and firm in the conviction that it is strengthening an international order based on the equality of rights among states. (Complimentary close) signed: A. F. Azeredo Da Silveira. End informal translation of note.

3. Sequence of immediately earlier events leading up to this meeting and presentation of the note were as follows:

(A) On afternoon of March 4 Embassy received in pouch final version of human rights report on Brazil⁵ which was to be given to Brazilian Government in accordance with instructions with Ref B. Political counselor called at 1700 hours on chief of North American Division (Cardoso), who was accompanied by his assistant (Seixas Correa), and presented copies of human rights report. Political counselor orally explained prospective timing of release of reports in line with para 2 of Ref B, noting that US was providing advance copy as courtesy to Brazil. Pol Counselor also provided background on reporting requirement to which this report responds (Ref A) and left single-page informal talking points memorandum drawing on paras 1 through 3 of Ref A. Cardoso received reports and talking points without emotions, but with following questions:

(1) What would be exact date of publication? Pol Counselor replied that release could come any time on or after March 7, but Congress would decide.

(2) Would reports on all other security assistance countries also be released? Pol Counselor replied that it would be difficult to say conclusively all would be released without knowing intentions of Congress, though it was reasonable assumption most if not all would be released.

(3) Was report related to recent proposal of \$50 million FMS credit for Brazil and would report be basis for Congress' decision. Pol Counselor affirmed that report was related to proposal but that it would be one of a number of factors that Congress would take into account in making its decision. Cardoso expressed his thanks and meeting ended.

⁵ Humphrey's subcommittee on Foreign Assistance released 82 reports on March 12. (Don Oberdorfer, "State Dept. Lists Rights Conditions in 82 Countries," *Washington Post*, March 13, 1977, p. A-1, and Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Says Most Lands Receiving Arms Aid Are Abusing Rights," *New York Times*, March 13, 1977, p. A-1)

(B) Pol Counselor received call at home about 1915 same day from Cardoso requesting that he come immediately to the Ministry. At brief meeting which ensued Cardoso returned both copies of human rights report and accompanying talking points memo with following oral statement: "On higher instructions, I am returning to you your memorandum, which cannot be accepted because it constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of Brazil." Pol Counselor asked what aspects of documents they had found unacceptable, to which Cardoso replied "all of it." Pol Counselor accepted returned documents but pointed out that the question of acceptance or rejection of these documents would not seem to arise in the present case, since report was internal document of the US government, a courtesy copy of which was given to the Brazilian Government only for its information. He noted that it was not comparable to a formal communication between the two governments calling on Brazil for some action. Cardoso said only that he had his instructions and meeting ended.

(C) Cardoso again called Pol Counselor at 0230 March 5 to say that Secretary General Guerreiro would be in his office at 0900 and would like to meet with Ambassador Crimmins at this time.

4. In my meeting with Guerreiro this morning, after receiving note, I said that I would accept the note with the reservation and clarification that the US and many other governments considered that concern among nations for human rights was not a question under international law, of interference in internal affairs and that, in light of the universal human rights declaration and other similar instruments, human rights concerns transcended natural boundaries. Guerreiro replied that Brazil was committed to observe its treaty obligations in this field, but the universal declaration was not a treaty but a resolution. He said that the Brazilian position was expounded in the note. To my question whether his statement meant that Brazil did not consider itself bound by the Universal Declaration and other human rights acts that it had signed, Guerreiro replied that of course it did.

5. I went on to say that I wanted to keep the record straight, an apparent necessity in view of some recent distortions. I said I wanted to be sure he understood the nature of the human rights report documents. I reiterated that it was a report (a) prepared in response to a Congressional requirement; (b) was required for all 80 countries that receive security assistance; (c) as such it would be an element in Congress' judgment, but this did not necessarily imply Congressional action because of it; (d) it was an internal working document of the US government given to the Brazilian government as a courtesy; and (e) the Executive Branch submits proposals for levels of military assistance to Congress and Congress acts on those proposals. Congress bases its decision on any number of factors, including the human rights situation.

6. Guerreiro noted specifically that the Brazilian note he had given me was not a classified document and suggested that it would be made public. I responded, with a smile, that even if it were classified, I suspected it would be published one way or another. (It has now been released)

7. Picking this up and suggesting a US breach of confidentiality, Secretary General referred to Secretary Vance's use of the word "alternatives" in his March 4 press conference alluding to the recent USG-GOB nuclear talks.⁶ I noted that Secretary's statements followed the leaks of confidential information about the Deputy Secretary's conversations here⁷ in *Jornal Do Brasil* on March 3. Guerreiro stated that the *Jornal Do Brasil* article was "unfortunate;" that he could not understand how *Jornal* got the information; and that he could not imagine that a Brazilian participant would have been involved.

8. My exchanges with Guerreiro throughout meeting were firm but entirely polite.

Crimmins

⁶ For the text of Vance's March 4 press conference, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1977, pp. 277-283.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 404.

164. Letter From President Carter to Brazilian President Geisel¹

Washington, March 25, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I was glad to get your letter of March 9.² I think it is a good sign that, so early in my term in office, we have begun a frank exchange on important issues. I am sure that we can expand this exchange as other questions arise which require our attention.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1-8/77. No classification marking.

² A translation of this letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1-8/77.

Several years ago, after my visit to Brazil,³ I brought back a vivid impression of your country's dynamism, and its determination to make the most of its vast potential. Since that time I have been convinced that our two nations must maintain a close and cooperative relationship—one based on mutual respect and mutual recognition of the important role each of us must play in an interdependent world.

The frank talks that Deputy Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Silveira had on March 1 were, I believe, another helpful step in our relationship.⁴ They identified the concerns that both our nations share, and they clarified the areas where we differ on nonproliferation issues.

We recognize how important these questions are for Brazil. The proposals we have made to your Government represent our serious and sincere effort to take into account your need for expanded and secure energy resources. They also represent an attempt to help develop a new global framework that will preserve the distinction between peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of the atom. I know that you share this goal, and I hope that our temporary differences will not prevent you from joining us to find mutually acceptable solutions.

The interests which link us are already substantial, and every day we discover new areas where we must work together for our mutual benefit. We have had disagreements in the past, and we will have them again. But I am confident that we can deal successfully with our differences and leave our basic relationship as firm and healthy as it is today.⁵

With that goal in mind, I will continue to follow closely the significant issues which concern both our countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ Carter visited Brazil in April 1972. (Bourne, *Jimmy Carter*, p. 239)

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 163.

⁵ [*Less than 1 line not declassified*] as a result of Carter's letter "key officials of the Brazilian government, including Geisel, believe the U.S. is sincerely interested in serious dialogue and a joint examination of problems which are causing irritation between the two countries." Additionally, "[*less than 1 line not declassified*], as a result of the letter, Brazil will seek ways to improve the dialogue with the U.S." ([*document number not declassified*]); Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 3, Brazil, 4-5/77)

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State and the White House¹

Brasilia, June 10, 1977, 1300Z

4709. Subject: Report of Conversation Between Mrs. Carter and President Geisel. Following sent Bogata June 9: Following is report, cleared by Mrs. Carter in Bogata, of Mrs. Carter's June 7 conversation with President Geisel.

Quote

Brasilia 4709.

1. Summary: During a 70-minute conversation on the morning of June 7, with which President Geisel said he was greatly pleased, and extensive exchanges at dinner that evening, Mrs. Carter explained the basic foreign policy concepts of the Carter Administration. The morning session was devoted principally to a discussion of human rights and economic and social development; the talk in the evening, to nuclear proliferation. Mrs. Carter stated that the primary purpose of her visit was to present first-hand President Carter's views and concerns and to hear and carry back to him Geisel's thoughts and opinions. On human rights, Mrs. Carter, recognizing President Geisel's own efforts and Brazil's stature in the world (she had earlier confirmed that we considered the MOU in force),² inquired whether Brazil could sign and ratify the American convention on human rights. Geisel, who had stated that his and President Carter's views on the importance of human rights coincided but had expressed skepticism about the pace of achievement as long as economic and social inequalities continued, replied negatively on the Costa Rican convention.³ He emphasized particularly that Brazil could not accept the infringement of sovereignty that the authority of the international tribunal provided for in the convention implied. Geisel volunteered that he differed with President Carter's statement that communism was a waning threat, asserting that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770207-0971. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

² The 1976 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Brazil that set up semi-annual consultative meetings is discussed in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Document 125. In telegram 126838 to Brasilia, June 2, the Department confirmed that Vance had informed Silveira that the United States considered the MOU to remain in effect, although they "should have realistic understanding of probable difficulties in scheduling meetings on rigid 'semi-annual' basis." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770195-1210) See Document 14.

³ The American Convention on Human Rights, signed in San Jose, Costa Rica, was sometimes referred to as the Costa Rican Convention.

the economic and social weaknesses of countries like Brazil made them vulnerable to infiltration and interference. Mrs. Carter explained the real purpose of President Carter's references. On nuclear proliferation, Geisel maintained the GOB position against using the waiver provision of Tlateloloco to permit full entry into force of the treaty for Brazil, but said he would give more thought to the matter. On the NPT, Geisel stood on the standard Brazilian arguments against adherence. Geisel reiterated that the GOB would not acquire nuclear weapons, and Mrs. Carter pointed out that the world was faced with decisions in this field that would shape the future, which was full of uncertainties. End summary.

2. Accompanied by Ambassador Crimmins, Mrs. Carter met with President Geisel, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Silveira, for 70 minutes (60 of which were devoted to substantive matters).

3. Exchange of courtesies: After delivering President Carter's letter to Geisel⁴ and her own letter of condolence on the death of his sister-in-law, Mrs. Carter thanked the President for making time available to receive her. She went on to say that the fact that her husband had corresponded more with President Geisel than perhaps with any other President demonstrated how much he valued the exchange and the relationship. Geisel expressed his thanks for both letters. He made no substantive comment on President Carter's letter. He said that, despite the death in the family and "other circumstances", he had wanted to receive and honor Mrs. Carter not only officially as the wife and representative of the American President but also personally as a charming woman.

4. Mrs. Carter's presentation: Mrs. Carter stated that in her enjoyable and useful meeting with Silveira,⁵ she had explained, as essential points of President Carter's foreign policy approach, his deep commitment to human rights, his recognition that the concerns and needs of developing countries have to be taken into account, and his conviction that U.S. foreign policy had to represent the best of the American people and had to have a moral base in order to move towards a better world. The President, she said, recognized that the HR commitment might create difficulties in the short run but in a long-term sense it

⁴ Not found. In an undated action memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski stated that Mrs. Carter would deliver a message to Geisel "which will allude to our intention to send a future letter suggesting a new approach on the nuclear issue." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1-8/77)

⁵ In telegram 4682 from Brasilia, June 8, the Embassy reported on Mrs. Carter's meeting with Silveira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770205-0025) See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 415.

would serve the interests of the entire world. The Carter administration is certainly not looking for adversary relationships, but we believe all countries basically share our ideals. For example, she observed, President Carter knew and appreciated the interest and efforts of Geisel in the human rights field. We recognize, she said, that of course no country is perfect in this respect and in the U.S. we have much still to do.

5. Referring again to her meeting with Silveira, Mrs. Carter noted that she had cited her husband's concerns about disarmament and the proliferation of nuclear explosive capability, the latter involving an effort to resolve the dilemma between energy needs and the risks of proliferation. The President's concerns, she pointed out, extended beyond the reduction of proliferation dangers to the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons. Concerning conventional weapons, Mrs. Carter pointed out that one of the first tasks her husband had turned to after taking office was a review of U.S. policy on arms sales, the results of which were announced very recently.⁶ The policy had three basic points: (a) annual reductions in the volume of arms sales; (b) a decision that the U.S. would not be the first to introduce new weapons systems in regions where they were not already present; and (c) consultation and cooperation with arms producers and arms consumers to obtain international agreement on restricting the sales of arms.

6. Mrs. Carter went on to say that her husband was taking a special interest in global policies in relation to the western hemisphere, an interest that was manifested in his OAS speech⁷ in which he had laid out three principles: (a) a commitment to human rights; (b) absolute respect for the individuality and sovereignty of every nation, and (c) cooperation in closing the gap between LDC's and DC's, to which end the President intended to work very closely with the governments of the countries of Latin America.

7. Mrs. Carter stated that her husband believed that we have reached a critical point in international relations in that the institutions constructed immediately after World War II are no longer adequate to deal with new problems and the concerns of the new nations that have emerged since the post-war period. She commented that those institutions had become so confining that we have not been aware of the great changes that have taken place in the last decade. In this respect, she referred to the emergence of new, strong countries like Indonesia, Iran, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil who are rightfully

⁶ Carter announced the administration's policy on conventional arms transfers on May 19. See footnote 1, Document 271 in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

⁷ April 14. Printed as Document 33 in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

demanding a voice and active participation in world affairs. We recognize, she went on, this demand and we hope that Brazil will continue to use its great influence to help re-shape the world so that it will be better and more just.

8. Summarizing the foreign policies of the Carter Administration, Mrs. Carter said that the President wanted to (a) develop wider and more flexible positions; (b) to assure that policy was more open and humane; and (c) to consult closely with the governments of Latin America and to adjust U.S. global policies to the needs and interests of those countries. Mrs. Carter said that her visit had as its essential purpose to make known at first hand to President Geisel our concerns and our policies and to learn his views and the policies and concerns that motivated Brazil. She explained that, because Brazil is such an important leader in the hemisphere and there is so much that Brazil and the U.S. share, Secretary Vance had informed Silveira that the memorandum of understanding was still in effect. She also expressed the hope that the energy and trade sub-groups would soon be able to meet. Noting finally Secretary Vance's plans to come to Brazil,⁸ she invited President Geisel to comment on her presentation.

9. Comments by President Geisel: President Geisel stated that Mrs. Carter's exposition had been complete and clear and that he had been pleased to hear it. He said that the first observation he wanted to make was that he and almost all Brazilians recognize that Brazil and the United States have been traditional friends and that we must be careful to develop and foster this friendship in the present and in the future as we have in the past. Here in Brazil, he went on, there has never developed an anti-American campaign; even when we had differences, they have never been used as a pretext for anti-Americanism. On the contrary, friendship should be the basis of our relationship. Geisel commented that he had been struck by a reference in President Carter's OAS speech, and Mrs. Carter's repetition of it, that each country's individuality should be respected. In keeping with that principle, it was essential, he noted, to analyze and understand the reality of each country and not to be swayed by prejudgments and tendentious reports sometimes based on unreliable or prejudiced sources. Geisel said that Mrs. Carter's visit was important in that context because she would have an opportunity to learn first hand about Brazil.

10. Stating that he wished to turn to specific points in Mrs. Carter's presentation, President Geisel said that human rights was an issue of extraordinary importance. He stated that his views and those of the President and Mrs. Carter coincided, noting that Brazil was party to the

⁸ Vance traveled to Brazil on November 22 and 23, 1977.

international documents on human rights, including the UN Universal Declaration. The President went on to say, however, that it was not very probable, of course, that the problem of human rights could be fully and miraculously solved overnight inasmuch as there were complex factors involved. He explained that for poor countries like Brazil, progress in human rights implied progressive efforts. The GOB has strived to defend human rights by many means, such as basic advances in the economic and social fields. We have made great strides, he said, in the field of housing, food, education and health. Brazil is fighting against intrinsic difficulties, for example, a population growth rate of 2.7 percent a year which requires the provision of 2 million jobs per year. The right to employment, he noted, is a very basic human right. On the other hand, he pointed out, fifty percent of the Brazilian population is composed of young people who are consumers of resources, and not producers.

11. Geisel on the communist threat: Geisel then declared that these observations brought him to a point that Mrs. Carter had not mentioned but that had appeared in recent speeches by President Carter, the speech at Notre Dame specifically.⁹ Saying that he and President Carter differed on the point, he explained that the question involved the Soviet Union on the one hand and communism on the other. Specifically, he said that President Carter had maintained that the Soviet Union and/or communism were losing importance, and that they should no longer provoke a phobia, since the danger from them was lessening. President Geisel expressed the opinion that President Carter's view might be correct with respect to the United States, but he doubted that such a judgment could be generalized to other countries. Elaborating on this point, Geisel noted that because the United States had solid economic and social structures, it could be considered immune to subversion. Communist interference does not prosper in the US. On the other hand, he continued, in countries like Brazil, the economic and social structures are deficient and there are many areas that are subject to infiltration. Consequently, communist efforts to interfere encounter fertile soil, and a country like Brazil has to be alert, particularly since it had had painful experiences in the past. The Brazilian people, the President asserted, are not sympathetic to communism but social and economic weaknesses create vulnerabilities to communist subversion.

12. At this point, Mrs. Carter said that she thought President Geisel may have misunderstood the intent of President Carter's references. What the President had said, Mrs. Carter explained, was that in the

⁹ Carter gave the commencement address at the University of Notre Dame on May 22. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 954–962) It is printed as Document 40 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

past we had been so afraid of communism we had embraced any government, no matter what its nature, in the name of resistance to communism. Mrs. Carter noted that, although we have been able to relax tensions in the world, competition between US and communism certainly exists and will continue to exist. The threat is, of course, present. We have, however, a quiet confidence that history is on the side of political freedom and political democracy, as the near-elimination of colonialism indicates. We are convinced, she added, that the developed democracies are not free because they are economically and socially strong, but are economically and socially strong because they are free.

13. Geisel responded that Mrs. Carter's explanation was more or less the way he had interpreted the President's references. He remarked that Mrs. Carter was right with respect to the historical fear of communism in the United States since it was there that McCarthyism had developed and that anti-communism had taken on an exaggerated form, to the point that the United States had become the center of anti-communism. He said that the point of difference between us could be expressed in another way: the United States has to face and deal with the danger of Soviet imperialism as the leader of the West, whereas the problem of Brazil is different. Brazil is not capable of taking part in the issue of Soviet imperialism; Brazil has to deal with internal infiltration and faces the internal weaknesses that the U.S. does not confront.

14. Saying that she understood the point Geisel was advancing, Mrs. Carter referred to her awareness of President Geisel's desire for greater political liberalism. She said that it was in this context that she had made her earlier observation about the true basis of the strength of the developed democracies. She went on to state that she was very conscious of President Geisel's personal efforts with respect to human rights and added that President Carter appreciated the seriousness of those efforts.

15. Discussion of the American convention on human rights: Mrs. Carter introduced this subject by saying that she would like to share briefly with President Geisel some of the opinions expressed to her by other leaders with whom she had talked on her trip. She said that Prime Minister Manley had been very pleased by the broader formulation given American foreign policy by President Carter and its emphasis on human rights.¹⁰ Manley had told her that, at the upcoming meeting

¹⁰ An account of Mrs. Carter's conversation with Manley is in telegram 3616 from Quito, June 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770196-1042) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, Document 178, footnote 2.

of Caricom countries, he planned to advocate the signature by participating governments of the American convention on human rights. He hoped and expected that other governments would become signatories. President Oduber of Costa Rica had been very enthusiastic about promoting human rights on a broad multilateral basis.¹¹ The military governments of Ecuador and Peru, she observed, are both pledged to restore civilian government.¹² Both governments considered the position of President Carter on human rights as very important and their leaders had told her that they were prepared to sign and ratify the convention and to strengthen the inter-American Human Rights Commission. In short, she said, she believed on the basis of her and her husband's travels, that there was a new spirit in the world with respect to human rights.

16. Alluding to the recognition by both the developed and less developed countries of Brazil's stature as an emerging power, Mrs. Carter declared that Brazil had great influence and could play a very important role in global policy with respect to human rights. She noted that the commitment to the furtherance of human rights transcended national boundaries.

17. President Geisel commented that he was in basic agreement about the importance of the question and about the impulses in the world. He said that he was very skeptical, however, about achievements with respect to human rights as long as there were rich countries and poor countries. To achieve the ideal is going to be difficult, he said, but he personally wished with all his heart that the ideal could be attained.

18. Mrs. Carter stated that she knew that this was President Geisel's desire. She said it was in that spirit that she wished that Brazil would join with others in adhering to the Costa Rica convention. She pointed out that by doing so Brazil would give a signal to the whole world. If Brazil at the OAS meeting in Grenada were to indicate such an interest, it would show the world that we all want to work together. Referring to President Geisel's remarks on economic and social weaknesses, Mrs. Carter said that she and her husband totally agreed that it was essential to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor; the United States wanted to work closely with the countries of Latin America in the effort to do so. Returning to the question of the convention, Mrs. Carter repeated that if Brazil were able to sign it, a great signal would be

¹¹ An account of Rosalynn Carter's conversation with Oduber is in telegram 3606 from Quito, June 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770196-0337) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 330, footnote 3.

¹² See Document 268 and footnote 2, Document 302.

given. She then asked President Geisel whether he believed that his government could sign and ratify the convention.

19. In reply, Geisel stated that he wanted to emphasize that what he was about to say was the present view of the GOB. He noted that Brazil was party to the UN instruments on human rights; Brazil was a member of the UN Human Rights Commission; and Brazil had supported the inter-American Human Rights Commission. Brazil had objections to the Costa Rican convention, he declared, the primary one being the jurisdiction given in the convention to the court of justice. He said that Brazilian sovereignty does not permit Brazil to submit to the judgments of such a court; it was a question of sovereignty, he emphasized. He continued that Brazil could not and should not subordinate itself to an exclusively Latin American framework inasmuch as human rights were not a Latin American problem but a universal problem; human rights was a matter for the UN as a whole. He summed up by saying that Brazil did not see the Costa Rican convention as a solution. He expressed regret for having to disagree with Mrs. Carter but said he had wanted to be frank and clear.

20. Mrs. Carter responded that she and her husband very well knew that human rights were a world problem, but action within the Inter-American system could constitute a model for the world.

21. President Geisel said that he wanted to recall the fact that Brazil was an extremely open society and one respectful of human rights. He cited specifically the harmonious and conflict-free relationships in Brazil of persons of many races and ethnic origins. He observed that the makeup of the Brazilian society was the best evidence of respect for human rights. He referred to longstanding Brazilian laws against racial discrimination and prejudice, laws which demonstrated the Brazilian respect for the principles of freedom. He said that these facts should be taken into consideration.

22. Closing exchanges: Noting the points that President Geisel had just made, Mrs. Carter stated that time had run out and that she regretted very much that she had not been able to cover some important points that she had intended to make. President Geisel agreed, saying that obviously the conversation could go on for additional hours. He suggested that Mrs. Carter and he continue their talk at dinner that evening. Mrs. Carter then mentioned specifically that she had wanted to address nuclear proliferation.

23. In taking his leave of Mrs. Carter, President Geisel told her that he had been greatly pleased by the conversation. He said that the talk had indicated that it was on certain aspects and details of issues that there were differences, but that deep down and basically, Brazil and the United States were in agreement, he believed. He added that he looked forward to continuing the conversation that evening about

nuclear proliferation. Mrs. Carter thanked President Geisel for the opportunity to have the exchange of views. She said that she thought it was very important that a personal relationship had been established. She assured President Geisel that she would take back to her husband a full report of his views. Geisel then said that he wanted to repeat a point he had made earlier: the basis for a reciprocally harmonious relationship was in mutual knowledge, and it was for that reason that Mrs. Carter's trip was so important.

24. Nuclear proliferation: At dinner on the evening of June 7, Mrs. Carter and President Geisel discussed the nuclear proliferation question, including the possibility of a waiver by the GOB of the conditions of the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Brazilian adherence to the NPT. On Tlatelolco, Mrs. Carter advanced the points she had made to FonMin Silveira the day before. Geisel maintained the position taken by his Foreign Minister. He did indicate to Mrs. Carter, however, that he would give further thought to the question of a Brazilian waiver.

25. On the NPT, Geisel stated that Brazil had long maintained and continued to maintain that the treaty was unbalanced, unfair to the non-nuclear countries, and discriminatory. He said that it would have to be amended before Brazil would consider adherence. To Mrs. Carter's suggestion that he might want to talk to an expert on the treaty, Geisel said that he was always ready to talk. Mrs. Carter mentioned that she understood that the major suppliers of nuclear fuel were holding meetings to determine new rules to govern procession of fuel, and she thought membership in the NPT on the part of consumers would be one important factor. Mrs. Carter told Geisel of her very recent trip with President Carter and Admiral Rickover on a new submarine powered by a reactor fueled by thorium, a type of reactor which, she said, would diminish the proliferation risk. President Geisel expressed keen interest in the reactor, explaining that Brazil had huge amounts of thorium.

26. At one point, Geisel asserted that the US was trying to withhold nuclear energy from Brazil. Mrs. Carter replied that this was not at all the case, that the US recognized Brazil's energy needs, and that our concern was not with power reactors but with the sensitive facilities that incurred the proliferation risk.

27. In the course of the conversation, President Geisel also reiterated that Brazil, as a very pacific country, had no intention of making nuclear weapons. Mrs. Carter responded that she understood that. She pointed out that President Carter believed that, as the Chief of State of the world's most powerful nation, he was obliged to look responsibly to the distant future and that the proliferation issue did not involve only the intentions of existing governments but also the unpredictability of future political developments. It was for this reason, Mrs. Carter

pointed out, that the countries of the world, facing right now decisions that could determine the future, had to be so careful in their actions that could increase the risks of proliferation.

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166. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Grenada, June 15, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Mr. Habib
Ambassador Todman
Ambassador McGee
Assistant Secretary Carter
Stephen H. Rogers, ARA/ECP (notetaker)

BRAZIL

Foreign Minister Silveira
Ambassador Cavalcanti
Minister Medeiros
Counselor Nogueira

SUBJECTS

Students' letter given to Mrs. Carter; Secretary's visit to Brazil; U.S.-Brazilian memorandum of understanding; Cuba; Treaty on illicit payments; Law of the Sea; Human rights; "Ambiguity" in U.S. Policies

Students' Letter. Foreign Minister Silveira said the problem with the letter given to Mrs. Carter in Brazil² was that it was unsigned, but he denied that he had suspected it was written by Americans. Ambassador Todman said it was a worldwide phenomenon that people who wanted to make a point on human rights looked to the US.

Vance Visit. The Secretary proposed he visit Brazil in the last two weeks of October, following the UN General Assembly. Silveira agreed. The Secretary said we would confirm it. The Foreign Minister said his

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS Meeting June 14–17, 1977 Grenada. Confidential. Drafted on June 29 by Rogers; approved by Twaddell on July 11.

² In telegram 4680 from Brasilia, June 8, the Embassy reported: "During Mrs. Carter's call at Embassy June 6, a student handed Ambassador Todman an 'open letter' for Mrs. Carter from striking students at University of Brasilia, describing their situation and general plight of human rights in Brazil." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204-1019)

mentioning July or August publicly was not an attempt to force a date but rather reflected his understanding of what the Secretary had said.

Memorandum of Understanding. The Secretary said he would write formally to confirm that the MOU remains in force. He agreed with Silveira that he was the one who raised the question, not the Brazilians. Silveira said the MOU was important as a method of carrying things out but did not prejudge anything. The Secretary proposed that the trade sub-group get together early, which Silveira agreed to.

Silveira raised the question of the meetings of policy planning officials. He and the Secretary agreed that it would be useful to hold such a meeting. Silveira referred to previous exchanges of papers, for example on African topics. The exchanges did not involve governments taking firm positions, and they were more valuable for that. He noted the Brazilian practice of making principal policy decisions known to the US and others and commented that the US had been doing that concerning Cuba.

Cuba. Silveira said he understood the US approach to Cuba and had nothing against it. Brazil, however, has abstained on Cuba. It could not be in favor but if it opposed others would hide behind Brazil. Brazil had to consider the small countries that were afraid of Cuba, with some justification. Cuba is giving financial support even in the less populated areas of northern Venezuela. There was no such Cuban activity in Brazil, however.

The Secretary referred to the 10 US prisoners Cuba had just released. Silveira discussed his familiarity with Cuba based on duty there in 1945–49. He said conditions were not as bad then as has been painted. He thought many, especially in Central America, that voted in favor of Cuba (presumably in the OAS in 1975) would not do so now because of their concern about what Cuba would do with the troops now in Angola.

Illicit Payments. The Secretary noted the proposal had received strong support at the Summit Meeting and said he hoped ECOSOC would decide in favor of it. Silveira said the Brazilian position was only that we must have a balanced position toward those that are corrupted and those that corrupt. At the Secretary's urging, it was agreed that the two delegations would work together on this subject.

Law of the Sea. Secretary Vance proposed that the US and Brazilian representatives to the negotiations consult. Silveira said Brazil felt the seabed problem³ could not be solved without a resolution also of the

³ A reference to provisions for mining in the international seabed, which were then being negotiated at the 6th Session of the 3rd UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. See the chapter on the Law of the Sea in *Foreign Relations, 1977–80*, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues, which is scheduled for publication.

other problems. Brazil had originally thought the issue should be treated separately, but now it was too late.

Secretary Vance said if we did not solve the problem internationally Congress would authorize US private enterprise to begin operations. The critical point was now. It would be sad to see the good work of previous LOS sessions lost.

The Secretary proposed again that Amb. Richardson and the Brazilian delegate consult in New York. Silveira did not object.

Silveira noted the Brazilian desire for technology for deepsea exploitation. Under Secretary Habib said the US was willing to share its technology. But if the developing countries did not take advantage of the offer the US would go ahead.

The Secretary noted that intelligence had shown the Soviets were preparing to move into deepsea operations; Habib noted the Soviets would not be generous with their technology. Silveira acknowledged that Brazil had no choice but to get along with the United States. He said he always trusted Americans because, though they may say “no” now, they change their minds. He used IDB creation and the 200-mile limit as examples. The Secretary agreed that we change our minds when we are wrong.

Human Rights. The Secretary asked where the Foreign Minister saw the meeting coming out on the human rights question. Silveira said Brazil supported the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as it is and asked what the US was proposing. The Secretary said we wanted to strengthen it and increase its funding. Silveira replied that we would have no organization at all if we kept giving additional funds to each specialized section of the organization. The Secretary insisted that to do its work properly the IAHRC needed more staff.

Silveira said we needed to make the Commission more serious. Pressed by Ambassador Todman, he said it is becoming more serious but it should be very selective about its sources of information. They should be neutral. If that could be done, Brazil would support it. But he was doubtful that that was possible at this time. One Commission source is Amnesty International, which everyone is afraid to attack for fear of losing an election.

The Secretary suggested a better and stronger Commission staff could conduct its own investigations instead of depending on such sources of information.

Silveira discussed at length the problem that Brazil’s federal system causes for Brazilian cooperation on human rights. Brazilian states are more autonomous than those in the U.S. The Federal Government would not be able to impose a Human Rights Commission investigation on a state.

The Secretary said no governor in the United States would oppose such an investigation. Silveira said that was not the case in Brazil. He could also envisage a situation in which a southern government in the United States would have opposed such an investigation in the past. When public opinion changes, it will become possible in Brazil.

Secretary Vance discussed the basic civil rights laws of the U.S. Under Secretary Habib asked whether Brazil had a human rights clause in its constitution. Silveira acknowledged that it did but restated the political objections. He said Brazilians were suspicious of morality claims. He knew all colonization in the past was based on moral issues—spreading the Christian religion, civilizing African countries, and so forth. The Brazilian public just would not accept the human rights convention, and the Brazilian Government had no flexibility. He called the U.S. the most advanced country as a political democracy, though not as a racial or economic democracy. But Brazil was not in that position. Nobody was killing anybody, there were no guerrillas and no religious wars in Brazil, but people kept claiming there were such things.

Habib said that we believe that so much that we wanted Brazil to help strengthen human rights cooperation. Silveira said Brazil would only sign the Convention when it could carry out its provisions, unlike some countries. He questioned whether the Caribbean countries would be willing to push human rights in Africa. If Brazil accepted visits by the Commission, the Commission would see thousands of good things but would give publicity only to the one or two other things it saw.

Secretary Vance said the US was willing to take that chance for itself. Silveira answered that the US was in a position to “digest social crisis” (though perhaps not future political crises). Brazil was not.

The conversation then led to the question of the two briefly imprisoned priests whom Mrs. Carter saw in Recife.⁴ Silveira described at length his role and the false information that had been spread about the incident, including (he said) a misleading statement to the press by the US Consulate.

“Ambiguity” in U.S. Policies. Silveira, speaking very frankly, cited this as one example of the ambiguity in the US approach to Brazil. Another example was the misunderstanding during Mrs. Carter’s visit

⁴ Two U.S. citizens, Thomas Capuano, a Mennonite missionary, and Lawrence Rosebaugh, a Catholic priest, were arrested in Recife and jailed without access to the U.S. consul from May 15–18, 1977. Mrs. Carter met with them on June 8 during her visit to Recife. (Telegram 120 from Recife, June 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770206-0560; Tarnoff to Brzezinski, May 21; National Archives, RG 59, Lot 80D177, HA Subject and Country Files, 1976–77, 1977—January–June—Human Rights, Brazil)

in which there was confusion between underwater and underground nuclear explosions.⁵ A third related to a “non-paper” delivered by the US Embassy; Silveira was surprised when the US complained about receiving no reply to the “non-paper.”⁶

The Secretary expressed the hope that Brazil would participate in the fuel cycle evaluation. He thought it very important. Silveira said the British had asked them. He went on to another example of “ambiguity”: the human rights note⁷ was delivered to a head of division late on a Friday afternoon. Silveira was up until 2:00 am talking to the President and otherwise deciding on how to respond. The denunciation of the 1952 Military Cooperation Treaty was based on the ambiguity in this situation. He noted the two versions of the report that were made available. Then yesterday the House of Representatives had said it would not appropriate funds for something the Brazilian had not asked for and in fact had denounced. He considered that a gratuitous political act that he could not forgive. (He agreed with Under Secretary Habib, however, that he could forget it.) He noted that the report was not a human rights report but a political report without human rights elements. He said we must abolish this ambiguity. The Secretary agreed and said he would take a look at the situation.

⁵ In telegram 4743 from Brasilia, June 10, the Embassy reported that it believed the confusion was due to an interpreter's error during Mrs. Carter's conversation with Geisel. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770003-0680)

⁶ Not further identified.

⁷ See Document 163.

167. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Other Recipients¹

Brasilia, September 20, 1977, 0003Z

7670. Subj: GOB Denunciation/Rescission of Military Agreements. Ref: A) Brasilia 7668² B) Brasilia 7669.³

1. Foreign Minister Silveira called me to his office at 5:00 p.m. local to hand me a note rescinding or denouncing four bilateral agreements in the military area and a press release to be issued at 6:00 p.m. (see Brasilia 7668 and 7669 for texts.)

2. Silveira stated that he did not think that the GOB decision would come as a surprise to me because he knew I was aware of the process that had been going on in the GOB. He said that he wished to emphasize to me, as Itamaraty would to the press, the last paragraph of the note.⁴

3. I replied that I was not surprised and that of course we accepted with equanimity the GOB decision that the agreements were no longer in its interests. To his statement that the denunciation/rescission of the three purely military agreements was a natural consequence of the March 11 denunciation of the 1952 [agreement],⁵ I commented that, according to my understanding, this was not necessarily the case but in any case the point was academic. I went on to say that I was afraid that, despite the final paragraph, the Brazilian press would tend to interpret the GOB action in a negative way. I added that I believed that the reference to non-interference, reminiscent of the emotionalism of March, would reinforce the tendency, and in any event much would depend on the nature of statements by well-known military figures. I

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770340-0924. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent Niact Immediate to USCINCSOUTH, USCINCLANT, DMA, CSA, CSAF, CNO, and the Consulates General in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

² September 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770340-0884)

³ September 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770340-0905)

⁴ See footnote 2, above. The last paragraph of the note noted "the desire of the Brazilian government to maintain the relationship between the two countries on the traditional bases of mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state," and stated that "the Brazilian government reaffirms its disposition to cooperate with the North American government." "Itamaraty" is a reference to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, housed in Itamaraty Palace.

⁵ A reference to the Brazilian refusal of U.S. security assistance and renunciation of the 1952 Military Assistance Agreement. (Telegram 1908 from Brasilia, March 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770084-0829) See Document 163.

also commented that I regretted that the time between the delivery of the note and the issuance of the press release was so short but that this seemed to be the established pattern. Silveira explained that he had not wanted leaks and speculation. (It should be noted that Silveira's request to see me was made at about 10:30 this morning, which suggests that the intent of the scenario was to reduce our reaction to a minimum.)

4. In response to press inquiries we are making these points: (a) we accept the GOB's decision with equanimity; (b) it appears that the GOB has decided that the agreements were no longer in its interest, which is, of course, its prerogative; (c) the GOB decision did not come as a surprise; (d) in these circumstances, the Embassy for its part does not consider this action a deterioration in relations; (e) we cannot speak for the Department with respect to effects on the scheduled visit of Secretary Vance. If asked about the effects on our human rights policy, we are saying that the USG policy continues unchanged. If questions tie the non-interference reference in the note to the human rights report, we are saying that, of course, we do not agree with the non-interference characterization because we do not consider that the establishment by Congress of conditions on the provision to other countries of US resources constitutes interference in internal affairs and because concerns about human rights transcend national boundaries. (Here we refer them to the Embassy's statement of March 5.)⁶

5. Comment: There are probably several reasons for the timing of the action, among them the retirement this Wednesday⁷ of General Potyguara, the notoriously anti-American current chief of the Armed Forces general staff, who has been pushing the recommendations to denounce/rescind the agreements; internal political considerations (the nature and extent of which can only be assessed when we see the kind of public play the GOB gives the matter); and the apparent GOB belief (very evident to me during Panama Canal week in the Brazilian Embassy in Washington) that US right-wing opinion is a resource to be invoked by the GOB against the policies of the Carter administration.

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⁶ The Embassy's statement is in telegram 1739 from Brasilia, March 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770076-1319)

⁷ September 21.

168. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, October 21, 1977

Brazilian Planning Talks
October 6–7, 1977*Summary of Talks*

The Brazilian planners were cautious and guarded in the day and a half of talks, as we sought to develop a more open and friendly dialogue, while displaying firmness on substantive matters. The Brazilians aggressively attacked our nuclear non-proliferation and “discriminatory” trade policies, while soft-peddling the other major bilateral issue—human rights. Nevertheless, the atmosphere was quite cordial, at least by the end of the talks.

Two interesting themes ran through the talks. The Brazilians displayed an ambiguity as to their status, demanding the special concessions granted LDCs, while asking to be accorded the attention worthy of an incipient global power. In making this transition, Brazil finds itself bumping up against rules designed to regulate relations among developed countries—despite being, in many respects, still underdeveloped. The second theme was the Gaullist flavor conveyed by the Brazilians’ emphasis on “grandeza”² and their emphasis on willingness to play issues as their short-term self-interest dictates.

Discussion

While planning talks are meant to be less operational than more formal negotiations, the Brazilians’ extreme concern to avoid delving in any depth into controversial bilateral issues was unusual, although they did not hesitate to criticize U.S. handling of our relationships in general terms. The Brazilians questioned the genuineness of our support for regional organizations and for globalism: they wondered whether the U.S. was prepared to make the necessary concessions that a global welfare approach would require. The Brazilians counseled that the Carter Administration had suddenly projected its policies without allowing time for the rest of the world to digest them. However, our human rights policy, they said, is now becoming clearer—although our non-proliferation efforts, bent as they were upon halting the inevitable

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL 10/16-31, 1977. Confidential. Drafted October 19 by Feinberg.

² Greatness.

spread of technology, were bound to fail. (The Brazilians did, however, express a willingness to discuss safeguards.)

But their annoyance with the U.S. runs deeper than recent Administration initiatives. Brazilian aspirations for “*grandeza*” center on rapid economic growth, which is linked to export expansion. The Brazilians repeated the charge that our trade policies discriminate against newly arriving countries, who are considered less important politically and for whom we feel less cultural affinity, than our Western European friends. In fact, as their manufacturing exports grow, the Brazilians find themselves bumping up against a trading system originally devised to regulate commerce among more powerful industrial nations. The existing rules of the game—e.g. prohibitions against export subsidies—are prejudicial to export-led growth models like Brazil’s. Also, certain tariff barriers inhibit entry of more labor-intensive and/or more highly processed products. The higher-income LDCs argue that such a trading system frustrates their drive to enter the club of industrial states.

While indicating their public need to show solidarity with the G-77 and willingness to “pragmatically” go along when it suits their interests, the Brazilians agreed that confrontation tactics were generally a mistake and that smaller, even bilateral groupings were more fruitful. They vigorously sought to distinguish Brazil from the poorer LDCs—but when we asked how the upper-tier LDCs might be incorporated into the decision-making process on global issues, the Brazilians offered no suggestions. Like us, they recognize the problem, but are still groping for answers on how to close this “decision gap.”

We were pleasantly surprised at their stance on human rights. They now see “subversion” as a lesser priority than development and avoided attacking our forcibly stated positions on human rights, except to argue that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission should be normative, not judgmental. This more relaxed view on human rights may reflect the whispers of liberalizing winds within Brazil, as well as their desire to disassociate themselves from the Southern Cone hardliners.

Conclusion

Brazil’s intention to have it both ways—wanting to receive the special concessions granted a LDC, while being treated like a global power, but without corresponding responsibilities—suggest that their gradual integration into the world system will not be without strains and disagreements. We will need to convince Brazil to balance its narrowly conceived “pragmatism” with a concern for global welfare. At the same time, we ought to look more closely at whether, in fact, the rules of the game are now stacked against late arrivals such as Brazil. Furthermore, as we told the Brazilians, as they become more important—and more competitive with us—we will have to be more aware of their policies and maintain close communications.

169. **Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schneider) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Stedman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, November 25, 1977

IFI Loans to Brazil

Issue for Decision

Does the Human Rights situation in Brazil warrant U.S. support for an upcoming \$80 million global industrial credit loan in the Inter-American Development Bank for Brazil?

Essential Factors

Some time this month² the U.S. Executive Director on the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) Board will be asked to support an \$80 million global industrial credit loan to Brazil and a \$24 million rural electrification loan. The Inter-Agency Group has recommended that we support the latter loan as it meets basic human needs. The Group did not reach a consensus on whether the U.S. should support the global industrial credit loan. At writing, the question of a U.S. "veto" is not involved, because no FSO money is projected for this particular loan.³

These two loans are the first ones for Brazil to come up for a vote subsequent to the passage of new legislation concerning implementation of our human rights policy in the international financial institutions. That legislation requires the US to oppose loans to countries engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights unless such assistance is directed specifically to programs which serve basic human needs. The Administration's policy has been to use its

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Brazil. Secret; Noform; Nocontract. Drafted by Bova and Bouton. Concurred in by Hansell, Bekel, and Ericson; concurred in draft by Watson and Walker.

² An unknown hand underlined the phrase "this month," put an asterisk next to it, and wrote in the right-hand margin, "now scheduled for 12/16." A different hand crossed out "12/16" and wrote "12/22" below it.

³ An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences of the paragraph and underlined the phrase "'veto' is not involved." In a December 5 note to Christopher, Oxman wrote that the Interagency Group considered the global industrial credit loan at its meeting on October 14, but no consensus was reached. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Brazil)

voice and vote in the IFI's to promote human rights even in countries where there has not been a determination that a consistent pattern of gross violation exists.

Human Rights Situation

Brazil's human rights performance has improved considerably under President Geisel but it is still a problem country.⁴ Since Geisel ordered the security forces in late 1976 to stop abusing political prisoners, there has been a significant reduction in the frequency and severity of reported cases. Geisel subsequently reaffirmed this order in July and again recently. Those arrested under the exceptional national security laws continue to be tried in military courts, which while noted for their uniform procedures, are not under the jurisdiction of the civil judiciary.

In May and June, there were widespread arrests of demonstrating students. Some of the leaders were reportedly tortured in the course of interrogation, as were four alleged communist party members arrested in Rio de Janeiro. Again in September student demonstrations in Sao Paulo were put down with such force (including forced entry into the Catholic University) that President Geisel personally strongly rebuked the Sao Paulo Security Chief. More recently, Geisel ordered the security forces to abjure mistreatment of prisoners taken in an intended sweep of alleged communists. We have also heard that seven policemen in Sao Paulo were recently released from duty and arrested for their abuses. (These last three points should be treated as sensitive information.)⁵

The area of political and press freedom has also manifested a mixed performance.⁶ The exceptional laws permit official proscription of "subversive" political philosophies. After an initial period of slow liberalization of the political process, Geisel recessed Congress in April 1977 when it blocked passage of a judicial reform amendment to the Constitution because they would not accept the government's desire to limit the independence of the courts and not to restore habeas corpus. During the recess, Geisel decreed an electoral reform law favoring the government oriented party in the next elections. Shortly after, two opposition deputies were deprived of their political rights, and both parties were denied access to television for campaigning. There is presently a study underway in the presidential staff of modes to open the political process

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "has improved considerably under President Geisel."

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

⁶ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

as well as a more formalized dialogue between the government and opposition elements.⁷

Press freedom has improved considerably under the Geisel government. There is a vigorous political debate underway in the press, generally focussing on redemocratization. Nevertheless, most newspapers must observe a self-censorship regime, with the forbidden subjects generally focussing on criticism of the "Revolution," the armed forces, and the President himself. A few publications still have government censors in the editorial offices. Some foreign publications also have been restricted. The electronic media are strictly controlled. Recently a writer was arrested for a novel previously passed by the censor; he was later released. A petition requesting freedom of the press and signed by thousands of intellectuals was printed in the press, but forbidden on television.⁸

"Marginal" Brazilian social-economic groups continue to suffer unequal treatment under the law, including abuse by police who are often ill-trained, under less than effective discipline, and sometimes corrupt. Such abuse was graphically illustrated in the harsh and humiliating treatment accorded two U.S. missionaries who were arrested and held several days without charges shortly before Mrs. Carter's June visit.⁹

Though Brazil supported the recent budget increase for the IAHRC, it has manifested a negative attitude toward inspection visits by the organization. Before the Grenada OAS meeting, the GOB lobbied strongly to persuade Paraguay to reject such a visit. Brazil considers our intervention on behalf of the IAHRC, as well as our general expressions of concern about human rights in Brazil, to be interference in its internal affairs.¹⁰

HA believes that we should underline our concerns over continuing serious human rights problems in Brazil by abstaining on the industrial credit loan which does not meet basic human needs.¹¹ We have attempted on several occasions at high levels to signal our concerns to the Brazilian Government, including a demarche made in late July when we told Brazilian officials that human rights performance was

⁷ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence.

⁸ An unknown hand highlighted the first sentence of this paragraph, underlined the phrase "self-censorship," underlined "A few publications still have government censors in the editorial offices," and underlined and highlighted the phrase "electronic media are strictly controlled."

⁹ An unknown hand highlighted the first sentence of this paragraph. On the two missionaries, see Document 166, footnote 6.

¹⁰ An unknown hand highlighted the paragraph.

¹¹ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence, underlined the word "abstaining," and wrote "HA position" in the left-hand margin.

an important factor in our support of IFI loans. The response given to such representations is that our concerns constitute interference in Brazil's internal affairs. The Brazilian Government has consistently refused to admit that problems exist. The time has come to put greater emphasis behind our verbal expressions of concern by demonstrating clearly the sincerity and priority of our human rights policy.¹² It is also time to demonstrate that a policy of intransigence on the Brazilian Government's part may have negative implications for some of their other national interests.

U.S. abstention on a loan to Brazil is in keeping with our abstention on Korea. It involves a country where other very real and important U.S. national interests exist and thus would have the additional advantage of clearly demonstrating the overall international consistency of our human rights policy. This would be particularly important in strengthening our human rights position with Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. These countries have indicated their belief that they are being singled out for negative U.S. action. They are also influenced, to varying degrees, by Brazilian actions and pressures. If Brazil can be convinced that it is in its own best interest to acknowledge its human rights problems and work toward their solution it could have a real and very important spillover effect among Southern Cone countries.¹³

In addition, such a firm stand would give hope and support to those forces within Brazil which are working for the creation of a more open and just society.¹⁴ There are indications that our human rights policy has already helped them to speak out ever more forcefully and openly. Any appearance of backsliding, inconsistency or lack of real commitment on our part could only serve to weaken their cause. Failure to back our words with action could have just that effect.

Another issue which must be considered is the Congressional reaction to continued US support of loans to Brazil, especially when such loans appear not to meet basic human needs.¹⁵ Brazil is viewed by many on the Hill as being a serious human rights violator. If the administration does not demonstrate clearly its intention to vigorously promote our human rights policy by using "voice and vote" on economic assistance to such countries, the Congress may further limit our flexibility in dealing with these nations.

¹² An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹³ An unknown hand underlined the first sentence of this paragraph and the phrase "strengthening our human rights position with Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay."

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "Congressional reaction."

ARA believes that abstention on the Brazil loan would give the wrong signal at the wrong time. Brazil, while still a human rights problem country, is a quantum leap from the the worst offenders in the hemisphere, much less the world. It has never been considered a gross and consistent violator, and we have never abstained on a Brazilian loan. It would be gratuitous and unproductive to do so now.¹⁶

The notion that the Brazilians need a signal is curious. The Brazilians have received many signals, loud and clear. Over the past several months, human rights have been on the agenda of every high level U.S.-Brazil discussion as well as in official correspondence and diplomatic notes. Our cultural exchange program has a considerable human rights focus. Our representations and our well-publicized attitude have been helpful to the active Brazilian civil rights groups. To pointedly escalate our criticism, when the Brazilians have not escalated repression, through an abstention could easily stimulate a nationalist reaction and engender conservative pressure on Geisel to call a halt to further liberalization. In fact, to abstain on this loan, when things have not gotten worse, would enhance the skepticism some Brazilians—not just those in the military—feel toward our human rights stance when they allege that it is an attempt to freeze Brazil out of its growth to major nation status. Should a deteriorating trend become evident, then an abstention or even a negative vote might well be indicated.¹⁷

To target Brazil at this point, solely to prove that we bring our policy to bear on countries in which we have other significant interests smacks of the arbitrary. ARA agrees that consistency is important—particularly in dealing with Latin America as we deal with other parts of the world. And we note the committee just approved loans to Indonesia (ARA has no quarrel with the decision) based on the hope that Indonesia would release 10,000 of the 30,000 odd political prisoners it holds. Are we to abstain on a loan to Brazil. Where, by any standard, the record is much better? Abstention on this loan would suggest a double standard for Latin America.¹⁸

¹⁶ An unknown hand underlined the first sentence of this paragraph, wrote “ARA position” in the left-hand margin, and underlined the phrase “quantum leap from the worst offenders in the hemisphere.”

¹⁷ An unknown hand underlined “To pointedly escalate our criticism, when the Brazilians have not escalated repression, through an abstention could easily stimulate a nationalist reaction and engender conservative pressure on Geisel to call a halt to further liberalization,” underlined the phrase “have not gotten worse” and wrote “But have they improved?” next to that sentence, and underlined the last sentence of the paragraph.

¹⁸ An unknown hand underlined the last sentence of this paragraph and wrote an illegible notation in the right-hand margin next to the paragraph.

Finally, an abstention under these circumstances would surely sour the atmosphere, making productive discussions with the Brazilian Government even more difficult on all important issues.¹⁹ Brazil is a significant power and we have another issue of grave concern to mankind, the nonproliferation issue, on our agenda. Abstention will not help the atmosphere for positive discussions on this issue, which is by no means near resolution.

S/P believes that the appropriate U.S. response would be to inform the GOB that recent improvements in the human rights situation in Brazil make it possible for us to vote affirmatively on this loan, but that continued mistreatment of prisoners, or a setback in the liberalization process, would make it difficult for us to support future loans.²⁰ If questioned about the issue (e.g., by Congress), we could reply that while human rights problems in Brazil are as severe as in some countries to which we oppose loans, we believe the trend in Brazil is positive and should be given cautious encouragement.

L believes that the foregoing description of human rights observance in Brazil leaves unanswered a number of questions which are important in determining whether an affirmative U.S. vote can be defended as legally permissible. (We could defend an affirmative vote only on the ground that Brazil is not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations.) In particular, the present record indicates that the military courts which try offenses under the national security laws have “uniform procedures”; there is no indication of whether these procedures afford a modicum of fairness. Similarly, the record notes President Geisel’s admonitions against further torture of political prisoners; the effectiveness of his efforts in reducing the incidence of official torture is not stated. (Reports of torture continue to be received, [1 line not declassified]²¹ Further, it is unclear how there can be a “vigorous political debate underway in the press” when criticism of the “Revolution,” the armed forces and the President is forbidden.

On the present record, the more prudent action from a legal standpoint would be to abstain.²² If an affirmative vote is considered justified,

¹⁹ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “Finally, an abstention under these circumstances would surely sour the atmosphere,” and wrote an illegible notation in the right-hand margin.

²⁰ An unknown hand highlighted this sentence and wrote “S/P position” in the left-hand margin.

²¹ An unknown hand underlined the first sentence of this paragraph, wrote “L position” in the left-hand margin, and underlined the phrase “reports of torture continue to be received.”

²² An unknown hand underlined the phrase “the more prudent action from a legal standpoint would be to abstain.”

L believes it would be desirable to accompany such a vote with representations to Brazilian Government as recommended by S/P. Such representations would seem consistent with the intent of sections 701(a) and 703(a) of P.L. 95–118. These provisions call upon the United States Government, in connection with its participation in the international financial institutions, to advance the cause of human rights and to insure that the rewards of international economic cooperation are available to those who are seen to be moving toward making standards for the protection of human rights effective in their own systems of governance.

THE OPTIONS

1. That you instruct the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to abstain on the global industrial credit loan to Brazil and have our Ambassador explain to the Government of Brazil that this action was taken because of U.S. concern over serious human rights conditions in that country.

2. That the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB be instructed to vote in favor of the global industrial credit loan to Brazil.

3. That the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB be instructed to vote in favor of the loan, but that the Embassy in Brasilia be instructed to inform the Brazilian Foreign Ministry at an appropriate level that our future votes on Brazilian loans will continue to be contingent on developments in Brazil's human rights performance.

Recommendations:

That you instruct the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to abstain on the global industrial credit loan to Brazil and have our Ambassador explain to the Government of Brazil that this action was taken because of U.S. concern over serious human rights conditions in that country. (HA, H and L recommend)²³

That you instruct the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to vote in favor of the global industrial credit loan to Brazil. (Assistant Secretary Todman, PM and EB recommend)²⁴

That you instruct the U.S. Executive Director to the IDB to vote in favor of the global industrial credit loan to Brazil and that our Embassy

²³ An unknown hand underlined the word "abstain" and the phrase "HA, H and L recommend." There is no indication of either approval or disapproval or the recommendation.

²⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "to vote in favor" and the phrase "Assistant Secretary Todman, PM and EB recommend." Christopher checked the approve option, and a stamped notation indicates that it was approved on December 14. In an undated note to Oxman, Anderson noted that Christopher decided to approve the loan. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 25, Brazil)

in Brasilia be asked to inform the Brazilian Foreign Ministry that our future affirmative votes will be contingent on developments in Brazil's human rights performance. (S/P recommends)²⁵

²⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "vote in favor" and the word "inform." There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, an unknown hand highlighted the entire paragraph and wrote "already done" in the right-hand margin.

170. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, March 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Military Relations with Brazil

As you prepare for your trip to Brazil,² I would like to bring to your attention a matter which concerns me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the serious erosion of our security ties with Brazil.

Brazil traditionally has been our firmest ally in South America. Its size, strength, economic vitality, influence, potential and emergence as an arms supplier in Latin America and the Third World all underscore the importance of maintaining good military cooperation and ties with Brazil in the years ahead.

Nevertheless, at the present time Brazil sees itself forced to embark on a deliberate policy of reducing its security ties with us. The reasons for this are complex, and reflect both Brazil's growing self-assurance and its unfortunate perception that we are somehow opposed to its enhanced role on the world scene.

Thus far our reaction to these developments has been rightly limited to acceptance of Brazil's actions and compliance with its demands to reduce our military cooperation. However, we appear to have adopted a policy that any discussions regarding future forms of cooper-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 1-3/78. Confidential.

² President and Mrs. Carter traveled to Brazil March 29–31. See Documents 172–173.

ation must come only as a result of Brazilian initiative. I do not believe that sort of approach is in our best interests.

I recommend that in your conversation with President Geisel you raise the issue of our future security ties. It is not appropriate at this time to propose specific new initiatives of cooperation, but I do think it essential to open the dialogue. We should make known our readiness to discuss the future shape and content of our bilateral military relationships.

Unless we begin a dialogue now on security issues, we must settle for acquiescing in a Brazilian-dictated moratorium on these questions, which most probably will continue for at least a year or more while President Geisel's successor is elected and installed. Such additional delay can produce only further deterioration in our security ties. Already if events continue on their course Brazil will be denied access to our FMS system after September 30, 1978.

The irrationality of some of the Brazilian actions should not make us respond in a manner contrary to our own interest. In the absence of some initiative on our part, I fear that what is left of our military relations with Brazil will be lost. Our ability to pursue other important interests—including human rights, conventional arms restraint and nuclear non-proliferation—will then decline even further.

Harold Brown

171. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 22, 1978

SUBJECT

Military Relations with Brazil

The Department shares the Secretary of Defense's concern over the deterioration of our ties with the Brazilian military and his interest in returning to a decent security relationship with Brazil.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 1-3/78. Confidential.

² See Document 170.

The Rio Treaty, which Brazil will continue to honor, provides a hemispheric security relationship against threats to the peace. But it does not mandate standing arrangements for bilateral military cooperation, and the Brazilians have chosen to terminate their military agreements with us. They are also keeping students out of U.S. military training programs, switching their sources of military supply away from the U.S. and towards Europe, and have foregone FMS beyond October 1 to avoid the submission of a human rights report to Congress.

In sum, there is a pronounced Gaullist flavor to the Geisel government and, even more disturbing, a streak of paranoia among the Brazilian military about U.S. intentions. (Incredible as it may seem, a recent report³ has two Brazilian military sources suggesting to our military that the CIA may be out to destabilize Brazil.) In addition to getting our own thinking in order as to what might be desirable, in the light of various U.S. policy concerns, by way of a modernized military relationship with Brazil, we will need to take into account these unfortunate Brazilian realities in devising the tactics of approach to the Brazilians.

In these circumstances, an obvious Presidential initiative might be rebuffed or misinterpreted to show that Brazil's Gaullist stance has us over a barrel. Moreover, one of the most plausible responses Geisel might make to the President would be to indicate interest only in the event we dismantled the requirement for a human rights report to Congress for countries receiving FMS, something the President would have to reject.

We believe, however, that the President should make one or both of the following points if a natural opportunity occurred in the conversation:

—We accept Brazil's decision to put our military relationship on a new footing and are willing to explore jointly future cooperative efforts in this context.

—A mutually acceptable relationship in the area of defense would advance our respective interests and facilitate cooperation on strategic concerns.⁴

In addition, your own conversation with General Golbery might give you an opportunity to discuss the issue in a less forced, less

³ Not further identified.

⁴ In a March 21 action memorandum to Vance, Kreisberg recommended that the Department should agree with Brown "that the President should raise military cooperation briefly with President Geisel." No decision was marked. (National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL 3/16-31/78)

formal setting.⁵ Golbery is known to be personally concerned about the deterioration of the relationship with the U.S., and is generally considered a leading geo-political thinker as well as perhaps Geisel's most important moderate advisor. Your talks with General Golbery could range all the way from general discussion to such specifics as reassuring the Brazilians of our intentions to expeditiously process between now and October 1 any FMS requests which they submit to the U.S. Additional talking points for such a conversation will be provided shortly.

Peter Tarnoff⁶
Executive Secretary

⁵ In a memorandum for the record, April 5, Turner noted that Brzezinski reported that Golbery "is also interested in better coordination on Africa." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R, Box 22, Folder 424) No other record of the conversation between Brzezinski and Golbery was found.

⁶ Wisner signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, April 4, 1978, 1215Z

2649. Subj: Draft Memorandum of Conversation of First Bilateral Meeting Between Presidents Carter and Geisel, March 29, 1978 at 5:45 p.m.

1. The following is a draft memorandum of conversation for the first bilateral meeting between Presidents Carter and Geisel, March 29, 5:45 p.m. Participants on the US side in addition to President Carter were: Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski and Chargé Richard E. Johnson. The Brazilian side was represented by Foreign Minister Silveira and Minister Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg of Itamaraty in addition to President Geisel.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104-2248. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. No final record of the conversation was found.

2. The substantive part of the meeting began with a discussion of the problems of Africa.² President Geisel opened the discussion by stating that the reasons for Brazil's policy in Angola are not always recognized. Brazil's presence is worthwhile from the standpoint of the Western world. Brazil is demonstrating to Angola that there are alternative directions in which it can turn, other than Cuba.

3. President Carter responded that it is important that the United States, Brazil, and others consult closely to prevent Africa from going communist, from turning toward the countries of Eastern Europe. The Africans naturally incline toward the West. If the Western nations can combine and take advantage of their favorable links, the outcome could be advantageous for us and the Africans as well.

4. President Geisel expressed his agreement. He said Brazil has many ties with Africa and is a neighbor of the nations of West Africa. The South Atlantic acts to bring these nations closer to Brazil, rather than to separate. African influence in Brazil is great, in part because of the long period of slavery in Brazil. In addition, Brazil has linguistic ties with the Portuguese colonies in Africa. If the Western countries do not support Africa, the Africans might decide there were no alternatives except to move closer to the Soviets. The Africans are not marxist inclined; they have long standing ties with France, England and, to some extent, Brazil. Brazil tries to help the Africans but its resources are limited. Brazil is seeking to develop its economic relationships, especially with the African countries; many of them are good potential markets. Africa must be helped, President Geisel concluded.

5. President Carter said that the Soviets have a temporary advantage in that they can send Cuban troops to intervene in the developing nations, e.g., Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia. The Soviets are inherently racist in their attitude. They look down on these peoples; they do not live with them as we do. After the military phase is over, the Africans are inclined to turn back toward the West. We should have a forum, perhaps at the level of foreign Secretaries or undersecretaries, with the participation of European countries, to study the African countries one by one with a view to strengthening their democratic forces and keeping them linked with the West. Giscard D'Estaing is much interested in such a project. There will be a NATO meeting in

² Vance and Silveira discussed Africa during their bilateral meeting on March 29. Telegram 2764 from Brasilia, April 5, transmitted a draft memorandum of conversation. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Exdis 1978 Memcons for Vance)

the United States in May.³ We could do some spade-work before it, and discuss the idea during the meeting.

6. President Geisel observed that the Soviets have an advantage over the West because they are far less scrupulous. (President Carter expressed his agreement.) Cuba is a very expensive satellite for the Soviets, and they feel compelled to make some use of it. With regard to the suggestion that the situation in the African nations be examined nation by nation, Brazil is fully ready to work with the United States in Africa. This is of extreme importance not only to the United States but to Brazil and many others. The problem of apartheid is very alarming. The intransigence of the whites in South Africa is causing a dangerous situation. It could provoke an extreme black reaction, with the blacks becoming even more racist than the whites, to the point where the whites are unable to survive. The Brazilian viewpoint on this issue is exactly like that of the United States.

7. President Carter said the United States shares Brazil's concerns about the situation in South Africa. The US is continuing to support the Anglo-US proposals on Rhodesia. It is also working under UN auspices with France, Canada, Great Britain and Germany on a solution to the problem of Namibia: with a view to establishing majority rule there. The key to the situation is the attitude of Vorster of South Africa, i.e., his influence on Ian Smith and his role in the solution of the Namibia problem. The United States has a positive relationship with the Presidents of the front-line countries. They will be sending their Foreign Ministers to Lagos to meet with Secretary Vance.⁴ President Carter said it would help him to have continuing information on the Brazilian attitude on these problems. The United States and Brazil should keep informed through their foreign ministers. This is potentially the most explosive issue in the world. If we are not careful the situation in the African continent could deteriorate into a shooting war. Given the reticence of the United States to become involved militarily and Cuban readiness to intervene, the final outcome could be contrary to the will of the Africans.

8. President Geisel expressed his agreement, stating that this is one of the most explosive areas in the world. Brazil, he observed, has no relations with Rhodesia, having never recognized the Rhodesian Government. It does have a limited relationship with South Africa, consonant with the restrictions proposed by the UN. It has substantial

³ For a record of the NATO meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe, which is scheduled for publication.

⁴ A summary of Vance's meetings in Lagos with the foreign ministers of Zambia, Botswana and Nigeria is in telegram 3080 from the Secretary's delegation, April 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780143-0288)

contact with Nigeria, one of the most developed of the African nations. Brazil favors independence for Namibia. The potential danger in the present South African situation is due in good measure to the regrettable intransigence of the English and Portuguese colonizers there. In comparison with British and French colonizers elsewhere in Africa, the pull out in the South was much too slow.

9. Dr. Brzezinski observed that the African situation in addition to being explosive has fundamental strategic implications. It is perhaps more important in this respect than the situation in other areas of east-west tension. If Africa turns to the left, we could become outflanked in the Middle East with the result that Western Europe could become neutral or leftist. This would seriously change the balance of power in the world.

10. President Geisel expressed his agreement. If we analyze the world situation, he said: we see the importance of the African Coast from the standpoint of access to the Middle East. This is why Brazil understands the importance of the US-Iranian link. Brazil has little military potential in the area; Brazilians are principally concerned with the ongoing struggle to develop their own territory. As far as Africa is concerned, Brazil concentrates on the West Coast. In the East, Brazil has close ties only with Mozambique. Although Brazil recognizes the importance of the East Coast, resource limitations make it impossible to establish much of a presence there. The United States has the responsibility and the strength to exercise influence in that region—the might and the means. The whole situation in the Horn of Africa is another reflection of the strategic importance of Africa and of the truthfulness of Dr. Brzezinski's observation.

11. President Carter said the United States has been pleased to see the national boundary restored and the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia cease. We hope the situation in Eritrea will not flare up, providing an excuse for the Cubans and Soviets to remain in the area.

12. Changing the subject to the Middle East,⁵ President Carter said the United States has been deeply involved in efforts to resolve problems there. The United States has strong ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as with Israel and Egypt.

13. President Geisel interjected that the United States' involvement stemmed from our world leadership role, a role the United States has had to assume since World War II.

⁵ Vance and Silveira discussed the Middle East during their bilateral meeting on March 29. See footnote 2 above.

14. President Carter said that matters have now reached a point where the issues in the Middle East are very clearly defined. He would be happy to discuss them should President Geisel desire.

15. President Geisel responded affirmatively, remarking that the situation there is as explosive as that in Africa, if not more so. These are certainly two of the most important problems facing the world today.

16. President Carter said that for several reasons the United States has found itself in the role of an intermediary. We deliver messages for Begin to Sadat and the reverse. These messages generally bring bad news for the recipient. When Sadat went to Israel, the United States hoped that the Israeli response would be sufficiently flexible to permit settlement, but matters did not work out this way. Israel, or at least Begin personally, is hard-headed on three issues and this has prevented progress in the direction of an accord: Israel 1) refuses to acknowledge the applicability of UN Resolution 242 to the West Bank of the Jordan,⁶ 2) refuses to refrain from establishing settlements in the occupied territories and expanding existing settlements, and 3) refuses to recognize the right of the Palestine Arabs to have a voice in determining their future.

17. President Geisel interjected that this is a problem of human rights.

18. President Carter agreed. What the outcome may be, he said, it is impossible to say. At least we have been successful in getting the issues out into the light where the whole world can see them. We believe Sadat is bold, and adequately flexible. There is a division in Israel as to what should be done. Since Begin left Washington after his recent visit,⁷ the United States has felt the best course of action is to let the situation develop in Israel and not to exercise pressure publicly—this could result in the creation of a solid front of the Israeli leaders in protest against US efforts to influence the situation. Many people overestimate the strength of our influence in Israel. The Israelis do have strong support among the people of the US and in the congress, and the United States is committed to the preservation of Israel's security. We will help Israel resist any threats to its national identity, but we hope and expect flexibility in the future.

19. President Geisel said the United States finds itself in the same situation at times as Brazil, a situation in which there is really no good solution and one has to select the one which is "least bad."

⁶ For UN Resolution 242, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 542.

⁷ Begin made an official visit to Washington March 21–23.

20. Secretary Vance said the United States feels that it is best for the moment to allow Israel to reflect on the developments during the recent Washington meeting, and its results. But the window of time available is limited. If some action does not occur fairly soon, the situation could deteriorate very badly. The United States will have to decide on the permissible length of this interval.

21. President Carter said it is very important to give Sadat our support. He is in a difficult and dangerous situation. Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Jordan have shown a disposition to support him. But he is in a vulnerable situation after his dramatic step. He took an initiative which has not succeeded.

22. President Geisel said Brazil's position has always been clear. Brazil supports UN Resolution 242, and recognizes the State of Israel. Brazil believes that Israel should receive assurances of its independent survival. The Arabs must understand that Israel has a right to live within assured and secure boundaries. Brazil also feels that Israel should return areas occupied during the wars and that the Palestinians have a right to survive as an independent nation; a right to territory and to national existence. Sadat's action was courageous and well-intentioned but he had bad luck because he took his step at a time when one of the more radical Israeli leaders was taking over the leadership of government. If the problem continues, future trends will work against Israel. The Arabs are increasing in strength: in numbers, in money and in equipment. Today the situation favors Israel, a strong country with unusually capable people, but in the future the advantage will tip toward the Arabs. In Brazil the Arab-Israeli problem has no internal repercussions. Arabs and Jews live close together as neighbors in perfect harmony. The Arab-Israeli issue has persisted for many years with many different nuances. The recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon was tremendously costly, particularly in terms of the deaths of innocent Israeli invasion of Lebanon was tremendously costly, particularly in terms of the deaths of innocent people, people who had no involvement whatsoever in the quarrel. One wonders how long this situation can persist. The newspapers are reporting the re-initiation of Israeli talks with Sadat. One could question what basis there is for further talks if the Israelis continue to be inflexible and to persist in remaining in the occupied territories.

23. President Carter said he agreed with President Geisel's prediction and sees little basis under present circumstances for a re-initiation of the talks. He said that the Brazilian view of the situation fits that of the United States exactly with one exception. The US believes that it would not contribute to stability in the Middle East were an independent Palestine to exist between Israel and Jordan. We would prefer joint Israel-Jordan administration for approximately five years, with

the Palestinians to have a choice thereafter of affiliating with Israel or Jordan. President Carter said that his guess is that the Palestinians would opt to join Jordan. He said that Arab leaders privately admit to seeing an independent Palestine as a focal point for subversion on the part of Libya, Iraq, Cuba or the Soviet Union, and as a continuing source of provocation.

24. President Geisel observed that this solution would be transitory in time and that a definitive solution is a long way off. Foreign Minister Silveira said that Brazil's position is one of support for the Palestine nation; unless such support is offered clearly, the Palestinians will not go along with us in our future efforts to find a solution. If the Western side exhibits a "perfectionist" attitude, the Arabs will not accept it. The west has to state that it favors an independent state; thereafter it can be left to the Arabs to convince the Palestinians as to the best solution. Unless the Western nations take a positive stand, we will lose the Palestinians.

25. President Geisel inquired as to the Soviet attitude on these questions.

26. President Carter replied that the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement last year as part of an effort to get all involved parties together for an eventual Geneva conference. This provided the first opportunity for an open and profound dialog between us. Iran, Egypt, Jordan and Syria distrust the Soviets and are concerned that the USSR might be a party to Middle East negotiations, the Soviets have never been constrictive in this respect. They stopped helping the United States in its efforts to arrange a Geneva conference and eventually the opportunity passed. The Soviets have a close relationship with Iraq, Libya and Syria, practically no relationship with Jordan and Egypt and none with Israel. President Carter said his best guess is that the Soviets will try to convince the world that they want peace but will prefer a continuing disturbed situation. We still consult with the Soviets through our Ambassadors on this question and keep them informed.

27. Dr. Brzezinski interjected that we keep the Soviets better informed than they do us.

28. President Geisel said that he has the impression, perhaps a superficial one, that the Soviet Union always has an interest in maintaining some area of friction in the world. First it was Korea, then Vietnam and now Israel. When the problems surrounding Israel are solved, a crisis will break out somewhere else. The Soviets always like to keep the flames of conflict burning.

29. Foreign Minister Silveira interjected that they always use a third party for this sort of intervention.

30. President Carter said that Secretary Vance had just told him that Sadat had agreed to receive Weizmann,⁸ who has a message for him. This did not appear to be a reopening of negotiations, however.

31. President Geisel said he has received reports that Weizmann's views often do not accord with those of Begin.

32. Foreign Minister Silveira observed that it is very important for Sadat to use his head carefully in this respect.

33. Dr. Brzezinski remarked that Weizmann is tactically more flexible than the other Israeli leaders, but that strategically he has the same objective.

34. President Carter suggested that at the next meeting one topic of conversation might be US relations with the Soviet Union and the SALT talks.

35. Changing the subject to US/Brazil relations, President Carter observed that it would be a most serious matter for the United States if major difficulties were to arise with its relations with Brazil. He expressed the hope that during the present visit the two Presidents and their Foreign Ministers can resolve any existing differences and restore Brazil-United States friendship and understanding to a higher level than it has ever been in the past. This, President Carter said, is his firm intention, and the United States will do everything it can to bring it about.

36. President Geisel responded that the United States could be assured that Brazil, as a country of the West, feels friendship and loyalty toward the US. This has been the situation in the past, is the situation now, and will always remain the situation. This relationship with the US is not due to traditional ties or to geographic or strategic factors, but is a question of Brazil's national destiny within the Americas and in the world. We are friends and as friends we must be united, in Latin America and throughout the world. President Geisel said he had worked all his life to develop this friendship. There is no anti-US campaign in Brazil as there is elsewhere in Latin America. Brazil and the United States have confronted international crises jointly, for example, in World War II and in the Dominican Republic.⁹ Brazil had some doubts about US action in the Dominican Republic, suspecting that our decision was a bit hasty, but nonetheless Brazil came out strongly in support of our action and stood by us. Difficulties do exist but they are entirely natural—a perfect identity of purpose is impossible. If problems did not exist in one area, they would be present in another. President Geisel said that during his recent trip to Germany a newspa-

⁸ Ezer Weizman, the Israeli Defense Minister.

⁹ A reference to the 1965 United States invasion of the Dominican Republic.

per reporter sought to exploit speculatively certain points of alleged US-Brazilian differences, i.e., some imagined gap. President Geisel responded to this questioning by stating that there were points of difference but the points of identity and the links binding the US and Brazil together are much more significant than those separating the two countries. The correspondent was told that this situation has prevailed in the past, and will continue into the future. Brazil, President Geisel said, has never been anti-American nor will it be. This is a logical situation for Brazil—a question of Brazil's national interest. Brazil is a part of the Western World and recognizes the United States as a world leader. Whether the United States likes it or not, it has the resources and the stage of development for world leadership, and it is shouldering its responsibilities.

37. President Carter said he concurred entirely in President's Geisel's statement on the US-Brazilian relationship. He proposed that at their next meeting he and President Geisel discuss ways of resolving the small differences existing between us.

38. Draft Memcon on second bilateral follows Septel.

Johnson

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, April 4, 1978, 2020Z

2704. Subject: Draft Memorandum of Conversation of Second Bilateral Meeting Between Presidents Carter and Geisel, March 30, 1978, 11:15 a.m.

1. The following is a draft memorandum of conversation for the second bilateral meeting between Presidents Carter and Geisel on March 30 at 11:15 a.m. For most of the meeting, participants on the US side in addition to President Carter were: Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski and Chargé Richard E. Johnson; the Brazilian side was represented by President Geisel, Foreign Minister Silveira and Counselor Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, the Minister's special adviser for bilateral political

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004-0260. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. No final record of the conversation was found. Sections 1 and 17-30 covering non-proliferation are printed as Document 433 in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

and economic affairs. After a discussion of approximately forty-five minutes, the group was expanded with the addition of Assistant Secretary Todman, Director Lake, Mr. Pastor and Embassy Economic Counselor Ruser on the US side and Finance Minister Simonsen, Planning Minister Velloso, Industry and Commerce Minister Calmon De Sa and Counsel Nogueira, a Foreign Ministry Advisor for Political Affairs, on the Brazilian side.²

2. The meeting began with a discussion of Brazil's agricultural situation, with President Carter expressing the hope that when he returns to Brasilia he will find the city surrounded by fields of corn and soybeans.

3. President Geisel then briefly described Brazil's efforts to develop the "Cerrado."³

4. President Carter said that the United States would like to see a sub-committee on agriculture set up under the memorandum of understanding. The United States needs Brazil's help in this sector and Brazil needs ours. The soil in the Brasilia region needs lime, potassium and phosphates; Brazil is developing a nitrogen production capability. The soil is like the soil in plains, Georgia; it is red but, potentially, rich.

5. President Geisel said huge areas of Brazil were still under utilized agriculturally. This is due to a lack of technology. Large areas have in the past been used only for cattle breeding and have had a low yield. The country's present situation requires that these lands be better utilized. Furthermore, with the world population increasing there is an expanding need for food. The basis for any country's economic development must be agriculture and livestock. This is the way it has been in the United States.

6. President Carter agreed, stating that the greatest resource of the United States has been its agricultural productivity, but the rate of expansion of farm production is leveling off. The United States welcomes the development of Brazil's agriculture. We see it not in terms of competition, but as an important contribution to humanity, to the world's needs.

7. Foreign Minister Silveira interjected that the United States is the only country in the world which has solved the problem of agriculture; the Soviet Union has not found a solution.

² In an April 5 memorandum of conversation, Pastor summarized the March 30 meeting among Simonsen, de Sa, Reiss Velloso, Pastor and Ruser, in which economic issues were discussed in greater detail. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 4/78-1/81)

³ A region of savanna.

8. President Carter said that the United States is eager to share its knowledge in this sphere with Brazil; the US would benefit from such an exchange.

9. President Geisel expressed agreement. He stated that the European countries have reached their limit as far as agricultural expansion is concerned. They must now concentrate on increasing their productive capacity through the application of technology. Brazil has adopted the same policy but has started late. More than half of the tillable land is idle. The Amazon is a virtually unknown area. Brazil, like the United States, is sometimes called names like "imperialistic," "hegemonist," but Brazil's "imperialism" is internal. The Brazilians are trying to exploit their own country and to achieve full national integration.

10. Moving on to another subject, President Carter asked whether President Geisel would like a brief report on US relations with the Soviet Union, including the SALT talks.

11. President Geisel replied that this is a subject which interests him deeply. One of the most crucial questions presently facing mankind is the effort to render the two very different systems compatible. One wonders whether this will prove possible. The Brazilian Government is deeply interested in the effort because Brazil strongly supports the cause of disarmament and peace.

12. President Carter said that while publicly both sides express concern about the state of the SALT talks, privately it should be acknowledged that much progress is being made. In the next few weeks, Secretary Vance will go to Moscow and Gromyko will travel to Washington.⁴ We hope that once the final stages of a solution have been worked out at this level, Brezhnev can come to the United States to finalize an accord. This is our basic aim. Daily negotiations are resulting in steady progress and most of the technical problems have been resolved. In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States, together with Britain, are working on a five-year ban on the testing of all nuclear devices. We are trying to encourage other countries with atomic weapons, the French and the Chinese, to join us in this moratorium. Good progress is being made in our negotiations. In addition we have initiated conversations with the Soviets about limiting arms sales abroad. We are reducing our level of arms sales every year. President Carter said he had discussed this matter with President Perez in Venezuela.⁵ The upcoming US special session on disarmament will

⁴ Vance traveled to Moscow May 19–23. For the memoranda of conversation covering his SALT discussions there, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 99, 100, and 101. Gromyko traveled to the U.S. at the end of May. See *ibid.*, Documents 109 and 115.

⁵ For a record of Carter's conversations with Perez, see Documents 345 and 346.

create an opportunity for further conversations in this sphere with the Europeans as well as the Soviet Union.⁶ We are also talking with the Soviets about limitations on the deployment of military forces in the Indian Ocean and the prohibition of attacks on space satellites. With regard to the SALT talks as well as the test ban negotiations, both the US and the Soviet Union are satisfied with the progress already made, although success cannot be guaranteed. Again, this progress is much more substantial than public statements would suggest. Noting that the plans for Secretary Vance's travel to Moscow have not as yet been announced, President Carter asked that the information be closely held. (Foreign Minister Silveira expressed his full understanding.)

13. President Geisel said that he had heard that Secretary Vance has had several contacts with Gromyko on this subject. He is aware that these negotiations are not easy and he wishes the United States every success. He said he was encouraged to receive this information about negotiations involving countries with nuclear devices, especially about efforts to suspend nuclear testing and prohibiting attacks on space satellites. This is a most worthwhile effort, he said, in which humanity has a strong interest. He expressed his understanding of the reasons why the United States has tested nuclear weapons. Given the present situation, a unilateral decision to abandon testing would be an impossibility. However, he said, it is in the interests of mankind for everyone to halt tests. The possibility of attacks on space satellites is a source of concern and of insecurity in the world. These negotiations require hard work and good will. The future of mankind is at stake. President Geisel inquired whether Brezhnev's health was precarious, whether there might be a change in Soviet leadership soon and, if so, what direction the change would take.

14. President Carter said that he had discussed this matter recently with Tito of Yugoslavia.⁷ Tito replied that he had observed Brezhnev very closely and had concluded that the reports of his bad health were exaggerated. (Foreign Minister Silveira interjected at this point that Tito should be an expert on survival.)

15. President Carter said that the United States hopes that Brezhnev's health can remain good. We have worked hard to achieve a comprehensive understanding with him and would hope not to see new leadership emerge in the USSR just now. The President said that he exchanges private letters with Brezhnev fairly frequently, in which views are openly and frankly expressed. As a result they know each

⁶ For the May UN Special Session on Disarmament, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 471–501.

⁷ For Carter's conversations with Tito in March 1978, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Documents 253 and 255.

other quite well. Brezhnev has a standing invitation to visit the United States, it being the Soviet Union's turn to visit us. Brezhnev has not yet accepted this invitation quite likely because he wants to see a firm agreement in the offing before he commits himself to travel.

16. President Geisel commented that this information was very encouraging.

17. Changing the subject, President Carter stated that he had enjoyed his press conference earlier that morning.⁸ Questions arose on both nuclear matters and human rights. These were answered truthfully and honestly with an acknowledgement that there were certain difficulties in these areas and that they had been discussed with the Brazilian Government. He pointed out to the press that we are interested in discussing these matters with the Brazilian Government, adding that the differences are minor in comparison with areas of bilateral agreement.

18. President Geisel said that these two subjects could not have been avoided. Had he been a journalist, they would have figured in his line of attack as well. Obviously President Carter has an obligation to reply truthfully with an explanation of his views. It would be absurd were he to feel embarrassed in responding. Our differences are natural and are not as great as is often stated.

19. President Carter said he had two questions to raise concerning the nuclear question. Brazil, he said, has signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco but will not recognize its applicability until all nations sign the treaty. This would include nations which will never sign, like France and the Soviet Union, perhaps also Cuba (under Soviet pressure). Giscard d'Estaing has said he has no particular objections to Tlatelolco, but he has doubts as to the desirability of France taking part in these Western hemisphere arrangements. President Carter asked whether, if Argentina signs and the list of Central and South American signatories is thereby completed, Brazil would agree to implement the accord?

20. President Geisel replied that this question would require further study. Argentina does not cause major concern for Brazil, he said. However, Brazil feels that countries like France and the USSR, which have nuclear weapons, should make a commitment pertaining to the non-use of these weapons in the Western Hemisphere. They should undertake to fight their wars elsewhere, not in South America, and to refrain from stockpiling their nuclear weapons here. Brazil wishes that the Russians, French and Chinese would also sign Tlatelolco. President

⁸ For the transcript of the news conference, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 627-634.

Geisel said that the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, a country with which Brazil has fair relations, especially in the trade sphere, came to him with a note critical of Brazil's accord with the Federal Republic of Germany. President Geisel said that he had to be a bit rude in his reply. He told the Soviet Ambassador that he had no right to bring this matter up in his dealings with Brazil, in the absence of Soviet acceptance of Tlatelolco obligations.

21. Foreign Minister Silveira said there were three phases in the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco—the signing, the ratification and finally the acceptance of the treaty by the nuclear powers. Brazil believes that with the signing of Tlatelolco it has committed itself not to manufacture nuclear weapons. Under the Geneva convention on treaties, if a country has signed an agreement, it is binding even though it may not have been fully ratified, and that country must comply with the agreement's terms pending ratification. Brazil feels that it must continue to work for a ban on nuclear attacks on this continent and on the storage of nuclear weapons here; Brazil does not wish to abandon the pressure on this point. This firm Brazilian policy of seeking guarantees from the Soviet Union and other countries was adopted after the Cuban missile crisis, when President Kennedy successfully pushed for the evacuation of missiles from Cuba. Brazil came out firmly in favor of assurances against the establishment in the Western Hemisphere of bases for the storage of arms. President Kennedy's successful handling of the Cuban missile crisis marked the beginning of a decrease in the pressure which Cuba exerted over Latin American nations. Brazil is totally committed at present not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany provides that no nuclear devices will be manufactured even for peaceful uses. The manufacture of nuclear explosives even for peaceful uses is for Brazil in the realm of fantasy, and Brazil is not interested in fantasy.

22. President Carter noted that Brazil has accepted IAEA safeguards on installations purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. He asked whether this applies to other installations.

23. President Geisel said that there are no unsafeguarded facilities in Brazil. This includes the facilities at universities where research is underway. Such facilities are under international controls. The scientific community in Brazil had hoped that Brazil's failure to ratify might mean that their research would not be under international control, but was disappointed to learn that this was not to be the case. President Geisel reiterated that Brazil's research centers are under Vienna safeguards, as well as anything constructed under the agreement with the FRG. Brazil feels that the IAEA should be strengthened and possibly reorganized to permit it to conduct its activities in Brazil and throughout the world. As a UN agency, it should be in a position to use any necessary resources to fulfill its purposes.

24. President Carter said that when his administration began there was no systematic formulation for considering requests for the supply of nuclear fuel abroad. US policy in this respect was variable. There is now in existence within the USG an entity responsible for such allocations. President Carter noted that he cannot control these allocations although he can exercise a veto power. We have recently passed a law which clarifies the circumstances under which the US will ship nuclear fuel in the future. It is important that Ambassador Smith return to Brazil and meet with the Brazilian authorities in order that there can be a clear understanding by both sides of the terms of this legislation, and so that Brazil's future needs for nuclear fuel can be met, consistent with US law. This law makes US terms clearer and will help avoid future interruptions in supply.

25. President Geisel said that he had not as yet examined the complete text of the law, but had read about certain of its provisions. He is aware that it calls for the renegotiation of existing accords with regard to the supply of nuclear fuel. Brazil has a 1972 agreement with the United States in this sphere. The Angra I nuclear power facility is under construction, with Westinghouse contributing. The US has agreed to furnish enriched fuel for the startup as well as for re-loading for a thirty-year period. President Geisel said that he had heard that the US has recently reaffirmed its commitment to furnish the startup fuel; he had expected nothing less of US, but was nevertheless pleased with this reaffirmation. Brazil is, however, concerned about subsequent shipments for re-loading over the thirty-year period, and would be happy to receive Ambassador Smith to discuss this question and examine the implications of the new legislation. President Geisel expressed confidence that no problems would emerge.

26. Foreign Minister Silveira said that there were no activities in Brazil not subject to safeguards. This is a concrete fact; this situation will continue to prevail unless there is a change in the status quo.

27. President Carter noted that Brazil has recently signed an agreement with the FRG to exchange technical information concerning the thorium fuel cycle. The United States welcomes this action. Our offer also remains open. The US has thorium and has had extensive experience in this area. Our only breeder reactor is based on thorium. If the German agreement turns out to be inadequate or if Brazil feels the need for more consultations on the thorium fuel cycle, we will be glad to cooperate. The US believes that the INFCE studies represent a good means of learning from one another. There are certain unpredictabilities in the nuclear sphere which need to be resolved. The INFCE studies do not have as their objective persuading countries to take action which is against their own interests, but rather are designed to help interested nations work together.

28. President Geisel responded that Brazil is very active in INFCE and is pleased to be involved in this kind of cooperative effort. Thorium cooperation with the FRG is not a new development, but rather has been underway for some time (Foreign Minister Silveira interjected at this point that it began in 1979).⁹ President Geisel observed that the United States is working along the same lines and that Brazil wanted to cooperate in an endeavor in which all have an interest.

29. President Carter agreed, stating that this is one more approach to a solution of the energy problem, an excruciatingly difficult matter for all of us.

30. President Geisel said he is happy about the US initiative on the bilateral examination of problems in areas involving other kinds of fuel. Brazil is seeking to develop alcohol as a source of energy, a natural direction for Brazilian efforts since the country has large land reserves. Brazil has found new and higher grades of coal deposits in the south, and the US offer to cooperate in coal research and development is most welcome. President Geisel said he was extremely happy over the prospect of joint efforts to cooperate in resolving the energy problem and to improve the outlook, in the face of the inevitable eventual exhaustion of oil reserves.

31. Foreign Minister Silveira said he had seen an interesting report yesterday which he had not yet passed on to President Geisel concerning research on the use of differences in sea layer temperatures to make ammonia. He said he hoped to have a chance to study this report.

32. President Carter said that in between visits, which he hoped would be frequent, he would like to communicate with President Geisel directly concerning such matters as the Middle East, US policy toward other countries such as the Soviet Union, or problems arising in our own nations. President Carter assured President Geisel that a letter from him would get an instant reply, and remarked that this kind of correspondence would help him in the decision-making process. He envisaged these exchanges taking place normally and routinely, rather than as crises develop. As issues arise in our relationship, they could be more easily resolved in this fashion.

33. President Geisel noted that he and President Carter have already exchanged letters; they may have been a bit formal, he said, but they were in any case letters. Following the present visit, perhaps the exchange can continue (with more intimacy and less formality), without getting the respective foreign ministers jealous. President Geisel said he intended as the need arose to write frequently and frankly concerning problems in our bilateral relationship. Efficient as our foreign ministries are, he said, this kind of contact can be extremely effective.

⁹ An error in transcription.

34. At this point the meeting was expanded as noted above, and moved to President Geisel's conference room.

35. Opening the expanded meeting there, President Geisel said the agenda had foreseen this meeting of the two presidents in the presence of the principal advisors. He and President Carter had already talked yesterday and today about many issues; perhaps there was not much left to discuss at this time. He and his ministers were available to talk on any subject President Carter wished to raise.

36. President Carter said the overriding impression that remained with him was that of a delightful and very productive visit. It had been all too brief. President Geisel and he had been able to talk very fully about a great many things including the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and SALT negotiations. An important question of mutual interest related to the Middle East was that of oil. In addition to the energy problem, there was Brazil's great agricultural potential and the common interests of the countries flowing from that fact. President Carter noted that he and President Geisel had also addressed the question of nuclear energy and nuclear fuel supply, and that they had a shared commitment to non-proliferation. In their discussions about the international economic order, they examined economic and trade matters and exchanged their personal knowledge in that area. President Carter said he believed the friendship between the two countries had been reinforced by the visit. In the future, either side would be able to communicate with the other, freely and without constraint, without a sense of crisis. When problems arose, the two governments would be able to consult fully and completely. He said he wished to express his great appreciation for the support, warmth and friendship he had received during his stay in Brasilia. Hospitality had been superb; he would remember his visit with pleasure and gratitude.

27. President Geisel replied there was not much he could add to what the President had said. He had the feeling that he and his advisors were perhaps keeping the President and his party from commencing their visit to Rio,¹⁰ and from the opportunity of a brief rest. It had been a great pleasure for him to receive the President and his party. The visit had been important; he would like to express his satisfaction with its results. Not only had it provided the possibility for personal contact—such contact is always better than more formal channels of

¹⁰ Carter visited Rio de Janeiro on March 30–31. He met with six leading Brazilian non-governmental figures on the 31st, including Cardinal Paulo Evaristo Arns, the archbishop of Sao Paulo and a leading human rights figure. For reactions to the president's visit, see the memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski, April 4 (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1978) and telegram 2765 from Brasilia, April 5 (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780147-0848).

communications—but it also afforded the opportunity for discussion of important issues: matters with regard to which the United States and Brazil shared interests in common, and issues on which the two countries diverged. It had been a useful visit which had strengthened relations between the two countries, and enables Brazil and the United States to better face the future. The outlook for relations between the two countries is exceedingly favorable. President Geisel said he was worried the visit had been so short. Despite this, it had produced excellent results: it had been very useful to him personally as well as to his government. He wished the President and his party a pleasant stay in Rio de Janeiro and thanked him for coming to Brazil.

Johnson

174. Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, undated

Dear Cy,

As you know, during his recent visit to Brazil the President and President Geisel agreed on the desirability of improvement of bilateral military cooperation.²

I believe we should move promptly to follow up on this agreement, capitalizing on the very productive atmosphere created by the President's trip. Specifically, I think our Departments should jointly consider and formulate proposals which our new Ambassador³ can be authorized to discuss with the appropriate Brazilian authorities shortly after his arrival in country.

The Brazilians are interested in cooperating in areas involving reciprocal benefit, a proposition in which we totally concur. In thinking about such areas, a few possibilities come readily to mind:

—Intensification of personnel exchange programs covering all Services and a wide range of professional skills and specialties;

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 25, Brazil. Confidential. Vance's response, printed as Document 176, indicated that the letter was dated April 25.

² See Documents 172 and 173.

³ Robert M. Sayre.

—Institution of a high level Brazil-US Lecture Exchange Series (senior Service and War College level);

—Encouragement of visits to the US by top level Brazilian military authorities under JCS and Military Department annual VIP programs (we would, of course, be prepared to reciprocate if invited);

—Consideration of the execution of memoranda of understanding between counterpart Services (and agencies like the Defense Mapping Agency) which would facilitate exchanges of ideas and information and participation in training, education, joint exercises and activities in both countries;

—Consultation at the JCS/Brazilian Armed Forces General Staff level on matters relating to hemispheric security interests.

Additionally, I think we should begin to consider an appropriate organizational framework completely different from the past. Within this framework our cooperative efforts could be discussed, and joint programs formulated and coordinated. Again, several possibilities involving senior military and diplomatic officials suggest themselves:

—An arrangement similar to that we have with Canada, i.e., a binational Defense Board consisting of diplomatic, political and military representatives to meet periodically for study and discussion of common security problems, with a subordinate Military Cooperation Committee composed of military officers responsible for planning.

—A more loosely structured relationship, perhaps folded in under the 1976 Memorandum of Understanding, which would involve periodic high level consultations on defense matters.

At this point in time I do not believe that we should regard any of these approaches as definitive or all-inclusive. Moreover, since greater equality is one of Brazil's principal aims in putting her military relationship with us on a new footing, I believe we should be as receptive and responsive as we can to any suggestions the Brazilians may have to offer.

As an opening move, I suggest we act promptly to approve the commercial exports of those items on the Munitions List which have been pending for some time now.⁴ Delay only adds an unnecessary irritant into our relationship at this juncture and tends to undercut the President's successful Brazilian visit.

Sincerely,

Harold⁵

⁴ Christopher approved a recommendation to authorize the issuance of licenses for these items on April 25. See the memorandum from Gelb to Christopher, March 7, and attachments. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 25, Brazil)

⁵ Brown wrote "Harold."

175. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 15, 1978

SUBJECT

U.S.-Brazil Military Relations

As I mentioned to you last week, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown followed up a conversation he had with the President on U.S.-Brazil military relations with a letter to Secretary Vance which suggests a great number of initiatives for establishing a special U.S.-Brazil military relationship.² I have great doubts that the President envisaged such a relationship when he spoke to Brown, or that he understood the political consequences in Brazil, in Latin America, and in the United States of trying to restore such a special military relationship at this time. *I have also learned from our new Ambassador to Brazil, Bob Sayre, that DOD officials have, on their own, floated these initiatives to their Brazilian counterparts,* and elicited no response.³ I therefore believe it is necessary and important to get some more guidance from the President on what he had in mind when he asked Brown to explore this issue.

I should caution you that an attempt to elicit more guidance on this subject from the President at this time could conceivably be interpreted as trying to preempt DOD's study. Christopher's Special Assistant alerted me to Brown's letter, which I attach at Tab A for your information, but DOD has not.⁴ I think a memo along the lines which I suggest at Tab I for you to send to the President would be useful in limiting DOD's study to subjects which would yield something useful.⁵ It could also put DOD on guard not to talk to Brazilians about these proposals without instructions. I fear that DOD is currently pursuing a path which can only embarrass the President.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Brazil, 4/78-1/81. Confidential. In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: "BP Let State handle this. If there is a problem then we will take it up with the President. DA 5/25" Inderfurth also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 174.

³ Inderfurth drew a line to the left-hand margin and wrote, "DOD should not be doing this. RI"

⁴ Attached; printed as Document 174. Comments by Oxman and Schneider on draft responses to Brown are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 25, Brazil.

⁵ Tab I is attached but not printed.

RECOMMENDATION:

Therefore, I would recommend that you send the memo at Tab I and that we suggest to DOD more productive lines of inquiry.

Alternatively, you may want to just mention to Harold Brown the problems inherent in the questions he's asking and the approach he's recommending and suggest a more specific focus for his study. Also, you may want to suggest that he submit his study to the President through the NSC.⁶

⁶ Inderfurth highlighted this paragraph and wrote in the left-hand margin, "Why not raise this at a V-B-B lunch? Rick." He also drew a line to the bottom of the memorandum and wrote "absolutely RI" beneath the recommendations. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of either recommendation.

176. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, June 9, 1978

Dear Harold:

I appreciate your letter of April 25 concerning the important question of future military cooperation with Brazil.²

I am pleased to report that all Munitions List export items pending for Brazil at the time were approved on April 25.³ This removed an irritant from our relationships in the wake of the President's successful visit. Our ability to respond to Brazilian requests in the future will depend upon a variety of factors, including the human rights situation in Brazil. We recognize that our responsiveness to such requests will have a significant bearing on prospects for improved cooperation.

With regard to the larger questions you raise, I think that before taking any new steps, it would be a good idea to explore the various aspects of increased cooperation with Brazil. I have in mind an internal study of where Brazil fits into our overall strategy for the defense of the United States and Europe. Such a study would also consider where

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 3, Brazil, 4-12/78. Confidential.

² See Document 174.

³ See footnote 4, Document 174.

we fit in Brazil's conception of its own vital interests. The study would have to be sensitive to the fact that the overall quality of our security ties will depend on a number of factors, including Brazil's human rights practices, as well as its policies concerning the production, purchase and export of arms. I think the study should also consider the relationship between the political climate in both countries and increased military cooperation.

In considering increased military cooperation with Brazil, there is an important issue of timing. As you know, this is the "lame duck" of President Geisel and the character of the next Brazilian administration is not yet clear. In addition, national legislative elections are scheduled for this fall, and the course of internal political liberalization for the next several years may well be affected by the way the Brazilian Government treats those elections.

I would also note that the means by which we move to increased military cooperation will be particularly important. For example, a formal bilateral military relationship may be unacceptable to the Brazilians inasmuch as special relationships connote veiled forms of paternalism to Brazil, and a formal joint relationship is precisely what Brazil is terminating. For the near term at least, informal ties have the best chance of acceptance by Brazil, and would, at the same time, create the flexibility we would like in our relationship at this time.

In order to move ahead on this matter, I would suggest that Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell work with a senior Defense Department official in carrying out the study mentioned above and in coordinating whatever initiatives we may mutually decide to take.

Sincerely,

Cy⁴

⁴ Vance signed "Cy." Brown's July 27 reply is in the Library of Congress, Harold Brown Papers, Box 110, Latin America.

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil¹

Washington, June 26, 1978, 1644Z

161897. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation of Bilateral Meeting Between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Silveira June 22, 1978 2:30 P.M.

1. Summary: Secretary Vance and Silveira discussed Africa, the Middle East, OAS reform, an OAS peacekeeping role, and US shrimping off Brazil. On the shrimping issue Silveira promised, after not responding to proposed talks at the technical level, to have the Foreign Ministry approach Ambassador Sayre on the issue. The Secretary promised that our shrimping experts would backstop the Embassy. End summary.

2. Participants on the US side in addition to Secretary Vance were Deputy Asst. Sec. Francis J. McNeil, National Security Council Member Robert Pastor, and Assistant Brazil Desk Officer James W. Chamberlin. The Brazilian side was represented by Foreign Minister Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, Ambassador to the US Joao Baptista Pinheiro, Ambassador to the OAS Alarico Silveira Junior, Minister Jose Nogueira Filho (Advisor for Political Affairs), and Counselor Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg (Advisor for Bilateral Affairs).

3. Foreign Minister Silveira began by saying that he had been happy to read the speech given by Secretary Vance in New Jersey.² He felt that this was the right way to deal with the problem in Africa; if you give the impression that you will do too much, you will not reap the advantages of your position. Africans may be afraid at this point so that the way we approach them is important. Secretary Vance agreed, and said he had recently received word from Nyerere that he approved of the speech.³ Silveira felt that Nigeria would also respond favorably.

4. Secretary Vance described the mission of Don McHenry whom he had sent to talk to Neto.⁴ The Secretary felt that we would make

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780264-1213. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to USUN. Drafted by Chamberlin; cleared by McNeil, Rondon, and in S/S; approved by Vance. Vance summarized this meeting in a June 23 memorandum to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 6/78)

² Vance addressed the Jaycees in Atlantic City on June 20, 1978. For text of the speech, see "United States Policy Toward Africa 'Is Based On American Interests and African Realities,'" *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980*, pp. 1145-1149.

³ For Nyerere's reaction to Vance's June 20 speech, see telegram 2662 from Dar es Salaam, June 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780259-0350) See also *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 89.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, footnote 3, Document 25.

more progress in dealing with Namibia and the question of the Angola-Zaire border by opening up communication. Silveira agreed, saying that the Brazilians had been protected by Neto, since the Cubans would like to see them leave. He felt that we must strengthen Angola's options, adding that the idea of diplomatic relations as an expression of friendship belongs to the past. He hoped the final reaction of the African states would be against all kinds of intervention and all foreign troops, but cautioned against the racial sentiment in Africa.

5. On Namibia Secretary Vance said that the two remaining issues with SWAPO are Walvis Bay and the 1500 man residual troop force to be left in the Northern or Southern part of Namibia. The Western five believe that for economic, geographic, and other reasons Walvis Bay should be part of Namibia. Silveira added that Nigeria would agree. The Secretary said that it would be silly for our efforts on Namibia to succeed or fail on the issue of where the 1500 troops would be stationed.

6. On the Middle East, Secretary Vance said that we were disappointed in Israel's replies to our two questions.⁵ Silveira agreed with the Secretary that negotiations were still going forward, and asked if he had not seen an indication of more US sympathy for the Palestinians in the US-India Joint Communiqué. Secretary Vance replied that although there would be a transition period, the Palestinians must ultimately have a voice in determining their future. The Secretary felt that Israel would have to eventually accept Resolution 242 as applying to the West Bank or problems would go on endlessly.

7. Secretary Vance said that the morning session of the General Assembly had included an interesting discussion of North-South issues, the New International Economic Order, and the question of setting OAS priorities.⁶ The discussion was opened by the Columbians, picked up by the Peruvians, and touched on by others. Silveira responded that outside of economic cooperation there was little reform to be done in the OAS; its principles should not be changed. The Secretary said that its priorities and focus should be considered. Could we discuss North-South issues at the hemispheric level? Silveira thought not in most cases. In any event, except for economic cooperation, reform would involve only secondary matters.

⁵ For the questions Vance had asked Dayan, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 248, footnote 3. For the Israeli answers, delivered on June 18, see Quandt, *Camp David*, pp. 195–196.

⁶ For a summary of the morning OAS General Assembly session on June 26, see telegram 162642 to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0630)

8. Secretary Vance asked how we could deal with setting OAS priorities—should we have discussions at the ministerial level, or set up a committee of wise men? Silveira said that the wise men would be a wise idea, but that they would not be politically acceptable. Governments want to protect their own interests. We could, however, exchange ideas. The basic interest of Latin America is development—politically, economically and socially.

9. The Secretary asked how Silveira felt about an OAS peacekeeping role. Silveira said that Brazil, with its ten neighbors, is in a special position; it is the largest trading partner of three of its neighbors, and an important partner of many of the rest. Thus, Brazil must adopt a pragmatic policy; the US with only two borders does not face the same kinds of problems. Venezuela has trouble on its other borders, but not with Brazil. He felt that we were taking Venezuela's position on peacekeeping; he was not being critical, just frank. He commented on Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, and their diplomacy. When the Secretary asked Silveira what he would do, he said he would not wrestle with it. There was not going to be any war between Chile, Bolivia and Peru.

10. The Secretary broached a bilateral question—shrimping. Silveira said that although the US did not recognize Brazil's 200 mile claim, it had accepted certain conditions on fishing within 200 miles, and thus in essence had agreed to fish outside the limit. Adm. Henning had told him by cable that five fishing boats were fishing where they should not have been, and that when the US shrimp boats had not responded to the Brazilian Navy boats on the scene, the Navy had to send another boat, and eventually a destroyer, which fired into the sea. He said that Brazil did not intend to shoot at the boats. He would tell Ambassador Sayre that Brazil will not fire at the boats, but that they should fish outside the 200 mile limit. This could be a problem he said.

11. Secretary Vance suggested technical level discussion of the issue. Silveira said that shrimping agreements were limited to joint ventures. Brazil was closing out foreign fishing because otherwise there would be no fish left. Shrimp are born near the coast and move out as they mature, so that fishing near the coast depletes the shrimp. In addition, although the boats that shrimp off the Brazilian Coast fly the US flag, they are based in small nearby states.

12. Secretary Vance said that he would hate to see the US pass restrictive legislation banning imported Brazilian shrimp, and he hoped that discussions between the two countries could prevent this. Silveira replied that Brazil did not do anything to the boats it seized, but if they continued to fish . . . (his voice trailed off). He thought that we must not have ambiguities in our relationship. He sensed that Brazil

did not have the same place in the hearts of Americans that it once did, but if Brazil felt encircled, it would stand fast. There are people who create problems, he said, but not us. Not us either, replied the Secretary, but if there is a problem we don't believe we should let it fester until it becomes an open sore. Silveira said that the Brazilian Navy has cooperated with the US, and thought that it would be concerned. Secretary Vance said that we would be in touch with Amb. Sayre on this subject, and would ask our Bureau concerned with fisheries to give all assistance to the Ambassador. Silveira said he had given instructions for the Foreign Ministry to talk to Amb. Sayre, but added that raising the possibility of legislative restrictions did not help the situation, and the Brazilians would have to respond if there were. The secretary replied that such restrictions were exactly what we wanted to avoid by getting discussions going.

13. Silveira said that if the US market were closed to markets. Brazil is now growing as the US was sixty years ago, and everyone must live with this. He said the US should not complain about its portion of the Brazilian market, because only the US share has not been decreased by Brazil's \$4 billion oil bill. Even the FRG and UK shares went down, but the US talks as if it had trade difficulties with Brazil.

14. When the secretary asked Silveira whether he would like to raise any bilateral issues, Silveira demurred. Commercial negotiations were going well, and he had no specific problems to raise; however President Geisel wished to know about the status of a reply to a letter on transfer of technology in the steel industry to President Carter. Mr. McNeil said that the reply had been cabled to Brasilia the day before, but provided a copy to Ambassador Pinheiro for the Foreign Minister that afternoon.⁷

Vance

⁷ Both Geisel's letter to Carter, May 30, and Carter's June 19 reply regarding an international steel arrangement are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1978.

178. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, November 6, 1978

[Omitted here are a note regarding the paper's scope and the table of contents.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

We expect the administration of President Joao Baptista Figueiredo to continue the effort begun by President Geisel to open the political system to greater civilian participation. Figueiredo could even be the last strictly military president.²

—This “liberalization” process, though, will be subject to setbacks and its ultimate success is by no means guaranteed. There are still, for example, important military officers who oppose liberalization; moreover, civilian pressures for further progress could eventually unnerve either Figueiredo or the military establishment as a whole and lead to a conservative backlash.

—We expect the new government to continue the policy of exported economic growth that has characterized recent years, and there could be new emphasis on developing Brazil's agricultural sector. The Brazilians will remain highly dependent on and receptive to foreign investment.

—We also expect the new administration to scale down—but by no means abandon—Brazil's massive nuclear development program, whose centerpiece is the 1975 deal with West Germany. Financial problems will probably force the Brazilians to cut back, but their determination to master nuclear technology is in no way diminished.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, “Brazil: Short-Term Prospects for the New Administration,” NI IIM 78-10023. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency; drafted under the auspices of the Acting NIO for Latin America by the Office of Regional and Political Research and the Office of Economic Research, CIA; coordinated with the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury. Forwarded to Vance on November 20 under covering memorandum from Turner, who wrote that it “responds to the question you raised with me in our conversation on 9 November.” Turner also wrote at the bottom of the memorandum, “The one page of ‘Key Judgments’ on page 2 summarizes the policies we believe Figueiredo will follow.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R, Box 2, Folder 62)

² In a memorandum for the record, November 13, Turner noted that during a November 9 conversation, Vance said: “He would also like us to look at the impact of the new president in Brazil on Brazilian/U.S. relationships. What is the outlook like here? I told him I thought we had seen a marked decline in Brazil's relations with the United States, as well as Argentina's. He agreed with that. He wondered what the future looked like.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R, Box 22, Folder 422)

—Finally, we believe Figueiredo has an open mind with regard to relations with the US, and clearly hopes that recent tensions between the countries over nuclear non-proliferation and human rights can be overcome. Nonetheless, the new governing team will be very wary of US intentions in these areas, which will continue to be seen in Brasilia as potential stumbling blocks.

INTRODUCTION

Brazil has entered a period of significant change. Over the last several years, civilians have begun to achieve a greater impact on national affairs than at any time since the mid-1960s. This trend appears likely to continue, because of both growing civilian assertiveness and government tolerance, even encouragement.

As a result, the administration that assumes office next March will encounter a political situation more complicated and more fluid than at any time since the military takeover in 1964. The new team's political acumen will most likely be tested early, and its success—or failure—could well set the tone for the rest of its six-year tenure.

Moreover, while the basic thrust of Brazil's economic policy is unlikely to change drastically in the near term, it is nevertheless clear that economic policymaking will become more complicated because of the problems it must address and because of the changing political environment. The heady days of the so-called economic miracle—when annual growth regularly averaged over 10 percent—are gone, probably forever. Brazil now faces the likelihood of substantially lower—though still respectable—growth. Such a prospect could have serious implications, however, for an economy that must accommodate large numbers of new workers each year. Inflation, now running at 40 percent, is also a serious problem. Brazil's large debt service, though manageable, could prove troublesome as well. The country's foreign indebtedness is already large, and may reach \$40 billion by the end of this year. Even more than before, the Brazilians will be compelled to maximize export earnings and they will be even more sensitive than before to the balance-of-payments situation.

Given the changing political environment, the new administration will have to deal with the variegated demands of many sectors of society, something the military-backed government has not had to do throughout most of its tenure. At the same time, given economic problems, policy planners will increasingly have to reconcile conflicting objectives, notably attempting to curb inflation while encouraging growth.

President-elect Joao Baptista Figueiredo, a retired general hand-picked by President Geisel, takes office next March. Figueiredo, the fifth military president to govern Brazil since 1964, has proven contro-

versial, and some Brazilians wonder whether he is capable of governing Brazil effectively in a period of change and increasing complexity.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper and two annexes.]

179. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, November 21, 1978

Summary of Talks

The thaw in our relations with Brazil facilitated a more open and frank dialogue than occurred in last year's planning talks.² While not hesitating to criticize aspects of our global policies, the Brazilians seemed generally to appreciate our basic thrusts on East-West, African and hemispheric issues. On North-South issues, they continued to display the ambiguous position of wanting increased participation in international decision-making as befits an emerging power while not wanting to be excluded from any benefits extended to LDCs. The sensitive bilateral issues of nuclear non-proliferation and military cooperation were omitted from the talks. We raised human rights in a global and Soviet context, and it was interesting to note how little the Brazilians disagreed with our position. The talks ended with a friendly meeting with Foreign Minister Silveira.

Discussion

Brazil is actively seeking to expand its ties and influence outside of the hemisphere, into Western Europe, Africa and the Middle East. They are searching for commercial ties—for new markets and sources of oil supply—as well as for diversified political relations. While they generally seemed to share our perceptions, it was also clear that, in each case, they would pursue their own perceived interests. As with DeGaulle, Brazil seeks tactical friends but not allies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 4, TL 11/16-30, 1978. Confidential. Drafted on November 16 by Feinberg, cleared by Ruser. Forwarded to Brzezinski under a November 28 covering memorandum from Pastor. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 5, Brazil, 1978)

² See Document 168.

On African issues, the Brazilians recognized that they benefitted from our efforts, and expressed concern at Cuban activities. At the same time, they seemed to prefer to avoid engaging themselves in the Cuban issue, arguing that only the US could bring sufficient pressure to bear on the USSR to moderate Cuban behavior. (On Angola, the Brazilians opined that a reduction in border tensions might give less ideological elements within the MPLA greater ascendancy.)

The Brazilians expressed great concern over a remark in a recent speech by Fred Bergsten classifying Brazil as an “advanced developing country,”³ fearing that should this concept become a formalized category, such countries could be excluded from future policies benefitting LDCs. They also suggested that this categorization could be an attempt to break them off from the G-77. In fact, the Brazilians argued, the G-77 has moderated its tone, implying that Brazil deserved some credit for this development. On the Common Fund, the Brazilians reported that the Latins have been leaning against the more radical African demands, and our willingness to make even a nominal contribution to the second window was seen as key to facilitating an agreement.

The Brazilians cited the Bonn Summit as a case where their interests were involved and LDC participation lacking.⁴ Nevertheless, they had no specific proposals for increasing their participation in global decision-making, and recognized that their LDC *bone fides* would be jeopardized by too close association with certain developed country institutions. The Brazilians were emphatic in stating that their increasing integration into the global economy was an historical inevitability.

Our hemispheric policies were well received. Our greater attention to the region, recognition and tolerance of diversity, and ability to see issues outside of an East-West prism were all praised. The Brazilians seemed to appreciate that diversity strengthens the West.

Sao Paulo

A day of meetings with non-governmental leaders in Sao Paulo exposed us to the exhilarating process of political liberation now underway. After Sao Paulo voted against the government party in 1974, Geisel began political reforms, to try to normalize relations between Brazilia and the country’s industrial center. Concern now exists as to whether president-elect Figueirido—Geisel’s personal choice—has the

³ Bergsten addressed The Conference Board in New York on June 5. (Hobart Rowen, “U.S. Exports Still Compete, Bergsten Says,” *Washington Post*, June 6, 1978, p. D7)

⁴ For the economic questions covered at the Bonn Economic Summit Meeting of the G-7, July 16–17, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 157, and *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 145–148.

ability and temperament to guide the liberalization process, although most observers doubted that the process could be capped. We were pleased to find that US foreign policy was not an issue in the November 15 congressional elections. Liberals appreciate our moral support, but no one expected or feared that we would try to intervene on anyone's behalf.

180. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 1, 1978

SUBJECT

Meeting with Chaves

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the Vice President.² It suggests that the Vice President use the opportunity of his meeting³ with Chaves to try to set a new tone for our relationship with the new administration in Brazil. I suspect the visit with the Vice President will be primarily protocolary in nature, and so I suggest that you use your half-hour before to try to get to know something more about what the new administration in Brazil wants to do, and how they view the US.⁴ I suspect that the new administration really wants to improve its overall relationship with the US, and there is some evidence to suggest that they may be reviewing their nuclear policies. While I don't believe that the reason for this review is to accommodate us, I feel reasonably certain that they are aware that will be the consequence, and I don't believe they are displeased by that fact. I also believe the new administration is committed to political liberalization, and while I am not so certain about how much a democrat Figueiredo is, I suspect that Chaves is personally and deeply committed to liberalization. I think we want to be encouraging of this process, without being condescending.

¹ Source: Carter Library, White House Central File, Subject File, Confidential, Box CO-13, Folder CO 22 1/20/77-1/20/81. Confidential. Sent for action.

² Not attached. The memorandum, dated December 4, is *ibid.*

³ Pastor wrote in the right-hand margin, "(Dec 5)."

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrases "I suggest" and "you use your half-hour before to try to get to know."

Knowing your views about the importance of strong relationships with key regional powers, it might be helpful to remember Kissinger's problem with trying to develop a "special relationship" with Brazil. Nixon and Kissinger both singled out in their statements Brazil as a special partner of the US. (Nixon said, "As Brazil goes, so goes Latin America.") The strategy backfired, generating just as much suspicion about US motives among the Brazilians, many of whom are suspicious to start with, as among Latin Americans.

In fact, I would argue that it is more in our interest for Brazil to play the role of a Third World leader, independent of the US, than as an emerging power which has a special relationship with the US. The North-South Dialogue is not going to go away, and frankly, I would prefer to have Brazil on the other side of the table, moderating the G-77, than in limbo in-between. Moreover, Brazil is still a military dictatorship, and while we want to encourage a public perception of Brazil as a society which is undergoing rapid political liberalization, still, we should not ignore the very strong public perception of Brazil as being ruled by generals, which, of course, it is.

But Chaves is a civilian, an engineer, and a well respected politician. I recommend that you ask him what conclusion he draws from the recent campaign and election, and how that will affect the new administration. I think it will be extremely useful for you also to give him a briefing of US global policies. Ambassador Sayre also suggests that you or the Vice President also ask him about how he envisages the relationship between the new Congress and the new Administration in the light of the repeal of the emergency powers of Institutional Act no. 5.⁵

Chaves has said that he personally admires you, and is known to even quote from you in impromptu speeches, which is something that you don't even do, though I always do.⁶

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I, with the biography at Tab A, and State's talking points at Tab B, to the Vice President.⁷

⁵ Telegram 9308 from Brasilia, November 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492-1040)

⁶ Brzezinski underlined the phrase "that you don't even do" and wrote in the left-hand margin, "I don't quote myself!"

⁷ Brzezinski checked the approve option. At the bottom of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, "original of Tab I given to Denis Clift for V.P." Tabs A and B were not found attached.

181. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, March 26, 1979, 2117Z

2637. Subject: Conversation Between Vice President Mondale and Brazilian President Figueiredo

1. S-Entire text.

2. Following is memorandum of conversation of March 22 between Vice President Mondale and Brazilian President Figueiredo. Meeting took place in Brazilian President's Office in the Planalto at 1530 March 22 and ended at 1630.

3. Tone of meeting was unusually friendly and President Figueiredo was very forthcoming and spontaneous although we know that he was briefed beforehand on several specific points in accordance with a list of topics we had provided the Foreign Ministry (State 069060).²

4. The President began the meeting by expressing appreciation for the visit of Mrs. Mondale who had headed, with Ray Marshall, the US delegation to the inauguration of the President.³ He also referred to the letter and telephone call from President Carter.⁴ He appreciated the picture. He welcomed the visit of the Vice President. He said that he interpreted all of these acts as a strong desire on the part of the United States to strengthen the traditional friendship and cooperation between the United States and Brazil, which he reciprocated.

5. The Vice President said that these words were well received. The United States wanted the best possible relationship with Brazil and President Carter wanted a strong relationship with the new Brazilian administration. President Carter wanted to meet personally with President Figueiredo and he extended an invitation to President Figueiredo

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790144-1049. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² March 20. Potential bilateral issues for conversation included "maintenance and strengthening of the consultation process, including energy cooperation, agriculture cooperation and trade. The Vice President would also be prepared to discuss the consular convention and the tax treaty in very general terms, indicating our hope that these things will progress. We do not wish to raise either the Peace Corps item or the security issues." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790128-0944)

³ Joan Mondale and Marshall traveled to Brazil March 14-16 for Figueiredo's inauguration. (Telegram 2294 from Brasilia, March 16, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790121-0827)

⁴ Joan Mondale delivered Carter's March 7 letter of congratulations to Figueiredo on his inauguration. Figueiredo's March 20 reply was transmitted in telegram 70402 to Brasilia, March 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790131-0839)

to visit the United States on a state visit and suggested that the US summer might be a good time. (At this point the Vice President handed President Figueiredo a letter from President Carter inviting him to visit the United States in the summer or autumn of 1979.)⁵

6. President Figueiredo said that he was very honored with these words and that President Carter's wish was also his. He said that the United States and Brazil had always been staunch friends and that he wanted to keep it that way. He said that he could not be precise on when he would visit the United States but that it would be a privilege to accept the invitation. He wanted it to be truly an objective visit (which we took to mean not protocolary) and that he was looking forward to talking to President Carter. He understood that President Carter was very businesslike and he appreciated that. He also said that we would work through diplomatic channels on a date and on preparations for dealing with the issues.

7. The Vice President said that President Carter had asked him to tell the Brazilian President that the United States was pleased that Brazil had decided to send its former Foreign Minister to the United States as Ambassador and he officially extended the agreement. President Figueiredo said that he appreciated this prompt response from President Carter. (The Brazilian Government announced the appointment on March 23.) The Vice President said that Ambassador Silveira knew the United States very well and the current issues in our relations. He also noted that Secretary Vance knew Foreign Minister Guerreiro. So he thought that these appointments of the Figueiredo administration boded well for US/Brazilian relations.

8. The Vice President then asked President Figueiredo how he saw the memorandum of understanding of 1976, the sub-groups that had been created under it, and the nature of the consultation between the US and Brazil. President Figueiredo said that he wanted to intensify the consultation. He noted that the three active groups were on agriculture, energy, and trade and finance. He wanted the ones on agriculture and energy to meet more often.

9. The Vice President said that he was pleased to hear this and he agreed on the usefulness of the consultation on trade and finance because this was exceedingly important. He thought that Brazil had made an unusually strong contribution at the MTN which would not have been possible but for the close relationship between Secretary Blumenthal and Secretary Simonsen. He also noted that trade was a highly political matter and that it needed constant and unceasing

⁵ Dated March 20. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Brazil, 1979–1980)

attention. He then proposed a visit of the President's adviser on science and technology (Frank Press). He suggested that this would immediately intensify the work of the energy subgroup. The Vice President gave equal emphasis to transfer of technology and energy and said that the group that Mr. Press brought with him should be in areas in which Brazil expressed a specific interest. He suggested that the details be worked out through diplomatic channels (i.e., the US Embassy and the Foreign Ministry).⁶

10. President Figueiredo said that he agreed with the Vice President's words on trade and finance. He was well aware of the close consultation and he appreciated the Vice President's words on Brazil's role at the MTN. He only wanted to emphasize that the two problems with which his administration had to grapple immediately were agriculture and energy. We must feed our people, he said, and therefore we must do better on agriculture. And we have to have alternative sources of energy. As you know we import 80 percent of our energy used for transport. We rely heavily on hydro power for industry but that is not inexhaustible. We are also working on nuclear energy. So we must press on these two areas and we would welcome working with you if you are interested. He said that he was also interested in renewable energy sources (biomass).

11. The Vice President said the United States would go to work immediately on this. We were also interested in biomass and the other sources of energy and he was certain that the Brazilian President knew the views of the United States on nuclear energy.

12. The Vice President then said that he wanted the Brazilian President to know that President Carter was impressed with the Brazilian President's inaugural address.⁷ As farm boys, both President Carter and he welcomed the words on agriculture. But he wanted the Brazilian President to know that President Carter especially welcomed the passages on democratic government and human rights. The Brazilian President addressed himself to this point after the Vice President had briefed him on international issues by saying that he was pleased to hear that President Carter had read his speech and was happy with his words on democracy and human rights. He appreciated that there might have been some abuses during administrations over the past fifteen years but such acts had never been the policy of these administrations. Rather

⁶ Press visited Brazil October 10–12, 1979. (Telegram 8788 from Lima National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790471-0683)

⁷ Figueiredo's inaugural address, March 15, "reaffirmed his earlier promise to make Brazil a democracy and stressed his determination to improve the material well being of all Brazilians." (Telegram 2363 from Brasilia, March 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790127-0772)

these isolated acts had been a response by security forces to subversion. He also said that his comments on agriculture and social programs in general were made in keeping with his own strongly held views that Brazil must do better for the poorer people.

13. The Vice President briefed the Brazilian President on US policy and actions in the Middle East, on SALT, the PRC and Cuba. The details of the briefing on the first three will not be repeated here because they are well known to the recipients of this memorandum. Because the Vice President had received earlier in the day a lukewarm response from the foreign minister to his representations on Cuba, he pressed very hard on this issue. His general line was that the world community should not reward the irresponsibility of Cuba by giving it a seat on the Security Council.

14. President Figueiredo said that Brazil could only applaud President Carter's courage and persistence on the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and he was pleased that this had borne fruit. Brazil had always favored pacific settlement of disputes. But given the political instability in Iran on which Brazil depended for oil, Brazil's general dependence on Arabian oil, etc., that Brazil had to be very cautious on any public statements.

15. On Cuba, the Brazilian President said that he regretted Cuba's attitude, its export of revolution, and its violation of the principle of self-determination of people. He was against Cuban troops in Africa or anywhere else. Personally he did not like the idea of Cuba on the Security Council but he would have to consult the foreign minister on what Brazil might do. The less we see of Cuba on the international scene, the President concluded, the better.

16. On China, he said that Brazil agreed. Brazil also had trade interests in China which it intended to pursue.

17. The Brazilian President said that Brazil will support US efforts on disarmament. You should not expect perfect results, he said. With specific reference to SALT, he said that we should avail ourselves of Breshnev's good will.

18. The Vice President then said that he had one private matter which he wanted to discuss with the Brazilian President and at that point the respective staffs withdrew.⁸ During this interim, Ambassador Sayre cleared with the Brazilian Foreign Minister language which would permit the Vice President to state that President Carter had

⁸ Mondale offered Figueiredo occasional intelligence briefings on world events. (Memorandum From Aaron to Clift, March 20; Memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski and attachment, March 20; Draft cable from Mondale to Carter, undated; Carter Library, Donated Historical Material: Mondale, Walter, Box 44, Foreign Countries: Brazil, 1979–80)

extended an invitation to President Figueiredo to visit the United States and that the Brazilian President had accepted with details to be worked out through diplomatic channels. The Ambassador also agreed with the Foreign Minister that the Brazilian government was free to announce at a time of its choosing the appointment of Ambassador Silveira to Washington. Ambassador Sayre had obtained agreement from the Foreign Minister at lunch that the Vice President could announce the visit of Frank Press at a time to be worked out through diplomatic channels. The Ambassador also discussed the possibility of negotiating tax and consular treaties with the foreign minister at lunch and the latter agreed that we should work on these through the normal channels, i.e., treasury and Fazenda on the tax treaty and the Embassy and foreign relations on the consular convention.

Sayre

182. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, March 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Strike in Sao Paulo² (U)

Ambassador Sayre has provided a number of good arguments for why we should adopt a more relaxed position with regard to the Sao

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Brazil, 1979–1980. Confidential. Sent for action. Sent through Clift, who did not initial the memorandum. A handwritten notation indicates that it was also sent through Aaron.

² Three metal workers' unions in Sao Paulo were on strike during Mondale's visit to Brazil, March 21–23. The Brazilian government intervened to halt the strike on March 23. (Telegram 2636 from Brasilia, March 26, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790140-0141)

Paulo metal worker's strike.³ We agree with most of his points. The problem has been cooled-down, but one cannot be certain whether the government will continue to behave in a restrained manner. We believe that it is necessary for us to register our concern not only because of the coincidence of Figueiredo's decision and your trip, but also to encourage restraint in the future. (C)

We don't believe it would be helpful, as we originally envisaged, for Sayre to convey your concern directly to Figueiredo, but we would recommend the following three actions:

—Sayre should be instructed to use an appropriate opportunity with an appropriate official of the government of Brazil to make clear how the action of the Figueiredo government is likely to be viewed internationally. Labor rights are, of course, an important element in human rights, and Figueiredo's forthright inaugural address therefore includes this concern.⁴ The decision to intervene in the metal workers' union could be viewed internationally as detracting from that commitment, and would therefore be a source of concern to all those countries that view Brazil's positive steps toward liberalization. (C)

—We understand that there have been some press reports suggesting that you spoke to Figueiredo about this labor strike, and implying that we condoned the decision. If the Embassy is asked, it should make clear publicly that this issue was not discussed with you, and we do not condone such actions.⁵ (C)

—Our consul-general in Sao Paulo should follow developments closely and should use appropriate opportunities to show U.S. support for labor rights. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, we will convey these three points in a message from you to Ambassador Sayre.⁶

³ In telegram 705 from Brasilia to the White House Situation Room, March 27, Sayre explained that Figueiredo's "first priority is to bring the rate of inflation under control." Sayre noted that the Brazilian government considered the strike to be "technically illegal," that "the government's intervention in the three unions was in accordance with Brazilian law," and that negotiations among labor, management and government were continuing. Sayre commented, "the government has, on the whole, acted with restraint. I see no departure in this action from what President Figueiredo committed himself to publicly on democratic government nor in what he repeated to you personally. Nor do I agree that this action casts any shadow on your visit." He concluded, "I do not think it would be advisable for us to interject ourselves into this internal matter." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 5, Brazil, 1979–1980)

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 181.

⁵ Aaron highlighted this paragraph and wrote in the margin, "Mr. Vice President—I would stick with this. Otherwise, letter from Figueiredo or the Teamsters. DA"

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

183. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, August 24, 1979, 1430Z

7525. Subject: Demarche on Brazilian Assistance to Nicaragua. Ref: A) State 219651,² B) State 211262,³ C) State 211259.⁴

1. S—Entire text

2. Summary: I met with Brazilian Foreign Minister evening August 23 and reviewed with him in detail Nicaraguan situation and our strategy for achieving successful outcome. Brazil is already making small economic contribution and is keeping close watch on developments. But Foreign Minister said on military assistance that “Nicaragua was not a part of our thinking.” Nevertheless, he promised to discuss within Brazilian government and give me prompt response. End summary.

3. I called on Brazilian Foreign Minister at 4:00 pm. August 23 and spent an hour with him on non-aligned meeting and Nicaragua. I briefed him in general on Secretary’s meetings in Quito (State 211259 and State 211262) and went over in detail comments State 219651. Foreign Minister did not raise any questions on our analysis of situation or strategy.

4. On economic side Brazil is sending this week Varig 707 full of supplies to Nicaragua.

5. Foreign Minister said Brazilian military is reluctant to become involved because it is inclined to see leftist extremist outcome in Nicaragua with repercussions elsewhere. Guerreiro said he had argued that if Latin countries did not help it would help to assure that outcome. I reinforced this argument. He said military aid had not been within Brazilian thinking on Nicaragua. I stressed that only US and Brazil within OAS had capability to supply equipment and provide training. Others such as Cuba would only be pass through for other suppliers.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790386-0853. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to Managua and for information to Panama City, San Jose, Tegucigalpa, Guatemala City, Caracas, and San Salvador.

² In telegram 219651, August 21, the Department instructed Sayre “to make a demarche to the GOB at the highest level for the purpose of describing our views of current developments in the Nicaraguan situation, the role the U.S. is playing and the course it intends to pursue, and the role of third countries.” The Department wanted “to encourage Brazil to contribute assistance, and we believe that it may be particularly well positioned to offer military assistance to the Nicaraguan government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790382-0419)

³ See Document 47.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 47.

He asked if US would supply as last resort and I replied US sending team to assess situation and I assumed we would try to be helpful but we wanted other OAS members pick up this requirement.

6. I noted current Panamanian effort and fact this tended to occupy ground but said Panama did not have capability to sustain military aid very long as opposed to much stronger capability on police training. Given Cuban activity, I said, time was of essence in giving GNR some sense that countries other than Cuba would help in meeting legitimate security concerns.

7. Foreign Minister asked about attitude of Venezuela and I told him Venezuelan President had taken more positive attitude after need had been explained to him.⁵ Foreign Minister said that he would discuss within government but he left me with impression that Brazil was reluctant to become involved.

Sayre

⁵ See Document 365.

184. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State¹

Brasilia, January 29, 1980, 0720Z

641. Subject: Goodpaster Mission to Brazil: Assessment.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. My one-day visit to Brasilia January 28 was more positive in its tone and results than I had expected.² President Figueiredo stated that Brazil would stand with the United States, as it had in past emergencies,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800050-0744. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

² Goodpaster was sent to Argentina and Brazil for talks regarding “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the counter measures taken by the Western nations and the grains and soybean curtailment and how this issue relates to Brazil.” (Telegram 21798 to Rio de Janeiro, January 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800044-1079) Goodpaster’s conversation with Figueiredo is summarized in telegram 642 from Brasilia, January 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800050-0777)

when the world situation required. Recalling Brazil's contribution in World War II, he said there should be no doubt that Brazil was a friend, by tradition one of our firmest allies. He also made clear, however, his grave concerns over Brazil's economic situation, and especially its very great dependence on Middle East oil. He stressed that he was always open to consultations, which he hoped could encompass the economic situation.

3. Soybean exports. During my talks, I focussed on Brazil's soybean export policy in the context of our suspension of agricultural exports and the range of other measures in response to Afghanistan. I stressed the political and economic importance that Brazil not undermine the US embargo. Figueiredo stated categorically that Brazil had no intention to take advantage of our action by sharply expanding exports to the Soviet Union; Brazil preferred to keep its traditional export markets. US policy on soybeans, however, was critical. Brazil would like to request that the US take steps to ensure that world soybean prices be maintained and that Brazil's export markets not be damaged by US soybean supplies withheld from the Soviet Union. We proposed that specific consultations be held among agricultural experts to address this problem.

4. Afghanistan. President Figueiredo clearly shared our perception of the dangers flowing from the Soviet invasion; his Foreign Minister's reaction, with whom I discussed the implications of the Soviet move at great length, was more qualified.³ Figueiredo voiced concern over Western oil supplies, should the Soviets be tempted to move beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and the need for a show of Western solidarity and strength. He appreciated Churchill's phrase that the Soviets seek the fruits of war without the costs of war.

