DEAN, PHILLIP WALTER. The Diplomatic Career of Jan Christian Smuts. (1976) Directed by: Dr. Walter T. Luczyński. Pp. 223.

The purpose of this study is to examine all available public and private correspondence of Jan Christian Smuts in order to assess his impact upon international affairs. This examination shows that Smuts wielded great influence over men and events in Great Britain and in the Commonwealth and maintained this position throughout his long career in public affairs.

Smuts seemed to fit naturally into the British context, and was increasingly given positions of trust and authority. He also achieved a personal harmony, apart from political views and policies, that penetrated to the great leaders of the world, as well as to humbler friends.

Smuts saw safety for South Africa in the wholeness of the British Empire and realized that South Africa retained these privileges because the Empire remained an elastic and expanding institution, offering advantages in proportion as cooperation and understanding prevailed. He viewed the British Empire, the League of Nations, and later the United Nations as vehicles through which international cooperation could be realized. It was, as Smuts saw it, a hope for the future.

THE DIPLOMATIC CAREER OF

JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS

by

Phillip Walter Dean
III

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CHAPTER I

THE EMERGENCE OF SMUTS INTO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

When Jan Christian Smuts was born on May 24, 1870, on a farm one hundred miles from Cape Town, the Cape of Good Hope and Natal were British colonies and the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were Dutch republics. During the nineteenth century in the Eastern Province of the Cape, Dutch and British settlers were still periodically engaged in frontier wars against the Bantu tribes whose penetration into South Africa from the north coincided with the development of the white settlements in the extreme south.

In 1836 the Great Migration began, mainly of dissatisfied Dutch farmers, or Boers, from the Eastern Province who subsequently, in the middle of the century, founded the Transvaal and the Free State Republics. The relationships between the two republics developed a strange pattern of friendships and antagonisms. In 1806 the British had annexed the Cape Province area and in 1820 British settlers arrived. Opposition to British rule subsequently led many of the Boers to migrate north. They reached Natal in 1837, and after defeating the Zulus founded the Republic of Natal in 1838. In 1843 the British annexed Natal, which became a crown colony in 1856. The Orange Free State which the Boers settled between 1835 and 1848 became a republic in 1854. Meanwhile, the Boers settled the Transvaal in 1837. The same year Andreus W. Pretorius formed it into a strong state. The new state was recognized by the British in 1852 and was named the South African Republic and Paul Kruger

emerged as the state's chief leader. Great Britain annexed the Transvaal in 1877 but restored its independence in 1881. Jan Smuts was ten years old when the first Anglo-Boer war broke out, and the defeat of the British in the Battle of Majuba on February 27, 1881 restored republican independence to the Transvaal Boers. Paul Kruger, whom Smuts was to serve later as State Attorney, served as President of the Republic from May 9, 1883 until April 30, 1888.

According to two of Smuts's biographers, Rene Kraus and F. S. Crafford, Smuts seems to have been a shy and introspective student with no great desire for athletics and not as useful on the farm as practical South African farmers expect their sons to be.[1] His parents, descendants of original Dutch settlers of the Cape, hoped he would enter the Dutch Reformed ministry; his own inclination proved to be towards law and philosophy, and later politics. From Victoria College at Stellenbosch, Cape Province he won an Ebdin Scholarship for overseas study which took him to Cambridge, England.

In September, 1891 he departed for England to read law at Christ's College, Cambridge where he remained until the summer of 1894. The best guide to the growth of Smuts's mind in his Cambridge years is a collection of essays which he wrote during his long vacations. The germ of his philosophical thought appears in an essay entitled _On the Application of Some Physical Concepts to Biological Phenomena_.[2] His awakened political consciousness led him to consider the bearing of language on the problems of his country in _The Conditions of Future South African Literature_ which he wrote in July 1892. In this essay he maintains that unity of the European peoples in Southern Africa must come before South Africa can attain greatness.

> What has been the real condition of the greatness of England, the condition which has rendered her world empire and her world-commerce possible? . . . That indispensable condition is the complete equilibrium which has existed for centuries between the various strata of English society. . . . With this national equilibrium the other essential factor of self-government through all the stages of the social order co-operated to educate Englishmen to that great ruling capacity which they have always subsequently displayed. . . . It is clear that if the past history of South Africa has effected this amalgamation of the fundamental factors of its white population and thus laid the basis for all enduring work on the part of coming generations, it need not be looked upon as barren and inglorious.[3]

He returned to South Africa in September 1896 and to the Cape a month later. On January 20, 1897 he left to start his law practice in Johannesburg where he remained from January 1897 until June 1898. Little has been recorded about this phase of his life. He did, however, do some teaching in law and wrote a pamphlet called The British Position in South Africa.[4] No evidence of its publication has been found. It is significant that in this pamphlet Smuts argues for an independent, unified South Africa that would remain aligned with Great Britain in matters of trade and foreign policy. This concept remained with him throughout his life. In The British Position in South Africa Smuts states:

> The Transvaal thus having the key to the political and commercial situation, a liberal internal and external South African policy on its part will react profoundly on colonial South Africa and have a disastrous effect on the chances of a rampant imperialism. The Dutch and even the English in the Colonies will come to look more and more to the Transvaal for material help and support. The Union Jack--which has been in South Africa, not as a symbol of peace and goodwill, but of blood, force and aggression--will be more and more relegated to that limbo of innocuous fads in which 'imperial federation' and similar entities and nonentities flourish.[5]

Smuts made his first appearance on a political platform at a meeting of the De Beers Consolidated Political and Debating Association

in Kimberly. A verbatim report of his speech appeared in the Diamond Fields Advertiser on October 30, 1895. It was a reply to a paper written by Oliver Schreiner and read at Kimberley by S. C. Cronwright-Screiner on August 20, 1895, in which Rhodes's Native policy was attacked and he was accused of using the Afrikander Bond in the capitalist interest and deceiving it. On October 29, 1895 Smuts publicly defended Rhodes. In this public defense of Cecil Rhodes Smuts relates that the great overriding concern for South Africa is to consolidate the white race and build an ordered civilization based on European models as a bastion against the black race.[6]

> It seems to me that in the politics of our country, and indeed of South Africa, there are two problems vitally affecting our present, and our future, which dominate and dwarf into comparative insignificance every other political problem and issue. These two problems are the consolidation of the white race, and the relation of the white to the coloured community in South Africa . . .
> The question thus is raised: How are we to be consolidated and fused into a great homogeneous white race? . . . We want sentiment. We want those invisible links of union which are harder than stone and tougher than the toughest metal. In one word we want a great South African nationality, and pervading national sentiment.[7]

Meanwhile, in the Transvaal Republic events were beginning to develop for the second Anglo-Boer War. Johannesburg, site of the world's greatest goldfield, attracted outsiders from all parts of the world and their presence created vexing problems for President Paul Kruger's government. The Boers called these foreigners "Uitlanders" and looked with disfavor on their mode of life and their insistence on franchise and other rights. The republic was not ready to assimilate them and the Boers had no desire to share their political power with others. On the British side, both Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa, and Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary

in London, saw eye to eye with Cecil Rhodes; and these men, by fostering and airing the "grievances" of the British Uitlanders in the Transvaal--chiefly workers in the gold mines--and demanding their enfranchisement by the Boer government, aroused popular sympathy in Britain, as well as in Cape Colony, for a militantly aggressive policy toward the Boer republic. On the Boer side, the abortive Jameson raid on December 29, 1895 and the leniency which the British courts had shown created a bitterness and an intransigeance which found expression in the re-election in 1898 of the anti-Uitlander Paul Kruger to the presidency of the Transvaal for another term of five years, and in the military alliance which he concluded with the Orange Free State. While British-Boer negotiations dragged on about enfranchising the Uitlanders, both sides prepared for war. The British thought they could quickly overpower the Boers.

For Smuts the Jameson Raid was a blow to his ideal of British and Boer cooperation in building a greater South Africa. He became angry and disillusioned with Rhodes and his sympathies swung over to the two Dutch republics.[8] Ons Land, an influential newspaper, was the mouthpiece of the Afrikander Bond and was established in Cape Town in 1892. The editor was Smutts's friend, François S. Malan. The paper was combined with Het Zuid-Afrikaan which was established in 1830 and published until April 1932.

Referring to the Jameson raid Smuts stated in the leading article in Ons Land

> Our history began once more to be written in blood. The monster of jingoism again showed its repulsive face in the land. The affairs of South Africa were again regulated from Downing Street. Deeply humiliated, Afrikanderdom sat indeed in dust and ashes.[9]

In a leading article in the South African Telegraph on July 18, Smuts expressed in strong language his disillusionment with all that Rhodes had done in South Africa.

> He (Rhodes) alone, of all the remarkable men of his generation, could have put the capestone to the rounded arch of South African unity. . . . He wanted indeed a United South Africa--but one which would be the work of Cecil Rhodes; and which would be the pedestal for his colossal personality. And he spurned the ethical code of humanity. He spurned the long laborious road, and took that moral short-cut which led the greatest genius of the modern world to St. Helena at the prime of his life.[10]

On June 8, 1898 Smuts was appointed State Attorney. The interesting circumstances around his appointment are revealed in several confidential telegrams that are published in Selections from the Smuts Papers.[11] The events that led to the appointment by President Kruger of Smuts as Transvaal State Attorney began in January 1897. On January 31, 1897 a constitutional struggle arose over Sir J. G. Kotze's decision in the case of Brown vs. Leyds. The plaintiff, Brown, claimed large mining rights against the Government of the South African Republic. The case turned on the question of whether a resolution (besluit) of the Volksraad[12] could alter existing law. Chief Justice Kotze ruled that it could not, since such action was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution (Grondwet). This challenge to the supremacy of the Volksraad was met by the adoption, by besluit, of Law No. I of 1897 which denied the right of the court to interpret the Constitution, and authorized the President to dismiss judges who claimed it. Kotze persisted in his opinion and was dismissed by Kruger. Smuts upheld Kruger in a legal brief the sum of which showed that the president was not necessarily wrong. The document met with hostility from the legal profession in South Africa; but it impressed the president.[13]

Smuts was a close spectator of the unfolding events which reached their climax in the outbreak of the second Anglo-Boer War on October 11, 1898. He accompanied Kruger to the abortive conference with the British High Commissioner, Lord Alfred Milner, at Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State.[14] The Bloemfontein Conference, held from May 31 until June 5, 1899 was almost entirely an encounter between Kruger and Milner. Smuts was present but took no part in the discussions. As legal adviser to President Kruger he probably drew up the memorandum submitted by Kruger.[15]

In a telegram composed by Smuts on October 5, 1899, just six days prior to the outbreak of war, Smuts' bitterness appears to have reached its peak. This reply to his former Middle Temple tutor, John H. Roskill, who had pleaded that he (Smuts) attempt to get Kruger to continue negotiations with the British, leaves the impression that Smuts prepared himself for a total break from Great Britain. Smuts's cable states:

> . . . All previous proposals have been formally withdrawn and no longer open for acceptance. What more solemn guarantee independence than London Convention and every other have been torn up. Lost all faith in British statesmanship which is bent on either losing South Africa or making it white man's grave.[16]

That sixteen years later Smuts was appointed Lieutenant-General in the British army attests to the great respect that he earned both as an able soldier and as a statesman.

By the end of the first week in October 1899, negotiations between Boers and British reached an impasse. Kruger had offered, with some restrictions, to enfranchise Uitlanders after five years of residence in the Transvaal. Joseph Chamberlain had demanded the five-year

franchise without restrictions. The only way out was war, and on October 11 it was precipitated by a Transvaal ultimatum which barely headed off a similar ultimatum from Britain. The Orange Free State immediately joined the Transvaal.

The Selections from the Smuts Papers contains a remarkable memorandum by Smuts on military and diplomatic strategy in the war he already believed to be imminent.[17] This memorandum written on September 4, 1899 for the Executive Council of the South African Republic offers suggestions for prosecution of war against Great Britain. His memorandum lists two essential conditions which must occur before the Boer Republics can secure victory over Great Britain. These are:

1. The Republics must get the better of the English troops from the start; and

2. The Republics must, as far as possible, take the necessary steps in advance to maintain themselves during a long and exhausting struggle.[18]

This memorandum is perhaps the most revealing gauge of Smuts's attitude toward Great Britain at the time of the Boer War. Smuts lists the following proposals, all backed up with detailed recommendations, for achieving victory over Great Britain.

> The great question then is: in what way we shall be able to get the upper hand from the start. My humble answer is: by taking the offensive, and doing it before the British force now in South Africa is markedly strengthened.
> . . . All possible efforts must be made to continue agriculture as in peace time. . . . The Treasury must not be allowed to become empty. . . . Steps should be taken to manufacture fire-arms and ammunition in this country. . . . Some military experts of high rank should be summoned from Germany. . . . An attempt should be made to start a rising in India on a large scale with Russian help.[19]

Smuts sums up in the final paragraph his designs for the future of South Africa.

> . . . in my opinion South Africa stands on the eve of a frightful blood-bath out of which our people will come, either as an exhausted remnant, hewers of wood and drawers of water for a hated race, or as victors, founders of a United South Africa, of one of the great empires of the world. I may be wrong, but I seriously think that, if the programme sketch-above is carried out, we should, within a few years perhaps within one year, found an Afrikaner republic in South Africa stretching from Table Bay to the Zambesi.[20]

Smuts held no military command from the beginning of the war until the fall of Pretoria on June 5, 1900. It has not been possible to find documents to show what part he played in the war organization of the South African Republic while its forces were invading Natal and attacking Kimberley, Mafeking and the key points of the railways to the Cape ports, though it is clear that he paid visits to the Natal front.[21] Also, there is little recorded of his activities during the early months of 1900 when the British forces drove out the Boers from Cape Colony and moved into the Dutch republics. From May 29, when his Government left Pretoria for Machadodorp, until June 4, when he joined them, Smuts was left in charge of the threatened capital. There are no documents in the Smuts Papers on this week, but after the Boer war Smuts wrote an unpublished account of it in his Memoirs of the Boer War.[22]

President Paul Kruger and the members of the Government had left Pretoria on May 29, 1900 and established themselves at Machadodorp on the railway line to Lourenco Marques in Mozambique. After the fall of Pretoria and the last defensive battle at Diamond Hill in the Magaliesberg on June 10, 1900, the guerrilla phase of the war began.

It was decided, as part of these operations, to attempt to regain a footing in the Western Transvaal which had been virtually abandoned to the British, partly because its commandos had been withdrawn for concentration elsewhere, partly because of widespread desertion among the Boers.[23] General J. H. de la Rey now assumed military control of the western districts. Expecting trouble from recalcitrant Boers, he asked for Smuts, who still held the office of State Prosecuting Attorney, as his assistant. An Executive Council resolution constituting a separate government for the Western Transvaal was passed, at Smuts's request, on July 17, 1900.[24]

In reports to Louis Botha, F. W. Reitz, C. R. de Wet, and Jacobus de la Rey Smuts described encounters with British forces and the successful reestablishment of Boer authority in the Western districts.[25] De la Rey delegated the reorganization of the Potchefstroom, Wolmaransstad and Bloemhof commandos to Smuts. He thoroughly and effectively carried out this assignment.[26]

In January 1901 a plan to invade the Cape Colony, first made in October 1900 at the Cyferfontein meeting of Botha, Smuts, Steyn and the members of the Orange Free State Government, was revived. Smuts was enthusiastic about it and clearly made up his mind not only to join such an expedition but, if possible, to lead it.[27] But this project, as well as his work in the Western Transvaal, was interrupted on May 10 by a summons from his Government to join them near Ermelo in the Eastern Transvaal for discussions about the future of the war.[28]

Meanwhile, on March 7, 1901 Lord Kitchener[29] had offered Botha generous terms for peace at their meeting at Middelburg, including

eventual self-government and a virtual amnesty for the Boers.[30] The Middelburg discussions came to nothing because the British Government would not approve of these terms.

On May 10, 1901 the Transvaal leaders, including Smuts, met at Immigratie near Ermelo and decided, because of their deteriorating situation, to make contact with and seek consultation from Kruger and members of the Boer deputation abroad through an envoy. Should Kitchener refuse permission to send an envoy, an armistice would be sought to enable the two Governments to discuss their future course of action. A letter signed by F. W. Reitz, State Secretary, was sent to Orange Free State President Steyn informing him of this decision. His reply was a strong objection to the whole proposed course of action.[31] In spite of this rebuttal it was decided to communicate with the leaders abroad by telegram. Smuts was charged with this task and went to Standerton, then held by British forces under General Clements, to carry it out.[32]

On receiving a reply from President Kruger to continue the struggle, the leaders of both Republics met at Waterval to consider it and then issued a public report drafted by Smuts.[33] This report read in part:

> . . . considering further the incalculable personal and material sacrifices already made for our cause, which would all be rendered worthless and vain by a Peace in which the independence of the Republics were given up; considering further the certainty that the loss of our independence, after the destruction already accomplished and the losses already suffered, would bring in its train the national and material downfall of our whole People;
> . . . resolves: that no Peace will be made and no Peace conditions accepted whereby our independent and separate national existence or the interests of our Colonial brothers will be surrendered.[34]

On August 1, 1901 Smuts, at the head of a commando of two hundred fifty Boers, started on a trek through the Orange Free State. He led his troops over the Orange River into British territory in the north-eastern Cape raiding and foraging and harassing the British lines. These events are described in detail in his unpublished Memoirs of the Boer War.[35] He wrote a number of other reports on the course of the war, not only to keep the Boer leaders in touch with one another, but also to be published abroad as propaganda.[36]

On February 8, 1902 General de Wet appointed Smuts to the command of all the Orange Free State forces in the Cape Colony in succession to Commandant Kritzinger who had been reported captured.[37]

In a letter to William T. Stead on January 4, 1902, only four months before the end of the war, Smuts again reveals his contempt for Great Britain. W. T. Stead, a British journalist, was one of the most influential publicists of his time.[38] At first a supporter of Cecil Rhodes and imperialism, he later changed his attitude and opposed the policy that led to the Anglo-Boer War. In discussing British military policy Smuts stated:

> Are such ruin and sorrow and suffering part of that great mission of Empire which the English people believe to be theirs? Does the present state of South Africa not rather show that Imperialism, as here applied, is not a mission but a madness? Every rule of international law, every principle of humanity, every precept of religion, has been wantonly and systematically violated for the greater glory of the Empire and the good of South Africa![39]

Smuts's invasion of the Cape was still actively in progress when the summons came from Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in southern Africa, for Smuts to attend the peace negotiations at Vereeniging.[40] On May 4, 1902 when Smuts was on his way to the Transvaal by

train to join his colleagues before the Conference at Vereeniging, he met Lord Kitchener at Kroonstad Station where they discussed terms of surrender.[41]

In notes taken by Smuts during the period of peace negotiations Kitchener's proposals are listed. They include surrender with honor, no chance of immediate self-government, and amnesty for rebels and temporary loss of enfranchisement. Also, Smuts writes that "Kitchener strongly disapproves unconditional surrender as this will indicate that Boers wish to rise again and then prisoners will not return without delay. English Government prefers unconditional surrender but Kitchener as friend of the Boers strongly against it."[42]

The few documents listed in the Selections from the Smuts Papers show that Smuts was late in getting to the peace negotiations in May 1902 and had no part in the preliminary negotiations.[43] His earlier discussions with Lord Kitchener formed the basis for the final draft of the peace treaty.[44] Documents 175 and 176 are resolutions drafted by Smuts and Hertzog at the request of the delegates at Vereeniging on May 16, 1902.[45]

The Peace Treaty of Vereeniging ending the South African War was signed on May 31, 1902, and the two Boer Republics lost their independence. Smuts, strongly influenced by Lord Kitchener's opinion that a Liberal Government would shortly come into power in Great Britain and that generous treatment could be expected for the two ex-Republics, threw his influence, as did General Louis Botha, on the side of making peace.[46] This helps to explain Smuts's acceptance and welcome into the British War Cabinet fifteen years later. Having,

however, been called direct from his commando headquarters in the Cape, and not being officially designated by the Transvaal, he was not a signatory to the treaty.

On December 14, 1902 news that Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was to make a South African tour and visit the Transvaal prompted Smuts and Louis Botha to begin laying the foundation for an opposition political party.[47] The Boer opposition to Sir Alfred Milner, then Governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, was based on his assault on the Dutch language in his education policy and his expressed intention to import Chinese laborers for the gold mines. Evading Milner's attempt to include them in the nominated Legislative Council, they decided to create an organized opposition. Along with Smuts, Louis Botha called a meeting of Boer delegates at Pretoria on May 25, 1904 which marked the beginning of political organization among the Transvaal Afrikaners. A committee was appointed to create a permanent party.[48]

In January 1905 Botha as Chairman, S. W. Burger, de la Rey, and Smuts founded an Afrikaner party, Het Volk. Louis Botha set as his ideal cooperation between the two white nationalities and full participation of the Boers in administrative affairs. In the activities of Het Volk Botha was the acclaimed leader with undoubted prestige and popularity. It was Smuts, however, who formulated the arguments, presented the Boer case, devised the strategy of encounter with Sir Alfred Milner and his officials, composed every major document that was used in the Het Volk fight against "Milnerism."[49]

The letters during this period show Smuts as still distrustful of British intentions though feeling that the worst wounds of the war could be healed by the achievement of self-government in the conquered republics. In a letter to Emily Hobhouse on July 4, 1904 Smuts notes the appearance of a movement for responsible government among the "moderate English" in the Transvaal.[50]

> Things out here (Pretoria) are moving slowly but I hope surely; there is a strong agitation in favour of representative and, if possible, responsible government springing up among influential sections at Johannesburg. Our friend Lord Milner is acting as an irritant on all classes and the prolongation of his stay may yet be for our real good, who knows?[51]

When a strong Liberal government under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman came to power in Great Britain in December 1905, Smuts was sent to London by Het Volk to state the case for self-government for the ex-republics and for a place for the Boers in its administration. Smuts took with him a supporting memorandum which he presented to the Colonial Office.[52] His talks with Liberal leaders Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Morley, and Winston Churchill, and the details of this mission are not recorded in his papers. However, in a private message to Smuts, Winston Churchill, at this time Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, thanked Smuts for the Memorandum on the Transvaal Constitution.[53] Churchill wrote:

> Let me thank you for the Memorandum on the Transvaal Constitution which you have been good enough to send me. I will read it with attention. We shall I hope be able to come to a settlement accepted as fair to both parties in South Africa. In any event I shall always be glad to learn your views and hope you will not hesitate to communicate them frankly.[54]

While in London Smuts convinced Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman that cooperation and partnership between the Boers and the British was

practicable and desirable. Sarah G. Millin and J. O. Smuts in their biographies of Smuts, relate the following:

> I went on explaining (Smuts said). I could see Campbell-Bannerman was listening sympathetically. Without being brilliant he was the sort of personality--large-hearted and honest--on whom people depended. He reminded me of Botha. Such men get things done. He told me there was to be a Cabinet meeting the next day and said, 'Smuts, you have convinced me.' [55]

By July 11, 1906 Smuts had drafted the programme for Het Volk in readiness for the election to come. Smuts wrote in a letter to J. X. Merriman of his draft for the party programme.[56]

> Meanwhile I have drafted a programme (both of ideal aims and practical measures) for our party and shall be most thankful for any hints or suggestions or criticisms from your experienced pen.[57]

Full responsible government for both the Transvaal and the Free State came on February 24, 1907 when the Het Volk Party captured 37 seats in the Lower House, giving it a seven vote majority.[58] Louis Botha became Prime Minister of the Transvaal with Smuts as Colonial Secretary and Minister of Education.

John X. Merriman's victory over Starr Jameson in the Cape Parliamentary election of February 1908 marks the point at which Smuts urged union for the South African states. The first stage of union was the Intercolonial Conference of May 1908 which resolved to call a National Convention to draft a Union Constitution. Smuts's preparation for the first meeting of the National Convention on October 12, 1908 are described in The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910.[59] Smuts drew up a complete Draft Constitution of South Africa in August 1908 which contained 133 sections, many of which were followed by references to corresponding sections of the Constitutions of Australia, Canada, and the Transvaal

Colony.[60] In September Smuts drew up two alternative plans, dealing mainly with the relations between the central government and the provinces and the provincial Constitutions.[61]

The National Convention, considering the possibilities of a Federal or a Union form of government for the ex-Republics and the Cape and Natal, chose the latter. Smuts's Draft Constitution was contained in the South Africa Act of the British Parliament. The Union became an accomplished fact on May 31, 1910. Louis Botha became the Union's first Prime Minister and Smuts assumed three important portfolios in the new Cabinet-Defense, Mines, and Interior. General Hertzog became Minister of Justice.

Smuts's first major task as Union Minister was the Defense Act which took him eighteen months to complete. This comprehensive bill became the cornerstone of the Union's defense policy.[62]

General Botha reformed his Cabinet on December 19, 1912 to exclude General Hertzog whose boldly expressed sentiments against Great Britain and the "foreign fortune-seekers" in South Africa precipitated a split in the Cabinet.[63] At a demonstration of support for Hertzog in Pretoria on December 28, 1912 General C. R. de Wet stood on a large manure pile to address the crowd and said, "I would rather be on a dungheap with my people than in the palaces of the Empire."[64] As a result of Hertzog's withdrawal from the Botha government and of his amalgamation of discontent among various Boer Nationalists such as de Wet, the Nationalist Party was organized in November 1913. Its policy, in general terms, envisaged eventual secession from the British Empire and nonparticpation in any war in which Britain happened to be involved. The

Nationalist Party, slowly but steadily growing in strength, bitterly opposed Botha and Smuts.

The supreme crisis, the outbreak of the First World War, and the Government's decision to take part in it, put upon Smuts, as Minister of Defense, the task of organizing forces for the invasion of German South-West Africa.[65] The first World War thrust Smuts to the forefront of British politics and set the stage for his emergence into world politics.

Smuts calculated that South Africa no longer had anything to win by challenging the British Empire, but had everything to gain in combination with free nations who were transforming the empire into a commonwealth. Having fought the British Empire in the Boer War, he realized at the outbreak of the First World War that South Africa's cooperation with Great Britain was vital in furthering the interests of his country.*

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*William K. Hancock's two volume biography of Smuts remains the most definitive work on the life and political involvements of J. C. Smuts, and it has been influential in the formulation of some of the ideas presented in this paper. I have relied more heavily, however, upon the seven volume Selections from the Smuts Papers.

NOTES

[1]Rene Kraus, Old Master, The Life of Jan Christian Smuts (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1944), p. 29 and F. S. Crafford, Jan Christian Smuts, A Biography (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1944), pp. 6-7.

2. "On the Application of Some Physical Concepts to Biological Phenomena," Jean van der Poel and William K. Hancock, Selections from the Smuts Papers (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1966-1973) vol. I, doc. 14. (Henceforth cited as Selections).

[3]"The Conditions of Future South African Literature," Selections, vol. I, doc. 15.

[4]"The British Position in South Africa," Selections, vol. I, doc. 43.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Samuel C. Cronwright-Schreiner, Life of Olive Schreiner (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1924), p. 139.

[7]"Speech, 1895, Selections, vol. I, doc. 23.

[8]"Reprint of Leading Article in Ons Land of March 12, 1896," Selections, vol. I, doc. 24.

[9]Ibid.

[10]"Reprint of Leading Article in the South African Telegraph July 18, 1896," Selections, vol. I, doc. 29.

[11]P. J. Malan to J. C. Smuts, May 26, 1898 and P. J. Malan to J. C. Smuts, May 31, 1898, Selections, vol. I, docs. 44, 45.

[12]The legislative assembly of the South African Republic.

[13]J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, A Biography (New York: Morrow, 1952) p. 38.

[14]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts (wife June 1, 1899, Selections, vol. I, doc. 89.

[15]W. P. Schreiner to J. C. Smuts, May 19, 1899, Selections, vol. I, doc. 87.

[16]Telegram from J. C. Smuts to J. H. Roskill, October 5, 1899, Selections, vol. I, doc. 129.

[17]Memorandum of September 4, 1899, Selections, vol. I, doc. 130.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]J. C. Smuts to Assistant General Erasmus, November 13, 1899, Selections, vol. I, doc. 131.

[22]"Memories of the Boer War," Selections, vol. I, doc. 180.

[23]Small, independent military unit of Boers in the South African War.

[24]Executive Council Resolution, July 17, 1900, Selections, vol. I, doc. 136.

[25]J. C. Smuts to Louis Botha, September 22, 1900 and J. C. Smuts to F. W. Reitz, November 29, 1900, Selections, vol. I, docs. 137, 138.

[26]Letter of Authorization from J. H. de la Rey to J. C. Smuts, December 1, 1900, Selections, vol. I, doc. 139.

[27]J. C. Smuts to N. J. de Wet (military secretary to General Botha) January 23, 1901, Selections, vol. I, doc. 143.

[28]M. T. Steyn to General J. C. Smuts, May 15, 1901, Selections, vol. I, doc. 151.

[29]During the Anglo-Boer War Kitchener had succeeded Lord Roberts as Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in South Africa.

[30]Leopold S. Amery, ed., The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902 (London: S. Low, Marston and Co., Ltd., 1900-1909) V:188-190.

[31]N. J. van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn (Johannesburg: National Press, 1921) II:72-74.

[32]State Attorney J. C. Smuts to President Kruger, June 3, 1901, Selections, vol. I, doc. 153.

[33]President Kruger to State Attorney J. C. Smuts, June 11, 1901, Selections, vol. I, doc. 154.

[34]General Notice, Waterval, Standerton District, June 20, 1901, Selections, vol. I, doc. 155.

[35]"Memories of the Boer War," Selections, vol. I, doc. 180.

[36]"The Expedition of Transvaalers to the Cape Colony, August-October 1901," The New Age, no. I, 1902, 106-187.

[37]Report from Smuts to J. H. de la Rey, January 26, 1902, Selections, vol. I, doc. 170.

[38]Stead was Assistant Editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, 1880-1883, Editor in succession to John Morley 1883-1889, Founder of the Review of Reviews in 1890.

[39]Smuts to W. T. Stead, January 4, 1902, Selections, vol. I, doc. 169.

[40]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, May 12, 1902, Selections, vol. I, doc. 172 and J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, p. 80.

[41]Colonel Deneys Reitz, Commando, A Boer Journal of the Boer War (New York: C. Boni, 1930) pp. 315-317.

[42]"Vereeniging Notes," Selections, vol. I, doc. 174.

[43]Selections, vol. I, docs. 173, 174, 175, 176, 177.

[44]J. D. Kestell and D. E. van Velden, The Peace Negotiations Between the Boer and Briton in South Africa (London: R. Clay, 1912) pp. 18-32.

[45]Selections, vol. I.

[46]Sir George Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener (New York: MacMillan Company, 1920) II:95-105.

[47]Circular letter drafted by Smuts to all districts in the Transvaal, December 14, 1902, Selections, vol. II, doc. 204.

[48]J. C. Smuts to Emily Hobhouse, May 27, 1904, Selections, vol. II, doc. 252.

[49]Smuts's address to Joseph Chamberlain, January 8, 1903 and J. X. Merriman to J. C. Smuts, March 4, 1906, Selections, vol. II, docs. 207, 287.

[50]British social worker and publicist. At the outbreak of the South African War she became secretary of the women's branch of the South African Conciliation Committee and started a relief fund for the Boer women and children.

[51]J. C. Smuts to Emily Hobhouse, July 4, 1904, Selections, vol. II, doc. 258.

[52]Memorandum of Points in Reference to the Transvaal Constitution, January 1906, Selections, vol. II, doc. 277.

[53]W. S. Churchill to J. C. Smuts, February 1, 1906, Selections, vol. II, doc. 278.

[54]Ibid.

[55]J. C. Smuts, Jan Christian Smuts, p. 98 and S. G. Millin, General Smuts (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936) I:132.

[56]J. X. Merriman-member of the Cape House of Assembly, 1869-1910 and of the Union House of Assembly, 1910-1924.

[57]J. C. Smuts to J. X. Merriman, July 11, 1906, Selections, vol. II, doc. 314.

[58]J. C. Smuts to J. X. Merriman, February 25, 1907, Selections, vol. II, doc. 336.

[59]Leonard M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) pp. 152-164.

[60]Draft Constitution, August 1908, Selections, vol. II, doc. 398.

[61]Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, pp. 157-160.

[62]M. T. Steyn to J. C. Smuts, December 9, 1911, Selections, vol. III, doc. 515.

[63]Basil Williams, Botha, Smuts, and South Africa (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948) p. 85.

[64]C. P. Crewe to J. C. Smuts, December 30, 1912, Selections, vol. III, doc. 547.

[65]J. C. Smuts to Sir Benjamin Robertson, August 21, 1914, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 589.

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT WAR

As Minister of Defense, Smuts had the task to organize South African troops for the invasion of German South West Africa. These activities were, however, interrupted by an internal crisis of rebellion and civil war. This struggle, though brief and regional, heightened the conflict between British and Afrikaner elements within the Union.

When Louis Botha announced in Parliament on September 9, 1914 that South African troops would invade German South West Africa Hertzog and the Nationalists bitterly opposed the expedition. In a letter to Smuts, Colonel Deneys Reitz describes the situation prior to the abortive rebellion in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.[1]

> The Hertzog leaders are, of course, making capital out of the German South West expedition and the Boers in this district are in commotion. If they are called up I feel sure that serious disturbances will take place. They stand in groups on every street corner inveighing against the Government and even the Commandant declares that he will support the burghers in resisting any commandeering orders. . . . Of course if the Government can occupy German South West by means of the various existing corps and make a clean job of it, the public will, after a few months, see the matter in another light, but at the moment the way people are going on here-about is nasty.[2]

This brief armed rebellion of a group of nationalistic Boers was confined to a section of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The leaders, General Solomon G. Maritz and General Jacobus H. de la Rey, saw an opportunity in the outbreak of the First World War to strike a blow for restoration of Boer Republican government.[3]

Against this opposition Smuts organized effectively the Union defense forces and suppressed the rebellion by the end of December 1914. In a letter to General Charles P. Crewe[4] Smuts remarks that "the collapse of the rebellion came sooner than he [Botha] had ventured to think and it would have been quite complete but for the escape of Kemp with some 600 men of a very good stamp to German West."[5]

In a letter to Arthur B. Gillett on September 27, 1914 Smuts expressed his feelings about Great Britain and the events leading up to the Great War.[6] He wrote:

> Let us remember the deeper import of the events through which we are passing and not simply curse our statesmen. It is difficult for me to see what other alternative there was for English statesmen. In 1907 the great C. B. [Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman] made a move towards limiting armaments and war preparations. Germany made not the slightest response. As the burden became too great for England, tacit arrangements came to be made with France, and her fleet was taken to the Mediterranean to protect also British interests, and England became morally responsible for the northern coasts of France. I don't think England could have done otherwise then, nor could she without infamy have backed out now. I love German thought and culture and hope it will yet do much for mankind. But a stern limit must be set to her political system which is a menace to the world even worse than Bonapartism was. But I must admit the future is to me very dark. If Germany wins--but what if Russia wins! Let us do our duty according to our best lights and leave the ultimate issue to that Providence which somehow turns evil to good and makes poor erring humanity reap 'the far off interest of tears.'[7]

As Minister of Defense Smuts played a major role in organizing the military campaign against the Germans in South West Africa. The area was divided into two zones of command. General Botha operated in the northern half of the territory and Smuts assumed command of the southern zone. Botha divided his force into four columns and drove in a wedge from west to east and occupied the capital, Windhoek, on May 12, 1915.[8] On July 9 the German forces surrendered unconditionally.

Meanwhile, in the south Smuts had organized a three-pronged attack, taking all important communication centers and roads leading to Windhoek. Smuts avoided frontal attacks, using instead an enveloping flanking movement which the Boers had used effectively in the Anglo-Boer War fourteen years earlier.

Since the outbreak of the war British and German troops had been skirmishing on the frontiers of German East Africa. Under General von Lettow Vorbeck the Germans had a well-trained and efficient army of 2,000 Germans and 20,000 native regulars.[9] The active campaign in East Africa had begun under the command of General Smith-Dorrien. He took ill in January 1916 and Smuts accepted the offer from Lord Sydney Buxton, Governor-General of South Africa, to command the British forces in East Africa with the rank of Lieutenant General. On February 8, 1916 Smuts became a Lieutenant-General in the British Army thus becoming Britain's second youngest general.[10]

Smuts had been offered the command on November 28, 1915 but declined because he believed his party needed him in South Africa. In a letter to Arthur B. Gillett in England Smuts stated:

> The British Government asked me to go and take the command in German East Africa but our parliamentary majority[11] is such that I do not want to leave General Botha alone, especially as the feeling in the country is still very bad after the rebellion. Maybe I shall be able to go to England after the end of the Session next April.[12]

On the day of his appointment Smuts described to Margaret Gillett the events leading up to his becoming a General.[13]

> When I refused the offer of the Imperial Government last November they sent out Smith-Dorrien who became seriously ill at Cape Town. So the Imperial Government renewed their offer to me, and in view of this situation and the 20,000 South Africans we are sending there my colleagues were strongly of opinion that I should go. I shall do

> my best to succeed where several predecessors have already failed. But I feel it is a terrible risk. Pray for your old friend who in these times is forced to do soldiering against his will. The old world which interested and fascinated us is lying in ruins, and what new birth of time will succeed it no one knows. Let us face the situation bravely and hope that something better may emerge.[14]

A secret telegram from Lord Byxton, Governor General of South Africa to Andrew Bonar Law, British Secretary of State, explains the circumstances surrounding Smuts's appointment.