5. To both the President and Foreign Minister Guerreiro I emphasized that our policy toward the Soviets had changed in fundamental ways as the result of recent events, that the Soviets had made a serious miscalculation, and that we intended to stay the course. Guerreiro, while not disagreeing with our analysis of the strategic implications, tended to place greater stress on the antecedents of the Soviet invasion (that is, preceding Soviet involvement in the country), and (perhaps for tactical reasons) pursued the question of a possible Soviet withdrawal after the objective of installing a new government had been accomplished. His thesis was that the range of action the US had taken was necessary and important to deter further Soviet moves, that Islam and the Islamic revolution were a bulwark against Soviet penetration,

³ Goodpaster's conversation with Guerreiro is summarized in telegram 707 from Brasilia, January 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800053-0584)

and that a principal contribution Brazil could make (given its relative weakness and great vulnerability) was to maintain and strengthen its relations with the Arab regimes. But Guerreiro and his associates were clearly impressed with the seriousness of the US purpose, our analysis of the dangers, and the range of measures the administration has taken.

6. Brazil's vulnerability. This clearly has become a central concern of the Brazilian leadership, as of the public. Figueiredo in some detail gave the grim statistics of Brazil's trade balance and dependence on foreign oil. In an exchange of unusual candor, Guerreiro raised the possibility of Soviet oil in exchange for soybeans, and, in private conversation, the Brazilian officials acknowledged their great dependence on Iraq and Iran. We pointed out the Soviet Union's own precarious petroleum situation, and there was agreement that the Soviets were an intermittent, unreliable supplier. From my talks, I believe there may be a need for candid economic consultations at a high level which address these issues and demonstrate to the Figueiredo administration our comprehension and concern for their dilemma. Perhaps Planning Minister Delfim Netto's forthcoming visit to the United States would be an opportunity for such consultations.⁴

7. Security relations. I also broached in a general way the security of the South Atlantic and the desirability of closer cooperation. President Figueiredo and Foreign Minister Guerreiro did not respond directly. Figueiredo, however, perhaps significantly, referred to Brazil's military weakness. Foreign Minister Guerreiro affirmed that Brazil was interested in consultations and the resumption of military support—although, of course, without returning to the institutional arrangements and agreements of former times. I believe the postponed visit of Admiral Hansen (Staff Director of the JCS) for security talks should be rescheduled at a mutually convenient date.⁵ (I understand the resumption of FMS is in principle agreed within the USG.)

8. Consultations on Global issues. In addition to Admiral Hansen's visit, we discussed a rescheduling of the policy planning talks. There was agreement that the talks were valuable and should be held at an early date.⁶

High

⁴ In telegram 293912 to Brasilia, November 3, the Department noted that Delfim was scheduled to meet with Miller on November 3. (Telegram 293912 to Brasilia, November 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800526-0880)

⁵ Hanson was scheduled to visit Brazil April 14–17. (Telegram 2335 from Brasilia, March 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800157-0593) A record of his meetings there was not found.

⁶ Planning talks were held on March 24–25. See Document 186.

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil¹

Washington, March 8, 1980, 2008Z

63112. Subject: Rebuilding A Security Relationship With Brazil

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. This cable lays out an agreed rationale for rebuilding our security relationship with Brazil, general goals of such a relationship and a proposed package of military initiatives to be implemented during the remainder of CY 1980 for the purpose of facilitating the accomplishment of these goals. The mission is authorized to seek Brazilian cooperation in the implementation of the initiatives outlined in this cable. Major FMS transactions would, of course, require appropriate notification of the US congress. End summary.

3. Since 1977, when the then-existing military agreements were terminated by the GOB, military relations have been exceedingly limited.² The current world security situation and the political “opening” in Brazil are conducive to US action to rebuild our security relationship. This process has been begun with our improved security dialogue and the upgrading of US and Brazilian service attaches to general/flag rank.

4. Additional steps are necessary, however, given Brazil’s growing importance to the U.S. in the security area because of its:

—Geographic location in relation to important shipping lanes in the South Atlantic;

—Pivotal role as second largest military establishment in the Western Hemisphere in OAS and Rio Treaty security and in any regional arms restraint initiatives;

—Military capabilities, especially its roles as the major armed force in South America and as a major naval power in the South Atlantic;

—Rapidly developing arms industry and arms export capabilities, especially directed toward third world markets;

—Long-term programs in advanced technology with military applications, such as its nuclear and space launch vehicle programs; and

—Growing heavy industrial capabilities, such as its substantial shipbuilding capacity.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800120-0960. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Ruser and Eisner; cleared by Bowdler, Bushnell, Eaton, Thornton, and Nimetz and in PM, S/P, L/PM, DOD/ISA, ARA/RPP, PM/SAS, H, T, ACDA, PM/ISO, PM/ISP, and HA; approved by Newsom.

² See Documents 163 and 167.

5. Our goals include:

- Restore Brazilian understanding of the U.S. determination to maintain the military strength of the West;

- Reestablish Brazilian confidence in the U.S. as a reliable security partner;

- Expand mutual sensitivity to shared security concerns including increased Soviet naval activity in the South Atlantic;

- Secure Brazilian cooperation in surveillance of the South Atlantic, such as base support for ad hoc [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and the upgrading of the Brazilian Navy's surveillance capabilities:

- Promote in Brazil's officer corps an understanding of the United States, of the values and principles underlying US foreign policy and of US military doctrine; and

- At the same time, increase U.S. sensitivity to Brazil's own interests and growing security ties to other third world nations.

6. To accomplish the above, the USG will seek to take the following military initiatives with Brazil during the remainder of calendar year 1980:

A. Visits

- USAF Chief of Staff to visit Brazil in March;

- VADM Hanson, Director of the Joint Staff, to meet with EMFA officials in Brasilia, in early April;

- Brazilian Air Force Chief of Staff to be invited to U.S. in April;

- US Army Chief of Staff to invite Brazilian Army Chief of Staff in August;

- Possible visit by commandant of army command and staff school (ECEME) to Ft. Leavenworth; and

- Encourage orientation visits to U.S. by Brazilian Military schools;

- USAF briefing team to visit Brazilian air command and staff college (ECEMAR).

B. Exercises

- Brazilian Navy/Marine Corps invited to participate in readex 2–80 in July–August;

- Brazilian army invited to send observers to reforger exercise in September; and

- Unitas XXI—July–November;

- Possible invitation to Brazilian Air Force to USAF red flag exercise.

C. Exchanges

- Support for the ambassador's long-term goal of a significantly expanded exchange program.

—USMC to accept Brazilian Marine Corps offer to send an officer to US as part of PEP;

—US Air Force to initiate a personnel exchange program; and

—US Army to expand PEP (Brazilian Army, however, should fill current vacant PEP slots).

D. FMS sales and commercial sales. Such sales would be in conformance with PD-13 guidelines. We are prepared to consider favorably.

—Brazilian interest in purchasing FMS training;

—Brazilian interest in purchasing FMS equipment;

—Brazilian requests to purchase munitions control items; and

—Particular consideration will be given to Brazilian interest in upgrading its Air Force and naval surveillance capabilities.

E. Other Initiatives

—US Army marksmanship detachment visit tentatively scheduled for September–December;

—Cinclant to explore providing two helicopters to lift heavy equipment required for construction of an air facility on Trindade Island;

—The US Navy to explore increased ship visits to Brazil;

—Invite visit of Brazilian naval training ship;

—Follow-up on joint USN-Brazilian Navy research effort along the South Atlantic ocean ridge and other cooperative scientific undertakings;

—Possible USAF Thunderbird visits; and

—Brazilian participation in world wide naval control of shipping CPX.

7. In the implementation of these programs, our long-term interest is improved security relations with Brazil, and to the extent future conditions permit, laying a basis for Brazilian cooperation in supporting shared security interests in the Atlantic. While we should not single out Brazil for a special security relationship, our objective is to restore cooperative relations with a new degree of mutual respect and support.

8. The mission is authorized to cooperate with appropriate Brazilian government and armed services officials to encourage and develop visits and exchange programs. FMS purchases of training and equipment are authorized, subject to arms restraints policy guidelines of PD-13³ (as amplified in 77 State 207984 and 77 State 252478, the MASM

³ For PD-13, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271. Telegram 207984 to All Diplomatic Posts, August 31, 1977, provided guidance for posts in implementing PD-13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770314-0926) (C) Telegram 252478 to All Diplomatic Posts, October 21, 1977, provided further guidance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770390-1146) (C)

and other policy guidance and directives). Where required, appropriate consultations with and notification of the US Congress will be made prior to any final offer. Invitations to and availability of specific training opportunities will be addressed by services in SepTels.

9. This message is for internal guidance. The USG initiatives and favorable responses to Brazilian interests are intended to establish, gradually and on the basis of step-by-step actions, the credibility of our desire to rebuild a mutually beneficial security relationship. At the same time, there remains the issue of whether we should now begin to engage appropriate Brazilian officials in a dialogue on our desire to rebuild an appropriate relationship in the security area, and the manner and timing of doing so. The Ambassador, if and when and to the extent he considers this opportune and desirable, is authorized; a) to convey to GOB in general terms US interest in fostering a mutually beneficial relationship in the security area suitable to present and prospective conditions; b) to share the nature of the actions we contemplate over the next ten months toward that objective; and c) to begin a dialogue with appropriate GOB officials on the possible nature of this new and evolving relationship.

Vance

186. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 24, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S.-Brazilian Policy Planning Talks, March 24–25, 1980

Summary of Talks

The continuing improvement in our relations with Brazil facilitated a friendly and candid exchange of opinions at the March 24–25 U.S.-Brazilian Policy Planning Talks. While there was a willingness to cooperate with the US in several areas, on many issues Brazil's perceptions and interests were clearly different from our own. Brazil, while indicat-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 6, TL 4/16-30, 1980. Confidential. Drafted by Purcell; cleared by Eisner.

ing that it would avoid undercutting US efforts to deter Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, was concerned that increasing East-West tensions could adversely affect the West's attention to the needs of developing nations and Brazil's flexibility in pursuing a diversified foreign policy. Although seeing itself as relatively more pragmatic than most LDC's, the Brazilians identified with the South on economic issues, since identification with the North is perceived to produce increased burdens and decreased economic privileges. Within Latin America, Brazil emphasized the need to address the area's economic weakness. While Brazil has traditionally been cautious in hemispheric political affairs, it sees itself evolving toward greater responsiveness to requests from the area for economic assistance and it wishes to have closer relations with the principal Latin America countries and groupings.

Discussion

East-West Relations and the Middle/East Southwest Asia

The Brazilians shared our concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but believe that the US and Western Europe have primary responsibility for dealing with it. The Brazilians also observed that our policy of economic sanctions was not related to the causes of the crisis. Although Brazil plans to cooperate with our efforts in a limited way, it is skeptical that our policy will modify Soviet behavior. The weakening of the spirit of Detente and the apparent disarray of the Western alliance are disturbing to them since they reduce Brazil's flexibility in pursuing a diversified foreign policy. As a country that identifies with both the West and the Third World, Brazil would like the US to use the Afghanistan crisis to strengthen the links between the West and the South.

We argued strongly on the need for a collective effort to increase the costs of the Afghan invasion to the Soviets and that deterrence was vital for building any stable East-West relationship. We stressed that while there were costs to individual countries from the policy course we proposed, the US was accepting these and we believed others should as well if the Soviet Union was to feel its effect.

International Economic Situation and the Petroleum Outlook

As one of the more industrialized developing countries, Brazil feels it gets the worst of both worlds. It is ineligible for the aid given the poorest countries, while admission to the group of developed countries brings Brazil more responsibilities than rewards. Brazil identifies more frequently with the Third World than with the industrialized North, and fears an increasingly defensive and protectionist Northern posture toward newly industrializing countries. On energy matters, Brazil was apprehensive that the North would cooperate with the petroleum-

producing countries, to the detriment of the countries of the South that do not have petroleum. Brazil believes that the energy problem could be partially ameliorated through increased South-South cooperation. The Brazilians believe, however, that any fundamental solution to the energy problem is dependent on a resolution of the Middle East conflict.

We stated that the US can support the North-South dialogue when LDC demands are specific and beneficial to both North and South. Massive transfers of resources to the LDCs will be difficult given anticipated slow growth of the global economy.

Latin America and the Caribbean

The Brazilians expressed concern over the growing instability in Central America and the Caribbean and the possibility of exploitation by Cuba and countries outside the region. We shared Brazil's concern and were supportive of increased Brazilian attention to, and involvement with, the area. Brazil is reluctant to play an active role in the Caribbean basin in view of its historical lack of involvement in the area but it is evolving toward being responsive to requests for assistance, particularly from Nicaragua. In South America, Brazil has focused its attention until now on the Southern Cone, but the emergence of the Andean Group and the importance of Venezuela's petroleum have encouraged Brazil to show more interest in its northern neighbors. Brazil also believes closer relations with Argentina are important, but at the same time does not want to isolate Chile. Despite differences of interest and perspective between Brazil and the U.S., the Brazilians believe that our recent policies in Latin America are more sensitive to the region's concerns than in the past.

Chile

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, February 16, 1977, 1545Z

1328. Subject: Strategy Paper for the Promotion of Human Rights. Ref: A) State 034069,² B) Santiago 0487³

1. Summary: The Embassy's goals for improved human rights practices in Chile remain those discussed in Ref B; the restoration of the due process protection for citizens; the abolition of DINA or its subjection to adequate controls; and the acceptance by the GOC of responsible internal inspection. The restoration of due process and elimination of DINA would also eliminate disappearances. Since either or both will be difficult of achievement, we believe the elimination of disappearances should be a separate objective. The impact on the GOC of such changes would be great. We judge that it would be possible to effect them in a reasonable time without imperiling Chile's internal security. Over time, such changes would contribute to the reestablishment of Chile's traditional political freedoms, at least to some degree. End summary.

2. Changes to be sought in priority order:

(A) Restoration of normal due process for protection of citizens; put more positively and in terms less objectionable to the GOC, this objective can be characterized as abolition of the GOC's emergency authority. In any case, "due process," would have to entail, for example, the end of arbitrary presidential authority under state of siege to detain persons indefinitely without charge, or to undertake other repressive measures under the rationale of national security. The restoration might be phased, perhaps in conjunction with regular reduction in emergency authority. But the terms would have to be clear, so that the aim could not be thwarted by legal obfuscation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D77055-0611. Confidential; Immediate.

² Dated February 15. In preparation for a paper on "promotion of human rights in the region," ARA asked: "What specific changes should we ask of the GOC to improve its human rights practices in priority order. What would be the effect on the GOC internally if all or some of these policies were implemented?" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770053-1075)

³ Dated January 18. The Embassy reported on Chilean human rights during 1976 and suggested the U.S. study a "two-pronged approach, distinguishing between procedural protection and due process for the individual on the one hand, and movement toward a more open, participatory society on the other." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770018-1102)

(B) Abolish or restrict DINA: DINA has the dual functions of coordinating the overall GOC intelligence effort, and internal security. The first function is legitimate and could be transferred to a new body. But normal police functions should be carried out by the regular police, under secure institutional control, and not by a secret police with near omnipotent powers and responsibility only to the President.

(C) End of disappearances: if we are successful in achieving the reestablishment of due process and the abolition of DINA, the problem of the disappearance of opponents of the regime would itself disappear. We have no illusions about how difficult it will be to convince the GOC to reestablish due process and eliminate DINA. The latter will be particularly difficult. In the meantime, we should focus on the problems of disappearances, since it may be possible to make progress without affecting the institutional changes required in A and B. Detentions resulting in disappearances are illegal even under the extensive authority granted the GOC under emergency legislation. The person is picked up, often without witnesses, and not heard of again. The government denies the detention, and since the chief detaining agency—the directorate of National Intelligence (DINA)—is protected by its National Security function, the civil courts cannot get a handle on them. With authorized preventive detention and torture (except for what may [have] happened to the disappeared) on the wane (see Ref B) the issue of the disappeared is most acute. Representation of a US position on disappearances would have to reach the highest level of government: President Pinochet (to whom DINA is directly responsible), the other junta members, and the senior army generals in Pinochet's entourage.

(D) Inspection by responsible international groups: with the secret police out of action and the citizen again able to protect his rights, responsible international groups could check to see that the system was self-regulating. It is important, of course, that the international bodies indeed be responsible.

3. Effect on the GOC internally if carried out over a reasonable period of time, these changes should not imperil the essential ability of the government to govern and maintain the domestic tranquility. In the long run such changes would tend to impel Chilean society in the direction of more openness and political participation. The Present regime will feel very threatened by this. In the short run, we would note the following impact:

(A) Disappearances: Illegal detentions remind people that the government can still be ruthless in suppressing subversion and dissent. But those problems can be handled in legal ways without undermining the government's essential authority.

(B) Due process: the restoration of full due process would make life more difficult for the government. It would have to adopt a different

style, seek broader support and inure itself to much more criticism. If carried out completely and immediately, the government's authority and ability to govern might be seriously affected.

(C) DINA: The efficiency of the GOC's anti-subversive measures would be affected, and the police would be considerably burdened. Political activity would increase, as would criticism of the government. Perhaps most important, whatever the importance of DINA in ensuring Pinochet's position as president, his position would be weakened.

(D) International investigating groups: they would act as guarantor for other changes and as such encourage those who would exploit the changes to engage in freer activity of various sorts—legitimate and otherwise.

Boyatt

188. Letter From President Carter to Former Chilean President Frei¹

Washington, March 2, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I want to express to you my personal regret for any embarrassment that the press reports, alleging that you have received payments from the Central Intelligence Agency, may have caused you or the people of Chile.² As you know, I have no control over the news media in our country, and I cannot prevent groundless assertions. I do want you to know, however, of my high personal esteem for you and for the people of Chile, and I trust that these malicious stories will not cast a shadow over our traditional friendship.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77. No classification marking.

² David Binder, "More Heads of State Are Reported To Have Received C.I.A. Payments," *New York Times*, February 19, 1977, p. 9. In a March 1 covering memorandum to Carter, attached but not printed, Brzezinski noted that the letter to Frei "is deliberately a little vaguer" than two other letters regarding similar allegations, because "there was some cooperation with Frei in the past." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77)

189. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 77-10044

Washington, March 8, 1977

CHILE: JUNTA SOLIDARITY

We believe the Chilean military junta is firmly in power and is unlikely to face a serious challenge to its authority over the next few months. There are longstanding differences among the junta members which could cause some strains, but anything as drastic as a breakup of the junta seems highly unlikely. Even if the junta should eventually fall apart, the position of President Pinochet, who is also commander in chief of the army, would probably not be threatened.

[9½ lines not declassified]

At the present time, Pinochet is seeking to modify the order of succession to guarantee that under any circumstances the army would hold the presidency. Under the present rules, a navy or air force officer could theoretically get the top job should the President retire or die. Pinochet also wants to institutionalize within the presidency:

—[3 lines not declassified]

—[1 line not declassified]

—[1½ lines not declassified]

[6 lines not declassified]

There have been some indications that Merino and Leigh are giving some thought to retiring, [3½ lines not declassified] any time soon. In any event, we believe that neither Merino's nor Leigh's departure would seriously weaken the President. The resignation of Leigh would, however, be of greater significance since it would clearly be for political reasons, and it might force Pinochet, for the first time, to do some political fence-mending.

The navy and air force will attempt to water down Pinochet's proposals, but probably will gain no more than small concessions. Pinochet is dealing from a position of vastly superior strength. He commands the army, whose military and political dominance are clear to all. Moreover he can point to considerable public support. We believe that serious challenge from the other services is unlikely.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 27. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis; coordinated with the Office of Economic Research [less than 1 line not declassified]. For an addendum to this memorandum, see Document 191.

Because of Pinochet's predominant position, we envision no fundamental change in junta policies in the near term, whether in the area of the economy or human rights. The junta believes that its economic policies—which it recognizes have been harsh—have produced demonstrable economic improvement. Last year's inflation rate, for example, was roughly half of that of 1975, and the balance of payments situation has also been encouraging. As for human rights, the officers genuinely believe that they have already done what they can to improve the situation. During the last year, some 2,700 political prisoners were released. The US embassy reports that of the 800 remaining political prisoners, only one is being held without charges, and it has heard of no cases of torture so far this year.² We believe further substantial improvement on the human rights front is unlikely.

² In telegram 487 from Santiago, January 18, the Embassy summarized human rights in Chile since the beginning of 1976 and recommended that the Carter administration "consider how U.S. influence can best be applied to encourage further steps toward the restoration of normal conditions in Chile." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770018-1102)

190. Letter from the Ambassador to Chile (Popper) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)¹

Santiago, March 8, 1977

Dear Phil:

During the last few weeks we here in Santiago have been carefully monitoring the unfolding of the Administration's new policy on human rights, as it has come to us through official statements and press and media commentary.² It is a landmark development.

It was a pleasure to read, this morning, the comprehensive and sensitive summary of the policy which the Deputy Secretary delivered

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Philip C. Habib Papers, Lot 81D5, PCH-Correspondence-Official, January-June, 1977. Confidential; Exdis. According to a stamped notation, the letter was received in P on March 15. A copy was sent to Todman. Habib wrote on the front of the letter: "Don Tice Show to Todman & Derian; Lamb draft a reply."

² Possible reference is to statements made at press conferences by Vance on January 31 and by Carter on February 23. ("Secretary Vance's News Conference of January 31," Department of State *Bulletin*, February 21, 1977, pp. 137-146; "President Carter's News Conference of February 23," Department of State *Bulletin*, March 21, 1977, pp. 251-255)

to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on March 7.³ His statement lays out succinctly what we are trying to do, the ways in which we will try to do it, and the difficulties involved. I will make sure that the text is made available to the appropriate officials and media representatives in Santiago.

As the six questions included in Secretary Christopher's statement indicate,⁴ the successful pursuit of our objectives will require great sophistication and sensitivity. Implicit in the six questions is another: how do we justify differential treatment as between various countries violating human rights?

This question is sharply posed by the experience in the Southern Cone. To the people down here, it looks as if the United States is limiting its human rights initiatives with respect to the Soviet Union and countries such as Uganda to condemnation and exhortation, without any substantive follow-through; at the same time, material penalties are imposed, through restrictions in U.S. aid, against other human rights violators who are weak, or unimportant to us. This morning *EL MERCURIO*, the outstanding Santiago newspaper, editorialized on what it called "the human rights imperialism" of the United States.

I think I am as aware as any one of the human rights abuses committed in Chile, and in a general way in Argentina and Uruguay. I have lived through many months of official and personal unpleasantness during the deterioration of U.S.-Chilean relations as we tightened down our restrictions on assistance to Chile. This was necessary, and I do not complain about it. But I am concerned with the point Mr. Christopher made in his first question: what action can we take now, in Chile and other nearby countries, which will improve the human rights situation rather than make it worse?

³ In telegram 49664, March 5, the Department transmitted an advance copy of Christopher's remarks to all diplomatic posts. Christopher said, in part, "The concern for human rights will be woven into the fabric of our foreign policy. If we are to do justice to our goals, we must act always with a concern to achieve practical results, and with an awareness of the other demands on our diplomacy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D70077-0054) See *Foreign Relations, 1977–80*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 27.

⁴ Christopher said, "We have been developing a series of questions by which to chart the direction of our policy and our progress." They included, "Will our action be useful in promoting the cause of human rights?" "What will be the most effective means of expressing our views?" "Even when there is only a remote chance that our action will be influential, does our sense of values, our American ethic, prompt us to speak out or take action?" "Will others support us?" "Have we steered away from the self-righteous and the strident, remembering that our own record is not unblemished?" and "Have we remembered national security interests and kept our sense of perspective, realizing that human rights cannot flourish in a world impoverished by economic decline or ravaged by armed conflict?" (Ibid.)

As regards Chile specifically, we have already passed the stage of an outraged Chilean reaction to the cutoff of U.S. assistance. Military aid went first; then the Chileans, seeing the handwriting on the wall, asked us last fall not to request Congress to provide any more economic assistance.⁵

Largely because of our attitude, the Chileans have taken certain steps to moderate the worst excesses of their internal security policies. The sharp drop in arbitrary detentions, reports of torture and mysterious disappearances in recent months could of course be reversed at any time. But for the moment it is a fact.

I would raise the question whether the time is approaching to move to a new stage. I note Mr. Christopher's statement that "We must . . . recognize that to be even-handed, we should not just penalize, but inspire, persuade, and reward".

Assuming there is no relapse on the Chilean side, the Chilean Government might in a short time be ripe for a move to persuade it to consolidate what it has already done, and to move on to new constructive modifications of its internal security practices. No one should underrate the difficulties of such persuasion. We are dealing with tough military men. But if properly suggested, there would be nothing to lose. I think the exercise would be worth a try. The basic point would be that in return for significant and continuing performance on the Chilean side, we could envisage a phased progression toward more normal economic, military and political relationships with this country.

I will not burden you here with my detailed ideas on this subject, except to say that I have expressed the hope to Terry Todman that the U.S. Ambassadors in this part of the world might soon be summoned to Washington, to engage in an in-depth consultation on the best ways of applying our human rights policies in the region.⁶

⁵ For the 1976 Security Assistance Act which prohibited U.S. military assistance to Chile, see *Foreign Relations, 1973-76*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, Document 235. For the Chilean decision not to seek economic assistance from the U.S., see *Foreign Relations, 1973-76*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, Document 251.

⁶ In a March 16 letter to Popper, Habib responded that Popper's letter "goes to the heart of the challenge posed by our human rights policy." Habib wrote, "None of this of course will be simple, and we will want to consult closely with those of you on the firing line when the studies now in process are at that point where your views can be most usefully factored in. We will be in touch on that." (National Archives, RG 59, Philip C. Habib Papers, Lot 81D5, PCH-Correspondence-Official, January-June, 1977)

Forgive me for proceeding at such length, but I did want you to know of our reaction.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

David H. Popper⁷

Ambassador

⁷ Popper signed “Dave” above his typed signature.

191. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 77-10053

Washington, March 15, 1977

ADDENDUM TO MEMORANDUM OF 8 MARCH, RPM 77-10044;
*CHILE: JUNTA SOLIDARITY*²

We believe that relations between Washington and Santiago have deteriorated to such a low state because of the US emphasis on the human rights issue that any leverage we may have had with the Chileans has largely disappeared. There are few “closet moderates” in positions of authority in Santiago today to whom the US could look as “forces for good.” The distinction between the views of the few moderates and those of President Pinochet is perceptible, but not very great. There is little prospect of the moderates prevailing against the hardliners in any policy debate regardless of any “carrots” Washington might offer. Continuing US pressures are likely only to arouse nationalist sentiments even further and reinforce the tendency in Santiago—and elsewhere in the Southern Cone—to view the US as an antagonist.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Box 7, Folder 27: RP M 77-10053. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin America Division, Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

² See Document 189.

Chile might eventually alter its human rights practices, but only after enough time has passed so that it will not appear to have done so in response to outside pressure. After a "cooling off" period the US might find Santiago receptive to the idea of easing certain restrictions if assured of concrete "rewards."

Chile feels desperately in need of military equipment to counter the Peruvian buildup and might respond favorably to offers of US arms. Acquisition of such equipment would measurably improve the junta's perception of the Chilean security situation and might provide a pretext for easing some restrictions. The junta might, for example, be inclined to drop its state of siege or ease the present curfew. The state of siege provision must be renewed twice annually and has just been extended. Quiet US assurances in the meantime might induce the junta to make the gesture of letting the state of siege run out routinely when it next comes up for review in September. By that time the government could salve its pride by simply declaring that it has determined the need for such a measure no longer exists.

Whatever policy Washington adopts, it will, for the foreseeable future, be dealing with Pinochet or someone like him. Any potential successor is likely to perceive Chile's problems in much the same light as the current President. In the final analysis, restrictions will be eased more in response to changing circumstances in Chile—and the military's perceptions of such change—than to outside inducements.

192. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, March 24, 1977, 0239Z

65361. Subject: Ambassador Cauas' Presentation of Credentials to the President.

1. Ambassador Cauas presented credentials to President Carter on March 23rd.² Ambassador was accompanied during the first part of the ceremony by his wife. During a subsequent five-minute conversation between President and the Ambassador, Assistant to the President for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770100-0661. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Luers; cleared by Brzezinski and in S/S-O and in draft by Driscoll; approved by Luers.

² Carter met with Cauas from 1:40 to 1:45 p.m.

National Security Affairs Brzezinski and Acting Assistant Secretary Luers were present.

2. The President opened the discussion by noting that the Ambassador had been Minister of Finance “and a good one at that.” The President asked the state of Chile’s economy today. The Ambassador responded that Chile was emerging from its major difficulties created by the previous government and the low price of copper. The balance of payments and inflation problems were improving.

3. The President said that the Ambassador was most certainly aware of the basis of the problems existing between our two countries. He wanted to assure the Ambassador that the United States Government and the American people wanted nothing less than the most friendly relations with the government and people of Chile. He said most certainly President Pinochet and he have a common interest in the just treatment of their citizens. The United States is prepared to go more than halfway over the next few months to see improved relations and he would like to move quickly to resolve the misunderstandings and differences between us. The Ambassador responded that Chile also and his President wanted good relations with the United States.

4. The President said that he had noted and was greatly pleased by the Chilean decision to release political prisoners last fall. This positive act was helpful. He assured the Ambassador that he would make certain that the American people learned of any further positive steps of that type. The President also said that any inadvertent remark or statement that created problems or misunderstandings between our two governments should be clarified at once, and he hoped the Ambassador would inform the Secretary of State or him personally if misunderstandings should arise. The President said he hoped the Ambassador would, through the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs or the Secretary of State, transmit any proposals on what steps might be taken to improve our relations.

5. The President said that it should be clear that he and the American people felt deeply about human rights and the importance of all governments to treat their people more fairly. But this interest should not be seen as interference but as supportive of the interest of all governments.

6. The Ambassador on several occasions throughout the President’s remarks responded affirmatively and with support. Upon departing the Oval Office, the Ambassador indicated to Luers that he was greatly encouraged by the President’s tone and remarks.

Vance

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, March 30, 1977, 2140Z

2582. Subject: PARM—Annual Policy and Resource Assessment—Part I. Ref: A) CERP 0001;² B) State 38356;³ 47671;⁴ C) Santiago 2567.⁵

Summary: The heart of this cable is a proposal to take advantage of the new administration's human rights policy by beginning a dialogue aimed at inducing the GOC to moderate its practices in this area. We would agree to offer the GOC certain incentives when meaningful changes actually occurred.⁶ End summary.

I. U.S. Interests

1. In conventional national interest terms, Chile is not of great importance to the United States. It is a rather small country, distant from us, and—except for its large production of copper—of minor significance in economic terms. Historically, what is unusual about Chile has been its bellwether role in the hemisphere's political and social development, and the long-term U.S. interest and participation in Chile's progress and convulsions, culminating in the tightly repressive military junta in power today.

2. Against this background, the U.S. has a priority interest in the peaceful restoration of human rights in a democratic and prosperous Chile, not only for their own sake, but also because of the influence

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770109-1005. Secret; Noforn.

² An annual policy assessment mandated by the Foreign Affairs Manual.

³ Dated February 19. The Department provided diplomatic posts with guidance regarding their annual policy review. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770060-0449)

⁴ Dated March 3. The Department provided further guidance regarding submission of the annual policy review. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-1163)

⁵ Dated March 30. The Embassy submitted parts 2 and 3 of its annual policy review. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770110-0093)

⁶ In telegram 57409 to Santiago, March 15, ARA officials wrote, "We think the overriding US interest in Chile is still human rights," and "we would expect that the human rights issue will be the central theme of your PARM document." In addition, they noted, "We are currently giving thought to how we can identify progress by given countries in human rights and what positive incentives we can offer. Your views on this would be most useful. This could also be passed as a PARM 'issue.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770089-0323) In telegram 57032 to Santiago, March 15, Todman told Popper, "By all means I would appreciate your thoughts on the next stage in our human rights dialogue with the GOC." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770087-1057)

Chile might have on political and economic development throughout the Southern Cone.

3. Other American interests in Chile include:

—The maintenance of friendly and constructive relationships with a stable Chilean Government broadly supported by its people. This would be particularly important if East-West relationships deteriorated or if Soviet and Cuban penetration in the Western hemisphere should become more marked.

—The assurance that Chile's policies will contribute to enhancing regional security and stability in the Andean area, through conciliatory political and territorial relationships. Of special concern are Bolivia's claim to an outlet to the sea and avoidance of an arms race with Peru.

—Continuing Board support from Chile regarding certain international problem areas: coping with anti-U.S. political and economic initiatives in multilateral forums; renunciation of nuclear weapons capability; careful exploitation of antarctic resources; and a productive and stable new regime for the law of the sea.

—Access as required to Chilean copper and other mineral resources, which could become important as we enter an era of resource scarcity.

—Maintenance of Chile's current liberal trade and investment policy, its creditworthy repayment of its heavy foreign debt, and its support of a market economy.

—Continued Chilean cooperation in controlling cocaine traffic to the United States.

—Dependability of Chilean support in the remote event that closure of the Panama Canal should result in greater traffic through the Southern straits, or in case of general war.

II. Ambassador's Overview

4. As we move into the current PARM period, the basic fact with which we have to reckon is the continuing stability of the Chilean military regime. Its internal security practices have been outstandingly successful: the country is tranquil, dissent is muffled. The junta has survived a very severe internal economic readjustment and initiated a slow recovery. It has established a strongly authoritarian government under the almost exclusive control of President Augusto Pinochet. And it has weathered a constant storm of criticism from outside sources—antagonistic governments and international organizations, private groups intent upon restoring internationally accepted human rights practices, the representatives of the marxist left, and an increasing band of voluntary and involuntary exiles.

5. But the stability of any dictatorship is a brittle thing. Ultimately it succumbs to an accumulation of setbacks and strains. The Chilean

military junta will be no exception, though it is too early to tell whether the next major political movement will be a shift toward a more participatory system under increasing civilian influence, or a violent turn toward right or left wing extremism.

6. Meanwhile, the sources of strain impinging upon the government bear close watching. Perhaps the most serious arises from the social inequities accompanying the sharp turn toward the freer and more austere economy decreed by the government two years ago. Life remains grim for Chile's unemployed and its urban and rural underprivileged, as well as for a middle class constantly squeezed by inflation and low production levels. But there are glimmers of hope for those most seriously affected. Although there is still little real saving or investment, business is beginning to improve; the inflation rate is lower; exports and copper prices are up; unemployment is starting to fall; the current year's harvests were excellent; and Chile is maintaining its record of prompt and full repayment of its foreign debt obligations. There are those who argue that the masses opposed to the government have been too prostrate to protest their fate, and that with fuller stomachs the level of restiveness will rise. This could be so; but we see no reason to believe that the junta's internal security forces could not control any such manifestations. Certainly none are apparent today.

7. There is a second and likewise important source of domestic strain; the dissatisfaction of both the submerged left and those who originally supported the junta in 1973, regarding it as a bridge to a new democracy in which Chile's traditional human rights and civil liberties would be restored. There is still a desire for a pluralist and humanistic society in Chile. It is strong enough so that, when the remaining, non-Marxist political parties were formally dissolved in March, there was an audible undertone of dissent in the public commentary. Momentarily, this seems to have curbed the elements pressing for a truly fascist state, but there is no sign that it will lead to any early relaxation of the prevailing authoritarianism.

8. The only other major source of strain the junta faces stems from its own internal structure. From the beginning the other services recognized Pinochet's primacy as head of the predominant army. They have been able to slow, but not to stop his gradual assumption of full power. They seem unlikely to be able to prevent him from taking the few remaining steps needed to complete the process.

9. There has at times been obvious discontent among the various officer corps. But the institutional unity of the military in Chile is, for Latin America, unusually strong. In our judgment the senior officers who pledged their collaboration in the traumatic experience of overthrowing Allende seem nowhere close to a schism, which could bring down the regime.

10. In foreign policy terms, the Government's most serious problem has been to cope with the assault on its human rights policies. Since mid-1976 it has made substantial progress in moderating its most inhumane practices. Some 2700 political prisoners of various types were freed in 1976 and only about 500 are still incarcerated; arbitrary detention has virtually ceased; we hear no new reports of torture; even the "mysterious disappearances", a subject of continuing concern, seem to have stopped entirely in 1977. Thus, while the DINA and other internal security agencies retain their prerogatives, and the apparatus of intimidation remains in place, conditions with respect to individual due process in Chile have noticeably improved.

11. In government quarters, there is burning resentment over the fact that the foreign response to these improvements has in most cases been not less but more stringent criticism. The tendency is to interpret this reaction as proof that nothing the regime might do will gain it the international approval it seeks, and accordingly to assume that the goal of the critics is not human rights improvements, but the replacement of the Pinochet Government by a "communist" regime. Thus, the sense of xenophobia is heightened, and the tendency to strengthen relations with the other military governments of the Southern Cone for common resistance to the outsider is enhanced.

12. For reasons of history, economic and military power, and broad popular affinities, the U.S. Government can exercise a stronger influence than any other over the Chilean Government. I believe it is in our interest to do what we can to encourage Chile to move further along the road to acceptable human rights improvements. Hence the major recommendation in the "courses of action" section of this paper: that we initiate a dialogue with the Chileans to determine whether we cannot, through appropriate incentives, stimulate a progressive evolution toward a more humane, open and participatory Chilean society.

13. This will not be easy. The tough military men of the junta are not libertarians. But they are realistic. Foreign criticism, and intimations of isolation, quarantine or boycott worry them. And we have little to lose through the proposed procedure. If it should succeed, it could put Chile on the path to a gradual restoration of its traditional democratic and pluralist society. The alternative would be an even more repressive totalitarianism of the extreme left or right.

14. It follows from the foregoing that we do not believe this is the moment for the U.S. to impose additional restrictions on economic assistance to Chile. Cutting off our residual aid program would be sharply counter-productive. So would American leadership in inducing the international financial institutions to apply a political litmus test to loans for Chile. Quite apart from its more general implications for the institutions themselves, such a step would on balance only

strengthen the junta's internal support. It would not bring the junta down; and Chilean moderates would react negatively to the disapproval of loans which benefit the country's poor. Sanctions of this character should be held in abeyance until it becomes clear that they would actually be helpful.

15. Apart from the normal grist of bilateral problems, the only other substantive issue we regard as of major importance for the parn process is the question of how to contend with the rising tension between Chile and Peru, as the 1979 centennial anniversary of the latter's great defeat approaches. In view of the massive infusion into Peru of sophisticated weapons systems and all that goes with them, and the consequent regional destabilization, we face the potential for a conflict which could be exploited by the Soviets and Cubans. The military, psychological, and territorial issues involved in this dispute are complex. They warrant a major planning exercise among Washington agencies, and a more activist U.S. policy vis-a-vis the potential antagonists, designed to minimize both the capability and the inducements for armed conflict.

III. Objectives, Courses of Action and Issues

A. Objectives within the PARM time frame:

1. Human Rights. To induce the Government of Chile to eliminate gross violations of individual human rights (arbitrary detention, torture, mysterious disappearance, lack of due process, etc.), and to modify its institutional structure so as to ensure human rights practices measuring up to internationally accepted standards. Unless we can make substantial progress with respect to this objective, our leverage in advancing the others is likely to be slight.

2. Fundamental Freedoms. As a concomitant of the foregoing, to encourage the restoration of civil rights such as freedom of expression and assembly, and of a participatory society and democratic political and trade union institutions. (While the country team considers this a less important objective, it is included at this point because of its relationship with objective 1.)

3. Regional Security. To ensure that the GOC does not provoke a conflict with Peru, inadvertently or as a result of negotiations over a corridor for Bolivia; and to the extent we can, to neutralize the Peruvian arms preponderance which might stimulate an attack on Chile.

4. Other Objectives.

—Respond (subject to human rights improvements) to opportunities for IFI lending and private loans and investments opened by the GOC's liberal economic policies;

—Prevent Chilean participation in an anti-American Southern Cone bloc;

—Maintain ties with broad elements of Chilean society to facilitate our diplomatic, cultural, informational and refugee relief activities.

—Maintain existing cooperation to suppress the international narcotics traffic;

—Enlist Chilean cooperation in countering harmful third-world initiatives in the UN and OAS systems;

—Retain Chilean support as we modify our position on copper and other international commodity agreements.

B. Courses of Action:

1) Human Rights and 2) Fundamental Freedoms. The country team favors an approach designed to induce the Chileans themselves to take significant steps toward a freer Chilean society.

We conclude that there is a reasonable prospect that through a quid pro quo policy, we can induce the Chileans to make a real start on the road back toward individual rights and democratic practices, and give them some idea of what we on our side might do for them if they did so.

Recognizing that the odds for complete success are small, and that there is some risk of a hostile GOC reaction, we nevertheless believe that the time is appropriate to open a dialogue with the Chileans on this basis. The first shock of President Carter's human rights initiatives has been absorbed; the President's statement when new Chilean Ambassador Jorge Cauas presented his credentials provides us with an opening ("the U.S. has sought to be of assistance by collaborating with Chile. . . I hope we can continue to do so in the future");⁷ and in Chile, the reaction to the March 11 dissolution of the democratic political parties may be giving the government pause.

An approach to Pinochet would have to be very carefully prepared. He has fallen in readily with the clamor in the Southern Cone over alleged American intervention and "human rights imperialism". Economic improvement in Chile, slight though it still is, has given him a better base for independence, even defiance. He will bridle at anything which smacks of dictation. But even if he should misinterpret our intent and rebel, we see little Chile could do to harm seriously any major U.S. interest. On the other hand, we judge that Pinochet would be willing to contemplate constructive steps, if he could thereby expect to rebuild his bridges with the United States. Puzzled and exasperated as he and his military colleagues have been by our antagonism, they have never ceased to desire American friendship. It would be a domestic and international political plus for him.

⁷ See Document 192.

We therefore propose that the following steps be initiated.

A. For planning purposes, an enumeration of the steps we would wish to see the Chileans take to free up their society, by priorities and stages; and a similar enumeration of the measures with which we would be prepared to respond, with priorities, as the Chileans began to take effective actions. (Illustrative lists are included as Annex A to this cable.)⁸

B. Congressional consultation designed to obtain at least neutrality regarding the exercise, until its results became apparent.

C. An informal, high-level sounding in Santiago by the Ambassador, who would ask whether he should recommend to Washington, a full-scale bilateral review of Chilean-American relationships, with emphasis on our differences regarding human rights.⁹

D. Assuming an affirmative answer, a high-level visit to Santiago, most appropriately by Assistant Secretary Todman, to explore the prospects for starting a phased, open-ended process of change, with assurance of sympathetic response from our side as it proceeded. (Alternatively but less desirably, the ambassador might do this, if armed with a special message from the President or the Secretary.)¹⁰

E. As a maximum objective, an effort to induce the GOC to make at least a conditional commitment to an evolutionary process of liberalization, with at least a few key dates—not unduly distant—as benchmarks. On our side, we would in return indicate that upon attainment of the objective, (i.e., actual liberalization) the executive branch would request congress to acknowledge that the Chileans had made “substantial progress” in ameliorating human rights abuses, and would complete the adjustment of U.S. military and economic assistance legislation accordingly.

F. Short of the foregoing, our negotiator would state that the executive branch would respond to movement on the Chilean side with successive steps within its power to restore the normal ongoing relations between the two governments. (See Annex A.) As a record of accomplishment was made, the administration would recommend to congress successive steps to modify the special legislative restrictions which currently prevent us from extending economic and military

⁸ Annex A is printed below.

⁹ In telegram 3466 from Santiago, April 27, the Embassy reported that during an April 25 meeting with Popper, Carvajal “expressed the belief that the USG had gone so far in its restrictions and sanctions against Chile that little U.S. leverage remained. He was inclined to believe it would be virtually impossible for the (present) GOC to do anything which would result in regaining U.S. favor.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770148-0067)

¹⁰ Todman visited Chile in August 1977. See Document 203.

assistance (including limited military sales) and training to Chile. We would also agree to work actively in international agencies, including financial agencies, against human rights restrictions on Chile which single it out in a discriminatory way.

Given the overriding importance of the human rights issue for Chilean-American relations, the country team requests a prompt decision with respect to this proposed course of action.¹¹

3. Regional Security.

We do not anticipate hostilities between Chile and Peru during the PARM period. Nevertheless, Andean tensions are increasing as the Peruvians deploy their new Soviet arms and attain the capacity to use them, thus endangering hemisphere security and inviting Soviet/Cuban adventurism.

We believe the U.S., alone and in cooperation with others, should undertake a continuing, quiet diplomatic campaign to de-fuse as far as possible the major sources of conflict. This could involve such measures as bilateral contacts (with Chile, as with the others concerned) urging restraint; the provision of accurate information to counteract unwarranted war scares; arrangements for mutually acceptable observation and fact-finding facilities; good offices if the Bolivian corridor question should become a major irritant; and the invocation of OAS machinery whenever appropriate. In addition, if progress in the human rights area should permit it, we should begin to provide the Chileans with a limited amount of defensive arms against potential Peruvian attack, as a steadying factor and a deterrent.

4. Other Objectives.

To the extent permitted by the constraints of the human rights problem all elements of the mission will seek to attain the goals listed in the "objectives" section above. Our actions must therefore be devised to sustain what common viewpoints still exist.

C. Issues:

We urge prompt Washington approval of our proposed human rights policy and an early decision to address the regional security problem. The Chilean environment is propitious for movement on the former; steps to reduce subregional frictions should be taken now, before a new crisis flares.

In arriving at the recommended human rights approach, we identified a number of issues needing Washington decisions:

¹¹ No reply to this cable was found.

—How are we to distinguish between what we do to help protect basic individual human rights, and what we do to advance political-civil liberties?

At what point does pursuit of institutional changes aimed at protecting basic human rights become self-defeating, in that the target government reacts against seemingly insatiable external pressures by becoming more repressive?

—How can the “multiple standard” predicament be resolved? How can we justify employing sanctions only against remote, non-strategic countries? Can we logically demand higher standards from governments professing a western value system? Those seeking our friendship? Those in the countries which formerly had humane democratic traditions? Or is there any other criterion we should or need to program, to support our country-by-country approach?

—What are the implications outside Chile of our particular policies for that country?

To what extent is the policy recommended in this paper applicable elsewhere—that is, the active involvement of the U.S. in specific human rights objectives; the link between performance and incentives in the first instance; and the implicit threat of additional sanctions to be invoked at a later date, if the dialogue should fail?

Annex A

1. Some steps which the executive branch might take to respond to specific human rights improvements by the Chilean Government:

A) A public acknowledgement of progress by a Washington USG spokesman, as it is made (this may influence private banks and potential investors).

B) Due acknowledgement of constructive changes in Chile by U.S. representatives in international agencies, and advocacy of balanced resolutions on Chile reflecting such changes.

C) A resumption of normal official visits and exchanges, including high-level military visits, and professional medals and awards (currently suspended).

D) Encouragement of contacts in the cultural (including IVP), sports and legal fields; an effort to moderate the de facto boycott of Chile by many American scholars.

E) Encouragement of visit by moderate, preferably uncommitted Members of Congress, and by other American opinion leaders who might observe and report on the improvements which would have taken place.

F) Signature of the long-delayed extradition treaty.

G) Sympathetic discussion with the Chileans regarding their concern over Peruvian arms predominance based on Soviet equipment and training.

H) Additional P.L. 480 Title II wheat and other foods for the Chilean work relief program.

I) Sympathetic U.S. consideration of Chilean loan projects in international financial institutions, consistent with congressional restrictions.

J) Signature of the OPIC guarantee agreement; first phases of resumption of OPIC and Export-Import Bank programs.

2. Similar steps requiring congressional approval:

A) Additional funding for Chile's outstandingly successful low-cost housing investment guarantee program.

B) A new P.L. 480 Title I concessional wheat import allotment.

C) Additional FY 77 AID projects.

D) Maintenance of an American military advisory team larger than the maximum of three officers mandated by current legislation.

E) Gradual restoration of an even-handed policy (as related to our treatment of Peru) as regards FMS military sales and credits, limited commercial sales, and cash and grant military training—the materiel component to be oriented toward defense against potential Peruvian armored or air attack.

(Most of the economic measures listed above would not require new legislation.)

3. Steps Chile might take to improve its human and civil rights performance.

A) Continue to refrain from killing or abducting people who are then said to have “disappeared”.

B) Announce that any member of the security forces guilty of killing or torturing prisoners will be tried and if guilty, punished. Disciplinary action would also be taken against such abuses of power as arson and other violence against regime opponents intimidation and harassment.

C) Release any “missing” persons who are now detained.

D) Relax or abolish the state of siege, restore habeas corpus procedures, widen civilian court jurisdiction in internal security cases.

E) Abolish or drastically curb DINAs, so that internal security activities are in fact confined to their legitimate sphere—the prevention of subversion by violence.

F) Permit responsible international groups to visit Chile to observe human and civil rights improvements.

G) Tolerate oral and written discussion and dissent which does not incite to violence.

H) Beginning at grass-roots level (e.g. mothers' and neighborhood committees, trade union locals, service clubs) permit internal elections and voting on decisions.

I) Reconstruct the country's destroyed electoral rolls, in preparation for a referendum on a new constitution and eventual elections.

J) Negotiate with the leaders of political parties eschewing violence, regarding a phased resumption of political activities.

Popper

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 25, 1977, 11:30 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vice President's Meeting with Former Chilean President Eduardo Frei

PARTICIPANTS

Vice President Walter Mondale

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dr. Eduardo Frei, former President of Chile

Denis Clift, Special Assistant to the Vice President

Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)

The Vice President said that he had watched Frei's career with great interest and was pleased to talk to him about the matters that interested President Frei. President Frei responded by saying that he was honored to have this appointment and asked whether Vice President Mondale would rather ask questions or have him make a statement. The Vice President said that he was aware that President Frei had come from Europe and he would very much appreciate his observations about Europe as well as about Chile. Also, he wanted to know how Frei viewed current economic and political developments in Chile. He asked whether Frei saw any possibilities of the present government evolving toward a more democratic one.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77. Confidential. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Vice President's Office.

Frei said that he spoke with Willy Brandt and with the Spanish Prime Minister.² He was especially concerned to talk with the Christian Democrats in Germany, and said that after the United States, the opinions of the Germans weigh most heavily on the Chileans. He went to Spain also because Spain has an influence on Chile, and finally to the U.S. because President Carter's concern for human rights will have a great impact on Chile and on all of Latin America. He said that the policy will create problems in the short term, but in the long term it is the only way. However, we should not look just at individual cases or countries; he insisted that we look at the entire structural problem.

Frei said that he felt Chile was at a crossroads, and that the armed forces was faced with a decision on whether it should turn towards democracy or towards increased repression. As of now the junta is based solely on force; it has no political program of any kind. But that cannot last long. He estimated that 75 percent of the people in Chile and even members of the armed forces believe that the political system is at a crossroads and that something must change.³

Frei then said that he believed the position of the United States was key to the future of Chile.⁴ He said that they (referring to the Christian Democrats and other democratic political forces in Chile) do not seek American intervention or want the American Government to be linked to any single party. But the U.S. can create conditions—by words, policies, and meetings—that will have great influence on the developments in Chile. But he said that the U.S. had to have more than words; the conduct and the personality of the American Ambassador is very important, and it is also important to have a coherent and consistent policy. He used the example of General Leigh, who had visited Argentina recently and said that it did not matter what the

² Brandt was the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the former chancellor of the FRG; Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez was the Spanish prime minister.

³ In a May 24 memorandum to Mondale regarding the meeting with Frei, Brzezinski wrote, "On March 15, 1977, General Pinochet extended the state of siege and banned all political parties, confiscating property, and prohibiting all political activity. Pinochet said he plans to continue in power indefinitely, and democratic groups in Chile are losing hope. That is why Frei, who is a cautious person, has embarked on an effort to broaden and intensify international opposition to Pinochet and perhaps build support for an alternative government." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 67, Vice President, 2-9/77)

⁴ Brzezinski wrote to Mondale that Frei's request to meet with Carter "presented us with a difficult decision since the press became aware of it. If we refused to meet with him, Pinochet would see it as an endorsement of his regime, and human rights groups in the US would say that our policy was only aimed at the Soviet Union." Brzezinski noted that Pinochet might interpret Frei's high-level reception in the USG "as a sign that the US is crowning his opposition, and he may accelerate the current wave of repression." (Ibid.)

White House thought; all that was important was the Pentagon, and he felt that the Pentagon was strongly supportive of the Chilean junta.

Mondale replied: "Well said." Brzezinski then stressed that the President's position on human rights is not cynical; it is sincere, but it is also not a crusade. The President intends by identifying with human rights groups and forces around the world to strengthen the pressures that will have an influence on making democratic governments increasingly probable. But effective implementation of this overall policy depends on the internal situations in individual governments. We can create a moral framework but we cannot determine internal conditions. He used the analogy of the USSR's view of the world's progress towards Communism. Dogmatists in the Soviet Union want much more direct revolutionary activity; while pragmatists believe that all that is necessary is to create the right global conditions, and Communism will emerge on its own.

Brzezinski said that he felt human rights is a compelling idea, which is historically right, and he felt that it corresponds with the conditions in advanced developing and industrial countries like Chile. He stressed that the goal of U.S. human rights policy was to create a moral framework, but that we will not use direct government involvement to influence internal events. He said that some progress had been achieved in many countries, and he hoped that some progress would occur in Chile as well. Frei responded by saying that at no time had he advocated the U.S. should either break diplomatic relations with Chile or use the U.S. Embassy for intervention. If democracy were to be imposed on Chile, it would be a failure. We are looking for a broad consensus, he said, in Chile and he hoped that the armed forces would be incorporated within this consensus.

Frei said that the U.S. can help. The Government of Chile needs a lot from the U.S. He said that unless Chile grants at least a minimal respect for human rights, for labor association, and for other political activity, the U.S. should make clear that the Chilean Government would not find a welcome here. He said that if the U.S. is sincere in wanting improvements in human rights, then it should be prepared to help in Chile.

Brzezinski said that our policy is world-wide; we are encouraging forces which promote human rights, and that together with these domestic forces our own government will be working toward this goal, and he felt that history was on our side.

Frei said that the nuances are very important because of the differences in each country. He said that the most recent information from Chile was that there was increased repression, but there was more rigidity than repression by the junta. He characterized the present political conditions as "less brutal, but more rigid."

Vice President Mondale then said that Dr. Brzezinski had defined our policies quite well. We are deeply and consistently committed to human rights and to encouraging democratic instincts in all countries. This is a view which is deeply held by the President. We are for human rights not because we are against Communism, but because we believe in human rights. In the past, Mondale said that we had gotten these two objectives—anti-communism and human rights—confused, and we often intervened in a clumsy way; a good example is Chile. When he was a member of the Church Committee,⁵ Mondale said that he was ashamed to learn of our behavior in Chile. Personally he said, what we did in Chile in the last decade imposes on us a special responsibility to deal with the situation in Chile with good sense and respect for our own values as well as Chile's.

Frei said that he agreed that special care should be taken, but he only asked for consistency in implementation of this policy.

⁵ A reference to the U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, chaired by Sen. Frank Church, 1975–76.

195. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, May 28, 1977, 0011Z

123807. Subject: The Deputy Secretary's Meeting with Ambassador Cauas.

1. The Deputy Secretary met with Ambassador Cauas at 3:30 p.m. May 26. Also attending were Mark Schneider, D/HA, Frank Devine, ARA, and Desk Officer Driscoll.

2. After an initial exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Christopher inquired into Cauas' economic program. Cauas gave him a brief run-down of the program. Mr. Christopher commented that Chile had achieved "real progress" considering the higher price for energy. Cauas then replied that Chile hoped to produce 50[%] of its oil within a year or two. The Deputy Secretary asked if there had been any problems

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190-1009. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Driscoll; cleared by Devine and Schneider and for information by Feinberg in S/P; approved by Christopher.

with blowouts on their off-shore platforms. Cauas said that no blowouts had occurred yet. However, one problem was that their fields had a high percentage of gas. The problem was in transporting it to market. Several LNG projects were currently under study.

3. The Deputy Secretary then said that he wanted to put the events of the last few days into perspective.² The point was that all new administrations want to meet the leaders of political parties that are out of power. The U.S. was not casting aspersions on anybody. We were not assuming a prejudiced attitude towards anybody. We think this sort of dialogue is healthy. He noted that he had seen opposition leaders from Italy, France and Germany during the past weeks. He emphasized that we were not taking sides. He hoped that the GOC could see these meetings in the same perspective.

4. Then Mr. Christopher turned to the human rights issue. He emphasized the deep concern in the U.S. about human rights. He said that he tended to think in terms of trends. The trend in Chile during the first quarter of 1977 had been good. During the second quarter we may be seeing a trend for the worse.³ He said that he hoped he was wrong. Returning to the Frei and Almeyda meetings he once again emphasized that he had wanted to put these meetings into perspective for Ambassador Cauas.

5. Cauas replied that he could understand meeting with Frei. However, the Almeyda meeting was a matter of concern for the GOC. Almeyda represents the Allende government. He was Allende's Senior Minister. Chile does not want to return to the Allende period. Turning to the human rights issue, Cauas allowed that there were many problems. He hopes and is personally doing everything he can so that the GOC can "improve the fabric of society." He hopes that this trend accelerates. What is needed is an atmosphere of calm. "The task of the Government is to restore the full functions of a 'normal' system." The best approach, in his view, is to create the conditions so that the GOC can move quickly toward normalization.

² A reference to Mondale's meeting with Frei on May 25 and Christopher's meeting with Almeyda on May 27. (Memorandum of Conversation, May 24, 1977; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77) See Document 194.

³ In a May 25 briefing memorandum to Christopher regarding the meeting with Cauas, Todman wrote that DINA told U.S. officials that it "had discovered a Socialist/Communist guerrilla plot" and "therefore, DINA had decided on a series of *illegal arrests and interrogations*. During the past few weeks we have heard stories of suspects being arrested and tortured for as little as a few hours to a few days and then released. We also have confirmations of new 'disappearances.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976-1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Box 2, Chile—January-June 1977)

6. The Deputy Secretary reminded Cauas of the President's remarks to him about his desire to improve bilateral relations.⁴ Candidly speaking, however, the human rights issue is a "barrier" to our relations with both the executive and the congress. Thus, he saw it in the GOC's interest to improve its human rights practices so that bilateral relations could improve. Further, he said there were three areas which greatly concerned us: the lack of due process, the state of siege and the activities of the intelligence services.⁵ He expressed the hope that the situation in Chile was at the point where the GOC could move to "normalcy." Government, he noted, exists for the well being of the people. It has the task of creating the conditions necessary to live in liberty. Thus, he wanted to work with Cauas toward the improvement of our relations.

7. Cauas replied to the Deputy Secy point by point. On due process there have been problems. People in the Government are working on these problems. He, personally, could see some progress. On the state of siege he noted that the GOC had said that it was not to be permanent. It has to be renewed every six months. The discussions leading up to a decision on whether or not to extend the state of siege are useful because it makes people in the GOC justify its continuance. He, again personally, hoped that it would be eliminated in September. But up to now the GOC has considered the maintenance of domestic tranquility to be the most important factor. On the intelligence services, Cauas remarked that every country has a need for intelligence. He noted that President Pinochet had publicly prohibited any illegal actions by these services. He also stated that many prisoners convicted under the state of siege had been given amnesty or allowed to leave the country; that trials for others were taking place; and that only one prisoner was being held without charge at the present time in Chile.

8. Cauas then turned to the problem of the disappeared. In his opinion this was the greatest human rights problem Chile had. He said that many people had assumed multiple identities. This makes tracing people alleged to have disappeared more difficult. Also people were killed in the days following the coup, many of whom were never identified. Others have left the country. Others still have been found living in places different from those they lived in previously. And some, he allowed, have really disappeared. This is a source of great

⁴ See Document 192.

⁵ Todman called these three areas "the three basic defects of the Chilean system which allow security authorities to operate with impunity." (Todman to Christopher, May 25, National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Box 2, Chile—January-June 1977)

concern for the GOC. It is a very damaging situation for Chile. His recommendation to the GOC had been to follow-up each case.

9. The Deputy Secretary thanked him for his explanation. However, sources that he respects have made him concerned about the recent trend in human rights practices in Chile. "You can't achieve freedom by denying it, except in the short term. You and I, intellectually, can accept that." Mr. Christopher asked Cauas to keep in touch with him, to let him know about progress made. He invited Cauas to telephone him or to call on him if he had any problems. In closing he emphasized our desire to better bilateral relations.

Vance⁶

⁶ Vance informed Carter of Christopher's meeting with Cauas in a May 28 memorandum, writing that Christopher "emphasized our readiness to continue a constructive dialogue with the Chilean Government and work toward improvement of their human rights situation." Vance also wrote that the meetings with Frei and Almeyda "demonstrate our willingness to communicate with all segments of Chile's body politic." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, box 18, Evening Reports [State], 5/77)

196. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, May 28, 1977

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

2. *CHILE*—We have pursued this week with the Chileans the serious state of human rights in their country. Warren Christopher received the Ambassador and singled out Chile's state of siege, lack of due process, and repressive intelligence agencies.² He emphasized our readiness to continue a constructive dialogue with the Chilean Government and work toward improvement of their human rights situation.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77. Secret.

² See Document 195.

Warren also met Allende's Foreign Minister Almeyda on Friday.³ Almeyda denied any improvement of human rights in Chile, nor could he envisage such without a basic change in the political system. Warren reminded him that, while we would not intervene in Chile's domestic affairs, we would not be deterred in our pursuit of improved human rights.

Fritz's meeting with Frei⁴ and Warren's meetings have attracted heavy press play here. The meetings demonstrate our willingness to communicate with all segments of Chile's body politic. Despite their unhappiness with the pressure we are bringing to bear, the Chilean Government has nevertheless authorized us to explore the prisoner exchange with the Soviets.⁵

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

³ In telegram 124513 to Santiago, May 28, the Department summarized Christopher's conversation with Almeyda regarding human rights and politics in Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770192-0016)

⁴ See Document 194.

⁵ Carter initialed this paragraph.

197. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Grenada, June 15, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Mr. Habib

Mrs. van Reigersberg (interpreter)

Frances Armstrong (notetaker)

CHILE

Foreign Minister Carvajal

Maria Eugenia Oyarzun

Sergio Diez

Diego Valenzuela

The Secretary began by noting that he appreciated the opportunity to meet and talk with the Chilean Foreign Minister. His words of welcome were reciprocated.

The Secretary then moved to the issue of human rights. He said that in his view the heart of the problem between the United States

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Vance Personal Files, Lot 80D135, Box 2, OAS meeting June 14–17, 1977 Grenada. Confidential. Drafted by Armstrong; approved by Twaddell on June 29. Vance was in Grenada for the OAS General Assembly meeting.

and Chile related to differences over human rights. He noted that he felt he should be completely frank and indicate specific areas which have been the subject of concern for the USG. He mentioned three: 1) the existence of the state of siege, 2) the operation of intelligence organizations, and 3) due process, i.e., the issue of the *desaparecidos*.²

Carvajal thanked the Secretary for his frankness, commenting that from what the Secretary had said yesterday,³ he believed that there existed a lack of understanding concerning the origin of the human rights problem in Chile. He noted that the Secretary had said terrorism resulted from oppression—that it erupted when people became desperate because of bad social conditions and rebelled against the government. He recognized that the same idea had been expressed yesterday by the Foreign Minister of Venezuela. However, he said he believed that terrorism had been introduced into America from outside the continent—from the Soviet Union. He also insisted that the US had left other countries in the hemisphere without protection from terrorism by pursuing a policy of detente, which left the USSR with its hands free to attack them through ideological penetration, subversion, and terrorism, all of which the Soviets pursue with abundant financial resources.

The Secretary then clarified that he had not intended to suggest in his statement in the informal dialogue that oppression was the only cause of terrorism. He said he had tried to say that if terrorism was met in a way that destroyed human dignity it could lead to more terrorism. He recognized that terrorism existed through other causes and must be dealt with, but he emphasized that no country should respond to terrorism in a way which ignored human rights and actually furthered terrorism.

With regard to detente, the Secretary said that the United States had been seeking to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war—for the benefit of all. He said that the United States considered this a valid objective

² "Disappeared ones." In telegram 4815 from Santiago, June 10, the Embassy briefed Vance "on the Chilean scene" and offered comments on the talking points prepared for his meeting with Carvajal: "Carvajal has approved a Chilean position to negotiate human rights improvements with the USG, specifically in the areas of emergency powers and habeas corpus procedures. As far as we know, this policy has not been approved by the junta." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770208-0273)

³ In his June 14 First Intervention before the OAS General Assembly, Vance said: "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice in our societies—legal, economic, and social justice. Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence, more victims, and more terrorism. Respect for the rule of law will promote justice and remove the seeds of subversion. Abandoning such respect, governments descend into the netherworld of the terrorist and lose their strongest weapon—their moral integrity." For the text of his remarks see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, pp. 69–72.

but that it was not so naive as to think that the Soviet Union no longer presented a threat. The Secretary noted that the United States remained economically and militarily strong and would deter any Soviet advance. He also drew attention to the fact that, in the field of human rights, the United States had shown no hesitation in addressing the Soviets in cases where it felt their action impinged on human rights. He concluded by saying that we had not acted to encourage terrorism throughout the globe while working for detente with the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Minister then explained why his country presented a special case. He said that the terrorism which existed in Chile today was not the result of oppression. Referring to the democratic tradition which Chile had maintained until 1970, he criticized Allende for having violated democratic rights and freedoms after his election. In Carvajal's terms, Chile's first failure in the human rights field was to have a government so democratic as to give way to a Marxist president. In his view terrorism came to Chile not through oppression but through a democratic process which was deteriorating. He then commented that the Soviet Union today continues to send tons of arms and munitions to Chile, and that, under these circumstances, it was impossible to deal with the people receiving them in normal ways. He said this was an experience which Uruguay and Argentina shared—all of them being democracies where the people were neither hungry nor oppressed.

Carvajal then indicated his desire to respond to what the Secretary had said at the beginning of their conversation about the state of siege and the operations of intelligence organizations. He said that those means would remain in effect as long as the GOC deemed it necessary to protect the first human rights of Chilean citizens—the right not to be killed by terrorists. He then asked Ambassador Diez to speak with more specificity about their human rights problems.

Ambassador Diez began by saying that the problem of the state of siege could not be viewed solely as a juridical matter. He said that one also had to consider how the government was using its powers in this area. Pointing to the fact that the government's policy had evolved in keeping with the realities of the political situation, he remarked that the Chilean Government had been very prudent in its use of executive powers. He said that today there is only one person detained in Chile under the state of siege and that, with this one exception, no one has been detained by executive power. All other detainees are in jail under sentences from the judiciary.

Diez then described the two fundamental stages of the state of siege. First was the period under "wartime" military justice, but he noted that nearly all the sentences imposed by the courts under these rules have now been pardoned. (He said that, of some 1400 cases presented for review, the government had rejected only two or three

dozen requests for pardon.) Second was the period under “peacetime” military justice (in effect now), which encompasses traditional Chilean law insofar as crimes against the security of the state are concerned. Under this system, the government attorney starts the case under a court martial procedure, but the defendant has the right to prompt appeal to the Supreme Court, which does not have any military judges. Diez concluded that due process was being guaranteed in Chile and that the state of siege was now being used as an instrument to guard the peace rather than to bring more oppression.

Diez suggested that the Secretary might not have a very clear picture of the situation in Chile and that the US Embassy in Santiago could confirm the information he had just relayed.

Diez then returned to the issue of the *desaparecidos*, which he characterized as one of their most serious problems. He described it also as a phenomenon with two distinct stages of evolution and which was now largely under control. He also offered four reasons for the large number of *desaparecidos*: (1) the large number of people buried without being identified. (Carvajal said that many died in the continuing confrontation following the change of government in Sept. 1973 and that a substantial number of unidentified persons were buried that year.) (2) The Communist Party’s order to its members to go underground. (3) The undocumented departure from the country of many people going to Argentina and Peru. (4) The fact that members of the extremist political parties frequently had four and five electoral cards apiece and therefore could easily claim that some of their members had disappeared.

Diez admitted that in the climate of hatred which existed in Chile there were undoubtedly some abuses of human rights. However, he also insisted that his government had not been reluctant to punish those guilty of such abuses. He said that while it has not published a list of those punished, it had given a list last year to Mr. Rogers of those tried for abuses.⁴ He noted that fifty people had been arrested thus far but that the investigation of human rights violations had been made much more difficult by the politicization of the issue. He mentioned the Red Cross had given them a list of 900 persons. He said that the government had investigated the whole list to the extent possible and had given the Red Cross three or four reports.

Diez noted that, in the process, it had found 100 *desaparecidos* living and working in and out of Chile and had asked for information where names and addresses didn’t match. He emphasized that the Chilean Government was cooperating in looking for a solution to the problem

⁴ Not found.

of the *desaparecidos* and said there were now very few new complaints of *desaparecidos*. He mentioned one recent case of a false kidnapping, which had been shown to be a plot; it turned out that extremists and not the police kidnapped the people. Diez ended UN discussion of the *desaparecidos* by saying there was a small part of truth in this grave problem and that his government was working on it.

He said they were worried about reality but that it was a hard situation to handle because of the politics involved.

Carvajal then interjected that he didn't want to attack the US because it was a country he admired, a country the entire free world should be grateful to for preserving freedom. But he admonished the US to have more understanding of the fact that these are problems which are not easy to solve even if the government wants to. Carvajal then quoted Ambassador Young on the topic of racism. Young had said that the Swedes were the worst racists, that they treated blacks as badly as they do in Queens.⁵ Carvajal said he didn't blame the US for racism because there were problems in the United States which were not entirely solved—and which did not need investigation by a commission. He noted there were also problems which appeared in the press and movies and said he had read with great interest of the Mafia in the United States. He acknowledged that the USG has tried to eradicate the mafia—but without success. He suggested that this failure might be seen as an error of omission as the United States has not been able to protect the human rights of the victims of the Mafia, which engages in institutionalized crime. Carvajal repeated that he didn't wish to attack the United States but simply was asking that the United States show greater understanding of the problems of others. He asked the Secretary to have faith in the fact that the Chilean Government was trying to eradicate abuses of human rights and had plans for a return to full democracy.

The Secretary responded that the United States would try to have understanding and that it had no intention of attacking any other country. He said we had spoken out on human rights because we considered them universal principles, but that we would be the first to admit that we were not perfect. He repeated his pledge to open our territory to investigation by any commission, including the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, if there were violations of human rights in the United States.⁶

⁵ "Young Places Soviets, Swedes in 'Racist' Ranks," *Washington Post*, May 26, 1977, p. A25.

⁶ In his First Intervention, Vance said: "If each member state were to grant the Commission free access to national territory, this body would be able to carry out onsite investigations at times and places of its choosing. My country will grant it this facility from today. We believe that for others to do so as well would reduce misunderstandings and the dissemination of false information." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, pp. 69–72)

Carvajal closed by noting that if the United States accepted a visit from the IAHRC, it would be the second country to do so—Chile having been the first.

198. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 27, 1977

SUBJECT

The Gedda Story and U.S. Policy to Chile

Having been caught in a crossfire and almost shot, let me offer three possible reasons why the two State Department officials tried to nail me.² I want to spell these out in some detail not only because of the obvious effect this incident has had on me and my relationship to you, but more importantly because of the implications of this incident for the NSC and for the President's policy on human rights.

I would speculate that the document I sent for comments as a draft PRM³ was presumably rewritten (to refer to "alternative Chilean regimes" and addressed to the CIA) and leaked for three reasons:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 7, Chile, 1/77-1/81. Confidential; personal. Brzezinski wrote Aaron's name in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Also in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, "ZB, Pastor makes a good case that we need a *Chile policy*. Maybe we should ask State to do a paper with options. DA P.S. also note p. 3." At the bottom of the page, Brzezinski wrote, "OK—prepare memo on interagency review. ZB" To the left of this, Pastor wrote a note dated August 18: "Spoke to Todman who said as predicted."

² A June 24 Associated Press article by George Gedda, quoting "two government sources," alleged that Pastor "asked for a CIA analysis of possible alternatives to Chile's rightist military junta" and said that Pastor was "one of several Administration recruits whose liberal views have upset many State Department professionals." ("U.S. Said to Seek Report on Chilean Alternatives," *New York Times*, June 25, 1977, p. 2)

³ A reference to a May 26 draft paper entitled "Policy Review on Chile." The draft stated that "while other U.S. interests clearly must be considered in evolving policy options for Chile, none can take precedence over our human rights concerns." The draft asked for a five-part review, including "a detailed catalog of decisions" which the USG "will need to make or could make in the next 18 months which will have an immediate impact on Chile," "a list of alternative goals for U.S. policy to Chile over the course of the next 18 months," and "a discussion of alternative strategies which the United States can pursue toward the alternative goals, but taking into account the feasibility of attaining the goals." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77)

—To try to get rid of me by identifying me with an unjustifiable policy of intervention and by making it appear as if I were acting on my own against your instructions.

—To try to put a stop to the NSC Staff's "interference" in the State Department's conduct of foreign policy.

—To keep U.S. policy to Chile solely the prerogative of ARA.

From my conversations with Rick and David,⁴ I know that our recollections of the circumstances preceding my LDXing a copy of the draft on Chile to State are different. Still I would like to state my impressions of what happened clearly and honestly.

I raised the issue of a PRM on Chile with you during the Frei interview, when he talked of the great need for U.S. policy consistency to Chile,⁵ and you said that we should talk about it later. Later, you said that you did not think the PRM was an appropriate instrument to do a country study, and you suggested an inter-agency study instead. About a week later, when I was talking to you about a Caribbean PRM⁶ (following the President's suggestion to all of us to try again, if you believe that you are right), I said that I thought that an inter-agency study would not work because Todman would chair it, and his views on the direction U.S. policy should take to Chile did not, in my opinion, reflect the President's views on human rights policy. (Todman strongly opposed the meeting between the Vice President and Frei and argued forcefully—(through Luers, since he was making a speech in Tampa)—at the Christopher meeting on Friday on behalf of three AID loans to Chile.⁷) Besides, Todman told me, as expected, that he did not think

⁴ Reference is to Inderfurth and Aaron. Brzezinski drew an arrow from the top line of this paragraph to Pastor's name in the "from" line of the memorandum.

⁵ See Document 194. In a May 19 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "I think a comprehensive policy to Chile is only possible within the context of a PRM which asks the Departments to sort out our objectives and suggest strategies to attain them." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 7, Chile, 1/77-1/81)

⁶ No PRM for the Caribbean was written. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, Document 348.

⁷ For the text of Todman's June 23 address to the Conference on Caribbean Business, Trade, and Development in Tampa, Florida, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 15, 1977, pp. 214–218. A meeting of the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance ("The Christopher Group") was held on Friday, June 24, 1977. Oxman's handwritten notes from the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, HR Interagency Group IV. (C) The Christopher Group decided to defer consideration of the loans to Chile for 30 to 60 days and to then reassess Chilean human rights conditions, and Hodding Carter made an announcement to this effect on June 28. On June 28, the GOC delivered a diplomatic note renouncing all further FY77 USG aid to Chile. (Vance to Carter, 6/30/77, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening reports (State), 6/77)

such a study was necessary. Then you asked me whether I had shown the drafts (of the Chile and Caribbean PRMs) to anyone in State for comments, and I said I had not, and you, in an offhand manner, suggested I send them for comments, “and then we’ll see.”

I told Luigi⁸ and Tom Thornton that you had reservations about the Chile study. If I were trying to do an end-run around you, I would never have volunteered those comments to them or anyone. Although I feel quite sure Luigi was not responsible for the leaks (he called me up to apologize for what happened, and he is about the only one in ARA whom I trust), I think he may have carelessly passed on to others the comment that you had reservations about that PRM, and that was exploited by the people who told Gedda, who wrote that Bob Pastor was acting on his own. I regret more than I can convey that it was used so successfully, and that you did not trust me enough at the beginning to see the Gedda article for what it was—an attempt to cut my most important source of effectiveness—my relationship with you.

Secondly, the NSC, and let me start by two stories. After the Frei interview with Mondale, a friend of mine in State overheard another official saying: “Goddamit, the White House is trying to make foreign policy.” John Marcum mentioned to me that when Kissinger moved over to State in 1973, he effectively castrated all the regional NSC Staff by either making regional policy himself or going directly to the President. On defense issues, one *had* to use the NSC because Defense strongly asserted its interest, but in regional policy, there were no obvious counterweights to Kissinger. So the Latin American people in NSC, Defense, and Treasury hardly did anything; whenever I came to Washington during this period, I was always surprised at how much time they had.

I have had difficulty working with ARA for personal and policy reasons, no doubt, but mainly I believe for institutional reasons. They act as if life does not exist outside ARA except perhaps on the seventh floor. They have tried to exclude me and have kept me uninformed on what they have been doing. Hardly any information or recommendations bearing on future policy are forwarded to the NSC unless I ask for it first. (There were hardly any “action folders” sent for the 12 days I was travelling on the trip with Mrs. Carter.)⁹ They, frankly, would like to see NSC disappear. To the extent that they want to relay information to the President, they have learned to convey this information through the Secretary’s memoranda to the President, which, of course, I do not see and on which I cannot offer my comments.

⁸ Reference is to Einaudi.

⁹ Rosalynn Carter traveled to the Caribbean and South America in early June 1977.

I suggest this would not be that much of a problem if I were dealing with some “new people” in ARA, but they have not arrived, and are not likely to.

Thirdly, U.S. human rights policy to Chile. I heard on Saturday¹⁰ that when the Gedda story broke, Todman’s reaction was: “consider that the Chile PRM is dead.” U.S. policy to Chile is currently a series of uncoordinated, ad hoc decisions. To the extent that ARA makes policy, it is an attempt to improve our relations with Chile.¹¹

That approach would be all right if Chile were not the kind of symbol which it currently is in the United States. Indications of its overriding symbolic importance to the U.S. and to the President’s human rights policy include the number of news articles on Chile in the last week and the number of times Jimmy Carter mentioned it in the second debate with Gerald Ford.¹²

State is currently wrestling with two very different approach for U.S. policy to Chile. ARA’s approach: begin a dialogue with Pinochet, trying to exchange economic assistance or positive statements by our Ambassador or Secretary of State for even the slightest indication of diminishing repression. As an example, Luers suggested to me the possibility of a Presidential letter of appreciation to Pinochet when he exchanged Jorge Montes, a prominent Chilean communist who was in prison since the coup, with ten Russian dissidents.¹³ The problem with this strategy is that it would risk Presidential association (either directly or indirectly) with the most regressive government in the hemisphere for “a pittance.”

A second option is suggested by Mark Schneider, Pat Derian’s very effective Deputy, to immediately and totally disassociate the U.S. from the present regime.

Presently, policy is not the result of bureaucratic pushing-and-pulling, as Graham Allison would have it, but rather the USG is presently pursuing these two options simultaneously. Sometimes, Schneider inserts himself in the process, bringing it to the attention of Christopher or Vance.¹⁴ Other times, ARA just communicates directly with the Chileans. There is obviously good reason to conclude that our policy to Chile has been inconsistent and ad hoc without a sense of

¹⁰ June 25.

¹¹ Aaron underlined this sentence.

¹² October 6, 1976; for excerpts see *Foreign Relations, 1977–80*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 11.

¹³ Aaron underlined these two sentences, circled Luers’s name, drew an arrow from the bottom of the page to Luers’s name, and wrote at the bottom of the page, “and this guy will be in charge of Soviet relations?”

¹⁴ Aaron underlined this sentence.

goals or strategies. That is why I initially drafted a PRM. Given the Gedda story and ARA's strong fight for loans to Chile, I think there is even a stronger and more compelling need for a systematic attempt to formulate a consistent policy to Chile than before, but for obvious reasons, this will be the last time I will say that.¹⁵

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

I guess what I found most depressing about the Gedda leak is that the "leakers" succeeded to a certain extent in achieving their three objectives.¹⁶

¹⁵ No PRM on Chile was finalized.

¹⁶ Aaron circled this sentence and wrote, "don't worry about it DA."

199. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, Undated

SUBJECT

Recent Activities of Eduardo Frei

1. Attached² is a memorandum on the recent activities of the former President of Chile, Eduardo Frei. This might be of particular interest to you in the light of your late May discussion with him.³

This subject will also be treated in a forthcoming issue [*less than 1 line not declassified*].⁴

Stansfield Turner⁵

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M00165A, Box 5, Folder 130: C-7: Chile. Secret. Drafted [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on July 1, concurrence by Wells on July 2. Printed from a copy which indicates that it was sent on July 5.

² See Document 200.

³ See Document 194.

⁴ July 7, 1977. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] File, Box 3, 7/7/77-7/15/77)

⁵ A notation indicating that Turner signed the memorandum was typed above his name.

200. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, Undated

SUBJECT

Activities of Eduardo Frei

1. Since his trip to Europe and the U.S., during which he met with Vice President Mondale and other U.S. leaders, former Chilean President Eduardo Frei has let it be known in certain circles that he would be willing to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with President Pinochet provided certain conditions were met. The conditions concern various measures to liberalize the Chilean regime. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

2. In late June Frei told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that during his recent talks with senior U.S. officials he had stressed the importance of creating valid political alternatives to the current military government in Chile. He said that such alternatives would have to include the military because, without its support, a change of government would be impossible. Frei added that if he were given the reins of government tomorrow, he would be unable to govern effectively because he lacks the support of the military, which is the only power base in Chile today.

3. Frei said that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] he has learned of dissatisfaction within all the services regarding the excesses of the Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), which is largely responsible for the poor image of the military government. Frei maintained that there are democratically oriented elements within the Armed Forces who want to return to the barracks, but only with dignity and assurance that Chile's security will not be jeopardized. He said that the current low prestige of Chile is causing disillusionment among Armed Forces personnel who consider themselves responsible for this image.

4. Frei told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that in order to resolve Chile's problems, the current government must terminate the state of siege, abolish DINA, and change certain key leaders who have been directly responsible for government policy to date. Frei is seeking the support of former President Jorge Alessandri, who is now President of the Council of State. Alessandri, a rightist with his own ambitions

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M00165A, Box 5, Folder 130: C-7: Chile. Secret. Drafted [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on July 1, concurrence by Wells on July 2. Printed from a copy which indicates that it was sent on July 5. The memorandum was attached to an undated covering memorandum from Turner to Mondale. See Document 199.

to consider, is unlikely to try to accommodate a Frei-Pinochet rapprochement. However, it is possible that Frei anticipates this but expects Alessandri to pass along his proposal, which presents slightly less strong conditions than those Frei related to his own collaborators. These are: to reduce the state of siege, to remove DINA's arrest powers, to make the government more representative, and to end the "persecution" of the Christian Democratic Party.

5. Frei also told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that he had given U.S. officials his opinion of Clodomiro Almeyda, leader of the moderate sector of the Socialist Party (PS) in exile, whom he described as the most representative member of the Chilean leftist exile community and the only PS leader in exile who was still independent of Moscow and Havana. When questioned [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Frei said that Almeyda is not yet aligned with the Social Democratic movement, but that he believed Almeyda would be interested.

6. The above information indicates that Frei is trying to make the most of his trip to the U.S. Indeed, Benjamin Prado, left-wing leader of Frei's Christian Democratic Party (PDC), said that Frei's meeting with U.S. officials had had a unifying effect within the Party and had greatly increased Frei's prestige in the PDC, especially with the left wing of the PDC, and among non-Marxist political parties, including the Radical Party and the Christian Left Party.

7. That Frei will succeed in bringing about modifications of key junta policies, however, is judged highly improbable, and his chances of arriving at any form of agreement with Pinochet are considered minimal.

201. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, July 11, 1977

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

2. *Chile*: President Pinochet spoke on July 9 to the issue of Chile's political evolution.² Pinochet said Chile is in a period of recuperation which, with increasing civilian participation in the bureaucracy, will last until 1980. This period will be followed by a 4–5 year transition stage, in which the armed forces will govern with the President of the Junta exercising executive power as President of the Republic. The Junta will appoint a legislative chamber in 1980 but within five years thereafter, two-thirds of its members are to be elected. At that time a President will be elected by the legislative chamber and a new Constitution will be promulgated. We have taken the public position today³ that, while not commenting on specific points in the plan, we are pleased with Pinochet's intention to return Chile to constitutional and elected government and regard the step as a positive one. We said that we would welcome a prompt return to an open, democratic government in Chile and expressed our interest in an early relaxation of the stricter measures in force under the current state of siege. Our Chargé is delivering a similar message to the Foreign Minister.⁴

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 7/77. Secret. At the top right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Cy J."

² "Chile's Leader Outlines A Plan For Civilian Rule," *New York Times*, July 11, 1977, p. 7.

³ In telegram 160699 to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, July 11, the Department sent the text of the noon press briefing related to Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770246-0637) A July 11 action memorandum from Feinberg to Vance, sent through Lake, makes similar points but does not appear to have been sent to Vance. (National Archives, RG59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 7/1-7/15/77)

⁴ In telegram 5710 from Santiago, July 13, Boyatt reported on his July 12 meeting with Carvajal. Boyatt said that "the United States is pleased with President Pinochet's announced intention to return Chile to a constitutional and elected government and believes that his plan is a positive step in this direction." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770249-0779) In telegram 174270 to Santiago, July 26, the Department reported that during his July 15 meeting with Cauas, Todman "pointed out that we were pleased in principle with president Pinochet's speech which outlined a return to constitutionality but are disturbed about the form and timing of the proposed system." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770265-1374)

202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, July 15, 1977, 1824Z

165377. Subject: Proposed Covert Action Operation

1. I have carefully reviewed your earlier proposal together with the additional points set out in Santiago 5582.² However, much as we might sympathize with the objective of curbing the role and power of Col. Contreras [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I am not rpt not persuaded we should go the covert action route to get at this problem.

2. The development of a solid and influential Chilean opposition [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicates there is a good chance that Chileans themselves will accomplish most if not all of the aim sought: A curtailment [*less than 1 line not declassified*] of DINA. It has not been demonstrated that the suggested covert contribution to this "withering fire" DINA is under would make the difference between the success or failure of this movement. At the same time, the apparently irrepressible tendency of our covert operations in Chile to become the subject of wide-spread public comment opens up the real possibility that our initiative would ultimately become known. The consequence would be that an indigenous and healthy movement toward the realization of human rights in Chile would become almost irretrievably compromised. We are of course concerned over the unfortunate results for our position in Chile and elsewhere were it to become known that we had resumed covert operations in Chile, but our principal aim is that the move toward human rights in Chile remain unencumbered and

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963-79. Secret; Roger Channel. Drafted in INR/DDC and by Barneyby; cleared by Devine, Todman, and McAfee; approved by Kirk.

² In telegram 4537 from Santiago, June 2, Boyatt described the proposed covert action. An Embassy contact would "make a representation to President Pinochet, ostensibly on the part of concerned Chilean senior military officers, that Colonel Contreras' actions have become counter-productive to the interests of the Chilean government and that he should either be removed from his position as chief of DINA or at the least his powers [*less than 1 line not declassified*] should be sharply curtailed." (Ibid.) In telegram 136105 to Santiago, June 13, Luers wrote: "Given the special history of our past actions in Chile, it would seem particularly unwise to launch such an initiative there," and instructed the Embassy to "take no action along the lines suggested." (Ibid.) In telegram 5582 from Santiago, July 7, Boyatt asked that the proposal be reconsidered: "DINA is now under withering fire from many quarters" and "the operation proposed would add to this momentum." (Ibid.)

uninfluenced, and therefore unendangered, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]³

Vance

³ In telegram 5920 from Santiago, July 20, Boyatt wrote: "I believe that the momentum within Chile will result in a restructuring of DINA and its loss of arrest powers. I fear that Contreras may survive the reorganization and that will mean risks in the future. In any case, your argumentation is persuasive; [*less than 1 line not declassified*]." (Ibid.)

203. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, August 16, 1977, 2126Z

6703. Subject: Todman Visit: Second Day in Santiago: Call on President Pinochet and Economic Subjects. Ref: Buenos Aires 6016² (Notal).

1. Assistant Secretary Todman and Charge were received by President Pinochet promptly at 5:00 p.m. Foreign Minister Carvajal and Jorge Cauas, Chilean Ambassador to the U.S., also were present. The scheduled one-half hour exchange of views expanded to an hour's conversation followed by another 20 minutes of talks during a tea hosted by the President.

2. Pinochet began with the standard GOC description of the horrible chaos of the Allende years, the demand by the vast majority of Chileans that the military take over the government to end the "Marxist reign of terror," and the need for tough measures as a reaction against the threat of urban guerilla warfare if not full civil war. Pinochet underlined that while many other countries in Latin America and the world were subjected to a situation in which private citizens, government officials and the left-wing political opposition were all being killed, Chile was an island of tranquility in which 99.9 percent of the citizens went about their business in safety and without complaint.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770295-1167. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Montevideo, and Quito.

² Not found.

3. Following the usual pattern, Pinochet's hard-nosed beginning was succeeded by more tempered comments. He lamented the unremitting propaganda campaign against the GOC by the Soviets and all other marxist elements, noting that in fact the Chilean reality was much better than its international image. Pinochet said that it was precisely because of the disparity between the image (totalitarian regime) and the reality (a process of normalization) that he welcomed visits such as Ambassador Todman's. He also discussed at some length the social programs (health, education and housing) which were being successfully carried through under his administration.

4. Assistant Secretary Todman emphasized that the purpose of his trip was to learn. He had come to meet and converse with a variety of Chileans in all areas of Chilean life. He was happy to report that he had been able to do so with results he felt would contribute to increased comprehension in each country of the tour.³ Todman assured Pinochet that the USG was not interested in overthrowing any government or intervening in the political life of any nation.

5. Ambassador Todman stated that, while the USG did not wish to dictate or impose, he wanted President Pinochet and the GOC to understand that human rights was the centerpiece of the Carter administration's foreign policy. In this sense US policy would be to encourage a process in all countries (including the US) of furtherance of human rights in three dimensions; that of protection of the person; that of a decent standard of living (including economic, health and education), and that of participation in the political life of a country.

6. Ambassador Todman noted with approval the news (announced a few hours previously) that the directorate of national intelligence⁴ was a positive move in the right direction and queried Pinochet as to what further steps the GOC contemplated in returning to a normal situation. Dramatic move such as reducing or abolishing state of siege or commuting sentences of Carlos Lazo and Erich Schnake⁵ could have important effect in conveying that real improvements are being made.

7. Pinochet responded by saying DINA had been dissolved because it had served its purpose. Rather than reacting to terrorists after citizens

³ Todman also visited Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil.

⁴ In telegram 6642 from Santiago, August 12, the Embassy reported that the GOC had abolished DINA and created the National Information Center (CNI). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770291-0576)

⁵ Lazo was executive vice president of the Chilean central bank and Schnake was a senator during the Allende presidency. Both were members of the Central Committee of the Chilean Socialist Party and were imprisoned after the 1973 coup. (Telegram 13662 from Paris, May 9, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770162-1160; Telegram 4510 from Santiago, May 13, 1976, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760185-0581)

had been killed, DINA had broken up the left-wing killer groups. He said he thought that there was still some danger of a resurgence of terrorist activity and that therefore he was determined to move carefully on the state of siege. With an amused smile, President Pinochet said he had been considering reducing the state of siege but that Ambassador Todman's visit had made it impossible since to do so would appear to be knuckling to international pressure. Following disclaimers Pinochet said that he was considering reducing the state of siege further and alleviating the curfew.

8. In response to Assistant Secretary Todman's question about Pinochet's plan for eventual elections, the latter noted that a return to normality was not a return to the past. The Armed Forces would never accept the reestablishment of the former "Politiqueria" (corruption plus log-rolling). On timing, Pinochet said (not very convincingly) that he could leave now but that the system would be the same. The return to elective politics should be carefully orchestrated in order to avoid being premature. He cited the revolving door military-civilian-military governments of Argentine and Ecuador as examples of the danger of too much haste.

9. Comment. The tone of the conversation throughout was one of frank and cordial dialogue. As noted previously, Pinochet appreciates directness. We judge that Assistant Secretary Todman's call on Pinochet will contribute to sustaining momentum toward achievement of additional U.S. human rights objectives in Chile.

Unquote

[Omitted here is a discussion of economic subjects]

204. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 23, 1977

SUBJECT

Query on Chilean Intelligence Shifts

1. INR and reporting components of the US Embassy in Santiago agree with us that there is no way to determine whether the National

¹Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Box 10, Folder 43. Confidential. [less than 1 line not declassified].

Information Center (CNI) will differ substantially from its predecessor, the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA).² The critical factor, as INR specifically noted, is not so much to be found in the legal framework as in the decisions of President Pinochet and events in Chile. We concur in this view.

2. We were requested by the White House,³ however, to provide an assessment of Pinochet's decision, i.e. our best guess as to whether or not we thought the Chilean government is moving sincerely to prevent abuses or merely resorting to subterfuge. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the move "appears to represent a genuine effort to curtail human rights abuses."⁴ Of course, we cannot flatly predict how Chile's security services will act under the new mandate, but [*less than 1 line not declassified*] we are inclined to be positive. We do not expect high officials of the government to condone further excesses such as torture or illegal disappearance, although isolated cases could still occur. If the security situation in Chile deteriorates—which is unlikely—the possibility of retrogression in the human rights field would increase.

3. In our view, the matter boils down to how one perceives Chilean intentions. We agree with the embassy that the Pinochet government "cannot help but recognize that it must persuade its skeptical friends of its sincerity in 'dissolving' DINA."⁵ We believe, on balance, that the risks of allowing repressive practices to recur are too great; the new organization would quickly find itself under even stronger attack than DINA. In our view, Chile cannot afford to gamble on the inevitable backlash that would undo efforts to improve its international standing, particularly its relations with the US.

4. In conclusion, we think that INR side-stepped making a firm judgment on the matter, going only as far as expressing some degree of skepticism. We have noted in today's INR NODIS *Morning Summary* a somewhat altered view; the dissolution of DINA is now seen by INR

² In telegram 6642 from Santiago, August 12, the Embassy reported on the abolishment of DINA and the creation of CNI. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770291-0576) In telegram 6818 from Santiago, August 19, the Embassy reported: "The law creating the National Information Center (CNI) deletes from its charter the blanket arrest and detention authority of its predecessor National Intelligence Directorate (DINA) and place CNI more clearly within the Ministry of Interior." The Embassy continued: "Whether the GOC intends fundamentally to change its internal security modus operandi depends less on the legal framework (decrees can be ignored), than on a variety of factors such as events in Chile, decisions by President Pinochet, forces at work within the GOC and the external environment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770300-0492)

³ Not found.

⁴ [*1 line not declassified*].

⁵ See telegram 6818 from Santiago, footnote 2 above.

as “the first stage of a major policy shift.”⁶ In addition, INR reports that Chilean Cardinal Silva—a strong critic of Pinochet—told the US Embassy that he considers the change to be a positive step.

Attachments

- (1) [*less than 1 line not declassified*]
- (2) Amembassy 6642, Aug 12, 1977
- (3) Amembassy 6818, Aug 19, 1977
- (4) INR Morning Summary/Chile

⁶ Not found.

205. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1977, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter / President Pinochet Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

CHILE

General Augusto Pinochet President
of Chile
Foreign Minister Carvajal
Ambassador Cauas
Brig. Gen. Sergio Covarrubias
Presidential Chief of Staff
Chilean Aide, Rene Vidal

U.S.

President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Thomas D. Boyatt, Chargé
d’Affaires, Santiago

Peruvian Arms Purchases

Following the amenities, President Carter began the conversation by stating that he had discussed the problem shared by the countries of the area with President Morales Bermudez of Peru.² The President

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 9-12/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

² A reference to border disputes among Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. See Documents 304 and 22.

emphasized U.S. friendship for all the countries and our concern about tension in the Andean region. President Carter said that Morales Bermudez informed him that the governments of Chile and Peru held regular consultations, and Carter was gratified to hear that. He wanted President Pinochet to know that the U.S. was eager and hopeful regarding the absence of conflict and disagreement in the Hemisphere.

President Carter said that Peru had made large arms purchases but that Morales Bermudez had informed him that they have met their security needs. Peru would not make further purchases of military equipment except for purposes of operation and maintenance. He also noted that Ecuador was also concerned about Peru's arms build-up.

President Pinochet responded by noting the Chilean Government's concern about Peruvian armaments. Chile was interested in peace; it only purchased enough arms to defend itself. Chile had been friendly to Peru and while this friendship was reciprocated, still Peru continued to buy arms.

President Carter repeated Morales Bermudez' statement to the effect that Peruvian arms purchases had been completed, adding that Morales Bermudez had also made the same pledge to some U.S. Senators. The President said that Morales Bermudez would probably be glad to repeat such assurances personally to Pinochet.

Pinochet said that Chile had decided to apply its limited resources to economic difficulties rather than arms purchases. Pinochet also analyzed Peruvian numerical superiority in major weapons systems, e.g., 600 Peruvian tanks versus 60 Chilean.

Bolivian Corridor

In response to President Carter's invitation to discuss the issue of Bolivia's desire for access to the sea, Pinochet repeated a brief history of the Bolivian Corridor negotiations including: Chile's 1974 initiative in re-establishing relations with Bolivia (they had been broken for 13 years); Chile's offer to cede to Bolivia a corridor to the sea through Chilean territory and Bolivia's agreement to the cession of an equal land area to Chile along their border; the requirement under the 1929 Treaty for Chile to consult Peru regarding territorial changes; the unacceptable counter-offer by Peru of the tripartite administration of a zone on Chilean territory near Arica; and the fact that Peru had not even responded formally to Chile's request for consultation. In answer to a question by President Carter as to what could be done at this time to increase the chances for a successful resolution of the problem, Pinochet suggested that the U.S. could try to influence the Peruvians to accept the granting of a corridor to Bolivia.

President Carter noted that Morales Bermudez had told him that the next move was up to Chile and Bolivia. The President said that

the U.S. had no desire to interfere, but he was searching for a common area. He hoped that the tripartite discussions would result in progress, but he understood that with respect to its proposal regarding a tripartite zone, Peru had introduced a new dimension to the problem. Pinochet said that the Peruvian proposal for tripartite administration of Arica was just a “time-bomb” and must be discarded.

The President asked Pinochet what procedural—as opposed to substantive—suggestions Pinochet might have for progress. Pinochet responded by saying that Chile’s position was that it was up to the Bolivians to take the lead in convincing the Peruvians to accept the deal which was, after all, very much in Bolivia’s interest.

President Carter closed this part of the discussion by saying that he would explore the matter with Bolivian President Banzer and express U.S. hope for a peaceful resolution of the matter.³

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

President Carter then turned to a discussion of hemispheric nuclear policy—Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The President indicated U.S. interest in having Chile waive its reservations with respect to Tlatelolco and sign the NPT. He asked if it was correct that Pinochet would be willing to let Tlatelolco enter into force if Cuba and Argentina sign and ratify first. Pinochet said that the matter was under active study and that Chile was willing to accept but to sign first would be a mark of weakness, a step he is not prepared to take. With regard to the NPT, Pinochet stated that Chile is way behind Argentina in nuclear development. This creates a difficult situation for Chile. If Chile’s nuclear development progresses sufficiently, Chile would be in a position to sign. But despite some uncomfortable problems over some islands in the South,⁴ Chile will sign if Argentina does.

President Carter then asked Pinochet if he meant that he would sign simultaneously with the Argentines, to which Pinochet replied yes. President Pinochet agreed that a nuclear-free zone in the Hemisphere—particularly in the Southern Cone—was a very important matter; Chile would sign if Argentina signed, even if Cuba did not sign. President Carter said that the U.S. would encourage Argentina to sign,⁵ but that it would be helpful if Chile could take the initiative. He said the goal of nuclear fuel supplies is for reactors to produce power, not explosives.

³ See Document 120.

⁴ A reference to the dispute between Chile and Argentina over control of three islands in the Beagle Channel, near Cape Horn; for further information see Document 37.

⁵ See Document 63.

*Human Rights*⁶

President Carter then opened the discussion of human rights, noting it was the only major bilateral problem and he wished to ventilate the matter in a frank and positive way. The President said that he hoped that the charges and allegations regarding deprivations of human rights in Chile could be answered. President Carter took note of the great progress which had been made in prisoner releases, trial procedures and the proclamation of future elections, and a return to democratic government. President Carter said he did not want anything to stand in the way of traditional U.S.-Chilean friendship, and in this regard invited President Pinochet to analyze the Chilean situation to help him understand the situation and eliminate any misunderstanding.

In response Pinochet made the following points:

—The Government of Chile agreed fully with the U.S. on the importance of human rights.

—Chile had passed through a difficult period during which the Marxist-Leninist government had no respect for human rights. Under the Unidad Popular regime citizens were being murdered in broad daylight and the military coup was designed precisely to preserve human rights.

—Since assuming control, his government had found 15,000 foreign mercenaries (Cubans, etc.) and 30,000 hidden imported arms in the country.

—The law being applied is an old one enacted in 1926.

—In the beginning there clearly were abuses—abuses on both sides. Whenever a soldier was killed, the world reacted with silence; when a revolutionary was killed, there was a great hue and cry. In any case, the abuses were in the initial period and things are much calmer now.

—Today there are no political prisoners and many of those convicted are being released under commutation procedures, some exchanging jail sentences for exile. People now in prison are all subject to judicial process under the Chilean court system. In general, Chile has freedom of the press, freedom of thought and freedom of travel. Restrictions remain, but they are to keep the nation from being destroyed. Chile had been torn into pieces and now the government was working for unity.

⁶ In an August 31 memorandum to Pastor, Propper requested that Brzezinski or Carter "reiterate to President Pinochet the continuing importance" to the USG "of obtaining the fullest cooperation at the highest levels of the Chilean Government in eliciting information necessary to resolve" the U.S. investigation into the assassination of Letelier. Pastor noted on the memorandum that he discussed this request with Brzezinski, "who said not to touch this matter again." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 2-8/77)

—Now the government has taken additional steps—the Intelligence Agency (DINA) which has been criticized so much, has been replaced by an Information Agency (CNI).

—On the legal side, it was important to understand that the judicial system had been permanent. In fact, the Supreme Court President is the same person who has served the past four Chilean Presidents.

—Finally, Pinochet said he was a great admirer of democracy and it was his fondest wish to leave office having built one, but not one liable to attack from underneath as had happened before.

President Carter noted that he had no inclination to disagree with Pinochet's assessment of the situation in Chile. Yet, in the eyes of the world Chile still had a human rights problem. The President asked for Pinochet's suggestions on how the problem could be alleviated—how to improve the world perception and demonstrate that the progress was real. He asked if he, the UN or the OAS could help.

Pinochet responded by pointing out that Chile was the victim of a vast and successful Marxist propaganda campaign. However, the country was moving step-by-step toward a new concept of democracy of which Chileans were very proud. Shortly the road would be clear. In the meantime, his suggestion was that everyone should come to Chile to see, as Assistant Secretary Todman had,⁷ that what is going on inside of Chile is not what they say.

President Carter picked up on the latter point and asked Pinochet to what degree he would permit outside observers. He did not want to interfere but saw outside observation as a way of clearing up the allegations. Would Pinochet permit the UN Commission on Human Rights? Pinochet said that since the UN Human Rights Commission was partial and politicized, it was not the appropriate body. What was needed was some way for the UN to establish rules for inspection which would be applicable to all countries. Chile had suggested to the UN that only two persons go. Their visit should be unannounced and quietly conducted.

President Carter asked if Pinochet would accept two observers sent by the UN without publicity. Pinochet said he would as long as there was no advance publicity and the observers conducted their survey in an impartial manner, but he did not believe that the UN would accept this. President Carter said that he thought that this was a fair procedure. The President said that the problem remains that there has not been recognition of the progress in the human rights area described by Pinochet, and this cannot happen unless an independent inspection

⁷ See Document 203.

occurs. If these observers find something, they should discuss it with Pinochet before making their findings public.

President Carter closed by saying that he hoped to improve relations of friendship between the U.S. and Chile and thanked Pinochet for coming to Washington for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.

206. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, September 24, 1977

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

6. *Chile and Human Rights*: Reports growing out of the recent visit to Washington of President Pinochet² indicate that Chile may be willing to consider receiving UN human rights observers under certain conditions.

Assistant Secretary Todman called in Chilean Ambassador Cauas to discuss this,³ and to offer our support in working out details of such a visit. In principle, we understand⁴ that the Chileans may be prepared to receive two UN visitors, without publicity, who would submit their report to the Chilean government for comment before publishing it. There are also certain "legal and procedural preconditions—the rules of the game" to be worked out.

The Chilean Ambassador to the UN is aware of our discussions and will be instructed to reopen exploratory talks with the UN. Chile prefers to deal directly with the UN on this, but will welcome an expression of US interest to the UN. Todman will do this in New York next week.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 9/77. Secret.

² See Document 205.

³ In telegram 232267 to Santiago, September 27, the Department reported on Todman's September 14 and 23 meetings with Cauas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770352-1148)

⁴ Carter underlined the phrase "we understand," and in the right margin wrote a question mark. In the left margin, he wrote: "Pinochet specifically promised this to me."

⁵ In telegram 10001 from the Secretary's delegation in New York, September 29, the delegation reported on Todman's September 28 meeting with Buffum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770354-0773)

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, November 2, 1977, 2053Z

262398. Subject: Letter to President Pinochet from President Carter

Begin text: Dear Mr President: I want to thank you for your letter of September 16² and to express my pleasure that you were able to visit Washington to witness the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties. These treaties will greatly strengthen relations among the nations of the Americas, and demonstrate our ability to resolve problems through frank discussion and negotiation as equals.

I also found it helpful to meet you personally to discuss issues of concern to both our governments. I gained a better understanding of your views, and hope that our meeting will stimulate further exchanges between our governments. You will have in Santiago Ambassador George Landau, who has my complete confidence. I urge you to speak with him as you would with me.

As I noted during our conversation, human rights considerations remain the major obstacle to restoration of the traditionally close relations between the United States and Chile. I earnestly hope such friendly and close relations can gradually be reestablished between our two countries. I am convinced, however, that there will be little change without increased evidence that your government is taking steps to safeguard and promote human rights and to restore to Chile the vigorous and open democratic tradition of which all Chileans have justly been proud.

I was particularly interested in your indication of willingness to receive two United Nations human rights observers, provided that they visit without publicity and meet privately with you before returning to the United Nations and making their report public. I have no intention of intervening in the affairs of your country, but I believe that the interests of Chile would best be served by such a visit and the subsequent submission to world opinion of an objective report concerning the human rights situation in Chile. I was pleased with the peaceful outcome of the demonstration by the Chilean women at ECLA headquarters, and hope that you will be able to cooperate with the United

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770404-0053. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to Lima and for information to La Paz, the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York, and Buenos Aires. Drafted in the White House, cleared in S/S-O and approved by Fuller.

² Not found.

Nations Secretary General on this matter.³ I will follow the course of your government's discussions with the United Nations on both matters with great interest.

In this regard, let me mention the very important role played by the non-governmental human rights organizations, and my hope that they will continue to contribute to the advancement of human rights and my firm belief that they should retain their consultative status at the United Nations.

As you know, I had the opportunity to review Bolivia's desire for renewed sovereign access to the Pacific with Presidents Banzer and Morales Bermudez.⁴ I assured them, as I did you, of my government's support for negotiations to find a solution satisfactory to all three nations, and of our continued interest in the achievement of a peaceful settlement. I was pleased that you and they were subsequently able to take advantage of your joint presence in Washington to meet privately on this important subject.⁵

Finally, let me repeat my profound interest in nuclear nonproliferation. You commented that Chile would be able to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and permit the Treaty of Tlatelolco to come into effect if Argentina were to do so. This would be a courageous and important decision. I discussed these same matters with President Videla, and urged him to take the remaining steps necessary to bring the treaties into force.⁶ I expect that there may be some progress soon. We can all hope that Latin America, before too long, will become the first region in the world to bar nuclear weapons. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

Vance

³ A reference to a hunger strike by relatives of Chileans who had disappeared, the goal of which was to call for UN support for their efforts to find out what had happened to their relatives. The hunger strike ended in June. (Telegram 5199 from Santiago, June 23, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770225-0621) In telegram 8272 from Santiago, October 6, the Embassy reported that a GOC report to the UN on disappearances was "rather lame and predictably barren," and that "about the only nice thing to be said is that it contains no lies of commission. We have no doubt that the persons named 'are not now detained by the security forces.'" (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770367-0077)

⁴ See Documents 120 and 304.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ See Document 63.

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, December 7, 1977, 2329Z

292444. Subject: Delivery of Pinochet Letter. Ref: Santiago 9816²

1. Ambassador Cauas, after checking with GOC yesterday, accepted appointment with Deputy Secretary Christopher to deliver President Pinochet's letter to President Carter. Meeting, also attended by ARA/AND Director Barnebey, took place 3:30 p.m. today.

2. Cauas said that President Pinochet, in his letter dated November 9,³ had wanted to inform President Carter that GOC was strongly opposed to the procedures being used by UN Human Rights Commission ad hoc working group. The investigation of the Chilean human rights situation carried out by this working group allegedly was not pursued legally or equitably, and Pinochet therefore wanted letter delivered to President Carter to allow him to analyze Chile's objections. Cauas said that the documents accompanying the Pinochet letter were given to Assistant Secretary Todman two weeks ago,⁴ but that the letter itself had not been delivered. Deputy Secretary Christopher said that he would send the letter today to President Carter. He would also inform the President, as Cauas explained today, that this letter of November 9 and the President's letter of October 31 had crossed, and that therefore Pinochet's letter was not in reply to the October 31 letter.⁵ Cauas clarified that GOC was continuing to process this response, which would be delivered at a later date. Cauas said he regretted that Pinochet's letter had not been reviewed earlier, since the UN is to vote today or tomorrow on the Chile Human Rights Resolution.⁶ Christo-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770455-0546. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Barnebey; cleared by Lamb and for information by Schneider and Hewitt; approved by Barnebey.

² Dated December 5. The Embassy reported that Cauas had a "lengthy position paper concerning events at New York and the GOC's problems with" the UN resolution on human rights in Chile, and a reply from Pinochet to Carter's October 31 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770450-1102)

³ The letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-12/78.

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ For Carter's October 31 letter, see Document 207. Carter responded to the November 9 letter on January 17, writing that he was "pleased to have your views" on the UN resolution on human rights in Chile. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-12/78)

⁶ The UN Third Committee adopted Resolution 32/118 condemning the human rights situation in Chile on December 7. The U.S. co-sponsored the resolution. (Telegram 5351 from USUN, December 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770455-1039) On December 16, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution. (UN Yearbook 1977, p. 715–716)

pher responded that we will study the Pinochet letter in terms of evaluating the actions which will have been taken by the UN on this subject.

3. Deputy Secretary then expressed concern over Chile human rights situation, saying that we look for further improvements in a situation which now constitutes an impediment in our relations. He said we recognize that there have been some improvements but we are disappointed that further progress has not been made. He later reemphasized that he wanted GOC to understand that our overall mood is one of disappointment at developments in the human rights situation in Chile.

4. Deputy Secretary said he recognized that Ambassador Cauas is trying to be helpful, and he said that he wants to keep the lines of communication with GOC. Cauas agreed that he too wants to keep communications lines open. He said he was glad to hear that human rights improvements of Chile have been noted by the Department. He then said that working group study goes beyond the human rights situation in his country; e.g., Chile is being judged on "caricatures" such as criticism of its university fee system. He said that a GOC initiative which he said would have brought some balance into investigations of human rights had not been supported in the UN (apparently this was a resolution proposed by Chilean UN delegation to call for new procedures for UN in analyzing human rights in all countries). Cauas added that further efforts to improve human rights are not easy now in view of constraints GOC faces, such as economic problems of large debt and low copper prices. He also said that there could be a nationalistic reaction within Chile to these UN pressures on human rights. The Deputy Secretary said he recognized Chile's efforts in economic areas in controlling inflation and seeking economic stability, but our concern remains with respect to bringing about human rights improvements there. Deputy Secretary said he hoped that Cauas would be among those advising against a xenophobic reaction since such a reaction could only harden positions on both sides and possibly result in downward spiral of more repression, more external negative reaction, etc. Cauas closed by saying his own objective was to convey clearly and honestly to GOC what USG believes, and said he was at Deputy Secretary's disposal to continue dialogue on this subject.

Christopher

209. Editorial Note

On September 21, 1976, the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, and his colleague, Veronica “Ronni” Karpen Moffitt, a U.S. citizen, were killed in a car bomb explosion in Washington, D.C. (See *Foreign Relations, 1973–76*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, Document 246.) Eugene M. Propper, an Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia, was in charge of the prosecution of those responsible.

By February 1978, the investigation had led Propper to want to interview two Chilean military officers about their possible knowledge of and involvement in the crime. In a February 17 memorandum to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Bushnell wrote that the two “possibly may have ‘contracted’ with Cuban exiles for the murders. Letters rogatory are being sent to Chile in an effort to take testimony from these officers.” The letters rogatory, issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, requested “the cooperation of the Chilean courts in taking testimony from the two Chilean military officers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile I) (S)

The two officers, named as “Juan Williams Rose” and “Alejandro Romeral Jara” in the letters rogatory, had used those false names and fraudulent Paraguayan passports to acquire U.S. visas in Asuncion, Paraguay in July 1976. Paraguayan presidential advisor Conrado Pappalardo had contacted then-U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay George W. Landau, saying that Chilean President Augusto Pinochet had personally asked Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner to issue the Paraguayan passports. Pappalardo claimed that the two would be investigating businesses in the U.S. for possible ties with “anti-Chilean, possibly terrorist, activities,” and that they would contact then-U.S. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence General Vernon Walters upon their arrival in the United States. (Telegram 3233 from Asuncion, August 5, 1976, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Box 16, Asuncion) (S) After getting word from then-Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Harry Shlaudeman that “this harebrained scheme” should be halted, Landau alerted Pappalardo that the two Chilean agents should not travel to the United States using fraudulent passports and visas. (Telegram 194941 to Asuncion, August 5, 1976, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Box 16, Asuncion; Telegram 3276 from Asuncion, August 6, 1976, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Box 16, Asuncion) (S) The unused visas were cancelled at the Embassy in

Asuncion on October 29, 1976. (Telegram 4492 from Asuncion, October 29, 1976, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Box 16, Asuncion) (S)

In March 1978, the two officials were identified as Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) agents Michael Vernon Townley, a U.S. citizen, and Armando Fernandez Larios, a Chilean citizen. ("A Chilean Paper Says Suspect in Killing of Ex-Allende Aide is North American," *New York Times*, March 6, 1978, p. A10; Juan de Onis, "Chile Orders Inquiry in the Letelier Case," *New York Times*, March 7, 1978, p. 6; "Chilean In Letelier Probe Linked to Secret Police," *Washington Post*, March 8, 1978, p. A20)

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, February 17, 1978, 0125Z

42100. Subject: Letelier-Moffitt Assassination Investigation

1. Department may call in Chilean Ambassador Cauas as early as February 17 to advise him of imminent presentation of letters rogatory in connection Letelier-Moffitt assassination investigation.² At that time Cauas will be given a copy of the US District Court for District of Colombia "cover letter" addressed to Supreme Court of Chile. We will stress gravity with which USG regards matter and our expectation that GOC will give prompt and full cooperation in the investigation.

2. The letters rogatory are being pouched to you early next week for presentation to the Foreign Minister.³ The text of the District Court's "request for international judicial assistance", but not the sealed questions, will become available in open court records within a few days, possibly as early as Tuesday or Wednesday (February 22 or 23), after the letters have been dispatched to Chile.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780072-0974. Secret; Niact Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Steven; cleared by Barnebey and in L and S/S-O; approved by Bushnell.

² No record of the meeting was found.

³ In telegram 1336 from Santiago, February 27, Boyatt indicated that the letters rogatory had arrived that morning and were delivered to Carvajal that afternoon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780090-0431)

3. You will soon be requested to seek an appointment with the Foreign Minister or the Senior Foreign Ministry official available in his absence, possibly on February 17 or if not then soon thereafter. When you make your approach, you should inform the minister that letters rogatory in the Letelier-Moffitt investigation are being sent to Chile and that your Embassy will deliver them as soon as received. You should state that Ambassador Cauas has been called to the Department, and has been handed an advance copy of the court's "request", which he will undoubtedly transmit to Santiago as quickly as possible.

4. For the interim information of the GOC (once you are authorized to make your approach), you may draw upon the following excerpts from the text of the "request" to make clear the general line of inquiry pursued by the court and the political implications of the situation. "It has become known . . . that two members of the Chilean military entered the United States one month before the Letelier and Moffitt murders. At least one of these men met with one of the persons believed to be responsible for these murders. Both of these men had previously obtained visas to enter the United States using fraudulent documentation from a country other than Chile. These visas were revoked by the United States on August 9, 1976, after the fraudulent nature of the documents was discovered. They subsequently obtained official A-2 visas from the US Embassy in Santiago, Chile on August 16, 1976 by presenting official Chilean passports . . . The information on the two men is as follows: Juan Williams Rose, Address Bustamente 24, Santiago, DOB March 12, 1949, official Chilean Passport 528-76; Alejandro Romeral Jara, Address Monjitas 613, Santiago, DOB May 15, 1950, official Chilean Passport 527-76 . . . It is believed that these men have knowledge and information concerning these murders. It is therefore requested that you cause each of these men to appear in court to answer under oath the written questions which are attached . . ."

5. The following talking points have been prepared for the Department's use with Cauas. You may draw upon them at your discretion.

—The Letelier-Moffitt investigation has proceeded to the point at which testimony from certain Chilean witnesses is essential.

—The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has issued letters rogatory requesting the cooperation of the Chilean courts in taking testimony from the two Chilean military officers. A copy of the court request is attached for the advance consideration of his government; the formal submission with the sealed questions for the witnesses is being sent to Santiago for presentation to the Foreign Ministry in accordance with recognized practice.

—No accusation of guilt upon the part of the Chilean Government is made or implied.

—However, it is of the utmost importance that the Chilean government recognize the gravity of this situation and the possible implications for our future relations.

—Although the courts have primary responsibility, we hope for and expect the cooperation of the Chilean government in obtaining the requested testimony.

—A failure to cooperate in the effort to establish the responsibility for the murders will have the most serious implications to this government, the congress and the American public.

—We hope and trust that the Chilean government will pursue this investigation with us to its ultimate end.

—Ambassador Landau is to make this same request for cooperation to the Foreign Ministry in Santiago, and he will deliver the letters rogatory as soon as they reach him.

—We wish Cauas well and regret his retirement from his post here on March 31. We regard him with respect and friendship.

6. Once you are authorized to make your approach, we would appreciate your reporting any significant reaction on the part of the minister or other official with whom you speak.⁴

Vance

⁴ In telegram 1128 from Santiago, February 17, Landau reported that, during his meeting with Carvajal that day, he “outlined in detail” the points in paragraph 5 of this telegram. Carvajal responded “that he was happy that the USG was now following the normal and correct procedure of letters rogatory,” and he worried that “the content of the covering letter which would be in the public record” would be used by the press to “play up such matters as alleged false passports to prejudge the GOC’s guilt.” Carvajal also said “that we could count on him and the court’s cooperation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780074-1172)

211. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, March 14, 1978, 0024Z

64279. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation: Visit of Chilean Delegation to Washington. Reference: State 056636²

1. Summary: Chilean delegation led by Montero met March 9 with ARA, L, and Justice officials. Montero reaffirmed commitment to cooperate in Letelier investigation, and promised rapid action. Delegation reviewed at length legal steps so far taken in Chile, and expressed opinion of GOC that Chilean law would probably not permit direct participation in court sessions by Propper. However, final decisions on USG participation up to Chilean judge, and in any event GOC disposed to permit unofficial access to witnesses, etc. Montero and Cauas emphasized GOC concern over sensational publicity and leaks characterizing US reporting of case. We expressed appreciation for visit, for assurances of cooperation, and reiterated our grave concern over matter and our expectation that Chile would cooperate. Appointment arranged for March 10 with Deputy Secretary.³ End summary.

2. Chilean delegation of Montero, Schweitzer, and Pantoja, escorted by Ambassador Cauas, met at 11:00 am March 9 with ARA deputies Bushnell and McNeil, ARA/AND Director Barnebey, Chile Desk Officer Steven, L Attorney Willis, Assistant US Attorney Propper, FBI Agents Cornick and Scherrer, and State Department Interpreter Seidenman.

3. Montero stressed GOC cooperation, intention to proceed in search of justice, desire to punish guilty, but hoped that matter would “not go beyond” (apparent expression of hope that investigation will not have political overtones). He reported latest steps indicating GOC intentions: A) Termination of state of siege, which “permits witnesses to be free of any restraints and press to comment freely”; B) sending of delegation to consult on case; C) appointing of special judge on

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112-0218. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Steven; cleared by Barnebey, Propper, and in S/S-O; approved by McNeil.

² Dated March 6. The Department informed the Embassy of the Chilean delegation’s request for an appointment with Department of State officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780101-0068)

³ In telegram 64280 to Santiago, March 14, the Department reported on the Chilean delegation’s March 10 meeting with Habib, who met with them in Christopher’s place. Habib “stressed seriousness of matter to both governments and our expectation of rapid response,” and Montero “repeated assurances on GOC side.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112-0215)

passport aspect. He noted that courts now proceeding with two separate actions, the letters rogatory and the passport matter.

4. At Montero's request, Schweitzer reviewed fully and carefully all of the steps so far taken in Chile, reading texts of the opinion of Attorney General to Supreme Court and Court's resolution of March 6. (Both texts transmitted to you in septel March 10.)⁴ Schweitzer also read FonMin Carvajal's letter to Supreme Court conveying Pinochet's request for appointment of special judge on passport matter. He stressed almost unprecedented nature of this presidential request, but stated he could not leave copy of text with US.

5. Texts read by Schweitzer, and his comments indicate that neither Propper nor Chilean attorney representing USG could, in opinion of attorney general, participate directly in taking of testimony as requested in letters rogatory. However, when pressed by Propper for clarification, Schweitzer supported by Montero allowed that final decision was up to judge in case, who might interpret law differently. In any event, GOC is prepared to work out arrangement for FBI and Propper himself, if so desired, to interview witnesses outside of formal court proceedings. Propper made clear US investigators had to see the witnesses.

6. Montero added that special judge's investigation of passport aspect of case would also be conducted in secret in preliminary stages. He repeated yet again GOC good will and desire to cooperate, however. He insisted that GOC is innocent of guilt in this case.

7. Schweitzer resumed review of what has transpired in Chile, none of which was new to US. He confirmed that "Williams" and "Romeral" names not found in Chilean armed services, and that FonMin passport records show passports in question to have been issued to other (unnamed) persons.⁵

8. Montero suggested that collaboration could take the form of a "joint investigation", presumably by FBI and CNI, without damage to legal aspects of matter. He invited Propper to come to Chile to see results of such investigation, to see Supreme Court justices, etc. He deplored press coverage and obvious leaks of information both in US and Chile, "which seem to be trying to create impression of GOC

⁴ Telegram 62081 to Santiago. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780108-0862)

⁵ In telegram 1480 from Santiago, March 6, the Embassy reported that the Chilean press had identified Williams "as U.S. citizen Michael Vernon Townley. Townley, the son of a U.S. businessman, lived in Chile for many years and during the Allende period was reported as involved in anti-UP activity." The Embassy also noted that it "had inconclusive information on Townley" and that new guidelines indicated that "information on American citizens could only be passed at the HQ level." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963-79)

guilt". He hoped that USG might tell press that GOC cooperating, and suggested "joint" press statement on his delegation's visit.

9. Propper carried burden of response on all legal questions arising in meeting, per prior agreement with State. He assured Montero that Justice and FBI investigations also secret, and that leaks to press and inaccurate statements therein equally distasteful to US. Steps have been taken to establish even stricter controls in effort to prevent leaks, but noted we do not control American press. He said that State Department's role is oversight of foreign policy aspects, and that State is not involved directly in the investigation. FBI Agent Scherrer will be present in Santiago whenever needed, and he should be GOC's contact for investigatory aspects of case. He told Chileans that we were in process of retaining Chilean attorney. He stressed again reasons for wanting to be present when witnesses give testimony, and turned aside the Chilean notion of a joint investigation by indicating he and FBI expected Chileans would give them anything they learned.

10. In response to separate appeal from Cauas for control over leaks and some public statement by USG that GOC is cooperating, we noted that we have privately and in public given recognition of GOC cooperation at the same time we have stressed our expectation of cooperation. Bushnell agreed that after meeting March 10, we would be prepared to issue a statement to press on visit, and Chileans would issue parallel statement. Statements of each party would be made available to other before release for comments. (Text of US statement sent septel March 10.)⁶

11. Chileans asked if it would be useful for them to see an appropriate senior official of justice department to discuss case and offer assurances. Propper noted that most senior justice officials were involved in matters at congress at moment and noted he would be giving full report of meetings to Attorney General. Chileans did not press.

12. Propper and Montero reviewed and confirmed understanding that arrangements may be made to permit US investigators access to witnesses in Chile, outside formal court procedures.⁷

Vance

⁶ Telegram 62917 to Santiago, March 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780108-1084)

⁷ In a March 10 memorandum to Carter, Vance reported on the meetings with the Chilean delegation, noting that "they stoutly deny that the government had anything to do with the assassination, but we do not know how far the evidence will take this case." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 3/78)

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, April 14, 1978, 0043Z

95806. Subj: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation: Meeting with Deputy Secretary April 6, 1978. Reference: Santiago 2494.²

1. Chilean Under Secretary of Interior Montero, accompanied by Attorney Miguel Schweitzer and Charge Amenabar, met 1800 hours April 6 with Deputy Secretary Christopher, ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary McNeil, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Propper and Barcela and Chile Desk Officer Steven, to discuss Letelier/Moffitt investigation.

2. Montero thanked Christopher for receiving them and affirmed seriousness with which GOC regards matter. He emphasized GOC concern for justice and for public opinion in both countries. He declared the GOC's innocence, reminded meeting of "open door" offered to Propper, pointed out significance of military investigation now underway in Chile, and noted that retirement of Contreras was designed to "give greater freedom of action" in investigation. (Separately, he indicated to McNeil that they were investigating Contreras.) He noted that GOC could ask US to seek extradition of Townley, or could keep him in Chile (presumably under local charges). But to show full faith, it had been decided to expel Townley immediately as Townley was illegally in Chile.

3. In return, GOC would appreciate public declaration by State and Justice Depts. acknowledging Chilean cooperation.³ GOC assumed responsibility to continue cooperation, and wished to make arrangements to share future information developed in Letelier case for mutual pursuit of justice. Montero expected that Townley might have much to tell of interest to GOC, but would now view GOC as enemy and might invent accusations against GOC, which naturally wished to be prepared.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780160-0312. Secret; Priority; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Steven; cleared by Propper, Oxman, and in S/S-O; approved by McNeil. Distributed only to ARA, D and L.

² Dated April 5. The Embassy detailed the agreement between USG and GOC officials by which Townley would be subject to "informal expulsion" from Chile and handed into U.S. custody for questioning regarding the Letelier assassination. Propper agreed "to provide GOC information on actions implicating Chileans in criminal acts (not restricted to Letelier case), that derives from Letelier/Moffitt assassination investigation and that we will give GOC access to Townley in US—provided he or his lawyer do not raise objections." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780147-0504)

³ In telegram 2479 from Santiago, April 4, the Embassy outlined the final GOC requirement: "A joint statement acknowledging Chile's full cooperation in this case." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780146-0135)

4. Christopher, in turn, thanked GOC for its cooperation to date. He asked Propper to comment on the arrangements that had been made. Propper said the GOC would expel Townley from Chile, on illegal entry charges, on Friday evening April 7. It was understood that the justice department, through the FBI, would convey to the GOC information concerning crimes committed in Chile which might be obtained from Townley. In turn, the GOC would inform the USG of all further information concerning the Letelier/Moffitt case which might be developed in Chile. This arrangement had been reached with Generals Orozoco and Mena in Chile. It was also understood that state and Justice Departments would collaborate in issuing a public acknowledgement of Chilean cooperation and an indication that cooperation between the two governments would continue.

5. Schweitzer asked for and received from Propper assurance that in Justice Department's view GOC responsibility for Townley would be considered at an end when he was placed on a plane in Santiago with accompanying FBI agents.

6. Christopher asked if the proposed statement was agreeable to both parties. Schweitzer said he had some minor questions on language, to be worked out with Propper and State Dept. Montero confirmed that release of the agreed statement on Monday, April 10, at the State Dept noon briefing, was acceptable to the GOC. Christopher said he had understood statement was acceptable to Chileans, and Schweitzer indicated it was. They had, however, a few minor suggestions. Christopher said those present were welcome to use his conference room to come to final agreement on the statement and that he would be available should any aspect of the statement need his further attention.

7. In leaving, Montero noted developments he had emphasized to Ambassador Landau in Santiago. The visit of Mr. Mezvinski to Chile April 10–11 to discuss the UNHRC problem; the April 5 speech of President Pinochet; and the Letelier case.⁴ He wished to ask that Secretary Vance receive Foreign Minister Carvajal in the coming months to permit Carvajal to explain the ongoing Chilean process of political development. Christopher assured Montero of our profound interest in Chilean liberalization and said that earnest consideration would be given to any request for a call on Secretary Vance. He could not, of

⁴ Mezvinsky visited Chile on April 10 and 11. (Telegram 2693 from Santiago, April 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780156-0348) Pinochet announced a set of prisoner releases on April 5. (Telegram 2551 from Santiago, April 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149-0793)

course, commit the Secretary or judge whether his schedule would accommodate such an interview.⁵

8. Subsequently, the participants, except for the Deputy Secretary, adjourned to the Deputy Secretary's conference room to make slight refinements in the statement's final text which has been sent septel.⁶ (Schweitzer sought to include the notion of a joint investigation in the statement, but we did not agree.)

Christopher

⁵ In an April 6 memorandum to Oxman, McNeil wrote that "at the last minute" the Chilean delegation "had seen the Junta (presumably all of them) who had instructed them to ask for one thing further, agreement in a month or so for the Secretary to see Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal." Propper had responded that the request "was State's business, but he was sure it would be unacceptable to link a judicial investigation with a political question." McNeil recommended that, if asked, Christopher respond by saying, "we have been scrupulously careful not to link our political relationship with the requirements of justice," but "obviously when a Foreign Minister makes a request to meet the Secretary we give it serious consideration." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile I) (S) Vance did not meet with Carvajal at this time; for the October 1978 meeting of Vance with Cubillos, see Document 226. For Vaky's August 1978 meeting with Cubillos, see Document 221.

⁶ The statement was made during the Department's noon press briefing on April 10. (Telegram 91806 to Santiago, April 10, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155-0042)

213. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State

2867

Santiago, April 17, 1978, 2211Z

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Box 127, [Chile] 4/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. 2 pages not declassified.]

214. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RPM-78-10246X

Washington, May 1978

CHILE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE LETELIER CASE

Key Judgments

Recent disclosures in the investigation of the murder of Orlando Letelier, former minister in the Allende government and one-time Ambassador to the US, have raised the possibility that the crime will be linked to the highest levels of the Chilean Government.² The sensational developments have evoked speculation about President Pinochet's political survival.³ We believe that Pinochet has a reasonable chance of riding out the storm, but if enough incriminating evidence comes to light, his support from the military could begin to slip rapidly.

Government reaction to proof of Pinochet's complicity in the Letelier slaying might take one of several courses:

—An attempt to institute a coverup, with charges that the US is trying to destabilize the regime.

—An effort to establish a scapegoat who would draw fire away from the President.

—An acknowledgment of a connection with the murder, but with the explanation that the action was justified because Letelier was plotting against Pinochet.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R, Box 2, Folder 70: C-7: Chile. Secret; Sensitive; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Forwarded to Turner and Carlucci under a June 8 memorandum [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

² In telegram 105846 to Santiago, April 25, the Department forwarded a memorandum from Propper to Landau: "We reached an agreement with Mr. Townley with respect to his cooperation. Mr. Townley has laid out in great detail his connections with DINA, which were extensive, as well as many nefarious activities planned or carried out by DINA or Cuban exiles working for DINA." In addition, Propper wrote: "Mr. Townley has implicated the highest officials of DINA in ordering Mr. Letelier murdered." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963–79)

³ In an April 24 memorandum to Aaron, Pastor wrote that "the central set of questions" for U.S. policy related to the Letelier investigation "are simple": Did Propper "have evidence, or does he believe such evidence is obtainable, that will link Pinochet, however indirectly, with the Letelier assassination?" Pastor wrote: "How those questions are answered has important consequences for U.S. policy. If we think that Pinochet is involved, then we need to be cautious and keep our distance even if he keeps taking steps forward to democratization." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-12/78)

—A recognition that Pinochet is guilty, followed by a military decision to force his removal.

Pinochet would not be deposed unless discontent became widespread in the army and even then only after much soul-searching by its leaders. There is no easily identifiable candidate in the wings, but an army general would most likely be named to head an interim junta. While military leaders would strive to reach a consensus on a succession formula, the present junta leaders would probably be required to step aside also.

A new president would probably attempt to heal the wounds caused by the scandal, but divisions might occur within the armed forces over the appearance of bowing to external pressures. Nevertheless, plans for a return to constitutional norms would probably be advanced. Public outrage over the revelation of transgressions by high government leaders could lead to a more rapid transition to civilian rule.

President Augusto Pinochet faces a potentially critical challenge to his continued leadership as the complex Letelier assassination probe continues to evolve. Letelier's murder in Washington raised immediate charges that Chilean intelligence agents were behind the incident. Recent developments suggesting that the death might be traced to high Chilean officials have caused shock waves in Santiago. Described by a junta member as "a Chilean Watergate," the controversy threatens to engulf the President along with intelligence and security officers. If the president's complicity is proved, it would have grave political implications, such as triggering military demands for Pinochet's resignation and compelling Chile's generals to find a successor.

At present, Pinochet stands a reasonable chance of holding his ground. Although there is grumbling among mid-level officers, the army does not appear to be seriously dissatisfied with the President, and most military men appear willing to accept his claim that his "hands are clean." Only if the scandal reaches considerable magnitude, with indisputable evidence of high-level conspiracy, would there be a substantial shift of sentiment against Pinochet. As long as the army remains behind him, there is little chance of his being unseated. Over the past four years, the Chilean armed forces have strived to preserve internal cohesion in the face of difficult social and economic problems and worldwide hostility. So far, dissent has been limited to low-keyed criticism of recent policy decisions. Military reluctance to move against Pinochet would be strengthened by fears of factionalism and unsettling political and economic repercussions.

Clouding the outlook for Pinochet is the possibility that former intelligence chief General Manuel Contreras will be linked directly to the crime. Public disclosure of Contreras' guilt—either through his own

admission or in court testimony—would be almost certain to implicate Pinochet and irreparably damage his credibility within the military. None of the government's critics and few of its supporters would be willing to swallow claims that Contreras acted without presidential concurrence. The former secret police chief is known to have reported directly to the President, who had exclusive responsibility for the organization's activities. Some generals may already harbor suspicions about Contreras' involvement in illegal operations and probably question Pinochet's responsibility in the matter.

Contreras will be the key to how the Letelier case unfolds. It is problematical whether he will be prepared to tell about the dark side of the regime's activity if the investigation surfaces information authenticating DINA collusion in plotting Letelier's murder. Past loyalty to Pinochet is no guarantee that Contreras would withhold sensitive details on operations authorized by the President, especially if he thought he were being tagged as a scapegoat. If Pinochet declared publicly that Contreras had lied to him, the general—who has now resigned from the army—might believe that he has little to lose by divulging closely held state secrets. Sensational disclosures embarrassing to Pinochet could rapidly make his position untenable. Pinochet might try to buy Contreras' silence by promising some sort of immunity or arranging his departure from the country. Contreras is not likely to attempt to shift the blame to lower echelon DINA minions.

Another aspect of the case that could be detrimental to Pinochet is the tie that has been made publicly between the Letelier assassination and the similar death of General Carlos Prats—Allende's army commander—in an unsolved car bombing in Buenos Aires in September 1974. This and the attempted shooting of exiled Christian Democratic Party leader Bernardo Leighton in Rome in 1975 have provoked speculation about a possible pattern of assassinations. Opposition elements have accused DINA of masterminding all three operations. Prats allegedly was about to publish a book vilifying the role of Pinochet in overturning a constitutional government. Some [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have charged that Prats was also actively involved with Chilean exiles conspiring against Pinochet. In any case, any disclosure that Pinochet authorized the death of a former army commander would create serious doubts within the military about the President's competence and judgment. Irrespective of conflicting attitudes within the armed forces about Prats' role in stubbornly opposing intervention in 1973, many military officers would suspect Contreras of ordering the killing and would have difficulty countenancing the idea of DINA conniving to bring about the death of a fellow officer.

Details of the Letelier slaying and other allegations of DINA misdeeds may unfold slowly, but the cumulative effect could be to place

Pinochet in an extremely vulnerable position. In the event of a full-blown scandal, the reaction could take one of several forms:

1) The government could resist pressures to ferret out new leads and attempt to cover up possible involvement. It might also counter by accusing the US Government of instigating an anti-Chilean campaign to destabilize the regime. Some hardline generals already harbor qualms about Pinochet's cooperation in illegally handing over Michael Townley to the US and presumably would be opposed to further concessions that might compromise the government. This course would risk additional damage to relations with the US, but it might find substantial backing in view of the poor prospects for an early improvement in any case.

2) Pinochet might decide to shift the blame to some DINA officials, arguing that the excesses occurred without his knowledge. He could buttress this line by noting that DINA was abolished last year and that a series of reforms had been instituted to guard against further illegalities. Anyone accused of criminal actions would presumably be tried under Chilean legal procedures rather than extradited, but even this might expose the government to damaging revelations. Even if the public were to accept Pinochet's professions of his own innocence, there is the chance that a scapegoat would not cooperate and would divulge information harmful to the President and some of his close advisers. This course would also heighten the chances of military disunity. Some elements might worry about their own necks; others would find it reprehensible for their superiors to try to escape responsibility for serious offenses.

3) If confronted with incontrovertible evidence, the government might face the issue directly by acknowledging a connection with the assassination but try to vindicate itself by contending that Letelier was conspiring against Pinochet. This would be a desperate pitch to rally domestic support against an almost certain outburst of indignation in the US and other countries. More important, it is doubtful whether the Chilean Army or public would accept the story, leaving Pinochet out on a limb and subject to growing domestic censure.

4) In the most difficult circumstances, the armed forces might recognize the culpability of the present leadership and attempt to force Pinochet's ouster. Pinochet is a stubborn, canny individual, however, with a sharp instinct for survival. He can be expected to play off one group against another to protect himself and to employ deftly the assets of his authoritarian regime. Security officials, chary of opening the door to a wide-ranging investigation of alleged regime misdeeds and illegal abuses since the 1973 coup, could be counted upon to side with Pinochet, but again, the potential for an internal military schism would be high. Pinochet's removal in disgrace would undercut the moral

authority of the armed forces. It would most likely so stigmatize them that any new junta leader would be compelled to accelerate plans for a return to civilian government. The military's efforts would be turned to salvaging what dignity it could from a humiliating plight and exonerating the honor of the institution if possible.

Pinochet's ouster would require Chile's austere generals to swallow a large measure of pride; it would not be an easy task for them and would require as much soul-searching as the decision to intervene against Allende. Moreover, should the army move to replace the President, there is no obvious successor in the wings. The choice would be determined in large part by how badly the military was tainted by the scandal. If Pinochet and other senior officials were judged guilty, pressures would grow to install a more moderate officer. Public opposition to Pinochet has not been formidable, and indeed he appears to enjoy substantial support among the populace, but criticism of his policies could prompt sentiment for a change.

Navy junta member Admiral Merino is nominally next in line for the presidency, but he is not likely to succeed because of the pre-eminence of the army. Air force chief and junta member General Leigh is ambitious, but his chances are likewise not rated high. He is a maverick who has openly aired his disagreements with Pinochet, but apparently he has no clear political program and little real following. While the army might feel the brunt of criticism in the event of Pinochet's downfall, we believe that it would still be able to retain the presidency. The other services are likely to come under some fire for their own roles in abuses that occurred after the coup. The public uproar likely to occur if Pinochet's complicity became explicit would be likely to reinforce military attempts to maintain collegial unity and to work out an acceptable succession formula.

Pinochet has edged aside most of the potential contenders for his job within the army. The high command would probably turn to a moderate, active duty general not too closely linked to Pinochet. Corps commander General Nilo Floody and the military rector of the University of Chile, General Agustin Toro Davila, have been mentioned among the potential front runners, although the field appears open to others as well. Both of these men reflect the conservative viewpoints of the armed forces; they are well disposed toward the US, and General Floody recently served as military attache in Washington.

Pinochet [*less than 1 line not declassified*] favors General Sergio Covarrubias, chief of the presidential staff, as his heir apparent. Covarrubias has little seniority, however, and his nomination would—by custom—force the retirement of a number of senior generals. Moreover, while Covarrubias is respected in some circles for his abilities, he is also looked upon with suspicion by senior officers because of his close

ties to Jaime Guzman, an influential young civilian adviser to the President and the ideological spokesman for the corporatist guild movement that has staunchly backed the military regime. They distrust Guzman because of his role in persuading Pinochet to adopt recent liberalizing measures. In Santiago, [1½ lines not declassified] the President was considering relinquishing office in favor of Covarrubias. We believe Pinochet is floating this idea in order to intimidate military leaders critical of his handling of the Letelier case. The Chilean leader may also be trying to use the threat of a Covarrubias presidency to persuade Contreras not to reveal anything incriminating, since Contreras strongly resents Covarrubias, whom he blames for forcing his resignation from the army after widely publicized charges that Contreras had a hand in the Letelier murder.

If Pinochet falls, the present junta would probably be forced to step aside also. Military leaders might hope that a complete change of faces would give the government a fresh start in improving its image. A new president would probably emphasize the interim nature of military rule and promise to advance the process of reconstituting democratic institutions. This is by no means certain, however, because of the authoritarian leanings of many officers. Military factions with strong nationalist inclinations might chafe at appearing to crumble under outside pressure for a rapid transition to civilian government.

Residual opposition within the military to advancing the timetable would probably be offset by the widespread popular demands likely to emerge once the floodgates were opened by Pinochet's departure. These pressures would be hard for a new junta to ignore, especially if its president were a moderate. Critics of the military government such as the Christian Democratic Party—the country's largest—would seek a political opening, perhaps offering to cooperate in return for pledges of continued movement toward a shorter period of military tutelage. Other groups—such as democratic labor organizations—might also find a post-Pinochet atmosphere more conducive to increasing their pressure for broader liberalization. Greater civilian participation in government might be one immediate spinoff of a changeover, as the armed forces moved to placate a public anxious for their return to the barracks and impatient for full reinstatement of the political liberties traditionally enjoyed in Chile.

215. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, May 25, 1978, 2153Z

3980. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation.

1. Summary: Although we remain hopeful, current visit of Propper and others has not yet brought desired additional cooperation from the GOC. The Ambassador explained the situation to Foreign Minister Cubillos at lunch today (see septel).² Orozco has promised a response to one of our requests by evening of May 26.³ This visit much more than previous, has been marked by almost hysterical press and media treatment, but which does not, in our view, represent GOC policy at this time. The judge looking into the Townley expulsion has requested Scherrer and Cornick to answer in writing questions on their role. We will report the questions and answers by septel.⁴ End summary.

2. FBI agents Scherrer and Cornick returned to Santiago May 17 and will depart May 26. Assistant US Attorneys Propper and Barcella returned to Santiago May 22 and will depart evening of May 25. Propper and Barcella have limited their official contacts on this trip to General Orozco. Scherrer and Cornick have also met with Mena and Pantoja of the CNI. The four specific objectives of these meetings are set forth in the following paragraphs.

3. Availability of Iturriaga as a witness: Lt. Col. (Army) Raul Iturriaga is a former Director of Foreign Operations in DINA. He was not, so far as we know, involved in the Letelier case. However, Propper seeks to have him made available to come to Washington as a witness at the trial in order to corroborate Townley's testimony on how DINA functioned. Propper has some reason to believe that Iturriaga would be willing to come. Orozco, presented with the request, told Propper that military regulations clearly prohibited Iturriaga from leaving the country to testify but that he, Orozco, would discuss the matter with higher authorities to see if a loophole could be found. Alfredo Etcheberry tells us that there is no specific legal prohibition against such a

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780222-1026. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

² In telegram 3978 from Santiago, May 25, Landau reported: "I told [Cubillos] that, in Mr. Propper's view, the GOC had not lived up to the written mutual cooperation agreement whereby each government would investigate the case independently and exchange their findings." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221-0982)

³ Not found.

⁴ Telegram 4029 from Santiago, May 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225-0012)

role for Iturriaga. Orozco has promised to get back to Scherrer by the evening May 26.

4. Paraguayan testimony: According to Propper's information DINA Chief Contreras called the Paraguayan Chief of J-2, Col. Benito Guanes to request the Paraguayan passports for "Williams and Romeral." Propper wants Guanes to come to the US to testify to that conversation. The Paraguayans say he will do so only if the GOC has no objection and that the Chileans must call them. Propper and Scherrer have raised the issue with Orozco who passed the buck to Mena. Mena says that if the Paraguayans want something from the Chileans they should initiate a request.

5. Propper, et al, also hoped on this visit to be able to talk to Contreras, Col. Pedro Espinosa and Capt. Fernandez Larios. They have been informed by Orozco that none of the three is willing to talk to them. According to Etcheberry they are within their rights in so refusing. Orozco did, however, show Propper and others portions of the secret testimony of the three before him.⁵

6. Finally, Propper had hoped Orozco, on the basis of information provided him by Townley in Washington, would have carried his own investigation further by this time.⁶ There is no evidence that the GOC has, in fact, pressed ahead in recent weeks.

7. Press coverage of this visit by Justice Department officials is much more antagonistic than on previous occasions. The climate was adversely affected by news stories in the U.S. (duly reported here) just prior to Propper's arrival that he was coming to obtain the extradition of Contreras and other ex-DINA officials.⁷ Only, but an important exception, "El Mercurio" of the newspapers has maintained a reasonably calm approach. All others have carried repeated Banner headlines misrepresenting purpose or facts of Propper visit or taking anti-American stances. We are reporting the flavor of these attacks separately (e.g. Santiago 3948).⁸ Anti-U.S. leaflets appeared today for first time.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ In telegram 4140 from Santiago, June 1, the Embassy reported that Orozco "told an embassy officer that he wanted the embassy to know that his slow progress is not from lack of effort, but is due primarily to the necessity of building a case that meets the standards of Chilean (not U.S.) law." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780230-0071)

⁷ Telegram 3948 from Santiago, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234-0960) See also "Chile Has An Opening In Extradition Pact," *New York Times*, May 22, 1978, p. A5.

⁸ May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234-0960) See also telegram 3977 from Santiago, May 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221-0919)

8. Earlier this week the focus of local attention was a request by Townley's lawyer for the judge investigating his expulsion to prevent the departure of Scherrer and Cornick until they had testified in her court. Because Scherrer and Cornick are travelling on diplomatic passports the judge has submitted written questions to Scherrer and Cornick through the Foreign Ministry. Their responses are not obligatory but both Scherer and Cornick will reply prior to departure May 26 and we will report the questions and responses by septel.

Landau

216. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, June 8, 1978, 2108Z

145831. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation: The Paraguayan Connection.

1. In consultation here with Ambassador White, Boyatt, Propper and Barcella, we have established a tentative plan of action designed to elicit Chilean and Paraguayan cooperation in the matter of testimony on the Williams-Romeral passports. Information recently received by Propper, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicates that the Chilean government does not intend to cooperate further in the Letelier case.

2. When you have our responses to the pending GOC questions, which should be in your hands soon,² you would be asked to hand them to General Orozco and to simultaneously note that we are awaiting cooperation on such matters as the Iturriaga testimony and the telephone call to the Paraguayan Government in which the GOC will "release" Colonel Guanes to testify concerning the Williams-Romeral passport affair. The Paraguayan testimony concerning the passports may be vital to the investigation. The importance of this should not initially be made evident to the Chileans, but it is probably the critical point upon which we will judge GOC cooperation. FYI. The Paraguayan testimony may be key to an indictment of Contreras. End FYI. Propper indicated that he feels you should tell the Chileans that these two

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963–79. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to Buenos Aires.

² Not found.

requests are totally within the governments ability to immediately comply with while others, such as finding Liliana Walker,³ may not be within their power to do immediately, and so cooperation will not be judged on requests such as the latter.

3. We would inform the GOC that we expect positive replies to both requests quickly. The first-priority item should be the call to the GOP.

4. If they do not make the phone call, we must consider how best to apply pressure. We contemplate at that stage asking you to seek an interview after about 3 days with an appropriate official other than Cubillos close to Pinochet such as General Vidal. We have not ruled out going to Pinochet himself, but we feel that there may be advantages in avoiding direct confrontation with Pinochet at this point. In an interview with Vidal or another official close to Pinochet, you would state the imperative need for GOC cooperation in obtaining Paraguayan testimony in the passport matter. You would tell Vidal that we consider GOC response on this particular issue to be the critical test for now of the GOC's continued cooperation. We would set a specific short time for GOC response. What do you feel is reasonable? You would state that failing that cooperation, you expect instructions to return to the US for consultations. In the event you are required to return, we would issue a public statement making clear the reason for your departure. We would hope and expect that this step would be unnecessary, since the threat may be sufficient to obtain what we want.

5. In the meantime we will have drafted in consultation with Ambassador White an instruction for his action in Paraguay. We would prepare a note for him to deliver to the Foreign Ministry, in which we would outline the Paraguayan involvement and ask for Colonel Guanes' testimony. However, Ambassador White would hold this note until it became certain that the effort with the GOC had failed and that you were leaving Chile. At that time he would go to Pappalardo and show him the intended note. He would make every effort to convince Pappalardo to obtain the testimony for us without forcing us to confront the GOP with the note. He would try to convince the GOP that it can by cooperating honestly maintain the posture of an uninvolved bystander in the Letelier case. He would stress that by refusing cooperation, the GOP would be placing itself in the much more dangerous position of appearing to help cover up the crime. We would be prepared to deliver the note if GOP cooperation were not forthcoming. He would

³ Liliana Walker Martinez (alias) was another DINA agent. (Nicholas Horrock, "Seven Indicted In U.S. Murder Of Chilean Aide," *New York Times*, August 2, 1978, p. A4) In 1990, she was identified as Monica Luisa Lagos. (Malcolm Coad, "Reopening of Letelier Case Ordered in Chile," *Washington Post*, April 25, 1990, p. A31)

see to it this was understood by Pappalardo, and that the note would inevitably become public. He would convince Pappalardo of our seriousness by pointing out the fact of your departure from Chile for consultations and our public charge of non-cooperation against the GOC.

6. We believe the described circumstances might be sufficient to stimulate crisis consultation between GOC and GOP, and hope this will result in their agreement to cooperate. If your efforts with GOC fail to produce their cooperation, we will find ourselves at the point of decision contemplated in your earlier consultation with the Deputy Secretary,⁴ at which time it was agreed that you would return for discussion of our next steps.

7. This message has been made available directly to Ambassador White, who expects to return to Asuncion about June 7 or 8. Your comments and suggestions will be welcomed.⁵

Vance

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ In telegram 4401 from Santiago, June 9, Landau responded: "I am in general agreement with the Santiago scenario set forth" in telegram 145831, "but I plan to deal initially with Foreign Minister Cubillos, not Orozco. Depending on the response I get from Cubillos it may be desirable to go directly to President Pinochet. GOC cooperation to date in the Letelier/Moffitt investigation has required in almost every instance my intervention with the Foreign Minister, first Carvajal then Cubillos." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780242-0704)

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, June 14, 1978, 2153Z

4515. Subj: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation. Ref: Santiago 4442.²

1. Foreign Minister Cubillos called me late June 13 and said that, as to my request, he had turned over the package of documents prepared by Messrs Propper and Barcella to General Orozco the afternoon of June 12. After a superficial reading, both he and General Orozco thought that the information was of little value to the GOC's effort to continue the investigation. He said no new evidence had been presented which would permit them to go ahead with their case. He said that they still were awaiting further information regarding the interview with General Walters.³

2. Regarding my request that Paraguay be called, Cubillos said he had discussed this with Minister of Interior Fernandez, who is General Mena's supervisor over CNI operations. Cubillos said that the GOC position is that any call to the Paraguayan government would be interference in that country's internal affairs. He said the GOP is a free agent and can do whatever it pleases. I replied that this answer will not be satisfactory to Washington. I recalled that the GOC had no problem in calling the Paraguayans and asking them for their cooperation at an earlier time, so why not tell them now that the Chilean government would have no objection to their permitting one of their officials to testify.

3. Regarding Colonel Iturriaga, Cubillos said the Chilean government would cooperate strictly within the legal framework, and any

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780249-0190. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Stadis.

² June 12. Landau reported: "I delivered package of documents prepared by Messrs Propper and Barcella to Foreign Minister Cubillos on June 12," and "told the Foreign Minister that we expected equal cooperation from the GOC. I asked specifically that a phone call be made immediately to Paraguay to inform GOP officials that there was no GOC objection to their testifying." In addition, "I requested that Lt Col Raul Iturriaga be allowed to testify in the United States." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780245-0866.)

³ In telegram 147382 to Santiago, June 9, the text of a memorandum from Propper and Barcella to Orozco was transmitted which read, in part: "I have been advised by the CIA that General Vernon Walters retired from the CIA on July 2, 1976. He was no longer there at the time either mission to the United States by DINA personnel took place. The FBI will interview General Walters for you within the next few days and the interview will be sent to you immediately thereafter." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780242-0469)

request for Col. Iturriaga's testimony would have to come through judicial channels and would be decided by the Chilean courts. I said that I understood this, but at this moment we wished Colonel Iturriaga to appear before the grand jury. This was not a legal question, but an executive decision to permit him to go. I said I understood that Iturriaga had stated that he was willing to go. Cubillos answered that they had not consulted Iturriaga but simply made the decision that everything had to go through legal channels. He said that he had been under the impression that we wanted Iturriaga for the trial. He promised to give me a definite answer later in the day regarding Iturriaga's appearance at the grand jury hearing. However he has now left for a 3-day visit to Lima without getting back to me.

4. I told Cubillos I was very disappointed with his information, which would be labeled as lack of cooperation in Washington. I said I would not want to speculate on other unpleasant consequences, but would not be surprised if other measures might be contemplated which are not in the best interests of bilateral relations. I then said that since he had talked to Fernandez, who apparently had made the decision on this issue, I might want to raise this matter with him and, if necessary subsequently with the President. He said I was welcome to do so and that he was sure the President would receive me, but he did not think that anything would change. I said that in my attempt to maintain US-Chilean relations at an even keel and particularly in view of the repeated assurances made by the president that full cooperation would be forthcoming, it would be only fair to stress to Fernandez or to him that the unforthcoming attitude on our two requests would be regarded as lack of cooperation.

5. At this time I am planning to request an appointment with Fernandez first and then, if necessary, Pinochet to renew the request for action on the two points. To make sure the GOC understands the degree of our concern and that I am not free-lancing, I recommend that the Department call in Ambassador Barros immediately at a sufficiently high level and make the points I have already made to Cubillos and will be making to Fernandez/Pinochet.⁴ I think we should be careful in speculating about my possibly being called back for consultation. This card is hard to play more than once, and we may want to save it for the indictment and extradition stage.

6. If, as a result of my meetings with Fernandez and/or Pinochet (aided by the demarche with Barros) we can get the Paraguayan phone call, and if they are still negative on permitting Iturriaga to travel now,

⁴ In telegram 155394 to Santiago, June 19, the Department reported on Christopher's June 15 meeting with Barros. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255-0806)

I think we should settle for letters rogatory on Colonel Iturriaga—if this can meet the need. Obviously we would have to move quickly on the letters.

7. Regardless of the outcome of discussions this week on our two requests, it is essential that our continued concern over cooperation in this case form part of the conversations with Foreign Minister Cubillos next week in Washington. He arrives June 21 to attend the OASGA. He should be reminded by the Secretary during his bilateral that full cooperation is an absolute must if our relations are to prosper.⁵

Landau

⁵ Vance did not meet with Cubillos at this time; for their October 1978 meeting, see Document 226. For Vaky's August 1978 meeting with Cubillos, see Document 221.

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, June 19, 1978, 2255Z

4641. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation. Ref: Santiago 4562.²

Summary: Foreign Minister on June 19 rejected formally our two requests for cooperation. He added that Pinochet had been greatly annoyed by what he viewed as implied threats by USG during meeting with Barros. Cubillos, who departs tonight for Washington, suggested

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780255-1058. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

² June 15. Landau reported on his meeting with Fernandez: "Minister of Interior Fernandez promised to have definitely reply for me on Monday, June 19, to our requests that the GOC call the Paraguayans and to have Col. Iturriaga appear before the grand jury. The GOC seems inclined not to cooperate with either request because it fears further self-incrimination." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number)

that Iturriaga might respond in writing to written questions. Recommendations for further action follow by septel.³ End summary.

1. As promised by Minister of Interior Fernandez (see reftel), Foreign Minister Cubillos called me to his office June 19 regarding our requests A) that the GOC ask the Paraguayans to cooperate and B) to have Lt. Col. Iturriaga appear before the grand jury.

2. The Foreign Minister read to me the following statement regarding Col. Iturriaga: 1) He is an active duty army officer detailed to the security service (CNI). As such, he would be asked to make declarations about the security service organization to which he belongs before authorities of a foreign government. 2) The duty of all Chilean citizens to declare before a court is limited to Chilean courts. To appear before foreign courts is entirely voluntary for all citizens with the exception of members of the armed forces, who are subject to military regulations. 3) Chilean army regulations (reglamento de servicios de guarnición del estado) and additional classified documents established that all statements regarding army institutions and organizations must be issued by the public affairs department of the army and cannot be made by an individual officer, particularly when the subject matter concerns the organization of the security services. 4) In the continued interest to assist in the investigation, the questions to which answers are desired could be presented informally in writing so that Iturriaga could voluntarily prepare his reply and forward it through official channels to the US." (FYI: the Foreign Minister said "informally" means that the questions could be sent in telegraphic form to me. He explained that reply through official channels means that the army would clear Iturriaga's answers before delivering them to the Foreign Minister to be passed on to me. End FYI)

3. The Foreign Minister then proceeded to read to me why our request that the GOC call the Paraguayans could not be honored. "A) This was a decision to be made by a sovereign country regarding a delicate intelligence matter. B) This is a problem between the US and

³ In telegram 4650 from Santiago, June 20, Landau recommended: "I think it essential at this point that we reassess the importance of the Paraguayan and Iturriaga testimonies." He continued: "If the current judgment in Washington is that these additional elements of evidence would be helpful but are not essential then I recommend we leave matters where they stand and save our remaining leverage until the issues of extradition or local prosecution come to the fore. If, however, the judgment is that one or both are necessary, then we have no alternative but to attempt to change the present GOC position. But in doing so, it seems to me critically important that we minimize the potential for Pinochet to turn this issue to his advantage." He concluded: "If it is decided that we still need the Iturriaga and Paraguayan testimonies, and if the meeting of Deputy Secretary Christopher with Cubillos June 21 does not produce the desired cooperation, then I recommend that I be recalled to Washington for one week's consultation beginning June 26." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780257-0402)

Paraguay. C) Chile is in agreement with whatever solution can be worked out between the two countries.”

4. After reading me his statement on our two requests, the foreign minister said that Ambassador Barros’ reporting telegram on his meeting with Deputy Secretary Christopher had caused great annoyance. Cubillos said that in his absence (he was in Peru) the telegram was taken directly to President Pinochet. Pinochet agreed with Barros’ reported assessment that Propper’s statement regarding possible testimony about a call from Pinochet to Stroessner constituted an unacceptable threat against the president. I explained that this was not a threat. We were simply laying out alternatives if, in absence of Chilean cooperation, we had to fall back on other witnesses. The Foreign Minister said that he, too, had been annoyed when I told him on June 13 (Santiago 4515)⁴ that the GOC replies to our requests would not be satisfactory to Washington and might have other unpleasant consequences. He said an aura of mutual distrust now existed. On one hand the GOC feels that we do not believe they really plan to cooperate in assuring that justice be done and, therefore, are withholding vital information. On the other hand the Chilean government believes that there is increasing evidence that the USG is using the Letelier investigation for political purposes.

5. I told the Foreign Minister that our Departments of Justice and State considered this to be a police case and that we are only taking them up on their offer of cooperation. Cubillos said he could assure me that GOC cooperation would be forthcoming in that the guilty would be tried in the strictest manner in accordance with judicial processes of Chile. But so far we had not given General Orozco any helpful information to advance the GOC investigation. I told him that all information would be included in the indictment and request for extradition, which would permit them to initiate their legal processes.

6. If of any value, Justice may wish to send questions for Iturriaga by telegram and I could see to it that a reply is obtained quickly.⁵ Regarding Paraguay, department may wish to inform Paraguayan Foreign Minister Nogues of Cubillos’ statement that “Chile is in agreement with whatever solution can be worked out between the two countries.”⁶

7. Comment: The recent *Washington Post* editorial calling for Pinochet’s resignation and turning over the government to the Christian Democrat Party is still subject of continuing press speculation and the

⁴ See Document 217.

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Not found.

basis of virulent anti-American press statements.⁷ Thus, Pinochet is building up a nationalistic furor over “interference.” It is not quite clear to me whether the government fails to cooperate because they think we do not have enough evidence to convict anyone or whether they are unsure of what we have and do not want to incriminate themselves further. The foreign minister mentioned to me that he regretted deeply that this matter was just coming to a head during his first trip to Washington. I said he would have ample possibility to explain the GOC position to either Secretary Vance or to Deputy Secretary Christopher. He said at this point he was not even sure he wanted to talk to them any further about this matter. End comment.

8. Recommendations for further action follow by septel.

Landau

⁷ “On President Pinochet’s Doorstep,” *Washington Post*, June 10, 1978, p. A14.

219. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, June 21, 1978, 1737Z

4681. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination Investigation: Revised Scenario. Ref: Santiago 4650;² TelCon Landau/Steven June 20³

1. In view of Foreign Minister Cubillos’—not totally unexpected but still shocking—refusal to accept Deputy Secretary Christopher’s invitation for a bilateral, I must reappraise my recommendations contained in RefTel and believe that a more drastic and immediate signal is called for.

2. Cubillos’ refusal to meet with Christopher underlines the hard-line attitude of the two new civilian ministers, Fernandez and Cubillos, in the Letelier case. Cubillos, who came to his job with a marked pro-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780259-0300. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

² June 20. See footnote 3, Document 218.

³ Not found.

U.S. attitude, undertook a number of favorable initiatives for us for which he was severely rebuked. He told me, for instance, that Pinochet was unhappy that Cubillos urged him to see the AFL-CIO visiting team which, after their meeting, made a number of negative statements regarding the GOC's labor policy.⁴ There were other similar incidents. Partly to regain credibility with Pinochet and partly because neither Fernandez nor Cubillos feel any sense of responsibility for the Letelier murder, they adopted a tougher line which caters to Pinochet's natural stonewalling instincts.⁵

3. In reftel, I expressed the view that a statement of non-cooperation might well be counterproductive. It could help Pinochet rally internal support. That risk is real. But, following the Cubillos' refusal to meet with the Deputy Secretary, I think we must run that risk in the hope, small though it may be, that the declaration will force Pinochet to reconsider the GOC's present posture. Thus, I have concluded that we should link my return for consultation with a statement complaining about lack of cooperation.⁶

4. I suggest that the Department of Justice issue this statement on Friday, June 23. I will depart Friday night. The statement will be in the U.S. and Chilean press on Saturday. At the noon briefing on Monday, June 26, any question whether my return was connected with the Justice complaint can be answered affirmatively, thus establishing linkage and clear signal to the GOC.

5. I suggest strongly that the statement Friday be issued by Justice (before my departure from here) and not by State, to give me more maneuverability. On my return to Santiago, I would plan to seek an early appointment with Pinochet to reiterate our requests and, as appropriate, inform him of measures the USG intends to take if cooperation

⁴ In telegram 4206 from Santiago, June 5, the Embassy reported that the AFL-CIO visitors "emphasized the support of U.S. labor for independent trade unionism and for a prompt return to full trade union freedoms." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780234-0388)

⁵ The CIA reported "since Pinochet's political survival is dependent upon Contreras' fate," the GOC strategy was to "stonewall any further requests from the U.S. government that would serve to build a case against Contreras and other Chileans." (CIA Report, June 23, 1978, National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II)

⁶ In telegram 159865 to Santiago, June 22, the Department transmitted the text of a statement to be made at noon on June 23: "Ambassador George W. Landau is being recalled from Santiago for consultations with officials of the State and Justice Departments concerning the Letelier/Moffitt assassination investigation. The Chilean authorities have not been forthcoming on important requests by the Justice Department which have been pending for some time." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780261-0390) In telegram 160635 to Santiago, June 23, the Department transmitted a transcript of the portion of that date's noon briefing that concerned Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780263-0008)

is not forthcoming (the topic of our discussions next week, and on which I will bring recommendations).⁷

Landau

⁷ Landau's memorandum with recommendations is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II.

220. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, June 30, 1978

[Omitted here are portions of the document unrelated to Chile]

2. *Chile*: Since Ambassador Landau's return for consultation a week ago, we have been pressing the Chileans on the Justice Department's outstanding requests for cooperation in the Letelier/Moffitt assassination investigation. They will now provide the assistance we were seeking.² We are sending Landau back to Santiago this weekend and making a press statement that "mutual cooperation has been reestablished."³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 6/78. At the top right of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Cy J."

² In a June 27 memorandum to Christopher, Oxman wrote: "According to Nogues, Cubillos has told him that Chile would have no objection to Paraguay's cooperating with our investigation. This, it seems to me, comes quite close to meeting our principal request of the Chileans." Oxman continued: "George Landau also informed me of his three-hour dinner last night with the Chilean ambassador (Barros). Among other things, Barros seemed to indicate that the Chileans might permit the FBI to take Iturriaga's deposition. This would be acceptable to Propper." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile I) Nogues and Cubillos were both in Washington for the OAS General Assembly meeting.

³ In telegram 168070 to Santiago, July 3, the Department transmitted the press statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780274-0133) On July 10, Guanes gave written testimony and an interview to FBI agent Calvin Clegg in Asuncion "regarding Contreras' request to issue Paraguayan passports." (Telegram 2753 from Asuncion, July 10, Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asuncion 1969–79) (S) Clegg interviewed Iturriaga in Santiago on July 5, and according to Clegg, "Iturriaga answered all questions except one which related to who had final authority for authorizing DINA foreign missions and issuing false passports." Clegg also noted that Iturriaga "limited his answers almost entirely to what he himself did and was not willing to talk about the roles of others." (Telegram 5009 from Santiago, July 5, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780276-0306)

221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, August 10, 1978, 1851Z

202396. Subject: Foreign Minister Cubillos Conversation with Assistant Secretary Vaky.

1. During Colombian presidential inauguration² Foreign Minister Cubillos, who headed the Chilean delegation, asked to meet with me. We met August 8 for about forty minutes. Cubillos' basic purpose was apparently to establish contact and a channel with me, and, secondarily to give me his position and points of view. It seemed to me to be almost catharsis for him; he did most of the talking in almost stream of consciousness fashion.

2. In summary, Cubillos made three general points:

A) Individual USG officials were in effect "interfering" in Chilean matters and complicating things by their public comments and observations. For example, he said, US companies told him that, when they consulted with Department officials, they were told to be careful because things "were not going to last down there." He claimed to have chapter and verse on these kinds of comments. Cubillos went on to say that he found the climate in the US very difficult, and he really had not been able to talk to anyone with the frankness and openness he desired. He was by the way highly laudatory of you and of his relations with you; he in fact cited this as the kind of model he would like to replicate elsewhere.

B. Chile was at a cross-roads right now. Events could proceed one of two ways—a continued move toward return to constitutional democratic government though this would be at the "Chilean pace and with Chilean dignity;" or a reaction by the military and return to an iron totalitarian government. He said he joined the government to push for the moderate line. It is a mistake, he said, to believe that the Letelier case would split the government or bring down Pinochet.³ That would

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780328-0054. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Stadis. Drafted by Vaky; cleared by McNeil, Barnebey, and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

² The inauguration of Julio Turbay as President of Colombia took place on August 7.

³ In a September 15 INR report entitled "Prospects for Chile's Pinochet," Crist wrote: "The outcome of the Letelier assassination case and its impact on US-Chilean relations could test President Pinochet's ability to continue governing Chile. The indictment of top Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) officials, including Manuel Contreras, by a US Grand Jury has had serious repercussions for the Chilean Government, but Pinochet believes he can weather the storm." (*document number not declassified*); Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis, Job 07501568R, Box 1, Folder 10)

not happen. Things which allowed the military hardliners to feel aggrieved, such as apparent offenses to “Chilean dignity,” hurt the chances of the moderates.

C. Once the Letelier extradition requests arrive,⁴ the matter will be in the hands of the Supreme Court and out of the hands of the executive branch. The court, Cubillos said, is truly independent and it is certainly respected as such within Chile. What it says will have the full support of all Chileans. The court can do one of three things: (1) refuse the request on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient; (2) accept the evidence as sufficient and extradite; or (3) accept the evidence as sufficient but exercise its prerogative under the treaty and try the accused in Chile rather than extradite. Cubillos said he believes the last is what will happen.

3. I limited myself to saying simply that as he knew our relations had been deeply affected by the history of events since Allende’s fall and the very serious record of human rights violations that had occurred. I recognized the very significant improvement in individual human rights matters. Chileans should be aware that, now, the Letelier case is a central element in our relations. It was, however, our very firm position that this was a strictly legal, judicial investigation which had no political intent and which we intended to keep “depoliticized.” This case, however, deeply affected the American people, and what Chile does with respect to our extradition requests will inevitably be closely watched by the American people. We fully expected that the sincerity and integrity of the Chilean judicial process would be evident in this matter.

Cubillos’ third point above was in reply to my comments.

Vance

⁴ The extradition requests were presented on September 20. See Document 225.

222. **Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Letelier/Moffitt Investigation

I have approved George Landau's request by secure phone to return here for a few days' consultations on Friday, August 18. The Chilean lawyer for the USG comes here Sunday, August 20, for conferences with Justice on the final preparations for submission of the extradition request, and both Justice and we believe it is necessary for George to be present at these final strategy sessions in which, among other things, we must prepare our lawyer against what Contreras will try to do to beat the rap.²

Contreras' defense lawyer has begun the expected effort to paint the assassination as a CIA plot, claiming Townley, the Cubans, and perhaps even George himself were CIA agents (Tab 1 for latest CIA report).³ As you know, Townley approached the agency in 1973. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] but they told us the contact was never pursued [*2 lines not declassified*]

Contreras' lawyer, now in the States, has dropped dark hints to the press about the involvement of a foreign ambassador in the matter of the issuance of visas to Townley and Fernandez (as "Williams" and

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 15, Human Rights—Chile II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by McNeil on August 15; cleared by Propper. A notation by Oxman on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Oxman and Christopher saw the memorandum.

² No record of the telephone call was found. Etcheberry was the USG attorney in Chile. On August 1, an indictment was filed in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia, charging five Cuban-Americans and three Chileans with a number of counts related to the murders of Letelier and Moffitt. Three of the Cuban-Americans had already been arrested in the United States and the two others were fugitives. The Chileans were Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez Larios, all of whom resided in Chile. (Telegram 193668 to Santiago, August 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780315-0120) (U) In a memorandum to Carter, August 1, Vance wrote: "We will be requesting extradition in the near future. We have little hope the Chileans will grant it but have somewhat more hope they will try the DINA representatives for murder in their own courts. We will make every effort to dissuade the Chileans from attempting a cover-up, which sensitive intelligence suggests they will do." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 10/78)

³ Tab 1, CIA cable [*telegram indicator not declassified*] to the FBI and the Department of State, dated August 11, is attached but not printed.

“Romeral”). George ordered the visas issued after Stroessner’s private secretary called to say that two Chileans had an appointment with General Walters and asked George to have visas issued to them.⁴ General Walters had visited Paraguay just two weeks before [2½ lines not declassified] Simultaneously, George sent a message to General Walters, who replied that he had just retired and knew nothing of the Chileans. George informed State and the eventually successful effort to get the visas back began. In the event Townley and Fernandez used other identities when they came up to the U.S., the “Williams” and “Romero!” identities, however, were subsequently used by other DINA agents travelling on Chilean passports to the U.S.⁵

General Walters’ statement, taken by the FBI at the request of the Chilean Government, is at Tab 2.⁶ He points out he had retired, knew nothing of the Chileans [less than 1 line not declassified] 1975 or from his 1976 trip to Paraguay. To back that conclusively, it may be necessary to declassify the exchange of cables between George and General Walters.⁷ We informed Propper and Barcela who agreed that State should inform the CIA. We have done so, and asked for copies of the Landau/Walters cable exchange.⁸ Justice contemplates a meeting with CIA and State (including Landau) early next week and plans on having George make a statement to be used as evidence before the Chilean Supreme Court giving the details about the visa issuance not dealt with in Walters’ deposition.⁹

So far as press guidance is concerned, we would plan to say on an “if asked” basis that Landau is coming up for routine consultations (including his annual physical) and that among other things he will consult on the diplomatic preparations for submission of the extradition requests.¹⁰

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the phrases “ordered the visas issued” and “two Chileans.” See Document 209.

⁵ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph, beginning with the phrase “and asked George to have visas issued.”

⁶ Tab 2, dated June 14, is attached but not printed.

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “the exchange of cables between George and General Walters.”

⁸ An unknown hand underlined the phrase “we have done so.”

⁹ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph. No record of a meeting was found.

¹⁰ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

223. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)**¹

Washington, August 31, 1978

SUBJECT

Chile—Military Pipeline Shipments

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Should FMS pipeline shipments to Chile be released? A decision is needed soon.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

FMS pipeline shipments to Chile have been under a DOD administrative hold since June 28, when you instructed that the San Francisco bomb fin shipment be suspended and that we place the pipeline under review for case-by-case determination.² Only one FMS "case", a minor training visit to Chile, has been approved since that time. Materiel with a value of approximately \$1,549,500 out of the \$24.8 million remaining has accumulated and is being held pending release by State. (DOD estimates that several million more will come up in the next month or so.) The materiel includes munitions, recoilless cannons, aircraft and ship spares, and miscellaneous equipment. An attachment to this memorandum summarizes what is being held.³

In order for the munitions (worth \$949,500) to be loaded on this year's ammunition supply ship, a release is needed by DOD in early September. Actual delivery in Chile will take place in December or January; and the shipment could still be recalled up to that time. Other, non-munitions equipment is being held at shipping points. Shipping dates by sea and air are not fixed other than for the ammunition ship

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Steven and Schneider on August 29. A notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Oxman saw the memorandum. Perry initialed the first page of the memorandum. Oxman wrote on the first page of the memorandum: "Conf w/ WC, 9/6. He meant it* should flow and we shd review each month, so we wd have something to turn off each month, shd we want to. *if over and above the \$945,000 for the supply ship."

² Not found. In late May, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) at the port of San Francisco refused to load bomb parts onto a ship that was bound for Chile. (John M. Goshko, "Plan to Ship Bomb Parts to Chile Arouses Dispute," *Washington Post*, June 20, 1978, p. A2)

³ The undated attachment, entitled "Summary of Chile FMS Shipments Pending—o/a August 20, 1978—approximate dollar values," is attached but not printed.

(the “Mirfak”), but we are now at a point where our review has resulted in a *de facto* suspension of the FMS pipeline.

On August 2, the House rejected by a two to one vote the Stark amendment which would have cut off the pipeline on general human rights grounds. By the same margin, it reversed a voice vote and rejected a roll call [on] the Harkin amendment to suspend the pipeline until the Letelier/Moffitt extradition requests had been honored after Justice and State had indicated this amendment would interfere in the judicial process.⁴

HA believes that the principle of our human rights policy and existing law (particularly the directive of Section 502B (a) (3) to avoid identification with regimes which deny fundamental freedoms)⁵ argues for not having a US Government relationship supplying and equipping the Chilean armed forces. The situation in Chile remains one of some flux in terms of future political developments. Our current stance toward Chile—cool, aloof—as described by the Ambassador, would argue against a military supply relationship. It was in part because of a belief in the Congress that the Administration would act appropriately in the absence of additional statutory instruction that the Stark amendment was defeated.

Similarly, the view that we would ourselves take steps to use the pipeline as leverage if an impasse developed in the Letelier case encouraged the reversal of the initial vote on the Harkin amendment. If the pipeline is simply permitted to flow, the length of time before the decision-point is reached on the Letelier extradition case may mean it will have run out. We could have an impasse then but no pipeline to use for leverage.

HA understands the view that the Chilean government could interpret our “pipeline under review” stance to be a *de facto* suspension. They could then argue that there is no reason to cooperate with the extradition request. On balance, we do not believe that will be a persuasive case for the Pinochet regime to make to its own public.

ARA notes that it is generally conceded that the human rights situation in Chile has improved substantially in the last two years.

⁴ John M. Goshko, “Halt in Arms for Chile is Passed and Reversed,” *Washington Post*, August 3, 1978, p. A1.

⁵ The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-559), which Ford signed into law on December 30, 1974, amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) and added Section 502B, which expressed that a principal goal of U.S. foreign policy is the promotion and the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights. Section 301(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 94-329), which Ford signed into law on June 30, 1976, further amended the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and added Section 502B(a)(3). See *Foreign Relations, 1977-81*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, footnote 5, Document 1.

Imposition of new sanctions at this point, as would be a suspension of the pipeline, without evidence of any retrogression in human rights behavior, would be illogical and clearly harms our dominant interest in pursuing the Letelier case. According to Defense, there will still be a quantity of items in the pipeline six months from now because a quantity of items will not be delivered until 1980.

THE OPTIONS

Option I:

Permit the currently completed pipeline (except the controversial bomb fins) to be loaded for delivery, retaining the option later of bypassing Chile with the munitions shipment. Unless an impasse is reached on the Letelier case or significant deterioration in the human rights situation occurs, permit the remainder of the pipeline, reviewed monthly, to flow.

PRO:

—Would be consistent with the position taken by State and Justice with the Congress.

—Would preserve the pipeline as leverage on Chilean cooperation in the Letelier/Moffitt case.

—Would avoid complex political, contractual, and financial consequences of further suspension or cutoff.

CON:

—Would draw criticism from influential elements in Congress and the public.

—Would work down the remaining pipeline accumulation to a point at which it eventually might not be a meaningful instrument for influencing the Chilean Government to cooperate in the Letelier case.

—Would mean that the U.S. government was continuing to supply weapons, ammunition and equipment to the armed forces in Chile in contrast to the logical consequence of our human rights policy.

Option II:

That you maintain the pipeline items in a state of review; storing them for future shipment to Chile if the human rights situation significantly improves and there is cooperation in the Letelier case.

PRO:

—Would be supported by vocal elements of both Congress and the public.

—Would represent (in contrast to mandatory legislative cutoff) a flexible Administration position, permitting items to be sent if situation improves.

—Given the denial of civil and political liberties in Chile and continued incidents, however reduced in number, of violation of rights of the person, the USG should not be supplying arms to the Chilean military.

CON:

—Would appear to impose a new and inexplicable sanction on a country with an improving human rights record.

—Would provide Pinochet an argument to the Chilean armed forces for non-cooperation with Letelier investigation.

—Would raise complex contractual questions with potential financial costs to USG.

—Would be opposed by Justice for negative potential in complicating extradition issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Option I to permit pipeline shipments (except the bomb fins) to resume (favored by ARA and Ambassador Landau).⁶

That you approve Option II to maintain pipeline in “state of review”, (favored by HA).

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations.

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, September 16, 1978, 1910Z

235980. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination: Further Cooperation Between USG and GOC on Investigation.

1. Under provisions of Silbert/Montero agreement of April 7, 1978² we made commitment to convey information obtained through Letelier investigation to GOC to be used by its investigators for possible prosecutions. By diplomatic note dated August 2, 1978,³ Chilean Embassy requested information so far obtained in case, in accord with April 7 agreement.

2. Extradition package to be presented to GOC on September 20 contains much of the information requested, and can be considered a form of response to the GOC request and compliance with our commitment to provide information. However, Justice and State recognize that further steps should be taken both to fulfill our commitment and to obtain ancillary benefits.

3. It is proposed at same time extradition papers are submitted to invite Generals Orozco and Mena to meet with Justice team (Propper, Barcella, Cornick and Scherrer) to review information contained in extradition package and certain other material not included in the package. This would serve three ends: A) would fulfill our commitment and respond to specific request contained in GOC note of August 2; B) would maintain lines of communication between Orozco/Mena and prosecutors/investigators on our side; C) would help to maintain influence with key officials on Chilean side whose role may be vital both in GOC decision to extradite and execution of that decision if made.

4. Arrangements for such consultations—always assuming that Orozco/Mena desire them—could proceed in alternative paths. Invitations to come secretly or to meet in a third country (Propper and Uarcella do not consider it feasible to visit Chile given likely publicity and Chilean reaction) could be extended informally by Embassy or through FBI channels to Orozco/Mena, thus preserving secrecy of their movements and activities which would probably be their preference. We recognize however that secrecy is unlikely to be preserved for long

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780378-0450. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Steven; cleared in S/S-O and in substance by Propper and Willis; approved by McNeil.

² A reference to the agreement under which Chile agreed to expel Townley to the United States. See Document 212.

³ Not found.

and Chilean Supreme Court might react negatively to what it could see as infringement on its jurisdiction over the extradition case. Elements both for and against the Pinochet regime might attempt to exploit such contacts by charging that a secret deal was being worked out, by passing the judicial authorities in spite of both USG and GOC public and repeated assurances that case is exclusively in judicial channels.

5. Alternatively, we could arm our Attorney Etcheberry with a letter, a draft of which is included below, to take to the appropriate representative of the Supreme Court on or about the time of presentation of the extradition package. The letter makes clear to the court our intentions, makes an appropriate bow to its authority, provides opportunity for Court to object if it so desires, and forestalls charges of secret deals. Substance of letter or letter itself could be made formally or informally public if that should be believed useful. If the court had no objections, private arrangements could proceed to consult with appropriate GOC officials, with the details of participation and site restricted if the Chilean officials prefer.

Following is proposed text of letter which could be provided to Etcheberry:

Begin quote:

Mr. Alfred Etcheberry, Esquire
c/o United States Embassy
Santiago, Chile

Dear Mr. Etcheberry:

In April of 1978, the United States and Chile each agreed to cooperate with the other with respect to the investigation into the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. As you are aware, we have now submitted our formal request for the extradition of Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, Pedro Espinoza Bravo and Armando Fernandez Larios to the Supreme Court of Chile. Having done this, the United States Department of Justice would now like to brief appropriate officials of the Government of Chile on the results of our investigation. We want to do this because of our agreement and, additionally, we hope it will assist the Government of Chile in its own internal investigation.

In order to insure that we do not impinge on any of the Supreme Court's prerogatives, we would like to bring our proposal to the court to insure that the court has no problem with it. If it does not, we will make plans to meet with appropriate officials of the government. We want to reiterate, however, that we are doing that in the spirit of mutual cooperation and to assist the government's investigation; it is not in any way meant to detract from our effort to extradite the above-named persons.

Sincerely,

Earl J. Silbert
United States Attorney
Eugene M. Propper
Assistant United States Attorney
E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.
Assistant United States Attorney
End quote

7. Action requested: Ambassador is requested to consult with Etcheberry and to provide comments and recommendations on this proposal.

Christopher

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, September 19, 1978, 1503Z

7075. Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Assassination: Further Cooperation Between USG and GOC on Investigation. Ref: State 235980.²

1. I have gone over carefully with Etcheberry, DCM, Polcouns and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the contents of reftel. While appreciating constructive purposes underlying proposals therein, we all think it important to remind ourselves that the objectives of Orozco/Mena are not identical with ours—and, quite possibly, are diametrically opposed. At a minimum they hope to prevent extradition; they probably also want to help Contreras avoid successful prosecution in Chile. Beyond that, they have an interest in knowing all that Townley has told us about DINA's operations (especially abroad) in order to be prepared for other eventualities. Thus we should define our compliance with the Silbert/Montero agreement in a limited manner (consistent with integrity and our interests), not expect that a more forthcoming posture will gain GOC support.

2. In our view the presentation of the extradition requests package satisfies the formal requirements to the Silbert/Montero agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780382-0505. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

² See Document 224.

We have had no further requests from the GOC since the August 2 note.³ When I discussed this subject with Orozco in mid-August he said that he was awaiting the documentation that would come with the extradition request. Accordingly, when I see Foreign Minister Cubillos September 20 to formally request extradition (I have an appointment for 10:30 am) I plan to refer to Orozco's needs, state my expectation that he will have access to the evidence in the package, and say that if Orozco has additional information/evidence requirements to please let us know exactly what he needs.⁴

3. I do not plan at this time to suggest a meeting between Orozco/Mena and the justice team. Some of the potential dangers are set forth in para 4 of reftel. We are particularly concerned that such a visit might be seen or characterized as attempt to apply pressure on Chilean judicial system. The letter option in para 5 would not substantially improve the situation. According to Etcheberry, who is strongly opposed to the letter, the Supreme Court is bound to take the position that USG contacts with Orozco/Mena are none of its business and have no bearings on the extradition requests. It will neither approve nor object, but may be left with a lingering doubt that we are trying to circumvent them. The psychological impact of an Orozco/Mena meeting with the Justice team is not clear. On the one hand we see some value in demonstrating in a highly visible manner that USG/GOC cooperation continues—i.e. that we are not after the Chilean Government as such but simply those individuals who planned and carried out the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. On the other there is some danger that the prospects for extradition will be further reduced if Chilean Supreme Court justices believe GOC officials are fully informed and actively pursuing the case—i.e. that the needs of justice can be served equally well by trial here.

4. We need not rule out definitely Orozco/Mena meeting with the Justice team. If they so request we should probably oblige. But any such meeting should be in Washington and there should be no secrecy whatsoever. On the contrary it must be given wide publicity including a statement from the GOC saying that meeting was being held at its request to underline our public stance of cooperation.⁵

Landau

³ Ibid.

⁴ In telegram 7099 from Santiago, September 20, Landau reported on his meeting with Cubillos. Landau did not report making these points regarding Orozco. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384-0311)

⁵ No record of a meeting was found.

226. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, October 17, 1978, 2016Z

263023. Subject: Foreign Minister Cubillos' Call on Secretary Vance.

1. Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos called on the Secretary on October 10 at 4:00 pm in the Department. He was accompanied by Chilean Ambassador Barros. Assistant Secretary Vaky, Deputy Assistant Secretary Guzman and Desk Officer Steven attended.

2. Cubillos expressed his gratitude for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary. He complimented the Secretary on recent successes in international diplomacy related to the Middle East problem, and expressed his pleasure in having Ambassador Landau in Santiago. The Secretary in turn thanked Cubillos for Chilean cooperation and support in international policy matters.

3. Cubillos then settled in to what he described as the reason for his request to meet with the Secretary, and 25 of the 35 minutes of the meeting were spent on a presentation on the Beagle Channel dispute and tensions between Chile and Argentina. He gave the Secretary a copy of the Beagle Channel arbitration award, and laid out a map to guide the discussion. He reviewed the background of the submission of the dispute to arbitration, demonstrated on the map the areas and lines in question, and expressed Chilean shock over Argentine rejection of the award. He had accepted Argentine President Videla's invitation to negotiate with the caveat that Chile would consider only the maritime boundary question, not the award itself covering the actual channel.

4. The Chilean position was described by Cubillos as a reasonable and normal proposal for a maritime dividing line based upon the principle of "equidistance" from the land masses bordering the mouth of the Beagle. He conceded that Chile was prepared to negotiate this and to make concessions. Argentina, he alleged, had "played" with various proposals involving the continental shelf and had discussed common areas of economic development, etc., but the Argentine position shifted constantly and Argentine claims were unclear. Cubillos maintained that Argentina had gone so far as to actually threaten war if agreement was not reached by November 2 or if Chile took the dispute to the ICJ, this latter despite the 1972 treaty in which both

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780425-0950. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information priority to Buenos Aires. Drafted by Steven; cleared by Guzman, Bushnell, and in S; approved by Vaky.

countries agreed to take disputes to the ICJ. He could not discount the use of force in the matter, and Chile would defend itself if attacked. He felt Chile had the moral right based upon the award to appeal for assistance.

5. The Secretary asked for a description of the British position and Cubillos and Barros produced copies of the exchanges between the UK and the parties in which the UK declared its role as arbitrator terminated. In response to questions Cubillos noted that the talks with Argentina continue, but he could not provide a full explanation of the Argentine position and Argentine aims. Barros suggested that the principle Argentine effort is to “save face” after having lost the arbitration award, and perhaps to protect Antarctic claims. Cubillos confirmed that the November 2 deadline is a self-imposed limit by the two parties, which is not inflexible. He had considered the possibility of a moratorium on settlement of the dispute, but had not discussed it with the Argentines. He felt that negotiation of a moratorium would be more complex and difficult than negotiation of a final resolution to the problem itself.

6. In response to the Secretary’s question, Cubillos said that neither government had appealed to the OAS for assistance in the negotiations. Chile had been “hurt”, however, by the lack of international interest and support (on question of Argentine rejection of the arbitration award). He understood that there was “bias” against Chile which held some governments back, but that the problem was critical. Chile would try to solve it through negotiations, or in the ICJ, and would not attack Argentina. It would be a matter of great regret if conflict took place. Cubillos hoped the U.S. would use a little influence, and said that concern on the part of the U.S. would help resolve the dispute. He jokingly called for “another Camp David.”

7. The Secretary promised to look into the matter. He said that the last thing we wanted was conflict in the hemisphere, and that he would discuss the matter with Assistant Secretary Vaky and other interested officers. Cubillos conceded that the November 2 deadline was flexible and that another 30 days for negotiation could be obtained.

8. Asked if the retirement of Admiral Massera in Argentina had reduced the tension to any degree, Cubillos replied that it had not. Massera out of office continued to press the issue, and his influence continued to be an important factor on the Argentine side.

9. Cubillos noted that Ambassador Landau had suggested to him that he explain to the Secretary the process of political institutionalization presently underway in Chile, and he devoted most of the remaining time in the meeting to a review of the process, including the drafting of a new constitution, the referendum planned in 1979, and the transition period over the next five or six years. He said that the new constitution

drew heavily from French and German precedents. An evolutionary process was needed in Chile. He said that it would be too easy to press for an election now in Chile, in which Pinochet could be elected without difficulty in the fashion of a Somoza or a Stroessner. Chileans did not want this, and civilians like Cubillos joined the government precisely to help the military make the transition to democratic government again. The alternative to this evolutionary process would be regression to true military dictatorship "as in the first days after the coup," according to Cubillos. He insisted that civilian rule at this point in Chile was impossible. In the next few months there will be public debate over the new constitution, leading to a referendum next year. Cubillos noted that Ambassador Barros would be at the Secretary's disposal at any time to help him to better understand the political process in Chile.

10. As the meeting ended, the Secretary raised the Letelier/Moffitt assassination case with Cubillos. He reminded Cubillos that the case was of "tremendous importance" to us, with Chilean government cooperation essential to our relationship. Cubillos assured the Secretary of his own concern over the case, and noted that he did not even know General Contreras. He believed that the case must continue to be dealt with in judicial channels in which both countries must have confidence. He noted with concern our public statements such as the recent comment on the action of the Chilean Supreme Court in conducting the extradition hearing in secret,² and expressed his concern that such statements misled and inflamed public opinion. He claimed firmly that "there is no monkey business" going on in the court, and such implications only enlarge the credibility gap. He had taken his job in an effort to reduce that gap. Upon departure he again thanked the Secretary for the meeting.

11. Both before and after the meeting, Cubillos emphasized to Steven both his high regard for Ambassador Landau and his assurance

² A reference to a September 28 story in the *Washington Post* alleging that Propper was "outraged" by Borquez's decision to conduct the extradition proceedings in secrecy. (Charles A. Krause, "U.S. Shows Unease Over Chile's Handling of Letelier Case," *Washington Post*, September 28, 1978, p. A21) In telegram 247184 to Santiago, September 28, the Department provided press guidance regarding the story: "In seeking extradition, the U.S. Government has placed its confidence in the Chilean judicial system. However, we are advised that the exclusion of Mr. Etcheberry from this proceeding is unprecedented in Chilean legal practice. We are naturally concerned that our interests be properly represented." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780396-0703) In telegram 247659 to Santiago, September 28, the Department reported: "spokesman replied to initial question on Krause article with guidance" outlined in telegram 247184. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780397-0001)

that a just resolution of the Letelier/Moffitt case was regarded as of greatest importance by the Chilean Government.³

Christopher

³ In an October 10 memorandum to Carter, Vance summarized the meeting with Cubillos. Vance reported that he told Cubillos that the USG “would watch the situation closely” in the Beagle Channel dispute and “gave him a firm warning on the importance we attach to quick and satisfactory resolution of the Letelier/Moffitt murder case.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 10/78)

227. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, April 20, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

6. *Chile.* We expect a decision from the Chilean Supreme Court sometime next week on our request for extradition to the US of the three DINA officials indicted for the Letelier/Moffitt murders.² The Court has three alternatives: extradition for trial in the US; trial in Chile; complete rejection of the demand. A minimally acceptable alternative would be a vigorous and open prosecution of the defendants in Chile. In order to avoid sending a potentially misleading signal on the eve of the Chilean Supreme Court decision, I recommended to the Export-Import Bank today that it take no action at this time on applications to increase the \$750,000 limit the Bank has imposed since 1975 on any

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 4/79. Secret. Carter wrote, “Cy. J” in the top right hand corner of the memorandum.

² In an April 24 intelligence information cable, the CIA reported that Pinochet had told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] that the extradition request “was in the hands of the Chilean courts and that, consequently, the case did not represent a political problem,” and “that his government would comply with the ruling of the Chilean Supreme Court on the extradition request.” The CIA also reported that Contreras, although he “believed that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the extradition case would be favorable to him,” was also “upset that he might be forced to submit to a local trial in order to placate the U.S. Government and preserve Chilean-U.S. relations.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Asian, Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis, Job 07S01568R, Box 1, Folder 9)

loan involving a project in Chile. We hope to be able to concur in approval of larger loans as soon as the Letelier matter is satisfactorily resolved.³

³ Further discussion of the question of Ex-Im Bank credits for Chile can be found in a February 1 action memorandum from Vaky, Derian and Katz to Christopher (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-12/79) and in a February 6 memorandum from Newsom to Christopher. (National Archives, RG59, Lot 81D154, David Newsom Files, 1978-81, Box 14, Latin America)

228. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

Santiago, May 14, 1979, 2051Z

3321. Subject: (C) Letelier/Moffitt Case: Borquez Refuses Extradition; Orders Trial in Chile.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Summary: Borquez released his decision May 14. It accepts validity of US evidence presented with extradition request but finds it unconvincing for purposes of extradition. He also argues that US practice is not to extradite its own citizens. Borquez concludes, however, that in addition to evidence presented by USG, he has found sufficient grounds for believing that the three Chilean army officers may have been involved in the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations and he, therefore, orders a military court to begin a trial against them in Chile. The term trial has a broader meaning than in US jurisprudence. The trial process ordered by Borquez may, but will not necessarily, lead to formal indictment and a decision on guilt or innocence. The immediate next step is an appeal of the Borquez decision by defense and USG lawyers. We expect this to extend through June. Meanwhile the three defendants will remain in custody. End summary.

3. Supreme Court President Borquez informed lawyers for Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez of his decision at 9 am May 14. USG

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790218-0385. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Stadis; Exdis.

Lawyer Etcheberry obtained a copy of the 46-page decision shortly thereafter. There are four main elements in the decision:

—First, Borquez rejects the contention of Supreme Court Fiscal Chamorro (Santiago 2619)² that the evidence presented in support of the extradition request must be in accordance with Chilean judicial norms. Rather, US rules of evidence govern; therefore, the Townley testimony is not discarded simply because it was the result of plea bargaining.

—However, second, Borquez does not find the evidence presented convincing for purposes of extradition. Devoting little attention to the other evidence, Borquez focussed on the Townley testimony and, with reference to the plea bargaining, and alleged changes in Townley's testimony, he questions whether Townley is an impartial and believable witness.

—Third, Borquez takes note of Article V of the bilateral extradition treaty which allows Chile or the United States the option of not extraditing its nationals but concludes that even if there had been enough evidence for extradition, the Supreme Court would have had no moral obligation to do so since US courts have refused to extradite in similar circumstances.

—Nevertheless, finally, because he is convinced that the three defendants have made absurd and contradictory statements (“contrary to some facts established in the record”), he orders, in accordance with Article III (2) of the Code of Military Justice, “an authenticated copy of the decision be sent, at the appropriate time, to the second military court located in this capital, for the purposes of beginning the necessary trial (Sumario), if one is not already underway, to investigate the responsibility Fernandez, Espinoza and Contreras may have in the crimes of murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt carried out in the city of Washington in the United States of America September 21, 1976.”

4. Trial or investigation?: USG Lawyer Etcheberry says categorically that Borquez has ordered trial. Even had Borquez denied extradition solely on the basis of nationality, his wording in ordering a trial in Chile would have been identical to that quoted above. In this respect there is an important and confusing difference between the US and Chilean legal systems. A trial in Chile, whether military or civilian, begins with an investigation by a judge. Evidence gathered by the judge during the investigative state can be used to convict. When the judge is convinced that there is enough evidence to make conviction

² Dated April 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178-0231)

a likely prospect, he can bring formal indictments against defendants. If, however, he decides that there is not sufficient evidence, the trial would be terminated at that point. Thus, while Borquez has ordered a trial in military court under Chilean procedures and using Chilean terminology, the initial stage will be more analogous to grand jury proceedings in the United States. The military judge will be able to make use of the evidence presented by the USG in requesting extradition, that developed by Borquez in the course of his own investigation, and whatever else the military judge may already have or be able to obtain. As the Department is aware, an investigation into the possible criminal activities of Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez (nominally, at least identified with passport fraud) has been underway for more than a year. We would expect the military court to subsume Judge Borquez' instruction under that umbrella.

5. Appeals process: The order to the military court will not take effect until the appeals process is completed. Etcheberry has been told that lawyers for Contreras and Espinoza will appeal the Borquez decision but that the lawyers for Fernandez will not. Etcheberry will, of course, appeal the decision also, requesting that the review panel grant extradition. Lawyers have five days from today to file their appeals. A clerk of the court will then probably take two or three weeks to prepare all the materials for the review judges. The oral presentations may be made about June 10 and a final decision will follow two or three weeks thereafter. In the meantime, the three defendants will remain under custody.

6. Immediate USG steps: We plan to follow the basic lines of the scenario set forth in Santiago 2942.³ I will be travelling to Washington for consultation tomorrow, May 15, and Etcheberry will travel the following evening. By septel we are sending revised proposals for the press statements to be made by state and justice, with suggested responses to possible questions.⁴

³ Dated April 30. Landau recommended that on his return from consultations in Washington, he "would plan to inform GOC officials the minimum measures we intend to take," and that these could "include withdrawal of the military group and suspension of the pipeline, and a presidential determination against Ex-Im Bank credit on grounds of supporting international terrorism." Furthermore, he reported that the "only two measures which would be really meaningful and cause the GOC grave concern" were "breaking relations" and convincing "Congress to enact legislation barring private bank lending." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790197-0389)

⁴ Telegram 3322 from Santiago, May 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790218-0450) In a May 15 memorandum, Vance informed Carter of Landau's recall for consultations and of the appeal of the Supreme Court's decision. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 5/79)

7. Comment: The Borquez decision is better than we had anticipated during the last few days. He has in fact ordered a trial in Chile for the three defendants. Whether it prospers and justice is done will now depend upon the priorities and imperatives attached to it by this military regime. The outcome is less satisfactory than would have been the case had Borquez found our evidence compelling and denied extradition solely on the grounds of Chilean nationality. In that case, the result of a trial here would have been almost a foregone conclusion.

8. While taking note that Borquez has ordered a trial here, the USG should continue to press for reversal of the Borquez decision at the appellate level. I consider that unlikely but there may still be a small chance that the review panel will find our evidence convincing and base the refusal to extradite on the nationality clause. In that case our evidence will have full value before the military court.

Landau

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Chile¹

Washington, June 1, 1979, 2124Z

140552. Subject: Instructions RE U.S. Reaction to Outcome of Letelier Case.

(Secret–Entire text)

1. We have now carefully reviewed and analyzed the decision by Judge Borquez denying our request that Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez be extradited to the United States to stand trial for the crimes for which they were indicted by the U.S. grand jury in Washington, D.C. We have also carefully considered the implications of that decision for our relations with Chile. While you were in Washington, you made an invaluable contribution to our deliberations.² We also benefitted greatly from the advice and counsel of Alfredo Etcheberry.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011-1459. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House. Drafted by Oxman; cleared by Vaky, Pastor, Newsom, Perry, and in L, A, and S/S-O; approved by Christopher.

² Landau returned to Chile on May 31. (Telegram 139536 to Santiago, June 1, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790247-0679)

2. You should immediately seek an appointment with the Foreign Minister and make the following points to him:

(A) I have been instructed on the highest authority to reiterate to you our profound and grave disappointment at the ruling Judge Borquez issued on May 14 and at the lack of seriousness with which the Chilean government has conducted its own investigation of the responsibility of Contreras, Espinoza, and Fernandez for the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt on the streets of Washington, D.C.

(B) While I was in Washington, I participated in a full review of the Borquez decision and of our relations with Chile.³ As a result of Borquez' ruling, we have arrived at a most delicate situation in our bilateral relations. The USG in good faith presented its extradition request. Although Borquez found our evidence admissible, his ruling, if allowed to stand, would effectively render that evidence useless in any proceeding in Chile. We note that he tacked on an instruction to the military court to start an investigation based on "absurdities and irregularities" that he had observed in the evidence. Had Borquez not deprecated our evidence and had he ordered a trial in Chile on the basis of that evidence, we would have been able to minimize the existing strain in our relations. The case would have gone to the same military court where Borquez proposes to end it, but based on our evidence. You must understand that it is on the basis of that same evidence that a U.S. grand jury in Washington, D.C. indicted these defendants—and the standard for indictment is essentially the same as the standard for extradition. Moreover, our evidence was strong enough to convince a jury to convict the two other defendants in this case who were tried in Washington, D.C.⁴

(C) Borquez' ruling would make it impossible for any proceeding conducted here in Chile to be genuine and thorough-going. The military

³ The review included a May 22 interagency meeting, chaired by Newsom, which Oxman described as "an occasion to give all interested parties a briefing on what has happened and a chance to register their views." (Oxman to Newsom, May 22; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II) In a May 21 briefing memorandum to Newsom, Vaky wrote: "the consensus among ARA, Justice, L, D, our Chilean lawyer, and others" was "that we should let the Chilean Supreme Court review run its course without further U.S. public pronouncements. The Ambassador, however, upon his return to Santiago would tell the GOC privately how we intend to react if the three Chilean military officers go untried." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Chile)

⁴ On February 14, Guillermo Novo and Ross were each convicted of conspiracy to murder a foreign official, murder of a foreign official, and of two counts of first degree murder for the killings of Letelier and Moffitt. Ignacio Novo was convicted of lying to the grand jury and of failing to inform authorities of the crime. (Kenneth Bredemeier, "Cuban Exiles Guilty in Letelier Death," *Washington Post*, February 15, 1979, p. A1)

tribunal conducting any such proceeding would be able to ignore the evidence we have presented, on the grounds that the Chilean Supreme Court had already ruled that that evidence was not convincing and credible. Since that evidence must be the core of any good-faith prosecution of these defendants for the crimes charged, it is clear that a trial in which our evidence was ignored would be a mere formal exercise.

(D) Needless to say, we will be appealing the Borquez decision with vigor and determination. In the course of that appeal, our attorney will press our view that Borquez erred in focussing almost exclusively on Townley's statements following his guilty plea and in disregarding the substantial body of other evidence we presented. He will particularly stress the fact that Borquez virtually ignored the full statement made by Townley to General Orozco before Townley had entered into any plea-bargain arrangement with the United States Government.⁵

(E) The future course of our relations with Chile will depend very heavily on the outcome of that appeal. If we are faced with a situation at the end of the appellate process in which no extradition has been granted, or in which Borquez' ruling on the sufficiency of our evidence has not been reversed, so that any proceeding before a military tribunal would be hobbled from the outset, then I can tell you that the reaction of my government, the Congress, and the American people will be severe—more severe than anything we have yet seen in our relations.

(F) We are equally distressed and offended by the utter lack of seriousness with which the Chilean government has conducted the investigation of Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez that has theoretically been under way in the military court for over a year, the so-called passport fraud investigation. Since it appears that this investigation has thus far led to nothing, we have real questions about the vigor of your investigation and prosecution of this crime. Given the magnitude and implications of the crimes involved, we cannot understand or accept the lethargy that has characterized the military tribunal's so-called investigation. In his decision, Judge Borquez asks this same tribunal to expand its investigation specifically to include the potential responsibility of Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez in the murders of Letelier and Moffitt. But the record of this tribunal in the passport fraud investigation makes it clear that unless the Chilean government takes a conscious decision to energize the tribunal, its proceedings will

⁵ In a May 29 memorandum to Oxman, Propper and Barcella wrote "that Mr. Townley gave a statement to General Orozco at Quantico, Virginia, implicating the three Chilean defendants, prior to the plea agreement with us. He was then ordered to tell the truth and cooperate with the United States Government." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 31, Human Rights—Chile II)

be without substance. In addition, of course, unless Borquez' ruling on the sufficiency of our evidence is reversed, the military tribunal's proceedings would be no more than a formal exercise.

(G) I want to leave you in no doubt that in my government's view, relations between Chile and the United States are approaching a crossroads. Whether we are able to traverse that crossroads in a manner that will help lead to the improvement in relations between our two countries, instead of a severe deterioration, depends on you, not on us.

(H) We believe the judicial process should be allowed to run its course. However, I am instructed to tell you that should the Borquez ruling simply be affirmed on appeal—which would mean that the matter would be referred to the military tribunal with our evidence completely and unjustifiably disregarded—then we would be forced to take concrete steps to register our position. I cannot at this time get into the details of the steps that would be taken, but I would only reiterate that the US reaction would necessarily be severe, in view of the fact that we would be dealing with a case of unpunished terrorism. This could include a presidential determination that the Ex-Im Bank should deny applications for the extension of credit to Chilean interests on the grounds that Chile is harboring international terrorists and that such denial would advance US policy with respect to international terrorism. This finding would be public and could influence a wide range of other matters.⁶

(I) A large number of other steps were discussed while I was in Washington, but it would be unnecessary to take them if the appellate panel reverses Borquez' decision so that a good-faith trial is conducted here in Chile on the basis of our evidence. In this regard I wish to call your attention to the letter Secretary Vance received recently from the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Mr. Henry Reuss, in which Mr. Reuss addresses the question of private US bank lending to Chile.⁷ In addition, I am instructed to advise you that the unsatisfactory outcome which I have described would make it more difficult for the United States to be helpful in any external problems Chile may have.⁸

⁶ In a May 25 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor informed him that the Department of State "wants to deliver a very, very firm demarche," and "would like to be specific about the threat and include the point about a Presidential determination on terrorism." Aaron initialed his approval of the draft instructions to Landau regarding the demarche. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chile)

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Presumably a reference to the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel. See Document 36.

(J) In conclusion, I would underscore that the impasse we are approaching is not of our creation. Had your own investigation been conducted vigorously and seriously, we would not find ourselves in this situation. The undeniable fact is that there is more than ample evidence to require Contreras, Espinoza and Fernandez to stand trial for the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt. They should either stand trial in the United States or in Chile. That trial must be full and fair. If it is, we have confidence that these men will be brought to justice. If, by contrast, no trial is held, or the trial that is held is a sham, and if these men therefore walk the streets, I assure you that the reaction of my Government, of the US Congress, and of the American people will be severe.⁹

3. FYI: For your background, and for that of the Embassy staff and Mr. Etcheberry, you should be aware of USG view of the Borquez decision:

(A) Our deliberations have strengthened our view that the Borquez decision is inconsistent with international norms of justice. We can neither understand nor accept his conclusion that the evidence we adduced in support of our extradition request was insufficient to warrant extradition.¹⁰ Under our extradition treaties with all countries, including Chile, evidence adduced in support of an extradition request need not establish guilt. Rather, the norm is that it must simply be adequate to support a finding or probable cause to believe that the defendants in question committed the crimes charged. We have no doubt that the evidence we presented was adequate to meet that burden. Indeed, it was on the basis of precisely the same evidence that the U.S. grand jury in Washington, D.C. indicted the three defendants in question—and the standard for indictment is essentially the same as the standard for extradition. Moreover, our evidence was strong enough to convince a jury to convict the two other defendants who were tried in Washington, D.C.

⁹ In telegram 3890 from Santiago, June 6, Landau reported that during his meeting with Cubillos, he “read him the instructions contained” here. Cubillos “was pessimistic, claiming that we have a weak case, that the review panel will uphold Borquez, and that there is nothing the GOC can do to influence the judges.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790255-1039)

¹⁰ In a May 22 intelligence information cable, the Central Intelligence Agency reported that Borquez said “that both the U.S. Government (USG) and Government of Chile (GOC) have political interests in the outcome of this case. He said that, given a choice between the political interests of the GOC and those of the USG, there is no doubt as to how a Chilean judge should rule,” and that “the results of this case” were “critical to the political interests of Chile while the interests of the USG will only be marginally affected by the decision.” Borquez “included the instruction to pass the case to a military judge only as a concession to the USG.” (*[document number not declassified]*; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Chron Files, Box 92, Chile, 5/79-1/81)

(B) Because we find the Borquez decision so completely unacceptable, we believe that our immediate objective must be to seek a reversal or modification of the decision on appeal. We authorize and encourage Alfredo Etcheberry to pursue our appeal with all the vigor and determination at his command. We of course remain primarily interested in the extradition of the defendants, and we hope the appellate panel will order extradition. Failing that, our goal is a ruling on appeal that will permit a good-faith prosecution of the defendants in Chile. In particular, we seek a reversal of Borquez' holding that our evidence is not credible or convincing and hence is insufficient to establish probable cause. Unless that holding is reversed, we do not see how a trial of the defendants in Chile could be genuine and thorough-going. This is so because the military tribunal conducting any such proceeding would be able to ignore the overwhelming evidence we have presented, on the grounds that the Chilean Supreme Court has already ruled that that evidence was not convincing and credible. Since we believe our evidence must form the core of any good-faith prosecution of these defendants for the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt, it would seem clear that a trial in which our evidence was ignored would be a sham. End FYI.

Christopher

230. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State¹

5236

Santiago, July 27, 1979, 2132Z

Subject: Letelier/Moffitt Case: General Sinclair's Request [*1 line not declassified*]

Ref: (A) State 189520,² (B) Santiago 5086³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790343-0320. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis; Special Encryption.

² Dated July 21. The Department described the contents of a potential affidavit by the CIA Director, which "would not confirm or comment on Sinclair's basic question about possible CIA operations in Chile. Affidavit, however, would refute Contreras' charges." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963-79)

³ Dated July 23. Landau reported on his July 23 meeting with Cubillos, during which they discussed how the USG could best respond to Sinclair's request for information regarding CIA presence in Chile in 1976. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963-79)

1. Confidential Entire Text.

2. Foreign Minister Cubillos called me morning of July 27 to discuss further the manner of handling the Sinclair request.⁴ He has spoken with Mena but not with Sinclair, whom he does not know well. According to Mena, there are no deeper purposes in Sinclair's inquiry than a desire to get on with the investigation. Cubillos suggested a three-pronged response to the Sinclair request which he thought would demonstrate our desire to cooperate with the investigation. The three points were:

(A) With respect to [*less than 1 line not declassified*] personnel in Chile, remind General Sinclair that a USG official is declared with the Chilean Government and suggest that he get in touch with appropriate office of the GOC for the information needed.

(B) Remind Sinclair of the existence of an affidavit from General Walters among the extradition papers⁵ and offer to arrange an interview between General Sinclair and General Walters if the former feels this would be desirable.

(C) Offer General Sinclair an affidavit by the Director of CIA which would refute the charges made by Contreras regarding CIA collaboration in sending Chileans to the U.S. to see the then Director Walters (as outlined in ref a.)⁶

3. I believe that such a response, as transformed below into a draft reply to the original note, strikes a happy balance between necessary restraint in discussing a sensitive subject and positive encouragement of and collaboration with an important ongoing local investigation of the Letelier/Moffitt affair.

4. Following is text of operational portion of proposed Embassy not to GOC.

⁴ In telegram 4695 from Santiago, July 6, Landau reported that Sinclair had "requested by note the names of CIA personnel in Santiago in mid-1976. The alleged involvement of the local station is important to Contreras' whole defense: that the CIA orchestrated the whole operation. It is also tactically important that we not be seen as impeding the Chilean investigation." Landau continued: "It may be that for legal reasons Sinclair will want something more definitive in writing; I would suggest to Cubillos that he check with Sinclair on that score, if receiving the name orally from me is not good enough, the GOC should tell us precisely what written communication would meet its needs and how such a document would be kept secret." (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790307-0703)

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 222.

⁶ See footnote 2. In a July 12 memorandum to Turner, Silver recommended that "any response" to the request should "come from Headquarters officials or from General Walters." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, Box 13, Folder 30: C-356 Chile [1979])

“ . . . and has the honor to refer to the Ministry’s NOE number 09724 of July 5, 1979, transmitting a request from Brigadier General Santiago Sinclair.

In his request, General Sinclair asked for “Information regarding the identity of the people who in 1976, during the months June, July and August approximately, belonged to or worked for an organization that might correspond to ‘CIA-Chile.’” The Embassy wishes to advise the ministry that any such persons would be declared to the appropriate entity within the Chilean Government, and the embassy further suggests that General Sinclair obtain the information he seeks from that Chilean source. The Embassy also wishes to bring to General Sinclair’s attention the existence of an affidavit from General Vernon Walters, Acting Director of CIA at the time in question, which forms part of the evidence submitted by the United States Government in the extradition case brought against General Contreras, et al. This affidavit may contain information of interest to General Sinclair. The Department of State is also prepared to arrange an interview between General Sinclair and General Walters if the former believes this would be helpful. Finally, if it would serve the purposes of General Sinclair’s investigation, the Director of CIA would be prepared to offer an affidavit refuting the charges made by General Contreras regarding CIA collaboration in sending Chileans to the U.S. to see the then Director, General Walters.”

5. I would appreciate prompt notification that this formula for response to General Sinclair is acceptable to the Department.⁷

⁷ In telegram 200774 to Santiago, August 2, the Department approved the following text of a note to the GOC: “. . . And has the honor to refer to the Ministry’s note number 09724 of July 5, 1979, transmitting a request from Brigadier General Santiago Sinclair. The Embassy wishes to advise the Ministry that such person would have been declared to the appropriate entity within the Chilean Government. The Embassy further suggests that General Sinclair obtain the information he seeks from that Chilean source. The Embassy also wishes to bring to General Sinclair’s attention the existence of an affidavit from General Vernon Walters, Acting Director of CIA at the time in question, which forms part of the evidence submitted by the United States Government in the extradition case brought against General Contreras, et al. This affidavit may contain information of interest to General Sinclair. In addition, should General Sinclair wish to interview General Walters, the State Department would undertake to contact General Walters to seek to arrange such an interview. Finally, if it would serve the purposes of General Sinclair’s investigation, the Director of CIA would be prepared to offer an affidavit refuting the charges made by General Contreras regarding CIA collaboration in sending Chileans to the US to see the then Director, General Walters.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Santiago 1963–79)

231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Chile and Nicaragua¹

Washington, August 15, 1979, 0126Z

212500. Subject: The Secretary's Bilateral with Chilean Foreign Minister Cubillos.

1. Entire text confidential

2. Summary: Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, discussed Nicaragua and other issues with Foreign Minister Cubillos in Quito on August 10.² Cubillos criticized Andean Group countries for their aid to FSLN, OAS decisions as violating non-intervention principle, and USG statements concerning Somoza's departure.³ The Secretary replied USG had seen Nicaraguan crisis developing a year ago and had sought a constructive hemisphere response to reinforce the Nicaraguan moderates' position so as to avoid a leftist takeover. Our actions then and since, he said, have been designed to avoid a totalitarian regime coming to power. Other issues dealt with included the status of the Beagle channel negotiations, and the impending Chilean Supreme Court decision on the Letelier/Moffitt case.

3. The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister's views on the Central American situation. The FM said he would reflect his gut feelings about the matter. The GOC was not happy at actions taken by the U.S. and the Andean Group. That is why Chile had abstained in the OAS. The GOC felt the OAS actions were a blow to the principle of non-intervention. Chile had been also strongly opposed to steps taken by the Andean Group in support of the Sandinistas. Chile's argument was that it wanted to keep its embassy open, certainly not as a sign of support for Somoza but rather to underline its concern for the principle of non-intervention, to observe and to help in the situation wherever it could,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot 84D241, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Box 9, Vance Exdis Memcons 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Barnebey and Fimbres; cleared by Steven and in draft by Pastor; approved by Vaky.

² Vance was in Quito August 9–12 to attend the inauguration of Roldos. In telegram 5398 from Santiago, August 4, Landau recommended that Vance should "limit his agenda for the Cubillos bilateral to the Letelier/Moffitt case, the overriding issue in US/Chile relations at this time." He suggested that Vance "reiterate to Cubillos the main points" of Document 229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790353-1229)

³ For the Andean Group and the FSLN, see Document 47. Presumably a reference to Vance's June 22 statement at the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers and the June 24 OAS resolution regarding the replacement of the Somoza regime. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XV, Central America, Document 223, footnote 2.

and with the hope that by so doing it would have a measure of future influence with the new regime. Consistent with this, Chile sent a plane with humanitarian aid along with selected Foreign Ministry officials to amplify reporting on the Nicaraguan situation. As a result, the GOC received the compliment that Chile was the first country to send "disinterested help." Chile's political observers were surprised to find strong anti-U.S. feeling in Nicaragua. Ambassador Pezzullo's statement was also rather unfortunate from the GOC view. This statement was exacerbated by the Secretary's own public statements which generally tended to confirm that the U.S. had worked to force out Somoza.

The Secretary observed the U.S. had seen the problem coming. A year ago the U.S. had tried hard to set up a situation in which the moderates would have a good chance of prevailing. But it had been a lonely vigil. The upshot was the U.S. failed to achieve a solution, a stable Nicaraguan Government, which all the L.A. countries would have been happy to see. The U.S. predicted the failure would lead to further polarization with the center driven to the left. This is exactly what happened. With the march of events, it was clear to the U.S. that the extreme left was about to take over. If the U.S. had not done what it did, we would now have a totally leftist government.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. was disappointed at finding itself abandoned. He affirmed again that he felt the U.S. course had been the correct one. As to the future, the Secretary said he felt Nicaragua could go either way but had hope that the final outcome would be an independent government. He said he was glad Chile had stayed in as it had done. He thought it necessary for all the countries to provide humanitarian aid, both because of human need and because it affords some leverage. Similarly, reconstruction assistance channeled through moderate hands also provides some constructive influence.

The Secretary further observed that the hemisphere cannot neglect the danger posed to Nicaragua's neighbors. The Foreign Minister asked whether the U.S. could not be more subtle in its approach. A moderate in Nicaragua had observed to his people that the U.S. had gotten used to managing Nicaragua through Somoza and was now trying to do the same through moderate elements in the new government.

The Secretary said such observations depend on who one talks to. He suggested the GOC not accept a single report along that line. Changing the subject, he wondered whether the Minister had any solutions to suggest. The Foreign Minister admitted he had none. However, he admonished again the U.S. should be more subtle and not give the impression it is trying to manage Nicaragua. As for Chile, since the GOC had its troubles with the U.S., the Nicaraguans see differently Chile's involvement in Nicaragua.

The Secretary noted that Chile's involvement was useful and encouraged the Foreign Minister to stay in the country and continue

talking to the Nicaraguans. He felt Nicaragua could go either way but had hope that the outcome would be an independent government. Turning to Nicaragua's neighbors, the Secretary felt Honduras recognized the pressures building up and looked like it could manage the problem. El Salvador, on the other hand, was extremely volatile and could explode in 2–3 months.

Asst. Secretary Vaky underlined the political and social pressures which are rapidly polarizing the country. He pointed to elections, perhaps next March, as the most plausible escape valve to these pressures. If the GOES could dramatically make such elections a showcase, in essence usurping the left's own political planks, this could have a salutary effect. The problem, continued Mr. Vaky, is that the government is stuck in the middle, a position it must abandon to avoid further polarization. Secretary Vance suggested the GOC could help out in the situation and that Chile would be listened to. The Foreign Minister said they could try but observed that Chile and Central America can be worlds apart. Asst. Secretary Vaky returned the conversation to Nicaragua, saying it is necessary that traditional Nicaraguan institutions, e.g., the press, Church, regain life as a support structure to the moderates. The more countries that aid Nicaragua the better also for these institutions.

The Foreign Minister said he planned to keep his people in Nicaragua until they are thrown out. He added the Central American colleagues he had talked to in Quito had a feeling the U.S. is pushing them too fast to make reforms.

The Secretary pointed out that similar comments had been made to the U.S. last year by the Central Americans—but they had been wrong and the U.S. had been right in its assessment. Pastor pointed out that what is pushing them is not the U.S. but the march of events.

4. Beagle Channel—responding to queries from the Secretary, the Foreign Minister said there was not much to report: The two sides have submitted their information to the mediator, who will ask for expert advice soon.⁴ Perhaps there will be something after summer's end. Generally, Chile has great confidence in Cardinal Samore and faith in the outcome. The Cardinal is aware of the delicate timing question from November to March. With respect to a putative arms build-up by the Argentines, the Argentines have placed \$2.5 billion in military orders; additionally, they have left in place much of the military infrastructure which they built-up in the South at the turn of the year. Chile, also, is purchasing mirages. Nonetheless, there seems to be no immediate danger of a military flare-up.

⁴ See Document 43.

5. On departing, the Foreign Minister responded to a question as to when its Supreme Court would rule on the Contreras case. He said in about two weeks. The Foreign Minister referred to the different judicial systems. Their incompatibility, he said, will make it difficult for Chileans or Americans to understand the final judgement whatever it might be. Not unrelated to the outcome is the fact that the U.S. is not credible in this situation to the Chilean military. They see the USG's objective is to overthrow the military and not the pursuit of justice. Accordingly, any overdrawn USG reaction to an independent judgement of the Chilean court would also have very bad consequences not only in Chile but elsewhere in Latin America.

Vance

232. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, October 2, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

2. *Chile*. We issued a statement today strongly criticizing yesterday's Chilean Supreme Court decision, which denied our request for extradition of the three Chileans indicted here in the Letelier murder and refused even to recommend further action within Chile on the murder charges.² The Court's decision is long and complex; we will need to study it carefully before deciding on further steps. We have asked Ambassador Landau to return to Washington shortly to participate in our deliberations.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State), 10/79. Secret. Carter wrote "Cy J" in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: "I do not wish to break relations."

² The statement made at the Department's noon briefing noted that the USG was "deeply disappointed and gravely concerned" by the decision, "that the three terrorists have been released from custody and are now free on the streets of Chile," and that Landau was being recalled "to join in our deliberations on this matter." (Telegram 260217 to Santiago, October 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790455-0637)

³ Landau departed Santiago on October 8. (Telegram 7024 from Santiago, October 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790463-1200)

233. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to Attorney General Civiletti

Washington, October 4, 1979

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, Box 13, Folder 30: C-356 Chile. Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

234. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 11, 1979

SUBJECT

Reaction to Chile's Decision on Letelier—Item for VBB (C)

I have never been comfortable with the way State has handled the Letelier case. They have conducted virtually all their business on this case through Stadis channels, and that, in part, accounts for why I have been unable to comprehend the transformation of the U.S. from government to prosecutor to judge, which is where we currently are. Having been burned on this issue at the beginning,² I have not inserted myself in the process since. But I believe the time to insert ourselves has arrived, and so I welcome your note on Harold Brown's memo.³ (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV), 9-10/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Owen and Cochrane.

² Presumably a reference to Brzezinski's instruction to Pastor. See footnote 6, Document 205.

³ Reference is to an October 9 letter to Vance on which Brzezinski was copied. Brown discussed the Chilean Supreme Court decision and proposed "countermeasures" being suggested by "some voices, both on the Hill and within the Administration." On the letter, Brzezinski wrote: "RP Keep me informed" and "I agree that" in reference to a sentence in which Brown argued that it was "particularly important at this time to keep our attaches and MILGP in Chile to support our intelligence requirements and maintain some communication with their military services." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV), 9-10/79)

I have just received a draft decision memo which State is working on for Vance,⁴ and it includes nineteen specific sanctions, from which Vance can select to convey our displeasure to Chile. Harold Brown's memo, insisting that we keep our attachés and MilGroup represents only DOD's ox, which they naturally want to protect. There are 18 other oxen; options include: remove our Ambassador; remove Peace Corps; raise the issue of Chilean terrorism at the UN; terminate all business by the Export-Import Bank; support legislation to cut off all private loans, etc. Frankly, Harold Brown's concerns pale alongside the other options. I would much sooner pull our MilGroup and attachés than cut all private loans; but that's beside the point for the moment. (C)

I don't see how we can move into a discussion of sanctions before we answer three fundamental questions:

(1) *By what justification can we be displeased with the Chilean Supreme Court's decision?* The Chileans claim that their Judiciary is independent and that the evidence before it was insufficient to try the three Chileans.⁵ We will need to make a very credible case that either of those two propositions is false. That case may exist, but I haven't seen it yet, and I have asked repeatedly for it. (C)

(2) To make a really powerful case, I suspect one will need to find a vehicle to transport us over the chasm of cultural arrogance—namely, *by what right can the U.S. State Department judge another government's laws and court?* My prima facie answer to that question is, "there is no such right," but I realize these are extraordinary times and the Letelier assassination was an extraordinary crime, but we still need a vehicle to cross that great divide. I believe that Vance and Civiletti ought to appoint a three-person judicial advisory team—preferably an international team (1 American, 1 Latin, 1 European) to advise us on the merits of the Chilean decision.⁶ If Christopher is right that the Chilean decision is without any justification, then the team will give our case a little bit more standing. (C)

(3) *What are our objectives in the Letelier case, in U.S.-Chilean relations, and overall?* I would presume that we would address this question after the first two and before we decide which sanctions to approve. (Unfortunately, we seem to be doing the last, first.) (C)

Even the simplest question on objectives has not been answered: Are we trying to shock the Chileans into trying the three terrorists, or do we accept that the final decision on a trial has been made and is

⁴ The final version of the decision memorandum is printed as Document 235.

⁵ In the left-hand margin, Aaron highlighted these two sentences.

⁶ Aaron highlighted this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin: "interesting idea."

negative? If the latter is the case, then our objective would presumably be to convey displeasure or to establish a deterrent as an international landmark for any other dictators thinking of shooting people in foreign countries.⁷ Anyway, we need a systematic answer to this question, assuming that we receive “satisfactory” answers to the first two. (C)

I have just learned that Christopher is going to chair a meeting at 9:00 a.m. on Friday to go over the options,⁸ and I will use that as an opportunity to ask the three questions above. I hope you will also ask Vance them at lunch.⁹ I believe it would be better if you asked him rather than officially tasked State to answer these questions, because I am not *yet* certain that we want to get the White House into formally making the decisions on this case.¹⁰ (C)

With regards to Harold Brown’s memo, I am extremely disappointed that he signed his name to it. The suggestion that if we pull out our MilGroup or the attachés, we will lose valuable intelligence, or worse, we might even lose the Southern Cone to the Soviets is absolute nonsense. First of all, I am not aware of any valuable intelligence we could lose by pulling them. Secondly, I think the best way to communicate our policy to a government like Chile is at a low and diplomatic level. More often than not, the Chileans use our military to serve *their* interests, rather than the other way around. Finally, the suggestion that the Cone could go left is ludicrous; that would be the best way to provoke a coup. The foundation of these governments is anti-Communism. They have nowhere to go, but us. That’s why they continuously seek contact with us and approval, if possible; and that’s why we have a fair amount of influence over them. (C)

⁷ Aaron underlined this sentence beginning with “our objective.” Aaron crossed out the phrase “foreign countries,” inserted “the USA” in the right-hand margin and wrote in the right-hand margin below it, “This is the point.”

⁸ No record of the meeting was found. “Friday” was October 12.

⁹ In an October 15 memorandum for the files regarding an October 12 luncheon meeting among Vance, Brown and Brzezinski, O’Donohue wrote that Vance said the Department of State “would make the finding under Chaffee (sic) to phase out FMS which would then draw down the MilGroup. However, he wants to think more about MilGroup withdrawal. Frank Kramer’s readout indicated that we should not take actions in the military field which would hurt us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot 84D241, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Box 2, 1979 Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons Oct-Nov-Dec.) In an October 12 memorandum to Pastor, Gates wrote: “It was decided at today’s VBB meeting that Secretary Vance will consult Ambassador Landau and suggest to the next VBB a proper response. Secretary Brown and Dr. Brzezinski stressed the importance of avoiding aimless punitive actions.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV), 9-10/79)

¹⁰ Aaron highlighted this paragraph.

The invitation by Argentina to the Soviets, which Brown notes,¹¹ was for three purposes: First, the Argentines have such an extraordinarily one-sided trade balance with the Soviets, that occasionally they have to show the Soviets that they might be interested in buying something, as well as just selling. Secondly, the Argentine military machine is voracious; they may have spent as much as \$2 billion in the last year on arms. It is possible that they might seek something from the Soviets that they couldn't get elsewhere, but I don't think we ought to cater to that appetite just to prevent them from doing that. Thirdly, the invitation was a crude and obvious ploy to give our military an argument to use to beat up on our human rights people. Our attaché probably learned about it before the Soviets did. (Another good reason why we shouldn't hesitate about pulling these guys; it's not clear which government they're working for.) (C)

Anyway, I'm not asking you to ignore Harold Brown's concerns, only that you put them in a broader context and see them for what they are: bureaucratically self-serving. I would hope that we could get State to answer the three questions above, and then, if necessary, we could suggest a ranking of sanctions.¹² (C)

¹¹ A Soviet military mission visited Argentina in August 1979. (Telegram 6815 from Buenos Aires, August 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790382-0073) In an October 9 letter to Vance, Brown wrote: "Our estrangement with Argentina has permitted the Soviets to acquire some access to that regime particularly in the military area." See footnote 3.

¹² At the bottom of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: "ZB—I think we should appoint an impartial group to examine whether the Chileans acted in good faith & if not really slam the blocks to them. DA"

235. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, October 19, 1979

RE

Letelier/Moffitt Case

As you know, the Chilean Supreme Court has denied our request for the extradition of the three Chilean intelligence officers indicted by a United States grand jury for the assassination of Orlando Letelier (a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S.) and Ronni Moffitt. Because the Court's decision also rules out virtually any possibility that these three men will be tried in Chile, it is likely that this act of terrorism, committed on the streets of our nation's capital, will go unpunished. We therefore now face the issue of how to respond to the Government of Chile.

Background. Letelier and Moffitt were killed in September 1976 by a bomb attached to their car. On August 1, 1978, a federal grand jury handed down indictments charging Michael Townley, a member of the Chilean secret police, and two others with having carried out the crime. The same grand jury charged three high-ranking members of the Chilean secret police with having planned and directed the killings. Townley and his two accomplices were subsequently tried and convicted in a U.S. District Court. The United States sought the extradition from Chile of the other three men.

Recommendations. The Government of Chile bears a two-fold responsibility for these crimes. First, high-ranking officials of that government have been charged with having planned and directed the crimes—and the overwhelming body of evidence that has been amassed by the Department of Justice makes it likely that those charges would be upheld if a fair trial could be held in either Chile or the U.S. Second, the Government of Chile has made no serious effort to investigate or prosecute these crimes on its own, and its judicial system has refused either to make the three Chilean officials available for trial in the U.S. or to order a thorough and effective local investigation.

By its actions—and its inaction—the Government of Chile has, in effect, condoned this act of international terrorism within the United

¹ Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Box 7, Alpha Channel (Miscellaneous)–9/79-12/79. Confidential. Sent via Alpha Channel. The memorandum was forwarded to Carter under covering memorandum from Brzezinski on October 25. In the top right-hand corner of the first page of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote: "Minimize backbiting—Put strong assessment of what we are doing. J"

States. We believe it is essential that we make clear, both to Chile and to others throughout the world, that such actions cannot be tolerated.

As you know, there have been suggestions from the Hill and elsewhere that we take extreme measures to demonstrate our displeasure, including enacting legislation to limit private bank lending to Chile, withdrawing our Ambassador, or even breaking relations altogether. I have considered these options, and while I share the outrage of those who have suggested them, I believe steps of this sort would not serve our interests in Chile or elsewhere. Instead, I recommend that the following steps be taken:

(1) *Diplomatic Steps.* During the course of the Letelier matter, Ambassador Landau has met regularly with Chilean officials to express the concern of the United States Government. In addition, we have recalled Ambassador Landau three times on consultations as a reflection of our displeasure at developments in the case, and Warren and I have made numerous demarches to Chilean officials. We will be meeting further with Chilean officials to reiterate our view that the Government of Chile's failure to investigate this crime is unacceptable, and to explain the steps we are taking. I believe we should also make a reduction in the size of our Mission in Chile as a concrete indication of our displeasure. I am prepared to make such reductions in the State Department component of the Mission staff, and I will shortly be submitting to you a proposal for personnel reductions by other agencies operating in Chile.² No further diplomatic steps are possible at this time, short of recalling Ambassador Landau permanently or breaking relations, neither of which I recommend.³

(2) *Terminate the FMS Pipeline.* A relatively small amount of equipment remains in the FMS pipeline (we estimate the value to be approximately \$7 million). I propose to terminate the pipeline in an orderly fashion, and to attempt to minimize any termination costs that might require a Congressional appropriation. However, I believe we should complete the termination of the pipeline by January 1, 1980, even if that does entail some minimal termination costs.⁴

(3) *Withdraw the MilGroup.* There are currently four U.S. officials in the MilGroup in our Embassy in Santiago. I propose to withdraw the Milgroup promptly. With the termination of the FMS pipeline by the end of the year, the Milgroup will no longer have any function to

² Not found.

³ Carter checked and initialed the approve option.

⁴ Carter checked and initialed the approve option.

perform in Chile. I recommend, however, that our three Defense Attaches remain in Santiago.⁵

(4) *Suspend EX-IM Financing in Chile*. The Chafee Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act authorizes the denial of EX-IM financing in cases where the President determines that such action would be “in the national interest” and would “clearly and importantly advance U.S. policy in such areas as international terrorism. . . .”⁶ We believe that Chile’s actions in the Letelier case justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. While the Congress intended that this sanction should be used only sparingly, it would be difficult to conceive of a more appropriate case than the present one—where high officials of a foreign government have been directly implicated in murders committed on United States territory, and where that government has effectively frustrated all attempts to bring the accused perpetrators of these crimes to justice.

Moreover, if the Chafee Amendment were not invoked in the present case, EX-IM activity in Chile would not simply remain at current levels; it would, instead, increase dramatically. Prior to the enactment of Chafee, EX-IM had for several years restricted financing in Chile to a maximum of \$750,000 per project. Following Chafee’s enactment, that restriction was informally extended pending the final outcome of the Letelier matter and a determination of whether the Amendment would be applicable. In the absence of the Presidential determination described above, EX-IM believes it would not have a legal basis for maintaining the \$750,000 ceiling and would therefore resume unrestricted lending in Chile, for the first time since 1974. EX-IM loans in Chile could therefore be expected to increase sharply.

I therefore recommend that you sign the proposed Presidential determination attached at Tab 1,⁷ both as an appropriate response to Chile’s actions in the Letelier matter, and to avoid the anomaly of seeming to reward those actions. Some elements of the business com-

⁵ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to the recommendation: “Phase down to two—then we’ll assess.”

⁶ On October 2, 1978, the Senate adopted the Chafee Amendment. (“Senate Votes Not to Require President to Draw Up Foreign Trade Blacklist,” *Washington Post*, October 3, 1978, p. A10)

⁷ Not attached. Citing the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, the proposed Presidential determination read: “I determine that it is in the national interest and would clearly and importantly advance United States policy in combating international terrorism for the Export-Import Bank of the United States to deny guarantees, insurance, extensions of credit and participations in the extension of credit in support of the purchase or lease of any product or service by any purchaser or lessee in Chile.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 7, Chile)

munity will undoubtedly criticize us for taking this step, but I believe strongly that we must do so.⁸

(5) *Deny Validated Licenses for Exports to the Chilean Armed Forces.* A number of applications for licenses to export items to Chile for the use of the Chilean armed forces have been held, pending the resolution of the Letelier matter. I believe these applications should now be denied. Under the Export Administration Act of 1979,⁹ future applications, received after October 1 of this year, may be denied only if you determine that the absence of export controls would be “detrimental to the foreign policy . . . of the United States.” Under this Act imposition of controls would also require us to consult with the Congress and to attempt to dissuade other countries from exporting controlled products to the Chilean armed forces. The use of export controls can be expected to draw strong opposition from the business community. I nonetheless believe that this additional Presidential determination and the other steps called for by the new Export Administration Act would be appropriate in this case. If you approve denial of these future licenses for the armed forces, we will meet with Department of Commerce officials next week to prepare specific recommendations for your review.¹⁰

(6) *Deny OPIC Guaranties.* OPIC involvement in Chile is currently very limited. I propose that we not approve any future OPIC guaranties or other OPIC activities in Chile.¹¹

(7) *Public Statement.* In conjunction with the actions described above, I believe we should issue a statement reiterating our grave concern and deep disappointment at the Chilean Government’s actions, including in particular its failure to investigate this crime, and outlining the actions we are taking.¹²

⁸ Carter checked and initialed the approve option.

⁹ The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) was signed into law by Carter on September 29, 1979.

¹⁰ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Continue to hold license requests—we can disapprove new ones as they are presented for the time being.”

¹¹ Carter checked the approve option.

¹² Carter checked the approve option. For text of the November 30 statement see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1980, pp. 65–66. In a November 19 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor explained the delay in announcing the decision: “because our aid package was in Conference, and Henry Owen felt that announcement of the decision could have an adverse impact on it. When that problem was resolved, the Iranian crisis occurred, and Secretary Vance recommended that we hold off announcing the decision until the Iranian crisis was resolved.” Pastor noted, “While we have not felt much pressure because of the delay in making a decision on the Letelier case, it is not likely that we will enjoy a respite for much longer.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-12/79)

I believe the actions I have suggested would be an appropriate and measured response to Chile's outrageous conduct in this affair. While it is unlikely that our actions will persuade Chile to alter its course and to bring the three Chilean officers to justice, our actions will constitute a strong reaffirmation of our determination to resist international terrorism, and may help to deter others who might be tempted to commit similar acts within our borders.¹³

¹³ In an undated memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski transmitted Carter's decisions and wrote that the actions "would constitute a strong reaffirmation of our determination to resist international terrorism and a deterrent to those who might be tempted to commit similar acts within our borders." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Chron Files, Box 92, Chile, 5/79-1/81)

236. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, February 19, 1980

SUBJECT

Chile and Argentina (U)

I sent you a memo for the VBB last Thursday on Chile and Argentina (attached).² I understand that it was decided that State and DOD should battle the UNITAS issue out on their own. They have not come to a conclusion and David Newsom wants us to take a position and, presumably, decide the issue. I continue to recommend the following (please check your concurrence as appropriate):

1. Agree to UNITAS for Argentina.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-10/80. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Pastor. Aaron initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: "2/20 See Bob Pastor's comments attached," a reference to a February 20 memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

² Not found attached. The memorandum is dated February 13. (Ibid.) "Last Thursday" refers to February 14.

³ Brzezinski checked the "yes" option.

2. Disapprove UNITAS for Chile.⁴ (C)

There is also an issue between State on (would you believe) whether or not a DOD cartographer's slot should be abolished as part of the Letelier crackdown. This is a matter of massive inconsequence from any point of view. Since DOD has taken a longer cut in percentage terms than other Embassy elements (and we would be scrubbing UNITAS for Chile) I suggest that we back DOD on this matter. Concur?⁵ (C)

There is also the question of visits left over from the VBB although I don't think this is particularly contentious. Do you concur that:

1. Allen should be allowed to visit Argentina?⁶
2. The Galtieri invitation should be delayed?⁷ (C)

I still think the larger issue (discussed on page 2 of attached memo)⁸ needs resolution. If you do not want to burden the VBB with it, please let me know your preferences. Should we:⁹

Substantially consider the Letelier phase over?

Continue to take follow-up actions influenced by it? (C)

⁴ Brzezinski checked the "yes" option. In the right-hand margin next to both points 1 and 2, Aaron wrote: "I agree so does Pastor. DA." The decision not to invite Chile to participate in UNITAS for 1980 was reaffirmed on April 1. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Aaron, Denend, and Dodson, April 1; Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Historical Material, Box 15, Meetings: Vance/Brown/Brzezinski, 3/80-9/80)

⁵ Brzezinski checked the "yes" option. Aaron underlined the phrase "back DOD" and initialed in the left hand margin. In a February 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "One of the President's decisions was to reduce the size of our own mission. If all of us agree that this slot is unnecessary, then to be consistent with the President's decision it should be abolished. I see no reason why we should back DOD on this matter." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Chile, 1-10/80)

⁶ Brzezinski checked the "yes" option. A reference to H.K. Allen, chairman of the Ex-Im Bank.

⁷ Brzezinski checked the "yes" option. In the left-hand margin next to both points 1 and 2, Aaron wrote: "Looks OK."

⁸ In his February 13 memorandum to Brzezinski (see footnote 2, above), Thornton wrote: "The President authorized a number of steps in the Letelier case and these have been taken (or are about to be taken.) The question arises as to whether we want to continue punishment of the Chileans on this issue. Do we want this to be a time-limited action or is it supposed to remain a semi-permanent factor in US-Chilean relations?" He continued: "My preference is to put the issue behind us—the UNITAS decision would be our last one under its influence." In his February 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor disagreed: "I would pose Tom's question differently: *How much staying power does the USG have?* I think it would be a terrible embarrassment to the President if we proceeded with 'business as usual,' such as suggested by the UNITAS exercise, four months after he announces a strong and firm policy." (Ibid.)

⁹ Brzezinski did not check either option, but he placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin and wrote: "avoid having to take a position ZB."

237. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 1, 1980, 11:45 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Members of Congress on Latin America (U)

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Frank Moore, Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison
Madeleine Albright, NSC Staff
Robert Pastor, NSC Staff/Notetaker
Representative Charles Wilson (D-TX)
Representative Henry Hyde (R-ILL)

Representative Wilson opened the discussion by saying that both he and Representative Hyde had been supporters of the President on foreign aid throughout the President's term. He said that as conservatives, both Congressmen had been very helpful in getting the foreign aid bill passed. Although he was able to deliver several votes to the Administration on foreign aid, Representative Wilson modestly suggested that his contribution was small compared to the forty or so conservative Republicans that Representative Hyde was able to deliver. However, both Congressmen have difficulty in supporting the President in the light of some recent decisions made in the area of foreign policy. It is possible that the UNITAS was the last straw, and he doesn't see how he can help the President on foreign policy anymore, especially since the Administration consistently favors left-wing tyrannies and is against governments with right-wing views. Perhaps he (Wilson) had been wrong in his assessment of developments in Nicaragua, but the decision to exclude Chile was ridiculous. This is a case which involves a purely security operation, and should not have been politicized. He criticized Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, for taking this action as personally insulting and "absolutely infuriating." (C)

Representative Hyde said that he would like to supplement what Representative Wilson said. *President Carter* said that it would be difficult to improve on it. (C)

Representative Hyde said that he had always supported aid for several reasons. First, he supported aid because of the humanitarian needs of poor people in developing countries. Second, the US had a moral

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President, 7/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

obligation to assist these countries. And third, we needed to assist these countries in their development in order to assure our own access to strategic minerals and for other economic reasons. However, he protests the fact that there are some in the government who try to use foreign aid as a political weapon to help tyrannies on the left. According to this formula, Argentina is a bad guy, and Communist countries like Yugoslavia, Romania, and radical governments like Tanzania, are to be helped. He thinks that this double standard is wrong, and that the threat is really coming from the left. He also thinks that the people who are implementing US foreign policy are livid against right-wing regimes, and that they take whatever steps they can to demonstrate their anger against these regimes. In conclusion, Representative Hyde said that he is ready not to support these aid programs anymore. (C)

President Carter said that he appreciated the full report of the two Congressmen, and said that he agreed with a lot that they had to say. However, it is not all black and white. Left-wing regimes have no place at all in US foreign policy. The US does not give any aid, and indeed does not even have diplomatic relations with governments like Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea. With respect to right-wing regimes, we do in fact have relations, trade and often give assistance. We also give some special attention to governments like Chile, Argentina and Brazil. We view these countries which we want as our friends as crucial. The President remarked that when he invited General Pinochet to Washington for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties in September 1977,² there were some who thought that this could even lead to riots in the United States, but he felt that such an invitation should be extended. Mrs. Carter has traveled throughout Latin America and has met with many leaders.³ We have sought good relations with the governments in Latin America. (C)

President Carter said that he felt the human rights policies are making a very positive impact in Latin America. In Ecuador, Peru and perhaps even in Bolivia, these governments are moving toward democracy, and we can see significant progress. (C)

President Carter said that the assassination of Letelier and an innocent American person with him was a terrible and unconscionable act, which took place in the streets of Washington, our capital. President Carter feels that sanctions were appropriate in this case. At first, we gave Pinochet time to deal with this issue, and we tried to put on an image of cooperation in order to facilitate his investigating, and if possible extraditing the criminals involved in the assassination. We

² See Document 205.

³ See Documents 268 and 165.

made clear to the Chilean government that we viewed this matter with great seriousness, and expressed our expectation that the Chilean government would try to find the people responsible for the crime and independently investigate their alleged involvement. Chile, however, did not do any of this. They should have. As a result, we took a number of steps to express our great displeasure with their failure to take action on this case. The decision that was made on UNITAS reflected this effort to make clear our displeasure with their lack of action.⁴ (C)

The President said that the UNITAS decision had a momentum of its own and that by the time that he got involved with it, it was too late. He said, however, that he had informed State that although he didn't want Chile to participate in the exercise this year, it could be done next year.⁵ We had to do something. It is possible that this action or other actions may have been too much; the President said he did not want to quarrel with that point. However, the Letelier assassination was a very serious insult to the United States. And we were correct in bringing pressure to bear on the Chilean government. We wanted to convey a very clear and significant message of displeasure to the Chilean government, and I believe we have made this point. (C)

Representative Wilson said that we have done too much. With the actions of Christopher and others in the State Department, he sometimes gets the feeling that there is a preference for Allende rather than for Pinochet. The reduction of the size of the Embassy and the other steps are indications of more than is necessary. (C)

Representative Hyde compared the trial of the criminals involved in the Letelier affair to the US putting J. Edgar Hoover on trial. It was not likely that we would do something like that because Hoover was said to have files on everyone, and we shouldn't have expected the Chileans to do it either. Moreover, we have identified the wrong guys as the culprits. He cannot believe that Pinochet approved such an action, although it is possible that there were some in his intelligence agencies who did. Nonetheless, we do push the Chileans much too hard in the Inter-American Development Bank and elsewhere by continually voting against them. (C)

Representative Wilson said that at the same time that we are voting against Chile, we are voting for Romania. He does not think this makes

⁴ See Documents 235 and 236.

⁵ In a May 29 memorandum to Muskie regarding a breakfast meeting the next day, Tarnoff advised: "The President has asked that the decision to exclude Chile from participation in this year's UNITAS naval exercise be discussed." In handwritten notes regarding the May 30 breakfast meeting, Muskie wrote: "Chilean maneuvers: stay with decision but let them know next year." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 82D100, Box 3, Pres. Breakfasts July, Aug, Sept 1980)

any sense for us to continually criticize right-wing regimes and support left-wing governments. He said that he is not asking for the Administration to turn around completely, but only to let "us win one." He said that that is only normal politics—to let one side win a few. But he doesn't feel that he has had any help or any recognition or any support for that position in the last three years. He said that Warren Christopher makes all of these decisions, not the President, not Secretary Miller. (C)

President Carter recommended that he talk to Warren Christopher. (C)

Representative Hyde said that Secretary Miller recently vetoed loans to Chile, and he thought that was overkill. (C)

Representative Wilson said that since 1945, there has been an attempt by every Administration to reach across to not only seek bipartisan support, but also across ideological lines on foreign aid. But he does not think that this is true of the Carter Administration. He insisted that there are not that many Tom Harkins on Capitol Hill, and President Carter would have to deal with some conservatives on this. (C)

Representative Hyde said that it is hard to constantly be helping the Nicaraguans if the conservative view is never supported. (C)

President Carter said that the two Congressmen had made their points very well. There is a lot that he can agree with, and some that he would disagree with, but he did not want to quibble. It is possible that we could have overmade our point to Chile. (C)

Representative Wilson asked whether the President couldn't say that publicly. (C)

President Carter said that he would have to think about it, although he didn't believe that it would be helpful for us to make such a comment at this time. (C)

238. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 18, 1980

SUBJECT

M-B-B Lunch—Argentina and Chile (U)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Chile.]

Chile

A year has passed since the Letelier sanctions were imposed and we had agreed among ourselves to review policy towards Chile about now. State had, in fact, begun to do so, when Christopher put a stop to it. I asked to have this item put on the agenda² so that we could get a determination whether or not we want to go through with the policy review or simply leave matters for the next administration to deal with. It is a fairly close call:

Con

—There are no pressing issues at stake for the next several months.

—The Chilean Government remains fairly odious and has recently perpetrated a mockery of the democratic process, perpetuating the rule of Pinochet.³ It may also be retrogressing on human rights.

—By leaving changes to the next administration, we give them some cards to play.

Pro

—The Letelier sanctions have had no effect, were never intended to be kept on permanently, and are now counterproductive to our own interests (e.g. the UNITAS issue).

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Chron Files, Box 92, Chile, 5/79-1/81. Secret. Sent for information.

² A reference to the November 19 luncheon meeting between Muskie, Brown, and Brzezinski. (Memorandum from Bartholomew to Muskie, November 18; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretary—Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 82D100, Box 3, MBB Lunches Oct-Dec 1980)

³ A reference to the September 11, 1980 plebiscite in Chile. In a September 12 memorandum to Carter, Muskie wrote: "With most of the votes counted, 67 percent have voted in favor of a new constitution and a transition plan which restores congressional elections in 1990 and presidential elections in 1997. The Chilean people were not offered an alternative. At our noon press briefing we expressed regret about the length of the transition period, the lack of media access for opponents, and repeated government intimidation of the opposition. We stressed our interest in seeing Chile return to a stable democracy." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports (State), 9/80)

—Despite some recent setbacks, Chilean human rights performance with regard to violation of the person has improved greatly and in the course of events this should have been recognized. The Letelier sanctions have overlaid this, however, with the result that we are much tougher on Chile than on Argentina where Basket I⁴ violations are much worse. This is anomalous and discredits our human rights policy. It also leaves us badly out of balance as between these two Beagle Channel contestants.

—Since we said that we would review our policy, let's do it. We are still the Government. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: I think we should go ahead with the review on two grounds:

—Let's leave a credible policy behind, and

—If we don't sort things out better, we will be inviting the next administration to throw the baby out with the bathwater, for we should continue considerable restraint in our relationships. (S)

I am not disturbed by the idea that there may be no specific actions that this Administration will be taking towards Chile; what I am concerned about is leaving behind appropriate guidelines (e.g. reaffirming the President's decision on 1981 UNITAS participation; how to vote on IFI loans to Chile).⁵ (S)

⁴ A reference to the CSCE Final Act, or Helsinki Accords, comprised of four "baskets" or categories of international issues, including human rights.

⁵ In a November 18 memorandum to Muskie, Bartholomew wrote: "the NSC staff believes that if we do decide on any significant initiatives towards Argentina, we should at the same time review our sanctions policy towards Chile." Next to this point, Muskie wrote: "next admin!"

Colombia

239. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 30, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Colombia.]

Colombian Cocaine Traffic. We are taking action on the disturbing reports² that official corruption in Colombia is contributing to traffic in cocaine. Assistant Secretary Todman plans to raise this issue with President Lopez in Bogota on May 9.³ He will also prepare the way for a second approach ten days later by Mathea Falco, the Secretary's Adviser on Narcotics Matters.⁴ Subsequently, our Ambassador to Colombia will follow-up by proposing specific actions Lopez can take to deal with the problem. In the meantime, we will hold up delivery of three helicopters scheduled for shipment to Colombia under our narcotics program.⁵

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "To Cy J" in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.

² In telegram 3471 from Bogota, April 15, the Embassy reported: "Evidence is that narcotics-related corruption is widespread, with estimated current annual trafficking return for Colombia of at least one-half billion dollars providing strong financial incentive," and that "official corruption undoubtedly has detrimental effect on US objectives and programs in narcotics field." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770133-0263)

³ Todman and Lopez discussed narcotics trafficking in Bogota on May 9. A memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976-1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Human Rights—Colombia 1977) See Document 14.

⁴ Carter wrote "OK" in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. Falco's trip was postponed to June. See Document 242.

⁵ In telegram 104488 to Bogota, May 7, the Department informed the Embassy of the decision "to hold up, at least temporarily, delivery of the helicopters pending planned demarche on the high level corruption issue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770160-0661)

240. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the Embassy in Venezuela, the Department of State and the White House¹

Bogota, June 10, 1977, 2110Z

5430. Subject: Mrs. Carter's Meeting With President Lopez.

Following is telegraphic memo of conversation which took place at Presidential Palace from 11 am to 12:15 on June 10. Memo is subject to approval by Mrs. Carter's party. Participants were: President Lopez, Foreign Minister Lievano, Mrs. Carter, Asst Secy Todman, Charge Drexler, and Ms. Hoyt and Mr. Pastor.

1. After an exchange of greetings, Pres Lopez noted that Mrs. Carter had received letters from the opposition in Brazil during her visit to that country.² He said he had offered both branches of the Colombian Communist Party the opportunity to communicate complaints to Mrs. Carter but they had declined and said they had not been deluded by the USG position on human rights. Mrs. Carter commented that of course the Colombian record on human rights was very good.

2. Mrs. Carter outlined for Lopez the background to her trip and President Carter's outlook towards Latin America. She underlined the President's interest in working closely with Latin American nations in cooperative efforts aimed at resolving regional and bilateral problems, she explained that the administration had adopted a more open approach to foreign relations and would be governed by the belief that our foreign policy needs to reflect our national values. We were seeking a wider participation in world politics as well as broad progress, on a multilateral basis, in human rights. President Carter also wants to end the spectre of war and reduce the waste of resources in armaments. The administration was, in particular, seeking wider Latin American adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. President Lopez remarked that the USSR had asked Colombia to take the lead among other LA nations in pressing Brazil and Argentina to ratify both these treaties.

3. Turning to specific measures the administration had already taken in furthering its LA policy objectives, Mrs. Carter cited the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations. She commented that significant problems still remained but that there had also been good progress and that we hoped for an agreement by the end of this summer. She thanked Lopez for the help he had already rendered in facilitating an agreement

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770208-0963. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

² See Document 165.

and asked him to impress upon Torrijos the need for reaching agreement on a new treaty before the summer was over. Lopez said he had not been in touch with Torrijos recently but added that he himself was “quite optimistic” about the treaty negotiations. Reiterating comments he had made earlier to Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz,³ Lopez said that only the USG was in a position to guarantee the security and neutrality of the Canal for the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. He said he had told Torrijos that Panama should possess the area’s resources and the US should hold the guarantee.

4. Regarding our bilateral relations with Cuba, Mrs. Carter reported that progress had been made but problems remained. She underlined the importance of the fact that we at least had opened a dialogue with Castro. Lopez characterized Castro’s latest speech on relations with the US as “tricky”.

5. Resuming her outline of the administration’s approach to foreign relations, Mrs. Carter said we were also seeking better institutional frameworks since those existing were formed at the time of World War II and had been overtaken by subsequent developments. She reiterated that we would be consulting closely with LA nations in developing our global policies and in attacking world problems. Lopez commented that if there is any nation with which the US has no problems, it is Colombia.

6. Developing further her earlier comments on human rights, Mrs. Carter said that on her trip she had encountered a far better response than she had expected to the Administration’s policy. She sensed a new spirit and popular interest with regard to safeguarding human rights and said that in view of Colombia’s good experience we would welcome Lopez’ suggestions on how to proceed. Lopez observed that the climate for furthering the cause of human rights seemed good. He commented that most governments in the world, and particularly in Latin America, were suffering from unpopularity because of inflation and a number of other reasons. In the democracies, people were calling for stronger, more effective government whereas in the military regimes, the people wanted democracy. In the latter nations, the regimes were being forced to promise elections and other changes in the next years ahead in order to calm their people. And this climate, in Lopez’ view, could be propitious for advancing the cause of human rights in those countries. He cautioned, however, that it would be hard, and inadvisable, for the US to act as a “protector” of human rights in LA particularly since this was really the collective obligation of the OAS and UN. He argued for the designation of a Latin American

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 2, Document 31.

commissioner for human rights within the OAS framework. Lopez envisioned the appointment of some distinguished statesman to fill this role and thought it might even be a Canadian, who would have special claims to objectivity. He added that this official should not be termed a "Secretary General" because this title sounded far less imposing in Spanish than in English. Lopez referred to recent moves by some Southern Cone countries to form a bloc countering US efforts on behalf of human rights by alleging that they constituted "intervention." In response to a question, Lopez and Lievano indicated that these moves were still under way but that Colombia had not been welcome as a participant. When asked what democratic nations might do to counter such moves on the part of Southern Cone nations, Lopez underlined that both Colombia and Venezuela had refused to join in and that the GOC, as he had mentioned previously, was advocating a collective approach to safeguarding human rights and an impartial Latin American Commissioner as an "ombudsman."

7. Turning to the question of narcotics, Mrs. Carter said the President was seriously concerned about drug abuse and accordingly had established a special White House Office on the problem, headed by Dr. Bourne, who was very close to the Carters. She reminded Lopez that Dr. Bourne and Ms. Falco, the Secretary of State's Special Adviser on Narcotics, planned to visit Colombia shortly. Mrs. Carter expressed the hope that President Lopez would meet with Bourne and Falco⁴ to discuss how our cooperative programs could be made more effective. Lopez stated that there were few things that had disappointed him as much as his experience with the USG with regard to narcotics control. He said the question was whether Colombia was corrupting the US or vice versa. In this connection, he stressed that it was American money, channels and aircraft that were being used in narcotics trafficking involving Colombian territory. He referred to his conversations nearly three years ago with President Ford and Secy Kissinger⁵ who, he said, promised to help Colombia with the equipment it needed to fight the traffickers, including helicopters and communications gear. Much time had elapsed since then and we were still debating the terms of an agreement to supply just three helicopters.

8. Mrs. Carter said the administration recognized the role of the American domestic market for drugs but she stressed that in this interdependent world it was impossible to confine responsibility in such a matter to one country. She went on to observe that the narcotics traffick-

⁴ See Document 242.

⁵ Presumably a reference to Lopez Michelsen's meeting with Ford and Kissinger on September 25, 1975. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Document 270.

ing had had a corrupting influence on the GOC. Both Lopez and Lievano said they entirely agreed with Mrs. Carter but they stressed that the GOC does not have the resources to fight back against the traffickers and that the promised USG help had never come. Mrs. Carter commented that the sources of this trafficking problem can be found in both the US and Colombia and that we needed to work together. Lopez observed that we should have begun doing so three years ago. He went on to describe the geographical factors which favored trafficking from the northeast part of Colombia. He added that recently discovered plantations for growing marihuana used advanced agricultural technology financed by Americans. Mrs. Carter reiterated that corruption was limiting the effectiveness of Colombian enforcement action. Lopez again agreed and emphasized the GOC's need for more and better equipment. Mrs. Carter repeated that she hoped President Lopez would meet with Bourne and Falco when they visited Colombia. Lopez said the GOC wanted to cooperate and fight alongside the US in this battle against the traffickers.

9. Mrs. Carter next registered the administration's concern over American prisoners, like Thelen,⁶ who had been held in Colombia for very long periods without being brought to trial. She related this to our concerns about human rights and underlined the interest in such cases in the US. Lopez replied that human rights in Colombia are protected by law, that the laws need to be enforced by an independent judiciary and that the Colombian executive branch cannot manipulate the judicial process because that would in fact be a violation of human rights. Mrs. Carter reiterated the concerns that were felt in the US with regard to persons who had been held several years without trial. Lopez acknowledged that there were delay and backlogs and said the Colombian Attorney General had recently undertaken to try to speed up some 8000 protracted cases which were pending trial. He also observed that such backlogs and judicial burdens were a problem in other countries, too, including the US.

10. Regarding the Starr kidnapping case,⁷ Mrs. Carter expressed appreciation for the GOC's help and concern and voiced the hope that it would do everything possible towards securing Starr's safe release. Lopez said the guerrillas seemed to be holding him in the remote El

⁶ A reference to William Thelen, a U.S. citizen arrested in Colombia on May 13, 1975. (Telegram 4635 from Bogota, May 20, 1975, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750177-0980; Telegram 4812 from Bogota, May 25, 1977, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770187-0509)

⁷ Richard Starr, a Peace Corps volunteer, was kidnapped by the FARC on February 14, 1977. (Memorandum from Christopher to Carter, 2/15/77; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports [State], 2/11-28/77)

Pato area and that if GOC armed forces tried to rescue him there it would endanger his life. He stressed that in such cases it was essential to be patient, and he expressed the hope that Starr's mother recognized the dangers of trying to force the issue by the use of armed force. Mrs. Carter underlined that the President was very close to the Peace Corps, particularly since his mother had also served as a PC volunteer.

11. Mrs. Carter asked if there were any messages or thoughts which President Lopez wished her to convey to President Carter. In reply, Lopez raised the issue of trade preferences and tariffs. Reiterating the Lievano Plan for a Latin American regional system in which the US would favor its southern neighbors in the Hemisphere, Lopez said the GOC either wanted better treatment from the US or help in securing equal treatment for all developing countries from all of the developed nations. He had in mind the fact that Colombia suffered discrimination in terms of market availability from the nations in the Lome Agreement⁸ and the British Commonwealth. Mrs. Carter said the US wanted to work with the Colombians via the MTN in Geneva to reduce regional discrimination. We thought this far better than creating new regional trading systems (as envisaged in the Lievano Plan). Lopez observed that the developing nations were in the minority in the MTN at Geneva and that in particular there were only a handful of LA nations participating. He went on to thank the Carter Administration for its enlightened action on shoe imports⁹ and expressed the hope that it would take similar position in regard to efforts to curtail Colombian cutflower imports. Lopez and Lievano went on to explain that they did not regard an increase in Colombian exports to the US as a form of increased economic dependence on the US. Lopez also observed that if there was a world wide system of preference open to all countries which first renounced the preferences they received under closed, regional systems, there would be a continuing movement towards the larger, global system and away from the others.

12. Lopez also warned that one of the most serious political/economic problems that would confront the US within the next few years would result from the anticipated drop in coffee prices. He said Colombia had taken measures which would mitigate the impact here but that most other coffee exporting nations had not done so and had pegged their internal prices to the international price. They thus faced severe economic dislocations, unemployment and consequent political disrup-

⁸ The Lome Convention was an investment and aid agreement between the European Community and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group States (ACP), signed in Lome, Togo, in February 1975.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 17.

tion when the price falls and the US would have to cope, especially in Central America, with the political problems this caused.

13. In conclusion, Mrs. Carter stated that the administration was committed to complete the Pan American highway segment¹⁰ in Colombia but was worried by lack of progress in curbing hoof and mouth disease. She expressed the hope that Pres Lopez would give this problem his personal attention. Pres Lopez good naturedly told Mrs. Carter to advise her husband not to waste his time worrying about this issue. Lopez said he had been listening to talk about completing the highway for many years but that meanwhile only the construction cost has gone up. He commented that it was all a complicated problem with many conflicting interests involved.

Drexler

¹⁰ A reference to the Darien Gap.

241. Letter from President Carter to Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen¹

Washington, June 21, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for meeting with Rosalynn during her visit to Bogota.² She has spoken with me about your discussions and we both found them useful and informative. We appreciate all your efforts to make her trip a success.

As you know, I have a deep personal concern, shared by the United States Congress and the American people, with the problems of drug abuse and illicit drug traffic. Like so many other problems that face us, drug abuse is global in nature and can be solved only through concerted international cooperation. Toward that end, I am making international drug abuse control a high priority of my Administration.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Colombia: President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, 5/77-6/78. No classification marking.

² See Document 240.

I know that Rosalynn conveyed to you my great interest in improving our joint efforts to interdict the drug traffic, particularly because of the corrosive influence that drug-related corruption is having on our societies. I would appreciate receiving any information which you have regarding the involvement of United States citizens in the drug traffic, and I would like to share with you some information which has come to my attention indicating that a number of high officials in the Colombian Government, and several important political figures, may be benefitting directly or indirectly from the illicit drug traffic. I would be glad to have a complete briefing provided for your information, if you wish, at your convenience.³

I am concerned that future cooperation between our two countries will be jeopardized by this problem. Let me therefore propose that the two of us share our information and that we establish together a joint commission composed of representatives of the highest levels of our two governments, which will meet on a regular basis to maximize coordination between our two governments in dealing with the illicit drug traffic.

I hope that you will discuss with my personal representatives, Dr. Peter Bourne, my Special Assistant, and Ms. Mathea Falco, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, ways in which we can mutually strengthen our drug control efforts.⁴

I am particularly troubled that Colombia, whose democratic tradition and leadership on human rights I have long admired, might suffer in the forum of international opinion if the drug traffic is allowed to expand unchecked. I value our personal correspondence and hope that we can use it to strengthen our efforts at defeating the danger that drug abuse presents to both our societies.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ In telegram 143585 to Bogota, June 21, Luers advised Drexler that he had sent a memorandum to Vance which reported on a briefing by Bourne, Bensinger, and Falco regarding "the Colombia/cocaine problem" and "corruption: which ministers and high officials are involved and how much does Lopez Michelsen know himself. The President wanted to know what incentives Lopez Michelsen would have to deal with the corruption issue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770221-0472) See related documents in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues, which is scheduled for publication.

⁴ See Document 242.

242. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State¹

Bogota, June 23, 1977, 0215Z

5809. Subject: Meeting With President Lopez

1. Meeting between President Lopez, Dr. Bourne, and Ms. Falco was cordial and brought assurances on both sides of increased cooperation in joint narcotics control efforts. President Lopez responded very positively to the overall suggestion of enhanced cooperation at a higher and sustained level on the narcotics issue.

2. President Lopez expressed his thanks for personal letter from President Carter, which he read immediately.² He then raised problem of delays in implementing earlier phases of narcotics control program, specifically citing failure to conclude helicopter contract,³ but recognizing that both sides were responsible for raising obstacles. He also noted that Colombia because of its respect for human rights cannot move as easily as military dictatorships against narcotics problems.

3. Dr. Bourne stressed the interdependent nature of the drug problem. He and Ms. Falco proposed creation of high-level joint commission to coordinate drug control efforts and to exchange intelligence. President Lopez said he would instruct Foreign Minister Lievano who will be in New York at Law of Seas Conference meet with Secretary Vance in Washington to discuss composition of such a commission.⁴ Lopez subsequently said he thought that the lead at the working level should be taken by Ambassador Barco who would work with officials in Washington in establishing the overall composition of the commission. He also said that he would consider appointing a legal attache specifi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Colombia, 4-8/77. Confidential; Immediate. Forwarded to Bourne, with Carter's comments, under a June 24 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

² See Document 241.