> It would, I think, be advantageous, as removing any jealousy on part of British officers, or any possible feeling that Smuts has ousted Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, if something like the following statement in connection with the public announcement of Smuts's appointment could be made.
> Begins: His Majesty's Government last November, when the Union German East Contingents were being formed, offered the command in German East to Smuts. At the time he was, for various reasons, unable to undertake it. When ill health necessitated S. D.'s as his successor. His Majesty's Government again offered command to Smuts, and in the circumstances he accepted it.[15]

General Smuts commanded the British forces in East Africa until January 21, 1917, by which time the campaign was all but over. Few letters are found in the Smuts Papers which relate to the East African campaign. Smuts's own brief account of the campaign appears in a preface to a history of the campaign: General Smuts's Campaign in East Africa, by J. H. V. Crowe.

In December 1916 Louis Botha and the South African Cabinet decided unanimously that Smuts should represent South Africa in the Imperial War Conference. He was reluctant to extend the already long separation from his family, but it is clear that a growing anxiety about the course of the war in Europe, and a desire to get closer to the center of action, influenced his acceptance of the cabinet's decision. He felt he would be in Europe only for a short while and would return "for good" in April or May.[16]

Writing to his wife on December 27, 1916 while he was actively campaigning in the field in East Africa, Smuts sums up his feelings prior to his departure for Great Britain.

> What do you say of the new Government in England with Milner and Curzon in it? I think very little of them. It is a 'damn the consequences' Government, and I expect little good of them. And then the half German Milner in it! . . . Yesterday a telegram came from General Botha that he has been invited to the London Conference but cannot go and proposes to nominate me in his place! . . . This is a great nuisance and still more so that I shall have to leave my work here at this moment, but if General Botha cannot go there is no other solution. . . . But I shall probably be needed in London only for a few weeks and shall not stay there long.[17]

On March 17, 1917 Smuts arrived in London at the invitation of David Lloyd George to attend the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. This cabinet consisted of visiting Dominion Prime Ministers who were attending the Imperial Conference together with members of the British War Cabinet.[18]

Three bodies met concurrently in London in the spring of 1917 and again, in the summer of 1918. One, the Imperial War Cabinet, was composed of Dominion Prime Ministers, the representatives of India, and the five members of the British War Cabinet, together with Lord Balfour, and Walter Long, the Colonial Secretary. It held fourteen sessions, opening on March 20 and closing on May 2, 1917. Its business was confined to making recommendations on war strategy and possible peace terms and had no real power.

The second body was the Imperial War Conference, which held fifteen sessions--March 21 to April 27, 1917. Even though only one British minister was usually present (the Colonial Secretary who presided), and the Australians were absent, the conference was the same

size as the Imperial War Cabinet--fourteen members. Included in this group were four Canadian ministers and four representatives of India. The large numbers present at such Commonwealth meetings were to lead, already in 1918, to the transaction of some of the most important business in meetings of the prime ministers, a procedure to which recourse would be had frequently in subsequent years.[19]

The third body was the British War Cabinet of Five, consisting of Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, and Sir Arthur Henderson. Of the five, only Bonar Law had departmental responsibilities, he was Chancellor of the Exchequer as well as leader of the House of Commons, and it was in the latter capacity that he sat in the War Cabinet. The other members were "relieved of the day-to-day preoccupations of administrative work" and were thus "entirely available for initiating policy and the work of co-ordinating the great Departments of State."[20] When the Imperial War Cabinet was not sitting, the British War Cabinet still had a large volume of work relating to British domestic affairs and war business of primary concern to the United Kingdom. The head of a department was summoned to the War Cabinet when a matter was discussed affecting his Ministry. Balfour as Foreign Secretary was present at most of the meetings.[21]

It had become customary to invite a visiting Prime Minister to British Cabinet meetings.[22] Thus, before the first meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet on March 20, the Dominion Prime Ministers, and Smuts who was not at the time Prime Minister, had attended some War Cabinet meetings. Smuts was to be a member of the British War Cabinet from June 9, 1917 to December 14, 1918.[23] There were only five members;

Smuts was the sixth, a sort of minister without portfolio, but with powers equal to the others.[24] Actually, it was impossible to legalize or define his position, because he was still Minister of Defense of South Africa and not a British Minister.

In his War Memoirs David Lloyd George relates how Smuts was accepted in the British ruling circle.

> So deep was the impression that General Smuts made at this time upon his colleagues, nay, upon the nation, that we would not let him leave us when the Conference was ended.[25] We insisted on keeping him here to help us at the centre with our war efforts. In very aspect of our multifarious tasks he was a valuable helper. He took his full share of the numerous committees set up to investigate, to advise, and subject to Cabinet assent, to direct action on vital issues of policy and strategy. He became and remained until the end of the war, an active member of the British Cabinet for all the purposes of war direction.[26]

At the request of the Prime Minister Smuts paid a visit on April 27, 1917 to France to observe first-hand the war. Upon his return to London he submitted to the War Cabinet a lengthy survey of the "General Strategic and Military Situation and Particularly that on the Western Front." This document has been published in Lloyd George's War Memoirs.[27] "Britain was fighting," Smuts stated, "for destruction of the German colonial system with a view to the future security of all communications vital to the British Empire," for "tearing off from the Turkish Empire all parts that might afford German opportunity of expansion to the Far East and of endangering our position as an Asiatic Power"--two objectives which, in effect, had been achieved. Great Britain was also fighting for the restoration of conquered territory and the crushing of German militarism in Europe--two objectives which remained to be achieved.

While asserting that Germany had to be defeated he stated:

> I repeat here my frank opinion that that will not be merely or even entirely a military defeat. A certain substantial measure of military success will be necessary and must be achieved not only because it is necessary for our ends, but also as a lasting lesson to Prussian militarism.
>
> But greater forces are fighting for us than our armies. This war will be settled largely by the imponderable--by the forces of public opinion all over the world which have been mobilised by German outrages . . . we should ever strive to keep this world opinion on our side and not be deflected by German methods of barbarism . . .[28]

In the course of his report to the War Cabinet on the military situation on the Western Front Smuts advocated placing greater emphasis on the Palestine theatre of operations. On April 23, 1917 Lloyd George offered to Smuts the command of the British army in Palestine.

> In reviewing the course of this (Palestine) campaign on 23rd April, the War Cabinet came to the conclusion that it was desirable to introduce more resolute leadership into the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. . . . In regard to the choice of a successor to Sir Archibald Murray, it was pointed out that General Smuts had expressed very decided views as to the strategic importance of Palestine to the future of the British Empire. He would therefore be likely to prosecute a campaign in that quarter with great determination, and there was a strong feeling that he would be one of the most suitable selections for the Chief Command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.[29]

According to Lloyd George and General Sir Archibald Wavell, Smuts declined because he had little confidence in the policy of Sir William Robertson, Chief of Staff at the War Office.[30] Sir William Robertson had asserted that France appeared unwilling to continue offensive operations and a change in strategy was warranted, whereas Smuts, in his report to the War Cabinet, had stressed the need for continuance of the offensive.[31]

In Lloyd George's account Smuts believed that Palestine would merely develop into one of the many forgotten fronts, with too few men

to carry out decisive maneuvers and that stagnation would set in. He believed that he could serve a more useful purpose by remaining in Britain at the center of action and by helping whenever possible.[32]

In a letter to his wife on June 9, 1917 Smuts gives a clear assessment of the political situation and his feelings toward his own role in the war.

> You know I have been asked to attend the War Cabinet regularly and, with General Botha's permission, I have agreed . . .--never in our life or in history will there again come a time so critical for mankind, and it would be cowardly and selfish if I were to refuse all requests for help and co-operation. I have refused the chairmanship of the Irish Convention as well as the command in Palestine; but membership of the War Cabinet is much better than either and gives me the right position to do good work in connection with our war policy. The Government was very insistent on this and I could not refuse. I am told that I have made an amazing impression on the public by my activities. Lord Wimborne, Viceroy of Ireland, says that no one can recall a comparable impression made by a foreigner. My speeches are now being printed in pamphlet form. Old Members of Parliament assure me that my speech at the House of Lords dinner has made a greater sensation than any other speech of their lives. I hope all this applause will not turn my little head, but will give me a chance to accomplish good work both for war and peace and for my fellow-man.[33]

A banquet given in honor of Smuts by the combined Houses of Parliament was held on May 15, 1917 in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. This was the first such honor accorded a Dominion statesman. Sir John French presided and introduced Smuts.[34] Sir Alfred Milner sat beside Smuts and also gave a brief introduction. In his speech Smuts spoke consistently of his belief in the importance to Great Britain in maintaining a British Commonwealth of Nations. He stated that the fundamental fact his listeners have to bear in mind was "that the British Empire, or this British Commonwealth of Nations, does not stand for unity, standardization, or assimilation, or denationalization; but it

stands for a fuller, a richer, and more various life among all the nations that compose it."[35] This idea remains a constant theme in both Smuts's private letters and in his public statements for the extent of his public career.

Smuts took an active part in the decisions taken by the British War Cabinet and corresponded frequently with David Lloyd George on military as well as political matters.[36] Smuts believed that Great Britain had locked up too many of its resources in opposing the Germans. The Allies must be ready to seize any new opportunity and they must equally be ready to ward off any unexpected thrusts that the enemy might make. To achieve these ends they must at all costs establish a strong strategic reserve force. In his report of April 30, 1917 to Lloyd George Smuts related that the British had been shouldering too large a share of what was essentially the French burden--the defense of French soil. The British must shed part of this load in order to create their strategic reserve.[37]

With this strong reserve Great Britain should begin an offensive at its own place and choosing. The great opportunities, in Smuts's view in the British War Cabinet, were to be found in Palestine. A strong offensive there would be the biggest threat that Turkey had had to face since the Gallipoli campaign and would give to the Palestinian front an importance eventually second only to that of the western front.[38]

According to the Smuts Papers and Lloyd George's Memoirs Smuts seemed to favor Lloyd George's military strategy. Lloyd George, a convinced Easterner, would have preferred to let the Germans attack

the defensive lines in France while the British took the offensive on one or more of the other fronts. His professional advisers, Haig and Sir William Robertson, C.I.G.S., were convinced Westerners, and were committed to the project of a great British offensive in Flanders.

Smuts's desire for an offensive in Palestine lessened appreciably as the Flander's offensive planned by General Haig gained prominence. The general reserve to be created by shortening the line in France would be assembled in the north for action in Flanders, possibly even in The Netherlands, which seemed to be under threat of a German invasion. All this, after the strong case which Smuts had made for a big effort in Palestine, looked like a complete volte-face. For this there was only one explanation that Lloyd George could see. Smuts was carried away by the argument of Sir Douglas Haig.[39]

The Haig plan had been to smash the German front in Flanders and let the cavalry through to Ostend, Zeebrugge, and beyond. These plans had the support of the C.I.G.S., Sir William Robertson. Before they were submitted Smuts examined them. Smuts had always been opposed to frontal attacks and a great practitioner of flanking movements. He had already emphasized the costliness of frontal attacks on the Western front in his discussions in the War Cabinet. Smuts believed that a special case would need to be made for the assault that Haig had in mind. Haig and his staff had their special case ready, point by point: the need to bolster the French, the need to anticipate a German invasion to The Netherlands, the need to drive the submarines from their advanced bases.

Smuts did not yield, however, to this argument. He did not recommend Haig's plan to the War Cabinet but recommended that it should be examined, along with any alternate plans.

On June 5, 1917 the War Cabinet established a small committee--the War Policy Committee--to investigate all the facts of the military, naval and political situations and to deliver a full report. The members of the committee were the Prime Minister, Lord Curzon and Milner, Smuts, and Bonar Law. At this time, the French army was very shaken after the collapse of General Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des Dames. Haig and Robertson believed the British army to be by far the most formidable fighting force on the allied side. They held no doubts that it could break through at Flanders. Lloyd George believed then, and has argued since, that they held back essential information from the War Cabinet.[40] These discussions took place on June 19 and 20, when Haig and Robertson were summoned to the War Policy Committee. They argued strongly for the Flanders offensive. Lord Milner and Bonar Law shared Lloyd George's misgivings; Curzon inclined toward the side of the generals; Smuts also spoke in their favor. Lloyd George wrote later that Smuts "was strongly of the view that the Generals had made out their case for at least having a good try. Personally he thought the chances were highly favourable."[41] What Lloyd George had failed to emphasize is the emphasis which Smuts laid upon two conditions: first that the French should give a guaranttee to hold on their front all the enemy division and reserves already located there; secondly, that Haig should arrest his offensive if he found it impossible to complete his full plan without excessive casulties. To these conditions the War Cabinet gave its consent to the offensive after a further day of discussions.

In stragegy, however, Smuts would not have considered himself a Westerner. During the June meetings of the War Cabinet and of the War

Policy Committee he urged the opportunities of offensive operations in the Levant. One of these was a landing at Alexandretta in support of Allenby's thrust northwards. The deep commitment of British power to the Flanders offensive, however, made his plans unworkable. Smuts had been wrong in his expectation that this commitment would or even could suddenly be cut if its costs proved to be excessive. There can be no doubt that Smuts regretted the War Cabinet's decision to push forward with the Flanders offensive and his own part in making it.

In a letter to his wife on August 29, 1917 Smuts reveals his determination to remain in Great Britain and continue his services to the Government and shows his concern for the suffering and dislocations caused by the war.

> . . . I am sorry to say that I doubt if I can be with you in October, or even get away from here. I have asked General Botha if he will be satisfied to leave me here until our parliamentary Session [January 18, 1918]. My work here is really very important and I do not see how I can be spared here in the immediate future. The English Government will fight very hard against my going away. The army authorities also plead with me to stay here. If peace comes quickly, it is very necessary that I stay here, for I expect a great row over the German colonies, in which we in South Africa have such a radical interest. I do not know what to do. I get constant invitations from the American Government to go there, as they think I can do a great deal of good there. I am even asked to Russia. So your heart-ache will not end in October. . . . We are going through a period which will probably always be marked in history as the greatest and most critical in the story of mankind. And how can our personal heart-aches be balanced against the immeasurable pain and sorrow of millions and millions?[42]

That the prestige of Smuts within British government circles was immense is revealed in a letter from Leopold S. Amery, Assistant Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet, and on the staff of the War Council at Versailles 1917-1918, to Smuts on August 21, 1917.

> My dear Smuts, I see the Cabinet are considering sending someone to Solonika to see what is really happening, and are undecided as to whether it should be a soldier or a politician. It should be both and you, my friend, are the man. Given proper facilities in the way of a destroyed or a light cruiser to travel on you could do Salonika,

> Athens, Egypt, and all in three weeks or a month and come back with a real grip of things, and with the power to make the Cabinet fall into line. I could come with you as staff, and tell you who the difficult people are out there, and we could work out some real plans while traveling. Get your Air thing through first and your Air Minister appointed (someone who can appreciate what General Staff work means and will see to it that a good General Staff for Air is created at once on an adequate scale), and then, say about 1-8 September, hey presto for the blue Mediterranean, size up Salonika, see how General Sir E. H. Allenby is doing and come back with a clear plan.[43]

Near the end of October labor discontent within Britain reached a crisis point due to the dislocations, shortages, and hardships which the war caused. The situation in the South Wales coalfields had become particularly serious due to the resistance to the draft among the coal miners. The British War Cabinet decided that it must face this challenge to its authority. Lloyd George was prepared to have the ringleaders arrested. He decided, however, to make one last effort at persuasion. He asked Smuts to go to the coalfields and address the miners.

Smuts departed London on October 29. The War Cabinet was due to meet that day to discuss the Italian disaster at Caporetto and the previous night Smuts had written a strong letter to the Prime Minister which stressed his views.

> I suggest that we declare at once to the Italian Government our readiness to send four or five divisions with a great proportion of heavy artillery to the assistance as fast as the movement can be effected. . . . The transportation arrangements should be pushed with the greatest energy so as to bring our reinforcements to Italy before the disaster has become too great.[44]

Smuts, thus, went straight from an urgent military crisis to an equally urgent crisis on the home front.[45] In these speeches he declared that the war was fought to safeguard individual freedom and self-government, which were the bases of the British Empire but did not exist in Germany. He said that Germany would be defeated, and that peace must be followed by disarmament and the establishment of small nations. At a large meeting at Tonypandy,

Wales he thanked the audience for the hymns they had sung and said that he had found "a beautiful spirit" in Wales. His tour from Tonypandy to the other towns became a triumph.

In his War Memoirs, David Lloyd George wrote the story of the singing at Tonypandy as he heard it from Smuts.

> I started by saying: 'Gentlemen, I come from far away as you know. I do not belong to this country. I have come a long way to do my bit in this war, and I am going to talk to you tonight about this trouble. But I have heard in my country that the Welsh are among the greatest singers in the world, and before I start, I want you first of all to sing to me some of the songs of your people.'
> Like a flash, somebody in that huge mass struck up 'Land of My Fathers.' Every soul present sang in Welsh and with the deepest fervour. When they had finished they just stood, and I could see that the thing was over.[46]

When Smuts returned on October 30, Lloyd George took him to a conference at Rapallo. There the two men made arrangements with their Italian and French colleagues for assistance to Italy along the lines sketched earlier by Smuts. They also made arrangements for a Supreme War Council, a notable step forward towards the coordination of strategy among the allies. By early December the Italian front was reestablished in strength on the Piave River, stretching through Venetia, northern Italy to the Adriatic. Here the Italians entrenched and withstood Austrian attacks until the end of the war.

The question arises now as to what kind of victory and what kind of peace was Smuts aiming at? In an unsystematic way, these questions have already been raised in various contexts: for example, in the discussions of his reasons for joining the War Cabinet, of his advice on strategy, of his views about the Commonwealth. It has been seen that he was asserting South African national interests under the two heads of status and security; that he was the advocate of limited objectives in war, and the primacy

of politics over military strategy; that his picture of the peace settlement contained a League of Nations created in the image of the British Commonwealth. All these scattered observations, however, are bound to leave a blurred impression unless some attempt is made to pull them together.

By examining correspondence between Smuts and L. S. Amery during their service in the British War Cabinet a clear picture can be drawn of Smuts's ideas and view on the future of the war and its outcome. Smuts had first met Amery when the latter came to South Africa on the eve of the Boer War as correspondent of The Times. From 1899 to 1909 he was on the editorial staff of The Times, organized its war correspondence during the Anglo-Boer War, and edited The Times History of the South African War. During the war Amery was Assistant Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet and Secretary under Sir Maurice Hankey in the War Cabinet. He was also on the staff of the War Council at Versailles from 1917 to 1918. As First Lord of the Admiralty from 1922 to 1924, and as Secretary of State for the Colonies and for Dominion Affairs from 1924 to 1929, he acquired a wide knowledge of Imperial Affairs. In 1938 and 1939 he was a leading opponent of "appeasement." In 1940 he became Secretary of State of India.

When Smuts arrived in England on March 15, 1917 Amery revealed his personal views on the urgent questions that would come before the Imperial War Cabinet.[47] These fell under two main categories: the conduct of the war and the terms of peace. Concerning the terms of peace, Amery was working on a memorandum which dealt with the strategical requirements of Imperial security.[48] The menace of enemy bases must be removed; that meant holding on to the conquered German colonies. Air communications must be safeguarded no less than sea communications;

that meant British control over the land bridge from the Mediterranean to India--an objective which could only be achieved by dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Amery related in this memorandum that a century earlier, the British had taken from the defeated French all the territory they needed for the security of their overseas empire, without denying to France a position of power and influence in Europe. Amery's desire was to give similar treatment to Germany. In 1948, when compiling his memoirs, Amery recalled the sudden and sweeping victories of 1918 which destroyed not only the enemy's will to resist but the allies' will to practice moderation.[49]

Smuts agreed in a limited way with Amery's views. Smuts's plans for South West Africa fitted well into Amery's new Imperial map. Smuts's insistence upon limited objectives in Europe was harmonious with Amery's ideas about an equilibrium among the Great Powers. He differed, however, from Amery in looking forward to a new and improved system of international organization. Smuts felt that the balance of power was useful as far as a means of minimizing hostility, but it was an insufficient safeguard for international liberty and order. Smuts, as will be shown later, believed that he had an individual contribution to make to the League of Nations. On the other hand, Amery was satisfied with the existing habits and practices of international politics.

In a letter to L. S. Amery Smuts reveals his acute perception of Germany's importance in the framework of world stability.

> The League of Nations and America will be all right. I am much more perturbed over Germany. Germany is necessary for saving Europe, even more than France was in 1815. To restrict her to 100,000 soldiers seems to me to hand her over definitely to Bolshevists and other cults whose numbers, unfortunately, we cannot limit.[50]

On September 9, 1917 Lord R. T. Reid Loreburn[51] wrote to Smuts asking him to make a personal effort, with the assistance of someone like Lord James Bryce[52] to get in touch with the German government concerning the possibilities of peace talks.

> (I have learned in years of official life to distrust the accuracy of Foreign Office estimates.) If you and another, such as Lord Bryce, could meet face to face someone on the enemy side, with the concurrence of our Allies, ostensibly to discuss some minor question such as Lord Newton lately discussed with them, and then were authorized to enter on the larger field quite informally and ad referendum we might in that way learn if there is a way which might open the prospect of peace. It might thus be done without exciting a sensation.[53]

Smuts circulated Lord Loreburn's letter among the War Cabinet but returned with a depressed hope of achieving positive results. He replied to Lord Loreburn on September 12, that:

> . . . while I largely agree with what you say I am at this time profoundly impressed with the enormous difficulties and perplexities surrounding the whole subject of peace. Difficult as it has been to wage this terrible war, I am not sure that the making of peace will not be an even more difficult business, requiring greater courage and statesmanship and far-sightedness.[54]

Despite Smuts's pessimism toward the possibilities of a peace conference a chance did seem to come in December 1917. Since the death of Emperor Franz Josef on November 21, 1916, the Habsburg government appeared willing to engage in peace negotiations. From January to July 1917 Prince Sixte de Bourbon, brother-in-law to the Emperor Karl and an officer in the Belgian army, had sounded opinion among the allies, particularly the French. These attempts had come to nothing, mainly because the Austrians could not bring themselves to consider any substantial concessions to the Italians; but by the end of the year, despite their victory at Caporetto against the Italians, their condition had grown much worse and their need for peace urgent.

In November 1917, predominant opinion in the British Foreign Office was that Austria was so bound to Germany politically and militarily that she could not conclude a separate peace, and that a further decline in food and economic conditions would be needed to produce either a revolution or such discontent as would lead the ruling classes to break with Germany. When, therefore, on December 3 Count Ottokar Czernin, Austrian Foreign Minister, sent word to the British Foreign Office that he desired a meeting between British and Austrian emissaries of very high rank, the response from the Foreign Office was cool.[55]

Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, was at first opposed to any meeting and favored asking the Austrian representative to set down his views in writing for the consideration of the British government, a procedure hardly calculated to lead to quick progress. At a Paris conference, however, at the end of the month Lloyd George spoke strongly in favor of a positive response to Austria and Balfour agreed that a representative should be sent.[56]

Lloyd George's first choice as emissary was Lord Reading who refused. He then turned to Smuts. Smuts traveled to Berne to meet the Austrian representative, Count Mensdorff, on December 18. Smuts held the conviction that military victory for the allies would be difficult even in 1919-1920, even with American help. Unless a counterpoise could be found to Germany in central-eastern Europe, the war would end with a Mittel-Europa bloc in existence which would be a standing threat to the peace of the world.[57]

Smuts interpreted his instructions as follows:

> First, to instill into the minds of the Austrians that in case they freed themselves from German domination and made a fresh start in sympathy with the British Empire they would have our full sympathy and support; and secondly, to gather as much information as possible while declining to enter into a general discussion of peace terms so far as the Germans were concerned. . . . A third object which I had in mind was, if possible, to induce the Austrians to conclude a separate peace; but the subject was from many points of view a risky one to open, as I was anxious to avoid laying ourselves open to the charge in future of having intrigued with the Austrians for a separate peace.[58]

Smuts advised Mensdorff that the British people saw no prospects for a free and peaceful Europe so long as German military domination remained unbroken.[59] Smuts also explained to the Count his conception of the League of Nations and of the British Empire's destiny as an intermingling League. A similar destiny awaited the Austro-Hungarian Empire, once it broke free from German domination.

> The best way to strengthen the bonds of sympathy between the British and Austro-Hungarian people was to liberalise as much as possible the local institutions of Austria-Hungary. We had no intention of interfering with her internal affairs, but we recognised that if Austria could become a really liberal Empire in which her subject peoples would, as far as possible, be satisfied and content, she would become for Central Europe very much what the British Empire had become for the rest of the world. She would become a League of Free Nations, very largely free from the taint of militarism, and she would have a mission in the future even greater than her mission in the past.[60]

Count Mensdorff asked Smuts for a new statement of British war aims which would make it clear to the nations of Europe, including the Germans, that the allies' aims were not to ruin them. As soon as Lloyd George received Smuts's report he brought it before the British War Cabinet. The War Cabinet decided on an early declaration of British war aims which would go to the extreme limit of concession and prove to the world that the destruction of enemy nations was not an object

of British policy. Lloyd George entrusted the task of drafting the war aims statement to Smuts, Philip Kerr, and Lord Robert Cecil. Smuts was hopeful that the Austrians would do their best to persuade the Germans to accept peace. His talks with Mensdorff had convinced him that they were close to the limits of their endurance.[61]

Following Smuts's return from his meeting Lloyd George entrusted Philip Kerr to travel to Switzerland to undertake a preliminary probe of Austrian intentions. After two unsuccessful encounters with Count Skrzynski, Counsellor of the Austrian embassy in Berne, all hopes of a separate peace were dashed when the Austrian diplomat told him on March 12, 1918 that Austria would always be allied with Germany. It was this volte-face that marked the end of negotiations between Great Britain and Austria in the Great War. The Austrians had clearly decided to place all their hopes on the success of the German offensive in France.[62]

Smuts's mood at the beginning of 1918 is perhaps best expressed in a letter to Mrs. Margaret Clark Gillett in which he stressed the need for immediate peace above anything else.[63] He wrote:

> May the Good be with us during this year. After the storms and tempests may it come silently but irrestibly like a tide from a better world. . . . Certainly to many, death--'gentle and soothing death'--would seem preferable to this measureless agony which is convulsing the world today. But I feel in my soul that the end is coming. May the peace be, not a German peace or an English peace, but God's peace enveloping all the erring nations as with the arms of an Everlasting Mercy. To that sort of peace I would contribute my last scrap of strength.[64]

On January 5, 1918 Lloyd George addressed the trade union leaders at Caxton Hall in London where he enumerated British war aims. This speech was based in large measure upon the draft Smuts had prepared.[65]

Lloyd George's speech contained the principles enunciated a few days later by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, except for "the freedom of the seas."

In a letter to Mrs. Smuts, Ernest F. Lane, private secretary to General Smuts from 1910 until 1925, mentions the role Smuts played in the Prime Minister's speech of January 5.

> One of the most important things that the General has done is, as a member of a sub-committee, to draw up a statement of the British war aims. The report of the sub-committee was considered by the War Cabinet, and Mr. Lloyd George's speech of three or four days ago was the result. I expect you will have seen all about it in the papers, but it will interest you now even more than it did when you know that the man responsible for most of the frame was the General. Three of them were on the sub-committee, and the General's effort was taken as the main frame on which to build the statement.[66]

Prime Minister Lloyd George's statements on January 5 were largely in accord with what President Wilson was to say three days later.[67] The principle of self-determination was accepted as the basis of settlement in Europe, and in Turkey. The disposition of the German colonies was to be settled by a conference which should have primary regard for the wishes of the native inhabitants as to their most suitable protector. Three conditions were essential if a lasting peace were to be achieved: "First the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."[68]

As a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet Smuts had been deeply involved in strategy. He was a member of the War Cabinet's Committee

on Manpower, which completed its work on January 31, 1918. The government acted on its recommendations.[69] On the basis of the estimates submitted by the War Office the allocation of manpower to the Western Front was adequate; but the War Office kept changing its estimates as its fears grew of a massive German offensive. As a result of this anxiety over an impending German offensive the Prime Minister sent Smuts on January 12 to France to report on the condition of the British Army.[70] His report revealed undertones of anxiety.

Though he was satisfied that the army's morale was good he had found the British troops greatly in need of rest after the Flanders battle. He had also found them in need of training. He stated that the defenses still needed much work put into them and this must fall primarily upon the troops, at the expense both of their rest and their training. Smuts, however, reported that a very strong defensive system would be completed within about six weeks and the German army appeared hardly likely to make their big attack before then.[71]

Several weeks later, on February 5, 1918 Lloyd George sent Smuts to study the war situation in the Middle East and to report to the War Cabinet on the opportunities and means of driving the Turks out of the war. Smuts's small staff included his friend Leopold S. Amery, his private secretary Captain E.F.C. Lane, and Brigadier-General John W. Stewart, a Canadian railway expert. The report stressed the need to assure the Turks that Constantinople would not be detached, and, that they would be given every assistance to organize themselves as a national state which would comprise the areas in which they possessed a numerical majority.[72] It also stressed the need to assure the Arabs that their

national claims were accepted in good faith and would not be prejudiced eitner by the Sykes-Picot agreement or by the Balfour Declaration. The report rejected the military plan of two converging offensives, one from Mesopotamia, the other from Palestine, in favor of a massive concentration of forces in Palestine and a breakthrough to the North. It expounded the logistics of this operation--troops, supplies, railways, port facilities, shipping--and offered suggestions about tactics. Smuts kindled General Allenby's enthusiasm for a hammerblow to destroy the Turkish lines and a deployment of forces to mop up their armies. In a letter to Smuts on September 25, 1918, L. S. Amery made mention of Allenby's success and of Smuts's role in planning the strategy. "I can't help thinking that your (Smuts's) continuous urging of the idea of a great cavalry raid upon him hadn't a good deal to do with his present achievement."[73]

Upon Smuts's arrival in London on March 1, 1918 from his mission to the Middle East the Germans were about to unleash their great offensive upon France. This last great offensive on the Western Front began March 21, 1918 with an attack which forced the British armies into rapid retreat with heavy losses of men and guns. By March 25 the Germans had advanced 15 miles.

Throughout the three month period of the German onslaught Smuts's resolution never faltered. On March 26 he wrote to Mrs. Margaret Gillett and viewed an allied victory as the only hope for future generations. The Germans had just opened their massive offensive and the allied leaders were conferring at Doullens, France. General Haig was envisaging a British retreat northward to the Channel ports; Pétain was making

preparations for a French retreat southward; Foch was insistent upon holding the united front. Smuts did not know how the discussions were going at Doullens but he tended to side with Foch.

He wrote to Margaret Gillett:

> It is undoubtedly a dark hour for this country and the world. The Germans are within sight of victory but the little distance between them and their desire may be large enough for the miracle once more to be wrought. If not, then in our day anyhow the Devil triumphs, and this generation will drill and prepare and scheme for the greater wars which will engulf the next generation. . . . A German victory which will mean for the West what it has meant for Russia will be horrible to contemplate. May God give strength to our boys who are standing in the breach.[74]

Three problems trouble Smuts during this period. His letters to Alice Clark, Margaret Gillett, David Lloyd George, and to his wife reflect his concern over Ireland, the state of public opinion to the great issues of war and peace, and the inactivity of the American army.[75]

Two events had brought the Irish question to a crisis: first, the military emergency, which forced the government, if only to satisfy British public opinion, to bring Ireland within the conscription law; secondly, the report of the Irish Convention which forced it to face the problem of Home Rule. From the beginning, Smuts took his stand upon the principle "Home Rule before Conscription is applied."[76] Meanwhile, the nationalist Irish were falling into line behind Sinn Fein and moving rapidly toward rebellion. On May 9 Smuts took his stand on the Irish question in a forceful letter to David Lloyd George. He declared that Irish home rule would have to be dropped for the present and with it Irish conscription.

> I feel very much perturbed over the Home Rule Bill, and I look upon it as the most dangerous snag on the path of the Government. . . . My advice in regard to this matter was not followed before, viz. not to touch conscription in Ireland till Home Rule was an accomplished fact. Even so I would again tender you advice. Inform Parliament that before introducing the Home Rule Bill which the government have prepared you are trying to obtain the adhesion of both Irish parties to it, as at such a time you do not feel justified in asking Parliament to divert their attention from the war to a Home Rule Bill which does not meet with a substantial measure of agreement from the people of Ireland and as a whole. . . . I do not consider the enforcement of conscription a practical measure in the present temper of Ireland. . . . In respect of Man-power the Americans must make good the failure of the Irish.[77]

In the spring and summer of 1918, while he was considering the worst possible consequences of a German victory, he was also considering the worst possible consequences of an allied victory. What he particularly feared was that the allies, after having repelled the German offensive, might be tempted to prolong the war until they had achieved a "knock-out blow."[78] He feared that they would let themselves slide into the unlimited use of force for unlimited objectives, regardless of the consequences of the nations involved.

The theme of victory but not overwhelming victory and resolution to achieve just ends permeates Smuts's speech of May 17 when he appeared in Glasgow to receive the Freedom of City. His speech was fully reported in Glasgow but not in the London papers. The Times report stressed the passages on the need to achieve victory and the dangers of pacificism, but omitted those on the impossibility of delivering a knockout blow and the undesirability of smashing Germany and imposing a dictated peace.[79] Smuts offered several reasons why the German offensive would be contained and repelled. These were the heroism of the British army, the achievement at long last of unity of

command under Marshal Foch, the inspired leadership of David Lloyd George, the sacrifices of the British people, and the assistance of the American people.

Smuts now moved to the contrasting German and allied conceptions of victory: the Germans were fighting an offensive war for unlimited objectives, the Allies a defensive war for limited objectives. The Germans must march to Paris, the Allies need not march to Berlin.

> . . . We have not gone into the war with any aggressive or offensive spirit. When this nation made its great choice of August 1914, it went into the war as a war of defense, of defense of the liberties of mankind, of the rights of small nations, and of the public law of Europe. That is what we are out for. That is our idea of victory. That is our war aim, and for that we shall fight until we have succeeded, and until we have won. We are not out to smash any country or Government. We are not making this war drag on uselessly in order to attain some impossible victory. We have a limited object. . . . When we talk of victory we don't mean marching to the Rhine, we don't mean marching on Berlin, we don't mean going on with the war until we have smashed Germany and the German Empire, and are able to dictate peace to the enemy in his capital.[80]

Whether or not the objectives enumerated in Smuts's own draft for Lloyd George's Caxton Hall speech, and in President Wilson's Fourteen Points were all "defensive" may well be disputed. Smuts was, however, justified by his interpretation of the allied objectives in calling him "limited." He was justified in emphasizing the dangers of a prolonged war for the sake of undefined objectives.

> The result may be that the civilization we are out to save and to safeguard may be jeopardised itself. It may be that in the end you will have the universal bankruptcy of government and you let loose the forces of revolution, which may engulf what we have so far built up in Europe, because civilization is not an indestructible entity.[81]

In his Glasgow speech Smuts attempted to make his audience understand that a middle way was possible between yielding, as the Russians had done, and fighting for a decided military victory. Diplomacy, Smuts declared, must assist military power to bring the war to a victorious end. These steps he had in mind: first, informal soundings such as he and Philip Kerr had conducted with the Austrians; secondly, acceptance by the enemy of preliminaries of peace embodying the essential allied demands; thirdly, a formal peace conference to fill in the details.

Smuts's Glasgow speech resulted in misunderstandings and misrepresentations. On July 30 Lord Lansdowne claimed the support of Smuts for his own program of peace by negotiations.[82] Emily Hobhouse wrote to Smuts to implore him to make just another such speech and he would bring down Lloyd George. "A strong man," she declared, "who will snap his fingers at the Press and who has a policy for peace could be Prime Minister of England before Christmas."[83]

Between May 28 and June 14 the Germans made their last violent bid for total victory. Their threat to the French army and to Paris itself brought to a head the third of the issues which had been bothering Smuts. Since the opening of the great German offensive at the end of March Smuts believed that the American army should show its strength. In a private letter to Lloyd George on June 8, 1918 he offered to lead the Americans into battle.

Smuts believed it possible that the Germans might make a peace offer in the winter. He believed that the Germans might think it a good policy, in view of their victory in the east, to propose a

moderate settlement in the west. They might begin with an agreement to evacuate Belgium and northern France. Smuts did not see how the allied governments could refuse an invitation to a peace conference on such a basis.

> The American Army will be there [in France] but it will be without a reliable Higher Command. Pershing is very commonplace, without real war experience, and already overwhelmed by the initial difficulties of a job too big for him. It is also doubtful whether he will loyally cooperate with the Allied higher commands. . . . What is to be done?
>
> I would propose that we suggest to President Wilson a reorganization of the American Command. . . . I am naturally most reluctant to bring forward my own name as you can well understand. But I have unusual experience and qualifications to lead a force such as the American army will be in an offensive campaign. I think if American amour propre could be satisfied I could in that capacity render very great service to our Cause.[84]

Lloyd George did not allow Smuts's suggestion go beyond him, either at that time or later when he published his War Memoirs. Smuts's letter of June 8 was first published in 1954 in Tempestuous Journey.[85] It was early in June that he made his suggestions to Lloyd George and there was still no sign of the German offensive weakening. Nor was there any sign of the American forces going into offensive action. Smuts was not arrogant when he offered himself as leader of the American forces. Perhaps the real motive was his passion for action and for personal commitment in a cause and at a crisis which he thought crucial. Smuts himself thought that American pride would stand in the way but he did not lay himself open to the charge of tactlessness. This was a private letter to David Lloyd George and Smuts trusted Lloyd George to supply tact if he took up the proposal with President Wilson. Lloyd George decided to let the proposal go no further.

Smuts believed that by prolonging the war the British Empire could make sure of crushing the Germans but might find itself at the same time reduced to the status of a second or third rate power. The leadership of the world would go to America and Europe would have fought herself to a finish. He stated his regret that Lloyd George was "the author of the 'knock out blow.'"[86]

As the autumn of 1918 approached the allies found within their grasp the "overwhelming victory" which Smuts had repeatedly stated that he did not want. When allied victory arrived he was slow to admit it. As late as October 22, in a letter to his wife, Smuts expressed doubt that the end of the fighting would come before the end of the year.[87] On October 23, in two successive memoranda for the War Cabinet, he asserted that it might take another year to beat the Germans.

However, on October 4 Prince Max of Baden had told President Wilson that Germany accepted his principles of peace and wanted him to arrange an armistice. Smuts had anticipated another year of fighting because the allies, in his view, were trying to get the wrong peace settlement in the wrong way. President Wilson was discussing with the Germans, but not with the allies, the principles, but not the terms of peace; the allies were discussing with each other the terms of the armistice. It was the President's main purpose to get his Points, Particulars, and Principles accepted; it was the allies' main purpose to assert their military power. As Lloyd George said in his War Memoirs: "It was not sufficient for Germany to express readiness to negotiate on the basis of the Fourteen Points unless we were

in a position to insist on her accepting our exegesis of the sacred text."[88]

The proposed armistice terms were so drastic that there was a possibility that the Germans might refuse to accept them. They might prefer to fight a war of national defense on their own frontiers, thereby putting the stigma of aggression upon the allies and leaving them to argue among themselves who was responsible for prolonging the war. Smuts believed this was a risk which Britain and the British Empire could not accept. It was principally the British effort which had contributed to the dramatic victories of the summer and autumn. The peace, if it came now, would be a British peace. If peace were postponed for another year it would be an American peace. Smuts stated that it was not the predominance of America but the fate of Europe which he had in the forefront of his mind.

Smuts argued that peace negotiations had followed the wrong road and that it was a matter of priority to get them back on the correct road. He proposed that the allies should make it their first objective to get the Preliminaries of Peace concluded. He listed the main heads of the Preliminaries of Peace: first, the whole program of British Commonwealth security which he had agreed with Amery eighteen months earlier;[89] then, the evacuation and restoration of all the occupied countries; the evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine, to be followed by a plebiscite; cession to Italy of the Trentino and some other territories; complete autonomy of Bohemia in a federal Austria; complete self-determination of the south Slavic peoples; independence of Poland

with access to the sea; revision of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest; establishment of the League of Nations.[90]

Through his membership in the British War Cabinet and his commission in the British army, Smuts exerted an active and sometimes dominant role in British affairs. This is illustrated by his meetings with Mensdorff and the fact that on October 22 Smuts was entrusted to guide the demobilization plans of all the British departments and to assemble the British brief for the Peace Conference.[91]

Smuts looked forward to the Paris Peace Conference. He expected to establish a new political order which would give nations, at long last, liberty and peace. The League would promote international understanding while the commonwealth would bind together politically the nations of the old British Empire. Also, he expected the Peace Conference to build a solid foundation for this new order by making a prudent and magnanimous peace treaty, just like the pledge from Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman in 1906 that committed Great Britain to a policy of trust toward the Boers.

NOTES

[1]Colonel Deneys Reitz-officer with the Union forces during the rebellion of 1914 and in South-West Africa and East Africa from 1915-1916.

[2]Deneys Reits to J. C. Smuts, September 12, 1914, Selections, vol. III, doc. 593.

[3]S. G. Maritz, a Lieut. General in the Union Defense Force in command of the military forces in the north-west Cape Colony, went into rebellion on October 10, 1914. He handed over as prisoners of war to the Germans those of his men who would not follow him. He joined the German forces in S. W. Africa and later fled to Germany where he remained for the duration of the war.

General de la Rey gained military fame during the Anglo-Boer War and became Commandant-General of all the forces in the western Transvaal. He signed the peace of Vereeniging and joined Botha and C. R. de Wet on a mission to Europe to raise funds for Boer relief and was an Executive Member of Het Volk. The part which he played in the 1914 rebellion remains obscure. He was acciently shot in Johannesburg on the night of Sept. 15, 1914 by a policeman when he ignored challenges to stop.

[4]General Charles P. Crewe--member of the Union House of Assembly and Chief Recruiting Officer of the Union.

[5]J. C. Smuts to C. P. Crewe, December 18, 1914, Selections, vol. III, doc. 611.

[6]Arthur B. Gillett, private banker and later director of Barclay's Bank Ltd.

[7]J. C. Smuts to A. B. Gillett, September 27, 1914, Selections, vol. III, doc. 598.

[8]Basil Williams, Botha, Smuts and South Africa (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1948), pp. 94-98.

[9]Jan Christian Smuts, pp. 162-163.

[10]Ibid.

[11]The government did not have an absolute majority.

[12]J. C. Smuts to A. B. Gillett, Nov. 29, 1915, Selections, vol. III, doc. 668.

[13]Margaret C. Gillett, wife of Arthur B. Gillett, a life long friend and corespondent to Smuts.

[14]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, Feb. 8, 1916, Selections, vol. III, doc. 672.

[15]Lord Buxton to A. Bonar Law, Secret Telegram, Feb. 8, 1916, Selections, vol. III, doc. 672.

[16]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, January 11, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 711.

[17]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, December 27, 1916, Selections, vol. III, doc. 710. At this time David Lloyd George had assumed the Prime Ministership.

[18]David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George,(London: Odhams Press, Ltd., 1938), 11:35.

[19]Leopold S. Amery, My Political Life, 2 vols. (London: Hutchinson, 1953) II:91.

[20]Lord Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (New York: MacMillan Company, 1962), II:673-707, 658-659.

[21]Ibid., p. 659.

[22]Ibid., pp. 658-659.

[23]J. C. Smuts to David Lloyd George, December 14, 1918, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 865.

[24]The Supreme Command, II:659.

[25]The Imperial War Conference from March 21 to April 27, 1917.

[26]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:36.

[27]Ibid., I:909-1016.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., II:90-91.

[30]General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allenby, A Study in Greatness, (London, G. G. Harrop and Co., Ltd., 1940), p. 184.

[31]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 184.

[32]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:91-92.

[33]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, June 9, 1917, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 766.

[34]Sir John French, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,1912, Field Marshal,1913, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, 1914 and recalled 1915, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 1918-1921.

[35]J. C. Smuts, War Time Speeches (New York: World Book Company, 1944), pp. 25-28.

[36]See Selections, vol. III, docs. 757, 763, 788, 826, 833, 851, 864; vol. iv, docs. 964, 994, 1009.

[37]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, III:1530-1536.

[38]L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, March 15, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 764.

[39]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, IV:chapter 63.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Ibid., p. 2184.

[42]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, August 29, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 774.

[43]L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, August 21, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 773.

[44]J. C. Smuts to David Lloyd George, October 28, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 773.

[45]The text of three speeches made by Smuts during his visit to South Wales are in the Selections from the Smuts Papers, "Report by R. Wherry Anderson, October 29, 1917," vol. III, doc. 789.

[46]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, III:1374.

[47]L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, March 15, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 726.

[48]L. S. Amery, My Political Life, II:102-104.

[49]Ibid., p. 105.

[50]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, March 21, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 914.

[51]Lord Loreburn, Solicitor-General and Attorney General, 1894, Lord Chancellor, 1906-1912, Knighted, 1894, created Earl, 1911.

[52]Lord James Bryce-Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, 1870-1893; entered House of Commons as a Liberal in 1880, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1886, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1892, President of the Board of Trade, 1894-1895, Chief Secretary for Ireland 1905, British Ambassador to Washington, 1907-1912. Among his many distinguished writings The Holy Roman Empire and The American Commonwealth are recognized as classics.

[53]Lord Loreburn to J. C. Smuts, September 9, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 777.

[54]J. C. Smuts to Lord Loreburn, September 12, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 780.

[55]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:1478-1489.

[56]Ibid., V:2499.

[57]According to W. K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel, editors of Selections from the Smuts Papers, Smuts's own notes of their talks on December 18 and 19, 1917 are in the Smuts Collection in the State Archives in Pretoria. They are, however, partly disjointed and partly illegible. Smuts's report to the War Cabinet is printed in War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:1478-1489.

[58]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, IV:2462.

[59]Ibid.

[60]Ibid.

[61]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, January 2, 1918 and Alice Clark to J. C. Smuts, January 7, 1918, Selections, vol. III, docs. 805, 807.

[62]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:1478-1489.

[63]Margaret C. Gillett was born in England and educated at Newnham College, Cambridge. She was engaged in work for the Liberal Party, women's suffrage, and the Society of Friends. She assisted in a project to aid displaced families in South Africa, in 1905-1907, following the South Africa War.

[64]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, January 2, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 806.

[65]E. F. C. Lane to S. M. Smuts, January 9, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 810.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 319.

[68]The text of Lloyd George's speech is in his War Memoirs, II:1510-1517.

[69]Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power, 1917-1918 (London: St. James Place, 1956), Chapter VIII.

[70]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, II:1500-1577.

[71]Ibid.

[72]For an account of the mission written by Smuts's private secretary, Captain Lane, see Selections, vol. III, doc. 816.

[73]L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, September 25, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 842.

[74]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, March 26, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 819.

[75]Selections, vol. III, docs. 822, 825, 826, 829, 830, 833, 834.

[76]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, April 13, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 822.

[77]J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, May 9, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 826.

[78]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, March 11, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 817.

[79]The Times (London), May 18, 1918, p. 7.

[80]Speech, Glasgow, May 17, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 829.

[81]Ibid.

[82]On July 31, 1918 a letter from Lord Lansdowne was read at a conference of his supporters in which he declared that the basis of preliminary negotiations should be defined and rejected the view that no peace discussions were possible until German power had been broken by a crushing military defeat. In support he quoted Smuts's Glasgow speech.

[83]Emily Hobhouse to J. C. Smuts, August 1, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 836.

[84]J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, June 8, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 833.

[85]Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey, Lloyd George, His Life and Times (New York: Hutchinson, 1954), pp. 476-477.

[86]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, August 7, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 837.

[87]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, October 22, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 847.

[88]War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, VI:3284.

[89]L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, May 15, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 751.

[90]Speech by Smuts to American newspaper editors in London, November 14, 1918, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 857.

[91]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, October 22, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 847.

CHAPTER III

SMUTS IN PARIS, 1919

The activities of Jan C. Smuts from January 1919 until July 1919 indicate the great wealth of influence he exerted over the course of the Paris Peace Conference. Some of his writings served as a basis for Wilson's idea of a league; his mastery of the intractable problems of the treaty aided President Wilson and Prime Minister Lloyd George; and his predictions of a future war with Germany indicated his perception of the problems at hand. The Selections from the Smuts Papers and David Lloyd George's Memoirs of the Peace Conference show that Smuts passionately and persistently searched out and probed the issues of crucial importance. From January to June he wrote almost every day a letter or a memorandum which dealt with the Paris Peace Conference.

Perhaps his most important memorandum was the pamphlet, The League of Nations; A Practical Suggestion, made public by the British government on December 16, 1918 and written two weeks earlier. This document, more than any other served to synthesize the ideas of President Wilson into a coherent and reasoned dialogue.[1] Even earlier, in an address to the London League of Nations Society on May 14, 1917 he had strongly advocated the creation at the war's end of an organization to maintain international rights and general peace.[2] Also, on May 18, 1918, six months before the Armistice, Smuts stated his disagreement

with the idea of smashing Germany completely. "I don't think an out-and-out victory is possible for any group of nations," he said; "the civilization we are out to save may be jeopardized itself."[3]

Earlier in the war, proposals to set up international machinery for the settlement of disputes and prevention of future wars had come before the British cabinet. Lord Robert Cecil, then Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, and later a devoted advocate of the League, wrote the first official memorandum on the subject.[4] His brief state paper was submitted to the British Cabinet on October 12, 1916 and was studied by Colonel Edward M. House on September 3, 1917. Lord Cecil's initiative encouraged the appointment of Lord Phillimore's Committee, a distinguished group which reported to the Prime Minister in March 1918.[5] Shortly after the Phillimore Committee's report a similar group in France, sponsored by the French government under the chairmanship of Léon Bourgeois, came up with a similar plan. In his Le Traité de 1919 et la Société des Nations, Bourgeois discussed the French plan for a league of nations. Lloyd George, who wrote that the Bourgeois Committee was formed by the French under British impetus, found its concept to be "bolder and more imaginative than the Phillimore report," particularly in its detailed and precise treatment of the powers and constitution of the proposed league.[6] Since none of these semiofficial schemes, British or French, appeared entirely acceptable, the Prime Minister appealed to Smuts to prepare another.[7] The result was The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, made public by the British government on December 16, 1918.

In his foreword Smuts referred to it as a "short sketch . . . hastily written at the last moment, and amid other pressing duties, in view of the early meeting of the peace conference."[8] In twenty-one propositions Smuts sought to demonstrate the workability of the league idea, which he considered the most important and far-reaching of all matters that the Peace Conference would consider. A revival of the spoils system at the war's end, he warned, would bring despair and Bolshevism; a league of nations must become in the broadest sense the reversionary of the dissolving empires. "Europe is being liquidated," wrote Smuts in a phrase which was to captivate Wilson; "the league . . . must be the heir to this great estate."[9] Smuts then discussed the potentials of the league as a mandatory power. Former territories of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, he believed, should be disposed of in accordance with the general formula, "No annexations, and the self-determination of nations." Germany was different: Alsace would justly revert to France, and the fate of the German colonies in the Pacific and Africa, "inhabited by barbarians" incapable of governing themselves, should accord with the principles of Wilson's celebrated Fifth Point on the impartial adjustment of colonial claims, based on the interests of the populations concerned.

Smuts offered a complete constitutional scheme, encompassing a general conference for the broad discussion of issues, a council of great powers as permanent members and other states in rotation to take executive action, and a secretariat, and courts of arbitration and conciliation. Referring specifically to two issues raised by Wilson in the Fourteen Points--freedom of the seas and establishment of an equality

of trade conditions by the removal of economic barriers between members of the League,--issues highly controversial in Britain--Smuts cautiously suggested that the permanent staff of the council should make a detailed investigation of the application of these principles to the circumstances of various countries. Touching on the complexities of disarmament he argued for the nationalization and inspection of armament factories by a league council adding, "There is no doubt that the influence of Krupps has been harmful to the great peace interests of the world and, in less degree, the same could be said of most other similar undertakings."[10] His final propositions, which dealt with means of preventing international disputes from developing into wars, were in substance a restatement of the Phillimore Committee's report, but framed in language certainly to appeal to Wilson. The final paragraph of his document bears this out.

> For there is no doubt that mankind is once more on the move . . . the great caravan of humanity is once more on the march. Vast social and industrial changes are coming--perhaps upheavals which may, in their magnitude and effects, be comparable to war itself. A steadying, controlling, regulating influence will be required to give stability to progress . . . (the League) may well be destined to mark a new era in the government of man, and become . . . to all the embodiment and living expression of the moral and spiritual unity of the human race.[11]

Smuts's own words better describe the impact of his pamphlet upon the President and the British Cabinet. In a letter to Mrs. Margaret Gillett he states:

> It is now 12 p.m. (Dec. 27, 1918). I have just returned from the King's dinner where I had a good talk with Wilson. He is reading my paper. I told him this was <u>the</u> great opportunity in history and the future would write us down very small people if we did not mark a new stage in world government.

> My paper has made an enormous impression in high circles. I see from the Cabinet minutes that the Prime Minister called it 'one of the ablest state papers he had ever read' . . . it was officially voted that it be given to Wilson to read to see our point of view! I feel rather pleased, knowing how hard I have fought for views, to find my efforts have produced some result.[12]

It was while Wilson was making his first contacts in Europe that he came under the influence of Smuts's Practical Suggestion. Although in his memoirs, Lloyd George suggests that Smuts traveled to Paris to explain his ideas to President Wilson in advance of his (Wilson's) visit to London, there is no evidence of this in Selections from the Smuts Papers. Smuts's letter on December 27 to Margaret Gillett sets the record straight.

Wilson left London on December 31 to pay a ceremonial visit to Italy. While enroute to Rome, General Tasker H. Bliss wrote confidentially from Paris to the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, in Washington, to describe the President as "in general . . . very much pleased" after the various interviews with Lloyd George and Balfour. "He was surprised at the mildness of the attitude of Mr. Lloyd George and his substantial agreement with him [the President] on various important points. He [Wilson] confessed he could not feel quite sure as to the permanence of Mr. Lloyd George's views." Bliss's letter continued:

> He [the President] was very much impressed by a document which he described as thoroughly statesmanlike in character which had been prepared by General Smuts. He had had time to study only part of this and intended to finish it on his way to Italy. He was struck by the extraordinary resemblance of General Smuts' views on such subjects as the League of Nations to the American views. In view of General Smuts' intimate relations with the British government and the fact that he had heard no criticism of the document, he hoped that these views might be more or less the governmental view.[13]

Wilson returned to Paris on January 7. The following day he was ready to discuss with House a revision of the Magnolia draft, later generally known as the first Paris draft.[14] Since this document was compiled after the President had had an opportunity to study the Smuts proposals in full it seems to support the contention that in several instances Wilson borrowed directly from the Smuts pamphlet. He adopted the concept of an executive council of the Great Powers, reinforced by the representatives chosen from the lesser states in rotation, and the idea of the veto in the council by three or more negative votes. Wilson's Article Two of his first Paris draft borrowed heavily from the Smuts plan both in context and language, as did his disarmament proposals.[15] There was a specific reference, in Smuts's own words, to the abolition of conscription and to the regulation by the League of the numbers in militia or volunteer armies.[16] There was no longer any provision for compulsory arbitration, an omission from the Magnolia draft also attributable to the influence of Smuts, and of the Phillimore report. Many of Smuts's recommendations on the guarantees surrounding arbitration, and the penalties facing covenant-breaking states were almost identical.

The more important addition from Smuts were Wilson's four supplementary clauses. These followed almost exactly Smuts's proposals for the league "as the successor to the Empires," though Wilson amended the original to read, "In respect to the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly under the domination of the German Empire."[17]

Wilson himself acknowledged Smuts' influence on his thoughts at this time at his White House conference with the members of the Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations on August 19, 1919. On this occasion he explained the origins of the covenant, saying:

> . . . between that time [the writing of the Magnolia draft] and the time of the formation of the commission on the league of nations, I had the advantage of seeing a paper done by General Smuts, of South Africa, who seemed to me to have done some very clear thinking, particularly with regard to what was to be done with the pieces of the dismembered empires. After I got to Paris therefore, I re-wrote the document . . .[18]

On January 18 the first plenary session of the Paris Peace Conference adopted the procedure greatly favored by Wilson of putting the framing of a league covenant first on the agenda. On January 19 Smuts and Wilson conferred. In a letter to Margaret Gillett Smuts mentions his visit with Wilson.

> . . . I spent last night with Wilson till 11:30 (Jan. 19, 1919). He, Lord Robert Cecil and I discussed the League of Nations. His ideas (may I confess it?) seem mostly taken from that pamphlet. Even my mistakes are appropriated. This seriously alarms me, as the paper was very hurriedly written as you know, and many things I would now rather put differently. Not so Wilson; for him the first fine rapture is enough.[19]

On January 19 Wilson sent Smuts a copy of his [Wilson's] draft for the league of Nations. Wilson's accompanying letter to Smuts reads:

> My dear General Smuts, It is with real pleasure that I send you the enclosed draft, and look forward to co-operating with you in perfecting it.
>
> Since drafting it I have made some emendations and additions which I shall hope to discuss with you, but they do not affect the larger features of the plan.
>
> Cordially and sincerely yours, Woodrow Wilson.[20]

During his stay in Paris Wilson listened to the suggestions of Bliss and of David Hunter Miller, legal adviser to the U.S. delegation, together with Secretary of State Lansing's comments.[21] According to Lord Robert Cecil, Lloyd George "having entrusted General Smuts and me

with the League negotiations . . . left the details very much in our hands."[22] In addition to general exchanges of views, the conferees decided to present a resolution to the Paris Peace Conference in favor of the covenant being included in the treaty. This was drafted by Cecil and later amended by Wilson and was accepted by the second plenary session on January 25.[23]

On January 25 Wilson heard Smuts address the Council of Ten in favor of South Africa's annexing outright German South-West Africa.[24] Smuts, who supported his Premier, Louis Botha, argued that the area concerned was good only for pastoral use and could be developed only as a part of the Union. Apparently, this was all he could find to differentiate it from the other German possessions in Africa which he agreed might be "mandated." It is significant that he prefaced his remarks with a statement of the difficulties which faced South Africa when the issue of invading South-West Africa had formented a serious rebellion there early in the war. The fact was that Botha and Smuts feared to return home from Paris empty-handed.[25]

On January 26 President Wilson invited Smuts and Lord Cecil to his offices in the Palais Murat to discuss the British and American drafts. Wilson showed them his now completed second Paris draft which contained Smuts's ideas. Lord Robert Cecil considered the document "verbose," and spoke to Smuts of "some propositions which appeared obscure and irrelevant."[26] Smuts, possibly aware that Cecil was criticizing indirectly Smuts's own views and phrases, remarked, "Nevertheless we must work with it as our basis."[27]

Smuts was by now more concerned, as was Lloyd George, about the deadlock between the British and Americans over the colonial question. On January 29, after discussions with Lloyd George, he delivered to Colonel House for Wilson's consideration a draft of his compromise proposal. His plan was that in the specific cases of the so-called "backward areas," i.e., the Pacific islands and German South-West Africa, the territories should be administered by the states contiguous to them, as an integral part of their domain and subject to their laws. Formal title would remain vested in the League, which would safeguard the interests of the native populations, and to which an annual report would be made.[28] It is obvious that the Smuts resolutions, while respecting the letter of Wilson's mandate proposals, virtually permitted annexation. After debate, an Anglo-American compromise was reached on January 30, when Smuts's proposal was adopted subject to the face-saving formula that it might be reconsidered should it conflict in any way with the league covenant as finally drafted.[29] With Wilson's acceptance of the first of Smuts's compromises the way was cleared for the creation of an Anglo-American draft of the covenant.

This was done after a meeting on January 31 of Wilson, Smuts, Cecil, and House had resolved the Anglo-American differences on the league scheme. At Lord Cecil's insistence it was decided that the legal advisers to the British and American delegations, Sir Cecil Hurst and David Hunter Miller, should put the President's draft into a form acceptable to the British. In evolving a compromise text much of the wording was changed but, according to Cecil, "the substance was for the most part unaltered."[30]

Smuts related his problems at arriving at a suitable compromise:[31]

> Our work continues fairly satisfactorily. . . . The Americans and ourselves are in the main agreed on the lines the League should take. But of course there are many other parties to consult and influence. . . . The troubles are over the transient things which now bulk very largely but will be forgotten in history. Whether the boundary is just here or just there leaves me stone cold. But it is over that boundary, and not future world government, that the principal heat is developed.[32]

The resulting Hurst-Miller draft was later accepted as a basis of discussion in the league commission, and to the embarrassment of Léon Bourgeois, former Premier and league advocate, the French plan was almost completely ignored. The French, however, took revenge by their delaying tactics and by several modifications of the covenant "essential to their security," including abandonment of the Wilson-Smuts proposal to abolish conscription.[33]

Concerning the many influences on the league covenant David Hunter Miller observed, "Any definite detailed draft prepared in advance by one of the parties will to some extent appear in the final text. . . ."[34] It is clear, however, that when the league commission first met under Wilson's chairmanship in House's offices on February 3, 1919, it did so to consider a working document on which Wilson himself had exercised a commanding influence, and that the impetus for much of Wilson's influence had come from the President's association with Smuts.

During these crucial meetings of the league commission prior to final adoption of the covenant, Wilson had cause to be grateful to Smuts for his consistent support. Before the full commission, Colonel Stephen Bonsal[35] noted that Smuts spoke "almost as rarely as House.

His best work was done in the committees and in missionary work with recalcitrant delegates when he could play . . . a 'lone hand,' an activity in which he . . . excelled."[36] When on February 8 he was called on by the President to commend the mandates scheme to the league commission, Smuts said: "What we offer is not a cornerstone of a new era but we hope it is the opening wedge that if pusned will open a door to better things. A year hence, when the world has enjoyed a breathing spell and men less war-crazed have taken our place, I believe . . . that it will be possible to improve our plan."[37] Wilson paid Smuts the compliment of repeating his words in his speech of February 14 when he presented the covenant to the conference: "A living thing is born . . . it is practical and yet it is to purify, to rectify, to elevate."[38]

When the Armistice was renewed on January 31, Smuts stated in a letter to Arthur B. Gillett that he thought the food blockade was being lifted, and that at last he could see a brighter future for Europe and for mankind.[39] He recognized a good many problems, but thought that they were only transient difficulties which would be forgotten in history.[40]

On February 16 he revealed in a letter to Alice Clark that the draft of the covenant was already in print. He stated:

> So the draft of the League has seen the daylight. It is almost entirely my original conception and I am naturally pleased at the acceptance of my ideas. I have kept well in the background so that the others might have the credit for the League as in that way their co-operation could best be secured.[41]

A draft had been presented to the Conference on February 14, and the final draft of the covenant was agreed on on April 11.

In following the correspondence of Smuts during the Paris Peace Conference there appears, after the middle of February, to be a change of feeling from hope that the Conference would be successful, to apprehension.[42] A break occurred during this time in leadership at the conference. Although its directing body, the Council of Ten, which represented the five principal Powers, continued regularly in session, the chief personalities were temporarily absent. Wilson returned to America and Lloyd George returned to London. Smuts was not an important person in the official hierarchy, as he himself put it, "only the second representative of South Africa."[43] On February 15 he went to England to see about some problems that had arisen over South African demobilization and to settle some pressing business. There he fell ill with influenza. On February 11 he had a violent gastric attack during a visit in cold weather to the old battlefield on the Marne, and on his return to London, suffered a serious relapse.[44] He was unable to return to Paris until March 23.

While recovering in London, the conviction began to grow that the work in Paris was progressing too slowly. The Peace Conference lacked a united purpose and goal. The Council of Ten (later the "Big Four") could have been an effective steering committee if only it could have made up its minds on a united goal. It spent the majority of the time treating the symptoms of European disorder without diagnosing its causes. The Council began with the idea that they would call in the Germans later to negotiate the treaty,[45] but they soon abandoned the idea. Meanwhile, the nations of central and eastern Europe were encouraged by the allies to stake out their claims in written memoranda and oral arguments. The territorial committees were not given definite powers and

terms of reference. Thus, the treaty began to take shape in a haphazard manner, without any central focus, unless the French were giving it one. The French had a clear view of what they wanted. Their desire was to secure their own security by perpetuating the present military and political weakness of Germany. For this reason they supported the effort of the new eastern European states to reverse the predominance of power which the Germans of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern empire had possessed there.

When Smuts arrived in Paris on Sunday, March 23 he had only a general idea of the way things had been developing during his absence. In a letter to Margaret Gillett he stated, "I have not yet got the hang of things here and will only begin this morning to find out what stage has been reached by the innumerable committees."[46] On March 26 he wrote to Lloyd George his reflections on what he had observed and learned about the present state of peace negotiations.

> I am seriously afraid that the peace to which we are working is an impossible peace, conceived on a wrong basis; that it will not be accepted by Germany, and, even if accepted, that it will prove utterly unstable, and only serve to promote the anarchy which is rapidly overtaking Europe . . .
>
> To my mind certain points seem quite clear and elementary:
>
> 1. We cannot destroy Germany without destroying Europe.
> 2. We cannot save Europe without the cooperation of Germany.
>
> Yet we are now preparing a peace which must destroy Germany, and yet we think we shall save Europe by so doing! The fact is, the Germans are, have been and will continue to be the dominant factor on the Continent of Europe, and no permanent peace is possible which is not based on that fact. The statesmen of the Vienna Congress were wiser in their generation; they looked upon France as necessary to Europe. And yet we presume to look down upon them and their work! My fear is that the Paris Peace Conference may prove one of the historic failures of the world; that the statesmen connected with it will return to their countries broken, discredited men, and that the Bolshevists will reap where they have sworn.[47]

At first reading this letter contains an obvious contradiction: Germany, Smuts said, was being destroyed; Germany, he also said, was bound to remain the dominant factor in Europe. The contradiction is resolved, however, when one looks beneath the surface. Smuts combined his views of the short-term and long-term prospects. He wanted to stress both the harshness of the punishment planned for Germany and its inevitable impermanence. To give an example of the harshness of the verdict against Germany, Smuts cited the proposal to restrict the German army to 100,000 men.

> In poor unarmed Ireland, with her four or five million inhabitants, we had to keep more than 100,000 troops at the crisis of the war in order to maintain order. Germany with her seventy millions, with her intolerable internal conditions, and the most threatening external dangers, has to be restricted to that number of troops . . . No government seriously determined to maintain order could possibly accept such a condition.[48]

Smuts did not believe that the penalties imposed upon Germany would prove effective in the long run. The Germans were bound to break free of the bonds and to take their revenge, starting with the states which were built at their expense. His March 26 letter to Lloyd George further reveals his unique grasp of the mood of the future.

> The fact is, neither Poland nor Bohemia will be politically possible without German goodwill and assistance. . . . My view is that in trying to break Germany in order to create and territorily satisfy these smaller States, we are labouring at a task which is bound to fail. We shall get no peace treaty now, and Europe will know no peace hereafter. And in the coming storms these new States will be the first to go under.[49]

In conclusion Smuts stated to Lloyd George that the allies should not demand a large indemnity unless they were prepared to supply the Germans with the raw materials and other facilities that would enable Germany to pay in goods. The last sentence of his March 26 letter sums

up his feelings toward the future course of Europe: ". . . I greatly fear our present panic policy towards Germany will bring failure on this Conference, and spell ruin for Europe."[50]

At the end of March 1919 Smuts believed that he had returned to Paris in time to prevent the total subjugation of Germany. On March 27, in his letter to Margaret C. Gillett, Smuts related the effect of his actions upon Lloyd George.

> I find the Prime Minister still leans on me more than I thought he was doing as we had tended to drift apart since the general election and its orgies of wild statements and doings. However, the still, small voice is always there and sometimes something happens which makes us listen to it. . . . He is at present leaning on me again, but one never knows the orbits of minds like his. As usual when I am pressing very hard on his conscience, he wants to send me on some distant mission.[51]

Meanwhile, on March 25 Lloyd George stated the fundamentals of a just and durable peace, and attempted to ensure that the draft treaty was built upon these fundamentals. This was the Fontainebleau Memorandum, which was discussed at the meeting of the Council of Four on March 27 and 28.[52] This memorandum emphasized the potential expansionist force of Bolshevism and the weakness of the chain of new states which were strung out along the western borders of Russia. If the outposts were weak there would be no barrier behind them. The Habsburg empire, for all its faults, had been an effective barrier. Only the German barrier remained. The memorandum concluded that it would be folly to pursue towards Germany a policy which would leave her helpless in the face of Bolshevik attack and political subversion. Germany was, therefore, well placed to act as the barrier against its westward expansion.

Lloyd George, therefore, had committed himself to a large part of the program which Smuts was urging upon him. The Fontainebleau

Memorandum was divided into two parts: first, "Some Considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms" and secondly, "An Outline of the Peace Terms." Basically, it attempted to tone down the demands which the French wished to have enforced against Germany. It offered the French an alternative means of ensuring their security, a British and American guarantee of their frontiers, instead of pushing back the German frontiers.

Until the time he wrote the memorandum to Lloyd George, on March 26, Smuts was busy day and night with routine business of the proposed league as well as detailed questions such as the future capital of the League, and the Japanese attempt to get racial equality affirmed in the covenant. As if these were not enough problems, Smuts allowed himself to become involved in the controversy over reparation.[53]

On the night of March 30 Smuts prepared a "legal opinion" on Germany's liability to pay reparation. The document he submitted has done more damage to his reputation than probably any other document that he ever produced in his entire life. He had not been a member of the reparation committee, he possessed no expert knowledge of economics, and he made a mistake by allowing himself to give a snap judgment on a crucial question which he did not at the time understand.

The document opens with a reference to a clause contained in the Lansing Note of November 5, 1918, whereby the obligation was put upon Germany, and accepted by her, to make compensation for the damage done to the civilian populations of the allies and their property by her "aggression" by land, by sea, and from the air.[54] Smuts summed up his argument in the final paragraph.

> . . . What was or is spent on the citizen before he became a soldier, or after he has ceased to be a soldier, or at any time on his family, represents compensation for damage done to civilians and must be made good by the German Government under any fair interpretation of the above reservation. This includes all war pensions and separation allowances; which the German Government are liable to make good, in addition to reparation or compensation for all damage done to property of the Allied peoples.[55]

The charge levelled against Smuts as the man responsible for imposing upon Germany the cost of the allied war pension and separation allowances was put into circulation in 1920 by the publication of the History of the Paris Peace Conference[56], edited by H. W. V. Temperley.

Though Smuts's responsibility for intensifying the reparation issue has been acknowledged only a small part of the responsibility actually rested upon Smuts. As has been noted, he had been remote from the complexities of the reparation problem up to the time he wrote his memorandum. He wrote it in a hurry on the eve of his departure for Hungary. He made a mistake and he acknowledged the fact.

Apart from the reparation issue another problem developed which required Smuts's energies. By March 1919 the political situation in Hungary commanded the attention of the Paris Conference. On March 29 Orlando initiated a discussion of the Hungarian situation in the Council of Four.[57] The issue evolved out of Bela Kun's proclamation of a Soviet state and the developing tensions between Rumania and Hungary.

The war had not caused as much suffering in Hungary as in Austria, since the country's wheat plains had guaranteed her against starvation. Yet, the Allied blockade had imposed severe restrictions, and was not lifted with the armistice. On March 20, 1919 the allied powers had required that a neutral zone should be established between Hungary and

Rumania. This involved a reduction of Hungarian territory which the Hungarians suspected would become permanent. They therefore refused to withdraw from it.

The left extremists, led by Bela Kun gained strength and on March 20 he became the effective head of the government. He proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet Republic with the political organization based on the Soviet system of Soldiers', Workers' and Peasants' Councils.