³ In a June 3 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote that the continued delay in delivery of the three helicopters "was occasioned by recent intelligence reports indicating that Colombian government officials are extensively involved in cocaine trafficking and that corruption is proving a serious obstacle in the narcotics interdiction effort in that country." Next to that paragraph, Carter wrote, "I agree." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports [State], 6/77)

⁴ In the right margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote, "Bourne give brief to Vance." Vance and Lievano met on June 15 at the OAS meeting in Grenada, but a record of a later meeting between them was not found. (Vance-Lievano memcon, circa 6/15/77; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, OAS meeting June 14–17 1977 Grenada)

cally for liaison in narcotics. Perhaps meeting of Foreign Minister Lievano, Vance, Bardo, Bourne and Falco could be arranged second week of July.⁵

4. Dr. Bourne then raised corruption issue, explaining President Carter has list of Colombian Officials involved, and that he would provide information for Lopez if latter desired. Lopez interrupted with strong expression of interest in being informed. Bourne continued that information was highly sensitive and varied in quality but that a private briefing for Lopez could be given by representatives of intelligence community so that Lopez could personally evaluate the information. Lopez responded that Colombian Intelligence indicated only low level official involvement, and that their own intelligence gathering capability was weak but that in some communities, such as Santa Marta, the whole community was involved. At conclusion of meeting Lopez asked specifically how intelligence briefing would be arranged.⁶ It was added that arrangements would be made through Washington and the appointment with Lopez would then be coordinated through chargé here.

5. Lopez raised problem of prosecuting traffickers who are citizens of the other country involved, saying that expulsion from country without prosecution was no solution, and asked if there was possibility of prosecution in home country where actual offense had not been committed. Bourne and Falco cited possibility of indictments under U.S. conspiracy laws and agreed to explore legal problems involved.⁷

6. Detailed memorandum of conversation will follow.⁸

Drexler

⁵ See Document 243.

⁶ Carter underlined and highlighted this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin, "ok-Give names but assess quality of intelligence cautiously."

⁷ Carter highlighted this sentence and wrote in the right-hand margin, "Get Bell to help," a reference to Attorney General Griffin Bell.

⁸ Telegram 5899 from Bogota, June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770227-0320)

243. Memorandum From the Director of the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy (Bourne) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 23, 1977

SUBJECT

Briefing of President Lopez-Michelsen

The promised briefing was conducted by Peter Bensinger, Administrator of D.E.A., Larry Laser of the Central Intelligence Agency and myself. We were accompanied by Robert Drexler the Charge d' Affaires. President Lopez-Michelsen was alone.

The material had been very carefully prepared and checked, and Peter Bensinger did an excellent job in presenting it in a low key and non-accusatory way. We left behind a written copy of the briefing² without any identification as to its source. The President did not flinch at any of the information we provided. When we reached Defense Minister General Abraham Varon Valencia, Lopez-Michelsen questioned us closely as to whether we had other information that we might not have written down because it was not solid. He said that at different times there were rumors Varon was trying to overthrow him, was smuggling Scotch whiskey, and involved in other illicit activities. Because of the changing nature of the rumors and the lack of hard evidence he sometimes questioned whether any of it was true. As he talked more I had the feeling that he not only wanted us to know that he knew a good deal more about Varon than we did, but that this was the one person on the list he could not move against directly.

At the end of the briefing he said that since our previous visit³ he had made considerable investigations on his own, and had been amazed at the degree of corruption, not merely around the drug issue, but also in connection with terrorist kidnappings and ransom payments. In one instance members of the National Police had even served

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Colombia: President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, 5/77-6/78. Top Secret. A stamped notation indicates that Carter saw the memorandum. A copy was sent to Rosalynn Carter.

² Not found. In telegram 6760 from Bogota, July 22, the Embassy reported that Bensinger "provided information on about thirty cases which exemplified narcotics-related corruption involving ministerial and judicial officials, military and law-enforcement personnel and high-level figures." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770262-0553)

³ Presumably a reference to the June 23 meeting among Bourne, Falco, and Lopez Michelsen. See Document 242.

as an execution squad for a kidnap victim. He described F-2, one of the National Law Enforcement Agencies, as "a nest of criminals".

He was extraordinarily candid and open in talking about the problems he faced. He reacted only with appreciation for the material we gave him, adding that he feared it represented only 10 per cent of the problem. It is clear also that he plans to move aggressively against these people. He thanked me profusely for the helicopters and the team we sent down there after the meeting to study the feasibility of spraying the marijuana fields. He said he plans to completely reorganize the National Law Enforcement Agencies and establish a special elite unit of loyal, well paid people of high integrity reporting directly to the Attorney General. (A formal announcement of this move was in the Bogota newspapers yesterday morning).

In summary I believe this is a tired embattled old man depressed by his failure to accomplish more than 20 per cent of his administrations original program, who is not particularly popular with the people, and who was badly stung by accusations that his sons were involved in illicit financial transactions. I think he had planned to drift through his remaining year in office. Now, I believe, the interest you and Rosalynn have taken in him has lighted a fire under him and given him the energy, clear goals and inspiration to try to redeem himself in the time he has left. We have also placed in his hands some powerful weapons. He said that the top objectives for the remainder of his administration will be crime, and corruption especially as it relates to drugs. I think he is very sincere, and Drexler said that he has never seen him so animated and filled with life. It will remain to be seen whether he is up to the task.

I thought it might be nice if you sent him a letter along the lines of the attached draft.⁴

⁴ Not attached. A July 26 letter from Carter to Lopez Michelsen regarding the Bourne visit is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Colombia, 4-8/77.

244. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1977, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Lopez Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

COLOMBIA

President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen
Ambassador Virgilio Barco
Mr. Felipe Lopez, President's son and
private secretary

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Chargé Robert W. Drexler
Mr. Robert Pastor, NSC

President Carter expressed his wife's and his own appreciation for the hospitality extended to Mrs. Carter during her recent visit to Colombia, which the President said she had enjoyed immensely.² President Lopez said that Mrs. Carter's visit had been a pleasure and that she had left a very popular impression. President Carter recalled that he had been in Colombia in 1973 and that the municipal elections which he had observed at that time were a demonstration of democracy and a test for the major political parties. President Lopez commented that the Government had won those elections and that in the world in general it was becoming increasingly rare for incumbent Governments to come out ahead in electoral contests. In this connection, Lopez observed that the odds seemed to be against Giscard's winning again in France. President Carter said he could not disagree with that assessment but that he hoped things would change in Giscard's favor.

President Carter expressed his appreciation for President Lopez' presence in Washington for the treaty-signing ceremonies. He observed that Colombia would preserve its special rights with respect to Canal passage in the new treaty. Lopez acknowledged this and remarked that previous Colombian administrations had sought to preserve these rights through arrangements with the USG, whereas his administration had moved instead to have these rights recognized by Panama itself through a kind of gentlemen's agreement. He thought this approach had been helpful both to Panama and the United States. President

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Colombia, 9/77-12/79. Confidential. The meeting was held at the White House. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; presumably drafted by Pastor.

² See Document 240.

Carter stressed that the United States was determined to pursue the Canal treaty negotiations to a successful conclusion, and he observed that Panama has done well under the new treaty. President Lopez said that Colombia would do everything in its power to make this last stage of the treaty process successful. President Carter commented that the presence of Lopez and the other Latin American leaders in Washington for the treaty signing would have a great impact on the U.S. Senate. President Lopez informed President Carter that he had phoned the King of Spain and asked him to "celebrate" the treaty signing and that Ambassador Barco also contacted President Marcos of the Philippines for the same purpose, thus adding two more Spanish-speaking countries to those who were in favor of the new treaty.

Turning to the subject of narcotics control, President Carter expressed appreciation for the cooperation that the Colombian President had extended to Dr. Peter Bourne, the President's special adviser on drug abuse. The President expressed the hope that the Bourne visit³ was compatible also with GOC desires. President Lopez emphasized that he was very concerned about the narcotics problem, which he said was growing worse every day. President Carter stressed that his administration had an intense interest in this problem, and that he was personally eager to cooperate in any way he could. He noted that in Colombia there was trafficking in marijuana and cocaine and that there was a possibility that heroin was also being produced. President Lopez said he had been shown photos of poppy fields, which apparently had been established by traffickers from Mexico. In answer to a question from President Carter, Lopez acknowledged that he had authority to destroy poppy fields but he pointed out that his police, while continuing their search, had not been able to locate the fields as yet.

President Lopez stated that narcotics trafficking was corrupting everything in his country: the police, the judiciary, the press and even local assemblies. He feared that the traffickers were also putting money into politics for the purpose of electing their own candidates for public office.

President Carter noted that much of the money in the trafficking comes from the U.S. He asked what the U.S. and Colombia could do to improve their efforts against this menace. President Lopez expressed appreciation for the assistance he had received from the USG and observed that the two governments have now started working together. President Carter cited the considerable success that we have had

³ See Documents 242 and 243.

through cooperative programs in Mexico, Burma and Thailand.⁴ Citing Mexico as a particularly good example, the President commented that law enforcement authorities there have shown a strong commitment to control efforts and that this was essential for success.

He invited President Lopez to contact him directly with regard to our bilateral efforts anytime Lopez felt this necessary.

President Lopez said that the three helicopters the USG provided⁵ had now arrived in Colombia but that this was not enough, particularly in view of the long coasts and other remote areas of Colombia that had to be patrolled.

In answer to a question by President Carter whether Colombia had cooperative programs with its neighbors similar to what the U.S. has with Mexico, Lopez said "yes." He also observed that Colombia's border areas, unlike those between Mexico and the U.S., were wild and unpopulated and therefore very difficult to police. President Carter reiterated that the USG was eager to help and that President Lopez should let him know directly whenever he needed a special team or other assistance. President Lopez expressed his gratitude that within forty-eight hours after discovery of the poppy fields, the U.S. had experts in the fields.

Turning to the subject of human rights, President Carter expressed appreciation for Colombia's help and advice with respect to internationalizing our efforts. President Lopez commented that the USG's human rights policy was starting to bear fruit and he cited the fact that many military regimes in Latin America are now fixing dates for elections. President Carter noted that he would be meeting with leaders of some of these countries this week, and he commented that the knowledge that other countries are observing them has in fact produced pressure for improvements in their handling of human rights.

President Carter noted that Colombia was a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty, and asked whether President Lopez could also try to influence those countries which had not yet put Tlatelolco into effect. Lopez noted that the Soviets had been in touch with him for a similar purpose.

President later then asked why the Colombians had not ratified the NPT since it entailed many of the same obligations as Tlatelolco. President Lopez replied, speaking frankly, that the NPT amounted to a freeze in favor of the superpowers and that it meant non-proliferation only for the newcomers. President Carter commented that the USG

⁴ On cooperative programs in Mexico, Burma and Thailand, see related documents in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues, which is scheduled for publication.

⁵ See Document 242, footnote 3.

under his administration is now trying to show greater restraint by negotiating lower limits on nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. He also referred to current efforts being made to safeguard the fuel cycle and commented that non-nuclear weapon states will find adherence to the NPT helpful in connection with obtaining access to nuclear fuel for peaceful applications.

President Carter asked about the status of the case of Richard Starr, the kidnapped Peace Corps volunteer. President Lopez said a letter had recently been received from him⁶ and Mr. Drexler explained that it was a message to his mother, asking her to negotiate his release and which also said that he was alive and well and in the hands of the FARC. President Lopez observed that the FARC had recently released a doctor they had been holding captive, and that apparently no ransom had been paid. He thought that Starr's chances for being released were good. Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the kidnappers had made any political demands, and President Lopez said they had not.⁷

Asking whether President Lopez had any points he would like to raise, President Carter commented that our bilateral relations and friendship were sound and that we had no important differences. President Lopez said that Colombia was concerned about the trend toward protectionism and expressed worry over the possibility that Colombian exports to the U.S. of textiles, flowers, shoes, and leather handbags might be restricted. President Carter said his administration's policy was not to erect trade barriers and that in spite of our trade deficit this year we were trying to work out extensions of the textile and sugar agreements, for example. He asked Mr. Pastor to look into the export areas President Lopez had cited and to inform the President whether there was anything he could personally do about them. He asked about the current Colombian trade balance, and President Lopez said it was very favorable this year, because of coffee, but said this was feeding inflation in Colombia.

⁶ The text of Starr's letter is in telegram 8123 from Bogota, August 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770313-1182)

⁷ In a September 23 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that a note the Embassy had received from the FARC "demands that the Colombian Government release a Marxist prisoner who has been in custody for some time." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports [State], 9/77) In telegram 8497 from Bogota, September 12, the Embassy reported that Drexler discussed the Starr case with Lopez Michelsen following the bilateral meeting. Drexler "explained that while USG could not negotiate with kidnappers, Starr's mother was prepared to deal with them in order to secure her son's safe release" and suggested that "she might therefore consider enlisting the aid of a local intermediary." Based on their conversation, Drexler concluded that "Lopez is not likely to go beyond this type of tacit acquiescence in the role of an intermediary." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770329-1245)

President Lopez raised the issue of the Quita Sueño Treaty⁸ and said that the U.S. Congress has ignored it for five years. He said the Treaty could be a new bridge of friendship between our two countries but was instead becoming a thorn in our relationship. He recalled that he had spoken to Senator Sparkman about the Treaty during his 1975 State Visit to Washington, and that Sparkman sounded favorably inclined. President Carter said he would himself speak with the Senator to see how matters stood.⁹ He cited the problem of Nicaragua and observed that the Senate does not want to get caught between the two parties in a territorial dispute. President Lopez said that Nicaragua was not a party to the Quita Sueño Treaty and that there was no reason for the U.S. to become an advocate of Nicaragua, as far as the territorial dispute with Colombia was concerned. He pointed out that in any case Colombia had taken possession of the islands and was already taking care of their lighthouses. What remained was a legal question of title to the islands. This was important to Colombia because of its bearing on the question of the GOC's territorial waters.

Secretary Vance said that the State Department had pressed the Senate on this issue, but that they were unresponsive. President Carter said his administration would continue pressing the Senate for ratification, although the immediate task was, of course, to get Senate ratification of the new Panama Canal Treaty. When that was out of the way, he promised to look into the Quita Sueño Treaty problem personally.

In concluding, President Lopez again offered to do anything possible with regard to the Panama Canal Treaties, explaining that he was a personal friend of Torrijos. President Carter expressed his appreciation and said that Colombia had already been most helpful.

⁸ The Treaty Concerning the Status of Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrana, in which the United States agreed to renounce all claims to sovereignty over the three uninhabited outcroppings in the Caribbean, was signed at Bogota on September 8, 1972. Nixon transmitted it to the Senate on January 9, 1973.

⁹ No record of a conversation with Sparkman regarding the Quita Sueno treaty was found.

**245. Letter From President Carter to Colombian President
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen¹**

Washington, December 19, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of November 25, which Ambassador Barco transmitted to me.² I understand from Ambassador Asencio, whom you very graciously received for the presentation of his credentials, that you and he talked further about some of the topics raised in your letter, particularly the Belize-Guatemala dispute. I am pleased that you raised the question of narcotics trafficking with Ambassador Asencio.³ As I stated in my November letter to you,⁴ that problem continues to be of special concern to both our countries.

I also share your concern over the serious problems created for Central America and other areas by wide fluctuations in the prices of coffee, sugar, and other commodities. The United States hopes that the recently-negotiated International Sugar Agreement will alleviate much of the difficulty over sugar prices. We continue to expect that the International Coffee Agreement will stabilize coffee prices around a long-term trend.⁵ Fortunately, the recovery of the United States from the 1974–75 recession has helped the countries of Central America and a number of other nations in the Hemisphere achieve a general increase in their nontraditional exports. This increase in export revenues should make it easier to adjust to commodity price fluctuations.

Price changes of principal exports can profoundly affect the political systems of small countries. This is one of many reasons for improv-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Colombia: President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, 5/77-6/78. No classification marking.

² The letter and the translation are *Ibid.*

³ In telegram 11346 from Bogota, December 6, the Embassy described Asencio's meeting with Lopez and reported: "A considerable portion of the conversation was on the drug problem (raised by the president) and included a reaffirmation by the President of his political commitment to the eradication of Colombian participation in trafficking." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770452-1196)

⁴ In his November 7 letter to Lopez Michelsen, Carter noted Lopez's "plan to reorganize the narcotics enforcement functions within a single civilian agency," and wrote: "I welcome and support this attempt to strengthen your country's narcotics enforcement capability because it should facilitate our cooperative narcotics enforcement programs." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 7, Colombia, 1977–1979)

⁵ The International Coffee and Sugar Agreements regulated commodity prices and sales among their signatories, which included both importing and exporting nations. In 1975, the United States signed the then most recent version of the Coffee Agreement; in 1977, it signed the latest iteration of the Sugar Agreement.

ing the various international commodity agreements so as to make prices more stable and equitable.

I share your concern about Belize. During the past several weeks there have been some indications that negotiators from Guatemala and Great Britain have managed to reduce substantially the areas of difference between them.⁶ I especially appreciate Foreign Minister Lievano's assistance in helping to move the issue toward a solution.

I hope the narrowing of the differences between Guatemala and Britain will lead to an early restoration of relations between Guatemala and Panama. General Torrijos and I have tried to keep each other informed on recent developments about Belize. We all share an interest in a just and durable settlement.

I appreciated your analysis of recent political developments in Central America. Your point that failure by the United States to ratify the Panama Canal Treaties could lead to greater political turbulence in Central America is well taken. As you know, I am pressing hard for public approval and Senate ratification of the treaties as soon as possible. While the treaties have aroused strong emotional reactions in my country, I perceive an increasing degree of support. I am optimistic about ratification of the treaties. I value highly your continuing strong support for this endeavor, which is of such great significance for the entire Hemisphere.

Ratification of the Canal Treaties will remove a possible source of tension in Central America and will lead to a new spirit of cooperation and the establishment of respect in which democracy can flourish.

I appreciate your sharing your views with me and hope that you will find mine useful. In this season, Rosalynn and I send to Mrs. Lopez and you our best wishes for a Happy Christmas and New Year.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁶ See related documents in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America.

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bogota, August 6, 1978, 7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Colombia

President-elect Turbay
Rodrigo Botero Montoya
Fernando Gaviria

United States

Secretary Blumenthal
Ambassador Asencio
Assistant Secretary of State Vaky
Executive Assistant Fisher
Anthony Hervas (translator)

Secretary BLUMENTHAL initiated the conversation by extending to President-elect TURBAY the best wishes of President CARTER. He cited the close relations between our two governments and our common interest in human rights, economic development and trade promotion for the developing countries. President CARTER's letter was handed to TURBAY.² After reading it slowly and deliberately, the President-elect expressed his gratitude to President CARTER for his kind letter, noting that he found in it positive offers of cooperation. The scope for mutual work, he noted, is ample.

MR. TURBAY cited coffee as a case in point. He recalled Secretary BLUMENTHAL'S role in the coffee negotiations of 1962.³ Today, he said, there are several problems with coffee. He went on to say that coffee production has a prominent impact on the social structure of Colombia, Brazil and other producing nations. In Colombia there are few large coffee land holdings; thus coffee affects the politics of the country and poor coffee markets can stimulate movements of discontent.

TURBAY went on to say that the GOC "knows" that the US at this moment is in good shape to lend a hand on coffee and urged that the USG help the upcoming London Conference in arriving at "some well defined criteria." Coffee, he said, is the problem of 15 Latin countries and not just of Colombia alone. He reminded the Secretary that coffee

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 9, Colombia, 9/77-12/79. Confidential. Submitted by Fisher. The meeting took place in Turbay's residence.

² Dated August 2. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 7, Colombia, 1977-1979)

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, vol. IX, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 360.

was their principal source of revenue and concluded his statement by saying that we need a new interpretation of "good neighbors." Presently, he jokingly suggested, the Latins are the "vecinos" and the North Americans the "buenos." There is a need for strengthened collaboration.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL responded that, as the President-elect noted, he is no novice on coffee. The sad aspect of the problem, he said, is that the very same words used by TURBAY today could have been spoken 16 years ago when the Secretary was then negotiating an agreement with GOMEZ JARAMILLO and CARLOS SANTAMARIA. The difference is that today the price of coffee is \$1.20 whereas then it was 35 cents.

The Secretary pointed out that the situation is not yet bad, that at present prices a profit could still be made on coffee sales. But the situation might worsen in the next few months. The USG, he said, is sympathetic to help; the Secretary's colleagues will welcome the opportunity to talk to GOC authorities in further preparation for the London Conference. But there exists a practical problem in the short run: with prices so high, it will be difficult to convince an inflation-conscious Congress to endorse a price support agreement, especially with the recent experience of \$4 coffee so fresh in mind. The USG will need time to convince the Congress. A ratification of an agreement, which would be required before discussing the matter of quotas, was practically impossible in this current session of Congress. But the USG will work with GOC and other producers in London in studying and analyzing the situation. Indeed, the Secretary said, GOC can count on the USG to work with them in London to "achieve a satisfactory solution and a better understanding."

President-elect TURBAY replied that one cannot today think in terms of the performance of prices 16 years ago. In 1962 dollars, one would be earning much more today. In the meantime, the terms of trade for Colombia have not improved greatly. To be sure, he said, \$4 a pound is not a sustainable price for consumers. The producing countries want a price that will not damage other economies; they do not want to create an unreasonable situation in the USA.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL said that there were two problems at hand. The first is the application of an agreement. This requires Congressional approval. The Congress cannot be expected to ratify an agreement this year. The second is the price problem. The producing countries feel that a trigger price of 77 cents is too low. Today's price is \$1.20. The question is: should we wait for prices to decline further still or is today's price the appropriate trigger level? This is a negotiation problem.

The Secretary repeated that, for the moment, it will be difficult to achieve a solution in a world which remembers \$4 coffee. We know

that prices will decline in the months to come. We will have to see lower prices before we can convince the Congress to act.

President-elect TURBAY agreed that the US consumer's viewpoint "is just." The question then is: how can help be provided in the meantime? The USG, he said, could increase its efforts to educate the Congress about the nature of the problem. He asked that the Secretary bear in mind that what is needed is preventive, not curative medicine. The Secretary responded that unfortunately it is difficult to apply a preventive remedy once the situation has gone bad.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL recalled his participation in the Bonn Summit.⁴ It was, he said, a good and successful meeting. On the subject of North/South relations, he noted that there was unanimous agreement that more must be done to help the LDC's in the area of commodity agreements, that progress should be made on specific agreements such as that on coffee. The coffee agreement, he said, will have to be activated at some point. The USG can be counted on for the cooperative spirit expressed by President CARTER as recently as three weeks ago at Bonn.

President-elect TURBAY responded that it pleases him greatly to hear about the goodwill of the USG. GOC, he said, would prefer to have assistance before "the fire erupts"; they do not like to see the USG come in as "firefighters."

The Secretary asked if he could raise a different subject and that was the issue of narcotics. He expressed the gratitude of President CARTER for the efforts that had been made to stop drug trafficking and noted that the President had followed MR. TURBAY'S statements of intent with great interest. The USG, he said, is encouraged by the progress that is being made.

The President-elect said that his government is willing to cooperate "to the maximum". He added that he would reiterate in his inaugural speech his intention to intensify GOC policies to identify all criminal elements and put an end to trafficking in all areas, coffee as well as narcotics. He said that he understood the need for joint efforts with the United States for, as he understood it, the financing of cocaine and marijuana production is coming not from within Colombia, but from abroad, possibly from the US.

TURBAY went on to say that it was necessary to deal with the drug problem by applying an "inflexible" policy much as the Russians

⁴ For the discussion of north-south relations at the Bonn Economic Summit Meeting on July 17, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 148. Carter's remarks at the conclusion of the Bonn Summit are in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, p. 1309-1310.

had been inflexible in the U-2 incident. Indeed, if GOC were to apply the same policy to planes flying over Guajira, an effective corrective action would be formed. Planes flying over this zone could be discouraged if the GOC could shoot them down using anti-aircraft artillery; this would definitely cut off the drug flow. The USG and GOC, he said, can make for great cooperation in this area. At present, US laws are very benign for drug traffickers—the authorities give them a short sentence and then let them go. Above all, we should be inflexible in the application of anti-drug sanctions. He said that speaking frankly, the US must change its legislation in the same manner as the GOC.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL welcomed the strength of MR. TURBAY'S statement, saying that the USG wishes to cooperate to strengthen deterrents to trafficking. He added that a decision to shoot down planes flying over Colombia territory was a matter of GOC sovereignty, but that they should make sure that they do not shoot down the wrong planes.

Ambassador ASENCIO intervened to say that such a decision would have to be applied very carefully.

President-elect TURBAY replied that he could not understand how a plane could get lost at 7:00 at night. He was curious how the USG dealt with planes that violated US airspace, specifically how they distinguish innocent trespassers from others. Obviously, if a pilot is not authorized, does not get in touch with the control tower, and is not in an emergency situation, then he is suspect.

The Secretary said that if TURBAY wanted to act this strongly, then he must make it clear to the international community that planes flying over Guajiro must identify themselves or they will be shot at. He repeated that this policy would have to be applied with great caution. Assistant Secretary VAKY suggested that if the President-elect wished to proceed along these lines, it might be useful to jointly study the technical aspects of such a program, its procedures, etc.

The President-elect stated that he was convinced that he needed to act energetically, that we need a "drastic, energetic" policy to deal with trafficking. He said that we have to prevent all means available to traffickers, including technical and financial supports. He said that he knew of certain farms where the planes fly over and drop money in payment for drugs. It is difficult for the farmers to fight against this influence. The traffickers must feel the terror which the situation presents us. A half-hearted solution, he said, would be bad.

TURBAY continued to say that his impression was that we have failed in our fight against narcotics traffickers. It is scandalous that some planes have landed to free prisoners and take campesinos to hospitals. Thus, instead of helicopters and loans, perhaps the USG could give the GOC anti-aircraft artillery. In this manner the Colombian

people could not be accused of using helicopters to themselves traffic in drugs.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL stated that he was grateful for TURBAY'S determination and suggested that we consider VAKY'S idea for in-depth study of the President-elect's proposal. He added that he knew of the joint effort being made by our customs authorities, that Commissioner CHASEN had reported the good and fruitful visits of the GOC's Director of Customs to the US. This is an area where we can work together.

MR. TURBAY asked if we were satisfied with the manner in which the Director of Customs was working with us. He asked if we were happy with the new unit in the Attorney General's office.

Ambassador Asencio replied that our authorities were working well together and added that we had a strong impression of DR. FRANCO, the customs director.

President-elect TURBAY said that GOC would appreciate USG assistance in studying the technical means to increase surveillance of traffickers. It is necessary, he said, to declare war on drugs, especially because of their effect on the security of the State. GOC is very concerned about their effect on Colombian international prestige and on Colombian youth. He repeated his concern for the "repugnant" manner in which narcotics affects the security of Colombia.

Ambassador ASECIO interjected to say that he had been having talks with the Defense Ministry and told the President-elect that if he so desired, Asencio would pursue these talks regarding possible special programs.

President-elect TURBAY agreed that the Ambassador should continue the discussions, noting that the US is better equipped to police the area and the individuals involved in trafficking. He recalled that when he was Ambassador to the US, he had spoken to Drug Enforcement Officials and there was a great increase in enforcement budgets. Nevertheless, they were not able to reduce the inflow of drugs by more than 5%. He restated his point that the GOC cannot solve the trafficking alone; we must work together.

President-elect TURBAY authorized ASECIO to speak with the Colombian Ministry of War and all other government agencies. The Ambassador suggested that the new task force within the Attorney General's office might need greater help. TURBAY replied that if ASECIO needed help, the Ambassador should come to him because he is interested in eradicating the drug problem.

The President-elect shifted the discussion to a second problem: capital flight from Colombia. He wondered aloud about the possibility of a bilateral agreement to stimulate repatriation of Colombian capital.

Specifically, he wondered whether USG could place a tax on capital that comes into the US from Colombia.

Ambassador ASECIO interjected that an investigation was underway on the deposits being made in Florida by narcotics traffickers. He added that he was working with the Ministry of Hacienda to put these reports to use, possibly in Colombian and American court cases.

President-elect TURBAY said that ASECIO'S idea was a good one but that it was too limited. Not all of the capital flight is going to Florida but to New York and Los Angeles as well; he wants to stop all flight of capital, not just that which is narcotics related.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL responded that the USG is always interested in negotiating a tax treaty. But this is a large and difficult subject. The US, he said, normally does not impose restrictions on foreign deposits. If they are illegal, that was one thing. If not, we did not subject deposits to controls. The Secretary pointed out the difficulty of identifying which deposits were narcotics related and which were not. Deposits could, after all, be laundered through another country. In short, a tax treaty was usually negotiable, but the Secretary had reservations about TURBAY'S idea.

The President-elect acknowledged that it is difficult to identify which deposits were drug related and which were not. He noted that capital flight stemmed from a lack of confidence and concerns about personal security; there were some who needed dollar deposits for a kidnapped son. This, he said, was of the greatest concern and was the reason why his Administration had to improve the situation in Colombia. But if he heard the Secretary properly, his answer appeared to suggest the need for a multilateral treaty to stem capital flight, a treaty with four or five countries, say the US, Switzerland and Costa Rica. Costa Rica, he added as an aside, was attracting the lion's share of capital flight flows in Latin America.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL said that if the President-elect wanted his Minister of Finance to discuss this matter further with Ambassador ASECIO, then fine. Or he should feel free to talk directly to the US Treasury. However, the Secretary was not optimistic about the prospect for a multilateral agreement. The USG believes in open capital markets. He suggested that the GOC would find the Swiss government even more ardent defenders of free capital movements. But if MR. TURBAY had specific ideas on the subject, we would be glad to work with him.

Secretary BLUMENTHAL said that he would convey to President CARTER President-elect TURBAY'S kind response to his letter. The USG, he said, would be happy to work closely with the GOC on narcotics and on coffee and other trade problems.

President-elect TURBAY closed the session by expressing his gratitude for the high level of the US delegation.

Richard W. Fisher

247. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, October 2, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Colombia.]

Colombia. Colombia is about to initiate an offensive against drug traffickers which will, for the first time, involve the Colombian military. The effort will begin by seeking to interdict the substantial export of cocaine and marijuana to the U.S. from the Guajira Peninsula area. To make the offensive possible, we signed an agreement last week to provide \$1.3 million in non-lethal supplies.² The vigor of this initiative will indicate the depth of the Turbay Administration's commitment to the anti-drug effort.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 10/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote "Warren" in the top right-hand corner.

² Carter placed a check mark in the margin next to this paragraph. In telegram 235459 to Bogota, September 16, the Department instructed the Embassy to "make a determined effort to compile as complete a report as possible" about the campaign. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780377-1168) In telegram 8944 from Bogota, September 19, Asencio wrote: "The Colombian military is extremely sensitive to the possibility of being criticized for accepting U.S. assistance for the Guajira operation. This was the reason why the decision was made not to use U.S. personnel or U.S. military equipment." Asencio recommended that the USG "should make an extreme effort to take into account Colombian military sensitivities and not be the ones who promote congressional and media focus on Colombian military actions." He concluded, "If all goes well, the events will speak for themselves and I see no need to stir the pot." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780385-0317)

248. Letter From President Carter to Colombian President Turbay¹

Washington, December 8, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 3.² Before discussing the issues you raised, please let me express my best wishes for the success of your administration.

Concerning the Treaty on the Status of Quita Sueno, I share your desire to ratify and implement this treaty soon. As you know, the Department of State has discussed with Ambassador Barco the problems involved.³ We are sending more information and instructions to Ambassador Asencio to use in his discussions in Bogota to find a formula which satisfies the concerns of both our governments.⁴

I also congratulate you on the firm measures being taken against narcotics trafficking in Colombia. I know of no more significant action that your administration could take than to help eradicate the evils of narcotics and narcotics traffic. I am keenly aware of the contribution these efforts can make to my country's welfare. My Administration has dedicated new resources to our campaign against the flow of illegal drugs across our borders. You can count on me and my Administration for the cooperation and coordination that are essential if our mutual efforts are to succeed.

I share your desire to see the completion of the Pan American Highway.⁵ As you know, a major constraint has been the danger that foot and mouth disease could spread from Colombia to Central America, Mexico and the United States, which are now disease free.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Colombia: President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, 8/78-2/80. No classification marking.

² The letter is *ibid.*

³ Vaky met with Barco on November 15. In telegram 304516 to Bogota, December 1, the Department transmitted the text of a November 24 letter from Vaky to Barco regarding procedures for the ratification of treaties. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496-0859)

⁴ Telegram 321277 to Bogota, December 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-0535)

⁵ In a December 7 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: "we had hoped to be more forthcoming" on the matter of the completion of the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap, "but Congressional resistance and budgetary constraints have operated to cause the Department of Transportation, with OMB approval, to drop the \$12.5 million item from its FY 1980 budget request." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Colombia: President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, 8/78-2/80)

For nearly five years, we have cooperated with Colombia to help control this disease as much as Congressional budgetary limitations have permitted. We want to continue that cooperation. I am pleased to learn of your strong emphasis on the control of foot and mouth disease; as you know, Colombia's willingness to increase its contribution of funds and resources—and to establish a framework which will assure the program's success—is essential to the continuation of our cooperation next year at the same level of activity as this year. I also hope that we can make significant progress toward completion of the Pan American Highway from Alaska to Chile during our administrations.

Our two countries have worked together closely and productively since your inauguration, and I look forward to warm and friendly relations in the future.⁶

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁶ Carter wrote "Best wishes!" and initialed below his signature.

249. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (McMahon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky)

Washington, undated

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa and Latin America Inter-agency Intelligence Committees, Colombia, 1973–1980. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

250. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism (Quainton)

Washington, January 18, 1979

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa and Latin America Inter-agency Intelligence Committees, Colombia, 1973–1980. Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia¹

Washington, August 13, 1979, 2158Z

211239. Subject: Secretary's Meetings With Colombian President Turbay and Foreign Minister Uribe.

1. (C–Entire Text)

2. Summary. In bilaterals August 10 in Quito, the Colombian President and Foreign Minister stressed to Secretary Vance the need for a new US-Latin American dialogue at the Presidential and/or Ministerial level. The Secretary promised to get a response to their proposal² for an invitation to President Carter to meet with Latin American Chiefs of State. In their view the principal problems in Latin America needing more US attention are stabilization of commodity prices and the dra-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–80, Lot 84D241, Vance Exdis Memcons 1979. Confidential; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by Pastor; cleared by Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky. Sent for information immediate to Caracas, Guatemala City, La Paz, Lima, Managua, San Salvador, Quito, Tegucigalpa, the Interests Section in Havana, and USUN. Vance was in Quito for the inauguration of Roldos.

² In telegram 7902 from Bogota, July 28, Vaky reported that Turbay had asked him “to sound out the White House as to President Carter’s receptivity to receiving a joint letter from a significant group of Latin American chiefs of state inviting him to join with them in a dialogue to give ‘new dimensions’ to our relations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790344-0205)

matic increase in regional arms expenditures.³ Turbay and Uribe promised to take on the Cubans vigorously in both the NAM Summit and in the contest for the UN Security Council seat, and they reiterated their plans to assist actively in Nicaragua and Central America.

3. On Tuesday, August 10, Secretary Vance met with Colombian Foreign Minister Diego Uribe for approximately one hour and then proceeded with the Foreign Minister to a luncheon with President Turbay for one hour and a half at the Ambassador's Residence in Quito. Attending both conversations were Ambassador Vaky, Robert Pastor (NSC) and Ambassador Raymond E. Gonzalez. Mrs. Rosalynn Carter hosted the luncheon.

4. "New Dimension" in Inter-American Relations.

Both Foreign Minister Uribe and President Turbay began their talks with an elaborate description of the state of Inter-American relations. They believe the US has neglected Latin America and has taken it for granted. FonMin Uribe said that Colombia wanted more attention from the US, which seemed to think that the only countries in Latin America were Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil. The US has been distracted by events in Africa and the Middle East and by detente and has not given Latin America the attention it deserves. FonMin Uribe said that this lack of attention was evident in two issues. The stabilization of commodity prices and the increase in arms expenditures by Latin American countries. He said that US disinterest in Latin America had led to a failure to develop an effective commodity policy. In addition, while the US has decreased its arms sales to the region, Western European and other countries have dramatically increased theirs. In moving to the same conclusion about the need for a "new dimension" in Inter-American relations, President Turbay discussed the emerging problems in Central America and the Caribbean. Both said that the time for a dialogue between the US and Latin America had arrived, and they asked whether President Carter would respond favorably to a letter of invitation from Latin American leaders to an informal meeting on major issues in Inter-American relations. Secretary Vance promised that he would try to get a response to President Turbay's question.

5. Secretary Vance pressed FonMin Uribe on what he and his President had in mind with regard to a conference. After much give-

³ In an August 1 memorandum to Brzezinski regarding Vaky's July conversation with Turbay, Pastor wrote: "we need to focus the dialogue on one specific and one general topic. The specific topic should be: What should the democracies in the Hemisphere do to keep Nicaragua from becoming another Cuba and the rest of Central America from becoming another Nicaragua?" In addition, Pastor wrote: "The general question should be: What should democratic nations do about Cuban expansionism?" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 25, Meetings—PRC 120: 8/1/79)

and-take, the FonMin said that he thought it should be an informal meeting to discuss a small agenda of two or three items (he suggested trade and arms sales as two possibilities) and should be held in an Andean country perhaps around January. He said that it might be better to have this informal meeting at the Ministerial level. He believed that all the Latin American countries should be included but he did not think that the Caribbean countries should necessarily be invited. President Turbay, however, seemed to suggest that the meeting would be at the Presidential level.

6. UN Security Council.

In response to a question from Mr. Pastor, and later from Mrs. Carter, the Colombians reaffirmed that they are seeking the UN Security Council seat. Secretary Vance promised full US support for Colombia's efforts, and the Colombians said that they intended to pursue the seat very vigorously with the Africans and with others. They also intended to work on this now; they were aware of the likelihood that Cuba would use the NAM summit to lobby for the seat, and they knew they would have a difficult time.

7. Non-Alignment Movement.

The Colombians said they had reviewed the Cuban draft declaration for the NAM Summit,⁴ and they disagreed profoundly with it. The Colombians intend to go to Havana to speak for themselves and for the Andean Pact to try to encourage the NAM to become truly non-aligned. The Colombians said that the Cubans are clearly not "non-aligned" and are attempting to steer the entire movement in their direction. Secretary Vance encouraged the Colombians to play an important role in Havana.

8. Nicaragua.

The Colombians agreed with our analysis of the situation in Nicaragua and said that they intended to play an active role individually and with the Andean Pact to assure the success of democratic forces there. Ambassador Vaky encouraged the Colombians to pursue several tracks simultaneously—working to encourage a free press, working through private sector contacts, increasing humanitarian aid, etc. The Colombians agreed.

9. Central America.

The Colombians also agreed with our analysis of this current political situation in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. FonMin Uribe said that we should try to focus on El Salvador first to assure that free elections occur.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, footnote 7, Document 76.

10. Cuba.

In response to a question from Pastor about whether Colombia was increasingly concerned about Cuba's activities abroad, Colombian FonMin Uribe said that Colombia was indeed concerned, but it was their impression that the Cubans were primarily interested in Africa, and they would be cautious in Central America.

11. Arms Restraint.

The Colombians said that they would work on the arms restraint initiative started by the Mexicans. Uribe was particularly preoccupied with the issue of increased arms expenditures in Latin America.

Vance

252. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 13, 1979

SUBJECT

A New "New Dialogue" (U)

You may recall that a couple of months ago President Turbay of Colombia mentioned to our Ambassador his intention of writing a letter to President Carter and to Andean Pact Presidents recommending the beginning of a "new dialogue" in the Hemisphere to construct a "new dimension" in inter-American relations.² He asked our Ambassador whether President Carter would be interested in receiving such a letter. When Vance visited Quito, Vaky and I pressed both Turbay and his Foreign Minister on what he had in mind.³ Our conclusion was: very little. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 12, Colombia, 1/77-12/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Pastor wrote "Bob" next to his name in the "from" line. Gates initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, Aaron wrote: "ZB looks good. I just suggest we do it & not bother the President. DA"

² Presumably a reference to Turbay's conversation with Vaky. See footnote 2, Document 251.

³ See Document 251.

Turbay thought a dialogue on commodities and arms sales was in order since these were the major issues for our countries to address, but he really had nothing specific in mind. And unfortunately, there is very little we can deliver on these two issues. (C)

Of such vague invitations are new slogans in inter-American relations created. As we have often learned, they frequently only lead to increased frustration. On the other hand, we cannot ignore Turbay, and he is awaiting our response. Christopher has sent the memorandum at Tab A,⁴ and I have attached a memorandum for you to send at Tab I.⁵ My recommendation is that we try to turn the suggestion for a new dialogue to our advantage by suggesting that we deal with concrete issues of special concern to us at a level below the Presidential.⁶ (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I and forward that with Christopher's recommendation at Tab A to the President.⁷ (U)

⁴ Tab A, dated August 28, is attached but not printed. The memorandum summarized Turbay's proposal and described the mechanisms of a "new dialogue."

⁵ Tab I, undated, is attached but not printed.

⁶ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin, "OK give me response to State. ZB"

⁷ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. In a September 26 memorandum to Christopher, Aaron suggested "that we inform President Turbay that President Carter would respond positively to Turbay's suggestion for a request for dialogue. The Vice President will initiate this dialogue in Panama on October 1." Aaron continued, "We should, however, be careful not to raise their expectations about Presidential involvement or about what such a dialogue could produce." (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/from Tarnoff, Wisner, Perry—1979) For Mondale's October 1 conversation with Andean Pact heads of state in Panama, see Document 49.

253. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance's Delegation to the Department of State¹

La Paz, October 23, 1979, 1855Z

10013. Subject: The Secretary's Meeting With Colombian Foreign Minister Diego Uribe Vargas.

1. Summary: The Secretary, accompanied by Amb Vaky and Robert Pastor (NSC) met with Colombian Foreign Minister Uribe at the Ambassador's Residence in La Paz on October 22. Principal subjects discussed were the proposed Fund for Peace, the Colombian candidacy for the UN Security Council seat and the future of the OAS. End summary.

2. Foreign Minister Uribe opened the meeting by stating that his government has great hopes that the Fund for Peace, which was proposed by President Turbay in his discussions with Vice President Mondale in Panama,² will soon be functioning. He explained that the Fund is intended to be a multilateral initiative designed to support the democratic countries in the region and to stimulate the non-democratic countries to move towards democracy. Many countries would participate, but it would be preferable for the Fund to be administered by the countries in the International Development Bank (IDB) to avoid bureaucratic overlap. The Fund would focus in particular on grant loans for social action, infrastructure and development. Loans would be available to the democratic countries, to those countries in the process of becoming democracies (e.g. El Salvador and Guatemala) and to those many countries which want to work toward democracy. The loans would be primarily for social action purposes within the recipient countries.

3. The Secretary asked what was the best way to move forward on this Fund—by including it in the ongoing dialogue in the OAS, by discussions among a smaller group of countries which already have a democratic background, or by some other means? Uribe replied that there are two possibilities. If the Fund is to be a part of the new dimension of the ongoing dialogue, then a few democratic countries could start it up first. If, on the other hand, it is to be an isolated initiative, it could be discussed in the OAS as a means of supporting social change towards a greater transformation of societies.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790486-0164. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to USUN and for information to Bogota. Vance was in La Paz for the OAS General Assembly meeting.

² See Document 49.

4. Amb Vaky suggested that if the Fund were to be administered by the staff of the Inter-American Bank, it might be useful to discuss this with Ortiz-Mena to see what his recommendations might be from a technical point of view. Uribe replied that, in order to avoid duplication of effort, some of the countries would be within the Bank but would administer the Fund on behalf of all the member countries. The member countries would determine whether a loan would be made and then the Bank would in fact administer it.

5. Uribe said that the amount of money in the Fund would have to be determined later, but he envisioned an initial contribution followed by an increase after some time. He said it would look better if every democratic country contributed at least something to the Fund, as the fund would be more solid if more countries participated.

6. Mr. Pastor pointed out that both the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank presently make large-scale loans to Latin America, of which 40 pct is allocated to social action projects such as health, education, etc. He suggested that this fund should target money more specifically to projects designed to promote democratization. Uribe said that democratic needs are defined vis-a-vis public opinion. Democracy is favored intellectually and philosophically but does not always receive governmental support. We must set priorities, but in general, the Fund should make program and social development loans. Some countries have greater difficulties than others. The Caribbean countries, for example, are experiencing pressing needs affecting their very survival, while other areas need improvements in infrastructure, electrification, etc. But we must also consider the political defense of democracy. He said that the Colombians are feeling very anxious as a result of the changes taking place in Central America, which is close to the Colombian islands as well as its mainland.

7. When Amb Vaky asked how this proposed Fund would differ from the loans cited above, which are also social funds with political effects, Uribe responded that this fund must be geared to democratic countries, to those which are becoming democracies and to those which are on the verge of falling from democracy—in effect, an economic Red Cross. The Secretary commented that this would be more politically oriented than a banker's fund, to which Uribe agreed.

8. Mr. Pastor commented that the above criteria would fit almost any country in Latin America, even Pinochet in Chile claims that he wants to move towards democracy. Uribe replied that the criteria for eligibility would have to be set by the countries administering the Fund. He commented that if everybody thought that helping Chile would be good, for example, then it would be done, though at this moment he did not think that would happen. He stressed again that the Fund would be used to support countries which otherwise would

have no incentive not to take the wrong path. It would become a tool which would make it much easier to handle certain situations than with the traditional diplomatic tools available.

9. The Secretary then brought up the question of Colombia's bid for the Latin American seat on the UN Security Council, asking where it stood and who we could help. Uribe said that Colombia had been working very hard on this and had contacted friendly countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He thought they were doing very well, though more work would be necessary. Cuba is running scared and has asked to talk with the Colombians, but they have refused to do so, saying there will be no compromise and no prior agreements.

10. Uribe said that Colombia would like very much for Guatemala to withdraw its candidacy for the seat, as this is taking some commitments away from Colombia. He had not yet approached the Guatemalan delegation to the OAS on this, as they had not yet arrived in La Paz, but planned to do so. He asked that we also approach Guatemala and urge them to withdraw, which Amb Vaky said we would do.³

11. The Secretary commented that Amb Vaky had talked to the Colombian Permanent Representative to the UN in New York to discuss this issue, and was told that the Colombian Embassy in Kenya was having problems communicating with the Governments of Zambia and the Gambia. We have since sent instructions to our Embassies⁴ to approach these governments in support of the Colombian candidacy, and we have also talked to the Saudi Arabians, the Gulf States and several African Governments about it. The Secretary said that if Colombia would like us to approach any other governments about its candidacy, we would be more than happy to do so. Uribe thanked him and said he believed Colombia would be successful in its bid for the seat.⁵

12. The Secretary then said that he had been thinking about the discussion he had had with Uribe the previous evening about the OAS.⁶ He had been trying to think of a way to move the initiative forward,

³ See telegram 7082 from Guatemala City, October 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790487-1061)

⁴ In telegram 273141 to all African Diplomatic Posts, October 18, the Department instructed posts to "seek an opportunity to refer to these elections in the course of normal senior level foreign office contacts over the next few days. We leave it to the judgment of each post whether and how to allude to the forthcoming contested election." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790478-0774)

⁵ Voting in the UN General Assembly for the Security Council seat began on October 26. Neither Colombia nor Cuba received enough votes to be elected, and balloting continued through the end of 1979. Mexico was elected to the seat in January 1980. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, footnote 2, Document 169. ("Mexico Wins a U.N. Council Seat in Vote Viewed as Defeat for Cuba," *New York Times*, January 8, 1980, p. A2)

⁶ Not found.

to do something to breathe new life into the organization so that it can deal with the issues which beset us all. He told Uribe that he planned to say something about this in his statement at the OAS the next day,⁷ stressing the importance of coming to grips with this set of issues.

13. Uribe said he found this very interesting because in the past, the importance of the OAS meetings lay in the juridical progress within the system—treaties, etc. Now the juridical progress is already advanced and the question for the OAS is that of grappling with the political and economic problems of the region, in effect, of updating the system. He suggested that one specific field of progress can be in the peaceful settlement of disputes, using conciliation, investigation and mediation. The region can contribute to this process across the board. It is very necessary, he said, to speed up the regional machinery for the diplomatic solution of minor disputes.

Vance

⁷ Vance's October 23 statement, "Western Hemisphere: OAS General Assembly Convenes," is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1979, pp. 65–67.

254. **Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, February 27, 1980

SUBJECT

Terrorist Incident in Bogota, Colombia: Situation Report²

A Task Force is at work under Tony Quainton in the State Operations Center.³ [less than 1 line not declassified] As you already know, Ambassador Asencio is not wounded but being held hostage within the Dominican Republic Embassy. His wife did not attend the reception and, therefore, is free.

State has been in touch with President Turbay, the Chief of Policy, and other officials in Bogota expressing our desire that they not use undue force which might cause injury to Ambassador Asencio.⁴

Colombian officials initially asked if we could provide tear gas and other riot control equipment.⁵ [2 lines not declassified]

The situation remains unclear. No negotiations with the terrorists have begun. There are unconfirmed reports of two dead and one wounded in the Embassy. Our intelligence indicates that the group is most likely an off-shoot of the M-19, the urban guerrilla organization in Bogota.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory File, Box 84, Sensitive XX, 2/80. Secret. Sent information. Denend initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. At the top of the page, Brzezinski wrote, "need DR early a.m. 28th."

² In telegram 2039 from Bogota, February 27, the Embassy reported: "During a Dominican Republic national day diplomatic reception at the Embassy of the Dominican Republic," "between fifteen and twenty terrorists armed with shotguns and small arms attacked the Dominican Embassy," entering the Embassy and taking hostage "the diplomats and Colombian Foreign Ministry officials therein. According to early reports, present at the reception were the Ambassador of the United States Diego Asencio, the papal nuncio and the Ambassadors of Brazil, Austria, Switzerland, and Venezuela." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800117-1097)

³ In a February 27 note to Brzezinski, Denend indicated that Aaron showed telegram 2034 from Bogota, February 27, to Carter and instructed Odom "to activate the terrorism group." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 12, Colombia, 1/80-1/81)

⁴ In telegram 2039 from Bogota, February 27, the Embassy reported, "We contacted Colombian governmental officials at all levels and urged in the strongest terms that violence be avoided to the extent possible. While there was some initial shooting between terrorists and Colombian authorities, at this time we are told that the Colombians plan no violent reaction and will merely seal the area off." See footnote 2, above.

⁵ See telegram 2036 from Bogota, February 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800101-0920)

The JCS has placed a C-141 medivac on alert at Charleston, South Carolina.

[1 line not declassified]

Until the situation settles between the terrorists and Colombian officials, there is little else we can do at present. One possible decision may face us this evening if [less than 1 line not declassified] to Bogota to gather planning information on the situation. I have discussed this at length with State. Quainton and the JCS agreed with me that we should only approve it if the Colombian officials are willing and interested.⁶

⁶ In a February 27 SCC meeting regarding El Salvador, participants also discussed the embassy seizure in Colombia: "In response to a request from the Government of Colombia for assistance in dealing with the terrorist seizure of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogota, the SCC agreed [2 lines not declassified] (Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, 1977–81, Box 109, SCC 279 El Salvador, 2/27/80) (S) The SCC Summary of Conclusions is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 419.

255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia¹

Washington, March 1, 1980, 2223Z

56454. Subject: Presidential Message.

1. C—Entire Text

2. Embassy is requested to transmit the following message from President Carter to President Turbay:

Quote: I have been following closely the situation involving the seizure of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogota. We have publicly condemned this brutal terrorist attack and the violation which it represents of the norms of civilized society.

Your role in personally guiding Colombia's response to this critical situation is widely recognized. This imposes a heavy and difficult responsibility on your shoulders, and I want you to know of our full support for your efforts to resolve this incident.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 84, Classified and Unclassified Files of Amb. Trusten Frank Crigler, 1976–1980, Lot 81F113, Box 1, Outgoing Correspondence Regarding Bogota Terrorist Incident. Confidential; Niact Immediate.

Your firm leadership has already resulted in the release of eighteen hostages. The opening of direct negotiations is an unavoidable next step toward the release of those who still remain in captivity. It is reassuring to know that your Government shares our concern for the health and safety of all the hostages, including Ambassador Asencio.

My Government is ready to assist in any appropriate way in your efforts to achieve a positive solution to this crisis. End quote.

Vance

256. Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 4, 1980

SUBJECT

Bogota Terrorist Incident: SCC Needed (C)

Bob Pastor and I had a discussion with State (Tony Quanton and Sam Eaton, DAS/ARA) this afternoon that revealed the need for an SCC discussion of where we are headed in the Bogota incident.² State is proceeding down a path which will lead to concessions and at least a minor victory for the M-19 group. Bob Pastor believes that such an outcome is not acceptable for our Latin American policy. It will lead to a series of future embassy takeovers. (S)

Basically, we have *two* choices. We can leave the responsibility for the outcome of the incident up to the Colombian government. *Or* we can become involved, sharing the responsibility. (S)

a. *Leave it to Colombia.* Although we are becoming involved by a series of small steps, we can still take this course. It will require, however, that we tell the Colombians that we are not asking them to forego a rescue effort even if it means casualties. The Presidential message³ has left the impression that we disapprove of the use of force even if

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 52, Terrorism: Bogota Crisis, 2-3/80. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. An unknown hand wrote "Urgent" at the top of the memorandum. A copy was sent to Pastor.

² See Document 255.

³ *Ibid.*

a negotiated solution can only be gotten with major concessions. The Austrians, Swiss and the Vatican are giving the same anti-rescue advice. (S)

b. *Become involved.* We are headed this way at present. As we go farther, we shall reach the point where we make concessions or use force. Whose force? We and the Israelis are the only involved countries with a credible capability. The Colombians do not have the capability. (S)

Bob and I believe that the President ought to have the choices put to him clearly by an SCC discussion. Bob is concerned about “caving” as it impacts on our Latin American policy. He sees a spate of future takeovers if we concede. I am concerned about the relationship between this case and Tehran and what it means for the President politically at home and abroad. Therefore, we recommend that the following agenda for the SCC on Thursday morning:⁴

1. A State briefing on the present situation, particularly the extent of our involvement and likely future involvement.

2. What is the U.S. attitude toward the negotiating process as it concerns the following hostage demands:⁵

a. Asylum.

b. Ransom.

c. Release of prisoners.

3. Our choices on the above are:

a. Encourage.

b. Discourage.

c. Acquiesce, i.e., accept Colombian decisions without expressing our feelings.

4. What is our attitude toward the use of force?

Are we willing to let the Colombians use force? If not, are we willing to join the Colombians and let them use our force? (S)

⁴ “Thursday” refers to March 6. An unknown hand underlined the phrase “SCC on Thursday morning” and wrote “ok” in the left-hand margin.

⁵ In his February 29 evening report to Carter, Vance wrote: “In addition to demanding the release of 311 prisoners, \$50 million in ransom, and publication of their manifesto, the terrorists have asked for safe passage for themselves and the prisoners to a third country.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports [State], 2/80)

257. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 6, 1980, 9–10:40 a.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Hostage Incident in Bogota, Colombia

PARTICIPANTS

<i>State</i>	<i>JCS</i>
Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David Newsom	Lt. General J.S. Pustay
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs, Samuel Eaton	<i>CIA</i>
Director, Office for Combatting Terror, Anthony Quainton	Director Stansfield Turner
<i>Defense</i>	<i>NSC</i>
Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor	William E. Odom Robert Pastor

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting opened with a State briefing on the present situation in Bogota. Thirty-three hostages remain in the Embassy of the Dominican Republic. Last night, the Austrian Ambassador was released after an appeal for mercy because his wife was reported to be dying. This is the third time hostages have been released in this incident, making a total of 24. Two negotiation sessions have been held between Colombian officials and the terrorists, and many additional telephone conversations have occurred. (S)

The terrorist demands have been reduced. The demand for release of 317 prisoners has been dropped to between 20 and 30. The \$50 million ransom demand has been cut by half. (S)

[4 lines not declassified]

Finally, there are some signs of preparation of a Colombian commando force for a possible rescue attempt. (S)

State explained that, if we hold to our present position and let events take their course in Colombia, this will likely result in:

- free passage for the hostages to an asylum point;
- the release of some prisoners;
- and, possibly, some ransom money being paid. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 52, Terrorism: Bogota Crisis, 2-3/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Carter wrote "Zbig" in the top right-hand corner of the summary and initialed it.

Defense strongly expressed the view that the U.S. should not condone any concessions. In the longer run, concessions will mean that more diplomats will find themselves in hostage situations. Others believed that to close off all options would be to encourage the use of force. (S)

There was some discussion of the implications for the present situation of the recent settlement of the ransom for the Peace Corps volunteer Starr in Colombia.² Officially, we did not condone that payment. Differing views were expressed on whether our official position in the Starr case will inhibit or encourage other terrorist ransom demands. It was agreed that the Starr case does not restrict our choices in the present case. (S)

It was emphasized that how we decide the issues before us today will, by implication, either involve the U.S. more deeply in the political responsibility for the Colombian decisions or will keep distance between the U.S. and those decisions. Defense expressed the view that we can take a very strong position on each of the issues while, at the same time, acknowledging that the Colombians are in charge. State asked that this basic choice be spelled out in the notes so it is clear that we are implicitly making choices for more or less involvement. (S)

The meeting reviewed what the U.S. position should be on the terrorists demands: *asylum*, *ransom*, the *release of prisoners*. Then it discussed the *use of force* for a rescue effort. (S)

Asylum. Newsom enumerated our options as follows:

1. Hold to our present official position that we do not favor asylum for terrorists.³

2. Hold to our present position but actively discourage other nations directly involved from agreeing to the granting of asylum.

3. In addition to Option 2 also go to any country offering asylum in an effort to discourage it from doing so. (S)

Defense initially expressed a preference for Option 2, but the discussion led to a consensus for the first option, holding to our present position but no active opposition to asylum. The rationale is to leave this as a possible final negotiated outcome, i.e., granting safe passage to a point of asylum but not meeting other demands. (S)

Ransom. Newsom set forth our options on the payment of ransom as follows:

² Starr was released on February 12. Starr's mother, Charlotte Jensen, coordinated with columnist Jack Anderson to reportedly pay a donated ransom of \$250,000 to the FARC. (Charles A. Krause, "Colombian Guerrillas Free Peace Corpsman After 3 Years," *Washington Post*, February 13, 1980, p. A16) For United States policy in the Starr case, see footnote 5, Document 244.

³ Carter wrote "ok" in the left-hand margin next to this option.

1. Stay with the current position that the U.S. will not be a party to the payment of ransom.

2. Also, actively discourage others from participating in the payment of a ransom. (S)

Defense expressed a strong preference for the second option. It was pointed out that Turbay's recent letter⁴ may be an effort to get the U.S. to wink at a ransom payment by other countries. It was reported that the Colombians are not having success in raising the ransom money, although the Venezuelans showed some early interest. We are not sure what Turbay's instructions to his negotiators are on ransom. We need to find this out. [1 line not declassified] No consensus was reached in the discussion. A few favored Option 1 believing the decision should be left to the Colombian Government but that the Colombians should negotiate hard to achieve safe passage without other concessions; a majority favored actively seeking to discourage payment of a ransom.⁵ (S)

Release of Prisoners. Newsom stated the choices on the release of prisoners as follows:

1. Leave the choice up to the Colombian Government entirely.

2. Take an active role in discouraging release of prisoners. (S)

Defense expressed strong support for Option 2, actively discouraging release of prisoners. State supports Option 1 and argues that there is a difference between prisoner release and ransom. In the case of prisoners, it is a Colombian internal matter governed by Colombian law. (S)

It was also pointed out that, in a response to President Turbay's letter, the U.S. could make explicit the long-run costs worldwide of making concessions. That is, a release of prisoners now can only encourage similar terrorist activities in the future.⁶ (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] by standing firm against ransom and release of prisoners, the chances of pushing the terrorists to accept only asylum are better. (S)

Use of Force. Our present position with the Colombia Government is that we do not favor the use of force under the circumstances. Newsom stated the options for the future as follows:

1. Do nothing and stay with our present position.

2. [2 lines not declassified]

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Carter underlined the phrase "actively seeking to discourage payment of a ransom" and wrote "I agree" in the left-hand margin.

⁶ Carter wrote "ok" in the margin next to this paragraph.

3. [2 lines not declassified]

4. Encourage Israel to offer assistance. (S)

In the discussion it was reported that the Colombians are preparing a 40-man force for a rescue, possibly but not probably, without the knowledge of President Turbay; and if the U.S. does not give the Colombian military a good reason for not undertaking such a mission, it might go ahead with a high probability of failure. [2 lines not declassified] Another consideration, if we stay with the status quo, is that the Colombian military may go ahead with the rescue mission anyway. [4 lines not declassified] Defense argued that we should be willing to take the risk. (S)

The only other country involved which has a credible rescue capability is Israel. It has not responded favorably to the Colombians for advice and assistance for the use of force. [8 lines not declassified] (S)

Once again it was emphasized that a U.S. willingness to participate in rescue efforts involves a fundamental decision to share the responsibility for the outcome. (S)

[7 lines not declassified] Finally, it was agreed that a letter be drafted for the President's reply to Turbay's letter.⁷ (S)

⁷ See Document 259. In the left-hand margin next to the last three paragraphs, Carter wrote: [1 line not declassified] Carter turned the page horizontally to write this comment.

258. **Memorandum From William E. Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, March 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Instructions on the Bogota Incident

I have prepared a memorandum to State, Defense and CIA which transmits the President's instructions indicated on the notes of the interagency meeting held Thursday (see Tab A).² (S)

His wording on the notes on page 4, [4 lines not declassified]

Vance believes not. In his memo to you³ he says that "to volunteer help would get us into the middle of a situation in which we might have to take responsibility for the loss of many Ambassadors lives. We should not involve ourselves in the Colombians' plans. [3 lines not declassified]

Pastor disagrees with Vance's position. [3 lines not declassified] He believes we should do that earlier rather than later. I agree.⁴ (S/S)

The President's language leaves issues undecided and can be interpreted as promise to approach Turbay. (S/S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

¹ Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, 1977-81, Box 122, SCM 112A, Mini SCC 3/6/80: Colombian Terrorist Incident. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Denend initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Tab A, attached, is printed as Document 260. For Carter's instructions, see Document 257. "Thursday" refers to March 6.

³ Dated March 7. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 10, Colombia, 1-3/80)

⁴ Denend highlighted this paragraph and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "ZB: I think you resolved this w/ Pastor on Saturday [March 8]." The comment is dated March 10.

**259. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in
Colombia¹**

Washington, March 8, 1980, 1845Z

80313. Subject: Presidential Message. For Charge Crigler. Please pass the following message from President Carter to President Turbay. No hard copy will follow.

Begin Text

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March 3, 1980.² I appreciate the great responsibility you bear for negotiating a safe release of hostages from the Embassy of the Dominican Republic; I myself have borne similar pressures during the last four months while my Government's Embassy has been under siege in Tehran.

I want to reiterate the full confidence I have in you and your Government as the sole negotiator for the release of the hostages. Your efforts will not only affect the lives of these diplomatic hostages but also the lives of Ambassadors as well as private citizens who could be captured in the future by terrorist groups like the M-19. To the extent that the M-19 succeeds in its objectives, that could encourage other terrorist groups throughout the world to seek their ends through this new and despicable form of international blackmail.

As you know, the policy of the United States Government is clear: we do not pay ransom to terrorists.

This tragic situation underlines once again the requirement for cooperation by the international community to develop effective deterrents to terrorism. In this connection, we would be pleased to join with your government and to seek support from our colleagues to ask the OAS to undertake an urgent review of what more the OAS could properly do in this field.³

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

End Text

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 4, Colombia: President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, 3-5/80. Confidential; Immediate; Priority.

² The letter and translation are *ibid.*

³ In telegram 2600 from Bogota, March 9, the Embassy reported on Crigler's delivery of the message and Turbay's reaction to it. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800004-0348)

260. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, March 10, 1980

The President has reviewed the notes of the interagency meeting and given the following instructions:²

Asylum. Hold to our present official position that we do not favor asylum for terrorists. (S/S)

Ransom. Maintain our present position that the U.S. will not be a party to the payment of ransom and actively seek to discourage payment of ransom. (S/S)

Release of Prisoners. In a letter in response to President Turbay,³ make explicit the long-run costs worldwide of conceding to the release of prisoners which can only encourage similar terrorists activities in the future. (S/S)

Use of Force. Do not involve the U.S. military with any Colombians without the approval of President Turbay. (S/S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 52, Terrorism: Bogota Crisis, 2-3/80. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Turner and Jones.

² See Document 257.

³ See Document 259.

261. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State¹

Bogota, March 31, 1980, 1910Z

3564. Subject: Bogota Hostage Situation

1. (Secret—Entire Text)

2. This cable outlines my interpretation and conclusions regarding the hostage situation.²

A. General Overview. GOC management of the crisis is controlled, careful and prudent. There seems to be no doubt that President Turbay is in complete charge. The GOC does not want to use force. It is trying to resolve the situation by negotiation. It is not deliberately stalling because it recognizes that the longer it takes the greater risk of something unpredictable happening that could lead to tragedy (and several people I talked to expressed that concern). On the other hand it knows that it will take time for the terrorists to come to realize what the real limits are and to rationalize a realistic agreement that could end the occupation. Hence the GOC will be calm, firm and patient in trying to convince the terrorists to leave.

The core problem is the prisoner issue³ which is discussed in greater detail below. No one believes that any of the other aspects present any obstacles. A good deal of agreement has already been reached on the question of safe exit, final destination, etc., and while further discussion will be necessary to reach understandings on all details such as who accompanies the captors when they leave, no one anticipates any basic difficulty in reaching them. No one here thinks money will be a problem. In fact no one even discusses it. The GOC will not discuss ransom, but some private circles have indicated that if this is the last element to resolve the situation something can be done. In any event, the pris-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2200. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 78713 to Bogota, March 25, Newsom informed Crigler that Vaky was traveling "to Bogota as my personal representative for a few days to provide me from his unique background with his assessment of the situation." Newsom wrote: "There has been increasing public and congressional interest in Ambassador Asencio's welfare and in the position we are taking. Many other governments have sent senior officials to Bogota. For these reasons it would be useful to have Pete's assessment." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2175)

³ In telegram 2604 from Bogota, March 9, the Embassy reported: "Although the terrorists have presented a list of 200 prisoners they would like to see released, they are primarily interested in securing the liberty of about thirty prisoners whose release, they say, is non-negotiable." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800122-0031)

oner issue blocks any further movement, because the captors say they will not commit themselves to anything else until that point is resolved.

B. The Prisoner Issue. The problem here is a fundamental conceptual gap between the two sides. The constitutional juridical system, and what it permits and does not permit, is held to be an absolute limit by the GOC. In this it is widely and deeply supported by virtually all sectors of the society; I found support on this issue surprisingly uniform. The system does not permit the President or the Executive to amnesty or pardon anyone. Therefore, the GOC reasons, it cannot negotiate the release of any given person. (The Constitution permits the Congress to pardon by a two-thirds vote, but it is generally agreed that even if it wanted to the government could not get a two-thirds vote in this case; and to convoke the Congress to debate it would create a debate that could center as well on objections to even talking to the terrorists; this is in short not a productive course of action). Everyone I have talked to agrees that the President would be impeached if he tried to free anyone by directive. It is important to recognize the depth of the feeling in Colombia that the principles of the system must not be violated at any cost. The specific feeling is particularly deep that if the M-19 achieved such a violation of the system the very authority-base of the country would be destroyed. It is this point even more than concern about specific persons being released that is the sticking point. While particularly in the military there is resistance to the idea of certain persons getting their freedom,⁴ the nation and the military establishment could probably cope with that. But none of this really touches the "system" problem. The point, in any case, is that the GOC really does feel it cannot go beyond the point it is at; it cannot deal in terms of the specific person and negotiate a release in return for the hostage. Only the functioning of the judicial system can free an accused person. I doubt that the President can be pressured into any change, even the ultimate blackmail threat. Nor do I think that the USG could—even if it wanted to—pressure the GOC into yielding on this point.

The terrorists on the other hand do not even think in these terms; the system has no meaning for them; their view is simply that how the GOC does it is its problem, and that the task is to create enough pressure or blackmail to get certain persons out. It would appear that they are not yet convinced that the GOC really will not go any further no matter what. Unfortunately, some of the other governments involved have the same mind set, and do not accept or understand the limitation the Colombians feel. Hence their representatives here

⁴ In telegram 3520 from Bogota, March 29, the Embassy reported on Vaky's meeting with Camacho Leyva regarding prisoners. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800158-0053)

seek to put pressure on the GOC to deal on the terrorists' terms, i.e. to deal in terms of specific persons. This complicating dimension is discussed further below.

If the terrorists finally do become convinced that they can push the GOC no further along this line, what will they do? It is unlikely that they will bring down the temple and harm the hostages. It is more likely that they will rationalize a decision to terminate the occupation and leave. In that case the GOC is certain that the conditions of the departure can be worked out.

In this situation, what the GOC is trying to do is to take such steps—and cut such corners—as it can to permit enough movement to give the terrorists reasonable ground to terminating its adventure. Thus it explores speeding up the process, etc., which probably can and will in even “special” ways, result in the freeing of a number of people. In parallel fashion it has established the task of trying to convince the terrorists that they have really achieved a great deal or enough to claim a victory and leave the Embassy, and that in fact processes set in motion will speed up release of accused persons. In these circumstances, the question that arises is is it possible to establish some new focus or framework conceptually recasting the situation so as to facilitate some final agreement? To some degree, this is what Turbay has sought to do in suggesting the presence of the IAHR or Amnesty as observers of the judicial process.⁵

C. The International Dimension. In these terms, Lopez Michelsen's observation that enlarging the scope may help solve the problem becomes interesting.⁶ One needs to think about how the international dimension can help—or complicate—the problem. Turbay's move to invite international observation of the judicial process as a guarantee of fair treatment under Colombian law is, I think, worth supporting. I am under no illusion that it changes things greatly, and it does not directly deal with the problem of the specific persons whom the M-19 wants to liberate. But it does present a framework that may make it easier for the M-19 to rationalize a disengagement. If the GOC proceeds along this line, we should support an invitation to the IAHR etc.

Another aspect might be third party mediation or involvement in negotiations. The GOC will not for now at least, accept mediation in

⁵ In telegram 3533 from Bogota, March 29, Vaky reported on his March 28 conversation with Turbay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2163)

⁶ In telegram 3532 from Bogota, March 29, Vaky reported that Lopez Michelsen had told him that “it was unjust” for the countries affected “to put all the weight on Colombia and then sit back and hold it responsible for everything. If the nations could reach consensus as to how to handle this situation, it would help Colombia resolve it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2172)

the classical sense both because it does not want to lose control of the negotiations and because it does not see that it can change its position on prisoners under international pressure either. In fact, the potential of international pressure trying to force the GOC to free prisoners in contravention of its judicial system's process worries Turbay. He will not yield, but it is just that much more uncomfortable and complicating.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that the M-19 might find it easier to lower its demands and accede to an agreement with regard to a third negotiator. In other words the M-19 might find it difficult to back down vis-a-vis the GOC negotiators, but might do it for someone else. Thus a point may arise when the presence of a third party may facilitate the face-saving compromises. We should keep that in the back of our minds; it is a point I will be discussing with Turbay when I see him again Tuesday.⁷

D. The Diplomatic Corps and Reverse International Pressure. Previous reporting will have described how complicating has been the position of other Governments involved in this case and the activities of some of their representatives here, notably the Mexican, Brazilian and Papal delegate. The complications are:

—The captors bring the hostages in to the substance of negotiations and get their advice.

—Some of the hostages pass anxieties back to their colleagues on the outside, and

—Some of the outside representatives reinforce anxieties and seek to press the GOC to be more "flexible"

A second dimension of complications are some disturbing hints that some may seek to discuss directly with terrorists the release of their Ambassador. We have no firm indications in this regard, but frustrations may very well lead to all kinds of soundings like this.

The sum of this situation is that international pressure tends to be directed onto the GOC, and to some degree the terrorists can count on the effective seconding of their pressure by the anxieties and pressures of other governments.

I believe it would be important to try to reverse the current as well, and direct some pressure of international opinion on the terrorists, i.e. some way to tell them that their continued holding to present stances and positions is counterproductive in their own terms in world opinion and in the broader picture.

⁷ April 1. See telegram 3663 from Bogota, April 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870117-2157)

We will attempt in the diplomatic corps meetings here⁸ to diffuse the question of pressure on the GOC, to highlight the need to denounce terrorism, and to suggest ways to convey to the terrorists the sense that international entities and other Governments want them to end the occupation (not unlike the Pope's Holy Week appeal.) There are limits however to what we can do here, given the actions of the Papal delegate and the Mexican. I think we should consider demarches to the various governments ourselves suggesting some kind of unified appeal or position to be passed to the terrorists (and their representatives here in Bogota instructed accordingly). We will be suggesting in a septel something like this (perhaps the Secretary convening the pertinent Ambassadors to suggest it) for you to consider.⁹

Asencio

⁸ See telegram 3596 from Bogota, April 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800163-0547)

⁹ Not found.

262. Letter from President Carter to Colombian President Turbay¹

Washington, April 19, 1980

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letters of February 13 and 27, 1980,² in which you proposed new dimensions in inter-American cooperation, and expressed your concern about the status of the islands of Quita Sueno, Roncador and Serrano. Your suggestions are timely and most welcome. I have delayed in responding because I have been exploring with my aides how best we can work with you and other hemispheric leaders to bring your proposals to fruition.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 4, Colombia: President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, 3-5/80. No classification marking.

² Translations of both letters are *Ibid.*

³ In a March 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff presented options for "withdrawing U.S. claims" to Quita Sueno and other claims in the Caribbean "in a way which would satisfy the Colombians without antagonizing the Nicaraguans at this delicate moment in our bilateral relations," and proposed that a reply to Turbay's letters wait until after the resolution of the hostage crisis in Bogota. (*Ibid.*)

Allow me to deal first with your timely suggestions on inter-American cooperation to support two of our most fundamental values—democracy and peace. Despite occasional setbacks, I believe we have made steady progress toward the achievement of democracy and peace in the Americas. But from time to time we need to review our progress in the light of changing regional and world circumstances in order to see what adjustments and new dimensions the times may require.

I believe our review should start with a reaffirmation of certain fundamental principles held in common by most of the governments and peoples of the hemisphere.

—The first and most basic of those principles is our deep concern for human rights.

—The second is that the civil, political and economic freedoms associated with democracy are essential to human self-realization and responsive government, and that they are a desirable and realizable goal for all nations of the hemisphere.

—The third is that there is a connection between economic progress, on the one hand, and the achievement and consolidation of democracy on the other.

—The fourth principle is that national sovereignty and independence should be respected and maintained, and peace within the hemisphere preserved.

On the basis of these principles, we need to examine the uncertainties and challenges that face our countries as we move into the 1980s. What are the obstacles to the advance of human rights and democracy, and what can we do to overcome them? How can economic progress be sustained in the face of difficult conditions, especially in the energy field? What can best be done to maintain peace in the hemisphere?

It is in the light of these questions that we must inventory our policies, institutions, and political attitudes, identify our resources, and decide what new initiatives—what new dimensions—we require. I am attaching an illustrative list of some ideas which my staff developed for your consideration.⁴

Mr. President, you have inspired an initiative with great potential. It is only appropriate that you should take the lead in bringing it to fulfillment. I assume you will wish to discuss your ideas further within the Andean Group, and when the Andean Group's support is assured, you may wish to convene a larger working group. To be most effective, this working group should be small, but it should include thoughtful people of broad vision from principal countries and subregional group-

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Illustrative List of New Initiatives With Comments."

ings in the hemisphere. If you should choose to follow such a course, my government would be pleased to join in your efforts. When more specific ideas have evolved and broad support is assured, we should consider moving to more formal meetings.

If this process can bring about a recommitment to freedom, peace, and human fulfillment, then, Mr. President, we will indeed have achieved new human and hemispheric dimensions of incalculable value to our peoples.

Your Ambassador has informed me of your concern about the Treaty on Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrano. Let me assure you of my continued support for that treaty.⁵

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁵ In an April 18 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: "Due to the sensitivity of our current relationship with Nicaragua, which also claims the three barren reefs in the Caribbean, we have delayed our approach to the Senate to ratify it, and Turbay fears that we may be abandoning the treaty altogether. Your reaffirmation of support will be appreciated." (Ibid.)

263. Editorial Note

By late April, 1980, almost 2 months into the Bogota hostage crisis, the Government of Colombia and the M-19 guerrillas had almost reached agreement on the M-19's two main demands: a ransom payment and the release of about 30 M-19 leaders from Colombian prisons. The Government of Colombia would not unilaterally release any prisoners, although it worked to speed up military trials and invited the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) to observe the trials. On April 22, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance sent a memorandum to President Jimmy Carter, noting that "the arrival of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on Sunday" had caused "a marked improvement in the prospects for an early resolution of the Bogota crisis." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) Although the United States and several other governments whose diplomats were hostages had opposed the payment of any ransom and the Government of Colombia did not discuss ransom in its negotiations with the

M-19, private negotiators simultaneously discussed a ransom payment with the M-19 captors.

The United States, like other governments whose diplomats were held hostage, was not directly involved in the negotiations. Consequently, the information it received regarding the resolution of the crisis changed quickly. On April 25, Vance wrote to Carter that "final agreement has not been reached on the question of prisoner release and there is still a possibility of an impasse developing on this issue. A detailed discussion of departure arrangements has been going on in the negotiating sessions. The current plan appears to be for most of the hostages to be released in Havana." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) In telegram 4748 from Bogota, April 26, the Embassy reported, "Reliable information has virtually dried up as GOC systematically excludes outsiders from wrap-up negotiations. Most persistent report now is that terrorists are not only holding firm on release of at least a few key prisoners but are also raising the ante on ransom. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that departure preparations are proceeding." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800207-0216) (C) Barely 45 minutes later, the Embassy cabled to the Department of State: "President Turbay just informed DCM by telephone 'in strongest confidence' that release of hostages would occur tomorrow morning, April 27." (Telegram 4750 from Bogota, April 26, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 12, Colombia, 1/80-1/81) (S) Eighteen hostages remained captive. (Asencio, p. 227)

On the evening of April 26, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed Carter that U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Diego C. Asencio would be flown to Havana with the captors and other hostages, where the remaining hostages would be released. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 23, Evening Reports [State], 4/80) (S) On the morning of April 27, the Embassy cabled: "As best we can reckon, Ambassador Asencio and most other hostages departed Bogota airport as planned aboard Cuban aircraft, in company of M-19 terrorists, at 0820 hours, bound for Havana, over-flying Panama." (Telegram 4757 from Bogota, April 27, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800210-0349) (LOU) After the hostages' release, Asencio was flown to Homestead Air Force Base in Miami.

In his memoir, Asencio wrote that a private Colombian citizen paid a ransom of \$1.2 million for the hostages. (*Our Man Is Inside*, pp. 212, 229, 241)

264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Colombia¹

Washington, November 26, 1980, 2116Z

315451. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Foreign Minister Uribe November 22, 1980.

1. Confidential Entire Text.

2. Secretary met with Colombian Foreign Minister Diego Uribe for approximately one half hour on November 22, 1980 for review of US-Colombian relations. Minister Uribe was accompanied by Ambassador Eastman and Ambassador Bernal (OAS). Ambassador Bowdler and Desk Officer Heaphy were present.

3. Secretary Muskie began by expressing his regrets that he would not be able to travel to Colombia as Secretary of State. He stressed that the US has neglected to pay proper attention to Latin America but praised the mutually beneficial relations currently existing between the US and Colombia. Referring to Colombia's leadership in promoting democracy, the Secretary asked for Colombia's views on Bolivia and other critical areas in Latin America.

4. After inviting the Secretary to visit Colombia in a private capacity, Uribe praised the Secretary's speech before the OAS.² However, he added that although the human rights emphasis was good, democratic governments have not profited much from the US because of their good records. Uribe stressed that we must build on human rights to include more emphasis on economic rights.

5. Uribe raised the Quita Sueno Treaty issue and urged that one of the Secretary's last acts be that of resolving the Quita Sueno problem. He emphasized that the GOC would like to see the issue concluded before the new US administration began. The Secretary replied that we have sent the letter answering questions raised during the hearings³ to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and that he would follow up with a personal appeal to the Committee to act on the Treaty. (It

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800567-0448. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to La Paz, Quito, Caracas, Lima, and Managua. Drafted by Heaphy, cleared in ARA/AND, S/S, S/S-O and by Eaton; approved by Bowdler.

² For the text of Muskie's November 19th remarks, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1981, pp. 33–36.

³ The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the Quita Sueno treaty on December 4, 1979. (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nominations of Sol M. Linowitz and Gerald B. Helman; To Hear Administration Testimony on Ex. A, 93-1: Treaty with the Republic of Colombia Concerning the Status of Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrana*, 96th Cong., 1st sess., December 4, 1979, p. 1-108)

was clarified later to Ambassador Eastman that the letter had not yet left the Department but that it was expected that it would be sent during the week of November 24.⁴) Uribe said it would be a “brilliant” way to end the Carter Administration. The Secretary cautioned that there were still obstacles to getting Senate action, most important of which was the lameduck period of the session.

6. The Secretary inquired about Colombia’s role in Central America and the Caribbean. Uribe referred to previous meetings with Asst. Sec. Bowdler⁵ in which the GOC had reviewed its relations and activities with countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala. However, he said that the real need is to find a mechanism for financial assistance in economic and social areas for those countries which are threatened by leftist guerrillas. He mentioned President Turbay’s Peace Fund proposal which he said would require some funding. In sum, he said Colombia was disposed to help. The Secretary agreed but said that the US Congress, reflecting perhaps a lack of understanding on the part of the American people on the direct connection between assistance and peace, was unwilling to provide adequate funds. Uribe reiterated that quick expenditure in social assistance was the key ingredient needed.

7. The Secretary then complimented the GOC for its excellent cooperation in narcotics interdiction and expressed his pleasure that the \$16 million pro-ag was almost signed.⁶ Minister Uribe stated that the Turbay administration had been making great progress in the area and cited the prosecution of traffickers and the US—Colombian extradition treaty recently ratified by the Colombian Congress. He stated that “with or without your money” Colombia was proceeding against drug trafficking, because it was committed to do so. He listed the narcotics cooperation agreements Colombia has already signed with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic and Honduras.

8. On Bolivia, Uribe said that the most serious problem was that Garcia Meza was so shameless that he had not even promised elections but instead had spoken of a 20 year dictatorship. Uribe said however, that Garcia Meza might be obliged to announce elections, which Colom-

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Bowdler visited Colombia in August 1980 and met with Turbay and other Colombian leaders. (Telegram 8567 from Bogota, August 12, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800384-1164)

⁶ In telegram 157 from Bogota, January 9, 1981, the Embassy reported that the project agreement was signed in November and summarized the US-Colombian anti-narcotics program. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810013-1129)

bia would view as a good development. Alternatively, he said we (presumably Colombia) would have to continue urging Bolivia to return to democracy even though this would be a “Sisyphean undertaking.”

Muskie

Ecuador

265. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 3, 1977

Proposed Israeli Sale of KFIR C2 Aircraft to Ecuador

The Issue:

In 1973 we agreed to help Israel develop its KFIR C2 Fighter Interceptor which is powered by a U.S. General Electric engine. Under the Foreign Military Sales regulations the U.S. is required to review and approve the sales of the engine to a third country. In December 1976 Israel asked us to approve the sale of the KFIR to Ecuador.² Secretary Kissinger did not approve the sale and held the matter for our review. The Israelis are now pressing for an early decision. They claim that unless the sale is approved by tomorrow evening, the Ecuadorians will not purchase the KFIR and instead turn toward the French Mirage. We cannot verify this. The Israelis have asked Senators Humphrey, Case and Javits to press their case with us. They have done so.

The Consequences

Here is what I see as the consequences of authorizing the sale:

A. Advantages

- please the Israelis and their supporters in the Congress;
- ease Israeli balance of payment problems; increase Israel's military self-sufficiency and allow it to establish a military export market in the third world;

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 12, State Department Evening Reports, 1-2/77. Secret. Above the addressee line, Carter wrote "Secret" and circled it. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Cy—We should not join in hi-tech weapons sale in S.A.—assess econ. loss to Israel & let me know J."

² In a February 3 memorandum to Aaron, Quandt and Sick wrote: "We have been aware since at least December that the Israelis were negotiating with Ecuador for the purchase of about 25 Kfir aircraft at a total value of approximately \$150 million. The general subject of Israeli sales of military equipment with US components to third countries was raised by Secretary Kissinger with Ambassador Dinitz in January, but no decisions were taken or conveyed with respect to specific sales cases other than drawing Israel's attention to the need to obtain US permission for such sales in advance." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 19, Ecuador, 2-12/77)

—improve US-Ecuadorian relations by ending a restrictive policy on the supply of sophisticated US arms which Latin Americans view as paternalistic.

B. Disadvantages

—contradict our announced intention to review our arms sales policies worldwide;

—make it difficult for the U.S. to disapprove sales of sophisticated aircraft to other Latin American countries;

—fuel an arms race in the already tense Andean region.

Israeli Reaction

If we refuse to authorize the sale, the Israelis will express deep unhappiness. They are unlikely, however, to be able to generate a massive protest against this decision on the Hill. If we decide to either postpone the sale pending the completion of our review or to refuse its authorization I recommend that we:

—give our worldwide review of arms transfers as the public reason;

—indicate to the Israelis privately that we understand their disappointment and will give consideration to some sort of compensation in the form of U.S. aid for the loss which they may suffer from losing the sale.³

³ In a February 11 memorandum to Carter, Vance wrote, "We believe this denial will not in itself affect Israel's economic or military viability." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 17, Evening Reports (State), 2/11-28/77) No decision memorandum regarding the Kfir sale was found.

266. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, February 7, 1977, 2340Z

871. Subj: Transfer of Fighter Planes to Ecuador. Refs: A) State 026807 B) Quito 618 C) Quito 801.²

1. Gen. Leoro, Commander of the Ecuadorean Air Force and member of the Supreme Council of Government, asked me to come to his office on the afternoon of Feb 7 to discuss press reports that the U.S. had denied permission to Israel to sell KFIR to Ecuador. I told Gen. Leoro that I had just a few hours before confirmed with Washington that such was indeed the case. I went on to say that the decision was a very difficult one for the U.S. Government, which had had to weigh its desire to cooperate with Ecuador in satisfying its military requirement and at the same its long-standing policy of not contributing to the introduction of advanced weaponry into Latin America. The General expressed his profound disappointment at the U.S. decision, which he described as "lamentable", and said that Ecuador would now be forced to seek a comparable aircraft from third countries, "including the Russians". He added that it was doubly unfortunate because while the KFIR would have been available within 12 to 18 months, there would be a longer lead time for other aircraft.

2. I seized upon this latter statement to suggest that the FAE once again consider the F-5. I said that I would do whatever I could to reduce the 24-month lead time that the FAE had previously been informed would be necessary. (We had already been informed by

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770044-0053. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² In telegram 26807 to Tel Aviv, February 6, the Department noted: "Under Secretary Habib informed Ambassador Dinitz February 4 U.S. had decided (a) that it could not agree to proposed Israeli sale of Kfir aircraft to Ecuador and (b) that security supporting assistance element of FY 78 aid request to Congress for Israel would be increased from dollars 500 million to dollars 785 million, for total of dollars 1.785 billion. Habib explained Kfir sale approval would have run counter to our policy of not selling advanced weapons, including sophisticated fighter aircraft, to Latin America—a longstanding policy which was consistent with our views about arms transfer in general." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770042-0661) In telegram 618 from Quito, January 26, Bloomfield reported on his meeting with Poveda and commented: "Ecuador has a genuine security stake in obtaining appropriate aircraft in the shortest possible time. The Peruvian acquisition and imminent receipt of Soviet SU-22s has heightened the GOE interest in the Kfir purchase." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770029-0010) In telegram 801 from Quito, February 3, the Embassy recommended that the Department give "favorable consideration" to Ecuador's request that its FMS credit allocation double for FY 77, to \$20 million. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770040-0152)

Northrop representatives that it was possible to reduce this lead time). Leoro said flatly that the F-5 would not be considered because it was not an adequate aircraft to protect against the Peruvian threat.

3. Upon my return from Leoro, I received a call from the President, Admiral Poveda, who was inquiring about the same press reports. I gave him the news and he reacted with the same expressions of chagrin that I had received from Leoro. He pointed out that alternative aircraft would probably be much more expensive for Ecuador and also that the lead times would be longer. But, he said, the acquisition of a modern interceptor was absolutely essential and Ecuador would have to turn to other suppliers.

4. Comment: I do not take Leoro's reference to the Russians seriously. Also in spite of Leoro's negative comment regarding the F-5, I believe that we should make an effort to present Ecuador with an alternative to the KFIR if our position on sophistication is to be at all credible. Leoro's rejection of the F-5 must be taken in the context of his extreme disappointment, indeed ire, at the news of the denial of the KFIR. I ask, therefore, that the Department bend every effort to offer Ecuador the F-5 with a shorter lead time than heretofore. We understand from the Northrop representatives that deliveries could be made in 18 months. If we could couple this with the offer of a couple of aircraft in twelve months, I believe that we still would stand some chance of convincing the Ecuadoreans that they should opt for this considerably cheaper package.

5. It would also take some of the sting out of the KFIR decision, if we were able to respond in the near future to the GOE's recent request for an increase in the FMS credit for FY 77 (Ref C), and I ask that prompt consideration be given to the recommendation in Ref C.

6. Incidentally, the timing couldn't be worse. The Supreme Council and the military are rolling out the red carpet today and tomorrow for the visiting Maj. Gen. Rachmeler, Coordinator of Security Assistance for the Department of the Army. It also would have been helpful to me if I had been informed in advance of the probability that the announcement of the KFIR denial would be made at today's noon briefing.

Bloomfield

267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, March 29, 1977, 1700Z

69266. Subject: Ecuadorean Mission to Washington.

1. On March 24 Ecuadorean Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Jose Ayala, and Chairman of Ecuador's Joint Chiefs of Staff, Renan Olmedo, met with Deputy Secretary Christopher. The Deputy Secretary also hosted a luncheon which included Undersecretary for Political Affairs Habib and other ranking State Department Officials.² The following subjects were discussed:

2. Andean Subregional Instability.

A) The Ecuadoreans, especially Olmedo, impressed upon us the Ecuadorean view that Ecuador is currently defenseless and facing a clear and imminent threat from Peru. Both Ecuadoreans emphasized that the Peruvian arms buildup has changed the geopolitical balance of power in the Andean subregion. Ayala noted that there have been rumors about open conflict, some such reports originating from commentaries in American and European news media. Ayala said all of this had created a pre-war psychosis that is disrupting relationships in the Andean region. In addition, Ayala said that a new factor of instability had been added because the Soviet Union is the arms supplier of Peru. Ecuador and Chile want to reduce their arms spending and do not want to see an arms race. They plan to do all within their power to prevent an outbreak of war but Ecuador knows that it will not be left out of a war and therefore must take adequate precautions to defend itself.

B) Christopher replied that the US understood Ecuador's concern about the arms imbalance, and had expressed that concern to the government of Peru. They added that the US was studying the situation carefully, and would try to be responsive to Ecuador within whatever limitations were determined for future US policy and resources. They concluded by saying the US was not unmindful of Ecuadorean concerns, but that US ability to help was limited.

3. Proposed Israeli Sale of KFIR Aircraft.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770107-0722. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to La Paz, Lima, Moscow, Santiago, Guayaquil, Tel Aviv, and USCINCSO. Drafted by Allitto; cleared in ARA/AND and S/S and by Luers; approved by Christopher.

² In telegram 69925 to Quito, March 29, the Department reported on Luers's meeting with Ayala and Olmedo. (Telegram 69925 from the Department of State, dated March 29, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770108-1198)

A) To defend itself, Ecuador arranged to buy 24 KFIR fighter aircraft from Israel. Ecuador, said Ayala, considers the KFIR a defensive aircraft and a deterrent to Peru. The US veto of the sale leaves Ecuador defenseless. Ayala said that Ecuador needed the KFIR or something else—one or the other is indispensable. This is the first time in 25 years that Ecuador has wanted to buy new aircraft. The Ecuadorians stressed that our KFIR veto meant only that Ecuador would buy from a country or countries other than Israel. They added that the Soviet Union and other countries had made very attractive offers. They stated that Ecuador did not wish to deal with the Soviet Union. Therefore, it appealed to the US to look at the problem very carefully.

B) Christopher stated that our veto should not be viewed as directed specifically against Ecuador, and that it was a continuation of our longstanding policy in Latin America, which has been one of restraint in introducing the most advanced weapons, including fighter aircraft. As for “something else”, Habib pointed out the practical problem of the US appearing to seek commercial advantage from the veto.

4. Ecuador-Peru Relations.

A) Ayala said that Ecuador was normally mistrustful of Peru, which made last December a difficult month after the scheduled visit to Ecuador of the Peruvian President fell through. Ecuador wants good relations with Peru, and for that reason sent a special envoy to Peru in February to improve relations. Peru’s arms buildup, however, has a destabilizing effect on the subregion, and Ecuador cannot be indifferent to powerful, modern arms that threaten Ecuador. Ecuador has no capacity, materiel, or desire to be aggressive. Ecuador, however, needs defensive arms to make its potential enemies think twice before considering attacking Ecuador.

B) Andean Office Director Devine told the Ecuadorians that the USG perceived less threat of imminent hostilities than do some other observers. He added that the US had tried to calm the situation in December and January by letting that fact be known in response to alarmist views and inquiries by the press and some of the nations concerned. He said the USG hoped that it had in this way contributed to some easing of recent tensions and that it would be our continuing policy to seek to contribute to the cause of peace in the Andean region.

5. US-Latin America

A) Ayala said the US had a responsibility to take an active part in keeping the peace in Latin America. For example, it should help countries like Ecuador, which was attacked in 1941 by Peru just as the United States was attacked at Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. Therefore, the US should study the defensive needs of countries like Ecuador that are threatened. He emphasized that Ecuador is seeking defensive and

not offensive weapons. As an example, he mentioned an integrated air defense system.

B) Christopher said that he appreciated the tour d'horizon given by Ayala and that he was sympathetic to the appeal for the US to consider specific situations on a case-by-case basis. He stated that he felt the US should develop bilateral policies based on changing situations rather than develop one policy sufficient for all of Latin America. He added that he particularly admired the trends in Ecuador—specifically Ecuador's admirable human rights record and its plan to return to democratic government in 1978. He said that we take those trends into account when dealing with Ecuador, which was one reason we were receiving the mission so early in this administration. He concluded by stating that we would certainly give careful consideration to Ecuadorean requests for defensive military equipment.

6. Other topics raised by US were:

A) US-USSR relations. Habib gave the Ecuadoreans a preview of US hopes and expectations for the trip of the Secretary to the Soviet Union.³

B) Regional agreement. Habib asked Ayala if a regional political arrangement was possible instead of an arms race. Ayala replied that in a pragmatic world a country needed an arsenal to prevent attacks on it. He cited the US arsenal as an example of one facet of US-USSR relations.

C) Integrated air defense system. Habib told the Ecuadoreans that one problem they faced in seeking to purchase the improved HAWK missile system was the fact that Ecuador would be the first country in Latin America to acquire that missile system. A question of policy is automatically involved by any introduction of a new weapons system into Latin America.

D) Human rights. Ayala praised the US for its philosophy of placing man in the center of its foreign policy. He asked, however, for the US to be pragmatic, as it was in dealing with Korea. He then asked how the US could set itself up as judge and jury for all other nations of the world. Habib responded that President Carter spoke at the UN on this subject in a multilateral way, adding that the US preferred a multilateral approach.⁴ If, however, such an approach proves to be impossible, then there is no question but that the US will lead in the human rights field. If that makes others angry, so be it. He added that human rights were

³ Vance visited Moscow, March 27–30. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 16–23.

⁴ The President addressed the UN General Assembly on March 17. The text of the President's speech is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29.

not a temporary concern of the US, but permanent policy. Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers asked if the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was a viable possibility to handle human rights questions. Ayala replied “Yes, but it will be delicate”. Luers then asked if the UN would be better. Ayala said “Yes, because the vote there is more universal”.

E) Presidential trip to Latin America. Ayala asked if a trip by President Carter to Latin America was a possibility this year. Christopher replied that such a trip had a high priority but that the President had said he would not travel much during his first year in office. Olmedo said a Carter trip to the Andean subregion would be useful to balance the presence of the USSR.

Christopher

268. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the White House, the Department of State, and the Embassy in Peru¹

Quito, June 3, 1977, 1630Z

3649. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation: Quito.

1. Summary. In three-hour discussion with Mrs. Carter and party, Ecuadorean side, led by Supreme Council President Poveda, made forceful presentation for improved security assistance relationship with U.S. Formulation, expressed with various nuances by several senior military officers on Ecuadorean side, was that Peru’s recent large-scale acquisition of arms had created a serious power imbalance in the region and the resulting destabilization was a threat to peace. Ecuador, they argued, is relatively defenseless in the face of this threat and needed the urgent cooperation of the U.S. in acquiring air defense capability, fleet modernization, and anti-tank equipment. Ecuadoreans argued that they agreed with USG new arms transfer policy, and believed that their situation exactly fit one of its qualifications, e.g., where countries friendly to the U.S. must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770198-1023. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.

balance. In this context, they questioned the KFIR decision² as part of the general presentation.

2. After explaining the Carter Administration's overall approach to foreign relations and more particularly to Latin America, Mrs. Carter explained the philosophy behind the President's arms transfer policy and stressed that the KFIR decision had not been directed against Ecuador, but was part of an emerging global policy. Mrs. Carter said that if Peru's acquisition of Soviet aircraft and other arms was indeed creating an imbalance, she would bring it to the President's attention. Asst. Secy. Todman emphasized that U.S. had been active in cooperating with Andean countries in search for peace. Amb. Bloomfield noted several recent cases where U.S. has responded well to Ecuadorean requests and stressed that it would continue to do all it could within the new policy guidelines.

3. Ecuadorean side explained its process of transferring power to civilian government and expressed pride in its human rights record. Mrs. Carter expressed admiration for Ecuadorean efforts in both areas, and asked Ecuador to become more active within the inter-American system to promote human rights and serve as an example just as it was in its return to democracy. The Ecuadoreans pledged that they would support whatever is necessary to strengthen human rights in the hemisphere. Afterwards and in conversation with Adm Poveda Mrs. Carter and others in her party (in conversations with High Foreign Ministry Officials, we were told that Ecuador would indeed ratify the American Convention,³ but they were concerned that the timing—from the perspective of their security situation—was not yet right.) At one point, they suggested that their ability to make further progress towards democracy could be affected by whether they receive security and economic assistance.

As a result of the way the Ecuadoreans organized the agenda for the meeting, the arms issue dominated the discussion, with human rights raised by Mrs. Carter, and the OPEC-Exclusionary Amendment not raised at all.⁴ (However, Asst. Secy. Todman, in a conversation later in the day with Foreign Ministry Officials, conveyed the President's

² See Documents 265 and 266.

³ The American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José, was adopted in San José, Costa Rica, in 1969. Ecuador ratified it on December 8, 1977. The text of the convention and information on its signatories is available through the Organization of American States, at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html>. Carter signed it at the OAS on June 1. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 47.

⁴ The OPEC-exclusionary amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 (H.R. 10710; P.L. 93-618; 88 Stat. 178) excluded all members of OPEC from the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP.

sentiment that President Carter opposed the Amendment but did not want to take a public stand now because of timing and because he did not want to seem to promise unless he could be more certain he could deliver.) End summary.

4. Mrs. Carter called upon the Supreme Council of Government at the Presidential Palace on June 2. Following introductions, an exchange of pleasantries, and presentation of gifts with the Supreme Council and other Ecuadorean Officials embarked upon a three-hour discussion of bilateral and regional political and security issues.

5. The Ecuadorean participants were: Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano, President of Supreme Council; General Guillermo Duran Arcentales, Supreme Council; General Leoro, Supreme Council; Foreign Minister Jorege Salvador Lara; Defense Minister Andres Arrata; Minister of Government Cl. Bolivar Jarrin; Chief of Staff of Joint Command, Gen. Carlos Aguirre Asanza; plus Economic Sector Ministers and key Agency Chiefs who did not enter into discussions. The U.S. participants were: Mrs. Carter; Asst. Secy. Terence Todman; Ambassador Richard Bloomfield; Ms. Mary Hoyt; Mr. Robert Pastor; Ms. Carol Benefield (stenographer); Ms. Stephanie von Reigersberg (interpreter).

6. President Poveda proceeded into an overview of foreign affairs. He noted that recent geopolitical changes in Latin America had occurred and that the center of political gravity had shifted from the Southern Cone countries to Brazil. There was also a gravitation of power towards the Caribbean where Central American unity had become a force and where Venezuela was attempting to bring into being a new dimension in Latin American foreign policy. But for South America, one of the greatest concerns was the leftist current that had been operative in Peru. He believed that this current had infiltrated into both the military and civilian sectors and although moderated somewhat by the present Peruvian Government, it was still running quite strong. He noted the problem created by the Peru-Bolivia-Chile triangle and predicted that the situation would become more tense as the 100 year anniversary of the War of the Pacific drew near in 1979. Moreover, despite recent political statements of friendship and high-level visits, there had been a dangerous political deterioration in the region which could lead to hostilities and in which Ecuador might find itself involved.

7. Poveda recalled Peru's invasion of Ecuador in 1941 when Ecuador lost 50 percent of its national territory. He declared that Ecuador was by tradition and right an Amazonian power and stated that they had been holding talks with the Peruvians to seek a peaceful solution to this problem. He observed that although diplomatic relations with Peru had reached a low point last December, they had now normalized. But he was gravely worried about the Peruvian arms build-up, believ-

ing it entirely disproportionate both to Peru's economy and to the military potential of its neighbors. Further complicating the situation in Peru, he continued, was that most of the arms had come from the Soviet Union. Poveda revealed that Ecuador had also received a feeler from the Soviet Union regarding arms and equipment, but due to Ecuadorean policy, its national character, and way of life, Ecuador was reluctant to accept the Soviet physical and psychological presence which would be established by an arms supplier-purchaser relationship.

8. Poveda ceded to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Salvador Lara, who delineated Ecuadorean principles in international law. Salvador said that Ecuador was motivated by the principles of democracy, respect for international law, defense of its sovereignty, non-intervention, the repudiation of the legitimacy of territory taken by force, the promotion of human rights and the elimination of racial discrimination. Ecuador, he said, is a friend of the United States because of its historic ties, its dedication to democratic principles, certain geopolitical imperatives, and the need for expansion of trade. Echoing Poveda's remarks on the Andean situation, Salvador said that there were various aspects of the situation each of which separately would be disturbing, but taken together represented a truly explosive potential. One of the factors was the landlocked status of Bolivia and its relation with Peru and Chile. A second was the arms acquisitions of Peru which had created a qualitative and quantitative power imbalance in the region at the expense of domestic recession and impoverishment of the Peruvian masses. A third was the Soviet presence in Peru. Notwithstanding the normalization of diplomatic relations with Peru, these factors, he said, could spell regional tragedy. Salvador also referred to Peru's invasion of Ecuadorean-claimed territory in 1941 and its deprivation of an Amazonian outlet. Ecuador only wished an honorable conciliation with Peru which would result in an outlet to the Amazon. Repeating his concern about the potential for hostilities in the region, he stated that Ecuador is happy that the U.S. shared its concern. He hoped that the United States would maintain its position of being willing to cooperate to bring about a relaxation of tensions in the area.

9. Mrs. Carter responded with a general view of the President's policy towards Latin America and the world. She explained that the Administration reflected a new and more open view to world and domestic affairs as well as a conviction that we cannot act abroad in a way that we would not act at home. The President sees a need for a wider system of world cooperation and believes that we are in a new historic era. Problems must be faced on a worldwide basis. We must reach out to areas beyond the industrialized countries and try to understand each other. In this context, Latin America is very important and

was one of the reasons for her visit. Describing human rights as the second major tenet of the administration's foreign policy, she noted that the commitment was not just a view of the President, but of the entire American people. We believe, she said, that this concern is shared by the people of this hemisphere and that this common belief can be the basis for a worldwide system of cooperation on human rights. Another tenet of our foreign policy is control and reduction of nuclear and conventional arms. She recalled that the last thing she did before leaving Washington was to attend the ceremony of the signing of the Protocol 1 of the treaty of Tlatelolco. One of the first things the President did after his inauguration was to ask for a study of conventional arms sales policy. While that study was under way, a difficult decision had to be made regarding the sale of KFIR fighters to Ecuador. She explained that the decision was made in a way that was thought consistent with our emerging arms policy.

Mrs. Carter listed the three main elements of that as (A) reduction of the amount of arms sold by the U.S. year by year; (B) not to introduce new sophisticated weapons to a region which would escalate the arms race and (C) to seek agreement by arms suppliers and purchasers to limit arms transfers. Focusing on Latin American policy, Mrs. Carter quoted from the President's Pan American Day speech.⁵ First, she said, our respect for the independence and individuality and sovereignty of the nations in Latin America. Second, the US wants to promote peace and stability in the area. Third was our emphasis on the promotion of human rights within an inter-American context. She also noted that the President had expressed U.S. support for the Ayacucho Declaration⁶ as a potential example to the world of how to seek ways to cooperate on these problems.

10. Asst. Secy. Todman observed that the State Department had been carrying out the President's policy in this regard by consulting with other countries in the search for peace. This was particularly true in the Andean region where the Department had embarked upon a series of consultations with countries in the sub-region. He also recalled that when Foreign Minister de la Puente of Peru had visited Washington earlier this year, he was informed of our concern about the extent of the arms build-up in his country. Todman said he was pleased to some extent by the exchanges of visits among the leaders of all the countries, believing that this would give each country the opportunity to appreci-

⁵ President Carter's Pan-American Day speech, given before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on April 14, 1977, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Document 33.

⁶ Eight Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in December 1974, declaring their intent to cooperate in restraining arms purchases in Latin America.

ate better the intentions and ideas of the others. He hoped that these consultations and visits would continue and would lead to a reduction of tension in the area. For our part, he concluded, we will continue to watch the situation very closely and keep in touch with leaders of all the countries of the area.

11. Commenting on the statements by Mrs. Carter and Asst. Secy. Todman, President Poveda declared that Ecuadorean foreign policy coincided 100 percent with the policy of President Carter in certain areas. In human rights and in the arms question, he said, Ecuador was in near perfect agreement with the U.S. No country with a democratic ambience, he explained, could really oppose U.S. efforts to bring about peace in the world. He appreciated the administration's policy of consultation and cooperation which met a sorely felt need among countries which did not previously have the full attention of the United States. He characterized Mrs. Carter's visit as an ample demonstration of this policy. With regard to arms sales, Poveda did not believe that Ecuador's position ran counter to the President's policy. He noted that the President's policy statement indicated that the U.S. would support friendly countries which had to depend upon advanced weaponry either to compensate for overall disadvantages or to restore a regional arms balance. He declared that though Ecuador was in favor of U.S. arms transfer policy, it also hoped that due consideration would be taken for the national security aspects in each case. He argued that Ecuador's defense position was so weak and its needs so small that they could not possibly produce alarm or threaten the peace. Meeting Ecuador's very small requirements would be the best way to reduce the warlike intentions on the part of neighboring countries. He formulated Ecuadorean policy on this question as seeking assistance and re-establishing a balance of power in the region and then freezing arms acquisitions in the name of promoting peace.

12. Mrs. Carter responded that the U.S. also was concerned about the amount of military equipment that Peru has purchased, and by the fact that most of it has come from the Soviet Union. She reiterated that we had expressed our concern over the potential destabilizing effect of such purchases on the region. If it is true, she said, that the Peruvians have in fact bought sophisticated aircraft from the Soviet Union thereby creating an imbalance, she would bring it to the President's attention. Declining to make any promises that she could not keep regarding the sale of arms, she assured the Ecuadorean side that she would convey their message to the President. On the other hand, she wondered why we could not use our imagination to find alternative ways to provide Ecuador with the security it clearly needs rather than divert scarce resources which could be used for development instead of defense expenditures. For example, she suggested that the peace-keeping func-

tions of the OAS ought to be strengthened. She asked the Ecuadorean side whether they had any ideas on this.

13. President Poveda requested US. cooperation in converting these alternatives into real possibilities. Regarding the OAS, he said he shared Mrs. Carter's interest in strengthening its peace-keeping function and would like to hear more about it.

14. Foreign Minister Salvador joined in, stating that Ecuador was firmly committed to the strengthening of the OAS. But, although the OAS has had some success in maintaining peace in the region, some experiences in peace-keeping had been disappointing. He trusted that with renewed concern about this question that the peace-keeping function, especially regarding the control of nuclear devices, would be strengthened. He spoke of the possibility, discussed some years ago, of establishing an OAS Peace-Keeping Force, but noted that it was feared by some Latin American countries as a potential interventionist force. If these fears could be erased, he thought, the Peace-Keeping Force concept might be worth reviving, but the time is not yet ripe for such ideas and time is of the essence for Ecuador.

15. Salvador, continuing, said that Ecuador had supported the Ayacucho Declaration at the sacrifice of a certain amount of national pride. Ecuador signed the Declaration in the hope that it would further peace and stop the diversion of resources. Unfortunately, immediately after signing, Peru undertook its large-scale arms acquisitions policy which has led to the deterioration of its economy and the derogation of the Ayacucho Declaration. Emphasizing that Ecuador was neither engaged in an arms race nor was initiating one, Salvador highlighted the national need to correct the quantitative and qualitative arms imbalance. Referring to U.S. arms transfer policy, Salvador noted that Peru had bought SU-22 fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union and therefore the U.S. could not be considered the first to introduce such sophisticated weaponry in the area. He realized that it must have been difficult and painful for President Carter to decide to veto the KFIR sale to Ecuador, but that this decision was also painful to Ecuador inasmuch as it had placed its national security in jeopardy. Salvador was gratified that Mrs. Carter had heard Ecuador's views and would convey them to the President. He hoped that Mrs. Carter's direct exposure to this question would do much to clear the air.

16. Mrs. Carter replied that KFIR decision had come in the middle of a review on arms transfer policies in the early days of the Administration. She stressed that the decision was not directed against Ecuador but it was part of a global policy, and at the same time, she said she understood Ecuador's security concerns and that the U.S. also was interested in peace and security in this region.

17. Continuing on the theme of security assistance, Poveda pointed out that if Ecuador did not take appropriate and timely measures

to increase its defense capability, the peace of the region would be compromised. Alluding to the President's arms transfer policy, Poveda said that Ecuador felt that it was a country friendly to the United States. He also stressed that Ecuador was a country on the road to democracy, a free country where extremism was minimal. As such, it sincerely believed that it had a claim on the attention of the U.S. with regard to security assistance. Poveda stated that Ecuador had spent little on arms heretofore because it was in agreement with the U.S. on this as a matter of principle. Because of its small military budget in the past, Ecuador had finally begun to develop. But some help with security now, although of little significance to the U.S., was vital to Ecuador.

18. Poveda next turned to General Arrata, the Minister of Defense, who recalled the national tragedy of 1941 when the country had to face a Peruvian invasion without being properly armed. Although Ecuador had never forgotten this, it had devoted the major part of economic resources to social and economic development until very recently. It was only after Peru began its arms build-up and created the tensions in the region that Ecuador began to re-equip its armed forces. He emphasized that Ecuador's sole purpose was defense and to avoid the repetition of the events of 1941. Arrata was grateful for the resumption of security assistance from the U.S. after a four-year suspension and especially the FMS credits that it had received in recent years. It intended to use these credits to acquire defensive equipment in order to dissuade its potential adversary from adventurism and thus avoid a conflict. He hoped that Ecuador's interest in obtaining the 24 KFIR fighters could be viewed in this light. He charged that the U.S. veto produced a dangerous delay in the execution of national defense plans. Ecuador also consulted with the U.S. regarding an integrated air defense system, including detection equipment and missiles. It had also requested two over-age destroyers since the Ecuadorean navy had only obsolete surface ships. The army had also made certain requests, but there had been long delays in delivery. Arrata concluded by asking, quote now that you've heard about our foreign policy and the military situation—which you also say is recognized by you, isn't it clear why we need your government's help? Unquote.

19. Army Commander and Triumvirate Member, General Duran, after exchanging pleasantries with Mrs. Carter, recapitulated the problems that the army had had in obtaining equipment through the FMS program. He recalled that General Rachmaller⁷ had offered to assist in speeding up the requests, but there would still be long delays of up to three years for rather small amounts of equipment. The anti-tank

⁷ Rachmeller visited Ecuador in February. See Document 266.

equipment which was sent in January had been barely enough for training purposes and the ammunition has now been almost completely used up. Duran stressed that the anti-tank equipment was eminently defensive, enabling the army to face a massive armored attack from Peru which had several hundred Soviet Tanks. Duran concluded that his only request was for the U.S. to comply on its sales agreements.

20. Air Force Commander and Triumvirate Member, General Leoro, expressed his profound disagreement with the KFIR veto. He explained that Ecuador, which had always depended on U.S. equipment, would now have to look elsewhere for new suppliers. The air force was only looking to balance the Peruvian potential and not trying to top it. It was not engaging in an arms race but was only trying to replace the meteors and canberras it acquired in 1954. He hoped that the USG would be sensitive to the situation and reconsider the veto. He repeated that Ecuador would have to look elsewhere—no matter where. Leoro insisted that Ecuador needed what he termed an quote integrated unquote air defense system, including radar and missiles. Ecuador had received bids from U.S. firms for the radar systems, but needed USG approval for the HAWK missile which, he asserted, was totally defensive. He bemoaned the fact that the requests which had been channeled through the Military Liaison Office had produced no results. Leoro wound up by pleading for the renewal of grants for pilot and other technical training which he said had been suspended. A positive U.S. reply on these matters, he said, would indicate that the U.S. understands and sympathizes with Ecuadorean problems.

21. Poveda briefly sketched in the Naval point of view. He thought that extremely cordial relations had existed between the U.S. and the Ecuadorean Navy since 1975, and that the understanding and coordination between the Embassy and the Navy had led to the de facto solution of the tuna boats problem. He was convinced that an understanding on this had been reached because of the intimacy that had been achieved with the U.S. He also pointed to Ecuador's participation in the *Unitas* Exercise as another example of Ecuadorean Navy identification with the United States. He concluded by putting on the record Ecuador's standing request for two destroyers and some auxiliary ships.

22. General Carlos Aguirre Asanza, Chief of Staff of the Joint Command, underlined the previous remarks on security assistance. He added that Ecuador had many offers from other countries on security assistance which it was studying, but it preferred to deal with the United States because of Ecuador's basic political orientation and the fact that other supplies might be much more expensive in the long run. But time was short, he said, since Ecuador had very little defensive capability now and had to create one immediately to defend its territory. The best way to achieve this goal would be in cooperation with

the U.S., and he hoped that Ecuador's needs would coincide with the Carter arms transfer policy.

23. Ambassador Bloomfield remarked that although he in no way meant to contradict the Ecuadorean case, he had to point out that the U.S. had demonstrated that it did indeed understand the Ecuadorean problem. For instance, Ecuador was the only country in Latin America that had its FMS credit increased in FY 1977. Also, the shipment of the anti-tank weapons represented an extraordinary measure since the equipment was taken out of the current U.S. inventory. In addition, Ecuador was the first country to receive the new production of LAWS. Ambassador Bloomfield also pointed to the delivery of the LST which had had to run the gauntlet of Congressional approval.⁸ Ambassador Bloomfield repeated Mrs. Carter's statement regarding the administration's policy that it would make no promises which it can't fulfill. With regard to the army's problem of delivery time, Ambassador Bloomfield stated that this was not a policy problem but rather a technical production problem from which our own army is also suffering. The destroyers, he said, were under active consideration, and now that the fishing dispute had quieted, he hoped that favorable action will be taken. But, he cautioned, it still needed Congressional approval. Ambassador Bloomfield stated that air defense is an area which falls in the purview of the administration's arms control policy. In this regard, however, Mrs. Carter had taken due note of the imbalance in air defense and would bring the matter to the President's attention.

24. Poveda switched the discussion to Ecuador's domestic politics and explained the government's policy of transferring the reins of power to a constitutional civilian government in the near future. He said that Ecuador was currently in the middle of a process that was designed to accomplish this. Drafts of two alternative Constitutions had just been delivered to the Supreme Council by commissions drawn from a broad spectrum of political currents. A referendum to choose a Constitution would be called when the issuance of new identification cards was complete, and that this would be followed by Presidential Elections and finally by the installation of a constitutional government. The government felt that this plan was both acceptable and feasible and believed that it would discourage extremism, terrorism, and the creation of guerrillas. Poveda thought that Ecuador's decision to transfer power to civilians had already had repercussions throughout the hemisphere and would continue to produce them. For instance, when Ecuador had first proclaimed its intention, few, if any, *de facto* governments had been talking about an end to military rule. He proudly

⁸ "LAWS" refers to light anti-tank weapons; "LST" refers to a landing ship tank.

observed that there were now several other countries that were talking the same way. In carrying out this policy, the government was acting in good conscience, realizing that in order to succeed it must respect freedom of speech, human rights and justice.

25. Continuing on this theme, the Minister of Government, Col. Bolivar Jarrin, said that civil liberties and rights were very well delineated by the government, and that these lines were respected. He claimed that Ecuador had no political prisoners, that the government persecuted nobody because of political beliefs, and that there were no exiles. Ecuador, he said, maintained a complete respect for human rights.

26. Mrs. Carter indicated that the fact she had come to Ecuador was evidence of our acknowledgement of Ecuador's record on human rights and its plan to return to democratic government. She informed the Ecuadorean side that yesterday the President had signed the American Convention on Human Rights, and noting that Ecuador had already signed it, expressed the hope that it would ratify the Convention as soon as possible. Mrs. Carter thought that Ecuador could play a unique role by serving as an example in the human rights field just as it was in returning to democracy. She then asked whether her hosts had any ideas on how to strengthen the Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

27. Poveda thanked Mrs. Carter for her frankness and sincere wishes. He stated that Ecuador, as few others in Latin America, could cooperate and support the acceptance of these concepts in other countries, and promised to explore further how to accomplish this. Poveda apologized that lack of time prevented the meeting from discussing Mrs. Carter's question on the Human Rights Commission as well as economic and social matters, but said he would give Mrs. Carter memoranda on the latter problems. Poveda concluded by thanking Mrs. Carter for the attention she had devoted to his country and for her eloquence. He said that her responses had already pleased them. It was always good to have a discussion among friends especially when both desire to achieve the same universal policy. Mrs. Carter, he said, had won the heart of Ecuador by her charming personality and her value as a human being.

Bloomfield

269. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, June 11, 1977, 1530Z

3883. Subj: Admiral Poveda's Request Regarding Sale of F-4 Aircraft.

1. Summary: Admiral Poveda has approached Embassy to sound USG out informally, but urgently, on whether we would make F-4 available to Ecuador. He indicated that an appropriate substitute package might also be acceptable if F-4 not available. Emb suspects that F-4 may not be suitable for Ecuador, but feels strongly that in light of announcement of new arms transfer policy² and Mrs. Carter's visit, we are obliged to come back with a legitimate counter-proposal. This would include F-5's and perhaps A-10's. End summary.

2. Background. Immediately following the visit of Mrs. Carter, the Ambassador was approached on June 4 by an Emissary of Adm. Poveda who reported the Admiral as wishing to make an informal sounding through the Ambassador about the possibility of obtaining F-4's from the US. It was agreed through the Emissary that President Poveda and the Ambassador would discuss the matter orally within a few days, but because of the death of his father the Ambassador had to leave Ecuador temporarily. The Ambassador sent word to Poveda that he would like for him to discuss the matter with the DCM who would be charge in his absence. Prior to his departure, the Ambassador outlined his thinking on the request and formulated recommendations which are transmitted by this cable.

3. Admiral Poveda spoke with the charge on June 9. He said that Ecuador must make a decision in the very near future on what kind of fighter aircraft it would purchase, and stated that he wanted to explore informally the possibilities for obtaining US aircraft, especially the F-4 which the Ecuadorean air force would consider to be a satisfactory substitute for the KIFR. The charge stated that the Ambassador was pessimistic about obtaining the approval for sale of F-4's but had said he would be glad to take soundings in Washington. Poveda stated it was essential to find out whether the US would permit sale of the F-4 or an acceptable substitute to meet Ecuador's basic air defense requirements and be attractive enough for prestige purposes to take the sting out of the KFIR veto.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770209-0537. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Lima.

² Presumable reference is to PD/NSC-13, May 13. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.

4. Poveda stressed that he wished to get a decision on US aircraft from the USG through his own personal channels and thereby avoid having a formal request refused that would have an even worse impact on US/Ecuadorean relations than the USG's refusal to permit Israel to sell Ecuador KFIRS. He implied that he too was dubious about USG approval of F-4's, but hopeful that the USG would come back with a package that would meet Ecuadorean defense needs and be attractive enough to overcome the injured pride of the Ecuadorean Air Force.

5. Poveda said the GOE was still interested in the US survey team to examine Ecuador's air defense needs. The charge cautioned that the Ambassador was also pessimistic regarding US approval for the sale of the I-HAWK (which the GOE has requested) because of the I-HAWK's sophistication and cost. The charge said it was possible that a survey team would find Ecuador could get along with less sophisticated air defense missiles. Poveda said he understood this, and that if Ecuador could obtain F-4's or other attractive substitute aircraft that could be coupled in an air defense system with less sophisticated but adequate air defense missiles, pressure for the I-HAWK would diminish.

6. Poveda again stressed that soundings on the F-4 must be handled very confidentially and carefully so as not to damage the overall bilateral relationship. The charge promised Poveda to relay his inquiry to Washington while again cautioning him against expecting too much. Poveda replied that he understood and asked the charge to proceed.

7. Comment: (The following reflects extensive conversations with the Ambassador prior to his having to depart Ecuador.) For several months, since the KFIR veto, we have declined to talk in specific terms about air defense requirements for the GOE with the explanation that the new administration had not yet formulated its new arms transfer policy. The policy has now been announced and as they indicated in their discussion with Mrs. Carter, the Ecuadorean belief that regional arms imbalance caused by the Peruvian build-up provides them with an exception to a generally tougher US attitude. Since the basic guidelines of the new policy are now clear and evident to the GOE, we do not believe that we can continue to procrastinate in facing the issues here and maintain any credibility. Ecuador feels there is no longer sufficient reason for the USG to continue postponing its response to security needs expressed repeatedly to the Embassy, to Washington by the GOE high level mission in March,³ and to Mrs. Carter. The GOE

³ In telegram 69266 to Quito, March 29, the Department summarized the March 24 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770107-0722) In telegram 69925 to Quito, March 29, the Department summarized the March 25 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770108-1198)

believes the continued arms purchases by Peru present an immediate danger. Most members of the armed forces would prefer American planes and missiles, but all are agreed that Ecuador cannot delay much longer before placing orders.

8. Mrs. Carter's visit has also contributed to the need for a quick decision on this problem. During the substantive conversation with her the Ecuadorean Officials put all of their eggs in one basket choosing to devote 90% of the three-hour conversation to security problems, even eschewing a discussion of GSP exclusion in the process. They gambled on convincing Mrs. Carter of the arms imbalance and Ecuador's need for defense equipment and they expected that she would convey her impressions to the highest levels. Poveda seemed pleased with Mrs. Carter's responses and we therefore do not think it a coincidence that Poveda's approach has been timed so soon after Mrs. Carter's visit.

9. We have no doubt that if we offered the F-4, FAE would accept it and that the transfer would rebound greatly to the benefit of our bilateral relationship. And although the F-4 is not currently authorized for Latin America, we understand that there has been some movement to change that. However, we doubt whether the change could be effected soon enough to give a reasonably prompt answer to Admiral Poveda. Moreover we have greater doubts about the appropriateness of the F-4 for Ecuador in any case. The level of sophistication needed to fly it and especially to maintain it may not be adequate in Ecuador. If so, it would either have a dismaying percentage of downtime, or US technicians and advisers would have to be present frequently and in numbers to assist the FAE. While we have argued in the past that some sort of US identification with Ecuador's defense would be salutary for regional peace, we do not believe that we would care to identify ourselves to the extent that the demands of Phantom servicing might imply.

10. The Embassy is also troubled by the potential impact on Peru of a sale by the US of F-4's. While we do not believe that their delivery would destabilize the region or produce any greater arms race that has been engendered by Peru unilaterally, we do believe that the sale by US of Mach 2.2 fighter bombers with an operational radius reaching Lima might cause the Peruvians to look askance at the US and cool the present thawing of bilateral relations.

11. Realizing that reversal of the KFIR decision is not in the cards and if F-4's are not considered appropriate, the Ambassador would like to go back to Admiral Poveda at the same time with a legitimate and possibly acceptable alternative offer. The Embassy is convinced that Ecuador must be given some kind of definite answer now. In the name of our own budding bilateral relationship and in view of what has transpired over the past several months, it is the least we can do.

The Ambassador, before his departure, therefore outlined as a proposal to the Department the following alternative option packages:

A. Offer 24–36 F–5's on normal terms. The F–5 is authorized for Latin America and its interceptor capability would make it an acceptable, if not ideal, plane for Ecuador's air defense problem. The chances of FAE accepting it, however, are probably less than 50% because of reasons mentioned previously. At least, we would have made the gesture.

B. Offer F–5's with accelerated delivery times. If we could offer some F–5's to reach Ecuador before the current 18 month factory lead time, GOE would find the proposal a great deal more attractive. It would indicate our special interest in their problems. We believe that there may be sufficient Army and Navy support for this kind of proposal to persuade the recalcitrant Air Force.

C. Offer a mix of F–5s and A–10s. GOE had evinced an interest in A–10s for some time now because their anti-tank capability counters perfectly Peru's large number of Soviet tanks. It meets a legitimate, obvious, and recognized defense requirement. It moreover has the attraction of being brand-new which would probably be sufficient to overcome FAE vanity. The FAE has already rejected repeated efforts by company representatives to sell it the A–4 or A–7, and we believe there would be virtually no chance of the FAE accepting a package of F–5s and A–4Ms or A–7s. Aside from production problems we understand that prohibitions on the A–10 derive from its FAU–8 round (gun projectile). We believe that the A–10 might be acceptable to the FAE, however, without the GAU–8 round or with another gun with some anti-tank capability and FAE hopes of being able to acquire the GAU-system in the future. The army, of course, could be expected to push very hard to obtain the A–10 because of its problems in dealing with Peruvian armor. We believe that offer of F–5s and A–10 would represent the optimum in being forthcoming for political reasons, giving Ecuador some air defense, adding to its anti-tank capability, and in minimizing the impact on our relations with Peru in consonance with meeting our objectives with Ecuador. Moreover, such a mix would force Ecuador to focus its military planning on a defensive strategy centered on thwarting realistic threats.

D. Although the survey team concept can probably no longer stand alone as an effective approach, it ought to be included in all of the three above options in order to further demonstrate our interest. On the other hand, if option B and certainly option C could be made available, we feel that we could get off the hook on the missile question without any particular political loss.

12. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] a decision on aircraft purchase will be made soon after the Ecuadorean mission to the Paris Air Show

returns to Quito on June 18. Our military representatives also believe this likely. If so, we have a very short time to be forthcoming and to attempt to channel the Ecuadorean defense effort into a desirable course.

Corr

270. Letter From President Carter to Members of the Supreme Governing Council of Ecuador¹

Washington, June 24, 1977

Dear Members of the Supreme Council:

I would like to thank you personally for the warm and gracious hospitality which you, your wives, your government and the people of Ecuador gave Rosalynn during her visit to Quito.² We considered the opportunity to discuss frankly and in depth our many common interests and concerns extremely useful.

Rosalynn has reported to me fully on the substance of your talks. I was especially pleased to hear that Ecuador will sign and ratify the American Convention on Human Rights, and would hope that Ecuador, from its well-known position as a champion of principle in international behavior, will continue to play a leading role in the effort to improve human rights. I know you will continue the active search for constructive ways to improve the human rights situation within our Hemisphere.

I also wish you well and will follow closely your plan for a return to civilian government during 1978. Rosalynn and I are impressed with your Government's plans in this area, which are worthy of emulation by other nations.

As for your arms requests, I would like to assure you that we are studying them carefully in light of my administration's new arms sales policy. We may not be able to respond fully and affirmatively on certain of your requests, but I would like to assure you that we will look thoroughly at each, and will consult with you in the near future about them.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 5, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 268.

Rosalynn's visit strengthened our awareness of potential security problems in the Andean subregion. We are actively searching for ways to reduce tensions in that area. I have instructed the Department of State to begin discussions in Washington with your government and with other parties concerned—and these have begun. We should pursue jointly every possible avenue to promote a reduction of intraregional tensions.

During her discussions in Lima with the Government of Peru, Rosalynn raised, with my full support, the subject of restraining arms acquisitions. She explained to the Peruvian Government our deep commitment to reducing tensions throughout the world, and pointed out that your concerns make it all the more desirable for Peru to demonstrate its peaceful intentions. She also mentioned your interest in further discussions with Peru about gaining access to the Amazon for your country.

We are also, of course, aware of your Government's concern about Ecuador's exclusion from the Generalized System of Preferences contained in the United States Trade Act. We are currently reviewing this question.

Again, my most sincere thanks for having made Rosalynn's stay in Quito such a memorable event. I hope that both of our countries, and others as well, will benefit from the process we have begun to build toward a more peaceful future.

Sincerely,³

Jimmy Carter

³ Underneath his signature, Carter wrote: "p.s. Rosalynn sends her best wishes. J.C."

271. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, July 19, 1977, 2145Z

4828. Subject: GOE Return to Civilian Rule. Ref: A) State 155911;² B) State 161242;³ C) Quito 4621.⁴

1. Begin summary. The following political analysis is a continuation of and update to a series of messages about the process currently underway to return Ecuador to civilian government. The assessment incorporates answers to questions raised in Reftels A and B. Nearly all political actors now seem to be convinced that the military is sincere in its plan to restore constitutional government, and in the last week political maneuvering and efforts at forming electoral coalitions have greatly intensified. The Embassy believes that the military's willingness to carry its plans for "retorno" through elections and to the assumption of power by an elected President depends largely on the military's belief that the process will not result in the election of Populist Assad Bucaram. The Embassy's analysis is that Bucaram could be electorally defeated by one of several potential candidates supported by a broad political coalition. We consider the return of Ecuador to civilian, constitutional government to be in the U.S. interest, and with the aim of encouraging the military to carry the process through to its conclusion we have carefully shared our view that Bucaram could be defeated with a few selected Ecuadorian leaders. End summary.

2. While it is still fashionable in some political circles to profess skepticism about the "retorno" process, nearly all major political elements seem to be persuaded at this point that the military government

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770257-0023. Confidential. Sent for information to La Paz, Lima, Santiago, USCINCSO, and the consulate in Guayaquil.

² In telegram 155911 to Quito, July 5, the Department reported on Barnebey's July 4 conversation with Poveda regarding "GOE plans for return to civilian regime, which Poveda characterized as going forward satisfactorily," and the potential candidacy of Bucaram. Barnebey requested the Embassy's analysis of Poveda's remarks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770238-1215)

³ In telegram 161242 to Quito, July 12, the Department requested the Embassy's analysis of other political parties and coalitions and military leaders' "understanding of realities of the current civilian political scene," including whether the military or either of the two proposed constitutions would block the candidacy of any political candidate. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770247-0534)

⁴ In telegram 4621 from Quito, July 12, the Embassy reported on an interview with former Ecuadoran president José María Velasco Ibarra that had been published in a Quito newspaper, including that Velasco "cited age and a flagging memory" as reasons why he would not return to Ecuador from his home in Argentina to campaign for president. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770248-0641)

is sincere in its current plan to hand government back to the civilians within a year. The exceptions are diehards like the Vesasquistas, the followers of Carlos Julio Arosemena, and some minor factions. Many Ecuadorean notables, such as Galo Plaza, while dubious about the specifics of the government plan, are participating wholeheartedly in the process in the view that while not ideal, the plan offers the only real possibility for return to civilian government at this time. Perhaps more important than the belief in the sincerity of the Triumvirate is the change we have noted over the past several weeks in the opinion that the mechanism put into gear by the military will actually work. As a result of this perception, politicians have begun to realize that not only is there a high probability that they will be involved in full-scale election campaigns as scheduled, but that timing of the electoral calendar behooves them to prepare as quickly as possible to face that election. The emergence of several serious presidential candidates and the backstage wheeling and dealing regarding coalitions in the past ten days are evidence of this realization.

3. The key to the success of the process revolves around the candidacy of Assad Bucaram. Efforts to block his candidacy during the Constitutional drafting process failed. While there still exists the possibility of a challenge to Bucaram's Ecuadorean birth certificate (presidential candidates must be native born Ecuadoreans according to both Constitutions),⁵ the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, headed by former President Galo Plaza, is known to be favorable to principle of letting Bucaram run, and will decide on this question if it is raised. The decision by the drafting commissions to permit Bucaram's candidacy has, in the minds of many, legitimized the putative election and enhanced its significance. In the opinion of many of those opposed to Bucaram personally, the risk of Bucaram's winning is partially off-set by the tremendous prestige that would be accrued to the candidate who was able to beat him. This in itself might give momentum to the new constitutional order sufficient to restrain the military from intervening again for perhaps several years.

4. The military, as an institution, is known to be opposed, and rather vehemently so, to the possibility of a Bucaram presidency. However, whether the military will step in before the election will depend on A) how complete the consensus to act is within the officer ranks, and B) their perception of how probable Bucaram's election is. This second point is highly critical since there are very strong countervailing pressures on the military to keep their word and retire from government rule unless unusual circumstances dictate otherwise. Further, the longer

⁵ The constitutions required that at least one of a candidates' parents be born in Ecuador; Bucaram's parents were both born in Lebanon.

the military delays in arriving at the conclusion that nothing can stop Bucaram legally, the more difficult it will become for them to intervene at all in view of the commitments and expectations regarding the return to civilian government which progressively hem the military leadership in at every new stage of the retorno process. In other words, the longer the military believes that Bucaram can be defeated legitimately, the greater the chances are that a civilian government will actually take office.