In a memorandum circulated at the Paris Conference, Bela Kun stated that Hungary's alliance with Russia was an informal "entente cordiale" of two identically constituted governments which did not "in any way imply an aggressive combination"; that the Soviet republic was "ready to negotiate territorial questions on the basis of the principal of self-determination"; and that it would "gladly welcome a civil and diplomatic mission of the Entente in Budapest."[58]

Lloyd George seized this opportunity and promptly volunteered the services of General Smuts.[59] After some discussion among Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Wilson it was agreed that Smuts should be sent to Hungary to "investigate the treatment of our missions and to examine the question of the neutral zone."[60] As for Smuts's instructions, they were rather open-ended. He was to explain to the Hungarian government that the neutral zone was established "without any intention of prejudicing the eventual settlement of the boundaries between Hungary and Rumania;" he was empowered to "make any adjustments in the boundaries of the neutral zone or the method of its occupation by Allied troops" which might further "the objects of the Allied and Associated Governments"; and he was authorized "to proceed to any place . . . and to take any steps which may enable him to carry out these objects or others closely connected with them."[61]

Sir Henry Wilson thought it "a curious business that a Welshman was sending a Dutchman to tell a Hungarian not to fight a Rumanian."[62] In order to reserve the full veto power of the Conference, the mission was to be essentially British. As aides Smuts selected Allen Leeper and Harold Nicolson, of the Foreign Office; Colonel Heyward, of Military Intelligence; Cyril Butler, of the Food Control Commission; and Ernest Lane, his personal Aide-de-Camp.[63]

Smuts and his party arrived in Budapest in the morning of April 4 and determined to avoid any gesture or word which might suggest approval or recognition of the new regime. He and his party refused to reside at the Ritz Hotel, preferring to stay in their railway cars. Bela Kun sought, however, to use the mission to raise his government's prestige. He created the impression that the Soviet government had succeeded in getting the respect and attention of the Peace Conference and that the visit foreshadowed de facto recognition.[64]

In his initial conference Smuts explained that the line suggested at the Paris Conference, the Vix note, "was not intended to be a permanent political frontier." He went on to say that the neutral zone, to be occupied by the allies, in order to prevent disorders and military clashes, would "in no way prejudice the Hungarian case." Smuts also promised removal of the blockade and friendly relations with the allies.

Bela Kun countered that compliance with the terms would precipitate the immediate fall of his government. Should the allies insist on evacuation of the neutral zone "there was no other party capable of assuming power" and of preventing chaos, so that the allies would have to step in and rule the country themselves.[65]

During their second meeting Bela Kun offered a counterproposal that the Rumanian troops withdraw eastward to the Maros line as originally stipulated in the Belgrade Military Convention of November 13, 1918, while units of the Big Four occupy the vastly enlarged neutral zone. After reading the counterproposal Smuts decided that it was too extravagant, since the Conference would not and could not force the Rumanians back to the Maros line. Smuts reiterated his insistence on an unqualified acceptance of his earlier memorandum. While Smuts was determined to break off negotiations then, Bela Kun expected him to propose further discussions and set another meeting for the following morning. Smuts, however, courteously broke off the conversations and at 8:00 p.m. order his train to move out of the station.

> As they stood the train gradually began to move. Smuts brought his head to a salute. We glided out into the night, retaining in the retinas of our eyes the picture of the four bewildered faces looking up in blank amazement.[66]

The Hungarian Soviet Republic was hopelessly isolated. Russia's Red Army was a thousand kilometers away; the Austrian government survived as a satellite of the allies. Smuts's mission had the effect of strengthening the Big Four's resolve to keep up the quarantine. The Rumanians in particular were eager to exploit this favorable situation. In the early summer of 1919 the Rumanian army advanced on Budapest. On August 1 Kun resigned and fled to Russia.

The newspapers proclaimed the mission to have been a fiasco.[67] For Smuts, the economic collapse of the Empire and its appalling human suffering became an "ineffaceable memory." The day after his return from Hungary Smuts wrote to Lord Parmoor:[68]

> The world is literally going to pieces unless the cement of a new fellow feeling can succeed to bind the broken fragments together. . . . What I have seen in Austria-Hungary will remain an ineffaceable memory.[69]

In combination with John Maynard Keynes, economist and Principal Clerk to the Treasury, and its representative at the Peace Conference, Smuts worked out a plan for getting the Danubian economies functioning by means of an international loan guaranteed by all the powers.

Smuts returned from Budapest with hopes that a draft treaty would emerge that he could support. Lloyd George was fighting for the Fontainebleau programme and was achieving some measure of success, particularly in the defeat of the French plans to detach the Rhineland from Germany and convert it into a buffer state. With strong encouragement from Smuts, Lloyd George resisted the strong pressure put on him by William Morris Hughes, Australian Prime Minister, who wanted to make the reparation harsher.[70] In conversation with Smuts, Lloyd George expressed fear that this pressure would soon prove too strong. Smuts's reply dated April 11, congratulated him on his success so far and asked him to stand firm which reveals his hope for progress.

> My sole reason in writing is to encourage you in the firm stand you have made, and to assure you of my whole-hearted support of the peace terms in so far as they are settled. . . . Upon our shoulders rests the responsibility of making peace, and if we think that the terms so far drafted are fair and just, we must take the responsibility and face the music, whatever Parliaments or peoples may say.[71]

This letter appears as the last of the hopeful letters that Smuts wrote during the Peace Conference. From Smuts's point of view, the situation now changed rapidly for the worse. One reason for this change of attitude was President Wilson, who on May 15 accepted Clemenceau's proposals

for the military occupation of Germany. Smuts, meanwhile, had been fitting his proposals for getting the wheels of Danubian industry to turn again into the John M. Keynes plan for a general financial settlement in Europe, propped up by an international loan. These ideas were far ahead of their time. On April 23 Smuts delivered his proposals to the Supreme Economic Council (which had been set up on February 8, 1919 to deal with such matters as finance, food, and shipping control during the period of the Armistice) but failed to win its support. The Supreme Economic Council was composed of five delegates from the four principal powers and reported directly to the Supreme Council. It did not take part in drawing up the economic clauses of the Peace Treaty. Smuts said of the Committee: "That is another talking shop which does nothing. Will the Lord never rid us of these useless debating societies? I find myself in a world where despair seems already to have settled on men's souls."[72]

By the end of April Smuts was hard at work reviewing the reports of the commissions as they were sent in for incorporation into the draft treaty.

> General Botha and myself were going through the 'Reparation' clauses this morning and both agreed that some of the provisions were impossible. . . . I am much troubled over the peace terms. I consider them bad. And wrong. And they may not be accepted. The world may lapse into complete chaos.[73]

Smuts began to think that the Germans might refuse to sign the treaty, or, if they did sign it, would fail to carry it out. He was at a loss as to what he could do. He did not want to attack his own side while the negotiations were still going on, but afterwards it might be too late.[74]

He decided to write to Lloyd George summarizing his objections to the draft treaty. This letter, dated May 5, was moderate in tone, but in substance it was more serious and to the point. Smuts stated that important changes could be made in the document without changing its "structure or main contents," but the total effect of the changes which he proposed would have been far-ranging. He emphasized the tactical advantage of making these changes before the draft treaty was published. In his letter Smuts listed his proposed changes under eight categories: the territorial clauses, the occupation terms, the denial to Germany of all aircraft, the destruction of all aerodromes behind her frontiers, the reparation clauses, the provisions as regards rivers and railways, the occupation provisions. Under each head he wrote a few words giving the grounds of his criticism and stating his remedies. With these principal changes he believed that the draft treaty could be made acceptable and reasonable. Otherwise, Smuts claimed, the Germans would probably refuse to sign it.[75]

His appeal produced no result. Two days after he had composed the letter of protest to Lloyd George the treaty was presented to the Germans at Versailles. According to Smuts, the ceremony of presentation seemed "to have been conceived more in a spirit of making war than making peace."[76]

From the period of May 7 to May 29--the day when the Germans delivered to the allied and associated Powers their observations on the draft treaty and their counterproposals--Smuts's letters show a note of urgent warning. He believed that Europe, under the treaty, "will know no peace; and the undertaking to defend France against aggression may

at any time bring the British Empire also into the fire."[77] Smuts and Botha took counsel as how best to warn Lloyd George that in a future war Great Britain could no longer count upon South African support. On May 6 Smuts asked Lloyd George for an assurance that South Africa was not committed by the proposed treaty which promised British military support to France in the event of a German attack.[78] On May 10 Lloyd George replied that the proposed peace treaty would not be binding on the Dominions until it was ratified by the Parliament of the Dominion concerned.[79]

On May 14 Smuts sent a letter to Lloyd George and to President Wilson which warned them of the dangers of the peace treaty.[80] Wilson replied on May 16 to state his belief that the treaty on the whole was not unjust and that Germany should be held responsible for the war.[81] Wilson's letter reads in part: "I feel the terrible responsibility of this whole business, but inevitably my thought goes back to the very great offense against civilization which the German State committed, and the necessity for making it evident once for all that such things can lead only to the most severe punishment."[82] There is no record of a specific reply by Lloyd George to Smuts's letter of May 14. In a letter to Margaret C. Gillett on May 19, Smuts, however, states that "the Prime Minister is very angry with me."[83]

Smuts's letter to Wilson and Lloyd George reads:

> The more I have studied the Peace Treaty as a whole, the more I dislike it. The combined effect of the territorial and reparation clauses is to make it practically impossible for Germany to carry out the provisions of the Treaty. . . . Under this Treaty Europe will know no peace; and the undertaking to defend France against aggression may at any time bring the British Empire into the fire.

> I am grieved beyond words that such should be the result of our statesmanship. . . . I pray you will use your unrivalled power and influence to make the final Treaty a more moderate and reasonable document.
>
> Democracy is looking to you who have killed Prussianism--the silent masses who have suffered mutely appeal to you to save them from the fate to which Europe seems now to be lapsing.[84]

A few days after Wilson's reply (May 16), Smuts wrote a letter to Margaret Gillett, giving the impression that Wilson had failed him.[85] In later years, though, he defended Wilson's reputation.[86]

In another letter to Margaret C. Gillett on May 16 Smuts appears to be at a complete loss as to what to do about the treaty.

> I am still looking at the Porcupine of mine, I mean the Peace Treaty, and considering what to do with the damned thing. . . . Something else will have to be done, but just exactly what?[87]

But on May 2 he arrived at the answer. He wrote a letter to his wife telling her that he would refuse to sign the treaty unless important changes were made in it.

> It is a terrible document, not a peace treaty but a war treaty, and I am troubled in my conscience about putting my name to such a document. Under this Treaty the situation in Europe will become intolerable and a revolution must come, or again, in due course, an explosion into war. . . . I have already protested against this, and I shall, if necessary, go further in my resistance. . . . I feel my responsibility greatly, and that is why I first want to do my best to get the Treaty altered. . . . If the Germans refuse to sign, I shall very probably set a campaign going in the press and on the platform in England and America . . .[88]

Smuts presently renewed his efforts for revision of the treaty. In a letter to Lloyd George two days later (May 22) he listed the most important provisions which in his opinion called for amendment. The terms were mostly the same as those he had listed in his letter of May 5, but he expressed more concern at the necessity of revising the treaty.[89] The Big Four, however, would not contemplate in any way his proposals.

On May 26 Smuts replied to a letter from Lloyd George who had invited him [Smuts] to serve on the Commission on Austrian Reparation. In the letter Smuts stated that he was against payment of all reparation by those countries for damage done by the dead and dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire.[90] In another letter he said that no matter what abstract principles of liability might be affirmed, the attempt to apply them to the countries carved out of the former Austrian Empire would lead to nothing but trouble, friction, and economic difficulties, and would probably drive all those countries some day "into league with Germany against us."[91]

On May 29 the Germans submitted their observations and counter-proposals. As soon as he saw the German reply to the peace terms he made its basic argument his own.

> They raise the point to the very forefront which I have always considered vital, viz., that we are bound by the correspondence of last October and November to make a Wilson peace--that is, one within the four corners of the Wilson Points and Speeches. This was a solemn international engagement which we must keep. It would be dreadful if, while the war began with a "scrap of paper," it were also to end with another "scrap of paper" and the Allies' breach of their own undertaking. I am going to fight it out on this basis.[92]

In a letter to Woodrow Wilson, Smuts raised the same issue: was the treaty to be a "Wilson peace" or a "scrap of paper"?

> If the Allies end the war by following the example of Germany at the beginning, and also confront the world with a 'scrap of paper,' the discredit on us will be so great that I shudder to think of its ultimate effect on public opinion. . . . I think the Germans make out a good case in regard to a number of provisions. All the one-sided provisions, which exclude reciprocity or equality, with which the Treaty teems, seem to me to be both against the letter and spirit of your Points.[93]

In his reply the next day Wilson ignored totally the main argument of Smuts's letter.[94] The only door remaining open to Smuts now was to prevail upon Lloyd George to be his advocate. Appeals to Lloyd George since mid-March had been ineffective. Smuts shifted his plea to his colleagues of the British Empire Delegation. The meetings of the British Empire Delegation at the Peace Conference, which were held after the Germans had submitted their counterproposals, were attended by nine principal members of the British Cabinet, by all the Dominion prime ministers, and by all the other overseas statesmen attending the peace conference. According to Lloyd George, they constituted "one of the most remarkable Cabinet Councils ever held by the British Empire."[95]

At the meeting of May 30, and again at the morning meeting of June 1, Smuts spoke. Lloyd George had given an account of some particular criticisms which Smuts made against the draft treaty, but not of the strong stand which he took upon the ground of fundamental principle. The pre-armistice correspondence, Smuts declared, constituted a solemn agreement. It bound the two parties to make a "Wilson peace," and if the allied and associated powers did the opposite, the war would have ended with a "scrap of paper." Smuts did not win the meeting's assent to that proposition, but, according to much of Smuts's correspondence, he won stronger support than would appear from Lloyd George's account.[96]

At the June 1 meeting of the British Empire Delegation, the Prime Minister made a speech which was not to review the main arguments and proposals that had been put forward but to enumerate those proposals which he was prepared to urge upon the Big Four. These proposals were:

modification of the clauses in the draft treaty dealing with Germany's eastern frontier; earlier entry of Germany into the League of Nations; modification of the clauses dealing with the army of occupation; and modification of the reparation clauses.

In Lloyd George's program there were some items which pleased Smuts, such as the proposed plebiscite in Upper Silesia, but the program as whole fell short of what he considered vital to the future peace of Europe.[97] On June 2 Smuts wrote a strong protest to Lloyd George. He claimed that the limited amendments that he [Lloyd George] was proposing failed to do justice to the views expressed the day before by several speakers of the British Empire Delegation, including General Botha.

> No proper regard appears to have been paid to the general feeling of the meeting, and the limitation of the resolution to recording unanimity in accepting the proposals submitted by yourself at the end of the afternoon meeting, though perhaps strictly accurate, cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged.
>
> In any case, so far as I myself am concerned, I wish to make it clear that I cannot agree to anything less than the very drastic course I proposed at the beginning of the meeting, viz.: that the Peace Treaty should be recast and transformed, so as to be more in accord with our solemn undertakings, our public declarations, and the requirements of a reasonable and practicable policy.[98]

Smuts was now in open conflict with Lloyd George. From time to time Smuts had exerted considerable leverage and had achieved some results. Those results had fallen short of his aim. He was now isolated. The statesmen of the British Empire had gone along with him part of the way, but they had also made it clear that they were not about to go in open conflict against the British Prime Minister.

On June 8, 1919 John Maynard Keynes, economist and British Treasury representative at the Paris Peace Conference, wrote to Smuts from London

to urge him to carry on the campaign against the Peace Treaty. Keynes had just resigned from the British delegation to the Peace Conference in protest of the indemnities charged against Germany.[99] Keynes wrote:

> I hope immensely that you may come to the conclusion that some public explanation of what is really happening and a protest against it is now the right course. If so, I am at your service--by pen or any other way.[100]

On June 10 Smuts replied to thank him for his letter. Smuts then asked John M. Keynes to write "an account, not for the specialist but for the plain man, of what the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty actually are and mean."[101]

At this same time Smuts concluded that "all accounts reaching us from England point to the fact that the plain Englishman is satisfied with the Treaty, just as he was satisfied with Lloyd George and the last general election."[102]

Meanwhile, on June 21 Smuts sent a secret telegram to General Botha which informed him that he would not sign the treaty.[103] On June 23, in a letter to Margaret C. Gillett, Smuts tells of his talk with Prime Minister Botha concerning the consequences of their signing the treaty.

> I am not going to sign it [the Treaty] on any account. What the consequences of my act will be I don't know and to some extent I don't care. Botha and myself were discussing last night the position as it will affect South Africa. Although he agrees with me, he must sign or we are out of the League of Nations. I regret bitterly having to act differently from him or appearing more scrupulous than him. His action is certainly nobler than mine. But I can't help myself.[104]

By June 28, however, Smuts had reversed his position and agreed to sign the treaty. His decision to sign the treaty showed his acceptance

of the fact that he had responsibilities to his country, his office, and his family. He had been linked inseparably with Prime Minister Botha in creation of the Union of South Africa and bringing it to its present position in the world. There was no doubt in Smuts's mind that Botha had to sign the treaty, for otherwise South Africa would lose her mandate over South-West Africa, her membership in the League of Nations, and her new status within the Commonwealth. Smuts realized that for him not to sign the treaty would mean a split in the party and would ruin all the work of state-building which he and Botha had achieved in seventeen years of working together.

Perhaps the following excerpt from a letter to Margaret Gillett reveals his inner struggle at trying to arrive at a decision on the treaty.

> . . . An out-and-out attack on the Treaty will . . . find a very limited response, and will in fact do much harm by openly playing into the hands of the forces of disorder. It is not criticism which is wanted but constructive helpfulness in building up quietly and slowly a new, better, more generous and humane spirit. . . . I believe in time and tide in the great affairs of the world, and the present time seems inopportune for the things I could say.[105]

When he made up his mind to sign the treaty he had in mind the future of Europe as well as the future of South Africa. He thought the treaty unworkable, but he also thought it necessary. As he said to John M. Keynes, a formal peace was needed to allow Europe and the world to have a chance of regaining stability and peace. To help there would be the League of Nations. The League was embodied in the treaty and without the treaty there would be no League. This consideration by itself probably helped Smuts change his mind about signing the treaty.

In his many letters from Paris, Smuts recalled his belief in the recuperative powers of societies. He believed the war-ravaged countries of Europe would make a recovery as rapidly as his own South Africa had done after the Boer War. Before this could happen they must have peace and a treaty, even if it were a bad one.

In his farewell statement upon leaving England on July 18, 1919 Smuts stated that he had opposed the treaty, "not in criticism but in faith."[106] He gave a list of amendments which he believed would prove necessary and, in the years to come, would become possible as "a new spirit of generosity and humanity" sprang to life in the heart of the peoples.[107] This was a familiar list which he had enumerated so often in his memoranda of the past three months. The list included territorial settlements to revise, guarantees to waive, punishments to forego, and indemnities to scale down. This was a full revisionist programme. Its achievement, he said, depended upon two things: upon the Germans proving themselves ready to fulfill the treaty as far as they were able; and upon the allies recognizing that God had given them the victory to use, not for their selfish ends, but for the highest ideals of humanity.[108]

A letter to Margaret Gillett seemed to indicate that Smuts had allowed himself to cast doubt upon the validity of everything which he had believed in and fought for since the outbreak of the war. "The last battle of the war is being fought out in Paris and we look like losing that battle and with it the whole war."[109]

It would be contrary both to his temperament and to his philosophy to have allowed himself to become totally disillusioned. In his

statement to the Press on June 28 he repudiated the idea that the past four years of war and peace had been altogether futile. He stated that two great achievements had been gained from the struggle and suffering of the war. The first was the overthrow of militarism, and the second was the establishment of the League of Nations. "But the League," he added, "is as yet only a form." "It still requires the quickening life, which can only come from the active interest and vitalizing contact of the peoples themselves."[110] And in his final public statement on July 18, 1919 before returning to South Africa, Smuts reminded the people of Great Britain of the

> brutal fact that Great Britain is a very small island on the fringe of the Continent, and that on that Continent the seventy-odd million Germans represent the most important and formidable national factor. You cannot have a stable Europe without a stable settled Germany.[111]

Smuts's concerns at Paris were the establishment of the league, the trusteeship system, and the reparation issue. Though the reparation issue embroiled Smuts in controversy, he maintained close ties with Wilson and undertook special assignments to Hungary. He felt the treaty was harmful to the future of world peace and seriously considered not signing it. He saw, however, that South Africa, as well as the rest of the world, would gain by being signatories of the peace. Peace had been established along with a permanent League of Nations. He hoped that the real peace of the people would follow and make amends for the shortcomings of the treaty.

NOTES

[1]Lord Loreburn to J. C. Smuts, December 22, 1918, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 870.

[2]Times (London) 15 May 1917, p. 3.

[3]Times (London) 18 May 1918, p. 4.

[4]See Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset, Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921, I:267 for discussion of Cecil's 'Memorandum on Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars.'

[5]Viscount Cecil, A Great Experiment, (Oxford: University Press, 1941), pp. 47-60.

[6]David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938), I:407-413.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Lt. General the Rt. Hon. J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion (New York: MacMillan Company, 1919).

[9]Ibid., pp. 3, 8. Smuts's son emphasizes the effect on Wilson in Jan Christian Smuts, p. 219.

[10]The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, p. 12.

[11]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[12]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, December 27, 1918, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 872.

[13]Tasker H. Bliss to Ray S. Baker, January 4, 1919, Woodrow Wilson Collection, U. S. Library of Congress.

[14]Shortly after the Phillimore Report was completed in March 1918 Wilson was sent a copy by Lord Robert Cecil. In June Wilson authorized House to begin drafting an American version. The House-Phillimore Draft was sent to Wilson on July 16, 1918, and rewritten by him sometime before a visit to Colonel House at Magnolia, Massachusetts, in mid-August. In the

"Magnolia draft" Wilson revised the numbering of House's proposals to thirteen, omitted any mention of an international court, and strengthened the sections on disarmament and abolition of the manufacturing of arms for profit. He also stressed the need for compulsory arbitration and the use of force when this failed, and, as Smuts was to do, rejected House's idea of limiting the league to great powers. It was the Magnolia Draft (the House-Phillimore drafts revised by Wilson) that Wilson took with him to Europe in December 1918. See Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:24, 25, 28-38, 48-50, 54.

[15]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York: Doubleday, 1922) III:96-100.

[16]Ibid., pp. 97, 102-103.

[17]Ibid., pp. 103-105, 108-110. Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:286-287.

[18]United States Congress, Senate, President Wilson speaking on the origins of the Covenant. 66 Congress, 1st Session, August 19, 1919. Congressional Record. Senate Document XIII, no. 7608.

[19]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, January 20, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 889.

[20]Woodrow Wilson to J. C. Smuts, January 19, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 887.

[21]Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:288.

[22]A Great Experiment, p. 66.

[23]Ibid., p. 68.

[24]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, January 25, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 895.

[25]The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I:343-348. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, I:257-258. J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, January 25, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 895.

[26]A Great Experiment, p. 68.

[27]Ibid., p. 69.

[28]For text of Smuts's resolutions, see Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:19-20.

[29]For an account of the compromise, see Lloyd George's The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I:359-363; and Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941) pp. 73-77.

[30]Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:299-300; and A Great Experiment, p. 69.

[31]In a letter to Alice Clark written from the Hotel Majestic in Paris on January 31, 1919.

[32]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, January 31, 1919, Selections, vol. iv, doc. 898.

[33]Versailles Twenty Years After, pp. 124-125; Intimate Papers of Colonel House, IV:310-313.

[34]David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: F. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928) I:3.

[35]Colonel Stephen Bonsal was a member of General Pershing's Staff in France during the First World War and at the Paris Peace Conference he served as confidential interpreter to Woodrow Wilson.

[36]Colonel Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business (New York: Doubleday, 1944), p. 34.

[37]Ibid., p. 35.

[38]Ibid., p. 36.

[39]J. C. Smuts to A. B. Gillett, January 29, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 896.

[40]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, January 31, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 898.

[41]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, February 16, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 908.

[42]Selections, vol. IV, docs. 914, 915, 916.

[43]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 19, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 979.

[44]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, February 11, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 905.

[45]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, September 10, 1918, Selections, vol. III, doc. 841.

[46]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, March 24, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 916.

[47]J. C. Smuts to David Lloyd George, March 26, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 918.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Ibid.

[51]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, March 27, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, docs. 919-920.

[52]The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I:266-273.

[53]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, March 31, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 925.

[54]This memorandum was first published in Bernard M. Baruch, The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sanctions of the Treaty (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), pp. 29-32.

[55]Ibid., p. 32.

[56]Harold W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 6 vols., (London: H. Frowde, Hodder, and Stoughton, 1920-24) VI:356-371.

[57]Paul Mantoux, Les déliberations du Conseil des quatre, 24 mars-28 juin 1919 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la recherche scientifique 1955), I:80-82.

[58]Ibid.

[59]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, March 31, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 925.

[60]Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, 1919 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1939), p. 292.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, ed., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London: Cassell and Co., 1927) II:179. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, C.I.G.S.-1918-1922 and British Military representative to the Supreme War Council at Versailles in 1917. He was Lloyd George's principal military advisor near the end of the war.

[63]See report written by Captain E.F.C. Lane on Smuts's mission to Austria-Hungary, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 933.

[64]Report from the British Embassy, Vienna, April 4, 1919, by Smuts, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 932.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking-Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919, (London: Wedenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 729.

[67]"Budapest Parleys Fail," Times (London), 10 April 1919, p. 12.

[68]Lord Parmoor-Unionist member of the House of Commons, 1895-1906, 1910-1914, member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 1914, Fellow of St. Johns College, Oxford.

[69]J. C. Smuts to Lord Parmoor, April 17, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 938.

[70]Hessell Duncan Hall, Commonwealth, A History of the British Commonwealth of Nations (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971), p. 266.

[71]J. C. Smuts to D. L. George, confidential, April 11, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 937.

[72]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, April 23, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 941.

[73]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 1, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 953.

[74]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 2, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 953.

[75]Memorandum by Smuts for David Lloyd George, May 5, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 958.

[76]The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I:676.

[77]J. C. Smuts to D. L. George and Woodrow Wilson, personal, May 14, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 967.

[78]Louis Botha to D. L. George, May 6, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 959. This letter was drafted by J. C. Smuts.

[79]D. L. George to L. Botha, May 10, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 964.

[80]J. C. Smuts to Lloyd George and W. Wilson, May 14, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 967.

[81]Woodrow Wilson to J. C. Smuts, May 16, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 970.

[82]Ibid.

[83]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 19, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 979.

[84]J. C. Smuts to Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, May 14, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 967.

[85]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 19, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 979.

[86]"General Smuts of South Africa Estimates President Wilson's Place in History," New York Times, 3 March 1921, p. 12.

[87]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 16, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 972.

[88]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, May 20, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 981.

[89]Memorandum by Smuts for David Lloyd George, May 22, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 986.

[90]J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, May 26, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 993.

[91]J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, May 27, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 995.

[92]J. C. Smuts to Alice Clark, May 30, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1000.

[93]J. C. Smuts to Woodrow Wilson, May 30, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1001.

[94]Woodrow Wilson to J. C. Smuts, May 31, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1002.

[95]The Truth about the Peace Treaties, I:688-720.

[96]Ibid.

[97]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, June 2, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1005.

[98]Memorandum circulated to Lloyd George by J. C. Smuts, also circulated to members of the British Empire Delegation, June 2, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1008.

[99]Roy F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), p. 253.

[100]J. M. Keynes to J. C. Smuts, June 8, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1012.

[101]J. C. Smuts to J. M. Keynes, June 10, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1013. J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, was first published in December 1919.

[102]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, June 13, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1017.

[103]Telegram from J. C. Smuts to Louis Botha, June 21, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1026.

[104]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, June 23, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1031.

[105]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, June 16, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1020.

[106]Smuts's statement to the public, July 18, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1057.

[107]Ibid.

[108]Ibid.

[109]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, June 3, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1010.

[110]Smuts's statement to the press, June 28, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1043.

[111]Smuts's statement to the public, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1057.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

Upon the death on August 28, 1919 of Louis Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa, Smuts was selected by the ruling South African Party to assume the prime ministership. Critics in South Africa led by General James B. Hertzog, leader of the Nationalist Party, tried to identify his disqualifications of training and experience but only succeeded to bring to public attention two facts that were well known. Twenty-one years had passed since Paul Kruger had made him State Attorney of the South African Republic but in all those years he had never once belonged to the parliamentary opposition. He had been away from South Africa from February 1916 to August 1919, except for one week at home between his military service in East Africa and his political service in London. After being home for no more than three weeks he found himself Prime Minister of South Africa. In the eyes of his political enemies, such a long absence was by itself the proof that he was alienated from his country and thereby disqualified from leading it.[1]

The absence had been imposed upon him by Prime Minister Botha. Smuts had not wanted the command in East Africa and had refused it when it was first offered. Smuts accepted service in London upon the insistent urging of Botha and the full South African Cabinet.[2] He retained their full support throughout his entire stay in Great Britain.

Botha and Smuts were in complete agreement about South Africa's participation in the war. From the start of the war to its finish they

held constantly in view two paramount objectives: national security and national status. The struggle for status was at its high point when Smuts reached London in March 1917. The protagonists of Imperial Federation, inspired by Lionel Curtis,[3] were making their bid for victory.[4] Their effort was foundly defeated by Smuts. On April 11, 1917, in conjunction with Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, and W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, he asserted the right of each self-governing dominion to take its place at the Paris Peace Conference among the sovereign nations of the world.[5] At Paris, the outward signs of South Africa's sovereignty in international law was its signature upon the treaty and its original membership in the League of Nations. On May 6 and May 15, 1919 Smuts drafted and Botha signed two letters to David Lloyd George which related to the British offer to France of a treaty of military guarantee. Botha and Smuts exacted from Lloyd George the admission that such a treaty would be binding upon Great Britain alone.[6]

> One result of the perfectly correct exclusion of the Dominions from the obligation which it is proposed to lay on the British people may well be that in some future continental war, Great Britain may be at war and one or more of the Dominions may stand out and maintain their neutrality. But that result is inevitable, and flows from the independent nationhood of the Dominions.[7]

Smuts calculated that the union of South Africa no longer had anything to gain by challenging the British Empire, as Hertzog of the Nationalist opposition advocated, but that she had everything to gain in conjunction with the free nations that were transforming the empire into a commonwealth. Smuts's opinion toward the empire is best summarized in his work on the League of Nations.

> Nations in their march to power tend to pass the purely national bounds; hence arise the empires which embrace various nations, sometimes related in blood and institutions, sometimes again different in race and hostile in temperament. In a rudimentary way all such composite empires of the past were leagues of nations, keeping the peace among the constituent nations but unfortunately doing so not on the basis of freedom but repression. Usually one dominant nation in the group overcame, coerced and kept the rest under. The principle of nationality became over-strained and over developed, and nourished itself by exploiting other weaker nationalisties. Nationality overgrown became imperialism, and the empire led a troubled existence on the ruin of the freedom of its constituent nations. That was the evil of the system, but with however much friction and oppression, the peace was usually kept among the nations falling within the empire. These empires have all broken down, and today the British Commonwealth of Nations remains the only embryo league of nations because it is based on the true principles of national freedom and political decentralisation.[8]

Smuts made a distinction between national sentiment and nationalism. To him national sentiment connoted a man's pride in his own area and people; it was unaggressive, and, consequently compatible with membership of free societies such as the Commonwealth and the League of Nations. Nationalism was to him the perversion of this pride; it was xenophobic, and consequently the enemy of international order in any form. He believed that this danger of nationalism was evident in Europe and also in South Africa. While the Paris Peace Conference was still in session, General Hertzog had arrived in Paris to demand liberation from British control for the entire Union of South Africa. Having failed that task, he demanded independence for the two Boer states. In Smuts's view these demands typified disruptive nationalism at its worst. Smuts saw it as his duty to resist these nationalist ideas in South Africa.[9]

He saw secession from the British Commonwealth as the immediate issue. Hertzog had raised it at Paris and many of his followers in

South Africa were calling for it. Smuts denounced it as a defeat for human solidarity, for the Commonwealth and for South Africa itself.[10]

Throughout the months from September 1920 to February 1921 Smuts was engaged in a furious parliamentary election campaign. In the midst of this campaign he did not forget the many problems and difficulties of the world. In anticipation of President Wilson's retirement on March 4, 1921 he wrote for the New York Times an article entitled "Woodrow Wilson's Place in History." "Wilson erred grievously but he wrought a great work for the world and the future will justify him. I want to tell the Americans something about it and at the same time break a lance for the league."[11] In November 1920 Smuts appointed Lord Robert Cecil as South Africa's representative at the League of Nations Assembly.[12] Believing that the Great Powers were endangering the future of the League by associating it with their own interests, he instructed Cecil to press for the admission to the League of Nations of Germany and the other ex-enemy powers.[13] At the same time he was sufficiently a realist to understand that a small power like South Africa could achieve little by acting in isolation. For this reason he welcomed the news which Lloyd George sent him on October 25, 1920 that June 1921 would be the most convenient time for a conference of the Prime Ministers of the Empire. Smuts hoped they would hammer out policies "to help set the world to right."[14]

His concept of a world set to rights was thus: free and equal nations peacefully pursuing their purposes within a cooperative international order. This was the concept of the Commonwealth which he had

expounded in May 1917;[15] it was the concept of the Commonwealth which he had expounded in December 1918 in his book The League of Nations, A Practical Suggestion.[16] He still believed in it, despite the disillusioning experience of national rivalries at the Paris Peace Conference. He still looked upon the League as the guardian of national freedom and world peace. Smuts hoped that the statesmen of the Commonwealth would guide the Great Powers in the right direction.

Smuts wanted the British Empire to change its name and call itself a Commonwealth; but the change had not yet been made. He made a list of the changes that still needed to be made in order to establish beyond all possibility of dispute the separate South African nationhood which the Paris Peace Conference had recognized.[17] South Africa's formal correspondence with Great Britain, like that of the other dominions, was still conducted through the Colonial Office; this also must be changed. South Africa's Governor-General still represented not only the king but the British government; this must be changed. South Africa's foreign relations were still conducted through the British Foreign Office; this too must change. The British Empire, Smuts insisted, could continue to exist only on the basis of complete freedom and equality. A new world had arisen and a new empire had therefore to be molded. That was the reason for holding the conference. The major tenets of his speeches on the forthcoming Conference of Prime Ministers were that the nations of the world were members together and that South Africa's membership in the League and the Commonwealth must be positive, active, and cooperative. He said explicitly that he wanted South Africa to exercise her influence in the world.[18] South African Party spokesmen countered Republican

propaganda by emphasizing the enhanced status of the dominions as put forth in Smuts's speech of May 15, 1917.[19] These ideas alarmed nationalists in South Africa including James Hertzog and Daniel F. Malan. Malan expressed the fear that consultation at Imperial Conferences would drag South Africa into all sorts of imbroglios which the South African people would know nothing about until after war had been declared.[20]

Though Malan appeared to believe that Smuts was subservient to British policy, Imperialists in Great Britain had cause to think just the opposite. They saw Smuts as a danger to the British Empire, not because he did not care for it but because he did not understand it. The Imperialists were custodians of a tradition which maintained that the Empire would stand or fall by its ability to speak with one voice on the issues of foreign policy. To the Imperialists of 1920 the day of disruption appeared imminent. In logic they could see one way of reconciling the Empire's time-honored diplomatic unity with the increasing autonomy of its several parts: imperial federation. They recalled that Smuts had been principally responsible for killing the hopes of imperial federation in 1917. The question of the constitutional relations of Great Britain and the Dominions came into open debate at the Imperial Conference of 1911.[21] Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister of New Zealand, presented a plan, inspired by Lionel Curtis, for federating the self-governing units of the Empire. Sir Wilfred Laurier, Prime Minister of Canada, and General Botha successfully opposed it as did all the other Prime Ministers.[22] At the Imperial Conference of 1917 the

constitution of the Empire was again on the agenda. Smuts helped to frame a resolution which was moved by Sir Robert Borden, seconded by William F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, and adopted by the conference on April 16, 1917. The resolution stated that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the Empire should be the subject of a special conference to be summoned after the war, but added that "any such adjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth."[23]

Smuts went on to say that although the dominions enjoyed great freedom, their status was in theory still that of "subject provinces of Great Britain" and their standing as equal nations of the Empire would have to be specifically recognized. Smuts expounded this view of the British Commonwealth as a community of nations linked by common allegiance to the crown in a speech to members of Parliament in Great Britain on May 15, 1917. The status of the dominions was further enhanced by their recognition as autonomous states at the peace conference and their admission as member states of the League of Nations. However, legal recognition of their independence had still to be secured.

In June 1921 Smuts attended a conference of Prime Ministers and representatives of Great Britain, the ominions, and India in London. This conference was to decide on the agenda for the constitutional conference to be held the following year. In anticipation of the up-coming assembly Smuts prepared a memorandum entitled "The Constitution of the

British Commonwealth, A General Declaration of Constitutional Rights."[24] The following section contains the basis of Smuts's concept of Commonwealth:

> . . . It has been suggested by Mr. Duncan Hall in his interesting book on the British Commonwealth of Nations, that a declaration of Constitutional Rights should be made which would explain the new developments in the Dominion Statutes, remove obscurities, set at rest doubts and abrogate what is obsolete--a declaration, in fact, which would become a precedent and a most important amendment of the unwritten law of the constitution. Such a declaration would set out that, as a matter of constitutional right, the British Parliament has no legislative power in respect of the Dominions; that the King has no more constitutional right of vetoing Dominion Bills than he has in respect of British Bills; and that the King in his Dominion Government has in respect of foreign affairs affecting the Dominions the same constitutional right that he has as King in his British Government in respect of the United Kingdom.[25]

Near the end of his memorandum Smuts emphasized the need for symbolic recognition of the change from Empire to Commonwealth. He proposed that the name British Empire should be changed to the British Commonwealth of Nations. He further proposed that each sister nation of the society should adopt its own distinctive national flag.