5. We have submitted in our parm and commented elsewhere that a return to civilian government in Ecuador serves our interests. While we should eschew any actions that might be construed as intervention, we should attempt to promote democracy discreetly and identify ourselves with it as nearly as possible. Since this was the principal theme of Mrs. Carter's visit here, we must assume that this policy is supported at the highest USG levels. One of the unique instruments that we have in affecting the process is the credibility of the Embassy's political analysis in the eyes of key military and civilian politicians; they view us as interested, as having the resources to collect and analyze, and as being free from intellectual bias. We are carefully using this device, when the opportunity arises with selected persons, to convey informally the impression that in our opinion Bucaram is beatable. (At the same time, we have an excellent relationship with Bucaram and feel that in the event that he comes to power our bilateral relations should not be affected by the above mentioned exchanges.)

6. In our exchanges with others on Bucaram we have deliberately raised questions about his being untested in any constituency larger than the province of Guayas, the equal popularity of Liberal contender Francisco (Panch) Huerta in roughly the same constituency the last time elections were held (1970), Bucaram's failure to attract a respectable audience when he held a rally in Quito a few months ago, his deteriorated physical condition, the advent of television as a major campaign medium which will presumably favor "cooler" candidates, and doubts about the extent of Bucaram's appeal to the 900,000 young voters who have entered the voting lists for the first time. We believe that this low-key campaign has been fairly successful thus far, as witnessed by the arguments coming full circle in a few instances and being attributed to our interlocutors. Of course, without any help from us, the analysis stands of its own weight and seems to be enjoying a growing acceptance here. Admiral Poveda, for instance, reflected these thoughts in his conversation with the ARA/AND Acting Director.⁶

⁶ See footnote 2 above.

7. The concentration of popular forces formally endorsed "Don Buca" at its convention last week. Because of the imponderables cited in the previous paragraph about the potential strength of Bucaram in the first national election since 1968, it is difficult, if not impossible to predict what will happen at the polls next spring if the transition process chugs on. In response to a question raised in Ref A), we believe that in this regard Poveda has as much purchase on political reality as most political observers, and based upon our assessment of his personal intellectual qualities, probably a good deal more than most. One thing, however, that all agree upon is that if Bucaram is to be beaten, he will be beaten by means of a coalition of several major and minor parties. That both draft constitutions call for the election of a President by an absolute majority which will probably lead to a second, run-off election, further encourage this thinking.

8. During the past ten days efforts to forge potential coalitions have picked up steam. The Liberals, who rest in the center of the political spectrum, are considered the linch-pin of such efforts and they have already allied themselves with the small, but prestigious, Unified Socialist Party and several minor personalistic groups. Meanwhile, the Conservatives on the center-right are eagerly pursuing a coalition with the Liberals, and the Liberals have fanned out their emissaries to both the center-right and center-left in order to establish the broadest possible electoral arrangement. One of the Liberal possibilities, Raul Clemente Huerta (who is in the position of being able to obtain his party's nomination if he wants it) is demanding nothing less than a coalition embracing all of these groups as the sine qua non of his candidacy.

9. Of other candidates, the Conservatives have offered the Liberals the names of Quito Mayor Sixto Duran Ballen and banker-politician Jaime Acosta Velasco and have asked in turn for Liberal names to consider. While Duran Ballen is rather more attractive to the Liberals and center-left than Acosta, the latter, as the nephew of Velasco Ibarra, is strengthened by the possibility of his appeal to the old Velasquista constituency. (How important Velasquista support might be is speculative in view of the fragmentation and possible disintegration that have occurred in the group recently as it has become clear that the octogenerian Velasco will not again be a presidential candidate (Ref C)). Left of center groupings consisting of the Christian Democrats, the Progressive conservatives, and the followers of ex-Ambassador to the U.S. Jose C. Cardenas, announced their mutual cooperation a few days ago. This group is probably the emerging new element that Poveda mentioned to the director of ARA/AND and noted to the Ambassador and DCM some months ago. The center-left agglomeration seems to be pushing Cardenas. The important Liberal splinter, the Democratic Left Party (Izquiorda Democratica) has remained aloof from these fusion efforts,

thus far, but Abdon Calderon of the much smaller Liberal splinter Alfarista Radical Front Party has announced his candidacy. The Communist Party (Moscow-line), the Revolutionary Socialists (Havana-line) plus other radical groups are involved in a *frente amplio de la Izquierda*, which should have little direct influence on the electoral process.

10. Anticipating the political campaign and election from this distance, the US finds itself in the fortunate position of not having to concern itself too much—in terms of our bilateral interests—about which candidate will eventually be chosen: none of the serious possibilities (including Bucaram) have expressed anything but a desire for greater accommodation with US. While the campaign itself could produce nationalistic issues which might change this estimate, at this point we must regard the chances of getting to the inauguration itself and the potential stability of the ensuing civilian government as our major areas of attention.

Corr

272. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 25, 1977

SUBJECT

Arms for Ecuador

Background

You will recall that Mrs. Carter's conversation with the Supreme Council of Ecuador was dominated by their requests for U.S. arms and/or Kfirs,² and as a result, State and Defense were asked to prepare an options paper for your consideration. It is attached at Tab A.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Materials, Country File, Box 17, Ecuador: 1/77-1/81. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum. According to another copy of the memorandum, Denend, Tuchman, and Pastor sent it to Brzezinski under a July 19 covering memorandum, recommending that Brzezinski sign the memorandum to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 19, Ecuador, 2-12/77)

² See Document 268.

³ Attached but not printed is a July 14 memorandum from Vance to Carter.

I agree with State's assessment that Ecuador exaggerates the possibility of a Peruvian attack, but I understand why the threat might be seen differently in Quito than in Washington. Even a ten percent chance of attack can be a powerful incentive to obtain a defense capability, particularly considering the inadequacy of current Ecuadorean defenses. Also, of course, there is the memory of Peru's attack in 1941–42, when one-third of Ecuador's territory was captured, as well as Ecuador's current fear that Peru might attack again to take the oil fields in the south.

The Ecuadoreans are about to agree to pay \$710 million for very advanced French F-1 aircraft and used Israeli Mirage-5s and Anglo-French Jaguars. They are very disturbed that the U.S. has not responded sooner and more positively to their requests, particularly given the good feelings exchanged during Mrs. Carter's trip, their supportive stand on human rights at the OAS General Assembly, and their desire to press forward toward a democratic and civilian government.

Options

All agencies agree on the importance of diplomatic initiatives, regardless of the decision on arms sales. The State Department is presently following up with President Perez on his proposal to try to reduce tension in the Andean region by seeking support for Bolivia's request for access to the sea. Perez also said that he wanted to eliminate—not just reduce—the tension by arranging a multilateral effort to develop and de-militarize the border area.⁴

State's memorandum lists five options, but the four agencies involved in writing the paper (State, ACDA, Defense, JCS) have only recommended two of these. Because the other three options do not, in fact, provide much realistic choice, I have dropped them and added a third, combining some aspects of the others, in an attempt to *balance* your desire to restrain arms sales with the *reality* that Ecuador is about to conclude a pact with France that will set the arms race in the region spiraling upward.

1. *Refuse to sell either aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.* State, DOD/ISA, and ACDA support this option because they believe Ecuador's fears are without foundation, and we should maintain our past policy of restraint on arms sales to Latin America.

2. JCS supports the *sale of F-5Es* (we offered them to Ecuador in 1974, but they rejected it thinking they could get Kfirs), and sending a site survey team to evaluate the need for the Vulcan-Chapparral, basic HAWK, or I-HAWK air defense missile systems.

⁴ See Documents 336 and 337.

3. Send a survey team to offer F-5Es and explore an air defense system and anti-armor capability (explicitly exclude the advanced I-HAWK missile system since we do not intend to sell it to Ecuador in any case). The team should also be prepared to discuss anti-tank weapons (TOW and others) to address Ecuador's concern over Peru's armored forces.

I recommend the third option because it is responsive to Ecuador's requests, and for a variety of reasons (human rights, movement toward democracy, U.S. fishing boats, cooperation in the UN and OAS General Assembly), it is in our interest to be responsive at this time. Secondly, our "package" would not be large or sophisticated enough to provoke a new escalation in the arms race as the proposed purchase of French F-1s would. At the same time this plan stands a fair chance of satisfying the Ecuadoreans while allowing us to make clear that we have no intention of helping Ecuador build up an arsenal to rival Peru's. (We have previously transferred F-5Es to Brazil, Chile and Venezuela.) The sale would be entirely consistent with arms transfer guidelines of PD-13.⁵ Finally, the F-5E is substantially less sophisticated than the Kfir, and so the sale would not conflict with our rejection of the Israeli sale.

On the other hand, note that this would probably be a FY 1978 sale, and we will be working under a tight ceiling.

DECISION

Approve

- | | |
|--|-------|
| 1. Refuse to sell aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.
(State, DOD/ISA, and ACDA recommend.) | _____ |
| 2. Sell F-5Es, send an air defense site survey team to evaluate the need for the Vulcan-Chaparral, basic HAWK, and I-HAWK. (JCS recommends.) | _____ |
| 3. Send a survey team to offer F-5Es and explore an air defense system and anti-armor capability (though not the I-HAWK). (NSC recommends.) ⁶ | _____ |

⁵ For Presidential Directive/NSC-13, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 271.

⁶ Carter checked the approve option and initialed below. A July 29 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance reports that Carter, on Vance's recommendation, amended this decision by removing the F-5Es from the offer to Ecuador. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 19, Ecuador, 2-12/77) The survey team traveled to Ecuador in December. A summary of its report is in telegram 8540 from Quito, December 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770480-0492) In November 1978, the GOE decided not to purchase the Vulcan/Chaparral air defense system, citing economic reasons. (Quito 8159, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780482-0489)

273. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1977, 10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Poveda Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

ECUADOR

Vice Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano
President of the Supreme Council
Foreign Minister Jose Ayala Lasso
Ambassador Gustavo Ycaza Borja (US)
Galo Montano, Minister of Industries
and Commerce
Rafael Cevallos (Aide)
Felipe Valladares (Aide)

US

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Ambassador Richard
Bloomfield
Robert Pasto, NSC

President Carter thanked Admiral Poveda for having accepted his invitation to Washington and for supporting the Panama Canal Treaty. He also thanked the Admiral for the hospitality shown by the GOE to Mrs. Carter during her recent visit. He said that she had learned a great deal and had reported fully to him. The President said that Mrs. Carter had helped him prepare for his visit with President Morales Bermudez of Peru and that he had expressed to the Peruvian President the Ecuadoreans' concerns regarding Peruvian arms purchases.² President Morales Bermudez had told President Carter that Peru's acquisition of arms had been completed and that from now on they would only be purchasing spare parts. President Carter told President Poveda that he hoped that President Morales Bermudez would give the same assurance directly to Ecuador and that Ecuador's concerns would be alleviated.

Admiral Poveda expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet with President Carter. He said that his government appreciated Mrs. Carter's visit to Ecuador. She had won the affection and esteem of all Ecuadoreans. He said that it was evident that she had kept her promise, which was to inform her husband of Ecuador's concerns.

Admiral Poveda congratulated President Carter on signing the Panama Canal Treaty, which he characterized as the beginning of a new era in hemispheric relations. He pointed out that most of the Latin

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 19, Ecuador, 2-12/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. Drafted by Bloomfield.

² See Document 304.

American Presidents assembled in Washington had taken advantage of the opportunity to have bilaterals with each other, and that the Canal Treaty had served as an example of the way in which problems should be solved not only between the US and the Latin American countries, but also within Latin America.

The Andean Region

After a brief reference to the “troubled” Caribbean, President Poveda discussed the situation in the Andean region. He had talked the previous day with the President of Peru and they had analyzed all the issues between the two countries, including those of an “historical nature”. They had instructed their Foreign Ministers to continue these discussions and the two Presidents would meet periodically. In this way Ecuador hoped to arrive at a solution in a few years to its long-standing territorial problem with Peru. Admiral Poveda expressed his appreciation to President Carter for the fact that he had talked in such a clear manner to President Morales Bermudez. This undoubtedly served as an incentive to Morales Bermudez to agree to the bilateral discussions of territorial problems.

National Security

Admiral Poveda then passed to the theme of national security. He said Ecuadoreans were a pacific people. Ecuador had never started a conflict, and did not want war. This was in spite of having lost at least 70% of its original territory. The Rio Protocol of 1942 had reduced Ecuador’s territory by 50%.³ Although this loss had seriously affected the morale of its people, Ecuador has never attempted to arm for the sake of revenge. Instead it has tried to work out its aspirations through the strengthening of international principles of justice.

Arms Requests

Admiral Poveda said that he wanted to ask President Carter to help Ecuador achieve equilibrium in the region, and thereby make for a more stable security situation. Ecuador’s first priority was anti-aircraft defense. The Department of State had told the GOE that the Hawk missile was not possible but had indicated, without any commitment, that it would entertain a request for a less sophisticated missile, the Vulcan/Chapparal. Also it would be helpful if the USG could accelerate its deliveries of equipment already purchased by the Army. There was great goodwill on the part of US agencies to provide equipment, but in some cases the delivery times were quite long. As for the Navy it

³ For the text of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol of 1942, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, February 28, 1942, pp. 194–196.

is quite pleased with the cooperation it has been receiving including the recently concluded UNITAS maneuvers. Its only additional request is for another destroyer, this time on a “hot-ship” basis.⁴

GSP Exclusion

Admiral Poveda then passed to the subject of economic development. He said that the Government was trying to help its people achieve a better life by investing its small income from petroleum exports. With this new capital, the GOE had built industrial plants, ports, highways, and had made some progress, although not enough, in agriculture. It was changing its petroleum laws in order to improve incentives for foreign investors. Ecuador now enjoys a satisfactory level of foreign exchange reserves, a relatively moderate rate of inflation, and a firm currency. The GOE wants its people to participate economically and politically in the life of the country. He referred to the government’s efforts in health and education. He pointed out that it had kept its international commitments both with governments and with foreign companies. He said that because of Ecuador’s desire to increase its foreign trade, the provision in the US Trade Act which excluded Venezuela and Ecuador from tariff preferences was a serious matter for the Ecuadoreans.⁵ He asked for President Carter’s goodwill to try to overcome the impasse in this matter, although he realized it depended on the Congress.

Access to Soft Loans

Finally, Poveda pointed out that when a country acquires some oil production it is automatically classified as rich. But Ecuador is far from rich. It needs access to the soft loans of the international agencies. Here Ecuador had run into some opposition. The amount of loans currently pending was not large—about \$70 million in total, but these go to important social projects and he would appreciate it if the US Government could evaluate Ecuador’s true economic situation when it considered these loans.

President Carter asked for more details and President Poveda said that there were four projects pending in the Inter-American Development Bank each one averaging about \$12 million plus one for about \$18 million.

President Carter then replied to the points made by President Poveda.

⁴ This was translated as a “HOTCHKISS” type. [Footnote is in the original. A “hot ship” transfer is one in which a U.S. ship is transferred immediately to a foreign navy upon its decommissioning, never becoming inactive.]

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 268.

Economic Issues

With regard to the soft loans from the IDB, he said that he certainly believed that the US would give its support for those loans. On the GSP exclusion, this law was passed by the Congress following the quadrupling of oil prices. He would like Congress to give him the discretionary authority to remove these restrictions as he saw fit in the best interest of the United States. He said obviously Ecuador and Venezuela did not deserve to be included in the ban because they had supplied the US with oil during the Arab embargo. Changing the law, however, would be difficult because Congress was reluctant to distinguish between various members of OPEC. Also, we now have good relations with many of the Arab states. The President said he could not guarantee success, but it was a goal of his Administration to get the OPEC exclusion removed, and we will continue to pursue it.

A Statement on GSP

The President then turned to Secretary Vance and after a minute of conversation said that he had asked the Secretary about the advisability of issuing a statement regarding his conviction that the GSP exclusion provision was unfair. This might help people understand that he was personally concerned and might have a good effect on Congress. However, he should discuss this matter with the Special Trade Representative, Mr. Strauss, before deciding whether to issue such a declaration.

Ecuador's Arms Requests

Turning to Ecuador's requests for defensive weapons, the President said that he would like to expedite the delivery of the antitank weapons already sold to the army. He said that he was glad that the USG had been able to deliver an LST and a destroyer. He thought that there would be no problem with the Vulcan/Chapparal as far as our arms policy was concerned. He said that he would have the Department of Defense look into it. Regarding Ecuador's request for a second destroyer he said he was not familiar with the "HOTCHKISS" (sic) class of destroyers, but he did not think such a destroyer would be in violation of our arms policies.

The President said we are trying hard by ourselves, and with the cooperation of other countries, including the Soviet Union, to halt the spread of arms. This was a difficult task, but the arms that Ecuador had asked for struck him as being purely defensive. He promised to give Poveda a report on these requests.

Fishing Dispute

President Carter then expressed his admiration and appreciation to Poveda for the fact that the two countries had not had any problems

regarding the fishing dispute in recent years. He said he understood this was in part due to Poveda's leadership. If the problem arose in the future he would appreciate Poveda contacting him directly if necessary in order to avoid any incident. The US did not wish to abuse its access to this resource.

Human Rights

The President said that he was pleased with the progress being made in Latin America on the human rights issue. He thanked Ecuador for its support of the US resolution at the OAS meeting in Grenada.⁶ This demonstrated that our peoples shared the same principles.

The President said that the US was looking with great interest on Ecuador's election plans which were a great example to the rest of the world.

Access to the Amazon

President Carter told Admiral Poveda that he had expressed to President Morales Bermudez an interest in Ecuador's desire for access to the Amazon River system. He had not quite understood Morales Bermudez' reply which was that there was a possibility of settlement within the context of Article 6 of the Rio Protocol. Morales Bermudez had said Peru was awaiting an initiative on Ecuador's part within that framework. Maybe this information was not of significance to Ecuador. If he, President Carter, could be helpful by speaking further to Morales Bermudez to facilitate discussions on this problem, he would do so, but he preferred that the two countries deal with the matter directly.

Admiral Poveda then undertook to reply to the two points made by the President.

Ecuador's Return to Democracy

He said the problem in Ecuador for years had been one of permanent political instability, with the Government alternating between civilian and military regimes. In this process, political parties had almost ceased to exist. Therefore, when his Government took office it undertook to develop a plan for restructuring the political life of the country. The objectives of this plan were twofold, first to unify all Ecuadoreans and second to create new large political parties which would have broad-based support. His government believed that the process had now been accepted by the people and by the political parties, to which the government was giving direct economic and moral support. Also, since the military were now actively promoting a restructuring of the political system, there should be a permanent equilibrium

⁶ See Document 20. The OAS General Assembly met in Grenada June 14–24.

among the various political forces in the country in the future. It was hoped that stronger political parties would serve as a check on those exercising power. Two constitutions had already been drafted and would be presented to the people in a referendum, possibly in January. However, the Government intended to go about this deliberately in order to be sure that the people's political interests had been reawakened. After the referendum there would be the electoral campaign.

Article 6 Not Acceptable

Regarding the question of access to the Amazon, Ecuador's aspiration was to have a sovereign access, not, as Article 6 of the Rio Protocol provided, merely the right of free transit leading to the Amazon. Ecuador was not interested in simply having the Peruvians' permission to pass their customs houses to get to the river.

President Carter said he presumed there was no possibility of an exchange of territory. Admiral Poveda smiled and said that Ecuador believed it had already given "its quota" of territory to Peru. President Carter asked if he had discussed this matter with Morales Bermudez. President Poveda said yes, and they had agreed to continue discussions of it through their Foreign Ministries. He was hopeful that this would bring results and he was grateful for President Carter's assistance in getting this process going.

President Carter said that he would reemphasize his interest to Morales Bermudez. He said of course he had no way of forcing Peru to work toward any solution but that he would make it clearer to Peru that he felt that such discussions would contribute to peace in the area. President Carter inquired what territory was involved and what rivers would be involved in a settlement.

Admiral Poveda said that Morales Bermudez and he had only agreed on certain general principles, and that there was not yet a concrete proposal. There was the possibility that a settlement could be reached on the basis that the border which had been defined under the Rio Protocol could not be completely drawn because of a geographical accident [here he was referring to the discovery of the Rio Cenepa subsequent to the Rio Protocol].⁷ It might be possible to give Ecuador sovereign access in view of the inoperability of the Rio Protocol in this particular area. Poveda said that once the discussions reached a more concrete stage he would inform President Carter and he was confident Ecuador's proposal would merit the support of the President.

President Carter closed the meeting by stating that he had thoroughly enjoyed meeting Admiral Poveda and that he felt the conversa-

⁷ Brackets are in the original

tions had been most useful. He then quipped that he was gratified to see Naval officers in high political positions and reminded the Admiral there was a long tradition, beginning with President Roosevelt, of ex-Naval officers in the White House.

Admiral Poveda expressed his appreciation for the meeting and invited President Carter in the name of the Supreme Council to visit Ecuador at any time he desired.

274. Editorial Note

On November 18, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed a letter responding to an October 10 letter from President Alfredo Poveda Burbano of Ecuador. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Box 17, Country File, Ecuador, 1/77-1/81; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Box 5, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79) (No classification markings on either letter) In telegram 280231 to Quito, November 23, the Department transmitted the text of Carter's letter for delivery. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770434-0741) (C)

In telegram 7981 from Quito, November 23, Ambassador Richard J. Bloomfield recommended that before delivery to Poveda, the letter "could be profitably amended to support certain human rights initiatives underway by the Embassy." He suggested the addition of one paragraph, which read: "I was saddened to hear of the unfortunate incident at the Aztra sugar mill October 18 which resulted in a number of tragic deaths. I am confident, however, that in the aftermath your Government will continue to maintain its excellent international reputation as a protector of human rights, whatever the provocation." Bloomfield also recommended the revision of another paragraph "concerning the return to civilian government to reflect and react to recent developments in that field as well." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770435-0944.) (C) In telegram 7854 from Quito, November 17, the Embassy summarized its previous demarches on human rights and the Aztra incident. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770425-0154) (S)

In a November 29 memorandum, Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff forwarded Bloomfield's suggestions to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski and recommended that the letter be revised, noting: "Our Embassy in Quito took the initiative in the incident, and, to my knowledge, it is the first

time that our Embassy in any country in Latin America suggested a human rights initiative. For that reason, it should be recognized by the President in his letter." On the last page of this memorandum, Rick Inderfurth of the National Security Council Staff wrote: "I think the letter should be delivered as is." The President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs David Aaron disagreed, writing: "that ARA is finally acting on our human rights policy is very important and should not be discouraged because we are afraid to ask Susan [Clough] to sign the letter again." On the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "R.P. Have the letter delivered as is; *add oral* comment on the recommended item. ZB." No indication of whether the letter was delivered to Poveda has been found. A note written by Pastor and attached to his memorandum to Brzezinski reads: "Called in Ambassador directly on Dec 1." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Box 17, Country File, Ecuador, 1/77-1/81) (no classification marking)

275. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, March 13, 1978, 2020Z

1557. Subject: Return to Constitutional Government and Human Rights In Ecuador: Comments of President Poveda

1. On March 8 the chargé had opportunity to raise with Supreme Council President Poveda the subject of human rights. The chargé noted that during his consultations in Washington the previous week high USG officials had expressed concern about the GOE's disqualification of Assad Bucaram for the Presidency.² He told President Poveda

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780113-0905. Confidential. Sent for information to the consulate in Guayaquil.

² Bucaram was disqualified as a candidate for president under the election law released on February 20. (Telegram 1099 from Quito, February 21, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078-0703) In a March 1978 intelligence assessment, the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that "although the move violates Bucaram's political rights and limits the Ecuadorean voters' freedom of choice, it increases the likelihood of a successful return to civilian government by the end of this year." The assessment noted that Sixto Duran-Ballen and Francisco Huerta "appear to be the strongest of the remaining contenders," although it also noted: "Despite Bucaram's disqualification, the votes of his followers—believed to make up the largest political aggregate in Ecuador—can still profoundly influence the election." (Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 16, Job 79T01316A, Box 4, folder 11)

he believed the current excellent state of bilateral relations derived in large part from the administration's strong support for human rights and democratic government and from the excellent efforts and relatively good record of Ecuador in these areas. He said he believed that the disqualification of Bucaram had hurt the GOE in Washington, but repeated that although the USG supports free and full participation in elections, its policy is to make no public statements or take any actions that might be construed as intervention in the internal affairs of a friendly sovereign state.

2. President Poveda stressed that the disqualification of Bucaram had occurred precisely because the military government was committed to returning Ecuador to civilian, democratic, constitutional government, and to doing it in such a way that constitutional government would be assured for years to come. He said the armed forces had prevented Bucaram's ascension to power in 1972 and again in 1978 because Bucaram was a demagogue without program and without the personal capacity to govern an increasingly complex and sophisticated society. He said to have let Bucaram run would have endangered the return process itself, because of the very strong opposition to him within the armed forces (implying that his disqualification should head off any military coup attempts); and he said that if Bucaram were to have run and won he would likely have been deposed within a few months because of his ineptness.

3. Poveda said that other military governments in the hemisphere are talking about return to civilian and democratic governments, but that Ecuador was the only country where careful attention was being given to reorganizing the basic political institutions and governmental structure so as to avoid a lapse into the corrupt and unstable system of the past. He expressed approval of the way the political scene was beginning to take shape.

4. The charge then raised directly the question of human rights violations. He noted that several minor political figures had been detained by the police for periods of several days during the last couple months, and suggested that these kinds of actions could further hurt the GOE in Washington. The charge stated there additionally was concern about the manner in which the GOE was treating its labor sector. He mentioned specifically a report the Embassy had received³ that the GOE was considering withdrawing official recognition of or banning CEOSL (the AIFLD supported union in Ecuador).

5. President Poveda asserted strongly that there were no political prisoners in Ecuador and that the minor political figures the charge

³ Not further identified.

had referred to were arrested for breaking specific laws. He said these laws had been enacted to assure a tranquil and orderly return to constitutional and democratic government. He said he would ask members of his government to explain to the charge the laws under which the minor political figures were detained, and he emphasized the military government's adherence to law, its respect for individual rights and the absence of any brutality or torture in Ecuador.

6. With respect to GOE consideration of withdrawing official recognition of or banning CEOSL, Poveda said knew nothing of it. He assured the charge that the GOE had no such plans, adding that he had enough problems already with irresponsible civilian politicians without stirring up and provoking the ire of a working class organization.

7. Comment. Admiral Poveda's remarks on the military's disqualification of Bucaram are consistent with what other GOE officials have told us. His argument that the military government wishes to restructure the political system so as to establish a lasting democratic government is the theme he has been propounding ever since he was Minister of Government under President Rodriguez-Lara.

8. The Embassy believes that although President Poveda vigorously rationalized his government's actions with respect the disqualification of Bucaram and the arrest of minor political fugues, the conversation served to remind him that all violations of human rights, not just torture and brutality, are taken into account by the USG and can affect a nation's relations with US.

9. Finally, the Embassy had learned from a reliable source two days prior to the meeting with Poveda that the Minister of Labor was thinking about withdrawing recognition of the CEOSL faction headed by Jose Chavez. Poveda probably was unaware of this. Poveda's reaction to the contingency of this meeting may help to forestall any such plans by the Minister of Labor.

Corr

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, June 26, 1978, 2011Z

162123. Subject: The Secretary's Bilateral With Ecuadorean Foreign Minister

1. On June 23, the Secretary met with Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Jose Ayala. Also present were Ecuadorean Ambassador Gustavo Ycaza, Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank McNeil, and Country Officer Tony Allitto. The following issues were discussed.

2. Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute

A. Ayala explained the dispute from the Ecuadorean point of view. His emphasis was on Ecuador's spirit of conciliation with Peru during the past 10 years. He also noted that the Peruvian Army had apparently not supported Peruvian Foreign Minister de la Puente last fall, which had caused de la Puente to draw back from Peruvian positions that had offered hope for a mutually satisfactory solution.

B. Ayala did bring good news, however, which was that he had met with de la Puente on June 21 (based on an initiative by Argentina's Foreign Minister), and the two agreed to announce publicly their intention to reach a solution, using something similar to the formula that renewed the Argentina-Chile talks. Ayala also claimed that de la Puente had accepted that Ecuador's desire for sovereign territorial access to the Marañon River would be a basic element of the talks.

C. The Secretary congratulated Ayala, encouraged that approach to the problem, and stated that if Ecuador and Peru could achieve a mutually satisfactory solution, the USG would be glad to consider requests for multilateral financial support for economic development projects along the border.

D. Ayala concluded by stating that the political climate in South America was not right for a final solution at this time, with both Ecuador and Peru in the midst of changing governments. He said that a solution was still years off, but that he would work to establish a climate of harmony in which a solution could be found in the future. Then the first task in the talks would be to reduce tensions. He noted, however, that the geopolitical situation had not really changed, citing as examples the border disputes of Ecuador-Peru, Argentina-Chile, and Bolivia-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0936. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Allitto; cleared in S/S-S and S/S-O; approved by McNeil. Sent for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, the consulate in Guayaquil, and the missions in Geneva and to USUN.

Chile-Peru. He concluded by stating that President Poveda had instructed him to tell the Secretary that Ecuador viewed its best defense as one in which its neighbors knew of Ecuador's peaceful nature, and in which its problems received the immediate attention of American nations such as the U.S.

E. The Secretary concluded by stating that Ayala should tell Poveda that the U.S. was extremely interested in seeing a mutually satisfactory solution of the border dispute.

3. Return to Civilian Rule

A. The Secretary expressed the administration's pleasure at Ecuador's progress toward civilian rule, and wished Ecuador well with its July 16 Presidential and local elections. Ayala said that everything was on schedule, there would undoubtedly be a runoff between the top two vote getters, and the new President would be inaugurated about December. He also stated that the Military's disqualification of former mayor of Guayaquil Asaad Bucaram had been a mistake by the Military, and an unnecessary one. He predicted that Sixto Duran-Ballen would come in first on July 16, but short of the 51 percent required to win. Ayala would not predict who would come in second, but did say that if Raul Clemente Huerta came in second, Huerta would probably win the second round, whereas if Jaime Roldos came in second, Duran-Ballen would win the second round.

B. The Secretary said it was heartening to see this process progressing so well.

4. Arms Restraint

A. The Secretary said that we hope to see the effort succeed to breathe life into the Declaration of Ayacucho, and that the President and he were both interested in seeing Latin America become an example to the world of how a region can effectively restrain conventional arms purchases.

B. Ayala noted that the Foreign Ministers of the countries that had signed the Declaration of Ayacucho had on June 22 signed a communique resulting from the Venezuelan initiative on regional conventional arms restraint. Ayala had secured agreement to insert a paragraph because he had felt more needed to be said. He noted that the Ecuadorean Delegation to the Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) would be instructed to push for inclusion of that paragraph in the SSOD's final document.

C. Ayala also stated that he believed that the Venezuelan effort needed to be expanded to include other Latin countries such as Brazil. Argentina's Foreign Minister had said that Argentina would do nothing if Brazil did not join. He planned to pursue this point with the Brazilian Foreign Minister either June 23 or the following week when Ayala

would be in Brasilia. He concluded by stating that Ecuador would also push for a Foreign Ministers meeting on this subject once the issue of how many countries should participate was resolved.

D. The Secretary asked if Brazil would join. Ayala replied that he thought so, especially if the initiative was limited to conventional arms, excluding the nuclear issue. McNeil saw no practical reason why Brazil could not join, and the Secretary agreed.

5. The Trade Act of 1974

A. Ayala expressed Ecuador's frustration at the absence of movement on the GSP exclusion issue, pointing out Ecuador's expectations had been raised at the beginning of our Administration. Ayala continued by noting that 16 Congressmen had met with Ecuador's Minister of Commerce Montano in May, and had told Montano that Congress was ready and waiting for the Executive Branch to push this issue.

B. The Secretary replied that the Congressmen were right, the Executive Branch had not taken action yet, and he did not want to hide behind an excuse of blaming Congress. He continued by expressing sympathy with Ecuador's frustration, but explained that this was simply not the time to push this issue because of the factors involved, and Ecuador should try to be patient a while longer.

6. Narcotics Control

The Secretary thanked Ecuador for its cooperation to date, but noted that both countries needed to work even harder on this problem, and Ayala said that there was coincidence of principle on this issue.

7. Law of the Sea Conference

A. The Secretary asked for Ayala's views on the Conference. Ayala stated that he was unhappy with what he viewed as a U.S. readiness to exploit unilaterally the resources of the sea, and believed that a conference collapse would be disastrous. He noted that other problems (e.g., highly migratory species, and base lines) had been relegated to a position of secondary importance because of what appeared to be an imminent collapse of the Conference.

B. The Secretary agreed, and said that the USG would make an extra effort to try to avoid a conference collapse, and that he planned to speak with Ambassador Richardson next week.

8. North-South Issues

A. The Secretary said that President Carter had decided to try to breathe life into the most important North-South issues at the Bonn Summit this summer.

He had not yet discussed this with the Europeans but he wanted Ecuador to know that this was the current thinking of the USG.

B. Ayala was pleased with the news noting that protectionism was very worrisome to all Latin America. The Secretary agreed, stating his hope that the multilateral trade negotiations would produce results.

Vance

277. Letter from President Carter to Ecuadoran President of the Supreme Council Poveda¹

Washington, August 2, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I want to congratulate you and all the people of Ecuador on the exemplary conduct of your recent elections. The world admires the atmosphere of civic responsibility and respect for democratic rights in which the elections were carried out. My nation views this democratic experiment as extremely important, and we earnestly hope it will be a success. We look forward to the completion of this historic process. The government and the people of Ecuador have provided the hemisphere with a commendable example of what can be accomplished through a spirit of cooperation and conciliation.

As one of the principal architects of this historic retorno, you can take personal pride in that achievement; and as a citizen of Ecuador, you should be deeply gratified at the maturity and sense of responsibility your people have shown. I wish you all success in carrying out the next stages of this historic endeavor.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent a copy of the letter for signature to Carter under an August 2 covering memorandum, noting that the Department of State recommended that Carter send the letter to Poveda. In the right-hand margin next to his approval of that recommendation, Carter wrote "retorno?" and underlined it. NSC memoranda noted that it "was a word being used in Ecuador which represents their process of returning to democratic rule." (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79) In telegram 7446 from Bogota, August 9, the Embassy reported that Vaky delivered the original of this letter to Poveda on August 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780325-1339)

I was pleased to hear that your conversation with our new Ambassador to Ecuador, Raymond E. Gonzalez, went so well.² He enjoys my full confidence, and I hope you will communicate with him as you would with me.

Rosalynn and I join in wishing you our very best.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

² On July 16, Jaime Roldos, who replaced Bucaram as the candidate of the CFP, and his vice presidential running mate, Osvaldo Hurtado, received 31 percent of the vote, the most of any candidate, in the first round of presidential elections. Since none of the candidates gained a majority, a runoff election was scheduled. In an August 2 memo to Carter, Brzezinski noted that "there is some concern on our part that elements in the military will not permit him [Roldos] to win the runoff." (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79) In telegram 5511 from Quito, August 8, the Embassy reported "that the Ecuadorean military are actively seeking a way to avoid having to turn power over to Roldos-Hurtado even though they probably want eventually to fulfill their commitment to the retorno process by turning power over to one of the more acceptable candidates." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780323-1253)

278. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to the Acting Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, September 5, 1978

SUBJECT

Ecuador—Elections in Jeopardy

Ecuador held model elections July 16, elections that surprised everyone by giving a commanding lead to Jaime Roldos, the candidate of the populist Concentration of Popular Forces (CFP). The probability of a Roldos victory in the run-off election unleashed an up and down

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850155-0321. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Guerra and McNeil. A notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that a copy was sent to Ambassador Gonzalez on September 8.

cycle of plotting by conservative military elements in league with the nation's conservative economic oligarchy. The preferred strategem, common knowledge in Ecuador, is to get a manipulable Electoral Tribunal to now declare massive fraud in provinces where Roldos was strong, forcing annulment of the elections.²

President Poveda, the architect of what had been a truly successful *retorno* process, has wanted to go through with the process and let Roldos take office. When I delivered the President's letter of encouragement, Poveda restated his commitment and noted that his conversations with Roldos had reassured him.³ Roldos himself, is a bright young (37) politician who in the words of our Ambassador, might make a good President if they let him.⁴ The plotters' charges that Roldos and his running mate are radicals or worse seem to have no substance; basically they fear his commitment to social and economic change.

We have continually sought to encourage Ecuador to persevere in an honest political process. Poveda's leadership has provided a guarantee but he now seems to be wavering. He just told our Ambassador, who had expressed our concern at the plotting, that if the Electoral Tribunal declares massive irregularities, the GOE might have to set aside the elections and hold new ones. Interestingly, Poveda indicated he would clear any decision in a meeting of military commanders down through colonel where the distrust of Roldos at the upper echelons is not shared.⁵

We sense that Poveda is maneuvering to preserve the process and national comity. But if he annuls the elections, the transparency of the charges of fraud will produce popular reaction that could lead to repressive measures. At all events, a breakdown in the process would require us to review our relationship with Ecuador.

² In telegrams 5434 from Quito, August 3; 5905 from Quito, August 23; and 6158 from Quito, September 1, the Embassy analyzed and reported on its responses to the plotting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780319-0218, D780346-0983, and D780358-0734)

³ See Document 277. In telegram 7446 from Bogota, August 9, the Embassy summarized Vaky's meeting with Poveda in Bogota. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780325-1339) In his September 6 Evening Report to Carter, Christopher wrote: "up to now President Poveda has been dedicated to the *retorno* process, but he appears to be wavering." (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 9/78)

⁴ Gonzalez's remark not found. In telegrams 5086 from Quito, July 21; 5475 from Quito, August 5; and 5585 from Quito, August 9, the Embassy reported on its meetings with Roldos. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780301-0123, D780321-0167, and D780326-0900)

⁵ In telegram 6118 from Quito, August 31, the Embassy reported on Gonzalez's August 30 conversation with Poveda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780356-0761)

279. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Presidential Message to Ecuador

At David's request, I have been working with Vaky on trying to find ways to keep the Ecuadorean electoral process on stream.² Our latest intelligence reports suggest that the plotting, which has been going on within the military to nullify the electoral returns of July 16, may be reaching its culmination with an announcement tomorrow.³ Our Ambassador has recommended and Vaky and I concur that we should arm our Ambassador with a Presidential message, which he could give to President Poveda if he thinks it would be useful—as opposed to counter-productive—in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process.⁴

It is very difficult to judge from here whether a statement or a Presidential message will have its intended result, or will give the hardliners the excuse of American interventionism to interrupt the process. Nonetheless, we believe it desirable to give this extra instrument to our Ambassador.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Ecuador: President Alfredo Poveda Burbano, 4/77-5/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Pastor wrote "Bob" next to his name.

² In a September 19 report from the North-South cluster to Brzezinski, Pastor wrote: "We are continuing to talk to as many people as possible in an effort to support Poveda's efforts. Our Ambassador has spoken to all of the military leadership expressing our great concern about the retorno process." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 54, Evening Reports: 9/78)

³ In telegram 6560 from Quito, September 19, the Embassy reported: "Implementation of plot to discard or destroy the retorno process reportedly will take place around September 22." The Embassy continued: "Embassy believes that USG cannot ignore a substantial modification or reversal of the process and should take a number of steps to express our concern as well as to indicate our unwillingness to be as closely associated with Ecuador as we have come to be." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780382-0891)

⁴ In telegram 6612 from Quito, September 20, Gonzalez asked that the Department "endeavor to have such a message prepared for my use, possibly within the next 36 hours, should we assess that the conjunction of events calls for it," and recommended possible language for the message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384-0720)

In addition, State has been in touch with SOUTHCOM, General McAuliffe, to request that he call several other Generals to express our concern. McAuliffe said that it is much more effective to fly there and speak to the Generals directly than to call over non-secure lines. He is considering going to Quito this Saturday,⁵ but will check with our Embassy first. In addition, we have also asked our Embassy whether a statement from the State Department at this point would be helpful. If it is, it will probably be issued tomorrow.⁶

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the sending of the message at Tab A.⁷

⁵ September 23.

⁶ In telegram 241187 to Quito, September 22, the Department provided press guidance on the retorno process and noted: "Unless question is raised in noon briefing, we would propose to stimulate question outside framework of briefing." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780386-0574) In telegram 6666 from Quito, September 22, the Embassy concurred: "Agree that it be made available at noon press briefing or immediately thereafter in order to make evening news here." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780386-0925) In telegram 6709 from Quito, September 23, Gonzalez reported that Poveda "expressed concern over the State Dept 'declaration' of earlier today (September 22) which presaged a deterioration of relations if the July 16 elections were not respected." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389-0151)

⁷ Tab A is attached and printed as Document 280. Brzezinski checked the "approve" option.

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, September 22, 1978, 0206Z

241309. Subject: Presidential Message on Retorno Process. Ref: Quito 6612.²

1. Following is text of message from President Carter to President Poveda. Per your request in Reftel, you are given discretion to use or not to use it, depending on your judgement in the developing situation as to whether it would be helpful in forestalling the plot to overturn the July 16 elections and thwart the democratization process. It is a message not repeat not a letter and there will be no repeat no signed copy.

2. Quote: I recall the assurances that you personally and other members of the Government of the Armed Forces have made to me and others in the past regarding your Government's determination to return Ecuador to constitutional rule and respect the popular will as expressed in elections. I believe that the position taken by your Government has been an example for the Hemisphere, it has enhanced the prestige of the Ecuadorean Armed Forces, and has won you the goodwill and esteem of people all over the world.

3. For these reasons, I find especially disturbing the reports reaching me concerning the possibility that the results of the July 16 election may not be respected. Without prejudging the validity of this information, I want to convey to you my dismay should these developments occur. During the past two years, Ecuador and the United States have been able to attain through our common efforts a bilateral relationship which has been unparalleled in recent years. Much of the progress in relationship has been based upon our mutual respect for human rights and democratic principles. The continuance of shared ideals will enhance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780386-0660. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Guerra and McNeil; cleared by Pastor, Oxman, Vaky, and in S/S; approved by Vaky. The Department repeated the telegram to USSOUTHCOM on September 22, 2015Z. (Ibid.)

² See footnote 4, Document 279. In telegram 6709 from Quito, September 23, Gonzalez reported that he delivered the message to Poveda on the evening of September 22: Poveda "remarked that if the SET report showed that the July 16 elections were corrupt (viciadas) the GOE would have to protect the interests of the people." In addition, Poveda "repeated his previous assurances that the military do not wish to remain in power." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389-0151) In telegram 7027 from Quito, October 5, Gonzalez reported on his meeting with Ayala to discuss Poveda's official reply to this message. (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408-0264)

the warmth of our relations. The absence of them would inevitably impinge upon our relationship.

4. Nevertheless, I am confident that these reports are not true, and that the United States and Ecuador can continue to further strengthen the already strong ties which bind us. End quote.

Christopher

**281. Evening Report From the Acting Secretary of State
(Christopher) to President Carter¹**

Washington, September 25, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Ecuador.]

Ecuador. The plot to overturn the July 16 election has been thwarted for the moment. On Friday, Ambassador Gonzalez gave President Poveda your message of support for return to democratic government.² The electoral board asserted the same evening that there had been widespread fraud, but the military government announced the following day that the fraud had not been serious enough to invalidate the election. The run-off election between the top two vote-getters will be held as planned.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State), 9/78. Secret. Carter and Mondale initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See Document 280.

³ In telegram 6768 from Quito, September 25, the Embassy reported that the GOE announced on September 23 "that it would name a new Supreme Electoral Tribunal (SET) and continue with the retorno process," holding legislative elections at the same time as the second round of the presidential election, and upholding the validity of the first round of the presidential election. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392-0412) In telegram 6774 from Quito, September 25, the Embassy reported that an Ecuadoran official told the Embassy "that US 'pressures or whatever you wish to call it' were responsible for the GOE's apparent last minute change of heart regarding the electoral process," but that the US should "leave well enough alone and not attempt to publicize our intervention." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392-0386)

282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, December 8, 1978, 0000Z

309103. Subject: Electoral Process in Danger Again. Ref: Quito 8399.²

1. (C—Entire Text)

2. The Embassy's recent reports, which have been very well done, on the renewed threat to the successful completion of the retorno process are disturbing. As appropriate, you and other senior officers should of course continue to stress to President Poveda and other GOE Officials that the USG considers the return to democratic rule as an important issue governing the amicable development of our bilateral relations.

3. This position was communicated to both Duran Ballen and Roldos during their private visits to Washington.³ Duran Ballen, although expressing concern over the future of Ecuador under a Roldos administration, steadfastly reiterated that the process would be respected by all Ecuadoreans. Roldos appeared confident that he would be the overwhelming winner in the run-off elections, and said he was "optimistic" that the elections would be held.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780505-0520. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the consulate in Guayaquil. Drafted by Guerra; cleared in ARA and ARA/AND; approved by Vaky.

² In telegram 8399 from Quito, December, 1, the Embassy reported on what it believed was "a renewed conspiracy to abandon the retorno process entirely. That conclusion, in conjunction with other events, means that the retorno is in serious difficulty. The Supreme Council of Government could step in in support of the process, but might not be willing to do so again." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496-1095) In telegram 8512 from Quito, December 9, the Embassy reported that the retorno process "now seems firmly on track again." (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780510-0635)

³ In telegram 312269 to Quito, December 11, the Department reported on the visits of Duran-Ballen and Roldos to Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511-0143)

283. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, May 7, 1979, 1945Z

3015. Subject: (C) Conversation With Jaime Roldos

1. Entire text confidential.

2. Summary: On May 1, President-elect Jaime Roldos spoke at length with EmbOff. He commented *inter alia*, on the political climate, his relations with Bucaram, the Jarrin Case, and Peru. End summary.

3. Polcouns spoke with President-elect Jaime Roldos Aguilera in the Guayaquil Home of Guayas Prefect Guido Chiriboga for nearly three hours on May 1. Among matters discussed were his plans to visit the US, his attitude towards narcotics, the Texaco problem (septels)² and his plans and political thinking in general.

4. Polcouns delivered to Roldos a letter from the Ambassador containing a congratulatory message from the President.³ Roldos was highly gratified by the gesture and registered his warm appreciation. He said that he had received messages already from Adolfo Suarez, Carlos Andres Perez, and Julio Cesar Turbay; however, this was the most important, he said. At this time and throughout the lengthy conversation, Roldos expressed his gratitude to the United States for its role in bringing about the retorno.

5. Roldos said that he was not surprised by his landslide victory two days before, although the margins in some of the traditional provinces of Sierra were unexpected.⁴ He admitted that he was somewhat concerned by the Febres-Cordero smear campaign and observed that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790207-0442. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to La Paz, Lima, Santiago, USCINCSO, and the consulate in Guayaquil.

² In telegrams 3068 and 3069 from Quito, May 8, the Embassy reported on the GOE dispute with Texaco. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790170-0382 and D790170-0462)

³ In telegram 109948 to Quito, May 1, the Department transmitted Carter's messages to Poveda, Roldos and Duran-Ballen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790198-0953)

⁴ In his April 30 Evening Report to Carter, Vance wrote: "With three-quarters of the vote counted, populist candidate Jaime Roldos has won an impressive victory in the Ecuadorean presidential elections, garnering 62 percent of the vote against 27 percent for his conservative opponent. The magnitude of Roldos' victory should make his mandate somewhat more secure and, for the moment at least, inhibit any inclination the military or commercial oligarchy may have to overturn the election." In the left-hand margin, Carter wrote: "Send my congratulations." (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State), 4/79)

his support had dipped appreciably, albeit not dangerously, about two weeks before the election. Recognizing that his camp had also engaged in a counter-smear campaign for a few days, Roldos said that although they had plenty of ammunition to fire, they decided to continue to emphasize the positive during the remainder of the campaign. In this context, he personally rejected a proposal that his campaign specifically attack Santiago Matheus, Duran's son-in-law who had been accused of conspiring with the former Minister of Finance Santiago Sevilla to secure the broking of GOE bonds. Roldos stated that his strategy of combining traditional personal stumping with an intensive media campaign in the last ten days was the key to his landslide. He was very complimentary about Osvaldo Hurtado's speeches on television during the last week of campaigning.

6. Musing that the landslide victory was not without its problems, Roldos said that he was doing everything possible to keep the euphoria of his supporters within bounds. He was proud that no exuberance leading to violence had occurred when the results were known, and he pointed to his own and Hurtado's low-key acceptance of victory as crucial in this respect. The worst thing that he could do, he added, was to gloat and display arrogance. He hoped that this tone would be continued during his administration.

7. While the margin of his victory eliminated any chance of interfering with the results and it would give him more leverage when he assumed office, Roldos said it also increased expectations, and perhaps fears, about how he would use his power. He declared that he had not swayed from his original intention of going ahead with a moderate reformist government aimed principally at strengthening the institutional bases of democracy. On the other hand, he now felt that he would have less trouble than anticipated in carrying out some of the socio-economic reforms that he thought necessary, e.g. minor reform of the Tax Law plus increased enforcement in collection, the resuscitation of the useful parts of the Agrarian Reform Law to assist effectively the small landholder, a raise in the minimum wage, etc. Although he would demonstrate that he was willing to listen to all climate of opinion, he also thought it necessary to prove early on that he would not be pushed around. He repeated an opinion that he had expressed several times before over the past few years, that no lasting socio-economic or political reform could take place in a climate of social indiscipline.

8. Roldos said that he was committed by his strong connection with the Guayaquil slums—the so-called suburbio—to give special emphasis to that sector. His strategy would include preventing further growth of the slum area by provision of large-scale public housing, and alleviating the miserable living conditions of present dwellers there with a stepped-up program of public services (paving, sewers,

electricity, drainage). He noted that the principal problem with the slum was not the destitute economic condition of its denizens, but the more tangible one of government neglect and indifference over many years. He inquired what type of international assistance might be available to assist him in this regard.

9. Roldos was asked about the difficulties created by the friction between him and his longtime mentor Assad Bucaram, the leader of the CFP. Roldos frankly acknowledged that this was a problem, and perhaps the most difficult one currently facing him. He asserted that it was becoming clear to him that a political movement could not have two strong leaders. This was not a judgment that he had made easily, but one which he had been forced to accept. At this point, Chiriboga, who had remained silent until then, claimed that Roldos, not Bucaram, was now the idol of the masses, and within the CFP organization itself Roldos had greater support among provincial leaders than Bucaram. Roldos observed, however, that this might not necessarily apply to the CFP contingent in Congress which contained a number of persons who had not been CFP leaders before and were only included at Bucaram's personal direction. Roldos and Chiriboga thought that the group from the Sierra, which had had little day-to-day contact with Bucaram might align itself with Roldos if push came to shove. However, this would not be known for sure until Roldos had a chance to sound out the individuals which he planned to do as part of an "orientation" tour throughout the provinces commencing in a few weeks.

10. Chiriboga stated, while Roldos listened, that Bucaram had always been difficult to deal with; however, recently his bitterness about Roldos and his paranoia had made any relationship impossible. Roldos did not relish the idea of Bucaram becoming President of the Congress, but neither was he enamored of the possibility of Bucaram failing to win the position and being able to blame it on treachery by Roldos. He indicated that if Bucaram needed only a handful of votes to gain the election, the pressures on the Presidency to help him obtain the remainder would be immense. Polcouns said that it sounded to him that an open split was unavoidable. Chiriboga seemed to agree with this, but Roldos opined that it was not inevitable and he would do everything short of capitulating in order to prevent it.

11. Another cloud on the horizon for Roldos was the disposition of the Abdon Calderon Assassination Case and its involvement of ex-Minister of Government General Bolivar Jarrin.⁵ Roldos declared that

⁵ Abdón Calderón, the presidential candidate of the Radical Alfarist Front (FRA) party, was shot in Guayaquil on November 29, 1978, and later died in a Miami hospital. Calderon had placed fifth among the six candidates in the first round of the presidential election in July 1978. (Telegram 8546 from Quito, December 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511-0347)

he would not rpt not conduct a vendetta against the Military and attempt to persecute them for the pecadilloes that they might have committed while in power. Certainly cases of corruption and abuses would continue to be uncovered in the normal course of the Administrative changeover, but he was satisfied that once the court system regained its independence, ordinary justice would automatically take care of these. However, the Jarrin case was different. On a practical level, Roldos said that the person murdered was not some unknown, but a prominent politician and party leader. He feared leaving Jarrin unpunished would just convince the military that it was a special caste which possessed a cloak of immunity, thus making such assassinations even more likely in the future. On another level, Roldos believed that there was a basic moral issue involved which he could not dodge. Asked what he would do if the Military Court exonerated Jarrin or gave him a slap on the wrist, Roldos replied firmly that a way would be found to re-open the entire judicial procedure. He did not think that the military would choose to draw the line on the Jarrin case, but even if it did, he felt he could not back off.

12. During a brief discussion of GOE arms purchases, the problem of Peru arose. Roldos thought that the present military situation was dangerous and wondered about the utility of making some dramatic gesture toward Peru which might improve relations. He mentioned that he was thinking of a visit to Peru, but did not know how the conflicting interpretations of the border problem could be handled in the publicity surrounding any Peru-Ecuador summit meeting. He said that he would explore this with the Foreign Ministry and with his own Foreign Policy Team.

13. Roldos said that he would go slow on making important appointments, because they could have a significant and enduring impact on politics as well as substance. However, he planned to name a series of task forces by May 15 and they would undoubtedly include people whom he planned to name to his offices. But he cautioned that most of the rumors that will be bruited about will be based on pure speculation since he planned to hold appointments very close to himself.

14. Comment: Roldos, despite his new status, was his same old, informal and quietly friendly self. If anything, he seems to be listening harder than ever. He appears absolutely determined not to commit the sin of hubris at this point and spoil his chances at government.

15. In our estimate, he has correctly delineated his problem areas: relations with Bucaram, relations with the military, and the need to conduct a reformist program without alarming anybody. This is a tall order for any President coming into power after seven years of military rule, let alone for one who is still a couple of years short of 40 and

without any previous administrative experience. However, during the recent campaign local commentators coined a new word, "Roldosear", defined as having the good fortune to turn adversity into advantage and coming out on top. After viewing Roldos' surprising campaign over the past 1½ years, there is a growing suspicion that Roldos may have not only the ability, but the luck, to surmount these obstacles, by "Roldoseando", and continue in power for five full years.

Gonzalez

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 20, 1979, 10:00–10:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Jaime Roldos, President-elect of Ecuador
 Horacio Sevilla-Borja, Charge d'Affairs
 Alfredo Pareja Diez-Canseco, Advisor to President-elect
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor
 Robert Pastor, NSC Staff
 Viron Vaky, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
 Ambassador Raymond E. Gonzalez, US Ambassador to Ecuador
 Tony Hervas, Interpreter

Dr. Brzezinski and President-elect Roldos began their conversation talking about Roldos's election and the new constitution in Ecuador. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski congratulated Roldos for his election and expressed the happiness of the United States on the successful return to democratic government in Ecuador. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 10, Ecuador. Confidential. Drafted by Pastor on August 2. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office. Pastor sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under an August 2 covering memorandum, noting "I continue to believe as I did right after the meeting that your brief remarks on our policy to Latin America and the way it relates to global change represent an important statement. I think it would be useful to use that as a basis for a broader public statement either by you or the President." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Ecuador, 1-12/79) Dodson sent a copy of the memorandum and a copy of the memorandum of conversation between Carter and Roldos (see footnote 2 below) to Tarnoff under an August 7 covering memorandum, requesting that Tarnoff "make appropriate distribution." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183-1082)

Roldos explained that the new constitution allows only one term for a President; there is no possibility of re-election. He said that Ecuador would have to determine the practical effects of this provision in the future. He explained that the new constitution would permit the President to veto a measure passed by Congress, but a national referendum could override the President's Act. The new constitution will come into effect on August 10. It is Ecuador's seventeenth constitution since 1830, but he hopes the new constitution will be practicable and will endure. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States hopes that with the election of Roldos, the democratic process throughout Latin America will be given added impetus. He said that President Carter is looking forward to meeting with Mr. Roldos, and regrets that he does not have much time.² (C)

Dr. Brzezinski then explained the new directions that President Carter and Secretary Vance have tried to establish for US policy to Latin America and the Caribbean. The Administration has tried to develop a formula that is responsive to the changes that have occurred in the Hemisphere and in the world. The new approach has been based on three basic propositions:

1. *Non-intervention.* This Administration is committed not to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American and Caribbean countries. That is a major change from preceding administrations; and it can, of course, produce transitory problems. (C)

2. *Support for democratic forces.* This Administration is committed to human rights and democratization. It will lend its support to democratic processes, as in Ecuador. (C)

3. *No single formula.* This Administration has adopted a more flexible approach to the bilateral, regional, and global concerns of the nations in this Hemisphere. We no longer have a single formula for dealing with the entire region. We recognize the diversity and the complexity of each country and of our relationship. We have deliberately avoided the temptation to adopt a single slogan to define our approach. We view Latin America as diverse a region as Europe and Asia, and one that therefore should not be subordinated to any single formula. (C)

² Carter met with Roldos in the Oval Office immediately after this meeting with Brzezinski. Carter congratulated Roldos on his election and said "that the democratization process in Ecuador was a matter of great importance to the United States," and that "the United States would like to consult with him on a continual basis on matters relating to Central America and to other nations, both with respect to problems and also to opportunities." (Memorandum of Conversation, 10:45–10:55 a.m.; Ibid.)

Dr. Brzezinski said that we hoped that our support for democratic forces and for non-intervention will help promote the development of pluralistic societies, particularly where there has not been any in the past, for example in Central America. This might mean that we will have to go through a difficult transitional phase, and events in Nicaragua represented a disturbing example of this problem. The US wants to avoid a situation in which the collapse of right wing dictatorships is automatically seen as a victory for the extreme left or for Cuba. We don't view it that way. Rather, we see that social change is occurring throughout the Americas, that more people can take advantage of education and health facilities. People are increasingly determined to participate in the political and social process. This Administration does not see any reason why progressive forces in Central America should not become the logical successors to reactionary or right-wing governments. Indeed, the Carter Administration is prepared to help promote these changes through economic and technical assistance and through symbolic support. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the primary responsibility for the changes must be in each country itself, and secondarily in its neighbors. The United States does not feel it has the right or the ability to dictate or control these changes. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the United States sees in Roldos personally and more generally in the recent democratic changes in Ecuador the alternative between right-wing dictatorships of the past and left-wing totalitarian regimes of the present. Anything that the United States can do to be helpful, we will do. But leadership for this effort must come from Latin America itself. The US wants to be helpful, but believes that during this historical transition, the leadership should be in Latin America's hands. (C)

President-elect Roldos said that he was extremely pleased by Dr. Brzezinski's statement. The criteria and principles of non-intervention and the right of people to select their own governments are fundamental and will allow all of us in the Americas to proceed in a framework of ideological pluralism and democratic government. The principle of subordination and dependency, which has characterized inter-American relations in the past, should now be replaced by cooperation and friendship and mutual respect. This is vital for the progress of the Ecuadoran people and also for its relationship with other countries. Ecuador wants to build a society based on its institutions. Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside. Ecuador is an alternative example where there was a direct replacement of a dictatorship by a democratic government. In comparing Ecuador and Nicaragua, two countries which have recently emerged from dictatorship, the conditions are so different that it is difficult to draw a general conclusion. In Ecuador

the change has occurred peacefully and with free elections. But in both countries we must move to try to strengthen democratic forces. (C)

Yesterday, during his conversation with Secretary Vance, Roldos discussed the economic potential of Ecuador, but also the tremendous need for the economy to be mobilized by access to soft loans, for example.³ It is important that people can see that democracy is not just an idea but is also a system which works for the betterment of its people. This will require specific and important decisions on redistribution of income, on health facilities, on education, etc. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski expressed the importance of the US and Ecuador being able to reach a trade agreement as a way to enhance the cooperation between the two countries. (C)

Roldos said that he hopes that will occur because democracy is not just a political problem; it is a social and economic problem. To the extent that we can advance solutions, we could avoid political obstacles or roadblocks. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Roldos expected any shift in the emphasis or in the direction of Ecuador's foreign policy during his leadership. (C)

Roldos said that his country's foreign policy will be guided by certain principles, including non-intervention, ideological pluralism, human rights, juridical equality among states, closer relations with countries with which it shares these interests, and normal relations with all countries. Yesterday, he told Secretary Vance about his desire to send technical specialists to visit the US in the first month of his administration to discuss financing and technical cooperation among our two countries.⁴ He also raised another issue of great concern—the transfer of a naval vessel, a destroyer. (C)

Ambassador Vaky explained that the issue concerned a destroyer which the Navy wanted to transfer to Ecuador. Congress expressed

³ Vance met with Roldos on July 19th at noon in the Secretary's office. (Memorandum of Conversation; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 20, Ecuador, 1-12/79) In his July 19 Evening Report to Carter, Vance summarized his meeting with Roldos. (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Evening Reports (State), 7/79) (S) Vaky, Gonzalez and ARA personnel discussed Central America with Roldos at the Department on July 19th at 2 p.m. (Memorandum of Conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183-1048)

⁴ In addition to informing Vance of his plan to send a commission to the United States early in his presidency "to explore investment, technology transfer and related subjects," Roldos assured participants in the meeting "that the climate for business operations will be favorable during his five-year term of office," and that "Ecuador of course is interested in both its private and public sectors." See footnote 3, above. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Ecuador, 1-12/79)

its unwillingness to release the vessel from the US Navy at this time. In answer to a question about the importance and the urgency of this issue by Dr. Brzezinski, Roldos said that he will have to assess its real importance. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski promised that he would look into it, to see whether it would be possible to disaggregate the general problem and come to a specific resolution.⁵ (C)

⁵ In an August 7 memorandum to Brzezinski prepared in advance of a Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski lunch, Pastor confirmed that DOD was attempting to work with Congress to transfer a Navy destroyer to Ecuador. (Carter Library, Carter Presidential Papers, Staff Offices, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Luncheon Meetings (BBV), 4-8/79) In telegram 208987 to Quito, August 11, the Department reported that the destroyers "are not now available because the House Appropriations Committee Defense Subcommittee is insisting that they be retained in the US Navy Reserve." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790364-0040)

285. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 29, 1979, 0359Z

4058. Subject: The Secretary's Meeting With Foreign Minister Pareja
1. (C—Entire Text)

2. Summary: The Secretary's UNGA bilateral with Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Pareja focused principally on Nicaraguan relief and reconstruction and the political situation in Central America. End summary.

3. The Secretary met with Foreign Minister Pareja on September 24. Also attending were Ecuadorian UN PermRep Albornoz and ARA Deputy Asst. Secretary Eaton. The Secretary expressed appreciation to Minister Pareja for his hospitality in Quito during the Presidential Inauguration and for having arranged for him to meet with members of the Andean Group to discuss the situation in Nicaragua and Central America.² The Foreign Minister said he thought the meeting would be

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790448-0222. Confidential; Exdis.

² Roldos was inaugurated and power was transferred to the civilian government on August 10. Rosalynn Carter and Vance headed the U.S. delegation at the inauguration. A record of the August 10 bilateral meeting between Vance and Pareja has not been found. For the August 11 meeting between Vance and members of the Andean Pact, see Document 47.

useful in the future. The Secretary briefed Pareja on U.S. efforts for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Nicaragua and informed him that President Carter was meeting that day with Nicaraguan junta members in Washington. He himself would be meeting with them in New York.³ He said it was extremely important to befriend the new regime and not allow more radical sectors to gain an advantage in the country. Minister Pareja expressed optimism over the political situation. The Secretary agreed but said it was necessary for democratic countries to remain engaged and not yield the field to others.

4. Pareja asked what other nations in the area were doing. Vance said that Peru had a broadly based program and could have an impact. Mexico was providing humanitarian aid. Venezuela was offering aid including help to Nicaragua's shattered industrial sector. Panama was helping the Nicaraguan police so that law and order could be restored. Costa Rica had given some aid. The Secretary said enough was not yet being done, but an effort was under way. The Foreign Minister said Ecuador had been able to offer limited assistance, but it had been able to offer some technical assistance in the form of sending engineers and would continue to do so.

5. In response to the Foreign Minister's expression of interest in the rest of Central America, the Secretary said that he had sent Assistant Secretary Bowdler, who had experience in the area, to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. The visit resulted in recommendations on steps to take to help move those countries toward needed social and democratic reforms. These included tentative programs which outline the actions which we expect and which we are prepared to support.⁴ Minister Pareja expressed concern for the situation in El Salvador. The Secretary said we shared this concern. We most hopeful of reform in Honduras and then El Salvador; progress was least likely in Guatemala.

6. The Secretary asked about the economic and technology mission that had been proposed during Roldos' visit to the U.S. The Foreign Minister confirmed such a mission was planned but did not go into detail.⁵

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 308.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 381.

⁵ For the Ecuadoran technical and economic commission to the U.S., see footnote 4, Document 284. In telegram 7507 from Quito, October 30, the Embassy reported that Roldos then believed that "more time was necessary before the GOE could send the mission." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790497-1034)

7. Text of this message has been cleared by ARA DAS Eaton. USUN suggests cable distribution to AmEmbassies Managua and Quito.

McHenry

286. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador to the Department of State¹

Quito, February 13, 1980, 1449Z

1030. Subject: (U) Message From President Carter on El Salvador. Ref: State 036613.²

1. Confidential Entire Text.

2. The President's message on El Salvador was delivered to President Roldos on February 11 during call by DAS Eaton and Ambassador to discuss fisheries (Septel) and to deliver President's letter of February 4, which also makes a specific reference to the crisis in El Salvador.³ Copies of both letters were also given to Foreign Minister Pareja in a meeting immediately preceding the CLL on the President.

3. Following the guidance provided in Reftel, DAS Eaton outlined USG concern over explosive situation in Central America and particularly in El Salvador, where junta Government is facing serious challenges from extremists of right and left. Eaton stated we support junta's efforts to carry out reforms and we are requesting support for GOES from Ecuador and other democratic countries. We also underlined our desire to establish an ongoing dialogue with GOE about conditions in Central America and on actions that might be taken to face the challenges there.

4. Foreign Minister Pareja, basing himself on Ambassador Galo Leoro's report on his recent mission to Central America with Andean

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870111-2023. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

² February 10. For Carter's message on El Salvador, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 408, footnote 5.

³ In his February 4 letter to Roldos on El Salvador, a response to Roldos's letter of December 28, President Carter wrote that "a new government is struggling to move that tragic country toward democracy and social justice, but several guerrilla groups and their popular front organizations are trying to thwart those objectives. I hope that Ecuador's recent success in making the transition to democracy will encourage the government of El Salvador." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 20, Pastor, Country, Ecuador, 1-11/80)

Group Delegation, characterized the situation in El Salvador as extremely serious and deteriorating daily. He reflected considerable pessimism over junta's ability to enact reforms, which he said the extreme right will not accept in any case. Pareja was also somewhat critical of the partisan Christian Democratic connection which Venezuela is attempting to introduce in El Salvador.⁴ The Foreign Minister said there is no Andean Pact position on El Salvador and reported that a junta representative was coming to Quito to ask for assistance. Pareja agreed that the junta should be supported but wondered what form such aid should take.

5. President Roldos stated that the El Salvador situation had come up in the recent Santa Cruz meeting of Andean Pact Ministers but that there is no consensus on joint action. He also mentioned that the Ecuadorean Ambassador in El Salvador has been threatened and has faced many problems. Despite this, the Ambassador has decided to remain and has taken an active role in mediating the release of the Spanish Ambassador and hostages being held in the Spanish Embassy.⁵ The GOE does not wish to diminish its presence in El Salvador.

6. The Ambassador will continue consultations and follow up on this matter when President Roldos has had an opportunity to study the President's message.

7. Dept may wish to repeat this telegram to reftel addressees and San Salvador.

Gonzalez

⁴ See Document 367.

⁵ The Spanish Ambassador to El Salvador, two Embassy officials, eight Salvadorans, and four Spaniards were held hostage in the Spanish Embassy in San Salvador from February 5 to February 18, 1980. (Telegram 843 from San Salvador, February 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800065-0014)

287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ecuador¹

Washington, April 19, 1980, 0000Z

102602. Subject: Ongoing Political Crisis: Embassy Recommendations. Ref: Quito 2593.²

1. S—Entire Text

2. Department appreciates receiving your excellent analysis on current status of the executive-legislative confrontation.

3. We understand that since the sending of refel there have been some positive developments including the planned recess of the extraordinary legislative session next week indicating the possibility of a compromise. The influence of responsible Ecuadoreans of stature such as those forming the Special Commission apparently is being felt.³

4. In this situation, the Embassy should continue its contacts for the purposes of (A) obtaining current information, and (B) reaffirming to Ecuadorean leaders the U.S. interest in the continuance and consolidation of Ecuadorean democracy. We should demonstrate our interest without appearing to intervene. We have no particular formula. That is up to the Ecuadoreans to work out. What we have is a basic mutual interest in the success of the democratic process. We believe it particularly important at this juncture that the Ambassador see individually Galo P. Plaza and the other members of the Special Commission to obtain their assessments.

4. We understand Ambassador Crespo will return from Quito Sunday. Next week Assistant Secretary Bowdler and DAS Eaton will have an opportunity to see him socially and ask him for his appraisal of the situation and express our deep interest in the continuation of demo-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800193-0767. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Guerra; cleared in ARA, ARA/AND and S/S; approved by Bowdler.

² In telegram 2593 from Quito, April 17, the Embassy summarized the crisis between the executive and legislative branches in Ecuador. A power struggle between Roldos and Bucaram, who had been elected president of the Legislative Assembly, had escalated until the Assembly called a special session "to interpret the constitution, consider its own constitutional amendments, try cabinet officials, and censure other government officials. Unless a mutually acceptable compromise can be reached prior to the termination of the special session, the stage likely will be set for a destabilizing and possibly disastrous showdown via a plebiscite." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800192-0079)

³ The Special Commission consisted of former presidents Galo Plaza and Andres Cordova, former constituent assembly president Gonzalo Cordero, and Cardinal Archbishop Pablo Munoz.

cratic government in Ecuador. We will advise the Embassy of the results of these conversations.⁴

Vance

⁴ The conversation between Eaton and Crespo was summarized in telegram 105487 to Quito, April 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800199-0254)

Paraguay

288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay¹

Washington, April 7, 1977, 2302Z

78303. Subject: IAHRC Report on Paraguay. Ref: State 73097;² Graham-Landau Telcon.³

1. As you are aware from the ref messages, the GOP has in effect declined to receive an IAHRC mission in Paraguay. (The GOU also refused to invite the IAHRC.)

2. We assume GOP is aware of provisions of Sec. 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act which requires USG, in the formulation and conduct of security assistance programs, to avoid identification with countries which violate human rights. The law states that one of the criteria for evaluating an individual program is the extent of a given government's cooperation with such organizations as the IAHRC. You should take early opportunity to remind the GOP of the provisions of 502B, express the hope that their decision is not final and express our view that an invitation, on balance, would be useful to GOP.

3. FYI. There is every indication that Paraguay will be next focus of congressional concern regarding US assistance programs for authoritarian governments in the region. Hearings may commence shortly. Congressman Fraser's office is aware of fact no invitation to IAHRC was forthcoming from GOP.⁴

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770122-0447. Confidential. Drafted by Graham and Zimmermann; cleared by White, King, Lister, and Derian; approved by Bray.

² In telegram 73097 to Asuncion, April 2, the Department relayed an IAHRC request for assistance in obtaining the texts of Paraguayan legislation related to human rights, and also reported, "the Paraguayan charge recently informed the desk that the GOP declined to invite the IAHRC to visit that country." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770115-0669)

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 1527 from Asuncion, April 18, Landau reported that he had discussed a potential IAHRC visit with Nogues and Pappalardo and that he doubted "that president will focus on this matter until Videla departs on April 22," but that he would "continue to urge that GOP invite IAHRC as quickly as possible." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770134-0320)

289. Editorial Note

In 1977 and 1978, U.S. policy toward Paraguay focused on convincing Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner to schedule a visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the Organization of American States (OAS). Ambassadors George W. Landau and Robert E. White, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence A. Todman, and Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher used carrot-and-stick diplomacy to try to convince Stroessner to first agree to a visit in principle and then to set a firm date.

In May 1977, Paraguayan presidential advisor Conrado Pappalardo informed Landau that Paraguay would give permission for an IAHRC visit. (Telegram 1846 from Asuncion, May 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770160-0059) (C) At the OAS General Assembly in Grenada in June, Nogues told Secretary of State Cyrus Vance “that Paraguay would cooperate with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission” but “they are still considering the prospect of inviting the commission to Paraguay, and he reminded the Secretary that this is a prerogative of each country.” Vance “expressed the strong hope that Paraguay would invite the commission, noting that this would have a significant impact on the hemisphere and would provide Paraguay an opportunity to take a leadership role.” (Telegram 27 from the Secretary’s Delegation in Grenada, June 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770217-0201) (C) Stroessner told Todman in August that “he was not against the visit” (Telegram 3420 from Asuncion, August 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770302-0851) (C) and assured Carter in September that an IAHRC visit after Paraguayan elections in February 1978 “would be no problem.” (Document 290)

By late 1977 U.S. officials thought that Paraguay might indefinitely postpone a decision on dates for the IAHRC visit, and began to use both diplomatic and financial pressure to push Stroessner to set a date. As early as June 1977, the Department received reports that other Southern Cone governments were pressuring Stroessner not to accept an IAHRC visit. (Telegram 2280 from Asuncion, June 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770200-0128, telegram 135207 to Asuncion, June 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770208-0548, and telegram 168495 to Brasilia, July 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770268-1195) (all are Confidential) In June, Zimmermann suggested to Lopez Escobar “that Paraguay consider withdrawing two loan applications now pending in the IDB” “until such time as a favorable decision is reached on the visit by the IAHRC,” noting that if the loans were not withdrawn, “the U.S. would be obliged to oppose the loans.” (Telegram 153087 to

Asuncion, June 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770234-0654) (C) Christopher's Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance approved some grants and loans to Paraguay in 1977, but deferred consideration of others because the visit had not yet been scheduled and in September allowed Paraguay's access to FMS funding for FY 1977 to lapse. (Telegram 281155 to Asuncion, November 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770435-1029, and telegram 229738 to Asuncion, September 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770347-0394, Action Memorandum from ARA, HA, and PM through T to Christopher, September 29, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 80D177, HA Subject and Country Files, 1976-77, Human Rights—Paraguay, 1977, June-December) (telegrams are both Confidential; action memo is LOU)

After the Paraguayan elections in February 1978, White was unable to get anything other than vague assurances from Stroessner and Papalardo. (Telegram 693 from Asuncion, February 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077-0567) (C) On February 22, Todman stressed to Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States Mario Lopez Escobar that "any further delay in setting a date for the visit would be viewed with utmost seriousness and could have a profound effect on our relations." (Telegram 46660 to Asuncion, February 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780083-0229, and telegram 47666 to Asuncion, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780085-0354) (both Confidential)

290. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1977, 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Stroessner Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

PARAGUAY

General Alfredo Stroessner, President of
Paraguay
Alberto Nogues, Foreign Minister of
Paraguay
Ambassador Mario Lopez Escobar
Ambassador Conrado Pappalardo
Col. Raul Calvet
Dr. Victor Boettner (interpreter)

US

President Carter
Vice President Mondale
(part-time)
Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Ambassador George W.
Landau

President Carter expressed his gratitude that President Stroessner was able to attend the Panama Canal Treaty ceremonies.

President Stroessner thanked him for the invitation and said it had been accepted with pleasure. He and his people were friends of the United States. He spoke admiringly of U.S. advances in technology and research, having witnessed the launching of Voyager I at Cape Canaveral on his way to Washington. President Carter gave him a book containing 400 satellite pictures of the earth taken from space as well as his own book. President Stroessner expressed his gratitude for the courtesies extended to him by NASA at Cape Canaveral. President Carter suggested that President Stroessner visit the Museum of Space and Technology while in Washington. (This was done September 7.)

Turning to the Panama Canal Treaty, President Carter said that the signing ceremonies would be a great step in improving relations with all our neighbors. Negotiations have been going on for 14 years and he was thankful that President Stroessner and other leaders came to witness the conclusion. President Stroessner said that he had left important domestic business to come to Washington. At this time, he said, the Colorado Party Convention was preparing for general election next February. The signing of the Treaty was more important however and that is why he came. President Stroessner continued that he wanted to be at the side of the US at this time as Paraguay was during the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Paraguay, 3/77-2/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House.

Dominican Republic conflict,² when Paraguay furnished a detachment of 330 soldiers in a show of solidarity with the U.S.

President Carter said that the historical friendship between the two countries has been very valuable and that this meeting was devoted principally to identifying and solving any differences between the two countries. Paraguay, he said, had supported the United States on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and had given support in many other areas for which the U.S. is grateful. The only problem he was aware of at this time is that of human rights. President Carter said he understood that some prisoners had been released and there have been improvements, but, nevertheless, the question of human rights remained a problem with Congress and our people. Maybe this was caused by misunderstandings. Could President Stroessner outline the situation for him? President Carter went on to say that Ambassador Lopez Escobar had told him earlier that the IAHR would be permitted to go to Paraguay. Maybe President Stroessner could outline his position on this matter.

President Stroessner related that Paraguay had been in turmoil for many years and in 1947 had a six months Communist-inspired revolution. This Communist aggression, the first one in Latin America, damaged the country not only politically but also economically. Following the 1947 revolution Paraguay had 8 Presidents in 7 years, one of whom did not even last through the month of February. When he took over in 1954 and was duly elected, he was afraid he might not last very long either. Since then the country has progressed economically, exports have increased ten-fold, the currency is stable, and monetary reserves are at an all time high. Paraguay does not buy arms, he declared emphatically. It has dedicated itself to rebuilding the economy. Whatever military equipment Paraguay receives has come as gifts from the United States, from Argentina and from Brazil. He referred briefly to the Chaco War (1932–1935) when Bolivia invaded Paraguay and was defeated.

He stressed that U.S. citizens were welcome in Paraguay. They have no problems and there have been no incidents with U.S. citizens. The country was developing rapidly. Itaipu, the largest hydroelectric dam in the world, was being constructed. Another dam to be built in cooperation with Argentina was on the drawing board. Democratic institutions exist in Paraguay and the country has a democratic government, a situation which does not exist in neighboring countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia and Brazil.

² For the Dominican Republic in 1965, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–68*, vol. XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana.

He said Paraguay respected human rights and that Paraguay was not a police state. Opposition parties are allowed but not totalitarian (Communist) parties. Right now Paraguay is in a pre-election period. The campaign is starting; general elections will be held next February. He asked President Carter to send a special representative to observe electoral procedures and to confirm that elections were free.³ *President Stroessner said that now was not the right moment to permit an IAHRC visit. It was not good politically during the election campaign. Afterwards there would be no problem.* President Carter asked for the date of the elections. President Stroessner said they would be in February. He said he hoped President Carter would understand that a visit during the electoral campaign would be misrepresented and used against the government. Havana and Moscow beamed special hate programs into Paraguay. Large campaigns against Paraguay are mounted, accusations of genocide and drug dealings are bandied around. He reiterated that he was not opposed to a visit by the IAHRC, but this now was simply not the right time for it to come.

President Stroessner said he understood that loans for Paraguay would be suspended and asked President Carter to please not restrict loans because this would cut down all that Paraguay was trying to achieve in the development field. He said Paraguay respected human rights and asserted no one was being killed. It is not like in neighboring countries where people are being killed every day and where they have terrorists. Frequent changes in governments in neighboring countries have brought about instability and terrorism.

President Carter said this explanation was convincing but that Congress and our news media feel that there exist human rights violations in Paraguay. He understood that major opposition parties are not allowed to campaign, that prisoners are being held without trial. President Carter said that he had no way to know whether this was true or not and he needed confirmation that these rumors were untrue. He said he understood that there was a timing problem with the IAHRC visit and we could honor the time schedule but until there was an invitation, problems with loans would continue. He said that it might be possible for one of our representatives of the Human Rights Office of the Department of State to meet with whomever you designate or to come and discuss this matter in Paraguay. He said the USG had no interest in interfering in Paraguayan affairs, but the existing rumors of human rights violations have affected US/GOP relations.

³ See Document 294.

President Stroessner admitted that some people have been imprisoned but asserted that they were subversives. They were being tried right now. Moreover, the opposition can speak out freely.

President Carter said he was sure that the State Department was fair in its evaluation and it might be useful if President Stroessner could work out a way with Ambassador Todman which would remove the problem between the two countries. He said he was proud of the historical relationship with Paraguay and he wanted to preserve it.

President Stroessner said that neighboring governments wanted to imitate Paraguay and that Banzer, Pinochet, and Videla wanted this form of sovereignty but they could not imitate him because they did not have elected governments. He said that Paraguay did not even have a police force. The people themselves assured that law and order were kept. President Stroessner reiterated his firm stand against Communism.

President Carter said that he had no intention to interfere in Paraguayan affairs and he hoped that the Paraguayan government could work out a satisfactory formula with Todman. This could be done quietly, he said. President Carter said he hoped he could go to Congress and tell them that the question of human rights violations was false and that the problem between the two countries had been solved.

President Stroessner assured President Carter that he was only interested in progress and peace and that his main concern was for the welfare of the two countries. His government was popular. Congress worked normally and was allowed to talk freely.

President Carter thanked him for his explanation and said again that the historic friendship between the two people must be preserved. The US was eager to remove problems, therefore, he thought this frank discussion of the problem had been valuable.

President Stroessner reiterated his request that a representative come from the US to observe the elections and asked again that loan applications not be restricted. He said he referred to bilateral loans, IDB and other loans, because these requirements cause tremendous damage.

In closing he said he wanted to make sure that President Carter understood that although he (Stroessner) had been President for a long time he had not moved a finger to be re-elected. It was an honor to be President, he said, but it was also a great burden. However, he could not let his countrymen down because people believed that if he bowed out everything that had been built up would fall apart. It was the people's wish that he stay.

As the two Presidents were departing, President Stroessner made two requests: one for an engineering battalion for road building pur-

poses and one for credits for two DC-8s for a Paraguayan commercial airline. President Carter did not comment regarding the engineering batallion; with regard to the DC-8s, he asked whether these would be commercial sales and when answered that they were, the President said that he didn't think the sale would present any problems.

291. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay¹

Washington, October 10, 1977, 1259Z

243500. Subject: Foreign Minister Nogues Meeting With the Acting Secretary

1. The Department (ECA-Zimmerman) informed Ambassador Lopez Escobar on October 4² that the inter-agency group, because of its assessment of the human rights situation in Paraguay was not inclined to give blanket approval for future loans but rather to consider them as they come up in the light of the human rights situation then prevailing. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Nogues spoke with Assistant Secretary Todman in New York on October 6³ and then called on Acting Secretary Christopher here on October 7. He clearly wanted the appointment with the Acting Secretary in order to be able to explain to President Stroessner that he had heard our position from the highest levels of the Department.

2. Minister Nogues described his visit as a courtesy call but noted that he wished to talk with the Acting Secretary about bilateral relations prior to returning to Asuncion on October 10. He understood there were difficulties with Paraguayan loans because of information received from Asuncion regarding recent cases of human rights violations.

3. The Minister referred to the bilateral conversation between Presidents Carter and Stroessner and the possible visit of the IAHR. He stated the understanding between the two Presidents was that a visit date would be set up by the GOP and the IAHR.⁴ He added that it was

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770369-0899. Confidential. Drafted by Graham, cleared in ARA and S/S, approved by Christopher.

² Not found.

³ Not found.

⁴ See Document 290.

his understanding that Secretary Vance agreed with this arrangement.⁵ Also, the Minister observed, the Commission might decide not to go to Paraguay once they have studied the GOP reply. In any event, the GOP is going to await the IAHRRC reaction to its reply before fixing any visit date.

4. Nogues next stated that he had understood that any delay of the IAHRRC in reaching a decision would have no adverse affect on Paraguayan loan applications. The Minister added that he was informed by his Ambassador that such was not the case—that, in fact, Ambassador Lopez Escobar had been notified that some pending loans were not being approved because of some adverse news received by the Department from his country.

5. Mr. Christopher responded that he wished to put the matter in a broader context in order that the Minister understand the way we operate in this complex and sensitive area. The U.S. Congress has laid down a strong policy governing the U.S. posture in supporting loans by the International Financial Institutions. President Carter has endorsed this action by the Congress and is personally committed to it. We are bound to consider the condition of human rights in the countries receiving our assistance and support. The Department, in consultation with other agencies of Government such as Treasury, attempts to apply this consideration in a constructive and even-handed way.

6. The Acting Secretary stated that he wanted to give this prelude to the specific discussion because some countries think they are being singled out. With respect to Paraguay, we do not apply our criteria on the basis of fragmentary bits of information from those hostile to the Government. Rather, our assessment of the human rights situation at any given time is drawn upon by experts in the Department, Embassy evaluations and a variety of other sources.

7. Mr. Christopher then noted that he was pleased by the unequivocal Paraguayan agreement to receive the IAHRRC if they desire to visit that country. We understand the visit would take place after the national elections in February 1978, within a relative brief period thereafter if the IAHRRC desired to go. He recalled having met President Stroessner at the airport when Stroessner came for the Panama Canal Treaty signing. Because of the agreement concerning the IAHRRC, which

⁵ In telegram 237026 to Asuncion, October 1, the Department reported that in a September 29 conversation with Nogues at the UN, Vance said "that he was very pleased to learn about Paraguay's agreement with the IAHRRC. The agreement to permit an IAHRRC visit would be helpful to the US on the question of supporting certain Paraguayan loan applications. The Secretary stated that he hoped that a date will soon be fixed for the IAHRRC visit." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770359-0007)

we regarded as an encouraging sign of human rights improvement, we were able to approve three aid loans, two aid grants and one IDB grant, which in their totality are substantial.

8. As future loans are presented, Christopher continued, we will take into consideration events at that time. Before the IAHRIC visit we will continue to have a problem in approving loans—our decision making will be considerably aided when we do have the IAHRIC report that would result from the proposed inspection visit.

9. The Acting Secretary next stated that he regretted the U.S. could not go ahead with the FY 77 FMS credit agreement.⁶ The monies involved in this program were small, and we considered that the loans we had approved were more important to Paraguay. Future FMS programs will depend on circumstances involving the disposition of our Congress and the human rights situation at that time.

10. Minister Nogues replied that he understood it was very helpful for the Minister to know how we evaluate information received. He requested that our evaluation process include the GOP interpretation of events. The Minister specifically referred to asylees in the Peruvian and other Embassies in Asuncion. He observed that their not having received exit permits might appear to outsiders as an infringement of human rights. If this is the case, he would like to spend some time in explaining the GOP position.

11. The Acting Secretary replied that, as this was the first he had heard of the asylees, it obviously had no affect on the loan decisions made to date. Christopher added that with Robert White having now received his agreement, he would be looking forward to White's evaluation reports. He again assured the Minister that the Department has the ability to conduct sophisticated analysis of the human rights situation.

12. The Minister replied that he had confidence in Christopher and the Department. He knew he would be able to work well with Ambassador White, who is a good servant of the U.S. in closing, Christopher returned to the question of loan approval. He stated that the worst thing that could happen would be for the Minister to depart with a misunderstanding of our policy. In the interregnum until an IAHRIC visit takes place, we will assess the information available and make the most even-handed judgment that we can in determining our voting position on any loans that may come up. The Acting Secretary stated that he has great confidence in Ambassador White, and would remind him, though it is hardly necessary, to obtain a copy of the GOP

⁶ Reference is to the action memorandum from ARA, HA, and PM through T to Christopher, September 29, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 80D177, HA Subject and Country Files, 1976–77, Human Rights—Paraguay, 1977, June–December. See Document 289.

reply to the IAHRC. Minister Nogues replied that his door would be open to White, and the Acting Secretary said that our door is likewise open to Ambassador Lopez Escobar.

13. We have agreed to Nogues' subsequent request to give him a copy of our memcon. Though he did not say so, it is obvious he wants the U.S. record so that Stroessner can see our position (and his defense of Paraguay) in black and white. Please, therefore, deliver to Nogues as a note verbale, the text of paragraphs two through twelve. You should indicate this is in compliance with his request.⁷

Christopher

⁷ In telegram 281155 to Asuncion, November 24, McNeil advised White that the Department had "agreed to support several loans for Paraguay in the IFI context because of Paraguay's agreement to receive the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and basic human needs factors" but that it had "deferred action on others." He instructed White to tell Nogues that "we are currently reviewing other loan proposals but are not in a position to vote for them if they were to come up immediately. We think it would be in Paraguay's interest to hold them up for the time being pending our review of the total Paraguayan loans picture in the IFIs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770435-1029)

292. Letter From President Carter to Paraguayan President Stroessner¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased that you were able to visit Washington for the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties and that this gave us the opportunity to meet.² Your views, as one of the hemisphere's senior leaders, are important to me.

I was glad to learn of your willingness to receive a visit from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights if the Commission finds that such a visit would be desirable after reviewing your government's response to its report on Paraguay. Several other members of the Organi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 96, Paraguay, 1/77-7/80. No classification marking.

² See Document 290.

zation of American States have now also indicated their willingness to receive the Commission. I believe Paraguay's readiness to do so is a very hopeful development, and one that strengthens effective cooperation within the framework of existing international commitments.

For my part, in addition to such a visit, I would like to repeat my offer to have officials of the Department of State's Office of Human Rights meet with your representatives in Paraguay, should that be helpful to you.

I am mindful of your interest in loans to assist your development programs. As you know, we have now stated our willingness to support Paraguay's application to the Inter-American Development Bank for the loan to improve the water system in Asuncion. We have also approved disbursement of six loans and grants by the Agency for International Development. Other loan applications by Paraguay will be considered as they come up for decision. My government's position will of course take into account all appropriate considerations, including human rights developments.

You also mentioned the matter of credits for the commercial purchase of two DC-8 aircraft for your national airline. If Paraguay proceeds with a request to the Export-Import Bank, it will be reviewed according to the Bank's established procedures. I would note that human rights considerations are also a factor in the Export-Import Bank's decision-making.

Finally, I encourage you to let me know directly if any matter should arise that you wish to bring to my personal attention.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

293. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State¹

Asuncion, December 28, 1977, 1830Z

5233. Subject: Conversation With Foreign Minister on Human Rights

1. Foreign Minister invited me to his office December 27 to discuss statements allegedly made by US representative to IDB, Ralph Dungan: the first related to the Jack Anderson column on child abuse in Paraguay² and the need for the government to refute these statements before presenting any more requests for loans; the second had to do with Paraguay's newfound prosperity which might make it ineligible for further soft loans.

2. I replied that if the government could refute Anderson's column that it would certainly be well advised to do so but that I did not think there should exist any direct correlation between the charges of a journalist and the response of the USG to loan presentations. Secondly, I said Paraguay indeed might have a problem regarding eligibility for soft loans but that if we could improve the record on human rights we could then begin to treat this problem in the technical context where it belongs and where there were good chances of success. The Foreign Minister agreed and pointed out that Brazil, Argentina and Chile all continue to receive soft loans.

3. When the Minister brought up the question of a date for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) visit and President Stroessner's directive not to set a date for the visit until after the February 12 elections, I made the following points to Nogues.

4. The GOP was giving Washington the impression that it was playing with the dates of the visit in the hope of avoiding an IAHRC visit altogether. It was hard for any knowledgeable observer to believe that there was any doubt about the outcome of the February 12 elections and that it appeared to us that the crucial date was more likely in early June when the OAS General Assembly would meet to consider, *inter alia*, the human rights situations in various countries. Both Paraguay and the US know that the IAHRC wants to visit Paraguay in March in order that it can complete its report in time for the General Assembly. If Paraguay continues its dilatory tactics the Commission could publish

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780001-0054. Confidential.

² Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Paraguayan Officials and Child Abuse," *Washington Post*, December 20, 1977, p. B15.

its report without the benefit of an on-site visit. In this case Paraguay might feel it had a logical pretext to state that there was no longer a necessity for a visit. Superficial diplomatic maneuvering such as this was no way to treat a serious problem. The important point for the GOP to remember was that President Stroessner had made a commitment to President Carter and if Paraguay wriggled out of that commitment they would face a stone wall in trying to get further credits.

5. Nogues took close notes and while he looked disapproving at times, he did not attempt to refute my version of the Paraguayan scenario. I believe that putting Paraguay on notice will impress upon this government that we know perfectly well what they are up to and that it is a no-win game.³

White

³ In telegram 310457 to Asuncion, December 30, the Department advised White: "we applaud strong stand you took with Nogues" and "you may find it useful in your subsequent discussions with Nogues to remind him that IAHRRC will be meeting on January 26 and that setting of date for visit could minimize adverse statements or actions at that time." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780004-0451)

294. Letter from President Carter to Paraguayan President Stroessner¹

Washington, February 8, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your offer to receive my personal representatives to observe Paraguay's February 12 general elections.²

I appreciate the spirit in which you have made the offer, but elections are essentially an internal affair. The presence of special envoys from another country could only be misinterpreted by the world at

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Paraguay: President Alfredo Stroessner, 3/77-2/80. No classification marking.

² Stroessner's January 16 letter to Carter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Paraguay: President Alfredo Stroessner, 3/77-2/80.

large, even though the visit took place at the request of the host government.

These considerations lead me to decline your offer regretfully—but I do have an informal suggestion that you may wish to consider. You might achieve the same end by offering the international press full access to the electoral campaign, election day voting, and the counting of ballots. I should imagine that such access would attract the United States press, as well as others.

Your reference to our conversation last September brings to mind another point—the setting of a date for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission's visit to Paraguay. Naturally this is a matter to be resolved by your government and the Commission. But you will recall that we spoke together of our urgent interest in this matter.³ And the recent visits of Commission teams to Panama and El Salvador⁴ are encouraging signs of a growing appreciation of the Commission's value to the Inter-American system. My own Administration continues to support strongly the protection and enhancement of human rights everywhere, and the Commission's role is of great importance to the future well-being of the hemisphere in this regard.

I did appreciate the reminder of your earlier offer on the election, and I hope you will understand my reasons for not accepting.⁵

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ See Document 290.

⁴ The IAHRC visited Panama from November 29–December 7, 1977, and El Salvador on January 18, 1978.

⁵ In telegram 693 from Asuncion, February 20, White reported on a conversation with Stroessner that day: "When he came to the visit of the IAHRC he was vague and said no more than that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was negotiating with the Commission now. He did not say about what. When I pressed him he said the IAHRC should as a top priority investigate the atrocities now being committed in Colombia. He then told me 'not to worry, that all would be arranged.'" White concluded, "it might be prudent to conclude the Paraguayans either are still playing games or that Stroessner has not yet made up his mind." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077-0567)

295. Editorial Note

Despite assurances from Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner's advisors that they were pushing Stroessner to allow an IAHR visit to be scheduled, by late 1978 Department officials became convinced that Stroessner would not allow the visit in defiance of the wishes of other Southern Cone governments. (Telegram 3213 from Asuncion, August 5, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321-1223) (C) Even without an IAHR visit scheduled, U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay Robert E. White assured Washington in April that the U.S. human rights policy had "caused a rift within the government of Paraguay" and that Paraguay's human rights "record has already begun to show improvement," although he believed that no "easing" of the U.S. policy was warranted since he was "skeptical that the release of prisoners arrested without cause and held without due process should be rewarded." (Telegram 1359 from Asuncion, April 4, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780148-0149) (S)

The USG continued to press Asunción to improve particular problems in the Paraguayan human rights situation while also focusing on regional policy questions. In July 1979, White sought to preserve U.S. influence in Paraguay, particularly with the lower ranks in the Paraguayan military, by recommending approval of commercial sales of non-lethal military equipment. (Telegram 3298 from Asuncion, July 19, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790333-0838) (S) In their October 1979 meeting, Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher and Paraguayan Foreign Minister Alberto Nogues discussed at length the imprisonment of Paraguayan opposition politician Domingo Laino, but the IAHR was not mentioned. (Telegram 262387 to Asuncion, October 6, 1979; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790459-0026) (C) The IAHR did not visit Paraguay during the Carter administration.

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State¹

Asuncion, August 16, 1979, 1532Z

3742. Subject: (C) Somoza Hoping to Come to Paraguay. Ref: Asuncion 3706; Asuncion 3667.²

1. (C-Entire text)

2. During afternoon church service August 15, Presidential Adviser Conrado Pappalardo told Charge he needed to consult with him on an "urgent, sensitive matter/during Foreign Minister's reception evening of same day in celebration of Stroessner's 25th anniversary. During the reception Pappalardo and Charge held 15-minute conversation regarding Somoza. Pappalardo said Somoza is "terrified, desperate and half-crazy" about his personal safety and has been exerting intense pressure on the GOP for over a week to grant him permission to come here. He said Somoza is hiding out at the House of Mario Sandoval in Guatemala,³ that Somoza has called President Stroessner several times, Sandoval and Luis Pallais⁴ have spoken with Pappalardo a number of times and Sevilla Sacasa⁵ is pressing the Paraguayan Ambassador in Washington hard to grant Somoza entry.

3. Pappalardo said he has worked hard to fend off these requests because he recognizes how much bad press Paraguay will get for accepting Somoza but the President feels it is a "humanitarian act" to take him in and completely in keeping with Paraguay's long tradition of harboring political exiles. Pappalardo said Somoza was terrified to return to the United States because he thought the USG might extradite him to Nicaragua, as it had returned Perez Jimenez to Venezuela,⁶ and he asked the Charge to make a special appeal to Washington to give Somoza guarantees against extradition. Charge promised to relay this

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-2610. Confidential; Nodis.

² In telegram 3706 from Asuncion, August 11, the Embassy reported that Stroessner had given Somoza permission to come to Paraguay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790006-0739) In telegram 3667 from Asuncion, August 9, the Embassy reported that "no one in the Foreign office or most other ministries will know whether or not Somoza is coming here until he actually arrives." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-2608)

³ Mario Sandoval Alarcon, leader of a Guatemalan right-wing political party, the National Liberation Movement (MLN).

⁴ Luis Pallais Debayle, cousin of Somoza and a spokesperson for the Liberal Party.

⁵ Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States from 1977 until 1979.

⁶ In 1963, the United States extradited former President Marcos Perez Jimenez to Venezuela for trial on embezzlement charges.

message but said his understanding was Somoza had a visa to return to the U.S. any time. Pappalardo said real question was guarantee against extradition and, unless this was offered to Somoza, he would not return.

4. It was impossible for him to fend off a decision on this problem much longer Pappalardo said because pressure from Somoza was almost irresistible and President Stroessner was nearly ready to concede him permission to enter on humanitarian grounds. Charge asked when Somoza might come and how. Pappalardo cautioned decision was still not taken and reiterated his hope that the USG would readmit Somoza with guarantees against extradition. But, if nothing eventuated, Somoza would arrive with a tourist visa early next week, perhaps Monday, August 20. Somoza has asked to charter a LAP (Paraguayan Airlines) aircraft to bring him here since he is afraid to travel on any regular airliner because it might set down in Manauga. Pappalardo said if the GOP let Somoza in, it would be for a brief stay, “no more than a week or two weeks at the most.” He would then have to find somewhere else to take refuge. Speaking very confidentially, Pappalardo told Charge that Luis Pallais said the reason why “the Americans are out to get Somoza” is because he intervened in the Panama Canal question by pressing his friends in Congress to work to defeat the implementing legislation. Pallais said President Carter himself regarded this as gross intervention in U.S. Internal Affairs and would not forgive Somoza.

5. Pappalardo also appealed to the Charge and through him to Ambassador White to do everything possible to diminish the bad reaction to the GOP’s decision in the American press. He asked if the Embassy could not report the conversation in such a way as to emphasize Paraguay’s humanitarianism and tradition of harboring exiles in order to diminish the adverse reaction that is bound to result.

6. Pappalardo said the President had ordered that everything be done to “clean up Paraguay’s image” and that was why all the political prisoners had been let go, the Croats expelled and Mengele’s citizenship cancelled.⁷ The Charge suggested that handing over Mengele to the German Ambassador at about the same time as Somoza arrived would

⁷ In October, the Embassy’s annual human rights report stated that six people were then political prisoners. (Telegram 4655 from Asuncion, October 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790470-1217) On July 17, 1979, Paraguay expelled Miro Baresic and Ivan Vujicevic, members of a Croatian nationalist group who were wanted in the United States for extortion and murder. (Telegram 3265 from Asuncion, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-2596 and telegram 85119 to Asuncion, April 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131-2098) (S) On August 8, the Paraguayan Supreme Court revoked the Paraguayan citizenship of Josef Mengele, who was wanted in West Germany for Nazi-era war crimes. (Telegram 3672 from Asuncion, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790365-0947)

help to assuage the image problem. Pappalardo denied heatedly that Mengele is still here but said the cancellation of citizenship was intended to demonstrate that Paraguay wants nothing to do with Mengele. Naturally, Mengele would be afraid to return here now since he would be open to extradition. Conversation ended with Charge's promise to report details to Washington.

7. Comment: Dr. Pappalardo's veracity is never wholly assured and we suspect GOP is fending off Somoza only long enough to complete 25th anniversary celebrations. His plea for the U.S. to readmit Somoza with undertaking never to extradite him strikes us as a cover for Paraguay's "humanitarian" decision, already taken, to let him come here. Regarding Pappalardo's request for an undertaking about Somoza's immunity from extradition, we do not regard it as necessary to respond but leave this to the Department's discretion.

Dion

297. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay¹

Washington, October 1, 1980, 0130Z

261898. Subject: GOP Reaction to Somoza Assassination. Ref: Asuncion 4012 and Previous.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Department appreciates reporting on GOP actions in aftermath of Somoza assassination. We understand the need to take decisive action in the wake of this terrorist incident, but we are concerned that overreaction by GOP security forces could result in reverses in first category human rights gains made to date and increase perception of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800468-0103. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted in ARA, cleared in ARA and HA, approved by Eaton.

² In telegram 4012 from Asuncion, September 26, the Embassy reported on the Paraguayan investigation into the September 17 assassination of Somoza in Asuncion. Paraguayan police had identified seven people who took part, but the Embassy noted: "the Paraguayan police may not be as certain of the identities of the alleged assassins as they claim to be." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800460-0801)

climate of fear among Paraguayans and foreign residents.³ We note that European missions in Asuncion are also concerned over indiscriminate detentions.

3. Ambassador requested to communicate USG concern to Interior Minister Montanaro at time he deems appropriate, drawing on following points:⁴

—The United States Government deplores this act of violence perpetrated on Paraguayan soil and supports appropriate efforts to bring those responsible to justice.

—However, we hope that security forces will exercise all due restraint in the pursuit of their duties, recognizing the damage that could be done to Paraguay's international image and to attempts to improve the political atmosphere within Paraguay should there be a reversal in category I human rights improvements.

—We hope that authorities and residents understand what documentation is required, that individuals lacking papers but clearly above suspicion not be harassed, and persons presently detained be released as quickly as their identity can be established.

Christopher

³ In telegram 3963 from Asuncion, September 24, the Embassy reported that the Paraguayan military had joined police in orchestrating "a massive dragnet" to locate Somoza's assassins, which included roadblocks and "a door-to-door search throughout the city of Asuncion going from one neighborhood to another." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800457-0843)

⁴ In telegram 4078, October 1, the Embassy reported that Lane had "conveyed the substance of the first two ticks" to Montanaro on September 23. The Embassy also reported that it had "been pursuing tick three concerns at lower levels in both ministries of foreign affairs and interior." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469-0279)

298. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Paraguay¹**

Washington, January 17, 1981, 0240Z

12467. Subject: Somoza's Assassination. Ref: Asuncion 0075.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Evaluating intelligence that became available in the weeks following the Somoza assassination, the Department determined in early October that it had no conclusive evidence as to the planners or perpetrators of the attack, although as you know, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] reports suggested FSLN and Montonero involvement.

3. You may tell Foreign Minister Nogues that the USG did not undertake an investigation of the assassination and has no conclusive evidence as to the planners or perpetrators. However, we remain concerned about such a terrorist act. Therefore, you may tell the Minister that, in our mutual interest in combatting international terrorism, we would be willing to try to trace the weapons seized after the assassination, as we earlier made known to Paraguayan authorities through confidential Embassy channels. We would do so in total confidentiality and would expect the Paraguayans to respect that confidentiality.

Muskie

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810024-0729. Secret; Exdis. Drafted in ARA, cleared in ARA, S/S and by Quinton, approved by Bowdler.

² In Asuncion 75, January 7, 1981, Lane requested guidance on how to respond to a request from Nogues for "any conclusions or findings by USG with respect to the probable identity of the groups or individuals who assassinated Somoza." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810008-1229)

Peru

299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru¹

Washington, February 4, 1977, 0111Z

25339. Subject: Cut in FMS for Peru; Invitation to Peruvian Foreign Minister

1. February 3 Peruvian Ambassador Garcia Bedoya was called in by Acting Assistant Secretary Luers and given original of Secretary's response to congratulatory message from Peruvian Foreign Minister, inviting de la Puente to a working luncheon in Washington February 10 while latter in U.S. en route back from visit to Spain. Luers stated invitation was important signal of U.S. interest in warm relations between our two countries. Texts of messages exchanged being sent Lima by septels.² (Luncheon being scheduled in State Department for 12:30, Thursday, February 10.)³

2. Shifting to decision to cut FMS for Peru for FY 77 from \$20 million budgeted to \$10 million, Luers advised Garcia Bedoya of action taken early December⁴ and also mentioned that projected level for FY 78 was likewise \$10 million. Explained that it had been impossible for USG to maintain level of \$20 million for Peru for this fiscal year in face of continuing Peruvian military buildup, capped by purchase of aircraft from Soviet Union. Such would not have been understood in Congress. As it was, there were those within USG who argued for total elimination of FMS for Peru.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770039-0945. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to Santiago and for information to Quito. Drafted by Fuller; approved by Luers.

² In telegram 25612 to Lima, February 4, the Department transmitted the text of de la Puente's message to Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0131) In telegram 25613 to Lima, February 4, the Department transmitted the text of Vance's reply to de la Puente. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0132)

³ For Mondale's meeting with de la Puente, see footnote 3, Document 300. In telegram 950 from Lima, February 4, the Embassy provided background information for the scheduled working lunch: "the hemisphere-wide chorus of press and public concern heard during the month of December regarding tensions, reported troop movements, Soviet arms purchase, and the possibility of a Peruvian attack on Chile" had "forced the GOP to examine more realistically the generally accepted but usually unspoken assumption that Peru, especially under the revolutionary government of the armed forces, would eventually right the wrongs of the past century and adjust accounts with Chile." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0221)

⁴ Not further identified.

3. Luers continued that remaining \$10 million should tide Peru over (following utilization of \$20 million from FY 76 funding for which Garcia Bedoya signed agreement late October 76, at end of transitional quarter). Indicated that possibility of increase later in fiscal year should not be totally precluded, provided funds were available and political environment permitted. Cut was to be seen only as an expression of USG concern over continuing Peruvian military buildup.

4. As expected, Garcia Bedoya reacted adversely. USG decision was "difficult to understand". Wasn't it a form of pressure to accomplish "other purposes" (referring to further purchases from USSR). Luers denied this, pointing out that there was still some FMS being provided for FY 77. Scale of military acquisitions was Peru's business; USG decision reflected our preoccupation with it.

5. Garcia Bedoya spoke of improved relations between militaries of Peru and U.S. and indicated that cut decision was "very disappointing". . . also "contradictory". Luers asked Garcia Bedoya to convey sense that USG does not want any significant diminishment in military relations and pointed to continued training program. (Later Garcia Bedoya was told that program would continue at previously projected level of \$900,000. It too had at one point been cut for FY 77—to \$700,000—but had later been restored to \$900,000.)

6. Garcia Bedoya returned to his interpretation that the U.S. was cutting off FMS because of Peruvian purchases from the USSR and referred to section in annual DOD military posture statement relating to Peru's purchase of Soviet aircraft (see septel). Ambassador argued that it had been "impossible" to buy such a plane from the U.S.; therefore Peru "forced" to turn to USSR. Cut in funding was "not important economically" but was important psychologically.

7. Luers reiterated that cut reflected concern over unfortunate environment in Andean region and mentioned similar concern re Peruvian military buildup on part of neighboring countries. Garcia Bedoya rejoined by stating U.S. is here agreeing with those neighbors.⁵

⁵ In telegram 25380 to Lima, February 4, the Department reported that the political counselor in the Peruvian embassy had expressed "Peruvian unhappiness" with an AP story "concerning 'new' Peru-USSR arms deal," and had asked for the U.S. military posture statement for FY 78. The telegram included the following excerpt from the statement: "The principal potential threat to U.S. interest in Latin America is the Soviet and Cuban efforts to establish power bases which exploit prevailing unstable social/economic conditions and interfere with U.S. access to strategic materials. Cuba is successfully penetrating the infrastructure of Caribbean states. The Soviets see the sale of arms as an effective means of entry. They recently were unsuccessful in the sale of missile-firing gun boats to Colombia, but have sold a highly sophisticated aircraft to Peru. With this sale will come Soviet technicians and an opportunity for increased influence." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0164)

8. Meeting ended with Luers' assurance USG wished to continue with military relationship appropriate to interests of both countries.⁶

Vance

⁶ For the U.S. concern with the military balance in the Andes, see Document 2.

300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru¹

Washington, February 15, 1977, 0120Z

33623. Subject: Washington Visit of Peruvian Foreign Minister. Ref: State 25339 (NOTAL).²

Summary: Long meeting between Secretary and Peruvian Foreign Minister focused on: A) general North/South issues—LDC commodity and debt questions, MTN, and LOS; B) OAS; C) regional issues—relations with Chile and Ecuador, access to sea for Bolivia; D) two strong U.S. policy concerns—arms limitations (including re Peru) and human rights (de la Puente urged against over-emphasis on Latin America, in particular against “cornering” Chile); E) Peruvian foreign policy (of peace with neighbors) and internal political situation. Exchange was wide-ranging, frank and cordial. President Carter and Secretary were extended invitations to visit Peru.

1. En route back to Peru through U.S. from official visit to Spain, Peruvian Foreign Minister Jose de la Puente was invited by Secretary to luncheon meeting February 10 (reftel). Also had session with Senate Foreign Relations Committee and called on Vice President.³ Held press

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052-0921. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to Santiago, and for information to La Paz, Quito, the U.S. Mission to the OECD in Paris, USUN, and the U.S. Mission to the EC in Brussels. Drafted by Fuller; cleared by E. Richardson, Tarnoff, and in E and S/S; approved by Todman.

² See Document 299.

³ In a February 11 memorandum to Carter, Mondale reported on his meeting with de la Puente. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 43, Peru, 2/12/77) A record of de la Puente's session with the SFRC was not found.

conference, which covered by news agencies.⁴ Left to return to Peru evening February 10.

2. Report on two-hour meeting with Secretary follows. In attendance on Peru side were Foreign Under Secretary Wieland, Ambassador to U.S. Garcia Bedoya, Ambassador to OAS Alvarado, Ambassador to UN Alzamora, three others; on U.S. side, Ambassador-designate to LOS Richardson, Assistant Secretary-designate Todman, Ambassador-designate to OAS McGee, Devine ARA/AND, Einaudi S/P, Frank E. Fuller, Peru Desk.

3. CIEC issues—Secretary started off formal exchange at luncheon by stating that new administration begins with predisposition to engage third world problems actively and constructively. Invited de la Puente's views on issues facing CIEC.⁵ Identifying conference as an important opportunity for progress on North/South issues, de la Puente described first 8 months as spent in "serene analysis"—performed with excellent spirit but without much substantive result. Now that new administration in power in U.S., CIEC participants must start in earnest on negotiation of restructuring of market for LDC products, abandoning the commodity-by-commodity approach and evolving instead a "package"—including in particular non-traditional exports and invisibles like transport. No precise details given. Unless complete dialogue begins, scheduled ministerial meeting in April may have to be postponed again.

4. Secretary asked about Peru's position on Common Fund.⁶ De la Puente indicated that Common Fund would be just a useless pot of money if serious efforts were not made to restructure individual markets. Frank said that U.S. viewed problem also from perspective of improving markets for individual commodities, but we are faced with a negotiation next month on Common Fund when we have just barely begun a 2-year cycle of negotiations on individual commodities. Common Fund will be first north/south meeting of significance for new Administration and it would be helpful if we could find a way that this first meeting could delay basic decisions until work on individual commodities were completed in UNCTAD framework.

5. Regarding LDC debt, de la Puente said inadequate DC response would annul results of discussion other issues. Later pointed out that

⁴ For de la Puente's remarks at the Peruvian embassy, see Karen DeYoung, "Peruvian Finds U.S. 'Mature,' Informal," *Washington Post*, February 12, 1977, p. A9.

⁵ For the U.S. post-mortem of CIEC, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 266.

⁶ For the U.S. approach to the UNCTAD common fund meeting, held in Geneva from November 7-December 2, 1977, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 280, 281, 284, 285, and 286.

debt in LDCs increasingly owed by state entities, not private sector. Change in mix suggests need for application of different standards. Debt issue should be handled on some kind of “global basis” as well as on case-by-case basis favored by DC’s; de la Puente said Peru’s experience with case-by-case negotiations had been favorable as in Paris Club discussions re Peru debt (where then Economic Under Secretary de la Puente worked with then Finance Minister Morales Bermudez). Trade-off there on accommodating debt problem was Peruvian resolution to try to accelerate foreign investment. Frank pointed out that debt problem would grow as most projections show \$40 to \$50 billion surplus of OPEC countries over the next five years. Since most of this surplus is deposited in institutions in Eurocur. Mkts., US, and Switzerland, international lending would have to continue to increase on a large scale despite fact that many countries, both developed and developing, are close to limits of their debt servicing capacity. Commercial banking sectors and international financial institutions have done most of required intermediation, but there were limits to their potential for future lending. New solutions would have to be found.

6. MTN—Secretary sensed rise in protectionism around world. De la Puente agreed, referring to it re negotiations in Geneva on tropical products⁷ and also in Lome Agreement.⁸ Richardson mentioned that trade expansion was vital in resolution of LDC debt problems, and de la Puente returned to theme of need for restructuring market for LDC products.

7. LOS—Richardson acknowledged we did not see eye-to-eye with Peru on rights of passage by naval and merchant craft over economic zone (as differentiated from territorial sea). U.S. must make clear to non-aligned what our basic interests are. Then LOS conference participants must remember that they are not rug merchants in a bazaar but have potentiality to become architects of a structure capable of providing for the best interests of all. Point is illustrated by accommodation between freedom of passage over economic zone and recognition of right of coastal state to exploit resources of zone.

8. Regarding deep seabed resources, Richardson and de la Puente agreed on need to establish international authority capable of working with large corporations, which have the needed technology and can raise the needed capital. Would corporations’ participation be on turn-key basis or, as Nigeria had proposed, in joint ventures with coastal state enterprises? Noted that in absence of treaty or in anticipation

⁷ A reference to the Tokyo Round of negotiations under the aegis of the GATT.

⁸ See footnote 8, Document 239.

of one, U.S. Congress might pass unilateral legislation. Financing of authority also an unresolved problem, even with U.S. putting up 20 percent.

9. OAS—Brief exchange held on need for reform of charter and difference in U.S.-Peruvian views.

10. Arms Limitations—Secretary expressed strong administration commitment for U.S. as “world’s leading arms seller” to rethink arms transfer policy with view toward significant overall reduction. Cited as instance refusal by USG to license sale of Kfir to Ecuador and also continuing policy versus sale of advanced equipment in Latin America.⁹

11. Regarding Peru, while reassured by GOP statements it had no aggressive intentions, Secretary urged leveling off of military acquisitions. De la Puente responded by giving long historical account of Peru’s procurement of Su-22 Soviet fighter-bomber and recent regional tensions.

12. Foreign Minister decried current campaign by parties he did not identify to sharpen for ulterior reasons animosity between Peru and Chile. Referred to traditional abrasions in South America: Argentina-Chile, Chile-Peru, Peru-Ecuador. Went on to affirm how Peru was “surrounded” while Chile had been helped extensively by U.S. Yet maintained that War of the Pacific had not, repeat not, created “feeling of revenge” in Peru (despite popular belief). On other hand, Peru must have sense of security—else would be more prone to provoke neighbors. Now, de la Puente continued, Peru was achieving military equality vis a vis neighbors and so was willing to call for limitations on offensive arms procurement in declaration of Ayacucho. Noted that Trilateral Commission considering arms limitations “meets regularly” (sic).¹⁰ In further deliberations of commission, de la Puente felt that U.S. as “world’s largest arms seller” could play constructive role, though precisely how de la Puente did not specify. Later said Peru, having reached “parity” with Chile and Ecuador, would like to stop purchasing more arms and hoped it would not be forced not to stop.

13. Turning to Peru’s procurement of Su-22, he explained PAF wanted only replacement aircraft, had been recommended McDonnell—Douglas A-4 Skyhawk, but had been obliged to negotiate with that company. Its price, terms far too steep. UK and France could not offer appropriate technology or terms. Then USSR came into picture and pushed a “very offensive” aircraft of a sophistication Peru actually

⁹ For the USG refusal to license the sale of Kfirs to Ecuador, see Documents 265 and 266. For the USG policy regarding sale of “advanced equipment,” see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Documents 259 and 271.

¹⁰ Not further identified.

did not want. “Tremendous discussion” ensued in GOP whether to take Su-22, and finally decision made to buy. (Foregoing represents interesting variant on sequence of developments as previously understood by US.)

14. With reference to relations with Ecuador, de la Puente said Peru trying to advance Andean Pact integration and joint border development projects. GOP recognized Ecuadorean aspirations to regain access to Amazon and has assured GOE it will try to help (without return of territory). Indeed, when Morales Bermudez met President Geisel last year on the Peru/Brazil border, Morales Bermudez recommended Brazil buy more oil from Ecuador, shipped down Amazon. However, Ecuador Foreign Minister made intemperate speech in General Assembly reinstating claim to lost territory—largely, de la Puente asserted, for internal political reasons relating to instability of ruling junta.

15. In conclusion, de la Puente emphasized dialogue with neighbors would be pursued at highest level to work toward real and permanent peace. However, to be able to pursue such a dialogue effectively, a country requires “strength in arms”.

16. De la Puente did not raise cut in FMS to Peru for FY 77 (reftel) with Secretary, but did briefly with Todman.¹¹ Foreign Minister minimized economic importance of \$10 million reduction but trusted cut was not “a measure against Peru”. De la Puente urged cut be rescinded. No commitment was made.

17. As lunch ended, Secretary and de la Puente exchanged brief informal toasts to meeting frequently in future. De la Puente emphasized he had not come “to seek or reject” but to meet Secretary. Urged Secretary to call him by phone—just a few words might be helpful in “avoiding misunderstandings”.

18. Secretary then took de la Puente to his office, accompanied by Garcia Bedoya, Todman and Fuller, for more private meeting.

19. Internal political situation—de la Puente sketched history of first and second phases of Peruvian Revolution and referred to “great division” in government once leaders (of first phase) began to think they were sole possessors of truth. Lack of unity in government could lead to Peru’s falling to communists. New plan Tupac Amaru designed to reestablish and strengthen unity through slow transfer of power back to people. De la Puente referred to Apra as “one of great resources to control communism”. Apolitical Peruvian people can be effectively organized by skillful party like communists. If economic development of country continues (and opposition is given no economic reason to

¹¹ See footnote 2 above.

mobilize against government), national elections could take place in four years—probably of representatives of sector organizations rather than parties.

20. Later, after mentioning that Morales Bermudez was due to retire from active military service in 1978, de la Puente said President “will remain” (beyond retirement)—confirmed in his position by army, with more civilians like de la Puente and Barua in his cabinet.

21. Foreign policy—de la Puente quoted Morales Bermudez as stating “our reality is the hemisphere”, in proposing improvement of relations with neighbors. Good relations also desired with “socialist countries” and “truly non-aligned” countries. De la Puente reported on his attendance at Colombo Non-Aligned Conference last summer and said he was surprised by strength of new moderation among participants (cited specifically Tito, Sadat, Indian Foreign Minister). Extremist countries (Cuba, Algeria) were vocal but their confrontational tactics were ultimately rejected.

22. Human rights—de la Puente conveyed Morales Bermudez’ endorsement of recommendations of Linowitz Report¹² and support for strong emphasis on human rights in conduct of foreign policy. Acknowledged Peru has 110 political prisoners. Felt U.S. was now taking positive attitude as “dominant (not dominating) country in hemisphere”, and could obtain results in HR field. However expressed concern regarding over-emphasis of focus on HR situation in Latin America. Example he cited was Chile, which we shouldn’t “corner”, which instead needed outside help so progress made in HR field wouldn’t be undone. Situation in Chile, de la Puente suggested, much better than in Rhodesia and South Africa, where a “race was being destroyed”.

23. Secretary spoke of problems of applying HR principles and later referred to a possible policy combining condemnation by USG of egregious violations of HR while dealing in a quiet way, without spotlight, with others. Todman suggested looking for positive things to be done in a HR country in order to “build to reduce the gap”.

24. Access to sea for Bolivia—Peru’s objectives were peace in the area, integration, and development (specifically a petrochemical project fueled by Bolivian oil down the existing pipeline). A sovereign corridor, as Chile has proposed for Bolivia, was never “an element of peace”, de la Puente maintained, whereas there were several cases of areas of shared sovereignty (proposed by Peru). De la Puente did not cite any

¹² A reference to the 1974 report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, chaired by Sol Linowitz. (Lewis H. Diuguid, “Linowitz Unit Bids U.S. End Covert Acts,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 1974, p. A2)

specifically. GOB has had to react cautiously to Peruvian proposal, since the Bolivian people preferred it to Chilean proposal which called for transfer to Chile of Bolivian territory in exchange for the corridor. Bolivia's own proposal, however, "poses complications", de la Puente said. Chile must now respond to Bolivia; then Peru will be questioned.

25. Bolivians are spoiled children, de la Puente said, thinking that out of a situation of conflict between Chile and Peru a solution to the sea-access problem will emerge. This is simply not true.

26. Peace in area—de la Puente described the militaries of Peru and Chile as now embracing each other while the press describes just the reverse. He asserted "There is no possibility of conflict" between Peru and Chile. Peru simply "cannot waste resources on a 72-hour war". Furthermore, it "has the planes but no ammunition".

27. Invitation to visit—at end of private meeting, de la Puente stated that Morales Bermudez had expressed his desire to receive President Carter in Peru with friendship. If President should be touring Latin America, Morales Bermudez invites him to consider visiting Peru—also Secretary.

Vance

301. Letter From President Carter to Peruvian President Morales Bermudez¹

Washington, May 5, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your kind and perceptive message of April 18.² Your distinguished Ambassador delivered it to me on May 3, when we met at the White House to discuss the new U.S. commodity policy on sugar.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. No classification marking. Dodson wrote in the top right-hand corner: "Handed by D. Aaron to Minister Igor Velazquez at 2:35 p.m., 5/5/77."

² Not found.

³ According to his Daily Diary, Carter met with Latin American ambassadors on May 3 from 2:15 to 2:43 p.m., "to discuss import relief for the domestic sugar industry." The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

You are gracious to refer to the new phase in my country's overall policy toward Latin America. When the economic policies of the United States affect Latin American countries, I intend to see that our countries consult; the talks with sugar-exporting nations are one illustration. This is one of the ways I hope to improve discussions between the industrialized and developing countries on the economic relationship between us. Peru has been a leading participant in this "North-South" dialogue.

As you mention, the United States views human rights as one of the elements that determines our relations with other nations. As Secretary Vance has pointed out in a recent speech,⁴ we take both civil rights and economic rights seriously. These are all part of what you describe as the ultimate goal of the state—establishing a more just society, economically, politically and socially.

I share the concern you mention about arms. As you know, the United States believes that, both to maintain peace and advance development, the countries of our hemisphere should limit the acquisition of arms, both conventional and nuclear. In my speech before the OAS on Pan American Day,⁵ I referred to the Ayacucho Declaration and the resolution of the signatories to "put an end to the purchase" of offensive weaponry. I hope that intention will become reality soon. If the countries of your region would put an end to "armamentismo," they would do a service to the region, and to the world.

I agree with you that our two countries must keep in touch, up through the highest level. As you know, I am sending Mrs. Carter as my personal representative on a tour to Peru and several South and Central American and Caribbean countries, for substantive discussions with their leaders. I am pleased your Government has consented to receive her, and I hope that she will have a chance to meet and talk with you.⁶

Thank you very much for inviting me to visit Peru. I would like to accept and certainly hope that I shall be able to visit your country sometime in the future.⁷

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁴ For Vance's April 30 speech at the University of Georgia Law School, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 37.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 33.

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 302.

⁷ Carter did not visit Peru during his presidency.

302. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 13, 1977

SUBJECT

Follow-Up from Mrs. Carter's Meetings in Peru

The following items requiring follow-up or continuing attention emerged from Mrs. Carter's conversation with Peruvian President Francisco Morales Bermudez:²

—The President agreed that Peru would sign and ratify the American Convention on Human Rights.³

—The President expressed his interest in pursuing joint efforts, perhaps through revitalized OAS machinery, at arms reduction, to buttress the Ayacucho Declaration and the activities of the Andean Group.

—The President indicated his willingness to continue discussions with Ecuador aimed at guaranteeing Ecuadorian shipping access to the Amazon, as is provided under the Rio Protocol.

—The Foreign Minister mentioned conversations with U.S. officials⁴ about a joint effort in crop substitution, to address the drug problem emanating from Peru.

—The President indicated that a remaining expropriation issue with Gulf would be resolved quickly, and promised that the 15 or so Americans accused of drug trafficking would be brought to trial speedily.

I have issued appropriate instructions for following up these items and others which emerged from Mrs. Carter's conversations in Jamaica, Costa Rica and Ecuador.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/77-12/79 [#1]. Confidential. Sent for information. At the top of the memorandum, Carter wrote: "Zbig-Please let Bob Pastor: a) Draft 7 letters-one to each leader, confirming points from R's meetings; b) Keep R. posted on L.A. affairs- J."

² In telegram 4636 from Brasilia, June 7, the Embassy reported on Rosalynn Carter's conversation with Morales Bermudez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770203-0146)

³ See footnote 4, Document 303.

⁴ Reference is to an October 1, 1976, meeting between de la Puente and Shlaudeman in New York. (Telegram 249900 to Lima, October 7, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760379-0300)

303. Letter From President Carter to Peruvian President Morales Bermudez¹

Washington, June 24, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for making Rosalynn's visit to Lima one of the most pleasant and productive stops on her trip. Your letter of June 7² reinforced my impression of how beneficial the talks were. Your talks with her covered the most important issues in our relations. You and your people were most hospitable while she was in Lima, and, as I am sure you know, she returned to Washington with a very warm feeling for Peru.

Rosalynn has, of course, reported to me in depth on the substance of your talks. I was most pleased to note that you dealt with the question of restraining arms purchases at some length. She conveyed to me your most welcome message that your country's intentions are purely peaceful. The concerns of your neighbors, however, illustrate the importance of considering concrete measures to demonstrate these benign intentions. I am confident that your interest in arms restraint will soon become clearer to others. Certainly, your suggestions for generating further interest in the Declaration of Ayacucho and other initiatives are most welcome.

I know of the severe economic difficulties which Peru is facing at the moment and of your determination to overcome them. I hope that the measures announced June 10 to correct the situation will be successful.³ We will try to do what we can to help.

For the longer term, I hope that the dialogue between the industrialized and the developing countries, which began in Paris at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, will continue.

I was especially glad to hear Rosalynn's report of her conversations with you about human rights. We agree on the importance of this subject, and on the fact that it has two aspects—civil rights and economic rights. I look forward with great pleasure to your government's

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. No classification marking.

² The Spanish text of the letter is in telegram 149128 to Lima, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770229-0546)

³ In telegram 4852 from Lima, June 11, the Embassy reported on the Peruvian "emergency economic program," which included "a reduction in Peru's public sector deficit, a reduction in Peru's balance of payments deficit, and legally-specified wage increases to offset the impact of higher transportation and foodstuff costs." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770209-0702)

ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights.⁴ Rosalynn has shown me a copy of the Plan Tupac Amaru, which you generously gave her.⁵ Your proposals for expanding the participation of your people in the political and economic life of your country are very encouraging.

Rosalynn has also reported your very kind invitation for me to visit Peru. I hope that before long I will be able to visit your beautiful country, all the more so because of what she has told me about the warm Peruvian hospitality and your impressive efforts to build a prosperous, peaceful nation.⁶

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁴ In a July 26 evening report to Carter, Vance notified the president that Peru would sign the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights the next day. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports [State], 7/77)

⁵ Not found.

⁶ Below his signature, Carter wrote: "Rosalynn sends her personal regards. J.C."

304. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 6, 1977, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Morales Bermudez Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

PERU

General Francisco Morales
Bermudez, President of Peru
Jose de la Puente, Foreign
Minister of Peru

U.S.

President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Secretary Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Peru, 2-12/77. Confidential. Drafted by Shlaudeman. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 3:10 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

General Enrique Falconi Mejia,
Chief of the Military Household
Ambassador Hubert Weiland
Ambassador Carlos Garcia Bedoya

Assistant Secretary Todman
Robert Pastor, NSC
Harry W. Shlaudeman,
U.S. Ambassador, Lima

Opening Remarks

The President opened the meeting welcoming Morales Bermudez to Washington and to this "historic occasion". He particularly thanked Morales Bermudez for the warm reception given Mrs. Carter in Lima, noting that Mrs. Carter found the stop there the high point of her trip—but "please don't tell the others".

The President expressed his gratitude for Peru's role in helping to lead the way toward important changes in South America, referring particularly to the Peruvian program of elections and a return to civilian government. The President expressed interest in learning more about the Peruvian Government's decision to cut back on arms purchases, a decision he had heard about from Senator Hollings.² The President referred to the concerns of Peru's neighbors with respect to these purchases and asked if the report from Senator Hollings was correct.

Morales Bermudez in opening his remarks thanked the President for the invitation to Washington, noted the importance that personal contact between the two Chiefs of State would have for future U.S.-Peruvian relations and said he would be pleased to address the President's concerns.

The Peruvian President noted with respect to President Carter's comments about his country's political program that the nine years of government by the Armed Forces have brought important changes and reforms to Peru. The Government of the Armed Forces realizes that in the future these changes must be "maintained in a democratic setting" if they are to be made truly lasting. It is for this reason that the program for a return to democratic government has been established.

Arms Limitations

With regard to President Carter's question on armaments, Morales Bermudez recalled his very frank dialogue with the two U.S. congressional delegations that recently visited in Peru.³ He had explained that reports of Peru's "armamentismo" were "distortions, misrepresenta-

² Hollings visited Peru August 23–26 and met with Arbulu on August 25. (Telegram 6950 from Lima, August 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770295-1117) (Telegram 7304 from Lima, August 25, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770308-0271)

³ In telegram 7012 from Lima, August 18, the Embassy reported on Yatron and Wolff's August 15 meeting with Morales Bermudez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770298-0519)

tions and frequently tendentious". Peru has a pacific policy and no offensive plans. Morales Bermudez referred to the numerous aggressions practiced against Peru in her past and to the territories lost as a result. He said that all Peru has done has been to cover its minimum security needs, replacing obsolete equipment in the process. Morales Bermudez asserted that the effort to cover those needs is now "for all practical purposes" (*practicamente*) completed.

The word *practicamente* did not come out in the interpretation and the President, having picked it up in the Spanish, asked Morales Bermudez if he meant to say that Peru's arms purchases were "practically completed". Morales Bermudez reformulated his response, saying that Peru has now achieved the level of armaments necessary to guarantee its national security and maintain parity with its neighbors. From this point on Peru will seek only to maintain its equipment, its logistics systems and the like. The President said he hoped Chile and Ecuador could be reassured with the information that Peru has decided not to continue adding to its armaments. Morales Bermudez responded that Peru has excellent relations with its neighbors, that these relations are particularly strong among the armed forces of the three countries, and that a frank and ongoing dialogue is maintained.

Bolivian Access to Sea

The President next queried whether it would be appropriate for him to ask about Bolivia's desire for access to the sea. The President said that he asked as an interested leader of the hemisphere rather than as one who wanted to intrude in the internal affairs of other countries. He said that he hoped our neighbors in South America could work together in harmony. What can be done about Bolivia's problem?

Morales Bermudez said that Peru has worked for peace and harmony in the region, had participated in regional meetings at which this problem had been addressed in recent years and had supported Bolivia's aspirations within that context. He noted that this is not a new problem, but rather a very old problem—a problem arising from a war in which Bolivia had lost substantial territory and natural riches. Morales Bermudez went on to make three points about Peru's position on the access-to-the-sea problem:

1. The first phase in working toward a solution must be agreement between the two countries most concerned, Chile and Bolivia. The dialogue between these two countries is a necessary first step.
2. Peru fully respects its international obligations, including those imposed by the treaties of 1929.
3. Any solution—and all parties desire a solution—must permanently preserve the peace in the area.

Morales Bermudez noted that the Treaty of Ancon (1929) had preserved the peace—a peace that now had lasted almost a century (from 1883).

The President asked if the time has arrived for a new initiative. Morales Bermudez said that the dialogue between Chile and Bolivia should continue, that there should be progress, even though it comes “little by little”. President Carter noted that under the existing treaty, Peru must approve any corridor granted Bolivia. Morales Bermudez said that was correct. The President then said that if Morales Bermudez had no objection, then in the course of his meetings with the leaders of Chile and Bolivia, he would encourage them to reach an agreement.⁴

Peru's Financial Crisis (also Sugar)

The President said Morales Bermudez had written him a very interesting letter about Peru's economic difficulties.⁵ The President noted his satisfaction in receiving this personal communication, emphasizing that direct communication of such a kind serves to reinforce a sense of partnership. The President said that the United States is eager to cooperate with Peru in the economic sphere. He referred to the recent decision of the U.S. Government to grant Peru \$57 million in CCC credits as an example.⁶ He added that there is a possibility for further assistance under Public Law 480. With respect to the IMF, the President said the U.S. would like to cooperate with Peru in its negotiations with the IMF,⁷ but he reminded Morales Bermudez that the United States is just a part of that organization. And while it is an important part, the U.S. does not control it.

The President referred to the problem posed for the United States by the distressingly low price of sugar.