Smuts's memorandum of June 1921 contained by anticipation the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the entire constitutional achievement from then until the Statute of Westminster of 1931; but Smuts gained no credit from it.[26] He found his plans frustrated by the principle of unanimity, which he himself had declared to be the "bedrock" in all the affairs of the Commonwealth. The principle of unanimity made it possible for any Dominion Prime Minister to veto any and every proposal for constitutional change. William M. Hughes of Australia declared himself opposed to constitutional discussions of any kind.[27]

Smuts became the target of his rhetoric and he realized it. He knew also that Hughes was carrying the conference with him. At the July 22nd meeting of the conference, after the important business had been taken care of--the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, defense, and foreign policy--Smuts presented his "General Declaration of Constitutional Right." No other Prime Minister supported him. The result of this was a resolution repudiating not only Smuts's proposed declaration, but also the constitutional conference.[28]

Meanwhile, the issue of an Irish free state had constantly occupied Smuts's attention since he publicly committed himself to that cause in July 1919, on the even of his return home after his two and a half years' service in Europe.[29] For the next two years he saw no sign that Britain would heed his warning. In January 1919 Dail Eireann issued a declaration of Irish independence and set up a republican government. An Irish state with its own judicial and executive departments and army took shape within the United Kingdom. In June 1920 the British government launched a campaign to destroy the Irish state by force. In December 1920 the Government of Ireland Act imposed limited Home Rule upon the partitioned areas of northern and southern Ireland. Dail Eireann denounced the Act as further British aggression against an independent Ireland.

Many of Smuts's friends wrote to him to urge him to speak out on the Irish issue. His friend and fellow soldier in the East African campaign, Tom Casement, brother of Roger Casement, had for some time been sending Smuts pamphlets about the Irish problem.[30] Eamon de Valera approved Tom Casement's meeting with Smuts in London in order to try to get his

support for the Irish nationalist cause at the imperial conference.[31] Also, Sir Horace Plunkett, Robert Erskine Childers, and Lady Catherine Courtney believed that Smuts was the man to mediate in the Irish crisis.[32]

When Smuts arrived in England on June 11, 1921 to attend the Prime Ministers Conference he made no public announcement on Ireland. However, on June 13 during a luncheon at Windsor Smuts and King George V discussed the Irish question at length.[33] They also discussed the speech that the King was to deliver at the opening of the new parliament in Northern Ireland on June 22. At the King's request, Smuts composed a draft of the message, a copy of which was sent to David Lloyd George.[34] Smuts stated in this letter that:

> . . . in his speech to the Ulster parliament the King should foreshadow the grant of Dominion status to Ireland, and point out that the removal of all possibility of coercing Ulster now renders such a solution possible. The promise of Dominion status by the King would create a new and definite situation which would crystallize opinion favourably both in Ireland and elsewhere. Informal negotiations could then be set going with responsible Irish leaders and details--financial and strategic--might be discussed with the Dominion prime ministers, if you like to do so.[35]

The King's speech, as finally drafted by Sir Edward Grigg, Lloyd George's private secretary, reflected the essence of Smuts's feeling on Ireland.[36] A letter from Sir Edward Grigg to Lord Stamfordham, private secretary to King George V, reveals the importance of Smuts as a possible mediator between the British government and the Irish nationalists.

> I am much impressed by General Smuts's view, because he has great insight into political situations; but there is a very difficult balance to be struck between conflicting considerations. I know the prime minister has had the position much at heart, and I am sure he will give his whole mind immediately to General Smuts's suggestions.[37]

The British Cabinet had decided to invite to London Eamon de Valera as "the chosen leader of the majority of Southern Ireland," and Sir James Craig, as "the Premier of Northern Ireland." The King had decided that its best intermediary with the southern Irish would be General Smuts.[38] The two adversaries, however, were unable or unwilling to agree on a meeting. If Craig went to Dublin, he would in effect be recognizing de Valera's claim to be the lawful President of a United Ireland; if de Valera went to London on the terms which Lloyd George had proposed both to him and to Craig, he would in effect be recognizing Craig as a co-equal with himself in a partitioned Ireland. It looked like an impasse.

Smuts himself was conferring with emissaries of de Valera in London.[39] The prospects of a military truce was emerging from de Valera's talks with the minority spokesmen in southern Ireland and the representatives of the British government. Smuts waited for an invitation from the Irish to meet with de Valera and this came on July 1.[40] Smuts tried, but without success to keep his mission to Dublin secret.[41] Smuts insisted that he had not come as an emissary of the British government; he brought no proposals from that government. He assured de Valera that an intense desire for peace existed in England and that the King's speech reflected that desire. Smuts advised de Valera to leave Ulster alone for the present and to concentrate his efforts upon building in the south a strong and free state, which would inevitably, in the course of time, exercise a magnetic attraction upon the six northern counties.[42]

Smuts had no actual part in the Anglo-Irish negotiations; but he remained informally in touch with both negotiating parties throughout his

stay in Britain. He was due on August 5 to board ship for South Africa. On August 4 he enclosed to the King a copy of a long letter he had written the same day to de Valera reaffirming his conviction that an Anglo-Irish settlement would in the end be achieved.

In his letter to de Valera Smuts recalled the history of his own country, which, after a start far less promising than Ireland, showed that the dominion solution of her problems actually worked. If Ireland accepted the same solution, he said, she would find support in a great society of sister nations.[43]

Yet, it appeared that de Valera no longer wanted Smuts's advice, though he had arranged for the meeting with Smuts the first week of July. On July 10, 1921 a military truce was signed and proclaimed in Ireland. On July 12 de Valera, accompanied by his lieutenants, arrived in London. In less than two weeks, however, the Irish were back in Dublin without having reached any agreement with the British on the basic principles of an Anglo-Irish settlement. The British were prepared to offer dominion status to Ireland, provided the six counties of Northern Ireland were not brought into the New Dominion without their own consent. The Irish were ready to accept the status of a dominion provided they could have the six counties; but if they could not, they would accept nothing less than complete independence for southern Ireland.

On September 7 the British government issued a new and tactfully phrased invitation to a peace conference; and on September 12 de Valera sent his letter of acceptance. The conference held its first meeting on October 11 and reached its conclusion on December 6, with the signature

of Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland.

This Anglo-Irish agreement became the prelude to bitter strife among Irishmen. From South Africa Smuts could not see the gathering storm in Dublin; he saw only the long-awaited miracle of Anglo-Irish reconciliation, the resurrection of a nation, the redemption of the Commonwealth. He saw the name Commonwealth written formally into the treaty, and the British league of free nations recognizing itself at long last for what it was. With these developments the frustration of Smuts's plan for a General Declaration of Right seemed at most a trivial setback. In the following message sent to the New York World on December 10, 1921 Smuts stated that:

> I congratulate Irishmen in America and over the whole world on the successful solution at last of the Irish question. The settlement follows clearly on the lines on which I advised the Irish leaders to proceed last summer. . . . The old British Empire has once more proved its wonderful power of combining, as it does, the complete freedom and independence of each state with close association in a world wide group of free states. It satisfies both the sentiment of nationality and the tendency towards international co-operation which are the two most powerful forces of our time.[44]

His determination to help to achieve a workable peace in Ireland underscored his desire for unity and cooperation among the nations of the world. His above statement to the press contains the germ of his Commonwealth doctrine. This definition of Commonwealth; i.e., the combining of the complete freedom and independence of each state with close association in a world-wide group of free states under the leadership of a strong Britain, remains central to Smuts's thinking throughout his diplomatic career.

Back in South Africa Smuts continually showed his faith in the Covenant of the League of Nations. His message to America on February 4, 1924 upon news of President Wilson's death, reflects this faith. He had long forgotten his protests to Wilson in May and June 1919. In his telegram to Mrs. Wilson he said that the world shared her grief at the departure of a prince among the sons of men.[45]

Smuts considered American isolationism as a major impediment to economic and political recovery. The departure of America from the European scene had removed a balancing factor which Europe badly needed for her stability. At Paris, Wilson had been willing to join with Great Britain in a joint guarantee of French security; but the Republican Senate refused that obligation. Smuts seemed to understand America; but he failed to understand France. A good indication of his mistrust of France is evidence in his letter to Prime Minister Bonar Law on November 20, 1922. Smuts stated that:

> Foreign policy is going to be the acid test of your rule. And there I frankly fear that your government may lean too much towards France. French policy was for centuries the curse of Europe and it was only the rise of Germany to first place that changed her attitude. Now Germany is down and out, and France is once more the leader of the Continent with all the old bad instincts fully alive in her. Let the Germans be made to pay what and when and how they can. But let the reparation question not be a cloak for the dismemberment of Germany and the sowing of the dragon's teeth afresh for the world. The French are out for world power . . .[46]

Smuts declared that the British Commonwealth must stand up to France but he did not explain how the Commonwealth was to achieve this. He seemed to think that Britain and the Commonwealth could be both non-interventionist and authoritative. He wanted non-intervention; but he did not want retreat. Smuts believed French policy would inevitably

lead to war. When asked by George Stadler, Belgian representative to the Reparations Commission, about the issue of continued German reparations, Smuts revealed his feeling of futility toward French policy.

> Yesterday (February 28, 1923) the Belgian representative here [George Stadler] came to speak to me about the Ruhr position. His point was that without reparations Belgium was bankrupt. I told him that the only advice I could give the French and Belgian governments was to increase their armies very largely and to prepare for the next war which their action was making a certainty. He appeared very much disconcerted. Poor devils, they know not what they do.[47]

Smuts had a clear view of the ends of his policy toward France, but no clear view of the means. He had instructed Lord Robert Cecil to press for the admission to the League first of Germany and secondly of Russia.[48] Smuts realized that a small country like South Africa could not do it. France under Poincaré was in a far stronger position than Smuts realized. Unlike his predecessor, Briand, Poincaré had no interest in a British military guarantee for France; the only guarantee that interested him was one that would support the entire structure of French alliances in eastern Europe. He did not expect to receive that from the British. So, without consulting Britain, French, Belgian, and Italian troops marched into the Ruhr on January 11, 1923.

The Reparation Commission had declared the German government to be in default on its payments. Therefore, the French and Belgian governments claimed that their invasion of Germany was legal. Smuts believed that Britain was sanctioning French policies that would undermine the prospects of a reasonable reparations settlement, of European recovery, of the world's prosperity and peace. He reiterated these views in a statement to the South African press on February 7, 1923.[49] He believed that he could do the most good at the coming Imperial Conference scheduled for September and October 1923.

In his opening address to the Conference of Prime Ministers on October 1 Stanley Baldwin quoted Disraeli on Britain's role as "a moderating and mediatory power."[50] The British government, he said, did not share the view of the French government that it had a right to move into the Ruhr; but it had strained every nerve to preserve solidarity with them and to follow a policy of neither helping them nor hindering them. When his turn came to speak Smuts said the world was in a bad way; but the British Commonwealth was still there and it had no need to speak with bated breath. Two years earlier it had opened the way to peace in the Pacific and now it was called upon to make a great united effort to bring peace to Europe. That was its duty. That was its self-interest also. Smuts emphasized the fact that a great attempt had to be made to restore the trade conditions of Europe.[51]

In his opening remarks Smuts further stated that all the signatories of the peace treaties were all concerned with the aftermath. He saw no reasons why Belgium should have a voice but Australia no voice at all on issues of great importance to the world's prosperity and peace. They had all fought the war to uphold the sanctity of international obligations. The French invasion of the Ruhr was a violation of international obligation. Smuts thought it a mistake not to deal honestly and forthrightly with France and not to stand up to her when she erred. The policies which France was following were ruinous to Europe and to the rest of the world. He stated his hope that America could be induced to attend a conference which would settle both reparations and inter-allied debts. If France refused to cooperate, he said, the conference should meet without her. Meanwhile, he stated it was urgent to get the French to evacuate the Ruhr.

At this time Smuts was looking to America for support. Since his arrival in England, he had been in telegraphic communication with Bernard Baruch, the intimate Presidential advisor on problems of international finance and policies.[52] He had some reason to believe that Baruch's efforts were proving fruitful. On October 9 the White House announced that President Coolidge endorsed his predecessor's proposals for American participation in the financial rehabilitation of Europe. This announcement, though filled with conditions, became the occasion for an important British move. In a note to Washington on October 13, the British government declared its intention of enlisting the immediate cooperation of its European allies in an invitation to the United States government to assist in an inquiry into the reparations question. The note started the round of negotiations which led two months later to the Dawes Committee and to a temporary workable reparations settlement.

Smuts intended to follow up this move by giving his opinion on the European situation. He delivered the speech on October 23 to the South African Luncheon Club in London.[53] His message, he claimed was urgent. Four years had passed since the peace treaty with Germany, but there was as yet no peace. The war between the peoples had merely been transformed to the economic sphere, and the economic war was proving even more devastating than the military war. Europe had not much time left, he said, to save itself. He proposed an immediate conference of the powers which were mainly interested in the reparation question. Smuts, in effect, was serving notice on the French that they were likely to find themselves isolated unless they changed their policies. Reparation payments, he added, would be the main issue at the conference.

About these payments he made two points: first, that the fantastic total fixed by the Reparation Commission in May 1921 could not possibly be paid; secondly, that a realistic total could be fixed and must be paid. But that could not begin to happen until the French evacuated the Ruhr. He denounced the Ruhr invasion not only as economic and political folly but as an illegal act. He saw many signs that Germany was falling to pieces. Germany's collapse, if not prevented, would prove more calamitous than the collapse of Russia in 1917. Britain and the Commonwealth, he said, could not stand by and watch the calamity occur. France must be told that Britain and the Commonwealth intended to safeguard their own interests. Smuts stated that he felt no hostility towards France. He recognized her just claim to security; but he did not believe that she could achieve that security by her adventure in the Ruhr and by trying to perpetuate her military domination over Europe.[54]

In the British press the speech made front page news and the Times printed it as a pamphlet. British opinion seemed to be solidifying behind Smuts.[55] The French government, however, still insisted on holding its own ground. This was the situation on November 14, when Smuts embarked for Cape Town. On his departure he wrote a letter to the Times, calling on the British government to summon a conference and invite the Americans to join it even if the French refused to come.[56] Such a drastic move proved unncessary. By the time Smuts reached South Africa the French were showing signs of willingness to compromise. Within two months of his return, the Dawes Committee was at work on the reparation

problem. Although his own plan had been a different one, Smuts deserved some of the credit for this beginning of a new hope in Europe. Smuts had won acclamation as a peacemaker--but more of it in Britain than in South Africa.

After his South African Party suffered defeat in a special election at Wakkerstroom, Smuts decided to dissolve Parliament and announce general elections for June 19, 1924. The reason for this local electoral defeat and Smuts's subsequent defeat at the polls lay in the circumstances of the Rand strike of 1922. The National Party, led by General James B. Hertzog and the Labor Party, led by Frederick H. Cresswell had, during the Rand strike, made an agreement, popularly known as "the Pact," to join forces for the purpose of ousting the Smuts government.[57]

The strike began on New Year's Day, 1922 when the Transvaal miners walked off their jobs, and were followed on January 10 by the gold miners and the workers in the power stations and engineering industries. The strikers opposed wage reductions. The goldminers were mainly concerned with the attempt by the Chamber of Mines to reduce costs by increasing the ratio of black to white miners in semi-skilled jobs.

After mobilizing the Active Citizen Force and declaring martial law on March 10, Smuts left Cape Town for Johannesburg to command the government troops against the armed strikers. While traveling by car from Randfontein to his headquarters in Johannesburg, he, Louis Esselen, Secretary of the South African Party, and his chauffeur repeatedly came under rifle fire.[58]

After the declaration of the general strike on March 7 the strikers committed many acts of violence including the killing of native miners. On March 10 there was fighting in the entire Rand area. Government troops suppressed the uprising in three days. A number of strikers were brought to trial and of eighteen sentenced to death for murder, four were executed. Government casualties were 50 soldiers killed and 237 wounded. Insurgent casualties numbered 138 killed and 287 wounded.[59]

The general election of June 19, 1924 resulted not only in the defeat of Smuts's South African Party but also in the loss of his own seat, Pretoria West, to the Labor Party candidate. The results of the election were: National Party 63; South African Party 53; Labor Party 18; Independent 1.[60]

During the next nine years, as leader of the opposition, Smuts engaged the Nationalist-Labor government under Hertzog on two major issues. The first was the conflict between the English and Afrikander elements over the determination of the Nationalists to give the country a distinctive national flag. The second was Hertzog's attempt to legislate a restrictive native policy.

The issue over the national flag stretched over two years and in the end the government was forced into a reluctant compromise.[61] The compromise resulted in the Union Jack and the Republican flags within the tricolour. After personal talks between Hertzog and Smuts the compromise was reached.

In response to Hertzog's native bills Smuts wrote a long [20 pages] critical memorandum on the bills that was distributed by the South African Party throughout the country.[62] No mutual accord could

be reached between the two leaders and Hertzog was unable to attain the required two-thirds majority of both houses of parliament to pass the bills.[63]

Even though Smuts was now out of touch officially with other governments he remained acutely aware of European and Commonwealth affairs. This appears most notably in his correspondence with Leopold S. Amery, now Secretary for the Colonies.[64] The Locarno agreements and the attitude of the dominions to the obligations undertaken by Great Britain, and his doubts about the effectiveness of the League of Nations made Smuts increasingly uneasy. In a letter to Arthur Neville Chamberlain Smuts reveals his uneasiness over the Locarno accord.[65]

> I am afraid the Dominions will keep out of this pact (the Locarno Pact) and will look upon this as a precedent to disinterest themselves in future more and more in the foreign policy of Great Britain. Thus for the Empire too the Pact will become a new departure. This is a serious matter which no doubt you have carefully considered. It may be that the future peace of Europe outweighs such considerations as arise in this connection. But I look upon the British Empire as, with the United States of America, the main guarantee of any public life that is worth living in the world. And I should be most sorry to weaken the voice of the Empire as a united whole in the councils of the world.[66]

Twice during the 1920's [first in 1924 and again in 1928] Smuts urged upon his old friend L. S. Amery an East African policy which would create a "great white state or system of states" in that region.[67] These letters to Amery reveal Smuts's longing for a unified Commonwealth with greater Africa as a principal participant. On May 22, 1928 he wrote to Amery that

> . . . The larger Africa attracts me profoundly. I believe that there are the makings on this continent of something very big indeed. Africa from the equator downwards ought within so many generations to take a high place with Canada and Australia, as

> one of the greatest Dominions in the Empire. For this careful planning is necessary now, and the reservation of sufficient elbowroom for our great white civilization, leaving sufficient land for the Native population for present and future needs. All this sort of work attracts me greatly, but my South African preoccupations have been such that I have not had the time to devote sufficient attention to these larger problems.[68]

Differences on the native bills, Commonwealth status, and the flag precluded a reconciliation between the two major parties. The election of 1929 was bitter and the Nationalist Pact won it by playing on racial fears and prejudices.[69]

This period of Smuts's life gave him more time to write and lecture than any other time in his life. The products of this period include: the publication of Holism and Evolution in July 1929; a presidential address before the South African Association for the Advancement of Science in May 1925; and participation in a seminar on the nature of life at the meeting of the British Association in Cape Town in August 1929.[70]

Between 1929 and 1934 Smuts made four visits abroad. He remained concerned with the inseparable questions of world peace and security, the fostering of the League of Nations, and the strengthening of the Commonwealth. In 1929 he visited Great Britain, the United States, and Canada to give lectures. He delivered the Rhodes Memorial Lectures at the University of Oxford in November 1929. These lectures were published in January 1930 under the title Africa and Some World Problems.[71] His address to the committee of the Empire Parliamentary Association sums up the theme he espoused.

> . . . I look upon the Empire as the greatest actual political achievement of time. The League of Nations is a great experiment, which is

> gradually becoming more than an experiment; it is stabilizing itself and it is becoming a reality; but the British Commonwealth of Nations, comprising one-fourth of the human race and of the globe, is an actual fact and is something far greater than has ever existed before in history. It guarantees peace and liberty and freedom to one-fourth of the human race, and when through the process of constitutional evolution you have achieved a result like that, it is your simple human duty to defend it to the uttermost, to stand by it, and to see that it does not crumble to pieces simply through negligence and through oversight. [72]

At this time he also became involved in two different problems of British foreign policy. These issues were to concern him for the rest of his life--the clash of the Arabs and Jews in Palestine and--the demands of the Indian nationalists. As a party to the Balfour declaration on Palestine Smuts considered it his duty to plead the Zionist cause with the British government. In three telegrams to J. Ramsay MacDonald on October 22-25, 1930 Smuts requested the British government to clarify its Palestine policy.[73] Smuts published these telegrams, the October 22 telegram reading in part:

> As one of those responsible for the Balfour declaration I feel deeply perturbed over present Palestine policy which marks retreat from declaration. Declaration was definite promise to Jewish world that policy of national home would be actively prosecuted and was intended to rally powerful Jewish influence for allied cause at darkest hour of war. As such it was approved by governments of the United States and other allies and accepted in good faith by Jews. It cannot now be varied unilaterally by British government. It represents debt of honour which must be discharged in full at all costs.[74]

Smuts sharply criticized British policy in India. He insisted that the solution to the British government-Indian Congress stalemate lay in cooperation with Gandhi. Following the publication of the Simon report on the working of the Government of India Act of 1919, the Labor government called a round table conference which met in London on November 12, 1930 but the Congress party boycotted it.[75] Smuts voiced his

concern privately in a letter to Margaret C. Gillett. On August 15, 1932 he wrote that

> I frankly cannot grasp the British policy. It seems to me a sheer muddle to put the [Indian] Congress in gaol, to alienate the moderates, and yet to think of going forward with the grant of a new constitution. Who will work this constitution and who will have any responsibility for its success?[76]

The second round table conference on India met in September 1931. Gandhi attended as the only delegate of the Indian National Congress. He opposed the main decisions and the conference foundered on the question of communal and minority electorates. While in London in November both Gandhi and Lord Irwin [Edward Halifax], Viceroy of India, sought Smuts's friendly intervention.[77]

It was while he was in England to preside over the Centenary meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science on September 21, 1931 that Great Britain went off the gold standard.[78] J. Ramsay MacDonald at this time was Prime Minister of the National government formed on August 24, 1931 to deal with the financial crisis. When a general election was scheduled to be held the question arose of how the government should go to the voters and how the party differences within the cabinet were to be handled. MacDonald spoke of resignation but King George dissuaded him. On the night of October 5 it was decided that the government would appeal to the voters for a free hand to cure the country's ills, a so-called "doctor's mandate."[79]

Smuts described his involvement in this governmental crisis in a letter to his wife on October 6, 1931.

> . . . there was a telephone call from the King who wished to know where I was. So I went to London this morning to see him. It then appeared that there was a big cabinet crisis yesterday; MacDonald

> was to resign, etc. And the King, as in the Irish difficulty of 1921, wished to have my advice about the whole matter. Fortunately for me the cabinet crisis was decided during the night and all was over when I arrived there this morning. But it shows what faith the dear old King has in me and how much he likes to look to me for help and advice. [80]

Smuts urgently recommended that South Africa follow Britain in going off the gold standard, but his advice was rejected by the Hertzog government. However, it was on the issue of "Off Gold" that Smuts returned to office. The flight of capital from South Africa finally compelled the government to change its position. The question of coalition between the South African Party and the Nationalist Party became acute when Tielman Roos, a popular South African Party leader, resigned from the appellate bench and re-entered politics on a pledge to force the National Pact government to leave the gold standard. His widespread support throughout the country forced the government to announce the abandonment of the gold standard on December 28, 1932. Roos had enough support in both the National and South African Parties to enable him to negotiate with Smuts for joint action to overthrow the Pact and form a coalition government. [81] On February 21, 1933 Smuts and Hertzog reached agreement on a coalition government. Smuts became Minister of Justice with wide powers--a post he kept until 1939, when the Second World War again brought him to the head of his Government. [82]

As Minister of Justice and Deputy Prime Minister under the Coalition Smuts administered his department, spoke often in parliamentary debates, and campaigned in behalf of his coalition. [83] Hertzog, the Prime Minister, treated foreign affairs as his own domain. Smuts, therefore, had little inside information about his country's situation in the

world. Nevertheless, throughout the 1930's, foreign affairs became the main theme of many of his speeches.

Smuts's public speeches and private correspondence can be grouped around the main themes of the international situation in the 1930's--the collapse of the Disarmament Conference, Italy's attack of Abyssinia in 1934, Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the rapid succession of crises in Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and Asia. In each of these crises Smuts dealt with the single question: how best to pursue peace. Until the final crisis of August-September 1939, he still professed to hope that war could still be avoided.

By 1934, the Disarmament Conference was in ruins and Germany had followed Japan outside the League. Smuts had a longstanding engagement in November to deliver an address on the occasion of his installation as Rector of St. Andrews' University. In his Rectoral address "The Challenge to Freedom" Smuts painted a sombre picture of the new tyrannies, disguised in patriotic colors, which were resurgent in Europe.

Smuts accepted another invitation to speak as the guest of the Royal Institute of International Affairs at a dinner at the Savoy Hotel on November 12, 1934. The institute was formed at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. In his Savoy speech Smuts stated that Freudian neuroses were at the root of the world's troubles and that the remedy for them was to drag them into the open.[84] Fear, the meanest of human motives, was the first and most dangerous neurosis: the remedy for it was to stop the war talk and to stop thinking of the League as a coercive body, which would bring aggressors to order by threatening them with sanctions. A second neurosis was the obsession with equality. It was Germany's present

trouble and the remedy for it was to treat the Germans as equals; they would then soon come back to the Disarmament Conference and the League. Smuts stated his assurance that the neuroses of Europe were curable and that before long Europe would settle down in peace. He stated further that whatever happened, the Western powers must never depart from an attitude of friendliness and human good will toward Japan. Finally, Smuts stated that cooperation between the British Commonwealth and the United States could help assure peace in the world.

In a personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Norman H. Davies, Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference, recorded his satisfaction with Smuts's Savoy speech. On November 27, 1934 Davies wrote:

> General Smuts, with whom I became well acquainted at the Paris Peace Conference, came to see me about a week before he made his recent and famous speech on world politics, emphasizing the necessity for the British Empire to cooperate with the United States. We discussed this Far Eastern problem fully and frankly, as a result of which I was quite satisfied with what his attitude would be, which is very important since he is generally recognized as the leading statesman in the British Empire.[85]

There appears a contradiction between his mood at St. Andrews and his mood at Savoy. If his theory of the curable neurosis proved sound, the contradiction would resolve itself as Nazi Germany, in response to the appropriate treatment, became not only a peace-loving but also a liberty-loving nation. That was the firm conviction of Smuts's friend, Lord Lothian.[86] On January 29, 1935 Lothian visited Berlin and returned with the news that Hitler did not want war, that he believed in self-determination, and that he could be trusted to keep the peace for the next ten years, provided the British negotiated with him in a spirit of frankness,

firmness, and respect for Germany's equal rights.[87] Smuts accepted Lothian's diagnosis.[88]

Smuts's attitude toward preserving the peace in the face of the Abyssinian crisis seems to repudiate the words he had spoken only a year before at the Royal Institute of International Affairs; he had said then that the League was a conference table, but now he was attempting to make it into a War Office. He had reasons, however, for his change of attitude. He believed that a return to the age of military conquest in Africa was dangerous. At the same time he believed that the struggle to save Abyssinia was equally a struggle to save the League. Regarding the Italian-Abyssinian crisis Smuts related to L. S. Amery that

> Strengthening the League therefore remained the only practical alternative, and that again meant making a reality of the sanction clause. . . . Today it is a secondclass power like Italy, tomorrow it will be a first-class power like Germany, trying to impose her will by high-minded action on other countries.[89]

Smuts told Lord Lothian that if the League failed there would be no use of his dreaming of a world state--there might be no world left to organize into a state. He asked Lothian to consider the consequence to the Commonwealth of the League's failure. The Covenant of the League, Smuts pointed out, provided members of the Commonwealth with a common code of practice; if they lost that guidance their foreign policies might begin to follow divergent, if not opposite, paths.[90]

Ethiopia was an independent sovereign state, a member of the League of Nations, and its Emperor Haile Selassie, appealed four times to the League for protection and for arbitration of the Italian-Ethiopian dispute. Faced with such an unequivocal test, the League Council and the

League Assembly declared Italy an aggressor and voted economic sanctions to restrain the Italians. A partial and ineffectual boycott by those states most ardent in defense of League principles was the consequence; but the resulting loss of trade was not acute enough to restrain Italy. The boycott was not applied to gasoline and other petroleum products without which the Italian invasion would have been impossible. Nor was any attempt made to close the Suez Canal, through which the Italian troops and supplies had to pass to reach the areas of combat. The diplomats of Paris and London, fearful of bringing Italy and Germany into an alliance, sacrified Ethiopia to the principle of power politics and expediency.

On June 10, 1936 Neville Chamberlain denounced the continuance of sanctions and a few weeks later, the Assembly of the League, responding again to a British lead, called them off. When he reflected on the events from September 1935 to June 1936--the British lead at Geneva, the British election, the Hoare-Laval pact,[91] the repudiation of that pact, the final capitulation on the sanction issue--Smuts could only consider biding for time, in the hope that somehow the world's unity might still be saved.

> To me the road appeared clear so long as we were all bound by the League as the basis of our foreign policy,but once that goes, I see only dangers ahead and no clear daylight. I am afraid that isolation will be a most difficult policy to carry through in actual practice. And if isolation is ruled out, and the League is ruled out also, where are we?
> You will see therefore why I am for extreme caution in dealing with the present situation. If Mussolini had been told at Stresa that an attack on Abyssinia would mean sanctions to the uttermost, I do not think he would have embarked on the Abyssinian adventure. I am afraid the League was betrayed there perhaps more through passivity and cowardice than malice aforethought.[92]

On March 7, 1936 Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland. In doing so he went beyond his earlier defiance of the Versailles Treaty, for he had declared the previous October that Germany would continue to accept neutralization of the Rhineland as an obligation incumbent upon her under the freely negotiated Locarno Treaty. It would therefore have been understandable if Smuts had ranked Hitler equal with Mussolini as a disturber of the peace and had advocated equal treatment for both. He did the opposite. Smuts thought coercion the right treatment for Mussolini but conciliation the right treatment for Hitler. To Maurice Hankey[93] Smuts stated that "judging from Hitler's private statement to Lothian and others, and his repeated public declarations, it seems a matter of sincere policy with him to come to an agreement with the British Empire, and it would be as well for us to speak with the enemy in the gate whilst he is in this mood."[94]

He was accepting Hitler's words at their face value. Tacitly, he accepted Hitler's plea that the Franco-Soviet pact of 1935 had absolved Germany from her obligations under the Locarno accord. Smuts's plan was to clinch quickly with Hitler's offer of peace pacts and of Germany's return to the League, and to proceed from that basis to a program of negotiated cooperation in the sphere of economic policy.[95]

Only a few months later Smuts was asking himself whether the opportunity that had seemed so clear to him in the spring of 1936 had ever really existed. Smuts refused to consider the return of South-West Africa to Germany, and Great Britain refused to consider the return of Tanganyika.[96] He found himself, like so many others, unable to form a clear idea of what Germany and Hitler really wanted.[97]

During this period Smuts kept his feelings under restraint. He seemed aware that if he gave his feelings free reign he would be committing himself to a crusade. The last thing he wanted was a crusade or a war of ideologies. He was, however, beginning to realize that not to have a creed and a cause might be just as dangerous for peace as having them. But two events, Palestine and Spain, convinced him that he must take a more active stand publicly.

In Palestine, throughout the mandatory era, Great Britain conducted numerous inquiries beginning in 1921 with the survey headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft, Palestine's Chief Justice. He reported that riots in 1921 resulted from Arab concern with Jewish immigration. During 1929, the Shaw Commission probed Arab-Jewish riots over the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Within the preceding ten years, the commission reported, there had been serious Arab attacks on Jews, although in the previous eighty none had been recorded. The cause was Arab fears that they would become a minority because of Jewish immigration and Zionist economic and political growth.[98]

Sharp protests by the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission against British efforts to curb Jewish immigration led to the economic investigation by Sir John Hope-Simpson in 1930. His report emphasized what he estimated to be Palestine's limited economic capacity and warned that the Arabs might face a land shortage if Jewish ownership continued to expand. This conclusion became the basis for the 1930 Passfield White Paper limiting immigration to "economic absorptive capacity" and reserving government areas for landless Arabs rather than for the Jews. The Jewish leadership denounced the White Paper and Prime

Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald attempted to explain away the White Paper restrictions in a letter to Dr. Weizmann during 1931. Jewish immigration would be continued, MacDonald promised, and only those Arabs who surrendered property to Jews would receive government land. The Arabs used the opportunity to intensify their anti-British and anti-Zionist propaganda.[99]

Following an Arab revolt in 1936, Parliament sent Earl Peel, former Secretary of State for India, to investigate the situation in Palestine. The Royal Commission proposed partition of Palestine into a small Jewish state populated by 285,000 Jews and 225,000 Arabs; an international enclave from the coast to and including Jerusalem; and an Arab state including most of the country. The British government began to consider the imposition of restrictions upon Jewish immigration into Palestine.[100]

The first rumor of British restrictions upon Jewish immigration brought Smuts to action. He and David Lloyd George were the two surviving members of the War Cabinet which had endorsed the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and had won international recognition for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. On October 22, 1930 he had cabled Lloyd George in protest against the MacDonald government's "incredible breach of fath" as he called it--in regard to the Balfour Declaration.[101] Now on July 23 he made a new appeal to Lloyd George in a letter requesting joint action to defend the National Home. He stated that it was not time to desert the Jews and lying down before Arab agitation.[102] In this letter Smuts stated that

> Whatever view one may take of the present government, and of their foreign policy, one cannot sit still and see a step being taken which is bound to have very far-reaching consequences in the future. The weakening of the Balfour Declaration, the lying down before Arab agitation, the certain hostility of the Jews all over the world, would add very much to the difficulties of our future path, and one feels bound to exert whatever influence is necessary in order to prevent a step which may have most regrettable consequences. Please see what you can do in the matter. I am sure your influence will be most potent . . .[103]

Regarding the Spanish civil war of 1936-1939 Smuts saw the German and Italian intervention as a plain case of the dictators helping the dictators and as a bid for an important strategic objective--a position of strength in the western Mediterranean which would enable the dictators to threaten the British entry point at Gibraltar and the French colonies in North Africa. He thought it unwise of the British and French to tolerate non-intervention when it was clearly, in his view, a one-sided and most dangerous intervention. He insisted that they could have kept the Germans and Italians out of Spain if they had been resolute and clear in their aims.[104]

In April 1937 Lord Lothian asked Smuts to come to Europe to help ease British-German tensions. Smuts did not go to Europe but on April 7, 1937 he wrote Lothian a long letter in which he said that Great Britain was still the greatest reserve force in the world and she was in a position to take the initiative without incurring the imputation of weakness. Germany, on the other hand, was in a far weaker position than appeared on the surface; Hitler's Four Year Plan had proved a failure, and Germany did not possess the resources for carrying on a long war. In his letter Smuts made a list of Britain's bargaining counters. The British, he said, did not intend to hold on to all the German colonies; they knew

that the regimes in Memel and Danzig were makeshift; they knew that they could secure American cooperation in opening large economic and financial opportunities in Germany.[105] He believed that all these inducements might be offered to the Germans for the sake of peace provided two basic conditions governed the negotiations: first, it must exclude everything prejudicial to France and Russia; secondly, it must include and settle every contentious issue.[106]

On May 14, 1937 Lord Lothian attempted the task which he had wanted Smuts to undertake. He visited Berlin as a self-appointed emissary, conferred with Hitler, Goering, and Schacht and composed a memorandum of his conclusions.[107] Lothian reported that the Germans, although difficult, were not unreasonable. They were nationalists, but did not want to dominate other nations. They were not jealous of the British Empire, but felt that the British were always frustrating them. There appeared to be good prospects of success in negotiating with Germany under the following headings: Eastern Europe, the colonial-economic question, and the League and disarmament.[108] According to Lothian, Smuts made no comment on the memorandum. Perhaps Smuts observed a contradiction in his own thought--his notion of achieving a comprehensive and permanent settlement with people whose essential dynamism he had so recently diagnosed.

Meanwhile Smuts's attention was turned to the Chinese situation. He insisted that the war in China was more ominous by far than any event anywhere in the world since the Great War. He asked himself how the Chinese would use their power when the Japanese had thoroughly militarized

them?[109] Hitler, meanwhile in October 1936, proclaimed the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome Axis. On November 6, 1937 Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded a year earlier between Germany and Japan. Smuts noted that announcement as a new betrayal not only of Asia but of Europe.[110]

Germany, Smuts said, was doing irreparable wrong in revenge for the smaller wrongs which she had suffered after the last war. Smuts faced the fact that peace was no longer obtainable except by recognizing German predominance in continental Europe. His recent assessment of the balance of power, Smuts now concluded, had proved fallacious, in particular, he had been far wide of the mark when he saw the Soviet Union as an effective counterweight. If anyone had told him, he stated in a letter to L. S. Amery, that the Soviet Union would sit still while Japan was securing mastery of China, he would never have believed it.[111]

Only a few months later, on March 28, 1938, he saw the Soviet Union again remaining uninvolved while Hitler made further advances on central Europe.[112] Smuts's thoughts now became more pessimistic. He wrote to Amery:

> . . . Today conditions and tempers give the League no chance. But it is a great vision, an ideal which always has its value even in the practical affairs of men, and even in the most untoward circumstances. After all, the League was only following the ideal which was incorporated into the practice of the British Commonwealth.[113]

Smuts consoled himself with two sources of strength: British sea power and the Commonwealth. "I am for our world-wide Commonwealth as the last remaining--and, I hope, effective bulwark of human liberty.[114] Looking into the future, he declared his faith in the staying power of freedom, the survival of the Commonwealth and the re-establishment of a rational world order.

South Africa's decision not to intervene in the event of war had been agreed upon informally by an inner circle of ministers--Hertzog, Smuts,

Pirow, and Havenga.[115] It was not, however, until September 28, 1938 that the full South African Cabinet approved the decision. The statement expressed South Africa's desire to assume the role of a semineutral. There would have been no obligation upon any belligerent power to recognize the existence of such a role and little likelihood that an aggressive belligerent would respect South Africa's desire when its own interests were at stake. The document, however, was a careful, honest, and laborious attempt to express the realities of South Africa's international situation and of her internal political situation. Smuts, though he ascribed to the declaration, felt that the formula which fitted one situation was not bound to fit the next. In a speech before the South African House of Assembly on August 25, 1938, he declared his conviction that South Africa would take her stand with Britain and the Commonwealth, if ever the day came when they had to fight for their lives.[116]

During the interwar period Smuts developed a pessimistic outlook toward world politics. He saw the course of events leading inevitably toward collision and tried desperately to stop it. He exerted efforts to save the League, to induce the British government to take the initiative in Europe to get restitution for Germany, and to draw the United States into a partnership of democracies. He showed a growing awareness of the evil purposes of Hitler and Mussolini and showed anxiety that British commitments on the continent might ultimately weaken the Commonwealth. At this time he saw the Commonwealth as a vital force in protecting world peace.

NOTES

[1]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, October 4, 1919, Selections, vol. V, doc. 7.

[2]See J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, January 11, 1917, Selections, vol. III, doc. 711, for mention by Smuts of telegram from General Botha saying that the Cabinet was unanimous in its opinion that Smuts should go to London.

[3]Lionel Curtis--administrator and writer. Born and educated in England and came to South Africa in June 1900 to take part in the administration of the Transvaal under Lord Milner. He wrote a number of books on Commonwealth and international affairs.

[4]Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, I:540-551.

[5]See speech by Smuts at Edinburgh when he received the Freedom of the City, in War Time Speeches, 1917, pp. 41-45.

[6]Selections, vol. IV, docs. 968-959.

[7]L. Botha to D. L. George (letter drafted by Smuts), May 15, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 968.

[8]J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, p. 13.

[9]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, September 21, 1919, Selections, vol. V, doc. 6.

[10]Great Britain, Cmd. Papers, 1474 of 1921, pp. 9-10, 14-28.

[11]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, Dec. 26, 1920, Selections, vol. V, doc. 40.

[12]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, Nov. 1, 1920, Selections, vol. V, doc. 34.

[13]Ibid.

[14]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, October 25, 1920, Selections, vol. V, doc. 33.

[15]Jan Christian Smuts, pp. 188-191.

[16]J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, (London, 1918).

[17]See Memorandum of the Constitution of the British Empire, by J. C. Smuts, April 16, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 46.

[18]Smuts to J. H. Hofmeyr, November 25, 1920, Selections, vol. V, doc. 38.

[19]J. C. Smuts, War Time Speeches, pp. 25-38.

[20]Journal of the Parliaments of the Empire, vol. I, pp. 540-551.

[21]See Selections from the Smuts Papers, vol. III, pp. 29-30.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Great Britain, Cmd. 8566 of 1917, pp. 5, 42, 46-48.

[24]H. Duncan Hall, "The Genesis of the Balfour Declaration of 1926," Journal of the Commonwealth Political Studies, I, no. 3, November 1962, pp. 169-193.

[25]"The Constitution of the British Commonwealth," June 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 46.

[26]Great Britain, Cmd. 1474 of 1921, pp. 25-28.

[27]H. Duncan Hall, "The Genesis of the Balfour Declaration of 1926," pp. 169-193.

[28]Great Britain, Cmd. 1474 of 1921, p. 28.

[29]Smuts's statement to the Press, June 28, 1919, Selections, vol. IV, doc. 1043.

[30]Thomas Casement to J. C. Smuts, May 30, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 48.

[31]Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic, (London: Gollancz Ltd. 1937), pp. 481-482.

[32]Sir Horace Plunkett--born in Ireland, Unionist Member of the House of Commons, 1892-1900; Chairman of the Irish Convention, 1917-1918; Senator of the Irish Free State, 1922-1923; and Fellow of the Royal Society, 1902.

Robert Erskine Childers--writer and Irish Nationalist leader, served in the Anglo-Boer War, junior clerk in the House of Commons, 1895-1910, served in the royal naval air service in the First World War. Joined the Sinn Fein movement and took part in the armed resistance to the Irish Free State government set up under the treaty of 1921; captured and executed on Nov. 24, 1922.

See letter from Sir Horace Plunkett to J. C. Smuts, June 8, 1921 and letter from Lady Courtney to J. C. Smuts, June 9, 1921, Selections, vol. V, docs. 49-50.

[33]Harold Nicolson, King George V: His Life and Reign, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1953), pp. 349-350.

[34]J. C. Smuts to Lord Stamfordham (King George's private secretary from 1910-1931), Selections, June 14, 1921, vol. V, doc. 52.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Harold Nicolson, King George V, pp. 352-354.

[37]Sir Edward Grigg to Lord Stamfordham, June 14, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 53.

[38]"Memorandum submitted to the King by Lord Stamfordham, June 29, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 54.

[39]Sir Edward Grigg to Lord Stamfordham, June 29, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 55.

[40]J. C. Smuts to Lord Stamfordham, July 1, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 56.

[41]Ibid.

[42]For summary of Smuts's talks with de Valera see "Memorandum of a Conversation between the King and General Smuts at Tuckingham Palace, July 7, 1921," Selections, vol. V, doc. 59.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Statement to the Press, December 10, 1921, Selections, vol. V, doc. 67.

[45]J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, February 4, 1924, and Smuts to the Editor of the "New York World," February 4, 1924, Selections, vol. V, docs. 134, 135.

[46]J. C. Smut to A. Bonar Law, November 20, 1922, Selections, vol. V, doc. 84.

[47]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, March 1, 1923, Selections, vol. V, doc. 95.

[48]J. C. Smuts to Lord Robert Cecil, July 5, 1922, Selections, vol. V, doc. 78.

[49]Statement to the Press, February 7, 1923, Selections, vol. V, doc. 94.

[50]Great Britain, Cmd. 1988, Imperial Conference, 1923, Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings, pp. 3-11, 14-18.

[51]Manchester Guardian, October 2, 1923, p. 3.

[52]See Telegrams: J. C. Smuts to B. M. Baruch, October 1, 1923, J. C. Smuts to B. M. Baruch, October 3, 1923, B. M. Baruch to J. C. Smuts, October 6, 1923, Selections, vol. V, docs. 109, 110, 113.

[53]J. C. Smuts to J. M. Keynes, October 22, 1923, and speech by J. C. Smuts at a dinner of the South Africa Club in the Savoy Hotel, October 23, 1923, Selections, vol. V, docs. 119, 120.

[54]Ibid.

[55]See letters from Lord Curzon, October 24, 1923; M.P.A. Hankey, October 24, 1923; G. N. Barnes, October 24, 1923; B. M. Baruch, October 24, 1923; J. M. Keynes, October 26, 1923; G. Stressemann, October 29, 1923, Selections, vol. V, docs. 121, 123, 122, 124, 127, 129.

[56]J. C. Smuts to the Editor of The Times, November 14, 1923, Selections, vol. V, doc. 132.

[57]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 256.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Speech by J. C. Smuts to South African Assembly, March 31, 1922, Selections, vol. V, doc. 75.

[60]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, June 24, 1924, Selections, vol. V, doc. 175.

[61]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, October 27, 1927, Selections, vol. V, doc. 233.

[62]Memorandum, August 1926, Selections, vol. V, doc. 204.

[63]Notes of Conversation with General Hertzog on Native Policy, February 13, 15, 27, 1928, Selections, vol. V, docs. 240, 241, 242.

[64]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, November 25, 1924, and J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, May 22, 1928, Selections, vol. V, docs. 155, 245.

[65]The Locarno Agreements were signed on October 16, 1925. They comprised a number of undertakings the main one being a treaty of mutual guarantee of the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers between Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium. Another aspect of Locarno was a Franco-Polish and a Franco-Czech treaty of mutual assistance in event of German aggression. Article 9 of the Locarno Pact exempted the Dominions and India from British obligations under the treaty.

[66]J. C. Smuts to Arthur Neville Chamberlain, October 21, 1925, Selections, vol. V, doc. 173.

[67]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, November 25, 1924, Selections, vol. V, doc. 155.

[68]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, May 22, 1928, Selections, vol. V, doc. 245.

[69]J. C. Smuts to E. F. Lane, June 28, 1929, Selections, vol. V, doc. 262.

[70]J. C. Smuts to I. B. Pole-Evans, May 8, 1925 and J. S. Haldane to J. C. Smuts, December 13, 1928, Selections, vol. V, docs. 163, 249.

[71]J. C. Smuts, Africa and Some World Problems (London, 1930).

[72]Speech before the Empire Parliamentary Association, January 28, 1930, Selections, vol. V, doc. 274.

[73]Following a number of incidents at the "wailing wall" which culminated in August 1928 in a major riot in which 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, Sir John Hope Simpson was sent to Palestine to report on Jewish immigration and land settlement. His report was published in October 1930, accompanied by a White Paper (Cmd. 3692) defining the policy of the British government. Both documents were regarded by Zionists as a departure from the Balfour Declaration.

[74]Telegram from J. C. Smuts to J. R. MacDonald, October 22, 1930, Selections, vol. V, doc. 284.

[75]Simon Report--Sir John Allsebrook Simon, Foreign Secretary under P. M. Ramsay MacDonald in the National Government 1931-1935. Later, he served as Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Lord Chancellor.

[76]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, August 15, 1932, Selections, vol. V, doc. 318.

[77]Lord Irwin to J. C. Smuts, November 14, 1931, and M. K. Gandhi to J. C. Smuts, November 17, 1931, Selections, vol. V, docs. 304, 305.

[78]Address: "The Scientific World Picture Today," Selections, vol. V, doc. 298.

[79]Harold Nicolson, King George V, p. 493.

[80]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, October 6, 1931, Selections, vol. V, doc. 300.

[81]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, January 11, 1933, Selections, vol. V, doc. 325.

[82]Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 156-157.

[83]See speech on coalition by Smuts in Cape Town on March 7, 1933 recorded by Cape Times on March 8, 1933.

[84]Speech by Smuts at Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 12, 1934, Selections, vol. V, doc. 370.

[85]Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), II:251.

[86]Lord Lothian (Philip Henry Kerr)--Politician, editor, and Ambassador. Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1916-1921, Secretary of the Rhodes Trust, 1925-1939, sat in the House of Lord as a Liberal, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in the National Government, 1931, and later, Under-Secretary of State for India, Ambassador to the United States, 1939-1940.

[87]J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian, (London: MacMillan, 1960), pp. 330-337.

[88]J. C. Smuts to Lord Lothian, February 20, 1935, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 373.

[89]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, December 2, 1935, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 387.

[90]For Smuts's letter of August 5, 1935 and Lord Lothian's reply, see Lord Lothian, pp. 209-211.

[91]In October 1935 British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, made an agreement with Premier Laval of France, by which Britain and France agreed that Mussolini might annex large parts of northern Ethiopia, become entrusted with the economic exploitation of southern Ethiopia, and assume even a kind of veiled protectorate over what was left of Haile Selassie's empire.

[92]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, June 29, 1936, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 399.

[93]Maurice Hankey, soldier and government official. Secretary of the Cabinet, 1916-1938, British Secretary at the Peace Conference, 1919, Minister without portfolio, 1939, author of Diplomacy by Confidence, and Supreme Command, 1914-1918.

[94]J. C. Smuts to M. P. A. Hankey, private, July 17, 1936, Selections, vol. VI:doc. 401.

[95]Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy, 1931-39, (London: Oxford Press, 1952-1958), pp. 240-252.

[96]In a press statement in Pretoria on July 10, 1936 Oswald Pirow, South African Minister of Railways and of Defense, 1933-1939 said that South West Africa and Tanganyika would never be returned to Germany, that Germany should be given a foothold in Africa and that very influential quarters in Britain supported this view. On July 16 the issue was raised in the House of Commons. Baldwin said that he regretted press interviews on "matters that are of some considerable delicacy." Times (London) July 17, 1936, p. 7.

[97]J. C. Smuts to M. P. A. Hankey, July 17, 1936, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 401.

[98]Great Britain, Cmd. 3530, Report of the Shaw Commission, 1930, pp. 106, 111, 125, 139.

[99]Great Britain, Cmd. 3686, Report of the Hope-Simon Commission 1930, pp. 41, 50.

[100]Great Britain, Cmd. 5479, Report by the Peel Commission, pp. 110, 112, 292, 376.

[101]See telegram from J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, October 22, 1930, and Lloyd George's positive reply on October 23, 1930, in Selections, vol. V, docs. 285, 286.

[102]J. C. Smuts to D. Lloyd George, July 23, 1936, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 403 and Benjamin Sacks, J. Ramsay MacDonald in Thought and Action (University of New Mexico Press, 1952), pp. 457-458.

[103]J. C. Smuts to David Lloyd George, July 23, 1936, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 403.

[104]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, July 27, 1936, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 404.

[105]J. C. Smuts to Lord Lothian, personal and confidential, April 7, 1937, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 411. Lothian, at this time was serving as Secretary of the Indian Franchise Committee and Secretary of the Rhodes Trust.

[106]P. B. Blanckenberg, The Thoughts of General Smuts, (Cape Town and Johannesburg: Juta and Company, 1951), p. 114 and J. C. Smuts to Lord Lothian, April 17, 1937, Selections, vol. Vi, doc. 411.

[107]J. R. M. Butler, Lord Lothian, (London: MacMillan, 1960), pp. 330-351, 217-219.

[108]Lord Lothian to J. C. Smuts, May 14, 1937, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 413.

[109]The Thoughts of General Smuts, p. 117.

[110]J. C. Smuts to S. G. Millin, November 12, 1937, Selections, vol VI, doc. 426.

[111]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, December 9, 1937, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 431.

[112]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, March 28, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 436. In this letter Smuts discusses the Austrian crisis and its implications.

[113]Ibid.

[114]J. C. Smuts to L. S. Amery, June 8, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 465.

[115]J. C. Smuts to S. G. Millin, September 14, 1938, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 445.

[116]Cape Times, 26 August 1938, p. 11.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

From the Munich crisis of September 1938 to the outbreak of war in September 1939 Smuts wrote often of his views on the international situation. In letters to his close friends, Margaret and Arthur Gillett, Sarah G. Millin, Thomas and Corliss Lamont, and Leopold S. Amery Smuts remained preoccupied with the looming threat of war.[1]

Viscount Simon[2] recalled in his memoirs how Smuts reacted to the decisions reached at Munich in 1938.[3]

> It was a terrible decision which faced the Czechoslovak Government, but there was no third choice. True, it was that Germany would be acquiring Sudetenland by cession and agreement, but if there was justification for this, and if Hitler was to be believed that this was the last of his territorial claims, European war might have been avoided.
>
> It was this hope, far fetched as it may seem in the light of the sequel, that made the Prime Minister's return from Munich the occasion for the applause of the free world. The Dominions approved. Smuts called Chamberlain 'a great champion, who in pursuing the path of the peacemaker, had risked all and I trust he had won all.'[4]

In spite of the continual and inevitable drift toward war Smuts remained hopeful that the League of Nations could somehow prevent the holocaust of world war. A letter to Lord Robert Cecil reveals this hopefulness. On December 6, 1938 Smuts wrote:

> It is our duty as believers in the League to continue to stand up for it, and in that way to counteract the general impression of the League as dead and as a matter of no account whatever. There has of course been a most lamentable change in the fortunes of the League in the last five or six years, but one hopes and prays that this may be a temporary phase, and that a favourable settlement in Europe and the absence of all other machinery for international purposes may make the League come into its own again. . . . It is really the defection of the U.S.A. that hamstrung the League and

> has made it practically impossible for it to discharge its duties satisfactorily. . . . I therefore still hope that it will be possible for you to have a heart-to-heart talk with Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and other men of good will in America, and strengthen them in their good resolves.[5]

Smuts did not subscribe to the assertion that Prime Minister Chamberlain had served his country well by postponing war to a more convenient time. Not the postponement of war, but the safeguarding of peace was Smuts's objective. On March 31, Neville Chamberlain asserted in the House of Commons that if Poland's independence were threatened the British government would give the Polish government full support. In a letter to Margaret C. Gillett on April 6 Smuts indicated that he thought that Chamberlain was attempting to rebuild collective security, but would find reconstruction a harder task than the collapse had been.

> Chamberlain's Polish guarantee has simply made us gasp from the Commonwealth point of view. I cannot see the Dominions following Great Britain in this sort of imperial policy the dangers of which to the Commonwealth are obvious. . . . The British government may argue that such a guarantee is necessary for the new policy of collective security against Hitler, and that it will mean peace and not war and therefore not involve Dominion obligations to assist Great Britain in war. For this argument there is much to be said. But what if there is war--and that over this sort of guarantee in eastern Europe? And in any case what a commentary on Chamberlain's previous disregard for collective security; and his calling League sanctions 'mid-summer madness' in the case of Abyssinia? The real midsummer madness was letting the League down and rendering it useless for future cooperation in case of dire need. Chamberlain's League policy and flirting with Mussolini may yet produce other more dangerous consequences. Time alone can show.[6]

In an interview in the London Times on March 27 Smuts admitted publicly that the League of Nations was doomed.[7] Also, in a letter to Florence Lamont three days later he stated that the world "suffered an immeasurable loss in its [the League's] downfall."[8]

> We may bitterly regret that we allowed the League to come to the pass to which it has fallen now. . . . I think we shall never again emerge from anarchy and the reign of brutal power until we have once more brought to the round table the various peoples of the world, great and small.[9]

During this period there is no record in the Smuts Papers of Smuts having direct contact with the "Cliveden Set." In a lengthy letter to Smuts, however, Florence Lamont describes her contacts with the Astors.

> I went to luncheon at the Cecils and after talking with Lord Robert, I felt that Chamberlain and his foreign policy were dreadful. I then hurried home, changed my dress and had tea with the Astors, just about an hour after I had left Lord Robert. You would think my convictions would last more than an hour! But not a bit of it. Waldorf Astor said, 'Now, Florence, you know Bob Cecil has been living in a dreamland for seven years. Tell me everything he said to you and I will answer it.' He then proceeded to answer it, point by point, sanely and quietly. And at the end of an hour I thought Chamberlain was the greatest man on earth.[10]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's dismissal of Maxim Litvinov in May 1939 as Soviet Foreign Minister, puzzled him. Litvinov had been a strong advocate of collective security and the League. Smuts asked himself whether the Soviet Union was turning to Germany, and whether Hitler was re-insuring himself with the Soviets as Bismarck had done.[11] As early as July 7, 1938 Smuts recognized the potential role of the Soviet Union as a mediator in Europe. He echoes this very sentiment in a radio broadcast to western Europe on November 11, 1938.[12]

On July 7, 1938 he stated to his private secretary, P.B. Blankenberg, that "my only hope is that with Russia in a firm military alliance with the Western Powers a military stalemate might be produced which will make war too risky an affair for either side and compel them to explore ways to a new peace."[13]

In a letter to Margaret Gillett on May 27, he rated slightly higher the chances of an Anglo-Soviet agreement.[14] On May 27 the British and French ambassadors in Moscow began discussions with the Soviet government for a pact of mutual assistance and a military convention. By early August Smuts was growing alarmed at the apparent failure of the negotiations to make headway. Peace seemed to hang on their outcome and if the negotiations came to nothing he imagined war was a certainty. In a letter to Sarah G. Millin he discussed why he became alarmed at the turn of events in Russia.

> The view I take of this Russian business--of course without knowledge of the real facts--is that Russia never wanted the negotiations for an alliance to succeed. They dismissed their previous foreign minister--the last real European among them--because he was keen on such an arrangement with the democracies. . . . Russia means and meant to sit out in this devil's dance in the West. Hence Litvinov had to go. She awaits her day as the overlord of a ruined Europe.[15]

Smuts's attitude toward the possibility of war had changed with the changes of circumstances. Four months before the Munich crisis he posed himself the question: What can I do to help save the peace?[16] After the crisis on March 15, 1939 when German troops entered Czecho-Slovakia he asked: What shall I do if war comes?[17] After the Nazi-Soviet agreement of August 23, 1939 he asked: What must I do if war comes?[18] These phases of circumstance and of his self-questioning were not sharply distinct but overlapping. Even in his mood of profound relief after the Munich agreement he had realized that the danger of war, although averted for the time being, might return soon.

On November 2, 1938, at a United Party Conference in the Orange Free State, Smuts expressed his hopes that Prime Minister Hertzog might

be proved right in forecasting a long period of peace--"but nobody has a guarantee that things may not be different."[19] Like Hertzog, he accepted South African rearmament as a means to safeguard the peace, but he was more insistent than Hertzog had been on its urgency for South Africa.

On South African foreign policy Smuts listed three goals: South Africa could not isolate herself, but needed friends; her best friends were Great Britain and the other nations of the Commonwealth; she could not count on staying neutral. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1939, Smuts, who was Deputy Prime Minister, remained constantly at odds with Prime Minister Hertzog over the issue of South African neutrality in the event of war between Britain and Germany. On September 4, three days after Germany had invaded Poland, and Britain was at war, Hertzog introduced a motion of neutrality into the South African House of Assembly. Smuts proposed instead to sever relations with Germany, and his proposal was accepted in the House of Assembly by 80 votes to 67.[20] Since the Governor-General refused his request for a dissolution of parliament, Hertzog resigned the next day and Smuts was summoned to form a government. The United Party had to be re-organized when, after the breach between Hertzog and Smuts on September 4, Hertzog and 36 other United Party members of the house joined the National Party opposition. Now Prime Minister, Smuts assumed the posts of Minister of Defense and of External Affairs. In a letter to Margaret Gillett on September 21, Smuts indicated that his decision to ally South Africa with Great Britain had general support.[21] "My stand has of course the unanimous approval of the English and a large section of the Afrikaners. But mere approval

is nothing as against strong organization; so my opponents are organizing while I am governing the country and tackling its problems."[22]

Hertzog regarded rejection of the neutrality by Smuts and by other ministers who had been members of his cabinet as an act of disloyalty and a breach of a cabinet agreement.[23] The core of Hertzog's argument was the equation he made between neutrality and independence. If South Africa joined the British, Hertzog declared, she would do so because a section of her people cared more for British than for South African interests. Such an outlook was incompatible with South African freedom and independence. If it prevailed, it would destroy South African unity.[24]

South African interests constituted the core of Smuts's argument. He reflect a different view from Hertzog on South African interests because he viewed Hitler and his policy differently. Smuts insisted Danzig was not the real cause of the war. The real cause was Hitler's refusal to admit any limit to his ambitions. The recovery of South-West Africa was one of them and if South-West Africa were lost the security of the Union of South Africa would be threatened. The time for defending the nation's independence and security was now, while the war was remote geographically and South Africa had loyal and powerful friends. If South Africa disassociated herself from her friends in the British Commonwealth the day would come when she would find herself isolated in the world.[25]

Smuts committed South Africa to war because he could see no alternative. He saw a threat to values which in his view had to be defended. First among them was the security of his own country. He repeated constantly his warning that the world was a dangerous place for small nations

which had no friends and this led him always to the commonwealth. He valued the commonwealth for the promise of a cooperative world order which he saw foreshadowed in this organization.

Upon attaining the Prime Ministership on September 6, 1939, Smuts pledged more support to the commonwealth struggle against fascism than Hertzog's proposals for modified neutrality on September 4. His forecast envisaged a war of the oceans, quite possibly of the continents, into which South Africa must inevitably be drawn because of her situation on the map.[26]

The immediate task at hand as he saw it was to fend off the Germans in the West while the Allies built up their strength. He had no doubt that Great Britain and the Commonwealth possessed the material and power to give their full resources in the struggle; but he did not feel so sure of France. He did not anticipate French military collapse; it was French moral conviction that he mistrusted. In the debate of September 4 in which Hertzog's government fell Smuts had pledged himself not to send South African soldiers overseas.[27] By his interpretation of this pledge, South Africa was not overseas: it was the home front. In a letter to Margaret Gillett on September 21, 1939 Smuts commented on Hitler's opening moves in the war.

> The spectacular and very early collapse of Poland is going to make our position much more difficult. It will be said: why fight for a state which had so little in it, and why sacrifice millions of lives and endanger civilization in the attempt to revive Poland? This argument will not impress Britain who has set her teeth; but what of the French who I don't think were ever keen in this affair? Hitler may try to concoct some very specious peace offer in order to sow dissension, and this he can do with impunity as it will not be accepted. Danzig was a bad start, and Poland has proved a severe knock. Even so there is no turning back. This war may go on until

> Britain and France are utterly exhausted and Germany also is utterly exhausted--and Russia, the looter, strides on to the desolate scene to collar the spoils. I hate to think of a Hitler Europe, but no less to think of a Stalin Europe: it is a choice between the Devil and Beelzebub. Our hope is that there will be an early internal collapse of Germany and that this devastating struggle will not continue till Europe sinks down in utter exhaustion and despair. What an end to this glorious mother continent of Western civilization--the proudest achievement of the human spirit to date. And into this war I have carried my country.[28]

The South African Parliament met in a new session on January 19, 1940. On January 23 Hertzog moved in the House of Assembly "that the time has arrived when the war with Germany should be ended and that peace be restored."[29] He said that war was no concern of South Africa's and that she had been dragged into it simply because Great Britain had declared war; that Germany was merely redressing the wrongs done to her in the Treaty of Versailles; that equality, not the domination of others was Germany's aim. Hertzog further stated that Hitler, after he had completed his campaign in Poland, had offered to discuss peace with the Western Powers. By refusing this offer those powers had put themselves in the wrong. By continuing the war they were committing a crime and South Africa should have nothing to do with it.[30]

Smuts rebutted those arguments and accusations and insisted that the Union could not make a separate peace without forfeiting its honor and sacrificing its vital interests. Hertzog's motion was put to the vote on January 27, 1940 and, defeated by 13 votes, 80 against 67 for. Now Smuts pushed for the War Measures Bill which would give the government statutory authority for action it would need to take so long as the state of emergency lasted. The Opposition fought the Bill at every stage and tried to kill it. The government replied by imposing the

procedure of guillotine, which in effect imposed a time-table of three days of debate on the bill. On February 13 the House of Assembly approved the War Measures Bill by 79 votes to 59. The Parliamentary session lasted until May 14. Later, in a speech at Capetown on April 8, 1940, Smuts defined the circumstances which rendered South Africa's participation in the war essential. "There is no isolation in the world today. It was a choice between two friendships. I am not an Englishman--I have not a drop of English blood in me--but I do believe that Great Britain is our greatest friend, and that Germany is a dangerous bedfellow."[31]

On May 10 Hitler launched his attack against The Netherlands and Belgium. This had the effect of solidifying Smuts's position in South Africa. He wrote on May 12 that:

> Here in South Africa the invasion of Holland and Belgium has had a stunning effect. The neutrality of Holland and Belgium has been repeatedly thrown at me by our Nats [Nationalist opposition] to show how a small country should protect its own interests in this storm. They never would believe that Holland would go the way of the rest. . . . Politically it will help me, for rightminded people will be more and more filled with disgust and repudiate Nazism with all it implies . . . people who have been violently against me are beginning to ask whether I was not after all right on September 4.[32]

When Smuts heard of Italian entry into the war on June 10, he answered Mussolini's challenge by two actions: a declaration of war against Italy and the assumption of supreme command over the South African armed forces. On May 13, three days after he assumed the Prime Ministership, Winston Churchill telegrammed Smuts:

> To you, my friend of so many years, and faithful comrade of the last war, I send my heartfelt greetings. It is a comfort to me to feel that we shall be together in this hard and long trek; for I know you and the government and peoples of the Union will not weary under the heat of the day and that we shall make a strong laager for all beside the waters at the end.[33]

As Commander-in-Chief (as well as Prime Minister, Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Defense) Smuts was able in the years ahead to reply with an immediate yes or no on all proposals submitted by Churchill and local commanders for the deployment of South African forces in the field.[34] The Selections from the Smuts Papers indicate that Churchill and Roosevelt carried on an extensive correspondence with Smuts throughout the war and discussed long range strategy of both a political and military nature.

The government's declaration of war against Italy enraged the Nationalists and injected new passion into their campaign against the war. Smuts had expected them to be dismayed by so dramatic a vindication of his argument of the past September that no small nation would be safe so long as Hitler was in power. The majority of Smuts's opponents were demanding immediate action to end the war, proclamation of a republic and secession from the commonwealth. They believed that Hitler would be victorious within a few months. Daniel François Malan, Nationalist leader, stated in a speech to his constituents that the choice confronting South Africa was "a Republic or Hitler."[35] At this time Smuts was preparing for a short parliamentary session to begin on August 24. He secured a resolution to continue the war, additional powers under the Amended War Measures Act to maintain internal order, and an additional 40 million South African pounds to spend on the war effort.

From the beginning of hostilities Smuts took an active interest in the military situation in France. William C. Bullitt, U. S. Ambassador to France, cabled President Roosevelt:

> I informed Reynaud that today General Smuts had sent to the British Government an urgent telegram stating that he considered that it was the duty of the British Government to the British Empire to put into the present battle every plane and every man that might be available. I have the text of this telegram which is worded superbly and states that it is the duty of the British Government not only to the people of Great Britain but also to all the peoples of the Empire to put into the present battle every resource of the Empire without selfishness.[36]

In a radio broadcast to the United States and Great Britain on July 21, 1940 Smuts gave an interesting insight into his opinion of the French collapse.

> . . . The overrunning of the small neutral countries I have mentioned is in the nature of such a minor military incident. Of course, the downfall of France is no minor incident; it is indeed one of the most serious catastrophes of modern times. But it may be fairly completely accounted for by the incredible mistakes of the French high command, the deep internal fissures of French politics and the hopeless weakness of its political leadership at the most critical moment. France was divided, sick soul before the end came and her case deserves our deepest sympathy.[37]

Meanwhile, the balance of power had been altered in North Africa. From the Commonwealth's point of view the situation could not possibly have been worse than it was in June. The scattered forces in Kenya, in the Sudan, in Egypt, and in Palestine fell far short of 100,000 men.[38] Almost immediately, those forces found themselves bereft of French support and under immediate threat from two large Italian armies in Libya and Abyssinia. Smuts thought it certain that Hitler would send German forces to fight alongside the Italians. In communications with Churchill on June 30, 1940 Smuts stated the probability of eventually having to yield Egypt.[39] It was all the more urgent, Smuts stated, to build up bastions of defense further south and to protect the supply lines to the Middle East and India. The Cape route must be safeguarded at all costs; the Empire had been founded on it and the commonwealth could not

survive without it. In his reply Churchill made clear his determination to keep the fleet in the eastern Mediterranean and to fight for Egypt.[40]

On points dealing with Mediterranean strategy Churchill increasingly turned to Smuts for advice and comment. In a letter to Smuts on October 16, 1940, Leopold S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, stated "Meanwhile the importance of your point (about increasing forces and air power in the eastern Mediterranean) is being increasingly appreciated by Winston and the cabinet as a whole. Such air force as we have in the Middle East is being modernized and expanded, and considerable reinforcements of ground troops are going out shortly."[41]

In a letter to Margaret C. Gillett in June, 1940, Smuts revealed his true feelings on the role of South Africa in a post-war world free of Hitler. Smuts stated:

> Now that the war in France is over and Hitler's army is without occupation they will very likely join the Italians in this joy ride through Africa. This menace I have to deal with at the same time that I am plotted against and attacked within the gates. South Africans are curious people. If we were wise and could sink differences we could now secure such a measure of defense cooperation among all our neighbours, including the Belgian Congo, that after this war we could be a great United States of Africa right up to the equator. This prospect of future expansion and security is before us, but instead of firmly grasping it we have to submit to what passes for politics in this country, but elsewhere is looked upon as national sabotage and betrayal.[42]

Perhaps Smuts viewed a South African dominated United States of Africa as a necessary partner with a free united post-war Europe.

On July 9 Admiral Cunningham won the first of his naval victories over the Italians in the Red Sea. In November Cunningham secured a notable victory over the Italian fleet in Taranto by putting out of commission a major part of that force as it lay at anchor, and decisively swinging

naval supremacy in the Mediterranean in Britain's favor.[43] At the end of July 1940 the first Hurricane fighters arrived in Malta. Also, at the end of August a British armoured division embarked for Egypt by way of South Africa. Throughout these same months air and ground reinforcements from Britain were reaching Gibraltar and Malta and large forces from Britain, India, Australia, and New Zealand were arriving in Egypt. Kenya was the staging post of the South African forces. Churchill would have preferred them to go directly to Egypt but Smuts refused.[44] As Commander-in-Chief of South African armed forces, Smuts was already under political attack for stretching too far his promise to defend the Union of South Africa and he would have been hard pressed to defend himself if he had moved South African troops to the northern side of the undefeated Italian army in Abyssinia. Also, Smuts believed that an attack from the south would prove the most effective means of overthrowing Mussolini's East African Empire. General Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, Middle-East from 1939-1941 and later Viceroy of India, agreed with him and subsequent events in East Africa proved Smuts correct.[45] On December 6 Wavell's forces began an offensive against the Italians in Libya. By December 12 they were in possession of the coastal region around Sidi Barrani and had taken a large number of prisoners.[46]

On October 26 Smuts flew north to Kenya to review South African troops with Anthony Eden and General A. P. Wavell. From Kenya Smuts proceeded with Eden and Wavell to Khartoum to discuss plans for the military campaign in northern Africa to defeat the Italians. Smuts concurred with the plan of attack which was agreed upon in Khartoum:

Operation Compass to expel the Italians from Egypt; Operation Canvas to overwhelm them in Abyssinia.[47]

Prime Minister Churchill asked Smuts on June 24, 1940 by telegram to deliver a radio address to Europe and America in order to bolster allied morale and to rally support against Hitler. On the evening of July 21 Smuts broadcast his speech. In it he envisioned eventual triumph over Nazism and expressed his belief that freedom remains the remedy for the ills which human society suffers. Also, he described his optimistic vision of Europe after the holocast.

> As against this spectre of Nazi-dominated Europe we oppose the vision of a truly free Europe. Freedom still remains our sovereign remedy for the ills from which human society is suffering. We envisage free Europe, free for individual and for nation, free in the sense of giving full scope for personal and national self development and self-perfection, each according to his own individual lines. . . . We have also learned that discipline and organization must go hand-in-hand with freedom. The failure of the League of Nations was largely due to the absence of a central control which could harmonize the freedom of each with the proper functioning of the whole of human society. We therefore aim at a society of nations which will supply this defect and which will possess a central organization equipped with the necessary authority and powers to supervise the common concerns of mankind. Intercourse between nations will be free and commerce, economics, and finance will be freed of all hampering restrictions and obstructions. As between man and man there shall be the rule of law, the absence of force and violence, and the maintenance of peace. In such an international society there will be no place for self-appointed leaders and Fuhrers. He who will be master shall be servant.[48]

Again, on December 31, Smuts broadcast a radio message to Great Britain. He began by quoting the saying that the Gods lavish on those they love infinite joy and infinite sorrow. That had been the British lot during the past year and would be their lot again in the year now beginning. But the year would also bring trouble for Hitler. People no longer looked upon him as the victor, and, although he still held

the initiative he would run into great dangers, however he used it. If he made a second invasion attempt against Britain he would find Britain in a much stronger position. If he carried the war into the Balkans and the Middle East he would be overstretching his lines of supply through hostile countries and would be unable any more to ignore Russia. Concerning America, Smuts stated, "I feel convinced that in the last resort America will not, as indeed she cannot afford to, stand out." He did not forecast in detail what he thought would happen in the coming year; however, he felt sure of one thing: 1941 would prove to be a "Year of Destiny."[49]

Smuts's attitude towards America was positive and confident. He believed that a moral solidarity existed between America and the British Commonwealth because they shared the same freedoms and represented the same values. In a letter to Sarah G. Millin on September 22, 1941, he stressed the importance of America in stopping the tide of Nazism.