He said the U.S. wants to be fair but the Peruvian Government will realize how difficult a problem it is for us all. The U.S. will do

⁴ See Documents 120 and 205. In telegram 7937 from Lima, September 13, the Embassy reported on Morales Bermudez and de la Puente's reactions to the meeting with Pinochet and Banzer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770331-0916)

⁵ Dated August 27. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80)

⁶ The credits were extended to finance the sale of U.S. wheat, corn and soybean oil to Peru. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, September 6; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 61, Panama Canal Treaties)

⁷ In telegram 7178, August 23, Shlaudeman summarized the Peruvian negotiations with the IMF regarding an austerity program: “The decision not to go through with the Piazza/IMF program of tough austerity was taken as a result of the GOP's conclusion that the social and political costs would be too high. I believe that conclusion was probably correct.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770304-0718)

what it can to resolve it. He said that the U.S. also wanted to work out a new international agreement on the marketing of sugar.

The President referred again to our desire to cooperate with Peru in meeting its problems, including those involved in negotiating a standby with the IMF. He asked that Morales Bermudez communicate directly with him whenever a specific issue would seem to require it.

In response, Morales Bermudez expressed his appreciation for the cooperation already rendered, for the expression of concern with respect to the standby negotiations and for such future assistance as could be provided.

Trade Gap

Morales Bermudez said that Peru's great difficulty arises from the instability in the prices paid for her traditional exports. All of Peru's economic programs and efforts are distorted by the decline of those prices. For example, in June the Peruvian Government thought the country could finish the year with its "commercial balance" more or less in equilibrium. But now, because of the fall in the price of copper and in the prices of other commodities, the Government realizes that there will be a shortfall of around \$300 million in that balance. Peru depends entirely for its well-being on these traditional exports, its industrial exports having reached only the embryonic stage.

Morales Bermudez noted the "new tonic" brought to relations between Latin America and the United States by the Carter Administration and expressed his hope that President Carter would be able to put forth formulas and solutions to help in overcoming this most difficult of all his country's problems. He also referred to the heavy impact increases in the prices of Peru's imports have on the Peruvian people at a time when the country's export earnings are declining.

President Carter said that he saw a good opportunity to reach international agreement on the sugar price this year. He asked about the role of CIPEC in stabilizing copper prices. Morales Bermudez indicated that CIPEC had been unsuccessful in that respect.

Help with IMF

President Carter asked Morales Bermudez about the possibility of Ecuadorean access to the Amazon. Morales Bermudez said that before addressing that particular issue, he would like to return to Peru's economic problems.

The Peruvian President asserted that the IMF tends to ignore political and social problems in prescribing economic measures for countries with financial difficulties. Morales Bermudez said the austerity program already in place in Peru had reached a stage where any further such measures would simply not be possible in terms of political and

social costs. Consequently, "we need direct political support with the IMF". Without such support there would be no reason for further negotiations. Morales Bermudez argued that if the Peruvian Government attempted to go further in imposing austerity, there would be no choice but to employ repression. A repressive policy would be against his Government's desires and goals. He repeated that Peru must have direct political support in its negotiations with the IMF. He then referred to the fact that in the 50's Peru received direct Treasury support during a time of similar economic crisis.

Political Stakes

Morales Bermudez stated that the political future of his country is at stake. In his view, if Peru does not emerge from its economic crisis, only two alternatives remain: repression or the rapid rise to power in the Government of the extreme left. A solution to the economic crisis is the only possible way to ensure democracy and free elections. With respect to the other two alternatives, Morales Bermudez said that in the Peruvian Government "we are pluralists. We respect the right of the Marxists and others to think as they wish". But "we do not accept the possibility that they (the Marxists) would orient the country's political thought". Morales Bermudez concluded by asserting that what happened in Peru would have considerable impact throughout Latin America. He noted the country's geo-political and geo-economic importance and offered the view that favorable developments in Peru would be favorable for the entire continent.

The President noted that the United States as a general proposition supports the IMF and specifically now supports its expansion. The U.S. Government also approves of measures of restraint of the kind proposed by the IMF—but within the bounds of a given country's capabilities. President Carter also referred to the IMF "stamp of approval" as particularly helpful to a country in opening up opportunities for commercial bank loans and other economic support. He said that the U.S. Government would try to assist "as we cast our vote in the IMF". "We know it will be difficult for you." The President further emphasized that the United States *does* want to contribute as best it can to the resolution of Peru's difficulties. He said that he was grateful for Peru's accomplishments in human rights and in ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Ecuadorean Access to Amazon

The President then expressed the hope that Morales Bermudez would take the initiative in relieving his neighbors' concerns and in helping Bolivia realize its aspirations. He asked again about Ecuadorean access to the Amazon.

Morales Bermudez said that Article 6 of the Rio Protocol⁸ provided a “viable” means of addressing this problem. He said it would be “feasible” within that context and added that contacts have been established between the two Foreign Ministers on this issue and progress has been made.

Closing Remarks

Morales Bermudez in taking leave of the President expressed Peru’s appreciation for the new spirit the Carter Administration has brought to relations between the United States and Latin America. He assured the President that Peru is “very close” to the United States in terms of policies and aspiration. The President thanked him and reiterated the invitation for Morales Bermudez to communicate directly with him on matters of mutual concern.

Finally, the President asked after his friend and former classmate, Jorge Pequeras. Morales Bermudez noted that both he and the Foreign Minister had also been classmates of Captain Pequeras—in secondary school in Lima. The Peruvian President handed President Carter a letter from his wife for Mrs. Carter.⁹

⁸ See footnote 7, Document 1.

⁹ Not found.

305. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance’s Delegation to the Department of State¹

New York, October 1, 1977, 1413Z

Secto 10026. Subject: Secretary’s Bilateral With Peruvian Foreign Minister

Summary: In Secretary-Foreign Minister bilateral, de la Puente touched on serious financial crisis, the recent agreement with IMF, and GOP intention to ask donor nations to suspend for two years the requirement of GOP counterpart financing in on-going and new development projects. Foreign Minister revealed he had met in New York with Chilean and Bolivian colleagues on question of access to sea for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770358-1212. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in New York for the UN General Assembly.

Bolivia. Dialogue will be continued through high-level special representatives which the three will be appointing (Marchand, Filippe and Murido). De la Puente also had had good talk with Ecuador Foreign Minister (apparently on access to Amazon). Secretary asked what concrete steps might next be taken in North-South dialogue, also on energy question. Foreign Minister criticized CIEC framework for discussion, claimed it had been a mistake to have left U.N. for CIEC, and strongly recommended working henceforth within UNCTAD context. Secretary asked for Peruvian support for widening adherence to Treaty of Tlatelolco, specifically citing non-signatories Argentina and Cuba. De la Puente referred to close relations to Argentina, urged approach by U.S. to it through friendly third countries, and agreed to speak to Buenos Aires on matter. End Summary

1. Following is the report of a 30-minute meeting in New York, September 29, between the Secretary and Peruvian Foreign Minister de la Puente. Ambassadors Garcia Bedoya (to U.S.), Alzamora (to U.N.) and Marchand (to OAS) sat in; also Deputy Assistant Stedman and Peru Desk Officer Fuller.

2. Secretary expressed thanks to the Peruvians for attendance at Panama Canal Treaty Signing and various meetings in Washington.² He reported that the President had found conversation with Morales Bermudez useful; it made a difference for leaders to have face-to-face contact.

3. De la Puente stated Finance Minister Saenz had had interesting talks subsequently in Washington³ and a "satisfactory" agreement had been reached with the IMF. He acknowledged, however, that problems remained and "sterner measures", which might have social and political repercussions, would have to be taken in the Austerity regime in Peru. Nevertheless, Peru is honoring all debt. In doing so, de la Puente continued, little was left over for development expenditures. The Foreign Minister disclosed that once back in Lima he planned to invite in Ambassadors from all developed countries to discuss the current development crisis. GOP hoped to obtain understanding from aid donors that in 1978 and 1979 GOP would not, repeat not, be asked to contribute counterpart funding to outside-financed development projects.

² See Document 304. In telegram 220508 to Lima, September 14, the Department reported on Morales Bermudez's September 8 meeting with Blumenthal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770333-1190)

³ In telegram 252027 to Lima, October 20, the Department reported on the September 29 working-level meeting, which was a follow-up to the September 26 meeting between Saenz and Solomon. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770387-0088)

4. Secretary stated that agreement with IMF should help Peru in getting additional private resources. De la Puente added he hoped it would also be helpful in getting central-bank-to-central-bank assistance. He then reverted to discussion of proposed waiver of counterpart financing requirements, reporting that Canada might agree to such in respect to a \$300 million (?) aid program planned for Peru.

5. Peru development problems were critical, de la Puente said. Population growth was 3½ percent a year, while the growth rate in GDP was only 1 percent. Five hundred thousand new workers entered the labor market each year, in a situation where unemployment was as high as 20 percent and under-employment even higher.

6. The Secretary assured the Foreign Minister that the U.S. will try to do what it can to help and cited “commodity credits” (CCC) and food aid under P.L. 480.⁴

7. In response to a question about further talks with Chile and Bolivia on the question of a sea corridor for latter, de la Puente announced he had just had a serious meeting with his Chilean and Bolivian counterparts. The Bolivian Foreign Minister had delivered a UN speech suggesting that the solution was up to Peru. This was unfair, de la Puente said, since first Bolivia and Chile must agree on a solution. Pinochet was still insisting on territorial concessions from Bolivia in exchange for a sea corridor; a majority of Bolivian public opinion is opposed to such a concession. De la Puente reported that three Foreign Ministers were issuing a press release affirming that the three states would continue the dialogue and were appointing special representatives to do so. De la Puente was appointing Marchand (who, when in Foreign Ministry last year, handled a similar assignment); Chile was appointing Dr. Filippe and Bolivia, Ambassador Murido.

8. Secretary asked whether Peru had had any discussions with its neighbors on GOP’s “completion of its arms purchases.” De la Puente said vaguely that relations were “seen to be satisfactory” and an exchange last week was “excellent.”

9. He then revealed that he had had a 2½ hour talk with the Foreign Minister of Ecuador which he characterized as “very constructive” and “very easy.” De la Puente added that between talks in Washington and talks now in New York, matters were moving forward. (The discussion with the Ecuadorian was apparently not on arms purchases but on access to the Amazon for Ecuador.)

10. Secretary asked de la Puente’s opinion as to what concrete steps might next be taken to further the North-South dialogue. Taking that as a reference to the CIEC conference, de la Puente advised he had

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 304.

been talking with colleagues in G-77 and they had concluded that the structure of foreign trade would have to be changed and an integrated program for basic commodities advanced. He argued against any replication of a "sui generis" conference like CIEC, characterizing it as something of a "political scheme" devised by the French, which the U.S. and other industrial countries entered not knowing too much what their aims were, and which the 19 LDCs entered without knowing whether any agreements achieved would be acceptable to all the other members of the G-77. Secretary said he had been urging his colleagues to get down to the formulation of concrete actions in further discussion. De la Puente repeatedly recommended that that discussion never again leave the U.N. framework.

11. The Secretary raised the question of future discussions on the energy problem, asking where they might be productively held. De la Puente recommended that the forum should be UNCTAD, where Peru and others had had "good experience." Again he commented that CIEC had resulted in a loss of faith on the part of the LDCS. It did not constitute "a dialogue—rather simply two excellent monologues." It had been a great mistake, leaving the UNCTAD framework, CIEC in effect had delayed the resolution of problems by two years.

12. Secretary switched the subject to development of wider adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and reported that the U.S. had talked to Argentina and had asked others to talk to Cuba about signing the agreement.⁵ De la Puente thought Argentina would ultimately go along. He suggested that the U.S. work through other friendly countries in moving Argentina to sign the agreement and said Peru would speak to Argentina and report the reaction. He noted that Peru-Argentina relations were close and Lima was in good position to discuss the matter with Buenos Aires.

13. In closing, the Secretary stated that U.S. officials had been impressed with Videla. De la Puente had similarly kind words for the Argentine President.

Vance

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 419.

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru¹

Washington, November 2, 1977, 2055Z

262399. Subject: Presidential Letter

Embassy requested to deliver following letter from President to General Morales Bermudez, dated October 31:

Begin text: Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your letters of September 12 and 24.² Like you, I was pleased we were able to meet and exchange views last month on the occasion of the historic signing of the new Panama Canal treaties.³

Now that we have met, I hope we will continue to keep in touch on matters of major concern to us both. Frank communications between us can deepen mutual understanding and improve cooperation on many issues in which Peru plays an important role.

As you probably know, I met individually with Presidents Banzer and Pinochet after our own meeting.⁴ One of the topics we discussed was Bolivia's aspiration for a sovereign outlet to the Pacific. I assured them, as I did you, of my Government's support for negotiations that would lead to an outcome satisfactory to all three nations. I was pleased that you and they were subsequently able to take advantage of your joint presence in Washington to meet privately on this important subject.⁵

I have been gratified to learn that Foreign Minister de la Puente has continued conversations since then with the Foreign Minister of Ecuador as well as with his Bolivian and Chilean counterparts on matters relating to peace, integration, and development in the Andean Region. One of the issues that most concerns me in this regard is the danger that scarce resources might be diverted to military ends. I was encouraged to learn from you that your Government had decided against purchasing new armaments. Did you get a chance to discuss

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113 Withdrawn Material, RC#1126, Box 10 of 13, Human Rights—Latin America. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information immediate to La Paz and for information to Santiago and Quito. Drafted from a text received from the White House; approved by Fuller and in S/S.

² The September 12 letter was not found. In telegram 8391 from Lima, September 24, the Embassy transmitted an unofficial translation of the text of the September 24 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770348-1053)

³ See Document 304.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 304.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 120.

this with your neighbors? I believe moves to implement the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to limiting the acquisition of offensive armaments—or controlling their use—would be a major step not only for the Andean Region but also for the global quest to control conventional arms. I would be most interested in hearing your further views on this subject—particularly on how weapons-producing countries like my own might cooperate with you and other countries to achieve genuine restraint.

I have learned that Foreign Minister de la Puente has held talks with Ecuadorean Foreign Minister Ayala on Ecuador's proposal for gaining sovereign access to the Amazon. That is an encouraging development.

The news that the leaders of the countries of the Andean Pact had used the occasion of the signing ceremony to complete the very difficult negotiations on the Automotive Sectoral Program was especially gratifying to me. The United States has long supported the goal of integration among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, and I am hopeful that the Andean Pact will remain an effective force for economic development in the region.

I was pleased to hear that Peru has now reached an agreement in principle with the IMF. I hope this will help you to overcome the balance of payments difficulties you described to me, and that the Peruvian economy will rebound from its difficulties. In that regard, I hope that the credits we provided through the commodity credit corporation were helpful. We are currently reviewing our program on food assistance, and I hope that we can be helpful here as well.

Finally, I appreciate your sending the autographed copy of the "Tupac Amaru" plan.⁶ Your hopes to consolidate the gains of the Peruvian revolution and your announcement of elections next June for a constituent assembly are most heartening.

Please do not hesitate to keep me informed of your thinking on these and other matters of concern to you. I have complete faith in Ambassador Shlaudeman, and hope that we may continue our dialogue either through him, or directly when necessary. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.⁷

Vance

⁶ Not found.

⁷ In telegram 284222 to Lima, November 25, the Department transmitted Morales Bermudez's November 10 response to this letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770438-0808)

307. Letter from President Carter to Peruvian President Morales Bermudez¹

Washington, February 1, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to extend my best wishes and those of my nation to you and the people of Peru.

I know that the months ahead will be difficult economically for Peru. But your recent decisions to institute an austerity program—decisions which required courage and statesmanship—are an important step back toward economic health, and I am glad that the International Monetary Fund has supported them.² With your country adhering to the terms of the IMF standby arrangement, and with a roll-over of the burdensome military debt to your major supplier seemingly likely, I share your hope³ that Peru's economic situation will now begin to improve.

For our part, we have accelerated the extension of new economic assistance to Peru. Food aid under PL-480 Title I concessional terms will be enlarged by \$15 million above the \$5 million program now under negotiation with your government. This will be the first time that Peru has received such assistance in this decade. We have also just announced the extension of a \$13 million credit from the Commodity Credit Corporation for food procurement, in addition to the \$57 million credit lines of last September.

I was concerned to hear that some problems developed with Export-Import Bank financing to your country. I understand that the Bank's Board of Directors just this week reconsidered its earlier decision and took favorable action concerning some of your banks.⁴ I hope

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. No classification marking.

² In telegram 473 from Lima, January 17, the Embassy reported Saenz's January 13 announcement of "new wage, price, and budgetary measures designed to stabilize economy," and described the GOP's effort to "steer a narrow course between labor demands and the targets of the IMF austerity program." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780026-0848)

³ See footnote 7, Document 306.

⁴ In a February 1 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: "Apparently the Export-Import Bank inadvertently cut off several lines of credit to Peru, just at the time of Peru's greatest need. We recommended that the Bank reconsider its decision, and decided to await sending the letter to you until the decision was made so that you could inform Morales directly. Thankfully, the decision was favorable and it is reported in your letter." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80)

this will help maintain the confidence of the international banking community in your country.

I was interested to note your speech⁵ on Peruvian Army Day, especially your reference to the need for the military to “become examples of austerity”—exemplified by your commitment not to buy new arms during the remainder of military rule in Peru. We believe such a standstill or even a cutback of outstanding military purchases is one of the best ways to restore balance-of-payments equilibrium without causing economic problems for the Peruvian people.

I would like to mention the problem of conflicting territorial aspirations in the Andes. As I said in my letter of October 31,⁶ I was encouraged by the actions that you, the President of Ecuador, and the Presidents of Chile and Bolivia took in September to advance discussions on the questions of Amazon access for Ecuador and Pacific access for Bolivia. Your letter of November 10 indicates that there has not been much progress since then.⁷ Peru is a major force in these matters, and perhaps another Peruvian initiative could advance the discussion.

You will recall my offer to help organize support in the international financing institutions for the economic development of the area linking Bolivia to the sea. I believe such a project would benefit the three states involved, Peru, Chile and Bolivia. Let me reiterate that offer here.

I was glad to learn of the peaceful reduction of tensions between your country and Ecuador in the past week. As discussions proceed, a more lasting and stable peace may become more likely. And, of course, increased regional economic cooperation could help both economically and politically. My Administration is now examining ways of contributing to regional economic cooperation in Peru and elsewhere. I would welcome your suggestions.

Finally, I extend my best wishes for the success of the electoral process which you are initiating this year, in preparation for the national elections in 1980 that will return your country to rule by elected representatives.⁸

⁵ Not found.

⁶ See Document 306.

⁷ In a February 1 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 4, above), Brzezinski wrote that in the November 10 letter, “with respect to the Bolivian corridor issue,” Morales Bermudez “said that Peru continues to await agreement between Bolivia and Chile. On Ecuador’s desire for access to the Amazon, he is evasive.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80)

⁸ In a February 1 memorandum to Carter (see footnote 4, above), Brzezinski wrote: “Morales’ position is reported to be very uncertain at this time, and the letter might help.”

Your cable on the death of Senator Humphrey was very much appreciated, and I forwarded a copy to Mrs. Humphrey.⁹

Rosalynn joins me in sending you and Mrs. Morales Bermudez our warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁹ The January 18 cable is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. Humphrey died on January 13.

308. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 25, 1978

SUBJECT

Letter to Peruvian President Morales Bermudez

The Peruvian economy faces an extremely serious external debt problem. President Morales Bermudez has taken a number of steps to impose a greater degree of economic stabilization, and these austerity measures have in turn created internal political problems. He has written a letter to you (Tab B)² to request your help in breaking out of this vicious cycle. He asks your support in four ways: (1) to encourage IMF flexibility; (2) to help Peru directly through the Exchange Stabilization Fund; (3) to lend our support to a prestigious institution, like the Inter-American Development Bank, to coordinate a group to restructure Peru's debt; and (4) that you personally meet with his Foreign and Finance Ministers to talk about Peru's desperate financial problems.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: "Susan retype last p," a reference to changes Carter made in the last paragraph of Document 309.

² Dated April 4; attached but not printed.

³ Carter underlined the phrases "encourage IMF flexibility," "Exchange Stabilization Fund," "Inter-American Development Bank," and "meet with his Foreign and Finance Ministers."

The response (at Tab A)⁴ is responsive in some ways—though hardly all—to his requests: (1) We could in fact informally urge that the IMF act with flexibility, and Peru is aware of that, but it would not be appropriate to put that in a letter from you. (2) Treasury strongly opposes the use of the ESF to help Peru at this time. (3) Peru is currently discussing with IDB representatives the most appropriate forum to discuss debt rescheduling. (4) We have strongly hinted to the Peruvians that a meeting with you would be difficult, but that we would try to arrange meetings with Cy and with Mike Blumenthal. They appreciate the scheduling problem, but said that a few (symbolic) minutes with you were all that was necessary. Foreign Minister de la Puente has also asked our Ambassador that if he could not meet with you whether it would be possible to meet with Mrs. Carter.⁵

The letter also mentions the support we have given to Peru through AID, CCC credits, and PL-480.

State and NSC drafted the letter and cleared it with Treasury and Jim Fallows.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter attached at Tab A.⁶

⁴ Attached, printed as Document 309.

⁵ In the right-hand margin, Carter marked this sentence.

⁶ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. The letter was signed on April 26. At the bottom of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: "Cause of delay in response: We needed to know IDB reaction to Peru's plans. Delay approved by State and us."

309. Letter from President Carter to Peruvian President Morales Bermudez¹

Washington, April 26, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

In your letter of April 4,² you raised a number of very important issues. As you know, my government supports the process you have begun, to restore democratic rule. We recognize that the acute problems which Peru now faces make this process especially difficult.

As I have assured you, the United States wishes to help you in every appropriate way. I hope that our Commodity Credit Corporation sales, the PL 480 Title I³ program, and development loans can assist you in meeting your country's needs. I also hope that our programs will stimulate others to express faith in Peru's future.

I am sure you share our view that an understanding with the IMF about an economic stabilization program will greatly help Peru meet its immediate problems and restore financial balance to its economy. A mission to Washington by your Ministers of Foreign Relations and of Economy and Finance would be more useful after your government has further developed its program with the IMF. The United States will continue to follow developments between Peru and the IMF, although any agreement must be worked out by the parties directly concerned.⁴

We have explored the possibility of a loan from the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and we regret that it is not possible because the Peruvian financial problem seems to be longer term in nature than is appropriate for such financing. I was pleased to learn that the Inter-American Development Bank is taking an interest in assisting Peru with its investment planning. My government will support the Inter-American Development Bank in this effort.

My government would, of course, be willing to participate in a multilateral consideration of rescheduling Peru's debt if you and your

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. No classification marking. Attached as Tab A to Document 308.

² See footnote 2, Document 308.

³ Title I is the concessional sales component of PL-480.

⁴ In his April 28 evening report to Carter, Vance wrote: "The Peruvian Cabinet finally approved a new emergency austerity program on April 25. The Ministers of Foreign Relations and Finance will be coming to Washington next week to outline the program and to seek IMF approval." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports [State], 4/78)

advisers believe that to be the best course of action. As you know, most recent debt reschedulings have been contingent on compliance with an IMF stabilization program. If Peru's creditors agree that the situation warrants debt rescheduling, the United States would work for quick completion of the negotiations.

We wish you every success in overcoming the formidable problems your country faces. Please let me know when your mission is prepared to come to Washington to meet with the Secretaries of State and Treasury. I will consult closely with them to assure maximum cooperation between our governments in addressing these financial questions.⁵

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁵ Carter rewrote this paragraph. In an earlier draft, the last two sentences read: "Please let me know when your mission is prepared to come to Washington. If my schedule permits, I would like to receive the two Ministers whom you might send. If that is not possible, I would make every effort for the Ministers to be received in my stead by the Secretaries of State and Treasury." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80)

310. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 8, 1978

SUBJECT

Peruvian Consultations

You will recall that the President changed the letter which we drafted for him to send to Morales Bermudez to read that he would "consult closely" with the Secretaries of State and Treasury "to assure

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/77-12/79. Confidential. Copies were sent to Erb and Denend. Bartholomew and Inderfurth initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

maximum cooperation between our governments".² Given the importance of Peru's financial problems to U.S.-Peruvian relations and also given the President's addition to the letter, I have kept abreast of Foreign Minister de la Puente's meetings with Mrs. Carter and today with Secretary Vance.³ I had planned to attend his meeting with Secretary Blumenthal tomorrow, but I have been informed⁴ by Treasury officials that no one outside the Department will be permitted to sit in on the meeting. I think this is a mistaken precedent; if the NSC is going to help coordinate the President's policy, then it is important for us to ensure that there is consistency in approach between the White House and the Departments on important matters such as this.

The meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 11, but I think the significance of Secretary Blumenthal's decision to exclude other agencies is sufficiently important that if you cannot or do not wish to be in touch with him before this meeting, you would want to raise it at some future time.⁵

As to the substance of the meetings, I noted that de la Puente's appearance had changed rather dramatically from last Friday when he made an emotive, political appeal to Mrs. Carter for help. Yesterday, Dick Cooper and John Bushnell hammered him for his country's fiscal irresponsibility,⁶ and he was unquestionably shaken by the directness of their arguments. Today, with Secretary Vance, he was much more reticent, and did not make nearly as strong a case as he had on Friday.⁷ Still, he told Secretary Vance that his team was negotiating a statement, which the IMF would (hopefully) issue to the private banks informing them that Peru's program was satisfactory. De la Puente said that he

² Pastor inserted the phrase "Tab A" at the end of this sentence. A copy of the paragraph with Carter's changes is attached but not printed. The letter is printed as Document 309.

³ In telegram 120369 to Lima, May 11, the Department transmitted a report on the meeting between Vance and de la Puente. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200-1214) Vance reported to Carter about his meeting with de la Puente in a May 8 memorandum: "Tomorrow de la Puente meets with Mike Blumenthal and will probably ask for U.S. help within the Fund on what appear to be stalemated negotiations. Within the bounds of our limited influence I believe we should use our good offices." In the left-hand margin next to that sentence, Carter wrote: "They only need until 6/6/78-ok." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports [State], 5/78) No record of Rosalynn Carter's meeting with de la Puente was found.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined the word "informed."

⁵ An unknown hand underlined the phrase "would want to raise it at some future" and placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to it. In telegram 123341 to Lima, May 15, the Department transmitted a summary of Blumenthal's meeting with de la Puente. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780205-1003)

⁶ A record of this meeting was not found.

⁷ May 5.

had spoken to Morales Bermudez, who agreed to all of the measures demanded by the IMF except the increase in the oil price. (It is unclear whether the Peruvians have accepted the IMF's stringent conditions.)

De la Puente also said that an executive from Occidental Petroleum had asked Wells Fargo to advance \$25 million to Peru to be paid back with local currency. This would permit Peru to last until after the elections in June. Secretary Vance said that "we will use our good offices with the IMF to the extent permissible, as we have done in the past". De la Puente also said that his country would defer the purchase of two German submarines and two Dutch frigates.

In discussions about the non-aligned movement, de la Puente said that he had received an invitation to attend the NAM, but he had some reservations. Secretary Vance encouraged de la Puente to go. De la Puente said that he had been in touch with the Egyptian and Yugoslavian Foreign Ministries, and they plus the Indians are eager to try to get the NAM to "return to the original principles". He said that if Egypt initiates the discussion about Cuba's activities in Africa, Peru would support them. But he said that it would be difficult for Peru or other Latin American countries to initiate such a discussion without being branded a surrogate of the U.S. De la Puente said that Boumedienne of Algeria had sent a special representative to Peru to voice Algeria's concern about Cuban involvement in Africa.⁸

After the meeting with de la Puente, I had a long conversation with our Ambassador, Harry Shlaudeman and John Bushnell, about what to do with regard to Peru's request for some FMS credits. We agreed that it would be inappropriate at this time to approve such credits, but the issues are quite complicated (relating to Peru's purchase of submarines and frigates), and we decided that the best way to proceed would be for me to float in very indirect terms a question with de la Puente about whether, in the light of Peru's extreme financial problem, they would consider withdrawing their request at this time. In the meantime, we will defer a decision. I will float this question at a dinner at the Peruvian Embassy this evening.⁹

⁸ An unknown hand underlined the phrases "NAM," "Secretary Vance encouraged de la Puente to go," "if Egypt initiates the discussion about Cuba's activities in Africa, Peru would support them," and "Algeria had sent a special representative to Peru to voice Algeria's concern about Cuban involvement in Africa." The unknown hand also placed two vertical lines in the left-hand margin next to the last sentence in the paragraph.

⁹ No record of this conversation was found.

311. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 78–10376

Washington, September 29, 1978

Peru: Seeking an End to Military Rule

Key Points

—The convocation of a civilian Constituent Assembly² is a significant step forward in President Morales Bermudez' plan to return constitutional rule to the country by 1980. Besides drafting a new national charter, the assembly will serve as an important bridge between the present military government and civilian political leaders.

—An effective working relationship appears to be evolving in the assembly between the two largest democratic parties,³ which—along with two other minor parties—control two thirds of the assembly seats. This cooperation should ensure passage of most constitutional articles.

—Five militant far-left parties, however, seem bent on challenging the government and embarrassing the democratic majority by disrupting the assembly proceedings. Assembly President Haya de la Torre will have to keep these parties in line to avoid confrontations with the government that could pose problems for the democratization process.

—Unless confronted by extreme provocations from the far left or by an economic collapse, the military establishment will probably remain united behind Morales Bermudez' plan for a phased return to constitutional rule.

—The country's military leaders will probably not approve a return to constitutional rule until tangible progress has been made in solving

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Box 4, Folder 25. Secret; [*handling restrictions not declassified*]. Prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

² Elections for members of the Constituent Assembly took place on June 18. In a June 21 preliminary assessment of the results, the Embassy reported that the electorate "would seem on June 18 to have divided into three quite distinct blocs: the right, center-right with about 31 percent of the votes; the social democrat center-left (APRA) with about 37 percent; and the left, far-left with about 30 percent. But doubts are raised that this reading will hold up into the future." (Telegram 5468 from Lima, June 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780259-0588) The official results were announced July 15. (Telegram 6344 from Lima, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780293-06570) The Constituent Assembly convened on July 19. (Telegram 6418 from Lima, July 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780296-1143)

³ A reference to the APRA party (37 seats) and the Popular Christian Party (25 seats). The Constituent Assembly was comprised of 100 seats. The Popular Action Party (AP) did not participate in the elections for the Constituent Assembly.

Peru's economic crisis. Since the government's two-and-one-half-year economic program has only recently been instituted, some slippage in the democratization program appears likely. It is doubtful that there can be a full return to civilian government before the end of 1980.

[Omitted here are sections on: "The Constituent Assembly," "The Influence of the Economy," and "Outlook"]

312. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 29, 1979, 0410Z

4060. Subject: UNGA: Bilateral Talks Between Secretary Vance and Peruvian Foreign Minister Carlos Garcia-Bedoya

1. (C-Entire Text.)

2. Summary: UNGA bilateral between Secretary Vance and the Peruvian Foreign Minister was held on September 24. The meeting was also attended by Peru's UN Perm Rep Carlos Alzamora, White House Ambassador Alfonso Arias-Schreiber, OAS Ambassador Luis Marchand, DAS Samuel Eaton and US Ambassador to Peru Barry Shlaudeman. The talk centered largely on the situation in Nicaragua and what efforts are being taken and planned by the US and Peru. The Secretary also suggested subsequent consultations on the Caribbean. The discussion of bilateral issues dealt with the lifting of the tuna embargo, Panama Canal tolls, and the redemocratization process in Peru. End summary.

3. Nicaragua. Secretary Vance told Minister Garcia-Bedoya that the United States is expediting the provision of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction aid to Nicaragua.² There has been a recent increase in U.S. assistance and the Department of State will be requesting a supplemental appropriation from Congress in the near future. The Secretary observed that President Carter was meeting with the Nicaraguan junta that same day and that he would be meeting with them in

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Exdis memcons 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 297.

New York later in the week.³ We seek close consultation with the Peruvians as we formulate our policy toward Nicaragua. The Secretary alluded to his frustration over the slowness of existing mechanisms for providing US assistance in emergency situations and that he would be seeking the creation of a contingency fund.

4. Minister Garcia-Bedoya recalled the initiative taken by the Andean Pact countries⁴ in the period prior to the overthrow of Somoza and said that the sub-regional group continues to wish to cooperate with the new junta in Nicaragua. He remarked that this involvement was not only out of a sense of solidarity but the desire to inject alternatives into that fluid situation. Peru, he stated, did not want to see a repetition of what transpired in Cuba twenty years ago. Peru believes that isolation was the crucial factor then.

5. Peru currently has four advisory missions operating or planned for in Nicaragua in the following areas: 1) refinancing the external debt (the Minister made an aside that he hoped the USG would provide Nicaragua the same support as we did Peru last year); 2) fishing; 3) mining; and 4) administrative reorganization. Nicaragua has asked for assistance in the field of education, now under strong Cuban influence, but Peru has so far been unable to respond. Peru has also offered Nicaragua a long-term credit of US \$10 million in addition to planeloads of emergency food and medicine. Minister Garcia-Bedoya remarked that there was a general feeling among Latin Americans that the United States was not yet doing enough rapidly enough in Nicaragua, although they are aware of U.S. governmental procedures and restrictions. The Minister expressed the fear that time is running out and that therefore there is an urgent need for a strong U.S. presence. There are conflicting reports on the correlation of forces in the new government, he said, but there is still time to influence the outcome.

6. The Secretary agreed entirely with the Peruvian assessment of the situation in Nicaragua. He said Peru was doing the right things in terms of its involvement and that these would have a meaningful effect. He expressed his own concern about the time it takes the U.S. to mount a new program, while saying that the US request for a supplemental should go to Congress soon and that he was proposing a contingency fund for future situations like this.

7. The Caribbean: The Secretary said that Special Assistant Habib recently had completed a study of the situation in the Caribbean which

³ For Carter's conversation with the junta, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 308. The junta's meeting with Vance did not occur. (Telegram 259483 to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts, October 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number given)

⁴ See Documents 358, 362, and 363.

he had approved.⁵ There has been much progress in shaping a U.S. policy toward that region. Vance indicated that he would like fuller discussions of the Caribbean with Peru to take place at an appropriate time.

8. Bilateral issues: Turning to bilateral issues. The Secretary was pleased to announce that the U.S. tuna embargo against Peru has been lifted and that it would go into effect upon publication in the Federal Register.⁶ At the same time, Vance expressed the hope that there would be no more seizures of U.S. tuna clippers and that a new tuna treaty could be negotiated. He also stated that the USG was cognizant of Peru's concern over Panama Canal tolls and assured the Peruvians that we would do our best to ensure that future toll increases would be held to moderate levels. The Secretary also expressed pleasure over the announcement by President Morales Bermudez of general elections next May. Ambassador Shlaudeman congratulated the Peruvians for the extraordinary progress they have made over the past two years in improving the economic situation.

9. Minister Garcia-Bedoya expressed appreciation over the lifting of the tuna embargo. As the second largest user of the Panama Canal, he expressed appreciation for anything the USG could do to keep toll increases to a minimum. He noted that the Morales Bermudez government has made a major effort to move ahead on the return to civilian government in the face of serious economic difficulties. While major problems still exist, the economic situation in Peru continues to improve. On the political front, the Minister expressed the hope that the civilian parties would assume their full responsibilities and work toward a coalition of democratic forces. A weak civilian government, he noted, would be most unfortunate for the future of Peru.

10. Suggested distribution:

—AmEmbassy Lima

—AmEmbassy Managua

—AmEmbassy Panama City

McHenry

⁵ Not found.

⁶ The United States imposed an embargo on Peruvian tuna imports on May 1, after the GOP seized a U.S. tuna boat. (Telegram 123161 to Lima, May 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790224-0002) The embargo was lifted on October 17. (Telegram 271547 to Lima, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790476-0431)

313. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 80-10207

Washington, May 1980

Peru: Prospects for Democracy [Portion marking not declassified]

Key Judgments

Peru's military government, in office since 1968, will hold elections on 18 May and restore civilian rule in July. This transition will end the longest-lived military regime in the Andes since World War II. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects for the successful introduction of civilian government are enhanced by the positive trends of recent years:

- The regime has shown a willingness to compromise and work with political leaders and has improved the economy through a tough austerity program.
- A centrist trend has brought leading generals and politicians closer together along the political spectrum.
- The heads of the major moderate parties have taken preliminary steps to prevent the election of a leftist President and have begun a dialogue with the armed forces.
- Peru's Andean Pact neighbors support the Peruvian electoral process. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

The incoming administration, however, will inherit serious problems. Labor unrest, sparked by high inflation and unemployment, is expected to intensify after July. This will pose a particular challenge because the political party system—characterized by ephemeral, personalistic groupings—tends not to produce the well-planned, cohesive programs needed to solve national problems. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

High-ranking skeptics of democratization within the military stand ready to intervene if the civilian government fails to satisfy their expectations or proves unwilling to allow the armed forces a voice in the formation of major policy initiatives. At the moment, however, forces that in the past have undercut democracy appear about equally bal-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Peru. Confidential. Prepared in the Latin America Division, Office of Political Analysis and coordinated with the Office of Central Reference, the Office of Economic Research, [*less than 1 line not declassified*], and the NIO for Latin America.

anced by factors favoring Peru's continued evolution toward a functioning democratic system. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Neither of the leading contenders for the presidency² is fundamentally hostile to the United States, and both have indicated a willingness to work with Washington when interests converge. Any new Peruvian president may seek more economic aid from the United States as he comes under pressure from a public restive after three years under an austerity program. The United States may be forced to decide whether to place primary emphasis on encouraging fiscal responsibility or whether to support some of the new government's efforts to placate the public. In this case, some forbearance by Peru's creditors may be crucial to the government's survival. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here are sections entitled "Introduction," "The Military Prepares for Elections," "The Political Actors," and "Troubled Economy, Restive Labor."]

Relations with the US and the Andean Pact

Both Washington and the Andean Pact countries want to encourage the formation of moderate civilian governments in Latin America and both want to strengthen the Pact organization itself, which is emerging as a spokesman for democracy in the hemisphere. In addition, both are particularly interested in ensuring political stability in the Andes, the Latin American region that has made the most significant progress in recent years toward democratic rule. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

For the United States, no crucial bilateral issues are at stake in the Peruvian democratization process. The United States should be able to establish a reasonably satisfactory working relationship with any of the leading civilian contenders for the presidency, and their policies probably will not reflect an anti-US bias. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Of the two leading presidential candidates, Belaunde is perhaps more favorably disposed toward the United States. He generally maintained a moderate foreign policy during his first administration,³ and his sympathy for the United States attitude may have grown during the several years he lived in Washington following his exile in 1968. Nonetheless, mindful of military criticism that he gave away too much in negotiating petroleum leasing rights, Belaunde may be cautious about appearing too amenable to foreign interests. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Because of Villanueva's short tenure as party chief, and because APRA itself has never been in power, neither the candidate nor the

² Belaunde and Villanueva.

³ 1963-68.

party has a proven record of performance. Villanueva's abrasive personality, however, and his determination to project a leftist nationalist image, suggest that he would be more erratic and more difficult to deal with than Belaunde. Moreover, Villanueva often has criticized US policies in the hemisphere.⁴ Nevertheless, he does not appear to have an inflexible ideological hostility to the United States and has indicated a willingness to work with Washington when interests converge. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

A new Peruvian president probably will seek additional economic assistance from the United States as he comes under pressure at home for increased government spending. A recent poll conducted in Lima showed that the military regime's popularity declined markedly after adopting the austerity program. A civilian government cannot afford to ignore such indications of public disapproval and will be inclined to return to some of the expensive social reform programs of the early 1970s or initiate new ones. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Under these circumstances, the United States may be forced to decide whether to place primary emphasis on encouraging fiscal responsibility in Peru, or whether to support some of the civilian government's efforts to placate the public. Because of the popular pressures to which the new administration will be subjected, a measure of forbearance on the part of Peru's creditors may be crucial to the government's survival. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

The new administration in Lima will be able to count on assistance from the Andean Pact, which has shown particular solicitude toward democratic governments within its own ranks. All the individual Andean countries have backed the Peruvian military's previous steps toward elections, and such support will act as a moral barrier against future Peruvian military designs against the government. The Pact, or its individual members, also may offer economic aid. Venezuela, in particular, has shown an interest in the Peruvian electoral process and has the financial resources to provide some assistance to the new government. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

If Peru joins the ranks of the democracies, all the Pact's member states—for the first time in the organization's history—will be under civilian rule. The Pact's new political dimension as a spokesman for democracy in Latin America has been, in fact, predicated on the assumption that Peru was well along the road toward restoring democracy. Better prepared politically and economically for the transition

⁴ Last summer, for example, he scored Washington's ties to former Nicaraguan President Somoza and urged members of his party not to attend the Fourth of July reception at the US Ambassador's residence in Lima. (Footnote in the original.)

Peru and the Andean Pact



than Bolivia or Ecuador—the Pact's other two fledgling civilian governments—Peru was expected to provide an example of a successful shift from military to civilian rule. [Portion marking not declassified]

The failure of the Peruvian electoral process would undercut advocates of the Pact's political role in the hemisphere at a time when that role is already under scrutiny within the organization. Some leaders in each member country are discouraged by their failure to ensure the implantation of moderate regimes in Central America. During the past year, for example, the Pact mediated in Nicaragua and lobbied for moderate positions at the nonaligned summit in Havana. More funda-

mentally, the leaders are concerned that political objectives are absorbing energy that should be spent furthering economic integration in the Andes, the purpose for which the Pact was originally founded. If the Peruvian elections are canceled or if the incoming government is overthrown, disillusionment within the Andean countries about the prospects for democracy and the wisdom of the Pact's pursuit of political goals will become more widespread. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

Prospects

Peru's continued evolution toward democracy depends on whether the positive trends of recent years—the movement of civilians and the military toward the center and the tentative steps toward more pragmatic and sophisticated political positions—prove dominant over longstanding mutual distrust among political actors and a century-old tradition of periodic military intervention. At the moment, the old and new forces appear about equally balanced. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

The performance of the government scheduled for inauguration in July will do much to set the tone for civilian-military relations and mark the path Peruvian politics will follow for the next decade or so. The development of civilian political maturity does not seem to have kept pace with that of the military since the mid-1970s, but growth is difficult for those denied the exercise of power. Once in office, civilians must demonstrate that they can deal effectively with national problems. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

The new government's life expectancy also depends on its ability to work within a restricted environment dictated by the military's continuing role in public life. Whether the generals intend to reach a specific agreement with the new government defining the role of the armed forces remains unclear,⁵ but with or without such an agreement, the military will insist on having a voice in government policy. Military officers have indicated that they expect the new regime to leave intact what they view as their major achievements—such as nationalization of some mines and industries and social welfare programs—and to consult them on major policy initiatives. They will insist on having something close to a veto on national defense matters, on the military budget and institutional structure, and perhaps on key economic questions. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

⁵ In telegram 3405 from Lima, April 16, Shlaudeman referenced reports "indicating that at least some elements of the armed forces are talking among themselves and with politicians about imposing on the three major presidential candidates conditions looking toward the policies and actions of the next government. There undoubtedly has been such talk, but I am skeptical that it has produced any formal demands or responses." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800197-0583)

*Rafael Hoyos Rubio*

Unclassified ©

Should civilians fail to satisfy military expectations, backing for intervention could coalesce around one of several high-ranking skeptics. For example, Army Chief of Staff Rafael Hoyos Rubio, the most powerful regime critic of democratization, is scheduled to become Army commander in January 1981—a logical position from which to launch a coup. Support for the democratization process, however, is fairly strong today among officers of all ranks and in all service branches. Ambitious military leaders will be reluctant to intervene as long as majority sentiment in the armed forces continues to favor civilian rule. [*Portion marking not declassified*]

314. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Peru¹

Washington, May 27, 1980, 1921Z

White House 80613. For Ambassador Shlaudeman

Please deliver the following letter from the President to President Morales Bermudez at the earliest opportunity.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 16, Peru: President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerutti, 5/77-6/80. Confidential. Sent for information to the Department of State.

Begin Text:

Dear Mr. President:

Assistant Secretary of State Mathea Falco has reported on a recent visit to Peru and on the impressive efforts your government is making to combat the flow of illicit drugs.²

The emergency law passed earlier this year aimed at eliminating illicit coca production in the key growing areas of Peru is, in our view, a vital step in dealing with the problem. The subsequent “Green Sea II” operation enforcing that law has produced dramatic and positive results.

You are, of course, aware of the United States’ strong domestic and international commitment to curbing illicit drug traffic. We see that traffic both as a threat to our own society and to the society of nations. The crime and enormous flows of money that it generates can undermine the economies, the political structures, and the national security of the producing countries.

For these reasons, I take great satisfaction in the close cooperation our two countries have developed in meeting this difficult problem.

With warmest wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

² In telegram 2940 from Lima, April 2, the Embassy reported on Falco’s trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800174-0353)

315. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 24, 1980

SUBJECT

Soviet-Peruvian Military Relations and Mrs. Carter's Visit

Your memorandum of July 21² said that Mrs. Carter's visit³ could provide an opportunity to explore whether President Belaunde would be interested in replacing Peru's military relationship with the Soviet Union by one with the U.S. I attach a paper on this subject⁴ which replaces a paper entitled *Arms Purchases, Arms Restraints*, previously supplied for Mrs. Carter's briefing book. We believe Belaunde, and indeed many Peruvian military, might prefer to resume a substantial military supply relationship with the United States and to reduce their relationship with the U.S.S.R., not only for political reasons but because of significant maintenance and support problems with Soviet equipment. However, there are major obstacles:

—The outgoing military government has probably placed orders for all of the major purchases the military has in mind, for now, including the trainer aircraft we had hoped to supply. Therefore there may be little opportunity for the next year or more to supplant a major Soviet or other third country sale;

—Any major U.S. sale would have to be for cash. We cannot compete with either the size or the terms of the concessional financing offered by Soviet and West European suppliers. The trainer sale, for example, would have amounted to 15 to 20 times the amount of FMS financing we have budgeted (\$3 million), within global priorities and limited resources, for Peru;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Peru, 1/80-1/81 [#2]. Secret.

² The memorandum, from Aaron to Newsom and Komer, asked for "a short memo on the costs and benefits to Peru, the U.S., and the USSR of a shift in Peru's military supply relationship toward the U.S. and away from the USSR. What could the U.S. propose which would be realistic and practical both from the U.S. and the Peruvian perspectives?" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Peru, 1979-1980)

³ Rosalynn Carter headed the U.S. delegation that attended the inauguration of Belaunde on July 28. In telegram 6805 from Lima, July 31, the Embassy reported on her trip. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370-0713)

⁴ Not attached. The July 23 paper, entitled "Arms Restraint and Peruvian Arms Purchases from the U.S.S.R.," is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 44, Peru, 1-12/80.

—The equipment most likely to interest Peru in the longer term is likely to be the F-X aircraft, which Presidential guidance does not authorize us to offer on a government-to-government basis. However, we are in receipt of a license application from one of the F-X manufacturers (Northrop) and are currently considering whether to approve a marketing presentation.

—U.S. sales of major items to Peru would be criticized by Ecuador and Chile, which fear Peru's military strength, and could further upset the regional arms balance;

—The possibility of our maintaining and repairing Soviet equipment owned by Peru, in order to supplant Soviet advisers and technicians (about 100), would be technically difficult and we are uncertain of the cost. Again, the Peruvians would have to pay.⁵

Nevertheless, we believe we should continue to indicate our willingness to advise Peru on its maintenance and support problems with Soviet equipment, and our readiness to sell military equipment which will not introduce new levels of sophistication or disturb the arms balance in the Andean region.⁶

The benefits to the U.S., and to Peru, of moving away from Peru's present relationship with the Soviet Union are obvious. However, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated its willingness to provide the equipment Peru wants. The Soviet entree to a major Latin American country is important to them and they would no doubt object strenuously should Peru seriously consider replacing Soviet technicians with Americans.⁷ While the Soviets have not gained as much influence as they would like from the relationship, it is evident that Peru's military dependency on them has affected its position on various international issues. However, if the Peruvian military has actually acquired all the Soviet equipment it wants, the U.S.S.R. would not be in a position to prevent the renewal of a U.S.-Peruvian military relationship.

The cost to the U.S. Government would be the political one of defending sales to a country which has just made a major purchase of advanced Soviet aircraft. There would also be a budgetary cost were FMS financing levels to be increased from the present \$3 to \$4 million a year, or grant training increased to the level of 1977 and prior years (approximately \$900,000).

⁵ An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing toward the paragraph.

⁶ An unknown hand placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and drew an arrow pointing toward the paragraph.

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the word "Soviet" and the phrase "no doubt object strenuously should Peru seriously consider replacing Soviet technicians with Americans."

The cost to Peru is likely to be perceived by Belaunde as also both political and financial. Politically, he would risk returning to a relationship with a supplier, the U.S., whom he may view as unreliable (because of a painful experience with U.S. sales policies in his first administration), and charges that Belaunde would be moving away from non-alignment and into the U.S. pocket. Financially, he would have to be willing to give up concessional Soviet terms.⁸

This memorandum has been coordinated with the Department of Defense.

Peter Tarnoff⁹
Executive Secretary

⁸ In an August 5 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Pastor wrote: "Mrs. Carter said that she did not have the opportunity in Peru to raise this with Belaunde, but Bill Bowdler is planning a trip there sometime in the Fall, and said that he would raise it at that time." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 44, Peru, 1-12/80) (S) No record of a fall trip by Bowdler to Peru was found. In telegram 8393 from Lima, September 15, the Embassy reported on Eaton's September trip to Peru. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446-0081)

⁹ Bremer signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff's typed signature.

Uruguay

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, January 26, 1977, 1707Z

336. Subj: GOU Reviews Relations With U.S. Ref: State 015150.²

1. Summary: An atmosphere of tenseness in US/Uruguayan relations surrounds a series of high-level government meetings now underway. Various sources indicate that the sessions are emotionally charged and are dealing primarily with GOU concerns that a series of U.S. moves involving military personnel assignments, a small arms purchase, MilGroup termination, the Koch Amendment,³ the IDB Fisheries Loan, use of prior year FMS credits and other measures now including shoe exports constitute conscious USG harrassment of Uruguay. We do not believe any decisions as to how to react have been made. The only outward manifestation of displeasure to date has been the GOU (and the Army's) failure to acknowledge the presence of our recently arrived Army attaché.

2. A series of meetings involving the President, FonMin Rovira, and the Military Chiefs, among others has created an atmosphere of tenseness in US/Uruguayan relations. The arrival of Ambassadors Perez Caldas and Giambruno from Washington and New York, respectively, and OAS Alternate Rep Araneo, contributed further to the feeling that something important is afoot, in spite of Perez Caldas statement that relations with the U.S. are "cordial as always." Media coverage has been widespread but shallow, due to lack of information.

3. The meetings are being portrayed as a review of GOU/USG relations, ostensibly concentrating on the U.S. shoe import restrictions. However, a variety of well-informed sources indicate that the whole range of bilateral relations is indeed being discussed with the GOU reaction to the Col. Fons and Major Gaazzo matter⁴ being given primary

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770028-1026. Secret; Priority; Stadis; Exdis.

² Dated January 24. The Department reported on a conversation between Perez Caldas and Zimmermann regarding Perez Caldas's return to Uruguay for consultations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770025-0401)

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Document 348.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Documents 365-369.

consideration in a tense and emotional atmosphere. The military reportedly are greatly concerned over U.S. intentions, not knowing whether we have in mind vetoing everyone ever involved in military intelligence, or even going beyond that to veto anyone ever involved in anti-terrorist campaigns, a move which would exclude most senior officers, at least, from U.S. assignments. Complicating matters is a belief that the U.S. is focusing on Uruguay and is singling it out for punitive measures. These include the Koch Amendment, the delay in obtaining an export license for the Smith and Wesson small arms purchase, the termination of the MilGroup, the Harkin Amendment and the USG objection to the use of FSO funds for the IDB fisheries loan, the use of prior year FMS credits for improvements on naval vessels, and now the threat to the Uruguayan shoe industry. Key officials are aware of the broad scope of MilGroup terminations and of possible restrictions on shoe imports and they know why we opposed FSO funds for the fisheries loan. Nevertheless, there have been so many recent U.S. moves impacting adversely on Uruguay that the nation's leaders appear to conclude that the U.S. has adopted a policy of conscious harrassment of Uruguay. Once word reached them on our refusal to permit the transfer of old F-86s from Argentina to Uruguay,⁵ they will be even more convinced that our moves are part of a concerted U.S. effort to chastise Uruguay.

4. We do not believe that the Uruguayans have reached any decisions as to how to deal with us. The only apparent reaction to date has been the Army's refusal thus far to even acknowledge the presence of the recently arrived Army attaché.

Siracusa

⁵ In telegram 15032 to Buenos Aires, January 22, the Department informed the Embassies in Argentina and Uruguay that it had decided to deny Argentina's request to transfer 12 F-86 aircraft to Uruguay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770024-0685) In telegram 308 from Montevideo, January 24, Siracusa objected to both that decision and that "the Department did not see fit even to consult this Embassy before taking a decision which can have so profound an effect on US-Uruguay relations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770025-0946)

317. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance's Delegation to the Department of State¹

Grenada, June 18, 1977, 0850Z

Secto 39. Subj: Secretary's Bilateral With FonMin Rovira

1. Participants: US: The Secretary, Ambassador Todman, Under Secretary Habib, Mrs. Van Reigersberg (interpreter), Ms. Armstrong, L/ARA (notetaker), Uruguay: Foreign Minister Rovira, Ambassador Alvarez.

2. The Secretary began by expressing his appreciation for this opportunity to speak with Foreign Minister Rovira and said he hoped that they would meet again at the UN.

3. The Foreign Minister replied by saying it was a pleasure and an honor to meet him and noted that the uncertainty of his tenure in office (a problem in countries such as his made it impossible for him to say that he would be able to meet the Secretary at the UN—although he hoped it would be possible).

4. The Secretary commented that Mr. Habib had reserved the human rights issue for him and said he thought the discussion at the General Assembly thus far had been useful in that everyone had had the opportunity to present his views. With regard to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, he said he hoped that the Government of Uruguay would be willing to permit its entry to investigate conditions in that country. He said he considered such an investigation important for a number of reasons: (1) the stature of the IAHRC itself, (2) the contribution Uruguayan cooperation with the IAHRC would make toward improving relations between the US and Uruguay, (3) the effect such a decision would have on the US Congress.² The Secretary empha-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14–17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OAS General Assembly meeting.

² An undated briefing paper prepared for this meeting noted that because of a lack of “discernible improvement” in the human rights situation in Uruguay after the Koch Amendment of 1976, the Carter Administration “did not request FY 78 security assistance for Uruguay. Bilateral relations have since deteriorated. The GOU renounced all pending requests for new military or economic aid. Concurrently, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission asked the GOU for an invitation to make an inspection visit. Despite our best efforts to facilitate the invitation, the Uruguayan military prevailed and the GOU refused to issue the invitation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Human Rights-Uruguay-1976) The Koch Amendment amended Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1977, forbidding FY 1977 FMS financing, grant training, and grant materiel assistance to Uruguay.

sized that the United States wanted to improve its bilateral relationship with Uruguay but that the human rights problem had raised real problems in this regard—problems he would like to see resolved so we could reestablish our longstanding good relations of the past.³

5. Rovira said that the US concern for human rights was not essentially different from the traditional concerns of the GOU but that one had to take into account the problems which Uruguay continues to face when judging its performance. He said that subversion in Uruguay had been so intensive as to jeopardize the destiny of the country and that it had made it necessary to defend the republic as in wartime. Rovira defended his gov't's actions concerning the IAHRC by saying it had direct relations with the IAHRC but had opposed a visit because it considered onsite investigations to be extraordinary means without legal or material merit. He pointed out that the GOU had already submitted all the data the IAHRC had requested prior to asking for permission to visit, that the OAS Charter described visits as exceptional measures, and that the IAHRC had never made formal request to visit the country. Rovira said the Uruguayan people resented the way they were being treated and that this feeling had to be dissipated because our two countries had been such loyal friends. Rovira suggested that the IAHRC had to be tightened up and described a bad experience Ambassador Alvarez had had when he visited the IAHRC. He said the USG did not have accurate information regarding Uruguay because, if it did, it would know that the GOU could not loosen its controls overnight. In his view, the GOU had to approach normalization deliberately and provided for the security of its people in the process. He then noted that 90 percent of the denunciations of human rights violations which they had received had been for Tupamaros, communists, and members of other clandestine organizations are the same people who tried to make a Marxist-Leninist revolution and were now giving Uruguay a bad name. Rovira said he wanted the U.S. Embassy to be aware of the situation in his country because Uruguay had enjoyed a free and democratic tradition.

³ In a July 13 memorandum of conversation, Pezzullo reported that Perez Caldas "said the military command was convinced that the United States sought their removal from power. Foreign Minister Rovira's interpretation of the Secretary's remarks to him in Grenada as advocating a political change reinforced this conviction." Pezzullo noted that the USG had provided Uruguay "with a memorandum of that conversation precisely to dispel that erroneous conclusion." Perez Caldas agreed that Vance "was urging a positive change in the human rights situation" but emphasized that Pezzullo should "keep reiterating this point in discussions with the military leaders in Uruguay. He warned that they were highly suspicious and read into every action an indication of US animosity toward the military's role." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976-1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Uruguay—July-December 1977)

6. The Secretary then asked Rovira what reforms he felt were necessary for the IAHRC and at what pace he saw a return to normality.

7. The Foreign Minister responded that the reform of the IAHRC was a matter which required great thought but that a practical first step might be to refer the question to the Inter-American Juridical Committee. He noted that the permanent council was not the proper forum for discussion of legal issues but that the IAJC could submit a preliminary report on the procedural and juridical norms which would give the member countries real guarantees. Rovira emphasized the importance he attached to such reforms by observing that the IAHRC had “effective” work to accomplish.

8. Regarding the structure of the Uruguyan Government, Rovira explained that it was a consensus government composed of civilians and members of the military. He then described how civilians in the early 1970s saw the country very close to chaos. Using examples from his own career as Public Security Minister and Member of Parliament, and said it was hard to imagine how a democratic country could ever have been faced with such a predicament. Returning to the question, he said that there was agreement that at the end of the term of President Mendez the two traditional political parties (the Nationalist and Colorado) would be consulted through a plebiscite. Rovira described the GOU as beginning to travel the road of popular consultation but cautioned that did not mean that Uruguay was not in a constitutional state now. He invited the Secretary and Ambassador Todman to visit to get first-hand information of the situation. He said that such a visit and sustained support of the Embassy would give a clear vision of Uruguay.

9. The Secretary then asked whether in the present situation the courts were handling all the normal load of cases or whether there were special methods of processing terrorists cases.

10. Rovira answered by saying that the Congress in 1972 (a period of normalcy) had passed a law establishing that cases of sedition be tried in military courts. He explained that the law was adopted by a majority of both houses in Congress and that it was still in effect. Rovira defended the law by noting that the situation had become so critical by 1972 that civil courts were unable to act. He said that civilian judges could not be expected to be soldiers—that their family members had been threatened and witnesses were even afraid to appear. He characterized the situation as one in which civil justice could not function and said the 1972 law had taken this problem into account and contributed to breaking sedition. Rovira promised to send the Secretary information on the Uruguyan situation. Noting that it was one which he expected was alien to the United States.

11. The Secretary replied that we had had a period in the South during the Civil Rights Movement when our judges were threatened—

civilian judges—and that it had required great courage to deal with the situation. He said he knew of the problems as he had had friends who were judges there at that time. The Secretary said we had been fortunate to be able to work our way through this very difficult period. And that we had been able to do so without removing cases from the civil courts.

12. Rovira explained away the US example by noting that Uruguay, unfortunately, was a small country where problems such as this could not be localized as the case of the US Civil Rights Movement. He said that in Uruguay the threat was generalized—that it was like an infection which threatened the whole fabric of society.

13. The Secretary noted that he had enjoyed talking with Rovira.

14. Rovira replied that he believed he had clearly reflected his country's position and that he believed some 90 percent of Uruguayans supported what he had said.

15. Note: Mr. Habib had a separate conversation with Foreign Minister Rovira prior to the Secretary's arrival in which the latter expressed his concern about the possibility that countervailing duties might be imposed on Uruguayan leather exports. Mr. Habib explained that the FTC an independent agency was looking into the matter and that the President would make the final decision based on its report. He promised to bring this matter to the Secretary's attention.

McGee

318. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, August 24, 1977, 2014Z

4090. Subj: Todman Meeting With Cincs

1. The morning of August 18 Assistant Secretary Todman, accompanied by the Ambassador, Feinberg, Lister, O'Mahony and Dao called

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770307-0501. Confidential. Sent for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and USSOUTHCOM.

on CINCs Vadora (Army) and Paladini (Air Force). Adm. Sangurgo sat in for Adm. Marquez, who was in Paraguay.²

2. Todman opening by noting that he was visiting Uruguay to gain a first hand view of the local scene. He explained that Uruguay's negative international image has adversely affected our bilateral relationship. He emphasized that only Uruguay can do something to change that image and that the U.S. is prepared to respond favorably when real improvement is evident. The U.S. does not intend or propose to dictate to Uruguay any specific course of action. He recognized that in part Uruguay's negative image comes from deliberate defamation by self-serving interests, but he made clear that many responsible and respectable sources are also critical of the performance of the government. This latter group, he asserted, was the most important in that they did influence USG attitudes. He explained that we are ready to help Uruguay and that we seek to understand in depth the situation here.

3. Vadora said he wanted to discuss two things: first, how to go about changing an international image, and second, human rights in general. He then reviewed the recent history of Uruguay that led to the current situation. Historically, he noted, Uruguayans had enjoyed full liberties and a very liberal democracy. The liberties themselves permitted her enemies to subvert and undermine her institutions which eventually led to internal war. Uruguay found herself defenseless because of her democratic system. In 1971 and 1972 the legally constituted Parliament did two things: declared a state of internal war and passed various laws which gave the military certain extraordinary powers to deal with subversion. Vadora continues that the military had acted therefore in accordance with the laws passed by Parliament. He also touched on the failure of the judiciary to try and convict subversives and other enemies.

4. Vadora saw Uruguay as the victim of an extremely well-financed international propaganda campaign, which the current government felt helpless to combat. He admitted that during the crisis of war "things" had been done which violated our broad definition of human rights. He further stated that these "things" had been investigated and where culpability had been found had been corrected. He insisted that

² In telegram 3024 from Montevideo, August 5, Pezzullo told Todman: "the most influential individuals you will be meeting will be the CINCs of the armed forces and the other high-ranking military officers." Pezzullo further advised Todman: "the highly influential Political Committee of the Armed Forces (including General Gregorio Alvarez) wanted an opportunity to meet with you," and "along with the CINCs they represent the key officers in the diffuse decision-making machinery of the GOU." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Uruguay—July-December 1977)

it was not the deliberate policy of the current government to violate human rights; that respect for human rights in Uruguay was traditional and still is current. Vadora then cited several instances in the past when Uruguay had supported the United States contrary to her own interests, such as in the 1962 OAS vote against Cuba in support of the United States, although Uruguay was not firmly anti-Cuba at the time. He stated that over the past two years 400 Uruguayans had been trained in Cuba and promised to provide the embassy with details. Todman said he would review the material and raise it with the Cuban authorities.

5. Todman explained that the U.S. was convinced that the best method of combatting communism was to strengthen democratic institutions. We must have contact with communist countries but this is in no way equivalent to giving in to them. Quite the opposite. It enables us to be more effective in understanding their societies and in influencing them in positive ways.

6. Vadora asked only that we appreciate that they were engaged in a life and death struggle for the freedom of Uruguay. Paladini joined the conversation at this point to note his interest in Todman's statement that the U.S. wanted to understand what had and was occurring in Uruguay. Paladini stated that in a population of only three million, the 3,000 Tupamaros constituted a sizeable force. If the terrorists had been fewer in number they could have been subdued while preserving individual rights. He said the Uruguayan military is a small family; that those killed and wounded were a personal loss for the others. He complained that the external image of Uruguay is distorted. He admitted that errors had been committed as in any war, but considered them exceptions rather than the rule. He said he understood how the U.S. Congress had to respond to special interests. What he could not understand was why the Executive Branch joined the attack on Uruguay.

7. Vadora said in some exasperation "When we defend ourselves we are accused of being anti-free press". Sangurgo noted that in 1973 the politicians failed and failed badly, yet none of them had been killed or jailed—only sent home. But now the United States listens to a traitor like Wilson Ferreira Aldunate.³ Todman acknowledged that some self-interested organizations and people are attacking the GOU. He pointed out, however, that we have heard from other, more responsible, sources whose requests for information sent to the GOU have gone unanswered. These charges dealt with disappearances, charges of torture and failure of due process.

³ See Document 321 and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976, Document 343.

8. Vadora countered by saying that the judiciary was not created by the military—everything that they (the military) had done was completely in accordance with their legal system which has traditionally been slow and cumbersome. In reply to Todman’s query about the suspension of habeas corpus, Vadora replied that this had been done by the Parliament under “medidas prontas de seguridad”.⁴

9. Todman affirmed our interest in strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) and suggested that the GOU might improve the international understanding of its internal situation by inviting the IAHRC to visit here. All three reacted negatively.

10. Mr. Lister presented a brief discussion of our human rights policy as seen from Moscow and the pressure it was putting on the USSR. He also made the point that any country that violated the rights of its citizens was serving communist propaganda designs.

11. Mr. Todman asked about the possibility of allowing prisoners to choose their right to exile. Vadora and Paladini replied that there were 63 in that category but none of them wanted to go. Vadora indicated that they had freed Communist Party leader Arismendi because he was reportedly near death but he has recovered and is in Moscow and an avid critic of human rights practices in Uruguay. Vadora explained that some prisoners who had gone into voluntary exile returned shortly after to resume fighting.

12. Vadora restated that he could not understand why the U.S. was trying to be the moral judge of the world. He recognized that the USG dealt with communism at a high level, but complained that we had forgotten about the communist subversives threat to small nations. He complained US did not care about health or well-being of people. He then asked Todman to clarify U.S. human rights objectives.

13. Todman outlined in detail our human rights posture as defined in the Christopher Chicago Speech.⁵ Vadora interrupted at one point to comment that nobody in the U.S. protested the Tupamaro violations when they were murdering innocent citizens in Uruguay.

14. The meeting ended with the Uruguayans expressing their appreciation for the frankness and candor of the exchange.

15. That evening, the CINCs and other key military leaders in the GOU attended a dinner at the Residence which included Foreign Mini-

⁴ Emergency security measures.

⁵ Christopher addressed the American Bar Association in Chicago on August 9. For the text, see *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980*, pp. 412–417.

ster Rovira,⁶ the entire Todman party and members of the Embassy staff. Todman re-raised the question he had posed at luncheon; namely how does the GOU propose to prepare the electorate for free and open elections in 1981;⁷ Vadora tried unsuccessfully to offer a step-by-step approach—in the process revealing that the GOU high command has given very little thought to the subject. Their fear of a return to the political weaknesses of the past clearly haunts them and is at the heart of their dilemma. They want a safe and controlled political process to succeed them. Uruguayan tradition runs in a more liberal direction—thus the lack of any real answer to the question “How do you get from here to there?”

16. Cleared by Assistant Secretary Todman.

Todman

⁶ In telegram 4086 from Montevideo, August 24, the Embassy reported on Todman's meeting with Rovira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770306-0286) In telegram 4088 from Montevideo, August 24, the Embassy reported on a working luncheon held by Rovira and attended by officials from the Uruguayan military and foreign ministry, as well as Todman's delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770306-0774)

⁷ In an August 10 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that Mendez had announced that elections would be held in Uruguay in November 1981. Christopher noted, “Our Embassy believes the timing of this announcement was influenced by the scheduled visit of Assistant Secretary Todman to Uruguay next week and views it as a response to our human rights policies.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports [State], 8/77)

319. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 9, 1977, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Mendez Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

URUGUAY

President Aparicio Mendez President of Uruguay
Enrique Delfante Sub-Secretary of Foreign Ministry
Ambassador Jose Perez Caldas

US

President Carter
Secretary Vance
Assistant Secretary Todman
David Aaron, National Security Council
Ambassador Pezzullo
Robert Pastor, NSC

Human Rights

President Carter opened by offering two books to President Mendez. One was the book he authored, *Why Not the Best*, and the other a volume of satellite photographs of a type useful for agricultural planning.

President Carter said he was grateful that President Mendez could come to assist in the signing of the historic Panama Canal Treaty. He indicated that the attendance of the Chiefs of State from the hemisphere was of value to us and that he appreciated President Mendez' agreeing to make this trip. The President then indicated that he would like to speak frankly regarding the difficulties and differences we have in our bilateral relationship.

Mendez said he appreciated a frank discussion because it was the language he understood best.

President Carter indicated that the problem of human rights has arisen as an obstacle between our two countries. He said there was a growing awareness among Latin American countries that positive changes must be made to insure that human rights are protected. Turning to Uruguay the President noted that many allegations have been made about violations of human rights which probably are exaggerated because they come from families which are personally involved

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 46, Uruguay, 1/77-10/80. Confidential. Drafted by Pezzullo. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.

and from a tendency in the press to give emphasis to negative factors. As a result, there is a widespread feeling in our country that human rights are not adequately protected in Uruguay, and that people are imprisoned without cause and suffer delayed trials. In light of these allegations it is difficult for the President, given the concerns of the Congress, to maintain a close relationship with Uruguay. The President said he would appreciate the views of President Mendez as to what actions Uruguay could take to help clarify this perhaps unfair international image. He added that what he sought was not meant as criticism but was asked in the spirit of seeking ways to remove this obstacle to our traditionally close relations.²

President Mendez said he understood clearly what the President was seeking. He reiterated that he appreciated the President's frankness and that he would attempt to give him a full explanation. Mendez then explained that the Uruguayan Government had been the victim of a campaign of defamation which was well organized and well financed, and which was making common cause with the criminals and seditious elements attacking his country. He said that, if the current government had not taken control, Uruguay today would be a communist country or a paradise for terrorists. President Mendez further explained that the current government did not have the resources to fight this campaign of calumny. It believed instead that its actions would of themselves speak positively for them. He indicated that he was a man committed to the law; one who had taught administrative law for 25 years before he was expelled from his position by the extremist forces that sought to dominate his country. He said he was a democrat by tradition who could not conceive of a country without democracy and of a man without freedom. He said he had felt a deep-seated sadness when he visited the Senate the day before because a parliament was not flourishing in his country currently. But he is gladdened by the hope that the country will soon realize the conditions to permit a return to a democratic form. Unfortunately, he lamented, Uruguay's enemies do not permit the return to an open democratic form at the present time, but he was confident that the day would soon come when that was possible.

² In a September 19 letter to Derian, Pezzullo wrote: "Mendez came away very impressed that President Carter had asked him to take the steps to prove to the world that the allegations made against Uruguay were exaggerated. I believe he feared that President Carter *would read the riot act*. He was pleasantly surprised to find the President to be reasonable and pragmatic. The end result is euphoria here. They recognize—and I keep insisting—that the ball is in their court." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1976–1977 Human Rights Subject Files and Country Files, Lot 80D177, Uruguay—July-December 1977)

Political Prisoners

Turning to the human rights issue more specifically, President Mendez said unequivocally that there were *no* political prisoners being held in Uruguayan jails.³ Instead, there are approximately 2,000 detained who are either delinquents or terrorists and who are either under judicial processing or have been sentenced. All of those detained, he assured, had received all the protection of due process. Additionally, under special security measures granted by the last parliamentary government, 190 individuals were in custody. He explained the 190 figure might be halved at the current moment because the policy was to free those immediately who were not found guilty of any infractions.

Mendez said further that when he became President he vowed that the number of prisoners held under special security measures would be reduced. And he was pleased that the current number is relatively insignificant and will be further reduced. He promised to remove the special security authority, possibly by the end of this year. He noted that under these measures *habeas corpus* was waived and people could be detained without notice for more than 24 hours. He justified the use of the special security measures as a means of combating terrorists who work as teams and who would be forewarned if information that their members taken prisoner was made public within 24 hours as required under normal conditions. But he stated categorically that there were *no* cases of torture or mistreatment, adding for emphasis that he checked personally to ensure that mistreatment did not occur.

He spoke of the recent arrest of a Brazilian journalist (Tavares) who was captured in flagrant violation of espionage laws.⁴ Within 48 hours the international press was claiming that the prisoner had been tortured and mistreated, that he had not been fed and that he was very sick and had been denied medical treatment. The press also claimed that the prisoner had lost half of his weight and was dying. To answer these charges the Uruguayan Government invited the Brazilian Consul to visit the prisoner with a private doctor. The interview was then published in the press. The prisoner stated publicly that he had not

³ Carter noted in his diary that in this meeting Mendez was "highly defensive, denied there were any political prisoners in Uruguay. Our information is that they have between two thousand and five thousand." (*White House Diary*, p. 95)

⁴ Flavio Tavares, a correspondent for the Mexican newspaper *Excelsior*, was arrested in Montevideo in July. (Telegram 170768 to Montevideo, July 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770260-0781; telegram 169483 to Buenos Aires, July 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770258-0516; and telegram 2869 from Montevideo, July 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770269-0366)

been physically abused and that he had been treated for an old asthma condition in a very proper way.

President Mendez then gave the following figures of prisoners who had been released from prison through July 30 of this year: 1,121 had been freed; 197 had been granted early release before their terms had been completed; and 14 foreigners had been expelled under the provisions of a 1924 law. President Mendez then complained that the Uruguayan penal system was old and in need of revision. But he indicated that their scruples were so high that they have built a new model jail for those held on terrorist charges which was better than the one housing common criminals. He said that the government of Uruguay had invited the diplomatic corps to visit the prison and that all had done so except for the USSR. (Note: our Ambassador did *not* visit the prison although our military attache did.) President Mendez then went on to say that it is true that their trial process is slow but this stems from causes that go back to the last century. He indicated that two new projects were under study to revise the court system. He said the government preferred a careful and slow study to insure that security is not jeopardized.

He indicated that the only terrorists who have died were those killed in direct combat with security forces. He added that terrorists who had surrendered had been treated with respect. As an example, he pointed to the case of Tupamaro leader Sendic who was shot in the mouth when apprehended and was given very costly surgical and medical care. According to President Mendez, Sendic has recovered his voice and received extensive plastic surgery to return his facial features to normal. He added that the proof that the Government of Uruguay respected human rights was the fact that 2,000 prisoners are in jail. He indicated that there was a simple way to have avoided the problem but that the Government of Uruguay does not engage in that type of behavior. He said, "We now pay the price because we have these prisoners."

President Mendez assured that if there is a charge made against any official for violating the rights of an individual, "I personally would assure that action was taken." He added for emphasis that if we became aware that such violations were being committed behind his back he would submit his resignation immediately. Mendez then recounted a case of mistreating a prisoner who had died. The investigation showed that abuses had been committed. As a result, the policeman and the inspector of police were dismissed".

Need For GOU Positive Action

President Carter indicated that he appreciated President Mendez' words. He added that President Mendez must realize that the initiative

for answering the allegations made against the Uruguayan Government must come from the Uruguayan Government. He then asked what President Mendez would advocate or recommend to facilitate the release of facts to the public to begin a positive program of improving Uruguay's image. He said it was important that the information deal with specifics that would demonstrate clearly that progress was being made.

President Mendez said he wanted to bring to the attention of President Carter that the government of Uruguay has just sent an extensive reply to queries raised by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). He indicated that it would be most helpful if that document could be released and thus help clarify the record. He added that it would appear logical for a commission of some sort to assess conditions in Uruguay. The Government of Uruguay did not offer an invitation to the IAHRC because we know that individuals in the IAHRC had already condemned us before they began the survey. We know that it has become a highly politicized commission that does not earn any one's respect. It has taken testimony from common delinquents, assassins and criminals. Rather than deal with the IAHRC, Mendez offered instead an open invitation to the President to send any person or groups of significance in the United States to Uruguay.⁵ He said the Government of Uruguay would open its doors to such visitors and offer complete freedom of movement and the freedom to meet and talk with any one they wished. He said he had already invited two U.S. Senators to make such a visit (Mendez did invite Senator Griffin at the SFRC luncheon yesterday). He assured that any visitor would be free to visit the jails, the courts and to talk with any one. He then commended the President for having selected a man of Todman's talent and intelligence to serve as Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs, and added that he also has made an excellent choice in the Ambassador sent to Uruguay. He indicated that with this level of quality among US officials dealing with Uruguay, he was optimistic that the troubles between our two nations would soon disappear. Mendez then noted that the government of Uruguay did not have the funds to mount a counter campaign against the international campaign of calumny as it would much rather use its resources for schools and roads. He indicated that however, it would organize a new information

⁵ In telegram 4446 from Montevideo, September 15, Pezzullo recommended: "We should follow up quickly on the offer made by President Mendez to the President to welcome any individuals or groups he would suggest visit here, in lieu of visit by the IAHRC." Pezzullo suggested "a two-phased approach" consisting of, first, "the visit of a prominent and objective person," and second, "a Codel from the House headed by Don Fraser to visit here early next year." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770336-0063)

commission to give prompt and responsive answers to anyone who requested information about prisoners. He indicated that currently information offices were scattered throughout the government and were not offering comprehensive and prompt answers to those seeking information. He emphasized the most important thing now is to "establish our credibility."

President Carter said he was most pleased that they had had a general discussion on this issue and asked President Mendez to communicate with him at any time either directly or through our Ambassador if he ever felt the need to do so. He said it had been an honor to have President Mendez here and added that continuing evidence was needed that the allegations about violations of human rights in Uruguay were being answered thoroughly and convincingly. He added that he looked to President Mendez' leadership to bring about improvement in its area of human rights.

President Mendez noted that he personally was racing the clock (a reference to his advanced age). He added that he did not want to do anything which would deprive him of having his comfort and rest.

Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties

He then said he would like to touch on one other issue, perhaps a minor issue for the United States, but one of major importance to Uruguay. He indicated that Uruguay was recuperating economically at a rapid pace. He said that they had reestablished their international credit, had built up reserves, had improved their trade balance and had doubled their level of exports. A great deal of attention was being given to nontraditional exports, especially because they were job-intensive industries and offered interesting prospects in that area. He mentioned that leather goods was the case in point. The Government had used a rebate system not so much as a subsidy, but to encourage these industries which needed an initial push to develop. Last year the rebate had been cut by 20%, and gradually it will be reduced further. He indicated that if U.S. markets were closed to these leather products, several new factories would be closed and 12,000 employees would lose their jobs. He realized this was not a large number in the U.S., but very significant for a small nation like Uruguay. He added that in the commission Uruguay would send to the U.S. to study the problem, an official from the Minister of Foreign Relations would be included. He said he wanted to bring this to President Carter's attention and to ask that the President ensure that the final decision be a "fair one."

President Carter responded that "any item that is important to Uruguay is important to us as well." He indicated that we have a problem with any product that is subsidized by a government. He assured that "We look forward to working with your government

through the MTN.” He suggested to President Mendez that “you can announce when you return to Uruguay that I have agreed to expedite consultations with your government because the subsidies have been removed.” Mendez then clarified that they had not been removed but rather reduced and in the process of being removed. Mendez closed the discussion by asking if he could have an autographed picture of the President. President Carter said he would be glad to provide one, and will also autograph the picture that was taken the night before at the State dinner.

320. Letter From President Carter to Uruguayan President Mendez¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure to have had a chance to exchange views with you on the occasion of the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.² I particularly appreciated your gesture in coming to show your support for the new Canal treaties at this historic moment.

Historically the United States-Uruguayan relationship has been a close one and I want to reestablish it on a sound basis. I hope that our conversation will prove an important step in that direction. We recognize that Uruguay has faced difficult times, and we value your friendship. I fully share your view that it is difficult to conceive of a country without democracy or of man without freedom of expression, and I earnestly hope that Uruguay will soon reassume its cherished position of leadership in the fulfillment of these ideals.

As I told you, however, the allegations of human rights violations now make it most difficult to sustain past relationships. I was heartened by your assurance that action will be taken against any official violating the rights of an individual. Your commitment to remove the special security authority, possibly by the end of this year, and your government’s organization of a new information commission to give prompt and responsive answers to those asking for information about prisoners

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Uruguay: President Aparicio Mendez Manfredini, 8/77-3/78. No classification marking.

² See Document 319.

are encouraging developments.³ We hope that the information commission will work closely with our Embassy.

Frankly, I must reemphasize the importance to Uruguay's image abroad of permitting a visit by the kind of respected international commission that could make public an objective report of its findings in the area of human rights. Uruguay's image here and elsewhere can only be changed by public awareness of your government's actions to protect human rights in Uruguay more effectively. As you are surely aware, a number of members of the Organization of American States have recently agreed to accept a visit by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. I know you have reservations (which I do not share) regarding this particular Commission, but there are other organizations that could help in the process as well.⁴

Meanwhile, I have very much in mind your invitation to me to send any person or group to Uruguay and your assurance that they would be given complete freedom of movement and freedom to talk with anyone they might wish. We will be responding shortly to your invitation through your Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I was glad to learn that representatives from your government have already met with Treasury Department officials and have reached agreement on the problem of Uruguayan leather goods exports to the United States.⁵

May I say again that it was a pleasure to meet you. Our conversation was a great help to me and I trust that you will let me know, either

³ In telegram 242671 to Montevideo, October 8, the Department reported that Christopher had told Rovira that the Carter-Mendez meeting had "raised our expectations that a number of specific actions will shortly be taken by the GOU, including removal of the special security authority, invitations to prominent individuals to visit and establishment of the information commission." Rovira responded "that the special security measures applied only to a special category of prisoners, but that there are no political prisoners in Uruguay, only common criminals. The information commission, he observed, was already functioning." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770369-0172)

⁴ In telegram 250368 to Montevideo, October 19, the Department reported on efforts by the ILHR to coordinate a visit by independent observers to Uruguay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770383-1121) In telegram 5114 from Montevideo, November 1, the Embassy assessed the benefits and drawbacks of such a group. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770402-0006)

⁵ In telegram 253422 to Montevideo, October 21, the Department reported on the terms of an agreement between the GOU and the Department of the Treasury for a waiver of countervailing duties on Uruguayan leather goods. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770388-0225)

through Ambassador Pezzullo or directly, if there is some matter you wish to bring to my personal attention.⁶

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁶ In telegram 5279 from Montevideo, November 10, the Embassy transmitted a translation of Mendez's response to this letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770416-0119)

321. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington, November 19, 1977, 2046Z

278192. Subject: Deputy Secretary Christopher's Meeting With Wilson Ferreira. Ref: MVD 5079.²

1. Former Senator Wilson Ferreira, accompanied by his son Juan Raul, met with the Deputy Secretary on November 15. Mr. Christopher began with the statement that this appointment was consistent with our policy of sharing views with all people and groups interested in positive improvements in human rights. It was not being held in a spirit of hostility towards the GOU. We value our relations with Uruguay and want to see an improvement in the human rights practices of that Government. We have made known our concerns to the GOU on several occasions.

2. Mr. Christopher then stated that our human rights concerns look broadly to three categories of rights: rights of the person; economic and social rights; and political and civil rights. While none of these categories had absolute priority, we had tended to concentrate in the case of Uruguay on personal rights and on a return to democratic

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770430-0315. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Graham; cleared by McNeil; approved by Christopher.

² In telegram 5079 from Montevideo, October 29, Pezzullo recommended that Christopher meet with Ferreira. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770398-1138)

government. In this connection, we are working as effectively as we can, and we are hopeful that our efforts will bear some success.

3. Wilson Ferreira replied that it did not bother him that we felt no hostility towards the GOU because his hostility was sufficient for both. He stated that he did not intend to dwell on the details of human rights violations in Uruguay, as these were well known. Mr. Christopher agreed that the real issue was what our policy direction should be, rather than recounting past events. Ferreira continued that the prisoner issue was not the great problem. While, physically, prisoner conditions remain bad, the situation is worse in Argentina and Chile. Ferreira added that torture had in fact diminished.

4. The fundamental problem, according to Ferreira, is the relationship of the GOU to the Uruguayan public. He stated that there is an Orwellian atmosphere prevailing, with the deterioration of public trust in the GOU almost impossible to believe. Torture has become almost obligatory during interrogation, according to Ferreira. The media is controlled almost as it was in the last century, he added.

5. Contrasting to the harsh GOU treatment of Uruguayan citizens, Ferreira stated, is the counter effect of U.S. human rights policy as perceived by the Uruguayan public. There is high regard for the American Embassy in Montevideo, which is projecting an image of seriousness.

6. Referring to General Vadora's presence in Washington,³ Ferreira stated that Vadora initially promulgated the theory in Uruguay that U.S. human rights policy was all words and no substance. He added that General Vadora believed the military controls the U.S. Government, and that his proper channel of communication was with the Department of Defense. Now, however, Vadora's attitude is one of uncertainty.

7. Senator Ferreira then stated that one area of concern is with the U.S. signals of satisfaction with human rights progress before it occurs—as an example, he stated that the GOU vague announcement of national elections just prior to Assistant Secretary Todman's visit to Montevideo was designed to improve that Government's image.⁴ Indications of happiness with this announcement by the Department were manipulated, through GOU monopoly of the media, to indicate U.S. approval of the GOU formula for a controlled election.

8. Ferreira added that he realized the U.S. was under pressure to demonstrate that its human rights initiatives were bringing some results, and that he was surprised we had made no comments on the

³ See Document 322.

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 318.

changes in public acceptance of the United States as a result of the Carter Administration's human rights policy. Prior to this policy the U.S. was not loved in Uruguay. He claimed Assistant Secretary Todman's trip was the first time he recalled Uruguayan youth having ever applauded an American official.

9. Mr. Christopher responded that we may make mistakes in trying to carry out our human rights policy. We are aware of the danger of reacting favorably to what turn out to be only cosmetic changes. However, we feel an obligation to recognize real change and avoid being too skeptical. He stated that we agree our human rights policy has achieved a real resonance among people and noted that the effect on people has thus far generally been greater than the effect on governments. Over time, our policy will have increased effect at the government level, even with respect to dictatorships. The question remains, how to be more effective now with governments. In the case of Uruguay, we have withheld security assistance and opposed multilateral economic assistance.

10. Senator Ferreira then gave his own impression of the impact of our policy on the Uruguayan military. He referred to the conversion from French to U.S. military tutelage, recalled the social antecedents of the military leadership, and a concept of democratic principles based on a strong anti-communist posture, as the modeling influences on the GOU military. With this orientation, it was possible to understand the strong reaction which the Uruguay military experienced upon being censured by its mentor (U.S.), according to Ferreira. To a certain extent, he added, the strong GOU reaction was justified because of our previous conditioning of the Uruguayan military to expect that its posture on subversion would be understood.

11. Ferreira continued that he is hopeful that our present policies may generate a movement within the Uruguayan military establishment, which is not as homogenous as believed. He then implied that the U.S. should exert more direct economic pressure, claiming that the military budget imposed on an already fragile economy was three times that of Chile, and that the Government deficit was being financed by foreign borrowing. He wondered how much coordination there is between the USG and private U.S. banks, which he stated were lending to an insolvent client. At this point, Ferreira's son interjected that Uruguay is the one country in Latin America where the alternative to the present government is democracy.

12. The Deputy Secretary concluded the meeting by stating that one reason we are so concerned about the present situation in Uruguay is because we know something about Uruguay's strong democratic tradition. It must be understood, Mr. Christopher observed, that our human rights policy is governmental and does not extend to the private

sector. Our goal must be to try to promote human rights through existing structures, and not by destabilizing governments. We will continue to work on this issue as effectively as possible and are glad to have assessments of the situation as provided by Senator Ferreira through WOLA.

13. At the noon briefing on the day of the meeting the following statement was read by the Department spokesman. There were no questions.

Quote: Uruguay: Deputy Secretary's meeting with former Uruguayan Senator Wilson Ferreira.

Deputy Secretary Christopher met today with former Senator Wilson Ferreira Aldunate of Uruguay. Senator Ferreira sought the meeting through the Washington Office for Latin America. Mr. Christopher agreed to meet with him in keeping with our policy of exchanging views with a broad spectrum of political leaders, especially those concerned with human rights conditions in their country. Deputy Secretary Christopher reviewed the human rights goals of the administration and told Senator Ferreira that we are hopeful that, through our continuing bilateral efforts in the aftermath of the meeting between President Mendez and President Carter, the Uruguayan Government will take steps to improve human rights conditions in that country. Unquote.

Vance

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington, December 3, 1977, 2254Z

289235. Subject: Deputy Secretary Meeting With General Vadora.
Ref: State 268689; MVD 5280²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770449-0533. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Graham, cleared by McNeil, approved by Christopher.

² In telegram 268689 to Montevideo, November 9, the Department reported that the Uruguayan embassy had requested an appointment with Christopher for Vadora. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770414-0795) In telegram 5280 from Montevideo, November 10, the Embassy recommended that Christopher should meet with Vadora, noting that "Vadora is unquestionably the most powerful figure in the GOU hierarchy." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770416-0494)

1. Deputy Secretary Christopher met with General Vadora for approximately 50 minutes on November 16. Accompanying Vadora were Uruguayan Ambassador Perez Caldas and Military Attache General Queirolo. Department participants included Deputy Assistant Secretary McNeil, Deputy Coordinator for Human Rights Schneider, Uruguayan Desk Officer Graham and Interpreter Hervas.

2. Mr. Christopher began with amenities by asking about the Managua Conference of American Armies.³ General Vadora replied that it had been a good meeting which especially dealt with the issue of human rights. The Deputy Secretary then stated that he was glad to have the opportunity to talk with General Vadora about the state of bilateral relations. The visit of President Mendez opened up a dialogue which we are pleased to pursue.⁴ Mr. Christopher continued that the one subject which has become an impediment to better relations is the lack of harmony on human rights policy. Mr. Christopher added that when President Mendez was in Washington he raised our expectations that the state of emergency would be lifted. General Vadora was asked when that will happen.

3. General Vadora replied that it will take some time to remove state of emergency measures due to the continuing contacts which subversive groups outside the country maintain with elements in Uruguay. However, the General added, these security measures do not impede normalization of other conditions. As an example, Vadora referred to the establishment of the Information Commission now cooperating with our Embassy.⁵

4. Mr. Christopher asked if the Commission is prepared to supply information on the condition of prisoners. General Vadora replied that, in principle, yes. Prisoners are not isolated. They are receiving visitors. Anybody can talk to them and find out their state of health. And the prisoners may write letters. The Deputy Secretary asked for a clarification of this statement, as to whether it was true in practice as well as principle, and whether it applied to inquiries from family and friends. General Vadora replied that in practice the prisoners may receive lawyers, representatives of their religious affiliation, and immediate family members. Direct contact between prisoners and persons in other categories is not permitted. Vadora stated that these are the same conditions accorded common criminals. The general was then asked if the commission will publish a list that would identify all

³ The Conference of American Armies is an annual meeting of Western Hemisphere army leaders.

⁴ See Document 319.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 320.

prisoners, the charges, and length of sentences. He replied that without doubt such a list would be published.

5. The Deputy Secretary explained that he wanted to be clear on why we were asking these questions. They were not intended in the spirit of hostility. Rather, it is useful to understand as fully as possible the impediments to better relations. General Vadora replied that the questions were not offensive and that the only way to resolve issues is to discuss them with candor and frankness. Mr. Christopher thanked Vadora for making this statement.

6. Mr. Christopher then asked whether some aspects of our concern, such as lifting media censorship and answering complaints about the judicial process, could not be addressed prior to resolution of the overall state of emergency question. General Vadora replied with a description of the origin of the state of emergency measures, stating that Wilson Ferreira had voted for these measures as a member of the Uruguayan Congress which adopted them. What is under review by President Mendez is the possibility that those persons arrested under provisions of the measures might be processed through civilian rather than military channels.

7. Referring to the media, Vadora stated that GOU actions have been taken under provisions of a press law and that there is no censorship in Uruguay. He then referred to the *El Dia* case, where actions against the newspaper were taken under security measures because the moral standards of the military had been ridiculed. Mr. Christopher asked for further clarification of these comments. General Vadora then stated that as in the U.S. the press is responsible for what it reports, and must be sure that what it reports is true. He claimed a measure of press freedom and cited as evidence critical reports from foreign correspondents in Montevideo. Mr. Christopher asked specifically what happened in the *El Dia* case. Vadora replied that an offensive remark was published in the classified ads section of the paper and that this is not acceptable under public norms. The managing editor, who bore the ultimate responsibility, was not a Uruguayan citizen, and was thrown out of the country. Mr. Christopher replied that in the U.S. the press is free from Government censorship. He said that while individuals could bring civil actions for money damages if they thought the press had injured them by publishing untruths, the Government could not prevent the press from publishing what it liked or penalize it for doing so. In short, he added the media situation here is not similar to that of Uruguay as claimed by Vadora. General Vadora noted that the decision permanently to close down a number of leftist newspapers, such as *Escoba*, was taken prior to the current Uruguayan administration.

8. The Deputy Secretary next informed General Vadora that the decision to release a substantial number of political prisoners would

be a major contribution and asked if this was foreseen. General Vadora replied that there were no political prisoners in Uruguay. Those now in jail were put there prior to the current administration, under the emergency security measures. Thus, he added, the owner of the prisoners is quote social justice unquote and not the GOU. On this point General Vadora observed that 185 prisoners had been freed in 1977 by the Uruguayan courts. He said that only the courts can release prisoners. Vadora modified this statement with the comment that anyone under detention who had not been formally sentenced could be freed, but once sentence is imposed they must serve their time. Thus the release of sentenced prisoners he said, is not dependent on the good will of President Mendez but rather is a function of judicial decisions. In reply to Mr. Christopher's question on whether the President could grant pardons, General Vadora said that he could for common criminals and had requested authority to grant pardons for those held under emergency security measures.

9. The Deputy Secretary reiterated at this point that we were probing for areas where we can improve relations. Steps such as those he had suggested would have a favorable effect on the U.S. Congress, which might be more important than its effect on the Administration. Mr. Christopher continued that our policy is to be helpful but we do not presume to draw road maps for the GOU. General Vadora interrupted to indicate that the U.S. can be of much assistance in precisely this way, by drawing road maps. Mr. Christopher stated that the whole administration looks forward to the time when we can offer economic and security assistance to the GOU, as well as our support for international financial institution loans to Uruguay. However, he went on, our perception of current conditions in Uruguay persuades us that we cannot take such steps until there has been substantial progress.⁶

10. Mr. Christopher said that he was sure Ambassador Pezzullo had already told Vadora what had been outlined in this meeting. He had great respect for the Ambassador and knew him personally to be a vigorous exponent of our policy. Mr. Christopher added that the Ambassador was also sympathetic to the desires of the GOU to improve

⁶ In telegram 199011 to Montevideo, August 20, the Department informed Pezzullo: "The Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, chaired by Deputy Secretary Christopher, reached the following decision with respect to Uruguay in a meeting held August 11. It was agreed that in view of the human rights situation in Uruguay, we would urge the Uruguayan government to withdraw the two pending IDB loans and that if they refuse, we would vote against the loans on the grounds that Uruguay is a gross violator" of human rights. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770301-1016) Minutes from the August 11 meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 17, Human Rights Interagency Group I.

relations. General Vadora replied that he considered Ambassador Pezzullo to be strong and interested in good relations. He went on to say that he was optimistic we will reach agreement on the issues and that he understood that it was not only the U.S. Congress, but the public as well, which must be convinced of the Uruguayan respect for human rights.

11. General Vadora then stressed that the situation in his country is not one where some group has taken over the country for narrow purposes. His objective is that the country not suffer constantly from subversion. Unlike the powerful U.S. which can tolerate so much dissent, Vadora claimed that Uruguay could relatively easily lose its democratic institutions to subversion.

12. Mr. Christopher said that he maintained an open door policy with respect to political leaders not now in government roles. In this connection, he had received Wilson Ferreira on November 15.⁷ This policy should not be misunderstood as a hostile act, as it was not done out of lack of respect for the existing government.

13. General Vadora replied that he understood the practice and that indeed he had received opponents of the USG. He mentioned that during the Tupamaro period subversive groups had carried a banner inscribed with anti-U.S. slogans. Opposition political parties also criticized the GOU during the same period for coming too much under U.S. influence. Thus, Vadora stated that the GOU must be careful, in the resolution of bilateral issues, not to appear to be selling out to the U.S. Vadora said that he would promise to do all possible without reducing security in his country. He indicated that he hoped for an opening (which he did not specify) that would permit narrowing of the gap between the U.S. and Uruguay. Mr. Christopher replied that while improvements must naturally be carried out by the GOU in its own way, we are hopeful that some specific advances can be made in the near future and that Ambassador Pezzullo will be able to help achieve this important result.

Vance

⁷ See Document 321.

323. Letter From President Carter to Uruguayan President Mendez¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I delayed a response to your message of January 11, 1978 to allow time for informal discussions about your government's offer to host the VIII General Assembly of the Organization of American States.²

I was impressed by the positive tone of your letter and the expressed desire that we work together to restore our traditional close relations. The reason we could not support your invitation was our belief that, if the Inter-American system is to be viable, its member states should effectively comply with the responsibilities of membership of all the organs of the Organization of American States. As Ambassador McGee indicated after the vote on your government's invitation, Uruguay's relations with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission should be normalized before the USG could support such an invitation.³

I believe these events have been valuable in giving us an opportunity to explain our own position and understand the other side's. I was particularly encouraged by your government's action in sending a special delegation here to resolve differences with the Inter-American

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 52, Uruguay. No classification marking.

² In telegram 104 from Montevideo, January 12, the Embassy transmitted Mendez's January 11 letter to the Department. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780018-0324) In a February 8 memorandum to Carter regarding that letter and Uruguay's bid to host the OAS General Assembly, Brzezinski wrote: "Given its poor human rights record and its defiance of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC), State, in consultation with NSC, adopted a strategy of trying to elicit an invitation from Uruguay for the IAHRC by informing them that our vote on their bid was contingent on their commitment to adopt a new relationship with the IAHRC." He continued: "We sought support from other 'like-minded' O.A.S. members, and when Uruguay decided to test our support, they asked for a vote and lost. There are indications that the Uruguayans are beginning to take the human rights situation seriously and could conceivably negotiate a visit by the IAHRC." Carter signed an attached letter to Mendez, but then wrote at the bottom of the February 8 memorandum: "Let's don't send. J" (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 52, Uruguay) A March 2 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter reported that Alvarez and Mendez were "insulted" by the lack of a reply to the January 11 letter, and noted that Pezzullo "is concerned that a failure to reply could be used by the hardline, anti-U.S. elements in the government." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 52, Uruguay)

³ In telegram 25776 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 31, the Department reported on the OAS vote against Uruguay's offer to hold the VIII OASGA in Montevideo and summarized McGee's statement after the vote. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046-1096)

Human Rights Commission.⁴ I hope that the government of Uruguay would be in a position to explore with the Commission the possibility of an acceptable solution to the current impasse.

You will be hearing from us soon about your invitation to me to send a person or group to Uruguay to view the human rights situation.⁵

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁴ In telegram 299 from Montevideo, January 26, the Embassy reported on the GOU's "framework and agenda for negotiations with the IAHRC." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780039-0597) In telegram 24560 to Montevideo, January 31, the Department summarized discussions it held with the Uruguayan special delegation, which was led by Borad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780045-0189)

⁵ Mendez made this offer during the two leaders' bilateral meeting in September 1977. See footnote 5, Document 319.

324. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington, April 15, 1978, 0035Z

96849. Subject: Uruguayan Air Force Chief Meeting With Deputy Secretary Christopher and ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary McNeil. Ref: Montevideo 1171²

1. Uruguayan Air Force CINC, General Raul Bendahan, accompanied by Ambassador Perez Caldas, met on April 10 with Deputy Secretary Christopher for forty-five minutes. ARA Deputy Assistant Secretary McNeil and Uruguayan Desk Officer Graham sat in, and afterwards met for an additional hour with General Bendahan.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780161-0904. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Graham; cleared in ARA/ECA, in draft in ARA, and for information by Schneider and in H, L, and EB; approved by Oxman.

² In telegram 1171 from Montevideo, April 7, Pezzullo recommended that Christopher meet with Bendahan, noting that Bendahan, the new chief of the Uruguayan Air Force, "is one of the key moderates in the military hierarchy and one of the most friendly senior officers to this mission," and was a supporter of Alvarez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780151-0293)

2. General Bendahan, after explaining the purpose of his U.S. visit, thanked Mr. Christopher for the opportunity to exchange ideas, adding that in Uruguay it is the military which must establish policies. Mr. Christopher responded that Bendahan's assistance in arranging the ABA visit³ and maintaining helpful contacts with our Embassy in Montevideo were appreciated. The GOU reception of the ABA mission was a good portent for the future, Christopher added.

3. Mr. Christopher asked the General about human rights developments. Bendahan replied that there have been substantial advances over the last two years in social issues. The country had progressed from a Marxist situation in the schools without wholesale replacement of teachers, and is awaiting the day when a new generation can restore traditional customs. Regarding political issues, he remarked that no government could long exist in the face of serious opposition from the public, and such opposition does not exist in Uruguay.

4. Mr. Christopher also asked Bendahan for his prediction of the future course of political events. The General outlined the plan for an election in 1981, under a new constitution, with the candidates to be approved by the Armed Forces. This program is intended to prepare the country for a return to the traditional fully democratic political process in 1982. Bendahan also offered the prospect in the near term of release or exile of political prisoners.⁴

5. Bendahan next gave the standard version of Uruguayan recent history, but was candid in acknowledging problems. He noted that recent history did not fit the Uruguayan democratic pattern and acknowledged "backsliding" in efforts to keep to a timetable for political reform. He referred to political forces of the left and discredited politicians who do not want to see the GOU succeed in its efforts to move into a new political stage after the national elections. He added that his Government had "good intentions" but recognized that this might not be sufficient—"We are what we are," he said, but with luck they would achieve the desired goal by 1982.

³ The American Bar Association sent a mission to Uruguay April 2–7 and issued recommendations on how the country could improve its human rights image. (Telegram 1182 from Montevideo, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780152-1122)

⁴ In an April 12 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported on his meeting with Bendahan: "Bendahan indicated the new military leadership, which has the ultimate voice in the country's government, will push ahead to restore Uruguay's traditional democracy in 1981–82. He also offered the hope of significant improvements in the nearer term with respect to restoration of due process and releases of political prisoners." Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: "good." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 4/78)

6. The General explained the economic aspects of the political crisis his country has gone through. He said Uruguay must work hard to strengthen its economy and that the ability of the GOU to remove constraints will in part depend upon economic conditions, which will in turn depend in part on U.S. support. General Bendahan predicted a return to traditional democracy in response to questions from Mr. Christopher. The General claimed that the Uruguayan public understands what the GOU is doing. He added that there was no public opposition to the program. "While they may not be cheering, there is enough understanding of what is being done," he added.

7. Mr. Christopher responded that, while the U.S. does not want to write the GOU timetable for reform or prescribe formulas, our relations will be affected by the ability of the GOU to follow the course that the General charted. If developments take place as sketched, we would be encouraged. Christopher added that we are prepared to respond in a favorable way to authentic positive developments. We would not be cool and aloof, but rather would respond in a warm manner to substantial improvements. He added that we wish the GOU good luck in its efforts to liberalize the political process. He thought the ABA statement should be helpful. Although not a blueprint or formula, it is clearly an indication of the direction in which progress would be welcomed.

8. In follow-up meeting, after reiterating our pleasure at the reception given by the GOU to the ABA visit, McNeil noted the ABA aide memoire had dealt with, among other things, political prisoners, including allegations of torture, which continued to give us great concern. Bendahan claimed torture was no longer a serious issue, and that with respect to political prisoners, distinctions had to be made between the majority—who were not political but who had committed serious crimes including murder—and a minority accused of lesser offenses. McNeil remarked that Bendahan had emphasized leftist opposition to the military's plans for a controlled return to Uruguay's traditional fully democratic system, and suggested there were also rightist elements opposed to a return to democracy. Bendahan said that was quite true, and, moreover, the far-right and far-left were really not very different.

9. Ambassador Perez Caldas brought up the subject of the U.S. position in the IFIs regarding loans for Uruguay. He "explained" to General Bendahan that it was Congress which was responsible for U.S. policy and not the Administration. Mr. McNeil responded that this was not accurate. It was true that Congress had established legislation, such as the Harkin Amendment,⁵ to reflect human rights concerns.

⁵ See footnote 8, Document 4.

However, it has been the administration which has interpreted how the sanctions should apply, and the U.S. policy in the IFIs is administration policy.

10. Comment: General Bendahan, though he wandered quite a bit, presented a more hopeful picture of Uruguay than previous visitors, such as Foreign Minister Rovira and the now retired Army Cinc Vadora. He talked about Uruguay's plans for the future, dwelt much less on defending the past, and offered the prospect of a return to the rule of law and democracy. Our impression is that one of his principal missions was to stress the importance of economic development and the U.S. role in helping Uruguay.

Christopher

325. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher¹

Washington, February 9, 1979

Uruguay's Request for Extension of FY 76 FMS Guaranteed Loan Commitment Period

Issue for Decision

Whether to extend the commitment period of Uruguay's FY 76 FMS guaranteed loan agreement until September 30, 1979.

Essential Factors

Uruguay signed an FY 1976 FMS guaranteed Federal Financing Bank (FFB) loan agreement for \$2.5 million on September 29, 1976, but we have never authorized any use of the loan because of the continuing unsatisfactory human rights environment in Uruguay. On September

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, HA Subject/Country Files, 1980, Lot 82D177, Box 20, Uruguay. Confidential. Sent through Benson. Drafted by Titus on February 7. Cleared by Jones, L. Watson (ACDA/WEC/ATE), William Marsh (T), T. Boreak (L/PM), and Howard McElroy (PM/SAS), in substance by T. Brown (ARA/ECA), and in draft by Steven Cohen (HA/HR), Jenonne Walker (S/P), and Richard Feinberg (S/P). Titus initialed for all the clearing officials except for Jones.

30 the two-year period allotted for commitments against the loan expired; the period must therefore be extended if we wish to keep the loan available as a means of responding to potential improvements in the Uruguayan Government's human rights performance. Authorization of an extension of the commitment period would not constitute, nor would it entail, the issuance of a new FMS loan guaranty.

No funds remain from earlier FMS loan agreements with Uruguay and we have signed no new FMS loan agreements since Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1977 (the "Koch Amendment") forbade the extension during FY 1977 of FMS financing, grant training or grant materiel assistance to Uruguay. No such provision is currently applicable, and in any case there is no legislative bar to Uruguay's use of funds from FMS loans approved before the "Koch Amendment" took effect. Nevertheless, we have not, as a matter of policy, approved any use of FMS loan funds available to Uruguay since the signing of the FY 1976 loan agreement.

ARA, Embassy Montevideo and PM Position

ARA, PM and Ambassador Pezzullo believe extension of the commitment period to September 30, 1979 is essential and should be approved.² Normally, we routinely approve participating countries' requests for extension of the commitment period on their FMS guaranteed loans; that is, the time during which the loan funds remain available for commitment against specific, approved FMS or commercial purchases of defense articles or services. Refusal to do so in this case would signal a change of policy to one of greater harshness toward Uruguay precisely when limited but important improvements have been taking place in human rights there. Our Embassy reports that there have been structural and procedural improvements in the conduct of Uruguayan security forces and in the functioning of the military justice system, together with a growing number of prisoner releases (well over 500 in 1978) and a marked decline in new detentions. Treatment of detainees, although still harsh, has improved markedly (see attached cables).³

² In telegram 4365 from Montevideo, December 20, 1978, Pezzullo noted that approving the loan extension "is a low-cost and potentially high-benefit move from the USG point of view. In keeping with our basic human rights policy, we would be offering an inducement to the GOU to make improvements in human rights." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-0791)

³ Cables are not attached. In telegram 4101 from Montevideo, November 29, 1978, the Embassy reported: "Recent political arrests, coming after a long downward trend in such detentions, contrast with overall progress in the area of integrity-of-the-person. Although arrests represent a backward step, the positive trend noted previously is still dominant." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492-0547)

Refusal of the extension would weaken the efforts of Uruguayan moderates to promote further liberalization and would strengthen the resistance of hardliners to such changes. It would also seriously undercut ongoing efforts by our Ambassador to encourage the Government of Uruguay to make further improvements in the human rights situation which would be sufficient to reduce U.S. disapproval of that Government's practices. Our policy would become, even more than now, virtually all "stick" and no "carrot". Furthermore, with recent budget restrictions there is practically no chance of FMS guaranteed loans in future years. The Ambassador also doubts, from his perspective and experience, that extension would elicit spontaneous criticism from Members of Congress, as is feared by some.

If this sign of openness on our part were to bring improvements in human rights performance, we would consider authorizing use of the loan to purchase non-combat equipment such as road grading machinery, equipment for the new wing of the military hospital, military surplus locomotives, etc. In no event would we authorize actual use of the loan to finance purchases of defense articles or services until the GOU took some major initiative in improving human rights. Further, we would only authorize such use after consulting HA and other interested bureaus and agencies.

HA Position

The human rights record of Uruguay continues to be very poor and has shown no significant improvement during the past year. The military government still holds 1700 acknowledged political prisoners, a significant figure for this small country.

We continue to receive reports of arbitrary arrest, torture, and disappearances. In November, government agents kidnapped four Uruguayan citizens living in Brazil and forced them to return to Uruguay.

Because of this record, we have opposed IFI loans to Uruguay, eliminated all new FMS financing and IMET programs since 1977, and refused to approve arms transfers except for minor spare parts.

If we were to approve extension, we could permit an actual draw-down only if there were substantial progress. However, extension would be for only eight months, and we have no evidence that there is any reasonable chance of such a marked reversal in GOU behavior during this period.⁴

There is a further problem. Even if there is substantial progress, we should move first on the economic side, not the military. This is

⁴ An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph.

particularly so, because it is the military that is responsible for the very serious continuing violations of human rights in Uruguay.

We understand ARA's desire to send a positive, low-cost signal to Uruguay. But we believe any extension would have to be accompanied by two explanatory statements to avoid creating false expectations: (1) that an actual drawdown could be approved only if substantial improvements were to occur; and (2) even if they did, we would prefer to move on the IFI side first and only defer use of FMS credits to a later stage after additional improvements. But would not such explanations effectively vitiate the desired positive effect of extension?

All things considered, HA and S/P believe that extension would be a mistake in policy and diplomatic terms. The only positive signal that makes sense is to say that we are prepared to consider steps in the economic area, such as EXIM, OPIC, and changes in our IFI votes if substantial progress occurs.

Recommendation:

That you authorize PM to request Treasury to extend the commitment period of the Uruguayan FY 76 loan to September 30, 1979.⁵

Attachment

Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Spiegel) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb)⁶

Washington, February 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Extension of Uruguay FMS Credit

Mr. Christopher has approved the recommendation in the attached action memorandum,⁷ with the following conditions:

⁵ Christopher checked and initialed the approve option on February 24 and wrote: "with conditions indicated on attached memorandum."

⁶ No classification marking. Sent through Perry. Copies were sent to Benson and Keiswetter.

⁷ A reference to Document 325.

(1) The credit should be extended on the understanding that (a) an actual drawdown would be permitted only if significant progress does, in fact, occur; and (b) we would prefer to move first on the economic side, e.g., by changing our vote in the IFIs, before moving ahead with security assistance.

(2) The decision to extend should be accompanied by a cable to the Ambassador, informing him of both these points, asking him to communicate the first to appropriate authorities, and leaving it to his discretion whether to communicate the second in order to avoid creating false expectations.⁸

⁸ Telegram 50014 to Montevideo, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790094-0238)

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington, October 6, 1979, 1215Z

262389. Subject: Foreign Minister's Meeting With the Deputy Secretary

1. (C—Entire Text).

2. The Deputy Secretary met with Uruguayan Foreign Minister Folle Martinez during the afternoon of October 4. Also present were Carlos Giambruno, Uruguayan Director of Political Affairs, and the Uruguayan Ambassador to the US Perez Caldas. On the US side the meeting was attended by Ambassador Lyle Lane, DAS Samuel Eaton, Claus Ruser, Director of ARA/ECA and Timothy Brown, OIC, Uruguay. Topics discussed included UNGA, Cuba and President Carter's recent address to the nation, Nicaragua, human rights in Uruguay, trade, and Paraguay.

3. In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary, Foreign Minister Folle responded that Uruguay will support the Colombian candidacy for the Security Council, as will most other hemispheric delegations, excepting a select few from the Caribbean and Central

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790458-1018. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Brown; cleared by Ruser, Eaton, and in D; approved by Eaton.

America. They expect Cuba to take the issue to the General Assembly, thus dividing the LA position for the first time. They cannot anticipate how it will come out there.

4. On President Carter's speech, the Foreign Minister contrasted it with that of Cuban Premier Castro,² and underlined the serious concern his own government has with the presence of Soviet troops in the Caribbean. The Deputy Secretary underlined President Carter's commitment to come to the aid of any country in the hemisphere which feels threatened by either Soviet or Cuban activities. The Foreign Minister responded that, after the speech of Comandante Ortega of Nicaragua, there seems to be little reason for optimism even though he had heard that the original was even stronger and had been toned down at the suggestion of the Costa Rican and Panamanian delegations. The Minister had also spoken with his Guatemalan and Honduran colleagues, and both were very worried.

5. The Deputy Secretary mentioned that we were pleased with progress being made in Uruguay on reducing detentions and new arrests, and asked how the new constitution will work. Folle responded that, since his 1978 visit,³ normalization has proceeded on schedule. A new constitution is going forward, as developed under military established guidelines. All the Ministers have now commented on the draft, which will now go to the Council of State and, subsequently, be submitted to a plebiscite. The intention is to establish a presidential system modeled on the present French Constitution. A draft political parties statute is also being written, and both will come into force before general elections scheduled for November of 1981.

6. The Deputy Secretary then asked whether habeas corpus exists in Uruguay. The Minister responded in the affirmative but conceded that it is suspended under current abnormal emergency security measures. It will be reestablished under the Constitution. In response to a further question the Minister then noted that the GOU had recently invited members of the Diplomatic Corps to visit the two main prisons, and individual prisoners, and that this had proven successful.⁴ An

² Carter's October 1 speech addressed the Soviet military presence in Cuba. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 1802-1806) The speech is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 129. On October 3, Castro addressed the UNGA. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, footnote 3, Document 80.

³ Folle met with Christopher on October 3 and Vaky on October 4, 1978. (Telegram 255684 to Montevideo, October 7, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780411-0794) (Telegram 255509 to Montevideo, October 7, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780410-0152)

⁴ Along with the chiefs of 26 other diplomatic missions, Cheek visited two Uruguayan prisons and met with six prisoners on August 30 and 31. (Telegram 3287 from Montevideo, September 7, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790411-0583)

agreement was also signed today (October 4) with the Red Cross to renew prisoner visits.⁵

7. There was then a discussion of trade and economic problems. Folle expressed pessimism for Uruguay and Latin America, particularly after Unctad V., and noted the problem trade barriers cause for Uruguayan exports, especially leather goods, meat and textiles to the EC Nine. Hopefully similar problems with the US over CVDS have been resolved. The Uruguayan economy was described by the Minister as fairly strong and he noted that Uruguay has an excellent international credit rating. However, oil prices are causing serious problems as Uruguay must import all it consumes. Experiments are underway with gasohol and the use of peat deposits, and hydroelectric energy is being developed. The Deputy Secretary agreed that petroleum prices are seriously distorting trade, and are negatively affecting most nations including the US. The Minister noted that, thankfully, Uruguay has at least been able to assure supplies through 1980, from Nigeria, Iraq, and Venezuela.

8. The Deputy Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister for calling and expressed his appreciation for their relaxed exchange of views. He then invited Folle to raise any topics that might be of special concern to him. The Minister responded that he, and his colleagues from Argentina and Chile, were especially concerned with prospects that the Nicaraguan example could infect Paraguay with terrorism. He said this was a general worry of those in the Southern Cone. The Deputy Secretary agreed that some aspects of the Nicaraguan situation are worrisome, but noted that special circumstances produced the upheaval in that country and pointed out that we are trying to encourage a moderate evolution of the current situation.

Vance

⁵ In telegram 3734 from Montevideo, October 10, the Embassy noted that it was "surprised" at this statement. After checking with Uruguayan officials, the Embassy reported that an ICRC official was in Geneva where he was "clearing proposed final agreement with ICRC headquarters," and that the GOU "assumed that contacts would be resumed within a week to 10 days." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790466-1145) The ICRC and the GOU severed relations in early 1976. (Telegram 1486 from Montevideo, May 5, 1978; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780192-0714)

327. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 7, 1980, 3-3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S.-Uruguayan Relations; Political Situation In South America (C)

PARTICIPANTS

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Thomas P. Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council

Lt. Gen. Luis Queirolo, Uruguayan Army Chief

Areco Jorge Pacheco,² Uruguayan Ambassador to the United States

David Aaron opened by noting that we were pleased with the release of prisoners and the establishment of a political timetable and hoped that movement would continue so that US-Uruguayan relations could be further strengthened.³ He then asked several questions about the political situation in Uruguay. *General Queirolo* responded with a general description of the timetable for political normalization, the state of the parties, the dangers of reinstating the Frente Amplio, and the need for new political figures to come to the fore.⁴ (*Queirolo* amended this to say that some of the old figures might return; Pacheco's expression remained pained. Pacheco was silent throughout the meeting.) (C)

The conversation then turned to the Soviet role in Brazil and Argentina. *Queirolo* observed (speaking personally) that the main issue was Chile vs. Argentina with the former turning to China and the latter to the USSR. Brazil was trying to draw closer to⁵ Argentina but its concerns were totally different, directed among other things to Africa, where

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 52, Uruguay. Confidential. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country Files, Box 97, Uruguay, 1/78-9/80) The meeting took place in Aaron's office. Copies were to be sent to Aaron, Pastor, Eaton, Davis, Kramer, and Embassy Montevideo, but Aaron crossed out all names for distribution other than his own and wrote "NO" next to them. A draft of this document was forwarded to Aaron under a July 8 covering memorandum from Thornton.

² Jorge Pacheco Areco.

³ In a July 3 memo to Aaron, Thornton noted, "There are still about 1,300 such prisoners." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 78, Uruguay, 1/77-1/81)

⁴ In his July 8 meeting with Christopher, Queirolo described the Uruguayan plan for a new constitution and elections in more detail, and Christopher "said this sounded like a good plan." (Telegram 182912 to Montevideo, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800333-0408)

⁵ Aaron crossed out the phrase "draw closer to" and wrote in "balance" in the right-hand margin. In a July 8 memorandum to Aaron, Thornton wrote, "Take a particular look at the line on Brazilian aspirations. That rather slipped by me and you may have understood better than I what he meant." See footnote 1.

Brazil hoped to pick up Portugal's mantle. *Queirolo* emphasized his concern about the Beagle Channel dispute, asserting that it could open a chain reaction of border issues (Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Brazil's interest in the Pacific).⁶ It would give the Soviets a means of diverting attention away from Iran/Afghanistan and would affect Uruguay. Specifically, Uruguay has been an element of balance between Brazil and Argentina but because of its location could end up being a base of operations for "some countries." (C)

Mr. Aaron responded that we had tended not to take such an alarmist view of the Beagle Channel dispute and have tried to be not involved. Perhaps we should be giving it more attention. (C)

General Queirolo returned to the subject of Uruguayan politics. He told Aaron that the political transformation would be done and it would be done well. The U.S. could be most helpful by leaving Uruguay alone. *Aaron* responded that he understood and the U.S. would "try to stay off your back." The U.S. has confidence and is impressed by what General *Queirolo* and other leaders have accomplished in Uruguay. *Queirolo* concluded the discussion by saying that, despite some bilateral problems, Uruguay is proud of its friendship with the U.S. It has nowhere to turn but to its membership in the Western world and looks to the U.S. to exercise leadership. (C)

⁶ For border disputes including the Beagle Channel issue, see the Regional chapter.

328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington October 5, 1980, 2040Z

266933. Subject: Christopher/Folle Meeting October 1

1. Confidential (entire text).

2. Summary: Deputy Secretary Christopher urged full public debate and wide participation as Uruguay moves back to democratic government. He expressed hope that prisoner releases would continue. With

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800476-0989. Confidential. Sent for information to Asuncion and La Paz. Drafted by Service; cleared by Dworkin and Bremer; approved by Bushnell.

recent incident and reports in mind, Christopher got from Foreign Minister Folle an acknowledgement that contacts of USG officials with opposition elements are normal and proper.² Folle, while not disagreeing with our assessment of events in Bolivia, voiced fear that nonrecognition of new regime would push it "in another direction".³ Other topics included Paraguay, Mexico, Central America and Uruguay's oil dependence. End summary.

3. Deputy Secretary Christopher met with Foreign Minister Folle for 30 minutes October 1. Others present were Ambassador Pacheco, Foreign Ministry Official Jorge Posadas, DAS Bushnell, Dworkin, Service, and interpreter.

4. Internal political evolution. Folle said plans for constitutional plebiscite this November and elections a year later are progressing well, that there is already a lively and extensive debate and that GOU leaders have been meeting with a wide range of interest groups. Work is proceeding on the new statute for political parties. After first saying that the proscriptions might be lifted on all politicians, he added the caveat "except for those involved in sedition and recent events." He did not elaborate. Christopher expressed the hope that GOU policies would permit the widest possible political participation. He said he was pleased at the assurances about the GOU's commitment to democracy. Christopher recalled his recent meeting with General Queirolo and said he had been impressed with his sincerity and democratic conviction.⁴

5. Releases of prisoners. Christopher raised this issue noting there has been some progress and urging more. Folle began with the standard denial that there are any political prisoners. There are instead 1,273 subversives of which 93 percent have been or are in trial process. Last year at this time there were 2,500 prisoners.

6. USG contacts with the opposition. Christopher expressed concern that some members of the Uruguayan Government may not understand that diplomatic contact with representatives of the opposition is a normal and necessary function. It should not be viewed as a negative

² In telegram 3510 from Montevideo, September 18, the Embassy reported on allegations within the Uruguayan military "that the U.S. embassy in Montevideo is playing an active role with proscribed politicians in coordinating opposition to the November constitutional plebiscite and to the military's political cronograma." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1971) In telegram 258491 to Montevideo, September 27, the Department advised that the Embassy position "should be that it is considered normal diplomatic practice for an embassy to maintain contact with all democratic political parties. Such contacts are for purposes of information gathering only and should not repeat not be seen as being for any negative purposes." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1969)

³ See Documents 156-159.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 327.

gesture toward those in power. Folle recalled there had been a recent problem (the Eaton visit) with a meeting involving a proscribed politician.⁵ Folle agreed that there should be no problem, that proscription is one thing, diplomatic contact another. Bushnell expressed satisfaction that all present at the meeting were in agreement on this point but suggested that other leaders in Uruguay, perhaps the military, did not understand diplomatic practices as well. It would be helpful if Folle could make the point to other members of the GOU. Folle acknowledged that there sometimes are misunderstandings in this regard.

7. Bolivia. Christopher told Folle that his Government, like ours, should be concerned by the violence and repression and by the overthrow of democratic processes in Bolivia. Folle agreed but expressed concern that the current isolation of the Garcia Meza Regime, coupled with the serious economic situation, might drive it in “another direction.” Christopher reiterated that it would be very difficult for the U.S. to recognize or support the GOB under present circumstances.

8. Other topics. On Paraguay, Folle sees the Somoza assassination as an isolated incident.⁶ Christopher offered the thought that the present political trend in Paraguay is not positive—in contrast to the situation in Uruguay. Folle expressed concern about what he viewed as a leftist trend in Mexico and Mexican relations with Cuba. He was also interested to learn how we view the current situation in Nicaragua. The Deputy Secretary and Bushnell were positive with regard to Mexico and cautiously optimistic regarding developments in Central America. At the beginning of the meeting there had been a brief discussion of the current UNGA session and events in the Middle East. Folle noted that Uruguay received a substantial part of its oil supply from Iraq (Venezuela is the other major supplier) and that its current stocks are good for only 90 days.

Muskie

⁵ In telegram 3510 from Montevideo, September 18, the Embassy noted that the military’s allegations “helps to explain the strong GOU sensitivities re DAS Eaton’s luncheon last week with the political party leaders.” See footnote 2 above. On September 9, Eaton held a luncheon with seven opposition politicians, six of them “proscribed” from political activity by the military. A dinner the previous evening was boycotted by seven flag-rank officers, and the Embassy noted that “the generals reportedly reacted to the luncheon as a symbol of further ‘U.S. interference in Uruguay’s internal affairs.’” (Telegram 3484 from Montevideo, September 17, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800443-0798)

⁶ See Document 297.

329. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Uruguay¹

Washington, October 8, 1980, 0210Z

268706. Subject: Bowdler/Folle Meeting October 3: USG Contacts With Opposition. Ref: Montevideo 3510²

1. Confidential Entire text.

2. During October 3 meeting reported septel,³ Ambassador Bowdler raised issue of Embassy contacts with political figures, saying they are normal and not intended as any interference. Foreign Minister Folle, referring indirectly to Eaton's luncheon meeting with Christian Democratic leader Terra,⁴ said that this individual was of the extreme left, had provided an electoral umbrella for other extremists in the formation of the Frente Amplio, and thus contacts at a meal with him were very sensitive. He implied that another type of meeting might not be. The Foreign Minister mentioned the situation of an Embassy Officer and how he tried to calm the situation that developed over contacts of this Officer with opposition politicians. He said, however, that there was one specific charge that General Queirolo had asked him to raise. It was that Embassy Political Officer Youle was promoting the idea of a governing triumvirate. Clearly, this type of activity was unacceptable. Mr. Eaton said that he had heard this report and was certain that the charges against the Officer were baseless. That he would promote a triumvirate made no sense. It was not U.S. policy and he was sure he had not done that. However, now that the Foreign Minister had specifically raised the matter, he would check once again and would confirm to him what he was sure was the case.

3. Action: Department would appreciate Embassy's latest thinking on the origins of the Youle/triumvirate complot story, and any further

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1967. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House. Drafted by Andre; cleared by Eaton, Service, and in S/S; approved by Bowdler.

² See footnotes 2 and 5, Document 328.

³ In telegram 269211 to Montevideo, October 8, the Department reported that Bowdler and Folle discussed Uruguay's petroleum needs, Central America, Bolivia, the OAS, Argentina, and Uruguayan elections. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800481-0813)

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 328.

indications of its hold on the minds of top leaders.⁵ Our present plan is that DAS Eaton would then go back to Pacheco here while chargé makes similar denial demarche to Folle.⁶

Muskie

⁵ In telegram 3814 from Montevideo, October 9, the Embassy assessed the idea of a governing triumvirate in Uruguay, noting that “with Uruguay’s history of collegial government, it is not considered a far-fetched notion here,” although “no one in this Embassy has ever made such a proposal (including Poloff Youle).” The Embassy judged that “the underlying motives of the current triumvirate complot story appear to lie not in the concept but in the GOU’s hypersensitivity to our contacts with proscribed politicians, where Youle’s political responsibilities have caused him to play a leading role.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1954)

⁶ In telegram 270987 to Montevideo, October 11, the Department noted that Eaton had met with Pacheco the previous day and “made clear and unequivocal statement to him that neither John Youle nor any other person at our Embassy had proposed or supported the idea of a triumvirate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031–1952) In telegram 3898 from Montevideo, October 16, the Embassy reported that Shaw had met with Folle on October 16 to deliver the same message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031-1949)

330. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA-M-80-10507

Washington, November 26, 1980

Uruguay: The Constitutional Plebiscite

Summary

The Uruguayan military’s effort to broaden political participation will be tested on 30 November when a draft constitution is submitted to a popular referendum. The outcome of the vote is very much in doubt and the results may be difficult to interpret.

The plebiscite is a major milestone on the military’s way to returning Uruguay to democracy. The ruling military council began the proc-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 85T00287R, Box 1, Folder 269. Confidential. [*Less than 1 line not declassified*] coordinated with the NIO for Latin America [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

ess late in 1979 when it published draft constitutional guidelines.² Last July, senior military officers attempted to increase interest in the plebiscite by allowing the two traditional parties—the Blancos and the Colorados—to renew limited political activity after a seven-year government-imposed proscription.

The plebiscite has acquired an importance for the highly politicized Uruguayans beyond the immediate issue of the constitution itself. The voters may use the plebiscite to express their opinion of the last seven years of military rule. The results may be hard to interpret, however. Some critics of the regime may reluctantly vote yes to get on with the gradual liberalization of the political process. Other opponents, concerned that the constitution will legitimize and perpetuate the status quo, may vote no. Although most of the military is pushing for a favorable vote, some strong supporters of the military, fearing any change, may also vote no.

Military and Political Views

After an inept start, the military is now using the media with some skill to get its message across. Some senior officers have publicly warned that a negative vote would mean an indefinite postponement of the political opening. A minority in the military, however, reportedly favors a no vote in the hope of prolonging military rule.

Both of the traditional political parties are divided.³ Because of Uruguay's strong political traditions, the parties still command voter respect—even after the seven years of inactivity and the proscription of most of their leaders. Their failure to speak out strongly in favor of the constitution is no doubt distressing to the military.

One large but fragmented faction of the Blanco Party has expressed lukewarm support for the constitution. A segment of the Colorado Party, led by former President Pacheco, also supports it. Many of his followers, however, have broken ranks and Pacheco's influence on the issue appears to have been undercut. Moreover, significant segments of both parties, backed by influential media groups and some labor groups, are joining forces in urging a no vote, reportedly with some success.

Deciding Factors

Uruguayans probably would welcome a return to democracy, although polls taken in late October and early November are contradic-

² In Airgram A-14 from Montevideo, May 28, the Embassy analyzed the guidelines published by the GOU for drafting the new constitution. (National Archives, RG 59, HA Subject/Country Files, 1980, Lot 82D177, Uruguay)

³ The National Party, often called the Blancos, and the Colorado Party.

tory. One poll showed a large margin in favor while others indicated a majority against. All have reported up to 50 percent of the electorate undecided.

One deciding factor may be the public perception of which side is waging the most effective campaign. The opposition, at a disadvantage in both organization and public exposure, is giving the government a run for its money late in the campaign. The government in fact has permitted an unusually high degree of debate and political activity in the last days before the referendum.

Perhaps the single factor most likely to produce a negative vote is the government's last minute decision to insert in the constitution a provision calling for a single presidential candidate—to be selected by the armed forces and the two major political parties—who would serve for a five-year term beginning in 1981. Most Uruguayans expected that there would be only one candidate for the term beginning in 1981, but formalizing this arrangement has produced an adverse public reaction. Added to the internal divisions over the constitution within the military and the political parties, as well as the increased media coverage of the opposition, this provision may cause voters to reject the draft constitution as a whole.

The Results

The carefully controlled expansion of political activity is likely to continue if the constitution is approved. In this event, retired General Gregorio Alvarez, who is widely viewed as the architect of the constitution and as a leading advocate of a gradual return to civilian rule, probably will be the presidential candidate.

The outlook is not so clear-cut should the constitution be rejected. The power of Alvarez and his military supporters almost certainly would wane, perhaps to the advantage of his arch-rival, Army Commander Queirolo, who could then more easily consolidate his power within the military. The military might nominate one of their own to head the government, replacing the elderly civilian now in office.

On the other hand, the military might interpret a negative vote to mean that the people want to retain the present governmental structure. In this case it might be content to continue the present governing arrangement essentially unchanged, although with some reshuffling of personnel.

The Constitution

The constitution up for approval on Sunday makes the executive the dominant branch of government in all policy areas and institutionalizes the military's role in the government. In the national security sphere—defense, foreign policy, and basic economic and social deci-

sions—the executive and the military retain sole authority. The constitution also legitimizes the military-dominated National Security Council presided over by the president in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The president and vice president are to be elected by a simple majority for a single five-year term. The president will have sweeping powers to preserve order and internal security, and to defend the nation against external aggression. He may appoint and remove executive branch personnel. He is responsible, with the advice of the National Security Council for directing foreign policy. He may veto draft legislation, and he prepares the national budget.

The constitution guarantees an impressive range of rights to protect individuals and groups from the arbitrary power of the state, but it gives the executive such sweeping qualifying powers that it is likely to cast a chill over Uruguayan politics indefinitely. For example, it permits the executive and the National Security Council to suspend individual rights in certain circumstances for 30 or 60 days, or indefinitely in time of war. Congress may reject these measures by a two-thirds vote, but only if it acts within specified time limits. Individuals belonging to organizations espousing violence may have their personal and political rights suspended permanently.

The legitimacy of all democratically organized political parties that can demonstrate even minimal appeal is recognized. Although this is not likely to affect the nature of the political parties in the near term, it could eventually lead to a proliferation of parties.

The constitution establishes a bicameral legislature—House and Senate—whose members are elected or reelected every five years. The party receiving a plurality is guaranteed at least a slim majority in both houses. The legislature may decrease or modify the national budgets, impose taxes, interpret the constitution in accordance with supreme court rulings, enact laws, establish tribunals and administer justice, declare war, and ratify treaties.

The power of the legislature to pass laws is qualified by the executive in two ways. The president may propose legislation under a special provision that states such bills will become law unless the legislature acts within 45 days. Further, the executive may veto or amend a bill. The Congress must then muster a two-thirds vote within 60 days to override the executive.

The constitution provides for a judiciary system headed by a supreme court whose five judges serve for 10 years. Supreme court judges will be nominated by the executive and approved by the Congress. The supreme court appoints appellate and lower court judges with the approval of the Senate and of the executive, respectively. In effect, however, the supreme court's ability to affect national policy is

restricted because the constitution gives it no power over either the executive or the military.

The constitution also establishes an entirely new political body, the Political Control Tribunal. It will be responsible for political trials, for suspending legislators, and for impeachment cases; it also may restore the political rights of proscribed politicians. Its nine members are to be nominated by the president and approved by the legislature.

The practical effect of this constitutional innovation is unclear and probably will depend on the willingness of tribunal members to exercise their unique authority to resolve major disagreements between the executive and the legislature through a vote of censure or a no confidence procedure. They theoretically will be able to force dissident majority legislators to resign, and they could bring the president down either directly or by calling for a special referendum.

331. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, December 1, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Uruguay]

7. *Uruguay*. In a defeat for the military regime, Uruguay's voters have rejected the draft constitution by a large margin. Sunday's² vote probably reflects the unpopularity of the military as well as public concern over its plans under the proposed constitution to retain a decisive role in future governments. What the government will do now is unclear. While some hardliners may seek to delay political transition indefinitely, the vote may encourage those democratic moderates who would accelerate the transition process. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Uruguay]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 24, Evening Reports (State), 12/80. Secret. In the top right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote "Chris" and initialed the memorandum. Christopher was acting for Muskie, who was in Mexico City reviewing the work of the U.S.-Mexico Consultative Mechanism.

² November 30.

Venezuela

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, February 23, 1977, 0000Z

39828. Subject: President Carter's Letter to President Perez

1. Deliver following letter from President Carter directly to President Perez as early as possible.

2. Begin quote: Dear Mr. President: I have seen your statement rejecting and condemning press reports alleging that you have received payments from the Central Intelligence Agency.² These allegations against you have distressed me deeply.

I want to express to you my personal regret and that of my Government for any embarrassment that these press stories may have caused you, your Government, or the people of Venezuela. As you know, I have no control over the news media in our country, and I cannot prevent these groundless assertions about you. You can appreciate the concern they have caused this administration which has dedicated itself to forging stronger ties with those nations in the world today that share our democratic values.

You, Mr. President, an independent and vigorous defender of Venezuela's interests, of the nations of Latin America, of OPEC and of the Third World, are one of the most respected and formidable leaders in the world today. That you were freely elected and that you govern an open society adds enormously to our respect for you and your Government.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770061-1264. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Jacobini from text received from the White House; cleared in S/S; approved by Luers.

² On February 19, the *New York Times* reported that "cash payments had been made" to a number of foreign leaders, including Perez "when he was Interior Minister of Venezuela." (David Binder, "More Heads of State are Reported to Have Received C.I.A. Payments," *New York Times*, February 19, 1977, p. 9) In a February 21 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski wrote: "President Perez issued an extraordinarily tough statement claiming that the allegations could only be part of a U.S. Government plot to attack him because of his defense of Venezuela's natural resources and his posture in OPEC and in the North-South dialogue. He said that he doesn't see how such information could have been released without the knowledge of high officials in the U.S. Government, and he has asked our Ambassador to request from you some kind of a clarifying statement denying Perez was a CIA agent and expressing confidence in him." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 2/77-5/78)

I hope and trust that these malicious stories—which should not even be dignified by direct comment—will not cast a shadow over the important future that we will share.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter End quote.

3. State Department has no plans to release text of letter but has no objection if GOV wishes to do so.³

Vance

³ In telegram 1883 from Caracas, February 23, Vaky reported that he delivered the letter to Perez on February 22, and that the “text of the message will probably be released publicly by GOV during the day today.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 46, Venezuela, 2-5/77)

333. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance’s Delegation to the Department of State¹

Grenada, June 19, 1977, 1626Z

47. Subj: Secretary’s Bilateral With Venezuelan FonMin Escovar—June 14

1. Participants: US: the Secretary, Under Secretary Habib, Amb Todman, Assist Secretary Carter, Amb McGee, Mrs Van Reigenberg (Interpreter), Mr S Rogers (ARA/ECP) notetaker, Venezuela: Foreign Minister Escovar, Amb Machin, (OAS), Amb Navas.

2. Subjects: human rights; the North/South dialogue; Perez visit to Washington; Panama Canal negotiations.

3. The Minister and the Secretary agreed Mrs Carter’s visit to Caracas went well.² The Secretary said we were looking forward to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14–17 1977, Grenada. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OAS General Assembly.

² Rosalynn Carter traveled to Caracas June 10–12. In telegram 5872 from Caracas, June 11, Pastor reported on Rosalynn Carter’s June 10 conversation with Perez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770209-0897)

President Perez's visit to the US.³ Escovar thought it would be important not only to bilateral but also to US-Latin American relations. The Secretary added the global dimension, particularly if the two presidents issued the statement the Venezuelans had suggested on human rights.

4. In answer to the Secretary's question, Escovar said he thought it would be possible to do something at this meeting on human rights. He referred to the concern in the Southern Cone about terrorism. Venezuela agreed on international measures against terrorism, but the Southern Cone countries tended to simplify the problem and consider that any concession weakened their fight against it.

5. President Carter's policy on human rights. Escovar went on, marked the first time since World War II that the US was expressing a moral policy. Strategically, the west had lost ground in the last 30 years, but he thought the Soviets would have to yield eventually in face of the moral position of the world. Escovar was happy, therefore, that the Secretary had placed the human rights issue in a global context.

6. Ambassador Machin said the US should stand very firm on human rights. With support from others like Venezuela, we might expect results in three or four years. He suggested machinery to make the provisions of the OAS charter binding in some fashion, perhaps as part of the charter reform exercise.

7. Escovar thought a declaration on human rights here would be seen as US interference in internal matters. He would say the next day that, since we are all committed to promoting human rights, this was not intervention. Venezuela agreed that we should not give international credits to violators of human rights. While the Venezuelans were not rigid about it, they suggested that supplying countries not approve arms supplies or loans from the international banks unless and until the human rights commission were stronger and more autonomous. This procedure would offset the belief that the US had too much influence over the decisions of the international banks.

8. Escovar suggested further that, since Nicaragua and the Southern Cone countries were so concerned about terrorism and non-intervention, it might be practical to have a declaration on all three subjects, with human rights first. Another possibility was two declarations. But Venezuela and some others would vote for the terrorism and non-intervention resolution only if the others supported the human rights resolution. Venezuela was in any case prepared to make a strong declaration on human rights.

³ Perez made a state visit to the United States June 28-30, 1977. See Documents 336 and 337.

9. The Secretary said this was very important. He asked whether the Venezuelans thought we could get support for further financial support for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and, the proposition that all countries should be open to visits from the Commission.

10. Escovar said both points were very sensitive, the first almost as much as the second. On the financial matter, he agreed with what the Secretary had said in his intervention about distributing financial costs (i.e. reducing the US share),⁴ but financial contributions were always painful. The proposal for visits was very difficult because it involved sovereignty. People weren't concerned about the Carter Administration but about what some future administration might do. In principle the proposal was acceptable, and Venezuela was open to visits.

11. Escovar asked what the US expected in practical terms. The Secretary said he looked for general support for the importance of human rights commission. If that was not possible, he hoped for clear statements of support from a number of countries and their willingness to open their countries to the Commission. He recognized that we would not accomplish the objective overnight. But if people stood fast in time others would go along. Escovar agreed.

12. Responding to a comment by Escovar, Ambassador Todman said that, although Cuba was suspended from the OAS, it had not withdrawn, so the Organization had the right to conduct investigations concerning Cuba.

13. Escovar said this was an interesting approach. If we could get some Southern Cone countries to accept it, we could use it with Cuba. He suggested using the issue in both directions.

14. In answer to a question from the Secretary, Escovar said the Brazilian position was very important. Despite its African policy, which was not going very well, it was very important for Brazil to have a good relationship in the western hemisphere and with the United States. He thought it would be possible to move Brazil. We should try to get more from them than we think we can get.

⁴ During his First Intervention before the OASGA on June 14, 1977, Vance said: "It is an anachronism for the United States to contribute 66 percent to the assessed budget of the OAS. A balanced and healthy organization requires that no single member should pay more than 49 percent of the assessed budget. A new system of OAS financing should be a part of overall reform. Realignment of quotas could be phased in over a period of time—as much as 5–10 years—to minimize hardship for the membership of the organization itself." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1977, pp. 71–72)

15. The Secretary said Costa Rica, Mexico and he thought most of the Caribbean would be helpful, as well as Colombia. Escovar agreed with respect to the Caribbean and Colombia.

16. The Secretary asked how we should proceed. Escovar said no country could oppose human rights. He discussed the political approach, saying that Pinochet did not believe in political relationships and couldn't understand them. Videla understood better. And Geisel understood quite well. Escovar had quite a good impression of Geisel, with which the Secretary concurred. The Secretary agreed to communicate with Escovar after his meeting with Silveir the next day.⁵

17. Escovar said we needed to do more with Argentina. Chile would be very sensitive to a clear position of the US towards its moving toward democratic processes. Spain was a good example, and Ecuador was too. Latin Americans tended to be perfectionists, wanting to start with a wide open system. Success of the Ecuadorean and especially Spanish examples would show that it was possible to move to democratic systems.

18. The Secretary said the democratic experiment in Spain seemed to have succeeded, despite economic problems. Escovar said the Venezuelans had been helping Spain economically. In answer to Amb Todman's question about the Dominican Republic's role, Escovar said he had very good opinion of Balaguer but that Balaguer was responsive to a variety of pressures including that of Cuban refugees in Santo Domingo.

19. The Secretary asked where the North/South dialogue should go now that CIEC had apparently concluded. Escovar said CIEC's basic problem was that it was too ecumenical. The new international economic order might be given some simple content. He drew a parallel in the negotiating methods with the Lome Agreement.⁶

20. The Secretary agreed that the dialogue must continue. He also agreed that there was much more in the basket than we could hope to deal with in that forum and in the time available. Specific problems might best be handled in different form to see if we could reach agreement or a better understanding. He had real doubts about establishing a pre-existing common fund for raw materials. He recognized there was a fundamental difference of opinion between the North and the South. We would negotiate on seven or specific commodities and then

⁵ For Vance's meeting with Silveira, see Document 166. For Todman's meeting with Perez, see Document 14.

⁶ The Lome Convention was an investment and aid agreement between the European Community and the African, Pacific and Caribbean Countries (ACP) group, signed in Lome, Togo in February 1975.

set about to get funds for the individual agreements, but it was unrealistic to think of a pre-existing fund of \$6 or \$8 billion.

21. Escovar said the Secretary's opinions were very important and very instructive. Though different from theirs. He said, and the Secretary agreed, that the subject should come up during Perez's visit to Washington.

22. The Secretary said he believed, and President Carter agreed, that the US should do more in foreign aid. This would be a substantial problem with Congress. But the President would do what he could. A most difficult problem is the so-called structural changes. He agreed that they would have to come, but only over time. It would take much explaining in the developed countries.

23. Amb McGee noted that members of Congress were either discouraged after years of seeking world cooperation or too new to understand the necessity. The administration felt strongly about pursuing the negotiations with Panama, and it had a Cuban policy, but these tended to lose the support of conservatives. Other actions, based on positions of strength, often lost the liberals, so it became increasingly difficult to pursue programs of economic cooperation and so forth.

24. Amb McGee asked about the apparent conflict between the advice to continue to insist on the principle of human rights but to avoid strengthening the rightists in Argentina or Brazil.

25. Escovar recognized the difficulty but thought it would be possible if we could show those countries real leadership. Already there was a great deal of pressure on them.

26. Machin called it a game between the principles and the tactics. The important thing in Argentina was to support the right forces in the army. In Brazil, other factors were helpful. Especially the resurgence of public opinion favoring a new approach. The government there no longer had unanimous support.

27. The Secretary agreed that the day would be lost unless the US were clear and absolutely firm on the principle. We should never give up on the principle even if we did not have the votes to succeed in this meeting.

28. Escovar reiterated that he thought it was practical to get a declaration. Depending on the drafting, he thought we could get something on the Human Rights Commission, but not on our budgetary objective. He noted that Brazil could not organize a joint meeting against President Carter's human rights policy because Venezuela, Ecuador and others opposed it. He said the US position had never been better in Latin America than it was today.

29. Amb Machin stressed the importance of appropriate tactics. He thought the Uruguayan Foreign Minister's tactic was to try to destroy

the Inter-American Human Rights Commission by claiming that the commission violated the OAS Charter. We must respond by saying we want to strengthen the Commission. He recalled the success of the Venezuelan-Colombian-Jamaican-US resolution on human rights a year ago in Santiago,⁷ because we all stuck to principle.

30. Secretary Vance said he thought we were fairly well agreed on the agenda for the meeting of the two Presidents, including some sort of agreement on energy and technology transfer, north-south, energy as a whole, and of course human rights first. Africa will also be included. Amb Todman added the Caribbean, tension in the Andes and Belize.

31. The Secretary said that the British were prepared to give up on Belize unless there was some by the Guatemalans, to which Escovar agreed.⁸ Escovar suggested economic compensation to Guatemala. Under Secretary Habib said the British were impatient. If forced to they would strengthen the defense forces and declare independence. The present British Government was more willing to compromise, and he had thought that that was true also of the Guatemalan Government. Escovar said he thought Guatemala would compromise if there was some way to save face. He had told Callaghan it was very important that the British not wash their hands of the situation.

33. Habib said now was the time to compromise for Guatemala and the time for the British to give as much as they could. Escovar agreed and said he had said as much to Laugerud. Habib said Price was pressing the British. There were too many factors pushing toward a sudden decision. Escovar said he had talked to Rowlands several times.

34. The Secretary said there had been some progress in the Panama negotiations and success was within our grasp if both sides showed flexibility and good sense. Escovar said Perez had advised moderation on Torrijos. The Secretary said it would be very difficult in the Congressional election year if there were no agreement this year.

35. Ambassador Macin said human rights put the Soviet Union on the defensive for the first time, and the Secretary added that this was also true in the armaments area. Escovar said that the Secretary and Gromyko seemed to have a difference of style. To which the Secretary added that there were some differences of substance also.

McGee

⁷ Presumably a reference to a resolution at the 1976 OASGA in Santiago, Chile, which supported the IAHR report on Chile. (Joanne Omang, "U.S., Chile Disagree on Rights," *Washington Post*, June 16, 1976, p. A23)

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 5.

334. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP-M-77-10162

Washington, June 22, 1977

SUBJECT

Venezuela on the Eve of President Perez' Washington Trip

SUMMARY

President Carlos Andres Perez wants a relationship with the US based on mutual benefit and respect. He comes to the US on 27 June looking for this partnership and for assurances that the Carter administration regards him as an important and dependable ally. He seeks US cooperation and support on global and regional issues important to Venezuela. His desire to portray himself as leader of Latin America and Third World countries and as a vigorous defender of their interests will govern much of what he says and does during his two-day visit. An improved US-Venezuela relationship is unlikely to diminish Caracas' strong support for OPEC because Perez believes that a unified OPEC is necessary to secure Venezuela's economic future.²

[4 sections (81 lines) not declassified]

Expectations for Trip

The Perez visit—the first time a Venezuelan president has visited the White House since 1970³—has become a matter of great, almost obsessive interest among Venezuelan political leaders. This state of mind is characterized by:

—a high level of expectation and intense desire for close association with the Carter administration;

—the “love-hate” ambivalence that normally characterizes Venezuelan relationships with the US; and

—an egocentricity that assumes Venezuela is as important to the US as the US is to Venezuela.

Venezuelan officials hope for a close relationship with the Carter administration because of ideological affinities, the prestige that associ-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00071A, Box 8, Folder 37: Venezuela on the Eve of President Perez' Washington Trip. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by the Latin American Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Economic Research, [1½ lines not declassified].

² [3 lines not declassified]

³ President Rafael Caldera Rodriguez made a state visit to Washington June 2–4, 1970. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972, Documents 665 and 666.

ation can bestow domestically and internationally, and the possibility of securing benefits for Venezuela's development.

The Carter administration's defense of democracy, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation and its attitudes toward Cuba and Panama have all struck responsive chords in Venezuela. Even the US energy policy is seen as complementing Venezuelan views that petroleum is a nonrenewable resource. Venezuelans in general see the new US administration as a refreshing change from past US governments because of its focus on ethics and personal liberties. President Perez believes that for the first time in more than a generation an opportunity exists for Caracas to achieve a really close political partnership with Washington.

These feelings are strengthened by a firm conviction that President Carter's policies buttress Perez' position at home. In response to criticism by some sectors of his Cuban and Middle East positions, Perez can point to the US policies with similar objectives. Nervous about the growing power of Brazil, Perez has applauded the US stand on nuclear nonproliferation. Having argued for reestablishing relations with Cuba and for renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty, Perez sees Washington's moves in these directions as vindicating his view of regional politics.

Perez faces a challenge to his status within the governing Democratic Action Party from the aging father of the Party, former president Betancourt. An issue dividing the two men is the choice of a candidate to carry the party banner in the presidential elections scheduled for December 1978 and the ideological direction that the party will follow for the next five years. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] One of Perez' objectives on the trip will be to demonstrate Washington's approval of his administration and thereby boost his claim to the party leadership.

Perez also perceives his visit as an opportunity to establish relationships beneficial to Venezuelan development. In practical terms, for example, Venezuela needs a close economic relationship with the United States. Nevertheless, Perez will remind US officials that Venezuela supplied petroleum to the US during the Arab boycott and has played a moderating role in OPEC meetings. He will insist upon revision of the 1974 US Trade Reform Act which contains an exclusion provision applicable to all OPEC members. Venezuelan officials believe they have commitments for such a change from officials of the previous administration;⁴ they will regard the Carter administration's fulfillment

⁴ For discussion of the OPEC exclusion from GSP, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, Document 388.

of this pledge as a symbol of US interest in a new relationship with Venezuela.

Economic Considerations

Economic growth is being maintained at about 6 percent under the impetus of an ambitious \$27 billion public investment program. Consumption is being further bolstered by high government expenditures for wages, welfare programs, and subsidies. Soaring imports and extensive price controls nevertheless are holding the lid on inflation again this year, despite some food shortages resulting from last year's poor crop. Venezuela's inflation rate is well below those of most other OPEC countries; the cost of living index increased at an annual rate of about 8 percent, just under the 1974–1976 average.

Caracas thus far is financing much of its investment program with foreign borrowing while attempting to keep its estimated \$8.5 billion foreign reserves intact. The government has already borrowed \$2.3 billion in Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets in the past nine months, and probably hopes to obtain as much as \$1.1 billion more later this year. Even so, Venezuela may well incur a small payments deficit this year comparable to the \$200 million shortfall in 1976. The deficits reflect a reduction in the current account surplus caused by rising imports and net capital outflows generated by foreign aid and compensation payments for the nationalized oil and iron ore industries. Venezuela achieved a \$4.1 billion payments surplus in 1974.

The Nationalized Oil Industry

Since nationalization on January 1, 1976, current oil operations have gone smoothly, in large part because the former owners are helping to run the industry under technical service and marketing contracts. At 2.3 million b/d, oil output is below capacity but slightly above planned conservation levels of 2.2 million b/d. So far this year, exports have not been adversely affected by Venezuela's position on the high side of the OPEC dual price system. Oil sales are handled largely by the former owners, although Petroven, the government oil holding company, is selling 20 percent of oil exports on its own account.

Exploration and development efforts since nationalization have reportedly been a disappointment to President Perez. In the first year of government ownership, investment outlays amounted to \$500 million, less than one-half the planned amount. Exploration efforts remained near the low levels of company drilling in the last year of private ownership, and oil reserves fell 3 percent during the year to 14 billion barrels.

Compensation Problems

Relations with the foreign oil companies are somewhat strained because the government has failed to pay full compensation on sched-

ule. More than one-half the nearly \$1 billion in compensation bonds is still being held by Venezuela in the Guarantee Fund set up to ensure that the companies properly maintained oil facilities prior to nationalization. The funds will not be released until final review of field evaluations of production equipment, pipelines, refineries, and settlement of back tax claims. Asset deductions are estimated to average 25 percent of the deposits in the Fund, but some range as high as 55 percent.

Government claims for back taxes could further reduce final compensation. The Comptroller General has filed a claim against the companies' deposits totaling more than \$500 million, and additional tax claims have been made by the Ministry of Finance. The Comptroller General's claim probably will have to be decided by the Venezuelan Supreme Court. Despite assurances from the Energy Ministry that the claim has little or no legal basis, foreign companies have yet to win a significant tax case before the Supreme Court.

President Perez promises to resolve compensation problems by the end of this year, but further delays are still likely. The Supreme Court probably will not be able to act on the Comptroller's tax claim before the present congressional session ends in July. Since the October–December session is traditionally set aside for the budget, congressional approval for release of the Guarantee Fund is unlikely this year and would be difficult to obtain during next year's presidential campaign.

[Omitted here is one section on the Economic Outlook Through 1980.]

335. Letter From President Carter to Venezuelan President Perez¹

Washington, June 24, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate the warmth and hospitality shown to Rosalynn during her visit to Caracas,² particularly the extensive personal efforts you made, which contributed greatly to the visit's success. The propos-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 2/77-5/78. No classification marking. In telegram 148784, June 25, the Department transmitted the letter to the Embassy in Venezuela. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770228-0402)

² See Document 333, footnote 2.

als and initiatives which arose during your wide-ranging, substantive talks with Rosalynn will provide an excellent basis for our discussions during your State Visit to Washington. I also want to thank you for your gracious letter of June 21.³

Your belief in the dignity of the individual and your support for human rights are well-known and long-held; I was heartened to hear you reaffirm them. I am glad we agree on the wisdom of increasing the funding and autonomy of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. I like your proposal for a separate Joint Communiqué on Human Rights, which mentions our support for the Costa Rican initiative to establish a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁴

Clearly, energy will be another of the main topics of our talks. My advisors and I will be prepared to explore possibilities of cooperation on energy research and development and to examine at length the many issues in this area of mutual concern. Your visit offers the opportunity for our two governments to seek ways to consult informally but frequently on these issues and others.

We may wish to explore further several points you made to Rosalynn. Your proposal for an economic assistance program for the Caribbean involving our two Governments and several others is extremely interesting.⁵ We believe that consultation and coordination among donors, working with the Caribbean Development Bank as well as other international financial institutions, should be carefully and thoroughly explored. Such a coordinated approach could make our assistance far more effective, while also fostering cooperation and economic integration in the area.

I am also eager to discuss your excellent suggestions for closer collaboration on terrorist activities, settling territorial problems, reducing arms expenditures and tension in the Andes, and limiting the spread of nuclear explosives capabilities.

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 5133 from Caracas, May 23, the Embassy communicated the Venezuelan proposal for a joint communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770183-1188) In telegram 126851 to Caracas, June 2, the Department transmitted a "first draft for consideration of post and then Venezuelan Government" of a "proposed joint communiqué on human rights" to be made by Carter and Perez on the occasion of Perez's state visit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770196-0772) For the Costa Rican initiative, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Document 323, and vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations, Documents 344 and 347.

⁵ In telegram 5903 from Caracas, June 13, the Embassy reported that Perez "suggested that Venezuela, the US, Canada, Mexico and Colombia meet urgently to exchange ideas and devise a joint economic development assistance program for the Caribbean." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770210-0765)

I hope that these and other topics of discussion and possible collaboration—such as a new Canal Treaty, and our respective relations with Africa and the Middle East—might be included usefully in a second, broader communique. We have sent you separately a draft proposal for your comment.⁶

Your State Visit provides us, as two friends who share so many common goals and ideals, with an historic moment to collaborate in the many vital areas of global, regional and bilateral affairs.

Rosalynn and I hope that you and Mrs. Perez will find your visit to this country a useful and enjoyable one, and that you will leave the United States with the feelings of warmth and friendship toward our country which Rosalynn brought back upon her return from Venezuela.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁶ In telegram 143414 to Caracas, June 20, the Department transmitted a “draft of joint communiqué on topics other than human rights for Embassy review and tabling with GOV.” The communiqué discussed nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms limitation, the North-South dialogue and international economic cooperation, oil and energy resources, international corporations, terrorism, the environment, technology transfer, and other topics. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770220-0453)

336. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 28, 1977, 11:16 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter's First Meeting with the President of Venezuela During His State Visit

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter Mondale
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence A. Todman
NSC Staff Member Robert A. Pastor (Notetaker)

President Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ramon Escovar Salom
Minister of State for International Economic Affairs Manuel Perez Guerrero
Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons Valentin Hernandez Acosta
Minister of Finance Hector Hurtado Navarro
Minister of Information and Tourism Diego Arria
Permanent Representative to the United Nations Simon Alberto Consalvi Bottaro
Ambassador to the United States Ignacio Iribarren Borges
Ambassador to the OAS Jose Maria Machin

President Carter opened the conversation by saying that since the United States and Venezuela shared so many goals and values, he was looking forward to seeking President Perez's advice on the many bilateral and multilateral issues of concern to the two governments.

President Carlos Andres Perez thanked President Carter for his generosity and said that "what you attribute to me is precisely what you are." He said that because he identified fully with many of President Carter's policies, he felt that coordination of policies would be easy. President Perez said that he would not only try to relate the Venezuelan view of issues, but also the views of Latin America and the entire developing world. He promised President Carter a memorandum on the North-South dialogue. He did not accept CIEC as a failure, but as an important beginning. He suggested that they try to find within the UN the appropriate mechanism to continue the dialogue.

He noted that for the first time the developing countries feel they have some power. But they would prefer to use this new power to

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The discussion of nuclear non-proliferation is also printed as Document 416 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

give an expanded definition to interdependence—a New International Economic System, as Secretary Vance called it—rather than face the industrialized world across the table with hostility. He recognized that the pace of negotiations on the North-South issues would have to be gradual, but he wondered whether the U.S. really understood the need for this kind of results, which developing countries would view as satisfactory.

President Perez said that President Carter's human rights policy has had a great and favorable impact on Latin America. For the first time, military governments speak of themselves as transitory. He thought that a Joint Declaration of Human Rights to be issued at the end of his visit would have a direct impact on Latin America, and he hoped to give it content by specifying his desire to increase the independence and the resources of the Inter-American Commission.² Also mentioned should be the Costa Rican proposal for a UN High Commission and the need to stimulate democratic processes.

President Perez then spoke about some of the important changes which have occurred in Latin America. Peru is headed towards democracy. When Morales Bermudez visited Caracas, he spoke about APRA playing an important role in Peru's political future. In Argentina, as he had said to Mrs. Carter, there is a strong possibility of returning to democracy, but the process is intimately tied to General Videla.³ Events in Argentina will have important implications for the developments in the entire Southern Cone.

President Perez had no recipes for Chile. The political situation has deteriorated, according to reports he has heard from Chilean exiles living in Venezuela. Brazil is a very diverse and complicated country, but he thought that the military was using the nuclear issue for their own purposes. Nevertheless, he thought that they are willing to move—in the long-term if not now—towards a democratic government.

On the issue of nuclear energy, President Perez said that he thought that a *Latin American organization* like OLADE (a Latin American Energy Organization set up by a Venezuelan initiative) or OPANAL (responsible for implementing the Tlatelolco Treaty) *would be one way of approaching the problem of developing nuclear energy*, and he suggested SELA as a possible channel or perhaps as an organization that could manage a

² The Joint Communiqué regarding human rights, issued on July 1, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1, 1977, pp. 153–154.

³ For information concerning Rosalynn Carter's two conversations with Perez, see footnote 2, Document 333 and footnote 5, Document 335. Perez's comments about Videla were made in his June 11 conversation with Escovar, Todman, Pastor, and Vaky. (Telegram 5989 from Caracas, June 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770212-0846)

reprocessing plant. On reprocessing, he said that Brazil was basically using the need for a reprocessing plant as an excuse to obtain a nuclear weapons' capability, which it wanted for reasons of status.

President Perez said that Latin American integration was an important subject, and he had always suspected that the US did not really want Latin American integration. This is never openly expressed, but in 1972, he had gotten this impression as a result of a conversation he had with the Assistant Secretary of State.⁴ President Perez stressed the importance of political stability and economic integration as important ingredients for building democracy in the Hemisphere.

President Perez expressed great concern about the *Caribbean problem*, which in the short-run was quite serious. The problem is that colonialism left small countries with small populations and small economic potential. *A major effort* needs to be made *at regional integration*. He used the examples of the islands of the Dutch Antilles, a few miles away from Venezuela, which want their independence separately. When these islands asked Venezuela for help against Castroism, President Perez told them to ask the US, jesting that the US has much more experience at intervention. More seriously, President Perez warned that if the US does not help the Caribbean, the nations will be taken over by economic mafias or by Cuba.

Jamaica is the key country because of its location and Manley's leadership. Perez was somewhat concerned about Jamaica's excessive preoccupation with Cuba, but he believes that the US policy of rapprochement to Jamaica has changed the situation in Jamaica for the better. President Perez said that he was greatly interested in *developing a comprehensive program for the Caribbean* because a solution to the economic problems of the Caribbean would be the best way to deal with Cuba.

He said that to understand Cuban behavior, one should see it as part of an overall strategy of the USSR, which is clearly willing to pay the price of subsidizing Cuba in order to pursue its goals. Nevertheless, Cuba had built a good educational system which has had a great impact on its youth and thus on the entire country. Venezuela has decided to re-establish diplomatic relations because the Communist structure is permanent as a result of the educational system, and Venezuela's interests are served better with relations than without.

President Perez understood, however, that such a course presents many more problems for the US than for Venezuela. He said that he was aware of President Carter's gestures and decisions to help improve the climate of US-Cuban relations. He expressed the opinion that *diplo-*

⁴ A record of this conversation was not found.

matic relations have helped Venezuela more than Cuba, and he surmised that Cuba would be reluctant to have embassies of countries like Costa Rica, Venezuela and the U.S. in Havana because the democratic presence might present a threat to Castro.

He raised the issue of anti-Castro Cuban terrorism. He said that he did not have proof, but he had good reports that former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by Cubans employed by the Chilean secret police, DINA.⁵ *President Perez suggested that the U.S. and Venezuela cooperate more in the exchange of information on terrorism.*

President Perez referred to the Belize issue as a "menace" which could easily lead to Cuban interference. He himself had made several efforts, including sending the Foreign Minister to Guatemala, but Guatemala wants half of Belize, and that is impossible. He reported that the President of Mexico is willing to cooperate to obtain Belizean independence. President Perez himself *favors a small concession to Guatemala for face-saving purposes.* He is concerned, however, that the Guatemalan army is not fully controlled by the government and may conceivably provoke a war. Perez suggested that *pressure by other countries to force Guatemala to come to an agreement may be necessary.*

In the *Andean* region, he said the problem is Peruvian revanchism. He said that *the only possible solution to the problem is to give Bolivia access to the sea and to begin an economic development program to the border region conditional on the guarantee of acceptance by all major parties of the permanence of the borders.*

President Carter then responded by reaffirming U.S. eagerness to strengthen the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights by giving it more funds and unimpeded access to investigate violations of human rights in all countries. The U.S. is also embarked on a broadening of our definition of human rights to encompass a world program against hunger and for better health. The President said he hoped that efforts to promote human rights would not be confined to two or three nations, but would be more multilateral. The President noted that the American people and Congress are sometimes excessively committed to *punish* countries which violate human rights. His inclination is to recognize and reward countries like Argentina which make progress in this area, while Congress' predisposition is to terminate assistance.

President Carter reiterated his *strong opposition to the creation of nuclear explosives capabilities in the Hemisphere,* and said that Mrs. Carter had made this point with many leaders, but particularly with Brazilian

⁵ For the investigation into Letelier's September 21, 1976, murder, see Documents 209 and 210.

President Geisel.⁶ In addition, we continue to put maximum pressure on Germany and Brazil to try to get their agreement modified. Our general policy will remain that we will continue to provide *nuclear fuel for these countries which do not have reprocessing capabilities*.

The President said that Geisel had claimed his intentions were peaceful, but Mrs. Carter had warned that his successors may not be so peaceful. Speculating on Brazil's motives, the President thought that the capability to produce nuclear weapons probably held a certain status for Brazil and represented greater equality in power.

Nonetheless, Mrs. Carter encouraged Geisel to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into effect. *The US has also asked the Soviets, and if Argentina could ratify it, that would remove Brazil's excuse. The President said that Argentina's apparent desire to build a reprocessing plant caused him some concern.* He had signed Protocol I as an indication of his commitment. He asked *whether Venezuela would use its influence to encourage Argentine's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty.*

The President then said that the US had no objection to *Latin American integration*, which he considered "*a step in the right direction.*" The President said he supported the Andean Pact⁷ and also *wanted to encourage multilateral efforts to help the Caribbean, either through the World Bank or the OAS, or perhaps a new entity.* Prime Minister Manley and President Oduber suggested that Amb. Andrew Young visit the Caribbean soon, and President Carter said it would be useful if Young goes to Caracas since he considers Venezuela *key* to this effort.

The President said that the *US is prepared to provide almost \$60 million to Jamaica this year and next, but that Congress would never approve this amount unless Jamaica reaches an agreement with the IMF first.* Also, the President agreed with Perez that more cooperation among neighboring countries would be needed to help Jamaica, and he was eager to learn from Perez new ideas on how this might be done.

President Carter said that he has tried to re-establish communication with Cuba and had signed two agreements to that effect.⁸ The US also plans to establish Interests Sections and exchange a number of diplomats in order to facilitate communication between the two governments. At this time, however, President Carter said that he doesn't have plans to move any further. Political prisoners and the continued

⁶ See Document 165.

⁷ A trade bloc formed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela joined the Andean Pact in 1973; Chile left it in 1977.

⁸ Presumably a reference to the U.S.-Cuba fisheries agreement, concluded in April, and to the Interests Sections agreement reached in May; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, footnote 4, Document 11 and footnote 6, Document 15.

deployment of Cuban troops in Africa have become major obstacles that need to be resolved before the US can re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba. President Carter agreed with Perez' overall assessment of Cuba, that Communism is permanent there.

Castro never requested diplomatic relations with the US, privately or publicly. His primary interest is to get the embargo terminated, but to the US, the embargo and the other issues are tied together.

On terrorism, the President informed Perez that he directed the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and other investigators to move aggressively to reduce the concentration and the relative freedom of terrorists in Miami. The President was concerned that this small minority was also terrorizing other Cuban-Americans.

On the issue of Belize and Guatemala, he said that a small territorial adjustment might solve the problem, but the US did not intend to redraw the map for these countries. He said that Perez' good offices would be much more appropriate, and we would be prepared to lend our support to his efforts. Perhaps, the two governments could agree to appoint a mediator to arbitrate the dispute.

The President said that *a mediator might also be helpful in the Andean dispute*. Peru's economy was feeling the weight of the arms build-up and would like to reduce its arms expenditures. While not aware of the country which Peru would trust most, President Carter said that *he would be glad to accommodate Venezuela's suggestion, provided the nations involved are in agreement on this.*

President Perez then told of his recent and very frank conversation with a representative from *French President Giscard*. President Perez told him that France was setting a bad example in Latin America in its reluctance to sign the *Tlatelolco Treaty* and its non-proliferation policies, and that *Venezuela supported President Carter's initiatives in this area*. *President Perez said that President Videla of Argentina made a commitment to try to have Argentina subscribe to the Tlatelolco Treaty, but Videla couldn't give Perez complete assurances until he examined the issue with the rest of his government.*

*A major concern of President Perez is the possible US withdrawal from the International Labor Organization and the increasing politicization of the ILO and UNESCO as a result of the Middle East conflict.*⁹ As a small country interested in human rights, Venezuela is very interested in these organizations, and withdrawal by the US would be a serious blow.

⁹ On May 27, the White House issued a statement indicating that a Cabinet-level committee was reviewing the issue of U.S. membership in the ILO. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 1029*)

President Carter explained that the US has been an active member in the ILO, but he is concerned that the Communists and the Arab countries have taken control of it and have increasingly used it for propaganda purposes. The President said that he wanted to stay in the ILO, but he didn't consider the last meeting encouraging. *As the US moves to a final decision in November, he pledged to President Perez that he would take his opinion into consideration.*

In answer to a question by President Carter about the best mechanism to help the Caribbean, *President Perez said the Caribbean Development Bank would be the most appropriate mechanism, not only for purposes of economic integration, but also because it would credibly deflect the criticisms that the US and Venezuela were becoming "neo-imperialists" in the Caribbean.*

Secretary Vance noted that the current Jamaican problem was too large, too short-term, and too urgent to be handled by the Caribbean Development Bank, but President Carter said he did believe the Bank might be a good way to deal with the long-term development problems of the small states of the region.

On Jamaica, the President said that he was prepared to give \$8 million before Jamaica reaches agreement with the IMF, and the balance after the agreement.¹⁰ President Perez suggested that a consortium of representatives from the US, Venezuela, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, and perhaps the UK, could meet informally to discuss the urgent Jamaica issue as well as the long-term approach.

President Carter then closed the meeting by suggesting an outline of the issues they could discuss the next day: Law of the Sea negotiations; Southern Africa; oil supplies; North-South dialogue; illicit payments treaty; Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation; and the OPEC-exclusionary amendment.

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean, footnote 4, Document 180.

337. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 29, 1977, 10:05 a.m.–11:05 a.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter's Second Meeting with the President of Venezuela during his State Visit

PARTICIPANTS

The same as the first meeting.²

President Carter opened the meeting by saying that *he was willing to accept Venezuela's proposal to set up a group of representatives from 30–35 nations, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, as well as industrialized and developing countries, to work within the U.N. on North-South economic issues.*³ President Carter hoped that the US and Venezuela would work closely in this forum to develop proposals, but it was President Carter's preference, in general, not to set up new organizations if one already existed to do the job.

On the Law of the Sea negotiations,⁴ *President Carter said that Congress would never approve a treaty if the free use of the seas was restricted. If the two-hundred mile economic zone were not designated "high seas," thereby permitting free navigation for commerce and navies, then the US could not sign the treaty.*

President Perez responded by saying that Venezuela now has a clearer idea of how the North-South mechanism can be established to continue the dialogue begun in Paris.

On the Law of the Sea conference, Perez said that Venezuela, as the first sponsor of the Conference, felt a deep obligation to see the negotiations conclude. But he was also concerned about the "contradic-

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

² See Document 336.

³ In a June 28 memorandum to Carter, Vance noted that during his lunch meeting with Perez that day, they discussed "what kind of mechanisms should be developed to continue the North-South dialogue. We agreed generally that continued discussions should occur in the context of the United Nations, probably through a committee of about 30 selected by the General Assembly." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports [State], 6/77) A draft memorandum of conversation for the Vance-Perez lunch meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, USOAS Files, 1971-1985, Lot 85D427, OAS—President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela, State visit June 27-30, 1977.

⁴ For more detail regarding the Law of the Sea, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues, which is scheduled for publication.

tions" which separate the industrialized countries, including the USSR, from the developing world. While trying to exterminate colonialism from the earth, the developing countries are now concerned that we may be creating it on the sea.

Perez said that Venezuela opposed the concept of a 200-mile territorial sea because it would increase international problems. He thought that accommodation could be reached on the patrimonial sea provided it was clarified as to how nations will use it. Perez pledged to talk to Ambassador Andres Aguilar about this; otherwise future generations will blame us for not negotiating a good treaty.

President Carter said that he thought that Ambassadors Aguilar and Richardson can work closely on this, "knowing how deeply you and I want a new treaty." A new treaty is of great importance not just because of mineral wealth on the seabed, but because of the danger of aggravating international tensions in the absence of an agreed treaty. He also noted the direct importance of a treaty to Venezuela's commerce in petroleum. Finally, the longer we delay, the more difficult it is to keep US business interests from beginning to explore for minerals. Venezuela, President Carter noted, occupies a crucial position because other nations trust it. He said that he would ask Ambassador Richardson to begin a follow-up program and work closely with Ambassador Aguilar.

President Carter said that he would appreciate if President Perez would provide his good offices to help in concluding a treaty with Panama on the Canal. The major issues have been negotiated, and the US will do its best to conclude the part dealing with economic arrangements as well.

President Perez said that he met with Torrijos before he left, with members of the US Congress the day before, with the Panamanian negotiators the night before, and Ambassadors Linowitz and Bunker for breakfast on June 29.⁵ He impressed upon the Panamanians the importance of reaching agreement because Torrijos does not have a clear idea of how the US constitutional system works.

In answer to President Perez' point about permitting Panama to improve its economy, *President Carter said that the American people could never be persuaded to pay Panama to take the Canal. Again, President Carter told Perez that his good offices in negotiating the treaty would be welcomed by the US.*

President Perez said that it was in the interest of the US to have Panama fully developed by the year 2000 so as to ensure that the Canal will be secure and operated efficiently.

⁵ Bunker and Linowitz briefed Perez on the status of the Panama Canal negotiations earlier that morning. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, Document 55.

President Carter said he understood Panama's point, but if the American people interpreted aid as part of a deal of giving away the Canal, that would be the end of the treaty. Once the right treaty is signed, however, President Carter said that he would use his full influence to get ratification of the Treaty by the necessary two-thirds of the Senate. He said the Treaty was very important to the US, and he asked Perez, to the extent that he saw fit, to continue to transmit the special concerns of each government to the other.

Secretary Vance repeated the point that it was key that economic assistance not be tied to a treaty for support.

President Carter *also asked for Perez's help in Southern Africa*. Carter said that he had made some progress in discussions with the leaders of Canada, Britain, Germany and France to present a unified stand to Vorster to get him to take concrete and democratic steps for Namibia.⁶ Vorster pledged to take these steps. One UN observer will be responsible for administering the territory until 1980 when full independence will be achieved. Now that South Africa has taken that step, which President Carter believes may be as far as they can go, he thought it was time for the front-line Presidents⁷ to reciprocate, and he asked Perez to use his good offices with the African leaders, if he thinks it would be useful.

President Perez said that the Shah of Iran had told him of his great concern about the Soviet threat in Africa, and he was aware that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia had expressed a similar concern in his talks with President Carter.⁸ The Shah is building up his military capability because he is not certain that the US or Europe would defend Iran if Iran were threatened.

Perez was concerned that Castro and the Russians were trying to become leaders of the blacks in Africa and the Caribbean.

Returning to the South Africa problem, President Carter said that the front-line Presidents could always promote disharmony by putting forward demands that could not be met, particularly since there are five different voices speaking. Also, the Soviets are encouraging the Africans not to negotiate with the British or the U.N. But he assured

⁶ For the June talks on Namibia, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Documents 58, 60, and 61.

⁷ The front-line states were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. Following the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, the Organization of African Unity included it in this designation.

⁸ For the May 1977 meetings between Fahd and Carter, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, footnote 8, Document 149 and *Foreign Relations 1977-1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Documents 36 and 37.

Perez that the US was putting great pressure on Ian Smith on the Zimbabwe issue and on Vorster on Namibia and Southern Africa.

President Carter said that he wanted to keep Perez fully informed on developments in Southern Africa, and would ask Ambassador Andy Young to keep him up-to-date. Carter said it would be very beneficial for Venezuela to play a stronger role in Southern Africa.

President Carter placed high priority on the negotiation of an international treaty on illicit payments,⁹ and he was pleased to note that all the OECD nations support the negotiations. In that regard, he said that *he would appreciate President Perez' good offices in persuading the developing countries of the treaty's importance.* It would take several years to negotiate a comprehensive code covering all the activities of international corporations, and a multinational agreement on illicit payments would not only be a step in the right direction, it would expedite a more comprehensive agreement.

Mrs. Carter had asked the President to mention the Friendship Force,¹⁰ which was a private program that will send 350 people to Venezuela from Nashville, Tennessee, and receive the same number sometime afterwards. President Perez said he would receive the group with great interest and pleasure.

On the international bribery treaty, *Perez said that if he could be assured by the United States that the code of conduct could be agreed to in a certain period, then he would begin talking to other developing country governments about moving more quickly on the illicit payments treaty. President Carter gave him assurances that the US had every intention of working hard for a code of conduct.*

President Carter then raised another issue, which is not of great material concern to Venezuela, but nonetheless, he mentioned it as a gesture of friendship. He wanted to take the initiative to alleviate the problem of *the OPEC-exclusionary amendment to GSP.*¹¹ The problem in changing the amendment was in finding the right formula. The United States does not want to be responsive to Venezuela and Ecuador without also responding to Saudi Arabia and the other OPEC countries. The President alluded to an option which Vice President Mondale had authored, and concluded by saying that *"my intention is to correct this problem."*

⁹ In August 1977, the United Nations Economic and Social Council directed that its Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Problem of Corrupt Practices should draft an international illicit payments treaty. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 1224–1225)

¹⁰ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXX, Public Diplomacy, Document 7.

¹¹ The OPEC-exclusionary amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 excluded all members of OPEC from the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, or GSP.

President Perez thanked the President for bringing up the issue and for his intention to change it. Perez then spoke about how repeal of the discriminatory provision would actually be more in the interest of the United States and the President's humanitarian foreign policy than in Venezuela's interest.

President Carter expressed his continuing concern with the Niehous kidnapping case. He referred to a number of inquiries from Mrs. Niehous, Senator John Glenn, and several others.¹² The President believed that President Perez was doing all he could, that he had no quarrel with the way the case has been handled, but he wanted Perez to know that the US was eager to help.

President Perez said that Ambassador Vaky had reminded him of the case several times. The investigation had advanced, but it was uncertain whether Niehous was still alive. Perez was certain, however, of the need to adopt a hard posture with kidnappings; otherwise, there would be many more.

President Carter said that he was greatly concerned about increases in the price of oil. While the United States can afford it, such increases would contribute to worldwide inflation and serve no one's interest.

In response to President Carter's comment that a reduction in the price of petroleum would be welcome, Perez said that a reduction in the prices of Venezuela's imports would also be welcome. Perez complimented President Carter for supporting OPEC by urging Americans to conserve on energy. The price of oil is now related to the price of available substitutes. Thanks to oil and OPEC, Perez said, the world realized the gravity of the energy crisis. Perez informed President Carter that Saudi Arabia would announce in the next ten days its intention to raise its prices so as to unify the price level at ten percent above 1976 levels for the rest of 1977. He said that the 1978 prices will be announced early in 1978, and he noted that OPEC was also concerned about inflation.

President Carter expressed his eagerness to work with Venezuela and with other OPEC nations on scientific research on petroleum production and exploration—for example, on developing technology for the Orinoco tar belt—and also on research on the nuclear fuel cycle. The more our countries work together, the more we can be sure that decisions taken now would not create problems in the future. President Carter hoped that any increase in the 1978 price would be minimal, but he recognized that

¹² Records of the inquiries from Donna Niehous were not found. On June 27, Glenn wrote to Carter to express his "deep concern" about both the "terrorist kidnapping" of William Niehous and the "threatened expropriation" of Owens-Illinois property. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 46, Venezuela, 6/28-30/77)

was OPEC's decision. The US domestic price will not reach OPEC levels for several years.

President Carter thanked President Perez for Venezuela's support in the financial consortium to assist Portugal. *President Carter, in turn, supported Venezuela's proposal for a development fund for those countries which move to democracy or show improvement in their human rights record.*

President Perez said that he needed the help of the United States and other countries in developing technology for future oil development, but this is a very sensitive issue in Venezuela. Just prior to Perez' departure, the Venezuelan press speculated that Perez was coming to the US to sell or negotiate the Orinoco tar belt.

Perez noted that any agreement to develop technology for the tar belt *must be within the context of an overall plan or agreement between the United States and Venezuela.* Our Ambassador and oil ministers can talk and come to an agreement which recognizes the strategic interests and concerns of the United States.

President Perez said we should think of ways to help Spain as well as Portugal since it is in our interest to strengthen these new democratic countries.

Secretary Vance commenced a rather detailed *discussion of the outstanding business disputes*,¹³ including the question of back taxes which the US oil companies are being asked to pay. *Perez assured President Carter that the decision is up to the Venezuelan courts first, but that he is watching it carefully.*

President Carter said that James Schlesinger will head the Department of Energy when it is set up, and he hoped that Valentin Hernandez will remain in close touch with Schlesinger in order to increase our cooperation in this area.

President Perez said that he hoped President Carter will find time to visit Venezuela before completing his first term. President Carter recognized the importance of personal contact, but he had sent many programs to Congress, and he wanted to remain in Washington for the first year to work on them.

¹³ In a June 27 briefing memorandum to Vance, Todman recommended that in his conversation with Perez, Vance "express the hope that the oil compensation payments, price regulation on the auto assembly industry and the intended Owens-Illinois nationalization will not disrupt bilateral relations." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 46, Venezuela, 6/1-27/77)

338. Letter from President Carter to Venezuelan President Perez¹

Washington, June 30, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter regarding North-South cooperation, and follow-up to the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, contains a number of thoughtful suggestions.² CIEC, in our view, while achieving only limited results, did help improve understanding between North and South regarding raw materials, a common fund, debt, monetary issues and development of energy resources in oil-importing developing countries. And in some important areas significant agreement was reached.³ We are, as you suggest, eager to continue a constructive dialogue in the future.

We will participate actively in the UNCTAD negotiating conference in November to establish a common fund which effectively serves the interests of producers and consumers.⁴ As you know we have, since I came to office, taken a constructive attitude toward this subject, and advanced positive proposals in discussions and negotiations on individual commodities. With respect to debt, we and the European Community have made a positive proposal in CIEC. Major differences in principle prevented agreement from being reached on this subject. We believe, however, that the proposal we have made can substantially improve the process for dealing with the problem.

With respect to the IMF, significant progress has already been made over the last two years in improving the international monetary system. In the months ahead discussions will continue in numerous areas. You can be certain that the US will examine closely the various ideas which have been proposed for further improvement in the international monetary system.

We are, as you know, especially interested in finding means of helping oil-importing developing countries to develop indigenous energy resources. Our own aid program is devoting substantial attention to this area and we are encouraging the World Bank to do likewise.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 2/77-5/78. No classification marking.

² Dated June 28. (Ibid.)

³ For the U.S. post-mortem of CIEC, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 266.

⁴ For the U.S. approach to the UNCTAD common fund meeting, held in Geneva from November 7-December 2, 1977, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 280, 281, 284, 285, and 286.

We would, in addition, be prepared to discuss additional measures for international cooperation toward this end.

We are anxious to make further progress, as we know you are. To do so I hope that our countries can work together to make maximum progress in those forums in which tangible results are most likely to be achieved, to create an atmosphere in which the peoples of the North and South better understand the importance of resolving problems in a spirit of compromise and understanding, and to ensure that the interests and concerns of the developing countries are adequately represented in international institutions.

You can be certain that the United States will approach the problems of the developing nations in a compassionate and positive way. In some areas we believe that significant progress can be made. In others, it is likely that results will be more modest. In still others, we must recognize that proposals of the developing nations would directly undermine institutions and arrangements which are fundamental to the workings of the industrialized economies. In order to make the progress which we hope for, we must clearly appreciate the limitations as well as the opportunities.

A constructive atmosphere which takes this into account will significantly improve the possibility of obtaining strong domestic support to substantially increase our development assistance, which will continue to focus on the development priorities of the developing nations and address more directly the needs of the poor majorities in these nations. It will help us further to obtain domestic support for progress in the multilateral trade negotiations and in other negotiations of vital interest to the developing nations. I remain committed to tangible progress, and I believe the American people are as well. If we can work together to shape a constructive international atmosphere, the more just, prosperous and equitable world we both want will have an excellent chance of being realized.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, August 8, 1977, 1453Z

7803. Subject: Exchange of Information on Cuban Exile Terrorists. Ref: (A) Caracas 7549 and State 8107.²

1. To assist in your consideration of CAP's request for intelligence exchange, I wanted to outline the following conditioning circumstances:

2. A. The Cuban Embassy here has launched what seems to us to be a major and sustained campaign to pass information to CAP and the GOV security apparatus on Cuban exile activity. [1 line not declassified]³ So far as we know this is both recent and still a one-way street, i.e. gov has only received. But it has greatly heightened CAP's legitimate concern and worry, since he is suspicious of the exiles anyway.

3. CAP's reaction to his worries about the exiles is to ask us for information and thus cooperation. Principally, of course, this is because the US is the locus of so much Cuban exile plotting and planning. But to some degree also it is a sincere bid for our assistance in a situation which—I repeat—really does worry him.

4. The effort of the DGI to pass this information is, in the circumstance, an interesting gambit. Playing as it does to legitimate fears of CAP, continued feeding of this information—especially if it is largely accurate—will create an acceptance of the channel and an according to it of legitimacy. If the Cubans were to obtain CAP's confidence then one could speculate that the channel could then be used for other things, perhaps to tar anti-Castro but not terrorist Cubans, or even for disinformation.

5. The main point, though, is that the Cuban effort puts added pressure on us to respond to CAP's requests. If the Cubans pass information and we fail to respond to GOV requests, CAP's suspicions and

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Caracas, 1963-79. Secret; Roger; Priority.

² In telegram 7549 from Caracas, July 30, Vaky reported that Perez had given him "a folder of material which he said was documentation on Cuban exile plotting for a terror campaign against Venezuelan personalities and institutions," and that "in cooperating on the Letelier case and in providing the information he had just given me, he wanted to take the first step in institutionalizing an information exchange." Vaky asked "that we decide urgently on how we are to respond to the president's basic request." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770274-0242) Telegram 8107 from the Department is misnumbered; in telegram 181773 to Caracas, August 3, ARA officials wrote: "we are working on how to respond to CAP's request for institutionalizing information exchange on Cuban exile terrorists." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770278-0121)

³ [Less than 1 line not declassified]

paranoia will be aroused. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] If we drag our feet or respond in meaningless ways, the same result could occur. I might note parenthetically that on three different occasions in the last two weeks, DISIP has asked [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for information on Cuban exiles in the US. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] I understand that it cannot pass such information on persons in the US—but neither have we been able to be forthcoming either, mainly because we have no channel or agreed ground rules for such a provision of information.

6. In short, I believe that the Cuban/DGI effort does increase the importance of our responding meaningfully to CAP's overall request.

7. B. On the other extreme is the fact that ex-Cubans are in key places in the Venezuelan security apparatus, and there is no way to avoid their participation in or knowledge of such exchanges. It is important though to understand their nature. The key figure here is Orlando Garcia. Garcia's loyalties are personal, and to CAP. He knows most of the Cubans, but he is not himself involved with the exile groups. There is some risk that information given to DISIP will become known by the Cuban exile groups, but not I believe deliberately leaked to them. More risky is that exiles will simply become aware that we are passing information with some danger of consequent retaliation against this Embassy.

8. C. Information passed on this subject should, in my view, be passed through FBI-LEGATT channel [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

9. In sum, I believe that we must respond quickly in some kind of meaningful way. I think it would be useful and that we could develop a two-way flow of information. I think the channel should be the LEGATT. What we now need to do is define our own ground rules—taking into account the above caveats—of what kind of information to pass and when, and how to respond to specific requests from them. The general question of information exchange came up in Propper's conversation with Rivas Vasquez and Garcia, and he will have specific impressions and suggestions.⁴

Vaky

⁴ No record of this conversation was found. In telegram 264677 to Caracas, November 4, the Department transmitted the draft text of a "U.S.-GOV agreement on information exchange and mutual assistance in criminal cases" and asked for the Embassy's comment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770407-1019)

340. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 7, 1977, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Carter/President Perez Bilateral

PARTICIPANTS

VENEZUELA

President Carlos Andres Perez
 Foreign Minister Consalvi
 Minister Lauria
 Ambassador Iribarren
 Ambassador Machin
 Dr. Plaza

U.S.

President Carter
 Vice President Mondale
 Secretary Vance
 Dr. Brzezinski
 Asst. Secretary Todman
 Ambassador Vaky
 Mr. Pastor
 Mr. Hormats

President Carter opened the conversation by noting that he and Secretary Vance had just been looking at a map of Belize. President Carter said that he hoped Guatemala and the UK could resolve their differences in a way compatible with the independence of Belize.² He noted that the southern part of the country had very little population and might provide the focus for some territorial adjustments. He thought the UK was willing to help contribute financially to a settlement formula if that became necessary.

President Carter said he had also talked to Peru and Chile about the Bolivian access problem.³ Morales Bermudez said that Chile and Bolivia should reach an agreement and then present it to him. The trouble, President Carter said, was that Chile and Bolivia had in fact reached an agreement and Peru had rejected it. We will, President Carter said, make every effort to help resolve this problem "guided by your leadership." President Carter noted that he was meeting with Banzer tomorrow (September 8).⁴ Pinochet had told him that Bolivia

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Venezuela, 7-9/77. Confidential. According to Carter's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room and lasted from 4:10 until 5:05 p.m. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Perez was in Washington for the Panama Canal Treaty signing ceremonies. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

² Carter met with Laugerud earlier in the afternoon. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 11.

³ For the meeting between Carter and Pinochet on September 6, see Document 205. For the meeting between Carter and Morales Bermudez on September 6, see Document 304.

⁴ See Document 120.

should take the initiative, and that Chile would cooperate. President Carter then asked whether President Perez had any further thoughts on these matters.

President Perez replied that he had sent one of his ministers to see Morales Bermudez to suggest that it would be convenient for representatives of the three countries (Peru, Chile, Bolivia) to meet to discuss the economic integration plan for resolving the Bolivian problem. Morales Bermudez said that if Bolivia would invite, he would accept. President Perez said that he was going to tell this to Banzer and urge Banzer to invite Peru and Chile to a meeting to discuss this plan. Perez added that he is convinced that this is the road to a solution. He noted that in Peru there was emotional feeling cultivated by the military which was antagonistic to an agreement with Chile. Until recently, at least, Peruvian military had taken an oath swearing to take revenge before the centennial anniversary of Peru's defeat in the War of the Pacific. Only two years remain until the 100th anniversary.

President Perez then said that Belize worried him a great deal. He believes that we must continue to press Guatemala to accept Belizean independence and a reasonable settlement. That was the purpose of the Bogota meeting's declaration on Belize.⁵ It was important that international pressure convince Guatemala it has no support for its position and to force it to think of integration as the road to a solution. He thought the UK would be able to create a fund as a way to begin to reach such a solution.

President Carter asked if Perez had communication with Belize, and Perez replied that he was in contact with Price. Venezuela is also to open a consulate in Belize. President Carter then asked if Belize insisted on retaining all its territory. Perez replied that he understood Belize would accept some symbolic adjustments on the border; would "share" sea resources and provide access; would agree to common defense and foreign relations arrangements; and would accept an integration arrangement, though this was more complicated. But they do not want to cede territory.

President Carter asked if Guatemala insisted on receiving territory. Perez said that the danger is that the leading presidential candidate, General Lucas, is a hardliner. So the problem will get worse when Laugerud leaves. There is another candidate who is more moderate and has a better attitude on the problem, but he would never be allowed to win. Therefore it was essential to reach an agreement now with Laugerud.

⁵ Not found.

President Carter said that Laugerud had informed him that any agreement would have to be submitted to the Congress and to the Council of State since it involved constitutional claims of territory. That obviously made a legal agreement much more difficult. President Carter said that Laugerud had described a portion of the southern part of the country—which was very lightly populated—as the minimum he had to have. But Laugerud insinuated that he might be able to compromise if an intermediary were able to propose something. President Carter said they also discussed the idea of financial assistance. President Carter had suggested the idea of a referendum on southern Belize so that the inhabitants there could voice their opinion on where they wanted to go. However, he did not believe that Guatemala could peacefully accept a solution which did not include a territorial cession by Belize.

President Perez said that the problem is in many ways artificial. The Guatemalan people have no deepseated feelings about Belize. The opposition candidate had proposed that the subject of granting independence be the subject of a plebescite, and the idea was not badly received. The problem is in the military. General Lucas says he will never violate the constitution. President Carter observed that Laugerud was a part of the military but seemed reasonable, and Perez agreed.

President Carter then said that he was happy to have Perez back in Washington and was grateful for his good offices on the Panama negotiations which have now resulted in a treaty that he thought was a good treaty. He said he would have trouble with ratification, but the visit of the Chiefs of State will help because it will show the support of the Hemisphere. President Carter added that he knew how hard Perez worked in encouraging both him and Torrijos to keep at it. And he was grateful.

President Perez said that the treaty was an historical event for the Hemisphere. It has already produced a new closeness among the nations of the region. There was a new and authentic flow of sympathy from Latin America toward the U.S. Perez said that he understands President Carter's political problem. But President Carter has applied a wise maxim—that to postpone is not to decide. It had been essential to reach an agreement. Otherwise the consequences would have been terrible. The presence here of the Chiefs of State would have an impact in that it would make the Senators think about the importance of the treaty and its ratification, and it would have equal impact on the American people. We must now, he added, produce additional actions and demonstrations to help the U.S. and improve the ambiance. Unfortunately, he joked, we cannot vote in the ratification process.

President Carter said he thought there was a good chance for having the treaty ratified. Valuable support had been received from

the AFL-CIO, business groups, bankers, black leaders. The obstacle was the long history of opposition to any change in the status of the Panama Canal. However, President Carter said, he was completely committed to the treaty and to its ratification and had decided to expend his political strength to secure its approval. Perez said, "We admire and applaud your bravery."

President Carter then said that the U.S. is trying to make progress on an international agreement on nuclear fuel cycle. We have discussed this matter with the producers of nuclear fuel—UK, France, Canada, Australia, and with major consumers such as Germany. At the London summit meeting it was agreed to form an international nuclear fuel cycle study.⁶ A meeting would be held for this purpose in Washington October 19–21.⁷ He hoped Venezuela would attend and participate in the discussion. President Carter said he was going to ask Videla to sign and ratify the Tlatelolco treaty.⁸ Chile had told him that if Argentina signs, Chile would waive the provision that all participants (read Cuba) must sign, and will put the treaty into effect.

Returning to the nuclear fuel cycle meeting, President Carter said that the study will permit all countries to understand the complexities of nuclear fuels; obtaining fuel without gaining the ability to produce weapons material was possible.

The problem, President Carter went on, was that there was a great deal of confusion about this subject. Brazil, for example, thinks it needs to have a reprocessing plant to have nuclear power. At the Washington meeting, we will discuss formulas for fuel needs, types of fuel, disposition of wastes, and reprocessing to show that it is possible to have nuclear power without the risk of increasing the capability to produce weapons material. The U.S. felt that Venezuela's leadership would be needed, and we hoped they would attend the conference. President Perez said this was very important, and he said Venezuela would be willing to participate.

President Perez said that Videla had promised him that he would study the possibility of signing and ratifying the Tlatelolco treaty. He added that Videla was a very reasonable and serious person and, he believed, Argentina's only real hope. Unfortunately there were powerful groups in the armed forces who were very hardline. And it was a question of how strong Videla really was. Brazil, Perez went on, was a problem. The Brazilians insist on proceeding with the German

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XI, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 342.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 63.

⁸ See Document 63.

arrangement. Recently, Perez said, he had talked to representatives of the German Foreign Office and the Social Democrat Party. They told him they could not break their commitment with Brazil, but if someone could convince Brazil to accept another arrangement, Germany would also agree. Perez said he told them this was not a good moral position, that they had a commitment to show moral leadership.

Perez said that he thought it was necessary to continue the pressure. He said the Brazilian arguments were hiding the truth. Only military objectives could justify or make reasonable the tremendous cost of a reprocessing plant. He said he had told the Germans this.

President Carter said we had told them the same thing. He added that the U.S. has pushed this thing about as far as we can. We have already jeopardized our relations with both Brazil and Germany. He said Brazil had told us that if Argentina ratifies, Brazil will put the treaty into effect, too. He noted that Rosalynn had found that President Geisel was not very familiar with the complications of nuclear fuel.⁹ Brazilians will come to the fuel cycle meeting in Washington and perhaps that will help make them more amenable to a solution, unless they are determined to manufacture explosives.

President Carter added that one advantage of working with Canada and Australia was that it would now be difficult for countries to buy enriched uranium unless they were willing to forego the possibility of producing explosive material. Many countries just do not know that they can have power and forego the capability of producing weapons. Two or three nations have deliberately developed this capability. But we are trying to stir up world opinion so that they will realize that they will be condemned by world opinion if they produce a nuclear weapon capability. South Africa was a case in point. President Carter said he would keep up the pressure. He added that the USSR and even China agreed with us. Secretary Vance noted that France said they had a new process for reprocessing which would make it virtually impossible to produce explosive materials, i.e., it would take twenty years to do so; it was also expensive.

Invited to present any items he had, President Perez said he was pleased to say that the Andean Pact members had reached an agreement on the division of the automobile sector industry. This sectoral agreement would be signed in Quito shortly. This was important because it now meant that the Pact could move ahead full speed. It also provided patterns for other sectoral agreements. There had been some problems with transnational companies who had sought to sabotage the agreement; however, now the cooperation of these companies would be

⁹ See Document 165.

needed to provide technology and other assistance. Perez said he was presenting President Carter with two memoranda¹⁰ outlining this agreement because of its importance. Noting that the pact members would now take up other sectors, he observed that they had not yet come to grips with the agricultural sector. Perez said that this morning the chiefs of state of the Andean nations had met in the Peruvian Embassy and issued a joint statement announcing the auto sectoral agreement. He said he hoped they would have U.S. support. President Carter promised to study the memoranda which he termed of interest to us.

President Carter added that he was sure all of Latin America was eager for cooperation. What was often needed was a leader to bring them together. President Carter said he was glad that Perez was providing that leadership. He went on to say that he was grateful for Perez' advice on Latin America because he had a great deal to learn. He hoped that Perez would not hesitate to suggest things to do or not do on all these matters.

President Perez said that the Caribbean question had come up in the Bogota meeting. All five nations there agreed something was needed. Minister Hector Hurtado was at this moment meeting with Ortiz Mena to suggest that the IDB convoke a meeting to discuss how best to proceed, as had been agreed upon. Secretary Blumenthal in an earlier meeting with him today had brought up the idea of including the IBRD.¹¹ The problem, Perez went on, was Trinidad. But Trinidad was isolated. Williams had adopted a very strange attitude. Perez said that he had spoken to Ambassador Young¹² about all of this, and they agreed this plan would be effective for economic cooperation in the area.

Perez said he had also talked to the Jamaican Foreign Minister who told him that Manley wanted him (Perez) to know that he (Manley) had been pleased with the results of President Carter's conversations with President Nyerere.¹³

Perez then went on to say that the Rhodesian situation worried him. The Ethiopian-Somalian war complicated it. The U.S., he said, cannot afford to lose its leadership in Africa. Otherwise the consequences would be serious. President Carter said that we were working closely with the UK because the British have certain legal rights to

¹⁰ Not found.

¹¹ For the meeting between Blumenthal and Perez, see telegram 222818 to Caracas, September 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770338-0628)

¹² Presumably a reference to their August 12 meeting during Young's visit to Venezuela. See telegram 8099 from Caracas, August 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294-0434)

¹³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 68.

govern Rhodesia. We will present our proposals to the UN in about two weeks and would appreciate Venezuela's support. We were trying to get Smith and Vorster to agree, but this may be doubtful, although they have not rejected the plan. Perez noted that the army might oppose the one-man one-vote formula. President Carter observed that he hoped the army could be reorganized after elections and in a way that would be compatible with the new government. He hoped that a UN force as an arm of the governor general could keep the two armies separate. The black leaders wanted the national army, but did agree that the Smith army might have some "minority" role to play in the future. Nyerere on his own initiative had said that the present police and civil service would have to continue to serve.

President Carter said that we face the prospect that if the U.S.-UK plan is not successful, Smith will move to his own solution with a couple of the black leaders like Sithole. Smith had indicated that he might accept a one-man one-vote formula if there were guarantees of some minimum participation for whites. The only alternative—or maybe the same alternative—was war with the nationalists.

In reply to Perez' question, President Carter said that Vorster had said he would not force Smith to accept a given formula, but if Smith accepted he would see that he complied. To give Vorster credit, he has tried to be helpful. He has faced pressure on Namibia, and on that question South Africa had been as cooperative as SWAPO. He also has internal problems, so is juggling three problems at once. President Carter said he was sure South Africa wanted to be part of the world community, but he is afraid that Rhodesia and Namibia may be just the first steps to revolution in South Africa itself. That is why he is moving slowly.

President Perez said Vorster may not be totally wrong, but there is no other solution. The USSR is taking clear advantage of the situation, and the danger existed that world conflict would shift to Africa, which was a reservoir of raw materials. It was necessary to convince South Africa that although whites got there first, the black majority would eventually prevail. If the West hesitates, it will lose Africa. President Carter observed that was very difficult and complicated. If Vorster sees the outcome to be the destruction of white rule, his motive to help would be destroyed. Vorster feels that the regime's economic strength is such that he could preserve white rule even with the condemnation of the outside world. And, of course, countries like the U.S., UK and Germany had massive investments there.

Some of the black leaders, including Nyerere, are willing to accept evolutionary change. President Carter said he had asked Nyerere what he would accept from Vorster. Nyerere responded that he would be satisfied if Vorster would only say that he believed in a pluralistic and

multiracial world, but that it would take a long time. That was enough for him to say.

President Perez said that that was theoretical. The situation has nevertheless reached a dangerous point, and the Soviet intentions were clear. We had to be cold and realistic. President Carter said that the problems were vast, and suggested that after completing his term, President Perez might consider addressing the problems as a special kind of project. They agreed that the problems were enormous, and he added that the Spanish Sahara and the Canary Islands were becoming a problem.

President Carter asked President Perez if OPEC would keep down the price of oil at the next OPEC meeting. Perez said that he thought there would be an increase, but they would try to keep it moderate. It was inevitable, however, because the prices of manufactured goods continued to rise.

President Perez noted that he had today proposed before the Andean Pact nations a world conference on inflation. This was a serious problem. President Carter joked that Venezuela should spread some of its oil wealth to poor countries like the U.S., and Perez replied that he “would dare to make the change” (from Venezuelan to U.S. President).

President Perez closed the meeting by giving President Carter a rare book—an 1865 book on the Isthmus of Panama.

341. Memorandum From the Chief of the Latin America Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Warren) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner¹

Washington, November 10, 1977

SUBJECT

Response to Venezuelan President's Request for CIA Support

1. *Action Requested:* Your approval to provide the limited support described below to the Venezuelan President.

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M00165A, Box 2, Folder 38. Secret. Sent via the Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations. [less than 1 line not declassified]

2. *Background:* On 22 September 1977 the Special Security adviser to Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez (CAP) contacted [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on behalf of CAP to request assistance in the investigation of the kidnapping of William Niehous, a U.S. businessman in Caracas.² [*less than 6½ lines not declassified*]³

3. [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]⁴ Your comments at that time were that the Agency should make no moves toward the Venezuelans without your approval, and that if we could do something, you were inclined to have President Carter relay the reply and material since President Carter was planning to visit Venezuela in late November.

4. The Division proceeded to explore our alternatives with both the Department of State and our own legal counsel. [*less than 6 lines not declassified*] We thought we might be able to provide some assistance on the Niehous case and the Ambassador and the Department of State have asked us to provide this assistance so long as the CIA does not become directly involved in carrying out the investigation.⁵

5. There are no legal restrictions against the CIA providing limited assistance to the Venezuelan President on the Niehous case. [*less than 3 lines not declassified*] The Department of State and Ambassador Vaky agree that this is a desirable course of action and we believe this assistance will demonstrate to President Perez that the U.S. Government is willing to cooperate when we can on subjects of mutual concern.

6. Now that President Carter's trip has been cancelled, at least temporarily, and the request from President Perez is more than a month old, we believe we should make a decision on the question of whether we will respond in a positive fashion. We believe there are the following options:

a. [*less than 1½ lines not declassified*] review the Venezuelan investigative files on the Niehous kidnapping and to make recommendations, but not to participate actively in the investigation. This option would have the advantage of being responsive to a request from the Venezuelan President and reflect concern for the well-being of an American citizen.

² Not found.

³ [*1 line not declassified*].

⁴ [*less than 2 lines not declassified*].

⁵ In telegram 10343 from Caracas, October 21, Vaky recommended that USG assistance on the Niehous investigation should be "clearly limited to advise and review and not direction of the GOV investigation." (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Caracas 1963-79) (S) In an October 31 memorandum for the record regarding a weekly ARA/CIA/INR meeting, Todman, Stedman and Warren agreed on this response to the requests from Perez. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Africa and Latin America Inter-agency Intelligence Committees, ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings 1976-77)

b. Our alternative would be to decline the request, indicating our reluctance to help in the Niehous investigation because we see little that can be contributed to the case since 21 months have elapsed since the kidnapping occurred. This stance would have the disadvantage of appearing totally uncooperative and unsympathetic about the kidnapping of a U.S. citizen.

7. We recommend the alternative posed in paragraph 6(a) above.

Raymond A. Warren⁶

⁶ Wells concurred on November 12. Turner approved on November 28. The date is stamped.

342. Letter From President Carter to Venezuelan President Perez¹

Washington, November 17, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply regretted the need to postpone my visit to Venezuela,² but I am delighted that it will be convenient for you to receive me sometime during the early spring.

Since I will not have an opportunity to discuss with you later this month the question of world oil prices, I have asked Secretary Vance to raise the issue directly on my behalf.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 2/77-5/78. No classification marking.

² Carter was scheduled to visit Venezuela in late November, but postponed the trip until March 1978. See Documents 336 and 337. In telegram 264749 to Caracas, November 5, the Department transmitted a message from Carter to Perez announcing the trip's postponement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0384)

³ Vance met with Perez in Caracas on November 23; the Embassy reported on their talks in telegrams 11456 and 11457 from Caracas, November 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770438-0145 and D770438-0037) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–76, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, footnote 7, Document 138. In telegram 11117 from Caracas, November 15, the Embassy reported on Vaky's November 14 demarche to Perez regarding oil prices. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770422-1185)

I have become increasingly concerned in recent months over the outlook for the global economy. Although the U.S. is in better condition than some others, it is proving difficult to make reductions in both inflation and unemployment. At the same time, we are now experiencing a large and growing trade deficit which is causing a threatening increase in protectionist sentiment in our country.

I believe it is essential that we work together over the critical months to come. At the forthcoming Caracas meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,⁴ I would like to urge your government to join with other leading nations in freezing the price of oil at least through 1978. As one of the largest producers of oil, we could work with you and others in promoting the development of alternate sources of energy, conserving oil and gas, and providing for a realistic and more predictable energy price structure in future years.

As you know, we have begun to make some progress in reducing international economic problems, but any price increase at this critical juncture would further reduce growth in developed and developing countries and would make more difficult the worldwide struggle against inflation. It would add to the problems of balance-of-payments adjustment, fostering protectionist pressures everywhere and possibly jeopardizing the stability of key currencies and of the international financial system.

From our earlier talks, I know how sensitive you are to the critical role of energy and energy prices in the world economy. I realize that a price freeze will require Venezuela and other oil exporters to forego short-term gains. But I pledge to you my continuing resolve to evolve an effective energy policy for my own nation and to work with you to ensure a restoration of vigorous, non-inflationary world economic growth which will make possible progress for all nations.

I am deeply gratified that the state of relations between our countries is such that it can permit frank discussion regarding the pressing concerns that face us. I look forward to hearing from Secretary Vance about his conversations with you as soon as he returns to Washington.⁵

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

⁴ For the U.S. strategy toward OPEC countries prior to their meeting in Caracas on December 20, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Documents 130 and 136.

⁵ See Document 343.

343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 25, 1977

1. *Perez*: I had three hours of discussions with President Perez² covering a very wide variety of subjects: nuclear proliferation, oil prices, North/South relations, Caribbean cooperation, Middle East, compensation for nationalization of US oil companies, human rights, Panama Canal treaties, Cuba, Southern Africa, and Guyana. I have already given you a brief summary of our discussions on a number of these subjects.³ Two or three deserve further comment.

On Belize Perez said that he had now come around to the position that the Belizeans should accept the British/Guatemalan tentative agreement. I told him that we agreed completely and described to him my conversation with Prime Minister Price of Belize.⁴ I told President Perez that we had advised the Belizeans to accept the current British/Guatemalan proposal and that it was our opinion that he would get the better deal if he made it now than if he waited for the next Guatemalan administration. I further indicated that President Torrijos had changed his views and now also agreed that it was desirable for Belize to accept the current British/Guatemalan tentative agreement. I said that I understood the Costa Ricans and Jamaicans also agreed. I urged President Perez to invite Price to meet with him so that he could persuade Price to accept that position. I told him that I believed his (*Perez*) role would be key to bringing about a settlement. He said he would do this immediately and I said that I would let them know the current Mexican position after I met with Roel on Friday or Saturday.⁵

When I raised the question of compensation for nationalization of US oil companies, I was pleased to find that the Venezuelans had gotten their house in order in preparation for my visit and now are making good progress towards winding up this matter. This is important, as it has been a lingering sore which needs to be cleaned up promptly.

On the question of the Caribbean development group Perez expressed his strong interest in seeing this go forward and pledged

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State), 11/77. Secret.

² See footnote 3, Document 342.

³ Not found.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, footnote 2, Document 17.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, footnote 5, Document 17. "Friday or Saturday" refers to November 25 or 26.

their full participation at the meeting on December 14/15 here in Washington. A problem remains between the Trinidadians and Venezuelans on this matter, as both mistrust the other. We are going to have to play the role of mediator between them.

President Perez raised the question of Cuba and said that he believed our estimates of Cuban personnel in Africa were inaccurate. He said that Castro had told him that our original figures several months ago were much too low, that the Cubans had since reduced the number of Cuban personnel in Africa, and that they wanted to make this clear to the US.

On Guyana Perez said he is prepared to settle the long-standing border dispute between Venezuela and Guyana. He expects to work out the settlement in the near future.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Venezuela.]

344. Telegram 1485 From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 13, 1978, 2201Z

1485. Subject: President Perez' Views on Nicaragua

1. Following a social reception evening of February 12 at which all were present, President Perez invited the Ambassador, and McNeil to join him and Foreign Minister Consalvi at La Casona for a late night cognac to discuss Nicaraguan situation. In the two-hour conversation which ensured Perez made another deeply-felt exposition on the situation which he clearly intended be conveyed to the highest levels of the USG. His main points were:

(A) With the growing crisis in Nicaragua, Perez said he had thought that the U.S. would take some initiative in implementation of President Carter's human rights policy, when nothing happened Perez said he took the initiative in writing the January 31 letter to President Carter² which he intended as an urgent consultation. Since he did not receive an answer from the President,³ Perez said he decided to take some

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780066-0633. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to Managua.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, footnote 3, Document 68.

³ For Carter's February 17 response and the USG deliberations over Perez's letter, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Documents 69 and 71.

initiatives alone and instructed Machin to place the matter of the IAHR on the OAS agenda; he also, the President said, persuaded the the CTV to call for a labor union boycott on oil and other shipments to Nicaragua.

(B) Somoza is an astute and Machiavellian feudal lord; he will not willingly give up any power or end the dynasty, either now or in 1981. He cannot simply be “talked” into real negotiation with the opposition; he can only be forced into it; otherwise, he will stall until it is too late.

(C) Unless some prompt measures are taken to force Somoza into negotiating the demise of the Somoza dynasty, the radicalization of the situation will be assured, the middle class will be chewed up in the middle and extremists of one sort or another will impose an armed solution.

(D) The Sandinistas are stronger than people think; Castro is assisting in very discreet and quiet but significant ways. The Sandinistas are divided into two groups; one an extreme wing which believes armed rebellion is the only route, and a second group which is prepared to accept middle class, private-sector association, although they do not ideologically agree with it. The private-sector, middle class, professional and business groups are beginning to support the Sandinistas in the same way that the middle class supported Castro. The situation, Perez said, is very similar to the Batista period, and if we are not careful the same thing will happen in Nicaragua. If things do not move to solution, the Sandinistas will begin to really press, and the National Guard will not resist them for too long, but will cut and run.

(E) To do nothing now will reinforce frustration, convince Somoza he can ride it out and hoodwink the Americans, push the middle class civic leaders into the Sandinista camp and give the latter respectability, and insure a radical “solution” abetted by Castro.

(F) Perez said he accepted the idea of negotiating a transition. But he repeated that Somoza will do this only if he is convinced the U.S. will not support his continuance in power and that he has no alternative. The fact that he is ill should help this idea, because he may be willing to face the necessity of negotiating an orderly “withdrawal” of the Somozas (preserving the family from ruin) before he drops dead.

(G) Perez said he proposes that the U.S. and Venezuela join in leading an international effort to put pressure on Somoza. What he suggested were steps to make clear to Somoza that he has no choice but to negotiate with the opposition and then explicit suggestions to him to undertake those negotiations. As to the first “demonstration” steps, Perez suggested that economic pressure be placed on Somoza and, secondly, that the U.S. undertake a criminal investigation in the U.S. of the alleged implication of Pedro Ramos in the Chamorro assassination. Doing the latter would, Perez said, be a clear signal to Somoza—

and to all Nicaraguans. Absent action by the U.S. authorities against Ramos, the far left in Nicaragua will assert the U.S. is helping cover up the crime.

(H) Noting that Somoza was reported in the press as preparing to buy major quantities of arms in Spain, Perez said he intended to call in the Spanish Ambassador and Spanish Economic Minister who is currently in Caracas to press them not to sell arms to Nicaragua. He asked that we also ask the Spanish to refrain from selling arms to Nicaragua.

2. For the most part we listened while Perez explained in more detail than in his earlier exposition (Caracas 1204)⁴ his assessment of the Nicaraguan situation, his analysis of the Sandinistas and his views of the strategy to be followed. He was clearly interested in our explanation of our quiet parallel approaches to Somoza and his Ambassador in Washington stressing the need for (A) an early IAHRC visit; (B) the initiation of a dialogue between Somoza and the opposition and (C) avoiding reprisals. He recognized that the U.S. genuinely hoped for the emergence of a democratic solution in Nicaragua, but felt that our quote hesitation unquote would inadvertently contribute to a breakdown in which we might be faced with the Hobson's choice of intervention or acquiescing in a return to rightest repression or, more likely, the emergence of a Castro-like phenomena.

3. In response to our questions about the apparently differing perceptions of the level of repression in Nicaragua, Perez agreed that the National Guard may have largely avoided flagrant incidents, although he insisted that the level of Guard violence in smaller towns was considerably higher than we seemed to recognize. Perez said that the repression was high, however, in the sense of legal harrassment and pressure. e.g., cutting off telex and telephone service to Chamorro's paper and family, and the use of economic levers and pressure against opponents. In this, Perez emphasized, Somoza was cynically shrewd and adamant.

Vaky

⁴ Dated February 6. During a February 5 discussion about the OAS role in Nicaragua, Vaky reported that Perez "said Somozas would never agree to give up real power and would not sincerely permit democratization which meant giving up power; democratization was possible only if Somozas left and they would leave only under international pressure." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780055-0470)

345. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Caracas, March 28, 1978, 3:30–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

International Political Issues: Panama Canal Treaties, Non-Proliferation, Middle East, Africa, Belize, Nicaragua, and Conventional Arms Restraint

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky
Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff Member

Venezuela

Carlos Andres Perez, President
Simon Bottaro Consalvi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Manuel Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs
Valentin Acosta Hernandez, Minister of Energy and Mines
Carmelo Lesseur Lauria, Minister, Secretariat of the Presidency
Hector Hurtado, Minister of State, President of the Investment Fund
Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren
Dr. Reinaldo Figuerido, Director of Foreign Trade Institute

After exchanging cordialities, President Perez asked about President Carter's preference with regard to an agenda. President Carter said that he would like to discuss international political issues today and economic issues tomorrow.

President Perez asked President Carter for his estimate of the chances for Canal Treaty ratification. President Carter said that this was the most difficult political issue he has ever faced, with the vote still very close. We are determined, he said, that when the process is completed there is no continuation of U.S. presence after this century and no insinuation of any U.S. intent to intervene in Panama's internal affairs. Some of the language of the reservations was unfortunate, and we will make every effort to correct the mistakes in the process of ratifying the second treaty.

President Carter said that Perez could help by adding his voice to his own in counseling Torrijos to be moderate and to wait for the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President's Visit to Brazil and Venezuela (3/78), 1-5/78. Confidential. The conversation took place in the Miraflores Palace. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

process to be completed. Those who oppose the Treaty welcome any sign of disharmony between the U.S. and Panama, and this should be avoided. We are reasonably sure, President Carter said, that we can accomplish what we have set out to do. He said he recognized the Treaties as the most important challenge and opportunity for bringing a new spirit to inter-American relations which has been placed on his shoulders.

President Perez expressed his concern over amendments to the Treaties, especially the DeConcini amendment.² When he learned of it, he immediately telephoned Torrijos and counseled him not to react but to wait, to be calm and "to go to the mountains and address the forest." (President Carter interjected that he had a similar conversation with Torrijos.) Perez said that Torrijos had described his conversation with President Carter and had agreed that he should wait until the process was completed and to evaluate the situation then. Torrijos had wanted to come to Caracas, but Perez said he talked him out of it on the grounds that if he were here the press would force him to make a statement. He sent his Minister of Education, Royo, instead, and Perez had a long conversation with him. They agreed, Perez said, that the wording of the De Concini reservation was "unacceptable". It was also unnecessary, Perez added, "since the U.S. had the power to do what it proposed anyway. War is simply declared; it is not announced ahead of time."

Torrijos believes, *Perez* said, that some kind of declaration should be made in the second treaty to offset the public impact of the De Concini Amendment. Perez said he had worked out suggested wording when Royo was here, and he wanted to give President Carter an aide memoire with that wording (Perez handed the President this memo).³ If something like this was not done, Perez said, the situation would be dangerous.

Perez said that Torrijos had sent a letter to each Latin American Chief of State who had attended the signing ceremony, since he felt obligated to keep them informed of recent developments which affected the Treaties.

President Carter said that we shared Perez' views and concern, and these views were very helpful to him.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIX, Panama, footnote 4, Document 159.

³ Not found.

President Carter said that Argentina had promised to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty soon. Although they have said this before, they had sent a message this month indicating they are getting ready to do so.⁴

The U.S. Congress had passed a law on nuclear energy, which clearly spells out the U.S. position in providing nuclear fuel with certain safeguards. *President Carter* said his visit to Brazil would be used to explain our position fully;⁵ he was afraid that Brazil may not have completely understood it. We believed it was relatively easy to cooperate in ways which will provide nuclear power and at the same time eliminate the danger of weapon production.

Perez said that during his conversations with Geisel (November 1977) he expressed solidarity with U.S. policy. Geisel was upset, and took the position that one could not keep Brazil from doing the things that the U.S. has already done. *Perez* told him that whatever the U.S. has already done, the world cannot afford unrestrained proliferation. It was because of aspirations in this area, *Perez* said, that he had proposed a multinational Latin American reprocessing center, under the auspices of OLADE or SELA, as a way of overcoming jealousies and satisfying needs. Brazil, of course, was also worried about Argentina. Geisel said that first he wanted to talk to *President Carter*, then he would talk to the GOV about the multinational center proposal.

President Carter said that we have tried the reprocessing route and have found it unsatisfactory. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Study which will be completed soon will probably recommend regional centers under international safeguards, precisely to overcome national sensitivities. He said he expected that the study would find that reprocessing is simply not a necessary part of a nuclear energy system. He expressed the view that both Germany and France realize the problems and would probably not offer the same kind of arrangements now that they did then.

President Carter said that common expressions of concern would be useful in drawing the distinction between legitimate desires for peaceful use of nuclear energy and arms production. He also noted that Brazil has thorium, and this is a promising source of fuel which would avoid the plutonium problem. Geisel is discussing the use of

⁴ Presumably a reference to the message that Aja Espil delivered to the Department on March 22, notifying the USG "that Argentina has every intention of ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as *President Videla* committed his country to do in conversations with *President Carter* and Secretary Vance." (Telegram 76482 to Buenos Aires, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780130-0734) The discussion of non-proliferation is also printed as Document 432 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

⁵ For *Carter's* March 29 and 30 conversations with Geisel, see Documents 172 and 173.

thorium, and this may be an avenue out of the present problem. Perhaps, the President said, the U.S. pushed too far too fast with Brazil, but we will discuss these matters.

Perez asked whether the U.S. would be helpful to Argentina in the area of thorium technology if they expressed interest, and the President answered affirmatively.

Middle East

Perez expressed great concern over the Middle Eastern situation. He recalled that he had told Secretary Vance during the latter's November visit,⁶ that the Sadat visit to Israel could end up being very dangerous if in fact Israel did not respond. That seems to be what has happened. Begin appears very intransigent and hard.

Perez said he realizes the difficulties all this presents the U.S., given the Jewish vote. But the situation was at a dangerous point. The time has come for the U.S. to take a decisive, tough position. Sadat is in danger, and the extremists are gaining in influence. The situation may get out of hand and out of U.S. control.

Perez added that when he was in Moscow (November 1976) the Russians indicated to him a desire to reach agreement with the U.S. on a Middle East solution and were in effect waiting for the Carter Administration to take power. The situation is confused and dangerous, and *Perez* said he would like President Carter's views.

President Carter acknowledged that it was a subject with great political importance and difficulty in the U.S., and it seemed that whenever the parties to the dispute wanted to communicate bad news, they used the U.S. He said that the U.S. had developed a position, and a series of recommendations which were reasonably compatible with principles Israel had espoused in the past, and which were now acceptable to Sadat, and perhaps also to Hussein. The problem is that Begin no longer espouses these principles. Even if Israeli security were assured and Israeli troops were on the West Bank, there were three key problems: (a) Israel refuses to terminate civilian settlements on occupied territory; (b) it refuses to allow Palestinian Arabs to have a voice in their future; and (c) it refuses to recognize that UN Resolution 242⁷ applies to the West Bank. If Begin holds to these positions, no progress can be made.

⁶ See Document 343.

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution Number 242, adopted in November 1967, affirmed that the fulfilment of the UN Charter required the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

It may be, President Carter indicated, that internal pressures in Israel will lead to modifications. He said that he saw a recent poll that indicated that more than 60 percent of the Israeli public do not think that settlements should be retained as an issue to try to gain peace. But the Begin government is stubborn on this issue, particularly in Judea and Samaria. Many in the U.S. who have supported Israel now express deep concern over their policies. The best thing to do over the next few weeks was to remain quiet and let internal pressures in Israel operate and take root. Sadat, he said, is flexible, bold and forthcoming. But he believes we have more influence over Israel than we do. (Perez interjected that he thought so too.) Our influence, however, is limited. We will pursue the ideas we have put forward, but there are limitations.

Perez said that when he was in Vienna (March 1977) *Kriesky* told him he was commissioned by the EC to make a report. He prepared it but waited to publish it until after the Israeli elections. He had thought that the analyses and recommendations—in which he found a certain degree of intransigence—would have brought constructive pressures on whomever won that election. Since *Kriesky* was a Jew and Austria a neutral this should have been the case. But nothing ever happened. Europe's position is now confused.

President Carter said that he believed that many leaders, including *Perez*, had stayed aloof in deference to the U.S., so as not to interfere with what we were trying to do. While he did not want to recruit leaders against Israel, the fact is that the U.S. cannot be the only voice to express world-wide concern. While he has not consulted with other leaders except for *Perez*, he will probably now do so. It would be helpful if Israel could be made to realize that the world expects Resolution 242 to be honored and that a peaceful settlement is needed.

President Carter said that the Israel Cabinet had supported Begin unanimously, but that was after a five-hour debate. He also understood that Defense Minister *Weizman* would be going to Egypt. If true, that is hopeful. It had been necessary to confront Begin, *President Carter* said, to clarify, for the first time in ten years, the differences that exist between us. Up to now Israel had been successful in fuzzing over and concealing these. This is now in the open.

Perez said that a great worry he had was how long Sadat could resist Arab pressures, especially the more extreme circles, e.g., Iraq and Algeria.

President Carter said that Sadat had the support of Morocco, Sudan, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. He is safe for a few more weeks, perhaps months. The Arabs want peace so desperately that they will accept any reasonable formula Sadat can work out, whatever they say publicly. Sadat, *Carter* said, was close to him and a good friend. He trusts the U.S. almost completely, but he unfortunately has an exaggerated idea of the extent of U.S. influence over Israel.

President Carter said that there is a possibility that we would make our recommendations public.

On Geneva, the U.S. is prepared to go at any time, but the questions of agenda, dates and procedures have proven more difficult than substance. It was because Sadat became impatient of this that he tried the end-run of his visit to Jerusalem. The U.S. would like to work out a proposal acceptable to Egypt and Jordan and then later Syria might accept. Asked if this might be a US-USSR joint prospect, *President Carter* said that the U.S. keeps the Soviet Union completely informed, but no nation in the region desires to see the USSR play an important role, certainly not Egypt and Jordan and not even Syria, which expressed the deepest concern when we signed the US-USSR agreement. The problem is that the Soviets still demand total withdrawal and an independent nation under the PLO. And privately, even the Arab nations don't want to see the Palestinians with a completely independent nation which would open their countries to subversion. Any further proposal we make will probably be a U.S. proposal. We would, however, consult the USSR and keep them informed.

Perez said he understood the Saudis were also intransigent on the issue of a Palestinian homeland. *President Carter* said many of the leaders in the region took a different position privately than they did publicly. They want peace so badly they would modify their position to accept a Sadat-Israeli solution, even if reluctantly.

President Carter said that we would be happy to answer any further queries *Perez* may have on the Middle East in the future on a private, confidential basis.

Africa

Perez said that he would like to discuss Africa. The problem of the Horn appears to be on the way to settlement, but that is not the case with Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Having received *Carter's* letter,⁸ *Perez* said, he expressed his concern to Castro. Castro, however, is deeply committed with the USSR. The Cubans defend their position arguing that the U.S. intervenes, and that while they will not intervene if they are asked for help by a legitimate government, they have the right to agree to help. *Perez* asked for *President Carter's* advice on ways to put pressure on Cuba.

⁸ Dated February 1. *Carter* wrote, "it appears that the Soviets are over-arming the Ethiopians, while the Cubans are sending large numbers of combat troops and fighter pilots. We are concerned about the possibility of an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia and massive air attacks against Somali cities by Cuban planes." (*Carter Library*, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 56, Venezuela, 1-4/78)

President Carter said that we see a prospect of additional military action by Cuban/Soviet forces in Ethiopia against Eritrea. There is still some fighting in the Ogaden. He noted that the Cubans have 16,000 troops in Ethiopia alone. In Angola there are more than 20,000. These figures are accurate. There has been an increase in the past year, the Ethiopian contingent representing a new movement. Whether the Cubans act as the agents of the USSR or vice versa, it is all very convenient for them.

What worries the U.S., *President Carter* said, is not just the achievement of peace in the Horn, but that the Cubans may effect a permanent placement of troops on the continent. We see Cuban intervention as a serious threat to peace. They are offering their services in Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and in Tanzania.

In the Horn, the Soviets first over-supplied the Somalis with weapons, and this precipitated Somalia's aggression. Then, the Russians did the same thing with Ethiopia, and it will probably lead to a similar problem.

The U.S., *President Carter* said, has no troops and no surrogates in Africa. All our actions are taken through the United Nations or openly and fairly as in the Anglo-American plan, which we hope will lead to an independent Zimbabwe with majority rule. The problem in Zimbabwe is that each of the leaders wants to be anointed Head of State. The President will be speaking to Obasanjo and Secretary Vance to Nigeria's Foreign Minister in a few days about this problem.⁹

On Namibia, the President explained that the U.S. had worked with the Contact Group to propose terms which would hopefully be acceptable to both sides. He is fearful, however, that the South Africans might preempt the proposal and call for elections. Ambassador Young is currently meeting with African leaders to discuss this.¹⁰ The European leaders are developing a greater interest now because all now recognize the problems if a solution is not found quickly. There is also some difficulty because the black leaders in the region are currently engaged in a predictable struggle for power.

Perez confessed his pessimism with regard to South Africa. He found the Internal Settlement an infantile idea—one the black people won't accept. Increasingly, *Perez* is convinced that the problem is not Zimbabwe or Namibia, but South Africa. Unless the U.S. establishes a firm position against South Africa, the Cubans will triumph, and the

⁹ For the meeting between Carter and Obasanjo, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, Document 200. For the conversation between Vance and Garba, see telegram 3074 from the Secretary's Delegation in Lagos, April 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1758)

¹⁰ Not further identified.

Soviets will gain great prestige. The presence of U.S. Multinational Corporations in South Africa is the fundamental problem, preventing decisive action by the U.S. and Europe in South Africa.

President Carter said that the U.S. would present a proposal to South Africa on Namibia the next day, and shortly after that, to the U.N.¹¹ Public support would be helpful, as it would be for the Anglo-American proposal which needs help.

The U.S. has joined in instituting sanctions on arms to South Africa under the U.N. resolution, though the U.S. had that policy before. On multinational corporations, the President explained the difficulty for the U.S. and for Europe to terminate investments. Actually, it is easier for the U.S. than for the Europeans because our investment is smaller. Whether it would be helpful is a matter of debate. The U.S. agrees that the Internal Settlement is completely unacceptable.

Belize

Perez labelled the Belize problem as dangerous for Central American peace and one that could lead to a conflict with Cuba. He said Prime Minister Price had recently visited him. He tried to convince Price to cede a small amount of territory, even to labelling it not a cession but a "rectification of boundaries". Price said no one in Belize would support a territorial cession as the price of agreement. Price was ready to agree to seaward limits that would give Guatemala greater access to the sea through the Keys. Guatemala, however, wanted Puerto Amatique.

At President Carter's request, Secretary Vance described his conversations with Price which took place two days ago¹² and after Perez' talk with Price. Price told him he would not cede territory, but would provide an access to the sea. Secretary Vance said that he thought a minor cession was the best way to resolve the problem, but this was not accepted by Price. The Secretary added that it appeared that time has run out and that this solution may not work. Price told him that he was trying to structure a multinational defense agreement to guarantee Belizean territory. He claimed that several Caribbean nations had agreed to the arrangement, and that Britain had agreed provided that a Spanish-speaking nation would join. Price said that Panama had agreed to a defense arrangement, but will not say so publicly. Price pressed Vance for support, and was told that we wanted to consult

¹¹ Presumably a reference to the Western Five proposal regarding Namibian independence. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XVI, Southern Africa, footnote 11, Document 200 and footnote 2, Document 85.

¹² Reference is to a meeting between Vance and Price on March 24. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 26.

with others, including UK and GOV. The Secretary added that the countries Price has talked to in the Caribbean have no defense forces, so any such alleged defense arrangement is unrealistic. He added that the U.S. had previously suggested the O.A.S. for defense arrangements.

Perez said that he had told Price he was opposed to the Belizean request for a defense force. That was no solution to the problem. Moreover, Guatemala could take it as a hostile act. Guatemalan desire for territory is very large; if it could be reduced to a token cession, this might work. *Perez* said that he was worried about President-Elect Lucas, who he felt was a hard man who might be tempted to use the Belize issue as an excuse for war—an escape valve for internal problems. Venezuela, *Perez* said, had tried to push an agreement. The maritime access idea of Price's is a good one; combined with a token cession, it would provide a solution Price could accept. Now is the time to push for that idea. *Perez* said he would take advantage of his June visit to Kingston to discuss this with Manley and perhaps invite Price to meet confidentially and privately with them there. Price, of course, is impatient and is seeking Caribbean and African support for his policy.

Perez' proposal might be a possible solution. Secretary Vance said that the problem is that Caribbean support has made Price more intransigent, and *Perez* agreed with that evaluation. *Perez* also said that he believed Guatemala would accept a settlement even if the territorial concession was minimal.

President Carter then commented that negotiations seem to have come to a stop, and the Secretary agreed that the UK seems to have thrown up its hands over the prospect of negotiating anything. *President Carter* asked what forum could be used to persuade Price. *Perez* said that the British are relaxed about the whole problem because they know that it is a hemispheric problem that we will have to settle sooner or later. Hence, he thought we should deal directly with Price. "It's our problem, not theirs. We need to solve it ourselves." If "technicians" could draw up a feasible boundary adjustment and even prepare a map, a small group could meet with Price and persuade him. He repeated that he would talk to Manley in Jamaica next month.

Secretary Vance said that Mexico was important in this picture, and Mexico had opposed cession of territory. *Perez* said that was because it also had claims and if some claims were to be met, Mexico wanted a piece of the action. But that is not a defensible position. *Perez* said he was proposing settlement with Guyana along the same lines—a small border adjustment in return for foregoing larger claims.

The President said he would like to be kept informed on future conversations on this issue, and *Perez* concluded his remarks on the

subject by saying that he was afraid that Gen. Lucas might invade Belize and that this would increase the possibility of Cuban involvement.

Nicaragua

Perez said that Somoza's authority no longer exists in Nicaragua. He depends upon the national guard and that is all that keeps him in power. The danger is that the Sandinistas are growing in power and now have the support of all anti-Somoza factions. The situation is like that of Batista. It would be better if some control could be exercised over the transition, as happened in Venezuela in 1958 with *Perez Jimenez*. *Perez* said he understands that there are retired national guard officers who could head up a junta. If the situation is left to Somoza's departure or death, a very dangerous situation will develop. Some day the US will find it necessary to take action such as it did in the Dominican Republic in 1965 because of the extremist solution that could occur.

President Carter said he believed *Perez's* description of the dangers was accurate, but it was difficult to know what to do. As *Perez* requested, we have encouraged Somoza to let in the Latin American Commission on Human Rights, and we have a difficult time in proposing any direct action by the U.S. to bring about Somoza's downfall. This would cause concern in the U.S. and also among small countries in the hemisphere since we have pledged to adhere to the principle of non-intervention.

Perez thought that the OAS machinery could be useful in this connection. Perhaps a Venezuelan proposal before the OAS, with support from others, would be useful. The OAS machinery has been used this way on other occasions. *President Carter* observed that that would depend upon the proposal. He was not sure that the OAS Charter provided a way to replace an unpopular leader of a government. *Perez* said what he meant was to put pressure on the actors to move for a solution. By mobilizing public opinion through the OAS, the political environment in Nicaragua would be changed, and a solution might emerge. Venezuela, he said, neither seeks nor desires direct intervention by the U.S. or anyone else.

The President said this would all have to be studied carefully, but he believed there were additional actions which could be taken. It was difficult to know what Somoza wanted—retain power, retain his wealth, keep his family safe, or what he would exchange for early elections. *The President* said that if Somoza shares *Perez's* assessment of the weakness of his position, he may be willing to call elections before 1981. Since that's a possibility, perhaps Secretary Vance could explore this.

But, *the President* continued, it's difficult for the U.S. to be put in a position of trying to change the leader of a small nation. The people

of the U.S. have reacted strongly about U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and are still very sensitive about the idea of U.S. intervention abroad. We would consult with you, but we cannot take the initiative. We would keep open the possibility of discussions with Somoza and with others. There should be further discussions on this between the U.S. and Venezuela.

Perez said that Somoza could not last to 1981. Guerrilla actions will increase, and Castro could exploit it. Therefore, we need to find a solution; we don't need to define a formula here, but let's discuss this further. He wanted to call President Carter's attention to the gravity of the problem and its dangers; it was like 1958 in Cuba. *Perez* said he was in touch with a wide range of moderate civic leaders and private businessmen. He is fully convinced that in their despair they will support the guerrillas. They will destroy Somoza, or Somoza will destroy them.

President Carter then said that any public statements (about the need for political change in Nicaragua) is best done by others. We would like to discuss this privately with you and with others. We haven't had private conversations with Somoza on this, but he has told us that he would not remain in power beyond 1981. If he shares your assessment, then he might change his mind on that.

Conventional Arms Restraint

Perez raised the issue of the arms race in the Andes. He said that Venezuela had called a meeting based on the Ayacucho Declaration, which is dormant.¹³ The problem is that if the U.S. doesn't sell arms to the region, the Europeans (and the Soviets, *President Carter* added) do. *Perez* said that "we cannot remain with our arms folded". In answer to a question by *President Carter* on how Ayacucho could be reactivated, *Perez* said that they could propose a meeting, but the situation is complicated by the breaking of relations between Bolivia and Chile.

President Carter said that in the last five years, Latin America has purchased \$7 billion worth of weapons. The U.S. has become a smaller supplier because of its arms restraint policy, selling less than Britain, France, or the Soviets. We would like to reduce our arms sales even more, though there is a limit on how far we can go because of private interests. We would welcome *Perez'* ideas on reviving Ayacucho.

¹³ Eight Latin American countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in December 1974, declaring their intent to cooperate in restraining arms purchases in Latin America. The discussion of conventional arms restraint is also printed as Document 288 in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation.

Perez said he would support the President's policies on arms restraint and try to get them adopted by other countries, but he needed more information.

The President said he would send the U.S. arms sales policy statement, and that perhaps it could be used as a model or a voluntary formula. Recently, the U.S. asked Mexico to reassess its defense needs and President Jose Lopez Portillo withdrew his request.¹⁴ It would be beneficial to pursue this as a prelude to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

Canary Islands

Perez said that there was a problem concerning the Canary Islands and the Azores which he wanted to bring to the President's attention. The question is whether these islands are a part of Spain or of Africa; the OAU could use some support. *Perez* said that he would forward some more information on this issue to President Carter.

President Carter said that he hadn't heard about this issue before, and that he liked the idea of tackling new problems. He closed the meeting by saying that he hoped to talk about the Law of the Sea issues tonight and tomorrow.¹⁵

¹⁴ Presumably a reference to Presidential Directive 13 regarding Conventional Arms Transfer Policy. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-81*, vol. XXVI, Arms Control, Document 271. In telegram 4165 from Mexico City, March 11, Lucey reported that after he told Lopez Portillo that sale of F-5s to Mexico "would conflict with President Carter's policy of conventional arms sales, on which he was trying to hold the line." Lopez Portillo responded that Mexico "had no interest at all in the acquisition of fighter aircraft." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780109-0032)

¹⁵ See Document 346. According to the President's Daily Diary, the Carters attended a state dinner that evening. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

346. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Caracas, March 29, 1978, 9:15–10 a.m.

SUBJECT

North-South Dialogue, Energy, the Caribbean and Law of the Sea

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Robert A. Pastor, NSC Staff Member
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky
Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff Member

Venezuela

Carlos Andres Perez, President
Simon Bottaro Consalvi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Manuel Perez Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs
Valentin Acosta Hernandez, Minister of Energy and Mines
Carmelo Lesseur Lauria, Minister, Secretariat of the Presidency
Hector Hurtado, Minister of State, President of the Investment Fund
Ambassador Ignacio Iribarren
Dr. Reinaldo Figuerido, Director of Foreign Trade Institute

North/South

Saying he would like to exchange ideas on North-South matters, Perez observed that President Carter's administration had given another cast to the dialogue. Recalling that the developing nations waited for President Carter to take office before concluding the CIEC talks, Perez noted that while the termination of CIEC was not entirely satisfactory, nevertheless new perspectives opened up on such items as the Common Fund and the debt problem. Even though the proposals agreed upon were relatively modest, the U.S. had showed understanding.

Since that time, however, virtually nothing has happened, and he felt very pessimistic. Perez said he would be meeting with European Chiefs of State in Jamaica in June. They would try to move the "hard heart" of Germany's Schmidt. The U.S. position, however, would be key and the attitude of the United States could support other U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President's Visit to Brazil and Venezuela (3/78), 1-5/78. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Miraflores Palace. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

policies, in Africa, for example. Perez said he would like to have President Carter's evaluation of the situation.

President Carter said he had of course been in office a little more than one year. He has nevertheless seen a common desire on part of both the North and South to reach goals which were not incompatible among themselves: Common Fund, commodity prices, debt forgiveness, increased aid. But our mutual desires have been frustrated by the inability of the DC's to negotiate with any semblance of order or mutual understanding with 90 different nations. Each leader acted politically for his audience back home. Attention focused on the most radical demands or proposals. News media concentrated on leaders who abused us the most. President Carter said he had discussed this problem with Manley. There was an obvious need for a forum that could work in a calm and objective atmosphere. This was the case, for example, with the Common Fund. We were eager to contribute. We felt that there was a major responsibility on the shoulders of those who buy and sell commodities to reach agreements on these issues. But this was almost impossible in a large group of over a hundred nations.

Until a procedural system could be set up to permit quiet negotiations, differences will continue to be emphasized rather than cooperation. We have, however, been unsuccessful so far. President Carter said he was prepared to use his influence with the DC's, and even the USSR, to persuade them to contribute to solution of all these problems. We feel frustrated, however, because of the desire, which we recognize is legitimate, of everyone for a voice in the deliberations.

President Carter suggested that there could be two stages: a small committee which could discuss these issues reasonably, draw up the general lines of a proposal, and then make a presentation to a larger group.

Perez Guerrero, speaking for Perez, noted that they shared President Carter's perceptions, and especially those described in his speech to the Venezuelan Congress.² The world was in a profound crisis, not one which would pass easily. It required mutual cooperation. You need us, he said, and we certainly need you. He described the move in the UN for adequate machinery and the eventual decision to move to the committee of the whole. He appreciated the need for some kind of two-step procedure and this is something to be considered.

Perez Guerrero then noted that Perez' reference to Schmidt's "hard heart" should not be taken as meaning that was the only problem. We have the impression, he said, that even the U.S. at times was more

² For Carter's March 29 remarks before the Venezuelan Congress, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 619-623.

inclined to defend the status quo than create new solutions. There seemed to be at times those who looked to poverty as the problem rather than to structural changes. But while poverty and the need for aid should be attended to, a change in the rules of the game to permit nations to develop more equitably was also important. The necessary changes could take place gradually.

Attention necessarily focused on the U.S. and on how it handled economic and fiscal problems. How was the U.S. handling the critical monetary problem, for example? Can you do that and balance the budget?

President Carter said that we had to move from confrontation to negotiation. We have seemed defensive because we have had to respond to loud attacks. Many past Presidents, including Nixon and Ford, were prepared to cooperate more with the developing world than the Congress. The Congress, very sensitive to the mood of the people, reacted to condemnations of us. When they heard such attacks their perception was that aid was not only not appreciated but not wanted. Hence, they were unwilling to authorize some major moves that were needed.

President Carter, responding directly to the question of the monetary crisis, said that the U.S. has a sound and strong economy with no basic weakness. He cited GNP and other indicators. We have deliberately tried, he said, to keep growth high. OPEC nations, he noted, had a positive trade balance of \$40 billion. This had to be absorbed by the rest of the world. Germany and Japan had positive balances. Our trade, he noted, was negative by over \$30 billion.

President Carter noted several factors that should lead to a strengthening of the dollar. Interest rates would be higher in the U.S. this year, leading to greater investment in-flows. There would be no increase in oil import levels in 78. Last year our economic growth averaged three percent higher than our major trading partners. This year that gap will narrow because other nations' economies are growing faster. We are more aware of the need to act to stabilize the dollar in times of market disorder, and we have worked out agreements with Germany and Japan in this regard. Had oil prices been pegged to the SDR during recent years, *President Carter* noted, OPEC would have earned less.

The U.S. will seek continued growth; we expect to balance the budget by 1980, but it may not be balanced before that. We hope to have an energy bill passed shortly giving us an overall energy policy for the first time.

We have confidence in the strength of the U.S. economy, *Perez* said. What worries us is that the North/South dialogue has stagnated. We have talked about ways of moving the dialogue forward in the UN. The G-77 has pressed for an open forum. No decisions have been

made to carry out the limited agreements of CIEC. Concern over the poor is understood, but poverty is a symptom not a cause. We understand, Perez continued, the U.S. efforts to decrease consumption of oil; it is difficult to become more austere. But concretely, Perez said, how do we put our mutual ideas into practice? How do we make progress on such items as the Common Fund or debt?

President Carter said that the U.S. for its part often has the impression that the G-77 wants all or nothing. Its demands often seem so strict, its condemnation so severe, that it apparently does not understand the practical limitations that do exist. We would welcome, he said, through under Secretary Cooper or the Secretary of State or some other official to describe what we have done, what our plans are, what our practical problems and limitations are so that mutual understanding will be enhanced. We are prepared, for example, to make various types of aid available such as food. Perhaps we could work out a plan that the DC's could carry out sequentially. But we feel that our limits have not been comprehended by others.

Perez said that we are in a vicious cycle. Whenever the LDC's talk of cooperation, the U.S. talks of aid. The U.S. concept is anchored to aid. This is important, of course, but more important is to cooperate on changing relationships, so that countries can overcome the need for aid. Charity is not the answer. Cooperation to establish better relationships in major economic interactions is what is needed. What is needed is not always food, but technology to grow it. Often with food aid, purchasing and production power is reduced. *Perez* cited trade as an example. While on the one hand the U.S. spoke of loaning money or providing aid, protectionism seemed to be rising in the U.S. Increased trade barriers will only make imbalances and poverty worse and the need for aid greater.

President Carter noted that the U.S. had taken the lead in the MTN. Negotiations were being pushed by us. LDC support of our efforts to lower trade barriers would be helpful. The French would not even discuss the issue until after the elections. The Japanese and the Germans have been reluctant to get involved. If the U.S. Congress knew that the LDC's were willing to cooperate, they might take a different view.

At the President's request, *Secretary Vance* then reviewed the various items in the North/South agenda. On debt, he noted that limited progress had been made at the recent UNCTAD meeting; more could have been made had there been better preparation by the participants. But progress here would depend upon working out possible formulae in smaller groups.

On the Common Fund, the Secretary said, the trouble is the "second window". We are fairly close together on the "first window". Some work was done in UNCTAD, but the next step is to work on the second

window concept, since this was symbolic as well as substantive. Here again perhaps a smaller group could get things started. We should make that the next step due to the importance of the Common Fund.

On the financial side, replenishments for the IFI's were of major importance. Support for this would assist in persuading Congress to take favorable action on these replenishments. In trade, the key sector was the MTN. LDC support in this was important. (Perez Guerrero interjected that the U.S. had worked more with the other DC's on this than with the LDC's.) Finally, there should be some cooperation and consideration for refining the structure of the overview committee.

President Carter suggested that Undersecretary Cooper might meet with comparable officials of a few other nations, including Venezuela and Jamaica, for quiet consultations. At this staff level issues could be defined and analyzed for the information of the leaders in a quiet way.

Perez said that was a good idea, but it should be done with discretion so that others could not accuse us of "running things". In this connection, *Perez* said, the role of Algeria, as Chairman of the Overview Committee, is important. Despite some of their strong views, its leaders were responsible and practical and should be included.

President Carter mentioned that several other leaders, even the Saudis and Sadat, had suggested that we work with Boumediene.

Energy

Perez said that the recent talks in Washington between Secretary Schlesinger and Minister Hernandez were useful, significant, and very positive.³ We should now like to push ahead on concrete cooperation more rapidly. We were worried, *Perez* said, because our productive oil capacity is declining. Production limits were in the neighborhood of 2.5 million BPD. Thus, Venezuela's capacity to help in an emergency, such as the 1973 embargo, was limited, and it could not do now what it did then.

Venezuela has reserves, *Perez* went on. The tar belt was one of the world's largest reserves of non-conventional oil. The nation's capacity to expand exploration and productive capacity is limited because its access to technology and capital is limited. *Perez* said he hoped that the USG could cooperate in helping Venezuela advance its productive capacity for the future, since such capacity would be strategically important to the U.S. as a safe source of future hydrocarbons.

³ In telegram 60227 to Caracas, March 9, the Department reported on the discussions between Schlesinger and Hernandez regarding U.S. energy legislation, the development of the Orinoco Tar Belt, and a potential bilateral program of energy cooperation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780105-0913)

Perez explained that the Japanese had made a proposal to invest a billion dollars in a pilot project for developing the tar belt. The GOV accepted it in principle. It would like to consider similar cooperation with Europeans and the U.S. This may be possible with the Europeans. Unfortunately, there is no U.S. state entity, and it was politically impossible to deal with the private companies.

One thought that has occurred to us, *Perez* said, was a possible joint venture with the U.S. and Canada. Petrocan, as a state entity, could be the channel for funneling technology and capital. U.S. capital through private companies could associate with Petrocan. Trudeau, *Perez* said, would be willing to cooperate.

Venezuela was also worried, *Perez* continued, about plans to increase domestic refining capacity and to reduce imports of refined products. (This referred to the Haskell Amendment.)⁴ This would present a serious problem to Venezuelan exports of residuals. There was also concern about imposition of tariffs on imports.

Director of Foreign Trade Figueredo, at *Perez*' request, explained a situation in which the U.S. may have violated the U.S.-Venezuelan commercial agreement on tariffs on oil. He provided an Aide Memoire on this item.⁵

Minister Hernandez elaborated on *Perez*' remarks and covered the same ground asking in effect how can the U.S. and Venezuela cooperate to develop reserves and obtain technology and financial help, bearing in mind the political problem of being unable to deal directly with the TNC's.

Hernandez also pointed out that while Venezuelan crude makes up only about 10 percent of U.S. crude imports, Venezuelan fuel oil makes up about 40 percent of imports of that product. Therefore, Venezuelan residuals were important to the U.S. He asked whether it would not be possible for the USG to purchase fuel oil for its strategic reserve. He also asked: "Can we count on a stable market?" He suggested that some long-term arrangements might be in order to guarantee a stable market in return for a secure and assured supply, perhaps some sort of Western Hemisphere preference.

Perez said that the strategic reserves of the U.S. were important to Venezuela as well, and he wondered if the U.S. and Venezuela cannot cooperate now, then it might be even more difficult in the future. After the Presidential elections in December, *Perez* said that he planned to raise prices of gasoline. It would be very unpopular to do now, but

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, footnote 3, Document 146.

⁵ Not found.

Venezuela's problem is that it is consuming so much gasoline that it has too little to export while having too much residuals.

Hernandez said that Venezuela's refineries were built to fit the needs of the U.S. East Coast, but Venezuela's principal goal is to have a mechanism which will permit greater stability for supplying petroleum and residuals.

Perez said that the Dutch Antilles would soon be independent. There are two refineries on those islands, one owned by Exxon, the other by Shell. The GOV intends to "associate" itself with these refineries making arrangements to guarantee crude supplies. Because an independent Antilles will need this industry, this complex will have political importance for the Caribbean. The U.S. should therefore consider giving some assurance of a market for these refineries.

President Carter said that the U.S. had to pass an energy program first. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the only major investment for the Orinoco would have to come from the U.S. companies. These companies would be eager to invest if they could have some stability for their contracts. They are disturbed about the nationalizations and outstanding law suits. Right now, the oil companies were busy lobbying the Congress, but perhaps after the energy bill passed, they may have time to invest in Venezuela.

President Carter said that he welcomed the development of the Orinoco by Japan, Canada and others. The U.S. is not competing against them. They have national oil companies, and Japan has a lot of capital to invest. He said that he was not aware of any effort in the Congress to restrict refineries in the U.S., but that if it were introduced, he doesn't think it would pass. *Jim Schlesinger* would know, and he'll find out.

President Carter said that he was aware that Venezuela wanted a long-term agreement, and he thinks it's a good idea. The President said that he would take this proposal up with Secretary *Schlesinger* aggressively when he returned. Meanwhile, he suggested to *Perez* that he might want to send Minister *Hernandez* to the U.S. to talk with the companies about research and development on oil shale and tar sands.

Caribbean

Perez said that it was very important for the U.S. and Venezuela to move forward on helping the Caribbean Group set up by the World Bank's conference.⁶

⁶ In a June 16 letter to *Perez*, *Carter* wrote that *Perez's* "decision to supply 10 percent of the financing for the Caribbean Development Facility (CDF) proposed by the World Bank is a welcome one," and that the USG planned "to channel much of the development assistance we will provide to the new facility via the Caribbean Development Bank." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 6/78-3/79)

Law of the Sea

Perez expressed his concern about the LOS Conference and specifically the prospect that the U.S. would act unilaterally in seabed mining.⁷ This would open Pandora's box and other nations would feel justified in acting unilaterally. The situation would be chaotic. He said that it would be bad for the U.S. to show impatience in this area when the developing countries have been so patient in the North-South dialogue.

President Carter said he was also deeply worried. It was difficult for him to restrain the Congress from passing legislation authorizing unilateral mining of seabeds since we have the capability. While he would do the best he can, legislation is a possibility. This was not a threat; he just wanted *Perez* to know how serious the situation was.

President Carter went on to say that our differences are deep. In particular a change of the LOS Conference President bothers us. There is a great investment in time up to now. To change the leadership would delay things a year. Perhaps more than in any other subject, the issues of LOS have been aired and intensely debated. He hoped, *President Carter* said, that there would be flexibility on both sides.

President Carter said he wanted to make two points: (a) We will try to avoid unilateral actions on seabed mining; (b) if we do pass legislation, he would do his best to see that such action is not prejudicial to the interests of the LDC's. He said that he would try to see that there was a fair distribution of the benefits to other countries.

Perez said that if the U.S. takes unilateral action that this would open the North-South dialogue to attacks on North American imperialism.

President Carter said he will do all he can to try to reach agreement in the Conference, but if it fails, and we need to take unilateral action, I will try to see that the benefits of mining are apportioned as fairly as possible and compatible with existing proposals in the LOS discussion.

Perez said that he was not worried just because of deep seabeds mining, but because of its possible effect on the North-South dialogue.

President Carter ended the conversation by suggesting that it might be useful to have quiet bilateral talks as early as next week at a high level on LOS issues to define them and explore solutions. *President Perez* agreed.

⁷ For the Carter Administration approach to U.S. seabed mining legislation after the 6th Session of the Law of the Sea Conference, see *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXV, Global Issues; United Nations Issues, which is scheduled for publication.

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, September 2, 1978, 1527Z

8293. Subject: President Perez' Views on Nicaragua. Ref: San Jose 3750²

1. I called on President Perez, who was accompanied by Acting Foreign Minister Gomez Mantellini, at 8:30 pm on September 1. Already advised of the subject, Perez immediately took the initiative and asked rhetorically "If we are all going to sit around while genocide is committed in Nicaragua"? He answered his own question by stating that it is still not too late to take some collective action to persuade Somoza to step down. If such action is not taken, he foresaw only continuing deterioration of the security situation until the U.S. finally will be forced to intervene militarily. "When this happens," said Perez, "we will have to join with the rest of Latin America in protest."

2. According to Perez, Somoza unfortunately regards President Carter's letter to him (expressing appreciation for Somoza's decision to allow the visit of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission) as a symbol of continued U.S. approval (or at least as the absence of disapproval).³ The sending of the letter (which Perez said he was obliged to regard as being at odds with the U.S.-Venezuelan understanding to consult on Nicaragua) had had this negative effect. It will now be necessary for the U.S.G. to disabuse Somoza of the notion that he enjoys American support and approval.

3. Perez thought that Somoza was not above trying to relieve internal pressures against him through a foreign adventure. He said President Carazo had privately expressed fears in this regard. Perez said he told Carazo that Costa Rica could count on complete Venezuelan support, including military, if it should become necessary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1904. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information immediate to Mexico City, San Jose, and the White House. The Embassy was responding to telegram 222951 to Caracas, September 1, which instructed the ambassador or chargé to deliver to Perez an oral message from Carter: "I have been watching developments in Nicaragua very closely and am very concerned, as I'm sure you are. I would very much appreciate your personal assessment of this situation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-1795) See *Foreign Relations, 1977–80*, vol. XX, Central America, Document 88.

² September 1. The Embassy reported: "Carazo believes that the time may have passed for any Somoza self-initiated transition of power to trusted associates, civilian or of the GN, but that now Somoza has to go." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139-2539)

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 76.

4. The formula which Perez considered most viable for the transition was what he called "Somozaism without Somoza." Somoza would be given guarantees for his safety and property in return for stepping down voluntarily. Governing authority would then be vested in a body composed of members of the Group of 12 and of senior National Guard officers. In this way, Sandinista influence would be minimized. The Sandinistas are a varied lot, said Perez, ranging from doctrinaire Marxists to democratic leftists. In any case, Perez thought their influence could be controlled. He added that if what was worrying the USG was the possibility that the ousting of Somoza would lead to a Communist take-over, he would be willing to send a personal emissary to Fidel Castro to request guarantees that Castro would not intervene to assist the Sandinistas. He thought at this point he could obtain them, he said. However, if the situation deteriorates further, it will be too late for anything else but a radical revolutionary solution in which Castro is bound to play a role.

5. When I asked how he thought the collective action should be organized, Perez said he thought it could be carried out in unison by the Governments of the U.S., Costa Rica and Venezuela. (As an after thought, he added the Government of Colombia). He appeared to rule out action through the OAS (although we have just learned that the Gov has decided to ask today for a consultative meeting of the UN Security Council and may request similar action in the OAS).

6. Perez said that whether or not any effective joint action can be undertaken against the Somoza regime, Venezuela is seriously considering breaking off diplomatic relations, possibly as early as Monday, September 4. He directed the Acting Foreign Minister to have the necessary documents and press communique prepared on a contingency basis and to have them ready for his return from the Andean Region on Sunday evening. Perez said he could be reached through the Acting Foreign Minister over the weekend in case we had any urgent messages for him. He reiterated strongly that action must be taken rapidly before the situation deteriorates any farther.

Crowley

348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, September 22, 1978, 1125Z

241478. Subject: Message for President Perez From President Carter

1. Dear President Perez: We have had reports during the night that Panama is planning an attack on Nicaragua, perhaps with Venezuelan assistance.²

2. Such action would be a tragic mistake. Not only would it cause bloodshed and suffering but it would lead to destructive armed clashes between nations of this hemisphere and threaten international strife. Such action would have a devastatingly adverse effect on our bilateral relations and could undo all we have sought to achieve in the hemisphere.

3. The United States has asked other nations to join in a mediation effort in Nicaragua. We are urgently pressing this effort. Ambassador Jordan expects to see General Somoza within the next forty eight hours with respect to this effort. Attack by your forces would prevent the mediation effort from going forward and interfere with our determined efforts to find an enduring peaceful solution. It is essential that you abandon any plans you may have for military intervention and allow this mediation process to have a chance to succeed.

4. In the strongest terms I urge that no military action be taken against Nicaragua.

5. Even if Venezuelan forces are not directly involved an attack by Panama would tend to involve you and reflect adversely on your country because of the associations which are well known. Therefore, if your country is not directly involved I urge you to contact General Torrijos and warn him of the adverse consequences of his reported actions.

Sincerely,

Christopher³

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-1777. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House. Drafted by Christopher; cleared by Vaky; approved in S/S-O.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 103.

³ In telegram 9022 from Caracas, September 22, the Embassy reported that Chargé Crowley delivered the message to Acting Foreign Minister Nava Carrillo at 10:30 that morning. Nava transmitted the message to Perez and dictated Perez's reply to Crowley, which said in part: "I have no knowledge of any plan by the chief of government of Panama regarding any military action affecting Nicaragua, and in my conversations with General Torrijos he has not even insinuated to me such a possibility." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1915)

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, October 11, 1978, 2300Z

9609. Subject: Nicaragua: Conversation With President Perez

1. Summary: During breakfast with President Perez, I listened to his entire tale of woe about his relations with the USG over Nicaragua. The President proposed a secret agreement between the US-Venezuela-Colombia-Panama to have a peacekeeping force on standby should chaos develop in Nicaragua. He also explained in some detail his assurances from Fidel that Cuba would not actively involve itself there. To several probes from me he denied that any evidence could be adduced that Venezuela is assisting the Sandinista movement or intervening in any way. He said he would be preparing a letter to President Carter in the next few days explaining again his belief that "delaying is not deciding" and that time is on the side of Somoza.² End summary.

2. In a two-hour breakfast at La Casona on October 11, I found the President as eloquent, friendly and energetic as ever. He is ending up his presidency strongly convinced that he leaves a more vital Venezuela than when he took over. Speaking candidly about the end of his administration, he is clearly not, as some have suggested, ignoring the fact that his presidency is coming to an end. On the contrary, he is trying to wrap up a number of initiatives, including Somoza before he leaves office in March. He was as friendly as he has always been with me and we talked about some of the changes he had noted in Venezuela over my five years of absence.

3. The conversation passed quickly to the subject of Nicaragua. The President related the entire history of his relations with Somoza and Nicaragua from the time of his exile in Costa Rica and spoke in considerable detail about the various events, as he saw them, since the death of Chamorro, including the visit of President Carter,³ his many talks with Torrijos, his long day on Orchila with Somoza, his profound disappointment to learn, after that meeting, of President Carter's letter

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1925. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found. In telegram 9674 from Caracas, October 14, Luers reported that he told Lauria that he "thought it was probably not desirable to have a letter written on this subject to President Carter at this stage. Lauria agreed that for the time being it would be best to deal more informally." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1933)

³ See Documents 345 and 346.

to Somoza⁴ and his increasing disappointment with the “naive and delaying” policy of the U.S. Perez is obsessed with this problem as everyone knows, but he said to me on my departure that he wants to clear it up before he leaves office. He believes he alone: can deliver Venezuela’s support; can influence the major external actors, particularly Fidel and Torrijos, but including the U.S., and, more importantly, that he can be an important actor in influencing the direction of events within Nicaragua. His ego is involved, not to mention his entire sense of history.

4. Between his orations on the role he perceives himself as having played, he did permit me opportunities to explain U.S. policy. I conveyed to him in some detail the information provided me through other channels about evidence of recent Sandinista involvement with the Cubans.⁵ (Thanks for that information by the way). I went over in general terms the status of the Mediation Group’s negotiations in Nicaragua. I went over with him an elaborate chart provided me by ARA of the Frente Amplio Opositor (FAO) NTO demonstrate the scope of the opposition. He assured me that he had had contact with virtually all of the elements we had listed as represented in the FAO. I assured him that our policy was not to try to delay until 1981. Our policy was to work through the Mediation Group to develop a consensus within the FAO and within Nicaragua on how best to organize a peaceful transition from the Somoza government. I told him that the FAO, including a representative of the Group of 12 as a major spokesman, was clearly seeing some benefit from these discussions. Some lifting of censorship had already been achieved and they were continuing to talk. It seemed to me unfortunate for anyone outside Nicaragua to be more aggressive and anxious than the FAO itself. I said that even if Somoza’s decision to lift the censorship was a tactic to divide the FAO we are continuing to try to work toward a lifting of the state of siege and other relaxations of constitutional restraints. I explained that we realized the task was extremely difficult but so far it had proceeded better than we had expected. I said that we saw broad support developing for a change in Somoza’s government, that Somoza seemed uncertain and that we need time and the support of the Venezuelan Government.

5. At several stages in the conversation I brought the subject back to Cuban involvement. Perez described assurances he had received

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 347.

⁵ Presumably a reference to telegram 256058 to Caracas, October 7, in which Vaky advised Luers to raise with Perez “accounts of sizeable Venezuelan covert aid in arms for Sandinistas.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Caracas, 1963–79)

from Fidel that Fidel would no longer involve himself with arms or direct support for the Sandinistas. Perez said he had summoned the Colombian writer, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, to discuss Fidel's strategy. Perez gave Garcia Marquez a precise message to take to Fidel describing the conditions that Fidel should agree to with regard to Nicaragua. Perez did not give me those specifics nor did he describe what Venezuela agreed to as a quid pro quo. He did say, however, that he has Fidel's word that Cuba will not involve itself in the support of the Sandinistas, either with arms or forces. Perez said these were assurances not unlike those he extracted from Fidel on Panama. He said he believes Fidel will keep his word in this case and he is basing his policy on that belief. I said his trust of Castro has, therefore, become a critical factor in Venezuela's strategy and we could not share that trust. I also said that many Sandinistas were already formed ideologically and do not need Fidel's support. I then said forcefully that it is curious that CAP would take the word of Fidel, for whom he has little respect, and reject the word of President Carter with whom he has close relations. He smarted, then smiled saying there is a difference between accepting the word of a friend and alerting him to naive policies, the latter being what he considers he is doing with regard to President Carter. He said he does not doubt the President's commitment or intentions, but questions seriously the USG's strategy.

6. I said that during the next few days while negotiations are beginning to take hold, the U.S., together with other mediators, is conveying a rather clear [position] to the opposition about our intentions. We hope that no violence will take place in Nicaragua during this crucial phase. I read from San Jose 4280⁶ a quote from Eden Pastora (Commandante Cero) that the FSLN now had "bazookas and 60 and 80 millimeter mortars, anti-tank missiles and 50 caliber machine guns." I said that this statement suggested the intention and capability of the Sandinistas to attack in the near future. Should such an attack take place, it would clearly do grave damage to our efforts to bring about a peaceful transition and most likely result in an even more savage retaliation from the National Guard than we witnessed only a month ago. Equally serious would be Somoza's reaction and the reaction of other Latin American governments. I said that Somoza's tactic of accusing Venezuela and Panama of promoting intervention, accompanied with his presumed allegation that it was Venezuela and Panama that had supplied the Sandinistas with weapons would, in the minds of many Latin American governments, justify Somoza's claim that he had been attacked from abroad. At a time when sympathy for Somoza is

⁶ Dated October 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780409-0885)

wavering everywhere, it would be a grave mistake for that to take place. Perez quickly assured me that under no circumstances could any demonstration be made that Venezuela had supplied arms or assistance to the Sandnistas. I said, looking him in the eye, that I hoped that was the case. He did not look back.

7. I asked the President what influence he felt he had over the Sandinistas and particularly over Pastora. At first he said he had no influence whatsoever. It is clearly a determined group that had become more radicalized over time, but he was sure Pastora was not a communist. I asked if they would listen to Perez. He said, of course they would, and he was in contact with them, but he could not influence them one way or the other on attacking Nicaragua. I used the analogy of Africa and said that the problem we were facing in Rhodesia and even Namibia was that the opposition in those areas probably was less likely to agree to negotiating a solution because of the availability of Cuban and Soviet troops. The transfer of arms and the offer of more arms plus the political backing of larger powers clearly tended to discourage negotiations. I said that supplying arms to the Sandinistas and the encouragement they received from Venezuela and others might make it even more difficult to find agreement within the left for our mediation effort. I noted that Ramirez, nonetheless, seemed to be negotiating seriously as a representative of the Group of 12. Perez again reacted forcefully and said he understood that argument well, yet what amazed him was that the Sandinistas had not used force already and that they had waited so long since the last attack. I found this a non-sequiter and told him so.

8. The President said he has learned that Somoza has contracted with a Venezuelan exile to kill him and that Nicaragua was planning an attack on Perez personally. The President said if that should happen, Venezuela would attack Nicaragua immediately and take care of the matter unilaterally. I said it seemed unlikely to me that Somoza would be so stupid. I said to the President that I could never tell when he made such statements whether he was simply trying to provoke the US or whether he was really serious. He smiled. Getting my point, he referred to the exchange of letters several weeks ago with President Carter.⁷ In some pulling back from his earlier remarks he indicated that it was only after the exchange of letters and his fury that he learned that Torrijos had indeed been up to something. I told the President that I thought that he, of all people, could work closely with the USG to achieve our common ends but that provocations of this type were

⁷ Presumably a reference to Document 348.

not helpful, that our process involved some degree of patience, and that we, as much as he, needed to avoid the use of military force.