> I see various English papers and people are not satisfied. They want England to do still more. They want the continent invaded. Are they mad? At this moment, with our limited resources, the continent invaded! A different Dunkirk it might be this time. We have to wait for America, and that's all there is to it. I wonder if the Americans think that, now Russia is in the war, we can manage without them. They make a big mistake if they do. How would they like, afterwards, to manage without us?[50]

Nine months earlier, on December 30, 1940 Smuts wrote to Margaret C. Gillett that "the moral effect of the United States becoming an ally would be enormous and put heart into all the forces of our side. Everybody will then know and feel confident that we cannot lose the war."[51] Smuts believed that solidarity of interest existed between them and

that for her own safety America could not stand aside when the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were attempting to destroy the commonwealth. In the Presidential election of November 1940 he preferred Roosevelt as a more forthright friend of the commonwealth than Wendell Wilkie.[52]

On March 6, 1941 commonwealth forces which included South African units entered Addis Ababa. Smuts now focused his attention toward Hitler's "deadly counterstroke."[53] He believed it might come any day, either in the Balkans or in North Africa, or both. General Wavell had begun an offensive against the Italians in Libya on December 6, 1940. Smuts believed that he had better not extend his forces too far in the western desert. Tobruk was far enough.[54]

On March 7, 1941 Smuts traveled to Cairo to meet with Anthony Eden and General Sir J. G. Dill, Deputy C.I.G.S.[55] The issue to be decided was whether or not the commonwealth forces which consisted of Australian and New Zealand troops would cross the Mediterranean to assist the embattled Greeks.[56] Smuts favored taking the risk. As part of his plan to control the whole Balkan region Hitler, having already reduced Hungary and Rumania to satellite states, sent German forces into Bulgaria on February 28, 1941.

On April 6, 1941 Hitler opened his massive Balkan campaign. British forces were defending Greece and Yugoslavia. On April 13 the Germans occupied Belgrade and Athens fell by the end of the month. The British Royal Navy rescued from Greece 50,000 of the 62,000 men whom it had recently landed there. It was a shattering demonstration of the new restrictions imposed upon naval power by air and land forces operating from a continental base.[57]

On May 24, 1941, acting upon the recommendation of Churchill, King George VI appointed Smuts Field Marshal in the British Army.[58] On September 30, at the investiture the Governor-General of South Africa, Sir Patrick Duncan, bestowed on Smuts, on behalf of the King, the rank of Field Marshal. King George's letter read:

> I was hoping to present your Field Marshal's baton to you personally in England, but I well understand the reasons why you do not want to be away from South Africa so long at the present time.
>
> I am therefore asking the Governor-General as my personal representative to hand it to you on my behalf. I would like you to know how proud my field-marshals are to count you among their number.[59]

Hitler's attack upon Russia on June 22, 1941 took Smuts by surprise.[60] Smuts was concerned, as Churchill was, that the commonwealth forces in North Africa and the Middle East appeared unable to use the breathing space afforded by Hitler's invasion of Russia to mount an offensive.

Meanwhile, on August 3 Smuts received an invitation from Churchill to meet at Cairo for discussions on war strategy.[61] Churchill reached Cairo on August 4 and writing to Clement Atlee on the 5th he said: "I am discussing the whole situation with Smuts who is a fount of wisdom."[62] The following is Smuts's account of the meeting:

> I had an unexpected summons from Churchill on a Friday to meet him in Cairo on the Monday following, and on Monday morning I was there in due course. We had a great time together, dealing with the military situation in the Middle East, discussing the war situation over the whole world, and finally winding up with war and post-war politics. Most of the matters under consideration cannot be written about, but the changes we made in the military command in the Middle East you will know long before you receive this. We stayed at the embassy in adjoining rooms and spent most of the time together night and day. . . . He pressed me to accompany him to Moscow whither he was also bound; but I had had enough of it and besides Moscow had no particular call on my presence.[63]

As a result of the Cairo meeting the following changes in military command occurred. General Sir Harold Alexander became Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East in succession to General Auchinleck, and General Sir Bernard Montgomery, succeeding General Ritchie, became Commander of the Eighth Army. An independent command for Iraq and Persia was created and offered to Auchinleck who declined it. Later, General Sir H. Maitland Wilson accepted it.

In his Memoirs, Field Marshal Montgomery indicated Smuts's continuing influence on Churchill which lasted throughout the war. Montgomery stated that

> Field Marshal Smuts was in Cairo at the time [August 1942] and the matter (the new commander of the British 8th Army) was discussed with him later that day. The Prime Minister and Smuts both favored Gort, who had made a great name for himself in the desert and who was strongly backed by general opinion in the Middle East.[64]

From this Cairo meeting two issues of importance for the continuation of the war were agreed upon. First, was a clearcut definition of two areas of command; secondly, was the inauguration of the combination of Generals Alexander and Montgomery. According to later testimony from Churchill and Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1941-1946, Smuts looked fordward to victory in North Africa as a decisive turning point for the Allies to clear the Mediterranean basin and to build the springboard for a fighting front in southern Europe.[65]

For Smuts the fate of North Africa was crucial to the survival of Great Britain. On May 26, 1942 the Germans had attacked the Allied defensive position in Cyrenaica from Gazala to Bir Hacheim. Both sides suffered considerable losses in the battle. On June 21 Tobruk fell to the Germans who took 33,000 prisoners, among them most of the Second

African Division of 13,000 men. The Allied retreat in Egypt stopped on July 1 when a defensible position between the Qattara depression and the sea at El Alamein was reached. The first three German attempts to break through there were repulsed by the First South African Division.

Smuts wrote from Pretoria on July 21, 1942:

> For, let there be no mistake, the loss of Egypt may, probably will, lose us the war. That has been my outlook from the beginning and has largely determined my decision to defend the Union in Middle East. If the Axis get Egypt they pass into the Red Sea, they will recover Eritrea and possibly Abyssinia, and once more threaten east and south Africa. They will pass on to Iraq and establish contact by land and perhaps by sea with India. They will join hands with Japan and, whatever happens to Britain, the British Empire will be looked upon as lost. There will be political change in South Africa, which will cease to be a line of Empire communication. The end will have come, I fear. The Mediterranean route may become so precarious as to be useless to us. That need not be fatal. But retreat from Egypt will, I fear, bring us perilously near the edge.[66]

During the course of the war Smuts remained in close contact with Allied leaders with his visits to north Africa and London. He did not go to the United States, though Roosevelt, on two separate occasions requested him to visit.[67]

On May 7, 1942 the President wrote to Smuts.

> Very often I rise in protest against geography, because even with modern transportation it is almost impossible for me to see and chat with my old friends who live at a great distance. There are so many things that you and I should talk over--maters relating to the old days when we met in London in 1918 and the equally important threats of the present--that some day and in some way we must meet again.[68]

On May 19, 1942 Smuts dispatched a letter by personal messenger to President Roosevelt. "To me," he said, "The all-important consideration is our timetable. It is 1942 that matters most. No doubt we can develop and deploy huge resources in 1943 and 1944, but we must first

pull through 1942."[69] Smuts further stated that if Hitler won successes in his summer offensive against the Russians--victory in Africa would give the Allies a firm base from which to counter the German thrust that could then be expected towards the oilfields in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. And if things went well in Russia it would give them the chance of striking from across the Mediterranean against the "weaker members and hangers-on of the Axis" in preparation for the assault against the Germans to be launched from the British Isles in 1943.

While in Cairo in August 1942 Churchill repeatedly pressed Smuts to make a visit to London.[70] Though with reluctance, Smuts did visit London on October 14 and remained until November 19. In a letter to Margaret Gillett Smuts explained his reasons for his reluctance to visit London. He stated that

> I fear the physical strain and exhaustion of a visit which is certain to be strenuous for me and make great demands on such small resources as I still command. I am not what I was twenty-five years ago, and even then I felt my strength taxed to the utmost limit in London. And again, what time will there be to see my friends in all this pressure? Taking it all in all, I remain doubtful about this visit which scarcely accords with my own feelings and intuitions. Still there it is: team-work is essential in this struggle, and I don't wish to appear to hold aloof. Churchill was most insistent and kept repeatedly returning to the subject.[71]

While in London Smuts attended meetings of the war cabinet and on October 21 addressed members of both houses of Parliament in the Royal Gallery.[72] He declared that the defensive phase of the war was over and that the stage was set for the offensive phase.

> For the first three years of the war our role was necessarily a defensive one. That role was imposed on us by the intensive secret preparations of the enemy for six years before the war,

> by the false sense of security he had sedulously fostered among us, and by the mood of appeasement which had in that way come about. That advantage of the enemy no immature offensive on our part could possibly have overcome. We could barely maintain our self defense against the most terrible odds . . .
>
> I only wish to emphasize that one phase is ended and another phase has begun . . . Certain points of great importance have already emerged. Thus we have accepted the name of the United Nations. This is a new conception, much in advance of the old concept of a league of nations. We do not want to be a league, but something more definite and organic, even if, to begin with, more limited and less ambitious than the League. The United Nations is, of course, a truthful conception, and on the basis of that conception much of the machinery for the functioning of an international order might well be restored.[73]

As a result of his frequent visits to Britain over the years, Smuts had established many close and personal friendships. In the inner circle around Churchill he had been consulted throughout the crises of the war. Smuts also established close friendships with Sir Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander and Chief of Allied air operations in Western Europe 1943-1945, and Lord Ismay, Chief of Staff to Churchill. Sir Alanbrooke, following his trip with Churchill to Moscow in August 1942, recorded his impressions of Smuts and Stalin, two contrasting, but equally interested personalities.

> It has been very interesting meeting men like Smuts and Stalin. Such a contrast! Smuts I look upon as one of the biggest of nature's gentlemen that I have ever seen. A wonderful clear grasp of all things, coupled with the most exceptional charm. Interested in all matters, and gifted with the most marvellous judgement [sic]. Stalin, on the other hand, a crafty,brilliant, realistic mind, devoid of any sense of human pity or kindness. Gives one almost an uncanny feeling to be in his presence. But undoubtedly a big and shrewd brain with clear-cut views as to what he wants and expects to get.[74]

Churchill's secretary, Sir John Colville, related Churchill's special feeling toward Smuts.

> . . . When in England Smuts was treated with an intimacy reserved for Churchill's closest circle of friends and advisers, and when in South Africa he was frequently consulted on important matters of policy and strategy.
>
> There were many reasons for this. Churchill took price in the part he himself had played in establishing a just and generous peace after the Boer War: romance and chivalry, dominant in his emotions, found in Smuts the perfect image of a gallant foe who had become a loyal and devoted subject of the British Crown. Like Botha and Deneys Reitz, he was a living proof that magnanimity in victory leads to goodwill in peace. Then, Smuts had been a member of the Imperial War Cabinet in the First World War and was a link with stirring memories of an earlier Great Coalition. Churchill respected his judgement [sic], acknowledged his wisdom and was invariably impressed by the clarity with which he presented his views and his arguments. Finally, even if the two men were unlike in character and philosophy, the General's company was congenial to Churchill and his conversation stimulating. There was on most questions, a true meeting of minds and a common faith in the virtues and destiny of the British Empire.
>
> Nobody was more successful than Smuts in moderating Churchill's more impetuous schemes and in offering a constructive criticism of genuinely statesmanlike proposals. . . . No doubt the transition from Empire to Commonwealth, which Churchill regarded with dislike and dismay, was a development which his fellow imperialist was prepared to accept with a greater degree of resignation. However that may be, until Smuts's dying day Churchill, in and out of office, turned again and again for advice, comfort and encouragement to the enemy General whom he had persuaded the King to create a Field-Marshal in the British Army.[75]

On August 15, 1943, President Roosevelt wrote again to Smuts asking him to visit the United States. Roosevelt wrote:

> Mr. Churchill has been here at Hyde Park for two or three days and he tells me he hopes you will soon be able to come to London. I need not tell you that I hope if you do this you will surely come to visit us in Washington.
>
> You will have a wonderful reception here and it is my thought that you might appear before the Congress for a short speech, and speak either in New York or Chicago to a large audience. I do not think, however, that it would be at all necessary for you to make an extensive tour of the country. I want especially to have a good chance to see you personally.[76]

On October 5, 1943 Smuts made his second wartime visit to London where on November 25 he addressed a large meeting of the Lords and Commons under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association.[77] This speech

was published and issued by the Empire Parliamentary Association. His son Jannie, who was on his staff, noted that he had never known his father in better form.[78] In this speech he stated that world peace was his objective and he enumerated principles to restore and to maintain it. The League of Nations had failed, he said, because the men who made it--he included himself--had shut their eyes to the reality of power. As a result, they had left the league leaderless. Leadership and power had to go together. From this principle he deduced the need for a new world organization with effective peace-keeping authority vested primarily in the Great Powers.

> Great Britain, the United States, and Russia now form the trinity at the head of the United Nations fighting the cause of humanity. And as it is in war, so will it have to be in peace. We shall have to see to it that in the new international organization the leadership remains in the hands of this great trinity of powers.[79]

The rest of his address was basically an attempt to justify the inclusion of Great Britain in the trinity. Smuts did not see in Chiang Kai-shek's China the greatness which he believed the Chinese people would some day assume. In regard to France Smuts felt that "France has gone, and if ever she returns it will be a hard and a long upward pull for her to emerge again."[80] On the new map of power there would be a blank where the three Great Powers of continental Europe--France, Germany and Italy--had formerly ruled. Across this blank would fall the shadow of Russia. Also, America was casting a long shadow across the Atlantic. Smuts hoped and believed that the Americans would remove themselves at long last from their isolationist traditions to exercise a stabilizing influence on Europe. All the same he felt misgivings both for the freedom of Europe and peace of the world should these blessings be left dependent upon a

state of equilibrium between the two mammoth powers. Smuts felt a need for a third mediating power. The reasoning Smuts gave for his nomination of Great Britain for this role was that she was the center of a commonwealth which could deal with Russia and America upon terms of equality.

He concluded the address with speculation upon means which might be available to build up the strength of the commonwealth. He envisaged applications for admission to it coming from the small democratic states of western Europe. The Smuts' idea was to offer France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark something in the nature of dominion status in the commonwealth. It would involve such steps as the creation of a common foreign policy; coordination of military strategy; combined boards of finance, transport, production, supplies, resources, and raw materials; a customs union; currency agreements; and a joint approach to civil aviation and colonial problems.[81] He foresaw a grouping of the overseas dependencies into units large and strong enough to manage their own affairs without control from London but also close association with neighboring dominions. He believed that was the way to iron out the distinction between commonwealth and empire and thereby develop to the full the commonwealth's potential strength.

Reaction to Smuts's speech was generally very favorable. Sir T. Drummond Shiels, Secretary of the Empire Commonwealth Association, wrote to Smuts on December 15 that "The Times has been enthusiastic in the matter, [publication of the speech] and, no doubt, you have seen the leading article supporting the publication. The press as a whole responded splendidly, and the general public have been intensely gratified at the opportunity of reading what you said."[82]

En route to South Africa on December 5, 1943, Smuts stopped at Cairo to meet with Churchill and Roosevelt, who were returning from a meeting with Stalin at Teheran. Smuts recorded his impressions of the visit in a letter to Margaret Gillett.

> At Cairo I had much to do during the three days of my stay. I attended the final conferences where the resolutions for our future work were taken, dined alone with Roosevelt and discussed the future, saw much of Churchill with whom most of my time was spent, though I found time for many others--diplomats and army representatives.[83]

The year 1943 marks a watershed in Smuts's attitude toward eventual world peace and postwar problems. After 1943 Smuts became less general and instead became more specific in dealing with issues of war and peace. By the early months of 1943 Washington had become the center of British and American decision-making. Churchill still spoke with authority to the Americans and to the Russians, and he continued to take counsel with Smuts.[84]

As a member of the War Cabinet of 1917 and 1918, Smuts had consistently argued that political decision should come first and military planning second. He had told his colleagues to clear their heads about their political ends and then decide their military means.[85]

Smuts's address in London on November 25, 1943 preached this same gospel. His speeches on the military situation from this period on reflected at least two definite goals. First, the Britain and Americans must go all out for victory in Europe by 1944; secondly, their road to victory must run not merely west to east but also from south to north. He gave two reasons for insisting upon victory in 1944. First, his horror at the damage the war was doing to the fabric of civilization; secondly,

alarm at the growing might of Soviet power. Smuts, however, was not anti-communist; he regarded power in itself as an evil.

Where the war ended was just as important to Smuts as when it ended. He wanted the British and American forces to be in positions which would give them an equal voice when confronting the Russians in the territorial and political settlement of Europe and the world. Smuts wanted to see the British-American strength firmly established in central and south-eastern Europe, a policy which coincided with Churchill's strategy.

> When I look at the sort of problems that we shall have to deal with at the end of this war, the problems of the new Europe and the new world, I doubt whether any peace conference will be able to settle those questions in a reasonable time unless it proceeds by a process of oversimplification and falsification. I am myself doubtful whether we shall ever come to a peace conference at all at the end of this war. It may be that we may be faced with questions so vast, so complicated, so difficult and intractable, that in the end we shall have to be satisfied with making a pretty comprehensive armistice dealing with the general military question of ending the war, and leave the rest of the problems to a long series of conferences, to a long process of working out solutions without coming to any general peace conference at all.
>
> That is one sort of situation that I consider probable--that we may never come to a peace conference at all, and that we may have to be satisfied with a comprehensive armistice which will open the door to a long series of investigations and researches, which may take a long number of years before finality is reached.[86]

Smuts persistently argued for an invasion of Nazi-held Europe by way of the Mediterranean.[87] On May 3, 1944 Smuts opened the Conference of Empire Prime Ministers with a long statement expressing doubts as to the advisability of departing from the Mediterranean strategy for a cross-Channel operation.[88]

Smuts was not satisfied with the various British-American war conferences. The Casablanca Conference, which was held from January 14 to

January 26, 1943, raised his hopes with the agreement to the invasion of Sicily; but the subsequent Trident Conference of June 1943 failed to reach any clear-cut decision for the invasion of Italy. With the toppling of Mussolini's government in mid-July, Smuts believed that the Allies lost a golden opportunity to crack the soft underlining of the Axis wide open by not following up Marshal Badoglio's secret negotiations for an armistice.[89] On August 31, 1943 Smuts wrote to Prime Minister Churchill: "While our Middle East campaign was conducted with conspicious vigour from El Alamein to the end in Tunisia, I sense a slackening and tardiness in operations since then. It took us several months between Tunisia and the Sicilian landing, and there is now another strange pause after Sicily at a stage in our affairs when the urgency is very great."[90]

Smuts had further reason to be pessimistic of Allied military plans. Another British-American conference, the Quadrant Conference at Quebec in August, had just given absolute priority in allocation of resources to Overlord, the cross-Channel invasion planned for 1944, at the expense of operations already under way in the Mediterranean.[91]

On September 3, 1943 he wrote Churchill that

> I feel convinced that we can and should do much more and better than the Quebec plan, which would unduly drag and prolong the war, with all the attendant risks and possibilities I have indicated in my former message [of August 31, 1943]. The bombing policy, the anti-U-boat campaign, and the large-scale attack across the Channel I approve. But in the Mediterranean we should take Sardinia and Corsica and immediately attack in North Italy without fighting our way up the peninsula . . . We should move on to the Adriatic, and from a suitable point there launch a real attack on the Balkans and set its resurgent forces going. This will bring Turkey into the picture and carry our fleet into the Black Sea, where we shall join hands with Russia, supply her, and enable her to attack Hitler's fortress itself from the East and South-east.[92]

When news reached him of the Italian armistice he sent Churchill a telgram which advocated the immediate seizure of the Dodecanese islands,

occupied by Italy since 1912, and, the invasion of the Balkans with a force of two to four divisions to prevent the Germans from disarming the 25 Italian divisions there.[93] He also advocated stiffening the Greek forces, building up a front against the Germans on the Danube and Sava in northern Yugoslavia and inducing the Hungarians to join the allied side. He further stated, "I suggest that our victories in the Mediterranean should be followed up in Italy and the Balkans instead of now adopting a cross-channel plan, which means switching on to a new theatre requiring very large forces and involving grave risks unless more air softening has been done."[94] Churchill reminded Smuts that his plan meant a complete reversal of the priorities agreed upon at the Quadrant Conference.

On September 11 the Germans seized Rome and the next day they liberated Mussolini. The Germans rushed reinforcements to Italy until they had 25 divisions on the Cassino front to keep the Allies out of Rome. At the same time the Germans built up their strength in the Balkans and kept a firm hold on Greece. By early October 1943, when Smuts arrived in London, the southern borders of the Axis had been strenthened and their position remained secure.

While in London Smuts discussed with Churchill the military importance of Italy and the Balkans in allied planning.[95] U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, John Winant, recorded his impression of Smuts's argument for a Mediterranean strategy in a telegram to President Roosevelt. "Last weekend Smuts and I were with the Prime Minister at Chequers. The withdrawing of landing craft from the Italian zone of action, the possibility of destruction by the rocket guns, the Greek islands, and the

timing of the second front all troubled him. I think you will find that the staff meetings will develop differences of immediate and future planning that need to be settled."[96]

Smuts stated to Churchill that in the south of Europe the allies had clear run to victory if only they would see it; it was folly to throw away that certainty for the sake of an operation which could not possibly be mounted for another six months or more, even if there were no further postponements.[97] It is possible that his importunity wore the allied military strategists down. Whatever the reason, on October 23 Churchill proposed to Roosevelt another conference to review British-American strategy in the light of the recent changes in the situation. In preparation for that joint review, the British Chiefs of Staff prepared a paper which included several items of the Smuts programme--an advance in Italy to the Piso-Rimini line; aid to the partisans in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania on a regular military basis; a bridge-head across the Adriatic; a triple bid to bring Turkey into the war, opening of the Dardanelles, creation of chaos and disruption for the enemy in the Balkans. The Chiefs of Staff said that if this meant a postponement of Overlord it was a consequence to be accepted.[98]

At the Teheran Conference, November 28 through December 1, 1943, Stalin insisted upon May 1944 as the date for Overlord and also endorsed a proposal of American origin for the invasion of the south of France in support of Overlord. This operation, whose name was Anvil, had the object of providing an additional supply line, of broadening the western assault on Germany, and of satisfying French pride. However, it could

only be mounted by bleeding the Allied forces in Italy of their fighting men and landing craft and thus condemning them to a bitter, frustrating struggle from the south to the north of the Italian peninsula.

During his third war-time visit to Great Britain, at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on April 28, 1944 Smuts made one last bid for his southern strategy.[99] His idea was to scrap the planned invasion of the south of France and to substitute for it a drive along the line Trieste-Lubliana-Vienna. Thus, there would be three main forces converging on Berlin: General Eisenhower's armies from the west, the Russians from the east, the Russians, British, and Americans from the southeast.

While in London prior to the cross-channel invasion, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, wrote a memorandum to President Roosevelt requesting a campaign medal for Smuts. Smuts will meet Marshall for the first time on June 11, 1944.[100] Marshall's memorandum reads as follows:

> General Eisenhower has suggested to me that he be authorized to present the European-African-Middle Eastern campaign ribbon to Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa. The Field Marshal visited the North African theatre on two or three occasions last year and General Eisenhower feels he would be highly complimented and most appreciative of the gesture. Executive Order #9625 authorizes awards of these ribbons to members of Land and Naval Forces of the United States only. Under the circumstances,I believe it should be made clear that this presentation has your personal approval and request you authorize it to be made in your name.[101]

On May 25th President Roosevelt approved and initialed the memorandum and returned it to General Marshall.[102]

In his Memoirs, Field-Marshal Montgomery related Smuts's apprehension in May 1944 that the world might drift back to its pre-war pattern

of alliances and power centers. Smuts believed that the present war marked the beginning of a new world in which Britain stood prominent; but in this new world Britain must remain as the corner-stone of the new structure.

> Smuts is worried we may lose the peace. Britain, with American aid, won the 1914/18 war. But when it was over we tired, and we stood back, allowing France to take first place in Europe. The result was the present war. He then went on to say that we cannot allow Europe to disintegrate. Europe requires a structure--a framework on which to rebuild itself. A good structure must have a firm core. France has failed dismally.
>
> Britain must stand forward as the corner stone of the new structure. Nations that want security must range themselves on the side of Britain; there can be no more neutrals. It is a Britain that stood alone in 1940-41 and then, with American aid, stemmed the tide. Britain is a continental nation. Britain must remain strong and must keep up small, but highly efficient, forces which are capable of rapid expansion. The keynote of the armed force necessary in peace time must be air power; the army can be relatively small.[103]

On June 12, 1944 six days after the allie invasion of France, Smuts accompanied Churchill to Normandy, landing at Courseulles in the Canadian sector. Smuts recounted this visit to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations, 1942-43.

> Today we visited the British and American armies on the soil of France. We sailed through vast fleets of vessels with landing craft of many types pouring more and more men, vehicles and stores ashore. We saw artificial harbours in the process of rapid development. We have shared our secrets in common and helped each other all we could. We wish to tell you at this moment in your ardous campaign that we realize that much of the remarkable technique and therefore the success of the venture has its origin in the developments effected by you and your staff of Combined Operations.[104]

When Operation Overlord was launched on June 6, 1944 Smuts contended to Churchill that Operation Anvil would be too late to serve any useful military purpose.[105] On June 21 Smuts departed London for Pretoria. Enroute, he stopped in Italy, at Ciampino outside Rome, for discussions

with General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief Allied Armies in Italy and the Mediterranean theatre. Alexander agreed with Smuts that Operation Anvil should be cancelled.[106] President Roosevelt, however, concurred that the invasion of southern France should go ahead on schedule. For the sake of Operation Anvil, the British and American forces in Italy were decreased by 40 percent. The landings in southern France took place on August 15 and the Allied forces drove rapidly to Lyon and beyond without meeting much opposition. Smuts called their drive a futile joyride and Churchill concurred.[107]

At the second Quebec Conference in September 1944 the Americans consented to discuss the advantages of preparing alternate military plans. The conference gave the approval to General Alexander to advance to Vienna. With his depleted forces he could not even manage to breakthrough in Italy. The conferees also gave their approval for a small force to be landed in Greece after the Germans were expelled.

Throughout the autumn and early winter of 1944, Smuts carried on continuous correspondence on Greek affairs with the Greek royal family. After the German conquest of Greece and Crete in the spring of 1941, members of the Greek royal family fled to Egypt where they were unwelcome. They then asked for asylum in South Africa and Smuts invited them to reside as his guests at Libertas, a residence adjacent to his home at Doornkloof.[108] They arrived the first week of July 1941. The Greek King, George II, was accompanied by his brother, the Crown Prince Paul; the latter's wife, Princess Frederika; their two children, Constantine and Sophia; and Prince George, and his daughter Princess Radziwill. Smuts became the

godfather of Princess Frederika's third child, Irene, who was born in South Africa in May 1942.

In a letter to King George II of Greece on June 4, 1943 Smuts revealed his reasons for his continued interest in Greek affairs. The letter reads in part:

> I know from repeated talks with British statesmen how sincere is their support for your Majesty and how conscious they are of the value to Britain of her loyal support for your Majesty. They know that Greece must play an important part in Mediterranean policy after the war, and her friendship with Britain must be in no doubt. But their support for the Greek throne is not sufficient. Far better is it for the Greek people to stand unalterably behind their king. And it is just here that the prince and princess can be most helpful to you and render a great service to the good cause. I would therefore respectfully suggest that the fullest use be made of both of them for this important purpose, and that their active service in all social and relief measures be utilized to secure popularity for the Greek royal family. I suggest this because of the wise policy similarly pursued with regard to members of the English royal house.[109]

In the fall of 1944 Smuts wanted to see a synchronization between military occupation and restoration of the Greek monarchy. At the request of Churchill, at the Quebec Conference, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a communication from Smuts on Greece "who advocated, as a matter of fair play that the King of Greece [sic] not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject perhaps to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek regim."[110] Smuts supported the Crown Prince's proposal to enter Greece with the British forces, and when that was refused he resisted the proposal to make Archbishop Damaskinos Regent.[111]

Smuts saw happening before him the immense shift in the balance of world power that he had always feared. "The footsteps of the Russian giant," he stated, "are being printed on the sands of time."[112] To the

Russians would go the glory of victory and the power that victory would bring.

The state of Europe and of the world in early 1945 contained many of the features which he had predicted in his famous speech of November 25, 1943 to the Lords and Commons under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association. As he had predicted in that speech a power vacuum developed in Europe. He saw only one victor and that victor was the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the three great powers of Continental Europe the Soviet Union inherited much of the position and power. In his 1943 speech he had identified America as a second Great Power that had finally taken a lead in establishing and maintaining a just equilibrium of power in Europe and the world. In 1945, however, Smuts seemed to think that the Americans were shunning the role assigned to them.

In a letter to Thomas W. Lamont, Chairman of the board of the J. P. Morgan Company, Smuts reveals his pessimism toward the fate of post-war Europe.

> You ask about my ideas for the peace so far as Germany is concerned. Little that we could suggest would be of much value when the end comes. The Big Three, to whom France has now to be added, will parcel out Germany between themselves for occupation, and each will carry out his own policy in his own sphere of occupation. Large chunks will be torn off to satisfy those neighbors who have suffered under the Nazis. Germany itself as an entity will scarcely continue to exist. Only the German people will remain, concentrated into a smaller area to stew in their own joice. The Atlantic Charter will go the way of Wilson's Fourteen Points. And a generation hence people will once more be wondering at the peacemakers of 1945-46.[113]

In 1943 he had identified the British Commonwealth as a member of the Big Three, powerful enough to play a part in world affairs. By 1945, however, he seemed to believe that the commonwealth was falling

short of the capacities and achievements he had envisaged for it. No applications from the democratic states of western Europe for membership in the commonwealth had been coming in, or were likely to come in. On September 29, 1944, however, Anthony Eden informed the House of Commons that the Government had embarked on a policy of drawing the countries of western Europe into a closer association with the British Commonwealth of Nations, thereby giving official approval to the ideas enunciated by Smuts in his November 25, 1943 speech.[114]

Smuts saw Churchill's Parliamentary defeat on July 5, 1945 as evidence of the fragmentation and erosion of power at the very center of the Commonwealth. Relating to Britain's role in world affairs he stated that "with the rise of the two collosi in the war and the new world, British influence could be so beneficial in its human, experienced, wise outlook. The world wants this wise broker between the new great powers whose outlooks are so very different."[115] Privately, Smuts offered his consolations to Churchill on his electoral defeat.

> Privately I have quoted to Churchill the lines from Mommsen on Hannibal's end which I have often quoted before: 'On those whom the Gods love they lavish infinite joys and infinite sorrows.' What else could one say that is adequate to such a situation and such a fall after achieving the most colossal success in history? The mountain of Transfiguration alternates with the shame of the Cross: such is the curve of the great ones, the favourites of the Gods. Like life and death, human destiny is of the essence of the mystery of this world, and the good and the wise maintain their sense of mystery whatever comes to them. After all, religion is based on this sense of mystery, but of a mystery which is essentially beneficient in its longrange effects. In spite of this philosophizing one cannot forbear sympathizing deeply with Churchill. To be so decisively rejected in the very hour of victory by the people whom he saved by his courage and stupendous exertions is truly the unkindest cut of all.[116]

Smuts still retained some hope that Europe would rise again from the ruins of war. "The United States is too far off and ill-informed on European matters to apply a brake. And in the next ten years the process of decay may continue instead of being reversed, and the new Europe beginning slowly to emerge."[117]

From the start of the war Smuts was confident that the Allies would win the war which he looked upon as a crusade of the spirit in defense of Christian civilization. But as it progressed he became more concerned of the peace to follow. The rise of Soviet power in particular alarmed him. As the war neared an end he began to despair of a statesmanlike settlement. The part he took in setting up the new League of Nations at San Francisco was dutiful but lacked conviction. Though still looked upon as a figure of influence and prestige, Smuts understood that the decisions affecting the peace of the world had already been decided by the great powers.

He hoped that a third power center based in Europe would emerge, though he reluctantly gave up the idea that Great Britain would lead it. Other matters that engaged his thought and moved him to such action as he could take were the weakening commonwealth, the anomalous position of India within it, the prospects of the restored monarchy in Greece, and the development of the state of Israel. In 1948 he welcomed the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. He acclaimed them as the portent of a three-fold achievement: first the Atlantic Community; secondly, European Union; and thirdly, Commonwealth Europe.

NOTES

[1]See Selections, vol. VI, docs. 450, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 465.

[2]Liberal Member of Parliament, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1937-1940, Lord Chancellor, 1940-1945.

[3]Viscount Simon, Retrospect The Memoirs of the Rt. Honorable Viscount Simon (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1952), p. 252.

[4]Ibid., p. 248.

[5]J. C. Smuts to Lord Robert Cecil, December 6, 1938, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 450.

[6]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, April 6, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 458.

[7]"Peril of Small Nations," Times (London), 28 March 1938, p. 16.

[8]J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Florence Lamont, March 30, 1939, Lamont Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Mrs. Florence Lamont to J. C. Smuts, November 193, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 449.

[11]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, May 17, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 461.

[12]"Twenty Years After-World Peace and the League of Nations," Times (London), 11 November 1938, p. 11.

[13]The Thoughts of General Smuts, pp. 130-131.

[14]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, May 27, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 464.

[15]J. C. Smuts to S. G. Millin, August 26, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 472.

[16]J. C. Smuts to Lord Lothian, May 20, 1938, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 438.

[17]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, March 17, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 456.

[18]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, August 28, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 473.

[19]Cape Times, 3 November 1938, p. 3.

[20]House of Assembly Debates (South Africa), vol. XXXVI, pp. 35-55, September 5, 1939, 8th Parliament, 2nd Session.

[21]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, September 21, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 480.

[22]Ibid.

[23]House of Assembly Debates (South Africa), vol. XXXVII, cols. 1220-22; vol. XXXVIII, pp. 4063-4137.

[24]G.A.L. Green, An Editor Looks Back: South African and Other Memories, 1883-1946, (Cape Town: Juta, 1947), p. 207.

[25]House of Assembly Debates (South Africa), vol. XXXVI, pp. 56-87, September 5, 1939, Second Session, 8th Parliament.

[26]Times (London), 8 September 1939, p. 7.

[27]Smuts, the Deputy-Prime Minister in Hertzog's United Party Coalition, succeeded to the Prime Minister's post.

[28]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, September 21, 1939, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 480.

[29]House of Assembly Debates (South Africa), vol. XXXVII, pp. 38-45, 8th Parliament, 4th Session, January 22, 1940.

[30]Ibid.

[31]An Editor Looks Back, p. 224.

[32]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, May 12, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 495.

[33]W. S. Churchill to General Smuts, May 13, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 496.

[34]See Selections, vol. VI, doc. 529 on discussions with Anthony Eden and General Sir John Dill concerning East African military campaign (March 4, 1941); doc. 538 on letter from Smuts to General Archibald Wavell discussing the North African campaign and thanking Wavell for his letter of May 8 detailing the military situation in the Middle East (May 19, 1941); doc. 577 on letter from Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Tedder discussing the Churchill visit to Moscow and the return to Cairo on August 17.

[35]"Malan's Speech at Portersville," Cape Times, 14 June 1940, p. 2.

[36]Orville H. Bullitt, ed., For the President Personal and Secret, Correspondence between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), W. C. Bullitt to President Roosevelt, telegram, June 9, 1940, pp. 456-457.

[37]Speech, July 21, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 508.

[38]Winston S. Churchill, History of the Second World War, vol. II: Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949), pp. 200-201.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Leopold S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, October 16, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 515.

[42]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, June 24, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 505.

[43]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 414.

[44]History of the Second World War, II:376-378.

[45]W. S. Churchill, History of the Second World War, vol. III: Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950, p. 82 and L. S. Amery to J. C. Smuts, October 2, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 514.

[46]J. C. Smuts to A. P. Wavell, December 12, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 520.

[47]History of the Second World War, III:82.

[48]"General Smuts on Lesson of Dunkirk," Times (London), 22 July 1940, p. 5.

[49]Speech, December 31, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 523. and "What Hitler Faces," Times (London), 2 January 1941, p. 4.

[50]Sarah G. Millin, The Pit of the Abyss (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1946), pp. 19-21.

[51]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, December 30, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 522.