9. The one seemingly serious proposal the President had to offer was that a secret pact should be reached between the U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and Panama, possibly including Guatemala, to join in a peacekeeping force to be used in Nicaragua in case of complete breakdown of order or a large scale act of genocide by Somoza and the National Guard. Perez said that, except for the National Guard, Somoza is completely without power or support within his country, that what will happen is either a [garble] National Guard last ditch effort against the Nicaraguan people or the murder of Somoza, either of which could lead to chaos within the country. What responsible governments need to do is to agree to restore order after one of these two events and have the force ready to do it. I said that I did not know what his responsibilities were to his Congress, but I thought it unlikely that President Carter could enter into such agreement without the approval of Congress nor could he undertake such an effort without Congressional agreement either formal or informal. I said, moreover, that I thought such a force would not receive the support of most of the countries of Latin American or the OAS. The President's immediate reaction was that they meant nothing to him. Then he changed his arguments and said that, under the right conditions, most of the countries of Latin America except for Brazil, Chile and Uruguay would probably come to support such action if were seen as a humane act.

10. The President had another appointment and asked that we continue the conversation later. He said he would be preparing a letter for President Carter laying out some of his views at a later time. This cable is already too long but I have given the main points and some of the flavor of his sense of frustration over the slow pace of the evolution of U.S. policy and U.S. actions with regard to Somoza. We will be sending a separate cable in the next few days analyzing CAP's political strategy and psychological state and we will try to have some recommendations on how to manage this matter here over the coming weeks.⁸

Luers

⁸ In telegram 9689 from Caracas, October 14, the Embassy wrote: "Perez is obsessed with forcing Somoza to leave power by March 1979 when Perez' presidential term ends. His tactics keep changing in response to internal and external developments." The Embassy recommended that the USG should "provide Perez personally with information to convince him that our efforts in Nicaragua are serious," "continue to work closely with his advisors keeping them informed so that they can exercise some influence over him," and "continue to provide Perez with any believable information we have on Cuban involvement in Nicaragua." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1937)

350. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, October 28, 1978, 0302Z

10231. Subject: Nicaragua: Conversation With President Perez and Ramiro Cardenal. Ref: Caracas 10230²

1. Summary: I met with President Perez Friday³ evening and provided him copies of the FAO press release, the most recent FAO proposal, and the Group of 12 communique. He said he was in full agreement with the most recent FAO proposal and thought the institutional solution was a good one. He still, however, reflected skepticism about Somoza leaving, is worried about FSLN impatience, and the possibility of violence. Perez, after a half hour conversation, called in visiting Group of 12 representative Ramiro Cardenal and Minister Lauria to discuss Perez' plan to meet with Robelo, Cordova, Rivas, Pastora, Tunerman and possibly others very soon to press for support for the mediation. Cardenal said that Robelo had told him by phone that he could withstand the pressure to withdraw from the FAO only for another week or so. Perez said that if the U.S. could give guarantees that Somoza would leave if the plan being evolved by the FAO is fully accepted by the Group of 12, he was certain the Group of 12 would support it. He said the U.S. should give the FAO now a specific list of what we were prepared to do to assure Somoza's departure. I replied we are working for a Nicaraguan solution and it is not appropriate for us to describe how we would remove Somoza. I said I could not give him guarantees on Somoza's departure, but it was my strong impression that once the Nicaraguan solution were presented to Somoza he could be persuaded to depart. I strongly urged support for continuing the mediation process and holding off military action. Perez became impatient with my repeated appeals to avoid violence and said it was naive for the U.S. to think the Sandinistas could hold off from attacking much longer. I agreed we would try to facilitate passports for him to hold his meeting in Caracas soon. Perez is still playing the brinksman and trying to push forward our time frame. He was also

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1958. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.

² October 28. Luers reported that Perez wanted the USG to "facilitate the issuance of passports to Rafael Robelo and Cordova Rivas so that they can come quickly to Venezuela to consult with President Perez on the mediation effort." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780443-1092)

³ October 27.

showing off a bit for Cardenal. But he agreed with the FAO proposal and I am persuaded he will be helpful. End Summary.

2. In an evening meeting in his office, I presented President Perez with the most recent documents on the mediation: the FAO press release, the most recent FAO proposal and the Group of 12 communique. He said he was bothered by recent developments and was anxious to summon to Caracas the major actors . . . Robelo, Cordoval, Rivas, Pastora and Tunerman, plus others if possible. Even though he was skeptical about the mediation effort, he strongly supports the institutional solution that preserves the constitution and provides for a constituent assembly. (He obviously had read the previous version I had handed him.)⁴ He said he had not been in touch with anyone except for Ramiro Cardenal of the Group of 12, who was next door with Minister Lauria. He summoned the two to join us after we went over some of the familiar ground of Perez' impatience with U.S. intentions and the pace of the mediation.

3. When Cardenal joined us we discussed at first the necessity for facilitating the issuance of passports to Robelo and Cordova Riva. (See reftel.) Perez said he wanted to have the meeting as soon as possible in Caracas to see what could be done to keep the mediation effort going. Cardenal said that he had been in frequent touch with Robelo who said that there was strong pressure on him to withdraw from the FAO and that he would probably have to withdraw if significant progress was not made within the next two weeks. Cardenal also said that he had been trying to reach Pastora in Costa Rica but had talked with Pastora's wife and hoped to be in touch within the next day or so to urge Pastora to come to Caracas.

4. Perez forcefully (partially for Cardenal's benefit) reiterated his skepticism of U.S. intentions. He said the U.S. should now tell the FAO and the Group of 12 exactly what we will do, in case Somoza does not depart, to remove him and when we are prepared to do this. He said that if the U.S. were to take such a step, the excellent FAO plan could go into effect immediately with the support of the Group of 12. I said that we were looking for a plan that could be supported broadly by Nicaraguans, that in seeking a Nicaraguan solution it would be inappropriate and disruptive for us to describe how we would remove Somoza, which would be contrary to our whole effort thus far. I said, however, that I was persuaded that if a truly Nicaraguan solution were to evolve, and I thought we were approaching one, then Somoza would leave. Perez said that if the U.S. could give a guarantee of this to the FAO, the entire process could move very rapidly with full Group of

⁴ Not found.

12 support. I said I could not give such a guarantee, but that I could assure him that if violence were to break out and the Sandinistas attack at this stage, the mediation efforts, which had come so far, would be gravely damaged.

5. I told the President that the U.S. wanted his support for the mediation. I then went through what I already reported (in para 2 of Caracas 10230).⁵ I stressed the confidentiality of this information. Perez demonstrated impatience both with my appeals for confidentiality of our discussions and my repeated concern over the outbreak of violence. Partially he was impatient to return to his home since this is his birthday; partially he is impatient with the pace of U.S. actions and what he perceives to be naive policy, but most importantly it was his way of keeping up the pressure and moving forward our time schedule. He repeatedly says he has no control over the timing of a Sandinista attack which could occur at any time. My conclusion, however, from the conversation is that Perez wants to help move the mediation forward. I, at no time, asked that he or Venezuela press the Group of 12 to return to the FAO. What I did stress was the need to support the mediation and avoid violence.

6. I will be seeing Lauria tomorrow, and, if necessary, the President. Should the conclave being organized by Perez come off, I would at some point like guidance from both Ambassador Bowdler and Assistant Secretary Vaky on the appropriate role I should play, if any.⁶

7. Comment: I sense from the exchange between Perez and Cardenal that there was considerable disagreement within the Group of 12 over the tactics of withdrawal and specifically over the most recent FAO proposal. Cardenal said that he fully endorses the most recent proposal and implied that there were only a few in the Group of 12 who were opposed to it. Any thoughts on this subject will also be helpful.

Luers

⁵ See footnote 2, above. Luers reported that he told Perez that he “had no instructions on openly supporting his efforts to bring these representatives of the FAO to Caracas. I said, however, that I was certain that Ambassador Bowdler would undertake personally to try to arrange for the passports as soon as possible.”

⁶ In telegram 276484 to Caracas, October 31, the Department repeated telegram 5425 from Managua, October 29, in which Bowdler recommended that Luers should not attend the meeting but should “enlist the support of Perez” to “influence” the FAO “to work together, be patient, support the mediation, and, above all, to avoid violence,” and that Luers should also “ascertain in as much detail as possible what happens at the meeting.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780009-0030) For the meeting between Perez and members of the FAO in Caracas, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 131.

351. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, November 16, 1978, 2005Z

10870. Subject: Nicaraguan Mediation. Ref: State 289989, Luers/Vaky Telephone Call²

1. Summary. I explained to Foreign Minister Consalvi on the evening of November 15 our intentions to try to resolve the central issue of Somoza's departure by seeing whether a plebiscite could be agreed to by all parties. I did this following my reading of reftel and after seeking authority and guidelines from Assistant Secretary Vaky. We must keep in close touch with Perez and his advisers during these critical phases. I drew on reftel for background and stressed to Consalvi that the U.S. and Venezuelan democracies probably had no choice but to give the plebiscite proposal a chance. I explained our full appreciation of the problems of carrying out a genuine plebiscite in Nicaragua saying the conditions we would require were based on strict international control. I stressed to Consalvi that President Perez on the eve of Venezuelan elections would be in an excellent position to defend free elections and explain their importance if he were required to should our current negotiating posture leak out. I stressed, however, that we hoped to keep this information extremely closely held. Consalvi took my explanation calmly. He stated that he did not believe the FAO would accept the plebiscite proposal. He said he would do his best to sell this to Perez and persuade him not to react too negatively, in public at least. He said he did not believe Pastora would engage in bloodshed without broad support—"he is not a loner." He also said that this close to the Dec. 3 presidential elections, he did not believe Perez would want to take any risks. Consalvi accepted a formula I suggested for a Venezuelan public stance on the plebiscite which, if accepted by Perez, should avoid rocking the boat from this end. I called on Minister of the Presidency Lauria on November 16 in the morning to review the bidding. Lauria had been with Perez and Consalvi late last night when Consalvi explained our position to the President. The President reacted negatively but not emotionally. He characterized it as another step to give Somoza more time, but doubted that the idea would prosper with the FAO. Lauria does not think we need to do any more now with

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101-1995. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information immediate to Managua.

² Dated November 15. The Department provided a "summary and analysis of the mediation effort to date." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-2272) No record of the telephone call between Luers and Vaky was found.

Perez who will probably not have occasion to comment to the press. Perez is having a press conference on Monday, November 20 and we should give them a better read out before that time. Lauria and Consalvi, I think, will be helpful during this difficult phase and the President is preoccupied with the elections. I hope that we can keep Venezuela under control by keeping them well informed and not surprising them. End summary.

2. On learning from reftel our current policy course regarding Nicaragua, I sought immediately authority from Assistant Secretary Vaky to brief GOV. Following my long and extremely helpful secure phone conversation with Vaky I asked Foreign Minister Consalvi to come by my residence on his way to the President's dinner for the Kuwaiti Petroleum Minister. In a half-hour conversation, I relayed our current posture drawing heavily on reftel and on my conversation with Pete Vaky.

3. Drawing on reftel I gave Consalvi some background on the "plebiscite" proposal of Somoza. I said that the USG has come to the conclusion that we must respond to Somoza's suggestion for a plebiscite in Nicaragua, to seek a resolution on the central issue of Somoza's departure. I said that President Carter wants to be able to assure the U.S. Congress, the U.S. people, and the world that this democratic option has been tried. In fact, as a democracy, the U.S. must do this. I added that the conditions for the plebiscite are onerous and that we have no idea whether Somoza would accept them, even if the FAO were to accept the plebiscite. In the first place, the plebiscite is to decide whether or not Somoza should leave; secondly, the plebiscite must be carried out under international auspices; and thirdly, throughout the plebiscite, the Guardia Nacional would probably have to remain in its barracks.

4. Consalvi replied that his personal and immediate reaction was that such a plebiscite would split the FAO. He said that if anyone within the FAO accepted it, it would, in effect, split the FAO. Second, he said if there is a plebiscite it must be done quickly, with a maximum of publicity and in accordance with a very strict timetable and controls.

5. I told Consalvi that President Perez must understand what is at stake and that he should not dismiss the exploration of the plebiscite proposal as another delaying tactic allowing Somoza to gain strength. It is also essential, I added, that Pastora and the FSLN not despair and go on the attack causing bloodshed. I said that my worry was how President Perez would react should the fact that we are pursuing the plebiscite option become public knowledge. I stressed that we were keeping this very closely held and I hoped that the Venezuelan Government would do likewise, but a press leak in Washington or Nicaragua was not unheard of. In such a case, I said that President Perez, on the

eve of Venezuela's elections, was in an ideal situation to discuss the meaning of free elections and plebiscites. Without fully supporting the plebiscite idea, the President could discuss the importance of elections with international controls, and free press and open debate. What concerns me would be a strictly negative GOV reaction. Consalvi did not expect the president's reactions to be too emotional and agreed that taking a positive line on elections and international controls might appeal to the President.

6. I then returned to the question of possible bloodshed by the FSLVN and Pastora, and I said to Consalvi that because of the perceived Venezuelan influence with an assistance to the Sandinistas, any bloodshed caused by the Sandinistas would carry with it a certain culpability for Venezuela. Consalvi replied, somewhat uncomfortably, that the culpability would be relative. But he took the point and added that, in his view, Pastora would not attack without the approval of the FAO and the Group of 12. He said Pastora is not a loner. Consalvi added that the key issue was to make the FAO buy the idea of the plebiscite. He added, however, that he did not believe that the FAO would accept the plebiscite and would consider it simply another trick by Somoza. Consalvi said he would try to tell the President "as coldly as I can" November 15, at a dinner at La Casona for Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ali Kalifa El Saban.

7. I reiterated to Consalvi that this was a serious proposal and not a delaying tactic, but it was an option which democracies such as the U.S. and Venezuela, for the purpose of their own integrity and for the judgment of history, should not forego. He agreed. As if to reassure me that Perez would not be too disposed to any adventures, Consalvi said that Perez has "other worries", i.e. the election; but then he added that the latest data poll shows that the ad candidate has a lead of 5-6 percent. He observed that this is good news, but that, in any event, Perez would not want to get involved in any "problems" this close to elections. Consalvi assured me a second time that he would do the best he could in presenting this to the President, and we left it that he would let me know whether, in his estimation, it would be useful for me to discuss this personally with the President.

8. I saw Minister Lauria this morning and got read-out on Consalvi's briefing of President Perez and Lauria late last night after the dinner. Lauria said that the President's reaction was indeed negative but not emotional. Both Consalvi and Lauria had expected a stronger reaction. Perez saw it, however, as another means of keeping Somoza in power. Lauria said, however, that he thought it unlikely the President would have an opportunity to react publicly should a leak occur until next Monday³ when Perez has a press conference. Lauria stressed that

³ November 20.

the President is completely occupied with election worries and he does not think, at least for the next two days, I need to see the President. Should, however, the FAO or Somoza react or a leak occur in the next two days, I should get back to Lauria or Consalvi prior to the President's press conference.

9. Comment: Consalvi and Lauria are both preoccupied with electoral problems. They are also inclined to the supportive and want no problems for Perez or the ad party at this stage. I think it is essential, however, that the department keep me fully informed on these developments and on the rationale for our policy so that we can manage the situation here almost on a daily basis. I do not know to what degree Perez or his people will have contact with Pastora over our policy. But I am persuaded that Venezuela does not want an outbreak of violence in Nicaragua that could implicate them at this stage. My suggestion to Consalvi that Venezuela might share some burden for bloodshed was taken by Consalvi, but not very well. I did not repeat that line to Lauria. End comment.

Luers

352. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

RP M 78-10448

Washington, November 30, 1978

Summary

The Democratic Action and the Social Christian parties, the two major political forces that have run Venezuela since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in 1958, are again jockeying for position for the 3 December general elections. The Democratic Action's candidate, Luis Pinerua Ordaz, is holding a narrow lead in opinion polls and seems the likely winner over his Social Christian opponent, Luis Herrera Campins. Although strong competitors, the two left-of-center parties tend to have similar outlooks on basic questions of international policy, economic development and national security; both are concerned by signs of growing public impatience with the inability of the major parties to solve many glaring problems, such as a shortage of

¹Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 80T00634A, Box 5, Folder 9. Confidential. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

housing, underemployment, and badly deficient public services. This frustration is particularly intense among the lowest income groups, which have yet to receive what they consider their fair share of 20 years of democratic rule and economic well-being.

Independent *Causa Comun* candidate, Diego Arria, is making a surprisingly strong showing in opinion polls. Arria has concentrated his efforts on a media-oriented campaign to make up what he lacks in party organization. He hopes to win support from the large independent bloc as well as from disaffected members of both major parties. If he attains 12 to 15 percent of the vote, he will score a major success and will play a significant role in the political system.

The governing Democratic Action Party's handling of both the nationalized oil industry and foreign companies has come in for sporadic criticism, but no important US interests are involved in this election. In fact, none would be put in jeopardy by the election of either of the major contenders. US-Venezuelan relations, however, will undergo a subtle change whichever administration takes over next March. Issues such as trade restrictions and technology transfer will assume a greater importance as Venezuela industrializes. The major differences in approach will be a reduction in the amount of time and resources directed toward foreign policy concerns as the new administration turns inward to deal with the nation's economic problems. The highly personalistic style of governing that characterized the presidency of Carlos Andres Perez will be substantially modified when a new president takes office on 13 March 1979.²

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

² In a December 4 memorandum to Carter, Vance attributed Herrera Campins' victory in the election to "his emphasis on improving public services and the quality of life for the average citizen." Vance noted that "while Venezuelan foreign policy is not expected to change in any marked degree, Herrera will probably pay less attention to international affairs than Perez." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports [State], 12/78)

353. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassy in Nicaragua¹

Caracas, December 6, 1978, 2010Z

11451. Subject: Meeting With President Perez Following his Talk With Tunnerman. Ref: Caracas 11444²

1. (S–Entire Text).

2. Summary: President Perez invited me to La Casona Wednesday morning to give me a read out of his discussion with Tunnerman last night. He said it looked bad. Tunnerman is deeply distrustful of the U.S. Government's purpose and is convinced that Somoza has no intention of leaving Nicaragua under any circumstances. Tunnerman claimed to be authorized by the FAO to tell Perez that Perez' credibility was being eroded by his continuing support for this delaying tactic. Perez defended his policy to Tunnerman but is persuaded that if Somoza does not publicly declare that he will leave Nicaragua if the plebiscite goes against him, that the FAO cannot talk directly with the PLN. The President said he doubts that the FAO can hold on much longer unless Somoza so declares himself. Perez also believes the OAS, for the sake of credibility, must discuss the IAHRC report and make a pronouncement on it. He wants to press for that soon. I told him that I would report his views to the Department and be back to him soon. End summary.

3. President Perez informed me late last night that he wanted me at La Casona, his residence, at 8:30 this morning to give me a briefing of his talk with Tunnerman (see reftel). Perez says it looks bad. Tunnerman is very negative about the U.S., distrusts our motives and believes that this distrust is increasing among the FAO. Tunnerman said that Perez is doing serious damage to his own reputation by continuing to support the delaying tactics of the U.S. Tunnerman, as an example, said that the OAS has not even addressed the deplorable conditions found by the IAHRC and is thereby discredited. Tunnerman claimed that he was authorized to speak for Robelo and the FAO about the increasing distrust of U.S. intentions and, particularly, the view of the FAO that Somoza has no intention of leaving Nicaragua.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187-2339. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information to Panama City and San Jose.

² Dated December 6. Luers reported that Perez was "still supportive of the mediation process" during their December 5 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850083-2306)

4. Perez said he rebutted many of Tunnerman's arguments. But he counseled that the U.S. should know the chronic deep distrust that persists among Latin American intellectuals and politicians alike of U.S. policies is becoming critical in the case of Nicaragua. Perez told Tunnerman that he has been, all along, extremely skeptical about the mediation effort and has had little faith in its outcome. Perez said, however, that he does have abiding faith in President Carter's desire to change U.S. policy toward Latin America and, in the case of Nicaragua, to bring about the beginning of a democratic process. Perez told Tunnerman that over the past 40 years bureaucratic and political supporters of Somoza have become deeply ingrained in the U.S. system. They make it difficult for firm U.S. Presidential action.

5. Tunnerman said that the Americans had been given until November 21 to bring about a solution for the departure of Somoza and they had failed. He asked how much longer can Nicaraguans accept these delaying tactics. Perez rebutted (based on our earlier conversation) that President Carter and the U.S. Government, as respecters of democracy, had to respond to Somoza's offer of a plebiscite. Therefore, the new extended time frame was based on the desire to see whether a genuine plebiscite could be agreed to. He, Perez, said that, with all his skepticism he accepts the reasons for President Carter's decision.

6. Tunnerman and Perez then apparently engaged in some discussion of the current situation in Nicaragua. Perez said he was well prepared to discuss these issues. Tunnerman alleged that Perez had proposed a constituent assembly and gave the background of Nicaraguan distrust of such proposals by Somoza. Perez said that I had briefed him on that and that Pallais-Debayle had alleged this was Perez' idea. Perez repeated to Tunnerman what he had told me last night that he had never proposed a constituent assembly and favored amending the existing constitution. Tunnerman charged that the Americans are too trustful of Somoza's plebiscite offer. Perez said he was able to respond with the graphic description I had given him (reftel) of the transparent ballots and the "La Magnifica" card that Somoza's thugs gave to those who voted "correctly". Tunnerman was impressed by the depth of our distrust of the Nicaraguan election process and our awareness of it. Tunnerman said "they told you about the 'transparent' ballots?" Moreover, CAP was able to give Tunnerman our sense of the need for large scale foreign civilian involvement to keep the electoral process honest.

7. Tunnerman alleged that Somoza is acting as though he has no intention of leaving. He is importing arms and mounting reports to assassinate Tunnerman himself. Perez said to me that he heard that arms were being shipped from Miami via Portugal to Nicaragua (a

Miami Herald story).³ Perez said he had similar reports that Somoza was trying to assassinate Perez.

8. The bottom line of the discussion for Perez is that the U.S. must demonstrate very soon its intentions more clearly. First, a major breakthrough would be to get Somoza to say publicly that, if he lost the plebiscite, he would leave the country. Perez said that he thinks that, if the U.S. brings sufficient pressure, Somoza will have to state publicly that he would depart if he lost the plebiscite. In that case, the U.S. could count on Perez' continuing support and, he thought on the FAO's support, to continue to work with the mediators and even negotiate with the PLN. He did not know whether Tunnerman and the Group of 12 would support this, but he thought the FAO would.

9. Secondly, Perez said that the OAS (or the Organ of Consultation) must act on the IAHRRC report on Nicaragua. Continued silence on that brings discredit on the U.S. and others was well as the OAS. He said sanctions must be brought against Somoza to increase the pressure. I told Perez that the history of the use of international sanctions has demonstrated that they are not effective. On the contrary, they are not only ineffective and difficult to sustain, but they very often reinforce the government in power. I said, moreover, it was virtually impossible to imagine that a two-thirds vote could be achieved in the OAS for sanctions against Somoza. Perez accepted the arguments, but said that Trujillo had been brought down by sanctions. I said it was my recollection that Trujillo was finally brought down by assassination and our purpose here was to avoid violence. Perez said that as a minimum, the OAS must address the human rights question if only to establish the credibility of the U.S., Venezuela and others who have supported human rights in the hemisphere. He reiterated his concern that the U.S. Government's credibility is becoming eroded and he wanted to continue to see that President Carter and his Latin American policies succeed.

10. CAP said that the U.S. Government must bring maximum pressure on Somoza. He thought that if, by the 15th of December, significant movement had not been achieved, including a public declaration of Somoza, (that he would leave if he lost the plebiscite), the FAO would split up and the Sandinistas would return to violence. I said that I hoped that we could get the FAO to agree to talk directly with the PLN before that date, but that I would stress to Washington Perez' view of the need for Somoza to declare himself publicly. I said I would

³ Danny Goodgame, "Is Miamian Selling Arms to Somoza?" *Miami Herald*, December 4, 1978, p. 1A.

also report the President's belief that the OAS must address the human rights question.

11. Comment: Perez is faced with a dilemma—how to maintain his own reputation and credibility and yet continue to support, what many are telling him, is a failing mediation effort. He wants to see concessions from Somoza such as lifting the state of siege, general amnesty and dropping of censorship. This would help Perez, as well as the mediation effort to sustain credibility. For Perez, however, as Somoza commitment to leave after the plebiscite is critical. For psychological and practical reasons, Perez would like Somoza out of Nicaragua before he leaves office in March. Perez is still with us. He is still prepared to talk to the FAO. But he is thinking increasingly about his reputation. Unless he sees some positive movement soon, he might slip from supporting our objectives in this very important effort.

12. A subjective addendum. Bill Bowdler is doing a superb job. His briefing in Panama was invaluable to me.⁴ There are few diplomats who have the wisdom of the Latins and tenacity of purpose to have carried us so far in this remarkable new area of international negotiations on democracy and human rights.

Luers

⁴ Not found.

354. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassy in Nicaragua¹

Caracas, December 13, 1978, 2109Z

11688. Subj: Talk With President Perez on December 13. Ref: A) State 313102² B) Managua 6547³

1. (S–Entire Text)

2. President Perez emphatically reasserted to me this morning his position that he could only get G–12 and full FAO support for the mediation effort if Somoza announces publicly that he will accept a plebiscite decision and leave the country if he is defeated. He stressed, as he has before consistently over the last several weeks, that to achieve that public statement the US must bring more pressure than it has henceforth and probably the best way to do that is have the US declare itself in the OAS in favor of some type of sanctions. Even though such sanctions would not be effective or approved by the OAS, they would have the affect of clarifying the US policy toward Somoza argues Perez. To my suggestion that some might be confused about Perez' position on Somoza's departure taking place before the plebiscite, Perez assured me that he would like Somoza to leave prior to the plebiscite, but that this was, under no circumstances, a condition and he realized that it would be difficult if not impossible to achieve.

3. In reading Ref A, I am at a loss to determine how the Dept could possibly have misconstrued my repeated explanation of Perez' belief that he can only get the G–12 involvement and full FAO support if Somoza says publicly that he would accept the terms of the plebiscite and leave if he loses. I have reported this clearly in numerous cables. Those closest at hand are Caracas 11451, Caracas 11499 and Caracas

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187-2298. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information to Panama City and San Jose.

² Dated December 12. Vaky wrote: "There seems to be some doubt in Perez' mind" "that Somoza will accept a defeat in the plebiscite and leave the country. My impression is that Somoza has agreed to that in principle with the details to be worked out." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187-2299)

³ Dated December 13. Bowdler wrote: "Somoza indicated in his December 1 press conference that he was prepared to turn over the presidency to whoever is chosen by a constituent assembly to succeed him. Under the PLN plan such a constituent assembly would be held if Somoza lost the plebiscite. Somoza has made no repeat no public or private commitment yet to leave the country. On the contrary Somoza in the same press conference said he would not repeat not do so if defeated in the plebiscite." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187-2302)

11610.⁴ Perez has said repeatedly that he would come out publicly forcefully and emphatically for the mediation effort if we could achieve this one result. Bill Bowdler's response (Managua 6547) was very helpful and I agree with him that this issue will be a tough fight. As I have indicated before I believe we need to use whatever muscle we possibly have in that fight.

4. Action requested: Can the Dept give me anything more on CAP's repeated requests for our position on using the IAHRC report as a basis for taking some initial steps against Somoza in the OAS or what other steps might we take to persuade Somoza to accept the plebiscite?⁵

5. In addition to our discussion about the key issues (above), CAP spoke to me philosophically and at length of his rationale for providing some support to the Sandinista movement. Quite frankly, his rationale was almost identical to what I had reported as my analysis of it (Caracas 11499). I told him that Pastora had put out some feelers for some contacts with US. Perez said obviously official contacts were inappropriate, but he strongly urged that we be in touch with him unofficially. Otherwise we will miss an option should our current efforts fail. Perez said that Pastora, for the time being, will probably continue to be the most effective leader of the FSLN and it would be tragic if Pastora and others found that the only recourse for arms and support was Fidel. He recalled his own meeting with Castro in 1960 when he was sent by President Betancourt to persuade Castro not to participate in actions against Trujillo. Castro at that time said that he had no armaments at all and was actually afraid of Trujillo's military power. Perez said that the analogy is obviously not apt, but he still believes that Castro in 1960 was manageable and was driven into the Soviet camp primarily in search of arms. Perez is thinking more now about what would happen after his departure from the Presidency of Venezuela and urged that we not forget these lessons of history and not place all of our policy on one track which, even we admit, might not succeed, i.e. the plebiscite.

6. Perez said he had invited Torrijos to come to Caracas this weekend to try to get Torrijos to work with him to bring about continued FSLN restraint and to find ways to keep the FAO engaged in the mediation effort. He wants Torrijos to help him persuade the Sandinis-

⁴ See Document 353. In telegram 11499 from Caracas, December 7, Luers analyzed Perez's influence with the FSLN and his objectives with the USG. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187-2325) In telegram 11610 from Caracas, December 12, Luers reported that Perez "predicted that the FAO will eventually give up or split up if we cannot get Somoza to announce that he will accept the plebiscite." (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850083-2310)

⁵ Not found.

tas, at least, not to oppose the mediation. He also said he had talked again to Ramiro Cardenal who says the FAO is splitting up because we have failed to get Somoza to declare himself on the plebiscite.

7. Comment: Perez is still trying to be helpful, while keeping up the pressure on us. Anything the Dept or Bill Bowdler can give me in response to my request in para 4 I would appreciate.

Luers

355. Telegram From the White House to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, January 24, 1979, 2051Z

WH 90126. Please deliver the following message from the President to President Perez immediately.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your kind and frank letter of December 22.² I greatly appreciated having your views on the difficult situation in Nicaragua. Ambassador Luers has kept me informed through his messages of his discussions with you.³ Your influence on Nicaraguan democratic sectors was very helpful in permitting the mediation process to take place. Your encouragement of the democratic sectors to participate in this attempt to resolve peacefully Nicaragua's political crisis was deeply appreciated by all who seek a democratic resolution of the problems in that country.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 6/78-3/79. Confidential. Sent for information to the Department of State.

² Perez's December 22 letter to Carter is Ibid.

³ Luers's report of the January 21 demarche, during which Perez said "that the mediation is over, and that unless the United States takes some action soon, Nicaragua will become the Achilles heel of President Carter's Latin American policy," is in telegram 620 from Caracas, January 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790032-0341) In a January 23 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor noted that Perez's January 21 demarche to Luers was "very disturbing," that Perez was "disturbed that the President has not yet responded to his earlier letter, and Perez fears that his good friend Jimmy Carter is not listening." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Carlos Andres Perez, 6/78-3/79)

As you know, the mediators have received and examined the latest response from the Nationalist Liberal Party of Nicaragua to their earlier proposal to conduct a fair and just plebiscite. It is apparent from their response, however, that they have not seen their way clear to accept the mediators' proposal for a workable, internationally supervised plebiscite. Their position appears to foreclose reaching a negotiated solution at the present time. I assure you that the United States remains deeply concerned about the state of human rights and the prospects for free, democratic government in that country, and we shall continue to shape our policies accordingly.

We believe it essential to encourage the democratic middle to keep it from breaking up,⁴ and to maintain the opportunity for negotiation of a peaceful and lasting solution to the current internal political crisis. The forces which have supported democratic solution—the broad opposition front, the private sector, labor, and the church—all constitute significant and necessary elements for Nicaragua's future. To the extent that the advocates of violence are encouraged, the moderate middle will disintegrate. I believe, therefore, that we should move carefully to protect—not weaken—the chances for peaceful accommodation and change, which we note from your discussions that you seek as well.

It will be important also to coordinate our policies in the OAS, and our responses to human rights factors. We think it is important to maintain the international community's pressure on the individual elements in Nicaragua, including the Somoza government, to persuade them to resume a peaceful solution to the crisis. I will keep you fully informed of our thinking and planning as we go along.

I greatly value your candid interpretation and advice on developments in the hemisphere, and your reactions to our existing policies and programs. If my administration succeeds in developing relations with Latin America on a more mutually beneficial and cooperative plane, as I believe we will, your help and advice to me will have been a significant element in such success.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

End text.

⁴ Pastor wrote that Perez was "likely to encourage moderate groups in Nicaragua to abandon the FAO and join the Patriotic Front (a Leftist group which will encompass the Sandinistas as well as the Group of 12). Vaky, Luers, and I agree that this is a dangerous strategy, which can only accelerate the polarization and radicalization in the country." (Ibid.)

356. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 13, 1979, 1826Z

1354. Subject: Nicaragua: Talk With President Perez Feb 13. Ref: A. State 034470² B. State 034488³

1. S–Entire Text

2. Summary: President Perez says that he is not supplying any money or arms to the Sandinistas. He will not and cannot because of the restraints of his political system, although he says rhetorically he thinks he should. Secondly, in discussing the OAS/MFM on Nicaragua,⁴ Perez will initially take a strong stand on sanctions and breaking relations for tactical reasons to enable the U.S. to reach a resolution which Venezuela will support which will be at least as strong as the UNGA resolution on Nicaragua. He also said, at my request, that he will instruct his Ambassador to the OAS not to have the session turn into personalized debate between Machin and Sevilla Sacasa. Perez said he had talked to Acting President of Guatemala Villagrán who promised that Guatemala would sign the mediation report and maybe agree to participate in discussing it at the OAS. He also said he would call President Padilla of Bolivia and urge him to support a strong resolution in the OAS. In sum, he (Perez) will end up supporting a strong resolution as described by the Department. He also continues to wring his hands about what else can be done, agrees that breaking off diplomatic relations is not desirable, but strongly believes that the U.S. should take more steps and suggested we might work with the Guardia Nacional to undermine Somoza. End summary.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790068-1117. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to Managua, Panama City, and San Jose.

² Dated February 9. The Department instructed the Embassies in Panama, Venezuela, Cuba and Costa Rica to make a demarche to their host governments regarding arms supplies to the Sandinistas. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790066-0647)

³ Dated February 9. The Department informed all American Republics posts except for the Embassies in Georgetown and Nassau and the Interests Section in Havana that it was likely that the MFM would be reconvened during the week of February 19 “to consider IAHRC report on Nicaragua” and “to hear report on activities of mediating group.” Regarding a potential OAS resolution “which clearly indicates the concern of the OAS members about the gross violations of human rights in Nicaragua, and is sufficiently strong to serve as an incentive for the Somoza government to undertake remedial actions,” the Embassies were asked for their “assessment of degree of flexibility of host country to accept formula which may be less strong than ideal from its point of view,” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790063-0798)

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 198.

3. President Perez invited me to breakfast Feb 13 for another tour d'horizon, but specifically to talk with Nicaragua again. Foreign Minister Consalvi was present and we covered many issues. I carried out my instructions contained in reftels.

4. Regarding the demarche on arms to Nicaragua and the Sandinistas, I went through the talking points in para 4 of Reftel A and I also used the additional talking point in para 7.⁵ Perez welcomed our efforts to control arms deliveries to Somoza. He is still skeptical that we can control private arms sales or even the secret transmission of Israeli arms on the question of arms to the Sandinistas, he said he is providing no military or financial assistance of any type to the Sandinistas and is inhibited by his political process from doing so. He said he would like to be able to help the Sandinistas now since they are most certainly going to turn to Fidel sooner or later. He says that once that happens and once the Sandinistas develop a romantic image of opposing Somoza, Latin America may have lost much of what has been achieved over the last decade of eliminating this romantic image of the guerrilla. He predicts that the Sandinistas will go to war and need help. No one can help them but Fidel. He then went into his geopolitical nightmare now that Iran has "fallen" and that the Soviets are upset over our relations with China, the Soviets will be much more inclined to support Fidel's trouble making in Central America. I gave the President my own perspective on Soviet strategy worldwide and described the problems I saw with his analysis and tried to persuade him that I doubted seriously that the Soviets would be pushing Fidel into Nicaragua. He assured me, however, that Venezuela is not and will not be supplying any assistance to the Sandinistas.

5. On the OAS/MFM. CAP was very supportive. I gave him the estimate of the voting positions of the various countries and explained the background of Brazilian/Argentine concerns over the IAHRC report as well as the problems we are encountering in dealing with the mediation group report. Perez said that on the mediation report, he had called acting Guatemalan President Villagrande following our last Friday⁶ conversation on this subject and urged Guatemala to sign the report. Villagrande assured Perez that Guatemala would sign the mediation report and said he would try to get President Lucas to agree to participate in a discussion of the report at the OAS. I told Perez that was not consistent with our information. Perez agreed that the

⁵ The talking points outlined the steps the USG was taking after the Nicaragua mediation had "come to an impasse," including restrictions on arms shipments to the GON and reducing aid. They also asked host governments to "do whatever possible to prevent transit of arms to the Sandinistas." See footnote 2, above.

⁶ February 9.

mediation report should probably not be discussed. Moreover, on the IAHRC report, Perez said he would call President Padilla of Bolivia immediately and try to urge Bolivia's agreement to favor a strong resolution.

6. On the resolution, Perez said that for tactical reasons, he thought Venezuela's opening position in the debate should favor a very strong resolution which would mention sanctions and possibly the breaking of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. This would be tactically helpful for the U.S. since the objective is to end up with a strong resolution. He agreed that Venezuela would ultimately agree to a resolution that was at least as strong as the UNGA resolution of December 1978. I said I was going beyond my instructions but believed the debate would be improved if it did not degenerate, as it has in the past, into a personal feud between Venezuela's OAS Ambassador Machin and Sevilla Sacasa. I said that these exchanges tended to degrade the debate and ultimately favored Nicaragua. Perez said he would call Machin back to Caracas. He will instruct him, to be low key in the debate and avoid turning the issue into a personalized feud between Venezuela and Nicaragua.

7. I think we can count on Venezuela to be helpful. Should Machin exceed the instructions he will personally receive, I request the Department inform me immediately. The President wants a large majority voting for a strong resolution and I think he will ultimately work with us to achieve that.

8. Perez did lament about what more could be done on Nicaragua. He is not inclined to break diplomatic relations, but tempted. He said that what the U.S. military should do is work with the Guardia Nacional to undermine Somoza. He recounted at length Somoza's deep distrust of the GN that emerged in his discussions of last summer with Somoza. I told the President we, including all branches of the U.S. Government, are out of that business and I hope we stay out.

Luers

357. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the White House¹

Caracas, March 26, 1979, 2055Z

2843. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation, Miraflores Palace, Caracas March 23, 1979 3:35 PM to 6:20 PM

1. (Confidential—Entire Text)

2. The following memorandum has not been cleared either by the Vice President or by Assistant Secretary Vaky.

3. Participants:

Venezuelan:

President Luis Herrera

Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano Velazco

Senator Aristides Calvani

Interior Minister Rafael Andres Montes de Oca

Defense Minister General Paredes Bello

Minister of State for Culture Guillermo Yopez Boscan

Ambassador German Nava Carrillo, Director General of the Foreign Ministry

Ambassador Marcial Perez Chiriboga, Civil Aide to the Vice President

Minister of the Secretariat of the Presidency Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos

Dr. Sosa Rodriguez, Former Ambassador to the U.S.

Jose Ignacio Moreno Leon, Acting Minister of Energy and Mines

Minister of Finance Luis Ugueto

Minister of Information and Tourism Jose Luis Zapata

Minister of Development Manuel Quijada

Minister of State for Science and Technology Raimundo Villegas

Acting Director of the Venezuelan Investment Fund Roberto Guarnieri

U.S.:

Vice President Walter F. Mondale

Ambassador William H. Luers

Ambassador Viron P. Vaky

Denis Clift

James Johnson

Robert Pastor

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139-1072. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. A final version of this memorandum of conversation was not found.

John J. Crowley, Jr.
Myles Frechette
Robert Knickmeyer

4. President Herrera began by expressing pleasure at having Vice President Mondale in Venezuela. He said there would be no rigid agenda but that he would like to discuss various matters of mutual interest, without being able to go into greater detail because his administration had been [in] office less than two weeks. He then presented the other members of his team.

5. Vice President Mondale introduced the U.S. side and told President Herrera that he brought with him a letter from President Carter² inviting President Herrera to the United States either in late 1979 or early 1980, the date to be fixed in accordance with both Presidents' commitments.

6. President Herrera accepted the letter, thanking Vice President Mondale for the invitation, and said that he wanted to do whatever he could to improve relations and bring Venezuela and the U.S. closer together. He said he believed a visit could do this and he accepted President Carter's invitation in principle. He said the date would have [to] be fixed later. He expressed gratitude for President Carter's gesture of friendship.

7. Vice President Mondale said that President Herrera's acceptance was good news and stated that he was sure that President Herrera would like President and vice versa. He said the timing of the visit could be worked out through diplomatic channels.

8. President Herrera said he wanted to start by expressing his respect for the United States, especially because now Venezuela and the U.S. share ethical values which are fundamental to humanity and particularly the countries of Latin America. These values are, he said, the defense of human rights and of democratic systems within a framework of liberty, dignity and social justice. President Herrera said that, for Venezuela, from the economic point of view, the U.S. is its major petroleum market and the source of almost 50 percent of Venezuela's day to day needs. For the U.S., Venezuela is a secure source of petroleum of growing strategic importance especially at a time when there is conflict in those countries which are the major petroleum producers. Venezuela is also a good market for U.S. manufacturers and agricultural products and is also extremely receptive to an increasing flow of U.S. tourists. President Herrera said we should not just have this economic

² Dated March 20. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Venezuela: President Luis Herrera Campins, 3/79-6/80)

optic, however. As democratic countries, both Venezuela and the United States must give an example of sincerity, and the best way to do this is through mutual respect, frankness and bilateral dialogue. He said this dialogue must be not just about petroleum but about global issues and various areas of interest to Venezuela and Latin America as a whole. Also, we must transfer this to multilateral form with the understanding that this cannot be viewed from the national point of view but from the collective Latin American point of view because of the similarity of positions and commonality of interests in Latin America. President Herrera said he wished to reiterate that Venezuela understands perfectly its strategic importance in today's world. Venezuela is the most secure source of oil for the U.S., Canada and Western Europe. Venezuela belongs to OPEC and has been working not only to defend oil prices but also to achieve a rationalization of the use of energy sources such as petroleum. OPEC is an important experiment for the developing countries and therefore Venezuela must fight for unity and solidarity within OPEC. He said that his administration wishes petroleum to be seen not just as a source of foreign exchange for Venezuela, but as the fount of harmonic development for Venezuela. That is why Venezuela looks to the U.S. for technological development, not just as a source of petroleum technology, but also in the fields of science, agriculture, education, culture and the marketing of manufactures and agro industrial and agricultural products. The focus for the technology transfer must be global, not partial. Petroleum, said President Herrera, is fundamental to the integral development of Venezuela.

9. Vice President Mondale said that he agreed with and endorses most of what President Herrera said with enthusiasm. He said that President Carter shares his view that human rights and liberty should be pursued and that it is most important to have ethical values as well. The Vice President said that, as he had said at the airport,³ "You are one [of] the great democracies in the world. Your peaceful transition shows the force of that democracy." We have a responsibility to work together, said the Vice President, and use our influence to encourage other societies to grant others these same privileges. If I read you correctly, said the Vice President, you agree. The Vice President said that he couldn't agree more with President Herrera that U.S.-Venezuelan relations should not be just commercial but based on broader terms. He said that he spoke for President Carter and for the United States in general in expressing gratitude to Venezuela for having increased its production of oil when Iran's production dropped off. He said Venezuela had agreed to increase its production beyond the level it

³ Mondale's arrival statement in Caracas was not found.

considered to be in its own interest at a time of chaos and when the oil market was drifting. He said the U.S. is very grateful for Venezuela's willingness to respond. He also said President Carter favors the repeal of the amendment which excludes Venezuela from access to the GSP. He said he had spoken to Senator Bentsen before coming to Venezuela. Senator Bentsen, he said is working on legislation which would repeal that amendment. The Vice President said he could not give President Herrera a sense of what the probability of the passage of that legislation would be, but he could assure President Herrera that Venezuela had the Carter Administration's support. With respect to oil prices, the Vice President said that the U.S. Government believes that the present spot market of \$18 to \$20 a barrel is too high and should not be the basis for upward adjustment of posted OPEC oil prices. He said the U.S. believes that these prices are too high for the U.S. economy and will cause inflation, hurting not only the U.S. economy but also causing more inflation in oil producing countries. Regarding technology transfer. The Vice President said he agreed that the basis for such a transfer should not focus only around oil. He said that the administration is prepared to assemble a team of scientists and specialists under Dr. Frank Press, the President's Science Advisor, to examine areas of interest both to Venezuela and the U.S. He pointed out that Venezuela had scientists with knowledge of interest to the U.S. He said that such technology could easily cover areas such as agriculture, energy, science and even marketing if that was Venezuela's wish. He said that both countries could explore the fields of cooperation through diplomatic channels so that the team could be assembled. He said that he would be less than candid if he did not acknowledge that he hoped some research on oil would be included. He said Dr. Press would be delighted to come to Venezuela whenever the Venezuelan Government asked for him.

10. President Herrera said he wished to express his pleasure that President Carter wanted to repeal the GSP amendment. He said he hoped this would be transformed into legislative reality as soon as possible. He said that he wanted former Ambassador Sosa Rodriguez to speak on this point.

11. Sosa Rodriguez said that eliminating the GSP exclusion could be of great importance for future trade and commerce between the U.S. and Venezuela, not just concerning hydrocarbons and derivatives, but also concerning other products which would be produced as a result of Venezuela's integral development. He said Venezuela shares to a great extent the U.S. view of the importance of Venezuelan oil as well as the point that oil prices should be rational. He said Venezuela believed there should be rationality in a world economic order, and that there should be a closer relation between the price of products

sold by mono product countries and the prices of the very varied products sold to developing countries. Within this context, said Sosa Rodriguez, Venezuela believes it can develop very close relations with the U.S. Therefore, Venezuela takes this as a good augury that the dialogue which began in 1963 is now branching out into more varied field. It is sure to achieve a greater stability in U.S.-Venezuelan relations.

12. President Herrera said he was happy that Vice President Mondale agreed on the importance of technology exchange in both directions. In that sense, he said he wanted his Minister for State for Science and Technology to state his administration's position on such exchange.

13. Minister Villegas said Venezuela was grateful for the offer of cooperation in science and technology, especially at a time when Venezuela was preparing to give an extra push to scientific research, not just in existing research centers, but in new ones to be established. Many Venezuelan scientists, he said, have spent part of their lives living and studying in the U.S. and have both professional and personal contacts there that will help in making use of this offer of technical cooperation by nurturing the bilateral nature of such cooperation. The areas of greatest interest to Venezuela now have to do with man and his environment. He said Venezuela needs research in agriculture and livestock and in medical areas. Another field would be engineering, especially chemical, metallurgical and electronic. He said Venezuela has very few researchers in these fields. Obviously, he said, Venezuela is most interested in scientific and technological cooperation on oil. Perhaps the most important field in which the U.S. could help Venezuela would be to help organize scientific research, especially the establishment of foundations or institutions which Venezuela, because of a lack of foresight, had not established. He said Venezuela wants to know as much as possible about the U.S. National Academy of Science and the National Science Foundation. He said these two institutions had been very important for scientific development in the U.S.

14. Vice President Mondale replied that we should give some thought as to how Venezuela would like to begin. He said the U.S. idea was to send Dr. Press and a team of scientists to come down and help out. He repeated that President Carter had authorized him to offer to send Dr. Press. He asked whether this made any sense.

15. President Herrera said that, of course, the offer made sense and that he considered it very positive. He said that only after an exchange of opinion would it be possible to establish a design for cooperation. He then called on Ambassador Perez Chiriboga to speak.

16. Perez Chiriboga said that the Venezuelans were very interested in the idea of having Dr. Press visit. He said that in Washington the

Copei delegation⁴ had heard Dr. Press say something that impressed them very much. Dr. Press had said that, to date, agricultural technology has been directed toward temperate zones and fertile areas and that relatively little has been done concerning tropical or semi-tropical areas such as the savannahs or plains of Venezuela. Perhaps this would be a good field for cooperation. A different aspect of technology transfer very important to Venezuela and to all countries is that the cost of transferring technology from developed countries to LDC's is enormous. He said that he was also aware that this was more a problem of private companies and multinationals than a problem concerning the relationship between governments. The fact is, however, he said, that LDC's pay more for technology than what is paid for that technology in the country where it is developed. According to a number of studies, he said, the increase in the cost of technology is greater than the increase in the cost of raw materials. We have to see how technology can be made available on more reasonable terms.

17. Vice President Mondale replied that he was aware of this and that it had been the subject of considerable debate. The Carter administration is not satisfied with the present state of affairs and is studying the establishment of an institute of technological cooperation. He said that the U.S. is aware that this is a very complicated problem and that President Carter will make this point in an upcoming speech to the Congress.⁵ One other point, said the Vice President, had been raised when his wife visited Caracas.⁶ That was the question of residencies for foreign medical students. He said the administration is trying to correct the legislation which has caused the problem. He said that the US Government knows that three years of residency and the examination are often irrelevant. He said the administration believes the U.S. is on the wrong track with that approach and that it should be establishing more international communication and sharing in this field. He said that one thing the framers of this legislation had in mind was that many foreign students come to study medicine in the U.S. and then

⁴ The delegation visited Washington February 20–23 and met with Mondale, Brzezinski, Christopher, and others. (Christopher memorandum to Carter, February 22, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports [State], 2/79) No record of the meeting with Press was found.

⁵ Presumably a reference to a March 27 message to Congress, entitled "Science and Technology." A portion of the message discussed proposed legislation to create an Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, "which will be charged with helping developing countries improve their scientific and technological capacity." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, p. 540) For text of the entire message see *Ibid.*, pp. 528–546.

⁶ Joan Mondale and Marshall led the U.S. delegation to Herrera's inauguration March 11–13. They met with Herrera on March 13. (Memorandum of Conversation, Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 47, Venezuela, 1-12/79)

don't want to leave. He realized this is not the case with Venezuelan or Saudi students. He said he had discussed this problem with President Carter and with Reubin Askew, who will be the Chairman of a new Committee on Immigration. Both are concerned about this problem. He said the administration is reasonably confident that it can come up with some solution.

18. President Herrera said he was happy that President Carter had raised this issue which he had mentioned to Mrs. Mondale. Venezuela doctors need good post-graduate training. The concern about this U.S. legislation had been expressed by universities, professionals, medical schools and the Venezuelan Academy of Medicine, and they had raised this issue through him precisely because of their concern. He said it had been raised earlier with Governor Askew in Florida by a Venezuelan delegate visiting there. He reiterated that Venezuela wanted its medical doctors to have the best possibilities for training so they could return to Venezuela to be useful. President Herrera said that the brain drain from LDC's was extremely alarming but that it was not a Venezuelan problem. He said that unless a solution is found to this problem it will be an irritant to a very important sector of Venezuelan society, i.e., the doctors.

19. Vice President Mondale said he understood. He pointed out that it has been a matter of great concern that doctors come to the U.S. for training from Korea or the Philippines, for example, where they are desperately needed and they, after training they refuse to return. Those governments want the U.S. Government to put pressure on those students and that is very uncomfortable for the U.S. Government. He recognized, he said, that under those circumstances the U.S. could be accused of contributing to the brain drain.

20. President Herrera said he wanted to raise another point which is not strictly a Venezuelan nor exclusively a U.S. problem. He said, however, that he believes that this is an area of cooperation that could be positive within the norms of mutual respect and sovereignty toward other countries. This is the issue of Caribbean development. In the last few years, he said, there has been a process of emancipation of the old British colonies in the Caribbean; soon the Netherlands and French West Indies will follow. The Caribbean area is different from the Anglo-Saxon or the Latin World. It never had intense relations with either of those worlds, and had a series of problems such as cultural and political subordination and economic under development. In less than 10 years, he said, we will have 15 to 16 new republics in the Caribbean which will also be a part of the inter-American system. They are also islands or countries which are very susceptible to outside influences, especially Marxist. Therefore, he said, his administration believes it important to stimulate the development of the Caribbean, not just to achieve levels

of economic development but also to solve social problems and improve the conditions for democracy. Also, he said, we must not forget that, because of the ethnic and religious makeup of the population of the Caribbean, the attitudes of Afro-Asian countries are very important. These new Caribbean countries pose in their policies the need for a new, more ample and comprehensive attitude and for more economic solidarity. President Herrera said that he was going to call on the Acting Director of the Venezuelan Investment Fund to discuss his administration's attitude toward Caribbean development. He said he knew President Carter had expressed his concern about the Caribbean and that some steps had been taken.

21. Roberto Guarnieri said that Venezuela recognizes the crucial importance of the integral development of the Caribbean in a political, economic and social sense. It is necessary that they have sufficient resources for a more accelerated economic development than they can achieve with their own resources. Since 1974, Venezuela has made significant contributions to the Caribbean area along with the U.S. and other contributors like the IMF, IDB, IBRD and the OPEC Fund. Venezuela has also promoted the Caribbean Development Fund to establish mechanisms for channelling resources to the Caribbean. Venezuela has contributed some \$240 million to finance economic development of the Caribbean. Part of this has been bilateral, part has been through funds which Venezuela channels to third world countries through the IDB and the OPEC Fund. He said he wished to emphasize that much of this has been granted on concessional terms. This has been particularly true with respect to loans from the OPEC Fund to five countries in the Caribbean. Through special programs between Venezuela and the Caribbean these have been granted at a concessional rate of interest. The rest of the loans have not been on concessional terms because they are from the Venezuelan Investment Fund and, under the statutes of the Fund its money must be loaned at market rates. It has been Venezuela's policy to make these loans freely, that is, not to tie them. He said that the practice of developed countries is often to offer concessional terms but to tie the recipient countries to specific usages such as special programs or specifying the countries where goods have to be purchased. He said Venezuela believes that in net terms, despite the fact that the Venezuelan Investment Fund loans cannot be made at concessional interest rates, since these are untied loans, they can be considered more concessional than grants which because they are tied, are less useful. He said that the Herrera Administration believes that Venezuela is a developing country, that it has economic and social needs and that these conditions do not allow Venezuela to grant concessional aid. Instead, he said, we must strive to create permanent wealth and recycle resources to maintain active

economic systems. There must be a net transfer of resources from countries that have most of the world's resources. Venezuela has a program and has taken initiatives which take into consideration its limited resources and the fact that these resources must maintain their purchasing power.

22. The Vice President said Ambassador Vaky would reply. Ambassador Vaky said that we agreed on the need for cooperative effort in the Caribbean, an area that presents very bothersome economic and political problem. He called attention to the meeting of Caribbean donors in March and later, in Paris in May to prepare for a Caribbean group meeting in June.⁷ He said he hoped that Venezuela would join the U.S. in convincing West Germany and Japan to be more helpful. He said the U.S. believed that in the Paris meeting in June it will be possible to deal with future programs. He said the U.S. also wants to stress regional programs rather than just bilateral. He also said that the U.S. hopes Caribbean countries will meet with the donor countries and study the range of uses of the resources that are available.

23. Vice President Mondale asked President Herrera for his views on Grenada.⁸ He asked how we should react and whether President Herrera saw Grenada as an isolated case or one having broader implications.

24. President Herrera said it was very difficult to give an opinion on the coup. He said Venezuela knew about unrest caused by the former government's administration of resources. There were also comments of growing opposition, but the coup caught Venezuela as well as the US by surprise. It even caught the former President of Grenada, who esp failed in this instance, by surprise. Venezuela had information from more normal channels. Ambassador Nava Carrillo has talked to the leaders of the new government and would share this information.

25. Ambassador Nava Carrillo said that Venezuela has analyzed carefully the reaction of the independent and non-independent states of the Caribbean. There were two trends which were visible. The first was fear, not of change but of the non-traditional form it had taken. The islands of the southern Caribbean were very cautious but three have recognized the new government of Grenada. There was also another trend among the non-independent states. This trend was to be fearful and to try to establish some sort of mechanism to react to

⁷ The Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development met on June 8 in Washington. (Telegram 153023 to Bridgetown, June 14, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790271-0382) References to the meetings in March and May were not found.

⁸ A reference to the March 13 coup in Grenada. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean, Document 313.

the change. The views of Mr. Bishop, the new leader in Grenada, are crucial. Bishop struck Nava Carrillo as a socialist, a man of the center left who is serious about trying to help his country. He said Venezuela had reached no final conclusion. The repercussions are all important and require cautious, continued study.

26. Vice President Mondale said it would be good if Venezuela and the U.S. kept in contact on Grenada and that President Carter was concerned.

27. The Vice President then said he wanted to raise the question of the United Nations Security Council. He said Bolivia was giving up its seat this year and that the question had arisen as to who, among the Latin American countries, will replace Bolivia. The U.S., he said, has traditionally supported the choice of the Latin Americans. Now, Cuba has a chance to occupy the seat and the U.S. wants to avoid this. He said the U.S. believes Cuba is irresponsible internationally. It is hard to find a country in Africa where Cuba is not involved. In the north-south Yemen situation, which is most sensitive, the Russians are supplying equipment and there are some 300 Russian, and 300 Cuban advisors as well as some Ethiopians. There are also 17,000 Cubans in Ethiopia. Cuba has become a major actor in a new strategy to provide Russia with a surrogate force. The U.S. does not believe that Cuba should be given the dignity of representing Latin America. The Vice President pointed out the U.S. had made efforts to improve relations with Cuba and the interest section in Havana was one result. The Vice President asked if Peru could be encouraged to seek the seat. He said that if Cuba got the second Latin American seat, then Latin America would be represented by Cuba and Jamaica which are not very representative of Latin America.

28. President Herrera replied saying that, in all sincerity, the Venezuelan Government has not yet addressed this question. His Administration had been in power for only ten days and that it had no evidence that the previous administration had done anything on this Security Council problem. He said this was an interesting point and that he agreed with the idea that Latin America should have the most authentic representation possible on the security council. Vice President Mondale asked President Herrera to give this some consideration, the U.S. thinking it is important, he said.

29. President Herrera said he wanted to raise another point with respect to cooperation in narcotics control. The use of narcotics, he said, is causing anguish in Venezuela because it affects the young and it seems Venezuela is now a conduit for narcotics on its way to the U.S. He said the Minister of Defense would address the problem.

30. General Paredes Bello said that the presence of narcotics in Venezuela was increasing. He said that Venezuela and Colombia, espe-

cially their armed forces and security forces, had been taking action. Last year, for example, Venezuela had been very active. In fact, more so than Colombia; but both countries had discovered marijuana growing along their common border. Paredes Bello said that they also discovered that these marijuana plantations were financed by U.S. economic interests. He said Venezuela had learned that this traffic is going out by air, particularly out of the Guajira Peninsula shared by Venezuela and Colombia. In addition, some narcotics are going by sea. Some of the vessels involved in this contraband have Venezuelan flags and some have Colombian. A few months ago (sic), Ambassador Asencio, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, who is well known in Venezuela, came to Caracas and talked about tripartite cooperation (US./Colombia/Venezuela). (Note: This took place on Feb. 16, 1979)⁹ Venezuela is interested in such cooperation but it has limitations concerning equipment and means. Asencio had asked that Venezuela reinforce its radar in Maracaibo. However, that radar belongs to the Ministry of Transport and Communications and is used only for controlling commercial air traffic. Venezuela has to improve its radar capability. Also the aircraft stationed in Maracaibo are not interceptors. They are reconnaissance craft which cannot cope with the new planes used by the traffickers. General Paredes Bello suggested a meeting of experts to see what could be done. In any event, it is important to put pressure on the Guajira area which is now being used for trafficking. It is a very ample area but if enough pressure is applied, the traffickers will find another route. He had discussed this with the Colombian Minister of Defense and the latter had been very receptive. However, Colombia was limited financially and technically. Venezuela is aware that the U.S. is giving economic assistance to Colombia. The U.S., he said, has the will to work on a problem which affects all of us. Venezuela wants to cooperate but needs technical and financial support.

31. The Vice President said he was pleased to hear the presentation on narcotics and that the U.S. places high priority on the control of narcotics. As in Venezuela, the youth of the U.S. are affected. The US has been working for years in Turkey, in the Golden Triangle and in Mexico to combat this deadly stuff which kills youth and corrupts governments. The U.S. would like to send Matea Falco, who coordinates all U.S. anti-narcotics efforts, to review all possibilities with Venezuela and Colombia.¹⁰

⁹ No record of this meeting was found.

¹⁰ Falco met with a Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs working group on May 28. (Telegram 4879 from Caracas, May 31, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790251-0537)

32. President Herrera said he understood that the Vice President had a tough schedule in Brazil¹¹ and Venezuela but wanted to raise one more point. He wanted to return to the beginning, to a point of US policy which has a great impact in Latin America. This is human rights and its defense. Venezuela believes it is not enough to announce it as a slogan but that we must find a way to implement it so that this policy can bear positive fruit. His administration has some concrete ideas, the beginning of a continental policy. He asked Former Foreign Minister Calvani to talk about it.

33. Aristides Calvani said human rights affects the political development of countries. It is a disease of societies and violations of human rights are therefore, pathological. But, like disease, such violations can be prevented. Human rights are also complex. How do you establish equilibrium between non-intervention and the right to intervene when human dignity is endangered by a sick regime? The defense of human rights has to be accompanied by political development in Latin America. This task is more than the effort of one country. It requires coordinated government efforts and cooperation of all democratic parties. Also, the problem is one of the formation (education or training) of leaders. He said that in Nicaragua, which has been under a dictatorship for forty years, leaders have no possibility of political formation and therefore there are no cadres and the whole thing has become a vicious circle. We must ask others to coordinate and join us in this effort. First, we must define which human rights will be emphasized. Second, this must be done without undermining non-intervention. Lastly, we must decide the question of mechanisms. The actions of governments and parties represent two kinds of machinery to be handled differently but which are complementary.

34. Vice President Mondale said he agreed, that it was a sensible proposition and that it was useless to try to promote human rights with empty mouthing. The Carter administration has spent two years trying to figure out how to implement its human rights policy, he said the U.S.G. had some justification for its concern. But, he said, there is a beginning of sanction within international law for actions outside one's own country on human rights. The United Nations Human Rights Convention and the Helsinki Accords put responsibility for violations on the signatories, where it belongs. Nevertheless, it is a difficult question and part of it without doubt, has to do with political leadership. There is no question that after long periods of authoritarian rule there are no natural leaders left. The Vice President explained that the Embassy is planning a human rights conference to be held in Caracas,

¹¹ See Document 181.

including high level USG participation, and these ideas could be discussed further at that conference.¹²

35. President Herrera said it had been a very interesting working session and that Venezuela had had only a short time to prepare for it. They had hoped to present the most outstanding themes without suggesting they were the only ones. In any event it had all been positive. Herrera said he viewed the exchange as the continuation of a dialogue. He wanted to stress that since Venezuela and the U.S. have a tradition of cordiality and friendship and now share a concern for human rights and democracy, we must try and be sincere and show that we have political will to reach an agreement on the problems we face together within a framework of mutual respect and frankness. He thanked Vice President Mondale for his time and said he would see him later in more relaxed circumstances.¹³

Herrera said he wanted to thank President Carter for his kind wishes for his Government and for Venezuela, he wished him the same in return.

36. Vice President Mondale thanked Herrera [and] said the session had been most useful. He was encouraged and heartened and would report on it to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance.¹⁴ He told Herrera not to worry about tiring the Vice President because it is the most expendable position in the U.S. Government.

37. Action requested: Please telegram concurrence and any changes.¹⁵

Luers

¹² The conference took place at the Embassy in Caracas June 28 and 29.

¹³ Herrera held a dinner for Mondale that evening. Mondale and Herrera met again the following morning, when they discussed multilateral trade negotiations, the Andean Pact, Camp David, SALT, and oil. (Memorandum of Conversation, March 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 47, Venezuela, 1-12/79)

¹⁴ Not found.

¹⁵ No response was found.

358. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, June 15, 1979, 0245Z

5425. Subj: Nicaragua: Meeting With Foreign Minister. Ref: Caracas 5426²

1. S—Entire Text

2. Summary. Foreign Minister Zambrano told me that he expects the Andean Group to approve a declaration declaring a state of belligerency within Nicaragua which will be issued probably on Saturday, June 16 or possibly on Sunday.³ Zambrano does not believe this statement will prejudice the outcome of a future reconvening of the 17th MFM and accepts our scenario of consulting, pre-cooking the MFM and then having Andean Group call for the meeting.⁴ The declaration he sees as not necessarily being the basis for the MFM, he would be agreeable to a plan which would have the MFM send a senior group of Foreign Ministers to Somoza for one last effort to achieve a political solution. This latest Andean Declaration he sees as means of showing how very serious and committed the Andean Group is. He believes a number of govts in the hemisphere will welcome the declaration even if they do not subscribe to it. He is not concerned if the US does not associate itself and is anxious to work with us in preparing for concrete action. End summary.

3. I met with Foreign Minister Zambrano this evening following several phone calls with Ambassador Vaky.⁵ He first gave me the state of play in the Andean Group. He gave me the text of the Peruvian Foreign Minister's proposed statement declaring a state of belligerency within Nicaragua. He said that he was in process of making some changes in the statement [to] refine it, but that essentially he fully approved the idea. He had already received approval from Ecuador

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269-1126. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

² Dated June 15. Luers transmitted the text of the proposed Andean Pact joint declaration on Nicaragua, which was sent to Zambrano by Garcia Bedoya. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790269-1116)

³ June 17. The Andean Pact's declaration was issued on June 16. (Telegram 5106 from Lima, June 16, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790273-0683)

⁴ For the U.S. strategy regarding the MFM, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Documents 210 and 212.

⁵ No record of the telephone calls were found.

and was waiting final approval from Colombia and Bolivia which he expected tonight or tomorrow. The Foreign Minister said the statement would probably be issued on Saturday or Sunday⁶ and he expected a number of countries in the hemisphere would associate themselves with it or would welcome it without necessarily agreeing with it.

4. I explained the legal and political problems that I understood would flow from such a declaration. I said we were concerned that a state of belligerency would bring about a situation in which both sides could ask and receive direct military assistance, thereby possibly internationalizing the conflict very rapidly. Secondly, it could prejudice a future OAS meeting and divide dramatically the hemisphere into two camps, thereby losing the support that had already been developed by the earlier Andean Group action. Finally, I said that I was concerned that the US would not be able to associate itself with declaring a state of belligerency and we at this time feel strongly that we would like to stand behind the Andean Group. Zambrano coolly replied that he does not believe this declaration need prejudice in any way an OAS meeting. The purpose would be to demonstrate how serious the Andean Group is and move the nations of the hemisphere further toward taking some action. He said that although legally one could argue a state of belligerency justify assistance to both sides, he anticipates that over the short run it will have the opposite effect. Once the Andean Group has so declared itself, he is persuaded that Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador will be hesitant to assist Somoza. However, he seriously doubts that Fidel would seize the opportunity to insert himself on the side of the Sandinistas particularly if he anticipates this declaration as antecedent to some more firm action supported by the Andean Group. Moreover, he argued that the US support for the state of belligerency would not be important. If we could not support it, that would be understandable and it would in no way limit our cooperation toward bringing together OAS action. He asked me what scenario the US has in mind.

5. Based on my briefing from Assistant Secretary Vaky, I said we would like to consult Friday or Saturday⁷ with all nations in hemisphere on the reconvening of the 17th MFM and we would have some ideas on the terms of reference for this meeting. We would like then for the Andean Group to agree to calling the MFM and then we would consult in person with key govt, particularly Mexico, Venezuela and probably Brazil. I said if we could reach agreement, Ambassador Vaky might

⁶ June 15 or 16.

⁷ June 14 or 15.

visit Venezuela some time in the middle of next week. I then described in general terms what we hoped the MFM would do: that it would approve a resolution expressing concern over the developments in Nicaragua and authorize a visit to Nicaragua of a group of senior hemispheric Foreign Ministers. I then said that if Somoza were not agreeable to a political solution called for by the entire OAS at the highest level, he would appreciate that he is on his own and would have to expect the next steps would be more severe.

6. Zambrano was delighted by the scenario, said again that he sees no contradiction between the declaration on the state of belligerency and our scenario, added that the Andean Declaration on this issue could be one position considered at a MFM but recognized that it could be put aside were another type of action approved, particularly one which would send a high level delegation to Somoza for one last attempt at a political solution.

7. Comment: Zambrano is emerging a [garble] and activist diplomat. He said that he had actually drafted the declaration at Cartagena and has continued to mobilize the Andean Group. Although the belligerency idea was originally his he is delighted Garcia Bedoya is running with it. He sees "belligerency" as a tactic which, although legally audacious and possibly risky, is politically necessary in order to keep up the movement toward more definitive action in a situation that is rapidly deteriorating. He repeated over and over again that the Venezuelan and Andean objective is to take action soon enough so that the center parties, including the business sector, the Conservative Party and the moderates in the FAO, can be given a chance, possibly with the presence of foreign troops from the rest of the hemisphere to establish a democratic govt. He was talking in hard, practical terms about the historic moment in which Latin American govt will act firmly to assure that a dictator of the right will not be replaced by a dictator of the left. He is prepared to act boldly and apparently with force to give democracy a chance. In my talk with him and in a subsequent briefing that I gave to the Minister of the Presidency Garcia Bustillos, it is clear that the Venezuelan position is emphatically not to want to give any opening to Fidel or to the communists in Central America, to stop the civil war, and to open the door to democracy.

8. I realize the Andean Declaration will cause problems from our standpoint, but it is clear to me that Venezuela and at least some of the Andean countries are preparing to work closely with us now. Although the Foreign Minister will be out of town all day tomorrow, I will be able to reach him tonight and early in the morning or tomorrow

night late. We have a tentative appointment to see each other on Saturday morning. I will await instructions.⁸

9. In drafting the foregoing I have received the amplifications and changes Zambrano made in the operative paragraphs of the declaration (see reftel.) One can see from the last para that he wrote in a contingency that the declaration of belligerency will last until positive measures are taken to put an end to the fighting and install a democratic regime in Nicaragua.

10. We have been given a window on negotiations between the Andean states by Zambrano. I firmly hope we will not reveal to any of his colleagues that we have these texts. I also hope we do not begin lobbying with Colombia and Bolivia against Zambrano. Venezuela under this govt is continuing to press to action but unlike the Perez approach, Herrera and Zambrano are bringing more Latins with them. Let's not cut them off.

Luers

⁸ In telegram 154042 to Caracas, June 15, the Department instructed Luers to "point out to Zambrano that we would have serious problems with any declaration of a state of belligerency which merely refers to status conferred upon a belligerent under international law" and recommended "that the Andean nations consider including a definition of what they mean by 'belligerency' in the Nicaraguan context, and what consequences that they intend to have flow from the declaration." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790271-0020) Luers met again with Zambrano on both June 16 and 17 to discuss Nicaragua. (Telegram 5491 from Caracas, June 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790273-0450 and telegram 5492 from Caracas, June 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790275-0358)

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, June 26, 1979, 0046Z

5797. Subject: Nicaragua: Views of Minister of Presidency Garcia Bustillos.

1. S–Entire Text.

2. Minister of the Presidency Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos headed the Venezuelan delegation to Cuba and told me today he had one of those famous six-hour discussions with Fidel. Garcia Bustillos is uneasy about the assurances he received from Fidel that Cuba would not intervene directly. He was not very forthcoming about the substance of the extended discussion. He said Fidel did complain about the frequent telephone calls from ex-President Carlos Andres Perez and said at one point that “Perez was even giving me advice on Cuban Government policy” (I presume this is related, among other things, to Perez’ urgings to Fidel not to recognize the provisional junta). Fidel did talk at length about presumed US plans to intervene. Garcia Bustillos said that if the United States were to intervene, it would use Cuba as the pretext. Therefore, the best means of keeping the United States from intervening is to keep Cuban hands off. I said Fidel is much more deeply involved than he is admitting to “either” Venezuelan Government and I was prepared to give both the Herrera and former President Perez’ “Governments” detailed reports on Cuban activities very soon.²

3. I tried to extract from Garcia Bustillos Venezuela’s and the Andean Group plans for the future. Garcia Bustillos said that a delegation from the Provisional Junta made up of one of the Chomorros and Ferre of the Nicaraguan Christian Democratic Party would visit Caracas Tuesday (June 26). They will seek to persuade the Venezuelan Government to recognize the Junta and break relations with Somoza. Garcia Bustillos implied this was a direction being considered. He said the Copei Government has been in close touch with Robelo and considers him sympathetic to the Christian Democratic Movement.

4. The Minister would give me little in the way of details, but indicated that the Andean Group action plan is well along and would include, Somoza’s departure, very possibly the recognition of the Provisional Junta or some variation of it, large scale, non-military support including economic and technical assistance and the presence of sub-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-1665. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Not found.

stantial Andean Group personnel in Nicaragua. I asked whether there would be any personnel in a security or fighting capacity and he said that was not being contemplated. It was also clear to me that Garcia Bustillos, although satisfied with the process up to now, is exceedingly worried about the course of events within Nicaragua. He said, in great confidentiality, that Venezuela may be being deceived by some of the Andean Governments with regard to the extent of their support to the Sandinistas. Secondly, he is skeptical that Fidel will keep his hands out for long. Thirdly, he is, quite frankly, persuaded that once Somoza leaves, Venezuela will not be able to exercise any physical "control" over events in Nicaragua. I said I agreed with all of these concerns and I hoped that he would voice them forcefully within his Government.

5. We talked also about my concerns of the continuing transfer of personnel and equipment from Venezuela to Nicaragua. I said that I was persuaded that prior to Herrera's inauguration in March, President Perez had been training and equipping here both Venezuelans and Nicaraguans for fighting with the Sandinistas. There were Venezuelan Air Force planes making regular sorties to Costa Rica and Panama for such purposes. We have reports from eye-witnesses that there were large numbers of Venezuelans fighting with the Terciario Sandinista faction in Nicaragua. I said there had been some recent reports that disturbed me to the effect that this assistance had continued after Herrera's inauguration, that some Venezuelans had gone recently and that the Herrera government was aware of this. I asked whether he could assure me of Venezuelan Government policy. Garcia Bustillos was initially, to my discomfort, ambiguous but as we talked through the issues he came to the point of saying that I could inform my government categorically that the present Venezuelan Government has supplied no equipment of soldiers to the Sandinistas since the inauguration and that such a policy was contrary to the Venezuelan position on Nicaragua (Venezuelan television reporters who have been in Nicaragua on the Sandinista side have reported indirectly to me of their surprise at the number of Venezuelans fighting with Pastora, although they have given no numbers).

6. Garcia Bustillos then spent most of the rest of the conversation expressing his outrage at the behavior of ex-President Perez, who daily calls the Presidents of the Andean and Caribbean Basin countries, who still meets with his cabinet on Mondays and who is acting as though he is managing Venezuelan foreign policy. His statement today that he would enter free Managua to raise the banner of liberty is an outrage and makes it very difficult for the Herrera government. I asked what resources Perez can draw on and does he have any support among the Venezuelan military. Garcia Bustillos replied that Perez apparently does have some resources, but not among the Venezuelan military.

7. As I have indicated, Garcia Bustillos is uneasy and repeatedly said that his government is coming to courses of action based on too little information and too little control over events. I said that it was essential that the United States work closely with Venezuela and that the Andean Group not consider that it can work entirely on its own. I said, not without a portion of irony, that the United States was still the most powerful nation in this hemisphere and this is far too serious a stage in history to have events proceed without our knowledge or involvement.

Luers

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassies in Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua¹

Caracas, July 9, 1979, 0243Z

6143. Subject: Nicaragua: Perez Talks to Junta. Ref: San Jose 2930.²

1. (Secret–Entire Text)

2. CAP spent much of Sunday³ talking to Torrijos and to the Junta in San Jose by phone. In several phone conversations with me, he reported the following:

Ramirez, Robelo, Mrs. Chamorro, Cuadao Chamorro, and Descoto were gathered in one place in San Jose convincing themselves they should not accept conditions dictated from Washington. They were angry because Bowdler had passed them by and because Escobar had not been in touch yet.

While refusing to be dictated to by the U.S. they had agreed in principle to expanding the Junta by two to including a “clean” GN officer as one of the two and to a restructuring of the GN. What angered them was that these were U.S. conditions thereby repeating the sad story of Nicaragua. They were angry that the U.S. would try to dictate

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-1634. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

² Dated July 8. Weissman reported on his consultations with Carazo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-1978)

³ July 8.

the economic policies of the new government and preserve "Somocismo" through retaining the National Guard.

Torrijos meanwhile was convinced that the deal was set, but both he and CAP were worried about the delays in making decisions.

3. According to CAP, therefore, the group in San Jose was working itself into a state of frustration and anger which he saw no way to counter. He is confused by their arguments. He said that considering going to Panama and Costa Rica to try to calm the Junta and move the decision making along more rapidly. In order to leave the country (within the first six months after leaving office as President) he must ask the permission of Congress. He is inclined to seek that permission tomorrow because he is worried about any further delays. Comment: I am of two minds about this. Should CAP go he could possibly help. But his travel would also complicate matters further with the Herrera government which we will need greatly in our post-Somoza strategy.

4. After consulting Pete Vaky,⁴ I called CAP back to ask that he weigh in again either tonight or Monday with the Junta, after they had talked with Escobar. I asked CAP to make the following arguments on our behalf:

We are at a historic moment in which the U.S. Government is allying itself probably for the first time with the democratic forces of Latin American behind the people of Nicaragua against a dictator. This moment should not be missed.

The transition plan is not "made in the USA" it has evolved over weeks if not months of consultation with Torrijos, Perez, and other leaders of the hemisphere as well as with many Nicaraguans.⁵ It is a plan designed to maximize the opportunity for a post-Somoza government to receive the international and domestic support which will be essential for its survival.

We have every intention of providing support to a new government which is broadly based but we have at no time tried to dictate economic policies or programs.

We do not want to preserve "Somicismo" in restructuring the National Guard but we seek to assist in providing stable new force that will permit the new government to exercise control—an objective which all parties seem to agree is important.

CAP said he has made some of these points before but would do so again either tonight or possibly better tomorrow morning when the Junta has talked to Escobar and "slept off" its hysteria.

⁴ No record of this telephone conversation was found.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 258.

5. CAP added that at one point Ramirez said the group wanted to explain its objective and its concerns directly to President Carter. I said they seemed to reflect the classic paradox in Latin thinking—on the one hand they object to a U.S. role; on the other hand they are compulsively attracted to U.S. power and to the U.S. President.⁶

Luers

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 261.

361. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassies in Nicaragua, Panama and Costa Rica¹

Caracas, July 11, 1979, 0030Z

6230. Subject: Nicaragua: Competing Venezuelan Forces.

1. S—Entire Text.

2. The Venezuelan Government and the chief opposition party AD are remarkably at odds on how to manage the Nicaraguan crisis, even though they all agree Somoza must go. The management of these various currents is becoming troublesome since we are going to need as much as we can get from Venezuela after Somoza leaves in the way of democratic support. The picture is confusing:

—CAP is almost a loner within Venezuela and the AD party in his all-out support for the moderates in the FSLN and the Junta. He is so discredited within his own party and in relation to the government in many ways that his central role with us on Nicaragua is extremely delicate.

—Much of the rest of the AD party is uninformed on current negotiations, generally opposed to CAP and worried about his actions and more inclined to support the Betancourt concern for Fidelismo.

—The COPEI government is inclined toward a support of the Junta with assurances very much like we are seeking, but places Andean

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140-1621. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

Pact agreement almost ahead of Nicaragua. Therefore, its actions are somewhat limited by Andean consensus.

—Others in COPEI are most interested in avoiding giving any opportunity to the left and in working to promote other moderate currents, particularly politicians inclined toward Christian Democracy. Some are even inclined to provide military support to a democratic opposition.

3. Given this setting, it is essential that I now keep the various sectors well informed. In addition, therefore, to my frequent conversations with CAP, I read in the Foreign Minister today fully on the state of play. Zambrano briefed the President following our conversation while I was in the office. Zambrano said the following:

—Cardozo is in San Jose working with the Junta and is persuaded we are still a long way from agreement on a scenario.

—Quintana called Zambrano today to say that Somoza has reached an “impasse” with Amb. Pezzullo and implied that he urgently sought Venezuelan Government help in working out a planned departure of Somoza.

—He, Zambrano, was prepared to work very closely with the U.S. as we approached the final hour and would even be willing to go himself or with other Andean Foreign Ministers to San Jose to package together the final solution. I told Zambrano we should stay in close touch for the next 24 or 48 hours. I wondered whether his trip to San Jose to meet with the Junta now would not be undercutting a trip following their assumption of power (should that take place) which would have far greater impact. He said he would take this into consideration. He was obviously very pleased that we were engaging him again more directly.

He is not pleased by the extent of Perez’ involvement. I explained why Perez was involved and that obviously the Government of Venezuela would be much more important after the transition (the Government has Perez closely monitored and is certainly well aware of my frequent conversations and visits with Perez).

4. Meanwhile, Perez informed me this evening of his anxiety over the continued delays. He said he was considering leaving early tomorrow morning for Panama and San Jose, if necessary, to try to put together the final agreement (it would indeed be curious, although unlikely, to find Perez and Zambrano in San Jose together).

5. Finally, I had a long meeting with AD Presidential Candidate Luis Pinerua Ordaz today and gave him a general briefing of the situation. Reflecting Betancourt’s serious concerns over Fidel, Pinerua was unhappy with the Junta. I explained that so were we and that all we had now was bad options. We could only pick the least bad. I

explained that we understood the differences within AD but that we would hope to have Venezuela's full support including the backing of AD for an effort to make a massive infusion of democracy in Nicaragua after Somoza.

Luers

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia¹

Washington, July 14, 1979, 1827Z

183068. Subject: Nicaragua: Andean Initiative.

1. (S–Entire Text)

2. For Caracas only: Please pass following confidential message from Secretary Vance for Foreign Minister Zambrano. You should also convey the sense of this message to President Herrera if at all possible, especially the penultimate paragraph:

Begin text: Dear Mr. Minister: I was pleased to learn that you and your Andean Group colleagues will be meeting in Caracas Sunday July 15 to consider ways to help resolve the tragic Nicaraguan crisis.² This is a climactic moment in the history of our hemisphere, the Nicaragua situation is one whose consequences will be felt throughout the region for years to come. Your initiative, undertaken in the spirit of the OAS resolution of June 22,³ merits the support and hope of all the members of the OAS.

You have in your hands a unique opportunity to advance determination, observance of human rights, and true reconciliation in that war-torn country. The polarization and bitterness that have occurred in Nicaragua can overwhelm moderation and rational, peaceful processes. The dangers of further violence through reprisals and vengeance and of radicalization are all too real.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1743. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Managua, Panama City, San Jose and the White House. Drafted by Vaky, cleared in S/S-O and approved by Christopher.

² For the details of Zambrano's plan for the joint action of the Andean Pact foreign ministers to travel to Costa Rica and Nicaragua to support the Nicaraguan provisional government junta, see telegram 6353 from Caracas, July 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163-2150)

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 223.

Finding solutions which will avoid these dangers is, I know you will agree, of the utmost importance. As you deliberate with your colleagues, I know you will bear in mind these difficult political, strategic and human factors, and the consequent need to help Nicaragua create conditions in which all elements can freely and without coercion participate in establishing the kind of broad-based, democratic, self-determined government and regime that the OAS resolution contemplated. The moderate democratic elements within Nicaragua will require the encouragement and support of the hemisphere if they are to survive and contribute to a reconstructed Nicaragua.

Our conversations with the junta continue actively⁴ and we believe that the junta is disposed to consider and agree to additional clarifications regarding a ceasefire in place and other conditions that would benefit a peaceful, moderate transition. I wanted you to know of these prospects. I recognize the value of working with the provisional government. I hope that all of us can continue encouraging it to demonstrate its commitment to a democratic and free play by all opposition forces in the transition period. To fail to express international opinion in this sense risks to some degree allowing powerful and extreme elements to overwhelm other sectors.

Please accept my best wishes for your endeavor and be assured that the United States stands ready to cooperate in any way that you believe may be appropriate in connection with your initiatives. Sincerely, Cyrus Vance. End text.⁵

3. For Quito, Lima, Bogota and La Paz: If your Foreign Minister is still available please convey the sense of the foregoing as the Secretary's views (rather than as specific message).⁶

Christopher

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 273.

⁵ In telegram 6384 from Caracas, July 15, Luers reported that he had read Zambrano the message and that Zambrano "was very pleased." Luers also "briefed him in general terms on Bill Bowdler's discussions today with the junta." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850004-1789)

⁶ No responses were found from the Embassies in Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, or Bolivia.

363. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State and the Embassies in Nicaragua and Costa Rica¹

Caracas, July 16, 1979, 1640Z

6407. Subject: Nicaragua: Turning the Corner With the Andean Group. Ref: Caracas 6398²

1. S–Entire Text.

2. Zambrano just called to say that he thinks he has tentative agreement for the Andean Ministers now to go to Costa Rica today. He has not yet had telephone contact today with d'Escoto or Ramirez so that he cannot determine whether their visit would be welcome. I sense that this change of course is a reaction to our conversation this morning and my expression of concern and belief that our sense of timing and urgency is valid.³ It is essential, therefore, that I provide him a read-out as soon as possible as to the environment in Costa Rica for receiving some or all of the Foreign Ministers. I said that I hoped that Zambrano could go with the group to Costa Rica with some or all of the Ministers since he, Zambrano, is much closer to developments and since Venezuela is such a key actor.

3. Zambrano also asked for more details about Somoza's departure. I said I could not give precise details but I suspect the departure would be very soon, possibly tomorrow, and that we are negotiating details of departure and entry into the United States in a way that suggests to us that the man is definitely leaving. I said from past experience, we would never exclude his deceiving us but the time is fast approaching where he has no alternative. Zambrano said that he agreed fully with my earlier discussions with him, that he, Zambrano, should not go to Managua if Somoza was going to use his presence to delay his own departure. On the other hand, if Zambrano's presence could provide a convenient additional excuse and justification for departure, Zambrano would be very prepared to go. He now would like to ask advice and even have us check out whether his arrival in Managua

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2082. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

² Dated July 16. Luers reported that Zambrano was having "difficulty" getting agreement among the Andean Pact foreign ministers for joint action to support the junta in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua once Somoza had departed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2084)

³ In telegram 6398 (see footnote 2, above), Luers wrote: "Apparently, the other foreign ministers are so badly informed they do not understand the extent of the FSLN strength in Nicaragua or the fact that the moment has arrived for action." When Zambrano said "he could not get Andean agreement to move," Luers told him that "it is time, therefore, for Venezuela to go it alone." (Ibid.)

could or should coincide very closely with the departure of Somoza. I said I would check with our Ambassador in Managua and Pete Vaky and get back to him immediately with our advice.

4. Comment: Zambrano is obviously a bit frustrated with his Andean colleagues and anxious not to be behind the curve on developments in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. He is fully prepared to work with us on the timing and would like our urgent advice on the situation, both in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Please provide guidance as soon as possible.⁴

5. Finally, Zambrano said he has been in touch with Dr. Calvini who has the visiting Nicaraguan leaders in town at a conference at the hotel Avila in Caracas. He is urging Calvani and the Nicaraguans to plan to return immediately to Nicaragua so that they will be present at the crucial moment. Obviously, for all these actions, Zambrano is depending very much on the accuracy of our reporting and judgments.

Luers

⁴ No response from the Department was found. In telegram 6427 from Caracas, July 16, Luers reported that he had told Zambrano "that Bowdler had already received urging from Ramirez for the group to go to San Jose immediately. I repeated that the time was right and he should delay no longer." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2080)

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, July 29, 1979, 1715Z

7207. Subject: Consultations on Central America: Views of President of Venezuela.

1. (S-Entire Text)

2. Summary: I saw President Herrera July 28. During hour and one half conversation, he showed annoyance over former President Perez' role in Nicaragua and what he presumed to be our support for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis.

Perez, expressed moderate optimism over Nicaragua but pessimism over ripple effects of Nicaraguan events elsewhere in Central America, and said US and Venezuela should keep each other informed as they each try to keep ahead of events that will be difficult to control. End summary.

3. Herrera's major points were:

—Except for Costa Rica, none of the Central American Governments inspire democratic support.

—Clearly, public opinion everywhere but in the US Congress, understood Somoza had to go.

—Carlos Andres Perez had been working for a year to make it happen. But Perez lacked the foresight to take preventive measures.

—Had the United States realized that Central America was so closely linked that Somoza's departure without preventive measures would cause severe shocks elsewhere? What precautions had we taken when we suddenly decided to stop supporting reactionaries?

—As President of Venezuela, he would now do absolutely everything in his power to avoid Nicaragua going through anything similar to Cuba.²

—Although his Government became involved too late to be effective before Somoza fell, the delegation going to Managua on Sunday³ is the largest in Venezuela's diplomatic history. Robelo will attend the Sela meeting in Caracas Monday, and others, including some military commanders, will be invited. The situation is bad but far from lost.

—Central America is another matter. After Puebla,⁴ the bishops thought El Salvador would blow before Nicaragua. All those countries have similar habits: Kill the moderates so as to keep the choice between the Government and Castroists.

—In El Salvador what little Government there is seems to lack a real will to open the system. He could not be sure, but violence may be inevitable.

—Guatemala simply draws up lists of names then kills them.

—Honduras is the best of the lot but carries the least weight.

—None of these Governments can survive without a political opening. We must try to provide this by focussing on the centers of power.

² In telegram 7208 from Caracas, July 29, Vaky reported on his conversation with Zambrano and other Venezuelan officials, in which they discussed the "Venezuelan consensus view of how to keep current Marxist advantage from being consolidated" in Nicaragua. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790346-0156)

³ July 29.

⁴ A reference to the meeting of CELAM, the Latin American Roman Catholic Bishops' Council, held in Puebla, Mexico in 1979.

—If Bolivia sustains its democratic process, the Andean Group may be in a position to do something, Brazil and Argentina are ready to follow the Andean lead.

—Even working together, the Latins do not have the influence of the US. But at least they are Latin.

—We should keep each other informed.

4. Comment. The acidity of Herrera's views on Central America is due in good measure to his continued anger at Perez for his direct support of the FSLN. Some of this anger carries over to us, for he still has difficulty accepting that we could be as unaware of its full extent as he himself was. But Herrera seemed to get a load off his chest by being frank. Though he will play his cards close to his chest for a time, Venezuela's actions will be generally in harmony with ours, and they will continue to want consultations. We will want to work with the Herrera Government to build confidence in our common purpose over the next few months.

Luers

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, August 15, 1979, 2350Z

213816. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With President Herrera.

1. Entire Contents Confidential.

2. Summary: In Quito for the Roldos inauguration,² Secretary Vance, accompanied by Assistant Secretary Vaky and Robert Pastor, met with President Herrera and Foreign Minister Zambrano on August 11. Discussions primarily dealt with U.S. and Venezuelan views on Nicaragua, other Central American countries, and the Caribbean.

A. Nicaragua and Central America. Herrera expressed concern over the future of Nicaragua and Central America, but said that democ-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS Memcons 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information immediate to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts. Drafted by Barnebey and Butcher; cleared by Pastor, Bremer and in S/S-O; approved by Vaky.

² See Document 284 and footnote 2, Document 285.

racy can still be encouraged in Nicaragua and aid should be provided promptly. He recommended that GNR military aid requests be answered positively, and said the GOV will consider providing military assistance. Since U.S. legal requirements preclude aid to police, Herrera agreed to look for a formula to provide police assistance. Herrera was pessimistic about Nicaraguan moderates, commenting that potential moderate leaders have no independent power base and are fearful of the FSLN. Still, he hopes reinstatement of press freedom will help. The Secretary informed Herrera the GNR delegation had told him press freedom will be reestablished in a week.³ The Secretary and President Herrera agreed that all democratic nations and groups should be encouraged to work for change in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

B. Caribbean. Herrera said the Caribbean is vital to Venezuelan interests, and aid should be provided to avoid totalitarian regimes coming to power in mini-states in that region. The Secretary said he will soon consult with Herrera and others on the Caribbean issues.

C. Cuba. Herrera thinks the Cubans will be “cautious” in Nicaragua. The Secretary informed Herrera that we have conveyed our views on Central America to the Cubans and the Soviets. FonMin Zambrano said he will attend the Havana non-aligned meeting only if he is granted observer status with the right to speak. End summary.

3. Memorandum of Conversation August 11, 1979

Participants

Secretary Vance

Assistant Secretary Vaky

Robert Pastor

Malcolm R. Barnebey (notetaker)

Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins

Foreign Minister Jose Alberto Zambrano

4. President Herrera said he welcomed seeing Secretary Vance at this inauguration, which marked the rare event of a *de facto* regime peacefully turning over power to an elected constitutional regime. He said he hopes Peru and Bolivia will reach a more stable, democratic status next year. He said Nicaragua also exemplifies an opening to democracy, and while the “Southern Cone” is “harder” than ever, Brazil represents a most important opening to an eventual return to a democratic system. Secretary Vance agreed that the Ecuadorean inauguration is important, and hoped it augurs well for similar evolution in other countries.

³ A memorandum of conversation for the meeting with the GRN delegation was not found.

5. Herrera then discussed Venezuela's view of recent Central American and Caribbean developments. He said he is concerned over the direction Nicaragua may go, and how events there will affect Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras. He said he is concerned, too, over possible repercussions in Costa Rica and Panama. He said he has concluded that—in view of the announcement of permission for a non-government press, and the continuing prestige and influence of the Catholic Church—democracy in Nicaragua can still be encouraged, and aid should be provided promptly for that country's reconstruction. The Secretary agreed that both humanitarian and reconstruction aid should be provided to help heal the wounds that country has suffered. He said the Nicaraguan delegation the previous day had questioned why the U.S. is only providing aid through the Red Cross and not directly,⁴ and added he would look at this question upon his return to Washington. He said he was inclined to use both channels for U.S. assistance, and asked Herrera to comment on this. Herrera replied that both channels seem indicated, and aid to the Red Cross also serves to build support for that agency's prestigious moderate leader, Ismael Reyes. Herrera commented that the Red Cross still has some autonomy, but that the problem he sees is that all aid is being provided and distributed without priorities or planning. He said it would be an error merely to send money and goods; rather, technical missions should accompany this aid—not to set priorities for Nicaragua but to assure that aid is administered well and in a non-political manner.

6. Herrera said that the FSLN commanders are now engaged in filling key power positions in the Government rather than in pressing for ideological rigidity in Government policies. He said the moderate civilian opposition previously had only an anti-Somoza goal, but their other goals were and are diffused—with the civilians in the GNR making little or no consistent efforts to build a political base. Herrera said conservatives and others are in disarray, although reinstatement of press freedom may help. He also made the point that Nicaragua's "pluralism" will depend for the most part on the will of the FSLN commanders. The Secretary said the GNR delegation had told him that press freedom will be reestablished "in eight days". Herrera replied he hoped this would be the case.

7. Assistant Secretary Vaky said we have seen some signs of renewed activity by the conservatives, by the private sector through COSEP and by the AIFLD-affiliated cuts. He asked how moderates could be encouraged to act, and if fear of the FSLN inhibited such actions. Herrera commented that Nicaragua moderates, such as the

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 301.

Christian Democrats with whom Herrera's Copei is related, have gone from fear of Somoza to fear of the Sandinistas. He observed that despite outside support the civilians have never developed leaders who could build an independent power base. He said he had tried to build up the moderates' morale, but instead they only awaited the FSLN commanders' decisions. Only a few, such as Nicaraguan human rights leader Jose Esteban Gonzales and dissident liberal Ramiro Sacasa, did not give up the struggle for leadership of the anti-Somoza opposition.

8. Herrera then chided the U.S. for slighting Latin America, focusing its attention more, say, on Asia and Africa. He also questioned what he termed the U.S. inclination to support dictatorial regimes, often seen by Latin Americans as merely a device to protect U.S. corporate interests. He acknowledged that the situation has changed, particularly due to U.S. emphasis on protection of human rights, and Latin American dictatorships have come to feel they have less support from the U.S.

9. He said other problems in defending democracy in the area result from frequent disagreement between the Christian Democratic and Social Democratic sectors, and the notion that only rich countries can afford democracy. As an example, he said Caribbean mini-republics often look to Marxist or Castro-type solutions because they consider that they lack the resources needed to pay for democratic solutions. Herrera said he had welcomed Mrs. Carter's statement in Puerto Rico about U.S. interest in the Caribbean,⁵ but he had seen no follow-up by the U.S.—or by Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela—to promote economic and social development in the area. He said that Trinidad and the countries to the north are vital to Venezuela's interests and should be aided so as to avoid becoming totalitarian states.

10. Returning to the subject of Central America, Herrera said the democratization of the Andean Group nations and of Nicaragua will have great impact in that region. He said he is particularly worried over Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, whose Governments all had close ties to Somoza. Efforts should be made, Herrera said, to encourage existing democratic organizations. He said that the leftist forces have no electoral strength and must rely on guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts. He said the hemisphere democracies must find a way—including through the OAS and regional groups like the Andean Pact—to press for a democratic opening in these countries. Otherwise, he said, they will go the same way as Nicaragua. El Salvador's military

⁵ Presumably a reference to Rosalynn Carter's October 11, 1977, speech in Dorado, Puerto Rico. ("Carter in New Bid For Canal Backing, *New York Times*, October 12, 1977, p. 9; John M. Goshko, "U.S. is Pressing New Effort to Aid Caribbean Economy," *Washington Post*, October 23, 1977, p. 134)

regime could, for example, be pressed to respect the results of its municipal elections scheduled for early in 1980.

11. The Secretary said he is in general agreement with Herrera's views on the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and on problems in Central America and the Caribbean. He said the U.S. has given more attention to problems in other parts of the world, but that the Carter administration—with the Panama Canal Treaty and human rights issues—has paid increased attention to Latin America.

12. Regarding Nicaragua, Secretary Vance said both countries should act to help that country get back on its feet. He said the observation that Nicaraguan moderates may fear the FSLN commanders is probably correct, but that the remedy for this is for people in the democracies with like interests to develop more ties to Nicaraguan moderates—in business, trade, and other areas—and the sooner the better.

13. The Secretary then asked for Herrera's views on these points:

—How can we best coordinate our efforts to foster progress in Nicaragua?

—Should the U.S. respond positively to military aid requests?⁶ If we decline, the GNR may turn to other sources. If we agree, how should we provide military and police assistance? Could the Andean Group countries help meet such requests for assistance?

—Regarding Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, how can we best cooperate to seek the opening to democracy which Herrera described? In El Salvador, especially, time is short.

14. Regarding the Caribbean, the Secretary said the U.S. has also been concerned over mini-states with too little administrative ability and too few resources to enable them to survive. The Secretary said we have worked on this problem, and hope to complete our analysis by next month. He said he would want to consult with Herrera and with others as to how next to proceed. Fortunately, he said, it is not yet too late to undertake such tasks in the Caribbean and to coordinate our aid efforts there.

15. Answering the Secretary's points, Herrera recommended:

—That military aid requests be answered positively and said that if the GNR follows up its earlier tentative request the Venezuelans will consider providing military assistance, personnel, etc. to help orient and advise the Nicaraguan armed forces.

—That to help bring about democratic change in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, both countries might begin in Honduras, and

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 302.

through internal pressures in all three—but not pressures from outside the area—to influence the military regimes to adopt reforms which will lessen present and future popular tensions.

16. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked if Venezuela could not help advise El Salvador with respect to its electoral process. Herrera replied that Foreign Minister Zambrano had looked into this possibility and Venezuela may send a group to visit El Salvador to explore possible assistance. Vaky added that perhaps this help might be provided in such a way that no single foreign country would be seen as intervening in El Salvador's domestic electoral affairs. Herrera added that to obtain a democratic opening in these countries the Church, through its bishops and the Regional Ecclesiastical Conference, can work for moderating changes, as can the Venezuelan and other Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Parties of the region. Zambrano emphasized that the governments in the three countries must first be convinced to adopt reforms and then other moderating changes can be encouraged by outside governments. Vaky observed that the military regimes and economic oligarchies in the area will be difficult to persuade to take such steps. Vaky quoted El Salvadoran President Romero as saying his regime would move toward reforms, but should not be pushed into them by outside pressures. Herrera commented that many of these regimes' generals were U.S.-trained, suggesting that change might be urged upon the military regimes through this route.

17. Vaky then returned to the question of how to mobilize other nations' efforts. Herrera opined that even Mexico might be urged to help, on the basis that they want others, most notably the U.S., to stay out of Central American affairs. The Secretary asked how the U.S. can help without appearing to be interfering in those countries' domestic affairs. Herrera replied that much depends on how the U.S. describes its intentions, which Latin Americans frequently see as solely the protection of U.S. economic interests. He said that Cuba's influence, particularly in the Caribbean, is not so much due to its military strength as to what it says and does on assistance matters—training people, providing doctors, etc. He said Venezuela can make concessions on oil deliveries to Caribbean mini-states, but the Cubans offer to send "400 teachers." He said that the U.S. in time could come to be seen as a friendly country, even though economic or other disputes remain. Herrera continued that when opportunities arise, such as this inauguration of a democratic regime in Ecuador, the U.S. President should be present, and this fact would far outweigh the effect of a few "Yanqui go home" signs. He said the presence of Mrs. Carter and the Secretary in Quito was helpful in encouraging democratizing trends in Latin America.

18. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked for views on Cuba's strategy, and how we should react. He asked what Zambrano would seek to

achieve at the Havana Non-Aligned Movement meeting. Zambrano said he would go only if he was granted "observer" status with the right to speak at the meeting. Of the Andean Group countries Peru and Bolivia would be active participants, Colombia is considering a more active role, and Ecuador is hurrying to open relations with Cuba. Thus, Zambrano said, the Andean Group is constructing closer links to Cuba. Herrera asked the Secretary about U.S. relations with Cuba. Secretary Vance responded that in view of Cuban activities in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere little had been accomplished since the two countries had opened interest sections in each other's capitals. He said that except for Cuba's release of prisoners little if any improvement has taken place in U.S.-Cuban relations.

19. Herrera continued that his government had not completed their review of Venezuelan policy toward Cuba because other issues had taken precedence. Unlike the U.S., Venezuela has not designed any global strategy for dealing with Cuba. For us, he said, "frictions don't exist" with Cuba over African issues, and, unlike the 1960s, at the present time Cuba poses no aggressive threat to Venezuela. What Venezuela has, as a consequence, is relations "at a distance" with Cuba.

20. Assistant Secretary Vaky asked whether Herrera believed Cuba would push hard to seize control of Nicaragua. Herrera answered that he thinks the Cubans will be "cautious," citing as an example the July 26 speeches in Havana of Castro and the GNR delegation—"Castro's speech was less radical than theirs." He stressed that Venezuela would also object to having "enemy" government under Cuba's tutelage close to his country's borders.

21. The Secretary stated that—whatever the Cubans' objectives—we have conveyed to them our views on Central America. He said we have also done this to the Soviets. We warned the Soviets of the consequences of any aggressive actions in the region. The Secretary added that while to date we have received no response to either demarche, we expect to receive them soon. He said that others with Cuban contacts, such as Mexico and Panama, should likewise express their views. These countries might have more impact on the Cubans than we do; for our part we would expect to exert greater influence on the Soviets.

22. Ambassador Vaky asked Herrera once again how to harness other countries in this effort. Pastor mentioned that the Andean Group countries, now that more of them are becoming democratic, could make a useful contribution. Herrera said efforts of many, including the Andean Group, should be joined in this effort, including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama and Barbados. He added that in Panama itself a democratic opening is a possibility, and that others should seek to help President Royo gain stature in spite of Torrijos' predominant

influence. Herrera said the Andean Group would seek closer ties to influence Panamanian developments, for instance while he and others are attending the October 1 Canal Ceremonies. (He said the Andean Group is particularly interested in establishing marketing and storage arrangements in Panama.)

23. Assistant Secretary Vaky returned to the subject of military assistance to Nicaragua, which Tomas Borge suggested informally to Ambassador Pezullo. Vaky said our legal restrictions preclude any U.S. assistance to police. Nevertheless there is a need for such assistance (vehicles, police experts, etc.), and asked if Venezuela and other Andean Group countries could provide it. He said Panama has a modest program there, but more is required. Herrera said Venezuela's aid would have to come from its own National Guard, which he said is an objectionable name for police to Nicaraguans, but agreed to look for a formula to provide police assistance. Asked further if other Andean Group countries might also contribute, Herrera said he would consult with his staff in this regard.

Vance

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 2, 1980, 0011Z

1045. Subject: Andean Pact Military Assistance to El Salvador. Ref: (A) San Salvador 703² (B) State 028294.³

1. S—Entire Text

2. I called on Foreign Minister Zambrano this afternoon (February 1) to express our strong concern that in view of developments in El Salvador it was imperative that the GOV decide as soon as possible on its participation in the proposed multilateralization of military assist-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated January 31. The Embassy reported on the visit to El Salvador of the Andean Pact mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800055-0237)

³ Dated February 1. The Department repeated San Salvador 712, January 31, in which the Embassy reported that the Venezuelan delegation "had agreed in concept to provide military and anti-subversive training to Salvadoran armed forces." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0575)

ance to the junta. Zambrano responded that the situation was extremely worrisome, and that Ambassador Cardozo had reported on his recent visit there in very somber terms. The question was, how can the military aid be furnished? It was clear that it would require a Presidential decision as far as Venezuela was concerned, he said. When I emphasized that time was short to coordinate any possible multilateral efforts, and that we were on the eve of the two-week trip that the President and he are making to the Middle East, Zambrano said he was not sure the President would have time to focus on the proposal before departing this week-end. According to Zambrano, President Herrera has suspended all audiences and is concentrating exclusively on the preparations for the trip. Zambrano recommended that I follow-up with Cardozo who was back from his visit.

3. I was able to pursue the matter with Cardozo (who was in the Ministry working with the Ambassador of Colombia on how the proposal should be presented to the Governments of Colombia and Venezuela). Cardozo said that on the basis of his visit, he judged the political situation to be so grave that he would not give the present junta more than thirty days of life, unless it receives strong outside support. He said he expected to see President Herrera tonight to propose Venezuela's participation in the military assistance effort. If the President agrees and if active military personnel are sent, it will require the approval of the Senate, or at least of the Interim Comision Delegada, which could be time-consuming. On the other hand, a possible alternative might be to locate suitable retired military personnel willing to accept the assignment plus a few selected security people and Copei Party activists. He said he would have to look further into the legal implications. He plans to talk tomorrow to ex-Presidents Betancourt and Caldera to assure Herrera bipartisan support. The Venezuelans would be political advisers and intelligence trainers and this latter skill is badly needed, according to Cardozo, who claimed that the GOS and the Salvadorean Armed Forces have no basic intelligence information about what is happening in the country. Cardozo said he had to go to Washington on Sunday, February 3 but would hope to get President Herrera's approval to return by February 7 to take a small hand-picked group to Salvador. Colombia's contribution (if the GOC agrees) would be five or six instructors in the area of counter-guerrilla training. The Ambassador said he plans to go to Bogota to present the proposal to President Turbay and the Foreign Minister on February 8. I urged him to go sooner.

4. I said we strongly supported the multilateral effort, and explained the importance of other groups going before our MTT.⁴ I

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 406.

said this seemed to me to be the time for the Andean countries, or at least Venezuela and Colombia, to stand up and be counted. The time to do something is now. Both of my interlocutors agreed on the urgency and the broader significance of the Salvadoren struggle. Cardozo said all of Central America will be put at risk if Salvador falls to the radicals. He did not think Honduras and Guatemala could long hold out under those circumstances, and the threat to Panama and even Costa Rica would be serious indeed. The Colombian Ambassador agreed.

5. Cardozo has promised to brief me tomorrow on the results of his meeting with the President. I detect an air of caution on the part of the Foreign Minister in discussing this matter. He is clearly leaving it to Cardozo and the President. Cardozo is seized of the issue and is not inclined to bury his head in the sand. But he has only one more day to persuade Herrera before the Middle East trip. I will work on this tomorrow full day.⁵

Luers

⁵ In telegram 1049 from Caracas, February 2, Luers reported that Cardozo had called "to say that he had gotten a green light for his plan from President Herrera," and that they had "agreed on about 8 or 10 names of trusted active military officers (3 or 4) and civilians (4 to 6). The President has charged his special foreign policy adviser Margarita Palacios to work with Cardozo to have a team ready to go to Salvador probably a week from Monday." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80)

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 9, 1980, 1640Z

1350. Subject: Venezuelan Assistance to Salvador. Ref: Caracas 1317.²

1. Secret-Entire Text

2. Cardozo and I met for an hour this morning. He showed extreme frustration from the fact that apparently as I had suspected, Calvani has put a temporary roadblock in Cardozo's plans. Since the plan was between Cardozo and the President and no one else except for Margarita Palacios knew about it, the Acting President, who is now out of Caracas, does not feel he can countermand Calvani's more fuzzy and cautious approach.

3. Cardozo said that he had a long unpleasant conversation yesterday with Calvani in which Calvani said that Cardozo could not, as an Ambassador, represent COPEI to the PDC in Salvador and that the Congress would be outraged at the presence of a military mission in Salvador. Calvani was also worried about the US involvement and about the public image of Venezuela. Calvani, therefore, is planning to take to Salvador on Monday³ two retired generals (General Sucre Figuerela and General Araque). They will spend four or five days in Salvador giving some "courses" in political action and preparing another "report" for the President. Moreover, two other military officers have already gone to Salvador from the Ministry of Defense to prepare their own report. Cardozo, meanwhile, will not go as planned but has his team of three military officers and four civilians ready to depart whenever he can reconfirm the President's instruction which may not be until Herrera returns on February 15. Cardozo's proposal on how to get around congressional concern is to characterize his group as a study team which will work with the Salvador Government for an "extended" period of time to examine their needs. Cardozo says he is fully prepared to go before Congress and defend his mission on that basis.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

² Dated February 8. Luers reported on the political divisions in Venezuela and within the COPEI party, and on the disagreement between Cardozo and Calvani, over how Venezuela should proceed with assistance to the junta in El Salvador. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Venezuela, 1/79-3/80)

³ February 10.

4. Cardozo clearly was furious at the handwringing indecisiveness of his government and party. He said President Herrera however fully understands and supports Cardozo's plan and also fully understands the US intentions to support with MTT's. Cardozo plans to lunch tomorrow with the Acting President, Montes de Oca, and the Minister of the Presidency, Gonzalo Garcia Bustillos, who thus far know very little about the situation. I have been unable to get to them the last three days since they have been out of town or incommunicado. Cardozo hopes he can turn the Acting President around or convince him to seek instructions from President Herrera.

5. We are at a critical stage. In terms of US-Venezuela relations, the top level political structure of this government must appreciate what they are getting into by sending this group to Salvador. But Herrera and Cardozo clearly have a commitment to make this Christian Democratic junta work. They also have apparently made a commitment to try to help save the Salvador situation against heavy odds. Others in the COPEI Party who are less familiar with our policy and the problems of Salvador, are characteristically cautious and trying to scuttle this effort.

6. Action requested: Given this background I, therefore, request instructions immediately for me to talk with the Acting President tomorrow morning (he returns to Caracas on Sunday) prior to or immediately following his lunch with Cardozo, along the following lines:

—The situation in Salvador is at a critical stage and the Government needs immediate political and military advice on how to proceed (expand these talking points as desired).

—Venezuela's plan as originally designed by President Herrera and Ambassador Cardozo is a major element in an assistance program to Salvador that would include support from Spain, Colombia, and other countries.

—Once such assistance is provided the US is prepared to provide technical support to the Salvador National Guard, particularly in the important area of communications and transportation.

—US Government at the highest level urges the President of Venezuela to proceed with his plan on an urgent basis.

7. Please provide me these instructions by flash cable. If I cannot use them with Montes de Oca, I will do so with Garcia Bustillos as soon as possible.

Luers

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Panama and Ecuador¹

Washington, February 10, 1980, 0027Z

36613. Subject: Message From President Carter. Ref: Caracas 1350.²

1. (C-Entire Text)

2. Ambassador should at earliest possible opportunity deliver following message from President Carter to your Chief of State.

Begin text.

Dear (insert name and title):

Recent events in Central America have become a matter of deep concern to me. An explosive situation has emerged in El Salvador that could deteriorate into civil war and threaten the peace and security of the entire area.

In El Salvador the Revolutionary Junta Government is attempting to carry out swift, peaceful reforms in order to improve the lives of its citizens and create a democratic and stable political environment. However, self-interested extremist forces oppose these efforts and threaten to push the country into a civil war from which a totalitarian government is likely to emerge. Despite the presence of some moderates in the so-called "popular forces," the leadership core of these groups consists of radical Marxists who are committed opponents to a pluralistic or democratic process. It is an illusion to think that these groups can be genuinely moderated.

The United States is eager to assist the new Government in its reform program, but the Revolutionary Junta Government needs a broader demonstration of support from a number of friendly and democratic countries. Encourage you to work with the junta to identify areas in which your Government can best help them to implement their reform program.

The United States understands and appreciates the need for fundamental change in Central America and is using its economic and security assistance programs to support reform. Rapid, peaceful change is essential to avoid political violence. However, the pressures for legitimate social and economic reform, in some cases long overdue, have helped to create unstable political conditions not only in El Salvador but in several other Central American republics as well. As a conse-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0107. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-81*, vol. XX, Central America, Document 408.

² See Document 367.

quence, these countries have become vulnerable to subversive elements, which have indigenous roots but are being trained, supported, and, to a certain extent, directed by Cuba. These Cuban activities are unquestionably interventionist.

The United States under my administration has repeatedly affirmed its intention to maintain a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other states. But our adherence to this policy is not a license for others to intervene. Cuba should not be permitted, by sponsoring subversion, to threaten the peace and security of Central America.

I am sharing these concerns with you in hopes of establishing an ongoing dialogue about conditions in Central America and the actions we might consider taking to meet the challenges we face there. I can assure you that the United States is as determined to support the forces of reform and development as it is to oppose the forces of subversion and extremist violence. Sincerely, End text.

3. For Bogota and Lima: Add the following to the middle of the third paragraph of the above text. Quote: We have already approached your Government on lending security and political support to the beleaguered Salvadoran junta. We hope that you will find appropriate ways to support the revolutionary junta in El Salvador.³ End quote.

4. For Caracas: To the third paragraph of the letter's text add: Quote: We have already discussed with you and your Government the possibility of lending security and political support to the beleaguered Salvadoran junta. I am encouraged by your Government's commitment to send advisors to El Salvador. End quote.

5. For Panama: Ambassador should deliver message to both President Royo and to General Torrijos. Post should add the following to the letter. Quote: You have been a bridge between the parties in El Salvador, maintaining contact with them and counseling them toward moderation. To the extent that your efforts help the new Government gain the support it needs to implement its reforms, we believe you are contributing to the peace of the region. End quote.⁴

6. For all action addressees. You should view this letter as an additional opportunity to engage the President or Foreign Minister in this issue, and to underscore the urgency of the issue. Our objective

³ In telegram 1493 from Bogota, February 12, Asencio reported delivery of Carter's message to Turbay. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800075-1098) In telegram 1219 from Lima, February 11, Preeg reported that he delivered the message to Garcia Bedoya, who said he would discuss it with Morales Bermudez that day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870095-1039)

⁴ In telegram 1451 from Panama City, February 14, the Embassy reported delivery of Carter's message to Royo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D80079-0768)

is to support the junta so as to increase the probability that it will remain a working Government. You should therefore deliver message personally to Chief of State if possible. If unable to do so or if this would involve delay you may deliver personally to Foreign Minister for transmittal to Chief of State. In delivering message you may draw on the following points:

—The letter is an indication of the personal interest and concern of President Carter with recent developments in El Salvador, and the importance the President attaches to close consultation with your government on this important matter.

—The President would value your views on developments in El Salvador and whatever assistance your Government could provide.

7. Ambassador Asencio should use this message to try to persuade President Turbay to as soon as possible respond favorably to the Salvadoran request for security assistance without delaying until March.

8. For Kuwait and Doha: Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins accompanied by Foreign Minister Zambrano is scheduled to visit Kuwait on February 10 and Qatar on February 11. You should deliver this message personally to President Herrera or Foreign Minister Zambrano only, making points in para 6. If unable to deliver as requested please advise.⁵

9. For Caracas: In presenting message you can expand on talking points as necessary per para 6 reftel.⁶

Christopher

⁵ In telegram 211 from Doha, February 11, Killgore reported the delivery of Carter's message to Herrera. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870148-2149)

⁶ In telegram 1351 from Caracas, February 11, Luers reported the delivery of the message to Montes de Oca and analyzed the "favorable but complex environment in Caracas for working with the U.S. in Central America." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0112)

369. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, February 16, 1980, 1800Z

1594. Subject: El Salvador: Talk With Cardozo. Ref: A) Caracas 1520² B) Bowdler/Luers Secure Line Telecon³ C) San Salvador 1066.⁴

1. S—Entire Text.

2. Cardozo and I met for breakfast. I explained that since we have received the green light from the JRG on sending in our MTTs (ref C) and since Washington believes we must move soon (ref B), we have decided to send to Salvador a small group as an advance team to the MTTs. I said that four or five military officers would probably be going to Salvador on Sunday⁵ and their visit could be justified publicly as an exploration mission much like the one the Venezuelans now have in Salvador. I said that since the USG wants to continue to work closely with Venezuela we want them to be aware that we believe it necessary to take this step now.

3. Cardozo said fine. We both noted the cool handling in today's Caracas press of the Venezuelan press release yesterday (Caracas 1554)⁶ and indications in the press that AD leaders seem less inclined to criticize COPEI. Cardozo said he would inform Acting President Montes de Oca of our decision at once.

4. We then talked again about our collaboration in this joint venture. Cardozo said that except for Calvani and perhaps Garcia Bustillos, there is agreement within the upper party and Government leadership that:

—Venezuela and the USG have common objectives in Salvador (support for democracy and defeat of the subversion).

—The US role is key to accomplishing these objectives.

—The two Governments should work together very closely but not give public evidence that we are doing so. He was grateful for the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0149. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated February 14. Luers reported on his talks with Perez and Barrios about cooperation between the AD and COPEI parties regarding El Salvador. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0139)

³ No record of the conversation was found.

⁴ Dated February 15. The Embassy reported that the JRG had accepted U.S. MTTs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137-1759)

⁵ February 17.

⁶ Dated February 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800082-0387)

information and believed that in this difficult process there is a major need to keep up these detailed exchanges.

5. He said he expects the following to happen:

—President Herrera will return Sunday afternoon and receive Cardozo no earlier than Monday, February 18. At that point Cardozo expects to get final approval from Herrera.

—On Tuesday at noon, Betancourt and Gonzolo Barrios, will meet with ex-President Caldera, Cardozo, and possibly Calvani to discuss: AD/COPEI cooperation on Salvador; how to handle the congressional approval issue; what support should be given to Salvador.

—On Wednesday, assuming Cardozo carries the day, he will go to Salvador with a possible lay-over in Panama. (He alone might have to return to Caracas on February 25 to attend a major COPEI Party/Government conference, while leaving his team in Salvador).

6. Cardozo said, however, that there were still hesitations here. He thought the Salvador situation was improving and that maybe there is no rush. I said that is not the case. He asked for a briefing on our (and Majano's) current evaluation of the situation. He said he would like to be able to brief the President on Monday.

7. I told Cardozo that:

—The situation is deteriorating and that we would probably go ahead by the middle of next week to move our MTTs to Salvador if the Venezuelan Government was still vacillating.

—Our commitment has been made, the JRG needs urgent help and we just cannot wait longer.

—We believe that the Venezuelan and other Latin presence at the policy level would still be far preferable to a U.S. presence alone but that we will have to take the less desirable alternative if Venezuela cannot make up its mind. He took the point and said he would be in touch during the next few days and give me regular progress reports. I repeated that by Tuesday if we do not have a definite word from Venezuela we will probably have to proceed on our own.

8. Action requested: The Department is requested to:

—Provide me with an overall briefing of the current situation in Salvador (military, economic, political, and subversion). Has the situation improved or worsened in the past two weeks? If so, how? Are Majano and the PDC working better together? Surely there must be a recent INR or CIA analysis that could be provided by cable.⁷

—Please send me relevant nodis traffic from Colombia and Peru and elsewhere on the status of our talks with others. I will not use

⁷ No response was found.

unless authorized but I need the perspective in order to better read the inputs the Venezuelans are receiving from their Andean colleagues.

—I am still hoping to receive by cable detailed briefing paper (that must exist) on the various groups of the left in Salvador including their orientation and external support. (Ref A, para 8).⁸

9. Comment: This “Hamletismo” in Latin America is characteristic but no less maddening. We must do everything to stop it from becoming “Pontiuspilatismo”. It is clearly in our interest to keep them engaged directly and actively which is certainly the instinct of Hilarion Cardozo, and hopefully by his President.

10. Footnote: I received my instructions (State 042857)⁹ after drafting this cable. I have as reported here carried them out and believe we should proceed as contemplated. I will provide a recommendation on Monday, after Cardozo sees President Herrera, on whether an additional Presidential letter would be helpful. As of today, I think not.

Luers

⁸ In telegram 42899 to Caracas, February 16, the Department noted that the response to this question was being provided [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0153)

⁹ Dated February 16. The Department instructed Luers to “inform appropriate Venezuelan officials of JRG favorable decision” regarding U.S. MTTs, and asked if a “further presidential letter would be helpful in overcoming any lingering hesitation to give Cardozo group green light to proceed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003-0458)

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela¹

Washington, March 6, 1980, 2050Z

60860. Subject: U.S. Security Assistance for El Salvador

1. (S–Entire Text)

¹ National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0189. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to Bogota, Havana, Lima, Lisbon, Madrid, Panama, and San Salvador. Drafted by A. Wilson and Bowdler; cleared by Hemenway, Pastor, and in S/S-O; approved by Christopher.

2. In line with SCC guidance² we are planning to provide security assistance to El Salvador following promulgation by the junta (JRG) of its reform program. The agrarian reform package, signed by all five members of the JRG, was promulgated at noon today in highly visible ceremonies designed to increase the visibility and impact of this far-reaching measure.³ Promulgation of the Banking Reform Law is expected to follow shortly.

3. Since we have been working so closely with the Venezuelans in support of the JRG, we want to inform President Herrera or Foreign Minister Zambrano (or if they are not available Presidential Secretary Garcia Bustillos) of our intention and obtain their reaction. Request you do this making the following points:

—We are gratified that the GOV as a result of the Calvani mission has several technicians assisting the GOES in police, agrarian reform and other fields (Para 3 of Caracas 1839⁴).

—Last week we signed a loan for \$5.5 million with the GOES for credit to small industries and cooperatives.

—We have been waiting to provide security assistance until the JRG promulgated its reform program, especially agrarian reform.

—With the announcement of the Agrarian Reform Decree today, we plan to initiate our security assistance within a few days beginning with a small advance team to be followed shortly by three MTTs (12 men each) to begin training at the three brigade headquarters.

—Some equipment and supplies will subsequently follow, basically in the communications and transportation areas.

—We plan to expand our help, especially in support of the Agrarian Reform Law, in the upgrading of urban areas, and work-generating projects in rural areas. The JRG will continue to need additional assistance from the GOV, both in the security and economic areas. We encourage the GOV to move such assistance forward as rapidly as possible.

4. We are taking advantage of Calderon Berti's presence to have Dr. Brzezinski mention matter to him and ask him to let President Herrera know of your interest in seeing him in order to convey the above point directly.⁵

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 419.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. XV, Central America, Document 424.

⁴ In telegram 1839 from Caracas, February 26, Luers reported on his meeting with Calvani. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-1073)

⁵ No record of the meeting was found.

5. The actual implementation or timing of our assistance could be affected by the GOV response. Please report their reactions by NIACT immediate.⁶

Vance

⁶ In telegram 2239 from Caracas, March 7, Crowley reported on his meeting with Zambrano: "I stressed to Zambrano—and repeated—that in our judgment the time has come to move on assistance as quickly as possible. He said he agreed that now was the time to act and assured me he would advise President Herrera accordingly." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0192)

371. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA 80-10494

Washington, December, 1980

Venezuela's Policy in Central America and the Caribbean
[portion marking not declassified]

Key Judgments

In its effort to become a major force in Central America and the Caribbean, Venezuela is using its financial and political resources to expand its influence throughout the region. In doing so, it is responding to the potential threat to its interests from the increasing pressures for change in the area, as well as hoping to promote progressive, friendly governments in several countries. [portion marking not declassified]

Venezuela, however, does not appear to have the resources to be as effective as either of the two dominant outside powers, the United States and Cuba. In the short term, Caracas's bid for influence will be hampered by domestic partisanship, a shortage of technical and human resources, and a lack of central direction and coherent strategy. Over the long term, Venezuela's commitment to this course and the availabil-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Box 3, Folder 3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Political Analysis; coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Central Reference, [less than 1 line not declassified], and the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America.

ity of surplus oil revenues for aid programs are uncertain. [*portion marking not declassified*]

These circumstances and Caracas's deteriorating relations with Havana should produce closer cooperation with the United States. President Herrera's government recognizes a considerable community of regional interests with Washington but cannot abide the public perception at home or abroad that it is acting as a US surrogate. The prospects for closer cooperation also will be affected by Herrera's confidence in the depth and breadth of US consultations, as well as by the extent to which Washington appreciates Venezuela's more parochial concerns and its fears of big power confrontation in the Caribbean basin.² [*portion marking not declassified*]

Venezuela accepts that it must compete with Cuba for influence in the region, but is apprehensive and prefers to maintain stable relations with the Castro regime and to avoid involvement in US-Cuban disputes. If Venezuela proceeds with plans to release a Cuban exile accused of bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976, however, Havana may break relations in the next few months.³ [*portion marking not declassified*]

In Central America, Venezuela's short-term policies seek to counter external forces that support violent revolution or reaction and to provide economic assistance and political initiatives that will relieve internal pressures in those countries. Its longer term objectives are to reduce political polarization in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras by encouraging democratic openings, bolster political pluralism in Nicaragua, and sustain and protect Costa Rica's democracy. El Salvador currently is the key to Venezuela's strategy.⁴ [*portion marking not declassified*]

² "Caribbean basin" refers to all of Central America and the Caribbean Sea. Central America includes Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize. "The Caribbean" refers to all of the islands of the Caribbean Sea, plus Guyana and Suriname. [Footnote in original]

³ A reference to Orlando Bosch, who was acquitted of the bombing by a Venezuelan military court in September. ("4 Acquitted in Cuban Bombing," *New York Times*, September 27, 1980, p. 3) In telegram 10558 from Caracas, November 29, the Embassy reported that "additional delay is still a possibility" in Bosch's release. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800571-0198)

⁴ In telegram 11023 from Caracas, December 14, Bowdler reported that Calvani had told him that the U.S. "suspension of aid" to El Salvador "had caused domestic political problems for COPEL," "but it had been an important element in the shaping of the new agreement" between the PDC and the Salvadoran military. Calvani had told the military "that Venezuela could not stand alone, after the US's action, in the face of mounting world opinion against El Salvador." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900073-1968)

In the Caribbean, Venezuela hopes to counter Cuban expansionism, preserve stability by shoring up democratic institutions and national economies, and avert superpower confrontations. Jamaica is the testing ground for more aggressive pursuit of these objectives. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Venezuela prefers to work much of its policy through multilateral mechanisms, such as international financial institutions, the Andean Pact, the Inter-American Energy Plan, and the OPEC Development Fund. Herrera believes this approach supplements, and in some cases replaces, Venezuelan resources and reduces Caracas's political exposure. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The new joint Venezuelan-Mexican Petroleum Financing Facility, the cornerstone of Venezuela's regional policy, can significantly further Caracas's interests. Among the agreement's potential pitfalls, however, are unanswered questions regarding its practicability as an instrument of political leverage and its vulnerability to possible Mexican-Venezuelan rivalry. In any event, the agreement promises to blunt charges from Central American and Caribbean nations that OPEC's pricing policies have undermined their economies, while the financial benefits will contribute to regional economic stability. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Domestic politics is playing an important role in Venezuela's policy toward the region. Former President Perez, still an independent force in Central American–Caribbean affairs and spokesman for the largest opposition party, differs with the Herrera administration on policy toward a number of countries, especially El Salvador. Herrera's confrontational style has hurt chances for interparty cooperation, but probably not enough to undermine Venezuela's overall policy. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here are Parts I (“Central America-Caribbean Policy: Motives and Tools”) and II (“The Cuban and U.S. Factors in Venezuelan Policy”) of the assessment, and Appendices A (“Venezuela's State-to-State Relations With Central America”) and B (“Venezuela's State-to-State Relations With the Caribbean”)]

372. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela to the Department of State¹

Caracas, January 10, 1981, 1742Z

243. Subject: Military Assistance to El Salvador. Ref: State 003728.²

1. Secret–Entire Text.

2. Due to visit of Codel Santini,³ the absence of the Foreign Minister, the sickness of Minister of Presidency Garcia Bustillos, the heavy schedule of Calvani, and the fact that the Venezuelan Government doesn't really begin working again until mid-January, it was difficult to get the message (reftel) to appropriate officials until January 9. I met with Garcia Bustillos and Calvani. Both were extremely pleased by our decision.

3. Garcia Bustillos, whom I saw first, said he would inform the President immediately since the President is deeply involved in all of the decision making. He said that I should have my substantive talks with Calvani, but that he supported the decision. He said he hoped that it would not be given much publicity and that we can minimize attention to the decision. He also offered that he hoped the Reagan administration would continue to pursue this similar policy and that it would not feel it necessary to draw excessive public attention to U.S. military assistance to Salvador.

4. The meeting with Calvani was much longer and more substantive. Calvani was very pleased by the information and by the decision. Indeed, he kept mumbling to himself throughout our conversation how relieved he was that we were taking these steps. He also referred back to his last discussion here with Bill Bowdler in December⁴ recalling that Bowdler had said we and Venezuela should treat this as a pedagogical exercise for the Salvadoran military requiring them to demonstrate certain progress and, as a reward, providing some military assistance stepping up the assistance as performance improves.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated January 7. The Department instructed the Embassy to "inform appropriate GOV officials that, in response to an appeal from President Duarte to strengthen his position with the armed forces, the USG plans to resume military assistance to El Salvador." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number) See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XV, Central America, Document 457.

³ In telegram 2564 to Caracas, January 6, the Department transmitted a press release announcing that a congressional delegation led by Santini would visit Venezuela on January 7 and 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810007-0191)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 371.

5. Calvani said that he had been in touch by telephone with various contacts in Salvador throughout the day on the 9th when the supposed large offense was to materialize from the left. He was receiving reports that the situation was quiet. He showed me his schedule of the day before to explain why he had been unable to meet with me. Virtually every meeting he had was connected in some way to efforts to brief on Salvador or to extract his government's assistance for Salvador. Calvani itemized for me briefly those steps that he thought were on the way within the Venezuelan Government to support Salvador:

—The oil facility has finally been approved for Salvador and Nicaragua. The President has asked Minister of Energy Calderon Berti to fly to Salvador first and Nicaragua second within the next week or so to sign agreements in the capitals. Calvani did not know whether the Mexicans would also participate in the signing in Salvador. Calvani underscored the point that it was the President who had insisted that Calderon go to Salvador and accomplish the Managua signing on the same trip for obvious political impact.

—The team Venezuela sent to Salvador to evaluate the Land Reform Program has completed its report, and it has been submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture here. Calvani has made his appeal to the Minister in front of the Minister's principal advisers. He has requested the follow-up assistance called for in the report for money, fertilizers, seeds and technicians. Calvani said the two problems are that the Salvadorean Government has been imprecise about what it needs in the way of seeds and fertilizers. Also the Minister of Agriculture in Venezuela might be changed within the next few days, meaning Calvani might have to begin this briefing process all over again with the new Minister and his new team.

—Calvani is seeking to provide two types of police assistance. First, he has spoken to Sosa Chacin, the head of the Venezuelan Technical Police (PTJ), about providing personnel, equipment, and expertise to help develop a technical police capacity under the Fiscal General in Salvador. Calvani had invited the Fiscal General to visit Caracas for this purpose, but unfortunately, the individual he had invited has just recently been replaced, so he must start that process over again in Salvador.

—Calvani has also been talking with the Mayor of San Salvador to improve the city police operations, particularly to combat simple crime. He has a commitment from the Governor of the Federal District in Caracas to work out a bilateral agreement with the Mayor of San Salvador. But this commitment might be undone because in the upcoming cabinet shuffle, the Governor of Caracas may move to another Ministry.

Calvani showed frustration at the bureaucratic problems he is facing in developing these assistance programs, making his job as coordi-

nator for El Salvador virtually full time, but he is optimistic about Duarte and his government.

6. I asked him whether, following Bill Bowdler's fruitful December visit, he had finally had a meeting with the Accion Democratica Party leaders as we had urged at the time. Calvani brightened up and said he had forgotten to tell me that indeed they had met only a few days after the Bowdler visit. He said he wasn't keeping "anything" from me, and he had intended to call me right after the meeting but had forgotten. He said that he, Eduardo Fernandez, COPEI Secretary-General; and Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, COPEI Parliamentary Leader, had met AD President Gonzalio Barrios, Luis Esteben Rey, Simon Alberto Consalvi, and Hernandez Grisanti for a very long session on Salvador. Calvani said that, after 5 minutes, he came to agree with my judgment that the Adecos were suffering from an extreme lack of information. Throughout most of the rest of the conversation, the exercise became one of information transfer, more than a debate over judgments and strategy. Calvani urged on them again, as Bowdler had and I have frequently, that they send a team to Salvador urgently to get first-hand knowledge. They said they would do it. But Calvani is persuaded (as am I after being at this for over a year now) that AD is so divided internally that it cannot make the decision to send a group, much less manage to select the individuals to send. Calvani said that the meeting was inconclusive but generally positive. The same group may meet again or may meet with President Herrera soon. However, all in the group recognized that AD's cooperation would depend, to a large degree, on the attitude of Carlos Andres Perez, who remains extremely hostile to the Duarte Government.

7. The fact that the Department provided me this advance information on our policy was extremely useful here in maintaining credibility about our policy and our desire to share with the Venezuelan Government.⁵

8. Department may wish to pass to Embassy San Salvador.

Luers

⁵ In telegram 9174 to Caracas, January 14, the Department provided further details about the resumption of military assistance to El Salvador for use in discussions with the GOV. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, no film number)