[52]J. C. Smuts to Florence Corliss Lamont, May 12, 1940, and October 22, 1940, Lamont Collections, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts and J. C. Smuts to Thomas W. Lamont, November 8, 1940, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 517.

[53]History of the Second World War, III:96.

[54]J. C. Smuts to A. P. Wavell, May 18, 1941, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 538.

[55]General Dill-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1940-1941, promoted Field Marshal, 1941, held special duties in Washington, India, and China.

[56]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, March 4, 1941, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 529.

[57]History of the Second World War, III:96.

[58]J. C. Smuts to King George VI, May 24, 1941, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 539.

[59]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 419.

[60]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, June 25, 1941, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 543.

[61]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, August 10, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 574.

[62]Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV, The Hinge of Fate, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), p. 415.

[63]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, August 10, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 574.

[64]Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal, The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958), p. 86.

[65]Sir Arthur Bryant, ed., The Turn of the Tide-Alanbrooke Diaries, (London: Colliers, 1957), pp. 438-440-441, 446-447, 449, 483.

[66]J. C. Smuts to F. H. Theron, July 21, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 573.

[67]Franklin D. Roosevelt to J. C. Smuts, May 7, 1942, and August 15, 1943, Roosevelt Collection, Hyde Park, New York.

[68]Ibid.

[69]J. C. Smuts to F. D. Roosevelt, May 19, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 576.

[70]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, August 10, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 574.

[71]Ibid.

[72]Jan Christian Smuts, pp. 423-426.

[73]Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, October 15, 1942, vol. 395, cols. 773-775.

[74]The Turn of the Tide, p. 483.

[75]John Wheeler Bennett, ed., Action this Day Working with Churchill, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 321.

[76]Franklin D. Roosevelt to J. C. Smuts, August 15, 1943, Roosevelt Collection.

[77]Nicholas Mansergh, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 1:46-58.

[78]Jan Christian Smuts, pp. 440-441.

[79]Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, 1:58.

[80]Ibid.

[81]Ibid.

[82]T. Drummond Shiels to J. C. Smuts, December 15, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 627.

[83]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, December 24, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 628.

[84]See letter from J. C. Smuts to J. H. Hofmeyr, June 8, 1944 in Selections, vol. VI, doc. 636, in which Smuts stated that he would have returned sooner to South Africa "but Churchill and other ministers appealed to me in such strong terms to stay longer that I did not feel it right to leave at such a moment."

[85]See Selections, vol. III, doc. 830, pp. 654-658.

[86]Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952, 1:568-569.

[87]Sir Arthur Bryant, ed., Triumph in the West, 1943-46 Based on the Diaries and Autobiographical Notes of the Field Marshal, the Viscount Alanbrooke, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 150.

[88]W. S. Churchill, History of the Second World War, vol. V: Closing the Ring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1954), p. 130.

[89]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, July 31, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 616.

[90]History of the Second World War, V:126.

[91]Ibid., p. 127.

[92]Ibid., p. 128.

[93]John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, (London: United Kingdom Official Histories, 1960), V:109-111.

[94]Ibid., pp. 554-556.

[95]J. C. Smuts to J. H. Hofmeyr, Secretary for External Affairs, October 12, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 620.

[96]United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Conferences of Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 152.

[97]History of the Second World War, V:220.

[98]Grand Strategy, V:109-111.

[99]The Turn of the Tide, p. 150.

[100]George C. Marshall to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 23, 1944, Roosevelt Collection.

[101]Ibid.

[102]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 150.

[103]Memoirs of Montgomery, pp. 212-213.

[104]J. C. Smuts to Lord Mountbatten, June 12, 1944, Msg. #3095, George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, Arlington, Virginia.

[105]Grand Strategy, V:349.

[106]Ibid., V:345-367.

[107]Ibid., V:367.

[108]J. C. Smuts to M. C. Gillett, April 12, 1942, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 565.

[109]J. C. Smuts to George II of Greece, June 4, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 610.

[110]United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conference at Washington and Quebec 1943, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), Department of State Minutes, August 22, 1943, p. 933.

[111]J. C. Smuts to G. Heaton Nicholls, South African High Commissioner in London, 1944-1947, December 20, 1944, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 650, and Louise Frederika, Consort of Paul I, King of the Hellenes, Measure of Understanding (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 60-65.

[112]Times (London), December 2, 1943, pp. 5, 8.

[113]J. C. Smuts to T. W. Lamont, January 4, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 657.

[114]Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 403, cols. 704-706.

[115]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, July 29, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 675.

[116]Ibid.

[117]Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

THE POST-WAR WORLD AND THE LAST YEARS

The end of the Second World War saw no lessening of Smuts's anxieties about the state of world affairs. He remained convinced that evil would remain, as it had throughout the ages, a persistent and intractable element of human society. In his letter to Margaret Gillett he sums up this attitude.

> There is so much that is divine in us, so near is man to God, that it only increases the pain and the horror of this tragedy beyond all comprehension. One can but bow one's head before this revelation of evil, of the evil in us and in our human arrangements. No devil could have conceived something worse than what is our human handiwork. And yet God so loved the world! That is the enigma, the mystery of both evil and good.[1]

Smuts realized also that human affairs in the twentieth century included scientific technology, totalitarian politics, and war economics. Confronted with the possibility and threat of total nuclear devastation, civilized man must attempt not merely the regulation but the prevention of war. Somehow man must create institutions capable of preventing future holocast.

In the early years of the Second World War Smuts had hoped for the reformation and restoration of the League of Nations. His plea went unheeded.[2] America had never joined the league and the Soviet Union after invasion of Finland, had been expelled on December 14, 1939. Both of these powers insisted on the need to create a new world organization and to give it a new name. The form and make-up of the

United Nations which he saw emerging were much the same as those contained in The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion. This was not very comforting to Smuts because the League had suffered disaster. If the United Nations were to escape the same disaster, the shortcomings of the old Covenant would need to be made good in the new charter. The difficult was, however, that there was disagreement as to what the shortcomings were.

In his speech of November 13, 1934 at Chatham House Smuts made himself the advocate of an international organization "with teeth."[3] He did not carry his advocacy of the coercive principle to its logical conclusion; i.e., an international organization with its own armed forces under its own executive. That would have signified a super-state, which he considered neither desirable nor, under existing circumstances, feasible. In that speech he made a proposal that the responsibility for keeping the world's peace be in the hands of the so-called trinity of Great Powers. Franklin Roosevelt had a similar idea. On September 15, 1944 at Quebec he added Nationalist China to Smuts's trinity and believed that these "four policemen" would be able to keep the world in peace.[4]

This conception of world order ran into difficulties. It appeared to contradict the principle of "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states" which had been promulgated in the Four Power Declaration at Cairo in October 1943. Smuts did not think the contradiction untenable. He had insisted on several occasions during the war that small nations could no longer find safety in isolation and, he believed that they would willingly accept the leadership of the Great Powers in the new system of world security.[5] Smuts was probably fairly satisfied with the compromise

finally arrived at, which did justice to egalitarian aspirations by giving the smaller powers representation on the Security Council, and by giving emphasis upon the prestige of the General Assembly where every nation would enjoy equal representation in every area except that of peace-keeping. In that sphere, the main responsibility was put upon the Security Council, and within the Security Council, upon the Great Powers.

From San Francisco, on May 8, 1945, he wrote in a pessimistic vein of the future, to Florence Corliss Lamont.[6]

> I am full of misgivings and even forebodings. The enemy has behaved so cruelly and sadistically and the trail of hatred and revenge he has left behind is such that one almost despairs of our side keeping within the limits of what is just and reasonable. . . . But this may be too much to hope for, and much needless suffering and setbacks may be in store before we reach the real Peace--the Peace of God as they said in the olden times.[7]

Smuts believed that new institutions by themselves were not a sufficient response to the challenge which confronted mankind. What was needed was a change in attitude in the minds and hearts of individuals. General Smuts and Mrs. Lamont corresponded frequently and discussed at length what stamp these new institutions would take. Smuts's requirements for human survival becomes clear from an examination of their correspondence beginning in 1935.[8] Smuts's requirements for human survival were high. Two things were needed: institutional reform and individual rebirth. He considered individual rebirth the fundamental requirement.

> The reconstruction of our world has not to come from some new machinery, some new social or international mechanism, but from a moral, a spiritual reconstruction from the depths of human nature itself. 'Thy Kingdom come,' love, toleration, pity, service, good will, peace--these are the laws of that kingdom.[9]

Reviewing the world around him Smuts saw numerous counterfeit religions--racism, nationalism, fascism, communism--all of which had

enough strength to power the engines of destruction. But where and how would power be generated to drive the engine of world peace? Smuts accepted the teachings of Christianity as a convincing refutation of all the counterfeit religions. However, he realized that Christianity was far removed from the thought and imagination of twentieth-century man. What Smuts longed for was to hear the Christian gospel proclaimed again in such a manner as to satisfy the reason and touch the heart of twentieth-century man.

> We may be living in a great period and at a great stage of history. And yet the most significant things are the simple human relations which will remain and continue when all else has passed into night. It is in ourselves and our simple human contacts that the mystery of life is enacted and the finest flowerings of the spirit take place. It is that in our modern civilization the externals have become too important and occupy such a foremost place in our lives that the interior life is dwarfed and driven clean under ground.[10]

According to Smuts the world could not wait for the thing it needed most, the religious miracle of individual men and women being born again. The first moves in the struggle for human survival would have to be made at the institutional end. This would be accomplished by the establishment of a World Security Organization. Such an organization, the United Nations, assembled at San Francisco from April 25 to June 26, 1945. On March 4, 1945 Smuts wrote to Margaret Gillett that only his sense of duty would take him to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco. He also mentioned the rumour circulated by the British delegation to the United Nations Conference that he was to be nominated as a candidate for President of the Conference.[11]

He wrote to Margaret Gillett:

> From London I shall move on to San Francisco. I do not know where the ridiculous rumour has originated that I shall be president of the conference. It is, of course, preposterous. Russia does not like me, France distrusts me, even in British circles there is divided opinion, and South Africa is too small fry for such exaltation. Indeed, it is only a sense of duty that takes me to San Francisco at all, at a time when I am badly wanted in South Africa. But I feel I should be there, in case I could be needed as one of those who remember 1919. Issues may be raised where I could speak with some effect because of my past experience. Churchill has wired me to express his pleasure that I can and will go there. But it may be that when the conference comes, the play will already have been fully written and only the theatrical performance will take place; and in that I shall take little interest, and that probably with a sad heart.[12]

Smuts surmised that when the conference met the decisions would have been already decided upon by the big powers and the affairs at the conference would serve only to reflect what had already been done by the victorious allies in the occupied capitals of the Axis. "Peace will depend not only on what we plan at San Francisco but also on what is done in Berlin, Vienna, Rome and the other occupied capitals where we are in charge of future dispositions and policies. The foundations are there, and if they are foundations of sand we shall plan the building in vain here."[13]

The San Francisco Conference drafted the charter of the United Nations and the Statute of International Court of Justice. Prime Minister MacKenzie King of Canada made a motion in the Steering Committee of the conference that Smuts be granted permission to speak at the Plenary Session. The motion was seconded by Anthony Eden and approved by voice vote.[14]

On May 5 Smuts was nominated President of the general assembly, one of the four commissions of the conference, which dealt with the Preamble and trusteeships.[15] In his speech at the opening of the

Conference on June 12, 1945 Smuts expressed optimism that the charter represented "a very real and substantial advance on all previous plans for security against war."[16]

> Our charter is not a perfect document. It is full of compromises over very difficult and tangled problems. But at least it is a good practical workmanlike plan for peace--a very real and substantial advance on all previous plans for security against war.
>
> It provides for a peace with teeth; for a unified front of peace-loving peoples against future aggressions; for a united front among the great powers backed by the forces of the smaller powers as well. It provides also for lesser combinations for prompt defense on a regional or local basis. And it provides for central organization and direction of the joint forces for peace.[17]

In this speech Smuts enumerated on the major contrast between the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations. At the close of the First World War, not as much preparatory work had been done that the way had been open for his own individual tour de force. In the brilliant state paper of December 1918, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, with little previous work to draw upon except the report of the Phillimore Committee, he had enumerated and expounded the essential objectives, organs, and procedures of the future League of Nations. Twenty-seven years later the situation was radically different. Two years, if not more, before the close of the Second World War preparatory work was begun by hundreds of experts and advisers on the "establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." In all this work, which was put into preliminary shape at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington in September, 1944, Smuts took no part.[18]

During the first U.N.O. conference, however, Smuts dealt forcefully with two important issues. These issues involved voting in the

Security Council and the wording of the Charter. Smuts posed the following questions regarding unanimity in the United Nations in a letter on June 7, 1945 to Edward R. Stettinius, Head of the United States delegation to U.N.O.[19] He asked, suppose the Great Powers could not agree in diagnosing a threat to peace and in prescribing the measures to deal with it? Should all action be held up until unanimity was reached? That raised the highly volatile issue of the veto, on which differences of opinion existed, at first between the British and Americans and, later on, between the British and Americans on one side and the Russians on the other. On this issue Smuts was not merely an observer. In his letter to Stettinius Smuts stated:

> I would not appeal to the representatives of the Big Five to give us an answer, one way or the other. If they cannot, then we would ask them to suggest some way out, some procedure to remove the block and save the conference from failure, from being abandoned at this late stage. . . . We cannot face the world with a complete failure. The consequences would be too disastrous.[20]

At the Yalta conference of February 1945 it had been agreed that decisions of the Security Council of the future World Organization on matters of precedure should require an affirmative vote of seven of the eleven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China. At San Francisco an attempt was made by some of the lesser powers to exclude the veto of the permanent members "from all arrangements relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes," or at least, from discussions of disputes by the Security Council as distinct from investigation of such disputes. A crisis developed on June 2 when the Soviet representative insisted that the permanent members must possess a veto over all

matters before the Security Council. On June 13 the Yalta formula was adopted and included in the Charter of the United Nations on June 26.[21]

On grounds of constitutional principle, Smuts considered the Soviet Union's claim totally unfounded. Earlier, in a long letter to Churchill on September 20, 1944 he advised acceptance on the grounds of political necessity. In his letter Smuts depicted the Soviet Union as a pariah in the past and was likely to behave as one in the future unless she received satisfaction. "Should a world organization be formed without Russia," he argued, "she will become the power centre of another group. We shall then be heading towards a third world war."[22]

In other words, he thought it necessary to pay a high price in terms of constitutional principle in order to entice Soviet Union into the United Nations. Whether he was right or wrong, his intervention produced a strong effect upon Churchill. On September 25, 1944 Churchill showed Smuts's letter to President Roosevelt.[23] The Smuts letter reads:

> At first I thought Russian attitude absurd and their contention one not to be conceded by other great Powers and inevitably to be turned down by smaller Powers also. But second thoughts have tended the other way. I assume that the Russian attitude is sincerely stated by Mr. Molotov and correctly interpreted by Moscow and Cadogan as one involving honor and standing of Russia amongst her Allies. She asks whether she is trusted and treated as an equal or is still an outlaw and Pariah. A misunderstanding here is more than a mere difference. It touches Russian <u>amour propre</u> and produces an inferiority complex and might poison European relations with far-reaching results. Russia conscious of her power may become more grasping than ever. Her making no attempt to find a solution shows her reaction and sense of power. . . . If unanimity for the Powers is adopted even including their voting on questions directly concerning their interests, the result would be that the United Kingdom and the United States be moderate and sensible and not to flout world opinion. . . . At the worst the principle of unanimity will only have the effect of a veto, of preventing action where it may be wise or even necessary. It will be negative and slow down action but it will also make it impossible for Russia to embark on activities disapproved of by the United Kingdom and the United States.[24]

No doubt this memorandum played some part in encouraging reappraisals and compromises of Yalta and, consequently, in bringing about U.N.O.[25]

Prior to the San Francisco Conference, Smuts made a second noteworthy intervention. On April 4, 1945 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers convened in London to discuss, among other issues, the proposals for the Charter which the experts had drafted at Dumbarton Oaks in August-September 1944 and the further proposals which the politicians had agreed upon at Yalta in February 1945. Smuts praised their work but still found something lacking in the draft charter. In a statement to the South African Delegation on April 24 he said that the charter was too legalistic in tone. It needed such words as to make the common man feel that the charter was not merely a piece of machinery but something truly great.[26]

At this Commonwealth Prime Minsters Conference Smuts drafted an eloquent declaration of humanity's hopes and faith.[27] The conference of Prime Ministers agreed that this would make a noble preamble to the charter. Perhaps the members of the conference felt the preamble was too noble and not quite consistent in style and contents with the rest of the charter. Whatever the reason, the prime ministers and their advisers combined Smuts's draft with the draft of Sir Charles Webster, though it continued to bear the name of Smuts.[28]

In deference to the diplomatic proprieties, the new draft began by identifying the High Contracting Parties subscribing to the charter.[29] At San Francisco, American idealists such as Dean Virginia Gildersleeve,[30] complained that the Smuts draft, as it was called, lacked in emphasis on humanity.[31] The aspirations of humanity, she insisted in her book, deserved

better treatment.[32] She proposed the opening words--"We the peoples of the United Nations . . ." Her proposal was adopted, but the closing sentences of the Preamble left no doubt at all that it was the governments, not the peoples of the United Nations, who were the creators of the charter and the subscribers to it.

Smuts's idealistic initiative produced consequences that were detrimental to himself and to South Africa. His initiative introduced "fundamental human rights" into the politics of the United Nations. The San Francisco Conference proved to be the last international meeting which Smuts attended with his reputation still untarnished by the racial attitudes imputed to his country and to himself as its Prime Minister. As President of the Commission on the General Assembly and as a respected elder statesman he was able several times to guide the conference over minor problems such as the regulation of the length of time to be allotted for routine items of business in the General Assembly.[33] Neither he nor any other person, however, would have been able to alter a document that had been so meticulously prepared.

During the last five years of his life, from 1945 until 1950, Smuts worked and spoke publicly for the success of the United Nations. Though he took an active part in setting up this new league of nations at San Francisco he realized the rather limited role both South Africa and Western Europe would play in the post-war world.[34]

The political, social, and economic changes following the war's end could only injure Smuts in the eyes of his political enemies in South Africa. The collapse of Europe, the expansion of Communism, the decline

of Britain and the commonwealth had been foretold by the opposition in South Africa. From the very beginning of the war to its end, the Nationalist Party reiterated its call to South Africa to seek her own safety by making a separate peace and by withdrawal from the commonwealth.[35]

Smuts did not believe that safety lay along that route. He foresaw the attempts that would be made to isolate South Africa. He could not foresee any gain South Africa could get by setting out to isolate herself. According to the reasoning of Smuts, the policy to follow was for South Africa to keep the friends he had, to support them in their efforts to rebuild their strength. On July 29, 1945 he wrote:

> Unfortunately my official position closes my mouth, and I cannot give the warnings I think are called for. And I may even take an exaggerated view of impending dangers. But I was not wrong in 1919-23, and I think the dangers today are, if possible, greater, as Russia is more ruthless and inexperienced in dealing with such situations than Britain and France were twenty-five years ago. All one can do is to put on one's thinking cap, and wait for such opportunities of being helpful as may occur in the future. Here in South Africa I shall be held up as one of the warmongers who helped to precipitate these evils on mankind! And the charge has a certain measure of plausibility which will go down, as it did in 1922-24.[36]

Smuts's public statements during this period indicate his open-minded view of Soviet Russia's aims. He regarded Russia as a continental power which pursued limited objectives that were dangerous; but he believed that the dangers could be contained by a realpolitik compounded of patience and firmness. For that reason he repudiated the anti-communist crusade but welcomed the American return to an active policy in Europe. He thought it necessary for America still to retain sole custody of the atomic bomb. He could see no other shield for western Europe.

He considered the polarization of power between America and Russia, however, a dangerous threat to peace.[37]

In 1945 Smuts seemed to be returning to his vision two years earlier of the commonwealth's role as mediator within the "trinity" of Great Powers but this vision no longer had substance. Smuts observed the unmistakable retreats of Great Britain as an Imperial Power. In the eastern Mediterranean, which had been a special interest of his own in two world wars, he found those retreats hard to bear. For him the Jewish National Home remained, as it had always been, one of his great causes. On November 30, 1947 when the partition plan of the United Nations special committee on Palestine was passed by the general assembly, Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, sent Smuts the following telegram.

> At this milestone in Jewish history I think with feelings of deepest gratitude of your noble friendship and unwavering support throughout the years from 1917 onward for the cause of my people. May God bless you and guard you.[38]

In a public telegram to Weizmann on March 29, 1948, Smuts urged him to accept the partition of Palestine.[39]

Though Smuts lamented the dissolution of the old British empire he clung to his faith that a new Britain would arise with a new role to play in the drama of human history. At this time (1947-1948) Smuts believed that Great Britain and the commonwealth had before them a brilliant prospect of self-fulfillment within the larger setting of history. It was the year of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Smuts welcomed these events both for what they were and for the creative promise which he read into them. In a letter to George Marshall, Smuts reiterated

his desire "that the Truman-Marshall policy of security and recovery in Europe will remain of full force and effect."[40]

At the same time Smuts had written Churchill about policy matters relating to Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and Western Germany's integration with the West. To Churchill he stated:

> I almost hesitate to have to confess it, but I am beginning to think more and more that the wise course for us is boldly and openly to integrate Western Germany with the West, and, instead of continuing to dismantle and cripple her, to put her on her feet again and make her part of our eastern defence wall, as she has been for centuries. . . . With the present weakness of the European situation, I see no way out of the Communist menace short of calling on Germany to play her part.[41]

Smuts welcomed American participation into the affairs of Western Europe. He acclaimed them as the augury of a three-fold achievement: first, the Atlantic Community; secondly, European Union; thirdly, Commonwealth Europe. He thought it inconceivable that Britain and the commonwealth would let slip this opportunity of union with Europe.

Realizing that no government or institution could achieve world stability single-handed, Smuts invoked the principle of cooperation to which he had devoted to much of his life. He was doubtless encouraged to do so by events in 1948, when the Western European governments formed, first, the Organization for European Economic Recovery, then, led by Churchill, set up the consultative Council of Europe, and, finally, created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which included the United States, whose government offered generous Marshall Aid to such European states as should seek closer economic and possibly, political union among themselves. Almost his last advice to the United Kingdom, still holder of the key position in a shaken world, was to pull herself together and cooperate with the commonwealth, the United States, and democratic Europe.

Following his last appearance on the world stage in June 1945 when he attended the San Francisco Conference, Smuts turned his interest and activities toward South African politics. By 1947-1948 Smuts's political alliance with the Nationalists had come apart. By naming the hated liberal Jan H. Hofmeyr Deputy Prime Minister and by recognizing the State of Israel, he risked a general election in May 1948. By this time his political base had been completely undermined by the Nationalists, who were led by Daniel F. Malan. Malan reassured English-speaking electors by temporarily putting aside Nationalist plans for a republic and by promising to deprive Africans of their representation in Parliament and the Cape Provincial Council. In the ensuing election Smuts lost his own seat and the Nationalists gained a majority of five in Parliament. Smuts found a seat at Pretoria East and made up his mind to fight to the last as in the South African War. His political career was, however, virtually finished, and his life's work of conciliation doomed when Malan broke with the 70-year-old tradition of mixed Anglo-Afrikaner ministries by appointing an exclusively Afrikaner Cabinet and embarking tentatively on a policy of <u>apartheid</u>, or racial separation.

As leader of the Opposition Smuts actively campaigned on behalf of his South African Party. He drove himself to still greater exertions, often traveling long distances by air, including several trips to Great Britain. On April 24, 1950 he attended a huge open-air celebration of his eightieth birthday at Johannesburg. He received the Freedom of the City and made his last public appearance at a banquet in Pretoria. Four weeks later, on May 28, he suffered a mild coronary thrombosis. His health steadily worsened with further attacks and on September 11 he collapsed with heart failure and never recovered.

The family declined Prime Minister Malan's offer of a state funeral and instead chose a military funeral. They scattered his ashes on the rocky hillside near his beloved home Doornkloof.

NOTES

[1]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, October 15, 1945, Selections, vol. VII, doc. 684.

[2]Times (London) 28 March 1941, p. 3; 14 May 1941, p. 3.

[3]Speech by Smuts at Royal Institute of International Affairs, Selections, November 12, 1934, vol. V, doc. 370.

[4]Elliott Roosevelt, ed., FDR,His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950),IV:1540-41.

[5]Broadcast Speech of July 21, 1940, Speech to the Empire Parliamentary Association of November 25, 1943, Selections, vol. VI, docs. 508-624.

[6]Florence Lamont-political philosopher, Lecturer on the Soviet Union at Cornell and Harvard,1943-1944, Lecturer in philosophy, Columbia School of General Studies, 1947-1959, Director, American Civil Liberties Union 1932-1954, wife of Thomas W. Lamont.

[7]J. C. Smuts to Florence Corliss Lamont, May 8, 1945, Smith College, Lamont Collection, Northampton, Massachusetts.

[8]The Lamont Collection, Smith College, contains nineteen letters which relate to world affairs written by J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Florence Lamont between June 15, 1935 and May 8, 1945.

[9]J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Florence Lamont, December 18, 1936, Lamont Collection.

[10]J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Florence Lamont, May 1, 1943, Lamont Collection.

[11]"Minutes of the 19th meeting of the United States Delegation, held at San Francisco Thursday April 26, 1945," U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1945, vol. I, The United Nations, (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 453.

[12]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, March 4, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 662.

[13]J. C. Smuts to Mrs. Florence Lamont, May 8, 1945, Lamont Collection.

[14]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 472.

[15]J. C. Smuts to S. M. Smuts, May 3, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 665.

[16]U.S. Congress, Senate, Speeches delivered at the Closing Plenary Session of the San Francisco Conference, 79th Congress, 1st session, July 16, 1945. Congressional Record, vol. 91, pt. 12.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958) p. 215.

[19]J. C. Smuts to E. R. Stettinius, June 7, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 672.

[20]Ibid.

[21]See W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. VI:Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 183-184, for Smuts's view on the veto issue.

[22]"The British P. M. Churchill to President Roosevelt, September 25, 1944," Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1944, 836-838.

[23]Ibid., p. 837.

[24]Ibid., pp. 836-837.

[25]Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: H.M.S.O., 1962), pp. 451-459.

[26]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 477.

[27]For draft text of preamble submitted by the South African delegation, May 3, 1945, see United Nations Conference on International Organization, (San Francisco, 1945), vol. III, doc. 2, p. 476.

[28]Sir Charles Webster, The Art and Practice of Diplomacy (London: Barnes and Noble, 1961) pp. 11-12, 71. Webster, a Professor of International History at London School of Economics, 1932-53 was a member of the British Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, and a member of the preparatory commission and general assembly of the United Nations, 1945-1946.

[29]"Minutes of the United States Delegation Held at San Francisco, May 29, 1945," Foreign Relations of the U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1945, I:958.

[30]Virginia Gildersleeve-American educator, Dean of Barnard College, Columbia University, 1911-1947, and only woman member of the U.S. delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945.

[31]A History of the United Nations Charter, pp. 910-918.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Anthony Eden, The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 13; Smuts to E. R. Stettinius, June 7, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 672.

[34]J. C. Smuts to J. D. Smuts (son), April 25, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 664.

[35]House Assembly Debates (Union of South Africa) 7th session, 8th Parliament, vol. 47, cols. 75-76; 4th session, 8th Parliament, cols. 7236-7240; vol. 43, cols. 33-50, 50-57, 532-536.

[36]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, July 29, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 675.

[37]J. C. Smuts to Margaret C. Gillett, August 10, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 676; and C. R. Attlee to J. C. Smuts, August 31, 1945, Selections, vol. VI, doc. 679.

[38]Chaim Weizmann to J. C. Smuts, November 30, 1947, Selections, vol. VII, doc. 751.

[39]J. C. Smuts to Chaim Weizmann, March 29, 1948, Selections, vol. VII, doc. 784.

[40]J. C. Smuts to George C. Marshall, November 5, 1948, Selections, vol. VII, doc. 823.

[41]J. C. Smuts to W. S. Churchill, September 27, 1948, Selections, vol. VII, doc. 816.

CHAPTER VII

JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS: AN ASSESSMENT

The ease with which Smuts could associate with different people, especially in his later years, was based on real understanding and insight. He achieved a personal harmony, apart from political views and policies, that penetrated to the great leaders of the world, as well as to humbler friends. Among these were Alice Clark, Margaret Gillett, Emily Hobhouse, Gilbert Murray, Louis Botha, Winston Churchill, Jan Hofmeyr, Paul Kruger, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Leopold Amery, Franklin Roosevelt, and many others.

As a South African, he was a natural aristocrat, yet a man of the people; an intellectual giant, yet a son of the soil; an interpreter of Nature, yet a man who understood the simplest of human beings. He stood for South Africa first, but not South Africa alone.

Smuts the statesman was also the philosopher and scientist. In his philosophical work, Holism and Evolution, his conception of the potertialities of man is analyzed and discussed with a wide-ranging tolerance.

> In mind we reach the most significant factor in the universe, the supreme organ which controls all other structures and mechanisms. Mind is not yet the master, but it is the key in the hands of the master, Personality. It unlocks the door and releases the new born spirit from the bonds and shackles and dungeons of natural necessity. It is the supreme system of control, and it holds the secret of freedom. Through the opened door, and the mists which still dim the eyes of the emergent spirit, it points to the great vistas of knowledge. Mind is the eye with which the universe beholds itself and knows itself divine.[1]

From 1914 to 1916 Smuts was regarded as one of the foremost allied leaders in Europe, and his advice to British governments was treated with the greatest respect. Again, during the Second World War Churchill and others called upon Smuts to give advice and companionship on matters of great importance. Yet, at one time or another, throughout his career, feeling sometimes ran high against him in his native South Africa. His unrelenting nationalist critics spoke out at every opportunity and ultimately succeeded in undermining his base of strength. Leaders in Europe, especially David Lloyd George, Leopold S. Amery, and Winston Churchill told him that Europe needed him and his future belonged to the whole world, not just South Africa.

There are clearly three different aspects of Smuts's life-work as a statesman. First, he tried to build bridges between South Africa and Great Britain, a formidable task, in view of the recent experiences of the Afrikaners in the South African War. Second, he tried to bridge the gulf between the English and Afrikaner elements in South Africa; the adoption of the Act of the Union bears testimony to his zeal in his direction. Third, he tried to work out a cooperative basis for the relations between white and non-whites, but he did not get much beyond a theory.

As an ambassador of South African interests in Great Britain, he was by far the best man for the work. He had a natural capacity for persuading people, and exercised it to a higher degree in Europe than he did among his own people in South Africa. Circumstances there gave him his opportunity, and he made skillful use of his chances. Kitchener's early hint to him about the probable advent of a Liberal Government proved

very important, and provided a turning point in British-South African postwar negotiations. He could not identify himself to a large extent with British policy; and he pointed out that all his life he had striven for the principle of liberty, as opposed to the repressive politics of totalitarian-minded men. He seemed to fit naturally into the British context, and was more and more given positions of trust and authority. In the First World War he was offered a position on the British War Cabinet. He seemed to make friends easily and found everywhere congenial colleagues. When overseas, he was away from the smallness, suspicions, frustrations of party politics--to him, a welcome relief. Nobody could have done more for good relations between Great Britain and South Africa.

He had fought for South Africa's status at the peace conference and placed it on an equal footing with that of Britain. He claimed that South Africa had achieved a greater status by becoming a member of the League of Nations. To Smuts there was safety for South Africa in the wholeness of the British Empire and the privileges South Africa had gained by the very fact that the empire remained an elastic and expanding institution, offering advantages in proportion as cooperation and understanding prevailed. An empire on a new footing was coming into being, and Smuts saw advantages in this for South Africa. And so, at a time when many overseas politicians were willing to condone the right of secession, Smuts stood out against it.

Yet, he could have combined his conception of South African nationhood, for which he had fought many battles against the Imperialists, with an open door to the development of secession. His position was so

strong in Europe, after all his services, that he could have persuaded the overseas politicians, and won over the opposition inside South Africa. Independent development, approached with care and wisdom, was a natural feature of the principle of growth within the Empire,and should not have become a means of inflaming racial hatred. The people needed education and encouragement, based on a positive appreciation for South Africa. Smuts should have demonstrated that this appreciation could be combined with the position of South Africa as an equal independent state within the commonwealth.

The Afrikaner was not prepared for "fusion." He had struggled for many years to demonstrate his individuality, and the right to develop his own language. It had been a hard struggle, the cultural depth of which Smuts never understood, in his preoccupation with imperial policies. The Afrikaner, who had grown up with the "superior attitude" of his English fellow citizens in regard to his culture, and had listened to derogatory remarks about Afrikans, was filled with fear that larger imperial contacts would lead to the swamping of the Afrikaner tradition. The Afrikaner, therefore, believed that separate development, for that moment of time, was the only safe road.

Looking at General Smuts' political career as a whole, we may say that he finally rejected British imperialism, but had to express his views tentatively, step by step. What he wanted most was the unity of Southern Afrika, including Rhodesia--a task obviously for the distant future.

There are two aspects of Smuts' personality that appear to be partly in conflict. On the one hand there is the lonely student who, by sheer intellectual ability, won some of the highest distinctions in

England, step by step. He was an Afrikaner with the natural reactions of a son of the veld, but with a flair for hard work and for using the opportunities presented in the interest of South Africa. He never became a full-fledged Englishman; at the end of his life he felt it a release to return to his family at Doornkloof. His sympathy with Great Britain was condemned by many of his own countrymen; but he believed that his services to Britain would help South Africa.

On the other hand, there was the mighty British Empire, with its enormous prestige, extending a hand of welcome--partly in its own interests--to a young Boer who had fought against Great Britain. What a great opportunity that was for the young Boer. President Paul Kruger had had the insight to employ Smuts, and Smuts was loyal to him. He shared the President's attitude to British Imperialism and reacted sharply to the political maneuvers connected with it. He felt deeply for Kruger and threw himself whole-heartedly into the struggle. He initiated and brilliantly conducted the invasion of the Cape towards the end of the war. But, when, after a surprisingly long struggle against the might of Britain, the Boers had to give in, he had the foresight to see that the most profitable way for the Republic, in the interests of greater South Africa, was to cooperate.

Smuts looked ahead to the time when the help given would be a benefit to South Africa by increasing her status. He looked also at the Allies and saw beyond their idealistic talk that each was working for its own advancement. He sympathized with the moral aspirations of his Quaker friends, the Gilletts of Oxford, but also appreciated the hard facts of politics.

In Smuts's philosophy of holism, one message stands out--a message of perfection, building up and leading to still greater perfection, of fragments leading to wholes which are superior to the mere sum total of their constituent parts. It is a doctrine of optimism and elevation.[2] Smuts's philosophy of holism, on its political side, was particularly applicable to Southern Africa. He believed that the lower part of the continent could best be administered by the people who actually lived there. Smuts would have liked to include Rhodesia, and he made two efforts to persuade its leaders. But he had had no ambitions beyond stability; his cause was not on the same footings as "the scramble for Africa."

But a difference arose in regard to the non-whites. Here Smuts held the traditional Afrikaner view. He was kindly in his attitude. Overseas he sat by many distinguished non-whites and had good friends among them. But in the South African context he supported the tradition of separate development, and insisted that in the circumstances it was the only practical policy. For reasons of practical politics he never adopted the views of British liberals on matters like the franchise. But he did not favor laws that were to stand for all time; there was always to be an element of elasticity. He was a practical politician, accustomed to estimate the course to be followed in a particular situation at a particular time, but he always tried to avoid dogmatic pronouncements.

Holism, therefore, was limited for Smuts politically by the circumstances of the situation in South Africa. But in shared ideals there were no such limits. His letters to friends in Oxford show this

clearly, especially the letters to Alice Clark. Her world of spiritual values was very real to him, and genuine. He understood that the philosophy of the whole would remain unrealized, because it was perhaps unrealizable. But it was something to aim at, a light to give direction; fraught with frustration, but deeply embedded, as a hope for the future.

Smuts's reputation remains intact and all the more admirable, in spite of the difficulties in a country like South Africa. Smuts's job, after all, was to do what was possible in a particular society with particular people, and one should try to respect his judgment. He was prepared to modify existing arrangements in the liberal direction, when he saw an opportunity. Dogmatism on ultimate principles, he foresaw, as the political danger; the rigid mind, in this changing world, does not lead to wisdom. But unfortunately the mind that is prepared, with wisdom, to adapt itself to the future, drives the extremists into a panic. The achievement of a balanced outlook is difficult because it invariably exposes people to distrust and criticism; but that outlook was the aim of Jan Christian Smuts, and the extent to which he achieved it is his title to fame.

NOTES

[1]J. C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (New York: MacMillan Company, 1926), p. 238.

[2]Jan Christian Smuts, p. 287.

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